CENTURY MEETS THE UNITED NATIONS CONFRONTING

THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE

By Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur

There is no global government. Yet, on any given day, mail is delivered

across borders; people travel from one country to another via a variety of
transport modes; goods and services and freighted across land, air, sea and
cyberspace; and a whole range of other cross border activities take place in
reasonable expectation of reliable, safe and secure service for the people, groups,
firms and governments involved. Disruptions are rare — indeed, in many
instances less frequent in the international domain than in some countries that
should have effective and functioning governments. That is, international
transactions are typically characterized by order, stability and predictability. This
is puzzling: How is the world governed even in the absence of a world
governance in order to produce norms, codes of conduct and regulations,
surveillance and compliance instruments? How are values allocated quasi-
authoritatively for the world and accepted as such, without a government to rule
the world?

The Central Challenge

1. The Mismatch of Global Institutions and Global Challenges

The central challenge of the 21st century is that the institutional framework for
dealing with contemporary global challenges does not match the scope, scale and
nature of the challenges themselves. If the 20th century represented the
culmination of a long history of the nation-state as the institutional framework
capable of addressing the challenge of modernity, the global challenges of the
21st century seem to exceed the grasp of the current international framework. This
conundrum does not mean that the nation-state needs to be superseded by a better
and stronger set of international institutions. To the contrary, the nation-state and
national political leaders constitute the foundation of political legitimacy
necessary for global governance and international institutional reform to move
forward.
There are several specific manifestations of institutional inadequacy that
are currently under scrutiny and which have generated proposals for reform. As
comprehensive and important as these four manifestations of incongruence are,
they do not represent the full nature of the mismatch but only illustrate several
obvious gaps in adequacy. First, the United Nations Security Council as a creation
of the post-World War Il alliance in 1945 is confronting a crisis of obsolescence.
Not only are Germany and Japan, the second and third largest economies in the
world, not represented as Permanent members Of the Security Council, but, with
the important exception of China, there are no developing countries represented
either. Second, since the World
Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle in 1999, there is a growing demand
for The 21st century is already being seen as posing challenges distinct from the
twentieth century. The challenges of this century seem to be characterized by a
fundamentally different construct. Whereas 20th century challenges were seen as
requiring specialization within domains to develop the knowledge and approaches
necessary to address them, the challenges of the 21 st century seem to be ones which
require understanding the interlinkages between challenges and the interfaces
between them rather than only burrowing deeper within the problem area itself as the
primary means of developing approaches. While the 20th century relied on specialists,
the 21 st century may come to rely more on people who are integrationists, capable
within their expertise but excelling in their grasp of the relationship between their
area of expertise and those adjacent to it which increasingly drive results within it.

As noted biologist Edward O. Wilson has written: "Most of the issues that
vex humanity daily — ethnic conflict, arms escalation, overpopulation, abortion,
environment, endemic poverty, to cite several most persistently before us — cannot
be solved without integrating knowledge from the natural sciences with that of the
social sciences and humanities." (Wilson 1998, 13). The linkages among the
challenges and between disciplines and approaches are fundamental drivers of
institutional inadequacy and mismatch.

Distinction Between Institutions and Governance

There is a fundamental distinction between the configuration of
international institutions and the process for global governance. In the debate on
global reform, there seems to be a confusion between reform in the institutional
arrangements and governance reform, as if they were the same when in fact they
are related but separate issues. The adequacy of the current configuration of
international institutions to confront global problems is a separate issue from that
of global governance. One is an issue of structure and framework; the other is one
of process and dynamics.

Distinction B etween Representativeness Legitimacy and Performance Legitimacy

 It is useful to distinguish between performance legitimacy and
representativeness. What is not always clear is that there is a tradeoff, or at a
minimum tension, between these two desiderata. For example, the UN General
Assembly must represent the high water mark for representativeness legitimacy
among all international institutions because it is based on the one country — one
vote principle. And yet it is not clear that it is the best vehicle for "getting things
done". The G-7/8 summit mechanism, by contrast, could be an efficient forum for
decision-making because there is a small number of leaders present enhancing
performance legitimacy. However, representativeness legitimacy is increasingly
questioned since the G-7/8 countries constitute a group of Western, industrial
countries with less than 15 percent of the world's population in a world that is
increasingly non-Western and non-industrial.
Authority, Agency and Political Legitimacy in Global Governance
For global governance reform to sufficiently enhance legitimacy, it is not
enough to generate greater performance legitimacy alone through greater
efficacy nor is it enough that reforms embody only greater representativeness
legitimacy. Political legitimacy is the perception that authorities with capacities
to execute decisions (agency) derive their authority from a foundational idea
rooted in widely shared values. Authorities can gain political legitimacy by
political processes, by being elected, for example, or by reflecting the values,
interests and goals of their people even if they do not formally represent them.
This last source of political legitimacy can be seen as being honored in the
branch with recent examples of leaders who cease to reflect their peoples'

