Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

4/26/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 662
G.R. No. 152375. December 13, 2011.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA
(substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND
E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), respondents.
Remedial Law; Distinction between a Final Judgment or Order and an

Interlocutory Order.—Case law has conveniently demarcated the line
between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of
the disposition made. A judgment or order is considered final if the order
disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular
stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved
party is appeal. If
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pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
Procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.”
* EN BANC.
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Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and

leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order
is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that: “As distinguished from a
final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000171b70b5a80771974c5003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/104
something more to be adjudicated upon. The term “final” judgment or order

signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the
parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it
leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the
controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other.
In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.”
Same; An interlocutory order remains under the control of the court
until the case is finally resolved on the merits.—We clarify, too, that an
interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is
finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind
the order upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.
In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution—which merely denied
the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No.
0009—could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or
final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite the petitioner’s
failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.
Same; The proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is
directed against a judgment or final order; Although a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that
it is a mere “rehash” of the arguments already passed upon and resolved by
the court, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law
or by the rules as a prohibited motion.—We also agree with the petitioner
that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third (actually
second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.
As Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the
proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed against
“a judgment or final order.” Although a second motion for reconsideration
of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere
“rehash” of the arguments
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154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the
ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.
Same; Certiorari; While Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.—Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment or final
order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of
Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal
from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to

question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of
the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for
reconsideration.
Same; Same; For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court requires among others that neither an appeal nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is
available to the aggrieved party; Exception.—While the 1998 resolution is
an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly
conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have
been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally
correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a
disputed interlocutory ruling. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of
certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an available
alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving
the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.
Same; Same; Without clear showing that its action was a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction, the
Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment
or at best an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.—In light of the above
discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a
question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount
to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its
action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its
exercise of jurisdiction. Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s
erroneous legal conclu-
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VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 155
sion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but
not a grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Same; Evidence; Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced
his direct evidence in the course of discharging the burden of proof, he is
considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only.—Although the word “rested” nowhere appears in
the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred it from an
overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the
order of presentation of a party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to
Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, both of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30,
after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging the
burden of proof, he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. Whether a party has rested his case
in some measure depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has
concluded his presentation of evidence.
Same; Same; The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from
requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it
has rested its case.—On the other end, though, there was nothing
intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to reopen its case
before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court
does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present
additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity,
however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional evidence is
already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of
the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the
case (for the purpose of introducing, “marking and offering” additional
evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action
invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Under Section 5 Rule 30, a party who has the burden of
proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies upon
and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.—Under this rule, a party who
has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence
he relies upon and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The obvious
rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party
and the consequent delay in the administration of justice.
Same; Where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for
instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to
the other or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of
newly
156
discovered evidence, the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be

recognized.—A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of
his evidence prevents him from introducing further evidence; but where the
evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from
the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where
the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered
evidence, the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized.
Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Same; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; Consolidation is a
procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.—

Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in
deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the
court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing
justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation
and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation
of issues within those cases.
Same; Same; Deposition; Before a party can make use of the
deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d), it also requires as a condition for admissibility, compliance with
“the rules on evidence.”—Before a party can make use of the deposition
taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d);
it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with “the rules
on evidence.” Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an
implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the
deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the
petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a
deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence
under Section 47, Rule 130. In determining the admissibility of the Bane
deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the
exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is
particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does
not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition
taken under another and farther jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Depositions are not meant as substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.—A deposition is
chiefly a
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mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings

for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties
and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.
Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of
informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant
as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in
open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on
evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the
deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand.—That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded
during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the
opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party
at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against
him during the trial or hearing of a case. However, under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand.
Same; Same; Same; Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires inter alia,
for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse
party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the
deponent in the prior proceeding.—Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or
deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the
classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is
not universally conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence
is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court
declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for
the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party
must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent
in the prior proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for the admission of a testimony or
deposition given at a former case or proceeding.—Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a
testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding. 1. The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative; 3. Involv-
158
ing the same parties; 4. Relating to the same matter; 5. The adverse party
having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Same; Same; Same; The phrase “unable to testify” appearing in both
Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a physical inability to
appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony; Where the deposition is
taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then
the deposition should be rejected in evidence.—The phrase “unable to
testify” appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers
to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony.
Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase “out of the Philippines,”
which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
absence from jurisdiction—the petitioner’s excuse for the non-presentation

of Bane in open court—may still constitute inability to testify under the
same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this
instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is
taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent,
then the deposition should be rejected in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The witness himself, if available, must be produced
in court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony given at the
former trial is mere hearsay.—Although the testimony of a witness has been
given in the course of a former proceeding between the parties to a case on
trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The
witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were
testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere
hearsay. The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also
inadmissible for the same reason.
Same; Witnesses; Cross-Examination; The function of cross-
examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on
direct examination; this right is available of course, at the taking of
deposition, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial.—The
function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of
a witness made on direct examination. The opportunity of cross-
examination has been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and
completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is
absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness
may be called. This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions,
as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal
justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for the
admission, as an exception to the
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VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 159
hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the

present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based
on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential
safeguard against falsehoods and frauds.
Same; Evidence; Judicial Notice; In adjudicating a case on trial,
courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending
in the same court and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried
or are actually pending before the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions.—
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge. This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to
all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the
adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or
when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with
the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case
then pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of
another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case
before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; In Philippine jurisprudence,
the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the
rights of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment.—In Philippine
jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into
one and the rights of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment,
thus: The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of
the different actions consolidated into a single action, in the same
manner as if the different causes of action involved had originally been
joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court
of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different
actions until it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be
no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by vir-
160
tue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action,

which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and
all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the
parties adjudicated in a single action.”
Same; Same; Same; Unlike a mere order of a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions, the consolidation of actions
merges the different actions into one single action; this means that evidence
such as depositions taken after the consolidation is admissible in all the
actions consolidated whenever relevant or material.—The 12 April 1993
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of the incidental
cases, including Civil Case No. 0130, with the main case, Civil Case No.
0009. Unlike a mere order of a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions, the consolidation of actions merges the
different actions into one single action. This means that evidence, such as
depositions, taken after the consolidation is admissible in all the actions

consolidated whenever relevant or material. In this case, since the notice and
the deposition-taking was after the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130
with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, the deposition could be admitted
as evidence in the consolidated cases.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Yolanda Q. Javellana for substituted heirs of J.L. Africa.
Agcaoili Law Offices for P. Ilusorio.
Robert A.C. Sison and Vicente Millora for Imelda R. Marcos.
M.M. Lazaro and Associates for respondent Nieto, Jr.
Edgar Dennis Padernal for Juan Ponce Enrile.
Marcos, Ochoa, Serapio and Tan Law Firm for Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr.
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VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 161

BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of
the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside the February 7, 2002
resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the
petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re:
Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).
The Antecedents
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines,

through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009)
against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and
Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings
respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves
and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized,
beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos.4
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present
petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa, was
not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No.

0009.5
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1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer; Rollo, pp. 60-67.
3 Fourth Division.
4 Petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence and
Comment/Opposition Ad Cautelam; Rollo, pp. 370-371.
5 See Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 475; 266 SCRA 515 (1997).
162

Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among

them, Civil Case No. 0130.7 The present respondents were not
made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.
Civil Case No. 0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders
meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors was elected. Later,
the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders
meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a
result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for
certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining order/preliminary
injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No.
0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991
Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:
“[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist
from exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares in the special
stockholders’ meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing
himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from
participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.”9
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130,

Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that since
January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been “illegally ‘exercising’ the
rights of stockholders of ETPI,”10 especially in the election of the
members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of
an order for the “calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders
meeting for
_______________
6 Petitioner’s Reply; id., at pp. 744-745.
7 Entitled Victor Africa v. Presidential Commission on Good Government.

8 See Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan, 450 Phil. 98, 104; 402 SCRA 84,
86 (2003).
9 Id., at p. 103; p. 85.
10 Id., at p. 104; p. 86.
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VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 163

1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed

guidelines.”11
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored
Africa’s motion in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the

[ETPI], for 1992 be held on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil
J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting
shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, through
Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their duly
authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding
shares.
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully
maintained until final judicial resolution of the question of whether or not
the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper case the underlying assets of
the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]”12
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a

petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 10778913 (PCGG’s
petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan
for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had
the right to vote.14 In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we
enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed
resolution.
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandigan-
bayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among
others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case
and the former merely an incident.15
_______________
11 Id., at p. 103; p. 86.
12 Id., at pp. 104-105; pp. 86-87.
13 Resolved by this Court on April 30, 2003.
14 Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8.
15 Rollo, p. 304. The other incident cases which were consolidated with the main
case are as follows:
1. Civil Case No. 0043 (Polygon Investors and Managers, Inc. v. PCGG)—a
complaint praying that judgment be rendered enjoining the
164

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the

PCGG filed with this Court a “Very Urgent Petition for Authority to
Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of
Increas-
_______________
PCGG, its commissioners, officers, employees, agents and/or representatives from
enforcing and/or implementing a writ of sequestration.
2. Civil Case No. 0044 (Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc. v. PCGG)—a
complaint praying that the Writ of Sequestration dated June 15, 1988 and Mission
Order No. MER-88-20 dated August 1, 1988 be declared null and void ab initio.
3. Civil Case No. 0045 (Africa v. PCGG)—an amended complaint praying that
judgment be rendered restraining (a) defendant Eduardo M. Villanueva from
representing himself and acting as Director, President and/or General Manager of
ETPI and committing or continuing to exercise the power, authority and functions
appertaining to such office; and (b) defendant PCGG from directly or indirectly
interfering with the management of ETPI.
4. Civil Case No. 0047 (Africa v. Gutierrez, et al.)—a complaint praying that
defendants be enjoined from acting as directors of ETPI.
5. Civil Case No. 0131 (Traders Royal Bank v. PCGG, Africa, et al.)—complaint
praying that defendants be ordered to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
6. Civil Case No. 0139 (Far East Bank and Trust Company v. PCGG, Africa, et
al.)—a complaint praying that defendants be directed to interplead and litigate their
respective claims on the proceeds of the deposit accounts maintained with plaintiff
and that judgment be accordingly rendered.
7. Civil Case No. 0143 (Standard Chartered Bank v. PCGG, Africa, Nieto, et al.)
—a complaint praying that judgment be rendered requiring all the defendants to
interplead among themselves and litigate to determine who are the legitimate
signatories of OWNI in its accounts with the plaintiff.
8. Civil Case No. 0128 (Traders Royal Bank v. PCGG)—a complaint praying
that defendants be directed to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims between
them, and that judgment be rendered accordingly.
9. Civil Case No. 0106 (Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. v. PCGG and Asset
Privatization Trust)—a petition praying that PCGG be ordered to withdraw its
objection to the alleged settlement agreed upon between DOMSAT and APT.
165
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 165
ing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock” (Urgent Petition). In our

May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the
Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate
resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in
Civil Case No. 0130.17
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony
of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of
ETPI) was taken—at the petitioner’s instance and after serving
notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18—on October 23
and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane
deposition) before
_______________
10. Civil Case No. 0114 (PHILCOMSAT and POTC v. PCGG)—a
complaint seeking to declare as null and void the writs of sequestration issued
by PCGG over plaintiffs-corporations and to enjoin PCGG and its officers,
agents, and nominees from interfering with the management and operations of
the plaintiffs-corporations. (Records, Volume III, pp. 451-452; 841-843.)
16 Resolution dated December 13, 1996; id., at p. 300.
17 Ibid.
18 Petitioner sent to the respondents a Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr.
Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 24 of the
Revised Rules of Court (Records, Volume XXXVI, pp. 11534-11535), which the
Sandiganbayan “noted.” Considering Victor Africa’s manifestation, among others,
that he was not available on the previously scheduled dates, on September 25, 1996,
the petitioner filed and sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr.
Maurice V. Bane upon Oral Examination (Rollo, pp. 68-71). The Second Amended
Notice reads:
The right to take deposition de bene esse is a precautionary privilege to
prevent [the] loss of evidence in the event the attendance of the witness at the
trial cannot be procured. Hence, Section 1, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of
Court, specifically grants the plaintiff the right to depose Mr. Maurice Bane
without leave of court. x x x.
It should moreover be noted that Mr. Maurice Bane, who resides in
England, has resigned from Cable and Wireless and is unable to travel to
Manila to attend or testify before this Honorable Court. Section 4, Rule 24,
allows Plaintiff to use Mr. Maurice V. Bane’s proposed deposition in evidence
insofar as the same may be admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
(underscoring and boldfacing supplied)
166

Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in

London, England.
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court),
purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose Bane without leave of
court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed
their answer, the notice stated that “[t]he purpose of the deposition
is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his
affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the
petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for
sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent
Petition].”20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the
Bane deposition “in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No.
0009.”21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present
and he cross-examined Bane.
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent
Petition by granting authority to the PCGG (i) “to cause the holding
of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of
increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock” and (ii) “to vote therein
the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of stock.”22 Thus, a special
stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March
17, 1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was
“unanimously approved.”23 From this ruling, Africa went to this
Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214
(Africa’s petition).
We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:
“This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders

meeting (to elect a board of directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s
petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend the articles of
incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply
the two-tiered
_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 292-297.
20 Id., at pp. 68-69. The records show that Maurice Bane executed the aforesaid affidavit
dated January 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines. Records, Volume III, pp. 683-688.
21 Id., at p. 69.
22 Id., at pp. 299-321.
23 Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8, at p. 109.
24 Resolved by this Court on April 30, 2003.
167
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 167

test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the
PCGG in the stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the
Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other choice but to remand these
questions to it for proper determination.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the
Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to determine whether there is a
prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill-
gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to
vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors
and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of
increasing the authorized capital stock of ETPI.”
The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty

(60) days from receipt of this Resolution and in conformity
herewith.
Civil Case No. 0009
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was
only on November 29, 1996 and March 17, 1997 that the first pre-
trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25
In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner
offered to present the following witnesses:
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF

THEIR TESTIMONIES
(1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C
& W) at the time ETPI was organized.
xxxx
(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x
(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x
(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x
(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina – x x x
_______________
25 Sandiganbayan Third Division Pre-Trial Order dated March 17, 1997, p. 1; Rollo, p. 576.
Penned by Associate Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices
Cipriano A. del Rosario and Leonardo I. Cruz.
26 Records, Volume XXXVI, p. 11405.
168

(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x

(7) Caesar Parlade – x x x
IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition

At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27
(1st motion), stating that—
1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil
Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130, 014628 the following witnesses were presented
therein:
a. Cesar O.V. Parlade
b. Maurice Bane
c. Evelyn Singson
d. Leonorio Martinez
e. Ricardo Castro; and
f. Rolando Gapud
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their
testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them,
since their testimonies and the said documentary exhibits are very relevant
to prove the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the
opportunity to cross-examine them.
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st

motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed a Common Reply30 to these
Oppositions.
_______________
27 Dated January 21, 1998; id., at pp. 322-329. Originally, what the petitioner filed
was a Manifestation that it was adopting the testimonies of specified witnesses,
among others. However, on January 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan required the
petitioner “to file a corrected pleading in the form of a motion in lieu of the
Manifestation.” (Records, Volume XLIV, pp. 128-130, 175).
28 Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050 and 0146 were ordered consolidated with Civil
Case No. 0009 by the Court in Africa v. PCGG, G.R. Nos. 83831, 85594, 85597, and
85621, January 9, 1992, 205 SCRA 38.
29 Records, Volume XLIV, pp. 278-282 and 497-500; Volume XLV, pp. 3-6 and
22-26.
30 Dated March 13, 1998; Rollo, pp. 593-597.
169
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 169

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a

resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 1st motion, as
follows:
Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is—

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the
testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as
part of its evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason that said
deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-
examination in this Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long

pending case, insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular
testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and
Ricardo Castro and documentary exhibits which said witnesses have
identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following
conditions:
xxx
xxx
That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be
cross-examined on their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx
[by the respondents].
IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998
resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on
December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not
included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission,
the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial
Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative
prayer that:
_______________
31 Fourth Division.
32 Penned by Associate Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro (now a
Member of this Court); Rollo, pp. 331-338.
33 Id., at p. 18.
34 Id., at pp. 339-346.
170

