Complaint Sisters For Life

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Case 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ Document 5 Filed 06/07/21 Page 1 of 27 PageID #: 71

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
(Louisville Division)
Electronically Filed
Sisters for Life, Inc. : 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ
c/o Christopher Wiest, Esq.
25 Town Center Blvd, Ste. 104 :
Crestview Hills, KY 41017
:
AND
:
Angela Minter
c/o Christopher Wiest, Esq. :
25 Town Center Blvd, Ste. 104
Crestview Hills, KY 41017 :

AND :

Kentucky Right To Life Association, Inc. :


c/o Christopher Wiest, Esq.
25 Town Center Blvd, Ste. 104 :
Crestview Hills, KY 41017
:
Plaintiffs
:
v.
:
Louisville-Jefferson County Metro
Government :
c/o Mayor Greg Fischer
527 W. Jefferson Street :
Louisville, KY 40202
:
AND
:
Mayor Greg Fischer
527 W. Jefferson Street :
Louisville, KY 40202
:
AND
:
Erika Shields, Chief of Police
Louisville Metro Police Department :
633 W Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202 :

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AND
:
Mike O’Connell
600 W Jefferson St :
Louisville, KY 40202
:
Defendants

PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF,


NOMINAL DAMAGES, AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Introduction

1. Almost every day in Kentucky a young woman in crisis because of an unplanned

pregnancy considers terminating her pregnancy through abortion. In plain English,

she considers killing the unborn human being in her womb because she believes she

has no other choice. To do so, she travels to the abortoria in Louisville. She may be

unaware that there are alternatives to abortion, that resources exist, and that others

care. Until a few days ago, and every single day that the Louisville abortion facility

operated since 2003, she would be met on the sidewalk outside that facility by the

Plaintiffs, who operate a Christian ministry on that sidewalk. They walk with that

young woman, who is often a person of color, and minister to her, telling her that she

has actually does have a choice. They let her know there are people who care about

her, love her, and will help her and her unborn child. But now, that can no longer

happen. Because Defendants made this interaction and sidewalk ministry illegal, this

sidewalk ministry. This case seeks to restore the constitutional right of Plaintiffs to

conduct their life-saving sidewalk ministry within a traditional public forum.

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Parties

2. Plaintiff, Sisters for Life, Inc. (“Sisters for Life”), is a Kentucky non-profit

corporation, with its headquarters located in Louisville, Kentucky.1 Formed in 2003,

Sisters for Life is a Christian, non-profit organization and ministry inspired by God to

put into action a comprehensive advocacy for preborn babies, and their mothers and

fathers who are faced with an unplanned or crisis pregnancy. They also advocate for

God’s family values. They believe God has a good plan and purpose for every life

and family, and they see it as their mission to help God’s family have hope and a

future. As such, they believe it is their assignment to serve and assist God’s family in

fulfilling God’s plan. Jeremiah 1:5, Jeremiah 29:11.

3. Angela Minter is the founder of Sisters for Life, and is also its President, who

regularly engages in evangelism associated with intervention with pregnant women

entering abortion clinics, and specifically EMW Women’s Surgical Center (“EMW”),

which is the abortion clinic located at 136 W Market St, Louisville, KY 40202. For

almost two decades, Angela has personally ministered to mothers and fathers outside

EMW, sharing her own experiences and regrets with abortion, connecting with them

and telling them about her experience as a teenager who aborted two of her children,

and her lifelong regret from having done so. Outside of sidewalk ministry, Angela

ministers in the community, reaching out to Louisville’s black churches, engages in

all forms of outreach, and seeks to end the cycle of death brought on by the abortion

industry, including its disproportionate impact to her black community.

