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Bloom’s Modern Critical Views

jane Austen
New Edition

Edited and with an introduction by

Harold Bloom
Sterling Professor of the Humanities
Yale University
Bloom’s Modern Critical Views: Jane Austen, New Edition
Copyright © 2009 by Infobase Publishing
Introduction © 2009 by Harold Bloom

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Jane Austen / edited and with an introduction by Harold Bloom. — New ed.
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ISBN 978-1-60413-397-4 (hardcover)
1. Austen, Jane, 1775–1817—Criticism and interpretation. 2. Women and litera-
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 Contents

Editor’s Note vii

Introduction 1
Harold Bloom

Ideological Contradictions and the

Consolations of Form: The Case of Jane Austen 21
Mary Poovey

“A Model of Female Excellence”: Anne Elliot,

Persuasion, and the Vindication of a
Richardsonian Ideal of the Female Character 59
E.B. Moon

Why Women Didn’t Like Romanticism:

The Views of Jane Austen and Mary Shelley 77
Anne K. Mellor

Gendering Rooms: Domestic

Architecture and Literary Acts 89
Cynthia Wall

Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 113

William Deresiewicz

Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 145

Jo Alyson Parker

Colloquy 173
Ivor Morris
vi Contents

Emma 189
Paula Byrne

“Pictures of perfection as you know

make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion 205
Gloria Sybil Gross

Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park:

“At Once Both Tragedy and Comedy” 219
Patricia Menon

An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 251

Emily Auerbach

Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 279

Sarah Emsley

Chronology 297

Contributors 299

Bibliography 301

Acknowledgements 305

Index 307
 Editor’s Note

My introduction centers on Jane Austen’s relationships to Shakespeare,

Samuel Richardson, and Dr. Samuel Johnson, while narrating the fortunes
of the Protestant will in four great novels: Pride and Prejudice, Mansfield
Park, Emma, and Persuasion.
Mary Poovey traces a dialectic between Austen’s aesthetic wit and the
ideological paradoxes of Austenian society.
Richardson’s influence on Persuasion is emphasized by E.B. Moon, af-
ter which Anne K. Mellor analyzes the contrast between Mary Shelley and
Austen in their stances toward romanticism.
For Cynthia Wall, spatial relations between Elizabeth and Darcy in
Pride and Prejudice mirror their eventual accommodation, while William
Deresiewicz adroitly suggests that erotic love in Austen essentially is a form
of friendship.
Mansfield Park is seen by Jo Alyson Parker as a double-voiced work,
both upholding tradition yet also criticizing the constructions of patriarchal
order.
Ivor Morris charmingly praises the sincerity of the sublimely egregious
Mr. Collins of Pride and Prejudice, after which Paula Byrne demonstrates the
art of the theater in Emma.
Persuasion, to Gloria Sybil Gross, manifests Dr. Johnson’s fierce realism
in regard to marriage, while both Mansfield Park and Sense and Sensibility
impress Patricia Menon as possessing aspects at once comic and darkening
toward the tragic.
Emily Auerbach wisely searches Sense and Sensibility for “reasons of the
heart” that, in Austen, reason does know, after which Sarah Emsley concludes
this volume with an acute reading of friendship and tolerance in Emma.

vii
 H arold B loom

Introduction

The oddest yet by no means inapt analogy to Jane Austen’s art of representa-
tion is Shakespeare’s—oddest, because she is so careful of limits, as classical
as Ben Jonson in that regard, and Shakespeare transcends all limits. Austen’s
humor, her mode of rhetorical irony, is not particularly Shakespearean, and
yet her precision and accuracy of representation is. Like Shakespeare, she
gives us figures, major and minor, utterly consistent each in her or his own
mode of speech and being, and utterly different from one another. Her
heroines have firm selves, each molded with an individuality that continues
to suggest Austen’s reserve of power, her potential for creating an endless
diversity. To recur to the metaphor of oddness, the highly deliberate limita-
tion of social scale in Austen seems a paradoxical theater of mind in which
so fecund a humanity could be fostered. Irony, the concern of most critics of
Austen, seems more than a trope in her work, seems indeed to be the condi-
tion of her language, yet hardly accounts for the effect of moral and spiritual
power that she so constantly conveys, however implicitly or obliquely.
Ian Watt, in his permanently useful The Rise of the Novel, portrays Aus-
ten as Fanny Burney’s direct heir in the difficult art of combining the rival
modes of Samuel Richardson and Henry Fielding. Like Burney, Austen is
thus seen as following the Richardson of Sir Charles Grandison, in a “minute
presentation of daily life,” while emulating Fielding in “adopting a more de-
tached attitude to her narrative material, and in evaluating it from a comic


 Harold Bloom

and objective point of view.” Watt goes further when he points out that Aus-
ten tells her stories in a discreet variant of Fielding’s manner “as a confessed
author,” though her ironical juxtapositions are made to appear not those of
“an intrusive author but rather of some august and impersonal spirit of social
and psychological understanding.”
And yet, as Watt knows, Austen truly is the daughter of Richardson, and
not of Fielding, just as she is the ancestor of George Eliot and Henry James,
rather than of Dickens and Thackeray. Her inwardness is an ironic revision of
Richardson’s extraordinary conversion of English Protestant sensibility into
the figure of Clarissa Harlowe, and her own moral and spiritual concerns
fuse in the crucial need of her heroines to sustain their individual integrities,
a need so intense that it compels them to fall into those errors about life that
are necessary for life (to adopt a Nietzschean formulation). In this too they
follow, though in a comic register, the pattern of their tragic precursor, the
magnificent but sublimely flawed Clarissa Harlowe.
Richardson’s Clarissa, perhaps still the longest novel in the language,
seems to me also still the greatest, despite the achievements of Austen, Dickens,
George Eliot, Henry James, and Joyce. Austen’s Elizabeth Bennet and Emma
Woodhouse, Eliot’s Dorothea Brooke and Gwendolyn Harleth, James’s Isabel
Archer and Milly Theale—though all these are Clarissa Harlowe’s direct de-
scendants, they are not proportioned to her more sublime scale. David Copper-
field and Leopold Bloom have her completeness; indeed Joyce’s Bloom may be
the most complete representation of a human being in all of literature. But they
belong to the secular age; Clarissa Harlowe is poised upon the threshold that
leads from the Protestant religion to a purely secular sainthood.
C.S. Lewis, who read Milton as though that fiercest of Protestant tem-
peraments had been an orthodox Anglican, also seems to have read Jane
Austen by listening for her echoings of the New Testament. Quite explicitly,
Lewis named Austen as the daughter of Dr. Samuel Johnson, greatest of liter-
ary critics, and rigorous Christian moralist:

I feel . . . sure that she is the daughter of Dr. Johnson: she inherits
his commonsense, his morality, even much of his style.

The Johnson of Rasselas and of The Rambler, surely the essential Johnson,
is something of a classical ironist, but we do not read Johnson for his ironies,
or for his dramatic representations of fictive selves. Rather, we read him as we
read Koheleth; he writes wisdom literature. That Jane Austen is a wise writer
is indisputable, but we do not read Pride and Prejudice as though it were
Ecclesiastes. Doubtless, Austen’s religious ideas were as profound as Samuel
Richardson’s were shallow, but Emma and Clarissa are Protestant novels with-
out being in any way religious. What is most original about the representa-
tion of Clarissa Harlowe is the magnificent intensity of her slowly described
 Introduction 

dying, which goes on for about the last third of Richardson’s vast novel, in a
Puritan ritual that celebrates the preternatural strength of her will. For that
is Richardson’s sublime concern: the self-reliant apotheosis of the Protestant
will. What is tragedy in Clarissa becomes serious or moral comedy in Pride
and Prejudice and Emma, and something just the other side of comedy in
Mansfield Park and Persuasion.

Pride and Prejudice

Rereading Pride and Prejudice gives one a sense of Proustian ballet beauti-
fully working itself through in the novel’s formal centerpiece, the deferred
but progressive mutual enlightenment of Elizabeth and Darcy in regard to
the other’s true nature. “Proper pride” is what they learn to recognize in
one another; propriety scarcely needs definition in that phrase, but precisely
what is the pride that allows amiability to flourish? Whatever it is in Darcy,
to what extent is it an art of the will in Elizabeth Bennet? Consider the
superb scene of Darcy’s first and failed marriage proposal:

While settling this point, she was suddenly roused by the sound
of the doorbell, and her spirits were a little fluttered by the idea of
its being Colonel Fitzwilliam himself, who had once before called
late in the evening, and might now come to inquire particularly
after her. But this idea was soon banished, and her spirits were very
differently affected, when, to her utter amazement, she saw Mr.
Darcy walk into the room. In an hurried manner he immediately
began an inquiry after her health, imputing his visit to a wish of
hearing that she were better. She answered him with cold civility.
He sat down for a few moments, and then getting up, walked about
the room. Elizabeth was surprised, but said not a word. After a
silence of several minutes, he came towards her in an agitated
manner, and thus began:
“In vain have I struggled. It will not do. My feelings will not
be repressed. You must allow me to tell you how ardently I admire
and love you.”
Elizabeth’s astonishment was beyond expression. She stared,
coloured, doubted, and was silent. This he considered sufficient
encouragement; and the avowal of all that he felt, and had long
felt for her, immediately followed. He spoke well; but there were
feelings besides those of the heart to be detailed, and he was not
more eloquent on the subject of tenderness than of pride. His
sense of her inferiority—of its being a degradation—of the family
obstacles which judgment had always opposed to inclination, were
dwelt on with a warmth which seemed due to the consequence he
was wounding, but was very unlikely to recommend his suit.
 Harold Bloom

In spite of her deeply-rooted dislike, she could not be insen-

sible to the compliment of such a man’s affection, and though her
intentions did not vary for an instant, she was at first sorry for the
pain he was to receive; till, roused to resentment by his subsequent
language, she lost all compassion in anger. She tried, however,
to compose herself to answer him with patience, when he should
have done. He concluded with representing to her the strength
of that attachment which, in spite of all his endeavours, he had
found impossible to conquer; and with expressing his hope that
it would now be rewarded by her acceptance of his hand. As he
said this, she could easily see that he had no doubt of a favourable
answer. He spoke of apprehension and anxiety, but his countenance
expressed real security. Such a circumstance could only exasperate
farther, and, when he ceased, the colour rose into her cheeks, and
she said:
“In such cases as this, it is, I believe, the established mode to
express a sense of obligation for the sentiments avowed, however
unequally they may be returned. It is natural that obligation
should be felt, and if I could feel gratitude, I would now thank
you. But I cannot—I have never desired your good opinion, and
you have certainly bestowed it most unwillingly. I am sorry to
have occasioned pain to anyone. It has been most unconsciously
done, however, and I hope will be of short duration. The feelings
which, you tell me, have long prevented the acknowledgment of
your regard, can have little difficulty in overcoming it after this
explanation.”
Mr. Darcy, who was leaning against the mantelpiece with his
eyes fixed on her face, seemed to catch her words with no less
resentment than surprise. His complexion became pale with anger,
and the disturbance of his mind was visible in every feature. He
was struggling for the appearance of composure, and would not
open his lips till he believed himself to have attained it. The pause
was to Elizabeth’s feelings dreadful. At length, in a voice of forced
calmness, he said:
“And this is all the reply which I am to have the honour of
expecting? I might, perhaps, wish to be informed why, with so
little endeavour at civility, I am thus rejected. But it is of small
importance.”

Stuart M. Tave believes that both Darcy and Elizabeth become so changed
by one another that their “happiness is deserved by a process of mortification
begun early and ended late,” mortification here being the wounding of pride.
 Introduction 

Tave’s learning and insight are impressive, but I favor the judgment that Eliza-
beth and Darcy scarcely change, and learn rather that they complement each
other’s not wholly illegitimate pride. They come to see that their wills are natu-
rally allied, since they have no differences upon the will. The will to what? Their
will, Austen’s, is neither the will to live nor the will to power. They wish to be
esteemed precisely where they estimate value to be high, and neither can af-
ford to make a fundamental error, which is both the anxiety and the comedy of
the first proposal scene. Why after all does Darcy allow himself to be eloquent
on the subject of his pride, to the extraordinary extent of conveying “with a
warmth” what Austen grimly names as “his sense of her inferiority”?
As readers, we have learned already that Elizabeth is inferior to no one,
whoever he is. Indeed, I sense as the novel closes (though nearly all Austen
critics, and doubtless Austen herself, would disagree with me) that Darcy
is her inferior, amiable and properly prideful as he is. I do not mean by this
that Elizabeth is a clearer representation of Austenian values than Darcy ever
could be; that is made finely obvious by Austen, and her critics have devel-
oped her ironic apprehension, which is that Elizabeth incarnates the stan-
dard of measurement in her cosmos. There is also a transcendent strength to
Elizabeth’s will that raises her above that cosmos, in a mode that returns us
to Clarissa Harlowe’s transcendence of her society, of Lovelace, and even of
everything in herself that is not the will to a self esteem that has also made an
accurate estimate of every other will to pride it ever has encountered.
I am suggesting that Ralph Waldo Emerson (who to me is sacred) was
mistaken when he rejected Austen as a “sterile” upholder of social conformi-
ties and social ironies, as an author who could not celebrate the soul’s freedom
from societal conventions. Austen’s ultimate irony is that Elizabeth Bennet is
inwardly so free that convention performs for her the ideal function it cannot
perform for us: it liberates her will without tending to stifle her high indi-
viduality. But we ought to be wary of even the most distinguished of Austen’s
moral celebrants, Lionel Trilling, who in effect defended her against Emerson
by seeing Pride and Prejudice as a triumph “of morality as style.” If Emerson
wanted to see a touch more Margaret Fuller in Elizabeth Bennet (sublimely
ghastly notion!), Trilling wanted to forget the Emersonian law of Compensa-
tion, which is that nothing is got for nothing:

The relation of Elizabeth Bennet to Darcy is real, is intense, but it

expresses itself as a conflict and reconciliation of styles: a formal
rhetoric, traditional and rigorous, must find a way to accomodate
a female vivacity, which in turn must recognize the principled
demands of the strict male syntax. The high moral import of
the novel lies in the fact that the union of styles is accomplished
without injury to either lover.
 Harold Bloom

Yes and no, I would say. Yes, because the wills of both lovers work by
similar dialectics, but also no, because Elizabeth’s will is more intense and
purer, and inevitably must be dimmed by her dwindling into a wife, even
though Darcy may well be the best man that society could offer to her. Her
pride has playfulness in it, a touch even of the Quixotic. Uncannily, she is
both her father’s daughter and Samuel Richardson’s daughter as well. Her wit
is Mr. Bennet’s, refined and elaborated, but her will, and her pride in her will,
returns us to Clarissa’s Puritan passion to maintain the power of the self to
confer esteem, and to accept esteem only in response to its bestowal.

Mansfield Park
John Locke argues against personifying the will: persons can be free, but
not the will, since the will cannot be constrained, except externally. While
one sleeps, if someone moved one into another room and locked the door,
and there one found a friend one wished to see, still one could not say that
one was free thus to see whom one wished. And yet Locke implies that the
process of association does work as though the will were internally con-
strained. Association, in Locke’s sense, is a blind substitution for reasoning,
yet is within a reasoning process, though also imbued with affect. The mind,
in association, is carried unwillingly from one thought to another, by acci-
dent as it were. Each thought appears, and carries along with it a crowd of
unwanted guests, inhabitants of a room where the thought would rather be
alone. Association, in this view, is what the will most needs to be defended
against.
Fanny Price, in Mansfield Park, might be considered a co-descendant,
together with Locke’s association-menaced will, of the English Protestant
emphasis upon the will’s autonomy. Fanny, another precursor of the Virginia
Woolf of A Room of One’s Own, was shrewdly described by Lionel Trilling as
“overtly virtuous and consciously virtuous,” and therefore almost impossible to
like, though Trilling (like Austen) liked Fanny very much. C.S. Lewis, though
an orthodox moralist, thought Fanny insipid: “But into Fanny, Jane Austen,
to counterbalance her apparent insignificance, has put really nothing except
rectitude of mind; neither passion, nor physical courage, nor wit, nor resource.”
Nothing, I would say, except the Protestant will, resisting the powers of asso-
ciation and asserting its very own persistence, its own sincere intensity, and its
own isolate sanctions. Trilling secularized these as “the sanctions of principle”
and saw Mansfield Park as a novel that “discovers in principle the path to the
wholeness of the self which is peace.” That is movingly said, but secularization,
in literature, is always a failed trope, since the distinction between sacred and
secular is not actually a literary but rather a societal or political distinction.
Mansfield Park is not less Protestant than Paradise Lost, even though Austen, as
a writer, was as much a sect of one as John Milton was.
 Introduction 

Fanny Price, like the Lockean will, fights against accident, against the
crowding out of life by associations that are pragmatically insincere not be-
cause they are random, but because they are irrelevant, since whatever is not
the will’s own is irrelevant to it. If Fanny herself is an irony it is as Austen’s
allegory of her own defense against influences, human and literary, whether
in her family circle or in the literary family of Fanny Burney, Fielding, and
Richardson. Stuart Tave shrewdly remarks that: “Mansfield Park is a novel in
which many characters are engaged in trying to establish influence over the
minds and lives of others, often in a contest or struggle for control.” Fanny, as
a will struggling only to be itself, becomes at last the spiritual center of Man-
sfield Park precisely because she has never sought power over any other will. It
is the lesson of the Protestant will, whether in Locke or Austen, Richardson
or George Eliot, that the refusal to seek power over other wills is what opens
the inward eye of vision. Such a lesson, which we seek in Wordsworth and
in Ruskin, is offered more subtly (though less sublimely) by Austen. Fanny,
Austen’s truest surrogate, has a vision of what Mansfield Park is and ought to
be, which means a vision also of what Sir Thomas Bertram is or ought to be.
Her vision is necessarily moral, but could as truly be called spiritual, or even
aesthetic.
Perhaps that is why Fanny is not only redeemed but can redeem oth-
ers. The quietest and most mundane of visionaries, she remains also one of
the firmest: her dedication is to the future of Mansfield Park as the idea of
order it once seemed to her. Jane Austen may not be a Romantic in the high
Shelleyan mode, but Fanny Price has profound affinities with Wordsworth,
so that it is no accident that Mansfield Park is exactly contemporary with The
Excursion. Wordsworthian continuity, the strength that carries the past alive
into the present, is the program of renovation that Fanny’s pure will brings to
Mansfield Park, and it is a program more Romantic than Augustan, so that
Fanny’s will begins to shade into the Wordsworthian account of the imagina-
tion. Fanny’s exile to Portsmouth is so painful to her not for reasons turning
upon social distinctions, but for causes related to the quiet that Wordsworth
located in the bliss of solitude, or Virginia Woolf in a room of one’s own:

Such was the home which was to put Mansfield out of her head,
and teach her to think of her cousin Edmund with moderated
feelings. On the contrary, she could think of nothing but Mansfield,
its beloved inmates, its happy ways. Everything where she now
was was in full contrast to it. The elegance, propriety, regularity,
harmony, and perhaps, above all, the peace and tranquillity of
Mansfield, were brought to her remembrance every hour of the day,
by the prevalence of everything opposite to them here.
 Harold Bloom

The living in incessant noise was, to a frame and temper

delicate and nervous like Fanny’s, an evil which no super-added
elegance or harmony could have entirely atoned for. It was the
greatest misery of all. At Mansfield, no sounds of contention,
no raised voice, no abrupt bursts, no tread of violence, was ever
heard; all proceeded in a regular course of cheerful orderli-
ness; everybody had their due importance; everybody’s feelings
were consulted. If tenderness could be ever supposed wanting,
good sense and good breeding supplied its place; and as to the
little irritations, sometimes introduced by Aunt Norris, they
were short, they were trif ling, they were as a drop of water to
the ocean, compared with the ceaseless tumult of her present
abode. Here, everybody was noisy, every voice was loud (except-
ing, perhaps, her mother’s, which resembled the soft monotony
of Lady Bertram’s, only worn into fretfulness). Whatever was
wanted was halloo’d for, and the servants halloo’d out their
excuses from the kitchen. The doors were in constant banging,
the stairs were never at rest, nothing was done without a clatter,
nobody sat still, and nobody could command attention when
they spoke.
In a review of the two houses, as they appeared to her before the
end of a week, Fanny was tempted to apply to them Dr. Johnson’s
celebrated judgment as to matrimony and celibacy, and say, that
though Mansfield Park might have some pains, Portsmouth could
have no pleasures.

The citation of Dr. Johnson’s aphorism, though placed here with superb
wit, transcends irony. Austen rather seeks to confirm, however implicitly, John-
son’s powerful warning, in The Rambler, number 4, against the overwhelming
realism of Fielding and Smollett (though their popular prevalence is merely
hinted):

But if the power of example is so great, as to take possession of the

memory by a kind of violence, and produce effects almost without
the intervention of the will, care ought to be taken, that, when the
choice is unrestrained, the best examples only should be exhibited;
and that which is likely to operate so strongly, should not be
mischievous or uncertain in its effects.

Fanny Price, rather more than Jane Austen perhaps, really does favor a
Johnsonian aesthetic, in life as in literature. Portsmouth belongs to represen-
tation as practiced by Smollett, belongs to the cosmos of Roderick Random.
 Introduction 

Fanny, in willing to get back to Mansfield Park, and to get Mansfield Park
back to itself, is willing herself also to renovate the world of her creator, the
vision of Jane Austen that is Mansfield Park.

Emma
Sir Walter Scott, reviewing Emma in 1815, rather strangely compared Jane
Austen to the masters of the Flemish school of painting, presumably because
of her precision in representing her characters. The strangeness results from
Scott’s not seeing how English Austen was, though the Scot’s perspective
may have entered into his estimate. To me, as an American critic, Emma
seems the most English of English novels, and beyond question one of the
very best. More than Pride and Prejudice, it is Austen’s masterpiece, the larg-
est triumph of her vigorous art. Her least accurate prophecy as to the fate
of her fictions concerned Emma, whose heroine, she thought, “no one but
myself will much like.”
Aside from much else, Emma is immensely likable, because she is so
extraordinarily imaginative, dangerous and misguided as her imagination fre-
quently must appear to others and finally to herself. On the scale of being,
Emma constitutes an answer to the immemorial questions of the Sublime:
More? Equal to? Or less than? Like Clarissa Harlowe before her, and the
strongest heroines of George Eliot and Henry James after her, Emma Wood-
house has a heroic will, and like them she risks identifying her will with
her imagination. Socially considered, such identification is catastrophic, since
the Protestant will has a tendency to bestow a ranking upon other selves,
and such ranking may turn out to be a personal phantasmagoria. G. Armour
Craig rather finely remarked that: “society in Emma is not a ladder. It is a web
of imputations that link feelings and conduct.” Yet Emma herself, expansion-
ist rather than reductionist in temperament, imputes more fiercely and freely
than the web can sustain, and she threatens always, until she is enlightened,
to dissolve the societal links, in and for others, that might allow some stability
between feelings and conduct.
Armour Craig usefully added that: “Emma does not justify its hero-
ine nor does it deride her.” Rather it treats her with ironic love (not loving
irony). Emma Woodhouse is dear to Jane Austen, because her errors are pro-
foundly imaginative, and rise from the will’s passion for autonomy of vision.
The splendid Jane Fairfax is easier to admire, but I cannot agree with Wayne
Booth’s awarding the honors to her over Emma, though I admire the subtle
balance of his formulation:

Jane is superior to Emma in most respects except the stroke of

good fortune that made Emma the heroine of the book. In matters
of taste and ability, of head and of heart, she is Emma’s superior.
10 Harold Bloom

Taste, ability, head, and heart are a formidable fourfold; the imagination
and the will, working together, are an even more formidable twofold, and
clearly may have their energies diverted to error and to mischief. Jane Fairfax
is certainly more amiable even than Emma Woodhouse, but she is consider-
ably less interesting. It is Emma who is meant to charm us, and who does
charm us. Austen is not writing a tragedy of the will, like Paradise Lost, but a
great comedy of the will, and her heroine must incarnate the full potential of
the will, however misused for a time. Having rather too much her own way
is certainly one of Emma’s powers, and she does have a disposition to think
a little too well of herself. When Austen says that these were “the real evils
indeed of Emma’s situation,” we read “evils” as lightly as the author will let us,
which is lightly enough.
Can we account for the qualities in Emma Woodhouse that make her
worthy of comparison with George Eliot’s Gwendolen Harleth and Henry
James’s Isabel Archer? The pure comedy of her context seems world enough
for her; she evidently is not the heiress of all the ages. We are persuaded, by
Austen’s superb craft, that marriage to Mr. Knightley will more than suffice
to fulfill totally the now perfectly amiable Emma. Or are we? It is James’s
genius to suggest that while Osmond’s “beautiful mind” was a prison of the
spirit for Isabel, no proper husband could exist anyway, since neither Touchett
nor Goodwood is exactly a true match for her. Do we, presumably against
Austen’s promptings, not find Mr. Knightley something of a confinement
also, benign and wise though he be?
I suspect that the heroine of the Protestant will, from Richardson’s Cla-
rissa Harlowe through to Virginia Woolf ‘s Clarissa Dalloway, can never find
fit match because wills do not marry. The allegory or tragic irony of this di-
lemma is written large in Clarissa, since Lovelace, in strength of will and
splendor of being, actually would have been the true husband for Clarissa
(as he well knows) had he not been a moral squalor. His death-cry (“Let
this expiate!”) expiates nothing, and helps establish the long tradition of the
Anglo-American novel in which the heroines of the will are fated to suffer
either overt calamities or else happy unions with such good if unexciting men
as Mr. Knightley or Will Ladislaw in Middlemarch. When George Eliot is
reduced to having the fascinating Gwendolen Harleth fall hopelessly in love
with the prince of prigs, Daniel Deronda, we sigh and resign ourselves to the
sorrows of fictive overdetermination. Lovelace or Daniel Deronda? I myself
do not know a high-spirited woman who would not prefer the first, though
not for a husband!
Emma is replete with grand comic epiphanies, of which my favorite comes
in volume 3, chapter 11, when Emma receives the grave shock of Harriet’s dis-
closure that Mr. Knightley is the object of Harriet’s hopeful affections:
 Introduction 11

When Harriet had closed her evidence, she appealed to her

dear Miss Woodhouse, to say whether she had not good ground
for hope.
“I never should have presumed to think of it at first,” said she,
“but for you. You told me to observe him carefully, and let his
behavior be the rule of mine—and so I have. But now I seem to
feel that I may deserve him; and that if he does choose me, it will
not be any thing so very wonderful.”
The bitter feelings occasioned by this speech, the many bitter
feelings, made the utmost exertion necessary on Emma’s side to
enable her to say in reply,
“Harriet, I will only venture to declare, that Mr. Knightley
is the last man in the world, who would intentionally give any
woman the idea of his feeling for her more than he really does.”
Harriet seemed ready to worship her friend for a sentence so
satisfactory; and Emma was only saved from raptures and fond-
ness, which at the moment would have been dreadful penance, by
the sound of her father’s footsteps. He was coming through the
hall. Harriet was too much agitated to encounter him. “She could
not compose herself—Mr. Woodhouse would be alarmed—she
had better go;”—with most ready encouragement from her friend,
therefore, she passed off through another door—and the moment
she was gone, this was the spontaneous burst of Emma’s feelings:
“Oh God! that I had never seen her!”
The rest of the day, the following night, were hardly enough
for her thoughts.—She was bewildered amidst the confusion of all
that had rushed on her within the last few hours. Every moment
had brought a fresh surprise; and every surprise must be matter
of humiliation to her.—How to understand it all! How to under-
stand the deceptions she had been thus practising on herself, and
living under!—The blunders, the blindness of her own head and
heart!—she sat still, she walked about, she tried her own room,
she tried the shrubbery—in every place, every posture, she per-
ceived that she had acted most weakly; that she had been imposed
on by others in a most mortifying degree; that she had been
imposing on herself in a degree yet more mortifying; that she was
wretched, and should probably find this day but the beginning of
wretchedness.

The acute aesthetic pleasure of this turns on the counterpoint between

Emma’s spontaneous cry: “Oh God! that I had never seen her!” and the
12 Harold Bloom

exquisite comic touch of: “She sat still, she walked about, she tried her own
room, she tried the shrubbery—in every place, every posture, she perceived
that she had acted most weakly.” The acute humiliation of the will could not
be better conveyed than by “she tried the shrubbery” and “every posture.”
Endlessly imaginative, Emma must now be compelled to endure the mor-
tification of reducing herself to the postures and places of those driven into
corners by the collapse of visions that have been exposed as delusions. Jane
Austen, who seems to have identified herself with Emma, wisely chose to
make this moment of ironic reversal a temporary purgatory, rather than an
infernal discomfiture.

Persuasion
“Persuasion” is a word derived from the Latin for “advising” or “urging,” for
recommending that it is good to perform or not perform a particular action.
The word goes back to a root meaning “sweet” or “pleasant,” so that the good
of performance or nonperformance has a tang of taste rather than of moral
judgment about it. Jane Austen chose it as the title for her last completed
novel. As a title, it recalls Sense and Sensibility or Pride and Prejudice rather
than Emma or Mansfield Park. We are given not the name of a person or
house and estate, but of an abstraction, a single one in this case. The title’s
primary reference is to the persuasion of its heroine, Anne Elliot, at the
age of nineteen, by her godmother, Lady Russell, not to marry Captain
Frederick Wentworth, a young naval officer. This was, as it turns out,
very bad advice, and, after eight years, it is mended by Anne and Captain
Wentworth. As with all of Austen’s ironic comedies, matters end happily
for the heroine. And yet each time I finish a rereading of this perfect novel,
I feel very sad.
This does not appear to be my personal vagary; when I ask my friends
and students about their experience of the book, they frequently mention a
sadness which they also associate with Persuasion, more even than with Man-
sfield Park. Anne Elliot, a quietly eloquent being, is a self-reliant character, in
no way forlorn, and her sense of self never falters. It is not her sadness we feel
as we conclude the book: it is the novel’s somberness that impresses us. The
sadness enriches what I would call the novel’s canonical persuasiveness, its
way of showing us its extraordinary aesthetic distinction.
Persuasion is among novels what Anne Elliot is among novelistic char-
acters—a strong but subdued outrider. The book and the character are not
colorful or vivacious; Elizabeth Bennett of Pride and Prejudice and Emma
Woodhouse of Emma have a verve to them that initially seems lacking in
Anne Elliot, which may be what Austen meant when she said that Anne
was “almost too good for me.” Anne is really almost too subtle for us, though
not for Wentworth, who has something of an occult wavelength to her. Juliet
 Introduction 13

McMaster notes “the kind of oblique communication that constantly goes on

between Anne Elliot and Captain Wentworth, where, though they seldom
speak to each other, each constantly understands the full import of the other’s
speech better than their interlocutors do.”
That kind of communication in Persuasion depends upon deep “affec-
tion,” a word that Austen values over “love.” “Affection” between woman and
man, in Austen, is the more profound and lasting emotion. I think it is not
too much to say that Anne Elliot, though subdued, is the creation for whom
Austen herself must have felt the most affection, because she lavished her
own gifts upon Anne. Henry James insisted that the novelist must be a sen-
sibility upon which absolutely nothing is lost; by that test (clearly a limited
one) only Austen, George Eliot, and James himself, among all those writing
in English, would join Stendhal, Flaubert, and Tolstoy in a rather restricted
pantheon. Anne Elliot may well be the one character in all of prose fiction
upon whom nothing is lost, though she is in no danger of turning into a
novelist. The most accurate estimate of Anne Elliot that I have seen is by
Stuart Tave:

Nobody hears Anne, nobody sees her, but it is she who is ever
at the center. It is through her ears, eyes, and mind that we are
made to care for what is happening. If nobody is much aware of
her, she is very much aware of everyone else and she perceives
what is happening to them when they are ignorant of themselves
. . . she reads Wentworth’s mind, with the coming troubles he is
causing for others and himself, before those consequences bring
the information to him.

The aesthetic dangers attendant upon such a paragon are palpable: how
does a novelist make such a character persuasive? Poldy, in Joyce’s Ulysses, is
overwhelmingly persuasive because he is so complete a person, which was
the largest of Joyce’s intentions. Austen’s ironic mode does not sanction the
representation of completeness: we do not accompany her characters to the
bedroom, the kitchen, the privy. What Austen parodies in Sense and Sensi-
bility she raises to an apotheosis in Persuasion: the sublimity of a particular,
inwardly isolated sensibility. Anne Elliot is hardly the only figure in Austen
who has an understanding heart. Her difference is in her almost preternatural
acuteness of perception of others and of the self, which are surely the qualities
that most distinguish Austen as a novelist. Anne Elliot is to Austen’s work
what Rosalind of As You Like It is to Shakespeare’s: the character who almost
reaches the mastery of perspective that can be available only to the novelist
or playwright, lest all dramatic quality be lost from the novel or play. C.L.
Barber memorably emphasized this limitation:
14 Harold Bloom

The dramatist tends to show us one thing at a time, and to realize

that one thing, in its moment, to the full; his characters go to
extremes, comical as well as serious; and no character, not even
a Rosalind, is in a position to see all around the play and so be
completely poised, for if this were so the play would cease to be
dramatic.

I like to turn Barber’s point in the other direction: more even than Ham-
let or Falstaff, or than Elizabeth Bennet, or than Fanny Price in Mansfield
Park, Rosalind and Anne Elliot are almost completely poised, nearly able to
see all around the play and the novel. Their poise cannot transcend perspec-
tivizing completely, but Rosalind’s wit and Anne’s sensibility, both balanced
and free of either excessive aggressivity or defensiveness, enable them to share
more of their creators’ poise than we ever come to do.
Austen never loses dramatic intensity; we share Anne’s anxiety concern-
ing Wentworth’s renewed intentions until the novel’s conclusion. But we rely
upon Anne as we should rely upon Rosalind; critics would see the rancidity
of Touchstone as clearly as they see the vanity of Jacques if they placed more
confidence in Rosalind’s reactions to everyone else in the play, as well as to
herself. Anne Elliot’s reactions have the same winning authority; we must try
to give the weight to her words that is not extended by the other persons in
the novel, except for Wentworth.
Stuart Tave’s point, like Barber’s, is accurate even when turned in the
other direction; Austen’s irony is very Shakespearean. Even the reader must
fall into the initial error of undervaluing Anne Elliot. The wit of Elizabeth
Bennet or of Rosalind is easier to appreciate than Anne Elliot’s accurate sen-
sibility. The secret of her character combines Austenian irony with a Word-
sworthian sense of deferred hope. Austen has a good measure of Shakespeare’s
unmatched ability to give us persons, both major and minor, who are each
utterly consistent in her or his separate mode of speech, and yet completely
different from one another. Anne Elliot is the last of Austen’s heroines of
what I think we must call the Protestant will, but in her the will is modified,
perhaps perfected, by its descendant, the Romantic sympathetic imagination,
of which Wordsworth, as we have seen, was the prophet. That is perhaps what
helps to make Anne so complex and sensitive a character.
Jane Austen’s earlier heroines, of whom Elizabeth Bennet is the exem-
plar, manifested the Protestant will as direct descendants of Samuel Richard-
son’s Clarissa Harlowe, with Dr. Samuel Johnson hovering nearby as moral
authority. Marxist criticism inevitably views the Protestant will, even in its lit-
erary manifestations, as a mercantile matter, and it has become fashionable to
talk about the socioeconomic realities that Jane Austen excludes, such as the
West Indian slavery that is part of the ultimate basis for the financial security
 Introduction 15

most of her characters enjoy. But all achieved literary works are founded upon
exclusions, and no one has demonstrated that increased consciousness of the
relation between culture and imperialism is of the slightest benefit whatsoever
in learning to read Mansfield Park. Persuasion ends with a tribute to the Brit-
ish navy, in which Wentworth has an honored place. Doubtless Wentworth
at sea, ordering the latest batch of disciplinary floggings, is not as pleasant as
Wentworth on land, gently appreciating the joys of affection with Anne El-
liot. But once again, Austen’s is a great art founded upon exclusions, and the
sordid realities of British sea power are no more relevant to Persuasion than
West Indian bondage is to Mansfield Park. Austen was, however, immensely
interested in the pragmatic and secular consequences of the Protestant will,
and they seem to me a crucial element in helping us appreciate the heroines
of her novels.
Austen’s Shakespearean inwardness, culminating in Anne Elliot, revises
the moral intensities of Clarissa Harlowe’s secularized Protestant martyrdom,
her slow dying after being raped by Lovelace. What removes Clarissa’s will
to live is her stronger will to maintain the integrity of her being. To yield to
the repentant Lovelace by marrying him would compromise the essence of
her being, the exaltation of her violated will. What is tragedy in Clarissa is
converted by Austen into ironic comedy, but the will’s drive to maintain itself
scarcely alters in this conversion. In Persuasion the emphasis is on a willed
exchange of esteems, where both the woman and the man estimate the value
of the other to be high. Obviously outward considerations of wealth, property,
and social standing are crucial elements here, but so are the inward consid-
erations of common sense, amiability, culture, wit, and affection. In a way (it
pains me to say this, as I am a fierce Emersonian) Ralph Waldo Emerson
anticipated the current Marxist critique of Austen when he denounced her
as a mere conformist who would not allow her heroines to achieve the soul’s
true freedom from societal conventions. But that was to mistake Jane Austen,
who understood that the function of convention was to liberate the will, even
if convention’s tendency was to stifle individuality, without which the will was
inconsequential.
Austen’s major heroines—Elizabeth, Emma, Fanny, and Anne—pos-
sess such inward freedom that their individualities cannot be repressed.
Austen’s art as a novelist is not to worry much about the socioeconomic
genesis of that inner freedom, though the anxiety level does rise in Mans-
field Park and Persuasion. In Austen, irony becomes the instrument for in-
vention, which Dr. Johnson defined as the essence of poetry. A conception
of inward freedom that centers upon a refusal to accept esteem except from
one upon whom one has conferred esteem, is a conception of the highest
degree of irony. The supreme comic scene in all of Austen must be Eliza-
beth’s rejection of Darcy’s first marriage proposal, where the ironies of the
16 Harold Bloom

dialectic of will and esteem become very nearly outrageous. That high com-
edy, which continued in Emma, is somewhat chastened in Mansfield Park,
and then becomes something else, unmistakable but difficult to name, in
Persuasion, where Austen has become so conscious a master that she seems
to have changed the nature of willing, as though it, too, could be persuaded
to become a rarer, more disinterested act of the self.
No one has suggested that Jane Austen becomes a High Romantic
in Persuasion; her poet remained William Cowper, not Wordsworth, and
her favorite prose writer was always Dr. Johnson. But her severe distrust of
imagination and of “romantic love,” so prevalent in the earlier novels, is not
a factor in Persuasion. Anne and Wentworth maintain their affection for
each other throughout eight years of hopeless separation, and each has the
power of imagination to conceive of a triumphant reconciliation. This is the
material for a romance, not for an ironical novel. The ironies of Persuasion
are frequently pungent, but they are almost never directed at Anne Elliot
and only rarely at Captain Wentworth. There is a difficult relation between
Austen’s repression of her characteristic irony about her protagonists and
a certain previously unheard plangency that hovers throughout Persuasion.
Despite Anne’s faith in herself she is very vulnerable to the anxiety, which
she never allows herself to express, of an unlived life, in which the potential
loss transcends yet includes sexual unfulfillment. I can recall only one critic,
the Australian Ann Molan, who emphasizes what Austen strongly implies,
that “Anne … is a passionate woman. And against her will, her heart keeps
asserting its demand for fulfillment.” Since Anne had refused Wentworth
her esteem eight years before, she feels a necessity to withhold her will,
and thus becomes the first Austen heroine whose will and imagination are
antithetical.
Although Austen’s overt affinities remained with the Aristocratic Age,
her authenticity as a writer impelled her, in Persuasion, a long way toward the
burgeoning Democratic Age, or Romanticism, as we used to call it. There is
no civil war within Anne Elliot’s psyche, or within Austen’s; but there is the
emergent sadness of a schism in the self, with memory taking the side of
imagination in an alliance against the will. The almost Wordsworthian power
of memory in both Anne and Wentworth has been noted by Gene Ruoff.
Since Austen was anything but an accidental novelist, we might ask why she
chose to found Persuasion upon a mutual nostalgia. After all, the rejected
Wentworth is even less inclined to will a renewed affection than Anne is,
and yet the fusion of memory and imagination triumphs over his will also.
Was this a relaxation of the will in Jane Austen herself? Since she returns
to her earlier mode in Sanditon, her unfinished novel begun after Persuasion
was completed, it may be that the story of Anne Elliot was an excursion or
indulgence for the novelist. The parallels between Wordsworth and Persuasion
 Introduction 17

are limited but real. High Romantic novels in England, whether of the By-
ronic kind like Jane Eyre and Wuthering Heights or of a Wordsworthian sort
like Adam Bede, are a distinctly later development. The ethos of the Austen
heroine does not change in Persuasion, but she is certainly a more problematic
being, tinged with a new sadness concerning life’s limits. It may be that the
elegant pathos Persuasion sometimes courts has a connection to Jane Austen’s
own ill health, her intimations of her early death.
Stuart Tave, comparing Wordsworth and Austen, shrewdly noted that
both were “poets of marriage” and both also possessed “a sense of duty un-
derstood and deeply felt by those who see the integrity and peace of their
own lives as essentially bound to the lives of others and see the lives of all in
a more than merely social order.” Expanding Tave’s insight, Susan Morgan
pointed to the particular affinity between Austen’s Emma and Wordsworth’s
great “Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Earliest Child-
hood.” The growth of the individual consciousness, involving both gain and
loss for Wordsworth but only gain for Austen, is the shared subject. Emma’s
consciousness certainly does develop, and she undergoes a quasi-Wordswor-
thian transformation from the pleasures of near solipsism to the more diffi-
cult pleasures of sympathy for others. Anne Elliot, far more mature from the
beginning, scarcely needs to grow in consciousness. Her long-lamented rejec-
tion of Wentworth insulates her against the destructiveness of hope, which
we have seen to be the frightening emphasis of the earlier Wordsworth, par-
ticularly in the story of poor Margaret. Instead of hope, there is a complex of
emotions, expressed by Austen with her customary skill:

How eloquent could Anne Elliot have been,—how eloquent, at

least, were her wishes on the side of early warm attachment, and
a cheerful confidence in futurity, against that over-anxious caution
which seems to insult exertion and distrust Providence!—She had
been forced into prudence in her youth, she learned romance as she
grew older—the natural sequel of an unnatural beginning.

Here learning romance is wholly retrospective; Anne no longer regards

it as being available to her. And indeed Wentworth returns, still resentful
after eight years, and reflects that Anne’s power with him is gone forever.
The qualities of decision and confidence that make him a superb naval com-
mander are precisely what he condemns her for lacking. With almost too
meticulous a craft, Austen traces his gradual retreat from this position, as the
power of memory increases its dominance over him and as he learns that his
jilted sense of her as being unable to act is quite mistaken. It is a beautiful
irony that he needs to undergo a process of self-persuasion while Anne waits,
without even knowing that she is waiting or that there is anything that could
18 Harold Bloom

rekindle her hope. The comedy of this is gently sad, as the reader waits also,
reflecting upon how large a part contingency plays in the matter.
While the pre-Socratics and Freud agree that there are no accidents,
Austen thinks differently. Character is fate for her also, but fate, once activat-
ed, tends to evade character in so overdetermined a social context as Austen’s
world. In rereading Persuasion, though I remember the happy conclusion, I
nevertheless feel anxiety as Wentworth and Anne circle away from each other
in spite of themselves. The reader is not totally persuaded of a satisfactory
interview until Anne reads Wentworth’s quite agonized letter to her:

“I can listen no longer in silence. I must speak to you by such

means as are within my reach. You pierce my soul. I am half agony,
half hope. Tell me not that I am too late, that such precious feel-
ings are gone for ever. I offer myself to you again with a heart more
your own, than when you almost broke it eight years and a half
ago. Dare not say that man forgets sooner than woman, that his
love has an earlier death. I have loved none but you. Unjust I may
have been, weak and resentful I have been, but never inconstant.
You alone have brought me to Bath. For you alone I think and
plan.—Have you not seen this? Can you fail to have understood
my wishes?—I had not waited even these ten days, could I have
read your feelings, as I think you must have penetrated mine. I can
hardly write. I am every instant hearing something which over-
powers me. You sink your voice, but I can distinguish the tones
of that voice, when they would be lost on others.—Too good, too
excellent creature! You do us justice indeed. You do believe that
there is true attachment and constancy among men. Believe it to
be most fervent, most undeviating in
F.W.
“I must go, uncertain of my fate; but I shall return hither, or
follow your party, as soon as possible. A word, a look will be
enough to decide whether I enter your father’s house this evening
or never.”

I cannot imagine such a letter in Pride and Prejudice, or even in Emma

or Mansfield Park. The perceptive reader might have realized how passion-
ate Anne was, almost from the start of the novel, but until this there was no
indication of equal passion in Wentworth. His letter, as befits a naval com-
mander, is badly written and not exactly Austenian, but it is all the more
effective thereby. We come to realize that we have believed in him until now
only because Anne’s love for him provokes our interest. Austen wisely has
declined to make him interesting enough on his own. Yet part of the book’s
 Introduction 19

effect is to persuade the reader of the reader’s own powers of discernment and
self-persuasion; Anne Elliot is almost too good for the reader, as she is for
Austen herself, but the attentive reader gains the confidence to perceive Anne
as she should be perceived. The subtlest element in this subtlest of novels is
the call upon the reader’s own power of memory to match the persistence and
intensity of the yearning that Anne Elliot is too stoical to express directly.
The yearning hovers throughout the book, coloring Anne’s perceptions
and our own. Our sense of Anne’s existence becomes identified with our own
consciousness of lost love, however fictive or idealized that may be. There is
an improbability in the successful renewal of a relationship devastated eight
years before which ought to work against the texture of this most “realistic”
of Austen’s novels, but she is very careful to see that it does not. Like the
author, the reader becomes persuaded to wish for Anne what she still wishes
for herself. Ann Molan has the fine observation that Austen “is most satisfied
with Anne when Anne is most dissatisfied with herself.” The reader is carried
along with Austen, and gradually Anne is also persuaded and catches up with
the reader, allowing her yearning a fuller expression.
Dr. Johnson, in The Rambler 29, on “The folly of anticipating misfor-
tunes,” warned against anxious expectations of any kind, whether fearful or
hopeful:

because the objects both of fear and hope are yet uncertain, so
we ought not to trust the representations of one more than the
other, because they are both equally fallacious; as hope enlarges
happiness, fear aggravates calamity. It is generally allowed, that no
man ever found the happiness of possession proportionate to that
expectation which incited his desire, and invigorated his pursuit;
nor has any man found the evils of life so formidable in reality, as
they were described to him by his own imagination.

This is one of a series of Johnsonian pronouncements against the dan-

gerous prevalence of the imagination, some of which his disciple Austen
had certainly read. If you excluded such representations, on the great critic’s
advice, then Wordsworth could not have written at all, and Austen could
not have written Persuasion. Yet it was a very strange book for her to write,
this master of the highest art of exclusion that we have known in the West-
ern novel. Any novel by Jane Austen could be called an achieved ellipsis,
with everything omitted that could disturb her ironic though happy con-
clusions. Persuasion remains the least popular of her four canonical novels
because it is the strangest, but all her work is increasingly strange as we ap-
proach the end of the Democratic Age that her contemporary Wordsworth
did so much to inaugurate in literature. Poised as she is at the final border
20 Harold Bloom

of the Aristocratic Age, she shares with Wordsworth an art dependent upon
a split between a waning Protestant will and a newly active sympathetic
imagination, with memory assigned the labor of healing the divide. If the
argument of my book has any validity, Austen will survive even the bad days
ahead of us, because the strangeness of originality and of an individual vi-
sion are our lasting needs, which only literature can gratify in the Theocratic
Age that slouches toward us.
 MARY POOVEY

Ideological Contradictions and

the Consolations of Form:
The Case of Jane Austen

R eading Jane Austen’s novels in the context of the works of Mary

Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley reminds us that Austen also lived through
and wrote about the crisis of values that dominated late eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century English society. Austen’s perspective on this crisis
was, of course, markedly different from those of the other two women,
for whereas both the lower middle-class Wollstonecraft and the emigrée
Shelley witnessed the radicals’ challenge to propriety from outside its emi-
nent domain, Austen spent her entire life in the very heart of propriety.
Austen never traveled as widely as either Wollstonecraft or Shelley, she
never flamboyantly defied propriety, and she never wrote to support herself
or anyone else. Perhaps partly as a consequence of her limited experience,
Austen did not choose to write about politics, nature, or metaphysics, and
she assiduously avoided the highly imaginative, melodramatic incidents that
so fascinated her contemporaries.
Yet for all the obvious differences between her life and aesthetic inter-
ests and theirs, Jane Austen did concern herself with many of the same issues
as Wollstonecraft and Shelley—with the process of a young girl’s maturation,
for example, and, more important, with the complex relationship between a
woman’s desires and the imperatives of propriety. Considering Austen’s nov-
els from the perspective of these issues and in terms of the debate already set

From The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Woll-
stonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen, pp. 172–207, 265–267. © 1984 by the University
of Chicago.

21
22 Mary Poovey

out in the works of Wollstonecraft and Shelley enables us to recognize what

the challenge to traditional values looked like from the inside and how an
artistic style could constitute part of a defense against this challenge. As we
will see, Austen’s class position placed her firmly in the middle of the crisis of
values we have been examining. As with Wollstonecraft and Shelley, Austen’s
gender and her decision to write professionally focused the contradictions in-
herent in this crisis. What is new is that Austen’s aesthetic choices—her style
and her subject matter—can be seen as “solutions” to some of the problems
that neither Wollstonecraft nor Shelley could solve. My analysis of Austen’s
work therefore comes last not because this order is faithful to chronology
but because her novels culminate a sequence of stages of female insight and
artistic achievement. We can never fully “explain” genius, but in considering
the ways in which Austen both completes Wollstonecraft’s analysis of female
inhibition and perfects Shelley’s attempt to make propriety accommodate
female desire, we can better understand her accomplishment and some of the
functions her artistic strategies served.1
Our access to Jane Austen’s personal attitudes to historical events and
to propriety will always be blocked by her sister Cassandra, who destroyed
many of Austen’s letters and censored numerous others; moreover, the let-
ters that did survive at times convey contradictory opinions and, what is
perhaps even more confusing, almost always employ a decidedly ambiguous
tone.2 When an individual work by Wollstonecraft or Shelley seems mor-
ally or stylistically ambiguous, surviving letters or journals help provide a
background for interpretation; and the psychological or aesthetic complexi-
ties that appear in their fiction and nonfiction alike can be clarified in the
same way. But the incompleteness and opacity of Austen’s personal record
often compound the notorious instability of her novelistic irony, thus lead-
ing us further into confusing (if delightful) ambiguity. When Austen tells
the obsequious James Stanier Clarke, for example, that “I think I may boast
myself to be, with all possible vanity, the most unlearned and uninformed
female who ever dared to be an authoress” (JAL, 2:443; 11 December 1815),
we feel certain that she pretends to diminish herself at her silly correspon-
dent’s expense. But when she tells her nephew that she cannot manage his
“strong, manly, spirited Sketches” upon the canvas of her art—“the little bit
(two inches wide) of Ivory on which I work with so fine a Brush, as produc-
es little effect after much labour” (JAL, 2:468–69; 16 December 1816)—it is
difficult to determine exactly how much of her self depreciation is genuine,
how much is simply encouragement for the young writer, and how much is
the mock vanity of a self-confident miniaturist. The Austen legacy has been
further complicated, of course, by the officious concern of her relatives. In
addition to Cassandra’s excessive concern for propriety, the efforts of her
brother and nephews to beatify “Aunt Jane” for Victorian readers has also
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 23

blurred our hindsight and has no doubt generated, in some cases, as much
overcompensation as accurate evaluation.

Lady Susan
In the absence of extensive biographical documentation, then, Austen’s juve-
nilia provide a logical point of departure. Indeed, her most extended early
work, Lady Susan (composed c. 1793–94), 3 places her precisely “between”
Wollstonecraft and Shelley and broadly establishes the aesthetic and ethical
issues that were to occupy her for the remainder of her career. Lady Susan is
an epistolary satire that takes to task both the ideal of “natural” propriety,
which Mary Wollstonecraft also challenged, and the suggestion, similarly
rejected by Mary Shelley, that individual desire is, automatically, socially
constructive. In the course of Lady Susan, Austen seems to agree with both
Wollstonecraft and Shelley; for, like Shelley, she insists on the destructive
potential of individual desire, and, like Wollstonecraft, she points to the way
in which the contradictions of social manners may distort the constructive
energies women do possess. Because of the hypocrisy implicit in propriety,
Austen suggests, there can be no victors: society cannot afford to unleash the
energy inherent in female desire, yet the morality by which society controls
desire destroys the individual and threatens society itself. In many ways the
“heroine” of Lady Susan is Austen’s version of the energy that Shelley was to
call a “monster”; but because Lady Susan’s society is almost as repressive and
barren as the one depicted in Wollstonecraft’s Maria, Austen’s presentation
of this creature is even more ambiguous than Shelley’s dramatization of the
monster in 1818.
The first two letters that appear in Lady Susan establish the unmistak-
able tone and range of the heroine’s voice. Recently widowed, immediately
ejected from her “particular” friend’s house for her outrageous flirtations,
Lady Susan Vernon writes first to her brother, Charles Vernon, to whom
she displays only her “winningly mild” countenance. “My kind friends here
are most affectionately urgent with me to prolong my stay,” she assures him,
“but their hospitable & chearful dispositions lead them too much into soci-
ety for my present situation & state of mind.”4 She is looking forward, she
says, to meeting her new “Sister” in the “delightful retirement” of the country.
But the reader, more privileged than Mr. Vernon, immediately receives an-
other version of these “facts.” In the next letter, addressed to her confidential
friend, Alicia Johnson, Lady Susan explains that “the Females of the Family
are united against me”; “the whole family are at war” (pp. 244, 245). “Charles
Vernon is my aversion, & I am afraid of his wife,” she acknowledges; never-
theless, out of necessity, she is off to visit them in “that insupportable spot, a
Country Village” (pp. 246, 245–46). Already we see that Lady Susan uses her
letters to manipulate reality—to create it, in fact; for we can assume that she
24 Mary Poovey

plays on Mrs. Johnson’s prejudices against propriety almost as consistently as

she plays on her brother’s simpleminded belief that “truth” has only one face
and a single voice.
In Lady Susan’s adroit manipulation of “truth” Austen is dramatizing
the way that the gap between appearance and reality, which is intrinsic to the
paradoxical configuration of propriety, generates a crisis of moral authority.
And the remarkable success Susan enjoys with most of her audience for most
of the novel suggests the gravity of this crisis. Because her retreat to the coun-
try enhances the impression she cultivates of being both virtuous and unavail-
able, Susan sustains the interest of both of her town admirers and adds to
them Reginald De Courcy, Mrs. Vernon’s brother and the heir to his family’s
estate. Susan is able to manipulate others chiefly because she knows that the
use of language is an art capable of generating plausible, internally consistent,
but wholly malleable fictions just as the manners of propriety can. Thus she
reverses Reginald’s initial prejudices against her simply by revising the “facts”
on which her notoriety is based, and she prejudices the Vernons against her
own daughter Frederica so as better to control the child and then almost
manages to make this timid daughter marry the man she herself has chosen
for her—her own cast-off suitor, Sir James Martin. Lady Susan freely admits
to the pleasure her quick wit and creative pen afford: “If I am vain of any-
thing,” she preens, “it is of my eloquence. Consideration & Esteem as surely
follow command of Language, as Admiration waits on Beauty” (p. 268). In
the end she fails to control reality completely only because the people she
has successfully duped—Mrs. Manwaring and Reginald, Frederica and Mrs.
Vernon—escape the closed system of her rhetoric by talking to each other.
“Horrid” facts obtrude, and her victims conspire to drive Susan out of both
family circles. Ultimately, Susan, without a pen or audience, has no influence
because she has no vehicle or context by which to create her “self.”
Throughout the novel, Lady Susan also aspires to maintain a related
but equally precarious balance: she wants to retain the power to exercise her
aggressive energies and, at the same time, the reputation for propriety that
gives her that power. “Those women are inexcusable,” she scoffs, “who forget
what is due to themselves & the opinion of the World” (p. 269). The principle
that Lady Susan overlooks but that Jane Austen underscores is that, given the
nature of female desire, these two “dues” are incompatible. Susan’s fidelity to
herself would entail indulging her apparently insatiable appetite for attention;
yet the “World” will not grant that appetite free expression or substantial
gratification. Lady Susan, in other words, is trapped in the very paradox of
propriety that she thought she could exploit; because it demands indirection,
propriety effectively distorts the desires it seemed to accommodate.
Despite her apparently indomitable wit, Lady Susan also finds herself
thwarted by another irony of the female situation. She seems to be a woman
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 25

of the mind and to pride herself on her ability to dominate not only other
people and their perceptions of reality but emotion itself. Susan’s sharpest
comments are reserved for women who, like her own daughter and Mrs.
Manwaring, experience and express strong feeling without inhibition or art.
Of her daughter Susan despairs: “I never saw a girl of her age, bid fairer to be
the sport of Mankind. Her feelings are tolerably lively & she is so charmingly
artless in their display, as to afford the most reasonable hope of her being
ridiculed & despised by every Man who sees her.” “Artlessness will never do
in Love matters,” she continues, “& that girl is born a simpleton who has it ei-
ther by nature or affectation” (p. 274). Yet despite her professed preference for
art over spontaneity, Austen hints that Susan yearns for a genuine contest—
perhaps even for defeat by an emotion that prudence cannot master. She will
not marry the “contemptibly weak” Sir James, she vows, for all his wealth: “I
must own myself rather romantic in that respect, & that Riches only, will not
satisfy me” (p. 245). Initially she is aroused by Reginald precisely because he
seems a worthy antagonist. “There is something about him that rather inter-
ests me,” she admits; “a sort of sauciness, of familiarity which I shall teach
him to correct. . . . There is exquisite pleasure in subduing an insolent spirit, in
making a person predetermined to dislike, acknowledge one’s superiority” (p.
254). The problem here is that even though Susan insists that power resides
in the mind, she fears that it may actually originate in emotion. Noting the
perceptible increase in Frederica’s affection for Reginald, Susan admits to “not
feeling perfectly secure that a knowledge of that affection might not in the
end awaken a return. Contemptible as a regard founded only on compassion,
must make them both, in my eyes, I [feel] by no means assured that such
might not be the consequence” (p. 280).
Beneath Lady Susan’s artful self-presentation, then, lurk fears and de-
sires she can neither conceal nor acknowledge. Her boasts of the power of art
belie a fascination not only with the “romantic” love that drives her daughter
to defy her but even with the fear that compels Frederica to run away from
Sir James. Similarly, Susan’s need to be flattered hides her persistent anxiety
that neither she nor the “World” is as admirable as she wants to believe, and
her impatience with spontaneity cloaks her fear that its real liability is just
what she says it is: if one is not loved in return, the lover may ridicule, despise,
and make sport of a woman’s heart.
Despite her aggressive hostility to feminine stereotypes, Lady Susan
conforms precisely to the typical female the mid-eighteenth-century moral-
ists described: she is vain, obsessed by men, dominated by her appetites, and,
finally, incapable of creating any identity independent of the one she tries to
denounce.5 Ironically, her aggressiveness only affirms the vulnerability she
prides herself on having overcome, and she is finally caught in the most fatal
paradox of female feeling: to express love is to risk rejection, yet never to
26 Mary Poovey

acknowledge feeling is to court isolation and the hollow victory of having

successfully repressed desire.
Part of the problem, Austen implies, is that society fails to provide any
power adequate to Lady Susan. Even in this patriarchal society there are sim-
ply no men strong enough either to engage or resist her irrepressible energy.
The novel is consistently dominated by women, despite Susan’s preoccupation
with men. Mr. Vernon seems oblivious to what is happening beneath his roof,
Reginald’s father, even when told of Susan’s plot, refuses to believe that such
women exist; Sir James, Mr. Manwaring, and Reginald are simply dupes of
Susan’s wiles. Only the women are capable of grasping the implications of her
exuberance or of doing anything about it. Even timid Frederica three times
defies her mother; Mrs. Manwaring finally overthrows Susan by pursuing her
husband to London; and Mrs. Vernon consistently proves herself capable not
only of understanding Susan’s art but of matching it with machinations of
her own. As Lloyd W. Brown has noted, the only real contest in Lady Susan
is between the heroine and Mrs. Vernon; Reginald and Frederica constitute
the pawns and the spoils. Like Lady Susan, Mrs. Vernon seeks to control
the emotions and the fixtures of these two young people; both women are
egotists, who use their epistolary art to manipulate “reality,” and only they can
fully comprehend any desire other than avarice.6
By the end of the story, the failure of every moral authority in Susan’s
society threatens to subvert any didactic effect this novel might have seemed
to promise. On the one hand, Lady Susan constitutes an attack on propriety,
which, paradoxically, Austen presents as both restrictive and permissive. Such
morality, Austen suggests, is inadequate not because it has misrepresented
female nature but because its attempt to control desire has served only to
distort this powerful force, to drive it into artful wiles and stratagems that are
often both socially destructive and personally debilitating. On the other hand,
because the world Austen depicts contains neither adequate outlets for this
energy nor a paternal authority capable of mastering it, we cannot imagine
what constructive form Susan’s exuberance could take—or, for that matter,
what social or moral institution could control it. Because Susan’s energy ex-
ceeds the capacity of the world she inhabits, it is necessarily destructive—not
only of the foolish men but of innocent young persons like Frederica and,
ultimately, of Lady Susan herself.7
Despite its destructive tendencies and effects, however, Lady Susan’s en-
ergy—like that of Shelley’s monster—remains the most attractive force in
this novel. And, as in Frankenstein, the power of this attraction is reinforced
by the epistolary form, which allows us not only to engage ourselves with
Lady Susan’s intellect but to sympathize with her conflicting feelings as well.
Even though the letters Mrs. Vernon writes supply another perspective on
Susan’s schemes, her judgments are no more “objective” or authoritative than
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 27

Susan’s whims—especially given her personal grudge against Susan. Similar-

ly, the final agent of “justice”—Mrs. Manwaring—comes from the household
that was, initially, so easily duped, and she too, like Mrs. Vernon, retaliates
from personal motives, not to save some absolute system of disinterested val-
ues. In a novel that lacks a spokesperson for such values, the epistolary form
generates moral anarchy; Austen does not establish a genuinely critical posi-
tion within the fiction but depends instead on an implicit contrast between
the values presented and those the satire presumes but does not formulate.
Within the moral consensus of a family such allusiveness might well suffice,
and we can imagine Austen reading Lady Susan to her amused family circle.
But without this consensus there is no moral authority because there is no
narrative authority. In the laissez-faire competition the epistolary Lady Susan
permits, the reader will identify with whatever character dominates the nar-
ration or most completely gratifies the appetite for entertainment. In Lady
Susan this character is, of course, the dangerous heroine.
So compelling and so complete is this heroine’s artful power that the
only way Austen can effectively censure her is to impose punishment by
narrative fiat. Predictably, this entails disrupting the epistolary narrative
and ridiculing not just the correspondents but the morally anarchic epis-
tolary form itself. “This Correspondence,” Austen playfully announces in
the “Conclusion,” “. . . could not, to the great detriment of the Post office
Revenue, be continued longer. Very little assistance to the State could be
derived from the Epistolary Intercourse of Mrs. Vernon & her niece” (p.
311). She then abruptly summarizes the fate of the characters: Mrs. Vernon
and Mrs. Manwaring triumph, and Frederica and her mother reverse posi-
tions in almost every important respect: the daughter marries Reginald,
and Lady Susan is reduced to marrying the suitor whom Frederica has now
cast off, Sir James Martin. But Austen will not allow even this summary to
have final authority, for in her final reference to Lady Susan she leaves her
in exactly the same moral vacuum in which we found her: “Whether Lady
Susan was, or was not happy in her second Choice—I do not see how it can
ever be ascertained—for who would take her assurance of it, on either side
of the question?” (p. 313).
Austen’s final ambivalence here suggests an attempt to accomplish the
same feat to which Lady Susan aspired: to obtain both “what is due to [her-
self ] & the opinion of the World.” What is due to herself as an artist is
uninhibited self-expression; the “opinion of the World” requires conclusive
moral order. Austen seems reluctant to deny the power or attraction of female
energy, perhaps because it is too close to the creative impulse of her own wit;
nor does she fully condone the indulgence of that energy, for its destructive
potential is undeniable. By allowing herself and her reader imaginative en-
gagement with her heroine, Austen seems to satisfy the prerogatives of desire;
28 Mary Poovey

by abruptly severing that engagement, she aspires to reassert the system of

social principles whose authority Lady Susan has so effectively challenged.

The narrative impasse at the conclusion of Lady Susan is in many ways

reminiscent of the problems that beset Wollstonecraft’s Maria: the appeal
of female feeling competes with Austen’s reservations about it almost as
dramatically as Wollstonecraft’s attraction to “romantic expectations” jeop-
ardizes her critique of sentimentalism. In both cases, one consequence of
this aesthetic ambiguity is uncertainty for the reader as to the moral ground
of the novels. Just as Maria seems to hover between irony and wholehearted
sentimentalism, so Lady Susan occupies the gray area between satire and
direct social criticism. But the intervention of the unmistakable narrative
voice at the end of Lady Susan, while necessitated by a version of Maria’s
tonal uncertainty, points to one essential difference between these two writ-
ers—a difference that becomes more marked during Austen’s subsequent
career. The “solution” Wollstonecraft offers in Maria involves two extreme
gestures: on the one hand, she rejects social institutions that inhibit indi-
vidual feeling; on the other hand, she redefines human emotions so that
they transcend social institutions altogether. By contrast, Austen brings
individual desire into confrontation with social institutions in order first to
discipline anarchic passion and then to expand the capacity of such insti-
tutions to accommodate educated needs and desires. One reason Maria’s
conclusion remains blocked is that everything in the sections Wollstonecraft
finished suggests her desire to segregate the realistic depictions of corrupt
society from her romantic effusions of passion. The conclusion of Lady
Susan, on the other hand, for all its contrivance, suggests an impulse to
contain even momentary fantasies of unmitigated power within the twin
controls of aesthetic closure and social propriety. In this sense, Jane Austen
resembles Mary Shelley more than Mary Wollstonecraft. But the balance of
her sympathies, along with the aesthetic solutions she developed to convey
them, take her beyond the artistic achievement of either of the other two.
The division of sympathies we see in Lady Susan bears a particularly in-
teresting relationship to Jane Austen’s complex social and economic position
during this period of change. As we have already seen, the period between
1775 and 1817, the years of Austen’s life, was punctuated by challenges to
the traditional hierarchy of English class society and, as a consequence, to
conventional social roles and responsibilities. William Wordsworth’s 1817
survey of the preceding thirty years summarizes the chaotic impact of these
changes:

I see clearly that the principal ties which kept the different classes
of society in a vital and harmonious dependence upon each other
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 29

have, within these 30 years, either been greatly impaired or wholly

dissolved. Everything has been put up to market and sold for the
highest price it would buy. . . . All . . . moral cement is dissolved,
habits and prejudices are broken and rooted up, nothing being
substituted in their place but a quickened self interest.8

In England, the decisive agent of this change was not just the French
Revolution but the more subtle, more gradual, dissemination of the values
and behavior associated with capitalism—first, agrarian capitalism in the
mid- and late eighteenth century, then, in the early nineteenth century,
industrial capitalism, as money made itself felt in investment and capital
return. As we have seen, by the first decades of the nineteenth century,
birth into a particular class no longer exclusively determined one’s future
social or economic status, the vertical relationships of patronage no longer
guaranteed either privileges or obedience, and the traditional authority of
the gentry, and of the values associated with their life-style, was a subject
under general debate. In the midst of such changes, the assumptions that
had theoretically been shared by eighteenth-century moralists and their
audiences seemed increasingly problematic, requiring refinement and
defense if not radical change. As the literature and political debates of this
period unmistakably reveal, the crisis in imaginative and moral authority
was pervasive and severe; even conservative writers generally abandoned
arguments about absolute truths in favor of discussions in which one set
of principles was defended against a contrary but equally coherent system
of values.9
As the daughter of a country clergyman with numerous and strong ties
to the landed upper gentry, Jane Austen was involved in this crisis of author-
ity in an immediate and particularly complex way. As Donald J. Greene has
conclusively demonstrated, Jane Austen was acutely aware of her kinship to
several prominent families, among them the Brydges, who were earls and
lords of Chandos, and the lords Leigh of Stoneleigh.10 More immediately, as
a clergyman Austen’s father belonged to the lesser realms of the gentry, and
Jane and her siblings all benefited more or less directly from the patronage
that traditionally reinforced the gentry’s hegemony. One of Austen’s brothers,
Edward, was adopted by the wealthy Knight family, of Kent, and, as heir to
the valuable estate of Godmersham, he was eventually able to provide a home
at Chawton Cottage for Jane, her mother, her sister, and their friend Martha
Lloyd. Two of Austen’s other brothers, James and Henry, became clergymen,
and her two youngest brothers, Francis and Charles, entered the British navy
and eventually became admirals; Francis in fact became a knight. Thus Jane
Austen was raised in the heart of middle-class society; she shared its values,
and she owed her own position to the bonds of patronage that cemented
30 Mary Poovey

traditional society, even though her immediate resources never permitted her
fully to emulate the gentry’s life-style.
In keeping with this class affiliation, Jane Austen’s fundamental ide-
ological position was conservative; her political sympathies were generally
Tory, and her religion was officially Anglican; overall, she was a “conservative
Christian moralist,” supportive of Evangelical ethical rigor even before she
explicitly admitted admiring the Evangelicals themselves.11
But neither the external evidence of Austen’s social position nor the
internal evidence of her novels supports so strict a delineation of her sym-
pathies. In the first place, even the traditional practices of paternalism were
influenced during this period by the rhetoric and practices of individualism.
(To give but one relevant example: promotion in such prestigious professions
as the navy could result from individual effort and merit [as Persuasion indi-
cates]; at other times it depended on the interest of a patron [as William Price
learns in Mansfield Park]). In the second place, the role played by Austen’s
class in the rise of capitalism was particularly complicated; for the agricultural
improvements that preceded and paved the way for early industrial capitalism
were financed and initiated in many cases by the landowning gentry, yet the
legal provisions of strict settlement and entail were expressly designed to pro-
hibit land from becoming a commodity susceptible to promiscuous transfer
or easy liquidation. Despite the fact that the landowning gentry participated
in the expansion of agrarian capitalism, their role was passive, not active; as a
consequence, their values and life-style were not extensively altered until the
more radical and rapid expansion of industrial capitalism began in the first
decades of the nineteenth century. When that occurred, the gentry were sud-
denly awakened to the implications of the changes to which their patterns
of expenditure had contributed.12 From the more vulnerable position of the
lower levels of the gentry, Jane Austen was able to see with particular clarity
the marked differences between the two components of the middle class: the
landed gentry and the new urban capitalist class.13 The division of sympathies
that occurs in her novels when middle-class daughters get rewarded with the
sons of landed families emanates at least partly from Austen’s being both
involved in and detached from these two middle-class groups at a moment
when they were implicitly competing with each other.

In Austen’s very early works, like Lady Susan, this division of sympathies
characteristically leads either to broad farce or to the tonal uncertainties
of parody.14 As her career progresses, however, we see Austen gradually
develop aesthetic strategies capable of balancing her attraction to exuberant
but potentially anarchic feeling with her investment in traditional social
institutions. This balance is embodied in the thematic material she chooses
and the rhetorical stance she adopts. At their most sophisticated, Austen’s
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 31

rhetorical strategies harness the imaginative energy of her readers to a moral

design; she thus manages to satisfy both the individual reader’s desire for
emotional gratification and the program of education prescribed by tradi-
tional moral aestheticians.
To understand why Austen assumed that a novel could simultaneously
gratify the cravings of the imagination and provide moral instruction, it is
useful to turn to Samuel Johnson, Austen’s favorite eighteenth-century essay-
ist. According to Johnson, novel-reading is an active, not passive, enterprise,
for it aggressively engages the imagination of its young reader. Novels, John-
son explains,

are the entertainment of minds unfurnished with ideas, and

therefore easily susceptible of impressions; not fixed by principles,
and therefore easily following the current of fancy; not informed
by experience, and consequently open to every false suggestion
and partial account. . . . If the power of example is so great, as to
take possession of the memory by a kind of violence, and produce
effects almost without the intervention of the will, care ought to be
taken that, when the choice is unrestrained, the best examples only
should be exhibited; and that which is likely to operate so strongly,
should not be mischievous or uncertain in its effects.15

Johnson’s wariness about the power of the imagination should remind

us of Mary Shelley; for, as different as these two writers were, they shared a
profound anxiety about the insatiable hunger of the imagination. Johnson’s
answer to this anxiety was to compose not novels but moral essays that were
characterized by a tremendous respect for reason’s antagonist. Mary Shelley’s
solution, as we have seen, was simultaneously less evasive and less effective.
In fact, her novels represent the two dangers to which imaginative engage-
ment might lead. At one extreme, as the 1818 Frankenstein proves, a “roman-
tic” novel might so thoroughly activate the imagination as to undermine all
moral authority; at the other extreme, as in Falkner, the moral novel might so
dogmatically focus the imagination that all subversive exuberance would be
driven into the background of the fiction, only to return to the forefront in
troubling reminders of what cannot be contained.
To a certain extent, Jane Austen shared this ambivalence with regard to
the imagination. When Anne Elliot advises Captain Benwick in Persuasion
to admit “a larger allowance of prose in his daily study” so as to “rouse and
fortify” a mind made “tremulous” by immersion in Romantic poetry, she is
warning against the “susceptibility” of the indulged imagination.16 But while
Austen might well agree with Johnson that novels should “serve as lectures of
conduct, and introductions into life,” her major works are not as defensive as
32 Mary Poovey

either his Rasselas or Shelley’s Falkner; they do not, that is, “initiate youth by
mock encounters in the art of necessary defence.”17 Instead, Austen attempts
to convert the pleasure generated by imaginative engagement into a didac-
tic tool. As the “productions” that provide “more extensive and unaffected
pleasure than those of any other literary corporation in the world,” novels
are best suited for such education. For in the best novels, Austen continues
in Northanger Abbey, “the greatest powers of the mind are displayed, . . . the
most thorough knowledge of human nature, the happiest delineation of its
varieties, the liveliest effusions of wit and humour are conveyed to the world
in the best chosen language.”18

Sense and Sensibility

The narrative impasse reached in Wollstonecraft’s Maria and the Scylla and
Charybdis of Shelley’s aesthetic choices remind us that achieving such a bal-
ance was not easy. Jane Austen’s first published novel, Sense and Sensibility
(1811), suggests how persistent this problem proved to be for her early in her
career.19 Sense and Sensibility is a much darker novel than any of the juvenilia
or the parodic Northanger Abbey (1818), and we might speculate that one
origin of its somber tone and the eruptions of anarchic feeling that punctu-
ate it lies in the anxiety with which Austen viewed individualism’s challenge
to paternalism. For in Sense and Sensibility, as, in a slightly different way, in
Lady Susan and Northanger Abbey, the most fundamental conflict is between
Austen’s own imaginative engagement with her self-assertive characters and
the moral code necessary to control their anarchic desires.
In the greater part of Sense and Sensibility, Austen’s aesthetic strategies
endorse the traditional values associated with her “sensible” heroine, Elinor
Dashwood. One of these strategies consists in measuring all of the characters
(including Elinor) against an implicit, but presumably authoritative, moral
norm. As early as the second chapter, in that free, indirect discourse that is the
hallmark of her mature style, Austen shadows the opinion of a single fallible
character with this implicit moral standard.20 Irony in Sense and Sensibility
arises for the most part from the novel’s action; the dialogue between Mr.
and Mrs. John Dashwood points up as surely as any overt narrative com-
mentary the parsimony behind their dwindling good will. But our response
to this dialogue is initially shaped by such sentences as the following: “To
take three thousand pounds from the fortune of their dear little boy, would
be impoverishing him to the most dreadful degree”; “How could he answer
it to himself to rob his child, and his only child too, of so large a sum?”21 The
hyperbole expressed in the words “impoverishing,” “dreadful,” and “rob” con-
veys both the strategy of Mrs. Dashwood’s rhetoric and its absurdity, and the
repeated use of the word “child” suggests how effective she is in manipulating
John Dashwood’s generosity. Because these sentences belong to the narrative
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 33

and not to direct dialogue, they mimetically convey the tone of the conversa-
tion and simultaneously judge it by reference to an implicit system of more
humane values—the undeniably Christian values that one should love one’s
neighbor as one’s self and that the man who hoards treasures in this world (or
the woman who encourages him to do so) will never get into the kingdom
of heaven.
But despite this ground of Christian principles, nearly everything in the
plot of Sense and Sensibility undermines the complacent assumption that they
are principles generally held or practically effective. Almost every action in
the novel suggests that, more often than not, individual will triumphs over
principle and individual desire proves more compelling than moral law. Even
the narrator, the apparent voice of these absolute values, reveals that moral
principles are qualified in practice. The narrator’s prefatory evaluation of John
Dashwood, for example—“he was not an ill-disposed young man, unless to
be rather cold hearted, and rather selfish, is to be ill-disposed” (p. 5)—directs
our attention most specifically to the way in which what should, in theory, be
moral absolutes can, and in practice do, shade off into infinite gradations and
convenient exceptions. Is it always morally wrong to be “rather” selfish, espe-
cially in a society in which such selfishness is the necessary basis for material
prosperity? What efficacy will moral absolutes have in such a society? How
could Elinor’s patient, principled fidelity win the passive, principled Edward
if it were not, finally, for Lucy Steele’s avarice?
A second strategy that is apparently designed to forestall such questions
by aligning the reader’s sympathies with Elinor’s “sense” involves the juxta-
position of Elinor and her sister Marianne at nearly every critical juncture in
the novel. Consistently, Elinor makes the prudent choice, even when doing so
is painful; almost as consistently, Marianne’s decisions are self-indulgent and
harmful, either to herself or to someone else. But this neat design is less stable
than an absolute and authoritative moral system would seem to require. Many
readers have found Marianne’s “spirit” more appealing than Elinor’s cautious,
prim, and even repressive reserve, and they have found Marianne’s passionate
romance with Willoughby more attractive than the prolonged frustration to
which Elinor submits. That such preferences may be in keeping with at least
one countercurrent of the novel is suggested by the fact that whenever Austen
herself explicitly compares the two putative heroes—Colonel Brandon and
Edward Ferrars—with the less moral, more passionate Willoughby, it is Wil-
loughby who is appealing. On two occasions when Willoughby is expected
but one of the more subdued lovers appears instead, the disappointment is
unmistakable; and when the reverse situation occurs, in the climactic final
encounter between Elinor and Willoughby, Elinor is aroused to a pitch of
complex emotion we never see Edward inspire in anyone. Moreover, Wil-
loughby repeatedly bursts into the narrative with “manly beauty and more
34 Mary Poovey

than common gracefulness,” but Edward and Brandon seem inert fixtures
of the plot, incapable of energetic gallantry and attractive only to the most
generous observer. The initial description of each of them is dominated by
negative constructions and qualifying phrases, and even Elinor cannot unre-
servedly praise the man she wants to marry. “At first sight,” she admits, “his
address is certainly not striking; and his person can hardly be called hand-
some, till the expression of his eyes, which are uncommonly good, and the
general sweetness of his countenance, is perceived. At present, I know him so
well, that I think him really handsome; or, at least, almost so” (p. 20). Colonel
Brandon, “neither very young nor very gay,” is “silent and grave” much of the
time (p. 34), and his “oppression of spirits,” like Edward’s chronic depression,
can scarcely compete with Willoughby’s charm.
The most telling dramatization of the contest between the potentially
anarchic power of feeling and the restraint that moral principles require takes
the form of a conflict within Elinor herself. This scene, in the final volume,
owes much to conventional eighteenth-century didactic novels, but Austen’s
placing it at a moment when the generally self-disciplined Elinor is unusu-
ally susceptible to emotion gives it a particularly complicated effect. Colonel
Brandon has presented a living to Edward Ferrars, and Elinor is finally, but
sadly, reconciled to the fact that her lover will marry someone else. In the
midst of this personal disappointment, she is also particularly sensitive to her
sister’s condition, for Marianne, whose own romantic disappointment had
sent her into a dangerous decline, has just been declared out of danger. Eli-
nor’s “fervent gratitude” for this news is especially great because of the joy and
relief it will bring to her mother, whose arrival is expected at any moment. It
is this hectic peace—as Marianne sleeps quietly upstairs and a violent storm
assaults the house—that Willoughby invades when he melodramatically steps
into the drawing-room.
Elinor’s first response is “horror” at his audacious intrusion; but before
she can leave the room, Willoughby appeals to something even more power-
ful than Elinor’s “honour”: her curiosity. Elinor is momentarily captivated
by Willoughby’s “serious energy” and “warmth,” and she listens “in spite of
herself ” to the story he unfolds—the chronicle of his passions, both honor-
able and base. At the end of his dramatic recital, Willoughby asks Elinor
for pity, and, even though she feels it is her “duty” to check his outburst, she
cannot repress her “compassionate emotion.” It is this emotion that governs
her judgment of Willoughby—a judgment that verges disconcertingly on ra-
tionalization:

Elinor made no answer. Her thoughts were silently fixed on

the irreparable injury which too early an independence and its
consequent habits of idleness, dissipation, and luxury, had made
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 35

in the mind, the character, the happiness, of a man who, to every

advantage of person and talents, united a disposition naturally open
and honest, and a feeling, affectionate temper. The world had made
him extravagant and vain—Extravagance and vanity had made him
cold-hearted and selfish. [p. 331]

When Willoughby departs, he leaves Elinor in an even greater “agitation”

of spirits, “too much oppressed by a croud of ideas . . . to think even of her
sister.”

Willoughby, in spite of all his faults, excited a degree of

commiseration for the sufferings produced by them, which made
her think of him as now separated for ever from her family with a
tenderness, a regret, rather in proportion, as she soon acknowledged
within herself—to his wishes than to his merits. She felt that his
influence over her mind was heightened by circumstances which
ought not in reason to have weight; by that person of uncommon
attraction, that open, affectionate, and lively manner which it was
no merit to possess; and by that still ardent love for Marianne,
which it was not even innocent to indulge. But she felt that it was
so, long, long before she could feel his influence less. [p. 833]

One purpose of this episode is clearly to dramatize the odds against

which Elinor’s “sense,” or reason, ultimately triumphs and therefore to in-
crease, not undermine, our admiration for that faculty. But a second effect
of the passage is to subject the reader to the same temptation that assails
Elinor. Because the presentation is dramatic and because, for a moment at
least, the character whose judgment has thus far directed our own hesitates in
her moral evaluation, the reader is invited to judge Willoughby not by refer-
ence to an objective standard but by his immediate appeal to our imagina-
tive, sympathetic engagement. As Elinor temporizes, the moral principle for
which she otherwise speaks seems dangerously susceptible to circumstances,
to the appeal of “lively manners,” and to the special pleading of aroused fe-
male emotion.
Jane Austen seems anxious to control the moral anarchy that strong
appeals to feeling can unleash; yet, significantly, she does not exclude pas-
sion from the novel, nor does she so completely qualify it as to undermine its
power. Instead, Austen attempts to bend the imaginative engagement it elic-
its in the reader to the service of moral education. To do so, she restricts the
reader’s access to the romantic plot by conveying its details and its emotional
affect only through indirect narration. At the beginning of the novel, for ex-
ample, the incident in which Willoughby rescues Marianne is summarized by
36 Mary Poovey

the dispassionate narrative persona, who supplies sentimental clichés but not
Marianne’s response to her rescue: “The gentleman offered his services, and
perceiving that her modesty declined what her situation rendered necessary,
took her up in his arms without farther delay” (p. 42). Similarly, the episode
in which Willoughby cuts and kisses a lock of Marianne’s hair is given to
Margaret to relate (p. 60), and the emotional specifics of Willoughby’s fare-
well at Barton Cottage can be deduced only from their aftermath (p. 82).
Most of Marianne’s outbursts of passion to Willoughby are confined to let-
ters, which are concealed from the reader until after Willoughby has snubbed
Marianne. In fact, the only emotionally charged encounter between the lov-
ers that Austen presents dramatically is their final meeting at the London
ball, and there Marianne’s passion is transmuted by Willoughby’s silence into
the terrible muffled scream that both voices and symbolizes her thwarted
love. So careful is Austen to keep the reader on the outside of such “danger-
ous” material that she embeds the most passionate episodes within other, less
emotionally volatile stories. Thus the story of the two Elizas—related, as we
will see, by a character whose relationship to the tale immediately activates
our judgment—is contained within the story of Marianne’s passion for Wil-
loughby—a relationship whose emotional content is conveyed to the reader
more by innuendo, summary, and indirection than by dramatic presentation.
And this second story, in turn, is contained within the story of the relation-
ship that opens and closes the novel—Elinor’s considerably less demonstra-
tive affection for Edward. By embedding these stories in this way, Austen
seeks to defuse their imaginative affect and increase their power to educate
the reader: from the fates of the two Elizas we learn to be wary of Marianne’s
quick feelings, and from the consequences of Marianne’s self-indulgent pas-
sion we learn to value Elinor’s reserve.
Instead of being allowed to identify with Marianne, then, for most of the
novel we are restricted to Elinor’s emotional struggles. This enables Austen
to dramatize the complexities of what might otherwise seem an unattractive
and unyielding obsession with propriety; it also permits her to filter the two
stories of illicit passion through a character whose judgment generally mas-
ters emotion. That the passion bleeds from the narrators of these two tales
into Elinor’s “sense” attests to the power of this force and to the dangerous
susceptibility that, without proper control, might undermine the judgment of
even the most rational reader.
Austen also attempts to control the allure of Marianne’s romantic desires
by refusing to consider seriously either their social origin or their philosophi-
cal implications. As Tony Tanner has pointed out, Austen really avoids the
systematic examination of “sensibility” that the novel seems to promise.22 The
novel begins like a novel of social realism. In the first paragraphs the narrator
sounds like a lawyer or a banker; family alliances, the estate that is the heart of
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 37

paternalistic society, even the deaths of loved ones, are all ruthlessly subordinat-
ed to the economic facts. Given this introduction, the reader has every reason
to believe that the most important fact—that Mrs. Dashwood will have only
five hundred pounds a year with which to raise and dower her daughters—will
govern the futures of Elinor, Marianne, and Margaret. And given this probable
development, the reader can understand why romantic fantasies are appealing.
It is no wonder that Marianne—facing a life of poverty, the spiritual banal-
ity of relatives like the John Dashwoods, and the superficial urbanities of a
neighborhood composed only of the Middletons and Mrs. Jennings—turns to
Cowper for imaginative compensation; nor is it surprising that she fancies (in
accordance with the promises of romantic novels) that her beauty will win the
heart and hand of an errant knight. Beneath Marianne’s effusions on nature
and her passionate yearning for a hero lies the same “hunger of imagination”
that Mary Wollstonecraft tried and failed to analyze in Maria. But to take
Marianne’s passions and longings seriously on their own terms would be to call
into question the basis of Christian moral authority, the social order that ideally
institutionalizes that authority, and, finally, the capacity of orthodox religion or
society to gratify imaginative desires.23 Elinor’s sense, despite its admirable ca-
pacity to discipline and protect the self, cannot begin to satisfy this appetite, and
no other social institution in the novel does any better. Instead of taking this
implicit criticism to its logical conclusion, as Wollstonecraft tried to do, Jane
Austen defuses its threat by directing our judgment away from bourgeois so-
ciety and toward the self-indulgent individual. Austen caricatures just enough
of Marianne’s responses to nature and love to make her seem intermittently
ridiculous, and, when her desires finally explode all social conventions, Austen
stifles her with an illness that is not only a result but also a purgation of her
passion. At the end of the novel, Austen ushers Marianne into Brandon’s world
of diminished desires in such a way as to make Marianne herself negate every-
thing she has previously wanted to have and to be.

