LABOR CASES WEEK 2 Final

LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS UNDER ATTY.
JACOME – WEEK 2
PREPARED BY DAVID, E. MENDOZA, S. MENDOZA, MARQUEZ, MURALLOS,
ENRIQUEZ, SANTOS, CARELLO, MESA, JIMENEZ, LABAMPA
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RUSTICO VEGA
FACTS:
At the early stage of beer grande production, several cases of beer grande full goods were received by MB as returned beer
fulls (RBF). The RBF's were found to have sediments and their contents were hazy. These effects are usually caused by
underpasteurization time and the pasteurzation units for beer grande were almost similar to those of the steinie.
Proposed lnnovation (Attach necessary information)
In order to minimize if not elienate underpasteurization of beer grande, reduce the speed of the beer grande pasteurizer
thereby, increasing the pasteurization time and the pasteurization acts for grande beer. In this way, the self-life (sic) of beer
grande will also be increased. 1
Mr. Vega at that time had been in the employ of petitioner Corporation for thirteen (1 3) years and was then holding the
position of "mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC Plant Brewery situated in Tipolo, Mandaue City.Petitioner
Corporation, however, did not find the proposal acceptable and consequently refused Mr. Vega's subsequent demands for a
cash award under the Innovation Program. He filed a complaint against the petitioner corporation with RAB CEBU (Regional
Arbitration Branch).
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: He asserted that his proposal "[had] been accepted by the methods analyst and implemented
by the Corporation [in] October 1980," and that the same "ultimately and finally solved the problem of the Corporation in the
production of Beer Grande." Private respondent thus claimed entitlement to a cash prize of P60,000.00 (the maximum award
per proposal offered under the Innovation Program) and attorney's fees.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioner Corporation alleged that private respondent had no cause of action. It denied ever
having approved or adopted Mr. Vega's proposal as part of the Corporation's brewing procedure in the production of San
Miguel Beer Grande. Among other things, petitioner stated that Mr. Vega's proposal was tumed down by the company "for lack
of originality" and that the same, "even if implemented [could not] achieve the desired result." Petitioner further alleged that
the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction, Mr. Vega having improperly bypassed the grievance machinery procedure prescribed
under a then existing collective bargaining agreement between management and employees, and available administrative
remedies provided under the rules of the Innovation Program. A counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses closed out petitioners pleading.
LA’s Decision: the Labor Arbiter, noting that the money claim of complainant Vega in this case is "not a necessary incident of
his employment" and that said claim is not among those mentioned in Article 217 of the Labor Code, dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. However, in a gesture of "compassion and to show the government's concern for the workingman," the
Labor Arbiter also directed petitioner to pay Mr. Vega the sum of P2,000.00 as "financial assistance."
NLRC’s Decision: The LA’s decision was modified by the Commissioner and directed the petitioner to pay Mr. Vega the sum of
60,000 pesos.
ISSUE(S): WON the fact that the money claim of private respondent Vega arose out of or in connection with his
employment relation" with petitioner Corporation, is enough to bring such money claim within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
WON LA AND NLRC HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE, SUCH AS UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE?
RULING:
NO. The Court notes that the SMC Innovation Program was essentially an invitation from petitioner Corporation to its
employees to submit innovation proposals, and that petitioner Corporation undertook to grant cash awards to employees who
LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS UNDER ATTY. JACOME – WEEK 2
accept such invitation and whose innovation suggestions, in the judgment of the Corporation's officials, satisfied the standards
and requirements of the Innovation Program 10 and which, therefore, could be translated into some substantial benefit to the
Corporation. Such undertaking, though unilateral in origin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforceable contractual (facio ut
des) 11 obligation on the part of petitioner Corporation under certain circumstances. Thus, whether or not an enforceable
contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen between petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the
circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to
be resolved by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of
employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.
NO. In accordance with Art. 217 of the Labor Code, Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving are workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases, 2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment; 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages,
overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this; Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of
money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217
embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or
incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the
employer-employee relationship. For it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in
connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the
regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and
lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis.
Applying the foregoing reading to the present case, we note that petitioner's Innovation Program is an employee incentive
scheme offered and open only to employees of petitioner Corporation, more specifically to employees below the rank of
manager. Without the existing employer-employee relationship between the parties here, there would have been no occasion
to consider the petitioner's Innovation Program or the submission by Mr. Vega of his proposal concerning beer grande;
without that relationship, private respondent Vega's suit against petitioner Corporation would never have arisen.
The money claim of private respondent Vega in this case, therefore, arose out of or in connection with his
employment relationship with petitioner.
BUT IS IT SUFFICIENT ENOUGH FOR MR. VEGA TO FILE A SUIT OF MONEY CLAIM FOR LA AND NLRC TO HAVE
JURISDICTION IN HIS CASE?
NO, THE PRINCIPAL RELIEF SOUGHT MUST FIRST BE ASCERTAINED; IF LABOR CODE HAS NO RELEVANCE ON IT THEN
IT SHALL BE FILED IN THE REGULAR COURTS.
CITING THE CASE OF MOLAVE, Before the enactment of BP Blg. 227 on June 1, 1982, Labor Arbiters, under paragraph 5 of
Article 217 of the Labor Code had jurisdiction over" all other cases arising from employer-employee relation, unless, expressly
excluded by this Code." Even then, the principle followed by this Court was that, although a controversy is between an employer
and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. Singapore Airlines Limited v. Paño, also
cited in Molave, involved a claim for liquidated damages not by a worker but by the employer company, unlike Medina. The
important principle that runs through these three (3) cases is that where the claim to the principal relief sought 9 is to be
resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the
general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage
structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such
claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale
for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNION-PSSLU LOCAL CHAPTER NO. 109 AND/OR ANTONIO DIAZ, PSSLU NATIONAL
PRESIDENT, petitioners, vs.
HON. POTENCIANO S. CANIZARES, in his capacity as Labor Arbiter,
FACTS:
PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo Philippines Inc. (Sanyo, for short) effective July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1994. The same CBA
contained a union security clause which provided:
Sec. 2. All members of the union covered by this agreement must retain their membership in good standing in the union as
condition of his/her continued employment with the company. The union shall have the right to demand from the company
the dismissal of the members of the union by reason of their voluntary resignation from membership or willful refusal to pay
the Union Dues or by reasons of their having formed, organized, joined, affiliated, supported and/or aided directly or
indirectly another labor organization, and the union thus hereby guarantees and holds the company free and harmless from
any liability whatsoever that may arise consequent to the implementation of the provision of this article.
In a letter dated February 7, 1990, PSSLU, through its national president, informed the management of Sanyo that the
following employees were notified that their membership with PSSLU were cancelled for anti-union, activities, economic
sabotage, threats, coercion and intimidation, disloyalty and for joining another union: Benito Valencia, Bernardo Yap, Arnel
Salvo, Renato Baybon, Eduardo Porlaje, Salvador Solibel, Conrado Sarol, Angelito Manzano, Allan Misterio, Reynaldo
Ricohermoso, Mario Ensay and Froilan Plamenco. The same letter informed Sanyo that the same employees refused to submit
themselves to the union's grievance investigation committee. It appears that many of these employees were not members of
PSSLU but of another union, KAMAO.
On February 14, 1990, some officers of KAMAO, which included Yap, Salvo, Baybon, Solibel, Valencia, Misterio and
Ricohermoso, executed a pledged of cooperation with PSSLU promising cooperation with the latter union and among others,
respecting, accepting and honoring the CBA between Sanyo and specifically:
1. That we shall remain officers and members of KAMAO until we finally decide to rejoin Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU; 2.
That henceforth, we support and cooperate with the duly elected union officers of Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU in any
and all its activities and programs to insure industrial peace and harmony; 3. That we collectively accept, honor, and respect
the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between Sanyo Phil. Inc. and Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU dated
February 7, 1990;4 That we collectively promise not to engage in any activities inside company premises contrary to law, the
CBA and existing policies;5 That we are willing to pay our individual agency fee in accordance with the provision of the Labor
Code, as amended;6 That we collectively promise not to violate this pledge of cooperation
The respondents herein were dismissed by SANYO CORPORATION for 1) they were engaged and were still engaging in
anti-union activities; 2) they willfully violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU which they signed and executed on
February 14, 1990; and 3) they threatened and were still threatening with bodily harm and even death the officers of the
union. The company received no information on whether or not said employees appealed to PSSLU. Hence, it considered them
dismissed as of March 23, 1991 On May 20, 1991, the dismissed employees filed a complaint (pp. 32-35, Rollo) with the NLRC
for illegal dismissal. Named respondent were PSSLU and Sanyo.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: On June 20, 1991, PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter
was without jurisdiction over the case, relying on Article 217 (c) of P.D. 442, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6715
which provides that cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreements shall be
disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The complainants opposed the motion to dismiss complaint on these grounds: 1) the series of
conferences before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board had been terminated; 2) the NLRC Labor Arbiter had
jurisdiction over the case which was a termination dispute pursuant to Article 217 (2) of the Labor Code; and 3) there was
nothing in the CBA which needs interpretation or implementation.
ISSUE: WON LA HAS JURISDICTION IN THE TERMINATION DISPUTE HEREIN?
RULING: YES. It is clear from ART. 217 OF THE LABOR CODE that termination cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. It should be noted however that said article at the outset excepted from the said provision cases otherwise provided
for in other provisions of the same Code, thus the phrase "Except as otherwise provided under this Code . . . ." Under
paragraph (c) of the same article, it is expressly provided that "cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies
shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may
be provided in said agreements.
It was provided in the CBA executed between PSSLU and Sanyo that a member's voluntary resignation from membership,
willful refusal to pay union dues and his/her forming, organizing, joining, supporting, affiliating or aiding directly or indirectly
another labor union shall be a cause for it to demand his/her dismissal from the company. The demand for the dismissal and
the actual dismissal by the company on any of these grounds is an enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. This
act is authorized by law provided that enforcement should not be characterized by arbitrariness.
The reference to a Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitrators for the adjustment or resolution of grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies is mandatory. The law grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery
and when not settled at this level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBA's does not only include grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the implementation of company
personnel policies. No other body shall take cognizance of these cases. The last paragraph of Article 261 enjoins other bodies
from assuming jurisdiction thereof:
The commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not
entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration
provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the
jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private
respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, We are
of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of
(their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that
"(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of
its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies." It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA shall name or
designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. It
need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and
the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of
private respondents. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or
dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members
who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with
members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due
process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been
an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent Labor Arbiter is directed to resolve the complaints of
private respondents immediately.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO, DANIEL S.L. BORBON II, HERMINIA REYES, MARCELA
PURIFICACION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 166, RTC, PASIG, and SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite (Annexes K
and I, SanMig's Comment, respectively). These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). SanMig entered into those contracts to maintain its competitive position and in keeping with
the imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of its operation. In said contracts, it was expressly understood
and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be
deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its
workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO is the duly authorized
representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) effective 1 July 1986 to 30 June 1989 (Annex A, SanMig's Comment). Section 1 of their CBA specifically
provides that "temporary, probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and,
therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement." In a letter, dated 20 November 1988 (Annex C, Petition), the Union advised
SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their
employment with SMC. The Union alleged that this group of employees, while appearing to be contractual workers supposedly
independent contractors, have been continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from six (6) months to fifteen (15)
years and that their work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it was contended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It was then
demanded that the employment status of these workers be regularized. On 12 January 1989 on the ground that it had failed to
receive any favorable response from SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and
union busting. The Union again filed a second notice of strike for unfair labor practice. As in the first notice of strike.
Conciliatory meetings were held on the second notice. Subsequently, the two (2) notices of strike were consolidated and
several conciliation conferences were held to settle the dispute before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
of DOLE (Annex G, Petition). Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and
D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages
before respondent Court to enjoin the Union.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The absence of employer-employee relationship negates the existence of labor dispute.
Verily, this court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of plaintiff's grievance
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioners take the position that 'it is beyond dispute that the controversy in the court a
quo involves or arose out of a labor dispute and is directly connected or interwoven with the cases pending with the NCMB-
DOLE, and is thus beyond the ambit of the public respondent's jurisdiction. That the acts complained of (i.e., the mass
concerted action of picketing and the reliefs prayed for by the private respondent) are within the competence of labor
tribunals, is beyond question"
ISSUE: WON THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE?
RULING: NO. We find the Petition of a meritorious character. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code
includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." While it is SanMig's submission that no
employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on
the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relationship of employer and employee". That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom,
what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be
absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees
vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved
bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not
SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "labor-only" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee
relationship may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite
in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the strike
itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire strangers outside the working unit; — those are
issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor laws, and SanMig's cause's of action in the Court below are
inextricably linked with those issues. WHEREFORE, the Writ of certiorari is GRANTED.
MOLAVE MOTOR SALES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XLIV and PEDRO
GEMENIANO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, PLAINTIFF in the case below, is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles in Dagupan City.
Private respondent, the DEFENDANT in the case below, was, or is, the sales manager of PLAINTIFF.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Alleging that DEFENDANT was a former employee, PLAINTIFF had sued him, on March 22,
1983, for payment of accounts pleaded as follows:That during his incumbency as such the defendant caused and without
authority from the plaintiff incurred accounts with the remaining balances in the total sum of P33,890.38 excluding interests,
arising from the purchases of vehicles and parts,repair jobs of his personal cars and cash advances,faithful reproductions of
the Vehicle Invoice, Debit Memos, Deed of Absolute Sale, Repair Orders, Charge Invoices, Vouchers, Promissory Notes,
Acknowledgement Letter and Statement of Account.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: DEFENDANT denied that he incurred any unpaid unauthorized accounts with the plaintiff in
the total sum of P33,890.38 excluding interests therefor, and, specifically denies under oath that the annexed Vehicle Invoice,
Debits Memos Deed of Absolute Sale, Repair Orders, Charge Invoices, Vouchers, Promissory Notes, Acknowledgement Letter
and Statement of Account have remained unpaid as in fact the truth of the matter is as follows, to wit: (Emphasis supplied)
DEFENDANT further alleged in a counterclaim that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF inasmuch as there
has been no application for clearance in regards to his separation.
At the pre-trial conference, the DEFENDANT raised the question of jurisdiction of the Court stating that PLAINTIFF's
complaint arose out of employer-employee relationship, and he subsequently moved for dismissal. It was then when
respondent Judge dismissed the case finding that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-employee
relationship and that jurisdiction belonged to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Before the enactment of BP Blg. 227 on June 1, 1982, Labor Arbiters, under paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code had
jurisdiction over "all other cases arising from employer-employee relation, unless expressly excluded by this Code." Even then,
the principle followed by this Court was that, although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the Labor
Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. In Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome, 116 SCRA 597, 604, in negating
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, although the parties were an employer and two employees, Mr. Justice Abad Santos
stated:The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the
plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether or not they
have retroactive effect is unnecessary.
ISSUE: WON THE CIVIL COURTS HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?
RULING: YES. In this case, PLAINTIFF had sued for monies loaned to DEFENDANT, the cost of repair jobs made on his
personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him. Those accounts have no relevance to the Labor
Code. The cause of action was one under the civil laws, and it does not breach any provision of the Labor Code or the contract
of employment of DEFENDANT. Hence, the civil courts, not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC, should have jurisdiction
The dismissal of the case is based on the ground that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-
employee relationship was erroneous. Claims arising from employer-employee relations are now limited to those mentioned
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 217. There is no difficulty on our part in stating that those in the case below should not be
faulted for not being aware of the last amendment to the frequently changing Labor Code.
The claim of DEFENDANT that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF, because the latter has not sought
clearance for his separation from the service, will not affect the jurisdiction of respondent Judge to resolve the complaint of
PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT could still be liable to PLAINTIFF for payment of the accounts sued for even if he remains an
employee of PLAINTIFF.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to take cognizance of the case below
and to render judgment therein accordingly.
ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE G. ONG, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance Cf Rizal,
Branch XV, Makati, Metro Manila, COSME DE ABOITIZ and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
FACTS: That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 20, 1977, defendant Cosme de Aboitiz, acting in his
capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of the defendant Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., went to
the Pepsi-Cola Plant in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and without any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated the
plaintiffs with the use of the following slanderous language and other words of similar import uttered in the presence of the
plaintiffs' subordinate employees, thus-
GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED (referring to
Ernesto Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! '(referring to Jose Ong )
Plaintiffs filed a joint criminal complaint for oral defamation against the defendant Cosme de Aboitiz duly supported with
respective affidavits and corroborated by the affidavits of two (2) witnesses: Isagani Hernandez and Jose Ganseco II, but after
conducting a preliminary investigation, Hon. Jose B. Castillo, dismissed the complaint allegedly because the expression "Fuck
you and "You are both shit to me" were uttered not to slander but to express anger and displeasure;, plaintiffs filed a Petition
for Review with the office of the Secretary of Justice (now Ministry of Justice) and on June 13, 1978, the Deputy Minister of
Justice, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., issued a resolution sustaining the plaintiff's complaint, reversing the resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal and directing him to file against defendant Cosme de Aboitiz an information for Grave Slander. ... ;
That the employment records of plaintiffs show their track performance and impeccable qualifications, not to mention their
long years of service to the Company which undoubtedly caused their promotion to the two highest positions in Muntinlupa
Plant having about 700 employees under them with Ernesto Medina as the Plant General Manager receiving a monthly salary
of P6,600.00 excluding other perquisites accorded only to top executives and having under his direct supervision other
professionals like himself, including the plaintiff Jose G. Ong, who was the Plant Comptroller with a basic monthly salary of
P4,855.00;
That far from taking these matters into consideration, the defendant corporation, acting through its President, Cosme de
Aboitiz, dismissed and slandered the plaintiffs in the presence of their subordinate employees although this could have been
done in private; That the defendants have evidently enjoyed the act of dismissing the plaintiffs and such dismissal was
planned to make it as humiliating as possible because instead of allowing a lesser official like the Regional Vice President to
take whatever action was necessary under the circumstances, Cosme de Aboitiz himself went to the Muntinlupa Plant in order
to publicly upbraid and dismiss the plaintiffs; On June 4, 1979, a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction was filed by the defendants. The trial court denied the motion on September 6, 1979, in an order which reads as
follows:
Up for resolution by the Court is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss dated June 4, 1979, which is basically anchored on whether
or not this Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON THE CIVIL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?
RULING: YES. The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by
the plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether or not
they have retroactive effect is unnecessary.
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for
damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code
and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent judge is hereby ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. 33150 and render a
decision on the merits. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al V Estanislao Surio

