Cia - Report Tortura 2015

H U M A N
R I G H T S
NO MORE EXCUSES
W A T C H A Roadmap to Justice for CIA Torture
No More Excuses
A Roadmap to Justice for CIA Torture
Copyright © 2015 Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-1-62313-2996
Cover design by Rafael Jimenez
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NOVEMBER 2015 978-1-62313-2996
No More Excuses
Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 8
Key Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 9

To US Authorities ..................................................................................................................... 9
To Foreign Governments .......................................................................................................... 9
I. Background ................................................................................................................................ 10
Short History of the CIA Program ............................................................................................. 10
The CIA Program: What Was Known before the Senate Summary .............................................. 19
Justice Department Inquiry into CIA Torture ............................................................................. 25
New Details in the Senate Summary ....................................................................................... 29
US Response to the Senate Summary......................................................................................32
II. Bringing Criminal Prosecutions in the US .................................................................................... 35

Substance of Potential Charges .............................................................................................. 35
Torture and Conspiracy to Torture ........................................................................................... 35
Evidence of Conspiracy to Torture ........................................................................................... 41
Evidence of Torture: Conduct Beyond What Was Authorized .................................................... 65
Other Criminal Charges ........................................................................................................... 81
Defenses ............................................................................................................................... 88
III. Repairing the Harm and Ending Torture ..................................................................................... 96

Obligation to Provide Redress, Compensation, and Rehabilitation ......................................... 96
US Failure to Comply with International Legal Obligations ...................................................... 98
Legislation, Other Measures ................................................................................................. 104
IV. International Accountability Mechanisms .................................................................................111

Investigations and Prosecutions of US Officials ......................................................................117
Investigations Focused on European Complicity .................................................................... 137
Potential Investigation by the International Criminal Court .................................................... 144
Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 147

To the US President .............................................................................................................. 147
To the Department of Justice ................................................................................................. 148
To the US Congress ............................................................................................................... 148
To Countries that Provided Support to the CIA Rendition Program .......................................... 148
To All Foreign Governments................................................................................................... 149
To Specific National Authorities in the Following Countries.................................................... 149
To the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and UN
Experts and Bodies ................................................................................................................151
To the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court ..........................................151
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... 152

Summary
It is now well established that following the attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated a global, state-sanctioned program
in which it abducted scores of people throughout the world, held them in secret
detention—sometimes for years—or “rendered” them to various countries, and tortured or
otherwise ill-treated them. While the program officially ended in 2009, the cover-up of
these crimes appears to be ongoing.
Many detainees were held by the CIA in pitch-dark windowless cells, chained to walls,
naked or diapered, for weeks or months at a time. The CIA forced them into painful stress
positions that made it impossible for them to lie down or sleep for days, to the point where
many hallucinated or begged to be killed to end their misery. It used “waterboarding” and
similar techniques to cause near suffocation or drowning, crammed detainees naked into
tiny boxes, and prevented them from bathing, using toilets, or cutting their hair or nails for
months. “We looked like monsters,” one detainee said of his appearance while in CIA
custody.
Much new information about detention and interrogation in the CIA program became
public with the release in redacted form of the 499-page summary of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence report in December 2014 (“Senate Summary”). The Senate
Summary reported that the CIA subjected at least five detainees to “rectal feeding,”
described in one case as infusing the pureed contents of a lunch tray into the detainee’s
rectum via a medical tube, done “without evidence of medical necessity.” The Senate
Summary also found that during a waterboarding session, one detainee became
“completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.” The CIA
forced some detainees to stand for days on end without sleep while they had broken
bones in their legs and feet, even though CIA personnel knew this would cause them long-
term physical injury. A CIA cable described one detainee as "clearly a broken man" and "on
the verge of complete breakdown."
The US government has not adequately accounted for these abuses. It has an obligation
under international law to prosecute torture where warranted and provide redress to
victims, but it has done neither. No one with real responsibility for these crimes has been
1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

held accountable and the government has actively thwarted attempts on the part of
victims to obtain redress and compensation in US courts.
The Obama administration asserted that it conducted a criminal investigation of the CIA
program through a Department of Justice inquiry led by a career prosecutor, Assistant US
Attorney John Durham. The Durham investigation closed on August 30, 2012 without
bringing any criminal charges. The apparent failure of the investigation to question current
or former detainees undercuts any claims that it was thorough or credible.
As set out in this report, Human Rights Watch concludes there is substantial evidence to
support the opening of new investigations into allegations of criminal offenses by
numerous US officials and agents in connection with the CIA program. These include
torture, assault, sexual abuse, war crimes, and conspiracy to commit such crimes. In
reaching this conclusion, we have drawn on our own investigations, media and other
public reports, and the declassified information in the Senate Summary. But more
evidence exists that has yet to be made public.
We believe that an independent and impartial investigation that has access to the full
Senate report, other information that the government continues to keep classified, and
interviews with current and former detainees, would yield further evidence of crimes and
identify more suspects than we do here.
US officials who created, authorized, and implemented the CIA program should be among
those investigated for conspiracy to torture as well as other crimes. They include: Acting
CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, Assistant Attorney General for Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) Jay Bybee, OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, an individual identified
as “CTC Legal” in the Senate Summary, CIA Director George Tenet, National Security Legal
Advisor John Bellinger, Attorney General John Ashcroft, White House Counsel Legal Advisor
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, Deputy White House
Counsel Timothy Flanigan, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Defense
Department General Counsel William Haynes II, Vice President Dick Cheney, and President
George W. Bush. In addition, James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, CIA psychologist
contractors who devised the program, proposed it to the CIA, and helped carry it out,
should also be investigated for their role in the initial conspiracy.
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We believe there is also sufficient evidence to investigate others who were not necessarily
part of the initial conspiracy but who later joined it. Individuals can join an already existing
conspiracy if they are aware of the conspiracy’s unlawful aims, in this case torture, and
take steps intended to help the conspiracy succeed. These would include those who
reauthorized the program after the legal memos endorsing it—the “Torture Memos”— were
withdrawn, those who supplied false information to the Justice Department upon which the
Justice Department relied in providing reauthorization, and those who later oversaw
operation of the CIA program.
Others should not only be investigated for torture but also for offenses such as war crimes,
assault, and sexual abuse. Even if individuals who carried out the torture can be said to
have reasonably relied in good faith upon OLC memos or CIA guidance to justify their
conduct—which, as detailed below, there is serious reason to doubt—considerable
evidence exists that CIA officers and interrogators tortured detainees in ways that went
beyond what was authorized.
This report also considers and rebuts arguments that barriers to prosecution under US
law—such as statutes of limitation, certain defenses, or a “specific intent” requirement—
might make it impossible to pursue criminal cases.
The failure to credibly investigate and prosecute torture committed in any territory under
US jurisdiction violates US obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and other treaties to which the US
is a party. Other countries and entities should open their own investigations into CIA
torture and should exercise universal jurisdiction, where applicable, over US nationals and
others implicated in torture or other abuses. Additionally, countries that were complicit or
otherwise unlawfully assisted the CIA program should also conduct investigations into the
alleged illegal conduct of their own nationals.
Besides violating international law, the US government’s inaction in the face of clear
evidence of torture sends a message to future US policymakers and officials that they too
can commit torture and other ill-treatment and not fear being held accountable. Several
presidential candidates for the 2016 elections have already indicated they would consider
using so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” if they were to be elected.

Holding government officials accountable for serious abuses is never easy; when high-
level officials are involved, it can be politically divisive. But Human Rights Watch research
over the past 25 years in dozens of countries has shown that forgoing criminal
accountability carries a high price. (See particularly Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice
Short (2009)). Lack of accountability may fuel future abuses and weaken the rule of law.
Globally, the US unwillingness to prosecute CIA torture weakens US authority to oppose

torture and other abuses abroad, provides a ready excuse for countries unwilling to
prevent or prosecute torture in their own countries, and undermines global respect for the
rule of law.
The egregious abuse of prisoners in CIA custody and failure to hold anyone accountable
has undermined global efforts to fight terrorism. Detainee abuse, including abuse of
prisoners by the US military, has been used by terrorist groups to obtain new recruits and
contributed to anti-US sentiment in many countries.
Ultimately, the guilt or innocence of any of the US officials involved in organizing or

carrying out the CIA program will rest with the criminal justice system. Suspects should be
tried in criminal proceedings that comport with international due process and fair trial
standards, including allowing them to challenge evidence, present defenses, and raise
mitigating circumstances. But before these fundamental institutions of democratic rule
can even be set in motion, US criminal justice officials need to first conduct credible
investigations and bring charges where appropriate, requirements that have gone unmet
for well over a decade since the first revelations of CIA torture after 9/11.
This report is organized into three parts—credible investigations and prosecutions,

redress, and international justice—reflecting different steps the US and other countries
should take to pursue accountability for CIA program abuses.
Credible Investigations and Prosecutions: The first part of this report examines some of
the specific federal criminal charges that could be brought against US officials involved the
CIA program. The most senior responsible officials should not be able to avoid culpability on
the grounds that they relied on advice from White House lawyers stating that the
interrogation techniques used on detainees did not amount to torture. This defense is weak
not only because the legal reasoning was so poor that it was soon repudiated by other Bush
NO MORE EXCUSES 4
administration lawyers and virtually all other legal professionals, but also because, in this
case, those involved in the CIA program themselves helped create the legal advice being
used as a shield to protect them from accountability for their alleged crimes.
Officials in the CIA and at the White House should have known, from the moment the
techniques in question were proposed, that they were violating the federal Torture Statute:
the techniques were reverse-engineered from a program designed to train US special
forces to endure torture, some were explicitly designated as torture by US courts, and
many were banned in the US Army Field Manual for Intelligence Interrogations in effect at
the time the abuse was approved.
And there is evidence in the Senate Summary that officials actually knew that the
techniques violated the Torture Statute. According to a Department of Justice Office of
Professional Responsibility investigation (OPR investigation), the CIA, through its acting
General Counsel John Rizzo, expressed concern about “criminal liability” under the Torture
Statute and sought, but failed to obtain, a guarantee from the Justice Department’s
Criminal Division that employees would not be prosecuted for use of the techniques.
The Senate Summary also contains a reference to a draft letter to the attorney general from
“CTC Legal” —a likely reference to someone in the legal department of the CIA’s
counterterrorism center—acknowledging that the “aggressive methods” of interrogation
the CIA was planning would violate the Torture Statute. While there are no records showing
that the letter was sent, its existence shows that at least some CIA advisers believed from
the beginning that the techniques being proposed were illegal. Finally, the OPR
investigation also noted that in mid-2002 senior White House and CIA officials appear to
have been involved in shaping the contents of the soon-to-be issued legal memos
authorizing abusive interrogation techniques, with sections likely added at their request
after the Justice Department refusal to give a non-prosecution guarantee.
Viewed in this context, there is strong reason to conclude that the infamous and since
discredited “Torture Memos” issued by the OLC in August 2002 authorizing techniques
that many others had previously determined to be torture, should be viewed as little more
than a legal fig leaf. “The position taken by the government lawyers in these legal
memoranda amount to counseling a client as to how to get away with violating the law,”

said John Gibbons, former chief judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, after
the memos had been released.
Other White House and CIA officials and OLC lawyers later joined the conspiracy by
knowingly keeping in the dark government officials they knew would oppose the CIA
program, allowing the conduct to continue despite knowledge detainees were being
mistreated, and reauthorizing the program once original authorizations were revoked after
news of torture by the US military at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq became public.
CIA personnel also engaged in practices that went well beyond the illegal techniques
“authorized” by the Torture Memos. Practices such as “rectal feedings,” use of water to
induce near suffocation, and certain painful stress positions, were either not authorized or
administered in ways that were not authorized. As such, the memos should not even be
contemplated as a defense for such actions.
Lastly, while the five-year federal statute of limitations for most federal crimes might be
thought to present an insurmountable bar to prosecution, it should not apply to many of
the crimes committed as part of the CIA program. It is not a bar to prosecutions for torture
or conspiracy to torture when there is a “foreseeable risk that death or serious bodily
injury” may result, or to prosecutions for the types of sexual abuse allegedly committed by
CIA program personnel. For all federal conspiracy charges, moreover, the statute of
limitations can be extended if perpetrators conceal a central component of the conspiracy,
as seems to have been the case here.
Redress: The second part of this report looks at the US government’s obligation to provide
redress to victims of abuse, including compensation and rehabilitation services,
guarantees of non-repetition (including through legislation and public statements), and
public disclosure of relevant information. The Convention against Torture and other
treaties require the US to provide redress for torture and other serious abuses, including
arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. Not only has the US failed to provide
compensation or any other form of redress to detainees in CIA custody, the Obama
administration has blocked every attempt by former detainees to bring civil suits in US
courts by invoking doctrines of state secrecy, state immunity, and national security.
NO MORE EXCUSES 6
International Justice: The third part of this report looks at the efforts of other governments
to investigate CIA torture and related abuses that occurred in their countries.
Investigations in other countries have targeted US officials as well as national officials
alleged to have participated in or been complicit in CIA abuses.
The duty to prosecute serious violations of international law lies primarily with domestic
judicial authorities in the country with principal jurisdiction over the crime. This normally
requires having a territorial link to the crime or the persons involved. However, third
countries can also investigate and prosecute on the basis of universal jurisdiction—laws
embodying the idea that certain crimes, including torture and war crimes, are so egregious
that every state has an interest in bringing perpetrators to justice.
The Convention against Torture contains a universal jurisdiction clause that places an
affirmative duty on governments to prosecute suspects who come on their territory
regardless of where the torture took place. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to war
crimes contains similar provisions. The US government’s failure to conduct its own
thorough and credible investigations into allegations of torture increases the importance
of states exercising universal jurisdiction for crimes alleged to have been carried out as
part of the CIA program.
Although the United States is not a party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ICC
may also be an avenue to accountability for alleged abuses by US nationals in
Afghanistan. The ICC is conducting a preliminary examination of the situation in
Afghanistan, which includes alleged torture of detainees by US armed forces there.
Whether the preliminary examination will lead to a formal investigation was not known as
this writing.

Methodology
The report was assembled using the numerous public source materials that now exist
documenting CIA renditions, detentions, torture and other ill-treatment. This includes our
own Human Rights Watch reporting and the declassified information in the Senate
Summary, but also books, media, and other public reports, both by governmental and non-
governmental organizations. It is also informed by nearly 15 years of our own research,
reporting and analysis on US counterterrorism abuses post 9/11.
We took this extensive factual record and supplemented it with legal research into the
various charges that could be brought for certain offenses under US law. In doing so we
focused on the main charges that would be available for the conduct in question and did
not include other charges such as obstruction of justice or false reporting that do not
center on the actual conduct in question. We also tried to include the most viable charges
and intentionally excluded those for which we thought a case might be made but for which
it was not clear whether there was sufficient evidence to support. We also supplemented
the factual record with legal research into civil remedies and international law.
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Key Recommendations
To US Authorities
• The Attorney General, with the support of the president, should appoint a special
prosecutor to conduct a thorough, independent, and credible criminal investigation
into the CIA torture that examines all evidence, including statements from current
and former detainees.
• The president should acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize to victims of torture, and

devise policies ensuring that victims receive appropriate redress, compensation,
and rehabilitation services.
• The president should declassify the full Senate Intelligence Committee Report on
the CIA rendition, detention, and interrogation program, redacting only what is
strictly necessary to protect national security, to ensure there is a full public
accounting of government wrongdoing and that victims of torture can obtain
redress.
To Foreign Governments
• Governments that provided support to the CIA program should ensure impartial
and independent criminal investigations of complicity in torture and other criminal
offenses allegedly committed in their countries by national and US officials in
connection with CIA renditions or interrogations, and prosecute those implicated in
crimes. Unless and until US officials show a willingness to pursue meaningful
accountability for CIA torture, other governments should exercise universal
jurisdiction or other forms of jurisdiction provided under international and
domestic law to investigate and, evidence permitting, prosecute US officials for
their alleged role in torture and other abuses.

I. Background
Short History of the CIA Program

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States took the lives of nearly 3,000 people
and had an impact that reverberated, and still reverberates, around the globe. Following
those attacks, President George W. Bush publicly sought and soon obtained from Congress
the authority to use force against those responsible for the attacks and those assisting them.
Six days after the attacks, on September 17, Bush secretly issued what is known as a
Memorandum of Notification (MON)—a covert action directive that granted the CIA
unprecedented counterterrorism authority, including to capture and detain individuals
"posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or
planning terrorist activities."1 The MON made no reference to interrogations or coercive
interrogation techniques.
The CIA immediately began developing a plan to detain individuals under the MON. Senior
agency leadership acknowledged that the CIA had limited experience running detention
facilities and considered acquiring expertise from the Defense Department and the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.2 In late March 2002 the CIA captured Abu Zubaydah, who became its
first detainee.3 Plans then intensified to establish the use of certain aggressive
interrogation techniques. Arguments ensued between the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the CIA over the types of interrogation techniques that should be used.4 The FBI
wanted to use methods that they had developed for years that did not involve violence or
force. FBI agents and officers involved in these discussions said the aggressive techniques
1 US Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and
Interrogation Program, December 13, 2012, updated April 3, 2014, released December 2, 2014,
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi.pdf (accessed February 18, 2015) (hereinafter “Senate Summary”), p. 11.
2 Senate Summary, p. 12.
4 Senate Summary, p. 27. For a more in-depth discussion of this dispute, see generally, Ali Soufan, The Black Banner: The
Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2011); see also Department of Justice,
Oversight and Review Division, Office of Inspector General, “A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of
Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq,” May, 2008,
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0805/final.pdf (accessed October 12, 2015) (hereinafter “DOJ OIG Report”), pp. 71-75.
NO MORE EXCUSES 10
the CIA sought to use were not only ineffectual, but would taint any evidence they acquired
for use in criminal trials.5
The CIA proposed the use of 12 interrogation techniques.6 The techniques, proposed by
two CIA contractors, had previously been used by the military’s Joint Personnel Recovery
Agency (JPRA) to train US Special Forces to better endure interrogation methods used by
enemies who did not abide by the Geneva Conventions.7
The 12 “enhanced interrogation techniques” proposed were: (1) the attention grasp; (2)
“walling”; (3) facial hold; (4) facial slap; (5) cramped confinement; (6) wall standing; (7)
stress positions; (8) sleep deprivation; (9) waterboarding; (10) use of diapers; (11) use of
insects; and (12) mock burial.8 When it was clear that the CIA was going to use such
5 US Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, “Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on
Suspected Terrorists,” July 29, 2009,
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20090729_OPR_Final_Report_with_20100719_declassifications.pdf
(accessed October 12, 2015) p. 33; see also DOJ OIG Report, pp. 71-72.
7 Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment of Detainees, July 12, 2011,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover_1.pdf, p. 40, citing US Senate, Committee of Armed

Services, “Report on Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody,” November 20, 2008, http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf (accessed October 12, 2015) (hereinafter
“SASC Report”), p. 6.
8 Senate Summary, p. 32. All of these “techniques,” with the exception of “diapers” and “mock burial” were eventually
approved in an August 1, 2002 memo (though cramped confinement and insects were combined into one and discussed
together). In that August 1, 2002, memo each of the “techniques” were approved for use specifically on Abu Zubaydah and
were described in the following manner: 1)“attention grasp”: grabbing the individual with both hands by the collar in a
controlled and quick motion and drawing him to the interrogator; 2) “walling”: with his heels touching the wall the subject is
“pulled forward and then quickly and firmly push[ed]” into a flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall. His
head and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash; 3) “facial hold”: an interrogator places his open palms
on both sides of the individual’s face to keep his head immobile; 4) “facial slap”: the interrogator slaps an individual’s face;
the goal is not to inflict physical pain but “to induce shock, surprise and/or humiliation;” 5) “cramped confinement:” the
individual is placed in a confined space, usually dark. In the larger box the detainee could stand, but in the smaller one, he
could only sit. For Abu Zubaydah, who had a fear of insects, interrogators requested permission to put a small non-stinging
insect into his box and to tell Abu Zubaydah, falsely that it could sting. This was approved; 6) “wall standing”: a detainee is
forced to stand about four to five feet from a wall, touching the wall so that his fingers supported all of his body weight, and
he was not permitted to move or reposition his hands or feet. The intent was to induce muscle fatigue. No time limit appears
to have been placed on this technique; 7) “stress positions”: the memo states that “a variety of stress positions” may be
used but only two were described in any detail. One involved forcing Abu Zubaydah to sit on the floor with his legs extended
straight out in front of him with his arms raised above his head. Another proposed having him kneel on the floor while
leaning back at a 45 degree angle. The intention was to produce muscle fatigue. No specific time limit appears to have been
imposed for this technique either; 8) “sleep deprivation”: up to 11 days were approved for use on Abu Zubaydah; 9)
“waterboard”: an individual is bound securely to an inclined bench. The individual’s feet are elevated. A cloth is placed over
the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done the cloth is lowered until it
covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air flow is slightly
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. The resulting increased carbon dioxide level in the blood
stimulates an increased effort to breathe, producing the perception of “suffocation and incipient panic, i.e. the perception of

methods, the FBI refused to participate in any further interrogations using “enhanced
interrogation techniques” or participate in any further discussions about the matter.9
As detailed below, the decision to use these techniques was discussed extensively among
senior US officials, including but not limited to: CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, Assistant
Attorney General and OLC head Jay Bybee, OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo, an unnamed individual identified as “CTC Legal” in the Senate Summary, CIA Director
George Tenet, National Security Legal Advisor John Bellinger, Attorney General John
Ashcroft, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the Vice President David
Addington, Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, and National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice.
Before the CIA used the full panoply of these techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the agency sought
a guarantee that the Justice Department Criminal Division would not prosecute any US
personnel involved.10 The Criminal Division refused.11 Following this, the CIA began working
intensely with the attorneys in the OLC to obtain memos that would authorize the techniques
proposed. (Meetings and deliberations about the content of the memos are discussed in
detail below.) Two memos were eventually issued on August 1, 2002. The principal author of
the memos was Yoo and they were signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee.12
The first memo was addressed to Gonzales and became known as the “Bybee I Memo.” It
was unclassified and analyzed the domestic and international legal prohibitions on torture
and, among other things, articulated an exceedingly high threshold, later repudiated by
the Bush administration, for what constitutes torture: physical pain equivalent in intensity
to that accompanying “organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”13 It did
drowning.” During the 20-40 seconds, water is continuously poured from above. After this period the cloth is lifted and the
individual is allowed to breathe three to four full breaths. The procedure may then be repeated. The procedure would likely
not last more than 20 minutes during any one application. “Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, assistant attorney general, to
John Rizzo, acting general counsel of the CIA, regarding ‘Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative,’” August 1, 2001,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf (accessed March 31,
2015)(“Bybee II Memo.”).
9 OPR Report, p. 47; see also DOJ OIG Report, pp. 71-75.
10 OPR Report, p. 47.
11 Ibid.
12 OPR Report, pp. 75-80, 251, 255.

13 “Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, assistant attorney general, to Alberto R. Gonzales, counsel to the president, regarding
"Standards for Conduct of Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A," August 1, 2002,
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not discuss the legality of any particular technique nor the legality of applying any type of
technique on a specific detainee. It was not made public until it was leaked to the media in
June 2004.14
The second memo, which was classified, was addressed to John Rizzo but also signed by
Bybee, became known as the “Bybee II Memo.” It was not released publicly until 2009 and
discussed the legality of each of the techniques individually, approving 10 specific
interrogation tactics proposed for use on detainee Abu Zubaydah.15 (“Diapering” and the
“mock burial,” though initially proposed, were not discussed in the memo). These two
memos collectively have publicly become known as the “Bybee Memos,” the “August 1,
2002 OLC Memos,” or the “Torture Memos.”16
After these memos were issued, the CIA began using what they called “enhanced
interrogation techniques” with little guidance. The CIA now admits that its guidance was
poor during this period.17 At some point after “enhanced interrogation techniques” and
detentions were contemplated, the CIA began opening and operating a number of secret
detention centers around the world. The US government has still not disclosed exactly
where and how many sites it operated. Though a number of CIA sites are identified in the
Senate Summary, they are designated using pseudonyms for their locations. But the media
and others have long reported that the CIA operated detention centers in at least
Afghanistan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Thailand.18 Additionally, the CIA worked in
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf (accessed March 31,

2015)(“Bybee I Memo”).
14 Dana Priest, “Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture ‘May Be Justified’,” Washington Post, June 13, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html (accessed August 18, 2015).

15 See Bybee II Memo, described in note 8 above.
16 One former CIA official later called these opinions a “golden shield,” and said that they that provided enormous comfort.
See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration, (New York: W. W. North & Co:
2009), p. 144; see also SASC Report, p. 33.
17 CIA, “Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Former
Detention and Interrogation Program,”

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June2013_Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_the_Former_Detention_and_Interrog
ation_Program.pdf (accessed October 12, 2015) (hereinafter “CIA Response”), pp. 2-4.
18 Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, “Decoding the secret black sites on the Senate’s report on the CIA interrogation program,”
Washington Post, December 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/09/decoding-the-
secret-black-sites-on-the-senates-report-on-the-cia-interrogation-program/ (accessed August 26, 2015); see also Human
Rights Watch, “Statement on US Secret Detention Facilities in Europe,”
Human Rights Watch statement, November 6, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/11/06/human-rights-watch-
statement-us-secret-detention-facilities-europe.

conjunction with a number of other countries to operate, run or use detention sites in
locations that included but were not limited to Morocco,19 Jordan,20 Pakistan,21 and Egypt.22
During the course of the CIA program, the agency held at least 119 individuals in CIA-run
detention centers, according to the Senate Summary. This is a conservative estimate23 and
does not include a number of detainees who were unlawfully rendered as part of the CIA
program.24
The full name for the CIA Program was the “Rendition, Detention and Interrogation” (RDI)
program. Unlawful renditions were a part of the program but the Senate Summary did not
address this aspect of it.25 The summary lists only the names of 119 individuals it considers to
be “detainees” in that there was “clear evidence of detention in CIA custody.”26 Left off the
list are an unknown number of individuals whom the CIA unlawfully rendered to countries
where it was known or recognized as likely that they would be tortured, whether as part of
19 Human Rights Watch, Delivered Into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya, September
2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0912webwcover_1.pdf, p. 78; Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman, “CIA

Whisked Detainees From Guantanamo Before Giving Access To Lawyers,” Huffington Post, May 25, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/06/cia-whisked-detainees-fro_n_673001.html (accessed August 26, 2015);
Mathew Cole, “Lithuanian President Announces Investigation into CIA Secret Prison,” ABC News, October 21, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/lithuania-investigating-secret-cia-prisons/story?id=8874887 (accessed August 26, 2015).
20 Craig Whitlock, “Jordan's Spy Agency: Holding Cell for the CIA,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/30/AR2007113002484.html (accessed August 26, 2015).

21 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, pp. 34-38, 61-62, 84-85.
22 “Libya/US: Investigate Death of Former CIA Prisoner,” Human Rights Watch news release, May 11, 2009,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/11/libya/us-investigate-death-former-cia-prisoner.
23 Senate Summary, p. 14, n. 26.
24 Unlawful renditions are not a focus of this report but have been extensively documented in prior reports, including
Delivered Into Enemy Hands; Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment of
Detainees, July 12, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover_1.pdf. Other organizations have
extensively documented CIA renditions as well. See e.g. Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret
Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” February 2013,
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf (accessed June 4, 2015)
(hereinafter “OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition”); The Constitution Project, The
Report of The Constitution Project's Task Force on Detainee Treatment (hereinafter “The Constitution Project Report”) April
2013, http://detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/Full-Report.pdf (accessed August 25, 2015), p. 127. The CIA carried out numerous
renditions that were unlawful and in violation of the Convention against Torture and other treaties to which the US is party.
The US has an obligation to fairly prosecute those officials responsible for unlawful renditions. Several civil cases involving
CIA rendition are discussed in the second chapter of this report “Bringing Criminal Prosecutions in the US.”
25 Rendition is the transfer of an individual between governments. Transferring someone to another country without
providing them an adequate opportunity to contest that transfer violates basic rights under international human rights law.
Transferring someone to another government where they would face a serious risk of torture or other ill-treatment is also
prohibited under international law. Transferring an individual to the custody of another government for the purpose of
torture, usually to obtain information, is a practice commonly referred to as rendition to torture. The phrase “extraordinary
rendition” has come to mean unlawful rendition. Delivered Into Enemy Hands, p. 1, n. 2.
NO MORE EXCUSES 14
their interrogation or as punishment.27 Many of those rendered described being held by the
CIA or by another government with the CIA’s cooperation, either before or after their transfer.28
Of the 119 individuals the CIA considers to have been CIA “detainees,” according to the
Senate Summary, at least 26 were “wrongfully held,” and did not meet the CIA’s own
standards for detention.29 “CIA records provide insufficient information to justify the
detention of many other detainees.”30
In November 2002, detainee Gul Rahman died from hypothermia after being shackled half-
naked to a concrete floor overnight in CIA custody at a detention site in Afghanistan.31 His
death spurred an investigation by the CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG), including
into the broader CIA program. The findings, issued in classified form in a May 2004 report
(“CIA OIG Report”), were sharply critical of the both the CIA’s use of techniques in an
authorized manner, and the use of techniques not authorized.32
While the OIG investigation was ongoing, media outlets began reporting that the US was
using abusive interrogation methods on detainees in secret detention centers.33 To counter
these reports, the Bush administration began putting out a number of statements aimed at
alleviating concerns that the US might be abusing or torturing prisoners. These statements
attempted to discount any possibility that the US was using torture and to emphasize that
all detainees were being treated humanely even if they were not, in the administration’s
view, protected by international law.34
27 See Getting Away with Torture, discussing the cases of Maher Arar, Mamdough Habib, Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed al-
Zari, Osama Moustafa Nasr (Abu Omar), Muhammad Haydar Zammar, and Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni, pp. 33-38; See also
Delivered Into Enemy Hands, discussing the cases of Abdul Hakim Belhadj, Sami Mostefa al-Saadi, and Mustafa Salim Ali el-
Madaghi, Delivered into Enemy Hands, pp. 78, 91 and 102. See also generally, OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret
Detention and Extraordinary Rendition."
28 Ibid.
29 Senate Summary, pp. 14-17; see also “Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee’s Study of the CIA’s Detention
and Interrogation Program, Findings and Conclusions,”
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=a992171e-fd27-47bb-8917-
5ebe98c72764&SK=04753BC866283C0F5913D7E1A24FA851 (accessed October 12, 2015)(hereinafter “Senate Summary
Findings and Conclusions”), p. 12.
30 Senate Summary Findings and Conclusions, p. 12.

32 See General OIG report. See also Levin and Bradbury Memos.
33 Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, “U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,” Washington Post, December 26, 2002,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html (accessed August 21, 2015).

34 Senate Summary pp. 115-119; David Cole, “Torture: No One Said No,” New York Review of Books, March 5, 2015,
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/mar/05/cia-torture-no-one-said-no/ (March 15, 2015).

These statements caused concern among the CIA leadership that other parts of the
executive branch were not backing the CIA’s program. The CIA began to seek assurances
from Secretary of State Rice, the OLC, and other executive branch departments that they
continued to support the CIA program. This generated another series of high-level
meetings during which the CIA secured reassurance that the White House and the Justice
Department backed the program.35
After the CIA OIG Report was issued, CIA Director Tenet suspended both the use of what
were called “standard” interrogation techniques, as well as “enhanced interrogation
techniques,” pending a legal and policy review.36 The CIA OIG Report also called for the CIA
to justify the usefulness and necessity of the “enhanced interrogation” program.
Even before the OLC and the CIA approved the use of “enhanced interrogation
techniques,” the US military had already begun using some of the tactics later authorized
in the August 1, 2002 OLC Memos and had trained military interrogators in their use.
Formal OLC and CIA approval set the stage for more widespread use of abusive techniques
by the military.37
In March 2004, reports and photographs emerged about detainee abuse by US military
personnel at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq causing a national scandal.38 And in June 2004, the
Bybee I Memo was leaked to the media.39 By this time Yoo had left OLC, and Jack
Goldsmith was named to replace him.40
35 Ibid.
36 Senate Summary, pp. 413-14. “Standard” interrogation techniques appear to have been first identified in a January 28,
2003 Guidance issued by CIA Director Tenet in response to the death of detainee Gul Rahman in CIA custody. See Senate
Summary, pp. 62-63. In that Guidance, “standard” interrogation techniques were defined as those “that do not incorporate
physical or substantial psychological pressure.” See OIG report, Appendix E (emphasis in the original). The Guidance said
they “include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by US law enforcement and military
interrogation personnel.” Some examples included sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, isolation, loud music, and diapering
generally not to exceed 72 hours.
37 See section titled “The US Military’s Approval and Use of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment” below. See also Getting Away
with Torture.
38 Rebecca Leung, “Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIS Probed,” CBS News, April 27, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-
of-iraqi-pows-by-gis-probed/ (accessed June 9, 2015); see also, Seymour M. Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” The New Yorker,
May 10, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib (accessed June 6, 2015).
39 Dana Priest and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,” Washington Post, June 8, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html (January 29, 2015); Dana Priest, “Justice Dept.

Memo Says Torture 'May Be Justified,'” Washington Post, June 13, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html (accessed August 18, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 16
Goldsmith reexamined the August 1, 2002 memos and concluded that the Bybee I Memo
was “riddled with error” and a “one-sided effort to eliminate any hurdles posed by the
torture law.”41 On May 3, 2004, in an attempt to get reassurance from OLC that they still
endorsed the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” Muller wrote Goldsmith asking
that he reaffirm OLC approval of the techniques as well as approve new ones.42 On May 27,
Goldsmith wrote back to Muller saying that he "strongly recommended” that the CIA
suspend use of waterboarding and review steps taken to ensure that in actual practice any
use of CIA techniques “adheres closely to the assumptions and limitations in the August
2002 opinion [the Bybee memos].”43 On June 15, 2004, Goldsmith withdrew the Bybee I
Memo and submitted his letter of resignation the following day.44 Goldsmith kept in place
OLC approval for all of the enhanced interrogation techniques other than waterboarding
but subject to the assumptions, limitations, and safeguards laid out in the Bybee II Memo,
which had not been withdrawn.45
Daniel Levin, who took over as acting head of the OLC after Goldsmith’s departure,
inherited the task of issuing replacement memos for the Bybee I and Bybee II memos.46 On
August 6, 2004, he issued a memo authorizing waterboarding47 and on December 30,
2004, issued a new legal opinion to replace the unclassified Bybee I Memo.48 Levin’s
replacement memo, like the Bybee I memo, analyzed the legal limits of the prohibitions on
torture but it acknowledged that the prior legal reasoning was wrong.49 Levin planned to
draft a new memo to replace the classified Bybee II Memo as well but he left the office in
February 2005 before he had finished those memos.50
41 OPR Report, p. 160; see also Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, p. 149.
42 Fax from Scott Muller, CIA General Counsel, to Jack Goldsmith, March 2, 2004 (hereinafter “Muller Fax”),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc22.pdf (accessed April 23, 2015).

43 Letter from Jack Goldsmith to Scott Muller, May 27, 2004,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-muller2004.pdf (accessed August 26, 2015).

44 OPR Report, p. 121. Goldsmith,The Terror Presidency, p. 159.

48 “Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A,” December 30, 2004, https://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc96.pdf (accessed

October 12, 2015)(hereinafter “Levin Replacement Memo”).
49 “Levin Replacement Memo, p. 16, n. 27 (“In the August 2002 Memorandum, this Office concluded that the specific intent
element of the statute required that infliction of severe pain or suffering be the defendant’s ‘precise objective’ and that it
was not enough that the defendant act with knowledge that such pain ‘was reasonably likely to result from his actions’ (or
even that the result ‘is certain to occur’). We do not reiterate that test here.”)
50 OPR Report, pp. 122-131.

The OLC deputy head, Stephen Bradbury, temporarily took over Levin’s vacant position. He
issued two new memos, both on May 10, 2005, intended to replace the Bybee II classified
memo. One discussed the legality of individual interrogation techniques and authorized all
of the same techniques approved in the Bybee II memo, but with new legal reasoning
(“Bradbury Individual Techniques Memo”).51 The memo also authorized several techniques
that had not been the subject of OLC opinions but had already been used by the CIA, such
as “water dousing” and “nudity.” The second May 10, 2005 memo addressed the
techniques covered in the Bradbury Individual Techniques Memo but clarified that their
use in combination with one another would not violate the Torture Statute (“Bradbury
Combined Techniques Memo”).52 Though previously not approved by official OLC memo on
any detainee other than Abu Zubaydah, and even then only in cursory fashion,53 the CIA
had since the start of the program frequently used multiple “enhanced interrogation
techniques” in combination.54 A third memo, issued on March 30, 2005, analyzed whether
the techniques would violate the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment prohibited under the Convention against Torture, and found that
they would not (“Bradbury CIDT Memo”).55
In December 2005, the US Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which barred the
use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment against any detainee in US
51 “Memorandum for John A. Rizzo [Senior Deputy General Counsel, CIA]; Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to
Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee,” May 10, 2005,
http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf (accessed January 29, 2015)(hereinafter “Bradbury
Individual Techniques Memo”).
52 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo [Senior Deputy General Counsel, CIA]; Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the
Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees,” May 10, 2005,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2013/10/21/memo-bradbury2005-2.pdf (accessed January 29,
2015)(hereinafter “Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo”).
53 Bybee II memo, p. 2, where use of the approved techniques “in some combination,” in an “escalating fashion” on Abu
Zubaydah is discussed in two sentences without any limitations placed on such combination or analysis thereof. By contrast,
the Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo is a 20 page memo evaluating use of techniques in combination and noting that
“a complete analysis under [the Torture Statute] … entails an examination of the combined effects of any techniques that
might be used.” See also note 310 where the fact that Yoo admitted that his August 1, 2002 memos did not address the
“cumulative effect” of the techniques is noted.
54 Senate Summary Findings and Recommendations, p. 3.
55 “Memorandum for John A. Rizzo [Senior Deputy General Counsel, CIA]; Re: Application of United States Obligations Under
Article 16 of [Convention against Torture] to certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda
Detainees,” May 30, 2005, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2013/10/21/memo-bradbury2005.pdf
(accessed January 29, 2015)(hereinafter Bradbury CIDT Memo”).
NO MORE EXCUSES 18
custody and required any detainee in the custody of the Defense Department to follow the
US Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogations when conducting interrogations.56
In a speech on September 6, 2006, President Bush formally disclosed the existence of the
CIA interrogation program to the public.57 He announced that a “small number” of
detainees had been held by the CIA in locations that he could not disclose and praised the
program for having “saved innocent lives.”58 He also announced that the remaining 14
detainees in CIA custody at the time would be sent to the military detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay. But he did not end the CIA program at this time. He said it needed to
continue because it was “crucial to getting lifesaving information.”59 As late as July 20,
2007, the OLC issued yet another memo authorizing the CIA to use techniques that were
abusive, asserting that they would not violate US laws against torture and other ill-
treatment or the newly enacted Detainee Treatment Act.60
President Barack Obama, on his second full day in office on January 22, 2009, signed an
executive order closing the CIA’s secret detention facilities and ending the use of
“enhanced interrogation techniques.”61
The CIA Program: What Was Known before the Senate Summary
Before release of the Senate Summary, substantial information had already been
published about the CIA program. As early as December 2002, accounts began to emerge
of the CIA subjecting detainees to stress positions, unlawful renditions, and other forms of
abuse.62 Following these initial reports, various media outlets and human rights
56 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law 163-109, 119 Stat. 3136, January 6, 2006, https://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat/a24d1cf3344e99934125673e00508142/b22319a0da00fa02c1257b8600397d29/$FILE/Detainee%20Treatment%20Act%
20of%202005%20.pdf (accessed June 10, 2015).
57 “Transcript—President Bush’s Speech on Terrorism,” New York Times, September 6, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=print (accessed June, 10 2015).

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques That May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda
Detainees, July 20, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-warcrimesact.pdf
(accessed June 10, 2015). Some of the abusive treatment approved included dietary manipulation, extended sleep
deprivation, the facial hold, the attention grasp, the abdominal slap, and the insult slap.
61 Executive Order 13491, “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” signed January 22, 2009,
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf (accessed June 15, 2011).

62 Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, “U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,” Washington Post, December 26, 2002,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html (accessed August 21, 2015).

organizations sought to document CIA activities more extensively. As early as 2003,
Human Rights Watch had already interviewed persons in Afghanistan with information
about CIA detention and, in a series of reports on “Ghost Detainees,” we had published
initial information on dozens of detainees who had disappeared into US custody.63
Especially after news broke of torture and other abuse of detainees by the US military at
Abu Ghraib, media outlets and rights organizations frequently reported on CIA abuse of
detainees, US efforts to circumvent laws prohibiting torture and other ill-treatment, and
the existence of secret CIA detention sites.64
63 Human Rights Watch, “Enduring Freedom”: Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, vol. 16, no. 3(C), March 2004,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan0304/afghanistan0304.pdf; Human Rights Watch, The United States’

“Disappeared”: The CIA’s Long-Term “Ghost Detainees,” October 12, 2004, https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/10/12/united-
states-disappeared-cias-long-term-ghost-detainees; Human Rights Watch, List of ‘Ghost Prisoners’ Possibly in CIA Custody,
November 30, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/11/30/list-ghost-prisoners-possibly-cia-custody; Human Rights
Watch, Ghost Prisoner: Two Years in Secret CIA Detention, Vol. 19, No. 1(G), February 27, 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0207/us0207webwcover.pdf.
64 A non-exhaustive list of just some of these materials includes“Enduring Freedom”: Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan;
Human Rights First, “Ending Secret Detentions,” June 2004,

http://theopenunderground.de/@pdf/war/afghan/EndingSecretDetentions.pdf (accessed August 21, 2015); Human Rights
First, “Behind the Wire: An Update to Ending Secret Detentions,” March 2005, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/behind-the-wire-033005.pdf (accessed August 21, 2015); Amnesty International, “Five years on 'the
dark side': A look back at 'war on terror' detentions,” December 13, 2006,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=amr51%2F195%2F2006&language=en, (accessed June
11, 2015); Human Rights Watch, “Statement on US Secret Detention Facilities in Europe,”
Human Rights Watch statement, November 6, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/11/06/human-rights-watch-
statement-us-secret-detention-facilities-europe; “US Operated Secret ‘Dark Prison’ in Kabul,” Human Rights Watch news
release, December 20, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/12/19/us-operated-secret-dark-prison-kabul; Human Rights
Watch, Off the Record: US Responsibility for Enforced Disappearances in the “War on Terror,” June 7, 2007,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/06/07/record/us-responsibility-enforced-disappearances-war-terror; Amnesty
International, “Below the radar: Secret flights to torture and 'disappearance,'” April 4, 2006,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR51/051/2006/en/ (accessed June 11, 2015); Human Rights Watch, “Letter to
Bush Requesting Information on Missing Detainees,” February 27, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/02/26/letter-
bush-requesting-information-missing-detainees; Delivered Into Enemy Hands; Jane Mayer, “The Black Sites,” The New
Yorker, August 13, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/08/13/the-black-sites (accessed June 11, 2015); Dana
Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,” Washington Post, November 2, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html (accessed June 11, 2015);
Priest Smith, “Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,” Washington Post; Dana Priest and Joe Stephens, “Secret World
of U.S. Interrogation,” Washington Post, May 11, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15981-
2004May10.html (accessed October 13, 2015); Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, (New York: Anchor Books, 2008); Steve Coll, Ghost
Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006); The
Constitution Project Report; OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition.”
NO MORE EXCUSES 20
The US Military’s Approval and Use In February 2002, JPRA personnel began
of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment65 providing training and written materials to

personnel in or headed to Guantanamo
and Afghanistan. 69 In July the CIA
The harm of CIA torture was compounded by
the US military’s adoption of many of the proposed the use of SERE-derived
CIA-approved interrogation techniques. interrogation techniques with the first

detainee held by the CIA, Abu Zubaydah. In
The military’s use of the techniques dates mid-September 2002, just after the OLC
to December 2001, when the Office of the issued its first memo authorizing CIA
Secretary of Defense inquired into the torture, JPRA staff began training
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Guantanamo personnel in the use of
(SERE) program. SERE methods were being abusive SERE school techniques.70
used by the military’s Joint Personnel

Recovery Agency (JPRA) to train US Special In late September 2002, a delegation of
Forces to endure interrogation methods used senior officials, including Defense General
by enemy forces that did not abide by the Counsel William Haynes, White House
laws of armed conflict.66 These techniques, General Counsel Alberto Gonzales, CIA
many drawn from the experiences of US General Counsel John Rizzo, and Chief of the
service members captured by North Korea Criminal Division of the Justice Department
during the Korean War, included stripping Michael Chertoff, visited the military
detainees naked for degradation purposes, detention facility at Guantanamo to discuss
exploiting cultural or religious taboos, use how interrogations were being managed
of forced standing, exposure to cold, and there.71 The evidence available suggests that
prolonged sleep deprivation. 67 The CIA the group encouraged the practices.72
later drew on these same SERE techniques

to create its “enhanced interrogation” By October 2002 Guantanamo commander
program.68 Maj. Gen. Michael Dunlavey was requesting

authority to use more aggressive
interrogation techniques including stress
65 This box is primarily a summary of excerpts from 70 Getting Away with Torture, pp. 40-41, citing SASC
Getting Away with Torture, which derived its information Report, pp. 43-49.
from a variety of sources. Additional sources are noted in 71 Getting Away with Torture, pp. 41-42.
the citations below. 72 Getting Away with Torture, p. 42, citing Phillippe
66 Getting Away With Torture, p. 40, citing SASC Report, p. 6.
Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal
67 Getting Away With Torture, p. 41. of American Values (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
68 Getting Away With Torture, p. 41. 2008), p. 76.
69 Getting Away With Torture, pp. 40-41.

positions; isolation for up to 30 days; delivered a draft memorandum to Haynes
deprivation of light and sound; exploiting stating that the majority of the proposed
individual phobias such as fear of dogs; techniques violated domestic and
forced grooming; use of scenarios designed international laws, at minimum constituting
to convince the detainee that death or “cruel and unusual treatment and, at worst,
severely painful consequences were torture.”76 Mora told Haynes that he would not
imminent for him or his family; and sign the memorandum unless Rumsfeld
waterboarding.73 rescinded his order. 77 Rumsfeld did so on
January 15, 2003 but at the same time said
Haynes submitted a memo to Rumsfeld that commanders could get approval for the
asking that he approve most of the methods techniques if they asked for it and provided
Dunlavey requested, with the exception of justification. 78 On April 16, 2003, Rumsfeld
waterboarding. On December 2, 2002, issued a new memorandum that, while more
Rumsfeld approved most of the restrictive than the December 2002 rules,
recommended techniques and appended a still allowed techniques that went beyond
handwritten note to his authorization of what the laws of war permitted, including
these techniques: “I stand for 8-10 hours a isolation, dietary manipulation, and sleep
day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” 74
adjustment.79
Roughly two weeks later after concerns Because of President Bush’s February 7, 2002
about Rumsfeld’s order were raised with decision to reject the applicability of the
Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora, Mora Geneva Conventions to Al-Qaeda and Taliban
in turn, raised his concerns with Haynes prisoners in Afghanistan, there was no
among others. After asserting pressure but overarching prescribed interrogation
still not receiving assurances that the regime for prisoners held there. 80 In late
orders would be rescinded, Mora met with 2002, Special Mission Unit Task Force
Haynes warning him that the (SMU TF) officials from Afghanistan visited
“interrogation policies could threaten Guantanamo, compared notes on
Secretary Rumsfeld's tenure and could even techniques from JPRA, and started drawing
damage the presidency.” 75 On January 15 up a more formal list of techniques to be
2003, uncertain whether there would be any specifically authorized. A large portion of the
change to the interrogation policy, Mora SMU TF policies were based on Rumsfeld’s
73 Getting Away with Torture, p. 42. 77 Ibid.
74 Getting Away with Torture, p. 43. 78 Getting Away with Torture, pp. 44-45.
75 SASC Report, p. 107. 79 SASC report. p. 132.