Marianne Dashwood was born to an extraordinary fate. She

was born to discover the falsehood of her own opinions, and to
counteract, by her conduct, her most favourite maxims. She was
born to overcome an affection formed so late in life as at seventeen,
and with no sentiment superior to strong esteem and lively
friendship, voluntarily to give her hand to another! . . . Marianne
could never love by halves; and her whole heart became, in time, as
much devoted to her husband, as it had once been to Willoughby.
[pp. 378–79]

To further defuse the questions raised by Marianne’s assertive subjectiv-

ity, Austen seconds the opinion of eighteenth-century moralists that women’s
38 Mary Poovey

appetites are particularly dangerous and more akin to inexplicable natural

forces than to socialized—hence socializable—responses. Except for Elinor,
nearly all of the women in Sense and Sensibility are given to one kind of excess
or another. Mrs. John Dashwood and her mother, Mrs. Ferrars, attempt to
dominate the opinions, the professions, and even the emotions of the men
who are closest to them; Willoughby’s aunt, who is empowered by money and
age, is even more tyrannical; and Sophia Grey, Willoughby’s fiancée, enacts
her passion and her will when she commands Willoughby to copy her cruel
letter for Marianne. Austen implies that these women are exceptional only
in the extent of their power, not in the force of their desires. The narrator
describes a “fond mother,” for example, as “the most rapacious of human be-
ings” (p. 120)—a description borne out by the monomaniacal Lady Middle-
ton—and she refers lightly to the “suffering” endured by every lady who has
the “insatiable appetite of fifteen” (p. 33). Until her compassion is necessary
to the plot, even Mrs. Jennings seems dominated by a single uncontrollable
desire, the hunger to live vicariously through the romantic attachments of her
young friends.
Austen’s female characters certainly do not monopolize passion, nor are
their little contrivances finally more destructive than Willoughby’s deceit.
But the implications of her characterizations of such women can be identi-
fied by contrasting them with her presentation of male characters. Austen
consistently provides men’s behavior with a realistic explanation by describ-
ing the social or psychological contexts that shaped it. Mr. Palmer’s general
contempt, Elinor concludes (without any narrative qualification), “was the
desire of appearing superior to other people” (p. 112)—a desire that is an
understandable compensation for Palmer’s initial error: “his temper might
perhaps be a little soured by finding, like many others of his sex, that through
some unaccountable bias in favour of beauty, he was the husband of a very
silly woman” (p. 112). Austen’s comparable references to Mrs. Palmer’s his-
tory are both cursory and curt: her mantelpiece, the narrator informs us, is
adorned with “a landscape in coloured silks of her performance, in proof of
her having spent seven years at a great school in town to some effect” (p. 160).
Austen also more extensively explains the differences between the Ferrars
brothers than between the oldest Dashwood sisters; she makes no attempt to
account for the temperamental contrast between Elinor and Marianne but
carefully attributes the differences between Robert and Edward to their edu-
cation. The only female character Austen appears to explain is Lucy Steele.
Initially, Lucy’s “deficiency of all mental improvement” seems to be the effect
of her neglected education: “Lucy was naturally clever; her remarks were of-
ten just and amusing . . . but her powers had received no aid from education,
she was ignorant and illiterate, and her deficiency of mental improvement
. . . could not be concealed from Miss Dashwood” (p. 127). Soon we discover,
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 39

however, that this “explanation” is really only Elinor’s generous and erroneous
first impression. Austen explicitly ridicules the notion that Lucy’s “want of
liberality” could be “due to her want of education” by having Edward cling to
this rationalization to the end. But in jilting Edward for his brother Robert,
Lucy conclusively proves herself inherently flawed. Like Shelley’s 1831 char-
acterization of Frankenstein, and like both portrayals of the monster, female
nature appears to be fated, fixed. Austen’s final comments on Lucy are deci-
sive: her behavior exposes “a wanton ill-nature” (p. 366), characterized by “an
earnest, an unceasing attention to self-interest” (p. 376).
The harshness with which Austen disposes of Lucy Steele exceeds the
necessities of the plot, but it is perfectly in keeping with her moral design.
For, like Shelley, Austen wants to convince the reader that female nature is
simply inexplicable and that propriety must restrain this natural, amoral force.
At least one other set of female characters also supports this argument, but,
paradoxically, the episode in which they appear alludes not to an innate fe-
male nature but to the constraints imposed on women by patriarchal society.
Because of this, the episode threatens to subvert the argument for propriety it
theoretically should support. The characters are the two Elizas, and their story
belongs to Colonel Brandon.
Colonel Brandon relates the story of the two Elizas to Elinor ostensibly
to persuade her to warn Marianne about Willoughby. But both the hesita-
tions with which he interrupts his narrative and the fact that he focuses not
on the second Eliza (Willoughby’s victim) but on her mother (“his” Eliza)
suggest that Brandon does not fully recognize his own motives for telling the
story. As the tale unfolds, it becomes clear that Brandon’s deepest intention
is to warn Marianne about the dangerous nature of her own passion; para-
doxically, however, the overall effect of the episode is to reveal to the reader
the depth—and consequences—of Brandon’s sexual anxiety.24 This anxiety,
initially aroused by the first Eliza, is now being reactivated by Marianne. But
there is one critical difference between the two situations: unlike the first Eli-
za, Marianne’s passion is not for Brandon but for Willoughby. Thus Brandon’s
anxiety is doubly displaced: it is a past fear of too much emotion and a present
fear of too little love. The first Eliza did love him, Brandon asserts, as if to en-
hance his own appeal, but she could not withstand her guardian’s pressure to
marry Brandon’s older brother, heir to the family’s encumbered estate. As he
tells the story, Brandon stumbles over the details that wounded him most:

“My brother did not deserve her; he did not even love her. I had
hoped that her regard for me would support her under any difficulty,
and for some time it did; but at last the misery of her situation, for
she experienced great unkindness, overcame all her resolution, and
though she had promised me that nothing—but how blindly I
40 Mary Poovey

relate! I have never told you how this was brought on. We were
within a few hours of eloping together for Scotland. The treachery,
or the folly, of my cousin’s maid betrayed us. I was banished . . .
and she was allowed no liberty, no society, no amusement, till my
father’s point was gained. I had depended on her fortitude too far,
. . .—but had her marriage been happy, . . . a few months must have
reconciled me to it. . . . This however was not the case. My brother
had no regard for her. . . . The consequence of this, upon a mind so
young, so lively, so inexperienced as Mrs. Brandon’s, was but too
natural. . . . Can we wonder that with such a husband to provoke
inconstancy, and without a friend to advise or restrain her . . . she
should fall? Had I remained in England, perhaps—but I meant to
promote the happiness of both by removing from her for years. . . .
The shock which her marriage had given me,” he continued, in a
voice of great agitation, “was of trifling weight—was nothing—to
what I felt when I heard, about two years afterwards, of her divorce.
It was that which threw this gloom,—even now the recollection of
what I suffered—” . . . [pp. 205–06; ellipses added]

The story begins and ends in Eliza’s infidelity to Brandon; only as an exten-
sion of this does her infidelity to her husband matter, only as the origin of
his pain does Eliza’s unhappiness figure. The weakness of this woman—and
her sexual abandon—are “natural,” according to Brandon; only the presence
of a male guardian could have protected her from herself. Once Eliza has
fallen, her fate is so predictable (and disturbing) that it warrants only sum-
mary description—except in regard to Brandon’s own misery:

So altered—so faded—worn down by acute suffering of every kind!

hardly could I believe the melancholy and sickly figure before me,
to be the remains of the lovely, blooming, healthful girl, on whom I
had once doated. What I endured in so beholding her—but I have
no right to wound your feelings by attempting to describe it—I
have pained you too much already. [p. 207]

Given the fate of the mother, Brandon is not surprised at the fall of the
second Eliza, the daughter, who has been bequeathed to his protection.
At seventeen, her mother’s fatal year and Marianne’s current age, she too
evaded her male guardian and ran away with Willoughby. Now pregnant,
abandoned, poor, and miserable, this Eliza is a second monument to the
passionate excesses of women.
The intense anxiety that Brandon betrays here is produced by his fear of
female sexual appetite. If female sexuality had caused the first Eliza to betray
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 41

him, how vulnerable might the excitable Marianne be to Willoughby, who

had seduced the second Eliza? Yet Brandon expressly admires Marianne for
the very passion that occasioned the downfall of the two Elizas. Brandon
wants Marianne to be emotionally responsive, but he wants her sexuality to
answer only to his command. When Elinor wishes that Marianne would re-
nounce sentimental prejudices, Brandon’s response is swift: “No, no, do not
desire it,—for when the romantic refinements of a young mind are obliged
to give way, how frequently are they succeeded by such opinions as are but
too common, and too dangerous! I speak from experience” (pp. 56–57). The
allusion is clearly to the first Eliza; Brandon fears that beneath the “romantic
refinements” of the girl lurks a woman’s sexual appetite, which is both “com-
mon” and “dangerous.” Better far to keep women innocent, to protect them
from themselves—and to protect men from their “natural” volatility.
The anxieties Brandon unwittingly reveals suggest that Austen at least
intuits the twin imperatives that anchor patriarchal society: men want women
to be passionate, but, because they fear the consequences of this appetite, they
want to retain control over its expression. This anxiety explains why women
in this society must experience so problematic a relation to their own desire.
In order to win the husband necessary to their social position, women must
gratify both of men’s desires by concealing whatever genuine emotions they
feel so as to allow men to believe that they have all the power. Women must
use indirection, in other words, the allure of “romantic refinements,” and the
subterfuges of manners and modesty in order to arouse male desires and as-
suage male anxieties.
The implications of this passage are very close to those Mary Woll-
stonecraft specifically addresses in both The Rights of Woman and Maria. But
in Sense and Sensibility Jane Austen will no more pursue the criticism of pa-
triarchy that is inherent in this insight than she will pursue the grim reality
that is implicit in the narrator’s account of the Dashwood’s economic situa-
tion. Despite its gestures toward realism, Sense and Sensibility repeatedly dis-
misses the analysis of society that realism might imply and instead embraces
the idealism of romance. But Austen’s idealism never completely banishes
her realistic impulse either. Instead, Austen retains both “principles” and ro-
mance. Thus Marianne debunks her own youthful romance, and the novel as
a whole endorses the “heroism” (the word itself appears on pp. 242 and 265)
of Elinor’s self-denial. Nevertheless, Austen rewards both characters at the
conclusion of the novel precisely in terms of romantic love and of lives lived
happily ever after.
Some of the tensions that we finally feel in Sense and Sensibility emerge,
then, from the conflict between the realism in which the action is anchored
and the romantic elements that Austen harnesses to this realism. Throughout,
she attempts to use realism to control the imaginative excesses that romances
42 Mary Poovey

both encourage and depict: not only does the point of view repress the ro-
mantic plot, but Austen also suggests that Elinor’s self-denial—her refusal
to reveal Lucy Steele’s secret and her willingness to help Edward even to her
own disadvantage—ultimately contributes to her own happiness as well as to
the happiness of others. The prerogatives of society, Austen suggests, some-
times make secrecy and repression necessary; but if one submits to society,
every dream will come true. The last part of this formulation reminds us, of
course, that, just as Austen uses realism to control the irresponsible and mor-
ally anarchic imagination, she also enlists the power of the reader’s wishes to
buttress her moral design. Theoretically, if her readers will submit to a version
of the frustration Elinor suffers or even the compromise to which Mari-
anne grows accustomed, their wish for a happy ending will be legitimized
and gratified. This fusion of realism and romance in the service of aesthetic
closure decisively distinguishes between Wollstonecraft’s Maria and Austen’s
early novels. For notwithstanding her imaginative engagement in “romantic
expectations,” Wollstonecraft’s persistent goal is to criticize the social insti-
tutions that seem to her to thwart female feeling. Jane Austen, on the other
hand, despite her recognition of the limitations of social institutions, is more
concerned with correcting the dangerous excesses of female feeling than with
liberating this anarchic energy. Her turn to aesthetic closure enables her to
dismiss many of the problems her own divided sympathies have introduced.
That the need for such closure grows out of society’s inability to grant hap-
piness to everyone in the terms it promises is a problem that can remain
unexamined because it is, ideally, irrelevant to this fiction. The most troubling
aspect of Sense and Sensibility is Austen’s inability to establish narrative au-
thority because she is ambivalent toward both realism and romance. Her in-
ability to establish moral authority is clearly related to this ambivalence. But
its complexities and implications are more clearly apparent in her next novel,
Pride and Prejudice.

Pride and Prejudice

In Pride and Prejudice (1813) the challenge that feeling and imaginative
energy offer to moral authority is particularly persistent and problematic,
for it is posed by the heroine herself. As the outspoken champion of the
prerogatives of individual desire, Elizabeth Bennet should jeopardize both
the social order, which demands self-denial, and the moral order, which is
based on absolute Christian principles. Yet, despite the dangers she seems to
embody, Elizabeth Bennet was Jane Austen’s special favorite. “I think her
as delightful a creature as ever appeared in print,” she wrote to Cassandra
(JAL, 2:297; 29 January 1813). And, as a favorite, Elizabeth is handsomely
rewarded: she marries the richest man in all of Jane Austen’s novels and is
established as mistress of Pemberley, one of those great country estates that
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 43

superintend and stabilize patriarchal society. In fact, Elizabeth’s triumph

signals the achievement of the balance that characterizes Austen’s mature
novels, for it is the result, on the one hand, of the gradual transformation
of social and psychological realism into romance and, on the other, of a
redefinition of romance. Essentially, Austen legitimizes romance by making
it seem the corrective—not the origin or the product—of individualism. By
such narrative magic, Austen is able to defuse the thematic conflict between
sense and sensibility—or reason and feeling, or realism and romance—that
troubled her earlier works. What is more, by forcing her reader to partici-
pate in creating the moral order that governs the novel’s conclusion, Austen
is able to make this aesthetic “solution” seem, at least momentarily, both
natural and right.
Pride and Prejudice depicts a world riven by ethical relativity, a fact that
both mocks any pretense to absolute moral standards and enhances the qual-
ity of everyday life in a small country village. “The country,” Darcy remarks,
“can in general supply but few subjects for such a study. In a country neigh-
bourhood you move in a very confined and unvarying society.” “But people
themselves alter so much,” pert Elizabeth responds, “that there is something
new to be observed in them for ever.”25 This principle of infinite variety with-
in apparent unity extends from the object of study to the observer, of course;
the fact that Elizabeth can praise Bingley for his compliance when he offers
to remain at Netherfield and call that same trait weakness when he stays
away (pp. 50, 135) tells us more about Elizabeth’s desires than the principle of
tractability. And the fact that Elizabeth can excuse Wickham for preferring a
practical marriage when she will forever blame Charlotte for making the same
choice reveals more about Elizabeth’s personal investment in these two situ-
ations than Jane Austen’s views on matrimony or money. Judgment is always
inflected—modulated—by personal desire, Austen suggests, just as vision is
always governed by perspective. “Principles” are often merely prejudices, and
prejudices simply project one’s own interests onto the shifting scene outside
so as to defend and reinforce the self.
Ideally, in such a world, conventions of propriety and morality make
living together possible by compensating for the competing desires of indi-
viduals and by stabilizing standards of judgment and value. But in Pride and
Prejudice, as in Austen’s other novels and, presumably, in her society as well,
social conventions no longer necessarily serve this end; instead, as Wollstone-
craft complained, social institutions have ossified until they threaten to crush
the desire from which they theoretically grew and which they ought to ac-
commodate. Beside the arrogant Miss Bingley, parading around the drawing
room in hopes of catching Darcy’s eye, or Mr. Collins, pompous embodiment
of unyielding propriety itself, Elizabeth’s impulsiveness, outspokenness, and
generosity seem admirable and necessary correctives. When she bursts into
44 Mary Poovey

Netherfield to see her sick sister, for example, the mud on her skirts becomes
completely irrelevant beside the healthiness of her unself-conscious concern
for Jane. That Miss Bingley despises Elizabeth for what she calls “conceited
independence” simply enhances our sympathy for conceit and independence,
if these are the traits Elizabeth embodies. And when Elizabeth refuses to be
subdued by Lady Catherine, whether on the subject of her music or her mar-
riage, we feel nothing but admiration for her, “impertinence”—if this is what
her energy really is.
Yet the juxtaposition of Elizabeth’s lively wit with this pretentious
and repressive society cuts both ways; for if the vacuity of her surround-
ings highlights her energy, it also encourages her to cultivate her natural
vivacity beyond its legitimate bounds. As the novel unfolds, we begin to
recognize that Elizabeth’s charming wit is another incarnation of willful
desire, which, by rendering judgment unstable, contributes to moral relativ-
ity. As Elizabeth embellishes her surroundings with imaginative flourishes,
we begin to see that indulging the imagination can harm others and that
it in fact serves as a defense against emotional involvement. Through this
juxtaposition, then, Austen is able to enlist the reader’s initial imaginative
engagement with Elizabeth in the service of moral education—an educa-
tion for the reader, which shadows (but does not correspond precisely to)
Elizabeth’s own education, and which schools the imagination by means of
its own irrepressible energy.
One of the first indications that Elizabeth’s quick wit and powerful
feelings may be unreliable moral guides emerges in her initial conversation
with George Wickham. Until this moment, Elizabeth’s companions and
the settings in which she has appeared have enhanced her charm and ap-
peal. But as soon as Elizabeth enters into her intimate conversation with
Wickham, Austen encourages us to recognize that something is wrong. The
problem here is not that a responsive young woman is attracted to a hand-
some young militia man; instead, the problem is that Elizabeth is uncon-
sciously using Wickham to reinforce her prejudice against Darcy and is, as a
consequence, allowing herself to be used by Wickham to reinforce his own
false position. There are no disinterested or straightforward emotions in this
scene; what appears to be Elizabeth’s simple response to Wickham’s physi-
cal and emotional charm is actually being fed by the subterranean force of
her anger at Darcy. Elizabeth is flattered by Wickham’s particular attention
to her, but she is equally aroused by the fact that his story justifies her anger
at Darcy. As a consequence of this double flattery, Elizabeth is blinded to
the impropriety of this stranger’s intimacy, she is seduced into judging on
the grounds of Wickham’s “countenance” rather than some less arbitrary
principle, and she is encouraged to credit her feelings instead of testing her
perceptions against reality.
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 45

The action of Pride and Prejudice generally reveals that, despite what
looks like a generous overflow of irrepressible energy, Elizabeth’s “liveliness”
is primarily defensive.26 More specifically, her “impertinence” is a psychologi-
cal defense against the vulnerability to which her situation as a dependent
woman exposes her. Elizabeth’s prejudice against Darcy is so quickly formed
and so persistent because, at the first assembly, he unthinkingly confronts her
with the very facts that it is most in her interest to deny. “She is tolerable,”
Darcy concedes, rejecting Bingley’s overtures on Elizabeth’s behalf, “but not
handsome enough to tempt me; and I am in no humour at present to give
consequence to young ladies who are slighted by other men” (p. 12).
Despite the fact that Elizabeth’s “playful disposition” enables her to turn
this “ridiculous” remark against Darcy, his cool observation continues to vex
and haunt her for much of the novel and to govern not only her anger toward
Darcy but also her “mortification” at the antics of her family. It has this effect
for two closely related reasons. First of all, in spite of her professed unconcern,
Elizabeth, like everyone else, is immediately attracted to this handsome, emi-
nently eligible bachelor, and, if only for a short time, he engages her natural
romantic fantasies. We discover this later, when Darcy offers to make her
dream come true and Elizabeth retorts by acknowledging that, though she
once considered him as a possible husband, she no longer does so: “I had not
known you a month,” she exults, inadvertently acknowledging the longevity
of her fantasy, “before I felt that you were the last man in the world whom
I could ever be prevailed on to marry” (p. 193). But, given Elizabeth’s social
position and economic situation, even to dream of marrying Darcy is an act
of imaginative presumption. The second reason for her lingering pain, then, is
that Darcy’s rejection deflates not only her romantic fantasies of marriage to
a handsome aristocrat but, more important, the image of herself upon which
such fantasies are based.
Darcy’s casual remark suggests that the fact that Elizabeth is momen-
tarily without a partner indicates that she will always be so “slighted,” that
her “tolerable” beauty will never attract the permanent partner she desires.
And this remark strikes very close to home. For the inevitable result of an
entail in a household more blessed with daughters than frugality is, at best,
a limited choice of suitors; at worst, the Bennet’s shortage of money for
dowries and their equivocal social position foretell spinsterhood, depen-
dence on a generous relative, or, most ominous of all, work as a governess
or lady’s companion. Austen never lets the reader or Elizabeth forget how
very likely such a future is. Darcy lays the groundwork for this scenario
when, alluding to their uncles in trade and law, he remarks that such con-
nections “must very materially lessen [the sisters’] chance of marrying men
of any consideration in the world” (p. 37). Even closer to home, when Char-
lotte Lucas rejects romance, she does so for its opposite, the matter-of-fact
46 Mary Poovey

assessment that a “comfortable home” is more substantial than romantic

fantasies. Elizabeth’s mother is even more brutally frank. “If you take it into
your head,” she warns Elizabeth, “to go on refusing every offer of marriage
in this way, you will never get a husband at all—and I am sure I do not know
who is to maintain you when your father is dead” (p. 113). In the context
of such dark realism, even Mr. Collins’s compensatory retaliation sounds
ominously like a self-evident truth. “Your portion is unhappily so small,” he
smugly informs Elizabeth, “that it will in all likelihood undo the effects of
your loveliness and amiable qualifications” (p. 108).
Elizabeth chooses to ignore all of these warnings, of course, because,
with the arrogance born of youth, natural high spirits, and intellectual su-
periority, she believes herself too good for such a fate. But Darcy challenges
her self-confidence, and, in the disappointment he indirectly inflicts on Jane,
he proves himself capable of bringing the Bennet family face to face with
undeniable reality. In the face of real dependence and practical powerless-
ness, Elizabeth grasps at any possible source of power or distinction. As she
confides to Jane in a moment of telling self-awareness, wit and prejudice have
been her two sources of power, two means of distinguishing herself:

I meant to be uncommonly clever in taking so decided a dislike

to him, without any reason. It is such a spur to one’s genius, such
an opening for wit to have a dislike of that kind. One may be
continually abusive without saying any thing just; but one cannot
be always laughing at a man without now and then stumbling on
something witty. [pp. 225–26]

From this statement, Elizabeth’s psychological economy is clear: she directs

her intelligence toward defending herself against emotional vulnerability;
she bases her moral judgments at least partially on her defensiveness; and she
rationalizes both the romantic fantasies with which she consoles herself and
the forays of wit with which she protects herself as spontaneous effusions of
a lively and superior mind.
Such criticism of Elizabeth’s “liveliness” is elaborated by Austen’s char-
acterizations of both Mr. Bennet and Lydia. Elizabeth is her father’s favorite
daughter, and Mr. Bennet’s witty intelligence clearly reinforces and feeds off
Elizabeth’s superiority. But Mr. Bennet is finally a failure, for he is lax when
it comes to the social duties that are most important to the Bennet family
as a whole and to Elizabeth in particular. Like Elizabeth’s society in gen-
eral, Mr. Bennet’s character is a moral vacuum; his “indolence and the little
attention he has [given] to what was going forward in his family” (p. 283)
finally permit, if they do not encourage, Lydia’s rebellion. Mr. Bennet tries
to make light of his moral irresponsibility by describing social relations as an
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 47

amusing game. “For what do we live,” he asks rhetorically, “but to make sport
for our neighbours, and laugh at them in our turn?” (p. 364). But the pain that
unthinking Lydia visits on the rest of the family proves conclusively how seri-
ous—and how selfish—his evasion really is.
Just as her father’s defensive intelligence refracts and exaggerates Eliz-
abeth’s intellectual “liveliness,” so Lydia’s wild, noisy laughter helps clarify
Elizabeth’s “impertinence.” But perhaps the most important function of Lyd-
ia’s story derives from its placement. For Austen positions the announcement
of Lydia’s elopement so as to precipitate the second, and most important,
stage of Elizabeth’s education. Through Darcy’s letter, Elizabeth has already
learned that she was wrong about both Wickham and Darcy, but Darcy’s
proposal and her angry rejection have, if anything, increased, not lessened, her
pride and sense of superiority. “Vanity, not love, has been my folly,” Elizabeth
exclaims at the moment of this first “humiliation” (p. 208); but, on second
thought, she is deeply flattered by the great man’s attentions, and, since she
does not regret her decision, she is free to bask in the triumph his proposal
gives her over his “pride,” over his “prejudices,” and over Lady Catherine and
Miss Bingley as well. Thus, even though she feels that her own “past behav-
iour” constitutes “a constant source of vexation and regret” (p. 212), Elizabeth
visits Pemberley with her vanity very much intact: “at that moment she felt,
that to be mistress of Pemberley might be something!” (p. 245). This dream of
what she might have been is jolted into the present and then into the future
when Darcy suddenly appears, proves courteous to the very relatives he had
previously slighted, and then invites Elizabeth back to Pemberley to meet his
sister. At this moment, Elizabeth realizes that her “power” is even greater than
she had dared imagine it to be.

She respected, she esteemed, she was grateful to him, she felt a real
interest in his welfare; and she only wanted to know how far she
wished that welfare to depend upon herself, and how far it would
be for the happiness of both that she should employ the power,
which her fancy told her she still possessed, of bringing on the
renewal of his addresses. [p. 266]

While this reflection is neither cool nor calculating, it does suggest that
Elizabeth feels herself more superior than ever—not so much to Darcy as
to love.
Jane’s letter arrives when Elizabeth is basking in this self-confidence; its
effect is to strip her of self-control, self-assurance, and her confident superior-
ity over feeling. In Darcy’s presence she bursts into tears and then, suddenly
recognizing what she now believes she has lost, she realizes that true power
belongs not to the imagination but to love: “Her power was sinking; every
48 Mary Poovey

thing must sink under such a proof of family weakness. . . . The belief of his
self-conquest . . . afforded no palliation of her distress. It was, on the contrary,
exactly calculated to make her understand her own wishes; and never had she
so honestly felt that she could have loved him, as now, when all love must be
vain” (p. 278).
Elizabeth’s fantasies no longer seem as wild or romantic as they once
did, but, before her wish can be fulfilled, she must be “humbled” by her own
sister—not only so that she (and the reader) will recognize the pernicious ef-
fects of Lydia’s passionate self-indulgence, but so that Elizabeth herself will
understand how intimately her own fate is bound up in the actions and char-
acters of others. Individualism is not simply morally suspect, Austen suggests;
it is also based on a naive overestimation of personal autonomy and power.
To pretend that one can transcend social categories or refuse a social role (as
Mr. Bennet does) is not only irresponsible; it also reveals a radical misun-
derstanding of the fact that, for an individual living in society, every action
is automatically linked to the actions of others. And to believe that one can
exercise free will, even when parents do not intercede, is to mistake the com-
plex nature of desire and the way in which social situation affects psychology
and self-knowledge.
Yet, despite its sobering implications, the “mortification” of Elizabeth’s
vanity does not constitute a rebuke to the premises or promises of romance,
as Marianne’s illness does in Sense and Sensibility. Instead, in order to con-
vert the power of romance into a legitimate corrective for harsh realism,
Austen redeems romance by purging it of all traces of egotism. As we have
already seen, to believe that one’s beauty and wit will captivate a power-
ful lord is really a form of vanity. But Elizabeth’s actual romantic fantasies
about Darcy are short-lived; the only dashing young man she fantasizes ex-
tensively about is Wickham. Elizabeth’s response to her aunt’s query about
Wickham may be only half serious, but her confusion does reveal the extent
of her susceptibility.

At present I am not in love with Mr. Wickham; no, I certainly

am not. But he is, beyond all comparison, the most agreeable
man I ever saw—and if he becomes really attached to me—I
believe it will be better that he should not. I see the imprudence
of it.—Oh! that abominable Mr. Darcy!—My father’s opinion
of me does me the greatest honor, and I should be miserable to
forfeit it. My father, however, is partial to Mr. Wickham. In short,
my dear aunt, I should be very sorry to be the means of making
any of you unhappy; but since we see every day that where there is
affection, young people are seldom withheld by immediate want of
fortune from entering into engagements with each other, how can
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 49

I promise to be wiser than so many of my fellow creatures if I am

tempted, or how am I even to know that it would be wisdom to
resist? All that I can promise you, therefore, is not to be in a hurry.
I will not be in a hurry to believe myself his first object. When I
am in company with him, I will not be wishing. In short, I will do
my best. [pp. 144–45]

Just as Elizabeth’s prejudice against Darcy originally fed her admiration

for Wickham, now her attraction to the young soldier focuses her resent-
ment against Darcy: if Wickham’s story is true, after all, Darcy has been
directly (although inadvertently) responsible for preventing a marriage
between Elizabeth and Wickham. But Austen does not allow this or any
other romance to develop or capture Elizabeth’s imagination; indeed, when
she dismisses this particular suitor, she does not ridicule either the claims
or the attractions of romance. Instead, when Wickham declares for the
wealthy Miss King, Elizabeth remains undisturbed, and the entire issue of
romantic love is simply pushed to the periphery of the narrative. Wickham’s
decision to marry for money does, after all, leave Elizabeth’s vanity intact.
“His apparent partiality had subsided, his attentions were over, he was the
admirer of some one else. Elizabeth was watchful enough to see it all, but
she could see it and write of it without material pain. Her heart had been but
slightly touched, and her vanity was satisfied with believing that she would
have been his only choice, had fortune permitted it” (p. 149).
Elizabeth’s eventual love for Darcy is legitimate because it springs not
from the vanity we ordinarily associate with romantic expectations but pre-
cisely from the mortification of pride. Yet because Elizabeth only belatedly
realizes that she loves Darcy, her humbling does not entail a rejection of ro-
mantic love. Indeed, unaccountable, uncontrollable romantic love continues
to play a role in Pride and Prejudice—in Darcy’s desire for Elizabeth. This
passion, which Austen notes but does not dwell on, is the subtextual force
behind much of the action. In response to love, Darcy overcomes his preju-
dices against Elizabeth’s connections, proposes to her, returns to her even
after hope seems gone, and eventually brings about the marriages of three
of the Bennet daughters. The narrative does not focus on the development
or pressures of this passion; even when Elizabeth playfully asks Darcy for an
account of his love, her mocking celebration of “impertinence” deflects any
explanation he might have given. Romantic love remains the unexamined and
unaccountable source of power in a novel preoccupied with various forms of
social and psychological power and powerlessness. It not only overcomes all
obstacles; it brings about a perfect society at the end of the novel.
The romantic conclusion of Pride and Prejudice effectively dismisses
the social and psychological realism with which the novel began. Elizabeth’s
50 Mary Poovey

“impertinence” may have originated in her need to dispel the vulnerability

of her dependent situation, but when marriage with Darcy cancels all the
gloomy forecasts about Elizabeth’s future, Austen no longer suggests a pos-
sible relationship between social causes and psychological effects. Elizabeth’s
“liveliness” persists, of course, but it is purified of its defensiveness and its
egotism. In essence, in awarding Elizabeth this handsome husband with ten
thousand pounds a year, Austen is gratifying the reader’s fantasy that such
outspoken liveliness will be successful in material terms, but she earns the
right to do so precisely because Elizabeth’s first fantasy of personal power
is not rewarded. Pride and Prejudice, in other words, legitimizes the reader’s
romantic wishes by humbling the heroine’s vanity. At the level of the plot,
power is taken from egotism and given to love; at the level of the reading
experience, power seems miraculously both to emanate from and to reward
individualistic desire.
Darcy and Elizabeth, then, learn complementary lessons: he recog-
nizes that individual feelings outweigh conventional social distinctions;
she realizes the nature of society’s power. Their marriage purports to unite
individual gratification with social responsibility, to overcome the class dis-
tinctions that elevated Lady Catherine over the worthy Gardiners, and to
make of society one big happy family. The last pages of Pride and Prejudice
describe family connections radiating throughout society, closing the gap
between geographical locations, social classes, and temperamental differ-
ences. The union that concludes this novel reestablishes the ideal, paternal-
istic society that Mr. Bennet’s irresponsibility and Wickham’s insubordina-
tion once seemed to threaten. With Darcy at its head and Elizabeth at its
heart, society will apparently be able to contain the anarchic impulses of
individualism and humanize the rigidities of prejudice, and everyone—even
Miss Bingley—will live more or less happily in the environs of Pemberley,
the vast estate whose permanence, prominence, and unique and uniquely
satisfying fusion of individual taste and utility, of nature and art, symbolize
Jane Austen’s ideal.27

Austen is able to effect an aesthetic resolution of what is essentially a moral

dilemma partly because the realistic elements in her portrayal of the situ-
ation are so carefully contained. As in Sense and Sensibility, Austen simply
does not explore to the full the social or psychological implications of her
realism. Darcy, Charlotte Lucas, Mr. Collins, and Mrs. Bennet all warn
Elizabeth that her impertinence will probably result in spinsterhood, but
Austen does not imperil the integrity of the romantic ending by dramatiz-
ing the perils of such a future in a character like Jane Fairfax, Miss Bates,
or Mrs. Smith. But even beyond curtailing the extent of her realism, Austen
controls the response of her readers by drawing them into a system of values
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 51

that seems, by the end of the novel, both “natural” and right. She can gener-
ate this system of common values because one of the fundamental principles
of her art is to assume that the relationship between an author and an audi-
ence is ideally (if not automatically) a version of the relationship she knew
best: the family.
The model of the family governs Jane Austen’s art in at least three im-
portant ways. To begin with, her own personal family served as her first and
most appreciative audience. Like the Brontës after her, Jane Austen wrote her
first stories for the amusement of her family; most of her surviving juvenilia
are dedicated to her siblings or cousins, and it is easy to imagine these stories
and plays being read in the family circle, with various members contribut-
ing jokes from time to time. Austen’s first longer works—First Impressions
(later Pride and Prejudice) and Elinor and Marianne (later Sense and Sensibil-
ity)—were also apparently family entertainments, and, even after she became
a published author, she continued to solicit and value the responses of her
family as she composed and revised her novels.28 For Austen, the entire en-
terprise of writing was associated with hospitality and familial bonds. Her
letters reveal that she sometimes half jokingly talked of her novels as her
“children” and of her characters as if they were family friends. She assured her
sister, for instance, that she could “no more forget” Sense and Sensibility “than
a mother can forget her sucking child” (JAL, 2:272; 25 April 1811); she re-
ferred to Pride and Prejudice as her “own child” (JAL, 2:297; 29 January 1813);
and she pretended to find a portrait of Jane Bingley exhibited in Spring Gar-
dens: “There never was a greater likeness,” Austen playfully announced; “She
is dressed in a white gown, with green ornaments, which convinces me of
what I had always supposed, that green was a favourite colour with her” (JAL,
2:310; 24 May 1813).29
The fact that Austen’s completed novels and the activity of writing itself
were part of the fabric of her family relationships helps to explain why she was
able to avoid both the aggressive polemicism that Mary Wollstonecraft em-
ployed and the enfeebling defensiveness to which Mary Shelley resorted. Aus-
ten actively wondered what her readers thought of her novels, and she regretted
that her works did not receive adequate critical attention, but she never seems
to have imagined an audience openly hostile to either her novels or herself, as
both Wollstonecraft and Shelley did, for different reasons. But in addition to
providing a hospitable transitional area between her private imagination and
the public bookstall, Jane Austen’s experience of a close and supportive family
also provided models both for the way an individual’s desires could be accom-
modated by social institutions and for the context of shared values that an au-
thor could ideally rely on to provide a moral basis for art.
The notion of the family that served Jane Austen as a model for the
proper coexistence of the individual and society was essentially patriarchal,
52 Mary Poovey

supportive of, and supported by, the allegiances and hierarchy that feminine
propriety implied. Its smallest unit—the marriage—embodied for Austen the
ideal union of individual desire and social responsibility; if a woman could
legitimately express herself only by choosing to marry and then by sustain-
ing her marriage, Austen suggests, she could, through her marriage, not only
satisfy her own needs but also influence society. For the most part, the cul-
minating marriages in Austen’s novels lack the undercurrents of ambivalence
that characterize Shelley’s depictions of even happy marriages. This is true
in part because the energies of Austen’s heroines are not so rigorously chan-
neled by propriety into self-denial either before or after marriage. As Sense
and Sensibility suggests, however, Austen does discipline female energies, but,
increasingly, she also suggests that the psychological toll exacted by patriar-
chal society from women is too high. The fact that almost all of the periph-
eral marriages in her novels are dissatisfying in one way or another seems to
indicate that Austen recognized both the social liabilities that Wollstonecraft
identified and the psychological complexities that Shelley intuited. Never-
theless, and especially in Pride and Prejudice, the most idealistic of all of her
novels, marriage remains for Austen the ideal paradigm of the most perfect
fission between the individual and society.
As the actual basis and ideal model of the contract between an author
and an audience, the family also promised a context of shared experiences, as-
sumptions, and values against which the writer could play and to which he or
she could eventually return. And it is in this sense—and for this reason—that
the moral relativism theoretically unleashed by individualism does not neces-
sarily undermine Austen’s conservative moral pattern or her didactic purpose.
For if an author can assume a set of basic assumptions and values, such as
family members share, then he or she can depend on the reader’s returning
with the narrator to that common ground, in spite of liberties to stray that
have been permitted in the course of the fiction. In fact, given the common
ground, these liberties often contribute to the didactic design of the novel, for
they foster the illusion that challenges to ethical and aesthetic authority are
actually being engaged and defeated in their own terms.
In Pride and Prejudice Austen tries to ensure that her readers will share a
common ground by making them participate in constructing the value system
that governs the novel. This participation is a necessary part of reading Pride
and Prejudice because Austen combines a predominantly dramatic presenta-
tion of the action with an irony so persistent that it almost destroys narrative
authority.30 Even what looks like omniscient commentary often turns out,
on closer inspection, to carry the accents of a single character. The famous
first sentence of the novel, for example—“It is a truth universally acknowl-
edged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of
a wife”—points to the radical limitations of both “truth” and “universally.”
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 53

Masquerading as a statement of fact—if not about all unmarried men, then

certainly about a community that collectively assumes it to be true—this sen-
tence actually tells us more about Mrs. Bennet than anyone else. In such local
instances, irony allows us a certain freedom of interpretation even when it
teases us to test our “first impressions” against our developing understanding
of individual characters and the priorities of the novel as a whole.
As Wayne Booth has noted, irony forces the reader not only to partici-
pate in interpretation and evaluation but to choose one system of values over
another.31 And it is through the value system developed in the overall action
of the novel that Austen hopes to counter the relativism that the localized
ironies might permit.32 We can see this principle at work in Charlotte Lu-
cas’s argument about marriage. The narrator, conveying Charlotte’s thoughts
indirectly, takes no explicit stand on her position: “Without thinking highly
either of men or of matrimony, marriage had always been her object; it was
the only honourable provision for well-educated young women of small for-
tune, and however uncertain of giving happiness, must be their pleasantest
preservative from want” (pp. 122–23). Certainly this statement illuminates
the limitations of Charlotte’s romantic expectations, but is it meant to be
an authoritative assessment of reality? Or is Elizabeth’s indignant rejoinder
more authoritative? “You must feel, as well as I do,” she exclaims to Jane, “that
the woman who marries him, cannot have a proper way of thinking” (p. 135).
Elsewhere Elizabeth’s “proper way of thinking” has proved self-interested. Is
this case any different? And how are we, finally, to decide?
In such passages, Austen is both permitting momentary freedom of
choice and demonstrating the vertigo that accompanies it. But through the
unfolding action of the novel she seems to qualify this freedom by endorsing
one option over the other: Mr. Bingley and Mr. Darcy do both want and need
wives; the love matches Elizabeth believed in do come about, despite all the
odds against them. And, most important, the paternal order established at the
end of the novel both embodies an authoritative system of values and abol-
ishes the apparent discrepancy between individual desire and social respon-
sibility. Jane Austen’s irony, then, enables her to reproduce—without expos-
ing in any systematic way—some of the contradictions inherent in bourgeois
ideology; for by simultaneously dramatizing and rewarding individual desire
and establishing a critical distance from individualism, she endorses both the
individualistic perspective inherent in the bourgeois value system and the au-
thoritarian hierarchy retained from traditional, paternalistic society. More-
over, by allowing her reader to exercise freedom of judgment in individual
instances while controlling the final value system through the action as a
whole, Austen replicates, at the level of the reading experience, the marriage
of romantic desire and realistic necessity that she believed was capable of
containing individualism’s challenge to traditional authority.
54 Mary Poovey

In Pride and Prejudice this strategy effectively focuses what had re-
mained two distinct narrative parts in Lady Susan and two competing cen-
ters of authority in Northanger Abbey and Sense and Sensibility. The closure
of Pride and Prejudice is thus aesthetically successful, but whether it in-
sures a comparable ideological resolution is doubtful. For at the level of
the plot Austen can grant moral authority to feeling by stripping desire of
egotism, but she cannot guarantee that every reader will be as educable as
Elizabeth or that all expressions of feeling will be as socially constructive as
Elizabeth’s desire for Darcy. This problem is raised specifically in Pride and
Prejudice by Lydia, and Austen never really dismisses this character or the
unruly energy she embodies:

Lydia was Lydia still; untamed, unabashed, wild, noisy, and

fearless. She turned from sister to sister, demanding their
congratulations, and when at length they all sat down, looked
eagerly round the room, took notice of some little alteration in it,
and observed, with a laugh, that it was a great while since she had
been there. [p. 315]

Even Austen’s concluding comment on Lydia acknowledges that she finally

finds a place within the same society that Elizabeth superintends. “In spite
of her youth and her manners,” the narrator informs us, Lydia “retained all
the claims to reputation which her marriage had given her” (p. 387).
Austen’s tacit assumption that her readers will renounce the moral an-
archy epitomized in Lydia and generated by the pattern of localized ironies
would be accurate only if her audience already shared her own experiences
and values. For the purposes of her art, Austen makes this assumption be-
cause it allows her to contain not only individual interpretations but also
the social criticisms implicitly raised in the course of Pride and Prejudice. In
fact, this assumption enables her to bring the real experiences of her readers
to bear on her narrative in such a way as to underscore the necessity of the
aesthetic solution, which pushes aside social realism and criticism. Austen’s
contemporary readers would no doubt have been all too familiar with the
facts and pressures that made Charlotte Lucas’s cool assessment of mar-
riage reasonable, and, merely by alluding to this shared experience, Austen
enhances the gratification that Elizabeth’s improbable success provides. Thus
she introduces the specters of spinsterhood, dependence, and compromise
less to explore the social strictures of Elizabeth’s situation than to invoke
the reality that makes her own consoling art necessary. The inadequacy of
the aesthetic solution to the social problems it supposedly answers remains
implicit but unproblematic; for it is precisely the gap between imaginative
desire and social reality—a gap that still exists—that makes the escape into
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 55

romance attractive to all readers and probably made Austen’s contemporaries,

in particular, anxious to believe that Elizabeth’s happiness was available to
every daughter of the middle class.
The special resonance and impact that her contemporaries sensed in
the statements and situations of Austen’s novels are dim or absent altogether
for twentieth-century readers. But even the experiences Austen’s contem-
poraries shared with her, merely by virtue of their historical, geographical,
and class proximity, would not have guaranteed a common set of values. For,
as we have seen, in this period of social turmoil even the dominant system
of values was characterized by internal tensions and contradictions—stress-
es that reflected the competition between bourgeois individualism and old
patterns of patronage and also the inevitable gap between the promises
of individualism and the general inequalities and personal repressions that
bourgeois society requires. Given the structure of bourgeois society, the
system of absolute Christian principles that is the foundation of Austen’s
novels necessarily had to have its everyday, functional version, which al-
lowed one to be “rather” selfish in pursuit of material prosperity as long as
one practiced charity and thought good thoughts. It is precisely the latitude
of interpretations permitted by this compromise of ethical and moral ab-
solutes that finally imperils the didactic design of Pride and Prejudice. For
the family of readers that Austen posited did not necessarily exist; even in
her own day, the consensus of values she needed to assume was as wishful a
fiction as Elizabeth Bennet’s marriage to Darcy.
Because of the sophistication of her narrative skills, the romance Austen
dramatizes at the end of Pride and Prejudice seems not only right but plausi-
ble. But it is plausible only because, in this novel, Austen separates the power
to gratify and discipline desire from the conditions that generate and frus-
trate that desire. The power moves from society to the realm of art; in Pride
and Prejudice Austen substitutes aesthetic gratification—the pleasures of the
“light and bright and sparkling” plays of wit—for the practical solutions that
neither her society nor her art could provide. That we do not more often feel
shortchanged by this sleight-of-hand attests to the power of her artistry and
to the magnitude of our own desire to deny the disturbing ideological contra-
dictions that have made such imaginative compensation necessary.

No t e s

1. The most extensive discussion of Austen’s treatment of propriety is Jane Nar-

din’s Those Elegant Decorums: The Concept of Propriety in Jane Austen’s Novels (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1973). Nardin’s analysis is extremely perceptive
and discriminating, but, finally, I cannot accept the degree of conscious intention she
attributes to Austen (see pp. 10–11). The most telling recent analysis of the contra-
dictions in Austen’s novels, and thus a reading more in keeping with my own, is Igor
56 Mary Poovey

Webb’s From Custom to Capital: The English Novel and the Industrial Revolution (Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 49–70, 101–21, 158–61.
  2. One example of Austen’s apparent self-contradiction is evident in her
opinions about Evangelicalism. On 24 January 1809 she told Cassandra: “You have
by no means raised my curiosity after Caleb (Hannah More’s Coelebs in Search of a
Wife;—My disinclination for it before was affected, but now it is real; I do not like
the Evangelicals.” On 18 November 1814, however, she informed Fanny Knight that
“I am by no means convinced that we ought not all to be Evangelicals, & am at least
persuaded that they who are so from Reason and Feeling, must be happiest & safest”
( Jane Austen’s Letters to Her Sister Cassandra and Others, ed. R. W. Chapman, 2 vols.
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932], 1:256; 2:410; hereafter cited as JAL). Austen might
simply have changed her opinion; on the other hand, she might have been making
distinctions we can no longer confidently reconstruct.
  3. The one extant copy of Lady Susan is a fair copy that bears the watermark
1805. Chapman acknowledges, however, that the transcription of the novel could
easily have postdated its composition by a number of years. B. C. Southam, in Jane
Austen’s Literary Manuscripts: A Study of the Novelist’s Development through the Surviv-
ing Papers (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 45–62, presents a strong
case for the earlier date.
  4. Lady Susan, vol. 6 of The Works of Jane Austen, ed. R. W. Chapman (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 243. (Volumes 1–5 appeared in the second
edition of the Works, published in 1926.)
  5. See Lloyd W. Brown, “Jane Austen and the Feminist Tradition,” Nine-
teenth-Century Fiction 28 (1973): 334, and Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar,
The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary
Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 118.
  6. See Lloyd W. Brown, Bits of Ivory: Narrative Techniques in Jane Austen’s
Fiction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), pp. 147–48, 153.
  7. Gilbert and Gubar point out that one way in which Austen attempts to
control our sympathy for Lady Susan is by making her cruelty to Frederica exceed
the demands of the plot. See Madwoman, pp. 155–56.
  8. William Wordsworth, letter to Daniel Stuart, 1817, quoted by Alistair M.
Duckworth, The Improvement of the Estate: A Study of Jane Austen’s Novels (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 81.
  9. For a discussion of the spirit of “party” and the “contrary systems of
thought” typical of the literature of this period, see L. J. Swingle, “The Poets, the
Novelists, and the English Romantic Situation,” Wordsworth Circle 3 (1979): 218–28,
and David Simpson, Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman
& Littlefield, 1979).
10. Donald J. Greene, “Jane Austen and the Peerage,” PMLA 68 (1953): 1017–
31; reprinted in Jane Austen: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Ian Watt (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 156–57.
11. See Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975), pp. 161–67, 284–85, and Duckworth, The Improvement, pp. 2–80. For
another discussion of Jane Austen’s religion, see Warren Roberts, Jane Austen and the
French Revolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), pp. 109–54.
12. See Terry Lovell, “Jane Austen and the Gentry: A Study in Literature and
Ideology,” The Sociology of Literature: Applied Studies, ed. Diana Laurenson (Hanley,
Eng.: Wood Mitchell & Co., 1978), pp. 20–21.
 Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form 57

13. See ibid., p. 21.

14. For an excellent discussion of the complexities of parody, see George
Levine, “Translating the Monstrous: Northanger Abbey,” Nineteenth-Century Fiction
30 (1975): 337.
15. Samuel Johnson, Rambler 4, in The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel John-
son, ed. W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, 14 vols. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969), 3:21, 22.
16. Persuasion, in The Works of Jane Austen, 5:101.
17. Johnson, Rambler 4, pp. 23, 21.
18. Northanger Abbey, in The Works of Jane Austen, 5:37, 38. Patricia Meyer
Spacks also points out that education in an Austen novel requires imaginative
engagement; see her “Muted Discord: Generational Conflict in Jane Austen,” in
Jane Austen in a Social Context, ed. David Monaghan (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble,
1981), pp. 170, 174, 177–78.
19. The precise order in which Austen composed her major works is unknown,
but B. C. Southam, having consulted Cassandra’s original memorandum and the
surviving manuscripts, argues persuasively for the following chronology: Elinor and
Marianne—completed before 1796; First Impressions—October 1796–August 1797;
Sense and Sensibility, the revision of Elinor and Marianne—begun November 1797,
revised again at Chawton 1809–10; Northanger Abbey, originally entitled Susan—c.
1798–99, never substantially revised; Pride and Prejudice, the revision of First Impres-
sions—conducted in 1809–10 and 1812; Mansfield Park—February 1811 June 1813;
Emma—21 January 1814–29 March 1815; Persuasion—8 August 1815–6 August
1816 (Southam, Jane Austen’s Literary Manuscripts, pp. 52–58). The dates given in
parentheses in my text are the publication dates.
20. For a discussion of Austen’s “free, indirect speech,” see Norman Page, The
Language of Jane Austen (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1972), pp. 123 ff.
21. Sense and Sensibility, in The Works of Jane Austen, 1:8.
22. Tony Tanner, Introduction to the Penguin edition of Sense and Sensibility
(Harmondsworth, Eng., 1969), p. 32.
23. See Tanner, ibid., p. 30.
24. I am indebted to Patricia Meyer Spacks and to her Yale College seminar
on Jane Austen for many of the observations about this episode.
25. Pride and Prejudice, in The Works of Jane Austen, 2:42–43.
26. Bernard J. Paris makes this point in Character and Conflict in Jane Austen’s
Novels: A Psychological Approach (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978),
pp. 118–39. While many of my observations are consistent with Paris’s reading,
I disagree with his central thesis that Elizabeth can be treated as a “real” person
throughout the novel. It is precisely Austen’s aborting of psychological realism that
interests me.
27. See Duckworth, The Improvement of the Estate, pp. 123–26 (see n. 8, above).
28. In 1799, for instance, Austen remarked to her sister Cassandra, “I do
not wonder at your wanting to read ‘First Impressions’ again” ( JAL, 1:52; 8 Janu-
ary 1799); her letters also show her sharing Mansfield Park with her brother Henry
before its publication, and she kept a list of the responses her family and friends
made to that novel and to Emma. See “Opinions of Mansfield Park and Emma”
in The Works of Jane Austen, 6:431–39. For another discussion of the relationship
between Austen’s composition and her family, see Mary Lascelles, Jane Austen and
Her Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 4, 146.
58 Mary Poovey

29. Austen’s niece Catherine Hubback commented that her aunt “always said
her books were her children” (quoted by R. W. Chapman, Jane Austen: Facts and
Problems [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948], p. 67), and from her nephews we learn
that Austen supplied her family with information about her characters’ “after-life”:
“In this tradition any way we learned that Miss Steele never succeeded in catch-
ing the Doctor; that Kitty Bennet was satisfactorily married to a clergyman near
Pemberley, while Mary obtained nothing higher than one of her uncle Phillips’
clerks, and was content to be considered a star in the society of Meriton; that the
‘considerable sum’ given by Mrs. Norris to William Price was one pound; that Mr.
Woodhouse survived his daughter’s marriage, and kept her and Mr. Knightley from
settling at Donwell, about two years; and that the letters placed by Frank Churchill
before Jane Fairfax, which she swept away unread, contained the word ‘pardon’ ” (J.
E. Austen-Leigh, A Memoir of Jane Austen [London: Macmillan, 1906], pp. 148–49).
Julia Prewitt Brown also discusses the importance of the family for Austen; see her
Jane Austen’s Novels: Social Change and Literary Form (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1979), p. 9.
30. One of the best discussions of this function of irony is in Nardin, Those
Elegant Decorums, pp. 4–11.
31. See Wayne C. Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1974), p. 44 and passim.
32. See A. Walton Litz, Jane Austen: A Study of Her Artistic Development (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 108.
 E.B. MOON

“A Model of Female Excellence”:

Anne Elliot, Persuasion, and the Vindication of a
Richardsonian Ideal of the Female Character

S ome of the most interesting questions to vex the minds of critics about
Jane Austen’s Persuasion have been to do with the persuasion itself. What
is its role in the novel? Is the question of whether or not Anne Elliot was
right in allowing herself to be persuaded to reject Captain Wentworth ever
convincingly resolved?1
Probably the most satisfactory readings of the work are those which see
the issue of persuasion as important not so much for itself or in its working
out as a theme, but in its relation to character.2 The opening chapters serve to
characterise Anne Elliot and to evaluate her against Sir Walter and Elizabeth
in such a way that she immediately becomes a measure of proper behaviour. So,
before we are presented with questions about persuasion, Anne’s character has
been established as not only gentle and self-effacing but also as morally strong
and exemplary. When, in due course, we discover that some years earlier Anne
had been persuaded to give up the man she deeply loved, we cannot then simply
conclude, as Captain Wentworth had done, that hers must be a weak or shallow
character. We are led, instead, to wonder what exactly those qualities are which
render a character persuadable, and how we should regard them. It is in the
building up of this implicit question—‘What kind of character is a persuadable
one?’—that Jane Austen gives us her directive to the novel’s mode and structure.
It is this question which the rest of the novel sets out to answer.3

From AUMLA 67 (May 1987): pp. 25–42. © 1987 by the Australasian Universities
Language and Literature Association.

59
60 E.B. Moon

The question, ‘What kind of character is a persuadable one?’, becomes

a means of scrutinizing a special kind of female character; the kind which, in
exemplifying what are traditionally considered as ‘feminine’ characteristics, is
both gentle and yielding, but which can only mistakenly be seen, as a conse-
quence of this, as necessarily weak or excessively pliable. It is this character
which Austen explores in its relation to ‘being persuaded’ and which she ulti-
mately vindicates as ‘a model of female excellence’ (159).4
Jane Austen’s treatment of the female character has been the subject of
much recent criticism, a great deal of it feminist. Some of the latter critics
see Austen as using her female characters to take up the issues, and the prob-
lems, of sexual stereotyping, demonstrating the undervaluing of women in
the patriarchal society. For many of these critics, though, the marriages which
end the novels embody an ultimate endorsement of conventional views about
women as wives that undermines the basic critique.5 An alternative view
is that Austen uses irony and parody as ‘subversive strategies’, and that the
conclusions of the novels are themselves parodic.6 This present study, while
agreeing that Persuasion does suggest that society underrates women, none-
theless would argue that the novel’s conclusion postulates proper fulfilment
for Anne Elliot as possible, within society, through marriage.
Margaret Kirkham, arguing for a feminist perspective (akin to Mary
Wollstonecraft’s) in Austen’s novels,7 makes the salient comment that, in Per-
suasion, ‘Jane Austen comes close to completely reversing the role of the hero-
ine as pupil-improver and of the hero as guardian-guide.’8 And Kirkham’s
view that, although Anne’s portrayal is close to the sentimental ideal, there is
nonetheless careful discrimination between Anne’s qualities and those of the
ideal,9 is similar to my own view. However, the particular feminist premises
on which Kirkham’s argument and conclusions are based do not seem to be
self-evidently there. What does seem to be present, pointed to it as we are by
Austen’s other directives in the novel, is an invoking of an earlier ideal, one
which, in Richardson’s hands, had drawn the approval of the blue-stocking
ladies of the 1750s: an ideal which had provided the basis for the sentimental
heroine of the second half of the century but which itself differed, in certain
important ways, from what the ideal popularly became.10 Austen’s directives
to what is being invoked are embodied in allusion, and signalled through the
use of the device of persuasion.
In choosing persuasion, and the ethical questions which attend it, Jane
Austen has used an issue which has a well-established literary history, one
which locates the problem surrounding Anne as deriving from that tradi-
tion of dilemmas of love and duty which confronted the exemplary heroines
of an earlier age.11 The employment of such a situation, with its own expec-
tations and conventions, acts to place Anne Elliot within that tradition.12
Arguably, then, the vindication of the character and nature of Anne Elliot
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 61

as a realisable and recognisable ideal of woman is a major concern of Per-

suasion. I suggest that there is a quality of allusiveness to the literature of the
past and a subtle, understated, but unmistakeable, reference to the charac-
ters and themes of Richardson’s works, particularly Sir Charles Grandison.
I am not, of course, suggesting that Jane Austen is using Grandison as
a specific model, nor that she is being directly emulative of that work. (It
has become generally accepted, though, that she had a fondness for, and a
debt to, Richardson; and although this view has not passed unchallenged,
it seems fairly well proven.13) One of her very few specific allusions to an
earlier work—in fact, not one of Richardson’s—through its very specificity
serves to illustrate the nature of her allusive method. This is the reference to
Prior’s Henry and Emma. In this work, the notes to the Penguin edition tell
us, ‘Emma expresses abject willingness to serve the nonexistent rival with
whom her Henry pretends to be in love in order to test her’ (Note 8, 394).14
Jane Austen writes: ‘Without emulating the feelings of an Emma towards her
Henry, she [Anne] would have attended on Louisa with a zeal above the com-
mon claims of regard, for his sake . . .’ (116). Jane Austen does not tell us the
precise point of Henry and Emma to which she is referring, but her reference
is obviously to something which is readily recognisable to her contempo-
rary readers. By means of such recognition, the reader is given a sketched-in
awareness of the particular tradition of the ideal woman that Jane Austen was
drawing on. This, in turn, enlarges understanding of how the novel’s question,
‘What kind of character is a persuadable one?’, might be approached. Anne’s
character is aligned to a tradition, but it does not simply reproduce the tradi-
tion. Through the novel an earlier ideal is reworked; and this, perhaps, is one
of the most exciting things about Persuasion and part of its point.

* * *

Some support for the view that Austen in Persuasion was drawing on a
Richardsonian ideal of feminine excellence, embodied most famously in his
Clarissa but most readily emulative in his Harriet Byron—and that she was
evoking a recognisable problem15—can be drawn from a (necessarily selec-
tive) comparison of Persuasion with Sir Charles Grandison, to suggest a degree
of similarity between Anne Elliot and Richardson’s two heroines, Harriet
Byron and Clementina della Porretta.
All are, of course, sweet, gentle, delicate16 and open, qualities shared
with other exemplary heroines of the period. Harriet is initially more lively
than Anne. She is younger, too, in years and experience, and her spiritedness
diminishes as both increase—the years little, the experience much. A basic
likeness between the two, however, is always there. Anne’s loss of bloom, aris-
ing out of an enforced renunciation of love, is paralleled by Harriet’s decline
62 E.B. Moon

when it appears that Sir Charles is committed to Clementina. Both women,

however, exhibit self-control, and each shows great fortitude under the duress
of having to hide heartache. Moler sees this as aligning Austen to the views
held by the ‘conservative’ novelists of the eighteenth century, views which
had been challenged by those of the ‘romantic-revolutionary’ writers who fol-
lowed Godwin and Rousseau.17
Neither Anne nor Harriet can stand cant or hypocrisy. Their com-
ments about lack of openness being a fault are fairly similar. (See Anne on
Mr Elliot [161] and Harriet on Sir Charles [I, 183]: a criticism which is
later done away with.)18
Fairly, conventionally, both are motherless. Harriet, of course, has Mrs
Shirley and Mrs Selby and the warmth and affection of family life which,
suggestively, is what Anne envies the Musgroves (41). However, it is not sur-
prising to note that Lady Russell, who stands in place of a mother for Anne
during her childhood years, to some extent has her counterpart in Sir Charles
Grandison in the Countess of D. The Countess, who would dearly like to have
Harriet for a daughter-in-law, writes to her with ‘the affectionate freedom of
a mother’ (II, 546). Both women would like their charges to marry, making
it clear that a woman’s potential remained generally unfulfilled if she did not.
The Countess of D., indeed, urges Harriet to permit herself ‘to be called out
into active life’ (II, 547), meaning marriage.
On another note, both heroines have a considerable degree of education
and cultivation; and a superior level of accomplishment is indicated for each
through a proficiency in Italian.19 Anne, for example, translates the words of
an Italian song for Mr Elliot and apologises for any deficiencies of meaning:
‘I am a very poor Italian scholar’ (186). Mr Elliot says:

‘Yes, yes, I see you are. I see you know nothing of the matter.
You have only knowledge enough of the language to translate at
sight these inverted, transposed, curtailed Italian lines, into clear,
comprehensible, elegant English. You need not say anything more
of your ignorance.’ (186)

Harriet was taught by her grandfather and although she, too, makes simi-
larly modest disclaimers about her knowledge, 20 as with Anne this accom-
plishment distinguishes her from others around her.
Apart from parallels of nature and nurture, other suggestive links exist
between Anne and Harriet as types. Both make similar moral judgements
about the men who are their suitors. Harriet says she told Sir Hargrave: ‘I had
not the opinion of his morals that I must have of those of the man to whom
I gave my hand in marriage’ (I, 96). Anne knows that she could never accept
Mr Elliot because her ‘judgement’ is ‘against him’. She ponders it:
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 63

He certainly knew what was right, nor could she fix on any one
article of moral duty evidently transgressed; but yet she would have
been afraid to answer for his conduct. She distrusted the past, if not
the present . . . (160–161)

The authorial presentation of Mr Elliot, too, has certain similarities with

Richardson’s presentation of Sir Hargrave. Sir John Allestree gives Harriet
Sir Hargreave’s ‘character’:

. . . he is a very dangerous and enterprising man . . . laughing and

light as he is in company, he is malicious, ill-natured and designing;
and sticks at nothing to carry a point on which he has once set his
heart. (I, 63)

Mrs Smith gives Anne the ‘character’ of Mr Elliot:

‘Mr Elliot is a man without heart or conscience; a designing, wary,

cold-blooded being, who thinks only of himself; who, for his own
interest or ease, would be guilty of any cruelty, or any treachery, that
could be perpetrated without risk of his general character.’ (199)

Sir John Allestree ‘made no manner of doubt’ that, despite Sir Hargrave’s
character, ‘he was quite in earnest’ in wanting to marry Harriet (I, 63). Mrs
Smith assures Anne that Mr Elliot is ‘no hypocrite now. He truly wants to
marry you’ (204). Each girl rejoices, later, in her escape from such a man and
from the ‘misery which must have followed’ marriage (Persuasion, 211).21
Jane Austen, then, sets her heroine within a well-established, Richardso-
nian framework. Significantly, in introducing Anne Elliot, she departs from
the Grandison pattern in an important point. Harriet and Clementina are
highly valued by their families. For Sir Walter Elliot, Anne’s ‘word had no
weight; her convenience was always to give way;—she was only Anne’ (5).
By implicitly comparing and contrasting the responses which are part of this
particular literary convention with the way Anne’s family actually regards her,
the author allows the expectation to be raised that, included in the novel’s
subject, will be the question of such a heroine’s proper worth and how it
should be assessed.
When a group in Bath discuss Anne’s prettiness they agree that they
admire her more than Elizabeth, but add: ‘But the men are all wild after
Miss Elliot. Anne is too delicate for them’ (178). ‘Delicate’ here refers to
Anne’s looks, of course, but these looks reflect her inner being; and Mr El-
liot, who prefers Anne, joins the ‘villains’ in Richardson’s and Jane Austen’s
novels (Lovelace in Clarissa, Sir Hargrave Pollexfen in Grandison, and Henry
64 E.B. Moon

Crawford in Mansfield Park) who are distinguished by having the penetration

to discern and respond to such women, women of true female ‘excellence’.
That Anne is such a woman is Mr Elliot’s expressed view (a view which de-
lights Lady Russell):

He thought her a most extraordinary young woman; in her temper,

manners, mind, a model of female excellence. (159)22

And both Harriet and Clementina are frequently referred to as ‘excellent

creatures’, even ‘sister-excellencies’ (III, 343).
In each novel, an ideal of female excellence forms part of the subject of
the work. What, in fact, constitutes such excellence is canvassed and scruti-
nized, the novels themselves finally endorsing a clearly delineated ideal. In a
sense, in both works, evaluation of the heroine/s becomes a test of character
for others.
There are two main issues in Persuasion which might be held to derive in
considerable part from Richardsonian models. One of these is evaluation of
female character. The second is allied to it and is to do with problems of love
and marriage for women. These are problems partly arising from the domes-
tic, private and passive nature of women’s lives but partly, also, from the way
the behaviour of the mild and gentle woman can be misconstrued, her nature
mistaken, and persuasion too often applied in the erroneous belief that such a
nature will invariably yield because yielding is its natural response. It is in the
working out of the great themes in Persuasion, of love and constancy, and of
persuasion itself, that these issues are able to be explored.

* * *

Both Persuasion and Sir Charles Grandison deal with love and constancy
and with the suffering which comes from love. Richardson is concerned to
put forward the conservative position that ‘first love’ is not necessarily a one-
and-only love; that if it should be overcome, then it can be. The novel argues
the well-known romantic and anti-romantic views on this topic. The two
heroines, Harriet and Clementina, both love Sir Charles Grandison, in each
case a first love. Most of the material on the many aspects of love which are
canvassed in Richardson’s novel seems to prefigure the way such matters are
looked at in Persuasion.23 Again, Jane Austen seems not to borrow directly
but to want to draw on a well-known area of debate and to arrive at her own
conclusions, many of which in fact reinforce Richardson’s. There are certain
strong parallels between Clementina’s case and Anne Elliot’s (disregarding,
for the moment, the acts of persuasion, which can also be paralleled). Each
young woman gives up the man by her own act, motivated, at least in part,
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 65

by the belief that it is for the man’s own good. In both cases, the novels show
that the renunciation of love, for however high a motive, can be blighting—in
Clementina’s case, almost catastrophic. She breaks under the strain and be-
comes deranged.
The results of the blighting of love are also felt through the story of Har-
riet, and felt the more strongly perhaps because portrayed in a more matter-
of-fact manner and through a more ordinary character than Clementina, the
‘noble enthusiast’. Overall, the parallels between Anne and Harriet are stron-
ger than those between Anne and Clementina, although Jane Austen has,
perhaps, drawn issues selectively from the combined stories of Richardson’s
two heroines. Harriet believes that, however hopeless her love for Sir Charles
might be, she can now never seriously contemplate marriage with another
man.24 For Anne,

. . . be the conclusion of the present suspense good or bad, her

affection would be his [Captain Wentworth’s] for ever. Their union,
she believed, could not divide her more from other men, than their
final separation. (192)

In Persuasion, Jane Austen appears almost to be using Anne Elliot’s position

as a means of taking up and re-working particular issues about women and
love as they are aired in Sir Charles Grandison, and taking them up in a man-
ner that is like offering proof for the truth of what was, in the earlier novel,
only an hypothesis. What I am suggesting is that, although Sir Charles
Grandison uses the retrospective mode for the first part of Clementina’s
story, the novel is mostly written in the tense of the on-going present, and
many of the issues debated are problematical. They concern what may hap-
pen in the future to Harriet and Clementina in relation to their love for Sir
Charles and their belief in the certainty of their own constancy. The broad
soundness of many of these projections is vindicated through the account
of Anne Elliot’s experiences in the eight years after she gave up Captain
Wentworth.
The debate is very lively in Sir Charles Grandison as to whether or not
constancy in hopeless cases is a selfish and unwise indulgence; as to whether
or not romantic views of love stand up against the practical tests of what
makes a happy marriage; about the almost inevitable loneliness and unhap-
piness of the unmarried woman in the ‘solitary and unheeded’ state which
Harriet’s grandmother, Mrs Shirley, argues that a woman moves into, if she
remains single (III, 397). Much of what is said, on both sides, bears on Anne’s
situation as we are given it in Persuasion. And both novels probe the natures
of men and women in order to differentiate between them in certain essential
ways. Anne and Harriet each believes, for example, that, although men love
66 E.B. Moon

deeply, they are more readily able than are women to turn their affections
to another. Both women realize that, in part, this can be attributed to social
role and to the more public lives which men generally lead. When Captain
Harville says that it would not have been in his sister’s nature to have forgot-
ten Benwick as soon as Benwick appears to have forgotten her, Anne agrees,
and pushes the point further: ‘It would not be the nature of any woman who
truly loved’ (232). However, she qualifies this remark by relating women’s
constancy to the domestic nature of their lives:

‘We certainly do not forget you, so soon as you forget us. It is perhaps,
our fate rather than our merit. We cannot help ourselves. We live at
home, quiet, confined, and our feelings prey upon us.’ (232)

Men, Anne argues, ‘have always a profession, pursuits, business of some sort
or other, to take [them] back into the world immediately’ (232). Certainly Sir
Charles Grandison, deeply disturbed when, honour bound to Clementina,
he finds that Harriet has made an impression on his heart, consciously turns
to ‘avocations in town.’25
Both the different kinds of life men’s and women’s roles force on them
and the categorizing of ‘man’s nature’ and ‘woman’s nature’, with the differ-
ent sex roles which rise from what is ‘natural’, are basic to the point of each
novel, and there is some similarity in the way each author pursues these
concerns. When Captain Harville, for example, points out that Benwick has
not had the postulated diversions in the world to enable him to transfer his
attachment from one woman to another, Anne takes the argument to the
logical conclusion that, in that case, ‘it must be nature, man’s nature, which
has done the business for Captain Benwick’ (233). Harville will not allow
this, arguing an analogy between men’s ‘bodily frames’ and their ‘mental’:

‘. . . as our bodies are the strongest, so are our feelings: capable of
bearing most rough usage, and riding out the heaviest weather.’ (233)

But Anne, continuing the analogy, presses it further:

‘Your feelings may be the strongest . . . but the same spirit of
analogy will authorise me to assert that ours are the most tender.
Man is more robust than woman, but he is not longer-lived; which
exactly explains my view of the nature of their attachments.’ (233)

These comments, with certain differences made between masculine and

feminine viewpoint, generally tally with those in Sir Charles Grandison. In
Richardson’s novel it is conceded that the differences between men and
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 67

women are, frequently, those of opportunity and education (cf. Anne and
the ‘pen’—234), but Sir Charles, while allowing for individual exceptions,
puts forward the novel’s generally approved—though not unchallenged—
point of view:

‘There is a difference . . . in the constitution, in the temperament

of the two Sexes, that gives to the one advantage which it denies
to the other . . . Why has nature made a difference in the beauty,
proportion, and symmetry, in the persons of the two Sexes? Why
gave it delicacy, softness, grace, to that of the woman . . . strength,
firmness to men; a capacity to bear labour and fatigue; and courage,
to protect the other?’ (III, 247)

Persuasion, with some qualifications, accepts this view of differences as a

donnée, and part of the book’s point is to exemplify and justify Anne Elliot’s
character in its terms. Indeed, that Anne herself also holds such a view is
demonstrated in what she goes on to say to Captain Harville, in defence of
her opinion that men’s feelings are not so tender as women’s:

‘Nay, it would be too hard upon you, if it were otherwise. You have
difficulties, and privations, and dangers enough to struggle with.
You are always labouring and toiling, exposed to every risk and
hardship. Your home, country, friends, all quitted. Neither time,
nor health, nor life, to be called your own. It would be too hard
indeed’ (with a faltering voice) ‘if woman’s feelings were to be
added to all this.’ (233)

This description of the sailor’s lot is matched rather well by Sir Charles’
(highly romantic) summing-up of man’s lot in general, offered after his
speech relating sex roles to constitution and temperament:

I, for my part, would only contend, that we men should have power
and right given us to protect and serve your Sex; that we should
purchase and build for them; travel and toil for them; run through,
at the call of Providence, or of our king and Country dangers and
difficulties; and, at last, lay all our trophies, all our acquirements,
at your feet; enough rewarded in the conscience of duty done, and
your favourable acceptance. (III, 248, 249)

What Anne says bespeaks the feminine perspective on the male role; what
Sir Charles says, the masculine. Anne has used her description to support
her view of the different qualities of male and female feeling, rather than
68 E.B. Moon

differences in simple natural capacity, but the same concepts underlie what
each says. At Captain Harville’s protests at what she has said, however,
Anne is stricken:

‘God forbid that I should undervalue the warm and faithful feelings
of any of my fellow-creatures. I should deserve utter contempt if I
dared to suppose that true attachment and constancy were known
only by woman.’ (235)

Full of remorse, she is forced into further explaining her own view. In doing
this, she gets to what she sees as the nub of the difference between the way
men and women love:

‘No, I believe you capable of everything great and good in your

married lives. I believe you equal to every important exertion and
to every domestic forbearance, so long as—if I may be allowed
the expression, so long as you have an object. I mean, while the
woman you love lives, and lives for you. All the privilege I claim
for my own sex (it is not a very enviable one, you need not covet
it) is that of loving longest, when existence or when hope is
gone.’ (235)

In Anne’s assertion that man’s affection is deep and lasting, but that
it essentially needs an object on which that affection can be focussed, Jane
Austen has, I believe, adapted the sense of a crucial point in Sir Charles Gran-
dison. This is the point which enables that novel’s resolution of the dilemma
of Sir Charles’ ‘double love’ to be arrived at. Torn by duties and proprieties be-
tween Harriet and Clementina, loving both, Sir Charles finally, as a result of
particular circumstances, marries Harriet. Richardson has to justify both Sir
Charles’ being able to love two women at once, and his eventual, fully accept-
able marriage to one of them. What becomes apparent is that Sir Charles,
despite difficulties, is properly able to turn all his love to the woman who can
most properly be his object. This, finally, is Harriet. When Sir Charles is at last
released from Clementina, and is seeking Harriet’s hand, he declares to Mrs
Shirley, Mrs Selby and Harriet:

. . . had not Heaven given a Miss Byron for the object of my hope, I
had hardly, after what had befallen me abroad, ever looked forward
to a wedded love. (III, 79)

Such a declaration supports Anne’s view that it is not that men are more
fickle than women but that they are more readily able to conceive and
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 69

maintain affection if they have an object for that affection towards which
they can ‘hope’ and on which, thereafter, they can continue to focus.
Both Wentworth and Grandison rather manage to exemplify Anne’s
warm acknowledgement that ‘true attachment and constancy’ do exist among
men. ‘I have loved none but you,’ (237) Wentworth writes. Lady G. says of Sir
Charles: ‘where he once loves, he always loves’ (II, 660). In both books, how-
ever, it is the women who demonstrate the capacity ‘of loving longest, when
existence or when hope is gone’.

* * *

In each novel, the delicate, gentle, modest heroine is accorded her full
worth. What gives credibility to the apportioning of high value to such a
heroine is that the action enables the feminine character to reveal itself in
its nature and to demonstrate its particular strengths. As we have seen, the
theme of constancy in each novel works in just this way. It is, however, the
theme of persuasion which is used, particularly in Jane Austen’s novel, to raise
the issues of what constitutes a morally weak character and what a strong,
and of how the common notions about this in relation to women can often
be mistaken ones.
Each novel looks at persuasion out of, and persuasion into, marriage.
The stress in Persuasion is on the first kind, with the second looked at
briefly with regard to Mr Elliot. The stress in Sir Charles Grandison is, over-
all, on the second kind, although the first part of Clementina’s story has as
a major aspect the role that the family disapproval of any marriage to Sir
Charles plays in her mental breakdown. It is in the points that the nov-
el raises about the feminine character, in relation to persuasion deployed
through affection, that some most useful and illuminating parallels with
Jane Austen’s novel can be made. Clementina talks of ‘cruel persuasion’ (III,
60), cruel because exerted by those whom she loves, whose wishes she finds
it very difficult to withstand. Anne Elliot once faced similar pressures, and
we are told;

Young and gentle as she was, it might yet have been possible to
withstand her father’s ill-will . . . but Lady Russell, whom she
had always loved and relied on, could not, with such steadiness of
opinion, and such tenderness of manner, be continually advising
her in vain. (27)

In both examples we get a sense of affection being used, not exactly manipu-
latively yet not entirely judiciously, and we feel the very real dangers of such
usage.
70 E.B. Moon

Both Anne and Clementina have a strong sense of duty. It is the conflict
between duty and love in Clementina’s mind which has unhinged her reason.
‘My duty calls upon me one way: My heart resists my duty, and tempts me not
to perform it . . .’ (II, 564). Anne Elliot says of herself in Persuasion:

‘If I was wrong in yielding to persuasion once, remember that it

was to persuasion exerted on the side of safety, not of risk. When I
yielded, I thought it was to duty . . .’ (244)

Richardson is concerned with both ‘duty’ and the moral rights and
wrongs of the persuader. Austen has Anne, far from simply assigning blame
to Lady Russell, very concerned to sort out the moral rights and wrongs of
her own original decision. She relates this to what she still sees as having been
her ‘duty’, Lady Russell being in the place of a parent to her:

‘I am not saying that she did not err in her advice . . . But I
mean, that I was right in submitting to her, and that if I had
done otherwise, I should have suffered more in continuing the
engagement than I did even in giving it up, because I should have
suffered in my conscience. I have now, as far as such a sentiment is
allowable in human nature, nothing to reproach myself with; and
if I mistake not, a strong sense of duty is no bad part of a woman’s
portion.’ (246)26

Letting one’s self be persuaded emerges under such a scrutiny, then, as

being not necessarily a matter of feelings or of weakness. It can be a matter
of fine and discriminating judgement. This point is brought explicitly into
the novel by the overheard conversation between Louisa and Captain Wen-
tworth about decision and firmness of mind,27 and developed through the
events at Lyme. It is Louisa’s accident at Lyme when, against Wentworth’s
advice she has jumped a second time from the Cobb, that leads to Anne’s
wondering:

whether it ever occurred to him [Captain Wentworth] now,

to question the justness of his own previous opinion as to the
universal felicity and advantage of firmness of character; and
whether it might not strike him, that, like all other qualities of the
mind, it should have its proportions and limits. (116)

It was at Lyme, Wentworth later admits, that he had finally understood

‘the perfect excellence of the mind with which Louisa’s could so ill bear a
comparison’ (242).
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 71

There, he had learnt to distinguish between the steadiness of

principle and the obstinacy of selfwill, between the darings of
heedlessness and the resolution of a collected mind. (242)

Thus we are given a succinct expression of the morality of persuasion in

relation to character. For Wentworth her character ‘was now fixed on his
mind as perfection itself, maintaining the loveliest medium of fortitude and
gentleness’ (241). In this way, an ideal of feminine excellence is established.
This draws, it would seem, on certain conservative conventions and didactic
certainties but is modified by Anne’s affirmation of the value of love (and by
the novel’s strong sense of her eight wasted years), and endorses the moral
power of ‘principled feeling’.28 The whole of the novel, with the twin themes
of persuasion and constancy, is thus structured and designed to scrutinise
and demonstrate the true character of the ideally feminine woman. This is
why, at the conclusion of the novel, the sorting out of the issues of whether
persuasion is a good thing or a bad seems to be a little unsatisfactory. We
do not get a simple answer to any question on the matter because there is
not one question in the novel on this theme, but two: not only, was the per-
suasion right or wrong in itself, but also, does having allowed herself to be
persuaded make Anne Elliot strong or weak? Jane Austen has intertwined
her themes of the value of feeling and of woman’s natural constancy with
the themes of the rights and wrongs of persuasion and the need for percep-
tion and judgement. Anne Elliot’s suffering was caused, in large part, by
the world’s not knowing how to value her, nor how to assess her motives
and conduct.
In endorsing gentle and reflective Anne as ‘a model of female excellence’
Jane Austen has not, I believe, at all turned her back on wit and vivacity.
Anne is neither a stuffy, didactic exemplar nor a prig. She is capable of wry
amusement at herself and her own actions, and she assesses others shrewdly
and well. Her portrayal need not, in any way, negate the value of what Eliza-
beth Bennet and Emma Woodhouse are, nor what they represent in the Aus-
ten canon. Jane Austen (again like Richardson) has always used two distinct
female character types as heroines, one lively, one quiet. So Anne is not a
completely new kind of heroine in the novels, and she has certain things in
common with Elinor Dashwood and with Fanny Price.29
David Monaghan, in his essay, ‘Jane Austen and the Position of Wom-
en,’30 compares and contrasts the various forms of female excellence pre-
sented in Austen’s novels (suggesting, for example, ‘quickness of observation’
and ‘judgement’ as the qualities in Elizabeth Bennet which make her superior
to both her sister Jane and Miss Bingley [107]. He argues that ‘by the stan-
dards established in the earlier novels Anne Elliot is perhaps the most perfect
of all Jane Austen’s women’ (119). He sees Austen in Persuasion, however, as
72 E.B. Moon

demonstrating that, in the changed social circumstances the novel depicts,

Anne can ‘no longer provide the model for womanhood’ (120). Monaghan
believes that, despite Austen’s ‘admiration’ for Anne, it is Mrs Croft who is
being put forward as possible new ‘model’, woman in ‘a new arena of ‘exer-
tion’, exemplifying ‘some tentative proposals for a redefinition of the female
role’ (119).
This argument is tantalising and attractive, and Mrs Croft is certainly
sympathetically drawn. However, I do not believe we need or, indeed, may
read the novel’s signals in this way. The final chapter leaves us with Anne hap-
pily, busily, fulfillingly married—‘a sailor’s wife’ (252). She has proved herself
completely adaptable to her new social circumstances and the novel in no
way suggests that she is anachronistic or non-viable in her new role. It seems,
if anything, that one of the things the novel is affirming is that the feminine
ideal as exemplified in Anne Elliot is adaptable.31
The ideal’s adaptability, too, is perhaps being demonstrated in the way
that the ‘indispensable characteristic’ of ‘tenderness of heart’ (Grandison, II,
395) of Richardson’s heroines moves acceptably in Persuasion into being an
affirmation of the Romantic position of the goodness of true feeling and of
the need for both men and women to acknowledge and express love in their
lives. Against this, it would also seem that, in relation to the period’s eleva-
tion of the value of feeling as an infallible moral guide, the novel is giving its
own caveat: Do not under-estimate the worth of the woman who controls her
feelings for the sake of duty and of others.
The novel is, in many ways, a vindication of a standard of moral excel-
lence in women which derives, as we have seen, almost directly from Rich-
ardson. He has a didactic certainty, in his portrayals, of the intrinsic worth of
the morally exemplary heroine. Jane Austen draws on this certainty, even as
she airs Richardson’s heroines’ problems again, with variations, as part of her
own scrutiny of the real value of such a heroine.

No t e s

1. Anne Molan (‘Persuasion in Persuasion’, CR [24, 1982], 16–29) believes that

the problem for many critics is that Jane Austen ‘has not explained how we should
judge whether persuasion and persuadability are good or bad’ (28). Critics gener-
ally, though, as Leroy W. Smith points out in Jane Austen and the Drama of Women
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), differ on this issue as to whether
Austen ‘upholds eighteenth-century values or sympathizes with new values’ (p. 156).
Smith largely assigns the problem to misunderstanding due to sexual stereotyping;
and sees the novel’s ‘movement towards a concept of androgynous being’ (p. 171) as
providing a resolution.
2. For example, R.S. Crane, ‘Persuasion’ (The Idea of the Humanities and Other
Essays Critical and Historical, 2 vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, II,
283–302). Mary Poovey, ‘Persuasion and the Promises of Love’, in The Representation
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 73

of Women in Fiction (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press,

1983), sees Austen as using two systems of values in the novel, one representing
individualism, the other paternalistic values, each one used ‘to correct the abuses of
the other’ (p. 155).
  3. It must not be forgotten that Austen did not, herself give the title Persua-
sion !o the work, but the fact that her executors did see fit to use that title is in itself
interesting; and the matter does not materially affect the argument of this article.
  4. Persuasion (Novels of Jane Austen, Vol. 5, O.U.P., 3rd ed., 1933; 1954). All
quotations from the novel are taken from this edition, ed. R. W. Chapman (1923).
  5. See the discussion of this issue by Karen Newman in ‘Can this Marriage
be Saved’: Jane Austen makes Sense of an Ending’ (ELH, 1983 winter, 40 [4],
693–710). For a full and detailed summary of critical points raised by feminists, see
Leroy W. Smith, op. cit.
  6. Newman, op. cit., p. 708.
  7. Jane Austen, Feminism and Fiction (Sussex and Totowa, N.J.: The Harvester
Press and Barnes and Noble, 1983), Introduction, p. xi et passim. See also Lloyd W.
Brown, ‘Jane Austen and the Feminist Tradition’ (Nineteenth-Century Fiction [28]
1973–74).
  8. Kirkham, op. cit., pp. 145, 146.
  9. Ibid., pp. 159, 160.
10. Particularly in the belief that feeling, though recognized as a potent moral
force, should not, alone, be used as a guide to conduct. It should be regulated by
principle and reason.
11. See Kenneth L. Moler, Jane Austen’s Art of Allusion (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1968) 192–195, and J.M.S. Tompkins, The Popular Novel to Eng-
land 1770–1800 (London: Methuen, 1961; 1969), 84 ff. for discussions of this issue.
Moler points out that ‘a parental attempt to influence a child’s choice of a matrimo-
nial partner was frequently described as “persuasion”’ (1963).
12. For a discussion of the characteristics of the exemplary conservative hero-
ine in the 1790s, and a comparison between the novels of Mrs West and those of
Jane Austen, see Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975), p. 98ff.
13. See discussions on the links between Richardson, or the Richardsonian
tradition, and Austen in Henrietta Ten Harmsel, Jane Austen: A Study in Fictional
Conventions (The Hague: Mouton, 1964), and E.W. Bradbrook, Jane Austen and
Her Predecessors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966). Alistair Duck-
worth, in The Improvement of the Estate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971, pp.
14–20), agrees with Bradbrook that the conventions came to Jane Austen more
immediately from Fanny Burney than from Richardson himself, but his use of
Clarissa as a gloss for Jane Austen’s fiction makes a strong case for at least indirect
inf luence by that novel.
Margaret Kirkham (op. cit.) disputes Jane Austen’s supposed affection for
Grandison. She writes: ‘The evidence of Austen’s own writings suggests a highly
critical attitude to Grandison and some antipathy to Richardson in general’ (p.
30). Much of Kirkham’s discussion is speculative (as to why we should ‘take with
a grain of salt’ (p. 30) Jane Austen’s brother’s comment that she admired Gran-
dison particularly). Her main argument rests on (doubtful) mocking references to
Grandison in Northanger Abbey (and to Richardson in Sanditon), that the Juvenilia
includes a number of parodies on Grandison, and that the ‘dramatisation of “Sir
74 E.B. Moon

Charles Grandison” . . . mocks its parent-novel mercilessly’ (p. 31). It seems an
over-simplified view to take the mockery of a few absurdities in Grandison as evi-
dence that Jane Austen did not like the novel. With regard to the critical reference
to Richardson in Sanditon, it is not difficult to understand why Jane Austen should
disapprove of glamourised depictions of the rake, in Richardson or anyone else,
and this is the substance of her satiric description of Sir Edward Denham, who
models himself on Lovelace. It should, however, be noted that Richardson, too,
was alarmed by the favourable reception Lovelace received from readers, and that
Sir Hargrave Pollexfen, the rake in Grandison, is portrayed as unlikeable. Kirkham
sees both Persuasion and Sanditon, too, as anti-Grandisonian in that they depict
baronets as faulty human beings (pp. 144–5). It is worth recalling that Sir Charles’
father, Sir Thomas Grandison, is also portrayed as faulty. In both novels, Persua-
sion and Grandison, the need to accept moral and social responsibility along with
position and privilege is strongly advocated, so any anti-baronet comment as such
seems somewhat misdirected. Finally, it is probably worth noting the comments
of another critic, who makes a strong case for Austen’s links with Richardson.
Jocelyn Harris, in ‘“As if they had been living friends”: Sir Charles Grandison into
Mansfield Park’ (Bulletin of Research in the Humanities, Vol. 83, No. 3, Autumn
1980), writes: ‘Given such lively affection, such imaginative and professional
involvement with Richardson’s novel, it need surprise no-one that Jane Austen
mined Grandison directly and substantially’ (pp. 360–61).
14. Persuasion (ed. D.W. Harding, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975).
15. I am partly indebted to the discussions of this point in Moler, Ch. 6, op.
cit., and in Ten Harmsel, op. cit., p. 166 ff.
16. Tomkins, op. cit., discuss the difficulty of defining delicacy (p. 93) but,
drawing on descriptions from the novels of her period (1770–1800), terms it ‘spon-
taneous moral taste, embracing but transcending propriety or decorum’ (p. 144).
17. See both Moler and Butler for discussions of the division between the
conservative novelists of the late-eighteenth century and those who followed the
‘modern philosophers’ and who admired ‘strength of mind and strength of feeling’.
The conservative writers consisted ‘true fortitude’ consisted for women in ‘self-con-
trol rather than in self-assertion, in the ability to restrain one’s emotions rather than
in the determination to indulge them at all costs’ (Moler, op. cit., p. 204).
18. Sir Charles Grandison, edited and with an Introduction by Jocelyn Harris
(London: O.U.P., 1972). All quotations from the novel are taken from this edition.
19. This was regarded as a suitable accomplishment for all young women of
the period but few, if any, of their peers seem to share it with them.
20. ‘Lady Maffei . . . often directed herself to me in Italian. I answered her in
it as well as I could. I do not talk it well: . . . But Lady Olivia made me a compliment
on my faulty accent, when I acknowledged it to be so’ (II, 369).
21. Marilyn Butler regards the portrayal of Mr Elliot as one of Jane Austen’s
failures because he ‘never represents any kind of real temptation’ to Anne (op. cit., p.
280). Mr Elliot’s presence, however, is to do with the issues of persuasion and the
choice of marriage partner on worldly grounds; and the tempter-figure is not Mr
Elliot but Lady Russell!
22. The term ‘female excellence’ was obviously much used to refer to the
ennobling qualities of women. Tompkins quotes from one of Fordyce’s sermons to
the effect that the ‘best guardian of the soul of man against vice was “the near and
frequent view of Female Excellence”’ (op. cit., p. 150).
 “A Model of Female Excellence” 75

23. Cf. Duckworth ‘. . . in some interesting ways the dilemma and response of
Richardson’s heroine [Clarissa] looks forward to, and comments upon, the dilemmas
and responses of Jane Austen’s heroines’ (op. cit., p. 14).
24. See Harriet’s letter to Lady G. (III, 31).
25. See Grandison III, 54.
26. Margaret Kirkham points out that this behaviour of Anne’s conforms to
what Wollstonecraft had laid down as ‘proper in a dutiful child of a “solicitous” and
affectionate, even though mistaken, parent’ (op. cit., p. 149). Richardson, of course,
does make similar points in Clarissa and Grandison.
27. See Marilyn Butler’s discussion of the image of the ‘nut’ in this scene, op.
cit., p. 278.
28. Cf. Mary Poovey who sees Austen dramatising the ‘power of principled
feeling’ in the novel (op. cit., p. 162).
29. Nina Auerbach, in ‘O Brave New World: Evolution and Revolution in
Persuasion’ (ELH [39] 1972, 112–128), sees Anne Elliot as a descendant of Marianne
Dashwood (p. 115).
30. In Jane Austen in a Social Context (Totowa, N.J.: Macmillan, and Barnes
and Noble, 1981), pp. 105–121.
31. Indeed see the men in the novel, too, adapting to changed social circum-
stances. And Wentworth’s helpfulness to Mrs Smith in her affairs reads remarkably
like Sir Charles Grandison’s helpfulness to all and sundry.
 ANNE K. MELLOR

Why Women Didn’t Like Romanticism:

The Views of Jane Austen and Mary Shelley

F or many years scholars and critics have been speaking in one way or
another of what we might call the romantic “spirit of the age.” But the
spirit we have been describing animated at best but a small portion of the
people living in England at the time. Among those it did not animate were
the leading women intellectuals and writers of the day. In order to under-
stand their antipathy to the “spirit of the age,” I must first offer a working
definition of romanticism. I will not renumerate A. O. Lovejoy’s multiple
“romanticisms.” Rather I wish to emphasize a few fundamental and shared
beliefs of the major English romantic poets, beliefs which were profoundly
disturbing to the women who encountered them.
When we try to define romanticism as a set of cultural ideas and values,
we usually turn first to the beliefs that developed out of the eighteenth-cen-
tury Enlightenment and that inspired both the American and the French
Revolutions. Remembering Rousseau and Thomas Paine, we identify roman-
ticism with the political doctrines of democracy and the rights of the com-
mon man, the assumption that every individual is born with an inalienable
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This doctrine also assumes
that human beings are born free of sin, whether we are seen as empty vessels
which experience will fill, as noble savages, or as children of innocence trail-
ing clouds of glory. Fundamental to romanticism, then, is a conviction in the

From The Romantics and Us: Essays on Literature and Culture, edited by Gene W. Ruoff,
pp. 274–287. © 1990 by Rutgers, The State University.