values, interests and goals being run off as leaders: Marcos, Pinochet, etc.
There are also broader processes involved in how leaders can achieve
legitimacy by reflecting the broad aspirations of people that embody common
values but go beyond narrow interests by articulating broader but specific goals
which can be addressed and even achieved by agency, process and institutions.
Specific goals have the advantage of laying out expectations of specific results
for which quantitative indicators can be created. By monitoring the evolution of
critical indicators and evaluating specific results, the political interaction of
leadership, decision processes (agency articulation) and institutions can even if
progress is not as high as anticipated. The openness, inclusiveness and integrity
of the process reinforce legitimacy beyond that derived from the values-
aspirations — consensus-goal formation sequence. This entire process enhances
democratic accountability. For all these reasons, national leaders tend to embody
political legitimacy.
3. The Global Age and Global Challenges Frameworks and Goals for the Global
Age
What is really quite stunning is that despite the fact that the configuration
of international institutions and global governance processes are seen to be
inadequate to address global challenges, this inadequacy has not prevented there
being generated two universally endorsed frameworks for prioritizing global
issue and setting goals for dealing with them: the Millennium Declaration and
the Millennium Development Goals. Both derive from a sequence of UN
conferences in the early to mid-1990s which generated a plethora of
recommendations for action on human rights, population social development and
women. These world conferences led to a prioritization of seven International
Development Goals by national authorities, development cooperation ministers
of industrial countries, in May 1996 focusing on poverty, gender equality,
education, health, and environment goals to be achieved by 2015.
 1. The Global Divides: North and South —An In Depth Study
The "double divide" is caused by political power, economic dependency,
and importation/exportation of resources. The transition of industrial production
to cheaper labor sources, international media, and expanding international trade
and communication have in some ways made the world smaller, yet in other
ways made the gaps between nations larger by creating greater dependency of
poor nations to wealthy nations.
2. Modernization theorists' ideas are rooted in the functionalist perspective
inequality. This theory believes that poverty is a basic human condition; so all
countries were poor to begin with. The first countries to adopt modern
technologies, attitudes, and institutions will in turn be the most wealthy
successful. Countries that hold on to traditional views and processes will
behind until modern corporations and novel technological advancements
eventually overtake traditional institutions. On the other hand, the dependency
theory is founded in the conflict perspective of inequality.
2.1. According to dependency theorists, the factor that mainly drives the
"double divide" is colonial imperialism that exploits poor countries by
excessive exportation of resources, taking additional profits, and
controlling through neocolonialism. Poor countries are dependent on
more powerful countries due to debt, foreign aid and domination by the
more powerful governments using economic and cultural influences.
This theory counters the modernization theory in that poverty is not the
fundamental human condition; it is created as a result of capitalism,
imperialism, and neocolonialism. Dependency theorists look at external
factors affecting a nation's struggles with poverty and inequality;
whereas, modernization theorists believe poverty is an internal struggle.
Neoliberalism is the underlying theory associated with the United
States conservative party.
2.2. The IMF and World Bank are the leaders of neoclassical economics
that believe in structural adjustment. Neoclassical economics promotes
that some of the main factors associated with the gaps in equality are
driven by governmental corruption, nepotism, and bureaucracy. To
avoid this, nations need to support an economy controlled by
supplyand-demand, entrepreneurship, technological advancement, and
free enterprise.
2.3. Neoliberals want to uphold individual rights, but are not as supportive
of group rights. In contrast, world systems theorists believe
advancement is determined by the "core centers of power" like the
United States. Core powers allow nations to become semiperipheral, to
serve as economic middlemen, in order to facilitate further capitalist
expansion. The poorest countries make up the periphery and are often
oppressed by the more powerful countries.
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 2.4. This theory states the only way for inequality to cease is for global
capitalism to be "overturned or radically altered" (Sernau, 69). This a
counter argument to neoliberal theorists who believe poor countries
must work their way out of poverty themselves to improve their
economic position.
3. Pascale defines "hegemonic systems" as social processes that reinforce
inequalities in a more subtle way compared to the more upfront forces like
formal laws and physical force that were historically behind the creation
inequalities. This oppression requires ordinary people to believe they have the
same interests and needs as the dominant group. Hegemonic systems are

