Politicallaw 2015 Edited

Dean’s
Circle 2016
University of Santo Tomas
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
POLITICAL
LAW
Recent Jurisprudence
Political Law Dean’s Circle
2016
Table of Contents
Constitutional Law 1 ........................................................................................................................ 2

Preliminary Considerations .......................................................................................................... 2
Presidency .................................................................................................................................... 3
Legislature .................................................................................................................................... 6
Judiciary ........................................................................................................................................ 7
Constitutional Commissions .......................................................................................................11
Commission on Audit .............................................................................................................11
Local Government ......................................................................................................................12
National Economy and Patrimony ..............................................................................................14
Accountability of Public Officers ................................................................................................18
Constitutional Law 2 ......................................................................................................................19
Equal Protection Clause..............................................................................................................19
Due Process Clause .....................................................................................................................20
Freedom of Expression, Right to Assembly and Academic Freedom .........................................21
Eminent Domain .........................................................................................................................26
Contract Clause...........................................................................................................................29
Criminal Due Process ..................................................................................................................31
Public Corporation .........................................................................................................................32
Validity of Ordinances ................................................................................................................32
Katarungang Pambaraggay.........................................................................................................33
Administrative Law, Public Officers and Election Law .................................................................34
Administrative Law .....................................................................................................................34
Public Officers .............................................................................................................................40
Election Law ................................................................................................................................53
Public International Law ................................................................................................................55
Forum Non Conveniens ..............................................................................................................55
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Preliminary Considerations
Purina Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President, and National Food Authority
G.R. No. 180323 September 16, 2015, Sereno, C.J.
When the law is clear and unambiguous there shall be no room for construction or
interpretation.
Facts:
Purina Philippines, Inc. (Purina) is a domestic corporation with 100% foreign equity to
engage in the manufacture of animal feeds in the country. One of the components used by petitioner
in the manufacture of animal feeds is corn, which is bought from local suppliers or imported from
other countries. In 1995, the National Food Authority (NFA) required Purina to acquire a warehouse
license to store corn. Purina filed the application but was denied by NFA because it is 100% foreign
owned. According to NFA, Purina cannot secure a license because it is 100% foreign owned and
according to PD 914, only 40% foreign equity is allowed to firms engaged in the corn industry. Purina
contended that it is not a firm engaged in the corn industry.
Issue:
Whether or not Purina is a firm engaged in corn industry.
Ruling:
Yes, Purina is a firm engaged in corn industry. According to PD 194, the term corn industry
shall include: Acquiring by barter, purchase or otherwise, rice and corn and/or the by-products
thereof, to the extent of their raw material requirements when these are used as raw materials in the
manufacture or processing of their finished products. This Court has steadfastly adhered to the
doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express
terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application. When the law is clear and unambiguous there shall be no room for construction or
interpretation.
YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION vs. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 207942 January 12, 2015 J. Bersamin
A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of
the police power.
Facts:
Trans-Asia explored an area in Barrio Larap, Camarines Norte which was owned and mined
by Philippine Iron Mines which cease operation in 1975 from 1986 onwards. It was granted the
exclusive right to the area on July 28, 2007. On August 31, 2007, Yinlu informed the DENR that it had
acquired mining patents of the area by way of deed of absolute sales stating that some of the covered
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areas by its mining patents were within the area of Trans-Asia. Trans-Asia informed Yinlu that it
would commence exploration in Yinlu’s area and requsted Yinlu to allow its personnel to enter the
area. Yinlu replied by stating that it can do works in another area but not in the area covered by the
mining patents. Trans-Asia’s registration of the area was put on hold when Yinlu requested to
register the deed of absolute sale in its favor. The DENR secretary verified the validity of Ylinlu’s
patents on the ground that the mining patents were issued PIMI in 1930 and that these patents were
validly transferred to Yinlu when PIMI sold them to the latter. The DENR Secretary ordered the
amendment of Trans-Asia’s rights over the mineral lands covered by Yinlu’s patents. The Office of the
President affirmed the decision of the DENR Secretary however the CA reversed the decision because
of the reason that Yinlu did not register the patents under PD 463.
Issue:
Whether or not the Yinlu had right over the contested properties.
Ruling:
YES. Yinlu has rights to the contested properties.
The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties. The
Government, whether through the DENR or the MGB, could not alienate or dispose of the lands or
mineral through the MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the
exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or
assign such exclusive right. We uphold the rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP to exclude the
disputed areas that had been established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered owner to be
taken out of the coverage of Trans-Asia’s MPSA.
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require registration and annual work
obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly provides that the provisions of PD No.
463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested rights under other mining laws, viz:
Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired Substantive Rights. Changes made and
new provisionsand rules laid down by this Decree which may prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with order mining laws previously in force shall have no
retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions of this Decree which are procedural in nature
shall prevail.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporation to purchase public lands
not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners’ prohibition action is barred by the
doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
Presidency
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ
G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015, J. Carpio
The concurrence of all the elements of a valid appointment should always apply, regardless of
when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps
in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid
appointment if the process lacks even one step.
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Facts:
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then Pres. GMA issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several government offices. Pursuant to the ban on midnight
appointments in Sec. 15, Art. VII of 1987 Constitution, for purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10,
2010 was the cut-off date for valid appointments and the next day was the start of the ban. Sec. 15
recognizes as an exception to the ban only “temporary appointments to the executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service of endanger public safety.” None of the petitioners
claim that their appointments fall under this exception. On July 30, 2010, then Pres. Aquino issued EO
2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by Pres.GMA which violated the
constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
Issue:
Whether or not EO2 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. None of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers have been issued and
released before the ban. The dates of receipt by the Malacanang Records Office (MRO) are dates
clearly falling during the appointment ban. The President exercises only one kind of appointing
power. There is no need to differentiate the exercise of the President’s appointing power outside, just
before, or during the appointment ban. The following elements should always concur in the making
of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the
appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should
always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during
the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a
single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step.
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence
that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment
paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left
his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is
an unequivocal act that signifies the President’s intent of its issuance. Petitioners have failed to show
compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their
appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand,
petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. Petitioners have
failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional.
Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.
ANA THERESIA "RISA" HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, et. al. v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD(TRB), et.
al.
G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015, SERENO, CJ
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The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the
Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative
functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter.
Facts:
PNCC entered into an agreement with CITRA for the Metro Manila Skyways(MMS) project.
PNCC and CITRA submitted a Joint Investment Proposal (JIP) which embodied the implementation
schedule of the MMS in 3 stages: South, North and Central. TRB approved. Citra Metro Manila
Tollways Corporation(CMMTC) was created and organized under Philippine laws to serve as a
channel. TRB, CMMTC and PNCC executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement(STOA). TRB,
CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement(ASTOA). Under it, Skyway 0 & M Corporation(SOMCO) replaced. PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC
entered into the assailed Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) where PSC received an amount which
was used for the settlement of its liabilities. PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department
Workers Organization(PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike. The Secretary of DOLE assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute. PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union(PSCEU)
filed a complaint for TRO. RTC denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the
Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and
administrative functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries,
whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. There can be
no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In
this case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the
President. The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President,
specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the
TRB.
The creation of the TRB and the grant of franchise to PNCC were made in the light of the
recognition on the part of the government that the private sector had to be involved as an alternative
source of financing for the pursuance of national infrastructure projects. As the franchise holder for
the construction, maintenance and operation of infrastructure toll facilities, PNCC was equipped with
the right and privilege, but not necessarily the means, to undertake the project. This is where joint
ventures with private investors become necessary. In joint ventures with investor companies, PNCC
contributes the franchise it possesses, while the partner contributes the financing - both necessary
for the construction, maintenance, and operation of the toll facilities. PNCC did not thereby lease,
transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell, or assign its franchise or other rights or privileges. This remains
true even though the partnership acquires a distinct and separate personality from that of the joint
venturers or leads to the formation of a new company that is the product of such joint venture, such
as PSC and SOMCO in this case.
Hence, when we say that the approval by the DOTC Secretary in this case was approval by
the President, it was not in connection with the franchise of PNCC, as required under Section 8 of P.D.
1113 and Section 13 of P.D. 1894. Rather, the approval was in connection with the powers of the TRB
to enter into contracts on behalf of the government as provided under Section 3(a) of P.D. 1112.
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Legislature
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA (AKMA-PTM) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

RESPONDENT, ABANTE KATUTUBO (ABANTE KA), FROILAN M. BACUNGAN AND
HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO
G.R. No. 207134, June 16, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Facts:
AKMA-PTM was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the
national and local elections in 2013. On May 24, 2013, COMELEC En Banc proclaimed 14 party-list
groups, which obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system and were thus
entitled to 1 guaranteed seat each. AKMA-PTM contends that COMELEC’s allocation of additional
seats for those two-percenters greatly prejudiced its interests.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for
the party-list candidates.
Ruling:
No. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. AKMA-PTM mistakenly
assumed that the statement in BANAT case disallowing fractional seats insofar as the additional seats
for the two-percenters in the second round should also apply to those party-list groups with less than
2% votes. But as demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share in representation may never be filled up if
the 2% threshold is maintained. In the same vein, the maximum representation will not be achieved
if those party-list groups obtaining less than one percentage are disqualified from even one
additional seat in the second round.
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA (AKMA-PTM) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

RESPONDENT, ABANTE KATUTUBO (ABANTE KA), FROILAN M. BACUNGAN AND
HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO
G.R. No. 207134, June 16, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
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available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Facts:
AKMA-PTM was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the
national and local elections in 2013. On May 24, 2013, COMELEC En Banc proclaimed 14 party-list
groups, which obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system and were thus
entitled to 1 guaranteed seat each. AKMA-PTM contends that COMELEC’s allocation of additional
seats for those two-percenters greatly prejudiced its interests.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for
the party-list candidates.
Ruling:
No. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. AKMA-PTM mistakenly
assumed that the statement in BANAT case disallowing fractional seats insofar as the additional seats
for the two-percenters in the second round should also apply to those party-list groups with less than
2% votes. But as demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share in representation may never be filled up if
the 2% threshold is maintained. In the same vein, the maximum representation will not be achieved
if those party-list groups obtaining less than one percentage are disqualified from even one
additional seat in the second round.
Judiciary
COL. ORLANDO E. DE LEON, PN v. LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR. AND SPECIAL
GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2
G.R. No. 176394, 21 October 2015, Third Division, (Jardeleza, J.)
A moot and academic case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value".
Facts:
Petitioners seek the issuance of a TRO against the respondents and all persons acting for or
under their authority to cease and desist from conducting court martial proceedings and to cease and
desist from otherwise prosecuting, investigating or proceeding in any manner against the petitioners
relative to their alleged violations of the Articles of War. Pending the resolution of this case, Special
General Court Martial No. 2 rendered various resolutions finding all the petitioners not guilty of the
charges against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court should still decide on the petitions filed by the
petitioners.
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Ruling:
No. The petition is dismissed on the ground of mootness. Thus, this case has been rendered
moot and academic by these various resolutions.
A moot and academic case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value" and
discussed that "generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.
Any resolution of the petitions to annul the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and
Letter Order No. 758, to restrain the Special General Court Martial and to order the release of the
petitioners from confinement would be of no practical value since as early as 2009, Special General
Court Martial No. 2 already absolved the petitioners of the charges under the Articles of War, Special
General Court Martial No. 2 has long been dissolved and the petitioners were already released from
confinement.
HILARIO P. SORIANO v. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 168157, August 19, 2015, Bersamin, J.
The discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in the determination of probable cause to charge
a respondent public official or employee cannot be interfered with in the absence of a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Romeo Santos executed a deed of assignment to Petitioner conveying to the latter a parcel of
land where the First Coconut Rural Bank (First Coconut) conducted its business through lease.
Eventually, First Coconut received a copy of the writ of possession directing it to vacate the leased
premises. It was that time only when First Coconut learned that the subject property had been a
subject litigation between Santos and one Teresa Robles. The RTC later on disposed the case between
Santos and Robles ruling in favor of the latter. Subsequently, Respondent Atty. Cleofe, then acting
Registrar of Deeds, canceled the TCT and issued a new one in the name of Robles without the
payment of proper taxes and fees. The petitioner questioned such irregularity but he was not
satisfied with the explanation; Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. The public respondents, in dismissing the charge against Atty. Cleofe, did not gravely
abuse their discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman found the evidence against him to be
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to charge him. Undoubtedly, he was a public officer
discharging official functions, an essential element of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. However, the other elements of the crime, specifically: that the accused must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and that his
acts complained of caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions were
not shown to be present.
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According to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Atty. Cleofe was not actuated
with malice or bad faith in issuing the new TCT in the name of Robles, and did not gain any pecuniary
benefit from his issuance of the new TCT pursuant to the order of the RTC, a court of competent
jurisdiction, but was rather guided by the ruling in LRA Consulta Case No. 2402 to the effect that the
requirement for the payment of transfer tax, capital gains tax, and documentary stamp tax, and for
the submission of a real estate tax clearance did not apply to a transfer pursuant to a court order. The
fact that Atty. Cleofe obeyed the ruling in LRA Consulta Case No. 2402 was indicative of his good faith.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF

