R70.P2.T7.BaselII - Global - v7.1 - Study Notes
R70.P2.T7.BaselII - Global - v7.1 - Study Notes
R70.P2.T7.BaselII - Global - v7.1 - Study Notes
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
Basel III: Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking
Systems
DESCRIBE REASONS FOR THE CHANGES IMPLEMENTED IN BASEL III FRAMEWORK. .................. 3
DESCRIBE CHANGES TO THE REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING CHANGES TO: THE
MEASUREMENT, TREATMENT, AND CALCULATION OF TIER 1 ................................................... 4
DESCRIBE CHANGES TO THE REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING CHANGES TO:
TIER 2, AND TIER 3 CAPITAL................................................................................................. 7
DESCRIBE CHANGES TO THE REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING CHANGES TO:
RISK COVERAGE, THE USE OF STRESS TESTS AND THE TREATMENT OF COUNTER-PARTY RISK
WITH CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS. .............................................................................. 8
DESCRIBE CHANGES TO THE REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING CHANGES TO: THE
USE OF EXTERNAL RATINGS ............................................................................................... 10
DESCRIBE CHANGES TO THE REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING CHANGES TO: THE
USE OF LEVERAGE RATIOS ................................................................................................. 10
EXPLAIN CHANGES DESIGNED TO DAMPEN THE PROCYCLICAL AMPLIFICATION OF FINANCIAL
SHOCKS AND TO PROMOTE COUNTER-CYCLICAL BUFFERS. ................................................... 11
DESCRIBE CHANGES INTENDED TO IMPROVE THE HANDLING OF SYSTEMIC RISK..................... 11
2
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
The measurement, treatment, and calculation of Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 capital
Risk coverage, the use of stress tests, the treatment of counter-party risk with
credit valuation adjustments, the use of external ratings, and the use of leverage
ratios
3
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
Common
Capital requirements Equity Tier 1 Total
and buffers Tier 1 Capital Capital
Tier 1: the predominant form of Tier 1 capital must be common shares and retained
earnings
Common Equity Tier 1 includes:
o Common shares issued by the bank that meet the criteria for classification as
common shares for regulatory purposes;
o Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments
included Common Equity Tier 1;
o Retained earnings;
o Accumulated other comprehensive income and other disclosed reserves;
o Minority interest
o Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1
4
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
5
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
5. May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years:
o To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior supervisory approval;
and
o A bank must not do anything which creates an expectation that the call will
be exercised; and
o Banks must not exercise a call unless:
i. They replace the called instrument with capital of the same or better
quality and the replacement of this capital is done at conditions which are
sustainable for the income capacity of the bank; or
ii. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum
capital requirements after the call option is exercised.
6. Any repayment of principal (e.g. through repurchase or redemption) must be with
prior supervisory approval and banks should not assume or create market
expectations that supervisory approval will be given
7. Dividend/coupon discretion:
o the bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel
distributions/payments
o cancellation of discretionary payments must not be an event of default
o banks must have full access to cancelled payments to meet obligations as
they fall due
o cancellation of distributions/payments must not impose restrictions on the
bank except in relation to distributions to common stockholders.
8. Dividends/coupons must be paid out of distributable items
9. The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, that is a
dividend/coupon that is reset periodically based in whole or in part on the banking
organization’s credit standing.
10. The instrument cannot contribute to liabilities exceeding assets if such a balance
sheet test forms part of national insolvency law
11. Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal
loss absorption through either (i) conversion to common shares at an objective
pre-specified trigger point or (ii) a write-down mechanism which allocates losses
to the instrument at a pre-specified trigger point. The write-down will have the
following effects:
o Reduce the claim of the instrument in liquidation;
o Reduce the amount re-paid when a call is exercised; and
o Partially or fully reduce coupon/dividend payments on the instrument.
12. Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or
significant influence can have purchased the instrument, nor can the bank directly
or indirectly have funded the purchase of the instrument
6
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
13. The instrument cannot have any features that hinder recapitalization, such as
provisions that require the issuer to compensate investors if a new instrument is
issued at a lower price during a specified time frame
14. If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the holding company in
the consolidated group (eg a special purpose vehicle – “SPV”), proceeds must be
immediately available without limitation to an operating entity or the holding
company in the consolidated group in a form which meets or exceeds all of the
other criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital
7
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
Revised metric to better address counterparty credit risk, credit valuation adjustments
and wrong-way risk (Effective EPE with stressed parameters to address general
wrong-way risk)
“Going forward, banks must determine their capital requirement for counterparty
credit risk using stressed inputs. This will address concerns about capital charges
becoming too low during periods of compressed market volatility and help address
procyclicality. The approach, which is similar to what has been introduced for market
risk, will also promote more integrated management of market and counterparty
credit risk.
