En Banc (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993) : 296 Phil. 694
En Banc (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993) : 296 Phil. 694
En Banc (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993) : 296 Phil. 694
EN BANC
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In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch
66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
[1] [2]
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was
[3]
instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
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[4]
unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
"x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to -?
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements."
[5]
and granting the plaintiffs "x x x such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of
7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with
rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna
may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance
of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of
the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of
which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum --
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent
spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j)
the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation
of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide
gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
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"CAUSE OF ACTION
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber
license agreements (‘TLA's,’) to various corporations to cut the aggregate area
of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex ‘A’.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum
or 25 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour -- nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included -- the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest
the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to
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plaintiffs -- especially plaintiff minors and their successors -- who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs’ letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
‘B’.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's, to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an
act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been
abundantly blessed with.
‘(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
‘(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
and 'make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic).' (Section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution);
c. ‘conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic).’
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. ‘protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.’ (Section 16,
Article II, id.).
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind -- the
natural law -- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-
[6]
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear
and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion
[7]
to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim -- that the complaint states
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question -- sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also
[8]
joined the latter in this case.
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
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Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action
as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging
than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment
clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore
assert that the petitioners’ recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains
effective for a certain period of time -- usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity,
the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due
notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since
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the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
[9]
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
[10]
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to
the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order read as follows:
xxx
“After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right
they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine,
plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
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Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of 'Separation of Powers' of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
[11]
would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.”
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified
data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also
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for those to come -- generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution -- air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental
balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right
to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
[13]
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then
[14]
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall
be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section
3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection
and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the development and use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of
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the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental
cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
[15]
Code of 1987, specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. -- (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the
present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account
social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on
the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. -- (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of
the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and
future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfil the
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social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and
(c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
[16]
and well-being." As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee
[17]
and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations.” The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty -- under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 -- to protect
and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
"x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
[18]
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
[19]
complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
[20] [21]
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid
down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a
blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under
the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subs-
heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly of partly, the
reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
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The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless,
be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
[22]
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz, a distinguished member of his Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of ‘grave abuse of
discretion,’ which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary."
[23]
In Daza vs. Singson, Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: x x x."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-
impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
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license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
[24]
would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the fundamental law."
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
"x x x Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein x x x."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
[25]
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
[26]
Secretary:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
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or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the
due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended.
Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
[27]
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant
case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non?impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
[28]
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., this Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute.
The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare."
[29]
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, quoted in Philippine
[30]
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, to wit:
"’Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general
rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his
freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.’"
[31]
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
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Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause
could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of
renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED,
and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-
777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., see separate opinion concurring in the result.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, and Vitug, JJ., no part.
[1]
Rollo, 164; 186.
[2]
Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.
[3]
Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
[4]
Rollo, 67.
[5]
Id., 74.
[6]
Rollo, 70-73.
[7]
Annex "B" of Petition; Id., 43-44.
[8]
Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.
[9]
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.
[10]
Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.
[11]
Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.
[12]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.
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[13]
For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony.
[14]
The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
[15]
E.O. No. 292.
[16]
Section 1.
[17]
Section 2.
[18]
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.
Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19
SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1
[1991].
[19]
Section 1(g), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.
[20]
Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.; Madrona vs.
Rosal, supra.
[21]
39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].
[22]
1991 ed., 226-227.
[23]
180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig,
191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].
[24]
Rollo, 44.
[25]
125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].
[26]
190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].
[27]
Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[28]
110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.
[29]
291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.
[30]
22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].
[31]
Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
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Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authorithy, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].
CONCURRING OPINION
FELICIANO, J.:
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J. in this
case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last
few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly
the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of
course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision. pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners’ claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi
to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of “class” here involved -- membership in this
“class” appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future -- it
appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries’ right of action in
the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such a beneficiaries’ right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown (“prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies”), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in
an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon “one
specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology” (Decision, p.
14). There is no question that “the right to a balanced and healthful ecology” is “fundamental”
and that, accordingly, it has been “constitutionalized.” But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as “specific,”
without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to “a balanced and
healthful ecology.” The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric
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appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and
smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 --
all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 (“the right --- to a balanced and healthful
ecology”) and 15 (“the right to health”).
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled “The Philippine Environment Code,” is,
upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more “specific environment management
policies” and “environment quality standards” (fourth “Whereas” clause, Preamble) relating to
an extremely wide range of topics:
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment
Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
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Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The
Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners’ cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific
legal right -- a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II
(15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed
to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of
law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of
the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause
of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for
at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution which reads:
“Section 1. xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as “the right to a balanced and healthy ecology” and
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“the right to health” are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as “a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,” the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and executive departments --
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J. rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA’s petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must
be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners’ entitlement to
the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one
or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I
suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners’ specific
legal right and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded
by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The
doctrines set out in the Court’s decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.
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