BACOLOD ·CITY, ATTY. MA VIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of

different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the legislature.
Facts:
Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They
were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. Respondent Atty. Majarucon, in
her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3)
days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’). Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that (1)
petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin;
and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
Issue:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not
within the ambit of this court’s power of review.
Ruling:
No. What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is
that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it
has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act.
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no
political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to
this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. A political question arises in
constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different agencies and departments of
the executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the
petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of their
respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In such situation,
presumptively, this court should act with deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise
of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
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In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO) v. NATIONAL

HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA) and GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ WATER DISTRICT (GMAWD)
G.R. No. 175417, February 9, 2015, Peralta, J.
Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisprudence that administrative decisions are entitled to
great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts.
Facts:
The Director of the Bureau of Public Works (BPW) turned over to the National Housing
Authority (NHA) a completed water works system in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite. The NHA must,
thereafter, turn over the same water works system to a cooperative water company. Accordingly, in a
Memorandum of Agreement, the NHA turned over the water works system to San Gabriel Water
Services Cooperative (SAGAWESECO), now GEMASCO. Later on, the NHA entered into a Deed of
Transfer and Acceptance with GMAWD and transferred to the latter the operations and management
of the water system in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite from GEMASCO. GEMASCO filed a Complaint
for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against the NHA, GMAWD, and the Local
Water Utility Administration before the Quezon City RTC, assailing the Deed of Transfer and
Acceptance executed between the NHA and GMAWD.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Transfer and Acceptance entered into by the NHA and the
GMAWD is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the
government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under its special and technical
training and knowledge, for the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter
that is best discharged by the concerned government agency and not by the courts. More so where, as
in the present case, the prime consideration is the interest of the public at large on the issue of basic
water need. Certainly, the Deed of Transfer and Acceptance entered into by the NHA and GMAWD
was the result of a valid exercise of the NHA’s management prerogative.
Constitutional Commissions
Commission on Audit
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TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. THE

COMMISSION ON AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR; COMMISSIONER JUANITO G.
ESPINO, JR.; and COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN BUENA VENTURA
G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015, Bersamin, J.
The Constitution has made the COA "the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers
over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations."
Facts:
In view of the inadequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work experienced
by government personnel, then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order
(AO) authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all officials and
employees of the DOLE. However, upon post-audit of COA State Auditor Valenzuela and a letter
endorsed to the COA Director, such AO abovementioned was said to be with no legal basis thus
disallowed. The TESDA filed an appeal before the COA Commission Proper assailing the disallowance
of the AO but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the
implementation administrative order of TESDA.
Ruling:
No. The petition has no merit. In the context of the foregoing, we uphold the disallowance by
the COA of the payment of the P5,000.00 as healthcare maintenance allowance. The COA did not act
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it properly exercised its powers and discretion in disallowing the payment of
the P5,000.00 as healthcare maintenance allowance.
The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the
power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been
intended by law. Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its
constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly
those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the
decisions of administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the
basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also upon the recognition that such administrative
authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Only when the COA acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, may this Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions.
Local Government
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FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COLON HERITAGE REALTY

CORPORATION, OPERATOR OF ORIENTE GROUP THEATERS, REPRESENTED BY ISIDORO A.
CANIZARES
G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015, J. Velasco, Jr.
The constitutional command is that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU
and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.
Facts:
The City of Cebu, in its exercise of its power to impose amusement taxes under Sec. 140 of
the LGC anchored on the constitutional policy on local autonomy, passed a city ordinance which
required proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas and other places of amusement, to
pay an amusement tax equivalent to 30% of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of the
City Treasurer of Cebu City. Almost a decade later, Congress passed R.A. No. 9167 creating the Film
Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP), which requires that all revenue from the amusement
tax on the graded film which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities shall be deducted
and withheld by the proprietors and remitted to FDCP which shall reward the corresponding
amusement tax to the producers of the graded film. This, according to FDCP, evinces the overriding
intent of Congress to remove from the LGU’s delegated taxing power all revenues from amusement
taxes on grade “A” or “B” films which would otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines
pursuant to Secs. 140 and 151 of the LGC.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9167 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Fiscal autonomy was defined as the power of LGUs to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.
It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof. Under the 1987 Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by
statute, the tax power of municipal corporations must be deemed to exist although Congress may
provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule on local fiscal
autonomy is the strengthening of LGUs and the safeguarding of their viability and self-sufficiency
through a direct grant of general and broad tax powers. It is apparent that what Congress did in this
instance was not to exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the
covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from
the taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. This is in clear
contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said
LGU and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.
It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress, broad as they may be, are
limited and confined within the four walls of the Constitution. Accordingly, whenever the legislature
exercises its power to enact, amend, and repeal laws, it should do so without going beyond the
parameters wrought by the organic law.
In the case at bar, through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the income
from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not and will under no circumstance accrue
to them, not even partially, despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly
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overstepped its plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative of the fundamental law’s
guarantee on local autonomy.
JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY
TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 210551, 30 June 2015, J. Peralta
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though
is open to judicial inquiry.
Facts:
Respondent City Council enacted an Ordinance known as the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City (SHT). Thereafter, another ordinance was enacted seeking to collect Garbage Fee.
Petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional and illegal the said ordinances. Petitioner asserts that
the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of garbage are basic and
essential duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage
fee, the latter has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that could
be covered by its revenues from taxes already imposed.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinances are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. An ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also
conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not
unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable. An ordinance must pass muster
under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. If not, it is
void.
On the SHT: Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses
the view that the use of property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute
to the common good. The SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its
power to impose. Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are
allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass
dwellings.
On the Garbage Fee: The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is
a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the
garbage fee is not a tax.
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National Economy and Patrimony
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., AND MCARTHUR MINING, INC. v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
If doubt exists as to the beneficial ownership and control, a resort to the Grandfather rule is
necessary in determining the nationality of a corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Facts:
The petitioners assail the decision of the Court which sustained the CA ruling, which found
petitioners as foreign corporations that are not entitled to Mineral Production Sharing Agreements.
The conclusion by the court was reached by the fact that MBMI Resources Inc, a 100% Canadian-
owned firm, effectively owns 60% of the common stocks of the petitioners by owning equity interest
of petitioners’ other majority corporate shareholders. In reaching the conclusion, the court applied
the Grandfather Rule as a supplement to the Control Test. To petitioners, the Court’s application of
the Grandfather Rule to determine their nationality is erroneous and allegedly without basis.
Issue:
Whether or not the Grandfather Rule cannot be applied in determining the nationality of the
corporation.
Ruling:
No. The use of the Grandfather Rule as a “supplement” to the Control Test is not proscribed
by the Constitution or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The Grandfather Rule was originally
conceived to look into the citizenship of the individuals who ultimately own and control the shares of
stock of a corporation for purposes of determining compliance with the constitutional requirement
of Filipino ownership. From the excerpts in the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it was
shown that the framers of the Constitution have not foreclosed the Grandfather Rule as a tool in
verifying the nationality of corporations for purposes of ascertaining their right to participate in
nationalized or partly nationalized activities. However, it is only when the Control Test is first
complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the subject
corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately
considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears. As a
corollary rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio is apparently met by the subject or
investee corporation, a resort to the Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the locus of
the “beneficial ownership” and “control.” On the case at hand, the fact that MBMI had practically
provided all the funds in Tesoro, McArthur and Narra creates serious doubt as to the true extent of its
control and ownership over the said corporations.
West Tower Condominium Corporation, on behalf of the residents of West Tower