1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and

setting the same for trial any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of
introducing additional evidence and limited only to the marking and offering
of the [Bane deposition] which already forms part of the records and used in
Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice
of the facts established by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked
exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis ours]
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a

resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 2nd motion:
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled “What Need Not
Be Proved.” Apparently, this provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider
admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial
or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is
mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon
the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or
Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as
the same is considered redundant.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done
through the ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein the defendant is
given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law.
Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis
ours]
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the

respondents separately filed their respective demurrers to
evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the
Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).
_______________
35 Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer; id., at pp. 352-355.
36 Id., at pp. 777-778.
37 Id., at pp. 357-359.
171
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 171

IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of

Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion,
seeking once more the admission of the Bane deposition.38 On
February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers
to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002
resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s 3rd motion. The
Sandiganbayan ruled:
But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not

plaintiff has already rested its case as to obviate the further presentation of
evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-appearing defendants
are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify
the admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do
not see any need to dwell on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution
rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied the introduction in evidence
of Bane’s deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s
failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-
day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for
this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in time would in effect
sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on
its rights for almost two years and it was only in February of 2000 that it
sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to
enable it to introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or
in the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the
deposition. But how can such a motion be granted when it has been resolved
as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having
moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution
has attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple
expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion,
is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998 ruling.”
[emphases ours]
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 360-368.
39 The Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) promulgated on April 1, 2003 a
resolution denying the demurrers to evidence filed by the respondents; id., at pp. 777-
790.
40 Supra note 2.
172

The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
The Petition
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion:
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998
HAD BECOME FINAL.
II.
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –
WHICH WAS ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN
INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) – AS PART OF
PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL
CASE NO. 0009).
III.
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND
IMPORTANT PIECE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON
THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
41
The petitioner argues that the 1998 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory order; thus, the
petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have
given it a character of “finality” so long as the main case remains
pending.42 On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002
resolution) either to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane
deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil
Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken,
introduced and
_______________
41 Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. While this case was
pending, then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Eduardo Antonio Nachura was
appointed Solicitor General, formerly a Member of this Court.
42 Rollo, p. 28, citing People v. MTC of Quezon City, 333 Phil. 500; 265 SCRA
645 (1996).
173
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 173

admitted in evidence) is but a “child” of the “parent” case, Civil

Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and
admitted in any of the “children” cases should be considered as
evidence in the “parent” case.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of
the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan should not have denied its
admission on “flimsy grounds,” considering that:
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the
Bane deposition) that it would be used as evidence in Civil
Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the
parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have
waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they
failed to show up.
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the
petitioner relative to its allegation that the respondents’
interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the
government.
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s
formal offer of evidence was obviously excusable considering
the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed and
the voluminous records that the present case has generated.43
THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS

and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY
In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our

Resolution of April 10, 200245), they claim that the present petition
was filed out of time—i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary period
prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46 This as-
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 35-50.
44 In his Manifestation, respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. stated that he was
adopting the Comment of respondent Nieto; id. at 856-857. On the other hand,
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile and the substituted heirs of respondent Jose Africa
merely reiterated the arguments advanced by respondent Nieto.
45 Id., at p. 471.
46 Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
174

sertion proceeds from the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion,
being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner,
likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along
the same line, they posit that the petitioner’s 3rd motion actually
partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the
assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that
the petitioner’s failure to contest the resolution by way of certiorari
within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a character of
“finality.”
The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its
case, the admission of a supplemental offer of evidence requires the
reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the
Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to
reopen the case since the evidence sought to be admitted was
“within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it] before
[it] rested its case.”48 The respondents also advert to the belated
filing of the petitioner’s 3rd motion—i.e., after the respondents had
filed their respective demurrers to evidence.
On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that
they have not waived their right to cross-examine the deponent; the
Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution and the
petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the
allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of
judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The
respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in
evidence because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites

for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
_______________
When and where petition filed.—The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
47 Respondent Nieto’s Comment, citing GSIS v. CA, 334 Phil. 163 (1997); Rollo,
p. 490.
48 Respondent Nieto’s Comment, citing Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of
Court in the Philippines, p. 338; id., at p. 489.
175
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 175

In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present

petition by arguing that a party may opt to wait out and collect a
pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd
motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution,
which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be done
through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioner’s 3rd
motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice should have
guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case
although it has filed a formal offer of evidence. A party normally
rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he
formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present
further evidence to substantiate his theory of the case should the
court reject any piece of the offered evidence.50
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is sufficient for the
admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is
not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts
in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his advanced
age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not
Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the
present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-
taking.
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano
Ilusorio have yet to file their respective comments on the petition.
Given the time that had lapsed since we required their comments, we
resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to

consider this petition submitted for decision.
_______________
49 Id., at pp. 521-528.
50 Petitioner’s Reply (to Nieto’s Comment), citing Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, p. 582, 2001 ed.; id., at p. 522.
176

The Issues
On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues
for our resolution, as follows:
1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion—
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited
motion for reconsideration;
iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the
Bane deposition to the petitioner’s cause; and
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under—
i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court; and
ii. The principle of judicial notice.
The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.
I. Preliminary Considerations
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s
1998 resolution.
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a
party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first
correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he
intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine
whether the 1998 resolution is “final” or “interlocutory” in nature.
_______________
51 Raymundo v. Isagon Vda. de Suarez, G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008,
572 SCRA 384.
177
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 177

Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final

judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of the
disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if the
order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates
a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy
available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution,
however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is
interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
“As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term
“final” judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of
the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for
future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it
leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the
controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other.
In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.”54 (emphasis
supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998
resolution is interlocutory. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the
petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time
when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its
evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits
of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.
_______________
52 Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 302; 147 SCRA 334 (1987),
cited in Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256; 148
SCRA 280 (1987).
53 Rudecon Management Corp. v. Singson, 494 Phil. 581; 454 SCRA 612 (2005).
54 Tomacruz-Lactao v. Espejo, 478 Phil. 755; 434 SCRA 588 (2004).
178

We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the

control of the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits.
The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution—which merely denied the
adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case
No. 0009—could not have attained finality (in the manner that a
decision or final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite
the petitioner’s failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.56
I (b). The 3rd motion was not
prohibited by the Rules.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be
considered as a proscribed third (actually second) motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section
5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription
against a second motion for reconsideration is directed against “a
judgment or final order.” Although a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the
ground that it is a mere “rehash” of
_______________
55 Jose Y. Feria and Maria Concepcion Noche, 2 Civil Procedure Annotated, 2001
ed., pp. 151-152, citing Manila Electric Co. v. Artiaga and Green, 50 Phil. 144, 147
(1927). This proceeds from the court’s inherent power to control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The only limitation is that
the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby
(Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 755; 360 SCRA
322 [2001]).
56 Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court reads:
Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
179
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 179

the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it

cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by
the rules as a prohibited motion.57
I (c). The 1998 resolution was not

ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved
party may appeal from a judgment or final order which completely
disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court declares
to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an
interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to
question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days
from notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a
motion for reconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature,
the respondents insist that the 60-day period for filing a petition for
certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioner’s notice of the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling
had long been rendered by the court, the petitioner’s subsequent
filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt to
resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While
the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by
the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim
that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned
by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for
certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed
interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper,
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that
neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
_______________
57 Rollo, p. 31, citing Philgreen Trading Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
338 Phil. 433; 271 SCRA 719 (1997).
58 Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, 408 Phil.
483; 356 SCRA 367 (2001).
180

is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ

of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an available
alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in
relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order
complained of.59
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009,
the petitioner had not yet concluded the presentation of its evidence,
much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the
case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
to question the admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After
the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy available to the
petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even
clarify its position on the admission of the Bane deposition. The
petitioner could introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include
this as evidence in its formal offer61—as the petitioner presumably
did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a
petition for certiorari, and the denial of the 1st motion could not
have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a petition.
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on
the finality of its 1998 resolution was
legally erroneous but did not consti-
tute grave abuse of discretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the
Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its
ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave
abuse of discretion
_______________
59 Africa v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 846; 287 SCRA 408 (1998).
60 When a deposition is presented at trial and admitted by the court, it is
competent evidence for the party in whose behalf it was taken, although it may not
have been actually read when introduced in evidence. (Vicente J. Francisco, 2 The
Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, p. 127, 1966, citing Baron v. David, 51
Phil. 1 [1927].)
Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
181
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 181

in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of
jurisdiction.62 Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous
legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an
abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason alone, the
petition should be dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately
dismiss the petition in light of the unique circumstances of this case
where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the
remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is
undoubtedly endowed with public interest and has become a matter

of public concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve the petition on
the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their
recurrence in the course of completely resolving the merits of Civil
Case No. 0009.
Although the word “rested” nowhere appears in the Rules of
Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred it from an overview of
trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order
of presentation of a party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to
Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5,
_______________
62 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619,
633, citing Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
185401, July 21, 2009, 593 SCRA 316, 344.
63 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059; 406 SCRA 190
(2003).
64 Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requires the parties to state in their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs the following:
(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or
alternative modes of dispute resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose
thereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail
themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and
182

Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course
of discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested
his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66
Whether a party has rested his case in some measure depends on his
manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation
of evidence.67
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner
expressly admitted that “due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed and
rested its case”;68 and that it “had terminated the presentation of its
evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009.”69 In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly
make an
_______________
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of

their respective testimonies.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial. (emphases added)
Burden of proof.—Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law. (emphasis added)
66 See Manuel V. Moran, 2 Comments on the Rules of Court, 1996 ed., p. 140.
Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. (emphasis added)
68 Petitioner’s Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, p. 3; Rollo, p.
341.
69 Petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence, p. 6; id., at p.
365.
Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or written, made by the party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that
183
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 183

about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual

order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting of its case
could not have been conditioned on the admission of the evidence it
formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the
lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition, was not
among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of
evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the
trial court.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present
petition for certiorari that the petitioner had firmly denied having
rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it
appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s denial of
its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the
case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.
Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not
necessitate an immediate recourse to the corrective writ of
certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of
action. The petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for
the admission of the Bane deposition, while seemingly innocuous,

carried fatal implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its
first attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No.
0009, and without seeking reconsideration of the denial, the
petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually
rested its case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane
deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its
formal offer of evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in
the Bane deposition into its case. In resolving the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, the
Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has “become part and
parcel” of Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured
the
_______________
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
71 In page 6 of the petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence,
the petitioner admitted the termination of the presentation of its evidence; yet, in page
4 of the petitioner’s Reply (to respondent Nieto’s opposition to petitioner’s Motion to
Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence), the petitioner stated that it has not yet rested
its case.
184

real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering that,

earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt to
adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for
the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the
Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen
the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the
petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2nd
motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen
the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the
consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however,
the petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded
to file its 3rd motion.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd
motion by denying having rested its case and insisting on the
introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the
petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the
Sandiganbayan’s resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it “mixed
signals.”73 By pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the
petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe for
review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was
that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the
introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane deposition.
Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not
have been prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding
any perceived ambiguity in the resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically
objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to reopen its case before the
court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does
not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present
additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such
opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of
additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of this discretion that
the Sandiganba-
_______________
72 Dated August 21, 2000 and April 3, 2001.
73 Rollo, pp. 31 and 34.
185
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 185

yan’s refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing,

“marking and offering” additional evidence) should be viewed. We
can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen
the case for the purpose of introducing and
admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further
evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
“Sec. 5. Order of trial.—Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule

31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall
be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as
follows:
xxxx
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only,
unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice,
permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case[.]” [emphases
ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must
introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies upon74 and
such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of
the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and
the consequent delay in the administration of justice.76
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his
evidence prevents him from introducing further evidence;77 but
where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for
instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one
party to
_______________
74 James M. Henderson, 6 Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases
Based Upon the Works of Burr W. Jones, § 2502, pp. 4950-4951.
75 Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 121 (1920).
76 Ibid.
77 John Henry Wigmore, 6 A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence
in Trials at Common Law, 1940, p. 519.
186

the other;78 or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the

nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the party’s right to introduce
further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party
may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the
exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on
the attendant facts—i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as
a “good reason” and be in furtherance of “the interest of justice.”
For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower court’s
exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower
court’s action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled
jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the
exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the
mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.81 Grave
abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported
imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond
allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment82 or mere abuse
of discretion.83
In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following
pronouncement:
“After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for
good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate
_______________
78 Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila, supra note 75.
79 Seares v. Hernando, etc., et al., 196 Phil. 487; 110 SCRA 343 (1981).
80 88 C.J.S. § 104, p. 217; 5A C.J.S. § 1606, p. 102; and Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 431
(1948).
81 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755; 409 SCRA 455 (2003).
82 San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 168088, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 564.
83 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, supra note 62.
84 Supra note 80, at p. 434.
187
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 187

court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional

evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been
omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the
evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present
evidence on the testator’s knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It
was due to a misapprehension or oversight.” (citations omitted; emphases
ours)
Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85

we ruled:
“The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he
commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound
discretion of the court. “The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion,”
it has been said by an eminent author, “is, that material testimony should
not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has
rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick,
and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case
injuriously.”
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the
general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes
the judge “for special reasons,” to change the order of the trial, and “for
good reason, in the furtherance of justice,” to permit the parties “to offer
evidence upon their original case.” These exceptions are made stronger
when one considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact
that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and
abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected.
Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be

given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support
of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require.” (emphases ours)
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
“However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice,
permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling
will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion appears, Generally,
additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be properly
disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without
justification.”86
_______________
85 Supra note 75, at p. 124.
86 Manuel V. Moran, supra note 66, at p. 141, citing 64 C.J. 160-163.
188

The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign

jurisprudence.87
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case.
Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid
any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the petitioner’s concern in
limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion “redundant.” This is
tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by
the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the
contemplation of law.
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved
to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even presented their
evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been
prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane
deposition, which was concededly omitted “through oversight.”88
The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is another
consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not
have perfunctorily applied Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court
on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the submission of
the Bane deposition.
_______________
87 In Hampson v. Taylor (8 A. 331, 23 A. 732, 15 R.I. 83, January 11, 1887) the
Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled:
We are of the opinion that it was entirely within the discretion of the court
to open the case for further testimony. The counsel for the plaintiff says, in
excuse for the omission, that it was conceded at the former trial, without
contest, that the place of the accident was a part of the public highway, and he
was thus put off his guard. It is quite common for the court to allow a party
to submit further testimony, after he has rested, when his opponent
attempts to take advantage of some formal point which has been
inadvertently overlooked, since it is or ought to be the aim of the court, in
ordering the course of proof, to further, not to defeat the ends of justice.
88 Rollo, p. 18.
89 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 336 Phil. 304; 269 SCRA 316
(1997).
189
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 189

On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should

follow as a matter of course. The state of the parties’ submissions
and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No.
0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this
point, the parties have more than extensively argued for or against
the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-
year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete
resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been
raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after
remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve the issue of
admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case
No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the
usual requisites of admissibility
_______________
90 In W. W. Dearing v. Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., 187 Phil. 488, 493-494; 98 SCRA
758, 764 (1980), we held:
Anent grave abuse of discretion, in Icutanim v. Hernandez, x x x it was held that
appeal and not certiorari, is the proper remedy for the correction of any error as to
the competency of a witness committed by an inferior court in the course of trial,
since such a situation involves an error of law constituting a violation of the rules of
evidence, apart from the fact that to allow any special civil action under the
circumstances would lead to multiplicity of suits and lead to protracted if not endless
trials. Similarly and for the same reasons, that rule would apply to the admission or
rejection of a deposition being offered as evidence. Thus, the jurisprudential rule is
that the admission or rejection of certain interrogatories in the course of discovery
procedure could be an error of law but not an abuse of discretion, much less a grave
one. Again, the reason for this rule [is that] the procedure for the taking of depositions
whether oral or thru written interrogatories is outlined in the rules leaving no
discretion to the Court to adopt any other not substantially equivalent thereto. Should
the judge substantially deviate from what the rule prescribes, he commits a legal error,
not an abuse of discretion. (citation omitted; emphases and underscoring ours)
190

