Global EV Outlook 2020

Global EV Outlook
2020
Entering the decade of electric drive?
Global EV Outlook 2020 Abstract
Abstract
The Global EV Outlook is an annual publication that identifies and discusses recent
developments in electric mobility across the globe. It is developed with the support
of the members of the Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI). Combining historical analysis
with projections to 2030, the report examines key areas of interest such as electric
vehicle and charging infrastructure deployment, ownership cost, energy use, carbon
dioxide emissions and battery material demand. This edition features case studies on
transit bus electrification in Kolkata (India), Shenzhen (China), Santiago (Chile) and
Helsinki (Finland). The report includes policy recommendations that incorporate
learning from frontrunner markets to inform policy makers and stakeholders that
consider policy frameworks and market systems for electric vehicle adoption. This
edition also features an update on the performance and costs of batteries. It further
extends the life cycle analysis conducted in Global EV Outlook 2019, assessing the
technologies and policies that will be needed to ensure that EV battery end-of-life
treatment contributes to the fullest extent to sustainability and CO2 emissions
reductions objectives. Finally, it analyses how off-peak electricity demand charging,
dynamic controlled charging (V1G) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) could mitigate the
impact of EVs on peak demand, facilitate the integration of variable renewables and
reduce electricity generation capacity needs.
IEA. All rights reserved.
PAGE | 2
Global EV Outlook 2020 Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
The Global EV Outlook 2020 was prepared by the Energy Technology Policy (ETP)
Division of the Directorate of Sustainability, Technology and Outlooks (STO) of the
International Energy Agency (IEA), under the direction of Timur Gül, Head of the ETP
Division. Marine Gorner co-ordinated the analysis and production of the report.
This report was collectively developed by (in alphabetical order): Thibaut Abergel, Till
Bunsen, Marine Gorner, Pierre Leduc, Sarbojit Pal, Leonardo Paoli, Seshadri
Raghavan, Jacopo Tattini, Jacob Teter, Sadanand Wachche and Per-Anders Widell.
Hanjiro Ambrose, Jessica Dunn and Margaret Slattery, from the University of
California Davis, supported with primary research, drafting and other contributions
to Chapter 4. Shahmeer Mohsin (Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble) also provided
valuable contributions.
The development of this analysis benefited from support provided by the following
IEA colleagues: Nicolas Beltran Achury, Hiroyuki Fukui, Maximilian Jarrett, George
Kamiya, Rebecca McKimm, Alison Pridmore, Alan Searl, Siddharth Singh, Lei Xiang,
Chengwu Xu and Xiaotong Yang on the national and regional policy sections in
Chapter 2; George Kamiya on the micromobility and aviation sections in Chapter 1;
Jose Miguel Bermundez Menendez on the fuel cell electric vehicles section in Chapter
1; Zoe Hungerford on Chapter 5.
Mechthild Wörsdörfer, Director of STO, provided encouragement and support

throughout the project. Valuable comments and feedback were also provided by
other senior management and colleagues within the IEA, in particular Keisuke
Sadamori, Laszlo Varro, Apostolos Petropoulos, Julien Armijo and Zoe Hungerford.
The report was edited by Debra Justus.
Sebastián Galarza Suárez (Centro Mario Molina Chile); Alekhya Datta, Ram Krishnan
and Shashank Vyas (TERI); Preet Gill, Scott Moura, Lin Osseiran and Raja Sengupta
(University of California Berkeley); Xiuli Zhang (University of California Davis); Reijo
Mäkinen, Tommi Muona, Marko Paakkinen and Mikko Pihlatie (VTT Finland); Rakhi
Basu, Annika Berlin and Chen Yang (World Bank) and Ivan Jaques (World
Bank/ESMAP) provided essential inputs and review for the development of the
electric bus section in Chapter 2. The members of Project ReCell (EIT InnoEnergy):
Attabik Awan, Anqi Shi, Robin Barkhausen, Gustavo Gomes Pereira, Piotr Grudzień,
Thomas Kürstgens, Sameer Chourasia, Iryna Samarukha, and Jane Christina Irawan,
PAGE | 3
provided inputs, review, and support for the development of Chapter 4. Matteo
Muratori (United States National Renewable Energy Laboratory) provided support for
the development of Chapter 5.
The following individuals have contributed to developing the activities of the Electric
Vehicles Initiative (EVI) on behalf of their governments by providing data and
assistance, and reviewing this report: Ekta Meena Bibra, Carol Burelle, Aaron Hoskin,
Thierry Speiss, Sylvain Roussel and Paula Vieira (Canada); Gabriel Prudencio and
Daniela Soler (Chile); Jiayu You (China), Zheng Yali, Hui Lai Zhang, and Jian Liu
(China); Pentti Puhakka, Mikko Pihlatie and Marko Paakkinen (Finland); Cédric
Bozonnat, Clarisse Durand and Sylène Lasfargues (France); Gereon Meyer and Birgit
Hofmann (Germany); Abhay Bakre (India); Tatsuya Nagai and Yoshinobu Sato (Japan);
Sonja Munnix, Gerben Passier (Netherlands) and Sacha Scheffer (Netherlands);
Mitchel Trezona-lecomte and Nesta Jones (New Zealand); Marianne Dalgard,
Ingeborg Kjærnli, Daniel Thorsell (Norway); Mia Abramsson, Lina Kinning, Martina
Wikström (Sweden); Rob Gould, Bob Moran and Tim Ward (United Kingdom). Other
contributors to data collection include Miranda Lello (Australia); Ricardo Zomer
(Brazil) with the help of Bruno Carvalho Doberstein de Magalhães (GIZ); Baldur
Petursson, Sigurdur Ingi Fridleifsson, Jón Äsgeir H. Porvaldsson and Anna Lilja
Oddsdóttir (Iceland); Alok Ray (Society of manufacturers of electric vehicles, India);
Andi Novianto (Indonesia); Francesco Vellucci (Italy); Hwanjung Jung (Korea);
Huzaimi Omar (Malaysia); Luis Filipe and Olinda Pereira (Portugal); Hiten Parmar
(South Africa); Stephan Walter (Switzerland); Yossapong Lao (Thailand) and Michael
Berube, Steven Boyd and James Miller (United States).
Dan Dorner, Sarbojit Pal, Rui Luo, Ellina Levina and Christian Zinglersen from the
Clean Energy Ministerial secretariat were also instrumental to facilitate the
development of EVI activities and providing relevant inputs to the publication.
Peer reviewers provided essential feedback to improve the quality of the report. They
include:
Xavier Moreau (Altergrids); Ryan Melsert (American Battery Metals); Qiang Dai, Jarod
C. Kelly and Michael Wang (Argonne National Laboratory); Sohail Hasnie (Asian
Development Bank); Robert Spicer (BP plc); Cécile Goubet (AVERE France); Cristiano
Façanha (CALSTART); Mridula D. Bharadwaj (Center for Study of Science, Technology
and Policy); Makoto Dave Yoshida, Tomoya Imazu, Utaka Kamishima, Yasuo
Matsunaaga and Tomoko Blech (CHAdeMO Association); Patrick Jochem (DLR);
Daniel Noll (Edison Electric Institute); Ana Quelhas (Energias de Portugal SA); Huiming
Gong (Energy Foundation China); Céline Cluzel (Element Energy); Chiara dalla Chiesa
(Enel X); James Copping, Panagiota Dilara, Filip Francois, Maurizio Maggiore, Julija
Sakovica and Cesar Santos (European Commission); Viktor Irle and Roland Irle (EV-
PAGE | 4
Volumes); Renske Schuitmaker (Fastned); Patrick Ploetz (Fraunhofer Institute);

Ramón Morales Balcázar (Fundacion Tantí – Observatorio Plurinacional de Salares
Andinos); Charlotte Argue (Geotab); Dennis Knese (GIZ); Mathy Stanislaus and
Jonathan Eckart (Global Battery Alliance); Filippo Berardi and Ming Yang (Global
Environment Facility); Kaoru Horie and Yuichiro Tanabe (Honda); Francisco Laverón
Simavilla (Iberdrola); Nicholas Lutsey and Dale Hall (International Council on Clean
Transportation); Jérôme Sabathier (IFPEN); Cristina Corchero García (IREC); Nicholas
Wagner and Yong Chen (IRENA); Pierpaolo Cazzola (International Transport Forum);
Gen Saito, Hiroyuki Kaneko and Yutaka Fukunaga (Nissan); Kevin Johnsen and Svend
Soyland (Nordic Energy Research); Emma Wiesner (Northvolt); Luca Maiotti and
Benjamin Katz (OECD); Marcello Contestabile (Qatar Environment & Energy Research
Institute); Hannah E. Murdock, Rana Adib and Duncan Gibb (REN21); Christell
Galbrun-Noel (Schneider Electric); Martin Haigh (Shell); Nikola Medimorec (SLOCAT
Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport); Thalis P. V. Zis (Technical
University of Denmark); Naotaka Shibata (TEPCO); Amy Davidsen, Sandra Roling and
James Beard (The Climate Group); Hiroyuki Fukui, Max Parness and Risa Oya (Toyota);
Samuel Karslake (UK BEIS); Fabrice Stassin, Jan Tytgat and Stéphane Levasseur
(Umicore); Rob de Jong and Alexander Koerner (UNEP); James Turnure, John Maples
and Mark Schipper (United States Energy Information Administration); Cabell Hodge,
Jeffrey Logan and Matteo Muratori (United States National Renewable Energy
Laboratory); Sebastián Castellanos, Vishant Kothari, Ryan Sclar and Lulu Xue (World
Resources Institute); Francesco Vellucci, Gerfried Jungmeier and James Miller as
members of the Hybrid and Electric Vehicles Technology Collaboration Programme;
Daniela Soler Lavin, Gideon Friedmann and Magnus Lindgren as members of the
Advanced Motor Fuels Technology Collaboration Programme and members of the
Clean and Efficient Combustion Technology Collaboration Programme.
The development of this report was facilitated by contributions from EVI countries
and the Hewlett Foundation for the co-ordination of the Electric Vehicles Initiative by
the IEA.
PAGE | 5
Global EV Outlook 2020 Table of contents
Table of contents
Executive summary .................................................................................................................. 10

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 33
Electric Vehicles Initiative ...................................................................................................... 34
EV30@30 Campaign .............................................................................................................. 34
Global EV Pilot City Programme ............................................................................................ 35
Drive to Zero Campaign ......................................................................................................... 36
GEF-7 Global Programme on electromobility ....................................................................... 37
Clean Energy Ministerial Horizontal Accelerator for power system integration of EV
infrastructure .......................................................................................................................... 37
Scope, content and structure of the report ......................................................................... 37
Chapter 1. Trends in electric mobility .................................................................................... 39
Electric mobility developments in the 2010s ....................................................................... 39
Electric car market in 2019: Annual growth slows, but market share increases ............... 44
EV markets in 2020: the potential impacts of Covid-19 and government responses ........ 51
Electric mobility trends in other modes ................................................................................ 58
Electric vehicle charging infrastructure deployment .......................................................... 74
References .............................................................................................................................. 78
Chapter 2. Policies and strategies to deploy electric vehicles and charging
infrastructure .................................................................................................................... 86
Electric vehicle policies.......................................................................................................... 86
Industry announcements ...................................................................................................... 132
References ............................................................................................................................ 140
Chapter 3. Prospects for electric mobility deployment to 2030 .......................................... 153
Scenario definitions .............................................................................................................. 153
Electric vehicles .................................................................................................................... 154
Charging infrastructure ........................................................................................................ 164
Impact of electric mobility on energy demand .................................................................. 170
Implications of electric mobility on well-to-wheel GHG emissions ................................... 173
Implications for automotive batteries .................................................................................. 176
References ............................................................................................................................. 181
Chapter 4. Batteries: An essential technology to electrify road transport ........................... 185
Battery technology and performance ................................................................................. 185
Life cycle of automotive lithium-ion batteries .................................................................... 189
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Key messages and policy recommendations ...................................................................... 217

References .............................................................................................................................219
Chapter 5. Integrating electric vehicles with power systems .............................................. 226
Overview ............................................................................................................................... 226
EV charging ........................................................................................................................... 228
Advanced flexibility .............................................................................................................. 233
Impact on electricity distribution systems ......................................................................... 239
Conclusions and policy recommendations ........................................................................240
References ............................................................................................................................ 243
Annexes .................................................................................................................................. 246
Annex A ................................................................................................................................. 246
Annex B.1. .............................................................................................................................. 255
Annex B.2. ..............................................................................................................................261
Abbreviations and acronyms ................................................................................................ 270
Units of measure ................................................................................................................... 272
List of figures
Global electric car stock, 2010-19 .........................................................................40
Passenger electric car sales and market share in selected countries and
regions, 2013-19 ...................................................................................................... 46
Share of trips under 15 km in the United States and suitable trip distances of
mobility options ...................................................................................................... 58
New electric bus registrations by country/region, 2015-19 ................................ 64
Global sales of medium- and heavy-duty electric trucks, 2010-19 ..................... 66
Global number of ports equipped with cold ironing facilities and cumulative
installed capacity, 2019 ........................................................................................... 71
Global stock of electric LDV chargers, 2013-19.................................................... 74
Private and publicly accessible chargers by country, 2019 ................................ 75
Total cost of ownership for various bus types in Shenzhen ...............................126
Electric vehicles models available and announced, 2019 ................................. 133
Company announcements of medium- and heavy-duty electric truck
models ................................................................................................................... 138
Global EV stock and sales by scenario, 2019, 2025 and 2030 ...........................155
EV share of vehicle sales by mode and scenario in selected regions, 2030 ... 159
Number of private chargers, associated energy demand and cumulative
installed charging power capacity in 2019 and by scenario in 2030 ............... 168
Number of publicly accessible LDV chargers, associated energy demand
and cumulative installed charging power capacity in 2019 and by scenario
in 2030 .................................................................................................................. 170
Electricity demand from the EV fleet by mode, charger type, country/region
and oil displacement, 2019 and 2030 .................................................................. 172
Net and avoided well-to-wheel GHG emissions from the global EV fleet, 2019
and 2030 ................................................................................................................ 174
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Annual global battery capacity additions from EV sales, 2019-30 .................... 178
Annual demand for materials for batteries from EV deployment, 2019-30 ..... 180
Relative advantages of post lithium-ion battery technologies.......................... 189
Comparative life-cycle GHG emissions of an average mid-size car by
powertrain, 2018 .................................................................................................... 191
Automotive battery capacity available for repurposing or recycling,
2019-30.................................................................................................................. 199
Opportunities to lower life-cycle GHG emissions of batteries .......................... 205
Global average weekday load profiles in an evening charging case and
a night charging case by vehicle type in the Sustainable Development
Scenario, 2030...................................................................................................... 228
Required generation capacity to meet electricity demand from loads other
than EVs during days of peak demand in the Sustainable Development
Scenario in selected countries/regions, 2030 ...................................................231
Contribution of EVs to hourly peak demand by country/region in the
evening and night charging cases in the Sustainable Development
Scenario, 2030...................................................................................................... 233
Available capacity for controlled charging (V1G) or vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
relative to global on-board EV battery capacity in the Sustainable
Development Scenario, 2030 .............................................................................. 237
V2G potential and variable renewable capacity relative to total capacity
generation requirements in the Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030.... 238
List of tables
Technology options for electric taxiing in commercial passenger aircraft ....... 73
National electric car deployment targets ............................................................. 87
National electric car purchase incentives in selected countries ........................ 92
Range of credits per vehicle type and targets in China’s NEV programme ...... 101
EV promotion policies based on plate access, traffic restrictions and
parking in China, 2019 .......................................................................................... 103
Selected electric bus case studies at a glance .................................................. 120
Policy drivers and responsibility for bus and charging infrastructure
deployment at a glance .........................................................................................124
OEM announcements related to electric cars .................................................... 136
Key assumptions for projections of EV chargers in 2030 .................................. 167
Share of electricity consumption attributable to EVs by region and scenario,
2030 ....................................................................................................................... 171
Examples of storage projects using second-life EV batteries .......................... 200
Examples of current lithium-ion battery recycling facilities..............................203
Lithium-ion batteries end-of-life policies, 2019 ...................................................213
Characteristics of driving and charging patterns by EV type in the main EV
markets .................................................................................................................. 229
Relevant literature on the economic benefits of electric vehicle charging
flexibility ................................................................................................................ 234
Table A.1 Electric car stock (battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles) by country,
2005-19 (thousands of vehicles) ......................................................................... 247
Table A.2 Battery electric car stock by country, 2005-19 (thousands of vehicles) .......... 247
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Table A.3 Plug-in hybrid electric car stock by country, 2005-19 (thousands
of vehicles) ............................................................................................................ 248
Table A.4 New electric car sales (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (thousands of
vehicles)................................................................................................................. 248
Table A.5 New battery electric car sales by country, 2005-19 (thousands of vehicles) .. 249
Table A.6 New plug-in hybrid electric car sales by country, 2005-19 (thousands of
vehicles)................................................................................................................. 249
Table A.7 Market share of electric cars (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (%) ........... 250
Table A.8 Market share of battery electric cars by country, 2005-19 (%) ......................... 250
Table A.9 Market share of plug-in hybrid electric cars by country, 2005-19 (%) .............. 251
Table A.10 Electric LCV stock (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (thousands
of vehicles) ............................................................................................................. 251
Table A.11 New electric LCV sales (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (thousands of
vehicles)................................................................................................................. 252
Table A.12 Market share of electric LCVs (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (%) ......... 252
Table A.13 Publicly accessible chargers (slow and fast) by country, 2005-19 (number
of chargers) ........................................................................................................... 253
Table A.14 Publicly accessible slow chargers by country, 2005-19 (number of chargers)
................................................................................................................................ 253
Table A.15 Publicly accessible fast chargers by country, 2005-19 (number of chargers) 254
List of Boxes
Box 1.1 Government and consumer spending on electric cars ....................................... 42
Box 1.2 Fuel cell electric vehicles ....................................................................................... 49
Box 1.3 Cheap gasoline inflates the payback period for electric cars ............................. 57
Box 2.1 China NEV credits and sales: The example of the BJEV EU series .................... 100
Box 2.2 Transport electrification commitments from the private sector: the
EV30@30 Campaign and The Climate Group’s EV100 initiative ...................... 133
Box 3.1 Covid-19 impacts on electric mobility to 2030: Exploring alternative
futures .....................................................................................................................162
Box 3.2 What is the difference between well-to-wheel and life-cycle GHG
emissions? .............................................................................................................. 175
Box 4.1 Second-life battery industry dynamics ............................................................... 198
Box 4.2 Direct cathode recycling ...................................................................................... 202
Box 4.3 Non-GHG impact indicators................................................................................. 205
Box 4.4 Guiding principles and a “battery passport” for a sustainable battery value
chain by 2030 .......................................................................................................208
Box 4.5 Lessons learned from recycling in parallel industries.........................................214
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Global EV Outlook 2020 Executive summary
Executive summary
The global electric vehicle fleet expanded

significantly over the last decade,
underpinned by supportive policies and
technology advances
Global sales of passenger cars were sluggish in 2019, but
electric cars had another banner year.
Sales of electric cars topped 2.1 million globally in 2019, surpassing 2018 – already
a record year – to boost the stock to 7.2 million electric cars. 1 Electric cars, which
accounted for 2.6% of global car sales and about 1% of global car stock in 2019,
registered a 40% year-on-year increase. As technological progress in the
electrification of two/three-wheelers, buses, and trucks advances and the market
for them grows, electric vehicles are expanding significantly. Ambitious policy
announcements have been critical in stimulating the electric-vehicle rollout in
major vehicle markets in recent years. In 2019, indications of a continuing shift from
direct subsidies to policy approaches that rely more on regulatory and other
structural measures – including zero-emission vehicles mandates and fuel economy
standards – have set clear, long-term signals to the auto industry and consumers
that support the transition in an economically sustainable manner for governments.
1
In this report, “electric car” or “passenger electric car” refers to either a battery electric vehicle or a plug-in hybrid
electric vehicle in the passenger light-duty vehicle segment. It does not include hybrid electric vehicles that cannot
be plugged-in.
PAGE | 10
Global electric car stock, 2010-19
8
Other PHEV
7
Other BEV
Electric car stock (millions)
6
US PHEV
5
US BEV
4
Europe PHEV
3
Europe BEV
2
China PHEV
1
China BEV
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 World BEV
IEA 2020. All rights reserved.
Sources: IEA analysis based on country submissions, complemented by other sources. For more details, see figure
1.1 in the main report.
Electric cars, which expanded by an annual average of 60% in the 2014-19 period, totalled
7.2 million in 2019.
After entering commercial markets in the first half of the decade, electric car sales
have soared. Only about 17 000 electric cars were on the world’s roads in 2010. By
2019, that number had swelled to 7.2 million, 47% of which were in The People’s
Republic of China (“China”). Nine countries had more than 100 000 electric cars on
the road. At least 20 countries reached market shares above 1%. 2
The 2.1 million electric car sales in 2019 represent a 6% growth from the previous
year, down from year-on-year sales growth at least above 30% since 2016. Three
underlying reasons explain this trend:
 Car markets contracted. Total passenger car sales volumes were depressed in
2019 in many key countries. In the 2010s, fast-growing markets such as China
and India for all types of vehicles had lower sales in 2019 than in 2018. Against
this backdrop of sluggish sales in 2019, the 2.6% market share of electric cars in
worldwide car sales constitutes a record. In particular, China (at 4.9%) and Europe
(at 3.5%) achieved new records in electric vehicle market share in 2019.
2
Market share is defined in this report as the share of new EV registrations as a percentage of total new vehicle
registrations, whereas stock share refers to the share of electric vehicle stock as a percentage of total passenger
vehicle stock.
PAGE | 11
 Purchase subsidies were reduced in key markets. China cut electric car
purchase subsidies by about half in 2019 (as part of a gradual phase out of direct
incentives set out in 2016). The US federal tax credit programme ran out for key
electric vehicle automakers such as General Motors and Tesla (the tax credit is
applicable up to a 200 000 sales cap per automaker). These actions contributed
to a significant drop in electric car sales in China in the second half of 2019, and
a 10% drop in the United States over the year. With 90% of global electric car
sales concentrated in China, Europe and the United States, this affected global
sales and overshadowed the notable 50% sales increase in Europe in 2019, thus
slowing the growth trend.
 Consumer expectations of further technology improvements and new
models. Today’s consumer profile in the electric car market is evolving from early
adopters and technophile purchasers to mass adoption. Significant
improvements in technology and a wider variety of electric car models on offer
have stimulated consumer purchase decisions. The 2018-19 versions of some
common electric car models display a battery energy density that is 20-100%
higher than were their counterparts in 2012. Further, battery costs have
decreased by more than 85% since 2010. The delivery of new mass-market
models such as the Tesla Model 3 caused a spike in sales in 2018 in key markets
such as the United States. Automakers have announced a diversified menu of
electric cars, many of which are expected in 2020 or 2021. For the next five years,
automakers have announced plans to release another 200 new electric car
models, many of which are in the popular sport utility vehicle market segment.
As improvements in technical performance and cost reductions continue,
consumers are placed in the position of being attracted to a product but
wondering if it would be wise to wait for the “latest and greatest model”.
The Covid-19 pandemic will affect global electric vehicle markets, although to a
lesser extent than it will the overall passenger car market. Based on car sales data
during January to April 2020, our current estimate is that the passenger car market
will contract by 15% over the year relative to 2019, while electric sales for passenger
and commercial light-duty vehicles will remain broadly at 2019 levels. Second waves
of the pandemic and slower-than-expected economic recovery could lead to
different outcomes, as well as to strategies for automakers to cope with regulatory
standards. Overall, we estimate that electric car sales will account for about 3% of
global car sales in 2020. This outlook is underpinned by supporting policies,
particularly in China and Europe. Both markets have national and local subsidy
schemes in place – China recently extended its subsidy scheme until 2022. China and
Europe also recently strengthened and extended their New Energy Vehicle mandate
and CO2 emissions standards, respectively. Finally, there are signals that recovery
measures to tackle the Covid-19 crisis will continue to focus on vehicle efficiency in
general and electrification in particular.
PAGE | 12
Most charging is done at home and work, yet deploying

publicly accessible charging points is outpacing electric
vehicle sales
The infrastructure for electric-vehicle charging continues to expand. In 2019, there
were about 7.3 million chargers worldwide, of which about 6.5 million were private,
light-duty vehicle slow chargers in homes, multi-dwelling buildings and workplaces.
Convenience, cost-effectiveness and a variety of support policies (such as
preferential rates, equipment purchase incentives, and rebates) are the main drivers
for the prevalence of private charging.
Private and publicly accessible chargers by country, 2019
Private slow chargers Publicly accessible slow chargers Publicly accessible fast chargers
6.5 million 598 000 264 000
1% 2% 0%
1%
5%
13% 12% 2%
China
5%
4% 3% Japan
8%
37% 1% United States
5%
United Kingdom
4%
5% Germany
50%
6% France
5%
Norway
4% 4% Netherlands
81% Other
11%
3%
24% 4%
The vast majority of electric light-duty vehicle chargers are private chargers. China
accounts for 80% of publicly accessible fast chargers compared to 47% of the world’s
electric light-duty vehicle stock.
Publicly accessible chargers accounted for 12% of global light-duty vehicle chargers
in 2019, most of which are slow chargers. Globally, the number of publicly accessible
chargers (slow and fast) increased by 60% in 2019 compared with the previous year,
higher than the electric light-duty vehicle stock growth. China continues to lead in
the rollout of publicly accessible chargers, particularly fast chargers, which are suited
to its dense urban areas with less opportunity for private charging at home.
China continues to lead in electrifying two/three-

wheelers and urban buses
Transport modes other than cars are also electrifying. Electric micromobility options
have expanded rapidly since their emergence in 2017, with shared electric scooters
(e-scooters), electric-assist bicycles (e-bikes) and electric mopeds now available in
PAGE | 13
over 600 cities across more than 50 countries worldwide. An estimated stock of
350 million electric two/three-wheelers, the majority of which are in China, make up
25% of all two/three-wheelers in circulation worldwide, driven by bans in many
Chinese cities on two-wheelers with internal combustion engines. About
380 000 light commercial electric vehicles are in circulation, often as part of a
company or public authority vehicle fleet.
New electric bus registrations by country/region, 2015-19
140 2.0
Electric bus registrations (thousands)
120
1.5
100
80
1.0
60
40
0.5
20
0 0.0
China India Europe South America North America Others
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Fewer new registrations of electric buses in China led to a 20% drop in registrations
worldwide in 2019, despite strong growth in other regions.
About half a million electric buses are in circulation, most of which are in China.
Although the number of new registrations in 2019 was lower than in previous years
due to a gradual subsidy phase-out from 2016 and a decline in the overall bus market,
the bus fleets in a number of city centres in China are near-fully or fully electrified
and contribute to improve the air quality. Driven by similar air quality concerns, bus
electrification is also gaining ground in many other regions: the City of Santiago de
Chile is home to the largest electric urban bus fleet outside of China. Case studies of
electric bus deployment in Helsinki (Finland), Shenzhen (China), Kolkata (India) and
Santiago de Chile (Chile) highlight the unique nature of each public transit system,
the roll-out of electric buses facing context-specific challenges related to network
size, ridership, degree of sector privatisation and the availability of funding streams
other than fare revenues.
With Covid-19, urban public transit, including buses, will face challenges of providing
high-capacity and affordable services while ensuring health security. There is a risk
PAGE | 14
that commuters may opt temporarily or definitively for personal vehicle options.
However, in dense cities of the developing and developed world alike, urban buses
provide a key means of transport that is not easily substitutable by cars without
exacerbating already severe congestion. Hence, the future of public transit in general
and electric buses in particular will be balanced between the impacts of the
pandemic, the overall capacity of the urban transport system, and continued
government support.
Electrifying heavy-duty trucks and air- and seaport

operations offer opportunities for cost and emission
savings
Opportunities for electrification can be seized over the coming decade even in
modes where emissions are hard to abate such as heavy-duty trucks, aviation and
shipping. Global sales of electric trucks hit a record in 2019 with over 6 000 units,
while the number of models continue to expand. High-power chargers are being
developed and standardised globally. Research on dynamic charging concepts, as
well as demonstrations of catenary line solutions, may enable expansion of the range
of operations for heavy-duty and long-distance operations for regional buses and
long-haul trucking. Electrification of shipping operations at ports is increasingly
common and is gradually being mandated by legislation in Europe, China, and, in the
United States, California. In aviation, electric taxiing (i.e. the electrification of ground
operations in aircraft) offers immediate potential for pollutant and CO emissions
2
reductions and operational cost savings for airlines.
Policies continue to support electric vehicle

deployment and are evolving to a more
holistic policy portfolio
Environmental and sustainability objectives drive electric
vehicle policy support at all governance levels
Electric vehicles are a key technology to reduce air pollution in densely populated
areas and a promising option to contribute to energy diversification and greenhouse
gas emissions reduction objectives. Electric vehicle benefits include zero tailpipe
emissions, better efficiency than internal combustion engine vehicles and large
potential for greenhouse gas emissions reductions when coupled with a low-carbon
electricity sector. These objectives are major drivers behind countries’ policy support
in the development and deployment of electric powertrains for transport. To date,
PAGE | 15
17 countries have announced 100% zero-emission vehicle targets or the phase-out of

internal combustion engine vehicles through 2050. France, in December 2019, was
the first country to put this intention into law, with a 2040 timeframe.
Policy actions for electric vehicles depend on the status of the electric vehicle market
or technology. Setting vehicle and charger standards are prerequisites for wide
electric vehicle adoption. In the early stages of deployment, public procurement
schemes (e.g. for buses and municipal vehicles) have the double benefit of
demonstrating the technology to the public and providing the opportunity for public
authorities to lead by example. Importantly, they also allow the industry to produce
and deliver bulk orders to foster economies of scale. Emerging economies can scale
up their policy efforts for both new vehicles and second-hand imports.
Tax rates that reflect tailpipe CO2 emissions can be conducive to increased electric
vehicle uptake. Fiscal incentives at the vehicle purchase, as well as complementary
measures (e.g. road toll rebates and low-emission zones) are pivotal to attract
consumers and businesses to choose the electric option. Local governments are key
in proposing and implementing measures to enhance the value proposition of
electric vehicles. The use of local low- and zero-emission zones can steer car
purchase decisions far beyond just those zones and may influence the relative resale
value of internal combustion engines and electric powertrains.
The vast majority of car markets offer some form of subsidy or tax reduction for the
purchase of an individual or company electric car as well as support schemes for
deploying charging infrastructure. Provisions in building codes to encourage
charging facilities and the “EV-readiness” of buildings are becoming more common.
So too are mandates to build charging infrastructure along road corridors and fuel
stations.
Policies are being tailored to support market transition

There is common understanding that government support for electric vehicle
purchases can only be transitional, as sale volumes increase. In the near term, a point
will be reached when technology learning and economies of scale will have driven
down the purchase cost of electric vehicles and mass-market adoption is triggered.
For the first time a decrease in government spending for electric car purchase
incentives was observed in 2019, while both consumer spending and total
expenditure on electric cars continued to increase. At the national level, both China
and the United States witnessed substantial purchase subsidies reductions or partial
phase out in 2019, but there are cases where these reductions were met by increases
in local government support. In China the central government was planning in 2019
to culminate a phase-out that dates to 2016, though, in the face of bleak electric car
PAGE | 16
sales in the second half of 2019, the subsidy scheme was extended through 2022.
Yet some other countries extended or implemented new purchase incentives
schemes in 2019 or early 2020, for example, Germany and Italy.
Shifts to a variety of regulatory and fiscal measures are likely to gradually become a
main driver of electric vehicle deployment, setting clear goals and a long-term vision
for the industry. Many of the regulatory policies impel vehicle makers to sell a greater
number or share of electric or otherwise more efficient vehicles. For example, today
60% of global car sales are covered by China’s New Energy Vehicle mandate, the
European Union CO2 emissions standard (which is applicable to all EU member
states) or a zero-emission vehicle mandate (in selected US states and Canadian
provinces). The European Union approved a new fuel economy standard for cars and
vans for 2021 30 and a CO2 emissions standard for heavy-duty vehicles (2020 30),
with specific requirements or bonuses for electric vehicles. In the European Union,
2020 is the target year for compliance with the CO2 emissions standards for light-
duty vehicles of 95 grammes of CO2 per kilometre, which has contributed to the
successful uptake of electric light-duty vehicles in Europe in recent years. In 2019,
China announced a tightening of its New Energy Vehicle mandate scheme with both
setting new credit targets for 2021-23 and a more stringent calculation method for
the credits beyond 2021. These actions are in step with its planned gradual transition
from direct to more indirect forms of subsidies and incentives (including increasing
support for charging infrastructure and other support services). In the United States,
regulatory developments were different from other markets; the Safer Affordable
Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) vehicles final rule, put in place in March 2020, replaced the 2012
rule, lowering the annual improvement in fuel economy standards from 4.7% in the
2012 rulemaking to 1.5% in SAFE for model years 2021 through 2026.
Range of credits per vehicle type in China’s New Energy Vehicle programme
Range of credits per vehicle

NEV credit
targets
Year BEV PHEV FCEV
2019: 10%
Until 2020 1-5 2 1-5
2020: 12%
2021: 14%
From 2021 1-3.4 1.6 1-6 2022: 16%
2023: 18%
Notes: For details, see table 2.3 in the main report.

PAGE | 17
Other countries with increasing policy activity to support electric vehicles are
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, India and New Zealand. For example, Chile seeks to
establish energy efficiency standards for new vehicles sold by car manufacturers or
importers, including multipliers for electric and hybrid vehicles in the calculation of
the sales average car efficiency.
In addition to new regulations, in order to transition from internal combustion

engines to electrified vehicles in the transport sector governments need a long-term
vision and a diversified and adaptive portfolio of policy measures, including new
fiscal schemes. For instance, governments will need to anticipate and adapt taxation
approaches early to replace lost fuel tax revenues, such as taxation based on vehicle
activity (e.g. distance- or congestion-based pricing).
Government responses to Covid-19 will influence the

pace of the transition to electric vehicles
Many uncertainties characterise the Covid-19 crisis, from the capacity of
governments and companies to double-down on transport electrification efforts to
what behavioural changes could potentially be expected from the current crisis,
including from low oil prices and confinement measures. As cities gradually emerge
from lockdowns, some of them are placing temporary restrictions on the frequency
and occupancy of public transport, raising the risk of a spike in car traffic. Many cities,
particularly in Europe, are therefore rapidly putting together policies to rethink the
use of urban space and to promote walking and cycling. As part of economic
recovery efforts, a focus on promoting clean transport is being called for at national
and local levels.
Auto manufacturing, a critical sector of economic activity in many of the world’s

largest economies, employs millions of people across the entire supply chain. It has
been severely affected during the Covid-19 crisis; practically all major car
manufacturers halted production lines for some period. Governments need to
carefully consider appropriate policy responses. It is reasonable to expect that
stimulus packages will seek to bolster the economy in countries with important
vehicle manufacturing capacity by including measures to support the automotive
industry, not least given their relevance for the labour market. While such measures
will inevitably help boost electric vehicle sales as well, targeted measures to support
electric vehicle sales in particular will be required to ensure that the electrification of
road transport remains on track towards the postulated goals.
In China, policy makers were quick to identify the auto market as a primary target for
economic stimulus. Among other measures, the central government encouraged
cities to relax car permit quotas, at least temporarily, complemented by
PAGE | 18
strengthening targeted New Energy Vehicle measures. In the European Union, at the
time of writing, existing policies and regulations were being maintained and
countries like France and Germany announced increased support measures towards
electric vehicles for the remainder of 2020.
Experience of automotive industry stimulus measures has been mixed. Cash-for-

clunkers programmes can be an effective approach if they are designed to support
the uptake of more efficient (e.g. hybrid) and electric cars. In past stimulus packages,
however, such considerations were not always adequately addressed and sales of
sport utility vehicles and diesel cars were boosted, which pushed up global oil
demand and air pollution. Support for the auto industry can also be tied to ambitious
fuel economy regulations, which in the past triggered innovation and helped jump-
start key parts of today’s electric car industry. Other targeted and direct support
measures, such as for charging infrastructure, or via favourable loans with low
interest rates and/or public co-funding, towards corporate fleets for bulk
procurement of electric cars, buses and trucks, could support continued growth in
electric vehicle sales. In countries where fossil fuel subsidies prevail, the low oil price
environment is an important opportunity to phase out price supports, which are
detrimental for pursuing energy efficiency efforts in general and for creating a
context that supports road vehicle electrification in particular.
Prospects for electrification in transport in

the coming decade
Adoption of electric drivetrains accelerates
This report explores the outlook for electric mobility to 2030 through two IEA
scenarios: the Stated Policies Scenario, which incorporates existing government
policies, and the Sustainable Development Scenario, which is fully compatible with
the climate goals of the Paris Agreement. The Sustainable Development Scenario
incorporates the targets of the EV30@30 Campaign 3 to collectively reach a 30%
market share for electric vehicles in all modes except two-wheelers by 2030.
Electric vehicles play a critical role in meeting the environmental goals of the
Sustainable Development Scenario to reduce local air pollution and to address
climate change. In this scenario, the global electric vehicle stock (excluding
3
The EV30@30 Campaign was launched at the Eighth Clean Energy Ministerial in 2017. The participating countries
are Canada, China, Finland, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.
PAGE | 19
two/three-wheelers) grows by 36% annually, reaching 245 million vehicles in 2030 –

more than 30 times above today’s level. Other than two/three-wheelers, growth is
strongest for the light-duty vehicle segment where electric powertrain technologies
are most readily available. In the Stated Policies Scenario, under the assumptions
taken, the global electric vehicle stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) reaches
nearly 140 million vehicles and accounts for 7% of the global vehicle fleet.
Global electric vehicle stock by scenario, 2019 and 2030
250
EV stock (million vehicles)
200
150
100
50
0
2019 2030 2030
Stated Policies Scenario Sustainable Development
Scenario
PLDVs - BEV PLDVs - PHEV LCVs - BEV LCVs - PHEV
Buses - BEV Buses - PHEV Trucks - BEV Trucks - PHEV
Notes: PLDVs = passenger light-duty vehicles; LCVs = light commercial vehicles; BEV = battery electric vehicle; PHEV
= plug-in hybrid electric vehicle.
Source: IEA analysis developed with the IEA Mobility Model.
By 2030, the global electric vehicle stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) is about

140 million in the Stated Policies Scenario, while the more ambitious Sustainable
Development Scenario projects about 245 million electric vehicles.
Electric car sales drive cost reductions in batteries,

which boosts deployment across all road vehicle
categories
With the projected size of the global electric vehicle market, expansion of battery
manufacturing capacity will largely be driven by electrification in the car market.
Indeed the electrification of cars is a crucial driver in cutting unit costs of automotive
battery packs that can be used in a variety of road modes. By 2030, the light-duty
vehicle fleet (cars and light commercial vehicles) represents the largest part of the
fleet of electric four-wheelers, regardless the scenario. China and Europe lead this
deployment, as policies promote electrification.
PAGE | 20
Electric two/three-wheelers will continue to represent the lion’s share of the total
electric vehicle fleet, as this category is most suited to rapid transition to electric
drive. The future electric two/three-wheeler fleet is concentrated in China, India and
the ten countries of ASEAN. Electrification of buses is mostly in urban areas due to
their shorter ranges and driving cycles suitable for electrification. Due to the
characteristics of their operations, intercity buses are not projected to make
significant inroads in the period to 2030, thus the overall stock shares of buses lag
slightly behind those of light-duty vehicles in both scenarios. Similarly, electrification
of medium- and heavy-duty trucks is mostly in urban environments. Trucks that
operate on regional and long-haul basis show the lowest sales and stock shares
among all vehicle categories in the scenarios.
Electric vehicles increase electricity demand but reduce

oil demand and well-to-wheel greenhouse gas emissions
In 2030, in the Stated Policies Scenario, global electricity demand from electric
vehicles (including two/three-wheelers) reaches 550 TWh, about a six-fold rise
from 2019 levels. The share of demand due to electric vehicles in total electricity
consumption at a national/regional level grows to as high as 4% in Europe. In the
Sustainable Development Scenario, with demand rising nearly eleven-fold relative
to 2019, to almost 1 000 TWh, the share of total demand ranges from 2% in Japan
to 6% in Europe.
In both scenarios, electricity demand on slow chargers represent the majority of

electric vehicle electricity demand (mainly due to a continuing dominance of
private charging). Fast-charging infrastructure is gradually deployed to respond to
the growth in relative shares of electric vehicles with higher battery capacity and
power requirements, e.g. buses and trucks.
PAGE | 21
Electricity demand from the electric vehicle fleet by mode, charger type, country/region
and oil displacement, 2019 and 2030
Electricity demand by mode By charger By country/region Oil displacement by mode
1 200 4.5
mb/d
TWh
4.0
1 000
3.5
800 3.0
2.5
600
2.0
400 1.5
1.0
200
0.5
0 0.0
2030 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030
2019 STEPS SDS STEPS SDS STEPS SDS 2019 STEPS SDS
By mode: Two/three-wheeler LDV Bus Truck

By charger: Two/three-wheeler LDV Private LDV Public Slow LDV Public Fast Bus Truck
By region: China Europe United States India Japan Rest of the world
Notes: Mb/d = million barrels of oil per day; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development
Scenario; LDV = light-duty vehicle. For more details, see figure 3.5 in the main report.
Source: IEA analysis developed with the IEA Mobility Model.
Global electricity demand from electric vehicles grows from 80 TWh in 2019 to 550 TWh in
2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario, when oil displacement reaches 2.5 mb/d.
In 2019, electric vehicles in operation globally avoided the consumption of almost

0.6 million barrels of oil products per day. In 2030, in the Stated Policies Scenario,
the electric vehicle fleet displaces around 2.5 mb/d of oil products. In the Sustainable
Development Scenario, it displaces 4.2 mb/d of gasoline and diesel.
In 2019, the electricity generation to supply the global electric vehicle fleet emitted
51 Mt CO2-eq, about half the amount that would have been emitted from an
equivalent fleet of internal combustion engine vehicles, corresponding to 53 Mt CO2-
eq of avoided emissions.
To ensure that electric vehicles can unleash their full potential to mitigate climate
change, it is crucial to reduce the CO2 intensity of power generation. Indeed, the well-
to-wheel emissions of the future electric vehicle fleet are projected to be significantly
lower than are those of internal combustion engines in 2030 in both scenarios. The
net emission reductions are more significant in the Sustainable Development
Scenario, in which higher electric vehicle deployment is coupled with more rapid
decarbonisation of electricity generation, in line with the Paris Agreement goals.
PAGE | 22
Net and avoided well-to-wheel GHG emissions from the global electric vehicle fleet, 2019
and 2030
2019 2030 STEPS 2030 SDS
60 400
Mt CO2-eq
Mt CO2-eq
300
40
200
20 100
0 0
- 100
- 20
- 200
- 40
- 300
- 60 - 400
- 500
- 80
- 600
- 100
- 700
- 120 - 800
Electric two/three-wheelers Electric buses Electric LDVs Electric trucks Avoided GHG emissions
Equivalent ICE two/three-wheelers Equivalent ICE buses Equivalent ICE LDVs Equivalent ICE trucks
Notes: STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario; LDVs = light-duty vehicles; ICE =
internal combustion engine. Positive emissions are from the global EV fleet. Negative emissions are those that would
have been emitted by an equivalent ICE fleet. The red dot denotes net CO2 emissions savings from EVs in
comparison with an equivalent ICE fleet.
Sources: IEA analysis developed with the IEA Mobility Model; carbon intensities from Energy Technology
Perspectives 2020 (IEA, forthcoming).
In 2030, electric vehicles reduce GHG emissions by almost half compared to an equivalent
fleet of internal combustion engine vehicles in the Stated Policies Scenario and by two-
thirds in the Sustainable Development Scenario.
Batteries: An essential technology to electrify

road transport
Battery capacity increases, pushing up demand for
materials
The ongoing trend of increasing battery capacity is projected to continue. By 2030,
battery electric vehicles are assumed to reach an average driving range of
350-400 km corresponding to battery sizes of 70-80 kWh. In addition to battery size,
another important variable in projecting total battery capacity is the proportion of
battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in overall electric vehicle
sales.
In the Stated Policies Scenario, global electric vehicle battery capacity increases
from around 170 GWh per year today to 1.5 TWh per year in 2030. In the Sustainable
Development Scenario, demand of 3 TWh is projected. Despite ambitious
PAGE | 23
electrification in the Sustainable Development Scenario, modes other than cars

account for only 11% of overall battery demand in 2030, highlighting the centrality of
electric cars in the battery market over the next decade.
The demand for the materials used in electric vehicle batteries will depend on
changing battery chemistries, nickel cobalt aluminium oxide (NCA), nickel
manganese cobalt oxide (NMC) and lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathodes for
lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries being the most widely used today.
The estimated material demand for the batteries of the electric vehicles sold in 2019
was about 19 kt for cobalt, 17 kt for lithium, 22 kt for manganese and 65 kt for nickel.
For battery needs in the Stated Policies Scenario, cobalt demand expands to about
180 kt/year in 2030, lithium to around 185 kt/year, manganese to 177 kt/year and
class I nickel to 925 kt/year. In the Sustainable Development Scenario, higher electric
vehicle uptake leads to 2030 material demand values more than twice as high as the
Stated Policies Scenario.
Annual lithium and cobalt demand for electric vehicle batteries, 2019-30
Cobalt Lithium
500 500
450 450 Heavy duty
400 400 Light duty
Historical
Metal demand (kt)
350 350
300 300 Variability for chemistry
250 250 Current supply
200 200
150 150
100 100
50 50
0 0
STEPS SDS STEPS SDS
2019 2030 2019 2030
Notes: kt = kilotonnes; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario. Error bars show
the variability arising from varying assumptions related to the development of future battery chemistries.
Demand for materials to make batteries for electric vehicles will increase exponentially in
the period to 2030; cobalt is the most uncertain reflecting various battery chemistries.
Battery technologies improve and costs drop

The cost of batteries for electric vehicles is falling markedly. Industry reports show
that sales-weighted battery pack prices in 2019 were an average of USD 156 per
kilowatt-hour, down from more than USD 1 100/kWh in 2010. The average battery
pack size across electric light-duty vehicles sold (including battery electric vehicles
and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) continues an upwards trend; it is now 44 kWh,
PAGE | 24
up from 37 kWh in 2018, and battery electric cars in most countries are in the
50-70 kWh range. This increase is driven by two trends: battery electric vehicle
models with longer ranges are becoming available and are increasingly in demand,
and the share of battery electric vehicles relative to plug-in hybrid electric vehicles is
rising.
The most common cathode chemistry used in electric vehicle Li-ion batteries is NMC.
The energy density of cells with NMC cathodes increases with increasing nickel
content. On these grounds, there are reasons to believe that density is also
continuing on an upward trend. While Li-ion technology has made tremendous
progress over the past decade in terms of energy density, costs and cycle life, room
for improvement remains. Research is being conducted to improve all three key
components of Li-ion battery cells: cathodes, anodes and electrolytes. In addition,
recent developments in battery design and thermal management aim primarily to cut
the costs of the pack and module components.
Promising avenues for advanced battery technologies

arise, but not without trade-offs
The next generation of Li-ion battery technology, set to enter the market in the
coming five to ten years, is likely to have low nickel content and use either NCA (with
less than 10% nickel) or NMC 811 cathodes. Near-term developments should enable
cell-level energy densities of up to 325 Wh/kg and pack-level energy densities could
reach 275 Wh/kg. These values approach the upper performance bounds of Li-ion
technology.
However, some electric vehicles might not necessarily be designed for the highest
possible energy density. This might be the case for urban buses or delivery vehicles
where volumetric constraints are less stringent, or for low-end electric vehicles
where affordability is more important than long driving ranges. For these
applications, the LFP cathode could be well suited.
For the next decade, the Li-ion battery is likely to dominate the electric vehicle
market. For the period after 2030, a number of potential technologies might be able
to push the boundaries beyond the performance limits imposed by Li-ion battery
technology. These include the lithium-metal solid state battery, lithium-sulphur,
sodium-ion or even lithium-air, which could represent an improvement from Li-ion on
indicators such as cost, density, cycle life, and benefits from more widely available
materials than Li-ion technologies. However, not a single technology reaps all these
benefits at the same time. In addition, even once performance is proven in the lab,
deployment and scale-up of these new technologies will take time and compete with
the well-established Li-ion technology, which by now benefits from considerable
PAGE | 25
experience in its large-scale manufacture and solid understanding of its long-term

durability characteristics, and of substantial investments already made.
As volumes and ranges increase, an appropriate battery

value chain is important for ensuring that electric
vehicles continue to contribute to sustainability goals
Considering the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of available powertrains,
analysis suggests that:
 Today the use phase is the largest contributor to life-cycle greenhouse gas
emissions of all powertrains.
 With a greenhouse gas intensity of electricity generation equal to the current
global average, battery electric vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles and fuel cell
electric vehicles have similar lifetime greenhouse emissions, and lower than
those of an average internal combustion engine vehicle.
 Increasing the range of a battery electric vehicle reduces its relative benefits
compared to internal combustion engine vehicles or fuel cell electric vehicles.
 As the electricity supply decarbonises and serves both battery manufacturing
facilities and charging, the benefits of lower life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions
of electric cars amplify relative to other powertrains.
PAGE | 26
Comparative life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions over ten year lifetime of an average mid-
size car by powertrain, 2018
t CO2-eq Variability relative to

vehicle size
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
BEV 40 BEV 80 ICE HEV PHEV FCEV
Vehicle cycle - components and fluids

Vehicle cycle - assembly, disposal and recycling
Vehicle cycle - batteries (65 kg CO₂-eq/kWh)
Well-to-tank fuel cycle
Tank-to-wheel fuel cycle
Additional emissions with 100 kg CO₂-eq/kWh battery manufacturing
Notes: The powertrains considered are globally representative: mid-size versions of an ICE car, a hybrid car, a plug-
in hybrid electric car with 60% of its lifetime mileage driven on electricity and 40% on gasoline, a BEV with a 40 kWh
or a 80 kWh battery, and a fuel cell electric vehicle with a hydrogen supply primarily sourced from steam methane
reforming of natural gas. The CO2 intensity of the electricity used to power the electric powertrains is based on the
global average in 2018. For more details, see figure 4.2 in the main report.
Sources: IEA analysis based on ANL (2018); Kelly et al. (2019); IEA (2019a); IEA (2019b).
On a global average, battery electric vehicles provide life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions
benefits relative to internal combustion engine vehicles. Decarbonising fuel used in a
vehicle is the biggest potential area for life-cycle emission reductions for all powertrains.
In the global average example in the figure, in a current battery electric vehicle with
a large battery (80 kWh) manufactured in China (representative of high greenhouse
gas intensity of battery manufacturing), the battery can be responsible for up to a
third of the vehicle’s life-cycle emissions. The main areas of action to reduce battery
manufacturing emissions and life-cycle impacts are:
 Increase the energy density of batteries.

