SOUTH ASIA’S STRATEGIC SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT

Ehsan Mehmood Khan

Abstract

South Asia is home to nearly one-fourth of humanity. It

also has one of the largest arrays of territorial and non-
territorial disputes in the world. The region has witnessed
several interstate wars and warlike situations besides a
number of intrastate insurgencies, ethnic discords and
confrontations in the last about seven decades. As a
consequence, the strategic security environment of the region
is overshadowed by traditional military security of the state.
Human security of virtually 1.57 billion people remains
hostage to the security perceptions based on the nature of
conflicts rather than human sufferings based on shared
realities. This paper analyzes key expressions and
manifestations of the security paradigm so as to recommend
practicable measures for a comprehensive, cooperative and
holistic security framework.

Introduction

History, geography, demography, and political opportunity

structure intermix to formulate national purpose, interests
and inspirations of a state. National interests stipulate
economic, social and political priorities. These, in turn, shape
a strategic construct – strategic mindset and security
paradigm – consistent with the power potential of the nation.
The string goes down to the lowest rung in a manner that it
receives light from the national purpose to the extent it must.
While economic, social and political concerns are debated
openly by the policymakers and strategic planners, they often
downplay the imprints of religion on decision making and
policy formulation process. At any rate, religious beliefs play a
consequential role in evolution of strategic culture and
concerns of a country or region.
All this is as much true in case of South Asian countries as
it is for any other state, whether big or small, developed or
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developing, and overtly theological or ostensibly secular.
However, South Asia’s strategic culture is quite different from
other major regions of the world because of its peculiar
security issues and atypical security calculus. Geo-historic,
geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economic and geo-cultural
dimensions together play their part in making and
maintaining the security construct of the region. Besides,
security interests of major powers of the world create an
unbreakable interface thereby leaving irremovable imprints
on the regional security landscape.

South Asia is one of the most militarized zones in the world

and home to inter-state and intra-state wars. Having
remained in a state of conflict for centuries, and especially
since 1947, it has turned into a “Corridor of Instability” on the
globe. Security problems of the region range from traditional
to non-traditional and state security to human security. State
security overshadows human security in a number of ways,
and people remain to be the ultimate sufferers. Thus, the
region is hostage to a security web of its own, and would
seemingly remain so in the decades to come.

Location and Makeup

Located in the heart of Asia, the South Asian region

physically stretches from the Hindu Kush to the Malay
Peninsula and from the Indian Ocean to the Himalayas, 1 and
is bordered by the Middle East, Central Asia, China and South
East Asia. This way, it is a meeting point for various important
regions on the globe. Thus, events and activities in South Asia
directly affect the contiguous regions and indirectly affect
remaining parts of the world. Likewise, any sort of
developments in the adjacent regions, too, reflect on the South
Asian affairs.

Traditionally, South Asia has been understood as a region

comprising seven countries namely Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives.
However, an extended definition of the area in keeping with
the archives of the UN shows Afghanistan too as part of South

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 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

Asia. Figure-1 illustrates.2 It is of note that the South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) initially
consisted of seven countries. Later, Afghanistan, too, became
a member. The composition of South Asia in this paper is,
hence, based on the UN definition of South Asia as well as
present membership of SAARC.

There is a unique
mismatch between
the population and
landmass of the
region (Figure-2).3
For instance, South
Asia’s population
(1,577,744,692) when
combined with that
of China
(1,338,612,968)
comes to
2,677,225,936 and is
thus 54% of this total
(Figure-3).4 On the
other hand, the
region has nearly
35% of the territorial
area when combined
with that of China
(9,596,961 square
kilometre). Similarly, compared with the European Union, the
region has virtually thrice more population (1,577,744,692 vis-
à-vis 491,582,852). To put it in global comparison, South Asia
has 23.23% of world population (6,790,062,216) dwelling on
1% of the globe (510.072 million square kilometre).5 These
comparisons have been given herein for the reason that
demographic and territorial composition of South Asia has a
concrete linkage with makeup of its security paradigm.

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 South Asia’s Strategic Security Environment

South Asia has a

diverse territory
ranging from fertile
plains to vast desert
stretches and the
highest mountain
ranges in the world.
To note, top thirteen
mountain peaks of
the world are located
in the Karakoram
and Himalaya
mountain ranges of
South Asia.6 The
region has
tremendous tapped
and untapped natural
resources. Throughout the recorded history of the region, it
attracted traders and invaders especially from the Central Asia
and the Middle East. Intermarriages, immigration and
settlements changed the demography of the region to a great
extent. Likewise, it paved a way for new religions and
languages. Today, South Asia is home to a number of major
world religions, ethnic tribes, races and languages. All these
are
inalienable
features of
security
outlook in
the region.
There are
numerous
other
expressions
e.g. sects
within Islam
and
Christianity,
and castes
within Hinduism. Thus, South Asia has tremendous

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 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

heterogeneity, which adds complexity to the already intricate

security atmosphere.