1
https://www.sisforlife.org/ (last visited 6/6/2021).
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4. Plaintiff, Kentucky Right to Life Association, Inc. (“KRLA”), founded in 1973,

serves as the state coordinating body for local Right to Life Chapters representing

tens of thousands of Kentucky citizens. It is a volunteer, non-profit organization

composed of grassroots people of different political persuasions, faiths, and

economic, social and ethnic backgrounds. KRLA exists to protect life. Its members

frequently conduct sidewalk ministry outside EMW in furtherance of the KRLA

mission, and KRLA and its members are harmed by the challenged ordinance, and,

further, the ordinance impairs the KRLA’s mission.

5. Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government (“Louisville Metro”) is a

duly organized combined municipal and county government under KRS Chapter 67C,

governing Jefferson County. Its legislative body is the Metro Council, and its

executive is the Mayor.

6. Defendant Mayor Greg Fischer is the duly elected Mayor of the Louisville-Jefferson

County Metro Government. Pursuant to KRS 67C.105, “[a]ll executive and

administrative power of the government shall be vested in the office of the mayor.”

Further, pursuant to KRS 67C.105(5)(d), the Mayor is charged to, and does,

“[e]nforce the ordinances of the consolidated local government.”

7. Defendant Ericka Shields is the duly appointed Chief of the Louisville Metro Police

Department, who, among other things, has primary responsibility for the enforcement

of city ordinances and other Kentucky laws within the City of Louisville.

8. Defendant Mike O’Connell is the Jefferson County Attorney. In that capacity, and

pursuant to KRS 15.725(2), he is commanded to, and does, “prosecute all violations

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whether by adults or by juveniles subject to the jurisdiction of the regular or juvenile

session of the District Court of criminal and penal laws.”

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9. Subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs

in this action is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. §

1988, 28 U.S.C. §1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and other

applicable law.

10. Venue in this District and division is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 and other

applicable law, because much of the deprivations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights

occurred in counties within this District within Kentucky, and future deprivations of

their constitutional rights are threatened and likely to occur in this District.

FACTS

11. As part of the practice of their faith, Angela and Sisters for Life engage in sidewalk

ministry outside 136 W Market St, Louisville, KY 40202, which is the location of

EMW, the last abortion clinic located in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the

most prolific provider of surgical abortions within the Commonwealth, having been

responsible for 3,645 abortions in 2019, or 99.5% of all abortions in Kentucky in

2019.2 Angela and Sisters for Life have engaged in their ministry since 2003.

12. In the same vein, KLRA members frequently engage in similar sidewalk ministry

outside of EMW, in the same manner that Angela and Sisters for Life do.

2
https://chfs.ky.gov/agencies/dph/dehp/vsb/Forms/2019KYAbortionAnnualReport.pdf (last
visited 6/6/2021).
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13. Sidewalk ministry involves offering both verbal and written materials outlining

alternatives to abortion and help for anyone wishing to pursue those options.

14. Angela and Sisters for Life inform women and their partners of other life choices

available to them for their child other than abortion, including adoption, free housing

during and after the pregnancy, free child care, free help with college tuition if they

choose not to abort their child, parenting resources including diapers, formula,

clothes, parenting classes, counseling and more, including information about child

development that shows parents how developed their child is at the particular stage of

their pregnancy.

15. Angela and Sisters for Life typically will initiate a conversation by, among other

things, asking would-be patients if they would like some literature.

16. During these exchanges, Angela and Sisters for Life consider it essential to maintain a

caring demeanor, a calm tone of voice, and direct eye contact. Such interactions,

Plaintiffs believe, are a much more effective means of dissuading women from

having abortions than confrontational methods such as shouting, brandishing signs,

blocking access, loud speakers, or other methods which, in Plaintiffs’ view, tend only

to alienate their intended audience.

17. Some of the things Plaintiffs are called to do (and do) are make efforts to engage

women and hand them literature, walk alongside and talk to women headed towards

the clinic who, presumably, want to procure an abortion, and pray for the women who

start to enter the abortion clinic.

18. Angela will often, as part of this ministry, tell these women about her own harrowing

experience with abortion as a teenager and the lifelong regret she has suffered as a

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result. And, as part of this experience, she will tell the women that God loves them,

and their baby, regardless of the decision they make.

