Sport Policy and Development

 Who makes sport policy and why do we need it?

 What is the purpose of sports development programmes?

Sport Policy and Development answers these questions and more by closely examining
the complex relationships between modern sport, sport policy and development and other
aspects of the wider society. These important issues are explored via detailed case studies
of key aspects of sport policy and sports development activity, including:

 school sport and physical education

 social inclusion
 health
 elite sport
 sporting mega-events.

Each case study demonstrates the ways in which the sport policy and development
fields have changed, and are continually changing in response to the increasing political,
social and cultural significance of sport. The book helps the reader to understand the
complexities of the sport policy-making process, the increasing intervention of govern-
ment in the sport policy and development fields, and how the short-term, ever-changing
and frequently contradictory political priorities of government come to impact on the
practice of sport policy and development.
Accessible and engaging, this textbook is an invaluable introduction to sport policy
and sports development for students, practitioners and policy-makers alike.

Daniel Bloyce is Senior Lecturer in the Sociology of Sport and Exercise and Co-Director
of the Chester Centre for Research into Sport and Society at the University of Chester,
UK. He is co-editor of the International Journal of Sport Policy.

Andy Smith is a Senior Lecturer in the Sociology of Sport and Exercise and Co-Director
of the Chester Centre for Research into Sport and Society at the University of Chester,
UK. He is co-editor of the International Journal of Sport Policy, and co-author of Dis-
ability, Sport and Society and An Introduction to Drugs in Sport. Both books are pub-
lished by Routledge (2009).
Sport Policy and Development
An introduction

Daniel Bloyce and Andy Smith

First published 2010
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For Ken Green – a mentor and friend, and also the person to be blamed
for us writing this book!
Contents

Acknowledgements viii
List of abbreviations ix

Introduction 1

1 The sport policy process: a sociological perspective 12

2 The emergence and development of sport policy 29

3 Youth sports development: physical education, school sport and community

club links 56

4 Community sports development: promoting social inclusion 79

5 Community sports development: promoting health 108

6 Elite sports development: promoting international success 132

7 The politics and policy of mega-events: a case study of London 2012 157

References 188
Index 204
Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the many people who, over many years, have encouraged us and
contributed, directly or indirectly, to our development as sociologists and to the devel-
opment of our thought in relation to sport policy and development. Particular mention
should be made in the first instance to the students whom we have had the pleasure of
teaching on our sport policy and development modules over the past few years. Discus-
sion stimulated in lectures and seminars has helped strengthen our understanding and
appreciation of the many issues involved. Several colleagues took the time to provide us
with constructive criticism and insightful commentary on earlier drafts of various chap-
ters of the book. For this we are extremely grateful and our special thanks go to: Fred
Coalter, Ken Green, Patrick Murphy, Ken Roberts, Miranda Thurston, Ivan Waddington
and, finally, the late Mick Green, whom we were unable to thank personally before his
untimely passing.
We would also like to express our gratitude to Barrie Houlihan, with whom we have
had the pleasure of working in our capacity as co-editors of the International Journal of
Sport Policy (Routledge), for his ongoing professional support. We would also like to pay
particular thanks to Brian Guerin and Simon Whitmore at Routledge for their continuous
support and patience as we completed this book.
Finally, we would each like to pay tribute to our friends and family. Andy would like
to pay special thanks to his parents and sister Jenny, for their ongoing support. I would
also like to dedicate this book to Nan (the self-proclaimed ‘boss’!) and to the memory of
my other grandparents. Daniel would like to pay particular thanks to his Mum for her
ongoing love and support. I would also like to thank Terry and Margaret Jameson,
without the support of whom my house would not be in the pleasant state of décor that
it currently enjoys! I would also like to thank Karen, for her love, support, understanding
and commitment to the cause – and for being a critical friend in reading numerous
chapters. Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of my dad, Michael
Bloyce (1938–2008), who was a diligent and exceptional university lecturer who inspired
me in all that I do.
Abbreviations

AAU Amateur Athletics Union

AfPE Association for Physical Education
AIHW Australian Institute for Health and Welfare
AIS Australian Institute of Sport
ASB anti-social behaviour
ASC Advisory Sports Council; Australian Sports Commission
BALPPE British Association of Advisers and Lecturers in Physical Education
BISp Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft (Federal Institute of Sports Science)
BMA British Medical Association
BMI body mass index
BOA British Olympic Association
BREEAM Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method
CAA Comprehensive Area Agreement
CASM Canadian Academy of Sport Medicine
CCPR Central Council for Physical Recreation
CCRPT Central Council for Recreative and Physical Training
CCT compulsory competitive tendering
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CHD coronary heart disease
CPA comprehensive performance assessment
CSP County Sports Partnership
CSL 2012 Commission for a Sustainable London 2012
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DCSF Department for Children, Schools and Families
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
DfES Department for Education and Skills
DH Department of Health
DHfK Deutsche Hochschule für Körperkultur (German University for Physical
Culture)
DIUS Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills
DNH Department of National Heritage
DPT drugs prevention team
DSO direct service organization
DVS Deutsche Vereinigung für Sportwissenschaft (German Union of Sport
Science)
EC European Commission
x Abbreviations
EIS English Institute for Sport
ESC English Sports Council
ESD elite sports development
EU European Union
FA Football Association
FKS Forschungsinstitut für Körperkultur und Sport (Research Institute for
Physical Culture and Sport)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GDR German Democratic Republic
GLA Greater London Authority
GOE Government Olympic Executive
HEPA health-enhancing physical activity
IMD Index of Multiple Deprivation
IOC International Olympic Committee
IYS Institute of Youth Sport
KKP Knight Kavanagh and Page
LDA London Development Agency
LEAP Local Exercise Action Pilot
LOCOG London Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
LSC Learning and Skills Council
LTAD long-term athlete development
NAO National Audit Office
NCAA National Collegiate Athletic Association
NCF National Coaching Foundation
NCPE National Curriculum for Physical Education
NDP National Demonstration Project
NDPB non-departmental public body
NFPA National Playing Fields Association
NGB national governing body
NHS National Health Service
NOF New Opportunities Fund
NRG Nations and Regions Group
NSO national sports organization
NTSP National Talent Search Program
NWDA North West Development Agency
OCOG Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
ODA Olympic Delivery Authority
Ofsted Office for Standards in Education
PAT10 Policy Action Team 10
PCPFS President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports
PCT Primary Care Trust
PDM partnership development manager
PE physical education
PEAUK Physical Education Association of the United Kingdom
PED performance-enhancing drugs
PESS physical education and school sport
PESSCL Physical Education, School Sport and Club Links strategy
PESSYP Physical Education and Sport Strategy for Young People
 Abbreviations xi
PHAC Public Health Agency of Canada
PI performance indicator
PLT primary link teacher
PSA public service agreement
PVP Pre-Volunteering Programme
SCW Sports Council for Wales
SDC Sports Development Council
SDOs sports development officers
SEU Social Exclusion Unit
SHA Strategic Health Authority
SOCOG Sydney Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
SSC specialist sports colleges
SSCo school sports coordinator
SSP School Sport Partnership
TASS Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme
TID talent identification and development
UKSC United Kingdom Sports Council
UKSI United Kingdom Sports Institute
USOC United States Olympic Committee
WHO World Health Organization
WSP Whole Sport Plan
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
YOT youth offending team
YST Youth Sport Trust
Introduction

In recent years the promotion and development of sport have become increasingly
common features of government sport policy and sports-development-related activity in
many countries (Bergsgard et al., 2007; Coalter, 2007a; Houlihan and Green, 2008). This
tendency has been strongly associated with the parallel tendency for government and
other state agencies to become increasingly interventionist in setting the sport policy
agenda and, hence, the sports development work that emerges from it. In this respect,
there has been a growing willingness to use sport and physical activities as vehicles of
social policy designed to achieve a range of other non-sport objectives. As Bergsgard et al.
(2007) have noted, the increasing salience of sport to governments and their various
policy agendas is an expression of the growing social and cultural significance of sport;
the malleability of sport as a resource to help achieve non-sport policy goals (e.g. reducing
youth crime and drug use, enhancing social inclusion, the promotion of health, and
community regeneration); and the multidimensional character of sport where it is seen
not only as ‘a distinctive public service and, in many countries, an important aspect of
overall welfare provision, but is also an important element of the economy in terms of
job creation, capital investment and balance of payments’ (Bergsgard et al., 2007: 3–4).
The steady increase in government and state involvement in sport has not, however,
been accompanied by a comparable growth in analyses of that involvement. This omission
has been in marked contrast to other areas of public policy, especially the costly areas of
national policy such as education, defence, health and welfare, but also in newer and
more modestly funded policy fields such as environment and culture (Houlihan et al.,
2009). As Houlihan (2005: 164) noted in his survey of nine major English language journals
from January 2001 to September 2003, ‘only 3% of the articles utilised the extensive array
of concepts, analytical frameworks and theories developed in mainstream policy analysis
to aid … understanding of sport policy making and the role of government’. Between
September 2003 and mid-2008 that proportion had increased slightly to 18 per cent, with
the vast majority of articles providing perceptive analyses informed by theory and concepts
drawn from other social sciences, especially sociology and cultural studies, and from the
humanities, particularly history (Houlihan et al., 2009). What was notable, however, was
that too few of these articles acknowledged, and fewer still investigated, the role and
increasing intervention of representatives of the state, other government agencies and the
private sector, for example, in helping to set the sport policy agenda and influencing the
development of modern sport more broadly (Houlihan et al., 2009). We may begin to
develop more adequate explanations of the complex relationships that exist between
modern sport, sport policy and development and other aspects of the wider society, by
enhancing the insights derived from these perspectives and complementing them with ‘a
2 Introduction
more explicit and theoretically informed understanding of the process of sport policy-
making and the role and significance of government and state agencies’ (Houlihan et al.,
2009: 1). This is, then, a book that we hope begins to fill this gap in the existing literature.
Our intention here is to make a modest contribution to our understanding of sport policy
and development. Set in this context, it is worth making clear to the reader what this
book is about and, equally importantly, what it is not about.
The purpose of this introductory text is to examine some of the complex relationships
between modern sport, sport policy and development and other aspects of the wider
society. It is also primarily intended for those either studying sport policy and sports
development or who work in both these fields. In this regard, it is hoped that the content
of the book will appeal to those who are following courses in a diverse range of subjects,
including sport policy and development, sports studies, sport and exercise sciences, physical
education (PE), as well as sociology, political science and policy analysis. In particular, it
is hoped that our preference for focusing on detailed case studies of some key aspects of
sport policy and sports-development-like work will help to broaden the appeal and
readership of the book. The case studies are also intended to help demonstrate something
about the ways and extent to which the sport policy and development fields have changed,
and are continually changing. Although many of the case studies and examples provided in
subsequent chapters come from Britain and, in some cases, primarily England, we have,
wherever possible, sought to incorporate international research in order to demonstrate
the cross-cultural and international relevance of the various topics to an understanding of
sport policy and development.
In light of our preference for focusing on some of the major issues that characterize
current sport policy and development activity via a case study approach, the book is not
intended to be a comprehensive survey of all the possible issues that may have been
explored. Indeed, such are the often short-term, ever-changing and frequently conflicting
and contradictory political priorities of government that it is impossible – indeed, fool-
hardy – to attempt to examine all of the various sport policy initiatives and sports
development programmes that are currently in operation in Britain and elsewhere. It is
perhaps almost inevitable, therefore, that we have left many stones unturned. There will
be some readers who would have liked us to have included chapters on many other sub-
jects than we have been able to here and some of which have appeared in other intro-
ductory texts on sports development (e.g. Hylton and Bramham, 2008). Other readers
may feel – quite rightly – that much more could have been said about each of the various
topics that are covered in the book. Themes such as elite sports development, sport and
social inclusion and sporting mega-events, among others, are deserving of books in
themselves. Indeed, in many cases, several existing texts have begun to examine the
complexities involved in studying these areas of sport policy and development. Amongst
the many and more recent examples that could be cited in this regard include the work of
De Bosscher et al. (2008), Green and Houlihan (2005) and Houlihan and Green (2008) on
the extent of state investment in, and direction of, elite sports development systems.
Together with Nicholson and Hoye’s edited collection of essays that explore the complex
relationships between sport and the development of social capital (Nicholson and Hoye,
2008), Fred Coalter’s excellent book A Wider Social Role for Sport: Who’s Keeping the
Score? (Coalter, 2007a) provides an important and invaluable survey of the many and
complex explanations for increasing governmental interest in sport, in particular the
growing emphasis that has come to be placed on the use of sport to alleviate a variety of
social problems. In relation to the complexities that surround the increasing social
 Introduction 3
significance and importance of hosting sporting mega-events (e.g. the Olympic and
Paralympic Games and soccer World Cup), Preuss (2004), Roche (2000) and Cashman
(2006), for example, have all made valuable contributions to our understanding of this
aspect of contemporary sport policy and development. Finally, mention should also be
made of the substantial contribution by Barrie Houlihan to our understanding of the
politics associated with various aspects of sport policy and development (e.g. Houlihan,
1991; 1997; 2005; Houlihan and White, 2002), especially youth sport (e.g. Houlihan, 2000;
Houlihan and Green, 2006) and elite sports development (e.g. Green and Houlihan, 2004;
2005; 2006; Houlihan and Green, 2008). For these and many other reasons, this book is
intended to complement the important, though at times competing, explanations that
have been advanced in the field thus far. We hope that this will help us develop our
understanding of the relationships that exist between sport policy and development and
aspects of the wider society. We also hope to show, throughout this book, something of
the ways in which a distinctly sociological approach to understanding these issues may
hold out the promise of developing relatively adequate explanations of sport policy processes
and the variety of sports development activity that emerges from them. It is now appropriate,
therefore, to say something about the theoretical perspective that underlies this book.

The theoretical perspective of the book: figurational sociology

The general theoretical approach on which we have drawn in this book is that of fig-
urational or process sociology, which has grown out of the work of Norbert Elias (1897–1990).
As Houlihan et al. (2009) have noted, the writings and ideas of Elias and his figurational
approach to sociology are coming increasingly to be used in analyses of policy processes
both within sport (e.g. Bloyce et al. 2008; K. Green, 2008; Hanstad et al., 2008; Murphy
et al., 1990; Waddington, 2000; Waddington and Smith, 2009; Williams et al., 1984) and
in policy contexts such as health service management (e.g. Dopson, 2005; Dopson and
Waddington, 1996). However, until now it has not been consistently applied to the study
of sport policy and development in the manner that we have attempted in this book. For
the most part, the figurational perspective has been used here implicitly in order to limit
the more explicitly theoretical aspects of the book and thus make it as accessible as possible
to those who have an interest in sport but who do not have a grounding in sociological
theory. The one exception to this is to be found in Chapter 1, where we have found it necessary
to make more explicit reference to several of the key concepts and ideas that underpin Elias’s
approach in order to try to understand the realities of the sport policy-making process.
Figurational sociology is one among a number of competing paradigms within sociology
but, over the past three or four decades, it has become a particularly well established
theoretical framework within the sociology of sport. As Waddington and Malcolm (2008: 3)
have noted, the work of Eric Dunning, together of course with Elias’s own writings on
sport, ‘have helped to establish figurational sociology as a particularly influential theoretical
framework within the sociological study of sport’. The prominence of figurational
sociology within the study of sport leads us to accept Malcolm’s view that ‘the maturity
of figurational sociology is now such that we can move away from extended theoretical
re-statements and assume that such information is readily available elsewhere’ (Malcolm,
2008: 261) (e.g. Bloyce, 2004; Dunning, 1999; Mennell, 1992; Murphy et al., 2000; van
Krieken, 1998). As a consequence we do not feel it necessary to provide a detailed outline
of the principles of figurational sociology. Nonetheless, it is worth offering a brief overview
of the figurational approach, and the manner in which it might be employed to help
4 Introduction
explain aspects of the sport policy process and the sports development work that emerges
from it.
The central organizing concept of figurational sociology is, unsurprisingly, the concept
of ‘figuration’ itself. Elias described a figuration as ‘a structure of mutually oriented and
dependent people’ (Elias, 2000: 316). A central dimension of figurations or dynamic
interdependency ties is power, conceptualized not as a substance or property possessed by
particular individuals or groups but as a characteristic of all human relationships (Elias,
1978). Elias developed the concept of ‘figuration’ as a means of trying to overcome some
of the difficulties associated with more conventional sociological terms and theories; in
particular, he was critical of what he regarded as misleading and unhelpful dualisms such
as that between the ‘individual’ and ‘society’. The way in which Elias’s approach helps to
overcome such dualisms is perhaps best seen in his game models (Elias, 1978). His
approach recognizes that human action is, to a greater or lesser extent, consciously
directed towards achieving certain goals and that all human action necessarily involves
both cognition and emotion. In this sense it fully takes into account the fact that humans
are thinking and feeling animals and that, in the individualized societies of the West, we
each have our own more or less individual pattern of intentions and preferences. However,
Elias also emphasized that the outcomes of complex processes involving the interweaving
of the actions of large numbers of people cannot be explained simply in terms of the
intentions of individuals. Indeed, he suggests that the normal result of complex processes
involving the interweaving of the more or less goal-directed actions of large numbers of
people includes outcomes that no one has planned (Elias, 1978). As we explain in Chapter
1, in relation to the study of an area such as sport policy and development, Elias’s
approach indicates how policy processes and their outcomes can be seen as an expression
of unequal power relations and differential relational constraints between groups of
people whose interests and perceptions are likely to diverge. In subsequent chapters we
also argue that many of the case studies on which we draw to illustrate aspects of sport
policy and development activity are particularly useful ways of identifying and analyzing
the figurations, or networks of relationships, of which sports development officers
(SDOs) and others (e.g. policy-makers, government ministers and school teachers)
involved in the organization and provision of sport are a part. This reveals the ways in
which these figurations have both enabling and constraining effects on the actions of the
groups involved. As we shall see throughout the book, the sheer complexity of the pat-
terns of interaction, involving large numbers of people all of whom have an interest in
sport policy and development, has had some important unintended outcomes. The unin-
tended outcomes of the kind identified in this book are, we shall argue, not unusual
aspects of social life. Indeed, it is important to recognize that, as Elias pointed out, the
normal result of complex processes involving the interweaving of the goal-directed
actions of large numbers of people includes outcomes that no one has chosen and no one
has designed. As Mennell (1992: 258) has noted, for Elias, ‘unanticipated consequences
are not a curious footnote to sociology but nearly universal in social life’. It is hoped that
this book, by drawing on Elias’s work, may help to draw attention to this generally
neglected aspect of policy-making within the world of sport generally and in sports
organizations more particularly. One other key aspect of Elias’s work on which we have
drawn explicitly and which provides a central integrating theme for the book as a whole
relates to Elias’s writing on involvement and detachment.
As Murphy et al. (2000) have noted, one particularly distinctive characteristic of the
figurational approach also worthy of consideration is Elias’s position on the relationship
 Introduction 5
between human understanding and values. This is an issue that has traditionally been
discussed in abstract terms in which proponents have argued for ‘objectivity’ and ‘sub-
jectivity’, for ‘value-neutrality’ or ‘value-bias’. Elias (1987) explicitly rejected ‘all or
nothing’ polarities such as these. It was his recognition of the relational complexities
involved in all human relationships that led him to claim that ‘researchers can realistically
only aspire to develop explanations that have a greater degree of adequacy than preceding
explanations’ (Murphy et al., 2000: 94). Elias argued, therefore, that we require ‘a more
adequate conceptualization of our ways of thinking about the world, and of the processes as
a result of which our present, more scientific, ways of thinking about the world have
developed’ (Waddington and Smith, 2009: 4) beyond the all too prevalent tendency to think
in terms of a mutually exclusive and radical dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity.
Elias conceptualized the relationship between human knowledge and values in terms of
degrees of involvement and detachment – a relational and processual conceptualization
that helps us to examine the development, over time, of more object-adequate or reality-
congruent from less object-adequate or reality-congruent knowledge (Elias, 1987; Murphy
et al., 2000). He did so on the premise that it is neither possible nor, for that matter,
desirable to attain complete detachment or involvement. In that respect, Elias did not
conceptualize the relationship between involvement and detachment in dichotomous
terms, or as a simple equivalent of that between objectivity and subjectivity. He instead
considered it as a continuum along which blends of involvement (that is, conducive to
more fantasy-laden and mythical thinking) and detachment (that is, conducive to the
production of more reality-congruent or object-adequate knowledge) are located (Elias,
1987; Murphy et al., 2000). Elias summarized the challenges faced by sociologists in
combining an effective balance between their involvement with and detachment from the
processes and phenomena they study in the following way:

The problem confronting [sociologists] is not simply to discard (their more involved,
political) role in favour of … [a more detached, scientific one]. They cannot cease to
take part in, and to be affected by, the social and political affairs of their group and
time. Their known participation and involvement, moreover, is itself one of the
conditions for comprehending the problems they try to solve as scientists. For while
one need not know, to understand the structure of molecules, what it feels like to be
one of its atoms – in order to understand the functioning of human groups one needs
to know, as it were, from the inside how human beings experience their own and
other groups, and one cannot know without active participation and involvement.
The problem confronting those who study one or the other aspects of human
groups is how to keep their two roles as participant and enquirer clearly and consistently
apart and, as a professional group to establish in their work the undisputed dominance
of the latter.
(Elias, 1956: 237)

Thus, in order to understand more adequately the reality of the sport policy process and
sports-development-like activity, it is imperative that we seek to achieve in our work
greater degrees of detachment in the hope that this will help to maximize the development
of knowledge that is more reality-oriented and that is less mythical and fantasy based.
Attempts to examine problems of this kind are best achieved, Elias (1987) argued, not
directly, but by means of a ‘detour via detachment’ in which those who are able to hold
their ideological orientations ‘in check’, as it were, throughout the course of their research
6 Introduction
are more likely to generate explanations that have a higher degree of reality-congruence
than preceding explanations (Dunning, 1999; Elias, 1987; Murphy et al., 2000). That is,
assuming we do not get lost along the way, if we as sociologists are able to successfully
undertake a detour via detachment it should help us to produce knowledge about the sport
policy-making process and related sports development work that complements existing
knowledge, or, when compared against existing explanations, knowledge that has a greater
degree of adequacy and that is more reality-congruent than previously (Elias, 1987).
It is a leitmotif of the figurational approach, like many other sociological and disciplinary
approaches, that scientific work rests upon an indivisible interdependence between, and
interpretation and observation of, theoretical and empirical work that contributes to the
development of funds of social-scientific knowledge that ‘becomes more extensive, more
correct, and more adequate’ (Elias, 1978: 53; emphasis in the original) continuously and
cumulatively over time. In other words, at the heart of the analysis we attempt to offer of
the various case studies in this book is the need to ensure that there is a constant dynamic
interplay between our theoretical assumptions and empirical observations. This, we
contend, is important because it is just one means by which it is necessary to move ‘in the
direction of that blend between involvement and detachment which is most conducive to
[developing more] reality-congruent knowledge’ (Dunning, 1992: 253). It is also impor-
tant for, as we shall discuss in Chapter 1, analyses of the nature of sport policy-making
and sports development work are characterized by a relative lack of detachment, by a
high commitment to ideological or extra-scientific concerns and by a high level of emo-
tional involvement. It is more likely that the resulting explanation will end up allocating
praise or blame rather than enhancing our level of understanding of the reality of sport
policy processes and of the relational constraints that come to impact upon the day-to-
day work of sports development officers (SDOs). It is therefore a central and necessary
task for any researcher, and not just figurational sociologists, motivated by a desire to
advance knowledge and understanding to subject to critical scrutiny the ideologies and
mythologies surrounding social phenomena (including sport) that they are studying.
Indeed, such is the strength of the prevailing ideologies that surround what Coalter calls
the ‘mythopoeic nature of sport’ (Coalter, 2007a: 22), there is a real ‘need to think more
clearly, analytically and less emotionally about “sport” and its potential’ (Coalter, 2007a:
7). In doing this we need to examine many of the assumptions and premises upon which
sport policy and development work rests.
The search for a relatively detached understanding of the complex relationships
between sport policy and development and of the realities of sports development activity
constitutes the central objective of this book. Our perspective, it should be noted, almost
inevitably leads us to be critical of much existing policy and the development work on
which it is based. Such policies frequently bear the hallmark of ideology and are based on
a one-sided and uncritically accepted view of sport rather than a relatively detached
analysis of the processes involved. In this respect, we have sought in this book to develop
a more realistic and adequate understanding of sport policy and development and, where
relevant, to question some of the taken for granted assumptions that surround many of
the issues that we examine. Despite the criticisms that we make in this regard, it should
be stressed that our objective in this book is not to engage in easy expressions of moral
indignation about the nature of sport policy and work of sport policy-makers and SDOs
but, rather, to enhance our understanding of these issues. Our primary objective is
therefore an academic one – to enhance our sociological understanding of sport policy-
making and sports development activity. However, it should be noted that a better
 Introduction 7
understanding of aspects of sport policy and development is a precondition for more
effective policy formation and implementation, whatever our policy goals may be. In this
sense, it may be argued that, as Waddington and Smith (2009: 8) have noted, ‘there is
nothing as practical as good theory’. It is hoped, therefore, that this book will have some
value not merely in academic but also in policy formation terms. This is important, for,
as Elias noted, ‘sociology, in particular, is failing in its task if its research cannot be made
fruitful for other disciplines’ (Goudsblom and Mennell, 1998: 172). In our case, such disciplines
that may stand to benefit from the insights that may be derived from a sociological analysis
include the fields of sport policy and development. More particularly, we hope that the
analysis provided in the book will have some policy relevance for those working in these
disciplines, for, as Keech has rightly noted:

Applied policy analysis is often seen to be of little relevance to practitioners, whether

they are teachers or sports development professionals. What counts, apparently, is
whether or not the individual is able to do ‘their job’. Agreed – but only in part!
Many of those who work in Physical Education, physical activity or sport development
often became involved through their enjoyment of sport and/or activity, but now fail
to realise that they work within a highly politicised environment. Within ongoing
debates about professional development, it is proposed that until practitioners
develop a greater strategic awareness of the complex policy context within which
they operate, they will not be fully able to realise why policy doesn’t always work in
practice and therefore lobby more effectively for the resources required to fulfil their
responsibilities and do ‘their job’.
(Keech, 2003: 211)

It is hoped that this book may contribute in some small way to making the relevance of
such a sociologically informed approach clear to practitioners. In this regard, we consider
this introductory text as nothing more than a symptom of a beginning in the pursuit of
developing a more adequate sociological explanation of the reality of sport policy-making
and of sports development activity. We would stress, however, that in doing so we have
not attempted to provide the definitive sociological account of the subject matter but an
interpretation of it. We hope that, if nothing else, the book provides a starting point on
which others can build and that it may encourage others to undertake greater systematic
study of sport policy and development. We do not for one moment labour under the
misconception that this book is in any way a definitive account of the sport policy and
development figuration. In our view there is, and can be, no such animal. It is, of course,
for the reader to form her/his own view on the extent to which we achieve what we take
to be our modest objectives.

Terminology: what is sport policy and development?

Perhaps the first point worthy of note is that it is especially difficult to define and
demarcate the scope of sport policy from other policy areas (Bergsgard et al., 2007), such
is the increasing willingness of government and policy-makers to draw upon the perceived
malleability of sport to help achieve a wide range of different policy objectives to which it
is expected to contribute. In this regard, Houlihan and White (2002: 80) argue that ‘sports
development is at best a series of overlapping policy objectives and associated processes’.
It is not our intention here, then, to provide an overview of the various ‘models’ of sports
8 Introduction
development (see Hylton and Bramham, 2008). This is because, useful though the literature
that examines the various models of sports development is, most of it is prescriptive: it
describes not how sports development exists in practice in the real world but how, in an ideal
world, it ought to be organized and structured, and, in this respect, most of the literature is
not empirically grounded. What is arguably more important is not a description of what
should happen in the name of sports development, or what sports development should look
like in theory. Rather, what are required are more empirically based explanations of how
sport policy and development exist and are delivered in practice, and, in that respect, it is
intended that this book will begin to provide explanations of this kind.
It is also important to note that the term ‘sports development’ and the profession to
which it refers are more widely known – in name at least – in the United Kingdom than
elsewhere in Europe and beyond. It is, however, difficult to identify precisely what the
day-to-day role of an SDO, in both local authorities and national governing bodies
(NGBs) of sport, entails. At first sight, their main priorities are to develop sport and
provide sporting opportunities for local residents and other identified target groups
(Bloyce et al., 2008; Eady, 1993; Houlihan and White, 2002). However, as Houlihan and
White (2002: 2) have noted, the ‘title of sports development officer is by no means uni-
versally adopted by those who are clearly involved in similar work’. Their roles and
responsibilities are typically ambiguous and difficult to define, and these can often vary
considerably within and between local authorities and NGBs. In a not dissimilar way,
Nesti (2001: 196) has pointed out that ‘it remains a difficult, and some would argue
impossible task, to identify the exact point at which it is legitimate to talk about the
beginning of sports development work’. To this he adds that, given the difficulties asso-
ciated with delineating clearly the boundaries of sports development work and the precise
roles and responsibilities of SDOs, it can properly be said that ‘sports development is the
concern of a much broader group than SDOs’ (Nesti, 2001: 197). This is a point that, as
we explain in subsequent chapters, is increasingly apposite at a time of rapidly changing
social and political policy in many countries. Such are the frequent organizational chan-
ges that typically result from the dynamic political and social policy climate, the nature of
sports development work and the job of an SDO are almost terminally unstable. This is
largely because sport policy initiatives and programmes shift with what has been per-
ceived by some within the profession as monotonous regularity, and as some initiatives
and development workers increasingly pass through what amounts to an ever-revolving-
door policy as SDOs are increasingly expected to contribute to a range of competing
policy agendas (Bloyce et al., 2008; Collins et al., 1999). Despite the uncertainty that
surrounds the jobs of sports development professionals and the often vague, contentious
definitions of sports development and the roles and responsibilities of SDOs, it may
nevertheless be said that a more or less key aspect of sports development is getting more people
involved in sport. It also appears to be the case that, as we shall attempt to demonstrate in
Chapters 3–7, those working in sports development in the current social and political policy
climate are expected to try to use a range of sports and physical activities in order to achieve
this objective (Bloyce et al., 2008; Houlihan and White, 2002).

The structure of the book

Given that until now few texts have attempted to bring together in one volume a range of
topics that begin to examine some of the key issues that surround sport policy and
development, we have deliberately sought to ensure that each chapter provides the reader
 Introduction 9
with an introductory guide to a number of key issues that begin to help us make socio-
logical sense of the relationship between sport policy, sports development work and aspects
of the wider society. Whilst we hope that some readers would be interested in reading the
book from cover to cover, to try to make the book as accessible as possible to the reader, we
have deliberately set out to provide a text that contains chapters on discrete topics that can be
read in any order. Indeed, they could be used as part of a broader area of study than sport
policy and development. The one exception to this is Chapter 1 – entitled ‘The sport policy
process: a sociological perspective’ – which should be read in conjunction with each of the
other chapters. It is our contention that in order to understand something about the other
key issues that are explored in the book it is helpful for the readers to have some appreciation
of the various phases and components of the sport policy process and to explore how these
can come to impact on the day-to-day activities of sports development work. In all cases,
however, each chapter begins with a series of objectives that indicate the content to be
explored and concludes with a list of further reading, useful websites and a series of revision
questions that may be used as part of further discussions on the issues raised.
In Chapter 1 we outline the beginnings of a figurational approach to the study of
policy processes that, we believe, can help to explain these processes more adequately on
a theoretical level. We also attempt to convey something of the ways in which our
sociological approach can be of some practical relevance for policy-makers and SDOs
who are faced in the course of their day-to-day activities with constraints that come to
limit the extent to which they are able to achieve their own personal and/or group
interests and objectives. Throughout the chapter we stress the need to focus upon iden-
tifying and analyzing the figurations, or networks of relationships, of which SDOs and
policy-makers involved in the organization and provision of sport are a part. This, we
hope, helps to reveal the ways in which these figurations have both enabling and con-
straining effects on the actions of the participating groups. A consideration of these and
related issues, we argue, is a vital prerequisite for understanding adequately the realities
of sport policy-making processes and the impacts these have on the operations and practice
of sports development work. Chapter 2 then examines the emergence and development of
sport policy in Britain, and particularly England, since the 1960s. It also considers some
of the major changes to the organization and administration of sport over the last half-
century or so before focusing, in particular, on the recent policy agendas of government
where an increasingly explicit emphasis has come to be placed on the achievement of
non-sport policy goals alongside other sports-related objectives. Chapter 3 focuses on
youth sports development policy and the adequacy of the assumptions that underpin
those policies. In particular, the chapter explores the growing political importance of PE
and school sport (PESS) and the emergence of the Youth Sport Trust (YST) as the insti-
tutional focus for PESS in England. The chapter also draws on a case study of one of the
most significant youth sports development policies to have been introduced in schools in
England in recent years, namely, the Physical Education, School Sport and Club Links
(PESSCL) strategy, which has since been retitled the Physical Education, School Sport and
Young People (PESSYP) strategy. It does so in order to show how the development of the
School Sport Partnership (SSP) programme, as one component of the PESSCL strategy,
has become one of the most important overarching infrastructures through which government
has attempted to achieve its sports-specific goals and non-sport objectives related to PESS
and youth sports development in schools.
A case study approach also forms the basis of the analysis presented in Chapter 4. We
explore how one consequence of the increasing intervention of government in sport
10 Introduction
policy-making has been that sport policy priorities have shifted away from the develop-
ment of sport and the achievement of sport-related goals towards the use of sport to
achieve other desired social objectives such as the promotion of social inclusion. To
convey something of the ways in which the social inclusion agenda has impacted upon
aspects of community sports development, the chapter draws on several high-profile
sports-based social inclusion initiatives. These include the Barclays Spaces for Sports
programme, the Kickz – Goals Thru Football programme, and anti-crime and drug-
reduction schemes such as the various Positive Futures projects currently in operation in
the UK. In doing so, we conclude that, perhaps with the exception of some Positive
Futures projects and despite the strong and increasing political policy commitment to the
social inclusion agenda, there is currently little hard evidence of the effectiveness of
sports-based schemes in reducing the complex causes of social exclusion, particularly
levels of crime, drug use or anti-social behaviour among identified target groups. Chapter
5 continues with the theme of how sport has been used as a driver for non-sport objec-
tives. Health is seen to be something that is synonymous with sporting participation, and
it is perhaps no surprise that governments have consistently subscribed to the notion that
sport can be used as a tool to develop good health. In this chapter we analyse the ways in
which sport and physical activity have been identified in policies around the world as a
tool with which to deal with growing levels of obesity. In doing so, the distinction
between sport and physical activity has become increasingly blurred. However, we argue
that it is important to distinguish between sport and other forms of physical activity,
since competitive sport carries with it potential health risks, often ignored by policy-
makers. Furthermore, we highlight in this chapter, through a case study of the development
of health policies in the UK, how sports professionals have been increasingly constrained
to become involved in health promotion activities. The ‘role’ of the SDO has, in this
sense, become ever more fluid.
In the final two chapters we turn our attention to elite sports development. In Chapter
6 we examine the ways in which elite sports development (ESD) systems have become
increasingly prevalent in many developed nations around the world. In the main,
although we argue that the American collegiate system developed many of the char-
acteristics of such systems earlier than was the case elsewhere, as far as government-
sponsored and government-led ESD systems are concerned, the countries of the former
Eastern bloc were key to their development. After the Second World War, East Germany
and the Soviet Union developed ESD systems that clearly made no small contribution to
the Olympic success experienced by these two countries. So successful were they that the
ESD systems quickly came to be emulated in several Western countries. Once again, we
use a case study of the development of the key characteristics of such ESD systems in the
UK, a relative latecomer to such clinical focus on ESD. We conclude the chapter by
arguing that the inter-state rivalry that is central to our understanding of the spread of
ESD systems around the world has contributed to diminishing contrasts between the
ways in which athletes in these countries are prepared for international sporting compe-
titions. At the same time, however, there are prevailing national characteristics within
each ESD system that, it might argued, have contributed to increasing variety in the
adopted approaches to ESD. In the final chapter, Chapter 7, we examine how sports
mega-events have influenced domestic and international sport policy and development. By
focusing primarily on the Olympic Games, we examine how and why competition to bid
for the Games has become so intense. Over the last twenty years or so there has been a
significant focus on the legacies that are said to emerge from hosting the Games, most
 Introduction 11
notably after the widely heralded Summer Olympics in Barcelona in 1992. As the intensity
to compete with other bids increases and the apparent desire to better all previous Games
plays heavily on the mind, we argue that the people behind the bids, and, most especially,
their government backers, are increasingly constrained to play up the apparent legacy
benefits of hosting the Games. Amongst these are economic growth, urban regeneration,
and even social inclusion and sustainable development. We focus our attention in the
second half of the chapter on the bid and the build-up to the 2012 Games to be held in
London. It is clear that legacies are central to the bid process, and the fact that the 2012
Games are to be hosted in the UK has had, unsurprisingly, a significant impact on sport
policy in broader terms.
1 The sport policy process
A sociological perspective

Objectives
This chapter will:

 examine a figurational approach to the study of the policy-making process;

 outline the key interdependent features of the policy-making process; and
 identify the practical relevance of a sociological understanding of the policy
process for sports development practitioners.

Introduction
As we explained in the Introduction, the general theoretical perspective that underlies this
book is that of figurational or process sociology. We also noted that although there is a
large and expanding literature on the nature of sports development and the sport policy
process generally, very little has been written about these issues from a distinctly sociological
perspective. The objective of this chapter is to begin to lay the foundations for a specifically
figurational understanding of the sport policy process. In doing so, it attempts to outline
how these concepts and assumptions can be of practical relevance for policy-makers and
SDOs who are charged with the formulation and implementation of effective sport policy
‘on the ground’. In this regard, by focusing on the dynamic networks of relationships or
human figurations in which policy-makers and SDOs are embroiled, the chapter examines
the various stages in the policy process (such as how a policy issue comes to be defined as
such, the objectives and priorities of policy-makers, and monitoring and evaluation processes)
and, in particular, the unplanned outcomes that result from the complex interweaving of
the intended actions of those involved.

Conceptualizing the policy process

Perhaps the first question that we need to ask ourselves before explaining the dynamics
involved in the policy process is: what actually constitutes policy? The answer may seem
fairly obvious, but, as we will see throughout the rest of this book, the formulation and
implementation of certain sport ‘policies’ can be criticized on the basis that the ‘policy’
does not constitute a policy whatsoever, and is more a ‘statement’ of intent or description
of a ‘problem’. Due to its rather ambiguous and contested nature it is difficult to
 The sport policy process 13
conceptualize adequately what is meant by the term ‘policy’ (Houlihan and White, 2002).
It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that all policies can be viewed as involving the
following overlapping and interrelated features: human action aimed at achieving certain
objectives; human action aimed at resolving, or at least ameliorating, an identified ‘pro-
blem’; and human action aimed at maintaining or modifying relationships within an
existing organization, between different organizations, or a human figuration of some
other kind (Murphy, 1998; Smith and Platts, 2008). In addition, as the British Medical
Association (BMA) (2002) has noted, the search for effective responses to a range of
social problems – such as the use of performance enhancing drugs in sport and the
improvement of the nation’s health – is also fundamental to any public policy, even
though this will, inevitably, involve value judgements by those concerned. In this regard,
they add that ‘in an ideal world’ problems of these kinds would ‘be self-evident, solutions
would be based on a detailed understanding of the issues, objectives would be clear and
progress toward them measurable, and there would be lasting commitment from policy
makers’ (BMA, 2002: 89).
However, we do not live in an ideal world and it is clear that the policy process rarely
follows the neat, rational models of change set out in some of the literature, and many
sport and other public policies are rarely based upon a detailed, evidence-based and
relatively detached understanding of the problems that they purport to tackle (BMA,
2002; Coalter, 2007a; Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Waddington and Smith, 2009). In
light of such problems, then, how can we begin to conceptualize the policy process in
reality? How is it possible to begin to advance our sociological understanding of the
complexities involved? How are the actions of policy-makers and other groups involved
enabled and constrained by the wider relational networks of which they are a part?
Before we examine these issues, it is important to remind ourselves that any study of
the complexities involved in the policy process is fraught with several difficulties, the
most important of which is that we are always dealing with the study of dynamic, com-
plex social processes or human figurations. Indeed, we are ourselves in process, and part
of broader social processes. It is for these reasons that we can only realistically aspire to
explain the relational complexities involved in the sport policy process more adequately
(Murphy, 1998; Smith and Platts, 2008). As with our knowledge of broader social pro-
cesses more generally, it would be foolhardy to suggest that it is possible to have a
complete understanding – or, indeed, anything approaching it – of the processes involved.
In this regard, what follows is an attempt to begin to conceptualize and come to some
understanding of the policy process in reality. While this process has, for analytical reasons,
been conceptualized in terms of a series of phases and constituent elements, as falling into
a particular sequence, we are acutely aware of the shortcomings of this approach. The
reality is that, like colours in the colour spectrum, these aspects of the policy process
shade into each other; they frequently overlap, fuse and merge in complex ways and often
occur simultaneously. In the following analysis, we have, therefore, attempted to offset
the limitations of this approach and to convey something of the dynamic interdependence
between the component parts involved in the various phases that make up the policy
process. The analysis represents a particular stage in our understanding of the policy
process and is, of course, constructed on the basis of our theoretical insights and
empirical observations, many of which derive from the figurational framework employed
in this book. At the very least we hope that it will help the reader to think and ask
important questions about the nature of the problems that policy-makers face and the
situations they wish to change, the adequacy of their objectives, the problems they are
14 The sport policy process
likely to encounter, and the outcomes that may result from the various strategies that
might be pursued to tackle such problems.

The definition of policy ‘issues’

As Dopson and Waddington (1996: 546) have noted, the policy process involves ‘many
people at different levels within and outside the organisation, and the extent to which
different groups are committed to or opposed to the prevailing policy, and the strategies
which they adopt in relation to that policy, play an important part in determining its
outcome’. Indeed, within particularly complex organizations and other human figura-
tions, different groups are differentially constrained to pursue their own perceived inter-
ests, which may or may not coincide, or only very partially coincide, with those of other
groups, and which may also be at distinct variance with those of others (Dopson and
Waddington, 1996; Smith and Platts, 2008). It is a vital prerequisite in any study of the
policy process, therefore, that we focus on the differential patterns of interdependencies
that characterize the relational networks within which policies are formulated and
implemented, for it is not adequate to focus exclusively on the values, priorities and
intentions of the groups involved. More particularly, for figurational sociologists it is
only possible to understand adequately the likely effectiveness of sport policies by recog-
nizing the wider human figurations within which sport policy-makers, SDOs and other
interested groups are embroiled, and the tensions, conflicts and degrees of consensual
elements that characterize these dynamic power relationships. Such an approach also
helps us to begin to anticipate some of the unintended, unplanned outcomes – to be
examined in more detail later – that inevitably result from the combined actions of the
groups involved, and the associated power struggles that accompany the implementation
of any proposed policy reforms. This is not only important on a theoretical level, but is also of
practical relevance for policy-makers, who, like all human beings, are never able to understand
fully ‘the constraints within which either they or other key players work and, as a consequence,
they frequently misunderstand, or at best only very partially understand, the actions and
intentions of other players’ (Dopson and Waddington, 1996: 545).
When conceptualized in this way it becomes clear that all policies begin life as issues
that develop and change over time and out of existing human relationships. They also
vary over time and from one society to another, as some groups are more able to take up
interests in some developments whilst simultaneously ignoring others in order to sustain,
protect and advance their own interests (Murphy, 1998). In this regard, the foregoing
problems have come to be defined as such by groups who, because of the particular
relational constraints that they experience, are better able to pursue, to a greater extent
than are other groups, their own priorities. They are also more likely to be able to
develop more effective and coordinated action in relation to policy formation. Such
groups are also often better able to define what constitute social problems or ‘issues’ for
which some kind of remedial action, in the form of policy, is warranted and can come to
determine the policy objectives and priorities to be pursued. By contrast, those who are
less enabled by their particular relational constraints are often less likely to develop
policy and tend to be those groups who are less integrated and who lack sufficient
requisite coordination to bring about desired change through the formulation and
implementation of policy. In this regard, the policy-making process involves the selection
of actions and strategies to move from one unsatisfactory position to an alternative, more
satisfactory position (Murphy, 1998; Smith and Platts, 2008). The construction of sport
 The sport policy process 15
policy, like all other areas of policy, presupposes a commitment among those individuals
and groups involved who are better able to develop various activities that enable them to
bring about desirable change in ways that other individuals and groups may not.
Placing human figurations at the heart of our analysis of the policy process helps,
therefore, to reveal the ways in which these figurations that enable and constrain action
consist of different groups of people often seeking to maintain, protect and advance their
individual and/or group interests. It also helps to point towards how policy processes and
their outcomes can be seen as an expression of the differential constraints and unequal
power relations between groups of people whose interests and perceptions are likely to
diverge (Elias, 1978; 1987). These dynamic power relational networks involve several
groups with differing perceptions and interests: those who are enthusiastic about change;
those who are willing to go along with the proposed policy changes with some misgivings;
those who are against the proposed changes; and those who are completely opposed to
the policies being proposed (Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Elias, 1978; 1987). As we
shall see in the remaining chapters of this book, the sheer complexity of the patterns of
interaction, involving large numbers of people all of whom have an interest in sport
policy and development, often has some important unplanned outcomes. Those involved
in the planning and implementation of policy, however, rarely reflect upon the possible
side-effects (both more immediate and longer term) of pursuing a particular policy. Of
course, this is not altogether surprising given the external constraints that policy-makers
and SDOs are frequently under ‘to do something’ about the problems with which they
are faced. But what are the likely outcomes that arise out of the tendency for sport poli-
cies to be based upon claims that have a high fantasy content that is ‘emotionally much
more attractive for people than knowledge which is more reality-oriented’ (Elias, 1987:
67)? In other words, what are the issues and likely outcomes facing policy-makers and
SDOs whose activities are premised upon policies that frequently offer ‘fantasy laden
solutions to social problems’ (Elias, 1978: 27)? What are the benefits of having an
appreciation of some of the possible side-effects of pursing a particular policy?
Perhaps the first point to note in this regard is that for some groups (in particular
increasingly interventionist government ministers and policy-makers) the primary objec-
tive of their work is to try to stimulate change designed to reduce or eliminate particular
perceived social problems, or to claim for sport things that help to protect their own
vested interests. Such an approach, however, tells us rather more about the particular
values and prejudices of those groups and tends to reinforce, rather than challenge, the
widely held beliefs and myths surrounding the policy issues under examination. Indeed,
much of the heavily value-laden character of many existing sport policies has the effect of
obscuring, rather than clarifying, the development of a more adequate understanding of
the problems they are designed to tackle, and constitutes a poor basis for future policy
formation (Coalter, 2007a; Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Smith and Platts, 2008;
Waddington and Smith, 2009). One consequence of the tendency for much policy to be
‘saturated’ with ideology and premised upon a lack of evidence is that many policy pro-
blems ‘are often poorly defined and constantly evolving; policy solutions are frequently
selected on the basis of a poor understanding of the problem, or because they fulfil some
other need, such as that for a quick, cheap and visible response; objectives are frequently
poorly specified and sometimes not specified at all; and evaluation of implementation is
rarely budgeted for’ (BMA, 2002: 89).
A further problem of conceptualizing the likely outcomes that emerge from pursuing
particular policy options is that of the deep-rooted tendency among policy-makers and
16 The sport policy process
government ministers towards thinking about social phenomena such as sport and the
issues surrounding sport in ‘present-centred’ terms (Elias, 1978; Goudsblom, 1977). This
deep-rooted tendency to understand various sport policy issues, like many other social
policy issues, from an all too-limiting and present-centred view usually means that,
among other things, many sport policy-makers and development officers rarely attempt to
understand how perceived problems have come to be the way they are. Still less are such
groups constrained to think about the whole range of implications this poses for the
formulation of future policy. As Elias (1978) has noted, this is not altogether surprising
for there has been a long-term and increasing tendency among those involved in planning
and implementing policy to make deliberate and conscious attempts at managing social
change. This is a process that, it should be noted, is part of broader unplanned developments
that have provided the basis for the kinds of planned programmes in which policy-makers
and SDOs are now themselves involved (Dopson and Waddington, 1996).
The tendency for policy-makers and SDOs to ignore the significance of the long-term
interweaving of planned and unplanned processes arises out of the fact that they ‘are all
too often involved in networks of relationships which constrain them to deliver results in
the short-term’ (Dopson and Waddington, 1996: 535). In particular, these groups are
increasingly involved in policy planning and change that is concerned with the here and
now and, in that respect, they frequently emphasize the benefits of a present-oriented and
practically led approach to policy planning over one that is more theoretically informed
and developmental in character (Coalter, 2007a; Dopson and Waddington, 1996). This
tendency has become further exacerbated since the late 1990s by the vulnerability of sport
as a policy area in which the participating groups, especially policy-makers and SDOs,
are under increasing ‘pressure to deliver short-term outcomes in a relatively short
window of opportunity’ (Coalter, 2007a: 44) and because the policy status of sport
increasingly depends on the ability of such groups to ‘prove its cross-cutting value’
(Coalter, 2007a: 44).
There are several problems with adopting such a present-centred approach to policy
planning. The need to engage in a longer-term developmental analysis of the structural
roots of the perceived social problems with which policy-makers are faced and to detach
themselves, insofar as it is possible, from their own entrenched ideological preconceptions
is vital to the process of policy formation. This is because

it is only through striving to understand long-term processes that we can move

towards obtaining an orientation that is sufficiently wide-ranging and reality-congruent
to enable us to decide whether short-term practical measures designed to overcome
difficulties and disadvantages will not, in the longer term, produce difficulties and
disadvantages that are even greater.
(Dopson and Waddington, 1996: 535)

It is our contention, then, that if policy-makers and SDOs wish to improve the effectiveness
of their programmes, and to appreciate what realistically their strategies are likely to
achieve, then it is important that they examine policy problems, not from an overly
involved position, but from a relatively detached and longer-term developmental per-
spective. Of course, we appreciate that it is very difficult within the heat of the struggle
for sport policy-makers and development officers to stand back and try to develop such a
relatively detached view. We are also aware that it is difficult for these groups to begin to
translate into practice – should they be inclined to do so – the insights that could be
 The sport policy process 17
derived from engaging in the foregoing type of abstract sociological reflection. However,
we are of the view that ‘those who are able to do so will almost certainly encounter
fewer problems and will also enhance their chances of achieving rather more of their
stated goals’ (Dopson and Waddington, 1996: 545).

Establishing policy objectives and priorities

It should be clear from our foregoing discussion that the initial phase of the policy process –
that of defining the problems to be targeted and the likely outcomes that result from
doing so – can be fraught with several difficulties. These complexities also characterize
the processes surrounding the setting of desired policy objectives and priorities, that will,
of course, be constrained by the particular circumstances and resources (such as appro-
priately trained staff, equipment, facilities and so on) available for the programmes in
hand. Ideally, before pursuing their agendas, policy-makers would engage in a systematic
review of the effectiveness of existing policies and then seek to form a realistic view of the
obstacles that are in the way of achieving their desired objectives (Coalter, 2007a; Dopson
and Waddington, 1996; Murphy, 1998; Pawson, 2006). They would then seek to ensure
that these objectives are clear and the achievement of one or more of their stated goals
does not undermine the achievement of other goals and existing valued arrangements.
These objectives may vary greatly and can be very specific, and can be broad or narrow
and involve longer or shorter time spans. They can also vary in their complexity and the
degree to which they are categorically achievable or ongoing, whilst the criteria by which
the relative success and relative failure of policy objectives can be assessed should be clear
and easy to determine (Coalter, 2007a; Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Pawson, 2006).
As Coalter (2002) has noted, the desired outcomes from sports development programmes
and policies typically range from being more sport-specific in orientation (e.g. increasing
levels and frequency of sports participation) to more intermediate outcomes that relate to
the impact upon the behaviour of participants (e.g. reduced drug use and increased levels
of fitness and health) and those that are related to wider social or community-wide outcomes
(e.g. reductions in overall levels of crime and drug use).
As subsequent chapters will make clear, a longstanding problem in many policies that
seek to promote sport for sport’s sake and those that use sport and physical activities as
vehicles for achieving other wider social objectives is the lack of consistency and clarity
regarding the objectives of those policies. When ‘objectives’ of one kind or another are
identified, they tend to be overly ambitious, unclear, non-specific and internally incon-
sistent. They are also all too often based on an uncritical and one-sided perception of
sport that amounts almost to a statement of faith in its effectiveness to achieve desired
social outcomes. In this respect, it is not uncommon for sport policy objectives to be
premised on poorly developed and vague rationales. The absence of such clearly devel-
oped rationales and the prevailing tendency for many policies and sports development
programmes to be characterized by largely ideological thinking limits the extent to which
policy-makers and SDOs are likely to achieve their formally stated objectives (Coalter,
2007a; Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Smith and Platts, 2008). This failure may be
traced to three principal and interrelated sources:

(i) their objectives may be impracticable, unrealizable, (ii) even when they are realizable,
their attempts to achieve them may be undermined by their limited perspective and
knowledge and an important aspect of this restricted vision stems from the prevailing
18 The sport policy process
tendency to view the world through eyes which are preoccupied with ideological
concerns, (iii) perhaps, above all, their pursuit of their goals is undermined or at least
mediated by the sheer complexity of the relational network that, ideally, their stra-
tegies should have taken into account. But in truth, the depth of this complexity is
such that even the most sophisticated of thinkers can only aspire to develop strategies
which prove, in the event, to have a degree of adequacy.
(Murphy and Sheard, 2006: 556)

An additional, and particularly salient, problem with which policy-makers and SDOs are
faced is that, like all social phenomena, their policy objectives and the reforms they may
wish to implement exist in a wider social context (Audit Commission, 2009; Coalter,
2007a). It is important, therefore, that they do not see one objective or policy to the
exclusion of other objectives and policies. They are but one element in other human fig-
urations and this is bound to have other, as yet unforeseen and unintended, consequences.
Such consequences are the normal outcomes of the complex, dynamic relational networks in
which policy-makers and SDOs are embroiled, and it is within these networks that such
groups also face the possibility that their interests and objectives may be at variance with
those of other groups since the resources available to meet those interests and objectives are
likely to be scarce. Nevertheless, one of the ways in which policy-makers and SDOs may
seek to anticipate some of these unplanned consequences is by continually monitoring and
evaluating their strategies, and by making modest predictions or forecasts about the future.

Information gathering and forecasting

A third difficulty with developing and implementing effective sport policy is the ability of
policy-makers and SDOs to gather appropriate and relevant information on the problem
to be tackled, and to make predictions regarding the future. These are notoriously com-
plex processes since our ability to predict the future is particularly limited by the power
struggles and accompanying planned and unplanned outcomes associated with the fig-
urational complexity that characterizes the relational networks in which policy-makers
and SDOs find themselves. Such groups are also limited by their knowledge of and ability
to control wider social processes and, as we noted earlier, their capacity for examining all
aspects of the policy process from a relatively detached perspective. Despite these poten-
tial pitfalls, it is important that policy-makers seek to develop among themselves a realistic
appreciation about what is feasible and to recognize the need to be both modest and
sceptical in their predictions. Their assessment of future developments related to the
achievement of their desired ends should also be based on systematically collected,
appropriate evidence that can be gathered within funding constraints and which can be
interpreted by an effective conceptual theoretical framework. In our view, it is an appre-
ciation of the figurational perspective that would appear to have greater explanatory and
practical relevance for policy-makers and SDOs. In particular, it is our contention that if
information gathering and forecasting are to be of practical relevance then they have to
be conducted in as relatively detached a manner as possible. Without doing so it would
be self-defeating for policy-makers to set out to establish what they want to achieve by
selecting only the evidence that supports their own ideological commitments (Coalter,
2007a; Murphy, 1998; Smith and Platts, 2008).
Although it may be that policy-makers and other groups may feel constrained to use
selected evidence for a range of personal and political reasons, and to justify particular
 The sport policy process 19
courses of action, maximizing the effectiveness of any policy can only be achieved by an
ability to combine one’s capacity for relatively detached thinking with the selection of
appropriate policy tools. But what methods could policy-makers use to gather evidence
on the problems with which they are faced and the likely outcomes of their actions?
There are, of course, a range of ways in which policy-makers and SDOs can generate
relevant data to inform their proposed policy solutions. These include observation, sur-
veys, interviews, attendance registers and analyses of the available literature. However,
the selection of which method or, as is most frequently the case, which combination of
methods is used should be determined by the nature of the problem to be tackled (Bloyce,
2004). The extent to which these can inform processes of monitoring and evaluation,
which should be inbuilt in all sport policies, will be discussed at greater length later, but
it is enough here to note that these will, of course, be constrained by the resources (including
time) available and also by the research capacities of those charged with performing the
research.

Policy implementation
In this section we will focus on the implementation phase of the policy process, a stage
that is also characterized by several difficulties that place policy-makers under consider-
able constraints, and that come to threaten, even undermine, the extent to which policy
can be implemented as intended. Before examining these issues, it is worth noting that in
an ideal world policy-makers would wish for themselves ‘complete control’ over the cir-
cumstances in which they find themselves, including the resources and staffing they have
at their disposal, their ability to understand policy problems perfectly, and to implement
their strategies as intended without opposition from other groups within and outside the
organization (Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Murphy, 1998; Smith and Platts, 2008). In
the real world, however, such luxuries are impossible and there are many processes that
are beyond the direct control of policy-makers and limit the extent to which they can
achieve their formally stated goals (Coalter, 2007a; Smith and Platts, 2008). The alloca-
tion of desirable resources – to be discussed in more detail later – that are required to
implement policies effectively, and which should be built into all aspects of the process,
are almost always particularly limited and subject to a variety of competing demands
from different groups.
The outcomes that accrue from the struggles over the distribution of appropriate
resources, and which come to limit the extent to which the proposed policies are designed
and implemented effectively, are exacerbated further if the proposed policies are not cost
effective and are unrealistic or impractical. If sport policies contain any one or a combi-
nation of these elements, then it becomes increasingly problematic to identify whether
any difficulties that are encountered result from the way the policy was designed or from
the processes involved during its implementation. However, even if a policy is realistic
and the requisite resources have been secured and distributed appropriately, its effective-
ness is still dependent upon the understanding, skills and abilities of those who adminis-
ter it as well as those charged with implementation. Indeed, as Dopson and Waddington
(1996: 533) have noted, it is hugely misleading to assume that even if policy-makers were
armed with ‘proper’ information and ‘sound’ management it would still be very difficult
for them to ‘implement change in such a way that the outcome, within closely defined
limits, [was] more or less what was intended’. Among the reasons for this is that
while some groups may have a greater capacity to make crucial decisions over things such
20 The sport policy process
as the content and priorities of policy, they are nevertheless ‘constrained by the nature
and complexity of the human figurations in which they are located and their aspirations
and their strategies are more or less continuously mediated and even thwarted’ (Murphy
and Sheard, 2006: 555) by the other groups involved, such as the implementers them-
selves, intentionally and otherwise. Consequently, it is important for policy-makers and
other key decision-makers to have some appreciation of the power structure of both the
organization and external context within which policy is administered, for it is the power
struggles that accompany policy implementation processes that help to limit significantly
the extent to which they achieve their formally stated goals. The ‘policy–implementation’
or ‘policy–practice’ gap, as it is often referred to, is something that should therefore be
regarded as the norm rather than as something unexpected, for, as we noted above, the
policy implementation process is always accompanied by the unintended, unplanned outcomes
of the interactions of the dynamic, differentially interdependent human beings involved
(Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Murphy and Sheard, 2006; Smith and Platts, 2008).

Monitoring and evaluation

If policy-makers want to know what is ‘going on out there’, so to speak, then they need
to consistently monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their programmes. Although it
could be argued this is not a particularly profound statement, in Britain the importance
of demonstrating evidence of effectiveness has been further enhanced by the increasing
emphasis that the Labour government has come to place on the need to provide evidence
of policy effectiveness in all areas of social policy, not just sport (Coalter, 2007a). The
importance that has come to be placed on ‘evidence-based policy-making’, demonstrating
value for money and the need to undertake outcome evaluation of all areas of public
investment, is also an expression of the ‘increased emphasis on outcomes and effective-
ness and an aspiration to base policy and practice on robust evidence to ensure the
delivery of the government’s policy goals’ (Coalter, 2007a: 1). However, despite this
general, alleged concern amongst government with basing policy and practice on out-
comes and effectiveness (Coalter, 2007a; Pawson, 2006), Coalter (2002: 11) has noted
that, in the world of sport, the ‘systematic monitoring and evaluation of sports develop-
ment programmes (especially those concerned with social inclusion) are in their infancy’.
The frequent failure to integrate these processes throughout all phases of the policy pro-
cess can be related to the general absence of a culture of monitoring and evaluation
within the sports development profession, and the tendency for some policy-makers and
SDOs to be resistant to such processes (Coalter, 2007a; Collins et al., 1999). This may be
due to a general lack of awareness of the processes involved in monitoring and evaluating
programmes and because if, and when, such tasks are undertaken they may come to
indicate something about a lack of clarity concerning the aims and objectives of sports
development programmes and strategies. The general lack and poor quality of monitoring
and evaluation can, moreover, be related to the ways and extent to which both processes
come to be strongly associated with accountability and assigning blame should the pro-
gramme, or elements of the programme, be perceived to be failing according to the agreed
criteria and objectives (Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter, 2007a; Pawson, 2006). It can also be
attributed to the tendency by key decision-makers, when faced with dealing with the
consequences of mounting financial constraints, to cut back on the resources allocated to
the monitoring process in the belief that this will not impact negatively upon the project
(Coalter, 2007a; Collins et al., 1999).
 The sport policy process 21
We clearly recognize that policy-makers frequently operate under a myriad of con-
straints that may result in them relinquishing their attempts to monitor the effectiveness
of their programmes. It is naïve to assume, however, that a policy designed to achieve
particular objectives actually achieves those objectives and that it does not have con-
sequences that, in the event, may well be the very reverse of what was intended. The
failure to monitor and evaluate adequately and continuously the effectiveness of sport
policies is, then, a serious matter of concern, not least because without such inbuilt pro-
cesses it becomes increasingly difficult to monitor the intended and unintended outcomes
of those policies, and so their efficacy is difficult to determine. Thus, insofar as the
development and implementation of sport policies is a complex process that inevitably
has unplanned consequences, it is imperative that such policies are systematically mon-
itored and evaluated with a view to asking whether or not those policies are achieving the
desired ends. It is just as important to monitor and evaluate policy reforms consistently if
we are to minimize what may be held to be potentially undesirable consequences – for
some groups at least – that may arise during their implementation (Coalter, 2007a;
Dopson and Waddington, 1996; Waddington and Smith, 2009).
On the assumption that monitoring and evaluation should be built into all policies
from the outset, and not considered as afterthoughts, ‘add-ons’ or something that can
easily be dispensed with (Coalter, 2007a; Collins et al., 1999; Pawson, 2006), there are a
number of methods that policy-makers can utilize to ‘provide evidence of the extent to
which the programme is being delivered as intended, meeting its targets and making
progress towards the achievement of its objectives’ (Coalter, 2006: 9). The chosen meth-
ods will, of course, be dependent upon the complexity of the processes to be monitored,
but if we are to come to some understanding of the effectiveness of sports development
programmes it is of particular importance that theory-based evaluations of such pro-
grammes are undertaken (Coalter, 2007a; Pawson, 2006). In this regard, Coalter, drawing
heavily upon the work of Pawson and Weiss, has noted that if we wish to better under-
stand why particular sport policies and programmes produce, or are assumed to produce,
particular impacts and outcomes, then, ‘rather than simply measuring outcomes (itself a
very difficult task), what is required is a better understanding of process – which sports
work for which subjects in which conditions’ (Coalter, 2007a: 29). More particularly, if
we are to understand better why programmes achieve desired and unwanted outcomes,
there is a need to move away from more summative approaches to monitoring and eva-
luation that frequently involve simple outcome-based evaluations of the effectiveness of
sports development programmes, towards utilizing more formative approaches that are
participatory, process-led and which are centrally concerned with examining ways of
enhancing the implementation and management of interventions (Coalter, 2007a; Pawson,
2006). As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the alleged need for more process mon-
itoring and evaluation, rather than simple outcome-oriented policy and practice, is said to
require theory-driven evaluations of sports development programmes that involve asking
questions about ‘what type of participation is presumed to lead to what type of outcomes
for what type of participant in what circumstances’ (Coalter, 2007a: 45).
The generation of baseline data – some of which are more quantitative in kind, others
of which can be more qualitatively oriented – is an additional method that is often
encouraged if policy-makers and SDOs are inclined to demonstrate the efficacy of their
programmes (Coalter, 2007a; Collins et al., 1999; Nichols, 2007). Although it is not
uncommon for policies to be implemented without first gathering baseline data, in order
to help make some judgement of the effectiveness of sport-focused interventions it is often
22 The sport policy process
important that baseline data are collected at the outset of the programme to help clarify
the size and nature of the problem before committing time and resources towards its
achievement. Whilst there are numerous methodological difficulties involved in trying to
arrive at a precise estimate of the extent of perceived social problems (e.g. levels of youth
crime and the prevalence of drug use in modern sport) and the seriousness with which
they are viewed, it is important that we strive, insofar as it is possible, to estimate as
accurately as we can the extent of these phenomena among the target groups of the pro-
gramme (see Chapter 4). It is important that we begin to address such questions, because
until they are answered it is difficult to know what criteria should be used in monitoring
and assessing, for example, the success of youth crime and drug reduction and prevention
policies. In this regard, there is a pressing need to define clearly the objectives of any
policy, as well as the groups for whom they are intended, and to specify exactly the cri-
teria for monitoring the success of that policy. The clarity of these criteria and the need
for baseline data will, of course, be dependent upon the clarity of the policy objectives and
aims of the programme, as well as the available resources (Coalter, 2007a; Collins et al.,
1999; Nichols, 2007).
Ideally, monitoring and evaluation should also be continuous processes, for a more
secure and reliable basis from which we can judge policy effectiveness and the outcomes
of its implementation would be to concern ourselves with producing systematically gen-
erated data that are collected over time, and that can be compared to similar programmes
or interventions should they exist (Coalter, 2007a; Crabbe, 2008; Murphy, 1998). While
this is often perceived as a somewhat onerous task, the production of such comparative
data that are collected over the duration of the programme is one worth making and has
the advantage of sensitizing us to the need for learning from the relative success and
failure of such policies as they develop. Longitudinal monitoring techniques such as these
can be impractical, however, and it may be that phased appraisals, or point-in-time
assessments of various kinds, may be more appropriate, though less adequate, means of
identifying the extent to which intermediate objectives and priorities are achieved (Coalter,
2007a; Crabbe, 2008; Nichols, 2007). It may also be the case that the selection of monitoring
techniques is constrained, to a greater or lesser degree, by the preference of some policy-
makers for ‘hard’ quantitative data (particularly in the form of statistical data), even
when more qualitative methods would prove to be more adequate indicators of a programme’s
relative success or failure (Coalter, 2007a; Crabbe, 2008; Nichols, 2007). Indeed, although
some policy-makers ‘are sceptical about the value of qualitative data regarding it as sub-
jective, capable of selective presentation and of limited value to general policy making’
(Coalter, 2006: 44), with intelligent and relatively detached interpretation these data can
frequently offer invaluable insights into the processes involved (Murphy, 1998). This, of
course, is not to deny the possibility that more quantitative data can also be frequently
subject to selective presentation and thus be of limited value to policy-makers.
Regardless of which course of action is taken, it would be wrong to rely entirely on
any one individual monitoring method, for this will provide only a partial and potentially
distorted picture of the processes involved, and of the extent to which any policy or
programme is achieving the desired objectives (Coalter, 2007a; Murphy, 1998). If it is
possible, therefore, it is often useful to complement the data generated by one method (e.g.
through surveys and attendance registers) with those derived from other methods (such as
interviews, leader/coach reports and observations), in order to triangulate – and perhaps
help bolster the reliability of – the findings of the monitoring process. Policy-makers
engaging in the monitoring process can also benefit from engaging in comparative
 The sport policy process 23
analysis of the relative success or failure of their own and other projects (Coalter, 2007a;
Crabbe, 2008; Murphy, 1998). Among other things, this may involve cross-comparisons
between different organizations, societies and historical periods. It may also entail –
although, as we note in subsequent chapters, this is something that is rarely done –
policy-makers seeking to draw upon the knowledge and experiences of those in other
social policy areas (for example cultural and educational policy), and to identify both
similarities and differences between the situations in which they find themselves and those
beyond the immediate context of the project. Finally, ad hoc discussions with the imple-
menters, together with their own observations of direct involvement in the implementation
process and experience of the developing policy, may also offer valuable insights and
knowledge of its effectiveness and success (Coalter, 2007a; 2008; Murphy, 1998). Of
course, this further creates the possibility that policy-makers may bring their own per-
sonal commitments about how policy ought to be pursued to bear upon the monitoring
process, and how its relative success or failure is interpreted. This also increases the
likelihood that policy-makers may seek to claim retrospectively that any of the reported
‘positive effects’ were part of their original plans or, conversely, to deny the connection
between their actions and what are perceived to be the unanticipated ‘negative side-effects’.
As we noted earlier, neither of these scenarios may be seen by some parties as desirable,
yet for other policy-makers the resultant unplanned outcomes that accompany the
implementation of a policy may be highly desirable for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless,
it is crucial that policy-makers seek, insofar as possible, to combine simultaneously their
own level of involvement with a certain critical degree of detachment, especially if the intention
is to develop a more realistic assessment of the intended and unplanned consequences that
accompany policy implementation.
This having been said, in light of the growing political pressure on policy-makers to
develop evidence-based policy and practice, secure additional funding and work with a
range of other stakeholders, it is becoming increasingly likely for outside, or so-called
‘independent’, consultants to be asked to conduct monitoring and evaluation exercises
and/or to act as advisers for developing new policy agendas. This is a tendency that is
becoming increasingly common in many countries, and in the sporting context there are
numerous examples we could cite of the growing involvement of ‘independent’ bodies in
many aspects of the policy process. The publication of the Independent European Sport
Review (IESR) (Aranut, 2006) is a case in point. The IESR was the outcome of a review
of European football initiated by the UK Presidency of the European Union (EU) in 2005,
and is said to be ‘a report, independent of the Football Authorities, but commissioned by
UEFA, on how the European football authorities, EU institutions and member states can
best implement the Nice declaration on European and national level(s)’ (Aranut, 2006:
139). As is invariably the case, the extent to which strategies such as the IESR were
‘independent’ was rather questionable, however (Smith and Platts, 2008); indeed, it is
even noted in the report that the ‘Terms of Reference have been drafted in consultation
with UEFA and … led by UEFA’ (Aranut, 2006: 139). Accordingly, while the sports
ministers of various EU Member States played a central role in the formation of the
report, and despite the self-proclaimed public consultation that accompanied this, it
might be concluded, as Miettinen (2006: 57) has put it, that the IESR was ‘commissioned
by UEFA, written by UEFA about UEFA’. In relation to the monitoring and evaluation of
sports-related programmes in the UK, it might also be noted that commercial organizations
such as Knight, Kavanagh and Page (KKP) have been commissioned to evaluate the
effectiveness of County Sports Partnerships (CSPs); the market research company Ipsos
24 The sport policy process
MORI is charged by Sport England with collecting data on sports participation (see
Chapter 6; Rowe, 2009); Substance, a social research company led by researchers from sev-
eral English universities, conducts case study research in the areas of sport, youth inclusion
and community regeneration (see Chapter 4); and the Audit Commission, together with a
range of other organizations, is responsible for examining the effectiveness of the local pro-
vision of public sport and recreation services (Audit Commission, 2009).
The rationale for the involvement of ‘external’ agencies in monitoring and evaluating
the effectiveness of sport-focused interventions usually takes a variety of forms. It might
be thought, for example, that insofar as monitoring and evaluation require specialized
skills, it is more prudent to utilize agencies with particular expertise in the area (Crabbe,
2008; Murphy, 1998). It could also be, in principle at least, that ‘outsiders’ have the
advantage of lifting the burden from already busy staff, help distance the latter from the
appraisal of projects in which they themselves may have been involved and subsequently
avoid the possibility that the failure of any policy can be attributed to one particular
individual or group within the responsible organization (Murphy, 1998). As we alluded to
above, however, in reality outside consultants are not always as ‘independent’ as they
first appear. They may, for example, bring with them their own priorities and pre-
conceptions of how a particular organization ought to be run, how a particular policy
ought to be pursued, reappraised or dropped, or what, in their view, constitutes relative
policy success and failure (Crabbe, 2008; Murphy, 1998). They may also be under pres-
sure to tailor their findings towards the particular objectives and interests of the host
organization. All these scenarios and more are possible, but they each carry with them
the possibility that aspects of monitoring and evaluation processes, and the reports on
which they are based, become distorted in a variety of ways (Murphy, 1998). It is fre-
quently advisable, therefore, to approach the reports of external consultants with a
degree of scepticism, particularly when they are made available for public consumption.
It is also important to be alive to the possibility that the conclusions drawn could be
based on the extent to which some groups have been successful in ensuring that the findings
reflect positively on their actions. By contrast, claims to the effect that a policy has been
particularly successful or otherwise may also be an expression of the ways in which other
groups have sought to cast unfavourable light on and mediate the actions of others.
It should be clear, then, that none of the available options to monitor and evaluate
policy effectively is without its respective pitfalls. As a consequence, a consideration of
the techniques for monitoring and evaluating policy, how these processes are to be con-
ducted, and who will be assigned the responsibility of such tasks, should be decided at
the outset and form an ongoing part of the policy process. The same might also be said
for issues of resource allocation.

