Problems of Post-Communism

ISSN: 1075-8216 (Print) 1557-783X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mppc20

Media Visibility and Inclusion of Radical Right

Populism in Hungary and Romania

Gabriella Szabó, Ov Cristian Norocel & Márton Bene

To cite this article: Gabriella Szabó, Ov Cristian Norocel & Márton Bene (2018): Media Visibility
and Inclusion of Radical Right Populism in Hungary and Romania, Problems of Post-Communism,
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2018.1460208

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1460208

Published online: 02 May 2018.

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Problems of Post-Communism
Copyright © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1075-8216 (print)/1557-783X (online)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1460208

Media Visibility and Inclusion of Radical Right

Populism in Hungary and Romania
A Discursive Opportunity Approach

Gabriella Szabó,1 Ov Cristian Norocel, 2,3

and Márton Bene1,4
1
Institute of Political Science, Center for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest, Hungary
2
Center for Research on Ethnic Relations and Nationalism, University of Helsinki, Helsinki,
Finland
3
Institute of Sociology, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
4
Department of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary

This article investigates the discursive opportunities for radical-right populist politics in
Hungary and Romania. We argue that it is important to assess whether the discursive activities
of radical-right media are reflected and included in the chains of discussion in the public
sphere. The involvement and visibility of radical-right media in news coverage is considered a
cue for their acceptance as legitimate actors in the wider media ecosystem, even when other
media may not accept their interpretations. Our findings tell two different stories in the
compared countries. In Hungary, we note that radical-right media are to a certain degree
incorporated into the wider media networks, while in Romania, radical-right media are
observed to be in isolated positions in both of the media networks we examined.

As the 2019 European parliamentary elections draw near, populist parties and the wider media ecosystem. To address
and in the context of a dramatically changing political land- this topic, in the present article we scrutinize differences and
scape, there is a pressing need to examine the interplay similarities in the media visibility of radical-right populist
between surging radical-right populist forces and the discourses in two East European countries, namely Hungary
media in post-communist Eastern Europe. Radical-right and Romania. We have selected these neighboring countries
populism is generally conceived of as an ideological mix because of their shared post-communist developments and
of nativist discourses with coded xenophobia added to eth- similarities in their media systems; yet the electoral fortunes
nic nationalist appeals; social conservatism and authoritar- of radical-right populist parties in the two countries could
ian inclinations; and welfare chauvinism blended with not be more different.
economic protectionism, delivered with populist references Among the largest opposition parties in Hungary is
to people’s sovereignty and anti-establishment rhetoric Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary [Jobbik
(Mudde 2007; Norocel 2013; Pirro 2015). Research sug- Magyarországért Mozgalom]), which won 20.54 percent of
gests that media have played a key role in the rise of radical- the votes in the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections.
right populist forces throughout contemporary Europe One way Jobbik broke through the mainstream media
(Aalberg and de Vreese 2016; Akkerman 2011; Ellinas blockade was by devising a political communication strat-
2010; Sheets et al. 2016); yet little is known about the egy that brought together the media supportive of its poli-
interplay between the media supporting radical-right tical platform, such as the party-affiliated newspaper
Barikád and its corresponding website alfahir.hu, and the
self-styled unattached radical-right online portal kuruc.info,
Address correspondence to Ov Cristian Norocel, Centre for Research on
to craft a media cluster promoting an alternative discourse to
Ethnic Relations and Nationalism, Snellmansgatan 12 (PB 16), FIN-00014 the mainstream discussion in the public sphere (Molnár
University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: cristian.norocel@-helsinki.fi 2016, 177; Pirro 2015, 70; Szabó and Bene 2015, 127).
2 SZABÓ, NOROCEL, AND BENE