G.R. NO. 154213
23 August 2013
Facts:
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd.
and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents were still on board the vessel, they
experienced delays in the payment of their wages and in the remittance of allotments, and were not paid for extra work and
extra overtime work. They complained about the vessel's inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to
heed their repeated requests for the improvement of their working conditions. when MT Seadance docked at the port in
Sweden to discharge oil, representatives of the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and found the
wages of the respondents to be below the prevailing rates. The ensuing negotiations between the ITF and the vessel owner on
the increase in respondents' wages resulted in the payment by the vessel owner of wage differentials and the immediate
repatriation of respondents to the Philippines.
Subsequently, on 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated respondents a complaint for disciplinary action
based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication
Office of the POEA.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 vested original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the
Labor Arbiters. jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and Regulations of
1991.
POEA dismissed the complaint in 1996.

NLRC dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, a petitioner for certiorari under rule 65 and mandamus.
CA dismissed such petition holding that the inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers from the POEA
blacklist/watchlist were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the NLRC, and that the NLRC had no
appellate jurisdiction to review the matter.
Issue:
Whether or not it is under the jurisdiction of NLRC to review cases on appeal decided by POEA.
Held:
No.NLRC has no jurisdiction to review an appeal decided by POEA. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10,
transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from
the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character involving such workers.
The NLRC has no jurisdiction to review an appeal case decided by POEA. According to Section 28 (b) of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the POEA shall exercise original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in
character, involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers. Since RA No 8042 has been
passed into a law after the filing of charges by the petitioner to the respondents, the rule on retroactivity of the laws shall be
observed.
As a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly provided, or unless the law is procedural or
curative in nature. there is no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal of the
POEA's decision on petitioners' disciplinary action against respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law
due to its providing or omitting guidelines on appeal
Thus, such law stating that the POEA has the jurisdiction to decide on disciplinary cases shall be observed in the case at bar.
Philippine Touristers Inc. V Mas Transit Workers UNION-ANGLO-KMU

Gr no.. 201237
DOCTRINE
Facts
respondent Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Mas Transit-Anglo-KMU (the Union) — a union organized through the affiliation of
certain MTI bus drivers/conductors with the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations — filed a petition for
certification election before the DOLE – NCR.
In the year 2000, MTI decided to sell its passenger buses together with its Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) issued by
the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to PTI. Records disclose that the sale of 50 passenger
buses together with MTI's CPC was approved by the LTFRB. As such, PTI was issued a new CPC authorizing it to operate the
service on the Baclaran-Malabon via EDSA route using the passenger buses that were sold.
In light of the foregoing, MTI issued a "Patalastas" dated March 7, 2001 apprising all of its employees of the sale and transfer
of its operations to PTI, and the former's intention to pay them separation benefits in accordance with law and based on the
resources available. The employees were also advised to apply anew with PTI should they be interested to transfer.
Thereafter, MTI sent each of the individual respondents a Memorandum informing them of their termination from work,
effective on said date, in line with the cessation of its business operations caused by the sale of the passenger buses to the new
owners.
Claiming that the sale was intended to frustrate their right to self-organization and that there was no actual transfer of
ownership of the passenger buses as the stockholders of MTI and PTI are one and the same, the Union, on behalf of its 98
members (respondents), filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, i.e., illegal lock out, and damages against
MTI and/or Tomas Alvarez (Alvarez), and PTI and Yague (petitioners), before the NLRC
Respondent’s contention: In their defense, MTI and Alvarez denied that the individual respondents were illegally dismissed or
locked out, contending that the closure of its business operations was valid and justified. They claimed that the company was
forced to sell its passenger buses to PTI as it was already suffering from serious financial reverses; and that since there was
nothing more to operate, it had no choice but to cease operations. They further added that the required Establishment
Termination Report was submitted to the DOLE while several employees — including some of the individual respondents —
were paid their separation benefits. Hence, they contended that the claims for reinstatement and backwages were without
factual and legal bases. Finally, they sought the dismissal of the complaint against 30 of the respondents since they had
executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay Para sa Pag-uurong ng Demanda" where they categorically moved for the withdrawal of
their complaint.
For their part, petitioners denied any liability to the respondents considering that no employer-employee relationship existed
between them and that petitioners were impleaded just because PTI happened to be the buyer of some of MTI's passenger
buses. They further pointed out that PTI is not the predecessor-in-interest of MTI as the sale involved the passenger buses
only and did not include the latter's other assets
LA's decision: LA ruled in favor of the respondents, finding MTI and petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice
Nlrc decision: petitioners appealed before the NLRC by filing their Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum, accompanied
by a Manifestation with Motion for Reduction of Bond. petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion attaching thereto PTI's
Audited Financial Statement (AFS) in support of the motion to reduce bond to prove its liquidity problems. However,
respondents vehemently opposed the foregoing actions of petitioners and sought for the inhibition of the Commissioners of
the NLRC-Third Division for failure to dismiss the appeal despite the apparent failure to perfect the same.
Ca decision: CA annulled and set aside the modified ruling of the NLRC finding the latter to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in applying a liberal interpretation of the rules on perfection of appeal. It held that PTI's alleged liquidity problems
cannot be considered as a meritorious ground to reduce the bond as there was no showing that they were incapable of posting
at least a surety bond equivalent to the full judgment award. It further observed that the partial bond posted was defective,
having been issued in favor of MTI and not PTI, and that the bonding company which issued the same was not authorized to
transact business in all courts of the Philippines during that time. Perforce, the CA concluded that there was no basis to extend
liberality to and relax the rules in favor of petitioners.
issue: whether or not the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when the latter gave due
course to petitioners' appeal and consequently issued a modified Decision absolving petitioners from liability
Ruling: YES. For an appeal from the LA's ruling to the NLRC to be perfected, Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code
requires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed. While
it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decision of the LA, the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (the Rules), particularly Section 6, Rule VI
thereof, nonetheless allows the reduction of the bond upon a showing of (a) the existence of a meritorious ground for
reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
In Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corp., the Court held that "meritorious cases" for said purpose would include "instances in which
(1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules,
(2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond,
(3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies
on the merits, or
(4) the appellants, at the very least exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the
reglementary period."
Mt. Carmel Employee’s Union V Mt. Carmel School