Resource allocation and budget planning

All phases and elements of the policy process do, of course, operate within a variety of
resource and budgetary constraints. These constraints come to limit significantly the
kinds of policies that can be realistically pursued. In that respect, all policies and sports
development programmes have to be devised and implemented with these limitations in
mind, although the priorities and resources given to different policies are matters of some
contention. It is important to note, however, that these constraints are not just aspects of
the overall power struggles that accompany the struggle over resources for the immediate
policies being devised. As an aspect of the relational networks that characterize the policy
 The sport policy process 25
process as a whole, they also have implications for other policies and proposals within
the same organization and, consequently, can impact on the decision to pursue one policy
option over another. For example, the allocation of appropriate resources can be frequently
dependent on the relative success or failure of existing policies, as well as the relation-
ships between the budget-holders and other groups within and outside an organization.
These relational constraints, and the consequent budgetary and resource implications,
are, of course, subject to considerable local variation, and are dependent upon the nature
of the problem to be tackled and the objectives of the proposed policies (Coalter, 2007a;
Murphy, 1998). The precise nature of this variation can only be determined empirically,
but there are several techniques that policy-makers can use to determine the most cost-
effective way of achieving their desired goals, namely, cost–benefit analysis and a balance
sheet approach (Coalter, 2002; 2006; Gratton and Taylor, 2000; Murphy, 1998).
The first of these, the cost–benefit analysis approach, is perhaps the most commonly
used technique in which an attempt is made to calculate and judge the direct and indirect
costs and benefits of pursuing a particular policy. This frequently involves assigning a
monetary value to various ‘factors’ and is an approach that underlies most attempts to
determine whether particular projects (e.g. staging the Olympic Games or building a new
local leisure centre) represent value for money (see Chapter 7). The approach can sensi-
tize us to the fact that not all costs and benefits of policy are incurred immediately. It can
also help decision-makers, over time, with budget planning. It is, however, a notoriously
difficult task to achieve and it is not always possible for some costs and benefits to be
expressed in financial or monetary terms (e.g. the ‘feel good’ factor of hosting the Olympics)
(Coalter, 2002; 2006; Gratton and Taylor, 2000; Murphy, 1998). More particularly, cost–
benefit analysis is not always an appropriate technique to determine the allocation of
resources and can, in some cases, even come to determine the particular direction of
policy and structure the activities of the implementers. It is also an approach during the
course of which key selective and subjective decisions are made, but which nevertheless
remain hidden behind the presentation of seemingly ‘hard’ and reliable statistical data.
As Murphy (1998) has noted, a more promising method that helps decision-makers
come to some judgement about the implications of pursing a particular policy is the
balance sheet approach. Pursuing this approach, he contends, helps policy-makers to
resist the tendency to reduce everything to a common (financial) denominator and involves
assessing the range of costs and benefits in terms of a number of criteria (Murphy, 1998).
These criteria can be largely quantitative, economic and numerically based, but the balance
sheet approach also permits the use of more qualitative means of assessment where this is
applicable. Such an approach is, of course, no less subjective than pursuing the cost–benefit
method, but it can be a more adequate means by which to clarify the most realistic and
appropriate policy option to pursue if it is conducted systematically and in an upfront way
(Gratton and Taylor, 2000; Murphy, 1998). In our view, the balance sheet approach repre-
sents the most appropriate means of helping policy-makers to come to deal with the una-
voidable budgetary constraints under which they work, and of addressing their often
overwhelming priority, namely, how to achieve their desired goals and deliver the most effi-
cient service at the lowest possible cost (Coalter, 2007a; Collins et al., 1999; Murphy, 1998).

Policy succession and policy closure

The final phase of the policy process that we shall consider here is that of policy succession
and closure. Before briefly examining the processes involved, it should be stressed that we
26 The sport policy process
use the word ‘final’ in a cautionary way, for, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter,
all policies emerge out of existing relationships and policies that are in a constant state of
flux. Like all complex social processes, policy and organizational change are unavoidable
features of the policy process given the consensual and conflicting elements that accom-
pany the dynamic power struggles between the various groups involved. As we shall see
in Chapter 2, however, a strong degree of continuity also exists in the policy agendas
of various sporting and non-sporting organizations. But let us return to our central
question.
Like policies generally, some sport policies are designed to run over a set period of
time, while others are implemented (with modifications along the way in some cases) and
then terminated once a particular problem has been resolved, partially alleviated or per-
haps even considered to be insurmountable (Coalter, 2007a; Murphy, 1998). In other
situations, there may be an open-ended commitment to particular policies that are subject
to periodic reviews, and which may or may not be contingent upon continued funding,
the availability of staff and other resource constraints. Regardless of which of these sce-
narios prevails, when there is the possibility of policy change, especially radical policy
and structural change, such moves are likely to be met with strong resistance by some
parties within an organization. Depending on the nature of the policy to be implemented
such resistance may also be met by outsiders as well. This is largely because such moves –
which can emanate from within and outside an organization – can be perceived to
threaten some, if not all, the interests of policy-makers and other members of that orga-
nization (Coalter, 2007a; Murphy, 1998). Even if upon the completion of a project that
was established to tackle a specific policy problem that programme is then subsequently
threatened with closure, the personnel involved may wish to seek to prolong the length of
the prevailing policy to protect, maintain and advance their own vested interests. They
may also do so to undermine those of others.
As we noted earlier, because of their differential power chances and divergent interests
not all groups are able to or want to adapt to the same degree, or in the same way, to
impending structural and policy change. Some groups may be more capable of adapting
to such changes because of the significance of their policy remit and/or the skills of their
members. Some may do so because of the attitudes of their members and the sufficiently
high degree of coordination and consensus among them. Others may have the ability to
survive by coping with and accommodating the proposed modifications without under-
mining their existence and operations (Coalter, 2007a; Murphy, 1998). Finally, it may
also be that some organizations and decision-makers have the potential to adapt to
changes in the continually changing policy environment but do not recognize this capacity.
This limited perspective may stem from a number of sources. These include an unwillingness
to contemplate change, and an unswerving belief among members of an organization in
their own abilities and experiences to withstand the outcomes that may result from
change. This restricted vision may also be traceable to the limited knowledge among key
personnel of the merits of monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of their current
policies and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their own organization, which, of
course, is itself constituted by complex networks of human figurations (Coalter, 2007a;
Murphy, 1998). It is clear, therefore, that if policy-makers and other members of staff are
able to internalize the need to monitor and evaluate their activities continuously and
systematically, then it is more likely that they will be able to respond better to, and perhaps
even withstand, the sometimes dramatic changes that can characterize the dynamic
environment in which they work.
 The sport policy process 27
Summary
The central objective of this chapter has been to outline the beginnings of a figurational
approach to the study of policy processes that, we believe, can help to explain these
processes more adequately on a theoretical level. It is also an approach that can be of
practical relevance for policy-makers and SDOs who are faced, in the course of their day-
to-day activities, with constraints that come to limit the extent to which they are able to
achieve their own personal and/or group interests and objectives. Throughout the chapter
we have stressed the need to focus upon the following interdependent features of a fig-
urational analysis of the policy process: the composite unit in which policy-makers and
SDOs find themselves; the planned and unplanned processes that result from the more or
less goal-directed actions of the various groups involved; the importance of power as an
aspect of interdependency ties; the importance of approaching the policy problem in a
relatively detached frame of mind; and the need to locate the policy problem being
addressed in its wider social context.
We are acutely aware that the foregoing analysis may be interpreted as a sceptical view
of the policy process but, if that is a view which prevails, we would stress that it should
not be dismissed as sceptical, but as a realistic view of the difficulties associated with
formulating and implementing effective sport policy and sports development programmes.
As we noted earlier, it is an analysis that is predicated on the premise that our under-
standing of and our ability to control social processes are, in reality, particularly limited
because of the constraints imposed upon us as people and our knowledge of those pro-
cesses. This recognition of our limited ability to control social processes generally, and
policy processes specifically, is not to argue that we have no control, and nor does it
imply that we should abandon our attempts to pursue formally stated policy goals and
agendas that may have hitherto proved to be particularly limited. On the contrary, we
would argue that it should be the goal of policy-makers to strive to make their strategies
more effective. This is a task that, in our view, would benefit fruitfully from the insights
that can be derived from a figurational perspective on the policy process and sports
development more specifically, even though the perceived interests of other groups may
be damaged as a consequence. Finally, and this is a point that cannot be emphasized too
strongly, we would stress that our foregoing analysis cannot capture all of the complex-
ities involved, particularly in relation to local variations in the policy formation and
implementation process. It is, however, presented with a view to enhancing the adequacy
of our understanding of the policy process. In Chapter 2, we seek to develop a related
feature of our figurational analysis of sports development and policy by examining the
emergence and development of sport policy and the sports development profession in
Britain since the 1960s.

Revision questions
1 Provide a sociological examination of a sports development strategy of either a
local authority or NGB of your choice.
2 To what extent can the sport policy process be explained adequately from a
figurational sociological perspective?
3 What practical insights may be developed from the analysis presented in this
chapter for either sport policy-makers or SDOs?
28 The sport policy process
Key readings
Coalter, F. (2007a) A Wider Social Role for Sport: Who’s Keeping the Score?, London: Routledge.
Elias, N. (1978) What is Sociology?, London: Hutchinson.
Pawson, R. (2006) Evidence-Based Policy: A Realist Perspective, London: Sage.

Recommended websites
Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy: www.evidencebasedpolicy.org
Demos: www.demos.co.uk
Institute for Public Policy Research: www.ippr.org.uk
2 The emergence and development of sport
policy

Objectives
This chapter will:
 examine the changing organization and administration of sport in the UK since
the 1960s;
 explore increasing government involvement in sport policy; and
 examine how key government policy changes are currently impacting on sport
policy priorities.

Introduction
The organization and administration of sport in many countries, including Britain, have
undergone considerable change over the past fifty years or so and these changes have had
a significant impact on the ways in which SDOs have sought to develop and implement a
variety of sport policy and development strategies. While it is impossible to trace here all
of the complexities involved in this regard, the central objective of this chapter is to
examine some of the major organizational changes that have impacted on sport policy
through the shifting priorities of government. This is important, it is argued, for in order
to adequately understand something of the ways and extent to which government sport
policy and development priorities are currently being implemented, it is necessary to
examine how the present situation of sport policy-making and sports development activity
has developed. It is equally necessary to examine something about the changing political
and policy priorities given not only to the role of local authorities and NGBs of sport in
implementing national sport policy, but also to the emphasis given to sport as an aspect
of local authority sport policy and development provision more generally.

The 1960s to mid-1970s: growing systematic government involvement in sport

Although we clearly recognize that the roots of the organization and administration of
modern sport can be traced back to England, in particular, during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (Dunning et al., 2004; Holt, 1989; Houlihan and White, 2002), it was the
period between the 1960s and mid-1970s that was characterized by a growing willingness by
the British government to accept sport and leisure as a legitimate area of public policy,
not least because of the commitment towards developing and sustaining the welfare state
ideology and the recognition of the growing social significance of sport. Indeed, in the
30 The emergence and development of sport policy
period before the 1960s and 1970s, there was little, if any, ‘systematic central government
interest in sport’ (Coalter, 2007a: 9). The prevailing political preference was for non-
intervention in either setting the sport policy agenda or organizing and administrating
sport, especially because the then established view of sport as an amateur pursuit meant
that many politicians came to see sport as something with which government should not
be concerned. On those occasions when government did become more involved in the
provision of sport, it was ‘reluctant intervention, justified only by the … need to achieve
urgent social goals, such as the combating of potential social disorder [with unemploy-
ment very high], or of preparations for war’ (Henry and Bramham, 1993: 113). In other
words, while there was initially a strong degree of reluctance to intervene in the provision
of sport, the growing receptivity of government to sport and the potential benefits of
sport as a malleable policy tool that could be used to help achieve particular social
objectives related to the welfare state (Coalter, 2007a; Henry and Bramham, 1993; Hou-
lihan and White, 2002) meant that sport began increasingly to gain ‘support from those
who saw it as a vehicle for social cohesion and integration’ (Keech, 2003: 15). This view
of the potential use of sport as a tool for social cohesion and promoting national prestige
amongst members of the British government was further encouraged by the more explicit
ways in which governments in Europe, in particular, were beginning to view the social
role of sport. As Coghlan (1990: 7–8) has noted, ‘the belief that sport had a larger role to
play in society was debated, and underlying it all the thoughts that Government should
be in some way more involved were entering the minds of sports administrators’, parti-
cularly because of the financial gains that could be made from political support for sport
during this period.
Despite the initial government antipathy towards sport in the early decades of the
twentieth century, one of the key organizations that came to play a central role in sport
policy and sports development activity in Britain was the Central Council for Physical
Recreation (CCPR), the inauguration of which, in 1935, was primarily a response to
growing concerns over the health of the nation (CCPR, 1960). The CCPR was, and still
is, an independent voluntary body representing a wide range of governing bodies in the
promotion, improvement and development of sport. In 1957, the CCPR commissioned Sir
John Wolfenden to serve as Chair of a Committee to examine the status of sport in the
UK, and the subsequent ‘Wolfenden Report’, published in 1960, not only raised the pro-
file of sport among government, but also helped provide ‘the context within which public
involvement in sport was to be considered for the next generation’ (Houlihan and White,
2002: 18). In view of the perceived interest that government was taking in sport and the
sport policy and development policy agendas, Coghlan (1990: 11) has claimed that the
Wolfenden Report was published against what he referred to as a ‘somewhat euphoric
background’. For the most part, this was because the Report was published within the
context of growing public, media and even political support for greater funds to be
directed at sport, and especially following the perceived success of the British Olympic
team at the Summer Olympics that took place in Rome during the same year. The Report
and the implications of its contents were not met with universal acclaim, however, for
some within the British Olympic Association (BOA), for example, expressed particularly
strong reservations about the Committee that was to produce the Wolfenden Report,
since no BOA members were to be represented on it. In particular, there were said to be
concerns by bodies such as the BOA that ‘the CCPR might attempt to use it to increase
its own power and influence at the expense of other bodies’ (Evans, 1974: 146). Similar
concerns over the lack of representation on the Committee were also expressed by the
 The emergence and development of sport policy 31
Scottish and Welsh arms of the CCPR, who felt that they, too, were not sufficiently
represented on the Committee (Evans, 1974).
When the Wolfenden Report was eventually published in September 1960, it was the
most comprehensive policy document concerning the organization and administration of
sport that had been seen in Britain until that time. The Report focused, in particular, on
young people and was concerned with, amongst other things, the opportunities available
for developing better and more readily available sports facilities and coaching, and
argued that there was a need to improve the broader organization and administration of
sport in the country (CCPR, 1960). It is also important to note, however, that while the
Report extolled many taken for granted assumptions about the apparent contribution
that sport could make to alleviating a variety of social problems, such as those related to
criminal behaviour, health and education (see Chapters 3–5), the claims that were made
about the alleged social impacts of sport were accompanied by a degree of circumspection
that has rarely been seen in sport policy documents published in Britain since. In relation
to the supposed character-building qualities that are often thought to be developed
through sports participation, the Report acknowledged that while these qualities may be
an outcome of participation, ‘it is easy to exaggerate (and to react from) this kind of
claim’ (CCPR, 1960: 5). A similarly appropriate and cautious conclusion was also arrived
at in relation to the use of sport as a vehicle of social policy designed to prevent youth
crime. In this regard, the CCPR (1960: 4) claimed, once again, that while sport could be
expected to make a contribution to reducing crime and anti-social behaviour among young
people, it was recognized that ‘the causes of criminal behaviour are complex, and we are not
suggesting that it would disappear if there were more tennis courts or running tracks’.
Beyond the reference that was made to the alleged contribution that sport could make
to addressing particular social problems, the majority of the Report focused very much
on the promotion of sport for sport’s sake and especially the need to raise participation
levels in sport and reduce the numbers of young people who drop out of sport upon the
end of compulsory schooling. This policy focus came to be expressed on the basis of
what the Report identified as a

manifest break between, on the one hand, the participation in recreational physical
activities which is normal for boys and girls at school, and, on the other hand, their
participation in similar (though not necessarily identical) activities some years later
when they are more adult.
(CCPR, 1960: 25)

Concern with this so-called ‘Wolfenden Gap’ became a key policy priority that has
remained a more or less central feature of sport policy over the last thirty years or so,
and for many groups it is still seen as a key area for sports development work (see
Chapter 3). At the time when the Report was published, it was claimed that to help
reduce the dropout rate from sport and physical activity ‘young people, particularly at the
stage of adolescents [need to be] given the opportunity for tasting a wide range of phy-
sical activities’ (CCPR, 1960: 7). It was also alleged that to support the encouragement of
young people towards participating in a wider range of sports and physical activities
more sports facilities needed to be developed, and, in that respect, the Report encouraged
the Conservative government at the time to make the £5 million funding available
annually that had been promised in its pre-election campaigns for facility development
and the enhancement of sport provision (CCPR, 1960).
32 The emergence and development of sport policy
It was not altogether surprising, therefore, that a second main recommendation of the
Report was that a new body, a Sports Development Council (SDC), be created, with
responsibilities for the distribution of government grants to sporting organizations (such
as the CCPR and governing bodies of sport) and the promotion of sport generally. In
particular, the Report concluded that while ‘no fundamental change is suggested in the
general pattern of our sports organisation’, there was a need for ‘greater co-operation
and integration’ (CCPR, 1960: 109) between the numerous NGBs, other national organi-
zations with responsibility for sport, including the National Playing Fields Association
(NFPA), the BOA and the CCPR, and the various local authorities who had some
responsibility for sport and leisure provision as well. To this end, it was proposed that
the SDC could help to encourage greater cooperation between the diverse groups whose
interests and motivations for the provision of sport within their own organizations were,
to a greater or lesser degree, likely to be similar and/or at distinct variance to those of
other groups. The Report recognized, however, some of the problems that would inevi-
tably be encountered by trying to bring about greater cooperation between the various
competing groups who comprised the complex networks of relationships within which sport
and sports development were organized and provided. The significance of these figurational
complexities for enhancing the organization of sport found particular expression in the
Report when it was stated that:

In a field where progress and development must manifestly depend in the main upon
voluntary service and personal, and often very specialised, enthusiasms, it would be
illusory to hope for the elimination of all overlapping, ‘empire-building’ or self-
centredness … Therefore, occasional signs that a few bodies of people take a some-
what narrow view of their responsibilities or attach a rather disproportionate
importance to their own activities have not worried us unduly. Such things are inseparable
from volunteers and pioneers alike, whether in sport or in other spheres.
(CCPR, 1960: 53)

In addition to the important role that the Council could potentially adopt in relation to
enhancing the organizational efficiency of sport, it was recommended that the Council
should remain ‘independent’ from government to preserve the so-called ‘non-political’
nature of sport. In this regard, the Report concluded that the inauguration of the SDC,
unlike the distinctly political Ministry of Sport that existed in France, for example, would
help preserve the alleged apolitical nature of sport and offset any public criticism that
could be expressed over the perceived ‘incongruous juxtaposition of departmental control
and private leisure-time activity’ (CCPR, 1960: 97). Despite the fact that the Report was
‘supported by powerful personalities in both the House of Commons and the House of
Lords’ (Coghlan, 1990: 11), the then Conservative government failed to respond to the
proposal by Wolfenden that a new umbrella organization, the SDC, be formed to develop
sport. In December 1962, they did, however, make Lord Hailsham, an existing Cabinet
minister, a ‘Minister with special responsibility for Sport’. Although the appointment of
Lord Hailsham was one indication of the growing political recognition of, and interest in,
sport at the time, for the most part the Conservative Party retained the view that sport
should be dealt with at arms length by the government. This was a view that was shared
by Lord Hailsham, who suggested that ‘whilst he agreed with the substance of the
Wolfenden Report, he did not agree with the establishment of a Sports Development
Council’ (Coghlan, 1990: 12).
 The emergence and development of sport policy 33
Whilst the then Conservative government failed to respond to the proposal by Wolfenden
that a new umbrella organization be formed to develop sport, this body – established in
1965 – became known as the Advisory Sports Council (ASC) following the election of a
Labour government in 1964. Having supported the proposal of an SDC in opposition, the
newly elected Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, stated that sport was one of those subjects
(like the arts) ‘essential to Britain’s economic and social development which had not been
given priority in the past’ (Wilson; quoted in Polley, 1998: 21). Denis Howell was
appointed to a new junior ministerial position within government, the Sports Minister,
and he subsequently became the first Chair of the ASC and was supported by various
staff from the CCPR who were seconded to help run the ASC, including the General
Secretary, Walter Winterbottom, who became Director of the ASC. Although the ASC
was not the ‘independent’ body sought after in the Wolfenden Report, the new Labour
government considered that the Council should be run for government and it was
expected that the Council would advise the government on sport in terms of the standard
of facilities available, the use of the available resources and priorities for the coaching of
sport, as well as ‘to foster cooperation among the statutory [local] authorities and
voluntary organizations concerned’ with sport (ASC, 1965).
The main policy priorities that characterized sport policy during the 1960s related to
maintaining and enhancing social order and increasing international sporting success, as
well as meeting the demand for wider opportunities for people to participate in sport and
physical activity (Henry and Bramham, 1993; Green and Houlihan 2005; Houlihan, 1997).
This was related to ‘increasing electoral pressure for an expansion of sport and recreation
facilities’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005: 52) in light of the significant degree of publicity
that had been attracted by the Wolfenden Report (Coghlan, 1990). This was also a period
in which the competing policy emphases of promoting elite sport and mass participation
began to emerge as the various groups involved in the organization of sport in Britain
were, in essence, involved in either the promotion of elite-level sport or ‘Sport For All’.
Indeed, one more or less consistent feature of government policy for sport in Britain ever
since has been set around the increasing tensions amongst those involved in the sport
policy community regarding the promotion of elite or mass sport participation. At this
relatively early stage in the debate over which of these dual sport policy objectives should
be prioritized in policy terms, however, there was said to be a large measure of consensus
among the various groups involved. This, ostensibly, was because ‘an increase in facilities
was the first priority’ (Houlihan, 1991: 99) for all those involved in the development of
sport regardless of particular allegiances and interests.
The emphasis that came to be placed on the enhancement of facility provision as one
of the first priorities for the ASC is not altogether surprising, for, as Coghlan (1990) has
noted, in 1964 it was estimated that there were no more than four indoor sports centres
in the UK. The perceived need to embark upon a programme of facility building was
limited by the prevailing lack of government and public funds that were available for
sport. Accordingly, to help meet the expectation that more facilities would be built to
enhance the provision for sport for members of the population, members of the ASC
were increasingly constrained to generate monies to help meet this obligation. In this
regard, ‘as the main providers would increasingly be the municipal authorities the
Council agreed that a partnership between local authorities and sports people should be
established regionally’ (Coghlan, 1990: 24). To this end, the ASC established numerous
Regional Sports Councils in England, and Councils for Scotland and Wales, that were
also to be advisory councils to the ASC. With increased public funding becoming
34 The emergence and development of sport policy
available for distribution through the ASC, there was a perceived need to employ pro-
fessional staff within many of the NGBs, which were all still largely staffed by honorary
officers and officials, and volunteers. The appointment of development officers within
many of the NGBs was seen to be ‘crucial for many governing bodies … particularly as
these appointments were grant-aided from public funds’ (Coghlan, 1990: 35–36).
Following the election of a new Conservative government in 1970, it was intended that
a ‘Sports Council’ with executive powers be developed as a body ‘independent’ of gov-
ernment, since many members of the Conservative Party still claimed that sport should
operate at arms length from the government and considered Denis Howell’s position as
both MP and Chair of the ASC inappropriate. Given this situation, in 1971 the Con-
servative government proposed that the ASC be given executive powers by way of
granting a ‘Royal Charter’. In this regard, the Scottish Sports Council and the Sports
Council for Wales were established with ‘Royal Charter’ statutes in December 1971 and
February 1972, respectively. A Great Britain Sports Council, that would have specific
responsibility for England, was also finally established by Royal Charter in the summer
of 1972 (a Sports Council for Northern Ireland was established in January 1974), at a
time when sport was becoming increasingly recognized as an accepted area of government
policy. The decision to establish the various Councils as ‘executive’ bodies was, initially,
expected to result in the break-up of the CCPR since it was to be subsumed into the new
executive Sports Councils. However, after much deliberation at various CCPR meetings,
it was decided that, although most of the paid staff of the CCPR were to transfer to work
for the Sports Council, the CCPR would remain as an organization that would serve as
the consultative body to the Sports Councils and act as a general voice for the NGBs that
constituted its membership (Coghlan, 1990; Evans, 1974). The assets of the CCPR, such
as the National Centres that had been set up with charitable status under their auspices,
were transferred to a charitable trust, with the Sports Council as trustee. This ‘arrange-
ment’, Houlihan (1991: 91) notes, ‘reflected the CCPR’s misgivings at losing control over
major sports resources’. Houlihan adds in this connection that although the creation of
the executive Sports Council was ‘warmly welcomed’ by many within the sports com-
munity, especially as there remained a desire to establish more sports facilities around the
country, ‘it posed serious problems for the relationship with the CCPR’ (Houlihan, 1991: 91).
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that since the Sports Council was to be funded
by Exchequer funds, various tensions and conflicts accompanied the prevailing pattern
of relationships that existed between the two organizations at the time (Jackson, 2008).
Indeed, as the emergent network of relationships that came to characterize the organiza-
tion and administration of sport at the national, regional and local levels lengthened
and became more complex, ‘the question of which organization did what and which
was more important in British sport continued to dog development’ (Coghlan, 1990: 32)
and helped undermine the extent to which the government could realize its sport policy
goals.
Notwithstanding the relational complexities that were coming to impact on the
operations of the various organizations involved in the administration of sport during
this period, the granting of Royal Charter status meant that the Councils were defined as
executive bodies and nominally free from ministerial control. This effectively meant that
the Sports Council became a non-departmental public body (NDPB) – that is, a body that

has a role in the processes of national government, but is not a government depart-
ment, or part of one, and which accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at
 The emergence and development of sport policy 35
arm’s length from ministers … Ministers are however ultimately responsible to Par-
liament for a NDPB’s independence, its effectiveness and efficiency.
(Cabinet Office, 2006: 2)

More specifically, Haywood et al. (1995) have claimed that while Royal Charter status
was granted to the Sports Council to ensure sport remained at arms length from the
government, its ‘insulation from governmental influence has been eroded’ (Haywood et
al., 1995: 191) gradually over time. Despite the claimed independence that the government
would have from the Sports Council, it is, of course, highly unlikely to find that a large
degree of formal independence could exist between the two groups (see Chapter 1). As
Polley has noted, the extent to which the Council could operate ‘independently’ of the
government is minimal, given that the Council

was to be chaired and constituted by government appointees, funded by government,

and should, in the words of the Royal Charter, ‘have regard to any general statements
on the policy of Our Government that may from time to time be issued to it by Our
Secretary of State’.
(Polley, 1998: 22)

The inability of the Sports Council to retain a significant measure of independence from
the political influence and policy priorities of increasingly interventionist government
ministers during this, and subsequent, periods is not altogether surprising, as the differ-
ential networks of interdependencies of which these groups were a part were becoming
increasingly complex and characterized by power struggles of many kinds. Indeed, one
consequence of the increasing figurational complexity and the interweaving of the more
or less goal-directed actions of large numbers of people who constituted the Sports
Council and government was the emergence of a series of outcomes that no one planned.
A good example of this is the ensuing tension that developed between the Sports Council
and the CCPR. The CCPR, when it commissioned the Wolfenden Report, did not intend
for its organizational status to be threatened or refined in some way. And nor, for that
matter, did the Sports Council intend for the CCPR, which remained as a separate
organization, to develop as a rival organization with a more effective means of lobbying.
As we noted in Chapter 1, these outcomes can be seen as an expression of unequal power
relations and differential relational constraints between the various groups involved
whose interests and perceptions are likely to diverge.

The mid-1970s to the early 1980s: facility development and target group
identification
One of the main priorities of the Sports Council was to increase the facilities for public
participation in sport and physical activity and, while there had been some development
of leisure centres and swimming pools in the 1960s, it was during the period from the
early 1970s to the early 1980s that a transformation of ‘the opportunities for participating
in sport’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 21) became an increasing policy priority for SDOs.
This was also a period during the course of which the emphasis in sport policy came to
be characterized by a rapid expansion in the development of sport and leisure centres in
local authorities funded primarily by the Sports Council and other public organizations.
As a consequence, through the grant aid that they received from the Sports Council, local
36 The emergence and development of sport policy
authorities came increasingly to be seen as significant providers of opportunities and
facilities to participate in sport and physical activity. Indeed, between 1971 and 1981 the
Sports Council helped local authorities within the public sector to ‘achieve the construction
of over 500 new swimming pools and almost 450 new indoor sports centres’ (Houlihan
and White, 2002: 21). The increased expenditure within local authorities was also, in
large measure, associated with the reorganization of local government during the early
1970s, one consequence of which was the establishment of larger units of authority, with
considerably greater budgets (Houlihan, 1991). In this regard, during this period those
working in the sports development field became locked increasingly into wider networks
of relationships that began to comprise many local councillors within some local autho-
rities who regarded the development of state of the art leisure centres as a means of
securing votes from local residents, and who often competed with neighbouring autho-
rities to provide the best available sports facilities (Jackson, 2008). The increasing level of
investment in sports facilities in local authorities was, in turn, strongly associated with
the perceived lack of appropriate facilities available for both participation and perfor-
mance sport, despite the lack of obvious strategic direction for the funding to be spent
(Coalter, 2007a; Houlihan and White, 2002; Jackson, 2008).
Facility development remained a key aspect of sport policy even following the further
change in the British government that saw the Labour Party elected to office in 1974.
Denis Howell was once again appointed to the junior position of Minster for Sport
within the new government, even though he had initially ‘been opposed to the establish-
ment of the executive Sports Council’ (Coghlan, 1990: 57) during a short tenure as Chair
of the CCPR whilst he served as a Member of Parliament in opposition. As Coghlan
(1990: 57) has noted, the election of Howell as the Chair of the CCPR had been con-
troversial and added further to the ‘conflict with the Sports Council which has continued
to a greater or lesser extent to the present day’. However, under the terms of the Royal Charter
the Labour government was not in a position to repeal the executive powers of the Sports
Council. The poor economic climate within Britain, as elsewhere, at this time also meant that
the organization of sport was said to require better coordination and management. This was to
be funded largely by using existing resources given the considerable financial constraints that
the previous desire to develop new sports halls, swimming pools and other sports facilities had
brought to bear upon those working in local authorities.
In an attempt to provide a more cohesive sport policy strategy, in 1975, the British
government published, for the first time, a White Paper on sport, entitled Sport and
Recreation. Among many other things, the government distinguished between ‘sport’ and
‘recreation’, with the former being regarded as the performance and excellence dimension
of sports development work, and the latter said to be more concerned with mass parti-
cipation (Department of the Environment [DoE], 1975). By distinguishing between these
features of sports development, Houlihan and White (2002: 25) argue that this made it
‘more difficult to conceptualise sports development as an integrated set of activities and
objectives’. To this they add that while the Sports Council may have adopted the slogan
‘Sport For All’ as their policy mantra, they also ‘stressed that elite competitive sport was
as much a part of Sport For All as the provision of community opportunities for parti-
cipation’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 25). The White Paper also expressed the govern-
ment’s view that there was a need for ‘a tightening-up of organisational arrangements (to
ensure against duplication and overlapping), for the fuller use of existing facilities, and
for the establishment of a clear order of priorities for such limited new provision as may
be possible’ (DoE, 1975: 2). In addition, it was stated that ‘the role of government is to
 The emergence and development of sport policy 37
co-ordinate and give a lead to the planning and use of resources within the community’
and not ‘to adopt a paternalistic attitude to the many different providers of recreation in
this country’ (DoE, 1975: 4). It was not altogether surprising, therefore, to find that while
local authorities, in the view of government, had ‘become the main providers of new
sports facilities and of parks and open spaces for informal outdoor recreation in the
towns’ (DoE, 1975: 8), there was no government support for the idea ‘that a statutory
duty should be placed on certain local authorities to provide adequate recreational facilities’
(DoE, 1975: 9). This was, in large measure, because of the evident concerns that came to
be expressed in the prevailing economic climate, where constraining local authorities to
make ‘adequate recreational facilities’ available to members of the community would
place even greater financial pressure upon the budgets of local authorities. In relation to
sport and recreation this was particularly significant, for since both were not statutory
services that local authorities would provide to their residents, the budgets of sport and
recreation services were often the first to be reduced, often substantially so, to help
manage the mounting financial pressures with which local authorities were faced (Coalter,
2007a; Houlihan and White, 2002).
As well as concentrating on the perceived need to enhance the organization and
administration of sport, additional emphasis came to be placed on the increasing desire of
the government for the Sports Council to use sport as a vehicle for ‘community develop-
ment’ and for achieving a range of non-sport government objectives. As Polley (1998: 22)
has noted, the White Paper ‘was particularly blunt on this, with its claim that “by redu-
cing boredom and urban frustration, participation in active recreation contributes to the
reduction of hooliganism and delinquency among young people”’. Against this growing
emphasis that came to be placed on the role of sport in the achievement of wider social
objectives, the government accepted that ‘recreation [including sport] should be regarded
as … part of the general fabric of the social services’ (DoE, 1975: 1). This was a clear
departure from the more circumspect announcements that were to be found within the
Wolfenden Report published fifteen years earlier, and by this time there was a very clear,
openly declared interest from the government in viewing ‘sport as an instrument of social
policy’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 28) that began to be more narrowly focused upon the needs
of particular target groups. To this end, Sport and Recreation focused, in particular, upon the
needs of young people, but also disabled people, retired people and women, especially mothers,
and provided the context within which, during the early 1980s, ‘there were clear signs of a shift
away from facility provision … to a strategy of concentrating resources on particular sports or
sections of the community’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 33). The reorientation of policy
towards focusing upon identified target groups did contribute to the Sports Council’s focus on
‘Sport For All’, although it could be argued that this ‘was simply an articulation of a movement
that had been underway in Britain for some time’ (Coghlan, 1990: 35). Arguably the relatively
poor economic climate of the day had contributed to the clearer articulation of such thinking,
such that existing facilities might be used as part of ‘new’ and more overarching policies more
efficiently and economically. As Coalter has argued:

Against the background of economic decline, rising unemployment and problems of

inner-city decay, there was a quickening of the pace of governmental use of sport in
urban policy … the apparent political neutrality of sport, and its presumed ability to
provide ‘an economy of remedies’ … made it a more attractive option than addressing
fundamental structural change.
(Coalter, 2007a: 10)
38 The emergence and development of sport policy
Thus, notwithstanding the supposed ‘independent’ status of the Sports Council, the gov-
ernment provided ‘substantial dedicated funds … for specific “social” programmes’
(Coalter, 2007a: 11). For example, perhaps because of the fact that the government did
not expect sport and recreation to be a statutory requirement within local authorities, the
‘inner urban areas in which recreational deprivation is associated with a conjuncture of
other forms of social and environmental deprivation’ were going to receive from the
government more directly ‘the highest priority for grant-aid’ (DoE, 1975: 16).

The 1980s: sport as a tool for achieving social goals

Alongside the growth in publicly funded facility provision there was a correlative development
of policies that focused more fully upon addressing the symptoms of urban riots and
unrest in inner cities (such as in Liverpool, Bradford and Bristol), as well as focusing
resources on particular sports, sections of the population (such as football hooligans) and
under-participating groups (such as women, disabled people and people from various
ethnic minority groups) (Green, 2006; Haywood et al., 1995; Houlihan, 1997; Houlihan
and White, 2002; Hylton and Totten, 2008). These changing policy priorities, particularly
in relation to the use of sport as a means of alleviating the symptoms of various social
problems, developed within the context of the so-called ‘winter of discontent’ and as
Margaret Thatcher led the Conservative Party into office in 1979. Houlihan and White
(2002: 27) argue that the broadly consistent view of ‘welfare policy’, and the place of
‘recreational sport’ within that policy paradigm, was ‘subject to an abrupt and sustained
challenge’ from the Thatcher government. Thatcher did not particularly like sport, and in
terms of her political position her view was bolstered by the perceived problem that
football hooliganism posed for her government and, of particular significance, members
of the wider society. Despite her evident dislike, and even distrust, of those involved in
the organization and development of sport, Thatcher and her government still perceived
sport as a potential solution to the problems of social unrest in various inner-city areas.
The role that sport was perceived to play in this regard was made clear in two major
innovations in the early 1980s. The first innovation was brought about through the
Manpower Services Commission – which was established by the government in 1974 to
help coordinate and manage the country’s employment and training services – and the
Sports Council, both of whom established the Action Sport programme in 1982. The
Action Sport programme, which is widely regarded as ‘the forerunner of many sub-
sequent sports development projects’ (Coalter, 2007a: 11), began to provide local autho-
rities in various inner-city areas with £1 million per year between 1982 and 1985. A
central objective of the 15 Action Sport programmes – which were run in Birmingham
and London in response to the inner-city riots of 1981 – was to develop, in partnership
with other interested agencies, sustainable, consumer-driven opportunities for low-parti-
cipant groups (particularly the unemployed). The significant diversity in the populations
of each authority was expressed in the diversity and type of programmes offered by
groups of SDOs who were recruited by local authorities to implement them. Many local
authorities recognized the contribution that sports development could make to their local
communities and subsequently provided further funding for the programmes that they then
sought to tailor towards the needs of groups within their region. In this respect, the scheme
was significant in helping to ‘promote sports development as a legitimate local authority
activity’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 37), especially because each of the fifteen participating
authorities were required to employ sports leaders (ninety were employed overall).
 The emergence and development of sport policy 39
The implementation of the Action Sport programme constrained the newly recruited
sports leaders who were working in local authorities to begin developing partnerships
with other non-sports organizations. Some of the early examples of partnership working,
particularly with those that were developed with other groups in the broader welfare
(especially health) policy fields, found particular expression in the various National
Demonstration Projects (NDPs) that were launched during the 1980s. The purpose of the
NDPs was to identify strategies to remove the barriers to participation for a range of
underrepresented groups. In particular, the formally stated purposes of the NDPs was: (1)
to improve participation through outreach development in the community; (2) to enhance
opportunities for particular target groups such as women and disabled people to partici-
pate in sport; and (3) to develop school sport, in partnership with the education autho-
rities (Sports Council Research Unit, 1991). What is of particular significance here,
however, was that despite the emphasis that came to be placed upon partnership working
the Sports Council reported that ‘managing the wide range of partners necessary for
project implementation and the challenge of reconciling sports development objectives
with those of non-sport partner bodies’ (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008: 227) was of parti-
cular concern for many working within sports development. This perceived threat to the
status of sports development work stood in marked contrast to the generally positive
perception of the increasing relationship between government and many sports organi-
zations that existed under the previous Labour government. Under the Thatcher admin-
istration, however, the position of sports development within the activities of local
authorities came increasingly under threat given the prevailing antipathy that the gov-
ernment expressed towards sport more generally. It is not unsurprising, therefore, that
the Sports Council and sports development workers became increasingly concerned with
working in partnership with organizations whose policy goals and priorities lay beyond
sport. While this enabled them to continue pursuing their sporting priorities, it simulta-
neously constrained them to meet the non-sporting objectives of their partners whose
main objectives were not commensurate with those of the Sports Council. One con-
sequence of this closer collaboration with non-sporting bodies was that it was not
uncommon that ‘the sport development objectives of the partnership were often margin-
alised or even undermined by the core activities of the other partner organisations’
(Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008: 228). Rigg (1986: 3), in his evaluation of the Action Sport
programme on behalf of the Sports Council in 1986, also argued that because the pro-
gramme was largely a response to the urban riots that took place in the inner cities
during 1981 ‘it was set up with a great deal of haste and rather less detailed planning
than we [the Sports Council] believe was necessary for such a large scheme’. Houlihan
and White have also drawn attention to some of the problems that were associated with
the poor policy planning that accompanied the implementation of the programme. In
particular, they suggested that ‘the alacrity with which the Sports Council adopted
Action Sport was due as much, if not more, to financial opportunism than to conscious
policy reorientation’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 35).
The perceived inadequacies that were said to have accompanied the implementation of
the Action Sport programme, and the growing tendency for sports development workers
to emphasize the social benefits of sport, are perhaps understandable. This was because,
under the Thatcher government, there was growing suspicion over the way in which
public money was being spent and the Sports Council, as we explained above, began to
extol widely the broader social goals that could be achieved through the provision of
sports development programmes in an attempt to protect their funding. Equally, it was
40 The emergence and development of sport policy
also not surprising that the government ‘started taking a much closer eye on the performance
of the many Non-Departmental Public Bodies under their aegis’ (Collins, 2008: 63),
which, of course, included the Sports Councils. To this end, Coghlan (1990: 57) argues
that the Sports Minister appointed by Thatcher in 1981, Neil Macfarlane, ‘increasingly
wished to control sports affairs, either directly or through the Sports Council where weak
leadership failed to stand up to the pressure and ceded power and influence point by
point’. The growing accountability and suspicion of the way in which many NDPBs were
spending public money was further expressed when Macfarlane himself stated that ‘if
public funds are used to finance sporting activities, isn’t it proper that politicians should
make political decisions affecting these funds? After all they are accountable’ (Macfarlane;
quoted in Coghlan, 1990: 57–58). This emphasis that was coming to be placed on the
accountability of NDPBs such as the Sports Council was not, it should be noted, something
that was unique to the Thatcher government, for – such is the nature of all social relation-
ships – it was also the case that the Sports Council was never able to act completely
independently of the previous Labour government priorities either.
As we noted earlier, the second major policy innovation that emerged during the early
1980s was the tendency for the Sports Council to move ‘beyond simply advocating and
subsidising more facilities to cater for all-comers, and [to set] targets for increased par-
ticipation in specific age and sex groups, and urging local authorities to do likewise’
(Roberts and Brodie, 1992: 10). The focus of the Sports Council on these under-participating
groups was further bolstered in their 1982 publication Sport in the Community: The
Next Ten Years (Sports Council, 1982). In this document it was argued that ‘not to
tackle the needs of these groups would put the Council in breach of its Royal Charter’
(Sports Council, 1982: 7). The central role that local authorities were also perceived to
play in enhancing participation was clearly recognized when it suggested that

most sport is played locally, and so the development of mass participation depends
critically on local initiatives. This will require local authorities and education
authorities, local sports clubs, other local voluntary groups and local commercial
interests to work both separately and in partnership.
(Sports Council, 1982: 35)

Of particular significance to Sport in the Community was the expectation that was placed
upon sports development workers to engage in partnership working, for it was suggested
that ‘action by the Sports Council will be at best palliative, and at worst futile, unless its
actions relate to the social policies of other agencies, and the Council looks forward to a
working partnership with statutory and voluntary agencies’ (Sports Council, 1982: 36). It
is not surprising, once again, that, with NDPBs being held to greater account under
Thatcher’s government, ‘for the first time a target for increasing participation was set’
(Collins, 2008: 63) as a central objective of the proposals set out in Sport in the Community.
In a similar manner to the Action Sport project, in Sport in the Community the government
also focused on particular ‘targeted groups’ – the so-called under-participating groups
(especially the unemployed) – and this policy focus was related to the perception that
‘sport could be seen as fulfilling an ameliorative function’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 34).
However, as Coalter (2007a: 11) argues, ‘although the rhetoric of recreation as welfare
was ideologically potent, it remained politically weak and relatively marginal to core
public policy developments, and the Sports Council’s largest single financial commitment
(45 percent of the total) was to elite sport’. This, it seems reasonable to suppose, was
 The emergence and development of sport policy 41
related to the fact that the Council was still dominated by former CCPR staff, whose
prior engagement in sport had been primarily ‘deferential towards the needs of the elite
athlete’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 36). It was not altogether surprising, therefore, that
the Sports Council’s focus on community sport during the 1980s, alongside the competing
interests of those who prioritized the development of elite sport objectives, helped to
divide those working within the organization and development of sport. Let us examine
these issues a little further.
The facility development that had characterized much of the first decade of the Sports
Council’s existence had contributed significantly to the promotion of elite-level sport and
the development of mass participation. Tensions had been largely suppressed, at least
publicly, with supporters of both of these particular agendas being able to pursue their
own vested interests through the support that was provided by government, and espe-
cially local authorities, for the development of sports facilities. However, the relatively
new focus on the experience of the participant (whether for elite or leisure sport), as
opposed to simply providing facilities for the whole range of participants, saw ‘tensions
between those whose primary concern was elite achievement and those concerned with
increased participation [begin] to surface’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 38). Indeed, the
network of relationships that comprised the organization and development of sport in
Britain during the 1980s was already very much characterized by ‘petty feuding and per-
sonal rivalries’ (MacFarlane; quoted in Coghlan, 1990: 151), with particular divisions and
tensions said to have been particularly prominent between the CCPR and the Sports
Council. This found particular expression through the ways in which the CCPR was still
regarded as the forum for the collective voice of the NGBs of sport, and yet most NGBs
all but ignored the Sports Council’s request that they discuss with them the ‘role they
wish to play’ over the ‘next ten years’ (Sports Council, 1982: 34).
In 1988, the Sports Council, seemingly undeterred by the lack of evident interest from
the government, or even the NGBs, regarding the proposals that they outlined in their
Sport in the Community strategy, published a follow-up strategy: Sport in the Commu-
nity – Into the 90’s. Building on the target group approach that it took in Sport in the
Community and the NDPs, in this strategy the Sports Council once again focused on
specific under-participating groups, particularly women and young people, together with
a broad focus on promoting performance and excellence, which, it was argued, ‘has to be
closely linked to developing mass participation’ (Sports Council, 1988: 71). According to
Coghlan (1990: 154), the Sports Council’s strategy document once again failed to gain
significant ‘attention from government and national governing bodies of sport’, despite
the fact that ‘the House of Commons and the Government [had] recently concluded that
the Sports Council produces good returns for public money’ (Sports Council, 1988: 6–7).
Nonetheless, in 1989 the structure of the Council was altered in response to criticism
from the government over the confusion that was said to exist surrounding the number of
different people and bodies responsible for the organization and administration of sport
(Houlihan, 1991), an issue that had been raised in the recent past. A related aspect of this
criticism of the prevailing organizational infrastructure and administration of British
sport was the fact that the ‘NGBs in general were extremely conservative organisations and
were slow to generate momentum in sports development’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 45).
Considerable tension also existed, as in earlier periods, between the CCPR, the BOA and the
Sports Council, which seemed to have further ‘coloured the attitude of the NGBs towards the
Sports Council’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 49). Consequently, the Conservative government
proposed that there should be a reduction in what it saw as the excessive bureaucracy of
42 The emergence and development of sport policy
the Sports Council and the CCPR with a view to making them more effective organiza-
tions. This was one of a number of ‘threatened reorganisations’, which Houlihan and
White (2002: 52) point out ‘were hardly conducive to policy stability’, and which help to
explain why ‘the organisation and administration of sport policy in the UK has been
bedevilled by the lack of a coherent “voice” for sport’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005: 54) for
some considerable time. It is perhaps unrealistic, however, to expect that a single,
coherent ‘voice’ for sport could, indeed, exist in this manner. This is clear not least
because, as in many other areas of social life, the sheer complexity of the differential
interdependency ties that characterize the particular power relationships of which the
groups involved in the promotion of sport are a part can come to limit significantly the
extent to which those groups can agree on some kind of desired action in relation to the
future organization of sport. In this respect, it is likely that the specific organizations
themselves could not be regarded as a ‘single’ voice for sport, given the internal rivalries
that are a characteristic of all such figurations.
Around the same time that these concerns were being raised about the perceived lack
of organization for sport within the UK, Houlihan and White (2002: 40–41) have argued
that the well-known pyramid model of the sports development continuum, ‘first used in a
report authored by Derek Casey in 1988 (Scottish Sports Council, 1988)’, was becoming
‘widely used by sports organisations throughout the UK’. The sports development con-
tinuum focused on the notion that developing a wide participation base would, by
extension, help widen the apex of the ‘pyramid’ of sporting excellence. Arguably, the
promotion of the continuum model by the Sports Council represented its attempt to
reconcile the evident tensions between those promoting elite sport and those promoting
grassroots participation, for this conceptualization of sports development work suggested
that these dual policy goals were inextricably interdependent. It could also be argued that the
promotion of this view of sports development was also a way in which the Sports Council
hoped to convey something of the interdependence that was said to exist between the variety
of organizations involved in the administration of sport from the foundation level to the
higher levels of participation, performance and excellence (Houlihan and White, 2002).
In addition to the lack of policy stability for sport that existed during the 1980s, the
perceived need to streamline the organizational structure of sport in Britain, reduce levels
of bureaucracy and increase the efficiency of those bodies responsible for the organization
and delivery of sport helped generate considerable structural change at the local authority
level in particular. The Conservative government was concerned that many local autho-
rities at the time were particularly inefficient financially and that there was, as a con-
sequence, a need to control local government spending more closely (Coalter, 2007a;
Houlihan and White, 2002). One of ways the Conservative government attempted to do
this was through the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). CCT was
originally introduced in the Local Government Planning and Land Act in 1980 and was
extended in the Local Government Act of 1988 to include a wider variety of service pro-
vision, including the management of sport and leisure facilities such as pools, leisure
centres, golf courses and tennis courts (Henry, 2001). The Act meant that local govern-
ment services could be put out to ‘tender’ for private administration, and whilst the ten-
dering of sport and leisure services through CCT eventually began in the early 1990s,
‘sports development was still peripheral to most strategies’ (Houlihan and White, 2002:
44) when they were put out to tender.
Even though many contracts for the right to deliver local services were won in-house
by local authorities, it was recognized that the introduction of CCT and the considerable
 The emergence and development of sport policy 43
structural change this would bring about at the local authority level would have a direct
‘impact on sport’ (Sports Council, 1988: 7). This was almost inevitable, especially when
the Audit Commission reported that ‘many authorities do not have a clear idea of what
their role in sport and recreation should be’ (Audit Commission; quoted in Coalter,
2007a: 12). This was because, in essence, the Audit Commission (1989) considered there
to be a lack of monitoring and evaluation, and accountability, of the use of leisure ser-
vices in local authorities by the local population. Since sport, recreation, leisure services
and facilities were still not statutory local authority services it is unsurprising that there
was little, if any, systematic monitoring of participation and use of facilities, or even a
clear understanding of what such services might provide to the local population –
beyond, that is, the simple use of the facility. However, for reasons we explained earlier,
the prevailing political climate during Thatcher’s time in office meant that while local
authorities were supported considerably by central government monies, this was asso-
ciated with greater accountability. As part of this overall concern with demonstrating the
extent to which sport and leisure services were providing ‘value for money’, analyses such
as those undertaken by the Audit Commission (1989) ‘led to the more general policy of
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) being applied to local authority sport and
recreation services’ (Coalter, 2007a: 12).
Despite the attempts by the Sports Council over the previous decade to work more
closely with local authorities in order to develop more coherent sports development
policy and practice, in terms of promoting ‘Sport For All’, sports development was still
peripheral to most strategies when they were put out to tender (Houlihan and White,
2002). A clear implication of the introduction of CCT was that services should be eco-
nomical, and, in this regard, it has been frequently suggested that this contributed to a
growing focus, even in the contracts that were won by the in-house work forces, or direct
service organizations (DSOs), on the commercial viability of sport and recreation targets
(Coalter, 2007a; Houlihan and White, 2002; Jackson, 2008). As Jackson (2008) has noted,
those working in the emerging sports development arena, whose primary purpose was
said to be targeting previously neglected sporting communities (those who the Sports
Council had, over the previous decade or more, specifically targeted for sports develop-
ment intervention), were ‘a clear casualty of this focus on bottom-line financial calcula-
tions’ (Jackson, 2008: 33). Indeed, the introduction of CCT was strongly associated with
‘a decade of price increases above inflation’ (Collins 2008: 65) in local authority sport and
leisure centres; so much so that the ‘reaction to the extension of CCT to sport and
recreation services was almost uniformly negative’ (Coalter, 2007a: 12). Despite the hos-
tility that accompanied the introduction of CCT to sport and leisure services, this policy
reform nevertheless contributed to a sea-change in the way in which such services were,
and still are, run. As Coalter argues, the ‘need to produce detailed contract specifications
to provide the basis for monitoring performance’ within the CCT process ‘marked a
broad shift from the rather vague approach of management by objectives … to objective-led
management’ (Coalter, 2007a: 13). Such an objective-led management approach, in terms
of setting stated targets and providing specific monitoring and evaluation of those targets,
has remained a significant feature in sports provision at the local level. Indeed, this
emphasis was retained throughout much of the 1990s under John Major, who succeeded
Margaret Thatcher in 1990. Major’s arrival as Prime Minister, and subsequent success at
the 1992 General Election, did not lead to a substantial change in the broader neoliberal
policies, such as CCT, of the previous administration (Coalter, 2007a). Indeed, under the
Major government the continued support of CCT contributed, albeit indirectly, to the
44 The emergence and development of sport policy
greater state involvement that was coming to characterize sport policy-making and the
delivery of sports development in local authorities and NGBs of sport. It is important to
note, however, that while Major’s government retained this commitment to implementing
the CCT programme in sport and leisure services, it did nevertheless lead, as we shall see
below, ‘to a more proactive approach to sport’ (Coalter, 2007a: 14).

The early 1990s to 1997: from addressing inequity to school and elite sport
As we explained above, the period between the 1960s and 1980s was characterized by a
significant growth in the contribution of local authorities to the organization and
administration of sport, even though this was curtailed somewhat by the introduction of
CCT and ‘a marked lack of sustained political interest and direction in sport’ (Houlihan
and White, 2002: 52) that continued in the early 1990s. It was also around this time
when, building on the work of the Action Sport Programmes and NDPs that were
developed during the 1980s, the Sports Council published a series of policy ‘Frameworks
for Action’ for young people, women, black and ethnic minorities, and disabled people in
which it was developing the concept of sports equity. The Sports Council defined the
concept of sports equity as being

about fairness in sport, equality of access, recognizing inequalities and taking steps to
address them. It is about changing the structure and culture of sport to ensure that it
becomes equally accessible to everyone in society, whatever their age, race, gender or level
of ability.
(Sports Council, 1993: 4)

As Houlihan and White (2002: 63) have noted, the introduction of sports equity as a
central feature of each of the Frameworks for Action ‘represented a shift in thinking from
the target group approach that had been popular in sports development work in the
1980s’. For the first time it also placed responsibility for addressing inequity on governing
bodies, local authorities and other traditional providers of sport. In this context, the
Sports Council began to place considerably more emphasis on the ways in which the
principles of equity should be embedded across all levels of the sports development con-
tinuum. It also focused particular attention on the need to break down not only the
individual and social constraints to sports participation but, significantly, those aspects of
the structure and culture of sport that also came to limit the involvement of under-participating
groups that included young people, women, and disabled people. These various position
statements helped draw attention to issues of equity, particularly gender equity and specifically
the rights and experiences of women, which had a significant impact on international sport
policy following the publication of the Brighton Declaration (1994). The general principle of
sports equity that underpinned the Sports Council’s series of policy statements ‘stimulated little
comment at the time’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 63) by government, however, and ‘had
limited impact on the sports development community’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 64).
According to Houlihan and White the marginal impact that these equity policies had on those
working in sports development, particularly in some local authorities, can be related to

the weak influence of the [Sports] Council at the time, and partly because the ideas
they contained did not fit with the immediate priorities and concerns of governing
bodies or Conservative-controlled local authorities. Those local authorities that were
 The emergence and development of sport policy 45
Labour-controlled considered themselves well ahead of the Sports Council on equity
issues, regarding the Council as a conservative and somewhat inequitable institution
itself in both its membership and operations.
(Houlihan and White, 2002: 64)

It was also clear that whilst the principles underpinning the notion of equity would
‘prove significant over the medium term to longer term’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 63),
the marginal impact that the Sports Council’s recommendations on equity initially had at
government level can be related to the general lack of interest in sport by the Thatcher
government. Following Thatcher’s replacement by John Major, however, the political
salience of sport increased substantially such that sport policy and sports development
policy, in particular, ‘was about to enter a period of sustained increase in public invest-
ment in sport, but also one of sustained governmental interest and debate about the role
of sport in society’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 52–53). Upon victory at the 1992 General
Election, Major’s government established the Department of National Heritage (DNH),
in which sport was included, and in 1994 a National Lottery was introduced and this has
since provided substantial additional funds to sport and helped change the landscape of
sport policy in the UK. Let us examine these issues in some detail.
The election of the Major government and the establishment of both the DNH and
National Lottery helped contribute to the growing state involvement in sport policy and
development. Following the establishment of the DNH in 1992, the Sports Council was
subject to further structural and policy changes. In the early part of 1993, it was proposed
that the structure of the Sports Council be radically changed to incorporate a new UK
Sports Commission, which would oversee performance and excellence, and an English
Sports Council, which would have a similar participation-oriented remit to the other
‘home councils’ in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, by August of the
same year, these proposals were scrapped by the DNH, on the basis that this would
simply increase further the bureaucratic nature of an already bureaucracy ridden organi-
zation. The government also considered that the recent passing of the National Lottery
Bill through parliament justified a rethink over exactly how, and even if, it was necessary
to restructure the organization and administration of sport at this time. This was because
it was widely hoped that when the National Lottery was to be introduced in 1994 sig-
nificant sums of money would be made available to sport, for distribution by the Sports
Council. David Pickup (1996), the Director-General of the Sports Council at the time,
was particularly scathing of the decision to scrap the plans to reorganize the Sports
Council on the ‘whim’ of the newly appointed Sports Minister, Iain Sproat. The inter-
vention of the new Sports Minister in this manner was not altogether surprising for, as
Houlihan and White (2002: ix) have noted, it has often been the case that ‘incoming
ministers for sport … have a capacity to translate their particular enthusiasms into policy
priorities in a way that is inconceivable in other government departments’. This tendency
was further compounded by the relatively low policy status afforded to sport by the
government, even under a largely enthusiastic Prime Minister in John Major. Indeed,
sport is an area of policy that was, and still is, susceptible to more ephemeral change
than other policy areas because it often has less well-established and coordinated lobby
groups than those that are to be found in other areas of governance, such as education,
health and policing. It is also the case that many ministers of sport have seen the job as a
way to gain ‘promotion’ to another ministerial position by seeking to make an immediate
impression upon their appointment to the post (Pickup, 1996).
46 The emergence and development of sport policy
In July 1994, just one year after Sproat had announced his decision to reconsider the
restructuring of the Sports Council, he announced that there would, indeed, be a
restructuring. This was to involve a separation of the Sports Council into a UK Sports
Council and an English Sports Council, while the other home nation Councils would
remain intact. This was not a significantly different proposal to the one that he delayed
one year previously. It was also announced by the government that more support would
be given to professional sport and greater effort was to be made to bring key sporting
events (such as the Olympic Games and soccer World Cup) to Britain. These proposals
were to be compensated for in the abandonment of work in a number of previously key
areas to the Sports Council, the most significant of which was the decision by Sproat to

withdraw from the promotion of mass participation, informal recreation and leisure
pursuits and from health promotion, [which are] laudable aims, but they are secondary
to the pursuit of high standards of sporting achievement. In due course, those changes
will allow us to give much greater help to our most important national sports.
(Sproat; quoted in Pickup, 1996: 205)

The introduction of the National Lottery in November 1994 contributed even more sub-
stantially to the state’s steady involvement in setting the sport policy and development
agenda. This found particular expression in the ‘increasingly contractual relationship
between the Sports Councils and NGBs … and the agreements that were entered into
prior to the release of National Lottery funding’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 57). Initi-
ally, the National Lottery was incredibly successful and ‘the early years of the Lottery
produced income well above expectations’ (Collins, 2008: 67), with the policy area of
sport, as one of a number of identified ‘good causes’, benefiting greatly from the sub-
stantial increase in funding. In view of the steady flow of Lottery monies that were made
available by the government, the existing duties and roles of the Sports Council were
extended and its members were given the responsibility of distributing 83 per cent of
Lottery proceeds allocated to ‘sport’. The increasing political salience of sport policy to
the government, and the larger sums of money available to the Sports Council, NGBs of
sport and local sports providers, was both enabling and constraining for each of the
groups involved. On the one hand, the various organizations involved in running, devel-
oping and promoting sports now had greater access to money that was previously una-
vailable. But, on the other hand, this simultaneously helped to constrain their activities
through the growing accountability that was associated with the increasing autonomy
that the National Lottery monies helped give them.
Insofar as the introduction of the National Lottery helped sustain increases in public
investment in sport during the 1990s, the publication of a second government White
Paper on sport, Sport: Raising the Game, by the DNH in 1995, was an important land-
mark in the growing involvement of the state and governmental interest in sport. Within
the context of local authority sports development, the publication of Sport: Raising the
Game (DNH, 1995) was of particular significance, for it marginalized considerably the
role of local government and made little reference to mass participation (‘Sport For All’)
or to local authorities who are the key vehicles of its promotion. The explicit policy
emphasis was not on mass participation or enhancing the involvement of specific target
groups, as had been the case previously, but on school sport and elite performance, with
a more efficient and streamlined structure for the organization of sport in the UK also
being emphasized as a key priority (DNH, 1995; M. Green, 2008; Houlihan and White,
 The emergence and development of sport policy 47
2002). That local authorities and the concept of ‘Sport For All’ were largely ignored in
Sport: Raising the Game was particularly important, for as we noted earlier it is in the
context of local authority leisure provision (such as leisure centres, private health clubs
and gyms) that many members of local communities participate in sport and physical
activity. As Houlihan (2002) has noted, the lack of attention that was paid to local
authorities and mass participation in Sport: Raising the Game can be interpreted as an
expression of the government’s view that the facility infrastructure for mass participation
and, hence, the achievement of ‘Sport For All’ objectives were not in place and that
responsibility for these was a matter that could be left to local government. In addition,
and of equal importance, was that the little attention that was paid to ‘the contribution
of local government, which spends over £800 million each year on sport, was a reflection
of the Conservative government’s longstanding antipathy towards local authorities’
(Houlihan, 2002: 196). The focus of much of the funds that were made available to sport
through the National Lottery was also disproportionately skewed towards the achieve-
ment of the dual policy objectives of elite and school sport. As Houlihan and White
(2002) have noted, although local authorities were heavily constrained to develop funding
strategies to access approximately 40 per cent of Lottery money allocated to them and
were encouraged by the Sports Council to think more strategically about sport and
recreation, ‘there was little incentive for local authorities to respond as bids for Lottery
funding based on analysis of need and levels of participation, or on goals such as the
reduction of deprivation or community regeneration, were explicitly prohibited’ (Houli-
han and White, 2002: 73). It is not unsurprising, therefore, that during the mid-1990s the
sports development needs of community members in local authorities were, at best,
pushed to the margins of the sports development policy as state involvement in setting the
national sport policy agenda began to increase quite substantially.
As we noted earlier, insofar as the role of local authorities in sports development work
was ignored in Sport: Raising the Game, school and elite sport were very much seen to
form the centrepiece of the prevailing sport policy priorities of the Conservative govern-
ment. In particular, in Sport: Raising the Game the government reaffirmed its belief in
‘the intrinsic benefits of team sports and introduced a raft of policy initiatives … to
strengthen sporting opportunities within the PE curriculum and within extra-curricular
activities’ (Bramham, 2008: 21). For reasons we explain in Chapter 3, the emphasis that
came to be placed on the need to promote school sport and the increasing availability of
Lottery monies together helped provide the context within which the YST was estab-
lished, which is now based at Loughborough University. The YST was established in
1994 and during the 1990s it became a very influential body in the organization and
provision of school sport and PE for young people. As Chapter 3 makes clear, the YST
has since been able to make a significant impact in setting the youth sport policy agenda
in a variety of ways, and its increasing salience to government has ensured that it continues
to receive a steady stream of external funding from government and other sports agencies,
such as the various Sports Councils (M. Green, 2008; Houlihan and Green, 2006).
The other important organizational changes that were proposed by the government in
Sport: Raising the Game included the establishment of a British Academy of Sport, for
the pursuit of sporting excellence and the encouragement of NGBs to develop closer links
with schools to meet their elite sport objectives by integrating school sport ‘into a process
of talent identification and a ladder of competition designed to meet the needs of gov-
erning bodies’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 67). The increased funding that was becoming
available to the Sports Council, almost exclusively from the initial success of the Lottery,
48 The emergence and development of sport policy
unsurprisingly encouraged the Council to develop a very compliant ‘new’ strategy in
1996. Titled England: The Sporting Nation (ESC, 1996), the strategy was a close ‘reflec-
tion of government policy’ (Collins, 2008: 68) and was effectively a more or less direct
elaboration ‘on themes in Raising the Game’ (Collins, 2008: 68). The UK Sports Council
(UKSC) and the English Sports Council (ESC) were eventually established by Royal
Charter in January 1997. One of the key reasons for this restructuring was to ‘eradicate
the anomaly of the former Sports Council having both British and English functions’, but
the overall, unintended, ‘outcome was the bifurcation of sports development’ (Houlihan
and White, 2002: 70). The UKSC was to oversee developing excellence, particularly in
international competitions where representative teams of the UK were participating, such
as at the Olympic Games, and also to administer doping control. The ESC, by contrast,
‘was charged with the development of sport in England, from foundation through to
excellence’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 70), which involved the concentration of its
resources on a select group of sports in order to develop their services and promote,
amongst other things, participation in sport and physical activity. The various Sports
Councils for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales remained in place.