This positions Hungary as a case study in which the radical- in the general media network. The involvement and visibi-
right populist forces have succeeded in legitimizing their lity of such media in news coverage may be a cue for their
discourses in the public sphere. In Romania, radical-right acceptance as legitimate actors in the media ecosystem,
populist parties enjoyed significant popular support after the even though other media may not accept their interpreta-
collapse of the Communist regime. In the early 2000s, the tions. In other words, their inclusion entails favorable dis-
Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM) was cursive opportunities for radical-right populist politics,
the largest opposition force. These early political victories while their exclusion impedes the diffusion of such political
notwithstanding, and contrary to the wider European trend, messages (Norocel et al. 2017). With this in mind, the
the political fortunes of PRM have steadily declined ever present study aims to answer the following research ques-
since, attracting only about one percent of the votes in the tion: Which patterns of discursive opportunities for radical-
2016 Romanian parliamentary elections. However, radical- right populist politics can be discerned in Hungary and
right populism did not vanish from Romanian politics along Romania? The research question is further divided into
with PRM (Cinpoes 2015; Gherghina and Miscoiu 2014; two sub-questions: Which mainstream media discursively
Norocel 2010). Over the years, PRM and its long-time chair, interact with radical-right media? What kind of network
Vadim Tudor, relied on the party newspapers România Mare structures connecting these media can be identified in
and Tricolorul, to which their online platforms were later Hungary and Romania?
added, to thwart mainstream media opposition to their radi- To assess the visibility of radical-right media, we employed
cal-right populist political agenda (Norocel 2013). Another network analysis as a methodological approach to examine
political communication strategy was to profit from the both the general architecture of the media ecosystem and the
mainstream media’s courting of political personalities like ego network of radical-right media (Scott 2013). Modularity is
Tudor because of their sensationalist and controversial dis- our main measurement to evaluate the community structure of
courses, which feed into a very specific area of the networks, by detecting the quality of network division into
Romanian mainstream cultural repertoire marked by the groups and subgroups (Girvan and Neuman 2002). In the two
casual use of intolerant frames (Cinpoes 2015, 292). cases we compared, this entails both the community structures
Regardless of these efforts, the radical-right populist forces of the two media networks and the locations of radical-right
failed to maintain political relevance, which makes Romania media within the general architecture of those networks. The
an interesting case study. This comparative framework aims similarities and differences between Hungary and Romania are
to flesh out the different media visibility of radical-right presented in a cross-country and cross-case perspective. Our
populist discourses in Hungary and Romania along with findings depict two different constellations. We conclude that
the different trajectories of radical-right populist parties in radical-right populist politics enjoy far better discursive oppor-
the two countries. tunities in Hungary than in Romania.
The media controlled by, affiliated with, or supportive of In the following section we review the most relevant
radical-right populist forces, which in our study are labeled literature in the field and indicate how the theoretical
as radical-right media, play a key role when they attempt to concepts are employed in mapping out the discursive
join mainstream politics (Barkun 2017; Skenderovic 2009). opportunities for radical-right populist politics, evincing
They are part of a radical-right populist media world that our contribution to understanding the contemporary
combines social media with traditional and novel formats of developments in post-communist Eastern Europe. We
press and radio and is tailored to intensify the voice of then continue with a section in which we present the
radical-right populist forces in the public discourse. innovative methodological toolkit that allows us to
Despite an ongoing debate about the discursive opportu- examine the presence of discursive elements of radical-
nities afforded to the radical-right media in Europe and the right populist political communication in the mainstream
impact of such conditions on the popularity of representa- media, and we detail our data collection and coding
tives of radical-right populist politics (Cinpoes 2015; process. We present the findings of our analysis. We
Minkenberg 2015; Muis 2015; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016; conclude that the discursive opportunities for radical-
Szabó and Bene 2015), little research has assessed the right populist politics are more favorable in Hungary
position of the radical-right media in the public sphere than in Romania, in the wider context of existing scho-
(Norocel et al. 2017). There is a pressing need for empirical larship, and suggest avenues for further research.
contributions that shed light on how and to what extent
radical-right media partake in news production and media
saturation. Concerning discursive opportunities, it is crucial DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR RADICAL-
to assess whether the discursive activities of radical-right RIGHT POPULIST POLITICS
media are reflected and included in the public sphere.
Consequently, this is a pioneering study that examines the Research suggests that mainstream media, whether inten-
media-visibility thesis of radical-right populist discourses by tionally or unintentionally, facilitate the increasing visibility
exploring and comparing the location of radical-right media and growing political appeal of radical-right populist forces
 MEDIA VISIBILITY AND RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 3

by means of sensationalist headlines, incited by radical-right specific to news production processes. It is dependent, on
populist communicators. Some scholars have argued that the other hand, on the opportunities inherent to media logic,
media tend to allocate more time and space to these forces which amplifies, distorts, and exacerbates political struggles,
when certain issues, such as crime or immigration, dominate thus selectively conferring legitimacy on certain issues,
the public debate (Mazzoleni et al. 2003; Walgrave and de specific approaches to a disputed topic, or some specific
Swert 2004). In this context, mainstream media may con- political actors while denying it to others (Ferree et al.
tribute to the overall radicalization of public discourse by 2002; Koopmans 2004, Muis 2015). In this context, media
covering the preferred topics of radical-right populist forces visibility pertains to the prominence that mainstream media
and providing a platform for their message to reach the allocate to a certain message (Muis 2015, 44). Media visi-
wider public. Others maintain that radical-right populist bility, in our view, depends on two factors: the number of
forces may successfully bypass the scrutiny, or outright communicative channels disseminating said message, and
boycott, of the traditional media by adapting their political the prominence it gains in the wider public sphere. As such,
strategy to privilege communication through faithful media media visibility is a necessary condition for a message to
and make extensive use of the Internet and social media influence the public discourse, and the more visibility the
(Atton 2006; Barlett, Birdwell and Littler 2011; Norocel gatekeepers allocate to the message in question, the greater
2013). These directly controlled communication channels its potential for further dissemination into the public sphere
are employed by radical-right populist forces to actively (Schudson 1995).
provide interpretive frames and counter-frames of events, Studies on the political communication of radical-right
in an attempt to impact the general media discourse. populist forces conceptualize media visibility by concentrat-
To anchor our analysis theoretically, we turn to research ing on the textual dimension; as such, quantitative and
on social movements and media studies, wherein the con- qualitative analyses of the media coverage of radical-right
cepts of discursive opportunity structure, media opportunity populist parties, their representatives, or their preferred
structure, and media visibility emerge as key theoretical topics are indicated as means to analyze radicalization
building blocks for our analysis (Cammaerts 2012; Ferree (Norocel et al. 2017; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2012).
et al. 2002; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Koopmans 2004; Although media visibility is crucial to the impact of radi-
Muis 2015; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2012). Well estab- cal-right populist politics in the public debate, the diffusion
lished in sociological literature, the concept of discursive of radical-right populist discourse also relies heavily on the
opportunities pertains to the ways that generally acknowl- relationship between the radical-right populist forces and the
edged discourses in the public sphere, and interpretive sche- surrounding discursive environment, particularly on their
mata (frames) in particular, determine the political impact of ability to stimulate a reaction from the mainstream
social movements and emerging political entities. More (Minkenberg 2015; Muis 2015). Intriguingly enough,
clearly, while social movements and political newcomers empirical examinations suggest that the relationship
pursue unconventional and novel ideas, and stimulate the between media and radical-right populist forces does make
coalescence of new collective identities (Melucci 1996), a difference to their political fortunes (Ellinas 2010; Norocel
their success is contingent on their ability to use existing 2013; Szabó and Bene 2015). Indeed, the reaction of the
discourses and constitutive frames in innovative ways to mainstream, whether supportive or hostile, is essential for
achieve their goals. In this context, then, social movements, radical-right populist forces to improve their media oppor-
and particularly political newcomers, are dependent on the tunities. What matters most, regardless of the tone of cover-
mainstream media to achieve their political goals (Gamson age, is the presence of radical-right populist discourses in
and Wolfsfeld 1993). Researchers call attention to media the public debate. Once mainstream media are engaged,
selection processes to understand at what time, for what radical-right populist forces seem able to exploit even nega-
reasons, and by which means social movements make it tive publicity to their advantage, reaching out to potential
into the news (Cammaerts 2012; Vliegenthart and voters and presenting their politics as viable political alter-
Walgrave 2012). Indeed, besides mass mobilization, visibi- natives, and in the process gaining in popularity across
lity in the media is necessary to validate their public Europe and the United States.
demands and to increase the legitimacy of their position in These theoretical explanations allow us to concentrate on
the public sphere. The concept of media opportunity struc- the reciprocal relationship between those media closely con-
ture in this context entails the extent to which political nected to the radical-right populist forces, and mainstream
newcomers are able to achieve these goals and successfully media in the wider media networks in Hungary and
get their message across in the mainstream media, and thus Romania. It is worth noting that the general media landscape
exert influence in the public sphere (Cammaerts 2012, 119). in the two countries is characterized by tabloidization, frag-
The access of political newcomers to the public sphere is mentation, incremental decline of broadsheet newspaper sales,
contingent on their relationship with mainstream media, and a high level of political pressure, resulting in high political
which act as gatekeepers. This dynamic relationship is con- parallelism, significant governmental control over public
ditioned, on the one hand, by the structural constraints broadcasting, and heavy politicization of the media system
4 SZABÓ, NOROCEL, AND BENE

