Labour Market Reforms
Labour Market Reforms
Labour Market Reforms
Dr.T.Ramanathan
Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental Economics, School of Economics,
Madurai Kamaraj University, Madurai-625 021.
P. Asirvatham
Ph.D Research Scholar, Department of Environmental Economics, School of Economics,
Madurai Kamaraj University, Madurai-625 021.
P.Raja
Ph.D Research Scholar, Department of Environmental Economics, School of Economics, Madurai
Kamaraj University, Madurai-625 021.
Abstract
It is argued that but for restrictive labour laws that create inflexibility in the labour market,
the Indian economy would have experienced a higher growth of employment. On the other hand, this
view is vehemently contested by trade unions and many other economists. This paper shows that the
Indian labour market is quite flexible despite so-called restrictive labour laws. However, at the same
time, Indian labour laws are so numerous, complex and even ambiguous that they promote litigation
rather than the resolution of problems related to industrial relations. A comprehensive view on
labour market reforms is required, one that addresses the needs of both employers and workers. The
author recommends simplifying and rationalizing the complex and ambiguous extant pieces of labour
legislation into a simple code that allows for labour adjustment with adequate social and income
security for the workers.
Introduction
The framework for producing labour market flexibility was designed to deregulate
the labour market and remove or cut protective regulations [Standing 2002]. The
Washington consensus was based on what Stiglitz (2002) called market fundamentalism. The
basic idea behind this thesis was that free market outcomes are efficient and Pareto
optimal. The free play of market forces results in employment of resource sat the market-
clearing prices; this leads to both efficiency (as almost all resources are employed) and
equity (all are rewarded according to their marginal contribution).
Several other economists [e g, Wilkinson 1992; Sengenberger and Campbell 1994],
however, contest this view with their microeconomic and macroeconomic logic. Their
argument runs as follows. Competing firms may compete either on the basis of reducing
their unit costs by lowering wages and labour standards(“low road to growth”) or by
pushing up productivity with innovation in technology, product design, and organisation
(“highroad to growth”). As long as a firm can continue competing on the basis of low wages
and bad working conditions, there is no motivation to innovate for improving productivity.
Only when the path to competition on the basis of low wages and bad working
conditions is barred by providing a floor of labour standards, the firms can become
enterprising and invest in technological and organizational innovation, which, in turn, leads
to better wages and working conditions. In fact, the absence of a minimum floor of labour
standards would inevitably ensnare the industrial economy in the syndrome of low wage
and low productivity. This is what leads to the “race to the bottom”, which is most
authoritatively brought out in the study by Blanch flower and Oswald (1994).
The study showed that almost all over the world, higher wages are associated with
higher employment; implying that unemployment could be the result of many factors
except high wages. A recent ILO study, based on data collected from162 countries,
concludes that stronger trade union rights do not generally hinder trade competitiveness,
including trade of labour intensive goods, and indeed countries with stronger trade union
rights tend to do comparatively well [Kucera and Sarna 2004].The fact that deregulation of
the labour market, even in most of the advanced capitalist countries, has not been able to
contain high unemployment even after decades of implementation, increasesscepticism
about deregulation and its supposed benefits.
Anyway, the rising tide of militant opposition to labour market deregulation (France
is the most recent case) and reduction of labour standards in several parts of even the
developed world puts a question mark on the rampant deregulation of the labour market.
Review of Literature
Anu V. Thomas 2, J. Sudhakumar (2013) Observations on daily productivity of
subcontract labour and directly employed labour engaged in masonry works on a project
were made to determine the variability in productivity among the labour force and the
causes of the inefficiencies. Productivity plots and statistical tests revealed the
productivity of the subcontract labour to be significantly higher than the productivity of the
directly employed labour.
Dibyendu Maiti and Sugata Marjit (2011) while a large body of researches
discusses the effects of international subcontracting on firm dynamics, the present work
deals with the similar issues of a domestic firm who subcontracts to the informal sector in a
typical developing world. Theoretically, we develop model that if the formal sector wage is
higher than that of informal sector, the choice of informal sector subcontracting and in-
house R&D investment appears to be alternative options to the firm to bypass expensive
labour in the formal sector. We argue that the R&D and labour productivity in formal sector
are highly influenced by the informal wage but not the formal sector one. Since the
subcontracting can raise both supply and demand for informal workers due to a rise of
formal sector wage, the movement of informal sector wage is uncertain and thereby, the
formal sector R&D and labour-productivity are also ambiguous. Thus, countries with a vast
segment of lowly-paid informal workers exhibit lowly-productive formal workers.
Sean Dougherty etal (2011) this study provides plant-level cross-state/time-series
evidence of the impact of employment protection legislation (EPL) on total factor
productivity (TFP) and labour productivity in India. Identification of the effect of EPL
follows from a difference-in-differences estimator inspired by Rajan and Zingales (1998)
that takes advantage of the state-level variation in labour regulation and heterogeneous
industry characteristics. The fundamental identification assumption is that EPL is more
likely to restrict firms operating in industries with higher labour intensity and/or higher
sales volatility. Our results show that firms in labour intensive or more volatile industries
benefited the most from labour reforms in their states.
Research Methodology
The data was collected from secondary sources, previous researches and analyses
of scholars, magazines, as well as National and International journal articles that are
related to the subject, as the study involved an extensive literature review which critically
analyzed.
Objectives
(i) To examine the Organized Versus Unorganized Sector Employment
(ii)To analyse the Employment Growth and Labour Flexibility in India
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis shows that despite all the hue and cry about inflexibility in
the labour market and stringent labour laws, the Indian industry has been adjusting its
workforce, more so after liberalization. This is amply evident from the cotton textile and
garment sectors wherein workers were retrenched on a massive scale during the 1980s and
from the loss of more than one million jobs during the latter half of 1990s in the organized
manufacturing sector.
The recent revolt of young workers in France should alert us to the possibility of
such social unrest anywhere in the name of promoting labour flexibility if “free hire and
fire” sanction is given to employers. This problem can only be tackled if the state
intervenes to ensure the security of income to all workers. India is among those countries
that spend least on social services and social security. China, whose example is often cited
in the context of labour flexibility, adopted a wide range of security of workers before
introducing reforms in the labour market. At the same time the Chinese economy was able
to generate much more jobs than are being generated in India. Though the Chinese workers
suffered, but state actively intervened.
The recently introduced national rural employment guarantee scheme in India is an
important step, but a lot more needs to be done for social and economic security in the
country. A country which is growing at 8 per cent cannot escape from such responsibility.
labour market flexibility can be implemented only alongside economic and social security.
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