GR NO 187621
24 SEPT 2014
DOCTRINE
Facts
petitioners were elementary and high school academic and non-academic personnel employed by Mount Carmel College
(respondent), located in New Escalante, Negros Occidental. In April 1999, the petitioners were informed of their retrenchment
by the respondent due to the closure of the elementary and high school departments of the school. The petitioners contend
that such closure was merely a subterfuge of their termination due to their union activities. According to the petitioners, they
organized a union in 1997 (Mount Carmel College Employees Union [MCCEU]), and were in the process of negotiating with the
respondent as regards their collective bargaining agreement when the respondent decided to close the two departments in
June 1999. The petitioners alleged that such closure was motivated by ill-will just to get rid of the petitioners who were all
union members because in June 2001, the school re-opened its elementary and high school departments with newly-hired
teachers. They claimed for the remaining separation pay differentials since what they received was only computed at 15 days
for every year of service when they were retrenched.
The respondent, on the other hand, denied committing any act of unfair labor practice and alleged that their retrenchment was
valid as it was due to the financial losses it suffered as result of a decline in its enrolment. The respondent claimed that as it
was, the expenses for its academic and non-academic personnel were already eating into its budget portion allocated for
capital and administrative development, and that the teachers' demand for increased salaries and benefits, coupled with the
decline in the enrolment, left the school with no choice but to close down its grade school and high school departments
LA's decision: Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the petitioners to have been illegally dismissed, among others. According to the LA,
the respondent's alleged losses were not serious as its financial statements even showed a net surplus. Thus, the LA ordered
the respondent to pay the petitioners separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, plus attorney's fees.
NLRC: NLRC reversed the LA decision, ruling that: (1) the respondent's failure to attach a copy of the appeal bond and other
documents to the Appeal Memorandum furnished to the petitioners is a minor defect; (2) the respondent acted in good faith
when it procured the appeal bond from Country Bankers and Insurance Corporation (CBIC), which, it turned out, was
blacklisted at that time (March 15, 2004); and since CBIC was already included in the list of the Supreme Court's accredited
bonding companies from February 1, 2005 until July 31, 2005, there is no more impediment for CBIC to "make good" its bond;
and (3) the petitioners' retrenchment is an exercise by the respondent of its management prerogative and the latter's state of
finances justifies the same.
CA: CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC and thus, affirmed its decision. The CA found no
factual basis for the petitioners' allegation that the school closed down for purposes of union busting, and that the school
cannot be compelled to operate at a loss, as shown by its financial statements. The CA also ruled that the respondent cannot be
compelled to re-hire the petitioners when it later re-opened as it has the discretion in the hiring of its employees.
issue: whether the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the
respondent's appeal despite the blacklisting of CBIC at the time it issued the appeal bond
Ruling
Yes court told that CA committed an error when it ruled that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion on the part og
NLRC in admitting the respondent’sappeal and reversing the decision of the LA. It should be stressed that the requirement of
posting of an appeal bond by a refutable company is jurisdictional. It cannot be subject to NLRC’s s discretion. At the time of
the respondent's filing of its appeal from the LA decision in 2004, the rules of procedure in force was the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, as amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002,
Section 6 required the issuance of a bond by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC or the Supreme Court
was substantially carried over to the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. In
this regard, the Court has ruled that in a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon:
(1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee;
(2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and
(3) filing of a memorandum of appeal||.
In this case, it was not disputed that at the time CBIC issued the appeal bond, it was already blacklisted by the NLRC. The
latter, however, opined that "respondents should not be faulted if the Bacolod branch office of the bonding company issued
the surety bond" and that "[r]espondents acted in good faith when they transacted with the bonding company for the
issuance of the surety bond.|||
The condition of posting a cash or surety bond is not a meaningless requirement — it is meant to assure the workers that if
they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the former's appeal. Such
aim is defeated if the bond issued turned out to be invalid due to the surety company's expired accreditation. Much more in
this case where the bonding company was blacklisted at the time it issued the appeal bond. The blacklisting of a bonding
company is not a whimsical exercise. When a bonding company is blacklisted, it meant that it committed certain prohibited
acts and/or violations of law, prescribed rules and regulations. Trivializing it would release a blacklisted bonding company
from the effects sought to be achieved by the blacklisting and would make the entire process insignificant.|||
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union –FFW V CA

348 SCRA 565
DOCTRINE assumption of jurisdiction by secretary of labor, automatically enjoins intended or impending strike|||
Facts
Petitioners employees of private respondent, an industry indispensable to the national interest, filed a notice of strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to a deadlock in the negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the latter. The Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment intervened and assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 262, par. (g),of the Labor Code, as amended, and issued an order enjoining
any strike or lock-out. The union struck despite issuance of assumption orders, and the immediate return-to-work order was
ignored by them. Subsequently, workers who failed to report back to work were served with letters of termination.
Meanwhile, hearings were conducted to determine the legality of the strike and both parties were required to submit their
respective position papers. The company adduced evidence, while the union did not, although it manifested that it would file a
motion to dismiss for failure of the company to prove its case. A decision was, thereafter, rendered finding the strike illegal,
ordering payment of backwages and other benefits to striking employees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings of the Secretary of Labor except as to the award of backwages and financial assistance. Hence, their recourse to this
Court by way of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.|||
Issue:
Ruling:
only questions of law are raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules Court and does not involve the evaluation
of findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies; that factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Department of Labor
and Employment supported by substantial evidence are entitled to great respect; that the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Secretary of Labor over labor disputes automatically enjoins any intended or impending strike and that defiance thereto as
well as of the return to work order of the Secretary of Labor are valid grounds for loss of employment; and the award of
backwages is granted only where there is a finding of illegal dismissal.
It is clear from [Article 263, Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended] that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes
jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue
another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor
automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the
assumption order. However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on September 8, 1995
thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their
actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to ignore. The rationale of
this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority, that
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.||
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC vs Brillantes

Facts:
PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches, with principal address at Phimco Compound, Felix Manalo St.,
Sta. Ana, Manila. Respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly authorized bargaining representative of
PHIMCOs daily-paid workers. The 47 individually named respondents are PILA officers and members.
When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its
renewal. The negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to disagreements on salary increases and
benefits.
On March 9, 1995, PILA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on the ground of
the bargaining deadlock. Seven (7) days later, or on March 16, 1995, the union conducted a strike vote; a majority of the union
members voted for a strike as its response to the bargaining impasse. On March 17, 1995, PILA filed the strike vote results
with the NCMB. Thirty-five (35) days later, or on April 21, 1995, PILA staged a strike.
On May 3, 1995, PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO), to
enjoin the strikers from preventing through force, intimidation and coercion the ingress and egress of non-striking employees
into and from the company premises. On May 15, 1995, the NLRC issued an ex-parte TRO, effective for a period of twenty (20)
days, or until June 5, 1995.
On June 23, 1995, PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union members, directing them to explain within twenty-four (24)
hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike. Three days later, or on June 26,
1995, the thirty-six (36) union members were informed of their dismissal.
On July 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case) with the NLRC. The
case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-04705-95, and raffled to Labor Arbiter (LA) Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
On July 7, 1995, then Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, and ordered all the
striking employees (except those who were handed termination papers on June 26, 1995) to return to work within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt of the order. The Secretary ordered PHIMCO to accept the striking employees, under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.[4] On the same day, PILA ended its strike.
On August 28, 1995, PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with the NLRC, with a prayer for
the dismissal of PILA officers and members who knowingly participated in the illegal strike. PHIMCO claimed that the strikers
prevented ingress to and egress from the PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing PHIMCOs operations. The case was docketed
as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-06031-95, and raffled to LA Jovencio Ll. Mayor.
On March 14, 1996, the respondents filed their Position Paper in the illegal strike case. They countered that they complied
with all the legal requirements for the staging of the strike, they put up no barricade, and conducted their strike peacefully, in
an orderly and lawful manner, without incident.
Labor Arbiter Ruling: (Ruled in favor of Petitioner employer)
LA Mayor decided the case on February 4, 1998,[5] and found the strike illegal; the respondents committed prohibited acts
during the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs premises and preventing the non-striking employees
from reporting for work. He observed that it was not enough that the picket of the strikers was a moving picket, since the
strikers should allow the free passage to the entrance and exit points of the company premises. Thus, LA Mayor declared that
the respondent employees, PILA officers and members, have lost their employment status.
On March 5, 1998, PILA and its officers and members appealed LA Mayors decision to the NLRC.
NLRC Ruling: (Ruled in favor of Respondent Union)
On February 20, 2002, the NLRC rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases, ruling totally in the unions favor.[8] It
dismissed the appeal of the illegal dismissal case, and denied PHIMCOs motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case.
The NLRC found that the picket conducted by the striking employees was not an illegal blockade and did not obstruct the
points of entry to and exit from the companys premises; the pictures submitted by the respondents revealed that the picket
was moving, not stationary. With respect to the illegal dismissal charge, the NLRC observed that the striking employees were
not given ample opportunity to explain their side after receipt of the June 23, 1995 letter. Thus, the NLRC affirmed the
Decision of LA Espiritu with respect to the payment of backwages until the promulgation of the decision, plus separation pay
at one (1) month salary per year of service in lieu of reinstatement, and 10% of the monetary award as attorneys fees. It ruled
out reinstatement because of the damages sustained by the company brought about by the strike.
CA Ruling: Ruled in favor of Respondent Union
The CA noted that the NLRC findings, that the picket was peaceful and that PHIMCOs evidence failed to show that the picket
constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the points of entry to and exit from the company premises, were
supported by substantial evidence
Issue:
1 WON the strike was legal?
2 what are the liabilities of UNION officers and personnel?
3 WON Phimco observe due process?
Held:
1No. It was illegal

Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC and the CA, we find the PILA strike
illegal. We intervene and rule even on the evidentiary and factual issues of this case as both the NLRC and the CA grossly
misread the evidence, leading them to inordinately incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike undisputably
had not been marred by actual violence and patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA officers and members
undertook as part of their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs premises, thus
preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from entering the PHIMCO compound. In this manner, the picketers
violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.
To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.[40]
The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the company compound. While a
strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of
what is happening in the company struck against. A picket simply means to march to and from the employers premises,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute.[41] It is a
strike activity separate and different from the actual stoppage of work.
While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of freedom of expression[42] and the right to
peaceably assemble to air grievances,[43] these rights are by no means absolute. Protected picketing does not extend to
blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises.[44] That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not
attended by actual violence may not free it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the
company premises.
NLRC resolution itself noted the testimonial evidence, all building up a scenario that the moving picket put up by [the]
respondents obstructed the ingress to and egress from the company premises[,][52] yet it ignored the clear import of the
testimonies as to the true nature of the picket. Contrary to the NLRC characterization that it was a peaceful moving picket, it
stood, in fact, as an obstruction to the companys points of ingress and egress.
Significantly, the testimonies adduced were validated by the photographs taken of the strike area, capturing the strike in its
various stages and showing how the strikers actually conducted the picket. While the picket was moving, it was maintained so
close to the company gates that it virtually constituted an obstruction, especially when the strikers joined hands, as described
by Aguilar, or were moving in circles, hand-to-shoulder, as shown by the photographs, that, for all intents and purposes,
blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. In fact, on closer examination, it could be seen that the
respondents were conducting the picket right at the company gates.[53]
The obstructive nature of the picket was aggravated by the placement of benches, with strikers standing on top, directly in
front of the open wing of the company gates, clearly obstructing the entry and exit points of the company compound.[54]
With a virtual human blockade and real physical obstructions (benches and makeshift structures both outside and inside the
gates),[55] it was pure conjecture on the part of the NLRC to say that [t]he non-strikers and their vehicles were x x x free to get
in and out of the company compound undisturbed by the picket line.[56] Notably, aside from non-strikers who wished to
report for work, company vehicles likewise could not enter and get out of the factory because of the picket and the physical
obstructions the respondents installed. The blockade went to the point of causing the build up of traffic in the immediate
vicinity of the strike area, as shown by photographs.[57] This, by itself, renders the picket a prohibited activity. Pickets may
not aggressively interfere with the right of peaceful ingress to and egress from the employers shop or obstruct public
thoroughfares; picketing is not peaceful where the sidewalk or entrance to a place of business is obstructed by picketers
parading around in a circle or lying on the sidewalk.[58]
What the records reveal belies the NLRC observation that the evidence x x x tends to show that what respondents actually did
was walking or patrolling to and fro within the company vicinity and by word of mouth, banner or placard, informing the
public concerning the dispute.[59]
The peaceful moving picket that the NLRC noted, influenced apparently by the certifications (Mayor delos Reyes, Fr.
Adeviso, Fr. Fausto and Barangay Secretary Gesmundo presented in evidence by the respondents, was peaceful only
because of the absence of violence during the strike, but the obstruction of the entry and exit points of the company
premises caused by the respondents picket was by no means a petty blocking act or an insignificant obstructive act.[60]
As we have stated, while the picket was moving, the movement was in circles, very close to the gates, with the strikers in a
hand-to-shoulder formation without a break in their ranks, thus preventing non-striking workers and vehicles from coming in
and getting out. Supported by actual blocking benches and obstructions, what the union demonstrated was a very persuasive
and quietly intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the operations of the company, not solely by the work
stoppage of the participating workers, but by excluding the company officials and non-striking employees from access to and
exit from the company premises. No doubt, the strike caused the company operations considerable damage, as the NLRC itself
recognized when it ruled out the reinstatement of the dismissed strikers.
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence, coercion or intimidation is unlawful.[62]
According to American jurisprudence, what constitutes unlawful intimidation depends on the totality of the circumstances.
[63] Force threatened is the equivalent of force exercised. There may be unlawful intimidation without direct threats or overt
acts of violence. Words or acts which are calculated and intended to cause an ordinary person to fear an injury to his person,
business or property are equivalent to threats.[64]
The manner in which the respondent union officers and members conducted the picket in the present case had created such
an intimidating atmosphere that non-striking employees and even company vehicles did not dare cross the picket line, even
with police intervention. Those who dared cross the picket line were stopped. The compulsory arbitration hearings bear this
out.
2. what are the Liabilities of the UNION Personnel

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x

Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination
of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

We explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. [71] that the effects of illegal strikes,
outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction between participating workers and union officers. The services of
an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing
that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The services of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may be
terminated, not only when he actually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike.[72]
In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required; substantial evidence, available
under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal on participating workers and
union officers as above described.[73]
In the present case, respondents Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan, Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela
Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, and Ramon Falcis stand to be
dismissed as participating union officers, pursuant to Article 264(a), paragraph 3, of the Labor Code. This provision imposes
the penalty of dismissal on any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike. The law grants the employer the
option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment.[74]

