POLITICAL LAW

CHAIR’S CASES AND RELATED JURISPRUDENCE

LEGAL EDGE BAR REVIEW CENTER

JOSE ANGELO A. DAVID
Associate Solicitor

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

a. NAPOCOR VS. SPS. ZABALA, G.R. No. 173520, JANUARY 30, 2013 [J. Del
Castillo]

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTS ON METHOD OF COMPUTING JUST

COMPENSATION ARE NOT BINDING ON COURTS. Legislative enactments, as well as
executive issuances, fixing or providing fix the method of computing just compensation are
tantamount to impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Thus they are not binding on
courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just
compensation.

Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner’s loss. The word
‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea
that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample." The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed
no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments
or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property
owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped
by any other branch or official of the government." Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes
and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are
not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount
thereof.

b. SPS. MERCADO VS. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 196707, JUNE
17, 2015 [J. Del Castillo] See also DAR VS. GALLE, G.R. No. 171836, August 11,
2014 [J. Del Castillo]

GUIDELINES FOR THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. As a

final note, we remind the RTC to observe the following guidelines for the proper determination of
just compensation: (1) just compensation must be valued at the time of taking of the property
expropriated, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property; (2)
interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case; and, (3) just
compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657 or
the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1988 and outlined in a formula provided in Department
of Agrarian Reform A.O. No. 5. If the RTC finds these guidelines inapplicable, it must clearly
explain the reasons for deviating therefrom and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the
reasonable just compensation for the property expropriated.
 c. APO FRUITS CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 164195,
DECEMBER 19, 2007 [J. CHICO-NAZARIO]

DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998, itself prescribes that the basic formula for just
compensation shall only be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable. The
three factors are: 1) capitalized net income; 2) comparable sales; and 3) market value per tax
declaration. DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998, II A, underscores that the above formula as therein
indicated, i.e., LV = (CNI x.06) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1), shall be used if all three factors are
“present, relevant, and applicable.” What is explicit in said AO, therefore, is the qualification that
for the aforesaid basic formula to be utilized in arriving at the land value, the three
factors, i.e., capitalized net income; comparable sales; and market value per tax declaration must
be determined by the RTC acting as SAC to be “present, relevant, and applicable.” Hence, it is
within its duty to: 1) identify the presence of the three factors; 2) determine if the factors are
relevant to the valuation; and 3) judge their applicability. The very same DAR AO, therefore,
recognizes that there are circumstances when, to the mind of the court, any of the three
factors are not present, relevant or applicable; and the basic formula cannot be used. In
such cases, alternative formulae are made available.

NOTE: The following are the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657—In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government
to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.

d. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPS. SALVADOR, G.R. No. 205428, JUNE
7, 2017 [J. Del Castillo]

AMOUNT OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES NOT CONSIDERED CONSEQUENTIAL

DAMAGES. It is settled that the transfer of property through expropriation proceedings is a sale
or exchange within the meaning of Sections 24(D) and 56(A) (3) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, and profit from the transaction constitutes capital gain. Since capital gains tax is a tax on
passive income, it is the seller, or respondents in this case, who are liable to shoulder the tax.
Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining
property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. In this case, no evidence
was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the subject property as a result of
the expropriation. More significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax on the transfer of
the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the remaining property,
it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

a. MINUCHER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SCALZO, G.R. NO.

142396, FEBRUARY 11, 2003 [J. Vitug]

CONCEPT OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was

a codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961,
its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the

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peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the
states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in
time of peace were universally held sacrosanct. By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest
treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established
as a rule of customary international law. Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse
among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment
of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the
external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic
presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably
with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the
representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the
receiving state

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors
or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the
heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising
the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the
technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic
staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the
mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless,
with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under
the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and
criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or
members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all
others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in
concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties,
such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of
oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded
diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their
states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of
diplomatic nature.

Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits 9 to 13, that he was an Assistant Attach of the United
States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attach
belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its
cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches
belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry
or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies
such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or
the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him,
but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in
their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or
departments in the home government. These officials are not generally regarded as
members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic
rank.

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive

branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, the Court has recognized
that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of

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indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction
of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign
Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post
litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an
immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. The government of the United States itself,
which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic
agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who
possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from
States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to
assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-
one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. Diplomatic
missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which
currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each
individual to the appropriate functional category.