(Bajomi-Lázár 2014; Dobek-Ostrowska and Glowacki 2015). the media sphere in which radical-right media seek visibi-
At the discursive level, over the past decade, the Hungarian lity. As such, we employed network analysis to examine
public sphere has witnessed a discrete blending between the both the general structure of the media sphere and the net-
discourses of the center-right and the radical-right populist work of radical-right media. Network analysis is a flexible
forces. This discursive porousness legitimized the entry of and reliable quantitative tool that allows mapping out struc-
frames and vocabulary specific to radical-right populist dis- tural attributes (such as group formation and the position of
course into the mainstream. The effect was that such topics as individual items) of a set of nodes (actors) linked by ties
the relationship to European Union (EU) institutions, the (relationship) of a certain type (Scott 2013, 4). These net-
situation of the Roma community, corruption, criminality, works may vary in terms of their density, internal division,
and welfare abuse were framed in the mainstream as they and the direction of their connections. For this study, we
were in the radical-right populist discourse (Ágh 2016; defined individual media as nodes of the media networks we
Bernáth 2014; Vidra and Fox 2014). In general terms, the analyze, while the ties between nodes entailed the connec-
left-leaning media were inclined to overdramatize the influ- tion between analyzed media via their discursive patterns.
ence exerted by radical-right populist forces on the public We operationalized the discursive patterns through their
sphere. In contrast, the conservative center-right government framing activities. First, the framing activities were moni-
led by Fidesz (the Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian tored and coded in terms of issue-specific interpretations
Civic Alliance [Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége–Magyar that each of the media applied in covering the topics chosen
Polgári Szövetség]) and the pro-government media were for analysis. The original two-mode network that contained
more willing to accept and apply the radical-right populist connections between media and frames (n*m, i.e., nodes are
interpretive frames, even while they tended to avoid providing both media outlets and frames) was transformed into a one-
much media visibility to Jobbik politicians (Ágh 2016; mode network containing connections only between media
Bernáth 2014). This is a somewhat paradoxical situation: (n*n, i.e., all nodes are media outlets). In such a network a
although radical-right populist issues and interpretive frames connection (edge) between two media outlets is created
were visible in mainstream media, Jobbik was relegated to a when both used the same frame in their articles. The weight
position of persona non grata in Hungarian mainstream pol- of this edge indicates the degree of similarity of the frames
itics and media. used by the two media. An edge between two nodes with
The Romanian public sphere represents in a sense the higher weight means that the framing activities of reporting
mirror image of the Hungarian one. Although the Romanian the selected issue were similar in these outlets.1 To compare
mainstream media subjected PRM to constant scrutiny, they the media networks thus identified, we applied modularity
manifested a strong appetite for the type of irreverent sensa- as the main tool for measurement. Modularity is useful for
tionalism that party leader Vadim Tudor provided. In so doing, testing whether strongly connected groups (communities)
mainstream media enforced existing sexist, outright xenopho- are present in the analyzed network structure (Girvan and
bic, and homophobic frames in the public sphere, and these Neuman 2002). More precisely, we based our calculations
were exploited for electoral gains by several political forces on the Girvan–Newman algorithm to assess maximum mod-
on both sides of the political spectrum (Cinpoes 2015, ularity in the examined networks. This algorithm tries to
291–93). A specific strategy that various radical-right populist detect the best division of the network and identify the more
forces resorted to, in order to get around the relative lack of densely-connected groups within the structure. The algo-
responsiveness on the part of mainstream media, was disse- rithm indicates the division that has the highest modularity
minating the radical-right populist discourse though party- of the network. A community in a network structure means
faithful media, such as the newspapers România Mare and that the nodes within the group have many more and stron-
Tricolorul, or television stations like Oglinda-TV (OTV) ger edges with each other than with the nodes outside the
(Gherghina and Miscoiu 2014, 187; Norocel 2013, 112–13). group; that is, their framing activities are highly similar and
Considering the mainstream media’s reaction in both Hungary significantly differ from outlets from other groups. The
and Romania, it appears that radical-right media are important modularity score can range from -0.5 to 1, and 0.3 is often
channels for disseminating radical-right populist discourses. It deemed as the benchmark value for a strong community
is precisely the network interaction between mainstream and structure (Clauset et al. 2004).
radical-right media that we examine herein. Having established these means of measurement, we
then specified the main variations of hypothesized loca-
tion of radical-right media within the network constella-
NETWORK ANALYSIS TO ASSESS MEDIA tions. If our data showed that the media networks were
VISIBILITY cohesive, we expected little or no difference between the
location of radical-right media nodes and the place of
The present study entailed the design of a new and sophis- mainstream ones. Such a finding would suggest that the
ticated methodological apparatus to capture the framing radical-right media are highly integrated into the main-
activities and, simultaneously, the community structure of stream media sphere and function as important actors in
 MEDIA VISIBILITY AND RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 5