77
78 Anne K. Mellor

value of the individual and a belief in an ethic of justice which treats every
person equally under the law.
For the romantic poets, the assumption that the individual, rather than
the state or society as a whole, was of fundamental significance meant that
their poetry was concerned above all with describing the nature and growth
of the individual. Wordsworth in The Prelude; or, Growth of a Poet’s Mind
implicitly claimed that his own autobiography, the development of his own
mind and character, was of epic importance. And the stages of the growth of
consciousness which all of Wordsworth’s poetry traced was fundamentally an
exploration of the nature of perception: how does the human mind come to
know the external world? What is the relationship between the perceiving
subject and the perceived object? For Wordsworth, as for Coleridge, Blake,
and the later romantic poets who had been inspired by the philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant, the human mind actively shapes and transforms the sense-data
it receives from nature into the “language of the sense.” As Percy Shelley put
it in “Mont Blanc”:

The everlasting universe of things

Flows through the mind and rolls its rapid waves,
Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom—
Now lending splendour, where from secret springs
The source of human thought its tribute brings
Of waters,—with a sound but half its own . . .

As the innocent child becomes a man, he comes to know the creative

powers of his own mind, a mighty mind whose capacity to use language
to transform, build up, and renew is as great as nature’s own life-giving
power. If the human mind creates the myths or meanings by which we live,
then its powers can be compared to a god’s. As William Blake repeatedly
proclaimed, “All deities reside in the human breast,” the “human form” is
“divine,” and “God becomes as we are, that we may be as he is.” For the
romantic poets, the creative powers of the human imagination are identical
with the creative powers of the Infinite I AM; when inspired, the poet can
imitate the works of God and create, as does the poet of Coleridge’s “Kubla
Khan,” “a miracle of rare device.” Without the transforming and myth-
making work of the imagination, nature is but a vacancy, for as Coleridge
insisted in “Dejection: An Ode,” “we receive but what we give, / And in our
life alone does Nature live.”
If one celebrates the human imagination as divine and locates the source
of all cultural meaning and value in the mythopoeic powers of the creative
mind, then one must also celebrate those emotions that arouse and inspire
the imagination, emotions above all of desire and love. As opposed to their
 Why Women Didn’t Like Romanticism 79

Enlightenment forebears, the romantic poets insisted on the value of bodily

sensations and emotions: in the moment of creation, not analytical reason
but rather the uninhibited flow of powerful feeling is at work. The romantic
poets therefore rebelled against the domination of reason, common sense, and
rigorous logic, insisting like Wordsworth that “we murder to dissect.” Or as
Keats put it in Lamia,

There was an awful rainbow once in heaven;

We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unweave a rainbow.

Turning against “cold” philosophy and abstract reason, the romantic po-
ets insisted instead on the ultimate value of passionate love, that love which
is embodied in Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound as Asia and which alone
can overcome the evil of Jupiter and bring about the mystic marriage of man
and nature, heaven and earth, that climaxes Shelley’s epic poem.
Modern critics of romantic poetry, responding to these concepts, have
offered various paradigms for organizing romantic thought. M. H. Abrams in
his masterful Natural Supernaturalism argued that the greatest romantic po-
ems traced what he called a “circuitous journey” from innocence to experience
to a higher innocence, a quest that begins with the child’s unconscious convic-
tion of a primal oneness between himself and mother nature and his fall away
from that communion into an experience of alienated self-consciousness and
isolation. But this fall, like Milton’s, proves finally fortunate, for it enables
the poet to spiral upward to a higher state of consciousness, even a sublime
transcendence, in which he consciously understands the ultimate harmony
between the workings of nature and his own mind and consummates a mar-
riage with nature through his “spousal verse.” More attentive to the scepticism
inherent in much romantic poetry, especially the writings of Byron and Keats,
I suggested in my book on English Romantic Irony an alternative paradigm to
Abrams’s, the model of a poet’s participation in an ongoing, chaotic life that
is simultaneously creative and destructive. If nature is constantly in flux, as
Byron, Shelley, and Keats believed, then all the structures designed by the hu-
man imagination, including the myths of the poets, are false, simply because
they impose a static order upon a chaotic and constantly changing world. To
represent such an abundant chaos, I argued, some romantic poets devised
linguistic strategies which were simultaneously creative and de-creative—po-
ems like Don Juan and “Ode on a Grecian Urn” which put forth symbols and
80 Anne K. Mellor

ideals only to undercut them, as when Byron tells us that the snake is in the
eyes of Juan’s beloved and innocent Haidée, or Keats reminds us that the
Urn’s image of a love that can never change is but a “cold pastoral.”
Commenting on both these paradigms of romanticism, Jerome McGann
has subsequently called them “the romantic ideology,” a description of roman-
ticism as a creative process. McGann insists that we must critically detach
ourselves from the values of romanticism when we interpret it and acknowl-
edge the despair expressed in much romantic thought, the moments when
Byron and Coleridge, Wordsworth and Keats, confronted the limitations of
mortality and recognized the failure of their creative powers. McGann’s em-
phasis on what Mario Praz first called “romantic agony” is entirely appropri-
ate, but it is only half the story. I still believe that the English romanticism of
which we have been speaking is best understood as an ongoing, enthusiastic
engagement with the creative energy of both nature and the human mind,
an engagement that acknowledges human limitations—as Byron said, man
is “half dust, half deity”—but nonetheless continues in a dialectical, perhaps
ever-to-be-frustrated, yearning for transcendence and enduring meaning.1
How did the women writers of the age respond to romanticism’s cel-
ebration of the creative process and of passionate feeling? On both counts,
they responded negatively, very negatively. But why? To answer that, I will
take as representative Jane Austen and Mary Shelley, two of the best-known
women writers of the day.
To understand Austen’s and Shelley’s hostility to the romantic imagina-
tion and to romantic love, we must think back to the book that perhaps more
than any other influenced them both, Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of
the Rights of Woman, published in 1792. Wollstonecraft was Mary Shelley’s
mother and died giving birth to her; perhaps as an act of compensation, or
simply in filial love, Mary Shelley throughout her youth obsessively read and
reread her mother’s books. It is less well known that Jane Austen was also a
committed disciple of Wollstonecraft’s teaching. Austen frequently quotes A
Vindication in her novels, even though she never dared to acknowledge open-
ly her debt to Wollstonecraft, mainly because the publication of Godwin’s
loving but injudicious Memoirs of the life, opinions, love affairs, and suicide
attempts of his dead wife had led the British press to denounce Wollstone-
craft as a whore and an atheist. In Jane Austen’s circle, no respectable woman
could publically avow her agreement with Wollstonecraft’s opinions. Even
today, the extent of Jane Austen’s debt to Wollstonecraft has only begun to
be documented.2
In A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Mary Wollstonecraft attacked
her society’s ideological definition of the female as innately emotional, intui-
tive, illogical, capable of moral sentiment but not of rational understanding.
Pointing out that women are assumed to have souls and to be capable of
 Why Women Didn’t Like Romanticism 81

sinning or becoming virtuous, Mary Wollstonecraft argued that if women

are to be held ethically responsible for their actions, then it must follow that
they are capable of ethical thinking. And if women are capable of thinking,
they must have a rational faculty. And if they have a rational faculty which
is capable of guiding and improving their character and actions, then that
rational faculty should be developed and exercised to its greatest capacity.
From this rigorously logical argument, Wollstonecraft launched a passionate
plea for the education of women, for only if women were educated as fully as
men would they be able to realize their innate capacities for moral virtue. Ap-
pealing to her male readers, Wollstonecraft further argued that more highly
educated women will not only be more virtuous, but they will also be bet-
ter mothers, more interesting wives and “companions,” and more responsible
citizens. In contrast, Wollstonecraft observed, her society’s practice of teach-
ing females only “accomplishments”—singing, dancing, needlework, a smat-
tering of foreign languages—produced women who were obsessed with their
personal appearance and fashion, who devoted all their energies to arousing
a man’s sexual appetites while duplicitously appearing “modest” and chaste in
order to capture the husband upon whom their financial welfare depended,
and who became “slaves” to their masters but petty tyrants to their children
and servants. “Created to feel, not to think,” the women of her time were kept
in “a state of perpetual childhood” and necessarily became “cunning, mean
and selfish.”3
Inspired by Wollstonecraft’s attempt to develop women’s ability to think
rationally, Jane Austen portrayed the heroines of her novels, not as the women
of sensibility celebrated by the romantic poets and the prevailing ideologi-
cal doctrine of the separate spheres which consigned women to the role of
promoting the domestic affections. Instead her heroines are women of sense,
women like Elinor Dashwood who refuse to succumb to erotic passion. Even
those heroines who are seduced by Gothic romances and fairy tales of roman-
tic love, like Catherine Morland in Northanger Abbey, are capable of recogniz-
ing the errors of their youthful delusions.
Indeed, all of Austen’s novels are novels of female education, novels
in which an intelligent but ignorant girl learns to perceive the world more
correctly and to understand more fully the workings of human nature and
society. Emma Woodhouse must recognize her own cruelty to Miss Bates,
must understand how wrongly she has perceived both Jane Fairfax and
Harriet Smith, before she can equal the intelligence and benevolence of a
Mr. Knightley. Elizabeth Bennet must overcome both her proud confidence
in her own ability to distinguish simple and intricate human characters
and her prejudiced and inaccurate reading of Mr. Darcy, through a process
of painful mortification, self analysis, and learning, before she can recog-
nize that Mr. Darcy is the man best suited to be her husband. Elizabeth
82 Anne K. Mellor

Bennet’s marriage to Fitzwilliam Darcy in Pride and Prejudice exemplifies

Mary Wollstonecraft’s ideal marriage, a marriage based on rational love,
mutual understanding, and respect. It is a further sign of Elizabeth’s intel-
ligence that the overriding emotion she feels for Darcy, as Jane Austen re-
peatedly states, is “gratitude.” For in a society where every woman is in want
of a husband with a good fortune, where marriage is, as Charlotte Lucas
reminds us, “a woman’s pleasantest preservative from want,” a woman must
above all be grateful to the man who rescues her from the financial depriva-
tions of spinsterhood.
Jane Austen’s conviction that women must above all be rational is per-
haps clearest in Mansfield Park, where we are asked to endorse the cautious,
chaste modesty of a Fanny Price rather than the energetic imagination of
a Mary Crawford. Fanny is the voice of prudence in the novel, of good
moral and intellectual sense, a voice that sustains the organic growth of
the family within a clean, well-lighted home, a voice that is finally beyond
price. In contrast, the women of Mansfield Park who are badly educated,
like the Bertram sisters who can recite by rote but cannot recognize the
insincerity of a Henry Crawford, or who rebel against the discipline of
logic and morality, like Mary Crawford, whose wit and charm identify her
as the romantic revolutionary in the novel, all end badly. Seduced by erotic
desire, Maria Bertram Rushford must end her days in banishment from
both the husband she abandoned and her family home at Mansfield Park,
condemned to the foolish, selfish, and manipulative company of Aunt Nor-
ris. And Mary Crawford, despite her cleverness and capacity for genuine
affection, cannot have the stable, enduring affection of an Edmund Bertram
and must settle instead for the company of her restless, self-indulgent, and
irresponsible brother.
Jane Austen’s fierce commitment to hard, calculating good sense is most
apparent in Mansfield Park, her least likeable novel. Its title was carefully cho-
sen—Lord Mansfield’s famous legal judgment in the case of Somerset ver-
sus Stewart in 1772 proclaimed that while the slave trade was appropriate
for the colonies (we must remember that Sir Thomas Bertram owns a slave
plantation in Antigua, which has been badly managed), nonetheless England
“is a soil whose air is deemed too pure for slaves to breathe in.”4 But Jane
Austen recognized that the English women of her day were little better than
domestic slaves, bought and sold on the marriage market, and kept at home
by fathers and husbands under “restraint.”5 The best that her countrywomen
could attain was a generous master, one who must be cautiously and wisely
chosen, one who would allow his wife, as Darcy allows Elizabeth, “to take
liberties” with him.6 In such a situation, women cannot follow the impulses
and dictates of their feelings alone. For sexual desire and passionate love can
too easily lead women into unhappy marriages, as we see when Lydia Bennet
 Why Women Didn’t Like Romanticism 83

is punished for her “high animal spirits” and promiscuous desire by the indif-
ferent contempt of Wickham. Or worse, it can lead women into the perpetual
disgrace and ostracism endured by Maria Bertram and the two Elizas in Sense
and Sensibility.
In direct opposition to the romantic poets’ celebration of love, the lead-
ing woman writers of the day urged their female readers to foreswear pas-
sion—which too often left women seduced, abandoned, disgraced . . . and
pregnant, with only the career of prostitution remaining to them—and to
embrace instead reason, virtue, and caution. The overflow of passionate feel-
ing in a female mind that has not thought long and deeply can be disastrous
for the welfare of women. Whether we read Wollstonecraft or Austen, Susan
Ferrier’s Marriage or Hannah More’s Strictures on the Modern System of Female
Education, Eliza Haywood’s Miss Betsy Thoughtless, or Mary Brunton’s Self-
Control, we hear a call, not for sensibility but for sense, not for erotic passion
but for rational love, a love based on understanding, compatibility, equality,
and mutual respect.
The second reason why women didn’t like romanticism was voiced most
powerfully by a woman who knew the romantic ideology as well as it could
be known, by a woman who had lived it at home, first as the daughter of
the radical philosopher William Godwin and then as the mistress and wife
of the poet Percy Shelley. Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley articulated
her profound disillusion with the central philosophical, poetic, and politi-
cal tenets of romanticism in her mythic novel, Frankenstein, or The Modern
Prometheus, written two years after her elopement at the age of sixteen with
Percy Shelley. Frankenstein is a direct attack on the romantic celebration of
the creative process. It is, first and foremost, the story of what happens when
a man tries to have a baby without a woman. Victor Frankenstein, who shares
Percy Shelley’s first pen-name “Victor”, his “sister” Elizabeth, his education
and his favorite reading, also shares Percy Shelley’s romantic desire to tran-
scend mortality by participating directly in the divine creative energy of the
universe. Frankenstein’s goal, to discover “whence . . . did the principle of life
proceed” (46), specifically echoes the goal of Percy Shelley’s narrator in “Alas-
tor” (whom Mary Shelley saw as his spokesman7), who addresses Mother
Nature thus:

I have made my bed

In charnels and on coffins, where black death
Keeps record of the trophies won from thee,
Hoping to still these obstinate questionings
Of thee and thine, by forcing some lone ghost,
Thy messenger, to render up the tale
Of what we are.
84 Anne K. Mellor

Percy Shelley’s desire to participate continuously in the creative power of

the universe and thus to become the equivalent of God is even more directly
articulated in his “Ode to the West Wind.” Here Shelley pleads with the
Power that creates, preserves, and destroys the universe to lift him “as a
wave, a leaf, a cloud” and make him its lyre or linguistic voice. “Be thou,
Spirit fierce, / My spirit!” Shelley prays, and then moves to the triumphant
rhetorical question that climaxes the poem:

Drive my dead thoughts over the universe

Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth!
And, by the incantation of this verse,

Scatter, as from an unextinguished hearth

Ashes and sparks, my words among mankind!
Be through my lips to unawakened earth
The trumpet of a prophecy! O, Wind,
If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?

Shelley’s words are “dead thoughts” because, once spoken, they become part
of a static, fixed language-system which cannot represent the ever-changing
flux of the universe of things which flows through the mind. As Shelley put
it in A Defence of Poetry: “The mind in creation is as a fading coal which
some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory
brightness.”8 If the poem is at best a faded coal, mere ashes, then the most
the poet can hope is that his words will arouse other minds to other creative
actions, that his thoughts—dead in themselves—will nonetheless prophesy
future revolutions and transformations.
But as Mary Shelley pointed out in Frankenstein, a romantic poetic
ideology that celebrated the creative process over its created products, that
dismissed the composed poem as but a “fading coal” of its originary inspira-
tion, and that ironically insisted upon the inability of language to capture
the infinite power, beauty, and goodness for which the poet yearned—such
an ideology can be seen as profoundly immoral. For Victor Frankenstein,
having stolen a “spark of being” from mother nature in order to animate the
reconstructed corpse lying at his feet, looks with horror at his wretched com-
position and flees from the room. Victor Frankenstein thus abandons the
child to whom he has given birth, and by failing to provide his creature with
the mothering it requires, he creates—to use a modern idiom—a battered
child who becomes a battering adult, a monster who subsequently murders
his brother, his best friend, and his wife.
Mary Shelley clearly believed that a poet must take responsibility not
only for the creative process but also for the created product. He must take
 Why Women Didn’t Like Romanticism 85

responsibility for the predictable consequences of his poems and for the prob-
able realizations of the utopian ideals he propounds. If Percy Shelley in Pro-
metheus Unbound urges his readers “To defy Power, which seems omnipotent,”
and in the “Ode to the West Wind” invokes a political revolution that will
bring down “black rain, and fire, and hail” upon the vaulted sepulchre of Eu-
rope, then he must also take responsibility for the deeds of those to whom the
incantations of his verse become a clarion call to revolutionary political ac-
tion. Mary Shelley was particularly sensitive to the suffering and cruelty that
a romantic idealization of radical political change could cause. She had seen
at first hand the devastations wrought in France by the fifteen years of war
initiated by the French Revolution, the Terror, and the subsequent Napoleon-
ic campaigns when she travelled through France on her elopement journey in
1814. She had then found the French village of Echemine “a wretched place
. . . [which] had been once large and populous, but now the houses were roof-
less, and the ruins that lay scattered about, the gardens covered with the white
dust of the torn cottages, the black burnt beams, and squalid looks of the in-
habitants, present in every direction the melancholy aspect of devastation.”9
In her novel, she represented the havoc wrought by the French Revolution
in the gigantic and misshapen body of Frankenstein’s creature. As I have ar-
gued at length in my book on Mary Shelley, Frankenstein’s creature—like
the French Revolution—originated in the idealistic desire to liberate all men
from the oppressions of tyranny and mortality.10 But the Girondist Revolu-
tion, like the monster, failed to find the parental guidance, control, and nur-
turance it required to develop into a rational and benevolent state.
As a mother, Mary Shelley understood that all one’s created progeny,
however hideous, must be well cared for. One cannot simply ignore one’s
compositions because one has ceased to be inspired by them. Mary Shelley
was profoundly disturbed by what she saw to be a powerful egotism at the
core of the romantic ideology: an affirmation of the human imagination as
divine defined the mission of the poet as not only the destroyer of “mind-
forged manacles” and political tyranny but also as the savior of mankind, the
“unacknowledged legislators of the world.” She had seen at first hand how
self-indulgent this self-image of the poet-savior could be. Her father had
withdrawn from his children in order to pursue an increasingly unsuccessful
writing career and had remorselessly scrounged money from every passing ac-
quaintance in order to pay his growing debts; Coleridge had become a parasite
on his admirers, unable to complete his Magnum Opus; Byron had callously
compromised numerous women, including her stepsister Claire Clairmont;
Leigh Hunt tormented his wife—and her best friend—Marianne Hunt with
his obvious preference for her more intellectual sister Bessy Kent; and her
own lover Percy Shelley had coldly abandoned his first wife and daughter in
his quest for intellectual beauty and the perfect soulmate and might easily
86 Anne K. Mellor

do the same again to Mary. Mary Shelley clearly perceived that the romantic
ideology, grounded as it is on a never-ending, perhaps never-successful, effort
to marry contraries, to unite the finite and the infinite, through the agency
of the poetic imagination and its “spousal verse,” too often entailed a sublime
indifference to the children of that marriage.
In contrast to a revolutionary politics and a poetics grounded on the self-
consuming artifact of romanticism, Mary Shelley posed an alternative ideol-
ogy grounded on the trope of the family-politic and its gradual evolution and
rational reform. Turning to Edmund Burke, she invoked his concept of the
organic development of both human minds and nation-states under benevolent
parental guidance as her model of a successful human community. Her credo is
based on what Carol Gilligan has taught us to call an “ethic of care,” the moral
principle that in whatever actions we undertake, we must insure that no one
shall be hurt, an ethical vision that Gilligan has found most often articulated
by women.11 Mary Shelley voiced this belief in a passage in Frankenstein that
functions both as moral touchstone and as a statement of her commitment to
the preservation of the domestic affections and the family unit:

A human being in perfection ought always to preserve a calm and

peaceful mind, and never to allow passion or a transitory desire to
disturb his tranquillity. I do not think that the pursuit of knowledge
is an exception to this rule. If the study to which you apply yourself
has a tendency to weaken your affections, and to destroy your taste
for those simple pleasures in which no alloy can possibly mix, then
that study is certainly unlawful, that is to say, not befitting the
human mind. If this rule were always observed; if no man allowed
any pursuit whatsoever to interfere with the tranquillity of his
domestic affections, Greece had not been enslaved; Caesar would
have spared his country; America would have been discovered
more gradually; and the empires of Mexico and Peru had not been
destroyed.12

If we take seriously the views of Mary Shelley and Jane Austen, in the
future when we speak of romanticism, we will have to speak of at least two
romanticisms, the men’s and the women’s. The male writers promoted an ide-
ology that celebrated revolutionary change, the divinity of the poetic cre-
ative process, the development of the man of feeling, and the “acquisition of
the philosophic mind.” In opposition, the female writers heralded an equally
revolutionary ideology, what Mary Wollstonecraft called “a REVOLUTION
in female manners.”13 This feminist ideology celebrated the education of the
rational woman and an ethic of care that required one to take full responsi-
bility for the predictable consequences of one’s thoughts and actions, for all
 Why Women Didn’t Like Romanticism 87

the children of one’s mind and body. The failure of the masculine romantic
ideology to care for the created product as much as for the creative process,
together with its implicit assumption that the ends can justify the means,
can produce a romanticism that, as Mary Shelley showed, is truly monstrous.
In his quest to participate in a divine creative energy, the English romantic
poet—whether we think of Percy Shelley, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Blake, or
Byron—acts out an egotistical desire for omnipotence and immortality that is
the prototype of the modern scientist who seeks to penetrate nature in order
to control and harness her powers to serve his own selfish interests. Mary
Shelley’s vision of Victor Frankenstein as the poet-scientist who creates a
monster he can’t control resonates ever more powerfully for us today, as we
wrestle with the fallout of America’s romantic desire to save the world for
democracy, the nuclear age initiated by the Manhattan Project’s creation of
the atomic bomb, an age in which we are capable of destroying—not merely
the enemy—but human civilization itself. As Frankenstein’s abandoned and
unloved monster tells him: “Remember that I have power; . . . I can make you
so wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you. You are my creator,
but I am your master;—obey!”14
The self-indulgent egotism of the romantic poets was painfully appar-
ent to the women writers who knew them best. The valid insights these poets
have given us have been many, especially into the philosophic debates we
still continue concerning the relation of the perceiving mind to the object of
perception, the role of feeling in shaping our mental processes, and the ways
in which language determines human consciousness. But we must balance
these insights with an understanding of the ways in which they encode a
masculine-gendered and thus limited view of human experience. In dialogue
with these powerful male romantic voices we must now hear other, female
voices, voices that remind us that calm reason and the domestic affections
may be necessary to preserve human society from a romantic idealism that
might otherwise unleash, however unintentionally, a revolution with truly
monstrous consequences.

No t e s

1. See M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in

Romantic Literature (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1971); Anne K. Mellor,
English Romantic Irony (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980); and
Jerome J. McGann, The Romantic Ideology—A Critical Investigation (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1983). This view of romanticism was also promulgated in
the exhibition on William Wordsworth and the Age of English Romanticism which
appeared in New York, Bloomington, and Chicago in 1987–88; see the catalogue
by Jonathan Wordsworth, Michael C. Jaye, and Robert Woof (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1987).
88 Anne K. Mellor

  2. See Margaret Kirkham, Jane Austen, Feminism and Fiction (Totowa, NJ.:
Barnes and Noble, 1983), 33–52; Claudia L. Johnson, Jane Austen—Women, Politics,
and the Novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), xxii.
  3. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. Carol H.
Poston (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 167, 62, 9, 141.
  4. “Somerset v. Stewart,” The English Reports 98 (King’s Bench Division 27)
Lofft I (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd; Edinburgh: William Green and Sons,
1909), 500.
  5. Jane Austen, Mansfield Park, chap. 21: “She was less and less able to endure
the restraint which her father imposed” (London: Penguin, 1966; repr. 1980), 216.
  6. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, 3:19: “by Elizabeth’s instructions she
began to comprehend that a woman may take liberties with her husband, which a
brother will not always allow in a sister more than ten years younger than himself ”
(New York: Norton, 1966), 268.
  7. That Mary Shelley regarded the narrator of “Alastor” as a spokesman for
Percy Shelley is evident from her “Note on Alastor” in which she describes the poem
as “the outpouring of his [Percy Shelley’s] own emotions.” See The Complete Poetical
Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Thomas Hutchinson (London: Oxford University
Press, 1905; repr. 1960), 31.
  8. Percy Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry,” in Shelley’s Prose, ed. David Lee
Clark (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1954), 294.
  9. Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, History of A Six Weeks Tour through a part of
France, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, with Letters descriptive of a Sail round the
Lake of Geneva, and of the Glaciers of Chamouni (London: T. Hookham, Jr., and C.
and J. Ollier, 1817), 22–23.
10. Anne K. Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (New
York and London: Methuen, 1988), chapter 4.
11. Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice—Psychological Theory and Women’s
Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), see esp.
173–174.
12. Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus
(The 1818 Text), ed. James Rieger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974;
repr. 1982), 51.
13. Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 192.
14. Shelley, Frankenstein, 165.
 C Y N T H I A WA L L

Gendering Rooms:
Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts

Every person of rank here is either a member of the legislation, or

entitled by his condition to take part in the political arrangements
of his country, and to enter with ardour into those discussions to
which they give rise; these circumstances lead men to live more
with one another, and more detached from the society of ladies.
The eating rooms are considered as the apartments of conversation,
in which we are to pass a great part of our time. This renders it
desireable to have them fitted up with elegance and splendour, but
in a style different from that of other apartments. . . .
Next to the great eating-room, lies a splendid with-drawing
room, for the ladies . . .1

I n the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the fashionable architects

Robert and James Adam articulated and affirmed a social as well as struc-
tural change in the interiors of upper- and middle-class English houses.
The dining-room had become the explicit territory of men, the space for
political and other kinds of discourse; the drawing-room came under the
supervision of women. But where the dining-room had dominated the
floorplan in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when men
and women tended to co-occupy its space in shared entertainment, by the
end of the eighteenth century the division into gendered space between the

From Eighteenth-Century Fiction 5, no. 4 (July 1993): 349–372. © 1993 by McMaster

University.

89
90 Cynthia Wall

dining and drawing-rooms corresponded to altered proportions: the draw-

ing-room became the usually symmetrical counterpart to the dining-room,
both architecturally and socially. 2 It would appear that a bargain of sorts
had been struck, consciously or unconsciously: in exchange for increasing
exclusion from formerly shared space, women were given or (assumed) a
separate (but equal?) space of their own.
The changing significance of and relationship between drawing-room
and dining-room mark new patterns of behaviour between women and men,
and these changes surface in a diachronic sampling of eighteenth-century
novels through characters acting both within and against the evolving pat-
terns of domestic interiors.3 In Roxana (1724), Clarissa (1747–48), and Pride
and Prejudice (1813),4 the central characters all work to define, protect, or
resist the boundaries of inhabited space, although the actions and reactions
of each are shaped by the changing dimensions and significations of her do-
mestic interiors. Roxana, in the first quarter of the century, enacts a more gen-
eral—less specifically or architecturally gendered—struggle to understand,
possess, and control the rooms she inhabits. At her famous ball she seems to
command the centre of her rooms, carefully arranging them to announce and
confirm her social and sexual power, although the rest of the novel charts the
disintegration of her spatial and psychological control. In mid-century, in ac-
cord with increasing popular awareness of architectural issues, Richardson fits
the massive story of Clarissa into smaller and smaller spaces, each carefully
described and circumscribed. At the narrative centre of the novel, Clarissa
tries to define and defend a sanctuary of private space in which the din-
ing-room becomes as psychologically significant as the bedroom. And Eliza-
beth Bennet, like so many of Austen’s heroines, begins to push against the
now-codified boundaries of masculine and feminine spaces: although much
of the sustained dialogue takes place within drawing or dining-rooms, some
of the most significant moments occur in more ambiguous, liminal spaces,
both physical and social—from windows, through doorways, on staircases;
the character as wallflower, eavesdropper, or tourist. Changes in eighteenth-
century interior design would obviously influence social behaviour, but they
also provided literary (and presumably real) spaces for resistance as well as
accommodation.

* * *

The connection between architectural change and literary expression in

the eighteenth century is neither arbitrary nor artificial. The publication
in 1715 of Vitruvius Britannicus and of Giacomo Leoni’s English transla-
tion of Palladio caught the public imagination, and a general awareness
and appreciation of architectural matters increased significantly throughout
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 91

the century.5 Nor was that appreciation limited to the upper-class patrons
and practitioners of art, to Burlington, Kent, and Pope. Craftsmen as well
as architects published a wide selection of books devoted to the theory
and practice of architectural design.6 These manuals, together with the
new standardization of middle-class townhouse design, meant that almost
anyone who could afford a house at all could afford one that conformed to
the current notions of Palladian taste and proportion.7 Attention to archi-
tectural structure and detail, both interior and exterior, was not simply a
matter for the designer and builder, but an issue of great excitement and
some knowledge to the occupant and observer. Defoe, Richardson, and
Austen were themselves each knowledgeable occupants and acute observers
of architectural space.8
The distribution and the gendering of interior domestic space also ex-
cited popular interest, but neither so early nor (at first) so explicitly. Robert
Adam notes in the preface to Works in Architecture that “within these few
years [there has been] a remarkable improvement in the form, convenience,
arrangement, and relief of apartments” (1:1). He credits this latter-day awak-
ening to the growing influence of French architectural theory, for it had been
in the “proper arrangement and relief of apartments . . . [that] the French have
excelled all other nations” (1:8). The idea of gendered space may have been
imported with the French influence: earlier in the century Jacques-François
Blondel had insisted upon a sober character for the dining-room, designed
with an “architecture mâle”—a masculine decor, deliberately and distinctly dif-
ferent from rooms designed for other forms of receiving and entertaining.9
But unlike the French, the English architects began to take the figurative
characterization of a masculine style quite literally, to create a space not sim-
ply “masculine” in design or decor (a trope long known in classical architec-
ture),10 but a space designed explicitly for men—“in which ‘we’ are to pass a
great part of ‘our’ time.”
In the late-seventeenth century, entertainment in the formal house,
whether town or country, meant that by and large the guests followed each
other through a pattern of room-centred activities: dining in the saloon (the
architecturally and linguistically anglicized counterpart of the French salon)
or dining-parlour, withdrawing to an antechamber for tea or dessert, cards
or music, and then returning to the dining-room for dancing and supper. A
handsome dining-room was socially and architecturally prominent, usually
one of the largest and grandest rooms in the house. By the middle of the
century, however, fashionable entertaining required a series of rooms offering
diverse but simultaneous activities. Although the mid-century assembly was
defined as “a stated and general meeting of the polite persons of both sexes,
for the sake of conversation, gallantry, news, and play,”11 entertainment was
decentralized and divided: “Dancing, tea-drinking, and cards went on at the
92 Cynthia Wall

same time, [but] usually in different rooms. . . . On occasions a running sup-

per was provided, and the guests went in and out of the supper room as they
felt like it” (Girouard, p. 193).
At the same time that the general social space of the upper-class house
splintered into a series of smaller rooms of synchronic activity, some of those
fragments assumed gendered identities.12 The physical contours and the im-
plicit functions of the different rooms—their form and their content—also
changed. Girouard shows that, while in the seventeenth century the drawing-
room had been invariably smaller than the dining-room, by the middle of the
eighteenth century the two rooms were more or less the same size (pp. 205,
233).13 Women often seemed to determine the position and size as well as
the decoration of the drawing-room:

At Hagley [Hall in Worcestershire] the drawing room is separated

from the dining room by the gallery. In 1752, when the plan was
still being worked out, Lyttelton wrote to the architect that “Lady
Lyttelton wishes for a room of separation between the eating room
and the drawing room, to hinder the ladies from the noise and
talk of the men when left to their bottle, which must sometimes
happen, even at Hagley.”14

In the novels to be discussed here, Roxana and Clarissa, like Lady Lyttelton,
are (or become) overtly interested in determining spatial boundaries, in
claiming or reclaiming rooms; although Elizabeth Bennet’s dramas are
enacted within socially presupposed spaces, she approves her friend Charlotte
Collins’s quietly aggressive redistribution of space at Hunsford Parsonage.
The interior spaces of each of these novels plot the gradual redefinitions of
space, but they also suggest forms of resistance to those redefinitions, forms
which themselves change in response not only to individual circumstance or
narrative demands, but also to the changing cultural pressures and possibili-
ties in terms of controlled, defended, or integrated space.

* * *

As popular awareness and knowledge of architectural matters gathered

energy and sophistication throughout the eighteenth century, it is not sur-
prising that literary attention to architectural detail should become more
concentrated and precise.15 But many of these concerns about the signifi-
cance of interior domestic space are to be found in Defoe’s novels. Roxana,
published in 1724 and allegedly set in the Restoration, differs strikingly
from Clarissa and Pride and Prejudice, since Roxana’s interest in defining
and controlling formal interior space is aggressively self-conscious. At a
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 93

time when such space had no specifically gendered contours or prescrip-

tions, Roxana quite literally draws all her rooms around her to generate and
consolidate forms of power. Her story enacts a prelude to the gendering of
rooms: she dramatizes the larger, constant, generally human desire to define
and control space (and, implicitly, its occupants). Yet in the end she forfeits
that power by misdefining and misoccupying that space. Her story pivots on
the most socially powerful arrangement and employment of London lodg-
ings, but it begins in an empty house and ends in a haunted one. The first
and final spaces of the novel invalidate her command of its centre and pun-
ish her for the attempt. In the end, all her inhabited space—psychological
as well as architectural—becomes haunted space.
Roxana regards all rooms not as general or gendered spaces for men and
women, but as the potential property or extension of herself. Her psychologi-
cal story begins when her first husband abandons her and she confronts the
poverty of a naked room:

I was in a Parlour, sitting on the Ground, with a great Heap of

old Rags, Linnen, and other things about me, looking them over,
to see if I had anything among them that would Sell or Pawn for
a little Money, and had been crying ready to burst myself, to think
what I should do next. . . . [I was] in Rags and Dirt, who was but
a little before riding in my Coach; thin, and looking almost like
one Starv’d, who was before fat and beautiful: The House, that
was before handsomely furnish’d with Pictures and Ornaments,
Cabinets, Peir-Glasses, and every thing suitable, was now stripp’d,
and naked . . . in a word, all was Misery and Distress, the Face of
Ruin was every where to be seen. (pp. 17–18)

Roxana’s body and her house are bound together by parallel clauses in an
identity that she will learn to exploit. Within this chilling interior emptiness
she begins a series of invisible occupancies, secretly inhabiting (and learning
to control) spaces that appear closed and empty to the rest of the world. Her
maid Amy thrusts the five children onto their unwilling paternal relatives
and spreads the story that Roxana has been turned out of doors and the
house shut up, although she actually continues to live there for several years
(pp. 21–22). The landlord, who had before seized her goods and stripped her
house, now discovers she is beautiful, and replenishes her domestic interiors
in the hope of exploring her sexual interior. Roxana quickly manipulates
his desire and assumes control of the actual and symbolic function of the
rooms, of the whole house, by appearing to transfer spatial control: “after
Dinner he took me by the Hand, Come, now Madam, says he, you must
show me your House, (for he had a-Mind to see every thing over again) No,
94 Cynthia Wall

Sir, said I, but I’ll go show you your House, if you please; so we went up
thro’ all the Rooms, and into the Room which was appointed for himself ”
(p. 33, emphasis added). She presses the landlord to stay the night (in the
room she appoints), and then with a great show of reluctance sleeps with
him—after he has legally endowed her with a good share of his wealth.
Through it all Roxana appears grateful, submissive, and flattered, but she
manages to acquire a deeper possession, a finer control, a steely dominance
that occasionally surfaces in startlingly brutal ways: one night she strips
Amy, throws open the landlord’s bed, thrusts her in, then stands aside to
watch (p. 46). The landlord may pay the bills and give orders to the staff,
but Roxana orders the space itself, determining and controlling social and
sexual boundaries.
Roxana repeats this pattern of secret occupation and invisible control
during her long affair with the prince in Paris. The prince is so taken with
her lodgings (“having a Way out into Three Streets, and not overlook’d by any
Neighbours, so that he could pass and repass, without Observation,” p. 66), as
well as with her person, that she offers: “I would be wholly within-Doors, and
have it given out, that I was oblig’d to go to England. . . . I made no Scruple
of the Confinement . . . so I made the House be, as it were, shut up” (p. 67).
She again collapses generic living space into powerful sexual space, manipu-
lating its apparent master by exaggerating the forms of obeisance within the
contours of her room: “When he came into my Room, I fell down at his Feet,
before he could come to salute me . . . and refus’d to rise till he would allow
me the Honour to kiss his Hand” (p. 61, emphasis added). The apparent acts
of homage implicitly forestall and disobey the prince’s commands.16 Such
manoeuvres prove so successful that by the time the affair is ended Roxana
is an exceedingly wealthy and increasingly confident woman, almost ready to
occupy private space publicly.
The central scene of the novel, in terms of narrative, psychological, and
architectural control, is Roxana’s ball in London, where she dons her Turkish
dress and dances for the assembled company. She seems to understand and
take full advantage of the sexual power implicit in social space (which implicit
power hints at some of the cultural incentives for breaking that space apart
later in the century). After acquiring impressive lodgings in Pall Mall, and
marketing a dazzlingly remote self-image, she gives a ball for her admirers
in which her attention to physical space and dramatic timing is exquisitely
controlled. She not only anticipates what will become the most fashionable
arrangements for upper-class entertainment, she also plots out one possible
evolutionary track of the drawing-room:

I had a large Dining-Room in my Apartments, with five other

Rooms on the same Floor, all which I made Drawing-Rooms for
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 95

the Occasion, having all the Beds taken down for the Day; in three
of these I had Tables plac’d, cover’d with Wine and Sweet-Meats;
the fourth had a green Table for Play, and the fifth was my own
Room, where I sat, and where I receiv’d all the Company that came
to pay their Compliments to me. (p. 173)

Roxana entertains in truly magnificent apartments: most town houses in

London, even those of the aristocracy, could rarely boast so many rooms
on one floor.17 Although those rooms most probably follow the kind of
floor plan introduced by Inigo Jones in the mid-seventeenth century, which
continued to dominate upper-class town and country houses through the
first quarter of the eighteenth century, Roxana’s method of occupying them
anticipates the social changes of the middle of the eighteenth century. Her
series of rooms, each with its separate activity, breaks away from the tradi-
tion that guided all the guests together through the various events of the
evening, moving instead towards social diversity and independence. All
rooms are equally theirs (hers). Yet as her own description testifies, though
the dining-room is structurally prominent, her arrangement and occupation
of the rooms for the ball pointedly emphasize her own drawing-room as the
socially (sexually) powerful centre.
When Roxana learns that the king might appear at her ball in masquer-
ade, she decides to publicize her absolute ability to empower interior space.
She slips upstairs to change into the Turkish costume, and then reappears in
the drawing-room:

I order’d the Folding-Doors to be shut for a Minute or two, till I

had receiv’d the Compliments of the Ladies that were in the Room,
and had given them a full View of my Dress. . . . The Folding-Doors
were flung open, and [my dancing partner] led me into the Room:
The Company were under the greatest Surprize imaginable; the very
Musick stopp’d a-while to gaze. . . . [And when my partner] led me
to the Drawing-Room Door . . . I did not go in, as he thought I
would have done, but turn’d about, and show’d myself to the whole
Rooms, and calling my Woman to me, gave her some Directions
to the Musick, by which the Company presently understood that I
would give them a Dance by myself. (pp. 174–75)

No longer does Roxana invisibly inhabit the secret centre of a house,

manipulating its spaces from behind a screen of gratitude; she has now
moved firmly into the centre of fashionable London society, demanding
public admiration and ordering domestic obedience. At a period when
social space was architecturally ungendered and therefore theoretically
96 Cynthia Wall

permissive, Roxana has apparently succeeded in her wish of becoming

a “Man-Woman” (p. 171), assuming full control of the social and spatial
centres of her life.
But the end of the novel subverts its middle, and undermines the faith
we can put here in the extent of Roxana’s control of her interior spaces. Un-
known to Roxana (as well as to the reader), one of her domestics, watching
from the margins of this scene, turns out to be her daughter Susan, one of the
children whom Amy had pushed onto the unenthusiastic aunt (p. 266). Susan
does not put the pieces together until much later in the novel, but the retroac-
tive shadow of her presence in this scene suggests that Roxana’s past habits of
invisible occupancy breed the very ghosts that come to haunt her.
Roxana begins to disintegrate even before Susan actually appears. She
slips back suddenly into invisible darkness, sacrificing something of what she
had wanted and achieved as a “Man-Woman” to become the courtesan, she
hints, perhaps of the King himself. After a three-year retirement, compressed
for the purpose of secrecy into a short paragraph (“with a Person, which Duty,
and private Vows, obliges her not to reveal, at least, not yet” [p. 181]), Roxana
emerges again into the public eye, but notes: “I did not come Abroad again
with the same Lustre, or shine with so much Advantage as before. . . . It began
to be publick, that Roxana was . . . not that Woman of Honour and Virtue
that was at first suppos’d” (pp. 181–82). After her personal and social triumph
in Pall Mall, she retreats into old patterns of secret habitations, but begins to
find that its darkness clings: “I seem’d like an old Piece of Plate that had been
hoarded up some Years, and comes out tarnish’d and discolour’d” (p. 182). The
consequences of self-hoarding are psychologically disfiguring.
Roxana tries to repolish her image, to make herself publicly presentable,
but she never acquires more than the appearance of respectability and whole-
someness.18 Even that appearance is soon shaken by the need for secrecy,
which induces a sort of psychological homelessness, a paralysis of agency. She
never really learns to live in her rooms; she occupies interiors in various roles,
never truly comfortable when psychologically naked in a private space, until
finally no rooms are hers. With Amy’s help, she can “transform [herself ] into
a new Shape, all in a Moment” (p. 209). She lodges with a Quaker lady in the
Minories, and gradually adopts her style, dress, and apparent security, claim-
ing triumphantly: “I was now in a perfect Retreat indeed; remote from the
Eyes of all that ever had seen me” (p. 211). At precisely this point of complete
disguise and protected enclosure, she begins to lose control of space more
rapidly and to recover less easily. In some sense she has reverted to invisible
occupancy, but this time without the sense of invisible agency. The success of
the Dutch merchant’s resumed courtship depends more on the discreet cho-
reography of Roxana’s landlady than on Roxana’s own efforts:
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 97

It was one Afternoon, about four a-Clock, my Friendly quaker

and I sitting in her Chamber up-stairs . . . when somebody ringing
hastily at the Door, and no Servant just then in the way, she ran
down herself, to the Door. . . . She [brought the merchant] into
a very handsome Parlour below-stairs. . . . I cou’d not speak one
Word to her, nor stir off of my Chair, but sat as motionless as a
Statue. (pp. 221–22)

For Roxana, the parlour seems suddenly inaccessible—architecturally,

physically, psychologically. “Parlour,” at this time, could refer either to a
drawing-room (i.e., a smallish, private room for conversation), or to a din-
ing-room (OED). The room obviously functions here as a place in which
temporarily to deposit the merchant, not to feed him. Yet in any context,
whether as drawing-room or dining-room, whether gendered or neutral, the
room has moved beyond Roxana’s reach.
Though Roxana does in time marry the merchant and become a count-
ess, the habits of secret occupation and dark retreat stealthily undermine her
foundations of security. More and more often she finds herself paralysed,
trapped in a room, terrified by doors and windows and wide open streets,
conflating psychological and structural dangers: “In a word, it never Lightn’d
or Thunder’d, but I expected the next Flash wou’d penetrate my Vitals . . .
it never blew a Storm of Wind, but I expected the Fall of some Stack of
Chimneys, or some Part of the House wou’d bury me in its Ruins” (p. 260).
As a sort of darkly logical consequence of her earlier identification of build-
ing with body, Roxana now anticipates her psychological collapse in terms of
structural disintegration.
In the end, no room, no arrangement of rooms, no prestigious or incon-
spicuous address, offers Roxana interior security or admits her spatial con-
trol. Her daughter Susan relentlessly tracks her down, invading her lodgings,
demanding acknowledgment, haunting her daily thoughts, and eroding her
self-control until all her series of houses seem to entrap rather than empower
her. Amy, so often the extreme manifestation of Roxana’s most secret spac-
es,19 acts out their shared sense of walled-in panic: thinking about Susan, she
“starts up, runs about the Room like a distracted body; I’ll put an End to it,
that I will; I can’t bear it; I must murther her . . . and then repeated it over
three or four times, walking to-and-again in the Room” (pp. 272–73). Interior
space crackles with frenetic, hostile, frustrated energy; the walls enclose and
confine without protecting; the threat from without is met by a worse within.
Finally Roxana loses even the semblance of spatial control, and her friend
the Quaker has to determine her actions, monitor her house, and direct her
escape:
98 Cynthia Wall

I was so confounded, I knew not what to do, or to say.

My happy Visitor had more Presence of Mind than I; and ask’d
me . . . but hast thou no Way out backward to go to her? . . . Now
it happen’d there was a Back-Door in the Garden, by which we
usually went and came to and from the House; so I told her of it:
Well, well, says she, Go out and make a Visit then, and leave the
rest to me. (pp. 318–19)

Susan has challenged Roxana’s ability to control the spaces she inhabits,
and her alleged murder destroys it altogether: “As for the poor Girl herself,
she was ever before my Eyes; I saw her by-Night, and by-Day; she haunted
my Imagination, if she did not haunt the House; my Fancy show’d her me
in a hundred Shapes and Postures; sleeping or waking, she was with me”
(p. 325). All Roxana’s inhabited space is now haunted space. But in a sense
Susan’s invisible presence had already haunted the apartments of Pall Mall,
repeating Roxana’s own habits of invisible occupancy, infiltrating spaces
that seemed most securely subordinated. 20 Roxana has lost whatever control
she might have had over her interior spaces, both architectural and psycho-
logical. All her manipulations of space—her tricks with folding-doors and
drawing-room entrances—prove only an illusion of control. She has inhab-
ited her houses on false pretences, and as such she is punished for presuming
to command the centres of rooms.

* * *

In perhaps surprising contrast, Clarissa, read architecturally, suggests a tri-

umph of spatial control. Clarissa’s difficulties, more overtly than Roxana’s,
arise in opposition to masculine usurpation of her domestic as well as sexual
interiors. Not coincidentally, Clarissa’s struggles with Lovelace in London
are centred as much on the dining-room as on the bedroom, at a time when
the dining-room was becoming emblematically male. But though Lovelace
penetrates both her bedroom and her body, his command of interior space—
whether private or public, sexual or social, gendered or general—is no more
authentic or durable than Roxana’s. Clarissa never aspires to the kinds of
spatial control that dominate Roxana’s imagination—on the contrary, she
continually offers to confine herself, to relinquish her dairy house—but
unlike Roxana, she never loses control within any space she occupies. She
fills them, utterly, with herself. Although she is raped and dies, she has (at
least) the literary victory of escaping into an eternally inviolable space and
occupying—even commanding, dominating, haunting—everyone else’s
psychological space.
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 99

The novel in some ways begins and ends in Clarissa’s parlour (and a
parlour, “when more spacious and handsomely furnished, is usually called the
drawing room,” OED). Clarissa explains: “There are two doors to my parlour,
as I used to call it . . . a wainscot partition only parting [it from the next par-
lour]. I remember them both in one: but they were separated in favour of us
girls, for each to receive her visitors in at her pleasure” (p. 303; 78). As a loved
and admired child, she was granted, along with her less remarkable sister
Arabella, the social and architectural anomaly of a public room of her own. In
this room she learns the art of bringing larger spaces into small. She decks its
walls with drawings of her favourite view: the wooded, hilly countryside seen
from “her” ivy summerhouse (p. 351n; 86). The large prospect in the small,
personal room prefigures Clarissa’s ability, in the words of Gaston Bache-
lard, to transcend the limits of geometrical space.21 She discovers the ability
to open up a psychological—and to some extent even a physical—freedom
within her closest confinement.
But it is Clarissa’s public ownership of space—her parlour, her ivy
summerhouse, her dairy house—that, in flagrant disregard of her brother’s
ideas of patriarchal possession, in part originates and fuels the family ef-
fort to dispossess and displace her. Her brother, her father, her uncles, and
her lovers each demand the right (the power) to say: Only I can grant you,
a woman, a room of your own. (So go to your room.) Clarissa’s family re-
venges itself upon her by dismantling her parlour and denying her pres-
ence. Understanding all too well—and envying all too much—the power
conferred by personal space, Arabella nastily sends Clarissa the details of
its destruction:

Your drawings and your pieces are all taken down; as is also your
own whole-length picture in the Vandyke taste, from your late
parlour: they are taken down and thrown into your closet, which
will be nailed up as if it were not a part of the house; there to perish
together: for who can bear to see them? (p. 509; 147)

The family’s spitefully nailing up the closet feebly prefigures Clarissa’s far
more definitive self-enclosure in her coffin. The family dreads Clarissa’s
power of presence, her command of interior space, and they struggle might-
ily to compress her spaces into their own; but as she becomes their unmen-
tionable secret, the idea of her becomes proportionately larger, until, like
Roxana’s daughter Susan, she penetrates the whole house in death.
Lovelace is equally interested in colonizing Clarissa’s domestic spaces.
Although Clarissa begins and ends her story within the space of her private
parlour, the house where Lovelace first entraps and finally rapes her occupies
100 Cynthia Wall

the strategic centre of the book. He baits her with a disingenuous description
of Mrs Sinclair’s house:

She rents two good houses, distant from each other, only joined
by a large handsome passage. The inner house is the genteelest,
and is very elegantly furnished; but you may have the use of a
very handsome parlour in the outer house, if you choose to look
into the street. . . . The apartments she has to let are in the inner
house: they are a dining-room, two neat parlours, a withdrawing-
room, two or three handsome bedchambers (one with a pretty
light closet in it, which looks into the little garden); all furnished
in taste. (p. 470; 130.1)

Clarissa writes with some small satisfaction to Anna Howe: “I am to have

the dining-room, the bedchamber with the light closet (of which, if I stay
any time at the widow’s, I shall make great use), and a servant’s room” (p.
471; 130). It is this dining-room as much as this bedchamber that becomes
the focal point for psychological domination, and its increasing cultural
significance as a masculine territory increases the significance of Clarissa’s
spatial triumph. 22
Until the actual rape, much of the dramatic conflict between Lovelace
and Clarissa is centred on the control of “her” dining-room.23 Unable to pen-
etrate her bedroom, Lovelace badgers her into meeting him in the presum-
ably safe public space of the dining-room, where he usually plans, attempts,
and fails to overpower her. In his accounts to Belford, Clarissa seems to ac-
quire a psychological and even a physical superiority in the dining-room, as if
the nature of the space itself confers power:

She flew to the door. I threw myself in her way, shut it, and in
the humblest manner besought her to forgive me . . . but pushing
me rudely from the door, as if I had been nothing . . . she gaining
that force through passion, which I had lost through fear; and out
she shot to her own apartment (thank my stars she could fly no
further!); and as soon as she entered it, in a passion still, she double-
locked and double-bolted herself in. (p. 573; 175)

The “fear” that Lovelace confesses to in fact determines the outcome of

every direct confrontation between them. He later corners her again in the
dining-room, and, although her apparent fear makes him release her, he
admits: “till she had actually withdrawn (which I permitted under promise
of a speedy return . . .), all the motions of my heart were as pure as her own”
(p. 646; 201). In the most dramatic dining-room scene of all, she confronts,
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 101

outwits, and firmly subdues the combined forces of Lovelace, Sinclair, and
the servants with the threat of suicide:

Now, Belford, see us all sitting in judgement [in the dining-room],

resolved to punish the fair briberess . . . and hear her unbolt, unlock,
unbar, the door; . . . then hear her step towards us, and instantly see
her enter among us, confiding in her own innocence; and with a
majesty in her person and manner that is natural to her; but which
then shone out in all its glory! . . . looking down my guilt into
confusion. . . . She withdrew to the door, and set her back against
it, holding the pointed knife to her heaving bosom . . . from the
moment she entered the dining-room with so much intrepidity,
it was absolutely impossible to think of prosecuting my villainous
designs against her. (pp. 948–52; 281)

It is her presence—in particular, her presence in that room of social and

architectural dominance—that “unmans” him, so to speak, and he real-
izes that she must not be present at her own rape. He is able to penetrate
her sexual space only when he has drugged her, dislodging her from her
body and therefore transforming sexual space into merely genital area.
After Clarissa has established psychological possession of the dining-room,
Lovelace makes his ultimate stab at sexual possession in the bedroom—but
only when that room is essentially empty.
Lovelace’s empty rape typifies the larger fissures in his spatial and psy-
chological dominance. He insists that he controls every space he occupies
and even some that he does not. But the nature of his possession is reduced
to a simple, ineffectual gesture, either physical or linguistic. When he first
learns of Clarissa’s escape to Hampstead, he runs frantically to her room: “I
have been traversing her room, meditating, or taking up everything she but
touched or used. . . . From her room to my own; in the dining-room, and in
and out of every place where I have seen the beloved of my heart, do I hurry;
in none can I tarry; her lovely image in every one” (p. 740; 228). He tries to
recapture the sense of her presence by reclaiming her space, by folding up
her smallest habitation in his arms. His servant Will tries to accommodate
that fierce desire to repossess Clarissa by helping to usurp her space: “They
showed her up to the very room where I now am. She sat at the very table I
now write upon; and I believe the chair I sit in was hers” (p. 762; 232). Yet
the possessive pronoun is hers; her image stamps each room; absent as well
as present, Clarissa dominates the dining-room, her bedroom, and Lovelace’s
own room. Like the spatially dysfunctional Roxana, Lovelace in the end de-
fines no rooms, commands no space. When he returns in disgrace to his own
family, he boasts:
102 Cynthia Wall

I have one half of the house to myself; and that the best; for the
great enjoy that least, which costs them most: grandeur and use are
two things: the common part is theirs; the state part is mine: and
here I lord it, and will lord it, as long as I please; while the two
pursy sisters, the old gouty brother, and the two musty nieces, are
stived up in the other half, and dare not stir for fear of meeting
me: whom (that’s the jest of it) they have forbidden coming into
their apartments, as I have them into mine. And so I have them all
prisoners while I range about as I please. (p. 1182; 395)

But Lovelace’s lordship, as he inadvertently admits, is a puppet monarchy.

The state rooms, of such prominence in the seventeenth century, were
becoming socially and architecturally obsolete. He occupies the rooms of
show rather than those of real and daily life: rooms of archaic ceremony
and no living value. He reigns undisputed over unwanted, untenanted
space. 24
Though Lovelace does recapture and rape Clarissa, the rest of the novel
relentlessly records the way that she finally and comprehensively eludes his
possession, retreating into her own ultimately inviolable space. The bounding
walls of drawing-room and dining-room and bedroom gradually recede be-
fore the abstract interiority of mind and soul. Clarissa’s spatial as well as spiri-
tual defeat of Lovelace also signifies a spatial and spiritual triumph over her
father and brother, the original delimiters of her domestic—and, they hoped,
psychological—interior space. She deludes Lovelace into believing she has
returned to her family, when she implies her own death, yet her words become
devastatingly literal as well: “I have good news to tell you. I am setting out
with all diligence for my father’s house” (p. 1233; 421.1). She talks repeatedly
and cheerfully to those with whom she lodges about buying a house of her
own (pp. 1250; 426, 1273; 440). Within that last and most confining habita-
tion—her coffin—she returns to occupy, dominate, and overflow, with poetic
finality, the centre of her old parlour, in the centre of her father’s house:

When the corpse was carried into the lesser parlour adjoining to
the hall, which she used to call her parlour, and put on a table in
the middle of the room, and the father and mother, the two uncles,
her Aunt Hervey, and her sister came in (joining her brother and
[Colonel Morden] . . .), the scene was still more affecting. Their
sorrow was heightened no doubt by the remembrance of their
unforgiving severity: and now seeing before them the receptacle
that contained the glory of their family, who so lately was driven
thence by their indiscreet violence (never, never more to be restored
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 103

to them!), no wonder that their grief was more than common grief.
(p. 1398; 500)

Clarissa herself becomes an example of something conceptually enormous

only nominally contained in a small space. 25 Unforgiven in life, but forgiv-
ing in death, she exquisitely, magnificently tortures her family and Lovelace:
she has conquered all space, and she cannot be reached. She repossesses for
all time (haunting her family and, through her letters, her readers) inviolable
and unalterable space.

* * *

Austen’s female characters, like Richardson’s, seem initially confined as

well as defined by the spaces they inhabit, and are concerned both to locate
and to test the strength of their boundaries. Clarissa, at first distinguished
by that gift of space, her parlour, then equally marked by her immure-
ment, works successfully to inhabit and reclaim for herself the centre of her
limited spaces, and finally the centre of all her spaces—domestic, social,
psychological, architectural, and narrative. Her final triumph is prefigured
by her psychological possession of the dining-room at a time when the din-
ing-room was becoming literally and manifestly masculine. By the time of
Austen’s novels, the separation of masculine and feminine interior space was
complete, explicit, and (as with Adam’s claim) ideologically self-justified.
Austen’s reader almost always knows exactly in which room any scene takes
place; and those scenes are set primarily in the drawing-rooms. Her heroines
seldom have any apparent quarrel with where they are placed: they await
the gentlemen in the drawing-room, and then proceed with their story.
But those drawing-room scenes tend to obscure the more subtle activity on
their perimeters: opinions are formed, prejudices confirmed, and dramatic
twists enacted in the more ambiguous spaces of stairs, vestibules, doorways,
windows, and outside the houses altogether—quietly pressing against the
boundaries of the drawing-room as the sphere for feminine activity. 26
In Pride and Prejudice Elizabeth discovers throughout the novel the
disadvantages that attend the strict codification of social space. At the first
dinner at Rosings, “when the ladies returned to the drawing room, there was
little to be done but to hear Lady Catherine talk, which she did without any
intermission till coffee came in” (p. 146). Implicitly different from the din-
ing-room (dominated by or at least tempered with men), the drawing-room
victimizes the women by allowing Lady Catherine to exploit her social prece-
dence and verbally tyrannize them. An earlier drawing-room scene between
Elizabeth and Bingley’s sisters shows how the importance of the men’s en-
trance becomes absurdly exaggerated by the after-dinner separation, and how
104 Cynthia Wall

the women’s response to that entrance can undercut whatever of value might
have emerged in the private female circle:

When the ladies removed after dinner, Elizabeth . . . attended

her [sister] into the drawing-room. . . . Elizabeth had never seen
[Miss Bingley and Mrs Hurst] so agreeable as they were during
the hour which passed before the gentlemen appeared. Their
powers of conversation were considerable. They could describe an
entertainment with accuracy, relate an anecdote with humour, and
laugh at their acquaintance with spirit. But when the gentlemen
entered, Jane was no longer the first object. (p. 47)

Miss Bingley’s foremost interest now is to attract Darcy’s attention. The

drawing-room, which would seem to provide the space for intelligent con-
versation between women, more often functions as itself a liminal space, a
place in which to wait for men.
But not always. The characterization above is complicated by the ex-
ample of that stoic woman, Charlotte Lucas Collins, who, in a strategy rather
like that of the early Roxana, appears to sacrifice superior space in order to
control personal space:

The room in which the ladies sat was backwards. Elizabeth at first
had rather wondered that Charlotte should not prefer the dining
parlour for common use; it was a better sized room, and had a
pleasanter aspect; but she soon saw that her friend had an excellent
reason for what she did, for Mr. Collins would undoubtedly have
been much less in his own apartment, had they sat in one equally
lively; and she gave Charlotte credit for the arrangement. (p. 150)

The act of defining spatial boundaries is displaced onto the character who,
from one point of view in the novel, made the wrong choice and delimited
her own sphere of action. But from Charlotte’s point of view, of course, it is
precisely this obvious chance to govern and redistribute interior space that
legitimates her decision to marry. Escaping Mr Collins validates almost any
deviation in domestic arrangements. Mr Collins is free to contemplate with
endless satisfaction the neighbouring estate of Rosings; Charlotte’s back-
ward room forwards her freedom from embarrassment.
Many of the most important misunderstandings and misinterpretations
of the novel occur in the centre of such socially sanctioned areas of discourse as
the drawing room.27 Elizabeth and Wickham share their ill-judged opinions
about Darcy in the drawing-room of Mrs Philips. The entire Bennet fam-
ily catalogues Darcy’s shortcomings in their family gatherings after dinner.
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 105

Bingley’s sisters vent their spite against Elizabeth in their brother’s drawing-
room. And Darcy first (and unsuccessfully) proposes marriage to Elizabeth
in the visual (if not spatial) centre of the drawing-room at Hunsford—by the
mantlepiece (p. 169). This central scene occupies the narrative centre of the
novel, and throws the centres themselves into doubt.
Yet many of the negative moments in the novel also seem initiated at
entrances, which might seem to discredit liminal spaces as well. Darcy enters
the drawing-room at Hunsford Parsonage several times to overturn Eliza-
beth’s peace (pp. 157, 168). After Elizabeth returns to Longbourn at the news
of Lydia’s scandalous elopement, Jane meets Elizabeth in the vestibule and
whispers the latest news (p. 252). When Lady Catherine arrives at Long-
bourn to demand Elizabeth’s intentions regarding Darcy, she “entered the
room with an air more than usually ungracious” (p. 311), promising unpleas-
antness before delivering it. But all these cornered moments of discomfort,
distress, or displeasure contain or herald some form of knowledge, some piece
of truth, or some moment of self-understanding, and so become the true psy-
chological, moral, and narrative centres of the novel.28
The principal resolutions of the novel retreat beyond the sanctioned
drawing-rooms into these slippery spaces, and the architectural margins are
emphasized by social and psychological parallels. At the opening dance of the
novel, Elizabeth first attracts the notice of Darcy as she sits in the uncomfort-
ably liminal position of wallflower and eavesdropper:

Elizabeth Bennet had been obliged, by the scarcity of gentlemen,

to sit down for two dances; and during part of that time, Mr. Darcy
had been standing near enough for her to overhear a conversation
between him and Mr. Bingley. . . . [Darcy] turning round, . . . looked
for a moment at Elizabeth, till catching her eye, he withdrew his
own and coldly said, “She is tolerable, but not handsome enough to
tempt me; and I am in no humour at present to give consequence to
young ladies who are slighted by other men.” (pp. 8–9)

Darcy seems determined to keep Elizabeth as well as himself well within their
respective, apparently non-tangential, spheres of interested and emphatically
uninterested observers. But Elizabeth of course overhears him, and thus their
first important connection is inadvertently established in that awkward space
outside the dance.
Darcy gives his haughty explanatory letter to Elizabeth as she wanders
outside the perimeters of Rosings:

She was proceeding directly to her favourite walk, when the

recollection of Mr. Darcy’s sometimes coming there stopped her,
106 Cynthia Wall

and instead of entering the park, she turned up the lane, which led
her farther from the turnpike road. The park paling was still the
boundary on one side, and she soon passed one of the gates into
the ground.
After walking two or three times along that part of the lane,
she was tempted . . . to stop at the gates and look into the park. . . .
She was on the point of continuing her walk, when she caught a
glimpse of a gentleman within the sort of grove which edged the
park; he was moving that way; and fearful of its being Mr. Darcy,
she was directly retreating. (p. 173)

Before she can enter the centre space of the park, Mr Darcy, himself hov-
ering in a “sort of grove,” gives her his momentous letter.29 The spatial
margins of the novel—not its drawing-rooms—are where things have room
to change.
Elizabeth and Darcy learn to understand and respond to each other in
the spaces between rooms, on the edges of estates. Elizabeth’s change of heart
begins in the between-spaces of Pemberley, which she visits from the liminal
position of a tourist with her aunt and uncle Gardiner. She begins to discover
Darcy’s sterling qualities from the housekeeper—herself a marginal but useful
character—who, we are told, “dwelt with energy on his many merits, as they
proceeded together up the great staircase” (p. 219). Eventually the tour-group
returns outside, where Darcy himself appears from behind the house: “As they
walked across the lawn towards the river, Elizabeth turned back to look again;
her uncle and aunt stopped also, and while the former was conjecturing as to
the date of the building, the owner of it himself suddenly came forward from
the road, which led behind it to the stables” (p. 221). Elizabeth is just leaving,
Darcy returning; Elizabeth is the tourist, the apparent eavesdropper, Darcy the
unexpectedly materializing presence-assumed-absent; in a fortuitous intersec-
tion of time and space, they meet again upon psychologically neutral ground,
and bend over backwards to demonstrate their respective new attitudes. When
after a walk they arrive ahead of the Gardiners at the house, Elizabeth declines
Darcy’s invitation to reenter the house, as if she prefers to keep them on this
threshold (p. 226). Later, at the inn at Lambton, when Elizabeth first gets the
shocking news of Lydia’s elopement, Darcy appears in the doorway and forgets
his manners so far as to cry out in naked concern, “Good God! what is the
matter?” (p. 243). (She later misunderstands his subsequent gravity as distaste
when he more conventionally occupies the room as he listens to her story.) And
finally, Darcy’s second and successful proposal occurs on a spontaneous walk
towards town (p. 324).
The importance of temporal and psychological margins reinforces the
prominence of spatial margins. Elizabeth’s admission of and pleasure in her own
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 107

happiness occurs within the liminal edges of time. She derives most comfort
and satisfaction in recollection and anticipation. After Darcy and his sister paid
their visit to Elizabeth and the Gardiners at the inn at Lambton, “Elizabeth
. . . found herself, when their visitors left them, capable of considering the last
half hour with some satisfaction, though while it was passing, the enjoyment
of it had been little” (p. 232). When they return the visit at Pemberley, and she
is trapped with Bingley’s sisters in the drawing room, “she expected every mo-
ment that some of the gentlemen would enter the room. She wished, she feared
that the master of the house might be amongst them” (p. 236). When she later
talks over the visit with her aunt Gardiner, she will only speak over or around
its centre: “they talked of his sister, his friends, his house, his fruit, of everything
but himself ” (p. 239). When Darcy appears with Bingley at Longbourn, “she
looked forward to their entrance, as the point on which all her chance of plea-
sure for the evening must depend” (p. 302). And when all is understood, and
Darcy and Elizabeth have declared their love for each other (in the garden),
later that evening in the Longbourn drawing-room “Elizabeth, agitated and
confused, rather knew that she was happy, than felt herself to be so” (p. 331).
Although the resolution of the novel returns Elizabeth to the centre of the
drawing-room, she still pushes beyond its limits. The happy ending of the novel,
its appearance of traditional closure, still resists the implications of that closure.
Elizabeth returns to the drawing-room with a more complete understanding of
herself and of Darcy, but emotionally and psychologically she reserves the right
to cross boundaries.
The fracturing of social interiors into masculine and feminine spaces in
the eighteenth century generated changing patterns of resistance within dif-
ferently accommodating walls. The evolving contours of the drawing-room
were on the one hand cultural and ideological constructions shaping the fe-
male character. As Simon Varey argues, “the spaces created (in theory or in
practice) by architects and those created by the novelists—whether or not
they are the same spaces—express specific ideology. . . . For one who resists
the pressure to conform as for one who does not, the self is defined, to a re-
markable degree, by space” (p. 4). The drawing-room, in which women were
to pass a great deal of their time (as implied by Adam’s separate claim for
men), would contribute to shaping the social and intellectual habits, man-
ners, and assumptions of upper and middle-class Englishwomen, and to the
increasing sense of division and difference between men and women, between
public and private, between the political and the domestic.
On the other hand, Heidegger defines space as “something that has
been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely, within a
boundary, Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which something stops but,
as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins
its essential unfolding.”30 Walls as boundaries in Heidegger’s sense do more
108 Cynthia Wall

than define and enclose: they imply and even generate alternate space; they
establish individual as well as cultural relationships between interiors and
exteriors; they suggest ways to resist as well as accommodate their own lim-
its. Women such as Lady Lyttelton actively worked to create the institution
of the drawing-room, determining its size, its position, its significance. The
female characters discussed here do more than simply inhabit their domes-
tic spaces: they transgress, transform, and sometimes even transcend them.
Roxana forges and then forfeits control of formal architectural space; Clarissa
achieves control of psychological space by transcending her confined domes-
tic space; and Elizabeth pushes through the codified walls of the feminine
sphere to find some room to breathe. As the drawing-room changed, along
with its implicit possibilities or restrictions, so did narrative patterns of imag-
inative opposition.

No t e s

1. Robert and James Adam, Works in Architecture, 1773–79, 3 vols (reprinted

Dourdan: E. Thézard Fils, 1900), 1:9. References are to this edition.
2. See Mark Girouard, Life in the English Country House (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978), pp. 203–6, 232–34.
3. The boundaries of my project here—the fictional habitation of culturally
and sexually determined interior space within otherwise widely dispersed canoni-
cal works—naturally suggest what will be left outside. I reserve for future work
the inspection of architectural spaces in marginal texts, where I suspect that, as in
Sarah Scott’s Millenium Hall (1762), different and perhaps more harmonious con-
figurations of interior space may be imagined and enacted. Another line of question-
ing—which also belongs in a different essay—is the position of canonical novels that
do not fit in the literary or ideological contexts I am establishing here. The novels
of Fielding and Smollett, for example, pay a distinctly different kind of attention to
architectural structures (both interior and exterior) from those of Defoe, Richard-
son, and Austen. I see Fielding’s and Smollett’s architectural imagery emerging from
but loyal to a prior literary tradition, more akin to Pope’s Epistle to Burlington and the
tradition of the country-house poem, where the houses function emblematically, as
reliable signs in themselves rather than as structures that define or influence spheres
of human action.
4. References are to the following editions: Daniel Defoe, Roxana; The
Fortunate Mistress, ed. Jane Jack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964); Samuel
Richardson, Clarissa; or, The History of a Young Lady, ed. Angus Ross (New York:
Penguin, 1985), with page number followed by letter number; Jane Austen, Pride
and Prejudice, ed. James Kinsley, based on R.W. Chapman’s text (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
5. For a more detailed account of the popularization and professionalization
of architecture, see Sir John Summerson, Architecture in Britain 1530–1830 (7th ed.,
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), pp. 269, 320–21; Summerson, Georgian London
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1945, 1978), pp. 17–83; Simon Varey, Space and the
Eighteenth-Century English Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
pp. 1–2, 10–23.
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 109

  6. See Summerson, Georgian London, pp. 72–75, 145; Reginald Tumor, The
Smaller English House 1500–1939 (London: B.T. Batsford, 1952), p. 75. Derek Jarrett
points out that “within a short time [after the publication of Thomas Chippendale’s
Gentleman’s and Cabinet-Maker’s Directory in 1754] even the most conservative local
cabinet-maker was forced to buy books of design for himself and keep abreast of
standards of elegance.” England in the Age of Hogarth (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1986), p. 141.
  7. See Summerson, Georgian London, pp. 38–51; A.E. Richardson and C.
Lovett Gill, London Houses from 1660 to 1820 (London: B.T. Batsford, 1911), pp. 2–
4, 9–13, 25–27. The labouring classes in the country were also affected—particularly
by the end of the century—since their houses on estates were frequently remodelled,
usually for reasons of health as well as taste. See Maurice Barley, Houses and History
(London: Faber and Faber, 1962), pp. 259–61. The living quarters of the poorest
classes in London itself, of course, were not terribly affected by questions of taste.
  8. Richardson’s and Austen’s interest in architecture is well known through
their letters. Defoe’s equal interest is less well documented and frequently discounted
by his biographers and critics. In my doctoral dissertation, “Housing Defoe’s Proj-
ects: The Rebuilding of London and ‘Modern’ Literary Space” (University of Chi-
cago, 1992), I have argued that in fact much of Defoe’s life and most of his important
works are centrally concerned with the psychological and social implications of
architectural structures.
  9. Peter Thornton, Authentic Decor: The Domestic Interior 1620–1920 (New
York: Viking Press, 1984), p. 93. Thornton cites Blondel’s Maisons de Plaisance
(1737–38) and Architecture Françoise (1752). Summerson agrees that French inf lu-
ence was always important to British architecture, but emphasizes that French
styles were rarely directly imported, particularly in the first half of the century
(Architecture in Britain, pp. 267–68). Thornton also points out a striking difference
between the gendered spaces of the French and English upper classes: in France,
husbands and wives occupied separate apartments, but by mid-century the wife
held her court in the larger suites, while her husband retired to the smaller and
more private rooms.
10. Vitruvius, for example, explains that when the Athenians erected temples
to Apollo and Diana, they invented two kinds of columns in which “they borrowed
manly beauty, naked and unadorned, for the one [Doric], and for the other [Ionic
and later Corinthian] the delicacy, adornment, and proportions characteristic of
women.” The Ten Books on Architecture, trans. Morris Hicky Morgan (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1914; reprinted New York: Dover, 1960), pp. 103–4.
11. OED citing Chambers’s Cyclopaedia (1751), quoted in Girouard, p. 191.
12. Girouard argues that the separation and change probably evolved out
of the practice of tea-drinking: the ladies would retire a short while before the
gentlemen in order to prepare the tea or coffee, while the men gradually became
more enamoured of their waiting period for its own sake. The lag time evolved
from minutes into (sometimes) hours. (One hour appears to be standard in
Austen’s novels.) Ralph Fastnedge suggests, on the other hand, that the habit of
withdrawing to a smaller “tea-room” contributed to the “softening” of manners
and in fact replaced the heavy drinking of the seventeenth century. See Fastnedge,
English Furniture Styles from 1500 to 1830 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955, 1967),
p. 115. Neither explanation necessarily affects the social consequences of increas-
ingly gendered space.
110 Cynthia Wall

13. See also Barley, pp. 202–12; Hugh Braun, Old English Houses (London:
Faber and Faber, 1962), pp. 129–30; Richardson and Gill, pp. 25–35; Summerson,
Georgian London, pp. 143–44.
14. Girouard, p. 204.
15. Although Nikolaus Pevsner, among others, remarked upon the surpris-
ing lack of architectural detail in Austen’s works, given her well-known interest in
houses (see “The Architectural Setting of Jane Austen’s Novels,” Journal of the War-
burg and Courtauld Institutes 31 [1968], 404–22), Austen’s highly charged attention
to the distribution and occupation (if not the appearance) of interior domestic space
not only reveals her own interest in architectural significance, but also matches the
larger public interest in the definitions and implications of structural space.
16. For additional examples of Roxana manipulating the prince through and
within interior space, see pp. 62, 63, 71, 77, 78–79, 96–97, 100.
17. See Barley, pp. 264–80; Braun, pp. 129–30; Richardson and Gill, pp.
25–35; Summerson, Georgian London, pp. 65–83; Tumor, p. 56.
18. As I argue elsewhere, some of Defoe’s other characters, in contrast, do
seem to achieve in the end an untroubled occupation of space. Moll Flanders in some
sense earns the full measure of security and gentility she had long wanted: in declar-
ing and sharing her full wealth with Jemy in the end, she finally fortifies her original
(deceptive) appearance of wealth with its reality. Crusoe’s redemption appears in his
ultimate ability to share his real estate with the mutineers.
19. See Terry J. Castle, “ ‘Amy, who Knew My Disease’: A Psychosexual Pat-
tern in Defoe’s Roxana,” ELH 46 (1979), 81–96.
20. In a sense, Roxana’s problems with Susan dramatize the threat for the
socially powerful that is always dimly implicit in their dependence upon a servant
class, and her efforts to expunge the presence of Susan from her life and mind
indirectly anticipate a larger social and architectural change. During the late-sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, and culminating in the nineteenth, the upper
classes became in general increasingly uneasy at the visible presence of servants, and
mazes of passages and back staircases began to riddle the plans of the great houses
in both town and country, so that all the functions of service could be performed
without the owners of the house encountering those who performed those functions.
Confrontation—personal and political—seemed to be architecturally occluded. (See
Girouard, pp. 138, 285.)
21. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (1958; Boston:
Beacon Press, 1969), p. 47.
22. Mrs Sinclair’s putative address (see p. 744) in Dover Street would have
been in the relatively new and overwhelmingly Palladian area near Burlington
House and Berkeley Square (see John Rocque’s map of London, 1747, I0Ab). The
fashionable architectural uniformity of this area supports the idea that this particular
dining-room shares the architectural and social significance of Palladian pressures,
which increasingly promoted the separation as well as symmetry of dining-room and
drawing-room (Summerson, Architecture in Britain, pp. 387–88).
23. Pamela also wages battle in the dining-room. Pamela, of course, as a ser-
vant has no title to any space of her own, and she experiences more immediately than
women of more protected classes (with the obvious Richardsonian exception) the
peculiar tenuousness of walls, the sense of domestic space as trap as well as refuge.
But she also utterly understands the gradations of social significance in rooms, and
the niceties of properly inhabiting them, particularly after she has married Mr B
 Gendering Rooms: Domestic Architecture and Literary Acts 111

and must stand up to Lady Davers. See Samuel Richardson, Pamela (1740), ed. M.
Kinkead-Weekes, 2 vols (London: Dent, 1926, 1976), especially 1:349, 386.
24. See Girouard, pp. 203–206, 230; Philippa Tristram, Living Space in Fact
and Fiction (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 256.
25. For an excellent discussion of closets, confinement, and freedom in Clar-
issa see Tristram, pp. 255–56.
26. This argument does not work the same way in all of Austen’s novels,
although the level of attention to the configuration and signification of interior
space remains consistent. In Mansfield Park, for instance, Fanny hovers too much
on the edges of interiors—in her attic, on the stairway with Edmund, in window
recesses. Fanny finds the closed feminine circle of the drawing room a release, where
“she was able to think as she would.” She must learn to occupy the centres—as her
return to Portsmouth reveals. In Sense and Sensibility Marianne Dashwood must
learn to control and contain herself within public space, rather as Fanny Price
must learn to enter it; Elinor, on the other hand, suffers like Elizabeth Bennet from
the insipidity of drawing rooms. In Persuasion, Sir Walter, Elizabeth, and Mary all
place undue emphasis on the size and appearance and number of drawing rooms,
while Anne captures attention, regains confidence, and reclaims Wentworth all in
passageways or staircases or comers of drawing rooms. The novel that significantly
does not fit into this pattern of plotted space is Emma—but Emma, of course,
already commands a house and by the end of the novel Mr Knightley moves into it
with her.
27. Another socially gendered and architecturally central room at this time,
of course, is the library. In Pride and Prejudice until the very end Mr Bennet con-
sistently retreats into his library to protect and prolong his patriarchal inadequacy
and inaction.
28. One possible exception to this theory is Wickham: when he enters the
room at Elizabeth’s aunt Philips’s, his dashing appearance confirms her initial preju-
dice in his favour (p. 67). But even here, Wickham is seen in the company of “a very
creditable, gentlemanlike set,” which he excels as much as “they were superior to the
broad-faced stuffy uncle Philips, breathing port wine, who followed them into the
room.” Knowledge of sorts, perhaps.
29. Tristram notes: “Austen’s gardens always mediate between the house and
the world around it” (p. 243).
30. Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking” (1951), Basic Writings,
ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 332.
 WILLIAM DERESIEWICZ

Community and Cognition

in Pride and Prejudice

T he opening of Pride and Prejudice vies with “Call me Ishmael” as the

most famous first sentence in English-language fiction, yet that which
makes it memorable also makes it anomalous within its author’s corpus.
Each of Jane Austen’s other novels begins by introducing one of its principal
characters.1 Only Pride and Prejudice begins with an aphorism: “It is a truth
universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune,
must be in want of a wife.” An aphorism, or rather a mock aphorism, for it is
immediately intimated that this “truth universally acknowledged” is in fact
nothing more than one of the fixed opinions of the “neighborhood” of “sur-
rounding families” amidst which the novel’s action is to take place.2 The
introduction of individual characters is delayed until the third paragraph
(even then withholding the usual Austenian fanfare of station, condition,
and history), and the community turns out to be the novel’s true point of
departure. Indeed, the note on which this opening ends, that our bachelor
of property will himself become the property of “some one or other” of the
local young ladies, lends, if only for a moment, a teasingly arbitrary air to the
identity of the specific family the narrator finally does introduce. In other
words, Pride and Prejudice can also be seen as beginning with the introduc-
tion of one of its principal figures, only here that figure is a community.
One might think this a strange choice given the protagonist with whom we

From ELH 64, no. 2 (1997): 503­–535. © 1997 by the Johns Hopkins University Press.

113
114 William Deresiewicz

are to be concerned; of all of Austen’s heroines, surely the brilliant, exuber-

ant Elizabeth Bennett deserves star billing. But as one tends to forget in
retrospect—so thoroughly does her presence dominate the novel as a whole,
so large does her energy and brilliance bulk in one’s imagination—Elizabeth
is very far from being the center of attention in the early chapters, scarcely
mentioned at all until the third, not clearly emerging as the heroine until
the sixth. What is presented in these first scenes is more than anything the
story of a community: of communal expectations, communal conventions,
communal activities. These pressures drive Mrs. Bennet, and consequently
the rest of her family, into the actions that occupy the novel’s first chapters.
And in the most important of the early episodes, the assembly at which Mr.
Bingley and his friends make their debut in the neighborhood of Meryton
gentry, the community itself steps forward, through a kind of disembodied
collective consciousness, to engage in acts of observation and judgment that
set the course of the rest of the narrative. Elizabeth cannot appear until well
into this initial story because it is that story—the story of how a community
thinks, talks, exerts influence—that produces her plot, that produces her.
These considerations suggest a relationship between Elizabeth and her
community very different from that generally depicted in the critical litera-
ture. A host of readers have emphasized her individuality and imaginative
freedom, but in crucial ways she is not free and very little of an individualist,
ways in which her story must be seen, not as an exercise of freedom, but as an
effort to achieve freedom, not as a light-footed dance away from a community
that cannot contain her, but as a struggle to wake herself out of a community
in which she is all too comfortably embedded.3 From this point of view, Pride
and Prejudice can be seen as Austen’s most deliberate and sustained critique
of community—a constructive critique, since the novel ends by sketching an
alternative vision of communal life that corrects what has been shown to be
vicious and preserves what has been shown to cherishable in it. To trace these
processes through the narrative we should take Austen’s hint and look at the
community first, Elizabeth’s place within it only afterwards.

Cognition and the Single Woman

The essential respect in which the community of the novel shapes the lives
and characters of its members turns out to be the least obvious. The com-
munity, as one might expect, functions as a set of social activities and behav-
ioral norms, but it also functions as a set of cognitive processes, or in other
words, mental habits.4 Consider the content of the collective consciousness
implicitly present in the early chapters: “He was discovered to be proud,”
“His character was decided,” “ ‘Every body says that.’ ” Judgments such as
these reflect common values, but they first of all require the gathering and
transmitting of specific information: “a report soon followed,” “the report
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 115

which was in general circulation,” “Mrs. Long says that,” “Lady Lucas qui-
eted [Mrs. Bennet’s] fears a little by starting the idea of,” and on and on.
Only then comes the application: “the gentlemen pronounced,” “the ladies
declared.” Such informal circulation of information and opinion is the focus
of communal life. Even dancing seems a mere pretext; what matters is what
is assumed, learned, known, believed, communicated. “It is a truth univer-
sally acknowledged”: that is, it is a belief ensconced in “the minds of the
surrounding families.” The novel takes as its point of departure, not customs
or conventions, but cognitive processes. In particular, it begins by setting out
the kind of cognitive process that crucially characterizes the community’s
thinking, the deductive logic of the syllogism. As we might reformulate it:

All single men in possession of a good fortune must be in want

of a wife.
Mr. Bingley is a single man in possession of a good fortune
Mr. Bingley must be in want of a wife.

Our “universal truth,” “well fixed” as it is in the minds of the surround-

ing families, serves as the major premise, the starting-point of deduction. “The
feelings or views” of the single man in question—empirical evidence that may
be thought to bear on the issue—have no place in the process and are there-
fore discounted. And because they are discounted, there is no possibility that
they will modify the major premise. Without the countercheck of induction,
of fresh observation and reconsideration, conjecture crowns itself as certainty
(“must be”), and beliefs once accepted harden into “universal truths.”
A host of distortions, mainly rather comic, follows from this basic
blindness:

A report soon followed that Mr. Bingley was to bring twelve

ladies and seven gentlemen with him to the assembly. The girls
were grieved at such a large number of ladies, but were comforted
the day before the ball by hearing, that instead of twelve, he had
brought only six with him from London, his five sisters and a
cousin. And when the party entered the assembly room, it con-
sisted of only five altogether. (10)

The funniest thing about this passage is that Austen manages to write
“twelve ladies and seven gentlemen” with a straight face. But it is no surprise
that the initial report was so wildly off. The whole idea that Bingley had gone
to London to get a large party was simply invented by Lady Lucas on the
spot, this being the idea she “starts” in order to “quiet” Mrs. Bennet. Scrupu-
lousness of report is not a great concern in this community, nor is scrupulous-
116 William Deresiewicz

ness of observation. Darcy’s ten thousand a year leads the ladies to declare
that “he was much handsomer than Mr. Bingley,” but after the discovery of
his pride, “not all his estate in Derbyshire could . . . save him from having a
most forbidding, disagreeable countenance.” The few occasions upon which
the collective consciousness returns late in the novel show that the communi-
ty’s confidence in its judgment remains unshaken even when its conclusions
have been discredited. After Wickham elopes with Lydia, we learn that

All Meryton seemed striving to blacken the man, who, but

three months before, had been almost an angel of light. . . . Every
body declared that he was the wickedest young man in the world;
and every body began to find out, that they had always distrusted
the appearance of his goodness. (294)

Revisionism saves the community from an admission of error and what

seems an even greater threat, of uncertainty, but at the cost of subordinating
perception and reason to expediency, desire, and self-conceit.
These observations might seem fairly unimportant until one recog-
nizes how powerful are the community’s cognitive patterns to compel in-
dividual action. Induction is a slow and uncertain process; no wealth of
observation suffices to prove a general truth. But deduction is certain and
swift; it springs like a mousetrap. Given a certain belief about single men
in possession of good fortunes, the syllogistic mechanism need only be
baited with the proper morsel of cheese, a Charles Bingley, for it to slam
down on Mrs. Bennet and thus on her whole family. Syllogistic mousetraps
of this kind are scattered throughout the novel, mental reflexes waiting to
be triggered, waiting in turn to trigger reflexive behavior. The most impor-
tant concerns the age at which young women are eligible to be married.
That, after all, is the really fundamental “truth” underlying the action of
the first scenes, so anxiety-producing that it cannot even be spoken aloud.
Thus Mrs. Bennet:

“Mrs. Long says that Netherfield is taken by a young man of

large fortune from the north of England; that he came down on
Monday in a chaise and four to see the place, and was so much
delighted with it that he agreed with Mr. Morris immediately
that he is to take possession before Michaelmas, and some of his
servants are to be in the house by the end of next week.” (3)

“Monday . . . immediately . . . Michaelmas . . . the end of next week”:
there’s a clock ticking in Mrs. Bennet’s head, and it’s ticking very loudly. Time
to get the girls married. Mechanical thought produces mechanical behavior,
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 117

and communal life, like the universal truths of communal thought, remains
forever “well-fixed.”
Surely Elizabeth comes, when she comes, as the exception to all this.
A stile-jumper by conviction as well as instinct, she not only flouts conven-
tion, she holds it up for deliberate mockery. But does she exhibit the same
relationship to her community’s patterns of thought as she does to its norms
of behavior? She makes terrible blunders of judgment, yet don’t these also
proceed from her energy, freedom, and brilliance—her desire either to laugh
at everyone, as she would have it, or “willfully to misunderstand them” (58), as
Darcy believes? If anyone is unlikely to have her opinions dictated to her, one
would think, it is Elizabeth Bennet. Yet this is precisely what happens, and in
the most important of all instances. There is no more crucial judgment in the
novel than the one she makes about Darcy at the very start of their acquain-
tance. Pride, she decides: inexcusable, insufferable pride. The word becomes
the tonic note of the book, and the whole course of the heroes’ relationship
can be charted through the reorchestrations its meaning undergoes.5 Some
three hundred pages later, Elizabeth finds herself telling her father that Darcy
“has no improper pride” (376), and the novel is ready to come to rest on its
final, glorious harmony.
But how does Elizabeth come to make that pivotal judgment in the
first place? Quite simply, it is handed to her by her community. The move-
ment of the word “pride” through the narrative and into Elizabeth’s voice
and mind follows the course I just traced: from community to family to
individual. It begins as one of the judgments made by the collective con-
sciousness at the first assembly, the very first negative judgment rendered
against Darcy: “His manners gave a disgust which turned the tide of his
popularity; for he was discovered to be proud, to be above his company, and
above being pleased” (10). By the end of the evening, the opinion has hard-
ened: “His character was decided. He was the proudest, most disagreeable
man in the world.” Mrs. Bennet, we are given to understand, participates in
the formation of this opinion, but her feelings are couched in words such
as “dislike” and “resentment,” with no characterological judgment made. By
the next morning, however, she has ceded both authority and articulation
to the voice of her community: “ ‘every body says that he is ate up with
pride’ ” (19). She is talking here (chapter 5) to her daughters and the Miss
Lucases, and the word proceeds to circulate within this inlet of the com-
munal lake. Charlotte accepts the characterization, dissenting only as to its
moral valence: “ ‘His pride,’ said Miss Lucas, ‘does not offend me so much
as pride often does, because there is an excuse for it . . . he has a right to be
proud.’ ” Now and only now is the word taken up by Elizabeth: “ ‘That is very
true . . . and I could easily forgive his pride if he had not mortified mine.’ ”
Playing on Charlotte’s emphasis of the personal pronoun, she reverses the
118 William Deresiewicz

moral direction of her friend’s analysis with typical irony, but assimilates the
characterological assessment without a thought. Mary affirms the consensus
in her own way (“ ‘Pride . . . is a very common failing, I believe’ ”), but her
remarks serve mainly as a device to end the conversation, and the point of
the episode seems precisely to have been the introduction of the word “pride”
into Elizabeth’s head. Had Austen simply wished to show her making the
judgment herself, either at the moment of Darcy’s snub or afterwards, she
could have done so with a great deal less effort.
Even the feeling of “mortification” connected with the snub—at least
as important to Elizabeth’s subsequent behavior as is the judg-ment it-
self—is urged on her by her community. Elizabeth was certainly not
pleased with Darcy’s behavior at first, but neither was she much affected
by it: “Elizabeth remained with no cordial feelings towards him. She told
the story however with great spirit among her friends; for she had a lively,
playful disposition, which delighted in any thing ridiculous” (12). There is
a wide space between thinking something “ridiculous” and being “morti-
fied” by it, and if Elizabeth had been mortified at the time, as she certainly
is later, she would hardly have “told the story with great spirit among her
friends.” Indeed, when she and Jane discuss the ball that same night, Darcy
isn’t so much as mentioned, not even when the snobbery of Bingley’s sis-
ters is explicitly canvassed. As Mrs. Bennet perceives (“I beg you not to
put it into Lizzy’s head to be vexed by his ill treatment” [19]), Elizabeth’s
resentment arises in the course of that next morning’s conversation, when
she finds that her friends take the incident as a more serious affront than
she was at first inclined to do. In short, while Elizabeth herself sends the
story of Darcy’s snub out into the community, she gets her opinion and
feeling about it handed back to her.6
Elizabeth’s second important judgment in the early stages of the novel,
her delighted approval of George Wickham, is no less an act of unconscious
mental conformity. Here the conformity is not to an opinion, but to the very
way the community makes and maintains its opinions, that is, to the logical
pattern I analyzed above. Another syllogistic mousetrap snaps shut, and it
stays shut for twenty chapters. Elizabeth’s response to Wickham is encap-
sulated in a silent thought that occurs during their long conversation about
Darcy’s perfidy and pride. The subject has already rendered her indistinguish-
able from her mother (“ ‘He is not at all liked in Hertfordshire. Every body is
disgusted with his pride’ ” [78]), and at one point she exclaims:

“To treat in such a manner, the godson, the friend, the favourite
of his father!”—She could have added, “A young man too, like you,
whose very countenance may vouch for your being amiable.”
In other words:
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 119

All men of good countenance are amiable.