PHIMCO was able to individually identify the participating union members thru the affidavits of PHIMCO employees
Martimer Panis[75] and Rodrigo A. Ortiz,[76] and Personnel Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco,[77] and the photographs[78] of
Joaquin Aguilar. Identified were respondents Angelita Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday, Alfonso Claudio, Francisco
Dalisay, Angelito Dejan, Philip Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio Libongcogon, Nemesio Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili, Alfredo
Pearson, Mario Perea, Renato Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo Sarmiento, Rodolfo Tolentino, Felipe Villareal, Arsenio Zamora,
Danilo Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo Camarin, Bernardo Cuadra, Angelito de Guzman, Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibaez,
Benjamin Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo Manalili, Raul Miciano, Hilario Pea, Teresa Permocillo, Ernesto Rio, Rodolfo
Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian Tuguin and Amelia Zamora as the union members who actively participated in the strike by
blocking the ingress to and egress from the company premises and preventing the passage of non-striking employees. For
participating in illegally blocking ingress to and egress from company premises, these union members stand to be dismissed
for their illegal acts in the conduct of the unions strike.
3.yes PHIMCO failed to observe due process

Under Article 277(b)[79] of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee, who is about to be terminated, a written
notice stating the cause/s for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish him or her with
two (2) written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee a
reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of
all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee.[81]

In the present case, PHIMCO sent a letter, on June 23, 1995, to thirty-six (36) union members, generally directing them to
explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike;
three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members were informed of their dismissal from employment.
We do not find this company procedure to be sufficient compliance with the due process requirements that the law guards
zealously. It does not appear from the evidence that the union officers were specifically informed of the charges against them
and given the chance to explain and present their side. Without the specifications they had to respond to, they were arbitrarily
separated from work in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure.
As to the union members, only thirty-six (36) of the thirty-seven (37) union members included in this case were notified of
the charges against them thru the letters dated June 23, 1995, but they were not given an ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend themselves; the notice of termination came on June 26, 1995, only three (3) days from the first notice - a perfunctory
and superficial attempt to comply with the notice requirement under the Labor Code. The short interval of time between the
first and second notice speaks for itself under the circumstances of this case; mere token recognition of the due process
requirements was made, indicating the companys intent to dismiss the union members involved, without any meaningful
resort to the guarantees accorded them by law.
Under the circumstances, where evidence sufficient to justify the penalty of dismissal has been adduced but the workers
concerned were not accorded their essential due process rights, our ruling in Agabon v. NLRC[82] finds full application; the
employer, despite the just cause for dismissal, must pay the dismissed workers nominal damages as indemnity for the
violation of the workers right to statutory due process. Prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of nominal damages
at P30,000.00, which same amount we find sufficient and appropriate in the present case
PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), vs Secretary of Labor
Facts:
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS,
PAG-IBIG and Philhealth.[1] After the conduct of summary investigations, and after the parties submitted their position
papers, the DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his
money claims.[2] Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Directors Order, but failed. The Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed
petitioners appeal on the ground that petitioner submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit instead of posting a cash or
surety bond. When the matter was brought before the CA, where petitioner claimed that it had been denied due process, it was
held that petitioner was accorded due process as it had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary
had jurisdiction over the matter, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the power of the
DOLE Secretary under Art. 128(b) of the Code had been repealed by Republic Act No. (RA) 7730.
The Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent. It was held
that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, this function could not
be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. This was the interpretation of the Court of the clause in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists in Art. 128(b).[5]
From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision (with Leave of Court). The
PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the
power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.[6] In its Comment,[7] the DOLE sought clarification
as well, as to the extent of its visitorial and enforcement power under the Labor Code, as amended.
The Court treated the Motion for Clarification as a second motion for reconsideration, granting said motion and reinstating the
petition.[8] It is apparent that there is a need to delineate the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary vis--vis that of the NLRC.
Issues:
1. WON DOLE make a determination of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists
2. What extent could DOLE determine?

Held:
1. Yes.
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that the power was
primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE
would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee
relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow, the
same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the employers
power to control the employees conduct.[9] The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. The DOLE Secretary,
or his or her representatives, can utilize the same test, even in the course of inspection, making use of the same
evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected. The expanded
visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could,
by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The
Court issued the declaration that at least a prima facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee relationship be made
to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will be faced with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will
weigh it, to see if the same does successfully refute the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the
exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship has already been
terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place.
The Court, in limiting the power of the DOLE, gave the rationale that such limitation would eliminate the prospect of
competing conclusions between the DOLE and the NLRC. The prospect of competing conclusions could just as well have been
eliminated by according respect to the DOLE findings, to the exclusion of the NLRC, and this We believe is the more prudent
course of action to take.
This is not to say that the determination by the DOLE is beyond question or review. Suffice it to say, there are judicial remedies
such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that may be availed of, should a party wish to dispute the findings of the DOLE.
It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
need not necessarily result in an affirmative finding. The DOLE may well make the determination that no employer-employee
relationship exists, thus divesting itself of jurisdiction over the case. It must not be precluded from being able to reach its own
conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by this Court.
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the
existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial
review, not review by the NLRC.
2. To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor
Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee
relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-
employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the
Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for
reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Director that there was an employer-employee relationship has been
subjected to review by this Court, with the finding being that there was no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and private respondent, based on the evidence presented. Private respondent presented self-serving allegations as
well as self-defeating evidence.[10] The findings of the Regional Director were not based on substantial evidence, and private
respondent failed to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The DOLE had no jurisdiction over the case, as
there was no employer-employee relationship present. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner is proper.
MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO, President, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL DlRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and
Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club
itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government.
Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the
amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 77-78, Rollo).
On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the
Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was
docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.
On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the
petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaints (p. 98, Rollo). Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974,
January, 1985, November, 1985 and May, 1986, were duly submitted for inspection.
On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report confirming that there was underpayment of
wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner,
Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing
the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees
Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, who rendered a
Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only
from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986
ISSUE:
whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
YES. In the present case, petitioner admitted the charge of underpayment of wages to workers still in its employ; in fact, it
pleaded for time to raise funds to satisfy its obligation. There was thus no contest against the findings of the labor inspectors.
Barely less than a month after the promulgation on November 26, 1986 of the Zambales Base Metals case, Executive Order No.
111 was issued on December 24, 1986,5 amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, to read as follows:
(b) THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 217 OF THIS CODE TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING AND IN CASES WHERE THE
RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE STILL EXISTS, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor
standards provisions of this Code AND OTHER LABOR LEGISLATION based on the findings of labor regulation officers or
industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and
raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection. (Emphasis supplied)
As seen from the foregoing, EO 111 authorizes a Regional Director to order compliance by an employer with labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code and other legislation. It is Our considered opinion however, that the inclusion
of the phrase, " The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists" ... in Article 128(b), as amended, above-cited,
merely confirms/reiterates the enforcement adjudication authority of the Regional Director over uncontested money
claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists. 6
Viewed in the light of PD 850 and read in coordination with MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 37, it is clear that
it has always been the intention of our labor authorities to provide our workers immediate access (when still
feasible, as where an employer-employee relationship still exists) to their rights and benefits, without being
inconvenienced by arbitration/litigation processes that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially
burdensome in the long run.
Note further the second paragraph of Policy Instructions No. 7 indicating that the transfer of labor standards cases from the
arbitration system to the enforcement system is
. . to assure the workers the rights and benefits due to him under labor standard laws, without having to go through
arbitration. . .
so that
. . the workers would not litigate to get what legally belongs to him. .. ensuring delivery . . free of charge.
Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by
long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. Labor laws
are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice.
This view is in consonance with the present "Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standard Cases in the Regional Offices
" 7 issued by the Secretary of Labor, Franklin M. Drilon on September 16, 1987.
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Rule II on "Money Claims Arising from Complaint Routine Inspection", provide as follows:
Section 2. Complaint inspection. — All such complaints shall immediately be forwarded to the Regional Director who shall
refer the case to the appropriate unit in the Regional Office for assignment to a Labor Standards and Welfare Officer (LSWO)
for field inspection. When the field inspection does not produce the desired results, the Regional Director shall summon the
parties for summary investigation to expedite the disposition of the case. . . .
Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. — Where employer-employee relationship no
longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, it is also clear that the limitation embodied in MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 to amounts not exceeding P100,000.00
has been dispensed with, in view of the following provisions of pars. (b) and (c), Section 7 on "Restitution", the same Rules,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Plant-level restitutions may be effected for money claims not exceeding Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00). . . .
(c) Restitutions in excess of the aforementioned amount shall be effected at the Regional Office or at the worksite subject to
the prior approval of the Regional Director.
which indicate the intention to empower the Regional Director to award money claims in excess of P100,000.00; provided of
course the employer does not contest the findings made, based on the provisions of Section 8 thereof:
Section 8. Compromise agreement. — Should the parties arrive at an agreement as to the whole or part of the dispute, said
agreement shall be reduced in writing and signed by the parties in the presence of the Regional Director or his duly authorized
representative.
E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's decision
upholding private respondents' salary differentials and ECOLAs on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial and
enforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128-b) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy
Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an
employer-employee relationship still exists. This intention must be given weight and entitled to great respect. As held
in Progressive Workers' Union, et. al. vs. F.P. Aguas, et. al. G.R. No. 59711-12, May 29, 1985, 150 SCRA 429:
. . The interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect. We see no
reason to detract from this rudimentary rule in administrative law, particularly when later events have proved said
interpretation to be in accord with the legislative intent. ..
The proceedings before the Regional Director must, perforce, be upheld on the basis of Article 128(b) as amended by E.O. No.
111, dated December 24, 1986, this executive order "to be considered in the nature of a curative statute with retrospective
application." (Progressive Workers' Union, et al. vs. Hon. F.P. Aguas, et al. (Supra); M. Garcia vs. Judge A. Martinez, et al., G.R.
No. L- 47629, May 28, 1979, 90 SCRA 331)
ODIN SECURITY AGENCY, petitioner, vs.HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA

Facts:
this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seeks to annul
and set aside the order dated March 20, 1987, issued by public respondent Luna C. Piezas in his capacity as the Regional
Director, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment, and the orders dated March 23, 1988 and March 13,
1989, issued by public respondent Dionisio C. De la Serna as Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and
to enjoin the public respondents and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from executing said orders.
On July 8, 1986, a complaint was filed by Sergio Apilado and fifty-five (55) others charging the petitioner Odin Security Agency
(hereafter "OSA"), underpayment of wages, illegal deductions, non-payment of night shift differential, overtime pay, premium
pay for holiday work, rest days and Sundays, service incentive leaves, vacation and sick leaves, and 13th-month pay. When
conciliation efforts failed, the parties were required to submit their position papers.
Private respondents alleged in their position paper that their latest monthly salary was P1,600; that from this amount,
petitioner deducted P100 as administrative cost and P20 as bond; that they were not paid their premium pay and overtime
pay for working on the eleven (11) legal holidays per year; and, that since private respondents were relieved or constructively
dismissed, they must also be paid backwages.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that on July 21, 1986, some 48 security guards threatened mass action against it.
Alarmed by a possible abandonment of post by the guards and mindful of its contractual obligations to its clients/principals,
petitioner relieved and re-assigned the complaining guards to other posts in Metro Manila. Those relieved were ordered to
report to the agency's main office for reassignment. Only few complied, so those who failed to comply were placed on "AWOL"
status. Petitioner claimed it complied with the Labor Code provisions, and in support thereof, it submitted the "Quitclaim and
Waiver" of thirty-four (34) complainants. It further alleged that complainants who rendered over-time work as shown by their
time sheets were paid accordingly; that service incentive leaves not availed of, night shift differential, rest days, and holidays
were paid in cash.
On November 18, 1986, petitioner filed an ex parte manifestation alleging that nineteen (19) complainants had withdrawn
their complaints.
On January 1, 1987, petitioner again filed a supplemental ex parte manifestation alleging that Luis San Francisco also
withdrew his complaint.
Earlier, on October 21, 1986, seventeen (17) complainants repudiated their quitclaim and waiver. They alleged that
management pressured them to sign documents which they were not allowed to read and that if such waiver existed, they did
not have any intention of waiving their rights under the law.
Petitioner in its reply argued that complainants were estopped from denying their quitclaims on the ground of equity; that
being high school graduates, complainants fully understood the document they signed; and that complainant's allegation of
coercion or threat was a mere afterthought.
Later, six (6) of the seventeen (17) complainants who repudiated their quitclaims again executed quitclaims and waivers.
Ruling of public respondent Luna C. Piezas:

Ruled in favor of the complainants:
The complaining guards filed a motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal by respondent Undersecretary
Dionisio C. De la Serna.
Ruling of De la Serna:
Ruled in favor of the complainants and modified the ruling of the Regional Director
Issue: WON the petitioner was denied due process
Held:
No
The petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the hearing officer of the
Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based his
decision in the case. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process are satisfied when
the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers (Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phil., Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 78787,
December 18, 1989; Asiaworld Publishing House vs. Ople, 152 SCRA 224; Manila Doctors Hospital vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 262).
What the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard
(Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399). There is no denial of due process where a party is given
an opportunity to be heard and present his case (Ong, Sr. vs. Parel, 156 SCRA 768; Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152
SCRA 237). Since petitioner herein participated in the hearings, submitted a position paper, and filed a motion for
reconsideration of the March 23, 1988 decision of the Labor Undersecretary, it was not denied due process.
The petitioner is estopped from questioning the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Director over the private
respondents' claims. Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director by taking part in the hearings before him
and by submitting a position paper. When the Regional Director issued his March 20, 1987 order requiring petitioner to pay
the private respondents the benefits they were claiming, petitioner was silent. Only the private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. It was only after the Undersecretary modified the order of the Regional Director on March 23, 1988 that the
petitioner moved for reconsideration and questioned the jurisdiction of the public respondents to hear and decide the case.
The principle of jurisdiction by estoppel bars it from doing this. In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36, we held:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rules, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbunjones, etc., 243 U.S. 273,
61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo, 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Sibonghanoy was reiterated in Crisostomo vs. C.A., 32 SCRA 54; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Capilitan vs. De la Cruz, 55 SCRA
706; and PNB vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 299.
The fact is, the Regional Director and the Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint which
was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor Code). Only later did the guards ask for backwages on
account of their alleged constructive dismissal (p. 32, Rollo). Once vested, that jurisdiction continued until the entire
controversy was decided (Lee vs. MTC, 145 SCRA 408; Abadilla vs. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92; and Pucan vs. Bengzon, 155 SCRA
692).
The jurisdiction of public respondents over the complaints is clear from a reading of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:
(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the
power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code and
other labor legislation based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases
where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without
considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
In Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Hon. Dionisio De la Serna, G.R. No. 82805, June 29, 1989, we clarified the amendment when
we ruled, thus:
To recapitulate under EO 111, the Regional Directors, in representation of the Secretary of Labor — and notwithstanding the
grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters by Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended — have power to hear
cases involving violations of labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other legislation discovered in the course of
normal inspection, and order compliance therewith, provided that:
l) the alleged violations of the employer involve persons who are still his employees, i.e., not dismissed, and
2) the employer does not contest the findings of the labor regulations officer or raise issues which cannot be resolved without
considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection (p. 9, Concurring Opinion, J.
Narvasa.)
The ruling in Briad Agro was reiterated in Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 78909, June 30, 1989:
... Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases,
and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and
the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. (p. 5, Decision.)
SSK PARTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. TEODORICO CAMAS and SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT,
Respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated November 16, 1988 of the Department of Labor and
Employment, affirming the Order of the Regional Director dated January 11, 1988 in three consolidated cases filed against the
petitioner: (1) by Teodorico Camas for illegal deductions; (2) for underpayment of wages, non-payment of legal holiday pay
and service incentive leave filed by the union in behalf of its members; and (3) for non-payment of employees' service
incentive leave, underpayment of allowance, overtime pay, premium pay, and non-payment of two (2) regular holidays in
December which were discovered upon routine inspection conducted by the labor regulation officers. After the parties had
submitted their position papers and evidence, the Regional Director issued an order on January 11, 1988
Decision of the Regional Director: Ruled in favor of the Respondent (Teodorico Camas)
Ordering respondent [herein petitioner] to refund to complainant Teodorico Camas the amount of Seven Hundred and
Seventy Five Pesos (P775.00) having been illegally deducted from his salaries; and
Ordering respondent to pay individual claimants in the second case their unpaid overtime pay, legal holiday pay, living
allowance and service incentive leave within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, otherwise a writ of execution shall be issued
for the enforcement of this Order.
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor but was dismissed.
Issues:
1) WON the Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction
2) WON the Petitioner was denied due process?
Held:
1) the Sec. of Labor has jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the Regional Director over claims for violation of labor standards is conferred by Article 128-B of the Labor
Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111 of March 26,1987 which provides that:
(b) The Provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order
and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor
legislation based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection,
and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders , except in cases where the
employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspections. (Emphasis supplied.)
The jurisdiction of the Regional Director over employees' claims for wages and other monetary benefits not exceeding P5,000
has been affirmed by Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 129 of the Labor Code as follows:
Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. — Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional
Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is
empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of
wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic
or household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations: Provided, that such
complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or
househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve
the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same.
Being a curative statute, Republic Act No. 6715 may be given retroactive effect if, as in this case, no vested rights would be
impaired (DBP vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342; Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041; Briad-Agro Dev. Corp. vs. De la Serna, et al.,
G.R. No. 82805, Nov. 9,1989).
Under the exception clause in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, the Regional Director may not be divested of his jurisdiction
over these claims, unless three (3) elements concur, namely: (a) that the petitioner (employer) contests the findings of
the labor regulation officer and raises issues thereon; (b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to
examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
In this case, although the petitioner contested the Regional Director's finding of violations of labor standards committed by the
petitioner, that issue was resolved by an examination of evidentiary matters which were verifiable in the ordinary course of
inspection. Hence, there was no need to indorse the case to the appropriate arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for adjudication (Sec. 2, Rules Implementing Executive Order 111).
2. No, Petitioner was not denied due process