 Scale up manufacturing facilities and increase throughput.
 Increase energy efficiency and use low-carbon energy sources in mining and
refining processes for raw materials, especially for aluminium, and in synthesis of
active materials such as nickel, cobalt and graphite.
PAGE | 27
 Increase energy efficiency and use low-carbon energy sources in cell

manufacturing and pack assembly.
 Ensure appropriate end-of-life battery management.
How batteries are used, recycled, or disposed of after

their electric vehicle application affects their life-cycle
impacts
Based on the two scenarios, it is estimated that 100-120 GWh of electric vehicle
batteries will be retired by 2030, a volume roughly equivalent to current annual
battery production. Without effective measures to address such volumes, this can
become a significant environmental liability. Spent batteries can be channelled to
second-use or recycling with the aid of policies that help to steer these markets
towards sustainable end-of-life practices.
Automotive battery capacity available for repurposing or recycling, 2019-30

Stated Policies Scenario Sustainable Development Scenario
140 14% 140 14%

EV batteries retired from automotive
Share of battery demand

120 12% 120 12%
applications (GWh/year)
100 10% 100 10%
80 8% 80 8%
60 6% 60 6%
40 4% 40 4%
20 2% 20 2%
0 0% 0 0%
2019 2025 2030 2019 2025 2030
Available for repurposing or recycling Share of new automotive battery demand
Notes: For details, see table 4.3 in the main report.
Spent battery availability in 2030 is projected to be comparable to current production

volumes.
Battery reuse in second-life, stationary storage applications for services to electricity

network operators, electric utilities, and commercial or residential customers can
extend the lifetime of batteries that are no longer suited for automotive applications.
Extending the useful life of automotive batteries can contribute to displacing the
environmental impacts, emissions and costs of manufacturing new batteries for the
provision of the same services. However, there is little experience to date from this
nascent market. Challenges in implementing second-life applications for automotive
batteries reside primarily in competition with the decreasing cost of new battery
PAGE | 28
manufacturing and a potentially long and technical refurbishing process that requires
efficient technical information transfer between the stakeholders along the value
chain. An industry is starting to emerge, made up of stakeholders from original
equipment manufacturers, utilities and specialised start-ups.
As volumes of spent electric vehicle batteries increase, the development of an

effective recycling industry will be key to the sustainability of Li-ion batteries. By
recovering critical materials, a robust recycling system would reduce demand for raw
materials, greenhouse gas emissions and negative local impacts from mining and
refining. Furthermore, domestic recycling enables countries to reduce their reliance
on imports of critical materials. So far, economic viability and market incentives for
recycling have been limited because of generally low raw material prices and small
volumes of spent electric vehicle batteries to date. However, as the growing market
for electric vehicles puts further pressure on primary resources, raw material prices
could increase and/or prices may become more volatile. Thus, materials recovered
through recycling would become more competitive. The economic and strategic
value of essential inputs, such as lithium and cobalt, may incentivise recycling in the
long term and steer recycling policies.
It is estimated that current recycling facilities using mainstream recycling

technologies such as pyrometallurgy and hydrometallurgy, may add a limited
greenhouse gas footprint to an electric vehicle battery (about 10%), compared to a
battery manufactured from primary raw materials. Research points towards a net
benefit when considering non-greenhouse gas indicators such as ecotoxicity. The
scale-up of Li-ion battery recycling facilities, driven by electric vehicle deployment,
as well other energy efficiency measures and renewable energy input into recycling
processes will be necessary to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
battery recycling. New, innovative recycling processes using less energy, and
adequate sorting and separation of battery pieces that need recycling or that can
directly be repurposed or repackaged into new batteries are also under research.
The policy landscape for battery end-of-life is evolving in

key regions
Recent policy developments highlight an increased focus on the projected large-
scale deployment of batteries for automotive applications and their life-cycle
impacts. Battery collection and recycling policies have usually focused on other
industries and battery technologies than the Li-ion batteries used in electric vehicles,
such as consumer electronics or lead-acid batteries. Hence, they are not designed
for electric vehicle battery end-of-life. In 2019, China mandated producer
responsibility, holding them responsible for the recycling, as well as the reverse
logistics involved in taking back the Li-ion batteries. The European Union is currently
PAGE | 29
reviewing its Battery Directive to adapt to transport electrification through identifying

improvements and assessing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence,
and added value of the policy; it has set up a Battery Alliance to discuss further
measures with key stakeholders. In the United States, the California Assembly Bill
2832 requires the formation of a Lithium-Ion Car Battery Recycling Advisory Group
to advise the legislature on electric vehicle Li-ion battery recycling policy. These
developments, along with private sector innovation, are expected to push forward
battery end-of-life solutions.
Integrating electric vehicles with power

systems can benefit both
Balancing electricity demand and supply will become an increasing challenge to
ensure the smooth integration of variable renewables-based energy generation and
the electrification of multiple end-use sectors. The uptake of electric vehicles in the
Sustainable Development Scenario, in which electric vehicles account for around 4%
of global annual electricity demand by 2030 (up from 0.3% today), brings
implications and opportunities for power systems.
Over the coming decade, managing electric vehicle charging patterns will be key to
encourage charging at periods of low electricity demand or high renewables-based
electricity generation. With 250 million electric vehicles on the road by 2030 in the
Sustainable Development Scenario, the share of electric vehicle charging in the
average evening peak demand could rise to as high as 4-10% in the main electric
vehicle markets (China, European Union and United States), assuming unmanaged
charging. A range of ready options with various degrees of complexity can be tapped
to reduce electric vehicle charging at peak system demand, thereby diluting the need
for upgrades to generation, transmission and distribution assets. While off-peak
charging at night through simple end-user programming and/or nighttime tariffs
would more than halve the contribution of electric vehicles to peak demand,
controlled charging in response to real-time price signals from utilities (V1G) could
further exploit synergies with variable renewable electricity generation and expand
the range of services electric vehicles offer to the grid.
PAGE | 30
Contribution of electric vehicles to hourly peak demand by country/region in the evening

and night charging cases in the Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030
70 14%
60 12% Two/three-wheelers
GW
50 10% Trucks
40 8%
Buses
30 6%
LCVs
20 4%
10 2% PLDVs
0 0% Share of peak load

Evening Night Evening Night Evening Night Evening Night (right axis)
charging charging charging charging charging charging charging charging
China India United States European Union
Shifting electric vehicle charging practices to avoid peak hours could reduce the
contribution of electric vehicles to peak demand to less than 4% in 2030 in the Sustainable
Development Scenario.
Not only are there means to alleviate the potentially negative impact of electric
vehicle charging on power systems, but the 16 000 GWh of energy that can be stored
in electric vehicle batteries globally in the Sustainable Development Scenario in 2030
could actively provide energy to the grid at suitable times via vehicle-to-grid
solutions (V2G). The V2G potential depends on availability of vehicles or vehicle fleets
to participate in such services at suitable times, consumer acceptance, and the ability
for participants to generate revenues, as well as other technical constraints related
to battery discharge rates or impacts on battery lifetime. All being accounted for, an
estimated 5% of the total electric vehicle battery capacity could be made available
for vehicle-to-grid applications during peak times. This could provide about 600 GW
of flexible capacity globally by 2030 across China, the United States, the European
Union and India, contributing to offset lower renewable electricity generation during
peaks as well as the increase of capacity needs to meet peak demand.
PAGE | 31
Vehicle-to-grid potential and variable renewable capacity relative to total capacity

generation requirements in the Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030
1 600
GW
1 200
800
400
0
China India United States European China India United States European
Union Union
Peak capacity (average of the 10% of hours of Off-peak capacity (average of the 90% of hours of
highest electricity demand) lowest electricity demand)
Vehicle charging for V2G, stated participation assumptions V2G potential, stated participation assumptions
Variable renewables Other generation capacity
Notes: Analysis represented in this figure is based on the EV deployment rates in the Sustainable Development
Scenario and assumptions of V2G capacity potential. For more details, see figure 5.5 in the main report.
Vehicle-to-grid services could unlock up to 600 GW of flexible capacity distributed across

the main electric vehicle markets in 2030 and moderate intermittency of variable
renewables during peak demand.
As a result, simple solutions can be implemented via relatively straightforward forms

of policy support to largely alleviate peak time charging, such as the promotion of
workplace charging or the use of off-peak tariffs. However, unlocking the full
flexibility potential of electric vehicles through dynamic controlled charging (V1G)
and vehicle-to-grid services (V2G) to reap synergies with variable renewable
generation and reduce electricity generation capacity needs would require the
adaptation of regulatory and market frameworks. Currently, flexible electric vehicle
integration is not on track for power systems to accommodate the distributed loads
that electric vehicle batteries represent in a co-ordinated way and on a large scale.
Specific stakeholders such as aggregators, along with business models that make
use of new regulatory frameworks to reward electric vehicle owners for providing
flexibility services are also needed for electric vehicle batteries to contribute to the
power system stability on a significant scale.
PAGE | 32
Global EV Outlook 2020 Introduction
Introduction
Electric vehicles (EVs), including full battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) have been gaining traction thanks to their ability to
deliver multiple environmental, societal and health benefits. These include:
 Energy efficiency: EVs are three-to-five times more energy efficient than
conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. This provides
unmatched energy efficiency improvement potential for vehicle road transport.
 Energy security: Electric mobility boosts energy security as it transitions the road
transport sector from its strong reliance on oil-based fuels. It reduces
dependence on oil imports for many countries. Furthermore, electricity can be
produced with a variety of resources and fuels, and is often generated
domestically.
 Air pollution: Thanks to zero tailpipe emissions, EVs are well suited to address air
pollution issues, especially in urban areas and along road networks, where a large
number of people are exposed to harmful pollutants from road transport vehicles.
 GHG emissions: Increasing electric mobility in association with a progressive
increase in low-carbon electricity generation can deliver significant reductions in
GHG emissions from road transport relative to ICE vehicles. In addition, EVs can
play an expanded role through their use to provide flexibility services to power
systems and act in concert with the integration of variable renewable energy
sources for electricity generation.
 Noise reduction: EVs are quieter than ICE vehicles and hence contribute to less
noise pollution, especially in the two/three-wheeler category.
 Industrial development: EVs are crucially positioned as a potential enabler of
major cost reductions in battery technology, one of the key value chains of
strategic importance for industrial competitiveness, given its relevance for the
clean energy transition.
These and other advantages of electric vehicles have led to growing global
deployment and increased understanding of the challenges and opportunities of
electric mobility over the last decade. While in some countries the transition to
electric mobility is still at an early phase, in several of the world’s largest car markets
the EV fleet is expanding at a fast pace. The cost of batteries and EVs is dropping and
EV infrastructure is being installed in many places, which supports the case for EVs
across transport modes (buses, taxis and shared vehicles, light-duty vehicles (LDVs),
two/three-wheelers and heavy-duty vehicles with short range requirements such as
urban deliveries). The range of models from which consumers can choose has also
continued to expand as manufacturers have launched new vehicles and announced
the roll out of several new models in the near future. Nevertheless, effective policies
PAGE | 33
are important to decrease the upfront investment cost gap, to promote charging
infrastructure and to ensure a smooth integration of EV charging demands into power
systems. The foundations for enabling the transition to electric mobility across
several large economies having been laid, there are strong prospects for the 2020
decade to become the decade for electric mobility.
This report provides an update of the status of the transition to electric mobility
worldwide. It considers the factors that have influenced recent developments in
electric mobility, the dynamics behind the rapid evolution, the impacts on future
prospects to 2030 for electrification and the implications for policy developments.
Electric Vehicles Initiative

The Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) is a multi-governmental policy forum established
in 2010 under the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM). Recognising the opportunities
offered by electric vehicles, the EVI is dedicated to accelerating the deployment of
electric vehicles worldwide. To do so, it strives to improve the understanding of the
policy challenges that come with electric mobility, helping governments to address
them and serving as a platform for knowledge-sharing, taking into account important
transformations that are occurring in the transport sector.
The EVI facilitates exchanges between policy makers working in governments that
are committed to supporting EV development and a variety of partners, bringing
them together twice a year. Its multilateral nature, its openness to various
stakeholders and the development of activities looking at different levels of
governance (country and city-level in particular) offer interesting opportunities to
exchange information and learn from experiences developed by a range of actors in
the transition to electric mobility.
Governments that have been active in the EVI in the 2019-20 period include Canada,
Chile, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), Finland, France, Germany,
India, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.
Canada and China are the co-leads of the initiative. The International Energy Agency
serves as the EVI co-ordinator.
EV30@30 Campaign
The EV30@30 Campaign was launched at the 8th Clean Energy Ministerial meeting
in 2017 with the goal of accelerating the deployment of electric vehicles. It sets a
collective aspirational goal for all Electric Vehicle Initiative members of a 30% market
PAGE | 34
share for electric vehicles in the total of all vehicles sales (except two-wheelers) by
2030. This will be the benchmark against which progress achieved in all members of
the EVI will be measured.
Eleven countries endorsed the campaign: Canada; China; Finland; France; India;
Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; Norway; Sweden and United Kingdom. In addition,
29 companies and organisations support the campaign: C40; FIA Foundation; Global
Fuel Economy Initiative; Hewlett Foundation; Natural Resource Defence Council;
REN21; SLoCaT; The Climate Group; UN Environment; UN Habitat; World Resources
Institute; ZEV Alliance; ChargePoint; Energias de Portugal (EDP); Enel X; E.ON;
Fortum; Iberdrola; Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance; Schneider Electric; TEPCO and
Vattenfall.
Global EV Pilot City Programme

The Global EV Pilot City Programme, launched in May 2018, at the 9th Clean Energy
Ministerial, is one of the implementing actions of the EV30@30 Campaign. It aims to
build a network of at least 100 cities over an initial period of five years, to work
together on the promotion of electric mobility. Its central pillars are to facilitate
information exchange among cities and to encourage the replication of best
practices, for example through webinars and workshops. Another important element
is to use the network to build on experience gained by creating analytical outputs
and reports to help cities and other stakeholders learn from previous experiences of
member cities.
The IEA and the Shanghai International Automobile City (SIAC) serve as the joint
secretariat of the EVI Global EV Pilot City Programme.
A key activity under the Pilot City Programme in 2020 is the delivery of the EV City
Casebook and Policy Guide (the Casebook). The Casebook is a joint project under the
EVI and the Hybrid Electric Vehicles Technology Collaboration Programme (HEV TCP)
and will include policy recommendations for local governments interested in
supporting the deployment of electric vehicles as well as showcasing large-scale
electrification projects from across the world.
PAGE | 35
To date, 41 cities are participating in the Global EV Pilot City Programme:
Global EV Pilot City Programme members
Country Cities
Calgary, Halifax Regional Municipality, Montréal, Stratford, Surrey,

Canada
Richmond, Winnipeg, York
Chile Santiago de Chile
China Beijing, Rugao, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Yancheng
Colombia Medellín
Finland Helsinki, Espoo, Oulu, Tampere, Vantaa
Germany Offenbach am Main
India Pune
Japan Aichi, Kanagawa, Kyoto, Tokyo
Amsterdam, the Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Metropolitan Region

Netherlands
Amsterdam
New Zealand Christchurch, Hauraki
Norway Oslo
Sweden Stockholm
Thailand Betong, Nonthaburi
United Kingdom Coventry, Dundee, London
United States New York City
Drive to Zero Campaign

The EVI Advisory board approved in November 2019 to suggest a new CEM Campaign
focused on the deployment of zero-emission and near-zero commercial vans
(medium and heavy duty), the ‘Commercial Vehicle Drive to Zero Campaign’ (Drive
to Zero Campaign). It aims to bring together governments, and leading stakeholders
such as manufacturers and fleet users, to work collaboratively to set in place
requirements, policies, and programs that can support electrification of commercial
vehicles. The Campaign is to be launched at the next Clean Energy Ministerial in
2020. Its operating agent is CALSTART.
PAGE | 36
GEF-7 Global Programme on electromobility

In late 2020 or early 2021, the GEF-7 Global Electric Mobility Programme (the
Programme) will be launched. The Programme is funded by the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) and aims to support low and middle-income countries with a shift to
electromobility. Within the Programme, there are currently 1 global project and
27 country projects that will be implemented over a five-year period. The IEA will
together with UN Environment (UNEP) lead the global project, which aims to expand
and complement the work under EVI. Under the global project, the IEA and UNEP will,
through a number of working groups (light-duty vehicles, two/three-wheelers, heavy-
duty vehicles and system integration and batteries), produce knowledge products to
help transferring experience and knowledge to the country projects. Knowledge
transfer will be supported by regional platforms (Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin
America/Caribbean). In addition, the data tracking framework used for the Global EV
Outlook publications will be extended to the countries under the Programme. The
Programme will in parts be implemented in collaboration with the EC Solutions
Project – a project funded by European Union’s Horizon 2020 focused on EV
deployment in urban areas.
Clean Energy Ministerial Horizontal

Accelerator for power system integration of
EV infrastructure
The Clean Energy Ministerial Horizontal Accelerator for Power System Integration of
EV Infrastructure (CEM Horizontal Accelerator) was launched in 2019 as a new
mechanism for strengthening the collaboration and capitalising on the synergies
between four CEM work streams involving the International Smart Grid Action
Network (ISGAN), the 21st Century Power Partnership (21CPP), the Electric Vehicle
Initiative (EVI) and the Power System Flexibility (PSF) Campaign. The CEM Horizontal
Accelerator is a step towards developing a cross-sectoral and holistic approach to
power system integration. Project participants consist of a transdisciplinary group of
international experts and sector stakeholders from different levels of government,
research and industry with complementary knowledge and insights into the EV-
power system nexus.
Scope, content and structure of the report

This report analyses the development of the global EV market to May 2020. It includes
recent policy developments for the main markets relevant for EV and supply
PAGE | 37
equipment for deployment, technology development and the outlook for EVs to
2030. It focuses on electric vehicles, including full battery electric vehicles (BEVs)
and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs) used in road transport applications. Its
geographic scope attempts to be as broad as possible, as data availability permits.
The analyses are presented in five chapters:
 Chapter 1 looks at trends in electric mobility, highlighting the electric mobility

developments in the 2010s covering EV registrations (vehicle sales) and stocks,
including data for the first months of 2020 when available. It discusses the
underlying factors that have been driving demand. It summarises the early
impacts Covid-19 has had on the auto industry and more particularly on EV
markets.
 Chapter 2 looks at existing policies and strategies to deploy electric vehicles and
charging infrastructure. It highlights electric vehicle policies in place today as
well as updates since Global EV Outlook 2019. It includes a special focus on the
deployment of electric buses in cities compiling findings from four case studies.
It also covers industry announcements.
 Chapter 3 presents the outlook to 2030. It focuses on projections of EVs and
chargers, evaluating the impacts that these have on energy use, well-to-wheel
greenhouse gas emissions, battery production volumes and material demand. It
does so in the context of two scenarios, the Stated Policies Scenario and the
Sustainable Development Scenario, plus it explores possible effects of the Covid-
19 pandemic on EV deployment to 2030.
 Chapter 4 focuses on current and future EV battery technology developments
and life-cycle impacts, including reuse and recycling. It concludes with policy
recommendations.
 Chapter 5 focuses on the integration of EVs with power systems with an overview
of possible approaches to optimise it and reap benefits from synergies between
EVs and variable renewable electricity generation. It concludes with policy
recommendations
PAGE | 38
Global EV Outlook 2020 Trends in electric mobility
Chapter 1.
Trends in electric mobility
Electric mobility developments in the 2010s

Oil was the predominant energy source in the transport sector, providing 92% of final
energy over the past decade, down only two percentage points from 1973. Increased
demand for transport for people and goods called for more oil use, which was
accompanied by increased carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Today the transport
sector is responsible for nearly one-quarter of global energy-related direct CO2
emissions and is a significant contributor to air pollution. Global and local objectives
and commitments to improve climate and air quality underscore that the transport
sector has a critical role to play.
Even with the ongoing dominance of oil products in transport, these drivers drove
rapid change. Over the last decade momentum accelerated to deploy a range of
powertrains and alternative fuels. The 2010s were ground breaking for the
introduction of electric vehicles 1 and to shape a promising nascent market.
Electrification is a key technological strategy to reduce air pollution in densely
populated areas and a promising option to contribute to countries’ energy
diversification and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction objectives. Electric
vehicle benefits include zero tailpipe emissions, better efficiency than internal
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles and large potential for GHG emissions reduction
when coupled with a low-carbon electricity sector.
Hitting the commercial market in the first-half of the decade, the sales of electric
cars 2 have soared over the last five years. The top sellers were both fast growing
emblematic companies such as Tesla as well as established automakers such as
Nissan (Leaf model) and Renault (Zoe model). Notably, a rapidly developing industry
in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, “China”) had the biggest impact on
electric car sales.
Only about 17 000 electric cars were on the world’s roads in 2010. Just five countries
could count more than 1 000 on their roads: China, Japan, Norway,
1
The term electric vehicle includes battery electric vehicles (BEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and fuel
cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). This report focuses on BEVs and PHEVs, i.e. electric vehicles that are fuelled with
electricity from the grid. All figures and discussion exclude FCEVs unless otherwise stated.
2
In this report, “electric car” or “passenger electric car” refers to either a battery electric vehicle (BEV) or a plug-in
hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) in the passenger light-duty vehicle (PLDV) segment. It does not include hybrid electric
vehicles (HEVs) that cannot be plugged-in.
PAGE | 39
United Kingdom and United States. The electric vehicle (EV) market was in its infancy
and made up of early adopters.
Yet by 2019 there were about 7.2 million electric cars on the world’s roads. Nine
countries had more than 100 000 electric cars on the road (Figure 1.1). The global
stock remains concentrated in China, Europe and United States. At least 20 countries
reached market shares 3 above 1% in 2019. 4
Global electric car stock, 2010-19
8
Other PHEV
7
Other BEV
Electric car stock (millions)
6
US PHEV
5
US BEV
4
Europe PHEV
3
Europe BEV
2
China PHEV
1
China BEV
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 World BEV
Notes: PHEV = plug-in hybrid electric vehicle; BEV = battery electric vehicle. Other includes: Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Thailand. Europe includes: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 5,6 Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom.
Sources: IEA analysis based on country submissions, complemented by ACEA (2020); EAFO (2020c); EV-Volumes
(2020); Marklines (2020); OICA (2020); CAAM (2020).
In 2019, the global electric car stock reached 7.2 million units. Over the five-year period
(2014-19), the annual average increase was 60%.
3
Market share is defined in this report as the share of new EV registrations as a percentage of total new vehicle
registrations, whereas stock share refers to the share of EV stock as a percentage of total passenger vehicle stock.
4
These include: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Korea,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United
States.
5
Note by all the European Union Member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the
exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
6
Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the
island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the island. Turkey
recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the
context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
PAGE | 40
EVs are becoming commonplace in many cities across the world. Moreover,
electrification of transport is occurring across multiple modes. These include
personal cars, taxi, car-sharing, ride-hailing and municipal fleets, urban buses,
two/three-wheelers (especially in Asia), and increasingly in commercial and freight
vehicle segments.
Governments have introduced a range of ambitious policies to support and structure

a nascent EV industry. These include approaches to reduce adoption barriers and to
promote deployment of the needed charging infrastructure. Achievements in
technology advances and market development coalesce with the objectives of a
number of policy makers, industry players and civil society to portend further
acceleration of EV deployment in the 2020s which may significantly transform the
road transport sector.
The initial policy focus of many governments addressed early adoption barriers, in
particular the higher upfront cost of EVs relative to conventional vehicles, the
availability of charging infrastructure, range anxiety and limited consumer
knowledge about the technology. Incentives for EV purchases and measures to
support market development such as installing publicly accessible chargers and
procurement programmes for public vehicle fleets were key approaches to tackle
barriers during the initial phase. When it comes to supporting EV adoption,
differentiated vehicle taxation based on their environmental performance exists in a
number of countries, enabling an EV support mechanism that tends towards
revenue-neutrality.
In recent years, many policies have started to shift towards regulatory signals to set
out a vision for the longer term. These include EV mandates, such as the Zero
Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate in California and the ZEV States, 7 as well as the New
Energy Vehicle (NEV) mandate in China. These initiatives have typical target
timeframes of 2015, 2030 and/or 2040. 8 In addition, stringent vehicle fuel-economy
regulations and/or CO2 emissions regulations (e.g. European Union) provide strong
impetus for vehicle electrification. In 2019, these three policies (i.e. US states ZEV
mandates, China New Energy Vehicle [NEV] 9 and EU CO2 emissions regulation)
7
States with zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandates include California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island and Vermont and, as of March 2020, Washington in
the United States. For further information, see Chapter 2, section on US EV policies. The provinces of Québec and
British Columbia in Canada also have ZEV mandates in place.
8
For further details, see Annex B.1 and Annex B.2.
9
For a discussion of the definition of New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) in China and the regulatory framework that
applies to them, see the country policy profile of China in Chapter 2.
PAGE | 41
covered about 60% 10 of the global car market. 11 In addition, 17 countries have
announced 100% ZEV targets or the phase-out of ICE vehicles through 2050 (see
Chapter 2, Table 2.1). 12 Many cities around the world have announced or are looking
to establish zero-emission zones or bans on ICE vehicles, which have the potential to
steer electric car purchase decisions far beyond those urban borders. 13
Box 1.1 Government and consumer spending on electric cars
Spending on electric cars expanded significantly over the last decade. In 2019 it
totalled USD 90 billion, a 13% increase from the previous year.
Spending on electric cars by consumers and national governments, 2010-19
80
Spending on EVs (2019 USD Bn)
70
Consumer
60 spending
50
40
30
Government
20 spending
10
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Notes: Government incentives are the sum of direct government spending through purchase incentives and
foregone revenue due to taxes waived specifically for electric cars. Consumer spending is the total expenditure
based on model price, minus government spending. Only national government purchase support policies for
electric cars are taken into account.
Sources: IEA analysis based on Marklines (2020); IEA (2019a); EV-Volumes (2020).
10
In 2019, China represented about 30% of the global passenger car market, European Union accounted for 23%,
the US states with ZEV mandates represented 7% (IEA, 2020a; ICCT, 2019a).
11
It is worth noting that about 85% of global light-duty vehicle sales are in markets with fuel-economy standards
and/or CO2 emissions (but 25% of these sales are in countries without ZEV mandates).
12
To date, only a limited number of these announcements have been adopted into law.
13
For further information on announcements made in local jurisdictions, see table 2.4 in Global EV Outlook 2018 (IEA,
2018b).
PAGE | 42
Direct consumer spending
The 2019 increase in consumer spending was driven by an increase in overall sales
(up 6% from 2018) and by a higher average electric car price. The increase in price
was due to a higher share of electric cars sold in Europe (25% in 2019 versus 18% in
2018), which on average are 50% more expensive than their counterparts In China.
Government spending
Governments represent a substantial part of the spending on EVs through incentive

schemes and tax waivers. The recent trends in government spending and direct
consumer spending have diverged: while government expenditure contracted by 15%
to USD 11 billion in 2019, consumer expenditure increased by 19% to USD 79 billion.
Globally, the share of government spending decreased from 17% in 2018 to 12% in
2019. Changes to incentive schemes in the United States and China have driven the
drop in government spending, as discussed in the next section. 14
While government expenditure in Europe increased, decreases were observed in

China and the United States because average European incentives are on the lower
end of the spectrum, at around USD 4 000 per vehicle (with the exception of Norway,
where incentives, in the form of tax exemptions, are much higher).
Despite tremendous sales growth over the last decade, the number of electric
passenger cars still represents only a small fraction (under 1%) of all cars in circulation
worldwide. Electrification of vehicles is proceeding in parallel with other important
trends such as the popularity of large and more fuel consuming cars in many markets
(IEA, 2019a). 15 There are strong examples of EVs already being established or
emerging in specific contexts; for example the dominance of electric two/three-
wheelers in China, the near fully electrified bus and taxi systems in some Chinese
cities, and EV sales dominating the car market in Norway.
14
China’s central government subsidy levels decreased by about half between 2018 and 2019. In the United States,
the federal tax incentives decreased; vehicles from Tesla and General Motors did not receive the full tax credit of
USD 7 500 for BEVs in 2019, as they had reached their quota of 200 000 vehicles sold.
15
Large EV models, in particular sport utility vehicles (SUVs) are increasing their penetration levels in the range of
models that automakers offer (see Chapter 2, Expansion of electric car models).
PAGE | 43
Electric car market in 2019: Annual growth

slows, but market share increases
Electric car market in 2019
The global stock of electric passenger cars continued to expand at a rapid pace in
2019, reaching 7.2 million units, 40% higher than in 2018. While significant, this pace
was slower than in previous years as the stock expanded by 63% in 2018 and 58% in
2017. Over the last decade, only in 2019 was the year-on-year growth below 50%.
Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) accounted for 67% of the world’s electric car fleet in
2019.
Nearly half (47%) of the world’s electric car fleet was in China in 2019, up from 45%
in 2018. The stock of 3.4 million electric cars in China in 2019 was a 46% increase
from the previous year. Europe, with 1.7 million electric cars, accounted for 25% of
the global stock in 2019, and 1.5 million units in the United States represented 20%.
By far, Norway was the global leader based on shares of electric cars, at 13% of the
total stock in 2019. 16 The second, Iceland, tallied 4.4% of electric cars in total stock.
Even with the ongoing expansion of electric car sales, only five countries, including
four members of the Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI), 17 had an electric car stock share
higher than 1.5% in 2019: Norway (13%), Iceland (4.4%), Netherlands (2.7%), Sweden
(2.0%) and China (1.6%).
Global electric car sales surpassed the 2 million mark in 2019 (2.1 million), just two
years after having crossed the 1 million mark in 2017. Worldwide the market share of
electric cars reached 2.6% in 2019, an all-time high (up from 2.4% in 2018 and 1.5% in
2017), even though the year-on-year growth in electric car sales saw the lowest value
in a decade, dropping to 6%, down from 69% in 2018. China remained the world’s
largest electric car market at over 50% of global sales; with 1.06 million electric cars
sold in 2019, 2% less than the previous year. Europe was the second-largest electric
16
In this analysis, EV sales and stock in Norway do not account for second-hand imported electric vehicles (about
10% of passenger car sales in 2019) to avoid double counting with exporting countries. This factor can be explained
by the high demand for EVs in Norway, which is a challenge for manufacturers to supply enough vehicles. As a
result, there is a trend to import newly registered electric cars from other European countries. A number of second-
hand EVs from other countries are also imported in Norway because of their cheaper price relative to new vehicles.
17
The Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) is a multi-government policy forum under the Clean Energy Ministerial
dedicated to accelerating the introduction and adoption of electric vehicles. It is co-ordinated by the International
Energy Agency. Thirteen countries currently participate in the EVI: Canada, China, Chile, Finland, France, Germany,
India, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom. For further information, see the
introduction to this report.
PAGE | 44
car market in 2019, with sales of 561 000 units. In 2019 in both China and Europe,
the market share for electric cars rose to their highest point so far – 4.9% and 3.5%
respectively – in the context of declining total car sales. The United States was the
third-largest electric car market with sales of 327 000 units.
In Europe, electric car sales in 2019 increased by 50% relative to 2018, a growth
rate that is significantly higher than the previous year (32%). Moreover, the
countries with the highest shares of electric cars in overall car sales are in Europe.
The top two were Norway at 56% and Iceland at 22%. In the Netherlands, the electric
car market share increased to 15% in 2019, up from 6% in 2018. Germany surpassed
Norway in 2019 for the highest sales volume at 109 000 electric cars (a 61%
increase relative to 2018). France, Netherlands and United Kingdom each has sales
volumes above 50 000 electric cars in 2019.
Electric car sales in the United States fell by 10% in 2019 versus 2018, when a surge
of Tesla Model 3 deliveries made up a very significant portion of new electric car
registrations. In Canada, registrations continued to increase (up 15% relative to
2018) to more than 55 000 units in 2019. Japan is the only major electric car market
where sales fell for a second year in a row (down 14%); in Korea sales dropped for
the first time (down 9%).
Worldwide, BEV sales rose 14% in 2019 relative to 2018, while plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEV) sales declined 10%. BEVs accounted for almost three-quarters of
worldwide electric car sales in 2019. The share of BEVs increased steadily from 50%
in 2012 to 68% in 2018, closely mirroring the rapid growth in electric car sales in
China, which is a market dominated by BEVs (79%). The share of PHEVs in electric
car sales dropped in the United States from 34% in 2018 to 26% in 2019, in the
context of strong BEV sales. Europe remained a strong market for PHEV sales; they
dominated in Finland (76%), Sweden (61%) and constituted nearly half the electric
car sales in the United Kingdom (49%). Nonetheless, in 2019, each country
represented in Figure 1.2 saw a decreasing share of PHEVs in total electric vehicles
sales relative to 2018.
PAGE | 45
Passenger electric car sales and market share in selected countries and
regions, 2013-19
New electric car sales (thousands)
1 500 6%
Dark shade: BEVs
1 250 5%
Electric car market share

Light shade: PHEVs
1 000 Market share of new 4%
electric cars
750 3%
500 2%
250 1%
0 0%
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
China United States Europe Other
120 20%
57%
56%
55%
18%
New electric car sales (thousands)
100 16%
Electric car market share

80 14%
12%
60 10%
8%
40 6%
20 4%
2%
0 0%
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
2013
2019
Japan Germany United France Canada Korea Netherlands Sweden Norway
Kingdom
Note: Regions and countries in this figure represent the largest electric vehicle markets and are ordered by size of
their conventional car market.
Sources: IEA analysis based on country submissions, complemented by ACEA (2020); EAFO (2020c); EV-Volumes
(2020); Marklines (2020); OICA (2020); CAAM (2020).
The worldwide market share of electric cars reached a record high of 2.6% in 2019,
expanding in all major markets except Japan, Korea and United States.
Forces driving the 2019 trends

Although the sales and market shares of electric cars reached new records in 2019,
there was a significant slowdown in the overall growth of electric car sales compared
with previous years. There are three underlying reasons: contracting vehicle markets;
cuts in electric car purchase subsidies in some key regions; and consumer
expectations of further technology improvements and new EV models.
Car markets contract

Total passenger car sales volumes were depressed in 2019 in many key countries.
Car markets that were fast growing in the 2010s for all types of vehicles, such as
China and India, had lower sales in 2019 than in 2018. In China, total passenger car
sales dropped 8% in 2019 on the heels of a 4% decline in 2018 from the previous year.
In India, the car market dropped 13% bucking the trend of year-on-year growth rates
above 3% since 2014. In the United States, total vehicle sales volumes dipped nearly
PAGE | 46
2% (Europe differed and saw an uptick of 1% in car sales volumes). Against this
backdrop of sluggish sales volumes in 2019, the 2.5% market share of electric cars in
worldwide car sales constitutes a record. In particular, China at 4.9% and Europe at
3.5% achieved new records in EV market share in 2019.
Cuts in purchase subsidies

Incentives in the form of purchase subsidies and tax reductions to alleviate purchase
costs were key drivers in all expanding electric car markets in the 2010s. 18 There is
common understanding that government support for EV purchases can only be
transitional, not least because of the potential volume of support needed as sale
volumes increase. In the near term, a point will be reached when technology learning
and economies of scale will have driven down the purchase costs of EVs and mass
market adoption is triggered. Accurately anticipating consumer adoption and
technology cost improvements is important to identify financial limits in providing
direct support to an increasing number of adopters. 19, 20
In many countries, EV
purchases are regularly observed just before subsidy schemes are diminished or
eliminated. These can impact monthly and annual sales data, and reflect timely action
on the part of EV purchasers to take advantage of subsidies, rather than very short-
term consumer interest variations.
China cut subsidies for electric car purchases by about half in 2019 as part of a
gradual phase out of direct incentives set out in 2016. 21 The effect on the electric car
market was immediate, with a striking fall in sales in July 2019 when the policy change
took effect and in subsequent months. 22 In late 2019 a pause in the roll back of the
subsidy was proclaimed and in March 2020 it was announced that the subsidiy
scheme would be maintained until 2022. The intention is to maintain the EV market,
in particular in light of the Covid-19 crisis, although the government retains a near-
term plan to phase out subsidies and transition to other policies to support EV market
uptake (e.g. NEV mandate, licence plate control, circulation restrictions). The effect
18
Details on purchase subsidies and tax reductions in selected countries are presented in Chapter 2, Figure 2.2.
19
There are also revenue-neutral policy mechanisms that aim to balance government support with direct revenue
streams from the sale of particularly polluting and/or GHG-emitting cars, for example the Bonus-Malus scheme in
France.
20
These considerations are also relevant when considering a long term, high penetration of alternative powertrain
vehicles on the road and their impact on government revenue from fuel taxation. A shift in transport taxation taking
into account a diversification of fuels and technologies is an important aspect for governments to take into account.
This was extensively discussed in Global EV Outlook 2019, Chapter 5, section “Government revenue from taxation”
(IEA, 2019b).
21
After a few years of China gradually reducing EV subsidies, local government subsidies were fully ended and
national subsidies were cut by more than half relative to 2018.
22
The market response to changes (up or down) in direct government support to consumers was discussed
extensively in the Global EV Outlook 2017 (Table 1) (IEA, 2017).
PAGE | 47
of the 2019 subsidy change on the electric car market therefore may be considered
short term, noting that in parallel the government is boosting its 2025 NEV sales
target from 15-20% to 25% and tightening the credit allocation to NEVs in its NEV
mandate.
Legislation in the United States includes a phase-out schedule for the programme
that provides federal tax credits per automaker. The tax credit applies to electric car
sales up to 200 000 units, from that point it is phased out over the subsequent year. 23
Electric car manufacturers such as Tesla and General Motors (and some others)
reached that cap in 2019 and saw the subsidies applicable to their models decline.
Many states are responding to these reductions in federal subsidies by introducing
or augmenting EV purchase subsidies (AFDC, 2020a).
Consumer expectations of further technology

improvements and new EV models
Significant technology improvements have increased the attractiveness of electric
cars for consumers. The 2018-19 versions of some common electric car models such
as the Nissan Leaf, Renault Zoe and Tesla display a battery energy density that is
20-100% higher than their equivalents in 2011-12 (BNEF, 2020). Plus, battery costs
have decreased by more than 85% since 2010. The range of electric car models on
offer has mushroomed; worldwide some 250 models were available in 2019
compared with around 70 in 2014. Another 200 models have been announced and
expected to come to market by 2025 (EV-Volumes, 2020). 24 Charging times are also
becoming less of a concern, in particular for long distance travel, thanks to
technological progress in fast charging (with chargers of 250-500 kilowatts [kW] for
cars being deployed or announced, an advance from the 50-120 kW capacity of most
current electric car models.)
Today’s electric car market profile is evolving from being populated by early adopter
and technophile purchasers. Significant potential exists for further technical
performance improvements and cost reductions, which places mainstream
consumers in the position of being attracted to a product but wondering if it would
be wise to wait for the “upcoming and better model” to roll out in the coming years;
automakers have announced a diversified menu of coming electric car models, many
of which are expected in 2020 or 2021. Examples include the Volkswagen ID.3,
23
Electric cars receive 100% of the US federal tax credit up to 200 000 sales by car maker, then 50% of the federal
tax credit for the following six months, 25% for the following six months after which the tax credit is fully phased
out.
24
See Chapter 2, Expansion of electric car models section.
PAGE | 48
Toyota RAV4 Prime and Tesla Model Y. With the next expected deliveries of Tesla’s
Model 3 – its more affordable and mainstream model (in particular in China) – it is
possible that consumer interest in EVs will surge. 25
Box 1.2 Fuel cell electric vehicles
Fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) are a type of electric vehicle in which hydrogen
combines with oxygen in a fuel cell to generate the electricity needed to power an
electric motor. FCEVs have the potential to be zero-emission vehicles since the
utilisation of hydrogen in fuel cells does not generate GHG emissions. However,
similar to other EVs that use electricity as an energy carrier, the overall GHG emissions
of FCEVs depend on the method used to produce hydrogen. To ensure GHG emission
reductions relative to conventional fossil fuels for transport, hydrogen would need to
be produced either from fossil fuel technologies coupled with carbon capture and
storage or from electrolysis using low-carbon electricity (IEA, 2019c).
FCEV sales have only begun to reach beyond the thousands in the last few years.
Policy momentum is accelerating and sales volumes in 2019 were notable. Yet the
number of FCEVs currently in use is significantly less than levels of BEVs or PHEVs: for
every fuel cell electric car on the road in 2019 there were about 120 PHEVs and nearly
250 BEVs. This reflects diverse factors such as the later introduction of FCEVs to the
market, fewer vehicle models on the commercial market and higher investment
requirements per refuelling station.
FCEV stock
Total sales of FCEVs in 2019 was 12 350, bringing the global stock to 25 210 units
(including passenger cars, buses and trucks) (AFC TCP, 2020). This roughly doubles
the figures from 2018, when global sales were 5 800 units and total stock was
12 950 FCEVs. 26
Passenger cars account for the majority of FCEV sales and stocks. Models from Toyota
(Mirai), Hyundai (Nexo) and Honda (Clarity Fuel Cell) dominate the market. BMW plans
to start producing a small number of crossovers (Hydrogen NEXT) from 2022.
Practically all the FCEVs in Japan, Korea and United States are passenger cars.
25
This effect was observed in Japan in 2017. PHEV sales nearly quadrupled relative to 2016 stimulated by the
introduction of the next-generation PHEV Prius. This growth rate was unmatched by BEVs in that year or by PHEVs in
any other year,
26
The stock and sales figures include only vehicles already operational at the end of 2019; vehicles ordered but not
delivered are not included.
PAGE | 49
Similarly, the European stock is dominated by cars (almost 95%), although there are
also a few buses (80) and trucks (28 light-duty vehicles and eight heavy-duty trucks). 27
The United States has the highest percentage of the global FCEV stock, mostly cars.
But China’s stock of FCEVs is escalating reflecting rapid deployment of fuel cell
electric buses (from 3 400 in 2018 to 4 300 in 2019) and commercial vehicles (from
1 300 in 2018 to 1 800 in 2019). Fuel cell electric buses account for almost 70% of the
current FCEV stock in China and road freight vehicles for most of the remaining 30%,
while fuel cell electric cars are only about 1% of the FCEV stock. Thus China dominates
the global stock of fuel cell electric buses (97%) and road freight vehicles (98%). By
developing refuelling of these commercial vehicles at large and centralised stations
that acquire by-product hydrogen from nearby chemical plants, China has effectively
implemented the most promising near-term business model to deploy FCEVs at scale
in operations with cost competitiveness to other zero-emission technology options
(highlighted in The Future of Hydrogen (IEA, 2019c)). Few fuel cell electric heavy-duty
trucks are in operation, reflecting the limited availability of fuel cell electric trucks
models on offer.
Global shares of fuel cell electric vehicles and hydrogen refuelling stations, and
shares by vehicle mode and country, 2019
FCEVs (25 210 worldwide) and HRS (470 worldwide) Share of type of fuel cell vehicle by country
(Global: cars 75%, buses 18% and trucks 7%)
100%
6%
3%
80%
United States
14% 32%
China
Share (%)
20% 25% 60%

Japan 13%
Korea HRS 40%
Germany 17%
20%
RoW 24%
7%
14% 0%
Korea Japan United China Europe
25% FCEV States
Cars Buses Trucks

Notes: FCEVs = fuel cell electric vehicles; HRS = hydrogen refuelling stations; RoW = rest of world. Global fleet
shares include fuel cell electric passenger cars, buses and trucks.
Source: All fuel cell vehicle data reported in this figure and section are based on the annual data submission of
the Advanced Fuel Cell Technology Collaboration Platform (AFC TCP) to the IEA secretariat (AFC TCP, 2020).
27
Vans with fuel cell range extenders are included within passenger cars figures.
PAGE | 50
Hydrogen refuelling stations
By the end of 2019, 470 hydrogen refuelling stations (HRS) were in operation
worldwide, an increase of more than 20% from the previous year. Japan has the most
with 113 HRS stations, followed by Germany (81) and the United States (64). In China,
the number of HRS increased threefold in 2019 (from 20 to 61). Currently, deploying
HRS require subsidies although some innovative business models are being tested.
This is the case in Germany (H2Mobility), where stations are built on a joint venture
basis between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), fuel suppliers and HRS
manufacturers.
Favourable total costs of ownership for FCEVs – in particular for long distance and
high energy demand heavy-duty vehicle applications where hydrogen fuel cell
powertrains are most competitive – depend critically on competitive costs for fuel
cell and hydrogen delivery. Cost reductions for fuel cells are expected through mass
manufacturing and learning-by-doing. For hydrogen delivery, in addition to the costs
of production, transmission and distribution, the size and utilisation rate of a HRS has
a critical impact on the final hydrogen delivered price. 28 Achieving high utilisation
rates is particularly challenging during the early phase of FCEV deployment, as the
HRS siting and scale need to be carefully rolled out to service refuelling demand.
Other factors that contribute to the favourable case of FCEVs in long-haul transport
are the lower refuelling times and the higher energy intensity of stored hydrogen in
FCEVs compared with the other electric vehicle types.
EV markets in 2020: the potential impacts of

Covid-19 and government responses
The market developments of the last decade and the shared visions among some
policy makers, industry players and civil society suggest a potentially transformative
further acceleration of EV adoption during the 2020s. At the outset of this decade,
however, the Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted economic activity and markets
around the world. How electric vehicles and the road transport sector progress will
28
The impact of HRS size and utilisation on the delivered price of hydrogen, as well as suggestions for policies and
operations that could foster the deployment of FCEVs where they are most competitive in the near term. (Discussed
in Chapter 5 of The Future of Hydrogen [IEA, 2019c]).
PAGE | 51
hinge on how consumers and the global EV industry emerge from the crisis and what
policy makers do to further bolster EV market uptake.
Many uncertainties surround the pandemic’s implications on electric car markets

over the next years. The extent and pace of the potential rebound of the auto-industry
will depend on a range of factors, including the pace at which confinement measures
are eased, potential second waves of the pandemic, the pace of economic recovery
and the willingness and ability of consumers and businesses to purchase new cars.
Government policy will also be critical (IEA, 2020b).
The impact of Covid-19 on car sales and manufacturing
Overall car sales slumped with the outbreak of Covid-19

To understand market expectations for electric cars, it is important to look at them in
the context of overall car market trends. The first four months of 2020 have seen an
unprecedented drop in global car sales. Global car sales between January and April
this year dropped by about one-third from the same period in 2019, with around 9
million fewer cars sold.
On a monthly basis, the decline in sales was even more pronounced, mirroring the
timing and stringency of the lockdowns across many countries. China, the world’s
largest car market, registered its sharpest year-on-year decline in February. Car sales
in China almost always dip in February because of the Lunar New Year holiday. But
this year, they plummeted by 80% compared with February 2019.
Other major car markets experienced their heaviest declines in April. In the United
States, they roughly halved year on year; in Germany, they dropped about 60%; and
in France, they plunged nearly 90%. In the United Kingdom and Italy, sales dropped
by 98% in April, signalling a complete breakdown of those markets. For India virtually
no car sales were reported.
Initial signs in countries where the lockdown is gradually easing suggest the potential
for a quick recovery. In China, policy makers were quick to identify the auto market
as a primary target for economic stimulus and encouraged cities to relax car permit
quotas, among other measures. Chinese car sales rebounded strongly in April to
reach 80% of the level registered in the same month a year earlier. Fears of Covid-19
also were reported to be bolstering sales, with driving generally seen as posing a
lower risk of infection than taking public transport. In Korea, where the spread of the
virus was contained quickly, car sales actually registered an increase over 2019 levels
in both March and April. In the first half of 2020, we currently expect global car sales
to be around 30% lower than in the same period last year (IEA, 2020b).
PAGE | 52
The impact of the crisis on electric car sales in early 2020

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic also brought about a dramatic decline in
electric car sales. In China, the drop followed that of overall car sales. The decline
was largest in February, with electric car sales falling to 16 000 vehicles, a plunge of
around 60% from the same month in 2019. Sales rebounded strongly in April,
reaching around 80% of the level they were at a year earlier. In the United States,
electric car sales in April more than halved from a year earlier to about
10 000 vehicles.
Electric car sales in European countries bucked the trend of the overall car market
for a variety of reasons. 2020 is the target year of the European Union’s CO2 emissions
standards, which limit average CO2 emissions per kilometre driven of new car sales.
In addition, Germany increased electric car purchase subsidies in February, and the
impacts of the system introduced in Italy in 2019 to encourage electric cars started
to affect the market.
The result: in the largest European car markets combined (France, Germany, Italy and
the United Kingdom), sales of electric cars in the first four months of 2020 reached
more than 145 000 electric cars, about 90% higher than in the same period last year.
In Norway, the country with the highest share of electric cars in overall car sales, the
number of electric cars sold between January and April 2020 was about the same as
in the same period in 2019 (IEA, 2020b).
The impacts of Covid-19 on vehicle manufacturing

Around the world, the reaction to the pandemic shuttered production lines of vehicle
manufacturers as well as OEMs along the supply chain. Hubei province is one of
China’s main hubs for automotive parts production and the area where the
coronavirus was first identified, and so the outbreak had an asymmetric impact on
manufacturers. Neither the Wuhan-based Dongfeng Group (the largest state-owned
automobile manufacturer in terms of NEV sales), nor its joint ventures with Honda
and Renault produced any vehicles in February 2020. Production gradually resumed
afterwards. According to the Chinese Association of Automobile Manufacturers, 90%
of factories had resumed work by 11 March 2020, with 77% of workers having
returned. By 9 March, of the 13 automotive parts groups surveyed, six had restored
all factories and five had restored over 80% of their factories. Actual production
showed slower recovery: by 11 March, the average production rate was less than 40%
among the surveyed groups (Caixin, 2020).
In February 2020, battery manufacturers produced 0.9 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of

batteries on top of the 0.6 GWh that were installed on cars. Prices of key parts and
materials declined in the first-half of March. Longer term, the pace at which EV sales
PAGE | 53
pick up in China will determine the battery supply and demand balance; battery
manufacturers in China lost about two months of production. The policy response in
China to deal with the impacts of the pandemic on the automotive industry as well as
on NEVs has been rapid. On 3 February China’s president requested to “stabilize
automobile sales and encourage relaxing car permit quotas”. Since then, several
policies and measures have been adopted at a national, provincial or city level, both
to bolster overall car markets as well as NEV sales (see Chapter 2).
What to expect from the global car market in 2020

We currently expect overall car sales in 2020 to be around 15% (or 13 million cars)
lower than in 2019, with the largest drops registered in Europe, the United States and
China. This represents a historic drop twice the size of the decline that occurred
between 2008 and 2009.
Electric cars are likely to have a much better 2020 than the rest of the auto industry.
They are gradually becoming competitive in some countries on the basis of the total
cost of ownership (which includes fuel expenses as well as purchase costs), even if
the recent plunge in oil prices has eroded that somewhat. But the high upfront
investment for consumers – electric car prices are still higher than those of
conventional cars – mean that the electric car market still relies on government
support.
But the Covid-19 crisis has raised concerns that the economic crisis could lead
governments to relax fuel efficiency standards to lower the pressure on struggling
automakers, or reduce support measures for electric cars to free up funds for use
elsewhere. That has not happened so far. China announced it would extend the
purchase subsidies that it had originally planned to discontinue this year until 2022 –
albeit at a slightly reduced rate. Italy also revised its existing programmes with
additional funds available for 2021 and 2022 as well as an extra EUR 1 500 (USD 1 700)
per electric vehicle if an old car is scrapped. France announced temprorarily
strengthened EV subsidies and cash-for-clunker programme, applicable between
June and December 2020. In addition, the typical electric car buyer still tends to be
wealthier than the average consumer and might be less affected by the economic
downturn. And around 100 new electric car models are expected to become
available over the course of 2020, increasing the choice for potential customers.
Against this backdrop, it is quite possible that global electric car sales in 2020 will be
more resilient than the overall car market, experiencing a substantially lower impact
of the pandemic. Our central estimate today is for global electric car sales to broadly
match or even slightly exceed 2019’s total to reach more than 2.3 million and achieve
PAGE | 54
a record share of the overall car market of more than 3%. This would bring up the
total number of electric cars on the road worldwide to a new record of about
10 million (IEA, 2020b).
However, many uncertainties remain, such as what possible behavioural changes

could be expected from the current crisis and confinement measures. As cities are
gradually emerging from lockdowns, some of them are placing temporary
restrictions on the frequency and occupancy of public transport, raising the risk of a
spike in car traffic. Many cities, particularly in Europe, are therefore rapidly putting
together policies to rethink the use of urban space and promote walking and cycling.
At the same time, however, national governments may look to reduce potential
employment losses in the auto industry through measures that stimulate car sales. 29
The greatest uncertainties though are with possible second waves of the pandemic
(which are not considered in our estimate) and with the pace of economic recovery
along with their impacts on consumer and corporate spending.
Governments’ responses to Covid-19 determines the

pace of the transition to electric cars
Today, electric cars in many markets are subject to a host of incentives and regulatory
efforts. Most global electric car sales involve a financial incentive from governments
that often takes the form of direct purchase subsidies or tax reductions. Ultimately,
government responses to the Covid-19 crisis will contribute to determining what
happens to electric car markets in 2020 and beyond. Sales could go into decline if
governments weaken fuel economy standards or electric vehicle mandates – or if
they implement an early phase-out of the subsidies for electric vehicle purchases. On
the other hand, targeted and direct support measures, including for recharging
infrastructure, could help push sales higher.
The car industry is a critical part of economic activity in many of the world’s largest
economies employing millions of people across the entire supply chain. It has been
impacted severely during the Covid-19 crisis, with practically all major car
manufacturers halting production lines for varying periods of time. The challenge for
governments now is to craft the appropriate policy response. It is reasonable to
expect that stimulus packages will seek to bolster the economy in countries with
important vehicle manufacturing capacity by including measures to support the
automotive industry, not least given their relevance for the labour market. While such
29
Longer-term policy and behavioural drivers and possible electric car stock outlooks to 2030 resulting from the
Covid-19 crisis are explored in Chapter 3, Box 3.1, in addition to the principal Stated Policies and Sustainable
Develpoment scenarios.
PAGE | 55
measures will inevitably help boost EV sales as well, targeted measures to support EV
sales in particular will be required to ensure that the electrification of road transport
remains on track towards the postulated goals.
There is a need for governments to sustain confidence among manufacturers in their

near- and long-term objectives for road vehicle electrification. 30 Clear and targeted
measures to boost EV sales in the near term are critical. But there is a risk that the
financial liquidity of the auto industry will be reduced in the fall-out from the
pandemic; supporting access to targeted and time-limited loans, guarantees and
other tools can help the private sector to continue to invest. Favourable loans, with
low interest rates and/or public co-funding, could help public or corporate fleets for
bulk procurement of electric cars, buses and trucks. Governments can additionally
provide signals to consumers and manufacturers by spurring investment in the
infrastructure necessary to boost EV deployment such as charging facilities and by
aligning complementary policies such as codes requiring charging stations in new
construction or refurbishment. Infrastructure investment will bolster confidence in
the uptake of EVs and the associated construction activity will support job creation
or preservation.
Past experience of automotive industry stimulus measures has been mixed. Cash-for-
clunkers programmes can be an effective approach if they are designed to support
the uptake of more efficient (e.g. hybrid) and electric cars. In past stimulus packages,
however, such considerations were not always adequately addressed and sales of
SUVs and diesel cars were boosted, which pushed up global oil demand and air
pollution. Support for the auto industry can also be tied to ambitious fuel economy
regulations, which in the past triggered innovation and helped jump start key parts
of today’s electric car industry. In countries where fossil fuel subsidies prevail, the
low oil price environment (Box 1.3) is an important opportunity to phase out price
supports, which are detrimental for pursuing energy efficiency efforts in general, and
for creating a context that supports road vehicle electrification in particular.
Examples of early responses from governments are available in Chapter 2.
30
For further information on Automakers ambitions for EV production and sales, see Chapter 2.
PAGE | 56
Box 1.3 Cheap gasoline inflates the payback period for electric cars
EVs have an initial higher purchase price than their ICE counterparts. From a
consumer perspective, the main economic advantage of owning an electric car is
lower running cost; electric powertrains have lower maintenance costs and,
depending on fuel and electricity prices, generally lower operating costs (IEA, 2018b;
IEA, 2019b). A key determinant of this cost difference is the price of fuel. In countries
with high levels of fuel taxation, consumers recover the extra purchase price faster.
In a low oil price environment, the costs of fuelling ICEs are reduced. If the price of
oil remains low, then the economic case for EVs will be hindered in most countries:
assuming oil prices of USD 25 per barrel, it could take 1-2.5 extra years to recover the
extra costs associated with an EV compared with an average oil price of USD 60 per
barrel. The impact is smaller in countries with higher fuel taxation, since a larger
portion of the fuel price at the pump is less directly dependent on oil prices. Increased
payback times are likely to have a greater impact on the medium and small car
segments, where consumers are more likely to be budget constrained.
Increased payback time for electric cars due to lower oil prices
3.0
Years
2.5
2.0
Increased
1.5 payback time
1.0
0.5
0.0
Germany United States China

Notes: The payback period is calculated as the time needed to recover the extra costs associated with the
purchase of an electric car. Costs are recovered due to the lower fuel and maintenance costs of an electric car
compared to an ICE. The increase in payback period for an oil price of USD 25 per barrel compared with
USD 60 USD per barrel is calculated for a typical vehicle in the three countries. The fuel tax rate is about 60% in
Germany and just under 20% in China and the United States. No discount rate is included. For more detailed
information on cost comparisons between EVs and ICE vehicles, refer to the Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA,
2019b).
Source: Analysis based on IEA (2020).

PAGE | 57
Electric mobility trends in other modes

Micromobility
Electric micromobility services have expanded rapidly since their emergence in
2017. 31 Shared electric scooters (e-scooters), electric-assist bicycles (e-bikes) and
electric mopeds are now available in over 600 cities across more than 50 countries
worldwide (NUMO, 2020). In most markets, e-scooters account for the largest
proportion of shared micromobility vehicles and trips. Nonetheless, micromobility
remains a small share of trips and travel distance overall.
In China, European Union and United States, around half of passenger-kilometres

(pkm) are trips under 8 kilometres (km), so the potential market for micromobility is
immense (McKinsey & Company, 2019). Globally, shared e-scooter trips are expected
to quadruple from around 230 million trips in 2019 to 850 million by 2028 (Navigant
Research, 2019). Dense cities such as Paris could see cycling and micromobility
services account for a fifth of all trips by 2030 (Schuller and Aboukrat, 2019).
Micromobility services can help reduce local air pollution, making them particularly
attractive mobility options in cities.
Share of trips under 15 km in the United States and suitable trip distances of
mobility options
15%
Share of trips
10%
5%
0%
0 3 6 9 12 15
Trip distance, km
Walking
Shared e-scooter
Shared e-bicycle
Ride-sourcing
Car sharing
Public transit

Note: Trip frequency shares are for trips shorter than 15 km only.
Source: IEA analysis based on BCG (2019).
The average distance of trips varies across modes. Electric micromobility modes are a
viable substitute only for the shorter range of car trips in major cities.
31
Micromobility is defined by SAE Ground Vehicle Standard J3194 as “vehicles that have a curb weight of less than
or equal to 500 pounds (227 kilogrammes) and a top speed of 30 miles per hour (48 kilometres per hour) or less”
(SAE, 2019). This section focusses on small micromobility vehicles such as standing electric scooters (e-scooters)
and electric bicycles (e-bikes). The next sections discuss two/three-wheelers and four-wheel low speed EVs.
PAGE | 58
The energy and emissions implications of micromobility depend primarily on two

factors: modal shifts (i.e. which modes are displaced and/or complemented) and the
life-cycle energy and emissions intensity of micromobility services. 32
Actual use data of shared micromobility are limited. According to early user surveys,
a quarter to half of e-scooter rides replaced a trip that would have been taken by car,
and 20% of e-scooter trips in cities provided first/last-mile 33 services to connect to
public transit (Bird, 2019; City of Santa Monica, 2019; Lime, 2019). However, other
surveys found that nearly half of micromobility trips displaced trips that would have
been taken by walking or non-motorised cycling (6-t, 2019; City of Santa Monica,
2019; Grow Mobility, 2019; Hollingsworth, Copeland and Johnson, 2019). While
micromobility also displaces some trips on public transit, it is at the same time an
important last-mile and public transport connection solution, and is an enabler of
increased mobility access.
Studies analysing the energy and emissions performance of micromobility vehicles

and services are emerging. Hollingsworth et al. (2019) found that shared e-scooters
in Raleigh, North Carolina (United States) had lower life-cycle GHG emissions
intensity per passenger (126 grammes of CO2-equivalent per passenger kilometre
[gCO2-eq/pkm]) than conventional personal cars, but higher emissions than a public
bus with high ridership. 34 Moreau et al. (2020) estimated life-cycle GHG emissions of
131 gCO2-eq/pkm for shared e-scooters in Brussels, nearly 20% higher than the
modes they displaced. The same study found that personal e-scooters today have
much lower life-cycle emissions (67 gCO2-eq/pkm), primarily as a result of longer
lifetimes compared to shared e-scooters.
These studies highlight both the current sustainability challenges as well as the
considerable opportunities to reduce GHG emissions. With over 90% of e-scooter
life-cycle GHG emissions associated with materials, manufacturing and transporting
scooters overnight, longer lifetimes and zero-emission support fleets can
substantially reduce life-cycle emissions.
32
Life-cycle energy use and emissions from micromobility services include those associated with materials and
components, manufacturing, transport (from the location of manufacture to final use), use and operations
(collection and distribution, electricity for charging) and end-of-life processing.
33
Micromobility services offer considerable potential to provide first-mile/last-mile connections to mass transit,
which could have considerable indirect benefits by reducing overall energy use, and CO2 and local pollutant
emissions.
34
Some of the study’s base case assumptions are fairly conservative (e.g. daily scooter collection and recharging
regardless of state of charge), which work to inflate the emissions intensity. The study includes sensitivity analyses
around key uncertainties such as collection travel distance, scooter use and scooter lifetime.
PAGE | 59
As the industry matures, micromobility companies are building and deploying

substantially more durable scooters compared to previous generations, which were
designed for private consumer use. The introduction of swappable components and
batteries are helping to reduce downtimes and extend lifetime (Lewin, 2019). Several
companies are electrifying their support fleets, with some targeting a 100% EV fleet
in 2020 (either by electric vans or electric cargo bikes).
Cities will play an increasingly vital role in encouraging broader and safer
micromobility use, and in improving its environmental performance. For example,
procurement and permitting strategies could select companies and services
operating zero-emission fleets (or committing to them). Thoughtful planning
decisions around building protected lanes, improving micromobility parking spaces
and enforcing speed limits can boost public acceptance, adoption and safety (ITF,
2020). Increasing the number of micromobility users could also help broaden the
coalition for support of cycling infrastructure and road space shifting in favour of less
space-intensive modes.
Beyond personal mobility, electric micromobility vehicles – notably e-cargo bicycles

– can play an increasing role in last-mile delivery in cities. E-cargo bikes are being
used across several European cities by postal and courier services, including PostNL,
Swiss Post, La Poste, Deutsche Post and DHL.
In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, shared micromobility companies have

drastically reduced or suspended services due to confinement and social distancing
measures, which induced plummeting demand. Some operators are running reduced
fleets with strict hygiene maintenance protocols. The financial impacts so far have
hit the start-ups in the shared micromobility landscape hardest (many of which were
not yet making a profit). This is the case even for the two largest companies with Bird
cutting 30% of its workforce in late March 2020, and a report estimated that Lime
only had enough cash to survive until mid-June (Bliss, 2020; Lanxon and Cheng,
2020).In the near term, significant market consolidation of operators seems
inevitable, given the financial challenges for many operators even before the
pandemic. Post-pandemic mobility preferences of users (including their future
preference for either shared or private micromobility vehicles) will likely play a very
large role in their viability in the long term. Bearing in mind the potential to reduce
both car travel and high occupancy on collective public transport, the degree of
active local policy support towards micromobility will be key to its viability in urban
transport.
PAGE | 60
Two- and three- wheelers
Two-wheelers
China leads the electric two-wheeler market with the largest fleet and annual sales.
In late 2019, the stock of electric two-wheelers in China was close to 300 million units
(Xinhua News, 2019a). Recent data suggests that the annual production of electric
two-wheelers rose from approximately 33 million in 2018 to 36 million units in 2019
(China Bicycle Association, 2019). 35 Regulations and modest prices have played a
major role in the high demand for electric two-wheelers. The growth of electric two-
wheelers has been spurred by two notable policies from the central government.
First, in 1999, the government designated electric two-wheelers possessing a low
speed and weight as bicycles. This exempted them from registration requirements
and permitted them to be driven on bicycle lanes. Second, several urban areas have
banned gasoline powered two-wheelers from city centres (Cherry, 2010).
The sales of electric two-wheelers in India rose from 54 800 units in 2018 to
126 000 units in 2019 (Wadhwa, 2019). India had an estimated fleet size of 0.6 million
electric two-wheelers in fiscal year 36 2018-19 (IEA, 2019b). About 20% of the CO2
emissions and 30% of particulate emissions in India are estimated to be caused by
motorised two-wheelers (Viswanathan and Sripad, 2019). Recent government
policies have taken into consideration the need to electrify the motorised two-
wheeler fleet. In 2019, the national government proposed a plan to make all two-
wheeler sales electric ones (up to 150 cubic centimetres) as from March 2025
(Vardhini, 2019). Under the first phase of the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of
Hybrid & Electric Vehicles (FAME I) scheme, 88 models of electric two-wheelers were
eligible for a subsidy. Until September 2018, around 90% of the beneficiaries under
FAME I were lead-acid powered electric scooters. From October 2018, subsidies for
lead-acid battery vehicles were discontinued, but incentives for lithium-ion battery
vehicles remained. As from April 2019, the second phase of the Faster Adoption and
Manufacturing of Hybrid & Electric Vehicles (FAME II) scheme encompasses strict
speed, range and energy efficiency requirements that would exclude 90% of the
remaining lithium-ion battery-driven models from the FAME subsidy scheme (CRISIL,
2019). 37
35
The scope of this section is motorised two-wheelers, which excludes in principle bicycles with electric assistance.
However, there is possible overlap between these two categories in the numbers from the China Bicycle Association
and Xinhua.
36
Fiscal year covers the period April to March.
37
Under this revised scheme, 5 electric two-wheeler manufacturers are eligible, as opposed to 18 two-wheeler
manufacturers under FAME I (Susvirkar, 2019).
PAGE | 61
Fleet operators of shared rental schemes operate electric two-wheelers in a few

European cities. Users can rent the electric two-wheelers using the operator’s
smartphone apps (IEA, 2018b). Recently, Cityscoot, one of the shared electric two-
wheeler operators and based in France, along with Uber announced the integration
of the Cityscoot option in the Uber application (Uber, 2019).
Three-wheelers
China has the largest electric three-wheeler stock in the world, with more than
50 million electric three-wheelers on its roads (Xinhua News, 2019b). Competitive
purchase prices relative to conventional ICE three-wheelers and the presence of
numerous domestic electric three-wheeler manufacturers are the prominent factors
fuelling the demand for electric three-wheelers in China (VynZ Research, 2019).
Electric three-wheelers have been widely adopted throughout for last-mile deliveries,
as well as to bring produce and other wares to and from markets. Logistics operators
have adopted them for their ability to circumnavigate traffic jams and to deliver
goods to the sometimes very narrow streets in urban areas (Sustainable Transport,
2018).
Three-wheelers provide a cheap mode of transportation across South Asia. While a

large portion of these are not electric, the three-wheeler fleets in South Asian
countries are gradually moving in that direction. With the largest population in the
region, India is home to approximately 1.5 million battery-powered electric three-
wheelers/e-rickshaws (Bhatia, 2020). The e-rickshaws transport about 60 million
people per day (Goel and Singh, 2019). Start-ups are cashing in. For example SmartE,
an app-based e-rickshaw ride-hailing service based in Delhi, is massively ramping up
its fleet (Varshney, 2019). Pakistan has adopted a new EV policy that aims to bring
500 000 electric two-wheelers and rickshaws into the fleet in the next four to five
years (Mukhtar, 2020).
Low-speed electric vehicles in China

Low-speed electric vehicles (LSEVs) are small four-wheeled vehicles having a
maximum speed of around 40-70 kilometres per hour. These vehicles have a small
driving range (IEA, 2019b). Low-speed electric vehicles are in their vast majority
concentrated in China. They are exempted from some registration requirements
because of their speed and size (IEA, 2019b). It is difficult to track exact numbers due
to a lack of data sources, as these vehicles are not systematically registered.
However, their number was estimated to exceed 5 million units in 2018, with about
700 000 new sales in that year (IEA, 2019b). Recent policies aim to tighten
regulations to contain further market expansion as these LSEVs pose road safety
concerns (Government of China, 2018). In November 2018, the government decided
PAGE | 62
to accelerate the phase-out of LSEVs that could not be brought up to established

standards (Government of China, 2018). Future developments of the industry will be
managed according to national regulations which aim to provide a stricter framework
for their production and use. It is unclear at this point as to the extent these tightened
regulations have impacted the LSEV market in China and how sales evolved in 2019.
Light-commercial electric vehicles

In addition to the 7.2 million passenger electric cars, there were almost
377 000 electric light-commercial vehicles (LCVs) on the world’s roads in 2019, up
from 310 000 in 2018. 38 Electric LCVs often are part of a company or public authority
vehicle fleet. In 2019, China had the largest electric LCV fleet (247 500 vehicles),
comprising 65% of the global stock. Europe had the second-largest electric LCV fleet,
with 31% of the global stock and over 115 000 vehicles, with the largest fleets in
France (49 000 vehicles) and Germany (22 000 vehicles). 39
In 2019, about 70 000 electric LCVs (mostly BEVs) were sold, almost entirely in China
(42 500 LCVs) and Europe (25 000 LCVs). This was the first time in the past decade
that electric LCV sales dropped (-37%) relative to the previous year, as growth slowed
in Europe and sales declined in China.
Electric buses
The global market for electric buses has declined since a spike in sales in 2016. In
2019, new electric bus registrations numbered about 75 000 vehicles, down 20%
from 93 000 units in 2018. There were about 513 000 electric buses worldwide in
2019, up 17% from 2018.
About 95% of the electric buses registered in 2019 were made and sold in China.
Year-on-year registrations have decreased by about 20%, due to a decrease in
purchase subsidies in 2019 (the subsidy decreased by 40% compared to 2016 (MIIT,
2015)), as well as a decline in the bus market in China.
The number of electric buses has strongly increased in Europe and in the United
States – although they are about two orders of magnitude lower than in China –
slightly reducing that Chinese market concentration. Still, the vast majority (over
0.5 million buses, or 98% of the global fleet) of electric buses operate in China.
38
Light-commercial vehicle refers to vehicles used for commercial purposes that have a gross vehicle weight of less
than 3 500 kilogrammes.

