Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO G.R. No. 208232

R. BAUTISTA, namely: EPIFANIA
G. BAUTISTA and ZOEY G.
BAUTISTA, Present:
Petitioners,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD,
FRANCISCO LINDO and MENDOZA, and
WELHILMINA LINDO; and HEIRS LEONEN,JJ.
OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN, namely:
MA. LOURDES DAQUIGAN,
IMELDA CATHERINE
DAQUIGAN, IMELDA DAQUIGAN
and CORSINO DAQUIGAN,
REBECCA QUIAMCO and
ANDRES QUIAMCO, ROMULO
LORICA and DELIA LORICA,
GEORGE CAJES and LAURA
CAJES, MELIDA BANEZ and
FRANCISCO BANEZ, MELANIE
GOFREDO, GERVACIO CAJES and
ISABEL CAJES, EGMEDIO
SEGOVIA and VERGINIA
SEGOVIA, ELSA N. SAM, PEDRO
M. SAM and LINA SAM,
SANTIAGO MENDEZ and MINA
MENDEZ, HELEN M. BURTON and
LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE
JACINTO and BIENVENIDA
JACINTO, IMELDA DAQUIGAN,
LEO MATIGA and ALICIA
MATIGA, FLORENCIO ACEDO
JR., and LYLA VALERIO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
March 10, 2014
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I
Decision 1 G.R. No. 208232

The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the

April 25, 2013 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No.
(1798)-021 as well as its Order of July 3, 2013 denying reconsideration.

The Facts

Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in

1983 a free-patent land located in Poblacion, Lupon, Davao Oriental and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (1572) P-6144. A few
years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein
respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two
months later, OCT No. (1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees.1

Three years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a

complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC, Branch 32,
Lupon, Davao Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No. 1798,2 anchoring his
cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141,
otherwise known as the “Public Land Act,” which reads:
SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of
five years from the date of the conveyance.

Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel,

prescription, and laches, as defenses.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was
substituted by petitioner Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).

Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a

compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to
Epifania a three thousand two hundred and thirty square meter (3,230
sq.m.)-portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and
withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise
was approved by the RTC in its Decision dated January 27, 2011, the fallo
of which reads:

1
Namely: Francisco S. Lindo (TCT No. T-14045); Filipina Daquigan (TCT No. T-14050); Lyla
D. Valerio (TCT No. T-15372); Rebecca P. Quiamco (TCT No. T-14051); Romulo D. Lorica (TCT No. T-
14052); George D. Cajes (TCT No. T-14053); Melida A. Bañez (TCT No. T-14054); Melanie T. Gofredo
(TCT No. T-14055); Gervacio Cajes (TCT No. T-14056); Elsa N. Sam (TCT No. T-14058); Pedro M. Sam
(TCT No. T-14059); Santiago T. Mendez (TCT No. T-14060); Florencio Acedo Jr. (TCT No. T-14061);
Helen M. Burton (TCT No. T-14062); Jose Jacinto (TCT No. T-14063); Imelda L. Daquigan (TCT No. T-
14064); Leo Matiga (TCT No. T-14066); and Egmedio C. Segovia (TCT No. T-14057).
2
“Civil Case No. (1798)-021” in some parts of the records.
 WHEREFORE, a DECISION is hereby rendered based on the
above-quoted Compromise Agreement and the parties are enjoined to
strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the same.

SO ORDERED.3

Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss4 dated

February 4, 2013, alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of the
property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they asserted that the total
selling price of all the properties is only sixteen thousand five hundred pesos
(PhP 16,500), and the selling price or market value of a property is always
higher than its assessed value. Since Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as
amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving title to
or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is
more than PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
in question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below
the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.

RTC Ruling5

Acting on the motion, the RTC issued the assailed order dismissing
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court found that Bautista
failed to allege in his complaint that the value of the subject property
exceeds 20 thousand pesos. Furthermore, what was only stated therein was
that the total and full refund of the purchase price of the property is PhP
16,500. This omission was considered by the RTC as fatal to the case
considering that in real actions, jurisdictional amount is determinative of
whether it is the municipal trial court or the RTC that has jurisdiction over
the case.

With respect to the belated filing of the motion, the RTC, citing Cosco
Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company,6 held that a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction may be filed at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the complaint for Repurchase, Consignation, with

Preliminary Injunction and Damages is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.7

Assignment of Errors

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners now

seek recourse before this Court with the following assigned errors:

3
Rollo, p. 98.
4
Id. at 101-104.
5
By Presiding Judge Emilio G. Dayanghirang III.
6
G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012, 670 SCRA 343.
7
Rollo, p. 23.
 I

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN ADMITTING

THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED FEBRUARY 4, 2013,
BELATEDLY FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE
CASE.