19. Necessarily, this sidewalk ministry is not loud, obnoxious, or confrontational;

experience has shown Plaintiffs that those tactics are counter-productive. Nor is the

sidewalk ministry a protest or meant or intended to block access to the clinic – the

message and ministry are a final intervention with women who often are in crisis and

believe they have no alternative to abortion. Plaintiffs deliberately walk along with

the women who are in the process of walking into EMW, and deliberately do not

block them.

20. Spectacularly, the ministry and interventions of Angela and Sisters for Life have been

responsible for saving over 800 babies outside EMW. Those 800 children are alive

today, thereby saving their mothers, fathers and families from the guilt and grief of

having a hand in their death.

21. For the avoidance of all doubt, the sidewalk ministry and counseling are part of the

sincerely held religious beliefs of the Plaintiffs, and are undertaken in accordance

with those same beliefs.

22. Given this success, it is not surprising that, at the insistence of EMW, which

substantially profits from the abortion trade, the Metro Council of Louisville Metro

passed legislation substantially restricting activities on the sidewalk outside EMW.

23. On May 20, 2021, the Metro Council passed Ordinance O-179-21 (the “Ordinance”),

in a 14-11 divided vote. A true and accurate copy of that Ordinance is attached as

Exhibit 1.

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24. Thereafter, Mayor Fischer signed the Ordinance on June 2, 2021, and, upon

information and belief, it has been published in accordance with law or is in the

process of being so published.

25. The Ordinance, while perhaps appearing modest at first blush, is actually remarkable

in both its overbreadth and scope. First, it provides: “(1) No person shall knowingly

obstruct, detain, hinder, impede, or block another person’s entry to or exit from a

healthcare facility.”

26. It further provides that “(2) No person shall knowingly enter, remain on, or create any

obstruction within the driveway of a healthcare facility or within a ‘buffer zone’ on

the public way or sidewalk extending from the entrance of a healthcare facility to the

closest adjacent sidewalk curb and 10 feet from side to side, during the facility’s

posted business hours, except: (a) persons entering or leaving such facility; (b)

persons using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to such facility

solely for the purpose of reaching a destination other than such facility; or (c) law

enforcement, ambulance, firefighting, construction, utilities, public works and other

municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment; or (d) employees or

agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment.”

27. The Ordinance defines “Entrance” as “any door to a healthcare facility that directly

abuts the public sidewalk; provided, however, that if the door does not directly about

the public sidewalk, the ‘entrance’ shall be the point at which the public sidewalk

intersects with a pathway leading to the door.”

28. We have denoted, for purposes of this Complaint, the “buffer zone” as that area on

the public way or sidewalk extending from the entrance of a healthcare facility to the

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closest adjacent sidewalk curb and 10 feet from side to side, where the “entrance”

described herein as the point at which the public sidewalk intersects with a pathway

leading to the door.

29. All told, the Ordinance prohibits anyone other than those coming within one of the

four secular exceptions to the Ordinance, including Plaintiffs herein, from being

located in a buffer zone. This buffer zone extends out to the street and, given the

width of the pathway that leads from the clinic to the sidewalk (which is 8 feet in

width) is approximately 73 feet long, and ten feet wide (blocking a total of some 730

square feet), and in terms of what has been marked and demarked as EMW property,

totals approximately half a city block of sidewalk that is now restricted.

30. More particularly, there is a pathway on EMW’s property that extends in two

directions from the door to the EMW facility. The EMW pathway, which totals

approximately 73 feet in length and approximately 8 feet in width, intersects and

connects with the public sidewalk running parallel to Market street. Therefore, all of

those points on the pathway that touch the public sidewalk constitute an “entrance”

under the Ordinance.