39
Data on LCVs is sourced from country submissions, EV-Volumes (2020) and EAFO (2020c).
PAGE | 63
With the backing of the FAME II programme, 40 deployment of electric buses in India
increased rapidly in 2019. Electric bus fleets now operate in cities such as Kolkata,
Mumbai, Pune and Bengaluru. New registrations have doubled over a year, reaching
450 units bringing India’s electric bus fleet to more than 800 vehicles in 2019.
In 2019, Europe registered 1 900 electric buses, more than double from the previous
year. Most of Europe’s 4 500 electric buses operate in the Netherlands (800), United
Kingdom (800), France (600) and Germany (450). For the second year in a row, the
2019 registrations for electric buses in Europe surpassed those of natural gas buses,
another popular alternative fuel for public buses (EAFO, 2020a). The European
electric bus fleet is larger than North America’s, which had 2 255 electric buses,
including more than 500 new registrations in 2019 (EV-Volumes, 2020). The
introduction of 63 electric buses in Mexico City marked the beginning of their roll out
in Mexico (Yutong, 2019).
South America is one of the major growth markets for electric buses. Registrations in
2019 were 3.5 times as high as in 2018, at more than 450. Santiago de Chile maintains
the largest fleet in the region with almost 400 electric buses. Other cities operating
electric buses are located in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador.
New electric bus registrations by country/region, 2015-19

140 2.0
Electric bus registrations (thousands)
120
1.5
100
80
1.0
60
40
0.5
20
0 0.0
China India Europe South America North America Others
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Sources: IEA analysis based on country submissions, complemented by ACEA (2020); CAAM (2020); EAFO (2020a);
EV-Volumes (2020); Marklines (2020); OICA (2020).
Fewer new registrations of electric buses in China led to a 20% drop of worldwide
registrations in 2019, despite strong growth in other regions.
40
More details on India’s FAME II programme can be found in Chapter 2.
PAGE | 64
Today battery electric is almost the exclusive technology choice for electric buses
with a 95% market share globally, by far exceeding new registrations of plug-in hybrid
and fuel cell electric buses. However, the fuel cell electric buses have garnered
increasing interest and some 4 000 were registered in 2019, more than 80% in China
(Box 1.2).
Electric trucks
Sales and stocks

Various data sources report broadly consistent, but slightly different sales and
cumulative fleet numbers for medium- and heavy-duty electric trucks. Most are in
China where official sales data for medium- and heavy-duty 41 electric trucks report
6 112 vehicles in 2019, 60% more than the previous sales spike in 2017 (Figure 1.5).
These trucks are nearly all battery electric. The turning point for EV truck sales in
China was 2015, when the central government extended subsidies and eliminated
upper weight limits on subsidies for electric LCVs and trucks. The qualification
requirements for the New Electric Vehicle programme subsidy scheme were
progressively tightened on electric cars, BEV trucks and LCVs (ICCT, 2019b).
Together with steady improvements in battery performance and cost reductions, as

well as an expanding model range, the volume of electric truck sales has been
increasing in China. Electric truck sales have been increasing to a more limited extent
in Europe and the United States where most heavy-duty electric truck activity is in
demonstration and customer trials. The commercial adoption of electric trucks lags
other vehicle categories mainly due to challenges stemming from the lower energy
density of batteries and the resulting weight and volume limitations, but also due to
limitations related to long charging times and availability of charging points.
To date, most electric trucks operate in urban environments, for instance in delivery
fleets or for garbage collection and other municipal operations. Trucks operating in
cities are able to recharge overnight at fast charging depots. In theory, in cities where
delivery is restricted or incentivised during the night or off-peak congestion periods,
electric trucks could also take advantage of bus depot charging stations during the
day, thereby maximising the utilisation of the infrastructure.
41
Heavy-duty trucks are more than 3.5 tonnes gross vehicle weight.
PAGE | 65
Global sales of medium- and heavy-duty electric trucks, 2010-19

2010
2011 China
2012
2013
2014 United States
2015
2016
2017
Europe
2018
2019
0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 6 000 7 000
Sales (units)
Sources: IEA analysis based on country submissions, complemented by ACEA (2020); CAAM (2020); EAFO (2020a);
EV-Volumes (2020); Marklines (2020); OICA (2020).
More than 6 000 heavy-duty electric trucks were sold in China in 2019 as it pioneers
electrification in this vehicle segment.
China is poised to emerge as the pioneer country in the electrification of heavy-duty

road freight. Though only accounting for 0.1% of the heavy-duty trucks on its roads,
cumulative sales of heavy-duty electric trucks are more than 12 000 over the last
decade. A major boost in commercial fleet adoption in Europe or the United States
could challenge that lead.
Charging infrastructure for heavy-duty electric trucks

Heavy-duty electric trucks require batteries with high capacity to meet their needs
for heavy-duty cycles and long-range operations. Today most of the batteries in
electric trucks, of which the models are in various stages of commercialisation, range
from 70-300 kilowatt-hours (kWh) for medium freight trucks (from 3.5 to 15 tonnes
gross vehicle weight [GVW]) and from 200 kWh to 1 megawatt-hour (MWh) for heavy-
freight trucks (with more than 15 tonnes GVW). To recharge the batteries for daily
operations in a reasonable amount of time, electric trucks require high power
charging and a wide range of power needs, which reflects the diversity of truck sizes
and operational patterns. Recharging the batteries can be via fast, ultra-fast and/or
mega charging technologies.
Electrification of trucks currently is taking place in urban areas, for reasons detailed
in Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b). Generally, these tend to be medium-duty
trucks and hence have smaller payloads and limited ranges. Urban operations offer
more opportunities to optimise charging stops and more accessibility to charging
infrastructure both along routes and at depots for overnight charging. Such truck
operations have lower requirements for battery capacity than regional and long-haul
PAGE | 66
trucks. Moreover, electric trucks may be granted special access in areas that regulate
noise and air pollution compared with diesel trucks, thereby offering a potential
competitive advantage.
Municipal and urban delivery trucks in circulation today typically share charging
infrastructure. Most are operating at a demonstration scale. For instance, Göteburg
in Sweden has opened 175 kilowatt (kW) chargers for its fleet of distribution and
waste collection electric trucks (Volvo FL and FE models) (Göteburg Energi, 2019). In
Shenzhen in China the deployment of heavy-duty electric trucks has been able to
leverage charging infrastructure built for the rapidly growing and large-scale
adoption of electric LCVs.
Electrification of longer distance routes, such as regional distribution, long-haul

trucking and intercity bus services will require development of adequate dedicated
high power charging stations. Some are likely to be private and used exclusively by
the fleet operators. Nonetheless, tailored policies to promote the roll-out, as well as
to ensure inter-operability and standardisation of certain technical and operational
specifications of public rapid charging infrastructure can help spur the transition to
electric and fuel cell powertrains in these operations (see Chapter 2 for discussion
and examples of such polices).
Activities underway on a demonstration basis for large electric trucks with big
payload and long-range capabilities rely on dedicated charging infrastructure that
has been installed and maintained either privately or jointly among logistics
companies. Corporate trials of models like Tesla’s Semi and Daimler’s e-Cascadia are
following this model, relying on chargers that have power ratings from around
100 kW to more than 1 MW (the latter consisting of four 350 kW charging plugs).
Charging standards for ultra-high power charging are being developed and are
moving broadly toward harmonisation. In collaboration with Tesla and Daimler and
other members of its High Power Charging for Commercial Vehicles task force, the
Combined Charging System (CCS) initiative CharIN is developing a CCS compliant
charging plug with a power of more than 2 MW. It will charge in the range of
200 - 1 500 Volts and 0 - 3 000 Amps (CharIN, 2019). The CHAdeMO Association and
the China Electricity Council are working jointly on a next-generation ultra-high
power charging standard (up to 900 kW), dubbed “ChaoJi” (CHAdeMO, 2019). 42 The
hardware of the new ChaoJi plug will be harmonised into one for the next-generation
CHAdeMO as well as China’s GB/T standards, ensuring backward compatibility with
42
CHAdeMO stands for CHArge de MOde. It is one of several charging plug (and vehicle communication) standards
for DC fast charging. Other standards for DC charging are CCS1 & 2 (Combined Charging System), Tesla (two types:
US/Japan and rest of world) and the Chinese GB/T system.
PAGE | 67
all the existing standards (GB/T, CHAdeMO and possibly CCS) to ensure inter-
operability across standards. Numerous real-life demonstration projects using a
variety of prototypes (both vehicles and chargers) have been ongoing since the
beginning of 2019. The development team, in collaboration with the broader
international community, published the ChaoJi technical requirements for the
CHAdeMO protocol (used globally) in April 2020, and aims to achieve the Chinese
protocol in 2021. ChaoJi will concurrently be proposed to the IEC/ISO committees to
be added to the direct current (DC) fast charging systems, while the first production
for vehicles is expected to enter the market as early as 2021 (CHAdeMO, 2020). In
Europe, OEMs and public and non-governmental organisations are incorporating
plans for the roll-out of rapid charging infrastructures (see Chapter 2 for further
discussion).
Product packages that couple the purchase of electric trucks with the installation of
charging equipment will be particularly critical for ensuring the viability of
deployment, especially for regional and long-haul operations. In the fuel cell domain,
Nikola’s bundled leasing model, where the company plans to work with corporate
partners – such as Nel ASA of Oslo, which produces electrolysers – and customers to
roll out hydrogen refuelling stations that draw upon hydrogen produced from
renewable electricity, is an example of such a business model.
The range of charging product options for heavy-duty electric trucks entering the
commercial market is expanding. New installations in 2019 build upon standards and
technologies that have been developed or are being proposed, and that have been
summarised in previous Global EV Outlooks. 43 For instance, Penske has opened 14 DC
fast charging stations in southern California to charge the Daimler Freightliners that
it has been testing (Engadget, 2019).
Electric road systems (ERS), which rely upon dynamic conductive or inductive power
transfer to enable vehicles to charge while driving, offer promising potential to
expand the operations that could be performed by vehicles with electric powertrains,
particularly in heavy-duty regional and long-haul operations, and intercity bus routes.
These systems can be installed within the roadway itself or with overhead catenary
lines. In both cases, trucks would require dedicated power transfer equipment to
make use of the ERS infrastructure (e.g. pantographs, in the case of catenary lines).
If installed on stretches of the most heavily trafficked corridors, ERS can mitigate the
43
For a review of charging standards up to 600 kW for urban electric buses, see the Global EV Outlook 2018 (IEA,
2018b). For a review of charging standards for trucks, and the companies – including Tesla and Chargepoint – and
technologies enabling so-called “mega chargers” for heavy-duty electric trucks, see Box 2.1 in Global EV Outlook
2019 (IEA, 2019b).
PAGE | 68
constraints and costs imposed by batteries, which may still be too large and heavy to
make all-electric operations feasible for operations that are long distance, with high
daily mileages and heavy and bulky cargo needs.
By virtue of being capable of providing power to any electric powertrain (i.e. PHEVs,
BEVs and FCEVs), provided that connections or inductive power receiving equipment
are installed on the vehicle, ERS can further serve as a powertrain neutral
infrastructure to expand the scope and operational flexibility of road electrification.
Several ERS technologies are at various levels of development from early prototypes
to first-of-a-kind commercial scale (IEA, forthcoming). Research and demonstration
on various ERS concepts are being championed across the United States, Sweden
and Germany, and several other European countries are considering their potential.
However, successful market diffusion of ERS would require a strong commitment
from industry and policy makers. In many countries today the lack of co-ordinated
commitments from multiple stakeholders to concrete ERS deployment plans is a
major barrier, in contrast to the case of the infrastructure needed for fuel cell or
battery electric trucks, where a similar degree of co-ordination and commitment is
increasingly evident.
Shipping: electrification in port

The electrification of maritime shipping is progressing, but is currently limited to
ferries and other short-distance vessels. 44 In the near term, purely electric ships are
expected to be economically competitive with other low-carbon powertrains only for
distances up to 200 km (IEA, forthcoming). The Nordic countries are leading the
electrification of short-distance ferries. Norway had about 20 electric ferries in
operation in 2019 and is planning to launch 50 more in the next two years (Plugport,
2020). Purely electric motive power does not appear to be a feasible technology for
ocean-going vessels in the foreseeable future (due to limitations in battery energy
density and their vast range of distances).
“Cold ironing” is an industry term for using onshore power supply while berthed. 45 It
is a way that ports can contribute to reduce emissions from the shipping industry by
simply plugging into an electrical supply point in port and cutting back on use of the
vessel’s engines. Through cold ironing, the ship’s electricity needs while berthed (e.g.
for lighting, pumps, refrigerators and services to crew and guests) are provided by
the electricity grid instead of via the auxiliary diesel generator on the ship. Therefore,
44
See Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b).
45
Also called onshore power supply, shore-side electricity or alternative maritime power.
PAGE | 69
ships avoid the consumption of maritime diesel when at berth, 46 both reducing air
pollutant emissions in harbours – among the most polluted and often densely
populated areas in the world (UN Environment Programme, 2020) – and cutting fuel
expenses. 47 It is estimated that cold ironing of large ships can cut their fuel
consumption by half when at berth. Moreover, depending on the efficiency of the
auxiliary generator and carbon intensity of the power grid, cold ironing can reduce
CO2 emissions (Zis, 2019).
One of the main challenges of providing cold ironing connections at ports is that
ships, even when in at berth mode, have significant power needs, normally higher
than any other mode of transport. Power requirements range from about 700 kW for
vehicle-carrying ships up to about 15 megawatts (MW) for cruise ships (T&D Europe,
2015). 48 In order for a ship to be able to cold iron when at berth, it must be equipped
with appropriate on-board electrical components. Generally vessels have not been
equipped with such components. Now major shipping lines have started to retrofit
their vessels to enable cold ironing and all new cruise ships and container ships larger
than 6 000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU - a measure of container ship cargo
capacity) are already equipped for cold ironing (T&D Europe, 2015; Port of Los
Angeles, 2018). 49,50
On the port side, the berth must be outfitted to enable cold ironing for ships that call.
While it is difficult to have precise and up to date statistics on the number of cold
ironing facilities, Figure 1.6 shows the evolution over time of the number of ports with
at least one berth capable of cold ironing. US ports were the pioneers in adopting
cold ironing in the early 2000s, since then most development has been at European
ports. Today, at least 78 ports worldwide are capable of providing cold ironing, of
which three-quarters are located in Europe. Cumulative installed capacity is
estimated to be at least 300 MW.
46
Some fuel consumption still takes place for large vessels, as the ship’s boilers continue running.
47
Other advantages of cold ironing are the reduction of noise and vibration on board, reduction of the machinery
wear and thus reduction of maintenance needs and extension of machinery lifetime.
48
The additional power needs for providing cold ironing services can rapidly lead to exceedance of the maximum
capacity of the power connection between the port and the grid connection. The need to reinforce grids can make
the installation of cold ironing connections in port more costly (Innes and Monios, 2018; T&D Europe, 2015).
49
Electrical equipment a ship needs to cold iron include a cable reel, connection switchgear, transfer and
switchboard (Agarwal, 2019).
50
Two options are available to retrofit vessels for cold ironing: install the necessary components on board or install
a container in the stern that holds all the power electronics required (Wärtsilä, 2017).
PAGE | 70
Global number of ports equipped with cold ironing facilities and cumulative
installed capacity, 2019
90 360
Cumulative installed capacity (MW)

Number of ports
80 320
70 280
60 240
50 200
40 160
30 120
20 80
10 40
0 0
2000-05 2006-10 2011-15 2016-19 Implemented
2000-19 + decided
North America Europe China India Oceania Others Installed capacity (right axis)
Notes: Decided = ports that have formally approved the installation of cold ironing connections. Data on power
capacity are not always available, thus it could be significantly higher than what is shown in the figure.
Sources: EAFO (2020b); DNV-GL (2020); T&D Europe (2015).
Almost 80 ports worldwide offered cold ironing in 2019, mostly in Europe.
The uptake of cold ironing reflects increasing adoption of policies and regulations at
national, international and individual port levels. Policies that have encouraged the
development of cold ironing facilities include:
 Since 2011, China has put in place a strategy advising that all new terminals for
container ships, bulk carriers, cruise ships and ropax51 ships should include
shore connection equipment (T&D Europe, 2015).
 In Europe, a directive requires that by 2025 all ports install infrastructure for shore
side electricity supply (European Union, 2014).
In parallel, policies are being rolled out that encourage ships to install the equipment
needed for cold ironing. Examples include:
 Since 2010, operators of container ships and cruise ships calling at California
ports are required to reduce at berth emissions from the auxiliary engines. The
emissions reduction requirement increases incrementally and is 80% in 2020
(CARB, 2020).
51
Ropax is an acronym for a roll on/roll off (ro-ro) ship that carries passengers in addition to vehicles, i.e. a ro-ro
vessel built for freight vehicle transport with passenger accommodation.
PAGE | 71
 China has a two-step strategy: from 2019 cold ironing capability is mandatory for
new domestic ships; from 2020, many types of new built ocean-going China-
flagged vessels must be equipped with shore side connection equipment (Si,
2018). 52
While in 2019 almost 80 ports worldwide were able to provide cold ironing service,
many more ports could install cold ironing equipment in the coming years to reduce
some of the local pollutant and CO2 emission impacts of maritime shipping. Ports can
play a fundamental role in encouraging the roll-out of cold ironing by setting
regulatory measures: for instance, ports can require ships to be equipped with cold
ironing connections or can differentiate port taxes based on whether ships connect.
The 20 largest harbours in the world account for 60% of maritime cargo transport
activity (UNCTAD, 2019), so even if a few of these major ports were to champion cold
ironing and establish appropriate regulatory mechanisms, rapid adoption of cold
ironing worldwide could be bolstered
Aviation: electrification in aviation ground operations

A growing number of start-ups and established aviation companies are developing
small electric turboprop planes and several demonstrations of small battery electric
aircraft flying over very short distances have been completed (IEA, 2019b). The first
all-electric commercial passenger aircraft flight took place in December 2019, when
a retrofitted seaplane took a 15-minute flight from Vancouver, British Columbia.
Even if the rapid increases in battery energy densities achieved over the past decade
were to continue unabated, battery chemistries at most would be capable of enabling
all-electric mode to fly distances of around 1 000 km. Thus it would displace only
about 20% of jet fuel demand (IEA, forthcoming). The requisite technology
developments in battery chemistries and in airframe designs will take decades to
develop. Hybrid electric aircraft could emerge in the next generation of aircraft. But
even in the near term, there are opportunities for electrification to reduce fuel burn
and emissions in aviation ground operations.
High costs for fuel and increasing attention on the environmental impacts of aviation
have spurred the industry and researchers to seek solutions to reduce fuel use and
emissions, particularly from the landing and take-off cycles (LTO). 53 Solutions for the
taxi phase of LTO face fewer operational constraints compared to those for cruise,
52
The types of vessels regulated are: container ships, cruise ships, ropax vessels, passenger ships of 3 000 tonne
class and above, and dry bulk carriers of 50 000 tonne class and above.
53
Landing and take-off cycles (LTO) include activities occurring up to 3 000 feet (914.4 metres) above ground level.
It comprises the flight stages: taxiing out, taking off, climbing out for departures, descending for landing, touching
down and taxiing-in for arrival.
PAGE | 72
where safety is paramount (Guo, Zhang and Wang, 2014). Fuel burn and emissions
from LTO are significant for short and medium-distance flights, and have important
implications for local air quality.
One of the most promising solutions to reduce LTO fuel use and emissions is electric
taxiing, which uses on-board electric motors powered by the auxiliary power unit
(APU). For flights on a typical narrow-body aircraft (e.g. the Airbus A320), taxiing
accounts for 5-10% of fuel burn (Nicolas, 2013). Electric taxiing could reduce fuel
used for taxiing by half and overall fuel use by 1-4% compared to two engine taxiing
(Nicolas, 2013; Re, 2012; Dzikus et al. 2011). External pushback 54 and electric taxiing
systems are widely available, with even larger fuel and CO2 savings than systems
installed on the aircraft itself. Other benefits and challenges are summarised in
Table 1.1.
Technology options for electric taxiing in commercial passenger aircraft
Fuel use and

Description and Cost Other advantages or
emissions
examples savings challenges
reduction
Fuel use: 50% of

taxi fuel or
Additional motor at 1-4% reduction
nose, on landing gear Time savings of 2-
overall compared
On-board or on main wheels USD 6 minutes on average.
to two engine
electric powered by an on- taxiing. 240 000- Extra weight and fuel
taxiing board APU (e.g. 500 000 consumption in cruise
systems WheelTug; Electric Tailpipe emissions:
per year. phase and APU
Green Taxi System around 60% CO2;
modification needs.
(EGTS); DLR; Safran). 50-75% for NOx,
CO and
hydrocarbons.
Electric pushback- Time savings of 54% on

Mototok: 100% on
External only systems pushback.
pushback fuel.
pushback (Mototok) or hybrid USD
Extensive equipment
and diesel-electric Taxibot: 98% on
100 000- investment, system
electric tractors tow the taxi fuel and 98%
5.4 million development and
taxiing aircraft during the reduction in CO2,
per year operations, congestion
systems entire ground but potential
and safety concerns,
movement (TaxiBot). increase in NOx.
increased NOx.
Sources: Guo, Zhang and Wang l. (2014); Lukic et al. (2019).

54
Pushback refers to the process in which an aircraft is moved backwards away from an airport gate, typically by
dedicated, low-profile vehicles called pushback tractors or tugs, or by the aircraft itself with engines on.
PAGE | 73
Electric vehicle charging infrastructure

deployment
By the end of 2019, there were 7.3 million electric vehicle chargers installed
worldwide, of which 6.5 million chargers were private light-duty vehicle (LDV) slow
or normal chargers. 55 The stock of chargers increased by 40% from 5.2 million in 2018
(Figure 1.7).
Global stock of electric LDV chargers, 2013-19

8
7
Number of chargers (millions)
5 Publicly accessible fast chargers
4
Publicly accessible slow chargers
3
2 Private slow chargers (LDVs)

1
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Notes: Private chargers include electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) 56 charging via both dedicated circuits and non-dedicated
charge points. 57 Estimates for private chargers assume that each electric car is serviced by 1.1 private chargers on average (level 1 or
level 2, either at home or workplace). These account for the majority of EV charging in all countries except China and Japan. 58 The
estimates for China and Japan are lower (EVs are being deployed in dense urban areas), at 0.7 chargers per EV for 2019. This is based
on a sample survey of 30% of electric car owners conducted by the China Power Consortium and China Electric Vehicle Charger
Infrastructure Promotion Alliance (Chinabaogao, 2019; EVCIPA, 2020). The survey estimates that 70% of EV owners have access to at
least one private charger at home and/or workplace, and this fraction is assumed to be representative of the population. For years
prior to 2018, a ratio of 0.8 chargers per EV is used for China and Japan, in line with analysis conducted in Global EV Outlook 2018
(IEA, 2018b) and Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b).
Sources: IEA analysis based on EVI country submissions, complemented by AFDC (2020b); Chinabaogao (2019); EAFO (2020a); ECF
(2018); Engel (2018); EV-Volumes (2020); Mathieu (2018); Nicholas (2019); T&E (2020); ZapMap (2019).
LDV chargers topped 7 million in 2019 and the vast majority are private chargers.
55
Normal or slow charging refers to charging power less than or up to 22 kW and the distinction is mostly region
specific. For example, in the European Union, the European Alternative Fuels Observatory (EAFO) classifies chargers
rated up to 22 kW as normal, whereas in the United States, they are classified as slow charge (EAFO, 2020a; AFDC,
2020). Nomenclature on slow and fast charging is specific to the context of EV charging and their relative
comparison is not based on fuelling rates at conventional liquid fuel pumping stations. Throughout the remainder of
this section as well as in any other section in the report where charging rates are referred, no distinction is made
between slow and normal charging. Home and workplace chargers are slow chargers that provide power less than
or up to 22 kW. Fast chargers provide more than 22 kW. For additional details about charger classification by rated
power, refer to Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b).
56
EVSE is generally used to denote any off-board equipment to supply energy to charge the vehicle. It consists of
charging cord, charge stands, attachment plugs, power outlet, vehicle connector and miscellaneous hardware for
protection (SAE, 2017).
57
Dedicated circuits are capable of both converting power (from direct to alternating current) and of modulating the
rate of power transferred to ensure charging power does not exceed the on-board rated power capabilities of the
vehicle. Non-dedicated charge points are typically 110/220 V sockets.
PAGE | 74
Private chargers
Private chargers accounted for about 90% (6.5 million) of the worldwide LDV
chargers in 2019. Convenience, cost-effectiveness and a variety of support policies
(such as preferential rates, equipment purchase incentives and rebates) are the main
drivers for the prevalence of private charging (Beach, 2019). Across many EV
markets, private home and workplace charging are the preferred locations. Home
charging accessibility depends on the built environment and is closely associated
with population density, penetration of dwelling units with a garage or carport, and
the local EV adoption rates (Wolbertus, 2020). Since the minimum infrastructure for
home charging, namely a compatible electrical socket and charger plug, already
exists in homes, it is difficult to accurately estimate the number of private chargers.
The second most preferred private charging modality is workplace charging. 59 On
average, the share of total energy for EVs charged at home and workplace is
estimated to be more than 85% in the European Union, United Kingdom and United
States (Göhlich, 2018; Cenex, 2018; Mathieu, 2018; T&E, 2020). The China EV
Charging Infrastructure Promotion Alliance in a 2019-20 report and survey estimates
that 70% of EV owners in China have access to private chargers. (Chinabaogao, 2019;
EVCIPA, 2020).
Private and publicly accessible chargers by country, 2019

Private slow chargers Publicly accessible slow chargers Publicly accessible fast chargers
6.5 million 598 000 264 000
1% 2% 0%
1%
5%
13% 12% 2%
China
5%
4% 3% Japan
8%
37% 1% United States
5%
United Kingdom
4%
5% Germany
50%
6% France
5%
Norway
4% 4% Netherlands
81% Other
11%
3%
24% 4%
Sources: IEA analysis based on country submissions, complemented by Chinabaogao (2019) and (EAFO, 2020a).
The vast majority of electric light-duty vehicle chargers are private chargers. China
accounts for 80% of publicly accessible fast chargers compared to 47% of the world’s
electric light-duty vehicle stock.
59
Workplace charging typically limits access to individuals affiliated with the employer.
PAGE | 75
Publicly accessible chargers
Light-duty vehicles
Publicly accessible chargers accounted for 12% (862 000) of global LDV chargers in
2019, of which 598 000 (8%) were slow and 263 000 (4%) were fast chargers. 60 The
global number of publicly accessible chargers per electric LDV slightly decreased
from 0.13 in 2018 to 0.12 at the end of 2019 with the expanding electric LDV stock,
but is still higher than the European Union recommended target of 0.10 (Spöttle,
2018; European Commission, 2019). Globally, the number of publicly accessible
charging points (slow and fast charging) increased by 60% in 2019 compared with
the previous year. Much of this increase was in China, which continues to lead with
the implementation of publicly accessible chargers, accounting for nearly 60%
(515 000) of worldwide publicly accessible chargers installed in 2019. China was
home to 80% of global publicly accessible fast chargers and 50% of publicly
accessible slow chargers installed in 2019 (Figure 1.8). Substantial regional variations
exist in the power capacity (kW) of publicly accessible chargers. Publicly accessible
slow chargers dominate in the United States and the European Union accounting for
80-85% of the new charger installations, whereas in China, they represent less than
60%.
Buses
The global stock of electric bus chargers rose 17% in 2019 (184 000 units) compared
to 2018 (157 000). 61 China continues to be the forerunner in electrifying its buses and
accounts for 98% of the global electric bus stock and 95% of the global stock of
dedicated bus chargers. In the European Union, Sweden leads in number of bus
chargers installed in 2019.
The charging infrastructure needs of electric buses are determined by service

frequency and dwelling times (the time that a vehicle stops at a scheduled stop
without moving), occupancy and most importantly by the charging strategy.
Compared to passenger cars, the driving routes and origin-destination choices of
buses are more uniform, but they have higher charging energy requirements. These
operational aspects dictate the number of chargers, capacity or rated power of the
charger and its location.
60 The number of publicly accessible fast chargers nearly doubled from 141 000 in 2018 to 263 000 in 2019. The
number of publicly accessible slow chargers increased by 47% in 2019 (from 396 000 in 2018 to 583 000 in 2019).
61
It is assumed that they are publicly accessible since the majority of the bus stock is used for public transport.
Disaggregation of bus stock into public bus fleets and private bus fleet is not included due to lack of data.
PAGE | 76
Overnight depot charging and on-route opportunity charging are the usual charging
strategies for electric bus fleets in many cities in China, the Europe Union and the
United States (Houbbadi, 2019; Horrox, 2019; Göhlich, 2018). There are three main
technology options in commercial use for charging: plug-in, pantograph and
inductive or wireless charging. Plug-in chargers rated 150-250 kW are commonly
used for overnight depot charging. Pantographs are better suited for on-route
opportunity charging in the United States and the European Union. Plug-in chargers
up to 400 kW are being deployed in China (ResearchAndMarkets, 2020). Though not
as widely deployed as conductive or pantograph charging, high power (300 kW or
more) wireless inductive charging is increasingly being tested in pilot projects
(Electrive, 2020; RTA, 2020). High power chargers are especially important for heavy-
duty fleet electrification. 62
62
For further details refer to the Charging infrastructure for heavy-duty electric trucks section in this report.
PAGE | 77
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PAGE | 85
Global EV Outlook 2020 Policies and strategies to deploy electric vehicles and charging infrastructure
Chapter 2.
Policies and strategies to deploy
electric vehicles and charging
infrastructure
Electric vehicle policies

Introduction
The deployment of electric vehicles over the past decade was driven by ambitious
government policies to reduce oil demand in transport, not least with a view to the
environmental benefits of tackling air pollution and climate change. This chapter
provides an update of electric vehicle (EV) policy status and an overview of key policy
developments in 2019, and to some degree early 2020. It provides focussed EV policy
updates for Canada, Chile, People’s Republic of China (hereafter, “China”), European
Union, India, Japan and United States.
Policies and targets around the world

Governments around the world have introduced policies to support the
transformation of the transport sector. These policies take a variety of forms: national
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets for transport; fuel efficiency targets and
carbon dioxide (CO2) emission standards; EV stock and sales targets and/or
mandates; financial support to consumers and manufacturers; charging
infrastructure regulations and deployment support. An overview of EV targets and
their role in decarbonising transport for selected countries is provided in Annex B.1
(light-duty vehicles) and Annex B.2 (heavy-duty vehicles).
In recent years these policies increasingly have been accompanied by a longer term
vision to phase out internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle sales in the mid to long
term and to achieve 100% EV sales or stock, in particular in Europe (Table 2.1). Norway
has announced a target that all new cars and light vans sold in 2025 shall be zero-
emission vehicles (ZEVs). Several other countries have announced targets for 2030,
and the United Kingdom by 2035. In December 2019 France passed a law that aims
to phase out sales of cars that burn fossil fuels by 2040 (Assemblée Nationale, 2019).
PAGE | 86
Similar objectives by 2040 are under consideration in Spain. Beyond Europe, policy
target announcements have been made by Canada for 100% light-duty ZEVs by 2040
and similarly by Cabo Verde, Costa Rica, Israel, Japan, Mexico and Sri Lanka with
target dates between 2030 and 2050 (Table 2.1).
Ambitious targets and policies will send a strong signal both to industry and new car
buyers, as well as affecting resale value. Such objectives complement ICE restricted
access zones that have been established or are under consideration in some major
cities. 1 Many include a vision for the mid and long term with EV deployment targets
and schedules for phasing out ICEs set out in policy documents (see Annex B.1 and
B.2). Nevertheless many governments need to develop more detailed
implementation plans and bring clarity to the scope of the bans (for example whether
hybrid vehicles are included) (Plötz et al., 2019).
National electric car deployment targets
Country 2021-22 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
Green: relative to vehicle Blue: relative to vehicle Yellow: full ICE phase
Colour code
sales stock out or 100% EV target
Asiaa
China 25% NEVs

(EV30@30 (PHEV, BEV,
signatory)b FCEV)
Indonesia 2 200 EVs
100%
30-40%
sales of
Japan HEV,
HEV,
(EV30@30 20-30%
PHEV,
signatory) BEV, PHEV,
BEV,
3% FCEV
FCEV
430 000
BEVs
33% BEV,
Korea 67 000
FCEV
FCEVs
(2022)
1
Examples include: Hamburg and Stuttgart where diesel cars are banned. Rome will ban diesel cars in 2024. Paris
aims to ban diesel cars by 2024 and all fossil fuel powered cars by 2030. Bans on ICE vehicles by 2025 in Athens,
Madrid and Mexico City. Ban on ICE vehicles by 2030 in: Amsterdam, Barcelona, Copenhagen and London (Plötz et
al., 2019; Reuters, 2020a; Bavarian News, 2019).
PAGE | 87
Country 2021-22 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
100 000
Malaysia
EVs
Pakistan 30% EV 90% EV
100%
electric or
Sri Lanka hybrid
vehicle
stock
1.2 million
Thailand
EVs (2036)
Europe
13 million
European Union
ZEV, LEV
1 million
100% ZEV
electrified
sales
vehicles
Denmark no sales of
new diesel
or petrol
car
Finland 250 000
(EV30@30 BEV, PHEV,
signatory) FCEV
500 000 1.8 million No sales of
France PHEVs PHEVs 3 new cars
(EV30@30 660 000 million and vans
signatory) BEVs BEVs using fossil
(2023) (2028) fuels
All
passeng
7-10 million er
Germany
BEV, FCEV vehicle
sales to
be ZEVc
No new
registration
s of diesel
Iceland
and
gasoline
cars
500 000
EVs
Ireland
No new
registration
PAGE | 88
Country 2021-22 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
s of ICE
cars
6 million
“electrically
powered”
Italy vehicles of
which
4 million
BEVs
15 000 300 000
Netherlands FCEVs FCEVs
(EV30@30
signatory) 100% ZEV
sales
Norway
100% ZEV
(EV30@30
sales
signatory)
1 million
Poland
EVs
No sales of
Portugal 30% ZEVs
ICE (tbcd)
17% EV
Slovenia
100% EV
sales
5 million 100% ZEV

Spain
EVs sales
No sales of
Sweden
new diesel
(EV30@30
or petrol
signatory)
cars
United Kingdom
No sales of
(EV30@30 50-70% EV
new ICEe
signatory)
North America
825 000
ZEVs 2.7 million 14 million
(PHEV, BEV, ZEVs ZEVs
Canada
FCEV)
(EV30@30
100% ZEV
signatory)
sales
10% ZEV 30% ZEV
(BEV, PHEV,
FCEV)
3.3 million All
United States
ZEVs . passeng
(selected states)
(PHEV, BEV, er
PAGE | 89
Country 2021-22 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
FCEV) in 11f vehicle

states sales to
be ZEV
in 10 g
States
Other countries
100% EV
Cabo Verde 35% EV 70% EV
sales
600 000
Colombia 10% ZEV
EVs
100%
Costa Rica 25% ZEV ZEV
sales
Chile 40% EV
177 000 1.4 million

EVs EVs
Israel* 100% EV or
NG vehicle
sales
64 000 EVs
New Zealand
(2021)
* The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use
of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli
settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Notes: In this table, the acronyms used reflect how the vehicle technologies are referred to in the various
announcements:
EV = electric vehicles (used when announcements mention electric vehicles without further precision); HEV = hybrid
electric vehicle; plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV), battery electric vehicle (BEV) and fuel cell electric vehicle
(FCEV) are used when announcements refer specifically to those technologies; ZEV = zero-emission vehicles; NEV =
new energy vehicles; LEV = low-emission vehicles (LEV in the European Union context refers to vehicles with tailpipe
emissions below 50 grammes per kilometre); NG = natural gas.
a
Within Asia, India is also an EV30@30 Campaign signatory.
b
Countries that joined the EV30@30 Campaign set a collective aspirational goal to reach 30% sales share for EVs
across passenger light-duty vehicles (PLDVs), light-commercial vehicles (LCVs), buses and trucks by 2030 (CEM-EVI,
2019).
c
As part of the ZEV Alliance membership.
d
Tbc = to be confirmed. Portugal raised the question of an ICE ban in 2018 (Publico, 2018). It has not been decided
yet.
e
A phase out of ICE vehicles by 2040 had been announced in the United Kingdom. Though in February 2020 a
consultation process got underway which is considering an earlier target of 2035 and whether HEVs and PHEVs will
be part of the phase-out.
f
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) manages the Zero-Emission Program (ZEV) which includes PHEV, BEV
and FCEV. Ten other states have adopted the programme: Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island and Vermont.
g
As part of ZEV Alliance membership: California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington.
Source: All sources can be found in the detailed tables in Annexes B.1 and B.2.
PAGE | 90
EV purchase incentives
Many countries are encouraging EV purchases with financial support in order to
address the higher upfront cost of an EV and to stimulate market development.
Table 2.2 gives an overview of selected national electric car purchase incentive
policies that are applicable to private consumers. These incentives generally are also
valid for company cars and in some cases are accompanied by dedicated measures
that apply to company cars. The Netherlands, for example, applies income tax
reductions on the private use of electric company cars. Such measures for company
cars can be a significant driver of EV sales.
The vast majority of subsidies for the purchase of a battery electric vehicle (BEV) are
in the range of EUR 4 000-6 000 (USD 4 500-6 800). Norway does not offer a
purchase rebate but provides a substantial tax exemption. 2 Buyers of BEVs in Japan
benefit from both a purchase rebate and a tax exemption. In some countries,
customers can also rely on additional financial support at the sub-national level. In
addition, many countries have introduced CO2 based taxes that penalise fossil-
fuelled vehicle sales. To some extent, this provides a mechanism that tends towards
revenue-neutrality for governments to promote low- and zero- emission vehicles (e.g.
the “bonus-malus” type schemes in France and Sweden).
Some countries that are planning for mass EV deployment, such as China, are
restructuring their incentive programmes and reducing direct subsidies. Other
countries are introducing subsidy caps based on the vehicle retail price, which aims
to avoid subsidising the purchase of premium EVs, such as Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, India, Spain and United Kingdom (Table 2.2). 3
2
Analysis of purchase subsidies and tax exemption schemes in Nordic countries is detailed in Nordic EV Outlook
2018: Insights from leaders in electric mobility, in particular Figure 2.5 (IEA, 2018a).
3
For further information on the evolution of EV support policies in the main markets, i.e. China, Europe and United
States, see Chapter 1 sections: Electric mobility developments in the 2010s and Electric car market in 2019.
PAGE | 91
National electric car purchase incentives in selected countries
Country Purchase subsidy Tax reduction Comments
Electric range to be
>50 km.
EUR 1 500 (USD 1 700) (BEV, For cars with maximum
Austria FCEV) retail price of EUR 50 000
EUR 750 (USD 850) (PHEV) (USD 56 000).
Diesel powered PHEVs

excluded.
Four rebate levels,

depending on retail price.
EUR 2 000 - 4 000
Belgium In Flanders region, EV
(USD 2 300 - 4 500)
purchase incentives were
abolished in January 2020.
* For cars with maximum

retail price under
CAD 5 000 (USD 3 700)* CAD 45 000-60 000
Canada (USD 33 600-44 800)
(BEV, FCEV, PHEV**) (depending on car type). **
PHEV with battery capacity
> 15 kWh.
Maximum retail price

CNY 300 000
(USD 42 400).
CNY 16 200 (USD 2 300)
(BEV*) Depending on electric
Exemption of
range
China CNY 22 500 (USD 3 200) purchase tax
(BEV**) (10%). * If 300 km ≤ range
<400 km.
CNY 8 500 (1 200) (PHEV***)
** If range ≥400 km.
*** If range ≥50 km.
* Maximum retail price

EUR 45 000 (USD 50 800),
EUR 6 000 (USD 6 800)* / ** EUR 60 000
3 000 (USD 3 400)** No registration
(USD 67 800) (not applying
France tax in many sub-
(BEV, FCEV and PHEV < 20 to FCEV). Subsidy can be
national regions.
gCO2/km) increased if an old car is
scrapped (depending on
revenues).
EUR 6 000 (USD 6 800)* /

5 000 (USD 5 600)** * Maximum retail price EUR
Germany
40 000 (USD 45 200).
(BEV)
PAGE | 92
EUR 4 500 (USD 5 100)* / ** Retail price between

3 750 (USD 4 230)** (PHEV) EUR 40 000 (USD 45 200)
and 65 000 (USD 73 400).
Income tax
deduction of * For PHEV and BEV, with a
INR 10 000 (USD 130) / kWh* INR 150 000 cap of 20% of vehicle retail
India Capped to INR 300 000 (USD 2 000) on price and for cars with
(USD 4 000) interest paid on retail price < INR 1 500 000
electric vehicle (USD 19 900).
loans.
0-20 gCO2/km:
* When scrapping an old
EUR 6 000 (USD 6 800)* / BEV exempt from car (Euro 1-4 generations)
4 000 (USD 4 500)** annual at the same time as buying
Italy ownership tax the EV.
21-70 gCO2/km: during five years
after registration. ** Without scrapping an old
EUR 2 500* (USD 2 800) /
car.
1 500 (USD 1 700)**
* Depending on electric
Up to JPY 200 000
range: JPY 200 000
(USD 1 800) (PHEV*)
(USD 1 800) if range
Up to JPY 400 000 No purchase and > 40 km.
Japan
(USD 3 700) (BEV**) weight taxes.
** Depending on range:
Up to JPY 2 250 000
JPY 400 000 (USD 3 700) if
(USD 20 800) (FCEV)
range > 400 km.
KRW 8 000 000 (USD 6 700)

(BEV)
Korea
KRW 22 500 000
(USD 18 800) (FCEV)
* Since 2018, taxes on ZEV

Purchase subsidy under Several tax purchase increase
Netherlands preparation (likely to apply in exemptions and progressively and will
July 2020). reductions.* reach standard levels in
2026.
BEV exempt from

VAT (25%) and * Weight-, CO2- and NOx-
Norway No purchase subsidy
three purchase based taxes.
taxes.*
Maximum retail price

Portugal EUR 3 000 (USD 3 400)
EUR 62 500 (USD 70 600).
PAGE | 93
* Depending on electric
range:
EUR 1 300 - 5 500 EUR 5 500 (USD 6 200)

Spain (USD 1 500 - 6 200)* (PHEV > 72 km.
and BEV)
Only applicable if retail
price < EUR 40 000
(USD 45 200).
* Payable after six months

SEK 60 000 (USD 6 500)*
Sweden of ownership. Capped at
(BEV and FCEV)
25% of retail price.
* Capped at 35% of retail

Up to GBP 3 000 price. Only for cars <
United Kingdom (USD 3 800)* (BEV and GBP 50 000 (USD 63 600).
PHEV**) ** If < 50 gCO2/km and
electric range >112 km.
* Depending on battery
Tax credit up to capacity (min. 5 kWh).
United States USD 7 500 (PHEV Gradual phase out for each
and BEV)* manufacturer after it has
sold 200 000 cars.
Notes: VAT = value-added tax; NOx = nitrogen oxides. This table applies mainly to private cars and displays
incentives applicable in March 2020. In some cases, incentives can be increased for large capacity cars (seven
seaters). Company cars can benefit from additional tax exemptions.
For China: battery energy density and energy efficiency are also considered in the calculation of the subsidy.
Incentives shown are those applicable in April 2020 (the purchase subsidy was reduced by 10% from end-2019
levels). At maximum, 2 million vehicles can be subsidised per year.
For Germany: the EUR 6 000 subsidy for BEVs can be provided at 50% from the government and 50% directly from
the automaker.
For France and Germany: changes in incentives were announced at the end of May 2020, and at the beginning of
June 2020, respectively. These changes are not reflected in this table. For further details, see section Major EV
strategy and purchase support changes in EU member states.
Sources: Austria: Umwelt Foerderung (2020); Belgium: Vlaanderen (2019); Canada: Government of Canada (2020a);
China: Ministry of Finance (2020); France: Ministère de la Transition Ecologique et Solidaire (2020); Germany: ADAC
(2020), Autobild (2020), Reuters (2020b); India: FAME II (2019), World Economic Forum (2019); Italy: Government of
Italy (2019); Japan: METI (2018); Korea: Electrive (2019); Netherlands: National Climate Agreement (2019), RVO
(2020), Rijksoverheid (2020); Norway: Norsk Elbilforening (2020), Reuters (2020b); Portugal: Fundo Ambiantal
(2020); Spain: Boletín Oficial del Estado (2019); Sweden: Transport Styrelsen (2019); United Kingdom: UK
Government (2020); United States: US DOE (2020a), US DOE (2020b).
PAGE | 94
Policy developments in major markets

This section updates the policy landscape for EVs in seven important markets:
Canada, Chile, China, European Union, India, Japan and United States. 4
Canada
Canada has set zero-emission vehicle targets of 100% of new vehicle sales by 2040.
The national government provides a comprehensive suite of measures in support of
these targets, ranging from consumer awareness, infrastructure development and
deployment to purchase incentives. It is supported by the Alternative Fuel
Infrastructure Deployment Initiative which aims to establish a coast-to-coast network
of fast charging infrastructure. An additional 2019 budget of CAD 130 million
(USD 97 million) was established to support the deployment of ZEVs over five years
(April 2019 to March 2024) (Government of Canada, 2019a).
Vehicle policies
Federal level
The national government has set ambitious targets for the transformation of the
transport sector. The targets are to reach ZEV sales of 10% by 2025, 30% by 2030
and 100% by 2040. By comparison, sales of ZEVs in 2019 accounted for 3.5% of new
car sales.
Several incentives at the federal level support the development and deployment of
ZEVs. The main ones are a point-of-sale incentive and a tax credit for ZEVs purchased
or leased after 1 May 2019. The incentives apply to BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs, while the
tax credit supports companies purchasing vehicles for commercial use.
Canada has introduced a GHG emissions standard for light-duty vehicles. Historically,
the Canadian standards have been aligned with the US fuel economy standards due
their integrated vehicle markets. Canada’s government is currently undergoing a
mid-term evaluation of the GHG emissions standard, in line with the underlying
regulation. Considerations will be taken to the recent final rule on the US fuel
economy standards (Government of Canada, 2014).
4
Specific policies related to the traceability and life-cycle impacts of EV batteries are discussed in Chapter 5.
PAGE | 95
New funding of CAD 300 million (USD 220 million) in the 2019 budget is available to
support the ambitions of the ZEV targets. Among other approaches, the federal
government will provide additional funds to encourage companies to purchase
medium- and heavy-duty ZEVs through accelerated capital cost allowances
(Government of Canada, 2020b).
In December 2019, the prime minister requested the minister of Infrastructure and
Communities to work with the provinces and territories to introduce new funding for
the purchase of 5 000 zero-emission school and transit buses over the next five years
(Government of Canada, 2019b).
Provincial level
Provinces in Canada have the right to adopt policies and incentives on top of existing
incentives at the federal level. At the forefront, British Columbia and Québec are the
only provinces that currently offer financial incentives for the purchase of ZEVs (CAA,
2019). ZEV sales in the two provinces combined represented almost 80% of the total
Canadian ZEV market in 2019. 5 In March 2020, the Québec’s government approved
a budget for 2020-21 that allocates additional funding to support ZEVs deployment.
It extends, inter alia, the purchase rebate for EVs until March 2026 (Transition
Energétique Québec, 2019). Québec is also the first province in Canada to adopt a
ZEV mandate for car manufacturers: it targets a sales share of 15.5% light-duty ZEVs
by 2025 to help bolster the market. The mandatealigns with the regulations
in California and 14 other states (UCS USA, 2019). British Columbia joined this group
by adopting a 100% ZEV target in its Zero Emissions Vehicle Act in May 2019
(Government of British Columbia, 2019). The provincial government recently
renewed funding for the Clean Energy Vehicle point-of-sale programme, which offers
up to CAD 3 000 (USD 2 200) off the purchase price for BEV and FCEV cars, and CAD
1 500 (USD 1 100) for PHEVs (CEVforBC, 2019).
Charging infrastructure policies

The federal government allocated CAD 180 million (USD 130 million) in the 2016-17
budget to support: the development of a coast-to-coast fast charging EV network
along the national highway system; natural gas refuelling stations along freight
corridors; hydrogen refuelling stations in metropolitan areas; demonstration of next-
generation charging technologies and the development of enabling bi-national
codes and standards. In 2019, CAD 130 million (USD 97 million) was allocated in the
5
The Canadian ZEV sales in 2019 reached 56 000 vehicles. Around 17 000 of these were sold in British Columbia
and 27 000 in Québec.
PAGE | 96
new Zero-Emission Vehicle Infrastructure Program to support the deployment of

charging in public places, multi-unit residential buildings, workplaces and
commercial areas, as well as for fleets and transit applications. (Government of
Canada, 2019a). 6
The provinces of British Columbia and Québec provide rebates for the purchase and
installation of chargers in individual homes, multi-unit buildings and workplaces.
Since April 2019, employers in Québec are no longer required to provide free
charging to their employees (Transition Energétique Québec, 2019).
Chile
Chile has a relatively low-carbon electricity mix which offers opportunities to electrify
parts of the transport sector to reduce CO2 and pollutant emissions. Significant
progress to deploy EVs has been made over the past three years. Chile has set out
short- and long-term targets for the electrification of private cars and public
transport. To support the targets, considerable legislative efforts have been taken to
stimulate demand for EVs and charging infrastructure, as well as providing funding
to boost the domestic lithium industry and lithium-based products.
Vehicle policies
Chile’s Energy Roadmap 2018-2022 sets a target to increase the existing number of
electric cars tenfold by 2022 compared to 2017 (2 430 units by 2022) (Ministry of
Energy, 2018). The National Electromobility Strategy includes targets to electrify
100% of public transport by 2040 and to achieve a 40% penetration rate of electric
cars in the private stock by 2050 (Ministry of Energy, 2017). In 2019, under a public-
private partnership, Enel X, BYD and Metbus (an electric utility, a bus manufacturer
and a bus operator, respectively) launched Latin America’s first 100% electric bus
corridor. 7
The Taxi Renewal Programme (Renueva tu Colectivo) provides access to financing

schemes for the renewal of taxis, including for the acquisition of electric and hybrid
vehicles (Chile Atiende, 2020). In 2019, three-quarters of Chile’s regions opened a
6
The first stage of the programme delivered 102 fast charging stations for EVs and 3 hydrogen refuelling stations.
Current projects are to deliver 526 fast charging and 12 refuelling stations. The second stage intends to deploy
900 EV fast chargers and 12 hydrogen fuel cell stations by 2026 (Government of Canada, 2019a).
7
More information on Santiago de Chile’s electric bus deployment is in the section on Electric bus deployment in
cities: lessons learned in this chapter.
PAGE | 97
call for submissions from taxi owners to benefit from the scheme (Ministry of
Transport and Telecommunications, 2019). 8
A new energy efficiency law is in the approval process (Senate, 2019). Part of it seeks
to establish energy efficiency standards for new vehicles sold by car manufacturers
or importers. To encourage more electric and hybrid vehicles, multipliers of up to
three per vehicle may be applied in the calculation of the sales average car efficiency
for manufacturers or importers (Ministry of Energy, 2019a).
In November 2019, a decree establishing technical and safety requirements for EVs
entered into force (DS 145 of the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications).
Among other aspects, it requires electric vehicles to be identified by a badge and
imposes requirements regarding signage in high-voltage circuits. These standards
also regulate the types of connectors allowed for EV charging.