In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane
deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing the
provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.91 The
petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case
No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others,92 the “former case
or proceeding” that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93—the rule in effect at the time
Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 were consolidated—provided that:
Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a common
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay.94 (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an

aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end,
the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases
in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those
cases.95
_______________
91 Petitioner’s Reply to the Opposition (filed by the substituted heirs of respondent
Jose Africa), p. 7; Rollo, p. 462.
92 Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1606, in effect at the time of the consolidation,
provides:
Rule-making Power. The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to promulgate its
own rules of procedure and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall
govern its proceedings.
93 1964 Rules of Court. This provision was copied verbatim under the present
rules.
94 This provision, in turn, is an exact reproduction of Rule 42(a) of the 1938

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States.
95 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2381, p. 427.
191
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 191

A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to

two observations. First, Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s
of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the
causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the
consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the
discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the
actions consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term
“consolidation” is used generically and even synonymously with
joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title
“consolidation” of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of
consolidation, as discussed below.
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering
that consolidation is basically a function given to the court, the latter
is in the best position to determine for itself (given the nature of the
cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and
the court’s capability and resources vis-à-vis all the official business
pending before it, among other things) what “consolidation” will
bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the
Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient premise that the
deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered
the consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the silence
of our Rules of Procedure and the dearth of applicable case law
on the effect of “consolidation” that strongly compel this Court
to determine the kind of “consolidation” effected to directly
resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term “consolidation” is
used in three different senses:97
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried,
in which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the oth-
_______________
96 See People v. Sandiganbayan, 456 Phil. 707; 409 SCRA 419, 424 (2003); Cojuangco, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 37404, November 18, 1991, 203 SCRA 619; Caños v. Hon.
Peralta, etc., et al., 201 Phil. 422; 115 SCRA 843 (1982).
97 Wright and Miller, supra note 95, at p. 429.
192

ers. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-

consolidation)98
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate
identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered.
This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between
the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in
one complaint. (actual consolidation)99
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each
retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment.
This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or
cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for
trial)100
Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate

several incident cases does not at all provide a hint on the extent of
the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the
consolidation it ordered—in view of the function of this procedural
device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official
business—we are compelled to look deeper into the voluminous
records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is
nothing that would even
_______________
98 1 C.J.S. § 107, p. 1341; Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil 2d § 2382.
99 1 C.J.S. § 107, id.; Wright and Miller, id., at p. 429. See Yu, Sr. v. Basilio G.
Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc., G.R. Nos. 138701-02,
October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 618.
100 1 C.J.S. § 107, id.; 1 Am. Jur. 2d § 131, p. 804; Wright and Miller, id.
101 The April 15, 1993 Resolution ordering consolidation reads:
Submitted for resolution is the Motion for Consolidation, dated June 22, 1992,
filed by the Republic of the Philippines (represented by the PCGG), counsel.
The record shows that there is no opposition in the above-entitled cases to the said
motion. It also appears that the subject matters of the above entitled cases are and/or
may be treated as mere incidents in Civil Case No. 0009.
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered consolidated with
Civil Case No. 0009, and shall henceforth be consolidated and treated as mere
incidents of said Civil Case No. 0009. (Records, Volume III, pp. 843-844.)
193
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 193

suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes

of action, parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been
no need for a motion to adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the
testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually resulted from
the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can
already take judicial notice of the same.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation,
at most, to be merely a consolidation for trial.103 Accordingly,
despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioner’s 1st
Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose testimony in the
incident cases is sought to be adopted, “are not available for cross-
examination in” the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other
witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents can cross-
examine them.
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan’s order of consolidation had actually resulted in the
complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in the
sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these
consolidated cases
_______________
102 See Victor Africa’s Motion (Records, Volume XVIII, pp. 6717-6722).
103 In its Motion for Consolidation, the petitioner argued:
4. On various dates, several actions were filed which are intimately related with
Civil Case No. 0009, involving as they are the same subject matter and substantially
the same parties x x x.
xxxx
10. Besides, the present Motion for Consolidation is not without a paradigm
which was recently sketched by [the Sandiganbayan]. During the hearing on April
6, 1992 of Africa vs. PCGG, docketed as Civil Case No. 0127, [the
Sandiganbayan] resolved to conduct a joint trial of the said case and of OWNI vs.
Africa, docketed as Civil Case No. 0126, inasmuch as both cases are intimately
related. The consolidation of the above-captioned cases would be merely a step in
the same direction already taken by [the Sandiganbayan] in Africa and OWNI.
(Records, Volume XV, pp. 5617-5622.)
194

had (at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual
consolidation without objection.104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally
independent of one another and the fact that in the present case the
party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for
reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties

to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI
stockholder involving
_______________
104 In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court,
Francisco wrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the
different actions consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if the
different causes of actions involved had originally been joined in a single
action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is
vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further
proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation
discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in
such manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent proceedings therein
be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1
C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the
Corpus Juris Secundum, the following caveat appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where
several actions are combined into one and lose their separate identity and
become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered; second, where
all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several actions
are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to distinguish between
these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter,
strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which has not always
been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S.,
107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
In defining the term “consolidation of actions,” Francisco provided a colatilla that
the term “consolidation” is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1
Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).
195
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 195

a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the

Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidation and,
together with the parties affected,105 acted towards that end—where
the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and
where the evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in
another action—must find support in the proceedings held below.
This is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity
of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the respondents the

effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the
provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,106 and even in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the
aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of
the petitioner’s right to due process. We reach this conclusion
especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a
testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon
oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission
is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan
ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that is, before the deposition was
taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the
Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any
reference, formal or substan-
_______________
105 The respondents vigorously opposed the petitioner’s motion to adopt the
testimony of, among others, Maurice Bane, and the Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of
the respondents, without the petitioner questioning this development until after two
years later. This circumstance cannot be taken lightly in view of the petitioner’s gross
procedural deficiency in the handling of this main case.
106 In those cases where the Court ordered or affirmed the order of consolidation,
even without expressly providing for the admissibility of evidence in all of the
consolidated cases, the parties are the same and/or the issues are relatively simple
and/or the causes of action could have actually been stated in one complaint (see
Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 182382-83,
February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 528; Active Wood Products Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86603, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 774; Delta Motor Sales
Corporation v. Mangosing, No. L-41667, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 598; Sideco v.
Paredes, et al., 74 Phil. 6 (1942).
107 Dated March 17, 1997; Rollo, pp. 576-587.
196

tive, to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief

dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner even made a representation
to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
IV (b). Use of deposition under Section
4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony un-
der Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No.
0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case, the admissibility of the
Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the
requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court—the

rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a
different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that Section
4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate,
prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt
the testimonies taken in the incident cases drew individual
oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the
Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again
presented some of
_______________
108 Under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, a Pre-Trial Order controls the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest
injustice.
110 1964 Rules of Court, Rule 24, Depositions and Discovery.
111 Petitioner’s Reply with Manifestation to Respondent Enrile’s Comment, pp.
12-13; Rollo, pp. 679-680.
112 Records, Volume XLV, pp. 110-112. Petitioner’s Common Reply reads:
1. While it is true that Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
xxxx
[petitioner] wishes to inform this Honorable Court that in order to
substantially comply with the aforementioned requirements, it would be
willing to present subject witnesses, except for Maurice Bane and Rolando
Gapud whose availability are difficult to obtain being foreign residents, only
to be cross-examined by the
197
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 197

the witnesses. The petitioner’s about-face two years thereafter even

contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to
treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on “Deposition Pending
Action” (deposition de bene esse) provides for the circumstances
when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a
motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions.—At the trial or upon the hearing of a

motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far
as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had
due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used

by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is
dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred
(100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used[.]
[emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.—The

testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same
parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse
party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
_______________
defendants who had no opportunity to cross-examine them in said previous
proceeding.
198

A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects

the petitioner’s position that the Bane deposition can be admitted
into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of
a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not
only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also
requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with “the rules
on evidence.” Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading
Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the
principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23
should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47,
Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition,
therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion
of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is

particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior
proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open
court but to a deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is their mutual
reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary
function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing
the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.114 Since
depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means
of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are
not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of
a party or
_______________
113 Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229, August 24, 1993, 225
SCRA 622.
114 Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010,
August 16, 2004, 436 SCRA 559, 573, citing Fortune Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 108119, January 19, 1994, 229 SCRA 355, 362.
199
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 199

witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral

examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a
requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.115
Examination to be done in open court.—The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court,
and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein,
in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court,
may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the
hearsay rule—i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is
offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded
during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the
opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually
presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case.116
However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes

laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition
may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand.117
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely
different provision. While a former testimony or deposition appears
under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of
former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not
universally conceded.118 A fundamental characteristic of hearsay
evidence is the
_______________
115 Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, supra note 113.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Jovito R. Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence, p. 540, 2nd ed., 1958. John
Henry Wigmore, supra note 77, at 51-53. But the generally accepted view, followed
by our own rules on evidence, is that prior testimony or deposition is an exception to
hearsay prohibition. (McCormick on Evidence by Edward Cleary, § 254, p. 759, 3rd
ed., Hornbook Series, Lawyer’s ed., 1984).
200

adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court

declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter
alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that
the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary
cross-examination119 afforded an adverse party in usual trials
regarding “matters stated in the direct examination or connected
therewith.” Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates
a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere
opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of
issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where
the former testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both
cases must, at least, be substantially the same; otherwise, there is no
basis in saying that the former statement was—or would have been
—sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to
do so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that
all the issues in the two proceedings should be the same.121
Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the
admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which is similar in

both actions cannot be questioned.122)
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130
a distinct rule on evidence and therefore should not be confused with
the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23
of the Rules of
_______________
Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest
or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
120 John Henry Wigmore, supra note 77, at p. 83.
121 Oscar M. Herrera, 5 Remedial Law, 1999, pp. 773, 774-775.
122 Id., at p. 773, citing Gibson v. Gagnon, 82 Colo 108, 257, p. 348; 2 Jones, Sec.
9:25.
201
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 201

Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule

130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition,
taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of this very same case.
Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan
found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the
circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further
requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or
proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under
Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section
47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless
the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The
aching question is whether the petitioner complied with the latter
rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the
following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition
given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to
testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or

administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken

at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony
and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former testimony or
deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first
lay the
_______________
123 Manuel V. Moran, 5 Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 ed., p. 409.
124 Vicente J. Francisco, Evidence, 1955, p. 646.
202

proper predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis
for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible
evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and
resolve.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply requires, inter alia, that
the witness or deponent be “deceased or unable to testify.” On the
other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency
of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides
several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual testimony
of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the
circumstances of the deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as
follows:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,

sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126
The phrase “unable to testify” appearing in both Rule 23 and

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a physical inability to
appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony.127 Hence
notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase “out of the Philippines,”
which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, absence from
_______________
125 Ricardo J. Francisco, 7 The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,

Evidence, Part I, 1997 ed., pp. 628-629.
126 Prior to the revision of the rules on evidence, the phrase “out of the
Philippines” appeared in the context of the witness’ unavailability (Section 41, Rule
130 of the 1964 Rules of Court). After the revision (the latest amendments to the rules
on evidence became effective on July 1, 1989), this phrase was deleted from the
present Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In contrast, the same phrase,
which appeared in Rule 24 of the old Rules (Rule 24, Deposition and Discovery, 1964
Rules of Court), was retained in the present Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on
depositions. The phrase “unable to testify,” however, survived the amendment of the
rules and was retained in both Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and Section
4(c), Rule 23 of the same Rules.
127 Vicente J. Francisco, Evidence, supra note 124, at p. 649.
203
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 203

jurisdiction128—the petitioner’s excuse for the non-presentation of

Bane in open court—may still constitute inability to testify under the
same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on
this instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the
deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to
accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be
rejected in evidence.129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course
of a former proceeding between the parties to a case on trial, this
testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The
witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were
testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is
mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is
also inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in
the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is an argument in favor of the
requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present
case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would
have no basis to presume, and neither can or should we, that the
previous condition, which previously allowed the use of the
deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same
deposition in another case or proceeding, even if the other case or
proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the
admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity,131
the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks
the admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by
assuming the continuity of the previous condition or conditions in
light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent
in court.132
_______________
128 John Henry Wigmore, 5 A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence
in Trials at Common Law, § 1404, p. 149.
129 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cruz, 376 Phil. 96; 317 SCRA 761 (1999).
130 Ricardo J. Francisco, supra note 125, at 627, cited in the Comment filed by
the substituted heirs of respondent Jose Africa, p. 3.
131 John Henry Wigmore, supra note 128, at p. 148.
132 To make matters worse, by not questioning the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its
1st Motion (to Adopt), the petitioner has impliedly acceded to the
204

IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of

the adverse party to cross-examine; identity
of parties; and identity of subject matter
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of
the statements of a witness made on direct examination.133 The
opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential
safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil
cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere
privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called.134 This
right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as
on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal
justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for
the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported
testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise
that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard135
against falsehoods and frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of
opportunity to cross-examine has been satisfied, we have to consider
first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the
admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be the same
“adverse party” who actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or
action, the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the
parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is not
required; substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices, as
_______________
Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the non-presentation of the deponent in court for
cross-examination is unjustified. Unfortunately, the petitioner “realized” its mistake
only two precious years later.
133 Ricardo J. Francisco, supra note 125, at p. 220.

