LABOR LAW > LABOR RELATIONS > VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION

ROGELIO BARONDA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO.,
INC., Respondents.

FACTS: Respondent Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. employed the petitioner as a mud
press truck driver. He hit HIDECO's transmission lines while operating a dump truck,
causing a total factory blackout. Power was eventually restored but the restoration cost
HIDECO. Following the incident, HIDECO served a notice of offense requiring him to
explain the incident within three days from notice. He complied. Thereafter, the
management conducted its investigation, and, finding him guilty of negligence,
recommended his dismissal. The resident manager served a termination letter and
informed him of the decision to terminate his employment effective at the close of
office hours of that day. Hence, HIDECO no longer allowed him to report to work on the
next day. The petitioner, along with another employee also dismissed by HIDECO, filed
in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
in Tacloban City a complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO.

Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. handled the case and eventually rendered his
decision by finding the petitioner's dismissal illegal, and ordering his reinstatement.
Voluntary Arbitrator Lopez, Jr. deemed the petitioner's separation from the service as a
suspension from work without pay, and commanded him to pay on installment basis the
damages sustained by HIDECO incident he had caused. HIDECO filed a motion for
reconsideration but the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the motion. Accepting the outcome,
HIDECO subsequently reinstated the petitioner. The petitioner filed his manifestation
with motion for the issuance of the writ of execution in the Office of the Voluntary
Arbitrator praying for the execution of the decision, and insisting on being entitled to
backwages and other benefits. HIDECO opposed the petitioner's motion for execution
and simultaneously presented its own motion for execution to enforce the decision of
the Voluntary Arbitrator directing the petitioner to pay the actual damages. The
Voluntary Arbitrator denied the petitioner's motion for execution on the ground that the
decision did not award any backwages and granted HIDECO's motion for execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision
was executory pending appeal.

HELD: YES

The timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of
the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator the reinstatement aspect of the
Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory regardless of the filing of
such motion for reconsideration or appeal.The immediate reinstatement of the
employee pending the appeal has been introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No.
6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor Code. The duties and responsibilities of
the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to
forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force,
which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an
indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.

We see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator, or

to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is ordered by the Labor Arbiter.
Voluntary arbitration really takes precedence over other dispute settlement devices.
Such primacy of voluntary arbitration is mandated by no less than the Philippine
Constitution and is ingrained as a policy objective of our labor relations law.The
reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force
and effect as that of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage
parties to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to
enforce the constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and
to enhance social justice.

MONTAÑO v VERCELES G.R. No. 168583 July 26, 2010  

The Federation/Union's Constitution and By‐Laws govern the relationship between and
among its members. They are akin to ordinary contracts in that their provisions have
obligatory force upon the federation/ union and its member. What has been expressly
stipulated therein shall be strictly binding on both.  

FACTS: Atty. Montaño worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center on October 1,
1994. Subsequently, he joined the union of rank‐and‐file employees, the FFW Staff
Association, and eventually became the employees' union president in July 1997. In
November 1998, he was likewise designated officer‐in‐charge of FFW Legal Center.  

During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW, Atty.
Montaño was nominated and elected for the position of National Vice‐President despite
the finding of FFW COMELEC that Atty. Montaño is not qualified to run for the position
because Section 76 of Article XIX of the FFW Constitution and By‐Laws prohibits
federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board and strong opposition and
protest of respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the
convention and president of University of the East Employees' Association (UEEA‐FFW)
which is an affiliate union of FFW.  

On May 28, 2001, through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC, Atty. Verceles
reiterated his protest over Atty. Montaño's candidacy which he manifested during the
plenary session before the holding of the election in the Convention. On June 18, 2001,
Atty. Verceles sent a follow‐up letter to the President of FFW requesting for immediate
action on his protest.  
On July 13, 2001, Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA‐FFW and officer of the
Governing Board of FFW, filed before the BLR a petition13 for the nullification of the
election of Atty. Montaño as FFW National Vice‐ President.  