Condominium and in representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and
generations yet unborn v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
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While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members.
Facts:
FPIC operates two pipelines namely White Oil Pipeline System (WOPL) and Black Oil
Pipeline System (BOPL) which are both located at Batangas and stretches to Pandacan Terminal and
Sucat respectively. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro
Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna and Rizal. Subsequently, a leakage from one of
the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started
to smell gas within the condominium. A search was subsequently made within the condominium
premises which led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. As a consequence
thereof, the condo’s power was shut down which compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon
their respective Units.
West Tower Corp. interposed the present Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on
behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner West Tower Corporation has the legal capacity to represent the
other petitioners.
Ruling:
Yes, it does. As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. In other words, the
action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be
enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the
condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at
the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power was shut
down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their
condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-
interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its
unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a
condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the
condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that
may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the
filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly
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put by the CA, not measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the
existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.
ANA THERESIA "RISA" HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, et. al. v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD (TRB), et.
al.
G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015, SERENO, CJ
Franchises or licenses issued by the government are issued subject to terms, conditions, and
limitations under existing laws and agreements.
Facts:
PNCC entered into an agreement with CITRA for the Metro Manila Skyways(MMS) project.
PNCC and CITRA submitted a Joint Investment Proposal(JIP) which embodied the implementation
schedule of the MMS in 3 stages: South, North and Central. TRB approved. Citra Metro Manila
Tollways Corporation(CMMTC) was created and organized under Philippine laws to serve as a
channel. TRB, CMMTC and PNCC executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement(STOA). TRB,
CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement(ASTOA). Under it, Skyway 0 & M Corporation(SOMCO) replaced. PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC
entered into the assailed Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) where PSC received an amount which
was used for the settlement of its liabilities. PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department
Workers Organization(PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike. The Secretary of DOLE assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute. PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union(PSCEU)
filed a complaint for TRO. RTC denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the TOC issued to SOMCO was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The TOC, as a grant of authority from the government, is subject to the latter's control
insofar as the grant affects or concerns the public. Like all other franchises or licenses issued by the
government, the TOC is issued subject to terms, conditions, and limitations under existing laws and
agreements. This rule especially holds true in this instance since the TRB has the power to issue "the
necessary 'Toll Operation Certificate' subject to such conditions as shall be imposed by the Board
including inter alia" those specified under Section 3(e) of P.D. 1112. Thus, impliedly written into
every TOC are the conditions prescribed therein. This authorization is issued upon the clear
understanding that the operation and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South MMS as a toll facility and
the collection of toll fees shall be closely supervised and regulated by the Grantor, in accordance with
the terms and conditions set forth in the STOA, as amended, the rules and regulations duly
promulgated by the Grantor for toll road operations and maintenance, as well as the lawful orders,
instructions and conditions which the Grantor, through the TRB, may impose from time to time in
view of the public nature of the facility.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED
WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented
herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity
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as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations
vs.SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE),
SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII
and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board,
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR.,
BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 180771 / G.R. No. 181527, April 21, 2015, Leonen J.
Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and
extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress. Moreover, in order to explore for
resources in a protected area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental
impact assessment.
Facts:
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No.
46 awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to
conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon
Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second
petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along
with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities.
The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008,
JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil
exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether
the case was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that
mootness is “not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.”
Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to
mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to
reach the merits of the case even though the particular service contract had been terminated.
Issues:
1) Whether or not marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue
the case.
2) Whether or not the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic
laws.
Ruling:
(1) No. As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural
and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence
“moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.”
Instead, the Court explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws.”
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(2) The Court held that while the service contract was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87
on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be
signed by the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely
by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in
protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be
performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that
JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed. Therefore its activity was unlawful.
Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources
can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not
specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration
should be permitted in that area.
Accountability of Public Officers
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MS. FLORED L. NICOLAS, former Court Interpreter
and Officer-in-Charge; MS. ERLINDA U. CABRERA, former Clerk of Court II; and MR. EDWIN
SANTOS, Clerk of Court II, all of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, GUIGUINTO, BULACAN
A.M. No. P-10-2840 June 23, 2015(Formerly A.M. No. 10-7-87-MTC) PER CURIAM
The failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect of duty,
dishonesty, and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Facts:
Clerk of Court II Erlinda U. Cabrera, the collecting officer of MTC Guiguinto, Bulacan, incurred
shortages. She was relieved from her duty and Court Interpreter Flored L. Nicolas was appointed as
OIC and was designated to handle the financial transactions of the court. Nicolas acted as such until
the appointment of Clerk of Court II Edwin C. Santos. Due to the absence without leave (AWOL) of
Nicolas and the grant of study leave to Santos, a second financial audit was conducted on the books of
accounts of the Guiguinto MTC covering the period August 1, 2004 to February 28, 2010. It was found
that both Nicolas and Santos incurred shortages. OCA recommended, among others, that Nicolas be
found guilty of gross neglect of duty for non-remittance of her judiciary collections.
Issue:
Whether Nicolas should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that Nicolas was a mere OIC did not diminish the expectation from her to
perform all the duties and responsibilities of a Clerk of Court. As the OIC, she bore the same
responsibilities and was expected to serve with the same commitment and efficiency as a duly-
appointed Clerk of Court. Likewise, she must be held liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or
impairment of the funds entrusted to her by virtue of her office.
Failure of a public officer, Nicolas in this case, to remit funds upon demand by an authorized
officer constitutes prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property
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to personal use. Without Nicolas’ explanation as to the non-remittance of court collections while she
was the accountable officer, the prima facie presumption stands.
In Audit Report, RTC-4, Davao del Norte, the Court held that the failure of the Clerk of Court
to remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct are
classified as grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Hence,
OCA’s recommendation was affirmed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Equal Protection Clause
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan, Compostela

Valley Province, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, Reyes, J.
The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Facts:
Petitioner Ferdinand Villanueva was appointed as the Presiding Judge of a first-level court
on September 18, 2012. Then, he applied for the vacant position of a presiding judge in the RTC on
September 27, 2013. JBC informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates. He moved
for reconsideration but JBC upheld his non-inclusion in the list because of its long-standing policy of
opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to incumbent judges who have served in
their position for at least five years. Petitioner has served as a judge for only more than a year.
Petitioner asserts that JBC’s five-year requirement violates the equal protection and procedural due
process for lack of publication.
Issue:
Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications
required by the Constitution and law. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised
its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the
Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. The number of years
of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by
experience, among other factors. JBC deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of
conversance with the law and court procedure. The classification created by the challenged policy
satisfies the rational basis test. The Court rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the
equal protection clause.
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The assailed JBC policy should have been published. The express declaration of the
guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper
of general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are
rules implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus, the JBC should have amended its
rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do. Nonetheless, the JBC’s failure to publish the
assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner’s private interest because he has no legal right to be
included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist
is strictly within the discretion of the JBC. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional
Due Process Clause
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD

INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, G.R. Nos. 212140-41
January 21, 2015, CARPIO,J.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to
furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the
time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent.
Facts:
The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada the complaints, which prayed, among others, that
criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen.
Estrada filed his counter-affidavits. Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints likewise
filed their counter-affidavits as a result, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filing . Sen.
Estrada’s request was made “pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
Ombudsman issued that there is no provision under the Office’s Rules of Procedure which
entitles respondent to be furnished all the filings by the other parties, e.g. the respondents. Under the
Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are
only required to furnish their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence to the complainant, and
not to the other respondents. To reiterate, the rights of respondent Sen. Estrada in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation depend on the rights granted to him by law and these cannot be based on
whatever rights he believes that he is entitled to or those that may be derived from the phrase “due
process of law.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman’s denial violated Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due
process.
Ruling:
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No. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process. There is no
law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require
is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, “[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been
secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and
other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x.” At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any
respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are
not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be
attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen.
Estrada’s Request.
Freedom of Expression, Right to Assembly and Academic Freedom
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. and PULSE ASIA, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 208962, April 7, 2015, J. Leonen
Regulation of speech, in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principal
advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections, is unconstitutional.
Facts:
Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather Stations,
Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (PAI), as well as other survey firms of similar circumstance, to submit
to COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published sometime in 2013,
including those of their “subscribers.” As recounted, SWS conducted a pre-election survey on voters’
preferences for senatorial candidates and published its findings. The Secretary-General of United
Nationalist Alliance wrote the law department of COMELEC, asking the latter to compel SWS to either
comply with the said resolution or be liable for its violation, an act constituting an election offense.
SWS supposedly replied to the letter, furnishing him with some particulars about the survey
without disclosing the identity of the persons who subscribed to the survey. Acting on the said letter,
COMELEC en banc issued an order for the hearing of the matter. It decided against the firms’ favor,
citing R.A. No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Elections Act. The firms allege that following the
issuance of Resolution No. 9674 and the filing of the present petition before the Court, they have not
been furnished any copies thereof. COMELEC Law Department issued a notice to the firms directing it
yet again to furnish the list of all of its subscribers and later on, issued a subpoena towards the latter
for its failure to comply with the directive. Thus, a criminal complaint for the violation of the
Omnibus Election Code was filed against them. SWS and PAI filed this present petition assailing the
resolution as having been issued ultra vires.
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the requirement
to submit names of their subscribers.
Ruling:
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No. The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of
his or her expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make
judgments of the value of such viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal
approach. However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must
provide limits to some expression during electoral campaigns. The required judicial temperament in
appraising speech in the context of electoral campaigns which is principally designed to endorse a
candidate, both by candidates and / or political parties, on the one hand, and private citizens, on the
other, has thus been articulated: Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties may
be regulated as to time, place, and manner.
This is the effect of our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates
or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally
advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such
regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions
coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate
in the criteria for the choice of a candidate. This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of
speech by a private citizen which will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly regulated
by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into

speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they
are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its
principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech
be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the
speech is made with or on private property.
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, Reyes, J.
A content-neutral regulation is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free

speech, provided that the requisites for its validity are complied with.
Facts:
RA 9006, otherwise known as the “Fair Elections Act” was passed on February 12, 2001.
Then, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A.
9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections.
Section 7 thereof enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda. The petitioner maintains
that Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the right
to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals; that the prohibition curtails their ideas
of who should be voted by the public. On the other hand, the COMELEC posits that privately-owned
PUVs and transport terminals are public spaces that are subject to its regulation and that Resolution
No. 9615 is a valid content-neutral regulation and, thus, does not impinge on the constitutional right
to freedom of speech.
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Issue:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615, which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material, inter alia, in
PUVs and public transport terminals are valid regulations.
Ruling:
No. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior
restraints on speech because it unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in
their property, and convince others to agree with them. Under Resolution No. 9615, posting an
election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it
the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner liable for an
election offense. The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of
the owners of PUVs and transport terminals because they are forcefully and effectively inhibited
from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the
revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech,
or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is
constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the
Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental
restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they
merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition
is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-
neutral regulation. It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615 furthers an important and substantial
governmental interest and that the governmental interest in imposing the said prohibition is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, the stated provisions of Resolution No.
9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article
IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
In sum, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the
constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring
equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF

BACOLOD ·CITY, ATTY. MA VIL V. MAJARUCONG.R. No. 205728
January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
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Tarpaulins and its messages are not religious speech. There are two aspects of this provision.
The first is the non-establishment clause. Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship.
Facts:
Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They
were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. Respondent Atty. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod
City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Navarra. The election
officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).
Petitioners contended that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated their fundamental right to freedom of expression and their free exercise of religion. On the
other hand, respondents contended that the tarpaulin is election propaganda subject to their
regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the questioned notice and letter violated the right of petitioners to their free
exercise of religion.
Ruling:
No. Tarpaulin and its message is not religious speech. There are two aspects of this
provision. The first is the non-establishment clause. Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship. The second aspect is at issue in this case. Clearly, not all acts done
by those who are priests, bishops, ustads, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from
any secular regulation. The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is
regulated by law. The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a
bishop amounts to religious expression.
Definitely, the characterizations of the religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court.
Certainly, the Court’s powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious
in nature. As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any
religious doctrine of the Catholic church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide
with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression
within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
GIL G. CAWAD et al. v. FLORENCIO B. ABAD et al.