Wickham is a man of good countenance.
Wickham is amiable.

Not only is the logic the same, so is its grounding in desire. Elizabeth,
like her community, won’t let the facts stand in the way of what she wants
to believe. This is, of course, a well-attested observation in the critical litera-
ture; the modification I am making concerns the origin of Elizabeth’s “prej-
udice.” It may well be that most everyone in the world thinks this way—ex-
cessively syllogistic, insufficiently self-critical, blinded by desire—but had
Austen wished to make that point, she would have done so. The point she
does make is much more specific; Elizabeth is presented not as a typical
person, but as a typical member of her community. She assents to and helps
propagate collective judgments; she takes her opinions for universal truths;
witty as she is, she risks the same mental gridlock as those around her.
Darcy, the product of a different community, displays different shortcom-
ings. His errors are ones of behavior, not of thought.7 But Elizabeth, in one
of her least admirable moments, blurts out what could be the motto of all
the “good people of Meryton”: “ ‘I beg your pardon;—one knows exactly
what to think’ ” (86).
The intellectual fault that Elizabeth shares with her community can be
understood at its most basic level as an inability to deal with contradiction.
Much of Mrs. Bennet’s foolishness, and the humor of that foolishness, con-
sists of an inability to see the contradictions in her own thinking: “ ‘Well,
Lizzy . . . what is your opinion of this sad business of Jane’s? For my part, I
am determined never to speak of it again to anybody. I told my sister Phil-
ips so the other day’ ” (227). Mr. Bennet’s moral indolence is made possible
through the equivocations of irony: “ ‘I admire all three of my sons-in-law
highly . . . Wickham, perhaps, is my favorite, but I think I shall like your
husband quite as well as Jane’s’ ” (379). The tension between his disgust
for Wickham and the recognition that he is responsible for Wickham’s
presence in his family is resolved by the use of a single word, “admire,” to
name both itself and its opposite. But the leading exemplar of the desire to
evade contradiction is Elizabeth herself. The most telling examples occur
in dialogues with Jane and Charlotte, her two intimates. In one, Jane tries
to suggest that Darcy may not be as bad as Elizabeth has concluded (86).
In another, Charlotte simply wants her to understand that she, Charlotte,
believes that “happiness in marriage is entirely a matter of chance” and that
“it is better to know as little as possible of the defects of the person with
whom you are to pass your life” (23). In neither case does Elizabeth alter
her opinion even slightly, and in both she closes the exchange with an ar-
rogantly self-affirming gesture. The first we have already seen: “one knows
120 William Deresiewicz

exactly what to think.” The other is deaf even to the possibility of contradic-
tion: “You make me laugh Charlotte; but it is not sound. You know it is not
sound, and that you would never act in this way yourself.” It is no wonder
that she spends so much of the novel being surprised.
Finally, even for Elizabeth, cognitive inertia becomes behavioral and
emotional stasis. On the fundamental question that confronts her she is, for
all her rapid motion, as jammed stuck as her mother ever is. Replying to
Charlotte’s suggestion that a young woman should secure a man first and
then worry about falling in love, she says: “Your plan is a good one . . . where
nothing is in question but the desire of being well married; and if I were
determined to get a rich husband, or any husband, I dare say I should adopt
it” (22). “Or any husband”: like Richardson’s Clarissa, Elizabeth has forsworn
marriage. But though the gesture may have been conventional by this point,
Austen does not use it casually. Essentially reflexive, it carries for that very
reason a tone of utter finality. And although one may see it as nothing more
than a prop that allows Elizabeth to maintain her self-esteem until the right
man comes along, that observation points to the essential problem: the right
man comes along, yet Elizabeth remains stuck in her old pattern. A com-
placent consciousness is at war with unsettled feelings, but complacency is
winning. The process of breaking this pattern constitutes the burden of the
plot: the positive outcome is a foregone conclusion only in retrospect. At
this point, certain of what she knows and of what she wants, Elizabeth has
stopped questioning herself. She knows exactly what to think, and she knows
exactly how to act. She is, like her community, “well-fixed.”

The Pleasures of Density

I have so far been discussing the community as a homogenous totality,
but as illustrated by the group conversation of chapter 5, it also possesses
a complex internal environment that looks different to each character.
Elizabeth’s experience of the community is in large measure her experience
within the subgroup of Bennets and Lucases. The importance of such
groups is suggested by the remark that introduces that very conversation:
“That the Miss Lucases and the Miss Bennets should meet to talk over a
ball was absolutely necessary; and the morning after the assembly brought
the former to Longbourn to hear and to communicate” (18). While
“absolutely necessary” may exhibit, in its extravagance, a rainbow edge of
irony, the very fact that the characters think it absolutely necessary makes
it at least quite important. In fact, it is clear from the outset that something
more is happening than the mere exercise of sociability. The young women
get together not, as Lydia and Kitty do, to go out and hunt up officers,
but to “talk over”—to discuss and analyze. We may note, as the scene
unfolds, the game of one-upsmanship that Mrs. Bennet and Charlotte
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 121

Lucas play with each other, but even as this tussle progresses to its inevitably
inconclusive end, more fundamental purposes are being accomplished. A
consensus, as we saw above, is being formed about Darcy’s character;
whatever the individual women had thought about him going into the
conversation, each leaves knowing that he suffers from “pride.” But it
is also clear that none of them (except Mrs. Bennet) had much known
what she thought of him. The conversation serves to evoke, shape, and
strengthen their opinions. What is more, the clarification that takes place
involves both homogenization and differentiation: the characters disagree,
now that they come to think of it, over the significance of Darcy’s pride.
Yet if we examine the structure of the conversation more closely, we
discover, not a series of flat contradictions (we already know how poorly
the community deals with those), but the gradual shaping of a collective
understanding. It is less a debate than a kind of game, a game in which
one pivots one’s interlocutor’s statements in an unintended direction even
while seeming to agree with them. Mrs. Bennet’s contest with Charlotte
Lucas displays this pattern:

[Mrs. Bennet:] “If [Darcy] had been so very agreeable he would

have talked to Mrs. Long . . . I dare say he had heard somehow
that Mrs. Long does not keep a carriage, and had come to the ball
in a hack chaise.”

“I do not mind his not talking to Mrs. Long,” said Miss Lucas,
“but I wish he had danced with Eliza.” [In other words, “Yes, he
snubbed Mrs. Long as well, but that doesn’t make his treatment of
your daughter any less humiliating.”]

The group maintains cohesion through the manner in which it manages

conflict, allowing it expression within conventionalized bounds. A more im-
portant example, for it embodies real differences of opinion, is the exchange
we looked at above:

“His pride,” said Miss Lucas, “does not offend me so much as

pride often does, because there is an excuse for it . . . he has a right
to be proud.”

“That is very true,” replied Elizabeth, “and I could easily forgive

his pride if he had not mortified mine.”

It is a bit like the parlor game, sometimes used with adolescents to teach
positive social skills, in which participants collectively create a sentence by
122 William Deresiewicz

taking turns adding one word at a time. The sense of the conversation here
(like the sense of the sentence in the game) takes a new direction with each
contribution, but is at every point the sum of all previous contributions. In-
dividual expression occurs within collective expression; individual expressions
together create collective expression. At bottom, the implicit meaning of this
mode of conversation, as it is the implicit lesson of the game, is that every
voice is valid.8 The exceptions underscore the rule. Mrs. Bennet can flatly
contradict Jane when Jane quotes Miss Bingley (“I do not believe a word of
it, my dear”), not because Miss Bingley isn’t present (Mrs. Long’s testimony
is also introduced), but because she is outside of the community (at this point
in the novel) and thus merits no voice in shaping the discussion. Mary’s ut-
terance, as always, makes no attempt to play off or play with anything that
has already been said and thus has no effect on the conversation whatsoever,
except indeed to end it by breaking its momentum. What is going forward
is not about the kind of general truths Mary tries to enunciate, but about the
play of opinions—valued as opinions—around specific, local truths. That is
why the ultimate consensus is only partial and only implicit. What is achieved
is not unanimity and is not supposed to be, but a delicate interplay of conflict
and agreement.
One finds, then, that values differ within the group, albeit within limits,
and dif fer over what may be presumed to be an important matter. What does
not dif fer—what is actively made to be the same—is the perception of the
events upon which those values operate. The conversation has served to mark
the circle of common judgment and the permissible limits of difference, but
it has also performed a more basic cognitive function, for it has constituted
what will henceforth be in this group the official version of the events of that
night: what Mr. Darcy said to Mrs. Long, what Mr. Bingley said to Mr. Rob-
inson, and also, since this will undoubtedly become part of the story for Mrs.
Bennet and Charlotte Lucas (and Lady Lucas and Mrs. Long and so forth),
what Elizabeth thinks about what Mr. Darcy did. And even more simply, the
conversation has determined that “what happened” at the assembly will mean
those points and not others.9 (Compare the exhaustive account that Mrs.
Bennet had tried to give her husband the previous night [12–13].) Elizabeth’s
personal history is being made here, but in this community the making is col-
lective. That is why it is “absolutely necessary”—one may not want to take the
characterization quite so ironically any more—that the previous evening be
“talked over.” The phrase has a certain resonance: the assembly happens over
again, in talk.
The application of this episode to the whole of Elizabeth’s relationship
to her community is quite suggestive. We see, first of all, the great extent
to which her participation in that community helps constitute her sense of
reality. We see further how the community gives her a framework within
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 123

which to work out her responses to that reality. Most importantly for what
is to follow in the novel, we see how Elizabeth tends to place herself in rela-
tion to that community. That she is a mocker of convention is central to the
image she projects—such mockery is her main mode of discourse in group
situations—but what we find in this scene we find everywhere her ironic
detachment makes itself felt: she could not stand apart from the group were
she not standing firmly within it. She mocks convention in just such a way
as to affirm its necessity. Probably the most complex and interesting example
occurs at a decisive moment in her relationship with Darcy. Wickham has
already turned her against him, but she also already recognizes the possibil-
ity of finding him attractive. The two are dancing together in silence when
Elizabeth decides to begin conversation in a way so conventional that Austen
doesn’t even bother to report it directly:

She made some slight observation on the dance. He replied, and

was again silent. After a pause of some minutes she addressed him a
second time with “It is your turn to say something now, Mr. Darcy.—
I talked about the dance, and you ought to make some kind of remark
on the size of the room, or the number of couples.” (91)

Having attempted to use a convention for its proper purpose—to open

conversation during a dance—Elizabeth turns to a mocking exposure of both
convention and purpose in order to accomplish the exact same purpose. (It
works.) In this unusual case, where normal and “unconventional” use occur
in quick succession, we are able to see how similar they really are. Elizabeth’s
unconventional behavior is a way of including herself within the circle of
convention while still marking what she believes to be her superior imagina-
tive freedom. The fine structure of her wit tells the same story: playing with
other people’s language as she does means necessarily locating herself within
that language.10 In this light it is wholly unsurprising that she accepts the
word “pride” as her own; modification, not rejection, is her typical mode of
response. In a community that includes everyone by allowing each a slightly
different role, the role it allows her—but it is only a role—is that of the person
who is not fully included.
For all that can be discerned about the community in Pride and Prejudice
through the examination of specific situations and interactions, there remains
a certain ambient quality, a texture, that eludes such analysis and yet ought to
figure prominently in this or any account. This quality can be characterized,
I believe, as the sense of a saturated social environment, an environment in
which no space exists that is not social: a sense that at every point towards
which a character might turn she will encounter someone she recognizes and
with whom she shares all requisite codes of communication; that her every
124 William Deresiewicz

utterance will be met with substantial interest, as immediately touching upon

the concerns of the person to whom it is addressed; and most importantly,
that her every action will bear consequences for people to whom she feels,
and feels she ought to feel, significant responsibility. I will call this quality
“density,” in part to denote that it is an aesthetic, not a sociological artifact, a
feature not of the community as such but of its narrative representation.11 A
narrative is made dense, first of all, by the elimination of everything extrane-
ous to socially significant interaction. Austen’s novels were revolutionary in
this respect, and Pride and Prejudice the most extreme case among them.12
Both scenic description and general reflection--two of the major types of
material the novel’s capaciousness had allowed it to develop--are completely
absent from its pages. What is even more striking, privacy and introspection
are almost completely absent until Elizabeth departs for Hunsford. Within
the community, every act and utterance, every moment, is social, and Eliza-
beth, for all the force and color of her personality, possesses only an implicit
interiority. But density is not only a matter of what is left out. It also involves
the existence of “multiplex” social relationships--relationships in which indi-
viduals are connected in a plurality of ways.13 That is why we are able to find
it in a novel that takes place within a small and relatively stable community.
Charlotte Lucas is Elizabeth’s friend, but she is also her mother’s friend’s
daughter, and to a certain extent also her mother’s friend. Miss Bingley, while
she is part of the community, is Elizabeth’s friend, at least in theory, but she
is also her sister’s friend, as well as her sister’s love-interest’s sister. With mul-
tiplexity, the array of relationships within a community becomes something
more than a family tree or set of family trees, more than a single large circle,
more even than a network or web. It is not just that there are several short
paths that connect Elizabeth and Charlotte through other people, but that
when Elizabeth and Charlotte encounter each other directly they do so in
and through a multiplicity of relationships. They are tied together by mul-
tiple strands. And because custom dictates that all these relationships carry
the right and indeed the responsibility of comment and interference, what
we find, in sum, is a large group of people all minding each other’s business
and all passing each other’s secrets back and forth all the time. Everywhere a
member of the community looks, someone is related to her somehow and has
something to say to her about everyone else in her life.
Density involves communication—utterance and response—but it also
involves causation—action and consequence. In other words, density provides
the matrix of the novel’s plot. Two striking examples occur at crucial mo-
ments in the interweaving of the action, both in the ball scene of chapter 18,
the long episode in which Darcy is turned against the courtship of Jane and
Bingley, and Elizabeth, at a time when she seems to be softening towards
him, is turned ever more decidedly against Darcy. The first occurs when Sir
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 125

William Lucas happens to walk past Elizabeth and Darcy on his way through
the dancing set. Because he has already formed a connection to Darcy (dis-
own it though the latter might wish), he stops and bows. And because he has
always had connections to Elizabeth, he permits himself to make a reference,
in front of both of them, to the time after which “a certain desirable event,
my dear Miss Eliza, (glancing at her sister and Bingley,) shall take place” (92).
That is how Darcy is put on guard about the danger of his friend marrying
into a family of vulgarians, and that is how Sir William sets the fibers of his
community vibrating just by walking across the room.
A short time later, Miss Bingley more deliberately plays a disruptive
role: “So Miss Eliza, I hear you are quite delighted with George Wick-
ham!—Your sister has been talking to me about him . . . and I find that the
young man forgot to tell you” (94) and so on for a long paragraph of vitu-
perative snobbery about “old Wickham” and “the late Mr. Darcy” that turns
Elizabeth decisively against the whole Netherfield crowd. Even given Miss
Bingley’s disposition, only density—the possibility and expectation of com-
munication—could have allowed Jane to speak with her about Elizabeth’s
interest in Wickham in the first place, and only density—the right of in-
terference—could have justified her presumption in speaking to Elizabeth
about Darcy and Wickham’s relationship. If, as I noted above, the novel is
structured so as to suggest that its plot emerges from the threshing of com-
munal mechanisms more than from the movements of individual will, here
is one of the ways in which that emergence takes place. Chapter 18, which
began with Jane and Bingley in the fairest way to happiness and Elizabeth
and Darcy in a pretty steady way to indifference, ends with the first pair tak-
ing their last looks at each other for a long while, and the latter, as a direct
result, careening towards their decisive confrontations. What has ultimately
wrought these changes is not the acts of any individual or individuals, but
the fact of a dense interconnectivity among individuals.
Now all this may be well and good, but there are more important things
one can do in a conversation than communicate information. For instance,
one can flirt. Or at least, one can in an Austen novel, for what passes as the
talk of eligible young people in earlier works could hardly be dignified by that
name. Consider the case of Evelina, one of the novels often cited as a precur-
sor of Austen’s work. Sir Clement has such a tough time of it with the object
of his desires because he has no legitimate excuse for talking to her, as well as
nothing to talk to her about once he has obtruded himself on her attention.
The density of Austenian communities solves both of these problems at a
stroke, providing a young gentleman and a young lady both with many topics
of conversation—all the concerns of all the people they know in common—
and with many pretexts for conversation—all the ways they are already con-
nected other than as potential mates. Conversation may be serious or light-
126 William Deresiewicz

hearted, sententious or witty, but it need not be overtly personal, and so can
be easy and abundant. Under the cover of such talk, potential lovers can share
the sustained physical and social proximity that leads to familiarity and, pos-
sibly, to intimacy. As one might put it, the first parts of their bodies that touch
are their voices. Examples pervade the Austenian corpus: Emma and Frank,
Edmund and Mary, Anne and Captain Benwick, and in Pride and Prejudice,
Elizabeth and both Wickham and Colonel Fitzwilliam, the Darcy cousin she
meets at Rosings. For all the surface brilliance of so many of the conversations
these young people have, more important things get exchanged than words.
Because feelings need not be declared, they can be communicated.
The density of the communal environment also makes possible another
essential aspect of Austenian courtship. Not only does Austen show young
ladies talking freely with their young gentlemen, she shows them passing
judgment on them as well, and not only on their breeding or income, but also
on their character, intelligence, and education. This is a possibility that Fanny
Burney did not seem to have imagined. Of course, the making of such judg-
ments is central to Austen’s conception of the proper conduct of life—central
to her plots, central to her authorial stance—but how are they to get made in
the first place? Whether a Sir Clement negotiates the conventions of love-
talk well or ill, Evelina will learn nothing about him other than his ability to
negotiate the conventions of love-talk; they carry not even the pretense of
meaningful external reference. Though the plot of Evelina confirms Lord Or-
ville’s goodness, the heroine renders her rapturous approval immediately, and
on the exclusive basis of his breeding. True, we are intended to take breeding
as an index of character, but so facile and dubious a substitution is very far
from the mature and considered judgment Austen advances as essential. For
the Austenian heroine, flirtatious conversation provides the material upon
which such judgment can operate. In listening to a Wickham or a Frank or a
Wentworth speak about what is most important in their world—the conduct
of the people around them—a young lady has the opportunity to assess intel-
ligence, character, and judgment.14 The opportunity only: as these examples
indicate, several of Austen’s novels hinge on the fact that the heroine does not
always do so properly. But that she can do so at all is a function of the com-
munal environment in which she lives.
Judgment would be of little use to an Austenian heroine, however, did
she not have a genuine choice in marriage. It is a third remarkable feature of
Austenian courtship that young ladies do have such a choice, whatever pres-
sure they are sometimes placed under by the parental generation. In order
to exercise choice, however, a young lady needs room to maneuver. Again
the density of the communal context makes this possible. By creating non-
romantic premises for young men and women to develop familiar relation-
ships with one another—the many non-romantic forms of connection that
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 127

also and already exist between potential mates—the communal environment

enables those relationships to develop non-romantic dimensions. In other
words, the multiplexity of relationships in Austenian communities creates
the conditions for friendship between women and men. The point is not that
romantic interest is dissimulated—friendship is achieved between potential
mates not in spite of erotic energy, but because of it—but that a great deal of
space is opened up within relationships that is not marked as romantic. An
emotional investment can be made before a decision is required. A young
lady can feel affection for a young gentleman, and feel what it feels like, and
even discover whether it is requited, without taking irrevocable or poten-
tially embarrassing steps. Many other fictional heroines and heroes, before
Austen and after, do not have such freedom. Because romantic feeling is the
only form of affection their worlds make available between young men and
women, to indicate affection is already to declare romantic interest and, very
quickly, to commit oneself to a choice.15 (Tertius Lydgate learns this lesson in
Middlemarch.) I mentioned Colonel Fitzwilliam before because he provides
so unusual a case in fiction: a man who turns out to be neither Mr. Right nor
Mr. Wrong, neither Darcy nor Wickham, Lord Orville nor Sir Clement. He
is simply an appealing young man who walks briefly through the heroine’s
life, but not so briefly that she does not consider him as a serious romantic
possibility. He is interested in her, and Charlotte is interested for her; that
Elizabeth herself had been interested we learn only later, after the upheaval of
Darcy’s proposal (209). But before that proposal we see her coming to know
this Colonel Fitzwilliam, and coming to be friends with him, in a way that
enables her to test her feelings for him, judge him, and then consider what she
wants to do about him. What seems to happen between them, on both sides,
is a spreading of affectionate feelings along a continuum from eros to amity.
The exact status of the relationship is meanwhile held in suspension in a way
that would be unthinkable in other novels, where “maybe” simply doesn’t ex-
ist, and where the only possible delay—rather poor in both narrative and hu-
man interest—is the lag between a lady’s ritual “no” and her inevitable “yes.”
I am not suggesting that this is a situation without peril—Elizabeth has to
manage her conversation with Colonel Fitzwilliam rather skillfully at several
points—but it is one that enables them to advance to either form of resolu-
tion with relatively little pain and a relatively great degree of freedom. It is
also quite a lot of fun, and it is exactly the way in which courtship is managed
throughout Austen’s work.
By situating her novels within communities, then, Austen transforms
the process of courtship as she found it in her novelistic predecessors, making
it both more conscious and more emotionally profound and fitting it more
naturally into an array of other relationships. It is not too much to say that she
also transforms love as it was understood in the novel. No longer an ecstasy
128 William Deresiewicz

antithetical or at least unrelated to friendship, it becomes instead a form of

friendship.16 Indeed, it arises in the context of friendship, in the situations
I discussed as creating the opportunity for friendship. To Tobin Siebers’s in-
sight that Austen’s novels are about “the philosophical and conversational
play in which men and women engage in order to test and choose each other”
I am adding the observation that men and women in Austen’s novels develop
the affection that leads them to choose each other through that very philo-
sophical and conversational play.17 Affection (Austen’s preferred word) rises
on the wings of what I have been somewhat clumsily calling cognition. But in
Austen, of course, this kind of friendship—the friendship of playful, opinion-
ated conversation—is not confined to lovers. We have already watched it in
action in the group conversation of chapter 5, where cognition and affection
(albeit somewhat strained) are intertwined in playful, opinionated conversa-
tion. Such friendship might indeed be called “communal friendship,” for it
becomes possible when proximity and density act as the structural underpin-
nings of familiarity, ease, and common interest. It could thus hardly be more
different from the friendship idealized in the sentimental novels of Austen’s
day, with their conventions of instantaneous intimacy and, upon the young
heroines’ separation, a correspondence of sufficient avidity and detail to en-
gross three volumes. Austen made it abundantly clear what she thought of
such stuff. The ridicule of that kind of intimacy is prominent in the juvenilia
and continues into the published work.18 As for the convention of girlish
correspondence, what we find instead in Austen are false friendships exposed
by the neglect or mendacity of such correspondence: Catherine Morland and
Isabella Thorpe, Elinor Dashwood and Lucy Steele, Jane Bennet and Caro-
line Bingley, Fanny Price and Mary Crawford. For Austen, “closeness” neces-
sitates closeness. In her conception, the energies of friendship and romance
are not mutually exclusive, but deeply interfused.
Although I began by speaking of the ways in which Pride and Prejudice
criticizes the community it represents, it should be clear by now how power-
ful were the reasons for Austen’s evident attachment to communal life, how
rich in her conception were its satisfactions, embracing not only the social
connections one normally thinks of as communal, but also the stronger and
more intimate ones of friendship and love. With this in mind it becomes
clear that the social process I have been describing, the process of flirtation,
courtship, and betrothal, contains a rather bitter contradiction: that which
is depicted as sweetest about life within a community—friendship—and
that which is depicted as most glorious about it for a young woman—flirta-
tion and courtship—are the vehicles for removing her from it. Austen her-
self may be presumed to have felt this contradiction with particular sharp-
ness. Though as a young woman she was “the prettiest, silliest, most affected,
husband-hunting butterfly” Mrs. Mitford ever remembered, she finally chose
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 129

not to complete the logic of flirtation, not to allow marriage to remove her
from what we know to have been a large and loving family, a family that
seems to have possessed many of the qualities of an Austenian community.19
Instead, she chose to write novel after novel in which this fate was imagina-
tively averted, the contradiction that necessitated it, reconciled.20

Friendly Fire
It is the task and privilege of the Austenian heroine to make a new home for
herself in the world. In no case is this process more carefully elaborated than
in that of Elizabeth Bennet; in Pride and Prejudice, the story of maturation
and the story of the creation of a new community are one story. The terms
in which Elizabeth’s original community are presented—cognition and
courtship (in other words, reason and love)—turn out to be central to her
maturation. It is in her dealings with eligible men that Elizabeth is tripped
up by and finally fights herself free from the cognitive constraints of her
community, and it is through her love for one of those men that she begins
to establish a new and better community. I noted before that Austen’s nar-
rative structures give her young women the opportunity to exercise careful
judgment in the evaluation of a potential husband. Fanny Price exercises
such judgment relative to Henry Crawford, and we can infer that Anne
Eliot did so relative to Frederick Wentworth when they first courted. Emma
Woodhouse, however, is blinded by her egotism. What Elizabeth is blinded
by we already know: the cognitive faults of her community. Her encounter
with Wickham enables her to indulge those faults; her encounter with Darcy
at first frustrates and finally forces her to break free of them.
Elizabeth’s judgment is never worse than in her long flirtatious conver-
sation with Wickham in chapter 16, the conversation in which he charms her
and reinforces her opinions about Darcy. For all that she can play the gadfly,
let it once become clear that she will hear only what confirms her own judg-
ments, and she settles into a steady rhythm of assent. Nearly every one of her
utterances during the main part of the conversation begins with (and often
includes little more than) such affirmations as, “Indeed!”, “Good heavens!”,
“This is quite shocking!”, and “How strange! How abominable!”, matched on
Wickham’s side by such replies as “Yes—”, “Probably not” and “It is wonder-
ful” (79–81). Beyond this, her remarks mainly consist of questions or inter-
jections designed to cue further explanation and affirmation. The exchange
becomes a kind of a positive feedback loop, a conversational form of circular
reasoning (“Darcy is wicked, therefore he does wicked things, therefore he is
wicked”). It could hardly have been otherwise; two identical positions are not
likely to force each other to change. No wonder we are told, after the passages
reported directly, that Elizabeth and Wickham “continued talking together
with mutual satisfaction” (84). Austen quite clearly wishes us to understand
130 William Deresiewicz

that “mutual satisfaction” is not the feeling people ought to have in a con-
versation, mutual agreement not the logical structure a conversation ought
to have. Once again, Elizabeth is avoiding contradiction; though Wickham
doesn’t undermine her position, he does undermine his own, a fact she will
allow herself to recognize only many pages later:

She perfectly remembered everything that had passed in con-

versation between Wickham and herself, in their first evening at
Mr. Philip’s . . . She was now struck with the impropriety of such
communications to a stranger, and wondered it had escaped her
before. (206–7)

But we do not wonder. Elizabeth’s intellectual complacency does not

incline her to question what flatters her own opinion. The communal envi-
ronment, moreover, while it creates a familiarity that makes searching judg-
ment possible, also creates an intimacy that makes it undesirable. (Like Fanny
Price maintaining her resistance to Henry Crawford, an Austenian heroine
must be willing to ruffle a few feathers in order to win her creator’s approval.)
Recall how the “rule” of the group conversation in chapter 5 managed conflict
by smoothing it into a semblance of concord, as well as the manner in which
Charlotte allowed Elizabeth to mislead herself about her feelings towards
marriage. The more Elizabeth welcomes Wickham into her social circle, the
less likely is she to want to question what he says.
The causes of Elizabeth’s failure with Wickham help explain some of
the most significant elements of her encounter with Darcy in a fresh way. It
is necessary first of all that the man who disrupts the patterns of Elizabeth’s
life be unpleasant to the point of cussedness. No affability, and no concern for
social harmony, will prevent their conversations from being unrestrainedly
oppositional. More important than Darcy’s arrogance, however, even more
important than his intelligence, is his insistence on searching out the truth
of a situation. At times, in fact, he seems to mistake the drawing-room for a
very different setting:

“Allowing the case, however, to stand according to your repre-

sentation, you must remember, Miss Bennet, that the friend who is
supposed to require [Bingley’s] return to the house, and the delay
of his plan, has merely desired it, asked it without offering one
argument in favour of its propriety.” (50)

Austen seems to be deliberately evoking and affirming the epistemologi-

cal procedures of a courtroom, where contradictory positions are debated and
adjudicated rather than mitigated or dissembled. For Darcy, quite unlike the
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 131

good people of Meryton, there is no such thing as compromise and no such

thing as dropping the subject. His conversations with Elizabeth, particularly
those in which they engage during her stay at Netherfield, are fundamentally
different from the others we have seen. They are, in a word, arguments, as Darcy
readily admits when his host disrupts the longest of them with some good-
humored nonsense: “ ‘I see your design, Bingley,’ said his friend.—‘You dislike
an argument, and want to silence this’ ” (51). Bingley does indeed dislike them,
and he knows why he does, as well: “ ‘Arguments are too much like disputes.’ ”
The distinction that Bingley is having difficulty maintaining has by our time
almost completely disappeared, but the context (as well as the OED) suggests
that in the usage of the day the difference between an “argument” and a “dis-
pute” turned on the presence or absence of rancor. Bingley dislikes arguments
because he can’t distinguish between rational disagreement and personal en-
mity.21 Elizabeth has the identical problem. It is she who loses her poise, with
italicized flagrancy, at the conclusion of the final conversation at Netherfield.
Darcy has been reflecting on his own character:

“My temper would perhaps be called resentful—My good opin-

ion once lost is lost for ever.”

“That is a failing indeed!”—cried Elizabeth. “Implacable resent-

ment is a shade in a character. But you have chosen your fault well.
I really cannot laugh at it. You are safe from me.”
“There is, I believe, in every disposition a tendency to some
particular evil, a natural defect, which not even the best education
can overcome.”
“And your defect is a propensity to hate every body.”
“And yours,” he replied with a smile, “is willfully to misunder-
stand them.” (58)

The contrast with Elizabeth and Wickham’s “mutual satisfaction” could

hardly be more sharply drawn.
No wonder Elizabeth recoils. Neither social niceties nor the conventions
of intimacy nor her own wit or intellect enable her to eliminate the contradic-
tions Darcy presents. We see now why it takes his letter to break through her
resistance. First of all, there is the location of its delivery. Elizabeth, physically
outside of her community, is thus outside of it symbolically as well, beyond
the confines of its long bourn. But the symbolic dimension is grounded in the
social. Had Elizabeth been at home, we know by now how she would have re-
sponded both to the letter and to the conversations that surround it. She would
have “talked them over”: squared her position on them with her like-minded
intimates, resolving them into nothing threatening. But we don’t need to guess
132 William Deresiewicz

about this, because Elizabeth says as much once she is back at home with her
sister, pretending to lament how unhappy she had been “with no one to speak
to of what I felt, no Jane to comfort me and say that I had not been so very weak
and vain and nonsensical as I knew I had!” (226). Talking-over is replaced by
introspection when Elizabeth finds herself alone, which is also to say that when
she had not found herself alone it had forestalled introspection.
It is also essential that Darcy put his apologia in written form. Elizabeth
is forced to take its antithetical positions seriously. No longer can they remain
externalized, embodied in the person of an interlocutor whose rebuff can be
made to stand for their refutation. No longer can the words that express them
be driven back on themselves, turned, toyed with, punned into a new mean-
ing, pooh-poohed, or subjected to any of the countless other tactics permitted
by the fluidity and impalpability of conversation and by the demand that con-
versation places on any position to continue generating verbiage for itself. The
only way Elizabeth can defend herself against a written text is to choose not
to think about it, which is at first precisely what she does. But she cannot be
satisfied with this evasion, and when she examines the letter again, this time
with care, she must at last admit a contradictory voice into her own mind.
Yet while the setting deprives her of the social resources with which she has
heretofore resisted such voices, so too does it remove the social context that
made an intolerable humiliation the price of the failure of such resistance.
Even so, she begins her reconsideration with what is for her the least sensitive
question, Wickham’s reputation. But because her judgments on these matters
constitute a single fabric, they all unravel once she takes up Darcy’s argu-
ments at any point. Searching for evidence to refute his claims of Wickham’s
malevolence, she recognizes the nature of the observations on which she had
built her good opinion: “His countenance, voice, and manner, had established
him at once in possession of every virtue” (206). In other words, “all men of
good countenance are amiable.” Beyond that, “she could remember no more
substantial good about him than the general approbation of the neighbor-
hood”—that is, the approval of the voices of her community. The inductive
reexamination of deductive conclusions now enters its next phase. New ob-
servations having overthrown the major premise that was used to evaluate
the original ones (men of good countenance are clearly not all amiable), those
original ones are recalled for reevaluation: “She perfectly remembered every-
thing that had passed in conversation between Wickham and herself, in their
first evening at Mr. Philip’s . . . She was now struck with the impropriety of
such communications.” So begins a page-long bill of particulars, until: “Of
neither Darcy nor Wickham could she think, without feeling that she had
been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd.” Having thus turned against herself,
against what already begins to feel like her old self (“Till this moment, I never
knew myself ”), she can return to those issues—Jane and Bingley’s courtship,
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 133

Darcy’s proposal—in which she has a far greater personal stake. “Widely dif-
ferent was the effect of a second perusal.—How could she deny that credit
to his assertions, in one instance, which she had been obliged to give in the
other?” Darcy’s credibility, the conclusion of one line of reasoning, becomes
the major premise that governs these others. Elizabeth acknowledges “the
justice” both of his description of Jane as not apparently in love with Bingley
and of his “charge” of impropriety against the Bennet family, and the scene
ends as quickly as Austen can get the job done.22
The crisis has been reached and passed. Elizabeth returns twice more
to Longbourn, but no longer does she participate in those communal activi-
ties in which we had seen her so deeply and happily embedded: no dancing,
no visiting, no gossip. Ultimately this will be the result of a sense that she is
soon to relocate to Pemberley (where the reconciling movement begins, again
outside the confines of her community), but for a long time it simply marks
a profound alienation from her surroundings. The feeling is already there in
her first conversation with Jane. Evoking the name of her characteristic error
(and this time it is her name, her word), she indicates the communal origin
of that error, takes responsibility for having fostered it in herself, and finally
distances herself from both error and community:

“The misfortune of speaking with bitterness, is a most natural

consequence of the prejudices I have been encouraging . . . The
general prejudice against Mr. Darcy is so violent, that it would be
the death of half the good people in Meryton, to attempt to place
him in an amiable light.” (226)

A subtle instance of Elizabeth’s desire for separation, and of the com-

munity’s resistance to it, occurs late in the novel. Darcy has returned to the
neighborhood but is remaining frustratingly out of reach. When he accom-
panies Bingley to a party at Longbourn, Elizabeth hopes that the tea table
will finally provide a pretext for contact. But the ladies crowd too closely:

And on the gentlemen’s approaching, one of the girls moved

closer to her than ever, and said, in a whisper,

“The men shan’t come and part us, I am determined. We want

none of them; do we?” (341)

The girl’s anonymity is particularly striking (she is the only unnamed speak-
er in the novel); it is as if the voice of the communal consciousness heard so
strongly at the beginning of the novel had assumed bodily form and were
whispering in Elizabeth’s ear.
134 William Deresiewicz

Elizabeth has had to step outside of her community in order to mature

and fall in love, but the manner in which these processes take place remains
true to the principles elaborated in the novel’s presentation of communal
life. Once again, affection rises on the wings of cognition. Elizabeth learns
a new way of feeling just where she has learned a new way of seeing and
thinking and knowing. A biological metaphor is useful here: a new life,
Elizabeth’s new life, forms within her only after she has opened her mind to
Darcy’s antithetical voice. The neighborhood of Meryton, despite its dull-
ness, is not a sexless place; reproduction in the strictest sense of the term
(as represented, for example, by the courtship of Charlotte and Collins)
is perfectly capable of taking place there. What that community lacks is
something that we might call “sexiness”: that in sex which is exhilarating
and risky because it threatens uncontrollable change, the disruption or even
destruction of existing cognitive, psychological, and social structures. Left
to itself, the community will reproduce—itself. The creation of a Lydia by a
Mrs. Bennet—or an Elizabeth by a Mr. Bennet, for that matter—is a kind
of parthenogenesis, reproduction without variation. What is needed, in the
biological sphere, is a seed of difference; in the logical sphere, an antitheti-
cal proposition; in the sphere of individual psychology and social relations,
a challenge to frozen patterns of thinking and feeling. “Growth through
contradictions”—the principle Richard Simpson found to be central to
Austen’s artistic development—is also central to the stories she tells.23
In this novel, at least, contradiction can arrive only from outside the
community. There is a tendency in literary criticism, prominent especially in
discussions of the genre of comedy or the category of the comic, to think of
community as the place where divergent voices can encounter one another.24
We have seen at least one sense, embodied in chapter 5, in which this idea
is borne out by the novel, but we have also seen how the community acts to
shut out voices that diverge too much. Even so, that community is in other
ways indispensable to Elizabeth and Darcy’s courtship. Their conversations
at Netherfield, though by no means affectionate or even cordial, follow the
pattern of communal flirtation and ultimately accomplish its purpose. They
give Elizabeth a knowledge of Darcy’s intellect and probity that remains in
memory until such time as love calls it forth. They also create a degree of
intimacy even in the absence of affection. The word “closeness” is again apt
as a description of communal feelings; when proximity is unavoidable, inti-
macy and enmity cease to be incompatible. Finally, Elizabeth’s love for Darcy
crystallizes only after he has symbolically identified himself as a member of
her community. The man who lost his first chance for Elizabeth’s love by dis-
daining her “connections” now welcomes her uncle and aunt to his estate and
then, in an outright act of self-humiliation, becomes the agent for connecting
himself to those very connections.
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 135

These acts and symbols, however, have more to do with the novel’s sec-
ond community than with its first. Darcy is already helping to create, hop-
ing to create, that which he cannot yet know will come into being. The new
community quickens in the last chapter, Elizabeth and Darcy’s marriage at
its center, but the narrative swings towards that configuration throughout the
whole last third of the book. What resemblance does this new community
bear to the one already presented? If the first community is inadequate, what
does a good community look like? We are not given the chance to observe
the new community in anything like the detail in which we have observed
the old, but its character may be inferred from two sources: the last chapter,
which gives a précis of the new arrangements; and, because the lovers stand
at the center of the new community, what Elizabeth and Darcy do together
over the course of the last three chapters but one. What they do together,
not surprisingly, is talk. But how do their conversations compare to those
that took place in Meryton? Do the lovers find a medium between “mutual
satisfaction” and rancorous “dispute”? In fact, these conversations are argu-
ments—albeit mainly over which of the lovers has the right to claim the
greater share of blame in their past conflict—yet they are able to remain both
incisive and amicable through a complementary interplay between the very
qualities of character—Darcy’s insistence, Elizabeth’s wit—that once clashed
so irremediably:

[Darcy:] “I knew enough of your disposition to be certain, that,

had you been absolutely, irrevocably decided against me, you would
have acknowledged it to Lady Catherine, frankly and openly.”

Elizabeth coloured and laughed as she replied, “Yes, you know

enough of my frankness to believe me capable of that. After abus-
ing you so abominably to your face, I could have no scruple in
abusing you to all your relations.”

“What did you say of me, that I did not deserve? For, though
your accusations were ill-founded, formed on mistaken prem-
ises, my behavior to you at that time, had merited the severest
reproof.” (367)

The difference between this and Netherfield lies not in the weapons
used, but in their targets. Both Darcy and Elizabeth are even tougher on
themselves than they are on each other. Darcy’s protestations of guilt are
not merely attempts to win additional approval from his fiancée. They per-
sist throughout a long exchange, culminating in his rejection of Elizabeth’s
dictum that one should “think only of the past as its remembrance gives
136 William Deresiewicz

you pleasure.” As for Elizabeth, she may not believe quite all her self-
mockery, but with it she accomplishes several important things: she gives
Darcy the rhetorical and emotional space he needs to criticize her himself,
she enables herself to receive his criticism without humiliation, and she
enables Darcy to continue listening when he does again become the target
of her mockery:

“I must ask whether you were surprised [at Jane and Bingley’s
engagement]?” said Elizabeth.

“Not at all. When I went away, I felt that it would soon

happen.”

“That is to say, you had given your permission. I guessed as

much.” And though he exclaimed at the term, she found that it
had been pretty much the case. (370)

Even Darcy, for all his strenuous self-examination, cannot see himself
clearly without the help of Elizabeth’s eyes. He can recognize his errors, but
not his absurdities. Elizabeth is in even greater need of a loving critic; with-
out Darcy’s integrity, she might easily slip back into self-satisfaction (“think
only of the past as its remembrance gives you pleasure”). Neither can see
themselves without the other, and only together—in the back and forth of
critical conversation—can either progress towards greater understanding.
Love is pedagogic in all of Austen’s novels, Platonic in that sense, but only
in Pride and Prejudice do the lovers lead each other towards truth.25
There is some question, however, as to the nature of this truth and the
manner in which Elizabeth and Darcy progress towards it. Is it, in Austen’s
conception, a state of definitive knowledge—a right answer—or is it rather a
path along which one can progress but at whose terminus one never arrives? I
have already said enough to indicate that I share the second view.26 My belief
rests in part on the course of Elizabeth’s thinking during and after her great
recognition. She does not pass in an instant from total blindness to total in-
sight. There is self-deception even in her immediate response (“Till this mo-
ment, I never knew myself ”), a compensatory gesture that ought to be taken
in the same spirit as the end of Joyce’s “Araby”: too good an epiphany to be
true. What is more, the last chapters of the novel are replete both with fresh
errors on Elizabeth’s part and with the narrator’s ironic jibes at her supposed
self-knowledge:

Elizabeth walked out to recover her spirits; or in other words, to

dwell without interruption on those subjects that must deaden
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 137

them more. Mr. Darcy’s behavior astonished and vexed her.

“Teazing, teazing, man! I will think no more about him.”
Her resolution was for a short time involuntarily kept by the
approach of her sister. (339)

Austen sketches an arc of error and correction and error, an upward

curve of self-knowledge and maturation that we are meant to see as extend-
ing beyond the end of the novel. The work of thought is never done: second
impressions are only slightly better than first. One moves from a state of
ignorance to a state of slightly lesser ignorance. The only difference between
the later parts of the novel and the “afterwards” (385) it projects in its last
chapter is that Elizabeth will no longer have to do this work on her own. But
though she and Darcy educate each other, neither has access to any source of
certainty. I do not question that Austen believed that “variability is a function
of human perception and not a characteristic of truth itself,” but in this novel,
and indeed in all her novels, human perception is all we have.27 The best her
characters can do is to combine their individual perspectives. By the lov-
ers’ second conversation, Elizabeth herself recognizes the incipient dynamic:
“ ‘My good qualities are under your protection, and you are to exaggerate
them as much as possible; and, in return, it belongs to me to find occasions
for teazing and quarreling with you as often as may be’ ” (381). Deciphering
the inevitable irony, one reads Elizabeth’s recognition that she will receive no
empty flattery from her husband and her announcement that she will return
the favor in her own way. An ongoing “conversation” will avert the mental
inertia of the novel’s first community, averting too the mechanical behavior
that is the evil extreme of social order.28 One may read the crowning dec-
laration of Elizabeth’s final letter to her Aunt Gardiner in this light: “ ‘I am
happier even than Jane; she only smiles, I laugh’ ” (383). Laughter signifies
many things in this novel, but bliss is not one of them. Bliss belongs to Jane;
to Elizabeth belongs the blessing of awakened consciousness.
As we saw, the group conversation in chapter 5—the novel’s most
concentrated picture of communal interaction—accomplished several pur-
poses: it shaped perceptions, elicited judgments of value, and established a
collective sense of reality. I have just noted how Elizabeth and Darcy’s con-
versations accomplish the first of these purposes. As for the second, while
the cognitive component of judgment becomes more vigorously debated,
more open, than in Meryton, the evaluative component--the standards by
which what is known is judged--becomes less so. Pemberley is far less tol-
erant of vice and stupidity than Meryton is (Mrs. Bennet is made to feel
unwelcome; Wickham is excluded), and thus far less tolerant of differences
in values. The lovers’ conversations contain nothing equivalent to Elizabeth
and Charlotte’s unresolved disagreement over the excusability of Darcy’s
138 William Deresiewicz

pride or the proper attitude towards marriage. In this sense, the boundaries
of permissible dissent are far narrower than in Meryton, and it is not the
business of conversation to draw them. As for the third and most important
purpose enumerated above, by spending so much of their time discussing
the past, ascertaining its content and meaning, Elizabeth and Darcy to-
gether create the foundational myth of their marriage. The very fact that
they have two conversations in the final chapters helps to emphasize this: in
the first they write the basic plot of their common story, in the second they
begin to discuss it as an established thing. In Siebers’s terms, “recounting a
story does not necessarily bring an end to . . . conflict,” but it “may at least
give us a chance to find a place in the world.”29
But I have been avoiding what is the essential question about the novel’s
final configuration. What community? Is the novel’s final community Eliza-
beth and Darcy’s marriage (in which case it isn’t really a community at all)
or is it the larger group that includes that marriage? The only answer that
makes sense of all the available evidence is that it is both. To say so is already
to indicate that this final community has significant structural differences
from the one with which the novel began. It is not a community of people
all living in the same place. Austen has granted her heroine the privilege of
no longer having to live as a social equal among her intellectual (and now,
moral) inferiors. The group laid out in the final chapter is thus something of
an imagined community, while the marriage assumes many of the functions
of a community in the strict sense. As we have just seen, Elizabeth and Darcy
do properly what the community of Meryton could not do properly. But a
marriage can’t do everything. In particular, it cannot provide the multiplexity
of relationships so essential to the value of the novel’s first community. The
narrator’s envoi delineates such multiplexity with respect to the second. Jane,
Bingley, Georgiana Darcy, Kitty, Mr. Bennet, the Gardiners: all help to form
the array of relationships within which Elizabeth and Darcy will live. Where,
indeed, does the marriage end and this larger web begin? As the phrase that
concludes the penultimate chapter suggests—“their family party at Pember-
ley”—the distinction finally cannot be made. Elizabeth will be married to her
sister’s husband’s best friend, her surrogate daughter’s surrogate father, her
uncle’s shooting partner, and so forth. I return to the observation that love in
Austen is a form of friendship, and that friendship is an essentially communal
relation. It is often said that comic plots involve the reconciliation of com-
munal and erotic energies, the implication being that the two are necessarily
in tension. Austen goes beyond this; for her, the two are one. Friendship steps
in as the essential middle term, mediating between marriage and community
both as a social form and as a type of feeling, permitting the flow of energy
between all three, a single elemental energy that infuses all human bonding.
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 139

No t e s

1. Two begin with the heroine: Northanger Abbey and Emma, in each of which
she is the exclusive center of action. Two begin with the paterfamilias: Mansfield Park
and Persuasion, in each of which he is a dominating presence. Sense and Sensibility, a
partial exception, begins by naming a family, but the Dashwoods can be considered
as constituting a kind of collective protagonist.
2. Jane Austen, The Novels of Jane Austen, 3rd ed., ed. R. W. Chapman, 6
vols.(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1932), 2:3. Volume 2 is hereafter cited parentheti-
cally in the text by page.
3. Marvin Mudrick, for example, sees Elizabeth as the novel’s chief exem-
plar of “people with individuality and will” as against those “who are simply
reproductions of their social type” (Irony as Defense and Discovery [Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1952], 125). For Alastair Duckworth, Elizabeth represents
“individualism” as opposed to Darcy’s “tradition” (The Improvement of the Estate
[Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1971], 117). A more recent form of the
same position replaces the dichotomization of embodied abstractions (Elizabeth
at one pole) with the counterposition of Elizabeth to her community. For Tony
Tanner, “it is not at first clear that Elizabeth will consent to be contained within
the highly structured social space available to her” ( Jane Austen [Houndmills:
Macmillan, 1986], 135). To Rachel M. Brownstein, Elizabeth “scrutinizes the
world so as to assess it and to keep herself at a distance from it” (Becoming a Hero-
ine: Reading About Women in Novels [New York: Viking, 1982], 124). This view has
found its most magniloquent exponent in Harold Bloom, who sees Elizabeth as “a
heroine of the Protestant will” and as “incarnat[ing] the standard of measurement
in her cosmos” (introduction to Jane Austen, ed. Harold Bloom [New York: Chelsea
House, 1986], 11 and 5).
For other critics Elizabeth’s freedom is more intellectual than existential.
Appropriately, there has been much celebration of her intelligence and wit, but often
without sufficient attention to its limitations. And again, the terms of that celebra-
tion have commonly been such as to draw the strongest possible contrast between
Elizabeth’s mind and those that surround it. Dorothy van Ghent sets Elizabeth’s
“emotional intelligence and quickness of moral perception” against an “all-environ-
ing imbecility” (The English Novel: Form and Function [New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1953], 107). To D. W. Harding, Elizabeth, like Catherine Morland
and Elinor Dashwood, is a type of Cinderella, “isolated from those around her by
being more sensitive or of finer moral insight or sounder judgment” (“Regulated
Hatred: An Aspect of the Work of Jane Austen,” in Jane Austen: A Collection of Criti-
cal Essays, ed. Ian Watt [Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963], 173). More recent
critics have turned to the other side of the question, exploring the initial limitations
of thought and feeling that make Elizabeth’s story one of growth rather than of sim-
ple triumph, but persist in seeing the heroine, even with those limitations, as sharply
distinguished from those around her. Susan Morgan, while critiquing Elizabeth’s
freedom, still perforce asserts it and indeed characterizes it as “the freedom to think
for [one]self ” (“Intelligence in Pride and Prejudice,” in Pride and Prejudice, ed. Harold
Bloom [New York: Chelsea House, 1987], 85). My purpose here is not to replace one
form of unbalance with its opposite, to reinvent Elizabeth as a fool or automaton, but
to show that her apparent freedom and mental agility exist within more subtle and
more powerful structures of habit and conformity.
140 William Deresiewicz

4. Questions of knowledge and judgment in Pride and Prejudice have been ably
discussed by a number of critics using different approaches from the one I follow
here. Such discussion is sometimes couched in terms of the epistemology embodied
by the novel as a whole (for example, see Tanner), sometimes, as I have indicated, in
terms of Elizabeth’s own mental growth (see Morgan).
5. See Robert B. Heilman, “E pluribus unum: Parts and Whole in Pride and
Prejudice,” in Jane Austen: Bicentenary Essays, ed. John Halperin (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1975), 127-33.
6. The point touches upon one of the basic questions that arise in the read-
ing of the novel: does Darcy’s snub make Elizabeth genuinely hate him, or does it
provoke a kind of hating love, a burning need to win his esteem? Are Elizabeth’s
provocations at Netherfield and Rosings expressions of simple malice or of unwit-
ting desire? (For the latter position, see for example David Monaghan, “Pride
and Prejudice: Structure and Total Vision,” in Bloom, Pride and Prejudice, 61; and
Brownstein, 119. For the former, see for example Joseph Wiesenfarth, The Errand of
Form: An Assay of Jane Austen’s Art [New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1967], 63; and
Morgan, 88.) To a great extent these questions can never be put to rest--nor would
one want them to be, since they are of the type that tests a reader’s own conceptions.
If one sees banter, even fairly hostile banter, as a sign of desire, one will need no
additional proof in this case. But it is at least worth noting that the novel does not
afford such proof. In my view, Elizabeth does not love Darcy as long as she is under
misconceptions about him. Only when those are removed does she begin to realize
that “he was exactly the man, who, in disposition and talents, would most suit her.”
Before she can modify her feelings, in other words, she must correct the cognitions
upon which those feelings are based. Austen has not forgotten the deeper impulses
to which consciousness is tied, but neither does she believe that the line of deter-
mination runs in a single direction. Indeed, one of her highest and most persistent
themes is the conditioning of deeper impulses by consciousness. The point is worth
emphasizing precisely because the course of intellectual history since her time has
led to so strong a perception of the opposite process.
7. That is why the word “prejudice” appears so much less than its titular
partner. Because the narrative looks mainly through Elizabeth’s eyes, it sees Darcy’s
leading flaw much more than it does hers. “Prejudice” does crop up precisely when
Elizabeth examines her own character (Heilman, 126-27).
8. This does not mean, however, that every voice is equal, since verbal skill
counts. What also counts in this conversation, though not in the simpler and more
formalized game, are such non-verbal factors as age, decidedness, and the ability to
speak in the name of an outside authority, three factors that give Mrs. Bennet the
largest voice, the voice that introduces the word “pride.”
9. For a discussion of the ways in which novelists have portrayed gossip as
helping to create communal myth (more massively than in the episode discussed
here), see Patricia Meyers Spacks, Gossip (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985),
229-57. Spacks has illuminating things to say about the relationship of gossip and
communities throughout the later chapters of the book. For a discussion of the func-
tions of gossip in another of Jane Austen’s novels, see Casey Finch and Peter Bowen,
“’The Tittle-Tattle of Highbury’: Gossip and the Free Indirect Style in Emma,”
Representations 31 (1990): 1-18. Finch and Bowen insist on gossip as an exclusively
repressive force, as if the community constituted in and through it always existed
separate from and, as it were, above the individual upon which it fastened its gaze.
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 141

But as my descriptions indicate in the case of this community, at least, individuals

also gossip about themselves, thus participating in the formation of the narrative that
constitutes them. The Austenian community is typically small enough to permit a
dialectical interplay between individual and collective power.
10. The already-cited utterance from the end of chapter 5 is one example (“I
could easily forgive his pride if he had not mortified mine”), improving upon the
other moves in that “game” by exhibiting linguistic as well as logical concurrence.
Here as elsewhere, such banter involves a brilliant probing of the layers of social
feeling by means of language. In the space of a few words, Elizabeth allows Darcy
his pride, disallows it for its mortification of her feelings, then rounds on her own
criticism by admitting that those mortified feelings are the very ones that, in Darcy,
commit the mortification. Pride can injure only pride; to inveigh against pride is
thus to own the very vice one condemns. And yet it stings.
11. The danger with Austen is that one will confuse density with what might
be called “snugness,” or as Virginia Woolf put it, “that sense of security which gradu-
ally, delightfully, and completely overcomes us” as we read her (“How It Strikes a
Contemporary,” in The Common Reader [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1925], 238). This snug sense of security is a feeling that I believe many readers of
Austen (including this one) perceive and delight in, but that ultimately strikes me as
little more than nostalgic projection.
12. The difference between artistic representation and sociological description
is worth emphasizing. Emile Durkheim, in a perception analogous to the one I am
developing here, uses the phrase “dynamic or moral density” to describe the outcome
of the “drawing together” of individuals into “sufficient . . . contact with one another
to be able mutually to act and react on one another” (The Division of Labor in Society,
tr. W. D. Halls [New York: Macmillan, 1984], 201). But though the real-world
equivalent of a town such as Meryton was far less dense in Durkheim’s sense than
was the city of London in Fielding’s day, the social environment of Pride and Preju-
dice is far more dense in my terms than is that of the last third of Tom Jones.
13. The term comes from C. J. Calhoun, (“Community: Toward a Variable
Conceptualization for Comparative Research,” Social History 5 [1980], 118-19) who
proposes it as a constitutive feature of all real-world communities. Calhoun also
notes the moral implication I touched upon above: “The responsibility for meeting
the claims of one relationship is enforced by the other strands which also tie its par-
ties together. . . . Such ‘moral import’ forces people to look beyond the immediate
instrumental considerations which might otherwise determine their actions.”
14. My discussion here is indebted to Tobin Siebers, “Jane Austen and Comic
Virtue,” in Morals and Stories (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1992). In Siebers’s
words, “it is tempting to coin the term ‘courtship novels’ for [Austen’s] works because
they are about the philosophical and conversational play in which men and women
engage in order to test and choose each other” (138).
15. My discussion here is indebted to D. A. Miller’s analysis of flirtation in
Narrative and its Discontents (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), 21.
16. This observation appears in two of Austen’s most important nineteenth-
century critics, Walter Scott and Richard Simpson. Scott wrote, of Emma, that
“Cupid walks decorously, and with good discretion, bearing his torch under a lan-
thorn, instead of flourishing it around to set the house on fire” ( Jane Austen: The
Critical Heritage, ed. B. C. Southam, [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968],
67). His review concludes with an appeal to the novel-writers of Britain to restore
142 William Deresiewicz

to some of his ancient rights “that once powerful divinity, Cupid, king of gods and
men.” For Simpson, apparently more at home with Austen’s sensibility, “in her ideal
love was only an accident of friendship, friendship being the true light of life, while
love was often only a troublesome and flickering blaze which interrupted its equable
and soothing influence” (Southam, 246).
17. Siebers, 138.
18. See Marvin Mudrick’s discussion of the juvenilia, 1-36. In the novels, with
the shift from burlesque to irony, the ridicule becomes more subtle. The sentimental
position is undermined indirectly, by being placed in the mouth of a discreditable
character: in Sense and Sensibility, Marianne, in Pride and Prejudice, Lydia.
19. Quoted in Woolf, 137.
20. The solutions take a number of forms: multiple marriages that create a
community where none had been before (Northanger Abbey and Sense and Sensibil-
ity); an incest plot, in which marriage takes place within the original community
(Mansfield Park and Emma); or the establishment of a new community in place of an
unsatisfactory one (Pride and Prejudice and Persuasion).
It is worth noting that Jane Austen’s favorite activity--and the commu-
nal activity that appears most frequently in her work--also constitutes a symbolic
resolution of the contradiction between the community and the romantic couple.
In English country dancing, individuals dance simultaneously as part of a couple
and as part of a larger group, the row of couples referred to as a “set.” Each couple
makes its way down the set dancing the same four-person pattern, in turn, with
each other couple. These quartets thus resemble the groups that carry on so many
of the conversations we find in Austen’s novels. The iterated pattern often has the
two women of the quartet switching partners temporarily, a woman’s relationship
with each of the two men thereby suggesting, in different ways, the spreading of
erotic and amicable energies I discussed above. Indeed, it is sometimes the case that
the two women take hands during the iteration of the pattern, and likewise the
two men, just as one sometimes detects the presence of erotic energies in Austen’s
same-sex friendships. Finally, the practice of changing partners every two dances,
indicated several times in Austen’s novels (see, for example, Pride and Prejudice, 13),
parallels the process of courtship, providing the women intimate and easy--though
regulated and restrained--engagement with a series of young men. (See Kate Van
Winkle Keller and Genevieve Shimer, The Playford Ball: 103 Early English Country
Dances [Chicago: A Cappella-Chicago Review Press and Northampton, MA: The
Country Dance and Song Society, 1990].) One begins to understand where Austen
got her ideas.
21. The contrast between Darcy and Bingley thus typifies what a number
of thinkers have identified as the transition from the “public man” of the Enlight-
enment, who kept his feelings removed from the realm of civic discourse, to the
private, emotive individual of modernity, for whom every issue is personal. (See for
example Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press,
1958]; Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity [New York: Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich, 1974]; and Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man [New York: Knopf,
1977.]) In other words, though Austen may have been on Darcy’s side, history turned
out to be on his friend’s.
22. The quoted words indicate that Elizabeth’s language has picked up traces
of Darcy’s legalisms. The presence of such a discourse at this point in the text is
no idiosyncrasy. Northrop Frye, in a passage that helped guide my analysis here,
 Community and Cognition in Pride and Prejudice 143

notes that “the action of comedy . . . is not unlike the action of a lawsuit” and that
the “resemblance of the rhetoric of comedy to the rhetoric of jurisprudence has been
recognized from earliest times” (Anatomy of Criticism [Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1957], 166).
23. Southam, 243.
24. I am referring among other things to C. L. Barber’s work on Shakespear-
ean comedy as well as to M. M. Bakhtin’s ideas about heteroglossia, laughter, folk
literature, and much else.
25. The point, that love in Austen may be understood as Platonic, made first
by Simpson, 244, is revisited by Trilling, 76-77, and Tanner, 24.
26. For the first, see, for example, Duckworth and Stuart M. Tave, Some
Words of Jane Austen (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1973).
27. The quotation is from Duckworth, 125.
28. “Conversation” is Siebers’s word, 156.
29. Siebers, 157. My thinking on these points is also indebted to Karl Kroe-
ber, Retelling/Rereading: The Fate of Storytelling in Modern Times (New Brunswick:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1992).
 J O A LY S O N PA R K E R

Mansfield Park:
Dismantling Pemberley

The heroine’s friendship to be sought after by a young Woman in the

same Neighbourhood, of Talents & Shrewdness, with light eyes & a fair
skin, but having a considerable degree of Wit, Heroine shall shrink from
the acquaintance.
—Jane Austen, “Plan of a Novel” (MW 429)

The woman who has only been taught to please will soon find that her
charms are oblique sunbeams, and that they cannot have much effect
on her husband’s heart when they are seen every day, when the summer
is passed and gone. Will she then have sufficient native energy to look
into herself for comfort, and cultivate her dormant faculties? or is it not
more rational to expect that she will try to please other men, and, in the
emotions raised by the experience of new conquests, endeavour to forget
the mortifications her love or pride has received?
—Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Woman

If, indeed, women were mere outside form and face only, and if mind
made up no part of her composition, it would follow that a ballroom was
quite as appropriate a place for choosing a wife, as an exhibition room for
choosing a picture. . . .
—Hannah More, Stricture on the Modern System of Female Education

From The Author’s Inheritance: Henry Fielding, Jane Austen, and the Establishment of the
Novel, pp. 155–180, 217–220. © 1998 by Northern Illinois University Press.

145
146 Jo Alyson Parker

I n The Opposing Self, Lionel Trilling points out that “Fielding’s Amelia . . .
may be said to bear the same relation to Tom Jones that Mansfield Park bears
to Pride and Prejudice.”1 Trilling’s statement anticipates the intra-canonic,
trans-gendered, trans-generational connections that I have been making
throughout. I would add that Mansfield Park not only serves as the dark
counterpoint to Pride and Prejudice but also revises many of the themes and
motifs of Amelia. It explores the implications of the conduct-book heroine
ideal that Fielding’s final novel helped promulgate, addresses the issue of
adultery from a woman’s perspective, and problematizes the issue of moral
and literary authority in a patriarchal society.
Tom Jones and Amelia, its contrapuntal sequel, test various ways of reviv-
ing a moribund social structure, each with varying degrees of success. Seem-
ingly subversive in both content and presentation, Tom Jones comes to argue
for the recuperability of traditional forms through the incorporation of some-
thing new—the bastard Tom or the novel form. With its exemplary heroine
and its didactic tone, Amelia ostensibly puts forth a conservative agenda, but
this conservatism is straining at the seams.
Pride and Prejudice and Mansfield Park have a similar obverse relationship.
Like Tom Jones, Pride and Prejudice attempts to solve the problem of societal
decline through seemingly subversive means—the insertion of a woman into
the patriarchal plot of the reconstitution of the estate. But, as with Fielding’s
novel, Austen’s also falls back on the old verities; traditional forms may re-
quire the introduction of a new element but they are intrinsically good. To a
certain extent, just as Amelia appears at first as a sort of sequel to Tom Jones,
the opening setup in Mansfield Park speaks back to the conclusion of Pride
and Prejudice. Claudia Johnson notes that “The Bertrams end where Darcy
begins—with the family circle which Austen’s more attractive patricians learn
to outgrow.”2 But we might also say that the Bertrams begin where Darcy
ends—with the marriage of a proud and wealthy gentleman to a woman of
inferior social standing. Lady Bertram may not be an older avatar of Eliza-
beth Bennet; but Sir Thomas Bertram, like Darcy, is the quintessential patri-
arch—sober, authoritative, responsible—and Mansfield Park, like Pemberley,
is the repository of traditional values. The manor, in fact, provides the model
for proper social behavior, as Fanny Price’s wistful assessment makes clear:
“At Mansfield, no sounds of contention, no raised voices, no abrupt bursts, no
tread of violence was ever heard; all proceeded in a regular course of cheerful
orderliness; every body had their due importance; every body’s feelings were
consulted” (MP 391–92). The “cheerful orderliness,” the “due importance” of
everyone, the consultation of everyone’s feelings—such a description suggests
that this is a well-regulated world, its hierarchical structure balanced with an
almost democratic consideration of the wishes of all its members. But Fanny
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 147

deludes herself, seemingly forgetting the miserable experiences she has so

recently undergone there. As we see, the inhabitants of Mansfield Park often
pervert or ignore such values. Whereas Pride and Prejudice holds forth hope
for a renewal—an improvement—of the estate, Mansfield Park implicitly
qualifies such hope, calling such values into question even as it attempts to
assert their soundness.
The predominant features of Mansfield Park explicitly support tradi-
tional values. Fanny Price is an exemplary heroine, faithful to a hero who is
momentarily deflected from her steadfast love but finally cognizant of her
perfections. The resolution of the plot—wherein the constant Fanny gets her
man and the instigators of change are banished from Mansfield—validates
the argument for supporting the status quo.
However, the surface polemic of Austen’s novel is disturbed by an un-
derlying countercurrent of skepticism. Austen may explicitly sanction Fanny’s
good behavior, but as Fanny’s story shows, female exemplarity is an insidious
notion. The attributes of the exemplary woman—obedience to authority, self-
effacement, and silence—actually disable her from fulfilling her function of
providing proper moral guidance. The plot may resolve itself in a convention-
ally happy ending, but such happiness is built upon an underlying foundation
of misery. The very things that promise social reformation highlight the fis-
sures in society, fissures that have an implicit connection with the overarching
values of Austen’s time. Like Amelia, Mansfield Park reworks, recontextualizes,
and refutes the easy solutions of an earlier text.3
Yet Mansfield Park also calls into question several of the assumptions
underlying Amelia. Drawing on the motif of the beleaguered heroine, each
text attempts to revise the status quo and testifies to the difficulty of so doing.
Yet although Amelia demonstrates Fielding’s increasing doubt that society
can return to traditional values, it never questions the appropriateness of such
a return. By reworking Fielding’s material Austen calls such values into ques-
tion, however. She shows us the underside of Amelia-like exemplarity and
faults the overarching patriarchal structure that implicitly encourages behav-
ior leading to social breakdown.

Excellent Woman
From the outset, nobody has known what to make of Fanny Price. Austen’s
earliest readers were divided on the subject; one of her nieces, for example,
was “delighted with Fanny” while another “could not bear” her (“Opinions
of Mansfield Park,” MW 431, 432). Our own assessments of Mansfield Park
are, in fact, integrally related to our assessments of Fanny. Her perverse
integrity and her unprepossessing virtues prompt the ambivalence and dis-
satisfaction we feel in regard to the text as a whole. Nina Auerbach subtitles
an essay on Mansfield Park “Feeling as One Ought about Fanny Price”—a
148 Jo Alyson Parker

title suggestive of the quandary in which we find ourselves when confronted

with Austen’s least engaging heroine.4 Fanny’s sickliness, her voicelessness,
her rectitude put us off, especially in that she is wedged between Austen’s
two most lively heroines, Elizabeth Bennet and Emma Woodhouse.
Although Tony Tanner notes that “nobody falls in love with Fanny Price,”
he joins with Lionel Trilling in defending her, arguing that she is a typical
Christian heroine, thus subject to unwarranted antipathy on the part of the
more secular modern-day reader.5 Auerbach, on the other hand, seems to
regard Fanny’s connection with otherworldly realms as tending toward the
demonic rather than the angelic: Fanny is “a blighter of ceremonies and a
divider of families,” a vampire figure who “feasts secretly upon human vital-
ity in the dark.”6 Yet the problem lies not so much with Fanny’s conduct-
book character, off-putting as that may sometimes be. Rather, it lies with
the fact that Fanny’s story shows us how little is to be gained by maintaining
such a character.
Although the conduct-book heroine had thrived in the half-century
since Richardson and Fielding put forward their paragons, Jane Austen gener-
ally mocked it. Austen’s most memorable protagonists are not of the conduct-
book type but instead are lively, somewhat wrong-headed characters capable
of change and growth. They consistently transgress, or at least stretch, the
bounds of what is considered proper behavior for women. The texts we have
tended to favor, such as Pride and Prejudice, follow a bildungsroman structure;
the protagonist errs, faces up to her faults (generally at the instigation of the
male mentor), and undergoes a certain amount of development. Violations of
what is strictly proper lead in part to chastisement and self-recognition, cer-
tainly, but such violations also bring about positive outcomes—for example,
Elizabeth’s sassing of Lady Catherine makes Darcy aware of her love for
him. Furthermore, although each heroine may renounce a propensity toward
imaginative flights, none evidences a newfound desire to become a model
woman.7 Elizabeth Bennet persists in “her lively, sportive manner” of talking
to Darcy (PP 387–88); and Mr. Knightly marries Emma in part, we are to as-
sume, because she is “faultless in spite of her faults” (Em 433), that is, because
her very faults make her attractive in his eyes.
Fanny may not be Austen’s only conduct-book protagonist, but she is
the most insistently so. With her strict adherence to duty Elinor Dashwood
has affinities to the model, but she also has an acerbic, domineering quality
that keeps her out of the ranks of exemplary womanhood; her sister, Mari-
anne, has gotten all the allotment of tenderness that is essential for ideal-
ity. Anne Eliot, although she has often been regarded as an older version of
Fanny, explicitly questions the implications and consequences of her own du-
tifulness, which thus enables Austen to engage in a deliberate self-conscious
assessment of conduct-book behavior.
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 149

Fanny, however, is consistently exemplary, the text validating her as the

epitome of womanhood. She just about fulfills Edmund Bertram’s prescrip-
tion for “the perfect model of a woman” (MP 347)—and he only holds back
his full praise because he lacks the insight that has been granted his gentle
cousin. Henry Crawford describes her in terms that elevate her above the
common run of womankind: “She is exactly the woman to do away every
prejudice of such a man as the Admiral, for she is exactly such a woman as
he thinks does not exist in the world. She is the very impossibility he would
describe” (293). Such panegyrics come not only from Edmund and Henry
but also from the Austen narrator, the narrative voice thus lending authority
to a definition of womanhood that, because of our prior acquaintance with
Austen, we might otherwise suspect. The narrator continually sings Fanny’s
praises; she has “heroism of principle” (265) and a “delicacy of taste, of mind,
of feeling” (81) that we are told Mary Crawford lacks. Despite Mary’s attrac-
tiveness to readers, in the contest between her and Fanny the narrator always
weighs in on Fanny’s side, encouraging us to champion her, as is evidenced
by the epithet “my Fanny” (461), the phrase marking a brief, uncharacter-
istic return to the overtly authorial stance. Constant in her affections and
her principles, combining a melting tenderness with an adherence to what is
right, Fanny is represented as the most gendered of her gender according to
contemporary notions of femininity.
Fanny comes from a long line of model heroines, and by comparing her
with some of these we can begin to see how Austen attenuates the tradition.
Fanny’s forebears include not only Fielding’s happy homemaker Amelia, but
also the angelic martyr Clarissa and the noble-minded name-dropper Cecilia.
Like them Fanny is gentle and pious; she is the only one of Austen’s heroines
for whom a place of worship clearly means more than a gathering place for
village society, although Anne Eliot’s concern for her cousin’s traveling on
Sunday might indicate that she is equally pious. It is likely that when we pic-
ture Fanny, we think of her in her virginal white dress—“A woman can never
be too fine while she is all in white,” says Edmund (MP 222)—and her amber
cross, as if she were a little nun.
With regard to the piety of conduct-book heroines, we might reverse the
old cliché and say that behind every great woman is a great man. Often, the
exemplary heroine owes her moral authority to a male mentor who is a man
of the cloth. Amelia has her Dr. Harrison, Clarissa has her Dr. Lewen, Cecilia
her Dean, and Matilda (the heroine of the second half of Elizabeth Inchbald’s
A Simple Story) her priest Sandford. This configuration of church-sanctioned
female exemplarity is suggestive of what Jacques Donzelot calls the “ancient
complicity” operating “between the system of matrimonial exchanges—the
key to the old familial order—and the religious apparatus.”8 In effect, by hav-
ing the female exemplar authorized/authored by the clergy, the novels can
150 Jo Alyson Parker

provide a transcendental imperative for her behavior and thus mask how well
it serves secular interests. And Fanny is no exception. As with her sister hero-
ines, her mind has been “formed” by a clergyman (in this case, an aspiring
one): Edmund “recommended the books which charmed her leisure hours, he
encouraged her taste, and corrected her judgment; he made reading useful by
talking to her of what she had read, and heightened its attraction by judicious
praise” (MP 22). Fanny indeed outdoes her mentor, standing firm against
Henry Crawford while Edmund succumbs to the temptation of Crawford’s
sister.9 Overall, Austen locates the source of Fanny’s moral authority firmly
in a patriarchal structure.
To a certain extent, Fanny outdoes her sister heroines in exemplarity.
Lionel Trilling points out that, in creating her frail heroine, Austen was
following “the tradition which affirmed the peculiar sanctity of the sick, the
weak, and the dying.”10 Fanny must be on her way to sainthood—we hear
a litany of her ills, from headache to exhaustion to excessive sensitivity to
noise. Clarissa, after all, is fairly robust up until the time of the rape, and
Amelia seems to bounce back from her fainting fits with renewed vigor. We
should bear in mind that, as Mary Wollstonecraft had pointed out fifteen
years earlier, conduct books advise a woman to hide the fact that “she can
take more exercise than another” and that “she has a sound constitution.”11
Fanny’s illness thus goes hand in hand with ultra-femininity. Whereas
Amelia and Cecilia properly disdain putting themselves forward, Fanny ef-
faces herself to the point of disappearing altogether. She is not just quiet-
spoken (“an excellent thing in woman”), she is practically voiceless—the
sentence “Fanny coloured, and said nothing” (MP 225) epitomizes her be-
havior. When Sir Thomas attempts to gauge Fanny’s feelings toward Henry
Crawford, he realizes that she is a cipher to him: “She was always so gentle
and retiring, that her emotions were beyond his discrimination” (366). Pa-
mela, Clarissa, Amelia, and Cecilia make a few missteps, Clarissa indeed
stepping fatally outside her father’s walls and into the arms of her ravisher.
But Fanny makes no false moves. She understands the pernicious nature of
the theatricals, she correctly assesses the true character of the Crawfords,
and so forth. Overall, she is hyper-exemplary.
Yet, as the text demonstrates, pushed to its logical conclusion the
notion of the exemplary woman will show signs of strain, on the levels of
both symbol and plot. Clarissa’s physical disintegration after the rape sym-
bolizes her gradual transcendence to a higher plane where she will leave
earthly woes behind and, presumably, take her place among the angels.
Fanny’s illness, on the other hand, tends toward no heavenly elevation;
it leaves us instead with an idea of chronic enervation, suggestive of the
enervation of exemplars. If Fanny represents enduring values, such values
are sickened.
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 151

The implicit connection between Fanny and Lady Bertram bears out
this notion. I would not go so far as Gilbert and Gubar, who argue that Fanny
is “destined to become the next Lady Bertram, following the example of Sir
Thomas’s corpselike wife.”12 But there certainly are similarities between the
two. Fanny prefers Lady Bertram for female companionship: “She talked to
her, listened to her, read to her; and the tranquillity of such evenings, her
perfect security in such a tête-à-tête from any sounds of unkindness, was un-
speakably welcome to a mind which had seldom known a pause in its alarms
or embarrassments” (MP 35). Both Fanny and Lady Bertram depend on oth-
ers to articulate for them, although Fanny (unlike her indolent aunt) actually
has a thought or two to articulate. Both are fixed—Lady Bertram on her
couch, Fanny in her opinions. Fanny, of course, has a core of moral fiber that
Lady Bertram lacks, but the outward appearance is the same. Rather than
considering Fanny as the replacement for Lady Bertram, we might consider
Lady Bertram as the replacement for Fanny, a bloodless doppelgänger with
the form—though not substance—of the proper lady. This connection is sug-
gestive of the fact that hyper-exemplarity and hyper-insipidity can be easily
confused.
Fanny’s gentleness points to another area of strain in the notion of ex-
emplary womanhood. She cannot make herself understood. Henry Crawford
persists in his suit in part because Fanny is too ladylike in her refusals: “Her
manner was incurably gentle, and she was not aware of how much it con-
cealed the sternness of her purpose. Her diffidence, gratitude, and softness,
made every expression of indifference seem almost an effort of self-denial;
seem at least, to be giving nearly as much pain to herself as to him” (MP 327).
The very sweetness “which makes so essential a part of every woman’s worth
in the judgment of man” (294) renders her own judgment incapable of being
considered.
We have one anomalous instance of Fanny’s voicing opposition to the
match between herself and Crawford. In Pride and Prejudice Elizabeth’s rejec-
tion of Mr. Collins’s proposal provided Austen with an opportunity to expose
the plight of women forced to hear out the addresses of men they do not like.
Yet Austen leaves it to the generally taciturn Fanny rather than the loquacious
Elizabeth to articulate most fervently this plight. Fanny’s speech to Edmund
to this effect is, in fact, her longest speech in the text. Herein she protests
against the assumption that a woman must find a man acceptable because he
has found her so: “Let him have all the perfections in the world, I think it
ought not to he set down as certain, that a man must be acceptable to every
woman he may happen to like himself ” (MP 353). She questions a code of
sexual conduct that both prohibits a woman from having feelings for a man
until he has made clear he has feelings for her and then requires that the
woman reciprocate in kind: “How then was I to be—to be in love with him
152 Jo Alyson Parker

the moment he said he was with me?” (353). Fanny may generally conform to
conduct-book behavior, but she herein voices a sharp critique of the behav-
ioral absurdities to which women are expected to accede, a critique Austen
seems to agree with.13 It is significant that Edmund just does not get it: “My
dear, dear Fanny,” he tells her, “now I have the truth . . . the very circum-
stance of the novelty of Crawford’s addresses was against him” (353–54). He
lays claim to “the truth”—but by seizing on the notion of novelty he ignores
Fanny’s truth, that she does not and cannot love Henry. Fanny’s statement
that “we think very different of the nature of women” points to a rift between
female and male assessments of woman’s nature that even the seemingly en-
lightened Edmund cannot bridge and that the text brings to the fore with its
portrait of the conflicted Fanny.
Generally, however, Fanny “properly” lacks assertion and rhetorical force,
and as a consequence she is unacknowledged. When paragons undergo trials,
they usually have the dubious satisfaction of having their perfections recog-
nized. As Anna Howe writes Clarissa, in the first letter of the novel, “Every
eye, in short, is upon you with the expectation of an example.”14 Cecilia’s
excellencies are known far and wide, prompting the male paragon Delvile to
seek her out. Even the rivalrous Miss Mathews acknowledges that Amelia
is “a much better Woman” than herself, and Amelia’s husband, Booth, talks
of “the general Admiration which . . . pursued her, the Respect paid her by
Persons of the highest Rank” (Am 38, 66). Few sing Fanny’s praises, however.
Edmund and (later) Henry Crawford recognize her virtues, certainly, and
by the end of the novel her importance to the Mansfield residents has been
acknowledged. But no one says of her, as Anna Howe says of Clarissa, “She
was a wonderful creature from her infancy.”15 People are much more likely
to point out, as Mrs. Norris does, that her behavior “is very stupid indeed,
and shows a great want of genius and emulation” (MP 19). And although
Edmund discovers her virtues early on, not until he has undergone disap-
pointment and heartbreak does he “learn to prefer soft light eyes to sparkling
dark ones” (470). Sir Thomas eventually realizes that she is “the daughter that
he wanted” (472), but it is only his actual daughters’ transgressions that throw
his niece’s virtues into relief. Henry’s love is an odd one, spurred perhaps as
much by his desire for the unattainable as his recognition of Fanny’s excellen-
cies. Neither Mrs. Norris nor the Bertram daughters nor Fanny’s parents ever
recognize that they have a little paragon in their midst, and in the conclud-
ing pages Lady Bertram, after some initial resistance, soon comes to substi-
tute Susan for Fanny, even coming to find her “the most beloved of the two”
(472–73). So much for Fanny’s importance to Lady Bertram!
Readers themselves may have a hard time recognizing Fanny’s impor-
tance. Like Amelia, Fanny is somewhat of a hidden heroine. Granted, we
are in her mind pretty much from the outset of the novel. But, as the other
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 153

characters are active rather than passive, they take over the action and thus the
interest of the story. They often take over the narrative focus as well. In each of
her novels Austen shifts the focalization at times from her main character to
various subsidiary ones. In no other, however, does she so consistently explore
the motives and feelings of the other characters or give us so much access to
the minds of her villains. We receive vivid, emotionally charged accounts of
Mary Crawford’s fondness for Edmund and her disappointed hopes, of Julia’s
jealousy of her sister, of Maria’s humiliation at Henry’s defection. We end up
feeling that the other stories have potential. Mary certainly threatens to sup-
plant Fanny in the readers’ affections just as she supplants her in Edmund’s.
As has often been noted, she has the liveliness that makes Elizabeth Bennet
so endearing; “with her lively dark eye, clear brown complexion, and general
prettiness” (MP 44), Mary bears more than a passing resemblance to Eliza-
beth, whose “fine eyes” first attract Darcy and whose tanned complexion later
prompts his defense of her to Caroline Bingley. Fanny’s closest analogues in
Austen’s novels (besides Anne Eliot, who is a deepened, matured, more self-
aware version) are the shadowy secondary characters that occur in the texts
written before and after Mansfield Park—the two Janes, Bennet and Fairfax.
Both are sweet girls, forced to bear in silence a lover’s apparent defection.
With Fanny it is as if Austen tries to bring forward the kind of character she
is generally content to leave in the background—and then runs up against the
problem that a Rosencrantz can never have the impact of a Hamlet.
Ignored and unrecognized for what she is, Fanny virtually has no im-
pact. Richardson’s Pamela almost single-handedly reforms a corrupt squirar-
chy; Clarissa is highly influential in life and death; Cecilia’s noble example
prompts noble action on the part of others. Although Amelia cannot single-
handedly reform the corrupt society that surrounds her (Fielding also ac-
knowledging the fading power of exemplars, though for different purposes),
she does manage to provide important instruction to her children and, ulti-
mately, to inspire Booth and a small circle of friends. Moreover, throughout
the text that bears her name, Amelia functions consistently as the emblem for
good to which Booth must aspire. But Fanny is granted little or no capacity
for influence. She is unable to stop Maria Bertram from slipping around the
iron gate with Mr. Crawford, to bring order to the Portsmouth house, or to
dissuade Edmund from participating in the play and falling in love with the
improper Mary. The only significant influence she has is over her sister, Susan,
and rather than attempting to reform the Portsmouth residents the two sis-
ters retreat up the stairs to avoid “a great deal of the disturbance of the house”
(MP 398), just as the Mansfield residents retreat from the rest of society at
the end of the novel.
Fanny’s most significant failure is with Henry Crawford. Austen clearly
sets up a story that is meant to remind us of the “rake reformed” theme of
154 Jo Alyson Parker

Pamela. Henry sets out a net for Fanny, but he is caught in it himself. He
seems to be on the road to reformation—he recognizes her superiority to
other women, and he takes on the squirarchical duties he had previously ne-
glected. But, as Frank Bradbrook suggests, there is more than a little of a La-
clos influence in Mansfield Park, and Henry may be more of a Valmont than a
Mr. B., mouthing a reformation that has only partially taken hold.16 If Fanny
is indeed “the woman whom he had rationally, as well as passionately loved”
(MP 469), we must wonder at a passion that can be deflected by seeming
whim, and all the narrator’s explanations as to the faultiness of Henry’s edu-
cation do little to satisfy us. To a certain extent Henry’s love for Fanny seems
to have less to do with his growing appreciation of her virtues than with her
indifference to his suit: “it was a love which . . . made her affection appear of
greater consequence because it was withheld, and determined him to have
the glory, as well as the felicity, of forcing her to love him” (326). Henry
thus regards Fanny not so much as a person to be valued than as an object
to be conquered, and he pursues a course similar to that of the Noble Lord
in Amelia, who abandons a woman once he has seduced her. It is significant
that Henry turns his attention to the less-than-exemplary Maria when she
seems to offer greater resistance: “He must exert himself to subdue so proud
a display of resentment” (468). By thwarting our expectations that Fanny will
reform Henry and become his bride, Austen drives home the inadequacy of
the exemplary woman/reformed rake paradigm.
She seems here to have borrowed a leaf from Hannah More’s book.
Fifteen years prior More had scoffed at “that fatal and most indelicate, nay
gross maxim, that a reformed rake makes the best husband,” arguing that
it goes on the “preposterous supposition . . . that habitual vice creates recti-
tude of character, and that sin produces happiness.”17 In undermining the
maxim herself, Austen reinforces our sense of Fanny’s negligible capacity
for influence.
Indeed, whatever reformation occurs in Mansfield Park results not from
Fanny’s influence but from the bad experiences the characters undergo. Fan-
ny essentially wins Edmund’s affections by default, Mary’s weaknesses rather
than Fanny’s virtues leading him to transfer his affections to his gentle cousin.
Sir Thomas recognizes his folly only after Maria’s elopement. And it takes a
brush with death to make Tom Bertram a better man.
Not only is Fanny incapable of influencing the characters within the
text, but the representation of her is probably incapable of influencing those
who read the text. As Nancy Armstrong argues in Desire and Domestic Fic-
tion, the rising novel enabled a social agenda whereby “the female relinquish-
es political control to the male in order to acquire exclusive authority over
domestic life, emotions, taste, and morality.”18 In effect, the versions of fe-
male exemplarity that novels put forth were intended to provide a model for
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 155

feminine authority and to carve out its particular realm of influence—the

inculcation of values within the domestic sphere. Samuel Richardson, for
instance, made no bones about his didactic purposes. After listing Pamela’s
manifold virtues at the conclusion of the novel, he points out that they “Are
all so many signal instances of the excellency of her mind, which may make
her character worthy of the imitation of her sex” (Pam 509, emphasis mine).
More grandly, in his postscript to Clarissa, he explains that he intended the
novel to “inculcate upon the human mind, under the guise of an amusement,
the great lessons of Christianity,” specifically through making the reader de-
sire to emulate his saintly-heroine: “And who that are in earnest in their pro-
fession of Christianity but will rather envy than regret the triumphant death
of clarissa, whose piety from her early childhood, whose diffusive charity;
whose steady virtue; whose Christian humility; whose forgiving spirit; whose
meekness, whose resignation, heaven only could reward?”19 Fielding’s and
Burney’s heroines are also put forth as worthy of emulation. How worthwhile
can it be to emulate Fanny, however, if such emulation leads to naught? Imi-
tating Fanny would not give one the capacity to lead others to virtue, or so
Mansfield Park implies.
Moreover, imitating Fanny would mean resigning oneself to a painful
existence. Stories such as those of Pamela, Clarissa, Amelia, Miss Sidney Bid-
dulph, and Cecilia show us that the lot of the model woman is to suffer. After
all, if the protagonist’s exemplary character is fixed, the novel’s action cannot
depend upon self-revelation and internal growth but must instead depend
upon the external events that beset the heroine—preferably, events that en-
able her exemplarity to shine forth. Fanny ostensibly goes through no more
than her sisters in ideality.
Or does she? Her sister heroines at least can pride themselves on their
consciousness of their own virtue, but Fanny has no such salve. Pamela and
Clarissa, for example, know that they are right to resist the importunities of
their would-be seducers. Cecilia, in renouncing a secret marriage with Del-
vile, takes consolation in her own virtue, as the following passage indicates:

notwithstanding the sorrow she felt in apparently injuring the man

whom, in the whole world, she most wished to oblige, she yet found
a satisfaction in the sacrifice she had made, that recompensed her
for much of her sufferings and soothed her into something like
tranquillity; the true power of virtue she had scarce experienced
before, for she found it a resource against the cruelest dejection, and
a supporter in the bitterest disappointment.20

Compare the above with Austen’s description of Fanny’s feelings after

she has told Sir Thomas she cannot marry Henry Crawford:
156 Jo Alyson Parker

Her mind was all disorder. The past, present, future, every thing was
terrible. But her uncle’s anger gave her the severest pain of all. Selfish
and ungrateful! to have appeared so to him! She was miserable for
ever. She had no one to take her part, to counsel, or speak for her.
Her only friend was absent. He might have softened his father; but
all, perhaps all, would think her selfish and ungrateful. She might
have to endure the reproach again and again; she might hear it, or
see it, or know it to exist for ever in every connection about her. She
could not but feel some resentment against Mr. Crawford; yet, if he
really loved her, and were unhappy too!—it was all wretchedness
together. (MP 321)

Fanny is damned if she does and damned if she does not. She cannot act
without violating some prescription of proper feminine behavior. She may
see more clearly than Sir Thomas, but she may not derive consolation from
this fact.
The changes Austen rings on the term “duty” underscore the double
bind in which the model woman finds herself. For Fanny, duty consists of
sticking to her principles, as she acknowledges resignedly after that dreadful
interview with Sir Thomas: “she believed she had no right to wonder at the
line of conduct he pursued. He who had married a daughter to Mr. Rush-
worth. Romantic delicacy was certainly not to be expected from him. She
must do her duty, and trust that time might make her duty easier than it now
was” (MP 331). But only a few pages later Lady Bertram puts forward a dif-
ferent definition of duty with her reiteration of Sir Thomas’s view that Fanny
has an obligation to accept Henry: “And you must be aware, Fanny, that it is
every young woman’s duty to accept such a very unexceptionable offer” (333).
We have, of course, encountered a similar notion of female duty in an earlier
passage—and we might recall what fatal results attend it:

Being now in her twenty-first year, Maria Bertram was beginning

to think matrimony a duty; and as a marriage with Mr. Rushworth
would give her the enjoyment of a larger income than her father’s,
as well as ensure her the house in town, which was now a prime
object, it became, by the same rile of moral obligation, her evident
duty to marry Mr. Rushworth if she could. (38–39)

The contested meanings of “duty” underscore Austen’s point that the

model woman often must attempt to align what may be mutually exclusive
aims—the preservation of moral integrity and the attainment of wealth
and standing. Here we have no happy resolution as in Pride and Prejudice,
wherein Elizabeth manages to preserve her integrity and marry a man with
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 157

ten thousand pounds a year. (Charlotte Lucas’s situation, of course, hints at

the dilemma faced by Fanny.) Fanny’s conception of her “moral obligation”
is directly at odds with the Bertrams’.
By the end of the text the Bertrams will come to redefine duty, teaming
that Fanny’s conception of it really serves the family’s interests after all, but
in the meantime we are made privy to Fanny’s suffering as she struggles with
impossible demands. Indeed, she is unable to find a Cecilia-like tranquillity
until the end of the volume. Overall, few moments of pleasure relieve the
long scenes of torture that Fanny undergoes. Even her pleasures are riddled
with painful sensations: as she prepares for the ball given in her honor she
worries about whether to wear Mary’s or Edmund’s necklace and sighs over
Edmund’s profession of love for Mary; the welcome news of William’s pro-
motion is followed by Henry’s unwelcome proposal. Austen makes clear the
connection between Fanny’s feelings of oppression and her conduct-book
behavior. After refusing Henry’s proposal, Fanny dreads an encounter with
Mary, rightly fearing that Mary will bring up distressing issues. But Mary
need only appeal to Fanny’s notion of proper behavior:

She was determined to see Fanny alone, and therefore said to

her tolerably soon, in a low voice, “I must speak to you for a few
minutes somewhere;” words that Fanny felt all over her, in all her
pulses, and all her nerves. Denial was impossible. Her habits of
ready submission, on the contrary, made her almost instantly rise
and lead the way out of the room. She did it with wretched feelings,
but it was inevitable. (MP 357)

The intensity of Fanny’s emotions is played off against her almost automa-
ton-like behavior. As in the scene after her interview with Sir Thomas,
Fanny’s sense of propriety renders her miserable. No wonder that the text
gives us such oxymorons as “painful gratitude” (322); to be an exemplary
woman means to he beset with contradictory impulses.
Austen’s final disposition of her conduct-book protagonist is ambiva-
lent. Fanny does get the requisite happy ending that would seem to validate
her “womanly” behavior: she is married to Edmund; William is on his way
to naval glory; and Susan has supplanted her as Lady Bertram’s companion,
thus freeing Fanny of the guilt she might feel at not being able to make all
of the people happy all of the time. But we might bear in mind that Austen
rewards all her protagonists with a happy ending, and she gives us no indi-
cation that Elizabeth will stop teasing Darcy or that the imperious Emma
will be satisfied with any but “the best treatment.” Austen’s improper ladies
may briefly pay penance for their sins. The scene wherein Emma reproaches
herself after insulting Miss Bates, for example, may be one of the most emo-
158 Jo Alyson Parker

tionally charged in the Austen canon. The proper Fanny, however, continually
pays penance for sins she does not commit, essentially serving as a scape-
goat for society’s failures to regulate itself correctly. At one time, she evokes a
Griselda-figure, willing to humble herself for the sins of others: “Sir Thomas’s
look implied, ‘On your judgment, Edmund, I depended; what have you been
about?’—She knelt in spirit to her uncle, and her bosom swelled to utter, ‘Oh!
not to him. Look so to all the others, but not to him’ ” (MP 185). We must
assume that only Fanny’s habitual self-effacement keeps her from kneeling
in actuality. And, despite the uncharacteristic emphasis on religion, Austen
offers us no more suggestion that a heavenly reward awaits Fanny than she
does in regard to her other protagonists.
When Mrs. Norris—that mouthpiece for all that is awry in the social
structure—tells Fanny that she “must be the lowest and the last” (MP 221),
she may indeed be voicing the implicit agenda of a society that depends on
female submission. For the behavior that it prescribes for rendering women
“womanly” is that which calls for their obedience, their dependence, their
sense of their own inferiority. We might consider Fanny as exemplary to the
second power—as the exemplary case of the exemplary woman, allowing us
to see the consequences of the concept. The character of Fanny may stem
from Austen’s internalizations of society’s “should-be’s,” but the plot in which
she is inscribed may stem from Austen’s concurrent resistance to the plot of
feminizing women.