Inter-state conflicts involve huge unsettled territory;

indeed, unparalleled with territorial disputes elsewhere in the
world. This, source of conflict, is the most dangerous
dimension of security in the region. This needs dexterity and
statesmanship on part of the South Asian leadership so as to
manage security and maintain stability in the region. With
unsettled inter-state disputes and unmediated intra-state
ethnic interests, human security atmosphere of the region
remains clothed in despair and desolation. This calls for a
regional approach to interconnection, interdependence,
integration and unity within the diversity, which is supported
by the UN Charter, too.7

Dynamics and Manifestations of Security Paradigm

South Asia is at war with itself. This densely populated

chunk of territory on the globe is heavily militarized too. The
region is carrying the burden of history. Historical memories
of the partition of India in 1947, the colonial legacies and more
so, the Muslim rule in India before the British colonized it,
have left strong imprints on the hearts and minds of the
people, which are acting as psychological determinant in
virtually all human affairs including the statecraft. It is here
that the religion interacts with security. These are, thus, a
major impediment on the way to concord and conciliation,
and a stumbling block for regional security and stability. The
state policies are influenced by political concerns and security
perceptions from top to bottom. Due to the same reasons,
even the most technical issues pending solution, often,
transform into geo-political moorings and politico-military
disputes. This has given birth to an intricate security template
and conflict landscape.

South Asia’s dynamics of conflict that shape up the

regional security environment have four principal motivations
namely the historical memories, colonial legacies, ethnicity
and foreign linkages. These motivations transform into

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 South Asia’s Strategic Security Environment

dangerous expressions leading to drastic consequences for the

individual states and societies as well the region as a whole, as
shown in Figure-4.8 The ultimate product of this complex
nature of security environment is an unremitting instability,
which leads to primacy of militarism rather than humanism.
Key manifestations of security paradigm are (Figure-5): 9 inter-
state wars; intra-state insurgencies; conflict management
rather than resolution; an unending conventional arms race;
nuclearization (of India and Pakistan); interventional politics
i.e. regional intervention; extra-regional intervention (e.g.
presence of foreign forces in form of International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan); 10 and human
insecurity, which is a by-product of some of these and a cogent
reason for others.

This has embedded a sort of mini Cold War in the region

especially in
case of the two
largest
countries i.e.
India and
Pakistan,
which keeps
playing its role
even in softer
human affairs
like sports and
cultural
activities. For
instance, a
cricket match
between India
and Pakistan
is taken
nothing less than a military encounter, though in non-kinetic
form, by many people of two countries.11

It is of note that South Asia is home to the world’s oldest

surviving UN mission, United Nations Military Observer
Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The UNMOGIP

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 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

dates back to January 1949 and operates on either side of the

Ceasefire Line (now the Line of Control) between the two
parts of Kashmir; Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Indian-
Occupied Kashmir.12

India-Centric Regional Disputes

The region is home to the world’s largest territorial

disputes. Important to note is that most of them involve India,
thereby
instituting an
India-centric
security
paradigm in
South Asia. Key
ones to name
are: India-China
Aksai Chin
dispute; India-
China South
Tibet/ Arunachal
Pradesh
dispute;13 India-
Pakistan
Kashmir dispute;
India-Pakistan
Sir Creek
dispute; India-
Pakistan dispute
over construction of dams by India in violation of the Indus
Water Treaty; Pak-Afghan argument over cross border
movement of militants; India-Bangladesh border dispute over
51 Bangladeshi enclaves and 111 Indian enclaves; India-
Bangladesh sea boundary dispute over New Moore/ South
Talpatty/Purbasha Island in the Bay of Bengal; 14 India-
Bangladesh Farraka Dam dispute; India-Nepal Boundary
dispute including 400 squares kilometres on the source of
Kalapani River; and India’s argument over militants’ crossing
with Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma and Bhutan. Figure-6
illustrates.15

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Kashmir, nevertheless, remains the site of the world’s

largest and
most militarized
territorial
dispute.16 It is
often referred to
as a nuclear
flash point on
the globe.
Kashmir is not
only an
unfinished
agenda of the
partition but
also an
unresolved
dispute of the
UN. The UNSC
adopted various
resolutions in
1948, 1949,
1950 and 1951
to resolve the
issue
democratically
but it has yet to
succeed. For
instance, in
1951 the UNSC,
through a resolution endorsed, “Reminding the governments
and authorities concerned of the principle embodied in its
resolutions 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948, 51 (1948) of 3 June
1948 and 80 (1950) of 14 March 1950 and the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August
1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the
will of the people expressed through democratic method of a
free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of
the United Nations…”17

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 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

To this end, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had articulated: “I

should like to make it clear that [the] question of aiding
Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to
influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we
have repeatedly made public, is that [the] question of
accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in
accordance with the wishes of the people and we adhere to
this view.”18 He further pronounced, “We have declared that
the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people.
That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it,
not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will
not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace
and law and order have been established to have a referendum
held under international auspices like the United Nations. We
want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we
shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster
[sic] offer.”19