62
created through more subtle processes like cultural norms, values that lead to
success, and even standards of beauty.
3.1. These social processes create a culture that is based upon the beliefs
and values of the dominant group and require the subordinate group to
internalize and accept the processes. By making hegemonic systems
less ordinary, it requires ordinary people to begin to look at social
processes with a critical eye and ask why.
3.2. Hegemonic systems are successful when they become commonplace
and ordinary people do not question their legitimacy. This silent
undertow propelled by ignorance is what allows oppression to continue
without a "sense of antagonistic domination". When hegemonic
systems become less ordinary and people begin to realize
they are in fact antagonistic and oppressive, these systems cannot be
sustained. They lose their power to control social contexts, thus leading
to their demise.
3.3. Differences between the North and the South were readily apparent
well before the American Revolution. Economic, social and political
structures differed significantly between the two regions, and these
disparities only widened in the 1800s. In 1861, the Civil War erupted
between the two sides, and much of the conflict surrounded regional
differences. Once the war ended, Reconstruction lessened some
regional disparities but increased others.

3.4. Slavery and Free Blacks

The major difference between the North and the South -- and the
one most responsible for the Civil War was the institution of slavery. In
the North, slavery was almost universally prohibited by the 1800s,
while the institution was a cornerstone of Southérn society. In the
 North, many blacks were free, and in states such as Massachusetts,
New York and Ohio, 100 percent of the black population was free. In
the states of the Confederacy, by contrast, few blacks were free.
Virginia had the highest ratio of free blacks to slaves, but even there
only 9 percent of the state's black population was free. The
Emancipation Proclamation would eliminate slavery, but for the first
half of the century, the issue divided the South and North.
4. Industrialization and Immigration
The South's slave economy supported agriculture, while the
North's free society enabled industrialization. By the beginning of the
Civil War, only one-ninth of the United States' industrial capacity was
situated in the South. The North,. meanwhile, produced 97 percent of the
country's firearms and 93 percent of its pig iron. The opportunities of
industrialization attracted European immigrants led to building major
cities in the North. By 1860, the North's population stood at 23 million
compared to the South's nine million. By contrast, 80 percent of
Southerners were employed in agriculture, compared to just 40 percent
in the North in 1860.
5. Political Identities
Before and after the Civil War, the North and South were very different
ih their political alignments. In the early 1800s, many Northerners
belonged to the Whig Party, while Southerners tended towards the
Democrats. By the 1850s and beyond, the Whig Party had collapsed, and
many more Northerners became Republicans, while Southerners remained
loyal to the Democrats. In addition, before the war, abolitionism was much
more common in the North, though even there it was rare.
6. Reconstruction and Its Impact
The end of the Civil War brought an official end to slavery, but it did
not immediately affect economic, political or social differences. Some
Reconstruction era policies even exaggerated them. The federal pension
system, which began in 1862 to provide support to veterans, was only
offered
to Union Army veterans. Former Confederate states created their own pension
systems, but without the financial resources of the federal government, they
often faced financial hardship in financing them.
6.1. As such, Union veterans including African-American veterans earned
financial security in the latter half of the 1800s, while their Confederate
counterparts were less well off Post-war Southern society, meanwhile, was
faced with federal occupption for nearly a decade.

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6.2. Thereafter, racial resentment brewed, and the Ku Klux Klan wreaked
havoc in the region in a way it did not elsewhere. For a brief time after the
war, African-American voting rights were reasonably well protected, but
by 1890 the KKK and others severely limited AfricanAmerican voting
rights in the South.
*Source: https://classroom.synonym.com/differences-northern-southernstates-
1800s-20845.html
The Digital Divide
Digital divide is a term that refers to the gap between demographics and
regions that have access to modern information and communications
technology, and those that don't or have restricted access.