Sport policy and development since 1997

The impact of Raising the Game was limited somewhat by the election, in May 1997, of
a Labour government that upon entering office immediately replaced the DNH with a
new Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). The inauguration of the DCMS
meant that sport now featured for the first time in the title of a British government
department, even though the position of Minister for Sport was still a junior ministerial
post. Blair gave the job to Tony Banks. This was something of a surprise move, given
that Tom Pendry had been the opposition spokesperson for sport before Labour were
elected to office. Banks would report to the new Cabinet position of the Minister for
Culture, who at the time was Chris Smith. Aside from these developments, as Houlihan
(2002: 197) has noted, the newly elected Labour government ‘was surprisingly hesitant
and faltering in its initial attempts to impose a “New Labour” stamp on sport policy’,
especially given that Labour had taken the unusual step of producing a ‘Manifesto for
Sport’ whilst in opposition in 1996 (Houlihan, 2002). However, that the new Labour
government did not immediately impose itself on sport policy is no major surprise, for
sport policy had always been, and still remained, low on the government’s agenda in
comparison to other areas of policy such as education, crime, health and defence.
In the absence of a clear governmental steer, in 1998, the ESC developed the slogan
‘More People, More Places, More Medals’. It organized its work around this slogan when
developing the Active Programmes a year later in a move in which the ESC was, on the
surface, appearing to anticipate the likely policy priorities that the Labour government
was going to pursue on the basis of what was contained in the Labour Manifesto for
Sport. In the publication Sports Development Planning (ESC, 1999: 5), the ESC suggested
that sports development should provide ‘opportunities for people, regardless of age,
gender, race, or ability to participate in sport and achieve their potential’ (ESC, 1999: 5).
The central policy plank derived from Sports Development Planning was the creation of
the Active Programmes. This alleged ‘new’ model of sports development focused on four
areas of work: ‘Active Schools’, ‘Active Communities’, ‘Active Sports’ and ‘World Class’.
According to Houlihan and White (2002: 87), ‘the Active Programmes were not designed
to supplant the model of the sports development continuum, but were a part of the
 The emergence and development of sport policy 49
rebranding of the English Sports Council that included the adoption of the title Sport
England as its marketing name’.
The New Labour government had been elected with the so-called ‘Third Way’ at the
heart of its political and policy philosophy. The Third Way, it is argued, ‘is said to be
simultaneously a modernised version of social democracy and beyond the old left–right
dimension of politics’ (Roberts, 2009: 111). In this respect, New Labour had tried to
distance themselves from the previous conception of the Labour Party – in opposition and in
government – as being a party that would set income taxes high and spend public money in
large sums. Instead, they were keen to integrate, insofar as possible, private enterprise and
supposed accountability with public spending, and considered that many public services
required ‘modernizing’. In order to do this, it was claimed that a process of ‘joined-up
thinking’ was needed to permeate all such organizations as well as between government
departments. As Pollitt has observed, this process of ‘joined-up thinking’ relates to

the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically co-ordinated thinking and action.
Through this co-ordination it is hoped that a number of benefits can be achieved.
First, situations in which different policies undermine each other can be eliminated.
Second, better use can be made of scarce resources. Third, synergies may be created
through the bringing together of different key stakeholders in a particular policy field
or network. Fourth, it becomes possible to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented
access to a set of related services.
(Pollitt, 2003: 35)

Furthermore, because of the prevailing desire among members of the government to find
a ‘new or “Third Way” to address social and economic problems, sport was to achieve a
new, more clearly articulated, prominence in social policy’ (Coalter, 2007a: 14). This
policy commitment was emphasized through the alterations that were made to CCT and
the policy focus of A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000), which was the first sport
policy to be released by the current Labour government in 2000. Although the Labour
government acknowledged the ‘role of CCT in improving cost management and widening
service provision, the Labour Party strongly criticised the CCT legislation for promoting
a universal focus on costs to the exclusion of social objectives and quality’ (Robinson,
2004: 11). After considerable debate between members of the government, in 1999 Labour
finally published the Local Government Act, which meant that CCT was to be abolished
on 2 January 2000, and ‘Best Value’ services were to be provided from 1 April 2000. In
this respect, Collins (2008: 70–72) argues that CCT ‘was made voluntary’ and Best Value
was to be a ‘broader and more demanding regime … in which local authorities had to
justify their modes of provision (direct, contracted or trusts), demonstrate efficiency
through Performance Indicators (PIs) and consult with and report to their residents’
(Collins, 2008: 70–72). According to the former Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions (DETR):

We all rely on local services. They are essential to our quality of life. We all have an
interest in seeing them improved and in ensuring that the best use is made of public
funds in providing them. Best value is designed to deliver those better quality services
and real value for money. It places a duty on local authorities to secure continuous
improvement in local services.
(DETR, 1999: 7)
50 The emergence and development of sport policy
Not surprisingly, this broader policy development had a significant impact on sport and
leisure provision at local government level, and especially on local authority sports
development units. The underlying rationale for Best Value, it was alleged, was ‘a con-
cern with quality, effectiveness, performance measurement and customer focus’ (Robin-
son, 2004: 11), with the two key principals behind Best Value being the service reviews
and an annual Best Value Performance Plan. In particular, the introduction of Best Value
meant that local authorities had to complete service reviews over a five-year period that
incorporated the following ‘4 Cs’:

 challenge why and how the service is being provided;

 compare performance with that of others across a range of relevant indicators,
taking into account the views of both service users and potential suppliers;
 consult local tax payers, service users, partners and the wider business community
in the setting of new performance targets;
 consider fair competition as a means of securing efficient and effective services.
(Sport England, 2001: 35)

The second key principal, the annual Best Value Performance Plan, effectively established
the principle of performance measurement as a central aspect of the work of local
authorities. In many respects, it is this performance measurement component that has had
the greatest impact on the delivery of sports development within local authorities. When
Best Value was being introduced, Sport England (1999: 16) suggested that it marked ‘a
crossroads for sports development from which the service will either grow or retrench’.
As a result of the inconsistencies that had faced sports development work within local
authorities over the previous decade or so, especially because of the introduction of CCT,
Sport England went as far to say that ‘given this context, the temptation to reduce sports
development activities within any Best Value Review is clear’ (Sport England, 1999: 16).
This is because sport and leisure was still not a service that local authorities were obliged to
provide and, in this regard, Sport England (1999: 16) feared that a ‘threat [to] … the future
of sports development is evident’. Sport England responded to the potential threat by pledging
its support to local authorities. It suggested that, in promoting Active Communities, it ‘will
be working closely with local authorities, enabling them to respond in a positive way to
the shift in the role of local authorities in the light of the Government’s “Best Value” and
“Modernising” initiatives’ (Sport England, cited in Carlisle City Council, 2002: 11).
Despite the evident concern from Sport England, amongst others, that Best Value could
be considered a threat to sports provision within local authorities, these fears were
assuaged, to some extent, by the publication of A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000).
In contrast to Raising the Game, in A Sporting Future for All the Labour government
indicated that, amongst other things, local authorities were regarded as a ‘catalyst’ and
central to the effective delivery of sports development work (DCMS, 2000: 13). Local
authorities were also considered by the incoming Labour government to play a central
role in developing and managing ‘inter-agency working and partnerships for the delivery
of both sports development objectives and broader community regeneration benefits’
(Houlihan and White, 2002: 111). As M. Green (2008: 97) has noted, whilst A Sporting
Future for All and Sport: Raising the Game from the previous Conservative government
‘are from different sides of the political spectrum, they demonstrated a striking note of
unity on the twin emphases of school (youth) sport and elite development’. Of particular
relevance here, however, was that in addition to the retained emphasis on school and elite
 The emergence and development of sport policy 51
sport, there was a renewed commitment by the government to the promotion of ‘Sport
For All’ and to the role of local authorities (particularly those in areas of high depriva-
tion) in achieving this objective. In addition, the Labour government also expressed a
commitment to developing local authority facilities and working with other private
commercial leisure facilities as just one means by which to develop mass participation in
sport and physical activity and to ensure that local residents ‘have easy access to high
quality and affordable facilities’ (DCMS, 2000: 36). The renewed emphasis on ‘Sport For
All’ and the parallel emphasis that came to be placed on the role of local authorities
as the main agents in delivering mass participation goals and policy implementation
clearly distinguished the sports development policies of the Labour government from
those of its predecessors. However, while local authorities featured prominently in A
Sporting Future for All, many of the other policy proposals contained within the docu-
ment served to harden ‘the emerging bifurcation between sports development as partici-
pation and sports development as talent identification and elite achievement’ (Houlihan
and White, 2002: 86).
The most significant sport-related document yet published by the Labour government
appeared in 2002. In December of that year, the DCMS and the government’s Strategy
Unit published the joint paper Game Plan: A Strategy for Delivering Government’s Sport
and Physical Activity Objectives (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002). Central within Game Plan
was a focus on health and community outcomes at a local level, whilst retaining a focus
on elite sport for national governing bodies of sport as well as school and youth sport. In
order to attempt to achieve the aims set out in Game Plan, the government introduced a
number of organizational changes, all of which expressed these changing policy priorities
for sport in the UK. A particular premise outlined in Game Plan was the suggestion that
the organizations involved in running sport in the UK had been poorly coordinated,
lacked efficiency and focus in their policy objectives, and duplicated a number of services/
roles already performed by other organizations. For example, it held that, ‘currently,
multiple statements of strategy lead to confusion; complex structures lead to inefficiency;
staff do not have the right skills; and many management systems could be improved’
(DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 18). It was also claimed that ‘if participation is to be
increased, it is at the local (not central or regional) level that most activity must be
focused’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 183). It also acknowledged that

Sport and physical activity are not always seen as a priority at a local level … As a
result, sport and leisure expenditure is often the first to suffer if resources are
reduced. A significant proportion of budgets is spent on the management and main-
tenance of facilities (rather than the strategic development of sport and recreation).
(DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 183)

One way in which it was proposed that local authorities might be encouraged to place
sports provision more centrally within their services was indicated by a similar desire to
develop performance indicators at a local level. After eighteen years out of office, ‘New
Labour’ instigated a reinvigorated effort to ‘modernize’ government organizations and the
public sector generally (M. Green, 2008). As Driver and Martell have noted:

Labour modernizers see New Labour as a ‘project’ that is taking politics ‘beyond
Thatcherism’ … The name ‘New Labour’ itself was one of the first [attempts to
modernize], signalling to the electorate a turn away from the unpopular policies of
52 The emergence and development of sport policy
Labour in the past by the constant distinction of ‘new’ from ‘old’ – and indicating a
government that wished to create a modernized ‘new Britain’.
(Driver and Martell, 2002: 67)

Almost inevitably, this modernizing agenda encompassed sport policy and sports devel-
opment. As McDonald (2005: 594) argues in relation to the broader ‘national’ agenda:
‘Like other areas of policy, the organizational structure of sport has been “modernised”’,
with evidence-based policy being an emerging and increasingly significant aspect of this
process (Pawson, 2006; Coalter, 2007a). In this regard, sports organizations, and those
working within sports development, are now increasingly expected to provide detailed
data regarding the monitoring and evaluation of strategies to demonstrate the impact
their services are having on the achievement of desired social outcomes. Thus, a parti-
cular policy priority of Game Plan is that ‘there should be a non-directive approach to
local provision, with more use of performance framework tools such as public health
focused targets and local PSAs (Public Service Agreements)’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002:
162), which are now very much part of the day-to-day reality of the operations of sports
development work in local authorities (Bloyce et al., 2008). Such a target driven approach
found further expression in 2005 with the development of the Comprehensive Perfor-
mance Assessment (CPA), as part of the Best Value process with which all local autho-
rities had to comply. The CPA included a ‘cultural’ component to the strategy as a
statutory requirement of all local authority service provision. Included in the culture
performance indicators were some sport-related targets, related to local participation
figures in sport, volunteering and sports facility provision. This meant that for the first
time as part of the broader Best Value policy there were now statutory targets for sport.
The CPA is due to be replaced with the Comprehensive Area Agreement (CAA), but, at the
time of writing, it is likely that the current sports indicators will continue to be assessed.
One of the policies that was central to many New Labour sport policy documents and
distinguished its policy approach from that of the previous Conservative government was
the policy emphasis that it came to place on the role that local authorities, amongst other
organizations, could play in the achievement of greater social inclusion (see Chapter 4).
That local authorities were considered important in contributing to the social inclusion
agenda was reinforced further in Sport England’s series of publications entitled Sport
Playing Its Part, in which sport and key agents of its promotion, including local autho-
rities and schools, are seen as important mechanisms by which desired social outcomes
such as reduced crime and drug use, greater educational attainment, community and
economic regeneration and the promotion of health can be developed among young
people (Sport England, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d). This view of sport as making a
substantial contribution to the enhancement of young people’s lives and to the achievement
of wider social objectives, particularly though locally based interventions delivered by local
authorities and sporting organizations, was further articulated in Shaping Places through
Sport, published by Sport England in November 2008. These reports once again sought to
demonstrate the alleged role that sporting organizations and related projects can play in
developing strong, sustainable and cohesive communities (Sport England, 2008b); the
improvement of health and reduction of health inequalities (Sport England, 2008c);
enhancing the life-chances and experiences of young people (Sport England, 2008d);
reducing anti-social behaviour and fear of crime (Sport England, 2008e); and using sport
as a vehicle for economic development and the enhancement of personal skills and
employability (Sport England, 2008f). As Coalter (2007a) has argued, and for reasons we
 The emergence and development of sport policy 53
explain in Chapter 4, despite the proliferation of policy documents in which the promotion
of social inclusion is a central objective, those measures that are frequently used to
determine the efficacy of sports development programmes in achieving the wider social
goals of government, such as social inclusion, are almost virtually impossible to assess.
This, Coalter (2007a: 17) argues, remains the case despite the fact that the articulation of sport
policy priorities ‘with core Third Way concepts provided a much greater degree of legitimation
and apparent integration’ of sport within the broader policy priorities of government.
Notwithstanding the growing willingness to use sport and physical activities as vehicles
of social policy designed to achieve a range of non-sport objectives, the government and
other state agencies have recently reiterated the desire to achieve a range of sport policy goals.
Amongst the most prominent and recent sport policy documents to have been released almost
simultaneously in England was the Sport England Strategy 2008–2011 (Rowe, 2009; Sport
England, 2008a), and the DCMS publication Playing to Win (DCMS, 2008a). Following the
award of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games to London (see Chapter 7), in December
2007 the DCMS asked Sport England to conduct a review of community sport in England. The
review resulted in the publication of Sport England’s new strategy for community sport in
England, for the period 2008–11. The strategy is said to contain several features that represent
‘a significant shift in focus and direction’ (Sport England, 2008a: 1) and that help Sport England
to meet its objectives related to its ‘Sustain, Excel and Grow’ programmes (Rowe, 2009; Sport
England, 2008a). Although, at the time of writing, it is too early to undertake some assessment
of the extent to which Sport England has been able to achieve its objectives in this regard, it
was nevertheless clear that Sport England intends to work with a range of partner organiza-
tions to focus on a range of community sport policy priority areas. In particular, the Strategy
makes explicit Sport England’s present policy focus in the following way:

Sport England focus on ensuring quality opportunities exist beyond the school gates
and enabling children and young people to migrate seamlessly from the school
environment to community sport. Sport England’s work with the Youth Sport Trust
on the Five Hour Offer, its focus on reducing drop-off in participation at the age of
16 and its ambitions to develop a modern sports club network in partnership with
National Governing Bodies, will be key components of this transition.
(Sport England, 2008a: 2)

In addition to these policy priorities, Sport England’s Strategy is said to reflect ‘a shift in
emphasis and role for National Governing Bodies’ (Sport England, 2008a: 2), who are
intended to be ‘the primary drivers to deliver this new strategy for community sport’
(Sport England, 2008a: 13). In return for the significant degree of autonomy that NGBs of
sport would be given by Sport England over the investment of public funds within their
sport, NGBs would be expected to take ‘greater responsibility for the delivery of the
outcomes’ (Sport England, 2008a: 2) and reinforce the need to develop Whole Sport Plans
(WSPs) – already a requirement in place following Game Plan – to indicate how they will
meet the relevant objectives of the Strategy.
The prevailing policy emphasis towards the development of community sport that was
expressed in Sport England’s latest Strategy was reinforced in Playing to Win (DCMS,
2008a), which is the latest major sport policy to be published by the Labour government.
Playing to Win was described by Andy Burnham, who was appointed as Secretary of
State for Culture, Media and Sport in January 2008, as ‘a plan to get more people taking
up sport simply for the love of sport; to expand the pool of talented English sportsmen
54 The emergence and development of sport policy
and women; and to break records, win medals and win tournaments for this country’
(DCMS, 2008a: Preface). By focusing on the three policy areas of PE and sport for young
people, community sport and elite sport, the plan also sets out the government’s ‘vision
for sport to 2012 and beyond. It suggests a shared goal to unite around – maximising
English sporting success by expanding the pool of talent in all sports. In short, more
coaching and more competitive sport for all young people’ (DCMS, 2008a: Preface). In
this regard, a central objective of Playing to Win is ‘to give more people of all ages the
opportunity to participate in high quality competitive sport’ (DCMS, 2008a: 3) and to
‘engage a million more people in regular sport participation’ (DCMS, 2008a: 8) by 2012–13.
In relation to elite sport, it is made clear that the role of UK Sport is:

to lead on the development of world class sporting talent, focused on winning medals
at international championships, and creating a world leading high performance
sporting system that will support that success into the future. UK Sport is respon-
sible for investment in UK level programmes and therefore works in partnership with
the three other Home Nation Sports Councils and Institutes alongside Sport England
and the English Institute of Sport.
(DCMS, 2008a: 9)

We shall return to the ways and extent to which both the Sport England Strategy and
Playing to Win have come to impact on the changing political and policy priorities for
youth sport and elite sport in Chapters 3 and 6, respectively.

Summary
In this chapter we have been centrally concerned with establishing the emerging policy
context within which current sport policy and development work have emerged. In par-
ticular, we have suggested that since the 1960s sport has come to be seen increasingly as a
policy tool for government to achieve wider social goals. In addition, greater importance
has come to be placed by governments on achieving international success, a process that
is examined in greater detail in Chapter 6. The impact of these more recent policy fra-
meworks, and the associated changes to which we drew attention above, helps provide
the context within which the various contemporary issues are examined in the remaining
chapters of this book. In Chapter 3, we shall begin to examine some key aspects of the
prevailing youth sports development priorities that have come to inform much con-
temporary policy related to school sport and PE in schools.

Revision questions
1 Examine the processes associated with increasing government involvement in
sport.
2 To what extent has a national governing body or local authority of your choice
been impacted by national government policy?
3 Compare and contrast how the policies of Conservative and Labour govern-
ments since 1990 have come to impact on sport policy and development.
 The emergence and development of sport policy 55
Key readings
Henry, I. (2001) The Politics of Leisure Policy, 2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Houlihan, B. and White, A. (2002) The Politics of Sports Development: Development of Sport of
Development through Sport?, London: Routledge.
Hylton, K. and Bramham, P. (2008) Sports Development: Policy, Process and Practice, 2nd edn, London:
Routledge.

Recommended websites
Central Council for Physical Recreation: www.ccpr.org.uk
Institute for Sport, Parks and Leisure: www.ispal.org.uk
www.sportdevelopment.info
3 Youth sports development
Physical education, school sport and community
club links

Objectives
This chapter will:

 examine the levels and patterns of young people’s participation in sport and
physical activity;
 examine some of the most significant youth sports development policies to have
been introduced in schools in recent years; and
 reflect upon some of the opportunities and challenges associated with the future
of youth sports development in schools.

Introduction
There has been growing concern over the past three decades or more with what is said to
be a trend towards sport and physical activity becoming increasingly rare features of
contemporary lifestyles, and especially those of young people. Indeed, one of the most
striking characteristics of British government policy towards youth sport in recent years
has been the assumption that PE, school sport (especially competitive team sport) and
physical activity are in rapid decline. More specifically, the apparent failure of many
schools to provide youngsters with what has been ambiguously described as ‘two or more
hours of high quality PE’ (Department for Education and Skills [DfES]/DCMS, 2003), as
well as the purported ‘privileging’ of sport and team games over physical activity in PE
curricula (Kirk, 2004; Penney and Chandler, 2000; Penney and Evans, 1999), is believed to
be among the central reasons for young people’s supposed declining levels of participation
and the perceived failure of physical educationalists in ensuring that young people remain
actively involved in leisure-sport and physical activity both in the short and long term
(Green et al., 2005a; Kirk, 2004; Smith et al., 2004). What is particularly striking about
this concern over aspects of young people’s lives is its near-universal acceptance across a
range of societies in the Western world and beyond for, in both more and less developed
societies, there is now a broad consensus that declining participation in sport and physical
activity – alongside the growing prevalence of ‘unhealthy’ diets and an increasing preference
for engaging in sedentary leisure activities – is the main ‘cause’ of a ‘health crisis’ said to
be emerging among children and youth (see Chapter 5).
Set in the context of this concern, the central objective of this chapter is to examine
those policies that are designed to address these perceived problems by promoting the
 Youth sports development 57
development of youth sport through PE and school sport (PESS) and the enhancement of
school and community sports club links. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of
what the available empirical evidence suggests about the levels and patterns of young
people’s participation in sport and physical activity in Europe and elsewhere. In doing so,
it questions the adequacy of many of the existing assumptions about these aspects of
young people’s lives. This is then followed by a more detailed examination of what might
be regarded as one of the most significant youth sports development policies to have been
introduced in schools in England in recent years: the Physical Education, School Sport
and Club Links (PESSCL) strategy. In particular, we shall discuss how the implementation
of the School Sport Partnership (SSP) programme, as part of the PESSCL strategy, has
come to impact on the activities of teachers, and hence the experiences of PESS among
their pupils, in rather differential ways and in a manner that may, in the event, have a
number of outcomes that no one has planned and which no one has intended. The
chapter concludes by reviewing some of the salient issues raised by the implementation of
PESSCL and SSPs and briefly reflects upon the future of youth sports development in
schools.

Young people’s participation in sport and physical activity

Studies of sports participation among young people tend to be somewhat conservative
and cannot by their very nature reveal much about the intensity and seasonality of par-
ticipation, the significance of sport and physical activity to young people’s lives, or the
quality of their experiences (K. Green, 2008; Smith, 2006). The available data indicate,
however, that in many countries current levels of participation in sport and physical
activity among young people are higher than those reported in the 1960s and 1970s.
Indeed, whilst there has been a plateauing in overall participation in the twenty-first
century, and even a slight decline amongst some groups (K. Green, 2008), there has been
a clear trend towards increased participation among young people in very many coun-
tries, and especially those in Western Europe. In Britain, Roberts (1996a; 1996b) has
noted how, contrary to received wisdom, between the 1970s and mid-1990s there has
been an empirically observable increase in young people’s participation in sport and
physical activity. More specifically, from his analysis of the government’s own surveys of
participation in the mid-1990s, Roberts concluded that

young people were playing more sports in and out of school than in the past … the
drop-out rate on completion of statutory schooling had fallen dramatically … social
class and gender differences had narrowed [and] … sports had higher youth participation
and retention than any other structured forms of leisure.
(Roberts 1996b: 105)

Indeed, such was the increase in young people’s involvement Roberts suggested that,
contrary to the alleged ‘golden age’ of sports participation (said to have existed around
the 1960s), the level of sport and physical activity participation for young people had
grown to be ‘well above the levels [of] … the 1950s and 1960s’ (Roberts, 1996a: 52), with
fewer dropping out of sport and physical activity at the end of their compulsory full-time
education.
Data from government-funded surveys conducted by NDPBs such as Sport England
and the Sports Council for Wales (SCW) have also indicated that the demonstrable
58 Youth sports development
tendency among young people towards increased and then stabilized levels of involve-
ment in sport and physical activity – both inside and outside schools – has continued. In
2002, for example, almost all young people in England and Wales were participating
‘occasionally’ (at least once in the past year) in sport and physical activity via National
Curriculum Physical Education (NCPE) and over three-quarters were involved on a ‘reg-
ular’ (at least ten times in the past year) basis in both countries (SCW, 2003; Sport Eng-
land, 2003). It was also apparent that while there has been a ‘small, but notable, increase
in the numbers of young people who are not taking part in at least one sport regularly’
(Sport England, 2003: 5; original emphasis), ‘there are now fewer young people spending
less than one hour, or no time, in a week doing sports and exercise than was the case in
1994’ (Sport England, 2003: 58).
It is not only the frequency with which young people participate and the time spent
doing so that has allegedly increased, however, for alongside these trends there has been
an increase in the number of sports and physical activities in which they frequently par-
ticipate in school (SCW, 2003; Sport England, 2003). These increases are particularly
worthy of note, not least because they point to the ways in which many PE teachers in
England appear to have, over the last eight years, focused more upon ‘increasing the
range of sports that young people take part in’ and less upon ‘the frequency in which they
participate in individual sports’ (Sport England, 2003: 19; emphases added). These trends
towards increased participation and the provision of a wider range of sports and physical
activities in NCPE have also been observed in the 2006/07 School Sport Survey (TNS,
2007). The Survey indicated that, in relation to the proportion of young people who
undertook at least two hours or more PE and out-of-hours school sport in a typical week,
there ‘have been very marked improvements in levels of participation in Years 1–6 (5–11-
year-olds)’ (TNS, 2007: 2) since 2003/04, with ‘smaller improvements’ (TNS, 2007: 3)
being reported for those aged 11–16 years old. It was also reported that the range of
activities provided for young people by their teachers had continued to increase during the
period surveyed: those 11–16-year-olds who attended secondary schools typically received
21 sports (on average) as part of curricular and extra-curricular PE, whilst primary-aged
school children (5–11-year-olds) were provided 16 sports on average (TNS, 2007).
Overall, it is clear that on the basis of the available evidence, there has been an
increase in young people’s involvement in sport and physical activity through NCPE in
England and Wales. Since the mid-1990s, in particular, there also appears to have been an
even more substantial increase in young people’s out-of-school involvement in sport and
physical activity. Data from the most recent Sport England (2003) survey of youth parti-
cipation ‘out-of-lessons’, for example, indicated that over three-quarters of all young
people were regular participants in some sport and physical activity, while just over half
of all youngsters surveyed by the SCW (2003) were involved ‘regularly’ during extra-
curricular PE. In England, it is also clear that whilst 14 per cent participated in no sport
or physical activity ‘out-of-lessons’ (compared with 17 per cent in 1999), the proportion
of young people who played seven or more sports frequently outside school lessons in 2002
(26 per cent) has steadily increased since 1994, with most young people involved in five
sports and physical activities on average (Sport England, 2003).
As we noted earlier, the upward trend in participation among young people in recent
decades is not restricted solely to Britain, for studies conducted in Australia (e.g. Dollman et
al., 2006) and in a number of European countries (e.g. Samdal et al., 2006) have also indicated
that whilst sport and physical activity participation among young people has increased
rapidly over the past three decades, this has stabilized somewhat since the late 1990s. In
 Youth sports development 59
particular, studies of participation in sport and physical activity among young people in
several Scandinavian countries have consistently pointed towards relatively continuous
increases in participation in recent decades. In Finland, for example, Laakso et al. (2008:
151) have noted that ‘Leisure time physical activity among young people in Finland
increased … from 1977 to 2007’, especially among young women. They also noted that
whilst ‘the frequency of unorganized spontaneous leisure time physical activity had
remained at the same level or increased slightly’ (Laakso et al., 2008: 149), the biggest
increases in youth sports participation had been observed in sports clubs. Similar con-
clusions can be drawn from studies of youth sports participation in Norway (Mamen and
Aaberge, 2006; Sisjord and Skirstad, 1996), where since the 1970s there is said to have
been a ‘tremendous increase in the number of young people taking part in organized
sport’ (Sisjord and Skirstad, 1996: 173), which remains ‘the most popular [leisure] activity
among youths’ (Sisjord and Skirstad, 1996: 175). In Sweden, Kristèn et al. (2003: 25) have
also pointed towards the alleged ‘dominance’ of sport in the lives of young people and
described the ‘sports movement’ as being the country’s ‘largest and most vigorous popu-
lar movement’ (Kristèn et al., 2003: 24), whilst in 2007 in Iceland more 14–15-year-olds
reported participating in sport and physical activity overall and in sports clubs since 1992
(Eiðsdóttir et al., 2008).
In other reviews of participation, De Knop and De Martelaer (2001: 41) have explained
that available data in the Netherlands continue to indicate that ‘young people participate
in large numbers’ in leisure-sport and physical activity, whilst in Flanders ‘more and
more teenage boys and girls’ are said to be increasingly ‘involved in leisure-time sports
participation’ (Scheerder et al., 2005: 325) in the twenty-first century. These findings are
consistent with those of a cross-sectional study of youth sports participation in Belgium,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which concluded that
‘physical activities and sports [continue to] belong to the most popular [leisure] activities
of young people’ (Telama et al., 2002: 140). A more recent study of 10–18-year-olds in
Portugal concluded that the tendency for participation to increase among young people as
they get older helps indicate the increasing ‘importance of sport [participation] among youth’
(Seabra et al., 2007: 379) in the country. All in all, it seems that the vast majority of young
people are taking part in sport and physical activity reasonably regularly both in and out of
school in many countries, and particularly so in northern Western European countries.
A related and notable feature of the trend towards increasing levels of participation
among young people has been the broadening and increasing diversification in the kinds
of activities undertaken by young men and women, especially in their leisure time. Of
particular significance in this regard has been the increasing preference among young
people – particularly during the 1980s and 1990s – to participate in what have been
described as ‘lifestyle activities’ (Coalter, 1999). The growing popularity of these ‘lifestyle
activities’ has been strongly associated ‘not only in Britain but in other countries, too,
with the emergence of commercialized, consumption-based, body-image-oriented and
highly individualized fashions such as jogging, aerobics and the use of mechanized fitness
clubs’ (Dunning and Waddington, 2003: 355–56). The increasing involvement of young
people in these kinds of activities, which tend to be characterized as individual or small-
group activities that are more flexible in nature, usually less competitive and tend to be
pursued more recreationally than competitive team-based sports (Coalter, 1999), has also
been strongly associated with the rapid expansion of public and private sports leisure
centres and the adoption of ‘Sport For All’ policies both inside and outside schools. As
Roberts (2004: 91) observes, these kinds of activities have become increasingly popular
60 Youth sports development
not least because ‘public facilities that are available for general public use, on a pay-as-
you-go basis, seem more congruent with present-day young people’s and adults’ lifestyle
preferences than the stronger commitment involved in club membership’.
In this regard, the increasing desire among young people (and adults) in many coun-
tries to engage in more commercialized, individualized and flexible sports and physical
activities rather than regular, more structured, forms of involvement such as that
required by a strong commitment to club-based sport, would appear consistent with the
broader changes in the increasingly individualized lifestyles of participants (Coalter, 1999;
Roberts, 2004; Smith, 2006). It is perhaps not altogether surprising, therefore, that in
several European countries, including Britain, ‘there is believed to be a problem of young
people failing to join sports clubs’ (Roberts, 2004: 91) during their leisure time. Indeed,
whilst it is clear that ‘in recent years some European countries’ sports clubs have experi-
enced a loss of members’ (Roberts, 2004: 32) and ‘that today’s young people seem to be less
“clubbable” than their predecessors’ (Roberts, 2004: 91), this is not to say that young people
are abandoning sport and physical activity. Rather, as Roberts has noted in relation to
elsewhere in Europe (though the general point may apply equally well to Britain):

It is more a case of them engaging in recreational swimming, surfing, skiing, sailing

and so on without joining clubs and teams, and participating in competitions. This
does not mean that competitive sport is threatened with extinction. It is more a shift
in the constantly moving boundary between club sport and self-organised recreation.
(Roberts 2004: 32)

These points notwithstanding, it might with equal validity be noted that while there has
been a gradual move away from young people participating in club-based sport in leisure
and schools since the 1980s, this has not meant that the numbers playing competitive
sports have been eliminated or even reduced (Roberts, 2004). It is more the case that
although involvement in club sport declines with age – during the secondary school years
and especially upon the end of full-time compulsory education – and is not necessarily a
long-term pursuit for many young people who first take it up, for a minority of young-
sters (especially males) competitive club sport is an important aspect of their sporting
lives (De Knop et al., 1998; Roberts, 2004; Telama et al., 2002; TNS, 2008).
With the shift away from competitive sports towards more recreational ‘lifestyle
activities’ among some young people, there are several caveats regarding trends in levels
and types of participation in sport and physical activity. First, and notwithstanding the
evident popularity of ‘lifestyle activities’ among young people, this does not preclude
team sports (which are, by their very nature, especially competitive) from being pursued
more recreationally. Nor, for that matter, does the popularity of recreational versions of
sports preclude involvement in activities where the primary motive for participating
might be ‘competition’. Second, while these kinds of ‘lifestyle activities’ have, as Coalter
(1999) observes, experienced substantial increases in participation by young people and
are frequently among those with the most regular participants, nevertheless it seems
that sport and team games as well as ‘lifestyle activities’ have become an integral feature
of young people’s participation both inside and outside school in many countries (Green
et al., 2005a; Smith et al., 2004; Telama et al., 2005). The third point is that the evident
shift towards ‘lifestyle activities’ should not be taken to indicate that young people are
turning their back on competitive sport, and team games in particular, for this is to
oversimplify what is, in reality, the rather complex nature of young people’s leisure-time
 Youth sports development 61
participatory repertoires. As Green et al. (2005a) have noted, while over half of young
people in the secondary age group in England in 2002 participated in team games fre-
quently in their leisure time, it is not only football and other ‘traditional’ games – such as
cricket – that remain popular among a minority of secondary-age youngsters. Rather,
other team sports (such as basketball) as well as partner sports (such as tennis, badmin-
ton and table tennis) also feature alongside more potentially recreational, less competitive
‘lifestyle activities’ (such as swimming, cycling, roller-skating/blading and skateboarding,
running and tenpin bowling) (Sport England, 2003). Indeed, it seems that young people’s
levels of participation in football has remained roughly the same since the 1990s – though some
other team games like cricket continue to lose appeal among boys – and many games remain as
popular now as previously, with netball, hockey, tennis and badminton, for example, becom-
ing more popular among secondary-aged youngsters (Sport England, 2003). Similarly, in Wales
those activities in which marked increases in curricular participation were observed in 1999
compared to 2002 included, for example, sports such as football, basketball, cricket and gym-
nastics, alongside more individual ‘lifestyle activities’ such as circuit training, aerobics and
weight training (SCW, 2003).
In short, as Telama and colleagues have pointed out with regard to Finland – although
the point might equally be applied to many youngsters across Europe, including in Britain –
‘the most popular types of sports [or, rather, physical activities] among adolescents
are … cycling, swimming, walking and running’ (Telama et al., 1994: 68), alongside other
more potentially competitive, performance-oriented team sports such as football and
basketball. This having been said, it is important to keep in mind the point that while for
many young people sport makes a relatively limited contribution, it is clear that more
individualistic and flexible activities dominate their leisure-sport and physical activity
lifestyles (Coalter, 1999; Smith, 2006). Indeed, these are the kinds of activities in which
they are more likely to continue participating ‘indoors’ at their local sport and leisure
centres, gymnasium or health clubs where they can ‘play their preferred sports, with their
own friends [and] at times of their own choice’ (Roberts, 1996b: 113).
Despite the existence of a romanticized view of young people’s supposedly higher
participation levels in sport and physical activity at some unspecified point in the past,
the available data indicate an increase and a gradual stabilizing during the early twenty-
first century in Britain and elsewhere since the 1970s, alongside a broadening and diver-
sification of participation. Indeed, while there is a significant minority of youngsters
doing relatively little or absolutely nothing, and while they may not be doing as much as
some (such as government, PE teachers and NGBs of sport) might want – nor, for that
matter, as much or at the level deemed desirable for the improvement of health – they
appear, according to empirical studies, to be doing far more than is commonly claimed
(Green et al., 2005a; Roberts, 1996a; Smith et al., 2004).
This having been said, it would be wrong to assume that all young people participate
as regularly, to the same extent or even, for that matter, in the same kinds of activities. Such
a clear-cut formulation cannot capture all of the complexities involved. In fact, there
appears to be a polarization of young people’s sport and physical activity participation
levels into those who participate on an almost daily basis and those who participate
rarely, if at all, with most young people somewhere in the middle (Roberts, 1996a, 1996b;
Smith, 2006; Telama et al., 2002). Participation levels, as Roberts (1996a: 51) observed,
continue to be distributed along a bell-shaped curve: ‘Most are towards the middle. At
one extreme a minority are highly active relative to the norm. At the other extreme
another minority is inactive both relatively and absolutely.’
62 Youth sports development
Although young people as a whole are experiencing a broader diet of sports and physical
activities in PE and in their leisure time than previous generations, their participation
continues to vary differentially over time and from one society to another. As has been
made abundantly clear elsewhere, the evidence also indicates quite clearly that young
people’s participation in sport and physical activity continues to be structured by many
forms of social division, particularly gender, social class (including highest level of education
obtained) and age (Coalter et al., 1995; Green et al., 2005b; Roberts, 1996a).
Having said something about what the available empirical evidence tells us about the
participatory patterns and tendencies of young people, the rest of this chapter will
examine some key aspects of youth sports development in England. In particular, the
chapter will examine the establishment of the YST and two policy developments that
have come to generate some of the most profound impacts on the practice of PESS and
that have been strongly associated with the increasing involvement of SDOs in PESS in
recent years: the introduction of the PESSCL strategy and the creation of SSPs.

Youth Sport Trust: the institutional focus for physical education and school
sport
As Houlihan and Green (2006) have noted, prior to the early 1990s political interest in
PESS was, in policy terms at least, marginal. There was also said to be a general ‘lack of
philosophical and conceptual coherence among organizations representing PE and school
sport interests regarding the contribution that PE might make to the development of
pupils’ (Houlihan and Green, 2006: 75), particularly during the debates in the 1980s over
whether PE should be included in a new National Curriculum. Following the appoint-
ment of John Major as Prime Minister in 1990, and the subsequent re-election of the
Conservative Party two years later, there was a ‘dramatic change in the political salience
of school sport and PE’ (Houlihan and Green, 2006: 74). As explained in greater detail
elsewhere (e.g. K. Green, 2008; Houlihan and Green, 2006; Penney and Evans, 1999),
particularly significant was the increasing intervention of government in educational
policy, as expressed, for example, in the development of a new NCPE. Introduced in
1992, the NCPE was intended to enhance the position of ‘traditional’, competitive team
games (such as football, cricket, rugby and hockey) to the school curriculum. The
emphasis that came to be placed on the importance of competitive team sport as being
the focal point of PE, together with the emphasis on elite sport and the perceived role PE
was believed to play in helping to raise standards of international success, was strengthened
substantially in the revision of the NCPE and the publication of the government’s policy
document Sport: Raising the Game in 1995 (DNH, 1995; see Chapter 2). In this regard,
both publications revealed quite clearly how government was becoming increasingly
interventionist in setting the PESS policy agenda during the 1990s. They also illustrate
how some groups (such as government and the elite sports lobby) had a greater capacity
to privilege some values and priorities (e.g. elite and school sport, competition and
international success) over others (e.g. mass participation and more recreational forms of
physical activity), and to develop alliances with other groups to achieve their desired
objectives. One alliance that the government developed to help achieve its elite and PESS
objectives during the mid-1990s was with the YST.
The YST is a registered charity that was established by Sir John Beckwith in 1994 and
is located at Loughborough University. The central objective of the YST is to develop
and implement a series of educational and sporting programmes for young people aged
 Youth sports development 63
4–19 in schools and their local communities (YST, 2007). These programmes are var-
iously designed to help, among other things, enhance levels of participation and
enjoyment in PESS, as well as provide young people with what are considered the
best teaching, coaching and resources possible to enable them to develop to the best
level they can in their chosen sport. They are delivered through schools and are sup-
ported by a complex network of corporate partners (e.g. Nike, BSkyB and Sainsburys),
trusts and foundations and government departments (e.g. DCMS and Department of
Children, Schools and Families [DCSF]) (YST, 2007). Among the many programmes that
could be cited in this regard are the TOPs programmes (including TOP Play for 4–9-year-
olds and TOP Link for those aged 14–16) that were first developed in the 1990s and are
designed to provide young people, regardless of their ability, with opportunities to par-
ticipate in sport and physical activity within school-based PE. The TOPs programmes are
also said to provide teachers, particularly those in primary schools, with a range of child-
friendly equipment and resources as well as additional training and support to enhance
the quality and quantity of PESS provision young people receive in schools (YST, 2007).
Step into Sport is another initiative organized by the YST, Sport England and Sports
Leaders UK and funded by the DCMS. This sports development programme – as part of
the PESSCL strategy to be discussed later – began in 2002 and is designed to establish a
framework of coordinated opportunities to enable 14–19-year-olds to begin and sustain
participation in volunteering and leadership training in sport. Step into Sport is particu-
larly intended to enable pupils to gain leadership qualifications (such as the Junior
Sports Leader Award), coach children in primary schools and help them organize their
own sports festivals, and take up sports volunteering placements in their local commu-
nities (YST, 2007).
A similar programme to Step into Sport is the Sky Living for Sport initiative that was
introduced in 2003 and is currently delivered by the YST in conjunction with BSkyB and
supported by the DCSF. The three-year programme targets 11–16-year-olds who are
considered by their teachers to be ‘at risk’ of being excluded from the perceived benefits
of school life, whether through poor attendance, lack of confidence or poor behaviour. In
this regard, the scheme is designed to enhance pupils’ behaviour, attitude and commu-
nication skills by encouraging them to set their own personal targets and goals by
working with their teachers, sometimes outside normal school PE lessons. As part of the
programme pupils are given the opportunity to participate in a range of activities – par-
ticularly non-traditional ones – including archery, canoeing, martial arts, sailing and
skateboarding, and are then required to organize a sporting event (such as inter-school
competitions and dance performances) for a local school or community group. By 2007
Sky Living For Sport is said to have been delivered to more than 14,000 young people in
over 600 secondary schools in England, Northern Ireland and Scotland and is now being
offered to all schools in these countries (YST, 2007). In addition, the YST and BSkyB
have now developed a range of downloadable resources and Continued Professional
Development tools to encourage teachers in all schools to develop and run the pro-
gramme themselves and to tailor it towards the particular needs of pupils in their school.
The aforementioned programmes represent some of the more recent developments that
are expressive of the ways and extent to which the YST has gradually begun to adopt an
increasingly central role in the delivery of PESS as well as youth sports development
activity more broadly. Indeed, the inauguration of the YST helped provide the kind of
institutional focus for PESS that was said to be lacking prior to the mid-1990s. This lack
of institutional and policy focus and the absence of any real consensus among professional
64 Youth sports development
PE bodies such as the Association for Physical Education (AfPE) (formerly British Association
of Advisers and Lecturers in Physical Education [BALPPE] and Physical Education Association
of the United Kingdom [PEAUK]), together with the institutional weakness of the DCMS
when compared to other more politically influential and powerful central government
departments (such as those related to health and education), has meant the YST has come
increasingly to be seen as the institutional focus for PESS and has been able to obtain a
greater capacity to define policy priorities in the area (Houlihan and Green, 2006).
Such was the growing influence and power of the YST and the increasing tendency for
government to fund many of its activities during the late 1990s, the Trust was charged by
the current Labour government to implement aspects of its first sport policy document, A
Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000). As we noted in Chapter 2, A Sporting Future for
All was premised, amongst other things, on the perceived need to reverse a supposed
decline in young people’s participation in sport and physical activity through school-
based PE and its alleged relationship with such things as lack of international sporting
success, declining standards of health and educational attainment. In light of these pre-
sumed tendencies, the government focused particular attention on extending the range of
sporting opportunities available to young people in curricular and especially extra-curri-
cular PE, the creation of 110 Specialist Sports Colleges (SSCs) that were to have an
explicit focus on elite sport and be located in communities of greatest need, the appoint-
ment of 600 School Sport Coordinators, and the enhancement of school links with com-
munity sports clubs. The policy commitment (in A Sporting Future for All) to creating
SSCs formed part of the specialist schools programme that was ostensibly launched by
the previous Conservative government in 1994 ‘to help secondary schools to develop
strengths and raise standards in a chosen specialism’ (Office for Standards in Education
[Ofsted], 2005: 5); in effect, to act as centres of excellence for particular subjects such as
sport, technology or science. The first SSC was designated in 1997 and since then the
phased implementation of SSCs meant that by August 2008 578 schools had been desig-
nated SSCs. By seeking to establish a more efficient national infrastructure for PESS, the
main objectives of the SSC policy included: improving participation and achievement in
PESS amongst students of all abilities; raising standards of teaching in schools; providing
a structure through which students can progress to careers in sport and PE; and pro-
moting the development of young talented athletes through the SSCs’ links with other
schools, sporting agencies, clubs and the regional centres of the UK Sports Institute with
whom they are involved (DfES/DCMS, 2003; Ofsted, 2005).
As the body responsible for supporting the implementation and organization of SSCs,
the YST has been able to exert quite considerable influence over how this aspect of con-
temporary policy towards PESS has come to impact on the activities of teachers and the
experiences of pupils. As Flintoff (2008a: 151) has noted, the extent to which the Trust
has been able to achieve some degree of control and influence has been through, for
example, its ‘application, evaluation and redesignation procedures; its annual conference,
and other continuing professional development opportunities for those teachers working
in the colleges’. Given the relatively greater position of power of the YST in implement-
ing policy related to the SSC programme, many schools and teachers have been ‘only
marginally involved in innovations emanating from the programme as it has progressively
developed’ (Flintoff, 2008a: 151). This is not to say, of course, that teachers and the schools
in which they teach have no power to control policy outcomes or to constrain the actions of
seemingly more powerful groups such as the YST. Indeed, while there is, at the time of
writing, little available evidence regarding the ways in which teachers working in SSCs
 Youth sports development 65
have sought to manage the implementation of government’s SSC policy through the YST,
the findings of studies conducted in the North and North West of England indicate that
there exists differential practice between teachers and schools in relation to the ways in
which aspects of the SSP and SSC programmes have been embedded in the practice of PE
and sport in schools (Flintoff, 2003; 2008b; Smith, Odhams, Platts and Green, 2009). The
data from these studies suggest that part of the explanation for the existence of such
differential practice in SSCs is that, despite the extent to which the YST attempts to
control, within closely defined limits, the implementation of policy towards SSCs, this is
often very dependent on the characteristic features and complex networks of relationships
that comprise individual schools. Of significance in this regard are the particular enthu-
siasms, habitus and life-experiences of teachers, senior management and head teachers
towards PESS; the ‘kinds’ of pupils who attend particular schools; the sporting traditions
of schools; available facilities and other resources (e.g. access to sports coaches and
SDOs); pre-existing links between schools, local sports clubs and the wider community;
and the extent to which drawing on the specialist schools programme can bring specific
advantages to schools (e.g. purchasing additional equipment, employing extra staff and
extending the provision of activities and opportunities, especially outside curriculum
time) (Flintoff, 2003; 2008b; Smith, Odhams, Platts and Green, 2009). The findings of
these studies suggest that while groups such as the YST, because of the particular rela-
tional constraints under which members of the organization work, have a greater capa-
city to make crucial decisions over things such as the content and implementation of the
SSC programme, they are nevertheless constrained by the nature and complexity of the
network of relations in which they are located. The aspirations and strategies of such
groups are also more or less continuously mediated (and sometimes thwarted) by other
groups such as PE teachers, sports coaches and SDOs. One consequence of this is that
those groups are able, to a greater or lesser degree, to reinterpret policy and to implement
the activities of SSCs, and the SSP of which they are a part, in ways that they feel are
most appropriate to the local context of schooling and that may, therefore, not have been
intended by government and the YST (Flintoff, 2003; 2008b; Smith, Odhams, Platts and
Green, 2009). We shall return to the significance of some of those unintended outcomes
that have been associated with the implementation of SSPs later.
Although a principle objective of the SSC initiative was to help government (and,
hence, the YST) to meet its objectives related to the enhancement of participation and
desirable experiences of PESS, a related aim of the SSC initiative, and the SSP programme
of which it is a part, is the achievement of other social objectives. As Houlihan and
Green (2006) have noted, the policy goals and priorities of A Sporting Future for All,
such as those related to the creation of SSCs, were indicative of the way in which under
the Labour government the political salience of PESS has not only been maintained, ‘but
also emerged as a significant cross-departmental vehicle for the administration’s broader
social objectives’ (Houlihan and Green, 2006: 77). Of particular significance in the present
context is that one central aspect of the YST’s increasing power to influence the policy
priorities for PESS is ‘the strength and clarity of the institutional message and values
conveyed by the organization, namely that school sport and PE initiatives have a sig-
nificant role to play in helping government achieve policy goals that extend beyond a
narrow focus on school sport and PE’ (Houlihan and Green, 2006: 85). It should be noted,
however, that the growing influence of the YST over the content and policy priorities of
school-based youth sports development policies cannot be comprehended in isolation from
the increasing willingness of its Chief Executive, Sue Campbell, to present PESS as a solution
66 Youth sports development
to many of the government’s wider policy concerns regarding, for example, social inclusion,
educational attainment, community cohesion and crime reduction (see Chapter 4).
The increasing political profile and prominence given to PESS in recent years have been
repeatedly emphasized by Sue Campbell. Perhaps because of her governmental advisory
role on these policy areas, Campbell has been able to persuade civil servants and govern-
ment ministers that PESS can have a prominent role in ‘achieving broader educational
objectives such as whole school improvement, community development and affecting per-
sonal behavioural and attitudinal change among pupils’ (Houlihan and Green, 2006: 82).
Given the apparent success that Campbell and others appear to have had over the last decade
in convincing government and civil servants of the alleged benefits that investing in PESS
might have for the achievement of other government objectives, it is perhaps not surprising
that such views were strengthened further in the PESSCL strategy, outlined in the cross-
departmental document Learning through PE and Sport (DfES/DCMS, 2003), published
in 2003. Before examining the policy priorities and goals of the PESSCL strategy, however,
it is perhaps of some significance that, as we briefly noted in Chapter 2, such has been the
growing power and influence of the YST in setting and implementing the PESS policy agenda
since the mid-1990s, the DCMS and Sport England announced recently that the YST is
now to be the sole organization with direct responsibility for PESS (DCMS, 2008a; Sport
England, 2008a). The activities of the YST are, in turn, expected to be integrated into the
broader sports development work undertaken by County Sports Partnerships (CSPs) that
is expected, amongst other things, to contribute to the delivery of PESSCL, develop links
between school, community and performance sport, and help ensure that school and
community sport is enhanced by, and focused on, the various Whole Sport Plans of the NGBs
of sport (for a review, see Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008; McDonald, 2005; YST, 2007).

Physical Education, School Sport and Club Links strategy

As we noted earlier, the PESSCL strategy – which started in 2003 – can properly be seen
as one of the most significant youth sport policy initiatives to have been introduced in
schools in England in recent years. The original overarching aims of the strategy were to:

a. establish a national infrastructure for PE and school sport by creating

i. 400 Specialist Sports Colleges, subject to sufficient high quality applications,
by 2005; and
ii. 400 School Sport Coordinator partnerships by 2006; with
iii. 3,200 School Sport Coordinators in secondary schools and 18,000 Primary or
Special School Link Teachers by 2006. There will be 2,400 School Sport Coor-
dinators and 13,500 Primary or Special School Link Teachers by 2005;
b. improve the quality of teaching, coaching and learning in PE and school sport; and
c. increase the proportion of children guided into clubs from School Sport Coordi-
nator partnerships.
(DfES/DCMS, 2003: 2)

To achieve these aims the PESSCL strategy was intended to bring together a range of
already existing programmes to provide a more coordinated, efficient and effective way of
enhancing the provision and experiences of PESS among young people. This would
appear to have been the case even though the PESSCL strategy was supported by considerable
resources that are funded largely by the Exchequer, with additional monies being supplied
 Youth sports development 67
from the National Lottery’s New Opportunities Fund (NOF). The level of investment
that was allocated to the implementation of the eight programmes that constitute the
basis of PESSCL was made clear in the strategy, which stated that

the Government is investing £459 million to transform PE and school sport. This
funding is on top of £686 million being invested to improve school sport facilities
across England. Together, this means that over £1 billion is being made available for
PE and school sport, and all schools in England will benefit in some way.
(DfES/DCMS, 2003: 1)

The YST, together with the DCSF and DCMS, is responsible for implementing the
PESSCL strategy, which had a joint DfES (now DCSF) and DCMS Public Service Agree-
ment (PSA) target to ‘increase the percentage of school children in England who spend a
minimum of two hours each week on high quality PE and school sport within and
beyond the curriculum to 75% by 2006’ (DfES/DCMS, 2003: 2). This figure was later
revised to a target of 85 per cent by 2008. On the basis of the findings generated by the
2006/07 School Sport Survey referred to earlier, this was said to be achieved a year early,
with 86 per cent of 5–16-year-olds said to have hit the target (TNS, 2007). Data from the
later 2007/08 School Sport Survey indicated that the proportion of young people who
spent a minimum of two hours each week on high-quality PESS had increased to 90 per cent
(TNS, 2008). It is important to note, however, that the proportion of pupils who are said to
have achieved the desired two hours of activity per week varied substantially between those in
the primary (5–11-year-olds) and secondary (11–16-year-olds) years. In general, the proportion
of pupils who reported participating in two hours of PESS each week initially increased across
the early primary school years, and ranged from 95 per cent amongst those in Year 1 (5–6 years
old) to 97 per cent in Year 6 (10–11-year-olds) (TNS, 2008). In secondary schools, however, the
opposite pattern was observed, with the proportion of pupils who claimed to spend two or
more hours engaged in PESS each week declining from a peak of 95 per cent reported by those
in Year 7 (11–12-year-olds) to 71 per cent for Year 10 pupils (14–15-year-olds) and 63 per cent
for those in Year 11 (aged 15–16) (TNS, 2008).
It is clear that achieving the PSA target of increasing the proportion of school children
in England who spend a minimum of two hours each week on high-quality PESS within
and beyond the curriculum to 85 per cent by 2008 was a, if not the, key policy priority of
the government’s PESSCL strategy during the first five years of implementation. Given
that this was evidently the case, it is also not surprising that the attention of much of the
YST’s activities – and the evaluation of its work – since the strategy was implemented
revolved, in particular, around assessing the extent to which schools achieved this policy
goal. What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that there is very little credible scien-
tific evidence for why this is regarded as an important policy goal by government and
other interested parties. Indeed, whilst there has always been a perceived need and
desirability for young people to receive a minimum of two hours of compulsory PE as
part of the National Curriculum amongst government and others within the profession,
this taken for granted, heavily ideological assumption has rarely been subject to any serious
critical examination and yet it continues to form a bedrock on which much school-based
youth sports development policy is based (Roberts, 1996a; Smith et al., 2004). As we shall
see next, one of the eight programmes of the PESSCL strategy that is considered to be ‘the
central component in fulfilling the Government’s strategy to help all young people access at
least two hours of high quality PE and school sport a week’ (YST, 2007: 7) is SSPs.
68 Youth sports development
School Sport Partnerships
The SSP programme – formerly the School Sports Coordinator Programme – is a central
component of the PESSCL strategy. From 2006 SSPs were introduced in phases and by
2007 all state-maintained schools and some independent schools had become members of
the programme. These schools now constitute the complex network of 450 SSPs that
currently exist in England. Partnerships are groups or ‘families’ of schools that receive an
additional £270,000 funding per year and are required to help enhance opportunities for
young people to participate in PESS. Each Partnership is led by a full-time partnership
development manager (PDM), who is usually located at a local SSC, which acts as the
central hub for the SSP. The PDM is responsible for the strategic development of the
Partnership, liaises with other agencies (e.g. the YST, local sports clubs and local autho-
rities) and is partly accountable to a local management group that is typically comprised
of primary and secondary school head teachers, a director of specialism (sport) and local
authority SDOs (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008). Typically, an SSP also consists of between
four and eight secondary schools each of which employ a school sports coordinator (SSCo) –
an existing teacher who is usually released from the teaching timetable for two or two and a
half days per week. The SSCo is responsible for the coordination and development of school
sport (especially intra- and inter-school sport, physical activity and competition) in his or her
own school and its family of between four and eight primary and special schools. Each of
these schools, in turn, has a nominated link teacher (primary link teacher [PLT]), a teacher
who is released from teaching for twelve days per year, and who is responsible for improving
the quantity and quality of PE and sport provision in his or her own school.
The key policy outcomes of the SSP programme can be summarized as increased par-
ticipation and standards of performance by young people across a range of sports,
improved motivation, attitude and self-esteem resulting in increased personal and social
development on the part of young people, and an increase in the number of qualified and
active coaches, leaders and officials working in local primary, secondary and special
schools and in local sports clubs and facilities (Flintoff, 2003; Houlihan and Lindsey,
2008). To these policy outcomes can be added seven more outcomes, including: ‘improved
attitude, behaviour and attendance in PE and the whole school’ (Institute of Youth Sport
[IYS], 2008a: 5) and ‘increased attainment and achievement in and through PE, OSHL
[out-of-school-hours learning] and sport’ (IYS, 2008b: 5).
That the policy outcomes of the SSP programme and the PESSCL strategy of which it
is a part contain sports development and non-sport objectives is not altogether surprising
for, as we noted earlier, one consequence of the increasing political salience of PESS
among civil servants and government ministers over the last decade or so has been the
extent to which key organizations such as the YST and its constituent members (e.g. Sue
Campbell) have been effective in claiming for PESS a range of perceived benefits. The
assumed benefits that participation in PESS is said to have for young people were neatly
captured in the PESSCL strategy, in which it is claimed that PESS, both within and
beyond the curriculum, can improve:

 pupil concentration, commitment and self-esteem; leading to higher attendance

and better behaviour and attainment;
 fitness levels; active children are less likely to be obese and more likely to pursue
sporting activities as adults, thereby reducing the likelihood of coronary heart
disease, diabetes and some forms of cancer; and
 Youth sports development 69
 success in international competition by ensuring talented young sports people
have a clear pathway to elite sport and competition whatever their circumstances.
(DfES/DCMS, 2003: 1)

These uncritically accepted views of the supposed worth of PESS to the enhancement of
young people’s lives are not, of course, confined to the policy area of PESS, for they also
underpin much government policy related to young people. Among the more recent
policy initiatives that focus on young people’s lives and which, to some extent, overlap
with the priorities of the SSP programme and PESSCL strategy are the Every Child
Matters initiative launched in 2003 (The Stationery Office [TSO], 2003), and The Children’s
Plan: Building Brighter Futures, published by the DCSF (TSO, 2007). As with the
PEESCL strategy and SSP programme, both documents clearly indicate the extent to
which the various ‘needs’ of young people are becoming increasingly central to the cross-
cutting policy priorities of government. Both emphasize the alleged role played by edu-
cation (including PESS) in meeting those needs (particularly in relation to physical and
mental health, emotional well-being, safety and future educational attainment). It is not
altogether surprising, therefore, that as a consequence of responding to the changing
policy priorities of, and conflicting pressures from, government, aspects of the provision
of PESS have come increasingly to be characterized by a move towards a slight down-
grading of delivering sport and physical activity programmes through PE to achieve
sports-related outcomes, in favour of implementing strategies designed to achieve other
non-sport government objectives. But to what extent can government hope to achieve its
objectives related to the promotion of PESS if teachers are being constrained to focus on
the delivery of non-sporting goals? Has the shifting emphasis in government policy
towards using PESS to achieve broader social and welfare policy goals made it more dif-
ficult for government to meet its targets in relation to the development of PE and sport in
schools? In effect, have these policies resulted in unplanned consequences that may well
be the very reverse of what was intended? The next section examines what the limited
available evidence has to say about the impact of both the PESSCL strategy and SSP
programme.

The impact of PESSCL and SSPs: sport policy goals

In an evaluation of the specialist schools programme, Ofsted (2005: 15) claimed that
‘the majority of sports colleges have improved the curriculum in PE and are offering a
wide range of accreditation opportunities … suited to the needs of a wide range of
pupils’. They also noted that since 1998 ‘pupils aged 16 in specialist schools have
performed significantly better in external examinations than those in other schools’
(Ofsted, 2005: 6). Moreover, all SSCs were said to have ‘effective links with other
schools, sports clubs and national sports bodies in their communities’ (Ofsted, 2005: 28),
and some ‘use specialist coaches to support activities, sometimes in less accessible activ-
ities, such as ice-skating, horse-riding, martial arts and golf, both in lessons and out
of school’ (Ofsted, 2005: 29). Similar findings were also reported in a more specific eva-
luation of the impact of the SSP programme undertaken by Ofsted a year later. In parti-
cular, it was suggested that since their implementation SSPs have helped to ‘improve the
quality of provision in physical education and school sport, particularly in primary
schools’ (Ofsted, 2006: 2), in terms of both curricular and extra-curricular time. As a
consequence of attending schools linked to an SSP, young people were also said to have
70 Youth sports development
‘greater opportunities to play sport outside school through schools’ strong links with
local sports clubs and sports coaches in the community’ (Ofsted, 2006: 2). It is important
to note, however, that whilst the impact of the SSP programme varied differentially
between primary and secondary schools, in general terms it was observed that ‘support
for the programme, and its impact, were not as strong in secondary schools as in primary
schools’ (Ofsted, 2006: 2).
Given that the provision of PE and sport in primary schools has historically been
considered largely underdeveloped by comparison to secondary schools, it is not surprising
to find that those in the primary sector were said to have ‘benefited substantially from the
opportunity to focus specifically on improving provision for PE and on involving pupils
in sport’ (Ofsted, 2006: 10). Amongst the other alleged benefits that primary schools are
believed to have obtained from being part of a Partnership is the ability of teachers to
provide pupils with a wider range of activities (including non-traditional ones and multi-
skills clubs) in which to participate inside and outside lessons; the allocation of two
hours per week to PE; the provision of additional resources (especially equipment) to
support the delivery of PESS; and enhanced training in PE for many primary school staff
(Ofsted, 2006). The greater use of specialist community coaches to develop links between
schools and community clubs, to help deliver sports clubs outside school time, and, in
some cases, to lead curriculum lessons whilst enabling some primary teachers to use this
time to engage in planning, preparation and assessment for other areas of the curriculum,
was also cited as a perceived benefit of the SSP programme (Ofsted, 2006).
Evidence cited in support of the impact of the SSP programme on the provision and
quality of young people’s experiences in secondary schools was also related to ways in
which more schools claimed to be providing pupils with at least two hours of PESS since
being involved in the programme; the continued broadening and diversification of activ-
ities available to pupils within and outside the curriculum; and the growth of accredited
leadership opportunities (e.g. the Junior Sport Leader Award) and examination courses
available to young people in PE and sports studies (Ofsted, 2006). The growing involve-
ment of specialist coaches, particularly in the provision of extra-curricular activities and
clubs, together with the increasing number and range of community links teachers are
developing with local clubs, sports development units and other schools (especially pri-
mary schools) to enhance the opportunities available for young people to participate in
PE and sport, is also considered to be among the other positive impacts brought about by
the SSP programme (Flintoff, 2003; 2008b; Ofsted, 2006; Smith, Leech and Green, 2009).
These presumed benefits notwithstanding, the implementation of SSPs has not appeared
to increase the amount of time available for PESS at Key Stage 4 (14–16-year-olds) to the
same extent that has been seen elsewhere across the primary and secondary years. It has
also been claimed that in some secondary schools ‘involvement in the programme was
judged to have had little impact on the leadership and management of PE … because the
[PE] department had a tradition of independence and was unreceptive to new ways of
working’ (Ofsted, 2006: 17). Accordingly, Ofsted (2006: 3) has claimed that there is a
need for teachers working in secondary schools to ‘work more closely with partnership
managers and school sport co-ordinators to maximize the impact of the programme for
all pupils’. Indeed, for reasons we shall explain later, Ofsted, and hence the government,
are now increasingly encouraging teachers and other members of SSPs to work with a
range of partners in schools, including SDOs and coaches, to deliver their policy goals
related to the SSP programme and especially those linked to the provision of PESS outside
of normal curriculum time.
 Youth sports development 71
More recent national evaluations of the SSP programme have been undertaken by the
IYS on behalf of the DCSF (IYS, 2008c; 2008d; 2008e; 2008f). The overall findings of
these studies indicate that since 2004 the range of sports and activities available to young
people has expanded substantially: in 2007, 87 per cent of Partnerships claimed to offer
twenty or more activities to young people and almost all of them (99 per cent) offered
multi-skills clubs to pupils (IYS, 2008d). In the majority of SSPs, the most widely avail-
able activities were those that have been traditionally present in many PE curricula such
as football, cricket, gymnastics, athletics and netball (IYS, 2008e; 2008f). Although the
implementation of SSPs has strengthened the place of these kinds of activities at the heart
of PE provision in schools, other sports such as boxing, golf, rugby union and swimming
are being made available to pupils as part of curriculum PE but, increasingly, as part of
extra-curricular time too. This growth in the availability of a wider range of sports is
also said to have been supplemented by increases in the provision of activities such as
archery, cycling, martial arts and orienteering (IYS, 2008e; 2008f). Confirming the find-
ings of the 2007/08 School Sport Survey (TNS, 2008) and smaller-scale studies of teachers
involved in the implementation of the SSP programme (Flintoff, 2003; 2008b; Smith, Leech
and Green, 2009), the IYS has also reported that since their inception SSPs have been
effective in enhancing both the amount of time available for pupils to engage in PESS and
the links between schools, community sports clubs, sports development units and spe-
cialist sports coaches. The latter, in particular, are said to have been effective in helping
to increase the number and diversity of intra- and inter-school sports competitions and
events among young people across all school years, even though participation remains
clearly differentiated by sex and age. More specifically, the available data indicate that
whilst ‘participation levels in inter-school competition for both girls and boys have stea-
dily increased’ (IYS, 2008e: 13) since SSPs were established, they have so far failed to
break down the long-established gap in participation levels between girls and boys in
inter-school competition. In fact, the gap in participation between school-aged young
people ‘has remained broadly the same with girls’ participation equating to around three-
quarters that of boys’ (IYS, 2008e: 13), and age-related declines in participation in inter-
school competition remain across the school years, with a marked drop-off in participation
continuing to exist for both boys and girls in the later secondary school years (IYS,
2008e; TNS, 2007).
In terms of the impact that SSPs have had on the complex relationships that exist
between the various partners involved in the programme, Houlihan and Lindsey have
noted that

the strongest partnership links are between secondary schools (via the SSCo) and
their cluster of primary schools. In general the relationship is perceived as being
mutually beneficial insofar as primary schools, who often do not have a specialist PE
teacher, receive training from the Coordinator while the secondary school receives
new entrants to year seven who have a higher standard of sports skills.
(Houlihan and Lindsey 2008: 230)

Furthermore, according to Houlihan and Lindsey (2008), while the SSPs may have the
advantage of enhancing the sporting skills of primary-aged young people, equally
important are the perceived benefits to the secondary school that are not associated with
the formally stated outcomes of the SSP programme. Of particular importance, they
argue, is that ‘secondary schools, who are often in intense competition with each other
72 Youth sports development
for primary pupils, see the work of their Coordinator as a way of promoting and marketing
the school to primary pupils (and their parents)’ (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008: 230). It is
this increasing marketization of education and the associated relational constraints and
pressures that help explain the apparent differential engagement of primary and secondary
schools within SSPs, and especially why the cooperation between secondary schools is
thought to be much weaker than that which characterizes the relationships between secondary
schools and the clusters of primary and special schools with whom they are linked
(Flintoff, 2003; 2008b; Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008; Smith, Leech and Green, 2009). Writing
of the impact that the marketization of education appears to have on the operations of
SSPs, Houlihan and Lindsey (2008: 230) have rightly noted that whereas there is ‘no
market competition between secondary and primary schools, there is frequently fierce
competition between secondary schools for new pupils which is often a disincentive to
cooperate’. To this they add that ‘a number of secondary schools consider that they have
little to gain from active involvement in the SSP as they have good facilities and sufficient
qualified PE staff and fear that they might lose by allowing pupils from other secondary
schools access to their resources’ (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008: 230). Although it is unlikely
that all secondary schools will react in such a way, it is clear that the particular network
of power relationships that characterize the operations of SSPs, and that constitute the
increasing marketization of education, will come to impact upon the ways and extent to
which SSPs within the particular kinds of local education markets that exist in England
can achieve desired policy outcomes in the future (Flintoff, 2003; Penney and Evans,
1999). It also appears to be the case that one unintended consequence of the development
of partnerships between secondary and primary schools, in particular, is that those
working in secondary schools see the SSP programme as one further way in which they
are able to identify, and subsequently recruit, desirable pupils from the local primary
feeder schools with whom they are linked (Smith, Leech and Green, 2009). In this regard,
one of the principal motivations of partnership workers from secondary schools, often
after being encouraged by their head teachers and senior management team, is to develop
partnerships with primary schools and to develop links between them, SDOs and coaches,
precisely because it may enable secondary school teachers to recruit a better standard
(especially in sporting terms) of pupils than may otherwise be the case (Smith, Leech and
Green, 2009).