The plebiscite could never be held. The issue not only

remains unresolved but is even more complicated today. More
than the territorial area or geo-strategic interests of the
nations, Kashmir is a human security issue for millions of
people, some of whom are living in a split family status and
many of them as refugee for the last about seven decades. The
territorial area of Kashmir is 222,236 square kilometres (total
on both sides of the Line of Control). It is only a little less than
the United Kingdom’s 243,610 square kilometres and more
than the territorial areas of Bangladesh (143,998 square
kilometres) and North Korea (120,538 square kilometres), and
virtually double the area of Bulgaria (110,879 square
kilometres). It is nearly five times larger than the territorial
areas of Denmark (43,094 square kilometres) and
Netherlands (41,543 square kilometres). These figures have
been given to put it in comparative perspective. The South
Asian nations also have hosts of non-territorial arguments.

Interstate Conventional Wars

The territorial and non-territorial issues have, in the past

led to wars between India and Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and

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1971, and India and China in 1962. Skirmishes between India

and Bangladesh border security forces are also a routine
bulletin in the region. Besides, the Line of Control (formerly
the Ceasefire Line) in Kashmir is in a virtual state of war since
1947.

Intrastate Arguments and Insurgencies

All the eight South Asian nations are home to different

types of ethnic arguments, confrontation, insurgencies,
violence and militancy. The key ones to note are: Taliban
Movement in Afghanistan and Federally Administrated Tribal
Areas (FATA) of Pakistan;20 Maoist insurgency in seven out of
total 28 states of India (aptly termed as the seven sisters);
Naxilite insurgency in India, which Dr Manmohan Singh, the
Indian Prime Minister, termed as the single biggest internal
security threat21 (the area affected by Naxilism is popularly
termed as the Red Corridor);22 LTTE in Sri Lanka;23 the
Maoists insurgency in Nepal, which lasted till 2006 and is
passing through post-culmination settlement phase; and
insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts region of Bangladesh.24

As a matter of fact, there are hundreds of militant

organizations operating in South Asia.25 Take the case of
India; there are virtually 200 armed terrorist organizations /
groups – most of them from the majority Hindu community –
that have picked up arms against the state and minority
communities with one motive or the other.26 Recently, India’s
Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde stated, “We have
got an investigation report that be it the RSS or BJP, their
training camps are promoting Hindu terrorism. We are
keeping a strict vigil on all this. We will have to think about it
seriously and will have to remain alert.” 27 This is too late a
confession, indeed. A lot of damage has already been done.

South Asia has now become home to transnational

terrorism with streaks of global terrorism, too. Pakistan and
Afghanistan are facing the worst kind of terrorism on the
globe with international and regional terrorist organizations

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operating in the mountainous border region receiving support

from other countries.

Regional Interventions

Interventional politics is part of the security paradigm in

South Asia. While it is true in some other cases too, India, the
largest country both in terms of territory and population and
with hegemonic desires and designs, has never missed an
exploitable opportunity in any country of the region. Indian
intervention in Sri Lanka in form of Indian Peace Keeping
Force (IPKF) in 1987 was a militaristic expression, still fresh
to the memories of the Sri Lankan people. 28 India has always
been interfering in Balochistan province of Pakistan during
various rounds of militancy there. It is also using its presence
in Afghanistan to nurture trouble in Pakistan. To this end,
Charles Timothy Chuck Hagel, the 24th US Secretary of
Defense, in a speech at Oklahoma’s Cameron University in
2011, articulated without mincing a word: “India for some
time has always used Afghanistan as a second front … India
has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side
of the border.”29 Earlier, Dr Christine Fair, a senior political
scientist at the RAND Corporation, said in 2009: “I think it is
unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan's apprehensions
about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition
with India. Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan,
Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main
activity. Moreover, India has run operations from its mission
in Mazar and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has
reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the (Pak-Afghan)
border.”30

India has expanded and extended its military presence in

the region. It is particularly expanding westward. For
instance, it has declared diplomatic presence in eight cities of
Iran and Afghanistan to include: Iran – Embassy in Tehran
and consulates in Bandar Abbas and Zahedan; Afghanistan –
Embassy in Kabul and consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat,
Jalalabad and Kandahar. Besides, it has declared non-
diplomatic presence both in Iran and Afghanistan. Its largest

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project in Iran is revamping of Chahbahar port. India is

running 84 different projects in Afghanistan especially in the
provinces of Kandahar, Zaranj, Herat, Mazare-e-Sharif, Pul-e-
Khumri and Kunar.31 There is strong evidence that the Indian
intelligence agencies are working as part of all these projects.
India has extended its outreach beyond Afghanistan. An
Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter squadron of MiG 29 is stationed
at Farkhor Airbase, some 130 kilometres southeast of
Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe since 2004-05. Earlier, India
had renovated Ayni airbase located 15 kilometres west of
Dushanbe at a cost of $70 million. 32 Later, they changed the
plan and stationed the IAF squadron at Farkhor. Certainly,
India has stationed these to pursue strategic military
objectives and not to carry out humanitarian activities. India
has also established a naval listening post in northern
Madagascar, off Africa’s east coast, to gather intelligence on
foreign navies.33 Indian naval presence is also reported around
Jaffna and Trincomalee Harbour in Sri Lanka, the Maldives
and Strait of Malacca. This is, indeed, a brief picture of India’s
military activities beyond its borders aimed at strangulating
the countries of the region.