134 Id., at p. 219.
135 Edward Cleary, supra note 118, at p. 48.
136 Manuel V. Moran, supra note 123, at p. 410.
137 Jovito R. Salonga, supra note 118, at p. 542.
205
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 205

where the subsequent proceeding is between persons who represent

the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in
estate. The term “privity” denotes mutual or successive relationships
to the same rights of property.138
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less
establish, the identity of interest or privity between the then
opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While
Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the
deposition should be admissible only against him as an ETPI
stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case
No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late
respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all
ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any
privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or
omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the
deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not result in the
integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders which
remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.139
IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of
taking of Bane deposition is insuffi-
cient evidence of waiver
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived
their right to cross-examine the deponent for their failure to appear
at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to
them.140
_______________
138 Oscar M. Herrera, supra note 121, at p. 772. Privies are distributed into
several classes, according to the manner of the relationship. Thus, there are privies in
estate, as donor and donee, lessor and lessee, and joint tenants; privies in blood, as
heir and ancestor; privies in representation as executor and testator, administrator and
intestate; privies in law for the law without privity of blood and estate casts the land
upon another as by escheat. (Id., at p. 542.)
139 Notably, Africa was not impleaded in Civil Case No. 0009 (Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 106244, January 22, 1997, 266 SCRA 515).
140 Petitioner’s Reply to Nieto’s Comment, p. 4; and petitioner’s Reply with

Manifestation to Respondent Enrile’s Comment, pp. 11-12. Rollo, pp. 678-679.
206

In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane

dated August 30, 1996,141 the petitioner originally intended to
depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to
specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition,
the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of
Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it likewise
moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective
orders against the intended deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the
other hand, among the respondents, only respondent Enrile appears
to have filed an Opposition143 to the petitioner’s first notice, where
he squarely raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioner’s
nineteen-day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s
motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever
handed down on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145
_______________
142 Records, Volume XXXVI, pp. 11574-11578; Volume XXXVII, pp. 11649-
11654; 11704-11709.
143 Records, Volume XXXVI, pp. 11610-11612.
144 Records, Volume XXXVII, pp. 11719-11720.
145 While the Sandiganbayan recognized that the petitioner intends to use the
Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009 (as stated in the Second Amended Notice of
the Taking of the Bane Deposition), the Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s Motion as if
Africa himself was impleaded in and is a party who can be bound by the proceedings
and the judgment in Civil Case No. 0009 (except only as a substituted heir of the late
respondent Jose Africa). In denying Victor Africa’s motion (forgetting about the
concern raised by respondent Enrile—which is equally applicable to the other
respondents), the Sandiganbayan seemed oblivious of the fact that the respondents
who were non-parties to Civil Case 0130 (where the deposition was taken) should be
heard. Apparently, the Sandiganbayan relied blindly on the petitioner’s assertion that
the taking of deposition is a matter of right and failed to address the consequences
and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous statement that the
petitioner intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009 (where only the
respondents, and not Africa, are parties). The Sandiganbayan ruled:
“More importantly, under Section 1 of Rule 24 the taking of such deposition, after
the answer has been served, is a matter of right and
207
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 207

It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of

the deposition upon oral examination is not simply based on the fact
of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound thereby. In
Northwest Airlines v. Cruz,146 we ruled that—
“The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the
deposition shall not be taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on
the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It
must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable
manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should
always see to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and
deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the
deponent, sufficient protection against abuses that may be committed
by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a
writer said: “Any discovery involves a prying into another person’s
affairs—prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to
litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid.” For this
reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is
intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or
oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both.” (emphasis
ours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on
respondent Enrile’s Opposition (which is equally applicable to his
co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the bare minimum
“safeguards for the protection of,” (more so) non-parties,147 and to
ensure
_______________
can be resorted to without leave of court.” (Records, XXXVII, pp. 11719-11720)
146 376 Phil. 111-112; 317 SCRA 761 (1999).
147 In its Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January 28, 1997, the petitioner
itself conceded that respondents are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130, where the
deposition was taken:
7. In this connection, we are not unmindful of the observation of [the
Sandiganbayan] that:
The principal issue in the main case, Civil Case No. 0009 x x x which is an
action for reversion, forfeiture, accounting and damages, is whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence that the Class “A” shareholding in ETPI is
ill-gotten wealth x x x.
208

that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the

Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioner’s assertion (that the
taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the
lingering concerns—e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-
party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130—at whose
incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition was
taken—rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s
reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party
status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130—the effect of
consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be
bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be
bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent
impairment of their right of cross-examination.148 Opportunity for
cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be
singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or
deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite
identity of parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan
considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its
action was premised on Africa’s status as a party in that case where
the Bane deposition was taken.
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court through its Section 5 which provides:
_______________
That point should not be pre-empted in the resolution of the subject
incident in G.R. No. 107789 x x x
8. Nor are we unmindful that this Honorable Court made clear that the finding in
its December 13, 1996 resolution “does not render moot and academic the principal
issue in the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, which is: whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence of alleged ill-gotten wealth of the defendants therein,
especially Jose Africa, Roberto S. Benedicto and Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., none of whom
is a party either in incident Civil Case No. 0130 or in the subject G.R. No. 107789.
(Italics supplied) (Records, XL, pp. 12568-12569.)
148 Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058, August 1, 2002,
386 SCRA 110; and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Bautista, et al., 135 Phil.
201; 26 SCRA 366 (1968).
209
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 209

“Effect of substitution of parties.—Substitution of parties does not

affect the right to use depositions previously taken; and, when an action has
been dismissed and another action involving the same subject is afterward
brought between the same parties or their representatives or successors in
interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action
may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor.” [italics and
underscoring ours]
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim

that the respondents waived their right to cross-examination when
they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally,
the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine
the deponent speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of
this right.
Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking
relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Section 15 of this rule reads:
“Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place.—A party

desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall
give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. The
notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name
and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not
known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class
or group to which he belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the
notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.”
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could

reasonably expect that the individual notices it sent to the
respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the
then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to begin with,
they were not even parties to the action. Additionally, we observe
that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously absent was
any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their
inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking would amount
to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice to
the right of the respondents to raise their objections at the
appropriate time.149 We
_______________
210

would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold

that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor in
substantial identity of interest with any of the parties in the same

action, can be bound by the action or omission of the latter, by
the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a
resultant waiver from the respondents’ mere failure to attend the
deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have
been taken earlier in Civil Case No. 0009—the principal action
where it was sought to be introduced—while Bane was still here in
the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no
longer under the Marcos administration and had returned to normal
democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was filed. In fact,
the petitioner’s notice itself states that the “purpose of the
deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on the facts
set forth in his Affidavit,” which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991
in Makati, Metro
_______________
Objections to admissibility.—Subject to the provisions of section 29 of this Rule,
objection may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition
or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the
witness were then present and testifying.
Section 17, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court reads:
Record of examination; oath; objections.—The officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on oath and shall personally, or by
someone acting under his direction and in his presence, record the testimony of the
witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically unless the parties agree
otherwise. All objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of
the officer taking the deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or to the evidence
presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other objection to the proceedings,
shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be taken
subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral examination, parties
served with notice of taking a deposition may transmit written interrogatories to the
officers, who shall propound them to the witness and record the answers verbatim.
211
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 211

Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have been taken—

without compromising the respondents’ right to cross-examine a
witness against them—considering that the principal purpose of the
deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are
avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient handling of
the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner
in the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.
After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the

peculiar circumstances of this case, the least that the petitioner could
have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and
proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable
ruling thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents would have
a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid a resultant
waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear
at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness dictates this course
of action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents
non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in
Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI
stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own
representations,151 this Court can only express dismay on why the
petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his
deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of
what he would testify on. Considering that the testimony of Bane is
allegedly a “vital cog” in the petitioner’s case against the
respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to
take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a
time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.
_______________
150 Records, Volume XXXVII, pp. 11628-11623.
151 See the petitioner’s Pre-Trial Brief (Records, Volume XXXVI, p. 11405)
where the petitioner made a representation to present Mr. Maurice Bane. See the
petitioner’s Common Reply (Records, Volume XLV, pp. 110-112) where the petitioner
conceded the applicability of Section 47, Rule 130; see the petitioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Records, Volume XL, pp. 12568-12569) where the petitioner
admitted that the respondents were not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (where the
deposition was taken) and Victor Africa was neither a party to Civil Case No. 0009.
212

V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of

judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had
already been previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No.
0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of
the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may
properly take and act on without proof because these facts are
already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption by a
court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary
support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in

securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and
canon law maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent
probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will
dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so
doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would
not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to
take judicial notice, inter alia, of “the official acts of the x x x
judicial departments of the Philippines,”155 or gives the court the
discretion to take judicial notice of matters “ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.”156 On the other hand, a
party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter
and the court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of
taking judicial notice
_______________
152 Ricardo J. Francisco, supra note 125, at p. 69.
153 Oscar M. Herrera, supra note 121, at p. 72.
154 Manifest things require no proof; what is known by the magistrate need not be
proved; Jovito R. Salonga, supra note 118, at p. 45; and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.,
Perspectives of Evidence, 2005, p. 52, citing 1 Jones on Evidence, p. 209.
155 Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
156 Id., Section 2.
213
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 213

of the matter involved.157 In the present case, after the petitioner

filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the
respondents were also heard through their corresponding
oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge.158 This rule
though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in
its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when,
with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and

number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any
part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court’s
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.159
_______________
157 Id., Section 3.
158 Manuel V. Moran, supra note 123, at pp. 47-48, citing Municipal Council of
San Pedro Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, 65 Phil. 318 (1938); and Prieto v. Arroyo,
121 Phil. 1335; 14 SCRA 549 (1965).
159 In Occidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
96721, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 167, 176, citing Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196
SCRA 650 (1991), we stated:
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil
Case No. 3156 formed part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No.
2728) with the knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their objection.
This fact was pointed out by the lower court, to wit:
The x x x findings of the Oroquieta Court became as conclusive
upon the company and its driver by their acquiescence and silence x x
x. (Decision of lower court, p. 12; records, p. 239)
xxxx
Returning to Exhibit “O,” supra (Decision, Civil Case No. 3156,
CFI, Branch III, Oroquieta City), the Court hastens to add:
214

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another

case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case
before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.160
_______________
Said exhibit has not been objected to nor commented upon by the
defendants Company and Enerio, through their counsel, x x x.
This being the case, petitioners were aware that Exhibit “O” (Decision in Civil
Case No. 3156) had formed part of the records of the case and would thereby be
considered by the trial court in its decision.
Defenses and objections not pleaded.—Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action
is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall

dismiss the claim. (underscoring ours)
In Lewin v. Galang, etc., 109 Phil. 1041, 1045 (1960), cited by the petitioner, the
Court held:
In view of this special defense [res judicata], the court below should have
taken judicial notice of the habeas corpus proceedings instituted by petitioner
before the same Court of First Instance of Manila and before the same judge,
Case No. 28409, Ted Lewin v. Commissioner of Immigration and
Commissioner of Customs, and we find that practically the same facts relied
upon in petitioner’s present petition for declaratory judgment are the very
facts upon which petitioner based his request for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus in the previous case.
In Tiburcio, et al. v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, et al., 106 Phil.
477, 483-484 (1959), likewise cited by the petitioner, we held:
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial notice of its own
records in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their
contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when such cases had been tried by the same
court and notwithstanding the [fact] that both cases may have been tried
before the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to be the
general rule, the same is not absolute.
215
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 215

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule
on mandatory taking of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of
the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued.
Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from
a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in
any of the “children” cases—Civil Case 0130—as evidence in the
“parent” case—Civil Case 0009—or “of the whole family of
cases.”161 To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases
warrants the taking of judicial notice.
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner
cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve only a
single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the
courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is obviously
obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself
admits that the
_______________
There are exceptions to this rule. Thus, as noted by former Chief Justice
Moran:
In some instance[s], courts have taken judicial notice of
proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection with
the matter in controversy. x x x
Moreover, appellants’ objection to the action of the trial court on this
matter is merely technical because they do not dispute the fact that appellant x
x x, who instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the
application in Land Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration of the same
parcel of land which application was denied by the court x x x. It may
therefore be said that in the two cases there is not only identity of subject
matter but identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the trial court did
not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
161 Petitioner’s Reply with Manifestation (to respondent Enrile’s Comment)
enumerates the various “family member” cases which arose from the present and
main case, Civil Case No. 0009.
162 De los Angeles v. Hon. Cabahug, et al., 106 Phil. 839 (1959); Lewin v.
Galang, etc., supra note 160; and Tiburcio, et al. v. People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation, et al., supra note 160.
163 Lewin v. Galang, etc., supra; and Tiburcio, et al. v. People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation, et al., supra.
216

present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood,

involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the
petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by
indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case,
which was presumably found competent and relevant in another
case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the
duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the
court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks,
instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the
petitioner’s attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v.
Sandiganbayan:164
“Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense,

tradition and the law, the Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes
as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except those which
have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for
trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon
the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they
rely.” (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the

petitioner’s argument that we should take judicial notice of the Bane
deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of
the petitioner’s 3rd motion—the Motion to Admit Supplemental
Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)—was a legal
error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the
Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case at the petitioner’s
instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3)
notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must
ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible under the
rules of evidence.165
_______________
164 319 Phil. 387, 389; 249 SCRA 281, 282 (1995).
165 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 47.
217
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 217

VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent

At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent,
quoting the Bane deposition. His covering note states:
“I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so

that the Court and the public will understand what the Bane deposition is all
about.” (underlining added)
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is

in order.
First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The
dissent perfectly identified what is at issue in this case—i.e., the
admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned
with the competence and relevance166 of the evidence, whose
admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the Bane
deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the
Bane deposition (or, to adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether
“Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness”) is not an issue here unless it
can be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent
evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent
insists that “in Philippine Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases
merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are
adjudicated in a single judgment,” citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our
discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response

to the dissent’s position, which we will restate here for emphasis:
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court,

Francisco wrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the
different actions consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if
the different causes of actions involved had originally been joined in a
single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions
until it is va-
_______________
166 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 128, Section 3.
218

cated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further

proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation
discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in
such manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent proceedings therein
be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1
C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the
Corpus Juris Secundum, the following caveat appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where
several actions are combined into one and lose their separate identity and
become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered; second,
where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which
case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where
several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate
character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to
distinguish between these methods of procedure, which are entirely
distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact
which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and
conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
In defining the term “consolidation of actions,” Francisco provided a
colatilla that the term “consolidation” is used in three different senses,
citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court,
p. 348).”
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have

quoted Francisco’s statement out of context. As it is, the issue of the
effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled matter
that requires the approach we did in the majority’s discussion on
consolidation.167
_______________
167 The dissent then compares the proceedings in the Court when cases are
consolidated to support its position that consolidation results in the merger of the
different causes of action. However, it is not exactly appropriate to compare the
consolidation of cases in the Supreme Court with the consolidation ordered by
the Sandiganbayan because the Supreme Court is NOT a trier of facts. First, the
scope of our review is limited generally to “questions of law.” Hence, no issue of
prejudice to other parties can arise should petitions in the Court be consolidated.
Second, unlike consolidated cases in the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan
219
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 219

Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The

dissent then turns to the purpose of consolidation—to “expeditiously
settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases” and
“the simplification of the proceedings.” It argues that this can only
be achieved if the repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with.
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that
since consolidation is primarily addressed to the court concerned to
aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in keeping with
the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what
consolidation would actually bring168 (especially where several
cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In the
present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would
suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the
petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond
joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court—which is not a trial
court—impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal
grounds?
Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues
that even if the consolidation only resulted in a joint hearing or trial,
the “respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition considering
that they were given notice of the deposition-taking.” The issue
here boils down to one of due process—the fundamental reason
why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of cross-
examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible
evidence—especially when read in light of the general rule that
depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in
open court, of a party or witness.
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of
deposition-taking (questioning the reasonableness thereof—an issue
applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the Sandiganbayan
failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s omission worse, the
Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioner’s assertion that the
_______________
itself had, in fact, separately adjudged an incident of Civil Case No. 0130 and
the few other incident cases independent of Civil Case No. 0009.
168 Correctible under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
220

deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus, failed to address

the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently
innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane
deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and
not Africa, are the parties).169 There is simply the absence of “due”
in due process.
Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The
dissent repeatedly misstates that the Sandiganbayan “granted” the
request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan
did not “grant” the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted
that the deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the
complexity of the issues that these consolidated cases have reached.
Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the most
minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to move for
the taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to
make a ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by
respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The
burgeoning omission and failures that have prevailed in this case
cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty of violating
the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities.
The above conclusions, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, are not
only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure involve
technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical
rules deserve. But the resolution of the issues raised goes beyond
pure or mere technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They
involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the
respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in
the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that
these shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They
involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are
founded and which we cannot disregard without flirting with the
violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking the
disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their
evolution.
_______________
169 When it denied Africa's separate opposition.
221
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 221

In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the

Court failed to arrive at a conclusive decision because of a tie vote
(7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in the
re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is
deemed sustained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition
for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez and

Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., I join the opinion of J.A.T. Carpio with the
qualification that the Bane deposition cannot be used against
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile because of his opposition thereto.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., No Part.
Abad, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Villarama, Jr., J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Sereno, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Reyes, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 filed by the Republic
of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), seeking to set aside the Resolution
dated 7 February 2002 of the Sandiganbayan, which denied
petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re:
Deposition of Maurice V. Bane).
_______________
1 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
222