the public debate. By the same measure, if our data were mainstream media. In turn, the Janiczák issue in Hungary
to indicate the presence of non-cohesive networks, this and the Diaconu issue in Romania illustrate the situation in
would indicate that the radical-right media nodes are which the radical-right populist forces act as promoters. In
peripherally positioned in relation to the entire network. Hungary, Dávid Janiczák was Jobbik’s mayoral candidate in
This would indicate that radical-right populist forces are the November 2014 local elections in Ózd (a mid-sized
constrained to the fringes of the public debate. industrial city in northern Hungary). Janiczák’s campaign
Alternatively, the radical-right media nodes could form and subsequent victory were used by Jobbik and affiliated
their own cluster, characterized by dense in-group con- media to advance a nation-wide public debate about the
nections and few or zero ties with nodes from outside the party’s preparedness to govern Hungary. We see an analogy
group. In this constellation, the radical-right media would between this case and the Diaconu issue in Romania.
coalesce into an alternative communication universe with Bogdan Diaconu founded the United Romania Party
a negligible effect on the public debate. (Partidul România Unită, PRU) in late August 2014 after
Our empirical examination concentrated on a couple of leaving the Social Democrats and publicly denouncing their
heavily debated political issues in 2014 in each country. The collaboration with the party that represented the political
criteria for issue selection were: the radical-right populist interests of the Hungarian minority. The event benefited
parties must be protagonists of the media coverage, and the from mainstream media exposure, and PRU is now a sig-
topic must produce high media attention for a sustained nificant radical-right populist party with a political agenda
period. We illustrate two types of situations for the radical- to “take back Romania for Romanians.” The Janiczák and
right populist forces. First, we chose one issue that exam- Dianconu issues serve here as litmus tests for whether
ined the changes in a communicative situation whereby proactive communication and offensive discourses from
radical-right populist forces came under criticism from radical-right populist forces change the position of affiliated
their adversaries (Issue A). To reveal the network differ- media in relation to mainstream media. The obvious differ-
ences, we selected a second issue whereby the radical-right ences between the issues notwithstanding, they all have in
populist forces actively introduced new political ideas or common the position of exteriority of the media initiators of
branches of their political organization, or initiated political the event in question.
maneuvers (Issue B). More clearly, the first pair of issues The data collection and analysis required a complex
aims to flesh out the media networks when the radical-right procedure with several steps and a careful perusal of the
populist forces are in a defensive position, while the second empirical material. First, we made an ex-ante calculation of
pair of issues was chosen to account for the reconfigurations the mainstream media: these were the most-read daily news-
of media networks when the radical-right populist forces papers (including tabloids) and online news portals. In addi-
aimed to attract public attention. The purpose was twofold: tion, we pre-defined the list of radical-right media (mostly
to observe whether the defensive and offensive communica- online news portals) for our analysis (see Appendix).
tion of the radical-right populist forces modified the struc- Second, we scrutinized all media by means of keywords
ture of media networks and the position of radical-right for each examined issue, as described in Table 1.
nodes, and to describe and evaluate the changes thus Four topical types of corpora, available in digital format,
observed. were created to collect and manage all the selected articles
This selection mechanism narrowed our focus to four on each issue in a ready-to-analyze format. The chosen
topics in the two countries. The Kovács issue in Hungary timeframe concentrates on two key political events in
and the Tudor vs. Funar issue in Romania illustrate the 2014: the most recent European parliamentary elections
media opportunities in a context in which radical-right (May 25) in both countries; the local elections in Hungary
populist forces were reported on critically. In Hungary, (October 12); and the most recent presidential elections in
Béla Kovács, a Jobbik representative in the European Romania (November 2 and 16, 2014). Every news item was
Parliament at that time, was accused of espionage for the subsequently examined systematically with the help of
Russian Federal Security Service. While Jobbik denied the guidelines collected in codebooks specific to each issue,
allegation, leaks of the investigation, and speculations about country by country. For the framing networks, we con-
Jobbik’s Russian ties, dominated mainstream media cover- ducted a qualitative pre-analysis to identify dominant inter-
age (May 2014). In Romania, Vadim Tudor (then ousted as pretive frames that were employed by the analyzed media
PRM chair) clashed with Gheorghe Funar (newly elected (Schreier 2012). The frames identified different explanations
chair) about the party’s list of candidates for the European and interpretations of the subject matter: positive, negative,
parliamentary elections (March to May 2014). Despite their or neutral for the radical-right populist forces involved.
different contexts, these issues represent a similar commu- After the issue-specific interpretive frames were labeled in
nicative situation for radical-right populist forces (negative the codebook (de Vreese 2005, 54–55), the total sample was
media coverage). They allow us to assess whether the re-coded to assess the presence of these frames. The coding
spread of defensive discourses and counter-arguments by was done by the authors and two competent assistants, and
radical-right media are integrated into the news flow by then the results were compared; whenever discrepancies
6 SZABÓ, NOROCEL, AND BENE