Conventional Forces

South Asian nations are maintaining large-size

conventional military forces to clothe the idea of traditional
state security. The active duty manpower in the armed forces
of six countries is 2,548,000 soldiers. Country-wise
manpower is shown in Figure-7.34 This does not include the
manpower of civil armed forces (CAF), other second line
forces and task-specific security forces. The figures of
remaining two countries i.e. Bhutan and Maldives have not
been included being insignificant. Even the active armed
forces manpower of the six countries mentioned herein is
more than the individual population of 195 countries and
semi-independent entities of the world. It is more than the
total population of Australia, New Zealand, Yemen and Ghana
(individually). Also, it is more that the population of three
South Asian countries to include Sri Lanka, Bhutan and
Maldives (individually), a little more than the combined

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 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

population of Sri Lanka and Maldives, and more than double

the combined population of Bhutan and Maldives. 35 On the
average, South Asia has nearly one active duty soldier to each
square kilometre of territory, whether inhabited or
uninhabited.

The security environment has led to a unique kind of arms

race in the region. Domestic arms production and acquisition

of military equipment from abroad continues. Indigenously,
India and Pakistan are producing, assembling or overhauling
fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles, warships,
submarines, frigates, artillery guns, small arms, mines,
grenades and a lot more. On the whole, South Asia’s military
expenditures have seen an increase of 41% from 1999 to
2008.36 India became the 10th largest defence spender in the
world in 200937 and the 8th largest in 2012. South Asia’s
military spending are given in Table 1.1.38

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Table 1.1: Military Spending in South Asia 2012 (previous

years in some cases)

Country Military Spending World

(US$ billions) Ranking
India 46.219 7
Pakistan 5.16 33
Sri Lanka 1.280 65
Bangladesh 1.137 68
Afghanistan 0.250 97
Nepal 0.207 104

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2013.39

It may be seen that India is spending at least 7 to 8 times

more than the total defence budget of remaining South Asian
countries. It is also of note that these are the expenditures
declared through annual budgets. Actual outlay is certainly
more than that as several military activities remain discreet
and unannounced. Such activities include impromptu defence
purchases from abroad, expenditures on intelligence agencies/
activities, and the expenditures on unconventional forces e.g.
nuclear and missile programmes. This consequently eats into
the public taxes and national capital which could otherwise be
spent on the well-being of the hapless populace.

Nuclearization

This is yet another thread of South Asia’s security

paradigm. The Small Nuclear Forces predicted in South Asia
in mid-1980s are not as small now. 40 As of today, located in
the Eastern Nuclear Cauldron (Figure-8),41 India and Pakistan
have sizeable arsenals of ballistic missiles and nuclear
warheads – enough to wage a wide-ranging war even though
nukes are being used as weapons of foreign rather than
defence policy, and war prevention rather than war fighting.
Albeit one nuclear bomb is sufficient to destroy a city of the
size of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, or even Delhi or Lahore in case
the circumstances lead to nuclear war fighting, however,

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reports indicate
India and Pakistan
to be possessing
dozens of
warheads. One of
the sources puts it
at 60 to 80 nuclear
warheads in case of
India and 70 to 90
possessed by
Pakistan.42

India-China Rivalry

South Asia’s security environment has numerous extra-

regional linkages too. India-China border dispute has the
biggest shadow on the security environment of South Asia.
India-China rivalry, indeed, goes beyond the disputes over
Aksai Chin and South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh). Both are
vying for regional dominance and a pronounced role in global
affairs. Consequently, both are pursuing to extend their
strategic security parameter. India-China maritime rivalry in
the Indian Ocean in order to control the strategic sea routes is
a real time issue. They do not share maritime border; yet, they
are emerging as rivals to dominate the Indian Ocean and
Western Pacific Ocean. The littoral areas are coming up as the
new combat zone. For instance, China has built naval
facilities, radars and signal-intelligence (SIGINT) posts all
along the Myanmar coast and in Coco Islands. On the other
hand, India and Myanmar signed Kaladan River
transportation agreement in April 2008 that involves India’s
upgradation of Myanmar’s Sittwe Port. Likewise both have a
competition to control the Strait of Malacca, a choke point
between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, which is
extremely important for China for its strategic supply lines. In
2005, India started conducting naval patrolling with Thailand
in the Andaman Sea. Although the patrols were primarily
directed against maritime crimes, these also served to restrict
Chinese activities in the area.43

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Extra-Regional Linkages and Interests of Major

Powers

Extra-regional linkages and interest of major powers in the

region is yet another and very important dimension of South
Asia’s security paradigm. India-US and India-Russia nuclear
deals have further exacerbated the security environment of the
region and paved the way for arms race at the expense of
socio-economic development of over 1.57 billion people of the
region. Presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, in Central
Asia, over Arabian Peninsula and in the Indian Ocean is but
one such manifestation of the issue. Extra-regional
intervention like ISAF/NATO in Afghanistan has
overshadowed the entire gamut of regional security. Drone
attacks in Afghanistan and FATA of Pakistan have added a
new dimension to the security landscape of the region. The
drone issue has generated an extended debate across the
globe, which is likely to lead to some logical end.