The case pertains to the complaint filed before the

Sandiganbayan by petitioner against private respondents for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages. The
complaint, which was filed on 22 July 1987, was docketed as Civil
Case No. 0009. Civil Case No. 0009 involves, among others, the
shares of private respondents in Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which were allegedly ill-gotten and were
eventually sequestered by the government.2
The issue in this certiorari proceeding concerns the admissibility
of the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, taken primarily for testimony
regarding the interlocutory issue in Civil Case No. 0130, which is
one of the incident cases of Civil Case No. 0009.
Civil Case No. 0130 is a petition for certiorari filed with the
Sandiganbayan by Victor Africa, son of Jose L. Africa,3 who is one
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, against the PCGG. Victor
Africa filed the petition, seeking to nullify the PCGG orders
directing him, among others, to account for his sequestered shares in
ETPI. In a Resolution dated 12 April 1993,4 the Sandiganbayan
ordered the consolidation of the main case, Civil Case No. 0009,
with several incident cases including Civil Case No. 0130.5
On 25 September 1996, in Civil Case No. 0009 in connection
with Incident Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789, petitioner filed
with the Sandiganbayan a Second Amended Notice to Take
Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination.6 On 23
and 24 October 1996, the deposition upon oral examination of
Maurice V. Bane, former director and treasurer-in trust of ETPI, was
taken before Consul General Ernesto Castro at the Philippine
Embassy in London, Eng-
_______________
2 See Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 March 2002, p. 12; Rollo, p. 13.
3 Upon his demise, Jose L. Africa was eventually substituted by his heirs as
defendants in Civil Case No. 0009. Victor Africa is one of the legal
representatives/forced heirs of deceased respondent Jose L. Africa; Sandiganbayan
Resolution issued on 1 April 1998, p. 6; Rollo, p. 336.
4 Promulgated on 15 April 1993.
5 See Sandiganbayan Resolution issued on 1 April 1998, p. 5; Rollo, p. 335;
Records, pp. 6646-6649.
6 Rollo, pp. 68-71.
223
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 223

land. Among the defendants in the main Civil Case No. 0009, only
Victor Africa appeared during the taking of the deposition.
On 22 January 1998, petitioner filed a motion7 praying that it be

allowed to adopt the testimonies of several of its witnesses in
incidental Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130 and 0146, including the
deposition of Maurice V. Bane, as its evidence in the main case,
Civil Case No. 0009. On 1 April 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution, denying in part the motion as regards the adoption of the
testimony on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane (and Rolando
Gapud) as part of petitioner’s evidence in Civil Case No. 0009, “for
the reason that said deponents according to the plaintiff, are not
available for cross examination in this Court by the defendants.”8
On 14 December 1999, petitioner made its Formal Offer of
Evidence consisting of Exhibits “A” to “XX-27.” However, through
oversight, petitioner failed to include among its exhibits the
deposition of Maurice V. Bane. Thus, in its Urgent Motion And/Or
Request for Judicial Notice dated 21 February 2000, petitioner
prayed that it be allowed to introduce as additional evidence the
deposition of Maurice V. Bane, or in the alternative, for the
Sandiganbayan to take judicial notice of the facts established by the
said deposition. On 21 August 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner’s motion. The Resolution stated:
“Allegedly the deposition of Maurice V. Bane was introduced as PCGG’s

evidence in Civil Case No. 0130 (in relation to G.R. No. 107789) which is
an incident of and consolidated with the above-entitled case in connection
with PCGG’s “Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special
Stockholders Meeting for the Purpose of Increasing ETPI’s Authorized
Capital Stock” and the said deposition of Maurice V. Bane is now a part and
parcel of the record of this main case.
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled “What Need Not
Be Proved.” Apparently, this provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider
admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial
or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is
_______________
7Id., at pp. 322-329.
8 See Sandiganbayan Resolution issued on 1 April 1998, p. 6; Rollo, p. 336.
224

mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon

the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or
Request for judicial notice as something which need not be acted upon as
the same is considered redundant.
On the matter of the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, the admission of the
same is done through the ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein the
defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided

by law. Definitely, it is not under Article 129 on judicial notice.”9
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan

denied in a Resolution issued on 3 April 2001. The Resolution
stated:
“In the subject Resolution [issued on 21 August 2000], this Court ruled
that the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice was something
that need not be acted upon as the same was already considered redundant,
the deposition of Bane, having become part and parcel of the record of
this main case since Civil Case No. 0130 is an incident to the same.
This Court further held that the admission of same is done through
ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein defendant is given ample
opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law, and not under
Rule 129 on judicial notice.
WHEREFORE, there being no other issue which merit consideration of
this Court, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.”10(Emphasis
supplied)
On 16 November 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit

Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane), seeking once again the admission of the deposition. On 7
February 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed
Resolution, denying petitioner’s motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
“The only issue that the court is actually called upon to address in the
pending incident is whether or not We should allow plaintiff-movant’s
Supplemental Offer of Evidence consisting of the deposition of Maurice V.
Bane.
_______________
9 Sandiganbayan Resolution issued on 21 August 2000, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 354-355.
10 Sandiganbayan Resolution issued on 3 April 2001, p. 2; Rollo, p. 358.
225
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 225

xxx
Defendants’ Opposition to the pending incident as well as plaintiff’s
Reply to the Opposition gave various reasons why the motion should or
should not be granted. But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of
whether or not plaintiff has already rested its case as to obviate the further
presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-
appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-
examine Bane as to qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross-
examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell on these matters in
view of this court’s Resolution rendered in April 1, 1998 which already

denied the introduction in evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has
become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for
reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or
wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at
this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules
of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was
only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a
motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Bane’s
deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take
judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how can such a
motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the
deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained
finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a
motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a motion
for reconsideration of this court’s 1998 ruling. Hence, the subsequent
motions, including the present incident are deemed moot and academic.”11
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

I vote to grant the petition.
It is important to note that the Second Amended Notice to Take
Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination, filed on
25 September 1996, was after the consolidation of Civil Case No.
0130 with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, through the
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 12 April 1993. This is evident in
the caption of the notice, thus:
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 63, 65-67.
226

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYAN
MANILA
Third Division
Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, CIVIL CASE NO. 0009
-versus- (Incident Case No. 0130
and G.R. No. 107789)
JOSE L. AFRICA, ET AL.,
Defendants.
It should be noted that the late Jose L. Africa, one of the

defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, has been substituted by his heirs,
including his son Victor Africa. Thus, Justice Brion’s statement that
Victor Africa is “plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009”12 is
misleading. Although Victor Africa was not originally impleaded in
Civil Case No. 0009, Victor Africa became one of the substitute
defendants in Civil Case No. 0009 upon the demise of Jose L.
Africa. In fact, Victor Africa, as substitute defendant in Civil Case
No. 0009, has filed with the Sandiganbayan several pleadings13 and
his Offer of Evidence.14
All the defendants of Civil Case No. 0009 were given notice of
the scheduled testimony by oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane.
Furthermore, the notice stated that “[t]he deposition of said witness
shall be used in evidence in Incident Case No. 0130-G.R. No.
107789 as well
_______________
12 Justice Brion’s modified draft Decision, p. 2.
13 Comment cum Opposition, filed on 18 July 2008, SB records (Civil Case No.
0009), Volume 66, pp. 126-136; Rejoinder, filed on 14 September 2009, SB records
(Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 67, pp. 206-210; Comment cum Opposition, filed on
14 September 2009, SB records (Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 67, pp. 212-213;
Memorandum, filed on 8 February 2010, SB records (Civil Case No. 0009), Volume
68, pp. 62-73.
14 Offer of Evidence filed on 14 May 2008, SB records (Civil Case No. 0009),
Volume 65, pp. 539-545; Supplemental Offer of Evidence filed on 4 September 2008,
SB records (Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 66, pp. 242-243.
227
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 227

as in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009.”15 Since notices have
been duly served on all the defendants, those who failed to show up
at the deposition-taking are deemed to have waived their right to
appear and cross-examine the deponent. Indeed, under Section 4,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the deposition “may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the
taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof.” Section
4, Rule 23 reads:
“Sec. 4. Use of depositions.—At the trial or upon the hearing of a

motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so
far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any
party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of

contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of the
taking of the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party
may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by
any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or
(2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
(d) if only part of the deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the
adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the
_______________
15 Underscoring in the original.
228

part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.” (Emphasis
supplied)
Granting that among the defendants in the main Civil Case No.
0009, only Victor Africa is a party to the incident Civil Case No.
0130, still all the other defendants in Civil Case No. 0009 were
given notice of the scheduled deposition-taking. The reason why all
the defendants were given notice of the said deposition-taking was
because at that time, Civil Case No. 0130 was already consolidated
with Civil Case No. 0009 and as emphasized in the second amended
notice, “[t]he deposition of said witness shall be used in evidence
in Incident Case No. 0130-G.R. No. 107789 as well as in the main
case of Civil Case No. 0009.”16
The Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 12 April 1993 which
consolidated the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, with several
incident cases including Civil Case No. 0130, reads:
Republic of the Philippines

SANDIGANBAYAN
Manila
----
THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. 0009
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
VICTOR AFRICA, ET AL.,
Intervenors,
x---------------------------x
_______________
16 Underscoring in the original; boldfacing supplied.
229
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 229

POLYGON INVESTORS AND MANAGERS,

INC.,
Plaintiff,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL.,
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
AEROCOM INVESTORS AND MANAGERS,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
Plaintiffs,
EDUARDO M. VILLANUEVA and
GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
Plaintiffs,
MELQUIADES GUTIERREZ, ET AL.,

Defendants.
x---------------------------x
VICTOR AFRICA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
230

Defendants.
x---------------------------x
TRADERS ROYAL BANK,
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.,
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK,
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
TRADERS ROYAL BANK,
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
x---------------------------x
231
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 231
DOMESTIC SATELLITE
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
GOOD GOVERNMENT AND THE
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST,
Respondents.
x---------------------------x
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE CORPORATION AND
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Plaintiffs,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION Present:
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, HERMOSISIMA, J.,
Defendant. Chairman,
DEL ROSARIO &
DE LEON, JJ.
Promulgated: April 15, 1993
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
DE LEON, J.
Submitted for resolution is the Motion for Consolidation, dated June 22,
1992, filed by the Republic of the Philippines (represented by the PCGG),
through counsel.
The record shows that there is no opposition in the above-entitled
cases to the said motion. It also appears that the subject matters of the
above-entitled cases are and/or may be treated as mere incidents in
Civil Case No. 0009.
232

WHEREFORE, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered

consolidated with Civil Case No. 0009, and shall henceforth be
considered and treated as mere incidents of said Civil Case No. 0009.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, April 12, 1993.17
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Section 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a common

question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The 12 April 1993 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordered

a consolidation of all the cases, not merely a joint hearing or
trial.
Justice Brion maintains that to resolve the issue of the
admissibility of the Bane deposition, the effect of the consolidation
of Civil Case No. 0130 with Civil Case No. 0009 should first be
determined. Justice Brion emphasizes that despite the consolidation,
the two cases remain distinct and separate from each other, such that
a mere notice of deposition taking, even if under the expressed intent
of using the testimony in evidence in the main case, cannot
automatically bind the private respondents who were not previously
heard thereon.
In his modified draft Decision, Justice Brion posits that the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 with several incident cases
including Civil Case No. 0130 is merely a “consolidation for trial.”
On page 31 of the modified Draft Decision, a “consolidation for
trial,” as defined in American jurisprudence is:
“Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires entry of a separate judgment. This type of
_______________
17 SB Records (Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 18, pp. 6646-6649. (Boldfacing supplied)
233
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 233

consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the
parties to one action to be parties to the other.”
In this kind of consolidation, the cases are merely tried together

but a decision is rendered separately in each case.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges
the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are
adjudicated in a single judgment, thus:
“The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the

different actions consolidated into a single action, in the same manner
as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in
a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions
until it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no
further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the

consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action, which
should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all
subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the
parties adjudicated in a single action.”18 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, when consolidated cases are appealed to the Supreme

Court or when the Court orders consolidation of cases, the Justice to
whom the consolidated cases are assigned renders a single decision,
adjudicating all the rights of the parties in the consolidated cases.19
The Chief Justice assigns the consolidated cases to the Member-in-
Charge to whom the case having the lower or lowest docket number
has been raffled.20
_______________
18 2 V. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 352-353 (1973).
19 See Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203
& 180702, 12 April 2011, 648 SCRA 47; Raquel-Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 174986, 175071 & 181415, 7 July 2009, 592 SCRA 169; Grefalde v.
Sandiganbayan, 401 Phil. 553; 348 SCRA 367 (2000).
20 Active Wood Products, Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 Phil. 825; 181 SCRA
774 (1990). Section 5, Rule 9 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court reads:
234

The 12 April 1993 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordered the

consolidation of the incidental cases, including Civil Case No. 0130,
with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009. Unlike a mere order of a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions, the consolidation of actions merges the different ac-
_______________
SEC. 5. Consolidation of cases.—The Court may order the
consolidation of cases involving common questions of law or fact. The Chief
Justice shall assign the consolidated cases to the Member-in-Charge to whom
the case having the lower or lowest docket number has been raffled, subject to
equalization of cases load by raffle. The Judicial Records Office shall see to it
that (a) the rollos of the consolidated cases are joined together to prevent the
loss, misplacement or detachment of any of them; and (b) the cover of each
rollo indicates the G.R. or UDK number of the case with which the former is
consolidated.
The Member-in-Charge who finds after study that the cases do not involve
common questions of law or of fact may request the Court to have the case or
cases returned to the original Member-in-Charge.
The Sandiganbayan has a similar rule regarding the consolidation of cases.

Section 2, Rule XII of the Revised Internal Rules of Sandiganbayan (A.M.
No. 02-6-07-SB dated 28 August 2002) provides:
SEC. 2. Consolidation of Cases.—Cases arising from the same incident
or series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be
consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket
number is raffled.
(a) Before Cases Are Raffled—Should the propriety of consolidation
appear upon the filing of the cases concerned as determined by the Raffle
Committee, all such cases shall be consolidated and considered as one case
for purposes of the raffle and inventory of pending cases assigned to each of
the Divisions.
(b) After Cases Are Raffled—Should the propriety of such consolidation
become apparent only after the cases are raffled, consolidation may be
effected upon written motion of a litigant concerned filed with the Division
taking cognizance of the case to be consolidated. If the motion is granted,
consolidation shall be made to the Division in which the case with the lowest
docket number is assigned. The Division to which the cases are consolidated
shall transfer to the Division from which the consolidated cases came, an
equivalent number of cases of approximately the same age, nature and stage
in the proceedings, with proper notice to the parties in said cases.
235
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 235

tions into one single action. This means that evidence, such as
depositions, taken after the consolidation is admissible in all the
actions consolidated whenever relevant or material. In this case,
since the notice and the deposition-taking was after the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130 with the main case, Civil Case
No. 0009, the deposition could be admitted as evidence in the
consolidated cases.21
The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits,
prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary costs and expenses.22 The consolidation
of actions involving a common question of law or fact seeks to
prevent a repetition of evidence, such that the testimony of witnesses
may be used in all the consolidated cases whenever it is relevant or
material.
In Bank of Commerce v. Perlas-Bernabe,23 the Court ordered the
consolidation of two cases which involve the same focal issue and
require substantially the same evidence on the matter. Similarly, in
Domdom v. Third and Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan,24 the
Court ordered the consolidation of cases in the Sandiganbayan,
where the core element of the cases is substantially the same and the
main witness is also the same. The Court held:
“In Teston v. Development Bank of the Philippines, the Court laid down
the requisites for the consolidation of cases, viz.:
“A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together
where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the
same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same
evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be
consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage
or prejudice the substantive rights of the parties.
_______________
21 It is even held in American jurisprudence that “[w]here two or more actions are
consolidated, a deposition taken in one of them prior to the consolidation is admissible on the
trial of the consolidated action.” (1 C.J.S. 1375)
22 Philippine National Bank v. Gotesco Tyan Ming Development, Inc., G.R. No. 183211, 5
June 2009, 588 SCRA 798; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 497; 403
SCRA 403 (2003).
23 G.R. No. 172393, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 107.
24 G.R. Nos. 182382-83, 24 February 2010, 613 SCRA 528.
236

The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid multiplicity of suits,

to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested
dockets, and to simplify the work of the trial court—in short, the attainment
of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
xxx
In the present case, it would be more in keeping with law and equity if
all the cases filed against petitioner were consolidated with that having the
lowest docket number pending with the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The only notable differences in these cases lie in the date of
the transaction, the entity transacted with and the amount involved. The
charge and core element are the same—estafa through falsification of
documents based on alleged overstatements of claims for miscellaneous and
extraordinary expenses. Notably, the main witness is also the same—
Hilconeda P. Abril.
It need not be underscored that consolidation of cases, when proper,
results in the simplification of proceedings which saves time, the resources
of the parties and the courts and the abbreviation of trial. It contributes to
the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording
the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases before
the courts. Above all, consolidation avoids the possibility of rendering
conflicting decisions in two or more cases which would otherwise require a
single judgment.”25 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
In this case, Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness in the main Civil

Case No. 0009 and the incidental Civil Case No. 0130. In fact, as
pointed out by Justice Brion, in petitioner’s Pre-Trial Brief dated 30
August 1996, petitioner offered to present Maurice V. Bane as one of
the witnesses in the main Civil Case No. 0009. Thus, when
petitioner filed on 25 September 1996 its Second Amended Notice to
Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination, in
Civil Case No. 0009 in connection with Incident Case No. 0130 and
G.R. No. 107789, petitioner emphasized that “[t]he deposition of
said witness shall be used in evidence in Incident Case No. 0130-
G.R. No. 10779 as well as in the main case of Civil Case No.
0009.” In fact, all the respondents were given the chance to be heard
considering that all the defendants of Civil Case No. 0009 were
given notice of
_______________
25
Id., at pp. 535-536.
237
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 237

the scheduled testimony by oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane,

which was taken on 23 and 24 October 1996. This is very clear from
petitioner’s Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr.
Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination, filed on 25 September
1996, in Civil Case No. 0009 in connection with Incident Case No.
0130 and G.R. No. 107789, thus:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYAN
MANILA
Third Division
Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL CASE NO. 0009
-versus- (Incident Case No. 0130
and G.R. No. 107789)
Defendants.
x-------------------------------------------------- x
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF MR.
MAURICE V. BANE UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Pursuant to Rule 2426 of the Revised Rules of Court, notice is hereby
given to defendants Jose L. Africa (deceased) thru his Estate
represented by Victor Africa and Atty. Juan de Ocampo and Atty.