TABLE 1
Comprehensive Summary of the Data Collection, Issue by Issue

Number of Number of nodes

media outlets in the media
involved in the networks
analysis (unit of network Keywords for the advance searches in the
(sample) analysis) sampled media products Timeframes for the data collection

Issue type A Kovács issue 56 25 Kovács Béla, KGB, kém May 15 – 23, 2014
(Hungary) (spy)
Tudor vs. 24 18 Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Gheorghe Funar, March 24 – May 25, 2014
Funar-issue europarlamentare (EP elections)
(Romania)
Issue type B Janiczák-issue 44 24 Janiczak Dávid, Ózd, választások October 22 – November 13, 2014
(Hungary) (mayoral elections)
Diaconu-issue 17 15 Bogdan Diaconu, Partidul România Unită, August 20 – September 10, 2014
(Romania) demisie (United Romania Party,
resignation)

were detected, the research team discussed the problem and significant electoral success of the various Romanian radi-
took a stance on it.2 As for the calculation of the metrics, the cal-right populist parties. In the following, we discuss the
igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006) and tnet (Opsahl 2009) network constellations, presenting them in a comparative
packages for R, as well as the Ucinet 6 software (Borgatti perspective issue by issue. Table 2 summarizes the domi-
et al. 2002), supported our analysis. NetDraw software was nant framing activities of the sampled media for each issue.
used to visualize the findings.

Comparing the Networks of the Kovács Issue and the

TWO DIFFERENT CONSTELLATIONS OF MEDIA
Tudor vs. Funar Issue
VISIBILITY
The two networks for Issue A in Hungary and Romania reveal
The main empirical claim that emerges is that in the media fundamental differences in terms of the number of nodes and
networks in Hungary and Romania, the radical-right media connections, as summarized in Table 2. The Kovács issue was
delineate the media opportunities afforded to radical-right covered and interpreted by more media than the Tudor vs.
populist forces in general. The Hungarian case indicates that Funar issue. Additionally, we observed that in the Hungarian
radical-right media were more integrated into the wider case the framing activities connected the media more densely
media sphere, thereby ensuring a high level of media visi- to each other than in the Romanian case. The media network of
bility. Data on general network structure suggest that the the Kovács issue is constructed by the diffusion of a plural set
radical-right media can connect to mainstream media by of interpretations with one dominant frame F1 (“A slander
providing publicity for conflicting interpretations of the campaign against Jobbik”). The architecture of the Kovács
public debate. Additionally, the examined radical-right network, however, exhibits a non-cohesive structure: the mod-
media tend to form a somewhat tightly knitted cluster. ularity value (0.22) indicates a slight polarization. The slightly
This position demonstrates the vitality of the radical-right polarized structure of the network indicates that the visibility
media ecosystem in terms of partaking in the wider political of the different interpretive frames divides the media space into
communication flow. With Jobbik’s electoral performance in two segments (see Figure 1).
mind, we argue that such conditions create rather favorable The network shows a couple of distinctly separate subgroups
media opportunities for the radical-right populist forces. The of nodes (communities) that emerged in framing the Kovács
Romanian case suggests the opposite pattern. It shows that issue. Community 1 collects twelve media (among which are
the radical-right media platforms were isolated and three radical-right media: alfahir.hu; kuruc.info; Hunhir.info).
remained at the fringes of the media networks. The periph- Community 2 is less dense and only five media are present in
eral position is diagnosed as a sign of minimal discursive this group. It is worth noting, however, that the political orienta-
connectivity between the radical-right and mainstream tion within the two communities is rather diverse. The radical
media. We also see communicative distances within the right media are integrated in Community 1 together with both
group of radical-right media platforms. We consider this center-right media (such as Magyar Hírlap and Mandiner.hu)
an indicator of rather disadvantageous media opportunities, and left-leaning media (such as hvg.hu and 444.hu). The visibi-
reflected in the low level of media visibility for radical-right lity of the dominant frame (F1) connects Community 1 to
populist discourses, which is confirmed by the lack of Community 2. The main interpretations are frames F3
 MEDIA VISIBILITY AND RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 7

TABLE 2
Data Summary on the Framing Activities of the Media Outlets in Hungary and Romania

In how many Number

media outlets of nodes
does the The rate (%) the frame (Total/
frame How many times was the appears in relation to the RR Number of
Frame appear? frame registered? total visible interpretations media) connections

Mainstream RR Mainstream
Total media media Total media RR

Issue type A Kovács F1 – A slander-campaign 23 130 96 34 36% 35% 43% 25/3 357
issue against Jobbik (Fidesz,
(Hungary) USA, EU)
F2 – Jobbik-Russia 20 48 44 4 13% 16% 5%
friendship, Kovács
Béla’s Russian
connections
F3 – Accusations are 17 51 29 22 14% 10% 27%
obscure and ridiculous
F4 – High treason 19 49 41 8 14% 15% 10%
F5 – Give up running in 13 30 22 8 9% 8% 10%
EP elections
F6 – Continue running in 16 49 45 4 14% 16% 5%
EP elections
Tudor vs. F1 – Funar as a coup- 8 22 8 14 28% 13% 73% 18/3 78
Funar maker
issue F2 – Tudor just a natural 6 14 14 0 18% 24% 0%
(Romania) person
F3 – Bureaucratic 16 26 24 2 33% 41% 11%
explanations
F4 – An offensive against 6 8 6 2 10% 10% 11%
the PRM
F5 –National Electoral 5 8 7 1 10% 12% 5%
Commission to blame
Issue type B Janiczák F1 – Jobbik won because 18 29 23 6 18% 21% 11% 24/3 161
issue of a good campaign
(Hungary) F2 – A result of the last 4 13 24 18 6 15% 17% 11%
years’ local government
F3 – Only Jobbik 10 17 11 6 11% 10% 11%
understands people of
Ózd
F4 – A new beginning for 14 31 17 14 19% 16% 26%
Ózd
F5 – Jobbik’s win was a 18 60 39 21 37% 36% 39%
fraud
Diaconu F1 – Social Democrats 14 21 20 1 34% 33% 100% 15/1 62
issue concede to Hungarian
(Romania) minority party’s pressure
F2 – An inconvenient 2 3 3 0 5% 5% 0%
politician
F3 – A pro-Moscow 4 6 6 0 10% 10% 0%
politician
F4 – PRU a new party for 12 20 20 0 32% 32% 0%
Romanians
F5 – The economic well- 9 12 12 0 19% 20% 0%
being of Romanians

