Section 6. Time Limit For Trial. - XXX in No Case Shall The

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in criminal cases, the identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a

vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for
the prosecution.1 As held in the case of In People v. Vidad, the Court said:

It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the


particular motive for taking the life of a human being shall be
established at the trial, and that in general when the commission of
a crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even
where the reason for its commission is unknown; but in many
criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the
proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the
mind to indulge in the criminal act. 

However, for more than eight years prosecution yet still failed to present
the essential witnesses as to prove the commission of the crime.

Under section 6 in relation to section 10 of " Republic Act No. 8493,


otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998"

Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. – xxx In no case shall the


entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from
the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall


be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:

xxx

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or


unavailability of the accused or an essential witness.

1
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.SPO1 BERNIE JAMON FAUSTINO G.R. No. 129220
September 6, 2000
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential
witness shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts
are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be
determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential
witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her
whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot
be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or
being returned for trial.

Jurisprudence always tells us that, An accused's right to "have a speedy,


impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. "This right to a speedy trial may be defined
as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its 'salutary
objective' being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety
and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating
historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, the old legal
maxim, 'justice delayed is justice denied' must be reiterated. This oft-repeated
adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal
cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy
trial."32 In Tan v. People,33 the Court made a thorough discussion on the matter,
to wit:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to
whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible
by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,


expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long
in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused,
but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind
that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
x x x x

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a


speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and ( d) Prejudice to the defendant.  x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for
such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State. x x x.34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the right to speedy trial (as well as the right to speedy disposition of cases)
should be understood as a relative or flexible concept such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Pertinently,
this right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements
of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Hence,
in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied such right, the
following factors may be considered and balanced: (a) the length of delay; (b) the
reasons for the delay; (c) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (d) the prejudice caused by the delay.35

Examining the incidents of this case vis-a-vis the aforesaid jurisprudential


parameters in determining the existence of violation of such right, the Court holds
that petitioner's right to speedy trial had been violated.

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