G.R. No. L-1006. June 28, 1949.)
G.R. No. L-1006. June 28, 1949.)
G.R. No. L-1006. June 28, 1949.)
SYLLABUS
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former People’s Court with treason
on three counts, namely: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid
or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the
United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably collaborate, associate and fraternize with the said Imperial
Japanese Forces, going out with them in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla
hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movement in the
Philippines; bearing arms against the American and guerrilla forces in the furtherances
of the war efforts of the Imperial Japanese Forces against the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, and mounting guard and performing guard duty for
the Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison in the municipality of Lopez, Province of
Tayabas, Philippines.
"2. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid
or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the
United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with Japanese
soldiers in and around the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in search of
guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy with the
resistance movement in the Philippines.
"3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the municipality of Lopez, Province
of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest and/or cause to be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla and did turn him
over and deliver to the Japanese military authorities in their garrison, since which time,
that is, since the said 18th day of March, 1944, nothing has been heard from the said
Antonio Conducto and is considered by his family to have been killed by the Japanese
military authorities."
cralaw virtua1aw library
The court found "no concrete evidence as to defendant’s membership in the U. N. or
Makapili organization nor on what the patrols he accompanied actually did once they
were out of town", and so was "constrained to rule that the evidence of the prosecution
fails to establish, in connection with counts 1 and 2, any true overt act of treason." We
may add that no two witnesses coincided in any specific acts of the defendant. The
People’s Court believed, however, "that the same evidence is sufficient to prove beyond
question defendant’s adherence to the enemy." cralaw virtua1aw library
As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the People’s Court was that it had been fully
substantiated.
The record shows that on or about March 11, 1944, Japanese patrol composed of
seventeen men and one officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas in
barrio Bibito, Lopez, Province of Tayabas, now Quezon. As a result, some of the
inhabitants of Bibito and neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred, were
arrested and others were ordered to report at the poblacion. Among the latter were
Antonio Conducto, a guerrilla and former USAFFE, Conducto’s wife, parents and other
relatives.
Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March 18, 1944, at about 5 o’clock in
the afternoon, in obedience to the Japanese order, she and the rest of her family went
to the town from barrio Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escleto’s house,
told them to stop and took down their names. With her were her daughter-in-law,
Patricia Araya, her son Antonio Conducto, and three grandchildren. After writing their
names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in the poblacion where they were
questioned by someone whose name she did not know. This man asked her if she heard
gunshots and she said yes but did not know where they were. The next day they were
allowed to go home with many others, but Antonio Conducto was not released. Since
then she had not seen her son. On cross-examination she said that when Escleto took
down their names Antonio Conducto asked the accused if anything would happen to him
and his family, and Escleto answered, "Nothing will happen to you because I am going
to accompany you in going to town." cralaw virtua1aw library
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town, Filemon Escleto stopped her, her
mother-in-law, her husband, her three children, her brother-in-law and the latter’s wife
and took down their names; that after taking down their names Escleto and a Philippine
Constabulary soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her husband asked Escleto
what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto said "nothing" and assured
Conducto that he and his family would soon be allowed to go home; that Escleto
presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, "This is Antonio Conducto
who has firearm;" that afterward they were sent upstairs and she did not know what
happened to her husband.
The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower court’s findings. It will readily be seen
from a cursory examination thereof that the only point on which the two witnesses,
Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero, agree is that the accused took down the names of
Conducto and of the witnesses, among others, and came along with them to the town.
Granting the veracity of this statement, it does not warrant the inference that the
defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of doing so. What he allegedly did
was compatible with the hypothesis that, being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought it
convenient as part of his duty to make a list of the people under his jurisdiction who
heeded the Japanese order.
It was not necessary for the defendant to write Conducto’s name in order to report on
him. The two men appeared to be from the same barrio, Escleto knew Conducto
intimately, and the latter was on his way to town to present himself. If the accused had
a treasonable intent against Conducto, he could have furnished his name and identity to
the enemy by word of mouth. This step would have the added advantage of concealing
the defendant’s traitorous action from his townmates and of not appraising Conducto of
what was in store for him, knowledge of which might impel Conducto to escape.
That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by the prosecution is best
demonstrated by the fact that it included, according to witnesses, Conducto’s wife and
parents and many others who were discharged the next day. The fact that, according to
the evidence of the prosecution, spies wearing masks were utilized in the screening of
guerrillas adds to the doubt that the defendant had a hand in Conducto’s misfortune.
In short, Escleto’s making note of persons who went to the poblacion as evidence of
overt act is weak, vague and uncertain.
The only evidence against the appellant that might be considered direct and damaging
is Patricia Araya’s testimony that Escleto told a Philippine Constabulary soldier, "This is
Antonio Conducto who has firearm." But the prosecution did not elaborate on this
testimony, nor was any other witness made to corroborate it although Patricia Araya
was with her husband, parents and relatives who would have heard the statement if the
defendant had uttered it.
Leaving aside the question of Patricia’s veracity, the failure to corroborate her
testimony just mentioned makes it ineffective and unavailing as proof of an overt act of
treason. In a juridical sense, this testimony is inoperative as a corroboration of the
defendant’s taking down of the name of Conducto and others, or vice-versa. It has
been seen that the testimony was not shown to have been made for a treasonable
purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication. This process of evaluating evidence
might sound like a play of words but, as we have said in People v. Adriano (44 Off.
Gaz., 4300 1) the authors of the two-witness provision in the American Constitution,
from which the Philippine treason law was taken, purposely made it "severely
restrictive" and conviction for treason difficult. In that case we adverted to the following
authorities, among others: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there
must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act." (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd
ed., Sec. 2038, p. 271.)
"It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be
possible to piece bits together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the
support of two oaths; . . ." (Opinion of Judge Learned Hand quoted as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)
"The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is
that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the
accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every action, movement, deed,
and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the
testimony of two witnesses." (Cramer v. U. S. of A., 65 S. Ct., 918; 89 Law. ed., 1441.)
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional
provision. Perhaps the framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than
modern researches in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a
quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude
device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not,
is severely restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional
Convention was warned by James Wilson that ’Treason may sometimes be practiced in
such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous
correspondence with an Enemy.’ The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the
difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim
or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group
considered that ’prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.’" (Cramer v. U. S. of
A., supra.)
The decision of the People’s Court will be and the same is reversed with costs de oficio.