Atty. Montaño filed his Comment with Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and not the BLR
has jurisdiction over the case.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * FFW COMELEC: Montano not qualified. * Bureau of

Labor Relations (BLR): Montano qualified. it upheld its jurisdiction over the intra‐union
dispute case and affirmed, as well, Atty. Verceles' legal personality to institute the
action as president of an affiliate union of FFW, the BLR ruled that there were no
grounds to hold Atty. Montaño unqualified to run for National Vice‐President of FFW. *
BLR (motion for reconsideration): denied * CA: reversed BLR, montano not qualified.
Atty. Montaño did not possess the qualification requirement under paragraph (d) of
Section 26 that candidates must be an officer or member of a legitimate labor
organization. According to the CA, since Atty. Montaño, as legal assistant employed by
FFW, is considered as confidential employee, consequently, he is ineligible to join FFW
Staff Association, the rank‐and‐file union of FFW. * CA (motion for reconsideration):
denied.  

ISSUES & RULING: 1. WON the CA was correct in upholding the jurisdiction of the BLR;

YES. The BLR has jurisdiction over intra‐union disputes involving a federation.  

Section 226 of the Labor Code28 clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional
Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter‐union and intra‐union
disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and
workers' association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR's jurisdiction over
the instant dispute involving member‐unions of a federation arising from disagreement
over the provisions of the federation's constitution and by‐laws.  

Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra‐union dispute settlement mechanism.
Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard ‘shall be filed in the Regional Office
where the union is domiciled.' The concept of domicile in labor relations regulation is
equivalent to the place where the union seeks to operate or has established a
geographical presence for purposes of collective bargaining or for dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.  

The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra‐union dispute involves a
federation, because the geographical presence of a federation may encompass more
than one administrative region. Pursuant to its authority under Article 226, this Bureau
exercises original jurisdiction over intra‐union disputes involving federations. It is well‐
settled that FFW, having local unions all over the country, operates in more than one
administrative region. Therefore, this Bureau maintains original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from any violation of or disagreement over any
provision of its constitution and by‐laws. 

2. WON the CA was correct in not declaring as premature the petition in view of the
pending protest before FFW COMELEC;  

YES. The petition to annul Atty. Montaño's election as VP was not prematurely filed.  

It is true that under the Implementing Rules, redress must first be sought within the
organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by‐laws. However, this
requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances. the
FFW COMELEC failed to timely act thereon. Thus, Atty. Verceles had no other recourse
but to take the next available remedy to protect the interest of the union he represents
as well as the whole federation, especially so that Atty. Montaño, immediately after
being proclaimed, already assumed and started to perform the duties of the position.
Consequently, Atty. Verceles properly sought redress from the BLR so that the right to
due process will not be violated.  

3. WON the CA was correct in not finding that the petition violated the rule on non‐
forum shopping;  

Montano is estopped from raising this issue since he only raised this during this motion
for reconsideration with the CA. The allegation regarding certification against forum
shopping was belatedly raised. It is settled that new issues cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal or on motion for reconsideration.  

4. WON the CA was correct in not dismissing the case for being moot in view of the
appointment of Atty. Verceles as NLRC Commissioner;  

The CA is correct. There is necessity to resolve the case despite the issues having
become moot. As manifested by Atty. Verceles, Atty. Montaño ran and won as FFW
National President after his challenged term as FFW National Vice‐President had
expired. It must be stated at this juncture that the legitimacy of Atty. Montaño's
leadership as National President is beyond our jurisdiction and is not in issue in the
instant case. The only issue for our resolution is petitioner's qualification to run as FFW
National Vice‐President during the May 26‐ 27, 2001 elections. We find it necessary and
imperative to resolve this issue not only to prevent further repetition but also to clear
any doubtful interpretation and application of the provisions of FFW Constitution & By‐
laws in order to ensure credible future elections in the interest and welfare of affiliate
unions of FFW.  

5. WON Montano is qualified to run as National Vice ‐ President  

NO, the decision of FFW COMELEC is final and should have been given credence.  

FFW COMELEC, undeniably, has sufficient authority to adopt its own interpretation of
the explicit provisions of the federation's constitution and by‐laws and unless it is shown
to have committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision and ruling will not be
interfered with. The FFW Constitution and By‐laws are clear that no member of the
Governing Board shall at the same time perform functions of the rank‐and‐file staff. The
BLR erred in disregarding this clear provision. The FFW COMELEC's ruling which
considered Atty. Montaño's candidacy in violation of the FFW Constitution is therefore
correct.  

6. WON the CA was correct in granting the petition to annul Montano's election as FFW
National Vice‐ President on the ground that FFW Staff Association is not a legitimate
labor organization.  

NO. the CA's declaration of the illegitimate status of FFW Staff Association is proscribed
by law, owing to the preclusion of collateral attack.