The petitioner's allegation that it was denied due process is not well taken. The petitioner actively participated in the
proceedings a quo by filing its answer to the complaint, presenting a position paper to the Regional Director, submitting
evidence in support of its claim, and appealing the decision of the Regional Director to the Secretary of Labor. Each of those
steps was a part and parcel of its right to due process.1â wphi1 As the petitioner had all those opportunities to be heard, it may
not complain that it was denied due process.
16. FRANCISCO GUICO, JR., doing business under the name and style of COPYLANDIA SERVICES & TRADING, petitioner,
vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, THE OFFICE OF REGIONAL
DIRECTOR OF REGION I, DEPT. OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, ROSALINA CARRERA, ET. AL., respondents.
Facts:
The case started when the Office of the Regional Director, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region I, San
Fernando, La Union, received a letter-complaint dated April 25, 1995, requesting for an investigation of petitioner's
establishment, Copylandia Services & Trading, for violation of labor standards laws. Pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement
powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code,
as amended, inspections were conducted at Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2, 1995. The inspections yielded the
following violations involving twenty-one (21) employees who are copier operators: (1) underpayment of wages; (2)
underpayment of 13th month pay; and (3) no service incentive leave with pay.
The first hearing of the case was held on June 14, 1995, where petitioner was represented by Joseph Botea, Officer-in-Charge
of the Dagupan City outlets, while the 21 employees were represented by Leilani Barrozo, Gemma Gales, Majestina Raymundo
and Laureta Clauna. It was established that a copier operator was receiving a daily salary ranging from P35.00 to P60.00 plus
commission of P20.00 per P500.00 worth of photocopying. There was also incentive pay of P20.00 per P250.00 worth of
photocopying in excess of the first P500.00. On July 13, 1995, petitioner's representative submitted a Joint Affidavit signed
and executed by the 21 employees expressing their disinterest in prosecuting the case and their waiver and release of
petitioner from his liabilities arising from non-payment and underpayment of their salaries and other benefits. Individually
signed documents dated December 21, 1994, purporting to be the employees' Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim were also
submitted.
In the investigation conducted by Hearing Officer Adonis Peralta on July 21, 1995, the 21 employees claimed that they signed
the Joint Affidavit for fear of losing their jobs. They added that their daily salary was increased to P92.00 effective July 1, 1995,
but the incentive and commission schemes were discontinued. They alleged that they did not waive the unpaid benefits due to
them.
Regional Director Guerrero N. Cirilo issued an Order 6 favorable to the 21 employees. First, he ruled that the purported
Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim dated December 21 and 22, 1994, could not cause the dismissal of the labor standards case
against the petitioner since the same were executed before the filing of the said case. Moreover, the employees repudiated said
waiver and quitclaim. Second, he held that despite the salary increase granted by the petitioner, the daily salary of the
employees was still below the minimum daily wage rate of P119.00 under Wage Order No. RB-I-03. Thirdly, he held that the
removal of the commission and incentive schemes during the pendency of the case violated the prohibition against
elimination or diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner received a copy of the Order on November 10, 1995. On November 15, 1995, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8
The next day, he filed a Memorandum of Appeal accompanied by a Motion to Reduce Amount of Appeal Bond and a
Manifestation of an Appeal Bond.
In his appeal memorandum, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Regional Director citing Article 129 of the Labor
Code, as amended, 10 and Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6715. 11 He argued that the
Regional Director has no jurisdiction over the complaint of the 21 employees since their individual monetary claims exceed
the P5,000.00 limit. He alleged that the Regional Director should have indorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper
adjudication and for a more formal proceeding where there is ample opportunity for him to present evidence to contest the
claims of the employees. He further alleged that the Regional Director erred in computing the monetary award since it was
done without regard to the actual number of days and time worked by the employees. He also faulted the Regional Director for
not giving credence to the Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim of the employees.
In a letter 15 dated February 23, 1996, the Regional Director informed petitioner that he could not give due course to his
appeal since the appeal bond of P105,000.00 fell short of the amount due to the 4 employees who did not participate in the
settlement of the case. In the same letter, he directed petitioner to post, within ten (10) days from receipt of the letter, the
amount of P126,841.06 or the difference between the monetary award due to the 4 employees and the appeal bond previously
posted.
On March 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to Reduce Amount of Appeal Bond. He manifested that he has
closed down his business operations due to severe financial losses and implored the Regional Director to accept the appeal
bond already filed for reasons of justice and equity. In an Order dated December 3, 1996, the respondent Secretary denied the
foregoing Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the directive from the Regional Director to post an additional surety
bond is contained in a "mere letter" which cannot be the proper subject of a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal before
his office. He added that for failure of the petitioner to post the correct amount of surety or cash bond, his appeal was not
perfected following Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended. Despite the non-perfection of the appeal, respondent
Secretary looked into the Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim signed by the employees and rejected it on the ground that the
consideration was unconscionably inadequate. He ruled, nonetheless, that the amount received by the said employees should
be deducted from the judgment award and the difference should be paid by the petitioner.
On December 26, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On February 13, 1997, he filed a Motion to Admit
Additional Bond and posted the amount of P126,841.06 in compliance with the order of the Regional Director in his letter
dated February 13, 1996.
On October 24, 1997, the respondent Secretary denied the Motion for Reconsideration. He ruled that the Regional Director has
jurisdiction over the case citing Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended. He pointed out that Republic Act No. 7730
repealed the jurisdictional limitations imposed by Article 129 on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives.
Issue: (1) whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the instant labor standards case, and (2)
whether or not petitioner perfected his appeal
Held:
1. We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the respondent correctly pointed out, this Court's ruling in
Servando — that the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws
cannot be exercised where the individual claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A.
No. 7730 amending Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code,viz:
Article 128 (b) — Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor
legislation based on the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor
employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the
course of inspection.
An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article may be
appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. (Emphasis supplied.)
The records of the House of Representatives 20 show that Congressmen Alberto S. Veloso and Eriberto V. Loreto sponsored
the law. In his sponsorship speech, Congressman Veloso categorically declared that "this bill seeks to do away with the
jurisdictional limitations imposed through said ruling (referring to Servando) and to finally settle any lingering doubts on the
visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment." 21 Petitioner's reliance on Servando is thus
untenable.
2. No. Article 128(b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal bond must be "in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the order appealed from." The records show that petitioner failed to post the required amount of the
appeal bond. His appeal was therefore not perfected.
17. PEPSI-COLA SALES AND ADVERTISING UNION, petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and ROBERTO ALISASIS,
respondents
Facts:
From 1964 until sometime about 1985, Alisasis was an employee of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. and later, of the Pepsi-
Cola Products (Philippines) Inc., after the latter had bought out the former. 4 He was also a member of the labor organization
of all regular route and truck salesman and truck helpers of the company — the Pepsi Cola Sales & Advertising Union (PSAU)
— from June 1, 1965 up to the termination of his employment in 1985. 5 As a member of the PSAU, he was also a participant in
the "Mutual Aid Plan" set up by said union sometime in 1980. During the entire period of his employment, there were
regularly deducted from his wages the amounts corresponding to union dues as well as contributions to the fund of the Mutual
Aid Plan.
On May 7, 1986, Alisasis filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch, Capital Region, Manila, a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Pepsi-Cola, Inc. This resulted in a judgment by the Labor Arbiter dated January 25, 1988 declaring him to have been
illegally dismissed and ordering the employer to reinstate him "to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with
full backwages for one (1) year from the time he was not allowed to report for work . . . ." The judgment was subsequently
affirmed with modification by the Fourth Division of the NLRC
It appears that both Alisasis and Pepsi-Cola, Inc. accepted the NLRC's verdict and complied therewith; that Pepsi-Cola gave
Alisasis back wages for one (1) year; and that Alisasis issued the corresponding quitclaim and considered himself separated
from his employment.
Alisasis thereafter asked his labor organization, PSAU, to pay him monetary benefits in accordance with Section 3, Article X of
the "Amended By-Laws of the Mutual Aid Plan of the Pepsi-Cola Sales & Advertising Union (U.O.E.F.), 12 in an amount equal to
"One (P1.00) Peso per year of service multiplied by the number of member(s) . . . ." 13 PSAU demurred, invoking in its turn
Section 1, Article XII of the same amended by-laws, declaring as disqualified from any entitlement to the PLAN and . . . (from
any) Benefit or return of contributions . . . under any circumstances," inter alia, "(a)ny member dismissed for cause."
Alisasis thereupon filed a complaint against the union, PSAU, with the Med-Arbitration Unit, National Capital Region,
Department of Labor and Employment, to compel the latter to pay him his claimed benefits. 15 The principal defenses alleged
by PSAU were that Alisasis was disqualified to claim any benefits under the Mutual Aid Plan, supra; and that the Med-Arbiter
had no original jurisdiction over the case since Alisasis' claim for financial assistance was not among the cases cognizable by
Med-Arbiters under the law "such as representation cases, internal union and inter-union disputes . . . (or) a violation of the
union's constitution and by-laws and the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization." 16 After due
proceedings, the Med-Arbiter promulgated an Order on April 16, 1990, ruling that he had jurisdiction and "ordering
respondent . . . (PSAU) to pay complainant Roberto Alisasis . . . his claim for financial assistance under the Mutual Aid Fund of
the union." PSAU appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who, by Resolution dated July 25, 1990, denied the
appeal but reduced the Med-Arbiter's award from P18,669.00 to P17,886.00. 17 Nullification of the Med-Arbiter's Order of
April 16, 1990 and the respondent Secretary's Resolution of July 25, 1990 is the prayer sought by the petitioner in the special
civil action of certiorari at bar.
Issue: 1. whether or not the case at bar is within the original jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor
Relations
2. whether or not Alisalis was dismissed for a just cause
Held:
1. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations and its Divisions is set forth in the first paragraph of Article 226 of the
Labor Code, as amended, viz.:
"ART. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. — The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional
offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of
either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or
affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration.
It is evident that the case at bar does not concern a dispute, grievance or problem "arising from or affecting labor-management
relations." So, if it is to be deemed as coming within the Med-Arbiter's jurisdiction, it will have to be as either an "intra-union"
or "inter-union" conflict.
No definition is given by law of these precise terms, "intra-union and inter-union conflicts." It is known, however, that intra-"
and "inter-" are both combining forms, prefixes — the first, "intra-," meaning "within, inside of [intramural], intravenous];"
and the other, "inter-," denoting "1. between or among: the second element is singular in form [interstate] 2. with or on each
other (or one another), together, mutual, reciprocal, mutually, or reciprocally [interact]." 18 An intra-union conflict would
therefore refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, and an inter-union controversy or dispute, one occurring or carried
on between or among unions. In this sense, the controversy between Alisasis and his union, PSAU — respecting the former's
rights under the latter's "Mutual Aid Plan" — would be an intra-union conflict under Article 226 of the Labor Code and hence,
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor Relations whose decision, it may
additionally be mentioned, is appealable to the Secretary of Labor.
2. The Court holds that Alisasis had indeed been "dismissed for cause." His employer had established this factual proposition
by competent evidence to the satisfaction of both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission. In the
latter's view, and in its own words, "Certainly, with the actuations of complainant, . . . (Alisasis' employer) had ample reason or
enough basis then to lose trust and confidence in him, . . . considering that (said employer) had already lost trust and
confidence in complainant which is founded on reasonable ground, as discussed earlier, (and therefore) there is no point in
requiring respondent to reinstate complainant to his former position ... (as to) do so would be tantamount to compelling the
management to employ someone whom it can no longer trust, which is oppressive."
It was merely "the manner in which such a dismissal from employment was effected . . . (that was deemed as) not in
accordance with law, (there having been) failure to comply with the notice requirement under Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 on
termination of employees." That imperfection is, however, a circumstance quite distinct from the existence of what the NLRC
has clearly and expressly conceded to be a "valid and lawful cause in the dismissal of complainant by respondent." And this is
precisely the reason why, as already pointed out, the NLRC declined to accord to Alisasis all the remedies or reliefs usually
attendant upon an illegal termination of employment — e.g., reinstatement, award of damages — although requiring payment
by the employer of the sum of P1,000.00, simply on account of its failure "to comply with the notice requirement under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 on termination of employees."
The petitioner union (PSAU) was therefore quite justified in considering Alisasis as a "member dismissed for cause," and
hence disqualified under its amended by-laws to claim any "Benefit or return of contributions . . . under any
circumstances, . . . ." The ruling to the contrary of the Med-Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor and Employment must thus be
set aside as tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
18. ABBOTT LABORATORIES PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. ABBOTT LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION, MR.
CRESENCIANO TRAJANO, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of The Department of Labor and Employment and MR.
BENEDICTO ERNESTO BITONIO, JR.,in his capacity as Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations, respondents.
Facts:
ABBOTT is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical drugs. On 22 February 1996, the
Abbott Laboratories Employees Union (hereafter ALEU) represented by its president, Alvin B. Buerano, filed an application for
union registration in the Department of Labor and Employment. ALEU alleged in the application that it is a labor organization
with members consisting of 30 rank-and-file employees in the manufacturing unit of ABBOTT and that there was no certified
bargaining agent in the unit it sought to represent, namely, the manufacturing unit.
On 28 February 1996, 5 ALEU's application was approved by the Bureau of Labor Relations, which in due course issued
Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-2-1638-96. Consequently, ALEU became a legitimate labor organization. On 2 April
1996, ABBOTT filed a petition for cancellation of the Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-2-1638-96 in the Regional Office
of the Bureau of Labor Relations. This case was docketed as Case No. OD-M-9604-006. ABBOTT assailed the certificate of
registration since ALEU's application was not signed by at least 20% of the total 286 rank-and-file employees of the entire
employer unit; and that it omitted to submit copies of its books of account.
On 21 June 1996, 7 the Regional Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations decreed the cancellation of ALEU's registration
certificate No. NCR-UR-II-1585-95. In its decision, the Regional Director adopted the 13 June 1996 findings and
recommendations of the Med-Arbiter. It ruled that the union has failed to show that the rank-and-file employees in the
manufacturing unit of ABBOTT were bound by a common interest to justify the formation of a bargaining unit separate from
those belonging to the sales and office staff units. There was, therefore, sufficient reason to assume that the entire
membership of the rank-and-file consisting of 286 employees or the "employer unit" make up the appropriate bargaining unit.
However, it was clear on the record that the union's application for registration was supported by 30 signatures of its
members or barely constituting 10% of the entire rank-and-file employees of ABBOTT. Thus the Regional Director found that
for ALEU's failure to satisfy the requirements of union registration under Article 234 of the Labor Code, the cancellation of its
certificate of registration was in order. Forthwith, on 19 August 11996, ALEU appealed said cancellation to the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, which referred the same to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On 31 March 1997, 11 the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered judgment reversing the 21 June 1996 decision of the Regional
Director. It gave the following reasons to justify the reversal: (1) Article 234 of the Labor Code does not require an applicant
union to show proof of the "desirability of more than one bargaining unit within an employer unit," and the absence of such
proof is not a ground for the cancellation of a union's registration pursuant to Article 239 of Book V, Rule II of the
implementing rules of the Labor Code; (2) the issue pertaining to the appropriateness of a bargaining unit cannot be raised in
a cancellation proceeding but may be threshed out in the exclusion-inclusion process during a certification election; and (3)
the "one-bargaining unit, one-employer unit policy" must not be interpreted in a manner that shall derogate the right of the
employees to self-organization and freedom of association as guaranteed by Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution and
Article II of the International Labor Organization's Convention No. 87.
Its motion to reconsider the 31 March 1997 decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations having been denied for lack of merit in
the Order 13 of 9 July 1997, ABBOTT appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in its letter dated 19
September 1997, 14 addressed to ABBOTT's counsel, the Secretary of Labor and Employment refused to act on ABBOTT's
appeal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeals in
cancellation cases emanating from the Regional Offices.
Issue: whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has the authority to review the decision of the Bureau
of Labor Relations and at the same time raised the issue on the validity of ALEU's certificate of registration
Held:
At the outset, it is worthy to note that the present petition assails only the letter of the then Secretary of Labor & Employment
refusing to take cognizance of ABBOTT's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Hence, in the resolution of the present
petition, it is just appropriate to limit the issue on the power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to review the
decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Regional
Director in cases involving cancellations of certificates of registration of labor unions. The issue anent the validity of ALEU's
certificate of registration is subject of the Bureau of Labor Relations decision dated 31 March 1997. However, said decision is
not being assailed in the present petition; hence, we are not at liberty to review the same.
Contrary to ABBOTT's contention, there has been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Its refusal to take cognizance of ALEU's appeal from the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations is in
accordance with the provisions of Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended by
Department Order No. 09.
Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor and Employment has
no jurisdiction over decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate power to review the
decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel the union's certificate of registration, said decisions being final and
inappealable.
It is clear then that the Secretary of Labor and Employment did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not acting on
ABBOTT's appeal. The decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations on cases brought before it on appeal from the Regional
Director are final and executory. Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 19
Even if we relaxed the rule and consider the present petition as a petition for certiorari not only of the letter of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment but also of the decision of the Bureau of the Labor Relations which overruled the order of cancellation
of ALEU's certificate of registration, the same would still be dismissable for being time-barred. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court the special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within a period of sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. ABBOTT received the decision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations on 14 April 1997 and the order denying its motion for reconsideration of the said decision on 16 July 1997. The
present petition was only filed on 28 November 1997, after the laps of more than four months. Thus, for failure to avail of the
correct remedy within the period provided by law, the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations has become final and
executory.
19. LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FERDINAND SAORNIDO as voluntary arbitrator and LUDO
EMPLOYEES UNION (LEU) representing 214 of its officers and members, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION (LUDO for brevity) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
coconut oil, corn starch, glucose and related products. It operates a manufacturing plant located at Tupas Street, Cebu City and
a wharf where raw materials and finished products are shipped out.
In the course of its business operations, LUDO engaged the arrastre services of Cresencio Lu Arrastre Services (CLAS) for the
loading and unloading of its finished products at the wharf. Accordingly, several arrastre workers were deployed by CLAS to
perform the services needed by LUDO.
These arrastre workers were subsequently hired, on different dates, as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO every time
the latter needed additional manpower services. Said employees thereafter joined respondent union, the LUDO Employees
Union (LEU), which acted as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
On April 13, 1992, respondent union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with LUDO which provides certain
benefits to the employees, the amount of which vary according to the length of service rendered by the availing employee.
Thereafter, the union requested LUDO to include in its members' period of service the time during which they rendered
arrastre services to LUDO through the CLAS so that they could get higher benefits. LUDO failed to act on the request. Thus, the
matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration.
The parties accordingly executed a submission agreement raising the sole issue of the date of regularization of the workers for
resolution by the Voluntary Arbitrator.
In its decision dated April 18, 1997, the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that: (1) the respondent employees were engaged in
activities necessary and desirable to the business of petitioner, and (2) CLAS is a labor-only contractor of petitioner. In due
time, LUDO filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision
of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely erred when it upheld the award of benefits which were beyond the terms
of submission agreement. Petitioner asserts that the arbitrator must confine its adjudication to those issues submitted by the
parties for arbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the date of regularization of the workers. Hence, the award of
benefits by the arbitrator was done in excess of jurisdiction.
Respondents, for their part, aver that the three-year prescriptive period is reckoned only from the time the obligor declares
his refusal to comply with his obligation in clear and unequivocal terms. In this case, respondents maintain that LUDO merely
promised to review the company records in response to respondents' demand for adjustment in the date of their
regularization without making a categorical statement of refusal. 7 On the matter of the benefits, respondents argue that the
arbitrator is empowered to award the assailed benefits because notwithstanding the sole issue of the date of regularization,
standard companion issues on reliefs and remedies are deemed incorporated. Otherwise, the whole arbitration process would
be rendered purely academic and the law creating it inutile.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT A VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR CAN AWARD BENEFITS NOT CLAIMED IN THE SUBMISSION
AGREEMENT
Held:
Yes. The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters is clearly defined and
specifically delineated in the Labor Code. The pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, read:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work
and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be
resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain
disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of
the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks."
In construing the above provisions, we held in San Jose vs. NLRC, 9 that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can
possibly include money claims in one form or another. 10 Comparatively, in Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, 11
compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which
has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where
the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party (emphasis supplied)."
12 While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor department's personnel, said arbitrator renders
arbitration services provided for under labor laws.
Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement.
Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the
final resort for the adjudication of disputes. 13 The succinct reasoning enunciated by the CA in support of its holding, that the
Voluntary Arbitrator in a labor controversy has jurisdiction to render the questioned arbitral awards, deserves our
concurrence, thus:
In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those questions expressly stated and limited in the submission agreement.
However, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has the power
to make a final settlement. Thus, assuming that the submission empowers the arbitrator to decide whether an employee was
discharged for just cause, the arbitrator in this instance can reasonable assume that his powers extended beyond giving a yes-
or-no answer and included the power to reinstate him with or without back pay.
As regards petitioner's contention that the money claim in this case is barred by prescription, we hold that this contention is
without merit. So is petitioner's stance that the benefits claimed by the respondents, i.e., sick leave, vacation leave and 13th-
month pay, had already prescribed, considering the three-year period for the institution of monetary claims. 15 Such
determination is a question of fact which must be ascertained based on the evidence, both oral and documentary, presented
by the parties before the Voluntary Arbitrator. In this case, the Voluntary Arbitrator found that prescription has not as yet set
in to bar the respondents' claims for the monetary benefits awarded to them. Basic is the rule that findings of fact of
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. 16 Here, the Voluntary Arbitrator received the
evidence of the parties first-hand. No compelling reason has been shown for us to diverge from the findings of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, especially since the appellate court affirmed his findings, that it took some time for respondent employees to
ventilate their claims because of the repeated assurances made by the petitioner that it would review the company records
and determine therefrom the validity of the claims, without expressing a categorical denial of their claims.
20. CELESTINO VIVERO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HAM-MONIA MARINE SERVICES, and HANSEATIC
SHIPPING CO., LTD., respondents.
Facts:
CELESTINO VIVERO, in this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 26 May 1999