G.R. No. 207145. July 28, 2015. En Banc. Peralta, J.
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The assailed circular cannot be invalidated for its issuance is consistent with, and germane to,
the purposes of the law.
Facts
With the enactment of RA No. 7305 or the The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers,
additional compensation were granted to health workers which includes hazard allowance,
subsistence allowance, longevity pay, laundry allowance and remote assignment allowance.
Subsequently, the Fourteenth Congress issued Joint Resolution No. 4. Pursuant to this resolution, the
President is authorized to modify the compensation of civilian personnel in the government and
specifically provided for certain amendments in the Magna Carta and its IRR.
With this resolution, the DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed issuances, DBM-CSC
Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, which prescribed rules on the grant of Step Increments due to
meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of service. It likewise limits those who
can be granted with Step Increment. Later, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 was issued
which according to the petitioner diminished the benefits conferred by the Magna Carta and its IRR.
On this ground, the petitioners file this petition for certiorari and prohibition against the respondent
alleging that the departments involved acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforecited
circulars. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the Circulars in question prescribe certain
requirements on the grant of benefits that are not otherwise required by RA No. 7305. Petitioners
further assert that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular grants the payment of Hazard Pay only if the nature of
the PHWs’ duties expose them to danger when RA No. 7305 does not make any qualification. They
likewise claim that said circular unduly fixes Subsistence Allowance at P50 for each day of full-time
service and P25 for part-time service which are not in accordance with prevailing circumstances
determined by the Secretary of Health as required by RA No. 7305. Moreover, petitioners fault
respondents for the premature effectivity of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular which they believe should
have been on January 29, 2012 and not on January 1, 2012.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the issuance of the joint circulars regulating the salaries and benefits
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
2. Whether or not the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for its failure to comply with
the publication requirement.
Ruling:
1.No. With respect to the infirmities of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular raised in the petition,
they cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion for not only are they
reasonable, they were likewise issued well within the scope of authority granted to the respondents.
In fact, as may be gathered from prior issuances on the matter, the circular did not make any
substantial deviation therefrom, but actually remained consistent with, and germane to, the purposes
of the law. First, the qualification imposed by the DBM-DOH Joint Circular granting the payment of
Hazard Pay only if the nature of PHWs’ duties exposes them to danger and depending on whether the
risk involved is high or low was merely derived from Section 7.1.1 of the Revised IRR of RA No. 7305.
Second, fixing the Subsistence Allowance at P50 for each day of full-time service and P25 for part-
time service was also merely a reiteration of the limits prescribed by the Revised IRR, validly issued
by the Secretary of Health pursuant to Section 35 of RA No. 7305. Third, the condition imposed by the
DBM-DOH Joint Circular granting longevity pay only to those PHWs holding regular plantilla
positions merely implements the qualification imposed by the Revised IRR.
With these, petitioners failed to show any real inconsistency in granting longevity pay to PHWs
holding regular plantilla positions. Not only are they based on the same premise, but the intent of
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longevity pay, which is paid to workers for every five (5) years of continuous, efficient and
meritorious services, necessarily coincides with that of regularization. Thus, the assailed circular
cannot be invalidated for its issuance is consistent with, and germane to, the purposes of the law.
2.No. Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law
in order for administrative rules and regulations to be effective. There are, however, several
exceptions, one of which is interpretative regulations which “need nothing further than their bare
issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed.” These regulations need not be published for they add nothing to the law and do not
affect substantial rights of any person
The DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself had already prescribed. There is really no new obligation or duty imposed by the subject
circular for it merely reiterated those embodied in RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR. The Joint
Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant the Revised IRR, the validity of which is undisputed.
Consequently, whether it was duly published and filed with the UP Law Center – ONAR is necessarily
immaterial to its validity because in view of the pronouncements above, interpretative regulations,
such as the DBM-DOH circular herein, need not be published nor filed with the UP Law Center –
ONAR in order to be effective. Neither is prior hearing or consultation mandatory.
Eminent Domain
SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO v LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015, Del Castillo J.
In eminent domain, the determination of just compensation is principally a judicial function of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Facts:
Spouses Nilo and Erlinda Mercado (Sps. Mercado) herein petitioners, were the owners of a
large parcel of land located in Davao City. Thereafter, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO)
of Davao City informed Sps. Mercado that their land shall be placed under CARP coverage and was
therefore offered P287,227.16 for 5.2624 hectares of their aforesaid property, a valuation made by
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) herein respondent. The Sps. Mercado refused the offer.
They aver that the fair market value of their property is pegged at P250,000.00 per hectare. In view
of the foregoing, summary administrative proceedings were conducted to determine just
compensation before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) which sustained the
valuation of Land Bank. This prompted Sps. Mercado to file a complaint for payment of just
compensation before the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
The RTC acting SAC found for Sps. Mercado. On appeal with the CA, the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC. It held that the RTC failed to follow the procedure and guideline set by
law in arriving at just compensation. Now, Sps. Mercado comes before the Supreme Court assailing
the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was proper determination of just compensation by the RTC acting as
SAC.
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Ruling:
None. The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Given all these, the Court
finds that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the property’s value at the time of its
taking. Thus, it is premature to make a final determination of the just compensation due to the
petitioners. And as the Court cannot receive new evidence from the parties for the prompt resolution
of this case, its remand to the RTC is deemed proper. Suffice it to state that "[w]hile remand is
frowned upon for obviating the speedy dispensation of justice, it becomes necessary to ensure
compliance with the law and to give everyone – the landowner, the farmers, and the State – their
due."
As a final note, we remind the RTC to observe the following guidelines for the proper
determination of just compensation: (1) just compensation must be valued at the time of taking of
the property expropriated, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property; (2) interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case; and,
(3) just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA
6657 and outlined in a formula provided in DAR A.O. No. 5. If the RTC finds these guidelines
inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom and for using other factors or
formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the property expropriated.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JESUS ALSUA, represented by BIBIANO C.

SABINO
G.R. No. 211351, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land,
(b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the income
therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by
government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
Facts:
In 1994, Heirs of Jesus Alsua and their representative Bibiano C. Sabino voluntarily offered
to sell their unregistered agricultural land to the government under R.A. 6657. However, they
rejected the valuation of the LBP being offered by the DAR using the formula stated in DAR AO No. 5
series of 1998. Thus, the LBP was prompted to deposit the said amount in cash and in Agrarian
Reform Bonds in respondents’ name. After summary administrative proceedings for the
determination of just compensation, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) fixed the
value of the subject lands at P5,479,744.15. The LBP moved for reconsideration but was denied.
The LBP then filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the RTC of
Legazpi City. The RTC rejected the valuation of both the LBP and the PARAD and fixed the just
compensation for the subject lands at P4,245,820.53 using DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, the CA fixed the just compensation
of the subject lands at 2,465,423.02 affirming the applicability of the provisions of DAR AO No. 5,
series of 1998. However, it declared that just compensation should be pegged at the price or value of
the property at the time it was taken from the owner and not its value at the time of rendition of
judgment or the filing of the complaint if the government takes possession of the land before the
institution of expropriation proceedings.
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Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in fixing the just compensation for the subject lands.
Ruling:
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the "time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property," such as when title is transferred in
the name of the beneficiaries, as in this case. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of
RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the
nature and actual use of the property and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e)
the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property,
and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land, if any, must be equally considered.
However, the Court has pored over the records and observed that the only factors
considered by both courts in determining the just compensation were (a) the nature and actual use
of the property, and income therefrom, as well as (b) the market value of the subject lands, without a
showing that the other factors under the said section were even taken into account or, otherwise,
found to be inapplicable, contrary to what the law requires.
Similarly, the Court has gone over the LBP’s findings and computation, as contained in the
Claims and Valuation and Processing Form, and is likewise unable to adopt the same since it was
partly based on the field investigation report which admittedly did not consider (a) the economic and
social benefits of the subject lands, and (b) the current value of like properties within the vicinity. To
reiterate, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657 must be considered in computing just
compensation. Accordingly, the Court finds a need to remand the case to the RTC for the
determination of just compensation in accordance with these factors.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT

ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS vs. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON
G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015, Peralta J.
The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
Facts:
In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took spouses Tecson’s
property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. The spouses demanded for the payment of the fair market value of the property but they
were not satisfied with the offer of the district engineer and demanded the return of their property
through filing of a complaint for recovery of possession with damages or the payment of
compensation at the current fair market value. The RTC favoured the spouses Tecson which decision
was affirmed by the CA. it ordered the payment of P1,500.00 per square meter with 6% interest per
annum from the time of the filing of the complaint. The decision was reverse by this court stating that
the value of the property should be based on the value on the time of taking of such. Hence, this
petition before this court.
Issue:
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Whether or not the basis of the fair market value should be based on the value of the
property at the time of taking and not the value of the time of filing the action.
Ruling:
Yes. The true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value
at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary
course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who
receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not
the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample. Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property
owner for appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the
landowner, with due consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.
More, the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
The just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance on the
part of the State-a proper subject of interest computed from the time the property was taken until
the full amount of just compensation is paid-in order to eradicate the issue of the constant variability
of the value of the currency over time. Hence, the court should award an interest of 12% per annum
from the time of taking up to June 30, 2013 and a 6% interest per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
satisfaction of payment of just compensation as per BSP Circular 799.
Contract Clause
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. and PULSE ASIA, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 208962, April 7, 2015, J. Leonen
As a valid exercise of Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) regulatory powers, Resolution No.

9674 is correctly deemed written into petitioners’ existing contracts.
Facts:
Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather Stations,
Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (PAI), as well as other survey firms of similar circumstance, to submit
to COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published sometime in 2013,
including those of their “subscribers.” As recounted, SWS conducted a pre-election survey on voters’
preferences for senatorial candidates and published its findings. The Secretary-General of United
Nationalist Alliance wrote the law department of COMELEC, asking the latter to compel SWS to either
comply with the said resolution or be liable for its violation, an act constituting an election offense.
SWS supposedly replied to the letter, furnishing him with some particulars about the survey
without disclosing the identity of the persons who subscribed to the survey. Acting on the said letter,
COMELEC en banc issued an order for the hearing of the matter. It decided against the firms’ favor,
citing R.A. No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Elections Act. The firms allege that following the
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issuance of Resolution No. 9674 and the filing of the present petition before the Court, they have not
been furnished any copies thereof. COMELEC Law Department issued a notice to the firms directing it
yet again to furnish the list of all of its subscribers and later on, issued a subpoena towards the latter
for its failure to comply with the directive. Thus, a criminal complaint for the violation of the
Omnibus Election Code was filed against them. SWS and PAI filed this present petition assailing the
resolution as having been issued ultra vires.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 9674 violates the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of contracts insofar as it compels petitioners to submit the names of their subscribers to
their election surveys.
Ruling:
No. It is settled that “the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited by the

exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general
welfare.” “It is a basic rule in contracts that the law is deemed written into the contract between the
parties.” The incorporation of regulations into contracts is “a postulate of the police power of the
State.” The relation of the state’s police power with the principle of non-impairment of contracts was
thoroughly explained in Ortigas and Co. v. Feati Bank: “While non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as "the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only
if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court held in Philippine Long
Distance Company v. City of Davao, et al., police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various
social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past
conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more
emphatic in Vda. de Genuino v. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We do not
see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to
prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.”
This case does not involve a “capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable” regulation. We
have demonstrated that not only an important or substantial state interest, but even a compelling
one anchors Resolution No. 9674’s requirement of disclosing subscribers to election surveys. It
effects the constitutional policy of “guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service” and
is impelled by the imperative of “fair” elections.
Criminal Due Process
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL CUNANAN y DAVID alias “PAENG PUTOL”

G.R. No. 198024, 16 March 2015, J. Del Castillo
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Jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be
timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing [in] which,
he is deemed to have waived” his right to question the regularity of his arrest.
Facts:
A confidential informant informed PSI Abalos that a certain “Paeng Putol” was engaged in
selling illegal drugs in Purok 4, Barangay Pineda, Pasig City. Acting on the information, a buy-bust
operation was formed to entrap appellant. PO1 Gunda, the designated poseur-buyer, together with
the confidential informant met Paeng beside a store and asked the latter if he could sell him P200.00
worth of shabu. After receiving the marked money, appellant entered a narrow alley and came back
with a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Gunda.
Thereupon, PO1 Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to inform the buy-bust team of the
consummated transaction and arrested appellant. Appellant denied the charge and interposed the
defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion. According to him, he was just watching a bingo game
when three men arrived and held him by both hands. They introduced themselves as policemen and
told him that they have a warrant for his arrest. They then handcuffed and frisked him and took
away his wallet and cellphone.
Issue:
Whether or not there the accused can still question the validity of his arrest.
Held:
No. The appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal
drug in a buy-bust operation. Contrary to his contention, it was not inconceivable that he would
openly sell an illegal drug in public. Jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the
arrest of an accused should be timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before
arraignment, failing [in] which, he is deemed to have waived” his right to question the regularity of
his arrest. As the records show, except during the inquest proceedings before the prosecutor’s office,
appellant never objected to the regularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, he even
actively participated in the trial of the case. With these lapses, he is estopped from raising any
question regarding the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL CUNANAN y DAVID alias “PAENG PUTOL”