The government set a goal of installing 150 publicly accessible charging points by
the end of 2019 and used public-private approaches which had installed 112 by year’s
end. The government has committed to developing standards for electric mobility,
including for charging infrastructure (Ministry of Energy, 2019b). 9 The Ministry of
Energy is mandated to regulate the inter-operability of the EV charging infrastructure.
A technical paper on electromobility was set out for consultation by the government
in December 2019 for a period of two months (Circular No. 21826). It includes
technical provisions related to the installation of charging points, including technical
standards (SEC, 2019b) (Ministry of Energy, 2019a).
Industrial policies
Chile accounts for 52% of the world's lithium reserves, mainly in the form of brines
(Ministry of Mining, 2019). Lithium is in high demand worldwide, particularly for use
in producing batteries for EVs. 10
8
Antofagasta, Araucanía, Arica and Parinacota, Atacama, Aysén, Bío Bío, Los Lagos, Los Rios, Magallanes, Maule,
O'Higgins and Valparaíso.
9
Current standards and procedures are the Electronic Procedure for Installation of Charging Points (TE-6) by the
Superintendence of Electricity and Fuels (SEC, 2019a), which in particular allows geo-localisation data collection of
the charging infrastructure. With the TE-6 database, the Ministry of Energy, through the Electromobility Platform,
recently launched the “EcoCarga” application which indicates the locations of all public charging stations in the
country, in addition to the technical characteristics of each point (Ministry of Energy, 2019c).
10
In 2017, Chile produced 80 417 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) and expects to increase the
production to around 240 000 tonnes by 2022 (Ministry of Mining, 2018).
PAGE | 98
The government is strongly promoting the domestic lithium industry. This extends
from extraction of raw material through the production of lithium-based products by
national and foreign companies, specifically focussing on EV batteries. Policies to
attract value-added battery industries offer local lithium products at preferential
rates for a pre-determined duration. 11
China
China has held a strong lead in electrifying road transport for a number of years. It
accounts for almost the entire global stock of electric two-wheelers, buses and
heavy-duty trucks. In addition, today almost every second electric car in the world is
in China. This reflects the government’s ambitious objectives and history of policy
support to the New Energy Vehicle programme which includes BEVs, PHEVs and
FCEVs. The government proposed an upwards revision of its NEV sales target in 2019,
envisioning 25% by 2025, from 15-20% by 2025 previously (MIIT, 2019a).
At the national level, the policy framework for EVs has seen a gradual transition from
direct to more indirect forms of subsidies and incentives, plus regulations. This has
been accompanied by increasing support for charging infrastructure and other
support services. As the level of national direct subsidies has been gradually reduced
since 2016, provincial level governments stepped in to promote NEVs based on local
circumstances and economic priorities.
Early signs related to the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic show that
many segments of China’s automotive market have been significantly impacted by
reduced demand, as well as by challenges along the complex automotive supply
chain. Central policy makers have identified the automotive market as a primary
target for economic stimulus packages with a number of policy updates expected to
boost vehicle purchases in the remainder of 2020.
11
See in particular the “Call for Added Value of Lithium” (Convocatoria de Valor Agregado de Litio)” (CORFO, 2019).
In 2019, two of the three companies involved in the project withdrew their investment intentions, citing concerns
about the timely scale-up of lithium supply in the country (Reuters, 2019). A new call is open and expected to be
awarded in May 2020.
PAGE | 99
Vehicle policies
National level
NEV credit mandate
In 2018, the government introduced a mandatory credit policy for vehicle suppliers
to boost domestic sales of NEVs. Major vehicle suppliers are required to reach NEV
credit targets for their fleets (MIIT, 2017). The percentage targets are not for sales
numbers but for credits. Each NEV is assigned a specific number of credits
depending on metrics including electric driving range, energy efficiency and rated
power of fuel cell systems. High performance vehicles get more credits (IEA, 2018b).
This instrument has been critical in the reshaping of China’s vehicle industry and the
uptake of EVs, which help to address air pollution issues in urban areas.
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) proposed an updated and
tightened NEV credit scheme in 2019 by both setting new NEVs credit targets for
2021-23 and by establishing a new calculation method for NEV credits beyond 2021
(MIIT, 2019b). Automakers are obliged to reach NEV credit targets of 14%, 16% and
18% over the period 2021-23. Compared to the previous system, the revised approach
implies a reduction in the number of credits allocated to BEVs and PHEVs and an
increase in credits for FCEVs (Table 2.3).
Box 2.1 China NEV credits and sales: The example of the BJEV EU series
Take an example of the best-selling BEV car in China in 2019, the BJEV EU series. In
the previous credit scheme such a vehicle would have been allocated 4.4 NEV credits,
which would decline to 2.2 credits after 2021. So assuming that the weighted-average
credits of EVs sold by a particular manufacturer in 2021 were 2.2 (and noting that the
exact number of credits depends on the electric driving range, energy efficiency and
rated power), to reach the NEV credit target for 2021 of 14%, the automaker would
have to ensure that 6.4% (14 / 2.2) of their sales would be NEVs in 2021.
Collectively, the revision of the NEV credit calculation, the new credit targets and the
additional revisions in the NEV mandate credit policy provide a significant stimulus
to the supply of EVs in China’s domestic market.
PAGE | 100
Range of credits per vehicle type and targets in China’s NEV programme
Range of credits per vehicle

NEV credit
targets
Year BEV PHEV FCEV
2019: 10%
Until 2020 1-5 2 1-5
2020: 12%
2021: 14%
From 2021 1-3.4 1.6 1-6 2022: 16%
2023: 18%
Notes: Before 2020, the number of NEV credits was calculated as: i) BEV - (0.012 x electric range + 0.8) x efficiency
adjustment factor; ii) PHEV - 2x efficiency adjustment factor; iii) FCEV - 0.16 x FCEV system rated power x efficiency
adjustment factor. The efficiency adjustment factor depends on the vehicle energy consumption (kilowatt-hours
[kWh] per 100 km) relative to its kerb mass (in kilogrammes). For further details about the adjustment factors before
2020 see ICCT (2018). After 2021, the number of credits per vehicle will be determined as: i) BEVs - (0.006 x electric
range + 0.4) x efficiency adjustment factor; ii) PHEVs - 1.6 x efficiency adjustment factor; iii) FCEVs - (0.08 x FCEV
system rated power x efficiency adjustment factor). For BEVs and PHEVs, after 2021 the threshold of the vehicle’s
efficiency to get an efficiency adjustment factor above 1 will be tightened.
Sources: MIIT (2017); IEA (2018b); MIIT (2019b).
NEV subsidy programme
China’s NEV programme started in 2016 and its subsidy component is updated each
year. The level of subsidy is determined based on three characteristics: vehicle
electric driving range, energy efficiency and battery pack energy density. In 2019,
the vehicle electric driving range threshold for the subsidy was raised to 250 km, up
from 150 km in 2018. The subsidy for each vehicle category was reduced in 2019 by
an average of 50% across categories, relative to 2018. 12 It was set to expire at the end
of 2020. It has been extended to 2022 to cushion the impacts of the Covid-19
epidemic on NEV markets 13, with the following schedule: starting April 2020, the
subsidy for cars will be reduced by 10% until end 2020 and by an additional 20% and
30% in 2021 and 2022. The subsidy is attributed for cars with a sticker price below
CNY 300 000 (USD 42 400) (MOF, 2020).
12
Subsidies for FCEVs have been stable in recent years (CNY 6 000/kW [USD 850/kW] with a limit of CNY 200 000
[USD 28 300] for passenger vehicles).They are included in the schedule for a gradual phase out. Though the
Ministry of Finance is considering to allow local governments to provide direct subsidies for FCEVs after 2020
(EnergyTrend, 2019).
13
During the EV-100 forum in January 2020 (and before Covid-19 began to have a major impact on China’s auto
industry), the minister of the MIIT announced that in order to stabilise market expectations and ensure the healthy
and sustainable development of the industry, the 2020 NEV subsidy policy would remain relatively stable and the
amount of (direct) subsidy would not be drastically reduced (to zero) (People’s Daily, 2020)
PAGE | 101
Fuel economy standard
A fuel economy standard for light-duty vehicles has been in place in China since
2005. An updated version for 2021-25 was announced in January 2019, with further
details finalised in January 2020. The standard, to be phased in gradually from 2021,
sets a 4L/100 km target for the country's new vehicle fleet in 2025. Through a fuel
economy credit scheme, OEMs are obliged to reach that target, or cover any credit
deficit by either transfers, past carry-overs, or NEV credit surplus. Otherwise, OEMs
will be unable to obtain approvals for new models less efficient than the fuel economy
standard. During the period, EV and efficient ICE vehicles will receive favourable
treatments when calculating each OEM's fuel economy. A separate standard on EV
efficiency sets a voluntary target on energy consumption based on weight classes
(MIIT, 2019c).
Subnational level
More than 29 provinces and cities in China have announced non-subsidy EV
promotion policies. Many provide buyers of electric cars easier access to licence
plates, waivers from traffic restrictions, and/or reductions in parking fees or free
parking (Table 2.4). In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, in February 2020 China’s
president underpinned the need to stabilise automobile sales and encourage a
relaxation of car permit quotas in cities (Wall Street Journal, 2020); hence many of
the city and provincial level policies outlined below have been temporarily relaxed or
suspended. This was followed by an announcement from the Ministry of Commerce
and the National Development and Reform Council requesting that local
governments support NEV markets through a variety of measures. 14 Measures have
been announced in China’s largest car markets: Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.
Such measures do not only target NEVs; they are meant to provide a stimulus to the
car market as a whole. This bears risks for NEVs in 2020. For example, additional
permit quotas can have a negative impact on the NEV market as most cities with
quota policies exclude NEV purchases from these restrictions, and so relaxing quotas
may lead to increased ICE vehicle sales. The exception is Beijing, where the expected
new quotas are all intended for NEVs.
Hainan province, an island in the south, was the first of China’s 31 provinces to
develop a comprehensive plan and official targets for a full transition to NEVs by
14
In addition to an optimisation of car licence plate permit measures, these include subsidies, cash-for-clunker
programmes, promoting the second-hand car market and relaxing restrictions on the use of pick-up trucks.
PAGE | 102
2030. The provincial government set out its Development Plan for Clean Energy
Vehicles in 2019 (The People’s Government of Hainan Province, 2019).
EV promotion policies based on plate access, traffic restrictions and parking in

China, 2019
Direct/easier Waivers from (Partially)

Province or Car plate Circulation
access to car traffic free
city restrictions restrictions 16
plate 15 restrictions parking
Yes,
Yes,
Beijing Yes independent Yes*
for BEV only
quota for BEV
Tianjin Yes Yes Yes* Yes
Hangzhou Yes** Yes Yes* Yes
Shanghai Yes** Yes
Hubei 50% off
Guangzhou Yes** Yes
Shijiazhuang
Gansu 50% off
When
Harbin
charging
Yantai Yes, plate ID
Nanjing First hour
Hainan Yes Yes Yes
First 2
Shenzhen Yes** Yes***
hours
First 2
Xi’an Yes* Yes
hours
First 2
Chengdu Yes* Yes hours or
50% off
Chongqing Yes* Yes
15
Chinese cities with licence plate lotteries, quotas and/or additional charges often provide reductions in the price, separate
lotteries with better odds of success, or complete exemptions to these restrictions for NEVs. These are summarised in this
third column of the table.
16
Circulation restrictions restrict private cars from driving within a certain designated area of the city (often, within one of
the outer concentric ring roads that encircle Chinese cities) on one out of five weekdays, based upon the last numbers of
their license plates.
PAGE | 103
Direct/easier Waivers from (Partially)

Province or Car plate Circulation
access to car traffic free
city restrictions restrictions 16
plate 15 restrictions parking
Inner Mongolia Yes
Shanxi Yes
First 2
Yunnan
hours
When
Xinjiang
charging
Hubei 50% off
Notes: Provinces are shown in underlined italics in the first column, and cities are shown in normal typeface. All
restrictions listed here refer to privately owned light-duty vehicles; various other restrictions apply to commercial
trucks. This table was compiled based on publically available information by Lei Xiang, and was verified and updated
by colleagues at the China Automotive Technology and Reseach Center Co., Ltd (CATARC).
* During the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the city generally suspended the implementation of traffic restrictions.
Chengdu began gradually putting back in place circulation restrictions on 7 April (Daily News, 2020), Beijing’s
restrictions went back into effect from 1 June, 2020 (Beijing Traffic Management Bureau, 2020); Xi’an’s and Tianjin’s
restrictions both came back into force on 8 June (Bendibao.com, 2020);
** Hangzhou, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen have increased the quota for conventional car plates in 2020.
*** Shenzhen has added 10 000 car plates on the quota for PHEVs with lower application requirements in 2020.

In March 2019, the Ministry of Finance, the MIIT and the National Development and
Reform Commission issued a new subsidy policy. It sets out the aim to shift from
subsidising local vehicle purchases to supporting infrastructure roll out (The People’s
Government of China, 2019).
China has been promoting three types of EV charging infrastructure:
 publicly accessible charging in cities

 private charging in residences
 enterprise/company based charging.
Many companies responded with new investment in charging infrastructure in 2019. 17
A number of local governments have also announced subsidies for charging
17
In December 2018, the State Grid Electric Vehicle Service Co., China Southern Power Grid and three private
companies (Teld New Energy Company, Star Charge and Lantian Weiye Clean Energy Fund Management Company)
founded the Xiongan Lianxing Network Technology Company, China’s largest EV charging operator. Located in the
Xiongan Special Economic Zone (Hebei Province), the company now controls 80% of China’s charging stations.
Between late 2018 and mid-2019, five Chinese charging operators (Star Charge, CarEnergyNet, YKCharge, EVCDX
and Kakuka) joined Germany’s Hubject, a platform that aims to expand charging networks globally, thus adding
35 000 charging points to Hubject’s network. The top-three companies operating public charging points in China
are: TELD with 148 000; Star Charge with 120 000 and State Grid with 88 000.
PAGE | 104
infrastructure. For example, Shenzhen is proposing to provide CNY 400 (USD 60) per
kilowatt-hour (kW) in subsidies for direct current (DC) charging facilities,
CNY 200/kW (USD 30) for alternating current (AC) charging facilities over 40 kW and
CNY 100/kW (USD 15) for those under 40 kW (Justice Bureau of Shenzhen
Municipality, 2019).
As part of the central government’s economic stimulus package to tackle the

economic impacts of the coronavirus, subsidies for new charging facilities are
expected. The State Grid has announced plans to increase investment in charging
stations. The City of Beijing has outlined a policy to provide up to
CNY 200 000 (USD 28 300) in subsidies per station for operators.
Industrial policies
To further promote the expansion of the NEV industry and to promote the
development of a NEV industry that is well positioned for the export market, the
government has introduced a ban on investment in newly established enterprises for
ICE car manufacturing that does not respect a number of energy performance related
requirements (IEA, 2018b). In addition, to address NEV production overcapacity
challenges while ensuring the manufacturing of high quality vehicles, the Chinese
Government introduced in January 2019 new requirements on NEV investments. For
instance, NEV manufacturing companies must have an established research and
development group, own patents related to EV technologies and offer after sales
services to their customers (Sohu, 2019a; NDRC, 2019).
New extensive guidance for the battery recycling industry was issued in 2019 (see
Chapter 5).
European Union
The European Green Deal, a major initiative that aims to bring the European Union
towards net zero GHG emissions by 2050 and promote strong “clean” growth was
presented by the European Commission in December 2019. It incorporates a number
of actions across all economic sectors including more stringent CO2 standards in
order to accelerate the transition to sustainable and smart mobility. It reaffirms the
European Union and its member states commitment to electrify portions of the
transport sector (European Commission, 2019a). Over the last year, many EU member
states introduced ambitious policies with the aim to accelerate the deployment of
EVs and charging infrastructure.
PAGE | 105
Vehicle policies
New CO2 emission performance standards for light-duty vehicles were adopted in
April 2019 (European Union Regulation 2019/631). It extended the 2020 targets for
new cars (95 grammes of carbon dioxide per kilometre [gCO2/km]) and new vans
(147 gCO2/km) and sets specific emission targets for each manufacturer. 18 The new
targets are defined as a percentage reduction with 2021 as starting point: 37.5%
reduction for cars and 31% for light-commercial vehicles (LCVs). If a manufacturer
exceeds its average emissions target, it has to pay a penalty. In order to support the
uptake of new zero- and low-emission vehicles, the scheme gives credits to
manufacturers that register high shares of vehicles emitting less than 50 gCO2/km.
Manufacturers exceeding production shares of 15% of zero- and low-emission cars
and vans in 2025, and in 2030 production shares exceeding 35% for cars and 30%
for vans, will be rewarded in the form of a less strict overall CO2 target (European
Commission, 2019b). The EU climate and energy 2030 targets will be hard to reach
without including EVs. 19
In 2019, the European Union introduced a CO2 emissions performance standard for
heavy-duty vehicles (European Union Regulation 2019/1242). The standards apply for
large trucks which account for around 65-70% of the CO2 emissions from heavy-duty
road transport in the European Union. On an average, these trucks will need to be
15% more fuel efficient by 2025 and at least 30% more efficient by 2030, relative to
a mid-2019 to mid-2020 period. As part of the 2022 review of the legislation, the
Commission will assess whether the scope should be extended to other types of
vehicles (European Commission, 2019c).
The Clean Vehicles Directive was revised in 2019 and sets mandatory minimum public
procurement targets for LDVs, trucks and buses for the periods 2021-25 and 2026-
30 to further promote the market uptake of EVs. The EU member states have various
requirements based on their economic situation and air pollution exposure levels
(European Commission, 2019d). 20

With the aim to raise ambition for EV charging infrastructure, as part of the European
Green Deal, it was announced in 2019 that the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure
18
This corresponds to 4.1 litres per 100 km (L/100 km) of petrol or 3.6 L/100 km of diesel.
19
More information is available in Global EV Outlook 2019, in particular Box 3.2 (IEA, 2019).
20
The targets for light-duty vehicles range from 17.6 % to 38.5 % for 2021-25 (vehicles with maximum tailpipe
emissions 50 gCO2/km) and 2026-30 (vehicles with 0 gCO2/km) while targets for heavy-duty vehicles vary from 6 %
to 15 % for 2021-25 and from 24 % to 65 % for 2026-30 among the EU member states.
PAGE | 106
Directive (AFID) (EU/2014/94) and the Trans-European Network for Transport (TEN-T)
regulation will be reviewed in 2021. To date, the AFID has required EU members to
set deployment targets for publicly accessible chargers for 2020, 2025 and 2030,
with an indicative ratio of 1 charger per 10 electric cars (European Commission,
2019e). At the start of 2020 the number of publicly accessible charging points in the
European Union was around 165 000 (European Fuels Observatory, 2020). The
European Commission projects the need for 1 million charging points across the
European Union by 2025 to support the accelerated deployment of EVs expected as
an outcome of the new policies in the European Green Deal (European Commission,
2019a).
In May 2018, the European Union introduced stricter codes on new and renovated
buildings to require EV charging infrastructure (Energy Performance of Buildings
Directive EU/2018/844). Member states were obliged to transpose the new
requirements into national legislations by 10 March 2020. As of 12 May 2020, 12 out
of 27 EU members had done so (European Commission, 2020a).
Industrial policies
The European Commission’s New Industrial Strategy for Europe in 2020, featured in
the European Green Deal, is viewed as the main European Union growth strategy and
is at the heart of the goal of becoming the world’s first carbon-neutral continent by
2050. This strategy was re-confirmed in April 2020 by the European Commission as
the impacts of Covid-19 pandemic were being recognised.
Moving forward and building upon the New Industrial Strategy, the European
Commission will present a strategy for smart mobility in 2020. Several funding
mechanisms including Horizon Europe and the EU Innovation fund as well as
Important Project of Common European interest are in this context expected to be
further developed with the aim to support the EU’s industry objectives, which also
benefit the EV industry. In addition, the European Battery Alliance is expected to be
the main driver and industrial platform for building a European battery technology
industry (European Commission, 2020b).
Major EV strategy and purchase support changes in EU member states

In 2019, several EU member countries advanced their ambitions to further deploy
EVs. Germany and Italy announced new deployment targets. The Netherlands
announced new commitments that will increase their existing EV objectives.
PAGE | 107
France
In late 2019, France issued the Loi d’Orientation des Mobilités (Mobility Orientation
Law). It aims to decarbonise land transport by 2050 and sets out measures to reach
this goal. Among them, it phases out the sale of vehicles that directly emit CO2 as
from 2040. It also defines EV deployment targets: in 2028, a combined stock of
3 million BEV and/or FCEV cars and 500 000 BEV and/or PHEV and/or FCEV LCVs.
The law sets provisions to facilitate installation of charging points in collective
buildings and higher quotas of low emissions vehicles when renewing large fleets of
public or private vehicles. For areas that are regularly exceeding air pollutant limits,
establishing low-emission zones will be mandatory by the end of 2020 (Assemblée
Nationale, 2019).
In response to the Covid-19 crisis and its impact on the automotive industry, the
French government has announced support measures for the sector at the end of
May 2020 (Government of France, 2020). They include an increased subsidy for BEVs
(EUR 7 000 [USD 7 900] instead of EUR 6 000 [USD 6 800]) and a subsidy for PHEVs
(EUR 2 000 [USD 2 300]). The existing cash-for-clunker scheme is made available to
a wider portion of French households and is increased for the 200 000 first demands
(EUR 5 000 [USD 5 700] for electric cars, instead of EUR 2 500 [USD 2 800]). In order
to generate a rapid recovery of car sales, these measures are only valid from June to
December 2020. As part of this plan, the French government committed to
accelerate charger deployment, targeting 100 000 publicly accessible chargers by
the end of 2021, instead of 2022 previously.
Germany
In September 2019, Germany revealed its Climate Action Programme 2030, including
to cut transport-related emissions by 40-42% by 2030. A package of measures was
set out to encourage increased electrification of transport. Germany is targeting a
combined BEV and FCEV stock of 7-10 million cars by 2030. Notably, Germany
introduced provisions for all petrol stations in the country to also provide charging
services. It also simplified the rules regarding the installation of charging
infrastructure. To promote EV sales, the subsidy for the purchase of an electric,
hybrid or fuel cell vehicle was increased in early 2020. It was reinforced in early June
2020 as part of a post Covid-19 national plan (Government of Germany, 2020). The
subsidy applies to EV purchases below a sticker price of EUR 40 000 (USD 45 200)
and the level of the subsidy varies by powertrain type: for BEVs it was increased to
up to EUR 6 000 (USD 6 800) 21 and for PHEVs to EUR 4 500 (USD 5 100). This will
21
Plus a possible EUR 3 000 (USD 3 400) additional subsidy directly from the automaker (Autobild, 2020).”
PAGE | 108
apply until the end of 2021. For EVs and PHEVs with a higher sticker price (up to
EUR 65 000), the subsidy level is lower (Table 2.2). As of June 2020, the reduced tax
for electric company cars is made available for cars up to EUR 60 000 (USD 67 800)
(previously EUR 40 000 [USD 45 200]). Although not specific to cars, the national
decrease of VAT rate from 19% to 16% for six months in 2020 (July to December) will
also positively impact the sticker price of EVs. In late 2019, Germany announced a
five-year extension of the annual vehicle tax exemption for EVs - which was due to
expire in 2020 - and in June 2020 it was further extended from 2025 to 2030. 22
Italy
The revised Integrated National Plan for Energy and Climate was released by the
government in 2019. It highlights electric and hydrogen mobility as an essential
instrument to reach the target of reduced carbon emissions in transport by 2030.
According to the plan, Italy is targeting 6 million electrically powered vehicles by
2030, including 4 million BEVs. Italy recorded a huge increase in EV sales in 2019
relative to 2018. This reflects the 2019 introduction of a subsidy of up to
EUR 6 000 (USD 6 800) for cars with rated emissions of less than 20 gCO2/km (i.e. a
few highly efficient PHEVs, or BEVs / FCEVs), if the buyer scraps an old car rated
Euro 1-4, otherwise the incentive is capped at EUR 4 000 (USD 4 500). Moreover
BEVs are exempt from the annual vehicle tax during the first five years and benefit
from reduced tax level afterwards.
Netherlands
The National Climate Agreement was announced in 2019 and includes a target to
reduce GHG emissions by 49% by 2030 relative to 1990 levels. It includes a 30%
reduction in CO2 emissions from inland and continental transport. Besides its former
commitment to reach 100% of ZEVs in new passenger cars sales by 2030, the
government introduced targets for taxis and FCEVs. By 2025, half of the taxi fleet
should be ZEVs, and by the same year the ambitions is to have 15 000 FCEVs on the
streets, aiming for 300 000 FCEVs by 2030. By 2025, it aims for all new public bus
sales to be electric, preparing for a full stock of electric buses in public systems by
2030. Further it aims to deploy 3 000 FCEV heavy-duty vehicles. The 30-40 largest
municipalities have to implement a zero-emission zone for freight vehicles (LCVs and
HDVs) by 2025 and long-haul freight has to improve its CO2 intensity by 30% by 2030.
Depending on engine size and CO2 emissions, it represents typically about EUR 100 (USD 110) per year for a
22
medium-size vehicle and about EUR 500 (USD 560) per year for high-end cars.
PAGE | 109
India
India’s roadmap for vehicle electrification, outlined in the National Electric Mobility
Mission Plan (NEMMP) 2020 launched in 2013, highlights the vision to boost adoption
and manufacturing of EVs. Over the years India’s approach to EV deployment has
been evolving. The current EV policy framework is a mix of incentive-based policies
accompanied by regulatory reforms, and public-private partnerships to encourage
EV adoption, expand charging infrastructure and support domestic EV and supply
equipment manufacturing capacity and battery manufacturing. Energy security and
clean air considerations have also prompted the adoption of stricter performance
and efficiency standards for the overall vehicle fleet, and led to new policies
focussing on the development and market adoption of electric and hybrid vehicles.
With an emphasis on sustainable transport, the current strategy for electric mobility
includes a wide array of shared and public mobility solutions. In addition to
electrification, India is exploring options such as energy efficiency regulations and
fuel diversification to reduce its oil import dependence by 10% in 2022.
Vehicle policies
Phase I of the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles (FAME) ran for
four years from 2015. Phase II (FAME II) was approved by the government with a
budget of approximately INR 100 billion (USD 1.3 billion) for a three-year period from
April 2019 (Government of India, 2019a). FAME II provides incentives for the purchase
of electric and hybrid vehicles, accounting for about 86% of the allocation and
deployment of charging stations.
Several changes as part of FAME II relate to the types of vehicles covered and
incentive volumes. Electric buses, two/three-wheelers, PHEV and HEV cars are
covered: the largest share of the incentives is reserved for buses (41%), followed by
three-wheelers (29%) and two-wheelers (23%). By August 2019, incentives had been
approved for 5 595 electric buses for both intercity (across 64 cities) and local
operations. Several cities, e.g. Kolkata, Nagpur and Delhi, are procuring electric
buses under the FAME II scheme. Several new electric car models with expanded
ranges of over 300 km were launched in 2019 and early 2020. However, FAME II
specifies a maximum sticker price of about INR 1 500 000 (USD 19 900) for cars to
be eligible, making most of the available car models beyond the scope of the scheme
because of higher prices. Overall, 2019 saw a decline in sales of electric cars. In
addition, given that only advanced battery chemistries (excluding lead-acid) are
eligible under FAME II, with incentives based on battery size, 2019 also saw an
immediate negative impact on the sales of electric two-wheelers, which fell about
94%. Most electric two-wheelers sold in India have lead-acid batteries and are low-
speed and therefore not eligible for incentives under the FAME II scheme. However,
PAGE | 110
as some compensation, the federal budget for 2019-20 announced an income tax
exemption of INR 150 000 (USD 2 000) on loans for EV purchases as an incentive. It
is premature to measure the effects on personal EV sales from this tax measure.
The Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL), India’s largest energy savings
company (ESCO), has been leading a bulk procurement programme for EVs since
2017. It aims to transform government vehicle fleets across the country. It set out an
initial intent for bulk procurement of 10 000 EVs. 23 However, the initial 1 500 cars
took about two years to roll out with some technical issues raised due to vehicle
range and quality. Drawing from that learning from the first tender, EESL floated a
new tender for an additional 1 000 electric cars in 2020 with more advanced
technical specifications, to accommodate for the fast changing technology.

Key decisions to expand the charging infrastructure network in India were taken in
2019. In October, the Bureau of Energy Efficiency was named as the Central Nodal
Agency for the roll out of publicly accessible charging infrastructure (Gouvernment
of India, 2019b). This provides administrative clarity that was missing in India’s EV
charging governance framework. Also in October 2019, the previous guidelines and
standards for charging infrastructure for EVs were revised and improved. The
guidelines set out targets for the installation of at least 1 publicly accessible charger
within a 3 x 3 km grid in cities, and 1 charging station every 25 km on both sides of
highways. There would also be 1 fast charging station every 100 km on highways. 24
These guidelines also include information on the specifications of the Electric Vehicle
Supply Equipment (EVSE) and related aspects of charger deployment. Further, under
FAME II, about INR 10 billion (USD 130 million) has been allocated to deploy networks
of charging stations, with incentives that range from 50-100% of the cost of a charger
based on its location and access.
In addition to aggregating demand for vehicles, EESL is also deploying 498 publicly
accessible chargers in government offices along with 68 publicly accessible
chargers across the country. The 2020-21 target is 1 500 additional publicly
accessible chargers in and around major metro rail systems and government
offices. 25
23
EESL awarded a tender for installing 10 000 EVs and 2 125 chargers across the country to Tata and Mahindra
primarily targeting LDV governmental fleets (Government of India, 2018).
24
In phase 1 (years 1-3) of this plan, cities with a population of over 4 million and important highways connecting
these cities would be targeted. In phase 2 (years 3-5), all state capitals and key highways connecting them would be
included.
25
In major metro rail systems and government offices in Jaipur, Chennai, greater Hyderabad, Noida, Nagpur, New
Delhi and South Delhi.
PAGE | 111
Industrial policies
With an aim “to leapfrog and envision India as a global hub of manufacturing of
electric vehicles” the government is using a range of policy measures to promote
domestic EV and EVSE manufacturing. The broad manufacturing scope includes
solar equipment, battery storage and charging infrastructure. The National Mission
on Transformative Mobility and Battery Storage was established in 2019 for the period
to 2024 and includes a Phased Manufacturing Plan for the entire value chain to
support the evolution of “large-scale export-competitive integrated battery and cell
manufacturing “gigaplants” in India” (Government of India, 2019c). Supplementing
national policies, India’s states have specific incentives for EV manufacturing.
To alleviate end-of-life battery concerns, India’s Ministry of Environment, Forest and

Climate Change updated its 2001 Battery Waste Management rules in 2020 with
more stringent compliance requirements for nickel, cadmium and lead by weight in
new and discarded batteries, and for overall battery waste management and
recycling (Government of India, 2020).
State level policies

Given the structure of the government in India, several aspects of road transport
policy making and deployment are within the jurisdiction of its 28 states and 8 union
territories. While overarching targets for EVs and charger deployment are set by the
federal government, the deployment is largely executed by the states. Several states
are providing financial incentives, duty waivers, exemptions from permit fees,
streamlined registration processes and supporting infrastructure to encourage EV
uptake and charging station deployment. While specific policy approaches vary by
local context, states such as Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra,
Tamil Nadu, Telangana and West Bengal have developed state level roadmaps and
policy guides to aid policy consistency.
Japan
Japan has set a target for “next-generation vehicles” 26 to account for 50-70% of new
car sales by 2030, including a target of 20-30% for BEVs and PHEVs (Government of
Japan, 2018). The government has implemented policies for vehicles and chargers,
as well as broader industrial policies, to help achieve these targets.
26
Including HEVs, BEVs, PHEVs, FCEVs and clean diesel vehicles.
PAGE | 112
Vehicle policies
In 2019, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism set new fuel-efficiency standards for LDVs for
2030 and HDVs for 2025.
For light-duty vehicles, the standards require a corporate average fuel efficiency of
25.4 kilometres per litre (km/L) by 2030, representing an improvement of 32.4% 27
compared to the fleet average for 2016 (19.2 km/L) (METI, 2019a). The scope of the
new standards has expanded to EVs, replacing standards for 2020 which covered
gasoline, diesel and liquefied petroleum gas vehicles only. The standards are
established on a well-to-wheel (WTW) basis to allow for comparisons of energy
consumption efficiency across all fuel types, including BEVs and PHEVs. 28 The
standard for heavy-duty vehicles 29 also has relevance for electric mobility due to its
capacity to improve efficiency, but it does not include specific provisions for EVs. 30
Japan provides subsidies for the purchase of PHEVs (up to JPY 200 000 [USD 1 800]),
BEVs (up to JPY 400 000 [USD 3 700]) and FCEVs (up to
JPY 2 250 000 [USD 20 800]). PHEVs, BEVs, FCEVs and very fuel-efficient vehicles
are also exempt from purchase and weight taxes. 31 Plus these vehicle types have
lower annual vehicle taxes, though this will be limited to only PHEVs, BEVs and FCEVs
starting in FY 2021 (METI, 2019b).

The government provides subsidies to support the installation of charging
infrastructure. It provides between half to two-thirds of the costs (depending on
location, charger type). In 2019, these subsidies totalled JPY 1.1 billion
(USD 10 million).
27
Since this improvement is based on an efficiency metric, as opposed to an intensity metric (such as litres per
100 km), it cannot be directly compared with other targets that are expressed in intensity terms.
28
The standards also incorporate the expected power generation mix in 2030 to account for differences in
generation efficiency across generation types.
29
The regulation applies to vehicles with a total weight of more than 3.5 tonnes.
30
It requires new trucks and other heavy vehicles to have weighted average fuel economy of 7.63 km/L by 2025
(implying an efficiency improvement of 13.4% relative to the 2015 standards), and a level of 6.52 km/L for buses by
2025 (implying an efficiency improvement of 14.3% relative to the 2015 standards).
31
In 2017, subsidies for very fuel-efficient vehicles had a budget allocation of JPY 13 billion (USD 120 million) (Sato,
2018). In the same year, this was complemented by JPY 1 billion (USD 9 million) to accelerate the introduction of
HEV, PHEV and BEV trucks and buses, and JPY 2.6 billion (USD 24 million) to promote FCEV buses utilising hydrogen
generated by renewable energy (Sato, 2018).
PAGE | 113
Japan is also supportive of the development of new international charging standards.

The CHAdeMO Association 32 and the China Electricity Council are working jointly on
a next-generation ultra-high power charging standard (up to 900 kW), dubbed
“ChaoJi” (CHAdeMO, 2019; CHAdeMO, 2020). The development team aims to publish
ChaoJi for CHAdeMO by the end of 2020 for global use. ChaoJi will be concurrently
proposed to the International Electrotechnical Commission / International
Organization for Standardization (IEC/ISO) committees to be added to the DC fast
charging systems.
Japan is also supporting the development of hydrogen fuelling stations. Government

subsidies support between half to two-thirds of station and equipment costs,
depending on the size of hydrogen station (300 normal cubic metres per hour
[Nm3/h] or 50–300 Nm3/h) and style (onsite, offsite, mobile) (NeV, 2019). The
property tax for hydrogen fuelling stations and equipment are reduced by 25% for
three years.
Industrial policies
METI launched a strategic commission for a “new era of automobiles” in 2018 that
includes a 2050 goal to reduce specific GHG emissions per kilometre by 80% across
all vehicles produced by Japanese automakers on a WTW basis, together with efforts
to fully decarbonise the energy supply (electricity and hydrogen) (Government of
Japan, 2018). 33
METI launched the Council for Electrified Vehicle Society (CEVS) in July 2019 to help
accelerate EV deployment (METI, 2019c). CEVS promotes collaboration and
information sharing among the public and private sectors on maximising the
advantages of EVs. 34
The government released its Strategic Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in
March 2019 (METI, 2019d). It includes targets to reduce the average price difference
between FCEVs and HEVs from JPY 3 million (USD 27 700) to JPY 700 000
(USD 6 500) by 2025. 35
32
CHAdeMO is one of the earliest and most widespread DC charging standards for electric vehicles in the world.
33
Further details on this strategy are available in Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019).
34
Specific guidance is provided by working groups on topics such as EV promotion and battery reuse (METI, 2019c).
35
It also includes cost targets for fuel cell stacks to be reduced from JPY 20 000/kW (USD 180/kW) to JPY 5 000/kW
(USD 45/kW) in same period.
PAGE | 114
United States
The United States has a long history of promoting more efficient vehicles at the
federal level (the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards date from the 1970s),
as well as low-emitting vehicles. The last few years have seen an increasing debate
between federal and state governments on the path forward for fuel-efficiency
standards.
Vehicle policies
Federal level
In late March 2020, the US administration proposed substantial revisions to the
vehicle fuel-efficiency standards in the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE)
Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards (NHTSA/EPA, 2020). The proposed
standards constitute a significant roll back from the current federal standards that
were passed in 2012. The proposed modifications lower the annual improvement in
fuel-economy standards from 4.7% in the current regulation to 1.5% for model years
2021 through 2026.
Various analyses suggest that the costs of this roll back on the US economy outweigh
the benefits (ICCT, 2020b; NHTSA/EPA, 2020). They find that the additional fuel
expenditures that the revised standards will impose on US consumers exceed the
costs of compliance for automakers. There is an additional expectation of reduced
competitiveness of US automakers in international car markets, suggesting that the
revised CAFE rules could result in domestic job losses.
Further, the US Congress decided to not extend the federal tax credit that provides
USD 2 500-7 500 in tax exemptions for the purchase of electric cars. This credit is
subject to a gradual year-long phase out on models made by automakers beyond a
limit of 200 000 vehicle sales.
State level
The proposed SAFE rule have provoked negotiations among automakers, state
legislatures and judicial authorities on whether a compromise between the SAFE Act
and the 2012 CAFE standards can be reached, or whether to continue following
California’s Low Emission Vehicles (LEV III) pollutant emissions and GHG regulations
PAGE | 115
would be the pathway for 14 US states (including California) 36 (New York Times, 2019;
CARB, 2019; CARB, 2020). California’s proposed compromise with five automakers is
much closer in scope to the previous CAFE standards than it is to the SAFE rule. The
four automakers that have supported the less stringent SAFE standards, General
Motors, Fiat Chrysler, Toyota, and Volvo collectively account for just under half of the
North American car market. Whether or not US states have the authority to set their
own rules via the special pre-emption waiver under the 1970 Clean Air Act is the
subject of a current lawsuit. 37 Hence, whether fuel- economy and emissions
standards will move forward along two tracks, reach a compromise, be settled in a
judicial finding, or another outcome that could lead to nationwide regulation, is
unknown at the time of writing.
Individual US states have the prerogative to adopt policies and regulations to

promote the deployment of EVs and other low-carbon mobility modes. Both the
Alternative Fuels Data Centre 38 of the US Department of Energy (US DOE) and the
Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) track state level initiatives to support
zero-emission and alternative fuel vehicles, and their supporting infrastructure on an
interactive and hyperlinked map (AFDC, 2020; C2ES, 2019). According to the
Alternative Fuels Data Centre, all but 4 US states have policies supporting the
commercial deployment of alternative fuel vehicles and/or their supporting
infrastructure. Of these, 16 states offer statewide subsidies, tax credits, or waivers or
reductions on inspections that explicitly support EV purchase for private individuals.
These can be usefully distinguished from support for efficient or alternative fuel
vehicles more generally, which are offered by 29 states (excluding a few states that
include subsidies for vehicle conversion), many of which are overlapping with the
aforementioned 16 states. Moreover, 42 states have policies to help financing of
installing or operating charging infrastructure deployment (e.g. low-interest loans,
leasing, opt-in time-of-use pricing), and 17 for fleet owners to purchase electric
medium- and/or heavy-duty vehicles.
The differing positions between the federal and state governments have catalysed
momentum at the state level to either follow California’s low-emission vehicle (LEV)
36
These are the so-called “177 States”, as they follow California’s exemption under Section 177 of the Federal Clean
Air Act. For the list, covering all updates through August, 2019, see: ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-03/177-
states.pdf.
37
The One National Program Rule, which aims to enable the US federal government to provide nationwide uniform
fuel-economy and GHG emission standards, was passed in September 2019 (US EPA, 2019). There are disputes on
this rule between the federal and state level governments and until there is resolution, the LEV III GHG emissions
standards remain in place for those states that have adopted them.
38
The AFDC search engine for federal and state laws and incentives is available
at:https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/search.
PAGE | 116
and ZEV regulations, or to assert their authority to craft similar standards on their
own. 39 In 2019, Minnesota and New Mexico announced the development of clean car
standards with GHG emission reductions generally aligned with California’s LEV
regulations, and with ambitions in both states more robust than the proposed federal
SAFE Act. 40 Minnesota’s plans include provisions to spur EV uptake to achieve 2030
market penetration targets. 41 Colorado, among the states that already follow
California’s fuel economy regulations, adopted a new Zero-Emission Vehicle rule in
September 2019, under which automakers must increase the ZEVs available for
purchase as part of their LDV stock by a minimum percentage by January 2022. 42
New Jersey proposed legislation for wider adoption of electric vehicles, calling for
2 million plug-in electric vehicles by 2035. 43
In recent years, momentum has increased in several states to extend zero emission
targets and regulations to medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. In 2018, California
adopted the Innovative Clean Transit Regulation to reduce emissions from HDVs, a
programme that also requires a gradual transition to a 100% zero-emission bus fleet
in public transport. 44 In late 2019, California, together with seven other US states,
committed to accelerate the adoption of zero-emission medium- and heavy-duty
vehicles in proposing the Advanced Clean Trucking rule and investigating mandates,
comprising sales targets and reporting requirements. California aims to adopt the
clean trucking measures in 2020 (CARB, 2019). In March 2020, Washington became
the first US state to implement a medium- and heavy-duty ZEV programme (State of
Washington, 2020).
39
In a role reversal, some state legislatures and governors are calling on the federal administration to recognise
their authority to enact and enforce legislation that applies in their jurisdictions.
40
The Minnesota and New Mexico clean car standard will increase the average fuel economy to 52 miles per gallon,
compared with the 37 miles per gallon in the federal SAFE proposal (Office of the Governor State of New Mexico,
2019).
41
The targets call for 20% of all passenger vehicles in Minnesota to be electric by 2030. The Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency has the authority to adopt clean car standards through a formal rulemaking process. It began a
fifteen month process in October 2019 to ensure that voices in the state are heard (Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency, 2019).
42
The alternative rule references proportional and/or early action credit options. This would facilitate the availability
of these models in Colorado as soon as 2021 (model year) (State of Colorado, 2019).
43
Proposed bills No.A4819 and S2252 consider a series of mandates, including additional obligations under the
Advance Clean Cars Program, deployment of a EV fast charging network, provision of rebates up to USD 5 000 for
purchasing eligible EVs, and requiring transit authorities to purchase only electric buses by 2032 (Bloomberg,
2020).
44
By 2029, 100% of new purchases by public transit authorities must be ZEVs, aiming for a full transition to clean
transport by 2040. The regulation covers standard, articulated, over-the-road, double‑decker and cutaway buses.
The programme differentiates between large and small transit authorities by fleet size and defines a purchase
schedule: starting in 2023 for large transit authorities (25% of purchases) and 2026 for small transit authorities (25%
of the purchases) (CARB, 2019).
PAGE | 117
Federal level
Despite not extending the federal tax credit on EVs, the US Congress did extend the
federal charging infrastructure tax credit in 2019. It covers up to 30% of the
installation cost of new EVSE (limited to USD 1 000) through fiscal year 2020 (The
Edison Electric Institute 2019).
The International Code Council (ICC) approved a new voluntary guideline to make all
new homes built in the United States EV-ready (EV-Ready Buildings Code). With the
adoption of the provision, ICC expects homeowners should be able to charge at least
one full-size EV overnight. 45
State level
Michigan recently passed a legislative package intended to increase access to EV
charging infrastructure at state-owned properties, businesses, multi-unit buildings
and workplaces. Legislation in Colorado allows electric public utilities to install EV
charging stations (or an electric motor vehicle infrastructure programme) as
regulated services and thus allow for cost recovery from ratepayers for the
investment (State of Colorado, 2019). Hawaii has launched a two stage rebate
programme to support the near-term installation of EV charging stations which
provides for two types of rebates (State of Hawaii, 2019). 46
In 2020, New Jersey approved an ambitious EV deployment programme that set a

target of 330 000 EVs on the road by 2025 and 2 million by 2035, in addition to the
charging infrastructure required to meet the goal. 47,48 California has introduced a
programme for EV charging infrastructure funded by the California Energy
45
For multi-unit buildings, two parking spots per building will need to be “EV-ready”, in addition of others that can
be easily fitted with an outlet or charger (“EV-capable”). Homeowners will still need to install an adequate EV
charger. The ICC codes are used by all US states, but they can decide whether or not to adopt the latest standard
(Quartz, 2020).
46
USD 4 500 (new) or USD 3 000 (upgrade) rebates for Level 2 AC multiport charging station. USD 35 000 (new) or
USD 28 000 (upgrade) rebates for DC fast charging stations; Stage 1: USD 150 000 in rebates for installations
completed between 1 January 2020 and 30 June 2020. Stage 2: USD 250 000 in rebates for installations completed
between 1 July 2020 and 30 June 2021 (State of Hawaii, 2019).
47
For the second target, the New Jersey legislation set the following goals: At least 400 DC fast charging stations in
no less than 200 different locations by December 2025. At least 75 of the 200 or more charging locations must be in
travel corridors, equipped with at least two DC fast charging points per location. At least 100 of the 200 or more
charging locations must be in community locations.

48
Additional incentives in the legislation include a rebate programme and targets for public transport electrification.
PAGE | 118
Commission and implemented by the Center for Sustainable Energy. The programme
budget is USD 71 million with a potential for up to USD 200 million (CALeVIP, 2019).
The hyperlinked map from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES)
outlines further state level programmes promoting ZEVs and alternative fuel
infrastructure (C2ES, 2019).
Industrial policies
US Electrify Forward Act

In January 2020, the US House of Representatives proposed the Electrify Forward Act
(US Government, 2020). It is a comprehensive plan to support the domestic
development, production and distribution of EVs and charging infrastructure. The bill
aims to “promote American leadership in vehicle manufacturing, job creation,
improved air quality and climate protection through domestic manufacturing of low-
and zero- emission vehicles and development of electric vehicle charging networks”.
The Act has the following objectives:
 To accelerate domestic manufacturing of batteries, power electronics and other

technologies in plug-in vehicles.
 To update residential and commercial building codes to encourage the
installation of EV charging infrastructure.
 To modify and reauthorise the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing
Incentive Program, a grant and loan programme at the US DOE, beginning in
fiscal year 2021 through 2030.
 To require states to consider new measures to encourage deployment of electric
vehicle charging stations.
Deploying electric buses in cities: Lessons learned from

Helsinki, Kolkata, Santiago de Chile and Shenzhen
Cities are often at the forefront of transport electrification (IEA, 2017). Many local
projects complement national programmes as highlighted in the country profiles.
Efforts in urban areas often focus on electric buses, which are becoming increasingly
common in cities to reduce GHG emissions and local air pollutants relative to diesel
buses. Electric buses have the driving range needed to operate in most public transit
systems. Many cities have demonstrated that obstacles related to upgrades to the
distribution grid and to power chargers can be managed effectively. The ongoing
decline in battery costs has brought electric buses closer to cost parity with other
bus technologies; in many cases they are already the cheapest option in terms of
total cost of ownership.
PAGE | 119
Yet, the strong trends for electric buses in recent years have been concentrated in
just a few countries while others have introduced only small pilot fleets. Each public
transit system is unique and the roll-out of electric buses faces context-specific
challenges related to network size, ridership, degree of sector privatisation and the
availability of funding streams other than fare revenues.
This section highlights four cases of city fleets operating in the public transit systems
of Helsinki (Finland), Kolkata (India), Santiago de Chile (Chile) and Shenzhen (China).
The case studies for Santiago and Helsinki take into consideration the operations of
all the fleet operators in the metropolitan region, while for Shenzhen, it draws from
the experience from one of the three major operators, and for Kolkata the focus is on
the public sector operator that, along with private operators, services the demands
of that metropolitan region.
These four cities have had very different approaches and trajectories for introducing
electric buses. While Shenzhen has had several years of experience in deploying e-
buses at scale and transforming their complete fleet, the other cities are at relatively
early stages of deployment. The bus types, nature of charging infrastructure and
patterns of use are also varied. The various paths for introducing e-buses under the
specific circumstances provide insights on viable trajectories for public transit
electrification, as well as obstacles that cities following in their footsteps should
anticipate. (These cases benefit from collaboration with the cities which prepared
detailed case descriptions. These case studies may be accessed at:
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020.
Selected electric bus case studies at a glance
City profile Buses Chargers Implementation
Helsinki introduced E-buses use a mix The regional public

electric buses in 2017. Its To date there are
of pantographs transport authority,
public transit system 48 electric buses
and fixed EVSE for Helsinki Region
accommodates (made by Linkker,
charging under Transport (HSL), has
370 million trips per Yutong, VDL) in
different regimes: promoted the roll-out of
year, a third of these on operation. The e-bus
15 buses are electric buses as a part
its 1 400 buses. Helsinki, fleet is set to
equipped with of tenders that include a
with a population of quadruple by 2021.
pantographs and minimum requirement to
Helsinki aims to
1 490 000, is the use opportunity operate e-buses. The
electrify 30% of its bus
smallest among the four charging while 33 operators already
fleet by 2025.
cities discussed. charge at depots. 49 exceed these provisions.
49
Opportunity charging here means charging during operation hours at bus stops or line terminus. Depot charging
describes charging outside of operation hours at bus depots, often at night.
PAGE | 120
HSL has organised

separate tenders to
contract charging
infrastructure operators
for opportunity charging
(bus operators are not
responsible for operating
the chargers).
WBTC’s roll out of e-

buses and chargers was
Since 2019, WBTC has made possible through
put 80 e-buses Buses are charged the first phase of the
Kolkata metro region supplied by Tata at ten depots, most Faster Adoption and
has 925 bus lines and Motors into operation of which are Manufacturing of Hybrid
over 11 000 buses to on 12 lines. Another equipped with & Electric Vehicles (FAME
serve about 14 million 150 vehicles will enter seven chargers I) scheme. This
residents. The service in the mid-term with power rating government programme
government-owned and WBTC aims to fully of 60 kW or made funds available for
West Bengal Transport electrify its fleet of 120 kW. All lines procurement of 80 e-
Corporation (WBTC) about 5 000 buses by have one or two buses with charging
operates 1 553 of the 2030. additional chargers equipment. Forty of the
buses on 348 lines. at the line 9 metre buses have
terminus. 125 kWh battery packs
and 40 of the 12 metre
buses have 188 kWh
battery packs.
Santiago has over The existing e-bus Santiago’s decision to

400 e-buses (6% of its fleets use depot adopt the Euro VI
Santiago de Chile has fleet) and aims to charging. standard in 2018 for
6 756 buses on transform its entire Operators lease buses laid the
380 routes that play a public bus fleet to chargers served groundwork for e-bus
key role in its public electric by 2040. 51 with renewables- deployment.
transit system, Red based electricity
Metropolitana de The electric fleets were
from Enel X and
Movilidad (RED). 50 In In 2019 operator commissioned outside of
Engie.
2018, the system served Metbus leased the regular competitive
the metropolitan area of 285 BYD manufactured Metbus buses use licence renewal tenders;
7 million people with e-buses for ten years about 160 chargers however, operators do
over 2 million trips a day. from energy company of 80 kW each. not receive explicit
The city’s first e- buses Enel X. Metbus’ subsidies.
Vule’s fleet
started service in 2019. electric fleet is set to charges with The regulator will
expand to 435 in 37 chargers of commission future fleet
2020. 150 kW, and STP additions under the
50
Known as Transantiago before 2019. Transantiago was inaugurated as a public transport system in 2007.
51
Estrategia Nacional de Electromovilidad, Chile.
PAGE | 121
In a similar uses 13 chargers of regular fleet renewal

partnership, operators 150 kW. tenders.
Vule and STP, together
with energy company
Engie, started
operating 100 Yutong
manufactured e-buses
in 2019.
Shenzhen, in 2019,
became one of the first The local government
Of the three operators, mandated fleet
cities to have Buses charge
Shenzhen Bus Group electrification and
transformed its bus fleet overnight at
(SBG), the focus here, offered purchase
to 100% electric. With a depots. Only a few
introduced e-buses in subsidies of up to CNY
fleet size of buses on long lines
three stages, starting 1 million (USD 140 000)
16 000 buses, get a 30 minute
in 2011 with 127 e- per bus. SBG bought
distributed among three extra charge
buses, reaching 545 buses in partnership with
bus operators (Shenzhen during the day.
by 2015 to an all- a leasing company.
Bus Group, Shenzhen
electric fleet of more Charging
Eastern Bus Company The government
than 6 000 buses in operators have
and Shenzhen Western supports the deployment
2017. The majority are more than
Bus Company) it serves of charging
BYD models, and now 1 700 chargers of
42% of the public transit infrastructure with most
after eight years of 150 kW and 180 kW
traffic (second only to a of the existing chargers
operations several at 104 terminals
subway system that having received
buses are also under and depots.
serves 50%). The urban CNY 600/kW (USD 85)
refurbishment.
population is more than installed capacity.
12 million inhabitants.
Driving factors in deploying electric bus fleets and chargers

For bus operators, the motivation to opt for electric buses differs depending on the
policy environment. Operators typically deploy e-buses with a strong partner from
the government or private sector, which enables them to finance and/or mitigate the
risks of the high upfront costs of e-buses.
In Helsinki, the deployment was guided by a requirement for e- buses in tenders to

allocate line concessions. 52 The local transport authority, HSL, supports this by
providing charging infrastructure.
52
Another Nordic city, Oslo, started trials in 2017 with the aim of making the entire public transport system fossil fuel
free by 2020 and fully electric by 2028.
PAGE | 122
Santiago’s decision to introduce stringent emission standards (Euro VI) for buses
supported the first large-scale introduction of e-buses in South America. 53 It
materialised through partnerships between bus operators and energy companies
that lease buses and chargers to operators on a per kilometre basis while supplying
electricity. The strong involvement of energy companies is unique to Santiago and
made the roll-out of electric buses possible without direct subsidies from the
government. However, special conditions on bus concessions provided additional
incentives for the operators.
In Kolkata, the purchase subsidies under the national FAME I scheme, with a 60%
national and 40% state funding support, was instrumental in the deployment of e-
buses, with the objective of reducing CO2 and local air pollutant emissions. In this
context, the government in West Bengal decided that in the City of Kolkata only
compressed natural gas and electric buses are to be procured. The first phase of this
programme offers funding to local transport authorities to acquire e-buses (either as
an outright purchase or via payments per bus) or to operate e-buses (through a gross
cost contract or payment per km). Kolkata opted for funding outright purchases, and
its West Bengal Transport Corporation (WBTC) owns and operates e-buses and
chargers. While Kolkata’s approach for e-bus deployment has relied significantly on
public funding till now, it is envisaged that with scale up and operational experiences,
other models of financing will be explored to make the operations cost neutral.
Shenzhen, which has the longest experience of deploying e-buses among the cities
considered, used a mix of instruments over the years to drive the roll-out of e-buses.
A mandate for fleet electrification was accompanied by a programme for purchase
subsidies with funds from both national and local governments. The local
government also set up a separate programme to promote deployment of chargers.
For the Shenzhen Bus Group (SBG), this programme also directly involved the local
bus manufacturer BYD, a Chinese company, which, in addition to delivering 80% of
the e-buses, is responsible for the maintenance of vehicle components that are part
of the electric powertrain, and offers an extended vehicle warranty of eight years.
This association has been useful particularly given that several SBG buses have come
to their full eight-year life-cycle and require replacement. Original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) have played a similarly strong role elsewhere. For instance,
BYD partnered with Metbus and Enel X in Santiago and is responsible for bus
maintenance (payed on a fixed per/km basis).
53
Other Latin American cities such as Bogota, which introduced 500 e-buses in 2020, are exploring similar options
to deploy electric buses under similar models.
PAGE | 123
Deployment of chargers is a significant undertaking and may pose additional project

risk. Helsinki and Shenzhen separated e-bus roll out and their operation and chargers.
In Helsinki, HSL holds tenders to license charging operators. In Shenzhen, SBG
offered subsidies to charger operators (most chargers received a subsidy of CNY 600
[USD 85] per kW installed capacity) and eased the application process for land-use
permits to promote the roll-out of infrastructure. Santiago’s bus operators lease
chargers along with e-buses from their partnering energy companies. While
operation of chargers and e-buses is not separate, the expertise of the energy
companies reduces project risks when it comes to operating chargers and
integrating their use both with the power grid and with bus schedules. There are also
safety risks that need to be overcome by training bus operators in dealing with high
voltage charging equipment. In India, support under the FAME programme bundles
financial support for chargers and e-buses, and Kolkata is the only case, among those
considered here, where WBTC, a state-owned undertaking, is solely responsible for
both chargers and buses. While these have certain advantages for the public sector
company to learn from these early operational experiences, as experience from other
cities highlight, there may be efficiencies in looking at bus and charging
infrastructure operations separately. 54
Policy drivers and responsibility for bus and charging infrastructure

deployment at a glance
Mandate for bus Purchase Split ownership

deployment subsidy of buses and chargers
Helsinki *  
Santiago de Chile **  
Shenzhen ***  
Kolkata ****  
* Helsinki’s tender documents for bus line concessions stipulate minimum quotas for electric buses, which
operators have exceeded.
** Santiago de Chile’s existing fleets entered the fleet without effective mandate. The city aims for full electrification
of its bus fleet by 2025 and stricter technology requirements are expected for future fleet additions.
*** Supported by government incentives, Shenzhen’s bus fleet was completely electrified by 2017.
**** Kolkata’s first 80 electric buses entered the city’s fleet without an effective mandate. WBTC aims for full
electrification of its bus fleet by 2035 and stricter technology requirements are expected for future fleet additions.
54
Experiences from Europe highlight that although charging concessions may have a duration of 5-7 years, charging
infrastructure lasts much longer, thereby resulting in much higher costs at the onset. As a result, governments are
exploring longer term concession periods for charging infrastructure of up to 15 years.
PAGE | 124
Experience from Helsinki and Santiago suggests that introducing e-bus fleets is
possible without offering explicit subsidies. However, bus operators may receive
other means to cover costs of e-buses. For instance, Santiago fleet operators get
contracts for 14 years when they operate e-buses compared to ten years for ICE
buses. Such non-fiscal incentives are innovative approaches that other fleets could
emulate. Most public transit systems do not generate profits and bus operators
receive public funds to boost revenues. In policy environments that mandate e-buses
in competitive tenders for line concessions but do not offer explicit subsidies for e-
buses, bus operators may need to consider the total cost of ownership (TCO) to
establish their bid price even if the capital costs might be higher. While some cities
that assume responsibility and costs for chargers, e.g. Helsinki and Shenzhen, also
absorb some of the costs of operating the e-bus fleets; other cities have taken the
non-subsidy route and employ usage-based charging contracts to incentivise e-bus
roll out.
Economics of electric buses

Electric buses have higher purchase costs than ICE buses, but e-buses have lower
fuel and maintenance costs. The difference in total cost of ownership (TCO) is
context-specific and is influenced for instance by local prices for diesel and
electricity, distance driven per unit of energy consumed, type of bus used for
comparative purposes, the costs of finance and whether the fleet size helps to
optimise the utilisation of existing assets such as maintenance facilities. For instance,
in Santiago, Enel working with Metbus have contracted to provide certified
renewable energy at a 40% discount rate for bus operations; while in Kolkata WBTC
is exploring the opportunity to use a time-of-day tariff scheme to their advantage.
The TCO of e-buses is set to further decrease in line with battery costs and may reach
cost parity with diesel buses in most regions within the next few years. 55
The high upfront costs of electric bus purchases were overcome in the four cases
discussed with different approaches. Shenzhen and Kolkata report that the TCO for
e-buses exceeded those of conventional buses. Over the bus lifetime, costs for
maintenance and fuel of an electric bus in Shenzhen’s fleet are about half of that for
a diesel bus, but the e-bus purchase price were about three-times higher, particularly
noting that Shenzhen was the earliest to adopt e-buses before they were widely
deployed. A lower TCO for electric buses (24% less than conventional buses) was
55
Battery costs, mileage and diesel prices have the biggest impacts on the comparative TCO of electric buses
relative to diesel buses. E-buses travelling 40 000-50 000 km/year are competitive in regions with high diesel
taxation regimes with battery prices below USD 260/kWh (IEA, 2019). Other local circumstances also influence TCO.
(See World Bank (2019) for city-specific TCO analyses of electric buses.)
PAGE | 125
achieved only due to significant subsidies for capital costs (Figure 2.1). With the
gradual phase out of such subsidies in China, TCOs for battery electric buses would
be relatively uncompetitive with ICE counterparts. Kolkata reports that the TCO per
vehicle-kilometre of electric buses are 20-35% higher than for conventional buses,
but expects future bus models to reach cost parity within two-three years, with falling
battery prices and larger base models. In Helsinki, the TCO of e-buses is similar to
diesel buses.
Although public bus fleets often rely on government funding support, fiscal subsidies
may not be continuous over a long period to support broadening e-bus systems given
scare public resources. In that context, other options can contribute to a mix of non-
fiscal incentives (as highlighted in the case of Santiago) and regulatory approaches
could be explored. Also note that while TCO allows financial comparisons of
operations of different vehicle types, given the large number of co-benefits
associated with electric bus fleets, such as improved local air quality and health, and
lower noise pollution, among others, capturing the true benefits of electric bus
operations may be better reflected through cost-benefit analysis that accounts for
the wider factors.
Total cost of ownership for various bus types in Shenzhen
400
USD (thousands)
Tax and fees
300
Maintenance
200
Fuel
100
CAPEX
0
ICE BEV (after purchase subsidy) BEV (before purchase subsidy)
Notes: Capex = capital expenditure; ICE = internal combustion engine; BEV = battery electric vehicle. Conversion
rate: CNY 1 = USD 0.14. The figure shows the TCO for the operations over the vehicle lifetime, which typically is eight
years in Shenzhen. While the capital costs for e-buses in Shenzhen appear to be high relative to their ICE
counterparts, the cost of Euro VI 12 metre diesel bus is around USD 300 000 to 400 000, far exceeding these
prices and also higher than the non-subsidised BEV costs in Shenzhen. Costs of battery replacement (if any) have
not been explicitly considered as part of this comparison.
Source: Case study on Shenzhen by Berlin, Zhang and Chen (2020).
The TCO of owning and operating e-buses can be competitive with conventional ICE buses
by providing purchase subsidies. Costs of fuel and maintenance for e-buses can be half
those of a comparable diesel ICE bus.
PAGE | 126
Clean fleets, blue skies: Positive externalities of electric buses