(“Accusations are obscure and ridiculous”) and F4 (“High trea- Community 2, while frame F3 was rarely present there.
son”) among the members of Community 1. In turn, the frames Concerning radical-right media, the combination of two inter-
F2 (“Jobbik–Russia friendship, Béla Kovács’s Russian connec- pretations was prevalent (frames F1 and F3). Notwithstanding
tions”) and F6 (“Continue running in EP elections”) appeared in the fact that the radical right provided a platform for reporting
8 SZABÓ, NOROCEL, AND BENE

FIGURE 1. The network of the Kovács issue (normalized network, only the strongest connections: light grey = Community 1; dark grey = Community 2,
white = out of community; square = mainstream media; triangle = radical right media). Network structure: slightly polarized. Position of the RR media:
integrated in Community 2.

that Kovács had a seemingly suspicious relationship with the notwithstanding, one other radical-right media outlet, maga-
Russian security services (frame F1), they also attempted to zincritic.ro, paid equal attention to both the main frame
counterbalance that somewhat by enabling Jobbik representa- embraced by the other radical-right media and its counter-
tives to argue against such an interpretation. Tellingly, frame F3, interpretation (F5: “National Electoral Commission to
which interprets the issue as a political attack against Jobbik and blame”). In the wider architecture of the media network, how-
questions the validity of the accusations, dominates the media ever, the radical-right media remained in a peripheral position.
coverage of the event by radical-right media.
In turn, the Tudor vs. Funar issue displays a cohesive net-
work structure, albeit with fewer nodes and a less dense Comparing the Networks of the Janiczák Issue and the
structure than the Kovács issue in Hungary (see Figure 2). Diaconu Issue
The cohesion of the whole network indicates that there is no
The two networks for Issue B in Hungary and Romania
group division in the structure. This means that the distribution
display fewer nodes and less dense connections than the
of frames was quite similar in the mainstream media. In this
networks for Issue A. This suggests that the topics promoted
case, the public debate about the confrontation between the
by the radical-right populist forces attract less media atten-
two strongmen of PRM was mainly framed as Funar’s illegi-
tion than political controversies such as those in Issue A. At
timate claims to draft PRM’s list on the eve of the 2014
a closer look, both the Hungarian and Romanian cases for
European parliamentary elections (coded F1: “Funar as a
Issue B exhibit polarized network structures, similar to the
coup-maker”; alternatively, F3: “Bureaucratic explanations”).
Hungarian case for Issue A, discussed earlier, whereby the
Despite the network’s cohesive architecture, there is a differ-
media spheres in the two countries were divided by the
ence between the discursive patterns of the mainstream and
different framing activities of the media. Once more, the
those of the radical-right media. While the mainstream media
political leaning of the analyzed media did not provide an
covered the issue from several different angles, thereby pro-
adequate explanation for such separation.
viding visibility for alternate explanations and interpretations
In the Janiczák issue, the modularity score for the whole
(such as frames F1 and F3), the radical-right nodes România
network was 0.21, and the score for the most tightly knitted
Mare print and ziartricolorul.ro online concentrated solely on
group was 0.31. The subgroups of the network varied nota-
one interpretation (frame F1). In fact, there is a clear discursive
bly in size. The largest subgroup contained 15 members
connection between the two radical-right media. This
(including three radical-right media: alfahir.hu; Hunhir.
 MEDIA VISIBILITY AND RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 9

FIGURE 2. The network of the Tudor vs. Funar issue (normalized network, only the strongest connections) (square = mainstream media; triangle = radical
right media). Network structure: cohesive. Position of the RR media: fringe.

info; kuruc.info), while the other two subgroups were belong to this community. Apart from this, Community 2
formed by four media outlets each (see Figure 3). The turned out to be a clique of two nodes. Community 3 contained
radical-right media were active, both in terms of referrals three media (including one on the radical right: buciumul.ro).
to other media and in terms of interpretive frames used; in The other radical-right media remained isolated (see Figure 4).
fact, they applied almost a third of all visible frames. In terms of frames employed within the network, frame F1
Among them, alfahir.hu was the most active, employing (“Social Democrats concede to Hungarian minority party’s
various frames significantly more often (27 times) than the pressure”) was the most commonly used, by both
media outlet coming in second (index.hu, 15 times), while Community 1 and Community 3, while only Community 2
Hunhir.info and kuruc.info ranked third and fourth respec- applied frame F2 (“An inconvenient politician”) and to a lesser
tively in this context. In terms of frames, F5 (“Jobbik’s win extent F1. The visibility of frame F3 (“A pro-Moscow politi-
was a result of a fraud”) was most used among radical-right cian”) also separates Community 1 and Community 2: the
media, and F4 (“A new beginning for Ózd”) was employed frame concerning the ideology and political strategy of
more frequently by these than the general average. In other Diaconu’s new party (frame F4: “PRU a new party for
words, the radical-right media provided visibility for both Romanians”) was present in the media belonging to
the most- and the least-advantageous interpretive frames Community 1, and less so in Community 2. In Community
regarding Jobbik’s mayoral candidate. We interpret this 3, buciumul.ro also used frame F1.
unexpected pattern of coverage as an attempt to counter-
balance the generally hostile media environment, by dis-
missing the arguments against Janiczák with the promise
DISCUSSION
of a successful future for Ózd.
The Diaconu issue shows a similar framing network struc-
Following in the footsteps of previous research in the field
ture. In this case the network appears as somewhat integrated,
(Cinpoes 2015; Minkenberg 2015; Muis 2015; Norocel el al.
with a modularity score of 0.15. Focusing on the strongest
2017; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016; Szabó and Bene 2015), our
connections, however, we identified three subgroups (commu-
point of departure was that visibility is key for the media
nities) with a modularity of 0.26. Community 1 had nine
opportunities that radical-right populist parties need for
members, though no radical-right media. Similarly to the
advancing their political agenda. In this context, we decided
Janiczák issue, the vast majority of the media in the network
that a suitable instrument for measuring the level of inclusion
10 SZABÓ, NOROCEL, AND BENE