G.R. No. 198024, 16 March 2015, J. Del Castillo
Jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be
timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing [in] which,
he is deemed to have waived” his right to question the regularity of his arrest.
Facts:
A confidential informant informed PSI Abalos that a certain “Paeng Putol” was engaged in
selling illegal drugs in Purok 4, Barangay Pineda, Pasig City. Acting on the information, a buy-bust
operation was formed to entrap appellant. PO1 Gunda, the designated poseur-buyer, together with
the confidential informant met Paeng beside a store and asked the latter if he could sell him P200.00
worth of shabu. After receiving the marked money, appellant entered a narrow alley and came back
with a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Gunda.
Thereupon, PO1 Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to inform the buy-bust team of the
consummated transaction and arrested appellant. Appellant denied the charge and interposed the
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defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion. According to him, he was just watching a bingo game
when three men arrived and held him by both hands. They introduced themselves as policemen and
told him that they have a warrant for his arrest. They then handcuffed and frisked him and took
away his wallet and cellphone.
Issue:
Whether or not there was in flagrante delicto arrest.
Ruling:
YES, appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal
drug in a buy-bust operation. Contrary to his contention, it was not inconceivable that he would
openly sell an illegal drug in public. Jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the
arrest of an accused should be timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before
arraignment, failing [in] which, he is deemed to have waived” his right to question the regularity of
his arrest. As the records show, except during the inquest proceedings before the prosecutor’s office,
appellant never objected to the regularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, he even
actively participated in the trial of the case. With these lapses, he is estopped from raising any
question regarding the same.
PUBLIC CORPORATION
Validity of Ordinances
JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY
TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 210551, 30 June 2015, J. Peralta
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though
is open to judicial inquiry.
Facts:
Respondent City Council enacted an Ordinance known as the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City (SHT). Thereafter, another ordinance was enacted seeking to collect Garbage Fee.
Petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional and illegal the said ordinances. Petitioner asserts that
the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of garbage are basic and
essential duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage
fee, the latter has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that could
be covered by its revenues from taxes already imposed.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinances are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. An ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid. For an ordinance to be valid though, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according to
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the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not
contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or
discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) not unreasonable. An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality
and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. If not, it is void.
On the SHT: Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses
the view that the use of property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute
to the common good. The SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its
power to impose. Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are
allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass
dwellings.
Katarungang Pambaranggay
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,

ANGELITA LAGMAY
G.R. No. 164594, April 22, 2015, Brion J.
Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done on
mere motion of the party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay. The proceedings in this case are
summary in nature.
Facts:
Angelita Lagmay, acting as a representative of her daughter of Annabel Lagmay, filed a

complaint against Michael Lagmay seeking to collect sum of money that Annabel sent to Michael
claiming that the two were sweethearts and agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a
truck. However when they separated, Michael did not return the money. Subsequently, the partiies
entered into an amicable settlement which was not repudiated by Michael but such was not honored
by him. Hence, a certificate to file action was issued by the barangay.
The MCTC ruled in favour of Annabel which decision was upheld by RTC. Upon Motion for
reconsideration, the RTC granted the same on the jurisdictional ground and dismissed Angelita’s
Motion for Execution. The CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the amicable settlement can be given force and effect despite the failure to
conform to the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the Local Government Code, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is
not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by: first,
execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or second, by an action
in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months from the date of
settlement has already elapsed.
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Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done
on mere motion of the party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay. The proceedings in this
case are summary in nature and are governed by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The second mode of enforcement, on the other
hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resorted to through the institution of an action in a
regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court. The proceedings shall be governed by the
provisions of the Rules of Court. Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under the
second mode and filed a motion for execution, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45-99.
It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was captioned "motion for
execution," rather than a petition/complaint for execution. A perusal of the motion for execution,
however, shows that it contains the material requirements of an initiatory action. First, the motion is
sufficient in form and substance. It is complete with allegations of the ultimate facts constituting the
cause of action; the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it contains the prayer for
the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there was also a verification and certification
against forum shopping. Furthermore, attached to the motion are: 1) the authenticated special power
of attorney of Annabel, authorizing Angelita to file the present action on her behalf; and 2) the copy
of the kasunduan whose contents were quoted in the body of the motion for execution. It is well-
settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations in the
body and not the caption.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW
Administrative Law
West Tower Condominium Corporation, on behalf of the residents of West Tower

Condominium and in representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and
generations yet unborn v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
When the adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of
an administrative body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative body
equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical expertise.
Facts:
FPIC operates two pipelines namely White Oil Pipeline System (WOPL) and Black Oil
Pipeline System (BOPL) which are both located at Batangas and stretches to Pandacan Terminal and
Sucat respectively. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro
Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna and Rizal. Subsequently, a leakage from one of
the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started
to smell gas within the condominium. A search was subsequently made within the condominium
premises which led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. As a consequence
thereof, the condo’s power was shut down which compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon
their respective Units.
West Tower Corp. interposed the present Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on
behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents be prohibited
from opening the pipeline and using the same until it has been thoroughly checked and replaced.
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On November 19, 2010 the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a TEPO requiring
respondents to file their respective returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to cease and desist
from operating the WOPL until further orders. To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the
Court remanded the case to the CA which recommended that FPIC be directed to submit the appropri
ate certification from the DOE as to the safe commercial operation of WOPL before FPIC can
be allowed to resume operations of the said piepline.
Meanwhile, on August 5, 2014 Secretary Petilla of the DOE submitted a letter recommending
activities and timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need to issue a Permanent Environmental Protection Order to

direct the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve and
rehabilitate the affected environment.
Ruling:
No, there is no need. After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions
of the parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August
5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations
of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in
the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate
reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the
WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for
continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life,
among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.
The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC’s proper implementation and compliance
with its PIMS and to evaluate the result of the various tests conducted on the pipeline. The DOE is
empowered by Sec. 12(b)(1), RA 7638 to formulate and implement policies for the efficient and
economical “distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal, natural gas.” Thus, it cannot
be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical knowledge and special expertise with respect to
practices in the transportation of oil through pipelines.
Moreover, it is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and proficiency
available within its offices, it has also rallied around the assistance of pertinent bureaus of the other
administrative agencies: the ITDI of the DOST, which is mandated to undertake technical services
including standards, analytical and calibration services; the MIRDC, also of the DOST, which is the
sole government entity directly supporting the metals and engineering industry; the EMB of the
DENR, the agency mandated to implement, among others, RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous
and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275 (Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the
BOD of the DPWH, which is mandated to conduct, supervise, and review the technical design aspects
of projects of government agencies.
The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore, be
availed of to arrive at a judicious decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate resumption of
the WOPL’s operation.
MACARIO CATIPON, JR.vs. JEROME JAPSON

G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
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The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her.
FACTS:
Macario Catipon Jr., though lacking 1.5 units in Military Science, was allowed to join the
graduation ceremonies of the Baguio Colleges Foundation with a restriction that he must cure the
deficiency before he can be considered a graduate. In 1985, he joined the Social Security System. In
1993, he took the Civil Service Professional Examination (CSPE) on the belief that the Civil Service
Commission still allowed CSPE applicants to substitute length of government service for any
academic deficiency they may have, unaware that in January, 1993, the CSC had discontinued the
policy. He obtained a rating of 80.52%. He only completed his 1.5 units deficiency in Military Science
in 1995.
Jerome Japson filed a letter-complaint with the CSC-CAR Regional Director, alleging that
Macario made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application by stating therein that he graduated in
1993, when he actually graduated only in 1995. As a non-graduate in 1993, Macario was not
qualified to take the CSPE examination. Thus, Macario was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of
Official documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by
the CSC-CAR.
The CSC-CAR Regional Director exonerated him on all charges except as to the charge for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
CSC-CAR sustained its judgment. He filed a Petition for Review with the CA but the CA denied the
petition and affirmed the decision of the CSC- CAR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Macario violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RULING:
YES. In filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director,
petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Indeed, the
administrative agency concerned – in this case the Commission Proper – is in the "best position to
correct any previous error committed in its forum." The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. When petitioner’s
recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.
THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO v. THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT AND/OR REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONER, RESPECTIVELY
G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2015, J. LEONEN
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The three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer are: (1) private
counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be; and (3)
the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.
Facts:
Clark Development Corporation is a GOCC facing labor cases. Consequently, they rendered
the services of the law firm of Laguesma. This retainer agreement however was without the
authorization from the COA and OGCC. Hence, when Clark Development requested for COA to pay the
latter denied it.
Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing the payment of the legal fees
to Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo as Clark Development Corporation’s private counsel?
Ruling:
No. The Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs, their subsidiaries, other corporate
off-springs, and government acquired asset corporations. Nonetheless, the GOCC may hire the
services of a private counsel in exceptional cases with the written conformity and acquiescence of the
Government Corporate Counsel, and with the concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA).
According to these rules and regulations, the general rule is that government-owned and
controlled corporations must refer all their legal matters to the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel. It is only in “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” or “exceptional cases” that it is
allowed to engage the services of private counsels. The labor cases petitioner handled were not of a
complicated or peculiar nature that could justify the hiring of a known expert in the field. On the
contrary, these appear to be standard labor cases of illegal dismissal and collective bargaining
agreement negotiations, which Clark Development Corporation’s lawyers or the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel could have handled.
Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986 and Office of the President
Memorandum Circular No. 9 also require that “before the hiring or employment” of private counsel,
the “written conformity and acquiescence of the [Government Corporate Counsel] and the written
concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be secured. . . .” In this case, Clark Development
Corporation had failed to secure the final approval of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
and the written concurrence of respondent before it engaged the services of petitioner.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. AVELINO DE ZOSA and BARTOLOME DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 205433, January 21, 2015, First Division, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling.
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Facts:
Having granted the authority to sell particular municipal properties and to perform such
other acts necessary and related to such sales, the Municipal Appraisal Board issued a resolution
decreasing the fair market value of the lands from P700.00 per square meter (sq. m.) to P500.00 per
sq. m. At the auction sale, the property was awarded to FJI Property Developers, Inc which acquired
the property for approximately P505.51 per sq. m.
Subsequently, Commission on Audit found out that proper fair market value for Lot No. 4431
should have been P878.26 per sq. m. The sale, according to COA, caused undue injury to the
Municipality. This prompted the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to
file a complaint against Avelino De Zosa and Bartolome Dela Cruz, then incumbent Municipal
Assessor and Municipal Engineer, respectively, of the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, for Grave
Misconduct. For their part, the respondent contends that they only intend to maintain a standard and
uniform valuation and appraisal of properties and MAB-Resolution No. 3-97 reflected the valuation
previously approved by the Cavite Provincial Assessment Board in its Resolution No. 10-96.
The OMB-Luzon found respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct however this was reversed and set
aside by CA on appeal. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly absolved respondents from administrative liability for
Grave Misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively liable for Grave
Misconduct. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In this case, records are bereft of any showing that respondents wrongfully intended to
transgress some established and definite rule of action which is attended by corruption, clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of the rules when they, along with the other members of the
MAB of the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, approved MAB-Resolution No. 3-97 causing the re-appraisal
and revaluation of the subject lands. On the contrary and as correctly pointed out by the CA, the
passage of MAB Resolution No. 3-97 was merely done so that lands within the municipality which
have the same attributes – those which are around "30 meters away from the national road, and
classified as agricultural being fishpond or marsh land with similar desirability, neighborhood and
important need for the acquisition of a real property" – will be assessed uniformly, pursuant to
Resolution No. 10-96 of the Cavite Provincial Assessment Board. As there are ample bases for the
passage of MAB-Resolution No. 3-97, the Court finds that the evidence on record supports the
conclusion that respondents did not commit Grave Misconduct, much less Simple Misconduct.
Perforce, the CA correctly exonerated them from administrative liability.
GLENDA RODRIGUEZ-ANGAT v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 204738, July 29, 2015, Villarama, J.
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The standard of substantial evidence is met when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming
or even preponderant, and respondent’s participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.
Facts:
Angat was a Social Insurance Specialist at the Loans Department of GSIS. She was assigned a
personal IP address with a Terminal ID to access GSIS databases. In an audit conducted, there were
salary loans with outstanding balances but tagged as fully paid in the central office. It was found out
that the Terminal ID used in the tagging of one of the salary loans as fully paid belonged to Angat.
GSIS required Angat to explain her participation in the erroneous tagging but she denied any
participation to such. GSIS was not persuaded by her explanation and filed an administrative case
against Angat for Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
GSIS held that Angat was liable for Grave Misconduct notwithstanding the formal charge, as the
erroneous tagging was a clear manifestation of mal-intent. On appeal, the CSC reversed the findings
of the GSIS and held that Angat may not be held liable for Grave Misconduct for she was formally
charged with Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, which
are only less grave and light offenses, and that she cannot be held guilt of a higher or graver offense,
otherwise she would be deprived of her right to be informed of the nature of the offense. However,
the CA reversed the CSC ruling and reinstated the findings of the GSIS.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented warrant the conviction of Angat.
Ruling:
YES. Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule where a
finding of guilt would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that
the respondent committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is such amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
standard of substantial evidence is met when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent
is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even
preponderant, and respondent’s participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.
In this case, it was indubitably proven that, first, the full payment tagging was erroneous as
proven by a verified and authenticated audit report; second, the erroneous full payment tagging was
done using Angat’s computer terminal ID, based on a certification issued by the Information
Technology Services Group; third, the erroneous full payment tagging on Angat’s terminal ID was
committed using a User ID which belongs to another person, and this sharing of computer user and
terminal IDs is expressly prohibited under an office regulation. Thus, when another user ID was used
to access Angat’s own terminal, an act expressly prohibited, Angat committed a Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations as alleged in the Formal Charge.
Public Officers
HILARIO P. SORIANO v. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 168157, August 19, 2015, Bersamin, J.
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The discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in the determination of probable cause to charge
a respondent public official or employee cannot be interfered with in the absence of a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Romeo Santos executed a deed of assignment to Petitioner conveying to the latter a parcel of
land where the First Coconut Rural Bank (First Coconut) conducted its business through lease.
Eventually, First Coconut received a copy of the writ of possession directing it to vacate the leased
premises. It was that time only when First Coconut learned that the subject property had been a
subject litigation between Santos and one Teresa Robles. The RTC later on disposed the case between
Santos and Robles ruling in favor of the latter. Subsequently, Respondent Atty. Cleofe, then acting
Registrar of deeds, canceled the TCT and issued a new one in the name of Robles without the
payment of proper taxes and fees. The petitioner questioned such irregularity but he was not
satisfied with the explanation; hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. First of all, the public respondents, in dismissing the charge against Atty. Cleofe, did not
gravely abuse their discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman found the evidence against him to be
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to charge him. Undoubtedly, he was a public officer
discharging official functions, an essential element of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. However, the other elements of the crime, specifically: that the accused must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and that his
acts complained of caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions were
not shown to be present.
According to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Atty. Cleofe was not actuated
with malice or bad faith in issuing the new TCT in the name of Robles, and did not gain any pecuniary
benefit from his issuance of the new TCT pursuant to the order of the RTC, a court of competent
jurisdiction, but was rather guided by the ruling in LRA Consulta Case No. 2402 to the effect that the
requirement for the payment of transfer tax, capital gains tax, and documentary stamp tax, and for
the submission of a real estate tax clearance did not apply to a transfer pursuant to a court order. The
fact that Atty. Cleofe obeyed the ruling in LRA Consulta Case No. 2402 was indicative of his good faith.
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT GAIL M. BACBAC-DEL ISEN v. ROMAR Q. MOLINA