The impact of PESSCL and SSPs: non-sport policy goals

Despite the generally positive evaluations of SSPs undertaken by Ofsted in particular,
evidence of the extent to which those who deliver the programme are successful in
achieving other policy outcomes has been considerably more variable and limited. This is
particularly the case in relation to those policy outcomes of the PESSCL strategy and the
SSP programme in which PESS are seen as important vehicles of social policy designed to
achieve government’s non-sports objectives. As we noted earlier, in addition to using
PESS to help achieve sports-specific policy goals, the SSP programme is also expected to
help contribute towards the achievement of non-sports objectives related, among other
things, to young people’s health, behaviour, attainment and attendance, not just in PESS
but across the whole school. This uncritically accepted view that PESS can bring about
effective behavioural and attitudinal change and develop among young people perceived
desirable qualities can, of course, be traced back over the century-long history of the
subject (Kirk, 1992). Of particular significance in this regard were the various PE syllabi
 Youth sports development 73
that were published since around the turn of the twentieth century, the ideologies and
practices that surrounded the use of games in the public schools of nineteenth-century
Britain, and the publication of various sport policies since the launch of the Wolfenden
Report in 1960 in particular (see Chapter 2). All of these and many other developments
expressed, to a greater or lesser degree, the many presumed health and physical benefits,
as well as the social (e.g. character development, discipline and leadership skills), affective
(e.g. personal and social well-being, self-esteem and self-efficacy) and cognitive (e.g. academic
performance) benefits that have been widely extolled on behalf of PESS (Bailey et al.,
2009; Coalter, 2007a; Sandford et al., 2006). As we make clear in Chapter 4, these ideol-
ogies about the supposed worth of PESS to the enhancement of young people’s lives
currently find expression in the government’s social inclusion agenda, in which sport is
believed to contribute to the development of people and their communities by generating
improvements in health, crime, employment and education. But what does the available
evidence suggest about the extent to which these policy outcomes have been, and perhaps
more importantly can be, achieved through the use of PE and sport in schools?
Having reviewed much of the published literature that explores the links between
sports participation and educational performance, Coalter (2007a: 108) concluded that
there currently exists ‘mixed, inconsistent and largely non-cumulative evidence about the
positive educational impacts of physical education and sport’. A similarly balanced and
appropriately cautious conclusion was also reached by Sandford et al. (2006), who
reviewed the use of school-based physical activity interventions to re-engage young people
with school life and promote their educational prospects. In particular, they suggested
that whilst ‘sport and physical activities are able, to some degree, to facilitate personal
and social development in some disaffected young people under some circumstances’
(Sandford et al., 2006: 261; original emphasis) it is misleading to argue that simply par-
ticipating in ‘PESS’ leads to improved educational performance among young people (see
also Bailey et al., 2009; Coalter, 2007a). Data from three more recent studies of the
impact of SSPs on pupil attendance (IYS, 2008a), attainment (IYS, 2008b) and behaviour
(IYS, 2008c) also reveal similar findings. In relation to attendance, 42 per cent of head
teachers and 52 per cent of Heads of PE surveyed felt – somewhat impressionistically –
that attendance had improved ‘slightly’ or ‘markedly’ since their school had become
involved in the SSP, with over half (53 per cent) of head teachers reporting no change
(IYS, 2008a). Of those who felt attendance had improved, just over two-fifths of head
teachers (43 per cent) and one-half of Heads of PE (52 per cent) felt that observed chan-
ges in attendance were attributable ‘slightly’ or ‘substantially’ to the SSP programme, and
38 per cent of head teachers claimed that the Partnership of which their school was a part
had no impact on attendance (IYS, 2008a).
In terms of the impact that SSPs were thought to have on pupil attainment, similar
proportions of head teachers (45 per cent) and Heads of PE (46 per cent) felt that
attainment had ‘improved a little’ since their school had been part of the Partnership, 21
per cent of head teachers and 14 per cent of Heads of PE claimed that it had ‘improved
markedly’, and approximately one-third (32 per cent) of head teachers and just under
two-fifths (38 per cent) of Heads of PE thought that there had been ‘no change’ in pupil
attainment since their school had been part of the Partnership (IYS, 2008b). One half (50
per cent) of head teachers who claimed that attainment had improved felt that this was
‘slightly due’ to membership of the SSP programme, a further 25 per cent said that the
Partnership had had ‘no impact’ on pupil attainment and just under one-fifth (18 per
cent) of head teachers did not feel it was possible to identify the impact of the SSP
74 Youth sports development
programme on the attainment of pupils in their school (IYS, 2008b). National attainment
data from the DCSF also indicated that those schools who were part of the first and
second phase of Partnership designation performed better in attainment tests for 6–16-
year-olds. There was, however, no significant relationship between a school’s membership
of an SSP and higher attainment scores, except for those pupils aged 6–7 years old (IYS,
2008b). In addition, whilst many respondents to the IYS study felt that there were notable
improvements in other perceived aspects of attainment (e.g. the ‘ability to learn’, devel-
opment of communication and motivation skills, confidence and coordination), ‘these
improvements were rarely backed up with robust evidence and were largely anecdotal’
(IYS, 2008b: 26).
Finally, in relation to pupil behaviour, similar proportions of head teachers and Heads
of PE felt that there had been ‘no change’ (46 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively) in
pupils’ behaviour or that ‘behaviour had improved a little’ (42 per cent and 43 per cent,
respectively) since their school had been part of the Partnership. Of those who thought
that being part of an SSP impacted positively on pupil behaviour, approximately half of
head teachers (50 per cent) and Heads of PE (47 per cent) reported that there had been a
‘slight improvement’ in pupil behaviour, whilst 17 per cent of head teachers and one-
quarter of Heads of PE felt that being part of the Partnership had ‘no impact’ on the
behaviour of pupils (IYS, 2008c). What is particularly noteworthy, however, was that the
PDMs and head teachers involved in the study did not feel ‘tackling behavioural issues
was the central concern of the SSP programme’ and for some ‘the establishment of causal
links between the SSP programme and behavioural change [was] an “impossible” task’
(IYS, 2008c: 5). Indeed, a frequent, substantial methodological challenge facing both
researchers and those involved with SSPs relates to the impossibility of establishing a
simple cause and effect relationship between increases or changes in the relations that
characterize PESS as a result of the implementation of the Partnership programme and
enhanced attendance, attainment and behaviour within the wider school context. For
many of the participants in the three impact studies conducted by the IYS – though this
applies to many other studies too (for reviews, see Bailey et al., 2009; Coalter, 2007a;
Sandford et al., 2006) – it was difficult to isolate the specific impact that SSP membership
had on any observed changes in pupils’ educational performance from the outcomes of
other programmes that were being delivered simultaneously by colleagues in schools. In
fact, if the experiences pupils derived from PESS did have an impact in affecting desired
behavioural and attitudinal change among pupils (particularly in small targeted groups
with pre-existing poor attendance rates, behaviour and low levels of attainment), then
this was most likely to occur indirectly, when PESS and the other activities of SSPs were
used as part of a broader complex package of interventions aimed at improving and
managing whole school change (IYS, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c).
This is not the only methodological difficulty that serves to limit the extent to which
the impact of participation in PESS through SSPs can be identified, for there exists some
significant variability in how different schools define and record: appropriate forms of
behaviour; the types of attainment tests provided for pupils; and authorized and unau-
thorized absences (IYS, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). In addition, as we noted above, many of the
comments from head teachers and other Partnership staff (e.g. PDMs, SSCos and Heads
of PE) involved in these and other studies tend to be based on the impressions they
formed during the context of their day-to-day teaching, rather than on the basis of any
hard, reliable and systematically collected data regarding the effectiveness of the impact
of the SSP on pupils’ behaviour, attendance and educational performance.
 Youth sports development 75
Notwithstanding the lack of robust evidence for the effectiveness of SSPs in generating
desired impacts on young people’s educational performance, there is some preliminary
evidence – beyond the more quantitatively based analyses undertaken by the IYS – that
indicates that those working within SSPs have nevertheless been making a range of
inevitably ideological claims about their ability to use PESS as a tool for achieving a
range of desired social outcomes (Flintoff, 2003; 2008b; Smith, Leech and Green, 2009). In
one recent study of a SSP in the North West of England, for example, the presumed
benefits of the SSP programme to young people’s educational experiences were often
accepted uncritically and perceived as almost inevitable outcomes of participation in the
programme by Partnership workers (Smith, Leech and Green, 2009). It was not uncom-
mon to find, therefore, that often few attempts were made by Partnership workers to
systematically monitor and evaluate SSPs for their desired impacts on young people. This
is not especially surprising since monitoring observed changes in pupil behaviour and
attainment is further compounded by the difficulties of identifying the presumed impacts
on these complex aspects of young people’s educational experiences. Indeed, it was not
uncommon for many of the teachers in this study to claim that while they and other
partnership workers sought to improve attendance and pupil behaviour and attainment,
measuring the precise impact of their efforts, beyond the generation of basic quantitative
outcome data, was especially difficult.
The roots of the claims that are frequently made on behalf of PESS by those involved
within the SSPs in this study and other studies (e.g. Flintoff, 2003; 2008b) were, in part,
traceable to the particular individual and group ideologies of PESS that characterized the
thoughts and practices of those working within SSPs. It was also clear, however, that
such groups have nevertheless been constrained, by virtue of the broader network of
relationships or figurations of which they are a part, in championing enthusiastically the
perceived value or ‘power’ of PESS. This tendency has, in turn, been reinforced by the
prevailing ideological tendency of government, the YST and other professional bodies to
exhort in policy and practice the alleged benefits that are thought to be accrued by young
people from regular engagement in PESS (Smith, Leech and Green, 2009).
Despite the willingness with which teachers and others involved in SSPs often claim for
PESS a variety of positive benefits for which there is, at best, very limited empirical evidence,
it was nevertheless possible to understand why they did so. There are, as we noted earlier, a
variety of widespread and longstanding ideologies linking sport and sports development
with a range of perceived positive social outcomes and these have been largely uncritically
accepted and continue to inform many of the programmes that teachers, SDOs and coaches
are required to implement by government and other groups such as the YST as part of
the SSP initiative. It is also the case that in the battle for public funding PE teachers and
other school staff, like SDOs (see Chapters 4 and 5), have to compete with representatives
of many other public services that might generally be perceived to have a more pressing
claim for a greater share of public funds (e.g. health) (Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter, 2007a).
In this regard, PE teachers and other Partnership workers (e.g. SDOs and coaches) especially
are being constrained to move beyond simply extolling the intrinsic benefits of sports
participation towards providing a more persuasive justification for using more public
funds to develop sport. That is, by virtue of the particular network of power relation-
ships of which they are a part, and within the context of the continued struggle to justify
their own professional status, PE teachers are being required to draw on broader gov-
ernment policy agendas in order to bolster both their own professional standing and the
position of PESS within the strategies of government. This is a point of considerable
76 Youth sports development
importance for, as Coalter (2007a: 44) has noted, PESS, like many other areas of sport
policy, is ‘a vulnerable policy area, under pressure to deliver short-term outcomes in a
relatively short window of opportunity’ and it is, therefore, becoming necessary for those
working in SSPs to be addressing – or, at least, to be seen to be addressing – the policy
desire by government to use the programme as a relatively cheap and apparently con-
vincing solution to a myriad of complex social problems (Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter,
2007a). In this regard, it is clear that the ever-lengthening and increasing complexity of
the networks of relations of which PE teachers are a part can be seen to have both con-
straining and enabling elements. They are constraining insofar as PE teachers are being
expected by government, Sport England, the YST and others to tailor their activities
towards the achievement of desired policy goals, even if those goals may be unrealistic.
Simultaneously, however, these relational constraints also enable PE teachers to meet the
agendas of their schools and, more importantly, their personal priorities. In this regard,
the growing tendency for PE teachers to make many of the claimed contributions for
PESS cannot therefore be adequately seen in isolation from broader professionalization
processes, and from the ways in which PE teachers seek to advance their own interests by
responding to the conflicting pressures under which they work.
But to what extent has the emphasis that has come to be placed on the promotion of
‘educational attainment, learning and development through school sport and PE’ (Houlihan
and Green, 2006: 88; original emphasis) resulted in outcomes that may not have been
intended or expected by government? Perhaps the first point worthy of note is that whilst
the priorities of the PESSCL strategy and SSP programme have increasingly constrained
those charged with their implementation to work with a wide variety of other organiza-
tions in order to achieve the government’s non-sport policy goals, the outcomes of this
increasingly complex interweaving of the actions of the many different groups may well
have made it more difficult for the implementers to achieve the government’s goals in
relation to school-based youth sports development proper, an outcome which it is fair to
assume was neither intended nor desired by government (Bloyce et al., 2008; Dopson and
Waddington, 1996; Elias, 1978). Equally, as the complexity of the relational networks
surrounding youth sports development increases, so it becomes more difficult for any one
group – even a group as powerful as the government – to retain control over the imple-
mentation of the PESSCL strategy and SSP programme. It also becomes difficult for such
a powerful group as the government to retain control over the outcomes that emerge
from the implementation of the PESSCL and SSP initiatives so that it is able, within clo-
sely defined limits, to pursue effectively its sporting and non-sporting objectives. In this
regard, it might be argued that the use of PESS as a means to pursue the government’s
non-sporting goals has had the effect of undermining the extent to which the government
is able to achieve its sporting priorities. It is also clear that whilst the government has a
greater capacity to make crucial decisions over the policy priorities to be pursued in the
PESSCL and SSP strategies, the nature and complexity of the human figurations in which
they are involved means that the extent to which the government is able to achieve its
objectives is very dependent on the actions of other groups such as those who work
within SSPs as they, too, attempt to protect, maintain and advance their own individual
and/or collective interests. Finally, it should be emphasized that unplanned outcomes of
this kind are not unusual aspects of social life; indeed, it is important to recognize that,
as we explained in Chapter 1, the normal results of complex processes involving the
interweaving of the goal-directed actions of large numbers of people include outcomes
that no one has chosen and no one has designed.
 Youth sports development 77
Summary
In this chapter we have attempted to examine one of the most significant youth sports
development policies to have been introduced in schools in England in recent years,
namely, the PESSCL strategy. We have also sought to examine the SSP programme as one
aspect of PESSCL that arguably became one of the most important overarching infra-
structures through which government has attempted to achieve its sports-specific goals
and non-sport objectives related to PESS and youth sports development in schools.
Indeed, on the basis of the analysis presented here, it is clear that PESS in particular, and
sport for young people more generally, remains an integral part of the current Labour
government’s conceptualization of sports development. Increasing significance has also
been placed on the government’s initiatives that prioritize the achievement of a range of
other social objectives using sport and physical activity as key vehicles of social policy.
In relation to the policy and practice of PESSCL and the SSP programme, it seems
reasonable to conclude that much recent school-based youth sports development policy is
predicated on the assumption that there is a need to provide young people with four ‘Cs’,
namely: more chances to participate in sport and physical activity; more coaches to
facilitate opportunities to participate and to improve the quality of young people’s
experiences of sport and physical activity; a wider range of competitions in which young
people can participate; and a more extensive club infrastructure designed to develop and
enhance links between participation in PESS and local community clubs.
Such an approach to youth sports development was hardened even further when the
PESSCL strategy was replaced – at least in name – by the PE and Sport Strategy for
Young People (PESSYP). This began to be delivered in schools and colleges in England
from September 2008. Overall responsibility for PESSYP lies with the DCSF and DCMS
in conjunction with the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS), with
the YST once again playing a central role in its implementation in primary and secondary
schools (DCMS, 2008a; Sport England, 2008a). The PESSYP, which builds on the work of
the PESSCL strategy, is supported by an investment of £783 million to improve the quality
and quantity of PE and sport undertaken by young people aged 5–19. This commitment to
enhance the take-up of sporting opportunities by 5–19-year-olds is now set out in PSA target
22, the objectives of which are, as we explain in Chapter 7, explicitly related to the delivery
of a successful London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games and to enhance the
proportion of young people engaging in PESS. In relation to increasing the take-up of
sporting opportunities among young people, the PSA target states that:

in addition to at least 2 hours per week of high quality PE and Sport in school for all
5–16 year olds, all children and young people aged 5–19 will be offered opportunities
to participate in a further 3 hours per week of sporting activities provided through
schools, Further Education (FE) colleges, clubs and community providers.
(HMSO, 2007: 3)

Collectively, this commitment is now commonly referred to as the ‘Five Hour Offer’, the
responsibility for which belongs to the YST, with support from the DCMS and Sport
England (DCMS, 2008a; Sport England, 2008a; Rowe, 2009). The implementation of
PESSYP and the introduction of the ‘Five Hour Offer’ coincided with the publication of
two recent English sport policy documents, namely, Playing to Win (DCMS, 2008a), and
the Sport England Strategy 2008–2011 (Rowe, 2009; Sport England, 2008a). As we noted
78 Youth sports development
in Chapter 2, both policies reinforce the currently prevailing policy priorities associated
with reducing drop-off in participation at the age of 16 by enhancing school sport and
community club links (Rowe, 2009; Sport England, 2008a) and providing ‘more coaching
and more competitive sport for all young people’ (DCMS, 2008a: Preface) as part of an
overall plan to develop ‘an integrated and sustainable sporting system which will nurture
and develop sporting talent, underpinned by a high quality club and competition struc-
ture’ (DCMS, 2008a: 3).
While at the time of writing PESSYP had only began to be implemented in practice, it
seems reasonable to suppose that the policy objectives and priorities that underpin
PESSYP are one more expression of the way in which SSPs, SSCs and other schools will
remain at the heart of the government’s future innovations related to youth sports
development in England. However, it might with equal validity be noted that, as Coalter
(2007a) observes of sport policy more generally and as we make clear elsewhere in this
book (see Chapters 4 and 5), the future policy status of PESS is likely to continue to
depend – perhaps increasingly so – on the ability of those working in these fields to
demonstrate its cross-cutting value and to help with the achievement of the government’s
wider social goals. It is also likely, therefore, that this continued policy emphasis on the
use of PESS to help achieve government’s non-sport objectives will encourage those
working within school-based youth sports development schemes such as SSPs to continue
championing enthusiastically the benefits that participation in PESS is thought to have for
other aspects of young people’s lives. As we noted earlier, however, this could be viewed
as less of an opportunity and more of a threat to the future of PE and sport in schools
and may help undermine the position of some of those involved in delivering the SSP and
PESSYP programmes, an outcome which it is fair to assume may not be intended or
desired by those within and outside the youth sports development policy community.

Revision questions
1 Why are young people and school-based youth sports development of particular
importance to the government’s sport policy agenda?
2 Examine the various policy issues that surround the use of PESS as vehicles of
social policy designed to achieve a variety of non-sport policy goals.
3 Given the prevailing direction of government sport policy and development prio-
rities, how and in what ways might school-based youth sport develop in the future?

Key readings
Flintoff, A. (2008a) ‘Physical education and youth sport’, in K. Hylton and P. Bramham (eds) Sports
Development: Policy, Process and Practice, 2nd edn, London: Routledge.
Green, K. (2008) Understanding Physical Education, London: Sage.
Houlihan, B. and Green, M. (2006) ‘The changing status of school sport and physical education:
explaining policy change’, Sport, Education and Society, 11: 73–92.

Recommended websites
Sport England: www.sportengland.org
Teachernet: www.teachernet.gov.uk
Youth Sport Trust: www.youthsporttrust.org
4 Community sports development
Promoting social inclusion

Objectives
This chapter will:

 examine some of the policy issues associated with the increasing adoption of
sport and physical activities as vehicles of social policy targeted at achieving
greater social inclusion;
 examine the various contributions that sport and physical activities are thought
to make to the achievement of greater social inclusion; and
 review the evidence for the effectiveness of sports development programmes in
which the intention is to prevent crime and drug use among young people.

Introduction
In Britain, as in many other Western societies, there has, over the last two or three decades,
been growing concern over a range of perceived social problems that together are seen as
stemming from what is currently popularly described as ‘social exclusion’. The term
‘social exclusion’ was first used in French social policy in the 1970s and, from the 1980s,
in the European Union (EU) as unemployment was increasing rapidly in several Member
States and as immigration was also rising (Levitas, 2004; Roberts, 2009). Together, these
processes were associated with growing concern that came to be expressed about the
formation of groups who were not only unemployed or just poor, but somehow seen as
‘outside’ and ‘apart from’ mainstream society (Roberts, 2009). In Britain, fears regarding
the spread of unemployment were accompanied by a debate over whether an emergent
underclass could be distinguished from other groups in the wider society. By the time
New Labour had won the 1997 general election, however, discussions about the existence
of an ‘underclass’ in society had been replaced by the concept of social exclusion. In the
period since 1997, the concept of social exclusion has become the preferred, political and
ideologically saturated, label used to refer to the forms of disadvantage that are said to be
experienced by those groups who are identified as ‘disadvantaged’ in one way or another
(Roberts, 2009). The concept has also ‘been subjected to changes in meaning that are
closely related to the political arguments encapsulated in third way debates’ (Levitas,
2004: 44) and the associated ideological preoccupations of government (see Chapter 2).
More particularly, as part of the somewhat ambiguous and contentious ‘Third Way’
approach to much British government policy (Levitas, 2004), particular concern has been
80 Community sports development: social inclusion
expressed about what can happen when people and local communities become ‘socially
excluded’ by experiencing a combination of linked ‘problems’. These ‘problems’, that
were once referred to as multiple deprivation or multiple disadvantage (Roberts, 2009),
include rising levels of crime and drug use, unemployment, low income, family and
community breakdown, lack of social integration and participation, and declining stan-
dards of employment, education and health (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). Such a view of
social exclusion is ‘spectacularly vague’ (Levitas, 2004: 45) and fails to explain adequately
the wider social processes that are associated with the development and existence of these
perceived social problems. Recent policy and political emphasis on social exclusion has
been underpinned by a concern with inadequate social participation, lack of social inte-
gration and power amongst local communities. A parallel emphasis has also come to be
placed on personal responsibility and accountability (Coalter, 2007a; Levitas, 2004). More
specifically, as Coalter has observed,

the emphasis on community and social inclusion is accompanied by an emphasis on

personal responsibility – to work or to seek work, to provide for family, to behave
responsibly, to take responsibility for personal health, to contribute to the solution
of community problems and so on.
(Coalter 2007a: 47)

This concern with community renewal, social inclusion and personal responsibility has
been expressed in a variety of ways, not least in the emergence of a plethora of policy
initiatives designed to combat the outcomes of those processes that are strongly asso-
ciated with experiences of social exclusion amongst people and the communities that they
form. Among these initiatives have been policies based on an amalgam of usually untested
assumptions about the important contribution that sport and physical activities are
thought to make to the achievement of greater social inclusion. This is a view that has
been articulated in several policy statements since the early 1960s (CCPR, 1960; DCMS,
2000; Sports Council, 1982; Sport England, 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2008e; 2008f).
As we noted in the Introduction to this book, over the past two decades or so, in
particular, one consequence of the increasing intervention of government in sport policy-
making has been that sport policy priorities have shifted away from the development of
sport and achievement of sport-related goals towards the use of sport to achieve other
desired social objectives. Indeed, those currently working in sports development in a
variety of capacities and in a range of diverse organizations and settings are becoming
increasingly, though differentially, constrained to maintain their sports development
priorities within the context of ‘conflicting pressures through being expected to con-
tribute to the government’s social inclusion objectives’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 107).
These conflicting pressures are, in turn, being generated within a rapidly changing social
and political policy climate where, in the battle for public funding, those working in
sports development have to compete with representatives of many other public services
that might generally be perceived to have a more pressing claim on a greater share of
public funds (for example health and education). As a consequence, many SDOs are now
being constrained increasingly to move beyond simply extolling the intrinsic benefits of
sports participation towards providing a more persuasive justification to develop sport
for broader social objectives (Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter, 2007a; Houlihan and White,
2002). This tendency has been hardened further by the fact that some SDOs themselves
believe in the intrinsic value and potential of sport in bringing about desired social outcomes
 Community sports development: social inclusion 81
(Bloyce et al., 2008). In light of this situation, we are now faced with what Coalter
(2007a: 70) describes as ‘widely ambitious, extremely difficult to define and measure
claims for the social impacts of sport’, particularly in relation to the ability of sports
development workers to use sport as a means of providing solutions to the government’s
social inclusion agenda. Set in this context, the central objectives of this chapter are: (1)
to examine some of the policy issues surrounding, and the outcomes of, the increasing
adoption of sport and physical activities as vehicles of social policy targeted at achieving
greater social inclusion, particularly among young people; and (2) to examine a point of
fundamental importance in policy terms: do such sport-based schemes work?

Sport and social inclusion: the policy context

As we noted earlier, since the 1980s social exclusion, and, by extension, social inclusion,
has come increasingly to dominate the policy agenda of many Western governments, and
especially those in Europe, the US and Australia. Within the EU, for example, Articles
136 and 137 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which, among other things, helped place greater
emphasis on citizenship, democracy and the rights of individuals through an expan-
sion of the powers of the European Parliament, recommended that social exclusion
should be one of the social policy goals of Member States. In one of the declarations
annexed to the Treaty, the role sport is perceived to play as a tool of social integration
was emphasized. A similar view was also articulated in the Lisbon Strategy, launched in
2000, and emerged out of discussions amongst EU leaders of Member States about how
best to ‘modernize’ Europe. In particular, in the Lisbon Strategy the creation of more
jobs, more competition and greater social cohesion were identified as three key policy
goals that were expected to lie at the centre of the government policy agendas of Member
States, who were each expected to contribute to a coordinated approach towards tackling
social exclusion within the EU (Daly, 2007). The Lisbon Review 2005 (known as the Kok
Report) was heavily critical of the Lisbon Strategy, however. The Review identified a
clear implementation gap in the ways and extent to which Member States had adopted
social inclusion policy objectives, and pointed towards a lack of determined and weakly
coordinated action in relation to the prevalence of social exclusion in the EU (Daly,
2007). Consequently, the Kok Report recommended that a reinvigoration of the Lisbon
Strategy was needed and that social exclusion should be downgraded as a policy objec-
tive, with a much sharper focus being placed on the achievement of social inclusion
through economic growth and the creation of jobs (Daly, 2007). Within the sporting
context, the role that sport was believed to play in the achievement of greater social
inclusion (and particularly as a tool for social and economic development) at the EU level
was expressed recently in the White Paper on Sport that was adopted by the European
Commission (EC) in July 2007. The EC, which was formerly the Commission of the
European Communities, is said to be independent of national governments and con-
stitutes the executive arm of the EU, which is an economic and political union of 27
Member States located in Europe. That the EC represents the executive arm of the EU
means that it is responsible for implementing the decisions of the European Parliament
and Council. The EC is also charged with implementing the policies and programmes of
the EU, as well as spending its funds. In some of the more recent policies that have
emanated from the EC, it was suggested, somewhat uncritically, that sport ‘makes an
important contribution to economic and social cohesion and more integrated societies’
(EC, 2007: 7) and can help with ‘job creation and … economic growth and revitalisation,
82 Community sports development: social inclusion
particularly in disadvantaged areas’ (EC, 2007: 7). It was also alleged that the provision
of, and support for, ‘sport-related activities is important for allowing immigrants and the host
society to interact together in a positive way’ (EC, 2007: 7). Finally, sport was also per-
ceived to be important for meeting the ‘specific needs and situation of underrepresented
groups … [such as] young people, people with disabilities and people from less privileged
backgrounds’ (EC, 2007: 7).
As we noted earlier, in Britain, following the election of the Labour government in
May 1997, social inclusion became a more or less central aspect of many social policies,
including those related to sport. More particularly, upon entering office the Social
Exclusion Unit (SEU) was established by the Labour Party and then Prime Minister,
Tony Blair. It was set up to examine how the government’s commitment to enhancing
social inclusion and broader welfare policy objectives could be achieved through ‘joined-
up government’ (see Chapter 2), that is, through cross-departmental strategies leading to
‘the construction of a comprehensive policy response to a complex and multidimensional
problem’ (Houlihan and White, 2002: 84). One of the first steps the SEU took to meet this
remit in relation to sport was to establish the PAT (Policy Action Team) 10 Working
Group, who were asked to report on the potential contribution that sport and the arts
make to the promotion of greater social inclusion (Collins et al., 1999). Together with the
review of the England National Lottery Strategy in 1998, the findings of the PAT 10
report, which have been outlined in some detail elsewhere (e.g. Collins et al., 1999; Col-
lins and Kay, 2003), provided the foundation for a focus on social inclusion in future
sport policy. Significantly, however, despite the recommendations of the PAT 10 report,
much of this policy has subsequently failed to recognize that it is poverty and socio-economic
status (together with other sources of social division) that lie at the core of social exclusion
(e.g. Collins and Kay, 2003). Among the many policies that could be cited in this connection
is A Sporting Future for All, in which government claimed that:

Sport can make a unique contribution to tackling social exclusion in our society …
We fully recognise that this is not something that sport can tackle alone but by
working with other agencies we believe it can make a significant contribution.
(DCMS, 2000: 39)

It has also been alleged that sport can make a positive contribution not only to the health
service (see Chapter 5) but to preventing crime and engaging those who are thought to be
alienated from education (DCMS, 2000). In this context, local authorities (in conjunction
with schools and local sports clubs) are frequently identified as playing a more or less
central role in the development of ‘creative and innovative ways of using sport to help re-
engage people and to equip them with the skills and confidence to re-join the mainstream
of society’ (DCMS, 2000: 39). As well as being a core policy priority of A Sporting Future
for All, social inclusion is also a central theme that runs through aspects of Game Plan
(DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002). Game Plan featured a list of benefits that participation in
sport and physical activities is alleged to have in the promotion of social inclusion of
particular social groups, including disabled people and ethnic minority groups, but espe-
cially young people. Indeed, whilst a myriad of groups are considered vulnerable to social
exclusion in much current government policy, it is young people and school-aged children
(particularly those identified as being ‘at risk’) who are the principal target group of
many sport-related interventions where proactive responses to a range of social problems
and the achievement of broader social goals are emphasized (Coalter, 2007a; Green, 2006;
 Community sports development: social inclusion 83
Houlihan and Green, 2006). As we noted in Chapter 2, this focus on young people has
also found particular expression in a series of recent Sport England publications, especially
Sport Playing Its Part and Shaping Places through Sport.
A central idea underpinning these reports and the policy-led debate about the potential
role of sport in social inclusion strategies tends to be that of social capital (and the closely
related concepts of cultural, economic and physical capital and ‘active citizenship’), which
has been most closely associated with the work of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam
(Coalter, 2007a). Readers who wish to find out more about the extent to which the ‘dif-
fuse and contested concept of social capital’ (Coalter, 2007a: 49) – and especially Putman’s
contribution to the debate – has come to impact on the sport and social inclusion policy
agenda in Britain might usefully consult the excellent work by Coalter (Coalter, 2007a;
2008; Coalter et al., 2000). For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that the
concept of social capital is rarely examined in great detail in many sport policy docu-
ments and its use ‘is consistently vague, with no systematic attempt to articulate clearly
its precise meaning and sport’s role in its development’ (Coalter, 2007a: 49–50). This is
unsurprising, for, as we noted earlier, it is not uncommon in policy areas of this kind for
the contribution that sport, and those working in sports development, can make to the
development of people and their communities to be based on a one-sided perception of
sport that amounts almost to a statement of faith in its effectiveness to achieve desired
social outcomes associated with the social inclusion agenda. We shall return to the policy
problems associated with this tendency for many sport-based social inclusion programmes
to be based on a series of largely untested assumptions of sporting culture later. It is clear,
however, that, notwithstanding the vagueness and uncritical acceptance of the role that
sport and physical activities are believed to play in the promotion of social inclusion and
especially social capital, both concepts continue to be attractive to policy-makers inside and
outside sport (Coalter, 2007a; Hoye and Nicholson, 2008; Nicholson and Hoye, 2008). As
Coalter has noted, there would appear to be at least two reasons for this:

First, evidence seems to suggest that there is a correlation between communities high
in social capital and a number of desired policy outcomes: lower crime rates, better
health and lower rates of child abuse … Second … the (vague) concept of social
capital contributes to New Labour’s desire to reform central government by reducing
departmentalism and encouraging ‘joined-up government’ – individual government
departments can adopt it as an objective, enabling all to ‘sing from the same hymn
sheet’. Such policies enable and require sport to claim its contribution.
(Coalter 2007a: 50)

Given the increasing emphasis that has come to be placed on social inclusion in government
policy, those working in sports development are now being increasingly constrained –
though to considerably varying degrees – to demonstrate the efficacy of sports-based
programmes in achieving not only traditional sports development objectives (such as
increased participation and provision of sporting and coaching opportunities) (see Chapter 3)
but, equally importantly, broader social goals. Indeed, it is now clear that several aspects
of sport policy and the development work (especially in local authorities) on which it is
based are becoming increasingly characterized by a desire for developing people and their
communities through sport alongside a correlative decline in the commitment to simply
developing sport amongst people in their communities (Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter,
2007a; Houlihan and White, 2002).
84 Community sports development: social inclusion
Sport-based social inclusion schemes
Such has been the rapid expansion of other sport-based programmes designed to promote
social inclusion through community sports development and other social inclusion
initiatives, there now exists an expanding literature that has begun to examine the effec-
tiveness of these programmes, with a number of evaluations being conducted in various
countries, including Britain (e.g. Coalter, 2007a; Coalter et al., 2000; Long and Sander-
son, 2001; Nichols, 2007; Taylor et al., 1999), the US (e.g. Hartmann, 2001; Hartmann
and Depro, 2006; Witt and Crompton, 1996) and Australia (e.g. Morris et al., 2003).
Despite obvious differences in, amongst other things, methodology, available resources (e.g.
staffing and cost), the aims and objectives of the programmes and the use (or lack
thereof) of monitoring and evaluation to judge effectiveness, these programmes can be
divided broadly into two main approaches that can be conceptualized as lying at opposite
ends of a continuum, with other schemes located somewhere in between these poles
(Coalter, 2007a). Coalter (2007a) refers to these two broad approaches towards sport-
based social inclusion programmes as sport plus and plus sport. The first of these, sport
plus, are those programmes ‘in which traditional sport development objectives of
increased participation and the development of sporting skills are emphasized’ (Coalter,
2007a: 71). These objectives are, however, ‘rarely the sole rationale and very rarely the
basis for external investment and subsequent evaluation’ (Coalter, 2007a: 71); indeed, in
the majority of cases sport is used in these programmes as a cost-effective tool to address
a range of broader social issues (e.g. levels of crime and drug use) (Coalter, 2007a). It is
important to note, however, that in sport plus approaches ‘sport’ is only one among a
number of other social activities (e.g. educational programmes and arts and music activ-
ities) that are used to achieve the desired outcomes of policy-makers. As we shall see
later, such an approach is not uncommon to many of the Positive Futures programmes
currently in operation in the UK. The second broad approach described by Coalter is plus
sport, ‘in which social, educational and health programmes are given primacy; and sport,
especially its ability to bring together a large number of young people, is part of a much
broader and more complex set of processes’ (Coalter, 2007a: 71). In approaches of this
kind, short-term outcome measures (e.g. behaviour change) are said to be more important
than the long-term sustainable development of sport and the achievement of sport devel-
opment objectives that are central aspects of sport plus approaches (Coalter, 2007a).
There are many schemes – whether sport plus or plus sport – and these vary considerably
in terms of both the source of funding and the organizations and personnel involved.
They also vary in terms of whether they are open to all members of the community or
whether they are targeted at specific groups (for example drug users and ex-offenders).
However, the critical question in terms of public policy is: do such schemes work? In
other words do such schemes have a significant impact either on the level of criminal
activity or on the amount of illegal drug use by young people and therefore contribute to
the achievement of greater social inclusion? Given that sport plus is the most widely used
approach to sport-based social inclusion programmes, we shall focus on some of these
schemes and their effectiveness – especially those designed to tackle crime and drug use
among young people – in the rest of this chapter.
Before we examine these issues, however, it is important to remind ourselves of a point
of some importance: sport-based social inclusion schemes, like many sports projects, are
appealing to government, many policy-makers and SDOs because there is a ‘willing
industry’ for them. That is, such projects can be promoted to, and implemented by,
 Community sports development: social inclusion 85
project workers and practitioners who believe in the alleged ‘power’ and benefits of sport,
and many young people (especially young males) can be attracted by the appeal of par-
ticipating in such projects. It is also the case that governments often present sport as a
simple, cost-effective solution to complex social problems since this is one way in which
they can be seen to be ‘doing something’ about those perceived problems (Coalter,
2007a). While governments can always invest in sport and physical activities as vehicles
of social policy, they cannot always – indeed, are sometimes unwilling to – provide long-
term, sustainable, effective solutions that may help to tackle the complex causes of social
disadvantage. We shall return to these issues later, but let us now examine some of those
social inclusion schemes that currently use sport as a means of achieving a range of policy
outcomes.

Barclays Spaces for Sports: developing people and places through sport
One sport-based social inclusion initiative that has been launched in the UK, with the
intention of ‘developing sport in the community and developing the community through
sport’ (Ramwell et al., 2008: 46), is the Barclays Spaces for Sports programme. The Spaces
for Sports programme was launched in 2004 as a three-year phased £30 million commu-
nity investment programme by Barclays, in conjunction with two national charities, the
Football Foundation and Groundwork, who provided an additional £29 million to sup-
port the initiative. Among the main purposes of the programme was the development of
community sports facilities and the creation of opportunities for participation in sport
and physical activity in areas of high social and economic deprivation and where there was
an identified need for facility development (Ramwell et al., 2008). As part of Barclays’
community investment activities and its overall corporate responsibility and sustainability
strategies, the Spaces for Sports programme was described as an initiative that ‘combines
both capital and revenue investment to develop local communities through sport’ (Ram-
well et al., 2008: 10). The capital investment for the project is being used to build 200
new state-of-the-art sports spaces (including multi-use games areas, skate parks, bike
tracks and climbing walls) that are being administered predominately by Groundwork
with support from the environmental charity BTCV and Nacro, a crime reduction charity.
Of these spaces, 174 were built in the UK as ‘local sites’ for the provision of over twenty-
five community sports (including football, hockey, cricket, tennis, BMXing, dance and
skateboarding) that residents can engage in for free, and on an open-access basis. The
remaining twenty-six sites – termed ‘flagship sites’ – are larger sporting spaces that are
jointly funded by Barclays and the Football Foundation and administered by the Football
Foundation. These sites are designed to develop community sport in disadvantaged areas
and are typically located next to Barclays Premier League or Football League clubs in
England. The revenue funds that are allocated to the programme are then used to support
sports development activity (including the role of volunteers) at each of the 200 sites,
whilst additional funds are also available for the provision of over 4,000 coaching packs
(comprising equipment and clothing) to teams and organizations to help stimulate and
sustain participation in a variety of sports. Local Hero Awards, which are awarded to
those who are identified as making a substantial contribution to grassroots sport in the
local community, are also funded from these additional monies (Ramwell et al., 2008).
Although the Spaces for Sports programme was particularly concerned with building a
sustainable physical infrastructure for sports development activity, an associated objective
of the programme was the development of sustainable activities on each of the sites to
86 Community sports development: social inclusion
encourage local residents to continue engaging in sport and physical activity and to
ensure that the site remains at the heart of community life (Ramwell et al., 2008). In
addition, and of particular importance, was the extent to which local residents were
intended to be represented and involved in the development of a site to ensure that it was,
indeed, meeting the needs of the local community. It is, of course, often very difficult to
obtain consensus among local residents on what local ‘needs’ are and not all residents are
equally able and/or willing to engage in the development of such community engagement
projects that are designed to promote social inclusion and social capital (Coalter, 2007a;
Nicholson and Hoye, 2008). This was a conclusion that was drawn by one study com-
missioned by Barclays, and which examines the impact of the programme on the devel-
opment of people and their local communities during the capital build phase (2004–07) of
the programme (Ramwell et al., 2008). The study was published by an independent
research group at Manchester Metropolitan University who utilized a range of research
methods, including interviews, observations, site visits, field notes and documentary
analysis to: ‘Measure the impact of the scheme on local communities and individuals;
Capture key learning from a groundbreaking public:private partnership to inform future
corporate programmes; Provide dynamic feedback enabling Barclays to successfully deli-
ver the programme while minimising risks and maximising successes’ (Ramwell et al.,
2008: 7). In relation to community engagement, the research group concluded that there
exists a ‘clear distinction at a significant number of local sites between the individuals
involved at the consultation, formation and build stage, and those involved at the devel-
opment and delivery stage once a site had been launched’ (Ramwell et al., 2008: 40). It
was also noted that whilst the Spaces for Sports programme is targeted at all members of
the local community, in practice it has been school-aged young people who have become
the principal target group at many sites since the inception of the programme. As a con-
sequence, it was claimed that there is a need to engage other members of the community,
including those of pre-school age (0–4 years) and older people aged 50 and above, who
may wish to use the site. This was important, it was claimed, because unless such groups
were integrated into the activities of the programme ‘[m]any sites will stand idle during
the day in term times. Targeting these other groups would see the space being utilized by
groups who may not at first glance recognise an opportunity for themselves to use the
site’ (Ramwell et al., 2008: 40). Given the variable community engagement that has
accompanied the introduction of Spaces for Sports, it was also recommended that project
workers should seek to develop ‘an understanding of how they are engaging within their
respective communities’ and report back on ‘what elements of the community they
engage with’ (Ramwell et al., 2008: 40) in future evaluations of the programme. Although
it may be easier and desirable to identify, often using more quantitative measures, which
groups of the local community engage in social inclusion schemes such as the Spaces for
Sports programme, determining the extent of community engagement or cohesion in
sport-based programmes, as in other areas of social and welfare policy, is altogether a
different matter. As Long et al. (2002) have noted, these kinds of outcomes are not always
amenable to simple forms of quantitative measurement. In that respect, the challenge for
policy-makers and SDOs involved with the Spaces for Sports programme may then
revolve around what constitutes ‘evidence’ for the impact of the programme in enhancing
community engagement.
Since the Spaces for Sports initiative is a relatively new project, it is difficult at the time
of writing to establish, with a large degree of confidence, the effectiveness of the programme
and the extent to which other desired outcomes of the programme have been achieved.
 Community sports development: social inclusion 87
Nevertheless, in addition to the reported experiences of participants and workers that are
detailed in each of the in-depth case studies undertaken by the research team at selected
flagship sites (for examples, see Ramwell et al., 2008), there are said to have been a
‘variety of different legacies [that] have been delivered by the programme’ (Ramwell et
al., 2008: 12) for local communities and the lives of residents (Ramwell et al., 2008). Of
particular relevance in the present context is the claimed effectiveness of the programme
in providing lasting legacies – for a more detailed consideration of the concept of legacy, see
Chapter 7 – in relation to: the provision of physical sporting infrastructures provided for
local residents; the development of knowledge about, and a model for, public–private
partnerships to engage in community sport investment programmes; and community
legacies that are brought about by greater social participation in the programme and
through the development of skills, job opportunities and training for residents. Mention
has already been made of the development of physical infrastructures that has been
associated with the programme, particularly in relation to the provision of extensive
community sport facilities and multi-use games areas for use by local residents on an
open access and freely available basis. In this regard, the Spaces for Sports scheme is said
to have made a significant contribution to the achievement of objectives associated with
the regeneration of sporting facilities and provision of sporting opportunities, as well as
the immediate wider regeneration and reinvigoration of local communities (Ramwell et
al., 2008). This is perhaps arguably the most significant – or, at least, the most immedi-
ate – impact that the programme has had on the lives of some residents since it has been
running in local communities. By contrast, many of the ‘knowledge legacies’ thought to
have been produced by workers on the programme would appear to have been developed
most strongly amongst those public and private organizations whose interests surround
‘targeting, commissioning, building and launching community sports sites’ (Ramwell et
al., 2008: 40) as well as pursuing other, perhaps hidden, agendas and priorities. More
particularly, Spaces for Sports does appear to have had a measure of success in enhancing
inter- and intra-organizational learning about the provision of opportunities and facilities
for community sports development, whilst encouraging partners such as some local
Groundwork Trusts to develop and deliver sport-based projects where previously they
had little or no experience in this area (Ramwell et al., 2008). In terms of developing
knowledge amongst participants, engagement in the programme is also thought to have
benefited volunteers, whose efforts have been recognized by project workers, and through
accreditation opportunities associated with their achievement of recognized coaching
qualifications and awards (Ramwell et al., 2008).
The final set of impacts thought to have been brought about by the programme are
those that relate to the use of sport to develop people and their communities. Central
among these perceived community legacies is the estimate that, as a result of the intro-
duction of Spaces for Sports, ‘over half a million people in the UK have (had) an oppor-
tunity to benefit from the programme’ (Ramwell et al., 2008: 13). A related feature of this
provision of additional opportunities to participate in sport and physical activity is that,
on the basis of monitoring data gathered by the Football Foundation, an average of more
than 50,000 people are now thought to be using Barclays Spaces for Sports sites every
week (Ramwell et al., 2008). On the basis of the available evidence, however, it is not
clear whether those who engage in the programme in this way are ‘new’ participants who
would not otherwise have participated in sport and physical activity without the programme.
It is also not clear whether the participants were already engaged in community-led
sports development activities and whether their involvement in the programme was in
88 Community sports development: social inclusion
addition to or a replacement for their participation in other sports development contexts.
Finally, the extent to which those engaged in the programme are ‘occasional’ or ‘regular’
participants or, as is often the nature of sports participation (especially among young
people), whether their involvement in the scheme is characterized by sustained participa-
tion followed by periods of ‘drop-out’ remains unknown. We should perhaps be rather
more cautious, therefore, about the claimed effectiveness of the programme in bringing
about long-term changes in the lives and behaviour of participants and, in particular, of
providing sustainable legacies for local communities. It is also clear that given the general
absence of systematically collected and reliable data on these and other elements of the
programme, the scheme will require careful and consistent process-monitoring and eva-
luation in the future to provide evidence of the extent to which the programme is being
delivered as intended, meeting its targets and making progress towards the achievement
of its desired objectives in the long term. In addition, such process-led monitoring and
evaluation is, as we noted in Chapter 1, a vital prerequisite for establishing what types of
participation at each of the sites generate what types of outcomes for what types of par-
ticipant in what types of circumstances (Coalter, 2007a). Finally, process-led monitoring
and evaluation may also be of some use in establishing the degree to which the public–private
partnership model on which the programme is based is sustainable in the long term, an
objective that is clearly of particular importance to the funders of the programme
(Ramwell et al., 2008).

The Kickz – Goals Thru Football programme

The Spaces for Sports programme is just one amongst many other examples that could be
cited of sport-based programmes in which the promotion of social inclusion among key
target groups, especially young people, has been associated with a general downgrading
of emphasis on the achievement of traditional sports development objectives. Alongside
this, as we noted earlier, there has been a correlative increase in the prioritization given
to sport, and particularly sports such as football, as a cheap and convenient policy solu-
tion to the complex causes of social exclusion (Collins et al., 1999; Tacon, 2007). As
Tacon (2007) has noted, in Britain football has, since the emergence of Football in the
Community schemes during the mid-1980s (but especially after the election of the current
Labour government), increasingly been considered as a particularly useful vehicle of
social policy designed to promote social inclusion among ‘at risk’ groups, particularly
young males. They are also thought to make a substantial contribution to community
regeneration. These schemes now operate at all Premier League, Football League and
some Football Conference clubs, which, together with a range of partners in the local
community (including sports development agencies), deliver a variety of schemes that are
designed to promote social inclusion among young people who are considered ‘at risk’ or
‘hard to reach’. One such scheme that uses the appeal of professional football to engage
young people who are considered vulnerable to crime (as victims or potential offenders)
from local estates and neighbourhoods that experience high crime rates, anti-social
behaviour and multiple deprivation is the Kickz – Goals Thru Football programme
(Football Foundation, 2008). The programme was initially developed out of discussions
between the Metropolitan Police, the Football Foundation, the Premier League, the
Football Association and the Football League. These discussions focused, in particular,
on how to engage more young people from local communities in so-called ‘positive
activities’ (including sport) and how traditional barriers that may exist between young
 Community sports development: social inclusion 89
people and local police could be broken down further. The overall concern is to help
promote social inclusion (through the reduction of youth anti-social behaviour) and
community engagement by providing young people with opportunities to participate in
sport and develop a range of other life-skills. The programme is currently managed by
the Football Foundation and is delivered locally – using an area-based and young person-
centred approach – by football clubs and local steering groups. These include members of
Police Safer Neighbourhood teams, various local authority agencies (including youth
services), youth offending teams (YOTs), leisure and sports services and social housing
providers (Football Foundation, 2008). Kickz is also supported by central government
through the Respect Task Force and the DCMS, as well as a range of other partners
including the Metropolitan Police, v (the national youth volunteering charity) and the
Department of Health. Much of the funding for the programme is provided by the
Football Foundation, the Metropolitan Police and the DCMS via the Premier League’s
Good Causes fund; for the period 2007–10, approximately £11 million of funding was
allocated to the delivery of Kickz from these bodies (Football Foundation, 2008).
Following the completion of pilot projects at four football clubs (Brentford United,
Fulham, Manchester City and Tottenham Hotspur) the Kickz programme was formally
launched in 2006 and rolled out nationally to a further 21 professional football clubs in
the 2006/07 football season. By the end of 2008, 38 clubs (including all 20 Premier League
clubs) were delivering Kickz to 15,000 young people aged 12–18 (Football Foundation, 2008).
The overall aim of the programme is to ‘create safer, stronger, more respectful commu-
nities through the development of young people’s potential’ (Football Foundation, 2008: 5),
which is complemented by a range of interrelated and overlapping objectives. These are:

 to engage young people in a range of constructive activities which link to the

Every Child Matters framework;
 to increase playing, coaching and officiating opportunities for participants;
 to break down barriers between the police and young people;
 to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour in the targeted neighbourhoods;
 to create routes into education, training and employment;
 to encourage volunteering within projects and throughout the target neighbourhoods;
and
 to increase young people’s interest in and connections with the professional game.
(Football Foundation, 2008: 5)

To help achieve these aims and objectives, the Kickz programme is said to be underpinned
by a concern to move away from ‘more conventional sport development models which
emphasise the simple delivery of activities to large numbers of participants over short
periods of time’ (Football Foundation, 2008: 11) towards offering football schemes that
enable project workers to ‘build relationships and trust’ with participants. The pro-
gramme is also intended ‘to move beyond the delivery of football coaching and competi-
tion, and [to] discuss difficult social and developmental messages with participants’
(Football Foundation, 2008: 11). Of particular importance here, it is claimed, is the regularity
with which young people can be engaged in the scheme. Unlike traditional sports development
schemes that may require participants to attend for relatively short periods of time (e.g.
once per week for twelve weeks), activity sessions that are delivered on the Kickz programme
are offered on a minimum of three nights per week, for forty-eight weeks per year. These
sessions typically include two nights of football and one additional session that can
90 Community sports development: social inclusion
include ‘elements such as other sports, music-based sessions and a range of developmental
activities such as drug awareness, healthy lifestyles, volunteering, accreditation, career
development and anti-weapons workshops’ (Football Foundation, 2008: 8). Although
football is seen as ‘the single most important engagement strategy’ (Football Foundation,
2008: 28) of Kickz, the content of the additional, ‘flexible’ sessions is chosen by the young
people themselves. This is because a crucial assumption that informs the Kickz strategy is
that if young people are to engage better with the programme it is vital that project staff
‘need to build strong relationships with young people with whom they are working’
(Football Foundation, 2008: 26). In this regard, given the emphasis that is placed on
establishing such cooperative and supportive relationships with young people, project
staff are expected to ‘create relatively non-authoritarian, non-judgemental and mutually
respectful environments’ (Football Foundation, 2008: 26) on the scheme. In addition,
where appropriate, they are expected ‘to meet with young people on their own terms and
to avoid heavy-handed punishments’ if they are ‘to succeed in engaging young people
who frequently feel marginalised from more traditional forms of service delivery’ (Foot-
ball Foundation, 2008: 26). As we shall explain in relation to the Positive Futures scheme
later, such an approach that places particular emphasis on consulting with young people,
engendering amongst them a sense of ownership and inclusiveness in the scheme, and
giving them relative freedom to choose which activities they would like to do and with
whom they do them, would appear vital prerequisites for enhancing the likely future
efficacy of Kickz. Indeed, this is a conclusion that was reached in a study entitled Tired of
Hanging Around, which was published recently by the Audit Commission (2009). In
particular, it was claimed that to help increase the effectiveness of programmes that use
sport and leisure activities to prevent anti-social behaviour among young people it is
important that project staff consult with young people when designing programmes and
ensure that such projects are as accessible, reliable and relevant as possible to the diversity
of young people’s needs and lifestyles (Audit Commission, 2009).
Since the Kickz programme has only been delivered nationally since the 2006/07 season,
it is clearly very difficult and too early to assess adequately the extent to which the various
existing Kickz projects are achieving the desired objectives, whether progress towards the
achievement of the programme aims are being made and whether the programme is being
delivered as intended. Despite the lack of available data that exist in this regard, some
preliminary assessment of the evidence of the impact of Kickz has, however, been
undertaken in the first monitoring and evaluation report of the programme that consists
of both quantitative (e.g. surveys) and qualitative (e.g. testimonies from participants)
measures (Football Foundation, 2008). Perhaps the first point to note is that between
September 2006 and the end of April 2007, 7,054 young people had engaged in the scheme
overall, with approximately 300 participants being engaged, for an average of forty-three
hours each, in the first phase of Kickz projects. Of those young people who had partici-
pated in the scheme, approximately 59 per cent (4,160) were classified as ‘involved’
(defined as being in contact with projects for twelve weeks or longer at the time data
were collected) in Kickz, and of these 42 per cent (n = 1,728) had completed at least 60
hours or more with the programme. A further one-third (33 per cent; n = 1,406) com-
pleted at least 75 hours or more and one-quarter (25 per cent; n = 1,026) had completed
100 hours or more with the programme on average (Football Foundation, 2008). Thus,
since projects were usually run, on average, three days per week for forty-eight weeks per
year, it may be concluded that the amount of time spent on the programme each week
ranged from just over one hour per week for some young people to approximately two
 Community sports development: social inclusion 91
and half hours per week for those who reported being engaged for 100 hours or more
with the programme. These data suggest, therefore, that if participants did, in fact,
engage with the programme three times each week, then the average amount of time
spent attending each session was, for some young people, approximately half an hour,
and perhaps just under one hour for those most persistently engaged in the programme.
Although such modest estimates are almost bound to entail a degree of error and mask
considerable variations between the amount of time some groups of young people spent
attending the projects, they nevertheless raise questions about the extent to which the
limited time spent on the programme by some young people could have contributed sig-
nificantly to any reported changes in their behaviour, and to the achievement of the var-
ious objectives of the programme. These reservations aside, however, it is clear that the
scheme has been successful in maintaining contact with large numbers of young people
and has retained the engagement of many of those who live in areas identified as socially
and economically disadvantaged in one way or another.
In addition to the variable time that young people spent engaged in the programme,
engagement with the scheme was also differentially related to the gender and age of par-
ticipants. As is common with many schemes of this kind, many more males (84 per cent)
than females (16 per cent) were involved in Kickz during the 2006/07 census period,
whilst just over 45 per cent of participants were aged 15 or over (Football Foundation,
2008). That the Kickz programme has been overwhelmingly male dominated is not alto-
gether surprising, for not only has football been a traditional ‘male preserve’, but higher
rates of offending have consistently been reported amongst some members of the
scheme’s principal target group, namely, groups of males who are thought to be more
likely to drop out from sport as they grow older and whose behaviour (especially those
from lower down the social hierarchy) is often controlled and regulated less effectively by
adults, and particularly adult males (Nichols, 2007; Skille and Waddington, 2006). This is
not to say, however, that Kickz is completely ineffective in targeting young women for, as
noted earlier, project staff have enjoyed some limited success in attracting a significant
minority of young women to the scheme; indeed, in some cases (e.g. the Arsenal and
Charlton Athletic Kickz projects) approximately 25 per cent of young women are reported
to have attended Kickz projects (Football Foundation, 2008). It remains to be seen,
however, whether project workers will be able to attract similar, if not higher, propor-
tions of young women to other Kickz initiatives. Indeed, it may be that the highly struc-
tured organization of the programme and the inclusion of more conventional, formally
organized activities such as football, which tends to emphasize a strong degree of com-
petitiveness and which can be particularly physically demanding and intensive, could
reinforce very traditional patterns of gender power relations that may be antithetical to
the involvement of some young women in the scheme and which may serve to reinforce
male dominance in this specific context (Skille and Waddington, 2006).
One additional problem worthy of consideration here, and which arises when
attempting to arrive at some understanding of the effectiveness of Kickz, relates to the
scheme’s efficacy in reducing crime and anti-social behaviour using a variety of educational
programmes and anti-weapons and crime workshops. To come to some estimate of the
impact of the projects on levels of crime and anti-social behaviour in the immediate areas
surrounding each of the projects, crime data – based on official Home Office classification
codes of crime – from September 2006 to August 2007 (the first full season in which
Kickz ran) were compared to data from the previous year (when Kickz schemes had not
begun). The findings indicated that in all geographical areas levels of recorded crime fell
92 Community sports development: social inclusion
on each of the days that Kickz was delivered, with data for London and the North West
revealing that crime reduction was over five times higher on days when the Kickz pro-
gramme was running compared to those days without sessions. These reductions in
crime, it is claimed, do not appear to have displaced crime to other nights when schemes
were not delivered; indeed, of the twenty-five project areas on which data are available,
increases in crime on non-Kickz evenings were recorded in just one following a decrease
in crime on nights when sessions were delivered (Football Foundation, 2008). It is
important to note, however, that these kinds of data do not provide unambiguous sup-
port for the effectiveness of Kickz in reducing crime and anti-social behaviour among
young people. First, it is important to note that the programme requires prospective
youngsters to volunteer their participation. While this is not in itself problematic, it does
create a number of problems in terms of evaluation. As Collins and Kay (2003: 170) have
noted, one of the major problems with such schemes is that any reported decreases in
‘levels of delinquency may arise because the young people who come onto schemes are
self-selecting’ and are less likely to offend than those who do not volunteer. In this
regard, it becomes difficult to attribute any decline in the incidence of delinquent beha-
viour to the programme itself. At the very least, this emphasizes the need to ensure that
the aims and objectives of any such programmes are clear and that the potential con-
sequences of voluntary participation are carefully considered in the final analysis. The
second point to note is that, as with many schemes such as Kickz, ‘it is impossible to
show a direct connection between any scheme and its impact on local crime and ASB
[anti-social behaviour]’ (Football Foundation, 2008: 41). Notably, where there is said to
be a connection between attendance on the programme and reductions in crime and anti-
social behaviour, those involved in the delivery of the projects claim that this is most
typically observed when Kickz is offered in conjunction with a variety of other local
crime reduction strategies; in such cases, reductions of up to 50 per cent in crime and
delinquency have been reported in some areas where the projects are delivered (Football
Foundation, 2008).
That it is very difficult – indeed, perhaps impossible – to establish a cause and effect
relationship between social inclusion programmes and reductions in crime and anti-social
behaviour is not something that is specific to the Kickz programme. As Coalter (2007a)
has noted, such difficulties in isolating from other existing crime reduction schemes the
precise contribution of individual sport-based programmes to any observed changes
(which are frequently indirect impacts of schemes) in participants’ behaviour and the
wider social contexts of local communities is also a problem that is encountered in the
evaluations of very many social inclusion projects. Indeed, if sport is combined with a
range of programmes – which often have similar objectives and goals – then it is parti-
cularly difficult to establish whether it is the sport-based intervention that results in any
change of behaviour, or an intervention of another kind, or a mixture of both. Writing of
these problems in relation to the British Summer Splash Schemes that were introduced
with the objective of using sport and arts activities to reduce street crime and robbery by
9–17-year-olds in several of the most deprived neighbourhoods and city centres during
school holidays, Long et al. (2002) noted that, while there are some evaluative data in
support of the effectiveness of the schemes, ‘it is not clear precisely what the data relate
to’ and there is ‘real difficulty in distinguishing between and accessing crime data covering
the exact project boundaries of such schemes’ (Long et al., 2002: 44–45; see also Nichols,
2007). As we shall see next, a similar conclusion may also be reached in relation to other
youth-focused anti-crime and drugs schemes.
 Community sports development: social inclusion 93
Sport and social inclusion programmes: reducing crime, delinquency and drug
use among young people
Perhaps one of the earliest and most well-known sport-focused interventions designed to
promote social inclusion by combating criminal behaviour among young people is the so-
called ‘Midnight Basketball’ programmes introduced in the US during the 1990s. These
programmes were designed to reduce crime and prevent violence by young African-
American males (aged 16–25) in poor inner-city urban areas with high levels of recorded
crime and youth delinquency by engaging them in supervised basketball matches during
the so-called ‘high crime’ hours between 10.00 p.m. and 2.00 a.m. (for a review, see
Hartmann, 2001; Hartmann and Depro, 2006). Originally designed as a ‘diversionary’
programme that focused primarily on the provision of basketball as a means of reducing
crime and delinquent behaviour, the concept of ‘midnight sport’ has subsequently been
developed, with programmes using other sports such as soccer, golf and table tennis
being introduced not only in the US, but also in countries such as Australia and Hungary
and in urban as well as inner-city areas (C. Green, 2008). Despite the rapid growth of,
and success claimed for, such schemes as midnight basketball/sport, they have tradition-
ally lacked any kind of coherent and evidence-based theoretical rationale and there is very
little evidence for their effectiveness in diverting participants away from committing
crime and engaging in other so-called delinquent behaviour (C. Green, 2008; Hartmann,
2001; Hartmann, and Depro, 2006). For example, one study of the impact of midnight
basketball programmes on levels of crime amongst young males living in urban areas in
the US concluded that whilst lower crime rates were reported in those cities where the
programme had been established longer, the relatively small numbers of young people
who participated in such schemes meant that any observed changes in behaviour could
not, in and of themselves, account for the reported decreases in crime in local areas
(Hartmann and Depro, 2006). In those cases where reduced levels of crime were observed
in areas where midnight basketball programmes operated, these decreases were most
usually reported when these schemes were ‘part of a whole package of crime prevention
programmes’ (C. Green, 2008: 135) in local communities. This is a point that is by no
means exclusive to the midnight sport models of sports development, for, as we noted
above, sport-based projects rarely exist in isolation from other existing schemes.
In Britain, similar schemes that have sport at their heart have also won support from
all of the major political parties as well as the police, the youth probation and educa-
tional services, local authority workers and from organizations with an interest in pro-
moting sport, such as Sport England. On this basis, such schemes have attracted large
amounts of funding both from the government and from voluntary sector organizations,
particularly those concerned with the welfare and lifestyles of young people. One exam-
ple of these schemes is the Positive Futures initiative, which is the largest national sport-
and activity-based social inclusion programme currently in operation in the UK. Positive
Futures was launched in 2001 as a joint partnership between the Home Office Crime and
Drug Strategy Directorate, Sport England, the Youth Justice Board and the Football
Foundation. The initial twenty-four Positive Futures projects were launched in 20 per
cent of the most deprived neighbourhoods and were targeted at 10–16-year-olds, with the
objective of increasing regular participation in sport and physical activity and using these
activities to reduce anti-social behaviour, crime and drug use among participants in the
locality of projects (Sport England, 2002). As Nichols (2007) has noted, it was also
intended that some of the Positive Futures projects would supplement the operations of
94 Community sports development: social inclusion
other organizations whose existing work already meets the objectives of Positive Futures,
and who can apply for extra funding to contribute to government’s social inclusion policy
priorities. Consequently, some of the Positive Futures projects have tended to be based on
a sport plus approach that is characterized by partnership working between sporting and
non-sporting organizations that use sport and other developmental activities, including a
range of lifestyle, educational and employment activities, to achieve the intended outcomes
(Coalter, 2007a).
As the programme has developed, and especially since responsibility for its management
passed, in 2006, to the charity Crime Concern, there has been a growing recognition that
where evidence exists in support of the effectiveness of the projects this is significantly
related to the ongoing personal and social development of participants that accompanies
their long-term engagement with the programme (Coalter, 2007a; Crabbe, 2008; Nichols,
2007). More particularly, it is clear that while ‘sport’ may be particularly helpful in
attracting young people considered vulnerable or ‘at risk’ of committing crime and using
illegal drugs, the provision of sport on its own is not sufficient to achieve the desired
outcomes of the programme. To increase the efficacy of the projects, therefore, it is now
recognized that sport needs to be complemented by a range of other activities that help
foster the long-term development of young people, and which are commensurate with
their broader lifestyles, where sport is only one among many other leisure priorities that
have to be balanced (Coalter, 2007a; Crabbe, 2008; Nichols, 2007). This is one reason
why, following the lessons that were learned during the early years of the programme,
Positive Futures has since not been designed as ‘a conventional “diversionary” or sports
development project’; rather, it is said to be ‘a relationship strategy’ in which these various
sport and other activities are ‘used to establish relationships with … socially marginalized
young people who are alienated from officialdom and “authority” figures such as teachers,
probation officers and even parents’ (Home Office, 2003: 6). Consequently, the programme
‘is not concerned with the celebration, development or promotion of sport as an end in
itself’, nor is it concerned with providing sports and physical activities as a diversion
from, or alternative to, ‘time spent engaging in substance misuse and crime’ (Home
Office, 2003: 8). Rather, sport, it is said, ‘is just a hook, a means of establishing relationships
with marginalized groups’ (Home Office, 2003: 16) such as some young people. Central to
the effectiveness of the scheme is the extent to which they form relationships with others
on the scheme, particularly project workers (Crabbe, 2008; Home Office, 2003; Nichols,
2007). In this regard, workers on the Positive Futures scheme are said to be ‘concerned to
gain a more complete picture of the ways in which projects (rather than sport or other
activities) influence participants’ attitudes, engagement, interests, education, employment,
peer groups and relationships’ (Crabbe, 2008: 31; original emphasis). Let us examine the
emphasis that is placed on building relationships between project workers and young
people on such schemes as Positive Futures a little further.

Developing relationships and the importance of peer leaders

It has often been recognized that the quality of relationships that are established between
project leaders and participants on programmes is crucial to maintaining and enhancing
their effectiveness in achieving desired outcomes (Audit Commission, 2009; Coalter,
2007a; Crabbe, 2008; C. Green, 2008; Smith and Waddington, 2004). This is a point that
is reinforced by Crabbe (2008: 32) in his evaluation of Positive Futures, when he suggests
that ‘for those who remain engaged, Positive Futures can help to build both breadth and
 Community sports development: social inclusion 95
depth into project related friendships, networks and opportunities rather than just access
to “more” or “different” people’. It is not simply the relationships per se that participants
form with others on the scheme that appear to be crucial, however. What is arguably
more important to the effectiveness of schemes like Positive Futures is the use of volun-
teer peer leaders to deliver programmes and engage participants, the rationale for which
is typically grounded in educational and learning theory (Coalter, 2007a; 2008). As
Coalter has observed,

because young people’s attitudes are highly influenced by their peers’ values and
attitudes, peer educators are less likely to be viewed as ‘preaching’ authority figures
and more likely to be regarded as people who know the experiences and concerns of
young people.
(Coalter 2008: 53)

Insofar as youth peer leaders are perceived to be effective role models for participants on
sport-based social inclusion schemes, this, it seems, is related both to the characteristics
of the peer leader and his or her perceived similarity to the learner (Coalter, 2008). This
is crucial, Coalter suggests, because learning in young people

is most likely to occur when the learners perceive that they are capable of carrying
out the behaviour (self-efficacy expectancy), think that there is a high probability that
the behaviour will result in a particular outcome (outcome expectancy) and if the
outcome is desirable – all of which can be reinforced via peer education.
(Coalter 2008: 53)

The use of peer leaders in bringing about desired changes in the behaviour of participants
and the sensitivity they adopt in relation to their needs are thus key components of the
effectiveness of sport-based social inclusion programmes. There are, however, a number
of additional problems that may need to be resolved before we can hope to measure more
accurately the effectiveness of schemes in which the development and maintenance of
relationships between participants and project staff are amongst the main objectives. It is
not generally clear, for example, how we are to ‘measure’ – if that were possible – the
relationships young people form with others on sport-based social inclusion schemes and
within the wider society more generally. What criteria should be applied in this analysis?
For how long do the young people involved have to have established a ‘relationship’ with
others for the project to be considered a success? Are these relationships likely to last in
the long term? For it is the nature of people’s, and especially young people’s, networks of
relationships that they will frequently change as they grow older; some relations with
friends and other groups will remain, while others will become less significant in their
lives. This is especially important when one considers that the relationships young people
are expected to form with project leaders and others on social inclusion schemes are, in
many cases, only temporary. Indeed, despite evidence of their effectiveness, such close
one-to-one relationships with project leaders can be particularly difficult to establish on a
long-term basis on many large-scale schemes. They are also particularly difficult to
achieve on those schemes that are short-term and that have a high turnover of both
project staff and volunteers as well as of the young people themselves (Coalter, 2007a;
Collins and Kay, 2003; C. Green, 2008; Nichols, 2007). These problems may be further
compounded by the tendency for project workers to work under almost constant pressure
96 Community sports development: social inclusion
to secure funding for future projects and to meet the short-term priorities of partners.
Not surprisingly, these and many other constraints often mean that rather less emphasis
is given to long-term evaluation, project development and, especially, to the development
of people, as volunteers and/or participants. These and many other constraints can make
it particularly difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects and the likely long-term
impact that engagement in them will have on the quality of the relationships that may be
established as a consequence (Audit Commission, 2009; Coalter, 2007a; Nichols, 2007).
The significance of some of these issues might usefully be explored by one of the most
systematic and careful evaluations of social inclusion schemes that was carried out by
Davis and Dawson for the Home Office (1996). They reviewed six projects using diver-
sion to communicate drugs prevention messages to young people. One of these projects
was based primarily around physical activities – in this case an outward bound camp –
but other forms of diversion included a young people’s music project, production of a
local newspaper, summer holiday play schemes and the production of a newsletter using
computer graphics and text. Davis and Dawson (1996) noted a number of key themes
emerging from these projects. First, they noted that there was particular confusion about
what is meant by ‘diversion’. In this context, they noted that some projects that they
observed had been in existence for some time before a drugs component, linked to funding by
the local drugs prevention team (DPT), was appended to it. They argued that if these projects
had previously been successful in attracting youngsters to the activities that they offered, then
they could fairly claim to have been diversionary. If a drugs component was added subse-
quently, this could more accurately be described, not as diversionary, but in terms of drugs
education. This is not merely a matter of semantics; the real question is whether the projects
had been properly thought through and, in that regard, Davis and Dawson concluded that

unfortunately this was not always the case and confusion surrounding the meaning
of diversion may in some part be to blame. This is because the bolting on of a drugs
education component to an existing venture was often motivated purely by the need
to secure DPT funding and was unconvincing in educational terms, no matter that
the original project may have been well received.
(Davis and Dawson 1996: 28)

Second, it was suggested that drugs prevention team funding is not an unalloyed blessing.
It was noted that pressure to secure funding for youth work leads project managers to
cast their net widely. One possibility is to apply for funding to the local DPT. Sometimes,
however, this money is applied for without sufficient thought or planning and on occasions,
they note, the element of DPT funding created a pressure to address the drugs issue in
ways that were perceived to distort the original nature of the project – perhaps because of
the element of compulsion involved to meet the requirements of the funding body or, in
some cases, because some workers (especially volunteer workers) lacked confidence in
their ability to transmit drugs messages effectively (Davis and Dawson, 1996).
Third, there were a number of weaknesses associated with short-term policy initiatives
(such as using sport to reduce drug use among young people) and, in this regard, Davis
and Dawson (1996) argued that it is extremely difficult to convey drugs messages effectively
on a short-term basis. They suggested that attempts to deal with the drugs issue in a
concerted fashion in the context of a summer project were not particularly successful.
Fourth, they argued that the only projects that are likely to be effective in terms of
‘diversion’ are those that offer young people an activity about which they are passionate.
 Community sports development: social inclusion 97
The other key ingredient, they suggest – though they recognize that this is based on very
limited observation – is that there needs to be some prospect of the activity in question
having some permanent place in the lives of young people, perhaps even offering the
prospect of future employment. They cite not just sport but also music and computer
technology as three examples of activities that have the capacity to excite passion and to
offer the possibility of long-term engagement (Davis and Dawson, 1996).
Finally, it was argued that a key factor in the success or failure of projects was the
personalities of the coordinator and the other people drawn to work on the project.
Specifically, Davis and Dawson (1996) suggested that it is important that project workers
should have ‘authority’ in the eyes of the young people attending these projects, but it
was also important that they should not be seen as authority figures; their authority must
lie in relevant knowledge and practice and, as we explained earlier, it is also important
that project leaders have a high level of skill in the core activity (see also Audit Com-
mission, 2009; Coalter, 2007a; Smith and Waddington, 2004). They also noted the diffi-
culties in conveying drugs messages to young people and the fact that volunteers often felt
that they lacked appropriate knowledge. They concluded that the problem is best tackled
not by giving volunteer workers ad hoc drugs education sessions, but rather by utilizing
specialists who could more confidently address these topics (Davis and Dawson, 1996).
The general conclusion of the report was balanced and cautious and did not go beyond
the evidence available. It is worth quoting at length, and we use it to precede our brief dis-
cussion of some of the more general policy issues associated with the use of sport-focused
schemes designed to contribute to the achievement of greater social inclusion. They
argued:

All the projects which we visited – even the most impressive – were modest in their
claim to influence drug related behaviour in the longer term; what is more they all
conceded that even if they did have an impact, this would be extremely difficult to
demonstrate. But leaving aside this question of the impact upon drug related beha-
viour, it was evident that projects might be more or less effective in their pursuit of
related goals such as the transmission of new skills, improving self confidence,
developing good relationships with adults, and gaining an increased understanding of
the potentially harmful consequences of drug abuse. Some projects appear to us to be
powerful interventions if measured in these terms; others were less impressive. Perhaps
all we can say is that it is at least plausible to suppose that some projects may have
had an impact on the drug taking behaviour of some of their customers; and that in
respect of some other projects it would have been implausible to suppose that they
had any such impact. Powerful sustained interventions may influence behaviour;
marginal, ephemeral interventions will not.
(Davis and Dawson, 1996: 31)

Are sport-based social inclusion schemes effective?

As we and many others have noted (e.g. Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter, 2007a; Collins and
Kay, 2003; Smith and Waddington, 2004), present-day policy-makers and SDOs hold
particular ideological views and assumptions about the supposed worth of sport in con-
ferring upon participants what are regarded as pro-social behaviours and values (e.g.
reduced crime and drug use). These views and assumptions, as with those related to the
presumed impact that sport and other activities have on the promotion of health (see
98 Community sports development: social inclusion
Chapter 5) and educational achievement (see Chapter 3), for example, are expressions of
the differential ways in which the thoughts and actions of policy-makers and SDOs are
unavoidably constrained by the relations they have formed with others in the past, and
which they continue to form in the present. Such is the impact that being a part of these
historically produced and reproduced networks of interdependence can have on policy-
makers’ and SDOs’ views and practice of sport it is now increasingly common to find
them championing enthusiastically the presumed social impacts of sport. Notwithstanding
these rhetorical and commonsense claims made on behalf of the effectiveness of sport in
social inclusion-based schemes, the consensus among more critical observers is that
despite the vast numbers of such schemes currently in operation in the UK and elsewhere,
there is a widespread lack of robust research on, and hence very little evidence for, their
effectiveness in reducing and preventing crime and drug use among young people (Coalter,
2007a; Collins and Kay, 2003; Dunning and Waddington, 2003; Hartmann, 2001; Long
and Sanderson, 2001; Nichols, 2007; Robins, 1990). For example, on the basis of their
review of the existing literature, which examined the relationship between sport and
social inclusion as part of their PAT 10 report for the DCMS, Collins et al. (1999: 4)
found that only eleven of the studies that they reviewed examined outcomes ‘with any-
thing approaching rigorous evaluations’ of the effectiveness of sport-based social inclu-
sion programmes. In this regard, they concluded that beyond these eleven studies, many
social inclusion schemes involved little, if any, evaluation, and where monitoring of such
schemes did take place this typically involved the recording and measurement of rather
simplistic outputs (Collins et al., 1999). A similar conclusion was reached by Tacon, who
has noted that, despite the increasing policy and political commitment to social inclusion
initiatives, ‘there is, to date, little evaluation evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of
these types of sports-based projects’ (Tacon, 2007: 2) in achieving their desired outcomes.
In addition, Tacon (2007: 19) adds that whilst currently ‘there are strong theoretical
claims, and even stronger political claims that sport, particularly football, can make a
positive contribution to social issues … there is little evidence to support these claims’.
Despite the existence of what Tacon sees as the ‘strong theoretical claims’ for the pre-
sumed impact of sport-based schemes in contributing to the achievement of greater social
inclusion among key target groups, particularly young people, there are also a number of
other theoretical reasons – in addition to the absence of supporting empirical evidence
that we discussed above – why one might be sceptical about the claims made on behalf of
the effectiveness of such schemes. One frequent justification for the use of sport in
schemes where crime and drug reduction or prevention is the main objective is that sport
can create enjoyment and excitement, and thus provide an antidote to boredom, for
young people (Coalter, 2001; Crabbe, 2000; Nichols, 2007). It is certainly the case, as
Elias and Dunning (1986) have argued, that sport can be seen as a ‘quest for excitement’.
However, as Crabbe (2000: 383) has noted, ‘this is often for much the same reason that
[young people] might also choose to use illicit drugs, become involved in criminal activity
or even sport-related violence’. Indeed, even a cursory examination of some of the most
salient aspects of youth cultures should therefore sensitize us to the fact that there are, as
Crabbe (2000: 390) has put it, ‘very real problems in using an activity such as sport that is
seen to replicate the experience or excitement of drugs if it is intended to help young
people come to regard drugs as a futile and sterile activity in comparison. The fact that
the same emotions of excitement, euphoria, celebration, tension and fear are being used
does not suddenly result in drugs no longer being seen as “fun” or worthwhile’. To this
we might also add that any scheme designed to combat drug use among young people
 Community sports development: social inclusion 99
should also seek to account more adequately for the context in which they use illegal
drugs as well as the people (especially their friends) with whom they frequently consume
them, not least because this might lead to a more secure basis from which to formulate
policy that is based upon a greater understanding of the broader dimensions and realities
of young people’s leisure lives (Smith 2006; Smith and Waddington, 2004).
The need to account for the context in which young people use drugs becomes even
more apparent when one examines another commonsense justification for the effective-
ness of such schemes (known as the so-called ‘displacement thesis’), namely, the claim
that simply participating in sport as part of a programme prevents youngsters from
simultaneously committing crime or using illegal drugs of one kind or another (Coalter,
2007a; Nichols, 2007). However, to the relatively detached observer – that is, to those
who have some appreciation of the other aspects of sporting culture – it is clear that
some young people may value playing sport alongside other leisure pursuits that posi-
tively promote drug use and other deviant behaviour; a good example would be the heavy
drinking culture that has traditionally surrounded a number of sports, including rugby
and soccer, in the UK (Coalter, 2007a; Dunning and Waddington, 2003; Smith and
Waddington, 2004). Indeed, Crabbe notes that, in contrast to approaches that stress sport’s
allegedly wholesome and socially cohesive character, it might, with equal validity, be noted
that sport provides environments in which ‘acts of violence, confrontation and drug use are
licensed in ritualized fashion and given meaning through their association with the hege-
monic masculine ideals of toughness, heroism and sacrifice’ (Crabbe, 2008: 23). Such obser-
vations should, therefore, sound a warning against making simplistic assumptions about the
effectiveness of sporting participation as a means of combating drug use and other activities
popularly regarded as indicative of the anti-social behaviour of target groups.
In addition to the theoretical problems that are associated with sport-based social
inclusion programmes, and particularly those designed to reduce crime and anti-social
behaviour, there is, as we explained earlier, a lack of systematic evidence of the effec-
tiveness of such schemes. But how might we begin to account for this lack of supporting
empirical evidence for sports development programmes and other schemes that are
expected to achieve a vast array of desired social outcomes such as the reduction of crime
and drug use? Coalter has argued in this connection that the lack of existing evidence of
the efficacy of these schemes can be related, in particular, to

an absence of a culture of monitoring and evaluation, bolstered by a range of factors:

a simple belief in the efficacy of such interventions; limited project funding is con-
centrated on provision rather than evaluation and a general lack of research exper-
tise. However, most fundamentally there has been a widespread lack of clarity about
the nature of outcomes and their measurement; substantial methodological difficulties
in controlling for intervening variables and assessing cause and effect relationships.
(Coalter 2007a: 117)

We shall briefly consider some of these issues in the remaining pages of this chapter.