76 SASC Report, p. 108. 80 Getting Away with Torture, p. 46.
NO MORE EXCUSES 22
December 2, 2002 authorization and the dogs, stress positions, sleep management,
legal reasoning behind the denial of wartime loud music, and light control.83
protections to Al-Qaeda and Taliban
prisoners.81 Around the same time, in August 2003, Gen.
Geoffrey Miller, who oversaw Guantanamo
In January 2003, in response to a Joint Staff interrogation efforts, went to Iraq to conduct
inquiry from US Central Command, the US a counterterrorism assessment. He brought
military command in Afghanistan submitted a with him interrogation policy guidelines for
list of interrogation techniques then in use in Guantanamo that he gave to Gen. Ricardo
Afghanistan. The list included techniques Sanchez, the overall US military commander
“similar” to those Rumsfeld had approved for for Iraq, and proposed them as a model. 84
Guantanamo even though that memo had Sanchez used both Wood’s proposed policy
been technically rescinded. When the and the Guantanamo guidelines to come up
command in Afghanistan received no with interrogation guidelines for Iraq that he
complaints, it interpreted the silence to mean issued on September 14, 2003. 85 The
the techniques were unobjectionable. 82 abusive techniques approved, along with
other techniques used by the SMU TF units,
Many US military and intelligence personnel were among those being used at Abu Ghraib
sent to Iraq then based their interrogation prison when the scandal connected to abuse
policies on those formulated by the SMU TF there became public in 2004.86
in Afghanistan. For example, Capt. Carolyn
Wood, who had helped develop interrogation The US military record on criminal
policies for regular US forces in Afghanistan accountability for abuse of detainees post-
in late 2002—and who was implicated in the 9/11 has been abysmal. In 2007, Human
beating deaths of two detainees there in Rights Watch collected information on some
350 cases of alleged abuse involving more
December 2002—was stationed in Iraq and
than 600 military personnel. Few had been
put in command of Abu Ghraib
punished. The highest-ranking officer
interrogation operations in mid-2003. In
prosecuted for the abuse of prisoners was a
July 2003, Captain Wood drafted a lieutenant colonel, Steven Jordan, court-
proposed interrogation policy based on the martialed in 2006 for his role in the Abu
Afghanistan and Iraq SMU TF guidelines. This Ghraib scandal. He was acquitted in 2007.87
included the presence of military working
81 Ibid. 85 SASC Report, p. 197.
82 Ibid. 86 SASC Report, p. 197, 201.
83 Getting Away with Torture, p 47; SASC report, p. 17. 87 Getting Away with Torture, p. 6.
84 SASC Report, p. 197.

In 2003, several media outlets began to report on CIA interrogation techniques.88 In March 2004
details of an army investigation into prisoner abuse in Iraq began to surface.89 In April CBS
published photos of the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. And in May The New Yorker published
an extensive expose about the abuse.90 Then in June, one of the Bybee memos purportedly
authorizing the CIA’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” was leaked to the media.91
In subsequent years, media outlets and human rights groups documented or obtained
information relating to the abusive interrogations of roughly 25 CIA detainees,92 but
information on the treatment of scores of other detainees remains unavailable. Freedom of
Information Act requests and lawsuits brought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
and others compelled the government to disclose a number of documents related to the
CIA program.93 But many other documents remain classified, including the September 17,
88 Raymond Bonner, Don Van Natta Jr., and Amy Waldman, “Threats and Responses: Interrogations; Questioning Terror
Suspects In a Dark and Surreal World,” New York Times, March 9, 2003
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/09/world/threats-responses-interrogations-questioning-terror-suspects-dark-surreal-
world.html; Jess Bravin and Gary Fields, “How Do Interrogators Make A Captured Terrorist Talk?” Wall Street Journal, March 4,
2003, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1046732825540976880 (accessed August 18, 2015).
89 Barbara Starr, “Soldiers charged with abusing Iraqi prisoners” CNN, March 20, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/03/20/iraq.prison.abuse/ (accessed August 18, 2015); Thom Shanker, “The Struggle for Iraq: The
Military; 6 G.I.'s in Iraq Are Charged With Abuse Of Prisoners,” New York Times, March 21, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/
03/21/world/struggle-for-iraq-military-6-gi-s-iraq-are-charged-with-abuse-prisoners.html (accessed August 18, 2015).
90 Rebecca Leung, “Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIS Probed,” CBS News, April 27, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-
of-iraqi-pows-by-gis-probed/ (accessed June 9, 2015); see also, Seymour Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” The New Yorker,
May 10 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib (accessed June 6, 2015).
91 Priest and Smith,“Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,” Washington Post; Priest, “Justice Dept. Memo Says
Torture 'May Be Justified,'” Washington Post.
92 A non-exhaustive list includes the accounts of 14 former CIA detainees documented in an International Committee of the Red
Cross report that was leaked to the press in 2007 (See Mark Danner, “US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites,” New York Review of
Books, April 9, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/apr/09/us-torture-voices-from-the-black-sites/); The
accounts of five former CIA detainees documented in the Human Rights Watch report, Delivered Into Enemy Hands; the accounts of
plaintiffs who have brought suits in US courts, see e.g. the complaint in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F.Supp.2d 1128,
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-02798), 2007 WL 2227631, pp. 3-13 (for more detail see individual declarations, e.g. “Declaration of
Mohammed Farag Ahman Bashmilah in Support of the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment,”
(hereinafter “Bashmilah Declaration”) http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/declarationofbashmilah.pdf (accessed June
27, 2014); Craig Smith, Souad Mekhennet, “Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands,” New York Times, July 7, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html?pagewanted=all&gwt=pay (accessed June 23, 2015);
Clara Gutteridge, “How the US Rendered, Tortured and Discarded One Innocent Man,” The Nation, June 27, 2012,
http://www.thenation.com/article/168621/how-us-rendered-tortured-and-discarded-one-innocent-man; Human Rights Watch, “The
Case Of Marwan Jabor,” http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0207/2.htm (accessed August 18, 2015); and the account of Suleiman
Abdullah Salim in a complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in Abdullah Salim v. Mitchell, Civil Action No. 2:15-CV-286-
JLQ, October 13, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/salim_v._mitchell_-_complaint_10-13-15.pdf
(accessed October 14, 2015)(the other plaintiff in this case, Ben Soud, formerly went by the names of Mohamed Shoroeiya and Abd
al-Karim; his account is documented in Delivered into Enemy Hands and to some extent in the Senate Summary).
93 See e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, “Accountability for Torture,” https://www.aclu.org/feature/accountability-
torture?redirect=accountability-torture (accessed June 26, 2015); see also Jason Leopold and Ky Henderson, “Tequila, Painted
Pearls, and Prada: How the CIA Helped Produce ‘Zero Dark Thirty,’” Vice News, September 10, 2015,

2001 Memorandum of Notification purportedly granting the CIA authority to covertly
capture and detain94 individuals posing “a continuing, serious threat of violence or death
to U.S. persons and interests or planning terrorist activities," and 11 CIA Office of Inspector
General reports related to the CIA program.95
Justice Department Inquiry into CIA Torture

In 2007 reports emerged that the CIA had destroyed 92 videotapes depicting two CIA
detainees, Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, being interrogated and subjected
to the use of CIA torture techniques—including waterboarding.96 In 2008, the US
Department of Justice appointed Special Prosecutor John Durham to look into the tape
destruction.97 After Barack Obama took office, his attorney general, Eric Holder, expanded
the Durham investigation to include a preliminary investigation into whether federal laws
were violated as part of the CIA interrogation program.98
Holder said his decision to expand the investigation was based in part on a report
produced by the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) finding
that two OLC attorneys, John Yoo and Jay Bybee (see below), had engaged in professional
misconduct in authorizing the CIA’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques”99 and
https://news.vice.com/article/tequila-painted-pearls-and-prada-how-the-cia-helped-produce-zero-dark-thirty (accessed October

14, 2015); Jason Leopold, “The Watchdog, the Whistleblower, and the Secret CIA Torture Report,” Vice News, May 19, 2015,
https://news.vice.com/article/the-watchdog-the-whistleblower-and-the-cias-secret-torture-report (accessed October 14, 2015).
94 Though the MON provides the CIA with “significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual basis for the
detention, and the length of the detention,” Senator Feinstein, in her Forward to the Senate Summary writes: “It is worth
repeating that the covert action authorities approved by the President in September 2001 did not provide any authorization
or contemplate coercive interrogations.” See Senate Summary, p. 11, and Forward, p. 2, n. 2.
95 Senate Summary, p. 11; Katherine Hawkins, “Disappearing People and Disappearing the Evidence: The Deeper Significance of the
SSCI Report," Just Security, August 15, 20014, http://justsecurity.org/14054/guest-post-disappearing-people-disappearing-evidence-

deeper-significance-ssci-report/ (accessed June 12, 2015). For a listing of documents withheld in the government’s response to an
ACLU Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit, see Letter from the US Department of Justice Civil Division, to the ACLU, November 14,
2011, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/cia_vaughn_index_11142011.pdf (accessed June 10, 2015).
96 Dan Eggen and Joby Warrick, “CIA Destroyed Videos Showing Interrogation,” Washington Post, December 7, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/06/AR2007120601828_pf.html (accessed June 23,

2015); Mark Mazzetti , “U.S. Says C.I.A. Destroyed 92 Tapes of Interrogations,” New York Times, March 2, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/washington/03web-intel.html (accessed April 7, 2015).
97 Eggen and Warrick, “Criminal Probe on CIA Tapes Opened,” Washington Post.
98 Department of Justice, “Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain
Detainees,” August 24, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-regarding-preliminary-

review-interrogation-certain-detainees (accessed February 19, 2015)(hereinafter “Attorney General August 24, 2009
Statement on Durham Investigation”).
99 Attorney General August 24, 2009 Statement on Durham Investigation. See also OPR Report. Specifically the OPR Report
found that Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General at the OLC committed “professional misconduct,” and John Yoo, Deputy

recommending that prior determinations by the Justice Department not to prosecute CIA
abuses be reexamined.100 (The OPR Report had not been made public at the time of
Holder’s announcement and was not disclosed until February 2010).101 It was also based
on a then still-classified 2004 CIA Inspector General report.102
Holder, however, also set strict limits to the Durham inquiry, making clear that “the
Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the
scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation
of detainees.”103 That preliminary investigation looked into 101 cases of alleged CIA abuse.104
On November 9, 2010, Holder announced that the Justice Department would not press
charges against anyone for destruction of the CIA videotapes depicting the interrogation of
two detainees.105 On June 30, 2011, he announced the closure, with no charges filed, in 99 of
the 101 cases.106 Holder provided little explanation for the decision not to press charges other
than to say that Durham had concluded that many of the 101 detainees were never in CIA
custody.107 If that is the case it raises questions about who had custody of the detainees,
where they were, and why this meant CIA personnel were not responsible for any
wrongdoing.108 Holder also said that he would open full investigations into the cases of the
Assistant Attorney General for the OLC “intentional professional misconduct” when they rendered legal advice in support of
the CIA’s use of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques,” OPR Report, p. 11.
100 Attorney General August 24, 2009 Statement on Durham Investigation.
101 Eric Lichtblau and Scott Shane, “Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror Memos,” New York Times, February 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html?_r=0 (accessed June 24, 2015).

102 Attorney General August 24, 2009 Statement on Durham Investigation. The 2004 CIA Inspector General Report, dated May 7, 2009,
was first released in a heavily redacted form by the George W. Bush administration in May 2008, then later in a less redacted form by the
Obama administration on August 24, 2009. The latter version is available here: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/
20090825-DETAIN/2004CIAIG.pdf (accessed June 26, 2015)(hereinafter “CIA OIG Report”).
103 Attorney General August 24, 2009 Statement on Durham Investigation.
104 Department of Justice, “Statement of the Attorney General Regarding Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees,”
June 30, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-regarding-investigation-interrogation-certain-detainees

(accessed February 19, 2015)(hereinafter “Attorney General June 30, 2011 Statement on Durham Investigation”).
105 Jerry Markon, “No charges in destruction of CIA videotapes, Justice Department says,” Washington Post, November 9, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/09/AR2010110904106.html (accessed June 26, 2015).

106 Attorney General June 30, 2011 Statement on Durham Investigation.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. David Passaro, the only CIA contractor or employee to be held criminally liable for detainee abuse, was prosecuted by the
Department of Justice for the death of Abdul Wali, who died at a US military base in Kunar province in Afghanistan. See The Constitution
Project Report, p. 74. Passaro was convicted of felony assault with a dangerous weapon and three counts of misdemeanor assault,
for which he was sentenced in 2006 to eight years and four months in prison. For more information on Passaro’s case, see “Anatomy
of an Interrogation,” Retro Report, April 19, 2015, http://www.retroreport.org/video/anatomy-of-an-interrogation/ (July 21, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 26
two remaining detainees, both of whom had died in US custody.109 A year later, on August 30,
2012, Holder announced the closure of these cases without bringing any charges.110 In closing
the investigation, Holder said he made his decision because “the admissible evidence would
not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”111
The Durham investigation was primarily focused only on CIA abuse that went beyond what
was authorized.112 This limitation was always too narrow in scope because the
authorizations not only permitted interrogation methods in violation of US and
international law, but also because they appear to have been designed specifically to
create a legal escape hatch for what would otherwise be the illegal use of torture.
Even within the administration-imposed restraints, the investigation appears wholly

inadequate. There is no evidence that Durham investigators interviewed any of the
detainees in the CIA program, whether still detained or since released.113 In November 2014
five former CIA detainees who alleged that they had been badly tortured by the CIA
109 Attorney General June 30, 2011 Statement on Durham Investigation; Eric Lichtblau and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Widens
Inquiries Into 2 Jail Deaths,” New York Times, June 30, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/us/politics/01DETAIN.html, (accessed April 7, 2015).
110 Department of Justice, “Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of
Certain Detainees,” August 30, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-closure-
investigation-interrogation-certain-detainees (accessed February 19, 2015)(hereinafter “Attorney General August 30, 2012
Statement on Durham Investigation”).
111 Ibid. The basis upon which the Justice Department made this determination is not clear. When announcing closure of the
investigation, the Justice Department put out a statement explaining that in making the determination not to bring charges, “Mr.
Durham considered all potentially applicable substantive criminal statutes as well as the statutes of limitations and jurisdictional
provisions that govern prosecutions under those statutes.” Attorney General August 30, 2012 Statement on Durham Investigation.
Having “admissible evidence [that] probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction” is consistent with determining
whether to bring criminal charges according to the US Attorney Manual. The manual further states, “both as a matter of
fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any
person unless the government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.” Department of
Justice, US Attorneys’ Manual. “Grounds for Commencing or Declining Prosecution,” Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-27.220,
http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.150 (accessed July 21, 2015).
112 “Mr. Durham’s review examined primarily whether any unauthorized interrogation techniques were used by CIA
interrogators, and if so, whether such techniques could constitute violations of the Torture Statute or any other applicable
statute.” Attorney General June 30, 2011 Statement on Durham Investigation.
113 See Letter from five former CIA detainees alleging they had been subjected to CIA torture beyond what was authorized but
yet were not interviewed for the Durham investigation. “Letter former CIA detainees to the United Nations Committee against
Torture,” Human Rights Watch, November 14, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/14/letter-former-cia-detainees-
united-nations-committee-against-torture; Spencer Ackerman, “Former CIA Detainees Claim US Torture Investigators Never
Interviewed Them,” The Guardian, November 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/11/libyan-cia-
detainees-torture-inquiry-interview (accessed February 12, 2014); Spencer Ackerman, “Doubt Cast Over US Torture
Investigation as More CIA Detainees Come Forward,” The Guardian, November 12, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2014/nov/12/more-cia-detainees-come-forward-us-investigation-torture (accessed February 12, 2014). However, two
attorneys representing two different former CIA detainees now held in Guantanamo told Human Rights Watch that Durham
spoke to them during the course of his investigation about what happened to their clients while in CIA custody.

asserted in a public letter that Durham never spoke to them during his investigation.114
They urged the UN Committee against Torture to question the US delegation about this
during the impending review of US compliance with the Convention against Torture.115
Other organizations working with former detainees held by the CIA and detainee defense
counsel also report that the Durham team never spoke to their clients.116
When the Committee against Torture, charged with reviewing state compliance with the
Convention against Torture, asked the US delegation whether any former detainees had
been interviewed, the delegation was unwilling to provide an answer. Instead, David
Bitkower, deputy assistant attorney general in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division,
newly disclosed that the Durham investigation had interviewed approximately 96
witnesses, but he would not say whether any of them were former CIA detainees.117 The US
response provoked the following statement from the committee:
The Committee regrets … that the delegation was not in a position to

describe the investigative methods employed by Mr. Durham or the
identities of any witnesses his team may have interviewed. Thus, the
Committee remains concerned about information before it that some former
CIA detainees, who had been held in U.S. custody abroad, were never
interviewed during the investigations, casting doubts as to whether this
high-profile inquiry was properly conducted.118
114 “Letter former CIA detainees to the United Nations Committee against Torture,” Human Rights Watch, November 14, 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/14/letter-former-cia-detainees-united-nations-committee-against-torture.
115 Ibid.
116 Ackerman, “Doubt Cast Over US Torture Investigation as More CIA Detainees Come Forward,” The Guardian.
117 Charlie Savage, “U.N. Commission Presses U.S. on Torture,” New York Times, November 13, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/world/europe/un-commission-presses-us-on-torture.html?_r=0 (accessed February

12, 2014); “Full Transcript: US Third Periodic Report to UN Committee Against Torture, Nov. 12-13, 2014” US Human Rights
Network, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/cat_complete_transcript_from_just_security.pdf
(accessed February 12, 2015). See p. 17 (“Why did the investigation not include victims of torture…?”); see also p. 23, p. 37,
p. 46, and pp. 49-50 (“we have not acknowledged one way or the other who it is that the Durham investigation team
interviewed or did not interview, and I am not in a position to do that today … [We] interviewed approximately 96 different
witnesses.”). The New York Times and Charlie Savage have sued the Department of Justice for information related to the
Durham investigation, including FBI witness statements. On September 30, 2015 a judge partially granted their request but
denied their request for witness statements. It is not yet clear whether either party will appeal. See New York Times and
Charlie Savage v. the United States Department of Justice, 14-cv-3777, Document 33, filed September 30, 2015, available at:
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2436601-savage-nyt-foia-durham-order.html (accessed November 7, 2015).
118 UN Committee against Torture, “Concluding observations on the third to fifth periodic reports of United States of
America,” November 20, 2014, (CAT/C/SR. 1276 and 1277) http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/UN-

Committee-Against-Torture-Concluding-Observations-United-States.pdf (accessed April 23, 2015), para. 11. (The Committee
against Torture further urged the US to “undertake a full review into the way the CIA’s responsibilities were discharged in
NO MORE EXCUSES 28
Barbed wire fence surrounding a military area near Stare Kiejkuty village, where Polish prosecutors are
investigating allegations the CIA ran a secret “black site.” © 2014 REUTERS/Kacper Pempel
New Details in the Senate Summary

The SSCI report is the product of six years of investigation by Senate Intelligence
Committee staff members who had access to more than six million pages of CIA materials.
These included operational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda, and emails,
briefing materials, interview transcripts, contracts, and other records.119 Notably, the staff
members did not have access to more than 9,400 documents that the CIA withheld,
relation to the allegations of torture and ill-treatment against suspects during U.S. custody abroad. In the event of a re-
opening of investigations, the State party should ensure that any such inquiries are designed to address the alleged
shortcomings in the thoroughness of the previous reviews and investigations.”).
119 Senate Summary, Forward, p. 5.

reportedly asserting the executive privilege on behalf of the White House.120 The full 6,700-
page report was completed in December 2012.121 However, it took nearly two years for the
Senate Intelligence Committee to decide to release the Summary and for the US
government to conduct declassification review. The Summary, still partially redacted, was
released on December 9, 2014.122 It is 499 pages long; the remainder of the full report
remains classified.
The Summary—and likely the full report—focuses exclusively on the CIA; it does not cover
abuses by other US government agencies, including the military. It also does not address the
issue of CIA renditions abroad. The Summary’s main findings are that the use of “enhanced
interrogation techniques” was not an effective means of gathering useful intelligence; that
the CIA inflated claims that the techniques were necessary to thwart terrorist attacks; and
that the techniques used were far more brutal than previously thought.123
The Summary covers many facts that were already well-known, but also includes many new
details, including:
• A list of all detainees that the US government says it detained in the CIA detention
and interrogation program. However, the US has still not released the names and
identities of detainees the CIA did not itself hold for a significant time period but
instead rendered to other countries.
• New details about the methods used in the CIA program. For example, the
Summary discloses that the CIA subjected detainees to “rectal feedings,” in which
CIA personnel forcibly inserted tubes into the rectums of detainees and infused
pureed food into their bodies, which the Summary and medical experts conclude
was not medically necessary.
• Evidence of interrogators’ intent to cause severe pain and suffering. This includes,
for example, details on how interrogators used excessively large tubes to conduct
120 Jonathan Landay, Ali Watkins, and Marisa Taylor, “White House withholds thousands of documents from Senate CIA
probe, despite vows of help,” McClatchy, March 12, 2014, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/03/12/221033/despite-vows-

of-help-white-house.html#storylink=cpy (accessed January 20, 2015).
121 “US: Release Report that Addresses CIA Torture,” Human Rights Watch news release, December 13, 2012,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/13/us-release-report-addresses-cia-torture (accessed July 1, 2015).

122 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and
Interrogation Program, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/executive-summary.pdf (accessed February 18, 2015).

123 Senate Summary, Findings and Conclusions, pp. 1-3.
NO MORE EXCUSES 30
rectal feedings, or forced detainees into positions that required them to stand for
days in order to deprive them of sleep when they already had broken bones in their
legs, knowing it would cause permanent and lasting physical injury.
• The disclosure that the CIA paid the company that Mitchell and Jessen formed and
was put in charge of implementing, carrying out and evaluating the effectiveness of
the CIA program, $81 million dollars.
• The disclosure that Federal Bureau of Prisons officials visited one of several CIA
detention facilities in November 2002 in Afghanistan and were “wow’ed” by the
degree of sensory deprivation there.
• Accounts of multiple detainees being subjected to water torture in ways that,

according to an interrogator, were virtually “indistinguishable” from waterboarding
and were unauthorized. Such accounts and prior reporting contradict Senate
testimony by then-CIA Director Michael Hayden that only three detainees had ever
been waterboarded.
• Evidence that the CIA recognized that the “enhanced interrogation techniques”
were unlawful. This can be inferred from, among other things, the CIA’s request for
Justice Department guarantees not to prosecute such practices under federal laws
prohibiting torture and CIA lawyers’ acknowledgment in a draft letter to the US
attorney general that use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” would be barred
by anti-torture laws.
• Details about the various steps the CIA took to cover up possible criminal activity
and obstruct the democratic process, including by making false claims to the
Justice Department, the White House, and Congress about the scope, nature,
successes, and necessity of the interrogation program.
• Efforts the administration took to keep senior members of its National Security
Council and Defense Department team in the dark about the program.
The Senate Summary also places these and other facts in the context of US decision-
making and explains how the Bush administration came to adopt, authorize, and approve
a government-sanctioned program of torture and enforced disappearance around the
globe. It should be recognized, however, that although the Senate Summary provides
important new details about the interrogation program, it remains an account told largely

from the government’s perspective. The voices of the detainees who were subjected to
torture are not included.
US Response to the Senate Summary

Evidence has long been available that US officials and agents violated US federal law, as
well as international law, in connection with the CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation
program.124 Failure to prosecute torture is itself a violation of the Convention against
Torture.125 The release of the Senate Summary puts forward further evidence of wrongdoing
that the US government is obligated under international law to investigate and appropriately
prosecute, as well as provide redress to victims. However, the US has largely failed to act.
The Obama administration and others have put forward three broad reasons why the US
need not and should not conduct criminal investigations into alleged abuses by US
officials connected to the CIA interrogation program:
• “An investigation was already conducted”: The Obama administration’s main

argument to justify no action is that it already conducted an investigation into
these events, pointing to the Durham inquiry.126
• “Prosecutions would be politically harmful”: President Obama famously said after

his election but before taking office that he “had a belief that we need to look
forward as opposed to looking backwards.”127 Commentators supporting this
124 See Getting Away with Torture, p. 49.
125 Convention against Torture, art. 7.
126 Carol Rosenberg, “Human rights groups ask attorney general to order new CIA torture probe,” Miami Herald, June 23,
2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article25313905.html (accessed June

25, 2015). In response to the request for the Attorney General to order a new torture probe, the Justice Department issued the
following response to this June 23, 2015 story: “In 2009, the Attorney General directed a preliminary review of the treatment
of certain individuals alleged to have been mistreated while in U.S. Government custody subsequent to the 9/11 attacks.
That review generated two criminal investigations, but the Department of Justice ultimately declined those cases for
prosecution because the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain convictions beyond a reasonable
doubt. Those investigators have also reviewed the Senate Committee’s full report and did not find any new information that
they had not previously considered in reaching their determination. This inquiry was extraordinarily thorough and we stand
by our previously announced decision not to initiate criminal charges.” The statements contradict representations made by
the Justice Department in ongoing freedom of information act litigation. According to a January 2015 declaration in ACLU v.
CIA, the Justice Department’s copies of the full report have remained unopened and have not been reviewed by Justice
Department staff or distributed in any way. See Letter to US Department of Justice Inspector General from Amnesty
International USA, September 21, 2015, available at:
https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/OIGComplaintAmnestyInternationalUSA.pdf (accessed November 7, 2015), pp. 4-5.
127 David Johnston and Charlie Savage, “Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs,” New York Times, January 11, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/12inquire.html?_r=0 (accessed October 14, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 32
approach contend that prosecutions, brought largely against Bush-era officials,
would invariably be divisive for the nation.128
• “Prosecutions of those involved in the CIA program are not viable under US law”:
Some observers have concluded that it may not be possible to charge those
responsible for CIA abuses due to difficulties in proving intent, the expiration of
statutes of limitations, and the applicability of other defenses.129
As mentioned above, international human rights law, notably the Convention against Torture
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), obligates states to
conduct impartial investigations and appropriately prosecute government officials
responsible for torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
The UN Committee against Torture has stated that a government’s obligation “to
investigate, punish, and prevent further torture or ill-treatment in the future” should give
“particular attention to the legal responsibility of both the direct perpetrators and officials
in the chain of command, whether by acts of instigation, consent or acquiescence.”130 The
128 Johnston and Savage, “Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs,” New York Times; Kathleen Hennessey and Michael A.
Memoli, “CIA torture report not likely to result in reforms or prosecutions,” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-torture-next-20141211-story.html (“The Justice Department defended its
decision not to prosecute those involved, saying the report would not trigger reconsideration” and additionally quotes Sen.
Richard M. Burr as saying, “We’re going to focus on real-time oversight. We’re not going to be looking back at a decade trying to
dredge up things.”); see also Raf Sanchez, “Why won't Barack Obama prosecute CIA torturers?” The Telegraph, December 12,
2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/11291476/Why-wont-Barack-Obama-prosecute-CIA-
torturers.html (accessed June 30, 2014) (“The release of the report has been explosive. Deep rifts between the CIA and the
Democratic Party have erupted into public view. Morale has slumped at the spy agency and Republicans are accusing the White
House of leaving America's spooks to swing in the wind. Imagine how much worse all of that would be if the Obama
administration was actually trying to send people to prison. The President would be prosecuting the friends and colleagues of
the spies he relies on every day to keep the US safe from terrorism. If the Justice Department went after George W. Bush or Dick
Cheney or other senior officials it would be seen as using the criminal justice system to persecute political opponents.”).
129 Michael Mukasey, “The CIA Interrogations Followed the Law,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-b-mukasey-the-cia-interrogations-followed-the-law-1418773648 (accessed April 21,

2015); John Yoo, “Dianne Feinstein's Flawed Torture Report,” Los Angeles Times, December 13, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-yoo-torture-feinstein-20141214-story.html#page=1 (accessed April 21, 2015);
Jennifer Bendery and Ali Watkins, “Despite Torture Uproar, DOJ Still Says No To Prosecutions,” Huffington Post, December 9,
2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/09/doj-torture_n_6298276.html?1418178014 (accessed March 9, 2015) (An
unnamed US Justice Department spokesman, the day the SSCI report was released also alluded to the possibility that
statutes of limitations, jurisdictional issues and legal opinions authorizing the abuse were bars to prosecution); “Statement
of the Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees, August 30, 2012,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-closure-investigation-interrogation-certain-detainees
(accessed August 12, 2015)(Holder raised “statutes of limitations and jurisdictional provisions” in closing the only Justice
Department investigation into widespread CIA abuses).
130 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Implementation of article 2 by States Parties, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/CC/2, (2008), para. 7,

http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhskvE%2bTuw1mw%2fKU18dCyrY

Committee considers it “essential” that the “responsibility of any superior officials,
whether for direct instigation or encouragement of torture or ill-treatment or for consent or
acquiescence therein, be fully investigated through competent, independent and impartial
prosecutorial and judicial authorities.”131
The UN Human Rights Committee, the independent expert body that monitors state
compliance with the ICCPR, has stated that where investigations uncover human rights
violations, governments “must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with
failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of
itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant.” The Committee noted that impunity for
arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearances, among other abuses, “may well be
an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations.”132
Neither the Durham inquiry with its narrow mandate and inadequate investigation, nor
Obama’s decision to give priority to political considerations, overcome US obligations under
international law to prosecute serious human rights violations.
In the following section we will discuss in detail the third reason proffered not to prosecute,
that prosecutions of US officials for torture may not or may no longer be legally viable.
rZhDDP8yaSRi%2fv43pYTgmQ5n7dAGFdDalfzYTJnWNYOXxeLRAIVgbwcSm2ZXH%2bcD%2b%2f6IT0pc7BkgqlATQUZPVhi
(accessed November 8, 2015).
131 Ibid., para. 26.
132 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 18,
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsjYoiCfMKoIRv2FVaVzRkMjTnjRO
%2bfud3cPVrcM9YR0iW6Txaxgp3f9kUFpWoq%2fhW%2fTpKi2tPhZsbEJw%2fGeZRASjdFuuJQRnbJEaUhby31WiQPl2mLFDe6ZS
wMMvmQGVHA%3d%3d (accessed November 8, 2015).
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II. Bringing Criminal Prosecutions in the US
There are several federal offenses that senior US officials, as well as other US personnel,
can be charged with concerning the CIA’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques.” The
following sections discuss the main charges that should be considered. Not discussed
here are possible charges against those alleged to have made false claims to federal
officials or government bodies, or to have obstructed justice.
Substance of Potential Charges

The key charges are torture, conspiracy to torture, and conspiracy as a stand-alone crime.
Assault, sexual abuse, war crimes and murder, as well as conspiracy to commit some of
these crimes, are separate offenses that prosecutors can also pursue.133
The level of culpability of those charged will vary widely depending on such factors as their
involvement in authorizing and implementing or carrying out the program, whether their
acts were authorized by the Justice Department, and whether mitigating circumstances
apply. Charges could be brought for the actual completed offense or for attempting, or
aiding and abetting, the offense.
Torture and Conspiracy to Torture

The US enacted what is referred to here as the Torture Statute to comply with its obligations
under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (the Convention against Torture).134 President Ronald Reagan had signed the
Convention in 1988 and Congress enacted the Torture Statute in 1994 to comply with the
Convention. Reagan said at the time the treaty was ratified that the US “will demonstrate
unequivocally our desire to bring an end to the abhorrent practice of torture.”135
133 The statutory sections include: torture (section 2340A(a)); conspiracy to torture (section 2340A(c)); conspiracy to commit
other federal crimes (section 371); war crimes (section 2441); sexual abuse (sections 2241-2246); and murder (section 1111).
134 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-482, p. 228 (1994); See the Torture Act 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1994) (hereinafter “Torture
Statute”). See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted
December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force
June 26, 1987, art. 7, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx (accessed November 12, 2015).
135 “Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention against Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment,” The
American Presidency Project, May 20, 1988, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35858 (accessed October 15, 2015).

The Torture Statute provides criminal penalties for torture, conspiracy to commit torture,
and attempts to commit torture occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, regardless of the citizenship of the perpetrator or victim.136
The Torture Statute defines torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering … upon
another person within his custody or physical control.”137 To prosecute the crime of
conspiracy to torture, prosecutors would have to prove the elements of conspiracy, as well
as conspiracy to commit the offense of torture under the Torture Statute.
Legal Standards
Intent Required to Prove Torture
The definition of torture under the Convention against Torture requires that it be
“intentionally inflicted.”138 When ratifying the treaty, the US included an understanding
containing similar wording—that in order for an act to constitute torture, it must be
“specifically intended” to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.139 The US later
included this “specifically intended” language in the Torture Statute.140 The Senate
Summary provides evidence of numerous instances in which US officials demonstrably
sought to inflict severe pain or suffering. Even absent such specific intent, there are other
serious crimes with which officials might be charged.
Federal courts have not interpreted the term “specifically intended” in reviewing a criminal
case.141 However, several US courts have interpreted the language in the immigration
136 Torture Act 18, U.S.C. § 2340A.
137 Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. §. 2340(1).
138 Convention against Torture, article 1.
139 U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990), at II(1)(a),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html (January 25, 2015). See Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The
United Nations Convention against Torture, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), paras. 106-107.
140 Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2340(1).
141 Only one case has been brought under the US torture statute. It was brought against Charles “Chuckie” Taylor who was
charged in 2006 for torture committed in Liberia and convicted in October 2008. His appeal, which he lost, did not challenge
the court’s interpretation of “specifically intended.” See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. Fla. 2010); see also
“Jury Convicts Taylor Jr. in First US Prosecution for Torture Abroad,” Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/10/jury-convicts-taylor-jr-first-us-prosecution-torture-abroad; “Q & A: Charles 'Chuckie'
Taylor, Jr.’s Trial in the United States for Torture Committed in Liberia,” Human Rights Watch Q & A, September 23, 2008
https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/23/q-charles-chuckie-taylor-jrs-trial-united-states-torture-committed-liberia. The trial
court’s jury instructions regarding the meaning of “specifically intended” read: “The Defendant can be found guilty of that
NO MORE EXCUSES 36
context in deciding whether individuals have valid challenges to removal because they
face torture in the country to which they would be transferred.142 In most of these cases
courts have followed the lead of Auguste v. Ridge, a 2005 appellate court decision
upholding an order of removal, which found that the “specifically intended” language in
the Senate’s reservation requires a showing of the “specific intent” standard used in US
criminal prosecutions.143 The court noted that the specific intent standard is a “term of art”
that is “well-known in American jurisprudence” meaning that “in order for an individual to
have acted with specific intent, he must expressly intend to achieve the forbidden act.”144
offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That the Defendant committed an act
with the specific intent to inflict severe physical pain or suffering … Specific intent to inflict severe physical pain or suffering
means to act with the intent to commit the act as well as the intent to achieve the consequences of the act, namely the
infliction of the severe physical pain or suffering. An act that results in the unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and
suffering is not torture.” United States v. Belfast, October 30, 2008, No. 06-20758-CR-ALTONAGA, 2008 WL 10908532.
142 After the US signed the Convention against Torture, Congress enacted legislation making it the policy of the United States
not to “expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” See Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1988 (“FARRA”), Pub. L. No. 1005-277, Sec. 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2, 2681-821 (1988); 8 U.S.C. Sec.
1231(b)(3). Courts that have interpreted the meaning of “specifically intended” in the context of these removal proceedings
include: Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 117-118 (2d Cir.
2007); Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
143 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2005); Auguste overturned an earlier Third Circuit case Zubeda v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003) (though the implementing legislation states that “‘in order to constitute torture, an act must
be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering’ the regulation then immediately explains: ‘[a]n
act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture.’ The intent requirement therefore
distinguishes between suffering that is the accidental result of an intended act, and suffering that is purposefully inflicted or
the foreseeable consequence of deliberate conduct. However, this is not the same as requiring a specific intent to inflict
suffering.”). In reaching its decision, the Auguste court deferred to a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) interpretation of the
Torture Statute under what is known as a Chevron deference standard—named after the case Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C.
Chevron held that agency determinations are accorded deference if Congress has not spoken to the issue and if the agency's
determination is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). Applying this standard the Auguste
court held that the BIA acted “reasonably” in mandating the use of a “specific intent” requirement. Auguste, pp. 144-45.
Such deference would not apply in the criminal context because there would be no prior agency determination to defer to.
Some academics have been critical of Auguste’s interpretation. See Redman, “Defining ‘Torture’: The Collateral Effect on
Immigration Law of the Attorney General’s Narrow Interpretation of ‘Specifically Intended’ When Applied to United States
Interrogators,” 62 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 465-95 (2007); see also Irene Scharf, “Un-Torturing the Definition of Torture and
Employing the Rule of Immigration Lenity,” 66 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, Fall 2013; Jens David Ohlin, “The Torture Lawyers: A Reply to
Parry and Harel,” Harvard International Law Journal Online, vol. 51, June 2005, p.98, http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/HILJ-Online_51_Ohlin.pdf (accessed Jan. 28, 2015). It is not clear that a court analyzing the type of
intent required under the Torture Statute in a criminal case would come to the same conclusion as those that have analyzed
it in the removal context. The fact that a court would be looking retrospectively at whether torture was inflicted rather than
prospectively at whether someone faced a risk of torture might have an impact.
144 Auguste, p. 145. (Auguste upheld an order of removal challenged by a US legal permanent resident with a criminal record
who claimed he would be subjected to indefinite detention despite having served out his sentence, and torture, in Haiti’s
abusive prison system. The court held that though Haitian prison conditions were “deplorable” and the conditions were used
punitively by the government, just because Haitian authorities had knowledge that severe pain and suffering “may result,”
does not mean they had the intent to inflict severe pain or suffering).

But in the criminal context, the meaning of “specific intent” is anything but clear.145 As a
respected treatise on criminal law notes, courts apply the meaning of “specific intent” in a
variety of ways.146 Some courts suggest that specific intent requires a conscious desire, or
“purpose” to produce the proscribed result—in this case severe pain and suffering—
“whatever the likelihood of that result happening from the conduct.”147 Other cases
suggest that only knowledge or notice that an act will likely result in the proscribed
outcome is necessary for “specific intent” and that the notice element will be satisfied by
the reasonable foreseeability of the natural and probable consequences of one’s act.148
Some academics have challenged the notion that the Senate even intended to create a
“specific intent” crime with its reservation to the treaty.149 And, while the infamous Bybee
145 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, “Sec. 5.2: Mental States: Intent and Knowledge,” in vol. 1 of Substantive Criminal Law, 2d
ed. (Eagan, MN: Thomson/West, 2003), (Westlaw database updated September 2014),
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/SecondarySources/CriminalLawSecondarySources/CriminalLawTextsTreatises/S
ubstantiveCriminalLaw/ (accessed April 6, 2015).
146 See Wayne R. LaFave, “Sec. 5.2: Mental States: Intent and Knowledge,” in vol. 1 of Substantive Criminal Law (“The
meaning of the word ‘intent’ in criminal law has always been rather obscure …’General intent’ is often distinguished from
‘specific intent,’ although the distinction being drawn by the use of these two terms often varies. … greater clarity could be
accomplished by abandoning the ‘specific intent’ -‘general intent’ terminology.”).
147 U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-405 (1980)
148 United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273, (4th Cir. 1979). See also United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445
(U.S. 1978)(it is now generally understood that a person acts with specific intent when he “consciously desires that result,
whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct” and with general intent he “knows that the result is
practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.”)
149 Where Congress seeks to require a showing of “specific intent” it uses that phrase. See Renee C. Redman, “Defining ‘Torture’:
The Collateral Effect on Immigration Law of the Attorney General’s Narrow Interpretation of ‘Specifically Intended’ When Applied
to United States Interrogators,” 62 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 465, 493, n. 171 (2007) citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Allard K.
Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic in Support of Petitioner Guillaume’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,” March
30, 2006, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/Guillaume_Second_Circuit_Brief_FINAL_060330.pdf
(accessed March 17, 2015), pp. 20-22. The brief reveals the results of a survey of the US Criminal Code finding only eight uses
of the phrase “specifically intend[s][ed].” In six of these, Congress uses the phrase in contexts that clearly do not impose a
“specific intent” requirement and have nothing to do with elements of a violation. Rather, in these sections, the word
“specifically” is used as an adverb that modifies “intend[s][ed]” in a general sense, such as in 2 U.S.C. section
658b(d)(3)(2000), which discusses the duties of congressional committees and it states that if the bill or joint resolution
would make a reduction, the Committee Report will contain: “a statement of how the committee specifically intends to
implement the reduction.” In contrast, the section of the US code implementing the Genocide Convention states, “[w]hoever
[commits a prohibited act] with the specific intent to destroy.” See Brief of Amicus Curiae Allard K. Lowenstein, p. 22, n. 11.
(The only two sections where use of “specifically intend[s][ed] could conceivably be an element of a violation were in the
Torture Statute and in one other statute related to punitive damages. In the punitive damages statute it states that there will
be no cap on punitive damages if the injury is ‘specifically intended’ but then defines specifically intended to mean when a
“defendant acted with the specific intent to injure the plaintiff.”). See also Jens David Ohlin, “The Torture Lawyers: A Reply to
Parry and Harel,” Harvard International Law Journal Online, vol. 51, June 2005, p.98, n. 15, http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/HILJ-Online_51_Ohlin.pdf (accessed Jan. 28, 2015)(“The [torture] statute was not designed to
allow potential perpetrators to open up a wedge between ‘pain’ and ‘severe pain’ and argue that they intended the former
but did not specifically intend the latter. If this were the case, almost any torture prosecution would be frustrated when a
perpetrator concedes that they intended to cause pain but then argue that the resulting severity was accidental. This is the
wrong mens rea for torture.”).
NO MORE EXCUSES 38
Torture Memos of August 1, 2002 interpreted the Torture Act’s language as including a
heightened specific intent requirement, less than two years later, the OLC would repudiate
that interpretation (see below).150 Regardless, even using the heightened standard
articulated in Auguste, the available evidence indicates that the architects of the CIA
Program specifically intended torture. Proof of that intent may be inferred from the total
facts and circumstances of the case and does not require direct evidence of the accused's
mental state.151 In fact, the process that led to the creation of the Torture Memos, and the
memos themselves, are evidence of intent to torture.
Elements of Conspiracy
Senior US officials who devised and authorized the CIA program did not actually carry out
torture themselves, but there is a strong case that they engaged in a conspiracy to
torture.152 In order to prove conspiracy under US law, there must be: (1) an agreement, (2)
among two or more persons, (3) for an unlawful purpose, and (4) at least one overt act
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.153 The overt act need not be illegal. It is also
150 See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department,
to James B. Comey, December 30, 2004, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (hereinafter “Levin
Replacement Memo”), p. 16, n. 27, https://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc96.pdf. (“In
the August 2002 Memorandum, this Office concluded that the specific intent element of the statute required that infliction of
severe pain or suffering be the defendant’s ‘precise objective’ and that it was not enough that the defendant act with
knowledge that such pain ‘was reasonably likely to result from his actions’ (or even that the result ‘is certain to occur’). We
do not reiterate that test here.”)
151 Oona Hathaway, Aileen Nowlan, Julia Spiegel, “Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture Under International and
Domestic Law,” 52 Virginia Journal of International Law (2012), p. 791, 798, 805. (Analyzing the required mental state for
torture in US jurisprudence in the extradition, civil and very limited criminal context and concluding that to the extent there
are differences across different bodies of US domestic law they go to the evidence required to establish intent, rather than to
the standard of intent itself).
152 Conspiracy to torture can be charged as one offense under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2340A(c), which permits the charge of
conspiracy to torture, or by combining the stand-alone offense of conspiracy under the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 371, with a charge of torture under the Torture Act 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a). The only difference appears to be what
sentence can be imposed. See US v. Parrett, 872 F. Supp. 910, 911 (D. Utah 1994); see also United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d
878, 885 (7th Cir. 1951). Parrett analyzed whether it was proper to charge a defendant for conspiracy to kidnap using the
federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 371, combined with the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a), when
essentially the same charge could be brought for conspiracy to kidnap under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1201(c) and held that either 18
U.S.C. sec. 371 combined with 18 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a) or 18 U.S.C. sec. 1201(c) on its own may be used—the only difference
would be the penalty that could be imposed. Conspiracy to kidnap under section 1201(c) carries a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment while conspiracy to kidnap using section 371 carries a maximum penalty of five years. There is no direct case
on point looking at the same issue with regards to the charge of conspiracy to torture given the dearth of cases brought
under the Torture Act (only one has been brought in US court, see United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cir. Fla.
2010)), but the statutory scheme of the federal kidnapping statute under 18 U.S.C. 1201 is virtually identical to that of the
federal Torture Statute under 18 U.S.C. 2340A.
153 United States v. Cohen, 583 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Stone, 323 F. Supp. 2d 886, 888
(E.D. Tenn. 2004).

necessary to demonstrate that conspirators intended to agree to commit elements of the
underlying offense, in this case torture.154
For conspiracy, the agreement can be inferred from direct or circumstantial evidence.155 No
proof of an express agreement is required. As one court noted, “criminal conspiracies are
by their very nature clandestine, and a tacit agreement inferred from the surrounding
circumstances can—and often does—suffice to ground a finding of willing participation.”156
The crime is frequently established as a result of inferences drawn from the acts of persons
accused.157 Relevant circumstantial evidence can include: “the joint appearance of
defendants at transactions and negotiations in furtherance of the conspiracy; the
relationship among codefendants; mutual representation of defendants to third parties;
and other evidence suggesting unity of purpose or common design and understanding
among conspirators to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy.”158
Individuals can also join a conspiracy if there is sufficient evidence they did so with some
knowledge of the conspiracy's “unlawful aims”—in this case torture—and with the intent of
helping the conspiracy succeed.159 In addition, under the doctrine of “conscious
154 United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2010); See also United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S. Ct.
1255, 43 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1975). As previously noted, the Torture Act defines torture as “an act committed by a person acting
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering … upon another person
within his custody or physical control.” Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2340(1). 18 U.S.C. sec. 2340(2) further defines “severe
mental pain or suffering” as “the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from— (A) the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or threatened administration
or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality; (C) the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death,
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.”
155 Charles Doyle, “Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview,” Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, p. 5, n. 45,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41223.pdf (accessed January 11, 2015) citing United States v. Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F.3d
32, 39 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754-55 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481
(3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2009).
156 United States v. Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. P.R. 2010).
157 Ibid.
158 Doyle, “Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview,” Congressional Research Service, p. 5-6, n. 46 citing United States v.
Wardell, 591 F.3d, pp. 1287-288, which held “[b]ecause ‘secrecy and concealment’ are frequently essential to a successful
conspiracy, ‘direct evidence of conspiracy is often hard to come by.’ Thus, ‘conspiracy convictions may be based on
circumstantial evidence, and the jury may infer conspiracy from the defendants’ conduct and other circumstantial evidence
indicating coordination and concert of action.”
159 U.S. v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2003) citing U.S. v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2002). Another way
courts put it is “whether there is proof that the defendant (1) had knowledge of the unlawful aims of the charged scheme and
NO MORE EXCUSES 40
avoidance,” knowledge can be found where a defendant consciously avoided learning the
fact while aware of the high probability of its existence, even if there is no evidence that
the defendant possessed actual knowledge.160
Evidence of Conspiracy to Torture