A.M. No. P-15-3322 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3569-P], June 23, 2015 Per Curiam
The sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to
being a court employee.
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Facts:
Branch Clerk of Court Gail M. Bacbac-del Isen received information from Marie Rose Victoria
C. Delson that Romar Q. Molina had asked money from her to facilitate the temporary release of
Consuelo Romero, accused in a criminal case. Ms. Delson quoted Molina saying to her. "Para mas
madali ilakad magbigay ka ng three thousand pesos (3,000)." Ms. Delson admitted giving the amount
of 3,000 to Molina and later demanding the return of the money when the accused was eventually
released on bond sans any effort of the latter. Executive Judge Cabato ruled that Molina’s acts were in
violation of Sections 1 and 2 of Canon I and Section 2(b) of Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. OCA adopted the findings and recommendations of Executive Judge Cabato, but with
modification as to the penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of grave misconduct for soliciting and receiving money
from a client on the promise of the latter a favor.
Ruling:
Yes. Being a court employee, respondent was expected to conduct himself in accordance
with the strict standards of integrity and morality. The special nature of duties and responsibilities of
court personnel has been recognized through the adoption of a separate code of conduct especially
for them. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires judicial employees to avoid conflicts of
interest in performing official duties. it specifically mandates that they should not receive tips or
other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings in the judiciary.
As a public servant, respondent is likewise liable under Rule X, Section 46(A)(11) of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which prohibits "soliciting or accepting,
directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value
which in the course of an employee’s official duties may affect the functions of his office."
The sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to
being a court employee. It does not matter, therefore, that herein respondent did not actually grant
the favor he promised, and that he paid back the money he had received from Ms. Delson. He should
be held accountable for soliciting and receiving money from litigants for personal gain – an act that
constitutes grave misconduct. Hence, Mr. Romar Q. Molina was found guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Prudencio C. Quimbo, Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 173277 February 25, 2015, Mendoza, J.
RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints
but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and employees
in every case.
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Facts:
On July 9, 1996 Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo), provincial Engineer of Samar, asked
Gilda D. Daradal (Daradal) to massage his forehead and nape. In the course thereof, Quimbo said “You
had been lying to me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I have to see yours?” She was
appalled as the utterance was made in the presence of her co-employees. Because of her refusal to
submit to such sexual advances, she was removed from the payroll. As a result, she filed an
administrative complaint of sexual harassment and Oppression against Quimbo in the office of the
Ombudsman Visayas branch. In his defense, Quimbo asserted that the claim against him is fictitious.
He further added that Daradal was enjoying a VIP treatment in their office and when required to
work, rebelled against him. The Ombudsman Visayas held Quimbo guilty of Oppression but
dismissed the case of Sexual Harassment. As a result, Quimbo was suspended from office. The CA
then reversed the Ombudsman’s decision saying that the Ombudsman does not have the power to
directly impose sanctions against public officials under its jurisdiction. It cited Section 13,
subparagraph (3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states the Ombudsman can only
“recommend” the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman can impose penalties against erring public
officials and employees.
Ruling:
Yes, the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose penalties against erring public
officials and employees. Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution
merely indicates a “recommendatory” function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative
power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman is
legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties against errant public servants. Further,
the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.
MARY-ANN* S. TORDILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NAGA CITY,
CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH 27 v. LORNA H. AMILANO, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF NAGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH 61
A.M. No. P-14-3241, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
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A public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. "Just debts" are
those: (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor.
Facts:
Mary Ann Tordilla and Lorna Amilano are court stenographers. The former was excluded
from attending the seminar held in April 2005. Despite her exclusion, the cash advance intended for
her was still received by Amilano. In 2007, she received a demand letter from the Office of the
Auditor of Naga City asking her to pay her unliquidated cash advance. When confronted, Amilano
admitted that she received the cash advance on her behalf and expressed her willingness to
reimburse the travel expenses. Another demand letter was received by Tordilla in 2009 from the
Office of the City Accountant. As such, she reminded Amilano of her obligation but the latter, again,
merely promised to pay her. Consequently, the former was prompted to file the present complaint
before the Office of the Court Administrator for dishonesty and willful failure to pay just debts. The
OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Lorna Amilano should be held administratively liable but not for simple misconduct but
for willful failure to pay just debts as charged.
Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987,"
provides that a public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Section
22, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by Section 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Rules), defines "just debts" as those: (a)
claims adjudicated by a court of law; or(b) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by
the debtor. Under the same Rules, willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense, with
the corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense. Clearly, under the Rules, the term "just
debts" may refer not only to claims adjudicated by a court of law but also to claims the existence and
justness of which are admitted by the debtor, as respondent in this case. As such, the OCA’s
classification of respondent’s infraction as simple misconduct – instead, of willful refusal to pay just
debts – was therefore erroneous.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. CONSTANTINO P. REDOÑA, FORMER CLERK OF

COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, TANAUAN, LEYTE
A.M. No. P-14-3194, January 27, 2015, Per Curiam
Those charged with the dispensation of justice – from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk –
are circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct at all times must not only be
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characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee
should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.
Facts:
Constatino Redoña, clerk of court of MTC, applied for separation benefits. When a financial
audit on the Books of Accounts of the MTC was conducted by the Audit Team of the Court
Management Office, the Team found the accountabilities of Redoña and irregularities in his records.
It was found out that there were unreported and unremitted collections and to cover up for the
missing collections, Redoña cancelled several official receipts and issued a certification of “no
collection” of fiduciary fund. And for several instances, he also incurred delay for 4 years in the
remittances of his collections on fiduciary fund. A regular administrative matter against Redoña was
thus filed, for gross misconduct, gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and delay in the deposit of court
collections.
Issue:
Whether or not Redoña is guilty of gross misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty.
Ruling:
YES. The Court has stressed that those charged with the dispensation of justice – from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk – are circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct at all times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else,
must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.
In this case, Redoña’s guilt is undisputed. For his failure to remit the collections on time, he
committed a gross violation of SC Circular No. 13-92 which commands that all fiduciary collections
"shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an
authorized depositary bank." Equally appalling is the tampering of the court records, such as the
unwarranted cancellation of official receipts which were committed with conscious and deliberate
efforts to conceal the missing collections thus evincing a malicious and immoral propensity. Thus, by
failing to properly remit the cash collections constituting public funds, Redoña violated the trust
reposed in him as disbursement officer of the judiciary. His failure to explain satisfactorily the fund
shortage, and fully comply with the Court's directives leave us no choice but to hold her liable for
gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty.
BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL v. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI’A CIRCUIT