7.1. The divide between differing countries or regions of the world is

referred to as the global digital divide, examining this technological
gap between developing and developed countries on an international
scale.
7.2. The Digital Divide has a tremendous impact upon the culture and the
people of every region. Technology effects every culture in different
ways. Because they do not have access to technology people in
technology poor nations suffer. However, in order to bridge the
digital divide, people need access to technology,
7.3. The North—South divide is broadly considered a socio-economic
and political divide. Generally, definitions of the Global North
include the United States, Canada, Western Europe, outermost
regions of
the European Union, developed parts of Asia (the Four Asian Tigers,
Japan, Brunei and Israel) as well as Australia and New Zealand. The
Global South is made up of Africa, Latin America, and developing Asia
including the Middle East. The North is home to all the members of the G8
and to four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council,
7.4. The North mostly covers the West and the First World, along with much
of the Second World, while the South largely corresponds with the Third
World. While the North may be defined as the richer, more developed
region and the South as the poorer, less developed region, many more
factors differentiate between the two global areas. 95% of the North has
enough food and shelter. The Global South "lacks appropriate technology,
it has no political stability, the economies are disarticulated, and their
foreign exchange earnings depend on primary product exports."
 Nevertheless, the divide between the North and the South increasingly
"corr&sponds less and less to reality and is increasingly challenged."
7.5. In economic terms, the North—with one quarter of the world population—
controls four-fifths of the income earned anywhere in the world. 90% of
the manufacturing industries are owned by and located in the North.
Inversely, the South—with three quarters of the world populations—has
access to one-fifth of the world income. As nations become economically
developed, they may become part of the "North", regardless of
geographical location; similarly, any nations that do not qualify for
"developed" status are in effect deemed to be part of the "South".
8. Theories' Explaining the divide
Uneven immigration patterns lead to inequality: On the Eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries immigration was very common into areas previously less
populated (North America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Australia, New Zealand)
from already technologically advanced areas (Germany, United Kingdom,
France, Spain, Portugal). This facilitated an uneven diffusion of technological
practices since only areas with high immigration levels benefited.
Immigration patterns in the twenty —first century continue to feed this
uneven distribution of technological innovation.
People are eager to leave countries'in the South to improve the
quality of their lives by sharing in the perceived prosperity of the North.
"South and Central Americans want to live and work in North America.
Africans and Southwest Asians want to live and work in Europe.
Southeast Asians want to live and work in North America and Europe".
8.1. Some economist have argued that international free trade and
unhindered capital flows across countries could lead t a contraction in
the North-South divide. In this case more equal trade and flow of
capital would allow the possibility for developing countries to further
develop economically.
8.2. However, policymakers in the South are often skeptical of capitalism
and have proposed alternative solutions. In 1974, Southern nations
called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) to restructure
the global economy. Their demands included linking prices of
commodity exports to manufactured improving the quality of their
represelåtation within institutions such as the World Bank, UN
Security Council, standardizing prices for raw materials, solving food
crises, and "opening up of the North's market for manufactured or
semiprocessed gods of the South.

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 "We are living in a time of mounting societal
discontent and political divisiveness — a fractured
world"

8.3. As some countries in thé South experience rapid

development, there is evidence that those states are
developing high levels of South — South aid. Brazil, in
particular, has been noted for its high levels of aid ($1 Billion
annually ahead of many traditional donors) and the ability to use its
own experiences to provide high levels of expertise and knowledge
transfer. This haé been described as a "global model in waiting"
8.4. The United Nations has also established its role in diminishing the
divide between North and South through the Millennium Development Goals,
all of which were to be achieved by 2015. These goals seek to eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote
gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve
maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure
environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for
development.
Technology can reinforce the global divide.
All over the world, industry is being disrupted by new technology.
What we have today is more than we dared to imagine yesterday: new
business models, new ways of communicating and new job disciplines. The
pace of technological change has brought the arrival of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution.
9.1. The processing power of computers and devices is getting faster,
internet speeds are rising 23% year-on-year and prices for technology
are falling. The price of personal computers has declined by 99.9%
since January 1980 and computer software now costs 0.7% of its
price in 1980.
9.2. Social media and online content make it easier than ever to gain
instant access to news and views, while technology's ubiquitous
presence has opened countless new career avenues for "no collar"
digital natives.
9.3. Yet for all the opportunities this revolution presents, navigating the
brave new world isn't without challenges. Without a decisive plan for
inclusivity at all levels of society, the revolution will fail the very
people it should benefit the most. While our access to unparalleled
levels of information, accessible at the click of a button or the tap of a
touchscreen, has damaged our 'ability to distinguish fact from fiction
with the rise of "fake news", it is just as worrying that those without
 access to technology are being excluded from the discussion in the
first place.
9.4. This is a risk we can't afford to ignore. In recent years, I've seen
more and more media headlines, debates, even TV
programmes intended to entertain, focus on the division and
issues that move us further away from each other.
9.5. If we don't act now, technology has the potential to reinforce these
changes. With opportunists able to misinform and twist our
understanding of the world around us the online space is dominated by
the divide between fact and fiction. The risk here is that technology
will force us to face an even greater divide, not just between the
connected and the disconnected, but between the technologically
empowered and disempowered.
9.6. The divide in connectivity is already starting to make its presence
felt. Look at Latin America and the Caribbean where more than
Ovo thirds of people have no access to mobile broadband,
compared with Japan, where 95% of people do. Intuitively, we
know that's wrong.

9.7. It's received wisdom that access to the internet is essential, but
access is nothing without skills and empowerment. A staggering
one in five (12 million) adults in the UK lack the right skills to
thrive in the digital age. We're at risk of hindering the social
mobility that technological innovation can stimulate. More needs
to be done to support everyone in realizing the benefits of access.
9.8. There's no better place to start than the classroom. The children of
today will be the leaders of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and
we need to reconsider how we educate them. I'd like to see a
move away from the current, exam-focused approach to a model
where we empower and support children's ability to curate,
analyse and evaluate what they're reading or seeing online, not
merely consume it.