The TCO of electric buses does not take into account their societal and environmental
benefits relative to conventional diesel buses, such as reduced emissions of local air
pollutants and of GHGs. The extent to which e-buses reduce GHG emissions depends
on the carbon intensity of the final electricity provided, the performance of the buses
they replace, as well as on the electric vehicle fleet size. The e-buses of Santiago’s
network run on 100% renewable electricity provided by the electricity companies
Enel X and Engie as part of their contract. Shenzhen’s SBG has by far the largest e-
bus fleet of the four cases and reports net savings of 0.26 million tonnes of CO2 per
year. 56 However, SBG is one of the three major operators in Shenzhen, implying that
the total emissions savings due to e-bus operations in the city is significantly higher.
In terms of air pollution, the conventional bus fleet in Kolkata predominantly consists
of buses with comparatively high pollutant emissions (most buses there meet only
Euro III or Euro IV standards), meaning that in Kolkata a third of particulate matter
pollutants from transport stems from buses. This means that expanding the e-bus
fleet can reduce direct transport emissions and improve air quality. Increased
satisfaction of passengers and drivers is another positive externality and was
observed in all four cities. While TCO analyses demonstrate the cost benefits of e-
buses, policy makers can make use of additional tools, such as cost-benefit analyses
for insights on broader project impacts.
Vehicle reliability and distribution grid factors

In the four cases considered here, all bus operations report that e-buses have
reached the same or better reliability as conventional models. Although initial
challenges had to be overcome, e.g. hurdles related to charging and range anxiety
in Kolkata and shorter driving ranges in Shenzhen. Integrating electric vehicles in a
bus network requires optimising asset utilisation of buses and chargers. Bus projects
that deploy opportunity charging tend to face challenges to maintain bus service
frequency despite needing to allow sufficient time at stops to recharge. For buses
that use depot charging, limitations in daily driving range can be a challenge. Sound
planning and management of buses and chargers to match operational profiles and
constraints can prevent the need to increase fleet size to maintain service levels.
The four cities did not experience detrimental impacts on the reliability of bus
operations with the introduction of e-buses. On the contrary, SBG reports lower
breakdown rates for e-buses in Shenzhen than for their conventional counterparts; in
This assessment compares emissions from electric buses (including electricity use during operation and battery
56
manufacturing) relative to tailpipe emissions from conventional buses.
PAGE | 127
Helsinki and Santiago, as well, breakdown rates were equal or lower than for diesel
buses. Kolkata reports reliability levels for e-buses of 98%. Three cities – Kolkata,
Shenzhen and Santiago – opted for a charging solution that primarily relies on depot
charging, with some extra terminal chargers to top up during hours of operation.
Santiago and Kolkata started their roll out on lines that are suitable to the range of
electric buses. Shenzhen reports that e-buses replaced diesel vehicles without the
need to adjust its network plan, by taking advantage of continuous maintenance
support and feedback learning from BYD, the manufacturer.
Providing charging infrastructure demands careful planning, as it can be a key

stumbling block for building an e-bus transit system. Electricity network operators
are responsible for distribution system upgrades, which were necessary in Santiago
and Shenzhen and appear to be more demanding given the larger fleet sizes. Kolkata
reports only minimal investment in distribution system upgrades, thanks to the city
power utilities (West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and CESC
Limited) that allowed e-bus charging under existing supply codes, meaning that the
WBTC did not have to pay fees associated with upgrading the distribution grid. This
is another form of non-fiscal incentives provided for e-buses that contribute to lower
costs for operators. In Santiago, Enel X performed grid upgrades at two terminals
with appropriate smart charging to help optimise the charging demands. Shenzhen’s
SBG by far has the largest e-bus fleet considered, which translates into the highest
requirements on grid infrastructure. The pre-existing grid zoning did not account for
concentrated power demand of charging depots and local grid reinforcements were
necessary. The Shenzhen government eased the land-use permitting application
process for charging infrastructure, however, land rent reaches 90% of costs for
charging infrastructure, a phenomenon also observed in other parts of the world. 57
Lessons from early adopters can aid the deployment of electric buses
The four case studies give a glimpse into some of the factors that drive e-bus
deployment in major urban centres, the challenges they face in converting from
conventional fleets to electric and the nature of electric bus operations. While the
upfront capital costs of electric buses relative to diesel equivalents remain
significantly higher, cities have adopted strategies ranging from innovative operating
models to providing subsidies to encourage e-bus uptake. Experience from cities also
highlights that even without direct fiscal incentives, which are often apportioned
from scare public resources, it is possible for cities to incentivise the uptake of e-
buses using a host of non-fiscal incentives and regulations. TCO, which do not reflect
57
ElaadNL has observed this trend in the Netherlands.
PAGE | 128
the costs of externalities, remains ambiguous as the defining factor for choosing
electric over diesel buses. Urban air quality concerns and the potential to reduce
emissions provided by e-buses in most instances have been key factors in driving
decisions to electrify bus fleets. Moreover, while the planning and deployment of
charging infrastructure for e-bus fleets vary depending on the nature of fleet
operations, urban energy companies are taking novel approaches to manage the
increased grid load that comes from integrating these fleets. With this view, Kolkata’s
WBTC is planning to meet part of its e-bus charging demand from renewable energy
(solar photovoltaic) and battery storage, which can also contribute to manage
demand in the context of time-of-day electricity tariffs.
As cities across the world gradually move from pilots to larger scale deployment of
electric buses, lessons from early adopters such as these four above and others
around the world offer insights for others seeking to replicate their successes and
avoid obstacles (World Bank, 2019).
Electric truck policies

Electric and fuel cell electric trucks and their supporting infrastructure are at very
early stages of deployment, mostly only in city level pilot projects. As such, adoption
will be more dependent on policy support than for other EV types given the bigger
gap in purchase price and higher requirements for fast or dynamic changing than
light-duty vehicles. Indeed, in cities and countries where zero-emission heavy-duty
truck models have been deployed, adoption has been spurred by either policy
incentives or corporate initiatives, and most commonly by a combination of the two.
In general, there are three approaches for electric truck recharging: depot charging
(usually overnight at the operator’s depot); distribution charging (at distribution
centres during the day while loading and unloading freight) and public charging
(charging along highways or at charging hubs in urban areas). Looking forward, the
policy toolkit for promoting electric trucks will be able to build upon successes with
LDV deployment, but will need to expand beyond those for cars to focus on
infrastructure. As with LDVs, regulations that set minimum performance such as fuel-
economy or GHG standards, as well as pollutant emissions standards “pull”
innovation and investment toward manufacturing and sales of cleaner trucks.
Further, fiscal policies such as road tolls and fuel taxes that account for the impacts
of heavy-duty trucks on road infrastructure and the various externalities of fuel
consumption (e.g. pollutant emissions, energy security) incorporate some of the true
costs of incumbent polluting ICE technologies. Purchase incentives, direct subsidies
and/or favourable loan terms for fleets of heavy-duty trucks and their requisite
infrastructure can help spur deployment. As part of their “Drive to Zero” campaign,
CALSTART, an organisation that works with the public and private sectors to build a
PAGE | 129
high-tech clean transportation industry, outlines and provides examples of these and
other policies. They include financial incentives (e.g. purchase incentives, direct
subsidies, congestion pricing and zero- and low-emission zones), incentives to spur
the deployment of rapid charging infrastructure, as well as policies that are better
suited for municipal and corporate fleets, such as exclusion zones and procurement
requirements. 58
Countries and states are beginning to incorporate explicit electrification targets for
heavy-duty vehicles. In its recent 2030 Climate Action Programme, the German
government set the goal of electrifying one-third of its truck fleet by 2030 (Transport
and Environment, 2020). The Pakistan government approved an ambitious EV policy
in November 2019 that aims for electric trucks to constitute 30% of new truck sales
by 2030 and 90% of new truck sales by 2040. Under this policy, Pakistan will offer
lower electricity tariffs for EV charging stations and electric trucks will benefit from a
general sales tax rate of 1% rather than the standard 17% (Uddin, 2020).
In the United States, California has led in adopting ambitious and concrete policies
to promote zero-emission medium- and heavy-duty powertrain technologies. In late
2019, California, together with seven other states, committed to accelerate the
adoption of zero-emission medium- and heavy-duty electric trucks by investigating
ZEV mandates, which would comprise sales targets and reporting requirements. 59
California aims to adopt the standards in 2020 (CARB, 2019). Some of the other
participating states are already promoting zero-emission buses and trucks, by both
directly introducing electric transit buses and by allocating the settlement funds from
the Volkswagen emissions scandal toward medium- and heavy-duty vehicle
electrification. In March 2020, the Washington State legislature became the twelfth
US state to adopt California’s ZEV mandates, and the first to expand the ZEV mandate
beyond LDVs to include medium-duty vehicles (Senate Bill 5811).
In April 2020, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) released the final draft of its
Advanced Clean Trucks standard, a proposal that will require truck manufacturers
that sell more than 500 trucks annually in the state to produce and sell electric trucks.
Under the proposed policy, starting in 2024 and for each year through 2035, a given
percentage of the sales of truck manufacturers in California must be electric – with
different targets for different truck types (i.e. class 2b-3, class 4-8 or “straight trucks”,
and class 7-8 or “tractors”). The proposal will be subject to a vote by the CARB in late
58
For more information on CALSTART, see: http://toolkit.globaldrivetozero.org/policies-and-actions/;
http://toolkit.globaldrivetozero.org/financial-incentives/ and http://toolkit.globaldrivetozero.org/non-financial-
incentives/.
59
The other states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island and Vermont.
PAGE | 130
June 2020 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020). California is further leading an

initiative among the 12 ZEV states to extend ZEV mandates to medium- and heavy-
duty vehicles based on the light-duty ZEV policy framework.
On the infrastructure side, San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), a utility that provides
services to two populous counties in California, has been authorised by the California
Public Utilities Commission to spend USD 107.4 million to install charging
infrastructure for medium and heavy-duty EVs in its service territory. 60 The
programme is expected to provide charging infrastructure capable of serving around
3 000 vehicles ranging from forklifts to heavy-freight trucks in the next four years
(Nikolewski, 2019).
Electric trucks stand to benefit from technology-neutral efficiency and emission

standards and regulations. Fuel-efficiency and/or GHG emission standards for HDVs
have been put in place across markets covering around 70% of sales globally. In
particular, EVs and other zero-emission powertrains will be increasingly competitive
vis-à-vis incumbent technologies with: the new HDV CO2 emission standards in the
European Union; the HDV fuel-economy standards put in place in India in 2018; and
stricter standards in the United States, China and Japan. Korea is designing HDV
standards and expects to promulgate them in 2022. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and
Korea are in various stages of developing policies to improve the efficiency of their
HDV fleets.
While the electric truck industry in Europe is still in early pilot demonstrations, all
major European truck manufacturers are embracing relevant technology. The
adoption of electric trucks in Europe will be driven by improving technology and an
expansion of models on offer (see next section), the newly adopted HDV CO2
emission standards and urban air quality restrictions such as zero and low-emission
zones. It will further be promoted by amending regulations to account for how they
might disadvantage electrification; for instance, Europe has eased maximum weight
allowance limits for zero-emission trucks, permitting them to carry two extra tonnes
(Transport & Environment, 2020).
The EU’s Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive (AFID) sets a regulatory framework
for the roll-out of recharging and refuelling infrastructure. However it does not
include charging infrastructure for electric trucks and vans, and only sets targets for
natural gas refuelling infrastructure for trucks.
60
Although medium- and heavy-duty vehicles represent only 10% of all vehicles in the state, they are responsible for
25% of the GHG emissions from the transportation sector.
PAGE | 131
In the European Union, almost 47% of road freight transport trips are less than
300 km, and for urban deliveries trucks with a range of 200-300 km fulfil most of the
delivery requirements (Transport & Environment, 2020). In a study on charging
demand for trucks within the Amsterdam region, CE Delft, an independent research
and consultancy organisation, found that depot charging could account for 78%,
destination charging for 16% and public charging of 6% of total charging demand for
electric trucks (Transport & Environment, 2020). While depot charging can fulfil most
of the European Union’s charging requirements, studies suggest that legislation on
infrastructure for trucks should tackle all depot, destination and public charging with
effective tailored measures (Transport & Environment, 2020).
Finally, having achieved a battery electric sales share of 97% for urban buses on the
domestic market, and with sales shares growing also in urban delivery and municipal
service (e.g. garbage and street sweeping) trucks, China is reportedly investigating
extending its NEV mandate policy framework to medium- and heavy-duty vehicles in
early 2021.
Industry announcements
Expansion of electric car models
Electric vehicle models are available for most vehicle segments and in all major
markets (Figure 2.2). We estimate that in 2019, 279 electric vehicle models were
available globally, a 26% increase from 2018. 61 China has the largest number of
available vehicle models at 171, while the European Union has 45 and the United
States has 49 models. In China, model availability is wider for BEVs than for PHEVs,
while the opposite is true in the United States and European Union. BEV models tend
to be mostly available for small and medium cars (with the exception of China, where
there are many electric sport utility vehicles (SUVs). PHEV models, on the contrary,
are more concentrated in the large vehicle and SUV segment.
61
The number of models does not take into account variants of the same model: if a model comes with two different
battery ranges, it is considered as only one model. Including all variants, the estimate for 2019 is more than
300 models.
PAGE | 132
Electric vehicles models available and announced, 2019

Available models
in 2019 Upcoming models
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Large car
Large car
Large car
SUV
SUV
SUV
Medium car
Crossover
Medium car
Crossover
Medium car
Crossover
Small car
Small car
Small car
Small car Medium car Crossover Large car SUV
China European Union United States
BEV Models PHEV Models
Notes: Available models are extracted from the Marklines database, upcoming models sourced from EV-Volumes.
Crossovers refer to smaller SUVs, SUVs are full sized.
Source: IEA analysis based on Marklines (2020), EV-Volumes (2020).
New EV models, mostly in the medium car and SUV segments, were introduced in 2019. The
outlook is for wider EV model availability worldwide.
For the next five years, OEMs have announced plans to release 197 new EV models.
Upcoming BEV models are more evenly distributed across vehicle sizes than are
currently available as automakers aim to offer EV solutions for all market segments.
Upcoming PHEV models, on the other hand, remain focussed on larger vehicles. This
can be partially explained by the fact that installing two powertrains is more
challenging for smaller vehicles; PHEV powertrains would take up a large share of the
vehicle volume and cost.
Box 2.2 Transport electrification commitments from the private sector: the
EV30@30 Campaign and The Climate Group’s EV100 initiative
Clean Energy Ministerial EV30@30 Campaign
The EV30@30 Campaign was launched at the 8th Clean Energy Ministerial meeting
in 2017. The Campaign aims to accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles within the
participating countries. It sets a collective goal to reach a 30% sales share for electric
vehicles by 2030. Recognising the importance of multi-stakeholder dialogue and
cooperation, the EV30@30 Campaign also receives the support of organisations and
private businesses that committed to contributing to the realisation of this goal via
PAGE | 133
their own activities and operations. By 2020, nine companies in the utility, automotive
and EV services sectors support the EV30@30 Campaign. 62,63
The Climate Group EV100
Now in its third year, the Climate Group’s EV100 initiative comprises 70 global
businesses that have committed to 100% electric fleets and/or company-wide roll out
of EV charging by 2030. 64
Sixty-three companies have committed to electrify their corporate owned/leased

fleets by 2030. The combined total fleet encompassed by these commitments totals
around 350 000 vehicles, of which more than 150 000 are light-commercial vehicles.
In addition, three leasing companies are targeting the electrification of approximately
2.3 million vehicles combined across their customer fleets.
To date, 82 000 vehicles have been electrified. BEVs represent 91% of the EVs in
corporate owned/leased fleets, indicating a strong current preference for BEVs over
PHEVs or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.
About 55 companies have committed to company-wide charging for staff,

accounting for some 2 200 locations. Seventeen business-to-customer brands have
made a similar commitment for their customers (totalling 2 000 locations). Some
9 500 individual charging units have been deployed across 1 100 locations for staff
and/or customers. More than 40% of EV100 members rely on 100% renewable
electricity for their EV charging.
According to a survey of the EV100 companies in 2019 , the most commonly cited
barriers to the EV transition were identified as:
 Immature EV product offering in target markets (cited as significant or very

significant by 78% of EV100 members).
 Capital cost of EVs (71%).
 Lack of charging infrastructure (65%).
 Operational change impacts (46%).
 Uncertain/underdeveloped policy landscape (30%).
62
The private sector companies supporting the EV30@30 Campaign are ChargePoint, Energias de Portugal (EDP),
Enel X, E.ON, Fortum, Iberdrola, Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance, Schneider Electric, The Tokyo Electric Power
Company Inc and Vattenfall.
63
For more information regarding the efforts being carried out by EV30@30 countries, and supporting organizations
and companies, see: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/a7571ce8-70dd-43a8-9ed7-
915cb05fc638/3030CampaignDocumentFinal.pdf
64
EV100 membership data as of May 2020. For more information, see:
www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ev100_annual_progress_and_insights_report_2020.pdf
PAGE | 134
Automakers ambitions for EV production and sales

The dynamism of the EV market was clearly demonstrated in 2019 by the increased
level of ambition in automakers plans to manufacture and sell electric cars. Table 2.7
summarises these announcements (which reflect the ambition before the Covid-19
pandemic and might be downscaled as a consequence). Daimler, Maruti Suzuki,
Toyota and Volkswagen have all set plans for the roll-out of electric cars through
2030 and beyond, suggesting that electric powertrains could become a central
technology in this decade. During 2019, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) and General
Motors have escalated their plans to sell electric cars in the short term, and Hyundai-
Kia and General Motors declared new targets for 2025. The BMW Group advanced
their EV roll-out plan from 2025 to 2023. Honda has both increased its electric car
deployment target and advanced the target year of its plan from 2025 to 2022 for the
European market from its aim announced in 2018. Exceptions in the general trend of
OEMs boosting their EV plans are Chongqing Changan and Maruti Suzuki. Chongqing
Changan has proposed only 25 new EV models by 2025 instead of the 33 it had
announced and set a target to sell half a million EVs on a cumulative basis by 2020. 65
Maruti Suzuki has delayed the launch of its first electric car model from 2020 to 2021,
and the CEO recently expressed concern about the acceptability of EVs (Bhalla,
2019). Despite Maruti Suzuki’s reduced pace, the long-term plan to fully embrace
electric mobility is demonstrated by the confirmation of its electric car sales target
for 2030. Of course, with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020,
the extent to which OEMs remain committed to the announced EV targets and
investment plans within the named timeframes remains to be seen and will be an
important market dynamic to monitor.
In terms of manufacturing capacity, OEMs in China currently lead the global EV

market. The estimated production capacity of NEVs for 2020 is 10-20 million vehicles
per year (Yanjiao, 2018; Sohu, 2019a). This capacity is much larger than current
demand levels (even without factoring in likely market contraction, at least on a
temporary basis, as a consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic).
65
This announcement comes after a target of 1.7 million EV sales by 2025. It is unclear whether this replaces the
previous target or whether both are complementary.
PAGE | 135
OEM announcements related to electric cars
Original equipment
Announcement
manufacturer
15-25% of the BMW Group sales in 2025 and 13 new EV models by 2023
BMW
(out of 25 electrified models).
0.5 million electric car sales in 2020 and 1.3 million electric car sales in
BJEV-BAIC
2025.
BYD 0.6 million electric car sales in 2020.
Chery Automobile 0.2 million electric car sales in 2020.
0.5 million cumulative electric car sales by 2020, 25 new EV models by

Chongqing Changan
2025.
0.1 million sales in 2020, 10 new EV models by 2022 and 25% of group
Daimler
sales in 2025. More than 50% of sales will be PHEV and BEV by 2030.
Dongfeng Motor CO 0.3 million electric car sales in 2020 and 30% electric sales by 2022.
15 new EV models by 2025, 40% of all sales will be electric in 2025 and
FAW
60% in 2030.
FCA 34 new EV models by 2022 (10 BEV models, 24 PHEV models).
Ford 40 new EV models by 2022 (16 BEV models, 24 PHEV models).
Geely 1 million sales and 90% of sales in 2020.
GM 22 EV models by 2023. More than 1 million EV sales around 2025.
Guangzhou Automobile
10% of all car sales in 2020.
Group
15% EV sales share in 2030 (part of two-thirds of electrified vehicles by

Honda
2030 globally and 100% of electrified vehicles by 2022 in Europe).
29 EV models by 2025 (23 BEV models, 6 PHEV models). 560 000 BEV
Hyundai-Kia
sales by 2025.
Mahindra & Mahindra 0.036 million electric car sales in 2020. 3 new EV models by 2022.
PAGE | 136
Original equipment
Announcement
manufacturer
One new EV model in 2020 and 5% of Mazda sales to be fully electric by

Mazda
2030.
Other Chinese OEMs 3.4 million sales in 2020.
0.9 million sales in 2022. 14 new EV models by 2021 (7 BEV models and 7
PSA
PHEV models).
Renault plans 12 new EV models by 2022 and 20% of the brand’s sales in
Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi 2022 to be fully electric. Nissan targets eight new BEV models by end
2022. Infiniti plans to have all models electric by 2021.
Maruti Suzuki A new EV models in 2021 and up to 1.5 million electric car sales in 2030.
0.2 million EV sales in 2020, 20 EV model by 2025 and 30 (13 BEV and 17
SAIC
PHEV) in the future.
Tata Motors A new EV model in 2020 and 4 new EV models by 2022.
0.5 million annual production capacity for Model 3 by 2020, a new EV

Tesla
model in 2020 and a new EV model in 2030.
10 new BEV models by the early 2020s and more than 1 million BEV and
Toyota
FCEV sales in 2030.
0.3 million EVs sold by summer 2020, 1 million EVs produced by 2023,
Volkswagen up to 3 million electric car sales in 2025, 25% of the group’s sales in
2025, 75 new EV models and about 26 million cumulative sales by 2029.
50% of group’s sales to be fully electric by 2025. A new EV model will be
Volvo launched every year until 2025. 50% of Volvo sales will be fully electric
by 2025.
Note: These announcements reflect the situation before the coronavirus pandemic, and thus may be overly
optimistic at present. This table is based on the information of companies’ announcements available to the authors
and may not be complete. It intends to present announcements only related to electric cars (PHEVs and BEVs),
therefore other announcements by OEMs that include hybrid vehicles and that provide no specific indication
regarding the PHEV/BEV share are not included here. Electrified vehicles include hybrids (HEVs), plug-in hybrids
(PHEVS) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs).
Sources: BMW - BMW Group (2017); BMW Group (2019). BAIC - Xinhua (2017); Finance Sina (2017); Dixon (2017). BYD
- China Economic Net (2018). Chongqing Changan – Xinhuanet (2020); AutoSina (2018). Chery – Yue (2019). Daimler
– Daimler (2018); Daimler (2019). Dongfeng Motor Co. – Nissan Motor Corporation (2019); Chejiahao (2019). FAW –
Jlntv (2018); FCA - Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (2019). Ford - Carey and White (2018). Geely – Sohu (2019b);
National Business Daily (2018); GM - General Motors (2020). Guangzhou Automobile Group – Xinhuanet (2018).
Honda –Riley (2019). Hyundai-Kia –Kane (2020b). Infiniti – Bloomberg (2019). Mahindra & Mahindra - The Economic
Times (2018); LiveMint (2019). Maruti Suzuki – Bhalla (2019); Nikkei Asian Review (2018). Mazda – Mazda (2018);
Schmidt (2019). Other Chinese OEMs - personal communication with Jiang Liu (Energy Research Institute of the
National Development and Reform Commission, China); Chejiahao (2019); Nengyuanjie (2019). PSA – Reuters (2017);
Groupe PSA (2019). Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi (2019); Nissan Motor Corporation (2017); Groupe Renault (2017). SAIC
– Xinhuanet (2017). Tata Motors – Contractor (2020); Tesla – Tesla (2019). Toyota – Toyota (2019a). Volkswagen –
Lambert (2020); Volkswagen (2019); Reuters (2018). Volvo – Volvo (2019); Korosec (2019).
PAGE | 137
Expansion of heavy-duty truck models

The variety of electric truck models available continues to expand. In 2019 and early
2020 prominent new models were announced by Bollinger and Toyota in North
America, Tata in India and BYD and Chanje in China (Figure 2.3). In October 2019,
Daimler Trucks – the world’s largest truck maker – committed to sell only ZEVs by
2039 and to abandon the development of natural gas powered trucks. The CEOs of
Volvo and Scania have recently expressed views that the electrification of HDVs is a
viable and crucial strategy to help reach climate targets. Both Volvo Trucks and
Renault Trucks started production of electric trucks in 2019 (Transport &
Environment, 2020). Scania deployed two battery electric urban distribution trucks
of 27 tonnes GVW in early 2020 (Kane, 2020a).
Company announcements of medium- and heavy-duty electric truck models
50
BYD 8TT
45
Nikola TRE BEV
40
Gross vehicle weight (tonnes)
35
Cummins Aeos
30
25
Hyundai H2 energy
20
Toyota Portal Beta
15 Volvo VNR electric Open - retrofitted
Fuel cell electric
10 BYD 6F
In production
Customer trials
5 Bollinger B1 / B2 Prototype
Catenary-enabled hybrid
0
0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800
Range (kilometres)
Notes: Models announced prior to May 2019 are included in Figure 2.2 in the Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019).
Models announced since June 2019 are shown in this figure. Unless otherwise noted, all models are battery electric.
The figure is not comprehensive, and in particular does not include many models produced by OEMs in China for
the domestic market. Tevva e-trucks are not shown, as the Tevva line-up of e-trucks range from 7.5-12.5 tonnes GVW
and have all-electric drive ranges up to 150 km, plus optional range extenders (Tevva, 2019). The latest models
offered by Tata Motors are not included in the figure (EV reporter, 2020);
Sources: For new models announced in 2019-2020: BYD (2020); CaliforniaHVIP (2020); Cummins (2017); Electrek
(2018); FDG (2020); Hyundai (2020); Lion Electric (2020); Lockridge (2020); NeuronEV (2020); Toyota (2019b);
Turpen (2018); Volvo Trucks (2020).
Available models of electric trucks are expanding and prototypes are coming to market in
the early 2020s.
To complement the “Drive to Zero” campaign spearheaded by CALSTART, the “Zero-

Emission Technology Inventory” (ZETI) provides governments and fleets with up to
PAGE | 138
date information on the rapidly expanding availability of medium- and heavy-duty

ZEV models. 66 ZETI provides a zero-emission technology inventory, and an interactive
online data and resource clearinghouse with commercially available medium- and
heavy-duty truck and bus models that can be queried by region, manufacturer and
vehicle type.
66
Available at: https://globaldrivetozero.org/resources/zero-emission-technology-inventory/
PAGE | 139
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PAGE | 152
Global EV Outlook 2020 Prospects for electric mobility deployment to 2030
Chapter 3.
Prospects for electric mobility
deployment to 2030
This chapter analyses the outlook for electrification of road transport to 2030. It
considers deployment of electric vehicles (EVs) and charging infrastructure, battery
capacity and related materials demand as well as the implications for energy demand
and GHG emissions.
The projections in this analysis rely on the gross domestic product (GDP) assumptions
in the World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019a) as at the time of writing there was not
yet an updated GDP projection. Given the economic disruption related to the Covid-
19 crisis, the assumption in this outlook implies an economic recovery following the
pandemic that leads to a similar level of economic activity over the next few years as
was previously estimated, which means a relatively speedy global recovery. The
analysis also assumes that policy targets that were in place by end-2019 for transport
in general and EVs in particular (highlighted in Chapter 2) remain in the context of
the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic repercussions. Box 3.1 presents possible
impacts from the Covid-19 pandemic on EV deployment to 2030.
Scenario definitions
Two scenarios, the Stated Policies Scenario and the Sustainable Development
Scenario, are the basis for this outlook for road transport electrification.
Stated Policies Scenario

The Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) is the central scenario of the IEA Energy
Technology Perspectives (IEA, forthcoming) and the World Energy Outlook (IEA,
2019a) reports. This scenario aims to illustrate the likely consequences of existing
and announced policy measures. It takes into account the policies and regulations
that governments around the world have put in place, as well as the expected effects
of announced targets and plans from governments and industry. Chapter 2 includes
a summary of EV deployment targets and internal combustion engine phase out plans
(Table 2.1) and purchase incentives (Table 2.2), and the EV policy framework (Policy
developments in major markets section). It also includes announcements from
PAGE | 153
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) regarding plans to expand the range of EV

models on offer (Figure 2.2), and the scale-up in electric car production (Table 2.7).
Sustainable Development Scenario

The Sustainable Development Scenario features in the IEA Energy Technology
Perspectives and the World Energy Outlook publications. There are three pillars to
the Sustainable Development Scenario. These are to: ensure universal energy access
for all by 2030; bring about sharp reductions in emissions of air pollutants; and meet
global climate goals in line with the Paris Agreement. The Sustainable Development
Scenario is based on limiting the global temperature rise to below 1.7-1.8 degrees
Celsius with a 66% probability, reaching net zero emissions by 2070. For electric
vehicles, the Sustainable Development Scenario incorporates the ambitions of the
11 countries that have joined the EV30@30 Campaign which collectively aims to
achieve a 30% market share for EVs in all modes by 2030 (except for two-wheelers) 1.
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, the collective target of 30% sales share in
2030 for light-duty vehicles (LDVs), buses and trucks is achieved at the global level.
To be able to assess the benefits of electric mobility on climate change mitigation,
the scenario also accounts for relevant measures such as progressive reduction in
the carbon intensity of electricity generation, ways to reduce average trip distances,
fewer trips by car, and to enable a larger share of movements on public
transportation and non-motorised modes of transport.
Electric vehicles
In the Stated Policies Scenario, the global EV stock 2 (excluding two/three-wheelers)
expands from around 8 million in 2019 to 50 million by 2025 and close to 140 million
vehicles by 2030, corresponding to an annual average growth rate close to 30%
(Figure 3.1). Thanks to this continuous increase in sales share, EVs are expected to
account for about 7% of the global vehicle fleet by 2030. EV sales reach almost
14 million in 2025 and 25 million vehicles in 2030, representing respectively 10% and
16% of all road vehicle sales.
1
The EV30@30 Campaign was launched at the Eighth Clean Energy Ministerial in 2017. The participating countries
are Canada, China, Finland, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom (CEM-
EVI, 2019).
2
Including cars, light-commercial vehicles, buses and medium- and heavy-duty vehicles.
PAGE | 154
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, the global EV stock reaches almost

80 million vehicles in 2025 and 245 million vehicles in 2030 (excluding two/three-
wheelers).
Global EV stock and sales by scenario, 2019, 2025 and 2030
Electric vehicle stock

250
EV stock (million vehicles)
200
150
100
50
0
2019 2025 2030 2025 2030
PLDVs - BEV PLDVs - PHEV LCVs - BEV LCVs - PHEV

Buses - BEV Buses - PHEV Trucks - BEV Trucks - PHEV
50
Electric vehicle sales 50%
EV sales (million vehicles)
Shares
40 40%
30 30%
20 20%
10 10%
0 0%
2019 2025 2030 2025 2030
China Europe US Japan India Others EV sales share (right axis) PHEV share in EVs (right axis)
Notes: PLDVs = passenger light-duty vehicles; LCVs = light-commercial vehicles; BEV = battery electric vehicle; PHEV
= plug-in hybrid vehicle. EV sales share = share of EVs (BEV+PHEV) out of total vehicles sales. PHEV share in EVs =
share of PHEV sales out of EV (BEV+PHEV) sales.
Source: IEA analysis developed with the Mobility Model (IEA, 2020).
By 2030, the global EV stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) is about 140 million with sales
of 25 million in the Stated Policies Scenario, while the more ambitious Sustainable
Development Scenario sees about 245 million EV stock with sales of more than 45 million.
PAGE | 155
Two/three-wheelers
Electric two/three-wheelers represent the largest fleet of EVs. This vehicle category
is most suited to completely transition from internal combustion engines to electric
drives thanks to the combination of relatively short trip distances, low energy
requirements per kilometre (km) driven, small battery size and ease of charging
without need for dedicated charging infrastructure. 3 In the Stated Policies Scenario,
the electric two/three-wheeler fleet is projected to increase from approximately
300 million in 2019 to 400 million globally in 2030, or around 40% of the entire
two/three-wheelers stock. Sales reach almost 45 million units in 2030, representing
a sales share of about 60% at global level. In the Sustainable Development Scenario,
the global electric two/three-wheeler stock reaches nearly 490 million (almost 50%
of the stock) and sales reach 55 million units (an 80% sales share). The future electric
two/three-wheeler fleet is entirely constituted of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and
is concentrated in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, “China”), India and the
ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN).
Light-duty vehicles
The current electric light-duty vehicle 4 fleet is the second-largest after two/three-
wheelers, accounting for more than 90% of the EV fleet across all modes except
two/three-wheelers. In the Stated Policies Scenario, the LDV stock increases from
7.5 million vehicles in 2019 to almost 50 million by 2025 and accounts for 3% of the
total LDV stock. By 2030 the LDV stock is 135 million (120 million cars and 15 million
LCVs) and accounts for 8% of the total LDV stock. In 2030, about two-thirds of the
global EV fleet is composed of BEVs. The sales of electric LDVs increase from
2.2 million in 2019 to almost 25 million by 2030 (17% of sales of LDVs). In the
Sustainable Development Scenario,100 million additional electric LDVs are projected
to be circulating worldwide by 2030, so that a total of almost 240 million electric
LDVs are on the road in that year (of which around 200 million cars), corresponding
to a 14% stock share. Sales of electric LDVs are projected to reach 45 million in 2030
(a 33% sales share, which would realise the EV30@30 objective of 30% EV market
share balancing the lower rate of electrification of trucks).
3
Further details on the factors driving the electrification of two/three-wheelers are available in Global EV Outlook
2019, (IEA, 2019b).

4
Light-duty vehicles include both passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles (LCVs).
PAGE | 156
Buses
Electric bus stocks reach 1.4 million units in 2025 and almost 3 million in 2030 in the
Stated Policies Scenario (4% and 7% stock shares respectively). In the Sustainable
Development Scenario, the deployment of electric buses accelerates, reaching
5 million units in 2030 (12% stock share). In both scenarios, electrification occurs
primarily in urban buses, due to their shorter ranges and driving cycles suitable for
electrification. Electric sales shares of intercity buses are far lower, and indeed the
long charging times needed for this vehicle category will make it among the last
operational vehicle categories to transition to electric drive. For this category, the
share of PHEVs is likely to be high, not least to be able to drive long distances but
switch to zero-emission capability when entering urban areas.
Medium- and heavy-duty trucks

The electric truck 5 fleet reaches 0.6 million in 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario
and 3 million in the Sustainable Development Scenario, hitting 1% and 3% of the total
truck stock, respectively. The share of sales of electric trucks rises from less than
0.2% in 2019 to 1.5% over the projection period (8% in the Sustainable Development
Scenario). By 2030, electric trucks gain share particularly in urban areas and regional
delivery applications.
This progressive electrification of the road transport sector by 2030, in both

scenarios, is accompanied by the emergence and consolidation of other powertrain
technologies supported by governments and as necessary for the achievement of
the goals represented in the Sustainable Development Scenario. In particular,
hybridisation of ICEs, in light of significant technology and market progress over the
past decade, continues to expand and reaches 7% of the global car stock by 2030
both in the Stated Policies and Sustainable Development scenarios. 6 Fuel cell electric
vehicles (FCEVs) are starting to make inroads, with commercially available FCEV cars
and growing sales in some areas such as California, and more FCEV truck models
announced. However, their market share remains low throughout the 2030 decade,
attaining 1% of global car sales by 2030 in the Sustainable Development Scenario. It
is expected that with technology learning FCEV sales accelerate after 2030.
5
Electric truck fleet includes medium freight trucks (3.5-15 tonnes gross vehicle weight (GVW) and heavy-freight
trucks (heavier than 15 tonnes GVW).
6
The Global EV Outlook 2019 estimated the hybrid electric car sales in 2030 would need to reach about 40% of total
car sales in the European Union in 2030, along with 26% electric cars, for the expected fleet sold in 2030 to meet
the EU gCO2/km emissions standards (IEA, 2019b).
PAGE | 157
Regional insights
EV deployment proceeds at different speeds across world regions. Figure 3.2 shows
the outlook in 2030 for EV uptake by mode and scenario in key regions.
China
The outlook for 2030 in both scenarios is that China retains the lead in terms of
absolute numbers of EVs deployed across all modes. In the Stated Policies Scenario,
EVs reach almost 60% sales share in 2030 across all transport modes (around 35%
excluding two/three-wheelers). The sales share of electric LDVs in China is among
the highest worldwide throughout the projection period and reaches 35% in 2030. 7
Compared to the projections of the Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b), electric LDV
sales projections for China have been revised up due to the extended New Energy
Vehicle (NEV) mandate targets to 2023 and new credits calculation method set in
2019, and the revision upwards of the 2025 NEV target 8 on the back of an expectation
that the supporting measures adopted by the government to support NEVs due to
the Covid-19 crisis will reap the expected effects (see Chapters 1 and 2). Over the
projection period, the deployment of electric buses is also led by China, which
reaches about 55% sales share in 2030. This reflects the emergence in China of many
of the world’s leading electric bus manufacturers (e.g. BYD, Yutong and others).
Already mainstream today at almost 50% of the country’s total two-wheelers fleet,
electric two-wheelers in China (250 million units in 2019) account for 70% of the
global two-wheeler stock and 90% of the China two-wheeler stock in 2030 in the
Stated Policies Scenario.
In 2030 in the Sustainable Development Scenario, two-out-of-three vehicles sold in

China across all modes are electric (more than 40% excluding two/three-wheelers).
EVs account for more than 40% of all LDV sales, about 60% of all bus sales, virtually
all two-wheeler sales and more than 10% of total truck sales.
7
The sales share is higher in Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, but they are smaller markets than China.
8
The NEV sales target announced in 2019 envisions 25% by 2025, against 15-20% by 2025 previously.
PAGE | 158
EV share of vehicle sales by mode and scenario in selected regions, 2030
China Europe India

100% 100% 100%
Market share (%)

Market share (%)
Market share (%)
80% 80% 80%
60% 60% 60%
40% 40% 40%
20% 20% 20%
0% 0% 0%
LDVs
LDVs
Trucks
Trucks
Buses
Buses
2/3 Ws
2/3 Ws
LDVs
LDVs
Trucks
Trucks
Buses
Buses
2/3 Ws
2/3 Ws
LDVs
LDVs
Trucks
Trucks
Buses
Buses
2/3 Ws
2/3 Ws
STEPS SDS STEPS SDS STEPS SDS

BEV PHEV BEV PHEV BEV PHEV
Japan United States Rest of the world

100% 100% 100%
Market share (%)
Market share (%)

Market share (%)
80% 80% 80%
60% 60% 60%
40% 40% 40%
20% 20% 20%
0% 0% 0%
LDVs
LDVs
LDVs
LDVs
Trucks
Trucks
Trucks
Trucks
Buses
Buses
Buses
Buses
2/3 Ws
2/3 Ws
2/3 Ws
2/3 Ws
LDVs
LDVs
Trucks
Trucks
Buses
Buses
2/3 Ws
2/3 Ws

BEV PHEV BEV PHEV BEV PHEV
Notes: STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario; 2/3 Ws = two/three-wheelers;
LDVs = light-duty vehicles; BEV = battery electric vehicle; PHEV = plug-in hybrid vehicle. Europe includes the
countries of the European Union plus Iceland, Norway and the United Kingdom.
China and Europe lead the electric vehicle markets in both scenarios.
Europe
Developments in electric mobility in Europe follow close behind those in China in the
Stated Policies Scenario. The extent of potential support to EVs in European countries
economic recovery measures related to the Covid-19 crisis is unknown at the time of
writing, and so the main assumption is that CO2 emissions standards for LDVs and
heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs), plans to phase out ICE vehicles sales and EV deployment
targets continue to promote electrification in Europe in the years ahead (see
Chapter 2, Table 2.1). Europe here includes Iceland and Norway, which today have
the highest sales of electric cars in total car sales, and the United Kingdom, which
has set ambitious electric car deployment plans. In Europe, EV sales share across all
modes exceed 30% in 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario. Electric two/three-
wheelers in Europe start from a low level compared to Asian countries but reach more
than 40% sales share in 2030. Electric buses attain almost 50% sales share, spurred
by the European Union Clean Vehicle Directive, which targets EV sales shares ranging
PAGE | 159
from 24% to 45% by 2025 and from 33% to 65% by 2030 for publicly procured
vehicles (European Union, 2019). Electric LDVs reach 30% market share in 2030 and
electric trucks reach 2%.
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, by 2030, Europe has a combined EV

market share (for electric LDVs, buses and trucks) of just under 50%.
India
EV sale shares across all modes (including two/three-wheelers) in India reach around
30% in 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario. Reflecting the intentions of FAME II, EV
deployment in India is mainly achieved through the electrification of two/three-
wheelers, which reach a market share of almost 50%. The rate of electrification of
buses and LDVs is lower, below 15% sales share in 2030.
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, EV sales shares in India scale up rapidly to

55% in 2030 across all road vehicle modes (30% excluding two/three-wheelers). By
2030 almost three-quarters of all two/three-wheelers sold are electric, as are almost
one-third of all LDVs and about 30% of all buses.
Japan
In the Stated Policies Scenario, by 2030 EV sales in Japan across all modes (excluding
two/three-wheelers) reach 20%, in line with the government’s long-term goal for
Japanese automakers to reduce vehicle GHG emissions by 80% (METI, 2018).
Although several Japanese companies are at the forefront of EVs and automotive
battery manufacturing, in the Stated Policies Scenario, Japan has lower domestic EV
sales shares than the leading countries. This reflects fairly modest BEV and PHEV
incentives compared to other countries and that fuel-economy standards in Japan do
not include specific provision for EVs, unlike the CO2 emission standards in the
European Union.
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, Japan reaches EV sales shares of almost

40% across all modes (except two/three-wheelers), the same as for electric LDV sales
shares.
United States
Electric mobility uptake in the United States proceeds at two speeds in the Stated
Policies Scenario. At a faster pace are the 12 states that have implemented a zero-
emission vehicle (ZEV) mandate (Berman, 2020) and the states that aim to continue
to follow California’s stricter GHG emission standards, rather than the proposed laxer
federal standards in the 2020 Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicle Rule (see
PAGE | 160
Chapter 2, Policy developments in major markets section). Electric mobility advances

at a far slower pace in those states that are not aligned with the California standards
or have a ZEV mandate. This reflects the less favourable value proposition of electric
cars in the US context of a high reliance on personal vehicles for mobility, more
common long-distance trips and low taxes on oil-based automotive fuels.
Considering the combined fast and slow tracks, the outlook for the share of EV sales
in the United States is 8% in 2030 across all modes (except two/three-wheelers) in
the Stated Policies Scenario.
The Sustainable Development Scenario assumes that the United States rapidly
adopts a regulatory framework supportive of electrification, whereupon EV
deployment accelerates to reach a 30% sales share across all modes (except
two/three-wheelers) in 2030. Lagging in deployment in comparison with China and
Europe, in the Sustainable Development Scenario the United States in 2030 does not
reach the same penetration of EVs as in those leading countries.
Other regions
This category includes two groups of countries. One includes countries with strong
ambitions to electrify road transport and that have enacted policies and measures to
boost EV adoption (e.g. Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan). The
second group includes countries that have not yet specifically expressed ambition to
deploy EVs; their EV uptake will continue to lag global average adoption rates. Since
the share of vehicle sales in countries in the second category overwhelms that of
countries in the first group, in the Stated Policies Scenario, the overall EV sales share
for the overall “other regions” category is lower than in key vehicle markets. EV
uptake in the overall “other regions” category is mainly concentrated on two/three-
wheelers and to a lesser extent on buses. However, some countries in the first group
are projected to experience very rapid EV deployment, with Israel attaining almost
50% sales share across all modes (except two/three-wheelers) by 2030, Canada
almost 30%, Colombia nearly 20% and Chile roughly 15%.
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, the level of ambition is assumed to rise

across all world regions. This results in LDVs attaining more than 20% market share
and buses about 40% by 2030 across the markets that are not covered explicitly in
the individual countries/regions highlighted in this section.
PAGE | 161
Box 3.1 Covid-19 impacts on electric mobility to 2030: Exploring alternative

futures
As cities and countries across the globe went into lockdown and as fears of contagion
spread, the Covid-19 crisis affected mobility patterns: passenger travel activity came to
a near-halt in urban centres and on intercontinental flights, and vehicle sales slumped.
It is likely that Covid-19 will have long-lasting impacts on the transport sector, although
its effects on the behaviour of individuals, the economy and policies are still uncertain.
Beyond the broader uncertainties around possible second waves of the pandemic or
the pace of the economic recovery, the evolution of future mobility patterns emerging
from the crisis might be different than before. For example, the experience of clean air
that provided citizens in urban areas with bright skies to an extent often not seen in
decades as a result of lockdown measures could drive change in urban policy and in
mobility patterns. For many companies and their employees, the lockdown
demonstrated the technical feasibility, and, in some cases, convenience and preference
for the option among employees (The Brussels Times, 2020), as well as efficacy and
potential for cost-savings of regular teleworking (Global Workplace Analytics, 2015;
Arruda, 2020; Picchi, 2020; Routley, 2020). For companies where this is an option,
encouraging the practice while reinforcing teleworking capabilities could reduce future
commuting needs. On the other hand, early indications in some cities suggest a faster
rebound in car activity than for public transport, partly because the use of public
transport options is restricted (Bloomberg, 2020; Ipsos, 2020). Continued fears about
the lack of social distance in public may well boost personal vehicle purchases and
overall driving for commuting. This bears the risk not only of increased congestion but
also, where these vehicles are not electric, of further increase in local pollution and
additional GHG emissions.
Government responses to the Covid-19 crisis will therefore be critical in shaping future
mobility patterns, grasping opportunities for changes in travel routines where they are
sustainable and mitigating possible adverse effects. To illustrate potential longer lasting
effects on future electric vehicle deployment, we identified two sets of drivers that may
steer the future of mobility and electric mobility in opposite directions: a “bright” future,
in which air quality concerns trigger policy changes in urban areas to reduce the
number of cars on the road towards less space-, pollution- and GHG-intensive transport
options. Cleaner powertrains such as EVs are prioritised both at municipal as well as
national level.
 a “bright” future, in which air quality concerns trigger policy changes in urban areas
to reduce the number of cars on the road towards less space-, pollution- and GHG-
intensive transport options. Cleaner powertrains such as EVs are prioritised both at
municipal as well as national level.
PAGE | 162
 a “bleak” pathway, in which behavioural and economic consequences to the Covid-

19 crisis result in stalling progress in EV deployment. Social distancing and health
security measures make it more difficult to use public transport; commuters avoid
public and shared transport for fear of contamination, leading to reduced revenues
from fares and lower levels of services, in a vicious downward spiral. Left without a
viable alternative, those who can afford to buy and use cars instead, resulting in
overall increased personal car adoption and use. The Covid-19-related economic
crisis leads governments to roll back policy support for EVs, and consumers favour
cheaper car options at purchase.
Policy and behavioural responses to the Covid-19 crisis that could facilitate a “bright”
pathway
Response Description
Recognising the potential for cost savings

and societal benefits, employers put in place
Increased teleworking
measures to normalise and encourage
occasional to regular work from home.
Based on the need for alternatives to space-

inefficient personal cars, cities around the
Accelerated support to modal shift to ‘active’ globe continue to reallocate street space
modes (walking and cycling) and public away from cars to walking and cycling and to
transit public transit (e.g. dedicated bus lanes); and
to allocate funding to supporting these
modes
Low- and zero-emissions zones, and

Increased support to quieter and lower- congestion charging schemes are already
emission powertrains at the local level, becoming more common, and more cities
including through congestion charges and follow in adopting measures favourable to
low- and zero-emission zones EVs after experiencing “cleaner air and
brighter skies” during lockdown
Governments use the opportunity, via their

economic recovery plans, to implement
Government support to economic recovery
measures and policies (including financial
prioritises alternative technologies such as
support to the industry and consumers) that
the EV industry
prioritise lower-emissions and alternative
technologies for transport.
PAGE | 163
Electric car stock in the Stated Policies Scenario and two alternative pathways
depicting possible Covid-19 impacts, 2030
160 16%
Electric car
Electric car stock (million)
140 14% stock (left)
120 12%
Electric car
100 10% stock share
(right)
80 8%
60 6%
40 4%
20 2%
0
2030 STEPS 2030 Bleak 2030 Bright

Notes: The possible impacts of the following factors are explored relative to the Stated Policies Scenario. “Bleak”
pathway: increased personal car ownership as a result of lower public transport use and reduced EV adoption from
reduced government support to alternative powertrains. “Bright” pathway: reduced personal car ownership as a
result of teleworking and urban mobility policies and increased EV adoption from urban mobility policies and
economic recovery measures prioritising cleaner technologies. STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario.
The combination of increased teleworking, an extension of the “blue skies” experience

in urban areas and economic recovery measures that prioritise low-emission vehicles
could bring up EV deployment in 2030 relative to the Stated Policies Scenario. In the
“bright” pathway, the number of electric cars would reach close to 160 million by 2030,
about 40 million more than in the Stated Policies Scenario. This would represent a big
step towards the EV market uptake required for the Sustainable Development Scenario,
although the latter would require larger-scale and structural efforts that span beyond
direct responses from the Covid-19 crisis. In particular, it would require stringent fuel
economy standards and/or EV mandates in all major car markets.
The “bleak” pathway would lead to the opposite effect, with increased car ownership
and travel and a slower uptake of alternative powertrain technologies. In this pathway,
EV deployment would slow down in comparison with the Stated Policies Scenario, to
reach 80 million electric cars by 2030, i.e. a third less than in the Stated Policies
Scenario. Direct CO2 emissions from cars in the bleak pathway would increase by more
than 400 Mt CO2, or nearly 15%.
Charging infrastructure
Future charging infrastructure (or electric vehicle supply equipment [EVSE]) needs
depend on the inter-relationships between vehicle stock, driving needs, charging
equipment usage and technical capabilities (e.g. rated power and connectivity
PAGE | 164
protocols). For electric LDVs, region specific factors such as population density,
charging behaviour and driving range have direct implications on the geographical
location of the EVSE and on charging rates. It is worthwhile to note that:
 Home charging access is positively correlated with the share of EV owners

occupying single family houses, detached/semi-detached units, or that have
access to a garage or carport (Dua, 2019; Melaina, 2016).
 Dense cities in China like Beijing, Hefei and Hangzhou, have higher proportion of
publicly accessible chargers compared to major EV markets in Europe and the
United States (Hall and Lutsey, 2017).
 Workplace and “away from home charging” is largely influenced by employer
initiatives and local policy measures (Smart, 2014).
 The installed capacity of publicly accessible chargers and the relative allocation
between fast and slow public chargers differ by region. Generally it depends on
a combination of factors including: market share of PHEVs and BEVs; average
battery capacities; driving and charging behaviour; population and housing
densities; technology progress and government policies (Hove, 2019; Hall, 2019).
Electric buses (e-buses) have higher energy consumption per kilometre driven and
drive longer daily mileages than LDVs, thus they are equipped with larger batteries.
To recharge them in a reasonable time, fast (≥ 50 kilowatt [kW]) charging is common
practice for e-buses. Yet, there is quite a degree of variation in the daily mission
profile of buses (depending on region specific ridership trends, occupancy factors
and degree of urbanisation), with consequential impacts on the supporting EVSE
infrastructure:
 For electric buses covering relatively short distances (less than 150 km/day), a
typical 50 kW fast charger can fully charge a 110 kilowatt-hour (kWh) e-bus in
about two hours at a depot (McKinsey & Company, 2018).
 In large cities with higher ridership, service frequency and daily mileage, there is
a stronger case for short-duration opportunity charging (e.g. at destinations and
depots) at higher power rates.
Electrification of trucks poses a unique challenge for charging infrastructure

deployment due to their high power and energy requirements, especially for long-
haul trucks. To fully charge a commercial 550 kWh battery capacity equipped long-
haul truck would require as much energy as the average daily energy consumption
PAGE | 165
of 55 households in the European Union. 9, 10 In order for an electric truck to recharge

in a reasonable amount of time, ultra-fast charging is being developed, reaching
power rates of more than 500 kW up to a few megawatts (MW) (Ronanki, 2019;
Spöttle, 2018; Electrive, 2019). This means an additional dimension to EVSE
deployment challenges and their impacts on electricity networks, particularly at the
distribution level (Plötz, 2019).
Assumptions
To address these points, the charging infrastructure projections in the two outlook
scenarios are based on assumptions that draw on current evidence from across the
world. 11 The assumptions follow three key metrics: EVSE to EV ratio; mode specific
charging rates; and share of total number of charging sessions by EVSE type. Only
conductive charging infrastructure is considered. EVSE classification is primarily
based on access (publicly accessible or private) and charging power (Table 3.1).
Overall, three types of EVSE are considered for LDVs: private (slow), publicly
accessible (slow) and publicly accessible (fast). 12 Charging demand of buses and
trucks is assumed to be met by dedicated fast chargers.
9
Daimler eCascadia has a 550 kWh battery (400 km range) (Daimler, 2018).
10
Estimated considering that in the European Union the total electricity demand from 220 million private houses was
about 770 terawatt-hours in 2018 (Earl, 2018).
11
For additional information regarding the methodology, refer to Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b). .
12
The distinction of 22 kW between slow and fast chargers is consistent with worldwide standards and connectivity
protocols. In Japan and the United States, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standard J1772 single-phase
AC level 1 (120 volt [V]/16 ampere [A], up to 1.9 kW) or level 2 (240V/32-80A, 7.6 kW – 19.2 kW) charging are
considered to be the norm for private slow chargers (home and workplace) for LDVs (SAE, 2010). In China and the
European Union, single phase AC (120V/16A-32A, 1.9 kW-7.6 kW) and tri-phase AC (240V/32A-80A, 7.6 kW-19.2 kW)
according to the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards, are considered to be the available
options for private (home and workplace) slow charging of LDVs (IEC, 2017). Differentiations by connector type and
power supply phase are not included in the analysis. Today there are four types of plugs for vehicle charging: two
each for AC (Type 1 single phase and Type 2 tri-phase) and DC (CHAdeMo and CCS) (IEA, 2018a).
PAGE | 166
Key assumptions for projections of EV chargers in 2030
EVSE EVSE: EV Average charging rate Share of charging by

Mode
type ratio (kW) EVSE type (%)
RoW Dense RoW and Dense RoW Dense
Private 1.07 0.93 6.7 87% 73%
Publicly
0.09 0.06 7.4 3% 7%
LDVs accessible slow
Publicly
0.02 0.04 150 10% 20%
accessible fast
RoW and
RoW and Dense RoW and Dense
Dense
Buses Fast 0.13 190 100%
Trucks Fast 0.26 480 100%
Notes: RoW = rest of world. Dense countries include China and Japan. LDVs = passenger light- duty vehicles and
light-commercial vehicles Share of charging by EVSE types refers to the fraction of total number of charging
sessions using that specific EVSE type.
Private LDV charging includes both home and workplace charging. Publicly accessible slow charging refers to AC
level 1 and level 2 charging up to 22 kW. Publicly accessible fast chargers can provide power higher than 22 kW. The
average power rate of LDV chargers is assumed to double from 3.3 kW today to 6.7 kW by 2030 The average fast
charging power of 150 kW is assumed based on historical growth and anticipated progress in DC fast charging
power in relation to the average battery capacities and the maximum power rate acceptable by the vehicles 13.
Publicly accessible fast chargers are assumed to be used for 10% of the charging events based on the European
Climate Foundation study (Cambridge Econometrics, 2018).
Buses ─ average bus charging rate is assumed to increase from 55 kW today to 190 kW in 2030 considering the
gradual replacement of current 50 kW DC fast chargers with ultra-fast chargers.
Trucks ─ It is assumed between now and 2030, conductive plug-in chargers will most likely dominate the truck
charger market and these commercially deployed truck chargers will provide on average 500 kW. This aligns with
the European Union wide initiative EUROP-E implemented by Ionity, that recommend 350 kW minimum by 2025 and
at least 500 kW in 2030 (Ionity, 2019; EUROP-E, 2017).
Sources: ACEA (2020); AFDC (2020); CHAdeMO (2019); CharIN (2019); EAFO (2020); EVCIPA (2019); EV-Volumes
(2020); GB/T (2019); Horrox, J. and M. Casale (2019); Houbbadi (2019); T&E (2020); ZeEUS (2017).
Private chargers
The number of private chargers for LDVs and dedicated chargers for buses and
trucks expands from 6.4 million in 2019 to almost 135 million in 2030 in the
Stated Policies Scenario, corresponding to more than 30% average year-on-year
growth (Figure 3.3). The cumulative installed power capacity of those chargers
13
Today the Tesla Supercharger v3 can provide up to 250 kW (Tesla, 2019) and and the European Union wide
initiative EUROP-E implemented by Ionity is capable of up to 350 kW output using CCS (Ionity, 2019). Recently
CHAdeMo 2.0 was launched with rated power of 400 kW and is expected to gear up to release CHAdeMO 3.0 or
ChaoJi ultra-fast charger up to 900 kW of output (CHAdeMO, 2019). The limiting factor is the on-board power
electronics which determine the rate at which the battery can be charged.
PAGE | 167
in 2030 is 0.6 terawatts (TW). In energy terms, private chargers consume

approximately 400 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity by 2030. The Sustainable
Development Scenario projects those variables to nearly double in 2030 compared to
the Stated Policies Scenario: the number of private chargers is more than 240 million,
installed power capacity is about 1.1 TW and electricity demand is about 770 TWh. 14
In both scenarios, almost the entire stock of private chargers is for LDVs. However, buses
and trucks together account for about one-fourth of total installed charging capacity and
consume more than 20% of total energy supplied by private chargers in 2030. This is
essentially due to the fact that buses and trucks require fast chargers with higher power
rates than for LDV chargers, require a large amount of electricity to fulfil their higher
mileages and have higher energy consumption per kilometre driven.
Number of private chargers, associated energy demand and cumulative

installed charging power capacity in 2019 and by scenario in 2030
Cumulative installed
Number of chargers Energy demand power capacity
270 900 1.2
225 750 1.0

Charging power capacity (TW)
Number of chargers (millions)
Energy supplied (TWh)
180 600 0.8
Truck chargers
135 450 0.6
Bus chargers
90 300 0.4 LDV chargers
45 150 0.2
0 0 0.0
2019 2030 2030 2019 2030 2030 2019 2030 2030
Note: STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario.