COURT, MARAWI CITY
A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J, 01 July 2015, J. Mendoza
Under the Local Government Code, the power of administrative supervision over civil registrars
was devolved to the municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units.
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Facts:
After a heated argument, Mamiscal decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq).
The repudiation was embodied in an agreement signed by Mamiscal and his wife Adelaidah.
Mamiscal thereafter had a change of heart and decided to make peace with his wife. Almost 5
months later, however, Adelaidah filed the Certificate of Divorce with the office of Abdullah for
registration. Although unsigned, the certificate, purportedly executed by Mamiscal, certified that he
had pronounced talaq in the presence of two (2) witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law for
the purpose of effecting divorce from Adelaidah. Abdullah eventually issued the Certificate of
Registration of Divorce thus finalizing the divorce. Mamiscal sought the revocation of the CRD,
questioning the validity of the kapasadan on which the CRD was based. In his motion, Mamiscal
contended that the kapasadan was invalid considering that he did not prepare the same. Moreover,
there were no witnesses to its execution. He claimed that he only signed the kapasadan because of
Adelaidah’s threats. Mamiscal also questioned the validity of the COD, denying that he had executed
and filed the same before the office of Abdullah.
Issue:
Whether this Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction against Abdullah for
his acts.
Ruling:
NO. The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital events and
other documents affecting the civil status of persons. Under the Muslim Code, the Clerk of Court of
the Shari’a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege of wearing two hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari’a
Court and second, as Circuit Registrar within his territorial jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to impose proper disciplinary action against
civil registrars. While Abdullah is undoubtedly a member of Judiciary as Clerk of Court, a review of
the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering the divorce
and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces. Under the Local
Government Code, the power of administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the
municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units.
MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015, J. LEONEN
The two general requisites before a benefit may be granted to government officials or
employees are: 1.) first is that the allowances and benefits were authorized by law and 2.), that there
was a direct and substantial relationship between the performance of public functions and the grant of
the disputed allowances.
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Facts:
Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), which took effect on July 1, 1989, standardized the salaries
of government employees. On September 30, 1989, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued National Compensation Circulars Nos. 56 and 59, enumerating additional allowances
that are deemed integrated into the basic salary. Due to these developments, Marina discontinued the
grant of several allowances to its employees. In a memorandum dated February 10, 2000, Marina
recommended to President Estrada the restoration of allowances of its employees. The President
approved and signed the memorandum on October 16, 2000. Relying on this approval, Marina
restored the grant of allowances and incentives to its employees beginning January 2001.
The COA held that allowances are already integrated as part of the salaries of government
employees under RA 6758. The COA did not give probative value to the memorandum to President
Estrada dated February 10, 2000 for Marina’s failure to present its original copy. The COA noted that
the Malacanang Records Office did not have a copy of this memorandum. Furthermore, the COA ruled
that the President’s approval of the memorandum was insufficient, since a law was required for the
grant of additional allowances and incentives.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the allowance or incentives granted to the officers and employees of Maritime
Industry Authority have legal basis?
2. Whether or not the approving officers and the recipients should solidarily refund the
disallowance?
Ruling:
1. None. The Supreme Court upheld the disallowance on the ground that the subject
allowances were neither non-integrated allowances nor additional compensation allowed by the
DBM. Furthermore, the President’s alleged approval of the memorandum would not suffice since it
was not a law. It was further ruled that the receipt of additional allowances and incentives
contravene Section 12 of RA 6758 and the constitutional prohibition against double compensation.
2. Yes. The Court held that the approving officers and Erlinda Baltazar are solidarily liable
to refund the disallowed amounts received by Erlinda Baltazar. It was observed that only Erlinda
Baltazar received hundreds of thousands of pesos in allowances while other recipients only received
a few thousand pesos. The exorbitant amount that she received should have alerted her and the
approving officers to the dubious legality of the allowances. These officers should be knowledgeable
of the amounts allowed for allowances and benefits. The court exempted the directors, officers, and
other employees of Marina from liability. It does not appear from the records of the case that these
employees were informed prior to the illegal disbursements that the allowances and benefits were in
violation of existing rules and regulations.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS AND EMILY ROSE KO LIM CHAO vs. MARY ANN T.
CASTRO
G.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015, Brion J.
The court point out that to constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate
to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer..
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Facts:
Sometime in 2001, Mariven Castro purchased on credit a vehicle. He executed a promissory

note and issued 6 post-dated checks to the seller. However the checks were dishonoured for
insufficiency of funds. Mariven then inquired with the seller if it is still possible to return the vehicle
in exchanged for the issued checks. When the vehicle was brought by Mariven’s wife and sister,
herein respondent, the manager found that the vehicle was defective and refused to accept the
vehicle. Marvin’s wife requested the security guard to register in their logbook the fact of entry of the
motor vehicle. Thereafter, the respondent came back on board a PNP-SWAT and got a copy of the
logbook and asked the manager to sign and return the checks. She even threatened to file a case
against Emily and his staff if they will not testify in her favor. Thus, the manager filed an
administrative complaint for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees against the respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. The CA modified Ombudsman’s decision by founding the respondent of simple
misconduct only. The respondent argued that she was denied of due process since the act of calling
for police assistance was not one of the specific acts cited in Emily’s complaint as constituting abuse
of authority.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the respondent is denied of due process.

(2) Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misconduct and hence administratively liable.
Ruling:
(1) No. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given
an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Due process is simply the opportunity given to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
As earlier stated, the respondent refuted Emily’s allegations in her counter-affidavit. The respondent
cannot now feign ignorance of the fact that her act of calling for police assistance vis-à-vis riding on
board the SWAT vehicle, was not among those included in the charge against her. The charge against
the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in
a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him;
what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.
(2) No. Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest and established by substantial evidence.
Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct. The respondent’s
acts of involving an elite police team like the SWAT in a matter purely personal to her and riding on
their vehicle in going to and from the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled for. By calling out the
SWAT to the premises of KD Surplus and by riding on their vehicle, she clearly wanted to project an
image of power and influence meant to intimidate, bully, and/or browbeat Emily.
The respondent in the present case summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to
aid her brother and sister-in-law. There was no link between the respondent’s acts and her official
functions as a city prosecutor. The respondent’s actions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, an administrative offense which need not be related to the respondent’s
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official functions. In Pia v. Gervacio, we explained that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. BEATRIZ E. LIZONDRA, COURT

INTERPRETER II AND OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, TABUK CITY, KALINGA, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-12-3101, July 01, 2015, CARPIO, J.
Delay in the remittances of collections constitutes neglect of duty and deprives the court of the
interest that could have been earned if the collections were deposited on time.
Facts:
An audit was conducted after the death of Balinag, Clerk of Court of MTCC Tabuk. This is to determine
his financial accountabilities and the regularity of cash transactions of Lizondra, the Officer-in-
Charge. The cash examination disclosed a shortage of P31,630.40 due to Lizondra's failure to deposit
the Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowances for the Judiciary Fund. Lizondra is also
accountable to the Fiduciary Fund which was due to the double withdrawal of the accused's cash
bond. Lizondra did not also report the Sheriff’s Trust Fund collections or issue official receipts for
every P1,000 received from party litigants upon filing of a civil case. Lizondra also failed to deposit
the SAJF and JDF collections within the prescribed period causing a total of P876.24 unearned
interest for the SAJF and PI, 169.86 unearned interest for the JDF. She explained that she failed to
deposit the collections due to transportation constraints.
Issue:
Whether or not Lizondra should be held administratively.
Ruling:
Yes. Being the custodians of court funds and revenues, clerks of court have always been
reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized
government depositories. Supreme Court (SC) Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 and Circular No.
13-92 mandate the clerks of court to immediately deposit their fiduciary collections upon their
receipt to an authorized depository bank. SC Circular No. 50-95 further provides that "all collections
from bailbonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty-four
(24) hours by the clerk of court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the
Philippines." As Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Lizondra has the same
responsibilities and is expected to serve with the same efficiency as a duly-appointed Clerk of Court.
However, Lizondra failed to faithfully perform the duties assigned to her. She violated circulars
issued by this Court by not remitting the court's collections on time. Not having money to transport
the court collections is not a valid excuse, since accountable officers are authorized to reimburse
their expenses from the Court under Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, as pointed out by the OCA.
ATTY. AURORA P. SANGLAY, Complainant, v. EDUARDO E. PADUA II, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 29, SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-14-3182, July 01, 2015, CARPIO, J.
The submission of the return and periodic reports by the sheriffs is not a duty that must be
taken lightly. The overall purpose of the requirement is to ensure speedy execution of decisions.
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Facts:
Padua, the Sheriff of RTC La Union, failed to make a report as to the issuance of a motion for
execution filed by Atty. Sanglay. Because of Padua's inaction, Atty. Sanglay filed with the RTC two
more motions. The OCA found Padua guilty of simple neglect of duty.
Issue:
Whether or not Padua is guilty of simple neglect of duty.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the OCA's finding that Padua is guilty of simple neglect of duty
but increases the fine to an amount equivalent to his salary for one month.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that sheriffs must make a report to the court
every thirty days until the judgment is satisfied in full. In the present case, Padua failed to report to
the court and state the reason why the judgment was not satisfied in full within 30 days after his
receipt of the writ. Despite the 9 March 2010, 4 July 2010 and 20 January 2011 motions filed by Atty.
Sanglay, Padua failed to make a report to the court every 30 days on the proceedings taken. In fact,
Padua made a partial report only after almost two years and only after Atty. Sanglay filed the present
administrative complaint.
The submission of the return and periodic reports by the sheriffs is not a duty that must be
taken lightly. It serves to update the court as to the status of the execution and to give it an idea as to
why the judgment was not satisfied. It also provides insights for the court as to how efficient court
processes are after judgment has been promulgated. The overall purpose of the requirement is to
ensure speedy execution of decisions.
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND SPECIAL CONCERNS, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA v. MARCELO B.