9.9. We also need to build trust. It is essential that people feel they can
participate in the digital economy on a level playing field with
their peers and, most importantly, without fear of abuse. Greater
collaboration with each Other, rather than echo chambers of
negativity and prejudice, will achieve this goal.

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9.10. As is the case with so many problems, the answer to bridging the
technological divide lies, ironically, with creative use of
technology. We don't have all the answers yet, and it feels as
though we are learning as
 we go along. But one thing is clear. If this revolution has the potential
to ring in å new era of social progress and strengthened societies, we
need to: improve access to technology; educate everyone so they can
fully benefit from the opportunities it opens up; and avoid the very real
danger of creating a digital underclass.
*Source: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/technology-can
reinforce-the-global-divide-lets-use-it-to-bridge-the-gap/

Asian Regionalism: A Style of Its Own

The world of today is rapidly transforming from a world of states into a world
of regions and states; over the past decade the role played by regions in both local
and global governance has undergone transformations.
1. Among the six Asian leaders (or seven if you include Australia) who attended
the London meeting of the Group of Twenty (G20) on April 2 was the chair of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—the first Fime ASEAN had been
accorded this recognition in such a high-profile international forum. It was a
telling indication of the increased importance of regional cooperation in Asia.
2. Asia is not yet adopting a common approach to tackling the ongoing global
crisis—although neither, to be fair, is the more established European Union
(EU). But by helping to form a consensus among their members, Asia's
regional groupings could help bridge the gap between national policies and
global action, enabling them to tackle the global crisis more effectively.
3. This essay compares Asian regionalism with Europe's. It contrasts their
differing approaches to regional cooperation and integration and draws
lessons for how they could address the global crisis and other
common challenges.
4. Models of regionalism
4.1. A common thread runs through the turbulent histories of Asia and
Europe: the immense dynamism and impressive discoveries of
their great civilizations h4ve often been directed towards
destruction and death. Fortunately, their collective energies are
now channeled more constructively—not least into closer
regional cooperation that entrenches peace and 4.2. Regionalism
has progressed much further in Europe than in Asia. The
devastation wreaked by two world wars convinced Europeans of
the importance of working together to bind their economies and
societies together. They realized that by pooling théir sovereignty
with their neighbors in certain areas they could achieve
 more than by acting alone. By drafting common rules, promoting close
coordination among national authorities, and developing strong regional
institutions that advance economic integration, the EU has generated huge
economic gains and sharply narrowed the income gap among member
countries. EU governments also cooperate closely in foreign and security
policy, as well as in justice and home affairs.
4.3. The milestones in Europe's economic integration are the creation of a
customs union, followed by a single market, and then a common
currency. Very broadly speaking, after adopting a common trade
policy, European countries agreed to the free movement of goods, labor
and services, then progressively liberalized their capital accounts, and
more closely coordinated their monetary and exchange-rate policies
before introducing the euro in 1999. Thus the integration of production
and trade preceded—and was a precondition for—financial and
monetary integration.
4.4. The EU now has an extensive institutional structure and a large
regional bureaucracy centered in Brussels, its administrative capital.
The European Commission, Council of Ministers, Court of Justice,
Parliament and other EU institutions employ more than 60,000
eurocrats, while EU governments' very large permanent delegations in
Brussels act as strategically important extensions of national ministries
and agencies.
Regionalism in Asia has developed rather differently. Regional
integration has been driven more by markets than by governments.
Cooperation among national authorities is more recent and less
intimate. It remains focused on economic issues (with some social
components) and light on formal institutions. For now, it involves no.
political ambitions, although ASEAN has an advanced security
dialogue with several Asian and non-Asian partners.

4.5. Asia's pragmatic and flexible approach to regionalism is partly dictated

by history. Asian countries are little inclined to compromise their
independence by pooling sovereignty with their neighbors, not least
because several Asian nation states have only recently emerged from
colonialism and need first to build their national identities.
5. Despite its current problems, the EU is often considered to be gold standard
for countries working together for peace and prosperity. While there are many
types of regionalism in the world — North America has NAFTA , South
America has Mercosur, Australia and New Zealand have Closer Economic
Relations — Asia is seen as a latecomer.