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY APPLIES TO FOREIGN STATES SUED IN

THIS JURISDICTION. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious,
it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the
country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was
acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the
present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from
Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he
is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the
suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.

In United States of America vs. Guinto, involving officers of the United States Air Force and special
officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled –

"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without
its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a moment
be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they
apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their

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 duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable
to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on
behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and
not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts."

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals elaborates:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by
Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al.
(33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity
of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does
not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

xxxxxxxxx

(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak
of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment
they are sued in their individual capacity.This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending
state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States,
stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence
is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the
United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities
of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be
gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication
between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy-bust operation
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support
the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government
has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo
of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to

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inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting
surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation,
and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can
be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in
the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit.

b. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH VS. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC., G.R. No. 182358,

February 20, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]

UNINCORPORATED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ENJOY IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. An

unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a
claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government
agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen.
The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or
incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in
pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.

In this case, the Department of Health, being an "unincorporated agency of the government" can
validly invoke the defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly
or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs
functions of governmental character.

NON-SUABILITY EXTENDS TO COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS

FOR ACTS DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. As regards the
other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon, it must be
stressed that the doctrine of state immunity extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed
against state officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties. "The suability
of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official
or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will
result in a charge or financial liability against the government." Otherwise stated, "public officials
can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith." Moreover,
"[t]he rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state x x x. In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the [C]omplaint on the ground that it has been filed
without its consent."

It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, as well as
Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the performance and discharge of their official
functions or in their official capacities, and not in their personal or individual capacities.
Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit were being charged with the issuance of the assailed orders.
On the other hand, Undersecretary Galon was being charged with implementing the assailed
issuances. By no stretch of imagination could the same be categorized as ultra vires simply
because the said acts are well within the scope of their authority. Section 4 of RA 3720 specifically

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provides that the BFAD is an office under the Office of the Health Secretary. Also, the Health
Secretary is authorized to issue rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively enforce
the provisions of RA 3720. As regards Undersecretary Galon, she is authorized by law to
supervise the offices under the DOH’s authority,49 such as the BFAD. Moreover, there was also
no showing of bad faith on their part. The assailed issuances were not directed only against PPI.
The suspension of PPI’s accreditation only came about after it failed to submit its comment as
directed by Undersecretary Galon. It is also beyond dispute that if found wanting, a financial
charge will be imposed upon them which will require an appropriation from the state of the needed
amount. Thus, based on the foregoing considerations, the Complaint against them should likewise
be dismissed for being a suit against the state which absolutely did not give its consent to be
sued. Based on the foregoing considerations, and regardless of the merits of PPI’s case, this case
deserves a dismissal. Evidently, the very foundation of Civil Case No. 68200 has crumbled at this
initial juncture.

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE

HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
[J. Mendoza]

ACCOMMODATION VS. ESTABLISHMENT. In order to give life to the constitutional right

of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a
recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a
certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their
religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the
public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.

In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government's favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the
"government [may] take religion into account ... to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would
otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." [Emphases supplied]

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, the Court upheld the exemption of members
of Iglesia ni Cristo from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a
union, because it would violate the teaching of their church not to affiliate with a labor organization.
In Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, the petitioners, who were members
of the Jehovah 's Witnesses, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge for it is their belief that those were acts of worship or religious devotion, which
they could not conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God. The Court accommodated
them and granted them an exemption from observing the flag ceremony out of respect for their
religious beliefs.

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Further, several laws have been enacted to accommodate religion. The Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 has declared Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Christmas Day as regular
holidays. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9177 proclaimed the FIRST Day of Shawwal, the tenth month
of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul Fitr (the end of Ramadan).
R.A. No. 9849 declared the tenth day of Zhu/ Hijja, the twelfth month of the Islamic Calendar, a
national holiday for the observance of Eidul Adha. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, expressly allows a Filipino Muslim
to have more than one (1) wife and exempts him from the crime of bigamy punishable under
Revised Penal Code (RPC). The same Code allows Muslims to have divorce.

As to Muslims in government offices, Section 3 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322,
provides:

Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in
the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the
morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee
breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the employee
who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this provision.

Pursuant thereto, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277, dated November 13, 1981,
which reads in part:

2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official
time of 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock is hereby modified to 7:30 AM. to
3:30 P.M. without noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime.

Following the decree, in Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City
(Re: Office Hours), the Court recognized that the observance of Ramadan as integral to the
Islamic faith and allowed Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30
o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon without any break during the period. This is
a clear case of accommodation because Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of E.0. No. 292, enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render
public service of no less than eight (8) hours a day or forty (40) hours a week.

On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that "no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise known as the non-establishment clause.
Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more
imperative to understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society's
perspective.

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It
simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that
the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may
adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs

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of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot
establish or sponsor an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.

Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:

"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Such government neutrality may be summarized in four general propositions: (1)
Government must not prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because
such preference would violate voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government funds
must not be applied to religious purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and
breed interfaith dissension; (3) Government action must not aid religion because this too
can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government action must
not result in excessive entanglement with religion because this too can violate voluntarism
and breed interfaith dissension."

Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the
other hand, is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government
resources with the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without
being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise their
religion.

In a September 12, 2003 Memorandum for Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the Office of the
Chief Attorney recommended to deny, on constitutional grounds, the request of Rev. Fr. Carlo M.
Ilagan to hold a oneday vigil in honor of the Our Lady of Caysasay within the premises of the
Court. Such controversy must be distinguished from the present issue in that with respect to the
former, a Catholic priest was the one who requested for the vigil. Moreover, in that case, the vigil
would take one (1) whole working day; whereas in this case, the masses are held at the initiative
of Catholic employees and only during the thirty-minute lunch break.

Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation.
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly
mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when
judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are
there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative
officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning
continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has
neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated
for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other
religions.

APPLICATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES NOT ALLOWED,

EXPLAINED. Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or
property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,

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or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."

The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose." "Appropriate" means "to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for
a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."

Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself
or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.
This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited
is the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any
church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily
intended for the furtherance of a particular church.

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of public
property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a
temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street
may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way
that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.

In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation
of public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere
incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have placed
it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same provision
bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are paid
to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered
service in the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
That a priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money he
received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely to compensate
the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will perform the same services
will also be compensated in the same manner.

Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the sole
purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.

RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

a. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROBELO, G.R. NO. 184181, NOVEMBER 26,
2012 [J. Del Castillo]

10
 EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 OF RA 9165 ON WARRANTLESS
ARREST. “[N]on-compliance with Section 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is the ‘preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” The records reveal that at no instance did
appellant hint a doubt on the integrity of the seized items.

b. PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION VS. NENA ANG, GR NO. 199371,

FEBRUARY 03, 2016 [J. Del Castillo]

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. On the claim of

lack of personal knowledge, the Court subscribes to petitioners' argument that facts discovered
during surveillance conducted by NBI agents De Jemil and Antonio - on the basis of information
and evidence provided by petitioners - constitute personal knowledge which could form the basis
for the issuance of a search warrant. Indeed, as was declared in Cupcupin v. People, which
petitioners cite, the surveillance and investigation conducted by an agent of the NBI obtained from
confidential information supplied to him enabled him to gain personal knowledge of the illegal
activities complained of.

c. PETRON GASUL LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION VS. ELENA LAO, GR NO.

205010, JULY 18, 2016 [J. Del Castillo]

APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION; WHERE FILED. Generally,

the search warrant application must be filed with the court which has territorial jurisdiction over
the place where the offense was alleged to be committed. This, however, is not an iron-clad rule.
For compelling reasons, which must be expressly stated in the application, an SW application
may be filed in a court other than the one having jurisdiction over the place where the purported
offense was committed and where the search warrant shall be enforced. See Section 2 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.

d. MARTIN VILLAMOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 200396, MARCH

22, 2017 [J. Del Castillo]

REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST. In warrantless

arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer."

DISTANCE OF FIFTEEN TO TWENTY METERS, NOT WITHIN PRESENCE OF VIEW

OF ARRESTING OFFICER. Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between
the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able
to determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante
delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter.

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE IS INDISPENSABLE FOR IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO

ARREST; TIP FROM INFORMANT DOES NOT SUFFICE. A mere tip from an unnamed
informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes without first
securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. It appears that the police officers acted based
solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge
that a crime had just been committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be

11
committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt
act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi
even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the
so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he
readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalia.

RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

a. HO WAI PANG VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 176229, OCTOBER
19, 2011 [J. Del Castillo]

VIOLATION OF RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; EFFECT ON

EVIDENCE. Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called
Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
such investigation. "The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation."

As the Court held in People v. Buluran, "[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction." Hence, petitioner’s
claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation
deserves scant consideration.

b. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JONAS GUILLEN, G.R. No. 191756, November
25, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]

RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT DURING VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED.

Owing to the complaint of the victim, the accused was apprehended by responding police officer[s]
of the Sampaloc Police Station. At the police precinct, the accused was presented to the victim
and [he] was positively identified as the person who raped her. At this juncture, the accused after
he was positively identified as the malefactor who sexually molested and raped the victim x x x
just [remained] SILENT. In other words, he did not DENY the accusation lodged against him by
the victim much less register any vehement PROTEST at the station.

When appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station,
he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence
should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that
appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation
of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence.

c. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NIEVES CONSTANCIO AND ERNESTO

BERRY, GR No. 206226, Apr 04, 2016 [J. Del Castillo]

PRESUMPTION THAT COUNSEL IS COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT. Atty. Suarez

testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional rights and the consequences of
any statements he would give. It is clear from the foregoing testimony that Atty. Suarez is a
competent and independent counsel and that he was in fact chosen by Berry himself during the
custodial investigation; and that he was no stranger.at all to the processes and methods of a

12
custodial investigation. In default of proof that Atty. Suarez was remiss in his duties, as in this
case, this Court holds that the custodial investigation of Berry was regularly conducted. For this
reason, Berry's extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him.

VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS TO THE MEDIA NOT COVERED BY MIRANDA RIGHTS.

Berry's confession is admissible in evidence because it was voluntarily made to a news reporter
and not to the police authority or to an investigating officer. Amparo testified that he requested
Berry for an interview in connection with his confession, and that the latter freely acceded. Hence,
Berry's confession to Amparo, a news reporter, was made freely and voluntarily and is admissible
in evidence.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

ALMUETE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013 [J.
Del Castillo]

APPEAL IS THE PROPER REMEDY OF ACCUSED FROM JUDGMENT OF

CONVICTION. In People v. Court of Appeals, this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal by the
Court of Appeals as it was made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained that an
acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the authority to review perceived
errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by
appeal by writ of error." Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner
availed of the wrong remedy.

APPEARANCE OF CONVICTS DURING PROMULGATION OF THE AFFIRMANCE OF

CONVICTION NOT ALLOWED. The practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts
for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Administrative Circular No. 16-93 issued on
September 9, 1993 prescribed the proper procedure—Upon receipt of the certified copy of the
judgment of the appellate court if the convict is under detention, the trial court should issue
forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the prisoner may be considered
remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison facility for confinement and service of
sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately order the bondsman to
surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the corresponding
mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this Court proof of the execution of judgment
within fifteen (15) days from date of such execution.

RIGHT TO BAIL

a. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DR. SOBREPEÑA, SR., G.R. No. 204063,
December 05, 2016 [J. Del Castillo]

BAIL; PENALTY IMPOSABLE IS DEATH, RECLUSION PERPETUA OR LIFE

IMPRISONMENT; SUMMARY HEARING. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

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Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

Thus from the above-cited provisions and in cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of
judicial discretion that remains with the judge.9 The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a
hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence
of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. "The court's grant or refusal of bail must
contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution on the basis of which should be formulated
the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused." In People v. Plaza, the Court defined a summary hearing and expounded the court's
discretionary power to grant bail to an accused.

"A summary hearing is defined as 'such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely
to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.' On such hearing, the Court does not
sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-examination.”

b. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
[J. Bersamin]

SUMMARY OF RULES ON THE RIGHT TO BAIL. All criminal cases within the
competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even
prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the

crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

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In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with
the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE GRANT OF BAIL. The decision whether

to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial
power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a
good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary
to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

In our view, Enrile’s social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country.
We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his
trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

CITIZENSHIP

a. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ONG, G.R. NO. 175430, JUNE 18, 2012 [J.
Del Castillo]

FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR NATURALIZATION. The qualification of some known

lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the person having the employment
gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income
such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit him and the members of his
family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.