There is substantial evidence supporting charges of conspiracy to torture against senior US
officials and CIA contractors, including evidence that some individuals joined the
conspiracy after it was first established.
Generating Legal Cover for Torture

After the US apprehension of Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002, someone identified as
“CTC Legal” in the Senate Summary recommended that a psychologist working on contract
in the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS)—identified in the Senate Summary as Dr.
Grayson Swigert—be used by the CIA to “provide real-time recommendations to overcome
Abu Zubaydah’s resistance to interrogation.”161 Not long thereafter Swigert, since identified
as James Mitchell, and another psychologist identified in the Senate Summary as Dr.
Harold Dunbar, since identified as Bruce Jessen, proposed that the CIA use 12
interrogation techniques on detainees.162 These techniques included waterboarding,
painful stress positions, walling, prolonged sleep deprivation, and cramped confinement
among others— most of which were eventually approved for use by the OLC.163 Mitchell and
(2) evinced, by his actions, an intention to further or promote its unlawful aims.” See Svoboda, p. 477, citing U.S. v. Beech-
Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1191 (2d Cir. 1989).
160 U.S. v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477-478 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2003).
161 Senate Summary, p. 26. Mitchell was known to CIA OTS because OTS had commissioned Mitchell and Jessen to prepare a
report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation. The report
was titled: “Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qaeda Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance
Training Perspective (undated),” Senate Summary, p. 21, 57.
162 Senate Summary, p. 32. Jason Leopold, “Psychologist James Mitchell Admits He Waterboarded al Qaeda Suspects,” Vice
News, December 15, 2015, https://news.vice.com/article/psychologist-james-mitchell-admits-he-waterboarded-al-qaeda-

suspects (accessed April 29, 2015); “CIA report: Who are the unlikely interrogators?” BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
us-canada-30405918 (accessed April 7, 2015).
163 Senate Summary, p. 32. The express goal of the program was to induce a state of “learned helplessness.” OPR Report, p.
236. See also “Memorandum from CIA to OLC, Background Paper on CIA’s Combined use of Interrogation Techniques,”
December 30, 2004, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc97.pdf
(accessed November 16, 2015). “Learned helplessness” is a psychological theory, based on testing done on humans and
animals, which holds that individuals forced to undergo painful or unpleasant stimuli will become unwilling to avoid further
exposure to such treatment, presumably because they have learned that they cannot control the situation. Jeannette L.
Nolen, “Learned helplessness,” Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/topic/learned-helplessness (accessed
November 11, 2015); See also American Psychological Association, “Report to the Special Committee of the Board of
Directors of the American Psychological Association Independent Review Relating To APA Ethics Guidelines, National

Jessen were ultimately hired as contractors by the CIA to develop the “enhanced
interrogation technique” program, carry it out, and assess its effectiveness.164
Officials in the CIA and at the White House knew or should have known, from the moment
these techniques were proposed, that they violated the Torture Statute. First, the
techniques were derived from those used in the Defense Department’s Survival, Evasion,
Resistance and Escape (SERE) program—a program designed to train US Special Forces to
endure interrogation methods used by enemies who do not abide by the Geneva
Conventions and the laws of war, which prohibit torture.165 Second, the US Army’s field
manual for intelligence investigations at the time prohibited many of the techniques the
CIA was considering and ultimately approved using, such as “abnormal sleep deprivation”
and “forcing an individual to stand, sit or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged
periods of time,” and “food deprivation,” explicitly defining them as forms of torture.166
Indeed, the Senate Summary includes strong evidence that CIA and senior White House
officials did know, practically from the moment that they were first being considered, that
these techniques violated the Torture Statute. According to a Department of Justice Office
Security Interrogations, and Torture,” (hereinafter “Hoffman Report”) July 2, 2015, revised September 4, 2015,
http://www.apa.org/independent-review/revised-report.pdf (accessed November 14, 2015), p. 529. “On the CIA's behalf, the
contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on ‘learned helplessness,’ and developed the list of
enhanced interrogation techniques that was approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees,” Senate
Summary, Findings and Conclusions, p. 11. The intended purpose was to force detainees to become “passive in response to
adverse or uncontrollable events.” Senate Summary, Findings and Conclusions, p. 19, n. 32. CIA cables described the
interrogations in the following manner: “the deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological
disorientation, and reduced psychological wherewithal for the interrogation,” as well as “the deliberate establishment of
psychological dependence upon the interrogator” Senate Summary, p. 26, n. 94. It can be argued that the psychological
state of learned helplessness meets the definition of “severe mental pain or suffering” under the Torture Statute which is
defined as “the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.” See 18 U.S.C sec. 2340.
164 Senate Summary Findings and Conclusions, p. 11. See also Senate Summary, p. 32.
165 Senate Summary, p. 21. See also “Statement of Senator Carl Levin on Senate Armed Services Committee Report of its
Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody,” December 11, 2008,
http://fas.org/irp/news/2008/12/levin121108.html (accessed March 20, 2015); Among the physical and psychological
pressures used at SERE schools are stress positions, sleep deprivation, face and abdomen slaps, isolation, degradation
(such as treating the student like an animal), and “walling.” Until November 2007, waterboarding was also an approved
training technique in the U.S. Navy SERE school. See SASC Report, p. 4.
166 Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation, September 28, 1992,
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf (accessed February 2, 2015), Chapter 1, p. 8. This document was in effect until
December 6, 2006 when it was replaced by the current US field manual for intelligence investigations on December 6, 2006.
See “Human Intelligence Collection and Counterintelligence Operations” FM 2-22.3, p. ii (“This publication supersedes FM
34-52, 28 September 1992.”) http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf (accessed November 10, 2015). Food deprivation,
or “dietary manipulation” as it was called was not officially approved in an OLC guidance memo until May 10, 2005. (See
Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo, p. 7).
NO MORE EXCUSES 42
of Professional Responsibility investigation (OPR investigation), the CIA, through its acting
General Counsel John Rizzo, expressed concern about “criminal liability” under the Torture
Statute and sought a guarantee from the Justice Department that employees would not be
prosecuted for use of these techniques.167 The Senate Summary also contains reference to
a draft letter to the attorney general from “CTC Legal” —a likely reference to someone in the
legal department of the CIA’s counterterrorism center, headed by Jonathan Fredman at the
time168 —asking for an advance guarantee not to prosecute any US employees or agents
using “aggressive methods” of interrogation and acknowledging that these methods
would otherwise be prohibited by the Torture Statute.169 The letter was drafted in July 2002
and circulated internally at the CIA, as well as to Mitchell, though the Senate Summary
says there are no records showing that it was ever sent.170 The existence of the letter
indicates that CIA legal advisers believed from the beginning that the techniques being
proposed were likely illegal.
At a July 13, 2002 meeting where the guarantee not to prosecute was discussed, Michael
Chertoff, head of the Justice Department Criminal Division, refused to provide such a
guarantee.171 At that same meeting, Daniel Levin, chief of staff to the FBI director at the
time, also reportedly said that the FBI would not participate in any interrogations
employing “enhanced interrogation techniques,” whether they were found legal or not and
that the FBI would not further discuss the matter.172 Also present at the meeting was Rizzo;
167 OPR Report, p. 37. As early as May 28, 2002, the day Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys, including CTC Legal and
Rizzo, discussed interpretations of the Torture Statute that might permit CIA officers to use certain interrogation tactics. See
Senate Summary, p. 22, n. 61-62.
168 See “Unclassified paper prepared by Jonathan Fredman for the Senate Armed Services Committee,” November 17, 2008,
https://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Jonathan-Fredman-to-SASC.pdf (accessed August 20, 2015).

The paper states in part: “On September 11, 2001, I was chief legal counsel for the CIA Counterterrorist Center, or
CTC….Among my responsibilities was to provide legal advice to the Director of CTC about proposed and ongoing operations
conducted pursuant to written Presidential direction to CIA provided following the attacks of 9/11.” Fredman confirmed that
these issues included “detention or interrogation,” and specifically interpretation of the anti-torture statute. Fredman wrote,
“I stayed at my post in CTC until early April 2004,” and that “[a]s the chief counsel for CTC, I managed a legal staff that grew
from three people in the days immediately before 9/11 to approximately 10 people thereafter.”
170 Ibid.
171 OPR Report, p. 47. Sometime after this meeting, between July 13 and July 16, Chertoff asked Yoo to draft a letter from Yoo
to Rizzo stating that after consultation with the Justice Department Criminal Division it is “our understanding” that the
Department “does not issue letters of declination for future conduct that might violate federal law.” The letter was drafted
and approved but there is no record it was ever sent. OPR Report, pp. 48-49.
172 OPR Report, p. 47 (Daniel Levin later served as Acting Deputy OLC, replacing Yoo and his role in that regard is discussed
later in this report).

“CTC Legal”; legal advisor to the National Security Council John Bellinger; and Department
of Justice OLC attorneys, including John Yoo.173
At that point, senior White House officials, including Counsel to Vice President David
Addington and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; CIA officials, including Rizzo; and
the OLC’s Yoo engaged in a series of meetings and consultations in an apparent effort to
generate novel legal cover for interrogation techniques that the CIA and others knew likely
constituted torture. Eventually, these meetings led to the production of the first official
memos, both issued on August 1, 2002, purporting to authorize the use of what the CIA
referred to as “enhanced interrogation techniques.”
Evidence of the process by which the Bybee Memos were developed includes:
• At some point after Abu Zubaydah’s apprehension, the CIA asked the OLC for an
opinion as to the legality of the proposed interrogation techniques.174 Attorney
General John Ashcroft instructed Yoo to draft the opinion.175 Yoo began doing so
after an April 16, 2002 meeting with unnamed individuals at the National Security
Council.176 Bellinger, having been told by CIA attorneys that they wanted to use
“aggressive” interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah and that they wanted a
guarantee that the Justice Department would not prosecute (known as a
“declination of prosecution”), facilitated contact and meetings among the CIA,
OLC, and Justice Department Criminal Division.177 He also reportedly told Yoo that
access to the interrogation program was extremely limited and that the State
Department should not be informed.178
• Sometime around July 8, 2002, as noted above, “CTC Legal” apparently drafted a
letter, identified as a “draft” in the summary, to the attorney general asking that his
office provide a guarantee not to prosecute in advance to any US employees or
personnel who carry out interrogations on Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might
173 Senate Summary, p. 33-34. Another report names Bellinger and places Gonzales at this meeting as well (see “Release of
Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s Opinions on CIA’s Detention and
Interrogation Program,” April 22, 2009, http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/ssci_olc.pdf (accessed March 15, 2015), p. 3).
176 OPR Report, p. 40-43.

NO MORE EXCUSES 44
subject them to criminal prosecution. The letter acknowledged that use of the
“aggressive methods” would otherwise be prohibited by the Torture Statute “apart
from potential reliance upon the doctrines of necessity or of self-defense.”179 The
letter was circulated internally at the CIA but there are no records to indicate it was
provided to the attorney general.180
• On July 12, 2002, Yoo met at the White House Counsel’s office with Gonzales and
likely Addington181 about his memo, which Yoo reportedly referred to internally as
the “bad things opinion.”182 At this point Yoo’s draft memo focused on the
definition of torture, the ratification and negotiating history of the Torture Statute,
and an analysis of what had been considered torture in prior cases.183 It did not
contain any arguments about whether the statute required specific intent to torture
as an element; nor did it address any potential defenses to the statute in the case
of prosecution.184
• On July 13, 2002, the meeting where Chertoff refused to provide a guarantee not to
prosecute and Levin said the FBI would not participate in interrogations, took
place. After this, the OLC memos seem to have become more important to the CIA
and senior officials at the White House, as they would need to rely upon them to
justify the legality of the techniques.
• The same day as the July 13 meeting, at Rizzo’s request, Yoo drafted and two days
later sent Rizzo a summary of the elements of the Torture Statute and how the
specific intent required under it could be negated.185 In a separate email to Rizzo on
181 The OPR report indicates Yoo and Gonzales met with either Flanigan or Addington at this meeting but subsequent
testimony by Addington at a House Judiciary Committee hearing on June 17, 2008 indicates it was likely Addington at this
and at a subsequent meetings with Yoo and Gonzales on July 16, 2002. See also SASC Report, p. 31. See OPR report, p. 52.
Neither Addington nor Flanigan cooperated with the OPR Investigation, and neither Yoo, Gonzales nor an unnamed OLC
attorney who helped Yoo with the memo and was also present at the July 12, 2002 meeting, said they had any specific
recollection of whether it was Addington or Flanigan who was present. See OPR report, pp. 7 and 50. Whether Flanigan was
present at other meetings, as well as his role in the initial conspiracy should be investigated however because other
documents point to Flanigan as being a member of what was known as the “war council” that included Haynes, Gonzales,
Rizzo, Yoo and Flanigan, who met regularly on a range of issues including interrogation of enemy combatants in the “war on
terror” during the period that interrogation policy was being developed. SASC Report, p. 31, n. 224.
182 OPR Report, 45-46.

185 OPR Report, p. 48. Yoo’s letter stated that, “if an individual undertook any of the predicate acts for severe mental pain or
suffering, but did so in the good faith belief that those acts would not cause the prisoner prolonged mental harm, he would
not have acted with the specific intent necessary to establish torture. lf, for example, efforts were made to determine what

July 15, likely in follow-up to the letter, Yoo also suggested to Rizzo “one other thing
to include … a footnote saying that we do not address because not asked” the
following:(1) how Commander-in-Chief power affects enforcement of the Torture
Statute; and (2) possible defenses to violations of the Torture Statute.186
• The next day, July 16, Yoo met yet again with Gonzales and likely Addington.187 After
this meeting, Yoo began adding new sections to the memo on the Commander-in-
Chief power and possible defenses to violations of the Torture Statute.188 He also
added in arguments about how specific intent could be negated.189 A colleague of
Yoo’s, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin, noticed that the new sections
were added and suggested they were “superfluous” and should be removed.190 Yoo
responded: “They want it in there.”191 The arguments remained in the analysis.192
• Yoo provided regular briefings about the draft memorandums to Attorney General
Ashcroft. He explained to him that the Justice Department Criminal Division had
refused to provide the advance declination. At some point Ashcroft asked if it
would be possible to issue advance pardons. Yoo informed Ashcroft it would not.193
• On July 17, CIA director George Tenet met with National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice, who told him that the CIA could proceed with its proposed
long-term impact, if any, specific conduct would have and it was learned that the conduct would not result in prolonged
mental harm, any actions undertaken relying on that advice would have be [sic] undertaken in good faith. Due diligence to
meet this standard might include such actions as surveying professional literature, consulting with experts, or evidence
gained from past experience.” The final Bybee I Memo contained similar language. See Bybee I Memo, p. 8.
187 OPR Report p. 50. As described in more detail in note 181 above, the OPR Report is not clear whether Addington or
Flanigan were present at this meeting. Flanigan’s and Addington’s role in this and subsequent meetings regarding
interrogation policy need to be investigated.
188 OPR Report, p. 49-53. The Commander-in-Chief power argument ended up as Part V of the Bybee I Memo, OPR Report, p.
68. The memo argued that interpreting the Torture Statute to prohibit the use of certain interrogation techniques used to
gather information from the enemy would be unconstitutional because it would interfere with the president’s Commander-in-
Chief power and authority to carry out a military campaign. See Bybee I Memo, p. 2 and pp. 31-39 (“Congress can no more
interfere with the President’s conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical
decisions on the battlefield.”). The common law defenses arguments ended up as Part VI of the Bybee I Memo. See OPR
Report, p. 68. The memo argued that the common law defenses of necessity and self-defense “could provide justifications
that would eliminate any criminal liability for violations of the torture statute.” Bybee I Memo, p. 39. For a full description of
the argument, see Bybee I Memo, pp. 39-46.
190 OPR Report, p. 51. See also, p. 63, where Philbin is reported to have explained that he thought the analysis should have
been limited to what the CIA could do within the law, including the defenses section, which he said “suggests that maybe
there is something wrong. You're going to have to use the defenses.”
192 See Bybee I Memo.

NO MORE EXCUSES 46
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, subject to the CIA providing more details about the
techniques, an explanation as to why they would not cause lasting irreparable
harm to Zubaydah, and a determination of legality by the OLC.194
• The CIA gathered the requested information over the course of the following week.195
The CIA asked Mitchell and Jessen about the possible psychological impact of using
the waterboard or proposed “mock burial” techniques on Abu Zubaydah. Through a
cable from the CIA Chief of Base, they responded that while SERE techniques are
applied on volunteer students in a harmless way with no measurable psychological
impact, they could not guarantee the same with Abu Zubaydah. While interrogation
personnel will “make every effort” to ensure Abu Zubaydah is not “permanently
physically or mentally harmed … we should not say … that there is no risk.”196
• On July 24, the OLC orally advised the CIA that Attorney General Ashcroft had
concluded that, with the exception of waterboarding, the proposed techniques—
including the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap),
cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, use of
diapers, and use of insects—could be used and were lawful.197
• In apparent response to Rice’s request, Defense Department General Counsel William

Haynes obtained two memos from JPRA staff.198 The first dated July 25, 2002 listed
lesson plans on “exploitation and interrogation” based on what had been effective
against “Americans” in the past.199 A second, dated July 26, 2002 had three
attachments. The first included a list of techniques used to train SERE students to
resist abusive interrogations; the second included operational risks, associated with
the use of SERE-techniques (such as the danger of obtaining false information and that
194 Senate Summary, pp. 34-36; “Release of Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel’s Opinions on CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program,” April 22, 2009,
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/olcopinion.pdf (accessed March 15, 2015), pp. 3-4.
195 Senate Summary, pp. 34-36.
196 Senate Summary, p. 36. The waterboard was used for demonstration purposes on a very small number of students in
limited applications during the SERE class and was ultimately discontinued in 2007 because of the dramatic effect on
students subjected to it. CIA OIG Report, p. 14, n. 14. CIA detainees were waterboarded repeatedly over a very short amount
of time. For example, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded 2-4 times a day with multiple iterations of the watering cycle during
each application. Senate Summary, p. 42.
198 See generally SASC Report, pp. 24-31, and specifically p. 26 where Haynes states that he was collecting the information
for the Justice Department for “a program he was not free to discuss with the Committee, even in a classified setting.”
199 SASC Report, p. 25. See also OPR Report, p. 56.

a detainee’s resistance will increase), which were described interchangeably
throughout the memo as “physical and psychological duress” and “torture;” and the
third included information on the impact of SERE techniques used on SERE students
which was described as “minimal”—though this was attributed to the voluntary nature
of the program and extensive steps taken to ensure that the students suffered no long
term harm.200 On July 26, Ashcroft orally approved the use of waterboarding.201
• Sometime around July 26, and perhaps the same day, the CIA informed OLC that it
wanted the approval in writing.202 On July 26, the White House also told Yoo that
they wanted the memos done “as soon as possible.”203 Yoo then incorporated
comments from Gonzalez, Chertoff, and Philbin into his drafts.204
• The final drafts of the two Bybee Memos, authored by Yoo, were issued on August
1, 2002. The second memo, addressed to Rizzo, invoked CIA consultations with
individuals with extensive experience in the use of SERE techniques in justifying its
claim that no prolonged mental harm would result from use of the “enhanced
interrogation” methods.205
This sequence of meetings, correspondence, and events strongly suggest the involvement
of senior White House and CIA officials in the production and content of the Bybee Memos.
The OPR investigation came to a similar conclusion: “In view of this sequence of events,
we believe it is likely that the sections [of the “August 1, 2002 Memos”] were added
because some number of attendees at the July 16, 2002 meeting requested the additions,
perhaps because the Criminal Division had refused to issue any advance declinations.”206
The fact that the CIA’s (CTC Legal’s) July 8 draft letter recognized the importance of
200 SASC Report, pp. 24-31. See also, OPR Report, p. 56. One of the authors of these memos, Jerald Ogrisseg, has since
stated that he produced his analysis with students in mind, not detainees, his analysis was not applicable to the offensive
use of SERE techniques, and that he would not stand by the same conclusions if the SERE resistance training were being
applied to detainees. SASC Report, p. 30. The nature of the SERE program included extensive physical and psychological pre-
screening processes; a limited risk that SERE instructions would mistreat their own personnel; was voluntary in nature, of
limited duration, had a known start and end date, and could be terminated by a student at any time. SASC Report, pp. 30-31.
203 OPR Report. p. 57.
205 Bybee II Memo, p. 4. See also OPR Report, p. 56 and CIA OIG Report, p. 14.
NO MORE EXCUSES 48
“potential reliance upon the doctrines of necessity or of self-defense” to avoid liability
under the Torture Statute strengthens this conclusion.
Ultimately, the OPR investigation found that Yoo violated his duty to exercise independent legal
judgment, committing “intentional professional misconduct,” and that Bybee acted in “reckless
disregard” of his obligations to provide independent legal analysis.207 The OPR investigation
called for both lawyers to be referred to their respective state bar associations for discipline but
in 2010 Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis rejected this recommendation.208
The meetings, correspondence, and events also provide evidence relevant to establishing
the elements of a criminal conspiracy in that they are evidence of an agreement, among
two or more persons (the senior administration officials involved in the meetings and
authorizations above) for an unlawful purpose—the use of interrogation techniques that,
individually, and certainly when combined as course of conduct, as discussed in more
detail below, amounted to torture. Many of the individuals involved also appear to have
engaged in overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy—such as facilitating contact
between parties that could approve use of the techniques, ensuring that relevant
government officials who might object were not informed of the techniques, orally
approving use of the techniques, drafting the memos or providing input for the content of
the memos, approving the memos or techniques, giving orders in accordance with use of
the techniques, and hiring psychologists Mitchell and Jessen to implement the program.209
207 OPR Report, p. 11. OPR recommended that both lawyers be referred to their respective state bar associations for
discipline. Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis overruled the OPR’s recommended sanctions, however, finding
that while Yoo and Bybee exercised “poor judgment,” they did not knowingly provide false advice, and therefore were not
guilty of professional misconduct. Memorandum from David Margolis, associate deputy attorney general, to attorney general
and deputy attorney general, regarding “Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional
Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on
Suspected Terrorists,” (hereinafter “Margolis Memo”) January 5, 2010,
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20100105_DAG_Margolis_Memo.pdf (accessed November 13, 2015), p. 68.
208 See Ibid. See also Margolis Memo, pp. 1-2.
209 Mitchell and Jessen had been psychologists with the US Air Force SERE program but the Senate Summary says they had
no individual interrogation experience, specialized knowledge of Al-Qaeda, background in terrorism, or relevant regional,
cultural, or linguistic expertise. Yet they were the ones who essentially designed the program that was ultimately approved.
Senate Summary, p. 32. They were also in charge of carrying out the program and, in part, with evaluating its success. In its
response to the Senate Summary, the CIA defended Mitchell and Jessen saying the Senate's assertion that they had “no
relevant experience” is “incorrect.” See “CIA Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the
Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program,” June 27, 2003,
ation_Program.pdf (accessed November 16, 2015)(hereinafter “CIA Response”), p. 11 of the summary section.

Based on the information outlined above, the following individuals should be investigated
for their role in the conspiracy: Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, Head of the Justice
Department OLC Jay Bybee, OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, the person
identified as “CTC Legal” in the Senate Summary, CIA Director George Tenet, National
Security Legal Advisor John Bellinger, Attorney General John Ashcroft, White House Counsel
Legal Advisor Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, Deputy
White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.
President Bush and Vice President Cheney should also be investigated for their roles in
approving torture. The Senate Summary indicates that Bush was not briefed on the CIA program
until April 8, 2006 and that at that time he “expressed discomfort” at the image of a detainee
chained, diapered, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself.210 However, Bush admits in
his autobiography that he discussed the program with Tenet in 2002, prior to application of
the first techniques, and personally approved them.211 Further, a still-classified Memorandum
of Notification for covert action, signed by Bush on September 17, 2001, provided the
purported basis for authorization of the CIA program, though apparently not for the use of
coercive interrogations.212 More about Cheney’s role after the “Torture Memos” were issued is
elaborated on below, but media reports indicate that he, together with Addington, was the
principal political force pressing OLC lawyers to justify the use of coercive interrogation
methods.213 As Cheney notably said during a media interview in which he defended the actions
of Yoo and other OLC lawyers, the lawyers did “what we asked them to do.”214
212 Senate Summary, p. 11-13. The MON made no reference to interrogations or interrogation techniques but provided the CIA
director with “unprecedented authorities” and “significant discretion” to detain persons posing a “continuing, serious
threat” to the US. However, Senator Feinstein’s Forward to the Summary notes that the MON did not provide authorization or
contemplate the use of coercive interrogations. Senate Summary, p. 2, n. 2. See also, Senate Summary, p. 11.
213 See Getting Away with Torture, p. 74, n. 278 stating: Cheney has been described by one author as the “single-minded driving force
behind the most aggressive aspects of the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policy,” (Mayer, The Dark Side, p. 343) and by the
Washington Post as “a prime mover behind the Bush administration's decision to violate the Geneva Conventions and the U.N.
Convention Against Torture.” (“Vice President for Torture,” Washington Post, October 26, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/25/AR2005102501388.html (accessed November 13, 2015)). See also “Cheney, Rice Approved Use of
Waterboarding, Other Interrogation Tactics,” Associated Press, April 11, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/04/11/cheney-
rice-approved-use-waterboarding-other-interrogation-tactics/ (accessed April 5, 2015).
214 “Transcript of Interview with Vice President Dick Cheney,” ABC’s This Week, p. 9 (Feb. 14, 2010), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-vice-president-dick-cheney/story?id=9818034&singlePage=true
(accessed January 12, 2015); see also Testimony of David Addington, former counsel to the vice president, before the House
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, “In defense of Mr. Yoo, I would
simply like to point out that is what his client asked him to do. So it is the professional obligation of the attorney to render
the advice on the subjects that the client wants advice on.” (The Constitution Project Report, p. 132 citing hearing testimony).
NO MORE EXCUSES 50
Mitchell and Jessen should be investigated for their alleged direct participation in torture,
often applied in ways beyond how it was authorized, but also for their role in the initial
conspiracy to torture as well. As the Senate Summary points out, it was Mitchell who first
proposed the use of 12 specific techniques derived from the US Military’s SERE school on Abu
Zubaydah (see above) to the CIA.215 Both Jessen and Mitchell had been psychologists with the
US Air Force SERE school so they would have known the school exposed trainees to
interrogation methods that would violate the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war.216
“CTC Legal’s” draft letter to Ashcroft asking for a guarantee to prosecute was circulated to
Mitchell.217 Also in July, Mitchell proposed the CIA enter into a contract with Jessen to aid the
CIA in its interrogation process.218 At some point, Mitchell and Jessen, perhaps not until 2005,
formed the company Mitchell Jessen & Associates along with other former JPRA officials and
SERE school employees or contractors.219 They received $81 million on their $180 million
contract with the CIA to carry out the program before it was terminated in 2009.220 The
contract was to assess detainees’ fitness for the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,”
conduct interrogations, and to assess the effectiveness of the techniques as applied.221
In late July as Yoo was finishing up the August 1, 2002 memos, he received a psychological
assessment of Abu Zubaydah and a report from CIA psychologists asserting that the use of
harsh interrogation techniques in SERE training had resulted in no adverse long-term
215 Senate Summary, p. 32, n. 138 (“The CIA did not seek out Swigert and Dunbar after a decision was made to use coercive
interrogation techniques; rather Swigert and Dunbar played a role in convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy.”).
216 Senate Summary, p. 21. See also “Statement of Senator Carl Levin on Senate Armed Services Committee Report of its
Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody,” December 11, 2008,
http://fas.org/irp/news/2008/12/levin121108.html (accessed October 25, 2015)(“The SERE techniques] were designed to
give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be
better prepared to resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody …. SERE training
is based on illegal exploitation [of the Genera Conventions] over the last 50 years.”).
217 Senate Summary, p. 33. Mitchell by this time was already on contract
with the CIA’s Office of Technical Services and had
been involved in Abu Zubaydah’s initial interrogations. Senate Summary, p. 26.
219 There are conflicting reports about when the company was formed. The Hoffman Report says that Mitchell and Jessen formed the
company in July 2002. Hoffman Report, p. 128. The SASC Report says Mitchell and Jessen formed the company after Jessen retired
from the Department of Defense which was in July 2002. SASC Report, pp. 22-23. However, the Senate Summary says Mitchell and
Jessen formed company “Y” in 2005. Senate Summary, p. 168. See also CIA response, p. 48, Conclusion 12. In either case each of
these sources agree that the company was co-owned by seven individuals, six of whom either worked for JPRA or one of the service
SERE schools as employees or contractors. See Hoffman Report, p. 128. SASC Report, pp. 23-24, and Senate Summary, p. 168.
220 Senate Summary, Findings and Conclusions, p. 11. See also Senate Summary, p. 168.
221 Hoffman Report, p. 128, citing SASC Report, p. 24. In May 2004 the CIA’s policy changed and thereafter
Mitchell and Jessen acted only as interrogators. See Hoffman Report, p. 128 citing “Memorandum from John Brennan,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Sen. Saxby Chambliss, CIA Comments on the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program” (June 27, 2013).

effects.222 The August 1, 2002 memo (Bybee II Memo) to John Rizzo relied in part upon the
psychological assessment of Abu Zubaydah sent to Yoo on July 24, 2002.223 Whether Mitchell,
Jessen, or anyone from the company played a role in making these assessments should be
investigated. The author of the July 24, 2002 psychological assessment is not clear but the
Senate Summary indicates that Mitchell was present during interrogation sessions with Abu
Zubaydah and likely produced a psychological assessment of him.224 The Senate Summary
documents concerns raised in CIA cables about a conflict of interest inherent in having
Mitchell and Jessen in charge of conducting psychological assessments of detainees, the
appropriateness of the application of “enhanced interrogation techniques” on them, as well
as the effectiveness of the techniques.225 The CIA admits the multiple roles of Mitchell and
Jessen raised conflict of interest concerns, especially early on in the program.226
Defining “Humane Treatment”

Other government documents, related to later stages of the CIA program, provide further
evidence that those named above were part of the conspiracy, and that others joined the
conspiracy at a later date. Specifically, there is evidence in the public record indicating
that senior US officials or government agents, both had knowledge of the “unlawful aims”
223 See Bybee II Memo, pp. 7-9, which uses the exact language used in the psychological assessment faxed to Yoo on July
24, 2002. See “Psychological Assessment of Abu Zubaydah,” faxed to John Yoo on July 24, 2002, ACLU: The Torture Data
Base, https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/cia-memo-psychological-assessment-abu-
zubaydah?search_url=search/apachesolr_search&search_args=page=3 (accessed July 23, 2015). The Bybee II Memo to the
CIA on August 1, 2002 concludes:
As described above, it appears you have conducted an extensive inquiry to ascertain what impact, if any, these procedures
individually and as a course of conduct would have on Zubaydah. You have consulted with interrogation experts, including
those with substantial SERE school experience, consulted with outside psychologists, completed a psychological
assessment and reviewed the relevant literature on the topic. Based on this inquiry, you believe that the use of the
procedures, including the waterboard, and as a course of conduct would not result in prolonged mental harm. Reliance on
this information about Zubaydah and about the effect on the use of these techniques more generally demonstrates the
presence of a good faith belief that no prolonged mental harm will result from using these methods in the interrogation of
Zubaydah. Moreover, we think that this represents not only an honest belief but also a reasonable belief based on the
information that you have supplied to us. Thus, we believe that the specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering is
not present, and consequently there is no specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering.
224 See Senate Summary, p. 26 stating that the CIA sent Mitchell as part of an interrogation team to where Abu Zubaydah was
being detained shortly after Abu Zubaydah’s capture. An FBI interrogation team sent a memo to FBI headquarters at the time
stating that CIA psychologists had acquired “tremendous influence” in questioning Abu Zubaydah. Senate Summary, p. 27.
225 Senate Summary, p. 65. “In a communication to the CIA Inspector General, someone from the CIA’s Office of Medical Services
writes, “OMS’ concerns about conflict of interest were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals
applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly
proposed continued use of the technique—at a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators
who could not use the technique.”
226 CIA Response, p. 10, para. 32.
NO MORE EXCUSES 52
of the conspiracy—using torture to “enhance” interrogations—or made a deliberate effort
to avoid knowing that torture was being used.
In late 2002, CIA officials appear to have grown concerned that President Bush and other
senior officials were not fully behind their use of the “enhanced interrogation techniques,”
and sought reassurance that they had approval to proceed.227
The concern stemmed from a memo that Bush issued on February 7, 2002, declaring that
the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees but that the US
armed forces would nevertheless treat detainees “humanely.”228 The CIA’s concerns were
compounded by various communications it received about detainee treatment after it
began using the OLC-approved techniques. As a result, then-CIA General Counsel Scott
Muller decided to draft a “Memorandum for the Record,” dated February 12, 2003,
memorializing conversations he had with senior members of the administration confirming
that the February 7, 2002 memo did not impose new requirements on the CIA to treat
detainees “humanely.”229 The memo mentioned conversations about a letter from
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld addressed to George Tenet, and received by the CIA
on November 26, 2002, raising the requirement of humane treatment articulated in the
president’s February 7, 2002 memo in relation to the transfer of a detainee from the
227 See David Cole, “’The New Torture Files’: Declassified Memos Detail Roles of Bush White House and DOJ Officials Who
Conspired to Approve Torture,” Just Security, March 2, 2015, http://justsecurity.org/20553/new-torture-files-declassified-

memos-detail-roles-bush-wh-doj-officials-conspired-approve-torture/ (March 15, 2015); see also, Cole, “Torture: No One Said
No,” New York Review of Books; Senate Summary pp. 115-119; Getting Away With Torture, pp. 30-31, citing Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), “Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s
Opinions on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program,” document released April 22, 2009,
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/declassified-narrative-olc-opinions-cia-detention-and-interrogation-program-
april-17 (accessed June 28, 2015), pp. 7; John Sifton, “New Torture Report Details Bushies' Role,” The Daily Beast, April, 22, 2009,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/04/22/new-torture-report-details-bushies-role.html (accessed June 28, 2015).
228 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, attorney
general, chief of staff to the president, CIA director, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees,” February 7, 2002,
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (accessed March 15, 2015). The Bush memo
appears to have built upon a January 25, 2002, memo by Alberto Gonzales stating that in his opinion the “war on terror” was
a “new paradigm [that] renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint
some of its provisions... .” Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to George W. Bush, President of the United States, January
25, 2002, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf (accessed March 15, 2015). In urging the
president to declare that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees, Gonzales noted that such
a declaration would "Substantially reduce[] the threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the War Crimes Act.” The War
Crimes Act, discussed below, criminalizes any “grave breach” of the Geneva Conventions, which includes torture.
229 Memo by CIA General Counsel Scott W. Muller, “Memorandum for the Record: ‘Humane’ Treatment of CIA detainees,”
February 12, 2003, http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Exhibit-B-Bush-Policy-and-Legal-Directives-on-

Interrogation.pdf (accessed March 13, 2015)(hereinafter “Muller Memo for the Record.”).

Defense Department to CIA custody.230 It also mentioned conversations between Muller,
Gonzales, Addington, Haynes, and Yoo, about a December 27, 2002 letter from Human
Rights Watch raising concern about allegations of US abuse of detainees.231
In the memo, Muller confirmed that on December 13, 2002, Yoo told him that the February 7,
2002 memo had been “deliberately limited” so it would only be binding on US Armed Forces,
not the CIA.232 Additionally, in two conversations John Bellinger told him that the types of
interrogation techniques authorized by the attorney general had been “extensively
discussed” and were “consistent with the President’s February 7, 2002 memo.” Muller also
noted that at a January 13, 2003 meeting attended by Muller, Gonzales, Addington, Yoo, and
Haynes about the Human Rights Watch December 27, 2002 letter, Addington, Gonzalez and
Yoo confirmed that the president’s memo was only applicable to the armed forces.233
At another meeting three days later, on January 16, 2003, Muller said that there was “an
arguable inconsistency between what the CIA was authorized to do and what at least some
in the international community might expect in light of the Administration’s public
statements about ‘humane treatment’ of detainees on and after the February memo.”234 At
that meeting, attended by Muller, Rice, Rumsfeld, Haynes, Secretary of State Collin Powell,
Cheney, and Tenet, the CIA’s past and ongoing use of approved interrogation techniques
was “reaffirmed and in no way drawn into question,” according to the Muller memo.235
The reassurance provided to the CIA did not put the matter to rest. On June 25, 2003, Haynes
wrote to Senator Patrick Leahy, in response to a letter Leahy wrote to Haynes with concerns
about detainee treatment, saying that it is US policy to treat all detainees in a manner
consistent with its obligations under the Convention against Torture as well as the
230 Muller Memo for the Record, p. 3.
231 Senate Summary, p. 115, n. 685. See also Muller Memo for the Record, pp. 3-4. The letter they were discussing was:
“United States: Reports of Torture of Al-Qaeda Suspects,” Human Rights Watch, December 27, 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2002/12/26/united-states-reports-torture-al-qaeda-suspects (accessed March 16, 2015).
232 Cole, “’The New Torture Files’: Declassified Memos Detail Roles of Bush White House and DOJ Officials Who Conspired to
Approve Torture,” Just Security; See also Cole, “Torture: No One Said No,” New York Review of Books.
233 Muller Memo for the Record, pp. 3-4.
234 Muller Memo for the Record, p. 4.

235 Muller, February 12, 2003, Memo for the Record, p. 4.
NO MORE EXCUSES 54
Constitution’s ban on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.236 On June 26,
2003, the White House issued a press release in support of International Support for Victims
of Torture Day condemning “cruel” treatment of detainees; and on June 27, 2003, a White
House spokesman was quoted as saying that the US government was treating detainees
“humanely.”237 All this prompted Tenet to write a letter to National Security Advisor Rice
reminding her that the CIA had previously objected to White House statements that all US
government detainees were being treated “humanely” and asked that the administration
“reaffirm its commitment” to use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program.238
These statements and actions were essentially admissions that, at minimum, the CIA was
not treating detainees humanely. They also undermine the credibility of claims that these
senior US officials were confident that the authorized techniques did not amount to
torture. Additionally, they support the view that at least some officials consciously avoided
asking whether the techniques were unlawful and may bring CIA General Counsel Muller,
Rumsfeld, Haynes, and possibly Powell, into the ambit of the conspiracy.239 By January 9
2003, Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora had already informed Rumsfeld and Haynes that
many of the same techniques were illegal and demanded orders approving them be
rescinded (see above).240 Documentation from a later July 29, 2003 meeting show Bellinger
suggesting, and others present—including Rice, Tenet, Muller, Ashcroft, Acting Assistant
Attorney General OLC Patrick Philbin, Gonzales, and Cheney—appearing to agree to keep
Haynes, Powell, and Bush out of meetings discussing details of the CIA program, which
236 Letter from William J. Haynes, II, general counsel to Department of Defense, to Senator Patrick Leahy, June 25, 2003, letter
is available here, “Bush Administration Policy and Legal Directives on Interrogating Al-Qa-ida Detainees,” Exhibit E,
http://ciasavedlives.com/bdr/bush.pdf (accessed November 13, 2015).
237 Memorandum from George Tenet, CIA director, to National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, (hereinafter “Tenet Memo
for NSA”), July 3, 2003, http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Exhibit-F-Bush-Policy-and-Legal-Directives-on-

Interrogation.pdf (accessed March 16, 2015), para. 2.
238 Ibid, para. 5.
239 The roles of Rumsfeld, Haynes, and Powell—present at the January 16, 2003 meeting where use of the CIA techniques was
reaffirmed—should be investigated. However, the Senate Summary indicates that neither Powell nor Rumsfeld were briefed
on the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program prior to the use of the approved techniques on Abu Zubaydah and that as late
as July 2003, Powell had still not been briefed for fear he would “blow his stack.” Senate Summary, pp. 38, 118. There is
substantial evidence that Rumsfeld is responsible for creating conditions for members of the armed forces to commit
widespread torture and that he approved specific interrogation techniques that amounted to torture—though that may need
to be analyzed separately from any role he may have played to further the aims of a conspiracy to torture as part of the CIA
program. See Getting Away with Torture, pp. 75-84. Abuses by the US military are beyond the scope of this report.
240 SASC Report, p. 107. Getting Away with Torture, pp. 44-45.

was referred to in the documentation as “controversial.”241 Rice, however, appears to have
changed her mind and on August 4, 2003 had Bellinger call Muller and suggest that Powell
and Haynes should be briefed before a specific date that is redacted from the memo.242
Reauthorization of the Torture Program

In November 2002, a detainee died in CIA custody and the CIA’s Office of Inspector General
issued its scathing report on May 7, 2004 about both the use of techniques in an
unauthorized manner, and the use of techniques that were never authorized. (“CIA OIG
Report”).243 After the CIA OIG Report, CIA director Tenet suspended both the use of what
were called “standard” interrogation techniques, as well as “enhanced interrogation
techniques” pending a legal and policy review.244 The program was later reauthorized in a
process that spanned the terms of three CIA directors: Tenet who resigned in June 2004,
John McLaughlin who replaced him as acting CIA director until September 2004, and Porter
Goss who took over from McLaughlin in September 2004.245 Daniel Levin, in 2004, and
Steven Bradbury, in 2005, wrote memos that reauthorized the program, replacing the one
that had been withdrawn by Goldsmith and drafting new ones that authorized additional
techniques. These memos rejected the legal reasoning of the prior “Bybee Memos” but
then authorized the same and even additional conduct using different legal reasoning.
Prior to re-authorization in 2005, according to the Senate Summary, the CIA provided the
Justice Department with numerous descriptions of the interrogation techniques that were
241 “Memorandum for the Record: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” dated August 5, 2003,
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Exhibit-G-Bush-Policy-and-Legal-Directives-on-Interrogation.pdf
(accessed June 28, 2015), p. 5, para. 13.
242 Ibid., p. 6.
243 See generally, CIA OIG Report. On January 2, 2004 CIA Inspector General John Helgerson provided a draftof his final May
7, 2004 OIG report on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program to the CIA for comment that had already alerted the CIA
to many of his concerns. See Senate Summary, p. 190.
244 Senate Summary, pp. 413-414. The difference between “standard” and “enhanced” interrogation techniques were first
explained in a memo issued by the CIA director Tenet on January 28, 2003. (See CIA OIG Report, Appendix E). The Guidance was
issued in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul Rahman. (See Senate Summary, p. 62-63). The memo purportedly formalized
existing practice for obtaining required approvals from CIA headquarters prior to use of the techniques. (See CIA OIG Report. p.
6). In that guidance, “standard” interrogation techniques were defined as those “that do not incorporate physical or substantial
psychological pressure.” (See CIA OIG Report, Appendix E (emphasis in the original)). The guidance said they “include, but are
not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by US law enforcement and military interrogation personnel.” Some
examples included sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, isolation, loud music, and diapering generally not to exceed 72 hours.
245 William Branigin, “CIA Director Tenet Resigns,” Washington Post, June 3, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A12296-2004Jun3.html (accessed April 30, 2015); Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Top Counterterrorism
Officer Removed Amid Turmoil at CIA,” Washington Post, February 7, 2006 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/07/AR2006020700016_2.html (accessed April 30, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 56
false and inconsistent with how the CIA had actually been applying them, the physical and
psychological impact of the techniques on detainees, the threat posed by those to whom
the techniques were being applied, and their degree of effectiveness.246 For example, the
CIA represented that standing sleep deprivation would be discontinued if it resulted in
significant swelling of the lower extremities (edema) but in practice this technique “was
repeatedly not stopped when edema occurred.”247 Additionally, the CIA provided false
information about the use of light and cold temperatures on detainees, the claim that
interrogations would stop when detainees experienced hallucinations, and a number of
other matters.248 The Senate Summary does not clearly identify who exactly is responsible
for supplying this false information, identifying a number of CIA sources, and indicates
that more information is available in the still classified sections of the complete report.
There is also information in the Senate Summary that Acting Assistant Attorney General for
OLC Steven Bradbury was looking for statements from the CIA that he could use to justify
the techniques in his new memo. For example, just days before Bradbury issued new
memos on May 10, 2005 re-authorizing the program, he sent a letter to the CIA asking if
medical monitoring and other safeguards in place “will effectively avoid severe physical
pain or suffering for detainees.”249 The CIA’s Office of Medical Services (OMS) had
expressed discomfort with these types of questions just a few weeks earlier when they
received a draft of the OLC authorizing memo for review:
Simply put, OMS is not in the business of saying what is acceptable in

causing discomfort to other human beings, and will not take on that burden....
OMS did not review or vet these techniques prior to their introduction, but
rather came into this program with the understanding of your office and DOJ
[Department of Justice] that they were already determined as legal, permitted
and safe. We see this current iteration [of the OLC memorandum] as a reversal
of that sequence, and a relocation of those decisions to OMS. If this is the
case, that OMS has now the responsibility for determining a procedure's
248 Ibid.

legality through its determination of safety, then we will need to review all
procedures in that light given this new responsibility.250
Nevertheless, OMS later responded to Bradbury that the CIA’s program “has effectively
avoided severe physical pain and suffering, and should continue to do so. Application of
the thirteen techniques has not to date resulted in any severe or permanent physical injury
(or any injury other than transient bruising), and we do not expect this to change.”251
CIA officials who supplied the false information can be considered to have joined the
conspiracy. The overt acts are that they supplied the false facts, were aware of the program’s
unlawful aims, the infliction of severe pain and suffering, and did so with the intent of the
conspiracy to torture succeeding. Similarly, by drafting and issuing new legal memos that
reauthorized the same and even additional “enhanced interrogation techniques,” especially
in light of the controversy around them and problems with the program reported by the CIA
OIG, both Levin and Bradbury can be seen as having undertaken overt acts—drafting of the
new memos—with knowledge of the conspiracy’s unlawful aims and with the intent that the
use of these techniques continue and thus that the conspiracy succeed.
Evidence against Other Officials in Connection with the Conspiracy

Other individuals who—due to their positions or reported actions—should be included in
an investigation in connection with the conspiracy include:
• Jose Rodriguez, Cofer Black’s successor, who oversaw operation of the CIA’s program
from May 2002-November 2004 and was responsible for ordering the destruction of
92 videotapes documenting the CIA’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,”
which included waterboarding sessions, over the objections of senior officials at the
White House and the CIA, as well as Congress.252 Later in his memoirs, Rodriguez
describes his order to destroy the tapes as “just getting rid of some ugly visuals.”253

252 Peter Finn and Julie Tate, “2005 destruction of interrogation tapes caused concern at CIA, e-mails show,” Washington
Post, April 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/15/AR2010041505854.html

(accessed April 6, 2015); Peter Taylor, “'Vomiting and screaming' in destroyed waterboarding tapes,” BBC, May 9, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-17990955 (accessed April 6, 2015).
253 Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “Jose Rodriguez, Ex-CIA Officer, Defends Destroying Waterboarding Videos In ‘Hard
Measures’ Book,” Huffington Post, April 24, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/24/jose-rodriguez-cia-hard-

measures-book_n_1450416.html (accessed April 13, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 58
• The CIA’s current deputy general counsel for operations, Robert Eatinger, who is
reportedly mentioned by name more than 1,600 times in the Senate’s full report,
though his name did not appear in the Senate Summary.254 Eatinger was a lawyer in
the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center when the center managed and carried out the
detention and interrogation program, and from mid-2004 until official termination
of the program in January 2009, he was the unit’s chief lawyer.255 He reportedly
provided legal advice that Rodriguez had legal authority to destroy the tapes and
that the destruction would violate no laws.256 He is also accused of providing
inaccurate information to the OLC about the CIA program upon which the OLC relied
when issuing authorizations for CIA action.257
• Cofer Black, head of the CIA’s counterterrorism center from June 1999 until the end of
2002, appeared to play a key role in implementing the program as well, though his
exact role is not necessarily clear from the public record. In October 2008, CIA Director
Tenet delegated responsibility to him to manage the capture and detention
authorities provided in the MON.258 Black famously said during testimony before
Congress on September 26, 2002: “[T]here was ‘before’ 9/11 and ‘after’ 9/11. After
9/11 the gloves come off.”259
• Someone identified as “CTC legal” in the Senate Summary. “CTC Legal” first
proposed to the CIA in April 2002 that they use James Mitchell as a CIA consultant in
254 “Senator Statement on Intel Committee’s CIA Detention, Interrogation Report,” March 11, 2014,
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/3/feinstein-statement-on-intelligence-committee-s-cia-detention-
interrogation-report (accessed April 6, 2015)(hereinafter “Senator Feinstein’s March 11, 2014 Senate Floor Statement”); Ken
Dilanian, “CIA lawyer Robert Eatinger is no stranger to controversy,” Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2004,
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/12/nation/la-na-cia-lawyer-20140313 (accessed October 21, 2015).
255 Senator Feinstein’s March 11, 2014 Senate Floor Statement.
256 Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, “Bush Lawyers Discussed Fate of CIA Tapes,” New York Times, December 19, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/washington/19intel.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed October 19, 2015).