70
 See Stephan Richter and John Wes€s article in The Jakarta Post:
Regionalism, Asia Style. This is actually the time for a perfect role reversal:
Today's Europe needs to embrace Asia's original private-sector orientation,
while Asia now has Europe's starting point of using trade to overcome difficult
history.
5.1. What is unique about Asian regionalism in a global context iS
that it has been substantially market-driven. This move started in
1985, following the Plaza Agreement to revalue the yen, when
many Japanese companies began offshoring labor-intensive
manufacturing activities to lower-cost destinations, such as the
ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia and China. Soon after, Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
followed suit in offshoring production. The region's value chains for
electronics, automobiles, clothing and footwear and other products
were thus gradually established.
6. Value chains spread to Asia
6.1. In the first phase, the final products of these value chains were
primarily sold to U.S., European and Japanese markets. However, ever
since the 2008 Lehman shock and the subsequent financial crisis,
there has been an acceleration of regional integration. China, in
particular, became a more active trading and investment partner of all
Asian countries.
6.2. With the rising purchasing power of Asia's middle class, Asia's value
chains are now increasingly servicing Asian consumers. Today, some
40% of East trade takes place within the region, compared with 30%
two decades ago. In Europe, the percentage of trade that is conducted
within the region already amounts to 69%. The goal for East Asia
should be move dynamically into the same percentage range.
6.3. Given the current level, that would require at least 50% increase in the
share of regional trade. That seems entirely feasible, given the growth
and population dynamics of the wider region. Consider also that this
by no means implies any "decoupling" from other global markets, or
specifically the U.S. market.
6.4. It just foreshadows a trading world where Asia completes the process
from initially being an outsourcing destination for multinational
corporations to becoming the key growth driver of the global economy.
Such a broadening of Asian nations' trade portfolio would be win-win
situation for Asia.
7. Comparing models
 7.1. The European example shows that such an intensification of trade
within the region also has important spillover effects into fields
other than trade. Doing business with each other ultimately is the
best instrument with which to build what most of Asia seems to
strive for — better neighborly relations. Trade ultimately is the
best confidence building measure
7.2. The two regions can also learn from each other. Europe would do
well to emulate the flexibility of Asia's production structures and
labor markets, its emphasis on investment in productivity-
enhancing research and development (R&D), and its concept of
Open regionalism, which minimizes discrimination against non-
members.
7.3. Asia could adopt some of the EU's governance principles. These
include: (i) deciding some issues by qualified majority voting and
others by consensus; (ii) giving additional weight to small
countries and minorities in decision-making, so as to make
regionalism more inclusive; (iii) the 'subsidiarity' principle,
whereby decisions are taken

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 at the lowest sensible level of government; (iv) the open method of
coordination, which allows member countries to agree on initiatives for
intergovernmental cooperation without legal constraints; and (v) mutual
surveillance through peer review and peer pressure, to ensure that
members respect commitments before resorting to sanctions.
7.4. Asia could also take inspiration from Europe's pro-activeness in creating
common institutions. Although trying to establish strong regional
institutions that involve the pooling of members' national sovereignty
would be premature, much could be done to enhance Asia's institutional
capabilities for economic cooperation. As the ongoing crisis is reshaping
the global financial architecture, enhancing Asia's economic dialogue
and cooperation is an important step to shape and raise its profile in
global institutions.
7.5. The EU is often presented as the integration model for other regional
groupings, in Asia and elsewhere. But while regions can learn from
others' experiences, their needs and circumstances vary. Asia must find
its own path to greater cooperation and integration. This requires
visionaries, people with great ideas who—as Jean Monnet, Robert
Schumann, and Altiero Spinelli did in Europe—can influence opinion
makers, inspire national leaders, and eventually enable the region to
speak with a more prominent common voice in global forums.
8. Asian and European representatives attending the G20 London Summit
8.1. APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
8.2. ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It includes Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
8.3. ASEAN+3 includes the 10ASEAN members plus the People's Republic
of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
8.4. ASEM = Asia-Europe Meeting.
8.5. EAS = East Asia Summit. It includes ASEAN+3 members plus
Australia, India, and New Zealand.
8.6. EU = European Union. It includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
8.7. (*) Abhisit Vejjajiva is the Prime Minister of Thailand, but was invited
to attend the G20 London Summit in his capacity as Chair of ASEAN.

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 8.8. (**) Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are members of ASEAN but
not of APEC.
8.9. Mirek Topolanek is the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, but was
invited to attend the G20 London Summit in his capacity as President of
the European Council.
8.10. (****) The country is not a recognized G20 member.
*Source: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/21/asian-regionalism-
howdoes-it-compare-to-europes/

"It is our belief that values — based leadership

provides the key to converting these current
challenges into future opportunities. "