15
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should
consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income should not be included in the
assessment. The spouses’ additional income is immaterial for under the law the petitioner should be the
one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen. Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants qualifications must be determined
as of the time of the filing of his petition.

b. MAQUILING VS. COMELEC, ARNADO AND BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16,
2013 [CJ. Sereno]

EFFECT OF USE OF FOREIGN PASSPORT AFTER REPATRIATION UNDER RA 9225.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary
act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United
States of America."

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as
a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s
bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE RESULTS IN VOID COC; SUCCESSION DOES

NOT APPLY. The Court held in Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining
the winner of an election.

16
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute
the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank
who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the
rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is
not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

c. ARNADO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, AUGUST 18, 2015 [J. Del Castillo]

COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 5(2) OF RA 9225 SUBSEQUENT TO FILING OF

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY PRODUCES NO LEGAL EFFECT. RA 9225 allows natural-
born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights
upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the
Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or
at the time of filing of their certificate of candidacy.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

ARVIN BALAG VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 234608, JULY 3, 2018
[J. Gesmundo]

PERIOD OF DETENTION FOR CONTEMPT BY VIRTUE OF LEGISLATIVE

INVESTIGATION IS NOT INDEFINITE. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under
the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last
until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it

17
was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject
of investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed
testimony called relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative
inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.

The Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances: First,
upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Second, the legislative inquiry of the
Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending
matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the
Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional
on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its
proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its
last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the
detained witnesses likewise ends.

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013 [J. Carpio]

GROUPS THAT CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ELECTIONS. Thus,

we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.

3. (a) Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.

(b) A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be (a) "marginalized and

underrepresented" or (b) lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.

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 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent.

The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must (a) belong to their respective sectors, or (b) must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors.

The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide

members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

POWER TO AUGMENT FUNDS

ARAULLO VS. AQUINO, G.R. No., 209287, July 1, 2014 [J. Bersamin]

REQUISITES FOR THE VALID TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS UNDER

SECTION 25(5), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. The transfer of appropriated funds,
to be valid under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, must be made upon a concurrence
of the following requisites, namely:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWERS

NOTE: Memorize Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. The provision states:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such

19
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

a. REP. LAGMAN VS. HON. MEDIALDEA, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 [J. Del
Castillo]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRESIDENT’S PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR

SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS A SUI GENERIS
PROCEEDING. "In an appropriate proceeding" does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those
enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed
pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision
of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by
the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition
for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.

A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought
and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them,
of opposing judgments, and of executing.” In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding"
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW DOES NOT EXTEND TO CALIBRATING THE

PRESIDENT'S DECISION PERTAINING TO WHICH EXTRAORDINARY POWER TO AVAIL.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-
in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the
situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which

20
among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the
part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his
prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity
of the State.

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that Solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.

THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DEFENSE SECRETARY IS NOT A CONDITION

FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary
of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to
declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements
of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to
common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his
mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers
of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

SUFFICIENCY OF FACTUAL BASIS TEST. Similarly, under the doctrine of

contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the
prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase
“sufficiency of factual basis” in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as
the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court
does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to
determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.

PARAMETERS FOR DETERMINING SUFFICIENCY OF FACTUAL BASIS. The

parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or
invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is
probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

b. PADILLA VS. CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 231671, JULY 25, 2017
[J. Leonardo-De Castro]

THE CONGRESS IS ONLY REQUIRED TO VOTE JOINTLY TO REVOKE THE

PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND/OR SUSPENSION OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. It is worthy to stress that the provision does
not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be conceded, subject to the discussions below,
that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting will be
done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the Constitution, still,
the requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the
Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on
the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension.

21
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners'
argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension ofthe privilege ofthe writ ofhabeas corpus, under
all circumstances.

c. REP. LAGMAN VS. SENATE PRESIDENT PIMENTEL, G.R. NO. 235935,

FEBRUARY 6, 2018 [J. Tijam]

CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO EXTEND AND DETERMINE THE PERIOD OF

MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS. The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the
initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or
deficiency in the provision. While it does not specify the number of times that the Congress is
allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the extension should
be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the
sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

DIPLOMATIC POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

a. VINUYA VS. ROMULO, G.R. NO. 162230, APRIL 28, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]

FROM A DOMESTIC LAW PERSPECTIVE, THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT HAS THE

EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO ESPOUSE PETITIONERS’
CLAIMS AGAINST ANOTHER STATE. In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
the US Supreme Court held that [t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.