II

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE INSTANT CASE FOR REPURCHASE IS A REAL
ACTION.8

The Issue

Stated differently, the issue for the Court’s resolution is: whether or
not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Arguments

Petitioners argue that respondents belatedly filed their Motion to

Dismiss and are now estopped from seeking the dismissal of the case, it
having been filed nine (9) years after the filing of the complaint and after
they have actively participated in the proceedings. Additionally, they allege
that an action for repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, it being founded on privity of contract between the
parties. According to petitioners, what they seek is the enforcement of their
right to repurchase the subject property under Section 119 of CA 141.

Respondents, for their part, maintain that since the land is no longer
devoted to agriculture, the right of repurchase under said law can no longer
be availed of, citing Santana v. Mariñas.9 Furthermore, they suggest that
petitioners intend to resell the property for a higher profit, thus, the attempt
to repurchase. This, according to respondents, goes against the policy and is
not in keeping with the spirit of CA 141 which is the preservation of the land
gratuitously given to patentees by the State as a reward for their labor in
cultivating the property. Also, the Deed of Absolute Sale presented in
evidence by Bautista was unilaterally executed by him and was not signed
by respondents. Lastly, respondents argue that repurchase is a real action
capable of pecuniary estimation.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent

laws.

8
Id. at 12.
9
No. L-35337, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 853.
 Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is
provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.―Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is

incapable of pecuniary estimation;

2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession

of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in

Sec. 33 of BP 129, which provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.―Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:

xxxx

3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which

involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one

involving title to or possession of real property or any interest therein or one
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present

petitioners’ predecessor, Alfredo R. Bautista, is to enforce his right to
repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-patent
holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act.

The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free
patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
 It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.10 In
this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil,11 wrote that “in determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim.” But where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and,
hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable
exclusively by RTCs.12

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of

pecuniary estimation, viz:

1. Actions for specific performance;

2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the
civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;13
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.14

The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is
one for specific performance.

The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which
were covered by a free patent. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly
contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant
within a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance pursuant to
Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and
made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is
deemed written into every contract.15 Although a contract is the law
between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts
are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between
the parties.16 Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he
may seek to enforce. That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to
10
General Milling Corporation v. Uytengsu III, G.R. No. 160514, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 241,
245.
11
G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999, 304 SCRA 738, 744; citation omitted.
12
Id.
13
1 F. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 44 (9th rev. ed., 2005).
14
Id. at 45; citing Vda de Murga v. Chan, No. L-24680, October 7, 1968, 25 SCRA 441.
15
National Steel Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Br. 2, Iligan City, G.R.
No. 127004, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 595, 608.
16
Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 113363,
August 24, 1999, 313 SCRA 1, 14.
enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of free patent.
Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly
such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance.
Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.

Respondents argue that Bautista’s action is one involving title to or

possession of real property or any interests therein and since the selling price
is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is lodged with the MTC. They rely
on Sec. 33 of BP 129.

Republic Act No. 769117 amended Sec. 33 of BP 129 and gave

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos (PhP 20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs.

At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title
to or possession of the lots he sold to respondents. Since the total selling
price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction
over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots
by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners, is but
incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to
redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. The reconveyance of the
title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to
repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or
remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome
of the performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to
the express provision of CA 141.

Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real

property or an interest therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first
level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP
16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of
respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because
respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC
and aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are
already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle
of jurisdiction by estoppel.

17
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.”
 In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party
raising defenses to the complaint, actively participating in the proceedings
by filing pleadings, presenting his evidence, and invoking its authority by
asking for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the court.18

Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to
dismiss––it having been filed nine (9) years from the filing of the
complaint––respondents actively participated in the proceedings through the
following acts:

1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for

Injunction19 dated September 29, 1994 whereby they even
interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000 for unpaid
survey accounts, PhP 100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP
200,000 and PhP 3,000 per daily appearance by way of attorney’s
fees, PhP 500,000 as moral damages, PhP 100,000 by way of
exemplary damages, and costs of suit;
2. By participating in Pre-trial;
3. By moving for the postponement of their presentation of
evidence;20
4. By presenting their witness;21 and
5. By submitting the compromise agreement for approval.22

Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking
the RTC’s authority by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no
longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply put, considering
the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should be,
considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the
dismissal of the action.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED. The April 25, 2013 and July 3, 2013 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. (1798)-021 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Lupon, Davao Oriental is

ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. (1798)-
021.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

18
G.R. No. 186366, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 556, 567-568; citations omitted.
19
Rollo, pp. 44-50.
20
Id. at 94.
21
Id. at 145.
22
Id. at 97-98.
Decision 9 . 208232

PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.

WE CONCUR:
I
!
I...._

l;w
ROBERTO A. ABAD ENDOZA
Associate Justice
t

.J1ARVIC MA VICTOR F. LEO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the o
Court's Division.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice