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PsycARTICLES: Problematic Images of Science in Undergraduate Psychology Textbooks: How Well Is Science
Understood and Depicted?SPECIAL SECTION: HETERODOX ISSUES IN PSYCHOLOGY
© 2018 The Author(s)

Archives of Scientific Psychology

August 20, 2018, Vol. 6, No. 1, 51–62

SPECIAL SECTION: HETERODOX ISSUES IN PSYCHOLOGY

Problematic Images of Science in

Undergraduate Psychology Textbooks: How
Well Is Science Understood and Depicted?
William O’Donohue, Brendan Willis
Author Affiliations
William O’DonohueDepartment of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno
Brendan Willis Department of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno
O'Donohue, W., & Willis, B. (2018). Problematic images of science in undergraduate psychology textbooks: How
well is science understood and depicted? Archives of Scientific Psychology, 6(1), 51-62.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/arc0000040 PDF
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ABSTRACT
Psychology is one of the most popular undergraduate majors in American universities, despite the fact that the
field has many unsettled questions about how to best progress as a science or even if it qualifies as a science
(Lilienfeld, 2012; O’Donohue, 2013). Lack of clarity and accuracy in describing what science is and psychology’s
relationship to science are at the heart of these issues. To better understand how science is defined and its
relationship to science is depicted, 30 undergraduate textbooks were examined and analyzed. It was predicted
that authors would be inconsistent in their characterization of science. Additionally, it also was predicted that key
controversies regarding the structure and methods of science would simply be ignored and support was also
found regarding this prediction as well. This suggests that the textbook definitions of science were often
simplistic. This analysis underscores the importance of a more consistent, accurate, and detailed presentation of
the science for undergraduate psychology students, as well as the need for further scholarship in this area.
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SCIENTIFIC ABSTRACT
Psychology is one of the most popular undergraduate majors in American universities, despite the fact that the
discipline still has many unsettled questions regarding fundamental philosophical and methodological issues
(Lilienfeld, 2012; O’Donohue, 2013). These issues may be associated with a lack of clarity regarding an accurate
conception of science and the nature of the relationship between psychology and science with respect to these
controversies. Kuhn (1972) has suggested that scientific paradigms are transmitted in textbooks. To understand
how the scientific status of psychology is depicted, 30 undergraduate textbooks were examined. It was
hypothesized that across textbooks authors would be inconsistent regarding how science was characterized. This
hypothesis was tentatively supported. It also was hypothesized that key controversies in metascience simply
would be ignored and support was also found regarding this hypothesis suggesting that the proffered definitions
of science were often simplistic. This analysis underscores the importance of a more consistent, accurate, and
detailed presentation of the science for undergraduate psychology students, as well as the need for further
scholarship in this area.

KEYWORDS:

undergraduate psychology teaching, psychology textbooks, science education, philosophy of science,

definition of science

Public skepticism of psychology unfortunately runs high, as evidenced by Lilienfeld’s (2012) article which outlined
six major criticisms regarding the scientific basis of psychology. Of importance to this article, Lilienfeld highlighted
the misconception that “psychology does not use scientific methods” (Lilienfeld, 2012, p. 115). Complicating this
issue, undergraduate students interested in psychology may enter their studies holding erroneous beliefs that run
counter to the findings of psychological research (e.g., “Most people use only 10% of their brain;” Lilienfeld, 2012;
Vaughan, 1977). Introductory courses in psychology are potentially capable of correcting these myths and
misconceptions of psychological phenomena (McCarthy & Frantz, 2016). To do so there is an important
metaissue: These students need to shift their epistemic criteria for rational belief formation from sources like “this
is what I was told,” or “everyone believes this,” or “some authority said so” to a commitment to the results of
science. However, such a shift requires that students would understand what science is and what psychology’s
relationship to science is.

For this reason, it is important to consider the following: How is science defined and how is psychology
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characterized as a science in undergraduate psychology textbooks? Textbooks are one of the primary teaching
tools in undergraduate psychology courses, and therefore an important component of any effort to psychological Help

education. Admittedly, the topic of how science is understood and depicted in undergraduate texts is a complex
one. Textbook authors need to efficiently cover a significant amount of information and need to be judicious
regarding coverage of any one topic. In addition, textbook authors ought not to be held responsible for unresolved
issues and controversies regarding the philosophy of science in the field. However, authors of textbooks also
need to avoid oversimplification, be faithful to problems that exist in the field, and use these as teaching
opportunities. Textbooks may be an opportunity to show students the interrelationships between subject matter
such as the natural sciences, psychological sciences, philosophy of science, linguistics, and even important
cultural critiques such as feminism. Kuhn (1972) has noted that textbooks are an important way in which
paradigms are transmitted and as such textbooks may be ways of inculcating a more general way of seeing the
world. Treating these issues in a more faithful manner may achieve the aim of a student who can see some sort
of synthesis of diverse strands of scholarship.

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What follows is not an exhaustive discussion of all the issues related to properly defining psychological science.
Rather, we present a summary of important points that could be considered in the instruction of students in some
of the key problems in metascience that have implications in defining what science is and then how this
conception or conceptions of science relate to the study of human behavior. We acknowledge that such a
summary is, by definition, somewhat brief. However, it is hoped that the following will promote further discussion
and research on the issue of how science is taught to undergraduate students.

The idea that undergraduate textbooks present inconsistent and even somewhat inaccurate information is not
entirely new. Griggs and Jackson (2013) evaluated the consistency of undergraduate textbooks of 13 current
editions of the most commonly used introductory psychology textbooks, and found that while some textbooks
included research methods as its own chapter, many grouped research methods together with a brief survey of
history and career areas in psychology. In addition, no textbook included a chapter on diversity related topics, and
only two books discussed evolutionary psychology or behavioral genetics despite the importance of these topics
in the field (Griggs & Jackson, 2013). Habarth, Hansell, and Grove (2011) analyzed 11 of the top selling
introductory textbooks and found 1,167 paragraphs discussing psychoanalytic content within those texts,
revealing that 2%–18% of paragraphs discussing psychoanalytic content included information that was inaccurate
or misleading.

These studies generally support the idea that undergraduate textbooks can be misleading. However, no study to
date has examined these problems in relation to one of the most fundamental issues—that is, information
regarding psychology’s scientific status and possible complications with this. Any comprehensive discussion of
science necessitates an understanding of at least some of the major issues within mainstream metascience as
these are, for the most part, unsettled matters (e.g., see O’Donohue, 2013). There are important debates
regarding demarcating science from nonscience, whether there is a second demarcation question between the
natural and the social sciences, the actual logic of scientific research (e.g., whether it is inductive or deductive),
the proper relationship between theory and data, whether science is distorted by certain sociopolitical biases such
as a patriarchal orientation, and so on.

Thus, the relationship between psychology and the philosophy of science can be argued to be complex
(O’Donohue, 2013), but it is important to faithfully depict science and its complexities to accurately and fully
capture the relationship of psychology with science. The following sections illustrate some of the major
subproblems within the philosophy of science, especially as these apply to psychology. It is the view of this article
that a more accurate portrayal of science involves incorporating more of these issues. While it might be argued
that introductory texts necessarily need to simplify complex material, there is also a question of whether such
presentations can become oversimplified and are there benefits to presenting such complexities because of their
importance to a liberal education. PDF
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The Definitional Criteria of Science and the Scientific

Method Are Controversial
There is significant disagreement among scientists and philosophers of science on the essential characteristics of
science. The logical positivists argued science is an inductive attempt to both rid the prospective knower of
metaphysical nonsense and to replace this with knowledge, generally characterized as justified true beliefs
regarding the sensory world (O’Donohue, 2013). In contrast, Sir Karl Popper rejected this conception of
knowledge and of the methods of science due partly to the failure of establishing an ampliative truth preserving
inductive logic, arguing instead that science is ultimately a deductive exercise involving error elimination by
falsificatory testing (Popper, 1963). For Popper, science is conducted by using the valid logical inference rule of
modus tollens and hypotheses and theories are eliminated by observing states of affairs that these exclude.

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Other conceptualizations of science have arisen, such as B.F. Skinner’s indigenous philosophy of science which
was, unsurprisingly, operant. He suggested there is no truth seeking in science, because “one cannot step
outside of the causal stream and observe behavior from some special vantage point . . .” (Skinner, 1974, p. 234)
and thus the contingencies of reinforcement are seen to shape the behavior and verbal behavior of the scientist.

In still another view quite popular among psychologists, Kuhn (1970) argued that science changes drastically
through a series of scientific revolutions. It first consists of a preparadigmatic phase in which there is little or no
agreement on methods, priorities, or even on definition of concepts. Normal or mature science occurs next when
there is a successful problem-solving exemplar that leads to generally agreed methods. However, normal science
is eventually disrupted by revolutionary science because the mounting number of anomalies—puzzle solving
failures of the normal science paradigm—leads to a “crisis.” This scientific revolution produces a new problem-
solving exemplar with the ability solve some of these anomalies but also produces a fundamental (what Kuhn
called a “gestalt switch”) changing of the rules of research and even the definition of basic constructs.

There is even a relatively well-known anarchist view of science, most associated with Paul Feyerabend
(Feyerabend, 1993), in which science is not seen as composed of one method or really any method but rather
science is seen as an essentially anarchistic problem-solving enterprise. Feyerabend elucidated this point by
saying that “the events, procedures and results that constitute the sciences have no common structure”
(Feyerabend, 1993, p. 1). According to Feyerabend “anything goes” in both structure and methodology is the rule
that maximizes scientific problem-solving successes.

Furthermore, recent postmodernist analysis of science has attempted to deconstruct science and such
deconstructions are seen to raise basic questions about what constitutes meaning, knowledge, and science. In
postmodernist analysis, science is seen to be the result of numerous political and personal influences including,
but are not limited to, agendas related to power such as patriarchy, capitalism, and racism. These analyses even
go so far as to suggest that other values such as social justice may be more important than values such as truth.
This is just a small sampling of the variance of the views about what constitutes science.

As can be seen, there is considerable disagreement regarding the basic definition of what science is. This is a far
cry from the typical “scientific method” sections found in many undergraduate textbooks which give a clear
impression the definition of science is universally agreed upon and there is only one way to conduct scientific
enterprises. It is therefore reasonable that introductory students of psychology be aware of these unsettled
issues, as “. . . to know science is to know the different ways it can be viewed” (O’Donohue, 2013, p. 3). In
addition, by doing so it would provide much useful information to the student as this would provide the student
additional exposure to key issues thought to be important in a liberal arts education, rather than have the
mistaken belief that science can be accurately captured by caricatures such as “the use of inductive methods to
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produce generalized knowledge.”
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Bad (i.e., Pseudo)Science

The issue of pseudoscience is also important both among philosophers of science and psychologists because it,
in some sense, demarcates good science from what only appears to be science—something that is unfortunately
relevant particularly to clinical psychology (Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Lohr, 2014). It is important to note that
pseudoscientific ideas are not only generated by those outside the field, such as by so called “folk psychologists,”
but also by those within the field itself. Concerns for example have been raised about fairly popular therapies
such as antidepressant medication, facilitated communication, Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing
(EMDR), and even more recently acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Lilienfeld et al., 2014; O’Donohue,
Snipes, & Soto, 2015). Understanding what pseudoscience is obviously depends on the proper definition of
science, which, again, points to the importance of accurately characterizing science. For example, if, as the

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Popperians have argued, science is characterized as an iterative, problem-solving process that entails repetitive
problem definition, tentative theory formation, and error elimination attempts (falsification), science can be
distinguished from pseudoscience by an analysis of the presence or absence of these essential features. For
instance, it could be the case that in pseudoscience beliefs tend to be retained even in the presence of falsifying
evidence; that is, within pseudoscience, the approach to error elimination is superficial at best (Popper, 1963).
Popper gives an example from psychotherapy:

As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once in 1919, I

reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he
found no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although
he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so
sure. “Because of my thousandfold experiences,” he replied; whereupon I could not
help say: “And with this new case, I supposed, your experience has become
thousand and onefold.” (p. 35)

Hence, pseudoscience may be at least partially characterized as inappropriate uses of ad hoc hypotheses
(covered in detail in a subsequent section) to protect and retain favored beliefs and thus pseudoscience is “false
science” because it misses the authentic error eliminating function of science.

O’Donohue et al. (2015; see also Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2015) analyzed a journal article published in the Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, which was based on a dissertation reporting the results of a clinical outcome
study of ACT. The analysis of the journal article indicated several key negative results found in the original
research—the dissertation—were not reported in the subsequent journal publication. Several of the authors’
predicted outcomes that were not supported were simply not reported in the published article. The original data
that showed ACT processes did not mediate the one outcome measure which was found to be statistically
significant were reanalyzed and subsequently reported in the journal article as positive and the original negative
analysis was not reported in the published article. Further, descriptions by some of the original authors in other
subsequent peer-reviewed publications did not accurately portray the actual results originally reported in the
dissertation. There is little or no evidence to suggest that any Popperian error eliminating attempts were being
made, rather that prior beliefs and commitments were being protected from potentially falsifying data.

One final note on pseudoscience. While pseudoscience is often referred to as false science, generally due to its
aforementioned lack of attempts at falsification, it may be more accurate to describe it as “fake” science instead. PDF
The reasoning for this stems from the tentativeness of science (discussed below), or that facts we consider to be
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true now may eventually be proven false in the future. Therefore, it is conceivable that some of what has been
uncovered through scientific investigation, is in fact, false, but this does not mean that all of a particular scientific
field is false. Rather it is the effort of attempting to falsify that helps to set science apart from pseudoscience, and
the lack of falsification is the hallmark of fake science.

The “Second Demarcation” Problem

The notion that psychology, and other social sciences, are somehow fundamentally different from other “hard”
(i.e., natural) sciences is referred to as the second demarcation problem. Meehl (1978) dealt with this issue in his
classic article on the “slow progress of soft psychology” (p. 806). It may be reasonable to state the scientific study
of human beings is fundamentally different than the scientific study of inanimate, or nonconscious or cognitively
simple entities. Humans may be more complex to study due to several reasons (e.g., possible free will, reactivity

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to being studied, and the inability to directly observe important phenomenological experience, ethical constraints,
etc.). Therefore, it may be the case that a human science is somehow different than a science of say, physics,
and perhaps to properly educate the psychology student on this issue would be necessary for an accurate
understanding of the relationship between science and psychology. However, the question remains if this possible
difference between “hard” and “soft” sciences is explained sufficiently in undergraduate textbooks.

Deductive Versus Inductive Logic of Research

Popper claimed that while a theory could never be proven, a theory could be disproven by subjecting it to so
called risky tests. Popper’s view of science was not, however, without problems as evidenced by the Quine-
Duhem problem. This problem states that the arrows of the logical inference rule of modus tollens are not only
pointed at the belief or hypothesis under test, but unfortunately are also pointed at auxiliary hypotheses
associated with the experiment (O’Donohue, 2013). Auxiliary hypotheses refer to additional statements that are
necessary to deduce the expected experimental outcome. To take an example, if a clinical outcome study is done
regarding some experimental treatment and the results to not show any improved effects of those who
experienced the new treatment versus those that experienced some control condition: the experimenter is also
logically free to “blame” an auxiliary hypothesis involved in the research, for example, the outcome measures
were not sensitive to changes that did occur, or the dosage of the experimental treatment was insufficient, or the
therapists were not properly trained to be faithful to the experimental protocol, and so on. Thus, the belief that
“the experimental treatment is more effective than the control” can be saved by pointing the falsifying force of the
experimental to one or more of these auxiliary hypotheses. A reasonable question that follows from the Quine-
Duhem problem, then, is “Under what conditions is it appropriate for a scientist to suggest that their problematic
results are due to auxiliary hypotheses, and under what conditions is it inappropriate to identify auxiliary
hypotheses as the legitimate target of the arrows of modus tollens?” This problem also suggest that scientists can
never isolate beliefs to best singly but rather it is the scientist’s entire web of belief that comes under test and the
best research can do is to point out the contradictory beliefs in the web.

One of Popper’s own students, attempted to provide a framework for how this key question can be properly
addressed. Lakatos suggested Popper’s model of science of deductive falsification was what he called “naive
methodological falsification (O’Donohue, 2013).” Lakatos stated there cannot be a single study or an experiment
that falsifies some favored theory. Rather, there is a body of research that is evaluated over a series of
investigations that can falsify, which he termed “sophisticated methodological falsificationism.” This form of
falsificationism also importantly differentiated between what Lakatos called progressive and degenerating
research programs. Progressive research programs respond to disconfirmatory data differently than degenerating PDF
research programs. In a progressive research program, if disconfirmatory results are found and if the researcherHelp
blames an auxiliary hypothesis, the research must also make modifications to the theory so that it has both
increased empirical scope (i.e., makes novel predictions) and some of these novel predictions eventually have to
be shown to be corroborated. Degenerating research paradigms will fail to meet one of these conditions. Thus, a
comprehensive understanding of a falsificationist view of science should include both Popperian falsification, a
discussion of the Quine-Duhem problem, and Lakatos’ proposed solution. As such, it can help the student
understand the extent to which competing accounts of some phenomena are progressive or degenerating—a
more sophisticated and revealing account than simply the notion of whether the account has been tested at all
and whether any of these data are supportive.

Verisimilitude/Tentativeness of Science

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There are also important disagreements regarding the nature of truth as it relates to science. The field of
epistemology seeks to understand the essential features of “knowledge” and relatedly “truth” as knowledge is
often characterized as justified true belief. One major theory is the correspondence theory of truth, which posits
that as a belief increasingly corresponds to reality, that belief is said to be true. A major goal of science from this
perspective is to develop a belief system that corresponds with reality, such that reality can be described with
accuracy (O’Donohue, 2013). A second competing account of truth is the coherence theory of truth, stating that
propositions are true if and only if they are logically supported by other beliefs in a network of beliefs that is itself
logically coherent.

Both theories of truth have been heavily criticized by philosophers of science for various inadequacies. For
example, Popper (1957) argued that knowledge was not justified true belief (Plato, 1997), but was the tentative
holding of theories whose experiments seemed to corroborate those theories. Popper stressed that because a
theory always has to be potential to be shown to be false (because only a small fraction of all possible falsifying
tests have actually been conducted), then at best it can only be said that the theory approximates the truth
(O’Donohue, 2013). In terms of application to the study of psychology, it is important for undergraduate students
to understand the complexities around how truth and fact are defined, especially given that facts that have been
discovered in the past have been disproven by modern research in the present.

The Role of Theory in Hypothesis Formation

Theories carry their own ontological assumptions about the kinds of entities that exist in nature. Thus, theory
influences what types of questions can be asked and how these can be answered (O’Donohue, 1989). For
example, methodological behaviorists do not form theories about unconscious processes or other intersubjectivity
nonobservable phenomena. Radical behaviorists accept discussion about so-called private events, but refuse to
grant these status as causal entities and thus independent variables in research. However, there are questions
about what actually constitutes a theory—such as, do theories need to contain scientific laws? And there are
questions about the logical relationships between theories and hypotheses—do hypotheses need to be deduced
from theories? Finally, psychology has had a tradition of “dustbowl empiricism” in which all theories were viewed
as superfluous at best, and misleading at worst. This presents a challenge for undergraduate students attempting
to make sense of the dizzying number of often contradictory theories in the domain of psychology.

The Role of Theoretical Competition

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Beyond deciding what constitutes a theory, the question also remains whether theories can be properly evaluated Help

with solely with respect to themselves, (e.g., their evidential support) or whether theories that seek to solve the
same problem(s) must be compared against one another and evaluated on their relative merits? Laudan (1978)
provided a framework for comparing theories with one another. Laudan (1978) argued that science is ultimately a
problem-solving activity, and that theories can be compared on the extent and on the rate that they solve
problems.

Possible Theory-Ladenness of Facts

While theory impacts the types of questions asked in research, philosophers of science have been concerned
that theory also can possibly shape the way data are seen and interpreted. If this is the case, then the concern is
that data are not independent from the theory and thus can there are no independent tests of a theory but rather

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only tests with “theory-ladened” data. The theory-ladenness of facts also indicates that the same set of facts can
be interpreted differently, depending on the beliefs and background of the observer.

Social Constructism Versus Natural Kinds

Social constructionism “. . . aims to discover the way social phenomena are invented, become known, are
disseminated, are institutionalized and finally come to constitute tradition” (O’Donohue, 2013, p. 124). For
example, the constructs of race and gender are viewed by a social constructionist as a term that is a product of a
unique and human history (e.g., the sociopolitical context in which the terms developed), the result of human
choices (e.g., decisions being formed about the kinds of demographic groups that individuals should be divided
among), invented by humans (e.g., arbitrary distinctions about what countries determine membership in the
Hispanic class), and usually serving someone’s interests in power and hurting others (e.g., racial distinctions
provide a system in which the race in power can discriminate against other races). On the other hand, proponents
of natural kinds argue that nature can be objectively carved at its joints—there is something real and objective to
the periodic table of elements for example. The question becomes are the terms of science natural kinds or social
constructions? And, more importantly to our field, do the constructs used in psychology constitute social
constructs or natural kinds?

Science May Contain Biases That Are Related to

Power
Understanding the debate between social constructionism versus natural kinds also facilitates a discussion of
postmodernist views on science. Understanding postmodernist views is relevant to the pursuit of science as it
offers an alternative stance(s) on viewing and interpreting information through its emphasis on relativism, broad
skepticism, the role of ideology in establishing and preserving political power, and overall suspicion of reason
(Duignan, 2014). Postmodernists often criticize scientific realism, the idea that there is a mind-independent reality
that science uncovers. For instance, Foucault (1988) saw psychiatry as a practice used to subjugate classes of
people under the cover of a narrative of “mental illness.” Postmodernists also generally suggest that the notion of
scientific progress is a fiction as it is just a narrative to expand the power of scientists.

Rhetorical Conceptions of Science PDF

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Alan Gross (1990) argued the core of science is rhetoric, the ability to persuade. He states in his book The
Rhetoric of Science “Rhetorically, the creation of knowledge is a task beginning with self-persuasion and ending
with the persuasion of others” (Gross, 1990, p. 3). Gross argued that the fundamental tasks of science all involve
persuasion. Scientists must first persuade themselves that they are researching the right question, that they have
the right methods for their question, that they have created a reasonably well-designed study, and so forth. They
must also eventually persuade others, such as persuading institutional review boards that their methods are
ethical, or persuading a grant committee to fund their research, or peer reviewers that the study ought to be
published. Gross uses the term persuasion rather than logically entail—because essentially, he views these key
decisions in science as matters of judgments rather than as logical entailments. It is unclear, however, if students
are being instructed about the possibility that persuasion and not simply dispassionate evaluation of evidence
factors into the process of scientific investigation.

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Method

Undergraduate Texts
In order to evaluate how science and the aforementioned complexities of science are being represented and
taught at the undergraduate level, a review of undergraduate psychology textbooks was conducted. To explore
how science is depicted and psychology’s relationship to science is characterized, 30 basic undergraduate
psychology textbooks were reviewed. We hypothesized that there would be little consistency across textbook
authors on the depiction of science. Additionally, we also hypothesized that these texts would fail to mention most
of the key subproblems of science described above, thus presenting a settled but misleading and simplistic view
of science.

Text Selection
A convenience sample of 30 textbooks were selected from undergraduate psychology courses taught at the
University of Nevada, Reno in addition to textbooks located in the university library, textbook samples obtained
from publishers, and electronic copies found on Amazon.com. While small, this sample size exceeded previous
similar studies, including Griggs and Jackson (2013) which assessed 13 textbooks and Habarth et al. (2011)
which assessed 11 textbooks. The sample size also equaled a more recent study that also examined 30
textbooks (Griggs, 2015). The books ranged in publishing year from 1998 to 2017, and came from the following
categories: eight abnormal psychology textbooks, 13 introductory psychology textbooks, five cognitive, and four
social psychology textbooks. Table 1

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contains a complete list of the texts reviewed. During the planning phase of the study, the possibility to limit the
review to texts of only one course (e.g., only introductory texts or only cognitive psychology texts) was
considered. However, it was decided to examine texts from across specializations for three reasons. First,
cognitive, social, abnormal, and introductory psychology classes often serve as “gatekeeper” classes where
students are exposed to the basics of psychology and thus still cover basic matters such as what are legitimate
research methods, legitimate questions, and so on. Second, these kinds of issues could either be seen as too
difficult for an introductory course—thus investigating their presence in texts of more advanced courses would be
called for—or, on the other hand, basic and thus germane to be covered in an introductory course. Because
either possibility is plausible we chose to cover both. Finally, the number of reviewed texts increased to PDF
acceptable levels after widening our search to other core psychological areas aside from introductory texts. Help

Text Coding
A content analysis of major key topics was conducted for this study. Each book chapter was coded on 18 different
categories. Each category was selected based on its importance to science and feasibility of detection. The
following categories were selected: (a) what constitutes science is controversial; (b) bad (pseudo) science; (c)
second demarcation problem; (d) deductive stance; (e) inductive stance; (f) verisimilitude/tentativeness of
science; (g) theory ladenness of facts; (h) the role of theory in hypothesis formation; (i) the role of competing
theories (i.e., Laudan); (j) social constructionism (vs. natural kinds); (k) rhetorical views of science; (l) science and
biases (e.g., political influences); (m) the role of ad hoc hypotheses; (n) evolutionary epistemology; (o) recognition
of conceptual problems (i.e., is it important for science to address conceptual problems or only empirical ones?);
(p) Kuhnian paradigms; (q) mature versus preparadigm sciences; and (r) strict method versus “anything goes”
(i.e., Feyerabend). Further details regarding the categories are included in Table 2.

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Coding was conducted by two doctoral clinical psychology students enrolled in a doctoral level philosophy of
science and history of psychology course as well as William O’Donohue. The following procedure was used for
coding each textbook. Coders examined the introductory chapter of the book, as broad issues about science are
usually covered in this chapter. Additionally, any dedicated methods chapters were coded for the same reason, as
most method chapters usually include a broad description of what science is. Finally, chapter summaries were
investigated to ensure that other the topics in question were not contained in other chapters of the textbook.
When possible, this was also confirmed by the use of keyword searches in any electronic version. Coders were PDF
instructed to code a category if the issue was explicitly or implicitly (i.e., in the context of something else)
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discussed in the text. A detailed coding scheme provided brief definitions and examples for each category as well
as instructions on how to code for the issue. If a topic was not discussed in the text (explicitly or implicitly), coders
were instructed to code this as a 0. If it was found that the author/authors had a positive/supporting stance on a
category, it was coded as a 1. Conversely, if it was found that author/authors had a negative/opposing stance on
a category, it was coded as a 2. If a category was discussed, but it was unclear about the stance taken coders
were instructed to code this as a 3. Please see supplemental appendix
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/arc0000040.supp) for full coding scheme including specific category and coding criteria.

Interrater Reliability
Interrater reliability was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa, the standard for assessing interrater agreement with
categorical variables. Three out of the 30 total books coded were assessed for interrater reliability, meeting the
conventional criterion of 10% of the sample. A minimum Cohen’s Kappa of 0.8 was used as a cut-off for interrater

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reliability as Cohen regarded this as “almost perfect agreement” (McHugh, 2012). A Cohen’s Kappa value of 1.00
was obtained after analyzing rater agreements and disagreements for each category, indicating perfect
agreement. Overall, there were 54 total agreements out of 28 cases, and 108 independent decisions. There was
one disagreement during the coding; however, this discrepancy was discussed among the raters and a
consensus was reached resolving the disagreement.

Results
To investigate the hypothesis of the extent to which there were inconsistencies between authors regarding
definitions of science, a simple frequency count was used for each item, these results are presented in Table 3.

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In the sample of 30 textbooks, the categories of “anything goes (i.e., Feyerabend), ad hoc hypotheses, and
rhetorical views of science” (n = 29) were only discussed once in the sample. The remaining 29 books in the
sample did not discuss these categories at all. The categories of evolutionary epistemology (n = 3), whether
psychology is a preparadigmatic science or a mature science (n = 3), role of competing theories and evaluations
in science (n = 6), social constructionism (n = 3), and Kuhnian paradigms (n = 3) where discussed in between
10% to 20% of the sample.

For the metascience issues actually discussed, the textbooks most often took a positive or supportive stance. In
53.3% of textbooks (n = 16) there was some discussion of the role of theory in hypothesis testing. The items most
frequently supported included: the role of competing theories (supporting n = 6, opposing n = 2),
verisimilitude/tentativeness of science (supporting n = 10, opposing n = 2), and deductive stance (supporting n =
7, unclear n = 3). Two texts suggested that psychology was, in fact, a Kuhnian mature (normal) science, while no
text suggested it was preparadigmatic. Also, more than a quarter of the sampled books (n = 8) identified
pseudoscience as a concern and discussed how to differentiate pseudoscience from legitimate science.

Almost a quarter (23.3%, n = 7) of the sampled textbooks explicitly stated that there is no difference between
psychology and other “hard” sciences such as chemistry and physics. Additionally, only 13.3% (n = 4) textbooks
had any sort of discussion regarding whether or not the definition of science itself is a controversial topic. Finally,
with the exception of the role of theory in hypothesis development, the most frequently discussed categories were
still included in less than 50% of the sample.

Discussion
The tentative support of the first hypothesis (i.e., that there would be little consistency in depicting what is
science), along with the frequency data showing relatively few textbooks mentioned even the highest frequency
topics investigated, suggests that undergraduate psychology students are not being provided a clear sense of
what science is and well as its complexities from their introductory psychology texts. Interestingly the data also
indicate that some texts are presenting science as an inductive enterprise, some as deductive enterprise
involving theory testing, others as both, and still others as neither inductive or deductive but rather as involving
the use of Kuhnian paradigms. However, most texts do not mention deductive or inductive approaches at all.
Some texts seem to support some postmodernist points, while the majority do not; and some describe the
problem of pseudoscience while most do not.

Despite the variance observed across texts, these data also generally suggest that students are being presented
a simplistic notion of science as having a relatively straightforward and settled characterization. Few texts PDF
mention that science is difficult to define, or that there are multiple proposed accounts of science. This is Help
concerning, especially given the continual debate regarding psychology’s (and other social sciences)
relationships to the natural sciences (the rate of problems solving progress/discovery of scientific laws is one
differentiator). Additionally, it hampers the reader’s understanding of issues such as the second demarcation
problem by insinuating that the scientific method for physics is (or ought to be) the same scientific method that is
used in psychology. Seeing science in an overly positivistic and simplistic light is known as the problem of
scientism and one wonders if there is a problem in these texts along these lines.

However, the results did indicate several strengths in undergraduate textbooks. One third of the texts reviewed (n
= 10) explicitly discussed the tentativeness of facts, and only two books in the sample stated that facts are
immutable truths instead of possessing only verisimilitude. In addition, very few textbooks took an unclear stance
or an opposing stance on the selected items. Items were either positively endorsed or simply not mentioned. This
indicates that, at the very least, while many textbooks are presenting a simplistic view of science, very few are

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reporting information that could be potentially detrimental to the education of undergraduate students (e.g.,
stating that pseudoscience is not important to consider, stating that all facts uncovered by science are immutable
truths, or saying that theory has no role in hypothesis formation).

Textbook authors appeared to be somewhat split on the existence of the “second demarcation problem” (i.e., the
idea that the social sciences are different from other natural sciences). Some of this discrepancy may reflect the
degree to which society disagrees on the role of free will in human behavior (O’Donohue, 2018). That is, if one
assumes that humans have agency and free will, then science can no longer search for universal laws that state
necessities to explain or predict human behavior, as at least in some cases the individual can freely “choose” to
behave and are not compelled in the sense that physical objects are compelled to behave. Given the contentious
nature of the free will versus determinism argument (e.g., Libet, 1999; Smilansky, 1994), perhaps it should not be
surprising that this topic was found to have the greatest variability in terms of the stance that authors took, along
with the highest number of explicitly negative statements (stating that there was not a second demarcation
problem).