It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment
-- perhaps serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved,
congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs
alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He
has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials. x x x

This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v. Executive Secretary
and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary; its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in
(now Chief) Justice Punos dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion:

x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes

with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be
entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available
information and can decide with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses
the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for

22
 our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the
world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the
presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a
wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of
his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead
to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence,
national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable
consequences.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to
our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in

international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards
the community of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ
in Barcelona Traction:

x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards

the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field
of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the
body of general international law others are conferred by international instruments of a
universal or quasi-universal character.

The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief
in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case,
the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as
a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.

The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international
law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified
only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

NOTE: Examples of jus cogens norms include: prohibition on the use of force; the law
of genocide; principle of racial non-discrimination; crimes against humanity; and the rules
prohibiting trade in slaves or human trafficking. Examples of erga omnes obligations include the
outlawing of aggression and of genocide, the protection from slavery and racial discrimination,
and the prohibition of torture.

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 b. SAGUISAG VS. OCHOA, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 [CJ. Sereno]

THE PRESIDENT MAY GENERALLY ENTER INTO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

WITHOUT NEED OF SENATE CONCURRENCE. Executive agreements may dispense with the
requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded.
As culled from the afore-quoted deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme
Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve
arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are
concluded (1) to adjust the details of a treaty; (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of
the Legislature; or (3) in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the
Constitution. The raison d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative
authorizations.

However, there are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the President's prerogative in
concluding international agreements, such as those that involve the following:

a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory (Article II, Section
8)

b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress
(Article VI, Section 28[2])

c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a
majority of all the Members of Congress (Article VI, Section 28[4])

d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that must
be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board (Article VII, Section 20)

e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate (Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution)

f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate is required, should the form of the government chosen
be a treaty (Article VII, Section 21)

PROHIBITION ON HOLDING ANOTHER OFFICE

FUNA VS. AGRA, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013 [J. Bersamin]

RULE UNDER ARTICLE VII, SECTION 13. Sec. 13, Article VII of the Constitution
provides that the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
Likewise, Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.

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Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII,. Hence,
Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

ARTICLE VII, SECTION 13 CONTRA. ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 7. The differentiation of

the two constitutional provisions was well stated in Funa v. Ermita, a case in which the petitioner
herein also assailed the designation of DOTC Undersecretary as concurrent Officer-in-Charge of
the Maritime Industry Authority, with the Court reiterating its pronouncement in Civil Liberties
Union v. The Executive Secretary on the intent of the Framers behind these provisions of the
Constitution, viz:

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office
or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
xxxx

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face,
the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution
is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given
a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided
under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII. (Bold emphasis supplied.)

ACTING OR TEMPORARY CAPACITY IMMATERIAL. It is of no moment that Agra’s

designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13, plainly indicates that the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the
Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or
in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. To hold an office
means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office,
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office (Funa
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308). Indeed, in the language of
Section 13 itself, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or
designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for
it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, is to prevent the concentration of

25
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the
veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in
the Executive Department and of limitations on the President’s power of appointment in the guise
of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as
officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled
corporations.

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

MAMBA VS. LARA, G.R. NO. 165109, DECEMBER 14, 2009 [J. Del Castillo]

LOCUS STANDI; TAXPAYERS’ SUIT. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He
must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met:
(1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality
and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged act.

As to the first requisite, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As
long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.

As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent "direct injury test"
bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking "transcendental
importance", "paramount public interest", or "far-reaching implications", ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious
legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court
did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

a. AGUINALDO VS. AQUINO, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 [J. Leonardo-De
Castro]

JBC’S POWER TO RECOMMEND. The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used
to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone
whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As
long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is
valid. President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees
into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the
Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

26
The JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every vacancy, could influence
the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees
to the President. Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as
restricts the chances for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's
option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the
President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed from considering the other
nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without legal
basis and in contravention of the President's appointing power.

b. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SERENO, G.R. NO. 237428, MAY 11, 2018
[J. Tijam]

THE COURT'S SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER THE JBC INCLUDES ENSURING

THAT THE JBC COMPLIES WITH ITS OWN RULES. In interpreting the power of the Court vis-
a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held that the Court's supervisory power consists of
seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. As when the policies of the
JBC are being attacked, the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty
to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC is compliant with its own rules.