The Fall of the House of Mansfield

As in Amelia, the resolution of the plot overtly champions conservative
values but simultaneously problematizes them by the evidence put forward
in their support. Maria’s adulterous liaison with Henry flies in the face of
such values, but it also is the inevitable offshoot of an extreme version of
them. The reestablishment of spiritual principles in Mansfield, represented
by Fanny’s new role there, serves as an ostensible solution to the problems
besetting the estate, but Austen implicitly demonstrates that the solution
works on only a limited scale. 21
Soon after the Crawfords arrive in the Mansfield neighborhood, Mrs.
Grant optimistically predicts that “Mansfield shall cure you both—and
without any taking in. Stay with us and we will cure you” (MP 47). In a
world wherein Mansfield had maintained its emblematic significance as
a center of moral authority, such an outcome might be possible. Henry
would marry Fanny, renouncing his libertine ways and taking his squirar-
chical duties seriously. Mary would marry Edmund, learning like Eliza-
beth Bennet to use her wit as a corrective rather than destructive force.
Maria Bertram would console herself with high society. Aunt Norris, af-
ter her initial resentment had passed, would take credit for Fanny’s match,
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 159

becoming as obnoxious in her attentions to Fanny as she had been in her

snubs. Henry himself offers a view of an ideal community that might,
in other circumstances, have served Austen as a final line for the novel:
“ ‘Mansfield, Sotherton, Thornton Lacey,’ he continued, ‘what a society will
be comprised in those houses! And at Michaelmas, perhaps, a fourth may
be added, some small hunting-box in the vicinity of every thing so dear’ ”
(405). Such an outcome does not occur, of course, and the contrast between
Henry’s vision and the actual conclusion throws into relief the fissures run-
ning through the seemingly solid edifice of Mansfield Park.
Rather than finding a cure at Mansfield, the Crawfords infect—or at
least lower—the Bertrams’ resistance to disease. Although the taint of city
living may give the Crawfords a certain outsider status, essentially they are
insiders, members of the same class as the Bertrams and certainly more ac-
ceptable socially than the child of a lieutenant of Marines. Henry is, after all,
a landowner, responsible for the well-being of his tenants. In effect, the threat
to the gentry comes from within the gentry.
Such a threat has all the more force in that it cannot be easily discerned.
Despite Henry’s fears of being “taken in,” it is the Bertrams who are taken
in, blinded to the Crawfords’ moral bankruptcy by their attractiveness. Sir
Thomas regards both Crawfords as suitable matches for his own children; the
connection he envisions ends up, ironically, an illicit one. We might expect
Edmund—the only one of Austen’s clergymen with an actual vocation (with
the possible exception of Edward Ferrars)—to have the surest sense of the
threat posed by the Crawfords, but he becomes the particular friend of both.
Only Fanny, the silent observer, can assess the true implications of their ap-
parently innocent high-spirited behavior, and she has no voice with which to
alert the others.
The characterization of the Crawfords also blinds us—or at least de-
stabilizes our expectations. In Amelia Fielding eschews his usual practice
of succinctly summing up the characters when he introduces them, thus
often leaving us uncertain as to characters’ motives and dependent on fur-
ther revelations. Austen similarly keeps us off-balance. The Crawfords are
initially attractive to us as well as to the characters within the novel, and
for the most part Austen forgoes the sort of commentary that might give
us clear indications as to how we are to read them.22 If, as Q. D. Leavis
has argued, Mansfield Park is a revised version of Austen’s epistolary “Lady
Susan,” it subtilizes the blatant character revelations of the earlier work,
in which Lady Susan’s letters to Mrs. Johnson provide a clear illustration
of her character, and Mrs. Vernon’s suspicions of her seem fairly disinter-
ested.23 In Mansfield Park, however, our main clues come from the Craw-
fords’ speech and actions and Fanny’s unvoiced assessments. But we may be
inclined to read the Crawfords’ speech and actions as evidence of a proper
160 Jo Alyson Parker

lack of control rather than of villainy, and we may consider Fanny’s assess-
ments, when unseconded by the narrator’s validation, as somewhat skewed,
especially in light of her evident jealousy of Mary. Furthermore, the Craw-
fords’ genuinely kind acts mitigate their improprieties. Mary pays marked
attention to Fanny after one of Mrs. Norris’s particularly virulent barbs, and
Henry envisions that in making Fanny his wife he can elevate her from her
“dependent, helpless, friendless, neglected, forgotten” condition (MP 297).
Granted, their behavior (particularly Henry’s) often verges on the improper,
but the Crawfords appear redeemable.
After giving us an instance of misbehavior on the Crawfords’ part, Aus-
ten generally juxtaposes an instance of kindness. It is only in the very last
chapters of the novel that the scales tip irrevocably toward the bad. Mary’s
mercenary desire for Tom Bertram’s death, expressed in a self-serving letter
to Fanny, reveals a cold-bloodedness that is inexcusable according to Austen’s
worldview. Henry’s elopement with Maria Bertram is an egregious social
transgression, indicative of his overweening selfishness and heartless lack of
concern for consequences. But it may be that up until these particular occur-
rences, we expect—perhaps even hope—that Austen will allow each Craw-
ford an epiphanic moment of self-revelation and a subsequent reformation.
Unlike Austen’s other novels, wherein we can predict the eventual partners if
not what will bring them together, Mansfield Park offers several possible plot
paths, and the hypothetical resolution envisioned by Henry does not seem to
be completely out of the question.
The elopement of Henry and Maria marks the point at which characters
in the novel and readers of the novel must have done with the Crawfords.
The man who “so requited hospitality, so injured family peace” (MP 469) no
longer has a place in the Mansfield world. Despite Edmund’s high-minded-
ness, we might expect (as Fanny does) that his feelings for Mary would win
out over his elevated sense of propriety and that she at least would not have
the gates of Mansfield forever barred to her. But her plan to persuade Henry
to marry Maria implicates her in Henry’s crime, at least in Edmund’s eyes, as
he makes clear to Fanny:

but the manner in which she spoke of the crime itself, giving it
every reproach but the right, considering its ill consequences only as
they were to be braved or overborne by a deficiency of decency and
impudence in wrong; and, last of all, and above all, recommending
to us a compliance, a compromise, an acquiescence, in the
continuance of a sin, on the chance of a marriage which, thinking
as I now thought of her brother, should rather be prevented than
sought—all this together most grievously convinced me that I had
never understood her before. (458)
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 161

Mary’s attempt to unite the two transgressors in marriage might seem

to have a certain affinity to Darcy’s engineering of the wedding of Lydia and
Wickham. But an adulterous liaison is not recuperable, and there is no grate-
ful Elizabeth Bennet to thank Mary for her pains. Instead, Edmund regards
the suggestion as evidence of Mary’s duplicity: “How have I been deceived!
Equally in brother and sister deceived!” (495). To Edmund the woman who
can speak lightly of adultery is as culpable as the adulterer. Clearly, a proper
lady must condemn adultery, and Fanny’s “shudderings of horror” (41) mark
the correct response.
The Henry-and-Maria elopement marks both the point beyond which
the Crawfords can no longer be part of the Mansfield world and the point be-
yond which the Mansfield family unit cannot survive as a whole. In Pride and
Prejudice Mr. Bennet receives the unrepentant Lydia Wickham back into the
family circle. Sir Thomas, however, refuses to receive the abandoned Maria,
offering the following justification: “Maria had destroyed her own character,
and he would not by a vain attempt to restore what never could be restored,
be affording his sanction to vice, or in seeking to lessen its disgrace, be any-
wise accessary to introducing such misery in another man’s family, as he had
known himself ” (MP 465). No one, except the silly Mr. Collins, frets that
Lydia’s bad example may cause others to emulate her. Maria’s dissimilar fate
enables Austen to demonstrate that adultery signals an unassimilable infrac-
tion of the social code.
Although almost all of Austen’s novels touch on some sort of illicit sexu-
ality, none of these situations has the disruptive force—both within the story
and as a symbolic element—of the Henry-and-Maria elopement. Maria’s
marriage to Rushworth links the grand estate of Mansfield with one of the
largest estates and finest places in the country” (MP 38); it is “a connection
exactly of the right sort; in the same country, and the same interest” (40). If it
does not have the symbolic resonance of, say, Tom Jones’s marriage to Sophia
Western, the Bertram–Rushworth marriage nonetheless signifies a consoli-
dation of squirarchical power, property, and wealth, and it reaffirms the con-
tinuation of the status quo through propagation. Maria and Henry’s trans-
gression flies directly in the face of such values, for it essentially disregards
Rushworth’s rights to his own “property.” The potential threat of bastardy
lies at the margins of the text, symbolically reinforced by the fact that Maria
plays an unwed mother in Lover’s Vows. As in Amelia adultery undermines the
values that preserve the status quo, and adulterers cannot be reabsorbed into
the society that they threaten.24
By drawing on the adultery motif Austen introduces an undermin-
ing element not only into Mansfield Park but into Mansfield Park. Once
adultery has entered the world of the text, there can be no return to prior
assumptions about the appropriateness of the status quo, despite the text’s
162 Jo Alyson Parker

effort to establish this very point. As Tony Tanner suggests in Adultery in the
Novel, adultery is a disruptive force for the novel genre itself: “In confront-
ing the problems of marriage and adultery, the bourgeois novel finally has
to confront not only the provisionality of social laws and rules and struc-
tures but the provisionality of its own procedures and assumptions.”25 This
text’s focus on adultery is much more limited than that of the bourgeois
novels Tanner discusses or even that of Amelia, wherein adultery serves as
the central problem addressed. After all, the Henry-and-Maria elopement
takes place only within the last three chapters. Yet it is the crucial action of
the novel, effecting the final disposition of all the major characters. Too, as
with the bourgeois novels Tanner studies, the adultery motif in Mansfield
implicitly undermines the surety of the values the text expresses.
As in Amelia adultery serves as both cause and effect of social break-
down, a positive feedback loop dismantling traditional values. Sir Thomas
is the archetypal patriarch, perhaps the most formidable authority figure in
the Austen canon. In a novel ostensibly pushing traditional values, we might
expect that he would be their most staunch supporter. After all, despite his
overabundance of pride, Darcy fulfills his patriarchal duties: he saves both
Georgiana and Lydia from ruin, essentially preserving two households. Sir
Thomas, however, enables or encourages the tendencies that lead to the de-
struction of the household. Sir Thomas errs throughout in valuing appearance
over essence. Because his daughters have been educated in the surface ac-
complishments he is satisfied: “the Miss Bertrams continued to exercise their
memories, practise their duets, and grow tall and womanly; and their father
saw them becoming in person, manner, and accomplishments, every thing
that could satisfy his anxiety” (MP 20). However, as Sir Thomas discovers too
late, “with all the cost and care of an anxious and expensive education, he had
brought up his daughters, without their understanding their first duties, or
his being acquainted with their character and temper” (464–65). Making no
attempt to delve below appearance, Sir Thomas is willing to accept Maria’s
feigned professions of respect for Rushworth. Prizing a blind obedience to
the dictates of authority over a considered attempt to formulate right values,
he browbeats Fanny in order to make her accept Henry Crawford. His man-
ner authoritarian rather than authoritative, he prompts both Maria and Julia
to flee from the restrictions he imposes.26
Granted, by the final chapter, Sir Thomas realizes his errors, and we
must assume that he will be a better baronet in the future. But what is sig-
nificant is that, unlike Darcy, the highest representative of social order in the
novel facilitates, rather than quells, disorder. Nor do we have a sense that his
children can do much better. Sir Thomas’s heir has become, by the close of the
novel, “useful to his father, steady and quiet” (MP 462), but we are given no
instances of model behavior on Tom Bertram’s part. Edmund, the guardian
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 163

of Mansfield’s spiritual values, gets no opportunity actively to enforce them.

We have here no Darcy or Knightley to reassure us that, though flawed, the
patriarch will ultimately put things to rights.
The critique of patriarchal values in Mansfield Park at times echoes Mary
Wollstonecraft’s radical Vindication. In the following passage, Wollstonecraft
might as well be discussing Sir Thomas’s confusion of external accomplish-
ments with internal virtues, epitomized in the education he provides his
daughters: “Manners and morals are so nearly allied that they have often been
confounded; but, although the former should only be the natural reflection
of the latter, yet when various causes have produced factitious and corrupt
manners, which are very early caught, morality becomes an empty name.”27
When Wollstonecraft describes how woman’s lack of real power “gives birth
to cunning,” we may recall how the Bertram daughters learn “to repress their
spirits in [Sir Thomas’s] presence” (MP 463), their powerlessness before their
authoritarian father occasioning duplicity.28 Even Fanny, exemplary in her
powerlessness as well as in her virtue, may possess some share of this quality;
we can certainly see in her some evidence of the contemporary manifestation
of cunning—passive aggressive behavior. When things are not going as she
would like, she tends to fall ill or assume a martyr role, as in the following
passage wherein Fanny sulks at Edmund’s absence: “she thought it a very
bad exchange, and if Edmund were not there to mix the wine and water for
her, would rather go without it than not” (66). Finally, as the epigraph at the
outset of this chapter indicates, Wollstonecraft suggests that adultery itself
results from a system of female education that teaches women their only
object is to render themselves pleasing to men. Once trained in the art of
attracting men, women will continue to do so even after they are married,
a hypothesis confirmed by Maria’s actions. In Mansfield Park Austen gives
concrete representation to some of the arguments that Wollstonecraft makes
in Vindication.
But Austen is not here subjecting patriarchal values to a radical critique
à la Wollstonecraft. Some of the same sorts of concerns that Wollstonecraft
addresses are addressed by Hannah More in her Strictures on female educa-
tion. She too deals with the matrimonial difficulties of a woman who has
been taught only to attract and please: she will “escape to the exhibition room”
and put herself on display once more; she will be “exposed to the two-fold
temptation of being at once neglected by her husband, and exhibited as an
object of attraction to other men.”29 Thus, although Austen’s text has affini-
ties to Wollstonecraft’s, it has affinities to More’s as well, and although it is
tempting to regard Austen as putting forward a feminist agenda, we can just
as likely regard her as putting forward a feminine one—one wherein women’s
improvement is put in service of patriarchal values. The elevation of morals
over manners would sustain, rather than undermine, the authority of the Sir
164 Jo Alyson Parker

Thomas Bertrams of the land. Overall, Austen advocates not that traditional
values be overthrown but that they be strengthened or revived—thus seem-
ingly taking the same sort of conservative stance that we saw Fielding take
in Amelia.
For all its conservatism, however, Mansfield Park unlike Amelia im-
plicitly links societal breakdown to an overarching patriarchal structure.
Through the fates meted out to its female characters, the text exposes the
underside of a system that constrains and undermines women. Fielding
gives us the exemplary Amelia, cheerful and supportive in the face of her
husband’s adultery, unfounded accusations, and improvidence. He also gives
us transgressive female characters, such as Miss Mathews and Mrs. Atkin-
son, who are subject to ridicule and shown as deserving the fates they get.
Austen, on the other hand, shows us that the fate of the exemplary woman
is to suffer silently as she experiences the defection of the man she loves
and faces conflicting demands. Even Austen’s transgressive women are pre-
sented sympathetically. We are made aware that, however misguided they
are, Mary Crawford, Maria Bertram, and Julia Bertram have feelings that
may be wounded and manipulated. Mary does indeed care for Edmund, and
when all intercourse has come to an end between them she finds herself “in
need of the true kindness of her sister’s heart” (MP 469). Maria succumbs
to Henry’s “animated perseverance” (468) of her, and although his pursuit
of her is prompted by mere vanity, she is in love with him, hoping that he
will marry her. Maria’s act of adultery irrevocably destroys her reputation,
necessitating her banishment from England, but Henry’s will be forgiven,
as Austen dryly acknowledges: “That punishment, the public punishment
of disgrace, should in a just measure attend his share of the offence, is, we
know, not one of the barriers, which society gives to virtue” (468). The text
demonstrates the psychic toll that a patriarchal structure takes on women
even as it overtly argues in favor of its soundness.
In order for traditional values to be revived and sustained, Austen—like
Fielding in Amelia—emphasizes the important role played by religion. We
might recall that one of the first acts performed by the reformed Mr. B. in
Pamela is the reconsecration of the family chapel—a reconsecration symbolic
of Pamela’s accession to spiritual authority in Mr. B.’s household. Austen, too,
gives symbolic resonance to the motif of the family chapel, making an im-
plicit connection between the degeneration of the Rushworth family and the
unused chapel at Sotherton. Fanny considers the custom of family prayers a
vital part of the regulation of a great estate: “It was a valuable part of former
times. There is something in a chapel and chaplain so much in character with
a great house, with one’s ideas of what such a household should be!” (MP 85).
We are left with the sense that the continuance of such a custom may have
made Rushworth less foolish and his mother less vain. We are told too that
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 165

paying attention to religion might have saved the Bertram daughters from
disgrace: “they had never been properly taught to govern their inclinations
and tempers by that sense of duty which alone can suffice. They had been
instructed theoretically in their religion, but never required to bring it into
daily practice” (463). Religion it seems might provide the missing element
that would keep society on track.
As the clergyman son of a noble family Edmund would appear to pro-
vide a hope for the future. Attempting to justify his choice of profession to
Mary Crawford he prescribes the proper function of a clergyman, a prescrip-
tion to which he will no doubt adhere:

And with regard to their influencing public manners, Miss Crawford

must not misunderstand me, or suppose I mean to call them the
arbiters of good breeding, the regulators of refinement and courtesy,
the masters of the ceremonies of life. The manners I speak of might
rather be called conduct, perhaps, the result of good principles; the
effect, in short, of those doctrines which it is their duty to teach and
recommend; and it will, I believe, be every where found, that as the
clergy are, or are not what they ought to be, so are the rest of the
nation. (MP 93)

The proper clergyman as Edmund defines him could supply what is wanting
in the Bertram daughters, in the Crawfords, in the household at Sotherton,
in society at large.
Although the text gives us an optimistic glimpse of what that revitalized
society might be, it concurrently undermines the likelihood of such a society
occurring. In the world of Mansfield, Mary’s succinct comment that “A clergy-
man is nothing” (MP 92) seems more apt. During the discussion of the So-
therton chapel, Mary offers an astute—if tactless—rejoinder to Fanny’s notion
about the importance and efficacy of family prayers: “It must do the heads of
the family a great deal of good to force all the poor housemaids and footmen
to leave business and pleasure, and say their prayers here twice a day, while
they are inventing excuses themselves for staying away” (86–87). Fanny and
Edmund take umbrage at Mary’s remarks, Austen nudging us to identify with
their values. Yet the dialogic interchange undermines our surety that religion
ever did or could have the sort of regulatory power with which Edmund and
Fanny invest it. Mary’s high-spirited comment that “The young Mrs. Eleanors
and Mrs. Bridgers” had their “heads full of something very different—especially
if the poor chaplain were not worth looking at” compels us to consider that
reinstituting family prayers may simply lead to false piety (87).
Rather than influencing others to do well, Edmund tends to be influ-
enced by others to go against his principles. Granted, when he gives in to
166 Jo Alyson Parker

the others over the play, he is not yet ordained, but he clearly knows it is his
duty to dissuade, not succumb. Although by the close of the novel Edmund
has presumably become a proper shepherd to his flock, the only instance
we have of his pastoral influence is the guidance he gives Fanny during her
youth—and by the time of the actual story, teacher and pupil seem to have
changed places. The only other clergyman in the novel is Dr. Grant, who, as
Mary indecorously but accurately says, is “an indolent selfish bon vivant, who
must have his palate consulted in every thing, who will not stir a finger for
the convenience of any one, and who, moreover, if the cook makes a blunder,
is out of humour with his excellent wife” (MP 111). With Dr. Grant, Austen
gives us a picture of a bad clergyman in the tradition of Mr. Collins and Mr.
Elton, and we are compelled to wonder whether this picture is not more apt
than the one she gives us of Edmund Bertram. In any case, Austen does not
reassure us as to the corrective influence of the clergy.
Because Austen gives neither Crawford an internal moment of self-rev-
elation, we are left with the feeling that they will continue their thoughtless
ways. Certainly, we are told that they regret their past actions. Mary, after
all, is “long in finding” someone who can “put Edmund Bertram sufficiently
out of her head” (MP 469). But she nonetheless is “perfectly resolved against
ever attaching herself to a younger brother again”—a sign that she has not
renounced the mercenary interests that made her wish for Tom Bertram’s
death. Henry, we are told, ends up with “no small portion of vexation and
regret” (468). But as we get this information only in summary, we are divorced
from any emotional involvement; we do not get a sense of the potency of
Henry’s pain as we get, for example, from Willoughby’s anguished confession
to Elinor in Sense and Sensibility. In forgiving Henry, society will enable if not
encourage him to follow the course he has always followed.
Mansfield Park ends on an apparently happy note, like Amelia, but this
conclusion—similar to that of Fielding’s text—offers us little hope of societal
reformation. In the final pages we are told that Tom Bertram has become
“useful” and “steady”; Lady Bertram has found Susan to be an indispensable
companion; Sir Thomas has discovered “the daughter he wanted”; and most
important, Fanny and Edmund have been united in marriage. Tanner regards
this marriage as a positive outcome: “a marriage it is, and a celebratory one,
symbolising or suggesting more far-reaching reconciliations and restorations;
a paradigmatic marriage for society in a larger sense, which transcends per-
sonal gratifications.”30 But the conclusion of Mansfield Park is suggestive of
alienation and exclusion rather than of celebration and reconciliation. The
effects of adultery, like those of a stone thrown in a pond, spread beyond
the original incident, leaving havoc in their wake. Henry and Maria must be
expelled from the world of Mansfield because their action threatens social
breakdown. Despite their expulsion, however, social breakdown nevertheless
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 167

occurs. The adultery divides Edmund from Mary, the Grants and the Rush-
worths from the Bertrams, and the Bertrams from one another. Whereas the
ending of Pride and Prejudice allows all to join in the final celebration, this is
not the case with Mansfield Park. Even Lady Catherine, with all her arrogance
and bossiness, can finally be readmitted to Pemberley; Aunt Norris, on the
other hand, must die in exile.
Too, although clearly put forward as a happy event, the marriage of Ed-
mund and Fanny is nevertheless suggestive of social regression. Several recent
discussions of Mansfield Park have dealt with the troubling “incest” motif in
the novel, and I think that we cannot ignore its symbolic import.31 Cousin
marriage, though legally sanctioned, still manages to invoke the old incest
taboo. By continually referring to the consanguineous connection between
Fanny and Edmund, Austen ensures that we keep this thought before us. At
the end of the novel Fanny and Edmund are not “the married couple” but “the
married cousins” (MP 473), their kinship relationship seemingly more impor-
tant than their marital one. In his study of the connection between the incest
taboo and social structure, Talcott Parsons suggests that the taboo enables the
proper functioning of society: “it is essential that persons should be capable of
assuming roles which contribute to functions which no nuclear family is able
to perform, which involve the assumption of non-familial roles. Only if such
non-familial roles can be adequately staffed can a society function.” Without
the incest taboo there can be no “formation and maintenance of supra-famil-
ial bonds on which major economic, political and religious functions of the
society are dependent.”32 The happy ending for Fanny and Edmund is para-
digmatic of the ending of social intercourse. Mansfield may have its emblem-
atic function restored, but this function will not extend beyond its grounds.
We might playfully extend Austen’s story and envision a marriage between
Susan—“the stationary niece”—and the other Bertram son.33
What happens with the triangular romantic configurations in the nov-
el reinforces the motif of Mansfield Park closing in on itself. In Volume I
(wherein Fanny is not “out”) we have Mary Crawford and the two Bertram
brothers and Henry Crawford and the two Bertram sisters. Once Fanny has
entered the game the configurations shift, and their elements are reduced; the
triangles now consist of Mary-Edmund-Fanny and Edmund-Fanny-Henry.
By the novel’s conclusion only the two elements both triangles have in com-
mon—the cousins Fanny and Edmund—remain.
The final centering of Edmund and Fanny within the household
does indeed make clear that moral values have been restored to Mansfield
Park. As Tony Tanner points out, Fanny is “the true inheritor of Mansfield
Park.”34 Although Tom Bertram is the actual heir, Fanny and Edmund—
installed in the living on the estate—presumably inherit Sir Thomas’s moral
authority and hold out the promise that Mansfield Park may attain the ideal
168 Jo Alyson Parker

that Fanny envisioned while exiled to Portsmouth.35 As a good conduct-

book heroine, of course, Fanny will work behind the scenes in her domestic
realm, leaving to clergyman Edmund the active enforcement and modeling
of morality.
But such moral revitalization is achieved at what cost? The first line of
the final chapter has often been marked as signaling Austen’s desire to hurry
through the process of tying things up. What has not often been marked is
the statement’s irony. When Austen proclaims, “Let other pens dwell on guilt
and misery” (MP 461), we expect that she intends to have done with such
subjects. But rather than abandoning them she revels in them. The happy
ending is offset by language hammering us with reminders of the unhappy
events that have taken place, as the following somber litany, culled from the
final chapter, demonstrates:

guilt misery odious melancholy suffering disappointment regret sorry

sorrow misery self-reproach anguish evil grievous bitterly wretchedly
disappointment wretchedness hatred punishment misery despised
disappointments punishment punishment guilt mortified unhappy
reproach melancholy destroyed misery punishment evil bitter
danger evil irritation tormenting hurtful disappointment bitterness
dread horrors selfish guilt folly ruined cold-blooded coldness
repulsive mortified anger regretting punishment punishment
vexation regret vexation self-reproach regret wretchedness wound
alienate distressing regret disappointment apoplexy death regretting
anxious doubting sick poor hardship struggle death painful alarm.

No wonder we have trouble with Austen’s claim that “the happiness of the
married cousins must appear as secure as earthly happiness can be” (473).
Such a positive statement lays but a thin veneer over the negative terms
embedded within the chapter. In order “to complete the picture of good”
(the accession of Fanny and Edmund to the Mansfield living), “the death of
Dr. Grant” must occur, the happiness of the principles thus dependent upon
the misfortune of others (473).
This is not to say that we can ignore the strong argument in favor of tra-
ditional values that is presented in the novel. The happy ending that rewards
Fanny and Edmund ratifies the values they espouse. Although the Mansfield
community ends up reorganized in part, it nevertheless revolves around most
of its original members, the return to the status quo confirming the sound-
ness of things as they are. Moreover, the argument of Mansfield is quite in
keeping with views Austen expresses in a letter, which appeared soon after
the publication of the text, in which she gives her niece Fanny Knight advice
about a suitor:
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 169

And as to there being any objection from his Goodness, from the
danger of his becoming even Evangelical, I cannot admit that. I am
by no means convinced that we ought not all to be Evangelicals,
& am at least persuaded that they who are so from Reason and
Feeling, must be happiest & safest.—Do not be frightened from
the connection by your Brothers having most wit. Wisdom is better
than Wit, & in the long run will certainly have the laugh on her
side; & don’t be frightened by the idea of his acting more strictly
up to the precepts of the New Testament than others. (Letter 103,
LSC 410)

Wisdom does indeed seem to have the laugh on her side as Austen banishes
the Crawfords from the sacrosanct grounds of Mansfield and installs Fanny
and Edmund as guardians of the Old World order.
We, on the other hand, do not laugh. Not (as sometimes has been ar-
gued) because we are uncomfortable with an Austen who validates the status
quo. After all, she does pretty much the same thing in the beloved Pride and
Prejudice when she lets super-patriarch Darcy save the day. We are uncom-
fortable with an Austen who puts forward an argument in favor of tradition
but who presents evidence that makes another case entirely.
Mansfield Park (as does Amelia) poses a problem to its readers in that
the ideological conflicts are never satisfactorily resolved. Austen here em-
braces the traditional conduct-book heroine, a figure she had earlier ridiculed;
in doing so she ostensibly embraces the conduct-book novel. There is not,
as in the first inheritance plot in Pride and Prejudice, a direct confrontation
with the patriarchal system of estate settlement, not is there any sense that
the nontraditional woman may revitalize the estate. Whatever revitalization
Mansfield Park undergoes occurs because Fanny adheres to tradition, see-
ing more clearly than the patriarch how she can best serve him. If we regard
Mansfield Park simply as an exemplary conduct-book novel, then we can say
that Austen puts her authorial vocation in the service of a patriarchal literary
tradition, creating a model version of feminine behavior.
Like Amelia, however, Mansfield Park works against its own ostensible
aims. Austen speaks with a double voice, as she does in Pride and Prejudice,
and she subtly interweaves her championing of traditional values with her
critique of patriarchal institutions that define and deny women. Like Fanny,
Austen generally is eminently ladylike and proper in expressing her senti-
ments here. Yet, also like Fanny, she draws our attention to the vexed posi-
tion in which the exemplary woman finds herself. When Fanny, discussing
Henry’s proposal with Edmund, attempts to articulate the truth of a woman’s
experience she mirrors her creator, turning a perceptive eye to the ambiguities
of lived experience for women in her society. Austen may try her hand at the
170 Jo Alyson Parker

conduct-book novel of her predecessors, but she problematizes its didactic

tendencies and reveals, perhaps unwittingly, that this particular literary lin-
eage has come to an end.

No t e s

  1. Lionel Trilling, The Opposing Self: New Essays in Criticism, 214.

  2. Johnson, Women, Politics, and the Novel, 119.
  3. Austen’s “problem novel” has, not surprisingly, received a good deal of
critical attention over the last few decades—perhaps because it mitigates against
any facile assumption of a coherent political stance on Austen’s part. Mansfield Park
has divided the critics as to whether it espouses conservative or subversive values.
Duckworth has argued for its status as the paradigm text in the Austen canon—a
Burkean affirmation of “improvement” over “innovation” (Improvement of the Estate).
His chapter on Mansfield Park is the first chapter in a study that is otherwise ordered
chronologically. Butler, in War of Ideas, similarly argues for Austen’s essential con-
servatism, regarding Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park as exemplary. Said
makes a case for the text’s complicity in “imperialist expansion,” arguing that it is
“the most explicit in its ideological and moral affirmations of Austen’s novels” (Cul-
ture and Imperialism, 84). Johnson in Women, Politics, and the Novel makes her case
for a subversive Austen, arguing that Mansfield Park parodies conservative fiction
and puts forth a consistent argument about the hollowness of the gentry’s moral
pretensions. I might point out that to an earlier generation of Austen readers the
conservatism of Mansfield Park was taken as a given (and regarded as off-putting).
One of the most recent debates over the novel occurs in Whit Stillman’s witty film
Metropolitan, wherein the Fanny-like heroine defends the novel to the hero, who,
citing Lionel Trilling, calls it “notoriously bad” (Whit Stillman, writer and director,
Westerly Films, 1991).
  4. Nina Auerbach, Romantic Imprisonment: Women and Other Glorified Out-
casts, 22–37.
  5. Tanner, Jane Austen, 143, 156. See Trilling’s comments on Fanny as a
Christian heroine (The Opposing Self, 129). Andrew Wright defends Fanny on simi-
lar grounds in Jane Austen’s Novels: A Study in Structure (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1961), 124.
  6. Auerbach, Romantic Imprisonment, 25, 27.
  7. Gilbert and Gubar in Madwoman in the Attic argue that Austen’s heroines
are punished for their flights of imagination. None, however, end up adhering to a
standard of proper female behavior that the notion of punishment implies.
  8 .See Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families, 171.
  9. In his biography of Austen, Park Honan implies that the private theatricals
the Austen family enjoyed in 1787—wherein they were joined by their glamorous
cousin Eliza de Feuillide—may have provided a real-life instance of morally upright
young men succumbing to the charms of a worldly young woman: “it is probably true
that before the rehearsals of The Wonder were over, both James and Henry were in
love with [Eliza]. . . . [Henry’s] feeling for Eliza might have been predictable, but
his behavior was as unusual as James’s neglect of clerical decorum. Jane Austen’s
attitude to theatricals was not that of Fanny Price in Mansfield Park, but she did have
a chance to see how rehearsals mix with seduction” (Her Life, 50).
10. Trilling, The Opposing Self, 129.
 Mansfield Park: Dismantling Pemberley 171

11. Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 111–12.

12. Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic, 165.
13. This situation may be akin to the one Austen faced when Harris Wither
proposed—a proposal she initially accepted but then turned down. Honan suggests
that Austen probably had no idea she was the object of Wither’s affections until he
actually proposed: “nothing obviously had induced her to view him as a lover before
he spoke. Initial attraction, flirtation and a deep, particular concern develop within
a social world subject to intense social scrutiny, but neither she nor Cassandra nor
anyone else could have seen that happening in her relations with poor Harris” (Her
Life, 194).
14. Richardson, Clarissa, 40.
15. Ibid., 1466.
16. Bradbrook, Jane Austen and Her Predecessors, 123.
17. More, Strictures, 2:119. Spencer argues that “Jane Austen is deliberately
undercutting the complacent belief in the power of love to reform” (Rise of the Woman
Novelist, 174). Samuel Richardson himself turned the rake-reformed model on its head
with Lovelace in Clarissa, but his purpose was not to show the receding power of the
exemplary woman but the extraordinary fortitude with which she was possessed.
18. Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction, 41.
19. Richardson, Clarissa, 1495, 1498.
20. Frances Burney, Cecilia, or Memoirs of an Heiress, 585.
21. David Spring argues that “the theme of landed decay and crisis has
been taken to extremes” in interpretations of Mansfield Park: “It needs therefore
to be said again that the world of the rural elite was neither going bankrupt in the
early nineteenth century nor disintegrating spiritually and socially.” Although he
acknowledges that Austen might have “read the nature of her society differently
from the way we might,” he does not give that notion much credit (“Interpreters of
Jane Austen’s Social World,” 66–67). I would, however, argue that even if there were
no actual crisis, Austen perceived one, as the novels indicate.
22. In a letter to Cassandra, Austen noted that their brother Henry, who was
then reading Mansfield Park, “admires H. Crawford: I mean properly as a clever,
pleasant man” (Letter 92, LSC 377–78).
23. See Q. D. Leavis, “Jane Austen,” A Selection from “Scrutiny,” 2:1–80.
24. For Copeland it is not adultery but runaway consumption that poses the
greatest threat to the values of Mansfield Park (Women Writing about Money, 102–6).
Copeland notes, however, the connection between runaway consumption and sexual
transgression: “Consumer desire fuels the moral action of Mansfield Park, and sexual
desire is inextricably intertwined in the struggle” (102).
25. Tanner, Adultery in the Novel, 15.
26. Johnson provides a thorough account of the failures of Sir Thomas: “He
quiets but he does not quell lawlessness; his children tremble at the detection, rather
than the commission of wrongs” (Women, Politics, and the Novel, 97). Unlike John-
son, however, I do not find in Austen an overall rejection of the values for which Sir
Thomas stands.
27. Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 86. For an extended argument about Woll-
stonecraft’s influence on Austen, see Kirkham, Feminism and Fiction. Although I
think Kirkham exaggerates Austen’s feminist tendencies, the connections she makes
are provocative. For a discussion of Austen’s and Wollstonecraft’s methods of deal-
ing with constructions of femininity, see Poovey, The Proper Lady.
172 Jo Alyson Parker

28. Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 83.

29. More, Strictures, 2:163. Guest discusses the affinities between the con-
servative More and the radical Wollstonecraft in “The Dream of a Common
Language.” As Guest implies, women who were politically opposed could find a
common ground as they considered means for female improvement. Yet, as I suggest,
although the means may be the same, the ends are different.
30. Tanner, Jane Austen, 173.
31. Johnson regards the incest motif as reinforcing Austen’s critique of patri-
archy. See also Johanna M. Smith’s argument that the motif “demonstrate[s] the
constrictions of sister–brother love,” in “ ‘My Only Sister Now’: Incest in Mansfield
Park” (13). For an argument on the positive nature of the incestuous marriage see
Glenda A. Hudson, “Incestuous Relationships: Mansfield Park Revisited.”
32. Talcott Parsons, “The Incest Taboo in Relation to Social Structure,” 21, 19.
33. Marilyn Sachs notes that Mrs. Francis Brown’s 1930 Susan Price, or Reso-
lution, a sequel to Mansfield Park, features such a cousin marriage. See her essay
“The Sequels to Jane Austen’s Novels,” 375.
34. Tanner, Jane Austen, 157. Tanner discusses the main characters in Mans-
field Park in terms of “guardians,” “inheritors,” and “interlopers” (142–75).
35. Greene argues that in Mansfield Park, “Jane Austen comes as close as she
ever does to a thoroughgoing presentation of a Tory democracy” (“Jane Austen and
the Peerage,” 163). It is a Tory democracy that Fanny envisions.
 IVOR MORRIS

Colloquy

W hen Charlotte waylays Mr Collins in the lane by Lucas Lodge, she

is agreeably surprised by the amount of love and eloquence which awaits
her there. Everything is settled between them in as short a time as his long
speeches will permit. One assumes long-windedness, which is tiresome
on any occasion, to be specially inopportune in a proposal of marriage;
but Mr Darcy is scarcely brief as he sets about making his own declara-
tion. Elizabeth goes through a variety of emotions while he is speaking,
and upon anger supervening tries to ‘compose herself to answer him with
patience, when he should have done’. He seems to take a fair time.
If there was ever an excuse for prolixity, it belongs to the world of formal
manners and ostentatious display which Jane Austen knew. For hers was an
age of society’s predominance, when man was viewed primarily as a social
creature, and individuals were to be assessed in relation to their fellows, and
according to widely accepted notions of decorum. Conversation being an
acknowledged art, the judging of a person from the quality of his talk was if
anything more pertinent then than it is today. And the speeches of someone
like Mr Collins may be better appreciated in the light of other characteristic
utterances.
Human nature not having changed, there can be no surprise that vanity
is the chief motive in much of what is spoken. The choice examples in this

From Jane Austen and the Interplay of Character, pp. 68–87, 165. © 1987, 1999 by Ivor
Morris.

173
174 Ivor Morris

respect are provided by Robert Ferrars, whose conversation is simply a series

of harangues upon his own ability, knowledge and good taste. To impress Eli-
nor Dashwood with his excessive fondness for a cottage as a residence, he tells
her how he threw on the fire three plans of Bonomi which Lord Cartland
had brought to show him, in the act of advising that peer that a cottage was
the thing; or how the distraught Lady Elliot implored him to tell her how a
dance could be managed in such confined space, failing to discern what was
immediately obvious to him. The vaunt direct, in his hands, becomes a vehicle
of detraction. Having been diverted beyond measure by the thought of his
brother Edward living as an impecunious clergyman in a cramped parsonage,
he turns more seriously to causes. ‘Poor Edward!—His manners are certainly
not the happiest in nature.—But we are not all born, you know, with the
same powers—the same address.’ Even more felicitous is his accounting to his
mother for Edward’s gaucherie: ‘“My dear Madam,” I always say to her, “you
must make yourself easy. The evil is now irremediable, and it has been entirely
your own doing.”’ She should have sent him to Westminster, with himself,
instead of to Mr Pratt’s—and Mrs Ferrars, on hearing this, is ‘perfectly con-
vinced of her error’.
For such flights as these Mr Collins is too ponderous, and John Thorpe
too shallow. The latter’s vanity is capable only of the crude boast, for the ex-
ercise of which any subject is fitting. His equipage is the most complete of its
kind in England, his carriage the neatest, his horse the best goer and himself
the best coachman, holding the reins in peculiarly judicious style, and direct-
ing the whip with singular discernment and dexterity. His skills in selling
horses, racing, shooting and hunting are legendary; and he is able to discom-
pose General Tilney at billiards with what in all modesty he must confess
to Catherine was ‘one of the cleanest strokes that perhaps ever was made in
this world’. Here also, self-praise propagates disparagement. James Morland’s
gig is a little tittuppy thing without a sound piece of iron about it, the most
devilish little ricketty business ever beheld, able to be shaken to pieces at a
touch—though in the hands of a good driver like himself capable of being
driven to York and back without losing a nail. But the very worst of carriages
is, by Jane Austen’s invention, revealed as superior to almost any novel in ex-
istence. ‘Udolpho!’ Thorpe cries, upon Catherine’s asking him if he has read it.
‘Oh, Lord! not I; I never read novels; I have something else to do.’ With the
exception of Tom Jones, Lewis’s Monk and the writings of Mrs Radcliffe, he
affirms, they are ‘the stupidest things in creation’.
Less braggart in tone, naturally, and more dexterously applied, are the
speeches employed by more intelligent minds in the self-laudatory task. Isa-
bella Thorpe uses to advantage Catherine’s surprise at anything that is exorbi-
tant or questionable in her remarks. Scolding a man for not admiring the an-
gelically beautiful yet amazingly insipid Miss Andrews is thus the enactment
 Colloquy 175

of a principle of not loving people by halves, and being ready to do anything

for a friend; determination to dress so as to be noticed devolves from the
most maidenly rule of never minding what men say. And Catherine’s report
of Henry Tilney’s subdued behaviour in his father’s presence during her visit
to Milsom-street provides opportunity for her friend’s grandiloquent, ‘How
contemptible! Of all things in the world inconstancy is my aversion.’ This
concern to cut a figure is what we might expect in Isabella—but not in some-
one like General Tilney. Yet his purpose, and his method, are the same when
he advises Catherine that he cannot pay Henry a visit at Woodston on the
Tuesday. It is his club-day; his not attending would be taken amiss; ‘and it is
a rule with me, Miss Morland, never to give offence to any of my neighbours,
if a small sacrifice of time and attention can prevent it.’
Less subtle, but just as efficacious at the right moment, is the direct lay-
ing of claim to a particular quality. Mrs Norris’s declaring herself a woman
of few words and professions, as she begins persuading Sir Thomas to take
Fanny into his house, is the more awesome in its prognosticating a plethora
of both. Lady Catherine’s stated belief, at the diminished table at Rosings,
that no one feels the loss of friends as much as she does, is as commanding in
its way as her advising Elizabeth in the hermitage at Longbourn House that
her character has been celebrated for a sincerity and frankness from which,
at such a moment, she will not depart. No less impressive is her telling the
assembled company in her drawing room that she supposes few people in
England have more enjoyment of music or better taste than she, and that she
would have been a great proficient if she had ever learnt.
But a greater proficient even than Lady Catherine at establishing a per-
sona by boastful speech is Mrs Elton. She even outdoes her where music is
concerned in being dotingly fond of it and absolutely unable to do without it
as a necessity of life. It is one of the resources she is blessed with. Another is
her unfailing discernment of what is admirable: she has noted Jane Fairfax’s
shyness and reserve, and likes her the better for it, being ‘a great advocate for
timidity’ and also sure that one does not often meet with it. The quaint, old-
fashioned politeness of Mr Woodhouse delights her; she is often disgusted
by modern ease—and has, to boot, ‘a vast dislike to puppies’, and ‘quite a
horror of upstarts’. Sound as these views are, moreover, she has not rushed
into them. Mrs Elton is as concerned to affect a deliberating independence of
opinion as she is to publish the opinions themselves. Since she is one of those
who always make their own decisions, she tells Mr Weston, she will judge his
son as she finds him; and in announcing to the proud father her pleasure at
meeting Frank, adds for his further edification, ‘You may believe me. I never
compliment.’ Jane Fairfax’s accomplished performance at the pianoforte thus
will provoke, not enchantment, but instead the superbly meditative, ‘I do not
scruple to say that she plays extremely well.’
176 Ivor Morris

However, cogitation quickly fades when other means are called for.
Emma learns that adding Jane to the Elton household would not in the least
inconvenience its mistress, since her greatest danger perhaps in housekeeping
lies in doing too much and being careless of expense; finding Jane a situation
will likewise present no difficulty to one of her extensive circle of acquain-
tance. And the ladies whom Mr Weston bustles off to greet on their arrival at
the Crown are certain to be Miss Bates and Jane, because the Elton’s coach-
man and horses are so extremely expeditious: ‘I believe we drive faster than
anybody.’ The confidential boast can do much; but should it falter, a vicarious
distinction is to be gained through allusion to Maple Grove, the residence
of Mrs Elton’s brother Mr Suckling, who flies about amazingly to and from
London with four horses and his friend Mr Bragge. If Enscombe, the abode
of the Churchills, is the retired place Mr Weston says it is, then it must be
like Maple Grove, than which nothing can stand more retired from the road;
nor can it be the size of the room at Hartfield which impresses her so much
upon her first visit, but its astonishing likeness to the Maple Grove morning
room. However, any remaining pretence of discreetness or scruple is at an end
when the moment comes for adopting the tones of authority—at a point, for
example, where Mrs Weston can be told it will no longer be necessary for her
carriage to convey Jane and her aunt, or Emma is silenced with the smiling
assurance that only Surrey has ever been called the garden of England; or
with the abruptness of an, ‘Oh no; the meeting is certainly today’; or with the
claim of equality coolly implied in a, ‘My dear Miss Woodhouse, a vast deal
may be done by those who dare to act. You and I need not be afraid.’
Mrs Elton is supreme through the whole gamut of self-magnification,
including the use of the sententious to cover a weakness or inconsistency,
or camouflage a purpose. Her never playing despite her passion for music
is the result of a married woman having many things to demand her atten-
tion; and the natural taste for simplicity which gives her ‘quite a horror of
finery’ springs into existence upon the alarming thought that her dress may
be too plain and require a trimming. But she has a close rival in Isabella
Thorpe. What could be more affecting than this young lady’s plaint—which
she makes at finding Catherine Morland determined to keep her appoint-
ment with the Tilneys—upon the painfulness of being slighted for strangers
when one’s own affections are beyond the power of any thing to change?
Or her sentiment while Mr Morland’s consent to her engagement to James,
and his financial assistance, is awaited: ‘Had I command of millions, were I
mistress of the whole world, your brother would be my only choice’? Mrs
Norris, too, must here not be overlooked. Her professions, while more
homely, have charming appositeness. To shame Sir Thomas Bertram as he
hesitates over bringing Fanny into his household, she discovers that, though
far from faultless, she would rather deny herself life’s necessities than do an
 Colloquy 177

ungenerous thing. Upon the plan being announced later that she should take
Fanny at the White house, she becomes a poor, desolate, frail, low-spirited
widow; and Lady Bertram’s surprise at her resignation to living quite alone
cannot move someone who, by further rapid transformation, is fit for nothing
but solitude. This pitiable being is just able to live within her income, though
she would dearly like to lay a little by the end of the year; but her sister’s (for
her) energetic, ‘I dare say you will. You always do, don’t you?’ brings the pained
and saintly remonstrance, ‘My object, Lady Bertram, is to be of use to those
that come after me.’ De mortuis nil nisi bonum.

* * *

However much or little Mr Collins may be seen to indulge in these self-

glorifying arts and wiles, he will in any case clearly be outdone by other
adepts. There is, however, a class of conversation in which he is able to
take but small, if any, part, because of the lack of a questioning intelli-
gence—or, as some would doubtless have it, of intelligence itself. This is the
variety of lively talk among acquaintances which Mr Bingley’s circle would
approvingly term an ‘argument’, and which, if opinion threatened to be too
strongly urged, might develop into the kind of ‘dispute’ for which he had
no inclination. Of this nature are the many interesting and amusing discus-
sions which have endeared the novels through their analysis of motives and
their commentary on human ways and pleasures—like that in which Elinor
Dashwood confesses the many times she has mistaken people’s characters
by incautiously accepting what is said by others or themselves. These words,
seized upon by Marianne as disproving her sister’s tenet of subservience to
society’s judgments, are shown instead to clarify a position upon which the
novel itself is founded: ‘No, Marianne, never. My doctrine has never aimed
at subjection of the understanding. All I have ever attempted to influence
has been the behaviour.’ In her quiet way Elinor is as redoubtable as Eliza
Bennet. Edward Ferrars’s airy announcement next morning after his walk
to the village that he knows nothing of the picturesque brings upon him
her charge of having reacted against the affectations of would-be connois-
seurs by a personal affectation of indifference. He is rescued by Marianne’s
deploring the artistic jargon which has become so common; but he unrepen-
tantly holds his own, and confounds his deliverer, by stating a simple dislike
of ‘crooked, twisted, blasted trees’, ruined cottages, flourishing weeds and
rampant banditti—to Elinor’s great amusement.
This is his liveliest moment; and one is reminded by it of the somewhat
warmer interchange at Netherfield Park when Bingley modestly seeks to
account for his bad handwriting by saying his ideas flow so rapidly that he
has not time to express them. Elizabeth’s sardonic riposte that his humility
178 Ivor Morris

must disarm reproof brings into deployment the heavy artillery of Darcy’s
acumen: nothing is more deceitful, he declares, than that appearance of hu-
mility, which is often mere carelessness of opinion, and sometimes the in-
direct boast—which Bingley’s evident pride in his defects of writing shows
to be in question. The marshalling of forces proceeds with the inclusion of
Bingley’s professed likelihood, if he ever quitted Netherfield, of being away
within five minutes, and his readiness in principle to jump off his horse the
instant a friend requested that he stay another week. Hostilities commence
in earnest with a sharp skirmish between Elizabeth and Darcy on whether
it is admirable or culpable to yield easily to persuasion. The master of the
house is at pains to put a quick stop to the impending battle royal, and does
so by comically insisting that the hypothetical friend’s size and disposition
be taken into account.
Just as much as these sprightly and diverting colloquies, one enjoys the
gentler reasonings occasioned by the decencies of friendship and family life.
‘That is the happiest conversation,’ says Dr Johnson, ‘where there is no com-
petition, no vanity, but a calm quiet interchange of sentiments.’1 Of this kind
is the discussion that follows Jane Bennet’s engagement to Bingley, when, on
Jane’s happiness bursting forth in wishes for her sister, Elizabeth replies with
a profundity which takes the reader beyond the confines of the novel, ‘Till I
have your disposition, your goodness, I can never have your happiness’—and
then brings him back with her plea to be allowed to shift for herself until
another Mr Collins should come along. Or one recalls Mr Knightley and Mrs
Weston in conference upon their shared concern for Emma, and anxiously
wondering what will happen to her; or the youthful Catherine on the top of
Beechen Cliff, so full of love for Henry Tilney and of knowledge, newly ac-
quired in conversing with him, of foregrounds, second distances, sidescreens
and perspectives, as voluntarily to reject the whole city of Bath as unworthy
to make part of a landscape.
A variety of observation and sentiment arises with the communion of
minds. Some critics are little impressed with Fanny Price’s enthusiasms; but
we would not be without her regret at the absence of anything awful in the
chapel at Sotherton, and the discontinuance of the practice of regular prayers
in a great house. Memorable, too, is her pleasure when, finding Edmund con-
tinuing at the window with her, she speaks her feelings in gazing with him
at the stars: ‘Here’s harmony! Here’s repose! Here’s what may leave all paint-
ing and all music behind, and what poetry can only attempt to describe.’
The same emotion, and proximity to a loved one, moves Henry Crawford
to discourse on that something in the eloquence of the pulpit which is en-
titled to the highest respect. And it is the dawning of tenderness for both
Louisa and Henrietta Musgrove that inspires Captain Wentworth to record,
in rather different style displaying markedly less of reverence, the Admiralty’s
 Colloquy 179

entertaining themselves now and then with sending a few hundred men to
sea in an unseaworthy ship, and his own refined gallantry toward women
which is characterised by a refusal to have them aboard.

* * *

Romantic attachment is the cause, naturally enough, of a great deal of

conversation in the novels, the course of true love leading from instances
of positive acrimony to as near the endearments of the betrothed as Jane
Austen cares to take us. Some of the most entertaining, as well as informa-
tive, speeches come in the series of embroilments which breaks out as Mary
Crawford, walking with Edmund and Fanny, pictures the Mrs Eleanors
and Mrs Bridgets of former days starched up in seeming piety in Sotherton’s
chapel, their thoughts certainly not occupied with the chaplain who would
have been inferior even to the parsons of the present. Her comment provokes
discussion as to whether private prayer, being easier, is preferable to prayer in
public. Edmund’s dictum that a mind which will not struggle against itself
under one set of circumstances is unlikely to prevail in others goes for the
moment unchallenged; but he is soon to be assailed by the scorn for par-
sonical motive implied in Mary’s sudden, ‘There is a very good living kept
for you, I understand, hereabouts.’ He admits inevitable bias through the
knowledge that provision has been made for him, but argues that this is no
pointer to insincerity in a profession offering small worldly advantage. For
his pains he is accused of preferring an income ready-made to the trouble
of working for one, and of joining a body of men universally looked down
upon. Debate of Mary’s thesis that ‘where an opinion is general, it is usually
correct’ is cut short by Fanny’s exclaiming at the kindness William has met
with from the chaplain of the Antwerp, but the conflict is to be renewed
later; for it not only arises out of strong mutual feelings of attraction, but is
charged with romantic meaning for the contenders.
It is only to be expected, amongst cultured and intelligent beings living
beneath the precise regulations which their society decreed for the conduct
of the sexes, that a diplomacy as to romance will be one of the arts of con-
versation. Someone as apparently staid as Edmund proves he can use it in
this purpose as ably as the flirtatious Henry Crawford himself. As talk at
the Parsonage comes round to matters of economy, Mary Crawford makes
her assertion that a large income is the best recipe for happiness she has ever
heard of, and goes on to declare her contempt for honest poverty and prefer-
ence for honest wealth and distinction. Edmund answers her, in serious tone,
that there are distinctions he desires and would be miserable at not attaining,
but that they are of a different character. Fanny sees with a pang some reflec-
tion on Miss Crawford’s side of his ‘look of consciousness as he spoke’; but
180 Ivor Morris

Mary’s response does not come until the dinner party Dr Grant gives the
Bertrams, when discussion during the game of Speculation centres upon pos-
sible improvements to Thornton Lacey. Edmund rejects Henry’s plans, saying
he intends to make the house comfortable and attractive without any heavy
expense: ‘that must suffice me; and I hope may suffice all who care about me.’
The sentiment, and the tone of voice and half-look with which it is uttered,
move Mary hastily to secure William Price’s knave at an exorbitant rate, and
to exclaim, ‘There, I will stake my last like a woman of spirit. No cold pru-
dence for me.’ The game resumes, the resolve conveyed in her words lost on
all but Edmund and Fanny.
Henry Crawford’s very considerable powers are enlivened with humour.
In the drawing room at Mansfield Park, where he has been reading Shake-
speare aloud, he catches at the suggestion Lady Bertram makes in compli-
menting him that he should fit up a theatre at his house in Norfolk:

‘Do you, Ma’am?’ cried he with quickness. ‘No, no, that will never
be. Your Ladyship is quite mistaken. No theatre at Everingham!
Oh! no.’—And he looked at Fanny with an expressive smile,
which evidently meant, ‘that lady will never allow a theatre at
Everingham.’

Edmund sees both what is meant and Fanny’s determination not to see it, and
decides that ‘such a ready comprehension of a hint’ is favourable to Henry’s
hopes. With far less aplomb does Mr Elton try the same thing, as Emma
tells how Isabella’s reluctant approval of her portrait of John Knightley
caused her to make the resolution against portraiture which she will now
break on Harriet’s account, there being ‘no husbands and wives in the case at
present’. Elton seizes upon the phrase with an ‘Exactly so—no husbands and
wives’, and with a consciousness so interesting that Emma begins to consider
whether she had not better leave him and Harriet together at once.
There is here none of the finesse observable on that hot summer day at
Sotherton Court when Henry Crawford pays his addresses to the bespoken
Maria Bertram with circuitous eloquence. He has made an admirable preface
in the chapel by stating, in the lady’s hearing, a dislike of seeing Miss Bertram
so near the altar—and, upon her inquiring as soon as she has regained com-
posure if he will give her away, a conviction that he should do so very awk-
wardly. Before the locked iron gate in the pleasure grounds, having contrived
to get Mr Rushworth sent off to find the key, he tells her that he thinks he
will never see Sotherton with as much pleasure as he does now; and on being
assured, after a moment’s embarrassment on the lady’s part, that a man of the
world will see it improved, as others do, he claims feelings too little evanes-
cent, and a memory rather too ungovernable for him to merit the category.
 Colloquy 181

Soon, his reference to the smiling prospect before her eyes draws from Maria
a confession of the ‘feeling of restraint and hardship’ the gate and the ha-ha
cause; and Crawford’s judicious reminder of Mr Rushworth’s ‘authority and
protection’, coupled with the assertion that she can get out easily with his own
assistance if this is not prohibited, leads her to commitment with the words,
‘Prohibited! nonsense! I certainly can get out that way, and I will.’ Though the
nature of the subject, perfectly understood by Fanny, arouses a flushed protest
from her and disapproval in ourselves, the parley’s sophistication, and indeed
delicacy, cannot fail to impress.
A Louisa Musgrove is not to be compared with a Maria Bertram; but
she must be to some extent aware, as she strolls with Captain Wentworth
at Winthrop, that in discussing herself and her sentiments with a man to
whom she is becoming increasingly attached, she is making an appeal to his
heart: for this, in Jane Austen’s terms, is an ‘interesting’ conversation that by
its nature can but hint at romance. Yet Louisa is not really acting by design
when she takes up Captain Wentworth’s jest at his sister’s indifference to be-
ing overturned by Admiral Croft’s gigmanship, and professes eagerly a like
bruising devotion to the man she should love. She speaks here with natural-
ness and on impulse; one must wonder, though, whether there might not be
something more purposive in her condemning Henrietta’s readiness to yield
to Mary’s haughty persuasions and give up her visit to Winthrop, and to
Charles Hayter. Certainly what she has to say brings Wentworth’s approval
of the decision and firmness of character it denotes—such warmth of con-
gratulation and advice, indeed, as can leave the attendant Anne Elliot in no
doubt as to what Louisa must be feeling. The reappearance of Henrietta with
the happy Charles Hayter is not the only thing that marks out Louisa for
Captain Wentworth from then onwards.
It is from the heart—though it be a troubled heart—that Wentworth
has spoken: true feeling must find expression. But, at certain times and in cer-
tain places, love cannot directly declare itself, and is compelled to suggest and
insinuate. Even when Wentworth, sure now of his wishes, is standing beside
Anne Elliot in the freedom which the Octagon Room’s space and bustle of
public thoroughfare affords, he can only glance at his own thoughts by speak-
ing of his surprise that Captain Benwick should turn to someone like Louisa
after having loved ‘a very superior creature’ like Fanny Harville. ‘A man does
not recover from such a devotion of the heart to such a woman!’ he exclaims.
‘—He ought not—he does not.’ Anne cannot speak; and he, uncertain as
to her attitude and affections, can say no more—but he has said much. No
less meaningful, or fraught with emotion, are the few words Anne exchanges
later on with Mrs Musgrove at the White Hart on the subject of putting
off the play till Tuesday so that they can all attend the party Sir Walter and
Elizabeth are giving in Camden-place. She states her small inclination for the
182 Ivor Morris

party and readiness to go to the theatre in Mrs Musgrove’s company, while

acknowledging the difficulty they would find in the proceeding. The remark
is inconsequential in itself—‘but she trembled when it was done, conscious
that her words were listened to, and daring not even to try to observe their
effect.’ The effect is immediate: Captain Wentworth is at her side, speaking
with new decision, and only Henrietta’s hurrying in to interrupt the group
can prevent his avowal.
In the end it is Anne who declares her love, through a masterly hinting
during the course of conversation in the same apartment, where she has ar-
rived to find Mrs Musgrove talking to Mrs Croft, and Captain Harville to
Captain Wentworth, and Mary and Henrietta expected to join the party at
any moment. She can only sit, outwardly composed but plunged in agitation,
listening to the talk of others until she is herself beckoned into conversation
by Captain Harville as he takes from its parcel the miniature of Captain Ben-
wick, first drawn for his sister, and now destined for Louisa Musgrove. The
trembling words, ‘Poor Fanny! she would not have forgotten him so soon!’ are
the beginning of a discussion—of an ‘argument’—upon love and devotion in
men and women which takes increasing significance from the well-defined
social situation—and the motionless figure of Captain Wentworth as he sits
poised, pen in hand, striving to catch sounds which Anne thinks for a mo-
ment might not be reaching him. She has started smilingly with an assured,
‘We certainly do not forget you, so soon as you forget us,’ justifying it by a
kindly contrasting of the confined lives of women with the exertions which
men face in their careers; soon she and Harville are engaged in the deepest
analysis of human feelings, each claiming for their sex strength and endur-
ance in affection upon the analogy of the bodily frames of men and women,
and by the verdict of literature, until the impossibility of proof confronts
them. It is when Harville tries to describe the love of a sailor for his wife and
family ashore—speaking ‘only of such men as have hearts!’ as he presses his
own with emotion—that Anne is driven by the logic of debate and of her love
for Wentworth to concede the point and to make, while composure lasts, an
assertion of love undying:

‘Oh!’ cried Anne eagerly, ‘I hope I do justice to all that is felt

by you, and those who resemble you. God forbid that I should
undervalue the warm and faithful feelings of any of my fellow-
creatures. I should deserve utter contempt if I dared to suppose
that true attachment and constancy were known only by woman.
No, I believe you capable of every thing great and good in your
married lives. I believe you equal to every important exertion, and
to every domestic forbearance, so long as—if I may be allowed the
expression, so long as you have an object. I mean, while the woman
 Colloquy 183

you love lives, and lives for you. All the privilege I claim for my own
sex (it is not a very enviable one, you need not covet it) is that of
loving longest, when existence or when hope is gone.’

The speeches of Juliet herself are not more frank, tender or affecting than
this of Anne Elliot, considered in its setting: for, with proper respect to
decorum, she must woo her man through the screen of social circumstance
by the skills of eloquence and simplicity of truth, without directing an overt
word to him.

* * *

The ability to hint with delicacy at romantic attachment is not to be

expected in Mr Collins. He has, one would think, neither the mental nor
the emotional accomplishment for nurturing the art—though he does pos-
sess a command of words which might otherwise have stood him in good
stead. What he manages to intimate to Charlotte Lucas at the dinner party
the Bennets give her family to make her almost certain by the time it breaks
up that her plan will succeed, we shall unfortunately never know. But there
can, surely, be little room for hinting in association with so massive a self-
regard. Mr Collins’s wish, upon his arrival at Longbourn, to avoid appearing
forward and precipitate on the subject of making amends to his fair cousins
takes the alarming form of an assurance to the young ladies that he comes
prepared to admire them. ‘At present I will not say more,’ he continues with
thunderous caution, ‘but perhaps when we are better acquainted—’ A for-
tunate summons to dinner saves the family from the full revelation of his
discretionary powers.
What Mr Collins in fact excels at is the address indiscreet and confes-
sional. This distinction of being able to make common property of his in-
most thoughts he shares with Miss Bates; but whereas actual ideas have to
be searched for in her speeches amidst the welter of irrelevant material, Mr
Collins’s thinking is presented to his hearers in a manner engagingly pointed
and precise. Thus when Mr Bennet receives an olive branch through the post,
or when his daughter is favoured by a proposal of marriage, neither is left to
guess at the motive. A wealth of personal information is laid at Elizabeth’s
feet: she is not only told of her suitor’s having come with the intention of
selecting a wife, and of his reasons for wishing to marry—among them being
the expectation that it will add greatly to his happiness—but is made famil-
iar with the exact terms and tones of Lady Catherine’s prompting: ‘Chuse
properly, chuse a gentlewoman for my sake; and for your own, let her be an
active, useful sort of person, not brought up high, but able to make a small
income go a good way.’ That what is at work here is not some rare genus of an
184 Ivor Morris

otherwise exemplary candour, but an insensibility almost as rare, is clear from

Mr Collins’s ascribing Elizabeth’s refusal, at the end of the interview, to her
wish of increasing his love by suspense, ‘according to the usual practice of
elegant females’. She and her father have been under no illusion from the
moment of their visitor’s grave disclosure of his method of composing and
delivering compliments to ladies.
Other people’s feelings do not enter into Mr Collins’s calculations—and
scarcely into his consciousness. His near-perfect self-involvement is appar-
ent not only when he holds the centre of the stage, but even in his exits and
his entrances. It is announced in his letter telling Mr Bennet that the week’s
visit he proposes therein can be made ‘without any inconvenience’ since his
patroness has no objection to his occasional absence from Hunsford. He en-
livens his departure by accepting as renewed invitation Mrs Bennet’s polite
expression of happiness in seeing him at some future time, and sending in his
letter of thanks the comforting explanation that he has done so merely with
the view of enjoying the company of Charlotte Lucas. Aware of what she is
dealing with, Elizabeth has come near to discouraging Mr Collins’s amatory
pursuit by suggesting that Lady Catherine will be displeased at her lack of
qualification for the honour. Mrs Bennet, by ignorance, attains greater success
in her outburst at her daughter’s perversity. ‘Pardon me for interrupting you,
Madam,’ the suitor cries, ‘but if she is really headstrong and foolish, I know
not whether she would altogether be a very desirable wife to a man in my
situation, who naturally looks for happiness in the marriage state.’ It is thus
to be foreseen that in welcoming Elizabeth to Hunsford Mr Collins should
speak to her as if wishing to make her feel what she has lost in refusing him;
or that he should presume, in writing to Mr Bennet after Lydia’s elopement,
‘to reflect with augmented satisfaction on a certain event of last November,
for had it been otherwise, I must have been involved in all your sorrow and
disgrace.’ Lack of discretion in this degree must be set down as pure folly.
There is something curiously engaging, though, in the trust it implies in the
value of every notion, and in the almost regal freedom through which these
firstlings of the brain are scattered for others’ edification.
If his achievements in self-revelation are set on one side, Mr Collins’s
speeches are seen to be limited in their range and uninspired in their quality
when viewed beside typical modes of utterance in the novels. They show him
to be, in sophistication, intelligence and moral quality, far removed from the
best of the characters, though by no means so bad as the worst. Whatever
social blunders he may commit, a complaisant manner ensures that many of
the excesses of arrogance to be found in the pronouncements of others are
avoided. His assumption of excellence, oddly enough, also helps to chasten
his remarks. The crude boast is absent. If he is inclined to talk without ceas-
ing of his house and garden at Hunsford, or to invite Elizabeth to admire
 Colloquy 185

everything within them, it is with a sense of wonder at his fortunate lot and
an evident wish that such contentment might be spread abroad. There is no
seeking for status in one whose dearest aspirations seem to be satisfied. He
may name Rosings as frequently as Mrs Elton calls to aid Maple Grove, but
his comparisons, unlike hers, are not odious: when he declares upon enter-
ing Mrs Philips’s house that he might almost have supposed himself in Lady
Catherine’s small summer breakfast parlour, his aim is chiefly to flatter his
hostess. And when that good lady learns that the chimneypiece alone in one
of the drawing rooms at Rosings had cost eight hundred pounds, she feels the
full force of the compliment, ‘and would hardly have resented a comparison
with the housekeeper’s room.’
Similarly, there is in Mr Collins no such pressing desire to lay claim to
perfections as can motivate persons as different as General Tilney and Isa-
bella Thorpe. He does, it is true, assert his skill in the art of compliment—but
the subject is mentioned in passing and pursued only through Mr Bennet’s
persistent questioning. Much the same applies to his boasting himself better
qualified by education and habitual study to decide upon social niceties than
his cousin Elizabeth: the claim only comes after she has implied the contrary
in trying to stop him introducing himself to Mr Darcy. That he can be de-
ficient in any way does not admit of question; his speeches are almost quite
free of protestations designed to hide a weakness. The exceptions are those as-
surances of bearing Lydia no ill-will for interrupting his reading of Fordyce’s
Sermons, or of not resenting the behaviour of Elizabeth in turning down his
proposal, or of not in the least regarding his losses at whist—all which, made
in a manner or with a tone of voice indicating the contrary, are Mr Collins’s
way of reining in those impulses that might cause him to swerve from the
path of rectitude.

* * *

But there is a tendency to be found in Mr Collins’s statements which has

no place in those of most of the other characters: a touch, not of steel,
certainly, but of a stringency which entices him towards the captious. The
truth, which he records with a certain sternness, that young ladies are
little interested in books of a serious stamp despite there being nothing so
advantageous to them as instruction, is made the means of mild rebuke. So
is the more painful fact of Elizabeth’s indifference to him, in leading him
to reflect with some contentment upon unattained benefits found to be
illusory. These less than civil reflections Mr Collins presents with his usual
guileless candour, but they are followed by others more forcefully frank; and
deepening acquaintance reveals in him a censoriousness which is the more
trenchant (and diverting) in being divorced from discretion.
186 Ivor Morris

Thus, in condoling by letter with his cousin upon the grievous afflic-
tion of Lydia’s elopement, he comments on the reason there is to think that
the girl’s licentious conduct ‘has proceeded from a faulty degree of indul-
gence’—adding, however, for the consolation of Mr Bennet and his wife, that
Lydia’s own disposition must be naturally bad, as she could not otherwise be
guilty of such an enormity at so early an age. He ends by coupling pity for
the distressed parents with the certainty that this false step in one daughter
‘will be injurious to the fortunes of all the others, for who, as lady Catherine
herself condescendingly says, will connect themselves to such a family’. This
is as round as need be, but the masterstroke of reprobation in the next letter
is reserved for Lydia’s father: it is nothing less than a set-down, to which Mr
Bennet’s own is a retort.

‘I must not, however, neglect the duties of my station, or refrain

from declaring my amazement, at hearing that you received the
young couple into your house as soon as they were married. It was
an encouragement of vice; and had I been the rector of Longbourn,
I should very strenuously have opposed it.’

This indignation is of the righteous kind. The discarding of meekness in

favour of the posture militant is brought about in Mr Collins by what he feels
to be pastoral obligation. It was this which, if he is to be believed, first sent
him on his way to the Bennets to spread the blessing of peace, and, indeed,
which forms the basis of his estimate of himself. As he assures the perplexed
Elizabeth, he considers the clerical office ‘as equal in point of dignity with
the highest rank in the kingdom—provided that a proper humility of behav-
iour is at the same time maintained’. The only vaunt that he is prepared to
make—one bemusing in its effect—is about his status as a clergyman.
The two most prominent aspects of his personality are united in the
address which, to Elizabeth’s embarrassment and her father’s delight, Mr
Collins declaims in a loud voice to the entire company in the ballroom at
Netherfield after Mr Darcy has rebuffed his attempt to introduce himself.
It is a masterpiece of presumptuous lowliness. Choosing the moment after
Mary’s debacle at the pianoforte when others are being asked for a musical
contribution, he begins in his patroness’s mode by declaring that an air would
certainly be forthcoming from him if he were so fortunate as to be able to
sing. This light introduction makes way for the august theme of a clergyman’s
manifold responsibilities, the dominant motif of obtaining an advantageous
agreement on tithes ushering in the lesser refrains of sermon-writing, par-
ish preoccupations, and improvements to the parsonage. But the profounder
statement is yet to come. The necessity of conciliatory manners towards every
body, especially those to whom the cleric owes preferment, is set forth with a
 Colloquy 187

commanding resonance which makes all the more affecting the diminuendo
of the concluding passage: ‘I cannot acquit him of that duty; nor could I think
well of the man who should omit an occasion of testifying his respect towards
any body connected with the family.’ The performer’s bow brings by way of
applause stares, smiles, and Mrs Bennet’s commendations on the sensibleness
of the remarks and the cleverness of the speaker.
Her judgment in the latter comment might be defended. Mr Collins has
replied to Darcy’s rudeness by an admirably impersonal allusion to his clerical
responsibilities. It is thus unexceptionable in being perfectly polite; but as a
retort and a self-vindication it is also emphatic. For not only does it justify
his earlier conduct, but it infers a claim to social recognition and to station
which, though of a kind subordinate to Darcy’s own, ought nevertheless to
command his respect.
Is the claim spurious? Darcy reacts to Mr Collins’s social intrusion
as one imagines Sir Walter Elliot would have responded to any familiar-
ity from Mr Wentworth, the curate of Monkford. The term gentleman is
hardly to be applied to such persons: Edmund Bertram’s intention to make
one of their number induces in Mary Crawford the near-horror implicit in
her assertion, ‘A clergyman is nothing.’ Whatever he may urge on behalf of
those who have charge of all that is of first importance to both the indi-
vidual and society, temporally and eternally, Edmund cannot alter Mary’s
conviction that what makes men clergymen is a love of ease, an absence of
ambition, and a deplorable manner. In her confidence that she is speak-
ing the general opinion she is on firm ground. Only the rare mortal in
the society presented in Jane Austen’s novels appreciates the dignity of the
clerical calling and function. Edmund’s father is thus distinguished. When
Henry Crawford makes known his wish to become the tenant of Thornton
Lacey, on the assumption that Edmund will as a matter of course be an
absentee parson, he receives a crushing rejoinder. Sir Thomas will be ‘deeply
mortified’ if his son does not live in his own parish. Human nature, he tells
Crawford, needs, more than weekly sermons, the friendship of the pastor: if
he does not live amongst his people, ‘he does very little either for their good
or his own.’ And he concludes with a deliberating courtesy that is eloquent
of the clergyman’s true status: ‘Thornton Lacey is the only house in the
neighbourhood in which I should not be happy to wait on Mr Crawford as
occupier.’
Much as Mr Collins might be despised in the minds of his hearers at
Netherfield, he is not at fault in affirming the parson’s right to consideration.
From many points of view the stand he takes is as defensible as that of Eliza-
beth Bennet in vindicating the right of younger daughters not to be socially
handicapped by the custom of coming out. Perhaps like her own, though, his
choice of time and place is not beyond criticism.
188 Ivor Morris

There is thus something original, and even vivacious, in the readiness

which he reveals by word and action to break with the conventions—though
always, be it understood, where his own interests are involved. It is not solely
in escaping out of Longbourn House with admirable slyness in order to has-
ten to Lucas Lodge and there throw himself at Charlotte’s feet that the ‘fire
and independence of his character’ is apparent. But his speeches as a whole
demonstrate a quality which must be creditable, and may be deemed admi-
rable, in any human being, even if it will not normally lead to advancement
and fortune. In Mr Collins’s statements, be they civil or ceremonious, trivial
or platitudinous, laughably presumptuous or stupidly contentious, there is
almost a complete absence of pretence. Amidst his many shortcomings he
is sincere, and, happily, nearly always transparently so. There is an element of
the paradisal in its scarcely ever occurring to him that a covering is requisite
for the nakedness of his thoughts. In this not insignificant respect Mr Collins
appears as an innocent—though, doubtless, he is one of those who will not
’scape the thunderbolt of the reader’s derision.

No t e

1. J. Boswell, Life of Johnson, 3rd edn (ed. J.D. Fleeman), London, Oxford
University Press, 1970, p. 623: Friday 14 April 1775.
 PA U L A B Y R N E

Emma

T he Lovers’ Vows debacle reveals that for Jane Austen acting is not so
much an aberration as an inevitability. The great lesson she took from the
drama, that social life requires a strong element of role-playing, is also one
of the guiding principles of her next novel. In addition, Emma returns to the
territory of Pride and Prejudice: the interplay of different social classes and
the quest to discover a language truthful to emotional experience.
The depiction in Pride and Prejudice of a fine lady who is also an un-
regenerate snob is brilliantly reworked in Emma. This time, however, rather
than the heroine being the victim of the cruelty and injustice of social snob-
bery, she is its perpetrator. Like Lady Catherine de Bourgh, Emma is con-
cerned with preserving ‘the distinctions of rank’, and, in spite of the novel’s
deep engagement with the concept of social mobility, she is initially resistant
to social change, unless upon her own terms.
The most traditional method of movement between the classes was
through marriage and in Emma there are a number of intermarriages. The
novel begins with the marriage between a former governess, Miss Taylor,
and a highly respected, albeit self-made, gentleman, Mr Weston.1 This union
finds its correlation towards the close of the novel with the marriage between
a woman on the brink of becoming a governess and a wealthy gentleman,
who is the son of Mr Weston. Furthermore, the novel ends with the promise

From Jane Austen and the Theatre, pp. 211–224, 256–258. © 2002 by Paula Byrne.

189
190 Paula Byrne

of future marriages (and matchmaking) between the daughter of the Westons

and the offspring of the most genteel characters, the Knightleys.2
The assimilation of the social classes through marriage was one of the
great themes of the drama, and alliances between ‘blood’ and ‘money’, or ‘old’
money and ‘new’, were the focuses of many successful comedies of the pe-
riod.3 In the novel tradition, Richardson’s Pamela was the prime exemplar of
an unlikely but successful union between a lowly servant girl and her master.
In Emma, the theme of intermarriage comes full circle when Emma is faced
with what she thinks is the probability, not merely the possibility, of a union
between illegitimate Harriet and the well-born Mr Knightley: ‘Mr Knightley
and Harriet Smith!—Such an elevation on her side! Such a debasement on
his! . . . Could it be?—No; it was impossible. And yet it was far, very far, from
impossible’ (E, p. 413). When Emma finally accepts that Harriet could well
be ‘the chosen, the first, the dearest, the friend, the wife to whom he looked
for all the best blessings of existence’, her wretchedness is increased by the
reflection that ‘it had been all her own work’ (E, pp. 422–23).
Whilst Harriet Smith is no Pamela or Evelina, resembling more the
simple country girl of David Garrick’s popular comedy, she does possess the
capacity for improvement. Eventually, Mr Knightley is forced to reconsider
his opinion of her character, and admit her to be Mr Elton’s equal: ‘An unpre-
tending, single-minded, artless girl—infinitely to be preferred by any man of
sense and taste to such a woman as Mrs Elton’ (E, p. 331).
Austen’s comedy of errors between Emma, Elton and Harriet in the first
volume of the novel is, however, dependent on the finely nuanced render-
ings of rank and station so beloved of eighteenth-century comedy. The comic
misunderstandings between the three characters are made possible by their
tenuous grasp of social realities. Harriet believes (or is made to believe) that
she is worthy of Mr Elton, whilst he, in turn, believes that he is worthy of
Emma. Emma’s concurrence in the misunderstandings is in no small part due
to the fact that she is unable to conceive that Mr Elton could aspire to her
own lofty level.
The misunderstandings within the Emma/Harriet/Elton love triangle
are very much in the tradition of stage comedy. In Hannah Cowley’s The
Runaway a similar set of comic misunderstandings (known in the period
as equivoques) occur between a father and son. The son (George Hargrave)
mistakenly believes that the elderly Lady Dinah is intended for his father,
and duly shows his happiness and approval of the match as he unwittingly
courts the lady. The situation allows for many opportunities for comic misun-
derstandings until the son is suitably enlightened and horrified to learn that
he, not his father, is the true object of desire. Likewise, Emma woos on behalf
of Harriet until the comic epiphany of Mr Elton’s proposal. Though aware of
his drunken state, Emma foolishly believes that she can restrain his advances
 Emma 191

by talking of the weather, and is astonished to find her efforts repulsed: ‘It
really was so. Without scruple—without apology—without much apparent
diffidence, Mr Elton, the lover of Harriet, was professing himself her lover’
(E, p. 129).
In Pride and Prejudice, Austen had displayed the range of her comic
skills in the great proposal scene between Elizabeth Bennet and Mr Collins,
and in Emma she reworks the idea to depict the discrepancy between male
and female behaviour in the courtship process. The high comedy of Elton’s
proposal is greatly enhanced by Emma’s unknowing compliance in the mis-
take, yet the scene is also charged with the archetypal male arrogance which
little expects anything but grateful acceptance from the female:

‘I have thought only of you. I protest against having paid the

smallest attention to any one else. Every thing that I have said or
done, for many weeks past, has been with the sole view of marking
my adoration of yourself. You cannot really, seriously, doubt it.
No!—(in an accent meant to be insinuating)—I am sure you have
seen and understood me.’ (E p. 131)

As with that other obtuse clergyman, Mr Collins, Elton interprets the lady’s
stunned silence as consent: ‘allow me to interpret this interesting silence. It
confesses that you have long understood me’ (E, p. 131). Emma’s incredulity
at finding herself the object of Elton’s desire is paralleled with his disdain at
the discovery that the illegitimate Harriet is intended for himself. ‘I think
seriously of Miss Smith! . . . no doubt, there are men who might not object
to—Every body has their level’ (E, pp. 131–32).
The narrative of Emma moves with great speed and skill between exter-
nal events and the inner consciousness of the heroine. Dramatic dialogue is
thus often followed by ‘free indirect discourse’ in which the third-person nar-
ratorial voice follows the unfolding of Emma’s thoughts.4 The carriage scene
is mainly rendered in dialogue, but it is immediately followed by Emma’s
ruminations on Elton. She quickly realises that ‘there had been no real af-
fection either in his language or manners’, though ‘sighs and fine words had
been given in abundance’ (E, p. 135). Furthermore, she understands that he
is a social climber who ‘only wanted to aggrandize and enrich himself ’ (E, p.
135). The great comic paradox is that Emma is angry with Elton for looking
down on Harriet, but is equally furious that he looks up to her level: ‘that he
should suppose himself her equal in connection or mind!—look down upon
her friend, so well understanding the gradations of rank below him, and be so
blind to what rose above’ (E, p. 136). Having shown the worst effects of social
snobbery in Elton’s dismissal of Harriet, the authorial irony re-establishes its
attack on Emma, whose snobbishness has yet to be purged: ‘He must know
192 Paula Byrne

that the Woodhouses had been settled for several generations at Hartfield,
the younger branch of a very ancient family—and that the Eltons were no-
body’ (E, p. 136).
Eighteenth-century drama’s obsession with the comic interplay of rank
and manners depended upon discrepancies between outward appearance and
inner reality. Plays such as She Stoops to Conquer, The Heir at Law, The Belle’s
Stratagem and The Clandestine Marriage all exploited the comic possibilities of
mistaken identity and social displacement. Emma’s lack of judgement is most
apparent in her opinions of Mr Elton and Robert Martin. Her conviction
that the handsome and gallant Mr Elton is a ‘model’ of good manners is as
wrong-headed as her observation of Robert Martin’s ‘clownish’ manners. Her
comments are restricted to Martin’s lack of outward lack of polish, his ‘un-
modulated voice’, and she duly condemns him as ‘a completely gross, vulgar
farmer—inattentive to appearances, and thinking of nothing but profit and
loss’ (E, p. 33). Emma’s absurd remark that Robert Martin is ‘not Harriet’s
equal’ is angrily quashed by Mr Knightley: ‘No, he is not her equal indeed, for
he is as much her superior in sense as in situation’ (E, p. 61).
The intricacies of social class are clearly understood by Robert Martin,
who fears that Harriet is now ‘considered (especially since your making so
much of her) as in a line of society above him’ (E, p. 59). Both Robert Martin
and Mr Knightley know that Emma is to blame for her friend’s recent social
elevation. Yet again, there are distinctions made between different social lev-
els. Emma thinks Robert Martin is unworthy of Harriet, and Mr Knightley
considers Harriet unworthy of Robert Martin: ‘my only scruple in advising
the match was on his account, as being beneath his deserts, and a bad connex-
ion for him’ (E, p. 61). Emma, sounding dangerously like Lady Catherine de
Bourgh, stoutly refuses to concede: ‘The sphere in which she moves is much
above his.—It would be a degradation’ (E, p. 62).
Whilst Emma initially thinks of compatibility in terms of rank and
station, Mr Knightley puts equal emphasis on compatibility of mind and
disposition: ‘A degradation to illegitimacy and ignorance, to be married to
a respectable, intelligent gentleman-farmer’. Knightley approves of Robert
Martin for being all that is ‘open’ and ‘straightforward’: ‘Robert Martin’s man-
ners have sense, sincerity and good humour to recommend them; and his
mind has more true gentility than Harriet Smith could understand’ (E, p.
65). Mr Knightley perceives that Harriet’s obscure origins are the insuper-
able social barrier to her making a good marriage (and Mr Elton’s comments
confirm this truth). Nevertheless, Emma is caught up in the romantic idea
that the natural child is of noble birth: ‘That she is a gentleman’s daughter, is
indubitable to me’ (E, p. 62). Such is her faith in Harriet’s true gentility that
she fires a parting shot that will later rebound upon her: ‘Were you, yourself,
ever to marry, she is the very woman for you’ (E, p. 64).
 Emma 193

Social mobility achieved either through intermarriage between the

classes or by means of trade and commerce provided stage comedy and fic-
tion with the perfect vehicle for comparing and contrasting different social
types. Austen’s own fascination with social mobility, explored in Pride and
Prejudice, is given fuller emphasis in Emma, where there is a greater depiction
of the assimilation of the trading classes into gentility. Whilst Miss Bates and
Jane Fairfax are seen to be downwardly mobile, Mr Perry and the Coles are
on the rise.5 The Cole family, who are described as ‘of low origin, in trade,
and only moderately genteel’, have risen to be ‘in fortune and style of living,
second only to the family at Hartfield’, yet they still struggle to rise above the
stigma of trade.
Emma initially sets herself against social mobility, for she has the com-
mon prejudice against trade and commerce, ‘I have no doubt that he will
thrive and be a very rich man in time—and his being illiterate and coarse
need not disturb us’ (E, p. 34). She dislikes visiting the Bateses at their hum-
ble home for fear of ‘falling in with the second and third rate of Highbury,
who were calling on them for ever’. Like Lady Catherine De Bourgh, Emma
wishes to preserve the distinctions of rank, and is therefore rendered uncom-
fortable by events that dissolve social distinctions, such as the Coles’s dinner
party and the ball at the Crown Inn. Emma needs to be reassured that there
will be no difficulty, ‘in everybody’s returning into their proper place the next
morning’ (E, p. 198).
But to her own astonishment, she discovers how much she enjoys the
Coles’s party (in contrast to the two more exclusive social gatherings at Don-
well and Box Hill), finding the Coles to be ‘worthy people’, capable of giving
‘real attention’ (E, p. 208). This is in contrast to the vulgar Mrs Elton, who
confirms Emma’s worst prejudices about trade, with her airs and pretensions.
Mrs Elton is a wonderful comic creation—in the mould of Fanny Burney’s
nouveau riche characters—with her incessant boasting of the Sucklings of
Maple Grove and her horror of upstarts such as the Tupmans, ‘encumbered
with many low connections, but giving themselves immense airs’ (E, p. 310).
Her idiosyncratic speech captures her own particular brand of vulgarity: ‘A
cousin of Mr Suckling, Mrs Bragge, had such an infinity of applications; ev-
ery body was anxious to be in her family, for she moves in the first circle.
Wax-candles in the school-room! You may imagine how desirable!’ (E, pp.
299–300). As with Burney’s comic monsters, however, her moral inferiority is
suggested in her treatment of her servants.6 Whereas Emma and her father
talk of James and Hannah with easy familiarity, Mrs Elton barely remembers
the names of her servants: ‘The man who fetches our letters every morning
(one of our men, I forget his name)’ (E, p. 295).7
Mrs Elton also uses her position of ‘Lady Patroness’ to bully Jane Fair-
fax and, together with her husband, to humiliate Harriet Smith: ‘the enmity
194 Paula Byrne

which they dared not shew in open disrespect to [Emma], found a broader
vent in contemptuous treatment of Harriet’ (E, p. 282). Mrs Elton takes up
Jane Fairfax because timidity is prepossessing in those ‘who are at all inferior’
(E, p. 283). But, in an important speech, Mr Knightley conveys his under-
standing of the ‘littleness’ of her character:

Mrs Elton does not talk to Miss Fairfax as she speaks of her.
We all know the difference between the pronouns he or she and
thou, the plainest-spoken amongst us; we all feel the influence of
a something beyond common civility in our personal intercourse
with each other—a something more early implanted. We cannot
give any body the disagreeable hints that we may have been very
full of the hour before. We feel things differently. (E, p. 286)

This elusive ‘something’ that Knightley speaks of is crucial to an under-

standing of the relationship between outward behaviour and inner feeling
that permeates Austen’s moral vision. The ‘something beyond common
civility’ is of course precisely what Emma transgresses on Box Hill, but
this must be understood as an uncharacteristic act, otherwise it would have
no effect.