Banks will be subject to a capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses (ie credit
valuation adjustment – CVA – risk) associated with a deterioration in the credit
worthiness of a counterparty. While the Basel II standard covers the risk of a
counterparty default, it does not address such CVA risk, which during the financial
crisis was a greater source of losses than those arising from outright defaults.”
Asset value correlation multiplier for large financial institutions
Collateralized counterparties and margin period of risk
Central counterparties
Enhanced counterparty credit risk management requirements include:
5a) Stress testing: Banks must have a comprehensive stress testing program for
counterparty credit risk. The stress testing program must include the following elements:
Banks must ensure complete trade capture and exposure aggregation across all
forms of counterparty credit risk (not just OTC derivatives) at the counterparty-
specific level in a sufficient time frame to conduct regular stress testing.
For all counterparties, banks should produce, at least monthly, exposure stress
testing of principal market risk factors (eg interest rates, FX, equities, credit spreads,
and commodity prices) in order to proactively identify, and when necessary, reduce
outsized concentrations to specific directional sensitivities
Banks should apply multifactor stress testing scenarios and assess material
non-directional risks (i.e. yield curve exposure, basis risks, etc) at least quarterly.
Multiple-factor stress tests should, at a minimum, aim to address scenarios in which
a) severe economic or market events have occurred; b) broad market liquidity has
decreased significantly; and c) the market impact of liquidating positions of a large
financial intermediary. These stress tests may be part of bank-wide stress testing.
Stressed market movements have an impact not only on counterparty exposures, but
also on the credit quality of counterparties. At least quarterly, banks should conduct
stress testing applying stressed conditions to the joint movement of exposures and
counterparty creditworthiness.
8
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
Exposure stress testing (including single factor, multifactor and material non-
directional risks) and joint stressing of exposure and creditworthiness should be
performed at the counterparty-specific, counterparty group (eg industry and region),
and aggregate bank-wide CCR levels.
Stress tests results should be integrated into regular reporting to senior
management.
The severity of factor shocks should be consistent with the purpose of the stress test.
When evaluating solvency under stress, factor shocks should be severe enough to
capture historical extreme market environments and/or extreme but plausible
stressed market conditions.
Banks should consider reverse stress tests to identify extreme, but plausible,
scenarios that could result in significant adverse outcomes.
Senior management must take a lead role in the integration of stress testing into the
risk management framework and risk culture of the bank and ensure that the results
are meaningful and proactively used to manage counterparty credit risk.
“It is important that supervisory authorities are able to assure themselves that banks using
models have counterparty credit risk management systems that are conceptually sound and
implemented with integrity. Accordingly, the supervisory authority will specify a number of
qualitative criteria that banks would have to meet before they are permitted to use a models-
based approach …. The qualitative criteria include:”
The bank must conduct a regular program of backtesting; i.e., an ex-post
comparison of the risk measures generated by the model against realized risk
measures, as well as comparing hypothetical changes based on static positions with
realized measures.
The bank must carry out an initial validation and an on-going periodic review of its
IMM model and the risk measures generated by it. The validation and review must be
independent of the model developers.
The board of directors and senior management should be actively involved in the risk
control process and must regard credit and counterparty credit risk control as an
essential aspect of the business to which significant resources need to be devoted.
The bank’s internal risk measurement exposure model must be closely integrated
into the day-to-day risk management process of the bank.
The risk measurement system should be used in conjunction with internal trading and
exposure limits.
Banks should have a routine in place for ensuring compliance with a documented
set of internal policies, controls and procedures concerning the operation of the risk
measurement system.
An independent review of the risk measurement system should be carried out
regularly in the bank’s own internal auditing process.
9
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
“One of the underlying features of the crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-
balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive
leverage while still showing strong risk based capital ratios. During the most severe part of
the crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in a manner
that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the positive
feedback loop between losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in credit availability.”
10
Guru. Downloaded March 7, 2020.
The information provided in this document is intended solely for you. Please do not freely distribute.
11