31. A true and accurate aerial depiction of this layout is depicted below. The white area

depicted below is EMW property that is adjacent to the public sidewalk property,

which EMW now has marked with “no trespassing” markers:

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32. But that is not all. EMW is also bordered by two other “Healthcare facilities” under

the Ordinance. As a result of the Ordinance, there is now a buffer zone around both

of those facilities. Using the map depiction above, to the left of EMW is BSideU for

Life Pregnancy Center (“BSideU”) at 140 West Market Street, Louisville, KY 40202,

which happens to be a pro-life center that provides pregnancy related services other

than abortion. BSideU permits Plaintiffs to conduct their sidewalk ministry from

BSideU’s property, but this is now explicitly prohibited by the Ordinance.

33. Using the map depiction above, to the right of EMW is an Optometrists’ office,

namely the offices of Drs. Vance and Stovall, at 120 W Market St, Louisville, KY

40202 (“Stovall”).

34. The effect of these healthcare facilities being located where they are, in terms of the

Ordinance, is a buffer zone that practically completely envelopes the entire city

block:

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35. Louisville Metro, in enacting the Ordinance, included all healthcare facilities within

its ambit, even though there were no material instances of any issues other than at

EMW, only because it intended to restricting the entire block above from being

accessed by the Plaintiffs and others seeking to dissuade women from obtaining

abortions. In other words, and as the photo above depicts, it was a not-so-clever

gerrymander to restrict an entire city block from being accessed by opponents to

abortion.

36. In the photo above, the yellow area approximately depicts the EMW property, and

specifically the parking lot and pathways that lead to the door, all of which are

“driveways” or “entrances” under the Ordinance. The orange depicts the pathways

that lead to the door and the parking lots of BSideU and Stovall, all of which are also

“driveways” or “entrances” under the Ordinance. And, the red area approximately

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depicts the buffer area under the Ordinance, which covers substantially all of the

public streets and sidewalks accessing EMW.

37. As depicted, the buffer area expands across an entire city block.

38. The buffer zone effectively prohibits persons from walking through it, or into it,

except as expressly permitted under an exception to the Ordinance.

39. The Ordinance is enforced with fines of up to $500 for each violation.

40. As it turns out, the buffer zone Ordinance prohibits the Plaintiffs and other sidewalk

ministers from speaking, praying, or interacting with those entering the EMW clinic,

including, without limitation, even with those entering who invite or otherwise

solicits contact with Plaintiffs.

41. The buffer zone compromises the Plaintiffs’ ability to initiate the close, personal

conversations that Plaintiffs view as essential to their sidewalk ministry.

42. Another pernicious effect of the buffer zone is to relegate the Plaintiffs to raising their

voices at parents from outside the zone – and as a practical matter, requires this to

occur from across the street – a mode of communication sharply at odds with the

compassionate message Plaintiffs wish to convey.

43. The buffer zone also makes it substantially more difficult for Plaintiffs to distribute

literature to arriving parents, again even where the parents wish to receive the

literature.

44. At the same time, the Ordinance explicitly permits EMW staff and volunteers to

escort those seeking an abortion into the buffer zone and into the clinic, where those

staff and volunteers regularly, and within the scope of their employment or volunteer

status, escort, encourage, and counsel the women seeking to enter the clinic to follow

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through with an abortion, thus providing speech in the buffer zone, but on only one

side of the abortion debate.

45. For the avoidance of all doubt, volunteers and employees of EMW will, within the

scope of their employment or volunteer status, and within the buffer zone, thwart or

attempt to thwart or block Plaintiffs’ efforts to speak or hand literature to those in the

process of walking to the EMW clinic property, regularly disparage Plaintiffs to those

seeking to enter the EMW clinic property, and will offer encouragement of those

seeking to obtain an abortion to do so, again providing speech on only one side of the

abortion debate.

46. Again, for the avoidance of all doubt, EMW authorizes its escorts to have these

conversations, with those being escorted, within the buffer zone.

47. The Ordinance is an insidious content and viewpoint-based speech gerrymander,

designed to squelch dissenting speech, and the practice of sincerely held religious

beliefs, in the vicinity of EMW.

