Paper 53
Paper 53
Paper 53
PAPER 53
QUANTUM INFORMATION,
ENTANGLEMENT AND NONLOCALITY
(b) Let DH be the set of density matrices defining mixed states of the system above.
Define
P a convex decomposition of a density matrix ρ in DH to P be an expression
ρ = i ai ρi , where each ρi is in DH and each ai > 0, and where i ai = 1. Define
a density matrix ρ in DH to be pure if, given any convex decomposition of ρ, we
have that ρi = ρ for all i. Show that ρ is pure (by this definition) if and only if
ρ = |ψihψ| for some state vector |ψi in H.
3 Alice and Bob share √four identical copies of an entangled state known to be of the
form α|00i + β|11i, with 1/ 2 < |α| < 1. They wish to try to generate some maximally
entangled states, using only local operations and classical communication. One strategy
is for Alice to measure the total value
P4 of the computational basis count of her four qubits
(i.e. for Alice to measure P A = P
i=1 i
A , where P A = |0iA h0|A projects on her i-th
i i i
qubit) and to send the result to Bob, and then for Alice and Bob to carry out further op-
erations. Develop this strategy, describing all the measurements involved and giving the
probabilities of their outcomes. Show explicitly what Alice and Bob have to do in order to
extract copies of maximally entangled pairs of qubits, in the cases where this is possible.
4 Part A
Consider the Bell states
± √
Φ = 1/ 2(| 00iAB ± | 11iAB )
AB
Here and below, the AB subscript indicates that the state is shared between Alice
and Bob, while an A subscript indicates that the state is with Alice only.
Recall that a purification of a state ρ of a system S is a pure state | ψi of a combined
system S + E, where E is an ancillary system and where TrE (| ψi hψ |) = ρ.
Alice and Bob share many copies of a quantum state and can implement local
operations and communicate publicly over a classical channel. Assume that the ancillary
system of some purification of Alice and Bob’s state is held by an eavesdropper (Eve).
Which of the states below can be used to produce a secure key and which cannot? Justify
your answers. (Security proofs are not needed.)
(1) | Φ+ iAB
√
2 2 1
(2) 3 | 00iAB + 9 | 11iAB
q q
1 1 7 7
(3) 3 | 00iAB + 3 | 01iAB + 18 | 10iAB + 18 | 11iAB
(4) 12 (ρ+ −
AB + ρAB )
(5) 12 (ρ+ −
AB ⊗ | 0iA h0 |A + ρAB ⊗ | 1iA h1 |A )
Part B
Below are three protocols which are intended to be secure Quantum Key Distribu-
tion (QKD) schemes. However, some or all of them may be insecure or may be impossible
to implement. For each protocol, state whether it is secure, insecure or impossible to
implement. Justify your answers. (Security proofs are not needed.)
Recall that
a Hadamard
transform in the computational basis is given by the unitary
1 1
map H = √12
1 −1
Protocol 1
⊗2n
1: Alice creates the state | Φ+ i , i.e. 2n EPR pairs.
2: Alice selects a random 2n bit string b, and performs a Hadamard transform on the
second half of each EPR pair for which b is 1.
3: Alice sends the second half of each EPR pair to Bob.
4: Alice selects n of the 2n encoded EPR pairs to serve as check bits to test for Eve’s
interference.
5: Alice announces the bit string b, and which n EPR pairs are to be check bits.
6: Bob receives the qubits and publicly announces this fact.
7: Bob performs Hadamard transforms on the qubits where b is 1.
8: Alice and Bob each measure their halves of the n check EPR pairs in the | 0i, | 1i
basis and share the results. If too many of these measurements disagree, they abort
the protocol.
Protocol 2
⊗2n
1: Alice creates the state | Φ+ i , i.e. 2n EPR pairs.
2: Alice selects a random 2n bit string b, and performs a Hadamard transform H on
the second half of each EPR pair for which b is 1.
3: Alice sends the second half of each EPR pair to Bob.
4: Bob receives the qubits and publicly announces this fact.
5: Alice selects n of the 2n encoded EPR pairs to serve as check bits to test for Eve’s
interference.
6: Alice announces which n EPR pairs are to be check bits.
7: Bob performs inverse Hadamard transforms H −1 on the qubits where a Hadamard
transform H had been performed.
8: Alice and Bob each measure their halves of the n check EPR pairs in the | 0i, | 1i
basis and share the results. If too many of these measurements disagree, they abort
the protocol.
9: Alice and Bob perform an entanglement purification protocol (EPP) to transform
their state so as to obtain m nearly perfect EPR pairs.
10 Alice and Bob measure the remaining EPR pairs in the | 0i, | 1i basis to obtain a
shared secret key.
Protocol 3
⊗2n
1: Alice creates the state | Φ+ i , i.e. 2n EPR pairs.
2: Alice selects a random 2n bit string b, and performs a Hadamard transform H on
the second half of each EPR pair for which b is 1.
3: Alice sends the second half of each EPR pair to Bob.
4: Bob receives the qubits and publicly announces this fact.
5: Alice selects n of the 2n encoded EPR pairs to serve as check bits to test for Eve’s
interference.
6: Alice announces the bit string b, and which n EPR pairs are to be check bits.
7: Bob performs Hadamards on the qubits where b is 1.
8: Alice and Bob each measure their halves of the n check EPR pairs in the | 0i, | 1i
basis and share the results. If too many of these measurements disagree, they abort
the protocol.
9: Alice and Bob perform an entanglement purification protocol (EPP) to transform
their state so as to obtain m nearly perfect EPR pairs.
10: Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in the | 0i, | 1i basis to obtain a shared secret
key.
END OF PAPER