Source: IEA analysis based on Mobility Model (IEA, 2020).
The number of private chargers, their energy demand and the needed cumulative installed
capacity nearly doubles in 2030 in the Sustainable Development Scenario relative to the
Stated Policies outlook.
In 2030, the total number of truck chargers is projected to reach more than 100 000
in the Stated Policies Scenario and around 650 000 in the Sustainable Development
Scenario (Figure 3.3). The electrification of trucks envisioned in the latter scenario is
attributable to an encouraging policy landscape and to responsive OEMs, battery and
14
To put into perspective, the total installed capacity of air conditioning equipment in the world today is about
10 TW, eight-times higher than the installed capacity of EV chargers in the Stated Policies Scenario (IEA, 2018b).
PAGE | 168
EV charger manufacturers, utility companies, fleet operators and trucking

companies. Trucks consume almost 70 TWh of energy in Sustainable Development
Scenario, three-times as much as in the Stated Policies Scenario (22 TWh) in 2030.
To meet this demand in 2030, 150 gigawatts (GW) of cumulative installed charging
power capacity will be needed in the Sustainable Development Scenario and around
35 GW in the Stated Policies Scenario.
Publicly accessible chargers

Understanding the role and value of publicly accessible charging infrastructure is
context driven. Publicly accessible charging infrastructure is often perceived as
complementary to private charging (home or workplace) to alleviate concerns about
range anxiety and to facilitate long distance travel. However, publicly accessible
charging could substitute private charging as the primary charging destination in
dense urban areas where multi-unit/apartment complex dwelling is more prevalent,
home charging access is scarce and workplace charging is restrictive, or for fleets
such as taxis and ride-hailing services (e.g. large charging hubs such as already exist
in China).
Figure 3.4 shows the number of publicly accessible LDV chargers installed, their
energy demand and the installed power capacity in 2030 in the two scenarios in this
outlook.
In the Stated Policies Scenario, the number of publicly accessible slow and fast
chargers increases from 870 000 today to almost 11 million in 2030. Publicly
accessible chargers reach cumulative power capacity of 120 TW and provide almost
70 TWh of energy, roughly one-fifth of the electricity consumed by private chargers
in the Stated Policies Scenario. Slow chargers are more than 90% of the total publicly
accessible charger installations (10 million), account for 60% of cumulative installed
charging power capacity and consume 20% of total energy.
PAGE | 169
Number of publicly accessible LDV chargers, associated energy demand and

cumulative installed charging power capacity in 2019 and by scenario in 2030
Cumulative installed
Number of chargers Energy demand power capacity
21 140 225
Charging power capacity (GW)

18 120
Number of chargers(millions)
180
Energy supplied (TWh)

100
14
135 Fast chargers
80
11 Slow chargers
60 90
7
40
45
4 20
0 0 0
2019 2030 2030 2019 2030 2030 2019 2030 2030
Note: STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario.

Source: IEA analysis based on Mobility Model (IEA, 2020).
The number of publicly accessible chargers in 2030 is 11 million in the Stated Policies
Scenario and almost twice that in the Sustainable Development Scenario. Fast chargers
represent 8% of the total installations yet consume 80% of total energy in both scenarios.
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, the number of publicly accessible

chargers and associated installed charging power capacity and electricity
consumption are projected to almost double relative to the Stated Policies Scenario.
The 20 million publicly accessible slow chargers provide 120 TWh of energy with an
installed capacity of 200 TW. Nearly 1.2 million fast chargers provide more than
90 TWh of energy with installed capacity of around 70 TW.
Impact of electric mobility on energy demand

The global EV stock consumed almost 80 TWh of electricity in 2019 (around 40%
more than in 2018). The bulk of this consumption was to power the large electric two-
wheeler fleet in circulation, particularly in China. The growth of the EV fleet
envisioned in both scenarios results in increased electricity consumption in all major
world regions.
In 2030, in the Stated Policies Scenario, the global electricity demand from EVs
(including two/three-wheelers) increases about sixfold from 2019 levels to 550 TWh.
It rises nearly eleven-fold relative to 2019, to almost 1 000 TWh in the Sustainable
Development Scenario. While today EVs account for a small fraction of global total
final electricity consumption (less than 0.5%), the picture is likely to change in the
PAGE | 170
future. Table 3.2 shows that by 2030 EVs in the assessed countries/regions will
account for at least 1% of total final electricity consumption in the Stated Policies
Scenario and minimum 2% in the Sustainable Development Scenario.
Share of electricity consumption attributable to EVs by region and scenario,

2030
Sustainable
Stated Policies
Country/region 2019 Development Scenario,
Scenario, 2030
2030
China 1.2% 3% 3%
Europe 0.2% 4% 6%
India 0.0% 2% 3%
Japan 0.0% 1% 2%
United States 0.1% 1% 4%
Sources: Electricity demand from EVs was evaluated with the Mobility model (IEA, 2020); total final electricity
consumption from (IEA, 2020) and IEA (forthcoming).
These projections suggest that EVs are likely to play an important role for power
systems in the near term. In advanced economies, the increasing demand of
electricity from EVs is expected to happen in a context that sees the total electricity
demand stagnating or even reducing due to energy efficiency improvements. On the
other hand, in emerging economies the consumption from EVs will be embedded in
a context of fast growing electricity consumption from all sectors. Understanding
when EVs are charged and at what power rate is important to manage the smooth
operation and security of power systems (see Chapter 5). Figure 3.5 indicates that
about three-fourths of the electricity consumed by EVs in 2030 in the Stated Policies
Scenario is provided by slow chargers.
PAGE | 171
Electricity demand from the EV fleet by mode, charger type, country/region

and oil displacement, 2019 and 2030
Electricity demand by mode By charger By country/region Oil displacement by mode
1 200 4.5
mb/d
TWh
4.0
1 000
3.5
800 3.0
2.5
600
2.0
400 1.5
1.0
200
0.5
0 0.0
2030 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030
2019 STEPS SDS STEPS SDS STEPS SDS 2019 STEPS SDS
By mode: Two/three-wheeler LDV Bus Truck

By charger: Two/three-wheeler LDV Private LDV Public Slow LDV Public Fast Bus Truck
By region: China Europe United States India Japan Rest of the world
Notes: mb/d = million barrels per day; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario;
LDV = light-duty vehicle. Electricity demand by EV mode is calculated using the following assumptions (where the
range indicates the variation across countries). Fuel consumption (in kWh/km): PLDVs 0.20-0.26; LCVs 0.31-0.42;
buses 1.2-1.74; minibuses 0.35-1.49; medium trucks 0.87-1.11; heavy trucks 1.46-2.08; two-wheelers 0.03-0.04.
Annual mileage (in km): PLDVs 8 000-18 000 km; LCVs 11 000-31 000; buses and minibuses 15 000-45 000;
medium and heavy trucks 22 000-91 000; two-wheelers 4 000-7 600. Charging losses are 5% and the share of
electric driving for PHEV is 70% of the annual mileage.
Global electricity demand from EVs grows from 80 TWh in 2019 to 550 TWh in 2030 in the
Stated Policies Scenario, when oil displacement reaches 2.5 mb/d. In both scenarios, most
electricity is drawn from slow chargers.
Stated Policies Scenario

In the Stated Policies Scenario, EVs are projected to consume about 550 TWh of
electricity in 2030, with LDVs accounting for almost 70% of the total EV power
demand, followed by two/three-wheelers, whose share in overall EV electricity
consumption declines from around 60% of the total in 2019 to only 15% in 2030.
Buses account for 13% and trucks for 4% of EV power demand globally in 2030.
The geographical distribution of the electricity consumed by EVs shifts somewhat

from current shares, which are dominated by China. China remains the largest
consumer with 220 TWh in 2030, despite that its share in global electricity demand
from EVs almost halves from 80% in 2019 to around 40%. As EV electricity demand
in European countries and the United States increase, they account for about
110 TWh and 60 TWh of EV electricity demand, representing around 20% and 10% of
global electricity consumption from EVs, respectively.
By reducing reliance on oil products in the transport sector, EVs also contribute to
energy diversification, environmental and climate goals. In 2019, EVs in operation
PAGE | 172
globally avoided the consumption of almost 29 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe)
(0.6 million barrels per day). In 2030, the EV fleet displaces more than 120 Mtoe
(2.5 million barrels per day) of diesel and gasoline.
Sustainable Development Scenario

EVs circulating worldwide require almost 1 000 TWh of electricity in 2030 in this
scenario. LDVs consume three-quarters of electricity demand by EVs, followed by
two/three-wheelers (10%), buses (9%) and trucks (5%). In the Sustainable
Development Scenario, the EV fleet in China remains the largest electricity consumer,
despite its share falling though still accounting for more than 25% of total EV
electricity demand. Europe accounts for almost one-fifth, but the gap between
Europe and the United States (15%) is reduced compared with the Stated Policies
Scenario, due to the rapid scale up of electric mobility envisioned for the United
States in the Sustainable Development Scenario.
The global EV fleet displaces 210 Mtoe (4.2 mb/d) of gasoline and diesel in 2030 in
the Sustainable Development Scenario.
Implications of electric mobility on well-to-

wheel GHG emissions
In 2019, the global EV fleet emitted 51 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt
CO -eq), about half the amount that would have been emitted from a same fleet of
2
ICE vehicles, corresponding to 53 Mt CO -eq of avoided emissions (Figure 3.6). 15 Well-

2
to-wheel (WTW) emissions savings from EVs are achieved thanks to the fact that the
16
high energy efficiency of the electric powertrain combined with the current global
carbon intensity of electricity systems emit less than ICEs in most countries. 17
To ensure that EVs can unleash their full potential to mitigate climate change, it is
crucial to further reduce the CO2 intensity of power generation. An increasing
number of countries worldwide are taking actions to decarbonise electricity
generation, which is set to further reduce the specific WTW emissions of EVs over
15
The analysis was carried out with country-specific electricity mix and carbon intensities.
16
The well-to-wheel analysis accounts for well-to-tank emissions (upstream emissions due to oil extraction and
processing for ICEs, and to power generation and transmission for EVs) and tank-to-wheel emissions (tailpipe
emissions). Life-cycle emissions, which take into account the emissions from vehicle manufacturing and disposal
are discussed in Box 3.1, in Chapter 4 and in Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b).
17
The carbon intensity of electricity production is calculated based on the average annual carbon intensity of
generation, and includes losses due to transmission and distribution, as well as in EV charging.
PAGE | 173
time. Indeed, the WTW emissions of the future EV fleet are projected to be
significantly lower than those of ICEs in 2030 in both scenarios. The net emission
reductions are more significant in the Sustainable Development Scenario, in which
electricity generation decarbonises faster than in the Stated Policies Scenario, in line
with the Paris Agreement goals (Figure 3.6).
Net and avoided well-to-wheel GHG emissions from the global EV fleet, 2019
and 2030
2019 2030 STEPS 2030 SDS
60 400
Mt CO2-eq
Mt CO2-eq
300
40
200
20 100
0 0
- 100
- 20
- 200
- 40
- 300
- 60 - 400
- 500
- 80
- 600
- 100
- 700
- 120 - 800
Electric two/three-wheelers Electric buses Electric LDVs Electric trucks Avoided GHG emissions
Equivalent ICE two/three-wheelers Equivalent ICE buses Equivalent ICE LDVs Equivalent ICE trucks
Notes: STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario; LDVs = light-duty vehicles; ICE =
internal combustion engine. Positive emissions are from the global EV fleet. Negative emissions are those that would
have been emitted by an equivalent ICE fleet. The red dot denotes net GHG emissions savings from EVs in
comparison with an equivalent ICE fleet.
The WTW GHG emissions from the projected EV stock are determined in each scenario by multiplying the future
electricity consumption from the EVs in each country by the final electricity carbon intensity at the country level,
using carbon intensity values from Energy Technology Perspectives 2020 (IEA, forthcoming) for both scenarios. The
WTW CO2-eq emissions for the equivalent ICE fleet are those that would have been emitted if the projected EV fleet
were instead powered by ICE vehicles with technology shares (diesel and gasoline) and fuel economies
representative of each country/region in each year. Fuel economies for ICE and EV powertrains for each mode are
provided in the notes for Figure 3.5.
Sources: IEA analysis developed with the Mobility Model (IEA, 2020); carbon intensities from Energy Technology
Perspectives 2020 (IEA, forthcoming).
In 2030, EVs reduce GHG emissions by almost half compared to an equivalent ICE fleet in
the Stated Policies Scenario and by two-thirds in the Sustainable Development Scenario.
In the Stated Policies Scenario, the global EV stock is projected to emit about 215 Mt
CO -eq by 2030 on a WTW basis. If that fleet were instead powered by ICEs, GHG
2
emissions would be almost 90% higher at around 400 Mt CO -eq. 2
In the Sustainable Development Scenario, which assumes rapid decarbonisation of

power generation as described in Energy Technologies Perspectives 2020 (IEA,
forthcoming) as well as faster EV market uptake, emissions savings via road transport
PAGE | 174
electrification reach 440 Mt CO -eq by 2030. The faster decarbonisation of electricity

2
systems in this scenario leads to faster reductions in the specific WTW emissions of
the EV fleet. Assuming the same generation mix as in the Stated Policies Scenario,
emissions from the EV fleet would be about 380 Mt CO -eq, or two-thirds higher in
2
2030. This indicates that decarbonising electricity generation in line with the
Sustainable Development Scenario should be pursued to significantly increase the
emissions reduction potential of EVs on a WTW basis.
Box 3.2 What is the difference between well-to-wheel and life-cycle GHG
emissions?
The difference between accounting for GHG emissions on a life-cycle basis versus a
well-to-wheel (WTW) basis is one of scope.
WTW emissions comprise both well-to-tank (WTT) and tank-to-wheel (TTW) emissions.
In the case of oil, WTT, or upstream emissions, include those incurred from oil
extraction, refining and distribution. For biofuels, they include the emissions that
come from growing the biofuels feedstock, transforming it into a biofuel and
transporting it to the fuel pump (and account for other co-products made in the
process). For electricity, they comprise the emissions incurred in generating the
electricity, including line losses, as well as in charging the vehicle. In the case of
hydrogen, WTT emissions are incurred by producing, transporting and dispensing the
hydrogen to the vehicle.
TTW (“tailpipe”) emissions come from the leakage of hydrocarbons in vehicle tanks
and from fuel combustion. Therefore TTW emissions are zero for electric and fuel cell
electric cars.
The scope of accounting for life-cycle emissions is broader than WTW emissions. Life-
cycle assessment takes into account that emissions also come from sourcing, altering
and incorporating materials into the final product (i.e. the car, its engine and
drivetrain, or battery and/or fuel cell), as well as from the end-of-life (i.e. disposal,
reuse and/or recycling).
On a WTW basis, in 2018 a medium-size battery electric car that is representative of

global average energy intensity had the lowest specific WTW GHG emissions (i.e. on
a per kilometre basis) among the powertrains evaluated, at around 95 grammes of
CO -eq per kilometre (g CO -eq/km). The average battery electric car emits about 60%
2 2
less CO -eq per kilometre than gasoline ICE vehicles and 40% less than conventional
2
hybrid cars. However, due to the large variability in the carbon intensity of electricity
generation in electricity systems and across countries, the GHG mitigation potential
of BEVs can vary considerably, depending on the power system that serves charging
PAGE | 175
demand. BEVs have nearly zero WTW GHG emissions in Norway and Iceland reflecting
their low-carbon power supply, while they may have even higher specific emissions
than gasoline internal combustion engines in similar size segments in countries that
still rely primarily on coal as a source for electricity generation.
Well-to-wheel GHG emissions for cars by powertrain, 2018
400
gCO2-eq/km
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
ICE HEV PHEV BEV FCEV
Range World average

Notes: ICE = internal combustion engine; HEV = hybrid electric vehicle; PHEV = plug-in electric vehicle; BEV =
battery electric vehicle; FCEV = fuel cell electric vehicle.
The range indicates the variability of WTW GHG emissions for each powertrain at the country level. For ICE
vehicles, HEVs and PHEVs, the range is determined considering the minimum and maximum fuel-economy
values across countries covered by the Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI) (for more on the GFEI, see IEA,
2019c). PHEVs are assumed to drive 60% of their annual mileage on electric drivetrain and 40% on gasoline
engine. For PHEVs and BEVs, the 2018 carbon intensities of electricity generation at country level are obtained
from Energy Technology Perspectives 2020 (IEA, forthcoming): the minimum and maximum correspond to a
vehicle charging in Iceland (0.1 g CO2-eq/kWh) and South Africa (1 002 gCO2-eq/kWh). Note that both LCA and
WTW accounting of GHG emissions measure not only CO2 emissions, but also GHG pollutants and typically
normalise these to a global warming potential of 100 years (GWP100), to report on a CO2-equivalent basis. For
FCEVs, the minimum is calculated considering production of hydrogen from dedicated renewables, the
maximum corresponds to hydrogen production from electrolysis considering electrolysis in China (the country
with the most FCEVs in operation and with the highest carbon intensity of electricity generation) and the world
average is based on steam methane reforming (8.8 kg CO2-eq/kg hydrogen).
Sources: IEA analysis developed with the Mobility Model (IEA, 2020), using data from IEA (2019c).
Implications for automotive batteries

Trends in EV battery size
The demand for batteries used for automotive applications is expected to grow in the
period to 2030 in both the Stated Policies and in the Sustainable Development
scenarios. Increasing sales volume of electric PLDVs is the main driver as is the
increasing size of the required batteries and electrification of other modes such as
buses and trucks.
PAGE | 176
In 2019, the average battery size used in BEVs increased by 14% relative to 2018, in
line with previous years. Average battery sizes for new BEVs range from 48 kWh to
67 kWh for cars (EV-Volumes, 2020). For PHEVs, the average battery size has been
roughly constant over the past five years at around 11 kWh, equivalent to an electric
range of around 50-60 km. There are two reasons for the increased battery size of
BEVs over the past year: the change in the incentive structure in China that favours
long-range vehicles, and the availability of the Tesla Model 3, which proved popular
among EV consumers and is equipped with an above average battery capacity. The
trend of increasing battery capacity is expected to continue, with BEVs reaching an
average driving range of 350-400 km by 2030, which corresponds to battery sizes
of 70-80 kWh.
Automotive battery capacity demand

In the Stated Policies Scenario, the global EV battery capacity (for all transport modes
combined) is estimated to increase from around 170 gigawatt-hours (GWh) per year
today to 1.5 TWh per year in 2030. In the Sustainable Development Scenario, demand
of 3 TWh is projected, driven by increased electrification, particularly heavy-duty
vehicles, and a higher share of BEVs in EV sales (Figure 3.7). Despite ambitious
electrification in the Sustainable Development Scenario, modes other than cars
would account for only 11% of overall battery demand in 2030. This highlights the
centrality of electric cars in the battery market over the next decade. An important
variable in this projection is the share of BEVs and PHEVs in overall EV sales. 18
18
For a sensitivity analysis on relative BEV/PHEV shares on projected battery capacity additions, refer to Global EV
Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019b).
PAGE | 177
Annual global battery capacity additions from EV sales, 2019-30

2019-30, by scenario 2030, by mode
3 000 3000
Battery capacity additions (GWh/year)
2 500 2500
2 000 2000
1 500 1500
1 000 1000
500 500
0 0
2019 2025 2030 Stated Policies Sustainable
Scenario Development
Scenario
LDVs-BEV LDVs-PHEV
Stated Policies Scenario Buses Trucks
Sustainable Development Scenario Two/three-wheelers
Notes: For cars, battery capacity ranges increase to 70-80 kWh in 2030 for BEVs and to 10-15 kWh for PHEVs. For
LCVs, battery capacity increases to 80-100 kWh in 2030 BEVs and to 15-17 kWh for PHEVs. The higher values are
applied mainly in North America and the Middle East. Buses are assumed to use batteries of 250 kWh; two-wheelers
use batteries of 3-4 kWh. Battery packs are assumed to have capacities of 150 kW for medium trucks and 350 kWh
for heavy trucks.
Battery demand reaches 1.5 TWh per year in the Stated Policies Scenario and over 3 TWh
per year in the Sustainable Development Scenario, driven by battery electric cars in both
scenarios.
Demand for battery materials

Increased numbers of EVs and wider driving ranges will push up demand for batteries
and thus on the key materials needed to make them. The nature of the material
demand will vary according to the development of battery chemistry. 19 Given the
evolving nature of lithium-ion technology, the chemical composition of batteries has
been rapidly changing and is expected to continue to evolve at least over the coming
decade. In the first-half of the 2010s, batteries with higher energy density used
19
Battery cells are currently composed of a graphite anode, liquid electrolyte and a cathode. The cathode is a
characterising element of batteries. There are three main families of cathode chemistry: ferrophosphate (FePO4),
nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC) and nickel cobalt aluminium oxide (NCA). In the case of NMC, further
differentiations characterise the ratios of nickel, manganese and cobalt in the cathode, leading to the use of
acronyms such as NMC 111, NMC 532, NMC 622 and NMC 811, where the numerical component represents the
various ratios. The FePO4 is only used by OEMs in China in lithium iron phosphate batteries (LFP) for cars. It is being
phased out due to its low energy density. A numerical notation indicating different material ratios is sometimes also
used for NCA. For example, the assessment of the expected battery technology commercialisation timeline included
in Global EV Outlook 2018 included a differentiation between N0.8C0.15A0.05 and N0.9C0.05A0.05 (IEA, 2018b).
PAGE | 178
cathodes with high cobalt content (nickel cobalt aluminium oxide [NCA] and nickel
manganese cobalt oxide [NMC] 111), while more modest performances were obtained
with lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathodes. Since then, the trend has been to
increase energy density and to reduce the reliance on cobalt due to its price volatility
and risky supply chain. Both drivers led to the use of content. In 2019, it is estimated
that 48% of new batteries for electric cars use cathodes with at least 50% nickel
content, meaning that both high cobalt content and LFP batteries have decreased
their market share. 20 This trend is expected to continue over the coming decade,
despite large uncertainties on the speed of adoption and the widespread use of high
nickel content battery chemistry. In terms of anode chemistry, pure graphite anodes
account for the vast majority of current supply, but silicon doped chemistries, which
enable higher energy densities, are beginning to be used and are likely to increase
their market share in the future. The uncertainty in cathode chemistry is reflected in
the material demand projections associated with the two scenarios.
According to our estimates, the material demand for the batteries of the EVs sold in
2019 was about 19 kilotonnes (kt) for cobalt, 17 kt for lithium, 22 kt for manganese and
65 kt for nickel (Figure 3.8). For battery needs in the Stated Policies Scenario, cobalt
demand expands to about 180 kt/year in 2030, lithium to around 185 kt/year,
manganese to 177 kt/year and class I nickel (> 99% nickel content) to 925 kt/year. In
the Sustainable Development Scenario, higher EV uptake leads to 2030 material
demand values more than twice as high as the Stated Policies Scenario. The choice
of the cathode chemistry significantly affects the demand for metals, particularly on
cobalt which varies by plus or minus 22%. 21 By 2030, heavy-duty EV applications
have a sizeable impact only on demand for lithium (16% of demand) among the
materials analysed, because they are expected to be mostly equipped with lower
energy density LFP cathodes for the next decade.
20
This includes NCM 532, NMC 622, NMC 811 and advanced NCA formulations.
21
See Figure 3.8 notes for details on the cathode composition assumptions that lead to this variability.
PAGE | 179
Annual demand for materials for batteries from EV deployment, 2019-30

Cobalt Lithium
500 500
450 450 Heavy duty
400 400 Light duty
Historical
Metal demand (kt)
350 350
300 300 Variability for chemistry
250 250 Current supply
200 200
150 150
100 100
50 50
0 0
STEPS SDS STEPS SDS
2019 2030 2019 2030
Manganese Nickel class I

2 500 2 500
2 000 2 000
Metal demand (kt)
1 500 1 500
1 000 1 000
500 500
0 0
STEPS SDS STEPS SDS
2019 2030 2019 2030
Notes: kt = kilotonnes; STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario; SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario. Future demand
for materials for battery manufacturing relative to the scenario projections is based on the global battery capacity
shown in Figure 3.7 and the following assumptions of the shares for cathode chemistries in LDVs. For the low cobalt
case: 10% NCA, 10% NMC 622 and 80% NMC 811. For the high cobalt case: 11% NCA and 76% NMC 622, 13% NMC
811. The central value is an average of these two cases. The share of cathode chemistries for heavy-duty vehicles is
assumed to be 95% LFP and 5% NMC 622 in the low cobalt case, while 80% LFP and 20% NMC 622 in the high cobalt
case. The share of metals in the battery for the types of chemistry analysed is indicated in Table 6.1 in the Global EV
Outlook 2018 (IEA, 2018a). The current supply of nickel refers to class I nickel.
Demand for materials to make batteries for electric vehicles will increase exponentially in
the period to 2030; cobalt is the most uncertain, reflecting the diversity of battery
chemistries.
PAGE | 180
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Global EV Outlook 2020 Batteries: An essential technology to electrify road transport
Chapter 4.
Batteries: An essential technology
to electrify road transport
Battery technology and performance

Recent cost and technology developments
The cost of batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) is falling markedly. Industry reports
show that sales-weighted battery pack prices continued to fall in 2019, reaching an
average price of USD 156 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), down from more than
USD 1 100/kWh in 2010 (BNEF, 2019). Not all original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) purchase at this price though, as there is a wide range of prices in the market.
The lowest prices generally are enjoyed by OEMs that place very large battery orders
for pure battery electric vehicles (BEVs) with long ranges and therefore need large
battery packs optimised for energy storage. Considerably higher prices than the
average are to be expected for either low volume manufacturers or for smaller
battery packs designed for plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs). 1
The average battery pack size across all electric light-duty vehicles sold (including
BEVs and PHEVs) continues an upwards trend; it is now 44 kWh, up from 37 kWh in
2018, and BEVs in most countries are in the 50-70 kWh range. This increase is driven
by two trends: BEV models with longer ranges are becoming available and are
increasingly in demand; and the share of BEVs compared to PHEVs is rising. For BEVs,
smaller battery packs tend to be favoured in Asian countries, while larger ones
dominate the North American and European markets.
There are no reliable publicly available sources to track the average energy density
of battery packs: tracking the market deployment of different cathode chemistries is
a good proxy. The most common cathode chemistry used in EVs is nickel
manganese cobalt (NMC). The energy density of cells with NMC cathodes increases
with increasing nickel content. Cells that use lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathodes
1
Battery packs for PHEVs are smaller and have higher power requirements, both of which correlate with higher
battery costs in terms of USD/kWh (IEA, 2018).
PAGE | 185
(mostly used in the People’s Republic of China [hereafter, “China”] and for heavy-
duty applications) have lower energy density than NMC cells. On these grounds,
there are reasons to believe that density is also continuing on an upward trend. We
estimate that in 2019, 16% of EVs used NMC 622 2 or above, compared to 7% in 2018.
Similarly, the share of LFP decreased from 9.1% in 2018 to 4.6% in 2019. The drop in
LFP batteries in EVs can be explained by the structure of the latest incentive scheme
in China, which favours higher density batteries. Current high-density EV cells can
have energy densities in the range of 240-300 Watt-hours per kilogramme (Wh/kg),
which equate to pack-level densities of 130-200 Wh/kg.
Outlook for battery technology developments
Technology trends over the next decade

While lithium-ion technology has made tremendous progress over the past decade
in terms of energy density, costs and cycle life, there is still room for improvement.
Research is being conducted to improve all three key components of lithium-ion (Li-
ion) battery cells: cathodes, anodes and electrolytes. A roadmap of these
developments is presented in Global EV Outlook 2018 (IEA, 2018). In addition, recent
developments in battery design and thermal management aim primarily to cut the
costs of the pack and module components. Two examples are the Contemporary
Amperex Technology Co. Limited’s (CATL) cell-to-pack technology and the Build
Your Dreams (BYD) “Blade Battery” that aim to remove the intermediary module
components, thus reducing pack costs and increasing energy density by up to 20%
(CATL, 2019; BYD, 2020). Meanwhile, the durability of NMC cells is continuing to
increase. Laboratory tests show that the cycle and calendar life of new cell designs
could be up to ten times higher than current technology, which may eventually have
value in grid balancing as well as electromobility applications (Harlow, 2019).
The next generation of Li-ion battery technology, set to enter the market in the
coming five to ten years, is likely to have low nickel content and use either nickel
cobalt aluminium oxide (NCA) (with less than 10% nickel) or nickel manganese cobalt
(NMC) 811 cathodes. On the anode side, ever increasing silicon content will be
tolerated thanks to improved binding agents and electrolytes. Such developments
2
Batteries with nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) cathode chemistries can have varying ratios of these constituent
metals. An NMC 111 battery has all three in equal shares; an NMC 622 has 60% nickel, 20% manganese and 20%
cobalt, and an NMC 811 cathode is made up of 80% nickel, 10% manganese and 10% cobalt. Cathode chemistries
with lower cobalt content are capable of achieving higher energy densities at lower costs (as cobalt is the most
expensive material to source and refine).
PAGE | 186
should enable cell-level energy densities of up to 325 Wh/kg (ANL, 2020). If these
developments are combined with improved packaging technology, pack-level
densities could reach 275 Wh/kg. These values approach the upper performance
bounds of Li-ion technology; any further substantial improvement would require a
shift in technology.
However, some electric vehicles might not necessarily be designed for the highest
possible energy density. This might be the case for urban buses or urban delivery
vehicles where volumetric constraints are less stringent, or to lower the initial
purchase prices of electric cars in markets where affordability is more important than
long ranges. For these applications, the LFP cathode technology is very well suited
due to the wide availability of its precursor materials (including the fact that it uses
no cobalt) and its long cycle life. The recent announcement of some Tesla vehicles
for the Chinese market to partner with CATL and adopt LFP cathodes and advanced
pack designs goes in this direction (Reuters, 2020).
Upcoming technologies – a glimpse beyond 2030

For the next decade, the Li-ion battery is likely to dominate the EV market for three
reasons. First, this technology is well established, meaning that there is now
considerable experience in its large-scale manufacture and solid understanding of
its long-term durability characteristics. Second, the very large investments in Li-ion
manufacturing and supply chains that have been made to date constitute a barrier
to entry for alternative technologies. Third, alternative technologies are still at a
range of lower technology readiness levels (TRLs); none have yet been used in real-
life conditions in commercial vehicle applications. 3
Even after a new technology reaches a level of technological maturity making it

potentially available, there will be a considerable delay before it will begin to
penetrate the market. This is because extensive testing under real conditions is
necessary, and even if and when testing demonstrates substantial improvements
along key metrics (e.g. cost, energy density, durability, safety), new production
3
The technology readiness level (TRL) scale is used to rate the status of technologies according to their status in the
progression from research, development and deployment to commercialisation. Adapted by the IEA, the scale goes
from the concept stage (TRL 1) to large scale demonstrations, and extends beyond the conventional TRL limit to
include various stages of commercialisation (up to TRL 11: proof of commercial stability). For more information, see
www.iea.org/reports/innovation-gaps.
PAGE | 187
capacity will have to be installed. Alternative chemistries that do not require

substantial retooling of existing factories therefore are better placed to rapidly
substitute Li-ion batteries.
For the period after 2030, there are a number of potential technologies that might
be able to push the boundaries beyond the performance limits imposed by Li-ion
battery technology. Figure 4.1 shows the key benefits, trade-offs and technology
readiness of some of the key chemistries for future battery technology. These
technologies are discussed in more detail in Energy Technology Perspectives 2020
[IEA, forthcoming]. The most promising near-term chemistry among these
advanced concepts is the lithium-metal solid state battery. This technology has
been prototyped by various companies and research groups, but it remains to be
proven in operation. Recent developments of this technology show that cycle life –
the technology’s main challenge – is improving. 4 Samsung researchers have
developed a prototype with a volumetric density of over 900 Watt-hours per litre
(Wh/L) (and an estimated gravimetric density of 400 Wh/kg) that is able to retain
89% of its charge after 1 000 cycles (Lee et al., 2020). Sion Power, a start-up, claims
that their product (420 Wh/kg) can retain 75% of its charge after 800 cycles (Sion
Power, 2020).
4
Number of charging and discharging cycles that a battery can undergo before losing a specified share of its rated
capacity. Typically, Li-ion batteries are expected to retain about 80% of their rated capacity after 500 -
1 000 charging cycles. Some batteries can retain 70% of capacity for 3 700 cycles (Harlow, 2019).
PAGE | 188
Relative advantages of post lithium-ion battery technologies
Li-metal anode solid state Lithium-sulfur

Cost Cost
3 3
2 2
Gravimetric Gravimetric
Life 1 Life 1
density density
0 0
Material Volumetric Material Volumetric

availability density availability density
TRL = 5 TRL = 4
Sodium-ion
Lithium-air
Cost Cost
3 3
2 2
Gravimetric Gravimetric
Life 1 Life 1
density density
0 0
Material Volumetric Material Volumetric

availability density availability density
TRL = 3-4 TRL = 1-2
Notes: 0 = worse than Li-ion battery; 1 = comparable to Li-ion; 2 = improvement compared to Li-ion; 3 = major
improvement relative to Li-ion. TRL = technology readiness level (defined on the IEA’s innovation gaps site:
www.iea.org/reports/innovation-gaps). More details are presented in Energy Technology Perspectives 2020 (IEA,
forthcoming). The relative advantages of each technology are estimated based on available literature on theoretical
potential, working principles, ability to manufacture and materials used.
Battery technologies under development offer potential performance advantages.
Life cycle of automotive lithium-ion batteries

The determinant of the extent to which electric vehicles can support climate goals is
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over their life-cycle. Chapter 4 of the Global EV
PAGE | 189
Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019a) discusses the life-cycle GHG emissions of EVs relative to
other powertrains, including the influence of factors such as vehicle mileage, size
and power. 5 It highlights the influence of the carbon intensity of the electricity system
to the GHG intensity in the use phase of an EV over its lifetime. The key messages
from that analysis include:
 Today the use phase is the largest contributor to life-cycle GHG emissions of all
powertrains.
 With a GHG intensity of electricity generation equal to the global average
(518 grammes of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour [gCO2/kWh] in 2018), BEVs,
hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) have similar
lifetime GHG emissions, and their emissions are lower than those of an average
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle.
 Increasing the range of a BEV reduces its relative benefits compared to ICE
vehicles or FCEVs.
 As the electricity used to charge EVs decarbonises in major EV markets, the
benefits of lower life-cycle GHG emissions of electric cars amplify relative to
other powertrains.
A BEV battery, depending on its size and assuming a typical range of emissions from
battery manufacturing and the global average carbon intensity of electricity in the
use phase, accounts for 10-30% of the total life-cycle emissions of the BEV (Figure
4.2).When fuelled by zero-carbon electricity during the use phase, BEVs could
become three-four times less CO2-intensive per kilometre (km) driven, and PHEVs
could become two-three times less CO2-intensive than conventional gasoline cars. In
this context, the relative emissions of Li-ion battery production and disposal will
remain minor in comparison to the total emissions of an ICE vehicle, and will gain in
importance compared to other life-cycle stages and components of an EV. This
section builds upon the analysis carried out in the Global EV Outlook 2019 to focus
on impacts from vehicle manufacturing and disposal, identifying opportunities for
improved sustainability throughout the battery value chain, including end-of-life
pathways (IEA, 2019a).
5
The powertrains considered were globally representative: mid-size versions of an ICE car, a hybrid car, a plug-in
hybrid electric car with 60% of its lifetime mileage driven on electricity and 40% on gasoline, a BEV with a 200 km or
a 400 km range, and a fuel cell electric vehicle with a hydrogen supply primarily sourced from steam methane
reforming of natural gas. The CO2 intensity of the electricity used to power the electric powertrains was based on
the global average in 2018. (Results and further information are available in Global EV Outlook 2019, Chapter 4, and
in particular in Figure 4.2 [IEA, 2019a]). The findings using similar methodology and assumptions are replicated in
Figure 4.2 in this section.
PAGE | 190
Comparative life-cycle GHG emissions of an average mid-size car by

powertrain, 2018
t CO2-eq Variability relative to

vehicle size
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
BEV 40 BEV 80 ICE HEV PHEV FCEV
Vehicle cycle - components and fluids

Vehicle cycle - assembly, disposal and recycling
Vehicle cycle - batteries (65 kg CO₂-eq/kWh)
Well-to-tank fuel cycle
Tank-to-wheel fuel cycle
Additional emissions with 100 kg CO₂-eq/kWh battery manufacturing
Notes: t CO2-eq = tonne of carbon-dioxide equivalent.

This figure provides updated battery life-cycle emissions ranges from the life-cycle GHG emissions of a global
average mid-size car by powertrain in Global EV Outlook 2019 (Figure 4.2) (IEA, 2019a). It shows the effect of a BEV
battery associated with the lower bound GHG intensity of current battery manufacturing (representative of
European Union based manufacturing) (green area) and the upper bound GHG intensity of current battery
manufacturing (representative of China based manufacturing) (hashed green area; additional to green area), based
on research from Kelly et al. (2019).
All ICE powertrains are assumed to be powered by gasoline, including the HEV and PHEV categories.
Vehicle assumptions: vehicle power 110 kW, BEV battery size 40 kWh (BEV 40) or 80 kWh (BEV 80); PHEV battery
size 10.5 kWh; battery chemistry NMC 111; annual mileage 15 000 km; vehicle lifetime ten years. (Assumptions
applicable to all powertrains unless otherwise stated).
Fuel-economy assumptions Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP) values: ICE - 6.8 litres of
gasoline equivalent per 100 kilometres (Lge/100 km); HEV - 5.1 Lge/100 km; BEV- 19.0 kWh/100 km
(2.1 Lge/100 km);FCEV 3.7 Lge/100 km. PHEV is a combination of ICE and BEV fuel economies with 40% total
mileage driven on gasoline and 60% on electricity (this utility factor is in line with WLTP provisions). The fuel
economy of BEVs and PHEVs (for the electric powertrain) includes a 5% penalty for charging losses.
Power supply GHG intensity in the fuel cycle is 518 gCO2-eq/kWh. This is representative of the 2018 global average
and includes transmission and distribution system losses.
The hydrogen production pathway considered here is steam methane reforming from natural gas (well-to-wheel
emissions intensity of 3.2 kg CO2-eq/Lge), which is representative of the majority of current hydrogen production.
The ranges suggested by the sensitivity bars represent the case of small cars (lower bound) and large cars (upper
bound)
Sources: IEA analysis based on ANL (2018); (Kelly et al., 2019); IEA (2019a); IEA (2019b).
On a global average, BEVs provide life-cycle GHG emissions benefits relative to ICE
vehicles. Decarbonising fuel used in a vehicle is the biggest potential area for life-cycle
emissions reduction for all powertrains.
PAGE | 191
Introduction to Lithium-ion battery life-cycle impacts and

GHG emissions reduction potential
The key components that contribute to the life-cycle GHG emissions of a battery for
an electric car include: 6
 Materials: Mining and refining processes, especially for aluminium, and synthesis
of active materials such as nickel, cobalt and graphite.
 Battery manufacturing: Climate control during cell assembly, which takes place
in a “dry room” which maintains ultra-low humidity (<1% relative humidity) and
other tightly controlled conditions to minimise contamination risks and to ensure
safety.
In addition, at the end-of-life, battery recycling processes require energy and
therefore cause GHG emissions. These are partly compensated by the fact that
recycling enables materials recovery, thereby offsetting the impacts (including GHG
emissions) of raw material mining and processing.
Each life-cycle phase, including recycling, presents opportunities to further reduce

the overall impact of BEVs compared to ICE vehicles by using low-carbon energy
sources and achieving economies of scale.
Materials
The key drivers of GHG emissions from the raw materials phase are aluminium (which
is used in the vehicle body and several battery components) and lithium-ion (Li-ion)
battery electrode materials, most notably cobalt, nickel, and natural and artificial
graphite. Supply chains of such materials are characterised by a high degree of
international trade, and their extraction, processing and refining, to achieve suitable
grades for battery manufacturing, is energy intensive. 7
The footprint of raw material production can be reduced primarily by using low-
carbon energy sources for production and refining where possible or by using
recovered or recycled materials. For example, emissions from current aluminium
production for the battery alone vary from roughly 10 to 25 kilogrammes of carbon-
dioxide equivalent per kilowatt-hour (kg CO2-eq/ kWh) of battery, depending on the
electricity grid mix where the battery is produced (Kelly et al., 2019), which can
represent up to a quarter of GHG emissions from battery manufacturing. Recycled
6
For more information on the main GHG-emitting processes in sourcing battery materials and manufacturing, see
Box 4.1 in Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019a).
7
For example, lithium and cobalt are primarily mined in Australia and South America (lithium), and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (cobalt), and mostly refined in China. For more information, see Global EV Outlook 2019, in
particular Box 4.1 and 5.3 (IEA, 2019a).
PAGE | 192
aluminium production requires approximately one-twentieth of the energy inputs of

primary production and sourcing recycled materials could significantly reduce the
emissions associated with battery aluminium (Liu et al., 2012). Optimisation of
manufacturing to promote resource efficiency can also decrease material intensity
and the GHG emissions of the battery. 8
Battery manufacturing
Raw materials need to be combined into the key battery components, namely
cathode, anode, separator and electrolyte, which make up the battery cells.
Individual cells are then assembled, components such as the battery management
system (BMS) added and thermal controls are assembled in the casing to form the
battery pack. In addition to production and refining of materials, a key contributor to
GHG emissions during battery manufacturing is the energy required during cell
assembly, which must take place in a dry room with extreme temperature and
humidity controls.
Manufacturing facility throughput

The GHG emission intensity of cell assembly is mitigated if assembly occurs in a high
throughput facility, which increases energy efficiency on per kWh of battery
produced basis. Thanks to growing battery demand and large-scale battery
manufacturing, the increase in throughput at existing cell manufacturing facilities
has already contributed to a decrease in the life-cycle emissions from cell production
(Kelly et al., 2019).
GHG intensity of energy sources used in manufacturing

The carbon footprint of manufacturing can be further reduced by using low-carbon
energy sources during cell assembly. Using the case of a representative Chinese
battery, Kelly et al. (2019) identified that over 80% of the emissions during cell
assembly come from natural gas used to supply heat, mostly for the dry room and
electrode drying. 9 The authors found that if all energy inputs to cell assembly were
produced from renewable electricity, the battery’s GHG footprint could be reduced
8
While the mining and refining of lithium typically has a lower GHG footprint than that of other transition metals,
there are significant environmental impacts when using surface evaporation ponds for the pre-concentration of
lithium containing brines. The conversion of aqueous lithium to lithium carbonate or lithium hydroxide products also
requires large inputs of chemical reagents and generates considerable wastes (Liu et al., 2019).
9
Electricity and heat are distinct forms of energy, though both can be measured in kWh. Heat has traditionally been
produced directly by burning natural gas or coal, but can also be generated by electric resistance heating or heat
pump technology, which is more efficient than resistance heating.
PAGE | 193
by 29%. Replacing natural gas-based heat processes with electricity makes sense
only if the combined GHG emissions from power generation and efficiency of
electricity-to-heat conversion result in a lower level of GHG emissions per kWh of
heat generated. Furthermore, producing all the heat from electricity requires that
facilities be equipped with different infrastructure and heat pump technology than
natural gas-based facilities. Another solution to significantly lower GHG emissions
from battery manufacturing is to incorporate renewable heat sources such as
biomethane, assuming availability at a competitive price. Using low-carbon
electricity in aluminium manufacturing, an electricity-intensive process, further
reduces the carbon footprint of the battery pack.
End-of-life
Strategies for managing used EV batteries

Developing an effective waste management strategy for EV batteries is crucial, as
they rely on a short list of finite critical materials with few substitutes. Batteries are
often discussed in the framework of the waste hierarchy: reducing first, followed by
reusing, recycling, recovering energy, and treatment and disposal (European
Commission, 2008). Also known as a cascading approach, this is a guiding
philosophy used by policy makers for the sustainable management of many types of
solid waste.
When they are retired from an electric vehicle, batteries may either be reused in
stationary storage applications, or sent to recycling facilities to recover constituent
materials.

Value-retention processes can extend product lives through reuse, repair,
refurbishment or remanufacturing. Value-retention has been shown to significantly
reduce material demand and emissions in other sectors (IRP, 2018).
In the case of EV batteries, “reuse” can refer to refurbishing modules for use in
another EV, as well as to repurposing or “second-life” where modules are
reconfigured to be used as stationary storage. The intuitive benefit of repurposing is
that it extends the battery’s usable life, maximising the economic value and reducing
the per kWh life-cycle impact (Engel et al., 2019; Richa et al., 2017). However, sceptics
point out that EV batteries by design are not optimised for stationary storage
applications. Furthermore, repurposing the battery delays it from entering the
recycling loop, preventing the recovery of critical materials, and inhibiting the
development of a recycling industry that requires higher volumes of battery waste to
PAGE | 194
profitably operate at scale. Therefore there is disagreement as to whether the waste

hierarchy is appropriate in the case of EV batteries.

Regardless of whether batteries are reused for stationary storage, they will eventually
need to be recycled or disposed of. Understanding the opportunities and barriers
related to recycling is critical to reduce the environmental impacts associated with
mining and refining of primary resources, as well as avoiding the improper disposal
of batteries.
Studies suggest that the potential environmental benefits of recycling will depend on
both the recycling technology used and the material composition of battery
cathodes (Dunn et al., 2015; Ciez and Whitacre, 2019; Richa et al., 2017). Energy inputs
and direct combustion of fuels and/or battery constituents during the recycling
process result in GHG emissions. The benefit from a GHG perspective depends on
the balance between emissions from recycling to recover key materials suitable for
new battery manufacturing, and emissions that would otherwise be associated with
the primary extraction and processing of raw materials. Emissions from recycling can
generally be reduced by recovering materials in usable forms, using low-carbon heat
sources where possible and improving unit energy efficiency, as for any industrial
process. (Details about battery reuse and recycling pathways are discussed in the
Recycling lithium-ion batteries section.) The next sections describe the current status
and potential for various end-of-life pathways, focussing on reuse and recycling.
Potential for battery second-life

In an electric vehicle, battery degradation will reduce the range the vehicle can travel
on a single charge. Three primary factors cause normal battery degradation:
 Temperature: Exposure to extreme temperatures accelerates battery

degradation, resulting in a shorter lifetime. This impact is more prominent in hot
rather than cold climates (Neubauer et al., 2015). Sensitivity to heat may be
mitigated by equipping the batteries with a thermal management system (i.e.
cooling). Early BEVs were not usually equipped with thermal management, which
is one of the reasons newer vehicles have longer battery life.
 Charging/discharging pattern: Repeatedly utilising the entire capacity of a
battery (i.e. high depth of discharge) and rapidly charging and discharging (i.e.
high C-rate) are likely to reduce battery performance.
 Time: Performance will degrade over time due to passive chemical processes and
ambient conditions, a process referred to as calendar degradation.
Barring a collision or mechanical defect, batteries are typically assumed to reach end-
of-life when they retain 80% of their initial capacity. However, the standard 80%
PAGE | 195
criterion has changed recently, as EV models on the road today have increasingly
longer ranges than their predecessors. Consequently, higher losses in range may be
acceptable to drivers, particularly if the vehicle is used as a second car or for short
trips. As a result, remaining battery capacity at end-of-life is likely to vary based on
individual behaviour and preferences. Similarly, each battery’s lifespan will vary
based on driving patterns and consumer preferences, but is expected to be between
8-15 years depending on the make and model. 10
In most cases, key components of the battery systems (e.g. modules) are still
functional when retired. Particularly when the vehicle is retired due to a collision or
mechanical defect, the modules and cells can be refurbished and reused directly in
another EV. Tesla Motors and Nissan have pursued refurbishing strategies and offer
refurbished battery packs as replacements for warranty issues and in pre-owned
vehicles (Ambrose and Kendall, 2016). Toyota also plans to reuse batteries as service
parts in addition to non-automobile applications (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2019).
Retired Li-ion batteries that retain 70-80% of their initial capacity can be reused in
less demanding stationary storage applications, providing grid services such as peak
shaving and/or balancing the intermittency of some renewable-based generating
sources, e.g. wind and solar. 11 Repurposing an EV battery as stationary storage is
estimated to extend its lifetime by 5-15 years, depending on its initial state of health 12
and the characteristics of the second-life application 13 (Jie Tong et al., 2013;
Neubauer, et al., 2015, Hossain et al., 2019). However, it should be noted that robust
data is scarce due to the relative newness of the application of this technology. 14
10
For example, Tesla provides an eight-year warranty on the battery and drive unit for all models, with minimum 70%
retention of battery capacity over the warranty period (Tesla, 2020). However, in a survey of Tesla Model 3 drivers,
Bloomberg found that charging capacity declined less than 1% for every 10 000 miles of driving, suggesting that the
actual lifetime could be much longer for many drivers (Randall et al., 2019).
11
Automotive batteries used in testing and development are another potential source of second-life storage. For
example, Audi is operating a 1.9 MWh energy storage project at the EUREF-Campus in Berlin using discarded Audi e-
tron test vehicle batteries (https://euref.de/en/euref-campus_en/).
12
State of health is a complex metric that reflects the ability of the battery to deliver the specified performance and
takes into account its capacity, internal resistance, voltage and self-discharge. However, most commonly it is
defined as the capacity at the time of the measurement as a proportion of the starting capacity (Prasad and Rahn,
2013).
13
The 15-year lifespan estimate represents a battery providing a network deferral service, meaning it is placed at a
node of interest on the electrical grid where peak demand is expected to exceed infrastructure capacity in coming
years. In this scenario the battery is assumed to operate at 50% depth of discharge per day for four months per year.
14
Researchers rely on modelling and simulated data. There are currently no published studies tracking the
performance of reused battery systems over a significant period or in real-world applications (Melin, 2019).
PAGE | 196
Challenges to second-life applications
Dynamic battery technology and cost environment

A key barrier to the second-life battery industry is their ability to compete with new
battery storage given the rapidly falling costs and improving performance of new
systems. Li-ion battery costs have decreased by over 85% since 2010, significantly
faster than suggested by peer-reviewed articles at the start of the decade (Nykvist
and Nilsson, 2015). Second-life batteries will start becoming available at scale around
2030, at which point new battery prices are likely to drop to USD 100/kWh or below.
Multi-steps refurbishing process

To be used as stationary storage, retired batteries must undergo several processes
that are costly and time intensive. The first step is an initial dismantling and testing
process to determine the remaining state of health of battery modules, as it will vary
for each retired system. The modules (or packs) must then be fully discharged,
reconfigured to meet the energy demands of their new application, equipped with a
battery management and cooling system, and re-packaged. It is estimated that the
cost of repurposing a used vehicle battery via the steps described could amount to
USD 25-49/kWh, or about half of the repurposed battery selling price (Neubauer,
2015). The cost can be reduced when facilities are operated at high throughput,
and/or information about the state of the battery modules is readily accessible to the
entity undertaking the repurposing. 15
Technical information transfer

Repurposing is complicated by the evolving nature of the battery industry, as the
capacity, chemistry and design of used cells change on a yearly basis. The chemistry
is often unlabelled and may be unknown to a third-party refurbisher, which makes
testing and reassembly difficult and more expensive (Engel et al., 2019; Jiao and
Evans, 2016). The unknown status of used batteries regarding their storage condition
and remaining capacity can also exacerbate the safety issues associated with
handling electrical and chemical devices (Hossain et al., 2019). Safety precautions
such as wearing personal protective equipment and conducting testing in a
controlled environment are necessary to mitigate the risk of fire and to contain
chemical fumes. Workplace safety has been identified as an area requiring further
research for both reuse and recycling (Melin, 2019).
15
This is also true for recycling.
PAGE | 197
Other challenges
Additional barriers to second-life include a lack of transparency regarding state of
health data from proprietary battery management systems, and transportation
challenges as EV batteries are classified as hazardous waste in many countries. This
leads to high transportation costs and difficulties navigating cross-border regulatory
differences (Shi et al., 2019).
Box 4.1 Second-life battery industry dynamics
Creating a successful business model around second-life batteries is a complex

challenge. Although the sustainability benefits may seem obvious, competing with new
battery systems is no simple task. New batteries are considered to be more reliable and
are generally produced by well established companies. Furthermore, most energy
storage developers require a ten-year warranty for battery systems, considering that
they may be paired with solar photovoltaic systems that are expected to last at least 20
years. Guaranteeing reliability for risk-averse customers essentially requires the backing
of an OEM or other large entity, which may indicate that second-life ventures will be
operated either by automakers directly or in partnership with them. Examples include
4R Energy Corporation, a repurposing venture launched by Nissan, or Renault’s
Advanced Battery Storage initiative. This approach also avoids concerns about
transferring liability, since the OEM retains ownership and responsibility for the battery.
Nonetheless, there are opportunities for entrepreneurship and innovation within the
second-life space. Most automakers lack the expertise to repurpose and develop
storage systems themselves, creating demand for specialised third parties. An example
is Relectrify, a company based in Melbourne, Australia, that specialises in BMS software
and inverters designed specifically for second-life batteries, rather than providing the
entire system.
Market prospects
From a high-level perspective, the market potential of repurposed battery storage
depends on the supply of retired batteries from EVs and demand for stationary
storage applications. In the Stated Policies Scenario, 100 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of
spent EV batteries are estimated to become available worldwide by 2030: this is
equivalent to the production volume of batteries of LDVs in 2019. In 2030, spent
batteries account for 6.5% of the projected battery demand that year in the Stated
Policies Scenario. The long lag-time between manufacture and end-of-life for EV
batteries, mean that in the Sustainable Development Scenario, the availability of
PAGE | 198
spent EV batteries is only marginally higher, at 120 GWh. However, due to its higher
demand for batteries, these would account for 4.3% of expected new demand in
2030 (Figure 4.3). In both scenarios, most spent batteries in 2030 will come from
LDVs.
Automotive battery capacity available for repurposing or recycling, 2019-30
140 14% 140 14%

EV batteries retired from automotive
Share of battery demand

120 12% 120 12%
applications (GWh/year)
100 10% 100 10%
80 8% 80 8%
60 6% 60 6%
40 4% 40 4%
20 2% 20 2%
0 0% 0 0%
2019 2025 2030 2019 2025 2030
Available for repurposing or recycling Share of new automotive battery demand
Notes: Batteries for LDVs are assumed to have the same lifetime as the vehicle, while for heavy-duty vehicles, an
average of
1.5 batteries per vehicle lifetime is assumed. Vehicle lifetimes vary according to region and are taken from the IEA
Mobility Model (IEA, 2020). LDVs have lifetimes of roughly 15 years, HDVs around 20 years and two-wheelers about
8 years. Vehicle lifetimes are assumed to follow a normal distribution around the average lifetime.
Spent battery availability in 2030 is projected to be comparable to current production

volumes.
Applications
Second-life batteries used in storage applications can provide various services for
electricity grid operators, electric utilities, and commercial or residential customers.
Today most pilot projects are used for peak shaving, frequency regulation and
optimising energy from variable renewable energy sources. Key examples of these
applications are described in Table 4.1. The largest economic benefit is provided
when battery systems provide stacked services; for example, a battery whose
primary purpose is to reduce demand charges for a commercial customer could also
be used, in parallel, to provide resource adequacy for a utility, and frequency
regulation and energy arbitrage for the system operator (Fitzgerald et al., 2015). This
way the economic value from providing various services accumulates and is
maximised.
PAGE | 199
A key challenge for battery storage (new or used) is how to capture each of these
value streams, which will depend on the structure of the local, national and regional
electricity market; the lack of a formal capacity market for resource adequacy could
reduce the value proposition for energy storage. In a sense, the market dynamics are
similar in dynamic charging or vehicle-to-grid (V2G) applications where batteries on
board EVs directly provide similar services to electricity systems. 16 A key distinction
is that second-life batteries are stationary and fully dedicated to providing electricity
to the grid when needed. The comparative advantage of V2G is that it avoids the
costly repurposing stage, but battery availability to provide the service is not
guaranteed, as automotive batteries primary purpose is to provide mobility services
(see Chapter 5).
Examples of storage projects using second-life EV batteries
Service Lead entities System description Size
University of California
Davis Micro Grid; System built from used Nissan Leaf
packs charges from a photovoltaic
Peak shaving RePurpose Energy, 287 kWh
array, then discharges on a constant
California Energy cycle from 16h00-20h00.
Commission; Nissan.
City of Kempten pilot;

Increased Excess energy produced by onsite
Energy Local Storage
consumption of solar is stored in repurposed Renault
Advanced System; 95 kWh
onsite Kangoo batteries, then discharged
Allgäuer Überlandwerk
renewables when demand is higher than supply.
GmbH (regional utility).
In collaboration with the local utility,

Frequency City of Lunen pilot; 1 920 used modules are assembled at
9.8 MWh
regulation Daimler Mobility House. a retired coal plant to supply balancing
power to the grid.
China Tower plans to replace lead-acid

30 kWh per
Telecom tower China Tower’; BYD; with used EV batteries to provide
tower; 54
Guoxuan High Tech; backup power for telecom towers
(backup) GWh
YinLong New Energy. (they operate close to 2 million across
potential
China).
Sources: Mobility House (2018), Jiao (2018), UC Davis RMI Winery Microgrid Project (n.d.), ELSA (n.d.).
16
Chapter 5 includes additional details as does the section Implications of electric mobility for power systems in
Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019a).
PAGE | 200
Another potential application is pairing second-life batteries with renewable energy

systems to increase energy access in remote areas (The Engineer, 2019; Nedjalkov,
2019). Key parameters that will determine the success of this application include the
total cost of the repurposed battery, import/export requirements for battery waste,
and the capacity of the local transportation system to handle and transport heavy
battery modules (Falk et al., 2020). Provided that it is technically and economically
feasible, using batteries for this purpose could provide significant environmental and
socioeconomic benefits; Casals et al. (2019) estimated that replacing electricity
produced by a diesel generator with a renewable second-life storage system would
reduce GHG emissions by 32%, on top of the local air quality and socioeconomic
benefits that would be realised.
Recycling lithium-ion batteries

The development of an effective recycling industry is key to the sustainability of Li-
ion batteries, and by extension electric vehicles. By recovering critical materials, a
robust recycling system would reduce demand for raw materials, reduce GHG
emissions and negative local impacts from mining and refining. Furthermore,
domestic recycling enables countries to reduce their reliance on imports for critical
materials.
So far, economic viability and market incentives for recycling have been limited
because of generally low raw material prices and small volumes of spent EV batteries
to date. However, as the growing market for EVs puts further pressure on primary
resources, raw material prices could increase, and/or prices may become more
volatile. Thus, materials recovered through recycling would become more
competitive. The economic and strategic value of essential inputs, such as lithium
and cobalt, may become the driving forces of recycling in the long term. One of the
three scientists that developed Li-ion batteries and recently won the Nobel Prize in
Chemistry, Akira Yoshino, emphasised the importance of recycling in meeting future
material demand (Suga, 2019).
Technologies for material recovery

Before undergoing a recycling process, battery packs must first be discharged, then
dismantled to at least the module level (Northvolt, 2019). From this point, the modules
are subjected to mechanical pre-treatment or a pyrometallurgical process, which
must be followed by a hydrometallurgical process to recover critical materials in
usable form.
PAGE | 201
 Mechanical pre-treatment primarily consists of shredding and sorting out plastic

fluff, metal-enriched liquid and metal solids. 17 After sorting, most copper,
aluminium and steel casings are recovered. The remaining material resembles a
black powder containing nickel, cobalt, lithium and manganese. This “black
mass” may undergo secondary treatment, which involves applying heat,
separating the cathode from the aluminium collector foil with a chemical solvent,
and then recovery of the cathode materials through hydrometallurgy (Northvolt,
2019).
 Pyrometallurgical recycling processes use high temperature smelting
(~1 500 degrees Celsius) to produce a concentrated alloy containing cobalt,
nickel and copper. These metals can then be extracted using a
hydrometallurgical process. The lithium and manganese end up in a slag that can
be directly used in the construction industry or processed further to recover
lithium (Dunn et al., 2015: Umicore, n.d.).
 Hydrometallurgical recycling methods are centred on leaching, removal of
impurities and separation. Leaching may be followed by solvent extraction
and/or chemical precipitation to recover lithium, nickel and cobalt.
Box 4.2 Direct cathode recycling
A nascent set of processes in battery recycling is known as direct cathode recycling,

which is currently under development by the ReCell Center at the Argonne National
Laboratory in the United States (ReCell Center, n.d.). Direct recycling resynthesizes
cathode materials through various chemical processes, yielding a cathode powder with
similar if not identical properties to the new cathode pristine material. The defining
feature is that cathode materials are recovered in a suitable condition to be used as
direct inputs in battery production without breaking them down into individual material
elements.
The benefit of recovering usable cathode material is that it preserves the embedded
energy and economic investment by avoiding the need to resynthesize cathode
materials (e.g. lithium, nickel, cobalt, or manganese) into a cathode compound. Once
synthesised, the cathode is nearly twice as valuable as the sum of its constituent metals
(Ciez and Whitacre, 2019). However, the recovered cathodes can only be input directly
into the manufacturing of the same battery type, a significant limitation given the rapidly
17
Pre-treatment is necessary to reduce hazards, remove cases and packaging materials, and to concentrate the
fraction of valuable materials (Zhang et al., 2018). A key challenge in pre-treatment is the release of potentially
hazardous and toxic gases during crushing due to high temperatures and force (Terborg, 2012). Wet crushing,
crushing under inert atmosphere, and/or at low temperatures have been investigated as methods to minimise
hazards.
PAGE | 202
developing battery chemistry landscape. However, a method to convert recycled

cathode materials to more current formulations (e.g. using NMC 111 as a feedstock to
produce NMC 622), while still in the laboratory research phase, is under development
(ReCell Advanced Battery Recycling Center, 2019).
Examples of current lithium-ion battery recycling facilities
Capacity
Company TRL level Country Technology
(tonnes)
Akkuser Oy Commercial Finland Mechanical 1 000
Mechanical, thermal treatment

Fortum Commercial Finland
and hydro
Umicore Commercial Belgium Pyro and Hydro 7 000
Lithion Commercial Canada Mechanical 2 500
Li-cycle Pilot Canada Mechanical 7 500
Retriev
Pilot United States Mechanical 4 500
Technologies
Mechanical and thermal

Accurec Commercial Germany 2 500
Treatment
Valdi Commercial France Mechanical and hydro 20 000 18
GEM High-Tech Commercial China Mechanical and hydro 10 000
25 000 -
Brunp Commercial China Mechanical and hydro
30 000
JX Nippon Mining
Commercial Japan Pyro and hydro
and Metals 5 000
NorthVolt Pilot Sweden Mechanical and hydro
Sources: Pinegar and Smith (2019); Eduljee et al. (2020).