48. It should be noted that prior to the passage of the challenged Ordinance, Louisville

Metro already had ordinances on the books to prevent blocking sidewalks.

Specifically, the City has had, at all times relevant hereto, ordinance 97.072, which

provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person in or on any sidewalk or any premises in or


abutting thereon to make any speech or harangue; to demonstrate, sell, or offer for
sale goods, wares, or merchandise; or to display any signs, device, information, or
exhibition in consequence of which there is caused or created such a gathering of
persons on the sidewalk as to interfere with pedestrian traffic thereon.

49. Louisville Metro has not seriously attempted less restrictive measures to combat the

purported ills that it contends required the passage of the Ordinance, including

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individual prosecutions, injunctions, ordinances against following and harassing

people within a certain number of feet of a health care facility, passage of legislation

similar to the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (18 USC

481(a)(1)), or ordinances requiring, at the directives of the police, the dispersal of

individuals blocking entrances to healthcare facilities.

50. The Ordinance in question provides a number of secular exceptions to the buffer zone

requirement, but makes no allowance for the practice of sincerely held religious

beliefs, such as those engaged in by the Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Ordinance allows

persons within the buffer zone who are (a) entering or leaving such facility; (b)

traversing the sidewalk but only if they are reaching a destination; (c) law

enforcement, ambulance, firefighting, construction, utilities, public works and other

municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment; and (d) employees or

agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment.

ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING STANDING

51. For the purposes of removing all doubt, Defendants Fischer, Shields, and O’Connell

are charged with enforcing, and actually do enforce, city ordinances, including the

ordinance challenged in this action.

52. Defendants Fischer and Shields made public statements demonstrating their intention

to regularly and systemically enforce the challenged ordinance, including statements

to public media, and threatened having the police charge people with violations of the

challenged ordinance. For his part, O’Connell’s office systemically prosecutes

violations of city ordinances.

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53. Plaintiffs, for their part, intend to violate the ordinance on a regular and systemic

basis, each and every day that EMW is open for business, including engaging in their

sidewalk ministry within the buffer zone, each and every one of those days.

COUNT I – 42 USC 1983, Violation of the First Amendment – Freedom of Speech

54. Plaintiffs reincorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully written herein.

55. The First Amendment guaranties, among other things, that government may make no

law “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const., Amend. I. It has been

incorporated against the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

56. Public streets and sidewalks comprising the buffer zone under the Ordinance are

traditional public forums, triggering the traditional public forum analysis under First

Amendment analysis and scrutiny. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476-477

(2014). The Government’s ability to restrict speech in such locations is “very

limited.” Id.

57. Restrictions in such areas can be upheld only if they are “reasonable restrictions on

the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified

without reference to the content of the regulated speech, they are narrowly tailored to

serve a significant governmental interest, and they leave open alternative channels for

communication of the information.” Id. at 477.

58. The restrictions here are not content neutral (and, in fact, constitute viewpoint

discrimination, which is presumptively unconstitutional) because they permit EMW

and its staff and volunteers to engage in pro-abortion speech within the buffer zone,

while foreclosing Plaintiffs from engaging in pro-life speech. For the avoidance of all

doubt, EMW staff and volunteers do speak, within the scope of their employment or

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volunteer status, within the buffer zone, encouraging would-be patients to obtain

abortion services at EMW. Id. at 484-485. Thus, because the Ordinance does not

satisfy strict scrutiny in that it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling

governmental interest, the Ordinance is unconstitutional on that basis alone.

59. Even if the Ordinance did not amount to content and viewpoint discrimination, it also

is not narrowly tailored under the less exacting narrow tailoring in a content-neutral

forum analysis, and it fails to leave open alternative channels for communication of

the information. Specifically, in application, it restricts an even greater area than the

U.S. Supreme Court struck down in Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, and, as in Coakley,

Louisville Metro has not undertaken less restrictive measures to achieve its purported

ends.

