A.M. No.

RTJ-03-1774             May 27, 2004

PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant,

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By a Sworn Complaint1 dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta
(complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with
"gross ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct."

Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, on motion of the accused, by Order 2 of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case
No. 212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia Say Chaw, et al., for illegal entry.

Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97 "[d]espite . . . the provision of P.D. 1599 which established the
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the apprehension of the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone,"
respondent "virtually surrender[ed] our sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction to the Chinese government."3

Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he has yet to resolve, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the lapse of more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such
failure, complainant charges respondent with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which
requires lower courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three months or ninety days from date of submission.

Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, "without giving notice to the prosecution," the petition for bail of Jose
Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable
cause against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 ("Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act").4

Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him (complainant) from appearing in Crim Case No. 634-99, People v.
Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainant’s) designation to handle the prosecution of the case by the Ombudsman.

By Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000,5 respondent contends that petitioner has no personality to initiate the complaint
against him as he is not a party to the cases subject thereof.

On the merits of the charges, respondent counters that territorial jurisdiction over the area where the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97
were arrested — within the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal — has not yet been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the
conflicting claims thereover by the Philippines and China and the absence of an inter-country agreement determining the common
boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone.6

As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his July 9, 1997 Order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case
No. 212-97, respondent points out that said motion was filed after the accused were already released from detention. He further points
out that during the pendency of said motion, representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) informed him that said office
was not interested in setting aside the order of dismissal but that it was suggesting an amendment of the order.7 Respondent explains
though that since the accused had already been released from detention and had left the Philippines, and the interest of the DFA was
merely for the amendment of the order of dismissal, the motion had already become academic.

As to the second charge, respondent informs that the petition for bail of Mangohig who was then under preliminary investigation,
which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set
by Mangohig heard on the morning of January 4, 2000 during which there was no appearance from the Prosecutor’s Office; and that
as the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense, respondent granted him bail.

As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No. 634-99, respondent explains that he had already reconsidered the same
through his February 10, 2000 Order,8 he having earlier failed to see petitioner’s designation by the Ombudsman.
In its August 16, 2002 Report,9 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found, as to the first charge, that it was not shown that
respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith sufficient to find him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it having appeared
that respondent based his dismissal order on his interpretation of a provision of law. The OCA thus concluded that as respondent’s
conclusions in his assailed order are not without logic or reason, and unattended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith, 10 he
could not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law. The OCA hastened to add, however, that respondent "is nonetheless required to act
on the motion for reconsideration."

As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of Court requires a movant to serve notice of his motion on all parties
concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof, hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail without hearing the
prosecution’s side.

Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondent’s explanations were fraught with inconsistencies since his allegation that
he failed to see complainant’s designation as Ombudsman-Prosecutor in Crim. Case No. 634-99 is belied by his December 17, 2000
Order11 wherein he noted that complainant was deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute said case. The OCA in fact
noted that respondent’s subsequent February 10, 2001 Order reconsidering his December 17, 2000 Order was issued only after the
latter order had attained finality and the instant case was filed.

The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) Pesos.

By Resolution of February 26, 2003,12 this Court noted the OCA Report and required the parties "to MANIFEST within twenty (20)
days from notice, whether they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted."

By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003,13 complainant proffered additional charges against respondent and submitted in support thereof,
among other things an administrative complaint filed by one Dr. Reino Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders issued by
respondent. Dr. Rosete’s complaint, which was addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, is both undated and
unsigned, however. In the same Manifestation, complainant submitted the case for decision.

On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance Division of this Court received an undated manifestation14 of respondent stating that he
was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed in the case.

This Court’s Findings

I. On the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97

On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the
public and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply to a given controversy.15 They are called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain
the desired professional competence.16

The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of Crim. Case No. 212-97 on jurisdictional grounds is, however, a matter for
judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an
administrative complaint.17

For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 18 Only in cases where the error is gross or patent,
deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith may administrative sanctions be imposed.19 There is no showing that this
was the case here.

With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-
97 no resolution of which has been issued, complainant, in his Reply to the Comment of respondent, refutes respondent’s explanation
in this wise:

When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the Chinese fishermen were not yet released from detention. It was during
the pendency of the motion that the Chinese fishermen were allowed to leave by the Chief of Police of Subic, Zambales despite our
representation that they should not be released from jail as another case for illegal fishing was still pending investigation. . . . The
representatives from the Foreign Affairs merely wanted to convey to Judge Ubiadas the serious implications of his Order of dismissal
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity and national security of our country. In fact, Foreign Secretary
Domingo Siazon publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge Ubiadas as evidenced of an article which appeared in the
July 13, 1997 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of said article is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made integral part
hereof.