* * *

Jane Austen’s interest in the disparity between what characters think and
what they say and do is an essential part of her dramatic inheritance. We
have seen how, from the juvenilia onwards, her works were in various ways
shaped by the comic drama of the period. But more than this, her very
vision of human beings in society is profoundly tied to her thinking about
acting and role-playing. Throughout the novels, she resorts to a lexicon of
theatre to explore the notion of the performed self. Mansfield Park explicitly
revealed the theatricality of the self, above all in the great scene between
Sir Thomas and Mr Yates; now in Emma, Austen explores this idea more
implicitly, through social structure and the interplay of character more than
in any particular incident.
Emma, though an ‘imaginist’, possesses a realistic grasp of the impor-
tance of social performance. She duly enacts her disappointment on behalf
of the Westons when Frank Churchill fails to appear at Randalls: ‘She was
the first to announce it to Mr Knightley; and exclaimed quite as much as was
necessary (or, being acting a part, perhaps rather more) at the conduct of the
Churchills, in keeping him away’ (E, p. 145).
When Frank himself dissembles on the subject of his prolonged absence
from Highbury, she accepts his duplicity with equilibrium: ‘still if it were a
 Emma 195

falsehood, it was a pleasant one, and pleasantly handled’ (E, p. 191). At the
same time, she observes him closely to ascertain ‘that he had not been act-
ing a part, or making a parade of insincere professions’ (E, p. 197). Emma
comprehends that, whilst she must act a part, she must also be on her guard
to recognise acting in others. When sharing the news of her engagement to
Mr Knightley, she is happy that ‘Mrs Weston was acting no part, feigning no
feelings in all that she said to him in favour of the event’ (E, p. 467).
Whilst Emma accepts that ‘acting a part’, playing a social role, is some-
times ‘necessary’, she draws the line at the sort of affectation and disingenous-
ness that disclaims the practice. On hearing Frank profess, ‘I am the wretch-
edest being at the world at a civil falsehood’. Emma cannot help but retort: ‘I
do not believe any such thing . . . I am persuaded that you can be as insincere
as your neighbours, when necessary’ (E, p. 234).
The disparity between outward conduct and inner feeling is also a source
of endless amusement. Emma’s impatience at having to observe right social
form is sometimes mocked, as, for example, when decorum demands that she
ask after Miss Fairfax, even though she doesn’t want to:

‘Have you heard from Miss Fairfax so lately? I am extremely happy.

I hope she is well?’
‘Thank you. You are so kind!’ replied the happily deceived aunt.
(E, p. 157)

Miss Bates and even Jane Fairfax demand Emma’s polite forbearance, but
most trying of all is Mrs Elton. Emma’s solitary outbursts are all the more
comic, as they contrast so vividly with her repressed politeness:

‘Knightley!—I could not have believed it. Knightley!—never seen

him in her life before, and call him Knightley!—and discover that
he is a gentleman! A little upstart, vulgar being, with her Mr E., and
her caro sposo, and her resources, and all her airs of pert pretension
and under-bred finery. Actually to discover that Mr Knightley is
a gentleman! I doubt whether he will return the compliment, and
discover her to be a lady.’ (E, p. 279)

Though Emma heartily dislikes Mrs Elton, and finds that on occasion ‘the
forbearance of her outward submission’ is put to the test, she (crucially)
keeps her disgruntled feelings to herself.8
Austen’s most discerning heroines, such as Elinor Dashwood and Eliza-
beth Bennet, possess the skill of appearing courteous in public without sac-
rificing their personal integrity. Emma also well understands the discrepancy
between what Elinor describes as the ‘behaviour’ and the ‘understanding’.
196 Paula Byrne

Thus when Mr Weston claims that Mrs Elton ‘is a good-natured woman
after all’, she finds the appropriate response: ‘Emma denied none of it aloud,
and agreed to none of it in private’ (E, p. 353). Similarly, when Mr Elton’s ro-
mantic attentions become annoyingly clear, Emma finds refuge in her ability
to act a part but remain true to herself ‘she had the comfort of appearing very
polite, while feeling very cross’ (E, p. 119). Even when her forbearance is most
sorely tested, by Harriet’s disclosure of her love for Mr Knightley, Emma’s
response is magnanimous: ‘She listened with much inward suffering, but with
great outward patience’ (E, p. 409). In each case, the phrasing is weighted
by the opposites—denied/agreed, appearing/feeling, inward/outward—to ex-
press the conflict between social and private expression.
Even when dealing with extremely difficult family members, such as
John Knightley and Mr Woodhouse, Emma shows her capacity for ‘uniting
civility with truth’. Thus, when John Knightley begins a typically anti-social
rant concerning a dinner party at Randalls, Emma is unable to give him the
‘pleased assent, which no doubt he was in the habit of receiving’. Rather, we
are told, ‘she could not be complying, she dreaded being quarrelsome; her
heroism reached only to silence’ (E, p. 114).
Throughout the novel, Austen explores the importance of silence, plain-
speaking and non-verbal communication, offset against verbal ambiguities,
equivocations, comic misunderstandings, riddles and word-games. In the first
half of the novel, techniques such as riddles and verbal ambiguities are used
with great effect to exploit the comic misunderstandings between Emma and
Mr Elton. The novel’s engagement with a more sophisticated exploration of
language and communication coincides, however, with the arrival of Frank
Churchill, who is the prime exemplar of verbal charm and social manipula-
tion.
From the outset, the Knightley brothers are associated with a lack of
gallantry and a love of plain-speaking. For instance, when the brothers meet,
they welcome each other in the ‘true English style’, which though plain and
unaffected is not lacking in feeling: ‘“How dy’e do, George?, and John, how
are you?” . . . burying under a calmness that seemed all but indifference, the
real attachment which would have led either of them, if requisite, to do every
thing for the good of the other’ (E, pp. 99–100). But whereas John Knightley’s
forthrightness often verges on rudeness, George’s rarely does. Furthermore,
he is attuned to the fact that the language of gallantry used by other men,
such as Frank and Mr Elton, is merely a means to an end. He warns Emma
that Mr Elton speaks a different language in ‘unreserved moments, when
there are only men present’. Mr Elton’s more private language reveals that ‘he
does not mean to throw himself away’ (E, p. 66).
George Knightley is similarly intolerant of Frank Churchill’s dandy-
ish manners. His own bluntness, which is contrasted with Frank’s excessive
 Emma 197

gallantry, conceals his genuine concern for others. For example, Frank’s insin-
uating praise and his importuning Jane Fairfax to continue singing, in spite of
a hoarse voice, is contrasted with Mr Knightley’s peremptory and blunt com-
mand: ‘That will do . . . You have sung quite enough for one evening—now, be
quiet . . . Miss Bates, are you mad, to let your niece sing herself hoarse in this
manner? Go, and interfere’ (E, p. 229). As Emma observes of Mr Knightley,
‘He is not a gallant man, but he is a very humane one’ (E, p. 223).
Frank Churchill’s gallantry and charm, on the other hand, are manifest-
ed by his love and mastery of word-play. This is as its most skilful and scintil-
lating when he is able to play Emma and Jane Fairfax off against each other,
such as on the occasion when Emma discovers him mending Mrs Bates’s
spectacles, and at Box Hill. On both occasions, however, the verbal acrobatics
and double-meanings are so brilliantly executed and multifaceted that they
become almost mentally wearying, especially when Emma invariably takes
up Frank’s challenge. Mr Knightley’s habitual brevity of speech, which usu-
ally terminates the verbal games, is therefore welcomed. His barely concealed
jealousy and disapproval of Frank Churchill, however, puts its own spin on
the proceedings.
When Emma interrupts the lovers in the Bateses’ sitting room to hear
Jane Fairfax perform at her pianoforte, she mistakenly ascribes Jane’s evident
discomposure to nerves: ‘she must reason herself into the power of perfor-
mance’. However much Jane dislikes having to rouse herself to ‘perform’ a
social lie, Frank relishes the opportunity to flex his verbal muscles by play-
ing a flirtatious double game with the two women. He uses the opportunity
to make love to Jane, whilst simultaneously continuing the Dixon pretence
with Emma and using her as a blind. Thus he speaks of the pianoforte as a
gift ‘thoroughly from the heart. Nothing hastily done; nothing incomplete.
True affection only could have prompted it’ (E, p. 242). Emma, thinking he
alludes to Dixon, is quick to reprimand Frank’s indiscretion—‘you speak too
plain’—but he replies with insouciance, ‘I would have her understand me. I
am not in the least ashamed of my meaning’ (E, p. 243).
When Mr Knightley passes the window on horseback, he is drawn into
conversation with Miss Bates. Not only does his bluntness amidst so much
verbal ambiguity come as a most welcome relief, but the highly comical dia-
logue between him and the garrulous Miss Bates, which is audible to the
small audience in the apartment, makes his feelings about Frank Churchill
all too clear:

[Knightley] cut her short with,

‘I am going to Kingston. Can I do anything for you?’
‘Oh! dear, Kingston—are you?—Mrs Cole was saying the other
day she wanted something from Kingston.’
198 Paula Byrne

‘Mrs Cole has servants to send. Can I do anything for you?’

‘No, I thank you. But do come in. Who do you think is here?—
Miss Woodhouse and Miss Smith . . . Do put up your horse at the
Crown, and come in.’
‘Well,’ said he in a deliberating manner, ‘for five minutes,
perhaps.’
‘And here is Mrs Weston and Mr Frank Churchill too!—Quite
delightful; so many friends!’
‘No, not now, I thank you. I could not stay two minutes.’ (E,
p. 244)

It is unsurprising that Mr Knightley, the advocate of forthrightness, dis-

likes Frank Churchill, although jealousy distorts his judgement. When he
and Emma discuss Frank’s absence from Highbury, she shows herself to
be highly sensitive to the social pressures upon a young man who is almost
entirely dependent upon the will of a woman such as Mrs Churchill. As
she sharply reminds Knightley, ‘You are the worst judge in the world of the
difficulties of dependence . . . You do not know what it is to have tempers
to manage’ (E, p. 146). No doubt she is alluding to the management of the
more awkward members of her own family: ‘Nobody, who has not been in
the interior of a family, can say what the difficulties of any individual of that
family may be’ (E, p. 146).
Emma understands that forthrightness is a privilege of the powerful, not
the disenfranchised. When Knightley suggests to her the simple and resolute
speech that Frank should make to the Churchills in order to break free of
their claims, she mocks his social naivety:

Such language for a young man entirely dependent to use!—

Nobody but you, Mr Knightley, would imagine it possible. But you
have not an idea of what is requisite in situations directly opposite
to your own. Mr Frank Churchill to be making such a speech as
that to the uncle and aunt, who have brought him up, and are
to provide for him!—Standing up in the middle of the room, I
suppose, and speaking as loud as he could! How could you imagine
such conduct practicable? (E, p. 147)

Paradoxically, although Austen is sensitive to the idea that it is not always

‘practicable’ to be forthright, especially where there is an imbalance of
power, she also exploits the tragicomic possibilities of social decorum that
proscribes circumlocution. Emma’s final and most painful misunderstand-
ing occurs precisely because of social equivocations, which lead her to believe
that Harriet is in love with Frank Churchill rather than Mr Knightley.
 Emma 199

Emma, resolving to herself that ‘Plain dealing was always best’ (E, p. 341),
encourages Harriet to confess her new love, but adds an important codicil:
‘Let no name ever pass our lips. We were very wrong before; we will be cau-
tious now’ (E, p. 342). The misunderstandings persist as the women, with
due propriety, agree upon the superior merits of the ‘gentleman’ in question
for rendering Harriet an elusive ‘service’:

‘I am not at all surprised at you, Harriet. The service he rendered

you was enough to warm your heart.’
‘Service! oh! it was such an inexpressible obligation!—The very
recollection of it, and all that I felt at the time—when I saw him
coming—his noble look—and my wretchedness before. Such a
change! . . . From perfect misery to perfect happiness.’ (E, p. 342)

Emma, of course, refers to Frank’s rescue of Harriet from the gypsies,

whereas she remembers the far more painful social snub of being ‘cut’ by Mr
Elton at the dance, and saved by Mr Knightley.
The confusion arises partly because social form dictates that the young
women cannot be too explicit, that the man cannot be named. This is the sort
of comic misunderstanding that is exploited in the drama. For example, in
the Clandestine Marriage one of the best scenes involves a misunderstanding
between the lovely young heroine and the lecherous Lord Ogleby. Fanny’s
equivocations on the delicate subject of her situation (she is secretly married
and pregnant) mislead the debauched aristocrat to believe that she is in love
with him. This is a classic example of the problems arising from the exigencies
of female propriety. Of course, in Emma, the irony is intensified, as Emma
is determined not to repeat her earlier misunderstanding with Harriet and
Elton, and is therefore especially self-satisfied with her discretion and ‘plain-
dealing’. When the mistake finally comes to light, it is the catalyst for Emma’s
double epiphany: the revelation of her own love for Mr Knightley and the
realisation of her own wrong-doing.
Jane Austen shows how language and propriety are vulnerable to eva-
sions and misconstructions, but offsets this by demonstrating the unmistak-
able power of non-verbal communication. The most memorable moments
in the novels are often those expressed by wordless actions. Few can forget
the emotional impact of Captain Wentworth silently removing the small
child from Anne’s back in Persuasion or Mr Knightley almost kissing Em-
ma’s hand. Elinor Dashwood’s tears of joy at the news that Edward is re-
leased from his engagement express her deep emotion, as do Emma’s quiet,
uncontrollable tears after Box Hill. Very often, strong feeling is rendered
by the frequency with which characters look at each other. Darcy’s love for
Elizabeth is expressed by the manner in which he fixes his eyes upon her.
200 Paula Byrne

Mr Knightley rumbles Frank Churchill and Jane Fairfax long before anyone
else does because he has noticed the way they look at each other: ‘I have
lately imagined that I saw symptoms of attachment between them—certain
expressive looks, which I did not believe meant to be public’ (E, p. 350).
In Emma Jane Austen explores the impact of a particular kind of telepathy
between couples. When Harriet is snubbed by Mr Elton at the Crown Inn ball,
it is made clear that Mrs Elton is complicit: ‘smiles of high glee passed between
him and his wife’ (E, p. 328). But when Harriet is saved by Mr Knightley, we
witness the loving telepathy between him and Emma: ‘She was all pleasure
and gratitude . . . and longed to be thanking him; and though too distant for
speech, her countenance said much, as soon as she could catch his eye again’ (E,
p. 328). Later, ‘her eyes invited him irresistibly to come to her and be thanked’
(E, p. 330). Similarly, Knightley expresses his own approbation and strength
of feeling non-verbally when he discovers that Emma has visited Miss Bates
following the Box Hill episode: ‘It seemed as if there were an instantaneous
impression in her favour, as if his eyes received the truth from her’s, and all that
had passed of good in her feelings were at once caught and honoured.—He
looked at her with a glow of regard’ (E, p. 385).
Their mutual respect and compatibility are also revealed by the frank-
ness of expression in their conversation. They quarrel and spar in private,
showing they are intellectual equals. Emma refuses to be intimidated by
Knightley’s brusqueness. She dares to contradict him, to accuse him of be-
ing manipulative and very fond of ‘bending little minds’ (E, p. 147), and of
being full of ‘prejudice’ against Frank Churchill. She deliberately provokes
him by taking views opposite to his. She confesses that even as a young
girl she called him George, ‘because I thought it would offend you’ (E, p.
463). In public, their dialogue is distinguished by an economy of expression,
which contrasts refreshingly with the tortuous, circuitous way in which, for
example, Frank Churchill and Jane Fairfax are forced to communicate in
public.9
In the dialogue between Emma and Mr Knightley there is an easiness
and familiarity, even when they touch upon delicate subjects. When Emma
attempts to ascertain his feelings towards Jane Fairfax, with the words ‘The
extent of your admiration may take you by surprise one day or other’, he
blithely responds, ‘Oh! are you there?—But you are miserably behindhand.
Mr Cole gave me a hint of it six weeks ago’ (E, p. 287). Strikingly, their ro-
mantic involvement is characterised by an absence of sentimental language
and false courtesy:

‘Whom are you going to dance with?’ asked Mr Knightley.

She hesitated a moment, and then replied, ‘With you, if you
will ask me.’ ‘Will you?’ said he, offering his hand.
 Emma 201

‘Indeed I will. You have shown that you can dance, and you
know we are not really so much brother and sister as to make it at
all improper.’
‘Brother and sister! no, indeed.’ (E, p. 331)

Even when the lovers discuss their impending marriage, there is a distinct
lack of sentiment: ‘The subject followed; it was in plain, unaffected, gentle-
man-like English, such as Mr Knightley used even to the woman he was in
love with’ (E, p. 448).
The association of a particular kind of brusqueness and forthrightness
with genuine feeling is used repeatedly in Emma to encapsulate the very es-
sence of Englishness. The true affection that belies the gruff exterior of the
language between the Knightley brothers, which Austen described as ‘the
true English manner’, is now revealed in the union between Emma and
Mr Knightley. It is, furthermore, Frank Churchill’s language, expressed in a
‘fine flourishing letter, full of professions and falsehoods’, which enables Mr
Knightley to clarify the indefinable ‘something’ that had previously eluded
him in his early analysis of what constitutes right moral conduct: ‘No, Emma,
your amiable young man can be amiable only in French, not in English . . . he
can have no English delicacy towards the feelings of other people’ (E, p. 149).
As in a long tradition within the drama, English plainness is contrasted with
French affectation.
As Austen makes clear, this ‘English delicacy’ is not confined to rank
or station. Even Emma recognises that Robert Martin and his sisters pos-
sess ‘genuine delicacy’, and that their exemplary conduct following Harriet’s
rejection is ‘the result of real feeling’ (E, p. 179). Yet this delicacy eludes the
Eltons, who in particular show ‘injurious courtesy’ towards those who are
socially inferior, and in need of protection, such as Jane Fairfax and Harriet
Smith. Momentarily, Emma makes a similar transgression to this when she
humiliates Miss Bates at Box Hill.10 Mr Knightley duly emphasises the mat-
ter of social inequality when he censures Emma’s treatment of Miss Bates:
‘Were she your equal in situation—but, Emma, consider how far this is from
being the case’ (E, p. 375). Emma swiftly make reparations with the con-
sciousness of his words guiding her response: ‘It should be the beginning, on
her side, of a regular, equal, kindly intercourse’ (E, p. 377).
Austen’s happiest alliances are those between equals, not necessarily so-
cial equals, but those in whom there is compatibility of mind, and mutual
respect and understanding. In the union between Emma and Knightley there
is the promise of an equal discourse. Integral to Austen’s resolutions is the
way that her spirited heroines, in the best tradition of the lively ladies of
comic tradition, never relinquish their penchant for merriment. Those critics
who insist that Emma’s reformation is not genuine cite the impudence of her
202 Paula Byrne

remark to her future spouse: ‘I always expect the best treatment, because I
never put up with any other’ (E, p. 474). To regard this as merely a continu-
ation of Emma’s egotism is to misunderstand the workings of the lively lady,
such as Austen’s favourites, Lady G. and Lady Bell Bloomer: comedy pro-
poses that a woman may marry a worthy and upright man without fear that
her high spirits will be stifled.

* * *

Mr Knightley declares to Emma after Box Hill: ‘I will tell you truths
while I can.’ There is only one final agonising encounter when they fail to
communicate fully, a last misunderstanding when each believes the other
to be in love with someone else. But this is short-lived, for Emma, having
first begged Mr Knightley not to speak of his love, will not ultimately
sacrifice their friendship: ‘I will hear whatever you like. I will tell you
exactly what I think’ (E, p. 429). When the misunderstanding is happily
resolved, he shows his characteristic awkwardness with the language of
sentiment: ‘I cannot make speeches . . . If I loved you less, I might be able
to talk about it more. But you know what I am. You hear nothing but truth
from me’ (E, p. 430).
Paradoxically, however, Mr Knightley’s pursuit of absolute truth is pre-
sented as touchingly idealistic: ‘Mystery; Finesse—how they pervert the un-
derstanding! My Emma, does not every thing serve to prove more and more
the beauty of truth and sincerity in all our dealings with each other?’ (E, p.
446). His noble sentiment is ironically undercut by Emma’s ‘blush of sensi-
bility on Harriet’s account’, for she is conscious that she is withholding the
full truth of her friend’s love for him, and her own part in it. It is only when
Harriet is safely married to Robert Martin that ‘the disguise, equivocation,
mystery, so hateful to her to practise, might soon be over. She could now look
forward to giving him that full and perfect confidence which her disposition
was most ready to welcome as a duty’ (E, p. 475). Whether or not Emma
finally does reveal the whole truth to Knightley is left open. But this ambi-
guity should come as no surprise, for the authorial voice has already warned
the reader: ‘Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human
disclosure; seldom can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or
a little mistaken’ (E, p. 431). There is no escape from a little disguise, a little
mistakenness: such is the lesson of the theatre.
The acknowledgement of the incompleteness of human disclosure strikes
at the very heart of Jane Austen’s creative vision. The novel, with its omni-
scient narrator, is in theory a genre that proposes the possibility of complete
truth. Austen, however, is more akin to Shakespeare in her perception of the
complexity and ambiguity of artistic truth. Her vision of how human beings
 Emma 203

behave in society is built on disguise and role-play, equivocation and mystery:

arts inextricably associated with the dramatic tradition.
Jane Austen’s insistence that all our disclosures are ‘a little disguised’
calls into question the argument of an influential line of critics who believe
that she was suspicious of ‘acting’ because of the supposed insincerity of
role-playing.11 These critics maintain that the growth of the heroine to-
wards authentic self-knowledge is the key to the moral world of the novels.
Such critics are themselves more Knightleys than Austens: they are sus-
ceptible to an ideal of truth that is surely unattainable. Rather, from Jane
Austen’s earliest beginnings in the amateur theatricals at Steventon and her
experiments with dramatic form in the juvenilia to her systematic engage-
ment with the drama in the mature novels, we find an implicit belief that
the social self is always performed. The ultimate model for this way of seeing
is the theatre.

No t e s

1. Mr Weston comes from a ‘respectable family, which for the last two or
three generations had been rising into gentility and property’ (E, p. 15). His fortune,
acquired by trade, has enabled him to purchase a small estate. See Juliet McMaster,
‘Class’, in The Cambridge Companion to Jane Austen, ed. Edward Copeland and Juliet
McMaster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 115–30.
2. Emma is delighted when Mrs Weston gives birth to a daughter: ‘She would
not acknowledge that it was with any view of making a match for her, hereafter, with
either of Isabella’s sons’ (E, p. 461).
3. The Clandestine Marriage and A New Way to Pay Old Debts held the stage
with notable success throughout Austen’s lifetime.
4. This technique has been much discussed by critics. See especially A.
Walton Litz, Jane Austen: A Study of her Artistic Development (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1965), pp. 146–47.
5. Julia Prewitt-Brown has noted that Miss Bates’s small apartment joins the
older gentry (Woodhouses and Knightleys), the new rich (Coles), and the lower-
middle to lower-class townspeople and clerks: ‘She represents Highbury’s fluidity
and mobility’. See Prewitt-Brown, ‘Civilizations and the Contentment of Emma’, in
Modern Critical Interpretations: Jane Austen’s Emma, ed. Harold Bloom (New York
and Philadelphia, 1987), p. 55.
6. In Burney’s play A Busy Day the heroine is devoted to her servant, Mungo,
whereas her newly rich family treat him with contempt.
7. Critics have noted the similarities between Emma and Mrs Elton, but, as
Claudia Johnson suggests, Austen contrasts them to distinguish between the proper
and improper use of social position. Mrs Elton’s leadership, for example, depends
upon the insistent publicity of herself as Lady Patroness, and the humiliation of
those who are socially inferior to her. See Claudia L. Johnson, Jane Austen: Women,
Politics and the Novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 129–30.
8. One exception is when she enters a private discussion with her trusted
friends, Mrs Weston and Mr Knightley, concerning Mrs Elton’s injurious treatment
of Jane Fairfax (E, pp. 286–89).
204 Paula Byrne

  9. They conduct a polite row on Box Hill, unbeknown to the rest of the
party: ‘How many a man has committed himself on a short acquaintance, and rued it
all the rest of his life’ (E, p. 372). Jane replies: ‘I would be understood to mean, that it
can be only weak, irresolute characters (whose happiness must be always at the mercy
of chance), who will suffer an unfortunate acquaintance to be an inconvenience, an
oppression for ever’ (E, p. 373).
10. ‘There is a pattern in the novel of vulnerable single woman, whom it is the
social duty of the strong and the rich to protect’: Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the
War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975; repr; 1987), p. 257.
11. Lionel Trilling remains especially influential in this regard. See, in par-
ticular, his Sincerity and Authenticity (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.
75–78. My own reading of Austen is closer to that of Joseph Litvak in his Caught in
the Act: Theatricality in the Nineteenth-Century Novel (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1993). Jane Austen’s characters act all the time, so even Fanny Price cannot
help but play a part: ‘All along in eschewing acting, Fanny has in fact been playing a
role, albeit “sincerely” . . . From Henry’s performance she learns not the necessity of
acting, but the impossibility of not acting.’ Litvak, Caught in the Act, p. 21.
 GLORIA SYBIL GROSS

“Pictures of perfection as you know

make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion

W riting jauntily to favorite niece Fanny Knight, Austen flouts the pris-
siness of one, Mr. Wildman (Fanny’s suitor), who apparently dipped into
her works and blanched: “I hope I am not affronted & do not think the
worse of him for having a Brain so very different from mine, . . . Do not
oblige him to read any more.—Have mercy on him, . . . He & I should not
in the least agree of course, in our ideas of Novels and Heroines; pictures
of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked” (Austen, Letters, JA to
Fanny Knight, Friday 14 March 1817, 486–87, no. 142). Perfect heroines
or, at least, exemplary ones, were indeed the rage from the mid-eighteenth
century forward,1 though Johnson sometimes took nice exception. As we
have seen, when Mrs. Thrale proposed Richardson’s Clarissa as “a perfect
character,” he contradicted: “On the contrary (said he), you may observe
there is always something which she prefers to truth.”2 What lurks beneath
the surface of character piqued his avid curiosity. How sporting then a
challenge for Austen to invent another “perfect” heroine, whose inward life
belies the public shining example. Not Fanny Price, whose motives proved
too limp and hampered, but Anne Elliot is her contribution to the genre. If
Emma was the “heroine whom no one but myself will much like,”3 Anne
conversely is the one whom everyone will like but she. As the author pre-
views the leading lady of Persuasion to Miss Knight in the same letter, “You

From In a Fast Coach with a Pretty Woman: Jane Austen and Samuel Johnson, pp. 164–186.
© 2002 by AMS Press.

205
206 Gloria Sybil Gross

may perhaps like the Heroine, as she is almost too good for me” (487), we
anticipate an ambitious performance.
Following on the heels of the exuberant Emma, Persuasion was written
quickly in twelve months, from August 1815 to July 1816.4 Never thoroughly
revised, the novel churns with raw feeling and naked revelation. Customarily
Austen wrote carefully and revised intensively, as she famously describes “the
little bit (two inches wide) of Ivory on which I work with so fine a Brush”
(Austen, Letters, JA to J. Edward Austen, Monday 16 December 1816, 467,
no. 134).5 By contrast, Persuasion occupied her less than a year, its composi-
tion marred by the bankruptcy of brother Henry and by the onset of her ill-
ness.6 Far from the deft handiwork of light ironic comedy, the levity and the
gay burlesque of polite society, it often leans toward pathos, even melodrama.
Its explicit realism stresses blasted hopes and a world without pity, where
characters stoop and stumble in largely unrelieved, unenlightened bondage.
An infernal vision intrudes on the high bourgeoisie, as Austen brings us clos-
er and closer to catastrophe. Comparable to Shakespeare’s dark comedies, the
ordered conventional ethos, whatever its f laws and peccadillos, mutates into
the grotesque. She visits the lower depths of satire, the place where jeering
idiots and madmen hold sway. We are close to the world of Rabelais, Dante,
or Pope and Swift’s most gruesome caricature. Here Austen imagines an ideal
heroine brought so low, she becomes a travesty. Oftentimes she parodies the
very goodness she wants to protect.7
Not surprisingly, Johnson’s essays on marriage and courtship, and not
least the plight of single women, were on Austen’s mind when she undertook
Persuasion. Possibly Tranquilla, the mellow and mature “correspondent” who
offers the advice of waiting for “a suitable associate,” despite the drawbacks of
single life, began as the model for Anne. Admitting the reckless way of the
beau monde, the Rambler’s woman of experience urges not to quit the field
nor take refuge in cynicism: “As, notwithstanding all that wit, or malice, or
pride, or prudence, will be able to suggest, men and women must at last pass
their lives together, I have never therefore thought those writers friends to
human happiness, who endeavour to excite in either sex a general contempt
or suspicion of the other.” On balance, she counsels moderation and cautious
optimism:

That the world is over-run with vice, cannot be denied; but vice,
however predominant, has not yet gained an unlimited dominion.
Simple and unmingled good is not in our power, but we may
generally escape a greater evil by suffering a less; and therefore, those
who undertake to initiate the young and ignorant in the knowledge
of life, should be careful to inculcate the possibility of virtue and
happiness, and to encourage endeavours by prospects of success.
 “Pictures of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion 207

From Tranquilla’s story, we gather that Johnson’s greater evil is a bad

marriage, his lesser spinsterhood, reversing conventional wisdom. On the
verges of feminist manifesto, she declares resistance to requisite matrimony,
telling of a succession of fops and jilts. The female counterpart to Hymaneus
(see Rambler 113 and 115), she resists the bridechamber in the face of wound-
ing disrespect. Hers “are the sentiments of one who has been subject for many
years to all the hardships of antiquated virginity; has been long accustomed to
the coldness of neglect, and the petulance of insult.” Compounded by social
ostracism, her dismal prospects make his seem rosy. Still she clings to a glim-
mer of hope, spoken peculiarly in negatives: “I do not yet believe happiness
unattainable in marriage, though I have never yet been able to find a man,
with whom I could prudently venture an inseparable union” (Rambler 119;
Yale Works, IV, 270–75).
Sentimentally, Johnson marries Tranquilla to Hymaneus, both past their
prime, in tribute, so it seems, to the cardinal virtues: discretion, fortitude,
temperance, judgment, and the like. Having survived blunders enough and
to spare, the two join in holy wedlock to their mutual relief. They boast a
union, also oddly stressed in negatives: they were not rash, not impetuous,
not bewitched. In the wedding announcement to Mr. Rambler, they con-
gratulate themselves as a couple who “sought happiness only in the arms of
virtue” (Rambler 167; Yale Works, V, 125). They represent the triumph of good
over moral obliquity. “Too good.” If anyone could catch this smidgeon of
smugness, it is Austen. The two represent a bulwark against villainy, but their
self-approving joy is simply not to be borne. Perhaps the story of Hymaneus
and Tranquilla sparked the plan for Persuasion, but like Johnson, Austen so
feasts on the negative that the positive is unpalatable. Anne is the prim and
prudent heroine who is always right. “No one so proper, so capable as Anne”
(P, vol. 1, chap. 12; Austen Works, V, 114), as Captain Wentworth succinctly,
if ambiguously, puts it. A model of imperturbability, her character represents
the over-the-hill schoolmarm whose lips are permanently pursed. From being
finicky about the untidy life style at Uppercross, squeamish at the rough fa-
miliarity of the Crofts or the Harvilles’ close quarters, tsk-tsking Mr. Elliot’s
Sunday travel, she takes a dim view of indecorum. More fatefully, her disci-
pline counters the law of the jungle, where natives grow increasingly restless
and bloodcurdling. The swine and brutes of Persuasion hardly bother to apply
camouflage. So first to the charming menagerie.
Alongside General Tilney, Mrs. Ferrars, Lady Catherine, Aunt Norris,
and Mrs. Churchill (among the eeriest for never being seen), Sir Walter Elliot
dominates Austen’s hall of monsters. While the latter interact with people,
however acrimoniously, as we first lay eyes on Sir Walter, he interacts with
the numinous Baronetage. Mirrors everywhere, staring down everyone only
to remark appearance and rank, he assumes the freakish proportions that Os-
208 Gloria Sybil Gross

car Wilde was to represent at the end of the century in The Picture of Dorian
Gray (1891). Austen suffers no scruples in making Anne’s father as repellent
as possible: “Vanity was the beginning and the end of Sir Walter Elliot’s
character; vanity of person and of situation” (vol. 1, chap. 1; V, 4). Quitting
the ancestral home at Kellynch only ruffles his feathers, which are instantly
smoothed by being assured a tony position at Bath: “He might there be im-
portant at comparatively little expense” (vol. 1, chap. 2; V, 14). As he leaves in
a fanfare, having been disgraced by profligate spending and primal stupidity,
Austen describes the departure with acid contempt: “The party drove off in
very good spirits; Sir Walter prepared with condescending bows for all the af-
flicted tenantry and cottagers who might have had a hint to shew themselves”
(vol. 1, chap. 5; V, 36).
Goaded by gratuitous cruelty, Sir Walter insults two most hallowed
institutions: family and country. As a parent, he is sinister, having ruined his
best daughter’s happiness. When Anne was engaged to Wentworth at nine-
teen, he abandoned the girl with chilling nonchalance: “Sir Walter, on being
applied to, without actually withholding his consent, or saying it should
never be, gave it all the negative of great astonishment, great coldness, great
silence, and a professed resolution of doing nothing for his daughter. He
thought it a very degrading alliance” (vol. 1, chap. 4; V, 26). In the equally
repellent Elizabeth, a mirror image, he takes narcissistic gratification; to
whiny Mary, who fancies herself frequently ill, he can only remark on the
redness of her nose. As a citizen and peer, no less, Sir Walter dishonors
patriotism by disparaging the navy: “The profession has its utility, but I
should be sorry to see any friend of mine belonging to it.” And he amplifies
with appalling equanimity: “Yes; it is in two points offensive to me; I have
two strong grounds of objection to it. First, as being the means of bringing
persons of obscure birth into undue distinction, and raising men to honours
which their fathers and grandfathers never dreamt of; and secondly, as it
cuts up a man’s youth and vigour most horribly; a sailor grows old sooner
than any other man; I have observed it all my life.” His sentiments reach an
ungodly pitch when recalling “a certain Admiral Baldwin, the most deplor-
able looking personage you can imagine, his face the colour of mahogany,
rough and rugged to the last degree, all lines and wrinkles, nine grey hairs
of a side, and nothing but a dab of powder at top. . . . I know it is the same
with them all: they are knocked about, and exposed to every climate, and
every weather, till they are not fit to be seen. It is a pity they are not knocked
on the head at once, before they reach Admiral Baldwin’s age [forty]” (vol.
1, chap. 3; V, 19–20). This, after the bloodiest campaigns of naval history in
defense of King and country, and when every English citizen knew by heart
James Thomson’s rallying battle cry, “Rule, Britannia, rule the waves; / Brit-
ons never will be slaves.”8 Not to mention the military service of Austen’s
 “Pictures of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion 209

two brothers, Sir Francis, Admiral of the Fleet, and Charles, Rear Admiral
and Commander-in-Chief of the East India Station.
At Bath, Sir Walter convivially strolls the streets in search of eyesores.
“He had counted eighty-seven women go by, one after another without
there being a tolerable face among them. There certainly were a dreadful
multitude of ugly women in Bath; and as for the men! they were infinitely
worse. Such scarecrows” (vol. 2, chap. 3; V, 141–42). Fancying himself ir-
resistible, he struts like a superannuated peacock. Elizabeth is no better.
Flagrantly slighting Anne, she takes up the compliant, if devious, Mrs. Clay,
who flatters and cajoles her way into Sir Walter’s and her own unendear-
ing graces. The latter accompanies the entourage to town instead of Anne,
“for nobody will want her in Bath” (vol. 1, chap. 5; V, 33). Upon her sister’s
delayed coming and Mrs. Clay’s posturings to go, Elizabeth underscores
the preference: “ ‘She is nothing to me, compared to you’ ” (vol. 2, chap. 4;
V, 145). The groveling and slavering after Lady Dalrymple and Miss Cart-
eret are rendered in nauseous detail. As high and mighty relations, they
represent parodic deities, something akin to Pope’s goddess Dullness and
her court. Their procession through the concert hall is a sorry spectacle of
knaves and fools: “The entrance door opened again, and the very party ap-
peared for whom they were waiting. ‘Lady Dalrymple, Lady Dalrymple,’
was the rejoicing sound; and with all the eagerness compatible with anxious
elegance, Sir Walter and his two ladies [Elizabeth and Mrs. Clay] stepped
forward to meet her. Lady Dalrymple and Miss Carteret, escorted by Mr.
Elliot and Colonel Wallis, who had happened to arrive nearly at the same
instant, advanced into the room. . . . Elizabeth, arm in arm with Miss Cart-
eret, and looking on the broad back of the dowager Viscountess Dalrymple
before her, had nothing to wish for which did not seem within her reach”
(vol. 2, chap. 8; V, 184–85). Needless to say, the object of her reach would
have been more graphically represented by Pope.
If Anne is “ashamed,” her estimate of “good company” begs to differ with
the rest. Earlier reflecting on her cousin’s Chesterfieldian code, she suggests:

“My idea of good company, Mr. Elliot, is the company of clever,

well-informed people, who have a great deal of conversation; that
is what I call good company.”
“You are mistaken,” said he gently, “that is not good company,
that is the best. Good company requires only birth, education and
manners, and with regard to education is not very nice. Birth and
good manners are essential. . . . You may depend upon it, that they
[Lady Dalrymple and Miss Carteret] will move in the first set
in Bath this winter, and as rank is rank, your being known to be
related to them will have its use in fixing your family (our family
210 Gloria Sybil Gross

let me say) in that degree of consideration which we must all wish

for.” (vol. 2, chap. 4; V, 150)

Austen clearly skewers the old saws of patrician education and code
of gentlemanly conduct taught by Lord Chesterfield, Johnson’s old nem-
esis. With fifteen editions published by 1800,9 Chesterfield’s Letters to his
Son (1774) was still widely circulated, offering recommendations of social
dissimulation and suave sexual morality. Also known was Johnson’s famous
takedown that “ ‘they teach the morals of a whore, and the manners of a danc-
ing master.’ ”10 Another time, he remarks sardonically: “Every man of any
education would rather be called a rascal, than accused of deficiency in the
graces.”11 Rest assured that Johnson’s and Austen’s sneer comprehends the
odious Elliots.
Next to Anne’s abominable family, the Musgroves would appear the salt
of the earth. Not really. The skeleton in their closet is a dead reprobate off-
spring, about whom Austen is at once grinning and severe:

that the Musgroves had had the ill fortune of a very troublesome,
hopeless son; and the good fortune to lose him before he reached
his twentieth year; that he had been sent to sea, because he was
stupid and unmanageable on shore; that he had been very little
cared for at any time by his family, though quite as much as he
deserved; seldom heard of, and scarcely at all regretted when the
intelligence of his death abroad had worked its way to Uppercross,
two years before. (vol. 1, chap. 6; V, 150–51)

The discovery of his serving under Captain Wentworth prompts his moth-
er’s mammoth outpourings: “Mrs. Musgrove was of a comfortable substan-
tial size, infinitely more fitted by nature to express good cheer and good
humour, than tenderness and sentiment.” As she blubbers on the sofa with
Anne scrunched to one side and out of view, “Captain Wentworth should
be allowed some credit for the self-command with which he attended to her
large fat sighings over the destiny of a son, whom alive nobody had cared
for.” If this were not enough, the narrator annotates: “Personal size and
mental sorrow have certainly no necessary proportions. A large bulky figure
has as good a right to be in deep affliction, as the most graceful set of limbs
in the world. But, fair or not fair, there are unbecoming conjunctions, which
reason will patronize in vain,—which taste cannot tolerate,—which ridicule
will seize” (vol. 1, chap. 8; V, 68).
It may be Johnson also eavesdrops on this blatant episode of fat grief.
While honest cause for sorrow earned his compassion and respect, beggarly
tales of woe were laughed to scorn. At Mrs. Thrale’s presuming a friend’s
 “Pictures of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion 211

commiseration over a will, he snaps: “ ‘She will suffer as much perhaps (said
he) as your horse did when your cow miscarried.’ ”12 Another time, shown
a letter in which friend Tom Davies, professing to lose sleep over mutual
friend Baretti’s murder trial, also recommends a young man in a pickle shop,
he scoffs: “ ‘Ay, Sir, here you have a specimen of human sympathy; a friend
hanged, and a cucumber pickled. We know not whether Baretti or the pickle-
man has kept Davies from sleep; nor does he know himself.’ ”13 When the
spirit moves them, Johnson and Austen expertly cut through the chaff. The
kernel of fakery and self-deceit shows us life as a macabre comedy.
The Musgrove girls, granted more benign than the Miss Bertrams, the
youngest Miss Bennets, let alone the Miss Steeles, nonetheless come across
as nuisances. Another couple of primping poppets itching for marriage, they
shimmy to the rhythm of gossip, balls, and beaus. When Captain Wentworth
drops anchor, rich, handsome, and bedecked with naval insignia, they besiege
him like groupies. To her credit, Henrietta withdraws, reminded of a semi-
betrothal to the déclassé but acceptable Cousin Charles Hayter. Of course the
one reminding her was sister Louisa, who now has Captain Wentworth to
herself. In Austen’s upside-down commentary on Anne’s unfortunate defec-
tion eight years earlier, Louisa, of the rock-solid intellect, boasts pertinacity
and self-will, no matter the opposition: “What!—would I be turned back
from doing a thing that I had determined to do, and that I knew to be right,
by the airs and interference of such a person [the hoity-toity Mary]?—or, of
any person I may say. No,—I have no idea of being so easily persuaded. When
I have made up my mind, I have made it. And Henrietta seemed entirely to
have made up hers to call at Winthrop today—and yet, she was as near giving
it up, out of nonsensical complaisance!” (vol. 1, chap. 10; V, 87). Déjà vu for
Wentworth, and he launches into a fulsome encomium on the mincing girl’s
seriousness of purpose: “Happy for her, to have such a mind as yours at hand!
. . . Yours is the character of decision and firmness, I see.” Commending a
spirit of “fortitude and strength of mind,” he alludes, no doubt from wounded
ego and more than a little bitterness, to Anne, who overhears the whole ex-
change: “It is the worst evil of too yielding and indecisive a character, that no
influence over it can be depended on.—You are never sure of a good impres-
sion being durable. Every body may sway it; let those who would be happy be
firm.” (V, 88) Then pontificating on a shrub, he illustrates: “ ‘Here is a nut . . . a
beautiful glossy nut, which, blessed with original strength, has outlived all the
storms of autumn. Not a puncture, not a weak spot any where.—This nut,’ he
continued with playful solemnity,—‘while so many of its brethren have fallen
and been trodden under foot, is still in possession of all the happiness that a
hazel-nut can be supposed capable of ’ ” (V, 88). Driveling on, he lavishes the
rapt young thing with more praise: “My first wish for all, whom I am inter-
ested in, is that they should be firm. If Louis Musgrove would be beautiful
212 Gloria Sybil Gross

and happy in her November of life, she will cherish all her present powers of
mind” (V, 88). He is dangerously close to proposing.
Following such accolades to brainpower and a break-proof noggin,
Louisa’s cracking her head at Lyme is a masterful stunt. Literally throwing
herself at Wentworth, she lands not him, but on the pavement. The near
catastrophe befits all the lunacy of the mismatch: her childish fluster and
his foolish indiscretion: “In all their walks, he had had to jump her from
the stiles; the sensation was delightful to her. The hardness of the pave-
ment for her feet, made him less willing upon the present occasion; he did
it, however; she was safely down, and instantly, to shew her enjoyment,
ran up the steps to be jumped down again” (vol. 1, chap. 12; V, 109). That
Louisa’s close call is farcical bares another lineament of Persuasion’s ghoul-
ish, gallows humor. Indeed Anne has the last laugh, having wanted to bonk
Louisa on the head for a long time and presently, observing Wentworth,
she “wondered whether it ever occurred to him now, to question the just-
ness of his own previous opinion as to the universal felicity and advantage
of firmness of character” (V, 116).
Maiming and murderous impulses toward her notwithstanding, Louisa
survives to find another lover and eventually a husband in the equally capri-
cious Captain Benwick. While the good citizens of the Cobb gathered near
the accident “to enjoy the sight of a dead young lady, nay, two dead young
ladies [Henrietta fainted], for it proved twice as fine as the first report” (vol.
1, chap. 12; V, 111), they are rudely disappointed. But Fanny Harville is truly
dead. Her fiancé Benwick first enters center stage inconsolable, sullen, and
withdrawn, with “a melancholy air, just as he ought to have” (vol. 1, chap.
11; V, 97). All but neglected by the others, Anne gravitates to him only to
hear more than she ever wanted of Scott’s and Byron’s poetry: “He shewed
himself so intimately acquainted with all the tenderest songs of the one poet,
and all the impassioned descriptions of hopeless agony of the other; he re-
peated, with such tremulous feeling, the various lines which imaged a broken
heart, or a mind destroyed by wretchedness, and looked so entirely as if he
meant to be understood” (V, 100). From the late lamented Fanny, not more
than three or four months gone, he attaches himself to Anne, then casually
drops her for Louisa, who obligingly and just as casually drops Wentworth.
The hypocrisy of sentimental avowals recalls Johnson’s retort to Boswell, who
expresses qualms: “I have often blamed myself, Sir, for not feeling for others
as sensibly as many say they do” whereupon that stalker of cant growls, “Sir,
don’t be duped by them any more. You will find these very feeling people are
not very ready to do you good. They pay you by feeling.”14 Evidently Austen
responds the same.
At Bath, infidelity, lies, and double-dealing run no less rampant. Fall-
ing in with the unsavory Mrs. Smith and the aptly dubbed Nurse Rooke,
 “Pictures of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion 213

two denizens of the demimonde, Anne glimpses life in the sewers. For once,
Sir Walter waxes correctly: “ ‘Westgate-buildings!’ said he; ‘and who is Miss
Anne Elliot to be visiting in Westgate-building?—A Mrs. Smith. A widow
Mrs. Smith,—and who was her husband? One of the five thousand Mr.
Smiths whose names are to be met with every where. . . . Upon my word,
Miss Anne Elliot, you have the most extraordinary taste! Every thing that
revolts other people, low company, paltry rooms, foul air, disgusting associa-
tions are inviting to you’ ” (vol. 2, chap. 5; V, 157). To be sure, Anne visits
her father’s persona non grata, an old schoolfellow who once befriended her
in need and is presently unwell and near penniless. But one more conniver,
Mrs. Smith has a secret agenda, hoping to make her fortune by Anne’s
presumed engagement to Mr. Elliot. With smooth indifference to a loyal
girlhood chum’s welfare, she encourages a match to a man whom minutes
later she decries as Satan incarnate:

Mr. Elliot is a man without heart or conscience; a designing, wary,

cold-blooded being, who thinks only of himself; who, for his own
interest or ease, would be guilty of any cruelty, or any treachery, that
could be perpetrated without risk of his general character. He has
no feeling for others. Those whom he has been the chief cause of
leading into ruin, he can neglect and desert without the smallest
compunction. He is totally beyond the reach of any sentiment of
justice or compassion. Oh! he is black at heart, hollow and black!
(vol. 2, chap. 9; V, 199)

This is too much. Downright un-Austenian, the evil is over the top, much as
Johnson would occasionally overdo righteous indignation in pieces written
in haste or invested with overzealous portions of injustice-collection.15 Left
unrevised but for the last two chapters, uncompleted owing to the author’s
advancing illness, Persuasion eventually founders in shoals of emotionalism,
never genuinely fulfilling its promise of grand demonic epiphany. While
the portrait of Sir Walter comes close, the rest falls short of the goal, and
we lapse into melodrama, at times, bathos. That is probably one reason why
Austen derides Anne as “almost too good for me,” in effect, a parody of
goodness. For a heroine she is overdrawn and inconsistent: a veteran of wars
past, battles lost but herself honorably acquitted, she alters unconvincingly
from rage and sexual longing to priggery, meekness, and servility. While
often likened to Fanny Price, here is no seventeen-year-old cowering in the
corner, baffled by chaotic sexual drives, but a mature woman unabashed by
a frank passion for Wentworth. With patent eroticism, Austen describes
how she watches his handsome face, the curl of his mouth, and thrills at
his touch. Taking Mary’s brat off her back, he arouses “sensations on the
214 Gloria Sybil Gross

discovery [that] made her perfectly speechless” (vol. 1, chap. 9; V, 80), and
handing her into the Crofts’ carriage, she “felt that he had placed her there,
that his will and his hands had done it” (vol. 1, chap. 10; V, 91).
But other times Anne is a stifled subordinate, mopping up after other
people’s messes. Careworn and self-effacing, she packs belongings, catalogues
books, makes the rounds of official farewells at Kellynch, caters to Mary’s
prima-donnish conceits, and nurses her unadorable offspring. Humbly she
forgives everyone’s obnoxious behavior. To her father and Elizabeth, it goes
without saying, she makes nary a complaint. To Lady Russell, a meddlesome
old snoop, who originally vetoed the engagement to Wentworth under pre-
text of maternal affection, she acquiesces still. Apparently Anne’s life for the
last eight years has accommodated the usual superfluous offices of a spinster.
Shunted back and forth between Kellynch, London, Bath, and Uppercross
(where at least Mary finds her useful), Anne consoles herself by the older
woman’s attentions, “think[ing] with heightened gratitude of the extraordi-
nary blessing of having one such truly sympathising friend as Lady Russell”
(vol. 1, chap. 6; V, 42).
The soundness of Lady Russell’s sympathy is sorely tested at Bath, when
Captain Wentworth steps forward as the two women take a morning walk.
Anne distinguishes him in a heartbeat:

She looked instinctively at Lady Russell; but not from any mad
idea of her recognising him so soon as she did herself. No, it was
not to be supposed that Lady Russell would perceive him till they
were nearly opposite. She looked at her however, from time to time,
anxiously; and when the moment approached which must point
him out, though not daring to look again (for her own countenance
she knew was unfit to be seen), she was yet perfectly conscious of
Lady Russell’s eyes being turned exactly in the direction for him, of
her being in short intently observing him.

Trusting to her confidant’s felicitations, Anne lingers sensually on his

physical charm: “She could thoroughly comprehend the sort of fascination
he must possess over Lady Russell’s mind, the difficulty it must be for her
to withdraw her eyes, the astonishment she must be feeling that eight or
nine years should have passed over him, and in foreign climes and in active
service too, without robbing him of one personal grace!” All for naught,
because the soul of tender loving care happened to be staring at window cur-
tains. Zinging Lady Russell blows the lid off her patronage, self-absorbed
and boorish. Even her protégé gets thrown off balance: “Anne sighed and
blushed, and smiled, in pity and disdain, either at her friend or herself ” (vol.
2, chap. 7; V, 179).
 “Pictures of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion 215

But Anne forgives Lady Russell, lamely explaining to Wentworth in an

apology padded with special pleading: “I have been thinking over the past,
and trying impartially to judge the right and wrong, I mean with regard to
myself; and I must believe that I was right, much as I suffered from it, that
I was perfectly right in being guided by the friend whom you will love bet-
ter than you do now.” Glossing over a monstrous error in judgment, she gets
them both off innocent: “I was right in submitting to her, and that if I had
done otherwise, I should have suffered more in continuing the engagement
than I did even in giving it up, because I should have suffered in my con-
science. I have now, as far as such a sentiment is allowable in human nature,
nothing to reproach myself with” (vol. 2, chap. 11; V, 246). Exonerating one
and all, she buries the hatchet she might well have wielded. She forgives the
sniveling Captain Benwick and Captain Wentworth himself, originally out
to even the score. Moody and spiteful, he either had smirked or frowned or
flirted in her face with the giggly Musgrove girls.
Whether Anne’s absolution extends to Mr. Elliot and Mrs. Clay, we
never learn. By Austen’s design, the former is perhaps too readily relegated
to the dungheap, to abscond with the malodorous, now-it-can-be-told kept
woman. That melting gaze at the Cobb was worthy of a Willoughby or Henry
Crawford. Like them, he cuts a dashing figure and first appraises the heroine’s
sexual appeal. Ascending steps from the beach, she meets him at the top:
“Anne’s face caught his eye, and he looked at her with a degree of earnest
admiration, which she could not be insensible of. She was looking remarkably
well; her very regular, very pretty features, having the bloom and freshness of
youth restored by the fine wind which had been blowing on her complexion,
and by the animation of eye which it had also produced. It was evident that
the gentleman, (completely a gentleman in manner) admired her exceedingly”
(vol. 1, chap. 12; V, 104). At the family’s grandiose abode at Bath, he has the
good sense to prefer her to Elizabeth, seeking an honorable attachment. An-
other rake on the mend, he shows delicacy, poise, and grace, lacking only the
love of Anne. Well, there is no accounting for taste: she prefers Wentworth.
While Anne’s forbearance, multiple pardons, the affective elegies to na-
ture (coming dangerously close to Fanny P.’s), and the mournful reflections on
constancy are sincere enough, they are not at the center of Persuasion. More
Richardson than Austen, they weigh onerous and register overwrought, often
collapsing into melodrama. When Captain Wentworth finally succumbs and
hands Anne his written proposal, we are in the clime of Clarissa, or worse,
with the plaintive cry: “On the contents of that letter depended all which
this world could do for her!” (vol. 2, chap. 11; V, 237). Austen tries to redress
the gaffe by making Anne look so unwell that Mrs. Musgrove inquires if she
got bonked on the head, like Louisa. But melancholy too often deflects the
real goal. At the real center of Persuasion is hatred.16 Had she the time and
216 Gloria Sybil Gross

energy to revise, the novel might have bared in bold relief a most leering and
grotesque epiphany of human nature. As such, it seethes with everything she
fears and loathes: mercenary ambition, brutality, and violence.
Neither did Johnson shrink at representing human nature in all its
primitive unmajesty. Addressing the young and naive, he warns:

He surely is an useful monitor, who inculcates to these thoughtless

strangers, that the “majority are wicked”; who informs them, that
the train which wealth and beauty draw after them, is lured only
by the scent of prey; and that, perhaps, among all those who croud
about them with professions and flatteries, there is not one who
does not hope for some opportunity to devour or betray them, to
glut himself by their destruction, or to share their spoils with a
stronger savage. (Rambler 175; Yale Works, V, 161)

And he could be killingly satirical. In the original Idler 22 on the vultures,

suppressed when the essays were collected in book form, undoubtedly
because he or his printer thought it too shocking for the general public, a
mother vulture instructs her charges on the arts of seeking prey. With cool
deliberation, she describes man as a beast of

strange ferocity, which I have never observed in any other being

that feeds upon the earth. Two herds of men will often meet and
shake the earth with noise, and fill the air with fire. When you
hear noise and see fire which flashes along the ground, hasten to
the place with your swiftest wing; for men are surely destroying
one another; you will then find the ground smoaking with blood
and covered with carcasses, of which many are dismembered, and
mangled for the convenience of the vulture. (Yale Works, II, 319)

While Johnson is reviling the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), Austen lived
most her life through the long drawn-out agony of the French Revolution
(1789–99) and Napoleonic Wars (1803–15).17 Well may we suspect the repu-
table characters in Persuasion, career navymen and women (e.g., Wentworth’s
sister, the martial Mrs. Croft), who, having won fortunes through looting
and plunder, whet their appetites for carnage and drool for more.
Attending to domestic life, Austen reproduces the sound and fury of
a world bent on destruction. Through socially accepted outlets, the lust for
power drives the bourgeois excellencies of rank, wealth, and possession.
Hence Persuasion winds down with the author’s lethal gibe at the ultimate
bourgeois coup, marriage, as usual professing not to teach a lesson: “Who can
be in doubt of what followed? When any two young people take it into their
 “Pictures of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked”: Persuasion 217

heads to marry, they are pretty sure by perseverance to carry their point, be
they ever so poor, or ever so imprudent, or ever so little likely to be necessary
to each other’s ultimate comfort. This may be bad morality to conclude with,
but I believe it to be truth (vol. 2, chap. 12; Austen Works, V, 248).
Austen’s “bad morality” erodes a trust in what is right and proper. The
mordant portrayals of personal and social deviancy appear to revoke any pos-
sibility of safe passage. Once more the ship of conscience careens in shark-
infested waters. Neither is marriage a safety island for Anne, who trembles at
the prospect of another war. Of all Austen’s “happy endings,” Anne’s alliance
affords the least security. When all is said and done, she is still the heroine
mocked as “too good,” who ironically loses peace of mind. Past endurance, it
is the offensive cult of matrimony that emboldens Austen in Persuasion so to
counter attack and draw blood. “You pierce my soul” (vol. 2, chap. 11; V, 237),
writes Captain Wentworth, but his is not untainted nor can we wholly vouch
for his integrity. The treacly denouement weakens Austen’s fierce demand for
answers. If venality spoils a perfect heroine’s wedding garlands, and others
grow foul by their own device, where then, as Rasselas also demands, is hap-
piness to be found? Johnson’s debate on marriage holds a key in Nekayah’s
snide challenge. We have come a long way from St. Paul’s exhortation to the
Corinthians, “It is better to marry than to burn.” Future founder of “a college
of learned women,” the feisty princess speaks her mind: “How the world is
to be peopled . . . is not my care, and needs not be yours. I see no danger that
the present generation should omit to leave successors behind them. We are
not now inquiring for the world, but for ourselves” (Rasselas, chap. 28; Yale
Works, XVI, 106).

No t e s

1. For a variety of ideals of womanhood, see Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady
and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shel-
ley, and Jane Austen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) and particularly
Penelope Joan Fritzer, Jane Austen and Eighteenth-Century Courtesy Books (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997).
2. George Birkbeck Hill, ed. Johnsonian Miscellanies, 2 vols. (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1897), I, 297.
3. James Austen-Leigh, Memoirs of Jane Austen, ed. R.W. Chapman (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1926), 157.
4. John Halperin, The Life of Jane Austen (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1984), 278, 296–99.
5. We know, for example, that Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice
were rewritten several times, Mansfield Park required two and a half years, and
Emma, written at the height of her powers and in her most characteristic style, took
well over a year. See introductory notes to Chapman’s edition of the novels.
6. Halperin, Jane Austen, 292, 296.
218 Gloria Sybil Gross

  7. For the experiment of an ideal heroine who redeems a fallen society,

one thinks particularly of Shakespeare’s Isabella in Measure for Measure. Like
Anne Elliot’s, her virtue, put to the test, distorts into over-nice scruples and
self-righteousness.
  8. Alfred (1740), Act 2, Scene 5.
  9. English Prose and Poetry, 1600–1800, ed. Odell Shepard and Paul Spencer
Wood (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 592.
10. James Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, ed. George Birbeck Hill; rev. L.F.
Powell, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934–50), I, 266.
11. Boswell, Life, III, 54.
12. Johnsonian Miscellanies, ed. George Birkbeck Hill, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1897), I, 207.
13. Boswell, Life, II, 94.
14. Ibid. 95.
15. See, for example, the Life of Savage (1744), written quickly after his beloved
friend’s demise in a Bristol debtor’s prison. He channels his emotions into a lurid
tale of Savage’s mother, who allegedly disowned him. Johnson is stupefied “that she
would look upon her son from his birth with a kind of resentment and abhorrence;
and, instead of supporting, assisting, and defending him, delight to see him strug-
gling with misery; or that she would take every opportunity of aggravating his mis-
fortunes, and obstructing his resources, and with an implacable and restless cruelty
continue her persecution from the first hour of his life to the last” (Lives of the Poets,
II, 323–24). Resurrecting Savage as a sacrificial victim, Johnson analogizes from the
atrocities of parents who murder their children to Savage’s mother, a fiend who

forbears to destroy him only to inflict sharper miseries upon him;

who prolongs his life only to make it miserable; and who exposes
him, without care and without pity, to the malice of oppression, the
caprices of chance, and temptations of poverty; and who rejoices to see
him overwhelmed with calamities; and, when his own industry or the
charity of others, has enabled him to rise for a short time above his
miseries, plunges him again into his former distress. (338)

Of the frantic emotionalism and bombast of his early efforts at dramatic

tragedy, Irene (1736), he appears embarrassed in later life. Hearing it read in com-
pany, he left the room: “I thought it had been better” (Boswell, Life, IV, 5).
16. See D. W. Harding’s seminal essay, “Regulated Hatred: An Aspect of the
Work of Jane Austen” Scrutiny 8 (1940): 346–62. Rpt. in Regulated Hatred and Other
Essays by D.W. Harding, ed. Monica Lawlor (London: Athlone Press, 1998), 5–26.
17. See Warren Roberts, Jane Austen and the French Revolution (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1979).
 PAT R I C I A M E N O N

Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park:

“At Once Both Tragedy and Comedy”

H ad Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park been the only two of her
novels to have survived, perhaps Austen would have evoked affection from
fewer readers. Mansfield Park, with a hero and heroine who are themselves
hard to love, is knotty and elusive in its complexity, while the earlier novel
often seems defiantly unsubtle, from the brilliant black farce of Fanny
Dashwood’s education of her husband in the art of meanness (an unambigu-
ously nasty, if peripheral, example of the mentor-lover) to the unrepressed
emotion of Marianne’s near-screams of agony at the loss of Willoughby
(105). Each of these two “darker” novels is noted for causing discomfort in
the course of its reading and dissatisfaction at its end, but there is another
resemblance other than Austen’s refusal to beguile. Anticipating Mansfield
Park, the earlier novel is notable for the way in which its structure tends to
ensnare readers into the condition of inattentive proofreaders who find not
what is there, but rather what they expect—desirable mentor-lover relation-
ships—even though in the earlier novel the promise of such relationships
fizzles to nothing while in the later it leads to tragedy.
Austen’s obsession with age in Sense and Sensibility both suggests the
need for, and disappoints expectations of, successful mentorship. Every char-
acter of significance has a stated or calculable age, age is often the subject
for humour, and discrepancies between chronological age and moral and

From Austen, Eliot, Charlotte Brontë and the Mentor-Lover, pp. 47–79, 194. © 2003 by
Patricia Menon.

219
220 Patricia Menon

emotional development are part of an insistent pattern, though the charac-

ters prove immune to even the narrative’s assertion that improvement has
taken place. Many are simply childish in their self-absorption, while others
show Austen working out more complex variations on the theme. Marianne,
for example, as John Wiltshire points out, appears never to be emotionally
weaned from her mother who, in turn, lives vicariously through her (29–30).
At the same time, the forty-year old Mrs Dashwood is in effect another sis-
ter—“Indeed a man could not very well be in love with either of her daugh-
ters, without extending the passion to her” (90)—with judgment less mature
than that of her oldest daughter. And Elinor, at nineteen, begins and remains
a generation older than everyone else, the only adult in a novel that specializes
in making children, and the blind indulgence with which they are treated, the
butt of many a dark joke.
Though Elinor’s calendar age makes her a rather unconventional can-
didate to be anyone’s mentor, there is a figure who promises to fit the ste-
reotype more closely. Joseph Weisenfarth is not alone in describing Colonel
Brandon as such when he includes (among a pattern of Austen’s “Pygma-
lions” and “Galateas”) his “shaping of Marianne Dashwood” (“Emma: point
counterpoint” 216–17). The Colonel is an obvious choice by reason of his
gravity and age—he is five years younger than Marianne’s mother, as the
reader is often reminded—and this is how he is usually perceived. But de-
spite Marianne’s convalescent resolve to draw on his library for books that
will provide her with “a great deal of instruction” (343), he is, in fact, a testa-
ment to the power of cliché to shape expectations. As Laura Mooneyham
White points out, “Marianne and Brandon do not educate each other. How
can they when they do not even have one instance of reported dialogue in
all of the novel?” (78).
In any case, Brandon isn’t up to being a mentor, for, flannel waistcoat
notwithstanding, he has never grown up. It is apparent from his falling in
love with Marianne after the tragedy of Eliza, that the “romantic refine-
ments of a young mind” (56), “the same warmth of heart, the same eager-
ness of fancy and spirits” (205) that appealed to him as a seventeen-year
old are the very characteristics he continues to find attractive in Marianne,
now the same age. His unwillingness to agree with Elinor that her sister
would be the better for being disabused of “the prejudices of a young mind”
through “a better acquaintance with the world” (56) is founded in a distrust
of experience and of the ability to learn from it. In his view, disillusionment
can only lead to moral breakdown and experience of the disasters ensuing
from youthful romanticism has done nothing to temper his commitment
to it. A romantic himself, the tale Austen gives him to tell is a signal of his
condition, a standard from popular fiction (the kind she announced her own
emancipation from in Northanger Abbey) covering all the angles: an elope-
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 221

ment betrayed; a greedy guardian and lascivious husband; a woman deceived,

debauched and impregnated; her mandatory end in rescue from the spong-
ing house, repentance and death—with, of course, an echo in her daughter’s
own fall from innocence. The tale is interlaced with his account of his own
naivety, first in his “noble” decision to take service in India leaving the girl
he loves unprotected in the hands of a greedy father and brother, and then
in the imprudence in his care for Eliza’s daughter. The whole is crowned
by the culmination of high romance, the step that Eleanor sighs over as a
“fancied necessity” (211), a duel with Willoughby. Even the “impossibility”
of the romantic’s forming a “second attachment”, one of the running jokes
in the work, is not so much denied as supported by her likeness to Eliza, the
first love whom, in effect, the romantic Brandon finally succeeds in marrying
(227). Jocelyn Harris suggests that Sense and Sensibility is a multiple retell-
ing of Clarissa: “The Eliza scenes fail for closely copying their original, the
Marianne scenes, which scrutinize and rework Clarissa, convince and move”
(59). But if the Eliza scenes are seen as criticism of a motif long fallen into
cliché rather than failures in themselves, then the reworking of the tale takes
on greater import.
If Austen fails to divest readers of their expectations of Brandon’s role
as mentor, she also fails to convince them (if indeed she tries very hard) of
his role as lover. At the close, the narrative voice (sounding suspiciously
tongue-in-cheek) asks us to accept that Marianne comes to love the Colo-
nel. Generations of readers have failed to be convinced, in part because the
process is couched in ominously sacrificial phrases that engender uneasiness
at her conversion. Mrs Dashwood, Edward and Elinor “each felt [Colonel
Brandon’s] sorrows, and their own obligations, and Marianne, by general
consent, was to be the reward of all. With such a confederacy against her,
what could she do?”; “that she found her own happiness in forming his, was
equally the persuasion and delight of each observing friend” (378–9). It isn’t
clear whether we are to laugh at Marianne’s former convictions or at the
transparent machinations of her “friends”. Nor is it clear how hollow our
laughter is expected to be.
There is no doubt about Marianne’s love for Willoughby. It is, however,
a love motivated by egotism, directed towards a man who “thought the same”
as she (53). It is Austen’s demonstration of the vulnerability of egocentrics to
manipulation by those who confirm their worth, made possible, as Susan Mor-
gan points out, by Willoughby’s familiarity with the code of sensibility, which
enables him to know in advance exactly what will please Marianne (“Let-
ter Writing” 107). Although, unlike Willoughby, she is undoubtedly sincere,
each lover adjusts to resemble the other in behaviour, endorsing the other’s
judgments and sharing an immature conviction of knowing everything. The
potential dangers of this reciprocal education are clear: a mutual admiration
222 Patricia Menon

society with the potential to injure the naively self-centred Marianne, while
being insufficient to sway Willoughby from his absorption in his own desires.
As to her older sister’s situation, no reader can long hold on to the hope
that Edward will have anything to teach Elinor, nor does he. Glenda Hudson
makes an attempt to rescue him from complete moral and emotional idiocy,
arguing that “Edward’s fraternal love is not metamorphosed into passionate
love until Lucy elopes with Robert” (Sibling Love, 57). But the novel belies
this when Edward admits “I was wrong in remaining so much in Sussex”,
persuading himself that “The danger is my own; I am doing no injury to
anybody but myself ” (368, emphasis in original). If Edward has nothing to
teach Elinor, signs of her influence upon him are no more believable than
the possibility that she might find lasting satisfaction with a thickhead who
requires Lucy’s elopement to convince him that his fiancée isn’t just a simple
good-hearted girl. When, at the novel’s conclusion, Elinor criticizes the way
he had behaved at Norland, the scolding is cast as love-talk, “as ladies always
scold the imprudence which compliments themselves” (368), an indulgent
recognition of his naivety that does nothing to reconcile the reader to him,
convince us that he is mature enough to merit her “tears of joy” (300), or show
him to have learned anything from Elinor. Indeed, his position, if not his per-
sonality, makes him an echo of the other idle males including Robert Ferrars,
John Dashwood, Mr Palmer, Brandon’s brother and Willoughby who are, as
Claudia Johnson shows, part of a pattern in the novel of “weak, duplicitous
and selfish” men who have little purpose in life but to await, and then spend,
the money that they acquire through inheritance or marriage (Jane Austen
57–8).
An immature romantic, a manipulative egocentric and an irresponsible
naif—the leading males in this novel have little to offer the sisters or receive
from them in the way either of love or of mentorship. If we ask where the
strongest drive to educate and the most intense love come together in the
work, it becomes clear why Brandon and Edward are of so little account.
They cannot help but be nullities in the face of Elinor’s love for Marianne.
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, citing the bedroom scene in which Elinor observes
Marianne writing to Willoughby, claims it manifests elements of hetero-
, homo- and autoerotic love (138–9). However, Elinor’s love seems not so
much sexual as an emotion of such intensity that it preempts the develop-
ment of an intense loving relationship of any other kind, including the sexual,
with the men the sisters marry. Motivating her pressing desire to educate her
younger sister aright, it is the strongest emotion in the work, leaving room for
very little else. It may be measured by the need that Elinor feels to conceal its
strength, the fear that this bond may be threatened by love for others being
the most convincing explanation for Elinor’s continued unwillingness to ask
Marianne about Willoughby, as well as for her decision, which she justifies
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 223

as due to her promise to Lucy, to keep Edward’s situation a secret. Following

Elinor’s confession of her own misery, it seems her devotion is reciprocated
though to a lesser degree—Marianne’s is the love of a creature stunned and
damaged. Furthermore, as Marianne’s mentor, Elinor has apparently been
only too successful. All egoism drained, a young woman with a relationship to
her husband more characteristic of a George Eliot heroine emerges: “Mari-
anne found her own happiness in forming his” (379). It is a depressing pros-
pect, but it is also an unconvincing one, for, insofar as the novel can be said
to end happily, it does so because the sisters are not parted by marriage. The
emphasis of the final paragraph is skewed towards the relationship of the
sisters, to which all others are presented as adjuncts: “among the merits and
happiness of Elinor and Marianne, let it not be ranked as the least consider-
able, that though sisters, and living almost within sight of each other, they
could live without disagreement between themselves, or producing coolness
between their husbands” (380).
With the dubious exception of the sisters’ relationship, Sense and Sensi-
bility treats the possibility of love and mentorship with the dismissive savage-
ry of black humour. By contrast, Mansfield Park with its infinite range of greys
seems—and is—a very different type of work. Yet in its concerns with sibling
affection and its suspicions of love and mentorship, it shows Austen working
with similar issues although to very much more subtly conceived ends.

* * *

Mansfield Park is the novel that provokes the most disagreement among
Austen’s readers, both as to its merits and its author’s intentions. An exami-
nation of the pattern of the mentor-lover relationships within it suggests
that in part this is due to the fact that Austen, who elsewhere proved herself
aware of the potential for a darker side to such relationships by evading the
difficult questions, here risked exploring that darkness more fully. That in
neither the earlier Sense and Sensibility nor the later Persuasion does she make
the mentor-lover relationship central suggests the difficulty she found in
dealing with its challenges in those novels in which light-footed diversion-
ary tactics could not be employed under the guise of comedy. The problem
she faced has its parallel in an episode inside the novel itself when, in the
absence of Sir Thomas, Mr Yates infects the susceptible young people of
Mansfield Park with the compulsion to put on a play. The project almost
stalls over their inability to agree on an appropriate genre: there was “such a
need that the play should be at once both tragedy and comedy” (130).
But in Mansfield Park, comedy is relegated to the readers’ expectations and
the edges of the work: it ceases the moment the brisk and distanced summary
of the Ward sisters’ history modulates, in the course of a discussion of the pos-
224 Patricia Menon

sibility of fostering Fanny, into the exposure of an unhealthy and contagious

mentor-lover relationship. It commences again only in the last chapter with its
apparent endorsement of the belief that it really is possible to sort characters
into those “not greatly at fault themselves” and “the rest” (461).
However, this shift into a comic closure leads to a related cause of con-
troversy encouraged by Austen’s closing designation of characters as sheep or
goats. Repeatedly critics reject Fanny for Mary, or Edmund for Henry (or vice
versa), or characterize Mansfield, in Trilling’s words, “for the author as well as
the heroine [as] the Great Good Place” (169). Indeed one of the most striking
features of much of the published criticism of the work is that, although there
are changes in interpretation and preferences over time, the assumption that
characters and places of Mansfield Park should be considered symbols of good
or evil is remarkably persistent. Like all Austen’s novels, however, Mansfield
Park, at least when shorn of its closing, resists, as I shall argue, all attempts to
read it in a schematic way.
Given her desire (even at the cost of evasion) to demonstrate the pos-
sibility of achieving equality of love and moral stature by a passage through
and beyond mutual mentorship in Pride and Prejudice, Austen might have
been expected, in her next novel Mansfield Park, to push towards the same
satisfying resolution. And, as in the case of its predecessor, much in the
work suggests this is her purpose. Yet, ironically, the only example in the
novel of achieved mutuality in love and mentorship is kept in the wings,
hinted at through references to the play Lover’s Vows. “As you have for a
long time instructed me, why should I not now begin to teach you?” ap-
peals Amelia as she manoeuvres her tutor into admitting he reciprocates
her love. But this is a relationship that Austen keeps off the stage of the
novel and, although rehearsed by Edmund and Mary, is not finally enacted,
either in the drama or in their lives. The couple who appear to be the closest
approximation to Inchbald’s lovers, despite the differences in temperament
between the aggressive Amelia and the passive Fanny, are the cousins of
the concluding chapter. But theirs is a union requiring a more suspicious
examination than is often given, an examination Austen discourages both
through the appealing symmetry of their relationship and through belated
assertions of its desirability.
Pervading the novel is Austen’s development of a complex pattern of
fractured mentor-lover relationships: overlapping three-way combinations in
which a central figure of each trio cannot find in any one person the satisfac-
tion of both moral and passionate needs and who suffers as a consequence by
being divided between two people, one a lover and the other a mentor. Con-
sideration of the intertwined relationships of Edmund, Fanny, Mary, Henry,
Maria, Julia, Rushworth and Yates would illustrate many variations on this
theme, but the initial pattern may be traced to their elders, for the novel is a
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 225

cross-generational exploration of the relationship of mentorship and love. In

the triangle of Sir Thomas, Lady Bertram and Mrs Norris, lie the origins of
the moral, emotional and sexual disjunctions that corrupt the inhabitants of
Mansfield Park.
The conditions for tragedy in this relationship are early demonstrated
during the discussion of Fanny’s “adoption”. Sir Thomas Bertram is an Ar-
istotelian figure, neither vicious and depraved nor, despite his pretensions,
preeminent in virtue and justice. His tragic error has been his marriage to a
woman inadequate as both a lover and a mentor, with superficial sexual charms
but neither energy nor intelligence. The defence offered by the narrative voice,
that she “did not think deeply, but, guided by Sir Thomas, she thought justly
on all important points” (449), is less a compliment than a condemnation, for
this denies her fallible husband any response that might challenge his moral
complacency. Had he sufficient insight, Sir Thomas might well lament, in
the words of the stage baron of Lovers’ Vows, the consequences of choosing a
moral nullity for a wife: “I had no instructor but my passions; no governor but
my own will” (LV in MP 500).
But this would not be entirely true, for Sir Thomas has a sister-in-law
who, though lacking sexual appeal, has both energy and an intense desire to
manage others. Austen demonstrates, in the first discussion of Fanny’s future,
how the moral vacuum consequent on Sir Thomas’s choice of wife enables
Mrs Norris, while offering no overt challenge to his self-image as Grandi-
sonian mentor, to seize the wifely role for herself. The conquest is achieved
through the guise of submission, shared understanding and repeated flattery,
“I perfectly comprehend you, and do justice to the generosity and delicacy of
your notions” (6), embodying Austen’s caricature of the courtesy book recom-
mendations for the capture and pleasing of a husband in the interest of secur-
ing one’s own aims. In fact, in her relationship with Sir Thomas, Mrs Norris
has taken to heart the defence of conjugal obedience expressed in Hannah
More’s Coelebs in Search of a Wife:

this scrupled “obedience” is so far from implying degradation,

that it is connected with the injunction to the woman to “promote
good works” in her husband; [suggesting] a degree of influence
that raises her condition, and restores her to all the dignity of
equality; it makes her not only the associate but the inspirer of
his virtues. (I:5)1

Mrs Norris’s particular talent is to corrupt Sir Thomas’s better intentions

in the interest of gaining and holding power within his household. Because
it threatens her plans, she determinedly sweeps away his nervous, but justifi-
able, concern not to do a “cruelty instead of kindness” to a foster child (6)
226 Patricia Menon

by playing on his pride of blood: “I could never feel for this little girl the
hundredth part of the regard I bear your own dear children, nor consider
her, in any respect, so much my own” (7). Indeed, while her own husband is a
cypher who conveniently dies after only a shadowy appearance in the novel,
she often speaks as if she is actually the baronet’s wife: “A niece of our’s, Sir
Thomas. . .”—and when she corrects herself at such a time, it is more a mat-
ter of flattery than abdication of the wifely role: “or, at least of your’s, would
not grow up in this neighbourhood without many advantages” (6, emphasis
original). Equally striking is Sir Thomas’ responsiveness to this treatment,
sometimes giving the momentary impression of speaking as husband to wife:
“There will be some difficulty in our way, Mrs. Norris. . . . as to the distinction
proper to be made between the girls as they grow up” (10). As his speech (an
appropriate term) continues, Austen carefully lays bare the sources of his vul-
nerability: the blend of justifiable delicacy (Fanny will not have the financial
expectations that will make his own daughters more marriageable) with sheer
snobbery, concluding in a request that disguises his submission to his mentor
as a courtly invitation:

“It is a point of great delicacy, and you must assist us in our

endeavours to choose exactly the right line of conduct.”
Mrs. Norris was quite at his service; and though she perfectly
agreed with him as to its being a most difficult thing, encouraged
him to hope that between them it would be easily managed. (11)

The reminder of the existence of another wife (“assist us”) is no more

than a token; a nullity can have no place “between them”.
Austen creates an odd trio who are not only morally but emotionally
deficient, so that even the three “parents” together cannot provide the love
necessary for the children to thrive. Lady Bertram knows no other love than
self-love while Mrs Norris, as substitute mother, considers love to be a com-
bination of indulgence and flattery. As Austen insists, and as the clumsy at-
tempts of Sir Thomas to overcome his emotional woodenness show, good
intentions are not enough to counteract this destructive situation, and often
he is simply blind to the disastrously incremental effects of the contradictory
methods employed in his children’s upbringing.
But, most significantly, Austen suggests that Sir Thomas continues to be
in the power of sexual impulses of which he is only intermittently aware, and
is still prone to be affected by the charms of a young woman, or, negatively,
by their absence. Leaving for Antigua, he tactlessly expresses the hope that
William will find Fanny not “entirely without improvement—though I fear
he must find his sister at sixteen in some respects too much like his sister at
ten” (33). Though the meaning of this reproach is initially obscure, it may be
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 227

understood in the light of his reaction when he returns. For, while readers
often give him moral credit for softening towards Fanny soon after his return,
Austen suggests that this is in considerable part due to his niece’s improved
physical charms. His first reaction is his “observing with decided pleasure
how much she was grown!” (178). And lest “grown” is thought to be merely a
recognition that she is taller, Austen has Edmund assure Fanny, soon after,

“Your uncle thinks you very pretty, dear Fanny—and that is the
long and the short of the matter . . . the truth is, that your uncle
never did admire you till now—and now he does. Your complexion
is so improved!—and you have gained so much countenance!—and
your figure—Nay, Fanny, do not turn away about it—it is but an
uncle.” (197–8)

The deftness with which Austen so neatly skewers not only Sir Thomas but
the insensitive son who teasingly quotes him, while allowing the reader to
feel Fanny’s surprise, embarrassment and hurt, is characteristic of the dense
texture of the work.
Austen offers a portrait not so much of a man harbouring incestuous
lust but rather of one whose perception of any woman is shaped by her sexual
appeal, and who, because of his susceptibility, is fearful of the effects of sexual
attraction. His being “an advocate for early marriages” (317) implies not only
a distrust of Henry’s ability to remain faithful, but a more general concern
that male sexuality requires the containment of wedlock. He imputes Fanny’s
resistance to Henry Crawford, accurately, but against all appearances, to an
absence in his niece of what “a young, heated fancy imagines to be necessary
for happiness” (318) while he finds reassurance in the evidence that Ma-
ria plans to marry Rushworth “without the prejudice, the blindness of love”
(201), his relief suggesting a distrust of sexual attraction based on his own
experience, at some level regretted, with the former Maria Ward.
The evidence for Sir Thomas being a man emotionally improved by his
new awareness of Fanny following his return from Antigua is ambiguous at
best. Austen makes it clear that his recent awareness of Fanny as a sexual be-
ing also prompts his recognition that Henry is sufficiently attracted to her to
offer her an advantageous marriage. While the impetus of his own pleasure
in her “figure” might not have done more than propel her to an occasional
parsonage party, the possibility of Henry’s interest leads to the ball, and finally
to the exertion of pressure on Fanny to ensure she accepts this financially
desirable match.
Seen in this light, the episode of the schoolroom fire and Sir Thomas’s
half apology for Mrs Norris appear the result of Fanny’s new consequence,
rather than of avuncular tenderness on her uncle’s part. In his altered view of
228 Patricia Menon

the past, now illumined by Henry’s interest, it appears to him that his men-
tor Mrs Norris has encouraged a “misplaced distinction” and he therefore
urges Fanny to understand—adding distance to his apology by his use of the
third person—that “Though their caution may prove eventually unnecessary,
it was kindly meant” (313). His is a performance of self-deceiving shiftiness
that becomes despicable when combined with the alternations of cruelty and
“kindness” to which he subjects her. The hurtful accusations

that you can and will decide for yourself, without any consideration
or deference for those who have surely some right to guide you—
without even asking their advice (318)

are so undeserved yet so accurately aimed at Fanny’s greatest fears that they
seem deliberately chosen to cause the greatest pain to a girl he acknowledges
to be “very timid, and exceedingly nervous” (320). The accusations roll on,
prudently suspended for tactical reasons to be replaced by the provision of
warmth in the schoolroom and the partial (but only partial) shielding from
Mrs Norris, acts that make Fanny’s unmerited sense of guilt all the greater,
while revealing how even genuine (if limited) sympathy and awareness can
be perverted. At the very moment when Sir Thomas, unwilling to tell Mrs
Norris about Henry’s proposal for tactical reasons, appears most clearly to
separate himself from his mentor, Austen allows him to reveal that he has
actually taken on his sister-in-law’s role, pointing up the similarity through
commentary:

Sir Thomas, indeed, was, by this time, not very far from classing
Mrs Norris as one of those well-meaning people, who are always
doing mistaken and very disagreeable things. (332)

After a tirade from Mrs Norris against Fanny’s “independence” it seems to

Sir Thomas, motivated by a Norris-like conviction of rightness, that “noth-
ing could be more unjust, though he had been so lately expressing the same
sentiments himself ” (324). And Fanny is assured “You cannot suppose me
capable of trying to persuade you to marry against your inclinations” (330)
even as he plans to transfer the task of overt persuasion to Henry Crawford,
and, later, to Edmund.
The best light in which Sir Thomas’s scheme for the Portsmouth trip can
be seen is another act of “well-meaning zeal”, carried out in ignorance of the
conditions there and of how oppressive his niece will find them. What cannot
be justified is his abandonment of Fanny: it is only after Maria and Julia have
run off that he sends for her, and then not for her own good but, as Edmund
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 229

correctly thinks, “for my mother’s sake” (442) and to have an excuse to get
Edmund away from London (452). At the end of the penultimate chapter
there is no evidence he has unlearned his mentor’s lessons in his own treat-
ment of Fanny, although that mentor, having done all the damage of which
she is capable, has been reduced to an impotence that makes her, when not
“irritated . . . in the blindness of her anger” at Fanny, a parody of her placid
sister: “quieted, stupefied, indifferent” (448).