18
Capacity includes all recycling at facility, not only capacity dedicated to lithium-ion batteries.
PAGE | 203
Environmental and economic trade-offs
Environmental
Like any industrial process, battery recycling is associated with its own environmental
impacts. Pyrometallurgy-based pathways emit GHGs due to the high temperatures
required and the need to treat toxic flue gases, both of which require significant
energy inputs. However, heat released by combusting battery components
(electrolyte, plastics and metals) during smelting can be recovered and used in
hydrometallurgic treatment (Umicore n.d.). Mechanical-based pathways use energy
for sorting, crushing and heat treatment, and must also control gas and particulate
matter emissions. Hydrometallurgical recycling has fewer operational impacts at the
facility but is associated with impacts from leaching chemicals through the supply
chain (Hendrickson et al., 2015). Like battery manufacturing, the GHG impact of
recycling can be reduced by operating facilities at high throughput and using low-
carbon sources of heat and electricity.
Estimates of recycling’s GHG benefits vary. Ciez and Whitacre (2019) found that only
direct cathode recycling could potentially provide a significant GHG benefit with
regards to primary material use as it spares the energy needed to break down all
cathode components individually. By contrast, Sanfélix et al. (2019) estimated that
shredding-based hydrometallurgic recycling would reduce the overall battery’s
impact by 11.3 gCO2-eq/km travelled (roughly one-quarter of the total impact),
assuming the recovered metals displace raw metal demand in a different industry
(i.e. open-loop). Such discrepancies are likely due to differing assumptions about
waste collection, recycling process efficiencies and the fate of recycled material
(open-loop versus closed-loop recycling), and distinct methods of allocating credit
for displaced raw material demand (Nordelöf et al., 2019). Given this ambiguity, a
policy driver for battery recycling may be the independence from global raw material
supply chains, rather than a significant reduction of the current battery GHG
footprint.
PAGE | 204
Opportunities to lower life-cycle GHG emissions of batteries
120%
Life-cycle GHG emissions:
100% Impact from classic material
recycling process
80%
Battery from primary materials
60% Battery decarbonisation strategies:
Renewable manufacturing
40%
20% High throughput manufacturing
0%
BEV battery from BEV battery from Lower carbon Direct cathode recycling
primary materials recycled materials battery (w/ and w/o
direct recycling)
Notes: The battery system contributes 10-30% of per km vehicle life-cycle GHG emissions (Figure 4.2), about 60% of
which is attributable to materials and the remainder to manufacturing. Renewable manufacturing assumes 100% use
of renewables-based electricity for cell production and assembly, resulting in a 29% reduction in overall emissions
(Kelly et al., 2019). High throughput manufacturing assumes a decrease in cell assembly energy inputs from
~70 kWh/kWh of cell throughput to 35 kWh/kWh (Peters, 2017). These values have been observed in state-of-the-art
or announced battery manufacturing facilities. Direct cathode recovery assumes full crediting of recovered
materials as displacement of primary production of cathode materials. Classic recycling represents additional
emissions associated with a battery produced from secondary materials processed with current industrial
pyrometallurgical or hydrometallurgical processes (Ciez and Whitacre, 2019).
Low-carbon energy and higher plant yield are key opportunities to reduce life-cycle GHG
emissions from EV batteries, though mainstream recycling technologies have a limited
impact.
Box 4.3 Non-GHG impact indicators
This report focusses on GHG emissions over the life-cycle of EV batteries. Nonetheless
other impacts are also important, such as ecotoxicity, acidification, and water and land
use. For Li-ion battery cathode materials, key non-GHG impacts include: sulfur oxide
(SOx) emissions; biodiversity loss from nickel refining; toxicity of cobalt mining for local
ecosystems; land and water use required for lithium recovery. Furthermore, local
economic benefits of raw material mining and refining must to be balanced with potential
adverse social effects on local communities. 19
19
Supply chain impacts are discussed more extensively in Global EV Outlook 2019 (IEA, 2019a), as are global efforts
to increase the supply chain transparency and reduce social and environmental impacts.
PAGE | 205
Mitigation measures exist. For example, SOx emissions are regulated in most
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Some
nickel and cobalt refining operations capture sulfur emissions, which significantly
decreases their adverse impacts (Kelly et al., 2019). The expected large-scale EV
transition ahead is a unique opportunity for governments and industry to anticipate the
risks associated with material supply chains and to develop adequate mitigation
strategies and practices. 20
Taking the non-GHG impacts into consideration reinforces the benefits of recycling
(Dunn et al., 2015). The energy required for recycling means a percentage of the GHGs
from material production are displaced by using recycled materials in battery production,
whereas it avoids negative local impacts.
Net benefits of recycling on ecotoxicity
100
0
Ecotoxicity (10 000 CTUe)
Pyrometallurgical
- 100 recycling
- 200
- 300
Hydrometallurgical
- 400 recycling
- 500
Burden of recycling Avoided impact from raw Net impact
materials

Notes: CTUe = comparative toxic units. Ecotoxicity is an indicator of the potential for chemicals emitted into the
environment to affect the surrounding ecosystem, as recommended by the UNEP Life Cycle Initiative (Rosenbaum et
al., 2008).
Source: Adapted from Richa et al. (2017).
Economic
In addition to GHG impacts, recycling pathways should be assessed based on the
quality and quantity of recovered materials, as well as economic cost. Commercially
available recycling processes mainly focus on recovering cobalt and nickel, in
addition to the more easily recycled elements (aluminium, copper and steel). They
20
Global efforts to promote transparent and sustainable supply chains of raw battery materials were discussed in
the Global EV Outlook 2019, section Supply and value chain sustainability of battery materials (IEA, 2019a).
PAGE | 206
may also recover lithium-containing materials, but further processing is needed to

get them to a usable form (Dunn et al. 2015). To truly close the loop and reuse the
recovered materials in new cathodes, the constituent material must be refined to a
sufficiently high quality then resynthesized into the cathode compound.
Alternatively, the recovered metals may be used to make different products with less
exigent input requirements. There is currently a knowledge gap regarding
remanufacturing techniques and the quality of resynthesized cathode materials as
the technology has yet to be commercialised (Melin, 2019).
Most studies assessing material recovery rates for recycling processes estimate
efficiency values between 80-100%; however, these are on a laboratory scale, and
represent a technical potential rather than economic reality (Melin, 2019). In
particular, lithium is rarely recovered in practice as it requires an extra processing
step and has a lower commodity price, around USD 8/kg, compared to USD 30/kg
for cobalt (LME, 2020a, LME 2020b).
Functional recycling is only profitable if the cost of recycling is lower than the market
value of the recovered materials, meaning that the economic viability varies
depending on cathode chemistry, with cobalt content being a key factor. Owing to
its high cost and media reports of human rights abuses at mining sites, battery
producers have made efforts to reduce cobalt content, creating a trend towards
chemistries like NMC 622, NCA and NMC 811 (Li and Lu, 2020). The result is that as
battery producers have successfully reduced the cost and impact of the cathode by
reducing cobalt content, they have also reduced the value of the battery at its end-
of-life. This represents a key trade-off; the cheaper materials are less harmful to local
environments and less energy intensive to produce, but their use in battery cells may
lower the likelihood that the batteries will be recycled (Harper et al., 2019; Dunn et
al., 2015).
Costs are expected to decrease in the future once a larger volume of batteries are
retired and facilities start operating at scale, and could be further reduced with
increased transparency about battery design (Gaines, 2014). Specific cost estimates
for industrial recycling are not publicly available. If commodity prices are relatively
low, policies such as extended producer responsibility or subsidies will likely be
required to motivate recycling in the short term. Second-life batteries can create
environmental and economic value, especially when paired with renewable energy
systems. However, repurposing the battery in a new location may also complicate
battery collection schemes and delay the recovery of critical materials. There is no
clear answer, as we still have much to learn about the costs, benefits and
performance of both pathways.
PAGE | 207
Policies for battery end-of-life

There is no global policy governing the reuse or recycling of Li-ion batteries at their
end-of-life. Policy mandating the end-of-life treatment can mitigate environmental,
social and safety issues, as well as provide certainty to the market to stabilise the
supply chain of critical materials. The most significant markets of Li-ion batteries will
be China, European Union and United States, as they are expected to concentrate
the bulk of the electric car stock in the coming years. These three regions have
different regulatory approaches to address battery end-of-life. The European Union
and China have placed responsibility on the OEM. The United States has not
implemented a federal policy, although several states have begun to act
independently (Saidani et al., 2019).
Global policies to manage waste batteries

Policy is challenged with enforcing the recycling and recovery of critical materials
that are currently uneconomical, and are likely to become more difficult given
continuing efforts to reduce the share of cobalt in cathode chemistries. Due to low
recycling requirements, a lack of enforcement and bans on landfilling without further
specifications of recycling or reuse, there have been low recycling and recovery rates
(Winslow, Laux and Townsend, 2018). Varieties of chemistries and designs, along with
the lack of labelling and transparent information on the battery use, have inhibited
the uptake of remanufacturing and recycling. This has resulted in increased end-of-
life costs and has not yet been adequately addressed by policy (Element Energy,
2019).
Recent developments highlight the increased focus and concern for end-of-life
impacts of batteries due to the uptake of EVs. At the international scale, the Global
Battery Alliance was founded in 2017 as a collaboration of 70 public and private
organisations with the goal to establish a sustainable battery value chain, from
sourcing, to repurposing and recycling (Box 4.5) (World Economic Forum, 2020).
Box 4.4 Guiding principles and a “battery passport” for a sustainable battery value
chain by 2030
The Global Battery Alliance’s report, “A Vision for a Sustainable Battery Value Chain in
2030” highlights the economic, environmental and energy access opportunities that
could emerge from a transition to a more sustainable battery value chain (GBA, 2019).
These include life-cycle cost reductions in battery supply chains (estimated at 23%),
PAGE | 208
which could result in 10 million jobs, and generate USD 150 billion in economic value
in 2030. Sustainable battery supply and end-of-life strategies further present
opportunities for substantial emission reductions in transport and power (estimated
to contribute “30% of the reductions needed in the transport and power sectors to
stay on track to achieving the 2 degree Celsius Paris Agreement target,” according to
the Global Battery Alliance (GBA) [2019]), all while playing a part in increasing
electricity access.
Realising these opportunities will require spurring rapid and sustainable growth in
battery value chains over the coming decade. To this end, the Global Battery Alliance
agreed in January 2020 on ten guiding principles to foster the creation of a
sustainable battery value chain by 2030. Forty-two organisations – including
automotive, mining, chemicals and energy companies with a combined revenue of
approximately a trillion dollars – have agreed on these principles across the three
impact areas.
Ten principles for a sustainable battery value chain by 2030
Source: Global Battery Alliance, 2019.
The Global Battery Alliance further proposes a “battery passport” as a means to

provide reliable, accessible and trusted data to businesses, governments and civil
society organisations across the value chain. The battery passport is a digital
representation of a battery based on a comprehensive definition of all environmental,
social, governance and life-cycle requirements that are relevant to improving the
sustainability of batteries. For efficiency and compliance reasons this definition of
requirements will be initially based on, but not limited to, already existing relevant
standards, laws and regulations. The battery passport will be enabled by a digital
platform and each battery passport will be a digital twin of its physical battery.
PAGE | 209
The battery passport will be delivered in three phases in consultation with

stakeholders across the value chain. The finalised Battery Passport 2.0 with full
functionality and covering the entire battery life-cycle, is targeted for development
by 2022.
In the United States, the California Assembly Bill 2832 requires the formation of a
Lithium-Ion Car Battery Recycling Advisory Group to advise the legislature on EV Li-
ion battery recycling policy (Public Resources Code, 2018). As of 2019, the mandate
in China requiring producer responsibility went into effect, holding producers
responsible for the recycling, as well as the reverse logistics involved in taking back
the Li-ion batteries (Pagliaro and Meneguzzo, 2019). The European Union is currently
reviewing the Battery Directive to adapt to the increase in EVs through identifying
improvements and assessing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence,
and added value of the policy (European Commission, 2018). These developments,
along with private sector innovation, will push forward battery end-of-life solutions.
European Union
The 2006 European Union Battery Directive has been the most influential piece of
legislation, restricting the disposal and mandating extended producer responsibility
(EPR), under which producers are responsible for the costs, collection and recycling
of batteries when they become waste (Green, 2017). EVs are also regulated under the
End-of-Life Vehicle Directive that requires a vehicle reuse and recovery rate of 95%,
a target that is consistently met. The intent of these policies is to force consideration
of the entire life-cycle in the design phase and to optimise resource recovery,
therefore reducing waste from the outset.
A revision of the EU Battery Directive (2006/66/EC) is expected in the second half of

2020. In 2019 the European Union reviewed the Battery Directive which was originally
developed for nickel-cadmium and lead-acid batteries. The Directive specifies that
batteries other than those mentioned have a recycling requirement of 50% by weight
(European Commission, 2006). Conclusions are:
 The Directive does not sufficiently incorporate recent technological

developments. New technology such as Li-ion batteries and evolving chemistries
need to be addressed in the end-of-life policy.
 The recycling target of 50% by weight does not adequately incentivise the
recycling of critical materials that are a minority of the weight; instead, the bulk
materials such as aluminium are recycled.
PAGE | 210
Extended producer responsibility obligations, especially as it pertains to the reuse of

batteries, are not clear. The second-life battery industry is hindered by an unclear
legal framework and absence of specific provisions on the transfer of responsibility
from producers to the remanufacturer. Currently, the producer is responsible for
battery disposal or recycling, regardless of the second or third lives. Provisions for
second-life need to be modified to enable and encourage Li-ion battery reuse.
Announced in 2019, the European Green Deal puts strong emphasis on establishing
a clean and circular economy, in addition to singling out sustainable and smart
mobility (European Commission, 2019). It further highlights the job-intensive nature
of the logistics and industrial facilities needed to realise domestic recycling.
China
China is the biggest player due to its global relevance in Li-ion battery production,
accounting for 50% of global EV battery manufacturing capacity and about half of
global production, and increasing EV demand within the country. In 2018, the
government adopted an interim framework called “The Interim Measures for the
Management of Recycling and Utilisation of Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles”.
This measure implements the EPR of Li-ion batteries; encourages standardisation of
the design and production and implements a traceability system.
Producers are responsible for labelling and the creation of recycling channels that
include battery collection (Xu, 2017). The recycling is typically outsourced which has
spurred the offtake of EV Li-ion battery recycling companies including Taisen
Recycling, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Brunp, Jinqiao Group, Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium
and GEM (Pagliaro and Meneguzzo, 2019).
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has released a guide for
collecting and storing Li-ion batteries, along with a draft mandate on the testing of
batteries that will be used in a second-life application (Avicenne Energy, 2019).
Japan
The government’s long-term strategy makes explicit references to a co-operative
approach across industrial stakeholders, for example, rules on Li-ion battery
recycling have been established so that vehicles can be properly handled when
dismantled (NEDO, 2018).
United States
The United States does not have a federal level Li-ion battery recycling regime.
Relevant regulatory frameworks mostly operate at the state level. The Federal
Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery Management Act (Battery Act) of 1996
PAGE | 211
does not cover Li-ion batteries but mandates states to manage the proper disposal
of batteries containing mercury, cadmium, lead or a determined hazardous material.
The law gives authority to the administration to regulate other battery types if they
are “toxic and may cause substantial harm to human health and the environment if
discarded into the solid waste stream for land disposal or incineration”. 21 Despite the
malleability of this section, Li-ion batteries are not considered hazardous at a federal
level under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which regulates hazardous
solid waste (Neuhaus, 2018).
California, New York State and Minnesota are the only states to have banned landfill
disposal of Li-ion batteries, although the bans are rarely enforced (Gaines, Richa and
Spangenberger, 2018). California has classified Li-ion batteries as hazardous waste
because of cobalt levels exceeding the metal toxicity levels and other health and
safety concerns including flammability (California EPA, 2019). Based on this
classification, and the acknowledgement of the importance of a circular economy,
the California Assembly Bill No. 2832 mandates the Secretary for Environmental
Protection to assemble a Lithium-Ion Car Battery Recycling Advisory Group to advise
policies for the end-of-life reuse and recycle of the Li-ion batteries. The goal of the
legislation is to develop policy that ensures as close to 100% of Li-ion batteries in the
state are reused or recycled in a safe and cost-efficient manner at the end-of-life
(Public Resources Code, 2018). This advisory group will deliver its proposals in 2022.
The US Department of Energy recently created the ReCell Center, a consortium of

labs dedicated to developing safe and cost effective battery recycling. Under ReCell,
national labs, academics and industry will collaborate to develop an innovative
approach towards a closed-loop battery industry. Unlike in the European Union and
China, extended producer responsibility is not currently at the centre of the US
strategy with the focus instead on the development of market-based solutions to
encourage sustainable end-of-life battery management (ANL, 2019).
India
India does not have a Li-ion battery end-of-life policy, although the government
announced in October 2019 that policy including extended producer responsibility
and a subsidy scheme for recyclers is under development. In 2011, the E-waste
Management and Handling Rules were updated to include Li-ion batteries and are
based on the EPR principles, but do not include recycling and safe disposal
requirements (JMK, 2019). The extended producer responsibility principles are
21
Section 103.d.
PAGE | 212
difficult to effectively implement with a flow of illegal e-waste into the country and
should be a cautionary tale for the future of EV end-of-life and affiliated policy
(Awasthi, 2017).
South America
Today, no country in South America has Li-ion battery end-of-life legislation, and the
overall battery recycling policy is sparse. Brazil was the first to regulate disposal and
treatment of batteries containing lead, cadmium and mercury. They implemented
extended producer responsibility with the requirement that consumers return the
batteries to the place of the purchase; this policy does not cover Li-ion batteries
(Espinosa, 2004).
Lithium-ion batteries end-of-life policies, 2019
Developed
Region Policy Year Description for Li-ion
batteries 22
Extended producer responsibility.

European
Battery Directive 2006 Requires 50% recycling of Li-ion No
Union
batteries by weight.
Interim Measures for the Extended producer responsibility.

Management of Recycling Implements labelling, a
China and Utilisation of Power 2018 traceability system and Yes
Batteries of New Energy encourages standardisation of the
Vehicles design and production.
Ministry of Industry and

Information Technology has
released a guide for collecting
Guide for Collecting and
China 2019 and storing Li-ion batteries, along Yes
Storing Li-ion batteries
with a draft mandate on the
testing of batteries that will be
used in second-life applications.
Establishment of a Lithium-Ion Car

Battery Recycling Advisory Group
California Assembly Bill No.
California 2018 to advise policies for the end-of- Yes
2832
life to achieve as close to 100% of
reuse and recycling as possible.
22
The column specifies whether the policy was developed specifically for Li-ion batteries based on the expansion of
EVs, or whether it was developed for another purpose and Li-ion batteries fall within the category.
PAGE | 213
Developed
Region Policy Year Description for Li-ion
batteries 22
New York State New York:

Rechargeable Battery Yes
Recycling Act.
Minnesota Rechargeable
2010; Extended producer responsibility. Minnesota:
United Batteries and Products
1991;
States Statute. Ban on the disposal in landfills. Yes
1991
New Jersey statutes: sale of
certain batteries dependent
New Jersey:
on battery management
plan No
Revision of mandated/recommended recycling rates

To establish a circular economy, key performance indicators (KPIs) for recycling
policy should focus on material recovered and recycled content used in the
manufacturing of batteries, not only the collection and recycling rates. The EU Battery
Directive recycling rate requirement of 50% by weight is an example of a KPI that
does not encourage high critical material recovery. Requiring collection without a
recycling requirement (as in the case of India) bears the risk of leading to the
stockpiling of Li-ion batteries without significant recycling. Recycling rates have a
wide range of definitions that complicate comparisons between regions, but they
typically represent the portion of materials recycled from the waste produced.
Recovery rates indicate the efficiency of the recycling process by calculating the rate
of materials recovered from the recycling process (Hotta et al., 2016).
Box 4.5 Lessons learned from recycling in parallel industries
The end-of-life management of electronics, automobile parts and lead-acid batteries

provide lessons and cautionary tales to the development of battery waste policy.
Electronic Waste
E-waste dumping from economically rich to poor countries is a continuing issue that
results in landfill disposal, artisanal picking and rarely in recycling. Both India and China
have a history of international e-waste imports, shifting the burden of waste away from
the waste-producing country. This has decreased since the ratification of the Basel
Convention, which prohibits such imports, but continues to be an issue due to illegal
smuggling (Awasthi, 2017). Informal recycling techniques include burning and
PAGE | 214
dissolution in strong acid, which is hazardous to the workers and surrounding

communities (Robinson, 2009).
Automobile parts
The automotive industry has been successful at achieving high recycling rates through
reusable parts such as catalytic converters, as well as shredding of the hulk for recovery
of aluminium, copper and zinc (Ferrão, 2006). Recycling of cars has been further
enabled through design for recycling (Coulter et al., 1998). The European Union, Korea,
Japan, China and Chinese Taipei have recycling legislation, while recycling in the United
States, Canada and Australia are based on market mechanisms and controlling the use
of substances through environmental protection regulations (Sakai et al., 2013). The
design of vehicles enables systematic dismantling and resale of parts through online
inventory databases aiding in the reuse and extended life of automobiles (Staudinger,
Keoleian and Flynn, 2001).
Lead-acid batteries
Lead-acid batteries have some of the highest recycling rates in the world due to
regulation covering the toxicity of lead, favourable economics and a simple chemistry
to recycle. The US recycling rate from 2014 to 2018 is reported at 99%, mainly driven by
the fee returns and reverse logistics network (Battery Council International, 2019). While
this rate is encouraging, lead-acid battery recycling has resulted in occupational and
surrounding community exposure to lead toxicity (World Health Organization, 2017).
Although lead-acid batteries and Li-ion batteries are not the same when it comes to
recycling, many of the lessons learned can be applied to the maturing Li-ion battery
recycling market.
Key lessons
Based on these observations, it will be particularly important for policy makers to ensure
that:
 Recycling and processing take place in jurisdictions with environmental controls.

 Li-ion batteries are traceable from the point of retirement to final recycling and/or
waste disposal.
 Li-ion battery waste is not exported to poor countries resulting in hazardous
disposal or recycling.
Design for recycling

Policy based on a technology’s full life-cycle impact can help avoid unintended
consequences, leakage and double counting (Kendall, Ambrose and Maroney, 2019).
For OEMs, considering life-cycle impacts informs the practice of EcoDesign and
PAGE | 215
Design for Recycling (DfR) (Luttropp and Lagerstedt, 2006). DfR is the inclusion of
end-of-life management to the product design phase through identifying key product
phases and characteristics that could enhance the viability of safe and economical
second-life battery application and recycling. Without anticipation of the end-of-life
in the design process, extra measures are required for disassembly that substantially
increase costs and decrease safety, creating an uneconomical process with high
barriers to entry (Kampker, 2016). These design interests can conflict with more
profit-maximising characteristics, and without regulation or an economic incentive,
trade-offs will likely lean towards benefiting the initial use (Hatcher, Ijomah and
Windmill, 2011). The European Union ecodesign preparatory study for batteries also
finds regulating the supply chain and design requirements is essential in creating a
sustainable battery industry (Fraunhofer and Viegand Maagøe, 2019).
Characteristics that benefit battery end-of-life include modularity, standardised

interfaces (housing) and design for disassembly (Kampker, 2016). The aim is to
enhance the ease and safety of disassembly, cleaning, testing and reassembly. Li-ion
batteries already excel in modularity – the cells are fit into a battery module, which
then fits into a battery pack. This modularity allows battery cells to be easily
identified, removed and replaced. Inefficiencies include difficulty in disassembly due
to the use of non-reversible adhesives such as gluing and welding. The use of
removable brackets, such as bolts, significantly decreases cost and enhances worker
safety (Reuters, 2011). Labelling materials and market standardisation simplify the
disassembly process and further decrease cost for both recycling and repurposing,
although the negative impacts of standardisation include the potential stifling of
battery development and innovation due to restrictions (Shaik, 2013). China’s 2017
interim measure mandates labelling and encourages standardisation to enhance the
efficiency of the end-of-life processes.
Policy makers must recognise that difficult trade-offs may exist between promoting
innovation in battery technologies and encouraging DfR. Extended producer
responsibility is expected to encourage DfR by holding the OEM responsible for
batteries throughout the life-cycle. The fact that established frameworks such as the
EU Battery Directive do not result in DfR may be attributable to specific challenges of
end-of-life management of Li-ion batteries (such as disassembly), for which existing
policy frameworks were not designed. As such, designing policy around the
characteristics of the product will encourage OEMs to balance battery performance
and ease of recycling.
PAGE | 216
Key messages and policy recommendations

Key messages
The rapid evolution of li-ion battery designs and chemistries for electromobility,
together with the diversity of EV batteries, make it difficult to design and scale up
recycling processes and technologies. Nevertheless, focusing on the battery supply
chain, including end-of-life, will become increasingly important over the coming
decade, as electromobility penetrates the mass market. A few salient points emerge:
 As power systems decarbonise, the relative impact of vehicle and battery

manufacturing on the overall EV life-cycle GHG emissions will grow. The carbon
intensity of the battery life-cycle can be reduced by using low-carbon energy
inputs to processes for production, recycling or recovery of raw materials and for
cell assembly, as well as by increasing the throughput of cell making processes.
 Before recycling, Li-ion batteries can be reused as stationary storage systems.
Whether they will be used in such applications will depend on the economics of
doing so and on policies for battery end-of-life. Extending their useful lifetime
reduces the life-cycle GHG emissions, environmental impact, and cost on a per
kWh basis. But such reuse also presents a trade-off with the benefits of recovering
and recycling valuable cathode materials that can re-enter the supply of batteries
for electric mobility.
 Battery recycling can reduce environmental, social and economic risks along
critical materials supply chains. It is estimated that current mainstream recycling
processes have a limited impact on an EV battery greenhouse gas footprint. This
footprint can be reduced via recycling facilities scale-up, energy efficiency
measures, low-carbon energy sources and innovative and simplified processes
that Design for Recycling can facilitate. Recycling can also ensure the domestic
availability of valuable and strategic materials.
 Many national or regional policies for waste management and recycling were put
in place before an EV market existed and are thus not adapted to deal with Li-ion
batteries.
 China has recently produced extensive new legislation and guidelines for the
end-of-life of Li-ion batteries and the recycling industry is growing in the country.
The European Union and California in the United States are reassessing their
legislation and more extensive policy is under development.
Policy recommendations
As the number of li-ion batteries produced, and the mass of their critical material
constituents in the rolling stock of EVs increases, a few lessons emerging from the
above analysis may help to frame the role of battery supply chains in ensuring that
electromobility realises its full sustainability potential:
PAGE | 217
 Develop metrics and traceability mechanisms that enable the quantification of

the carbon embedded in battery manufacturing and implement incentives or
regulations that favour low-carbon batteries on the market.
 In light of EV market expansion, assess and revise current battery waste
management mechanisms. Clear guidance on collection, recovery and recycling
rates targeting those materials classified as critical are of particular importance.
Lessons learned from recycling legislation targeting consumer electronics and
automotive parts should be taken into account to inform Li-ion battery policy
making and implementation. While regulations that explicitly mandate design for
recycling (DfR) may risk stifling innovation in Li-ion batteries, clear regulations on
extended producer responsibility can ensure that DfR is incorporated into
automotive design.
 Encourage second-life use of Li-ion batteries in viable technical and economic
cases, such as to support the deployment of renewables-based electricity
generation. Involve stakeholders in the battery value chain in the development of
openly accessible devices that are capable of tracking and reporting battery cell
state of health to facilitate reuse.
 As the economic value of recycling is uncertain, it will be important to reduce
these uncertainties while minimising the additional costs imposed by developing
and implementing waste management and recycling policies that safeguard the
environment and security of supply. Financial models (e.g. deposit, subsidy,
leasing) that incorporate the cost differential between recycled and primary
materials can motivate recycling.
 Incentivise or mandate the use of a transparent value chain accountability system
(such as the Battery Passport concept explored by the Global Battery Alliance)
and involve stakeholders in the battery value chain to ensure traceability of the
battery from the point of retirement to reuse and/or recycling. In particular, make
information about batteries accessible to recyclers and repurposers (including
labelling battery chemistry on battery packs and modules).
 Countries where high numbers of EVs are in circulation can implement supply
and disposal measures which lessen the environmental and social burdens
placed on materials- and battery- producing and recycling regions outside of
their jurisdictions..
PAGE | 218
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PAGE | 225
Global EV Outlook 2020 Integrating electric vehicles with power systems
Chapter 5.
Integrating electric vehicles with
power systems
Overview
Balancing electricity demand and supply will become an increasing challenge to
ensure the smooth integration of variable renewables-based energy generation and
the electrification of multiple end-use sectors. The uptake of electric vehicles in the
Sustainable Development Scenario, 1 in which EVs account for around 4% of global
annual electricity demand by 2030 (up from 0.3% today), bring implications and
opportunities for power systems (IEA, 2019). They could play a much more active role
than in the Stated Policies Scenario in which both EV electricity use, EV flexibility
potential and need for flexibility services (partly due to the rise of variable
renewables) are lower.
Over the coming decade, it will be increasingly important to manage EV charging

patterns and to encourage charging at periods of high renewables-based electricity
generation in power systems that have them in their power mix. The share of EV
charging in peak demand could rise to as high as 4-10% by 2030 in the main EV
markets (People’s Republic of China [hereafter, “China”], European Union and United
States), assuming unmanaged charging and the EV stock of the Sustainable
Development Scenario. A range of ready options exist that can be tapped to influence
EV charging to reduce its call at peak system demand, thereby diluting the need for
upgrades to generation, transmission and distribution assets (Manríquez, 2020). 2 In
particular, by 2030 at the global level, in the Sustainable Development Scenario:
1
In this chapter, all assumptions not related to electric vehicles, including on power systems and other demand
sectors, are taken from the IEA Sustainable Development Scenario presented in Energy Technology Perspectives
2020 (IEA, forthcoming).
2
Distribution system operator perspective on the impact of EV charging is very granular spatiotemporally and many
challenges are highly dependent on the local context, so analysing its impacts in a generic and global manner is a
difficult undertaking. Keeping this in mind, discussion and policy guidance for mitigating the impact of EVs on
distribution networks is presented at the end of this chapter.
PAGE | 226
 Promoting off-peak hour work-based charging during daytime could move on

average 50 gigawatts (GW) from grid congestion periods to work hours, which
could coincide with high electricity generation from solar photovoltaic (PV) or
wind.
 Rather than charging EVs in the evening peak demand period, shifting charging
to off-peak night hours through simple end-user programming and/or night-time
tariffs. The projections indicate this could displace another 110 GW with no
impact on the battery state of charge when the end-user needs the vehicle.
 In addition, about 70 GW of peak demand shaving from EVs could be realised
with dynamic controlled charging in response to price signals from utilities
(referred to as V1G). 3
In addition to being able to moderate their impact on peak electricity demand by
patterns of charging, EVs can facilitate the integration of variable renewables and
provide flexibility services to power systems. Services to electricity grids cover
various timescales, from the millisecond frequency control to long term where EVs
act as a variable in adjusting supply and demand, and influence capacity planning. 4
EVs could also play an active role in providing electricity to a grid during peak
periods. If just 5% of the total EV battery capacity was made available for vehicle-to-
grid applications, this could supply about 600 GW of peak demand across the main
EV markets 5 by 2030 with the EV deployment projected in the Sustainable
Development Scenario, and potentially address a lack of variable renewable
generation in peak periods.
For this potential to be realised, governments and relevant industry need to address
the underlying technical and acceptability challenges by:
 Instituting static electricity pricing by period of the day (peak/off-peak periods)

to incentivise off-peak charging, or dynamic electricity pricing for larger benefits,
including enhanced integration of variable renewables.
 Investing in dynamic controlled charging (V1G) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
infrastructure, alongside the adaptation of effective regulatory frameworks and
promotion of aggregators.
3
Broadly speaking pricing includes the effect of increased renewable energy penetration and the effect of reducing
transmission line congestion by mitigating peak demand under dynamic controlled charging, which manifests in the
form of system level operating cost reduction which in turn lowers locational marginal prices.
4
One of the most common flexibility services that current EV fleets participate in is ancillary services, or the control
of network frequency thanks to an ultra short-term modulation of the battery charging rate. The long-term value of
this market for EVs, however, is uncertain, as EV fleets expand and thus the potential revenue per vehicle is bound
to shrink. More extensive discussion on the possible flexibility markets EVs could contribute to and their policy and
regulatory implications, is provided in Global EV Outlook 2019, Chapter 5 (IEA, 2019).
5
600 GW represents the cumulative flexibility capacity available distributed across the United States (90 GW),
China (300 GW), India (40 GW) and the European Union (160 GW).
PAGE | 227
 Developing software that allows distributed loads to participate in the electricity

market, one- and bi-directional electricity flows (for V1G and V2G) and user-
friendly controls to promote end-user engagement.
Approaches should also aim to address the local impacts of EVs on electricity
distribution networks. EV charging may result in local congestion due to clustering
of EV charging, especially if they are numerous (e.g. passenger cars), concentrated
in a given area (e.g. fleet depots or multi-dwelling buildings), or require high power
charging (e.g. some light-commercial vehicles, trucks, buses).
EV charging
EV diversity in vehicle types, use patterns and charging options
The diversity of electric vehicle types (e.g. two/three-wheelers, passenger light-duty

vehicles [PLDVs], light-commercial vehicles [LCVs]) and their activity profiles (e.g.
commuting, urban logistics, road freight, public transit) are the main determinants of
EV charging patterns in 2030 (Figure 5.1).
Global average weekday load profiles in an evening charging case and a night
charging case by vehicle type in the Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030
300
Evening charging case:
GW
250
Two/three-wheelers
200
Trucks
150
Buses
100 LCVs
50 PLDVs
0 Night charging case

00:00 06:00 12:00 18:00 23:59
Note: PLDVs = passenger light-duty vehicles; LCVs = light-commercial vehicles. EV load curves are aggregated at the
global level. They are not accounting for varying time zones and might not be representative of regional patterns.
They are representative of an assumed typical weekday.
Electric cars make up the bulk of daily EV electricity demand; the evening charging peak
could be shifted using static off-peak tariffs.
In the Sustainable Development Scenario in 2030, PLDVs account for more than 60%
of the energy consumed by EVs at the global level. PLDVs are the largest contributor
PAGE | 228
of all EVs to the evening or night charging peaks. When people return home from
work is a key time for vehicle charging and accounts for 80-90% of PLDV charging in
the United States (Wood et. al., 2017; Funke, 2019) and Europe (Mathieu, 2018; Engel
et al., 2018) or potentially later during the night. 6 Most other modes, including buses,
LCVs and trucks, follow suit, although work-based charging opportunities or breaks
in commercial or bus activities help spread the EV load profile throughout the day.
The charging pattern of two/three-wheelers is spread more evenly over the day, due
to the multiplicity of functions they fulfil, the large number of small-size batteries they
represent and their ease of charging (Table 5.1).
Characteristics of driving and charging patterns by EV type in the main EV

markets
Primary use Variety of

Type Daily mission profile Charging patterns
case routes
Peak on road from 6:00- 80-90% at home in

9:00 and 16:00-19:00, the evening or late
Mostly commuting or
parked at home or at at night;
activities that precede
workplace 95% of the occasionally at
PLDVs or follow the Low
time; long distance trips workplace; more
commute; occasional
often during low distributed pattern
long distance trips.
electricity demand for motorway
periods. chargers.
Urban logistics, In the evening or at

Low trip distances,
construction, retail, night after end of
delivery, renovation, high number of trips. commercial
maintenance and other activities;
LCVs Traffic peaks earlier than High
services from occasionally before
PLDVs in the morning and
individuals under start of most
travel day ends later in the
contract or self- businesses or
evening than PLDVs.
employed. during daytime.
Fixed routes, pre- Mostly at depot for

determined schedules, overnight charging.
Public transportation,
Buses short (optimised) and Very low 10%-30% of
school buses.
known dwelling times charging in daytime
during the day. (e.g. at end of line).
6
Studies distinguish between charging immediately in the evening (upon return from work around 18:00) and
delayed evening/overnight charging (22:00 or later) using time-of-use rates segmented by time of day. The number
of time-of-day rates levels can vary from simply from just day/night or peak/off-peak time pricing to several (off-
peak, mid-peak, on-peak and super off-peak rates) depending on the utility, prevailing market rules and geography
(BNEF, 2017).
PAGE | 229
Primary use Variety of

Type Daily mission profile Charging patterns
case routes
Long trips, smaller

Local distribution, number of trips than other
Mostly at depot,
Trucks freight, long-haul modes. Traffic volume Medium
overnight.
goods delivery. peaks between 10:00-
13:00.
Commuting, last-mile
Micro Traffic volume spreads Spread relatively
connectivity, on
mobility, throughout the day due to evenly across the
demand ride sourcing, Very high
two/three- the multiplicity of vehicles day compared to
shared mobility
wheelers and functions. other modes.
services, food delivery.
Notes: These are the charging patterns reported in recent literature and are considered reasonable in a 2030
timeframe. They also represent the main determinants of the estimated 2030 charging load profiles shown in Figure
5.1.
Sources: Figenbaum (2018); Beach (2019); McGuckin and Fucci (2018); US DOT (2018); Tao et al. (2018); Engel
(2018); Pavlenko (2019); Groot et al. (2017); NHTS (2018); Wood et al. (2017); Funke (2019).
The type of day (i.e. weekday, weekend or holiday) has a strong influence on the EV
load curve. Weekday travel accounts for about 75% of annual private car mileage
(McGuckin and Fucci, 2018) and 75% of urban bus mileage (Miller, 2018). On the
contrary, discretionary activities such as shopping or recreational purposes shape
vehicle operations on weekends. The range of timing and routes of weekend EV
charging load curves generally results in smoother load curves but can also lead to
occasional, localised, high electricity consumption at peak travel periods (e.g. at the
beginning or towards the end of a holiday or following a major sporting or
entertainment event) (RTE, 2019). It might also be location-dependant, with
implications for local distribution networks, such as commercial neighbourhoods
with large parking facilities, malls or airports, and highway fast charging stations,
which may have higher demand during weekends.
Temperature and seasonality also influence the magnitude and timing of electricity
demand peaks due to their impact on occupancy rates, battery efficiency and
electricity prices. Widespread adoption of teleworking could also impact vehicle use
and charging patterns (Brand, 2019).
Time-of-use tariffs can significantly reduce peak demand

Co-ordinating charging windows among EVs that charge in the evening and night
periods can moderate risks of grid congestion. Currently a peak in electricity use
occurs between 19:00-20:00 in the winter in key EV markets such as France and
Germany (ENTSOE, 2020), and in the summer in the United States, southern China
PAGE | 230
and Australia (NHTS, 2017; Haustein and Nielsen, 2016), as people turn on heating
and cooling systems, and home appliances.
Looking forward, a variety of factors will contribute to increasing peak electricity

demand in the evening hours from sectors other than transportation, underscoring
the importance of shifting EV charging to off-peak hours (Figure 5.2). These include
connected devices, shifts to electric cooking and soaring space cooling demand,
which will contribute as much as 30% of the peak load in places with high air
conditioner ownership such as China (IEA, 2020).
In parallel, wind and solar deployment profiles suggest that variable renewable
electricity generation (from offshore and onshore wind, as well as utility and
buildings-integrated PV) covers only 10-20% of electricity needs from 18:00-22:00 by
2030 in the Sustainable Development Scenario, on an average weekday in these
markets. Of course, this is highly geographically dependent.
Required generation capacity to meet electricity demand from loads other than
EVs during days of peak demand in the Sustainable Development Scenario in
selected countries/regions, 2030
1 400
02:00 - 05:59
GW
1 200
06:00 - 09:59
1 000
10:00 - 13:59
800
600 14:00 - 16:59
400 18:00 - 21:59
200
22:00 - 01:59
0
Note: The hourly capacity required is averaged over the 30 days of highest electricity demand.
Shifting EV charging outside of the 18:00–22:00 period would help reduce the burden on
electric generation capacity needed to meet peak demand.
To assess the sensitivity of the main charging periods on generation capacity needs
for the energy system in 2030, we consider two cases: the evening charging case
and the night charging case (shown in Figure 5.1). The evening charging case
assumes that 80% of EV charging needs are met during the 18:00-00:00 period at a
global level. In the night charging case EV charging needs are met in the 23:00-05:00
period, which takes advantage of the fewer constraints usual to night-time
PAGE | 231
transportation patterns. It assumes the expected predominance of home charging in

2030 for PLDVs and two/three-wheelers, as well as public and private charging at
depots for LCVs, buses and trucks.
In the evening charging case, EVs add 60 GW to the peak demand in China, 50 GW
in both the United States and European Union, and 20 GW in India by 2030
(Figure 5.3). At the global level, this represents the equivalent of roughly half of
installed nuclear generation capacity in 2018. Around 80% of these capacity
additions globally will be required for PLDV charging, although more than 20 GW will
be needed for other modes in China (including buses, LCVs and two/three-wheelers).
The night charging case shows that around 60% of the peak load related to EVs could
be avoided by shifting the charging period by a few hours. This means that off-peak
tariffs have the potential to avoid the addition of 110 GW of flexible electricity
generation capacity. In the night charging case, in 2030 and with the EV fleet of the
Sustainable Development Scenario, the contribution of EVs to peak load falls from 4-
5% to under 2% in China and India, and from 8-12% to slightly over 4% in the United
States and the European Union.
The night charging case could be achieved by implementing effective regulatory and
market frameworks to adopt differentiated time-of-use electricity tariffs for peak and
off-peak periods (to be evaluated at the national or regional level based on
consumption data and revised as load profiles change). The attractiveness of the
incentive to encourage EV charging at night could be enhanced with larger price
differentials across pricing segments, or by refining the differentiations (e.g. with
more than two segments), and complemented by digital equipment to facilitate
vehicle charging start at the optimised times, in co-ordination with consumers
choice, to increase the effectiveness of the pricing measures. This case does not
include upgrades in electric vehicle supply equipment in comparison to the evening
charging case, nor controls to make EV charging responsive to real-time electricity
prices.
PAGE | 232
Contribution of EVs to hourly peak demand by country/region in the evening

and night charging cases in the Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030
70 14%
60 12% Two/three-wheelers
GW
50 10% Trucks
40 8%
Buses
30 6%
LCVs
20 4%
10 2% PLDVs
0 0% Share of peak load

Evening Night Evening Night Evening Night Evening Night (right axis)
charging charging charging charging charging charging charging charging
Shifting EV charging practices to avoid peak hours could reduce the contribution of EVs to
peak demand to less than 4%.
The start time of EV charging needs to be managed (e.g. through controls,

differentiated tariffs at the local level) to avoid sudden high local variations of
electricity demand when an off-peak tariff begins. As EV participation increases,
more dynamic pricing mechanisms (e.g. more rate tiers or full real-time electricity
pricing) could reduce this risk, alongside other benefits.
Advanced flexibility
Digitalisation brings additional opportunities to reduce the contribution of EVs to
peak demand through controlled charging (or V1G) or via the use of batteries as
distributed energy resources during peak periods (through strategic discharging
using vehicle-to-grid [V2G] infrastructure).
Controlled charging aids integrating variable renewables

generation and moderating new capacity needs
Unidirectional controlled charging (V1G) refers to the ability to control the time, rate
and duration of EV charging to optimise it in terms of electricity system needs. It
requires dispatch signals sent by a power system operator or an aggregator to the
EV’s on-board controls or to the electric vehicle supply equipment to manage the
charging demand.
Time-of-use based strategies (where end-users would programme the time of

charging in advance or automated programming mode maximising the share of
electricity used during off-peak hours) could displace an average of 60% of power
PAGE | 233
generation capacity needs for EV charging away from peak loads. Active control
strategies could help to further optimise vehicle charging. After applying an off-peak
programming strategy, the remaining load displacement potential is around 20 GW
in China, the European Union and United States, and about 8 GW in India (Figure 5.3).
Controlled charging can also help integrate variable renewables-based generation

since it may coincide with the times during which the vehicle is parked at the
workplace (during times when solar irradiance is the highest) or at different time
intervals during the night (making the most of variable wind electricity generation)
(IRENA, 2019).
V1G would benefit from opening markets to new stakeholders. Aggregators could
serve as an intermediary for market signals so that the existing EV communications
and control capability is enough to activate V1G without dedicated investments in
metering or other network element. However, boundaries around data ownership
need to be drawn and market signals need to be dynamic (Zhang et al. 2020). Once
in place, V1G offers a strategic opportunity for utilities to leverage the flexibility of
EVs, with a net positive economic impact for power system operations and end-users.
These include increased and more stable revenues from end-users participating in
market services, avoided or delayed costs for generation, transmission and
distribution capacity expansions and increased flexibility to help avoid curtailment of
variable renewables generation (Table 5.2) (Elementenergy, 2019a).
Relevant literature on the economic benefits of electric vehicle charging

flexibility
Strategy Reference Region Benefits
Citizens Utility
Static TOU rates Illinois, US USD 2.6 billion in 2030 (system)
Board, 2019
USD 0.2-1 billion (system) and

MJ Bradley & Five northeast
Static TOU rates USD 107-265 per PLDV owner in
Associates, 2017 states, US
2030
New York State,

Static TOU rates NYSERDA, 2019 USD 2.3 billion in 2030 (system)
US
Controlled charging USD 1.45-1.75 billion (grid-storage

LBNL, 2018 California, US
(V1G) system equivalent)
USD 70 per kW per year in peak

Controlled charging SilverSpring generation capacity cost and
United States
(V1G) Networks, 2015 USD 770 per kW per year in
transmission upgrade costs
PAGE | 234
Strategy Reference Region Benefits
British
USD 2 400 per EV over ten-year
Static TOU rates BCUC, 2019 Columbia,
period (system)
Canada
13% reduction in energy system

Static TOU rates and European
Kletke et al., 2018 costs, or EUR 0.7 million (USD 0.8
real-time pricing Union 28
million) in 2030
Static rates and

CNY 1 000 (USD 140) per EV in
unidirectional Jian et al., 2018 Shanghai
2030, and 4.5 Mt CO2 in 2030
charging (V1G)
Elementenergy, United GBP 180 million (USD 230 million) in

Static rates
2019b Kingdom 2030 (system)
Avoided procurement cost in 2030:

EUR 0.68-0.76 billion (USD 0.77-86
Controlled charging Ensslen et al., France and
billion) (or 46-51%) in France,
(V1G) 2018 Germany
EUR 0.44 billion (USD 0.50 billion)
(or 20%) in Germany
Notes: TOU = time-of-use; V1G = unidirectional controlled charging. System benefits include avoided costs from grid
upgrades (transmission, distribution and peak generation capacity expansion) and lower energy costs.
V2G can turn EVs into distributed energy resources

While the V1G strategies outlined can help to mitigate the impact of EVs on power
systems and significantly facilitate the integration of variable renewables in
electricity generation, deploying vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologies could
fundamentally change the dynamics by turning EVs from a consumer of electricity
into a power provider, and hence part of the solution to shave peak demand. Meeting
peak demand 7 in an electricity system typically requires 15-25% of generation
capacity beyond capacity required to meet electricity demand for 90% of the hours
of lowest demand. This accounts for about 600 GW of capacity to meet peak demand
across China, European Union, United States and India combined. The projected EV
energy storage capacity (i.e. the cumulative battery capacity of the EV fleet) in these
regions by 2030 in the Sustainable Development Scenario amounts to 16 000 GWh.
The question arises: could part of this stored energy be harnessed as mobile
distributed electricity generation units to help meet peak demand?
The fraction of this cumulative battery capacity that potentially could be used for
vehicle-to-grid applications is typically less than 3%. That is enough to make a strong
7
In this case, peak demand is the average capacity required to meet demand for 1% of the hours with highest
electricity demand throughout the year.
PAGE | 235
case to tap this capacity in lieu of traditional electricity storage options or installing
new generation capacity to meet peak demand (Figure 5.4).
To provide power to the grid, EVs need to be parked, connected to V2G infrastructure
and belong to an owner willing to actively participate. Our analysis excludes 50-60%
of commercial vehicles, 80-95% of PLDVs in developing economies (other than
China) and 65-85% of PLDVs in developed economies and China in 2030. In addition,
no more than 5% of two/three-wheelers and buses are assumed to participate. These
assumptions reflect the limited battery capacity for two/three-wheelers (which may
reduce the financial reward per vehicle) as well as the lack of dedicated charging
infrastructure for this mode, and the attractive revenue potential for commercial
vehicle fleet owners from the high number of vehicles available, as opposed to
personal electric car owners.
Other practical and technical challenges reduce V2G potential, although none
constitutes an impediment:
 In many power systems peak demand occurs in the evening hours (18:00-22:00).
In this period, only small shares of EV batteries are likely to be at their lowest state
of charge and in need of a recharge. In fact, the PLDV battery capacity is typically
four-five times larger than what is required for daily travel. In addition, part of the
charging could be transferred to the day (e.g. at the workplace). Therefore,
roughly 15% of PLDV battery capacity is used for transportation on average during
a weekday, and a higher share of capacity for other modes.
 As there is little consensus to date on how V2G affects vehicle lifetime, the
assumption here is that maximum 60-80% of the nominal rated battery capacity
could actually be drawn with no premature degradation of the battery. More
research and tests are needed to analyse the parameters influencing the lifetimes
of batteries, including the amount of energy being drawn and recharged
annually, the typical state of charge patterns over a day and the average rate of
discharge.
 Depending on the maximum discharge rate of EVs, not all of the usable capacity
would be discharged during the peak demand periods, as each of these periods
are typically limited in time to an hour or a couple of hours. The discharging
capacity of PLDVs and LCVs ranges from 3 kilowatts (kW) to 10 kW (for a total
capacity of 40 kWh to 80 kWh), and rates tend to be on the higher end of this
range for vehicles using home-based charging equipment. Overall, limitations
due to the rate of discharge render around a quarter of total battery capacity not
practical for V2G applications.
 Due to the conversion from direct to alternative current during discharging, 10%
(for 8 kW chargers or more) to 20% (for 3 kW chargers) of the energy being drawn
from the battery will be lost (Zecchino et al., 2019).
PAGE | 236
Available capacity for controlled charging (V1G) or vehicle-to-grid (V2G)

relative to global on-board EV battery capacity in the Sustainable Development
Scenario, 2030
Two/three-wheelers Capacity available for

flexibility services
Trucks
V2G efficiency losses
V1G
Buses
LCVs Capacity in vehicles not
PLDVs participating
Two/three-wheelers Capacity unexploited due

to the rate of discharge
Trucks
Capacity unexploited to
V2G
Buses preserve battery lifetime

LCVs Capacity used for
transportation
PLDVs
Capacity not in charge
0 2 000 4 000 6 000 8 000 10 000 12 000 during peak time
GWh
Notes: The available capacity for flexibility services represents the share of the total global capacity that reasonably
could be technically available for controlled charging and discharging. Constraints other than those singled-out in
this figure, such as policy readiness or consumer behaviour, might affect this potential as well. Given the
uncertainty of each influencing parameters, this figure should be read in light of the assumptions presented in the
text.
About 5% of total global EV battery capacity could be available for V2G, unlocking several
hundreds of gigawatt-hours to meet peak demand.
Accounting for all limitations, around 5% of the total electric vehicle battery capacity
would be available for use in V2G services. PLDVs hold the largest potential in
absolute terms due to the combination of their large fleet size and the opportunity to
deliver flexibility services from home. The share of total LCV battery capacity that
could realistically be used for V2G is about 10%, the highest across modes. The
participation rate might indeed be higher than for PLDVs due to the possibility of
aggregating battery capacity across a LCV fleet, in which the batteries could also be
larger. The share of electric bus capacity that could be used for V2G has potential to
grow, depending on bus operations and further enhancements in the rate of
discharge of V2G infrastructure.
EV battery capacity available for V2G is sufficient to meet substantial peak demand
Despite being a very small share of the total EV battery capacity by 2030, the total
technically available potential for V2G in the Sustainable Development Scenario for
EV deployment exceeds the additional generation capacity required to meet peak
demand in almost all major EV markets (Figure 5.5). Indeed this technical potential is
about 2 000 GW globally, an amount well in excess of the flexible generation capacity
needed during peak periods.
PAGE | 237
V2G potential and variable renewable capacity relative to total capacity

generation requirements in the Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030
1 600
GW
1 200
800
400
0
China India United States European China India United States European
Union Union
Peak capacity (average of the 10% of hours of Off-peak capacity (average of the 90% of hours of
highest electricity demand) lowest electricity demand)
Vehicle charging for V2G, stated participation assumptions V2G potential, stated participation assumptions
Variable renewables Other generation capacity
Notes: Analysis represented in this figure is based on the EV deployment rates in the Sustainable Development
Scenario and the assumptions of V2G capacity potential (Figure 5.4). If the technical V2G potential is untapped,
additional generation capacity and/or other flexibility measures would be needed to meet demand. This graph aims
to show the potential contribution of V2G to peak power capacity needs but does not show its actual contribution in
the Sustainable Development Scenario.
V2G services could unlock up to 600 GW of flexible capacity distributed across the main EV
markets in 2030 and moderate intermittency of variable renewables during peak demand.
Potentially, under stated EV participation assumptions to demand-side response

programmes, V2G services could unlock up to nearly 600 GW of flexible capacity,
split across China, European Union, United States and India. This flexible capacity
could be used for:
 Compensating variability in renewable-based generation during peak periods.