Yolanda Javellana, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos
(deceased) thru his Estate represented by Special Administratrix BIR
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio thru their
counsels on records that Plaintiff thru the undersigned counsel will take
the testimony by oral deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane c/o Cable &
Wireless Plc., 124 Theobalds Road, London WC1X 8RX, England on
October 23, 24 and 25, 1996 at 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., until finished
before the Philippine Consul General in London, England, in his office or in
a suitable place in London or in Wales, England, as may be advised to the
parties.
_______________
26 Now Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
238

The purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify

and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit hereto attached as
Annex “A” so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of plaintiff
and/or establish prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of
Eastern’s Class A stock in support of the “Very Urgent Petition For
Authority To Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting For the Sole Purpose
of Increasing Eastern’s Authorized Capital Stock” (Incident Case No.
0130 – G.R. No. 107789). The deposition of said witness shall be used in
evidence in Incident Case No. 0130-G.R. No. 107789 as well as in the
main case of Civil Case No. 0009. (Underscoring in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
In his modified draft Decision, Justice Brion maintains that

respondents’ notice of the taking of the Bane deposition is
insufficient waiver of their right to appear and cross-examine the
deponent when they failed to show up at the deposition-taking.
Justice Brion insists that respondents “cannot be bound by the taking
of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their
right to cross-examine.”27
I disagree. The 12 April 1993 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan,
ordering the consolidation of the incidental cases, including Civil
Case No. 0130, with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, effectively
merged the different actions into one single action. The
consolidation of the cases was meant to expeditiously settle the
interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases. The
simplification of the proceedings with the aim of affording the
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases
before the courts can be achieved when repetition of the same

evidence or presentation of identical witnesses is dispensed with.
This means that evidence, such as depositions, taken after the
consolidation is admissible in all the actions consolidated whenever
relevant or material. In this case, since the notice and the deposition-
taking was after the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130 with the
main case, Civil Case No. 0009, the deposition could be admitted as
evidence in the consolidated cases. This Court has even held in Yu,
Sr. v. Basilio G. Magno Construction and Devel-
_______________
27 Justice Brion’s modified draft Decision, p. 47.
239
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 239

opment Enterprises, Inc.28 that in consolidated cases, “[t]he evidence

in each case effectively became the evidence of both, and there
ceased to exist any need for the deciding judge to take judicial notice
of the evidence presented in each case.” Besides, even assuming that
the 12 April 1993 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan merely ordered a
joint hearing or a “consolidation for trial,” private respondents are
still bound by the Bane deposition considering that they were given
notice of the deposition-taking. The evidence adduced in a joint trial
binds all the parties. Otherwise, what would be the point of holding
a joint trial if common witnesses have to be presented again in each
of the cases and the same evidence offered again and again?
Precisely, a joint trial aims to prevent repetition of the same or
common evidence and to spare the common witnesses from the
unnecessary inconvenience of testifying on the same issues in
separate proceedings if the cases were not jointly tried. To rule
otherwise is to frustrate the purpose of a joint trial which is to
prevent delay and save unnecessary costs and expense.29
In Tan v. Lim,30 the Court even allowed evidence that has not
been formally offered in a case which was jointly heard with another
case because evidence offered during the joint hearing was deemed
evidence for both cases which were jointly heard. The Court ruled:
“It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules directs the court to
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered and that under
Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after presentation of
testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules would
have convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of evidence in
Civil Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an offer of
evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly heard by the
trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was
adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself
stated that it would freely utilize in one case evidence adduced in the other
only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in Civil Case
No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his testimony since
at the time it was made, the
_______________
28 G.R. Nos. 138701-02, 17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 618, 634.
29 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 240 Phil. 561; 156 SCRA 597 (1987).
30 357 Phil. 452; 296 SCRA 455 (1998).
240

Rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the
witness is called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a
very rigid, technical case as they are devised chiefly to secure and not defeat
substantial justice.”31
Furthermore, Justice Brion posits that in determining the

admissibility of the Bane deposition, not only Section 4, Rule 23
must be considered but also Section 47, Rule 130. The said
provisions read:
“Sec. 4. [Rule 23] Use of depositions.—At the trial or upon the

hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of
the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one
of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of the
taking of the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party
may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by
any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or
(2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
(d) if only part of the deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the
adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the
part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 478-479; p. 482.
241
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 241

Sec. 47. [Rule 130] Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.—

The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given
in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the
adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.” (Emphasis
supplied)
In my opinion, Section 47, Rule 130 does not apply in this case
since the Bane deposition was not taken in a former case or
proceeding. The records show that the Bane deposition was taken
when the cases were already consolidated. Clearly, there is no
“former proceeding” to speak of which would require the
application of Section 47, Rule 130. The Bane deposition was
taken in CIVIL CASE NO. 0009 (Incident Case No. 0130 and
G.R. No. 107789). In fact, in the Second Amended Notice to Take
Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination, filed on
25 September 1996, the title of the case was “REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, versus JOSE L. AFRICA, ET AL.,
Defendants” with case number “CIVIL CASE NO. 0009 (Incident
Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789).” Thus, Justice Brion’s
reliance on Section 47, Rule 130 is misplaced. Besides, even if
Section 47 is applicable, the Bane deposition may still be given in
evidence against the respondents since all of them were given notice
of the deposition, and thus had the opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent had they participated in the deposition-taking. Since
notices have been duly served on all the respondents, those who
failed to show up at the deposition-taking are deemed to have
waived their right to appear and cross-examine the deponent.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan granted the request for the taking
of the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, who was Executive Vice-
President and Treasurer of ETPI from 1974 until his retirement in
1987.32 In October 1996, during the deposition-taking, Maurice V.
Bane was already 72 years old and residing at 1 Ecton Hall, Church
_______________
32 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V. Bane, p. 10; Rollo, p.
89.
242

Way, Ecton, Northants (England).33 Clearly, under Section 4(c)(2) of

Rule 23,34 the deposition of Maurice V. Bane can be used as direct
evidence. In fact, in its Resolutions issued on 21 August 2000 and 3
April 2001, the Sandiganbayan stated that the deposition of Maurice
V. Bane has “become part and parcel of the record of this main
case (Civil Case No. 0009) since Civil Case No. 0130 is an
incident to the same.”
A cursory reading of the Bane deposition, which took two days
to complete and covers 211 pages of the transcript of record of the
proceedings and the testimony, reveals that it is a critical and vital
evidence in the case of petitioner against private respondents with
regard to its allegation in Civil Case No. 0009 that private
respondents’ shareholdings in ETPI were illegally purchased and
rightly belongs to the Government.
The testimony of the witness, Maurice V. Bane, was offered for
the following purposes:
“[I]n general the testimony is offered to prove that the Class A

stockholdings in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines Inc, or “Eastern”
for short, otherwise referred to as the Filipino 60% equity, is ill gotten in
nature; that the actual and/or beneficial owner of said shares was the late
President Ferdinand Marcos; and that accordingly, said shares are subject to
reversion
_______________
33 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V. Bane, p. 8; Rollo, p. 87.
34 Sec. 4. [Rule 23] Use of depositions.—At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or
an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the
rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the
taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the
following provisions:
xxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is
out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; (Emphasis supplied)
243
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 243

and/or forfeiture in favor of the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines in this

case. Specifically, the testimony is offered to establish the environmental
facts and attendant circumstances surrounding the formation and
organization of Eastern in 1974; that there was duress and/or compulsion
exerted upon Cable & Wireless and its wholly owned subsidiary, the Eastern
Extension Australasia Telegraph Company, of which the witness was the
then General Manager in the Philippines, such that Cable & Wireless and
Eastern Extension Australasia were forced or compelled to give up their
legitimate business activities in the Philippines which was 100% British
owned in favor of Eastern, which was to be newly organized as a 60/40
Filipino company, with 40% being for the account of the company of the
witness, Mr. Bane.”
In short, the witness will establish in these proceedings that President
Marcos and/or his emissaries or parties acting on his behalf gave the witness
only two possible options which was: (1) a 40% equity in the company to be
newly organized, which is Eastern in exchange for surrendering all of the
assets and franchise of Eastern Extension Australasia; or 100% of nothing,
meaning that if the witness and his company refused to give up their
legitimate business in the Philippines then Marcos made it clear that there
will be no more Eastern Extension Australasia that would be operating in
the Philippines.
Lastly, the testimony is offered to prove the ownership issue that is
involved in this case in favor of the Plaintiff, and also support the pending
petition of Eastern Telecoms to increase its authorized capital stock from the
present 250 million pesos to 4 billion pesos by allowing the PCGG to vote
the sequestered Class A stock in the company. Hence, the testimony will
establish the prima facie factual foundation for maintaining the
sequestration of the Class A stock.”35
In the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, he identified and affirmed

his Affidavit36 dated 9 January 1999. Excerpts from Bane’s
testimony
_______________
35 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V. Bane, pp. 8-9; Rollo,
pp. 87-88.
36 AFFIDAVIT
I, MAURICE V. BANE, of legal age married, a British [words missing from
photocopy], and with business address at Eastern Telecommunications [missing
words] Inc., Telecoms Plaza, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati, Manila, after being duly
sworn, do hereby depose and say,
244
during the deposition-taking are as follow:
_______________
1. I am presently the Senior Adviser of Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc. (“ETPI”), a Philippine corporation duly registered and authorized to engage in
the business of telecommunications in the Philippines since 1974;
2. Until my retirement, I served as the representative of Cable and Wireless,
Ltd., (“C&W”) a British company that presently owns 40% of the outstanding capital
stocks of “ETPI”, “C&W”, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Eastern Extension
Australasia and China Telephone Co., (“EEATC”), was formerly the sole owner and
operator of the franchise that is now owned and held by “ETPI”. The company has
been operating in the Philippines since 1880 initially under a royal decree from Spain.
Following the Pacific War in 1945, the franchise was renewed in 1952 by the
Philippine Government under then President Elpidio Quirino;
3. In the late 60’s the possibility of establishing earth satellite stations in the
Philippines arose as a result of heavy pressure from the U.S. Military who were to be
its major users. Many companies and consortiums, including “EEATC” bidded for the
contract. Then President Marcos finally awarded the contract together with the
franchise to the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corp. (“POTC”) which at
that time was relatively unknown in the international communications industry. The
prime movers of “POTC” were Messrs. Potenciano Ilusorio, Honorio Poblador,
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. and Roberto S. Benedicto, who were all known Marcos
associates. This group became very much a part of the Philippines
telecommunications scene.
4. “EEATC” forged a partnership with “POTC” for the establishment of a
tropospheric scatter system communications with Taiwan. A franchise, Oceanic
Wireless Network, Inc. was purchased and all government approvals were obtained
by Messrs. Nieto and Ilusorio. The system was installed and during its inauguration,
the principal guests were President and Mrs. Marcos, showing perhaps the political
influence of Nieto and Ilusorio.
5. When President Marcos declared Martial Law in September 1972, it was clear
that his grip on the country was virtually complete. “C&W” was fully aware of its
uneasy tenure in the Philippines. In March 1973, then Secretary of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile called us to a conference at Camp Crame. I attended the said
meeting together with the representatives of RCA and Globe Mackay. Secretary
Enrile firmly told us that we had until July, 1974 to organize ourselves into 60/40
corporations with Filipino majority ownership and, if we did not comply, the
Government would take the necessary action.
6. I pointed out that “EEATC” was not covered by the Laurel-Langley Act since
we were a British corporation with a fully constitutional franchise. Secretary Enrile
said that if we did not comply with his directive, there would be no more “EEATC”;
245
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 245

MR. LIM: Mr. Bane, paragraph 2 of your affidavit refers to a company ETPI, the
acronym in letter “ETPI.” May I ask you, sir, what is ETPI?
_______________
7. While we might have legal and valid grounds to contest the directive, under the prevailing martial law
restrictions we had little recourse but to comply. After considering all economic and political factors, it
was felt that some form of partnership with the POTC group would be the most advantageous option;
8. Prior to the above, discussions had been held with Ilusorio and Poblador, who then appeared in charge
of POTC – discussions were generally unsatisfactory since it was quite hard to pin Ilusorio down and
we gained the impression that they wanted us to give them their participation in “EEATC” with
minimal monetary consideration in return for political protection;
9. In approximately April/May 1973, rapid changes took place in POTC. Ilusorio and Poblador appeared
to have lost their control in POTC and Nieto emerged as the controlling figure. We learned much later
that this was upon the instructions of President Marcos. Thus, discussions concerning “EEATC” were
continued with Nieto;
10. The time factor was important with July 1974 over the horizon and it was agreed to call a meeting
with the accounting group of SyCip, Gorres and Velayo as intermediary. At the said meeting, we found
that Atty. Jose Africa was the main representative of Nieto/POTC. He had previously not seemed a
major figure in the group although he had attended several board meetings of Oceanic Wireless. Africa
quickly spelt out the rules – that they were interested in the proposition and that we were to deal only
with the DAN group (composed of Roberto Benedicto, Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr.). We were
informed that this was at the express wish of President Marcos who had appointed their group to
control the telecommunications interests;
11. Negotiations were thereafter commenced with Mr. Eduardo M. Villanueva of SGV as intermediary,
David West and W. H. Davies were the major “C&W” participants. We also requested Atty. Luciano
Salazar Law Office to represent us on legal matters;
12. The figure eventually negotiated for the assets (net book value only and no good will) was Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) on the basis of which the BAN group will put up Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00). Further meetings took place to finalize the details but Africa later informed us that
they could not raise the required amount. As a compromise, he suggested that the new corporation raise
a bank loan from which “C&W” could be paid. While we were not happy with this arrangement, we
resigned ourselves to the fact that we would have to accede. It was agreed that stockholders’
contribution would be Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) plus a bank loan of Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00) to cover asset payment and working capital. Africa then advised that they could only
raise
246

A That’s Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Incorporated.