Human Insecurity

Human security in South Asia is overshadowed by the

primacy of traditional state security. 44 National exchequers,
which could otherwise be spent on well-being of over 1.57
billion South Asian people, are rather a source of sustenance
for state security mechanism. Human security is not a priority
in regional security arena due to longstanding disputes and
shared threat perceptions, which instead work towards
reinforcing the state security system. The region is home to
largest number of adult illiterates, largest number of out-of-
school children, largest number of unemployed adults, largest
number of households without electricity and tap water,
largest number of malnourished individuals and largest
number of people suffering from lack of access to basic health
facilities in the world. The list goes on and needs an
independent study to deal with the subject. In sum, human
security is held hostage to the traditional security and cannot
be improved till such time that the security paradigm is
balanced between traditional and non-traditional security
needs.

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Conflict Resolution: the Limiting Factors

Conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict

settlement and conflict resolution are different facets of
statecraft. In case of South Asia, these are neither being
desirably debated in academic circles, nor being implemented
at policy level in a desired fashion. More often than not, the
political leadership of South Asia is found boasting about their
efforts on the way of peace. However, “peace” to them often
means conflict prevention or management, and certainly not
conflict settlement or resolution.

Conflict resolution takes place through political process.

Media, intelligentsia, think tanks and civil society facilitate the
process by providing platforms for discussions and
negotiations, and cultivating the environment for political
initiatives. In case of South Asia, the entire process is corroded
and complete procedure is flawed. The most critical element
in conflict resolution is for the parties to seek resolution. If
policy-makers do not believe that they can achieve by
unilateral action what they want, they look for alternatives.
This is the stage where there is some scope for conflict
resolution.45 Harold Hal Saunders, the United States Assistant
Secretary of State for Near East Affairs between 1978 and
1981, noted: “In many cases, developing the commitment to
negotiate is the most complex part of the peace process
because it involves a series of interrelated judgments. Before
leaders will negotiate, they have to judge: (1) whether or not a
negotiated solution would be better than continuing the
present situation; (2) whether a fair settlement could be
fashioned that would be politically manageable; (3) whether
leaders on the other side could accept the settlement and
survive politically; and, (4) whether the balance of forces
would permit an agreement on such a settlement. In more
colloquial language, leaders ask themselves: How much longer
can this present situation go on? Is there another way and
could I live with it politically?”46

Certainly, the states are the key parties to the conflicts such
as those faced by South Asia. States are represented by their

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institutions like the governments and political parties, etc.

South Asian leadership does not show political will to settle or
resolve the contending issues. Dispute, both territorial and
non-territorial are used as political slogans and election cards.
In case a given political party shows some leaning to move a
mile forward on the way of peacemaking and conflict
resolution, the contending political parties pull the process
back by a myriad mile by demonizing the political party
showing resolve as “being involved” in national “sell-out.”
India has a worst history in this regard. Indian think tanks
often reverse the political process. They are mostly found
involved in research and reflection on conflict rather than
peace, terrorism rather than counterterrorism, and state
security rather than human security. One cannot name a
single research institute or think tank in India, which would
go against popular content or conventional wisdom apropos
conflict resolution in South Asia albeit India itself is the centre
of conflict in the region due to various types of disputes with
all countries bordering it.

Recommended Regional Security Framework

International experience shows that the regional security

paradigm can best grow and sustain under a cooperative,
comprehensive and holistic framework facilitated by
meaningful conflict-resolution endeavours. The formats of
European Union (EU), Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and African Union
(AU) etc bear testimony to the fact. South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), on the other hand, has
rather reduced to a meet, greet and depart forum. South Asia
must also embrace the notion of a comprehensive,
cooperative, collaborative, integrative and all-inclusive
security paradigm. Recommended framework is as follows:

Resuscitation and Revitalization of SAARC: For the

purpose of regional approach to conflict-resolution, SAARC
should be both resuscitated and revitalized. The SAARC

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 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

Charter needs to be expanded and redefined with the regional

security as an imperative and the foremost article.

South Asia Security Dialogue (SASD): In line

with OSCE and ARF, South Asia should institute SASD from
the platform of SAARC. SASD should involve all SAARC states
as members and US, EU and China as facilitators. SASD
should primarily work to resolve the impending territorial and
non-territorial disputes in the region. This institution should
consist of various working groups (WGs) for each dispute in
the region. All issues should be discussed, debated and
dialogued at working groups level involving officials, civil
society representatives and global enablers. WGs should
formulate their recommendations for the policy level. In case
of crosscurrents between two or more issues, joint working
groups may be formed. The progress is dependent on the
political will of the leadership. Hence, if one issue is not
resolved, it should not cast back on resolution of the other
issues. If SASD functions in line with the spirit of this
proposal, it would help resolve the regional disputes in a
graduated manner.