FIGURE 3. The network of the Janiczák issue (normalized network, only the strongest connections. Light grey = Community 1; dark grey = Community 2,
black = Community 3; square = mainstream media; triangle = radical right media). Network structure: polarized. Position of the RR media: integrated in
Community 1.

or exclusion of radical-right populist discourses is the amount Hungarian case, few differences were detected in the interpretive
of attention that mainstream media pay to such discourses frames afforded visibility by both radical-right and mainstream
that are disseminated through radical-right media. Our stance media. This suggests that the radical-right media were constitu-
is that the more integrated a position the radical-right media tive elements of the two subgroups that emerged in the network.
enjoy in the wider media sphere, the greater chances they In the Romanian case, in turn, the interpretive frames employed
have to disseminate their political views, arguments, and by the radical-right media nodes differed significantly from the
interpretations of political events in the public debate. Such mainstream discursive patterns. This indicates that our sample
an integrated position suggests that the radical-right media from the radical-right media remained on the fringes of the
have become legitimate, effective, and influential media pre- wider media network in Romania.
sences in the wider political discussion, and as such this sheds The second type of issues (Issue B) was constructed to
light on the key conditions for media opportunities afforded flesh out the differences in the network structure and the
to radical-right populist politics. The network analysis of the
media spheres in Hungary and Romania illustrates more
generally the different constellations of media opportunities TABLE 3
for radical-right populist politics, and particularly, the various Comprehensive Summary of Findings
locations that media directly associated with radical-right Structure of Position of the radical
populist forces may take in the wider media sphere (see the network right media
Table 3).
The first type of issues (Issue A), whereby radical-right popu- Issue type A Kovács issue polarized integrated
(Hungary)
list forces were presented critically, revealed that the diffusion of
Tudor vs. Funar cohesive integrated: fringe
interpretive frames created a polarized media network in issue
Hungary and a cohesive network in Romania. These differences (Romania)
notwithstanding, the analyzed media appear to be somewhat Issue type B Janiczák issue polarized integrated: strong
integrated in the wider media network, although the connection (Hungary) cluster of radical
right nodes
between the radical-right media and mainstream media nodes
Diaconu issue polarized 1 outlet is integrated;
were significantly stronger in the Kovács issue than in the Tudor (Romania) others are isolated
vs. Funar issue. Worth noting in this context is that in the
 MEDIA VISIBILITY AND RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 11

FIGURE 4. The network of the Diaconu issue (normalized network, only the strongest connections. Light grey = Community 1; dark grey = Community 2;
black = Community 3; square = mainstream media; triangle = radical right media). Network structure: polarized. Position of the RR media: isolated (1 node is
integrated in Community 3).

position of radical-right media when the radical-right populist media microcosm and its position in the wider media net-
forces are promoters, initiating and introducing new political work (Bernáth 2014, 112–13; Szabó and Bene 2015, 142).
ideas, branches of their political organization, or political There is, however, an ongoing political realignment of the
maneuvers. Surprisingly, Issue B revealed polarized net- Hungarian political spectrum, whereby Fidesz is incremen-
works in both Hungary and Romania, whereby the radical- tally abandoning its centrist position and is tilting further to
right media platforms were located in contrasting positions in the right, while Jobbik is attempting to move out of the
relation to the mainstream. More specifically, the Janiczák radical-right corner and toward the center. These changes
issue indicated a constellation in which the radical-right impact on the political discourses and media visibility of
media formed a centrally located tightly knitted cluster of radical-right media; this indicates that more research is
nodes with strong connections to each other. In contrast, in needed to assess the effects of these political shifts on the
the Diaconu issue the radical-right media were isolated from discursive opportunities available to these political forces.
the mainstream media and fragmented among themselves. Our study is an excellent point of departure for such a
With this in mind, we argue that our findings on the project. Rather differently, in Romania we noticed that the
visibility of radical-right populist discourses tell two differ- radical-right media are in isolated positions in the wider
ent stories in the two countries we compared. In Hungary, media ecosystem, a situation that was consistent in both
we noted that the radical-right media are to a certain degree media networks we examined. In a sense, these findings
incorporated into the wider media networks we analyzed. strengthen previous critical assessments of the Romanian
We even found evidence that the radical-right media are public sphere: the radical-right media, and the radical-right
able to maintain their previously formed cluster in the populist discourses they disseminate, are generally ignored
wider media, which we deem to be a sign of a consolidating by mainstream media. In the aftermath of the disastrous
radical-right media microcosm. Our conclusion in this case 2016 Romanian parliamentary elections, PRU announced
is that while Hungary displays media opportunities that are its commitment to unify under its leadership the other radi-
favorable for radical-right populist politics, the political cal-right populist forces; now that Tudor has passed away,
legitimacy of Jobbik is contingent on the radical-right PRM has joined in with the third-largest radical-right
12 SZABÓ, NOROCEL, AND BENE