257 Senator Feinstein’s March 11, 2014 Senate Floor Statement; see also Complaint from Katherine Hawkins, National
Security Fellow at OpenTheGovernment.org to John P. Fitzpatrick, Director of the Information Security Oversight Office,
September 15, 2015, Re: Wrongful classification of information regarding CIA torture, in violation of Executive,
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/ISOO_Complaint_CIA_torture.pdf, (accessed October 19, 2015), pp.
11-13 (hereinafter “OpenTheGovernment.org Complaint”), which connects Robert Eatinger to several pseudonyms in the
Senate Summary and identifies him as having played a major role in supplying inaccurate information to the OLC.
259 Testimony of Cofer Black, former chief, DCI’s Counterterrorism Center, CIA, Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” 107th Congress, September 26, 2002,
http://fas.org:8080/irp/congress/2002_hr/092602black.html (accessed April 6, 2015).

interrogations and the use of aggressive interrogation techniques.260 “CTC Legal”
also was the author of a July 8, 2002 letter that acknowledged the illegality of the
CIA’s proposed enhanced interrogation techniques.261 This individual was part of a
CIA legal team present at the July 13, 2002 meeting, which included Rizzo and other
unnamed CIA lawyers, who proposed the use of “enhanced interrogation
techniques” and sought a declination from the Justice Department’s Criminal
Division.262 “CTC Legal” also drafted a memo in June 2003 when the CIA was looking
at reaffirmation of the CIA program stating that one of the August 1, 2002 memos
provided “safe harbor” for the CIA’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques.”263
“CTC Legal” was also present, along with Alfreda Bikowski, during “aggressive”
interrogations of Abu Zubaydah that included the use of waterboarding.264
OLC Memos as Evidence of Conspiracy and Intent to Torture

Beyond CIA efforts to obtain what would be preemptive immunity from prosecution for
using torture, the strained legal reasoning of the “Bybee Memos” themselves also
suggests that those involved knew they were creating “authorization” as a cover for what
would otherwise almost certainly be deemed illegal acts.
The memos themselves were deeply flawed from a legal perspective and have been
widely discredited.265 The Bybee I Memo invented definitional requirements for torture
that went far beyond any existing standard by, for example, drawing on irrelevant health
benefits statutes to argue that “physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death.”266 Mental pain or suffering would only
260 Senate Summary, p. 26; see also “OpenTheGovernment Complaint,” which connects Jonathan Fredman, Chief Legal
Counsel for the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center on September 11, 2004 until April 2004 with the pseudonym “CTC Legal” in the
Senate Summary, pp. 7-10.

265 For example, nearly 130 prominent lawyers, retired judges and a former director of the FBI released a statement after the
first of the memos was leaked to the press condemning their use. “The position taken by the government lawyers in these
legal memoranda amount to counseling a client as to how to get away with violating the law,” wrote one of the signatories.
The memos “circumvent long established and universally acknowledged principles of law and common decency,” the
statement said. Scott Higham, “Law Experts Condemn U.S. Memos On Torture,” Washington Post, August 5, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41189-2004Aug4.html (accessed January 28, 2015).
266 Bybee I Memo, p. 1.
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amount to torture if it results in “significant psychological harm of significant duration,
e.g., lasting for months or even years.”267
The Bybee I Memo advised that the claimed specific intent requirement in the Torture
Statute could be negated by a good faith belief that the acts undertaken would not cause
prolonged mental harm. A defendant in a criminal case could demonstrate this good faith
belief by showing for example that he surveyed the professional literature, consulted with
experts, or reviewed evidence gained from past experience.268 The memo also advised that
if an interrogator were to harm a detainee during use of “enhanced interrogation
techniques,” he would be doing so to prevent further attacks on the US and therefore
would be justified by the Commander-in-Chief’s constitutional authority to prevent the
nation from attack.269 The assertion ignores well-established US Supreme Court precedent
making clear that the executive branch does not have unbridled authority in the conduct
foreign affairs—it is bound by congressional statues and judicial decisions.270 Torture is
prohibited by US and international human rights and humanitarian law at all times and for
all reasons. There is no exception for war or public emergencies.271
The Justice Department withdrew the Bybee I Memo in June 2004, in the wake of the Abu
Ghraib scandal and just days after its contents were leaked to the media.272 Jack
Goldsmith, who replaced Yoo, headed the OLC from October 2003 to June 2004, and was
largely responsible for getting the Bybee I Memo withdrawn, said the memo was “riddled
with error” and a “one-sided effort to eliminate any hurdles posed by the torture law.”273
On June 4, 2004, CIA Director George Tenet suspended the use of both “enhanced” and

270 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). As Justice Robert H. Jackson stated in a concurring
opinion, “[the president] has no monopoly of ‘war powers,’ whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of
the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command. It is also empowered to make
rules for the ‘Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,’ by which it may to some unknown extent impinge upon even
command functions.”). Ibid., pp. 643-44. See also Kathleen Clark and Julie Mertus, “Torturing the Law,” Washington Post, June
20, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54025-2004Jun19.html (accessed April 6, 2015).
271 Convention against Torture, art. 2(2).
272 See OPR Report, p. 121; Priest and Smith, “Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,” Washington Post; Priest,
“Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture 'May Be Justified,'” Washington Post.

273 OPR, investigation p. 160.

“standard” techniques pending policy and legal review.274 New legal memos issued later to
replace the Bybee I Memo acknowledged that the prior legal reasoning was wrong.275
According to the replacement memo, “Because the discussion concerning the President’s
Commander-in-Chief power and potential defenses to liability was—and remains—
unnecessary, it has been eliminated… Consideration of the bounds of any such authority
would be ‘inconsistent’ with the President’s unequivocal directive not to engage in torture.”276
Specifically concerning the claim that harm to a detainee might be justified in order to
prevent the nation from an attack, the replacement memo stated that “[t]here is no
exception under the statute permitting torture to be used for a ‘good reason.’ Thus, a
defendant’s motive (to protect national security, for example) is not relevant to the question
of whether he acted with the requisite specific intent under the statute.”277 On the level of
pain required to meet the definition of torture, the replacement memo reads: “[W]e do not
believe Congress intended only to reach conduct involving excruciating and agonizing pain
or suffering. …Thus, we do not agree with the August 2002 Memorandum.”278
Though the replacement memos—one issued on December 30, 2004279 (“Levin

Replacement Memo”) and several others issued in 2005280 (“Bradbury Memos”)—attempt
to apply new legal reasoning, they continued to authorize the same and even additional
conduct that amounts to torture or other ill-treatment.281 For example, they continued to
authorize waterboarding. Waterboarding is essentially the same as other forms of water
274 SSCI, pp. 413-414. See discussion of the difference between “standard” and “enhanced” interrogation techniques in
section “Reauthorization of the torture program” in note 244 above. The difference between “enhanced” and “standard”
interrogation techniques are discussed in the footnotes for this report’s chapter Evidence of Conspiracy to Torture:
Reauthorization of the Torture Program.
275 For example,“…we disagree with statements in the August 2002 Memorandum limiting ‘severe’ pain under the statute to
‘excruciating and agonizing’ pain ‘equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.’” Levin Replacement Memo, p. 2,
https://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc96.pdf (accessed January 29, 2015).
276 Levin Replacement Memo, p. 2.
277 Levin Replacement Memo, p. 17.

278 Levin Replacement Memo, p. 8 and p. 8, n. 17.
279 Levin Replacement Memo.
280 Acting OLC head Steven Bradbury issued three opinions to CIA general counsel John Rizzo providing further guidance and
authorization for the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” in May 2005. The three memos are discussed in the first
section of the Background chapter of this report.
281 Scott Shane and David Johnston, “U.S. Lawyers Agreed on Legality of Brutal Tactic,” New York Times, June 6, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/politics/07lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed April 22, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 62
torture that have been prosecuted in US courts,282 as well as military courts and tribunals
in the past.283 President Barack Obama, former Attorney General Eric Holder, Attorney
General Loretta Lynch, have all called waterboarding torture.284 “The position taken by the
government lawyers in these legal memoranda amount to counseling a client as to how to
get away with violating the law,” said John Gibbons, former chief judge of the US Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, after the memos had been released.285
The language used in the 2005 replacement memos themselves, drafted by then Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, acknowledges the severity and harshness of
the techniques while at the same time purporting to authorize them. One memo states that
use of the waterboard does pose a “small risk” of certain “potentially significant medical
problems” such as vomiting and aspirating emesis, aspirating water—which might lead to
pneumonia—or “spasms in the larynx that would prevent [a detainee] from breathing.” In
the event of such spasms, “a qualified physician would be present to intervene and
perform a tracheotomy if necessary.”286 The memo authorizes up to 180 hours (7.5 days) of
sleep deprivation, which was often done by forcing detainees to stand nude and diapered
during that period.287 Though the memo acknowledges this may cause “edema,” (swelling
282 A Texas sheriff and two of his deputies who tried to argue they were just following orders were prosecuted and convicted
in federal court in 1983 for torturing six detainees. The method of torture was to handcuff the detainees “to a table or chair
with the face wrapped tightly with a towel. The head would be pulled back, they said, and water would be poured over the
towel until, fearing drowning, they would talk.” “Ex-Sherriff Given 10-Year Sentence,” New York Times, October 27, 1983,
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/27/us/ex-sheriff-given-10-year-sentence.html (accessed February 3, 2015). The judge
sentenced the sheriff to 10 years in prison and fined him $12,000. He also sentenced one of the sheriff’s deputies two years
plus a three-year suspended sentence, and another to seven years, but he would only serve four. At the sentencing, the
judge said that law enforcement had been allowed to fall into “the hands of a bunch of thugs” and that “the operation down
there would embarrass the dictator of a country.” See also United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984) affirming the
conviction though the opinion was limited to a procedural matter concerning refusal to grant a severance.
283 See Getting Away with Torture, pp. 54-56 listing several instances of US courts and tribunals finding waterboarding and
other forms of water abuse constitute torture.

284 David Stout, “Holder Tells Senators Waterboarding Is Torture,” New York Times, January 15, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16holdercnd.html?scp=3&sq=Eric%20Holder%20torture&st=cse&_r=0
(accessed February 6, 2015); Video: Loretta Lynch: “Waterboarding is torture,” Politico, January 28, 2015,
http://www.politico.com/multimedia/video/2015/01/loretta-lynch-waterboarding-is-torture.html (accessed February 6,
2015); Ewen MacAskill, “Obama: 'I believe waterboarding was torture, and it was a mistake,’” The Guardian, April 29, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/30/obama-waterboarding-mistake (accessed February 6, 2015).
285 Scott Higham, “Law Experts Condemn U.S. Memos On Torture,” Washington Post, August 5, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41189-2004Aug4.html (accessed March 31, 2015).

286 Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, deputy assistant attorney general, to John Rizzo, senior deputy general counsel for
the CIA, May 10, 2005, (hereinafter “Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo,”)
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/techniques.pdf (access November 13, 2015), p. 14.
287 Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo, p. 10.

caused by fluid gathering in the tissues)288 it suggests that in this case, the detainee can
be restrained in a way that will continue to deprive him of sleep while lying prone until the
condition subsides and then resume standing.289 Also, though individuals will likely
experience “some discomfort,” “distress” and “fatigue,” and this can also cause
“impairment to coordinated body movement, difficulty with speech, nausea, and blurred
vision,” this would not amount to torture so long as the individuals are monitored and
their diapers checked regularly for skin irritation, the memo read.290 It also may result in
hallucinations, the memo reads, which could result in “profound” disruption of the senses
and thus be defined as torture, but because it would not be “calculated” to achieve that
result, it would not satisfy the requirements of the torture statute.291
Further, a separate memo for the first time authorized use of the techniques in combination
(combinations of practices such as diapering, nudity, walling, stress positions, and water
dousing, among others).292 Some of these specific techniques have been referred to as
amounting to torture by US courts.293 The US has also denounced many of these techniques
288 Definition of “edema,” PubmedMed Health, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMHT0022960/ (accessed
February 7, 2015).
290 Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo, pp. 37-38
292 Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo.
293 Most cases analyzing whether past conduct amounted to torture are civil, and courts tend to look at a course of conduct rather
than whether each individual technique to which a plaintiff was subjected amounted to torture. Some of the specific cases with
relevant conduct include: In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (D. Haw. 1995) (a class action in which
approximately 10,000 plaintiffs sued the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, the former president of the Philippines, for torture, enforced
disappearance, and summary executions. Among the many forms of torture for which the estate was found liable was a technique
called the “water cure” where a cloth was placed over the detainee’s mouth and nose, and water poured over it producing a
drowning sensation. Relief was granted under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA)); Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790 (9th Cir.
1996) (in which two plaintiffs who did not take part in the class action (above) sued the Marcos’ estate. One was interrogated,
blindfolded, and severely beaten. Also, while shackled to his cot, a towel was placed over his nose and mouth and, for six hours,
interrogators poured water down his nostrils so that he felt as though he were drowning. He then spent more than eight years in
detention, five of them in solitary confinement. Another plaintiff was held in incommunicado detention, repeatedly interrogated,
subjected to mock executions, and threatened with death. Both plaintiffs were found to have been subjected to torture and were
granted relief under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the TVPA); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19 (finding that holding one
plaintiff at gunpoint, threatening to injure him physically if he did not confess to espionage or otherwise provide information, and
incarcerating him in a room with no bed, window, light, electricity, water, toilet or adequate access to sanitary facilities, constituted
torture. Also finding that placing loaded guns to plaintiffs’ heads, depriving them of medical treatment, and incarcerating them in an
environment without adequate toilet facilities constituted torture); See also note 282 above in this section describing a case where a
Texas sheriff and two of his deputies who tried to argue they were just following orders were prosecuted and convicted in federal
court in 1983 for torturing six detainees. cf. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 767, n. 15 (9th Cir. Cal. 2012)(In deciding whether
respondents, including John Yoo, were entitled to qualified immunity in a civil case brought by a U.S. citizen for violation of his
constitutional rights in military detention, the court assumed without deciding that treatment even less severe than some of the
harshest of the approved CIA “enhanced interrogation techniques” amounted to torture but also that whether Padilla’s abuses
amounted to torture was “not beyond debate” at the time the OLC memos were issued. The opinion states—without many details
NO MORE EXCUSES 64
as torture when practiced by other countries.294 Additionally, the Army Field Manual on
Intelligence Interrogation in effect when the OLC memos were issued, prohibits torture and
lists as an example of physical torture: “forcing an individual to stand, sit or kneel in
abnormal positions for prolonged periods of time,” and “food deprivation.”295 It also lists
“abnormal sleep deprivation,” as an example of mental torture.296
Finally, the new memos were issued only after many of the most egregious abuses took
place.297 Even if they had been based on sound legal analysis, they could not have
provided retroactive authorization.
Evidence of Torture: Conduct Beyond What Was Authorized

Both international human rights and humanitarian law prohibit torture and other forms of ill-
treatment, standards that CIA program practices violated. But even if one were to discount
those international requirements, the CIA program went beyond the techniques that were
authorized and the claimed protections from legal liability set out in the Torture Memos.298
that would allow his treatment to be properly compared to what detainees in the CIA program were subjected to—that Padilla
endured prolonged isolation; sensory deprivation, and “stress” positions, among other things).
294 Human Rights Watch, “USA and Torture: A History of Hypocrisy,” December 9, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/09/usa-
and-torture-history-hypocrisy (accessed February 2, 2014); James Ross, “Details of how U.S. rebuked foreign regimes while using
same torture methods,” Reuters, December 11, 2014 http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/11/us-called-out-foreign-
regimes-as-cia-used-same-torture-methods/ (accessed November 7, 2015); See also Getting Away With Torture, p. 57.
295 Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation, September 28, 1992,
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf (accessed February 2, 2015), Chapter 1, p. 8. (However, this language was
removed in 2006. See e.g. Human Rights First, “The U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogation: A Strong Document in Need of Careful
Revision,” https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Army_Field_Manual.pdf (accessed May 8, 2015), p. 2.
296 Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-52, p. 2.
297 Senate Summary, p. 96. (While the CIA held detainees from 2002 until 2008, early 2003 was the most active period of the
program. Of the 119 detainees identified by the Senate Summary as being held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in
early 2003. Of the 39 detainees found to have been subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques,” 17 were subjected to
them between January 2003 and August 2003, primarily at detention sites identified in the Senate Summary as Cobalt and
Blue, both of which are believed to have been in Afghanistan); see also Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, “Decoding the secret
black sites on the Senate’s report on the CIA interrogation program,” Washington Post, December 9, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/09/decoding-the-secret-black-sites-on-the-senates-
report-on-the-cia-interrogation-program/ (accessed February 1, 2015).
298 The CIA admits that CIA officers and contractors used techniques that went beyond what were authorized and that they
detained individuals who never should have been. But it says those responsible, 16 of them, have been administratively
sanctioned and it would not be practical or productive to revisit these practices. See CIA Response, paras. 29 and 30,
ation_Program.pdf (accessed February 7, 2015).

First, the CIA used enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah before OLC issued
the Bybee Memos. Documents released in April 2010 in response to Freedom of
Information Act requests from the ACLU,299 revealed that the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah
to sleep deprivation beyond 48 hours at some point after his capture but before April
2002.300 The CIA claims it did this only after “consulting” with “NSC and DOJ” and getting
approval to use sleep deprivation for between 24-48 hours. How many hours of sleep
deprivation beyond 48 Abu Zubaydah was subjected to, or how many times during this
period, is not made clear from the document, but it does say that due to a
“misunderstanding” the 24 to 48-hour time frame was exceeded.301
Additionally, the Bybee II Memo to Rizzo only approved the use of specific techniques on
Zubaydah for certain purposes and under certain conditions.302 “If these facts change, this
advice would not necessarily apply,” the memo read.303 The Senate Summary is filled with
examples of changed facts. For one, the CIA applied the authorizations for Zubaydah to
other detainees without seeking further formal approval.304 After the Senate Summary was
released, John Yoo said that the initial OLC authorization for the use of “enhanced
interrogation techniques” was meant to only apply to Abu Zubaydah.305 It was not until
almost a year later, on July 29, 2003, that CIA records indicate, according to the Senate
Summary, that the attorney general stated at a meeting that the legal principles of the
August 1, 2002 memorandum applied to other detainees.306
299 American Civil Liberties Union, “Torture Documents Released 4/15/2010,” https://www.aclu.org/torture-documents-
released-4152010 (accessed August 13, 2015). See also “How Abu Zubaydah’s Sleep Deprivation Got Out of Control,”
emptywheel, April 16, 2015, https://www.emptywheel.net/2010/04/16/how-abu-zubaydahs-sleep-deprivation-got-out-of-
control/ (directing readers to pages 113-114 of the massive set of documents released where Abu Zubaydah’s sleep
deprivation prior to the OLC memos being issued is documented) (accessed August 13, 2015).
300 American Civil Liberties Union, “The Torture Documents Released 4/15/2010,”
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/natsec/20100415_CIArelease_destructionoftapes.pdf (accessed November

13, 2015), pp. 113-114.
301 Ibid.
302 Bybee II Memo, p. 1.

303 Bybee II Memo, p. 1.
304 Senate Summary, p. 411; See OPR Report, p. 124, n. 95.
305 Dan Lamothe, “Former Bush lawyer: U.S. did not consider cumulative effects of ‘enhanced interrogation,’” Washington
Post, December 12, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/12/12/former-bush-lawyer-u-s-did-

not-consider-cumulative-effects-of-enhanced-interrogation/ (accessed November 13, 2015).
306 Senate Summary, p. 411; OPR Report, pp. 116-117. Apparently one basis for the attorney general’s comments at this meeting
was a set of “Bullet Points” that the OPR report describes as having generated a “controversy.” See OPR Report, p. 114. The origins
of the “Bullet Points” appear to be the CIA. They were sent to Yoo on April 2003 by Muller, reworked by an unnamed OLC attorney
and Yoo, and then sent back to the CIA. OPR Report, pp. 100-01. According to the unnamed attorney, they were intended to provide
a summary to the CIA OIG John Helgerson—who was working on a report evaluating the CIA’s detention and interrogation
program—of the legal advice the OLC had provided to the CIA about the legality of the detention and interrogation program. They
NO MORE EXCUSES 66
After Jack Goldsmith took over as head of the OLC after Yoo’s departure, he read the CIA OIG
Report and learned that the CIA had been using the Bybee II memo to justify the use of
“enhanced interrogation techniques” on other detainees. He subsequently wrote a letter to
the CIA admonishing them for this practice. “Our initial review of the Inspector General’s
Report,” Goldsmith wrote to Muller on May 27, 2004, “raises the possibility that, at least in
some instances and particularly early in the program, the actual practice may not have been
congruent with all of these assumptions and limitations [in the August 1, 2002 memo to
Rizzo].”307 While he acknowledged that at some point it appeared that the OLC had agreed
that the legal principles articulated in the August 1, 2002 memo could apply to other
detainees, he “strongly recommended” that the CIA suspend use of waterboarding and
review steps taken to ensure that in actual practice any use of CIA techniques “adheres
closely to the assumptions and limitations in the August 2002 opinion.”308 After Goldsmith’s
resignation from the OLC, subsequent OLC staff appear to have produced individualized
memoranda for detainees subject to CIA “enhanced interrogation techniques.”309
were also meant to “demonstrate that the OLC had already weighed in.” OPR Report, p. 101. They appear to have been prepared
sometime in June 2003. Muller said they “served as a basis for the ‘Legal Authorities’ briefing slide used at the July 29, 2003
meeting,” which was also attended by Cheney, Rice, Patrick Philbin, the Director of National Intelligence, and others. OPR Report,
p. 116. On March 2, 2004 Goldsmith said he first received a copy of the “Bullet Points.” OPR Report, p. 114. They were attached to a
letter he received from Muller on that day asking him to reaffirm the legal advice he claimed OLC had given to the CIA regarding the
detention and interrogation program. Specifically, Muller wanted Goldsmith to reaffirm the August 1, 2002 Yoo letter, the Bybee
Memos, and the “Bullet Points.” OPR Report, p. 114. Goldsmith was concerned by the “Bullet Points” because they appeared to be
a CIA document, contained no legal analysis or any indication that OLC had reviewed them. OPR Report, p. 114. After this, in late
May 2004, the CIA Office of General Counsel sent a copy of the final May 7, 2004 CIA OIG report to OLC. The report included
descriptions of the legal advice provided to the CIA by OLC and included copies of the “Bullet Points” as appendices. On May 25,
2004, Goldsmith wrote to CIA IG John Helgerson asking for an opportunity to provide comments on the report’s discussion of the
OLC’s legal advice before it was sent to Congress. Two days later, on May 27, 2004, Goldsmith wrote to Muller and advised him
that the report “raised concerns about certain aspects of interrogation practice.” On June 9, Goldsmith called Yoo to get
clarification on the “Bullet Points.” OPR Report, p. 116. Yoo told Goldsmith that the OLC had not produced the “Bullet Points” and
that they did not constitute the official views of the OLC. OPR Report, p. 116. On June 10, 2004, Goldsmith wrote to Muller that the
OLC would not reaffirm the “Bullet Points” which “did not and do not represent an opinion or a statement of the views of this
Office.” OPR Report, p. 16. Though apparently there had been some discussion about the CIA and the OLC submitting a joint letter
to Helgerson, in the end because the two offices had different views about the significance of the Bullet Points, they would not be
joint signatories to the letter. OPR Report, p. 116. Goldsmith submitted his comments to Helgerson on June 18, 2004. In those
comments he asked that two areas of “ambiguity or mistaken characterizations” in the report be corrected. First, that the attorney
general’s comments at the July 29, 2003 meeting on the “expanded use” of “enhanced interrogation techniques” were intended to
refer to the use of approved techniques on other detainees in addition to Abu Zubaydah, not the use of new techniques. Second,
he said that the “Bullet Points” “were not and are not an opinion from OLC or formal statement of views.” OPR Report, p. 117.
307 “Letter from head of the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith to General Counsel of the CIA Scott
Muller,” May 27, 2004, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-muller2004.pdf

(accessed August 23, 2015).
308 Ibid.
309 See Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo, p. 4. See also e.g. Letter from Daniel Levin to John Rizzo, September 6, 2004,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-rizzo2004-4.pdf (accessed August 26, 2015); and
documents 70, 74, 79, 85, 88, 95 described in a Vaughn Index (a document that agencies prepare in FOIA litigation to justify

In addition, the Senate Summary and other documents show that the use of the interrogation
techniques specifically in combination does not appear to have been specifically approved by
OLC memo on any detainee other than Abu Zubaydah, and even then in a cursory fashion,
until May 10, 2005.310 Failure to have done this combination analysis at the outset is one of
many a serious flaws of the initial August 1, 2002 memos. For one, US courts tend to look at a
course of conduct rather than each individual method of abuse when determining whether it
amounts to torture.311 But for another analyzing techniques individually and in isolation
ignores the cumulative impact they will have on an individual victim, especially when
combined with the conditions of confinement in CIA detention facilities, conditions not even
discussed or considered, in the August 1, 2002 memos. These included complete isolation for
long periods of time, total darkness, unsanitary conditions, extreme cold temperatures, and
constant loud noise. Moreover, the CIA also does not appear to have obtained advice from the
OLC that techniques the CIA referred to as “water dousing,” “nudity,” “dietary manipulation,”
and use of the “abdominal slap” would not violate the Torture Statute until August 26, 2004,
and even then, the “advice” did not constitute official OLC approval.312 Yet there is evidence
that the CIA used these techniques, and in combination, before August 26, 2004.
Even before the Senate Summary was released, the CIA OIG Report documented a number of
interrogation techniques allegedly used by the CIA that were not authorized. Though much of
the relevant section of the report remains classified, included in the declassified portion
were allegations, and in some cases confirmations, of the following: use of pressure points
to bring about near unconsciousness; mock executions; other threats; use of a stiff brush;
creating abrasions; stepping on a detainee’s ankles while shackled; use of cold
each withholding of information under a FOIA exemption) sent in response to an American Civil Liberties Union FOIA request,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/torturefoia_vaughn_olc.pdf (accessed August 26, 2015).
310 See Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo. See also admission of this fact by John Yoo after the Senate Summary was
released, Dan Lamothe, “Former Bush lawyer: U.S. did not consider cumulative effects of ‘enhanced interrogation,’”
Washington Post, December 12, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/12/12/former-bush-
lawyer-u-s-did-not-consider-cumulative-effects-of-enhanced-interrogation/ (accessed April 19, 2009) (“’We did not examine
this question of how long you could use the methods for, or what’s their cumulative effect,’ Yoo said in an interview for C-
SPAN’s ‘Newsmakers’ program that included Checkpoint and will air on television Sunday morning. ‘Quite frankly, we didn’t
examine them at that time because in the rush of events, we were just focusing on one person, Abu Zubaida [sec] and the
use of these methods we hoped would be one or very few times.’”). See also note 53 above.
311 See note 293 above.
312 Letter from Daniel Levin to acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, August 26, 2004 (hereinafter “Levin August 26, 2004
Letter to Rizzo”), https://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc85.pdf, p. 2 (accessed April

23, 2015) (The letter responds to a request for “advice” on water dousing as well as three other techniques—dietary
manipulation, nudity and abdominal slaps. Levin’s letter indicates that the water dousing as described, among other
techniques discussed, would not in their opinion violate the Torture Statute but he also says the advice does not constitute
OLC’s policy approval of the techniques described).
NO MORE EXCUSES 68
temperatures; rough or hard “takedown”313; and unauthorized so called “water dousing” or
waterboarding.314 In one draft of the CIA OIG Report cited in the Senate Summary, the OIG
concluded that in a number of cases, CIA interrogations went “well beyond what was
articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of August 1, 2002.”315
Waterboarding and Water Dousing

The CIA OIG Report said “water dousing”316 had been used since early 2003.317 But the
technique does not appear to have been officially approved until much later.318 According to
the Senate Summary, water dousing was not even designated by the CIA as a “standard”
interrogation technique319 until June 2003 and was later re-categorized by the CIA in 2004 as
an “enhanced interrogation technique.”320 It appears that it was not until August 26, 2004
that the CIA for the first time got official “advice” from OLC that the technique, if used in the
way described, would not violate the Torture Statute.321 Even then, OLC made clear that the
313 A “rough takedown” was described in the Senate Summary as being when “approximately five CIA officers would scream
at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure him with Mylar tape. The detainee would then be
hooded and dragged up and down a long corridor while being slapped and punched.” See Senate Summary, Findings and
Conclusions, p. 4, p. 56, n. 278, and p. 190, n. 1122.
314 CIA OIG report, pp. 41-79.
316 This technique was defined and applied differently throughout the program. In the CIA’s initial request to OLC for authorization on
March 2, 2003 it was explained as a technique whereby interrogators pour, from either a garden hose or container, potable water over
a detainee, while he is either restrained by shackles and/or by an interrogator in a standing or supine position on a floor, bench, or
similar level surface, naked or clothed. The water is intended to be applied so that it does not enter the nose or mouth. A “water
dousing” session could last from 10 minutes to an hour. Fax from Scott Muller, CIA General Counsel, to Jack Goldsmith, March 2, 2004”
(hereinafter “Muller Fax”), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc22.pdf
(accessed April 23, 2015) (The fax asks Goldsmith to reaffirm OLC approval for the August 1, 2002 memos as well as approve several
new techniques, one of which was water dousing). See also, Delivered Into Enemy Hands, pp. 48-51 where detainees Khalid Sharif,
formerly Abu Hazim, and Mohammed Shoroeiya, who now goes by the name of Mohammed Ahmed Ben Soud and used to go by the
name Abd al-Karim describe their “water dousing” and waterboarding experiences. They are referred to as Abu Hazim and Abd al-
Karim in the Senate Summary respectively. See also Spencer Ackerman, “Torture by another name: CIA used 'water dousing' on at
least 12 detainees,” The Guardian, October 16, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/oct/16/cia-torture-water-dousing-
waterboard-like-technique (accessed October 25, 2015); Lindsay Wise and Jonathan S. Landay, “Despite denials, Senate torture
report says waterboarding more widespread than CIA claims,” McClatchy DC, December 11, 2014,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article24777370.html (accessed October 25, 2015).
317 CIA OIG, p. 76.
318 Muller Fax (The fax asks Goldsmith to reaffirm OLC approval for the August 1, 2002 memos as well as approve several new
techniques, one of which was water dousing).

319 For an explanation of the difference between “standard” and “enhanced” interrogation techniques, see discussion in notes to
section “Reauthorization of the torture program” above. According to the January 28, 2003 Guidance, CIA interrogators were to obtain
advance approval to use “standard” interrogation techniques, “whenever feasible,” but were required to obtain advance approval for
“enhanced” interrogation techniques—though in all instances use of both standard and enhanced techniques were supposed to be
documented. (See CIA OIG Report, Appendix E). In the January 28, 2003 Guidance, a number of examples of standard and enhanced
techniques are provided but “water dousing” is not listed in either category. (CIA, OIG report, Appendix E).
321 Levin August 26 2004 Letter to Rizzo.

Instruments that the CIA Used
at CIA “Black Sites” as
Described and Drawn by One
Former CIA Detainee
A sketch by Ben Soud, who formerly

went by Mohammed Shoroeiya, as
well as Abd al-Karim, depicts a
narrow windowless box where he
said he was held naked for one and a
half days while speakers on each
side of his ears blared loud music.
© 2012 Ben Soud
A sketch by Ben Soud formerly

Mohammed Shoroeiya, as well as
Abd al-Karim, depicts a wooden
board to which he was strapped and
on which his interrogators put him
when he underwent abuse with
water. © 2012 Ben Soud
Ben Soud, formerly Mohammed

Shoroeiya, as well as Abd al-
Karim, said his captors would
sometimes threaten to lock him in
a small wooden box, like the one
drawn by him to the left, and once
did lock him such a box.
© 2012 Ben Soud
NO MORE EXCUSES 70
“advice” did “not constitute the Department of Justice’s policy approval for the use of the
technique.”322 The OLC apparently did not provide official approval for the use of water
dousing as an “enhanced interrogation technique” until May 2005.323
Nevertheless, the CIA used it in various ways beginning in early 2003.324 The Senate
Summary documents use of “water dousing” on several detainees in ways that
approximated “waterboarding” in April 2003.325 At detention cite Cobalt, known to be in
Afghanistan,326 where the CIA held most of its detainees,327 CIA operatives would hold the
detainee down while he was naked on a tarp on the floor with the tarp pulled around him to
form a makeshift tub while cold or refrigerated water was poured on him.328 Other detainees
were hosed down repeatedly while they were shackled naked, in the standing sleep
deprivation position.329 As approved in 2005, interrogators were not supposed to allow any
water to get into a detainee’s nose or mouth.330 However, this was not the way the water
dousing was applied on many occasions.331 In other cases detainees were completely
submerged in tubs of water that was not just cold but filled with ice or “icy.”332
The CIA also “water doused” an unknown number of detainees while on a waterboard.333
Although this part of the CIA’s program is still classified, the Senate Summary says that the CIA
used the technique “extensively” on a number of detainees without seeking or obtaining prior
authorization.334 The practice prompted concern from at least one CIA interrogator who said: “I
322 Ibid., p. 2.
323 “Bradbury Individual Techniques Memo,” May 5, 2015, p. 9 approving water dousing as one of 13 “enhanced interrogation
techniques” which could be used, http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf (accessed April 23, 2015).

324 CIA OIG report, p. 76.
325 Senate Summary, pp. 105-109. See also Delivered Into Enemy Hands, documenting water dousing accounts on two
detainees Khalid Sharif, formerly known as Abu Hazim, and Mohammed Shoroeiya, formerly known as Abd Karim and who
now goes by the name of Mohammed Ben Soud, during the same period, pp. 47-51. See also CIA OIG report, p. 76.
326 Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, “Decoding the secret black sites on the Senate’s report on the CIA interrogation program,”
Washington Post, December 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/09/decoding-the-
secret-black-sites-on-the-senates-report-on-the-cia-interrogation-program/ (accessed August 26, 2015).
327 Senate Summary, Findings and Conclusions, p. 10.

330 See Bradbury Individual Techniques Memo, pp. 9-10 for rules about how water dousing was supposed to be done.
331 See Delivered into Enemy Hands, pp. 50-51; See also Senate Summary, pp. 105-108.
332 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, pp. 50-51; See also Senate Summary, pp. 104, n.610; 105, n. 616.
334 Senate Summary, p. 106. See also note 618 on this page of the Senate Summary which says “for additional details see
Volume III” which is still classified.

have serious reservations about watering [the detainees] in a prone position … I think it goes
beyond dousing and the effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water
board … if it is continued [it] may lead to problems for us.”335
In 2008, then-CIA director Michael Hayden told the US Senate that the CIA had only used
waterboarding on three detainees.336 But a report by Human Rights Watch, corroborated by
the Senate Summary, provides strong evidence that the CIA waterboarded at least one other
CIA detainee.337 Later media reports provide evidence the CIA used water on other detainees
in other ways that induced the sensation of suffocation or drowning.338 As noted above, the
Senate Summary documents the CIA’s use of water to inflict torture on detainees in ways that
would often make it indistinguishable from waterboarding and on many more than three
detainees.339 Additionally, the Senate Summary makes clear that even in the cases of the
three detainees for which the CIA purports to have had authorization to waterboard, the way
in which the CIA used the technique went far beyond what was authorized.340 During SERE
336 Testimony of Michael Hayden in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008,
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/110824.pdf, p. 71-72 (accessed July 2, 2012) (“Let me make it very clear and to state so
officially in front of this Committee that waterboarding has been used on only three detainees.”). The CIA waterboarded Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed 183 times, Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri twice. CIA Office of the Inspector
General, “Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 – October 2003),” May 7, 2004,
declassified in August 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20090825-DETAIN/2004CIAIG.pdf (accessed
July 2, 2012), (“CIA OIG Report”), p. 90-91.
337 See Senate Summary, p. 107, n. 623, citing to the account of Mohammed Shoroeiya— who also went by the name of Abd al-
Karim and now goes by the name of Mohammed Ben Soud who is identified in the Senate Summary as being one of the
detainees in the CIA program—in the Human Rights Watch report Delivered Into Enemy Hands. The Senate Summary’s reference
says that the full SSCI committee study, still classified, contains a photograph of a waterboard at detention site Cobalt even
though there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at that location. The waterboard device in the photograph is
surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two-thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting
on the wooden beams of the board. See Senate Summary, p. 104, n. 245. In meetings between SSCI staff and the CIA in the
summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the presence of the board at that location as well as the buckets, the solution
and watering cans. See Senate Summary, p. 51, n. 45. Ben Soud is one of three plaintffs who have brought suit against Mitchell
and Jessen. See Abdullah Salim v. Mitchell, Civil Action No. 2:15-CV-286-JLQ, October 13, 2015,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/salim_v._mitchell_-_complaint_10-13-15.pdf (accessed October 14,
2015. See also video of Human Rights Watch initial interview with Ben Soud where he describes how the CIA used the
waterboard on him: Human Rights Watch video interview with Ben Soud
http://hrwnews.org/distribute/2012MENA_Libya_Rendition/ (at minute 1:25). See also Delivered Into Enemy Hands, pp. 48-49.
338 Spencer Ackerman, “Torture by another name: CIA used 'water dousing' on at least 12 detainees,” The Guardian; Lindsay Wise and
Jonathan S. Landay, “Despite denials, Senate torture report says waterboarding more widespread than CIA claims,” McClatchy DC.
339 See Delivered into Enemy Hands, p. 48-51. See also Senate Summary, pp. 105-108.
340 See e.g., Senate Summary p. 43-44 (waterboarding sessions on Abu Zubaydah “resulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary
leg, chest and arm spasms" and "hysterical pleas.” In at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah “became completely
unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.” Abu Zubaydah remained unresponsive until medical
intervention, when he regained consciousness and expelled “copious amounts of liquid.” See also pp. 87-88 “[Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed] had been subjected to more than 65 applications of the waterboarding sessions between the afternoon of March 12,
2003 and the morning of March 13, 2003. CIA records note that KSM vomited during and after the [waterboarding] procedure.”
NO MORE EXCUSES 72
training (see below) from which waterboarding was derived, most trainees experienced the
technique only once or twice, knew that it would last a short period of time, and knew that
they would not be significantly harmed by the training.341 During CIA interrogations, detainees
however were subjected to repeated applications over prolonged periods of time.342
“Rectal Rehydration” and Other Sexual Abuse

The CIA also used “rectal rehydration” or “rectal feeding” which, as described in the
Senate Summary, would amount to sexual assault, on at least five different detainees. The
practice, not known to have been authorized by the OLC, involved inserting pureed food or
liquid nutrients into the detainee’s rectum through a tube, presumably without his
consent.343 The CIA claims this was a medically necessary procedure and not an “enhanced
interrogation technique.”344 The Senate Summary, however, states the procedure was done
“without evidence of medical necessity.”345 Medical experts report that use of this type of
procedure without evidence of medical necessity is “a form of sexual assault masquerading as
medical treatment.”346 At least three other detainees were threatened with “rectal
rehydrations.” Allegations of excessive force used on two detainees during rectal exams to do
not appear to have been properly investigated.347 One of those two detainees, Mustafa al-
Hawsawi, was later diagnosed with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and
symptomaticrectal prolapse.348 Some CIA detainees have also reported having suppositories
341 OPR Report, p. 136, n. 109.
342 For example, during a 17 day period when the CIA used a number of “enhanced interrogation techniques” on Abu
Zubaydah in combination, including walling, attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confinement,
white noise and sleep deprivation" it also waterboarded him “2-4 times a day...with multiple iterations of the watering cycle
during each application." Senate Summary, p. 42. During this period Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded,"
and "whimpered," to his interrogators. Ibid. He also vomited during some waterboarding sessions. Ibid. CIA detainee Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed was waterboarded at least 183 times. Senate Summary, p. 85. A medical officer later wrote of Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed’s water boarding sessions that he was "ingesting and aspiration [sic] a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the
new technique we are basically doing a series of near drownings.'" Senate Summary, p. 86.
344 CIA Response, p. 55. (“The record clearly shows that CIA medical personnel on scene during enhanced technique interrogations
carefully monitored detainees’ hydration and food intake to ensure HVD's [High Value Detainees] were physically fit and also to ensure
they did not harm themselves…Medical personnel who administered rectal rehydration did not do so as an interrogation technique or
as a means to degrade a detainee but, instead, utilized the well acknowledged medical technique to address pressing health issues.”)
346 “CIA Torture Report Highlights Unnecessary Medical Procedure,” Physicians for Human Rights Press Release, December
10, 2014, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press-releases/cia-torture-report-highlights-unnecessary-medical-

procedure.html (accessed August 24, 2015).

forced into their anus,349 and other detainees have reported CIA operatives sticking fingers in
their anus.350
Other Unauthorized Techniques

There is considerable evidence that many detainees in CIA custody were shackled with their
hands above their heads for prolonged periods of time, sometimes days. This was often done
while detainees were naked, at times diapered, and was often combined with sleep
deprivation.351 The OLC does not appear to have approved shackling detainees with their
hands above their heads at all until the May 10, 2005 Bradbury memos. Even then, it approved
the technique only in conjunction with sleep deprivation for up to two hours.352 The CIA does
not appear to have received approval from the OLC to use nudity, the abdominal slap, and
dietary manipulation on detainees until at least August 26, 2004, yet it used these techniques
on numerous detainees prior to these approvals.353 The CIA contends that diapers were
authorized for use on detainees only “for sanitation and hygiene purposes,” but CIA records
indicate in some cases the central purpose was to “cause humiliation” and “induce a sense of
helplessness.”354 Similarly, the CIA represented to the OLC that nude detainees were not
“wantonly exposed to other detainees or detention facility staff” but many were nevertheless
kept in a central area and “walked around” by guards as a form of humiliation.355
Even though techniques considered “standard,” such as days of sleep deprivation and “water
dousing,” amounted to torture or ill-treatment, the Senate Summary concludes that at least 17
detainees were subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques” without authorization.356
349 El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (Application no. 39630/09), Judgment of 13 December 2012,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621 (accessed April 20, 2015), para. 21, 40,

46, 124. See Delivered into Enemy Hands, p. 36, n. 123.
350 Craig S. Smith and Souad Mekhennet, “Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands,” New York Times, July 7, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html (accessed April 20, 2015).

351 Senate Summary, p. 49; See also p. 53 (“Ridha al-Najjar underwent “hanging” described as “handcuffing one or both of his wrists
to an overhead horizontal bar” for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days); p. 103, n. 597, p. 497, n. 2717; Several other detainees
reported being shackled with their hands above their heads for significant periods while naked and diapered at a CIA detention facility
in Afghanistan that can be identified in the Senate Summary as Cobalt. In one case this lasted a day and a half, on another occasion
for three days, and one former detainee said he felt like it lasted for 15 days. See Delivered into Enemy Hands, pp. 44, 45 and 63.
352 Bradbury Combined Techniques Memo, p. 11. The CIA appears to have separately approved this for up to four hours. See
Senate Summary, p. 415; see also p. 498, n. 2723.


NO MORE EXCUSES 74
Conditions of Confinement at a CIA “Black Site” as Described by Former Detainees
A sketch by Ben Soud, who formerly

went by Mohammed Shoroeiya as
well as Abd al-Karim, depicts his
cell. © 2012 Ben Soud
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
Four former CIA detainees, Ben Soud (formerly Mohamed Shoroeiya and Abd al-Karim), Khalid al-Sharif, Majid
al-Maghrebi, and Saleh Di’iki, all said that for most of the duration of their detention at the first site in
Afghanistan where they were held, they were put in one of the three positions depicted on the previous page
(referred to as Positions 1, 2, and 3). They were held in these positions for varying amounts of time ranging
from multiple days to months. For detailed accounts of their detention and conditions of confinement see the
Human Rights watch Report ”Delivered Into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to
Gaddafi’s Libya.” These illustrations were drawn based on the testimony and re-enactments of the positions
by the victims. One of victims, Khalid al-Sharif, was shown the three images and said they were very accurate
depictions.

Though use of unapproved techniques on even one detainee is a serious allegation, there are
a number of reasons why this number might be low. First, it does not include cases in which
CIA interrogators had authorization but applied the techniques in an unauthorized manner.357
Second, the Senate Summary is based on CIA records,358 yet the CIA kept poor records on the
use of enhanced interrogation techniques at detention facility Cobalt359 where more than half
of the CIA’s known 119 detainees were held.360 Finally, the Senate Summary states that its
number of 119 total detainees is a conservative estimate.361
Libyan Survivors’ Accounts of Abuse in CIA Custody
Former detainees released from CIA custody what was authorized for “46.5 hours, 24 hours,
have provided accounts of CIA detention and and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of
torture not documented in the Senate sleep between sessions.”364 These references
Summary. 362 One is former CIA detainee do not convey the full scale of the abuse al-
Adnan al-Libi, who is mentioned in the Senate Libi experienced, the horrendous conditions
Summary only twice. The first time, he is listed to which he was subjected, or the pain and
as one of several detainees threatened with suffering he endured.
rectal rehydration. 363 The second time he is
referred to in three lines of text stating that he When Human Rights Watch interviewed al-Libi,
was subjected to sleep deprivation beyond long before the Senate Summary was released,
358 This includes operational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda and emails, briefing materials, interview
transcripts, contracts, and other records. Senate Summary, Forward, p. 5 of 6.