Recent trends in designing of textbooks may pave the road for a more coherent understanding of what science is,
starting at the undergraduate level. Griggs and Jackson (2013) noted that an increasing number of introductory
textbooks authors are devoting an entire chapter to research methods. Logically, a discussion of “how to do
science” requires at least a cursory examination of “what science is,” perhaps providing a suitable context for
presenting science and the philosophy of science in more detail. Given the inconsistent nature in which such
discussions have been framed (as evidenced by the present study), we propose some suggestions in order to
frame an image of science in a more comprehensive manner:

Perhaps the Most Important Point Is a Metapoint—Letting the

Student Know That Defining Science and Its Relationship to the
Study of Human Behavior Is a Complex, Unsettled Issue
An introductory textbook should make this clear as well as introducing several of the more frequently cited
accounts of science, in order to give the students an introduction to the variety of depictions in existence. Most of
these accounts have important areas of agreement though, for example, that any attempt at defining science
should include that science is a problem-solving enterprise. One advantage of this is that it can allow the student
to ask the simple, easy to grasp but fundamental question of: “And to what extent is this problem solved?”
Authors of textbooks are already hard pressed to incorporate sufficient information regarding their topic of choice
in an efficient manner, therefore at a bare minimum we suggest that introductory texts make this point clear. The
remaining points are extremely important as well, but an understanding that science is a complex and still hotlyPDF
debated issue is the first critical step.
Help

The Second Demarcation Question

It is vital for undergraduates to understand the argument that the social sciences, including psychology, are
potentially different from the other natural or “hard” sciences. Core to this argument is the idea that the scientific
study of human beings is somehow different from the study of inanimate or nonconscious or nonsentient entities.
Radical ideography, free will, and the impossibility of directly observing phenomenological experiences all make
the study of human behavior potentially more complex and troublesome than other branches of science

Embedding Science Within the General Concerns of

Epistemology

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Undergraduate students may be able to particularly benefit from an understanding of what knowledge is and how
science relates to general epistemology. Epistemologists are often oriented to science because science has
resulted in an unprecedented growth of knowledge. Although an extended treatment of epistemology, including
the historical notion of knowledge as justified true beliefs (Plato, 1997), and the problems thereof (e.g., Kitcher,
1992) may be unwieldy, some discussion of whether there are other methods of generating knowledge beyond
science (as a corrective for scientism), and science as a corrective for common heuristical biases could be
particularly illuminating for those attempting to gain a liberal education.

The Dangers of Pseudoscience Within Psychology

Given the penchant that the psychological disciplines have for attracting nonscientific views and premises
(Lilienfeld, 2012), providing a comprehensive discussion for how to identify pseudoscientific theories and
correcting students’ pseudoscientific notions would appear to be critical.

Introducing Both Verificationist/Inductive and

Falsificationist/Deductive Approaches to Science
An adequate discussion should provide at least the benefits and limitations (e.g., no valid ampliative inductive
logic vs. the Quine-Duhem problem for the falsificationist) to both approaches, as well as examples of research
strategies along both lines. An excellent discussion would also include the benefits of designing research in a way
that represents a risky test of that theory as well as pitfalls of ad hoc stratagems to save favored theories or
hypotheses.

Discussing the Role of Theory in Scientific Analyses

Accounts might cover discussions of what properly constitutes a theory, and how theories both relate to data as
well, as how to rationally appraise theories. This would help corrective a rather loose and informal use of the word
“theory.”

The Role of Competition Between Theories As a Way of Selecting

Better Theories in Science
There were six textbooks in total that generally appeared to support the notion that scientific progress at least
requires some comparison of competing theories. For example, one textbook author wrote “When a better theory
is found, it will replace the old one. This is part of the accumulation of scientific knowledge” (Stangor, 2012, p.PDF
56).
This also might allow a more exacting and astute analysis of the merits of competing theories—and avoid the Help
usually incorrect view that all competing theories stand on equal footing—a position perhaps taken more to not
offend any potential textbook adopters than an accurate description of the real state of affairs.

The Role of Rhetoric, Bias, and Other Postmodernist Concerns

Should Also Be Covered
These are particularly important as they are currently popular in the general college culture. Textbooks ought to
cover the natural kinds versus social constructionist debate. Textbooks ought to critically describe concerns about
whether science is biased against women and minorities. The role of rhetoric in science is also important.

We believe that addressing at least these eight points would represent a significantly more comprehensive notion
of science and scientific study for undergraduates, and would subsequently enhance students’ abilities to assess
the merits and drawbacks of the psychological drawbacks presented in the remainder of the text.

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An integrated definition of science accounting for the complexity of science and its unsettled, nature would be
helpful in teaching undergraduates the actual nature of scientific inquiry. We propose the following definition:

The question “What is science?” is unsettled. Philosophers of science have

examined this question for over a century and have not reached any consensus.
Science’s aims are debated—although many believe it is an attempt to solve
problems such as “Why do some people want to commit suicide?” But even this
statement is reveals further complexities: (a) It reveals that scientific problems
involve subproblems: “How can we accurately measure if someone intends to
commit suicide?” (b) It reveals that science involves conceptual problems—how do
we exactly define “an intention to commit suicide”—is a stray thought about its
benefits sufficient. Is something stronger needed? and (c) It can involve deeper
philosophical problems such as free will versus determinism: “Are we measuring an
aspect of free will—a person’s ability to choose their own actions, such as suicide,
instead of being simply a passive conduit of causal forces?” Also, it is important to
note that some critics suggest that “science is problem solving” is a too sanitized
notion of what science is doing; these critiques such as the postmodernists suggest
that science is a tool of the powerful, especially White western males to retain and
expand their power.

Now that we have a sketch of some of the controversies about the aim of science,
let’s briefly outline some of the controversies about the process of science. First,
there are questions about whether science relies on inductive logic—roughly
reasoning from many observations to more general statements or rather it involves a
deductive logic—roughly attempting to falsify beliefs. There are also debates about
the extent to which the data that could do either of these things are theory-laden—
that is, not truly independent from the theory these are evaluating.