9. Asia's economic integration has been largely driven by the development of

increasingly sophisticated production networks that span the region and
enable corfipanies to benefit from each country's comparative advantages,
through an articulated regional division of labor. As industries have been
transferred from advanced economies to developing ones, the production
of manufactured goods has been fragmented across the region. This, in
turn, has generated a huge expansion of intraregional trade in parts and
components. But since Asia's exports of final goods mostly go to the
United States and Europe, closer regional connections have gone hand in
hand with greater global ties.
10. The catalyst for the recent enhancement of regional cooperation in Asia
was the 1997/8 financial crisis. This created a greater awareness pf the
region's shared interests and vulnerabilities. In particular, it created a
greater need for financial cooperation—prompting the establishment of
the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers' Process and several related structures
such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative—
at an earlier stage of integration than in Europe. The emergence of Asian
regionalism also reflects the region's disappointment with the way the
International Monetary Fund handled the 1997/98 crisis.
11. Asia does not yet have a single market in goods and services, although
bilateral and subregional trade agreements have multiplied in recent years.
This is in part driven by the stalling of the World Trade Organization's
Doha Round, but also by the proliferation of preferential trade
agreements around the world. Even so, Asia's regionalism remains

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 outward-oriented—focused on supporting market relationships rather than
supplanting them and on sustaining its openness to global markets.
12. Asia lacks strong regional institutions and a bureaucratic body to serve the
region. Unlike in Europe, regional treaties tend to be short and focused on
codifying informal interactions among members rather than introducing a
complex set of binding rules, and related sanctions. Asia's few regional
institutions are small and lean, with a limited mandate from national
authorities to manage external shocks, internalize regional spillovers, and
provide effective regional public goods. Whereas European regionalism is
dominated by the EU, Asian regionalism is based on many overlapping
subregional organizations that cooperate to varying degrees in different areas
and provide a solid backbone to connect markets and people.

13. The criteria for admission to the EU are quite clear—democracy, a market
economy, and the transposition into national law of EU laws and regulations
(the acquis communautaire). Compliance with these rules can be monitored
fairly objectively. Candidate countries must also be approved by a consensus of
existing EU member states. In the case of Asian regional bodies, however, it is
difficult to identify an unambiguous set of rules governing membership issues, as
they are generally based on ad hoc decisions by political leaders.

"If you're concernéd about environmental crisis and climate

change, learn about sustainability"

14. Important regional players such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), India,
and Japan have yet to start a concrete dialogue on formulating a vision, shared goals
and roadmap for regional cooperation in Asia. But the Creation of the East Asia
Summit (EAS) in 2005—which brings together the 10 members of ASEAN, plus the PRC,
Japan, and the Republic of Korea (which together make up ASEAN+3), as well as
Australia, India, and New Zealand—could eventually provide a forum for such an
impetus. While the EAS has no plans for now to create an 'Asian Commission' and
unerge as the Asian counterpart to the EU, EAS, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN could help
Asia to act together and speak with a single voice.
15. Facing the future
15.1. Europe and Asia both face the huge challenge of articulating a
response to the ongoing economic crisis. Although its ultimate impact
on regional cooperation and integration is still unclear, it could give a
new impetus to Asian regionalism, as the 1997/8 crisis did.

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 15.2. Compared to the model Europe pursued, Asia has had the distinct
advantage that it did not put the cart before the horse. Its regionalism has been
market-led—and thus Started out with emphasizing the right path for creating the
basis for shared prosperity in the region. Unlike in Europe, Asian governments
have arguably followed, rather than led,

this process.
15.3. That does not mean, however, thåt governments don't have an important role
to play. One concrete example where they can achieve something
transformative is discussions of a possible FTA between China, Japan
and Korea that have been underway for some time.
15.4. Another example concerns relations between South Korea and
Vietnam. The two nations, very much on opposite ends militarily
during the Vietnam War, are now slated to sign a bilateral free trade
agreement by year's end.
15.5. That kind of forward-looking pragmatism should be an inspiration to
other nations across Asia. A particularly crucial economic dimension
where this should play out, given the size of both economies, is in the
trade relationship between Japan and South Korea, two countries that
have continued to see their difficult pasts haunt their future. Will
Korea follow Vietnam in putting progress first?

15.6. The history-healing aspect aside, the cross-cultural understanding that

trade connections foster is also pivotal for Asia's future.