Establishing the scale of the problem

A longstanding problem in social policies where sport is used as a vehicle for enhancing
social inclusion by, amongst other things, preventing and reducing crime and drug use
among young people is the lack of consistency and clarity regarding the objectives of
100 Community sports development: social inclusion
those policies. When ‘objectives’ of one kind or another are identified, they tend to be overly
ambitious, unclear, non-specific and often premised on poorly developed and vague rationales.
At one level the failure to clarify such questions is not altogether surprising since it is
frequently the case that government and other interested organizations seek to develop
such policies without first gathering baseline data that may be used to help clarify the size
and nature of the problem before committing time and resources towards its achieve-
ment. While there are numerous methodological difficulties involved in trying to arrive at
a precise estimate of the extent of young people’s criminal activity and use of illegal
drugs, it is important that we strive – insofar as it is possible – to estimate as accurately
as we can the extent of criminal behaviour and drug use among the young people for
whom the policy is intended. It is important that we begin to address such questions
because until they are answered it is difficult to know what criteria should be used in
monitoring and measuring the success of drug-reduction and prevention policies intended
for young people. In this regard, there is clearly a pressing need to define more clearly the
objectives of policies of this kind as well as the groups for whom they are intended, and
to specify more exactly the criteria for monitoring the success of that policy.

Monitoring and evaluating sport-based social inclusion schemes

Writing in 1990, Robins (1990: 1) noted that ‘research into the relation between sport and
delinquency has been virtually non-existent in the UK’. One of the few systematic studies
that existed at that time was by Coalter (1989), who, following a review of the literature
on the subject, was unable to conclude that there is a correlation between high levels of
sports participation and low levels and frequency of delinquency among young people in
the UK. Beyond Coalter’s review, however, Robins observed that there was a dearth of
properly conducted and monitored evaluation of schemes where the reduction of crime
via sports participation was a main objective. It was in this context that Robins critically
examined all the major programmes that had then been set up with the aim of using
sport and recreation as part of a crime prevention strategy. These included a wide variety
of schemes – for example community development schemes, police schemes and schemes
designed to rehabilitate young offenders – and Robins (1990: 89) concluded that there was
‘little evidence of evaluation of the effect of programmes on young people’ and that, as a
consequence, ‘information about outcomes was hard to come by’ (Robins, 1990: 92). An
additional problem, he added, was that none of the programmes surveyed included a
process of follow-up or aftercare in their objectives and, specifically with regard to those
schemes that were targeted at convicted offenders, he noted that information about re-
offending patterns, where it was available, was generally sketchy. He also noted that ‘no
clear picture of aims and objectives and their underlying rationales emerge’ (Robins,
1990: 88).
Despite the points raised by Robins and Coalter two decades ago, there has been
relatively little progress in terms of monitoring the effectiveness of such schemes. For
example, Nichols and Taylor (1996) examined the effects of the West Yorkshire Sports
Counselling Scheme and concluded that while there was evidence of the effect of the
programme on crime, with a significant reduction in reconviction rates for young offen-
ders participating in the programme for eight weeks or more, the sample size of young
offenders was too small to provide a statistically reliable estimate of the value of the
benefits gained, to set against the cost of the programme. More recently, Coalter (2001:
31) has noted that there is ‘an absence of robust intermediate or final outcome data … for
 Community sports development: social inclusion 101
large-scale diversionary projects’ as well as other rehabilitative programmes. Such pro-
grammes, he adds, also ‘tend to have vague rationales, overly ambitious objectives and a
relatively unsophisticated understanding of the variety and complexity of the causes of
criminality’ (Coalter, 2001: 31). In addition, Taylor et al. (1999) identified 54 programmes
operating in 34 probation service areas; they noted the huge variety of programmes on
offer, particularly in terms of their duration, scale and intensity (from one-day sessions to
two-week residential programmes), and in terms of the activities offered and the pro-
gramme rationales. As Gratton and Taylor (2000) have pointed out, this diversity of
programmes can be interpreted in one of two ways: either as a reflection of uncertainty
about both why the programmes are provided and what is effective or, alternatively, as
an indication that with such a complex set of intermediate outcomes there are many
possible ways to achieve one or more of those outcomes.
It is also worthy of note that where monitoring and evaluation processes are built in to
sport-based schemes they tend to be applied rather inconsistently and the emphasis is
often placed upon demonstrating the ‘benefits’ afforded to individual participants on the
programme (e.g. Crabbe, 2000; Long et al., 2002; Nichols, 2004; 2007; Robins, 1990).
While those involved in running and analyzing these programmes often, with some jus-
tification, point to particular individuals whose involvement led in the short term to
changes in interpersonal relations, capacities for self-reflection and social adjustment, ‘it
should be remembered that whatever short term efficacy the programme may have on
individuals … may be rapidly dissipated in the absence of any process of follow up and
after care’ (Robins, 1990: 93). Robins (1990), for example, has written in this connection
of the problems of over-relying on individual data in his review of the Solent Sports
Counselling Project in Hampshire, UK. The report included an analysis of the re-offending
patterns of a random sample of 48 clients. Of the 13 clients who were involved with the
project for less than three weeks, only 2 were not subsequently charged with offences
within a year of leaving the project. The re-offending patterns of the remaining 29
(information was not available for 6 of the sample) indicated that almost half the clients
had maintained a trouble-free record since being involved with the project and a further
half-dozen clients appeared to have reduced their previous rates of offending (Robins,
1990). However, Robins points out that, although the evaluation refers to trouble-free
records and reduced rates of re-offending by almost half of the clients, it is not at all clear
whether this was causally connected to attendance at the project and there may be other
more significant reasons why such changes occurred.
Similar methodological problems of this kind also arise in relation to other studies in
which there is an attempt to provide evidence of the effectiveness of sports provision in
terms of reductions in, or changing patterns of, recidivism rates. For example, in a study
of four British schemes in the mid-1990s, Tsuchiya (1996) reported that the participants
in two of the schemes (data were unavailable for the remaining two because no mon-
itoring or evaluation of the schemes was conducted) had a 36 per cent and 50 per cent
reconviction rate after one and two years, respectively. At first glance, such figures would
appear rather convincing, although a closer examination of the data cited in support of
these claims should encourage us to be rather more cautious about the alleged effectiveness
of these schemes.
The first scheme for which Tsuchiya (1996) reports data included four types of programme:
(1) offending behaviour group work; (2) craft workshops and education; (3) life-skills
sessions; and (4) sports and outdoor pursuits. From Tsuchiya’s analysis, however, there is
no indication of which of these elements of the programme was responsible for its claimed
102 Community sports development: social inclusion
effectiveness and, while the evidence may be less convincing in the case of sports and
outdoor pursuits, it would be surprising if the first three of the programmes provided as
part of the scheme had no impact at all on reconviction rates. With regard to the second
scheme cited by Tsuchiya, 260 (54 per cent) of the 483 youngsters who were referred to
the scheme signed up to start the programme, but of these a further 67 (14 per cent) failed
to show up for the initial interview, 104 (22 per cent) did not show up for the first session
and 52 (11 per cent) were not interested in taking part or were unable to participate for
other reasons (Tsuchiya, 1996: 297). In other words, of the 260 young people for whom
the scheme was originally intended, only 37 youngsters actually started the programme
and only half of these did not re-offend within two years. In light of these considerations,
one might justifiably question the likely effective on recidivism rates and the cost-effi-
ciency of such schemes as well as the generally positive analysis Tsuchiya provides of
them. Collins and Kay, among others (e.g. Nichols and Taylor, 1996), have suggested
that one reason for the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of schemes of this kind is
‘because of the difficulty and cost in establishing the true re-offending rate amongst a very
mobile population, even when costly access is given to the national computerised crime
records’ (Collins and Kay 2003: 170).
A further difficulty that is frequently encountered when attempting to establish the
effectiveness of sport-focused schemes arises in relation to the frequent overreliance on
individual data, or isolated anecdotal stories, in which participation in such schemes is
presumed to lead to changes in participants’ behaviour. Such problems were particularly
clear in a study by Nichols (2004), who outlines a sport-based project delivered by SDOs
in West Yorkshire and in which interviews were conducted with just nine young people.
In his paper – which provides data on just four of the nine youngsters on the project –
Nichols notes that ‘the programme has had a limited diversion effect’ (Nichols 2004: 191)
both during and after participation in the scheme. The limited effect of this project is all
the more apparent when one considers that ‘there was only evidence that three of the
nine case study participants were progressing to independent sports participation and one
of these would probably have done so anyway’ (Nichols, 2004: 188). Indeed, the lack of
evidence for the effectiveness of this project is perhaps unsurprising since ‘its main focus
was on achieving sport development objectives’ (Nichols, 2004: 192) and because it is
provided by SDOs whose primary interest is with the development of sport and not with
a reduction in criminal behaviour by the participants.
Similar problems arise in relation to intervention schemes that use sport as part of a
drugs education or drugs rehabilitation programme. For example Crabbe (2000) analyzed
the rehabilitative and diversionary elements of the Leyton Orient Community Sports
Programme in London, the objective of which was to establish a programme of activity
that would provide local ex- and stabilized drug users with a range of sporting and per-
sonal development opportunities. Crabbe (2000: 388) concluded, following four months
of observation of the project, that the participants ‘are benefiting from the alternative
focus that the sports activities provide and the need to remain “stable” that participation
requires’. He noted that several participants, as a result of their involvement, had
obtained qualifications ranging from junior team managers awards to qualifications in
photography and places on other courses at local colleges. Two of the participants were
subsequently employed on a casual basis in the community sports programme itself.
Crabbe’s evaluation is, on the whole, a positive one, although his evaluation is, like other
more recent studies (e.g. Nichols, 2007), based on the identification of individual partici-
pants who have benefited from the scheme rather than on the analysis of a variety of
 Community sports development: social inclusion 103
systematically gathered quantitative and qualitative information, which would help provide
a more reliable basis for judgements about the effectiveness of such schemes.

The social context of sport-based social inclusion schemes

In addition to the problems of judging the effectiveness of social inclusion schemes in
helping to bring about desired change in the behaviour of individual participants, it is
often overlooked that, as we noted in Chapter 1, it is not simply the provision of ‘sport’
that may account for any of the achieved outcomes of such programmes. In addition, of
particular importance are the ways in which different kinds of sports and activities are
experienced differently by different kinds of participants in particular circumstances.
Indeed, it would be misleading to think that just because the provision of particular kinds
of sports in particular social contexts may help bring about desired change among some
individuals or groups this can be generalized unproblematically to many other partici-
pants. Thus, since the experience of programmes varies differentially between individuals
and groups of young people, it cannot simply be assumed that they will each derive the
intended benefits, if any, of the programme in the same way, or for the same reasons. It
might with equal validity be noted that any changes in the observed behaviour may not
be attributed directly to the operations of the scheme, but to changes in the wider social
context. Accordingly, not only do we need to know something of the context within
which the outcomes of sport-based social inclusion schemes are produced, but it is also
important to have some appreciation of the broader social context in which the schemes,
the participants and those who design and deliver them exist (Audit Commission, 2009;
Coalter, 2007a). In short, there is a need to analyze those processes and experiences that
are associated with programmes that may or may not be considered successful. No less
importantly, if we are to move towards a more adequate means of judging the effective-
ness of such schemes, it is important to examine what works, for which participants, in
what particular circumstances when designing and delivering sport-based social inclusion
schemes (Audit Commission, 2009; Coalter, 2007a).
The importance of recognizing the social context within which sport- and non-sport
schemes operate is a conclusion that can almost certainly be arrived at from data generated
by the birth cohort studies that are conducted in Britain (Feinstein et al., 2005; Robson
and Feinstein, 2007). Data from the 1970 cohort, for example, suggest that participation
in unstructured youth clubs that typically attracted higher proportions of more ‘dis-
advantaged’ youth and that were less likely to be heavily supervised by adults was associated
with adult forms of social exclusion and socio-economic disadvantage. Those young
people who attended youth clubs and engaged in youth offending when aged 16, for
example, were significantly less likely to have educational qualifications at age 30 and
were more likely to be a teen parent than those who did not (Feinstein et al., 2005).
Conversely, participation in sports clubs and community activity centres, which had a
greater degree of structure than youth clubs, was said to have a positive, marginal long-
term impact on later life outcomes by young people from all levels of the social hierarchy.
In particular, the participation of 16-year-olds in the more structured social contexts that
were to be found within sports clubs and community centres was said to help ameliorate
the long-term effects of poor family background and possession of fewer educational
qualifications (Feinstein et al., 2005). It is important to note, however, that the perceived
negative effects of only attending youth clubs when aged 16 were offset or nullified to
some extent by engaging in combinations of activities, such as attending youth clubs and
104 Community sports development: social inclusion
sports/community centres, which was associated with reducing the impact that youth
club attendance had on adult forms of social exclusion and socio-economic disadvantage
(Robson and Feinstein, 2007). The overall findings of the 1970 birth cohort studies sug-
gest, therefore, that although the social context of youth club participation was not
‘objectively harmful’ (Robson and Feinstein, 2007: 38) to young people’s later life
experiences, it was nevertheless clear that the provision of different leisure activities in
varying social contexts during the teenage years did come to impact differentially on
future behaviour. In this regard, it might be concluded that the extent to which participation
in youth-focused social inclusion schemes can be effective in bringing about desired
change among young people depends, to a significant degree, upon the contexts within
which those schemes are provided and the particular network of relationships that characterize
the delivery of them. It is also important to remind ourselves that

we cannot take for granted that well-intentioned public funds to provide youth with
meaningful leisure experiences will inevitably be beneficial … [It is important] to
specify what aspects of leisure activities are beneficial, the conditions under which
leisure activities may be problematic, and the ways in which peer groups can be
effectively organised during leisure time to facilitate positive social adjustment.
(Mahoney et al., 2001: 519)

The extent to which SDOs and other practitioners are able and/or willing to engage in
project evaluations that focus on issues of context and process may, of course, be parti-
cularly limited and perhaps altogether neglected because of the perceived accountability
culture this fosters and because of the perceived impact this will have on valuable
resources (see Chapter 1). Collins et al. arrived at a similar conclusion following their
review of sport-based social inclusion schemes, where the evaluation of the schemes they
reviewed was often said to be ‘tentative, indicative and anecdotal, because insufficient (human
and financial) resources are given to it, and insufficient intellectual attention in most cases is
expended to identify outcomes and gather the necessary evidence to demonstrate them’ (Col-
lins et al. 1999: 26). They also noted that these problems are frequently compounded by several
other things, including: the short-term nature and changing political priorities of government;
a lack of sustained funding from sponsors; and since many social inclusion projects typically
last just three years, project staff are often more concerned with looking for another job or
securing additional funding than they are with monitoring and evaluating the project they are
working on (Collins et al., 1999; see also Audit Commission, 2009).
Despite these constraints, it is clear that, as we have noted elsewhere in this book (see
Chapters 1 and 3), insofar as few sport-based schemes include built-in processes for sys-
tematically monitoring and evaluating their effectiveness and outcomes, the efficacy of
those programmes becomes increasingly difficult to determine. It is also clear that, in
policy terms, the failure to monitor and evaluate adequately the effectiveness of such
schemes is a matter of serious concern. Without such in-built processes it becomes
increasingly difficult to monitor the intended and unintended outcomes of those policies
and, most importantly, whether they have any medium- to long-term impact on the pro-
blems they are intended to address. As we noted in Chapter 1, such problems are not
exclusive to evaluations of the effectiveness of sports schemes, for without appropriate
monitoring and evaluation measures it is incredibly difficult to identify the various out-
comes that non-sport reforms (e.g. government training measures) have on the identified
objectives of programmes.
 Community sports development: social inclusion 105
Developing a theoretically and empirically grounded rationale
In addition to the lack of systematic monitoring, several researchers have identified a
further problem with most sport-based programmes: the absence of a clearly developed
rationale for these schemes. One consequence of this is that in many of these projects the
scale and nature of the problem to be targeted – as well as the goals to be achieved –
become more diffuse, complex and wide-ranging such that the achievement of one goal
might undermine the achievement of other goals and thus the likely success of the pro-
gramme itself. This notwithstanding, proposals for the establishment of schemes of this
kind are frequently accompanied by a list of alleged benefits of participation in sport
without any attempt to articulate either the relationships between these alleged benefits
or the connections between these benefits and a reduction in crime and drug use. For
example, the DIVERT Trust, in its booklet Match of the Day (described as a step-by-step
guide to setting up football projects for young people at risk), draws upon the West
Yorkshire sports counselling project to list five benefits of participation in sport. These
benefits include: (1) improved self-esteem; (2) improved relationships with peers; (3)
constructive use of spare time; (4) the opening of opportunities, for example in training
and employment; and (5) the development of new relationships with adults (DIVERT
Trust, 1996: 10–12). However, the DIVERT Trust does not specify precisely how these
alleged benefits have an impact on levels of youth delinquency; indeed, the West Yorkshire
project, which provides the basis for these claimed benefits, was itself careful about
overemphasizing the link between sport and crime prevention (Davis and Dawson, 1996).
The difficulties associated with such rationales might be fruitfully illustrated by
examining briefly the claim that participation in sport leads to improved self-esteem, a
claim that has been made in a number of studies. There are several problems here. First,
as Nichols (1997) has noted, the increased self-esteem that may be associated with excellence in
sporting achievement is, by definition, only attainable by a few and there may be difficulties of
readjustment when the individual loses the capacity to perform sport at an exceptional level.
Second, it is in the nature of sport that there are winners and losers; if enhanced self-esteem is a
consequence of winning, then what, we may ask, is the impact on the self-esteem of those who
are losers? In addition, the nature of the alleged link between enhanced self-esteem and reduced
levels of criminal behaviour is by no means clear. Indeed, as Crabbe (2000) has pointed out, in
some situations the ‘drug use–crime’ relationship can itself provide meaning and purpose in the
absence of legitimate structured opportunities and can generate status and identity in contexts
of social and economic exclusion. It is also the case that whilst it is commonly assumed that
those with low self-esteem are more likely to engage in anti-social behaviour such as crime and
use drugs of various kinds, on the basis of current evidence and the methods employed in the
design of most published research there is little evidence from the UK and US in support of the
presumed causal relationship between sports participation and improvements in self-esteem
(Coalter, 2007a; Emler, 2001). Indeed, where there is evidence in support of a relationship
between self-esteem and sports participation it is often not those with low self-esteem, but
those groups with higher levels of self-esteem, who are most at risk of engaging in anti-social
behaviour (Coalter, 2007a; Emler, 2001).

Summary
As we noted in Chapter 2, there has been a strong degree of continuity in the sport policy
priorities and goals of successive governments from different sides of the political spectrum
106 Community sports development: social inclusion
in many countries, including Britain, since the 1990s. We also explained that one of the
policies that is central to the current Labour government’s policy agenda in Britain, and
that distinguishes its priorities from those of previous governments, is the explicit
emphasis that it has come to place on social inclusion and particularly how activities such
as sport can achieve broader welfare policy goals. In this chapter we have sought to
examine some of the policy issues surrounding the use of sporting schemes as vehicles of
social policy in which the intention is to contribute to the achievement of greater social
inclusion by reducing levels of crime, delinquency and drug use, particularly among
young people. In doing so, we have attempted to show that, perhaps with the exception
of some Positive Futures projects and despite the strong and increasing political policy
commitment to the social inclusion agenda, there is currently little evidence of the effec-
tiveness of sport-based schemes in reducing crime, drug use or anti-social behaviour
among identified target groups. This would appear to be for a variety of complex reasons.
One major problem in this regard is that relatively few schemes have built-in techniques
for monitoring and evaluating their impact on levels of crime, drug use or anti-social
behaviour; as a result, it is difficult to be sure what impact, if any, they have on such
behaviours. Moreover, the absence of any clearly articulated theoretical rationale for
these schemes means that, even where success is claimed, it is often unclear what specific
aspects of the schemes account for that claimed success. Of equal, if not greater, sig-
nificance is that, contrary to the prevailing and largely uncritically accepted view of ‘sport
as good’ (Coalter, 2007a) as a rationale for many social inclusion schemes, ‘sport in any
simple sense rarely achieves the variety of desired outcomes attributed to it and that
issues of process and context … are key to understanding its developmental potential’
(Coalter, 2008: 48). More particularly, it is clear that if we are to enhance the effectiveness
of such schemes there is a clear need to think far more clearly and analytically about the
potential of ‘sport’ in helping to achieve desired social outcomes.
In addition, we have suggested that when considering the design of sport-based social
inclusion schemes there is greater need to recognize the differential contribution that dif-
ferent kinds of sports and physical activities can make to different kinds of participants in
particular contexts, and to consider the importance of fostering a greater understanding
of the extent to which the wider social contexts in which programmes exist can impact
on the effectiveness of those programmes. The latter consideration is of particular
importance since one the major weaknesses of many sport-based social inclusion schemes
has been the failure to change the habitus, that is, the deeply seated values and beliefs, of
participants towards their propensity for engaging in what are regarded as undesirable
behaviours (e.g. crime and drug use). Indeed, the expectation that one-off initiatives,
shorter-term programmes or schemes that are delivered consistently over longer periods
of time can, of themselves, begin to reverse the roots of complex social processes asso-
ciated with social exclusion is, to put it at its most charitable, a rather unrealistic one.
Such schemes are also particularly limited in their effectiveness because they cannot, on
their own, reasonably be expected to bring about substantial change either in the wider
contexts of people’s lives or in their communities, where the complex causes of social
disadvantage continue to exist relatively independently of the very schemes that are
designed to tackle them. Finally, as Gratton and Taylor have noted in relation to crime
reduction schemes – though the point would apply equally well to anti-drugs schemes
and other social inclusion schemes – even if it is accepted that crime may be reduced by
sport-based programmes, ‘the evidence does not extend … to proving that the value of
the crime reduction is greater than either the costs of providing the programmes or the
 Community sports development: social inclusion 107
costs of dealing with crime after it has taken place, and more work is needed on these
cost–benefit questions’ (Gratton and Taylor 2000: 111).

Revision questions
1 Examine the various contributions that sport and physical activities are thought
to make to the achievement of greater social inclusion.
2 Examine the evidence for the effectiveness of sports development programmes in
which the intention is to prevent crime and drug use among young people.
3 To what extent is the social inclusion agenda coming to impact on the day-to-day
activities of SDOs?

Key readings
Collins, M. and Kay, T. (2003) Sport and Social Exclusion, London: Routledge.
Nichols, G. (2007) Sport and Crime Reduction, London: Routledge.
Nicholson, M. and Hoye, R. (2008) Sport and Social Capital, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Recommended websites
Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion: www.cesi.org.uk
Communities and Local Government: www.communities.gov.uk/communities
Crime Concern: www.crimeconcern.org.uk/home.asp
5 Community sports development
Promoting health

Objectives
This chapter will:

 examine the relationships between sport, physical activity and health;

 analyze the ways in which policies use sport and physical activity to combat
obesity; and
 assess the impact that health policy has on sports development officers.

Introduction
The health benefits of physical activity have been extolled in many societies over many
centuries. It was not until the second half of the twentieth century, however, that scientific
evidence supporting such beliefs began to grow. Morris and colleagues’ classic study
examined the incidence of coronary heart disease (CHD) among postal workers delivering
mail on foot or bicycle compared to that of their less physically active colleagues working
in the sorting rooms (Morris et al., 1953a; 1953b) led to a raft of publications doc-
umenting the benefits of physical activity and the problems associated with physical
inactivity. Nowadays, there are numerous scientific studies demonstrating the impact that
physical exercise has on reducing the risk of non-communicable or lifestyle diseases
(Barengo et al., 2006; Conroy et al., 2005; Dugdill et al., 2005; Hardman and Stensel,
2009; Haskell et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2003; Paffenbarger, 2000; Schnor et al., 2006; Sui et
al., 2007; Vuori, 2001). Indeed, there is now considerable consensus among physiologists
and epidemiologists that physical activity does have beneficial consequences for both
physical and mental health even though there is some dispute over the intensity and frequency
of physical activity required to generate substantial health benefits.
Set in this context, the objective of this chapter is to outline the scale and nature of the
problems associated with overweight and obesity and physical inactivity globally, before
assessing the policy responses to this perceived problem. Initially, we will examine the
development of policy across the world before providing an in-depth case study of the
way in which policies towards health in general, and physical activity and sport in par-
ticular, have developed in the UK. In doing so, it will become evident that there has been
something of a blurring of what is deemed to constitute sport and physical activity, and
that perhaps the general policy response has been couched in terms of an agenda char-
acterized by moral panic over obesity levels. That is to say, although there are strong
 Community sports development: health 109
epidemiological data regarding obesity levels to show the social and economic problems
associated with overweight and obesity, to some extent policy-makers and the media,
especially, frequently overreact and sensationalize scientific evidence cited in support of
the levels of overweight and obesity and their impact. Furthermore, a characteristic of
policy developments in many countries has been to see physical activity and sport as some
kind of ‘quick fix’ for the problems said to be caused by overweight and obesity. Conse-
quently, many policies have tended to contain short-term goals. Even where they have set
longer, arguably more realistic targets, these are frequently replaced by other policies that
all but ignore the targets established previously. In addition, it is noteworthy that the health
costs of sports injuries are frequently ignored by policy-makers and sports promoters
alike. We conclude the chapter by focusing on the socio-economic and environmental issues
related to health that have often been examined in a rather vague manner by policy-
makers hitherto, but are arguably at the heart of developing a more reality-congruent
understanding of health and health inequalities. In doing so, we will also examine the
supposed role of physical activity and sport within these policies, and the impact that this
has had on SDOs and others promoting sport.

Global concerns regarding physical activity, sport and health

According to the World Health Organization (WHO) (2000: 1), ‘obesity is a chronic
disease, prevalent in both developed and developing countries, and affecting children as
well as adults’. The increase in levels of obesity around the world is said to be sig-
nificantly linked to high, and increasing, levels of physical inactivity and poor diet. As
such, the WHO (2004: 2) claims that ‘unhealthy diets and physical inactivity are thus
among the leading causes of the major noncommunicable diseases, including cardiovas-
cular disease, type 2 diabetes and certain types of cancer, and contribute substantially to
the global burden of disease, death and disability’. This has contributed to a ‘profound
shift in the balance of the major causes of death and disease’, such that, ‘globally, the
burden of noncommunicable diseases has rapidly increased’ (WHO, 2004: 2). This relates
to the epidemiological transition that is associated with the fact that in most countries in
the world the major causes of child mortality have been tackled but, as a consequence, an
ageing population has developed and is now more susceptible to non-communicable diseases.
National data that also signal alarm regarding the high, and increasing, rates of non-
communicable diseases and a lack of physical activity can be found across the indus-
trialized world, including in Canada (Public Health Agency of Canada [PHAC], 2003a),
the US (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2008), the UK (Department
for Culture Media and Sport [DCMS]/Strategy Unit, 2002; Department of Health [DH],
2004a), Australia (Australian Institute for Health and Welfare [AIHW], 2008; Stewart et
al., 2004) and now China (Wu, 2006) as well. The scale of the problem of obesity, in
particular, is said to have reached epic proportions, such that Gard and Wright (2005: 6)
point out that ‘the idea that the world is in the grip of an “obesity epidemic” is currently
ubiquitous’. For example, the US Surgeon General reported in 2001 that obesity had
reached epidemic proportions in the US (US Department of Health and Human Services,
2001), and in England the House of Commons Health Committee (2004: 7) also claimed
that ‘an epidemic of obesity has swept over’ the country. There is also much consensus
on where the main causes of such widespread obesity lie. In Canada there is perceived to
be an ‘inactivity crisis’ (ParticipACTION, n.d.), while the Chief Medical Officer for
England also noted that ‘physical inactivity, along with unhealthy diets, has contributed
110 Community sports development: health
to the growth of obesity in England’ (DH/DCMS, 2004: 4). At one level, of course, the
cause of weight gain and obesity is simple: it relates to the tendency for people to con-
sume too much energy and calories and not expend enough so that consumption out-
weighs expenditure. The issue is more complex in children, and ‘there is a scarcity of
truly longitudinal studies in contemporary children reporting on the impact of early
weight gain on metabolic health’ (Gardner et al., 2009: e67), although the latest data
from the Early Bird study indicate that most weight gain has occurred before they start
school (Gardner et al., 2009).
In addition to the health implications of being overweight or obese, as briefly outlined
above, there are a number of economic impacts related to increasing obesity levels in the
population that are related to complicated assessments regarding days lost by the work-
force and to the cost of medical treatment of the problems associated with obesity. In
light of these impacts, promoting physical activity and sport is seen as an important
aspect of addressing such problems. Allender et al. (2007: 347), for example, argue that
‘there is an economic case for developing policies and interventions that promote physical
activity’. Furthermore, the WHO (2003: 1) state that ‘physical activity and healthy sports
are essential for our health and well being’. Garman (2007: 29) argues that because ‘in all
of the six World Health Organization (WHO) regions except the African region, non-
communicable diseases are more frequent as causes of death than communicable dis-
eases … the primary causes of death and disability are now a factor of social and
political agency within the control of societies, with effective civil and public health
action’. Indeed, as Waddington (2000: 17) argues, ‘there is now a substantial body of data
from both epidemiological and clinical studies which indicates that moderate, rhythmic
and regular exercise has a significant and beneficial impact on health’. There is no need to
rehearse here what these specific studies have found, since the link between health and
physical activity is extensively documented. What is rather less understood, and far less
frequently examined in the literature, is the effectiveness of promoting sport and/or physical
activity as vehicles of social policy designed to promote health.

The development of policies around the world

In most industrialized, Western countries, concern has been growing about the physical
health of the population since the mid-twentieth century. As we saw in Chapter 2, in the
UK, for example, the Central Council for Recreative and Physical Training (CCRPT)
was established in 1935 amid concerns about the health of the nation, and especially of
young people. Two decades later, in July 1956, President Eisenhower established the
President’s Council on Youth Fitness, which was later renamed the President’s Council
on Physical Fitness and Sports (PCPFS, 2008). Within this there was a ‘strong emphasis’
on the alleged role that team sports could play in the promotion of physical activity
(Shalala; cited in US Department of Health and Human Services, 1996: i). With increasing
evidence of the benefits of physical activity for health, by the 1970s ‘the American College
of Sports Medicine (ACSM), the American Heart Association (AHA), and other national
organizations began issuing physical activity recommendations to the public’ (US
Department of Health and Human Services, 1996: 4).
More recently, the Canadian government is widely regarded as a model of best practice
regarding its position on health promotion. In this respect, the Lalonde Report, published
by the Canadian government in 1974, was arguably the first government publication that
looked beyond the simple biological determinants of health, focusing as it did on the
 Community sports development: health 111
environment, individual lifestyles and access to healthcare, as well as biology. Since then,
most governments around the world, but particularly in the West, have published policies
concerned with broader notions of health promotion, even though there is still a tendency
to focus primarily on healthcare services rather than the preventative measures that might
be pursued (Hunter, 2007). Over the last thirty years or so, international organizations
such as the WHO have developed ‘international declarations and charters, through which
the need for healthy public policies was identified and disseminated’ (Scriven, 2007: 120).
The Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, for example, was launched by the WHO at
the first international conference for health promotion, held in Ottawa, Canada, in 1986.
Since the Charter was published, much health promotion activity has taken place by
governments in more developed countries, in particular. This has frequently taken the
form of focusing on the physical activity levels of the population. Such developments
have been noticeable in the US (Kim et al., 2006; Lightsey et al., 2005), Canada (Katz-
marzyk and Janssen, 2004; Pederson et al., 2005; Warburton et al., 2006), Australia and
New Zealand (Chau et al., 2008; Duncan et al., 2006; Hearn et al., 2005; Spinks et al.,
2007), China (Chen, 2008; Ji and Working Group on Obesity in China [WCOG], 2008;
Wang et al., 2007), Russia (Godinho, 2005) and most countries in Western Europe
(Astrup, 2001; Cavill et al., 2006; Fussenegger et al., 2007; Moreno et al., 2007; Ziglio et
al., 2005). In much of Eastern Europe, and in many developing countries, however, there
has been ‘a dearth of modern concepts of health promotion, as well as negligible resour-
ces, little public policy development and numerous one-off, discontinuous project activ-
ities’ (Ziglio et al., 2005: 234).
In 1988, the Australian government, through the AIHW, published its first ‘Australia’s
Health’ Report, which focused renewed effort on developing physical activity. Since then,
every two years the AIHW has published the Report for the Australian government.
Similarly, in the US in 1996, physical activity, generally, was made a more prominent
feature of the health targets set by the federal government. It was announced in the first
ever US Surgeon General’s Report on physical activity, for example, that

increasing physical activity is a formidable public health challenge that we must

hasten to meet … Physical activity thus joins the front ranks of essential health
objectives, such as sound nutrition, the use of seat belts, and the prevention of
adverse health effects of tobacco.
(US Department of Health and Human Services, 1996: iv)

The Report was declared ‘a national call to action’ (US Department of Health and
Human Services, 1996: v). It included a specific focus on more traditional sports as a way
of being physically active, but also emphasized the benefits from a broader range of
activities, such as gardening and walking. In this respect, the Surgeon General announced
that ‘it is hoped that this different emphasis on moderate amounts of activity, and the
flexibility to vary activities according to personal preference and life circumstances, will
encourage more people to make physical activity a regular and sustainable part of their
lives’ (US Department of Health and Human Services, 1996: 3). Healthy People 2010 (US
Department of Health and Human Services, 2000) builds on the earlier Healthy People
2000 in setting out an overarching national vision for health, with a clear focus on pro-
moting physical activity. In addition, the PHAC’s Healthy Living Unit has a mission
statement ‘to improve the health and well-being of Canadians through regular physical
activity’ (PHAC, 2003b).
112 Community sports development: health
It is evident, then, that there has been an increasing focus on physical activity in
national and international policies around an emerging consensus that physical inactivity
is a significant contributing factor to the growth in non-communicable diseases around
the world. Policies have been, and continue to be, developed that focus on the amount
and type of physical activity people should be doing in order to gain health benefits.
According to the WHO (2003: 9), there is ‘a new challenge and at the same time a tre-
mendous opportunity for the sports movement as a whole, and sport for all in parti-
cular’. In this respect, it is argued that in taking a more ‘active role’ in reducing the
‘global burden of non-communicable diseases’, the ‘sports community’ could ‘contribute
uniquely and importantly to the promotion of public health and at the same time
strengthen the social credibility and accountability of sport’ (WHO, 2003: 9). This is a
particularly interesting area of analysis since the contribution of sport to such physical
activity targets has frequently been the source of much debate. Indeed, there are few ideas
that are as uncritically accepted as those assumptions linking sports participation with
good health (K. Green, 2008; Waddington, 2000). On the whole, as indicated by the
WHO (2003) quotation above, sport is seen as making a positive contribution to health.
However, as we will see in the case study below, increasingly sport is being defined so
broadly in policy documents that the definition includes physical activities like walking.
The impact this has on those promoting sport is of particular interest to us, because as
policy on sport has broadened many are now finding that they are having to promote
healthy lifestyle activities as part of their ‘sport’ promotion (Bloyce et al., 2008). We will
examine the differential impact of policies focused on sport and broader notions of phy-
sical activity within our case study of the UK.

The development of health, sport and physical activity policies in the UK

As we have already seen, the CCRPT raised concerns about the health of the nation in
1935 and again in the Wolfenden Report in 1960. The assumed relationship between
sports participation and health was one of the justifications for the publication in 1975 of
Sport and Recreation. This was the first UK government White Paper on sport, and
increased government concern relating to sports participation and physical activity fol-
lowed it. The White Paper outlined the need to increase physical activity because of the
desire to ‘reduce the incidence of coronary heart disease’ (Department of the Environ-
ment, 1975: 3). Sport and physical activity were promoted for good health and the Sports
Council worked for the best part of a decade in the 1980s ‘to improve the data on the
links with health’ (Collins, 2008: 65). However, Ian Sproat, in his short term in office as
Sports Minister, devolved all responsibility for health targets to the Department of
Health. With this, and the fact that local authority sports provision was not mentioned in
Raising the Game, SDOs within local authorities arguably began to appreciate the pre-
carious nature of their jobs. In doing so, many SDOs began to identify the links between
sports participation and the assumed contribution this makes to good health as a way of
seeking their own salvation in the sense that they perceived that they could make a sig-
nificant contribution to health targets for their local health authorities (Ireland, 2001).
This, according to Robson and McKenna (2008: 172), combined with the ‘post-Thatcherite
endorsements of active living’ exemplified in the White Paper The Health of the Nation
(DH, 1992), helped contribute to a growing perspective amongst SDOs that they, along
with ‘health promoters and medical practitioners were able to envisage a range of
joint undertakings’ related to sport and health. However, this is to rather overstate the
 Community sports development: health 113
position of local authority SDOs in this relationship at this time, and even the desire of
medical practitioners and health promoters to focus on sport or even physical activity.
Nonetheless, many of those people responsible for promoting sport in the UK have
recognized ‘that health provides an essential bargaining tool in winning support for local
authority leisure development, from cardiovascular based health and fitness suites to new
swimming pools’ (Ireland, 2001: 106). Indeed, Ireland (2001: 105) argues that since the
mid-1990s the emphasis in UK policy ‘has moved firmly away from sport towards
encouraging physical activity as part of our daily lifestyle’, in large measure because of
the funding available for using physical activity in general to promote health.
The Health of the Nation was widely criticized for not focusing on health inequalities
and the cause of such inequalities (Adams, 2001). Such a stance was not unique to the UK
at this time, and many academics have criticized public health policies for being too
focused on the individual in taking control of their own health. Crawford (1980: 365)
coined the term ‘healthism’ to refer to the process whereby ‘the problem of health and
disease’ was situated ‘at the level of the individual’. ‘Solutions’, he argues, have been
‘formulated at that level as well’ (Crawford, 1980: 365). In light of this, a key criticism of
such policies is that they are reductionist and, in essence, ignore social, economic, cultural
and environmental impacts on health. The notion that the individual can, therefore,
choose to lead a healthy lifestyle, or not, ignores the enabling and constraining aspects of
their socio-economic status and the environment around them.

Public health policy under New Labour, 1997–2000

The Active for Life campaign established under the Conservative government in 1995 was
‘an important stepping stone towards the greater prevalence of physical activity on the
contemporary agenda’ (Robson and McKenna, 2008: 173). This has been reinforced
under the New Labour government, along with a renewed, government-sanctioned focus
on the contribution that sport, as well as physical activity, could make to help combat a
number of social problems (see Chapter 4). Promoting physical activity and sport for
health benefits was viewed by Labour as a cross-departmental issue, and part of the
joined-up thinking philosophy of the third way politics that is permeating much Labour
government policy (see Chapter 2). This is a clear demonstration of the broader ideolo-
gies within the government coming to bear on sport policy and sports development.
Under New Labour, ‘health was no longer seen as a private domain where individuals
were free to make lifestyle choices, but rather as a collective issue where citizens had
rights to health care, guaranteed by strong government action and funding’ (Robson and
McKenna, 2008: 173). Whilst this is certainly true of the rhetoric within much public
health policy produced under the Labour government, some may argue that elements of
the ideology of healthism can still be found in those policies.
Sport England positioned itself as an organization that could help in combating ill
health under the new Labour government. As Trevor Brooking, the Chair of Sport Eng-
land at the time, quite openly admitted in the foreword of a publication entitled Best
Value Through Sport: The Value of Sport to the Health of the Nation, ‘this document is
aimed at those who hold the purse-strings in health’ (Sport England, 1999: 1). To this
end, the apparently positive contribution sport could make was promulgated throughout
the document. Sport, we were told, ‘in combination with other lifestyle interventions, can
prove to be one of the “best buys” in preventive and rehabilitative health care’ (Sport
England, 1999: 3). This was a clear attempt to realign sport policy goals with the goals
114 Community sports development: health
associated with the more well-established and better-funded goals of public health that
had been partially severed under the previous Conservative administration. Interestingly,
despite Robson and McKenna’s (2008) claim regarding the alleged ‘joint undertakings’ for
the promotion of physical activity shared by health promoters and SDOs, Sport England
(1999: 5) noted that ‘many health care professionals do not view “sport” as an effective
way of promoting physical activity among the least active in the population as they
associate sport with team games and competitive activity’. This prompted them to high-
light what they perceived to be, ‘for public policy purposes, a broad definition of sport’
(Sport England, 1999: 5). The preferred definition was that offered six years earlier by the
Council of Europe:

Sport means all forms of physical activity which, through casual or organised partici-
pation, aim at expressing or improving physical fitness and mental well-being,
forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition at all levels.
(Council of Europe; cited in Sport England, 1999: 5)

Sport England (1999: 5) stated that ‘this wide and inclusive definition of sport extends its
relevance to the whole population and its value as a significant player in promoting the
health of the nation’. However, as Coalter (2007a) rightly points out, it also confuses and
fudges the issues concerned, because, he argues, there is a need to distinguish sport from
more general physical activity since the former may not always have a positive impact on
health, about which more later. Clearly recognition of the financial benefits of being
considered a major player in helping to combat perceived health problems in the nation
was a major driver in this broad definition of sport favoured by Sport England.
Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation (DH, 1999) was the Labour government’s successor
to the previous administration’s Health of the Nation White Paper. Saving Lives made a
small reference to physical activity directly, although this was in reference to the perceived
positives associated with a ‘physically active lifestyle’, and stated that the importance of
this would be borne out in a sports strategy to be published later that year. Numerous
goals were set to be achieved by 2010, and were related, among other things, to cancer,
CHD and strokes. Saving Lives was, according to Scriven and Orme (2001: xix), a further
reflection of the ‘third way’ approach of New Labour ‘by putting on to the new public health
agenda the objective of redressing inequalities’. Furthermore, they argued that ‘to counter the
possibility of being accused of political rhetoric, a range of strategies, such as Health Action
Zones [established in 1997], have been put in place that are intended to achieve this objective’
(Scriven and Orme, 2001: xix). Twelve Sport Action Zones were also established four years
later. The Health Action Zones and Sport Action Zones were specifically located in areas of
social and economic deprivation and went someway to recognizing that there was an impact
on health of the socio-economic conditions in these areas. Saving Lives also stressed the
importance of joined-up thinking, a key philosophy of the New Labour government, and
focused on the range of organizations and agencies that might contribute to the goals therein.
However, once again, the role of sports organizations in achieving such goals was barely
mentioned. Even leaving aside sports organizations, ‘a key issue’, according to Scriven
and Orme (2001: xx), ‘is undoubtedly the different interpretations and ideological
understanding of health promotion that the various agencies and their respective profes-
sional representatives espouse’. As Scriven and Orme (2001) imply, the different ‘agencies’
with an interest in the health agenda no doubt bring to the table a number of different
preconceived ideological standpoints that often make it quite problematic to assume that
 Community sports development: health 115
they will each pull in the same direction. That is to say, it is highly unlikely that joined-up
thinking will necessarily mean that organizations, whose main roles and responsibilities
may be at distinct variance with those of other organizations, will be able to move
towards commonly agreed goals and objectives. Indeed, for reasons we make clear in
Chapter 1, it is often the case that the relational networks of which such organizations
are a part are characterized by greater degrees of internal and external conflict than of
cooperation and consensus. This becomes all the more complex by virtue of the network
of interdependencies associated with health promotion becoming ever denser and more
populated with different organizations, all vying for different positions of prominence and
available funding streams.

Sport and physical activity for health policy under New Labour, 2000–04
Although numerous statements had been released regarding football, in particular, the
new Labour government’s first sport policy, A Sporting Future for All, was published in
May 2000 (DCMS, 2000). Within the document, the DCMS (2000: 39) argued, amongst
other things, that ‘the strategy provides the context for local authorities to link the value
of sport to the wider benefits of health’. On the whole, however, the document made
little explicit mention of the contribution that sport might make to the health agenda.
However, it is not only the case that sports development work has diversified to include
broader notions of what such work should entail because the government seems to be
encouraging this broadening of horizons. The important issue here, however, is that this
diversification is seen to be worthwhile financially (Bloyce et al., 2008). For example,
according to the CCPR (2002: 5), ‘the Government currently spends 800 times more on
health than it does on sport and recreation’. As such, they argued at the time that, for
sports organizations and the government at large, ‘greater emphasis is required on pre-
ventative health programmes’ (CCPR, 2002: 5). The specific contribution that sports
organizations could make to these ‘programmes’ was positively argued.
The focus on physical activity was extended quite explicitly as an aspect of NHS provision
in the National Service Framework for Coronary Heart Disease (DH, 2000), insofar as all
NHS bodies were required to have ‘agreed to and be contributing to an increasing physical
activity policy’ (Ireland, 2001: 109). In this regard, it is important to note that emphasis
came increasingly to be placed on the contribution that physical activity could make to
public health strategies at this time. Perhaps almost inevitably this had implications for
those promoting sport, and with the publication of Game Plan in 2002 the boundaries
between the contribution to health by physical activity and by sport became even more
blurred. As we noted earlier, Waddington (2000) had been rightly critical of what he
perceived to be the blinkered focus of policy-makers on sport rather than physical activity
and exercise in relation to health promotion within sport strategies.
Although Collins (2008: 70) argues that, with the publication of Game Plan, ‘the link
with health seemed to have run into the sand’, this seems quite contrary to key themes
within it. Game Plan makes very clear links between sport and physical activity strategy
and health. Indeed, it is quite clearly stated within Game Plan that ‘our primary aim is to
develop a sport and physical activity culture to produce a fitter, more active population
and realise the significant health benefits and savings available’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit,
2002: 90). In fact, Game Plan places considerable emphasis on the role that participation
in sport and physical activity can play in improving health and, in that respect, the prevailing
policy commitments are but one further expression of Labour’s attempt to enhance
116 Community sports development: health
‘joined-up thinking’ between disparate policy areas and of integrating policies across a
range of government departments (such as the DCMS and the Department of Health).
An increasing feature of Labour policy that came to have a profound impact on sport
policy and development was the establishment of performance indicators and targets (see
Chapter 2). Thus a particular policy priority of Game Plan was that ‘there should be a
non-directive approach to local provision, with more use of performance framework
tools such as public health focused targets and local PSAs [public service agreements]’
(DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 162). Such targets are now very much part of the day-to-day
reality of the operations of sports development work in local authorities. As we have
argued elsewhere,

given the relatively powerful position of Sport England and their greater capacity to
set the government’s policy agenda for local authorities, it was not surprising that
the current policy focus on health issues was also widely cited as a justification for
re-orientating sports development activity away from the development of sport per
se, towards using sport and physical activities as vehicles of social policy designed to
achieve health outcomes.
(Bloyce et al., 2008: 369)

A quite specific target set out in Game Plan was to get at least 70 per cent of the target
population sufficiently active for health benefits, with the recommended amount being 30
minutes of moderate-intensity exercise five times a week. This was, however, derided in
some quarters for being overly ambitious given that the proportion of the population
engaged in such health-enhancing physical activity (HEPA) was 32 per cent. As such, the
target was soon modified to a 1 per cent increase annually until 2020. In order that it
might achieve this annual increase, Sport England ‘refocused its work and in doing so
recast itself as the de facto national physical activity agency’ (Robson and McKenna,
2008: 174). This is an interesting observation, for two reasons: first, the idea that Sport
England recast itself, once again, downplays significantly the substantial constraints
imposed upon it by the government; and, second, it highlights the increasingly blurred
boundaries between sport and physical activity promotion. We shall discuss this in
greater detail later, as these boundaries have become even more blurred in the period
since then.
Derek Wanless published two government-commissioned reports into health promotion
and policy in 2002 and 2004. These highlighted the need for the government to evaluate
the provision of health care, and to focus more on prevention, especially in terms of the
projected costs of not investing in a long-term public health strategy. Wanless also
acknowledged the impact that a person’s socio-economic status had on health, and
prompted the government to publish a new paper on health at the end of 2004. Choosing
Health (DH, 2004a), whilst clearly placing an emphasis on individual lifestyle choices
(Hunter, 2007), does acknowledge the contributions that can be made by the broader
community and government. There is also an explicit focus on ‘joined-up thinking’ that
highlights the need to establish the idea that the health agenda has important implications
for all departments within the government. Some mention is also made of the social
inequalities in health, although much less attention is paid to this than to other perceived
areas of importance. Choosing Health (DH, 2004a: 16) indicates, with no apparent sense
of irony, that this is ‘the start, not the end, of a journey’. This is despite the fact that
Saving Lives, the Labour government’s health action plan published just five years earlier,
 Community sports development: health 117
is mentioned just once. None of the targets set in Saving Lives to be achieved by 2010
were mentioned. As we have already noted, this is hardly untypical of government policy
in sport, health or in any other policy area. Indeed, as Coalter (2007a) has rightly argued,
it would appear that governments tend to be more interested in ‘take-offs’ than ‘landings’,
insofar as they often release policies but rarely see them through until their scheduled
‘landing’, the date for which the original targets were set.
Choosing Health highlights the need to work ‘with the sports and recreational activity
sectors to deliver positive, innovative messages about healthy lifestyles through, for
example, football, walking, cycling and fitness centres’ (DH, 2004a: 24). Interestingly,
within the White Paper there is a small section titled ‘Sport’s Unique Contribution’, in
which it is stated that ‘sport in the broadest sense, which includes everyday activity, is
attractive to many and offers people the kind of social networks [that are seen as desir-
able elsewhere in the White Paper]. And there is evidence that the right kind of invest-
ment can generate very significant increases in participation’ (DH, 2004a: 91). None of
this ‘evidence’ is cited to support this claim, and there is no elaboration on what sport ‘in
the broadest sense’ means. This can be seen as a further illustration of the way in which
sport is being used as a term to include a broad range of activities that do not necessarily
involve more conventional competitive sports. This is something that was becoming an
increasing part of sports strategies released under the Labour government, but it is per-
haps even more significant since this is a public health strategy referring to ‘sport’ in this
generic sense. Furthermore, Choosing Health also paid attention to a broader approach
to health promotion, and focused on the possible benefits that could be accrued from
promoting physical activity within people’s everyday lives. A key development from this
has been social marketing and the ‘personalizing’ of services. In linking this with moti-
vation, it was suggested that pedometers would be a good motivational tool in ‘market-
ing health’ (DH, 2004a: 90). Evidently this proposal had an impact on Sport England. In
its resource for Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), it
sets priority activities for children, adults and ‘older people’. All of them included a key
focus on walking as an everyday activity – to school, to work and whilst shopping – and
encouraged ‘the use of pedometers as a motivational tool’ for all age groups (Sport Eng-
land, 2006e: 20). Thus, it would seem that as part of the joined-up thinking approach
within the government, public health policy is increasingly encroaching into sport, and
sport policy encroaching into physical activity. This is a further blurring of the bound-
aries between sport and physical activity. However, notwithstanding the fact that this can
be seen as part of government’s broader philosophy of joined-up thinking, there would
seem to be increasing tension for those charged with promoting sport because of the fact
that they have had to broaden their remit regarding what, precisely, this is (Bloyce et al.,
2008; Houlihan and White, 2002).
The increased focus on sport and physical activity was further underlined in the Chief
Medical Officer’s Report At Least Five a Week: Evidence on the Impact of Physical
Activity and Its Relationship to Health, published in 2004, in which it was stated that
‘the health importance of physical activity, exercise and sport, is recognised in the NHS
Plan and in the National Service Frameworks for the NHS’ (DH, 2004b: iv). As noted
earlier, Waddington (2000) pointed out that policies that have focused on sport as an
activity that would be beneficial for health have tended to ignore the obvious health risks
associated with competitive sport. However, in line with the WHO’s (2003: 3) stated
recognition that there are ‘risks and harm’ associated with sport, the Department of
Health (2004b: 29) recognized that ‘very high levels of fitness training or engagement in
118 Community sports development: health
vigorous and contact sports also carries higher risk of sports/exercise-related injury’. The
Department of Health (2004b: 92) also stated that ‘we are currently consulting the med-
ical profession on the recognition of sport and exercise medicine as a specialty within the
NHS’. According to Verow (2006: 225), with ‘10% of attendances at accident and emer-
gency departments being for sport-related injuries’ the new specialism was to be wel-
comed. Furthermore, this ‘new NHS medical speciality’ was also ‘to underpin the drive
across the NHS to promote increased physical activity’ (DH, 2005: 29). Although one
might say that this is yet further evidence of joined-up thinking, it could also be argued
that this is another area in which the traditional approach to sports development work is
coming under threat because the proposal indicates that ‘the NHS is responsible for
taking forward the health improvement agenda and this will include promoting physical
activity’ (DH, 2005: 27). This, by implication, meant that because it was to include phy-
sical activity an increasing area of the work that many sports bodies had become
‘responsible’ for was now no longer seen to be under their jurisdiction.
In a series of papers put together by Sport England entitled Driving Up Participation:
The Challenge for Sport, Rowe et al. (2004) provided an assessment for Sport England
following the publication of government targets to increase the physical activity of the
nation set out originally in Game Plan:

Sport England has to determine within its own business planning process how it will
position itself in relation to this overarching aim to increase physical activity levels in
England. It is important for Sport England to keep its unique identity as the leading
sports development agency whilst still being seen to be a key player in the physical
activity and health agenda. In order to achieve this positioning it is proposed that
Sport England within its business plan (and as part of its Funding Agreement with
DCMS) set a target based on ‘sports contribution to overall physical activity levels
required for health’.
(Rowe et al., 2004: 19)

Following this, Sport England declared that it would be responsible for meeting three out
of the proposed five bouts of thirty minutes physical activity per week required for
HEPA. This was despite the fact that Rowe et al. (2004: 18) acknowledged the fact that
in the most recent Health Survey for England available at the time ‘sport’ made up only 8
per cent of the total ‘physical activity levels’ of those currently meeting the target hours a
week ‘for health benefits’. Even combined with walking the total was just 20 per cent – in
effect, only one of the five bouts on average. Clearly, this was a rather ambitious target
for Sport England, the SDOs and other people involved in the delivery of community
sport to achieve. It is hardly surprising, then, that many SDOs became increasingly
involved in schemes associated with occupationally related physical activity, such as
walking to work or school schemes.

The continued blurring of sport and physical activity 2004–2008

Sport England also became a key sponsor, together with the Department for Health and
the Countryside Agency, in the delivery of ten Local Exercise Action Pilots (LEAPs) that
were developed early in 2004 to ‘assess a range of community approaches that aim to
increase levels of activity across the community as a whole but also with targeted work
with specific groups such as older people and children’ (DH, 2005: 19). Furthermore, in
 Community sports development: health 119
March 2005 Sport England announced that the Everyday Sport campaign was to be rolled
out nationally after what it considered was a successful pilot in the North East of England.
The campaign was seen, again, as more of a ‘physical activity’, rather than ‘necessarily a
sport campaign’ (Sport England, 2005a) and was ‘reminiscent of the Active for Life
campaign of the previous decade’ (Robson and McKenna, 2008: 174). With this, and its
involvement in LEAPs, it was clear that the notion of ‘sport’ was being considered in a
very broad manner within specific strategies and campaigns. This was further reinforced
from the government’s perspective when the policy statement on increasing physical
activity that emanated from Choosing Health was called Choosing Activity, and focused
attention much more on the broader dimension of physical activity rather than competi-
tive sports (Allender et al., 2007). Within this, it is recognized that ‘the proportion of
people who choose to be active in their leisure time show an upward trend’ within certain
socio-economic groups (DH, 2005: 5). However, at the same time it is also recognized
that as the amount of manual work people are required to do decreases and reliance on
the car increases, the overall physical activity people get in their daily lives is decreasing
(DH, 2005). In particular, the Department of Health argued:

We need a culture shift if we are to increase physical activity levels in England. This
will only be achieved if people are aware of, understand and want the benefits of being
active. Opportunities will be created by changing the physical and cultural landscape –
and building an environment that supports people in more active lifestyles.
(DH, 2005: 6)

This can be seen as a recognition that sedentariness cannot be explained by a rather

simplistic focus on leisure-time physical activity promotion, or that the related health
problems could be solved by only promoting leisure-time physical activity. A lack of such
recognition by previous governments has been the source of much debate (Riddoch and
McKenna, 2005; Waddington, 2000). What an SDO might be able to do in connection
with this, however, is an interesting area of study. It is likely that few would have gone
into the job specifically to become involved in walking or cycling to work/school
schemes. This is likely to be an increasing aspect of their day-to-day jobs, as the bound-
aries between sport and physical activity become increasingly blurred (Bloyce et al.,
2008). It was proposed that

Sport England is developing this new approach, which is based on the development
of community ‘hubs’ with new management partnerships that link sport and physical
activity with health, education, lifelong learning and social welfare.
(DH, 2005: 20)

Interestingly, despite the obvious areas where Choosing Activity focused on the wider
issues of physical activity relating to the environment, and to a lesser degree regarding the
health inequalities related to socio-economic status, ‘the individual’ remained the key
area of focus: ‘the national engine for health improvement is to be found in the ambition
of people themselves to live healthier lives’ (DH, 2005: 37). It could be argued, therefore, that
the ideology of healthism that underpins this approach is rarely far away from such policies.
Sport England’s response to Choosing Health and Choosing Activity was encapsulated
in the publication of Sport Playing Its Part: The Contribution of Sport to Healthier
Communities (Sport England, 2006a), which was one in a series of publications entitled
120 Community sports development: health
Sport Playing Its Part. The then Chair of Sport England, in the foreword to Healthier
Communities, claimed that ‘the role of sport in promoting physical and mental health
and in particular, its contribution to reducing obesity and chronic heart disease is being
increasingly recognised’ (Sport England, 2006a: 2). As has become the norm when Sport
England focuses on ‘health’, ‘sport’ and ‘physical activity’ are terms used interchangeably
throughout the document. This is a further illustration of how increasingly public health
and sports development policy are converging, with greater focus on more generic defi-
nitions of sport and a greater focus on wider physical activity. As we have argued above,
this has as much to do with vying for the larger pots of money available in ‘health’ as it
has with the ‘joined-up thinking’ promulgated by the Labour government. Indeed, Sport
England (2006a) admits quite openly that a key driver for focusing on health is the
funding available. In other words, Sport England is more likely to be better funded, as
are many of its partners, if it explicitly has objectives and targets linked to physical
activity and health. This has led Robson and McKenna (2008: 171) to conclude that
‘there has been an emerging trend of “healthy alliances” or health partnerships between
sports development professionals and health practitioners to promote physical activity. In
many instances past mutual suspicion has been supplanted by strategic partnerships, and
debates about joint working have largely been won’. However, the idea that such ‘healthy
alliances’ have come about due to an increasing mutual respect, or even a conscious synergy
of aims, is to thoroughly downplay the constraints imposed, by and large by the government,
on professionals working within sports development, health promotion and the NHS.
The 2007 Foresight Report, titled Tackling Obesities: Future Choices (Foresight, 2007),
was commissioned by the government through its Office for Science in order to produce a
long-term vision for dealing with the potential problems of rising overweight and obesity
over the next forty years. The Report’s conclusions suggest that obesity is a complex
problem related to biological and social factors and warn that policies aimed only at
individuals in tackling the so-called obesity crisis are destined to fail. Amongst the key
stakeholders identified are the DCMS and Sport England, although sport is barely men-
tioned in the Report. The focus is very much more on generic physical activity, and
building physical activity into people’s everyday lives through commuting and changing
the environmental setting. The Report suggested that the scale and complexity of the
problem associated with obesity is comparable to climate change and should receive as
great a focus. Indeed, the focus on broader concerns about the working and living
environment are outlined in the Report, which stated:

Provision of facilities for sport and formal exercise is an important part of a strategy
to counter obesity. However, their lower usage by people of lower socioeconomic
status, combined with the need to increase total activity levels across society, not
merely among those motivated to engage in sports, suggests additional action needs
to be taken. There are other ways to increase physical activity through designing
opportunities for health and activity into architecture and urban design … Promotion
of ‘active transport’ (e.g. walking and cycling) is one way of increasing activity.
(Foresight, 2007: 66)

In the same year, Sport England (2007) funded the Active Design project and published a
report that went largely unnoticed by the press. The Report, and the project as a whole,
was regarded by Derek Mapp, Chair of Sport England at the time, in the foreword as ‘a
fresh approach to urban planning and design funded by Sport England to help get local
 Community sports development: health 121
communities active and more involved in sport’ (Sport England, 2007: i). It was also
endorsed by the then Sports Minister, Richard Caborn. The central theme of the strategy
is to attempt to promote physical activity through making physical environments more
conducive to ‘active travel’ (Sport England, 2007: 2), by encouraging town planners to
plan for more people to be able to walk and cycle around their towns and city centres.
This was most important in terms of a focus on ‘everyday activity destinations’, but the
strategy also focuses on more ‘informal activity and recreation’ that might be facilitated
more through better planning of open spaces like parks, and a better focus on more
amenable planning for ‘formal sports and leisure activities’ (Sport England, 2007: 10). It
is far too early to assess the impact of the strategy, but this is a further illustration of the
ways in which Sport England, prominent amongst many organizations whose primary
focus, in theory, is on the promotion of sport, has had to increasingly diversify its activ-
ities. On the surface, town planning to encourage greater ‘active travel’ is not something
one might expect as the remit of a sports organization. Although, of course, it can be
seen, again, as part of the joined-up thinking of the Labour government, and the per-
spective of public health, focusing on promoting physical activity through ‘active travel’
is entirely consistent with the epidemiological data that indicate the important contribu-
tion that travel-related physical activity plays in promoting overall levels of daily physical
activity.

A ‘new’ distinction between sport and physical activity for health policy?
In March 2008, the first major policy statement regarding health under the new Gordon
Brown administration was published, entitled Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives: A Cross-
Government Strategy for England. Gordon Brown in his foreword to the strategy
announced that it ‘marks an important shift in our focus to support everyone in making
the healthy choices which will reduce obesity, especially among children’ (DH/DCSF,
2008: iii). However, the extent to which this really does mark a shift is debatable. It is yet
more evidence of the prevailing tendency for governments to produce new policies for
‘old’ problems, but, in doing so, to ignore all previous policy statements, and to offer
only very limited difference from them. For example, Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives
makes no mention of Choosing Health, Choosing Activity or Game Plan, the three
existing policies associated with health and physical activity. It is difficult, therefore, to
conclude anything other than that, once again, the targets set in each of these documents,
associated with reducing levels of obesity, are ignored, to be superseded by yet more
‘new’ targets. The specific aim of this strategy is ‘to be the first major nation to reverse
the rising tide of obesity and overweight in the population by ensuring that everyone is
able to achieve and maintain a healthy weight’ (DH/DCSF, 2008: v).
Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives promises a multifaceted approach to dealing with the
issue of obesity and the health-related problems associated with it. This includes pro-
moting good health through promoting healthy foods, physical activity as part of our
daily lives, promoting health at work, whilst also concentrating on treatment and support
for people already overweight or obese. Sport and physical activity are both mentioned in
terms of their contributions to arresting the rising levels of obesity amongst the popula-
tion. However, some interesting distinctions are drawn. In this respect, this does repre-
sent something of a shift, since it redefines the boundaries between sport and physical
activity. A quite specific focus on community sport is promoted, with £392 million pro-
mised from the government, and ‘an estimated £324 million from Lottery funding over
122 Community sports development: health
the period 2008–11, to deliver community sport’ (DH/DCSF, 2008: 19). In relation to this,
it is claimed that ‘Sport England is developing a new strategy to build a world class
community sport infrastructure to sustain and increase participation in sport and allow
everyone the chance to develop their sporting talents’ (DH/DCSF, 2008: 19). It also pro-
posed that the government would review its overall strategy for physical activity. The
new strategy would be ‘clearly aligned to the new ambition on healthy weight’ and would
give consideration to ‘establishing a potential new body, “Active England”, to drive for-
ward the Government’s commitments relating to wider physical activity, complementing
Sport England’s work. The review will consider the scope and funding of any such body
before reaching a final decision’ (DH/DCSF, 2008: 20). As yet, no such decision has been
made, though these developments are interesting in light of our earlier discussion
regarding the blurring of the boundaries between those promoting physical activity for
health and those promoting sport.
It is no surprise, given the aforementioned developments, that the most recent policy
statements from the DCMS and Sport England suggest that the boundaries between
sport, health and physical activity need to be made more distinct. As such, the DCMS in
its new strategy statement, Playing to Win, comments that ‘sports bodies will focus their
efforts and investment on sport, while other bodies will lead on the delivery of physical
activity’ (DCMS, 2008a: 18). This, no doubt, further contributed to Sport England’s
refocusing on ‘community sport’, which in its latest annual report enabled Sport England
to provide ‘a clear distinction with the physical activity agenda being driven by a number
of departments, including the Department of Health and Department of Transport’
(Sport England, 2008a: 1). It is clear, as we will see in Chapter 7, that the Olympic
Games to be held in London in 2012 have already started to impact on this decision to
redefine the remit of organizations whose primary aim, on the surface, is the promotion
of sport, rather than general physical activity. However, how long such a distinction will
last, given the differential funding available to the ‘sport’ and ‘health’ agendas, remains to
be seen. In fact, before the year was out, in November 2008 Sport England updated its
Sport Playing Its Part series, and it was replaced by Shaping Places through Sport. One of
five key areas of focus was on Healthier Communities (Sport England, 2008c). Within this
document, Sport England (2008c: 4) outlines how the ‘power of sport’ can be used ‘to
develop healthier communities’. Once again the boundaries between sport and physical
activity are completely blurred in this document. It is impossible to gauge at this early
stage what these recent developments will mean for the working lives of SDOs. Suffice to
say, however, that when the 2012 Games are over, and if ‘Active England’ is established
as a non-departmental public body that, in essence, rivals Sport England for government
funding, it is likely that Sport England will keep pressing the case that sport does have a
role to play in achieving health-related outcomes, especially when one considers that the
funding available to health is likely to continue to dwarf that available to sport. We now
want to discuss the implications and issues associated with the emergence of policy aimed
at health, from sport and public health strategies.