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An important question to consider is whether these topics are best discussed in introductory textbooks or if they
should also be included in other more advanced level textbooks. Our argument is that these topics should be Help
included in any basic undergraduate classes covering the traditional core areas of psychology, including
abnormal, research methods, cognitive, personality, social, and so on as it is important for the all these domains
to present a consistent view of science and psychology’s relationship to it. In addition, covering these issues is
also relevant for the general goals of a liberal education; these issues cover logic, definition of knowledge, bias in
science, how to evaluate theories and other topics that can apply to the informed citizen’s appraisal of important
issues ranging from human contributions to climate change, to the legitimacy of research involving Big Pharma, to
understanding whether evolution is “just a theory.”

Another possible concern that has been raised is how much space it would take in textbooks to adequately
discuss these issues and if these are even necessary at the undergraduate level. Without a solid understanding
of science, it is difficult or impossible to define pseudoscience and thus it is difficult to separate good science from
not so good science—a critical issue in psychology. Moreover, it would be helpful to help the undergraduate to
understand why his or her experience of a psychology textbook is different than his or her experience of a

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chemistry or physics text. This would involve understanding possible reasons why psychological science has not
enjoyed the same rate of progress as these other sciences. This important question can be partly addressed by
the complexities of applying traditional notions of science to human behavior. Additionally, introductory textbooks
from across psychological domains often contain extensive descriptions of the history of psychology, frequently
beginning with the ancient Greeks, followed by a discussion of theories of mental illness in the Dark Ages
including the subject of trephining. This information is certainly interesting; however, it often dwarfs the amount of
detail paid to defining science and its relation to psychology. We would propose shortening these historical
sections to allow for a longer discussion on the philosophical issues that are currently impacting the field.

Another area of concern that requires additional research is in the so-called “foundational myths” of psychology. It
was observed that many of the historical sections in the undergraduate textbooks detail the classic studies of
recent history, for example the Stanford Prison Experiment, the Milgram experiments, and so forth. However,
there is mounting evidence that these studies are not being represented accurately in undergraduate texts.
Griggs (2015), for example, found that since 1984 distorted coverage of the Asch social pressure experiment not
only persisted in textbooks but significantly increased. These historical sections need careful revision to ensure
accurate representation of the landmark studies in our field.

It is important to note that textbooks in undergraduate psychology serve not only to instruct, but also to essentially
indoctrinate students into a particular way of thinking. It is entirely possible that some of the issues raised above
were not included in textbooks simply because their authors did not agree with them or decided that they did not
fit the narrative they were attempting to craft. However, this was one of the reasons that this study focused on a
variety of different issues related to the philosophy of science. It is possible that writers may attempt to advance
an inductive instead of a deductive view of science; however, most textbooks failed to mention either. While there
is still debate in the field over what philosophical views will best advance the science of psychology, the
undergraduate textbooks bare little evidence of such disagreement. Textbooks should be able to present their
author’s perspectives while still indicating these issues are far from being resolved and still open to discussion
and interpretation.

The present study has several methodological limitations worth mentioning, particularly the number of textbooks
analyzed, unequal balance of textbook types, and how textbooks were gathered and evaluated. While more than
doubling the sample size of several previous studies, the current sized sample of textbooks obtained is a
limitation in this study. The limited number of texts evaluated precluded further additional statistical analyses of
the texts due to the lack of statistical power. Having an unequally distributed number of texts by subject matter
(i.e., eight abnormal books, 13 introductory books, five cognitive books, and four social books) further limits the
kinds of comparisons that can be drawn. Textbooks were obtained by convenience sample, diminishing the
generalizability of our findings as the books sampled may not be a true representation of undergraduate PDF
psychology texts. The primary reason for the smaller number of textbooks was the difficulty in acquiring full text Help
copies for our analysis. Free textbooks samples often did not include the chapters where issues related to the
definition and conceptualization of science were discussed. Additionally, local sources and sample textbooks
provided by publishers had a limited selection of textbooks that could be utilized in this study. Future research
should consider partnering with larger textbook publishers or enlisting the resources of several university libraries
in order to widen the sample of textbooks used. However, despite the relatively small sample size and
heterogeneity of textbooks, it still is possible to gain information that multiple textbooks across varying domains
struggle with the complexities of accurately defining science and it relates to psychology.

Future research into this topic may also provide important insights for the training of undergraduate psychology
students. Notably, the present study neglects any lecture material presented as an adjunct to textbooks that may
cover some of these gaps in didactic instruction. However, a thorough understanding of the kinds of subject
matter absent in textbooks may inform instructors on how to better compile lecture material that accounts for

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these gaps. The field of psychology still faces many daunting challenges in its efforts to understand human
behavior. Improving undergraduates’ grasp on science and its relationship to psychology is an important step in
training the next generation of researchers to be able to answer these important questions.

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Supplemental material:https://doi.org/10.1037/arc0000040.supp (https://doi.org/10.1037/arc0000040.supp)

Data repository:https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36966.v1
This article is part of the special section “Heterodox Issues in Psychology.” The guest editor for this section is
Scott O. Lilienfeld.The authors have made available for use by others the data that underlie the analyses
presented in this article (see O’Donohue & Willis, 2017 ), thus allowing replication and potential extensions of this
work by qualified researchers. Next users are obligated to involve the data originators in their publication plans, if
the originators so desire.
Copyright of this manuscript belongs to the author(s). The author(s) grant(s) the American Psychological
Association the exclusive right to publish this manuscript first, identify itself as the original publisher, and claim all
commercial exploitation rights. Upon publication, the manuscript is available to the public to copy, distribute, or
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content.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Brendan Willis, Department of
Psychology, University of Nevada, 1664 North Virginia Street Reno, NV 89557-0296
Email: brendanwillis@nevada.unr.edu (mailto:brendanwillis@nevada.unr.edu)
Received July 31, 2017
Revision received November 20, 2017
Accepted November 23, 2017

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