359 See Senate Summary, p. 51; see also Senate Summary, p. 107, n. 623 (“the full nature of CIA interrogations at detention site []
remains largely unknown. Detainees at detention site [] were subjected to techniques that were not recorded in cable traffic, including
multiple periods of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity of
foot, nudity and ‘rough treatment.’” The name of the detention site in footnote 623 is blacked out but it is clear from other parts of the
Senate Summary that this is detention site Cobalt. See Senate Summary, p. 51; see also p. 104, n. 610; p. 106, n. 620; it says so
specifically on page 51 and in notes 245 and 620 it says that the photograph of the waterboard was taken at detention site Cobalt.
360 Senate Summary, Findings and Conclusions, p. 10.
362 See for example, the harrowing account of Suleiman Abdullah Salim in a complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties Union
in Abdullah Salim v. Mitchell, Civil Action No. 2:15-CV-286-JLQ, October 13, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_
document/salim_v._mitchell_-_complaint_10-13-15.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015). Abdullah Salim underwent extreme
forms of torture at two CIA black sites and was held by the CIA for 16 months. (He was held by the US military for another four
years before he was released on the basis of not posing a threat to the US). Yet he is barely mentioned in the Senate Summary
other than in a few lines of text. One of these is a footnote where it states that he was one of “numerous detainees were stripped
and shackled, nude, in the standing stress position for sleep deprivation or subjected to other enhanced interrogation techniques
prior to being questioned by an interrogator.” See Senate Summary, p. 484, n. 2639.
NO MORE EXCUSES 76
he said he thought one of his sleep deprivation manipulation, and the blare of loud Western
episodes lasted for more like 15 days, though music 24 hours a day, all at the same time.368
he said he was in a windowless cell with little
ability to track time with great accuracy.365 He Other former detainees, entirely unconnected to
also said the sleep deprivation was al-Libi, reported having heard his screams while
accomplished by forcing him to stand all those they too were held at the facility. 369 One,
days with his hands chained above his head, Mohamed Bashmilah, identified as Mohammad
feet shackled to the ground so that if his legs al-Shomaila in the Senate Summary, is
buckled, he would have to hang from his arms mentioned only once, in a footnote that lists the
in order to try and sleep—something impossible names of at least 26 detainees that the CIA for
to do. He endured this while diapered and the first time admitted publicly to have
otherwise naked. Once released from the wrongfully detained.370 The summary does not
standing sleep deprivation position and mention that Bashmilah was first abducted in
allowed to shower, al-Libi said he could not Jordan with the help of the US, tortured there,
move his arms and so guards had to bathe him. rendered to Afghanistan where the CIA held him
“I was there for 15 days, hanging from my arms, in the same facility as al-Libi, in cold, dark
another chain from the ground. They put a windowless cells, with only a bucket for a toilet,
diaper on me but it overflowed so there was chained to the floor and wall and in unsanitary
every type of stool everywhere.” 366 He said he conditions. He remained in the same diaper in
had hallucinations and felt like he was going which he was transported to the facility for 15
insane and was going to die. 367 Nor does the days before he was provided with clothes,
Senate Summary explain that, in addition to among other examples of mistreatment. 371 He
this one particular incident of sleep deprivation, tried to kill himself three times, once by cutting
the CIA held him for a total of eight months in himself and using his own blood to write “this is
total isolation, in pitch black windowless cells, unjust” on the wall.372 The CIA held him for 19
subjected to freezing cold temperatures as well months before transferring him to Yemen where
as well as nudity, painful stress positions, days he was detained for nine more months before
of continuous sleep deprivation, dietary being convicted of forgery and then released.373
365 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, pp. 62-64. 370 SSCI, p. 16, n. 32.
366 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, p. 63. 371 Bashmilah Declaration, p. 15.
367 Ibid. 372 Scott Shane, “Amid Details on Torture, Data on 26 Who
368 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, pp. 60-66. Were Held in Error,” New York Times, December 12, 2014,
369 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, p. 63, fn. 221; See also http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/13/us/politics/amid-
details-on-torture-data-on-26-held-in-error-.html?_r=1
Bashmilah Declaration, page 21, http://chrgj.org/wp-
(accessed February 12, 2015).
content/uploads/2012/07/declarationofbashmilah.pdf
373 Ibid.
(accessed February 12, 2015).

Although the Senate Summary contains numerous descriptions of torture of detainees in
CIA custody, there are evidently countless other abuses that are not documented in it. Just
as the Justice Department’s Durham investigation was seriously flawed by the failure to
include accounts from torture survivors, the Senate Summary would have greatly
benefitted from access to the survivors themselves. Any future investigation, if it is to have
any credibility, needs to include in-depth interviews with those who were detained and
subjected to abuse in the CIA program.
Individuals Involved in “Unauthorized” Techniques

Mitchell and Jessen are among those who could be prosecuted for use of unauthorized
techniques. They were the only two interrogators permitted to take part directly in the
initial application of “enhanced interrogation techniques” on Abu Zubaydah and they also
were directly involved in the application of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” including
waterboarding, on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abd al-Nashiri.374 The Senate Summary
makes clear that they applied techniques in ways that were unauthorized on many
occasions.375 Jessen also assisted CIA “Officer 1” in the interrogation of Gul Rahman (see
below) who died in custody.376
The Senate Summary does not identify who carried out abuses that went beyond what
were authorized but it does identify some by pseudonym.
374 Senate Summary, p. 40 (“According to CIA records, only the two CIA contractors, Swigert and Dumbar, were to have contact
with Zubaydah.”); see also pp. 45-46 (“A cable from Detention site Green, which CIA records indicate was authored by Swigert
and Dunbar, also viewed the interrogation of Zubaydah as a success….” The cable further recommended that psychologists—a
likely reference to contractors Swigert and Dunbar—“familiar with interrogation, exploitation and resistance to interrogation
should shape compliance of high value captives prior to debriefing by substantive experts.”); see also Senate Summary p. 65
(“As described later in this summary, [Swigert and Dunbar] had earlier subjected [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] to the waterboard
and other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques.”); see also p. 84 (“Between March [REDACTED], 2003, and March 9, 2003,
contractors Swigert and Dunbar, and a CIA interrogator, [REDACTED], used the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against
[Khalid Sheikh Mohammed], including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the
abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and walling.”); see also p. 108, fn. 631 (“The cable also noted that CIA contractor
Hammond Dumbar had arrived at the detention site and was participating in Hambali’s interrogations as an interrogator.”)
375 For example, from August 4, 2002 through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to “enhanced interrogation
techniques” on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. [Swigert and Dunbar] placed a rolled towel around Zubaydah’s neck and
slammed him into a concrete wall. Senate Summary, pp. 40-41. Also, prior to his death, Jessen and CIA Officer 1 subjected
Gul Rahman to “48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough
treatment” that was not approved in advance. p. 54. Jessen was also involved in what the CIA called a “rough takedown” of
Gul Rahman which involved dragging him outside, cutting off all his clothes, slapping and, punching him. Jessen stated that
although it was “obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, “a couple of times the punches were forceful.”
Senate Summary, p. 56, no. 278. See also for example, Senate Summary pp. 83-84, 84-85; 88; 90 and 165.
NO MORE EXCUSES 78
Since the Senate Summary was released, Mitchell has said that the summary unfairly
maligns him and Jessen.377 For example, he said that the Senate Summary mentions a
number of instances when CIA interrogators reported abuse and the use of unauthorized
techniques but it does not mention that he and Jessen were the ones who reported it.
Mitchell also said he was one of the interrogators who reported abuses to the CIA
inspector general, initiating what resulted in a May 2004 OIG report.378
The Senate Summary identifies CIA “Officer 1” as being in charge of the Cobalt facility
during a time when numerous detainees were subjected to “unapproved coercive
interrogation techniques” and a detainee, Gul Rahman, died in CIA custody.379 Officer 1 has
been identified as Matthew Zirbel.380 Zirbel was involved directly in the interrogation of Gul
Rahman and ordered the detention conditions that led to his death.381 Zirbel was not
sanctioned for his role in Rahman’s death.382 Four months after the death, Zirbel received a
bonus for his “consistently superior work.”383 The Senate Summary also identifies Officer 1,
Zirbel, as the officer involved in a water dousing session that was not authorized. It
resulted in the detainee “turn[ing] blue” and a physician’s assistant stepping in to remove
the cloth over the detainee’s mouth so he could breathe.384
The Senate Summary also explains that a “senior debriefer” informed the CIA Inspector
General that she “heard” that at detention site Cobalt someone identified as Officer 2
“hung detainees up for long periods with their toes barely touching the ground.”385 Officer
2 is also identified in the summary as having been involved in the interrogation of Abd al-
Nashiri, when a number of unauthorized techniques were used.386
377 Jason Leopold, “Psychologist James Mitchell Admits He Waterboarded al Qaeda Suspects,” Vice News, December 15,
2015, https://news.vice.com/article/psychologist-james-mitchell-admits-he-waterboarded-al-qaeda-suspects (accessed
April 29, 2015) where Mitchell admits his involvement in waterboarding sessions used on all three detainees.
378 Ibid.
380 Ken Silverstein, “The Charmed Life of a CIA Torturer: How Fate Diverged for Matthew Zirbel, aka CIA Officer 1, and Gul
Rahman,” The Intercept, December 15, 2014, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/15/charmed-life-cia-torturer/

(accessed April 29, 2015). Emptywheel, “Immunizing Crimes: Blankfein, Zirbel, and Arpaio, but Whither Corzine?”
Emptywheel, September 2, 2012, https://www.emptywheel.net/2012/09/02/immunizing-crimes-blankstein-zirbel-and-
arpaio-but-whither-corzine/ (accessed November 14, 2015), see “*Matt Zirbel.”

383 Ibid.
385 Senate Summary, p. 58, no. 278.


For example, Officer 2 put Nashiri in a standing stress position with his hands affixed
over his head for approximately two-and-a-half days; placed a pistol near Nashiri’s head
while blindfolded and revved a power drill near his body; slapped Nashiri multiple
times on the back of the head during interrogation; implied his mother would be
brought before him and sexually abused; gave Nashiri a forced bath using a stiff brush;
and used improvised stress positions that caused cuts and bruises resulting in the
intervention of a medical officer, who was concerned that Nashiri's shoulders would be
dislocated from using the stress positions.387
The Senate Summary also documents that Officer 2 was not properly trained and had
“anger management” issues.388 Officer 2 is not further identified in the Senate Summary,
but the Washington Post identified Albert El Gamil as a CIA linguist who interrogated
Nashiri, subjected him to a mock execution, and put a drill to his head.389 The CIA
inspector general also reported on those events.
One senior CIA official identified as “the Deputy Chief of Alec Station” throughout the
Senate Summary has been named in press reports as Alfreda Bikowsky.390 She is reported
to have participated in interrogation sessions that involved waterboarding, walling, and
other techniques that amount to torture, and observed others engaged in such
techniques.391 She is also said to have advocated for the rendition of Khaled el-Masri, a
German citizen the CIA wrongfully detained, and to have done so for many months after his
387 Senate Summary, pp. 69-70. One of the definitions of “severe mental pain or suffering” under the Torture Statute is the
“threat of imminent death” or the “threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death” or “severe physical
pain or suffering.” See 18 U.S.C. 2340(2)(D).
388 Senate Summary p. 68, n. 345.
389 Adam Goldman, “The hidden history of the CIA’s prison in Poland,” Washington Post, January 23, 2004,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-hidden-history-of-the-cias-prison-in-
poland/2014/01/23/b77f6ea2-7c6f-11e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html (accessed November 13, 2015).
390 Jane Mayer, “The Unidentified Queen of Torture,” The New Yorker, December 18, 2014,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/unidentified-queen-torture (accessed June 29, 2015); Glenn Greenwald and

Peter Maass, “Meet Alfreda Bikowsky, the Senior Officer at the Center of the CIA’s Torture Scandal,” The Intercept, December
19, 2014, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/19/senior-cia-officer-center-torture-scandals-alfreda-bikowsky/
(accessed June 29, 2015); Matthew Cole, “Bin Laden Expert Accused of Shaping CIA Deception on ‘Torture’ Program,” NBC
News, December 16, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/bin-laden-expert-accused-shaping-cia-
deception-torture-program-n269551 (accessed June 29, 2015).
391 Senate Summary p. 91, where she is reported to have taken part in intensive interrogation sessions that included
waterboarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“Mukie,” Bikowsky reportedly said referring to Khalid Sheikh Mohmammed, “is
going to be hatin’ life on this one.”) See also Senate Summary, p. 43, n. 197 where she is reported to have been present
during intense waterboarding sessions of Abu Zubaydah; Matthew Cole, “Bin Laden Expert Accused of Shaping CIA
Deception on 'Torture' Program,” NBC News, December 16, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/bin-laden-
expert-accused-shaping-cia-deception-torture-program-n269551 (accessed August 20, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 80
mistaken identity was realized.392 She was not disciplined for her role in his continued
wrongful detention and was in fact promoted to run the “Global Jihad Unit.”393 The Senate
Summary also accuses her of falsely reporting in CIA cables that the CIA program was
much more effective than it actually was, claiming, inaccurately for example that key
operatives were identified and plots thwarted as a result of enhanced interrogation
techniques.394 These cables would then serve as a “template” on which future
justifications of the program were based.395 Bikowsky reportedly now holds a senior
position at the CIA equivalent to that of a general in the army.396
Other Criminal Charges

In addition to torture and conspiracy to torture, there are a number of other charges that US
authorities could bring either on their own or along with conspiracy. These include assault,
sexual abuse, murder, and war crimes. In addition, the crime of conspiracy can be brought
as a stand-alone charge under the federal conspiracy statute,397 allowing prosecutors to
charge conspiracy even if the underlying offense is never completed.398 In either case,
whether charged on its own or along with another substantive offenses, the elements of
conspiracy discussed above would need to be established in order to sustain the charge.
Assault
Federal law criminalizes various degrees of assault, from “simple assault,” to assault with a
deadly weapon, to assault that results in “serious bodily injury.”399 The assault must occur
393 Matthew Cole, “Bin Laden Expert Accused of Shaping CIA Deception on 'Torture' Program,” NBC News, December 16,
2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/bin-laden-expert-accused-shaping-cia-deception-torture-program-
n269551 (accessed August 20, 2015).
394 Senate Summary, pp. 185-86, 191-92. The inaccurate representations included assertions that the information obtained
from the use of “enhanced interrogations” saved “countless American lives inside the US and abroad” and that without the
use of such techniques “we will not be able to prosecute this war.” Senate Summary, p. 86.
395 Ibid.
396 Mayer, “The Unidentified Queen of Torture,” The New Yorker; Cole, “Bin Laden Expert Accused of Shaping CIA Deception
on 'Torture' Program,” NBC News.

397 18 U.S.C. sec. 371 is the federal conspiracy statute. It states: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States … and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
398 United States v. Rehak, 589 F.3d 965, 971 (8th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003)(the
conspiratorial “agreement is a distinct evil, which may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive offense ensues.”).
399 18 USC section 113. Simple assault (section 113(a)(5)) is defined as either a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the
person of another, or by a threat to inflict injury upon the person, when coupled with an apparent present ability, causes a
reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. See United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1999)

within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US.400 A CIA detention facility
would appear to be within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” of the US.401 The
crime of simple assault is “committed by either a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the
person of another, or by a threat to inflict injury upon the person of another which, when
coupled with an apparent present ability, causes a reasonable apprehension of immediate
bodily harm.”402 Several “standard” CIA practices would seem to amount to assault:
• Though not included among “enhanced interrogation techniques,” what the CIA
called “rough takedowns” were part of the CIA’s program according to the Senate
Summary. This involved several CIA personnel rushing simultaneously at a
detainee while in his cell and while they were yelling and screaming. They then cut
off all this clothes, secured him with tape, put a hood on him, slapped and
punched him, and dragged him outside, up and down a corridor several times
through the dirt. This caused abrasions on the detainee’s hands, face and legs.403
• Another technique called “walling” involved shoving a detainee repeatedly into a

wall that was supposed to be made out of flexible material while the defendant
(rejecting contention that federal assault statute is void for vagueness) and United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050, 1051-52
(9th Cir. 1976) (same). The various other types of assault available under section 113 increase the penalty depending upon
certain elements. Relevant subsections of the subsections of 113 include assault with intent to commit any felony (which
includes torture under 18 USC 2340A) except murder (section 113(a)(2)), punishable by not more than 10 years and a fine;
assault by striking, beating, or wounding (section 113(a)(4)) punishable by not more than one year and a fine; simple assault
(section 113(a)(5)), punishable by not more than six months and a fine; and assault resulting in substantial bodily injury
(section 113(a)(6)), punishable by no more than 10 years and a fine. “Substantial bodily injury” is defined as an injury that
involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement or a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member, organ or mental faculty. 18 USC section 113(b)(1). “Serious bodily injury,” is defined the way it is described in
18 USC 1365 to mean bodily injury which involves: a substantial risk of death; extreme physical pain; protracted and obvious
disfigurement; or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
400 19 USC section 113(a).
401 Section 18 USCS § 7 is the statute that defines special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (SMTJ).
Section 7(3) states the following is SMTJ: “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof … for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful
building.” Section 7(7) also states the following is SMTJ: “[a]ny place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an
offense by or against a national of the United States.” Section 7(9)(A) also states with respect to offenses committed by or
against a national of the United States that the SMTJ includes: “the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military
or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land
appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership.” Further, the
US recently acknowledged for the purposes interpreting obligations under the Convention against Torture, that it
understands any territory under its jurisdiction will extend to “all places that the State Party controls as a governmental
authority.” See Acting Legal Adviser McLeod: U.S. Affirms Torture is Prohibited at All Times in All Places,” Opening Statement
of Mary E. McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser U.S. Department of State during review by the Committee against Torture, November
12-13, 2014 – Geneva, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/11/12/acting-legal-adviser-mcleod-u-s-affirms-torture-is-
prohibited-at-all-times-in-all-places/ (accessed February 14, 2015).
402 United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999) interpreting the meaning of “assault” criminalized in 18
USC sec. 113.

NO MORE EXCUSES 82
had a foam ring around his neck to prevent whiplash.404 However, the Senate
Summary states that during one of the walling sessions, James and Mitchell placed
a rolled towel around Zubaydah’s neck and slammed him into a concrete wall. 405
In addition, many specific instances of conduct that would amount to assault have been
reported. A non-exhaustive list includes:
• Nine of 14 detainees in CIA custody interviewed by the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) alleged that they had been subjected to daily beatings during
the initial period of their detention.406 Their beatings involved “repeated slapping,
punching and, less often, kicking, to the body and face, as well as a detainee
having his head banged against a solid object.”407 These beatings lasted up to half
an hour and were repeated throughout the day and again on subsequent days.
They took place during periods ranging from one week up to two to three months.408
• Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, one of the detainees interviewed by ICRC, alleged that
on a daily basis during the first month of interrogation in his third place of CIA
detention: “if I was perceived not to be cooperating I would be placed against a
wall and subjected to punches and slaps in the body, head and face.”409 Similarly,
Walid bin Attash, told the ICRC that: “every day for the first two weeks [in CIA
custody in Afghanistan] I was subjected to slaps to the face and punches to the
body during interrogation.”410
• The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights made a determination
of fact in El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, relying on a 2007
report conducted by the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, that former detainee Khaled El-Masri was “beaten severely from all sides”
404 Bybee II Memo, p. 13. Bradbury Individual Techniques Memo, p. 32.
406 International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody,
(February 2007), http://assets.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf (accessed April 20, 2015), p. 13. The 14

detainees include Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi Mohammed Binalshib, Abdelrahim Hussein Abdul Nashiri, Mustafha Ahmad Al Hawsawi,
Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Majid Khan, Ali Abdul Aziz Mohammed, Walid Bin Attash, Mohammed Farik Bin Amin, Mohammed
Nazir Bin Lep, Encep Nuraman, Haned Ahmad Guleed, Ahmed Khalafan Ghailani, and Mustafah Faraj Al Azibi. Ibid., p. 5.
407 Ibid., p. 13.
408 International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody,
p. 13 (February 2007), http://assets.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf (accessed April 20, 2015).

409 International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA
Custody, p. 13.
410 Ibid.

by CIA agents, thrown to the floor after his clothes were forcibly removed, and that
a suppository was forcibly inserted into his anus before being flown from Skopje
Airport in Macedonia to Afghanistan.411 After arriving in Afghanistan, the CIA drove
El-Masri in a vehicle for 10 minutes, then “dragged [him] from the vehicle, slammed
[him] into the walls of a room, [threw him] to the floor, kicked and beat[] him. […]
Later, he understood that he had been transferred to a CIA-run facility.”412
• Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah described a similar beating while held in CIA
custody. He said he was turned over to the CIA in the early morning hours of
October 26, 2003. After a short car ride to a building at the airport in Jordan, his
clothes were cut off by black-clad, masked guards wearing surgical gloves. He was
beaten. Bashmilah said one guard stuck a finger in his anus.413
• Laid Saidi, who had been held by the CIA for 16 months, said CIA interrogators
“beat me and threw cold water on me, spat at me, and sometimes gave me dirty
water to drink.”414
Sexual Abuse
At least three types of sexual abuse charges may apply to CIA actions under federal law.
These include sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, and abusive sexual contact. These
provisions make it a crime to force anyone, while in a facility run by any federal department
or agency or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US, to engage in a
sexual act or sexual contact.415 A sexual act is defined to include, in relevant part, “the
penetration, however slight, of the anal … opening of another by a hand or finger or by any
object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, [or] degrade.”416 Sexual contact is
defined to include: “intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the
411 El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (Application no. 39630/09), Judgment of 13 December 2012, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621 (accessed April 20, 2015), para. 21, 40, 46, 124.
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621 (accessed April 20, 2015), para. 24.

413 Mark Benjamin, “Inside the CIA’s Notorious ‘Black Sites,’” Salon, December 14, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/2007/12/15/bashmilah/ (accessed April 20, 2015).

414 Craig S. Smith and Souad Mekhennet, “Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands, New York Times, July 7, 2006,

415 18 U.S.C. sec. 2241; sec. 2242; and sec. 2244. See discussion of meaning of special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the US under 18 U.S.C. 113 in section of this report discussing the crime of assault above.
416 18 U.S.C. sec. 2246.
NO MORE EXCUSES 84
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, [or] degrade.”417
The CIA subjected at least five detainees to “rectal rehydration” and threatened several
other detainees with the procedure.418 “Rectal rehydration”—which in one case involved
pureeing and rectally infusing a detainee’s meal of humus, pasta sauce, nuts and raisins
—was done for the purpose of behavior control, not out of medical necessity.419 A chief
interrogator characterized the procedure as illustrative of the interrogator's “total control
over the detainee.”420 Another CIA official described the technique as helping to “clear a
person’s head” and being effective at getting a detainee to talk.421 One email describing
the technique said “we used the largest Ewal [sic] tube we had.”422 These statements
suggest that the use of rectal rehydration was intended to abuse, harass, humiliate and
degrade detainees, not for any legitimate medical purpose.
The Senate Summary indicates that CIA leadership, including General Counsel Scott
Muller and CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt, was also alerted to
allegations that rectal exams were conducted with “excessive force” on two detainees
at detention site Cobalt in Afghanistan.423 An unidentified CIA attorney was asked to
follow-up but CIA cables do not indicate there was any resolution.424 As noted above,
one of the CIA detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later diagnosed with chronic
hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomaticrectal prolapse.425 Hawsawi is one of five
detainees accused of playing a role in the September 11 attacks and is on trial at the
military commissions at Guantanamo Bay. Since he was arraigned on the charges in
May 2012, he has sat on a pillow throughout the proceedings.426 When asked about the
417 18 U.S.C. sec. 2246.
418 Senate Summary, pp. 4 and 100.

419 Senate Summary, p. 100, n. 584; See also “Medical Practitioners Denounce ‘Rectal Feeding’ as ‘Sexual Assault
Masquerading as Medical Treatment,’” Physicians for Human Rights, https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_other/fact-sheet-

rectal-hydration-and-rectal-feeding.pdf (accessed February 5, 2015).

424 Ibid.
425 Ibid.
426 Carol Rosenberg, “Senate report confirms CIA had ‘black site’ at Guantánamo, hid it from Congress,” Miami Herald,
December 10, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article4434603.html


details of what happened to his client, Walter Ruiz, Hawsawi’s lawyer in the military
commission proceedings, said that due to rules about classified information he was
unable to discuss any facts that were not contained in the Senate Summary about his
client’s time in CIA custody.427 Some CIA detainees have also reported having
suppositories forced into their anus.428 And other detainees have reported CIA
operatives sticking fingers in their anus.429
Murder and Manslaughter

At least one detainee, Gul Rahman, died from hypothermia after being shackled overnight,
half-naked, to a concrete floor at a CIA detention center in Afghanistan.430 Rahman was
taken into custody in Pakistan on October 29, 2002 and died at the CIA detention site
Cobalt, on November 20, 2002.431 CIA records state that while he was in CIA custody he
was subjected to “48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness,
isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment” without approval of these techniques in
advance.432 Several former CIA officials report that Rahman’s “hands were shackled over
his head” and “he was roughed up and doused with water.”433 The Senate Summary states
that “dehydration, lack of food, and immobility due to 'short chaining,’” were also factors
that contributed to Rahman’s death.434
Another detainee, Manadel al-Jamadi, also died just over five hours after his arrest while
undergoing a CIA-led interrogation.435 A plastic bag had been placed over his head and he
427 Human Rights Watch email exchange with Walter Ruiz, August 24, 2015. See also section on “Classifying Information
about CIA Torture” below.

available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621 (accessed April 20, 2015), para. 21, 40,

46, 124. See Delivered into Enemy Hands, p. 36, n. 123.
429 Craig S. Smith and Souad Mekhennet, “Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands,” New York Times, July 7, 2006,

431 Senate Summary, p. 54. See also, Adam Goldman and Kathy Gannon, “Death Shed Light on CIA ‘Salt Pit,’ Near Kabul,”
Associated Press, March 28, 2010, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36071994/ns/us_news-security/t/death-shed-light-cia-

salt-pit-near-kabul/ (accessed November 13, 2015). Detention site Cobalt is widely believed to have been the same as what
many called the Salt Pit before the Senate Summary used the pseudonym Cobalt for it.
433 Goldman and Gannon, “Death Shed Light on CIA ‘Salt Pit,’ Near Kabul,” Associated Press.
435 John McChesney, “The Death of an Iraqi Prisoner,” NPR, October 27, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4977986 (accessed April 19, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 86
was shackled with his arms behind him to a barred window five feet off the ground.436
Military investigators deemed it a homicide due to “blunt force trauma” to the head and
torso “complicated by compromised respiration” and five broken ribs.437 Both cases were
included in the Durham investigation into CIA abuses (see above) but al-Jamadi’s case was
not included in the Senate Summary.438 The reason it was not included is unclear, but it is
possibly because his death occurred at Abu Ghraib, a military base, not at a CIA detention
center, and there was some military participation.439 No criminal charges were ever brought
in either case yet the publicly available facts indicate that either manslaughter or murder
charges were viable in both cases.440 Though the statute of limitations would likely bar
charges for manslaughter today, charges for murder could still be brought since it is a
capital crime and therefore not subject to a statute of limitations (see below).
War Crimes
Charges may be available under the US War Crimes Act of 1996.441 The act provides
criminal punishment for whomever, inside or outside the US, commits a war crime, if either
the perpetrator or the victim is a member of the US Armed Forces or a national of the
United States.442 A “war crime” is defined as any “grave breach” of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions or acts that violate article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
436 Jane Mayer, “A Deadly Interrogation,” The New Yorker, November 14, 2005,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/11/14/a-deadly-interrogation (accessed April 19, 2015).

437 McChesney, “The Death of an Iraqi Prisoner,” NPR. Mayer, “A Deadly Interrogation,” The New Yorker; See also The
Constitution Project, p. 96, summarizing these two reports.

438 Peter Finn and Julie Tate, “Justice Department to investigate deaths of two detainees in CIA custody,” Washington Post,
July 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-prosecutor-probes-deaths-of-2-cia-held-

detainees/2011/06/30/AGsFmUsH_story.html (accessed June 30, 2015); Jason Ryan, “DOJ: No Charges in CIA Detainee Death
Investigations,” ABC News, August 30, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/doj-charges-cia-detainee-death-
investigations/story?id=17119715 (accessed June 30, 2015).
439 The military charged Navy SEAL Lt. Andrew Ledford with dereliction of duty for allowing his men to punch and jab al-
Jamadi with their rifle muzzles and assault for punching al-Jamadi himself. He was acquitted of all charges. See John
McChesney, “Navy SEAL Cleared of Prisoner Abuse in Iraq,” NPR, May 8, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4670936 (accessed April 19, 2015).
440 See 18 U.S.C. sec. 1111. Malice, as defined for purposes of second degree murder, under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1111(a) can include the
mental state of either: “intent to do serious bodily injury” or “depraved heart recklessness,” United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d
1300, 1307 (10th Cir. Utah 2005). “Proof of the existence of malice for second degree murder does not require a showing that the
accused harbored hatred or ill will against the victim or others. Neither does it require proof of an intent to kill or injure. Malice may
be established by evidence of conduct which is ‘reckless and wanton and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, of
such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.’”
United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 947-948 (4th Cir. Va. 1984)(citations omitted). 18 U.S.C. sec. 1111 also requires that the
crime be committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. For discussion of the meaning of
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction see section discussing the crime of assault under 18 U.S.C. 113 (above).
441 Getting Away With Torture, p. 49.
442 War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104–192, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2441.

(Common Article 3). Grave breaches include “willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment”
of prisoners of war and of civilians qualified as “protected persons.” Common Article 3
prohibits murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and “outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”
The 2006 Military Commissions Act revised the War Crimes Act and limited the definition of
war crimes, with retroactive effect.443 As a result, humiliating and degrading treatment of
detainees in US counterterrorism operations following the September 11 attacks can no
longer be charged as a war crime under the statute.444 However, the Military Commissions
Act did not change liability for murder, rape, sexual assault, and torture.445
Defenses
Statutes of Limitations
Though much of the torture and other abuse took place many years ago, many of the
available charges are not barred by statutes of limitation.446 The statute of limitations for
most federal crimes is five years,447 but there are several exceptions to this rule that are
applicable to the facts described above.
Capital Offenses
There is no statute of limitations for capital offenses, which include torture that result in
death.448 In at least two cases, the CIA’s use of interrogation techniques contributed to death.449
443 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-366, 10 U.S.C. 948-949 (2006); War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-192, 18
U.S.C. sec. 2441 (2006).

444 “Human Rights Watch, “Q & A: Military Commissions Act of 2006,” section 16,
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/qna1006/
445 Getting Away With Torture, p. 49.
446 This statute of limitations analysis does not address attempts, or aiding and abetting.
447 Offenses Not Capital, 18 U.S.C. sec. 3282(a).
448 Capital Offenses 18 U.S.C. sec. 3281, see also 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a) authorizing punishment by death under the statute for
torture that results in death and 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(5) which authorizes punishment by death if death results from the kidnapping.
Human Rights Watch opposes the death penalty in all circumstances as an inherently cruel and irrevocable punishment.
449 See Murder and Manslaughter sections below.
NO MORE EXCUSES 88
Offenses Leading to Serious Risk of Bodily Injury or Risk of Death
The USA Patriot Act expanded the statute of limitations for a specific list of offenses from
five to eight years.450 Torture, as well as conspiracy to torture and conspiracy to kidnap
persons abroad, are crimes that are included on that list.451 While many of the offenses
described above were committed more than eight years ago, the statute of limitations may
well have been tolled (or extended), as discussed below.
In addition, when the commission of one of the offenses results in death or creates a
foreseeable risk of death or serious bodily injury, there is no statute of limitations.452
Many of the CIA abuses and potential charges described above fit the category of offenses
that create a foreseeable risk of death or serious bodily injury.453 As previously noted, in at
least one case, the CIA’s use of torture resulted in death. In other cases, detainees came
close to dying or it was clear they would suffer other long-term injuries.
450 P.L. 107-56, 115 sec. 809 (2001); see also the law codified at 18 U.S.C. sec. 3286(a), listing, among others, any provision
in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) as those crimes for which the statute of limitations is extended to eight years.
451 See Federal Law 18 U.S.C. sec. 3286(a) applying a statute of limitation of eight years for any offense listed in Federal Law
18 U.S.C. sec. 2332b(g)(5)(B), which includes the crimes of conspiracy to kidnap under 18 U.S.C. sec 956(a)(1) as well as
torture and conspiracy to torture under 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a) and (c).
452 See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3286(b) stipulating no statute of limitation for offenses listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) if the
commission of such offense resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death, or serious bodily injury to another person.
Though the list of offenses to which this statute of limitation exception applies are called “terrorism offenses” in the statute,
there is no requirement that they meet the definition of the term “Federal crime of terrorism” in section 2332b(g)(5)(A) and
(B), just that they are one of the enumerated offenses in section 2332b(5)(B). Rather it appears that an offense must meet
both requirements in 233b(g)(5)(A) and (B) in order to be considered a “Federal crime of terrorism” for sentencing
enhancement purposes. The US government took the same position in Nezirovic v. Holt, United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, Roanoke Division, 990 F. Supp. 2d 606, March 13, 2014. In Nezirovic, the government of Bosnia
sought Nezirovic’s extradition for allegations that he had abused unarmed civilian prisoners during the Bosnian war.
Specifically, he was accused of among other things, beating them with batons, threatening them with death, forcing them to
remove their clothes and crawl on the ground, to put their noses in others’ anuses, and to eat grass on which others had
urinated. Under the extradition treaty, extradition would have been barred if the applicable statute of limitations for the
same crime in the US, the crime of torture, had expired. The US government took the position in the case that there was no
bar to extradition because as one of the numerated offenses under 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B), there was no statute of
limitation for the crime of torture under 2340A when the charged offense resulted in or created a foreseeable risk of death or
serious bodily injury. The court agreed. Nezirovic, p. 613. See also US government brief in Nezirovic which supports this
reading of the statute. Brief for Respondent-Appellee (January 03, 2014) at pp. 18-19, Nezirovic v. Holt et al., 990 F.Supp. 2d
606 (2014) (7:13CV00428). See also Charles Doyle, “Statutes of Limitations in Federal Criminal Cases: An Overview,”
Congressional Research Service, October 1, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31253.pdf (accessed October 25,
2015), p. 2, n. 18 (Although the crimes [enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 233b(g)(5)(B)], were selected because they are often
implicated in acts of terrorism, a terrorist defendant is not a prerequisite to an unlimited period for prosecution”).
453 “Serious bodily injury” is defined as meaning “bodily injury which involves– (A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme
physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
member, organ, or mental faculty.” See section 18 U.S.C. sec. 2332(b)(g)(3) which states, as used in this section, the term
“serious bodily injury” has the meaning given that term in section 1265(g)(3). “Serious bodily injury” is not defined however
in 1365(g)(3) but it is defined in the next subsection, 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3).

In contemplating the very first use of the approved “enhanced interrogation techniques”
on Abu Zubaydah, who had been shot three times during his capture and was reportedly
close to death,454 CIA officers at the detention site where he was held wrote:
If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve

a host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of
condition all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be
provided to [him]. In the event that [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be
prepared to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving
our hosts.455
The memo went on to note that if Abu Zubaydah died, he would be cremated, but
“regardless …. In light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be
implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [he] will remain in isolation and
incommunicado for the remainder of his life.”456 One application of the waterboarding
technique on Abu Zubaydah was so physically harmful that it induced convulsions and
vomiting.457 He later became completely “unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his
open, full mouth."458
Another detainee was subjected to the CIA’s “water-dousing”459 technique during which a
CIA officer poured cold icy water directly on the detainee’s face “to disrupt his
breathing.”460 The detainee “turned blue” and a physician’s assistant intervened,
removing the cloth over the detainee’s mouth so he could breathe.461
454 Scott Shane, “Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation,” New York Times, June 22, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed April 21, 2015).


459 For a definition of “water dousing” and explanation of how it was applied, see the “Waterboarding and Water Dousing”
section of this report above.

461 Senate Summary, p. 107. A linguist apparently reported this incident to the CIA inspector general. It was later referred to
the Justice Department for criminal investigation but not pursued, a CIA inspector general report concluded, because the
linguist’s claims could not be corroborated. The detainee, Khalid Sharif, who went by the name of Abu Hazim at the time he
was in CIA custody, (the name the Senate Summary uses) was interviewed for Human Rights Watch for the report Delivered
into Enemy Hands several times in 2012. At that time he said that no US government personnel ever interviewed him for any
criminal investigation regarding this abuse or any other abuse he suffered while in CIA custody. Had they done so, the
account could have been corroborated.
NO MORE EXCUSES 90
In another case, two detainees with broken feet were forced to stand and walk on their
injured legs for days while being subjected to standing sleep deprivation, despite a
medical examiner recommending that they not put any weight on their broken bones for, in
the case of one detainee, five weeks and in the case of another detainee, for three
months.462 With regard to one of the detainees, a CIA cable drafted days later stated that,
“even given the best prognosis,” the detainee would have “arthritis and limitation of
motion for the rest of his life.”463
Sexual Abuse
There is no statute of limitations for certain types of sexual abuse crimes.464 These include
the three charges discussed above as potentially applicable to “rectal rehydration”: sexual
abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, and abusive sexual contact.
Special Case of Conspiracy

Conspiracy, like most federal crimes, is subject to a five-year statute of limitations. But it is
distinct from other offenses in that it is a continuing crime that does not end until the last
co-conspirator commits the last overt act of the conspiracy.465
Normally, actions taken by co-conspirators to hide crimes after they are committed are not
considered part of the conspiracy. However, where concealment is a central component of
the purpose of the conspiracy—as appears to be the case here—the limitation period may
be extended until the date of the last act or attempted act of concealment.466

464 Limitations: Child Abduction and Sex Offenses 18 U.S.C. §3299 which states “Notwithstanding any other law, an
indictment may be found or an information instituted at any time without limitation … for any felony under Chapter 109A…”
The felonies in Chapters 109A include violations of 18 U.S.C. §2241 (aggravated sexual abuse), §2242 (sexual abuse), and
§2244 (abusive sexual contact).
465 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946).
466 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 405 (1957). “Grunewald drew a distinction between ‘acts of concealment done in
furtherance of the main objectives of the conspiracy,’ and ‘acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been
attained for the purposes of covering up after the crime.’ Where the latter is involved, the government must present some proof
of an express original agreement to engage in the acts of concealment. However, nothing in the case law imposes a requirement
that conspirators expressly agree to engage in acts of concealment where those acts are done in furtherance of the main
objectives of the conspiracy. Rather, the acts of concealment committed by one co-conspirator need only have been
‘foreseeable’ to the other co-conspirator.” United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 14 (1st Cir. Mass. 2009) (citations omitted).

On the facts at issue here, if prosecutors charged conspiracy using the stand-alone
conspiracy statute, one of the central components of the conspiracy would be the process
by which various officials sought to generate legal cover, or “authorization” for the use of
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” knowing those techniques were unlawful. Ongoing
attempts on the part of senior White House, CIA, or other officials to conceal their
involvement in manufacturing the legal cover for torture can be considered an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy that works to extend the five-year statute of limitations.
The concealment continues to this day. As recently as December 11, 2014, two days after
the SSCI report was released, former Vice President Dick Cheney reiterated the
importance of OLC approval for the techniques, as if OLC approval were an independent
act and not itself part of the conspiracy to commit torture: “Torture is something we very
carefully avoided.… All of the techniques that were authorized by the president were, in
effect, blessed by the Justice Department opinion that we could go forward with those
without, in fact, committing torture.”467
Concealment of the central component of the conspiracy, to the extent that it took place,
could work to toll any statute-of-limitations issues until the present, or at least very recently.
The same is true for other attempts, well documented in the Senate Summary, to keep the
nature, extent and effectiveness of the abuses from the public and prosecutors.468
In addition, it is unclear whether the Department of Justice had full access to relevant CIA and
White House records as part of the Durham inquiry—or does even today. Indeed, Senate
Intelligence Committee staff drafting the report never had full access to White House or CIA files
as they relate to the CIA program. The CIA asserted executive privilege on behalf of the White
House in relation to more than 9,400 documents that the Senate Intelligence Committee
requested for their report.469 The CIA also refused to provide a copy of an internal review of the
CIA’s program (often referred to as the “Panetta Report” after then CIA director Leon Panetta) to
467 Interview with former Vice President Dick Cheney, “Meet the Press Transcript - December 14, 2014,”
http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-december-14-2014-n268181 (accessed January 12,

2015).468 See, e.g., finding and conclusion number 3 of the Senate Summary titled: “The interrogations of CIA detainees were
brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others,” Senate Summary, pp. 3-4.
468 See, e.g., finding and conclusion number 3 of the Senate Summary titled: “The interrogations of CIA detainees were
brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others,” Senate Summary, pp. 3-4.
469 Jonathan Landay, Ali Watkins, and Marisa Taylor, “White House withholds thousands of documents from Senate CIA
probe, despite vows of help,” McClatchy, March 12, 2014, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/03/12/221033/despite-vows-

of-help-white-house.html#storylink=cpy (accessed January 20, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 92
the Senate Intelligence Committee.470 In the event that prosecutors had full and immediate
access to all CIA files on August 29, 2009 when the investigation was announced, the statute of
limitations might bar prosecution under the general conspiracy statute, section 371, but it
would not bar prosecution for torture, conspiracy to torture under section 2340A(c), or
conspiracy to kidnap under section 956 both of which have an eight year statute of limitations
and no statute of limitation when a foreseeable risk of death or serious bodily injury may result.
“Good Faith” Reliance on Counsel

As noted above, Bush, Cheney, and others have asserted that in implementing the
program, they were merely relying on OLC’s guidance that the techniques being employed
by the CIA were lawful.471 This suggests officials might invoke a defense of a “good faith”
reliance on counsel to any criminal charges brought. But such a defense would be weak as
applied to these facts.
Under US law an accused person generally cannot invoke an “advice-of-counsel” or “mistake-

of-law” defense.472 As Judge Richard Posner has noted, “If unreasonable advice of counsel
could automatically excuse criminal behavior, criminals would have a straight and sure path
to immunity.”473 However, advice of counsel can be relevant to certain elements of crimes,
such as a requirement of knowledge or willfulness.474 For example, as one case notes:
Reliance on counsel's advice excuses a criminal act only to the extent it

negates willfulness and to negate willfulness counsel's advice must create (or
perpetuate) an honest misunderstanding of one's legal duties. If a person is
470 Mark Mazzetti, “Behind Clash Between C.I.A. and Congress, a Secret Report on Interrogations,” New York Times, March 7,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/us/politics/behind-clash-between-cia-and-congress-a-secret-report-on-
interrogations.html (accessed January 20, 2015).
471 See, e.g., “Matt Lauer interviews Bush about 9/11,” NBC News, September 11, 2006,
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nbc-news/14781377#14781377 (accessed April 20, 2015) (at minute 8:20, Lauer: “Were you
made personally aware of all the techniques that were used for example against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and did you
approve those techniques?” Bush: “I told our people, get information without torture and was assured by our Justice
Department that we were not torturing…Whatever we have done is legal, that is what I’m saying, it’s within the law. We had
lawyers look at and say, Mr. President, this is lawful.”); “Transcript: Cheney Defends Hard Line Tactics,” ABC News,
December 16, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6464697 (accessed April 20, 2015) (“Again, we proceeded very
cautiously. We checked. We had the Justice Department issue the requisite opinions in order to know where the bright lines
were that you could not cross. The professionals involved in that program were very, very cautious, very careful—wouldn't do
anything without making certain it was authorized and that it was legal. And any suggestion to the contrary is just wrong.”).
472 United States v. Sprong, 287 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. Wis. 2002) and United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 613 (7th Cir. Ill. 1991).
473 Sprong, p. 665.

474 Sprong, p. 665, Benson, p. 613.

told by his attorney that a contemplated course of action is legal but
subsequently discovers the advice is wrong or discovers reason to doubt the
advice, he cannot hide behind counsel's advice to escape the consequences
of his violation.475
However, a portion of the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, which was drafted after the Abu
Ghraib revelations and the release of the Torture Memos, provides that in any criminal
prosecution arising out of a US person’s or other agent’s engagement in operational
practices involving the detention and interrogation of individuals:
that were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that
they were conducted, it shall be a defense that ... [the] agent did not know
that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would not know the practices were unlawful. Good faith
reliance on advice of counsel should be an important factor, among others,
to consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful.476
This statutory defense applies only to “officially authorized” conduct that was “determined
to be lawful at the time.” In this case, the defense would center on the question of whether
it was reasonable to believe that the CIA practices were lawful and if reliance on the advice
of counsel was made in “good faith.” If so, even under section 1004(a), good faith reliance
would not be a complete defense but it would be an “important factor … to consider” in
assessing whether a person should have known the practices were unlawful.
This defense is weak for the following reasons:
First, it was not reasonable to believe these practices were lawful. As mentioned above,
the techniques themselves were derived from the SERE program—a program designed to
475 United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 614 (7th Cir. Ill. 1991).
476 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law 163-109, 119 Stat. 3136, January 6, 2006, Section 1004(a), codified at 42
U.S.C. §2000dd-1(a) http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/ic-legal-reference-book-2012/ref-book-detainee-

treatment-act-of-2005 (accessed August 18, 2015). This act, among other things, also prohibited “cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment,” of persons in the custody of the US government, and required Department of Defense
personnel to employ United States Army Field Manual guidelines when interrogating detainees.
NO MORE EXCUSES 94
train US special forces to endure interrogation methods used by enemies who did not
abide by the Geneva Conventions; many of the techniques were already banned by the US
Army Field Manual in effect at the time—a manual that describes many of the techniques
as torture; and the FBI refused to participate in the program. It is reasonable that people
involved should have questioned the legality of the practices. Moreover, the extensive
discussion about whether the CIA was engaging in “humane” practices reveals that CIA
officials concern about whether they should be engaging in the practices at all, even after
they were “authorized.”
Second, reliance on counsel was not “in good faith.” As mentioned above, before the OLC
memos were produced, the CIA and senior officials already knew that courts would almost
certainly find many of the authorized techniques illegal. That is why they sought a
guarantee not to prosecute from the Department of Justice Criminal Division, which refused
to provide it, and very likely why the FBI refused to participate in the CIA’s detention and
interrogation program. Only after these rejections did Yoo add arguments to the memos
about the specific intent requirement, commander-in-chief powers, and defenses to
prosecution. The evidence suggests that this was done at the request of senior officials at
the White House and the CIA who were concerned about the illegality of the techniques
and looking for legal cover. As one legal scholar put it: “When considered as a whole, the
memos reveal a sustained effort by the OLC lawyers to rationalize a predetermined and
illegal result.”477 This alone suggests that any reliance was not in good faith. But numerous
other signs along the way, such as Abu Zubaydah’s waterboarding sessions, which
generated concerns about illegality from CIA officers, provide further evidence.478
Finally, the statutory defense is only available to those who engaged in “specific
operational practices” in connection with detention and interrogation activity. It should
therefore not be available to those involved in authorizing the program. It also should not
be available to those who engaged in practices that went beyond what where authorized.
This would include applying techniques in a manner inconsistent or in excess with
authorizations or doing so without getting prior approval as required.
477 David Cole, “The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers,” The New York Review of Books, October 8, 2009
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-torture-memos-the-case-against-the-lawyers/ (accessed
January 28, 2015).