South Asia Nuclear Dialogue (SAND): SAND should

be established as a corollary to the SAARC in line with SASD
with same membership and facilitation level. SAND should
first help India and Pakistan to work on nuclear risk reduction
and nuclear-cum-missile restraint measures. Then, it should
work to persuade the two nations on maintenance of
minimum credible deterrence rather than maximum possible
deterrence. If SASD succeeds in resolving major disputes in
South Asia, especially between India and Pakistan, SAND
should work on de-nuclearization of the region.

Conventional Arms Reduction Dialogue (CARD):

Conventional arsenals of all South Asian countries are
swelling with each tick-of-the-click. Likewise, against the
global winds of reduction in the size of standing armies, South
Asians are moving uphill. Major share of the defence budget is
consumed either on manpower related administrative aspects
or production and purchase of military hardware. Certainly,

39 Margalla Papers 2013

 South Asia’s Strategic Security Environment

India shares greater burden due to the India-centric disputes

and security paradigm in the region. CARD, which should be
composed and organized in line with SASD and SAND, should
work with the states of the region on reduction of
conventional arms as well as manpower. The states would,
thus, be able to divert the capital spared by reduction in
defence budgets to address the human security issues.

South Asian Parliament (SAP): The case of a South

Asian Parliament (SAP) may be considered as an organ of
SAARC. It may comprise equal number of members from all
eight countries of the region. Ten members from each state is
a respectable figure. The membership may be based on ex
parliamentarians, intellectuals, media persons, lawyers and
experts in different fields. Speakership of SAP should revolve
between the member states on biannual basis. This means
that the turn of each country would come after four years. The
purpose and mandate of SAP should be to provide an
interactive forum, serve as a regional forum for exchange of
ideas and proffer recommendations to the member states on
important issues of mutual interest.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): CBMs at

the level of state are of utmost importance for the purpose of
creating a dialogue-supportive environment based on mutual-
trust. CBMs are to be initiated alongside the proceedings of
SAARC, SASD, SAND and CARD. A number of measures may
be initiated by the states. Key ones are: relaxation of visa
requirements for movement of people within the region; visa-
free movement of the people of Kashmir on either side; setting
free each other’s prisoners as a good will; issuance of friendly
rather than inflammatory statements by national leaders;
tangible cessation of interference in each other’s affairs and
reduction of forces on borders. In case of India-Pakistan
relations, India has always talked of CBMs, which would
consequently cultivate environment for dialogue on major
issues including the core issue of Kashmir. It is considered
that talks on the territorial disputes are the biggest leap on the
way to confidence building and mere “people-to-people”
gestures as often advocated by India can be of no use.

40 Margalla Papers 2013

 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

People-to-People Contacts (PPC): PPC at the level of

societies would help cleanse the stains of historical memories
and reduce tension. Inter-parliamentary commissions and
dialogues, and forums of interaction between the people from
various walks of life e.g. investors, traders, students, media
persons, academics and intellectuals will be of the essence in
this regard. People will certainly seek to concentrate on
human security rather than the traditional state security.
Eventually, this would work as a complimentary axis of
conflict resolution.

Multi-Tracked Diplomacy (MTD): MTD has helped

in easing up tension in South Asia in the past. A host of
models may be adopted and put into action on the sidelines of
other initiatives. It could take the shape as follows: Track-1,
state-to-state meets between the diplomats and officials;
Track-2, regional diplomatic ventures involving more than
one (or all regional) states; Track-3, societal engagement
involving the civil society and citizenry; and Track-4,
involvement of global enablers in Track-1 or 2 or combination
of both.

Intra-Region Trade: Intra-region trade in South Asia is

abysmally low. South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which
could have been the greatest success of SAARC, is held up due
to security moorings of the SAARC members. The states have,
heretofore, preferred to work on either bilateral/ preferential
trade agreements within the region or are depending on extra-
regional trade. SAFTA should not only be signed and ratified
by all SAARC members but should also be put into action in
keeping with the universal definition of free trade. It should be
taken as a comprehensive subject. Trade should not only
mean the duty-free flow of goods across the borders but
should also involve provision of investment opportunities and
free movement of labour.

Human Security under all Circumstances: It is

imperative for the South Asian leadership to agree to at least
one fundamental agenda that the people would remain a
priority under all circumstances and that the human security

41 Margalla Papers 2013

 South Asia’s Strategic Security Environment

aspects would not be interfered with even during warlike

situations. SAARC should help bring the states and societies
closer. The human security spheres in which it can be of use
are as follows: inter-state transfer of experience; trade;
education and literacy; healthcare including combating
epidemics; environmental security and disaster management;
food security; river water-sharing treaties and agreements
between the states; and resolution of ethnic discords.