* * *

This primary triangle, with Sir Thomas at its apex, is the source of the
moral and emotional corruption of the Bertram children in Mansfield
Park, and as such is fully worked out in the course of the novel in such a
way as to make a very persuasive case for the dangers resulting from the
separation of the roles of lover and mentor and upon deficient love and
mentorship. In Edmund’s case his Aristotelian fall is not due, any more
than his father’s, to vice and depravity. He has been protected from the
worst of the inf luences shaping his siblings by the long-understood need
for him to take up a profession and his solid, quiet temperament leading
to his interest in the Church. The inheritance of some characteristics
from his father, a seriousness and an acceptance of established principles,
has contributed to an easier relationship between them, freeing Edmund
to some extent from the fear and resentment that the other children feel.
And Austen both names and reveals Edmund’s best quality, “the gentle-
ness of an excellent nature” (15) when, at sixteen, he perceives and soothes
some measure of his cousin’s misery. Sir Thomas’s damaged impulses to
kindness have clearly survived in Edmund in a stronger and more admi-
rable form, capable of open expression. From the beginning he becomes
Fanny’s mentor, giving her “a great deal of good advice” and she feels she
has “a friend” (17). The echoes of Grandison’s inscription of himself to
Clementina as “Tutor, Friend, Brother” (616) ring warmly here until one
remembers what a tangle Richardson’s pair got themselves into.
But Austen suggests that Edmund has acquired some of his father’s
conventionality and emotional blindness, as capable as everyone else of ex-
pecting Fanny to adjust with ease to her new life until he is forced into aware-
ness by finding her crying. From the beginning, he establishes a pattern that is
to be a constant in their relationship. He attempts to shape her responses for
her, simplifies the causes of her misery to fit the orthodox terms he expects,
and then, ostensibly for her own good, gently gives a conventional reason to
behave as the family desires while falsifying their feelings out of a convenient
blindness:
230 Patricia Menon

“You are sorry to leave Mamma, my dear little Fanny,” said he,
“which shows you to be a very good girl; but you must remember
that you are with relations and friends, who all love you, and wish
to make you happy.” (15)

That this is no isolated response is clear when Austen provides a later

parallel in the less forgivable advice he offers Fanny when she is fifteen and
expected to move to the home of the newly widowed Mrs Norris. Fanny, “in
distress”, tells him of the shocking news: “Well, Fanny, and if the plan were not
unpleasant to you, I should call it an excellent one” (25). In a lengthy series of
justifications, Edmund shows he is as gullible as his father in thinking that his
aunt will take Fanny on. Worse still, he is either capable of deceiving himself
about his aunt’s character and the benefits to Fanny from the scheme or of lying
to his cousin, instead of attempting to protect her from the future she dreads.
Some of his father’s insensitivity to the depth of another’s feelings must play
a part, along with a convenient allegiance to the principle of filial respect that
excuses him from considering the possibility of challenging a parental decision.
Fanny’s protests punctuate his advice, but by the end he brings her to concede:

“I cannot see things as you do; but I ought to believe you to be right
rather than myself, and I am very much obliged to you for trying to
reconcile me to what must be.” (27)

Austen draws a parallel here to Mrs Norris’s flattering treatment of

Edmund’s father, but Fanny’s response is in some ways more dangerous by
reason of its differences. Its very sincerity, her belief she should trust to his
view rather than her own endanger Edmund’s ability to examine his motives
critically. His “excellent nature” makes him more subtly vulnerable: a Mrs
Norris, though capable of manipulating his father, could not overset his
judgment of himself as Fanny can.
In both of these instances, Austen shows Edmund’s habitual mode, even
when uninfluenced by such special circumstances as the willed blindness in-
duced by having fallen in love. But once he has met Mary, the moral weak
spots in Edmund crack open to reveal, not merely a loss of sensitivity to
Fanny’s welfare and feelings, but a willingness to employ tactics strongly re-
sembling his father’s. Alone, unsupported, guilty, Fanny has withstood every
pressure to accept Henry Crawford. Edmund, the only person who might
sustain her, apprised of the situation by his father, responds manipulatively
(and characteristically):

“So far your conduct has been faultless, and they were quite mistaken
who wished you to do otherwise. . . . But (with an affectionate smile),
let him succeed at last, Fanny, let him succeed at last. . . .”
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 231

“. . . I wish he had known you as well as I do, Fanny. Between us, I
think we should have won you. . . . I cannot suppose that you have
not the wish to love him—the natural wish of gratitude. You must
have some feeling of that sort. You must be sorry for your own
indifference.” (347, 348, emphasis original)

Hoping, as on previous occasions, for his support, she is thrown what looks
like a lifeline, only to find herself pulled deeper into guilt and isolation.
Austen’s unusual interpolation of a stage direction in the form of his “affec-
tionate smile”, draws attention to the theatricality of his performance, the
refusal to recognize Fanny’s anguish and the artificial insistence on a warm,
shared, understanding. Fanny’s objections are swept away as they always
have been, Edmund “scarcely hearing her to the end” (349). Austen shows
that all that is new since their very first conversation is Edmund’s uncon-
scious incorporation into the argument of his own concerns about Mary
Crawford. It may be too much to expect of Edmund that he recognize that
Fanny loves him, but Austen suggests it isn’t modesty that blinds him, but
insensitivity. The dreadful blundering joviality of “Between us, I think we
might have won you” in reference to Henry echoes his earlier heavy-handed
account of the nature of his father’s admiration, and offers a reminder of his
father’s blindness to others’ feelings.
Austen marks the episode from its beginning to its end with signs of
Edmund’s treachery. He is clearly aware of the emotional satisfaction attached
to the role of mentor and he attempts to use it to further Henry’s cause:

“a most fortunate man he is to attach himself to such a creature—to

a woman, who firm as a rock in her own principles, has a gentleness
of character so well adapted to recommend them. . . . I know he will
make you happy; but you will make him every thing.”
“I would not engage in such a charge,” cried Fanny in a shrink-
ing accent, “in such an office of high responsibility!”
“As usual believing yourself unequal to anything!” (351)

It is a well-honed routine, but one to which Fanny no longer re-

sponds to with conviction: “Fanny could with difficulty give the smile that
was here asked for. Her feelings were all in revolt” (354); her smile, again
scripted by Edmund, is as artificial as his had been. Austen signals that
the betrayal is complete when Edmund, recognizing further talk is useless
“led her directly with the kind authority of a privileged guardian into the
house” (355). The identification of father and son is confirmed when they
agree on the same tactics, Edmund subsequently showing no more interest
in her welfare than his father, making contact only in so far as his need for
a confidante arises.
232 Patricia Menon

But the resemblances between father and son as mentors also have some
disconcerting echoes in their nature as lovers. In Mrs Norris’s favour it should
be noted that she had been psychologically correct in predicting that Fanny’s
position would prevent Tom or Edmund falling in love with his cousin. For
Edmund, as Mrs Norris predicts, Fanny remains friend, cousin and, after his
rejection of Mary, “My Fanny—my only sister—my only comfort now” (444);
it is the un-sisterly and un-Fanny-like Mary Crawford with whom he falls
in love:

Active and fearless, and, though rather small, strongly made, she
seemed formed for a horsewoman; and to the pure genuine pleasure
of the exercise, something was probably added in Edmund’s
attendance and instructions. (66–7)

Mary’s physical vitality and confidence, her conscious pleasure in her own
sexual attractiveness, and a willingness to take the lead (it is she who sug-
gests they “rise to a canter” although Edmund is nominally giving “instruc-
tions”) make Edmund her very willing pupil (67).
Indeed, in this couple Austen initially presents a wholly engaging depic-
tion of mutual sexual attraction. But she also shows Edmund to be son to Sir
Thomas and Lady Bertram, and as such, shaped by their marriage. For this
very reason, Mary’s active self-assertion, so unlike his mother’s manner, both
attracts and frightens him. Son, too, of Mrs Norris, he struggles to dissociate
Mary from a kind of “liveliness” he has learned to dislike: “there is . . . nothing
sharp, or loud, or coarse. She is perfectly feminine, except in the instances we
have been speaking of. There she cannot be justified.” His frequent discussions
with Fanny are designed to elicit a reassurance from her that he is right to
judge Mary’s “lively mind” to be “untinctured by ill humour or roughness”
even before he knows her views on marriage or the clergy. But his uncertainty
necessitates a preemption of criticism, “I am glad you saw it all as I did”.
As Austen begins the long process of testing the reader’s judgment of Miss
Crawford in all her complexity, she is careful to offer a reminder that Fanny
is no unbiased observer. Even if jealousy played no part, she could not follow
Edmund in “a line of admiration” powered by the magnetic force of sexual
attraction (64, emphasis original).
Mary, despite her good qualities, is deeply flawed as a result of her up-
bringing by an unfaithful uncle and an unhappy aunt: unthinkingly merce-
nary and cynical in her view of marriage and frighteningly willing to abet
her brother’s campaigns of emotional plunder. When she speaks to Fanny of
Henry’s courtship, her willingness to do so in terms of power—“your con-
quest”, “your power over Henry” who “glories in his chains” (360), and “the
glory of fixing one who has been shot at by so many; of having it in one’s
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 233

power to pay off the debts of one’s sex” (363)—reveals not only her acceptance
of power as the basis of relations of men and women, but also her low valu-
ation of love, which to her is worth only the most hackneyed of clichés. She
is obsessed with attacking Edmund’s chosen profession, in part for worldly
reasons and in part in reaction against the example of her brother-in-law. Yet,
despite all her defences, conscious and unconscious, she, like Fanny, is attract-
ed to Edmund by his virtues: “There was a charm, perhaps, in his sincerity, his
steadiness, his integrity, which Miss Crawford might be equal to feel, though
not equal to discuss with herself ” (65).
If Edmund is to make headway as Mary’s mentor as well as her lover,
it seems more likely that his conduct rather than his speech will convert her.
Austen neatly has him both enunciate and illustrate this point as he defends
the clergy:

“The manners I speak of, might rather be called conduct, perhaps,

the result of good principles; the effect, in short, of those doctrines
which it is their duty to teach and recommend; and it will, I believe,
be every where found, that as the clergy are, or are not what they
ought to be, so are the rest of the nation.”
“Certainly,” said Fanny with gentle earnestness.
“There,” cried Miss Crawford, “you have quite convinced Miss
Price already.” (93, emphasis original)

The carefully constructed pronouncements provoke flippancy from his new-

est pupil and at their last meeting, when Mary lashes out defensively under
his rebuke: “A pretty good lecture upon my word. Was it part of your last
sermon?” (458), it is his propensity to preach and his choice of the role of
public mentor that she chooses to insult.
In the end, Edmund’s conduct and character aren’t sufficient to combat
the effects of Mary’s preconceptions and the influence of her upbringing and
friends, although her wit and liveliness appeal as much to the reader as to Ed-
mund. Indeed, Austen herself seems to have realized the reader might have
difficulty with, in the phrase of Samuel Johnson, such a “mixed character” and,
anxious to preclude confusion, to have been guilty of putting her own finger
unnecessarily on the scales when she has Mary write to Fanny of the possible
advantages of Tom’s death.
Edmund’s reactions to Mary in their final meeting are not just a simple
victory of right over wrong. Something seems amiss when he repeats a charge
he formerly denied in the early stages of his love when he had defended her
as “feminine” against his own doubts of her propriety. Repelled by Mary’s
worldly attempts to hush matters up and designate the elopement “folly” he
struggles to express his sense of her failings: “No reluctance, no horror, no
234 Patricia Menon

feminine—shall I say? no modest loathings!” (454–5). For Edmund, the word

“feminine” indicates a belief in a double standard, not only of speech but of
moral judgment, although nothing else in Austen’s work suggests that she
herself believed standards of judgment should differ by gender. This must be
Edmund’s problem, one more inheritance from his father.
It is at his final meeting with Mary, or at least in his retrospective ac-
count of it to Fanny, that Edmund, so appealingly open to Mary’s sexual at-
traction in the course of the novel, appears to revert under stress to something
more resembling Sir Thomas’s distrust:

“I had gone a few steps, Fanny, when I heard the door open behind
me. ‘Mr. Bertram,’ said she, with a smile—but it was a smile ill-
suited to the conversation that had passed, a saucy playful smile,
seeming to invite, in order to subdue me; at least, it appeared so to
me. I resisted. . . .” (459)

As Anne Mellor notes, Mary is “finally depicted as little better than a

prostitute, beckoning seductively from a doorway” (58). It’s impossible to
know whether Edmund’s impressions correspond to Mary’s intentions; he
himself is unsure. More significant is the fact that he interprets the appeal
as a sexual one, designed to override his moral judgment, to “invite” and
“subdue”. His disgust makes him particularly susceptible to the attractions
of a docile, sisterly creation of his own who will not, like Mary, attempt to
“subdue” him through sexual attraction: “Fanny’s friendship was all that he
had to cling to” (460). Austen, of course, is already setting us up for another
world, the world of comedy in the last chapter in which, to the hero’s sur-
prise, he unexpectedly finds love where he least expects it, but this should
not obscure her delineation of Edmund’s revulsion from an apparent sexual
appeal as an inheritance from his father.
No critic denies that either Sir Thomas or Edmund has his faults; the
more usual response is to judge those faults as forgivable. Fanny, however,
has frequently been seen (with admiration or horror) as being intended by
Austen to be perfect.2 Even the Bakhtinian Baldridge denies the novel the
dialogic status it so richly deserves: “the static career of whose immaculate
heroine stands at cross purposes with the formal requirements of the genre
she inhabits” (62). It is a relief, therefore, to find critics resisting the pressure
of the novel’s closing to discuss Fanny as a complex human being. Roger
Gard, for example, maintains that “Fanny’s judgments (those that have a
hint of the mean-minded or mealy-mouthed) and her excessive decorum,
are typically responses to threats to her precariously held calm” (131–2). John
Wiltshire argues that “Jane Austen’s representation of Fanny’s psychology
is so full and intricate that it causes conflict within the novel’s ethical, and
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 235

ultimately conventional, structure” (108), a statement that can equally well

be applied to Austen’s representation of its mentor-lover relationships. The
outward manifestations of Fanny’s insecurity have, through time, appealed
or repelled depending on both the individual and cultural predilections of
the reader. But Austen explores more complex issues: whether, with Fanny’s
particular combination of interrelated weaknesses and strengths, she can
live an independent moral life, whether her relationship with Edmund is
advantageous to both, and whether she will share Edmund’s ambivalent
attitude to sex.
Though the detrimental effects of Fanny’s admiration on her mentor
are clear, his care for her seems, initially at least, to be wholly beneficial. But,
just as the consequences of her grateful devotion enable Edmund to avoid
judging himself by calling on her approval, so the relationship has risks for
Fanny, for whom his love and his mentorship have always been linked. It isn’t
surprising, then, to find a seventeen-year-old Fanny hastening to agree with
Edmund that Miss Crawford is “very indecorous” (63), both out of a desire to
demonstrate she has learned her lessons in propriety as well as out of inklings
of rivalry. Nor is it unexpected that she should learn with pain that her role is
not to agree with his criticisms but to refute them.
But, as a consequence of Fanny’s demure demeanour, what is easier
to miss (at least on the evidence of most critical readings) is how quickly
after the Crawfords’ arrival, Fanny’s love for Edmund develops a sexual
element. Tony Tanner, for example, considers that the closing of the novel
demonstrates Austen’s “purposeful—deliberate—intentions to abstain from
the whole realm of sexual feelings” (173). Roger Gard believes that Fanny
is “neither saintly nor sexy” although, as he points out, some find saintliness
erotic (130), a position supported by Hannah More’s recommendation in
Coelebs that modesty is sexually exciting (I:89). But although Sir Thomas
and Henry Crawford (undoubtedly both supporters of the conduct-book
ethos) are reassured and excited by what they see as a contrast between her
unfeigned modesty and her sexual development, Austen goes further than
this, showing that Fanny, though unaware others might find her sexually
attractive until Edmund teases her about his father, is certainly conscious
of her own sexuality. The situation is complicated by Fanny’s status. Mrs
Norris’s belief that the cousins, having been brought up as “brothers and
sisters” (6) will not fall in love, while true of Edmund, has been nullified for
Fanny by her sense of herself as an outsider, ironically perpetuated by Mrs
Norris herself (the issue of whether such love is incestuous is best consid-
ered later in this chapter).
Austen’s willingness to allow Fanny a sexual life is further impressive
testimony to an authorial interest that most critics have denied or ignored.
On the second day of Mary’s riding lessons, the waiting Fanny is forgotten,
236 Patricia Menon

and she walks to where she can see the cheerful group admiring the riding of
the physically intrepid Mary:

[Fanny] could not turn her eyes from the meadow, she could not
help watching all that passed. . . . Edmund was close to [Mary], he
was speaking to her, he was evidently directing her management of
the bridle, he had hold of her hand; she saw it, or the imagination
supplied what the eye could not reach. (67)

As she watches, Fanny passes from child to sexually aware woman, from
sulkiness to jealousy. That she is capable not just of seeing, not even just of
imagining, but of recognizing the possibility she is imagining, that Edmund
“had hold of [Mary’s] hand” marks her sexual awareness though she is quick
to attempt to deny significance to what she sees:

She must not wonder at all this; what could be more natural than
that Edmund should be making himself useful, and proving his
good nature by any one? (67)

But the statement is concluded with a question mark; Edmund’s interest,

though “natural”, is not simple “good nature”; and Miss Crawford is not
“anyone”, as Fanny now very well knows. There really is no possibility for
Fanny to retreat back to childhood from this moment.
And, indeed, the atmosphere of Mansfield, liberated from the oppression
of Sir Thomas’s presence, is permeated with sexuality released and encouraged
by the arrival of the Crawfords, and given expression through the decision to
enact Lovers’ Vows. Mary, much against her will, is unable to maintain the sexual
and emotional detachment that has hitherto protected her from more than a
mercenary interest in men, while Henry’s skilful playing of one sister against
the other flourishes on his indifference and their self-centred inability to resist
his manipulations. That a good deal of both Edmund’s hostility and attraction
to the play can be seen in terms of hostility and attraction to the atmosphere
of sexual excitement it promotes is clear. But what Austen also suggests is that
Fanny’s contribution to their shared but faltering resistance is driven by the
same mixed motives as her mentor’s. This isn’t, of course, what Fanny admits
to herself: “For her own gratification she could have wished that something
might be acted, for she had never seen even half a play, but every thing of
higher consequence was against it” (131). But she is alert, with the empathy of
a fellow-sufferer “connected only by [her] consciousness” (163) to Julia’s “agita-
tions of jealousy” (136, emphasis original), while her astonishment at the choice
of play when she reads it can only be exacerbated by the recognition that her
predicament would be even more “improper for home representation” (137)
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 237

than that of the play’s heroine, Amelia. Like the character, she is in love with
her mentor but without Amelia’s belief that the emotion is reciprocated or her
superior social standing. But it is the expression of love rather than the feelings
themselves that Fanny consciously repudiates: “the language of [Amelia], so
unfit to be expressed by any woman of modesty” (137).
Austen doesn’t simplify Fanny’s reaction to acting to virtuous or prig-
gish distaste, instead revealing the mixture of moral qualms, disappoint-
ment, jealousy and self-pity she feels when Edmund “consults” her about
his taking a role:

Her heart and her judgment were equally against Edmund’s

decision; she could not acquit his unsteadiness; and his happiness
under it made her wretched. She was full of jealousy and agitation.
Miss Crawford came with looks of gaiety which seemed an
insult. . . . She alone was sad and insignificant. (159)

But Austen goes further, offering a much more ambiguous account of

Fanny’s “innocent” reaction to the highly charged rehearsals, once they
begin, when she, unlike Julia, becomes involved in them:

Fanny believed herself to derive as much innocent enjoyment from

the play as any of them;—Henry Crawford acted well, and it was a
pleasure to her to creep into the theatre, and attend the rehearsal of
the first act—in spite of the feelings it excited in some speeches for
Maria.—Maria she also thought acted well—too well;—and after
the first rehearsal or two, Fanny began to be their only audience,
and—sometimes as a prompter, sometimes as spectator—was
often very useful.—As far as she could judge, Mr. Crawford was
considerably the best actor of all. (165, emphasis original).

From the retrospective position of Henry’s reading of Henry the Eighth,

Fanny’s fascination with the rehearsals is passed off (by Fanny or the narra-
tive voice) as a simple attraction to the theatre:

His acting had first taught Fanny what pleasure a play might give,
and his reading brought all his acting before her again; nay, perhaps
with greater enjoyment, for it came unexpectedly, and with no such
drawback as she had been used to suffer in seeing him on the stage
with Miss Bertram. (337)

But “drawback” seems a mild term in view of the fact that even the sophis-
ticated Mary finds the performance of Maria and Henry (“one of the times
238 Patricia Menon

when they were trying not to embrace”) so blatantly erotic that she feels she
must protect her brother from even the imperceptive Rushworth’s growing
suspicions by pretending to admire the “maternal ” in Maria’s performance
(169, emphases original). Justified by being “useful”, “Fanny believed herself
to derive as much innocent enjoyment from the play as any of them”, but, in
the ferment of strong sexual and emotional excitement that the play engen-
ders, the comparison says nothing more of Fanny’s innocence than that the
others are far from innocent and she wishes to deceive herself, a self-decep-
tion that strongly resembles that of her mentor Edmund. Her discernment
of the situation is too sharp for an innocent, but she cannot keep away,
drawn to the overtly sexual spectacle.
The climax comes with the arrival (tellingly in Fanny’s domain-by-de-
fault, the schoolroom) of Mary asking that Fanny read Edmund’s part so
that Mary can practise Amelia’s speeches of love to her stage (and would-be
real) mentor-lover, then of Edmund himself with the mirror image of this
request. The convergence of real and theatrical roles are painfully appropriate
punishment for Fanny’s having been tempted into the role of voyeur in the
scenes between Maria and Henry. It is a scene in which Austen makes every
detail count. Mary’s assumption that Fanny can have no sexual interest in
Edmund, “But then he is your cousin, which makes all the difference” and
her conflation of the two: “You must rehearse it with me, that I may fancy you
in him, and get on by degrees, You have the look of his sometimes” (168–9,
emphases original) puts Fanny in the discomfiting position of taking the role
of the mentor who has moulded her in his likeness, as well as reminding her
of her questionable position in loving a cousin. Her awareness is reinforced by
Edmund’s arrival and his delight in being able to alter his plan from rehears-
ing with Fanny to using her as prompt for his acting as mentor with Mary,
doubly ironic in view of his final return to Fanny. Even Mary’s conversion of
the schoolroom chairs, “not made for the theatre” but “more fitted for little
girls”, into furniture supporting declarations of theatrical love and real sexual
interest serves as a reminder of the discontinuity between the maturity of
Fanny’s emotions and the family’s consignment of her to the limbo of the ex-
schoolroom and being neither “in” nor “out” (48–9). Only a renewed request
that she take a role in the play forces her to articulate the strength of the
unsuspected power that drew her to the rehearsals, while leaving her unable,
or unwilling, to admit to herself the strength of the compulsion: “She was
properly punished” (172).
Though Sir Thomas’s return provides a brief respite for Fanny, it is fol-
lowed by the much greater ordeal of being subjected to pressure from all
those who claim to know best on Fanny’s behalf, to accept an unwelcome
suitor. That Austen intended to point a parallel between Sir Thomas the slave-
owner and his desire to “sell” Fanny to the highest bidder has become part of
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 239

the critical argument deriving from the Antiguan visit (Sutherland xxiii–xxv)
and Brian Southam provides details of Austen’s personal connections with
Antiguan estates that make it difficult to argue that Austen was not aware of
the implications of choosing such a destination (“Silence” 493–8).
More hotly disputed is the significance of the visit as an indicator
of Austen’s own assumptions. We never learn Sir Thomas’s attitude to the
slave trade as such, as his reply to Fanny is not reported (the family’s “dead
silence” and Fanny’s diffidence cause the subject to be dropped, 197–8) al-
though, given the date, he is certainly a slave owner, and, as Southam sug-
gests, perhaps his uncharacteristic failure to pursue the conversation de-
notes his embarrassment. But is Austen on Sir Thomas’s side? Edward Said
believes she is (Culture 80–97), but his reading of the novel in the tradition
of Trilling’s “Great Good Place” (“Mansfield Park” 169), as if Mansfield Park
and its owner (and therefore the wealth from the West Indian plantation)
are endorsed by Austen, is an oversimplification dependent on giving the
closing chapter more weight than the remainder of the novel.3 On the oth-
er hand, sweeping statements of any kind concerning Austen’s intentions to
condemn slavery and suggest Fanny herself is enslaved seem out of place
here. The actions of the navy to which Austen’s admired brothers belonged,
and into which Anne Elliot so joyfully married, contributed to defence of
colonies that had long depended on slavery. And while Austen’s references
to Sir Thomas’s source of wealth implicitly criticize his assumption of a
right and duty to think for others, including finding his children homes
with a wealthy “bidder”, it is too crude a formulation to equate Fanny di-
rectly with Sir Thomas’s enslaved workers. The echoes from those distant
plantations, however, may be heard (though perhaps with more resonance
by readers today) in Fanny’s recognition that her duty as a dependent is
to obey her uncle, and they provide an appropriate backdrop to her inner
conflict. As Maaja Stewart points out, the “real issue in the drawing room
[is] Fanny’s wish to please Sir Thomas” (122). Her resistance to him over
Henry’s proposal is therefore all the more impressive.
Henry’s first urge to make “a small hole in Fanny Price’s heart” is ini-
tiated by his response (resembling that of Sir Thomas) to “the wonderful
improvement” in her looks (229), strengthened by an egotistical desire to
overcome her manifest dislike of him (230). It is at this point, with evident
intent, that Austen suggests the resemblance between sexual and sibling love,
bringing Fanny and William together in a relationship which, were it not
identified by the context as fraternal, would surely be difficult for a reader to
distinguish from the sexual. Often considered a creator of cool love scenes,
Austen ensures that this reunion is all warmth, lit by “the glow of Fanny’s
cheek, the brightness of her eye. . . .” It is a scene in which Austen explores
the complex effects on the watching Henry Crawford, who has “moral taste
240 Patricia Menon

enough to value” her obvious capacity for “feeling, genuine feeling” while her
physical attractions pique his desire to “excite the first ardours of her young,
unsophisticated mind” (235).
Austen must know what she is doing here, deliberately evoking a watch-
er’s sexual response to the intensity of this sibling love, a step particularly
daring because the narrative voice has just been praising the “fraternal” over
the “conjugal tie”:

Fanny had never known so much felicity in her life, as in this

unchecked, equal, fearless intercourse with the brother and friend
. . . with whom . . . all the evil and good of their earliest years could
be gone over again, and every former united pain and pleasure
retraced with the fondest recollection. An advantage this, a
strengthener of love, in which even the conjugal tie is beneath the
fraternal. Children of the same family, the same blood, with the
same first associations and habits have some means of enjoyment in
their power, which no subsequent connections can supply. (234–5)

Of course, it is notoriously difficult in an Austen novel to find the exact

point at which the narrative voice or the character’s thoughts take or give up
control, but it seems to me that “An advantage this . . .” has too generalizing
a tone to be Fanny’s, the question being, rather, whether the narrative voice
is endorsed by Austen, which can best be decided by the course of the work
as a whole.
This is a part of the novel that has provoked a variety of responses.
In a detailed reading, attentive to the complexities of a very knotty pas-
sage (one that he finds “profoundly unsettling”) Brian Crick suggests that it
might be paraphrased as “can the estrangement between a brother and sister
who have been especially fond of one another ever be justified by marrying
someone from outside the family circle?” (81), tracing the implications of
this passage for the relative valuing of familial and marital love through the
work to the novel’s close, where “the tell-tale signs of irresolution” (104–
5) mark Austen’s treatment of Fanny’s marriage to her surrogate brother.
Glenda Hudson, however, has no qualms at all about the appropriateness of
“fraternal love” as the basis for marriage, believing Austen intends us to see
Mansfield Park as preserved and revivified, concluding that “the incestuous
marriage of Fanny and Edmund is healing and curative . . . a retreat to fam-
ily life is appropriate and necessary to solidify moral standards” (“Consoli-
dated Communities” 109).
With a view that is radically different from Hudson’s, Claudia Johnson
discerns in the work Austen’s creation of a pattern of incestuous eroticism
displayed in references throughout the work, not only in Fanny’s interest in
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 241

William (easily transferred to Edmund) but also the comments of both Sir
Thomas and Fanny’s own father, the latter making his daughter the “object
of a coarse joke” (MP 389). Johnson links fraternal and cousinly affection to
the erotic interest shown by these father figures, maintaining that Austen
builds up “a sustained body of detail that invites us to reconsider conserva-
tive political arguments which idealize familial love” ( Johnson, Jane Austen
117–18).
However, though there are, as I have argued, striking parallels between
Edmund and his father, there are also significant differences. To treat the two
as one, and then to conflate both with William on one hand and Mr Price
on the other neglects Austen’s carefully drawn distinctions—we surely do not
feel the same distaste for William and Fanny’s love that we feel for Mr Price’s
joke nor Sir Thomas’s stiffer admiration. Nor does a wholesale attack on fa-
milial love explain the troubling endorsement of the cousins’ marriage at the
close of the work. I also find it difficult to read the passage on the “conjugal”
and “fraternal” ties as ironic to the discredit of the fraternal. It seems to me
that Austen does indeed find Fanny’s love for William attractive and does
rate “fraternal” love so highly that she wishes to bestow its attributes on the
“conjugal”, in so doing recognizing the element of the sexual that is a compo-
nent of such a strong emotion.
There are a number of responses the reader may make to this messy prob-
lem. It would be easy to simply dismiss this sibling love as “incestuous” and thus
automatically objectionable (subsequently either condemning Austen for en-
dorsing it or arguing, as Johnson does, that Austen herself condemns it). But as
Sybil Wolfram has demonstrated in her study of kinship, the definitions of in-
cest and arguments usually advanced against it vary from one society to another
and each argument can in turn be shown to be illogical (137–96).4 She points
out that the most common popular objection is that the offspring are likely
to be defective, a view she counters by arguing from genetics that “inbreeding
intensifies characteristics, but good as well as bad” (145). As a justification of
Fanny’s marriage to Edmund, however, this may prove no defence at all if the
intensified characteristics (symbolic rather than genetic) are indeed “bad” and
the relationship is based on a retreat from maturity.
The problem of “fraternal” love adds to the reader’s difficulty in assess-
ing the intricately linked causes of Fanny’s resistance to Henry Crawford and
the pressures brought to bear on her by Sir Thomas and Edmund, revealing
just how complicated, difficult, and sometimes fortuitous Austen perceives
human choice to be. Fanny, with great difficulty given her desperate need
to please, withstands the accusations of ingratitude and selfishness, and the
implicit threats to deprive her of all she cares about. She asserts by her resis-
tance that her judgment is superior to that of Sir Thomas who has permit-
ted his daughter to marry Rushworth and to that of Edmund who, in his
242 Patricia Menon

pursuit of Mary, has compromised his principles. That the same principles
have proved ineffectual to guide the other young people suggests that it is
Fanny’s exclusion from Mrs Norris’s indulgence that has helped to safeguard
her, but the matter is not entirely straightforward, for Fanny’s greatest protec-
tion has been her hidden love for Edmund, and her high valuation of mutual
love. Moral integrity and love together give Fanny strength to overcome her
weaknesses, but Austen makes no claim here that the connection between
passion and judgment is anything but coincidental, for, while love gives Fan-
ny strength because it supports her principles, it weakens Edmund because it
runs counter to his.
When Fanny is recalled to Mansfield Park from Portsmouth, her moods
swing violently: initially considering “the greatest blessing to every one of
kindred with Mrs. Rushworth would be instant annihilation” (442), she sub-
sequently feels “in the greatest danger of being exquisitely happy, while so
many were miserable” (443). Edmund’s arrival at Portsmouth and his “violent
emotions”, “brought back all her own first feelings” (445, 444)—but soon she
feels “enjoyment” in seeing the beauties of the Mansfield grounds, followed
by “melancholy again” (447). Such mixed and fleeting reactions are both natu-
ral and understandable, but, when Edmund comes to unburden himself, de-
claring he “would infinitely prefer any increase of the pain of parting, for the
sake of carrying with me the right of tenderness and esteem” (458), Fanny’s
resolve hardens. Edmund’s self-centred reiteration of his miseries is certainly
irritating (and Mary’s revelations to Fanny outrageous, if unconvincingly out
of character), but what follows is a ruthlessness worthy of Mrs Norris:

Fanny . . . felt more than justified in adding to his knowledge of

[Mary’s] real character. . . . He submitted to believe, that Tom’s
illness had influenced her; only reserving for himself this consoling
thought, that considering the many counteractions of opposing
habits, she had certainly been more attached to him than could have
been expected, and for his sake had been more near doing right.
Fanny thought exactly the same; and they were also quite agreed
in their opinion of the lasting effect, the indelible impression,
which such a disappointment must make on his mind . . . and as
to his ever meeting with any other woman who could—it was too
impossible to be named but with indignation. Fanny’s friendship
was all that he had to cling to. (459–60)

The nature of Fanny’s triumph is dubious, her actions suggesting not

only a decision to cause pain in order to speed up the cure, but, much worse,
also a smug conviction of rightness: “more than justified”. Her actions here
present a contrast to her earlier refusal to use her knowledge of Henry’s
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 243

behaviour with Maria to discredit him and release herself from Sir Thomas’s
pressure. Fanny, whose changing language has charted her course from the
alternations of the “girlish” and “bookish” to the maturity of Portsmouth, as
Kenneth Moler demonstrates (172–9), now regresses to the dangerous role of
admirer though now sustained by hypocritical reassurances: “Fanny thought
exactly the same, and they were also quite agreed in their opinion”. But there
is a difference: that “they were quite agreed” becomes “he submitted to be-
lieve” and their relationship completes the shift into what it had always had
the potential to be: a vehicle for ruthless management methods resembling,
though more subtle than, those of Mrs Norris. To say that Mrs Norris and Sir
Thomas are finally united in Fanny and Edmund is too crude a formulation
to take into account what remains genuinely admirable in the cousins, but
enough elements of that earlier “marriage” are present to cause disquiet.
Edmund of the “strong good sense” (21) now appears as the foolish male,
a victim of wounded vanity whose self-centred conviction that he will be for-
ever tragically inconsolable will soon be disproved by his recognition that
Fanny is “only too good for him” (471). His love and current disillusionment
are belittled by the language of this account: “not an agreeable intimation”, “it
would have been a vast deal pleasanter” (459). The closing paragraph of the
penultimate chapter thus provides a transition into the determinedly comic
resolution of the last, a chapter denying two conclusions Austen has already
demonstrated: that the world is a great deal too complex to be divided into
those “not greatly in fault themselves” and “the rest” (461), and that, while the
division between mentor and lover is destructive, the coming together of the
two roles may be as dangerous in its own way if it involves the mutual rein-
forcement, rather than the questioning, of the lover’s worst qualities.
The difficulty of judging Austen’s relationship to the events and to the
narrative voice in the final chapter is considerable, partly because the tone,
even within the chapter, is uneven, patches of flippancy alternating with pas-
sages that are unmistakably serious and appropriate to the tone of the novel
as a whole. In fact it seems that Austen, very late in the game, has set herself,
unsuccessfully, to satisfy the same apparently conflicting purposes that gave
the young people such difficulty when they chose Lovers’ Vows—to combine
both “tragedy and comedy” (130). On the one hand, the narrative voice in the
final chapter imitates the “rhyming butler” of the play, comically simplifying
the moral complexity of the novel in the same terms: “And if his purpose
was not fair, / It probably was base” (LV in MP 518) with cursory claims to
have cleansed the infection, the neat classification of the characters into “fair”
sheep and “base” goats, and the perfunctory distribution of the appropriate
rewards and punishments. On the other hand, despite the narrative voice’s
disavowal, there is a good deal of “guilt and misery” (461) in the last chap-
ter that is indeed consonant with what has gone before, although even here
244 Patricia Menon

the treatment is inconsistent. Tom and Julia are dismissed with conventional
tokens of penitence that suggest complete lack of interest on Austen’s part,
while the accounts of the fates of Mary and Henry Crawford and of Maria
and Mrs Norris, though summary, are nevertheless appropriate to the tragic
tenor of the work as a whole.
But it is on behalf of the remainder that falsification and special pleading
occur. Sir Thomas becomes “poor Sir Thomas” (461), recognizes his past inad-
equacies as a parent, and is freed from the “hourly evil” of Mrs Norris, who, in
an echo of her wifely status, had “seemed a part of himself, that must be borne
for ever” (465–6) but is now dismissed as if divorced, ostracized in the company
of “their” cast-off daughter. The serious analysis of his failures mixes oddly with
the ease with which he is permitted to recognize and repudiate them (along
with the adulterous daughter of his own creating). The convincing relapse into
cynicism of Mr Bennet after the flurry of Lydia’s elopement has no counterpart
in consistency here. Furthermore, Sir Thomas’s treatment of Fanny is dishon-
estly trivialized: “He might have made her childhood happier; but it had been
an error of judgment only which had given him the appearance of harshness”
(472, emphases mine). The narrative voice allows good intentions to excuse
the errors that have led directly to Maria’s downfall and a great deal of misery
besides: his “liberality had a rich repayment” in the form of both a replacement
daughter and a substitute niece (472). But even those good intentions are care-
lessly recast in a way not supported by the prior text: “He saw how ill he had
judged, in expecting to counteract what was wrong in Mrs. Norris, by its reverse
in himself ” (463), a false claim of deliberate policy indirectly contradicted soon
after: “His opinion of [Mrs. Norris] had been sinking from the day of his return
from Antigua” (465), by which time, as Austen had demonstrated, his children’s
characters had been long formed.
Like “poor” Sir Thomas, Fanny is also taken under protection of the
narrative voice of the final chapter, as “My Fanny”, before the difficult busi-
ness of describing her equivocal state is glossed over: “sorrow so founded on
satisfaction, so tending to ease, and so much in harmony with every dearest
sensation, that there are few who might not have been glad to exchange their
greatest gaiety for it” (461). Her state is presented not only as emotionally
understandable but also as morally unproblematic.
But the final betrayal of Austen’s prior revelation of the dangers of Ed-
mund’s relationship to Fanny as mentor-lover comes in the nonchalant justi-
fication of their marriage:

With such a regard for her, indeed, as his had long been, a
regard founded on the most endearing claims of innocence and
helplessness, and completed by every recommendation of growing
worth, what could be more natural than the change? Loving,
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 245

guiding, protecting her, as he had been doing ever since her being
ten years old, her mind in so great a degree formed by his care, and
her comfort depending on his kindness, an object to him of such
close and peculiar interest, dearer by all his own importance with
her than any one else at Mansfield. . . .
. . . there was nothing on the side of prudence to stop him or
make his progress slow; no doubts of her deserving, no fears from
opposition of taste, no need of drawing new hopes of happiness
from dissimilarity of temper. (470, 471)

If Pygmalion does not marry his own creation, the narrative voice im-
plies, his only other choice is a woman with alien and dangerous values.
Moreover, the nature of Edmund’s “change” towards Fanny is not specified
as a change from familial to sexual love but is blurred by the use of the more
general “care”: “Edmund did cease to care about Miss Crawford, and became
as anxious to marry Fanny, as Fanny herself could desire”, while flippancy
discourages serious reflection on the reader’s part: “I purposely abstain from
dates on this occasion . . .” (470). This is a cosy union of mutual admiration all
the more distressing because it presents as desirable those aspects of the rela-
tionship that Austen has clearly revealed in Edmund’s father’s situation, as in
his own, to be morally and emotionally dangerous. Julia Prewitt Brown goes
further, arguing that “At the close of Mansfield Park, Fanny is as much married
in mind to her surrogate father Sir Thomas as she is in fact to her substitute
brother Edmund. . . . Anticipating Freud, Austen implies that for the woman,
the classic sex partners are father and daughter” (Jane Austen’s Novels 99), but
striking as this statement is, I think it over-schematizes the more complex
pattern of resemblances and differences for which I have argued.
Although to trust the tale but not the teller in regard to Mansfield Park
is, in most areas, to free the body of the work from the narrative voice of
the final chapter, some problems in that chapter stem not so much from
the betrayal of earlier insights, but from the culmination of contradictions
already established. Fanny completes her transmutation to sister-mother,
making up for the emotional and moral deprivations of Edmund’s childhood
and Edmund becomes her brother-child, a replacement for William and her
Portsmouth siblings. The confusion over “fraternal” and “conjugal” love, ear-
lier highlighted by the unironic treatment of Fanny’s relationship to William,
is thus perpetuated. The potential of “incest” to intensify characteristics, “good
as well as bad” here works against the couple, intensifying the worst. Unfor-
tunately, the pressure to bring fraternal and conjugal love together results in
the undercutting of the central insight of the work, that to marry your own
admiring creation is a terrible moral risk for both of you. And yet, denial of
this recognition is what the last chapter demands.
246 Patricia Menon

But there is yet another problem that cannot be blamed on the clos-
ing chapter. From the beginning Austen has shown what is wrong with the
particular situation of Edmund and Fanny and suggested the temptations
to which the mentor-lover is in general prone; however, by exploring the
dangers of dividing lover from mentor she has set up a logical structure that
presses towards uniting the two in one person. As a result, Edmund in the
last chapter is so clearly less mature than Fanny that Austen’s determina-
tion to achieve moral equality for her couples as a prerequisite for marriage,
central to her work (although, as noted, not achieved in Sense and Sensibility),
is undermined. Regrettably, as Julia Prewitt Brown argues, part of Edmund
Bertram is annihilated when he marries Fanny (“Civilization” 95).
Although a familiar problem from Emma and to a lesser extent from the
other novels discussed, the question as to how to explain the flippancy that
characterizes parts of the closing chapter5 cannot be evaded in the predomi-
nantly serious Mansfield Park. Is it the consequence of Austen’s loss of interest
once the traditional closure of the marriage plot has been reached? Is it a test
of the sentimental reader, with covert warnings about life’s uncertainty? Is it
a general recognition that the complex questions raised in the novel are not
subject to any form of conclusion, and that, therefore, a happy ending is no
more true or false than any other? Is it an unsuccessful attempt to yoke a trag-
edy with a comic finale to placate her readers? As such it would be consistent
with the would-be actors’ motive in choosing Lovers’ Vows: “There were . . . so
many people to be pleased” (130).
The truth probably consists of some combination of all of the above. As
mentor, Austen declines to pose true/false questions, and while this refusal
has much to recommend it as a pedagogical device, it brings with it the ancil-
lary “benefit” of blurring her own uncertainties and difficulties. What is clear,
however, is that in her relationship to her readers in all but the last chapter of
Mansfield Park, Austen is less interested in pleasing them than in any other of
her novels and even less willing to lead them to the recognition of a definitive
ideal, a change that helps to account for the acute discomfort many feel with
the work of a writer they expect to be both charming and assured. It is much
harder to love the author of Mansfield Park than of Pride and Prejudice or Per-
suasion, and in this novel Austen relinquishes flirtation to Mary Crawford.

* * *

Though the complexities of Mansfield Park challenge any too-simple for-

mulation, Austen’s treatment of the mentor-lover in her works as a whole
suggests that she is principally interested in the mentor-lover relation-
ship as it contributes to, or works against, what she sees as an ideal end:
a marriage founded on both moral equality and mutual sexual love, on
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 247

both judgment and passion. This is true both when passion is ultimately
feared or denigrated as it is, for example, in Abelard’s presentation of
it—attitudes Austen clearly condemns in Sir Thomas, Edmund, or Mr
Bennet—and also when a character such as Fanny is tempted to adopt
Heloise’s self-denying devotion. Austen’s attitude remains steady whether
the mentor-lover relationship is marginal as in Northanger Abbey and Sense
and Sensibility, (supposedly) mutual as in Pride and Prejudice, perilous as
in Mansfield Park, or something to be outgrown as in Emma. This is an
ideal she never abandons, despite her partial recognition that judgment
and passion, though not automatically opposed, are also not amenable to
being neatly integrated with or balanced against each other, and despite
the unsolved difficulties arising from the conflict of this insight with the
comic endings of the various novels.
In fact, it is Mr Bennet, speaking out of his recognition of the ideals he
has betrayed, who reveals just this problem as he seeks to counsel Elizabeth
after Darcy requests her hand for a second time:

I know that you could be neither happy nor respectable, unless you
truly esteemed your husband; unless you looked up to him as a
superior. Your lively talents would place you in the greatest danger
in an unequal marriage. You could scarcely escape discredit and
misery. My child, let me not have the grief of seeing you unable to
respect your partner in life. (376, emphasis original)

While there is no difficulty in prefacing either “respect” and “esteem” with a

word such as mutual, the difficulty lies in reconciling a desire both to “look
up” to a “superior” and to repudiate an “unequal marriage”. We applaud Mr
Bennet’s words without examining too closely their inherent contradic-
tion. That Austen reaches for the goal of mutual love combined with moral
equality, however impossible to perfect in life as in art, is what makes her
view of the responsibilities and rewards of marriage so attractive; that her
closings claim success in the endeavour remains problematic.

* * *

In 1814, soon after she had begun Emma, Austen wrote to Cassandra, “Do
not be angry with me for beginning another letter to you. I have read the
Corsair, mended my petticoat, & have nothing else to do” (Letters 257: 5
March 1814). Less than three years later, in “Sanditon”, Austen began a
caricature of a would-be-Byron, Sir Edward Denham, whose account of
his favourite reading materials marked him as one whose ideals were totally
antipathetic to hers:
248 Patricia Menon

The Novels which I approve . . . are such as exhibit the progress
of strong Passion from the first Germ of incipient Susceptibility
to the utmost Energies of Reason half-dethroned,—where we see
the strong spark of Woman’s Captivations elicit such Fire in the
Soul of Man as leads him—(though at the risk of some Aberration
from the strict line of Primitive Obligations)—to hazard all, dare
all, achieve all, to obtain her . . . and even when the Event is mainly
anti-prosperous to the high-toned Machinations of the prime
Character, the potent, pervading Hero of the Story, it leaves us full
of Generous Emotions for him;—our Hearts are paralized—. . . .
(Minor Works 403–4, punctuation and spelling as shown)

A little over thirty years later, Charlotte Brontë would write of Jane Austen,
in language almost as fevered as Sir Edward’s, and with only slightly less
reliance on capital letters:

The Passions are perfectly unknown to her; she rejects even a

speaking acquaintance with that stormy Sisterhood; even to the
Feelings she vouchsafes no more than an occasional graceful but
distant recognition; too frequent converse with them would ruffle
the smooth elegance of her progress. Her business is not half so
much with the human heart as with the human eyes mouth hands
and feet; what sees keenly, speaks aptly, moves flexibly, it suits her
to study, but what throbs fast and full, though hidden, what the
blood rushes through, what is the unseen seat of Life and the
sentient target of death—this Miss Austen ignores; she no more,
with her mind’s eye, beholds the heart of her race than each man,
with bodily vision sees the heart in his heaving breast. (Southam,
CH 1:128)

But there was another link between the two authors besides Brontë’s
repugnance for what she perceived to be Austen’s ignorance of “The Pas-
sions”. Sir Edward Denham’s future was secured by an irony of fate: he was
to be reincarnated repeatedly in Brontë’s juvenilia, and, as “the potent, per-
vading Hero of the Story”, would reappear in the person of another Ed-
ward—Edward Rochester. As if looking forward in time, Austen, in whose
works mentorship was a relationship best left behind in the growth to mutual
maturity, provided a criticism of Brontë sharper than any Brontë would make
of her. The worlds Brontë created had more in common with the schoolroom
of Abelard than Austen’s “elegant but confined houses” (Brontë in Southam
1:126), schoolrooms where teaching and learning were erotic activities likely
to lead to “Aberration from the strict line of Primitive Obligations”, where
 Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park 249

judgment and passion were opposed, and passion was a cause of elation and
fear because it threatened annihilation rather than mutual completion.

No t e s

1. Cassandra had encouraged an apparently unenthusiastic Jane to read this

work in 1809 (Letters 170, 172: 24 and 30 January 1809).
2. For critics who have bestowed angelic or demonic status on Fanny over
the years see, for example, Harding in 1940 (“Regulated Hatred” 358), Trilling
in 1955 (“MP” 155, 160), Tanner in 1986 ( JA 143, 148–9), Auerbach—“vampire”,
“Grendel”, “cannibalistic”—in 1983 (“Charm” 212–13), Mellor in 1993 (58), Bal-
dridge in 1994 (62).
3. For a thoroughgoing response to Said’s reading, covering more material
than is relevant here, see Susan Fraiman, “Jane Austen and Edward Said . . . ”:
“Slavery functions . . . as a trope . . . to argue the essential depravity of Sir Thomas’s
relations to other people. I agree with Said that they are largely elided and always
subordinated to the English material. The imperialist gesture is to exploit the
symbolic value of slavery while ignoring slaves as suffering and resistant historical
subjects” (Fraiman 213).
4. In her study of kinship and marriage, Sybil Wolfram argues that though
marriage between cousins had been legal from the time of Henry VIII, opposition
to such marriages has nevertheless survived into the present, on the “unfounded
assumption” that they commonly produce “idiot children”. She points out that while
this case is usually argued today on genetic grounds, in the eighteenth century the
wrath of God was adduced, to the extent that at least one cattle-breeder of the time
kept quiet about his practice of inbreeding to improve his stock (21, 38, 138, 145).
On a personal level, Jane Austen’s brother Henry married his father’s sister’s daugh-
ter, the widowed Eliza de Feuillide (née Hancock).
5. This is, of course, an issue that has been much discussed in connection with
Austen’s novels in general and Mansfield Park in particular. For a helpful summary
of various views, see Pam Perkins (21–5).
 E M I LY A U E R BAC H

An Excellent Heart:
Sense and Sensibility

For there is no friend like a sister

In calm or stormy weather;
To cheer one on the tedious way,
To fetch one if one goes astray,
To lift one if one totters down,
To strengthen whilst one stands.
—Christina Rossetti, Goblin Market

. . . my troubles are two.

But oh, my two troubles they reave me of rest,
The brains in my head and the heart in my breast.
—A. E. Housman, Additional Poems: XVII

She had an excellent heart;—her disposition was affectionate, and

her feelings were strong; but she knew how to govern them: it was a
knowledge which her mother had yet to learn, and which one of her
sisters had resolved never to be taught.
—Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility

A s Jane Austen worked to transform “Elinor and Marianne” into what

would become Sense and Sensibility, she must have wondered whether any

From Searching for Jane Austen, pp. 100–127, 314–316. © 2004 by the Board of Regents
of the University of Wisconsin System.

251
252 Emily Auerbach

manuscript of hers would ever reach a readership or generate an income.

Austen knew she could write novels with “genius, wit, and taste to recom-
mend them,” as she noted in the unpublished Northanger Abbey, but would
any publisher agree (NA, 37)? Was there a public discriminating enough to
prefer them to the improbable, sensational bestsellers of the day?
The changed title suggests that Austen perhaps added philosophical
depth to what began primarily as a sketch of two characters. The new title,
however, has in some ways hindered readings of Sense and Sensibility. Yes,
Austen links Elinor to sense (“Her own good sense so well supported her”)
and Marianne to sensibility (“too great importance placed by her on the deli-
cacies of a strong sensibility”), but she continually muddies the semantic wa-
ters, using not just the title words but terms like sensitive, sensible, and sensa-
tion (141, 201). Marianne is “sensible and clever,” Elinor is “most feelingly
sensible,” and Marianne ironically becomes “insensible of her sister’s presence”
when she focuses on the sensations of her own romance (6, 134, 175). Austen
carefully crafts her fiction so that readers cannot, in all fairness, reduce these
two sisters to mind and emotion. As Carol Shields observes, “we have real
sisters here, not convenient contrarieties.”1 Furthermore, Austen presents a
large cast of characters, both male and female, possessing varying degrees of
sense and sensibility. By so doing, she joins Mary Wollstonecraft in inviting
readers to reconsider the standard assumption that men have sense, women
have feeling.
Though her narrative voice is less pronounced in Sense and Sensibility
than in Northanger Abbey, Jane Austen still remains ever present between
the lines of her novel. If you think this female character in Sense and Sensi-
bility is an unbelievably greedy, selfish, mercenary schemer, be advised that
she is better than half her sex, Austen asserts with acerbic irony. If you find
this marriage loveless, this man’s will and testament unfair, this woman in-
sipid, this card party dull, this man idle, or this group’s conversation boring,
remember that they are typical, Austen insists. Phrases such as no traits
at all unusual, like every other place, like half the rest of the world, as usual,
and often dot the pages of this biting novel. The Jane Austen we discover
in Sense and Sensibility indicts her era’s anti-intellectualism, commercial-
ism, and selfishness. Through her narrative voice, she reminds readers that
scoundrels, wastrels, philistines, and bores are the norm, not the exception,
in real life—a dark, cold, almost-tragic real life offset only by instances of
individual growth and genuine affection.
As Eva Brann notes in an article about Sense and Sensibility entitled
“Whose Sense? Whose Sensibility? Jane Austen’s Subtlest Novel,” Austen
asks “the frequent question, unique to this book: Who is its heroine?”2
Some critics find the easy answer to be Elinor: “Sense and Sensibility is
the story of Elinor Dashwood. The action of the novel is hers; it is not
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 253

Marianne’s.”3 Yet two women move across center stage in this novel. What
exactly are we meant to conclude about the differences between “Elinor
and Marianne,” the novel’s original title? If Elinor is the heroine, do we
automatically assume that her husband is more heroic than Marianne’s?
What does John Hardy lose by excluding Marianne from his collection of
Austen heroines?4 In our search for Jane Austen, do we find her more on
one heroine’s side than the other? Some have argued that Marianne is in
fact “the life and center of the novel.”5 Biographers alert us to the fact that
there may be greater similarities between Jane Austen and Marianne, Cas-
sandra Austen and Elinor. According to a relative, Jane Austen reported
that, faced with the death of her fiancé, Cassandra behaved “with a degree
of resolution and Propriety which no common mind could evince in so try-
ing a situation.”6 Could the book have started out as a tribute to Cassandra
Austen’s propriety and ended as a celebration of Jane Austen’s vitality? As
early as 1866 a reviewer noted, “Elinor is too good; one feels inclined to
pat her on the back and say, ‘Good girl!’ but all our sympathy is with the
unfortunate Marianne.”7 Other critics claim that Jane Austen meant for
Elinor to be the heroine but that Marianne took on a life and power of
her own: “Marianne . . . has our sympathy: she, and our response to her, are
outside Jane Austen’s control”; “The true heroine of Sense and Sensibility is
Marianne. . . . The result is that a perfect comedy of manners was spoilt,
and a great flawed novel written.”8
I believe that Jane Austen deliberately constructs a tale of two hero-
ines—or rather, two young women. The narrator shifts readers back and forth
between the two sisters and everything they represent. To exclude Marianne
from Jane Austen’s Heroines shortchanges Austen’s dual accomplishment in
Sense and Sensibility—in particular, her ambivalent feelings toward revolu-
tionary ideals, romantic notions, and youthful illusions.
If Northanger Abbey demonstrated that, had she chosen, Jane Austen
could have written a gothic potboiler, then Sense and Sensibility proves that
she could have created a romantic tragedy. The word heart appears in this
novel far more than in any other she would write, often accompanied by
adjectives such as anguished, broken, sinking, wrung, wounded, sick, and heavy.
Austen censured and laughed at humiliated, desperate young women in her
adolescent sketches (like Emma, who “continued in tears the remainder of
her Life” after Edgar departs [MW, 33]), but in Sense and Sensibility she tem-
pers her criticism with empathy. Marianne Dashwood may be silly at times
(“I must feel—I must be wretched”) but her heartache is raw—and real (190).
As Victorian novelist George Moore notes, in Sense and Sensibility Austen
“gives us all the agony of passion the human heart can feel” because “it is here
that we find the burning human heart in English prose for the first, and alas,
for the last time.”9
254 Emily Auerbach

Why might Austen delve more deeply into emotional states in this nov-
el? As she worked on revising “Elinor and Marianne” into Sense and Sensibil-
ity, Austen encountered suffering too real to be ignored: her sister’s loss of a
fiancé to yellow fever in 1797, the death of a cousin in a road accident in 1798,
her family’s decision to leave their home in 1801, her father’s death in 1805
and the corresponding need for Mrs. Austen, Jane, and Cassandra to find
smaller living quarters (much like Mrs. Dashwood and her daughters mov-
ing to a smaller cottage), and Jane Austen’s possible disappointments in love,
whatever they may have been, before reaching the decision to don the garb of
an old maid. Perhaps seeing grieving fiancées and devastated widows so close
to home left Austen unwilling to write yet another light-hearted spoof of the
sentimental heroine.
Austen’s portrayal of Marianne’s romanticism differs in tone from her
derision of Catherine Morland’s fascination with the gothic. After all, Aus-
ten liked the same writers as Marianne: Austen praises Cowper and Scott in
her letters, as well as Gilpin’s writings on the picturesque.10 Like Marianne,
Austen enjoyed music and felt less restrained and proper than her elder sister,
who preferred painting. In one letter Jane Austen jokes that Cassandra has
more “starched Notions” than her own (4 February 1813). An acquaintance
of the family praised Jane Austen’s sparkling eyes and energy but observed,
“her sister Cassandra was very lady-like but very prim.”11 By using adjectives
such as striking, brilliant, eager, and animated to describe Marianne but never
Elinor, Austen suggests that Marianne’s romanticism gives her a fire lacking
in her tamer sister. True, by staying inside during inclement weather rather
than running wildly down a steep slope Elinor avoids spraining her ankle and
getting thoroughly drenched, but one suspects she could have used the fresh
air and the liberty.
Liberty seems central to Marianne’s character—and perhaps to her
name. At the time Austen began “Elinor and Marianne” in the mid-1790s,
she would have been well aware that Marianne stood for France—in par-
ticular, revolutionary France—and was being captured in the iconogra-
phy of the time as a half-clothed, vibrant young woman whose youth and
spirit conveyed the dawning of a new era. In Marianne into Battle, Maurice
Agulhon traces the official link between the female symbol of liberty and
the French republic to 1792, just a few years before Austen began “Elinor
and Marianne.” Statues of Louis XV gave way to statues of Marianne;
paintings depicted her as “young, active, with a short dress (that leaves her
legs bare at least below the knee, and sometimes also a breast bared); rather
a tomboy in short.”12 As Lynn Hunt observes, by the end of the 1790s,
“Liberty was indelibly associated with the memory of the Republic she
had represented. In collective memory, La Republique was ‘Marianne.’ ”13
Characters named Marianne figure prominently in French literature, often
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 255

as young women of common origins who stand up to their so-called aris-

tocratic betters.
Could Austen have chosen the name Marianne because she wanted
readers to consider both the good and the bad side of French revolutionary
ideals? Austen copied out the Marseillaise, dotted her letters and novels with
French phrases and allusions, and was acutely aware through her brothers of
military conflicts between France and England.14 I disagree with George
Moore, who patronizingly creates an apolitical, demure, sheltered voice for
Jane Austen: “I know nothing . . . of politics. . . . I am a maiden lady, inter-
ested in the few people with whom my life is cast. If you care to know how
So-and-so marries So-and-so, I will tell you.”15 Austen tells her readers far
more than that. We recognize Marianne’s idealism and scorn of outmoded
conventions, but also her impracticality and zeal. Consider the words of
Marat-Mauger, a French revolutionary, who wrote in 1793, “A revolution
is never made by halves; it must either be total or it will abort.”16 This
sounds much like Austen’s comment about Marianne, “She could never
love by halves” (379). Marat-Mauger also offers a definition—“Revolution-
ary means outside of all forms and all rules”—that seems to fit Marianne’s
proud disregard of propriety. Marianne’s fervor is refreshing yet disturbing,
admirable yet off-putting.
There also is a French connection the only other time that Austen
chooses the name Marianne: Austen dedicates her juvenile sketch “Love and
Freindship,” composed as a series of letters to Marianne, to her flamboyant
cousin Eliza de Feuillide, then married to a French count. When Austen
wrote “Love and Freindship” in 1792, Count de Feuillide had not yet lost his
head to the guillotine, so perhaps Austen felt freer to send her cousin this
light-hearted burlesque. In “Love and Freindship,” Laura tells Marianne that
she and Sophia successfully persuaded a young woman to reject a sensible
man because of his lack of romantic appreciation: “They said he was Sensible,
well-informed, and Agreable; we did not pretend to Judge of such trifles, but
as we were convinced he had no soul, that he had never read the Sorrows of
Werter, & that his Hair bore not the slightest resemblance to Auburn, we
were certain that Janetta could feel no affection for him, or at least that she
ought to feel none. The very circumstance of his being her father’s choice too,
was so much in his disfavour, that had he been deserving of her, in every other
respect yet that of itself ought to have been a sufficient reason in the Eyes of
Janetta for rejecting him. . . . It was her Duty to disobey her Father” (MW,
91–92). Austen’s readers would have known that Goethe’s Sorrows of Werther
(1774) epitomized romanticism and had already caused a rash of suicides.
Tormented by passions and lost in dreams, Goethe’s artistic hero eventually
shoots himself in the head. As Marianne recognizes near the end of Sense
and Sensibility, she comes perilously close to following after Werther: She ex-
256 Emily Auerbach

claims, “Had I died—it would have been self destruction” (345). Austen must
have sensed that one danger of European romanticism—whether French,
English, or German—was its morbidity.
The passage from “Love and Freindship” describing Janetta’s rejection of
a man because he is Goethe-less and because he is her father’s choice seems
an exaggerated version of scenes Austen would later include in Sense and
Sensibility. Marianne believes Elinor should reject Edward because he reads
Cowper so lamely, and she and Willoughby scorn the fatherly Colonel Bran-
don because others respect him. People in love must be afflicted, Marianne
suggests, and she assumes that Elinor cannot possibly love Edward because
she acts so sensibly: “When is she dejected or melancholy?” (39). Although
Marianne is not a mere caricature as are Laura and Sophia of “Love and Fre-
indship,” she displays some of the same affectations.
In passages in Sense and Sensibility giving voice to Marianne, Austen
summons the affected diction, punctuation, and martyred tone of romantic
poetry. Marianne’s lyrical address to Norland expresses her regret that her
childhood home cannot feel her pain and that the trees will not visibly reg-
ister grief over the departure of owners with such good taste: “Oh! happy
house, could you know what I suffer in now viewing you from this spot,
from whence perhaps I may view you no more!—And you, ye well-known
trees!—but you will continue the same.—No leaf will decay because we
are removed, nor any branch become motionless although we can observe
you no longer!— . . . No, you will continue the same; unconscious of the
pleasure or the regret you occasion, and insensible of any change in those
who walk under your shade!—But who will remain to enjoy you?” (27).
Austen may be smiling here at Marianne’s overblown use of language, but
she also lets readers know that Marianne’s feelings are real. Marianne does
appreciate nature more than the new inhabitants do. The answer to her
question of who will remain to enjoy nature is no one: later in the novel we
discover that John and Fanny Dashwood, the new owners of Norland, have
chopped down the old walnut trees to make room for a greenhouse.
Elinor twits her younger sister for delighting in romantic agony—her
love of things desolate, dying, and dead. If Edward were at death’s door, may-
be Marianne would be attracted, Elinor jokes: “Had he been only in a violent
fever, you would not have despised him half so much. Confess, Marianne,
is not there something interesting to you in the flushed cheek, hollow eye,
and quick pulse of a fever?” (38). Marianne, one suspects, could have written
a moving “Ode to Autumn” à la Keats, “Ode to Dejection” à la Coleridge,
or “Ode to the West Wind” à la Shelley (“the leaves dead / Are driven, like
ghosts from the enchanter fleeing”):
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 257

“And how does dear, dear Norland look?” cried Marianne.

“Dear, dear Norland,” said Elinor, “probably looks much as it
always does at this time of year. The woods and walks thickly
covered with dead leaves.”
“Oh!” cried Marianne, “with what transporting sensations have
I formerly seen them fall! How have I delighted, as I walked, to
see them driven in showers about me by the wind! What feelings
have they, the season, the air altogether inspired! Now there is no
one to regard them. They are seen only as a nuisance, swept hastily
off, and driven as much as possible from the sight.”
“It is not every one,” said Elinor, “who has your passion for dead
leaves.”
“No; my feelings are not often shared, not often understood.”
(87–88)

Marianne cries; Elinor says. Autumn brings Marianne “transporting sensa-

tions” and exclamations, while Elinor sees piles of dead leaves. In conversa-
tions like this one, Austen places readers in the middle with her, irritated
that Marianne is carrying on excessively yet conscious that she genuinely
delights in nature and spends more time outdoors than Elinor does.
Part of Marianne’s appeal is her frankness, her lack of guile and conceal-
ment. In a society of fawning hypocrites and greedy schemers, Marianne is
refreshingly open. Marianne has “neither shyness nor reserve” when, talking
to Willoughby and scorns her sister’s suggestion that she has been too un-
restrained: “ ‘Elinor,’ cried Marianne, ‘is this fair? is this just? are my ideas so
scanty? But I see what you mean. I have been too much at my ease, too happy,
too frank. I have erred against every common-place notion of decorum; I
have been open and sincere where I ought to have been reserved, spiritless,
dull, and deceitful:—had I talked only of the weather and the roads, and had
I spoken only once in ten minutes, this reproach would have been spared’ ”
(47–48). Marianne believes that she can do no wrong because she can feel no
wrong. Perhaps Austen felt that one limitation of romantic literature was its
amorality. When Marianne asserts of a man, “Whatever be his pursuits, his
eagerness in them should know no moderation,” she little realizes that Wil-
loughby has indeed followed just such a credo, seducing young women and
pursuing women of fortune with plenty of eagerness and immoderation (45).
Marianne has to learn that one can be eager, handsome, spirited, lively, pas-
sionate, musical, and well spoken—but despicable.
Austen clearly saw that too great an emphasis on feeling leaves one
self-absorbed, uncontrolled, and vulnerable. Too great a faith in imagined
258 Emily Auerbach

worlds guarantees disillusionment. Those who embrace liberty may become

libertines; instincts are not always divine. Colonel Brandon’s melodramatic
Tale of Two Elizas (is it coincidence Austen chose the name of her cousin?)
stands as a warning to Marianne. Like Marianne, Eliza had a “warmth of
heart” and “eagerness of fancy and spirits” that caused Colonel Brandon to
fall in love with her (205). Scorning the values of their society, the romantic
colonel and Eliza tried unsuccessfully to elope in order for Eliza to escape
forced marriage to the colonel’s older, more prosperous brother. Faced with
disappointment, Eliza responds by becoming a fallen woman subject to her
passions. As Colonel Brandon reports, “I could not trace her beyond her first
seducer, and there was every reason to fear that she had removed from him
only to sink deeper in a life of sin. . . . So altered—so faded—worn down by
acute suffering of every kind!” (207). After Colonel Brandon rescues her from
prostitution and imprisonment for debt, Eliza dies of consumption. There is
real death, disease, poverty, and sex in Sense and Sensibility. Eliza’s pursuit of
sensuality leads to a real child, “a little girl, the offspring of her first guilty
connection” (208). This second Eliza, also subject to “the violence of her pas-
sions,” falls victim to Willoughby’s seduction (322).
Although Marianne scorns Elinor for suggesting that it is improper
for her to be wandering alone with Willoughby through the rooms of his
relative’s house and scoffs at the need for a formal engagement, the Tale of
Two Elizas suggests that Marianne is foolish to discard rules designed not
for her oppression but for her protection. Austen censures those like Lady
Middleton who are too priggish to hear talk of pregnancy or illegitimacy,
but she also warns against promiscuity, anarchy, and the unbridled pursuit
of sensation.
Austen demonstrates that Marianne, despite her romantic taste and per-
sonal beauty, evinces antisocial behavior at times, making no effort to flatter
others: “ ‘ What a sweet woman Lady Middleton is!’ said Lucy Steele. Mari-
anne was silent; it was impossible for her to say what she did not feel, however
trivial the occasion; and upon Elinor therefore the whole task of telling lies
when politeness required it, always fell” (122). Is Marianne’s refusal to lie a
refreshing sign of her integrity, winning our admiration? Or is it a sign that
she has not learned to be an adult member of a community? Perhaps both:
Austen simultaneously praises and censures the romantic emphasis on spon-
taneous, uninhibited emotion.
If Marianne illustrates the unbridled zeal of French revolutionaries, per-
haps Elinor embodies the enduring British tradition of remaining composed
under pressure, of keeping a stiff upper lip. Passages describing Elinor are
dotted with words like judgment, reason, duty, principle, observation, thought,
restraint, command, civility, decorum, and knowledge. Stay calm, she tells herself:
“For a few moments, she was almost overcome—her heart sunk within her,
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 259

and she could hardly stand; but exertion was indispensably necessary, and she
struggled so resolutely against the oppression of her feelings, that her success
was speedy, and for the time complete. . . . Elinor [spoke] with a composure of
voice, under which was concealed an emotion and distress beyond any thing
she had ever felt before” (134–35). Like the British explorer Stanley, Elinor
might have observed calmly, “Dr. Livingstone, I presume?” when encounter-
ing a countryman in the heart of an African jungle.
Elinor uses her calm, steady, reasoned judgment to keep her family func-
tional throughout the novel. With a mother acting like little more than a
teenager, two younger sisters whose eyes are glazed over with romance, and
a father so cheerfully sanguine that he dies without obtaining written docu-
mentation providing adequately for his widow and daughters, Elinor must
become wise beyond her nineteen years. She seems the calm, rational head of
the household. Calmness does not win as many admirers as passion, though:
as one critic laments, “Elinor, not to mince words, is what some have forth-
rightly called a stick.”17 Mark Twain crowned Elinor the queen of waxwork,
unable to warm up and feel a passion.18
Elinor is no prudent stick without emotion, however. Austen first in-
troduces Elinor as a woman of feeling—a loving daughter and sister with
an “excellent heart” and “affectionate but genuine feeling” (6). Elinor falls in
love with Edward before Marianne ever meets Willoughby. What draws us
to Elinor is her genuine concern for her family, her ability to suffer without
wallowing in misery, her pride when she faces rejection or disappointment,
her discernment, her skill at handling awkward social situations, her empathy
for others, and her masterful efforts at self-control.
Yet Austen shows that Elinor is not as objective as she thinks. Because
she is attracted to Edward Ferrars with a “blind impartiality,” she invests him
with artistic potential: “Had he ever been in the way of learning, I think he
would have drawn very well” (19). Austen will later give this silly thought
to Lady Catherine de Bourgh in Pride and Prejudice, who insists that she
and her daughter are naturally musical, though neither can play (PP, 173).
Elinor’s keen eyes seem to play tricks on her at times. When Elinor sees Ed-
ward wearing a ring with hair in it and hears him falsely assert that the hair is
his sister’s, Elinor jumps to a conclusion without evidence: “That the hair was
her own, she instantly felt” (98). Like Marianne, Elinor indulges in instant
feelings and, like Marianne, her judgment can thus be wrong. The hair is not
hers, nor is Edward free to propose marriage.
Austen gives readers no answer as to what an intelligent, sensitive wom-
an with sense and sensibility ought to do when forced to spend evenings
with tasteless, insensitive neighbors and relatives. Marianne withdraws; Eli-
nor adapts. While Marianne solipsistically pours out her emotions into the
piano, Elinor “joyfully profit[s]” from the subterfuge of using “the powerful
260 Emily Auerbach

protection of a very magnificent concerto” to hide her secret conversation

with a rival, “and thus by a little of that address, which Marianne could never
condescend to practise, gained her own end” (149, 145). Are we to admire
Elinor for using a hypocritical means to a social end, or applaud Marianne
for refusing to play the game?
Marianne needs to be more like Elinor in order to find a welcome place
in society, yet along with Colonel Brandon we applaud Marianne’s audacity,
ardor, and candor. We all, in a sense, would like to tell the Mrs. Jennings, Mr.
Palmers, Lady Middletons, and Mrs. Ferrars of the world that they are nosy,
rude, boring, and mean, rather than continuing to exchange Christmas cards
and pleasantries with them. Of course Marianne should not be as rude as Mr.
Palmer, who perhaps stands as a warning of social “honesty.” Mr. Palmer calls
his mother-in-law “ill bred,” labels Willoughby’s house “as vile a spot as I ever
saw in my life,” and constantly opposes his wife, who informs him, “My love,
you contradict every body. . . . Do you know that you are quite rude?” (111–
12). Marianne’s bluntness and contrariness place her in danger of becoming
as outspoken and opinionated as Mr. Palmer.
Both sisters have affectionate hearts, but Elinor masks hers and strains
for social correctness, even if it means dissembling. When Marianne makes
blunt remarks, Elinor assumes “the whole task of telling lies when politeness
required it” (122). Elinor stands somewhere in the middle between the open,
direct Marianne and the manipulative Lucy Steele, an artful woman who
skillfully and insincerely uses the art of flattery to worm her way into favor.
Austen invites readers to compare differing social responses by having Elinor,
Marianne, Lucy and Nancy Steele (as eldest, called Miss Steele) all present
when Lady Middleton and Fanny Dashwood argue over the earthshaking
matter of their sons’ comparative heights:

One subject only engaged the ladies till coffee came in, which was
the comparative heights of Harry Dashwood, and Lady Middleton’s
second son William, who were nearly of the same age. . . .
Lucy, who was hardly less anxious to please one parent than the
other, thought the boys were both remarkably tall for their age,
and could not conceive that there could be the smallest difference
in the world between them; and Miss Steele, with yet greater
address gave it, as fast as she could, in favour of each.
Elinor, having once delivered her opinion on William’s side, by
which she offended Mrs. Ferrars and Fanny still more, did not see
the necessity of enforcing it by any farther assertion; and Mari-
anne, when called on for her’s, offended them all, by declaring
that she had no opinion to give, as she had never thought about
it. (233–34)
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 261

A key question here is what does Austen think? Which approach does she
recommend? The Steele sisters are social hypocrites, but it is precisely Lucy’s
cunning use of flattery that will land her a wealthy husband by the novel’s
end. Did Elinor need to give an opinion about the boys’ heights at all? Was
Marianne’s approach—to abstain entirely and display obvious indiffer-
ence—the only one with integrity?
I see no “triumph of politeness over sincerity” here, to use Susan Mor-
gan’s phrase; no clear victor or clear heroine.19 In a later scene at the Palmer
house as the other women do carpet-work and chat of children and social
engagements, Austen again shows two sisters responding differently to vapid
conversation: Elinor “however little concerned in it, joined in their discourse,”
while Marianne makes a bee line for the library (304). Who made the right
decision? Where is our heroine? Elinor maintains a civility sorely absent in
Marianne, yet she lacks Marianne’s refreshing openness.
Since pain triggers growth, Marianne emerges the most altered of the
two sisters by novel’s end. As if to underscore the idea of character develop-
ment, Austen leaves Marianne at the same age (nineteen) as Elinor was at the
novel’s beginning. How much can happen in just two years if people are open
to learning from their erroneous judgment and behavior, Austen implies.
Elinor’s stance at the end of the novel differs dramatically from her
earlier complacency. In an early chapter, she had smugly observed of Mari-
anne, “A few years will settle her opinions on the reasonable basis of common
sense and observation. . . . A better acquaintance with the world is what I
look forward to as her greatest possible advantage” (56). By the novel’s end
Elinor has dropped this irritatingly parental tone because she knows that her
own maturing process was far from over. Perhaps she might now admit the
truth of Blaise Pascal’s remark, “Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait
point” (The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of ).20 Readers,
too, may feel differently now about that earlier moment in the novel when
Marianne and Elinor parted from their mother before heading for London
for a few weeks. At the time, the narrator implied that Elinor was the only
reasonable one: “Elinor was the only one of the three, who seemed to consider
the separation as anything short of eternal” (158). But by showing readers
that this almost was a final farewell, Austen invites reconsideration of Elinor’s
perceptions.
In a novel with two heroines rather than one, it is interesting that the
only time the term “heroism” appears is when both sisters are present—and
both progressing. When Marianne stifles the spasm in her throat and does
not burst out passionately, Elinor hails this evolution in her sister: “Such ad-
vances towards heroism in her sister, made Elinor feel equal to any thing
herself ” (265). Austen celebrates the growth (or “advances”) of both heroines.
To leave out either Elinor or Marianne from a discussion of Austen’s heroines
262 Emily Auerbach

does an injustice to Austen’s dual focus. Sense and Sensibility invites readers to
compare and contrast Elinor and Marianne, not choose between them.
Similarly, Sense and Sensibility emerges as the only Austen novel to
present two men running for election as the hero. Some vote for Colonel
Brandon; others for Edward Ferrars. If real life has more than one central
character, why not a novel, Austen seems to suggest. To reinforce the real-
ism of her art, Austen contrasts both men with John Willoughby, a man
resembling “the hero of a favourite story” (43). Contemporary moviemakers
miss the point of Austen’s characterization when they give white horses,
soul-searching glances, or a taste for poetry to Colonel Brandon or Edward,
as if distrusting audiences ever to accept an unheroic hero.21 Austen asks
more of her readers.
Austen ironically demonstrates that although John Willoughby has
“manly beauty” and reads Cowper “with all the sensibility and spirit” Edward
lacked, he apparently has ignored the poet’s message (42, 48). Did Austen
hope readers would think of the following Cowper lines, which contain the
title words of her novel?

I would not enter on my list of friends

(Though graced with polish’d manners and fine sense,
Yet wanting sensibility) the man
Who needlessly sets foot upon a worm.22

Willoughby definitely is “graced with polish’d manners and fine sense,” yet
even he admits that he has trampled on Marianne’s feelings: “It is astonish-
ing . . . that my heart should have been so insensible!” (320).
During Marianne’s illness, Colonel Brandon both feels and thinks,
cares and acts. With quick helpfulness, he brings Mrs. Dashwood to her
daughter’s bedside: “He, meanwhile, whatever he might feel, acted with all
the firmness of a collected mind, made every necessary arrangement with
the utmost dispatch, and calculated with exactness the time in which [Eli-
nor] might look for his return. Not a moment was lost in delay of any kind”
(312). I disagree with those who find Colonel Brandon a disappointing
match for Marianne. Poor Colonel Brandon has been called a “wooden
and undeveloped character . . . unexciting and remote,” a “vacuum,” and a
“stolid sad sack.”23 Colonel Brandon’s primary fault resembles that of Brit-
ish colonialists in general, even those claiming to be enlightened: he has a
paternalistic tendency to enjoy rescuing the weak and less fortunate. But
Colonel Brandon’s character is hardly “undeveloped.” True, he is an awk-
ward narrator, but he admits this about himself. His inarticulateness hints
at depth not dearth of feeling: “it would be impossible to describe what I
felt,” he tells Elinor (199). As Austen notes of this man who uses both his
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 263

head and his heart, “Colonel Brandon . . . was in every occasion mindful of
the feelings of others” (62; my italics).
In fact, one begins to wonder along with Mrs. Jennings why Austen did
not pair this chivalrous man of action with Elinor. The two spend far more
time talking to each other than to their prospective mates. So what does Ed-
ward Ferrars add to the novel, and why might Elinor prefer him? We have
our dastardly villain (Willoughby) and our manly hero (Colonel Brandon)
paired literally in a duel: “we met by appointment, he to defend, I to punish
his conduct” (211). Willoughby marries for money while Colonel Brandon
marries for love. Willoughby looks the part of the perfect gentleman; Colonel
Brandon acts like one. Why might Austen have added Edward Ferrars to her
gallery of gentlemen?
Although Edward may seem weak, inexperienced, or idle compared
to the older, well-traveled Colonel Brandon, he possesses at least one trait
Austen knows is lacking in both the Colonel and in Marianne: wit. Edward
has self-deprecating humor and can banter with the ever-serious Marianne
in a way slightly reminiscent of Henry Tilney’s exchanges with Catherine
Morland and Eleanor Tilney in Northanger Abbey. Instead of praising the
picturesque as Henry does, Edward dryly mocks the affectations of its sen-
timental proponents: “I have no knowledge in the picturesque . . . I shall
call hills steep, which ought to be bold, surfaces strange and uncouth, which
ought to be irregular and rugged, and distant objects out of sight, which
ought only to be indistinct through the soft medium of a hazy atmosphere”
(96–97). Marianne takes Edward seriously and wonders why he boasts of
his ignorance, but Elinor recognizes his pose. When Edward continues to
assert, “I do not like crooked, twisted, blasted trees . . . ruined, tattered cot-
tages . . . nettles, or thistles, or heath blossoms” and boasts that he would
prefer “a troop of tidy, happy villagers” to “the finest banditti in the world,”
Marianne looks at him with amazement while Elinor laughs (98). Through-
out the novel only Elinor and Edward—and of course the narrator—display
the ability to see life ironically.
If we free ourselves from the image of Edward as a dull, mother-domi-
nated milquetoast and look carefully at his conversation, we see that he
displays a flair for discerning character. In a conversation with Marianne, he
drolly imagines what she would do if she inherited a fortune: “And books!—
Thomson, Cowper, Scott—she would buy them all over and over again; she
would buy up every copy, I believe, to prevent their falling into unworthy
hands; and she would have every book that tells her how to admire an old
twisted tree. Should not you, Marianne? Forgive me, if I am very saucy.
But I was willing to shew you that I had not forgot our old disputes” (92).
Marianne replies in utter seriousness, failing to catch Edward’s friendly
jibes. Although Edward tells Elinor that “gaiety never was a part of my
264 Emily Auerbach

character,” one senses that the esprit he displays here while unhappily en-
gaged to Lucy has the potential to turn to genuine mirth once he is blessed
with a happy marriage (93).
Our final view of Edward shows him with greater integrity than his
more pragmatic wife-to-be. Edward refuses to cave in to his mother: “I can
make no submission—I am grown neither humble nor penitent,” he insists,
but Elinor argues that “a little humility may be convenient.” Although finally
he agrees to visit his mother, he “still resisted the idea of a letter of proper sub-
mission” (372). Throughout, Edward displays democratic notions, observing
that he feels more at home among the lower classes than with the gentility.
Edward remains steady in his principles, secure in his exceptional decision to
forfeit the right of eldest son, and happily engaged in his parish duties. Aus-
ten turns her milquetoast into a mensch.
As narrator, Austen reserves some of her censure for her minor charac-
ters, particularly for those who do not grow. Edward Ferrars’s younger brother
has become a pretentious dandy who regards his decorated toothpick case as
a necessity of life:

The correctness of his eye, and the delicacy of his taste, proved to
be beyond his politeness. He was giving orders for a toothpick-case
for himself; and till its size, shape, and ornaments were determined,
all of which, after examining and debating for a quarter of an
hour over every toothpick-case in the shop, were finally arranged
by his own inventive fancy, he had no leisure to bestow any other
attention on the two ladies, than what was comprised in three or
four very broad stares. . . . At last the affair was decided. The ivory,
the gold, and the pearls, all received their appointment, and the
gentleman having named the last day on which his existence could
be continued without the possession of the toothpick-case, drew on
his gloves with leisurely care, and bestowing another glance . . . as
seemed rather to demand than express admiration, walked off with
an happy air of real conceit and affected indifference. (220–21)

This passage perhaps hints at the devastating effects of “empire” on those

who decadently reap its rewards without possessing any awareness of the
labor and injustice supporting their own luxurious lifestyle. We see Robert
Ferrars giving orders and making demands. The repetition of words like
“leisure” and “bestow” captures his idleness and imperiousness. Austen’s
readers would have recognized that ivory, gold, and pearls were among the
fruits of colonialism. Although this passage contains the only reference to
ivory in Austen’s novels, there are other brief allusions to the slave trade and
to the West and East Indies. Earlier in Sense and Sensibility Willoughby’s
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 265

references to “nabobs, gold mohrs, and palanquins” would similarly have

reminded readers that British extravagance came only through the harsh
labor of others (51). 24
Robert Ferrars thinks only of himself, not those exploited for the sake of
his country’s wealth. He loves ornaments and is “adorned in the first style of
fashion.” Little else occupies his time. He reminds one of Mary Wollstone-
craft’s depictions of women more interested in what they will wear on a trip
than in where they will go. In a chapter called “The State of Degradation to
Which Woman is Reduced,” Wollstonecraft asks, “Can dignity of mind exist
with such trivial cares?” She concludes that rich men have become honorary
women: “Women, in general, as well as the rich of both sexes, have acquired all
the follies and vices of civilization, and missed the useful fruit.”25 An idle,
wealthy gentleman like Robert Ferrars is ladylike in the worst sense of the
epithet. Robert Ferrars’s act of drawing on his gloves “with leisurely care”
shows his uselessness. Austen’s oxymoronic description of Robert Ferrars’s
“sterling insignificance” captures the link between British imperialism (“ster-
ling” suggests the British unit of value) and the pettiness of its leisured, pam-
pered upper class (221).
Austen includes many other sterling examples of insignificant men and
women in this novel. Mr. Palmer “idled away the mornings at billiards, which
ought to have been devoted to business” and displays “Epicurism . . . selfish-
ness . . . conceit” (305). Sir John Middleton has no resources for solitude,
displays a “total want of talent and taste,” and feels no purpose in life beyond
hunting, shooting, and throwing pleasure parties (32). Nancy Steele uses bad
grammar and thinks of nothing but herself, her pink ribbons, and her con-
quest of beaux, while the vulgar Lucy Steele schemes her way up the social
ladder. A dense woman, the “everlasting talker” Mrs. Jennings fails to see that
her raillery causes pain or that her comments lack depth (“Mrs. Taylor did
say this morning that one day Miss Walker hinted to her, that she believed
Mr. and Mrs. Ellison would not be sorry to have Miss Grey married”) (54,
194). Both her daughters are vapid, uneducated, frivolous women who dis-
play a few trivial “accomplishments” for the sake of catching a husband, then
promptly drop the effort: Lady Middleton celebrates her marriage by giving
up music and now passes the time elegantly “saying little and doing less”;
Charlotte Palmer hangs above her mantlepiece “a landscape in coloured silks
of her performance, in proof of her having spent seven years at a great school
in town to some effect” and now spends her time lounging, dawdling, laugh-
ing, and whiling away the time while her servants do the work (175, 160).
Why are Lady Middleton, Charlotte Palmer, Fanny Dashwood, the
Steele sisters, and women of their ilk so insipid and illiberal? Again, Austen
suggests that idleness and lack of education are much to blame, just as in the
case of the many dissipated and indolent men in this novel. Wollstonecraft
266 Emily Auerbach

had warned of self-indulgent fine ladies “brimful of sensibility, and teeming

with capricious fancies” as well as “mere notable women” with “a shrewd kind
of good sense, joined with worldly prudence” who possess “neither greatness
of mind nor taste.”26 Without ever writing a line of a political treatise as
Wollstonecraft had done, Austen offers an equally revolutionary argument
for educating both men and women to be whole human beings. Only then
can they live in harmony and fulfillment.
Like Wollstonecraft, Austen rejects the notion that “man was made to
reason, woman to feel.”27 Perhaps Austen was tired of reading passages in
conduct books suggesting that young women were innately sensitive, quiver-
ing, emotional messes, such as the Reverend John Bennett’s Letters to a Young
Lady, on a Variety of Useful and Interesting Subjects, Calculated to Improve the
Heart, to Form the Manners, and Enlighten the Understanding: “The timidity,
arising from the natural weakness and delicacy of your frame; the numerous
diseases to which you are liable; that exquisite sensibility, which, in many of
you, vibrates to the slightest touch of joy or sorrow . . . the sedentariness of
your life, naturally followed with low spirits or ennui; whilst we are seeking
health and pleasure . . . will expose you to a number of peculiar sorrows.”28
Austen also might have objected to Tennyson’s later lines, “Man with the
head and woman with the heart: . . . All else confusion.”29 In Sense and Sen-
sibility Austen insists that all will be confusion unless both men and women
possess both sense and sensibility.
John Halperin writes, “Somewhere between Sense and Sensibility
lies what is just plain sensible, and it is here that Jane Austen wishes us to
stand.”30 Austen argues this not only in Sense and Sensibility but in all her
other novels: as Joan Ray notes, “the phrase sense and sensibility is key to
reading Austen, whichever of her novels we pick up.”31 Sensibility need not
be delicate weakness or self-indulgence, but rather a genuine ability to feel
for others. Sense need not be cunning or narrow pragmatism but rather an
enlightened use of one’s mind. In Austen’s world, any human needs both. As
Joseph Wiesenfarth observes, “to be a whole person, one must have sensi-
bility enlightened by sense.”32
Austen suggests that it may be particularly difficult to achieve such
wholeness, such humanity, in an economically exploitative society. For many
men and women, sense becomes little more than a calculated self-interest in
obtaining cents and percents for oneself. In Sense and Sensibility more than
in any other novel, Austen links the pursuit of money to the destruction of
finer feelings.
This novel is permeated with remarks about fortunes, annuities, moi-
eties, inheritances, salaries, and livings, as if each character comes with a
price tag attached. From start to finish, money determines behavior. Money,
not love, seems to make most of the world of Sense and Sensibility go round.
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 267

Perhaps W.H. Auden had Sense and Sensibility in mind when he wrote these
lines about Jane Austen:

You could not shock her more than she shocks me;
Beside her Joyce seems innocent as grass.
It makes me most uncomfortable to see
An English spinster of the middle class
Describe the amorous effects of “brass”,
Reveal so frankly and with such sobriety
The economic basis of society.33

We certainly see the amorous effects of brass in the loveless marriages of Lucy
Steele, Colonel Brandon’s brother, and John Willoughby. As Willoughby
admits, “My affection for Marianne . . . was all insufficient to outweigh
that dread of poverty, or get the better of those false ideas of the neces-
sity of riches, which I was naturally inclined to feel, and expensive society
had increased” (323) Willoughby has managed to hit the jackpot, snaring
Miss Grey and her fifty thousand pounds. As he notes in a rare moment of
integrity, “In honest words, her money was necessary to me” (328). Edward
Ferrars could have been the equivalent of a millionaire as well, for if he had
married Miss Morton he “would settle on him the Norfolk estate, which,
clear of land-tax, brings in a good thousand a-year,” land her thirty thou-
sand pound fortune, gain a wife with a title, and be assured of receiving his
inheritance from his pleased mother (266). Mrs. Jenning’s “ample jointure”
(a financial settlement providing for a widow) allows her to see both her
daughters “respectably married” with expensive and extensive estates (36). If
money can’t buy you love, it certainly can buy you marriage.
In Sense and Sensibility we meet a society so based on economics that it
uses income to measure the worth not only of prospective marriage partners
but also of people in general. John Dashwood would probably approve of
having people wear name tags saying “Hello, my name is ___ and I make ___
pounds a year.” He compliments Mrs. Ferrars because she has “such very large
fortune” and indeed “never wished to offend anybody, especially anybody of
good fortune” (222, 267). When Colonel Brandon arrives, John Dashwood
“only wanted to know him to be rich, to be equally civil to him” (223). As the
grieving Marianne declines in health, John Dashwood ticks off her declining
market value: “I question whether Marianne now, will marry a man worth
more than five or six hundred a-year, at the utmost” (227). The only purpose
of John Dashwood’s life seems to be to acquire money, spend it on himself
and his immediate family, and keep it away from others, including the rela-
tives he had promised to help. His concept of the ultimate spiritual horror
is the loss of property: “Can anything be more galling to the spirit of a man
268 Emily Auerbach

than to see his younger brother in possession of an estate which might have
been his own?” (269).
Is John Dashwood’s first name of significance? In a novel where “Mari-
anne” may symbolize revolutionary France, does Austen invoke the spirit of
John Bull—the prosaic, mercenary, soulless symbol of England—by naming
three of her English gentlemen “John”? John Dashwood is a selfish material-
ist, Sir John Middleton an aristocrat without taste or inner resources, and
John Willoughby an idle, dissipated, extravagant “gentleman” who marries for
money and seduces for pleasure, leaving broken hearts and lives in his wake.
Young John Middleton, a boy of six, monopolizes the conversation, harasses
his female cousins, searches their bags, steals their belongings, and displays
his “spirits” by “monkey tricks” such as throwing Lucy’s handkerchief out the
window—hardly a good omen of little John Bulls to come (121). If we add
to Austen’s collection the crass, philistinistic, fortune-hunting John Thorpe of
Northanger Abbey, the dissolute “Honorable” John Yates of Mansfield Park, the
rather dour, reserved attorney John Knightley of Emma, and the “civil, cau-
tious” lawyer John Shepherd in Persuasion, John Bull definitely comes out in
need of amendment.
Austen heightens the contrast between those with and without feel-
ing by presenting two Mrs. Dashwoods. As Isobel Armstrong observes, “The
novel imagines a world with too much sensibility in Mrs. Dashwood, and
too little in the other Mrs. Dashwood, Fanny.”34 The first Mrs. Dashwood’s
warm-blooded personality and possession of “a sense of honour so keen, a
generosity so romantic” make her a far cry from the coldly objective and self-
ishly calculating Mrs. John Dashwood (6). Austen shows how Fanny perverts
the language of maternal feelings (“our poor little boy”) to talk her easily
convinced husband out of any sense of charity, duty, or justice (9). The original
plan to give three thousand pounds to needy relatives is reduced in just a few
minutes to nothing more than an occasional present of fish and game, when
in season. Fanny succeeds as a mother in looking out for the interests (liter-
ally) of her child, but at what social and moral cost?
Using words like observe, certainly, undoubtedly, to say the truth, and I am
convinced, John and Fanny Dashwood conclude that the late Mr. Dashwood
was not “in his right senses” when he asked his son to share his fortune (9).
By sprinkling the word sense throughout this novel, Austen demands that we
question its meaning. When Colonel Brandon decides to give Edward a liv-
ing as rector that he could have sold for profit, John Dashwood responds with
utter amazement: “This living of Colonel Brandon’s—can it be true?—has he
really given it to Edward? . . . this is very astonishing! . . . and now that livings
fetch such a price! . . . a man of Colonel Brandon’s sense! . . . It is truly aston-
ishing! . . . what could be the Colonel’s motive?” (294–95). John Dashwood’s
definition means it makes sense for Willoughby to marry the heiress Miss
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 269