setting aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission of 28 May 1998 as well as its Resolution of 23 July 1998
denying his motion for its reconsideration, and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter of 21 January 1997.
Petitioner Vivero, a licensed seaman, is a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP). The Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by AMOSUP and private respondents provides, among others —
ARTICLE XII
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Sec. 3. A dispute or grievance arising in connection with the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be adjusted in
accordance with the following procedure:
1. Any seaman who feels that he has been unjustly treated or even subjected to an unfair consideration shall endeavor to have
said grievance adjusted by the designated representative of the unlicensed department abroad the vessel in the following manner;
A. Presentation of the complaint to his immediate superior.
B. Appeal to the head of the department in which the seaman involved shall be employed.
C. Appeal directly to the Master.
Sec. 4. If the grievance cannot be resolved under the provision of Section 3, the decision of the Master shall govern at sea . . . in
foreign ports and until the vessel arrives at a port where the Master shall refer such dispute to either the COMPANY or the UNION
in order to resolve such dispute. It is understood, however, if the dispute could not be resolved then both parties shall avail of the
grievance procedure.
Sec. 5. In furtherance of the foregoing principle, there is hereby created a GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE to be composed of two
COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES to be designated by the COMPANY and two LABOR REPRESENTATIVES to be designated by the
UNION.
Sec. 6. Any grievance, dispute or misunderstanding concerning any ruling, practice, wages or working conditions in the
COMPANY, or any breach of the Employment Contract, or any dispute arising from the meaning or the application of the provision
of this Agreement or a claim of violation thereof or any complaint that any such crewmembers may have against the COMPANY,
as well as complaint which the COMPANY may have against such crewmembers shall be brought to the attention of the
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE before either party takes any action, legal or otherwise.
Sec. 7. The COMMITTEE shall resolve any dispute within seven (7) days from and after the same is submitted to it for resolution
and if the same cannot be settled by the COMMITTEE or if the COMMITTEE fails to act on the dispute within the 7-day period
herein provided, the same shall be referred to a VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE.
An "impartial arbitrator" will be appointed by mutual choice and consent of the UNION and the COMPANY who shall hear and
decide the dispute or issue presented to him and his decision shall be final and unappealable . . .
On grounds of very poor performance and conduct, refusal to perform his job, refusal to report to the Captain or the vessel's
Engineers or cooperate with other ship officers about the problem in cleaning the cargo holds or of the shipping pump and his
dismal relations with the Captain of the vessel, complainant was repatriated on 15 July 1994.
On 01 August 1994, complainant filed a complaint for illegal dismissal at Associated Marine Officers' and Seaman's Union of
the Philippines (AMOSUP) of which complainant was a member. Pursuant to Article XII of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, grievance proceedings were conducted; however, parties failed to reach and settle the dispute amicably, thus, on
28 November 1994, complainant filed [a] complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
The law in force at the time petitioner filed his Complaint with the POEA was EO No. 247.
While the case was pending before the POEA, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the POEA had
no jurisdiction over the case considering petitioner Vivero's failure to refer it to a Voluntary Arbitration Committee in
accordance with the CBA between the parties. Upon the enactment of RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, the case was transferred to the Adjudication Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
On 21 January 1997 Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor Jr., on the basis of the pleadings and documents available on record,
rendered a decision dismissing the Complaint for want of jurisdiction. 4 According to the Labor Arbiter, since the CBA of the
parties provided for the referral to a Voluntary Arbitration Committee should the Grievance Committee fail to settle the
dispute, and considering the mandate of Art. 261 of the Labor Code on the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Voluntary
Arbitrators, the Labor Arbiter clearly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner (complainant before the Labor Arbiter) appealed the dismissal of his petition to the NLRC. On 28 May 1998 the
NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the record was clear that petitioner had exhausted his
remedy by submitting his case to the Grievance Committee of AMOSUP. Considering however that he could not obtain any
settlement he had to ventilate his case before the proper forum, i.e., the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. 6
The NLRC further held that the contested portion in the CBA providing for the intercession of a Voluntary Arbitrator was not
binding upon petitioner since both petitioner and private respondents had to agree voluntarily to submit the case before a
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. This would entail expenses as the Voluntary Arbitrator chosen by the
parties had to be paid. Inasmuch however as petitioner chose to file his Complaint originally with POEA, then the Labor
Arbiter to whom the case was transferred would have to take cognizance of the case.
The NLRC then remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. On 3 July 1998 respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC on 23 July 1998.
Thus, private respondents raised the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the provision in the CBA requiring a dispute
which remained unresolved by the Grievance Committee to be referred to a Voluntary Arbitration Committee, was mandatory
in character in view of the CBA between the parties. They stressed that "since it is a policy of the state to promote voluntary
arbitration as a mode of settling labor disputes, it is clear that the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in taking
cognizance of a case which was still within the mantle of the Voluntary Arbitration Committee's jurisdiction."
But the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondents. It held that the CBA "is the law between the parties and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law." 10 Hence, petitioner should have followed the provision
in the CBA requiring the submission of the dispute to the Voluntary Arbitration Committee once the Grievance Committee
failed to settle the controversy. 11 According to the Court of Appeals, the parties did not have the choice to "volunteer" to refer
the dispute to the Voluntary Arbitrator or a Panel of Arbitrators when there was already an agreement requiring them to do
so. "Voluntary Arbitration" means that it is binding because of a prior agreement or contract, while "Compulsory Arbitration"
is when the law declares the dispute subject to arbitration, regardless of the consent or desire of the parties.
The Court of Appeals further held that the Labor Code itself enumerates the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, and prohibits the NLRC and the Regional Directors of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from entertaining cases falling under the same. 13 Thus, the fact that private respondents
filed their Position Paper first before filing their Motion to Dismiss was immaterial and did not operate to confer jurisdiction
upon the Labor Arbiter, following the well-settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by law and not by consent or agreement
of the parties or by estoppel.
Issue: whether the NLRC is deprived of jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases whenever a CBA provides for
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration proceedings.
Held:
The case is primarily a termination dispute. It is clear from the claim/assistance request form submitted by petitioner to
AMOSUP that he was challenging the legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of due process. The issue of whether
there was proper interpretation and implementation of the CBA provisions comes into play only because the grievance
procedure provided for in the CBA was not observed after he sought his Union's assistance in contesting his termination. Thus,
the question to be resolved necessarily springs from the primary issue of whether there was a valid termination; without this,
then there would be no reason to invoke the need to interpret and implement the CBA provisions properly.
In San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission 21 this Court held that the phrase "all other labor disputes" may
include termination disputes provided that the agreement between the Union and the Company states "in unequivocal
language that [the parties] conform to the submission of termination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary
arbitration." 22 Ergo, it is not sufficient to merely say that parties to the CBA agree on the principle that "all disputes" should
first be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator. There is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination
disputes should be resolved by a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special
class of disputes that are generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law.
Absent such express stipulation, the phrase "all disputes" should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict traditionally
within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e., disputes relating to contract-interpretation, contract-implementation, or
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Illegal termination disputes — not falling within any of these
categories — should then be considered as a special area of interest governed by a specific provision of law.
In this case, however, while the parties did agree to make termination disputes the proper subject of voluntary arbitration,
such submission remains discretionary upon the parties. A perusal of the CBA provisions shows that Sec. 6, Art. XII (Grievance
Procedure) of the CBA is the general agreement of the parties to refer grievances, disputes or misunderstandings to a
grievance committee, and henceforth, to a voluntary arbitration committee.
The CBA clarifies the proper procedure to be followed in situations where the parties expressly stipulate to submit
termination disputes to the jurisdiction of a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. For when the parties have
validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure
should be strictly observed. Non-compliance therewith cannot be excused, as petitioner suggests, by the fact that he is not
well-versed with the "fine prints" of the CBA. It was his responsibility to find out, through his Union, what the provisions of the
CBA were and how they could affect his rights
As earlier stated, the instant case is a termination dispute falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter, and does not specifically involve the application, implementation or enforcement of company personnel policies
contemplated in Policy Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy Instruction No. 56 does not apply in the case at bar. In any
case, private respondents never invoked the application of Policy Instruction No. 56 in their Position Papers, neither did they
raise the question in their Motion to Dismiss which they filed nine (9) months after the filing of their Position Papers. At this
late stage of the proceedings, it would not serve the ends of justice if this case is referred back to a Voluntary Arbitrator
considering that both the AMOSUP and private respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter by filing
their respective Position Papers and ignoring the grievance procedure set forth in their CBA.
After the grievance proceedings have failed to bring about a resolution, AMOSUP, as agent of petitioner, should have informed
him of his option to settle the case through voluntary arbitration. Private respondents, on their part, should have timely
invoked the provision of their CBA requiring the referral of their unresolved disputes to a Voluntary Arbitrator once it became
apparent that the grievance machinery failed to resolve it prior to the filing of the case before the proper tribunal. The private
respondents should not have waited for nine (9) months from the filing of their Position Paper with the POEA before it moved
to dismiss the case purportedly for lack of jurisdiction. As it is, private respondents are deemed to have waived their right to
question the procedure followed by petitioner, assuming that they have the right to do so. Under their CBA, both Union and
respondent companies are responsible for selecting an impartial arbitrator or for convening an arbitration committee; 30 yet,
it is apparent that neither made a move towards this end. Consequently, petitioner should not be deprived of his legitimate
recourse because of the refusal of both Union and respondent companies to follow the grievance procedure.
Tabigue et al., vs International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO)
Facts: Petitioner Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners, all employees of respondent INTERCO, filed a Notice of Preventive
Mediation with the Department of Labor and Employment – National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional
Branch No. XI, Davao City against respondent, for violation of CBA and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting.
As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration.
The NCMB thus set a date for the parties to agree on a Voluntary Arbitrator. Before the parties could finally meet, respondent
presented before the NCMB a letter of Genaro Tan (Tan), president of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers’ Union (the union) of
which petitioners are members, addressed to respondent’s plant manager Engr. Paterno C. Tangente (Tangente), stating that
petitioners "are not duly authorized by the board or the officers to represent the union, hence all actions, representations or
agreements made by these people with the management will not be honored or recognized by the union." Respondent thus
moved to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners soon sent union president Tan and respondent’s plant manager Tangente a Notice to Arbitrate, citing the "Revised
Guidelines" in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Procedure vis a vis Section 3, Article XII of the CBA, furnishing the NCMB
with a copy thereof, which notice respondent opposed. The parties failed to arrive at a settlement.
NCMB: NCMB Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote petitioner Alex Bibat and respondent’s plant manager Tangente of the lack
of willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit the case
thereto; and that under the CBA forged by the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary arbitration but that
since Tan informed respondent that the union had not authorized petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to bring the
case to voluntary arbitration. He further concluded that "the demand of petitioners to submit the issues to voluntary
arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED." He thus advised petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce
their rights.
On petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the NCMB Director, by letter of April 11, 2007 to petitioners’ counsel, stated that
the NCMB "has no rule-making power to decide on issues as it only facilitates settlement among the parties to labor disputes."
Petitioners thus assailed the NCMB Director’s decision via Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals which dismissed it
by Resolution of October 24, 2007 in this wise:
Considering that NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions but merely a conciliatory body for the
purpose of facilitating settlement of disputes between parties, its decisions or that of its authorized officer cannot be
appealed either through a petition for review under Rule 43 or under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further perusal of the petition reveals the following infirmities:
1. Payment of the docket fees and other legal fees is short by One Thousand Pesos (Php 1,000.00);
2. Copy of the assailed "Decision" of the Regional Director of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board has not been
properly certified as the name and designation of the certifying officer thereto are not indicated; and
3. Not all of the petitioners named in the petition signed the verification and non-forum shopping.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising
the following arguments:
THIS PARTICULAR CASE FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SECTION 6, RULE IV, IN RELATION TO PARAGRAPH 3,
SUB-PARAGRAPH 3.2, SECTION 4, RULE IV, ALL OF THE REVISED PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES IN THE CONDUCT OF
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS.
THE NCMB, WHEN EXERCISING ADJUDICATIVE POWERS, ACTS AS A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.
FINAL JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS, OR AWARDS OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
BOARDS, LIKE THE NCMB, COMMISSIONS, AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES, ARE APPEALABLE BY PETITION FOR REVIEW
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
LABOR CASES, AS A GENERAL RULE, ARE NEVER RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF TECHNICALITY ESPECIALLY SO WHEN
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES ARE AFFECTED.
The petition fails. Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioners claim that they had completed the payment of the appellate docket fee and other legal
fees when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. While the Court has, in the interest of
justice, given due course to appeals despite the belated payment of those fees, petitioners have not proffered any reason to call
for a relaxation of the above-quoted rule. On this score alone, the dismissal by the appellate court of petitioners’ petition is in
order.
CA decision: The appeal was dismissed. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court under which petitioners filed their petition before the
Court of Appeals22 applies to awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: Whether without the workers, without the union, may submit issues to voluntary arbitration?
Ruling: No. Under Section 9 (3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 21 the Court of Appeals exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.
An agency is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.24(underscoring supplied)
Given NCMB’s following functions, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No. 126 (the Reorganization Act of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment), viz:
(a) Formulate policies, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to effective
mediation and conciliation of labor disputes;
(b) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions;
(c) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors or institutions, and other government authorities concerned with
matters relative to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes;
(d) Formulate policies, plans, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to the
promotion of cooperative and non-adversarial schemes, grievance handling, voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes
of dispute settlement;
(e) Administer the voluntary arbitration program; maintain/update a list of voluntary arbitrations; compile arbitration
awards and decisions;
(f) Provide counseling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the administration of collective agreements;
(g) Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being implemented in the regional offices; and
(h) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Minister,
it can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency.
Respecting petitioners’ thesis that unsettled grievances should be referred to voluntary arbitration as called for in the CBA, the
same does not lie. The pertinent portion of the CBA reads:
In case of any dispute arising from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement or any matter affecting the
relations of Labor and Management, the UNION and the COMPANY agree to exhaust all possibilities of conciliation through the
grievance machinery. The committee shall resolve all problems submitted to it within 15 days after the problems have been
discussed by the members. If the dispute or grievance cannot be settled by the Committee, or if the committee failed to act on
the matter within the period of 15 days herein stipulated, the UNION and the COMPANY agree to submit the issue to Voluntary
Arbitration. Selection of the arbitrator shall be made within 7 days from the date of notification by the aggrieved party. The
Arbitrator shall be selected by lottery from 4 qualified individuals nominated by in equal numbers by both parties taken from
the list of Arbitrators prepared by the NCMB. If the Company and the Union representatives within 10 days fail to agree on the
Arbitrator, the NCMB shall name the Arbitrator. The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties.
However, the Arbitrator shall not have the authority to change any provisions of the Agreement. The cost of arbitration shall
be borne equally by the parties.
Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to represent the union. Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Atlas
Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission. Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name
or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
Clutching at straws, petitioners invoke the first paragraph of Article 255 of the Labor Code which states:
Art. 255. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer.
To petitioners, the immediately quoted provision is meant to be an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role of
the labor organization/union. The Court is not persuaded. The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time,
present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Goya Inc.vs. Goya Employees Union
Facts: Sometime in January 2004, petitioner Goya, Inc. (Company), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture,
importation, and wholesale of top quality food products, hired contractual employees from PESO Resources Development
Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory in Parang, Marikina City. This prompted
respondent Goya, Inc. Employees Union–FFW (Union) to request for a grievance conference on the ground that the contractual
workers do not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). When
the matter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for
voluntary arbitration.
During the hearing on July 1, 2004, the Company and the Union manifested before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Bienvenido E.
Laguesma that amicable settlement was no longer possible; hence, they agreed to submit for resolution the solitary issue of
"whether or not the Company is guilty of unfair labor acts in engaging the services of PESO, a third party service provider,
under the existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence."6 Both parties thereafter filed their respective pleadings.
The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO is not a management prerogative and in gross
violation of the CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). It noted that the contractual workers engaged have been
assigned to work in positions previously handled by regular workers and Union members, in effect violating Section 4, Article
I of the CBA, which provides for three categories of employees in the Company.
It was averred that the categories of employees had been a part of the CBA since the 1970s and that due to this provision, a
pool of casual employees had been maintained by the Company from which it hired workers who then became regular
workers when urgently necessary to employ them for more than a year. Likewise, the Company sometimes hired probationary
employees who also later became regular workers after passing the probationary period. With the hiring of contractual
employees, the Union contended that it would no longer have probationary and casual employees from which it could obtain
additional Union members; thus, rendering inutile Section 1, Article III (Union Security) of the CBA.
Respondent’s Contention: The Union moreover advanced that sustaining the Company’s position would easily weaken and
ultimately destroy the former with the latter’s resort to retrenchment and/or retirement of employees and not filling up the
vacant regular positions through the hiring of contractual workers from PESO, and that a possible scenario could also be
created by the Company wherein it could "import" workers from PESO during an actual strike.
Petitioner’s contention: In countering the Union’s allegations, the Company argued that: (a) the law expressly allows
contracting and subcontracting arrangements through Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Order No. 18-02; (b) the
engagement of contractual employees did not, in any way, prejudice the Union, since not a single employee was terminated
and neither did it result in a reduction of working hours nor a reduction or splitting of the bargaining unit; and (c) Section 4,
Article I of the CBA merely provides for the definition of the categories of employees and does not put a limitation on the
Company’s right to engage the services of job contractors or its management prerogative to address temporary/occasional
needs in its operation.
CA Ruling: Dismissed the petition. THE HONORABLE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HIS POWER WHICH WAS
EXPRESSLY GRANTED AND LIMITED BY BOTH PARTIES IN RULING THAT THE ENGAGEMENT OF PESO IS NOT IN KEEPING
WITH THE INTENT AND SPIRIT OF THE CBA.10
THE HONORABLE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR COMMITTED A PATENT AND PALPABLE ERROR IN DECLARING THAT THE
ENGAGEMENT OF PESO IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE INTENT AND SPIRIT OF THE CBA.
This Court does not find it arbitrary on the part of the Hon. Voluntary Arbitrator in ruling that "the engagement of PESO is not
in keeping with the intent and spirit of the CBA." The said ruling is interrelated and intertwined with the sole issue to be
resolved that is, "Whether or not the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice in engaging the services of PESO, a third party
service provider, under existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence." Both issues concern the engagement of PESO by the Company
which is perceived as a violation of the CBA and which constitutes as unfair labor practice on the part of the Company.
Issue: Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator can decide questions not covered by Submission Agreement.
Ruling:
Yes. Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement.
Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the
final resort for the adjudication of disputes. The succinct reasoning enunciated by the CA in support of its holding, that the
Voluntary Arbitrator in a labor controversy has jurisdiction to render the questioned arbitral awards, deserves our
concurrence, thus:
In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those questions expressly stated and limited in the submission agreement.
However, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has the power
to make a final settlement. Thus, assuming that the submission empowers the arbitrator to decide whether an employee was
discharged for just cause, the arbitrator in this instance can reasonably assume that his powers extended beyond giving a yes-
or-no answer and included the power to reinstate him with or without back pay.
In one case, the Supreme Court stressed that "the Voluntary Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the
agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court. The Arbitrator, as already indicated, viewed his authority as embracing not merely the
determination of the abstract question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted but also, in the affirmative
case, the amount thereof.
By the same token, the issue of regularization should be viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission agreement
mentioned only the determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough
leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on voluntary arbitration was
created – speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the
ultimate question of whether respondent employees are entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file another action for
payment of such benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate providing
full protection to labor.
Indubitably, Ludo fortifies, not diminishes, the soundness of the questioned VA Decision. Said case reaffirms the plenary
jurisdiction and authority of the voluntary arbitrator to interpret the CBA and to determine the scope of his/her own
authority. Subject to judicial review, the leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative is aimed at accomplishing the
rationale of the law on voluntary arbitration – speedy labor justice. In this case, a complete and final adjudication of the
dispute between the parties necessarily called for the resolution of the related and incidental issue of whether the Company
still violated the CBA but without being guilty of ULP as, needless to state, ULP is committed only if there is gross violation of
the agreement.
Lastly, the Company kept on harping that both the VA and the CA conceded that its engagement of contractual workers from
PESO was a valid exercise of management prerogative. It is confused. To emphasize, declaring that a particular act falls within
the concept of management prerogative is significantly different from acknowledging that such act is a valid exercise thereof.
What the VA and the CA correctly ruled was that the Company’s act of contracting out/outsourcing is within the purview of
management prerogative. Both did not say, however, that such act is a valid exercise thereof. Obviously, this is due to the
recognition that the CBA provisions agreed upon by the Company and the Union delimit the free exercise of management
prerogative pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees. Indeed, the VA opined that "the right of the management to
outsource parts of its operations is not totally eliminated but is merely limited by the CBA," while the CA held that "this
management prerogative of contracting out services, however, is not without limitation. These categories of employees
particularly with respect to casual employees serve as limitation to the Company’s prerogative to outsource parts of its
operations especially when hiring contractual employees."
Master Iron Labor Union vs. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47