III. Repairing the Harm and Ending Torture
Obligation to Provide Redress, Compensation, and Rehabilitation

The Convention against Torture, in addition to obligating states to investigate and
appropriately prosecute torture and other ill-treatment, requires them to provide redress to
victims of torture and ensure that they have “an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation.”479 This should include the means to obtain full rehabilitation to the extent
possible, as well as compensation to dependents when a torture victim is deceased.480
As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the United
States is also obligated to “give effect to the rights” recognized by the treaty, including when
those rights have been violated “by persons acting in an official capacity.”481 Specifically,
the US is treaty-bound to provide an “effective remedy,” including a “judicial remedy,” and
to ensure that competent authorities “enforce such remedies when granted.”482
In addition to torture and ill-treatment, the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention,
and requires states, at minimum, to provide those detained with the ability to challenge
the lawfulness of detention before a court.483 The ICCPR specifically requires that those
who are the “victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.”484
Harms from Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Ill-Treatment

The CIA program had both short-term and long-term physical and psychological effects on
detainees. Techniques such as suspension of the arms causes musculoskeletal pain, chronic
severe headaches, numbness and weakness in the arms. Constant exposure to loud music
causes hearing loss. And prolonged stress positions result in back pain and numbness in the
479 Convention against Torture, art. 14 (“Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be
entitled to compensation.”).
480 Ibid.
481 ICCPR, arts. 2(2) and 2(3).
482 ICCPR, art. 2(3).
483 ICCPR, arts. 7 and 9(1)-(4)

484 ICCPR, art. 9(5).
NO MORE EXCUSES 96
legs.485 Former detainees subjected to CIA interrogation techniques reported lasting mental
health effects such as depression, anxiety, sleeplessness, post-traumatic stress disorder,
feelings of hopelessness, sadness, isolation, bouts of weeping, panic attacks, nervous or
explosive reactions to minor problems, memory loss, and flashbacks.486
Detainees in CIA custody were also subjected to long-term incommunicado detention,

which itself can amount to a form of torture.487 For their families it brought the
considerable stress of not knowing the whereabouts of their relatives or even whether they
were alive or dead.
One Family’s Suffering
Mohammed Shoroeiya’s wife Fawziya had no knowledge of her husband’s whereabouts

after US and Pakistani forces took him into custody during a raid on their home in
Peshawar Pakistan in March 2003. She did not know that US forces sent Shoroeiya to two
different “black sites” where he was detained for 16 months.488 The US then rendered
Shoroeiya back to Libya, a country from which he had fled 15 years earlier and where he
feared he would be tortured, perhaps killed. It was only at this point, in August 2004, that
Libyan authorities informed Fawziya that her husband was alive.489 The Libyan government
then transported Fawziya and their daughter Aisha back to Libya from Pakistan. However,
Shoroeiya, a known opponent of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, remained imprisoned
485 International Center for Transitional Justice, “U.S. Accountability and the Right to Redress,” August 2010,
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-USA-Right-Redress-2010-English.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015), p. 19

(hereinafter “ICTJ Accountability and Redress Report”), summarizing findings of a number of other reports documenting the
effects of abuse, torture and long-term arbitrary and incommunicado detention on former US detainees held in Iraq,
Guantanamo, and Afghanistan including: Physicians for Human Rights, “Broken Laws, Broken Lives: Medical Evidence of
Torture by the US,” June 2008; Human Rights Watch, “Guantanamo: Detainee Accounts,” 2004,
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/gitmo1004/gitmo1004.pdf (accessed April 28, 2015), pp. 23-24; Human
Rights Watch, “Locked up and Alone: Detention Conditions and Mental Health at Guantanamo,” June 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0608_1.pdf (accessed April 28, 2015). The report also cites several
detainee accounts from complaints in civil cases brought against US government officials for abuse in US detention.
486 ICTJ Accountability and Redress Report, p. 19.
487 See, for example, UN, “UN Special Rapporteur on torture calls for the prohibition of solitary confinement,” October 18,
2011, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11506&LangID=E#sthash.S2GGl1cj.dpuf
(accessed September 28, 2015). The US has recognized prolonged incommunicado detention as torture. See, for example,
US Department of State, “Human Rights Report: China,” March 31,
2003, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18239.htm (accessed September 28, 2015).
488 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, pp. 34-58.
489 Ibid., pp. 56-58.

in Libya for another seven years. He was only released in 2011, along with other political
prisoners in Gaddafi’s jails, during the Libyan uprising of 2011. While her husband was in
US and Libyan custody, Fawziya relied on the good will of neighbors and family to
survive.490 “One day they just came and took him. I didn’t know what to do,” Fawziya said.
“I had nothing, all I had were prayers, and they told us nothing.”491 Shoroeiya said
knowing the impact his absence had on his wife and child was the hardest thing about
being detained, harder than the torture:
The biggest suffering for any prisoner like myself was the situation with our
families. When my daughter comes to me and says they prevented her from
going to school or my wife comes to me and says she doesn’t have a dime
to spend, that is suffering. You asked me about the physical abuse. That
was number 10 on the list of the worst things that I was going through.492
Many other families were left without their main breadwinner and suffered severe
economic hardship. After the US released men it had detained from detention, many
reported having problems adjusting to normal life, difficulty finding jobs, and problems
coping with the stigma associated with their prior detention.493
US Failure to Comply with International Legal Obligations
Failure to Provide Compensation

Compensation can provide victims and their family members with the means to address the
lasting impact of human rights violations. These can include loss of employment
opportunities, education, social benefits, earning potential, harm to reputation, costs
required for legal assistance, and medical, psychological and social services.494
Compensation, of course, is not a substitute for investigations and appropriate prosecutions,
and does not address many government obligations under the Convention against Torture. 495
490 Ibid., pp. 56-58.
491 Human Rights Watch Interview with Fawziya, Misrata, Libya, March 27, 2012.
492 Delivered Into Enemy Hands, p. 58.
493 ICTJ Accountability and Redress Report, p. 20.
494 Ibid., p. 21.

495 CAT, General Comment No. 3, paras. 9-10.
NO MORE EXCUSES 98
It can be expected that there would be significant political resistance in the United States
to providing compensatory redress to former detainees because of the belief that the US
“war on terror” justified the government’s actions, that those detained were involved in
terrorism even if not prosecuted for the crime, and that any compensation provided could
be misused for terrorist activities. Such arguments do not take into account that many
detainees were taken into custody unlawfully even by the CIA’s own standards, that those
involved in terrorist acts remain protected under international law against torture and
other ill-treatment, and that measures can be put in place to prohibit funds from being
used for illegal purposes.496 Moreover, providing compensation would go a long way in
helping deflate anger against the United States in many countries around the world.
Regardless of the extent of these practical benefits, however, US treaty obligations require
that compensation and other redress be provided without discrimination, regardless of
why the person entitled to redress was detained, including whether that person was
accused of terrorist acts.497
US Obstruction of a Right to a Remedy

In reporting to the UN Committee against Torture in 2013 about its compliance with treaty
obligations, the US stated that “various avenues” exist and a “wide range of civil
remedies” are available to victims of torture to obtain redress.498 Yet virtually no individual
who has brought suit against US personnel or civilian contractors working for the US
government with valid claims of CIA or US military post-9/11 torture have ultimately
prevailed in court.
496 At least 26 detainees in the CIA program were “wrongfully held,” and did not meet the CIA’s own standards for detention.
CIA records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many more. Senate Summary, Findings and
Recommendations, p. 12.
497 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3, “Implementation of Article 14 by States Parties,”
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/general_comments/cat_gen_com3.html (accessed July 1, 2015), para. 32; see also UN Human

Rights Committee, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,” General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of
16 December 2005, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx (accessed April 28, 2015)
(hereinafter “Basic Principles”), para. 8; UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (January 28,
2008), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fGC%2f2&Lang=en, para.
21. See also, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, Non-discrimination, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCCPR%2fGEC%2f6622&Lang=en
498 “US Government, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention pursuant to the
optional reporting procedure, Third to fifth periodic reports of States parties due in 2011,” United States of America,
CAT/C/USA/3-5, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/213267.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015), para. 147 (also
available as a UN Document, dated December 14, 2013 as a download here:
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT/C/USA/3-5).

Many cases have been dismissed in court not for lack of merit but rather because the US
government has blocked suits at early stages by claiming the state secrets privilege.499 In
other cases, courts have refused to weigh in, finding that the subject matter of the case
touches on foreign policy or national security—issues normally within the purview of the
executive branch.500 In still other cases government attorneys have successfully argued
that claims are preempted under federal law or trigger various forms of immunity.501 These
cases have set precedents making it nearly impossible for detainees to effectively sue for
torture and ill-treatment in US courts.502 To ensure that victims of arbitrary arrest and
torture have a genuine right to remedy in the United States, Congress should pass
legislation calling for compensation, the executive branch should initiate its own
compensation mechanism, and the Department of Justice should take a different stance on
the state secrets privilege.
State Secrets Privilege

In the United States, the state secrets privilege allows the head of an executive
department to refuse to produce evidence in a court case on the grounds that doing so
would reveal secret information that would harm national security or foreign relations
499 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010), p. 1092 (“[W]e do not reach our decision lightly
or without close and skeptical scrutiny of the record and the government's case for secrecy and dismissal… We …
acknowledge that this case presents a painful conflict between human rights and national security.”); El-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 947 (2007) (upholding lower court’s dismissal of suit on grounds
that el-Masri, who alleged that he was kidnapped, illegally detained and abused by the CIA, would not be able to make his
case except by using evidence barred by the state secrets privilege).
500 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (cert. denied, June 14, 2010), pp. 565, 575, 578, 580-81 (upholding lower court’s dismissal of suit,
on the basis that it would interfere with national security and foreign policy, by Canadian national who claimed he was sent by the
United States to Syria, where he was tortured for one year until his release); see also cases brought by several former US detainees
in Guantanamo, Iraq and Afghanistan blocked on the same theory which effectively would bar a suit brought by a CIA detainee on
the same grounds: Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009); In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F.
Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007), pp. 103-07, affirmed by Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011), p. 765.
501 See, for example, Rasul v. Myers, 563 U.S. 527 (2009) (affirming lower court’s dismissal of torture and related claims on
immunity grounds); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing claims on immunity grounds). See also Saleh et
al v. Titan Corporation, Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States of America, May 2011, available at
http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/09-1313%20Titan%20US%20Br%20(2).pdf (accessed May 4, 2011) (brief submitted by the
Obama administration claiming that the court need not consider the case because federal preemption blocked
consideration, and because there was no disagreement among lower courts requiring resolution by the Supreme Court).
502 See ICTJ Accountability and Redress Report summarizing outcome of suits brought by former US detainees in CIA and military
custody since September 11, 2001, pp. 12-17, 31-35. (See, for example, discussion of the Westfall Act under which courts have
found US officials have immunity from suits for detainee abuse: “The Westfall Act protects federal employees from personal
liability for torts committed within the scope of their employment; in these circumstances, it provides a defense of absolute
immunity to federal officials … Absolute immunity under the Westfall Act is available only to the extent the tort falls within the
scope of official employment and does not fall within one of the law’s limited exceptions. Plaintiffs have argued unsuccessfully
that torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment can never be within the scope of employment.”).
NO MORE EXCUSES 100

interests if disclosed.503 Courts can test these claims to a certain extent but in most cases
have deferred to government assertions about the potential harms.504
The US government should reconsider its position on the state secrets privilege with
regard to any new litigation brought forward in light of release of the Senate Summary, as
much of the information that would be at issue is now publicly available.505
The Obama administration’s own policy regarding state secrets requires that the privilege
be invoked only “when genuine and significant harm to national defense or foreign
relations is at stake and only to the extent necessary to safeguard those interests.”506
The US has now conceded far more details about US authorized torture, and released far
more details on the interrogation programs than ever before. It cannot credibly claim that
litigating cases about such topics would endanger US national security. Prior to the release
of the Senate Summary, US government officials made alarming claims about the dangers
release of the report would pose, such as widespread anti-American protests.507 No
evidence has been put forward that those claims ultimately came true.508 At minimum, the
503 United States v. Reynolds, US Supreme Court, No. 21, March 9, 1953, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
504 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. Va. 2007), pp. 305-306 (“Frequently, the explanation of the department
head who has lodged the formal privilege claim, provided in an affidavit or personal declaration, is sufficient to carry the
Executive's burden. In some situations, a court may conduct an in camera examination of the actual information sought to be
protected, in order to ascertain that the criteria set forth in Reynolds are fulfilled. The degree to which such a reviewing court
should probe depends in part on the importance of the assertedly privileged information to the position of the party seeking
it. ‘Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted ….’ On the other hand,
‘even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military
secrets are at stake.’ Indeed, in certain circumstances a court may conclude that an explanation by the Executive of why a
question cannot be answered would itself create an unacceptable danger of injurious disclosure. In such a situation, a court
is obliged to accept the executive branch's claim of privilege without further demand.”).
505 See “Letter to Attorney General Loretta Lynch from American Civil Liberties Union Legal Director Steven R. Shapiro,” ACLU,
November 5, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_letter_to_lynch_on_cia_torture_lawsuit.pdf

(accessed November 16, 2015).
506 US Justice Department, “Memorandum on Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege,”
September 23, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/09/23/state-secret-privileges.pdf

(accessed May 8, 2015), pp. 1-2. (“The Department will not defend an invocation of the privilege in order to: (i) conceal
violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (ii) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency of the
United States Government...; or (iv) prevent or delay the release of information the release of which would not reasonably be
expected to cause significant harm to national security.” (emphasis in original)).
507 See “Dire warning over pending release of CIA torture report,” CBS News, December 7, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mike-
rogers-releasing-senates-cia-torture-report-a-terrible-idea/ (accessed June 8, 2015); see also Erin Kelly, “Officials fear torture report could
spark violence,” USA Today, December 9, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/12/08/cia-torture-report-senate-
intelligence-committee/20087371/ (accessed June 8, 2015).
508 “Feinstein calls out Torture Report Threat Assessment,” C-SPAN, February 12, 2015, http://www.c-
span.org/video/?c4527978/feinstein-calls-torture-report-threat-assessment (accessed November 12, 2015); Joshua Keating,

courts should scrutinize government claims about the need for secrecy in the CIA torture
context, and allow the cases to go forward with appropriate protective orders that would
bar disclosure of sensitive material.
In the alternative, if the government is genuinely concerned about revealing state secrets it
can offer to settle lawsuits rather than fight claims when it knows US officials have
engaged in torture or other ill-treatment, or propose other types of compensation
mechanisms that would assist victims with recovery.
Classifying Information about CIA Torture
Until December 2014, the US deemed all information relating to the CIA’s
detention and interrogation program as classified. This included even
detainees’ own “observations and experiences” about what happened to
them in while in CIA custody. 509 The classification rule effectively barred
former detainees who were still held at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility
and their lawyers from making complaints about CIA torture to tribunals
abroad, other third-parties, and to the outside world in general, because it
would run afoul of US restrictions on classified information. About 25
detainees previously held by the CIA remain at Guantanamo.510
“Why Hasn’t the Torture Report Sparked Anti-American Protests?” Slate, December 11, 2014,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/12/11/why_hasn_t_the_torture_report_sparked_anti_american_protests.htm
l (accessed June 8, 2015).
509 United States v. Mohammad, et al., Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, Order of 16 December 2013
Granting Defense Motion to Dismiss Because Amended Protective Order #1 Violates the Convention Against Torture, AE 200II
(December 16, 2013), available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(AE200II).pdf (accessed May 4,
2015), paras. 7-9. See also United States v. Mohammad, et al., Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay,
Defense Motion to Dismiss Because Amended Protective Order #1 Violates the Convention Against Torture, AE 200 (August
12, 2013), available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(AE200(MAHRBSWBA)).pdf (accessed May
4, 2015) (Amended Protective Order 1 simply deleted the line which classified the “observations and experiences” of the
defendants while in the CIA program but the bar against disclosure of information about the defendants’ torture effectively
remained because the US continued to control what information came to and left from the defendant at the facility and the
entire CIA detention and interrogation program remained classified, even if the defendants’ own observations and
experiences about it did not).
510 See “CIA Prisoner Database,”The Rendition Project, undated, available as a download on this page:
http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/prisoners/data.html (accessed August 25, 2015). Of the former CIA prisoners listed in
the database, 33 were listed as being “detained” as of August 25, 2015, though not all of them in Guantanamo and some
have since been released. One of them for example, Ahmed Ghailani, is detained at a federal prison in the US. Two others,
Ridha al Najjar and Lufti al-Gharsi, were held in Afghanistan but have since been released. See Kate Clark, “The ‘Other
Guantanamo’ (13): What should Afghanistan do with America’s foreign detainees?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 2,
NO MORE EXCUSES 102

The use of classification rules to block information about torture and ill-
treatment from being made public violates article 13 of the Convention
against Torture, which requires states to ensure that any individual subjected
to torture under their jurisdiction “has the right to complain” and have their
complaint “promptly and impartially examined.” 511 In a legal document
submitted in several cases before military commissions at Guantanamo since
release of the Senate Summary, the US government took the position that the
treatment and conditions of confinement of detainees while in CIA custody
was no longer classified (though identities of individuals or other
governments involved and locations of CIA detention centers remained
classified).512
However, as of this writing, court orders in the military commission cases that
govern the way that classified information is handled in the military
commissions , as well as cases brought on behalf of Guantanamo detainees
challenging the lawfulness of their detention (known as “habeas corpus”
cases), have not yet been updated. As a result, restrictions on the ability of
lawyers representing detainees to discuss their clients’ treatment while in CIA
custody remain in place. Lawyers representing one detainee of the CIA who is
still in Guantanamo, Majid Khan, submitted their notes containing
information about how Khan was treated in CIA custody for declassification
review and were granted permission to share that information with the
public. 513 Release of that information to the press generated stories about
Khan being subjected to even more torture than is documented in the Senate
Summary. 514 But a similar attempt on the part of Joseph Margulies, Abu
Zubaydah’s lead defense lawyer, to release his client’s account of his CIA
torture, was rejected in September 2015 for unknown reasons.515
2015, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-13-what-should-afghanistan-do-with-americas-foreign-
detainees/ (accessed August 25, 2015). Samr al-Barq is listed as being held in “administrative detention” in Israel.
511 Convention against Torture, art. 13.
512 Marty Lederman, “’Gag order’ on Military Commission defendants substantially lifted,” JustSecurity,
http://justsecurity.org/19615/gag-order-military-commission-defendants-substantially-lifted/.
513 David Rohde, “Exclusive: Detainee alleges CIA sexual abuse, torture beyond Senate findings,” Reuters,
June 2, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-torture-khan-idUSKBN0OI1TW20150602 (accessed August 25, 2015).
514 Ibid.
515 David Rohde, “U.S. Government Blocks Release of New CIA Torture Details,” Reuters, September 10, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-usa-cia-torture-idUSKCN0RA2RM20150911 (accessed October 25, 2015); see

Legislation, Other Measures
In one of the cases dismissed on state secrets grounds, Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed discontent that the plaintiffs were
deprived of an opportunity to prove their alleged mistreatment and obtain
compensation.516 The court also noted its dismissal eliminated judicial review, “an
important check on alleged abuse by government officials and putative contractors.”517 But
the court also said the US government could still provide a remedy and pointed to a
number of actions the US government had taken in the past in similar circumstances.518
For example, during World War II, the US relocated and detained more than 110,000
citizens and non-citizens of Japanese ancestry in various locations in the US.519 The Civil
Liberties Act of 1988, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, acknowledged the
fundamental injustice of the “evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States
citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry during World War II.”520 It also
stated that government actions were motivated by "racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and
a failure of political leadership" rather than legitimate security concerns and gave each
surviving detainee $20,000.521
The Jeppesen court pointed to settlements under this act as an example of ways the US
had provided reparations for wrongful detentions of non-US citizens in the past. The Civil
Liberties Act did not cover more than 2,000 Latin Americans of Japanese descent,
including entire families, whom the US abducted from their countries and interned at
camps in the US. They were not entitled to compensation because they were not US
citizens or lawful permanent residents, a requirement under the statute. After the war the
US returned many of them to Japan even though they were from Latin America, where some
also Joseph Margulies, “Open the Lid on US Torture,” Al Jazeera America, September 15, 2015,
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/9/open-the-lid-on-us-torture.html (accessed October 25, 2015); “Groups Urge
End to Blocking Release of CIA Torture Details,” Human Rights Watch news release, September 18, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/18/groups-urge-end-blocking-release-cia-torture-details.
516 Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010) (cert. denied May 2011), p. 1091.
517 Ibid.
518 Ibid.
519 Internet Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014, s.v. “Executive Order 9066,” http://www.britannica.com/topic/Executive-Order-
9066 (accessed November 16, 2015); see also Maisie Conrat and Richard Conrat, Executive Order 9066: The Internment of
110,000 Japanese Americans (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 1992).
520 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 App. U.S.C. § 1989(a).
521 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 App. U.S.C. § 1989(a) and 1989b-4(a)(1).
NO MORE EXCUSES 104

of them ended up homeless and starving.522 These Latin Americans brought a class action
lawsuit based on the Civil Liberties Act that ended up settling, recorded in Mochizuki v.
United States.523
In denying the plaintiff’s claims, the Jeppesen court also indicated that Congress had the
power to enact private bills.524 Generally such bills are meant to benefit solely the
individuals named in them.525 While uncommon, private bills are meant to “address
claims …. founded not on any statutory authority, but upon the claim that ‘the equities and
circumstances of a case create a moral obligation on the part of the Government to extend
relief to an individual.’”526 The Jeppesen court also noted that Congress could also refer an
individual claim to the Court of Federal Claims for a recommendation before enacting a
private bill.527
No one in Congress or the executive has proposed legislation that would provide
compensation to victims of CIA torture, nor has the executive offered any other way to
resolve the issue.
In contrast to the US, several other countries have provided compensation to former
detainees held by the CIA or the US military for which their own authorities also committed
wrongdoing. They have done so even though the level of culpability may have been
significantly lower than that of the US. Some of these settlements include:
• The United Kingdom has committed to mediation with those who have brought civil
claims alleging UK involvement in torture and illegal renditions and wherever
appropriate, to provide compensation ("[W]e are committed to mediation with
522 Mochizuki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
523 Ibid.
524 “When national security interests deny alleged victims of wrongful governmental action meaningful access to a judicial
forum, private bills may be an appropriate alternative remedy.” Mohammed v. Jeppesen, p. 1092.
525 “Private laws differ from public laws in that they lack general applicability and do not apply to all persons. Instead they
are generally ‘designed to provide legal relief to specified persons or entities adversely affected by laws of general
applicability.’ Private laws apply only to the person named in the law and grant a benefit from the government to that person,
not otherwise authorized by law.” Matthew Mantel, “Private Bills and Private Laws,” Law Library Journal 99 (2007): 88.
526 Office of Pers. Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 431 (U.S. 1990), citing Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Supplemental Rules of Procedure for Private Claims Bills,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (Comm. Print 1989).
527 Mohammed v. Jeppesen, p. 1092, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509(c).

those who have brought civil claims about their detention in Guantanamo. And
wherever appropriate, we will offer compensation.").528
• The UK has already settled claims brought by 16 former Guantanamo detainees.529
• The UK in December 2012 settled a case with Sami al-Saadi who was unlawfully
rendered by the CIA, with the cooperation of UK intelligence services, to Libya.530 A
second civil case against the UK government by a Libyan rendition victim, Abdul
Hakim Belhadj, is ongoing.531
• In 2008 the Swedish government formally apologized for its role in the CIA’s
unlawful rendition of Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed Alzery to Egypt and
compensated each the equivalent of $500,000.532
• In 2007, the Canadian government apologized for its role in the unlawful rendition of
Maher Arar to Syria by the CIA in 2002 and paid him a settlement of C$9.7 million.533
(Arar brought suit in the US earlier, but his case was dismissed on grounds that the
judicial branch should not weigh in on US rendition policy— according to the court, a
foreign relations issue within the purview of the executive branch).
• In 2010, Australia paid out an undisclosed settlement to Mamdouh Habib, a former

Guantanamo detainee.534 Habib is an Australian national who was arrested in
Pakistan shortly after the September 11 attacks, secretly taken to Egypt, where he
528 Speech from David Cameron, Prime Minister to the House of Commons, “Statement on detainees,” July 6, 2010,
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-detainees (accessed July 1, 2015).

529 “U.K. to pay millions to ex-Gitmo terror suspects,” NBC News, November 16, 2010,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40210747/ns/world_news-europe/t/uk-pay-millions-ex-gitmo-terror-
suspects/%20-%20.VWOT2U9Viko#.VYGBMThMuUk (accessed July 1, 2015).
530 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Government pays Libyan dissident’s family £2.2m over M16-aided rendition,” The Guardian,
December 13, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/13/libyan-dissident-mi6-aided-rendition (accessed August

25, 2015).
531 Owen Bowcott, “Abdel Hakim Belhaj wins right to sue UK government over his kidnap,” The Guardian, October 30, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/abdel-hakim-belhaj-court-kidnap-mi6-cia-torture (accessed August 25, 2015).

532 Louise Nordstrom, “Egyptian deported by CIA gets residency in Sweden,” World Post, July 4, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120704/eu-sweden-cia-flights/ (accessed July 1, 2015); “Sweden to

compensate exonerated terror suspect,” New York Times, July 3, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/03/world/europe/03iht-sweden.5.14218093.html?_r=0 (accessed November 16, 2016).
533 Ian Austen, “Canada to Pay $9.75 Million to Man Tortured in Syria,” New York Times, January 27, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/27/world/americas/27canada.html?_r=0 (accessed November 16, 2015).

534 Natalie O’Brien, “Australian official saw Egyptians torture Habib,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 13, 2011,
http://www.smh.com.au/national/australian-official-saw-egyptians-torture-habib-20110212-1ardt.html (accessed April 29, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 106

was tortured for seven months, and then transferred to Guantanamo Bay, where he
was held until January 2005.535
In addition to these settlements, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled against
Poland for its role in the detention and torture of two former detainees in CIA custody, Abu
Zubaydah536 and Abd al-Nashiri.537 It also ruled against Macedonia for its role in the
abduction and torture of Khaled el-Masri.538 A US federal court had dismissed el-Masri’s
case on state secrets grounds in 2006 and his appeals were all denied.539 The European
Court ordered Poland and Macedonia to pay €250,000 and €60,000 respectively. Poland
has paid out its settlement to Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri.540 Macedonia was due to pay
within three months of the judgment on December 12, 2012.541
Guarantee of Non-Repetition, Satisfaction, and the Right to Truth

The right to redress encompasses the concepts of “effective remedy” and “reparation,”
which not only include restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation but also “guarantees
of non-repetition” and “satisfaction.”542
With regard to non-repetition, the Committee against Torture has interpreted the
Convention against Torture to provide that states are obligated to combat impunity for
535 Ibid.
536 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, (no. 7511/13), Judgment of 24 July 2014,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146047 (accessed November 16, 2015).

537 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Nashiri v. Poland, (no. 28761/11), Judgement of 24 July 2014, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146044 (accessed November 16, 2015).

538 European Court of Human Rights, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (no. 39630/09), Judgement of
December 13, 2012, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621.

539 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296.
540 “Poland pays $250,000 to victims of CIA rendition and torture,” The Guardian, May 15, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/15/poland-pays-250000-alleged-victims-cia-rendition-torture (accessed
August 25, 2015).
541 European Court of Human Rights, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para. 273(12).
542 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3 (Implementation of Article 14 by States Parties),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/general_comments/cat_gen_com3.html (accessed July 1, 2015), para. 2; UN General

Assembly Resolution 60/147, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,” December 2005,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx (accessed April 28, 2015), para. 18 (“In
accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of individual circumstances, victims of gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law should, as appropriate
and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective
reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.”).

violations, including by taking measures such as “establishing effective clear instructions
to public officials on the provisions of the Convention, especially the absolute prohibition
of torture”; “civilian oversight of military and security forces”; “establishing systems for
regular and independent monitoring of all places of detention”; providing training for
security forces and health and legal professionals on human rights law, including specific
training on the Istanbul Protocol (on documentation of torture); and “reviewing and
reforming laws contributing to or allowing torture and ill-treatment.”543 A UN General
Assembly resolution sets out more general measures for victims of serious human rights
and international humanitarian law violations.544
Though then-President George W. Bush disclosed the CIA rendition, detention, and
interrogation program in 2006 and moved a number of prisoners from CIA custody to
Guantanamo, the program did not officially end until President Barack Obama issued
executive order 13491 on his second day in office. This order barred the CIA from operating
detention facilities and from holding detainees on all but a temporary, transitory basis;
required all US personnel to abide by the Army Field Manual for Intelligence Interrogations;
and required that the International Committee of the Red Cross have prompt access to all
laws-of-war detainees.545
These are important measures. But Obama’s executive order is not adequate to ensure
non-repetition in the future—particularly when inaction on investigations and
prosecutions sends the message to those responsible for torture that the law will not be
enforced. Upon the release of the Senate Summary, CIA Director John Brennan made
significant admissions about mistakes the CIA had made in running, operating,
reporting on, and promoting the program. However, he also said whether the techniques
had some value was “unknowable.” And when asked what was to stop future policy
makers from using them again, he said the CIA was not currently contemplating
reinstating the detention program or using “enhanced interrogation techniques” but he
543 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/GC/CAT-C-GC-
3_en.pdf (accessed November 16, 2015), para. 18.

544 See Basic Principles, para. 23.
545 “Executive Order 13491 – Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” The White House, January 22, 2009,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations (accessed May 2, 2015).
NO MORE EXCUSES 108

deferred to “policymakers in future times” regarding whether they might need to be
used again in a similar type of “crisis.”546
There remains a very real danger that US officials will again view torture as a viable policy
option. Obama’s executive order, like all executive orders, can be revoked by future
presidents. Several 2016 presidential candidates have defended the “enhanced
interrogation techniques” and said or implied that they would use them again.547 US
presidential candidate Jeb Bush, when asked whether he would contemplate using
“enhanced interrogation techniques” if he were elected, did not rule out the possibility
and also said that waterboarding was not torture.548
The best way to ensure that torture and other ill-treatment will not be used in the future
is by prosecuting past unlawful acts. Strengthening existing legislation against torture
would also establish clearly that the US government does not intend to engage in such
practices again.
On June 16, 2015, the US Senate passed an amendment proposed by senators John McCain
and Dianne Feinstein to a defense spending bill (the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016) that if it becomes law, could codify much of what is in Obama’s
executive order 13491.549 The amendment passed in the Senate by a vote of 78-21.550 The
546 “TRANSCRIPT: CIA Director John Brennan Addresses Senate's Report on CIA Interrogation Program,” ABC News, December
11, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/International/transcript-cia-director-john-brennan-senates-report-

cia/story?id=27539690&singlePage=true (accessed July 1, 2015).
547 Kaili Joy Gray, “Donald Trump And Fox & Friends: It’s Cool, Sydney Hostage-Takers, CIA Was ‘Just Following Orders,’”
Wonkette, December 15, 2014, http://wonkette.com/569220/donald-trump-and-fox-friends-its-cool-sydney-hostage-takers-

cia-was-just-following-orders#iweGwD3WVS1CKQic.99 (accessed October 25, 2015); Heather Digby Parton, “Ben Carson’s
sick torture rationale: Is this 2016’s most deluded contender?” Salon, February 20, 2015,
http://www.salon.com/2015/02/20/ben_carsons_sick_torture_rationale_is_this_2016s_most_deluded_contender/
(accessed October 25, 2015); Michael Isikoff, “Carly Fiorina Defends Bush-era Torture and Spying, Calls for More
Transparency,” Yahoo Politics, September 28, 2015, https://www.yahoo.com/politics/carly-fiorina-defends-bush-era-torture-
and-spying-130015256041.html?soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk=tw (accessed October 25, 2015); James Q. Lynch, “Rick Perry
won't rule out torture to protect Americans from domestic terrorism,” The Gazette, May 20, 2015,
http://thegazette.com/subject/news/government/rick-perry-wont-rule-out-torture-to-protect-americans-from-domestic-
terrorism-20150520 (accessed July 1, 2015).
548 Trip Gabriel, “Jeb Bush Says He Won’t Rule Out Waterboarding in Interrogations,” New York Times, August 14, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/08/14/jeb-bush-says-he-wont-rule-out-waterboarding-in-interrogations/
549 “US: Support Anti-Torture Legislation,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 16, 2015,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/16/us-support-anti-torture-legislation.
550 Julian Hattem, “Senate votes to ban use of torture,” The Hill, June 16, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/national-
security/245117-senate-votes-to-permanently-ban-use-of-torture (accessed November 12, 2015).

entire bill was then vetoed by Obama over other issues, but a similar provision remained in
the compromised version bill which, as of this writing, was expected to be signed into law
by the President.551 It provides that any individual detained by the US in an armed conflict
can only be interrogated in ways outlined by the US Army Field Manual on Intelligence
Interrogations. It also requires review and updating of the manual within three years to
ensure that it reflects current best practice and complies with all US legal obligations and
requires that the International Committee of the Red Cross get “notification of, and
prompt” access to, all prisoners held by the US in any armed conflict.552 It is already clear
under US law that torture and other ill-treatment is illegal but this requirement would help
to more specifically restrain the physical action certain US interrogators could take.553
However, it is also impossible to know for sure how future administrations will interpret its
obligations under the provisions. Additionally, an exemption for the FBI, the Department of
Homeland Security, and other federal “law enforcement entities” was added to the
compromised version of the bill.
551 Rebecca Shabad, “White House expects President

Obama to sign defense bill,” CBS, November 10, 2015,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-house-expects-president-obama-to-sign-defense-
bill/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cbsnews%2Ffeed+(CBSNews.com) (accessed
November 12, 2015).
552“US: Support Anti-Torture Legislation,” Human Rights Watch news release.
553 Though the Interrogation Manual bars many forms of abusive treatment, its Appendix M still allows some abusive forms
of sleep and sensory deprivation. For example, it permits limiting detainees to only four hours of sleep every 24 hours,
permitting 40 hours of sleep deprivation at a time, potentially over an extended period. US officials have said that Appendix
M would not be applied in a way that allows for such abuse but the text as written would still permit such practices. During
the next Defense Department review process, the US should remove the provisions in Appendix M that allow for abuse
through isolation or sleep and sensory deprivation that can amount to torture or ill-treatment.
NO MORE EXCUSES 110

IV. International Accountability Mechanisms
The US government’s failure to conduct adequate criminal investigations into allegations

of torture and other serious abuses committed by US nationals in the context of the CIA’s
rendition, detention, and interrogation program has opened the door to investigations and
prosecutions by national judicial authorities outside the United States.554
Investigations to date have targeted both US officials and those from other countries since
a number of European countries provided support to the CIA program, in particular by
allowing US officials to establish secret prisons known as “black sites” on their territory or
to use their airports and airspace to conduct rendition flights. Several investigations have
also focused on allegations of torture and other serious abuses committed outside of the
context of the CIA program, principally around torture and ill-treatment of detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay; in Iraq (especially at Abu Ghraib prison); and in Afghanistan. In
addition, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has opened a preliminary examination into
the situation in Afghanistan and is assessing whether to open a formal investigation,
including into allegations of detainee abuse by members of the US armed forces.
Jurisdiction over criminal offenses normally depends on a link between the prosecuting
state and the crime. Most often this link is territorial, meaning that the crime occurred in
the state that is prosecuting the crime. In other instances, the link is that the alleged
perpetrator or the victim is a national of that country.555 However, judicial authorities of
third countries may also investigate and prosecute the most serious international crimes—
including war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and genocide—even where the
crimes took place elsewhere and neither the accused nor the victims are nationals of that
state. Such cases are pursued under the international law principle of “universal
jurisdiction,” which embodies the idea that certain crimes are so egregious that every
state has an interest and corresponding duty in bringing perpetrators to justice.556
554 See section of this report titled “Justice Department Inquiry into CIA Torture” in the “Background” section above.
555 These are known as “active personality” or “passive personality” jurisdiction.
556 For more information on universal jurisdiction, see Human Rights Watch, The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can
Pursue Human Rights Criminals Abroad, November 1, 1998, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1998/11/01/pinochet-

precedent; Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art, vol. 18, no. 5(D), June 2006,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf; The Long Arm of Justice: Lessons from Specialized War
Crimes Units in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, September 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/IJ0914_ForUpload.pdf.

Universal jurisdiction provides an important safety net for ensuring accountability when
serious crimes cannot or will not be effectively prosecuted in the state where the crimes were
committed or before an international criminal tribunal. For certain crimes, including war
crimes, and torture, international treaties and customary international law place an
affirmative duty on states to exercise universal jurisdiction and prosecute suspects who
come onto their territory, unless the state decides to extradite them to face trial elsewhere.557
The principle of universal jurisdiction has existed for centuries. However, its application to
human rights abuses and war crimes only began to gain real momentum in the past two
decades, with the arrest of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in the United Kingdom
in 1998 on charges of torture committed in Chile.558 Since then, more and more governments,
particularly in Europe, have been willing to use domestic universal jurisdiction laws to
ensure that those responsible for torture, war crimes, and other international crimes do not
escape justice.559 At the same time, most cases brought to trial under universal jurisdiction
557 The Convention against Torture—ratified by the United States and 157 other countries—provides that “[t]he State Party in the
territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed [torture] is found shall ... if it does not extradite him, submit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.” Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to war
crimes, which the United States and virtually every country have ratified, has a similar provision. The International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance contains a similar provision. See Convention against Torture; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted August 12, 1949, 75
UNTS 31, entered into force October 21, 1950, art. 49,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=4825657B0C7E6BF0C12563CD002D6B0B&action=openDocument;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
adopted August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85, entered into force October 21, 1950, art. 50,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=2F5AA9B07AB61934C12563CD002D6B25&action=openDocument;
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 135, entered into force October
21, 1950, art. 129,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=77CB9983BE01D004C12563CD002D6B3E&action=openDocument;
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287, entered into
force October 21, 1950, art. 146,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument
; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted December 20, 2006, G.A. Res.
61/177, U.N. Doc. A/61/448, entered into force December 23, 2010, art. 9,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/ConventionCED.aspx. All UN member states have ratified treaties with obligations
to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners suspected of committing certain crimes abroad against other foreigners. Amnesty
International, “International Law Commission: The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare),” February 3, 2009,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/001/2009/en (accessed March 23, 2015), pp. 74-98. See also International Law
Commission, “Survey of multilateral conventions which may be of relevance for the work of the International Law Commission on the
topic ‘The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)’, Study by the Secretariat,” U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/630, June 18,
2010, http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_630.pdf (accessed March 24, 2015).
558 See Human Rights Watch, The Pinochet Precedent.
559 According to a 2012 survey conducted by Amnesty International, 163 states have some form of universal jurisdiction
legislation in place, with courts in at least 85 countries able to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime of torture and at
least 136 countries able to do so for war crimes. Amnesty International, “Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of
Legislation around the World – 2012 Update,” October 9, 2012,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/ior530192012en.pdf (accessed June 3, 2015), pp. 2, 12-13.
NO MORE EXCUSES 112

have involved low- and mid-level suspects from less powerful countries.560 In 2008, US
prosecutors notably secured a first conviction under its Torture Act, which allows cases
based on universal jurisdiction to prosecute torture committed abroad, against the son of
former Liberian dictator Charles Taylor, Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr.561 The trial of former
Chadian dictator Hissène Habré in Senegal, which began on July 20, also marks the first time
in history that a former head of state is prosecuted by the domestic courts of another country
and the first universal jurisdiction case to proceed to trial in Africa.562
Human Rights Watch has compiled a review, set forth below, of criminal investigations
initiated abroad into torture and other serious abuses committed as part of the CIA program
or by US armed forces since the 9/11 attacks.563 Many of these investigations do not make a
distinction between US military and CIA abuses, so we have included investigations
regardless of whether the military or the CIA was the dominant focus. Nearly all of the cases
have been initiated by victims and civil society groups, and all have occurred in Europe. Many
European civil law jurisdictions, unlike most common law countries like the US, allow victims
and in some cases nongovernmental organizations to file criminal complaints directly with
the courts, thereby triggering the opening of a judicial investigation.564 Many criminal
complaints filed by private parties have not resulted in actual investigations. Italy is the only
country to have brought a case to trial, which eventually resulted in the final in absentia
convictions of CIA officers and a US air force colonel, as well as several Italian officers.565 The
560 Over the past two decades, universal jurisdiction cases have been brought before the courts of Argentina, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe; The Long Arm of Justice, annexes. See also Redress and
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the European Union: A Study of the Laws and Practice
in the 27 Member States of the European Union,” December 2010,
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_In_the_27_Member_States_of_the_European_Union.p
df (accessed March 24, 2015).
561 Chuckie Taylor was actually a US citizen who was initially arrested while attempting to enter the US for a passport violation.
See “First Verdict for Overseas Torture: Decision in Trial of Ex-Liberian President’s Son Significant for Justice,” Human Rights
Watch news release, October 30, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/30/us-first-verdict-overseas-torture.
562 “Hissène Habré Trial to Begin July 20: Former Chad Dictator Charged with Crimes against Humanity,” Human Rights Watch
news release, May 13, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/13/senegal-hissene-habre-trial-begin-july-20.

563 This list is restricted to criminal cases and does not discuss other civil cases and inquiries that are underway or have
been completed.
564 For more information, see Human Rights Watch, The Legal Framework for Universal Jurisdiction in France, September
2014, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/IJ0914France_3.pdf, pp. 4-6. The European Center for

Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), the International Federation for Human
Rights (FIDH), and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) have been the most active nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in terms of filing criminal complaints against US officials for alleged torture and other serious abuses.
565 Malaysia also held criminal proceedings before a commission, but the commission is not part of the national judicial
system, so its judgment was “merely declaratory in nature.” Prosecutor v. George W. Bush & 7 Others, Kuala Lumpur War

trial brought to light important information that was tempered by being in absentia, which
raises serious fair trial concerns.566
Nearly all of the other criminal investigations initiated against US nationals to date have
been closed. However, a criminal investigation in France is progressing slowly. And
Germany’s federal prosecutor’s office is considering whether to open an investigation into
senior members of the Bush administration following the filing of a new complaint by the
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) in December 2014, shortly
after the release of the Senate Summary.
Mounting evidence of involvement by governments in Europe in the CIA program—

underscored by the Senate Summary—and growing pressure from civil society groups, and
court judgements, led several countries to open criminal investigations into complicity by
their nationals. This includes Poland where the investigations have languished, and in
Lithuania where investigations were opened briefly, closed for a number of years, and then
reopened when the Senate Summary was made public. UK authorities have initiated four
separate investigations, two of which remain open.
Overall, these cases are an important reminder to the US government that legal avenues
for accountability are not just available in the United States, and that US officials involved
in the CIA program are not free and clear just because the US government has thus far
been unwilling to bring cases.
However, as discussed below, European efforts at investigating the CIA program have
faced political pressure from the US and actions by US authorities to block investigations.
European governments will need to demonstrate greater commitment and persistence if
these cases are to proceed to indictments and prosecutions.
Crimes Commission, Case No. 2-CTH-2011, Judgment, May 11, 2012,

http://criminalisewar.org/tribunal/Judgement%20KLWCT%20May%202012.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015), para. 23.4. “Bush
and Associates Found Guilty of Torture,” Kuala Lumpur Foundation to Criminalise War press release, May 11, 2012,
http://criminalisewar.org/2012/press-release-bush-and-associates-found-guilty-of-torture (accessed April 30, 2015).
566 Trials in absentia compromise the ability of an accused to exercise their rights to a legal defense under article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Those rights compromised include the right to be present during the trial,
the right to defend oneself through counsel of choice, and the right to examine witnesses.
NO MORE EXCUSES 114

European governments should also ensure that accountability extends to those non-US
nationals who bear responsibility for torture and other serious abuses committed in
connection with the CIA rendition, detention, and interrogation program. A study by the
Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) in 2013 found that 54 foreign countries provided
support of some form to the CIA program, with 21 of those countries being within Europe.567
The active participation of European countries in the CIA program has been widely
confirmed.568 Each of these countries should ensure that thorough and impartial criminal
investigations are carried out to establish the responsibility of not only US officials over
whom their courts may have jurisdiction, but also their own nationals. Toward this end,
European and other countries that may have been complicit or participated in the CIA
program should request a copy of the full Senate report with minimal redactions.569They
should also inform the US government that they have no objections to the report publicly
naming their country.
567 Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” February 2013,
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf (accessed June 4, 2015).

568 See UN Human Rights Council, “Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering
Terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while
Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Represented by its Vice-Chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and
the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin” (“UN Joint Study on Secret
Detention”), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42, February 19, 2010, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-
HRC-13-42.pdf (accessed June 4, 2015), para. 159; UN Human Rights Council, Report on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/3, February 4, 2009,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/10session/A.HRC.10.3.pdf (accessed June 16, 2015), para. 52;
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees
involving Council of Europe member states,” June 12, 2006, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewPDF.asp?FileID=11527&lang=en (accessed June 15, 2015); Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Secret
detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report,” June 11, 2007,
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=11555&lang=en (accessed June 15, 2015); European
Parliament Resolution of 11 February 2015 on the US Senate report on the use of torture by the CIA (2014/2997(RSP)),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0031+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
(accessed June 17, 2015); European Parliament Resolution of 10 October 2013 on alleged transportation and illegal detention
of prisoners in European countries by the CIA (2013/2702(RSP)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0418+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed June 4, 2015); European Parliament Resolution of 11
September 2012 on alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in European countries: follow-up of the
European Parliament TDIP Committee report (2012/2033(INI)),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0309&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-0266
(accessed June 4, 2015); Human Rights Watch, Delivered into Enemy Hands; OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention
and Extraordinary Rendition”; Amnesty International, “Partners in Crime: Europe’s Role in US Renditions,” June 14, 2016,
http://www.amnesty.eu/static/documents/2006/Partners_in_crime_14062006.pdf (accessed June 15, 2006); International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody,”
February 2007, http://assets.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf (accessed June 17, 2015).
569 This is consistent with the European Parliament Resolution of 11 February 2015 on the US Senate report on the use of
torture by the CIA.