populist force. The stated ambition is to contest the forth- interpretations of political events in the public sphere. This
coming elections for the European and Romanian parlia- is associated with a disadvantageous communicative envir-
ments as well as the presidential elections as a unified onment for radical-right populist forces. By means of net-
political force. It remains to be seen whether the radical- work analysis, we identified that radical-right media were
right media will respond in kind and push for a more unified positioned as integral parts of a mainly polarized structure
media presence. In perspective, the developments in the two of media networks in Hungary. In Romania we found that
countries question whether there is a causal relationship radical-right media were located at the fringes of media
between favorable discursive opportunities in the media networks. We argue for moving toward a more sophisticated
and electoral successes for radical-right populist forces. It understanding of the media-visibility thesis in the case of
is generally agreed that a high level of media attention radical-right populism: visibility not only matters in the rise
increases the chances for improving election results of radical-right populism, but it is also an important indica-
(Aalberg and de Vreese 2016; Ellinas 2010; Mazzoleni tor for dynamic changes in the discursive opportunities
et al. 2003). In the case of Jobbik in Hungary, however, available for these forces as well. Moreover, we argue for
one may consider the opposite: that the rise in electoral combining the relational approach with that of a structural
support may eventually lead to a wider acceptance of radi- paradigm in studying radical-right populism.
cal-right populist discourses by the mainstream media.
We are nonetheless aware of some inherent limitations to
our analysis. A first limitation pertains to the selection bias: if FUNDING
the media network had been organized around other issues,
perhaps the analysis might then have had slightly different This article was funded through the Incubator program of
findings concerning the location of the radical-right media the Center for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of
and the diffusion of the interpretive frames. A second limita- Sciences.
tion concerns the chosen timeframe: we opted to focus on
recent political developments (2014), and so could not
account, for example, for more complex dynamics of gradual
NOTES
acceptance or increasing irrelevance of radical-right populist
1 The following formula was used for counting the tie value between
discourses in Hungary and in Romania, respectively. Rather,
two media:
our research provides a comparative snapshot that sheds light
on the discursive opportunities for radical-right populist poli- X Wax þ Wbx
 
Wax Wbx

tics in contemporary media networks in the two countries. A 
jWax  Wbx j þ 1 ðWax Wbx Þ þ 0; 001
third limitation concerns the sampling bias: we were not able to
collect a representative sample of broadcast media either in
Hungary or in Romania; this meant that we had to exclude Wax represents the tie value between outlet a and frame x (the number
both television and radio programs from our empirical exam- of times frame x appeared in media a), and Wbx represents the tie
ination. Finally, our study was not able to assess the tone of the value between outlet b and frame x (the number of times frame x
appeared in media b). If any value equals 0, the whole equation
media reporting of political controversies. Further qualitative
results in 0, i.e., no links between the nodes. In the case of all
analyses are needed to examine in what ways radical-right other values this element is close to 1; therefore it does not change
media platforms contribute to the creation of advantageous the ultimate score. As a result, when a frame makes no connection
media opportunities in Eastern Europe. In addition, empirical between two media, the score is 0.
studies could analyze the role of journalists in quarantining 2 We estimated the intercoder reliability using Krippendorff α
(Krippendorff, 2004); this resulted in 0.77 for Issue A, and 0.8 for
radical- right populist discourses or in mainstreaming such
Issue B in Hungary, respectively, and 0.8 and 0.87 in Romania.
discourses in the region.

CONCLUSION ORCID

In this article, we aimed to comprehend the patterns of Ov Cristian Norocel http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7349-4000

visibility and inclusion of radical-right media in mainstream
political interaction in the public sphere in Hungary and
Romania. We argue that the more integrated a position the
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14 SZABÓ, NOROCEL, AND BENE

APPENDIX: SAMPLED MEDIA OUTLETS Romania

Hungary 1. Mainstream media
1. Mainstream media —Dailies and weeklies: Adevărul; Click; Evenimentul
zilei; Jurnalul Naţional; Libertatea; România liberă;
—Dailies and weeklies: Blikk; Bors; Demokrata; HVG;
Ziarul Lumina.
Heti Válasz; Magyar Hírlap; Magyar Narancs; Magyar
—Online news portals and blogs: adevarul.ro; Adrian
Nemzet; Metropol; Népszabadság; Népszava; Világgazdaság.
Năstase blog;alba24.ro; antena3.ro; bzi.ro; citynews.ro;
—Online news portals and blogs: 444.hu; atlatszo.hu;
click.ro; cotidianul.ro; cugetiliber.ro; evz.ro; gandul.info;
atv.hu; bekialtas.blog.hu; Blikk online; Bors online; brux.
hotnews.ro; libertatea.ro; oradetimis.oradestiri.ro; pressa-
info; cink.hu; Figyelő online; hir24.hu; hirado.hu; hvg.hu;
lert.ro; realitatea.net; rtv.net; stiripesurse.ro; tion.ro; zf.ro;
index.hu; jobbegyenes.hu; kardblog.hu; kettosmerce.hu;
ziare.ro; ziaruldeiasi.ro; ziuadecj.realitatea.net; ziuadecon-
kisalfold.hu; magyarhirlap.hu; mandiner.hu; mno.hu; mos-
stanta.ro.
maiorum.hu; napi.hu; nepszava.hu; nol.hu; nyugat.hu;
origo.hu; Örülünk Vincent blog; ozd.hu; portfolio.hu; sze-
gedma.hu; tenytar.hu; tutiblog.com; vs.hu.

2. Radical-right media (both print and online) 2. Radical-right media (both print and online)
—alfahir.hu; Barikád; derestv.hu; Hazai Pálya; Hunhir.info; —buciumul.ro; glasul.info; magazincritic.ro; România
kuruc.info; n1tv.hu. Mare; tricolorul.ro; ziaristionline.ro; ziarulromaniamare.ro.