HA DATU TAWAHIG v.

CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR I LINETH LAPINID

GR No. 221139, 2019-03-20
Facts:
Lorriane Fe P. Igot (Igot) filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Cebu
City Prosecutor charging Sumatra with rape.
Prosecutor I Lineth Lapinid found probable cause to charge Sumatra
with rape and recommended filing a corresponding information.
Judge Singco directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Sumatra, but he would not be arrested until July 2, 2013. Following his
arrest, Sumatra filed a Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to
Quash.These motions cited as bases Sections 15[9] and 65[10] of the
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, and were:... predicated on the ground
that the Regional Trial Court]ha[d] no jurisdiction over the case.
Singco denied the Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to
Quash. She reasoned that: The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not
apply to the prosecution of a "dispute" such as this case as it does not
involve claims over ancestral domain nor it relates to the rights of
indigenous communities/people which would require the application of
customary laws and practices to resolve the "dispute" between the parties
herein.
A certain Vicente B. Gonzales, Jr. (Gonzales), identifying himself as
Datu Bontito Leon Kilat and representing himself to be a "customary
lawyer," filed a "Motion to Release the Indigenous Person," which was
founded on grounds substantially the same as the Motion and Supplemental
Motion to Quash.
Sumatra filed this Petition for Mandamus on November 11, 2015. He
notes that Igot had already brought her accusations against him before the
concerned Council of Elders and that the Dadantulan Tribal Court was
subsequently formed. He adds that on January 3, 2007, the Dadantulan
Tribal Court issued a Resolution clearing him and declaring that he "should
be spared from criminal, civil, and administrative liability."
Relying on the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and "other related laws
concerning cases involving indigenous peoples," petitioner maintains that a
writ of mandamus must be issued to compel respondents to "uphold and
respect" the Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "thereby release
Sumatra from jail to stop [his] continued arbitrary detention."
Issues:
1.Whether or not this Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering
respondents Judge Estela Alma Singco, City Prosecutor II Fernando
Gubalane, City Prosecutor I Lineth Lapinid, City Prosecutor Nicolas Sellon,
and Assistant City Prosecutor Ernesto Narido, Jr. to desist from proceeding
with the rape case against petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra. NO
2. Whether the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act works to remove from courts
of law jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. NO
RULING:
1. NO. Court denies the Petition
1987 Constitution vests this Court original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. However, it is not only this Court that has the competence to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court of Appeals
and regional trial courts are equally capable of taking cognizance of petitions
for such writs.
Nonetheless, the original jurisdiction this Court shares with the Court
of Appeals and regional trial courts is not a license to immediately seek relief
from this Court. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus must be
filed in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is grounded on considerations of judicial economy.
The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent
"inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to
prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets.
noted that "the doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of
courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner
However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible
rule. In Spouses Chua v. Ang, this Court held that a strict application of this
rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a
case."
This Court has recognized that a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction may be warranted in exceptional cases as when there are
compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition, or when what is raised is a
pure question of law.
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined
EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE ON HIERARCHY OF COURTS.
Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following
grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised
that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves
transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is
of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional
organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may
affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when
the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
 2. NO. This Court, however, takes cognizance of the Petition, in the
interest of addressing the novel issue of whether the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act works to remove from courts of law jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving indigenous peoples. It does not.
Petitioner asserts that, in light of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, it
was respondents' duty to desist from proceeding with the case against him.
His plea for relief, therefore, falls under the first situation. For a writ of
mandamus to be issued in such a situation, there must be a concurrence
between: (1) a clear, duly established legal right pertaining to petitioner; and
(2) a correlative, ministerial duty imposed by law upon respondent, which
that respondent unlawfully neglects. First situation demands a concurrence
between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a correlative duty
incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed
upon them by law. Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly
established. It cannot be a prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled
Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to
perform the act mandated by law.
Duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than
discretionary.
Additionally, a writ of mandamus, as with certiorari and prohibition,
shall be issued only upon a showing that "there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law
to desist from taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous
peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of petitioner's
cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
A crime is "an offense against society. It "is a breach of the security
and peace of the people at large. A criminal action, where "the State
prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law," is thus
pursued "to maintain social order. It "punishes the offender in order to deter
him or her and others from committing the same or similar offense, . . .
isolates him or her from society, reforms and rehabilitates him or her."
One who commits a crime commits an offense against all the citizens
of the state penalizing a given act or omission:"a criminal offense is an
outrage to the very sovereignty of the State.
Accordingly, a criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the
"People" as plaintiff. Likewise, a representative of the State, the public
prosecutor, "directs and controls the prosecution of an offense... capacity to
prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the State's police power.
It inheres in "the sovereign power instinctively charged by the
common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the
interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties
of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights."
 The basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions make it
improper for the State to yield "disputes" involving criminal offenses to
indigenous peoples' customary laws and practices. To yield criminal
prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as
the objects of criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may
enable a measure of reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal
offenses, but it will never enable the consummate recompense owed to the
State and the Filipino people.
Ultimately then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a
miscarriage of justice. It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's
intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice. Its view of self-governance
and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances. Preservation is
pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with
the national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal
statutes designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.
Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of
mandamus, there is no right or duty to even speak of here. Nowhere in the
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to abandon
jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying
customary laws.
Petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be
spared from criminal liability. The Regional Trial Court is under no
obligation to defer to the exculpatory pronouncements made by the
Dadantulan Tribal Court. Instead, it must proceed to rule on petitioner's
alleged liability with all prudence and erudition. WHEREFORE, the Petition
is DENIED.
Principles:
The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous
peoples was never intended and will not operate to deprive courts of
jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Individuals belonging to indigenous
cultural communities who are charged with criminal offenses cannot invoke
Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to
evade prosecution and liability under courts of law.