The JBC's exercise of discretion is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy

decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court's supervisory
and corrective powers. The primary limitation to the JBC's exercise of discretion is that the
nominee must possess the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and the laws
relative to the position. While the resolution of who to nominate as between two candidates of
equal qualification cannot be dictated by this Court upon the JBC, such surrender of choice
presupposes that whosoever is nominated is not otherwise disqualified. The question of whether
or not a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based on facts and
therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating
body.

c. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
[J. Reyes]

JBC HAS AUTHORITY TO SET STANDARDS/CRITERIA IN CHOOSING NOMINEES.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the
process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main
function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution
and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree
of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

In imposing a policy requiring first-level court judges to have served in their position for at
least five years before promotion to second-level courts, the JBC merely exercised its discretion
in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary
must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. "To ensure the fulfillment of
these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring
judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President
are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is

27
shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre
and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified."

JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CABUNGCAL VS. LORENZO, G.R. NO. 160367, DECEMBER 18, 2009 [J. Del Castillo]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER PERSONNEL

ACTIONS. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over
disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the
civil service.

In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose services were terminated
due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they belong to the civil
service, the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office. Consequently, petitioners’
resort to the CA was premature. The jurisdiction lies with the CSC and not with the appellate
court.

JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ENGR. MARMETO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 213953, SEPTEMBER 26, 2017 [J. Del
Castillo]

POWER TO REVIEW WHETHER THE PROPOSITIONS IN AN INITIATIVE PETITION

ARE WITHIN THE POWER OF THE CONCERNED SANGGUNIAN TO ENACT. Section 124(b)
of the LGC provides that "[i]nitiatives shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the
legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact." Section 127 of the LGC gives the courts authority to
declare "null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Chapter for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the Sanggunian concerned to enact the said measure."
Significantly, the power of the courts to nullify propositions for being ultra vires extends only to
those already approved, i.e. those which have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in
the initiative election called for the purpose. In other words, the courts can review the terms
only of an approved ordinance. It will be premature for the courts to review the propositions
contained in an initiative petition that has yet to be voted for by the people because at that point,
there is no actual controversy that the courts may adjudicate. This begs the question of which
tribunal can review the sufficiency of an initiative petition?

Inasmuch as the COMELEC also has quasi-judicial and administrative functions, it is the
COMELEC which has the power to determine whether the propositions in an initiative
petition are within the powers of a concerned Sanggunian to enact. In Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that –

while regular courts may take jurisdiction over 'approved propositions' per said Sec. 18 of
R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers
may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language
are concerned x x x and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or

28
 parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the 'capacity of the local legislative
body to enact.' x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The COMELEC's power to review the substance of the propositions is also implied in
Section 12 of RA No. 6735, which gives this Court appellate power to review the
COMELEC's "findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum x x x."

IMPEACHMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SERENO, G.R. NO. 237428, MAY 11, 2018 [J.
Tijam]

IMPEACHMENT IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY BY WHICH AN INVALIDLY

APPOINTED OR INVALIDLY ELECTED IMPEACHABLE OFFICIAL MAY BE REMOVED
FROM OFFICE. By its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of a quo
warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on
grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of a public officer's
appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses without
questioning his title to the office he holds.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable
officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been
determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when
he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer commits
any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the
functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in
permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising
sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office through
impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public position. It
is a direct proceeding assailing the title to a public office. The issue to be resolved by the Court is
whether or not the defendant is legally occupying a public position which goes into the questions
of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally qualified and has complete legal title to
the office. If defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority, the relief that the
Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. In other words, while
impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office,
quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.

OMBUDSMAN

GONZALES VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014 [J.
Brion]

PRESIDENT HAS NO DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OVER A DEPUTY

OMBUDSMAN, BUT MAY DISCIPLINE A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR. In the voting held on
January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision
insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA

29
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a
Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

Premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations.

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