Moral panics and health

It might be argued that ‘the past decade or so has witnessed a growing moral panic sur-
rounding the alleged “ill-health” of people generally, and young people in particular’
(Smith and Green, 2005: 241), not just in the UK, but throughout much of the developed
world. It is actually quite difficult to assess the degree to which we really are witnessing a
 Community sports development: health 123
profound growth in obesity-related illness, brought on by apparently increasing levels of
physical inactivity. Statistics are, of course, ‘products of social activity [and yet] … we
sometimes talk about statistics as though they are facts that simply exist, like rocks,
completely independent of people’ (Best, 2001: 27). It is, therefore, extremely difficult to
measure with any degree of object-adequacy levels of obesity, for example, across whole
nations. On the basis of various government studies, however, we have access to data
that have been produced regarding obesity, levels of physical activity and projections of
future costs to the health service. In measuring certain perceived problems, as Best (2001:
44) points out, ‘the broader the definition the bigger the statistic’. The use of the body
mass index (BMI) to measure population levels of overweight and obesity is a particularly
good example of this. The problems of using the BMI in such measurements have been
acknowledged by the WHO (2000: 31) in recognizing that there is a ‘lack of consistency
and agreement’ due to different interpretations of the measurements over time and
between different countries. What is regarded as ‘overweight’ and ‘obese’ has also chan-
ged over time and is interpreted differently in different countries, making ‘trends’ difficult
to identify. This is something that is also recognized by the DH/DCSF (2008: 35), who
acknowledge that the BMI

can be less accurate for assessing healthy weight in individuals, especially for certain
groups (e.g. athletes, the elderly) where a slightly higher BMI is not necessarily
unhealthy … For children the situation is more complicated. There is no fixed BMI
to define being obese or overweight since this varies with gender and with growth
and development.
(DH/DCSF, 2008: 35)

However, in the main, Best (2001: 44) argues that ‘because people promoting social problems
favor big numbers (because they make the problem seem bigger and more important), we
can expect that they will favor broad definitions’. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore,
that the DH/DCSF (2008: 35) consider BMI to be an ‘effective measure of weight status at
a population level’, although they do not emphasize why this might be the case. Fur-
thermore, the WHO continue to use it as a baseline measurement of increasing levels of
obesity across the world. It might reasonably be argued, then, that ‘the statistics do not
measure changes in the incidence of the problem so much as changes in social attitudes
toward that problem and the organizational practices of the agencies that keep track of
it’ (Best, 2001: 101–2). In other words, the greater the concern that has come to be
expressed over physical inactivity and obesity in the recent past, particularly in the media,
but also within government policy, the greater the level of attention that has been given
to how we might measure the problem in this regard. Karpf (1988: 27) has referred to a
process whereby media sources and, indeed, government departments, NDPBs and non-
government organizations use ‘graphs, maps and percentages’ to ‘give an aura of “facti-
city”’ to certain health issues. In other words, a degree of caution needs to be applied
with regard to how such data are used. The problem with gathering population-level data
on overweight and obesity is compounded further when one considers how difficult it is,
also, to adequately measure levels of physical activity across populations. Indeed,
Livingstone et al. (2003: 681) point out that ‘the accurate measurement of physical activ-
ity is fraught with problems’. Boreham and Riddoch’s (2003: 17) review of the health
benefits of physical activity for children and youth concludes that ‘there is surprisingly
little empirical evidence to support this notion’. Furthermore, as Coalter argues,
124 Community sports development: health
although most authors accept the overall analysis that physical activity has health, and
therefore economic, benefits, they admit that some of the estimates (taken from routine
data sources) are somewhat crude. Inevitably such calculations are imprecise, contain
substantial margins of error and are based on theoretically informed judgements.
(Coalter, 2007a: 154)

Indeed, one might say that the judgements are based on a high degree of involvement. As
Smith and Green argue, ‘claims regarding young people’s involvement in sport and phy-
sical activity, and the relationship of these to their supposed “ill-health”, have tended to
be driven by “ideological rather than scientific concerns” (Dunning 1986, p. 2) and, as a
consequence, have lacked “the degree of detachment necessary for fruitful sociological
analysis”’ (Smith and Green, 2005: 249). It is, after all, extremely difficult to get population
data for appropriate levels of HEPA. Measuring the number of bouts of exercise individuals
might do in a given week (as in the Active People Survey in England) is, of course,
extremely time consuming and expensive (Rowe, 2009). However, it is almost impossible
to draw from this the extent to which the people surveyed are actually engaged in levels
of activity that are sufficient to derive health benefits. Nonetheless, it is a common
assumption that the populations in most nations across the world are not engaged in
enough exercise and, as such, the promotion of physical activity and/or sport is seen as a
way to address this. Although, as we noted earlier, a concern over levels of sport and
physical activity participation in England has long been expressed, it is only in more
recent years that has this come to be most strongly associated with the levels of concern,
perhaps even panic, over rising levels of overweight and obesity.
As Gard and Wright (2005: 5) state, ‘what is interesting … is the way people who talk
and write about obesity and its causes [such as increasing levels of physical inactivity], in
fields such as medicine, exercise science and public health, in the midst of great uncer-
tainty, manage to speak with such unified certainty about the obesity crisis’. Certainly
this is reflected in much of the policy covered within this chapter. The networks of
interdependencies that have developed in health and physical activity promotion, including
sport promotion, contain numerous people who have a vested interest in demonstrating
that we are witnessing decreasing levels of physical activity and increasing levels of obesity.
These interrelated processes are said to be having deleterious effects on the health of
populations throughout the world. However, it could be argued that, as McDermott
(2007: 313) points out, there is something of a ‘circuitry of research funding’. In trying to
exemplify this she argues that

when the public is potentially unable to separate fact from judgment, due to scientific
experts being given the task of speaking to the implications of morally charged issues
such as obesity and inactivity, the grounds for funding become questionable. Scientific
journalism thus functions as an apparatus of governance as it acts as a conduit
through which an epidemic vocabulary not only comes to be cemented to particular
conditions (e.g., inactivity, obesity) in the public imagination but also facilitates a
health issue being identified as of great consequence to population welfare, and thus
requiring intervention and funding.
(McDermott, 2007: 313)

We might argue that groups of people in more established positions, within academia,
within the government and within large organizations, have a greater control over the
 Community sports development: health 125
flows of communication (Elias and Scotson, 1994). Such a condition serves to perpetuate
the idea that we are in the grip of a physical inactivity crisis and, unsurprisingly, those
people employed to promote sport have, consciously or otherwise, taken the opportu-
nities afforded by such developments. As Coalter (2007a: 153) argues in relation to the
conclusive style in which organizations like Sport England report levels of obesity and
physical activities, ‘such calculations perform a dual purpose: they dramatize the nature
of the issues and their broader, collective, consequences and also act as part of the lob-
bying process for greater public investment in sport’. This might be explained, in part,
because Sport England, amongst others, remains ideologically committed to sport and not
health.
It is important to recognize that, as Cohen (2002: viii), who first developed the concept
‘moral panic’ in his seminal work Folk Devils and Moral Panics, indicates, ‘calling
something a “moral panic” does not imply that this something does not exist or happened
at all and that reaction is based on fantasy, hysteria, delusion and illusion or being duped
by the powerful’. Instead, he argues, ‘it has been exaggerated in itself and/or compared to
other, more serious problems’ (Cohen, 2002: viii). In fact, the anecdotal evidence is
overwhelming insofar as in virtually all attempts to measure population obesity levels the
fact that levels of obesity are increasing substantially is difficult to ignore, and, thus, this
is difficult to deny. We do not subscribe, therefore, to Gard and Wright’s (2005) suggestion
that the obesity crisis is, to all intents and purposes, a myth. We also do not claim that
there is no problem, but if we are to develop a more adequate appreciation of the levels
of overweight and obesity within populations it is important that we seek to develop
explanations of these issues that are based on a relatively detached view of the available
data, and that take into account something about the complex ways in which the social
patterning of overweight and obesity has developed over time. Only then are we in a
position to provide more reality-congruent assessments that would contribute to more
effective policy. Instead, we have a situation where, as McDermott (2007: 316) points out,
‘physical activity is positioned as the modern preventative panacea’. However, problems
arise with such a position, not least because of the potential health costs that stem from
the promotion of sport and the potential injuries that might be incurred.

The promotion of sport or physical activity?

As we move further away from individualized, moderate and rhythmical physical activities
(such as aerobics) towards more complex, physically vigorous activities (such as ‘traditional’
team games) the likely health ‘costs’ of involvement in these activities increase correlatively.
From a sociological perspective, this can best be explained, at least in part, by reference
to the rather different pattern of social relationships involved in these types of activities
(Coalter, 2007a; K. Green, 2008; Waddington, 2000). Perhaps one of the most important
differences between physical activities and team sports is that the former involves a rather
different pattern of social relations from the latter – there are greater constraints when
participating in team sports, and, of course, the potential for greater levels of explosive
body contact. In relation to this, physical activities are more likely than are team sports to
involve physical movements of a rhythmic nature that, in addition to the intensity and
duration of the activity, can be controlled to a much higher degree by the individual
participant (Waddington, 2000; Waddington et al., 1997). So, perhaps the most important
difference between sport and physical activity is that, whereas the competitive element is not
central to most forms of physical activity, sport, by contrast, is inherently competitive.
126 Community sports development: health
Moreover, sport is arguably becoming increasingly competitive not just at the elite level
but at lower levels too (Waddington, 2000). In this connection, Waddington (2000) has
noted that the increased competitiveness of modern sport – one aspect of which is the
increased emphasis that has come to be placed on winning – means that, unlike most
people who take part in non-competitive physical activities, those who play sport are,
particularly at the higher levels, frequently subject to strong constraints to ‘play hurt’,
that is, to continue playing while injured or to play with painkilling injections ‘for the
good of the team’, with all the associated health risks these behaviours entail (Liston et
al., 2006; Roderick et al., 2000; Young et al., 1994). However, as we have seen, sport is
frequently promoted unproblematically alongside physical activity as a means of coping
with the apparent health problems that are experienced by people in modern societies,
whilst the physical risks to health that active participation in sport may entail are
simultaneously ignored.
In this respect, as Coalter (2001: 5) argues, ‘among many of the least active and least
healthy groups, the promotion of a more active lifestyle may be a more useful strategy
than offering only traditional sports’. To this end, he suggests that ‘the traditional product-led
[target group] “sports development” approach needs [to be] reviewed, with a more needs-
based approach based on an understanding of personal and social circumstances’ (Coalter,
2001: 5). In this respect, the Department of Health and DCMS in the UK recognized that
‘people currently have limited and often conflicting information on healthy lifestyle
choices’ (DH/DCMS, 2004: 8). One might argue that this ‘limited’ information is borne
out by a view that ‘healthy’ and ‘physically active’ are terms that many people associate
with sport and that some react negatively to the idea of ‘physical activity’ as a result. For
example, Sport England quotes one SHA report that stated:

in a way Sport as an umbrella term can appear to be exclusive, signifying elite athletes,
footballers who are frequently young and male. To succeed with the Public Health
agenda of the delivery of increased physical activity this needs to be inclusive, so that
women, the elderly, (those on) incapacity benefit or unemployment benefit and the
frail can also participate.
(Sport England, 2005b: 16)

In Game Plan, the government cited Finland as the main benchmark for success in relation
to sports participation, claiming that here, as in Sweden, ‘participation in organised and
competitive sport actually increases amongst older people, due to the focus placed on this
group in these countries’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 23). However, Gratton (2004) sug-
gests that this is incorrect. He argues that competitive sport decreases significantly with
age throughout the whole of Europe, including Sweden and Finland. What does increase
in Sweden and Finland, in stark contrast to the rest of Europe, is ‘participants taking part
with a high frequency (intensive) but not in a competitive and organised situation. Rather
it is informal and non-competitive’ (Gratton, 2004: 93). As a result, Gratton (2004: 94)
argues that ‘policy intervention to increase participation needs to be concentrated in the
non-competitive, informal area of sport participation since this is where it is most likely
to attract the groups that will yield the highest health benefits from participation, older
age groups and the lower socio-economic groups’.
Waddington (2000) argues that it is not uncommon to find government policies where
the concepts of sport, physical activity and exercise are frequently conflated. Indeed, as
Coalter has noted:
 Community sports development: health 127
Part of the reason for [largely] ignoring the negative consequences of sports partici-
pation is the consistent failure to distinguish systematically between physical activity
and sport … [The] all-encompassing definition serves to fudge important distinctions
between physical activity, physical recreation, recreational and competitive sport. It
thereby permits the sports lobby to claim to be a major contributor to the fitness and
health agenda (although the concern with the costs of sports injuries would imply
that we require more precise definitions in this area).
(Coalter 2007a: 156; original emphasis)

It is clear, then, that in response to the apparently increasing levels of obesity and
decreasing levels of physical activity, we have seen a blurring of sport and physical
activity in policies and strategies in recent times. In some respects, this has resulted in
something of a tension between those promoting physical activity and the wider health
agenda, and those promoting community sport. This is not unlike the longer-standing
tension between elite sports promotion and mass participation sport. In other words,
tensions have now emerged regarding the kinds of activities to be promoted in the name
of ‘mass participation’ or ‘Sport For All’. This blurring of the distinctions between sport
and physical activity has permeated down to SDOs on the ground (Bloyce et al., 2008).
Indeed, as Robson and McKenna (2008: 175) argue, ‘in many areas the traditional sports
development plan has been supplanted or augmented by a holistic physical activity strategy’.
The apparent willingness of Sport England and SDOs on the ground to embrace the
broader health agenda can be explained in relation to the enabling and constraining
aspects of their relational networks. As the government, in particular, placed an increas-
ing emphasis on the health agenda, and identified sport, in its ‘broadest’ sense, as a key
contributing factor, it is not surprising that those involved in sports promotion became
embroiled in the promotion of HEPA. There are undoubtedly opportunities enabled by
the links with health, not least to do with the increased financial implications for those
promoting sport, but also to do with the legitimization and professionalization of the
vocation of sports development (Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter, 2007a; Houlihan and White,
2002). In this sense, it is perhaps unsurprising ‘given the increasingly interventionist role
of government in sport policy over the last decade’ that many SDOs ‘are increasingly and
enthusiastically championing the perceived role of sport in contributing positively to the
achievement of broader social objectives’ (Bloyce et al., 2008: 368). However, their
involvement must always be explained in terms of the habitus of those employed in such
positions and strongly related to the fact they are likely to be sports enthusiasts and
believe that ‘sports development work should be about the promotion of sport’ (Bloyce et
al., 2008: 367). A large part of the reason they sought employment in ‘sport’ in the first
place is because of their involved passion for sports. It would not be surprising, therefore,
if the SDOs on the ground broadly welcomed the apparent repositioning of community
sport so prominently on their agenda, in the UK at least, in 2008. However, as noted earlier,
this has not prevented Sport England from publishing its new policy outlines, Shaping
Places through Sport, in which the commitment to ‘healthier communities’ through the
‘power of sport’ very much remains high on the ideological agenda of Sport England.

Short-termism and healthism

The idea that we are witnessing a physical inactivity crisis is certainly not new. As Karpf
(1988: 32) pointed out over twenty years ago, ‘leotarded health zealots, anxiously
128 Community sports development: health
charting their daily fibre intake, seem the very epitome of modernity – the result of recent
knowledge about health and illness. So, it’s chastening to cast back to the 1920s, 1930s,
and 1940s and see a fitness craze and a preoccupation with nutrition almost identical’.
Indeed, often the apparent ‘“modern” or “present day” problem represents … [something
of a] re-surfacing of a longstanding moral panic’ (Smith and Green, 2005: 242). It is
perhaps unsurprising, then, that, as is evident from the discussion above, often policies
and strategies developed to deal with this apparently ‘new’ and ‘worrying’ problem can
be considered as ‘old wine in a new bottle’. Over the past decade or so of Labour gov-
ernments in the UK, for example, there have been several different strategies that have the
promotion of sport and/or physical activity for health outcomes at their heart, or at least
as one of their central objectives. Frequently, however, despite setting sometimes rea-
sonably long-term goals and targets, these are rarely commented upon in policies that
succeed them. In other words, as we explained earlier and for reasons we outlined in
Chapter 1, it seems that in the area of health, as elsewhere, governments are more inter-
ested in ‘take-offs’ than ‘landings’ (Coalter, 2007a). As such, Coalter (2001: 50) is critical
of the ‘short-term’ nature of many government and local government sports development
policies. He argues as follows:

Many sports projects are subject to both short-term funding and unrealistic expectations
for quick results (in part based on their own theoretical claims). Many practitioners,
although wholly committed to their work, acknowledge that short-term projects
have very limited impacts on deep-rooted fitness and health problems [and] attitudes
to physical activity.
(Coalter, 2001: 50)

In essence, those promoting sport have been persuaded that sports participation is good
for health; it has become part of their habitus. One might argue that there has been a
process of occupational socialization through the constraining and enabling aspects of
increasing government involvement in, and development of, performance indicators for
sport that have goals beyond sport, such as health. This, combined with the greater
budgets available for health objectives and an apparently related ‘status anxiety’ amongst
SDOs and others promoting sport, contributes to an increasing desire to claim more for
the benefits that can be achieved from promoting sport (Bloyce et al., 2008; Coalter,
2007a; Houlihan and White, 2002). An impact of this is that there would seem to be ‘a
widespread absence of robust monitoring information on the health benefits of provision.
Much of the rationale for this has rested on assumed beneficial outcomes of any increased
activity’ (Coalter et al., 2000: 28). In addition to this, Coalter et al. (2000: 28) argue that
there is a lack of long-term monitoring of such programmes and ‘this reflects the short-
term nature of most initiatives, the lack of funding for such monitoring and the lack of
expertise to undertake such work’.
It might be argued that such short-termism and the associated moral panics about
health have been a part of the broader processes of medicalization and healthism of
physical inactivity and the corresponding levels of obesity. As McDermott (2007: 312)
argues, categorizing obesity as a disease, ‘in the way this term is traditionally understood
within epidemiology, signals … [its] medicalization (Conrad, 1992; Gard and Wright,
2005), a representation that is increasingly critiqued’. A related development is that, as
we noted earlier, this contributes to a process whereby attention is focused almost
exclusively on the individual as being ultimately responsible for controlling his or her
 Community sports development: health 129
own health. At the same time, this serves to divert ‘attention away from wider social
processes – for example, poverty, unemployment, industrial pollution, or the poor quality
or lack of accessibility to health services – which may be associated with high levels of
illness’ (Waddington, 2000: 15). In Western Europe, although there has been an evident
substantial increase in focus by the various national governments on health promotion,
for the most part there has been a ‘continuing preoccupation with individual risk behaviours
and the promotion of healthy lifestyles … and little evidence of the creation of the institu-
tions and systems necessary to sustain the development of effective population health pro-
motion’ (Ziglio et al., 2005: 234). Much the same criticism is made of the current focus on
health promotion in Canada (Pederson et al., 2005) and the US too (Lightsey et al., 2005).
However, in the twenty-first century several policies have emerged, in the UK at least, that
pay attention to some of the wider issues that are likely to impact on health, like socio-eco-
nomic status and the broader physical environment (Foresight, 2007; Sport England, 2007).
The extent to which they have an impact on the ground, however, cannot yet be determined.
It is to this concern with the wider contributing factors to health that we now turn.

Socio-economic and environmental factors

There are two main areas of criticism that can be levelled at many of the health policies
promoted by governments around the world. These centre around the wider, but never-
theless central, contributing factors of the impact of socio-economic status and the
broader environment in which people live their everyday lives. Roberts and Brodie’s
(1992: 141) seminal study of sport and physical activity participation in inner-cities in the
UK concluded that there is a ‘niche rather than a foundation role for sport within health
policy and promotion’. These niche benefits, they add, offer ‘no solutions to socio-eco-
nomic health inequalities’ (Roberts and Brodie, 1992: 142), for relying on sport as a
vehicle for the promotion of public health has always been a problematic policy strategy for
the government (Roberts and Brodie, 1992). That such sports promotion does not appear to
offer a ‘solution’ to such socio-economic inequalities is neatly captured by Snape (2005: 146),
who argues that, ‘despite a plethora of government-sponsored initiatives to encourage and
enable more people of Black ethnic minority status to engage in exercise and sport … parti-
cipation within these ethnic minority groups continues to remain low and to exhibit sub-
stantial differences to that of the majority White community’. Clearly, it is not just ethnic
minority groups that have been the target of several sports and physical activity campaigns
(and neither are these trends limited to the UK) but also people from socio-economically
disadvantaged groups, and yet most data reveal that their participation rates remain low in
comparison to people from higher socio-economic groups. In addition, Gratton (2004: 87)
points out that ‘overall inequalities by socioeconomic group can be demonstrated across a
wide range of measures of health and the determinants of health’. For these and many other
reasons, it is clear that physical activity promotion can only have a marginal impact until the
broader inequalities and social divisions in health within society are addressed, which is
something that is beyond the remit of those promoting sports, including, of course, SDOs.
The socio-economic factors contributing to health are arguably exacerbated in certain
areas by physical environments that are ‘toxic to physical activity’ (Riddoch and
McKenna, 2005: 193). In this respect, Riddoch and McKenna argue that

if population-level change is desired, as opposed to just a few individuals changing

for the better … communities must address the issue of exactly why the members of
130 Community sports development: health
those communities are inactive. In the UK, and probably in the rest of the western
world, the reasons almost certainly lie within the types of environment in which
most people live.
(Riddoch and McKenna 2005: 192)

Summary
We noted earlier that in order make more adequate sense of the complex relationships
that exist between participation in sport, physical activity and health we need to pay
particular attention to the ways in which health inequalities are socially patterned and to
the differential health outcomes that are to be found amongst various social groups. As
Riddoch and McKenna (2005: 194) argue, ‘there has been no communal, nationwide
population decision to take less exercise. Rather, it has happened surreptitiously,
stealthily, without most even noticing’. The significance of broader long-term changes
associated with aspects of commercialization, urbanization, globalization, medicalization,
automation and mechanization processes, in addition to the growing affluence – both
relatively and absolutely – of particular social groups has contributed to changes in most
people’s lifestyles. Such changes, we would argue, have contributed to people becoming
less physically active in their day-to-day lives. There are a number of key developments
that need to be considered in this regard. These include the kinds of jobs in which people
are employed, and especially the long-term tendency for many occupations to shift away
from being characterized by manual, physically demanding activity towards those jobs
that promote sedentariness to a greater degree. Developments in travel, and particularly
the growth in the number of cars purchased and the extension of bus services, has also
meant that more people, including schoolchildren of course, than formerly use a car in
their daily lives. In addition, the increasing variety of media technologies and commercial
leisure opportunities available to people in their leisure time have also contributed to
rising levels of sedentariness, overweight and obesity. Indeed, these are just some among
many other unintended consequences emanating from the intended actions of people
developing technologies that are increasingly designed to meet evident demand to make it
easier to be sedentary, whether it be time-saving devices in the home or at work, or in
terms of the number of people relying on automated transport. Notwithstanding the
recent attempts to address ‘active travel’ in promoting health in the UK, for example, the
House of Commons Health Committee was critical of its own government’s position on
this, and it provides a particularly apposite way to conclude this chapter. The Committee
suggested that, ‘given the profound impact increased levels of activity would have on the
nation’s health, quite aside from the obvious environmental benefits, it seems to us entirely
unacceptable that successive governments have been so remiss in effectively promoting active
travel’ (House of Commons Health Committee, 2004: 77).

Revision questions
1 Provide a sociological examination of the increasing concern that is coming to
be expressed over the state of the nation’s health.
2 Reflect on how effective the public health and sport policy response has been in
impacting on existing health inequalities.
3 Discuss the interrelationships between sport, health and physical activity.
 Community sports development: health 131
Key readings
Gard, M. and Wright, J. (2005) The Obesity Epidemic: Science, Morality and Ideology, London:
Routledge.
Hardman, A. and Stensel, D. (2009) Physical Activity and Health: The Evidence Explained, 2nd
edn, London: Routledge.
Waddington, I. (2000) Sport, Health and Drugs: A Critical Sociological Perspective, London: Routledge.

Recommended websites
British Heart Foundation: www.bhfactive.org.uk
Foresight: Tackling Obesities: Future Choices: www.foresight.gov.uk/OurWork/ActiveProjects/Obe-
sity/Obesity.asp
World Health Organization: www.who.int/en
6 Elite sports development
Promoting international success

Objectives
This chapter will:

 examine the increasing spread of elite sports development systems around the
world;
 explore the key characteristics of elite sports development systems; and
 examine the inter-state rivalry contributing to the increasing seriousness with
which sport is competed at the international level.

Introduction
The emergence of state-sponsored, elite sports development (ESD) ‘systems’ has become
an increasingly prominent feature of sport policy in numerous countries throughout the
world, most especially since the 1960s and 1970s. It should be noted that when we refer
to systems in this chapter we are aware, of course, that they do not exist independently of
human interaction. Indeed, the ESD systems to which we will refer are, in fact, the fig-
urations of interdependent groups of people that have developed quite specifically with
the aim of developing elite-level sport. With the growing social significance of sport
internationally, governments have sought to invest in promoting international sporting
success, most particularly, though not exclusively, in Olympic sports. The global dis-
semination of achievement sport, and the subsequent desire to succeed on the global
media stage, has seen a dynamic interchange of ideas regarding ESD systems. This
growing interdependency of sporting systems, and the people comprising them, has con-
tributed to a diminution in the disparity between the approaches taken by people to
develop elite sports structures in the major sporting nations in the world. The central
objective of this chapter is to examine the emergence of the increasing willingness of
governments to intervene in setting the ESD policy process and the organization of ESD
systems. This has contributed to more systematic talent identification and development
(TID) programmes being implemented in several countries. We will also examine the
growing emphasis that is being placed upon sports science support and the provision of
‘modern’ sporting facilities for the exclusive use of elite sports performers. These devel-
opments cannot be understood adequately unless they are conceptualized as elements in
the increasing professionalization of coaching systems. They have involved governments
in devising more specific strategies for the prioritization and targeting of funding. These
 Elite sports development 133
are the key characteristics of the modern ESD system that will be discussed within this
chapter. However, in many countries the extent to which governments facilitate the
implementation of ESD over and above their contribution to mass sport promotion has
been prominent in the debate. In several countries this has resulted in considerable ten-
sion between the prevailing focus on elite sports and the development of mass sports.
There have also been various other domestic issues that have impacted on the develop-
ment of elite sport systems that have contributed simultaneously to the emergence of
subtle variations in the ESD systems that are currently in operation in many countries.
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the ‘diminishing contrasts and increasing
varieties’ (Elias, 2000) that are, it will be argued, characteristic of the global spread of
ESD policies.

The increasing social significance of sport and growing government

involvement in elite sports development
In the physical sciences a substantial body of literature has been produced focusing on
factors that are ‘trainable (physiology, psychology and biomechanics)’, ‘teachable (tactics)’,
and other factors ‘outside the control of the athlete and coach (genetics and age)’ (Smith,
2003: 1105). There is little doubt, however, that the physical dimensions of sport would
be enhanced still further by a greater understanding of the ways in which policies are
implemented. In pursuit of this end we will begin with an analysis of the emergence of ESD
systems, and how the prevailing characteristics of such systems became more widespread.
The global spread of modern achievement sport, largely from the West, has been
strongly associated with the increasing social significance of sporting performance in very
many countries and has contributed to the spread of particular kinds of elite sports (e.g.
soccer) and global sporting competitions (e.g. the Olympic Games). Waddington and
Smith (2009) have identified some of the processes that have contributed to the growing
social significance of sport on an international scale. The processes include the medicali-
zation of life and sport, the growing commercialization and politicization of sport and, of
particular significance, here, the de-amateurization of sport (Waddington and Smith,
2009). The general de-amateurization of sport involved performers moving away from
seeing sport as primarily a source of intrinsic pleasure towards placing a greater emphasis
on winning, as they were having to play for broader social and sometimes political units
(e.g. city, region, nation-states). In addition to this, Beamish and Ritchie (2006) have
observed that there has been a growing tendency, since the inauguration of the Olympic
Games, for media corporations, the sporting goods industries and other commercial
interest groups to become influential in the organization of the Games. They argue that
such developments have ‘played significant roles in shaping contemporary world-class,
high-performance sport and created the enormous impetus behind the quest for pushing
human athletic performance to increasingly rarefied heights’ (Beamish and Ritchie, 2006:
67). The commercialization of sport developed substantially from 1945 onwards and this
has increased pressure on athletes to perform for the increasing financial rewards on
offer. This process is linked to a growing politicization of sport (Waddington and Smith,
2009), whereby governments seeking to bask in the potential reflected glory of sporting
success have invested more in terms of providing the best sporting infrastructure possible
to generate and support world-class athletes. Indeed, according to Houlihan and Green
(2008: 3), governments have increasingly used ‘sport as a policy instrument’ and most
governments now ‘espouse a commitment to elite sport and competition’, and for those
134 Elite sports development
that can afford to make this commitment it is frequently backed by large public invest-
ment. Governments increasingly take this position for a variety of reasons, among them
the promotion of their political system, the generation of national pride and the asso-
ciated ‘feel good’ factor, in search of economic advantage and diplomatic objectives (De
Bosscher et al., 2008; Green and Houlihan, 2005; Hoberman, 1993). In order to increase
the possibility of obtaining some of the perceived rewards of achieving some success at
the level of elite sport, since the Second World War many governments have developed
quite explicit ESD objectives.
In relation to the development of ESD objectives, several authors have argued that
there is an increasing tendency for a homogenous ‘model’ of ESD systems to be adopted
and pursued in a growing number of countries (De Bosscher et al., 2008; Oakley and
Green, 2001a; 2001b; Green and Houlihan, 2005; 2008; Houlihan and Green, 2008). In
this respect, within this chapter when we refer to ESD systems we are specifically meaning
state-sponsored systems. There is some evidence, as will become clear below, that there
was an ESD system in place in the US even before this time, based on the college system for
sport. However, this was not state funded and was rather more ad hoc within the
American colleges. State-sponsored ESD systems have emerged as part of the overall
development of elite sport, especially in conjunction with the increasing economic, poli-
tical and cultural significance of sport. These developments were part of a wider process
towards using scientific and technologically assisted pursuits for enhanced athletic per-
formance that have accompanied, as we noted earlier, the de-amateurization, commer-
cialization and politicization of sport (Waddington and Smith, 2009). More specifically,
Beamish and Ritchie (2006: 92) argue that there was a political commitment by the East
Germans, as well as the Soviet Union, to ‘keep ahead of the competition [the West in
general, and the US and West Germany in particular] in all aspects of the scientific pre-
paration of world-class, high-performance athletes’ (Beamish and Ritchie, 2006: 92). In
this respect, they claimed that the desire to succeed in sport on an international scale can
only be adequately understood when located within the context of the Cold War rivalry,
the development of high-performance sport systems in East Germany (German Demo-
cratic Republic [GDR]) and West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]), and
East–West relations more generally from the 1950s through to the 1980s (Beamish and
Ritchie, 2006), although it might be appropriately argued that this desire is far more wide-
spread than the context in which they try to place it. As Waddington and Smith (2009) and
Oakley and Green (2001a; 2001b) argue, one must also consider the emergent nation-states
from Africa following the Second World War, and, more recently, following the break-up of
the Soviet Union, the emerging nation-states in the Balkan and Baltic regions, that have given
a fresh impetus to the quest for international sporting success. In order to make more sense
of these developments, we will briefly survey the emergence of ESD policies in various
countries that, we will argue, are crucial to an understanding of their subsequent diffusion.
We will begin with an overview of the systems developed in the former communist countries
of the Eastern bloc, before examining how these impacted on selected countries in the West.
Finally, we will present a case study of the development of ESD systems in the UK.

The significance of the Eastern bloc: ESD systems in the Soviet Union and the GDR
The first consistent and systematic approach to ESD was developed in the 1950s in the
Soviet Union and the GDR. The emergence of several communist states, most notably in
Eastern Europe, prior to and immediately after the Second World War, provided the
 Elite sports development 135
context within which many ‘loose confederations of diverse ethnic groups: different races,
languages, traditions, religions, stages of economic growth, prejudices’ (Riordan and
Cantelon, 2003: 91) converged. Sport was increasingly seen by the communist leaders in
many of these emerging states as a useful tool with which to promote national cohesion
and identity, and to project this image to the outside world. Hoberman (1993: 18) argues
that ‘in the Soviet Union, the official promotion of competitive sport began in the 1930s’;
however, a Soviet team did not compete in the Olympic Games until 1952 in Helsinki, by
which time international sports competitions (particularly the Olympics) were coming to
be seen as a useful means by which the superiority of communism over capitalism could
be demonstrated.
Sport has provided a particularly apposite, albeit potentially risky, arena in which to
demonstrate the superiority of one nation, or one political system, over another. It is an
arena that very many people across a range of societies follow through the media; and
which provides outcomes that, on paper at least, no one can dispute; and therein lies the
risk. That is to say, the promotion of propaganda and ideology within capitalist and
communist countries meant that sport, with clear result-based outcomes, became
increasingly viewed as a very effective barometer by which objective measurements could
supposedly be made. Within the GDR and the Soviet Union, in particular, considerable
attention was paid to developing systems of ESD that could produce gold medal-winning
athletes and teams, with the Olympic Games being regarded as the key arena for the
demonstration of sporting superiority. Indeed, according to van Bottenburg (2001: 141),
in 1948 Soviet officials declared that their ‘leading athletes had the task of “securing first
place in the world in the most important sports over the next few years”’. Furthermore,
the newly emerged GDR government became a significant geographical and symbolic
aspect of the East–West political divide. This arguably contributed to the high priority
given by the GDR government to establishing an effective ESD system. It was a priority
driven by the desire of the GDR’s Communist Party to build national pride not only in
competition with West Germany but also in relation to the Soviet Union. The fact that
much of the Western world did not recognize the GDR as a political entity no doubt
fuelled this desire further. In fact, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) only
recognized the GDR in 1965 and it competed in its first Games in Mexico in 1968.
Riordan and Cantelon (2003: 100) argue that ‘policies of pervasive social welfare in
which sport was an essential feature in constructing the infrastructure of socialist society
provided conditions that were more conducive to discovering, organising and developing
talent in specific sports than those of the more disparate and private Western systems’. In
this respect, the totalitarian regimes in office helped create an atmosphere where there
was little, if any, public accountability for the relatively huge sums of money that were
made available to fund elite sport policies in the Soviet Union and the GDR (Grix, 2008;
Hoberman, 1993; Riordan and Cantelon, 2003). The ESD systems established in East
Germany, in particular, soon came to be regarded with admiration, fear and a large
degree of scepticism from many outside of the country. The scepticism related to the
belief of some in the West that there was also a systematic doping programme in the
GDR – something, of course, that was proved after the break-up of the communist
regimes. Nonetheless, other parts of the system came to be seen as ‘the vanguard of
developing sporting excellence’ (Green and Oakley, 2001: 247). The GDR team only fin-
ished outside the top three of the medals table once in all the Summer and Winter Games
it entered from 1968 to 1988. The Soviet Union was even more successful, albeit with
much greater resources, and its athletes finished in the top two of the medals table for
136 Elite sports development
every Summer and Winter Games it entered, coming first in 13 out of 18 of those Games.
The GDR, in particular, ‘developed and applied a highly sophisticated system to produce
top-level athletes and became renowned for its international sporting accomplishments’
(Merkel, 1995: 100). This system, according to some, was ‘unparalleled’ across the world
(Hoberman, 1993: 18). It was characterized by a range of key developments: the increas-
ing use of scientific methods, utilizing anthropometric and physiological measurements,
to identify athletic talent; systematic selection of potentially gifted children based on sci-
entific profiling and the establishment of sport schools; professional development of high-
quality coaches; scientific focus on training regimes; and a highly centralized, state-funded
system of coordinated groups responsible for developing athletes at national training
centres (Beamish and Ritchie, 2006; Hoberman, 1992). Notwithstanding the suspicion at
the time that many of the results achieved by the GDR (and Soviet Union) were affected
by a systematic doping programme, many of the characteristics of the systems in place, as
we will see later, became key features of ESD outside the GDR in later years.
The system for funding elite sport in the GDR ‘was characterised by a strict and clear
decision-making and competency hierarchy’ (Petry et al., 2008: 117). The East Germans,
with a comparatively small population (circa 17 million), developed a quite systematic
targeting of medals at the Olympic Games. The targeting focused on those areas where
medal aspirations were more realistic. They analyzed sports performances in the 1950s,
for example, and ascertained that women’s field events at the Summer Games were not
nearly as keenly contested as the more blue-riband events such as the men’s, and to a
lesser degree women’s, 100 metre sprints. Given the increasing propensity of the world’s
media to focus on overall medal tables, the East Germans targeted areas where numerous
medals could be won relatively easily. This is not to deny the success achieved by the
GDR in some of the more ‘popular’ events, but simply to recognize that the country
enjoyed unprecedented success in men’s and women’s field events and some other more
‘minor’ sports, such as long-distance walking, shooting and, at the time, gymnastics.
These helped boost its overall medal tally.
Funds were almost exclusively devoted to ESD, and this policy was rarely, if ever,
challenged (Grix, 2008). As Merkel (1995: 102) points out, ‘Sport For All’ was never ‘a
major issue on the political agenda of the East German government, since from the
beginning of the 1960s onwards the emphasis was almost exclusively on the production of
top-level athletes’. Significant financial assistance from the state was provided for state of
the art facilities and scientific and coaching support to the elite athletes in the Soviet
Union and East Germany. Moreover, notwithstanding the communist sporting ideology
of these countries, elite athletes received substantial rewards, partly to ensure that those
athletes involved in the more commercially lucrative sports remained in the country,
rather than absconding to the West. Of course, it also meant that these so-called amateur
athletes were able to train and prepare for competition on a full-time basis.
The vast population of the Soviet Union meant that the need to identify ‘talent’ early
was less acute than was the case in the GDR. Although there was some talent identifi-
cation in place within the ESD system of the Soviet Union, ‘the system lacked rigour and
was not based on a nationwide programme of strictly uniform tests and norms’ (Green
and Houlihan, 2005: 22). Nonetheless, the Soviets were amongst the first to endeavour to
identify talent on the basis of scientific measurements related to physiological perfor-
mances at various ages. In essence, this represents the first stage of what Green and
Houlihan (2005) identify as a three-stage approach to TID. The second stage involved
matching the physical attributes of those children identified at stage one as having
 Elite sports development 137
‘potential’ to the ideal physical profile required for specific sporting events. The third
stage involved the selected individuals in programmes of participation in sporting com-
petition, and the necessary coaching to develop their skills (Green and Houlihan, 2005).
Given the success and the relatively small population in the GDR, it is no surprise that
the East German system involved considerable attention being given to identifying talent.
The GDR ‘implemented state run, systematic talent identification programs as early as
the 1960s and 70s’ (Abbott and Collins, 2002: 158). It seems that the talent selection and
identification techniques employed built on the ‘same anthropometric procedures devel-
oped by the racial scientists [in Germany] prior to 1945’ (Krüger, 1999: 44). Much of the
testing occurred in sport-specific boarding schools and, as in the Soviet system, involved
matching the physiological profile of children as young as four to particular sports. All
children within the GDR were subject to a variety of physical and physiological measure-
ments, and those who matched certain criteria were to attend the sports boarding schools.
The system was based on the same three-stage approach for identifying talent developed in
the Soviet Union (Green and Houlihan, 2005), but conducted with more scientific rigour.
An important aspect of the ESD system developed in the GDR was the establishment
of the Deutsche Hochschule für Körperkultur (German University for Physical Culture
[DHfK]), founded in Leipzig in 1950. The complex included a 100,000 seater stadium and
numerous training facilities. It housed both more established and developing athletes, and was
also a site for the development of elite-level coaches. This establishment was complimented by
two other organizations, the Forschungsinstitut für Körperkultur und Sport (Research Insti-
tute for Physical Culture and Sport [FKS]), which was the venue for top-secret sports science
research, and the Gessellschaft für Sportmedizin der DDR (GDR Society for Sports Medicine),
established in 1956. The FKS was at the heart of the East German experimentation with per-
formance enhancing drugs. There is not the time, or the scope, within this chapter to discuss
the development of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) and the impact that such develop-
ments had on elite sports. For an overview of the development of PEDs, which is, of course, not
unrelated to the development of ESD systems, see Waddington and Smith (2009).
Alongside the research into PEDs, other research was conducted that has now become
commonplace in sports science support in other ESD systems, such as nutritional and med-
icinal support. Together, these institutes were the first centrally administered and funded
centres for the development of elite sports performance and sports science research in the
world. In addition to the development of state of the art facilities, there was a focus on the
development of coaching techniques (Merkel, 1995), such that the coaching system in many
Eastern bloc countries was, in large measure, fully professionalized, with dedicated career
structures for full-time coaches and a wide network of support from semi-professional
coaching staff. In many non-communist bloc countries at this time the prevailing pattern was
for coaching to be ad hoc, based largely on a system of volunteering. However, as we will see,
specialist institutions, with an increased emphasis on sports science and ‘professional’
coaching, soon spread to the West. In fact, the systems developed in the Eastern bloc coun-
tries for promoting elite sport ‘provided a “template” for the subsequent development of elite
sport models in Western nations’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005: 19).

Learning lessons from the ‘enemy’: ESD systems in West Germany, Canada,
the United States and Australia
The disproportionate success the GDR enjoyed at the Olympics heightened the desire
amongst national sports organizations (NSOs) from other countries to learn more about
138 Elite sports development
the systems in place there. It is likely that these NSOs then brought it to the attention of
governments that were receptive to greater or lesser degrees to the idea of establishing
similar systems. As Green and Oakley (2001: 252) argue, ‘in their relatively recent drive
for (global) elite sporting excellence, many Western nation-states have embraced elements
of the Eastern Bloc’s managed approach to sporting supremacy’. In West Germany,
where the political leaders were most acutely aware of the Olympic successes of their
East German neighbours, there was increased pressure to perform at least as well on the
international stage. The West German government embarked on a process of developing
an elite sports system of its own, a commitment given further impetus by Munich win-
ning the right to host the 1972 Olympic Games. Those people attempting to develop elite
sport in West Germany ‘began to coordinate their first High-Performance Sport Plan in
1965. Not surprisingly, the main reference point was East Germany’ (Beamish and
Ritchie, 2006: 94). With the success of the GDR at its first Olympic Games in 1968 and
with the Munich Games in prospect, the West German government was under particular
pressure to establish ‘nationwide structures for supporting top level sport’ and to pursue
its elite sport priorities (Petry et al., 2008: 118). The allocation of substantial funding
allowed national team coaches to be appointed for various sports and the establishment
of high-performance training centres along the lines of those in the GDR. In addition, there
was an increasing focus on talent identification and the development of sport boarding schools,
as well as a greater focus on sport science support, with the establishment, in 1970, of the
Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft (Federal Institute of Sports Science [BISp]) and then the
Deutsche Vereinigung für Sportwissenschaft (German Union of Sport Science [DVS]). The
apparent similarities to the ESD system in the GDR are quite striking. However, a significant
difference was that although the West German government provided large sums of money for
the programmes, it ‘did not become directly involved in sport development, nor did it directly
fund the high-performance system’ (Beamish and Ritchie, 2006: 95). Instead, the system of
financing continued to be a complex mix of public funds, private funds and a system based on
volunteering. The funding was not, therefore, as acutely focused on elite sport as was the case
in East Germany, and ‘the degree of direct control exercised over sport was slight by compar-
ison to that found in the GDR where sport remained tightly under state management’ (Bergs-
gard et al., 2007: 57). In West Germany there was more apparent accountability of government
funding, and greater pressure to maintain a focus on the promotion of mass participation and
physical activity more generally. In contrast, in their pursuit of sporting success many of the
governments in Eastern bloc countries spared no expense.
With the Montreal Games (1976) in prospect, the Canadian government’s reaction to
Canadian athletes’ relatively poor performances on the international stage was to venture
down the same path as West Germany. It too established an ESD strategy not unlike
those that had been developed in the communist world. In West Germany and Canada
the contexts within which the desired ESD system emerged were in some ways similar.
The governments in both countries had concerns over internal cohesion. In some respects
West Germany was a ‘new’ nation, while Canada wrestled with the problem of the
French-Quebec separatist movement. Playing host to the Olympic Games made both
governments conscious of the expectations of their citizens, the fact that national pride
was at stake and, therefore, the need to ensure a respectable performance. These pressures
were compounded by the success enjoyed in international competition by their respective
immediate neighbours, the GDR and the US.
The Canadian government implemented a sport policy designed to produce elite performers
in 1970, and during the 1970s the Canadian government provided substantial funds to
 Elite sports development 139
develop elite sport, and especially Olympic events. Indeed, such was the desire to pursue
Olympic success that during the 1970s and 1980s ‘there was a steady centralization of
state control over elite sport underpinned by increasing public subsidy. Mass participa-
tion was largely pushed to the margin of political debate at the federal level and was
increasingly left to the provinces and municipalities to administer and finance as they saw
fit’ (Bergsgard et al., 2007: 49–50). There was a growing professionalization of sporting
structures, and a move away from the volunteerism that had characterized the organiza-
tion of sport in Canada up until this point (Macintosh and Whitson, 1990). In 1970, the
Canadian Academy of Sport Medicine (CASM) and a number of centres of excellence
were established. Performance targets for priority sports were established. The ‘pro-
fessionalization’ of the ‘management’ of sports structures and a more direct input from
the ‘sports sciences’ were key characteristics of the new ESD systems in place in Canada
(Macintosh and Whitson, 1990: 41). Such was the perceived success of these ESD systems
that ‘for years after its triumph at the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games, Canada
was frequently referred to as “the East Germany of the Commonwealth”’ (Hoberman,
1993: 19). Following the scandal surrounding Ben Johnson’s positive drugs test at the
Seoul Games of 1988, and the Dubin Inquiry that followed it, elite sport policy in Canada
was pared back somewhat, and a greater focus was given, once again, to mass partici-
pation (Green and Houlihan, 2005). It is likely, however, that the cutbacks had rather
more complex roots and that the Johnson case and the subsequent enquiry may have
been a useful rationalization.
Successive American governments have resisted (on occasions, resolutely opposed) any
movement in the direction of such a centralized system (Sparvero et al., 2008). However,
it is the case that by American Olympic standards their performance at the Munich
Games in 1972 had been poor and this was made all the more difficult to accept by the
continuing success of the Soviet teams. In combination these elements engendered a short
period in which there was a federal focus on elite sport policy. For example, in 1975
President Ford established the President’s Commission on Olympic Sports (Chalip, 1995;
Galemore, 2003; Hunt, 2007). The ‘commission was asked to study the way in which
amateur sports were organized in the United States, to determine whether and how fed-
eral subsidies should be given to amateur sports and to make recommendations about
how best to develop all Olympic sports’ (Wakefield, 2007: 778). Obviously, a strong
motivation behind this was an increasing concern about the fact that the Soviet Union
and the Eastern bloc countries were making effective use of their success in the Olympics
as a propaganda tool in the Cold War. President Ford himself commented that ‘the
Communists “do things we would never find acceptable in a free society. Completely
regimented, state-supported, state-manipulated athletic programs are not for us”. How-
ever, he believed that “the Government does have a role in helping to promote United
States competition in international sporting events”’ (Hunt, 2007: 805). However, it
might be argued that there was then, and still is today, a ruthless pursuit of athletic
success in the American collegiate system. But on this occasion it was clear that key
politicians in the US were looking for a way to defeat the Soviets, ‘but to do so without
resorting to government control’ (Chalip, 1995: 7). The President’s Commission on
Olympic Sports published numerous reports over the next two years. The final one,
published in January 1977, recommended that

the United States rationalize its Olympic sport governance by establishing the USOC
[United States Olympic Committee] as a ‘central sports organization’ with a ‘vertical
140 Elite sports development
structure’ for governance of all Olympic sports. The report argued that adminis-
trative rationalization was a panacea for the ills plaguing American Olympic
sport … This recommendation became the basis for the Amateur Sports Act.
(Chalip, 1995: 8)

The Act was a response to the problems created by the ongoing power struggles between
two of the most prominent national sports organizations (the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association [NCAA] and the Amateur Athletics Union [AAU]) within the US at that
time (Wakefield, 2007). It could be argued, though, that the limitations of the internal
organization only became a pressing concern in response to performances in comparison
to the Soviet Union, in particular, in the international arena. This was a time when more
serious thought than ever before had been given to direct federal involvement in estab-
lishing some kind of coordinated sports development approach, and the idea that the
ongoing conflict between the NCAA and AAU ‘was detrimental to American Olympic
efforts’ (Galemore, 2003: 2). As Hunt (2007: 797) points out, as the sporting ‘rivalry developed,
it became increasingly apparent that the American sport system was ill-equipped to keep pace
with the Soviet Union’.
Despite resisting any kind of federal government involvement in sport, several of the
President’s advisers were by now focusing their attention on developing ‘an athletic fra-
mework oriented around “elite” sport’ (Hunt, 2007: 801). The Amateur Sports Act, after
various deliberations, was eventually published in 1978 and it established the USOC as a
privately operated, not-for-profit organization to be responsible for all ‘rights and
responsibilities associated with elite sport development’, at least in terms of international
competitions (Sparvero et al., 2008: 244). That is to say, ‘it was agreed that the govern-
ment should facilitate the reorganization of sport into a more efficient system, but gov-
ernment should not run sport’ (Chalip, 1995: 7). The USOC was to provide a more
coordinated approach to the development of elite sport, but was to do so ‘without
recourse to federal [financial] assistance’ (Sparvero et al., 2008: 244). Thus, while the
federal government took the unusual step of giving a direct steer to the processes that
were to underpin future American involvement in the Olympics, it stopped short of
offering any financial assistance or intervening in strategy. That having been said, many
features of ESD systems can now be identified within the US’ approach to elite sport. For
example, ‘in 1989, the USOC created an athlete identification and development commit-
tee’ (Chalip, 1995: 9), and with numerous established centres of excellence (or ‘Training
Sites’) and ‘a strong provision of science/medical backup’ for American athletes (Oakley
and Green, 2001b: 99), the provisions for elite sports people are clearly a significant
aspect of the American sports structure. However, this approach has developed far less
systematically and without federal, and with only a modicum of state, involvement.
Moreover, it is on nothing like the scale seen elsewhere (USOC, 2008). Indeed, notwith-
standing this brief period of governmental concern, it could be argued that the success
achieved by American athletes in the Olympic Games over the years has been attained
despite a lack of federal involvement. Today there is still ‘no federal agency with any
responsibility for elite sport development, and there is no government level official whose
portfolio encompasses sport’ (Sparvero et al., 2008: 245). On the whole, then, the Amer-
icans have relied on a very competitive and well-established system in relation to high
school and college sporting competition, and with the vast comparative wealth and size
of the US this has been sufficient to sustain success at the Olympics (Oakley and Green,
2001b; Sparvero et al., 2008). There is a need to distinguish between, on one hand, state
 Elite sports development 141
and private involvement in sport and, on the other, more or less systematic approaches to
the development of athletes and the organization of sport. It could be argued that the
American college system from the end of the nineteenth century has been in the vanguard
of this approach. In effect America had the first professional athletes. Whether the recent
emergence of the Chinese as a dominant force in Olympic sports will prove to be another
watershed or, in Chalip’s (1995) words, a ‘focussing event’ that triggers a further bout of
American federal introspection, similar to the one produced by Soviet dominance in the
1970s, remains to be seen.
A similar pattern of events to those that encouraged the Canadian government’s
involvement in ESD and the American government’s discussions about ESD influenced
the Australian government’s decision to establish ESD systems that have arguably become
the most lauded in the non-communist world. The poor performance of the Australians
at the Montreal Games of 1976 is considered to have been the central driving force
behind the government’s decision to establish a systematic sports development pro-
gramme. They failed to win a single gold medal and came thirty-second in the overall
medals table, having finished in the top ten in each of the previous six Summer Games.
The change in policy involved a shift of emphasis away from a concern with the provision
of mass participation towards a more explicit emphasis on elite development (Green and
Houlihan, 2005; Stewart et al., 2004). The Australian government learned from the
Eastern bloc systems, and also, arguably, from their commonwealth partner Canada. The
focus turned to a ‘systematic sifting of school-age children as a means of identifying the
potential elite, the development of specialist training academies, the subordination of
domestic governing bodies to government policy and the use of public money to support
elite athletes’ (Houlihan, 1997: 6). To this end, a more formalized education and training
programme of coaches was established that contributed to the establishment of the Australian
Coaching Council in 1978 (Stewart et al., 2004). Many sports promoters in Australia
complained that there was a stark shortage of ‘international’ sports facilities in their
country, a shortage brought into sharper relief following the Montreal Games. These
concerns sparked a significant investment in sports facilities aided by the development of
the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) in Canberra in 1981. It became part of ‘a more
concerted approach to facility development for elite level training in many sports’ (Green
and Houlihan, 2005: 67). The development of the AIS was part of a wider recognition by
the Australian government and NSOs of what was needed if they were to compete at the
highest levels in Olympic competition. They needed to put in place ‘organisational stra-
tegies and the more professional and scientific approach to “producing” athletes that had
underscored the success of the Eastern Bloc athletes’ (Magdalinski, 2000: 317). The AIS
was initially based on the centralized institute established within the GDR. However, in a
country the size of Australia a centralized system soon proved to be impractical. There-
fore, while it still operated as the AIS, under pressure from state governments and
national sporting bodies it quickly devolved into regional centres of sporting excellence
(Stewart et al., 2004).
The Australian government justified this diversion of public money away from the
development of grassroots sport, or ‘Sport For All’, to elite sport on the grounds that
success at the highest level would stimulate mass participation (McKay, 1991). In the
wake of Australia’s performance in Montreal, this change in policy received public
backing (Stewart et al., 2004). According to Oakley and Green (2001b: 93), not only did
the new focus on ESD stimulate the building of the AIS, much as in the GDR before it,
there was a direct campaign to target ‘“softer” medals, particularly in some women’s
142 Elite sports development
disciplines at which Australia [now] leads the way. Women’s Rowing, Judo and Weight-
lifting have been targeted by Australia in this way’. Much as in the GDR, the relatively
small Australian population (circa 20 million) limited ‘the pool from which talented
athletes can be secured and developed’ (Stewart et al., 2004: 100). It is not surprising,
then, that in Australia talent identification also became a central feature of the system.
To this end the National Talent Search Program (NTSP) was established. This is a
national programme implemented by the AIS that was based on a highly successful
rowing talent search programme already in place (Stewart et al., 2004). It could be argued
that the NTSP is a rather more sophisticated, computerized ‘stages approach’, based on
that first developed in the Soviet Union and the GDR (Green and Houlihan, 2005). According
to Green and Houlihan (2005: 38), ‘the primacy of sports science and sports medicine
expertise is also a key principle underlying the contemporary development of Australia’s elite
sport model’. They liken it to the research developments that took place in East Germany
under the auspices of the DHfK and FKS. When, in 1993, Australia was awarded the right to
host the 2000 Olympic Games, the funding and provision for elite sport increased yet more
(Cashman, 2006). Australia’s sustained success in international sports encouraged other
Western nations, the UK in particular, to view its system as a model of good practice.

The development of ESD systems in the United Kingdom

Green and Houlihan (2005: 63) state that the UK is ‘a “late adopter” of many of the
principles of organisation and administration developed by former Eastern bloc coun-
tries’. As we explained in Chapter 2, up until the 1960s successive British governments
considered sport policy as something largely beyond government remit. However, since
the 1960s there has been a growing propensity for British governments to intervene in
sport policy and to utilize sport policy to achieve a wide range of goals. In the last decade
or so, this has seen the development of many of the structures that were commonplace in
the former Eastern bloc countries and later came to be adopted in modified forms by
West Germany, Canada and Australia. However, no systematic attempt was made to
enhance ESD until the election of John Major’s government in the 1990s. As Green (2006:
226) argues, ‘before the mid-1990s, support for elite sport development was uncoordi-
nated and fragmented, with little sustained support from government and its sporting
agencies’. Even after the publication of Raising the Game in 1995, a document that sig-
nalled the determination of the Major government to concentrate resources on elite sport,
there was continued debate over exactly how this might be achieved. Nonetheless, since
1995, and following what was the worst performance, in terms of their overall place in
the Summer Olympics medal table, by the Great Britain and Northern Ireland Olympic
team at the 1996 Olympic Games, ‘both Conservative and Labour governments have
promoted, legitimised, and funded a system for supporting elite athlete development that
bears little resemblance to the fragmented, makeshift and unplanned state of affairs of
just 10 years ago’ (Green, 2006: 218). A significant dimension of this approach has been
the greater willingness of UK Sport to allow athletes to be funded by their NGBs. This
broad shift in emphasis and resources to elite sport has in large measure been driven by
the fact that such policies are also being increasingly pursued by the governments of other
nations. This international competition is the principal driving force behind the adoption
of these policies for all the countries involved. There would be little incentive for British
governments to pursue new policies if their athletes had been holding their own in
international sports competitions. In fact they have been playing catch-up. In this regard,
 Elite sports development 143
there is little doubt that the success achieved by Australian athletes, in particular, made a
significant contribution to this sea-change in British government policy.
As we saw in Chapter 2, the establishment of the National Lottery in 1994, and the
increased money available for expenditure on sport that it has generated, changed the
working environment for many of those promoting sport. This new source of funding
gave the declared commitment to pursue an ESD approach a substantial kick-start. For
example, the lottery-funded ‘World Class Performance Programme’, set up in 1996, was
specifically geared to elite athletes, with the intention of targeting the winning of medals
at major international competitions. In the past, many NGBs in the UK have had to rely
heavily on government funding, and with the emergence of a commitment to an ESD
approach this dependency has grown. The Labour government commissioned a review of
elite sports funding, led by Jack Cunningham. It was published by the DCMS in 2001.
The Cunningham Review argued that ‘radical steps need to be taken if we are to create a
world class system capable of producing consistent success in the international arena’
(DCMS, 2001: 5). It was also acknowledged that ‘decisive leadership and a strong com-
mitment from UK Government’ was a requirement if such a system was to work (DCMS,
2001: 7). It proposed that UK Sport should become the lead body responsible for over-
seeing the World Class Programme. Moreover, in an attempt to ensure that it was clearly
understood which bodies were responsible for elite sport funding and grassroots funding,
respectively, it recommended that ‘home nation’ sports councils concentrate on the latter.
The following year these proposals were endorsed by the publication of Game Plan. Since
then the British government, largely through UK Sport, has adopted a more ruthless
approach that has been based on a strategy of stringent accountability by those NGBs in
receipt of government funding. These NGBs are required to set quite specific targets
related to world rankings and the number of medals they aim to win. As Green (2007a:
938) argues, ‘any resistance to the drive for Olympic medals is somewhat [futile] as NGBs
become ever more dependent on government resources, which are linked inextricably to
Olympic medal targets’. The government stipulated four key areas: ‘medal potential; evi-
dence of a performance system able to produce a high number of talented athletes; track
record; and significance of the sport in the eyes of the public’ (UK Sport, 2001: 6). These
criteria have, by and large, remained consistently in place since then, although M. Green
argues that the last criterion has, to all intents and purposes, been ignored by UK Sport and
the British government (M. Green, personal communication, 2009). In pursuit of these goals,
‘UK Sport has put together what is termed a “no compromise” strategy in its aim to be placed
fourth in the Olympic medals table in 2012 … which targets resources solely at those athletes
capable of delivering medal winning performances’ (Green, 2007b: 940). In theory, and this
has often happened in practice, sports that do not meet their stated targets have their funding
cut or, sometimes, withdrawn completely (National Audit Office [NAO], 2008).
The Cunningham Review proposed that ‘there is a need to focus more resources on
talent and club development similar to many of our successful international competitors’
(DCMS, 2001: 28). Such a view also found expression in Game Plan (DCMS/Strategy
Unit, 2002: 9); however, concern was also raised about the ‘damaging effects of over-
specialisation’, and the promotion of the Long-Term Athlete Development (LTAD)
model was encouraged. LTAD is a periodization model, first developed by Istvan Balyi. It
sets out ‘a framework for structuring young athletes’ development through a number of
stages, from the “FUNdamental” through to the “Training to Win” stage’ (Green, 2007b:
437). The LTAD model was a central feature of Game Plan, despite the fact that it has
been criticized for being more participation related, as opposed to being a performance-
144 Elite sports development
based model (Earle, 2004), is not based on rigorous scientific examination or testing, and
is not particularly ‘grounded in the reality of young people’s sport socialisation experiences’
(MacPhail and Kirk, 2006: 73). In this respect, it could be argued that ‘the promotion and
indeed legitimation, of the LTAD model is a pertinent example of the ways in which
dominant policy ideas and discourses generated at central government level … become
embedded as “common sense” ways of working for sport organisations and practitioners’
(Green, 2007b: 437). Notwithstanding the promotion of LTAD, talent identification has
become ‘a further important element of the recent support for the elite level that closely
parallels Australia’s “Talent Search” programme’ (Green, 2004: 374).
Funding that is made available to the NGBs through the World Class Programme
requires that they also have in place a TID strategy, which involves providing pathways
to elite levels of performance between sports clubs and schools. There has not quite been
the level of focus on TID as there was in the former communist countries, or as there is
in Australia. However, since London won the right to host the 2012 Olympics, it is
arguably the case that TID has become a more obvious and central feature of the ESD
policy in the UK. A number of recent programmes focus quite specifically on identifying
potentially talented performers on the basis of their physiological profile and their
sporting aptitudes, particularly in time for the 2012 London Olympics. The ‘Sporting
Giants’ campaign was launched in February 2007, and is aimed at getting those people
who are of a certain height to consider becoming involved in rowing, handball or vol-
leyball. Having gone through a process of selection, a number of applicants have been
identified and are now included in Olympic development programmes. The Talent
Transfer scheme currently specifically focuses on gymnasts who, by virtue of their age,
are in effect too old to be considered as having medal potential in that sport, who might
consider diving, with its related, ‘transferable’ skills, as a sport for competition in 2012.
Similar to Talent Transfer, Pitch2Podium is a scheme aimed at young footballers who
were not able to secure a professional football contract to see if they can transfer their
sporting ability and assesses their talents in relation to a number of potential sports
(including cycling, hockey, athletics, canoeing, bob skeleton and the modern pentathlon).
The Girls4Gold scheme is a TID strategy that is also aimed at identifying and developing
talented female athletes in a number of prioritized sports (cycling, bob skeleton, canoe-
ing, modern pentathlon, rowing, sailing and windsurfing). Phase One of this programme
involves a number of physiological and psychological tests, in order to identify successful
candidates for Phase Two. This involves more sports-specific assessment on an intensive
Talent Confirmation Training Programme lasting between three and six months (UK
Sport, 2008a). This is not unlike the three-stage approach first developed in the Soviet
Union and the GDR. The PESSCL strategy (now PESSYP), discussed in Chapter 3, set
out to achieve, amongst various other things, ‘success in international competition by
ensuring talented young sports people have a clear pathway to elite sport and competition
whatever their circumstances’ (DfES/DCMS, 2003: 1).
Such strategies have been put in place because there is an increasing recognition that,
contrary to the traditional concept of sports development in the UK being based on the
‘pyramid structure’, a wide participation base does not necessarily contribute to greater
numbers of elite performers. In 2000, Sport England produced a consultancy document in
which various key personnel were asked to comment on the structure and organization of
sport in the country following the publication of A Sporting Future for All. In it, a ‘per-
formance consultant’, David Whitaker (cited in Sport England, 2000: 41), noted that ‘a
broad base does not guarantee excellence, a narrow one does not preclude it … Numbers
 Elite sports development 145
are not the answer, pathways are’. Many NGBs have been, until quite recently, run on
very traditional lines, so much so that the Labour government has made a process of
modernization a key aspect of its sport policy agenda (see Chapter 2). Part of this reform
process is that not only should they have talent identification strategies in place, but
NGBs must have development strategies, ‘part of which involves the construction of
“performance pathways” to higher levels of competition especially between school and
clubs’ (Green, 2007a: 940). The attempt to establish SSCs is a major part of this process,
and it was considered necessary ‘to incorporate such schools into a planned, co-ordinated
and integrated organizational and administrative model of elite sport development’
(Green, 2004: 374). A major aspect of the PESSCL strategy is the Gifted and Talented
strand, launched in September 2003. The Ofsted (2004) report into gifted and talented
young people in several SSCs argued that more needed to be done to identify and work
with talented children. To this end, a proposal within the Gifted and Talented strand of
the PESSCL strategy is to provide ‘a school-based profiling and tracking system’ (Ofsted,
2004: 4). The system is run under the auspices of the YST under the banner ‘Talent
Matters’ and the development of on-line resources through the Talent Ladder scheme.
Both schemes are voluntary for schools. The websites include suggestions for potential
policy implementation (YST, 2008). The Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme (TASS) is, to
all intents and purposes, an extension of this, and provides a range of support services to
young sports people attending further and higher educational establishments.
After several years of wrangling over the details, it was eventually decided to establish
the United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI) and various ‘home nation’ institutes in 2000.
In essence, the UKSI is ‘based on the Australian decentralized institute network’ (Green,
2004: 374), although the government had initially favoured a centralized system. How-
ever, De Bosscher et al. (2008: 131) argue that ‘sports administrators in the UK learnt
from the Australian model and implemented a regional model from the outset rather than
the originally planned centralised “flagship” approach’. This rather oversimplifies the
processes involved. The discussions that took place in the UK occurred over a period of
several years. They were as much about internal politics as about ‘learning’ from the
newly revised decentralized system in place in Australia. If anything, it is illustrative of
the ways in which it is common for the British government to look briefly at other policies
and development models. It then selects the ‘best bits’, and expects them to work in a
different social context. Nonetheless, since its establishment, the UKSI has provided
‘much needed world class facilities and a higher standard of co-ordinated support services
than the UK has ever had before’ (DCMS, 2006). Today, the UKSI exists as a network of
often sport-specific centres of excellence, comprising the four Home Country Sports
Institutes (the English Institute for Sport [EIS], for example, was established in 2002),
with a central services team based at UK Sport.
Although Baker et al. (2003: 4) appear to be stating the obvious when they point out
that ‘research is starting to show the distinct advantages of having access to an expert
coach’, little focus was placed on elite-level coaching in the UK until quite recently.
Arguably, the roots of this neglect of quality coaching can be traced to the commitment
to an amateur ethos and a concept of volunteering that have traditionally been at the
heart of sport in England, if not the UK. As we have already briefly noted, this was not
uncommon in other countries, but it could be argued with justification that such an
embracing of the ‘volunteer coach’ was especially embedded within British sporting cul-
ture (McDonald, 2005). The National Coaching Foundation (NCF) had been established
in the UK in 1983 as a sub-committee of the Sports Council. It was formed to establish a
146 Elite sports development
comprehensive coach education programme throughout the UK. It is fair to say, then,
that concerns had been expressed in numerous circles regarding the lack of direction and
education for coaches within numerous sports in the UK prior to this more recent focus
on ESD (Green and Houlihan, 2005). Even so the Cunningham Review noted that

the UK is a long way behind other countries in the licensing and employment of
sports coaches. The vast majority of sports coaches are still volunteers despite the
increased amount of time and expertise required in the rapidly changing world of
sports performance. This is an area which requires a radical new approach – a step
change in how we recruit, train, employ and deploy sports coaches.
(DCMS, 2001: 5–6)

Not long after the Cunningham Review was published a specific programme for ‘the
professionalization of coaching (from “The Coaching Task Force”) was launched in 2002’
(Bergsgard et al., 2007: 167). The establishment of various ‘Performance Director’ posts within
NGBs in the UK has created ‘clearly identified, limited and specialist responsibilities’ (Green
and Houlihan, 2005: 180), and the performance directors, amongst several other duties, were
charged with developing more professional approaches to coaching within their sport.
The Cunningham Review also outlined a need to develop sports science and sports
medicine and look to develop and nurture young sports scientists emerging from British
universities. However, Green and Houlihan (2005: 177) argue that, ‘in the case of the UK,
the effective utilisation of sports science and medicine is clearly some way off’. However,
following the unprecedented successes at the Beijing Olympics of 2008, many people
beyond the UK are looking enviously at the advances made in sports science support and
ESD provision more generally, largely enabled through the substantial sums of money
given to NGBs for this, especially in light of the successful bid to host the 2012 Games.
The process of ‘modernization’ that NGBs in receipt of government funding have been
subjected to, it might be argued, has impacted upon the ESD provision and a growing
receptiveness to sports science support. It is now routinely provided by many of the more
prominent NGBs of Olympic sports in the UK.
In relation to the global flow of such multi-sport, multi-site institute facilities, and the
increased organization and administration of coaching and sport science within them,
Oakley and Green (2001b: 95) argue that ‘it is difficult to replicate exactly what other
countries do and, therefore, programmes have to be developed in sympathy with each
country’s own environment and circumstances’. This is not just the case with the estab-
lishment of institutes, but across the board of ESD policy. There are increasing similarities
in the way in which the broad objectives and structural arrangements of ESD systems and
policy more generally have been adopted in numerous countries around the world.
Simultaneously, the ‘local’ situation, in terms of geographical, demographical, cultural
and political constraints, has contributed to an increasing variety in approaches to ESD in
terms of the detail of the content. It is to a discussion of the diminishing contrasts and
increasing varieties in ESD systems that we now wish to turn.

The global flow of ESD systems: a case of diminishing contrasts and increasing
varieties
The spread of ESD systems is part of a long-term process of lengthening interdependency
chains known as globalization. As Elias (2001: 163) argues, ‘the network has become
 Elite sports development 147
visibly more dense in the course of the twentieth century’. Elias argued that the civilizing
process is part of a broader trend of global diffusion (Elias, 2000). In the course of
developing his theory of civilizing processes (first published in 1939) he made reference to
the diminishing contrasts between different cultures and growing Western influence long
before the current spate of publications concerning globalization. In respect of ‘diminishing
contrasts’, Elias argued that

the course taken by all these expansions is determined only to a small degree by the
plans or desires of those whose patterns of conduct were taken over. The classes
supplying the models are even today not simply the free creators or originators of the
expansion … We find in the relation of the West [for example] to other parts of the
world the beginnings of the reduction of contrasts which is peculiar to every major
wave of the civilizing movement.
(Elias, 2000: 384)

The spread of achievement sport around the world, and the increasing social significance
of such sporting competition, is a good example of diminishing contrasts in the cultural
wares across the globe, as other (perhaps equivalent) activities such as folk forms of sport
are disappearing or have disappeared. Several authors go so far as to argue that across
the world elite sport policy is becoming more uniform. For example, De Bosscher et al.
(2008: 13) write: ‘In their quest for international success in a globalizing world, the elite
sports systems of leading nations have become increasingly homogenous’. There seems to
be a widely held perception, then, that a ‘formula’ exists for the production of elite ath-
letes. The major driving force behind the establishment of ESD systems has been a com-
bination of some or all of the following elements: a perceived desire to demonstrate an
internally cohesive nation-state; the forthcoming hosting of major international sports
events; and a perception of poor sports performance on the international stage. All of these
developments have to be understood in the context of the development of nation-states and
this cannot be understood adequately unless one locates it within inter-state rivalries.
Globalization processes are an aspect of greater interdependence. The initial spread of
ESD is the unintended consequence of intentional actions. Whilst the development of ESD
systems in the Soviet Union and the GDR was intentional, it was not their intention to
see these systems replicated, in one form or another, by their major competitors in other
parts of the world, much as when American scientists developed the atomic bomb it was
not their intention for the Soviet Union to develop its own soon afterwards. Of course,
the Americans made strenuous, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to try to ensure that the
Soviets did not develop the atomic bomb. Whilst such strenuous efforts might not have
been made by the Soviet Union and the GDR to ‘protect’ their ESD systems, they certainly
remained guarded about their precise make-up – a point reinforced with the break-up of
the communist bloc, when in the new, united Germany, specific research was carried out
by West German sports scientists to discover what, specifically, was involved in the
former East German system. The increasingly high levels of global interdependency and
the associated competition make it very difficult for any group to monopolize knowledge
for any length of time. As part of this inter-state rivalry the social significance of sport
has grown. As Oakley and Green (2001a: 89) put it, there has been a widespread ‘recog-
nition by politicians of the (symbolic) public value of sporting success’. It is the increas-
ing prioritization given to sport that has found expression in both state-sponsored and
state-run ESD systems. The former British Minister for Sport, Tony Banks, argued that
148 Elite sports development
‘in a world where sport seems to be replacing war as a measure of national ascendancy,
the pressure on governments to promote sporting success is irresistible’ (Banks; cited in
Theodoraki, 1999: 187). This is obviously something of an exaggeration, and somewhat
premature, given the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Banks’s own government became
heavily involved in. Nonetheless, the argument that inter-state rivalry is a significant
process in the proliferation of state-funded and state-led ESD systems is the centrepiece of
the argument here. These processes have contributed to what some have referred to as a
‘global sporting arms race’ (De Bosscher et al., 2008; Oakley and Green, 2001a, 2001b). In
other words, a global sport figuration has emerged in which various governments, with
significant influence from various commercial enterprises, have become increasingly
interdependent in the provision of sporting competition. At the same time they are each
trying to be more successful than one another at international sports events. As the var-
ious nations become increasingly interdependent within the context of elite sport, this has
a constraining impact on all nations competing, making them measure their performance
in relation to one another. This process is not unlike the global spread of weapons of
mass destruction. In this respect, as Elias points out,

the most powerful state-societies are no less constrained than the smaller, less powerful
state-societies which have been drawn into their orbit. Together they form a
common figuration – a structural ‘clinch’. The balance of power between inter-
dependent states is such that each is so dependent on the others that it sees in every
opposing state a threat to its own internal distribution of power, independence and
even physical existence. The result of the ‘clinch’ is that each side constantly tries to
improve its power potential and strategic chances in any warlike encounter [and,
arguably, international sports competitions]. Every increase in the power chances of one
side, however slight, will be perceived by the other side as a weakening and a setback in its
own position. Within the framework of this figuration it will constitute a setback. So
countermoves will be set in motion as the weakened side attempts to improve its chances;
and these in turn will provoke the first side to make its own countermoves.
(Elias, 1978: 169–70; emphasis in the original)

One can make direct application of this passage to the development of ESD systems. In
relation to the global sports figuration, the development of ESD systems within various
countries around the world, particularly in light of perceived ‘failures’ in international
competitions and perceived advancements in such systems in other competitor nation-
states, has helped increase the interdependencies and global flows of ESD systems. For
example, with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, several key
individuals employed as coaches and sports scientists within the Soviet Union, and more
particularly the GDR, were soon being employed within various Western countries. In
addition, over the longer term, fluctuations in power differentials will occur. As we have
seen, the first countries where ESD systems were clearly articulated and implemented
were the former Eastern bloc countries of East Germany and the Soviet Union, and the
systems put in place undoubtedly contributed to athletes from these countries achieving
significant success, most notably at the Olympics. Since then other nations have enjoyed
greater success at international sporting events. Systems first developed in the Soviet
Union and the GDR have diffused to other countries, where they have been subsequently
modified. It is important to take into account, therefore, a wide range of interrelated
processes when examining the emergence of ESD systems around the world. We need to
 Elite sports development 149
consider the development of such systems not in isolation, but as the outcome of differ-
ential power struggles between groups that comprise the dynamic figurations of inter-
dependent and competing nation-states. It is not possible to understand adequately the
emergence and development of the AIS or the UKSI, for example, by looking solely at the
political and social conditions within Australia and the UK, respectively. Furthermore, a
good example of the inter-state rivalry and success of others contributing further to
‘countermoves’ being made is the ongoing ‘reaction’ of Australian sports administrators
and politicians to Team GB’s success at the Beijing 2008 Olympics (Australian Sports
Commission [ASC], 2008; M. Green, personal communication, 2009).
Hoberman (1993: 29) argued that ‘the only major difference between these two worlds
[the capitalist and communist countries of the world] was state-sponsored doping in East
Germany and the USSR’, although it should be recognized that doping was present in the
West as a form of private enterprise. He also recognizes, however, that, amongst other
things, the success of the Soviet and GDR elite sports systems cannot be reduced to a
simple understanding that they involved a systematic performance enhancing drugs pro-
gramme. As noted above, following the reunification of Germany in 1990, several West
German sports science scholars examined the former East German system, and identified
four principle characteristics of the system, apart from the systematic doping, that many
had already tried to emulate in one form or another beyond these communist countries
anyway (Beamish and Ritchie, 2006; Merkel, 1995). The key characteristics identified were:

The systematic and scientifically organized selection of boys and girls, in their early
childhood, for particular sport activities; immersion of those young athletes in the best
possible facilities where a methodical, developmental approach to training and con-
ditioning was followed; the development of extensive networks of support by well-
qualified scientists from all areas of research relevant to the enhancement of human
physical performance; and the concentration of their efforts into a very restricted range
of sports (usually individual sports as well as those with some Germanic tradition).
(Beamish and Ritchie, 2006: 100)

Many of these characteristics were emulated in the ESD systems that emerged in several
capitalist countries over the decades following their emergence in the Soviet Union and
East Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. As such, it is our intention now to briefly discuss
in turn what we perceive to be the main characteristics of these so-called ‘homogenous’
ESD systems. With this in mind, we will examine the following characteristics associated
with ESD:

 the extent to which funding was provided and prioritized;

 the extent to which emphasis was placed on the identification of talent and its subsequent
development; and
 the extent to which facilities were provided, including the provision of both sports
science support and professional sports coaches.