Q ETPI and Eastern refer to the same company, which is Eastern Telecoms or the
full name thereof, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc?
A That’s correct, yes.
Q Again, your Honor, for consistency in the proceedings, instead of ETPI, the
questions and the answers will refer to “Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc” as simply “Eastern.” Paragraph 2 also of your affidavit refers
to “EEATC.” Please, sir, tell us, Mr. Bane, what position, what particular
position you held in EEATC when it was operating in the Philippines?
A I was the general manager.
Q Was that the highest position in the Philippines? Was that the highest office in
EEATC in the Philippine operation?
_______________
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and “C&W” could loan them Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Again, we were unhappy but again we complied;
13. All the necessary documents, articles, by-laws and stockholders agreements were drawn up by the
Salazar Law Office. Of particular delicacy was the issue of franchise. It was decided that the old
franchise should be retained in all detail but this was to be transferred to a new company to be called
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Atty. Salazar drafted the Presidential Decree for the
transfer of the franchise. The draft was personally delivered to Nieto who committed to secure
President Marcos’ approval and signature. True enough, Marcos signed the P.D. Drafted by Atty.
Salazar in its entirety, without any revision or amendment. This was convincing evidence of the
political power and influence of the BAN group;
14. After complying with all the registration requirements and other government regulations, “ETPI”
commenced to fully operate as a telecommunications company under its new franchise in August 1974;
15. I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts in order to elucidate on the
events and circumstances that led to the transfer of the assets and franchise of “EEATC” in favor of
“ETPI” and the emergence of BAN group thereat.
Affiant further sayeth naught.
09 January 1991, Makati, Metro Manila.
(signed)
MAURICE V. BANE
Affiant
247
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 247

A Yes, it was, yes, the British terminology for these things quite often is that we
always used to refer to “managers” but the American terminology, of course,
is usually “president” it was the equivalent of.
Q Thank you, sir. Now, just for clarity can you elaborate on what was EEATC in
relation to Cable and Wireless or C&W?
MR. AFRICA: He has already answered, your Honor.
A Yes, it was a wholly, 100% owned subsidiary of Cable and Wireless.37
xxx
Q x x x Mr. Bane, I would refer you back to paragraph 3 of your affidavit, sir. I
noted from your narration in paragraph 3 that the earth satellite stations
contract which you had just explained was awarded after bidding by President
Marcos to a company you mentioned here which is Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation, or POTC. My question is: do you know this
POTC, what was it?
A Yes, it was the - - I think I’m correct in saying - - it was the management arm
of Philcomsat. Philcomsat, Philippines Telecommunications Satellite
Corporation. POTC, well the managers of Philcomsat, and I understand that

the shareholders were the same in each case.
Q In this paragraph, sir, you stated in reference to Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation or POTC that it was “relatively unknown in
the international telecommunications industry.” Could you explain that?38
xxx
A Well, there were some, I should imagine, some ten or twelve companies were
bidding or hoping to be awarded the earth station contract. Among those was
my own company, Eastern - - EEATC. We had not heard of, any of us: RCA,
ITT, the large number of other domestic companies such as Clavicili and
others, were all bidding for this earth station and none of us had heard of
POTC until it suddenly emerged that it was a company that had been
_______________
37 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V. Bane, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 95-96.
248

formed and that very shortly after our bids all went in, we heard that it had been,
that the contract had been awarded to Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation.
Q Thank you, sir. (Off the record) May I proceed, your Honor? Did you find out
who were the people behind POTC?
A Yes.
Q And who were they?
A To the best of my recollection the incorporators were Potenciano Ilusorio,
Honorio Poblador, Ambassador Nieto, Ambassador Benedicto, and I think
there were two other gentlemen, one of them I think was the brother in law of
Mr. Nieto and the other one I cannot recall - - no, I can’t recall his name. He
died fairly soon after, I think, that was formed.39
xxx
MR. LIM:Mr. Bane, you mentioned personalities like Potenciano Ilusorio, Honorio
Poblador, Manuel Nieto Jr., Roberto Benedicto. My question to you, sir, is:
what was your personal impression of these gentlemen vis-a-vis, for instance,
the Marcos administration?
AWell, it was common knowledge among the expatriate, senior expatriate
community that these gentlemen were close associates of President Marcos.
MR. AFRICA: May I also object again, your Honor please, to the statement of
the witness. Again, it’s not a statement of fact but only a matter of discussion
among his co-workers, but facts again are different from what his perception
was.
MR. LIM: That is noted, your Honor.
CONSUL GENERAL: That is noted, Mr. Africa.
MR. LIM: Mr. Witness, was this group of people, these gentlemen or
personalities that you have mentioned, do you know if they were later on
identified with any particular business or industry sector in the Philippines?

A Yes, they were identified with telecommunication interests.
Q Was there an occasion when your own company, EEATC, forged a partnership
or business with POTC?
_______________
249
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 249

A Yes, there was.

Q What was the business that the two companies forged or engaged in?
A That business was to establish a tropospheric scatter system between the
Philippines and Taiwan. In actual fact, it was three companies involved: it was
POTC and also Western Union International in the United States, and Eastern
Extension or EEATC.
xxx
Q So that tropospheric scatter system became operational?
A Oh yes, yes.
Q Do you know if the system was inaugurated?
A It was, yes.
Q Who were the principal guests during the inauguration?
A President and Mrs. Marcos.
Q Now what technical qualification did your company, EEATC, have to operate
that tropospheric scatter system?
A In addition to being a 20% stockholder, my company was appointed as
managers. Eastern, with the backing of Cable & Wireless, was able to provide
all the necessary technical expertise for the implementation and operation of
the system. Cable & Wireless as such has done these systems, a large number
of these systems worldwide, so we had all the experience necessary.
Q At that time, meaning at the time this tropospheric scatter system was
established, what was your company then, what was your company at that
time?
A Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph.
Q EEATC?
A EEATC.
Q If you don’t mind, sir, kindly refer to that as EEATC instead of Eastern. What
technical qualification did POTC have to be able to be EEATC’s partner in
this tropospheric system business?
A To the best of my knowledge little or no technical qualification.40
xxx
_______________
250
Q Now Mr. Bane, let me now take you to paragraph 5 of your affidavit and if I
may read to you, sir. Paragraph 5: When President Marcos declared Martial
Law in September 1972, it was clear that his grip on the country was virtually
complete. C&W was fully aware of its uneasy tenure in the Philippines. In
March 1973, then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile called us
to a conference at Camp Crame. I attended said meeting together with the
representatives of RCA and Globe Mackay. Secretary Enrile firmly told us
that we had until July 1974 to organize ourselves into 60/40 corporations with
Filipino majority ownership and, if we did not comply, the Government would
take the necessary action. First of all, please explain and elucidate on your
statement “C&W was aware of its uneasy tenure in the Philippines.”
A Well, prior to Martial Law we were operating quite comfortably as a company,
but with the implementation of Martial Law there was great deal of
uncertainty as to what might happen in the country under Martial Law. In
other countries it had been known that things were, shall we say, nationalized
or taken over and, of course, there was a certain degree of unease among us
when we discussed in the Cable & Wireless that something similar might
happen in the Philippines.
Q Now you made mention in this paragraph that I read of other companies,
namely RCA and Globe Mackay. What were these companies?
A They were similar to EEATC, operating in exactly the same fashion, doing the
same type of business, all three of us were competing against each other for
international business.
Q Do you know the nationality of RCA and Globe Mackay?
A They were both 100% American corporations.
Q Whereas EEATC was, according to you, 100% British?
A That is correct, yes.
Q Except for that difference in the nationality the three of you, meaning EEATC,
RCA and Globe Mackay, were engaged in the same kind of business which
was telecommunications in the Philippines?
A Correct.
xxx
251
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 251

Q Now, can you remember where in Camp Crame this meeting took place?
A Yes, it was in a fairly large boardroom. I would imagine the table was large
enough to accommodate about 16 people. I had the impression that it was the
board room perhaps attached to the Secretary of Defense’s office in Camp
Crame.
Q Now, was it actually Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile who met
with you?
A Yes, it was.
Q In person?
A In person.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your affidavit which is a reference to what transpired in
that meeting, you stated, and I would like to quote the short sentence in
paragraph 6: “I pointed out that - - “ I withdraw the question. Mr. Witness,
what transpired in this meeting with Secretary Enrile? In other words, why did
he call you together with RCA and Globe Mackay people to a meeting?
A Well, he said, as far as I can recall and after all it’s a long time ago, he recalled
that the meeting was to in effect spell out the rules in terms of
telecommunications. He pointed out to RCA and ITT that under the Laurel-
Langley Act, which was due I think in July 1974 to expire, that they would
have to go 60% Philippine ownership. I think that I’m pretty sure that Mr.
Voss or his lawyer did say that their franchise in actual fact was established in
1924 and therefore it fell without, beyond the Laurel-Langley Act, but I seem
to recall that Attorney Enrile said that that’s not germane, you will go 60/40.
He also said to us, EEATC, that you will go 60/40.
xxx
MR. LIM: x x x My question, sir, is: what exactly did Secretary Enrile tell you,
and I refer to your person, and your lawyer who was with you, Attorney
Luciano Salazar?
A After he dealt with RCA and Globe Mackay, I said to him: well, the Laurel-
Langley Act does not apply to EEATC; we are 100% British corporation, our
franchise goes back to 1880 and we were the first company, actually, to
connect the Philippines to the outside world in communications, granted by
Queen Isabella of Spain, I think, and after the War, the Second World War, the
252

franchise was renewed by President Quirino in 1952, I think it was.

xxx
Q You mean to tell the court that Secretary Enrile also included your company
EEATC to be made 60/40?
A Oh yes.
Q Now, your companion, Attorney Luciano Salazar, did he say anything to Mr.
Enrile?
A Yes, he did.
Q What was his remark or explanation if any?
A He said that the franchise was perfectly constitutional and that Mr. Bane was
quite correct and that legally there was no reason for Eastern to go 60/40.
Q When you say now, just now Eastern you are referring to EEATC?
A EEATC, yes.
xxx
MR. LIM: Did Secretary Enrile respond favorably to the explanations of
Attorney Salazar?
A No, he did not. He said that if EEATC did not move to a 60/40 position then
there would be no EEATC.
xxx
Q What options did Secretary Enrile give you during this meeting?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor please, which is that Secretary Enrile
is the best witness for this particular aspect.
MR. LIM: Same request for - - subject to a court ruling later.
A Two options really: to become 60/40 Filipino corporation or to, in effect, have
100% of nothing, because there would not be any EEATC.41
xxx
MR. LIM: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Bane, we ended your testimony with your
confirmation that the events narrated in paragraph 7 up to paragraph 14 of
your affidavit all transpired after that meeting in March 1973 with Secretary
Enrile, so my question now
_______________
41 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V. Bane, pp. 26-31, 33, 35; Rollo, pp. 105-110, 112,
114.
253
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 253

is: in particular what followed after that meeting with Secretary Enrile, was
the formation and organization of Eastern in 1974?
A Mmm.
Q Is that correct?
A Well, yes, the events really were I had to advise Cable & Wireless Hong Kong,
who were very closely connected with the Philippines, of the situation and I
said we had no alternative but to go to a 60/40 corporation. It was decided that
I should come back to London and discuss it with the directors of Cable &
Wireless in London. Also, we were asked at the meeting, which perhaps I
forgot earlier on, by Secretary Enrile for progress reports of moving to 60/40
corporation. So I wrote a letter to Secretary Enrile and said that we were now
actively planning and that I had already spoken to one or two other
telecommunication corporations but that I had to return to London to discuss it
with my senior directors. It was difficult at that time because it was Martial
Law. No people were allowed to leave the Philippines so, through that letter, I
made an application to leave and I was granted leave to come back to the UK
to discuss with Cable & Wireless the formation of a 60/40 corporation.
Q Eventually, after clearing all those hurdles, after doing all the groundwork, I
mean after passing through all the groundwork and the details, eventually
what transpired was the organization of Eastern in 1974 as a 60/40 Filipino
corporation?
A That is correct, yes.
Q And the 40% or minority equity was taken by your company, Cable &
Wireless?
A Correct, yes.
Q Mr. Bane, would you, and I refer to your person, have agreed to divest of
100% British owned EEATC if pressure was not exerted on you by Secretary
Enrile?
MR. AFRICA: Objected to, your Honor please, no relevance.

MR. LIM: I am asking the witness for his answer to the basic facts that now
present themselves as a result of the previous testimony.
MR. AFRICA: The same objection, your Honor. It calls for a personal opinion.
254

MR. LIM: Subject to the court’s ruling may I ask the witness to answer? May I
repeat the question, sir? Would you, and I refer to you person, have acceded or
agreed to divesting yourself of 100% British owned EEATC in favor of only
40% equity in a new corporation, if pressure was not exerted on you by
Secretary Enrile?
A No, I would not; I would have continued with EEATC as 100% British
Corporation. You see, you have to appreciate that I had all the resources and
all the backing and all the financial support of Cable & Wireless who were the
largest telecommunications operator in the world. We could have quite easily
– and I know that finance would have been available from them – we could
have quite easily continued as 100% British corporation.
Q Would Cable & Wireless, your own company, have agreed to the divestment of
100% British owned EEATC if pressure was not exerted by Secretary Enrile?
A No, I don’t think they would.
xxx
MR. LIM: In other words, you are saying that had it not been for that fateful
meeting with Secretary Enrile and the pressure was brought to bear on your
person and your company you would not have agreed to organizing Eastern in
1974?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor, please, calling for an opinion and a
conclusion.
A No, I would not.
MR. LIM: And the same thing is true with your company, C&W, there would
have been no permission or approval from C&W?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor, please.
A No, they would not.
MR. LIM: And when you say no, you would not, you are saying that your person
and C&W would not have agreed to divesting EEATC of 100% British
control?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor, please.
A Correct.
MR. LIM: He said “That’s correct.” Did you, and I refer to your person, or
Attorney Salazar check or try to find out if Secretary Enrile was acting for
President Marcos in reference to this March 1973 meeting?
255
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 255

A No, no we didn’t. It was under Martial Law and I mean when you spoke of
President Marcos you spoke of Secretary Enrile, they were the two very close
people. Martial Law, after all, was declared as a result of an apparent
attempted assassination on Secretary Enrile. There was no point in us trying to
appeal to President Marcos. We had to accept that what Secretary Enrile said
was in effect President Marcos.42
xxx
MR LIM.: Now, subject to the same request for a later ruling from the court, do I
understand it, Mr. Bane, that initially you were talking to Ilusorio and
Poblador?
A That’s correct.
Q But later in the negotiations the two were out and you were now just talking to
Mr Nieto?
A Not just to Mr. Nieto; we were also talking to Attorney Jose Africa.
Q So let me clarify that. After the Enrile meeting and because of your decision to
just go along with what Enrile wanted, there was this process set into motion
to organize a new outfit and at the start you were talking to Ilusorio and
Poblador, is that right?
A Correct.
Q Later on, and this was before Eastern was organized, you continued the
negotiations, this time with Ambassador Manuel Nieto junior and Attorney
Jose L. Africa, is that correct?
A Correct.
Q Now, there is a statement in paragraph 9: “We learned much later that this was
upon the instructions of President Marcos.” Who told you that President
Marcos had issued the instruction to be dealing with Nieto?
MR. AFRICA: Objected to, your Honor, asking for –
MR. LIM: I am asking the source of the statement.
MR. AFRICA: My objections, I am just putting it on record: objected to for
asking for hearsay evidence.
MR. LIM: Subject to a later ruling, your Honor.
_______________
256

A It was either Ambassador Nieto or Attorney Africa.