Grey. It makes sense for Mrs. Ferrars to want Edward to marry the wealthy,
titled Miss Morton. As Miss Steele observes, “Miss Godby told Miss Sparks,
that nobody in their senses could expect Mr. Ferrars to give up a woman like
Miss Morton, with £30,000 to her fortune, for Lucy Steele that had nothing
at all” (273; my italics).
As narrator, Austen pretends to admire the fact that Lucy’s sense pays
off: “The whole of Lucy’s behaviour . . . the prosperity which crowned it . . .
may be held forth as a most encouraging instance of what an earnest, an
unceasing attention to self-interest . . . will do in securing every advantage of
fortune, with no other sacrifice than that of time and conscience” (376). Why
might Austen call this behavior “encouraging” or refer to John Dashwood
as “respectable”? Austen pretends as narrator to adopt her era’s prevailing
opinions—to assume the majority voice of her era. Yet by ironically prais-
ing characters with obviously flawed values, Austen invites her readers to go
against the norm. She demonstrates that those with a “sensitive conscience”
like Marianne, a respect for principles like Edward and Elinor, or a generosity
of spirit like the brotherly Colonel Brandon must look senseless to the Steeles
and John and Fanny Dashwoods of the world (350).
While Austen attacks the money-mindedness of society, she also ex-
poses the vulnerability of those too romantic to cope with financial reality.
Mrs. Dashwood’s inability to save money in the past makes her ill equipped
to handle her newfound adversity. Marianne’s naivete about money matters
makes her too blind to Willoughby’s expensive lifestyle and the lengths he
will go to preserve it. At least Elinor and Edward face real life: “They were
neither of them quite enough in love to think that three hundred and fifty
pounds a-year would supply them with the comforts of life” (369). The hap-
piest characters in Austen’s fictional world are those who understand money
but are not destroyed by its corrupting power. Colonel Brandon’s act of giving
a living to Edward Ferrars may not make “sense” to John Dashwood, but it is
consistent with the ideals of brotherhood celebrated in this novel.
Austen does not come in as narrator to tell us her ideals or even to
indicate whether we are to prefer Elinor to Marianne, Edward to Colonel
Brandon. Instead of intruding as she did in Northanger Abbey to tell us about
the hero and heroine of her “tale,” she inserts her presence in Sense and Sen-
sibility for a different purpose: to remind readers that her seemingly exagger-
ated characters and events are not unusual. All of society stands indicted here
through Austen’s frequent references to the characters’ resemblance to others
of their sex, class, or era.
Throughout this novel, Austen reminds us that selfish, unfair people will
be deemed respectable if they have money. Rather than presenting the un-
fair disinheritance of Mrs. Dashwood and her daughters as unusual, Austen
informs us in the opening chapter that such occurrences are the norm: “The
270 Emily Auerbach

old Gentleman died; his will was read, and like almost every other will, gave as
much disappointment as pleasure” (4; my italics here and in the next quota-
tion). Rather than expressing surprise at Fanny and John Dashwood’s selfish
disregard for the claims of their relatives, Austen matter-of-factly states, “It
was very well known that no affection was ever supposed to exist between the
children of any man by different marriages” (8). Throughout Sense and Sensi-
bility, Austen sprinkles in clauses such as still more common, in many cases of a
similar kind, like many others, too common, in common use, the common opinion,
in the common phrase, as any other man, as ladies always [do], by no means un-
usual, in the usual style, like other parties, like the half the rest of the world, like
every other place. Austen makes her opinion clear that mean-spirited, crass,
tasteless people, loveless marriages, and boring events are the norm, not the
exception.
What are we to think of the state of women if the illiterate Lucy Steele
(described as “capable of the utmost meanness of wanton ill-nature”) is
pronounced to be “superior in person and understanding to half her sex”?
(366). What are we to think of men if our narrator tells us that the rude,
hedonistic Mr. Palmer possesses “no traits at all unusual in his sex and time
of life”? (304).
The dreadful marriage of the Palmers—one of insults and abuse on
the one hand and escapist oblivion on the other—is described as too usual,
too common, to make Elinor wonder about it. Indeed, Elinor considers “the
strange unsuitableness which often existed between husband and wife” (118;
my italics). She mistakenly assumes that since Mr. Palmer’s mistaken reasons
for marriage are common, it must not do any harm: Mr. Palmer’s “temper
might perhaps be a little soured by finding, like many others of his sex, that
through some unaccountable bias in favour of beauty, he was the husband
of a very silly woman,—but she [Elinor] knew that this kind of blunder was
too common for any sensible man to be lastingly hurt by it.—It was rather
a wish of distinction she believed, which produced his contemptuous treat-
ment of everybody, and his general abuse of every thing before him. It was
the desire of appearing superior to other people. The motive was too common
to be wondered at” (112; my italics). This is a fascinating passage. Mr. Palmer,
like Mr. Allen in Northanger Abbey and like Mr. Bennet in Pride and Prejudice,
has joined “many others of his sex” in valuing beauty at the expense of sense,
a far “too common” blunder. Austen implies that many men marry inferior
women, and that this action reflects a more universal desire of looking su-
perior to others. Austen seems to separate herself from Elinor Dashwood
in this paragraph. Elinor stops wondering about Mr. Palmer because his cir-
cumstances seem so common. But readers are left to conclude that a man of
sensibility may indeed be lastingly and devastatingly hurt by a bad marriage
and by inflated egotism.
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 271

Perhaps more than in any book she would write, Austen aims her satiric
gaze at the ignorance, dullness, and tastelessness of the public—of everyone. If
the empty-headed Robert Ferrars is “as well fitted to mix in the world as any
other man,” God help the world (251). The ostentatious residence of the Palm-
ers is “like every other place of the same degree of importance” (302). When
Austen describes a “musical” party consisting of people who talk through per-
formances and have no real taste or appreciation for the music, she points out
that such events are “not very remarkable” because they are “like other musi-
cal parties” in general where the majority of listeners have no taste and the
“performers themselves were, as usual” arrogant in assuming themselves the
best performers in England (250). John Middleton’s vapid pleasure parties are
conducted in “the usual style.” Lady Middleton utters “the most common-
place inquiry or remark,” and Mrs. Jennings offers “common-place raillery.”
The “common cant” usually distorts the truth, Austen notes. Austen indicts
all people as empty talkers with her comment about Mrs. Ferrars’s concise use
of words: “She was not a woman of many words: for, unlike people in general,
she proportioned them to the number of her ideas” (232; my italics). Rather
than singling out the selfish Fanny Dashwood as unusual, Austen relates her
cruelty to her relatives to the behavior of people in general.
Throughout Sense and Sensibility Austen categorically suggests that
something profound is wanting in society. Mrs. Ferrars evinces a “want of
liberality,” Mrs. Palmer a “want of recollection and elegance” (90, 304). Lucy
Steele evinces a “want of real elegance and artlessness” and “want of informa-
tion in the most common particulars,” as well as a “thorough want of delicacy,
of rectitude, and integrity of mind” and “want of liberality” stemming from
her “want of instruction” and “want of education” (124, 127, 367). Sir John
and Lady Middleton resemble each other only “in that total want of talent
and taste,” and the audiences at their musical parties show a “shameless want
of taste” (32, 35). The cumulative effect of all these references to wants is to
leave readers deeply aware that something is lacking in human society.
Austen’s narrative intrusions point out that her society lacks not only
culture but also morality. Although critics have sometimes faulted Austen for
creating a stage villain in Willoughby, she seems to me to have gone to great
lengths to make Willoughby quite unsurprising to those around him.35 She
reduces him at the end not to shameful ignominy or penitent remorse, but just
to ordinariness. True, once he finds out that Mrs. Smith might have left him
her fortune even if he had married Marianne, he regrets choosing a woman
for money rather than love. Yet he expresses no concern about his seduction
of Eliza, and he goes on to lead an unremarkable life: “But that he was for
ever inconsolable, that he fled from society, or contracted an habitual gloom
of temper, or died of a broken heart, must not be depended on—for he did
neither. He lived to exert, and frequently to enjoy himself. His wife was not
272 Emily Auerbach

always out of humour, nor his home always uncomfortable; and in his breed
of horses and dogs, and in sporting of every kind, he found no inconsiderable
degree of domestic felicity” (379). Willoughby will fit in fine. Maybe Sir John
Middleton will stop labeling him “as good a kind of fellow as ever lived,” but
he still will take him out hunting (43). Lady Middleton decides to visit rather
than snub Mrs. Willoughby because she is rich enough to be elegant. Like
spraying air freshener on the source of a bad odor rather than removing it,
society masks over any stink, any scandal (if the perpetrator be male), any in-
justice, and proceeds with elegance. The well-bred Lady Middleton may rush
out of the room to avoid hearing talk of a love-child or a pregnancy, but the
true horror lies in her own indifference, ignorance, and false elegance.
Although Marianne stands out as exceptional, striking, and refreshingly
unconventional compared to the Lady Middletons of her milieu, even she be-
comes less extraordinary in the hands of our ironic narrator. When Marianne
misjudges others, falls for the superficially graceful, polished Willoughby, or
displays selfishness, she merely resembles many others in the world: “Elinor
[was] . . . assured of the injustice to which her sister was often led in her
opinion of others, by the irritable refinement of her own mind, and the too
great importance placed by her on the delicacies of a strong sensibility, and
the graces of a polished manner. Like half the rest of the world, if more than half
there be that are clever and good, Marianne, with excellent abilities and an ex-
cellent disposition, was neither reasonable nor candid. She expected from other
people the same opinions and feelings as her own, and she judged of their
motives by the immediate effect of their actions on herself ” (201; my italics).
Does Austen insert this perplexing passage to inform readers that most of
us, Marianne included, are neither reasonable nor candid in its earlier sense
of being unprejudiced and, as Dr. Johnson puts it in his famous dictionary,
“free from malice; not desirous to find fault”? Even those who are clever and
good with excellent dispositions and abilities may fall victim to irrationality
and partiality, she suggests. Through an inserted “if ” clause, Austen makes us
question whether the majority of people are clever and good. By this point
in the novel, Austen has demonstrated that more than half the characters are
silly and selfish. The whole world seems implicated here, since even a char-
acter with cleverness and feelings judges others according to “the immediate
effect of their actions on herself.”
Such narrative potshots at the world perhaps explain why many critics
are quick to call Sense and Sensibility a bleak book written in a foul mood by
an embittered spinster.36 Perhaps Austen’s anger stemmed not from her in-
ability to find a mate but to find a readership. How did she feel as lightweight
pulp fiction brought fame and fortune to lesser writers while her manuscripts
of First Impressions and Susan remained unpublished? Did her experience of
watching across the Channel as the French Revolution dissolved into the
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 273

Reign of Terror leave her convinced of the selfishness of all concerned? As

her family moved from Steventon to Bath, did she find herself condemned to
a hollow life of unbearably petty activities in the company of stupid people?
Did Austen’s acquaintance with real emotional pain (as in the case of Cassan-
dra’s loss of a fiancé) darken her vision?
Although Marianne in Sense and Sensibility comes closer to death than
any other Austen heroine does, it is interesting that even in this novel Austen
refuses to write unadulterated tragedy. The word “almost” occurs at climactic
moments. Feeling “almost choked by grief,” Marianne “almost screamed with
agony” when confronting Willoughby’s rejection (182). In turn Willoughby
“almost ran out of the room” when departing forever from Marianne and Eli-
nor, “almost ran out of the room” when responding to the news of Edward’s
liberty (332, 360). Through qualifiers like these, Austen keeps her narrative
reins in check, giving us something that is almost tragedy, almost melodrama.
The same Jane Austen who burlesqued fainting heroines in “Love and Fre-
indship” perhaps still distrusts tear-jerking sentimental fiction but knows that
life really does contain tragic losses and dark despair. As Eudora Welty put it,
Jane Austen’s novels are “profound in emotion” for “in her writing there deeply
lies, as deeply as anything in her powers, a true tenderness of feeling.”37 Sense
and Sensibility leaves us no doubt that Austen could have written a poignant
deathbed scene, with Mrs. Dashwood and Elinor consumed with grief at the
side of a lifeless Marianne, with a power that would have rivaled the ability
of Charles Dickens to describe Little Nell’s final moments or Louisa May
Alcott to describe the loss of Beth March.
In our search for Jane Austen, we often found her in Northanger Abbey
using the personal pronoun “I,” whether telling us of “my heroine” or deliver-
ing her ironic opinions. For the most part, that “I” voice is gone from Sense
and Sensibility. The only direct use of the narrative “I” in this novel appears at
the beginning of a passage describing Fanny Dashwood’s frustration at hav-
ing to send a carriage for Marianne and Elinor. I quote this passage at length
because it illustrates several features of the narrator:

I come now to the relation of a misfortune, which about this time

befell Mrs. John Dashwood. It so happened that while her two
sisters with Mrs. Jennings were first calling on her in Harley-
street, another of her acquaintance had dropt in—a circumstance
in itself not apparently likely to produce evil to her. But while the
imaginations of other people will carry them away to form wrong
judgments of our conduct, and to decide on it by slight appearances,
one’s happiness must in some measure be always at the mercy of
chance. In the present instance, this last-arrived lady allowed her
fancy so far to outrun truth and probability, that on merely hearing
274 Emily Auerbach

the name of the Miss Dashwoods, and understanding them to be

Mr. Dashwood’s sisters, she immediately concluded them to be
staying in Harley-street; and this misconstruction produced within
a day or two afterwards, cards of invitation for them as well as for
their brother and sister, to a small musical party at her house. The
consequence of which was, that Mrs. John Dashwood was obliged
to submit not only to the exceedingly great inconvenience of
sending her carriage for the Miss Dashwoods; but, what was still
worse, must be subject to all the unpleasantness of appearing to
treat them with attention. . . . The power of disappointing them, it
was true, must always be her’s. But that was not enough; for when
people are determined on a mode of conduct which they know to
be wrong, they feel injured by the expectation of any thing better
from them. (248–49)

This “I” ironically adopts Fanny’s point of view by pretending that the obvi-
ously trivial incident of sending a carriage is a “misfortune,” an “evil,” and an
“exceedingly great inconvenience.” This same narrator refuses to let readers
put Fanny’s selfish, snobbish behavior at arm’s length from their own. She
interrupts this account to talk about “our conduct” and ends with a general
comment on “people.”
The final chapters of Sense and Sensibility provide further glimpses
of Jane Austen, simply from the emphasis she chooses to give at the end.
To the irritation of many critics, Austen chooses to withdraw as narrator
rather than give us tender romantic scenes between her two pairs of lov-
ers. When Edward finally has the freedom to propose to Elinor, Austen
states matter-of-factly, “How soon he had walked himself into the proper
resolution, however, how soon an opportunity of exercising it occurred, in
what manner he expressed himself, and how he was received, need not be
particularly told” (361). Why need it not particularly be told? Why do we
also hear no spoken words between Marianne and Colonel Brandon in the
final chapter?
Some have speculated that Austen distances herself from such romantic
moments because, as an unmarried woman, she had no familiarity with such
scenes and a prudish reluctance to dwell on them. Yet since she displayed no
such inhibition in giving us Marianne’s passionate outburst to Willoughby or
Colonel Brandon’s narrative of his attachment to Eliza, one suspects a dif-
ferent reason. Could it be that in a novel exploring the relationship between
solitude and society, between intimacy and public life, Austen demonstrates
through her respectful silence that there are some emotions and moments
understood only in private? She need never back off from dialogue between
Sir John and Lady Middleton, for Sir John’s idea of intimacy is a noisy crowd.
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 275

We know that John and Fanny Dashwood will never talk of anything un-
related to money and property. Perhaps Austen leaves readers outside the
homes of Edward and Elinor, Colonel Brandon and Marianne, to signal that
indoors these two couples have found their own very private domestic happi-
ness—the exchange of ideas and reciprocity of affection possible only to men
and women with both sense and sensibility. Her stance as author—respectful
of her lovers’ privacy—places her in diametric opposition to Nancy Steele,
hovering outside the door to eavesdrop on her sister’s conversation with Ed-
ward. “La! . . . do you think people make love when any body else is by? . . . all
I heard was only by listening at the door. . . . And I am sure Lucy would have
done just the same by me” (274). Nancy and Lucy Steele will listen through
the door; Austen will not.
In the final paragraph of Sense and Sensibility, Austen delivers an in-
junction to her readers: “Between Barton and Delaford, there was that con-
stant communication which strong family affection would naturally dic-
tate;—and among the merits and the happiness of Elinor and Marianne,
let it not be ranked as the least considerable, that though sisters, and living
almost within sight of each other, they could live without disagreement
between themselves, or producing coolness between their husbands” (380).
The narrator ranks as considerably important the fact that the sisters remain
close to their mother and to each other; their two husbands have warmth
between them. The final image is of a world of rational discourse (“constant
communication”) and natural emotion (the “happiness” resulting from the
natural dictates of “strong family affection”). Austen ends her novel about
the prevalence of cold, selfish, dull people bickering over money and status
with the image of a close-knit family.
Even though that final sentence suggests that the main characters lived
happily ever after in perfect harmony, Austen does not lapse into saccharine
Walt Disney–like writing here. She could have written, “because they were
sisters, they lived within sight of each other in harmony and their husbands
enjoyed a warm relationship.” Instead, she writes “though sisters, and living al-
most within sight of each other, they could live without disagreement between
themselves, or producing coolness between their husbands.” Just as when we
are told “whatever you do, do not think of an elephant” we must think of the
elephant, so here by being reminded of disagreement and coolness, we keep
those problems with us as we close the pages of the novel. Austen continues
to the end to insert into Sense and Sensibility her biting perception that the
majority of human beings—and their countries—lack the true sense and sen-
sibility needed to live in harmony.
Perhaps in Sense and Sensibility more than in any other novel she would
write, Austen opines that most men and women are selfish, competitive, dull,
greedy, petty, vain, and insufferably insipid. Create your own oasis of family
276 Emily Auerbach

warmth, intellectual stimulation, personal growth, and social altruism, Aus-

ten suggests in the conclusion to Sense and Sensibility, for little hope exists of
reforming or even escaping “the rest of the world.”

No t e s

  1. Shields, Jane Austen, 48.

  2. Eva Brann, “Whose Sense? Whose Sensibility?” Persuasions 12 (1990): 131.
  3. Stuart Tave, Some Words of Jane Austen (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1973), 96.
  4. John Hardy, Jane Austen’s Heroines: Intimacy in Human Relationships (Lon-
don: Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1984).
  5. Marvin Mudrick, Jane Austen: Irony as Defense and Discovery (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1952), 93.
  6. Eliza Hancock to Philadelphia Hancock, 3 May 1797, in Richard Austen-
Leigh, Austen Papers (London, 1942), 159, cited in Le Faye, Family Record, 94.
  7. Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine, 1866, cited in Southam, Critical Heri-
tage, 1: 206.
  8. Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975), 196; Lawrence Lerner, “Sense and Sensibility: A Mixed-Up Book,” in
The Truthtellers: Jane Austen, George Eliot, and D. H. Lawrence (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1967), 166.
  9. George Moore, Avowals (1919; reprint, London: Heinemann, 1924),
39–40.
10. See Tony Tanner, Jane Austen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1986), 91.
11. Le Faye, Jane Austen, 178.
12. Maurice Agulhon, Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbol-
ism in France, 1789–1880, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), 16. Also see the discussion of Marianne’s dangerous name in Mar-
garet Anne Doody’s introduction to Sense and Sensibility (Oxford: Oxford World
Classics, 1990), xvii.
13. Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984), 62.
14. See Honan, Jane Austen, 98.
15. George Moore, “Turgueneff,” Fortnightly Review, February 1888, cited in
Southam, Critical Heritage, 2: 188.
16. Marat-Mauger’s remarks are cited in Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in
the French Revolution, 27.
17. Steele Gibbons, Introduction to Sense and Sensibility (New York: Heritage
Press, 1957), x.
18. For the complete text of Twain’s remarks in “Jane Austen,” an unpublished
essay about Sense and Sensibility, see my appendix.
19. Susan Morgan, “Polite Lies: The Veiled Heroine of Sense and Sensibility,”
Nineteenth-Century Fiction 31 (September 1976): 191.
20. Blaise Pascal, Pensées, section 4, line 277 (New York: Dutton, 1958), 79.
21. See the discussion of Ang Lee’s Sense and Sensibility in Jane Austen in Hol-
lywood, ed. Linda Troost and Sayre Greenfield (Lexington: University Press of Ken-
tucky, 1998). For example, Cheryl Nixon notes that “the film remakes Brandon into
 An Excellent Heart: Sense and Sensibility 277

a standard-bearer of true emotion” and “a courtship hero” (39), and Nora Nachumi
observes that “the movie works hard to create the impression that Brandon is the
perfect romantic hero for Marianne” (133).
22. William Cowper, The Task, book 4, line 560, in Poetical Works, ed. H. S.
Milford (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 231.
23. Honan, Jane Austen, 275, 278; Marvin Mudrick, Jane Austen, 88; Louis
Menand, “What Jane Austen Doesn’t Tell Us,” New York Review of Books (1 Febru-
ary 1996), 14.
24. Nabobs were wealthy, important colonists; mohrs were coins used in British
India; palanquins were closed litters on which several natives would transport VIPs.
25. Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792; reprint,
London: Penguin, 1985), 151–52.
26. Ibid., 158.
27. Ibid., 154.
28. John Bennett, Letters to a Young Lady (Warrington: W. Eyres, 1789), 7.
29. “The Princess,” 5: 439–41, in The Poems of Tennyson, ed. Christopher Ricks
(London: Longmans, 1969), 815.
30. Halperin, Life of Jane Austen, 91.
31. Joan Ray, “Code Word Jane Austen, or How a Chinese Film About Mar-
tial Arts Teaches Life Arts,” Persuasions 22 (2000): 10.
32. Joseph Wiesenfarth, The Errand of Form: An Assay of Jane Austen’s Art
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1967), 55.
33. W.H. Auden, “Letter to Lord Byron, Part 1,” in Letters from Iceland (Lon-
don: Faber & Faber, 1937), 21.
34. Isobel Armstrong, Sense and Sensibility (London and New York: Penguin
Books, 1994), 81.
35. “Willoughby is a stage villain,” notes William Lyon Phelps in his intro-
duction to the 1906 New York Holby edition of Sense and Sensibility (xxxvii).
36. See, for instance, Halperin’s description of Sense and Sensibility as “bleak
and black and nasty” in Life of Jane Austen, 84.
37. Eudora Welty, “The Radiance of Jane Austen” (1969), in The Eye of the
Story: Selected Essays and Reviews (New York: Random House, 1978), 8–9.
 SARAH EMSLEY

Learning the Art of Charity in Emma

But lovely as I was the Graces of my Person were the least of my

Perfections. . . . In my Mind, every virtue that could adorn it was centered;
it was the Rendezvous of every good Quality & of every noble sentiment.
—Jane Austen, “Love and Friendship,”
Volume the Second (MW 77–78)

E mma is about the process of learning to respect other people, to tolerate

differences, and to be charitable to others, and it is about the role of misery
in the process of education. Although Emma Woodhouse never suffers
severe physical pain or loss, in the course of the novel she is required to
undergo suffering that contributes to her education, and the kind of pain
she endures is the torment of coming to consciousness of her own errors.
In contrast to Fanny Price, who possesses a firm knowledge of herself,
but struggles to act with confidence, Emma acts confidently but has to
learn to think about the consequences of her actions; she thus resembles
Elizabeth Bennet. The novel describes how a young woman who appears
to have everything comes to realize that she does not quite have it all, and,
moreover, that she definitely does not know everything. Some have sug-
gested that the process she has to go through to arrive at that realization
is education by humiliation, and that she is required to submit to the bet-
ter knowledge of her moral superior, her friend/brother/father-surrogate,

From Jane Austen’s Philosophy of the Virtues, pp. 129–144, 181–182. © 2005 by Sarah
Emsley.

279
280 Sarah Emsley

whose testing of her moral worth is rewarded by her hand in marriage. A

number of critics have objected to the idea that Emma must be disciplined
by Mr. Knightley in order to be worthy of becoming his bride.1 In contrast,
I read Emma as primarily responsible for her own moral education, an edu-
cation into charitable thought. Her education is dependent on her choosing
to change, not on her submitting to Mr. Knightley’s wishes. I see Emma as
independent, even in her education in recognizing her own errors, and there
is evidence that Mr. Knightley himself sees her as capable of recognizing
her own errors.
Unlike Marianne Dashwood, who learns mostly from her sister, and
Elizabeth Bennet, who learns primarily from the process of reading Dar-
cy’s letters, and Fanny Price, who learns from her cousin and her reading of
Samuel Johnson and other writers, Emma Woodhouse does not listen and
she does not read. How, then, does she learn? What is it that brings her to
understanding and humility, and how does she discover what is missing from
the “best blessings of existence” that her life at the start of the novel seems to
incorporate? Emma has “some” of the “best blessings of existence” (E 5) from
the opening sentence onward, but what does she lack? What she starts with
is that she is “handsome, clever, and rich, with a comfortable home and happy
disposition,” and the added comfort that her life thus far has been unruffled
by bad fortune of any form: she “had lived nearly twenty-one years in the
world with very little to distress or vex her” (E 5). But although she seems to
have everything, what is missing is charity.2 To some extent this absence re-
calls the lack of love in Lady Susan, but whereas love never gains prominence
in Lady Susan Vernon’s life, it gradually does in Emma’s. At the beginning of
the novel, Emma has not yet either had to experience the charity of others,
or had to learn how to practice charity toward others. And as Paul says in 1
Corinthians, “though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and
have not charity, I am nothing” (13:2b). Emma needs to learn what charity is,
and to do so she must struggle to achieve self-knowledge.

Education and the Dangers of Solitude

At the beginning of the novel, having lost the constant companionship of
her governess and friend Miss Taylor, who has now become Mrs. Weston,
Emma is “in great danger of suffering from intellectual solitude” (E 7).
Austen’s irony is directed at Emma here, as Emma will not really be cut
off from all social discourse, but to what extent does intellectual solitude
constitute real danger? The focus here is on Mr. Woodhouse, whose valetu-
dinarian habits prevent him from engaging in any “activity of mind or body,”
and thus he is “no companion” for his daughter (E 7). She will have to look
outside her home for intellectual companionship, then, because what she
fears, though she may not be fully aware of the fact, is the reality of being
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 281

left with her own mind. Emma claims to be quite able to depend on her
own mind for strength, but one of the things she has to learn is that she is
not self-sufficient. When Harriet Smith presses her for her reasons for not
marrying, and her plans for the future in lieu of marriage, Emma says con-
fidently that “ ‘If I know myself, Harriet, mine is an active, busy mind, with
a great many independent resources’ ” (E 85); however, she does not know
herself yet, and that is part of the point of the novel. Does Emma have to
come to terms with society’s expectation of her, and reshape her conception
of her own strength to fit a model that requires her to be supported by a
much stronger and more independent gentleman? Does Austen require that
Mr. Knightley learn anything, or is he permitted to be genuinely self-suf-
ficient? Unlike Mr. Darcy, who has to adjust his perspective when he falls in
love, Mr. Knightley represents a static, unchanging standard of gentleman-
like virtue. To what extent is he Emma’s teacher, and to what extent is her
judgment independent?
Emma’s fear of loneliness means that she welcomes company, even if it
is not quite up to the standard of Mrs. Weston’s friendship. Facing another
of the “long evenings” in which her only company is hearing Mrs. Goddard,
Mrs. Bates, and Miss Bates in conversation and “quiet prosings” with her fa-
ther over cards, she welcomes the introduction of Harriet Smith to the circle
at Hartfield (E 22). The addition of Harriet appears to promise a kind of relief
from intellectual solitude. Harriet is a distraction, and Emma can take her on
as a project, and improve her, despite the fact that “She was not struck by any
thing remarkably clever in Miss Smith’s conversation” (E 23). What Harriet
mainly alleviates is the problem of lonely exercise, not the problem of intel-
lectual solitude. The conversation may not be challenging, but “As a walking
companion, Emma had very early foreseen how useful she might find her
. . . . She had ventured once alone to Randalls, but it was not pleasant; and a
Harriet Smith, therefore, one whom she could summon at any time to a walk,
would be a valuable addition to her privileges” (E 26). Although Emma tells
herself that the appeal of Harriet’s companionship is that “Harriet would be
loved as one to whom she could be useful” (E 26–27), it is clear that the real
appeal is that Harriet is useful to Emma, as a kind of decorative, serviceable
addition.3
What might be more useful to Emma at this point in her career is a little
more intellectual solitude. She has little time for contemplation of her own
mind or her place in the world, partly because she is richly blessed with the
outward markers of what her place in the world is—beauty, money, and inde-
pendence—and partly because she is too busy participating in society, laugh-
ing at the mistakes of others. When her brother-in-law Mr. John Knight-
ley suggests to her that Mr. Elton “ ‘seems to have a great deal of good-will
towards you’ ” (E 112), she does not even consider the possibility that her
282 Sarah Emsley

confident assessment of her social life might be wrong, and receives this warn-
ing simply as a joke: “she walked on, amusing herself in the consideration of
the blunders which often arise from a partial knowledge of circumstances, of
the mistakes which people of high pretensions to judgment are for ever fall-
ing into” (E 112). She is certain that Mr. Elton should marry Harriet.

Knowing One’s Own Mind

Emma does, however, see some things clearly, early on; she is not entirely
blind to the meaning of the workings of society. Although she does not
judge herself, she does judge Frank Churchill to be in error for not visit-
ing his new stepmother (Austen’s term is “mother-in-law”) Mrs. Weston
(E 122), even though she later defends Frank Churchill’s behavior to Mr.
Knightley, arguing that dependence and indebtedness to others can make
it difficult to do what is right in a given situation (E 146). She finds herself
“taking the other side of the question from her real opinion, and making use
of Mrs. Weston’s arguments against herself ” (E 145). It could be argued here
that her judgment of Frank’s nonappearance in Highbury has to do with her
own interest in seeing him, and finding out whether her imagined connec-
tion with him has any basis in reality, but it is also important that she can see
that it is the right thing to do for him to visit his father’s new wife. She can
see this well before Mr. Knightley stresses to her that “ ‘There is one thing,
Emma, which a man can always do, if he chuses, and that is, his duty. . . . It
is Frank Churchill’s duty to pay this attention to his father’ ” (E 146).
One of the ways in which Emma shows that she does know her mind
is that it is very difficult for her to pretend that she is in love with Frank
Churchill, even after she has met him and been charmed by him. She may
not be able to see that she loves Mr. Knightley, but she is intellectually and
emotionally aware of the fact that she is not in love with Frank Churchill.
Emma thinks through her flirtation with Frank, and her self-knowledge in
this situation makes it possible for her to think through other aspects of
her own behavior and feelings. It is through her analysis of where her love
lies that she begins to know more about how she engages with other people
in society. When Frank leaves Highbury after his first visit, Emma spends
time alone thinking about her feelings, and after examining her reaction to
his departure she concludes that “ ‘I do suspect that he is not really neces-
sary to my happiness. So much the better’ ” (E 264). She sees that he is
changeable and that she does “ ‘not altogether build upon his steadiness or
constancy,’ ” and that “ ‘Every consideration of the subject, in short, makes
me thankful that my happiness is not more deeply involved’ ” (E 265). She
knows herself too well to play at lovesickness, and she knows something
about her own happiness. The problem, still, is that she has difficulty know-
ing the happiness of others.
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 283

The roots of this problem lie in her initial conception of what charity is.
She has thought that it would be charitable to be useful to Harriet (when in
fact she uses Harriet as a pawn in her own matchmaking game), that it would
be charitable to Mr. Elton to find him a pretty wife (when she has used him
as the object of that game), and also, that it would be charitable to Frank
Churchill for her to bestow her affections on him. This is charity conceived of
as condescension. Emma Woodhouse, proud, elegant, and benevolent, might
condescend to treat “a Harriet Smith” as a friend, to arrange the local clergy-
man’s love life for him, and to fall in love with a long-lost neighbor. But, as
Emma needs to learn, charity is not about power.
In contrast to Elizabeth Bennet and Catherine Morland, whose revela-
tions of self-knowledge come quite late in their respective novels, Emma has
her first encounter with the pain of enlightenment relatively early, in Chap-
ter 16. Marilyn Butler argues that it is not until Emma learns that Frank
Churchill and Jane Fairfax are engaged that she finally judges herself clearly.4
But Emma is forced to criticize her own mind well before the climax of the
novel. After Mr. Elton has proposed to her—“actually making violent love to
her” (E 129)—in the carriage on the way home after the Westons’ Christmas
Eve party, she is obliged to acknowledge her blindness regarding the object
of her charitable matchmaking scheme. She does not yet know how blind
she has been to Harriet’s feelings in the whole affair with Robert Martin, or
how reprehensible it is that she has directed Harriet to love Mr. Elton, but
she does see how wrong she has been about interpreting Mr. Elton’s behavior,
and how her encouragement of his attentions could have been misinterpreted
as welcoming his affection for her.
When she arrives home that night she is obliged to compose herself for
her family’s sake, and to wait until she is alone to think things through: “her
mind had never been in such perturbation, and it needed a very strong effort to
appear attentive and cheerful till the usual hour of separating allowed her the
relief of quiet reflection” (E 133). Quiet reflection—being alone with her own
mind—may be a relief of sorts, but it is not comfortable, as “Emma sat down to
think and be miserable.—It was a wretched business, indeed!” (E 134). Thinking
about one’s own mistakes is difficult, painful, and miserable. It is something Mr.
Woodhouse almost never does—later in the novel Emma blesses his “favouring
blindness” to her interest in Frank Churchill’s attentions to her, and Austen says
that “the entire deficiency in him of all such sort of penetration or suspicion,
was a most comfortable circumstance” (E 193). In this case his deficiency pro-
vides comfort for Emma, but presumably in most cases it provides comfort for
him: he worries, but he does not think, and thus even his complaints are part of
the comfort of his own complacency. With such a father it is either surprising
or inevitable, depending on the influence granted to genes or the exigencies of
circumstance, that Emma does have to think for herself.
284 Sarah Emsley

When she does, she is thoroughly miserable. She forces herself to look
back “as well as she could; but it was all confusion. She had taken up the idea,
she supposed, and made everything bend to it” (E 134). The more she thinks
about the past, the more she realizes her responsibility for what has hap-
pened: “If she had so misinterpreted his feelings, she had little right to wonder
that he, with self-interest to blind him, should have mistaken her’s” (E 136).
The result of her miserable intellectual solitude is that she sees that

The first error and the worst lay at her door. It was foolish, it was
wrong, to take so active a part in bringing any two people together.
It was adventuring too far, assuming too much, making light of
what ought to be serious, a trick of what ought to be simple. She
was quite concerned and ashamed, and resolved to do such things
no more. (E 136–37)

This language suggests that Emma begins to see herself as chief among sin-
ners,5 and that she is contrite about her sin. In taking blame upon herself,
she is beginning to acknowledge that she cannot do everything right by
herself, but needs help. She is not wholly self-sufficient.
Following the debacle with Mr. Elton, Emma is angry not with him, but
with herself. “She wished him very well; but he gave her pain, and his welfare
twenty miles off would administer most satisfaction” (E 182). Although she
would be more comfortable if he never returned to Highbury, she knows the
value of seeing him as a reminder of her faults. Austen says that “his sight was
so inseparably connected with some very disagreeable feelings, that except in
a moral light, as a penance, a lesson, a source of profitable humiliation to her
own mind, she would have been thankful to be assured of never seeing him
again” (E 182). Seeing him is painful, but morally useful.
As far as Harriet is concerned, Emma is obliged to think again about
separating her from Robert Martin. When Harriet sees Mr. Martin and his
sister in Ford’s, she is flustered and does not know what to do, especially when
they are kind to her despite her rejection of the proposal and the family as
beneath her. At Hartfield, Harriet turns automatically to Emma to assuage
her nervousness, saying “ ‘Oh! Miss Woodhouse, do talk to me and make me
comfortable again’ ” (E 179). But Miss Woodhouse, having had to acknowl-
edge her error about Mr. Elton, is a little more wary of providing immediate
comfort without thinking carefully about the consequences: “Very sincere-
ly did Emma wish to do so; but it was not immediately in her power. She
was obliged to stop and think. She was not thoroughly comfortable herself ”
(E 179). As in Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice, the desire to be
amiable and make others comfortable conflicts with the desire to be wholly
truthful. Emma’s discomfort at this point is not enough to make her seriously
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 285

reexamine her initial judgment that Robert Martin is not good enough for
Harriet, but it is enough to make her stop and think. And if she does this
often enough, Austen implies, she will approach a better understanding of
truth, and will be better equipped to behave charitably to others.

Charity as Style
What charity is not, therefore, is looking after others by telling them how
to live. This is Mrs. Elton’s idea of charity, and it is clearly shown to be
misguided, as her officious exertions on behalf of Jane Fairfax demonstrate.
In addition to directing the lives of the less fortunate, Mrs. Elton also
sees charity as a matter of style. In her estimation, charity is what those
in power offer to those without power: it both assists the beneficiary, and
increases the positive social image and self-image of the benefactor. Early in
the novel, Emma is guilty of conceiving of charity in just this way, and the
introduction of Mrs. Elton to Highbury is a reminder to her of how char-
ity should not be conducted. For example, Emma feels for Jane when Mrs.
Elton insists that her servant will pick up Jane’s mail, or when she insists on
arranging a governessing position for Jane. Even when Mrs. Elton is plan-
ning her part in the strawberry party, her focus is on her image, and her
ability to make Jane over in her own image. She tells Mr. Knightley that “ ‘I
shall wear a large bonnet, and bring one of my little baskets hanging on my
arm. Here,—probably this basket with pink ribbon. Nothing can be more
simple, you see. And Jane will have such another’ ” (E 355). But this kind of
charity—“Look, you too can be perfectly stylish just like me—it’s easy”—is
vanity, as Mrs. Elton’s repeated insistence on image at the expense of feeling
shows. Similarly, she opines, “ ‘I wish we had a donkey. The thing would be
for us all to come on donkies [sic], Jane, Miss Bates, and me—and my caro
sposo walking by. I really must talk to him about purchasing a donkey’ ” (E
356). As Marcia McClintock Folsom points out, “The artificiality of Mrs.
Elton’s vision is revealed by her thought of pestering her husband to buy the
donkey to complete this imaginary scene of country life.”6 Mrs. Elton is
clearly thinking more of the picturesque image of herself on a donkey than
of providing any help to Jane or Miss Bates. At the strawberry-picking party
at Donwell, “Mrs. Elton, in all her apparatus of happiness, her large bonnet
and her basket, was very ready to lead the way in gathering, accepting, or
talking” (E 358), and her insistence on being first in everything belies her
attempts to provide charity to others.
Is it necessary to have equipment for virtue, apparatus for happiness? It is
easier, no doubt, to offer charity to others if one has much to offer, but charity
resides more in the disposition of a person than in objects or wealth to be dis-
pensed. The question of external circumstances necessary to the virtuous life
arises when Emma and Harriet discuss the situation of Miss Bates. Emma is
286 Sarah Emsley

defending the idea that she herself proposes to remain single, and argues that
while “ ‘a very narrow income has a tendency to contract the mind, and sour
the temper,’ ” “ ‘a single woman, of good fortune, is always respectable, and
may be as sensible and pleasant as anybody else’ ” (E 85). She acknowledges
that Miss Bates does not fit in the category of miserly old maid, however:
“ ‘Poverty certainly has not contracted her mind: I really believe, if she had
only a shilling in the world, she would be very likely to give away sixpence of
it’ ” (E 85). Like Mrs. Smith in Persuasion and like the biblical widow who
gives her last mite to those poorer than herself, Miss Bates is an exemplar
of charity.7 Thus although Emma professes to believe that it is necessary to
have wealth in order to be generous and good-natured, she has to except Miss
Bates, the example of the single woman’s life that is closest to home, because
Miss Bates does not lack charity. She is “ ‘only too good natured and too silly
to suit’ ” Emma (E 85), but she is not uncharitable. Equipment and material
resources for promoting virtue may make charity easier, as Aristotle proposes,
and as Austen suggests in other novels, especially earlier novels such as Sense
and Sensibility, but they are not always necessary, as characters in both Emma
and Persuasion demonstrate.8
Emma has drawn on the resources of Hartfield in order to offer charity
to Mrs. and Miss Bates, in much the same way that she visits the poor. She
sends Hartfield pork to the Bates household—as her father says, “ ‘Now we
have killed a porker, and Emma thinks of sending them a loin or a leg; it is
very small and delicate’ ”; Emma replies that she has done more than that:
“ ‘My dear papa, I sent the whole hind-quarter. I knew you would wish it’ ”
(E 172). She is generous, but her charity here is mostly action, not thought.
Although she has to be thoughtful enough to go to the trouble of sending this
gift to them, the action does not really alter her attitude toward the recipients
of her charity. It is more a matter of form than of goodwill to others.
In her conversation with Harriet, just after they have established that
Miss Bates is not an uncharitable old maid, Emma speaks uncharitably of
Jane Fairfax—“‘I wish Jane Fairfax very well; but she tires me to death’ ” (E
86)—and then she moves easily into the role of Lady Bountiful, visiting the
poor of the parish and dispensing tangible charity. There is no irony, however,
in Austen’s description of Emma’s attitude toward the people she visits here:
“Emma was very compassionate; and the distresses of the poor were as sure of
relief from her personal attention and kindness, her counsel and her patience,
as from her purse” (E 86).9 So it is not empty action, but compassionate aid,
as she “entered into their troubles with ready sympathy, and always gave her
assistance with as much intelligence as good-will” (E 86). It is Emma’s own
ironic observation after they have left the cottage that it can be difficult to
fix one’s mind on the sufferings of others when there are potential distrac-
tions in one’s own life, as she says smilingly, “ ‘I hope it may be allowed that
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 287

if compassion has produced exertion and relief to the sufferers, it has done all
that is truly important. If we feel for the wretched, enough to do all we can
for them, the rest is empty sympathy, only distressing to ourselves’ ” (E 87).
She does not believe that sympathy alone will help: action and benevolence
in proportion to the need of those in distress will be helpful, but thinking
without acting will not.
That Emma knows the difference between the sentimental pretensions
of claims to suffer along with others in distress, and the more realistic attempt
to help others without drowning in their misery with them, suggests that
she is critical of the idea of charity as style. She is not, of course, as stylishly
charitable as Mrs. Elton, and she does offer real help. Yet like Mrs. Elton, she
also claims to offer help to those whose social situation is not quite so distant
from her own. Mrs. Elton fixes on Jane; Emma fixes on Harriet, and then
tries to help Jane as well. In both of her fixations, Emma is attracted to the
object of her charity partly because of the idea of helping a beautiful young
woman who appears to need help. This attraction makes Emma resemble the
eponymous hero of George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, heroic and sympathetic
rescuer of beautiful women in distress. Harriet is not as desperate as Mirah
Lapidoth, and Jane is not as tragic as Gwendolen Harleth, but nevertheless
the rescuer in each case is predisposed to offer help because of the beauty not
of the action of rescue, but of the recipient. As in the epigraph I have chosen
for this chapter, from “Love and Friendship” (MW 77–78) the graces of the
person are conflated with the graces of the mind; and thus the beauty of the
woman in question makes charity that much more appealing.
In Emma, Austen is concerned with the difference between charity as
love and charity as image. The issue is highlighted in an exchange between
Emma and Frank Churchill in which Frank proposes to purchase gloves at
Ford’s as proof that he is “ ‘a true citizen of Highbury’ ”; he says, “ ‘It will be
taking out my freedom’ ” (E 200). Emma laughs that “ ‘ You were very popular
before you came, because you were Mr. Weston’s son—but lay out half-a-
guinea at Ford’s, and your popularity will stand upon your own virtues’ ” (E
200). It is not that it would be charitable of Frank to support the business of
Ford’s, but that to be seen to patronize the same shop as everyone else would
serve as a sign that he subscribes to the image of Highbury society. Frank
proves his virtues by exercising the power of purchasing. But this is not a
version of virtue Austen condones: for her, virtue has to do with consistency
between charitable thought and charitable action.

Benevolence and Friendship

Frank needs to prove his virtues, because not everyone in Highbury is con-
vinced that he has them. Prior to his arrival there, Emma and Mr. Knightley
have speculated on his character, with the latter insisting, on the basis of
288 Sarah Emsley

Frank’s seeming reluctance to visit Mrs. Weston at the proper time, that he
will prove to be “ ‘a very weak young man’ ” (E 148). Mr. Knightley’s opinion
is that Frank “ ‘can be amiable only in French, not in English. He may be
very “amiable,” have very good manners, and be very agreeable; but he can
have no English delicacy towards the feelings of other people: nothing really
amiable about him’ ” (E 149). Amiability, as I have suggested in previous
chapters, is an important virtue for Austen because it is so closely connected
with charity. Emma teases Mr. Knightley that this kind of amiability might
be enough for Highbury, as “ ‘We do not often look upon fine young men,
well-bred and agreeable. We must not be nice and ask for all the virtues into
the bargain’ ” (E 149).
Their conversation raises the question of the difference between good
will and friendship, an issue that recurs in the novel. Although Emma says
she does not expect all the virtues, she does appear to imagine that Frank
will be everyone’s friend: she says that “ ‘My idea of him is, that he can adapt
his conversation to the taste of every body, and has the power as well as the
wish of being universally agreeable’ ” (E 150). Mr. Knightley objects to this
description as the ideal of amiability, because if true it would mean that Frank
would adapt his character so well to the demands of those around him that
he would be insufferable: “ ‘ What! At three-and-twenty to be the king of
his company—the great man—the practised politician, who is to read every
body’s character, and make every body’s talents conduce to the display of
his own superiority’ ” (E 150). Mr. Knightley is already jealous of Frank, but
his objection holds, and the kind of universal goodwill that caters to every
individual while serving primarily to emphasize the charitable person’s own
superiority is insufferable in the great as well as in the inexperienced twenty-
three-year old.
Emma experiences the problem of an older man’s universal amiability
later in the novel when she realizes that Mr. Weston does not discriminate
among his acquaintances, even though he treats them each as a particular
and exclusive friend. When it comes to the evening of the ball at the Crown,
it turns out that he has invited a large number of friends to come early to
inspect the rooms, giving each to believe that he relies on his or her taste
alone. It is not Emma’s vanity alone that is damaged by being considered “the
favourite and intimate of a man who had so many intimates and confidantes”
(E 320); although her vanity is hurt here, she is right to see the contradictions
inherent in this way Mr. Weston has of treating everybody. Consciously or
not, she recalls the earlier conversation with Mr. Knightley, and reflects that
“General benevolence, but not general friendship, made a man what he ought
to be.—She could fancy such a man” (E 320).
Where is tolerance and where is charity, in the debate about the differ-
ence between benevolence and friendship? How does one determine who
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 289

one’s friends are, and how treatment of a friend differs from treatment of
everyone else? Does one merely tolerate all others, or does tolerance also re-
quire one to be amiable, charitable, and benevolent? Charity involves more
than just the right attitude toward giving gifts and paying visits. In Emma,
Austen suggests that an understanding of charity also involves careful judg-
ments about friendships and intimate relationships. Tolerating everyone or
everything will not always be the charitable thing to do, so distinctions may
be necessary. It seems exclusive to gather a small group of friends, and leave
the rest to chance and charity, and yet this is what Austen leaves us with at the
end of the novel: a “small band of true friends” who witness the wedding of
Emma and Mr. Knightley (E 484). She does not say exactly who makes it into
that category, but there is no question that it is an exclusive group. Although
to a certain extent the distinctions Emma and Mr. Knightley make about the
small band of friends have to do with class, such judgments also have to do
with charity. Austen suggests that while one may cultivate a charitable at-
titude and a healthy respect for other people, one need not treat everyone as
a “favourite” or an “intimate.” Some people will form closer ties than others,
and both this love that binds together a small band of friends, and the kind
of love one offers to broader numbers of people are central aspects of char-
ity. In Emma, charity is not defined simply as either good works performed
for other people, or as love offered to one’s intimates: romantic love, the love
of friendship, and the love of benevolent good works are all part of Austen’s
understanding of charity. The process of learning to be charitable, therefore, is
more than an education in good works or social justice, as it can help charac-
ters work toward happiness as well as goodness.

“Perfect Happiness”
A number of critics have discussed the concept of “perfect happiness” in Jane
Austen’s novels, especially in Emma. Rachel Brownstein suggests, rightly,
that “The gap between ‘real’ Austen heroines like Catherine or Emma
or Fanny and the ideal mere picture of perfection Jane Austen thought
other people admired too much is in effect the subject of all her novels.”10
“Pictures of perfection as you know make me sick & wicked,” Austen wrote
(Letters, March 23, 1817; 335), and it is worth remembering this statement
of hers when we find Fanny especially “too perfect” or “too good.” Even
Austen’s most virtuous heroines are not always perfect. Elaine Bander makes
the distinction that “Perfection, for Austen, is not being but becoming.”11
Through their contemplation of what it means to live a good life, Austen’s
heroines work toward practicing, exercising, or becoming virtuous.
Julia Prewitt Brown argues that “when we close the pages of Emma we
have learned enough about Emma and Mr. Knightley and Highbury and
life in general there to know exactly how much perfection and how much
290 Sarah Emsley

happiness are included in the narrator’s ‘perfect happiness.’ ”12 Yet while Aus-
ten surely recognizes the limitations of the “perfect happiness” and wedded
bliss that she alludes to in the concluding paragraph of Emma, it seems un-
likely that she intends her readers to shake their heads sadly over the disil-
lusionment that awaits Emma and Mr. Knightley. On the contrary, her earlier
description of Mr. Knightley offers a better way of understanding her choice
of these words: when he and Emma reach an understanding, “Within half an
hour, he had passed from a thoroughly distressed state of mind, to something
so like perfect happiness, that it could bear no other name” (E 432). Their
life together, therefore, promises to be, like Emma, “faultless in spite of all
[its] faults” (E 433). The virtuous life is not a perfect life, but in attempting
to learn, exercise, and practice the virtues, Austen suggests, one may achieve
something like perfect happiness, not happiness as an end result, but as a
process open to revision.
In Emma, Austen suggests that the practice of charity is part of the
process of learning, in Mrs. Dashwood’s terms, to know one’s own happi-
ness. Charity is not about one’s own image, one’s condescension to others,
but about generosity of spirit and genuine love and grace toward other peo-
ple, whether those people are intimates or strangers. How does one achieve
the right attitude toward one’s self and others, and how would one know
exactly when it was right? As in Sense and Sensibility, the awareness of the
right balance that constitutes happiness is difficult to achieve. And as in
Pride and Prejudice, practicing charity at the right time, and in the right
manner, toward the right persons, can be challenging. Emma’s reaction fol-
lowing Mr. Elton’s proposal to her causes her to repent her errors, and to
resolve to behave better and more carefully in the future. She confesses to
Harriet that she was wrong to have encouraged the pursuit of Mr. Elton,
and this confession “completely renewed her first shame” (E 141). Emma
thinks that “It was rather too late in the day to set about being simple-
minded and ignorant; but she left [Harriet] with every previous resolution
confirmed of being humble and discreet, and repressing imagination all the
rest of her life” (E 142). Her repentance is genuine, and the turn to humility
is part of the traditional response of the contrite sinner following confes-
sion, although her vow to repress imagination forever is more along the
lines of Marianne Dashwood’s sober plans for her cheerless virtuous future
than along the pattern of Christian confession. The person confessing prays
to be granted “that this day we fall into no sin, neither run into any kind of
danger; but that all our doings may be ordered by thy governance,”13 all the
while knowing that the fallen nature common to all will mean that each day
we fall into some kind of sin. The prayer is part of the process. Emma re-
pents, knowing that she will not be able to avoid being wrong about some-
thing else yet again. But in this situation, she confesses to Harriet, and she
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 291

worries that “she should never be in charity with herself again” (E 141). Is it
the aim of virtue to be in charity with one’s self?

Uncharitable Emma
When Emma infamously chides Miss Bates at Box Hill for having to
limit herself to saying only three dull things at once in response to Frank
Churchill’s game (E 364), she does not at first realize that she has been
uncharitable. She carries on blindly with her conversation with Frank and
Mr. Weston, and it does take Mr. Knightley’s later reprimand to cause her
to review her conduct. At first she “tried to laugh it off,” saying that “ ‘It
was not so very bad. I dare say she did not understand me’ ” (E 374), but he
explains to her the implications of her insult to someone like Miss Bates
whose “ ‘situation should secure [Emma’s] compassion’ ” (E 375). Would
Emma have realized this herself? Having recognized in the situation with
Harriet and Mr. Elton just how wrong her behavior could be, is Emma any
more likely to see clearly the occasions on which she condescends to those
around her? Perhaps she would in time have come to see the folly of treat-
ing Miss Bates this way, but moral education is slow and time-consuming
as well as painful. Would it have taken her years or at least months to learn
where her charity is deficient?
When during the ball at the Crown Mr. Knightley and Emma had
discussed the problem of Emma’s attempt to marry Harriet to Mr. Elton,
Mr. Knightley had said, “ ‘I shall not scold you. I leave you to your own
reflections’ ” (E 330), and Emma had asked, “ ‘Can you trust me with such
flatterers?—Does my vain spirit ever tell me I am wrong?’ ” (E 330). His
reply was that she could be trusted to distinguish between her vain spirit
and her serious spirit: “ ‘If one leads you wrong, I am sure the other tells you
of it’ ” (E 330). He knows that she is capable of thinking through moral
decisions.14 Yet at Box Hill, he sees that her serious spirit has not told her
of it, as he witnesses her continued attempts at amusement with the others,
with no sign of apology to Miss Bates. Is he trying to save her the trouble
of having to learn to come to a consciousness of her mistakes? In trying to
teach her virtue, is he making her moral education less painful, or more?
Or is his reprimand partly the result of his own vanity: he wants Emma to
be perfect too, despite his objection to Mr. Weston’s clever remark that the
letters “ ‘M. and A.—Em—ma’ ” stand for perfection (E 371)? The reason
he reprimands her is that he knows she will not learn by reading. She does
learn by thinking things through, but it took Mr. Elton’s outburst to provide
the occasion for her to reconsider that situation, and there is no way that
Miss Bates would ever confront Emma. There needs to be something that
instigates Emma’s thinking about her conduct. Mr. Knightley’s speech here
parallels Mr. Elton’s declaration of love in that it prompts Emma to think.
292 Sarah Emsley

There is no need for Mr. Knightley to continue to argue the point, as

Emma immediately sees “[t]he truth of his representation” (E 376). And from
here on, she is left in intellectual solitude, despite Harriet’s presence in the
carriage, and “Time did not compose her. As she reflected more, she seemed
but to feel it more. She had never been so depressed” (E 376). Once she gets
home, she realizes that her attitude toward her father ought to have guided
her attitude toward Miss Bates. To him, she has been patient and kind in
thought as well as in action. Toward Miss Bates, “She had been often remiss,
her conscience told her so; remiss, perhaps, more in thought than fact; scorn-
ful, ungracious” (E 377). Mr. Knightley has chided her only for the one public
remark, but Emma’s conscience tells her that she has been thinking scornfully
of Miss Bates all along, even while sending her pork and paying her visits.
And she has spoken of her ungraciously to Harriet. In fact, Emma’s own con-
science is more severe in judging her thought and action than Mr. Knightley
is. The realization that she has not loved her neighbor as herself is Emma’s
second moment of revelation, and it is far more painful than the earlier rev-
elation that she has misjudged the situation with Mr. Elton.

Charity and Romantic Love

Emma’s third revelation is the recognition “that Mr. Knightley must marry
no one but herself!” (E 408). Once again, however, it takes someone else’s
prompting to get her to examine her own perceptions. As soon as Harriet
has revealed that she not only aspires to love Mr. Knightley, but actually
has some idea that he returns her affections, Emma’s mind starts working,
and “A mind like her’s, once opening to suspicion, made rapid progress” (E
407). This description is important: Emma has the kind of quick mind that
can analyze behavior thoroughly. Her intelligence is sharp, but her initial
perceptions are a little dull, perhaps because she is so confident of her social
position that she lacks the critical impulse. From the moment Harriet tells
her love, thinking is painful once more for Emma. While Harriet “give[s]
the history of her hopes with great, though trembling delight,” Emma’s
“mind was in all the perturbation that such a developement [sic] of self,
such a burst of threatening evil, such a confusion of sudden and perplexing
emotions, must create” (E 408–09). Intellectual self-examination may be
painful, whether one is analyzing the difficulties of acting charitably toward
other people, or the complexities of romantic love.
In the opening paragraphs of the novel, Jane Austen reveals that the
“real evils” of “Emma’s situation were the power of having rather too much
her own way, and a disposition to think a little too well of herself ” (E 5). Add-
ed to these evils, or perhaps a result of them, has been a resistance to thinking
very deeply. The things that need to be adjusted to make the “best blessings”
of her life more complete are the way she treats others, and the way she thinks
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 293

of herself. Yet while it sounds reasonable, as Mr. Knightley says elsewhere in

the novel, that “ ‘Fine dancing, I believe, like virtue, must be its own reward’ ”
(E 258), virtue in Emma is rewarded with more material blessings, just as fine
dancing is often rewarded with a fine partner. Virtue may be worth pursuing
for its own sake, but it does not hurt that one’s reputation improves, or that
benefits accrue to virtuous behavior. Parallel to the two things that need to
be adjusted in Emma’s world are two possible definitions of charity: Emma
needs to learn to be charitable to others in thought as well as in action, and to
be less forgiving of her own faults. Thinking makes her miserable, especially
when she’s thinking of her own errors, but careful thought is essential to the
practice of charity, and Emma comes to understand not only what her bless-
ings mean for her own life, but also what these blessings require of her in her
attitude toward those who are less blessed and who suffer more. Emma has
to learn to love her neighbor as herself, and to be in love and charity with her
neighbors rather than simply with herself.
Like Fanny Price, Emma has to think hard, and negotiate the tension
between knowing her own mind and heart and knowing how to behave to
relatives and friends around her. Self-knowledge can conflict with charity
toward one’s neighbors, but in Emma, Austen proposes that it is important
to endeavor both to know one’s self and to love God and neighbor. Emma
Woodhouse experiences moments of moral recognition, and each of these
three major revelations causes her to think carefully and to challenge her
usual view of the world. In contrast to Elizabeth Bennet, who experiences
one significant epiphany after reading Darcy’s letter, Emma undergoes three
revolutions of mind in order to effect her moral education. Like Elizabeth,
however, she finds that her education is prompted by the reminders the hero
gives her to revisit her interpretation of the world. In Emma, Austen focuses
on the theological virtue of charity, and explores its meaning as the Christian
love of neighbors as well as its role in romantic love. Through intellectual
suffering, Emma Woodhouse learns how to think about charity, and how she
may live out charity in action.

No t e s

1. Mark Schorer describes “The Humiliation of Emma Woodhouse.” Gilbert

and Gubar, e.g., argue that Emma is humiliated and “must accept the fate of being
mastered” (Madwoman in the Attic, 161–62), and Edward Neill criticizes the “ultra-
patriarchal Mr Knightley” (Politics of Jane Austen, 95).
2. Michael Giffin argues that in addition to the novel’s focus on the education
of an individual into charity, Austen explores the predicament of the fallen commu-
nity of Highbury ( Jane Austen and Religion, 150). Jane Nardin also argues that Emma
is about charity, but she emphasizes the narrower definition of charity as “the act of
294 Sarah Emsley

giving material aid or advice to those, especially those in a worse social or financial
position, who seem to need it” (“Charity in Emma,” 66).
3. Barbara K. Seeber argues that Harriet is the “other heroine” of the novel,
and that “the dominant narrative tries to naturalize Harriet’s exclusion and to natu-
ralize her inferior class position as her inferior personal worth.” Seeber suggests that
“Harriet, like Frankenstein’s monster, takes on a life of her own and it is precisely
this that the main narrative cannot accommodate” (General Consent, 43). While
Emma does make use of Harriet more as an accessory than as a friend, Harriet is not
monstrous, she is just ordinary. Upon their marriages both she and Emma take up
new responsibilities that mean their parting is not “The ‘unmerited punishment’ of
Harriet Smith” that Seeber’s chapter title claims it to be. When Seeber argues that
Harriet is “exiled to the periphery of Highbury” (General Consent, 45), she cites the
passage in which Emma thinks that “every blessing of her own seemed to involve
and advance the sufferings of her friend, who must now be even excluded from
Hartfield” (E 450). But in this passage Emma still believes that Harriet is in love
with Mr. Knightley, and she imagines the exclusion of Harriet as necessary to spare
Harriet the pain of seeing Emma and Mr. Knightley happy together. Once Emma
discovers that “Harriet had always liked Robert Martin” (E 481), their friendship
begins to “change into a calmer sort of goodwill” (E 482), but there is no banish-
ment, no punishment here.
  4. Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, 258.
  5. Compare 1 Timothy 1:15, where the Apostle Paul writes, “This is a faith-
ful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to
save sinners; of whom I am chief.” On the relation between embarrassment and
shame, see David Southward, “Jane Austen and the Riches of Embarrassment.”
  6. Folsom, “ ‘I Wish We Had a Donkey,’ ” 160.
  7. Miss Bates is the only Austen character who quotes—in her case, mis-
quotes—from the Bible: commenting on Emma’s kind gift of Hartfield pork, she
says, “We may well say that ‘our lot is cast in a goodly heritage’ ” (E 174). The refer-
ence is to Psalm 16:7. As Margaret Doody points out, Miss Bates has no heritage,
no estate to inherit, and her good fortune here is that she is the recipient of charity
(“Jane Austen’s Reading,” 348). It is typical of her good nature, however, to see even
the smallest kindnesses, whether given or received, as examples of Christian charity.
Koppel contrasts Miss Bates’s Christian charity with the negative version of Chris-
tian perfection represented by the Eltons (Religious Dimension, 26).
  8. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099a.31–1099b.2.
  9. Emma is less charitable in her attitude toward Robert Martin and his
family than she is to the poor, however. David Wheeler attributes her snobbery
toward manual laborers to her “old-fashioned attitudes toward agrarian economy,”
and points out that she seems unaware of recent economic changes in her society
(“Jane Austen and the Discourse of Poverty,” 253). For a discussion of the relation
between economics and virtue in Austen, see also Elsie B. Michie, “Austen’s Powers:
Engaging with Adam Smith in Debates about Wealth and Virtue.”
10. Brownstein, “England’s Emma,” 233.
11. Bander, “The Pique of Perfection,” 161.
12. Brown, Jane Austen’s Novels, 69–70.
13. The Order for Morning Prayer, in The Book of Common Prayer. Koppel
also argues that Emma’s repentance and desire to reform can best be understood
with reference to the Christian ideal of moral behavior; he suggests that Emma is
 Learning the Art of Charity in Emma 295

“by Christian standards the most deeply flawed of Jane Austen’s heroines” (Religious
Dimension, 31; 37).
14. Patricia Menon suggests that Austen downplays Mr. Knightley’s role as a
mentor, as she does in the case of Henry Tilney in Northanger Abbey and Mr. Darcy
in Pride and Prejudice as well, because these novels propose a model of marriage in
which moral equality is necessary for “perfect happiness” (Mentor-Lover, 45).
 Chronology

1775 Jane Austen is born on December 16 in the village of Steventon,

Hampshire, to George Austen, parish clergyman, and Cassandra
Leigh Austen. She is the seventh of eight children. She and her
sister Cassandra are educated at Oxford and Southampton by
the widow of a principal of Brasenose College, and then they
attend the Abbey School at Reading. Jane’s formal education
ends when she is nine years old.
1787–93 Austen writes various pieces for the amusement of her family
(collected in the three volumes of Juvenilia), the most famous of
which is Love and Friendship. She and her family also perform
various plays and farces, some of which are written by Jane.
1793–97 Austen writes her first novel, the epistolary Lady Susan, and
begins the epistolary Elinor and Marianne, which will become
Sense and Sensibility.
1796–97 Austen completes First Impressions, an early version of Pride and
Prejudice. Her father tries without success to get it published.
Austen begins Sense and Sensibility and Northanger Abbey.
1798 Austen finishes a version of Northanger Abbey.
1801–02 George Austen retires to Bath with his family. Jane probably
suffers from an unhappy love affair (the man in question is
believed to have died suddenly), and also probably becomes
engaged for a day to Harris Bigg-Wither.

297
298 Chronology

1803 Austen sells two-volume manuscript titled Susan to a publisher

for £10. It is advertised but never printed. This is a version of
Northanger Abbey, probably later revised.
1803–1805 Austen writes ten chapters of The Watsons.
1805–1806 George Austen dies. Jane abandons work on The Watsons. She,
her mother, and her sister live in various lodgings in Bath.
1806–1809 The three Austen women move to Southampton, living near
one of Jane’s brothers.
1809 Jane, her sister, and her mother move to Chawton Cottage, in
Hampshire, which is part of the estate of Jane’s brother Edward
Austen (later Knight), who has been adopted by Thomas Knight,
a relative. Edward has just lost his wife, who died giving birth
to her tenth child, and the household has been taken over by
Jane’s favorite niece, Fanny.
1811 Austen decides to publish Sense and Sensibility at her own
expense and anonymously. It appears in November in a three-
volume edition.
1811–12 Austen is probably revising First Impressions extensively and
beginning Mansfield Park.
1813 Pride and Prejudice is published in January. A second edition of
it, as well as a second edition of Sense and Sensibility, come out
in November.
1814 Mansfield Park is published anonymously. Austen begins
Emma.
1815 Austen completes Emma and begins Persuasion. Emma is
published anonymously by a new publisher.
1816 A second edition of Mansfield Park is published.
1817 A third edition of Pride and Prejudice is published. Austen
begins Sanditon. She moves to Winchester, where she dies,
after a year-long illness, on July 18. She is buried in Winchester
Cathedral.
1818 Persuasion and Northanger Abbey are published posthumously
together, their authorship still officially anonymous.
 Contributors

HAROLD BLOOM is Sterling Professor of the Humanities at Yale Uni-

versity. He is the author of 30 books, including Shelley’s Mythmaking, The
Visionary Company, Blake’s Apocalypse, Yeats, A Map of Misreading, Kabbalah
and Criticism, Agon: Toward a Theory of Revisionism, The American Religion,
The Western Canon, and Omens of Millennium: The Gnosis of Angels, Dreams,
and Resurrection. The Anxiety of Influence sets forth Professor Bloom’s pro-
vocative theory of the literary relationships between the great writers and
their predecessors. His most recent books include Shakespeare: The Invention
of the Human, a 1998 National Book Award finalist, How to Read and Why,
Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary Creative Minds, Hamlet: Poem
Unlimited, Where Shall Wisdom Be Found?, and Jesus and Yahweh: The Names
Divine. In 1999, Professor Bloom received the prestigious American Acad-
emy of Arts and Letters Gold Medal for Criticism. He has also received the
International Prize of Catalonia, the Alfonso Reyes Prize of Mexico, and
the Hans Christian Andersen Bicentennial Prize of Denmark.

Mary Poovey is a professor at New York University, where she is also

the director of the Institute for the History of the Production of Knowledge.
Her publications include A History of the Modern Fact and Making a Social
Body: British Cultural Formation, 1830-1864.

E.B. Moon has been associated with the University of New England in
Armidale, New South Wales, Australia.

299
300 Contributors

Anne K. Mellor is a distinguished professor of English and women’s

studies at the University of California at Los Angeles. She has edited and/or
written several texts, including Mothers of the Nation: Women’s Political Writ-
ing in England, 1780–1830 and Passionate Encounters in a Time of Sensibility,
both of which she authored.

Cynthia Wall is a professor at the University of Virginia. She is the

author of The Prose of Things: Transformation of Description in the Eighteenth
Century and The Literary and Cultural Spaces of Restoration London. Addi-
tionally, she has edited or coedited several titles.

William Deresiewicz is an associate professor at Yale University.

He is the author of Jane Austen and the Romantic Poets.

Jo Alyson Parker is chair and professor of English at St. Joseph’s

University. She is the author of Narrative Form and Chaos Theory in Sterne,
Proust, Woolf and Faulkner and coeditor of Time and Memory.

Ivor Morris has been a university lecturer and is the author of Shake-
speare’s God: The Role of Religion in the Tragedies and Hamlet, King of Den-
mark, an alternative tragicomical ending to Shakespeare’s play.

Paula Byrne is the author of Perdita: The Literary, Theatrical, Scandal-

ous Life of Mary Robinson and editor of Jane Austen: A Sourcebook.

Gloria Sybil Gross is a professor of English at California State Uni-

versity, Northridge. She has written The Invisible Riot of the Mind: Samuel
Johnson’s Psychological Theory.

Patricia Menon has taught at Niagara College in Southern Ontario,

Canada.

Emily Auerbach is a professor of English at the University of Wis-

consin at Madison. She is the author of Maestros, Dilettantes, and Philistines:
The Musician in the Victorian Novel and The Courage to Write I and II: Women
Novelists of 19th-Century Europe and America. Additionally, for Wisconsin
Public Radio she is the project director of “The Courage to Write,” an award-
winning series of documentaries on women writers released nationally.

Sarah Emsley teaches in the Expository Writing Program at Harvard

University.  She is the editor of Jane Austen and the North Atlantic Essays from
the 2005 Jane Austen Society Conference in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
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306 Acknowledgments

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Inheritance: Henry Fielding, Jane Austen, and the Establishment of the Novel. ©
1998 by Northern Illinois University Press. Used with permission of Northern
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1987, 1999 by Ivor Morris.

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Philosophy of the Virtues. © 2005 by Sarah Emsley. Reproduced with permission
of Palgrave Macmillan.

Every effort has been made to contact the owners of copyrighted material
and secure copyright permission. Articles appearing in this volume generally
appear much as they did in their original publication with few or no editorial
changes. In some cases, foreign language text has been removed from the
original essay. Those interested in locating the original source will find the
information cited above.
 Index

Characters in literary works are indexed by first name (if any), followed by the name of
the work in parentheses.

Abrams, M.H. suffering, 71

Natural Supernaturalism, 79 yearning, 19
Adam Bede (Eliot), 17 As You Like It (Shakespeare), 13
Adam, Robert, 91 Auden, W.H., 267
Adultery in the Novel (Tanner), 162 Auerbach, Emily, 300
Agulhon, Maurice, 254 on Sense and Sensibility, 251–277
“Alastor” (Shelley, P.), 83 Auerbach, Nina, 147–148
Alcott, Louisa May, 273 Austen, Cassandra, 22, 247, 253–
Amelia (Fielding) 254, 273
adultery in, 161–162 Austen, Charles, 29
Amelia in, 146–147, 149–150, Austen, Edward, 29
152–153, 164, 166, 169 Austen, Francis, 29
Noble Lord in, 154 Austen, Henry, 29, 206
plot, 158–159 Austen, James, 29
Anne Elliot (Persuasion), 31, 205, Austen, Jane
239 aesthetic wit of, 12–13, 21, 23, 43,
character, 59–72, 148–149, 207– 54
209 chronology, 297–298
childhood, 62, 199 class position, 22–23
consciousness, 16–17, 19, 213 death, 17
family, 210 illness, 206
and Frederick, 12–18, 59, 65, influences on, 1–20
69–70, 129, 210, 214–215 letters, 22
marriage, 60 society, 1, 28–30, 43, 173
passion, 18
persuasion of, 12, 17, 59–60, 181, Barber, C.L., 13–14
183, 212 Bennett, John, 266
self-reliance, 12 Blake, William, 78, 87
sensibility, 14–15, 17 Blondel, Jacques-François, 91

307
308 Index

Bloom, Harold, 299 “Dejection: An Ode,” 78

introduction, 1–20 “Kubla Khan,” 78
on the Protestant will in Austen’s Cowley, Hannah
novels, 1–20 The Runaway, 190
Booth, Wayne, 9, 53 Cowper, William, 16, 254, 256, 263
Brann, Eva, 252 Craig, G. Armour, 9
Brontë, Charlotte, 51, 248 Crick, Brian, 240
Jane Eyre, 17
Brontë, Emily, 51 Darcy. See Fitzwilliam Darcy (Pride
Wuthering Heights, 17 and Prejudice)
Brown, Julia Prewitt, 245–246, Defense of Poetry, A (Shelley, P.), 84
289 Defoe, Daniel
Brown, Lloyd W., 26 Roxana, 90–99, 101, 104, 108
Brownstein, Rachel, 289 “Dejection: An Ode” (Coleridge), 78
Brunton, Mary Deresiewicz, William, 300
Self-Control, 83
on erotic love and friendship in
Burke, Edmund, 86 Austen novels, 113–143
Burney, Fanny, 1, 126, 193
Dickens, Charles, 2, 273
Byrne, Paula, 300
Don Juan (Byron), 79–80
on the art of theater in Emma,
Donzelot, Jacques, 149
189–204
Byron, Lord, 85, 87, 212
Don Juan, 79–80 Edward Ferrars (Sense and
Sensibility), 267
Christian depression, 34
moralists, 2, 37 and Elinor, 33–34, 36, 42, 159,
principles, 42 174, 177, 199, 222–223, 256,
values, 33, 155 259, 263–264, 268–269,
Clarissa (Richardson), 215, 221 273–275
Arabella in, 99 Eliot, George, 223, 287
Clarissa Harlow in, 2, 5–6, 9–10, Adam Bede, 17
14, 61, 90, 92, 98–103, 108, heroines, 2, 7, 9–10, 13
120, 149–150, 152–153, 155, Middlemarch, 10
205 Elinor Dashwood (Sense and
Lovelace in, 63, 98–103 Sensibility), 71, 128, 272
Protestant will in, 2–3 confession, 223
spatial control in, 90–92, 98–103, conflicts, 34, 36, 41, 259–260
108 and Edward, 33–34, 36, 42, 177,
tragedy in, 15 199, 222–223, 256–257, 259–
Clarke, James Stanier, 22 260, 263, 269–270, 274–275
Coelebs in Search of a Wife (More), sense of, 32–33, 35–39, 81, 148,
225, 235 166, 174, 177, 195, 220, 251–
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 80, 85, 254, 258–259, 261–262, 264,
87, 256 273
 Index 309

Elizabeth Bennet (Pride and intermarriages in, 189–190

Prejudice), 2, 71, 195 Jane Fairfax in, 81, 175–176,
character, 12, 14–15, 43, 114, 148, 193–195, 197, 200–201, 283,
151, 161, 177, 279, 283 285–287
consciousness, 120, 137 narrative, 191, 284
and Darcy, 3–6, 15, 43–50, 52–55, Protestant will in, 2–3, 9–12,
81–82, 105–107, 117–119, 16–18
122–127, 129–138, 148, 153, Robert Martin in, 192, 201–202,
157, 173, 283–285
178, 184–187, 199, 247, 280, 293 social classes in, 189–199, 282
desires, 42–44, 49, 133 General Tilney in, 185
fantasies, 45, 48 Mr. and Mrs. Weston in, 189, 196,
generosity, 43 280, 282–283, 288, 291
happiness, 55 Emma Woodhouse (Emma), 2, 71
impulsiveness, 43, 45–46, 50, and charity, 280, 282, 285–287,
123–124, 130 289–291, 293
inferiority, 3–5 confidence, 279, 281, 283
marriage, 42, 45, 48, 55, 82, 120, consciousness, 17, 148, 176, 178,
130, 135, 138, 156 180
maturation of, 129–130, 134, 137 cruelty, 81
moral education, 44, 47, 137, 175 education, 279–281, 283–284, 292
pride, 117 errors, 9–10, 190–192
outspokenness, 43, 129 feelings, 11, 157, 191, 253, 284,
self-confidence, 46–47 287, 291
social space, 90, 103–104, 108 heroic will, 9
society, 46, 191 imagination, 9, 12
true nature of, 3 likeable, 9, 12, 205
vanity, 48–49 loneliness, 281
wit, 44, 135, 158 marriage, 10, 148, 200–201, 280,
Elizabeth Elliot (Persuasion), 59 289
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 15 and social classes, 189–199, 282
law of Compensation, 5 Emsley, Sarah, 300
Emma, 206, 246–247, 268 on friendship and tolerance in
art of theater in, 189–204 Emma, 279–295
Miss Bates in, 81, 157, 176, 183, Excursion, The (Wordsworth), 7
193, 195, 197, 200–201, 285–
286, 291–292 Falkner (Shelley), 32
comedy in, 3, 10, 16, 190–192 Fanny Price (Mansfield Park), 71,
Mr. and Mrs. Elton in, 190–196, 128, 205, 213
199–200, 281–282, 284–285, adoption, 225–227, 232
287, 290–292 behavior, 146–152, 158–159,
Frank Churchill in, 194–201, 178–180, 215, 224, 233–239,
282–283, 287–288, 291 279–280
on friendship and tolerance in, fears, 228, 230
279–295 gentleness, 151, 240–241
310 Index

independence, 228, 243 and Emma, 10, 81, 148, 178, 190,
insecurity, 235 195, 197–202, 280–282, 285,
marriage, 240, 243–246 287–293
nervousness of, 8 and Harriet, 10–11, 190, 192, 194,
sickness, 148, 150 196
sufferings, 157, 229, 231, 242, 244 Gilligan, Carol, 86
virtue of, 6–7, 14–15, 82, 129–130, Godwin, William, 80, 83
150–158, 164–169, 175–177 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang
vision, 7, 9, 146, 160, 162–163, 293 Sorrows of Werther, 255
Ferrier, Susan Greene, Donald J., 29
Marriage, 83 Gross, Gloria Sybil, 300
Fielding, Henry, 1–2, 7 realism of marriage in Persuasion,
Amelia, 146–147, 149–150, 152– 205–217
154, 158–162, 164, 166, 169
Pamela, 153–154 Halperin, Johm, 266
realism of, 8
Hardy, John, 253
Tom Jones, 146, 174
Harriet Smith (Emma), 201, 287
Fitzwilliam Darcy (Pride and
and Mr. Elton, 190–193, 200,
Prejudice), 146
282–283
and Elizabeth, 3–6, 15, 43–50,
and Mr. Knightley, 10–11, 81, 190,
52–55, 81, 105–107, 117–119,
194, 196, 198–200, 281
122–127, 129–138, 148, 153,
marriage, 202, 283–285, 290–292
157, 173,
178, 184–187, 199, 247, 280, 293 Harris, Jocelyn, 221
first marriage proposal, 3–4, 15, Haywood, Eliza
47, 105, 127, 133, 173 Miss Betsy Thoughtless, 83
pride, 118, 121 Heidegger, Martin, 107
true nature of, 3, 104, 116, 121, “Henry and Emma” (Prior), 61
130, 161–163, 169, 281 Housman, A.E., 251
Flaubert, Gustave, 13 Hudson, Glenda, 222, 240
Folsom, Marcia McClintock, 285 humor
Frankenstein (Shelley), 23, 26, 31, 39, in Austen’s work, 1, 10, 32, 180,
83–87 190–192, 212, 219, 272
Frederick Wentworth (Persuasion), Hunt, Lynn, 254
211, 217
and Anne, 12–18, 59, 65, 69–71, “Imitations of Immortality Ode”
129, 207, 210, 214–215 (Wordsworth), 17
and Louisa, 212 irony
passion of, 213 in comedies, 12, 14–17
Freud, Sigmund, 18, 245 rhetorical, 1–2, 7, 53, 60, 252, 280,
Fuller, Margaret, 5 286

Gard, Roger, 234–235 James, Henry

Garrick, David, 190 heroines, 2, 9–10, 13
George Knightley (Emma) Jane Eyre (Brontë, C.), 17
 Index 311

Jane Fairfax (Emma) Lamia (Keats), 79

character of, 9 Leavis, Q.D., 159
Johnson, Ben, 1 Leoni, Giacomo, 90
Johnson, Claudia, 146, 222 Lewis, C.S., 2, 6
Johnson, Samuel Lewis, Matthew
influences of, 2, 8, 14–16, 19, Monk, 174
31–32, 205–217 Lloyd, Martha, 29
on novel reading, 31 Locke, John, 6–7
The Rambler, 2, 8, 19 “Love and Friendship” (sketch),
Rasselas, 2, 32 255–256, 273
realism, 205–217 Lovejoy, A.O., 77
John Willoughby (Sense and Lucy Steele (Sense and Sensibility),
Sensibility), 215 128, 258
charm, 34, 258 avarice, 33
faults, 35, 38, 166, 221–222, 258, elopement, 222, 264
260, 263–264 manipulation, 260–261, 265,
and Marianne, 33, 34–41, 219, 267–271, 275
221–222, 267–269, 271–274 secret, 38–39, 42, 223
Jones, Inigo, 95
Joyce, James, 2 Mansfield Park
Ulysses, 13 comedy in tragedy in, 3, 219–249
double-voiced work, 145–172
Kant, Immanuel, 78 Edmund Bertram in, 82, 149–153,
Keats, John, 80, 256 157–163, 165–169, 178–180,
Lamia, 79 187, 224, 227–238, 240–247
“Ode on a Grecian Urn,” 79 Henry Crawford in, 64, 82, 129–
Kirkham, Margaret, 60 130, 149–162, 164, 166–167,
“Kubla Khan” (Coleridge), 78 169, 178–181, 187, 215, 224,
227–228, 230, 232, 236–239,
Lady Susan, 32, 280 241, 242, 244
Alicia Johnson in, 23 John Yates in, 268
attack on propriety, 26 Lady Bertram in, 8, 83, 146, 156–
Charles Vernon in, 23–24, 26 157, 166, 177, 225–226, 232
division of sympathies in, 28, 30 Mary Crawford in, 82, 128,
Federica in, 24–27 149–150, 153–154, 157–161,
irony of the female situation in, 165–167, 179–180, 187, 224,
24–25 231–236, 238, 242, 244, 246
James Martin in, 24, 26–27 mentor love in, 244, 246–247
Mrs. Johnson in, 24 narrative, 149, 225, 245
letters in, 23, 159 Mrs. Norris in, 8, 158, 167, 175,
Mr. Manwaring in, 26 207, 225–228, 230, 232, 235,
Mrs. Manwaring in, 25, 27 242–244
narrative, 27–28, 54 plot of, 146–147, 160
Reginald De Courcy in, 24–27 Protestant will in, 6–9, 12, 14–16,
society in, 23, 26, 28 18
312 Index

social behavior in, 146–147, 158, Moler, Kenneth, 243

163, 166, 224 Monaghan, David, 71–72
structure, 219 Monk (Lewis, M.), 174
Thomas Bertram in, 7, 82, 146, “Mont Blanc” (Shelley), 78
150–151, 155–162, 164, 166– Moon, E.B., 299
167, 175–177, 187, 194, 223, on Richardson’s influence on
225–229, Persuasion, 59–75
233–234, 238–239, 241, 243–244, Moore, George, 253, 255
247 More, Hannah, 154
West Indian bondage in, 15 Coelebs in Search of a Wife, 225, 235
William Price in, 30, 179–180, Strictures on the Modern System of
241, 245 Female Education, 83, 145, 163
Maria (Wollstonecraft), 23, 28, 32, Morgan, Susan, 17, 261
41 Morris, Ivor, 300
Marianne Dashwood (Sense and on Mr. Collins in Pride and
Sensibility), 290 Prejudice, 173–188
fate, 37
frankness, 257, 260–261 Natural Supernaturalism (Abrams),
illness, 262 79
language, 256 Northanger Abbey, 220, 252–253
liberty, 254–255 authority in, 54, 273
passion, 33, 36–40, 48, 148, 177, Catherine Morland in, 81, 175,
219, 221, 251–254, 258–262, 178, 254, 263, 283
268–269, 272–274, 280 Eleanor Tilney in, 263
rescue, 35–36 Henry Tilney in, 175, 178, 207,
self-absorption of, 220–223 263
and Willoughby, 33–36, 39, 41, Isabella Thorpe in, 185
219, 221–223, 258, 260, 267, mentor love in, 247
271 parody in, 32
Marriage (Ferrier), 83
McGann, Jerome, 80 oddness metaphor, 1
Mellor, Anne K., 234, 300 “Ode on a Grecian Urn” (Keats), 79
on the contrast between Mary “Ode to the West Wind” (Shelley,
Shelley and Austen, 77–88 P.), 84–85
Menon, Patricia, 300 Opposing Self, The (Trilling), 146
on comedy in tragedy in Mansfield
Park and Sense and Sensibility, Paine, Thomas, 77
219–249 Pamela (Richardson), 190
Middlemarch (Eliot), 10 Pamela in, 153–155
Milton, John, 2, 79 Paradise Lost (Milton), 6, 10
Paradise Lost, 6, 10 Parker, Jo Alyson, 300
Miss Betsy Thoughtless (Haywood), on Mansfield Park as a double-
83 voiced work, 145–172
Molan, Ann, 19 Parsons, Talcott, 167
 Index 313

Pascal, Blaise, 261 119–124, 127, 130, 137, 157,

Persuasion, 199, 286 173, 183–184, 188
Mrs. Clay in, 209 comedy in, 3
comedy in, 3, 212 community of, 114–131, 134–135,
Elizabeth Elliot in, 59, 181, 208– 138, 165, 183–186, 189–191,
209, 214–215 193
Fanny Harville in, 67–68, 181, George Wickham in, 43–44,
207, 212 47–50, 83, 104, 116, 118–119,
Henrietta Musgrove in, 178, 181– 123, 125–127, 129–132, 137,
182, 210–211 161
individualism in, 30, 64 infinite variety in, 43
influences on, 59–75, 205–217 Jane Bennet in, 46–47, 51, 71,
James Benwick in, 31, 66 105, 119, 122, 124–125, 128,
John Shepherd in, 268 132–133, 136–138, 178
Lady Russell in, 12, 62, 64, 70, judgment in, 43
214–215 Lady Catherine, 44, 47, 50, 103,
Louisa Musgrove in, 70, 178, 105, 148, 165, 183–186, 189,
181–182, 210–212 192–193, 207, 259
mentor love relationship in, 223, Lydia Bennet in, 46–48, 54, 82,
246 105–106, 116, 120, 161–162,
mode and structure of, 59 184, 186, 244
Protestant will in, 12–20 mentorship in, 224, 246–247
realism of marriage in, 64, 69, moral authority in, 42
205–217 narrative, 113
swines and brutes of, 207 Protestant will in, 2–6, 9, 12, 18
Walter Elliot in, 59, 62–63, 69, realism in, 43, 49–50, 82
181, 207–210, 213, 215 romantic conclusion of, 49, 54–55,
Picture of Dorian Gray, The (Wilde), 156, 167, 169
208 spatial control in, 90–92, 103–108
“Plan of a Novel,” 145 structure, 148
Poovey, Mary, 299 William Collins in, 43, 46, 50,
on Austen’s aesthetic wit, 21–58 104, 151, 161, 173–174, 177–
Praz, Mario, 80 178, 183–188, 191
Prelude, The (Wordsworth), 78 Prior, Matthew
Pride and Prejudice, 284, 290 “Henry and Emma,” 61
action of, 45, 50, 114, 146–147 Prometheus Unbound (Shelley, P.), 79,
aphorism in, 113 85
Caroline Bingley in, 43–44, 47, Prostestant will
50, 71, 103–105, 107, 122, in Austen’s novels, 1–20
125, 128, 153 temperaments, 2
Charles Bingley in, 43, 45–46, 53,
115–116, 122, 131–133, 136, Radcliffe, Ann, 174
138, 177 Rambler, The (Johnson, S.), 2, 8, 19
Charlotte Lucas in, 43, 45, 50, Rasselas (Johnson, S.), 2, 32
53–54, 82, 92, 104, 115, 117, Ray, Joan, 266
314 Index

Richardson, Samuel individualism in, 32

Clarissa, 2–3, 5–6, 9–10, 14–15, irony in, 32
61, 90–92, 98–103, 108, 120, John Dashwood in, 32–33, 37,
149–150, 152–153, 155, 205, 222, 256, 267–270
215, 221 Margaret Dashwood in, 37
influence of, 1–2, 7, 14, 59–75 mentor love relationship in, 223,
Pamela, 153–155, 190 247
Sir Charles Grandison, 1, 61–70, 72, narrative, 32–33, 36, 38, 42, 54,
229 221, 252–253, 264, 269, 272,
Rise of the Novel, The (Watt), 1–2 274–275
romanticism obsession with age in, 219
and Austen, 7, 14, 16–17, 77–88, parodies in, 13
72, 179, 253, 256–257, 259 plot of, 33–34
poets, 77–81, 83, 86–87 realism, 41–42, 50–52, 267
and Shelley, 7, 31, 77–88 reasons of the heart in, 251–277
Room of One’s Own, A (Woolf), 6–7 Robert Ferrars in, 38–39, 174, 222,
Rosetti, Christina, 251 264–265, 271
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 77 somber tone of, 32, 35, 223
Roxana (Defoe) Sophia Grey in, 38
Amy in, 93–94, 96–97 two Elizas in, 39–40, 83, 177,
narrative style of, 94 220–221, 258
Roxana in, 90, 92–99, 101, 104, Shakespeare, William
108 As You Like It, 13
spatial control in, 90–99, 101, 104, influence of, 1, 13–15, 180, 202,
108 206
Susan in, 96–99 irony, 14
Runaway, The (Cowley), 190 Shelley, Mary
Ruoff, Gene, 16 compared to Austen, 7, 21–23, 26,
28, 31–33, 51–52 77–88
Said, Edward, 239 Falkner, 32
Sanditon, 16 Frankenstein, 23, 26, 31, 39,
Scott, Walter, 9, 212, 254, 263 83–87
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 222 and romance, 7, 31, 80, 83, 85–87
Self-Control (Brunton), 83 Shelley, Percy, 83, 87, 256
Sense and Sensibility, 48, 166, 284, “Alastor,” 83
290 A Defense of Poetry, 84
Colonel Brandon in, 33–34, “Mont Blanc,” 78
37, 39–41, 220–222, 256, “Ode to the West Wind,” 84–85
258, 260, 262–263, 267–269, Prometheus Unbound, 79, 85
274–275 Shields, Carol, 252
comedy in tragedy in, 219–249 Siebers, Tobin, 128, 138
Fanny Dashwood in, 32, 38, Sir Charles Grandison (Richardson),
219, 256, 260, 265, 268–271, 1, 64, 229
273–275 Clementina della Porretta in, 61,
idealism in, 41, 258, 265 65–66, 68–70
 Index 315

John Allestree in, 63 Wall, Cynthia, 300

Harriet Byron in, 61–63, 65–66, on spatial relations between
68 Elizabeth and Darcy in Pride
Smollett, Tobias George and Prejudice, 89–111
realism of, 8 Watt, Ian
Sorrows of Werther (Goethe), 255 The Rise of the Novel, 1–2
Stendhal, Henri-Marie Beyle, 13 Weisenfarth, Joseph, 220
Strictures on the Modern System of Welty, Eudora, 273
Female Education (More), 83, 145, White, Laura Mooneyham, 220
163 Wilde, Oscar
The Picture of Dorian Gray, 208
Tanner, Tony, 36, 148, 166–167, 235 William Collins (Pride and Prejudice)
Adultery in the Novel, 162 sincerity of, 173–188
Tave, Stuart M. Wiltshire, John, 220
on Austen, 4–5, 7, 13–14 Wolfram, Sybil, 241
Tennyson, Alfred, 266 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 252
Tolstoy, Leo, 15 Maria, 23, 28, 32, 41
Tom Jones (Fielding), 146, 174 A Vindication of the Rights of
Trilling, Lionel, 239 Woman, 41, 80–81, 145, 163
on Mansfield Park, 6, 148, 150, works of, 21–23, 28, 42, 51, 60, 82,
224 86, 265
The Opposing Self, 146 Woolf, Virginia, 10
on Pride and Prejudice, 5 A Room of One’s Own, 6–7
Twain, Mark, 259 Wordsworth, William, 80, 87
The Excursion, 7
Ulysses (Joyce), 13 “Imitations of Immortality Ode,”
17
Varey, Simon, 107 influence of, 14, 16–17, 19–20, 28,
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, A 79
(Wollstonecraft), 41, 80–81, 145, The Prelude, 78
163 Wuthering Heights (Brontë, E.), 17