60. The Ordinance thus violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech guaranties.

61. Plaintiffs therefore seek declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and nominal damages

for the foregoing violations, as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs under 42

USC 1988.

COUNT II – 42 USC 1983, Violation of the First Amendment – Freedom of Assembly

62. Plaintiffs reincorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully written herein.

63. The First Amendment also guaranties the right “of the people peaceably to assemble.”

This guaranty has also been incorporated against the states. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299

U.S. 353 (1937).

64. Assembly on public streets and sidewalks is among the guaranties protected by the

First Amendment. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).

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65. These rights, being fundamental rights, trigger strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486

U.S. 456, 461 (1988).

66. The Ordinance is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental

interest. It is thus also a violation of the Freedom of Assembly guaranty of the First

Amendment.

67. Plaintiffs therefore seek declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and nominal damages

for the foregoing violations, as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs under 42

USC 1988.

COUNT III – 42 USC 1983, Violation of the First Amendment – Free Exercise of
Religion

68. Plaintiffs reincorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully written herein.

69. The First Amendment also provides that: “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” This clause, too,

has been incorporated against the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296

(1940).

70. “[A] law that discriminates against religious practices usually will be invalidated

because it is the rare law that can be ‘justified by a compelling interest and is

narrowly tailored to advance that interest.’" Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th

Cir. 2020). That is because a “a law might appear to be generally applicable on the

surface but not be so in practice due to exceptions for comparable secular activities.”3

Id. “Do the four [categories] of exceptions in the [ordinance], and the kinds of

[exceptions] allowed, remove them from the safe harbor for generally applicable

3
This case also presents hybrid First Amendment rights, which also triggers strict scrutiny under
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-882 (1990).
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laws? We think so.” Id. "At some point, an exception-ridden policy takes on the

appearance and reality of a system of individualized exemptions, the antithesis of a

neutral and generally applicable policy and just the kind of state action that must run

the gauntlet of strict scrutiny." Id. at 413-414.

71. The Ordinance thus constitutes a violation of Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights.

72. Plaintiffs therefore seek declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and nominal damages

for the foregoing violations, as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs under 42

USC 1988.

COUNT IV – KRS 446.350 – Violation of the Kentucky Religious Freedom


Restoration Act

73. Plaintiffs reincorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully written herein.

74. KRS 446.350 provides:

Government shall not substantially burden a person's freedom of religion. The right to
act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief may not
be substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing
evidence that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act
or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to further that interest. A
"burden" shall include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing
penalties, or an exclusion from programs or access to facilities.
75. Defendants have substantially burdened Plaintiffs’ freedom of religion, including

their right to act in a manner motivated by their sincerely religious beliefs, i.e.

sidewalk ministry. Defendants cannot overcome, by clear and convincing evidence,

that they have a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act or

refusal to act and have used the least restrictive means to further that interest.

76. Plaintiffs therefore seek declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for the foregoing

violations.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs’ demand judgment against Defendants:

• For nominal damages, as prayed for;

• For declaratory and injunctive relief, including a restraining order, preliminary

injunction, and permanent injunction;

• For reasonable attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988; and

• For such other relief as this Court may find just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Christopher Wiest___________
Christopher Wiest (KBA #90725)
25 Town Center Blvd, Suite 104
Crestview Hills, KY 41017
513-257-1895
(859) 495-0803 (fax)
chris@cwiestlaw.com

/s/ Thomas B. Bruns_____________


Thomas B. Bruns (KBA #84985)
Bruns, Connell, Vollmar & Armstrong, LLC
4750 Ashwood Drive, Suite 200
Cincinnati, OH 45241
(513) 312-9890
(513) 800-1263 (fax)
tbruns@bcvalaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing in the Court’s CM/ECF system, this 7th day of
June, 2021, and that I will serve same with the summons in this matter.

/s/Christopher Wiest___________
Christopher Wiest (KBA #90725)

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