Q Now, I show you paragraph 10 of your affidavit which is continued, I am sorry
I show you paragraph 10, I draw your attention to paragraph 10 of your
affidavit which is found on page 4. Do you confirm and ratify in particular
what is stated in paragraph 10 of the affidavit?
MR. AFRICA: Subject to question and answer later on, your Honor, please.
A Yes.
MR. LIM: Thank you, sir. May I request, your Honor, that the entire paragraph
10 be sub marked as Exhibit C-12-C-1 and that the last sentence therein
reading: “Africa quickly spelt out the rules – that they were interested in the
proposition and that we were to deal only with the BAN group (composed of
Roberto Benedicto, Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr.,). We were informed
that this was at the express wish of President Marcos who had appointed their
group to control telecommunications interests;” that that particular sentence
be now underscored but same would be part of C-12-C-1 which is the entire
paragraph 10, but the last sentence I request that it be underlined or
underscored for emphasis. (Marked)
Q What participation did you have in the organization of Eastern?
A I was very deeply involved, together with our director from London, Wilfred
H. Davies and also our finance director, David West.
Q Were you one of the incorporators of Eastern?
A I was, yes.
Q Did you sign the Articles of Incorporation of Eastern?
A I did.
Q Would you have agreed to be one of the incorporators of Eastern and signed its
Articles if no pressure was exerted on you by Secretary Enrile?
MR. AFRICA: Objected to, your Honor, please.
MR. LIM:I request an answer for the same reason.
A No, I don’t think I would.
Q What is that, Mr Bane?
A No, I would not, no.
257
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 257

Q You are telling the honorable court that your agreeing to incorporate Eastern
and your having signed the Articles of Eastern was the result of that pressure
during the Enrile meeting in March of 1973?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor.
A Yes, that is correct, because we would have continued as 100% British
corporation. So the pressure was brought to bear upon us to go to a 60/40
corporation.
MR. LIM: I notice from the Articles of Incorporation of Eastern that you are the
Treasurer in Trust, that you were the Treasurer in Trust, meaning the Treasurer
upon the incorporation of Eastern?
A Yes, that’s true.43
xxx
MR. LIM: That is the tenor of the affidavit. Just to satisfy that concern I will
rephrase the question. Do you know what happened to the assets of EEATC
when Eastern was incorporated on June 10, 1974?
A Yes, Eastern purchased all the assets of EEATC.
Q I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 12 of your affidavit which I
read: “The figure eventually negotiated for the assets (net book value only and
no good will) was ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) on the basis of which
the BAN group will put up six million pesos (P6,000,000.00). Further
meetings took place to finalize the details but Africa later informed us that
they could not raise the required amount. As a compromise, he suggested that
the new corporation raise a bank loan from which ‘C&W’ could be paid.
While we were not happy with this arrangement, we resigned ourselves to the
fact that we would have to accede. It was agreed that stockholders’
contribution would be five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) plus a bank loan of
seven million pesos (P7,000,000.00) to cover asset payment and working
capital. Africa then advised that they could only raise one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) and ‘C&W’ could loan them two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00). Again, we were unhappy but again we complied.” My
question is: do you confirm the correctness of this narration including the
figures mentioned here?
_______________
258

MR. AFRICA: Subject to question and answer, your Honor please, as there are
statements which are of conclusion and/or hearsay.
A Yes, I do confirm that that’s precisely what happened.
MR. LIM: What this one million pesos which was the amount that the Africa
group said they could only raise, what was this one million?
A Well, it was their contribution to the capital of the company.
Q Aside from the one million pesos contribution to the capital of Eastern from
the Filipino group of Benedicto, Africa, and Nieto, do you know if additional
contributions in terms of money were made by them afterwards?
A Well, in as much as that they repaid the loans that C&W granted them out of
the dividends yes, there were in effect contributions, I suppose.
Q How much was the amount of the loan?
A Two million pesos.
Q That two million pesos loan was repaid by the Filipino group out of stock
dividends?
A No, out of – yes, stock dividends, yes, cash dividends.
Q Cash dividends?
A Cash dividends as I recall.
Q Now, aside from that were there any subsequent contributions to the capital of
Eastern from the Filipino group?
A Not as far as I can recall, no.
Q So in terms of cold cash or money, what they contributed initially was only one
million pesos?
A Correct.
Q The loan that they got from C&W of two million was repaid to the company,
or to C&W in terms of the dividends?
MR. AFRICA: Already answered, your Honor.
A Yes, yes, correct.
MR. LIM: Who granted the loan to the Filipino group?
A The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Well, they didn’t grant it to the Filipino
group; they granted it to Eastern.
Q And was there a guarantee made for that loan?
MR. AFRICA: Leading, your Honor please.
259
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 259

AYes, a guarantee was made by Cable & Wireless.

MR. LIM: I request, your Honor, for emphasis that paragraph 12 of the affidavit
which has been read into the record and which has been confirmed by the
witness be bracketed and sub marked as Exhibit C-12-d-1, paragraph 12.
(Marked)
Mr. Bane, would you or your company Cable & Wireless have agreed to that kind
of payment arrangement, which is to pay in dividends, if it were not for the
pressure from Secretary Enrile?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor please.
A No, we would not; it wasn’t, it was not standard business practice in any way
at all. We would not normally have agreed to a condition such as that.
xxx
Q Mr Bane, what was the position of Manuel Nieto Jr. in Eastern after
incorporation?
A He was the President.
xxx
Q Now, Mr Bane, paragraph 13 of your affidavit mentions that: “Attorney
Luciano Salazar drafted the Presidential Decree for the transfer of EEATC’s
franchise to Eastern, that said draft decree was personally delivered to Manuel
Nieto, Jr., who committed to secure President Marcos’ approval and
signature.” Do I take it that this was in 1974 contemporaneously with the
organization of Eastern?
A Yes, it was.
Q You said Manuel Nieto Jr., was the Eastern President?
A That’s correct.
Q Was Mr. Nieto able to secure the approval of President Marcos to the transfer
of EEATC’s franchise to Eastern?
A Yes, he was, it was issued under Presidential Decree.
Q If I show you a copy of that Presidential Decree would you be able to
recognize it in the sense that it refers to your company, the former EEATC, not
former, the EEATC?
A Yes. (Handed)
Q At this point, your Honor, I make of record that this representation has handed
to Mr. Maurice Bane Exhibit C Motion Increase in Capital.
260

A Yes, that is indeed the Presidential Decree.

Q Your Honor, may I make a little correction in my manifestation. What I handed
to the witness is a photocopy of Presidential Decree 48944 with the Exhibit
marking being reproduced as part of the document, the document actually
marked as Exhibit C is now part of the case records. Now, Mr. Witness, please
tell the court whether you had any personal participation in the preparation of
this particular decree PD 489?
A Yes, I did. I consulted with Attorney Salazar. We went through the Eastern
franchise and so to that extent, in putting this together, yes I did co-operate
with Attorney Salazar, although of course Attorney Salazar was the prime
person behind drafting the document.
Q Your affidavit mentions that this was approved by President Marcos in the
entirety of the draft decree as prepared by Attorney Salazar and you, meaning
no correction was made by Malacañang. My question is: what did that convey
to you, meaning the fact that Marcos approved the Presidential Decree drafted
by Attorney Salazar and yourself without revision or amendment?
MR. AFRICA: Objected to, your Honor please, asking for an opinion and a
conclusion.
MR. LIM: That is very relevant, your Honor, the witness having participated in
preparing this.
MR. AFRICA: Anyway, my objection is on the record.
AWell, Mr. Nieto undertook and promised us that he would get the draft
Presidential Decree signed into law by President Marcos.
MR. LIM: And was he able to deliver on his promise?
A He certainly was. You can see the signature on the bottom.
Q Witness referring to –
A I do recognize that signature, yes, as President Marcos’ signature.
Q Your Honor, at this point may I request that this draft – I’m sorry that this copy
of PD 489 be again marked in this deposition pro-
_______________
44 AUTHORIZING “THE EASTERN EXTENSION AUSTRALASIA AND CHINA TELEGRAPH COMPANY, LIMITED” TO
TRANSFER THE FRANCHISE GRANTED TO THAT COMPANY UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 808, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5002, TO THE EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC.
261
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 261

ceedings as Exhibit D Deposition Bane and the signature of President Marcos

at the bottom of page 2 pointed at by the witness be sub marked and bracketed
as D-1 Deposition Bane. (Marked) Mr. Bane, did you also serve as director of
Eastern, one of the directors, I mean, of Eastern?
A Yes, I was for a time, a short period of time.
Q Now, after Eastern’s incorporation in 1974 did you carry on as an officer of
Eastern?
A Yes, I did.
Q What positions?
A Executive Vice President and Treasurer.

Q And as you said this was up to 1987?
A Yes.
xxx
Q Would you have acceded to that kind of set up, meaning having Filipino
partners in the persons of Mr. Nieto and later Attorney Africa if it were not for
the pressure from Secretary Enrile during your March 1973 meeting?
MR. AFRICA: Already answered, your Honor please.
A I can only repeat what I said before, that no, of course I would not.
MR. LIM: Now, during your stint with Eastern in association with Mr. Nieto and
later with Attorney Jose Africa, do you know of instances when President
Marcos intervened on behalf of Eastern, or showed personal interest for
Eastern?
MR. AFRICA: Question is vague and intervene is an all-encompassing word.
MR. LIM: I reform, your Honor. Mr Bane, you said that from 1974 continuously
up to 1987 you were associated with Eastern, you were one of its officers and
you were working with Filipino directors or officers. During this time the
President of the Philippines of course was continuously Mr. Marcos. My
question, sir, is: during your incumbency in Eastern do you know of instances
when President Marcos helped your company obtain correspondenceships, or
in its competition with PLDT?
A Yes, I do, yes.
262

Q In what way did Marcos help Eastern?

A Well, once the company was formed and under the formation of the company
Eastern or Cable & Wireless had a management contract to manage the
company, we could see that telecommunications development was very badly
needed in the Philippines. The satellite earth station had been constructed and
the Tropo had gone in, but there was still a very large demand for circuits. We
therefore devised a plan to put underseas cables, telephone cables, from the
Philippines to Japan, from the Philippines to Hong Kong, Philippines to
Singapore and then latterly Philippines to Taiwan. For that we obviously
needed approvals right at the top, because we were, in effect, in competition
with PLDT. PLDT were really dragging their heels in development, perhaps
because of lack of financing or whatever. So we saw an opportunity to perhaps
establish Eastern as a major player in the Philippines telecommunications. I
therefore drafted a letter which was – what is the word I’m looking for
perhaps – which was fine tuned perhaps is the best word, by Attorney Jose
Africa. And this set out Eastern’s plans for development of submarine cable
systems and everything else, and we asked at the bottom of the letter for
Presidential approval. And this letter was signed by Ambassador Nieto; it was
taken to Malacañang and it was signed, written across the top of the page, I
think the words were just “Approved, President Marcos” so we received
approval, direct approval from President Marcos to proceed with the
implementation of this very big cable project. It meant to say that we had
bypassed the national telecommunications commission under whose authority
this would normally have been submitted, but knowing as we did that with
PLDT’s opposition we probably wouldn’t have got it through the NTC.
Q So it was President Marcos himself who gave the approval for Eastern to
undertake the construction of these submarine cables that you mentioned?
Q And can you tell us the significance of that designation, what happened to
Eastern because it got this project?
A Well, by putting in the submarine cable systems, since we were financing
them, we had to have the approval of, of course, the distant administration – in
this case Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, so one of the benefits that
accrued from this was that we
263
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 263

became a telephone correspondent to these countries. After all, these cables

were very high capacity. I think to Hong Kong they were 1380 telephone
circuits, to Japan 960 telephone circuits, so that what it did it was for the great
benefit of the Philippines. We used the phrase in the letter “to make the
Philippines the hub of telecommunications in South East Asia,” which we
hoped we were going to do and I think to a large extent we did do. The
ultimate benefit to Eastern was quite considerable, it enormously increased
cash flow and of course from that we financed the cables.45
xxx
Q Mr. Bane, you stated that you were with Eastern for 21 years?
Q 21 continuous years.
A With EEATC and with Eastern.
xxx
Q Mr. Bane, were there other stockholders of Class A during this 21 year period?
A The only changes that I was aware of that were made was that Attorney Jose
Africa pointed out to me, after the incorporation, that they wanted to put some
of the stock, or they would put some of the stock in the name of various
companies. He also mentioned that of course they were going to put some
small, a very small minority of shares in the names of family members. That’s
as far as I knew.
Q These companies, what companies were these? Or rather, excuse me sir, rather
what would be the nature of these companies?
A I don’t know, I don’t know what the companies were. I do know the names. I
think Ambassador Nieto’s was Aerocom, was Ambassador Benedicto’s
Universal Molasses, I can’t remember? And then Attorney Jose Africa, I
think, was Polygon.
Q Now having been associated with Manuel Nieto Jr. and Jose L. Africa and also
Mr. Benedicto for many years, did you come to know at any time during that
period of association with them whether President Marcos had any

participation or control in their stockholdings in Eastern?
_______________
264

MR. AFRICA: Please, objected to, your Honor, witness isn’t competent. The best
witnesses would be the persons themselves, not what this witness has been
told.
MR. LIM: If the witness knows, your Honor.
MR. AFRICA: But what he was told, not what is true, or what is true and
correct?
A No, I was not told that President Marcos had a stockholding in Eastern. There
was, of course, speculation among ourselves as to – in a vague sort of way we
often wondered. The only time that I actually knew that President Marcos had
a significant stockholding in Eastern was when, after sequestration,
Ambassador Nieto went on to television and stated on television that I think
first of all he stated something about Philcomsat POTC and he then stated on
television that President Marcos owned 40% of the stock of Eastern. That’s
the only time that I was, I had any direct, shall we say, or had been directly
informed – by television of course – that President Marcos was a
stockholder.46
In the 2006 case of Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan,47 this Court

overturned the ruling of the Sandiganbayan’s Partial Decision and
held that the testimonies through depositions of Campos, Gapud
and de Guzman established the Marcoses’ beneficial ownership of
Prime Holding Incorporated (PHI). The Court ruled that “the
testimonies of Campos, Gapud, and de Guzman, persons who
actually participated in the formation and early years of operation of
PHI, constitute evidence that directly addresses the critical issue.”48
In this case, the deponent Maurice V. Bane was the Executive
Vice-President and Treasurer of ETPI from 1974 until his retirement
in 1987. Maurice V. Bane had personal knowledge of and
involvement in the circumstances leading to the formation of ETPI
in 1974, which is crucial to petitioner’s allegation that private
respondents’ interest in ETPI rightfully belongs to the Government.
To dismiss the Bane deposition as inadmissible based on the tenuous
ground that there
_______________
46 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V. Bane, pp. 76-78; Rollo,
pp. 155-157.
47 515 Phil. 1; 479 SCRA 1 (2006).
48 Id., at p. 46; p. 54.
265
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 265

was no “actual consolidation” of cases is to disregard the obvious

fact that the Bane deposition was taken in CIVIL CASE NO. 0009
(Incident Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789) and that all the
defendants (now private respondents) in Civil Case No. 0009 were
duly notified of the scheduled deposition-taking.
Although petitioner, in its formal offer of evidence in Civil Case
No. 0009, inadvertently omitted the deposition of Maurice V. Bane,
petitioner thereafter filed an urgent motion praying that it be allowed
to introduce as additional evidence the deposition of Maurice V.
Bane. The Sandiganbayan should have granted this motion or the
succeeding Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re:
Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) filed on 16 November 2001. As held
in the 1997 case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division):49
“In all cases involving alleged ill-gotten wealth brought by or against the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, it is the policy of this Court
to set aside technicalities and formalities that serve merely to delay or
impede their judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits before the Sandiganbayan. Substantial justice to all
parties, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly
pursued. Eleven years have passed since the government started its search
for and reversion of such alleged ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution
of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is adequate proof
of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit
conduct, let it be brought out now.”50
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 7 February

2002 should be reversed and set aside. The deposition of Maurice V.
Bane taken on 23 to 24 October 1996, together with the
accompanying documentary exhibits, should be admitted as part of
petitioner’s evidence. I vote to GRANT the petition and REMAND
this case to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Petition dismissed.
_______________
49 G.R. No. 113420, 7 March 1997, 269 SCRA 316.
50 Id., at p. 334.
266

Note.—Lest it be forgotten, the rationale for consolidation is to

have all cases which are intimately related, acted upon by one
branch of the court to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered. (Philippine Airlines, Incorporated vs. Zamora, 564
SCRA 50 [2008])
——o0o——
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4/26/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 662

G.R. No. 152375. December 13, 2011.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

Remedial Law; Distinction between a Final Judgment or Order and an

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 153

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and

something more to be adjudicated upon. The term “final” judgment or order

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 155

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

discovered evidence, the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be

expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.—

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 157

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

absence from jurisdiction—the petitioner’s excuse for the non-presentation

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 159

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

tue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action,

depositions, taken after the consolidation is admissible in all the actions

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 161

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines,

not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No.

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among

During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130,

7 Entitled Victor Africa v. Presidential Commission on Good Government.

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 163

1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed

“WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the

The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 165

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

ing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock” (Urgent Petition). In our

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in

“This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 167

The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty

WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x

IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition

The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st

VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 169

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a

Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is—