A number of countries may be in a position to exercise jurisdiction over US and foreign
officials for their role in serious abuses committed as part of the CIA program and related
mistreatment of persons in detention. Victims and witnesses, and other relevant evidence,
may be located within their jurisdiction, which may oblige national authorities to
investigate and prosecute the offenses.
Germany may provide a useful model as to how prosecutorial authorities can be

proactive under the principles of universal jurisdiction. German prosecutors now have
the ability to conduct broad preliminary investigations known as “structural
investigations.” These are aimed at cataloguing crimes (as opposed to focusing on
specific individuals), gathering details about them, and identifying potential victims and
witnesses and other evidence to facilitate future criminal proceedings before national
courts or elsewhere.570 This could help lay the groundwork for investigation of specific
individuals should they enter Germany.
In addition, possible suspects from the US or elsewhere may be present in or travel to

Europe or other countries that may have jurisdiction over them, thereby providing an
opportunity for their arrest and, provided there is sufficient evidence, prosecution.
National immigration, police, and judicial authorities should prepare for this eventuality,
be vigilant to the identity of persons traveling to their countries, and work together to
ensure that police and prosecutors are given an adequate opportunity to consider
investigation and prosecution where suspects arrive on their territory. Human Rights Watch
and four other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have sought a meeting of war
crimes prosecutors from EU countries to discuss the Senate Summary and efforts to ensure
accountability for CIA-related abuses.571
The ICC may also prove to be a path toward some accountability for US abuses committed
in Afghanistan. The ICC is conducting a preliminary examination into alleged international
crimes by all parties in Afghanistan. Should it decide to open a formal investigation in
Afghanistan, it will need to consider including US abuses as part of its investigation.
570 For more information, see Human Rights Watch, The Long Arm of Justice, p. 60.
571 Letter from Human Rights Watch, Redress, FIDH, ECCHR, and TRIAL to members of the EU Genocide Network, “Discussing
Ongoing and Potential Investigations and Prosecutions Following the Release of the US Senate Intelligence Committee
Report Summary,” April 20, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/20/letter-members-eu-genocide-network-discussing-
ongoing-and-potential-investigations-a.
NO MORE EXCUSES 116

Given the confidential nature of judicial investigations, particularly when cases are at an
early stage, it is possible that judicial authorities in other countries have investigated or
are pursuing similar investigations, but the information is not available publicly. The
information provided below is therefore not necessarily an exhaustive list of all criminal
cases that have occurred or are pending in foreign jurisdictions.
Investigations and Prosecutions of US Officials
Italy
In November 2009, a court in Milan convicted 23 Americans and two Italian military
intelligence officers for aiding and abetting in the abduction of Egyptian cleric Hassan
Mustafa Osama Nasr (known as Abu Omar). The cleric had been kidnapped as he was walking
down the street in Milan in February 2003 in what is believed to have been a joint operation
by the CIA and Italian military intelligence. He was allegedly put on a plane and flown to an air
base in Germany and then on to Egypt, where he claims to have been repeatedly tortured.572
The case, which Italian prosecutors initiated in 2003 despite strong opposition from US
authorities, was brought against 26 Americans—all but one of whom were CIA officers—
and seven Italian military intelligence officers.573 None of the Americans were ever arrested
or present during the trial.574 Criminal proceedings moved forward slowly, in part due to
Italian authorities’ successive attempts to block the case due to concerns over its effect on
US-Italian relations. The Italian government successfully challenged much of the evidence
on the grounds that it might endanger national security, and refused to seek the
extradition of the American defendants.
572 “Italy/US: Italian Court Rebukes CIA Rendition Practice,” Human Rights Watch news release, November 4, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/04/italyus-italian-court-rebukes-cia-rendition-practice; “CIA agents guilty of Italy

kidnap,” BBC News, November 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8343123.stm (accessed March 30, 2015); John
Hooper, “Italian court finds CIA agents guilty of kidnapping terrorism suspect,” The Guardian, November 4, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/04/cia-guilty-rendition-abu-omar (accessed April 1, 2015); Rachel Donadio,
“Italy Convicts 23 Americans for C.I.A. Renditions,” New York Times, November 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/world/europe/05italy.html?_r=0 (accessed April 1, 2015).
573 Of all the cases surveyed for this report, this is the only instance in which prosecutors opened an investigation on their
own initiative without a complaint having been filed by the victim or an NGO.
574 Human Rights Watch expressed concern at the time over trials in absentia, which do not afford defendants an adequate
opportunity to present a defense as required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14. See
“Italy/US: Italian Court Rebukes CIA Rendition Practice,” Human Rights Watch news release. Italian law allows in absentia
trials when there are reasons to believe the accused are aware of the trial, and are willingly refusing to participate.

The trial court convicted 22 of the CIA agents, two of the Italian military intelligence
officers, and a US air force colonel. It also handed down penalties ranging from five to
eight years, with the CIA’s Milan station chief, Robert Seldon Lady, receiving the most
serious sentence. The court ruled that the three other American defendants in the case
were protected by diplomatic immunity, including the CIA’s Rome station chief, Jeffrey
Castelli.575 It also dismissed charges against the five remaining Italians in the case,
including the former head of Italy’s military intelligence service, Gen. Nicolò Pollari, on the
grounds that the evidence against them was protected by the state secrecy doctrine.576
In December 2010, the Milan appeals court upheld all of the convictions but increased the
sentences given to the Americans.577 In September 2012, Italy’s highest court affirmed the
convictions but overturned the acquittal of the five Italians and ordered them to face a new
trial.578 In February 2013, two separate trials by the appeals court led to convictions of the
five Italians and three US citizens who had previously been acquitted.579 Italy’s highest
court overturned the convictions of the five Italians in February 2014, again on the basis of
the state secrecy doctrine. In March 2014, the same court upheld the three remaining CIA
agents’ convictions.580
575 Human Rights Watch believes the court’s interpretation of diplomatic immunity was overly broad and should not have
been interpreted to protect officials responsible for grave international crimes such as torture. Ibid.
576 Human Rights Watch took issue with the court’s interpretation of the state secrecy doctrine. Ibid.
577 The appeals court gave Lady a nine-year prison term and seven-year terms to the other Americans. It slightly decreased
the prison terms of the Italian military intelligence officers, from three years to two years and eight months. Amnesty
International, “Italy/USA: Supreme Court orders re-trial of former high-level intelligence officials and upholds all convictions
in Abu Omar kidnapping case,” September 21, 2012,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/20000/eur300152012en.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
578 “Italy/US:
Ruling on CIA Case Highlights US Inaction,” Human Rights Watch news release, September 20, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/20/italyus-ruling-cia-case-highlights-us-inaction; Amnesty International, “Italy/USA:
Supreme Court orders re-trial of former high-level intelligence officials and upholds all convictions in Abu Omar
kidnapping case.”
579 The appeals court sentenced the CIA’s Rome station chief Castelli to seven years in prison and the two other CIA agents to
six years. It sentenced Italy’s military intelligence head Pollari to 10 years, his deputy head Marco Mancini to nine years, and
the three other Italian military intelligence agents to six years each. “Italy: Continue Efforts Toward Justice for CIA Abuses,”
Human Rights Watch news release, July 20, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/20/italy-continue-efforts-toward-
justice-cia-abuses; “Italy's ex-spy chief convicted over 2003 CIA rendition,” BBC News, February 12, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21435632 (accessed March 30, 2015); Alison Sacriponte, “Italy court convicts 3
Americans for 2003 rendition kidnapping,” Jurist, February 2, 2013, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/02/italy-court-
convicts-3-americans-for-2003-rendition-kidnapping.php (accessed March 30, 2015).
580 Judith Sunderland, “Dispatches: Italy Stands Alone on Justice for CIA Abuses,” Human Rights Watch dispatches, March
12, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/12/dispatches-italy-stands-alone-justice-cia-abuses.
NO MORE EXCUSES 118

Regardless of whether any of the US nationals serves prison time, the case marked the first
trial of US officials for CIA-related abuses post-9/11. Italian judicial authorities appear to
have issued European Arrest Warrants, which are only valid in Europe, for all those
convicted in absentia.581 In July 2013, former CIA’s Milan station chief Robert Seldon Lady
was detained briefly in Panama on an Italian arrest warrant, and the Italian justice ministry
pursued an extradition request—the only time it has done so.582 Panamanian authorities
refused the extradition request and released Lady. In October 2015, Sabrina De Sousa, a
former CIA agent convicted in the case, was detained by authorities on a European Arrest
Warrant issued in Italy at an airport in Lisbon as she was trying to leave the country.583 She
was released from detention shortly thereafter and is out of custody while her extradition
case is pending.584
Germany
Three criminal complaints have been filed in Germany. While Germany allows victims and
NGOs to file criminal cases directly, the prosecution has wide discretion to decline to
pursue them.585 The federal prosecutor’s office declined to initiate an investigation in the
first two cases, but has yet to decide on the third. In addition, state prosecutors issued
warrants against 13 CIA agents in relation to the unlawful rendition of German national
Khaled el-Masri from Macedonia in early 2004, but Germany has not taken further steps.
581 Abu Omar currently has a case pending against Italy before the European Court of Human Rights for its role in his
abduction and mistreatment and its failure to hold those persons responsible for the crimes against him accountable. Abu
Omar challenges Italian judicial authorities’ decision not to convict five Italian officials on the basis of the state secrecy
doctrine and its failure to request the extradition of the US officials convicted in the case. “Italy: Court set for CIA terror
abduction human rights complaint,” Council of Europe news release, June 1, 2015,
http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2015/06/italy-court-set-for-cia-terror-abduction-human-rights-complaint (accessed
August 17, 2015). See also European Court of Human Rights, Nasr v. Italy, (44883/09), Application of Osama Mustafa Hassn
Nasr and Nabila Ghali of 6 August 2009, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113123.
For more information, see Human Rights Watch, The Legal Framework for Universal Jurisdiction in Germany, September 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/IJ0914German_0.pdf.
582 Judith Sunderland, “Dispatches: Italy Stands Alone on Justice for CIA Abuses”; Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, “Panama
releases former CIA operative wanted by Italy,” Washington Post, July 19, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panama-releases-former-cia-operative-wanted-by-
italy/2013/07/19/c73ebc12-f083-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html (accessed March 30, 2015).
583 Jason Leopold, “Former CIA Officer Detained in Europe While Trying to Clear Her Name in Rendition Case,” Vice News,
October 8, 2015, https://news.vice.com/article/former-cia-officer-detained-in-europe-while-trying-to-clear-her-name-in-

rendition-case (accessed November 6, 2015).
584 Ibid.
585 For more information, see Human Rights Watch, The Legal Framework for Universal Jurisdiction in Germany, September
2014, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/IJ0914German_0.pdf.

2004 Complaint
In November 2004, CCR586 assisted four Iraqis in filing a criminal complaint against then-
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former CIA Director George Tenet, and a number of
other current and former senior military officials,587 for alleged torture and other ill-
treatment amounting to war crimes suffered at the hands of US armed forces in the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq.588 US officials expressed concern over the case, warning that
“frivolous lawsuits” could adversely affect the US relationship with Germany.589 Through
the US embassy, Rumsfeld also informed German authorities that he would not take part in
an upcoming Conference on Security Policy in Munich if the case proceeded.590
On February 10, 2005, just days before Rumsfeld was scheduled to speak at the security
conference in Munich, the federal prosecutor’s office announced that it would not pursue
an investigation.591 The office justified its decision on the grounds of subsidiarity, asserting
that there were no indications the US was refraining from investigating and prosecuting the
crimes in the US. Emphasizing that the US had a closer connection to the alleged crimes,
the federal prosecutor’s office said that it need not look at whether Rumsfeld was himself
under investigation in the United States or whether the exact same crimes were being
investigated.592 ECCHR and CCR challenged the decision, but the appeals court declared
586 The complaint was filed by ECCHR executive director Wolfgang Kaleck when working for CCR, prior to ECCHR’s founding.
587 These officials included Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force Seven at Abu Ghraib; Maj.
Gen. Walter Wojdakowski, Dep. Commanding Gen. of the Combined Joint Task Force Seven at Abu Ghraib; Brig. Gen. Janis
Karpinski, Commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade at Abu Ghraib; Lt. Col. Jerry Phillabaum, Commander of the 320th
Military Police Brigade at Abu Ghraib; Col. Thomas Pappas, Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib;
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L. Jordan, Chief of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib; Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller,
Commander of the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo; and Under Sec. of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone.
588 The complaint alleged that the torture and ill-treatment of detainees amounted to a war crime under the German Code of
Crimes against International Law. For more details on the case, see European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights
(ECCHR), “Rumsfeld torture cases,” undated, http://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/international-crimes-and-accountability/u-
s-accountability/rumsfeld.html (accessed March 23, 2015).
589 “Lawsuit against Rumsfeld threatens US-German Relations,” Deutsche Welle, December 14, 2004,
http://www.dw.de/lawsuit-against-rumsfeld-threatens-us-german-relations/a-1427743 (accessed June 3, 2015).

590 Adam Zagorin, “Exclusive: Charges Sought Against Rumsfeld Over Prison Abuse,” Time, November 10, 2006,
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1557842,00.html (accessed April 29, 2015); “Pentagon concerned

about legal complaint in Germany against Rumsfeld, others,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2004.
591 “Germany Won’t Prosecute Rumsfeld,” Deutsche Welle, February 10, 2005. See also “Keine deutschen Ermittlungen
wegen der angezeigten Vorfälle von Abu Ghraib/Irak,” Federal Prosecutor’s Office press release, February 10, 2005,
https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?newsid=163 (accessed March 23, 2015).
592 The federal prosecutor’s office argued that the complex of crimes was under investigation so it need not look at whether
the same accused and the exact same crimes were the subject of criminal proceedings in the US. “Keine deutschen
Ermittlungen wegen der angezeigten Vorfälle von Abu Ghraib/Irak,” Federal Prosecutor’s Office press release.
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the request for review inadmissible, including on the basis that the prosecutor did not
abuse discretion in declining to move forward.593
In July 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers sent a
letter to German authorities expressing concern over the prosecutor’s decision. Noting the
“strong political pressure” exerted by the US and the questionable timing of the decision,
the letter alleged a violation of the independence of the judiciary.594 The Special
Rapporteur underlined that there were no indications that US judicial authorities were
actually investigating the alleged crimes, with the exception of low-ranking officers, or had
any intention to look at criminal responsibility of senior military officials. He also took
issue with the prosecutor’s cursory decision dismissing the complaint.595
2006 Complaint
In November 2006, just days after Rumsfeld had resigned as defense secretary, CCR596 filed
another complaint with the German federal prosecutor’s office on behalf of Guantanamo
detainee Mohammed al-Qahtani and 11 Iraqis who had been held at Abu Ghraib.597 The
complaint targeted Rumsfeld, Tenet, and other current and former senior military officials,598
but also included current and former government attorneys Alberto Gonzales, William Haynes,
David Addington, John Yoo, and Jay Bybee.599 Like the earlier complaint, it alleged that the
defendants had committed war crimes by justifying, ordering, and implementing abusive
interrogation policies that resulted in torture of the 12 individuals.
593 CCR et al. v. Donald Rumsfeld et al., Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart, Case No. 5 Ws 109/05, Decision, September 13,
2005, http://www.ecchr.eu/de/unsere-themen/voelkerstraftaten-und-rechtliche-
verantwortung/usa/rumsfeld.html?file=tl_files/Dokumente/Universelle%2520Justiz/%2520Entscheidung_OLG_Stuttgart_Kl
ageerzwingungsverfahren.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015). See also Katherine Gallagher, “Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld
and Other High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture,” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7, no. 5
(2009): 1105-1106, http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/5/1087.full.pdf+html (accessed April 30, 2015).
594 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,
A/HRC/4/25/Add.1, April 5, 2007, pp. 96-98.

595 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
596 The complaint was filed by ECCHR executive director Wolfgang Kaleck when working for CCR, prior to ECCHR’s founding.
597 CCR, “German War Crimes Complaint against Donald Rumsfeld, et al.” undated, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-
cases/german-war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld-et-al (accessed March 30, 2015).

598 These officials included Under Sec. of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone; Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander
of Combined Joint Task Force Seven at Abu Ghraib; Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo;
Col. Thomas Pappas, commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib; Maj. Gen. Walter Wojdakowski,
deputy commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force Seven at Abu Ghraib; Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, senior intelligence
officer at Abu Ghraib; and Col. Marc Warren, staff judge advocate for Coalition Forces in Iraq.
599 CCR, “German War Crimes Complaint against Donald Rumsfeld, et al.”

The complaint documented how no meaningful investigations had taken place in the US or
Iraq and provided lengthy submissions. It was supported by numerous human rights and
civil society organizations, international legal scholars, and a former UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture. In addition, former Army Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, who had been a
defendant in the 2004 case in relation to her role as commander of the 800th Military
Police Brigade at Abu Ghraib, submitted written testimony in support and offered to
appear as a witness.600
On April 27, 2007, the federal prosecutor’s office again decided not to open an investigation.
This time the federal prosecutor focused less on the issue of subsidiarity and more on
whether there were sufficient links to Germany to merit an investigation. She concluded that
none of the suspects resided in Germany or could be expected to come there.
The prosecutor also concluded that any investigation was likely to be unsuccessful because
US authorities would not cooperate with the case.601 She said: “To resolve possible
accusations, investigation on the scene and in the United States of America would be
unavoidable. Because the German investigative authorities have no executive powers
abroad, this could only occur through legal assistance. But such requests are obviously
futile—especially if we consider the legal and security situation in Iraq.”602
The complainants filed a challenge with the court, asserting that an investigation could
take place even in the absence of the accused, but the petition for review was again
dismissed. The court held that, while the possibility of former US officials coming to
Germany could not be excluded, it was not a sufficient basis to compel an investigation.603
600 Testimony of Former US Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, Former Head of Abu Ghraib, for the German criminal procedure
against DOD Donald Rumsfeld and others, October 26, 2005,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/abu%20KarpinskiTestimony2006.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015).
601 “Kein Ermittlungsverfahren wegen der angezeigten Vorfälle in Abu Ghraib/Irak und in Guantánamo Bay/Kuba,” Federal
Prosecutor’s Office press release, April 27, 2007,

http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?themenid=9&newsid=273, English translation,
https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/americas/usa/USA-Guantanamo-Abu-Ghraib/GERMAN-
FEDERAL-PROSECUTOR-S-OFFICE (accessed June 10, 2015). Criminal Complaint against Donald Rumsfeld et al., Federal
Supreme Court of Kalrsruhe, Case No. 3 ARP 156/06-2, Decision, April 5, 2007,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/ProsecutorsDecision.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015).
602 Criminal Complaint against Donald Rumsfeld et al., Federal Supreme Court of Kalrsruhe, Case No. 3 ARP 156/06-2,
Decision, April 5, 2007, p. 7.

603 Derweesh et al. v. Donald Rumsfeld et al., Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart, Case No. 3 ARP 156/06-2, Decision, April 21,
2009, http://ccrjustice.org/files/Beschluss%20OLG%20Stuttgart.pdf (accessed March 23. 2015).
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2014 Complaint
On December 17, 2014, following the release of the Senate Summary, ECCHR filed a third
complaint against Rumsfeld, Tenet, and other “alleged perpetrators in senior positions
within the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the CIA and other
departments” with German federal prosecutors.604 Unlike the 2004 and 2006
complaints, this complaint has not been filed on behalf of specific victims. The
allegations are similar to those contained in the earlier complaints, namely that US
authorities conceived of and implemented a program of torture that was carried out by
CIA, military, and other US officials.605
The federal prosecutor’s office has not yet decided whether to open an investigation. Since
the 2004 and 2006 cases were dismissed, universal jurisdiction has gained growing
acceptance in Germany, as evidenced by the creation of a specialized war crimes unit in
2009 and the opening of broad preliminary investigations—known as “structural
investigations”—into grave crimes committed abroad, including in Libya and Syria, which
have little direct link to Germany.606 In addition, as discussed above, the federal
prosecutor’s office has changed its internal policy and now only exercises discretion where
a suspect is not ever likely to come to Germany and where no potential victims and
witnesses can be identified in the country.607 German officials told Human Rights Watch in
March 2014, prior to the filing of the most recent complaint, that the earlier Rumsfeld cases
might be decided differently now.608 Victims and witnesses to certain US abuses
committed in Iraq and Guantanamo are believed to be living in Germany. Federal
prosecutors should open a structural investigation and take steps to gather and preserve
evidence that could be used in later criminal proceedings in Germany or elsewhere.
604 “Criminal complaint against Bush era architects of torture,” ECCHR, http://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/international-
crimes-and-accountability/u-s-accountability/germany.html (accessed November 6, 2015).

605 Criminal Complaint by ECCHR against George Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld, et al., Karlsruhe Federal Court of Justice, December
17, 2014, (accessed November 6, 2015).

606 See also “DR Congo: German Court Convicts Two Rwandan Rebel Leaders,” Human Rights Watch news release,
September 28, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/28/dr-congo-german-court-convicts-two-rwandan-rebel-leaders.

In addition, for more information on “structural investigations” and the work of specialized war crimes units in Germany, see
Human Rights Watch, The Long Arm of Justice, pp. 52-55, 58-60.
607 Ibid., pp. 58-59. Human Rights Watch interview with German officials, March 18, 2014. See also “Zehn Jahre
Völkerstrafgesetzbuch,” German Parliament, November 7, 2012, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/113/1711339.pdf

(accessed April 30, 2015), question 11.
608 Human Rights Watch interview with German officials, March 18, 2014.

Khaled El-Masri Case
In June 2004, Munich state prosecutors opened a criminal investigation into allegations
that German national Khaled el-Masri had been a victim of the CIA rendition, detention,
and interrogation program. El-Masri’s case was one of the most documented unlawful
rendition and torture cases, and it was the first such case to be heard by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
In December 2003, Macedonian border guards arrested el-Masri while he was crossing by
bus into Macedonia from Serbia. He was detained in Macedonia for several weeks and
then turned over to CIA agents and flown to Afghanistan, where he was tortured for several
months. Eventually the CIA dropped him off in Albania without charging him with any crime
and he returned to Germany.609
In January 2007, Munich prosecutors issued arrest warrants for 13 CIA agents on charges of
wrongful imprisonment and causing serious bodily harm to el-Masri.610 The case was
initiated at the state level, rather than the federal level, because the allegations did not
include torture as a war crime.611 The case strained US-Germany relations, with prosecutors
citing lack of cooperation from US authorities.612 US diplomatic cables released by
WikiLeaks revealed that US authorities warned German officials that pursuing the arrest
warrants and extradition of those accused would “have a negative impact on our bilateral
relationship.”613 In the end, the German government never sought the suspects’
609 For more information, see European Court of Human Rights, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
(39630/09), Judgment of 13 December 2012, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-

115621. See also “Litigation: El-Masri v. Macedonia,” OSJI, last modified January 23, 2013,
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/litigation/el-masri-v-macedonia (accessed March 31, 2015).
610 “Germany issues arrest warrants for suspected CIA agents,” The Guardian, January 31, 2007,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/31/usa.germany (accessed March 23, 2015); Mark Landler, “German Court
Seeks Arrest of 13 C.I.A. Agents,” New York Times, January 31, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/31/world/europe/31cnd-germany.html?_r=0 (accessed April 20, 2015); “Germany Issues
Arrest Warrants for 13 CIA Agents in El-Masri Case,” Der Spiegel, January 31, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/el-
masri-kidnapping-case-germany-issues-arrest-warrants-for-13-cia-agents-in-el-masri-case-a-463385.html (accessed March
23, 2015).
611 Torture may be considered a constituent act of war crimes or crimes against humanity under German law but is not
defined as a separate crime. It can therefore only be prosecuted as an “ordinary” crime and falls within the jurisdiction of
state prosecutors. Human Rights Watch, The Legal Framework for Universal Jurisdiction in Germany, p. 1.
612 Craig Whitlock, “German Lawmakers Fault Abduction Probe,” Washington Post, October 4, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/03/AR2006100301449.html (accessed March 30, 2015).

613 US State Department cable, “Al-Masri Case – Chancellery Aware of USG Concerns,” February 6, 2007,
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BERLIN242_a.html (accessed April 30, 2015); Letta Taylor (Human Rights Watch),
“Time to Clean House on Torture,” commentary, The Guardian, December 3, 2010,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/03/time-clean-house-torture.
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extradition. While prosecutors have taken no further steps, the arrest warrants remain
outstanding, which means that the suspects could face arrest if they travel to Germany or
other European countries.614
On December 12, 2012, the ECtHR found that el-Masri had been tortured and held
Macedonia responsible for his torture and ill-treatment both within the country itself and
after his transfer to US authorities.
In December 2014, after the release of the Senate Summary, ECCHR wrote to the German
Minister of Justice to urge Germany to request the extradition of the 13 CIA agents and to
seek an apology and compensation for el-Masri from US authorities.615 In July 2015 ECCHR
filed a criminal complaint with the German federal prosecutor against Alfreda Bikowsky, a
CIA agent connected to el-Masri’s CIA rendition, torture, and continued detention months
after his mistaken identity had been realized.616 The complaint was connected to its
December 17, 2014 complaint against Tenet, Rumsfeld and others. In October it made
another submission in support of the complaint.617 Should the German federal prosecutor
not launch a criminal investigation, ECCHR plans to file a criminal complaint against
Bikowsky with the Munich state prosecutor that issued the arrest warrants for the 13 CIA
officials charged in el-Masri’s case.618
France
Victims and NGOs have filed criminal complaints in France in connection with alleged
torture and other abuses in Guantanamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Under French law, victims
and other affected parties, including nongovernmental organizations, can file a criminal
614 ECCHR, “Piecing together the puzzle: making US torturers in Europe accountable,” September 2014,
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-256-torture-schuller-fajana.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015).

615 “Germany must enforce criminal prosecution of CIA agents and demand an apology and compensation for CIA victim El
Masri,” ECCHR news release, December 15, 2014, http://www.ecchr.de/el_masri_case.html (accessed June 9, 2015). Amnesty
has supported ECCHR’s call to re-open the investigation into its own role in the CIA torture program. Amnesty International,
“Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence: USA’s European ‘Partners in Crime’ Must Act After Senate Torture Report,” January 2015,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/212000/eur010022015en.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015), p. 23.
616 Elisabeth Braw, “German human rights group files complaint against CIA ‘Queen of Torture,’” Al Jazeera America, October
19, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/19/in-germany-cia-official-charged-with-torture.html (accessed

November 6, 2015).
617 Ibid. See also “Criminal complaint
against Bush era architects of torture,” ECCHR,
http://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/international-crimes-and-accountability/u-s-accountability/germany.html (accessed
November 6, 2015).
618 Elizabeth Braw, “German human rights group files complaint against CIA ‘Queen of Torture,’” Al Jazeera.

complaint directly with investigative judges rather than passing through prosecutors to
ensure that a judicial investigation is opened.619 An investigation remains pending in one
case, but prosecutors declined to open an investigation against former Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld on the grounds that he had immunity.
Guantanamo Detainees Case

In November 2002, the parents of two French citizens who were detained at Guantanamo,
Nizar Sassi and Mourad Benchellali, filed a criminal complaint before French courts
alleging unlawful detention by US officials.620 A judge in Lyon declined to investigate,
which was upheld by an appeals court. In January 2005, however, France’s highest court
reversed the decision, and an investigation was opened in June 2005.621
In June 2006, a third French citizen, Khaled Ben Mustapha, who had also been held at
Guantanamo, joined the case, alleging that he had been a victim of kidnapping and torture
by US officials.622 In January 2012, the investigative judge submitted a formal request to US
authorities for access to the Guantanamo Bay detention center, all documents relevant to
the detention of the three French citizens, and the names of anyone who had contact with
them during their detention.623 The US never responded to the request.624
In February 2014, the former detainees’ lawyer filed an expert report aimed at establishing
the criminal responsibility of former Guantanamo commander Geoffrey Miller and
619 For more information, see Human Rights Watch, The Legal Framework for Universal Jurisdiction in France, September
2014, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/IJ0914France_3.pdf, pp. 4-6.

620 Thecomplaint did not name specific defendants, which is permitted under French law. “La plainte des familles de
Mourad Benchellali et Nizar Sassi doit être à nouveau examinée,” mLyon, January 4, 2005,
http://www.mlyon.fr/19116-la-plainte-des-familles-de-mourad-benchellali-et-nizar-sassi-doit-etre-a-nouveau-
examinee.html (accessed April 21, 2015).
621 European Court of Human Rights, Sassi and Benchellali v. France, (21015/05), Judgment of 27 September 2005, available
at http://jurisprudence.cedh.globe24h.com/0/0/france/2007/09/27/sassi-et-benchellali-c-france-82780-21015-05.shtml;
Letter from Patrick Baudouin, lawyer for the complainants and Honorary President of FIDH, to Jean-Claude Marin, Public
Prosecutor, Office of the Prosecutor of the Paris Court of Appeal, October 25, 2007,
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/plainteFINALE25oct07.pdf (accessed April 21, 2015), pp. 11-12.
622 As authorized under French law, Khaled Ben Mustapha’s complaint also did not name specific defendants. “Plainte d’un
ancien détenu français de Guantanamo pour enlèvement et torture,” NewsML, June 23, 2006,
http://newsml.cwi.nl/internal/data/NewsFeed_FR-2006/06/23/afp.com-20060623T163612Z-TX-SGE-JWM75.xml (accessed
April 21, 2015).
623 “French Court Investigating U.S. Torture: Summon Former Gitmo Commander,” CCR press release, April 2, 2015,
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/french-court-investigating-u.s.-torture%3A-summons-former-gitmo-
commander (accessed April 21, 2015).
624 Ibid.; ECCHR, “Piecing together the puzzle: making US torturers in Europe accountable,” September 2014.
NO MORE EXCUSES 126

requested that Miller be subpoenaed to testify.625 In April 2014, the investigative judges
declined the request on the grounds that US authorities would not cooperate or make
Miller available for questioning. The former detainees appealed this decision.626 On April
2, the appeals court reversed the decision and ordered the lower court to summon Miller to
explain his role in the alleged abuse of the former detainees.627
Rumsfeld Case
In late October 2007, on the eve of a visit by Donald Rumsfeld to Paris for an event on
foreign policy, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), ECCHR, CCR, and the
French League for Human Rights filed a complaint with French prosecutors alleging that
Rumsfeld bears criminal responsibility for torture and other ill-treatment committed in US-
run detention facilities in Guantanamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.628 Former Army Brigadier
General Janis Karpinski submitted written testimony in support of the complaint as she
had in Germany a year earlier.629 Rumsfeld traveled to Paris as planned and faced no
judicial consequences.630
The following month, the Paris district prosecutor formally dismissed the complaint
without addressing the merits. Relying on an opinion from the foreign ministry, he
concluded that Rumsfeld had immunity from prosecution based on his former position as
US defense secretary.631 The NGOs urged the general prosecutor to reconsider this
625 CCR and ECCHR, Joint Expert Opinion before the Appeals Court in Paris (Tribunal de Grande Instance, Cour d’Appel de
Paris), Case No. 2275/05/10, February 26, 2014, http://ccrjustice.org/files/MILLER-DOSSIER-FINAL_en_20140226_public.pdf

(accessed March 23, 2015).
626 “Rights Groups Urge French Appeals Court to Subpoena Former Guantánamo Commander in Torture Investigation,” CCR
press release, March 5, 2015, http://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/rights-groups-urge-french-appeals-

court-subpoena-former-guant-namo (accessed June 10, 2015).
627 “French Court Investigating U.S. Torture: Summon Former Gitmo Commander,” CCR press release.
628 Letter from Patrick Baudouin, lawyer for the complainants and Honorary President of FIDH, to Jean-Claude Marin, Public
Prosecutor, Office of the Prosecutor of the Paris Court of Appeal, October 25, 2007. For a summary of the case, see CCR,
“French War Crimes Complaint against Donald Rumsfeld, et al.” undated, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-
cases/french-war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld (accessed March 23, 2015).
629 Testimony of Former US Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, Former Head of Abu Ghraib, for the French criminal procedure
against former American Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, October 24, 2007, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/doc_20_-
_Karpinski_Testimony.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015).
630 “Visite mouvementée de Donald Rumsfeld à Paris,” Courrier International, October 26, 2007,
http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2007/10/26/visite-mouvementee-de-donald-rumsfeld-a-paris (accessed June 15, 2015).

631 Letter from Jean-Claude Marin, Public Prosecutor, Office of the Prosecutor of the Paris Court of Appeal, to Patrick
Baudouin, lawyer for the complainants and Honorary President of FIDH, November 16, 2007,
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/reponseproc23nov07.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015).

decision, but in February 2008 he confirmed the granting of immunity on the grounds that
the alleged conduct could not “be dissociated” from Rumsfeld’s official function.632
The prosecutors’ decisions rested on an interpretation of the International Court of

Justice’s (ICJ) decision in the Arrest Warrant (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium)
case and another decision by France’s highest court.633 The ICJ ruled that certain foreign
government officials are entitled to temporary immunity from prosecution by foreign
states, even with regards to grave international crimes. Many advocates, including Human
Rights Watch, interpret the judgment not to bar later prosecutions for grave international
crimes, however. In addition, the prosecutors’ decisions to grant Rumsfeld immunity
ignore contrary international precedent, including the Nuremberg and Pinochet cases,
which have held that torture and war crimes cannot be legitimate functions of a
government official, and numerous international tribunal statutes, which unequivocally
state that official capacity does not exempt a person from criminal responsibility for grave
international crimes.634
632 Letter from Patrick Baudouin, lawyer for the complainants and Honorary President of FIDH, to Jean-Claude Marin, Public
Prosecutor, Office of the Prosecutor of the Paris Court of Appeal, November 23, 2007,
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/courrier_REPONSE_FIDH-LDH-CCR-ECCHR-JCMARIN-23nov07.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015);
Letter from Jean-Claude Marin, Public Prosecutor, Office of the Prosecutor of the Paris Court of Appeal, to Patrick Baudouin,
lawyer for the complainants and Honorary President of FIDH, February 27, 2008,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Rumsfeld_FrenchCase_%20Prosecutors%20Decision_02_08.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015).
633 The Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, International Court of Justice, Judgment, February 14, 2002,
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=121&p3=4 (accessed March 23, 2015); In the Appeal of the
Prosecutor General, Supreme Court of France, Criminal Chamber, Case No. 00-87.215, Judgment, March 13, 2001,
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007070643 (accessed March 23, 2015). See also
“A retrograde decision and a dangerous precedent!” FIDH news release, March 14, 2001,
https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middle-east/libya/A-retrograde-decision-
and-a (accessed March 23, 2015).
634 The United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, IV, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control
Council Law No. 10 (“Nuremberg Judgment”), 1950, p. 411; R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet, House of Lords, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, March 24, 1999,
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/17.html (accessed March 30, 2015). See also Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002; Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY Statute), adopted by Security Council May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute), adopted by Security Council November 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955;
Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), August 8, 1945, http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b39614 (accessed May 25, 2015).
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Spain
Spanish judicial authorities have opened three cases into alleged torture and other serious
abuses, but all three have either been stayed or dismissed (appeals are pending in all
three cases). US authorities vigorously opposed the cases.635 US diplomatic cables in 2009
suggest that US embassy officials, joined by some members of Congress, tried to influence
the Spanish judicial process in order to obtain the dismissal of the cases, and that
Spanish officials bowed to pressure by US officials.
“The Bush Six”

In March 2009, the Association for the Dignity of Spanish Prisoners filed a criminal
complaint against six former Bush administration lawyers, including Alberto Gonzales,
David Addington, William Haynes, John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and Douglas Feith. The complaint
alleged that the US government committed torture and war crimes against several former
Guantanamo detainees, including five individuals who were either Spanish citizens or
residents of Spain,636 as a result of the legal advice provided by the six defendants.637
Investigative judge Baltasar Garzón, who issued the historic arrest warrant against
Pinochet in 1998, found the case admissible. However, following opposition from Spain’s
Attorney General, Garzón submitted the case for reassignment to another judge.638
Since Spanish courts have subsidiary jurisdiction (meaning they can only hear cases in
which the courts of the country where the crimes occurred have not initiated criminal
proceedings), the new investigative judge sent a formal request to US authorities in May
2009 asking for confirmation of whether an investigation into the allegations was being
635 Giles Tremlett, “Wikileaks: US pressured Spain over CIA rendition and Guantánamo torture,” The Guardian, December 1,
2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-us-spain-guantanamo-rendition (accessed June 3, 2015).

636 The Spanish detainees represented by the Association for the Dignity of Spanish Prisoners included Hamed
Abderrahman Ahmed, Reswad Abdulsam, Lahcen Ikassrien, Jamiel Abdul Latif al Banna, and Omar Deghayes.
637 Criminal Complaint by CCR against Alberto Gonzales, David Addington, William Haynes, John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and Douglas
Feith, Madrid National Court, March 17, 2009,
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Bush%20Six_complaint_spanish_0.pdf (accessed May 25, 2015); Human
Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment of Detainees, July 2011,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover_1.pdf, pp. 100-101; Gallagher, “Efforts to Hold Donald
Rumsfeld and Other High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture”; Julian Borger and Dale Fuchs, “Spanish
Judge to Hear Torture Case against Six Bush Officials,” The Guardian, March 29, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/29/guantanamo-bay-torture-inquiry (accessed April 28, 2015).
638 US State Department cable, “Garzon opens second investigation into alleged US Torture of Terrorism Detainees,” May 5, 2009.

conducted.639 After the judge set a deadline for the US to respond,640 US authorities
finally answered on March 1, 2011, asserting that they had completed several
prosecutions and that Assistant US Attorney John Durham was continuing his
investigation into alleged detainee abuse. The US also claimed that there was no basis
for prosecuting Yoo or Bybee as they had already been investigated and cleared of
responsibility by an ethics body.641 The Spanish judge stayed proceedings and sent the
case to the US Department of Justice for further action asking only that the US inform it,
at the relevant time, of the measures it ultimately may adopt as a result of the case’s
transfer.642 The Association for the Dignity of Spanish Prisoners, joined by two
additional NGOs, challenged the decision but both the appeals court and the Supreme
Court denied the appeal.643 In March 2013, the Association filed a petition for review
with the Spanish Constitutional Court, which remains pending.644
Guantanamo Detainees Case

In April 2009, just weeks after the “Bush Six” complaint had been filed, Judge Garzón
opened a preliminary investigation into related allegations concerning Guantanamo.
The investigation named no specific defendants, but focused on allegations put forward
by four of the former Guantanamo detainees named in the “Bush Six” case: Hamed
Abderrahman Ahmed, Lahcen Ikassrien, Jamiel Abdul Latif al Banna, and Omar
639 Central Court for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number Six, Madrid National Court, Case No. 134/2009,
Decision (Preliminary Investigation), May 4, 2009, unofficial English translation,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Bush%20Six%20Order%20Rogatory%20Letter%20English%20(2).pdf (accessed March 30,
2015).
640 Central Court for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number Six, Madrid National Court, Case No. 134/2009, Judicial Order
(Preliminary Investigation), January 28, 2011, unofficial English translation,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/28%20January%202011%20Order%20English.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
641 Central Court Number Six for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings, Madrid National Court, Case No. 134/2009, US
Department of Justice Response (Preliminary Investigation), March 1, 2011,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/US%20Letters%20Rogatory%20Response%20March%201,%202011%20-%20ENG.pdf (accessed
March 30, 2015).
642 Central Court for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number Six, Madrid National Court, Case No. 134/2009, Judicial Order
(Preliminary Investigation), April 13, 2011, unofficial English translation,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/13%20April%202011%20Order%20ENG.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
643 Spanish Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Chamber, Case No. 1916/2012, Decision, December 20, 2012, unofficial
English translation, http://ccrjustice.org/files/2012-12-

20%20Spanish%20National%20Court%20Decision%20Final%20English.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
644 Petition to the Spanish Constitutional Court, March 22, 2013, unofficial English translation, http://ccrjustice.org/files/2013-
03-22%20ENG%20Application%20for%20amparo%20[2][1][971][0978.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
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Deghayes.645 The Human Rights Association of Spain (APDHE) is a civil party in the
case.646
In May 2009, Judge Garzón issued formal requests to US and UK authorities to determine
whether any investigations were pending with respect to the four individuals.647 Neither
country responded.648
Meanwhile, in October 2009, Spain’s Parliament amended its laws to restrict jurisdiction
to cases with a demonstrated link to Spain. Consequently, cases would only be admissible
where the victim is a Spanish national, the suspect is present in Spain, or some other
legitimizing link to the country exists.649 The change in law did not mean an end to the
Guantanamo investigation, however, as one of the victims was a Spanish citizen, another
was a Spanish resident, and Spain had previously requested the extradition of all four in
connection with an unrelated criminal case.650 Even without these links, Judge Garzón
found that jurisdiction would have existed because of Spain’s international obligations to
investigate and prosecute both torture and war crimes.651
645 The investigation targeted those who “approved [the] systematic plan of torture and ill-treatment.” Central Court for
Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number Five, Madrid National Court, Case No. 150/2009, Judicial Order (Preliminary
Investigation), April 27, 2009, unofficial English translation,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Unofficial%20Translation%20of%20the%20Spanish%20Decision%2004-27-2009_0.pdf
(accessed March 30, 2015).
646 Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de España (APDHE), “Qué Hacemos,” undated, http://www.apdhe.org/tras-la-
reforma-de-la-justicia-universal-el-juzgado-central-de-instruccion-no-5-de-la-audiencia-nacional-decide-proseguir-con-la-
investigacion-del-caso-de-genocidio-en-el-sahara-occidental-y-del-cas/ (accessed August 18, 2015).
647 Central Court for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number Five, Madrid National Court, Case No. 150/2009, Decision
(Preliminary Investigation), May 26, 2009, unofficial English translation,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/May%202009%20Letter%20Rogatory%20English.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
648“Spanish Investigations into the United States Torture Program,” European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights,
http://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/international-crimes-and-accountability/u-s-accountability/spain.html (accessed August

16, 2015).
649 Spanish courts also have jurisdiction where the defendant is a Spanish national. Permanent Mission of Spain to the
United Nations, declaration pursuant to para. 3 of General Assembly Resolution 67/98 of 14 December 2012, “The scope and
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction,” No. 094 FP, April 29, 2013,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/68/UnivJur/Spain_E.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
650 The four former Guantanamo detainees had all been criminally charged in Spain but were acquitted at trial, at least in
part due to the use of torture and other forms of serious abuse to which they had been subjected at Guantanamo. For more
information, see CCR, “The Spanish Investigation into U.S. Torture,” undated, http://ccrjustice.org/spain-us-torture-case
(accessed March 30, 2015); “Spanish Investigations into the United States Torture Program,” ECCHR, last modified June 25,
2013, http://www.ecchr.de/spain-600.html (accessed March 30, 2015).
(Preliminary Investigation), January 27, 2010, unofficial English translation,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/National%20Court%20Madrid%20Decision%201.27.10_English_0.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).

The public prosecutor appealed Garzón’s decision to proceed with the investigation, but
the Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber rejected the appeal.652 In May 2010, the case was
reassigned following Garzón’s suspension from his judicial function for having tried to
investigate Franco-era abuses.653
In January 2011, CCR and ECCHR, both of whom later joined the case as formal parties,654
requested that former Guantanamo commander Geoffrey Miller be subpoenaed to explain
his role in the alleged torture of the detainees.655 A year later, with still no response from
US or UK authorities, the new judge on the case issued a ruling reaffirming the court’s
jurisdiction over the case without deciding on the subpoena request.656
In March 2014, Spain’s Parliament again amended its law to restrict jurisdiction following a
diplomatic row with China.657 The new law introduced an extensive set of requirements
related to the nationality of the suspect and victims and the suspect’s status in the
country, placing Spain in breach of its international legal obligations to extradite or
prosecute certain offenses like torture and war crimes.658 Despite this change, the judge
presiding over the Guantanamo case ruled, in April 2014, that the investigation should
652 Spanish Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Chamber, Case No. 66/2010, Decision, April 6, 2011, unofficial English
translation, http://ccrjustice.org/files/Resolution%20High%20Court-%2017%20May%202011%20-ENG.pdf (accessed

March 30, 2015).
653 Garzón faced criminal charges for investigating cases of illegal detention and enforced disappearances committed during
the Spanish Civil War, despite Spain's 1977 amnesty law. For more information on the case, see “Spain: Garzón Trial
Threatens Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch news release, January 13, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/13/spain-garz-n-trial-threatens-human-rights.
654 The court admitted CCR and ECCHR to represent two of the former detainees on January 10, 2013. Central Court for
Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number Five, Madrid National Court, Case No. 150/2009, Decision (Preliminary
Investigation), January 10, 2013, unofficial English translation, http://ccrjustice.org/files/2013-01-
10%20Order%20re%20CCR%20and%20ECCHR.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
655 Criminal Complaint by CCR and ECCHR against Geoffrey Miller, Central Court for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number
Five, Madrid National Court, Case No. 150/2009, Criminal Complaint, January 4, 2011, unofficial English translation,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/FINAL%20Spanish%20Miller%20Submission.pdf (accessed June 9, 2015).
(Preliminary Investigation), January 13, 2012, unofficial English translation, http://ccrjustice.org/files/2012-01-

13%20AUTO%20GUANTANAMO%20(Eng).pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
657 Human Rights Watch, “UN Universal Periodic Review submission: Spain,” May 2014, http://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/document/spain/session_21_-_january_2015/hrw_-_human_rights_watch.pdf; Jim Yardley,

“Spain Seeks to Curb Law Allowing Judges to Pursue Cases Globally,” New York Times, February 10, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/world/europe/spanish-legislators-seek-new-limits-on-universal-jurisdiction-
law.html?_r=0 (accessed March 30, 2015).
658 Human Rights Watch, “UN Universal Periodic Review submission: Spain.”
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proceed in light of Spain’s obligations under the Convention against Torture and the
Geneva Conventions.659 Spain’s National Court upheld this decision in November 2014.660
However, in May 2015, in a case against Chinese officials involving abuses in Tibet,
Spain’s Supreme Court issued a new decision interpreting in a more restrictive manner the
legislative changes on universal jurisdiction.661 Citing that ruling, on July 17, 2015, Spain’s
National Court dismissed the entire Guantanamo case.662 The complainants have lodged
an appeal against the decision.663
CIA Flight Investigations

Spanish authorities launched a civil investigation in November 2005 into claims that CIA
planes carrying detainees had made secret stopovers on Spanish soil, but concluded that the
flights were legal.664 Around the same time, a judge in Mallorca, where US planes are alleged
to have landed, opened a criminal investigation. In light of the torture allegations, he deferred
the case to the National Court. In June 2006, Judge Ismael Moreno of the National Court
opened a criminal investigation targeting the 13 US officials who were on board the flight that
rendered Khaled el-Masri, which allegedly stopped in Spain before continuing on to
Macedonia to abduct el-Masri.665 A group of Spanish lawyers and other professionals from
(Preliminary Investigations), April 15, 2014, unofficial English translation,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/15April2014_No.5_Decision_Ordering_case_to_proceed_ENG.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
660 “El juez Ruz logra respaldo para investigar las torturas de Guantánamo,” El País, November 13, 2014,
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/11/13/actualidad/1415882427_280141.html (accessed June 9, 2015).

661 Spanish Supreme Court, 2nd Chamber in Criminal Matters, Ruling No. 296/2015, May 6, 2015,
http://supremo.vlex.es/vid/571092402 (accessed August 20, 2015).

662 Central Court for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings Number Five, Madrid National Court, July 17, 2015, unofficial English
translation, http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/2015-07-17_UJSpain_NationalCourtDecision2_eng.pdf
663 “Former Detainees and Human Rights Groups Appeal Spain’s Decision to Discontinue Guantánamo Investigation,” Center
for Constitutional Rights, July 23, 2015, http://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/former-detainees-and-

human-rights-groups-appeal-spain-s-decision (accessed August 16, 2015).
664 “Spain probes ‘secret CIA flights,’” BBC News, November 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4439036.stm
(accessed June 3, 2015); “Spain court launches investigation into CIA rendition flights,” Jurist, June 12, 2006,
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2006/06/spain-court-launches-investigation.php (accessed June 3, 2015).
665 The opening of the investigation happened just days after a Council of Europe report named Spain as one of a number of
countries through which CIA flights transited. “Spain court launches investigation into CIA rendition flights,” Jurist; “Spain
doesn’t object to secret flights,” El País, December 3, 2010,
http://elpais.com/m/elpais/2010/12/03/inenglish/1291357242_850210.html (accessed June 3, 2015).