NAIG, UTILITY WORKER II, MAINTENANCE AND UTILITY SECTION, COURT OF APPEALS,
MANILA
A.M. CA-1532-P, July 29, 2015, Villarama, Jr. J
No other office in the government demands a higher standard for morality and decency than
the judiciary. Thus, a disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is a willful act that violates basic decency
or morality of society, is punishable by suspension under the RRACCS.
Facts:
Associate Justice Peralta Jr. and Atty. Ocampo-Peralta endorsed the Salaysay of Naig wherein
Naig narrated that he is a 48-year old man working as Utility Worker II for the Maintenance and
Utility Section of the CA. He states that he did part-time work for Justice Peralty and Atty. Peralta’s
household on weekends. It was during this time that he met their househelper, Emma Sabado. They
fell in love after 5 years and begot a child. However, Naig was married man but had been separated
for a period of more or less 6 years at the time he entered into relationship with Emma. Having an
illicit relationship with Emma, a formal charge against Naig was thus filed for violation of Sec. 43 B.3,
Rule 10 of the RRACCS, since such act constituted disgraceful and immoral conduct. The Committee
on Ethics and Special Concerns then declared Naig guilty as charged. As indorsed, the OCA affirmed
the recommendation of the Committee. However, due the factors of first infraction, separation from
his wife for 6 years and expression of remorse, OCA imposed only a fine against Naig.
Issue:
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Whether or not Naig is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct when he engaged in an
illicit relationship.
Ruling:
YES. The Court has stressed that no other office in the government demands a higher
standard for morality and decency than the judiciary. Furthermore, Memorandum Circular No. 15 of
the CSC defines disgraceful and immoral conduct as a willful act that violates basic decency or
morality of society. It may be committed in a scandalous or discreet manner, within or out of the
workplace. A complaint may be brought or initiated by the disciplining authority or any person
against the parties involved.
The Court agreed that Naig is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct but the penalty of
fine would not suffice. Court personnel, from the judge to the lowest clerk, are invested with the
sacred duty to maintain the good name and standing of the institution they serve. Considering that
this is Naig’s first infraction and his repentant attitude, the Court imposed only the penalty of
suspension for a period of 6 months.
GLENDA RODRIGUEZ-ANGAT v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 204738, July 29, 2015, Villarama, J.
Misconduct shall be considered grave only in cases where the elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules are proven by substantial evidence.
Facts:
Angat was a Social Insurance Specialist at the Loans Department of GSIS. She was assigned a
personal IP address with a Terminal ID to access GSIS databases. In an audit conducted, there were
salary loans with outstanding balances but tagged as fully paid in the central office. It was found out
that the Terminal ID used in the tagging of one of the salary loans as fully paid belonged to Angat.
GSIS required Angat to explain her participation in the erroneous tagging but she denied any
participation to such. GSIS was not persuaded by her explanation and filed an administrative case
against Angat for Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
GSIS held that Angat was liable for Grave Misconduct notwithstanding the formal charge, as the
erroneous tagging was a clear manifestation of mal-intent. On appeal, the CSC reversed the findings
of the GSIS and held that Angat may not be held liable for Grave Misconduct for she was formally
charged with Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, which
are only less grave and light offenses, and that she cannot be held guilt of a higher or grave offense,
otherwise she would be deprived of her right to be informed of the nature of the offense. However,
the CA reversed the CSC ruling and reinstated the findings of the GSIS.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of a higher or grave offense of Grave Misconduct is lawful.
Ruling:
NO. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and
not a mere error of judgment. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an
official or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some
benefit for herself or for another, at the expense of the rights of others. Nonetheless, a person
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charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not
involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. Grave misconduct
necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct.
In this case, GSIS was not able to adduce substantial evidence to prove the elements
constitutive of Grave Misconduct. GSIS failed to discharge its burden to show clear and convincing
evidence that the erroneous full payment tagging was done due to corruption, willful intent to violate
the law or persistent disregard of well known legal rules on the part of Angat. Instead, GSIS simply
ratiocinated and concluded its finding of Grave Misconduct on Angat using her terminal for the
erroneous full payment tagging despite her awareness of its repercussions as a clear manifestation of
her mal-intent. At most, the Court held that Angat is liable only for Simple Misconduct, since her
violation of an office regulation and GSIS’s failure to prove the elements of Grave Misconduct.
ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, MA. GRACIA PULIDO-TAN, JUANITO ESPINO
and HEIDI MENDOZA
G.R. No. 204757, 17 March 2015, J. Reyes
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may
have in support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
Facts:
Petitioner Nacion, who was then assigned by the COA to the MWSS as State Auditor V, has
been formally charged by COA Chairperson Pulido-Tan for acts found to be committed when she was
still with the MWSS. COA found her guilty of grave misconduct and violation of reasonable rules and
regulations. Although grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by the extreme penalty of
dismissal from service, Nacion was only meted out a penalty of one year suspension without pay
after COA considered the presence of mitigating circumstances. Petitioner filed this present petition
for certiorari invoking due process as she argues that the records during her tenure with the MWSS
should not have been included by the audit team in its investigation, as no office order covering it
was issued by the COA Chairman. Furthermore, the documentary evidence considered by the Fraud
Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO) did not constitute substantial evidence to prove the
commission of the offenses with which she was charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion guilty of
grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.
Ruling:
NO, the Court emphasized in Dycoco v. CA that “an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” In the case at bar, no such grave abuse is
obtaining.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he
may have in support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the
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parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Given this and the
circumstances under which the rulings of the COA were issued, the Court finds no violation of
Nacion’s right to due process. As the OSG correctly argued, the constitution of a separate fact-finding
team specifically for Nacion’s case was not necessary for the satisfaction of such right.
JOSEFINA M. CABUHAT v. JUDGE REYNALDO G. ROS, CLERK OF COURT JEWELYNE JOVETTE B.

VALENTON-CARREON AND CLERK III JULIUS B. SALONGA, ALL OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 33, MANILA AND CLERK OF COURT VII JENNIFER DELA CRUZ-BUENDIA,
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2386 September 16, 2015, Perez, J.
Simple neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task
or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, gross neglect of duty is
characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, or by
flagrant and palpable breach of duty.
Facts:
Josefina Cabuhat won a collection case against PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association,
Inc. (PESALA) before the MTC. PESALA appealed and the case was raffled to Branch 33 of RTC Manila,
where Clerk III Julius B. Salonga works.
On June 19, 2006, the RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by PESALA. The court required Josefina to comment, but the said order was not attached to the
records of the case. In 2009, Josefina filed a motion to resolve the motion for reconsideration.
Josefina’s motion was received by Clerk III Julius but the same was not attached to the records of the
case. In 2011, Josefina inquired about the status of the case. Clerk III Julius informed her that the case
had already attained finality and that he already placed the records in the court’s bodega. Josefina
asked for the records of the case, and received the same only after months of waiting.
Issue:
Whether or not Clerk III Julius B. Salonga is liable for simple misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Simple neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, gross
neglect of duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the
consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.
As Clerk III, Julius has the duty to maintain a systematic filing of cases and make available all
court records for inspection by the public unless the Court forbids its publicity. As the person in
charge of the civil cases, it is his duty to make sure that all pleadings filed in their branch are properly
attached to the record and thereafter referred their Branch Clerk of Court who, in turn, shall forward
to these to the Presiding Judge.
Here, the records of the case were incomplete due to Julius’ failure to attach the court’s 2006
order, as well as Josefina’s 2009 motion in the records. Salonga's lapses started the chain reaction of
mishaps. Furthermore, Salonga, who had custody of the record of the case, failed to explain why the
record of the case ended up in the "bodega" despite the fact that there was an incident still to be
resolved by the court.
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But since the negligence of Clerk III Julius was not tainted with bad faith or any motive to
conceal, destroy, or profit from the loss of the records, Clerk III Julius is liable only for simple neglect
of duty.
Election Law
KABATAAN PARTY LIST, represented by Representative Mark Terry Ridon and Marjohara
Tucay et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 221318, 18 December 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. The Constitution
prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage: The State may regulate said right by
imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as
per the second sentence of the provision, a “literacy, property or other substantive requirement.”
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 10367 which implements the mandatory

biometrics registration system for new voters and directs registered voters to have their biometrics
validated otherwise their applications shall be deactivated. Petitioners contend that (a) the
biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is a
penalty of deavtivation; (b) biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated
by the Constitution; (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution considering that,
applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and
hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage; (d) voters to be deactivated are not
afforded due process; and (e) poor experience with biometrics should serve as warning against
exacting adherence to the system.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 10367 as well as the COMELEC Resolutions issued in relation thereto are
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law.
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the parameters for the exercise of
suffrage. Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the
right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and
third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The
State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction,
however, that the same do not amount to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a “literacy,
property or other substantive requirement.” Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the
limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-
economic considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote
and to further the public good.
53 | P a g e
2016
MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO III
G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015, VELASCO, JR., J.
The reglementary period for instituting an election period should be reckoned from the actual
date of proclamation, not from the date of notice.
Facts:
Garcia and Payumo were candidates for the mayoralty race. In the poll’s conclusion, Garcia
was proclaimed winner. The Office of the Election then released to Payumo a certified copy of the
printed Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the
date of proclamation of the winning mayoralty candidate. On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an
election protest with the RTC. Anent the timeliness of the recourse, Payumo claimed that from May
15, 2013, the proclamation date appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until May
25, 2013, within which to challenge the election results. He added that since May 25, 2913 falls on a
Saturday, he filed his protest on the immediately succeeding working day, Monday, May 27, 2013.
Issue:
Whether or not Payumo’s election protest was filed out of time.
Ruling:
YES. It is the manual COCP which contains the true and exact date of Garcia’s proclamation –
May 14, 2013, not the printed COCP. Payumo’s reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is
misplaced. To be sure, Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes
necessary only for purposes of transmitting the results to the next level canvassing, and not for
proclaiming the winning candidates, insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds
have been lowered are concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling. Having
established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate on May 14, 2013, it is then
plain to see that Payumo’s election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period and ought to be dismissed outright. Also, Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that the 10-day period ought to be reckoned from the date of proclamation and not from the
date of notice. Moreover, Payumo cannot be deemed to have acted in good faith. Here, knowledge of
Garcia’s May 14, 2013 proclamation is attributable to Payumo since he was represented by Manalili
during the canvassing proceeding.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Forum Non Conveniens
54 | P a g e
2016
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M)

BERHAD
G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Forum non conveniens gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that
it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one.
Facts:
PNCC and Asiavest Holdings caused the incorporation of an associate company known as
Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct
rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. PNCC obtained various guarantees and
bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations.
These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia. However, There was failure
to perform the obligations under the contract, prompting the State of Pahang to demand payment
against Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad's performance bonds. Subsequently, Asiavest Merchant
Bankers Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the RTC and it
based its action on Malaysian laws. The RTC then found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad
complied with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws. The CA dismissed PNCC's appeal for
raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this court. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of
money filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract
executed and performed in Malaysia, and the applicability of the forum non conveniens principle.
Ruling:
Yes, the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the Complaint. The courts may
choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one
to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make
an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision.” The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A
mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements
exist cannot operate to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to
assume that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main
office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in
Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine
corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better
positioned to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case against petitioner.
55 | P a g e

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Dean’s

Digested by: DC 2016 Members

Constitutional Law 1 ........................................................................................................................ 2

Whether or not Purina is a firm engaged in corn industry.

YES. Yinlu has rights to the contested properties.

Whether or not EO2 is constitutional.

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA (AKMA-PTM) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA (AKMA-PTM) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

HILARIO P. SORIANO v. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF

A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of

GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO) v. NATIONAL

TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. THE

FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COLON HERITAGE REALTY

Whether or not RA 9167 is constitutional.

Whether or not the ordinances are unconstitutional.

NO. An ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

National Economy and Patrimony

West Tower Condominium Corporation, on behalf of the residents of West Tower

G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015, J. Velasco, Jr.

Whether or not the TOC issued to SOMCO was valid.

Accountability of Public Officers

Whether Nicolas should be held administratively liable.

Equal Protection Clause

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan, Compostela

Due Process Clause

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD

Freedom of Expression, Right to Assembly and Academic Freedom

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

A content-neutral regulation is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF

GIL G. CAWAD et al. v. FLORENCIO B. ABAD et al.

SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO v LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

In eminent domain, the determination of just compensation is principally a judicial function of

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JESUS ALSUA, represented by BIBIANO C.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT

As a valid exercise of Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) regulatory powers, Resolution No.

No. It is settled that “the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited by the

Criminal Due Process

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL CUNANAN y DAVID alias “PAENG PUTOL”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL CUNANAN y DAVID alias “PAENG PUTOL”

Whether or not there was in flagrante delicto arrest.

Whether or not the ordinances are unconstitutional.

MICHAEL SEBASTIAN vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,

Angelita Lagmay, acting as a representative of her daughter of Annabel Lagmay, filed a

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW

West Tower Condominium Corporation, on behalf of the residents of West Tower

Whether or not there is a need to issue a Permanent Environmental Protection Order to

MACARIO CATIPON, JR.vs. JEROME JAPSON

Whether or not Macario violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. AVELINO DE ZOSA and BARTOLOME DELA CRUZ

GLENDA RODRIGUEZ-ANGAT v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

Whether or not the evidence presented warrant the conviction of Angat.

HILARIO P. SORIANO v. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ

BRANCH CLERK OF COURT GAIL M. BACBAC-DEL ISEN v. ROMAR Q. MOLINA

Office of the Ombudsman v. Prudencio C. Quimbo, Court of Appeals

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. CONSTANTINO P. REDOÑA, FORMER CLERK OF

BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL v. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI’A CIRCUIT