Diminishing contrasts: prioritization of funding, talent identification and

development and the professionalization of support structures and personnel
The sports organizations of nations that have achieved international sporting success,
particularly in the context of the Olympic Games, have been the recipients of substantial
150 Elite sports development
central government assistance in the form of funding and policy direction. The only
exception to this rule is the US. We have already seen how central governments in the
Soviet Union and the GDR provided substantial funds to the centralized ESD systems
established in these countries. A number of Western countries developed systems that
placed a similar emphasis on funding. In this respect, ‘the targeting of resources’ has been
a major ‘strategic issue’ (Oakley and Green, 2001b: 93). A common feature of the ESD
systems discussed here is that the strong political support created by ESD has contributed
to sport policy interventions across the elite–mass spectrum that have been framed in
such a way that elite success is the ‘ultimate’ goal that all within these systems work
towards (M. Green, 2008). Following the success achieved by the East German system in
particular, Beamish and Ritchie (2006: 23) noted that ‘government planning and coordi-
nation … [became] increasingly significant in shaping the world of high-performance
sport’. The other key feature is the targeting of funding for particular sports, and parti-
cularly in terms of providing money directly to the athletes themselves. Given the sub-
stantial sums of money various governments continue to invest in their respective ESDs,
it is perhaps not surprising that ‘governments have become more willing to intervene
directly in the elite development process requiring substantial changes … as a condition
of grant aid’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005: 2).
Undoubtedly the perceived success of the three-pronged TID system in the GDR, discussed
above, contributed ‘to the increased deployment of systematic TI [talent identification]
processes worldwide’ (Abbott and Collins, 2002: 158). This process was, of course, pri-
marily driven by inter-state rivalry. The adoption of aspects of the East German system
was a means to this overarching end. The growing commitment toward the development
of ESD involved, among other things, the increasing use of scientific knowledge generated
by state-funded, systematically developed research. This was all geared to ensure sub-
stantial increases in the frequency and intensity of training regimes. The emphasis on the
need to be seriously competitive on the international stage also meant that ‘a trend
towards initiating serious, systematic training at earlier and earlier ages … [and]
increased specialization at younger and younger ages’ (Beamish and Ritchie, 2006: 27)
became increasingly commonplace. In fact a more ‘scientific’ approach to identifying
talent has become a key characteristic of virtually all national ESD systems. According to
Martindale et al. (2007: 187), ‘first-class TID systems capable of delivering highly able
and prepared athletes to the senior level are particularly important against the backdrop
of ever-increasing professionalism and standard of world-class performance in the
modern era’.
Whilst most sports scientists agree that an effective TID system is essential for sus-
tained success in international sports competitions (Abbott and Collins, 2002), there is
less agreement on precisely what this should entail. Most of the ideas behind TID have
stemmed from the Soviet Union, although some of the Soviet methods of talent identifi-
cation involved tests that ‘would seem relatively primitive to Western coaches’ (Riordan,
1986: 228). Several sports scientists argue that many of the celebrated Western ESD sys-
tems for identifying talent also remain fairly rudimentary. A number of academics argue
that there is a lack of clarity regarding the theoretical underpinnings of the approaches
that typify talent identification strategies. For example, Abbott and Collins (2002: 158)
note in their review of the ‘typical procedures adopted’ within talent identification
schemes that, ‘although objective and systematic, the theoretical principles that underpin
this traditional approach to TI remain unclear’. Talent identification is problematic
insofar as simply choosing children on the basis of their height/weight/upper body
 Elite sports development 151
strength/hand–eye coordination at a young age does not take into account the dramatic
changes that occur in adolescence, or those who might be considered as ‘late-developers’.
In this respect, many academics advise caution when estimating the predictive powers of
such physiological factors at a young age (Abbott and Collins, 2002; Bailey and Morley,
2006; Bompa, 1994). Consequently it is argued that ‘talent detection and early develop-
ment processes are complex and lack clear-cut theoretical-based knowledge. Therefore,
they are difficult to evaluate’ (Falk et al., 2004: 354). As we have seen elsewhere in this
book, this shortcoming tends to be typical of sport policy and sports development more
generally (see Chapter 1). It is, therefore, unsurprising that, not just the specific talent
identification strategies, but ESD systems in general exhibit the same characteristic.
Perhaps because the ‘science’ behind the identification of talent is complex, there
appears to be no consensus within the scientific community regarding how best to go
about identifying talent. Clearly, the development of talented athletes requires consider-
able scientific support. The most obvious way in which this support has been developed
is through national centres of excellence, in which facility provision, coaching and scien-
tific support are provided and coordinated. As with the other key characteristics of ESD
systems, the development of a specific central institute of elite sport was first established
in the Eastern bloc countries.
Green and Houlihan (2005: 175) argue that in many Western nations where ESD sys-
tems are in place funding has been initially established for facilities and the athletes
themselves, with funding for ‘the supporting services of coaching, sports science and
medicine [being] generally an afterthought’. They also argue that in the early phases of
‘engagement with sports science [the tendency was to] focus on equipment rather than
the athlete, primarily because the application of science to equipment and apparel design
has greater potential to generate profits than research into nutrition, psychological pre-
paration and training regimes’ (Houlihan and Green, 2008: 8). Sports science support has,
therefore, become a significant area of commercial investment which, of course, trans-
cends the boundaries of national ESD policy. Nonetheless, following the successes of the
GDR athletes, in particular, sport science support has become an increasingly important
area of national government funding in other countries. It is a development that has been
associated with the development of ‘an elite level organisational focus’, such as by the
AIS and UKSI, that has given some ‘direction to sports science research’ (Green and
Houlihan, 2005: 177). It has also contributed to a more coordinated approach to coach-
ing. The success of the AIS approach to ESD has seen ‘multi-sport academies or institute
facilities’ become ‘a common feature within elite sport strategies’ (Oakley and Green,
2001b: 83) in many nations competing at the top end of international sports competitions.
Green and Houlihan (2008: 291) argue that ‘it is clear that increasing global competi-
tion is encouraging a growing number of nations to adopt a more strategic approach to
the development of elite athletes in order to differentiate themselves from “rival” coun-
tries’. In order to sustain, improve upon or surpass their previous achievements, they are
constrained to respond to developments in rival countries and in doing so they are often
prone to pursuing similar approaches. As Green and Houlihan (2008: 291) observe, there
is ‘strong evidence of strategic approaches based increasingly around a homogenous
model of elite sport development but with subtle domestic variations’. Thus Elias (2000:
385) argues that as the diminution of ‘the contrasts in conduct between the upper and
lower groups are reduced with the spread of civilization … the varieties or nuances of
civilized conduct are increased’. Consistent with this thesis, while the spread of ESD
around the world seems to have resulted in ‘diminishing contrasts’ in the way in which
152 Elite sports development
governments, NGBs and NSOs, and even the athletes themselves, prepare for international
sporting competitions, there emerge subtle differences in the approaches pursued. Any
examination of globalization processes must also deal with ‘local’ cultures and knowl-
edgeability (Bloyce, 2008; Bloyce and Murphy, 2008; Houlihan, 2008; Maguire, 1999).
That is to say, if we are to understand the global spread of ESD systems it is not suffi-
cient to take account of the similarities that characterize their diffusion; we must also be
cognizant of how indigenous populations adapt these systems in light of their own perceived
needs, experiences and traditions.

Increasing varieties: the emergence of subtle local nuances in elite sports

development
It is important to remember that although reference is often made to the ‘Eastern bloc’
countries as if they are homogenous, the respective countries exhibited noticeable differ-
ences in the approaches taken to ESD. When the Soviet Union and the GDR were devel-
oping their ESD systems they were responding to different domestic pressures. For
example, as was pointed out above, the ESD system of the Soviet Union was not nearly as
sophisticated as that of the GDR. The vast population of the Soviet Union meant that it
could rely on elite performers emerging from vast pools of competitors, and so less
emphasis was placed on talent identification. The comparatively small population of East
Germany and the pre-war German focus on scientific analysis of human performance led
the GDR to place a more sophisticated emphasis on TID.
Green and Houlihan (2005) observe that the systems of Australia, Canada and the UK
generated a similar axis of tensions. They all experienced an ‘apparent incompatibility
between the needs of the elite athlete’ and ‘the needs of the club infrastructure and the
grass roots participant’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005: 169). Green and Houlihan (2005:
169) also note that this has found expression in a parallel ‘tension between an aspiration
towards a professionalized rational-bureaucratic model of management and the volun-
taristic and more sectional/political model of decision-making found in many sports’.
Predictably, the governing bodies of sport in many Western countries have struggled to
appease all the stakeholders in sports development. This has resulted in considerable
tensions, and has also placed NGBs in the difficult position of trying to square the circle.
In the totalitarian states of the former communist bloc countries such tension was never
expressed, at least not in a sustained and public fashion. As Green (2007a: 922) points
out, ‘scant regard [was given] by the governing regimes in these Eastern bloc countries
and others … to balanc[ing] support for elite sport success with sporting opportunities
and provision for the generality of the population’. One major difference between these
ESD systems and those in the West is that in the latter there has been greater pressure for
public accountability in terms of policy, expenditure and general well-being. However,
the extent to which grassroots opinion has made itself felt has varied from country to
country. In some instances this pressure has helped to bring about modifications in sport
policy and even in the way in which ESD systems have been implemented. In doing so it has
helped to bring about variations that mediate and mitigate the push towards uniformity. As
Green has noted,

on one level, Houlihan may be correct that the former Eastern bloc model of elite
sport development bears several similarities to elite sport systems in Australia,
Canada and, indeed, now the UK. However, on another level, a deeper analysis
 Elite sports development 153
reveals some stark discontinuities … Australian talent identification systems bear
little resemblance to what many have claimed about the Soviet Union and GDR …
[In Australia] there remains a strong reliance on club-based development and social
systems of recruitment, rather than formal talent identification programmes.
(Green, 2007b: 433)

One might argue that such ‘club-based development’ also remains a feature of UK sports
provision. Hence, as De Bosscher et al. (2008) recognize, there have actually been quite
different approaches taken to TID in a range of countries. Of course, even in cases where
an attempt was made to replicate the system of another country, its implementation
would be bound to give rise to differences. Contrasts are likely to have arisen, for
example, out of a failure to adequately comprehend the ‘model’ in place. Another might
stem from a rigidity of thought. Even though it is not uncommon to have talent identifi-
cation as part of the wider ESD system, in numerous countries national strategies ensure
that approaches take idiosyncratic forms. For example, in the GDR athletes were sub-
jected to intense measurement and testing protocols that were not regarded as ethical in
many democratic countries, not to mention the drug regimes to which athletes were
subjected, knowingly or otherwise. In Australia the system is more sophisticated, but still
involves some considerable analysis and measurement of individuals. In the UK, the
system employed to identify talent is more rudimentary and, to a certain extent, ‘volun-
tary’. Collins (2008) makes a similar point with regard to the attempt to professionalize
coaching in the UK. He argues that while higher-level coaching has received some funding,
‘much training is left for individuals to fund themselves’ (Collins, 2008: 75).
While Australia is still wrestling with problems emanating from friction between the
regional provision of mass sport and the federal support for elite sport, this falls short of
the tensions generated in this regard by the efforts to establish ESD systems in the UK
(Green and Oakley, 2001). Green and Oakley (2001: 255) argue that developing effective
ESD systems ‘becomes a real challenge when faced with the political and sporting
autonomy of the UK with four international sporting nations and one Olympic team.
This mosaic of different interests is likely to hinder the development of a truly Olympic-
focused national elite sport system’. For example, the UKSI is now an establishment that
relies essentially on the home nation institutes. The EIS, for instance, ‘is a wholly owned
subsidiary of UK Sport, having been funded by Sport England until March 2006 … Each
of the sports councils for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales also fund similar insti-
tutes to service athletes throughout the rest of the UK’ (NAO, 2008: 14). The Great
Britain cycling team is but one example of this geographical diversity, being based in
Manchester and working on the whole with the EIS quite specifically.
As we saw in Chapter 2, the Conservative governments of the 1990s tried to distinguish
quite specifically between what they regarded as the appropriate focus for central gov-
ernment, namely elite sport, and mass sports participation, which they held to fall within
the brief of local authorities. Under the Labour governments of the last decade or so ESD
has remained a very live concern, especially in light of the London Olympics of 2012. At
the same time, grassroots participation has been placed firmly back on the agenda. This,
together with the traditional reliance on volunteer coaches and administrators, contributed
to the distinctive form taken by elite sport policy in the UK.
Oakley and Green (2001b) highlight the minimal involvement of the US federal government
compared with the higher levels of government involvement in other countries. They
point out that ‘it is the traditions and patterns of government involvement in sport that
154 Elite sports development
[have in large measure] shape[d] the sports system in each country’ (Oakley and Green,
2001b: 101). While the establishment of ESD systems in the Eastern bloc countries was
largely an outgrowth of rivalries with the US, in the US itself the federal government’s
involvement in elite sport has been negligible. As Sparvero et al. (2008: 247) observe, ‘the
federal government’s refusal to become a sport policymaker is consistent with the ideo-
logical foundations of American governance. The traditional American political philoso-
phy is that the powers and intervention of government must be limited in order for
individual liberties to be protected’. The dominance of commercial team sports, coupled
with the comparative lack of federal or even state funding, means that the facilities and
associated support for many Olympic sports in the US are relatively scarce. This severely
reduces the ability of American teams to make a sustained impact at the Olympics across
a range of events. Thus again we see how the broader traditions of a country can mediate
the prevailing approach to sport and, in the process, extend still further the range of
global variation. As noted earlier, many of the characteristics of ESD systems have
been a longstanding feature in the US in the form of centres of excellence and sports
science support, but these have emerged under the auspices of a commercially funded
USOC and the prominence of the NCAA collegiate sports system. They are not state-
funded or state-supported systems. In this respect, it is difficult not to agree with the view
of Sparvero et al. (2008: 251) that ‘there is no “system” for elite sport development’ in
the US.
This chapter has afforded insufficient space to present a more comprehensive account
of the myriad ways in which governmental and sporting cultures have shaped their ESD
systems. A further layer of complexity should be added to this already complex mix,
namely, the influence that multinational companies have had upon the trajectory of ESD
policies. For example, in the case of commercially advanced sports like soccer, basketball
and baseball there has been considerable difficulty in establishing government-led ESD
systems because in many countries professional clubs have greater control over the
development of players than the national federations. They are also not restricted nearly
as much by TID based on national boundaries. For example, much has been written
about the inability of domestic NGBs of soccer in African countries to establish and
control ESD systems for soccer without interference from wealthy European clubs (Darby
et al., 2007). Green and Houlihan (2005) have raised another issue that relates to the
commercial influences with which some national federations of athletics have to contend.
Some individual athletes have refused to compete in their own national trials, preferring
to secure the lucrative individual sponsorships on offer by competing at other global
events. These contingencies make it difficult to establish criteria for funding athletes and
for ensuring that they conform to certain training and competition regimes. This has led
Slack (1998: 3) to argue that athletes ‘no longer represent their club, their country, or
themselves, they represent the corporations who provide the money for their sport’. This
is something of an oversimplification because many athletes represent themselves, their
clubs and their countries, in the course of which tensions and conflicting loyalties are
bound to arise.
The Eliasian concepts of diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties also sensitize us
to the need to address the differential popularity of different sports in different countries.
This has meant that specific ESD systems have had to adjust to and accommodate certain
sports. Baker et al. (2003: 6) recognize that ‘the importance that a country or society
places on a particular sport can have a dramatic influence on any success achieved’ and
on the level of funding provided by the government. The fact that British governments
 Elite sports development 155
were relatively slow off the mark in developing ESD systems can be strongly related to
Britain’s gentlemanly amateur traditions. This may also go some way towards explaining
the apparent reluctance of British governments, at least publicly, to target the ‘soft’ medal
sports that have been a focus in other countries. Although, as indicated above, in reality
the ‘no compromise’ approach taken by UK Sport has meant that, despite it outlining this
as a priority (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), the reality, as was evident in the successes at
the 2008 Beijing Games, is quite different. There are clear signs that in the wake of the
2012 Games being awarded to London in 2005 (see Chapter 7) ESD policy in the UK is
embracing a broader focus on identifying talent in so-called ‘minor’ sports, where medals
may not be as keenly contested. This is a good example of the way in which the hosting
of a mega-event is a significant ‘focusing event’ (Chalip, 1995) on the strategies and
policies adopted for ESD, an issue that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.

Summary
In concluding this chapter, it is worth reflecting upon Green and Oakley’s (2001: 250)
question, in relation to the global flow of ESD systems, namely ‘whether we are witnes-
sing a trend towards uniformity in elite sport development systems – diminishing con-
trasts – or whether there is room for diversity – increasing varieties – within such
systems’. However, this formulation falsely dichotomizes the processes involved. Elias
argued that these figurations involve a blend of diminishing contrasts and increasing
varieties. Therefore, we would argue that over the past fifty or so years the emergence of
ESD systems has been characterized by processes of diminishing contrasts and increasing
varieties. While more and more countries are looking to develop ever more sophisticated
ESD systems, the chances of some of them gaining a competitive edge may be enhanced
by a conscious appreciation of the need to take account of the distinctive features of their
sporting environment. Of course, such is the nature of global sport that no sooner will
one country develop an approach that proves successful than other countries will seek to
emulate it. But in the process they are bound to modify it.
In our view, the way in which ESD systems have undergone global diffusion needs to
be understood in the context of deeply rooted dynamic human figurations. This frame-
work helps to sensitize us not only to the increasing uniformity that characterizes pro-
cesses of globalization, but also to the inevitable variations that arise. Such a perspective
also sensitizes us to limitations of viewing the present structure and organization of elite
sport in the world as somehow the consequence of processes of Westernization or even
Americanization. As Maguire (1999: 93) circumspectly observes, ‘it is possible … to
overstate the extent to which the West has triumphed in terms of global sport structures,
organizations, ideologies and performances’.

Revision questions
1 Examine the way in which elite sports development policy is implemented in a
national governing body of your choice.
2 Compare and contrast elite sports development systems in the UK and the US.
3 Examine the impact that elite sports development policy has had on ‘Sport For
All’ in a country of your choice.
156 Elite sports development
Key readings
De Bosscher, V., Bingham, J. Shibli, S., van Bottenburg, M. and De Knop, P. (2008) The Global
Sporting Arms Race: An International Comparative Study on Sports Policy Factors Leading to
International Sporting Success, Oxford: Meyer and Meyer.
Green, M. and Houlihan, B. (2005) Elite Sport Development: Policy Learning and Political Priorities,
London: Routledge.
Houlihan, B. and Green, M. (eds) (2008) Comparative Elite Sport Development: Systems, Structures
and Public Policy, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Recommended websites
Australian Institute of Sport: www.ausport.gov.au/ais
English Institute of Sport: www.eis2win.co.uk/pages/
UK Sport: www.uksport.gov.uk/
7 The politics and policy of mega-events
A case study of London 2012

Objectives
This chapter will:

 discuss how sports mega-events impact upon existing sport policy;

 examine various legacies from recent Olympic Games; and
 examine the bid and build-up to the London 2012 Olympic Games.

Introduction
There is a small, but growing, literature on so-called sporting ‘mega-events’, such as the
Olympic Games, and their impact on the political, economic and cultural landscape of
the hosting country and city. Much of this existing literature has examined the economic
impact of such events. Rather less has been written, however, about the policy processes
associated with hosting mega-events and the impact they have on broader aspects of sport
policy and other associated legacies alleged to emerge from hosting them. Roche (2000: 1)
defines mega-events as ‘large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events
which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance.
They are typically organised by variable combinations of national governmental and
international non-governmental organisations’. The Olympic Games have, arguably,
become the biggest global event known to humankind and it is hardly surprising that,
given their huge global appeal, politicians are often very keen to host them in their
country. In this respect, they ‘have been important points of reference for processes of
change’ (Roche, 2000: 7) and recently governments have made significant policy changes
and promises having secured the right to host the Olympics. Whilst, for brevity’s sake,
we will discuss the London 2012 bid, and the organizations behind it, from the point of
view of a ‘single’ bidding party, it is important to note that bidding cities comprise
complex networks of interdependent groups that are constituted by some who are advo-
cates of the Games, some who are prepared to go along with the proposals of the bid,
others who are against the proposed reforms and others who might be completely against
hosting the Games in ‘their’ city.
In this chapter we will seek to examine the reasons why cities and governments bid for
mega-events. The optimism that goes, sometimes wildly so, with the apparent benefits of
staging such events is of particular interest to us here because it is frequently the apparent,
additional benefits of hosting an event such as the Olympics that tend to be among the
158 A case study of London 2012
major justifications provided by bidding cities and/or governments for doing so. We will
then examine the benefits that are often widely extolled for the impact of mega-events by
examining the various ‘legacies’ said to have been provided by previous Olympic Games.
The chapter will draw on a case study of the successful London bid to host the 2012
Summer Olympics in order to analyze some of the policy issues and processes associated
with the bid, in particular the ways and extent to which the bid, and the subsequent
build-up to hosting the Games, has come to impact on sport policy in the UK. We reflect
upon the IOC’s response to criticisms that the number of events in which athletes com-
pete at the Summer Games, in particular, have meant that the Games have become too
large – a process widely referred to as ‘gigantism’ – and that there is a need to restrict the
number of sports that are part of the Games. We conclude by examining the fact that at
the same time that the IOC is attempting to manage the size of the Games as a sporting
contest it is complicit in a process whereby bidding cities, at least in countries with
democratically elected politicians, are increasingly constrained to promise more and more
long-lasting benefits in order to host the Games, a process which has contributed to what
one might refer to as ‘legacy gigantism’. Let us first examine the reasons why so many
politicians are keen to pursue the Games.

In pursuit of the Olympic Games

Bidding to host the Summer Olympic Games has not, generally, been as fiercely competitive
as the last four or five bid processes have been. After the infamous Montreal Games of 1976,
which were so poorly managed that the people of Montreal were still paying for them
through their taxes thirty years later, only one city, Los Angeles, bid to host the 1984 Games
(Whitson and Horne, 2006). The Los Angeles 1984 bid helped change the process to make
it more appealing to major international cities to host the Games. The perceived com-
mercial success of the Los Angeles Games coincided with Juan Antonio Samaranch’s
presidency of the IOC, which was the start of a very prosperous era for the Olympics.
Since 1984, bidding has become so intense, and investment in the Games so expensive,
that it is difficult to generate sufficient income for hosting the Games from commercial
sources alone. Indeed, the 1996 Atlanta Games are the only Games since 1984 to have
been almost entirely funded by commercial sources. This may be explained, in part, by
the reluctance of the federal or even state governments to be involved in such projects,
which has been a consistent theme over the years (Sparvero et al. 2008).
The public funding for the bid and subsequent hosting of the Games by the successful
city is often justified on the basis of the numerous associated benefits said to accrue from
doing so. In this regard, those hoping to win the right to host the Games expect, amongst
other things, that doing so will result in them being able to develop new and existing
physical infrastructure within and around the host city, and to regenerate urban areas
through fast-tracking developments in transportation and buildings (Chalkley and Essex,
1999; Digby, 2008; Essex and Chalkley, 2004; Evans, 2007; Gold and Gold, 2007a; Malfas
et al., 2004; Preuss, 2004; 2008). As Evans (2007: 305) has noted, the Olympic Games
provide those attempting to develop urban areas with ‘sources of finance and political
opportunities for fast-tracking projects not feasible under “normal” conditions’. The
immoveable deadline of hosting the Games themselves means that the planning process is
often accelerated, even though at some point in the past applications for planning
approval may have proved to be difficult. This has become particularly important, for
among many of the other numerous additional claimed benefits of hosting the Games has
 A case study of London 2012 159
been the need to boost the ‘image’ of a city to attract tourists and international business
clients – before, during and after the Games (Gold and Gold, 2007a; Preuss, 2004; 2008;
Wang and Theodoraki, 2007). In this respect, it is clear that ‘the Olympic Games have
emerged as an important tool of urban and regional renewal through their ability to
justify redevelopment and enhancement’ (Wang and Theodoraki, 2007: 125) of the host
city and the immediate surrounding locations in which they take place.
The concerns that came to be expressed over the need to provide the host city with a
variety of ‘legacies’ from hosting the Games can be traced back to the mid-1950s (Gold
and Gold, 2007a). Despite this, legacy concerns were really crystallized after the perceived
success of the Barcelona Games in 1992, which were widely heralded with having a
regenerative impact on the city (Coaffee, 2007; Gold and Gold, 2007a; Monclús, 2007).
Indeed, as Coaffee (2007: 155) argues, in part ‘the “Barcelona Model” for regenerating the
urban environment through staging the Olympics now provides the blueprint for other
cities bidding for Summer Games’. The Olympic Games were used for ‘public policy
objectives’ (Preuss, 2008: 420), as a catalyst to stimulate the local economy by attempting
to rival Madrid as a centre for the development of international investment and tourism.
In this regard, the Games were ‘used to justify the substantial public investment during
the Olympiad and to create within the city and the province of Catalonia the desired
impetus to make good the long-term underinvestment in leisure, culture, sport and
transportation during previous decades’ (Preuss, 2008: 420). As noted above, with the
exception of the Atlanta Games, held on the centenary of the first modern Games, in
1996, and heavily funded by private, commercially generated sources, all of the Games
since Barcelona 1992 have justified large sums of public expenditure in pursuit of stimu-
lating the local and even national economy. After the Atlanta Games had been widely
criticized for being over-commercialized the IOC welcomed the blend of public – from
the federal government and New South Wales state funds – and private enterprise
investment that was the hallmark of funding for the Sydney Games (Preuss, 2004).
Indeed, so successful was this perceived model of funding that it is a model that came to
be used by the bidding committees for the following three Games: Athens 2004, Beijing
2008 and London 2012. Indeed, in relation to these latter three bids, ‘the overwhelming
majority of the costs have been financed by the public purse, [and] this also appears to
reflect the growing importance governments have attached to the notion of Olympic
legacy’ (Kasimati and Dawson, 2009: 140). This is, of course, an expression of the
growing cultural and economic significance of sport, with the Games seen as the epitome
of elite-level sport.
Between 1980 and 2000 the Olympic Games grew significantly in terms of the number
of sports and events that were included within the Olympic programme, a process that
has been widely referred to as the ‘gigantism’ of the Games (Essex and Chalkley, 2004;
Preuss, 2004). This expansion of the Games has come to substantially increase the burden
on host cities, by increasing numbers of athletes, their respective aides and the huge
number of media personnel in attendance at the Games, whose needs must all be catered
for. One unintended consequence of this growth of the Games has meant that only ‘larger
urban centres in the developed world’ can realistically hope to bid for the Games, because
‘these places have both the financial capacities to stage the event and established tourism
industries that can be enhanced’ (Essex and Chalkley, 2004: 201). In addition, it is no
coincidence that as the logistics of hosting the Games entails huge sums of public
expenditure there are growing pressures on democratically elected governments to be seen
to demonstrate that hosting the Games should yield significant exogenous developments.
160 A case study of London 2012
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is now increasingly the case that ‘in order to justify the large
public subsidies required to host such an event, advocates have tended to argue that there
are significant economic benefits both directly and indirectly attributable to hosting these
events’ (Atkinson et al., 2008: 420). In other words, the increasingly expensive nature of
the Games has had the effect of constraining those cities and governments bidding to host
them to make wider and wider claims, and inflated unrealistic promises, about the benefits
that may be accrued from doing so. In this regard, the concept of ‘legacy’ has increasingly
‘become an essential part of the IOC and the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
(OCOG) vocabulary’ (Girginov and Hills, 2008: 2092). Indeed, one of the identified ‘roles’
of the IOC now enshrined in the Olympic Charter is ‘to promote a positive legacy from the
Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries’ (IOC, 2007: 15). The various alleged
legacies for host cities and countries are worth considering in more detail.

The exogenous legacies of the Games

Prominent amongst the desired legacies for the bidding committees is that by hosting the
Games a positive economic legacy will be generated. In particular, it is frequently claimed
that hosting the Games will attract significant investment from international commercial
enterprise as well as significant income from large numbers of international tourists
(Baade and Matheson, 2002; Cashman, 2006; Preuss, 2004, Roche, 2000). As we noted
earlier, far from stimulating the local economy the costs of the Montreal Games were
eventually assumed by the Montreal taxpayer for over a generation – although the world
economic situation at the time was not exactly conducive to hosting an event of this
magnitude, since the Games ‘took place against a backdrop of severe world recession and
inflation that profoundly affected costings’ (Gold and Gold, 2007b: 36). However, the
claimed economic success of the Los Angeles Games just eight years later has often been
cited by bidding city organizations ever since as a reason for attempting to win the right
to host the Games (Preuss, 2004). Kasimati (2003), amongst others, has suggested that
there are a number of long-term economic benefits to a city hosting the Summer Olympics.
These include, as we suggested above, newly constructed sporting facilities and related
infrastructure, such as the athletes’ village, hotel and transport development. The hoped-for
urban revival is said to bring with it investment and an enhanced international reputation,
which in turn may generate increased tourism, additional employment opportunities and
increased inward investment (Kasimati, 2003).
Despite the claimed economic benefits of hosting the Olympic Games, many economists
‘have consistently found no evidence of positive economic impacts from mega-sporting
events’ (Owen, 2008: 3), and, as Gratton et al. (2006: 43) have argued, ‘the economic
benefit of the Games … is often overestimated in both publications and economic analyses
produced by or for the OCOG’. Indeed, even where some studies have provided some
evidence of the positive economic impact of the Olympics, ‘what is clear is that the esti-
mated net economic impact of the Olympic Games is relatively small in terms of the host
city’s annual GDP’ (Vigor et al., 2004: 18). Thus, although enhancing the local economy
is widely seen by bidding parties as a key justification for hosting the Games, it is very
difficult to establish the extent to which previous Games can, indeed, be regarded as
having had a measurable and valid positive impact on the local economy (Atkinson et al.,
2008; Crookston, 2004; Gold and Gold, 2008; Gratton et al., 2005; 2006; Owen, 2008;
Preuss, 2004; Vigor et al., 2004). But what about the impact that the Games have on
generating a strong tourist economy?
 A case study of London 2012 161
As Preuss (2004: 46) has noted, ‘the Olympics especially are seen as catalysts for driving
tourism, but not just for the time of the Olympics itself … [but] for attracting future
tourists long after the event has been staged’. However, evidence in support of the extent
to which hosting the Olympic Games can have a positive impact on increasing tourism is
sketchy at best, for, as Preuss (2004: 59) himself points out, ‘there is a risk of over-estimating
the numbers for post-Olympic tourism’. In a not dissimilar way, Cashman (2006: 107)
has argued in relation to the Sydney Games in 2000 that there had been ‘excessive optimism’
regarding the potential benefits that the Games would bring to tourism, and many
involved had been guilty of ‘overstating the importance of Olympic tourism’ (Cashman,
2006: 107). In addition, evidence from various Games suggests that even where tourism
may have matched anticipated levels ‘the flow of new tourists tends to dry up fast’ (Vigor
et al., 2004: 3) once the Games have ended. Furthermore, as we will examine in our case
study of London 2012, it can properly be said that many of the bigger cities that are, in
the main, the cities most likely to host the Games in the first place already enjoy sizeable
international tourist economies and the Games may well put off some tourists (Gratton et al.,
2006). Despite some of these concerns raised by several academics about the presumed
positive impact of hosting the Games on the local economy, many of these concerns
relate to specific operational costs related to hosting the Games. It is arguably through
the capital infrastructure investments that most potential gains could be made, where
investment is more long-term, relating to the sporting venues, the new and upgraded
transport and housing infrastructure. It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that many
of the main legacy outcomes that are frequently cited in support of hosting the Games are
related to the broader infrastructural, social, sporting and ecological benefits (Gratton et
al., 2006; Hall, 2006; Preuss, 2004; Whitson and Horne, 2006). Let us briefly examine
some of the claims that are made in relation to the regeneration benefits that cities may
derive from holding the Games.

The Olympics and urban regeneration

An increasingly prominent dimension of the motivations for bidding committees to host
mega-events has been the apparent associated regeneration of the host city or cities,
especially in terms of the built environment, housing development and employment in the
local regions (Raco, 2004). This strategy has been used in mega-events beyond the
Olympics. For example, some grounds built and redeveloped for the Soccer World Cup
held in Germany were developed on so-called ‘brownfield’ sites (Digby, 2008). Brownfield
sites are on the whole previously used sites that now lie abandoned or, sometimes,
underused industrial sites, as opposed to ‘greenfield’ sites, which would require uprooting
living flora. Furthermore, the main stadia that were developed for the Manchester 2002
(Digby, 2008; Gratton et al. 2005) and Melbourne 2006 (Digby, 2008) Commonwealth
Games were both developed on ‘brownfield’ sites as part of a broader regeneration
strategy. The North West Development Agency (NWDA) (2004) heralded the regenerative
effects of the Manchester Commonwealth Games. However, although the Manchester
region undoubtedly benefited from substantial investment as a direct result of the Games,
and some areas of east Manchester, where the main stadia and other sports complexes
were built, did, in fact, benefit from some initial regeneration, it is not yet possible –
indeed, it is almost impossible – to determine the likelihood of longer-term impacts on
the region (Gratton et al., 2005). Roche (2000: 140) has also noted that the ‘long-term
impacts are always difficult to establish given the relative infrequency of and lack of
162 A case study of London 2012
funding for, systematic longitudinal studies’ of the legacy benefits that are believed to
accrue from hosting mega-events. The further away one moves from an event the more
difficult it becomes to establish that any changes that have occurred are a direct result of
hosting a mega-event. Indeed, even though there were measurable short-term benefits in
terms of the construction industry in the build-up to the Montreal Games, and increased
tourism during the Games, the post-Games ‘legacy’, as is well documented, never really
materialized (Whitson and Horne, 2006). On the contrary, as we noted above, the citizens
of Montreal were left with a ‘debt’ that was only paid off in 2006.
Despite the difficulty faced when trying to establish evidence for a regenerative effect,
the Munich Games of 1972, although synonymous with the terrorist attack and sub-
sequent murder of several Israeli Olympic team members, have been well regarded by
some for having ‘become a showcase of regeneration’ (Raco, 2004: 41). Furthermore,
numerous Games have sparked massive investment in transport infrastructure improve-
ments. As Roche (2000: 139) points out, the new ‘bullet train’ was ‘inaugurated in the
Tokyo Games in 1964; new metro systems introduced or extended for the Games of
Rome, Tokyo, Montreal, Seoul, Barcelona and Athens (2004); major new urban road
systems for Barcelona; and the creation of new international airports for the Barcelona
and Athens Games’. However, as we discussed earlier, in many respects it was the per-
ceived success of the so-called regeneration of Barcelona in 1992 that heralded a new era
of utilizing the Olympics as a tool for the promotion of urban development. It was sug-
gested, for example, that ‘massive new infrastructural investments were made in the city
which were connected with the Olympics. These included a new waterfront and resi-
dential area (which continues to be called “the Olympic village”), a new international
airport’ (Roche, 2000: 143), as well as the construction of six new sports stadia and the
upgrading of the main Olympic stadium.
In relation to the ‘legacy’ of such developments that accompanied the hosting of the
Barcelona Games, Raco (2004: 41) argued that the ‘Olympic Village development has
been a commercial success story’, although a related development has seen house prices
and rental inflation well above the national average in Spain. In this regard, it was
pointed out in a recent report by the London East Research Institute, commissioned for
and published by the Greater London Authority (GLA), that the local populations in and
around the Olympic Village area of Barcelona ‘have not [had] significantly improved …
access to housing and jobs’ (GLA, 2007a: 9). In relation to this, many have questioned,
more generally, the idea that Barcelona can be considered a regeneration success story
(GLA, 2007a; Raco, 2004; Roche, 2000). Similar reservations might be expressed about
the alleged regenerative effects of Sydney and Athens. In Sydney, for example, ‘rates of
evictions and homelessness increased markedly in the neighbourhoods alongside the
Olympic development’ and, according to Raco (2004: 37), it could be argued from this
and other case studies that ‘although development takes place in such cities it does not
always lead to the development of its poorer urban neighbourhoods and communities. In
fact, it can make things worse by creating blight, congestion and community displace-
ment’. Indeed, in relation to the regeneration of the local economy, through employment
opportunities, during and after the Games in Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney and Athens, the
evidence is also far from clear cut, and, if anything, suggests that the ‘long-term unem-
ployed and “workless” communities were largely unaffected by the staging of the Games
in each of the four previous host cities’ (GLA, 2007a: 9). For all the stated benefits asso-
ciated with the regeneration that hosting the Olympics will bring, ‘there is a need for
research to concentrate on the longer-term urban regeneration benefits that sport has the
 A case study of London 2012 163
potential to deliver’ (Gratton et al., 2005: 998). It is, however, very difficult to establish a
direct cause and effect relationship between investment in the infrastructure and tangible
benefits associated with that investment. In this regard, Essex and Chalkley (2004: 201)
have noted that ‘the precise effectiveness of this form [hosting the Olympics] of urban
renewal policy is contested and difficult to measure’, especially because not only is it
impossible to isolate the impact of hosting the Games from other events or programmes
that may be running simultaneously, but it is also especially difficult for policy-makers to
control the outcomes of wider social processes that can both enable and constrain, to a
greater or lesser degree, their ability to achieve the desired objectives. As we explain in
more detail below, of particular significance at the moment is, of course, the wider global
economic downturn that is being experienced in many countries and that appears to be
strongly associated with the escalating costs of hosting the London 2012 Games. At the
time when the London bidding committee was preparing the Candidate File to host the
2012 Games, it was clearly very difficult to not only anticipate the emergence of the
global economic downturn, but also to foresee the extent to which this may come to
impact the economic implications of hosting the Games. As we noted in Chapter 1, this
reminds us of a point of fundamental importance: that there are many processes – espe-
cially those that result from the interweaving of the more or less goal-directed actions of
large numbers of people on a global scale, as is the case here – that are beyond the direct
control of policy-makers and that come to limit the extent to which they can achieve their
formally stated goals.

The Olympics and sustainability

More recently, the idea that the Olympics should have a sustainable, ‘green’ legacy has
come increasingly to dominate aspects of the ideological agenda for the IOC and the
bidding committees for cities hoping to host the Games. The Sydney bid had focused on
the growing international sensitivity toward environmental concerns, and, as Cashman
(2006: 191) argues, ‘the idea of the Green Games was an important selling point of the
Sydney 2000 Olympic bid because it coincided with a move by the IOC to recognise the
environment as a core principle of Olympism in the 1990s’. The growing sensitivity con-
cerning the environmental impact of hosting the Games helps explain the series of critical
headlines (at least in the Western press as far as Beijing was concerned) that accompanied
the Athens and Beijing Games. In this regard, in Athens ‘environmentalists … were par-
ticularly critical that the rules laid down in the tender for the Olympic Village were lar-
gely ignored when reducing construction costs became the priority’ (Gold, 2007: 279), and
much was made of the prevalence of smog in Beijing. Sustainable living had become a
significant feature for the IOC and this, of course, cannot be divorced from the increasing
concern over the environment that has been a feature of the politics of most industrialized
nations around the world in the twenty-first century.
The Sydney bid included several prominent references to sustainable living, and the
regeneration of parts of Sydney for the hosting of the Games required a significant
environmental transformation as part of the alleged regeneration that would result from
hosting the Games. Much of the existing site was polluted with toxic waste and the
Olympic Park and stadium were built on disused chemical sites, landfill sites and an
armaments dumping ground. The ecological regeneration of the area was heralded as a
success by many, and the Sydney Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
(SOCOG) invited Greenpeace to provide a ‘green score’ for the Games. However, despite
164 A case study of London 2012
the rhetoric behind the view that the environment was a strong feature of the successful
Olympic bid, in the build-up to the Games there was something of a ‘retreat’ from the
tag of the Green Games. Cashman (2006: 193) argues that, in part, this was because
‘SOCOG realised that the idea of the Green Games was open-ended, leading to unrea-
listic green expectations’. This is another example of making inflated promises that
appeal to the prevailing ideological agenda at the time in order to increase the chances of
winning the right to host the Games. Indeed, ‘in retrospect, those who promoted such an
idealistic environmental platform in 1993 [when the bid was won] may have been naïve
to talk up the environment, thereby raising expectations about the delivery of such a wide
range of environmental promises’ (Cashman, 2006: 195). Cashman (2006: 213) goes on to
argue that ‘the Green Games were imperfectly realised in Sydney and attracted much
criticism’, especially as Greenpeace, contrary to prevailing expectations, actually scored
the whole operation relating to the Games as 5 out of 10 for the ‘sustainable principles’
employed. However, it is undoubtedly the case that the Sydney Games did raise the issue
of sustainable living and energy sources, and kept it on the agenda, ensuring that it was a
topic of considerable discussion amongst Australians, and especially those who may not
have been interested, at least publicly, in the environment beforehand (Cashman, 2006). It
might be argued, therefore, that this aspect of the exogenous ‘legacy’ that was seen as a
potentially desirable impact of the Games is, at best, difficult to measure, and at worst
hosting the Olympic Games may actually have the opposite impact of what was intended.
More specifically, it may be suggested that hosting the Games may potentially do more
harm than good to the environment, with the global travelling encouraged by hosting the
Games and the sheer industrial work required in order to develop the infrastructure to
host them. Certainly, once again, any perceived ‘positive’ legacy impact on the environ-
ment is extremely difficult to measure. It is one of the many ‘known unknowns’ of the
Games, as Horne (2007: 85) refers to the rather intangible legacy impacts associated with
such mega-events. What, then, of the direct ‘sporting legacy’ of the Olympics? After all,
for all that the Games are a celebration of culture and have recently become synonymous
with generating a variety of exogenous developments, they are recognized and celebrated
by many across the world, first and foremost, as a global sporting event. What impact do
the Olympics have, then, on the sporting landscape of the host city and country?

A lasting sporting legacy

There is little doubt that the sporting infrastructure of a host city is improved in the
aftermath of hosting the Olympics. On occasions this will entail upgrading existing
facilities (like the Olympic stadium at Barcelona) but it also often involves the develop-
ment of substantial new sporting facilities, such as those that were developed as a con-
sequence of hosting the Games in Sydney, Athens and Beijing. In addition, it is frequently
expected that several related sporting impacts will be generated from hosting the Games.
A more tangible ‘benefit’ is that frequently host nations perform much better in terms of
medal acquisition at ‘their’ Games. Of course, it would be unrealistic to suggest that this,
alone, is a reason for bidding to host the Games. Some have argued that there is a
‘trickle-down effect’, whereby the intensity of the build-up and hosting of the Games will
have a necessary and positive impact on sports participation rates within the host city
and country at large (GLA, 2007a; Murphy and Bauman, 2007). Once again, however, it
is hard to identify the tangible benefits for a positive ‘sporting legacy’. In fact, there has
been little research into the impact that the hosting of such mega-events has on mass
 A case study of London 2012 165
sport participation rates (Hamlyn and Hudson, 2005; Wang and Theodoraki, 2007), and
what evidence does exist tends to be anecdotal and inconclusive (GLA, 2007a). Research
into the impact that the Sydney Games had on mass participation rates, for example,
suggested that if there was any impact at all it was extremely short lived and fleeting
(Cashman, 2006; GLA, 2007a; Murphy and Bauman, 2007). In addition, although the
NWDA (2004) argues that the Manchester Commonwealth Games in 2002 had a positive
impact on participation levels, most academics agree that they had no measurable impact
(Coalter, 2004; Murphy and Bauman, 2007). Once again, it is difficult to draw any firm con-
clusions regarding the legacy impact of increasing sports participation because of the difficulty
of establishing a simple cause and effect impact of hosting the Games on participation (Coalter,
2004; 2007b). What, then, of the potential impact of the new sporting infrastructure?
There have been widely reported problems in terms of the extent to which many of the
facilities that are built for the purpose of the Olympic Games remain underused in the
post-Games era. This was certainly the case after both the Sydney and Athens Games
(Gold and Gold, 2007a). In relation to Sydney the main Olympic stadia ‘have experienced
major revenue shortfalls which threaten their viability’ (Searle, 2002: 845) and the Sydney
Olympic Park has been described by some as a ‘white elephant’ (Cashman, 2006: 153).
The Sydney Games were also criticized in this regard because new, permanent facilities
were built, despite the additional cost that they involved. Such has been the concern over
the lack of participation and facility use that it is now ‘current IOC policy that if there is
no identified post-Games community use for sports facilities temporary facilities are
preferable’ (Cashman, 2006: 181). However, since 2003 more events have been held
within the stadium, including Australian Rules Football matches and inter-state cricket
matches. A ‘master plan’ for Sydney Olympic Park was ‘finally adopted in May 2002’ in
which it was recognized that the park ‘could not survive on sport and recreation alone
and proposed greater residential and commercial development’ (Cashman, 2006: 161). In
the case of the main facilities developed for the Athens Games, the Athens OCOG ‘made
much of the idea that it was creating permanent facilities that would have post-Olympic
use’ (Gold, 2007: 278), but the reality is that, in part due to much internal political
wrangling after the Olympics, ‘progress towards realizing a new life for the venues has
been patchy’ (Gold, 2007: 282). The main Olympic stadium is now used by the city’s two
main professional football teams, but the surrounding landscaped spaces of the Olympic
Park area ‘are not part of the local amenities or accessible to visitors’ (Gold, 2007: 282).
Notwithstanding the difficulty of generating relatively object-adequate evidence for
most, if not all, of the claimed legacies of hosting the Olympics, and the potential spir-
alling costs involved, there remains, for many politicians and sports organizations, ‘an
unquestioning belief in the … benefits of hosting such large scale events’ (Hall, 2006: 66).
In this respect, ‘the sheer size and scope of the Olympics may well blind suitors for the
Games to the substantial financial risks’ (Baade and Matheson, 2002: 127–28). As we
explain later, these issues can also be related to the London 2012 Games. In the rest of
this chapter, we will examine the extent to which those behind the London 2012 bid are
blinded by the supposed benefits of hosting the Olympics and examine whether lessons
have been learned from the experiences of previous Games.

London 2012: the bid

Coalter (2004: 96) argues that the lack of research and tenuous evidence related to the
various supposed positive impacts from hosting the Olympics raises ‘critical questions
166 A case study of London 2012
about some of the assumptions underpinning the London 2012 claims about its potential
impact on sports participation’. It would seem that, initially at least, the British govern-
ment was also being told by its own advisors that ‘the benefits of hosting mega sporting
events, whether economic, social or cultural are difficult to measure and the available
evidence is limited’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 149). This quotation, it should be noted,
is taken from the Labour government’s own sport policy, Game Plan, published in
December 2002. Whilst recognizing the limited evidence to support hosting such a ‘mega-
event’, the DCMS and Strategy Unit (2002: 151) also recommended that although it tends
to be local authorities that bid for the Games, ‘due to the sensitivity of bidding for and
hosting events, central government will be under great pressure to step in with additional
funding if required’. It was recommended, therefore, that instead of viewing the hosting
of mega-events with scepticism ‘central government should always be involved from the
earliest stages’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 148) in order to influence policy from the
start of any such bid. Despite the lack of available evidence for the legacy benefits of
hosting the Games, just four months later the same government backed the London bid
to bring the Olympics to the UK in 2012. The government’s ideological commitment to
sport, and the perceived benefits of hosting the Games, not least the potential positive
political impact that winning the right to host the Games might bring in the immediate
short term to the government, meant, it would seem, that it ignored the evidence in blind
faith. As Gratton et al. (2005: 996) have noted, this underlines the point that despite the
underwhelming evidence in favour of hosting such Games for their exogenous or even
sports development legacies, ‘in the end such decisions are political rather than part of a
rational planning process’. Politicians frequently consider there to be kudos in being
associated with sport, and especially the Olympic Games, which is frequently seen as the
biggest prize of all. In much the same way that we argued in Chapter 6 that there is a
global sporting arms race, one might include the securing of the rights to host the
Olympics as something that is regularly considered as being worth virtually any cost.
This tendency to make a variety of ideological claims on behalf of the alleged benefits
that hosting a global event such as the Olympic Games is thought to bring is not altogether
surprising, such is the growing cultural, economic and political significance of sport
which has been accelerating during the post-1945 period.
Nine cities, including London, eventually submitted bids to host the 2012 Games.
These included the early favourites Paris and Madrid, as well as Havana, Istanbul,
Leipzig, Moscow, New York and Rio de Janeiro. Those responsible had to submit bids
to the IOC by the summer of 2003, and the next summer the IOC reduced the number of
bid cities to five (London, Madrid, Moscow, New York and Paris). The bid files for each
of these city’s bids were to be submitted by November 2004, and the IOC Evaluation
Commission sent inspection teams to visit each of the five cities early in 2005. Following
the bribery scandals that emerged in the international media associated with the Winter
Games in Salt Lake City in 2002, this bidding process was the first under the new, more
tightly scrutinized process implemented by the IOC. Initially, Barbara Cassani, an
American businesswoman, who was largely based in the UK, was appointed as Chair of
the London bid. This was considered by many as an appointment based on concerns
about the organizational problems following the initially successful bid to host the World
Athletics Championships in London in 2005. Poor management and organization after
winning the bid meant that London had to withdraw from hosting them because it was
clear that the required developments were not going to be delivered on time. That is to
say, the appointment of someone with a good reputation in business to lead a very
 A case study of London 2012 167
technical bid was initially seen as a way of ensuring a more professional approach, given
that organizing large sports events in the UK had only recently been tarnished by the
London World Athletics bid. This coincided with a deliberate process of the ‘moder-
nization’ of many British sports organizations that was brought about by increasing
government involvement in the running of sport in the UK in the recent past (see Chapter 2).
There is little doubt that the failure to meet the requirements for hosting the 2005 World
Athletics Championships contributed to the fact that most commentators considered that
London was not a particularly serious contender because Paris and Madrid were still
considered very strong favourites.
Throughout the bidding process, the London bid was highly ambitious in the variety of
‘sustainable legacies’ that were being promised for after the Games. Indeed, some might
say that, given the apparent outside chance of winning the bid, rather like a party in
opposition that is extremely unlikely to win the next general election, London could
‘afford’ to make a series of inflated promises about the alleged benefits that hosting the
Games would have for London and the UK (Evans, 2007). Ironically, given the desire for
Cassani to lead the original bid, because London was still believed to be trailing behind
Paris and probably Madrid it was decided that her deputy, Lord Sebastian Coe, a former
Olympic champion and politician, would be a better figurehead due to his standing in the
Olympic Movement. Accordingly, Coe replaced Cassani as Chair of the Bid Committee
for a final push in the summer of 2004. The London bid was still seen as having only an
outside chance of winning even on the day of the final vote and it was seen as something
of an upset when London was awarded the Olympic Games on 6 July 2005.
The various documents that were submitted on behalf of the London bid, most notably one
of the preliminary reports, London 2012: A Vision for the Olympic Games and Paralympic
Games (London 2012, 2004a) and the actual Candidate File (London 2012, 2004b), made
a range of inflated promises for the proposed London Games. To achieve the various policy
goals for the set budget, those responsible for the bid considered that the Games would
represent considerable value for money: ‘When all the sums have been done we would be
better off than before. £2.375bn has been earmarked to stage the Games, but they bring in
benefits and rewards to match’ (London 2012, 2004a: 25). The alleged benefits and rewards
were similar to many of those that had been legacy promises at previous Olympic Games.
However, the London bid also consistently focused on the diversity of the city of London and
in the Candidate File it was stated that, ‘for the city, hosting the Games would leave an
enduring sporting, social and economic legacy’ (London 2012, 2004b: 1). More specifically
there were four main themes proposed for the ‘vision’ of the London 2012 bid. These were:

 delivering the experience of a lifetime for athletes;

 leaving a legacy for sport in Britain;
 benefiting the community through regeneration;
 supporting the IOC and the Olympic Movement.
(London 2012, 2004b: 17)

Sport was declared to be ‘at the heart’ of the bid (London 2012, 2004b: 1). At the same
time, Sebastian Coe declared that the Olympic and Paralympic Games, whilst they were
the ‘biggest sporting event in the world’, also provided the opportunity for ‘economic
benefits and long-term legacies from which the whole country can benefit’ (cited in
London 2012 Nations and Regions Group, 2004: 18). The legacies, as set out in the
Candidate File, were supposed to be achieved for sport, for the community, for the
168 A case study of London 2012
environment and for the economy (London 2012, 2004b). In a similar vein to the various
claims made by bidding committees of previous host cities, the legacy for sport, it was
proposed, was to see ‘the Olympic ideals … flourish at all levels. Grassroots sport would
boom in our schools and local communities. Our most talented youngsters would be
supported, offering them every chance to fulfil their promise and their dreams’ (London
2012, 2004a: 12). Furthermore, given that the bid proposed the development of a range of
new facilities for the Olympic Park at Lea Valley, including a new Olympic stadium, a
velodrome and Olympic swimming and diving pools, it was declared that, ‘after the
Games are over, London will possess some of the finest sports facilities for hosting
national and international events’ (London 2012, 2004b: 19). To this end it was proposed
that the London Olympic Institute would be created and would be ‘a world-class insti-
tution for sport, culture and the environment, which will provide facilities and services
for elite athletes as well as encouraging participation in sport’ (London 2012, 2004b: 19).
One might argue that such a proposal had its origins in the fact that the stadia in Sydney
were, by this time, being criticized for being underutilized.
In addition to the development of a sporting legacy, it was proposed that an economic
legacy would result from hosting the Games, with ‘the creation of wider employment
opportunities and improvements in the education, skills and knowledge of the local
labour force in an area of very high unemployment’ (London 2012, 2004b: 25) said to be
among the major economic benefits of hosting the Games. This would, it was claimed,
‘enable residents of the Lower Lea Valley to have a stake in the economic growth of their
region and begin to break the cycle of deprivation in the area’ (London 2012, 2004b: 25).
It was claimed that local residents would gain not only from the creation of new jobs,
but also from the new ‘sustainable’ sporting, housing and transport infrastructure that
was being proposed. In this regard, it was claimed that

the Olympic Park will create a high quality environment for the neighbouring mixed-
use communities. It will enhance the amount and quality of greenspace, promote
sustainable travel, conserve local biodiversity and wetlands, and improve air, soil and
water quality. Its design will take account of the potential impacts of climate change
and will set new standards for sustainable production, consumption and recycling of
natural resources.
(London 2012, 2004b: 23)

A further alleged benefit thought to be an important legacy of the Olympics would be the
promotion of greater social inclusion (Chapter 4). The Candidate File ambitiously set out
to use the Olympic Park as ‘a hub for east London, bringing communities together and
acting as a catalyst for profound social and economic change’ (London 2012, 2004b: 19).
In this respect, it was proposed that the Olympic Park area ‘will become a model of
social inclusion, opening up opportunities for education, cultural and skills development
and jobs for people across the UK and London, but especially in the Lea Valley and
surrounding areas’ (London 2012, 2004b: 19). In the process, it was proposed that since
the new facilities would be available for use by the broader community, as well as elite
athletes, ‘this will create a more inclusive, more active community, leading to a fitter
society and reducing health inequalities’ (London 2012, 2004b: 19). The tendency for such
largely uncritical acceptance of non-evidence-based, exaggerated promises can be related
to the fact that those involved in the London bid had been constrained to set out a wider
array of ambitions because of the considerable external constraints that they were
 A case study of London 2012 169
experiencing from the IOC and in competition with other bidding cities, to ensure that,
like many other Games, the London Games would be seen to be ‘bigger and better’ than
preceding ones. Thus it could be argued that the London bid is based on a ‘best of the
rest’ strategy that is likely to prove far too ambitious, especially given the difficulties that
were associated with the various legacies expected to have been generated by previous
Games.
Before we begin to examine the claims for the proposed legacies expected to result
from the London 2012 Games, and the progress made in preparing for the Games over
the last four years, it is important to briefly outline the organizational structure that has
been implemented in order to support the hosting of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
in London.

London 2012: structure and organization in preparation for the Games

Once London was announced as the host of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games,
the London Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG)
was established with Lord Coe as its Chair. The LOCOG, as is the case in all recent
Olympic Games, is responsible for the staging of the Games, and is largely financed by
raising money from the private sector, through sponsorship, broadcasting rights and
selling merchandise. Under IOC guidelines, the government is not allowed to take any
part in ‘running’ the Games (IOC, 2007). This is rather spurious, however, since the
government does play an important part in ensuring the Games can take place by pro-
viding the majority of the funds to ensure that the infrastructure, including the sporting
venues, is delivered on time. To this end, the British government passed the London 2012
Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act in March 2006. One of the motions passed in
the Act was the creation of the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) as a non-depart-
mental public body (NDPB), and, like other NDPBs, such as UK Sport and Sport Eng-
land, the ODA is accountable to the DCMS. The ODA is responsible for the delivery of
the infrastructure for the Olympic Park and it reports to the Olympic Board, which is
made up of representatives from the LOCOG, the BOA, the GLA and the government.
The Olympic Board is chaired jointly by the Mayor of London (currently Boris Johnson)
and the Minister for the Olympics, a newly created ministerial position that was taken up
by Tessa Jowell, who had been an integral part of the bid process in her previous role as
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. The Olympic Board ‘is the strategic
decision making body with responsibility for the whole Olympic programme’ (HMSO,
2007: 7). Finally, the Government Olympic Executive (GOE) provides support to the
Minister for the Olympics, with the specific role of ‘maintain[ing] oversight of the entire
programme on behalf of Government’ (HMSO, 2007: 7). In this respect, the GOE is
accountable for the national expenditure of public funds and the GLA is accountable for
the distribution of public funds regionally (CSL 2012, 2007). In addition, in an attempt to
secure UK-wide legacies, the LOCOG has established a Nations and Regions Group
(NRG), in which each of the home nations (Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales) and
the nine various regions of England have boards that are represented. Each sets in place
its own vision for 2012.
Since the winning of the bid and the implementation of the organizational structure to
set about working towards hosting the Games in 2012, a flurry of official publications
have been produced that will form the basis for our analysis here. Many of these policy
documents set out in greater detail the ‘legacy commitments’ for the Games and a more
170 A case study of London 2012
specific (and much larger) budget. Perhaps, given the broader goals established by some
of the key parties involved in producing the Olympics, it is no surprise that the budget
for the Games has risen substantially. Before we examine some of the legacy commitments
in more detail, let us briefly consider more specific details of the budget that has been set
aside for hosting the Games.

The London 2012 budget

When the bid to host the Games was originally submitted, it was claimed that ‘the estimated
cost to the public sector was approximately £3.4 billion’ (House of Commons Culture,
Media and Sport Committee, 2008: 8). Approximately £2.375 billion was the capital
budget from the public sector funding package for the ODA to build the permanent
sports venues and broader infrastructure required for the Games mentioned in the origi-
nal bid documentation (London 2012, 2004a), and approximately £1.044 billion was the
operating budget to be spent by the Exchequer on the ‘wider regeneration in the Lower
Lea Valley’ (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2008: 8). A fur-
ther £738 million, it was suggested, ‘would be forthcoming from the private sector, as a
contribution to the costs of facilities and infrastructure’ (House of Commons Culture,
Media and Sport Committee, 2008: 8). In total, the proposed original budget stood at
over £4 billion. The budget for the Games is focused on ‘those costs that are to be pub-
licly funded and therefore exclude the staging costs to be incurred by the London Orga-
nising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), which is
intended to be self-financing’ (NAO, 2007: 4–5). This is a requirement of the IOC,
although ‘the Government is the ultimate guarantor of funding for the Games, including
LOCOG’s staging costs’ (NAO, 2007: 5).
It was announced in March 2007, however, that the proposed costs of the Games had
increased considerably, to £9.325 billion. Many media sources reported that the new
budget announced by the Minister for the Olympics, Tessa Jowell, was ‘nearly four
times’ the originally proposed budget (e.g. BBC, 2007). This is because many within the
media considered the original budget to be around £2.4 billion, a fact never openly dis-
puted by the government or others involved in the bid at the time, of course, since the
much larger sum would, no doubt, have contributed to a significant amount of bad press
at the time. This could have detracted substantially from the likely success of the bid
given that one of the IOC’s concerns in awarding the Games is that the host city can
demonstrate that the public are in favour of the Games being staged in their city and
country. The £2.4 billion sum did not include the operating costs required for the devel-
opment of the Lower Lea Valley or, of course, the money that it was hoped would be
generated from the private sector. Nonetheless, as has been the case in most Olympic
Games where the budget has been examined, the budget that is currently being proposed
for hosting the London Games is substantially higher than at the time of the bid. The
failure, at least publicly, to anticipate budgetary rises is not surprising given the limited
perspective that the government adopted at the outset – and still does – largely, it might
be argued, because of the prevailing tendency to claim for sport benefits for which there
is little evidence.
A good illustration of the government’s failure to anticipate appropriately the budget
requirements of hosting the Games is that in the original bid there appears to have been
no specific budget set aside for security at the Games, which was, of course a significant
oversight, made to look especially ill-judged when on 7 July 2005, the day after London
 A case study of London 2012 171
won the right to host the Games, several coordinated terrorist attacks took place in the
capital, resulting in the deaths of fifty-six people. Thus ‘£0.6 billion for policing and
wider security … in the wake of the events of 7 July 2005’ was but one addition to the
original budget (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2008: 9).
However, it is not our intention here to offer a detailed, economic evaluation of the
budget, but it is clear that the current budget for the Games has attracted particular cri-
ticism, including from the government’s own House of Commons Committee of Public
Accounts (2008) and House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2007;
2008). Such criticism is neatly captured in the following quotations:

We are not particularly surprised at the increase in costs, and it should not be forgotten
that substantial savings are being made in certain areas. But we are very disappointed
that the cost estimates have been found to be faulty so early in the process.
(House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2007: 3)

Although it is not surprising that early assessments underestimated the final costs,
such a radical revision of cost estimates has been damaging to confidence in the
management of the overall programme. It has also exposed the Government and
Games organisers to the charge that the initial bid was kept artificially low in order
to win public support.
(House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2008: 3)

Irrespective of the criticisms regarding the budgeting for the Games, there is widespread
belief, at least publicly, within the government and those responsible for delivering the
Games that a number of legacy outcomes will emerge following the hosting of the Games
in 2012.

The legacy promises for London 2012

The original London 2012 Candidate File, as we have already seen, set out four general
‘vision’ themes. Two years after the Games were awarded to London, these vision state-
ments were developed further in specific statements that outlined numerous legacy pro-
mises, which came from the DCMS, the GLA and a new public service agreement (PSA
22), which was to ‘Deliver a successful Olympic Games and Paralympic Games with a
sustainable legacy and get more children and young people taking part in high quality PE
and sport’ (HMSO, 2007: 5). The various stated legacy aims are given in Table 7.1.
Despite the variety of legacy aims that have been proposed by the DCMS, the GLA and
in PSA 22, these might be summarized as being about regeneration, social inclusion,
sustainability and a sporting legacy for elite sport and mass participation, which is
expected to have health benefits. One might argue that for a Labour government keen to
focus on what it perceived to be the importance of joined-up thinking, hosting the Games
would be seen as a perfect opportunity to exhibit such an approach because of the myriad
interrelated legacies alleged to emerge from hosting them. However, this fails to
appreciate the relational complexities involved, as in many cases the achievement of one
aim may have unintended consequences that help to undermine others.
The various DCMS and LOCOG publications that have been produced thus far in the
build-up to the Games refer to the idea that the ‘Plans’ are ‘live documents’, suggesting
that they are regularly updated and monitored, at least on an annual basis, and there is a
172 A case study of London 2012
Table 7.1 Legacy visions for London 2012
Our Promise for 2012: How PSA Delivery Agreement 22 Five Legacy Commitments
the UK will Benefit from the (HMSO, 2007: 5–6) (GLA, 2007b: 3)
Olympic Games and
Paralympic Games (DCMS,
2007: 4)
1 Make the UK a world- 1 Construction of the Olympic 1 Increasing opportunities for
leading sporting nation Park and other Olympic venues Londoners to become involved
in sport
2 Transform the heart of East 2 Maximising the regeneration 2 Ensuring Londoners benefit
London benefits of the 2012 Games from new jobs, business and
volunteering opportunities
3 Inspire a generation of 3 The Olympic Park and 3 Transforming the heart of
young people to take part in venues are designed and built East London
local volunteering, cultural according to sustainable
and physical activity principles
4 Make the Olympic Park a 4 Public participation in 4 Delivering a sustainable
blueprint for sustainable cultural and community Games and developing
living activities across the UK and sustainable communities
participation in sporting
activities both in the UK and in
other countries, particularly
those in development
5 Demonstrate the UK is a 5 Creation of a world-class 5 Showcasing London as a
creative, inclusive and system for Physical Education diverse, creative and
welcoming place to live in, (PE) and sport welcoming city
visit, and for business

promise to develop ‘Legacy Action Plans’ annually. In the ‘second Legacy Action Plan’
report Tessa Jowell claimed that ‘too often in the past, governments have expected major
events to bring automatic windfall benefits. But we know now that nothing is guaranteed
without careful planning and initiative from the outset’, and here was a ‘chance to turn
the rhetoric of legacy into fact’ (DCMS, 2008b: 2). In the next section, we will analyze
aspects of the planning and the policy process using the various documents’ focussing on
each defined legacy area. In the process, it will become evident just how significantly the
2012 Games is coming to impact on the broader direction of sport policy in the UK.

London 2012: regeneration legacy?

Although some sports are due to take place beyond the Olympic Park area in 2012,
including sailing events at Weymouth, football matches at various stadia around the UK,
and tennis, archery, beach volleyball, shooting and riding events at other venues in and
around London, on the whole the main focus of the Olympics will, of course, be at the
main Olympic Park. The area where this is being developed, in the Lower Lea Valley,
and the surrounding boroughs are some of the most deprived areas in the country. In
England a measurement of deprivation based on economic, environmental and social
(which includes measurements of educational attainment) factors produces a score for
 A case study of London 2012 173
comparison within the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). Based on this, ‘62 per cent
of the Olympic zone neighbourhoods … are ranked in the top ten most income-deprived
areas in England, and 48 per cent in the worst five’ (Evans, 2007: 312). In addition, the
site identified for the Olympic Park was a brownfield site. In this regard, it is clear that
regeneration of the area is high on the political agenda, for it led Ken Livingstone, the
former Mayor of London and one of the key figures behind the bid, to claim that
‘regeneration was the main reason why I backed the bid’ (GLA, 2007b: 3). Regeneration
is also one of the key features of PSA 22, in which it is stated:

Regenerating the heart of East London is central to the commitment to provide a

lasting and sustainable legacy long after 2012. This will be driven by the development
of a Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF), an overarching plan which will govern
delivery of the regeneration agenda. It is also vital that a sustainable legacy for the
Games’s venues is effectively incorporated into this planning and successfully delivered
when the Games finish in 2012.
(HMSO, 2007: 5)

Even before the Games were awarded to London, proposals were introduced to develop
the area as part of the wider plans to attempt to regenerate the Thames Gateway. The
immutable deadline for when the facilities must be transferred to the IOC in order to
hold the Games has contributed to significant progress being made in relation to receiving
planning permission. The fast injections of cash that substantial regeneration projects of
the kind being proposed here are rarely able to enjoy, and without which they might
never be completed, have also helped in this respect (House of Commons Culture, Media
and Sport Committee, 2007). However, at the same time, ‘by linking capital projects to
an unalterable Olympic timetable, costs may end up higher than they otherwise would
have been’ (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2007: 10). This is
a particularly good illustration of the constraining and enabling aspects of the develop-
ment associated with the building work currently taking place in preparation for the 2012
Games. In other words, by winning the right to host the Games, and with an immoveable
timetable for the completion of the projects, development work has been able to proceed
more swiftly than may have been the case otherwise and planning permission appears to
have been easier to come by. Simultaneously, however, the constraints associated with
the additional pressures to ensure that the build is finished to someone else’s timetable
have meant that some contractors have been able to negotiate higher than normal prices.
An additional unintended consequence, some would argue, of the need to complete the
project by a deadline set by the IOC means that other projects for the region and beyond
may be adversely affected. For example, a planned project to link East and West London
by extending the rail network has been postponed until at least after the Games have
taken place ‘because it would have been impossible to complete in time for 2012’
(Atkinson et al., 2008: 426). In this respect, Raco argues that in previous Games

the failure to build on the existing strengths and continuities of regeneration areas
has resulted in many flagship projects and spectacle-based forms of development
failing to engage with local communities’ needs and aspirations. Indeed, often
implicit in such programmes is the need to change ‘problem’ communities entirely
through processes of gentrification and displacement.
(Raco, 2004: 35)
174 A case study of London 2012
It is clear that some local groups have been deeply resistant to the changes brought about
to the Lower Lea Valley already in preparation for the Games, and some small local
businesses have been forcibly moved on. For example, the Lee Valley Regional Park
Authority (2008: 14) ‘identified the 2012 Olympics as a major risk that could affect all our
key business objectives into the future. The award of the Olympics to London will affect
our land, business, financial and human resources’. Nonetheless, those groups who have
developed the Legacy Action Plans still claim that the regeneration of the area will
emerge from the ‘hard’ infrastructural development, especially from building the Olympic
Village and the sports venues, as well as extending and updating the transport links to
and from the region. Furthermore, it is claimed that new jobs and provision for skills
training for much of the local population will be amongst the other developments that
the lead-up to the Games will generate. Similar claims were made, in the early 1980s,
about the ‘Docklands development’, which saw the building of Canary Wharf and the
establishment of a large financial services sector and housing developments in close
proximity to the Olympic Park. However, this did not produce any noticeable regen-
erative effects in terms of sustained employment for the local population (Evans, 2007;
Macrury and Poynter, 2008). Indeed, ‘critics have rightly argued that the Docklands
development has served to reinforce the polarization between rich and poor communities
in East London’ (Macrury and Poynter, 2008: 2077), with the new housing in and around
Canary Wharf becoming rather exclusive and beyond the means of most of the existing
local population. Furthermore, in the 1990s the development of the Millennium Dome
(the venue for the gymnastics competitions in 2012), also in close proximity to the
Olympic Park, contributed to ‘limited’ regeneration of the region (Evans, 2007: 300). So
what, if anything, will the infrastructural changes brought about by hosting the Olympics
do differently? Of course, investment and, to a certain degree, infrastructural develop-
ment are on a much greater scale. It is argued that after 2012 there will be ‘9,000 high-
quality homes on the Olympic Park site, many of which will be affordable to Londoners
on low incomes. A further 30,000 homes will be built in the surrounding area providing
more affordable accommodation’ (GLA, 2007b: 3). Whilst there is significant potential for
affordable new housing, we have already seen in the case of Barcelona’s Olympic Village
how this, subsequently, served to exacerbate existing social divisions, with many local
residents being unable to afford many of the flats in the Village. It is not clear at this
stage either quite what controls, if any, the GLA has put in place to ensure that what
happened after Barcelona is avoided on this occasion.
A further argument put forward by those hoping that a lasting legacy will emerge from
London 2012 is the new and improved transport links being developed to and from the
main Olympic Park. The ODA (2008: 2) has published an accessible transport strategy
and considers that the Olympics in 2012 ‘will be a catalyst to improve the accessibility of
transport networks across London and the UK’. New underground stations are part of
the transport plan, as well as ‘active transport’, such as walking and cycling, through the
Active Spectator Programme, which ‘is designed to ensure that public transport, walking
and cycling displace all nonessential car use at the Games completely, promoting heal-
thier lifestyles as well as reduced social and environmental impact’ (GLA, 2007c: 9). The
cycle and walkways will remain in and around the Olympic Park once the Games have fin-
ished, with the intention, as with Sport England’s (2007) policy agenda on ‘active design’
(Chapter 5), of promoting physical activity in the day-to-day lives of local residents.
Finally, the development of employment opportunities that is expected to result from,
in the first instance, the building work carried out on the Olympic Park, and thereafter
 A case study of London 2012 175
from the new businesses that it is hoped will be attracted to the region, forms part of the
rationale for the proposed regeneration legacy, and it is hoped that this will ‘create local
jobs, improve skills and help to get thousands of people into work’ (GLA, 2007b: 3). As
noted earlier, however, despite the claimed impact few previous Olympic Games have
generated sustained local employment once the Games have ended. Perhaps in light of
this, the GLA established the London 2012 Employment and Skills Task Force in 2006
and is attempting to use its ‘Olympic’ leverage to ensure that businesses in the area
commit to providing low-level entry jobs for the large number of the adult population in
the Thames Gateway that have no formal qualifications (Evans, 2007). Together with this
comes the establishment of the Personal Best programme (formerly known as the Pre-
Volunteering Programme [PVP]), designed to ‘help Londoners who are not already in
training or work to learn about volunteering and to improve their employment prospects –
and their chance to become a London 2012 volunteer – by developing new skills’ (GLA,
2007c: 5).