South Asia Literacy Commission (SALC): Illiteracy

is the worst human security challenge faced by South Asia. To
combat illiteracy at regional level so as to complement the
efforts of the states, it is recommended to institute SALC
under the auspices of SAARC. It should be formed as an
independent body and should have its membership based on
reputed educationists. The governments should only be
interacting with SALC for the purpose of funding and
facilitation, and should have no role in its proceedings. SALC
should be monetarily supported by South Asia Literacy Fund
(SALF), a subsidiary established for the purpose, the
management of which should fall in the realm of SALC. The
Commission should launch a targeted campaign against
illiteracy opening area-specific SALC institutions including at
least one world class university in each country with teaching
staff from all member states but students from the host
country. SALC technical institutes should be established in all
member states in keeping with the requirements of host state.
It should also establish elementary education institutes in the
areas with high illiteracy rate. Later, the spheres of its
activities may be expanded by establishing more universities
and institutes. SALC should also be utilized as a forum for
inter-state movement of students for studying in public and
private institutions of any SAARC member country.

South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA): SAFMA

already exists as an institution of SAARC. Nevertheless, there
is a dire need to revitalize it. SAFMA can help create and
maintain a dialogue-supportive environment. The institution
itself needs to work out a code of conduct for being a
collaborator rather than contender, and an institution for

42 Margalla Papers 2013

 Ehsan Mehmood Khan

regional integration rather than a mouthpiece of any single

state.

Conclusion

South Asia is in need of introspection more than ever

before. It has remained in a perpetual state of war in
traditional and nontraditional forms for the last many
decades. Must it reach the mark of a 100-year war? Such a
proposition would, certainly, be useless both for South Asian
states and societies, and individuals and communities. Hence,
there is a need to tilt the mass of regional security paradigm
from traditional state security to human security. It is of note
that whereas traditional state security is often based on
perceptions, human security is a manifestation of shared
realities. It must be noted that no state of the region would
relegate the traditional state security paradigm due to the
nature of conflict. However, the acme of leadership would be
to create and maintain balance between state security and
human security in a manner that both complement each
other.

South Asia has a great potential to progress in the comity

of nations on the globe, if it embraces the concept of human
security as part of a cooperative and comprehensive security
paradigm. Human security of virtually 1.57 billion people
would certainly work to complement the state security. For
this, the South Asian leadership needs to depart from a tested
but failed system of state security and embrace an all-
acceptable notion of human security. An adequate level of
human security achieved as a consequence would surely
ensure the security of states too, thereby re-modeling the
security paradigm in a universally accepted fashion.

International community is expected to share some burden

by making possible a dialogue for the purpose of conflict-
resolution in South Asia. This would have dividends not only
for the South Asians but for the entire world. Success of the
world community would surely boost up the confidence of the
one-fourth of the human race living in South Asia in the global

43 Margalla Papers 2013

 South Asia’s Strategic Security Environment

leadership. This would also help make a concrete case for

denuclearization and arms reduction in the region. In sum,
dividends are countless but need regional as well as global
resolve; the earlier, the better!

44 Margalla Papers 2013

1
Rob Johnson, A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947 (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2005), 7.
2
Map by the writer. UN Map of South Asia also shows Afghanistan as part of the region. Details may be found at
“UN map of South Asia,” www.un.org/depts/Cartographic/map/profile/Souteast-Asia.pdf (accessed June 29,
2013).
3
Illustration by the writer. Data obtained from CIA – the World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html and