There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no longer interested in the setting aside of his Order of dismissal. In fact,
the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of dismissal was already filed in his Court and he even issued an Order dated 18 July
1997 submitting the said Motion for resolution. Copy of said Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made
integral part hereof. Since the said Motion for Reconsideration of his Order of dismissal was already considered by him as submitted
for resolution as of 18 July 1997, Judge Ubiadas should have resolved one way or the other, the said motion. 20 (Underscoring
supplied)

Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already released at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not
relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he even issued an order stating that it was submitted for resolution.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct direct judges to dispose
of their cases promptly and within the prescribed periods, failing which they are liable for gross inefficiency.21

To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with, this Court laid down guidelines in
SC Administrative Circular No. 1322 which provides, inter alia, that:

Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months
from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so.
(Underscoring supplied)

This injunction is reiterated in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-9923 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, failure to observe which is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties
to speedy disposition of their cases.24

Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent is liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order which is
a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and which carries the penalty of suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than ₱10,000 but not
exceeding ₱20,000.

II. On the grant of bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 271-99

Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a respondent-suspect-detainee,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought. 25 So Fortuna v.
Penaco-Sitaca26 instructs:

[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable
legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding
applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)27

True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. 28 Given the filing of
the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was afforded reasonable
notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing
that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the application for bail by showing that evidence of
guilt is strong.29

While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a "reasonable
notice" of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a
three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice,
there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice.

Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense
committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the prosecution.
In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, 30 which is punishable by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape31 qualified by relationship which is punishable by death.

Under the circumstances, by respondent’s assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure 32 which is a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries
the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than ₱20,000 but not exceeding ₱40,000.33

This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is
entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense
without being subject to punishment prior to conviction,34 against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the
community from dangerous elements.35

III. On the failure to recognize complainant’s special designation from the Ombudsman in Crim. Case No. 634-99

The brushing aside by the OCA of respondent’s explanation on the matter is well taken.

In the exercise of his power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient," 36 the
Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the government service for assistance. 37 Section 31 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 provides:

Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors – The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize
any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and
control.

It is on the basis of the above-quoted provision of law that Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero endorsed Case No. OMB-1-
98-2418 (Chan v. Esmane-Diaz) to complainant with the instruction to file the Information and to prosecute the case.38 The
indorsement included an order to submit a monthly report to the Office of the Ombudsman of any actions taken in relation to the case.

Respondent’s December 17, 1999 Order39 which states, inter alia, as follows:

The Officer-in-Charge of the City Prosecutor’s Office is hereby directed to designate any of the Assistant Prosecutors of the City
Prosecutor’s Office to take the place of Provincial Prosecutor Dorentino Z. Floresta. While Prosecutor Floresta appears to have been
deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute this case, no special reason was given for such authority. Instead, it appears
that such designation was merely based on the premise that the offense charged was committed in Subic municipality as erroneously
indicated in the original Information filed with this Court.

Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of Prosecutor Floresta himself, shows that the place of the commission of
the offense charged is in Olongapo City, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor does not have the authority to continue prosecuting
this case for the People of the Philippines (Section 2, Rule 117, 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For this reason, the Office of the
City Prosecutor should take his place inasmuch as the Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo has territorial jurisdiction over the
offense charged.40 (Underscoring supplied),

shows that he was not only aware of complainant’s designation, hence, belying his explanation that he must have overlooked the
same. It also shows his ignorance of the above-cited provision of the Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special
reason for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of any prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.

It would appear though from respondent’s above-quoted December 17, 1999 Order that he was of the belief that it was the City
Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had "territorial jurisdiction" over the offense. It is in this light that he is given
the benefit of the doubt, absent any showing that he was motivated by malice or bad faith.

With respect to the charges raised against respondent in complainant’s April 1, 2003 Manifestation, by which complainant submitted
an unsigned and undated complaint by a certain Dr. Reino Rosete and copies of respondent’s other assailed decisions: While Section 1
of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, allows the institution of administrative proceedings upon an anonymous complaint, the
veracity of Rosete’s complaint is doubtful as it does not bear his signature. It is clearly not intended to be an anonymous complaint.
Finally, on the rest of the charges against respondent, this Court is unable to pass upon them as complainant merely submitted
photocopies of respondent’s assailed orders without stating clearly and concisely the alleged acts and omissions constituting violations
of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of Court or the Code of Judicial Conduct.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 72, Olongapo City, is found GUILTY of
undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the law or procedure in granting an application for bail without affording
the prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), with
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.