Mallorca and the APDHE are civil parties in the case.666 Later that year, media reports revealed
that additional US planes had made stopovers elsewhere in Spain.667
The most challenging aspect of the case proved to be determining the identity of the US
officials on the flight. A Spanish national police investigation identified a list of 13
suspects and, in May 2010, led to the issuance of arrest warrants for these individuals on
charges of using false documents to enter the country.668 Judge Moreno continued his
efforts to confirm the suspects’ identities, including by sending judicial cooperation
requests to German and UK authorities in October 2012.669
Judge Moreno later broadened the investigation to address whether four senior Spanish
officials should also be held criminally responsible for authorizing US stopover flights
in the country.670 In November 2013, despite opposition from civil parties, prosecutors
requested dismissal of both investigations.671 Judge Moreno dismissed the investigation
into the Spanish officials, and stayed the investigation into the CIA officials in
September 2014. An appeals court upheld his ruling in November 2014 on the grounds
that the allegations against the Spanish officials were insufficient to establish that they
knew that the CIA detainees were being abused, and that Spanish authorities had—at
666 “Spain doesn’t object to secret flights,” El País; APDHE, “Qué Hacemos,” http://www.apdhe.org/tras-la-reforma-de-la-
justicia-universal-el-juzgado-central-de-instruccion-no-5-de-la-audiencia-nacional-decide-proseguir-con-la-investigacion-
del-caso-de-genocidio-en-el-sahara-occidental-y-del-cas/.
667 “Spain doesn’t object to secret flights,” El País.
668 Prosecutors, who had requested the issuance of arrest warrants, asserted that the UK-based NGO Reprieve was in
possession of the names of the 13 CIA agents. Jeff Stein, “Spanish prosecutors want 13 CIA agents arrested,” Washington
Post, May 12, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/05/spanish_prosecutors_want_13_ci.html (accessed
June 8, 2015); “Spain doesn’t object to secret flights,” El País.
669 These officials included Miguel Nadal, then-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Miguel Aguirre de Cárcer, then-Director
General of Foreign Policy for North America in the Foreign Affairs Ministry; Javier Jiménez-Ugarte, former Secretary General for
Defense Policy in the same ministry; and Ramón Gil-Casares, former cabinet director of foreign policy for the prime minister.
The cooperation requests appear to have been directed at asking foreign judicial authorities to share information and
interview persons who might know the identity of the US officials under investigation. US officials later described this
collaboration between Spanish and German judicial authorities as particularly worrisome because it “complicate[s] our [US]
efforts to manage this case at a discreet government-to-government level.” Giles Tremlett, “Wikileaks: US pressured Spain
over CIA rendition and Guantánamo torture,” The Guardian, December 1, 2010.
670 José María Irujo, “Solicitada la imputación de cuatro españoles por los vuelos de la CIA,” El País, November 6, 2013,

671 Prosecutors based their request on the grounds that the court had been unable to confirm the true identity of the 13 CIA
agents. Ibid.
NO MORE EXCUSES 134

least for now—exhausted all leads and been unable to conclusively identify the CIA
agents involved.672 The civil parties have appealed the case to the Supreme Court.673
Switzerland
In February 2011, CCR and ECCHR prepared criminal complaints against former President
Bush on behalf of two persons who had allegedly been tortured during their detention at
Guantanamo Bay. However, the complaints were never filed as Bush cancelled his trip
to Geneva.674
Canada
In September 2011, CCR and the Canadian Center for International Justice (CCIJ) called on
the Canadian minister of justice and attorney general to open a criminal investigation
against former President Bush for his alleged role in authorizing and overseeing the
“administration’s well-documented torture program.”675 Bush was expected to go to
Canada the following month to attend an economic summit.676 A week before Bush’s
planned visit, the NGOs publicly expressed their intention to assist torture survivors in
672 Spain Court of Appeals, Case No. 346/2014, Decision, November 17, 2014,
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/doAction?action=contentpdf&databasematch=AN&reference=7354188&links=%22336
/2014%22&optimize=20150422&publicinterface=true (accessed June 9, 2015). See also M.F., “El juez archiva la
investigación de un vuelo de la CIA que hizo escala en Palma,” El País, September 8, 2014,
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/09/08/actualidad/1410185663_522922.html (accessed June 8, 2015); Fernando J.
Pérez, “La Audiencia Nacional da carpetazo a la investigación de los vuelos de la CIA,” El País, January 12, 2015,
673 Mateo Balin, “Los querellantes piden al Supremo reabrir la causa de los ‘vuelos de la CIA,’” La Rioja, February 20, 2015
http://www.larioja.com/nacional/201502/20/querellantes-piden-supremo-reabrir-20150220005656-v.html (accessed June

8, 2015).
674 Swiss law requires the presence of the suspect before a criminal investigation can be opened. Swiss Criminal Code of
December 1937, art. 6, http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015). Draft complaint against
George W. Bush prepared by CCR and ECCHR, undated,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/FINAL%207%20Feb%20BUSH%20INDICTMENT.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015). See also Ewen
MacAskill, “George Bush calls off trip to Switzerland,” The Guardian, February 6, 2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/feb/06/george-bush-trip-to-switzerland (accessed April 30, 2015).
675 Letter from CCR and the Canadian Centre for International Justice (CCIJ) to Robert Douglas Nicholson, Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada, September 29, 2011,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/2011.09.29%20Cover%20Letter%20to%20Canadian%20Minister%20of%20Justice.pdf (accessed
March 30, 2015); Draft indictment against George W. Bush pursuant to the Canadian Criminal Code and the Convention
against Torture, prepared by CCR and CCIJ, September 29, 2011,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/2011.09.29%20Bush%20Canada%20Indictment.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
676 “Canada: Don’t Let Bush Get Away With Torture,” Human Rights Watch news release, October 12, 2011,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/12/canada-don-t-let-bush-get-away-torture.

filing a formal criminal complaint if the minister failed to initiate an investigation.677 On
October 20, 2011, the day of his expected arrival, CCIJ lodged a criminal complaint against
Bush with the Surrey provisional court in British Columbia, where the summit was to be
held.678 Within hours, the prosecutor stayed the proceedings.679 Bush attended the summit
and no further steps were taken in the case.680
In April 2012, CCR and CCIJ reported the incident to the UN Committee against Torture.681
The committee urged Canada to take steps to exercise universal jurisdiction over persons
alleged to be responsible for torture but did not mention the Bush visit.682
In November 2012, the same two NGOs—acting on behalf of four persons alleged to
have been victims of torture at US-run military facilities in Afghanistan and Guantanamo
Bay—filed an individual complaint with the UN Committee against Torture, arguing that
Canada had violated its international obligations by failing to arrest Bush.683 In
response, Canada asserted that it had insufficient evidence in its possession at the
time to justify charging Bush and that it did not expect to receive assistance from US
authorities.684 Both parties have submitted additional responses to the committee. One
was a letter from the NGOs alerting the committee to Bush’s planned visit to Toronto in
677 Letter from CCR and CCIJ to Robert Douglas Nicholson, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, October 14,
2011, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR%20CCIJ%20Follow%20up%20Letter%20s.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).

678 In Canada, such a complaint is known as an “information.” See Submission by Mathew J. Eisenbrandt, Legal Director of
CCIJ, October 20, 2011, http://ccrjustice.org/files/2011-10-20%20Court%20Information%20AS%20FILED.pdf (accessed

March 30, 2015).
679 Court order of stay of proceedings, October 20, 2011, http://ccrjustice.org/files/2011-10-
20%20Court%20Stay%20of%20proceedings.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015); Letter from Andrew MacDonald, Deputy
Regional Crown Counsel, to Matthew Eisenbrandt, Legal Director of CCIJ, October 24, 2011, http://ccrjustice.org/files/2011-
10-24%20Letter%20from%20Attorney%20General%20Staying%20the%20Case.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
680 “George W. Bush draws protesters at B.C. appearance,” CBC News, October 20, 2011,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/george-w-bush-draws-protesters-at-b-c-appearance-1.1097491
681 CCR and CCIJ, “Submission of the Center for Constitutional Rights and the Canadian Centre for International Justice to the
Committee against Torture on the Examination of the Sixth Periodic Report of Canada: The Case of George W. Bush and
Canada’s Violation of Its Obligations under the Convention Against Torture,” undated, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR-
CCIJ%20CAT%20CANADA%20Report%20re%20Bush.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
682 UN Committee against Torture, “Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention,
Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, Canada,” CAT/C/CAN/CO/6, June 25, 2012,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/CAT.C.CAN.CO.6.doc (accessed March 30, 2015).
683 Hassan bin Attash, Sami el-Haji, Muhammed Khan Tumani and Murat Kurnaz v. Canada, Complaint to the UN Committee
against Torture, November 14, 2012, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CAT%20Canada%20Petition%20.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
684 Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Submission of Canada regarding the admissibility and merits of the
communication to the UN Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 536/2013, October 7, 2013
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Canada%20Response%20to%20CAT.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015).
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May 2014.685 However, no action was taken during Bush’s visit and the committee has
not yet issued findings in the case.686
Investigations Focused on European Complicity
Poland
In March 2008, the district prosecutor’s office in Warsaw opened a criminal investigation
into CIA-related abuses committed on Polish territory, although the scope of the
investigation has never been disclosed.687 The investigation appears to be limited to Polish
involvement.688 The investigation has languished for years, partly due to unexplained
changes in staffing, the transfer of cases from Warsaw to another city, claims of
inadequate cooperation from US authorities, and invocation of the “state secrets”
doctrine.689 In September 2015 the Polish prosecutor announced that the US rejected four
further requests for documents and information, including requests for statements from
witnesses still in US custody in Guantanamo.690
Three men who are held at Guantanamo Bay—Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Zayn al-Abidin
Muhammed Husayn (Abu Zubaydah), and Walid bin Attash—have been granted formal
685 Letter from CCR and CCIJ to the UN Committee against Torture, May 8, 2014,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/FINAL%20submission%20to%20CAT%20Canada%20May%202014%20a.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015).

686 CCIJ, “George W. Bush and the “War on Terror,” undated, http://www.ccij.ca/cases/george-w-bush/ (accessed August
19, 2015).
687 In September 2012, the European Parliament “deplore[d] the lack of official communication on the scope, conduct and
state of play of the investigation [and] call[ed] on the Polish authorities to conduct a rigorous inquiry with due transparency,
allowing for the effective participation of victims and their lawyers.” European Parliament Resolution of 11 September 2012
on alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in European countries: follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP
Committee report, (2012/2033/ (INI)). See also European Parliament Resolution of 10 October 2013 on alleged transportation
and illegal detention of prisoners in European countries by the CIA, (2013/2702 (RSP)); UN Joint Study on Secret Detention,
para. 118; UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Poland,” U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/POL/CO/6/ (2010), October 27, 2010, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/poland2010.html
(accessed June 5, 2015).
688 The investigation appears to be aimed only at Polish officials’ potential involvement in CIA-related abuses. Christian
Lowe and Pawel Sobczak, “After U.S. torture report, Poland asks what its leaders knew,” Reuters, December 12, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/12/us-usa-cia-torture-poland-insight-idUSKBN0JQ1QQ20141212 (accessed
April 30, 2015).
689 Some have suggested that Polish authorities have prevented the investigation from moving forward. Amnesty
International, “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence,” p. 10; OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary
Rendition,” pp. 99-102.
690 “US refuses more requests from Poland for assistance in CIA secret prisons probe,” Associated Press, September 22,
2015, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/09/22/us-refuses-more-requests-from-poland-for-assistance-in-cia-secret-prisons-
probe/ (accessed October 26, 2015).

victim status in the case.691 Fellow Guantanamo detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi also sought
victim status but was turned down.692 Bin Attash and al-Hawsawi currently face charges
before a US military commission for their alleged involvement in planning the September
11, 2001 attacks, and al-Nashiri faces charges for his alleged involvement in planning an
attack against the USS Cole—a US Navy warship docked in a Yemen harbor in October
2000. Abu Zubaydah does not face any charges.
In March 2012, a confidential source reported to the media that former Polish intelligence
chief Zbigniew Siemiątkowski had been charged in the case. Siemiątkowski acknowledged
being questioned, but the prosecutor’s office refused to confirm whether he faces
charges.693 In early February 2013, the Polish minister of justice made a statement
suggesting that the decision to charge Siemiątkowski had been made “hastily,” adding
that the case “needs [to] be addressed with extreme restraint.”694 After human rights
groups expressed concern over the statement—in particular whether it revealed a lack of
prosecutorial independence—the prosecutor general stated that there had been “no
official confirmation that they [prosecutors] had charged anybody.”695 Less than two weeks
later, a Polish newspaper reported that the charges against Siemiątkowski would soon be
dropped.696 The prosecutor’s office confirmed that an investigation was underway but
would not indicate whether it was looking into Siemiątkowski’s role.697
691 According to an interview that Janusz Śliwa, deputy prosecutor in Krakow, gave Amnesty International, the granting of
“injured person,” or victim, status in criminal proceedings means that there is a “likelihood” that a person has suffered a
crime in Poland. Amnesty International, Unlock the Truth: Poland’s Involvement in CIA Secret Detention, June 2013,
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/2013_unlock_the_truth_-
_polands_involvement_in_cia_secret_detention.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015), p. 16.
692 The prosecutor rejected the application for victim status in March 2014. Al-Hawsawi appealed the decision, but the
prosecutor again declined the request in December 2014. Amnesty International, “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence,” p 10.
The Redress website says Polish law prevents them from disclosing the grounds for the decision. See Redress, “Mustafa al-
Hawsawi,” undated, http://www.redress.org/case-docket/al-hawsawi-case-1.
693 Amnesty International, Unlock the Truth, p. 16.
694 Ibid., pp. 17-18; Interview with Jarosław Gowin (“Rozmowa dnia: Jarosław Gowin”), Polish Radio 1 (“Polskie Radio”),
February 5, 2013 (accessed April 29, 2015).

695 Amnesty International, Unlock the Truth, p. 18; Ewe Siedlecka, “Seremet: Let’s not confuse life with film” (“Seremet: Nie
mylmy życia z filmem”), Gazeta Wyborcza, April 28, 2013,

http://wyborcza.pl/1,76498,13812229,Seremet__Nie_mylmy_zycia_z_filmem.html#ixzz2RqYAF4Do
(accessed April 29, 2015).
696 Amnesty International, Unlock the Truth, p. 18; “Polish Prosecutors to Drop Charges in CIA Jail Inquiry-Report,” Reuters,
February 19, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/19/us-poland-cia-siematkowski-idUSBRE91I0MT20130219

(accessed April 29, 2015).
697 “Polish Prosecutors to Drop Charges in CIA Jail Inquiry-Report,” Reuters.
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Al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah have both brought Poland before the ECtHR for its failure to
investigate the abuses committed against them during their time in US custody. In July
2014, the ECtHR ruled that Poland had authorized a CIA black site to be used on its soil
and that Polish authorities bore responsibility for the two men’s torture and unlawful
rendition.698 It found that Polish authorities had failed to properly investigate the abuses
despite national authorities’ assertions that their 2008 investigation remained ongoing.
The court ordered Poland to pay Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri €100,000 (about $112,000)
in damages.699 Poland sought to appeal the decision, but its request was denied.700
Following the release of the Senate Summary in December 2014, Polish prosecutors
announced that they would request the full version of the committee’s study for their
investigation.701 They appear to have done so, but in June 2015 Polish judicial authorities
said that the US was refusing to comply with the request.702
Lithuania
In January 2010, following a parliamentary investigation that confirmed the existence of
two black sites and that Lithuanian airports and airspace had been used for CIA-related
flights, the prosecutor general’s office opened a criminal investigation.703 One year later,
698 “Poland: Landmark Rulings on CIA Torture Complicity,” Human Rights Watch news release, July 24, 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/24/poland-landmark-rulings-cia-torture-complicity. Both men continue to be held by

US authorities at Guantanamo Bay. Human Rights Watch was the first to present evidence identifying locations in Poland and
Romania as CIA black sites. “Human Rights Watch Statement on U.S. Secret Detention Facilities in Europe,” Human Rights
Watch news release, November 6, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/11/06/human-rights-watch-statement-us-secret-
detention-facilities-europe.
699 The court also awarded Abu Zubaydah €30,000 euros (about $34,000) in costs and expenses. European Court of Human
Rights, Al-Nashiri v. Poland, (28761/11), Judgment of 24 July 2014, available at

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/003-4832205-5894802 (accessed April 29, 2015); European Court of
Human Rights, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, (7511/13), Judgment of 24 July 2014, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146047 (accessed April 29, 2015).
700 Nikolaj Nielsen, “European Court Confirms Polish Complicity in CIA Rendition,” EU Observer, February 18, 2015,
https://euobserver.com/justice/127697 (accessed April 29, 2015).

701 “After U.S. torture report, Poland asks what its leaders knew,” Reuters, December 12, 2014.
702 Christian Lowe and Wojciech Zurawski, “Poland says Washington stonewalling CIA jail investigation,” Reuters, June 12, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/12/us-usa-cia-torture-poland-idUSKBN0OS1N220150612 (accessed June 13, 2015).

703 Lithuanian authorities claimed that they had been unable to determine whether the site was used to hold prisoners due
to lack of cooperation from US authorities. “Lithuania asks U.S. to say if CIA Tortured Prisoners There,” Reuters, December
10, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/10/lithuania-cia-torture_n_6300540.html (accessed April 30, 2015);
OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” pp. 90-93; “Lithuania: Reopen Investigation
Into Secret CIA Prisons,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 25, 2013,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/lithuania-reopen-investigation-secret-cia-prisons.

the case was abruptly closed for lack of evidence.704 Prior to its discontinuance, Amnesty
International and Reprieve had brought information to the attention of the prosecutor’s
office, including allegations that Abu Zubaydah had been held in one of the country’s
black sites and tortured.705 Abu Zubaydah then filed an application against Lithuania
before the ECtHR in July 2011.706 The case is pending, and the European Parliament has
since called on Lithuania to reopen its investigation in light of new evidence.707
In September 2013, a new complaint was filed by Redress and the Human Rights
Monitoring Institute (HRMI) on behalf of another former CIA detainee, Mustafa al-Hawsawi,
alleging that he too had been held and tortured by the CIA at a black site in the country.708
In October 2013, the prosecutor’s office decided not to open an investigation. Redress and
HRMI appealed this decision, and they secured a favorable decision by the Vilnius
Regional Court in January 2014 that affirmed al-Hawsawi’s right to an investigation of his
claims. In February 2014, the prosecutor general’s office opened a formal investigation.709
Following the release of the Senate Summary in December 2014, the prosecutor general’s
office claims to have sent a formal request for legal assistance to US authorities.710 In April
704 The prosecutor general’s office said some materials gathered during the investigation constituted a state secret and could
not be used for prosecution purposes. Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, “Lithuania:
Homophobic Legislation and Accountability for Complicity in US-led rendition and secret detention programs,” October 2011,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/32000/eur530012011en.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015), pp. 5-7.
705 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
706 European Court of Human Rights, Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, (45454/11), Judgment of 14 July 2011,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115816 (accessed April 30, 2015).

707 European Parliament Resolution of 11 September 2012 on alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in
European countries; European Parliament Resolution of 10 October 2013 on alleged transportation and illegal detention of
prisoners in European countries by the CIA; “Lithuania: Reopen Investigation Into Secret CIA Prisons,” Human Rights Watch
news release.
708 Letter from Carla Ferstman, Director of Redress, and Natalija Bitiukova, Deputy Director of the Human Rights Monitoring
Institute (HRMI) to Lithuanian Prosecutor General Darius Valys, “Request for an investigation concerning suspicion of
criminal offences committed in Lithuania against Mr Mustafa al-Hawsawi,” September 13, 2013,
http://www.redress.org/downloads/casework/final-lithuania---investigation-request.pdf (accessed June 4, 2015).
709 “Prosecutor Launches New Investigation into Lithuania CIA Rendition Claims,” Redress press release, February 20, 2014,
http://www.redress.org/downloads/lithuania-investigation-press-release---final.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015); “Lithuania

Opens CIA Rendition Investigation,” Amnesty International public statement, February 21, 2014,
http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/21022014_Lithuania_CIA_rendition_investigation_public_statement.pdf
(accessed April 30, 2015). For more information on the case, see Redress, “Mustafa al-Hawsawi,” undated,
http://www.redress.org/case-docket/al-hawsawi-case-1 (accessed June 1, 2015).
710 The prosecutor’s office declined to comment on the specific contents of the request. “Lithuania Parliament Urged to Once
Again Probe CIA Prison,” Baltic News Service, December 29, 2014, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/foreign-affairs/lithuanian-
parliament-urged-to-once-again-probe-into-cia-prison.d?id=66776060 (accessed April 30, 2015). See also Amnesty
International, “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence: USA’s European ‘Partners in Crime’ Must Act After Senate Torture Report,”
January 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/212000/eur010022015en.pdf (accessed April 30, 2015), pp. 17-18.
NO MORE EXCUSES 140

2015, it announced the reopening of its initial investigation and included al-Hawsawi’s
claim in the investigation.711 The investigation remains ongoing at the time of writing.
Romania
Successive Romanian governments have denied hosting a secret prison.712 In May 2012,
the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) filed a criminal complaint with the Romanian
general prosecutor on behalf of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, alleging that he had been held at
a black site within the country and tortured there.713 The general prosecutor acknowledged
the complaint, assigned it a case number, and said he would review it, but nothing has
since happened.714 OSJI subsequently lodged an application against Romania before the
ECtHR.715 The case is pending.
After the release of the Senate Summary, former Romanian president Ion Iliescu and
former intelligence chief Ioan Talpes admitted that Romania did in fact host the site.716
The current government claims to have no knowledge of the secret prison, but in
December 2014 a ministry of justice official said that there was an ongoing judicial
investigation in Romania into the allegations.717 It is unclear whether this is the same
case initiated by OSJI.
711 “Lithuanian Prosecutors Restart Investigation into Secret CIA Jail,” Reuters, April 2, 2015, http://rt.com/news/246365-
lithuania-restart-probe-cia/ (accessed April 30, 2015); “Lithuania Reopens CIA ‘Black Site’ Investigation,” Agence France
Presse, April 3, 2015, http://www.globalpost.com/article/6505193/2015/04/02/lithuania-reopens-cia-black-site-
investigation (accessed August 18, 2015).
712 In 2008, a superficial parliamentary inquiry concluded that no CIA detention centers had existed in Romania and that no
US flights had transited through the country. OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,”
pp. 103-06; Amnesty International, “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence,” p. 13.
713 OSJI, “Litigation: Al-Nashiri v. Romania,” updated August 6, 2012, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/litigation/al-
nashiri-v-romania (accessed June 4, 2015).

714 OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” p. 106.
715 European Court of Human Rights, Adb al-Rahim Husseyn Muhammad al-Nashiri v. Romania, (33234/12), Judgment of June
1, 2012, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113814 (accessed June 4, 2015).

716“Former Romania president admits allowing CIA site,” Al Jazeera, April 27, 2015,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/romania-president-admits-allowing-cia-site-150427140351035.html (accessed
August 18, 2015); “Romanian ex-spy chief acknowledges CIA had ‘black prisons’ in country,” The Guardian, December 14,
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/romania-cia-black-prisons-ioan-talpes (accessed August 18, 2015).
717 “U.S. torture report puts Romania's role under scrutiny,” Reuters, December 16, 2014,
http://www.aol.com/article/2014/12/16/u-s-torture-report-puts-romanias-role-under-scrutiny/21117326/ (accessed August

18, 2015).

Macedonia
Despite strong evidence to the contrary, Macedonian authorities long denied any
involvement in the rendition of Khaled el-Masri. In October 2008, el-Masri filed a formal
request for a criminal investigation with the Skopje prosecutor’s office. The prosecutor
took no steps in the case before the statute of limitations for the crimes expired.718 In
September 2009, el-Masri then filed an application against Macedonia before the
ECtHR. On December 12, 2012, the ECtHR found in favor of el-Masri. The court found that
he had been subjected to torture and ill-treatment both within Macedonia and after his
transfer to US authorities, and held Macedonia responsible for its role.719
United Kingdom
In addition to a shelved public inquiry into allegations of UK complicity in the CIA
torture program720 and the settlement of several civil claims for damages,721 UK police
and prosecutors have opened three criminal investigations, one of which remains
open, and established a joint panel to examine possible criminal cases, the status of
which is unclear.
British Criminal Investigations

The UK government opened the first investigation, known as “Operation Hinton,” in
November 2008, which focused on the alleged involvement of UK Security Service (MI5)
718 OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” pp. 94-95.
719 European Court of Human Rights, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, pp. 58-60.
720 The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) conducted a first flawed investigation in 2007 which concluded that the UK
has no involvement in rendition or torture, an outcome criticized by the UK Parliamentary Joint Human Rights Committee. The
prime minister announced the launch of a judge-led inquiry in July 2010, but the inquiry was ultimately boycotted by civil
society groups, including Human Rights Watch, over its weak powers and lack of independence. It was shelved by the
government in January 2012 citing ongoing investigations but a second inquiry was promised. The Detainee Inquiry
completed its preliminary report in June 2012 but the UK government did not publish it until December 2013. Government of
the United Kingdom, “The Report of the Detainee Inquiry,” December 2013, http://www.detaineeinquiry.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/35100_Trafalgar-Text-accessible.pdf (accessed June 4, 2015). That same month, the UK
government announced the ISC would take over responsibility for the investigation rather than establishing an independent
inquiry as it had promised. The ISC commenced its investigation in September 2014, which is ongoing. See “UK: Broken
Promise on UK Torture Inquiry,” Human Rights Watch news release, December 21, 2013,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/21/uk-broken-promise-torture-inquiry (accessed August 18, 2015); Amnesty
International, “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence,” pp. 19-20.
721 OSJI, “Investigations into CIA Renditions,” November 2013, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/fact-
sheets/investigations-cia-renditions (accessed June 4, 2015); OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and
Extraordinary Rendition,” pp. 115-16.
NO MORE EXCUSES 142

officers in the rendition and torture of Binyam Mohamed by US authorities.722 The Crown
Prosecution Service concluded that UK officials had involvement in his case but that
there was “insufficient evidence” to bring criminal charges. The second investigation,
known as “Operation Iden” and opened in June 2009, looked into the actions of UK
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officers who interrogated suspects at the US-run prison
in Bagram, Afghanistan. It too was closed for “insufficient evidence.”723
In January 2012, a third criminal investigation—which has become known as “Operation

Lydd”—was opened to look into allegations that UK security service officers from MI5 or
MI6 were involved in the unlawful rendition and torture of former Libyan opposition
figures Abdullah al-Sadiq (known as Abdul Hakim Belhadj) and Sami Mostefa al-
Saadi.724 Both men had filed complaints in November 2011 after the release of classified
documents uncovered by Human Rights Watch in Libya that exposed UK officials’ role in
their rendition.725 The investigation appears to be moving forward, with the police
having handed prosecutors a file of evidence in October 2014.726 Also in January 2012,
police and prosecutors announced the establishment of a joint panel to examine other
allegations of UK complicity in US rendition and torture.727 The status of the joint panel
and any other potential investigations beyond the Libya case is unclear.728
723 Ibid., pp. 116-117.
724 “UK: Broken Promise on UK Torture Inquiry,” Human Rights Watch news release; OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret
Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” p. 117.

725 Human Rights Watch, Delivered into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya, September
6, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0912webwcover_1.pdf, pp. 97-99, 104-06. Both men, along with

Belhadj’s wife who was also rendered to Libya, have pursued civil claims. Belhadj and his wife’s claims are still ongoing. Amnesty
International, “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence,” pp. 20-21; Redress, “Belhaj v Jack Straw, former Head of Counter-Terrorism at
MI6, Sir Mark Allen, the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Security Service (MI5),” undated, http://www.redress.org/case-
docket/belhadj-v-jack-straw-and-others (accessed June 4, 2015). The UK government paid al-Saadi £2.23 million to settle his
lawsuit. OSJI, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” p. 117.
726 Owen Bowcott and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Police hand Libyan abduction evidence to Crown Prosecution Service,” The Guardian,
October 31, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/31/met-libya-abduction-rendition-cps (accessed June 4, 2015).

727 Ian Cobain, “Police to investigate MI6 over rendition and torture of Libyans,” The Guardian, January 12, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/12/libya-rendition-torture-abduction-mi6 (accessed June 4, 2015).728 Ian

Cobain, “MI6 to be investigated over treatment of three more terror suspects,” The Guardian, April 23, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/23/mi6-al-qaida-investigation (accessed October 26, 2015).
728 Ian Cobain, “MI6 to be investigated over treatment of three more terror suspects,” The Guardian, April 23, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/23/mi6-al-qaida-investigation (accessed October 26, 2015).

Scottish Criminal Investigation
In May 2013, an online database729 mapping CIA renditions worldwide revealed that
airports in Scotland were used to refuel CIA planes used in renditions.730 These revelations
prompted Scottish police to open a criminal investigation, which was pending at writing.731
The release of the Senate Summary brought renewed attention to the investigation and led
Scottish police to request access to the full, un-redacted version of the report.732
Portugal
Information handed over by European parliamentarian Ana Gomes prompted Portugal’s
general prosecutor’s office to launch a criminal investigation in February 2007 into US
stopover flights that allegedly carried CIA rendition victims.733 Prosecutors closed the
investigation in May 2009 due to lack of evidence. Gomes tried to appeal the decision on
the grounds that the investigation had been inadequate and had not included all relevant
testimony, but the prosecutor’s office denied the request in September 2009.734
Potential Investigation by the International Criminal Court

In addition to the cases before national jurisdictions in Europe, the International Criminal
Court (ICC) may be another potential forum for holding US officials accountable for post-
9/11 abuses. In late 2014, the ICC prosecutor said that her office is considering whether to
pursue an investigation into torture and other serious abuses allegedly committed by US
armed forces in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008.
729 The Rendition Project, “Rendition Flights,” undated, http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/flights/index.html (accessed
June 10, 2015).

730 It does not appear that detainees were on board those aircrafts but rather that the aircrafts were refueling on their way to
and from rendition operations in other countries. Billy Briggs, “Scottish Police Investigating British Role in CIA Kidnapping,
Torture,” MintPress News, June 2, 2015, http://www.mintpressnews.com/scottish-police-investigating-british-role-in-cia-
kidnapping-torture/206099/ (accessed June 4, 2015); Ian Cobain and James Ball, “New light shed on US government’s
extraordinary rendition program,” The Guardian, May 22, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/22/us-
extraordinary-rendition-programme (accessed June 4, 2015).
731 Craig McDonald,“Revealed: Police investigate evidence that six CIA torture flights landed in Scotland,” Daily Record, June
22, 2014, http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/revealed-police-investigate-evidence-six-3741550 (accessed
June 5, 2015).
732 If the request is granted, the full version of the report could reveal significant new information that was withheld at the
request of UK officials. Billy Briggs, “Scottish Police Investigating British Role in CIA Kidnapping, Torture”; Craig McDonald,
“Rendition experts fear police were too quick to clear CIA torture flights landing in Scotland,” Daily Record, April 19, 2015,
http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/rendition-expert-fears-police-were-5546817 (accessed June 5, 2015).
733 “Portugal Probes Alleged CIA Flights,” Washington Post, February 5, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/AR2007020501454.html (accessed June 5, 2015).

NO MORE EXCUSES 144

This announcement came in the context of the preliminary examination into Afghanistan
that the ICC prosecutor initiated in 2007.735 Her jurisdiction is limited to war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide committed within the country or by Afghan nationals from
May 1, 2003 onwards.736 The main focus of the examination appears to be crimes
committed by pro- and anti-government forces, including the Taliban, the national
intelligence service, the police, and the army. However, the prosecutor is also looking at
“alleged abuse of detainees committed by international forces.”737
In December 2014, just before the Senate Summary was released, a report on the ICC
prosecutor’s investigative activities singled out US officials as potential targets: “In
particular, the alleged torture or ill-treatment of conflict-related detainees by US armed
forces in Afghanistan in the period 2003-2008 forms another potential case identified by
the Office.”738 The report says her office is looking at whether the “enhanced interrogation
techniques” meet the threshold of gravity to fall within her jurisdiction and the “relevance
and genuineness” of any steps to investigate and prosecute the alleged offenses by US
authorities.739 During a media interview in March 2015, the prosecutor said, “We’re looking
at the [US Senate] report very, very closely. And we will determine what to do, especially if
it relates to our jurisdiction in Afghanistan.”740
While the US has not ratified the Rome Statute and is not a party to the ICC, the court
would still have jurisdiction over US nationals with respect to crimes committed in
Afghanistan since Afghanistan has ratified the treaty and the abuses took place on Afghan
735 The ICC has also opened a preliminary examination into alleged war crimes committed by officials of the United Kingdom,
which is an ICC state party, involved in detainee abuse in Iraq. Since Iraq is not a party to the ICC, the ICC’s authority only
reaches to nationals of ICC members who are implicated in crimes committed in Iraq, and not to any national implicated in
crimes committed on Iraq’s territory, as is the case with Afghanistan. For more information on the preliminary examination,
see Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
re-opens the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq,” May 13, 2014, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014.aspx (accessed
November 16, 2015).
736 Afghanistan ratified the Rome Statute on February 10, 2003. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court,
“Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014,” December 2, 2014, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-pre-exam-

2014.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), paras. 75-76.
737 Ibid., para. 94.
738 Ibid.
739 Ibid., paras. 95-96.
740 James Reinl, “Int’l Criminal Court Studying CIA Report ‘Very, Very Closely,’” Reader Supported News, March 6, 2015,
http://readersupportednews.org/news-section2/318-66/28925-intl-criminal-court-studying-cia-torture-report-very-very-
closely (accessed March 26, 2015).

soil. If the prosecutor finds that the crimes rise to the level of war crimes and that US
prosecutorial authorities are not adequately investigating the alleged offenses, she could
open a formal investigation.
The ICC should continue efforts to monitor whether US authorities are pursuing meaningful
and effective criminal investigations and trials into detainee abuse allegedly committed by
members of the US armed forces in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. If US authorities
fail to pursue accountability for abuses and the alleged crimes meet the other criteria
necessary for the ICC prosecutor to exercise jurisdiction in Afghanistan, her office should
consider opening a formal investigation into US-related abuses as part of a broader
investigation into crimes committed in Afghanistan.
NO MORE EXCUSES 146

Recommendations
To the US President
• Support the Attorney General’s appointment of a special prosecutor to conduct a
thorough, independent, and credible criminal investigation into the CIA rendition,
detention, and interrogation program that examines the conduct of those who
authorized and implemented torture and other abuse by the CIA, including conduct
that may have purportedly been authorized.
• Acknowledge wrongdoing and formally apologize to victims of torture conducted or

authorized by the US. In the absence of congressional action, establish an
independent body to administer claims and provide appropriate redress, including
compensation and rehabilitation.
• Declassify the full Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the CIA’s detention and
interrogation program, redacting only what is strictly necessary to protect national
security. Improve declassification procedures more generally to ensure that only
truly sensitive sources and methods remain classified and that the declassification
process proceeds more quickly.
• Declassify entirely the CIA rendition, detention, and interrogation program rather
than selective aspects or elements of it as is the current practice.
• Support legislative initiatives to require all US government agencies, including the

CIA, to use only interrogation techniques listed in the Army Field Manual on
Intelligence Interrogations.
• Instruct all relevant government agencies to initiate a review of their role in the CIA
program as described in the full Senate Intelligence Committee report to identify
mistakes made, lessons learned, and best practices going forward.
• Institute reforms at the CIA that provide more open congressional hearings on CIA
policy and practice, stronger CIA reporting requirements to Congress, greater
oversight from other divisions of the executive branch, and a bolstered CIA Office
of the Inspector General.

To the Department of Justice
• The Attorney General should appoint a special prosecutor to conduct a thorough,
independent, and credible criminal investigation and bring charges where warranted
concerning CIA torture and other crimes. The investigation should look into the
conduct of those who authorized and implemented the CIA program as well as those
who went beyond what was authorized. In conducting such an investigation, ensure
all relevant witnesses, including victims of the alleged torture and ill-treatment, are
interviewed and all relevant physical evidence is collected and examined.
• Do not invoke the state secrets privilege in civil litigation concerning US torture
except when absolutely necessary to prevent genuine harm to US national security
and, even then, apply the privilege as narrowly as possible. Use of the privilege
should not prevent the provision of appropriate redress to victims of US torture.
To the US Congress
• Enact legislation that would acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize, and provide
redress, including compensation and rehabilitation, to victims of US torture and
other abuse.
• Enact legislation that would prohibit the CIA from holding individuals in detention
except immediately after a lawful arrest and ensuring their prompt transfer to an
authorized detention authority.
• Revise Appendix M to the US Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogations to

prohibit the use of abusive sleep and sensory deprivation techniques.
To Countries that Provided Support to the CIA Rendition Program

• Ensure impartial and independent criminal investigations of complicity in torture
and other criminal offenses allegedly committed in the country by national or US
officials in connection with CIA renditions or interrogations, and prosecute those
implicated in crimes.
• Request a minimally redacted copy of the full Senate Intelligence Committee Report
from the US government and provide it to prosecutorial authorities.
NO MORE EXCUSES 148

• Inform the US government that country officials do not object to the country or its
nationals being named or identified in any information released to the public
related to the CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program.
• Press US authorities to initiate meaningful criminal investigations in the United States

and prosecute those responsible for torture and other serious abuses since 9/11.
To All Foreign Governments

• Exercise jurisdiction, including universal jurisdiction, as provided under domestic
and international law, to investigate and, evidence permitting, prosecute US
officials alleged to have been involved in criminal offenses against detainees in
violation of international law.
• When permitted under domestic law, gather evidence to facilitate future

prosecution of US officials should such officials enter their territory.
• Take measures to ensure that all relevant national agencies, including immigration,
police, and prosecutorial authorities, are able to monitor, investigate, and prosecute
US officials and others implicated in CIA torture should they enter the country.
• Call for a side meeting of the European Network of Contact Points in respect of
persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
(known as the EU Genocide Network) to discuss investigations of torture and other
abuses by US officials since 9/11.
To Specific National Authorities in the Following Countries

France
• Enforce the appellate court decision to issue a summons for former Guantanamo
commander Gen. Geoffrey Miller and take all necessary steps to seek his
appearance for questioning before French judicial authorities in connection with
the ongoing investigation.
Germany
• Federal prosecutors should open a “structural investigation” to gather all evidence
of US-related abuses committed post-9/11 that is available within the country and
that may be used in future criminal proceedings in Germany or elsewhere.

• Request the extradition of the 13 CIA agents against whom arrest warrants have
been issued in connection with the rendition of Khaled el-Masri.
Italy
• Judicial authorities should pursue legal avenues that would allow its European
Arrest Warrants for the 26 US nationals convicted in absentia in connection with
the rendition of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (Abu Omar) to remain valid;
• The Ministry of Justice should pursue the extradition of all 26 Americans and afford
them a retrial if they are extradited.
Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, and Romania

• Prosecutors should conduct impartial and independent criminal investigations of
complicity in torture and other criminal offenses allegedly committed in their
countries by national and US officials in connection with CIA renditions or
interrogations, and prosecute those implicated in crimes. Such investigations
should include national and US government officials.
Portugal
• Prosecutors should reopen criminal investigations in connection with CIA torture in
light of the Senate Summary.
Spain
• Judicial authorities should reopen the criminal investigation in the “Bush Six” case
because the US Department of Justice has taken no further steps to investigate and
prosecute those alleged to be responsible for abuse of detainees at Guantanamo.
• Judicial authorities should ensure that the second criminal investigation into
alleged abuse of detainees at Guantanamo proceeds based on the Spanish
nationality of one of the victims.
United Kingdom
• Prosecutors should conduct impartial and independent criminal investigations of
complicity in torture and other criminal offenses allegedly committed in the country
NO MORE EXCUSES 150

by national and US officials in connection with CIA renditions or interrogations, and
prosecute those implicated in crimes.
• Scottish police should expand their ongoing criminal investigation into CIA
rendition flights to include US officials.
To the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

Europe, and UN Experts and Bodies
• Monitor the implementation of recommendations made in prior reports to countries
identified as having supported the CIA rendition, detention, and interrogation
program.
• Continue to call on countries that supported the CIA program to investigate and
prosecute all those responsible for CIA torture and other abuses in their country,
including national and US officials.
• Encourage police and judicial authorities in different countries to strengthen

cooperation with respect to ongoing or future investigations and prosecutions of
CIA torture and other offenses.
• Call on the European Genocide Network to convene a side meeting to discuss

investigations of torture and other abuses by US officials since 9/11.
• Press US authorities to initiate meaningful criminal investigations and prosecute

those responsible for torture and other serious abuses committed since 9/11.
To the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court

• Continue to monitor whether US authorities pursue credible and impartial criminal
investigations and prosecutions of detainee abuse allegedly committed by
members of the US armed forces in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008.
• Consider opening a formal investigation into US-related abuses in Afghanistan if no

criminal proceedings take place in the US and other relevant criteria are met to
establish jurisdiction.

Acknowledgments
The first three chapters of the report on the lack of accountability in the US, were written by
Laura Pitter, senior national security counsel at Human Right Watch. The fourth chapter,
International Accountability Mechanisms, was written by Leslie Haskell, former counsel in
the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch.
The entire report was reviewed and substantively edited by James Ross, legal and policy
director. Joseph Saunders, deputy Program director, provided further edits.
The first three chapters were reviewed and edited by Maria McFarland, US Program co-
director. Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington director, and John Sifton, Asia advocacy
director, provided specialist review and further edits. Alison Parker, US Program co-
director, also provided limited edits to the report. Julia Liston, Human Rights Watch
summer Klatsky Fellow, provided assistance with legal research, as did interns, Adam
Kirchner, Morgan Moone, and Charles Church. W. Paul Smith, US Program coordinator also
assisted with legal research but primarily contributed research on non-legal issues.
Human Rights Watch is enormously grateful to the many journalists, human rights
reporters, and non-governmental organizations committed to reporting about these
abuses and who have made enormous contributions to the record on CIA abuses that now
exists. In particular we would like to the American Civil Liberties Union for its Freedom of
Information Act litigation that has led to the declassification of many important documents
related to CIA abuses and torture. We would also like to thank the many other non-
governmental organizations, government entities, and academic institutions that have
worked on documenting abuses and advocating for accountability, including Amnesty
International and Amnesty International USA, the ACLU, The Constitution Project,
Openthegovernment.org, The Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights First, the
Center for Victims of Torture, the National Religious Campaign Against Torture, Physicians
for Human Rights, The New York Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, and the
International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School. We would also like to thank the
American Bar Association for publicly urging the Department of Justice to open new
investigations into CIA torture and other ill-treatment.
NO MORE EXCUSES 152

The section on International Accountability Mechanisms was edited by Elise Keppler,
International Justice Program associate director. Benjamin Ward, Europe and Central Asia
Division deputy director, Judith Sunderland, Europe and Central Asia Division associate
director, and Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner, International Justice Program advocacy director
provided specialist review. Aurelie Poelhekke, International Justice Program associate, and
Hamish Collings-Begg, intern in the International Justice Program provided research and
editorial assistance. Valuable research assistance was also provided by Andreas Schüller,
legal advisor in the International Crimes and Accountability Program of the European
Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR); Jürgen Schurr and Kyra Hild, legal
advisors at Redress; Steve Kostas, lawyer with the Open Society Justice Initiative, who
spoke in his personal capacity; and Dr. Sam Raphael, co-director of The Rendition Project
and senior lecturer in international relations at Kingston University.
W. Paul Smith, US Program coordinator and Maya Goldman, US Program associate jointly
copy edited the entire report. Kathy Mills, publications specialist and Jose Martinez
provided production assistance.

NO MORE EXCUSES
Following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated a global,
state-sanctioned program in which it abducted scores of people throughout the world, held them in secret detention—sometimes
for years—or “rendered” them to various countries, and tortured or otherwise ill-treated them.
Many detainees were held by the CIA in pitch-dark windowless cells, chained to walls, naked or diapered, for weeks or months at
a time. The CIA forced them into painful stress positions that made it impossible to lie down or sleep for days, to the point where
many hallucinated or begged to be killed to end their misery. To date, no one has been held accountable for these abuses that
amount to crimes under US and international law.
No More Excuses: A Roadmap to Justice for CIA Torture provides a path forward. The report sets out a detailed analysis of the
various criminal charges available and challenges claims put forward by the US Justice Department that prosecutions for torture
are not legally possible. It also outlines steps the US should take to provide compensation and rehabilitation to victims of torture;
and steps other countries should take to pursue their own criminal investigations into CIA torture.
Human Rights Watch calls on the United States to appoint a special prosecutor to conduct a thorough, credible criminal investi-
gation of those who authorized and implemented the CIA program as well as those who committed acts of torture beyond what
was purportedly authorized. The US should also acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize, and provide redress to victims of torture.
Cover illustration © 2015 Brian Stauffer for Human Rights Watch
hrw.org

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H U M A N

For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org

Key Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 9

II. Bringing Criminal Prosecutions in the US .................................................................................... 35

III. Repairing the Harm and Ending Torture ..................................................................................... 96

IV. International Accountability Mechanisms .................................................................................111

Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 147

Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... 152

1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

Globally, the US unwillingness to prosecute CIA torture weakens US authority to oppose

Ultimately, the guilt or innocence of any of the US officials involved in organizing or

This report is organized into three parts—credible investigations and prosecutions,

5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

7 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

• The president should acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize to victims of torture, and

9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

Short History of the CIA Program

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover_1.pdf, p. 40, citing US Senate, Committee of Armed

11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

12 OPR Report, pp. 75-80, 251, 255.

http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf (accessed March 31,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html (accessed August 18, 2015).

Detention and Interrogation Program,”

13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0912webwcover_1.pdf, p. 78; Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman, “CIA

dyn/content/article/2007/11/30/AR2007113002484.html (accessed August 26, 2015).

31 Senate Summary, p. 54.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html (accessed August 21, 2015).

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/mar/05/cia-torture-no-one-said-no/ (March 15, 2015).

15 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html (January 29, 2015); Dana Priest, “Justice Dept.

https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc22.pdf (accessed April 23, 2015).

http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-muller2004.pdf (accessed August 26, 2015).

46 OPR Report, p. 124.

47 OPR Report, p. 127.

2340A,” December 30, 2004, https://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc96.pdf (accessed

17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=print (accessed June, 10 2015).

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf (accessed June 15, 2011).

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html (accessed August 21, 2015).

19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan0304/afghanistan0304.pdf; Human Rights Watch, The United States’

Human Rights First, “Ending Secret Detentions,” June 2004,

of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment65 providing training and written materials to

CIA-approved interrogation techniques. interrogation techniques with the first

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Guantanamo personnel in the use of

used by the military’s Joint Personnel

detainees naked for degradation purposes, detention facility at Guantanamo to discuss

later drew on these same SERE techniques

program.68 Maj. Gen. Michael Dunlavey was requesting

21 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

73 Getting Away with Torture, p. 42. 77 Ibid.

75 SASC Report, p. 107. 79 SASC report. p. 132.

81 Ibid. 85 SASC Report, p. 197.

82 Ibid. 86 SASC Report, p. 197, 201.

23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

24 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2015

Justice Department Inquiry into CIA Torture