London 2012: social inclusion legacy?

We saw in Chapter 4 that the social inclusion agenda is a significant feature of the current
Labour government’s political philosophy and has come to impact significantly on its
sport policy priorities and goals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, and especially given the
ethnic diversity and socio-economic deprivation that characterize the regions surrounding
the Olympic Park, social inclusion is a key feature of the legacy plans for London 2012.
Indeed, particular emphasis is given in many of the Olympic policy statements of the
population diversity of London as a whole, which is said to be the most diverse city in
the world, where over 300 languages are spoken every day. The legacy plans suggest that
Londoners should embrace the cultural celebrations around the Olympics and demonstrate
a united, inclusive but ethnically diverse city (GLA, 2007b). In doing so, it is intended
that a diverse range of volunteers will be recruited who would be able to ensure that ‘all
competing teams and spectators will be made welcome by Londoners who speak their
language or who share their culture’ (GLA, 2007c: 5). Whilst London is, indeed, an
extremely ethnically diverse city, it is difficult to see how hosting the Olympic Games,
like many other sporting events and programmes (see Chapter 4), will help promote
community integration by bringing people from a variety of socio-economic and ethnic
backgrounds ‘together’ in anything other than an ephemeral way.
Volunteering is central to the broader aims associated with social inclusion. Getting
volunteers involved, as was the case with the Manchester Commonwealth Games, is
frequently cited as making a significant contribution to widening sports participation,
generating ‘active citizenship’ and promoting social inclusion (NWDA, 2004). However,
the GLA (2007a: 9) points out that at previous Olympics ‘many volunteers were trained
for specific low-skilled, customer-focused service tasks. There is little evidence of volunteer
skills transferring to the post-Games economy’. Furthermore, the very people who
volunteer in sport are often those people who are already disproportionately involved in
sport, and, in that respect, volunteer recruitment for sports events ‘seems a case of
preaching to the converted and may have had limited impact on sports development’
(Coalter, 2004: 103). The aim of Personal Best, however, following eleven pilot schemes
that took place, ‘engaging over 500 people across London in basic volunteer-related
training’ (LOCOG, 2007a: 8), is to roll the programme out across London, specifically
targeting ‘unemployed people from hard to reach groups’ (HMSO, 2007: 22). It is
176 A case study of London 2012
recognized that ‘the attraction of the course is likely to be its Olympic hook’ (HMSO,
2007: 22). As Coalter (2007b) has noted, however, it is difficult to see how sporting
events, even a global event such as the Olympics, can engage people who are typically
considered ‘hard to reach’ in terms of sports participation. Amongst those groups iden-
tified as ‘heard to reach’ are those who are eligible for, or are in receipt of, incapacity
benefits, including disabled people, people aged over 50, ex-offenders, homeless people in
sheltered accommodation, refugees, asylum seekers eligible to work in the UK and
migrants (LDA, n.d.). Many of these groups are not traditionally already involved in
sport. It is hoped that by 2012 some 20,000 people will have engaged with Personal Best,
and then those who have completed the programme will be given an interview to become
a volunteer at the Games (GLA, 2007b). According to the London Development Agency
(LDA), who, in partnership with the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) and JobCentre
Plus, run Personal Best, 875 people eventually took part in the eleven pilot schemes. Of
these ‘so far 14.5% have already moved onto either full or part time employment and
23.5% into further learning. Their achievements were celebrated alongside Olympians
and Paralympians at a ceremony in Wembley Stadium’ (LDA, n.d.). However, given, as is the
case with many of the legacies proposed, that no obvious targets were set, it is not clear whe-
ther these figures are regarded as having matched expectation or desires. As we will discuss
later, the lack of stated distinct performance indicators (PIs) for the number of legacies being
proposed seems at variance with a Labour government which, for reasons we explain in
Chapter 1, has placed increasing emphasis on accountability, measurement and evaluation,
and evidence-based policy-making.
As well as these tangible attempts to encourage more people to become involved in
community developments and focusing on developing new skills to promote employment
opportunities, it is recognized that there is a need to tackle the health inequalities that
‘profoundly affect east London’s communities’ (LOCOG, 2007b: 48). It is hoped that by
getting more people involved in volunteering, but also by providing more employment
opportunities and altering the environmental landscape of the area, these measures will
go some way to helping improve the health of people across the region.
Another area where the promotion of social inclusion is emphasized is through the
development of sustainable ways of living (e.g. developing a cleaner environment in
which to live) and it is hoped that hosting the Olympics will help to generate and promote
such sustainability. Indeed, according to the LOCOG,

inclusion underpins all other sustainability themes – poorer people and minority groups
are the first to feel the effects of climate change and declining biodiversity – and has a
particularly close link to health. Deprivation also remains a strong determinant of ill-
health.
(LOCOG, 2007b: 40)

As we have seen already, the idea that the Olympics can be a catalyst for sustainable, ‘green’
living first really came to the fore in the legacy statements of the Sydney Games. It is also an
important aspect of the message about legacy that those behind London 2012 want to promote.

London 2012: sustainability legacy?

According to some, ‘the commitments [to sustainable development] contained in the
Candidate File were key to London winning its bid to host the 2012 Games’ (CSL 2012,
 A case study of London 2012 177
2007: 8). In one of its Legacy Action Plans, the LOCOG (2007b: 5) declared that the
sustainability legacy is ‘framed by the concept of “Towards a One Planet Olympics”’.
This was specifically developed from the BioRegional and World Wide Fund for Nature’s
(WWF) ‘One Planet Living’ concept, which sets out various principles required for sus-
tainable living. According to the LOCOG (2007b: 5), ‘as the most high-profile event in
the world, the Games give us the chance to show how changes to the way we build, live,
work, do business and travel could help us to live happy and healthy lives, within the
resources available to us’. With this in mind, the LOCOG (2007b: 9) has set out to pro-
mote education about climate change. It also sets out to manage waste in and around the
Olympic sites more efficiently, promoting biodiversity by leaving a ‘legacy of enhanced
habitats within the Olympic Park’ and attempting to ‘foster an understanding of the
importance of biodiversity in supporting healthy lifestyles’ (LOCOG, 2007b: 9), and
promoting healthy, sustainable ways of living. Furthermore, the building projects asso-
ciated with the Games, it is suggested, will be carried out to the highest, most efficient
environmentally aware specifications (CSL 2012, 2007). In their assessment of the poten-
tial impact of hosting the Games in London, Mean et al. (2004: 131) declared that ‘if a
London 2012 Olympics is to deliver a sustainable legacy, it will be vital to embed the
Olympics within broader programmes and policy agendas that start well before 2012 and
continue well afterwards’. The fact that the four key stakeholders in London 2012, the
DCMS, the GLA, the ODA and, of course, the LOCOG, were all involved in setting up
the Commission for a Sustainable London 2012 (CSL 2012) in January 2007 seems to go
some way towards addressing these concerns. The CSL 2012 is responsible for regularly
reviewing the sustainability process leading up to the 2012 Games, and is to publish regular
reports on progress being made on the legacy commitments for the Games. One of its
earliest reports made the following claim:

Two years since winning the bid, London is further advanced than any other host
city in establishing structures, objectives and policies to implement these [sustainable
development, SD] commitments. In addition, London’s integrated concept of SD,
incorporating social, economic and environmental considerations puts it at the fore-
front of sustainability thinking worldwide.
(CSL 2012, 2007: 8)

However, at this time there are concerns expressed by the CSL 2012 about the failure of
some contracts for building work to meet the required standards for the development of
‘excellent’, sustainable building development as set out in the Building Research Estab-
lishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) (CSL 2012, 2009). As with any
assessments of the action plans in place for all ‘legacies’ associated with the Games, it is
clearly too early to make some kind of assessment of the ‘green’ credentials of the
London 2012 Games here, but it is likely that the ambitions surrounding the ability to
generate a ‘green’ Games are, perhaps inevitably, hampered by major building work. The
sustainable agenda permeating the bid may be explained, in part, by the more ideologi-
cally led dimensions of the bid. As we noted in relation to the bidding process sur-
rounding the Sydney Games, ‘green politics’ has been very much on the international
political agenda in the twenty-first century. Consequently, it is not altogether surprising
to find that the LOCOG, ODA and others appear to have felt constrained to be ‘seen to
be doing’ something in this regard. A key element of the sustainable living approach in
general, however, is the promotion of active transport and healthy living. Both of these
178 A case study of London 2012
policy aims are related to the particular focus on the sporting legacy that the 2012 Games
are expected to leave.

London 2012: sporting legacy?

Perhaps the most obvious claim by various governments for a legacy of hosting the
Olympic Games is the impact that it has on the numbers of people participating in sport
at the grassroots level, but also the focus it can bring to bear on elite-level sport. As we
explained earlier, within the Candidate File a sporting legacy was seen to be ‘at the heart’
of the London bid (London 2012, 2004b: 1), with particular emphasis being placed on the
fact that the population had a great deal of ‘passion’ for sport and that people in the UK
demonstrate that they are keen sports spectators on a regular basis (London 2012, 2004b:
11). This is a rather ambiguous claim that is a rather one-sided, idealistic view of sport
based on an emotional generalization from the few to the whole (Elias and Scotson,
1994). In addition to these claims, it is also expected, somewhat uncritically, that the
Games will help contribute to a central directive of the government’s sport policy: to
increase sports participation by ‘1% year-on-year by 2012’ (DCMS, 2007: 7). Part of this
concern with raising participation generally is the specific focus that has come to be
placed on young people (see Chapter 3). The preoccupation with raising participation
levels among young people found further expression in the 2012 Legacy Action Plan of
the DCMS, in which it was stated that 2008 was ‘to mark the beginning of a golden
decade of sport – raising participation, especially among young people and those who are
least active and to stem the tide of young people dropping out of sport’ (DCMS, 2007:
19). This was even though it was reported by the Culture Select Committee that ‘no host
country has yet been able to demonstrate a direct benefit from the Olympic Games in the
form of a lasting increase in participation’ (House of Commons Culture, Media and
Sport Committee, 2007: 37).
The uncritically accepted view that the Games will have a sporting legacy was also
prominent in the LOCOG’s (2007b: 48) strategy, in which it was stated that, ‘as the
world’s pre-eminent festival of sporting excellence, the Olympic and Paralympic Games
offer huge opportunities to inspire and promote sports participation, play and other
forms of physical activity, and other elements of healthy living’. Such a desire also found
expression in the PSA 22, where it is stated that ‘the hosting of the 2012 Games is
expected to increase public participation in cultural and community activities across the
UK’ (HMSO, 2007: 6). At the time of writing, it was interesting to note that there is no
explicit mention made of the part played by SDOs in helping to achieve these aims in the
legacy action plans of the DCMS, LOCOG or the PSA 22. It is, however, likely that there
‘will be community activities and educational programmes throughout the country’
(DCMS, 2007: 4) and that SDOs will, indeed, be expected to make some contribution to
these aspects of community activity.
In addition to the sporting legacy aims of increasing participation, mostly of young
people, considerable attention is also focused in many of the policy statements related to
London 2012 on enhancing elite success as a significant target for the Games. Even before
the unprecedented modern-day success of Team GB at the Beijing Games, targets for
performance in 2012 were being set and it was hoped that, given the unprecedented suc-
cesses that ‘home’ athletes had enjoyed at previous Olympic Games, ‘home advantage’
would be an important factor in London too. Of course, it is rather naïve to assume that
the better than normal performances by athletes in front of their own crowds at previous
 A case study of London 2012 179
Olympics are somehow related to ‘home advantage’ alone, if at all. Without fail in the
recent past, the financial support in place for elite athletes in the host nation has always
exceeded proportionately that available before. In this sense, the home advantage might
be more reasonably assumed to come from the increased funding offered to the athletes.
Nevertheless, the DCMS (2007: 7) announced that ‘our ultimate goal is to finish fourth in
the Olympic medal table and first in the Paralympic medal table’, goals which, at the time
of publication, were widely regarded as being far too optimistic. However, given the
unprecedented modern-day success of British athletes in Beijing, where fourth and second
place were achieved at the Beijing Olympics and Paralympics, respectively, this overall
target actually remains the same for London 2012.
All of these policy statements are characteristic of the many kinds of legacy promises
being made in a variety of policy publications leading up to the Games. This is not
uncommon, for, as Murphy and Bauman (2007: 199) rightly point out, ‘considerable and
extravagant claims continue to be made by hosts of some major events regarding their
impact on PA [physical activity], sports participation, or the social-change agenda’. They
are made, in the case of those writing policies and legacy action plans for London 2012,
contrary to the government’s rhetoric of evidence-based policy, as they are made without
the support of much, if any, evidence at all. But are the requisite resources being provided
to help ensure the desired ends are achieved?
The London Summer of Sport scheme that started in 2006, and is scheduled to go
beyond 2012, ‘offers free sporting activities for people of all ages across London’ (GLA,
2007b: 6). Numerous clubs have been invited to take part to ensure that this offer is
realized, and, according to the GLA (2007b), several of those clubs taking part have
enjoyed increased numbers of paying members as a direct result of their involvement in
the scheme. The apparent success of the scheme is said to be a significant factor in
extending it over the winter months as well, in the London Winter of Sport programme,
which is more narrowly focused on 5–16-year-olds and is linked to the government’s
desire to offer young people the opportunity to take part in a minimum of five hours of
sport every week (see Chapter 3). It is also related to the London Youth Offer, which is a
programme funded by the LDA and the DCSF aimed at giving young people, particularly
those deemed to be ‘at risk of missing out’, the opportunity to develop new skills and to
‘raise their aspirations’ (GLA, 2007b: 6). In addition, numerous roadshows have been
implemented, in London and elsewhere, in an attempt to showcase the London 2012
Games and provide people, particularly young people, with opportunities to participate
in sport and community activities. Taster sessions in various Olympic and Paralympic
sports like rowing, tennis and boccia are available, with the provision of information about
how and where they can join in beyond the roadshow also being one of the main priorities of
the scheme. To help reinforce the alleged relationship between expected rising levels of parti-
cipation and the benefits of this to health, the GLA (2007c: 17) claimed that the Games repre-
sent the chance to ‘showcase … fitness, healthy living, willpower and self-improvement’. To
help achieve this the GLA (2007c: 17) is said to be working with various partners and, ‘with
critical support from the NHS, will use the inspiration and excitement generated by the Games
to improve physical and mental wellbeing in London’. But to what extent can these aspirations
be achieved in practice? Can increasing participation among the general population be expec-
ted to emerge out of hosting the Olympics?
In assessing the potential for a sporting legacy to be left from hosting the Olympics in
2012, Coalter (2004: 98) argued that ‘if a London 2012 Games is to make any contribution to
a sustained increase in sports participation, it must be as a partner in a much broader
180 A case study of London 2012
development strategy, with a wide range of organisations seeking to build on the heightened
profile of sport’. To some degree the kind of partnership working suggested by Coalter is
beginning to take place in London, with the GLA working with the LDA, the NHS and
others to promote sport and physical activity to the population of London. There is evi-
dence that such strategies are in operation beyond London as well. For example, to
coincide with the build-up to 2012, the DCMS, in partnership with Communities and
Local Government, the Department of Health, the Department for Work and Pensions
and the DCSF, has introduced a scheme whereby local authorities can ‘offer free swim-
ming to the over 60s’ (DCMS, 2008b: 18). It is also proposed that this scheme be rolled
out to include children, with aspirations ‘to move towards universal free swimming’
(DCMS, 2008b: 18). However, offering free swimming, or free use of leisure centres, does
not have particularly good success rates (Coalter, 2007a; Roberts and Brodie, 1992). Just
because such sessions are free does not mean that people will participate, especially those
traditional non-participants who are the focus of many of the schemes. Additionally, this
provides a further opportunity for those already participating to do so more frequently
and in more cost-effective ways.
Nonetheless, it is expected that the introduction of these kinds of schemes to encourage
more people to participate in sport and physical activity will help contribute to improving
health among the participating groups. These schemes are said to be complemented by a
range of other health-based policy initiatives. In December 2008, for example, the
LOCOG announced that ‘we will soon launch “Healthy Active Lifestyles” which will
promote the right balance between healthy eating, physical activity and emotional well-
being, helping children and young people to take small steps to living a more healthy
lifestyle’ (LOCOG, 2008: 23). In addition to these proposals, the government’s latest
strategy on health, Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives (see Chapter 5), sets numerous targets
that coincide with, and are related to, the policy aims of the 2012 Games. Various
national walking campaigns, including the Schools Walking Challenge for 2012, and
other campaigns that are said to be ‘harnessing the inspirational power of the Games’
(LOCOG, 2008: 24) are also being introduced across the country. These include schemes
such as the ‘£140m invested in Cycling England for improved cycling infrastructure and
training, to demonstrate visible change in cycling provision’, and the ‘Healthy Commu-
nity Challenge Fund, which will support new approaches to promoting physical activity,
such [as] increasing the number of cycle lanes, initiating walking promotion schemes, or
referring patients to a gym for a programme of exercise’ (LOCOG, 2008: 24).
In some respects, it might be argued that the build-up to the 2012 Games are having a
direct impact on the declared policy aims and directives of much sport and physical activity
policy in Britain. In the case of those schemes where the promotion of health-enhancing
physical activity (HEPA) is a central objective, especially in more public health-oriented
policy, these schemes tend to be broadly complementary to other existing policies that are
in place already. In relation to sport and elite sports provision, however, the 2012 Games
have come to impact significantly on the policy priorities and objectives of sport policy
more generally. The funding that has been made available to UK Sport from the gov-
ernment in the run-up to 2012, for example, has nearly doubled with 2012 in mind,
although it was also proposed that UK Sport attempt to raise £100 million from the private
sector (NAO, 2008). In light of the increased funding that has become available from the
government and the National Lottery funding streams, in May 2007 UK Sport launched
its Mission 2012 evaluation programme for NGBs as a ‘response to those demanding high
levels of accountability for the significantly increased level of investment [from the
 A case study of London 2012 181
government] in our high-performance system’ (UK Sport, 2007a: 20). Through Mission
2012, UK Sport will assess each Olympic and Paralympic governing body in relation to
three broad areas: (1) the systems in place for the governance, organization, coaching and
other support systems, and facilities; (2) the athletes’ performance, development and
general well-being; and (3) the perceived climate within the sport, related to the experi-
ences of athletes and staff (DCMS, 2008b; NAO, 2008; UK Sport 2007b). However
unrealistic it might be, NGBs will ‘be expected to deliver and operate at high standards of
internal organisation and democracy, ensuring that the voices of all levels and participant
groups are heard’ (Sport England, 2008a: 2), and, in this respect, athletes’ opinions are
sought. Mission 2012 uses a traffic light system in the build-up to the Games to bench-
mark NGBs against agreed goals set for 2012, and this means that, according to UK Sport
(2007b), NGBs ‘will be more effectively monitored and evaluated than ever before’.
Results are published for UK Sport quarterly, and green indicates that the progress is on
track for 2012, amber means that there are areas that have been identified that need closer
examination and red means that the UK Sport panel considers that immediate intervention
is required (UK Sport, 2007b).
These developments are clear examples of the way in which hosting the Games in 2012
is both constraining and enabling those in the UK sport policy figurations. No doubt such
developments will enable those NGBs that can demonstrate that they are achieving tar-
gets, and which can therefore potentially obtain greater levels of funding, to develop the
ESD systems in place in their sport even further. However, they do place a further con-
straint on NGBs already subjected to monitoring and evaluation procedures because
Mission 2012, it seems, is being used alongside these. According to the NAO (2008: 7),
‘some governing bodies were unclear how UK Sport would use the information from
Mission 2012, alongside other performance information, to make funding decisions or
how it would intervene if sports identified significant risks to achieving their goals’. Fur-
thermore, as we saw in Chapter 6, having won the right to host the 2012 Games, UK
Sport broadened its funding, moving from a ‘no compromise’ approach that concentrated
funding primarily on those sports and athletes most likely to achieve medal success, to
‘all Olympic and Paralympic sports to achieve creditable performances at the Games,
even if these will not lead to winning medals, to further their aims to deliver an elite
sporting legacy from the Games’ (NAO, 2008: 6). The NAO (2008: 5) considered that this
‘new’ policy approach, combined with the required focus on generating the £100 million
that had not yet been secured from the private sector, ‘may distract UK Sport’s focus and
funding from its primary goal of winning medals … and on the longer term legacy for
elite sport in the United Kingdom’. UK Sport has, however, since argued that it has not
abandoned its ‘no compromise’ strategy, but that the extra money available had meant
that it was now able to fund sports that could perform ‘creditably’ at home (House of
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2008: 9). However, there are no clear perfor-
mance indicators for what a ‘creditable’ performance means. Nonetheless, the first Mission
2012 report indicated prior to the Beijing Games that two sports, shooting and the
Paralympic sport of goalball, had received the only overall ‘red’ lights. The Team GB
shooting team failed to win any medals at Beijing, and after their funding was cut by
some 78 per cent shooting could no longer afford to employ a Performance Director (The
Times, 12 February 2009). Although several sports were provided with considerable
increases in funding, the reduction in funding for shooting was also compounded by
virtue of the fact that, in part due to the global economic downturn experienced in 2008
and 2009, UK Sport was not able to raise the hoped-for £100 million from the private
182 A case study of London 2012
sector. This was a risk reported by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee
even before the global financial downturn began to accelerate because it claimed that UK
Sport did not have the ‘skills or capacity to raise the £100 million from the private sector’
(NAO, 2008: 6). The media reaction to the apparent shortfall in funding available to ‘our
Olympians’ was considered by many to be a grave situation when ‘we’ are hosting the
Games (e.g. The Independent, 2 December 2008). In view of the concerns expressed by
many within the media and within sports organizations, the government has pledged to
make up some of the shortfall to minimize the impact of this on other NGBs. The irony here is
that the same British media that were initially scathing of the fact that costs for the Olympics
were running so high were now demanding that the government act in light of this shortfall. It
could be argued that an unintended consequence of hosting the Games is the higher level of
scrutiny given by the media, amongst others, to sport policies in the build-up to them, which
can further constrain the government, and NGBs, to be ‘seen’ to be doing something about a
perceived problem relating to the Games. Furthermore, in light of the increased public funding
that has become available to the various NDPBs with a sporting interest, the Sports Minister,
James Purnell, called on Sport England to be more clearly focused on ‘sport development and
sports participation’ (cited in House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2008:
49). The Culture Select Committee expressed disappointment that

fifteen months after publication of our initial Report on preparations for the Games,
no comprehensive plan for maximising participation in sport has been published. A
draft strategy was drawn up and was subject to consultation; but the Central
Council for Physical Recreation told us that it was ‘simply a repackaging of existing
Sport England commitments, within existing spending plans’ and that it was in any
case withdrawn … There appears to be no shortage of activity in developing plans
for participation. In fact, the profusion of commitments, promises and plans for
using the potential of the Games to increase participation in sport being developed,
whether real or rumoured, is bewildering; but none of what is proposed amounts to
a single, comprehensive, nationwide strategy.
(House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2008: 53–54)

When Sport England (2008a) eventually did publish its ‘new’ strategy in June 2008, which
focused, in particular, on community sport, the strategy and goals for sport were strikingly
similar to what preceded it, which amounted, in many respects, to little more than a
restatement of previous policy statements. Nonetheless, the fact that the London Olympics
were ‘little over four years from now’ was regarded as being ‘an appropriate time [for the
government] to take a clear look at the sport development system and its fitness for
purpose’ (Sport England, 2008a: 1). The proliferation of plans and policy statements that
have been produced, most especially since the bid to host the Games was won, provide us
with plentiful examples that the government, and related organizations, seems to suffer
from what has been referred to as ‘intiative-itis’ regarding sport. That is to say, it is
further illustration that the government seems to be more interested in take-offs and not
landings (Coalter, 2007a).

Summary
There is much to be commended in some of the preparations taking place for London
2012, and especially the attempts being made to integrate into existing policy some of the
 A case study of London 2012 183
new policy directives that are emerging as a direct result of the Games. This, together
with the development of partnerships working with a variety of sports and non-sports
organizations already involved in the delivery of similar policy goals and initiatives, is
essential if progress towards the legacy ambitions is to be realized to any degree (Coalter,
2004). This is also a conclusion that was drawn by EdComs, a company commissioned by
the DCMS in 2007 to assess the legacy potential for mega-events, who also argued that
‘legacy strategies will need to be embedded in existing programmes and policy areas to
achieve success in the long term and real benefits to participation provided’ (EdComs,
2007: 9). In addition to these potential strengths, there are also tentative signs that those
responsible for writing and implementing the London bid are learning from some of the
mistakes made in the build-up to, and hosting of, previous Olympic Games. Cashman
(2006: 165), for example, argued that ‘the history of Sydney Olympic Park suggests the
need for future Olympic cities to plan carefully beforehand for the post-Olympic out-
comes of venues and precincts’. That there are already plans in place for a London
Olympic Institute, utilizing most of the permanent facilities, suggests that some things
have been learned from the Sydney Games. At the time of writing, however, debate
regarding the post-Games use of the main Olympic Stadium is ongoing, and at present
there is little concrete evidence to suggest that much thought has been given to ensuring
that the stadium does not become a ‘white elephant’. Although there are still plans to
ensure that an athletics track remains at the venue and that its capacity will, in all like-
lihood, be downgraded from an 85,000 to a 25,000 capacity stadium, it is hoped that a
professional football or rugby union club may use the venue, as was the case following
the Manchester Commonwealth Games, when Manchester City Football Club took up
residence. However, so far no sports club has pledged to do this.
Notwithstanding the attempts to integrate the Olympic-specific policy priorities into
other existing policy, it is also clear from our above analysis that the general consensus
amongst academics, at least, is that recent bids for the Olympic Games have been rather
ambitious and unrealistic considering the lack of prevailing evidence and, as such, it is
important that more ‘caution needs to be exercised in accepting all that is claimed’ (Vigor
et al., 2004: 3). As we noted earlier, the legacies that are expected to follow the Summer
Olympic Games are very difficult to measure, and, if anything, the evidence suggests that
these impacts ‘are fleeting, at best, and as the years pass it becomes difficult to isolate the
impacts of the mega-event on the fortunes and stature of a city from those of other eco-
nomic triggers or from larger cycles of growth and recession’ (Whitson and Horne, 2006:
86). On the basis of the available evidence, it is extremely unlikely that the London
Games will be any different, especially because the legacy action plans that have been
developed, and, in some cases, are now being implemented, are ‘trying to achieve change
that no other Olympic and Paralympic Games have delivered’ (EdComs, 2007: 50).
Indeed, even one of the government’s own Select Committees, for example, has noted
that ‘doubts have already emerged, both about the cost of staging the Games and about
whether a lasting benefit can be achieved’ (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport
Committee, 2007: 3).
Not only can the potential benefits derived from the hosting of the Olympics be
excessively exaggerated and risk huge cost overruns, it is inevitable that several unin-
tended consequences will emerge from hosting the Games that may not always be seen as
desirable by several of the groups involved (Gold and Gold, 2007a; Gratton et al., 2006).
As Gratton et al. point out, amongst the most obvious unintended consequences that
frequently result from the hosting of mega-events such as the Olympic Games are:
184 A case study of London 2012
high construction costs of sporting venues and related other investments, in particular
in transport infrastructure; temporary congestion problems; displacement of other
tourists due to the event; and underutilized elite sporting facilities after the event
which are of little use to the local population.
(Gratton et al., 2006: 42)

In addition to these issues, it is clear that, given the sheer size of the Games and the vast
sums of money required to support their delivery, the government funds (especially
National Lottery monies) allocated to other organizations, including charities and those
responsible for sport, have already been reduced in some cases, as the cost of the Games
continues to escalate (Coalter, 2007b). The House of Commons Culture, Media and
Sport Committee has noted in this regard that

National Lottery distributors for the main ‘good causes’ – arts, charities, heritage
and sport … are already suffering a decrease in income because a significant part of
Lottery funds are going towards financing the Games. A further call on the Lottery
would deprive existing good causes of even more resources and threaten severe delay
or damage to existing programmes.
(House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2007: 3)

The direct impact that this diversion of funds has had already on grassroots sport is
made clear by Girginov and Hills (2008: 2096–97), who point out that, ‘at the national
level, the lottery funding was raided to help pay rising games costs to the tune of £65m,
reducing funds for sports development. The diversion represented an 8% cut of Sport
England’s budget’. Sport England, of course, now has a specific responsibility for the
development of community sport, and its ability to realize its community-sport objectives
might be further compromised as growing emphasis comes to be placed on the need for
UK Sport to sustain its funding of NGBs in the build-up to the Games. This, in turn, will
inevitably come to impact on the capacity of NGBs, and especially those whose funding
may be reduced by UK Sport’s ‘no compromise’ strategy, to balance and support both
their grassroots and elite sport priorities.
In relation to the expected regeneration benefits thought to be derived by those living
in the Lower Lea Valley area, as Raco (2004: 37) argues, ‘if the Olympic Games is to be
judged as “successful” then the quality of life in such neighbourhoods needs to be sig-
nificantly improved. In short, it needs to generate development of, not just development
in, local areas’. At the moment, it is difficult to establish the extent to which hosting the
Games may bring about these benefits for local residents. In this respect, it is not at all
clear what, if any, plans are in place to ensure that the very people whom the regeneration
of the area is supposed to benefit will not be adversely affected and what, for example, is
in place to ensure that the area does not experience a process of gentrification that would
make the new housing unaffordable for most of the current residents. As Preuss (2004:
80) argues, ‘the people who are often seriously impacted by Olympic Games are those
who are least able to form community groups and protect their own interests’. It is dif-
ficult to see, apart from the volunteer programmes in place to try and engage the current
local community, how simply developing the area will actually ‘address the causes of
multiple deprivation in the area’ (Vigor et al., 2004: 28).
It is also not at all likely that the hoped-for economic gains through hosting the Games
will be matched. There are certainly no guarantees that the money generated through
 A case study of London 2012 185
tourism will yield significant gains, if any. Indeed, it is highly likely that, as Newman
(2007: 256) argues, ‘London is already the most visited city globally … [and] the large
numbers of visitors expected to attend the 2012 Games will replace other tourists who
will avoid London during this period’ (Newman, 2007: 256). It is also a distinct possibi-
lity that, as we explained earlier, various construction firms will increase the costs
involved in constructing the infrastructure given the time constraints under which the
ODA and the LOCOG are placed by virtue of the immoveable Games deadline. This is
further compounded by the fact that hosts of the Games frequently try to ensure their
events are more ‘spectacular’ than previous Games. As part of these broader constraints,
it is not uncommon for commissioned designs for buildings to be overly ambitious, and
that can contribute to already escalating costs. This has been a point of criticism
regarding the design of the proposed Aquatics Centre for London, for example, which
has already been scaled back from the original proposal, and even at the time of writing
the final architectural design specification is sufficiently ambitious that only one firm
bidder for the project was secured. The failure to develop a competitive and cost-effective
design was criticized by the Culture Select Committee, who stated that ‘the history of the
Aquatics Centre shows a risible approach to cost control and that the Games organisers
seem to be willing to spend money like water’ (House of Commons Culture, Media and
Sport Committee, 2008: 4). Such a criticism must, of course, be seen in the climate of
rising costs generally, and in light of the current global economic climate. We have
already mentioned how the Montreal Games took place against the backdrop of a global
recession, and clearly the current economic situation is already having a significant
impact on London. The potential threat of the organizers going beyond the already
revised £9.325 billion budget will severely hamper them from sustaining their claim that
the London 2012 Games will be an ‘economic success story’. At the time of writing, it is
clearly impossible to know when there will be an upturn in the global economic situation
and when the current financial pressures that are being experienced will be relieved to
some extent. However, what this serves to demonstrate is that, even with careful plan-
ning – although we are not saying that this bid has been carefully planned in this sense –
it is impossible for policy-makers to control broader social processes that have con-
tributed to the global recession.
Notwithstanding all of this, ‘the reproach of Olympic opponents that funds could be
used for more “sensible” projects than for the Games is not correct since the largest part
of the funds would not come into the host city without the Games’ (Preuss, 2004: 292).
Therefore, it might be argued that the temptation to bid for the Games in view of the
potential economic and cultural gains to be made is something of a double-bind for the
local and national governments involved. The likely investment makes it, in some cases,
the only realistic prospect for large-scale development to take place. On the other hand,
however, as costs escalate, often simply to cover the logistical requirements of hosting
such mega-events as the Olympic Games, the desired legacy outcomes tend to become
more ambitious. We have already seen that the sheer logistical task of hosting the Games
has contributed to increasing costs that, when heavily subsidized by public monies, need
to be presented by the government to the voting public as contributing to the achievement
of broader social, economic and even ecological goals. This situation is compounded by
the growing relational complexity of an increasingly globalized economy, where interna-
tional competition for jobs and capital investment has contributed further to seeing the
Olympic Games as a potential ‘panacea’ for meeting the ‘social and economic’ priorities
of government (Horne, 2007: 92).
186 A case study of London 2012
As Andranovich et al. (2001: 113) argue, in the global competition for urban invest-
ment ‘a new and potentially high-risk strategy for stimulating local economic growth has
emerged. This strategy, called the mega-event strategy, entails the quest for a high-profile
event to serve as a stimulus to, and justification for, local development’. The measure-
ment of Olympic legacies is, therefore, susceptible to ‘political interpretation’ (Malfas et
al., 2004: 209). In this respect, the phrase ‘sustainable legacy’ has become part of the
Olympic discourse, but, as Vigor et al. (2004: 8) argue, ‘“sustainable legacy” is a slippery
term subject to different interpretations and diverse perspectives as to what type of legacy
is desirable or achievable’. In the case of London 2012 we have seen that, whilst several
specific ‘performance indicators’ have been included in legacy plans relating to increasing
participation in sport, for example, most aims are so general as to represent what, in the
event, amounts to little more than a ‘wish list’ of outcomes from hosting the Games. As
Gold and Gold (2007b: 46) have noted in relation to analyses of previous bids, there is ‘a
strong dose of wish fulfilment’ in the projected legacy outcomes. The people writing the
bids are, to put it bluntly, too involved to be able to see the wood for the trees. In other
words, wishful thinking can be traced back to the individual and group ideological lean-
ings of those involved. Of course, they are constrained, as the competition to host the
Games becomes stronger, to offer more and more goals that are, in fact, likely to prove
unattainable and may result in outcomes that no one has intended. To this end, it is clear
that ‘the winning of the competition is a distinct exercise from the actual budgeting for
the event’ (GLA, 2007a: 8), and those involved in bidding for cities often, perhaps quite
deliberately, underestimate the cost whilst overestimating the potential achievement of
the Games in bringing about desired social outcomes. The GLA (2007b: 15–16) has noted
in a similar manner that ‘enthusiasm, perhaps inspired by the powerful affective charge
associated with the Olympic brand, can encourage an overestimation and presumption, in
terms of specific socio-cultural outcomes ushered in by the “magic” of the Olympics’. The
extent to which these outcomes can be achieved will, of course, be a matter of empirical
investigation. But whether they are, in fact, achieved and the processes through which
they are delivered will, at the very least, result from the intended and unintended out-
comes of the differential power relationships that characterize the networks of inter-
dependencies that constitute the global Olympic figuration. We consider, in fact, that a
broad unintended consequence of the increasing competition to host the Games between
cities and governments is a process of ‘legacy gigantism’, where each bidding city com-
petes with the others to host an Olympic Games with the ‘best legacies ever’.

Revision questions
1 Analyze the Olympic legacies that have emerged from previous Olympic Games.
2 Provide a sociological assessment of the developments that have been implemented
so far to help deliver the legacy outcomes of the London 2012 Games.
3 Examine the impact that hosting the Games has had on domestic sport policy in
a country of your choice.
 A case study of London 2012 187
Key readings
Preuss, H. (2004) The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972–2008,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Roche, M. (2000) Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global
Culture, London: Routledge.
Vigor, A., Mean, M. and Tims, C. (2004) (eds) After the Gold Rush: A Sustainable Olympics for
London, London: IPPR and Demos.

Recommended websites
Games Monitor: Debunking Olympic Myths: www.gamesmonitor.org.uk
International Olympic Committee: www.olympic.org
Olympic Games and Paralympic Games: London 2012: www.london-2012.co.uk
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Index

A Sporting Future for All (DCMS) 49–51, 64, Baker, J. et al. 145, 154
82, 115, 144–45 Banks, Tony 48, 147–48
Abbott, A. and Collins, D. 150 Barcelona Games (1992) 159; Olympic Village
Action Sport programme 38–40, 44 development 162, 174
Active Communities 50 Barclays Spaces for Sports: effectiveness of
Active Design project 120–21, 174 86–88; legacies 87; monitoring and
‘Active England’ 122 evaluation 88; participation 87–88; and
Active for Life 113 social inclusion 85–88
Active People Survey, England 124 baseball 154
Active Programmes 48–49 basketball 154
Active Spectator Programme 174 Beamish, R. and Ritchie, I. 133, 134, 138, 149,
active travel 121, 130 150
Advisory Sports Council (ASC) 33 Beckwith, John 62
Allender, S. et al. 110 Beijing Games (2008) 159, 163
Amateur Athletics Union (AAU) 140 Bergsgard, N. et al. 139, 146
Amateur Sports Act (1978) 140 Best, J. 123
American College of Sports Medicine (ACSM) Best Value 49–50, 52
110 Best Value Performance Plan 50
American Heart Association (AHA) 110 Best Value Through Sport: Case Studies (Sport
Amsterdam Treaty 81 England) 113
Andranovich, G. et al. 186 BioRegional 177
Aquatics Centre for London 185 birth cohort studies 103–4
Association for Physical Education (AfPE) Bloyce, D. et al. 116, 127
64 body mass index (BMI) 123
At Least Five a Week: Evidence on the Impact Boreham, C. and Riddoch, C. 123
of Physical Activity and Its Relationship to Brighton Declaration (1994) 44
Health (DH) 117 British Academy of Sport 47
Athens Games (2004) 159, 163, 165 British Association of Advisers and
Atkinson, G. et al. 160 Lecturers in Physical Education (BALPPE)
Atlanta Games (1996) 158, 159 see Association for Physical Education
Audit Commission 24, 43, 90 (AfPE)
Australia: elite sports development (ESD) British Medical Association (BMA) 13, 15
systems 141–42; health promotion 111; British Olympic Association (BOA) 30–31,
obesity 109; and social inclusion 81; talent 32, 41
identification and development (TID) Brooking, Trevor 113
programmes 142, 153; women in sport Brown, Gordon 121
141–42; youth participation in sport 58 brownfield sites 161
Australian Coaching Council 141 BSkyB 63
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare BTCV 85
(AIHW) 111 budgeting 25; see also funding
Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) 141–42, 149, Building Research Establishment
151 Environment Assessment Method
Australia’s Health report 111 (BREEAM) 177
 Index 205
Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft (BISp) Coghlan, J.: election of Howell 36; facility
138 provision 33; government involvement 34;
Burnham, Andy 53 Sports Council 41; target group
identification 37; Wolfenden Report 30
Cabinet Office 35 Cohen, S. 125
Caborn, Richard 121 Collins, M.: coaching 153; compulsory
Campbell, Sue 65–66 competitive tendering (CCT) 43, 49; health
Canada: elite sports development (ESD) and physical activity 115; mass participation
systems 137–39; health promotion 110–11, 40; National Lottery funding 46
129; obesity 109–10 Collins, M. and Kay, T.: crime reducing
Canadian Academy of Sport Medicine (CASM) strategies 92; social inclusion schemes 102
139 Collins, M. et al.: social inclusion schemes 98, 104
Canary Wharf 174 commercial influences: and funding 154
Casey, Derek 42 Commission for a Sustainable London 2012 177
Cashman, R. 3, 161, 164, 183 Communities and Local Government 180
Cassani, Barbara 166, 167 community renewal 80
Central Council for Physical Recreation community sport 53, 122, 182
(CCPR) 30–32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 115 Comprehensive Performance Assessment
Central Council for Recreative and Physical (CPA) 52
Training (CCRPT) 110, 112 compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 43,
Chalip, L. 140 44, 49
Children’s Plan: Building Brighter Futures (The Conservative Party/government 38, 44, 47;
Stationery Office) 69 sport policy 41–42; view of sport 32, 34, 153
China 109, 111 Council of Europe 114
Choosing Activity 119, 121 Countryside Agency 118
Choosing Health 116–17, 121 County Sports Partnerships (CSPs) 23, 66
circuitry of research funding 124 Crabbe, T. 94–95, 98, 99, 102, 105
civilizing process 147 Crawford, R. 113
‘club-based development’ 153 Crime Concern 94
coaching 137, 153; diminishing contrasts 151; crime reduction 92–94, 106–7
elite-level 145–46; specialist community Culture Select Committee 178, 182, 185
coaches 70 Cunningham, Jack 143
Coalter, F. 6, 38; compulsory competitive Cunningham Review 143, 146
tendering (CCT) 43, 44; crime reducing Cycling England 180
strategies 92; definition of sport 114; desired
outcomes of policy 17; evidence-based policy Davis, G. and Dawson, N. 96–97
making 20; government control 30; De Bosscher, V. et al. 2, 145, 147, 153
government policies 117; lifestyle activities De Knop, P. and De Martelaer, K. 59
59, 60; London 2012 Games sporting legacy delinquency: and participation in sport 100
179–80; mass participation 40; monitoring Department of Children, Schools and Families
and evaluation 21; moral panics 123–24; on (DCSF) 63, 67, 77, 123, 179
obesity 125; on PE and school sport (PESS) Department for Culture, Media and Sport
76; on personal responsibility 80; Positive (DCMS) 48, 53–54, 63, 67, 77, 89, 115, 120,
Futures, peer leaders 95; short-termism 128; 122, 126, 143; London 2012 Games 166, 169,
on social capital 83; social inclusion 52–53; 171, 177, 178–79, 180
on social inclusion 84; social inclusion Department of the Environment (DoE) 38
schemes 99, 100–101; social significance of Department of the Environment, Transport
sport 37–38, 81; sport policy 78; sports and the Regions (DETR) 49
development approach 126; sports Department of Health (DH) 89, 118, 180;
participation 126–27; sports participation physical activity levels 119; sports
and delinquency 100; sports participation development approach 126; use of BMI 123
and educational performance 73; on the Department for Innovation, Universities and
Third Way 49; on volunteering 175–76; A Skills (DUIS) 77
Wider Social Role for Sport: Who’s Keeping Department of National Heritage (DNH) 45,
the Score? 2 46–48
Coalter, F. et al. 128 Department for Work and Pensions 180
Coe, Sebastian 167, 169 detachment 6–7
206 Index
Deutsche Hochschule für Körperkultur English Institute for Sport (EIS) 145, 153
(DHfK) 137 English Sports Council 45, 46, 48
Deutsche Vereinigung für Sportwissenschaft environment: and health 127; and the Olympic
(DVS) 138 Games 163–64, 177
diminishing contrasts 147, 155; coaching 151; Essex, S. and Chalkley, B. 159, 163
elite sports development (ESD) systems 150– European Commission (EC): White Paper on
51; funding 150; sports science and medicine Sport 81–82
151; talent identification and development European Union: and social inclusion 81–82
(TID) programmes 150–51 Evans, G. 158
DIVERT Trust: Match of the Day 105 Every Child Matters 69, 89
Docklands development 174 Everyday Sport campaign 119–20
Dopson, S. and Waddington, I. 14, 16, 19
Driver, S. and Martell, L. 51 facility development 35–37, 41
Driving Up Participation: The Challenge for facility provision 33–34
Sport (Rowe, N. et al.) 118 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 134; elite
drugs 97, 135, 137; context 99; German sports development (ESD) systems 137;
Democratic Republic (GDR) 149; reduction funding 138
through sport 98–99, 105; Soviet Union 149 figurational sociology 3–7
drugs prevention teams: funding 96 figurations 13–14; and policy issues 15, 18–19
drugs rehabilitation programmes 102 Finland 59, 61, 126
Dubin Inquiry 139 fitness crazes 127–28
Dunning, E. 3, 124 Five Hour Offer 77–78
Dunning, E. and Waddington, I. 59 Flanders 59
Flintoff, A. 64
Early Bird study 110 Football Association 88
Eastern Europe: health promotion 111 Football Foundation 85, 87, 88, 89, 93
economy: global downturn 163, 182, 185; and football hooliganism 38
obesity 110; and the Olympic Games 160, Football in the Community 88
184–85, 185–86 Football League 88
EdComs 183 Ford, Gerald 139–40
Eiðsdóttur, S. et al. 59 Foresight Report (2007) 120
Eisenhower, President 110 Forschungsinstitut für Körperkultur und Sport
Elias, N. 3, 7; diminishing contrasts 151; elite (FKS) 137
sports development (ESD) systems 146–47, four ‘Cs’ 77
155; figurational sociology 4; game models 4; funding 75, 80; and commercial influences 154;
human understanding and values 5; inter- diminishing contrasts 150; drugs prevention
state rivalry 148; involvement and teams 96; elite sports development (ESD)
detachment 5–6; theoretical and empirical systems 135; Federal Republic of Germany
work 6; unplanned outcomes 15–16 (FRG) 138; German Democratic Republic
Elias, N. and Dunning, E. 98 (GDR) 150; London 2012 Games 170–71;
elite athletes 41 National Lottery 45, 47; Olympic Games
elite sports 33, 36, 42, 47, 50, 62; and facility 158, 180–82, 184; social inclusion schemes
development 41; Sports Council 40–41 96; Soviet Union 150; Sport England 184;
elite sports development (ESD) systems 10, talent identification and development (TID)
146–47, 155; Australia 141–42; Canada 137– programmes 144; United Kingdom 142–43
39; diminishing contrasts 150–51; emergence
of 133–34; Federal Republic of Germany game models 4
(FRG) 137; funding 135; German Game Plan: A Strategy for Delivering
Democratic Republic (GDR) 134–37, 147, Government’s Sport and Physical Activity
148; globalization 146–49; government Objectives (DCMS) 51–52, 82, 115–16, 118,
involvement 133–34; homogenous model 121, 126, 143, 166
134; increasing varieties 152–55; Soviet Gard, M. and Wright, J. 109, 124, 125
Union 134–37, 147, 148; United Kingdom gender: equity 44; Kickz – Goals Thru Football
142–46; United States of America 134, 139– programme 91
40, 153–54 German Democratic Republic (GDR) 10;
England: The Sporting Nation (English Sports contrasted with Soviet Union 152; elite
Council) 48 sports development (ESD) systems 134–37,
 Index 207
147, 148; funding 150; talent identification 116–17; and SDOs 112, 114, 127; socio-
and development (TID) programmes 137, economic factors 129
149, 153; use of drugs 149 Health Survey for England 118
Germany see Federal Republic of Germany Healthier Communities (Sport England) 122
(FRG); German Democratic Republic healthism 113, 119, 128–29
(GDR) ‘Healthy Active Lifestyles’ 180
Gessellschaft für Sportmedizin der DDR 137 healthy alliances 120
Gifted and Talented 145 ‘Healthy Community Challenge Fund’ 180
gigantism 158, 159 Healthy People 2000 (US Department of
Girginov, V. and Hills, L. 160, 184 Health and Human Services) 111
Girls4Gold 144 Healthy People 2010 (US Department of
global diffusions: and human figurations 155 Health and Human Services) 111
globalization: elite sports development (ESD) Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives: A Cross-
systems 146–49 Government Strategy for England (DH/
Gold, J. and Gold, M. 186 DCSF) 121–22, 180
Good Causes fund 89 Henry, I. and Bramham, P. 30
Government Olympic Executive (GOE) 169 Hoberman, J. 135, 139, 149
governments: and elite sports development Home Country Sports Institutes 145
(ESD) systems 133–34; involvement in sport Home Office 94, 96
29–35, 44, 133–34, 150; ministers for sport Home Office Crime and Drug Strategy
45; and social inclusion schemes 84–85 Directorate 93
Gratton, C. 126, 129 Horne, J. 164
Gratton, C. and Taylor, P. 101, 106–7 Houlihan, B. 1–2, 3, 33, 34, 47, 48
Gratton, C. et al. 160, 163, 166, 183 Houlihan, B. and Green, M. 2, 62, 65, 76, 133–
Great Britain Sports Council 34 34
Greater London Authority (GLA) 162, 169, Houlihan, B. and Lindsey, I. 39, 71–72
174, 175, 177, 179, 186 Houlihan, B. and White, A. 7; Action Sport
Green, C. 93 programme 39; on Active Programmes 48–
Green, K. et al. 61 49; Conservative government sport policy
Green, M. 50, 142, 143, 145, 152–53 42; elite athletes 41; facility development 35;
Green, M. and Houlihan, B. 2; Australian on “joined-up thinking” 82; mass
sport model 142; coaching 146; commercial participation 36, 40; ministers for sport 45;
influences 154; Conservative government on National Lottery funding 46; on NGBs
sport policy 42; elite sports development 41; political interest 44; social inclusion 80;
(ESD) systems 151; social significance of on Sport and Recreation 37; sports
sport 33; sports science and medicine 146; development 8, 38, 42; sports equity 44–45;
talent identification and development (TID) welfare policy 38; on Wolfenden Report 30
programmes 136–37; UK elite sports Houlihan, B. et al. 3
development (ESD) systems 142; Western House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport
elite sports development (ESD) systems 152 Committee 171, 184
Green, M. and Oakley, B. 135, 138, 153, 155 House of Commons Health Committee 130
Greenpeace 164 House of Commons Public Accounts
Groundwork 85, 87 Committee 181
Howell, Denis 33, 34, 36
Hailsham, Lord 32 human figurations: and global diffusions 155
Haywood, L. et al. 35 human understanding and values 5
health 10, 112–13, 127; and London 2012 Hunt, T. 140
Games 176, 179–80; and moral panics 122–
25; New Labour policy 113–15; and physical Iceland 59
activity 108–9; risks 117–18, 126; young increasing varieties 155; elite sports
people 56–57 development (ESD) systems 152–55; talent
Health Action Zones 114 identification and development (TID)
health-enhancing physical activity (HEPA) 116, programmes 153
118, 124, 127, 180 Independent European Sport Review (IESR) 23
Health of the Nation, The (DH) 112, 113 individual responsibility 113, 128–29
health promotion 110–11, 113, 129; Institute of Youth Sport: Physical Education,
environmental factors 129–30; and policy School Sport and Club Links (PESSCL) 71
208 Index
inter-state rivalry 147–49, 150 Local Exercise Action Pilots (LEAPs) 118, 119
International Olympic Committee (IOC) 135, Local Government Act (1988) 42
158, 159, 160, 169 Local Government Act (1999) 49–51
Ipsos MORI 23–24 Local Government Planning and Land Act
Ireland 113 (1980) 42
Local Hero Awards 85
Jackson, D. 43 London 2012: A Vision for the Olympic
Johnson, Ben 139 Games and Paralympic Games (London
‘joined-up thinking’ 49, 82, 113, 114–15, 116, 2012) 167
117, 121 London 2012 Candidate File 167–68, 171, 176,
Jowell, Tessa 169, 170, 172 178
Junior Sport Leader Awards 63, 70 London 2012 Employment and Skills Task
Force 175
Karpf, A. 123, 127–28 London 2012 Games 77, 122, 144, 159; the bid
Kasimati, E. 160 165–69; budget 170–71; economic legacy
Keech, M. 7 168; employment opportunities 174–75; and
Kickz – Goals Thru Football programme 88– global economic downturn 163; health
90; effectiveness of 90–91; and gender 91; benefits 176, 179–80; legacies 167, 171–72;
monitoring and evaluation 90; participation organizational structure 169–70;
90–91; social benefits 91–92; women 91 regeneration legacy 172–75, 184; security
Knight, Kavanagh and Page (KKP) 23 170–71; and social inclusion 168, 175–76;
Kok Report 81 sporting legacy 167–68, 178–82; and sports
Kristèn, L. et al. 59 participation 165–66; sustainability legacy
176–78; transport structure 174
Laakso, L. et al. 59 London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic
Labour Party/government 45, 48; facility Games Act (2006) 169
development 36; and social exclusion 82; London Development Agency (LDA) 176, 179
and sports development 77; view of sport 33, London East Research Unit 162
153 London Olympic Institute 168, 183
Lalonde Report 110 London Organizing Committee of the Olympic
Learning and Skills Council (LSC) 176 and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) 169, 170,
Learning through PE and Sport (DfES) 66 171, 176, 177, 178, 180
Lee Valley Regional Park Authority 174 London Summer of Sport scheme 179
legacies: Barclays Spaces for Sports 87; legacy London Winter of Sport programme 179
gigantism 158, 186; London 2012 Games London Youth Offer 179
167, 171–72; London 2012 Games economic Long, J. et al. 86, 92
legacy 168; London 2012 Games Long-Term Athlete Development (LTAD)
regeneration legacy 172–75, 184; London 143–44
2012 Games social inclusion legacy 175–76; Los Angeles Games (1984) 158, 160
London 2012 Games sporting legacy 167–68, Lower Lea Valley 168, 170, 172, 174, 184
178–82; London 2012 Games sustainability
legacy 176–78; measuring 183; Olympic Macfarlane, Neil 40, 41
Games 10–11, 158–59, 160–61, 164–65, 183, Magdalinski, T. 141
186; performance indicators (PIs) 176; Maguire, J. 155
Sydney Games (2000) sporting legacy 165 Mahoney, J. et al. 104
Legacy Action Plans 172, 174, 177, 178 Major, John 43–44, 45, 62, 142
legacy gigantism 158, 186 Malcolm, D. 3
Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) 173 Malfas, M. et al. 186
Levitas, R. 79 Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games 161,
Leyton Orient Community Sports Programme 165, 183
102–3 Manchester City Football Club 183
lifestyle activities 59 Manpower Services Commission 38
Lisbon Review 81 Mapp, Derek 120–21
Lisbon Strategy 81 Martindale, R.J.J. et al. 150
Livingstone, Ken 173 McDermott, L. 124, 125, 128
Livingstone, M. et al. 123 McDonald, I. 52
local authorities 43, 44, 46–47, 50–51, 52 Mean, M. et al. 177
 Index 209
medals: targets 135, 143 New Labour: modernizing Britain 51–52; physical
mega-events see London 2012 Games; Olympic activity for health policy 115–21; public
Games health policy 113–16; sport policy 48–54
Mennell, S. 4 New Zealand 111
Merkel, U. 135 Newman, P. 185
Metropolitan Police 88, 89 NHS Plan 117
Midnight Basketball 93 Nichols, G. 93–94, 105
Miettinen, S. 23 Nichols, G. and Taylor, P. 100, 102
Millennium Dome 174 non-communicable diseases: and lack of
Mission 2012 180–82 activity 109–10
monitoring and evaluation: Barclays Spaces for non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) 182
Sports 88; baseline data 21–22; comparative North West Development Agency (NWDA)
analysis 22–23; continuous process 22; 161, 165
independent consultants 23–24; Kickz – Norway 59
Goals Thru Football programme 90; lack of
43; modernizing agenda 52; policy change Oakley, B. and Green, M. 134, 141, 146, 147,
26; process-oriented 21; qualitative data 22; 153–54
quantitative data 22; resistance to 20–21; obesity 108–9, 121–22, 127, 130; economic
School Sport Partnerships 75; social impact 110; moral panic 124; and physical
inclusion schemes 96, 100–103, 104, 106 activity 120; population-level data on 123;
Montreal Games (1976) 158, 160, 162, 185 related illnesses 123; young people 109, 110
moral panics 122–25, 128 objective management approach 43
‘More People, More Places, More Medals’ Ofsted 69–70, 145
(ESC) 48 Olympic Board 169
Morris, J. et al. 108 Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) 169, 177
multiple deprivation 80 Olympic Games 135, 157; economic impact
Munich Games (1972) 162 160, 184–85, 185–86; expansion of 158, 159;
Murphy, N. and Bauman, A. 179 funding 158, 180–82, 184; gigantism 158,
Murphy, P. 25 159; legacies 10–11, 158–60, 160–61, 164–65,
Murphy, P. and Sheard, K. 18, 20 183, 186; negative impact 184; and
Murphy, P. et al. 4 participation in sport 165; and regeneration
158–60, 161–63, 184; sporting legacy 164–65;
Nacro 85 sustainability legacy 163–64, 186; and
National Audit Office 181 transport structure 162; unplanned outcomes
National Centres 34 183–84; and urban regeneration 161–63
National Coaching Foundation (NCF) 145–46 Olympic Village development: Barcelona
National Collegiate Athletic Association Games (1992) 162, 174
(NCAA) 140, 154 Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
National Curriculum Physical Education (OCOG) 160
(NCPE) 58, 62 Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion 111
National Demonstration Projects (NDPs) 39–
40, 44 participation in sport 24, 35, 57, 126, 144–45;
national governing bodies (NGBs) 41, 53, 142– Barclays Spaces for Sports 87–88; benefits of
43, 145, 180–81, 184 105; and delinquency 100; grassroots
National Health Service: physical activity participation 42; Kickz – Goals Thru
policy 115, 118 Football programme 90–91; and the London
National Lottery 143, 180, 184; New 2012 Games 165–66; mass participation 33,
Opportunities Fund (NOF) 67; sports 36, 40, 41, 46–47, 51, 127, 139, 141; Olympic
development 46; sports funding 45, 47 Games 165; young people 57–62; youth clubs
National Playing Fields Association (NPFA) 32 103–4
National Service Framework for Coronary partnership development managers (PDM) 68,
Heart Disease (DH) 115 70
National Service Frameworks 115, 117 PAT (Policy Action Team) 10 Working Group
National Talent Search Program (NTSP) 142 82
Nations and Regions Group (NRG) 169 Pawson, R. 21
Nesti, M. 8 PE and school sport (PESS) 57, 62–66, 68–69;
Netherlands 59 future policy status 78; non-sport policy
210 Index
goals 78; non-sporting goals 69; and School President’s Council on Youth Fitness 110
Sport Partnerships 75; and social problems Preuss, H. 3, 159, 161, 184, 185
76; unplanned outcomes 76 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 117
PE and Sport Strategy for Young People Public Health Agency of Canada, Healthy
(PESSYP) 77 Living Unit 111
pedometers 117 public service agreement (PSA 22) 67, 77, 171,
Pendry, Tom 48 173, 178
performance indicators (PIs) 49, 116–17, 176, Purnell, James 182
186
Personal Best Programme 175–76 Raco, M. 162, 173, 184
personal responsibility 80 Raising the Game 112, 142
physical activity: blurred with sport 118–21; Ramwell, A. et al. 85–88
development of 111–12; distinct from sport recreational facilities 37
121–22; and health 108–9; lack of, and non- recreational sport 38
communicable diseases 109–10; levels of 119; regeneration 158–60, 161–63, 184
National Health Service policy 115, 118; Regional Sports Councils 33
New Labour policy 115–21; and obesity 120; resources 19, 24–25, 37, 42–44; see also
promotion of 125–27; and sports funding
development officers (SDOs) 118, 119; and Respect Task Force 89
team sports 125–26; United Kingdom 112– Riddoch, C. and McKenna, J. 129–30
13; and young people 57–62 Rigg, M. 39
Physical Education Association of the United Riordan, J. and Cantelon, H. 135
Kingdom (PEAUK) 64 Roberts, K. 57, 59, 60
Physical Education, School Sport and Club Roberts, K. and Brodie, D. 40, 129
Links (PESSCL) 57, 63, 144, 145; non-sport Robins, D. 100, 101
policy goals 72–76; sport policy goals 66–67, Robinson, L. 49–51, 50
68, 69–72 Robson, S. and McKenna, J.: Active for Life
Pickup, David 45 113; Everyday Sport campaign 119; health
Pitch2Podium 144 agenda 127; health promotion and SDOs
Playing to Win (DCMS) 53–54, 77–78, 122 112, 114; healthy alliances 120; individual
plus sport 84 responsibility 113; on Sport England 116
Police Safer Neighbourhood 89 Roche, M. 3, 157, 161–62
policy: changing 26; conceptualizing 12–14; Rowe, N. et al. 118
figurational perspective 18–19; forecasting Royal Charter (Sports Council) 34–35, 36
18–19; and health promotion 116–17;
implementation 19–20; information Samaranch, Juan Antonio 158
gathering 18–19; and issues 14–15; Sandford, R. et al. 73
monitoring and evaluation 20–24; objectives, Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation (DH) 114,
clarity of 22; objectives, identifying 17–18; 116–17
present-centred approach 16–17; resistance Scheerder, J. et al. 59
to change 26; reviews of existing 17; and school sport 47, 50
social processes 27; target group School Sport Partnerships (SSPs) 68–69; impact
identification 37; unplanned outcomes 15– on pupil attainment 73–74; impact on pupil
16, 24; use of term 7–8; wider social context attendance 73, 75; impact on pupil
18 behaviour 74, 75; impact on sport policy
policy-makers 19, 97–98 goals 69–72; marketization of education 72;
Polley, M. 35, 37 monitoring and evaluation 75; non-sport
Pollitt, C. 49 policy goals 72–76; and PE and school sport
Portugal 59 (PESS) 75; unplanned outcomes 72
Positive Futures programmes 10, 84, 93–94, School Sport Survey 2006–7 (TNS) 58, 67
95–97, 106 School Sport Survey 2007–8 (TNS) 67, 71
Pre-Volunteering Programme Unit 175 School Sports Coordinator Programme see
Premier League 88; Good Causes fund 89 School Sport Partnerships (SSPs)
President’s Commission on Olympic Sports school sports coordinators (SSCo) 66, 68, 70
139–40 schools 56–57, 70, 71–72
President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Schools Walking Challenge 180
Sports (PCPFS) 110 Scottish Sports Council 34
 Index 211
Scriven, A. and Orme, J. 114–15 funding 184; health agenda 127; and obesity
Seabra, A. et al. 59 120; physical activity 118, 119, 126; Positive
Shaping Places through Sport (Sport England) Futures programmes 93; and public health
52–53, 83, 127 policy 113–16; sport participation 24, 144–45
short-termism 128 Sport England Strategy 2008–2011 53, 77–78
Sisjord, M.-L. and Skirstad, B. 59 Sport For All 33, 36–37, 37, 43, 46–47, 50–51,
Sky Living for Sport 63 59, 127
Slack, T. 154 sport for sport’s sake 31
Smith, A. and Green, K. 122, 124, 128 Sport Playing Its Part (Sport England) 52, 83,
Smith, Chris 48 119–20, 122
Smith, D. 133 sport plus 84, 94
Snape, R. 129 Sport: Raising the Game (DNH) 46–48, 50, 62
soccer 154 Sporting Giants 144
social capital 83 sports clubs 60
social exclusion 79–81, 82 Sports Council 34, 37–38, 47, 112; elite sports
Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) 82 40–41; facility development 35–37;
social inclusion 52–53, 73, 80, 81–83; and Frameworks for Action 44; a non-
London 2012 Games 168, 175–76 departmental public body 34–35; pedometers
social inclusion schemes 84–85, 93; Barclays 117; reorganization 45–46; Sport in the
Spaces for Sports 85–88; developing Community: Into the 90’s 41; Sport in the
rationale 105, 106; diversionary nature of 96; Community: The Next Ten Years 40
and drug prevention 96–97; effectiveness of Sports Council for Northern Ireland 34
97–99; funding 96; and government 84–85; Sports Council for Wales (SCW) 34, 57–58, 58
ideology 97–98; Kickz – Goals Thru Sports Council Research Unit 39
Football programme 88–92; lack of baseline sports development 8, 38, 39, 42, 126; and Best
data 100; lack of objectives 99–100; Value 50; and Labour Party/government 77;
monitoring and evaluation 96, 100–103, 104, and local authorities 43, 46–47; National
106; peer leaders, drugs messages 97; short Lottery funding 46; partnership working 40;
term nature of 96–97; social context of 103– and policy outcomes 75–76; use of term 8
4, 106 Sports Development Council (SDC) 32
social policy: and PE and school sport (PESS) sports development officers (SDOs) 112–13;
72–76 and health promotion 112, 114, 127; London
social significance of sport 29, 30–31, 33, 37, 2012 Games sporting legacy 178; and physical
52–53, 81 activity 118, 119; social inclusion schemes
Solent Sports Counselling Project 101 97–98; and social objectives of sport 80–81
Soviet Union 10; contrasted with German Sports Development Planning (ESC) 48
Democratic Republic 152; elite sports sports equity 44–48
development (ESD) systems 134–37, 147, sports science and medicine 146, 151
148; funding 150; use of drugs 149 ‘Sport’s Unique Contribution’ 117
Sparvero, E. et al. 140, 154 Sproat, Iain 45–46, 112
specialist community coaches 70 statistics 123
specialist schools programme (SSP) 64–65 Step into Sport 63
Specialist Sports Colleges (SSCs) 64–65, 66 Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) 117
sport: barometer for political systems 135; Strategy Unit 166
blurred with physical activity 118–21; ‘Sustain, Excel and Grow’ programmes 53
commercialization of 133; de-amateurization sustainability: London 2012 Games 176–78;
of 133; decline 56; definition of 114; distinct and Olympic Games 163–64, 186
from physical activity 121–22; increased Sweden 59, 126
competitiveness 126; modernization policy Sydney Games (2000) 159, 161; and the
145, 146; non-political nature of 32; environment 163–64, 177; and regeneration
promotion of 125–27; social inclusion 162; sporting legacy 165
objectives 80; team sports 125–26 Sydney Organizing Committee of the Olympic
Sport and Recreation (DoE) 36–37, 112 Games (SOCOG) 163
Sport England 50, 52, 57–58, 76, 77; Active
Design project 120–21, 174; commitment to Tackling Obesities: Future Choices (Foresight)
sport 125; community sport 53, 122, 182; 1, 120
Everyday Sport campaign 119–20; and Tacon, R. 88, 98
212 Index
Talent Confirmation Training Programme 144 unplanned outcomes: Olympic Games 183–84;
talent identification and development (TID) PE and school sport (PESS) 76; policy 15–16,
programmes 132, 136–37; Australia 142, 153; 24; School Sport Partnerships 72; specialist
diminishing contrasts 150–51; funding 144; schools programme (SSP) 65; Specialist
German Democratic Republic (GDR) 137, Sports Colleges (SSCs) 65
149, 153; increasing varieties 153; United
Kingdom 143–44, 145, 153 van Bottenburg, M. 135
Talent Ladder scheme 145 Verow, P. 118
‘Talent Matters’ 145 Vigor, A. et al. 183, 184, 186
Talent Transfer Scheme 144 volunteering 175–76, 184
Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme (TASS)
145 Waddington, I. 110, 115, 117–18, 126
target driven approaches 52 Waddington, I. and Malcolm, D. 3
target group identification 37, 44 Waddington, I. and Smith, A. 7, 133, 134
targets 116–17, 121; medals 135, 143; for Wakefield, W. 139
performance 178–79 Wales 61
Taylor, P. 101 Wang, W. and Theodoraki, E. 159
team sports: and physical activity 125–26 Wanless, Derek 116–17
Telama, R. et al. 59, 61 Weiss, M. 21
Thatcher, Margaret 38, 39, 45 welfare policy 38, 39
‘The Coaching Task Force’ 146 welfare state 29, 30
Third Way 49, 53, 79–80, 113, 114 West Yorkshire Sports Counselling Scheme
Tired of Hanging Around 90 100, 105
TOPs programmes 63 Whitaker, David 144–45
‘Towards a One Planet Olympics’ 177 Whitson, D. and Horne, J. 183
town planning 121 Whole Sport Plans (WSPs) 53, 66
transport structure: and Olympic Games 162 Wilson, Harold 33
Tsuchiya, M. 101–2 Winterbottom, Walter 33
Wolfenden Gap 31
UK Sport 143, 155, 180 Wolfenden, J. 30
UK Sports Commission 45 Wolfenden Report 30–32, 33, 37, 112
UK Sports Council (UKSC) 46, 48 women in sport 44, 91, 141–42
Union of European Football Associations World Athletics Championships, London
(UEFA) 23 (2005) 166–67
United Kingdom: elite sports development World Class Performance Programme 143
(ESD) systems 142–46; funding 142–43; World Health Organization (WHO): health
health promotion 129; obesity 109–10; promotion 111; on obesity 109, 110; physical
physical activity policies 112–13; talent activity 112; use of BMI 123
identification and development (TID) World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 177
programmes 143–44, 145, 153
United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI) 145, young people: Barclays Spaces for Sports 86;
149, 151, 153 emphasis on 82–83; frequency of
United States Department of Health and participation in sport 57–58; health crisis
Human Services 111 56–57; obesity 109, 110; participation in
United States of America: collegiate system sport and physical activity 57–62;
139; developing physical activity 111–12; participation levels 61
elite sports development (ESD) systems 134, youth clubs 103–4
139–40, 153–54; health promotion 110, 111, youth crime 31
129; obesity 109; and social inclusion 81; Youth Justice Board 93
social inclusion schemes 93 Youth Sport Trust 62–66, 67, 76, 77, 145
United States Olympic Committee (USOC)
139–40, 154 Ziglio, E. et al. 111, 129