Indeed, while variable renewables account for 25-40% of the power being drawn
during off-peak times, 8 it could fall to 5-10% during peak time, which represents
a capacity loss of 400 GW across China, India, European Union and United States.
 Contributing to meet part of the additional capacity generation needs during
peak demand periods, as an extra 500 GW would typically be required to provide
electricity demand in such periods relative to off-peak times across the four
regions considered.
In 2030, across China, India, European Union and United States, V2G could help
avoid 380 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity generation needs during peak demand.
This is nearly equivalent to the total final electricity consumed in Italy in 2018. If V2G
from EVs met peak demand instead of fossil fuel-based generation, 330 million
tonnes of CO2 (Mt CO2) emissions would be avoided globally, equivalent to total
8
Estimates of peak time are averages on the 10% most congested hours for the grid on an annual basis. Estimates
referring to off-peak times are averages on the 90% least-congested hours for the grid on an annual basis.
PAGE | 238
energy-related CO2 emissions from Italy in 2018. To achieve these peak demand
savings, and accounting for energy losses, around 470 TWh of electricity would need
to be supplied to EV batteries at off-peak times, during which the carbon intensity of
the electricity will be lower.
Impact on electricity distribution systems

Widespread vehicle electrification will impact all the components of an electricity
system: generation, transmission and distribution networks. At a local level, EV
charging can significantly increase and change the timing and magnitude of
electricity loads on distribution networks and possibly impact cables, transformers
and other components, as well as power quality or reliability. This is particularly
critical for high power charging and in cases where many EVs are concentrated in
specific locations, like clustering of residential light-duty vehicle charging or depots
for commercial fleets.
Impacts of residential EV charging

Residential EV charging represents a significant increase in household electricity
consumption that can require upgrades of the household electrical system. Unless
properly managed, it may lead to demand that exceeds the maximum power that can
be supported by distribution systems, especially for legacy infrastructure and during
times of high electricity utilisation (e.g. in peak hours or on extreme days) (IEA, 2018).
For example, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate indicates that
an average increase in residential load of 5 kW would overload more than 30% of
distribution transformers in Norway (NVE, 2016). In Germany, its market share of more
than 10% EV may be leading to bottlenecks (Jochem, Märtz and Wang, 2018).
Clustering effects 9 in EV uptake can trigger local overloading of residential

distribution transformers where vehicles are typically charged, resulting in a need to
accelerate distribution system upgrades (Saarenpää et al. (2013); Liu et al. (2017). This
is exacerbated for higher power charging: level 2 charging (typically using a 220 to
240 Volt power source delivering maximum 19 kW) significantly increases the peak
load and stress on distribution transformers compared to level 1 charging (typically
using a 120 V power source delivering maximum 1.9 kW) (Muratori, 2018). Moreover,
EV charging can negatively impact power quality and require upgrades or re-design
of distribution networks (Khalid et al., 2019).
9
EV adopters can be consumers with similar socio-demographics, which tend to live in the same area. Moreover,
neighbour effects support the adoption of new technologies like EVs.
PAGE | 239
Controlled charging helps to minimise the impact of EV charging on residential

distribution networks. However, price signals are usually offered to consumers over
a large geographic region, often at the scale of an entire country, with the intent of
reshaping overall system load. At the local level, multiple consumers responding to
the same signal might cause “rebound peaks” that can overstress distribution
systems, calling for co-ordination among consumers connected to the same
distribution network (Muratori and Rizzoni, 2016). For example, direct EV charging
control from an intermediate aggregator allows for active network management for
shifting load between feeders in response to the effect of anticipated EV charging
demand relative to local network constraints (UKPN, 2019).
Impact of commercial EV charging

Commercial and publicly accessible EV charging can involve higher power levels.
This is particularly the case for direct current fast charging (DCFC), which today is
typically at 50 kW per plug. Though power levels are rapidly increasing and often
being installed with many charging plugs at a particular location which could lead to
possible megawatt level loads, roughly equivalent to a peak load in a large hotel.
Moreover, DCFC stations are often located in areas where electricity systems are less
developed (e.g. along highways). Much higher power levels (up to 1 megawatt or
more) might be needed for heavy truck charging, but those applications are still in
an early market phase and currently most electric heavy-duty vehicles (e.g. primarily
buses) are charged at depots overnight. Nevertheless, DCFC may also be directly
connected to a medium-voltage grid which avoids grid congestion issues on the low
voltage network on which slow chargers are usually connected.
The impacts of integrating fast EV charging with distribution systems are

geographically and case specific. Distribution grid impacts and upgrades could be
prevented via controlled, staggered charging systems based on the needs of
commercial fleet or via distributed energy storage or other flexibility measures. Even
in cases where upgrades would be required, they would not necessarily be cost
prohibitive, especially for widely utilised stations. Power systems can be cost
effectively upgraded to accommodate fast EV charging in many cases.
Conclusions and policy recommendations

Ready solutions exist to address the few technical challenges to accommodating EV
charging at the bulk power level (i.e. generation and transmission): a number of
technologies, regulatory frameworks and market incentives could be adopted to
avoid having a majority of EVs charging at times of peak electricity demand. Some
are easy to implement both technically and practically, with large scope for
PAGE | 240
displacing EV peak demand from peak demand times from other electricity uses,
such as strategic charging infrastructure siting (e.g. at the workplace to encourage
daytime charging).
Off-peak charging, unidirectional controlled charging (V1G) and vehicle-to-grid

(V2G) can unlock further flexibility potentials. These technologies can enable a
smoother integration of EVs with power systems, integration of variable renewables,
and, in the case of V2G, the use of EV battery capacity as an active, flexible,
distributed energy resource during peak periods.
A significant opportunity for achieving system cost reductions and unlocking the
potential from a fraction of the 16 000 GWh of cumulative EV battery capacity
deployed by 2030 in the Sustainable Development Scenario resides in V2G.
Therefore, the deployment of charging infrastructure, standards and regulatory
enablers for flexibility services (especially for PLDVs, LCVs and buses) needs to be
complemented by business models that compensate EV owners for providing
flexibility services. Further research is also required to investigate the effect of
charging and discharging cycles on battery lifetime, as the scientific community has
not reached consensus on this matter.
Among various available pricing mechanisms time-of-use rates are widely offered
by many utilities (Myers, 2019). 10 TOU pricing gives users incentive to charge EVs
during off-peak hours (e.g. 23:00–05:00) and disincentives to charge during peak
hours (e.g. 18:00–22:00). There can be multiple price tiers, based on the season,
month, type of day (e.g. weekend or weekday) and other factors influencing hourly
electricity demand. Today, the reduction in the off-peak rate relative to peak rates on
a per kWh basis range from 5-40% in the United States (BNEF, 2017), to 20-65% in the
United Kingdom (Zap Map, 2019), 23% in Beijing (Wan and Tong, 2019), and 35-80%
in France (IEA DSM, 2017), although these tiers may not be applied to all end-users.
The direct control of EV fleets by an aggregator, differentiated tariffs across various
sub grids or end-users alongside other flexibility tools provide ways to mitigate a new
peak induced by the tariffs.
Real-time pricing is a more advanced, dynamic pricing mechanism that adjusts

electricity price based on real-time balance of demand and generation. In many
countries it is applied at the wholesale market level and is not visible to individual
consumers. Hence, aggregators have a key role to play to make the link between
price signals and the control of EV charging without additional network investment.
10
There are multiple categories of time-varying rates, including time-of-use, subscription rates, off-peak credits,
real-time pricing, variable peak pricing, critical peak pricing and critical peak rebates.
PAGE | 241
The management of demand via aggregators may also help integrate EVs to the
systems in districts less sensitive (i.e. elastic) to price incentives. Real-time pricing
aims to balance electricity markets at the system level and generally does not include
distribution level considerations. Therefore, pricing mechanisms to manage
distribution level congestion and related business models should be envisaged by
policy makers and industry stakeholders. Taking distribution network effects into
account requires not only appropriate business models and price signals, but also
co-ordination among multiple customers with related communication and
distributed control challenges.
While the timing and speed of charging at publicly accessible stations (such as on-
street or highway chargers) is less flexible (e.g. due to end-user time constraints),
business models exist that provide incentives to reduce maximum peak power from
public installations. For example, demand charges (a fixed monthly payment
proportional to the peak power drawn over a month) are a fairly common market
instruments to limit the peak power demand of commercial and industrial customers.
This can also be done by modulating EV charging power 11 or leveraging behind-the-
meter stationary energy storage. Stationary battery storage can be cost effective at
mitigating costs associated with demand charges by up to 50% for EV direct current
fast charging stations, especially for low utilisation EV charging loads (Muratori et al.,
2019), or when coupled with onsite solar PV systems. Although PLDVs constitute
more than 70% of global EV electricity demand in 2030 in the Sustainable
Development Scenario, the contribution of other modes is likely to be significant in
certain regions. In particular, buses, LCVs and two/three-wheelers could account for
more than half of the contribution of EVs to the peak load in China. Hence, it is
essential to target PLDVs when adapting regulations on power markets, but it is also
important to analyse implications on generation, transmission and distribution of
other modes. Targeted policies could aim to exploit opportunities specific to fleet
vehicles such as LCVs, buses and trucks. For example, incentives for V2G might
particularly be effective and attractive for publicly or privately operated fleets, as
there is a higher proportion of fast charging infrastructure for these modes, and since
facilitated aggregation opportunities and the larger pooled battery capacity might
offer more attractive financial rewards. 12
11
To the extent EV drivers can afford any additional waiting time, which is unlikely on highway charging stations, for
example.
12
As many vehicle fleets already benefit from co-ordinated management on aspects other than charging.
PAGE | 242
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Global EV Outlook 2020 Annexes
Annexes
Annex A
Electric vehicle stock, sales, market share

and supply equipment deployment statistics
This annex presents the electric vehicle (EV) and electric vehicle supply equipment
time series data for the 44 countries covered in this report. 1 These include the Electric
Vehicles Initiative (EVI) 2 members, countries falling under the scope of activity of the
European Alternative Fuels Observatory and countries that have reported data to the
EVI.
The main data sources are submissions from EVI members, statistics and indicators
available from the European Alternative Fuels Observatory (EAFO, 2020) for
European countries that are not members of the EVI and data extracted from
commercial databases (EV-Volumes, 2020; Marklines, 2020; ACEA, 2020; OICA,
2020; CAAM, 2020).
In the following tables, the category “others” includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus 3, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.
1
Numbers reported in this annex can differ from the data published in the Global EV Outlook 2019 due to revisions
from databases or new analysis conducted.
2
The Electric Vehicles Initiative is a multi-government policy forum under the Clean Energy Ministerial dedicated to
accelerating the introduction and adoption of electric vehicles. It is co-ordinated by the International Energy
Agency. Thirteen countries currently participate in the EVI: Canada, China, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, India,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.
3
Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is
recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document
relates to the area under effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the
island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the island. Turkey
recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the
context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
PAGE | 246
Electric car stock
Table A.1 Electric car stock (battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles) by country,
2005-19 (thousands of vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.9 3.7 5.1 7.3 10.9 20.1
Brazil 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.1 3.0
Canada 0.5 2.5 5.7 10.7 17.7 29.3 45.9 90.1 141.1
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7
China 0.5 1.9 7.0 16.9 32.2 85.3 292.7 628.7 1207.7 2288.8 3349.1
Finland 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.6 3.3 7.2 15.5 29.4
France 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 3.0 9.3 18.9 31.5 54.5 84.0 118.8 165.5 226.8
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.9 5.3 12.2 24.9 48.1 72.7 109.6 177.1 258.8
India 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.3 2.8 2.9 3.4 4.4 4.8 7.0 9.1 11.2
Japan 1.1 3.5 16.1 40.6 69.5 101.7 126.4 151.2 205.3 255.1 294.0
Korea 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.7 6.0 11.0 25.7 60.6 92.4
Mexico 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 2.2 4.0 4.7
Netherlands 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.1 6.3 28.7 43.8 87.5 112.0 119.3 146.7 214.8
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.4 5.9 11.4 17.7
Norway 0.0 1.7 1.8 2.7 3.9 8.4 15.7 35.4 69.2 114.1 176.3 249.0 328.6
Portugal 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 2.5 4.3 8.7 17.0 29.7
South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2
Sweden 0.0 0.2 1.1 2.7 7.3 15.9 29.3 49.7 78.6 97.0
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 9.0 19.4
United Kingdom 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.9 5.6 9.3 24.1 48.5 86.4 133.7 184.0 259.2
United States 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.6 2.6 3.8 21.5 74.7 171.4 290.2 404.1 563.7 762.1 1123.4 1450.0
Others 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.62 0.67 0.98 3.40 7.75 13.24 26.49 51.01 83.37 142.26 213.49 318.96
Total 1.91 2.24 2.70 6.60 8.89 17.03 64.32 183.64 386.32 692.63 1 235.73 1 988.18 3 136.78 5 111.92 7 167.83
Table A.2 Battery electric car stock by country, 2005-19 (thousands of vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.05 0.22 0.41 0.78 1.54 2.21 3.42 5.22 11.51
Brazil 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.94
Canada 0.22 0.84 2.48 5.31 9.69 14.91 23.62 46.28 78.68
Chile 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.28 0.44
China 0.48 1.57 6.32 15.96 30.57 59.40 206.12 463.12 931.12 1746.99 2581.19
Finland 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.36 0.61 0.84 1.45 2.40 4.66
France 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.30 2.93 8.60 17.38 27.94 45.21 66.97 92.95 124.01 166.81
Germany 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.25 1.65 3.86 9.18 17.52 29.60 40.92 59.09 95.15 146.46
India 0.37 0.53 0.88 1.33 2.76 2.95 3.35 4.35 4.80 7.00 9.10 11.19
Japan 1.08 3.52 16.13 29.60 44.35 60.46 70.93 86.39 104.49 131.02 152.32
Korea 0.06 0.34 0.85 1.45 2.70 5.76 10.44 24.41 54.94 84.07
Mexico 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.50 0.73 0.93 1.20
Netherlands 0.01 0.15 0.27 1.12 1.91 4.16 6.83 9.37 13.11 21.12 44.98 107.54
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.49 1.65 4.58 8.94 13.28
Norway 0.01 1.69 1.78 2.68 3.91 8.03 15.01 33.10 58.88 83.10 116.13 162.27 222.62
Portugal 0.72 0.91 0.96 1.10 1.29 1.97 2.78 4.67 9.10 15.98
South Africa 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.56
Sweden 0.00 0.18 0.45 0.88 2.12 5.08 8.03 12.39 19.54 30.34
Thailand 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.19 0.89
United Kingdom 0.22 0.55 1.00 1.22 1.40 1.65 2.87 4.57 7.25 14.06 20.95 31.46 45.01 60.75 99.26
United States 1.12 1.12 1.12 2.58 2.58 3.77 13.52 28.17 75.86 139.28 210.33 297.06 401.55 640.37 882.28
Others 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.62 0.67 0.96 3.31 6.66 11.39 22.74 38.37 53.41 76.78 111.07 178.67
Total 1.91 2.24 2.70 6.61 8.89 16.65 54.88 113.71 224.84 397.76 719.86 1182.32 1931.40 3274.34 4790.87
PAGE | 247
Table A.3 Plug-in hybrid electric car stock by country, 2005-19 (thousands of vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.08 0.18 1.13 2.15 2.85 3.92 5.72 8.60
Brazil 0.03 0.08 0.36 0.71 2.08
Canada 0.30 1.70 3.18 5.42 8.00 14.36 22.33 43.82 62.38
Chile 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.21
China 0.34 0.66 0.92 1.65 25.92 86.58 165.58 276.58 541.80 767.90
Finland 0.13 0.30 0.57 0.97 2.44 5.72 13.10 24.70
France 0.10 0.70 1.53 3.60 9.28 17.03 25.82 41.47 60.02
Germany 0.24 1.40 3.02 7.41 18.52 31.81 50.47 81.92 112.35
India 0.01
Japan 0.02 10.98 25.11 41.28 55.47 64.86 100.86 124.08 141.68
Korea 0.25 0.58 1.25 5.62 8.35
Mexico 0.01 0.53 1.50 3.08 3.53
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.02 4.35 24.51 36.94 78.16 98.90 98.22 101.75 107.27
New Zealand 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.42 0.76 1.30 2.48 4.42
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.66 2.34 10.28 30.95 60.18 86.73 106.02
Portugal 0.04 0.05 0.49 1.52 4.02 7.92 13.72
South Africa 0.00 0.13 0.40 0.53 0.61 0.68
Sweden 0.66 1.78 5.21 10.83 21.29 37.28 59.09 66.61
Thailand 0.06 0.32 0.32 0.32 8.84 18.48
United Kingdom 0.02 0.03 1.02 2.09 10.02 27.55 54.96 88.66 123.28 159.91
United States 7.98 46.57 95.58 150.94 193.77 266.65 360.51 483.00 567.74
Others 0.02 0.09 1.09 1.85 3.76 12.64 29.95 65.49 102.42 140.28
Total 0.39 9.43 69.93 161.48 294.87 515.87 805.86 1205.37 1837.57 2376.95
New electric car sales
Table A.4 New electric car sales (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (thousands of
vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.05 0.25 0.29 1.32 1.77 1.37 2.28 3.61 9.16
Brazil 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.32 0.42 1.91
Canada 0.52 2.02 3.12 5.07 6.96 11.58 16.68 44.15 50.96
Chile 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.18 0.30
China 0.48 1.43 5.07 9.90 15.34 73.17 207.38 336.00 579.00 1081.09 1060.30
Finland 0.03 0.18 0.22 0.44 0.69 1.43 3.06 5.71 7.88
France 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.19 2.73 6.26 9.62 12.64 22.95 29.51 37.60 46.70 61.35
Germany 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.14 1.65 3.37 6.93 12.74 23.19 24.61 54.56 67.50 108.63
India 0.37 0.16 0.35 0.45 1.43 0.19 0.41 1.00 0.45 2.00 1.20 2.10 2.09
Japan 1.08 2.44 12.62 24.44 28.88 32.29 24.65 24.69 54.10 49.75 38.90
Korea 0.06 0.27 0.51 0.60 1.26 3.30 5.02 14.64 34.90 31.86
Mexico 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.78 1.20 1.79 0.72
Netherlands 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.88 5.12 22.42 15.09 43.77 22.67 10.32 27.97 67.52
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.32 0.49 1.50 3.47 5.54 6.88
Norway 0.01 1.68 0.08 0.91 1.23 4.46 8.21 21.45 33.73 44.89 62.31 72.69 79.64
Portugal 0.72 0.19 0.05 0.18 0.20 1.12 1.84 4.39 8.34 12.68
South Africa 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.38 0.20 0.15 0.23
Sweden 0.00 0.18 0.93 1.55 4.67 8.59 13.42 20.35 28.96 40.70
Thailand 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.16 8.63 10.32
United Kingdom 0.22 0.32 0.45 0.22 0.18 0.28 1.22 2.69 3.75 14.74 29.34 37.91 47.25 50.36 75.14
United States 1.12 1.47 1.19 17.73 53.24 96.70 118.78 113.87 159.62 198.35 361.32 326.64
Others 0.53 0.08 0.05 0.30 2.42 4.33 5.69 13.43 23.85 31.20 60.93 78.30 107.86
Total 1.89 0.34 0.84 3.69 2.28 8.24 48.24 118.16 204.16 328.80 546.59 750.64 1172.51 1980.14 2101.68
PAGE | 248
Table A.5 New battery electric car sales by country, 2005-19 (thousands of vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.05 0.17 0.19 0.37 0.76 0.67 1.21 1.80 6.28
Brazil 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.54
Canada 0.22 0.62 1.64 2.83 4.38 5.22 8.71 22.66 32.40
Chile 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.16
China 0.48 1.09 4.75 9.64 14.61 48.91 146.72 257.00 468.00 815.87 834.2
Finland 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.50 0.78 1.90
France 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.19 2.63 5.66 8.78 10.57 17.27 21.76 25.98 31.06 42.80
Germany 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.14 1.40 2.21 5.31 8.35 12.08 11.32 25.07 36.06 63.28
India 0.37 0.16 0.35 0.45 1.43 0.19 0.41 1.00 0.45 2.00 1.20 2.10 2.08
Japan 1.08 2.44 12.61 13.47 14.76 16.11 10.47 15.30 18.10 26.53 21.30
Korea 0.06 0.27 0.51 0.60 1.26 3.05 4.69 13.97 30.53 29.13
Mexico 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.27
Netherlands 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.86 0.79 2.25 2.66 2.54 4.05 9.19 24.43 62.00
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.30 1.16 2.94 4.36 5.28
Norway 0.01 1.68 0.08 0.91 1.23 4.12 7.88 19.77 25.78 24.22 33.08 46.14 60.35
Portugal 0.72 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.67 0.81 1.89 4.43 6.88
South Africa 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.16
Sweden 0.00 0.18 0.27 0.43 1.24 2.96 2.95 4.36 7.15 15.80
Thailand 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.69
United Kingdom 0.22 0.32 0.45 0.22 0.18 0.26 1.21 1.71 2.68 6.81 10.10 10.51 13.55 15.74 38.51
United States 1.12 1.47 1.19 9.75 14.65 47.69 63.42 71.04 86.73 104.49 238.82 241.91
Others 0.53 0.08 0.05 0.28 2.35 3.33 4.93 11.52 14.99 15.63 23.77 34.38 67.52
Total 1.89 0.34 0.84 3.69 2.28 7.86 39.19 57.64 112.58 195.43 324.1 464.75 756.49 1 343.4 1 533.42
Table A.6 New plug-in hybrid electric car sales by country, 2005-19 (thousands of
vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.08 0.10 0.95 1.01 0.70 1.08 1.80 2.88
Brazil 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.29 0.35 1.37
Canada 0.30 1.40 1.48 2.24 2.58 6.36 7.97 21.49 18.56
Chile 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.14
China 0.34 0.32 0.26 0.73 24.27 60.66 79.00 111.00 265.22 226.11
Finland 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.44 1.21 2.55 4.93 5.98
France 0.10 0.60 0.83 2.07 5.68 7.75 11.61 15.65 18.55
Germany 0.24 1.16 1.62 4.39 11.11 13.29 29.50 31.44 45.35
India 0.01
Japan 0.02 10.97 14.12 16.18 14.19 9.39 36.00 23.22 17.60
Korea 0.25 0.33 0.67 4.37 2.73
Mexico 0.01 0.52 0.97 1.58 0.45
Netherlands 0.00 0.02 4.33 20.16 12.43 41.23 18.62 1.13 3.54 5.52
New Zealand 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.20 0.34 0.54 1.19 1.60
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.32 1.68 7.95 20.67 29.23 26.55 19.30
Portugal 0.04 0.01 0.44 1.03 2.50 3.91 5.80
South Africa 0.00 0.12 0.28 0.13 0.08 0.07
Sweden 0.66 1.12 3.43 5.63 10.46 15.99 21.81 24.91
Thailand 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.14 8.52 9.63
United Kingdom 0.02 0.01 0.99 1.07 7.93 19.24 27.40 33.70 34.62 36.63
United States 7.98 38.59 49.01 55.36 42.83 72.89 93.86 122.49 84.73
Others 0.02 0.07 1.00 0.76 1.91 8.86 15.56 37.15 43.92 40.34
Total 0.38 9.05 60.52 91.58 133.37 222.49 285.89 416.02 636.74 568.26
PAGE | 249
Market share of electric cars
Table A.7 Market share of electric cars (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (%)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 1.1%
Brazil 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Canada 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 2.6% 3.0%
Chile 0.1%
China 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 1.0% 1.4% 2.3% 4.6% 4.9%
Finland 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 1.2% 2.5% 4.7% 6.9%
France 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 1.2% 1.4% 1.8% 2.2% 2.8%
Germany 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 1.6% 2.0% 3.0%
India 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Japan 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9%
Korea 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.9% 2.3% 2.1%
Mexico 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Netherlands 0.2% 1.0% 5.4% 3.9% 9.7% 5.9% 2.5% 6.3% 15.1%
New Zealand 0.1% 0.2% 0.6% 1.2% 2.1% 2.8%
Norway 1.5% 0.1% 0.7% 0.9% 3.2% 5.7% 14.5% 21.1% 26.6% 33.6% 49.1% 55.9%
Portugal 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.6% 0.8% 1.9% 3.7% 5.7%
South Africa 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
Sweden 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 1.4% 2.4% 3.4% 5.2% 7.0% 11.4%
Thailand 0.9% 1.7%
United Kingdom 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.6% 1.1% 1.4% 1.8% 1.9% 2.8%
United States 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 2.3% 2.1%
Others 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.5%
Table A.8 Market share of battery electric cars by country, 2005-19 (%)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.8%
Brazil 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Canada 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 1.3% 1.9%
Chile 0.1%
China 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 1.0% 1.9% 3.4% 3.9%
Finland 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 1.7%
France 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.5% 1.9%
Germany 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.7% 1.1% 1.8%
India 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Japan 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.5%
Korea 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.9% 2.0% 1.9%
Mexico 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Netherlands 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 0.6% 1.1% 2.2% 5.5% 13.9%
New Zealand 0.1% 0.5% 1.0% 1.7% 2.2%
Norway 1.5% 0.1% 0.7% 0.9% 3.0% 5.4% 13.3% 16.1% 14.4% 17.8% 31.2% 42.4%
Portugal 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.8% 1.9% 3.1%
South Africa 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Sweden 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 1.1% 1.7% 4.4%
Thailand 0.0% 0.1%
United Kingdom 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 1.5%
United States 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 1.5% 1.5%
Others 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 1.0%
PAGE | 250
Table A.9 Market share of plug-in hybrid electric cars by country, 2005-19 (%)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4%
Brazil 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Canada 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 1.3% 1.1%
Chile 0.1%
China 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 1.1% 1.1%
Finland 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 1.0% 2.1% 4.1% 5.2%
France 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8%
Germany 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.9% 0.9% 1.3%
India 0.0%
Japan 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4%
Korea 0.3% 0.2%
Mexico 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Netherlands 0.9% 4.8% 3.2% 9.2% 4.9% 0.3% 0.8% 1.2%
New Zealand 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7%
Norway 0.2% 0.2% 1.1% 5.0% 12.3% 15.8% 17.9% 13.6%
Portugal 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 1.1% 1.7% 2.6%
South Africa 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Sweden 0.2% 0.4% 1.1% 1.6% 2.7% 4.1% 5.3% 7.0%
Thailand 0.9% 1.6%
United Kingdom 0.3% 0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4%
United States 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 0.5%
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Electric light-commercial vehicles (LCV)
Table A.10 Electric LCV stock (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (thousands of vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia
Brazil
Canada 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Chile 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.15
China 0.40 0.70 1.20 1.80 2.50 14.98 53.38 120.60 204.80 247.46
Finland 0.21 0.26 0.35
France 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.73 0.73 1.52 3.20 6.84 11.96 16.44 21.37 26.93 33.24 41.34 49.34
Germany 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.50 1.45 2.05 2.76 3.78 6.22 11.40 16.70 21.89
India
Japan 0.85 3.34 5.40 6.45 7.27 7.60 7.92 8.20 8.72
Korea 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Mexico
Netherlands 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.49 0.67 1.26 1.46 1.63 2.21 3.20 4.50
New Zealand 0.78
Norway 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.56 1.27 1.97 2.92 4.81 6.72
Portugal 0.08 0.33 0.54
South Africa
Sweden 0.01 0.28 0.50 0.78 1.11 1.15 1.23 3.71 3.95
Thailand 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
United Kingdom 0.10 0.25 0.46 0.66 0.84 1.08 1.35 1.78 2.10 2.92 4.70 5.83 6.45 7.63 10.95
United States 0.01 0.19 1.01 2.08 3.56 5.21 5.21 5.21 5.21 5.21
Others 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.61 0.61 0.83 1.01 1.90 2.79 4.01 5.78 7.97 9.94 13.29 17.37
Total 0.63 0.79 1.00 2.06 2.28 4.15 7.96 18.31 29.36 41.26 66.99 117.97 201.51 309.59 377.97
PAGE | 251
Table A.11 New electric LCV sales (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (thousands of
vehicles)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia
Brazil
Canada 0.01
Chile 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.13
China 0.27 0.12 0.33 0.52 0.55 0.72 12.46 38.40 67.22 84.21 42.65
Finland 1.00 1.67 0.06
France 0.26 0.80 1.68 3.65 5.11 4.49 4.93 5.56 6.31 8.10 8.00
Germany 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.28 0.95 0.60 0.72 1.02 2.45 4.47 5.29 5.19
India
Japan 0.85 2.49 2.07 1.05 0.83 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.52
Korea 0.02 0.01
Mexico
Netherlands 0.04 0.07 0.34 0.18 0.59 0.20 0.17 0.51 1.01 1.30
New Zealand 0.07
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.71 0.70 0.94 1.89 1.91
Portugal 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.25 0.21
South Africa
Sweden 0.01 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.33 0.05 0.20 2.47 1.38
Thailand 0.00
United Kingdom 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.82 1.04 1.13 0.99 1.18 3.32
United States 0.01 0.18 0.82 1.08 1.48 1.65
Others 0.26 0.35 0.22 0.20 1.22 1.11 1.65 2.45 3.20 3.52 3.90 5.10
Total 0.63 0.16 0.20 0.59 0.44 1.59 3.88 10.72 11.24 12.38 25.73 52.07 85.80 110.26 69.71
Table A.12 Market share of electric LCVs (BEV and PHEV) by country, 2005-19 (%)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia
Brazil
Canada 0.0%
Chile 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
China 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 2.1% 3.6% 3.5% 2.2%
Finland 6.4% 10.8% 0.4%
France 0.2% 0.4% 1.0% 1.4% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.8% 1.7%
Germany 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.9% 1.6% 1.9% 1.8%
India
Japan 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Korea 0.0% 0.0%
Mexico
Netherlands 0.1% 0.1% 0.6% 0.3% 1.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.7% 1.3% 1.7%
New Zealand 0.1%
Norway 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 2.7% 5.3% 5.1%
Portugal 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5%
South Africa
Sweden 0.0% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.1% 0.4% 4.4% 2.4%
Thailand 0.0%
United Kingdom 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.9%
United States 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.9%
PAGE | 252
Title of the Report Executive summary
Electric vehicle supply equipment stock
Table A.13 Publicly accessible chargers (slow and fast) by country, 2005-19 (number of
chargers)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 476 727 1 930
Brazil 459 913
Canada 724 1 179 2 321 3 424 4 035 5 841 7 940 8 951
Chile 2 10 13 18 27 27 42 70 192
China 30 000 58 758 141 254 213 903 275 000 515 908
Finland 267 383 836 847 847 2 275 3 451
France 809 1 802 1 814 10 445 19 618 21 184 24 132 29 701
Germany 1 518 2 447 2 722 5 058 23 901 24 014 25 724 37 063
India 25 247 352 1 827
Japan 312 801 1 381 1 794 11 511 22 091 24 321 28 762 29 971 30 394
Korea 62 177 292 388 786 1 566 4 014 7 093 9 187
Mexico 1 502 2 706 2 706
Netherlands 400 400 2 803 5 791 11 981 18 008 32 524 33 282 36 671 50 153
New Zealand 104 293 369
Norway 2 800 3 123 3 746 4 607 5 293 5 513 7 541 9 209 12 371 9 436
Portugal 1 078 1 127 1 175 1 195 1 260 1 295 1 605 1 786 3 091
South Africa 124 239 246
Sweden 505 2 000 2 130 2 502 3 474 6 912 7 000 9 440
Thailand 96 96 817
United Kingdom 1 503 2 840 5 691 7 706 9 240 13 260 15 241 17 424 27 094
United States 333 339 373 482 3 903 11 695 14 990 20 115 31 674 38 168 43 037 54 500 77 358
Others 1 306 4 145 5 980 8 207 14 199 20 812 24 029 30 854 41 891
Total 333 339 373 3 994 12 178 31 480 48 028 105 784 183 821 332 668 434 471 537 682 862 118
Table A.14 Publicly accessible slow chargers by country, 2005-19 (number of chargers)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 436 666 1 679
Brazil 454 908
Canada 722 1 172 2 266 3 361 3 900 5 168 7 100 7 976
Chile 1 6 8 13 22 22 35 61 154
China 21 000 46 657 86 365 130 508 163 667 301 238
Finland 250 357 706 706 706 2 050 3 113
France 800 1 700 1 700 9 865 18 620 20 153 22 736 27 661
Germany 1 500 2 400 2 606 4 587 22 213 22 213 23 112 34 203
India 222 327 1 736
Japan 8 640 16 120 17 260 21 507 22 287 22 536
Korea 29 59 115 151 449 1 075 3 081 5 394 6 514
Mexico 1 486 2 677 2 677
Netherlands 400 400 2 782 5 770 11 860 17 786 32 120 32 875 35 852 49 324
New Zealand 89 131
Norway 2 800 3 105 3 688 4 511 5 185 5 185 7 040 8 292 11 145 5 466
Portugal 1 072 1 120 1 158 1 178 1 238 1 254 1 452 1 602 2 732
Sweden 500 1 000 1 065 1 251 1 737 3 456 6 050 8 279
Thailand 88 88 748
United Kingdom 1 503 2 804 5 435 7 182 8 174 11 497 13 062 14 732 22 359
United States 333 339 373 482 3 903 11 695 14 990 20 115 28 150 35 089 39 601 50 258 64 265
Others 1 299 3 940 5 419 7 533 12 518 18 617 21 164 25 906 34 504
Total 333 339 373 3 682 11 312 29 616 43 928 90 851 156 069 257 515 325 592 396 410 598 317
PAGE | 253
Table A.15 Publicly accessible fast chargers by country, 2005-19 (number of chargers)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 40 61 251
Brazil 5 5
Canada 2 7 55 63 135 673 840 975
Chile 1 4 5 5 5 5 7 9 38
China 9 000 12 101 54 889 83 395 111 333 214 670
Finland 17 26 130 141 141 225 338
France 9 102 114 580 998 1 031 1 396 2 040
Germany 18 47 116 471 1 688 1 801 2 612 2 860
India 25 25 25 91
Japan 312 801 1 381 1 794 2 871 5 971 7 061 7 255 7 684 7 858
Korea 33 118 177 237 337 491 933 1 699 2 673
Mexico 16 29 29
Netherlands 21 21 121 222 404 407 819 829
New Zealand 104 204 238
Norway 18 58 96 108 328 501 917 1 226 3 970
Portugal 6 7 17 17 22 41 153 184 359
Sweden 5 1 000 1 065 1 251 1 737 3 456 950 1 161
Thailand 8 8 69
United Kingdom 36 256 524 1 066 1 763 2 179 2 692 4 735
United States 3 524 3 079 3 436 4 242 13 093
Others 7 205 561 674 1 681 2 195 2 865 4 948 7 387
Total 312 866 1 864 4 100 14 933 27 752 75 153 108 879 141 272 263 802
References: Annex A
ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers Association) (2020), www.acea.be/, accessed
10 March 2020.
CAAM (China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (2020), www.caam.org.cn, accessed
10 March 2020.
EAFO (European Alternative Fuels Observatory) (2020), https://www.eafo.eu/, accessed
3 March 2020.
EV-Volumes (2020), EV Data Center, http://www.ev-volumes.com/datacenter/, accessed
10 March 2020.
Marklines (2020), https://www.marklines.com/portal_top_en.html, accessed 10 March 2020.
OICA (Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs Automobiles) (2020), www.oica.net/,
accessed 10 March 2020.
PAGE | 254
Annex B.1.
Transport regulations and targets supporting

passenger light-duty electric vehicle
deployment
Country/ Year
Key policy measures and targets* Source
region announced
Asia
Proposal for tightened fuel-economy

Government of China
standard: 4 L/100 km by 2025 2019
(2019)
(New European Driving Cycle).
Target of 5 million EV by 2020 (including Government of China
China 2012
4.6 million PLDV). (2012)
(EV30@30
New electric vehicle (NEV)b mandate: 12%
signatory)a Government of China
NEV credit sales in passenger cars by 2016
(2018)
2020.c
By 2025, around 25% NEV (PHEV, BEV and
2019 MIIT (2019)
FCEV) sales.
CO2 emissions standard of 113 gCO2/km in
India 2015 Ministry of Power (2015)
2022.
(EV30@30
Target of 30% EV sales by 2030 across all Government of India
signatory) 2018
modes. (2018)
Market Research
Indonesia 2 200 EVs in PLDV by 2025. 2019
Indonesia (2019)
Fuel-economy target of 19.7% reduction in
specific fuel consumption by 2020 2011 and ECCJ (2011), Government
relative to 2009 and an additional 23.8% 2019 of Japan (2019a)
between 2020 and 2030.
2030 corporate average fuel economy
standards: 2019 Nippon (2019)
25.4 km/L (+ 32% compared to 2016).
Japan CO2 from transport to be reduced by 25%
2018 METI (2018)
(EV30@30 by 2030 (compared to 2015).
signatory) Long-term goal (by the end of 2050) to
Government of Japan
reduce 80% of GHG emissions per vehicle 2018
(2018)
produced by Japanese automakers.
Target of 20-30% BEV and PHEV sales in
Government of Japan
PLDV by 2030, in addition to 30-40% HEV 2018
(2018)
and 3% FCEV.
By 2050, 100% sales of HEV, PHEV, BEV Government of Japan
2018
and FCEV. (2018)
PAGE | 255
Country/ Year
region announced
Targets of 430 000 BEV and 67 000 FCEV Government of Korea
2019
on the road by 2022. (2019)
By 2030, 33% of new cars to be BEV or
Korea 2019 Electrive (2019)
FCEV.
Yonhap News Agency
Target of 80 000 FCEV taxis in 2040. 2019
(2019)
Target of 100 000 electric PLDV stock in Government of Malaysia
Malaysia 2017
2030. (2017)
By 2030, 30% of PLDV sales to be EV.
Pakistan 2019 ICCT (2020)
By 2040, 90% of PLDV sales to be EV.
Replace all state-owned vehicles with BEV
2017 Straits Times (2017)
or HEV by 2025.
Sri Lanka Private owners have until 2040 to replace
their fossil fuel burning vehicles (including 2017 Straits Times (2017)
two/three-wheelers).
Thailand Target of 1.2 million EVs by 2036. 2016 Harman (2018)
Europed
From 2020:
- EU average vehicle fleet emission target
for new cars is 95 gCO2/km.
2019 European Union (2019a)
- Allocation of a specific emissions target
for each manufacturer (EU wide) vehicle
fleet.
Emission standards for gCO2/km of LDV,
requiring 15% reduction between 2021
2019 European Union (2019b)
and 2025 and 37.5% reduction for cars
European and 31% for vans between 2021 and 2030.
Union
Revision of the Clean Vehicles Directive
on public procurement, including European Parliament
2019
minimum requirements of 17.6% in 2025 (2019)
and 38.5% in 2030.
Target of 90% reduction in transport GHG European Green Deal
2019
emissions by 2050. (2019)
Based on CO2 targets, projection of
European Green Deal
13 million zero- and low-emission vehicles 2019
(2019)
by 2025.
Target of 1 million electrified vehicles Government of Denmark
2018
PLDV stock by 2030. (2018a)
Denmark 2030: No sales of new diesel and petrol
Government of Denmark
cars. 2018
(2018b)
2035: Every new car to be ZEV.
Finland
Target of 250 000 EV (BEV, PHEV, FCEV) Government of Finland
(EV30@30 2017
stock in PLDV by 2030. (2017)
signatory)
PAGE | 256
Country/ Year
region announced
Multiply by five the sales of BEV in 2022 Government of France
2018
relative to 2017. (2018)
Reach a fleet of 1 million BEV and PHEV in Government of France
2018
2022. (2018)
by 2023:
- for PLDV: target of 500 000 PHEV and
Government of France
660 000 BEV (including FCEV) 2020
France (2020)
- for LCV: target of 170 000 BEV, PHEV,
(EV30@30
FCEV.
signatory)
by 2028:
- for PLDV: target of 1.8 million PHEV and
Government of France
3 million BEV (including FCEV) 2020
(2020)
- for LCV: target of 500 000 BEV, PHEV,
FCEV.
2040: No sales of new cars and vans Government of France
2019
using fossil fuels. (2019)
Target of 7-10 million EVs (BEV and FCEV) Climate Action
2019
by 2030. Programme 2030 (2019)
Germany
All passenger vehicle sales to be ZEV by
2015 ZEV Alliance (2015)
2050.
2030: Ban on new registrations of Government of Iceland
Iceland 2018
diesel and gasoline cars. (2018)
Government of Ireland
Target of 500 000 EVs in PLDV by 2030. 2018
(2018)
Ireland
Draft Scheme of New
2030: ban on new ICE car registrations. 2020
Climate Law (2020)
Expected stock of 6 million “electrically Integrated National
Italy powered vehicles” in 2030 (including 2019 Energy and Climate Plan
4 million BEV). (2019)
Target to reduce national GHG emissions National Climate
2019
by 49% by 2030 relative to 1990 levels. Agreement (2019a)
Netherland Target of 15 000 FCEVs by 2025 and National Climate

2019
s 300 000 by 2030. Agreement (2019b)
(EV30@30 National Climate
Target of 50% of taxis to be ZEVs by 2025. 2019
signatory) Agreement (2019a)
Target of 100% ZEV sales in PLDVs by
2017 Kabinetsformatie (2017)
2030.
Norway
Government of Norway
(EV30@30 2025: 100% ZEV sales in PLDVs and LCVs. 2016
(2016)
signatory)
Government of Poland
Poland 1 million EVs in PLDVs by 2025. 2016
(2016)
Target of one-third of car stock to be ZEV
2019 Mobi Summit (2019)
by 2030.
Portugal
2040: Proposed ICE ban. 2018 Publico (2018)
PAGE | 257
Country/ Year
region announced
Target of 17% EV stock in PLDVs by 2030. 2017 Novak (2017)

Slovenia
2030: Targets of 100% EV sales in PLDV. 2017 Novak (2017)
Targets of 5 million EVs in LDVs, buses Government of Spain

2020
and two/three-wheelers in 2030. (2020)
Spain
Government of Spain
2040: No sales of PLDV emitting CO2. 2020
(2020)
Targets of:
- Reduce CO2 emissions from transport by Government of Sweden
Sweden 2017
70% in 2030 relative 2010 (2017)
(EV30@30
- Net zero GHG emissions by 2045.
signatory)
No new petrol or diesel cars to be sold Government of Sweden
2019
after 2030. (2019)
Target of 50-70% EV sales in PLDVs by Government of the United
2018
2030. Kingdom (2018)
United
2035: Ban on sales of new ICE cars. HEVs
Kingdom
and PHEVs could also be banned –
(EV30@30 Government of the United
ongoing consultation. 2020
signatory) Kingdom (2020)
(Previously planned for 2040, but
currently being brought forward.)
North America
Annual reduction of CO2 emissions per

kilometre of 5% from 2017 to 2025 for Government of Canada
2012
PLDVs and 3.5% from 2017 to 2021 and 5% (2012)
from 2022 to 2025 for light trucks.
Targets of:
Government of Canada
- 825 000 ZEVs on the road by 2025
Canada 2019 (2019)
- 2.7 million ZEVs on the road by 2030
(EV30@30
- 14 million ZEVs on the road by 2040.
signatory)
Targets of:
- 10% ZEV sales in PLDVs from 2025 Government of Canada
2019
- 30% ZEV sales in PLDVs from 2030 (2019)
- 100% ZEV sales in PLDVs from 2040.
2040: 100% of sales to be ZEVs (BEV, Government of Canada
2019
PHEV or FCEV). (2019)
Targets of 3.3 million EVs in eleven states
2014 ZEV Program (2014)
combined by 2025.e
ZEVf mandate in ten statesg: 22% ZEV
United credit sales in passenger cars and light- 2016 ZEV Program (2014)
States duty trucks by 2025.h
(selected California: 1.5 million ZEVs and 15% of
State of California (2018),
states) effective sales by 2025, and 5 million ZEVs 2016
CARB (2016)
by 2030.
All passenger vehicle sales to be ZEVs in
2015
ten states.i ZEV Alliance (2015)
PAGE | 258
Country/ Year
region announced
Other countries
Targets of:
- 100% of public authorities fleet to be
EVs by 2030 Ministry of Industry, Trade
2019
Cabo - 35% of PLDV sales to be EV by 2025 and Energy (2019)
Verde - 70% of PLDV sales to be EV by 2030
- 100% of PLDV sales to be EV by 2035.
Integral replacement of all ICE vehicles Ministry of Industry, Trade
2019
with EVs by 2050. and Energy (2019)
Targets of:
- 10% of vehicle sales to be ZEVs by 2025.
Colombia - 600 000 EVs by 2030. 2019 BC News (2019)
- 100% of government fleet to be EVs by
2030.
Target of 37 000 EV stock in PLDVs by Government of Costa Rica
2017
2023. (2017)
- 25% of vehicle fleet to be electric by
2035.
Costa Rica
- 70% of taxis to be ZEV by 2035, 100% by Government of Costa Rica
2019
2050. (2019)
- 100% sales of new LDVs to be ZEVs by
2050 (60% of the fleet of LDVs).
Tenfold increase in EVs from 2017 by Government of Chile
2018
2022. (2018)
Chile
Government of Chile
40% EV in PLDV by 2050. 2018
(2018)
Targets of:
Government of Israel
- 177 000 EV stock in PLDVs by 2025. 2018
(2018)
Israel 1 - 1.4 million EV stock in PLDVs by 2030.
2030: All new vehicles to be powered by Government of Israel
2018
electricity or CNG. (2018)
Intended Nationally
South
Target of 20% HEVs by 2030. 2012 Determined Contribution
Africa
(INDC) (2012)
New Target of 64 000 EV stock in PLDVs by Government of New
2016
Zealand 2021. Zealand (2016)
Notes: L/100 km = litres per 100 kilometres; LDV = light-duty vehicles; PLDV = passenger light-duty vehicles; BEV =
battery electric vehicles; LCV = light- commercial vehicles; HEV = hybrid electric vehicles; FCEV = fuel cell electric
vehicles; ZEV = zero-emissions vehicle; ICE = internal combustion engine; gCO2/km = grammes of carbon dioxide per
kilometre; CNG = compressed natural gas.
1
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use
of such data by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is without prejudice to the status of
the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
PAGE | 259
(a) Countries that joined the EV30@30 Campaign set a collective aspirational goal to reach 30% sales share for EVs
across PLDV, LCV, buses and trucks modes by 2030 (CEM-EVI, 2018).
(b) New energy vehicle includes BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs.
(c) The 12% NEV credit sales mandate includes multipliers depending on vehicle technology and range. Current NEV
models are eligible for multipliers between 1 and 5.
(d) Several European countries also apply vehicle registration and circulation taxes differentiated on the basis of
environmental performance (not included in this table).
(e) California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont
and Washington.
(f) Zero-emission vehicle includes BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs.
(g) This includes the eight states listed in note 6 plus Maine and New Jersey, which joined in 2016.
(h) The 22% sales mandate includes multipliers depending on vehicle technology and range. Most current models
are eligible for credits between 0.5 and 3.
(i) As part of ZEV Alliance members: California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington.
PAGE | 260
Annex B.2.
Transport regulations and targets supporting

heavy-duty electric vehicle deployment
Country/ Year
Key policy measures and targets Source
region announced
Asia
Proposal to improve fuel economy of

China trucks by 15% by 2021 relative to 2015 2016 ICCT (2016)
(EV30@30 levels.
signatory)a Target of 5 million EVs by 2020 (including Government of China
2015
0.4 million buses and 0.2 million trucks). (2012)
Target of 100% BEV share of purchases in

India 2017 SIAM (2017)
urban buses by 2030.
(EV30@30
signatory) FAME Phase IIb includes a purchase Government of India
2019
incentive scheme for electric buses. (2019)
Japan Fuel economy to be improved 13.4% by
Government of Japan
(EV30@30 2025 for heavy trucks and of 14.3% for 2019
(2019b)
signatory) buses relative to 2015 levels.
Target of:
Yonhap News Agency
Korea - 40 000 FCEV buses by 2040 2019
(2019)
- 30 000 FCEV trucks by 2040.
Government of Malaysia
Malaysia 2 000 EVs in bus stock by 2030. 2018
(2017)
Buses: 50% of new sales to be EV by 2030

and 90% by 2040.
Pakistan 2019 ICCT (2020)
Heavy-duty trucks: 30% of new sales to be
EV by 2030 and 90% by 2040.
Europe
CO2 emission standards for new heavy-

duty trucks to be reduced by 15% by 2025 Regulation (EU)
2019
and by 30% by 2030 (reference period: 2019/1242
2019/2020).
European
Revision of the Clean Vehicles Directive
Union
including minimum requirements for European Union (2019c);
urban buses (24-45% in 2025 and from 2019 European Parliament
33% to 65% in 2030), and for trucks (6- (2019)
10% in 2025 and 7% to 15% in 2030).
PAGE | 261
Country/ Year
region announced
By 2023, target of 200 hydrogen heavy- Automobile Propre

France 2020
duty vehicles (buses, MFT and HFT). (2020)
(EV30@30
signatory) By 2028, target of 800 to 2 200 hydrogen Automobile Propre
2020
heavy-duty vehicles (buses, MFT and HFT). (2020)
Incentives for buses to switch to electric, Climate Action

Germany 2019
hydrogen and biogas technologies. Programme 2030 (2019)
Daily News Hungary

Hungary All public transport to be electric by 2029. 2019
(2019)
Ban on sales of diesel-only buses in 2019. Government of Ireland

Ireland 2018
Target of 70% electric bus stock by 2035. (2018)
30% reduction of CO2 emissions across National Climate

2019
the transport sector by 2030. Agreement (2019b)
Netherlands Target of 100% EV public bus share of
Government of the
(EV30@30 purchases by 2025 and 100% EV public 2016
Netherlands (2017)
signatory) bus stock by 2030.
In 2025, target of 3 000 FCEV heavy-duty National Climate
2019
vehicles on the road. Agreement (2019b)
Target of 100% EV share of purchases of

Norway urban buses by 2025.
Government of Norway
(EV30@30 Target of 75% EV share of purchases of 2016
(2016)
signatory) long distance buses and 50% in trucks by
2030.
Targets of 5 million EV in LDV, buses and Government of Spain
Spain 2020
two/ three-wheelers in 2030. (2020)
Targets of:
Sweden
- Reduction of CO2 emissions from Government of Sweden
(EV30@30 2017
transport by 70% in 2030 relative to 2010. (2017)
signatory)
- Net zero GHG emissions by 2045.
North
America
Tighter GHG emissions standards for
Canada
heavy-duty trucks from 2021 and Government of Canada
(EV30@30 2018
increasing stringency up to 25% relative to (2018)
signatory)
2017 in 2027.
Fuel economy of heavy-duty trucks should
United
be reduced by 30% by 2027 relative to 2011 NHTSA (2011)
States
2010 levels.
Other regions
50% of EVs (new acquisitions) for urban

transportation by 2025. Ministry of Industry,
Cabo Verde 2019
25% of heavy-duty trucks sales to be Trade and Energy (2019)
electric in 2030, 100% in 2035.
PAGE | 262
Country/ Year
region announced
100% electric public transport sector by Electromovility Platform

Chile 2018
2040. (2020)
100% new public transport to be ZEV by

Colombia 2019 BC News (2019)
2035
Targets of:
- 70% of buses to be zero emissions by
Government of Costa
Costa Rica 2035. 2019
Rica (2019)
- 100% of buses to be zero emissions by
2050.
Notes: MFT = medium freight truck; HFT = heavy-freight truck. The Clean Vehicles Directive sets a minimum sale
share for each European Union member state, while the range in this table is the EU range. Half of the target has to
be fulfilled by zero-emissions buses (BEV and FCEV).
(a) Countries that joined the EV30@30 Campaign set a collective aspirational goal to reach 30% sales share for EV
across PLDV, LCV, buses and trucks by 2030 (CEM-EVI, 2018).
(b) Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles.
PAGE | 263
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https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/South%20Africa%20F
irst/South%20Africa.pdf
Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (2019), Government of Italy,
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Kabinetsformatie, The Netherlands (2017), Coalition Agreement 'Confidence in the Future',
www.kabinetsformatie2017.nl/documenten/verslagen/2017/10/10/coalition-
agreement-confidencein-the-future
Market Research Indonesia (2019), Indonesia to boost EV adoption,
www.marketresearchindonesia.com/indonesia-to-boost-ev-adoption/#!
MIIT (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, People’s Republic of China) (2019),
New Energy Vehicle Industry Development Plan (2021-2035) (Draft for Comment),
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METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) Japan (2018), Trend of Next Generation/Zero
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Ministry of Industry, Trade and Energy, Cabo Verde (2019), Resolution No. 13 / 2019 from
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Electric-Mobility-Policy-Chapter.pdf
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european-country-with-the-highest-number-of-electric-vehicles-sold/
National Climate Agreement (2019a), The Netherlands,
https://www.klimaatakkoord.nl/documenten/publicaties/2019/06/28/national-climate-
agreement-the-
netherlands?utm_source=MER+Webinar+Contacts&utm_campaign=413b7a56a1-
National Climate Agreement (2019b), The Netherlands, Agreements for Mobility,
https://www.klimaatakkoord.nl/mobiliteit
NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) (2011), HDV GHG and fuel efficiency
final rule, www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/HDV_Workshop_10Nov2011_EPA.pdf
Nippon (2019), Japan’s 2030 fuel efficiency targets aim to get more EVs on the road,
Nippon.com, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00481/japan%E2%80%99s-
2030-fuel-efficiency-targets-aim-to-get-more-evs-on-the-road.html
PAGE | 268
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2030-reducedebt-idUSL8N1MN54J
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PAGE | 269
Abbreviations and acronyms
AC alternating current
AFID Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive
APBIIA Automotive Power Battery Industry Innovation Alliance
APU auxiliary power unit
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asia Nations
B2C business-to-customer
BEE Bureau of Energy Efficiency
BEV battery electric vehicle
BMS battery management system
C2ES Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions
CAD Canadian dollar
CAFE Corporate Average Fuel Economy
CARB California Air Resources Board
CCS combined charging system
CEVS Council for Electrified Vehicle Society
China People’s Republic of China
CNG compressed natural gas
CO2 carbon dioxide
DC direct current
DCFC direct current fast charging
DfR Design for Recycling
e-bike electric-assist bicycle
e-buses electric bus
EGTS electric green taxi system
EPR extended producer responsibility
ERS electric road systems
ESCO Energy Savings Company
e-scooter electric scooter
EUR Euro
EV electric vehicle
EVI Electric Vehicle Initiative
EVSE electric vehicle supply equipment
FAME Phase I of the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles
FAME II Phase II of the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles
FCA Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
FCEV fuel cell electric vehicles
GBA Global Battery Alliance
GBP United Kingdom pound
PAGE | 270
GDP gross domestic product

GHG greenhouse gas
GVW gross vehicle weight
HDV heavy duty vehicle
HEV hybrid electric vehicles
HFT heavy freight trucks
HRS hydrogen refuelling stations
HSL Helsinki Region Transport
ICC International Code Council
ICE internal combustion engine
IEA International Energy Agency
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
INR Indian Rupees
IPCEI Import Project of Common European Interest
ISO International Organization for Standardization
JPY Japanese yen
KPI key performance indicator
KRW Korean won
LCV light-commercial vehicle
LEV low-emission vehicle
LFP iron phosphate
Li-ion lithium-ion
LTO and take-off cycles
MFT medium freight truck
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
NCA nickel cobalt aluminium oxide
NEMMP National Electric Mobility Mission Plan
NEV New Energy Vehicle
NMC nickel manganese cobalt oxide
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEM original equipment manufacturer
PHEV plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
PLDV passenger light-duty vehicle
PV photovoltaic
RED Red Metropolitana de Movilidad
SAFE Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient
SBG Shenzhen Bus Group
SDG&E San Diego Gas & Electric
SDS Sustainable Development Scenario
SEK Swedish Krona
STEPS Stated Policies Scenario
SUV sport utility vehicle
TCO total cost of ownership
PAGE | 271
TRL technology readiness levels

TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TTW tank-to-wheel
US DOE US Department of Energy
USD United States Dollar
V1G unidirectional controlled charging
V2G vehicle-to-grid
WBTC West Bengal Transport Corporation
WLTP Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure
WTT well-to-tank
WTW well-to-wheel
ZETI Zero-Emission Technology Inventory
ZEV Zero Emission Vehicle
Units of measure
cc cubic centimetres
gCO2 grammes of carbon dioxide
gCO2/km grammes of carbon dioxide per kilometre
gCO2/kWh grammes of carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour
gCO2-eq/pkm grammes of carbon dioxide equivalent per passenger kilometre
Gt-CO2 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide
GW gigawatt
GWh gigawatt-hours
kg CO2-eq/kWh kilogrammes of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt-hour
kg CO2-eq/Lge kilogrammes of carbon dioxide equivalent per litres of gasoline equivalent
km kilometres
km/L kilometres per litre
kt kilotonnes
kW kilowatt
kWh kilowatt-hours
kWh/100 km kilowatt-hours per 100 kilometres
Lge litres of gasoline equivalent
Lge/100 km litres of gasoline equivalent per 100 kilometres
Lge/100 m litres of gasoline equivalent per 100 metres
Mb/d million barrels per day
Mt CO 2 million tonnes of carbon dioxide
Mtoe million tonnes of oil equivalent
MW megawatt
Nm /h3
normal cublic metres per hour
pkm passenger-kilometres
TEU twenty-foot equivalent units
t CO2 tonnes of carbon dioxide
PAGE | 272
t CO2-eq tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent

TW terawatt
TWh terawatt-hours
Wh/kg Watt-hours per kilogrammes
Wh/L Watt-hours per litre
PAGE | 273
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
AGENCY
The IEA examines IEA member IEA association
the full spectrum of countries: countries:
energy issues
including oil, gas Australia Brazil
and coal supply and Austria China
demand, renewable Belgium India
energy Canada Indonesia
technologies, Czech Republic Morocco
electricity markets, Denmark Singapore
energy efficiency, Estonia South Africa
access to energy, Finland Thailand
demand side France
management and Germany
much more. Through Greece
its work, the IEA Hungary
advocates policies Ireland
that will enhance Italy
the reliability, Japan
affordability and Korea
sustainability of Luxembourg
energy in its Mexico
30 member Netherlands
countries, New Zealand
8 association Norway
countries and Poland
beyond. Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
The European
Commission also
participates in the
work of the IEA
Please note that this

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specific restrictions that limit
its use and distribution. The
terms and conditions are
available online at
www.iea.org/t&c/
Source: IEA. All rights

reserved.
International Energy Agency
Website: www.iea.org
This publication reflects the views of the IEA Secretariat but does not necessarily reflect those of
individual IEA member countries. The IEA makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, in
respect of the publication’s contents
(including its completeness or accuracy) and shall not be responsible for any use of, or reliance on, the
publication. Unless otherwise indicated, all material presented in figures and tables is derived from IEA
data and analysis.
This publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty
over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any
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* The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,
East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

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Global EV Outlook

IEA. All rights reserved.

Mechthild Wörsdörfer, Director of STO, provided encouragement and support

The report was edited by Debra Justus.

Volumes); Renske Schuitmaker (Fastned); Patrick Ploetz (Fraunhofer Institute);

Executive summary .................................................................................................................. 10

Key messages and policy recommendations ...................................................................... 217

and 2030 ................................................................................................................ 174

The global electric vehicle fleet expanded

Global electric car stock, 2010-19

IEA 2020. All rights reserved.

Most charging is done at home and work, yet deploying

Private and publicly accessible chargers by country, 2019

IEA 2020. All rights reserved.

China continues to lead in electrifying two/three-

(e-scooters), electric-assist bicycles (e-bikes) and electric mopeds now available in

New electric bus registrations by country/region, 2015-19

IEA 2020. All rights reserved.

Electrifying heavy-duty trucks and air- and seaport

reductions and operational cost savings for airlines.

Policies continue to support electric vehicle

in the development and deployment of electric powertrains for transport. To date,

17 countries have announced 100% zero-emission vehicle targets or the phase-out of

Policies are being tailored to support market transition

Range of credits per vehicle

From 2021 1-3.4 1.6 1-6 2022: 16%

Notes: For details, see table 2.3 in the main report.

In addition to new regulations, in order to transition from internal combustion

Government responses to Covid-19 will influence the

Auto manufacturing, a critical sector of economic activity in many of the world’s

cities to relax car permit quotas, at least temporarily, complemented by

Experience of automotive industry stimulus measures has been mixed. Cash-for-

Prospects for electrification in transport in

two/three-wheelers) grows by 36% annually, reaching 245 million vehicles in 2030 –

Global electric vehicle stock by scenario, 2019 and 2030

By 2030, the global electric vehicle stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) is about

Electric car sales drive cost reductions in batteries,

Electric vehicles increase electricity demand but reduce

In both scenarios, electricity demand on slow chargers represent the majority of

By mode: Two/three-wheeler LDV Bus Truck

IEA 2020. All rights reserved.

In 2019, electric vehicles in operation globally avoided the consumption of almost

IEA 2020. All rights reserved.

Batteries: An essential technology to electrify

Development Scenario, demand of 3 TWh is projected. Despite ambitious

electrification in the Sustainable Development Scenario, modes other than cars

IEA 2020. All rights reserved.

Battery technologies improve and costs drop

Promising avenues for advanced battery technologies

the well-established Li-ion technology, which by now benefits from considerable

experience in its large-scale manufacture and solid understanding of its long-term

As volumes and ranges increase, an appropriate battery

IEA. All rights reserved.

t CO2-eq Variability relative to

Vehicle cycle - components and fluids

IEA 2020. All rights reserved.

 Increase the energy density of batteries.

active materials such as nickel, cobalt and graphite.

 Increase energy efficiency and use low-carbon energy sources in cell