"Sustainable development means "meeting the needs of

the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs"

16. Asia's boon: Diversity

16.1. Asia is undoubtedly more diverse than Europe — whether in terms of
level of development (from rich Singapore to very poor Laos), politics
(from democracy to dictatorship and everything between), economics
(free markets to state capitalism and more), or religion (Buddhism,
Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Shintoism and more). In fact, diversity
is the very definition of Asia.
16.2. But this diversity. has ;not stopped Asian countries from working
together for 'prosperity and peace. And . over time, market-led

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 regionalism has proven its value and is now progressively becoming
more institutionalized.
16.3. The evidence to date suggests that Asia's experience in regionalism
has been very successful. Almost seven decades ago, in the midst of
the Cold War, no one could have imagined Asian countries working
together as they are doing today.
16.4. Asia's regionalism is most certainly a work-in-progress, but it is
progressing step-by-step. And while it showed the European Union the
importance of basing regionalism on the private sector as a driving
force, Asia can now take a decisive step forward by emulating
Europe's past focus on governments working with each other to
overcome the specters of the past.
*Source: https://www.theglobalist.com/regionalism-asia-style/
17. A Unified Korea
17.1. For centuries before the division, the peninsula was a single, unified
Korea, ruled by generations of dynastic kingdoms. Occupied by Japan
after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and formally annexed five years
later, Korea chafed under Japanese colonial rule for 35 years—until
the end of World War Il, when its division into two nations began.
17.2. "The catalyzing incident is the decision that was made—really,
without
the Koreans involved —between the Soviet Union and the United
States to divide Korea into two occupation zones," says Michael
Robinson, professor emeritus of East Asian Studies and History at
Indiana
University, who has written extensively on both modern Korea and its
history.
18. Why was Korea Divided?
18.1. In August 1945, the two allies "in name only" (as Robinson puts it)
divided control over the Korean Peninsula. Over the next three years
(1945-48), the Soviet Army and its proxies set up a communist regime
in the area north of latitude 380 N, or the 38th parallel. South of that
line, a military government was formed, supported directly by the
United States.
18.2. While the Soviet policies were widely popular with the bulk of the
North's laborer and peasant population, most middle-class Koreans
fled south of the 38th parallel, where the majority of the Korean
population resides today. Meanwhile, the U.S.-supported regime in the

77
 South clearly favored anti-communist, rightist elements, according to
Robinson.
18.3. "The ultimate objective was for the Soviet Union and the United
States to leave, and let the Koreans figure it out," he explains.
"The trouble was that the Cold War intervened... And everything
that was tried to create a middle ground or to try to reunify the
peninsula is thwarted by both the Soviet Union and the United
States not wanting to give in to the other."
18.4. In 1948, the United States called for a United Nation-sponsored vote
for all Koreans to determine the future of the peninsula. After the
North refused to participate, the South formed its own government in
Seoul, led by the strongly anti-communist Syngman Rhee.
18.5. The North responded in kind, installing the former communist
guerrilla Kim Il Sung as the first premier of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the capital of
Pyongyang.
19. KOREAN WAR
19.1. The Korean War (1950-53), which killed at least 2.5 million people,

did little to resolve the question of which regime represented the "true"
Korea. It did, however, firmly establish the United States as the
permanent béte noire of North Korea, as the U.S. military bombed
villages, towns and cities across the northern half of the peninsula.
19.2. "They leveled the country," Robinson says. "They destroyed
every city." The armistice that ended that conflict in 1953 left the
peninsula divided much as before, with a demilitarized zone
(DMZ) running roughly along the 38th parallel.
19.3. Unlike another Cold War-era separation, between East and West
Germany, there has been extremely little movement across the DMZ
between North and South Korea since 1953. Robinson describes the
border as "hermetically sealed," which helps to explain the drastically
different paths the two nations have taken, and the continuing divide
between them.
20. HERMIT KINGDOM
20.1. With continuing strong ties-to the West (and an ongoing U.S. military
presence), South Korea developed a robust economy, and in recent
decades has made steps toward becoming a fully democratic nation.

78
 "The world has changed, so must our standards of
leadership"

20.2. Meanwhile, North Korea remained an isolated "hermit kingdom" —

particularly after the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s —
and economically underdeveloped, as well as a virtual police state
ruled by a single family for three generations.
20.3. The North's dedicated efforts to develop a nuclear program have also
greatly heightened tensions with South Korea and its allies,
particularly the United States.
21. KOREA TODAY
21.1. Despite recent efforts at diplomacy under South Korea's new
president, Moon Jae-in, the stark differences between the two Koreas
were on full display in the run-up to the 2018 Winter Olympic Games.
Even as South Koreans began welcoming athletes from around the
world to the Winter Games, Kim Jong Un's regime in the North put on
a military parade in Pyongyang's historic Kim Il Sung square.
21.2. AsCNNreported,fourofthecountry'snewestmissiles, theHwagong-
15,
flew over the parade as Kim watched from a balcony, then spoke about
the evils of imperialism.
21.3. Appropriately, the parade commemorated the day Kim's grandfather,

Kim Il Sung, formed the Korean People's Army (KPA) in 1948 — a

fateful year in the history of Korea's division.
21.4. "Starting in 1948, there are two established state organizations run by
Koreans, each claiming to be the legitimate leaders of the people of
the whole nation," Robinson says. "And frankly, nothing's changed
since then."

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