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html?countryName=United
%20States%20Pacific%20Island%20Wildlife%20Refuges&countryCode=um&regionCode=au&rank=237#um
(accessed December 9, 2009).
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
“Highest Mountain Peaks of the World,” National Geographic Society, quoted in
http://www.abell.org/nal/PDFs/World_Stats/Highest%20Peaks%20in%20the%20World.pdf (accessed
December 11, 2009).
7
Article 53-54 to Chapter VIII of UN Charter.
8
Conceptualized and illustrated by the writer.
9
Ibid.
10
A part of ISAF may withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, as announced by the US and NATO. However,
presence of foreign forces in and around the region is likely to remain a reality during the decades ahead.
11
The word military encounter used metaphorically considering the response of emotionally charged (more than
passionate) crowed. In some cases it has led to very untoward incidents in matches between India and Pakistan.
12
Further details may be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/facts.html (accessed
July 8, 2013).
13
The disputed territory is located south of the famous McMahon Line agreed to between the Britain and Tibet as
part of the Simla Accord signed in 1914, which China has never endorsed as the Tibetan government was not
sovereign and thus did not have the power to conclude treaties with other countries. Indo-China War of 1962
took place over the same dispute.
14
Interestingly, some common Indians claim the Indian Ocean to be belonging to India. Likewise, common
Bangladeshis too lay a complete claim on the Bay of Bengal.
15
Illustration by the writer.
16
CIA – The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html
(accessed November 29, 2009)
17
UNSC Resolution 90 (1951) dated 31 January 1951.
18
J. C. Aggarwal and S. P. Agrawal, Modern History of Jammu and Kashmir: Volume I - Ancient Times to
Shimla Agreement (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1995), 35.
19
Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches, 1946-1949 (New York: The John Day
Company, Inc., 1950), 59. Originally published by the Publication Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi. Reprinted by the John Day Company in 1950 and 1971.
20
Taliban are one of the fiercest armed group in South Asia and the biggest security challenge facing the
prospects of peace in the region.
21
“Rahi Gaikwad: Manmohan: Naxalism the greatest internal threat” The Hindu, New Delhi, October 12, 2009.
22
Armed Marxist revolutionaries known as Naxilites – named after the 1967 revolt by farmers in the West Bengal
village of Naxalbari, which spreads across the poor Indian states. “Kapil Komireddi: Blood runs India’s Red
Corridor” The Guardian, April 23, 2009.
23
Albeit, the LTTE has been overpowered by Sri Lankan Armed Forces in 2009 and the LTTE Chief Vellupillai
Prabhakaran was killed, yet, the threat exists in form of the LTTE ideology and many Sri Lankans fear that they
might rise head again.
24
The conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) dates back to pre-Bangladesh times, when it was East
Pakistan. CHT saw a fierce insurgency from 1977 to 1997 waged against the government by (United People's
Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and its militant wing named the Shanti Bahini). They demanded autonomy
for the indigenous people, the Chakma people, who are mainly Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and Animists. The
insurgency has officially receded since 1997 but the conflict continues as the roots of conflict exist.
25
There are so many militant groups in South Asia with so long a list of dreadful acts that it needs a separate and
all-inclusive study to cover and conclude.
26
Ehsan Mehmood Khan, Human Security in Pakistan (Islamabad: Narratives, 2013), 22.
27
For details see, “BJP, RSS conducting ‘terror training’ camps, says Shinde,” The Indian Express, January 21,
2013.
28
Details may be found in a number of topical accounts e.g. Depinder Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka (New
Delhi: Trishul Publications, 1992).
29
Rama Lakshmi, “Chuck Hagel confirmed in Washington, but doubts remain in India,” The Washington Post,
February 27, 2013.
30
“What is problem with Pakistan?” Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan (accessed on July 1,
2013).
31
Peter Wonacott, “India Befriends Afghanistan, Irking Pakistan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2009.
32
Matthew Stein, “Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity,” Foreign Military Studies Office
(FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 (October 3, 2012): 2-6.
33
Siddharth Srivastava, “India drops anchor in the Maldives,” World Security Network, September 2, 1009,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/India/siddharth-srivastava/India-drops-anchor-in-the-Maldives
(accessed July 1, 2013).
34
Illustration by the writer. Data obtained from Anthony H. Cordesman, Robert Hammond and Andrew Gagel,
“The Military Balance in Asia: 1990-2011, A Quantitative Analysis,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington D.C. (May 16, 2011): 93.
35
List available at “Country Comparison: Population,” CIA – the World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (accessed July 5, 2013).
36
“Military expenditures by region,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A (accessed December 8, 2009).
37
“The top ten military spenders,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A (accessed December 8, 2009).

SIPRI Yearbook 2013, “Armament, Disarmament and International Security.” Stockholm International Peace
38

Research Institute (SIPRI), www.sipriyearbook.org (accessed July 5, 2013).

39
SIPRI Yearbook 2013, “Armament, Disarmament and International Security.” Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), www.sipriyearbook.org (accessed July 5, 2013).
 Dr. Thomas Blau and others, “Small Nuclear Forces in South Asia,” in Small Nuclear Forces and U.S. Security
40

Policy, ed. Rodney W. Jones (Lexington Books: Lexington: 1984), 89 to 107).

41
The term being introduced by this writer herein for the first time considering that there are two nuclear
cauldrons in the world: Eastern Nuclear Cauldron comprising China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, and
(nuclear aspirant) Iran; and Western Nuclear Cauldron comprising the US, Russia, the UK, and France. The
nuclear weapon states have been so categorized bearing in mind their location and areas of nuclear interest.
Russia’s case is a bit different. Considering its location, it falls into the Eastern Nuclear Cauldron but from the
point of view of its nuclear interests, it is part of the Western Nuclear Cauldron. At any rate, Russia’s nukes have
been, and are still, playing a role in the security paradigm of the West more than the East.
42
“Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html (accessed December 12, 2009).
43
Gurpeet S. Khurana, “China-India Maritime Rivalry,” Indian Defence Review, April 2009.
44
As against state security, in which state is the only security referent, individuals and communities are the key
referents in case of human security. The concept of human security, though still evolving, was given a normative
paradigm in UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR) – 1994. According to HDR-1994, human security
comprises seven subsets to include: political security, economic security, personal security, community security,
food security, health security and environmental security. Three more subsets to include women security,
children security and education security have been added in the Human Security Framework for Pakistan, which
may be applicable to other peer countries, proposed in Ehsan Mehmood Khan, Human Security in Pakistan
(Islamabad: Narratives, 2013).
45
Sundeep Waslekar, A Handbook for Conflict Resolution in South Asia (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996),
4.
46
Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: the Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985), 24.