Llamanzares v. COMELEC, Et Al (G.R. No. 221677-2216700)
Llamanzares v. COMELEC, Et Al (G.R. No. 221677-2216700)
Llamanzares v. COMELEC, Et Al (G.R. No. 221677-2216700)
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September
1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the
name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their
petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe."
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner
registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On
13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card
for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport
No. F927287 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently,
on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport
and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and
DD156616.7
The petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at
the University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies
abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner
graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts
where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14
She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. On 8
April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with
Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same
Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As
can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of
the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates
(ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the United States."49
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
"Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21
October 2010.
Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo
claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-
born Filipino on account that she was a foundling.
RULING:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles
of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive
from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international
law include international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it. "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based
on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," such as
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is
embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation." These are the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality
shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage
is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born
on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens
of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born
within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean
that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party
to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives
effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted
that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is
likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of
international law although the convention had been ratified by only
sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the
ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner
points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State
Practice in the United States.