Facts: The Master Iron Works Construction Corporation (Corporation for brevity) is a duly organized corporate entity
engaged in steel fabrication and other related business activities. Sometime in February 1987, the Master Iron Labor Union
(MILU) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Corporation for the three-year period between
December 1, 1986 and November 30, 1989.
Right after the signing of the CBA, the Corporation subcontracted outside workers to do the usual jobs done by its regular
workers including those done outside of the company plant. As a result, the regular workers were scheduled by the
management to work on a rotation basis allegedly to prevent financial losses thereby allowing the workers only ten (10)
working days a month (Rollo, p. 8). Thus, MILU requested implementation of the grievance procedure which had also been
agreed upon in the CBA, but the Corporation ignored the request.
Consequently, on April 8, 1987, MILU filed a notice of strike (Rollo, p. 54) with the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon the intervention of the DOLE, through one Atty. Bobot Hernandez, the Corporation and MILU reached an agreement
whereby the Corporation acceded to give back the usual, work to its regular employees who are members of MILU (Rollo, p.
55).
Notwithstanding said agreement, the Corporation continued the practice of hiring outside workers. When the MILU president,
Wilfredo Abulencia, insisted in doing his regular work of cutting steel bars which was being done by casual workers, a
supervisor reprimanded him, charged him with insubordination and suspended him for three (3) days (Rollo, pp. 9 & 51-52).
Upon the request of MILU, Francisco Jose of the DOLE called for conciliation conferences. The Corporation, however, insisted
that the hiring of casual workers was a management prerogative. It later ignored subsequent scheduled conciliation
conferences (Rollo, pp. 51-52 & 57-58).
Hence, on July 9, 1987, MILU filed a notice of strike on the following grounds: (a) violation of CBA; (b) discrimination; (c)
unreasonable suspension of union officials; and (d) unreasonable refusal to entertain grievance (Rollo, p. 9). On July 24, 1987,
MILU staged the strike, maintaining picket lines on the road leading to the Corporation's plant entrance and premises.
At about 11 o'clock in the morning of July 28, 1987, CAPCOM soldiers, who had been summoned by the Corporation's counsel,
came and arrested the picketers. They were brought to Camp Karingal and, the following day, to the Caloocan City jail. Charges
for illegal possession of firearms and deadly weapons were lodged against them. Later, however, those charges were
dismissed for failure of the arresting CAPCOM soldiers to appear at the investigation (Rollo, p. 10). The dispersal of the
picketlines by the CAPCOM also resulted in the temporary lifting of the strike.
On August 4, 1987, the Corporation filed with the NLRC National Capital Region arbitration branch a petition to declare the
strike illegal (Rollo, p. 40). On September 7, 1987, MILU, with the assistance of the Alyansa ng Manggagawa sa Valenzuela
(AMVA), re-staged the strike. Consequently, the Corporation filed a petition for injunction before the NLRC which, on
September 24, 1987, issued an order directing the workers to remove the barricades and other obstructions which prevented
ingress to and egress from the company premises. The workers obliged on October 1, 1987 (Rollo, p. 25). On October 22, 1987,
through its president, MILU offered to return to work in a letter.
LA: Declared illegal the strike staged by petitioners and terminated the employment of the individual petitioners.
NLRC: Affirmed the decision of LA.
Issue: Whether or not the strike staged was illegal. Whether or not there was blatant violation of the CBA and ULP on the part
of the employer.
Ruling: All told, the strike staged by the petitioners was a legal one even though it may have been called to offset what the
strikers believed in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of the employer (Ferrer, et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., 17 SCRA 352 [1966]). Verily, such presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations of unfair labor
practices are subsequently found out to be untrue (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Org. [FFW]
vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation, 112 SCRA 440 [1982]). Consonant with these jurisprudential
pronouncements, is Article 263 of the Labor Code which clearly states "the policy of the State to encourage free trade
unionism and free collective bargaining". Paragraph (b) of the same article guarantees the workers' "right to engage in
concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection" and recognizes the "right
of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout" so long as these actions are "consistent with
the national interest" and the grounds therefor do not involve inter-union and intra-union disputes.
The strike being legal, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in terminating the employment of the individual petitioners,
who, by operation of law, are entitled to reinstatement with three years backwages. Republic Act No. 6715 which amended
Art. 279 of the Labor Code by giving "full backwages inclusive of allowances" to reinstated employees, took effect fifteen days
from the publication of the law on March 21, 1989. The decision of the Labor Arbiter having been promulgated on March 16,
1988, the law is not applicable in this case.
San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC, 304 SCRA 1
Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining
agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they
agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-
strike no-lockout agreement.
On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a notice of strike, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal
transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6)
harassment of union officers and members,(7 ) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair
labor practice.
The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1)
illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5) other acts
of unfair labor practice.
The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda group, to
which the latter opposed, alleging Galvez’s lack of authority in filing the same.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices
raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other.
After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable.
Hence issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation.
While separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a
strike vote. Petitioner opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote Illegal, invoking the case
of PAL v. Drilon, which held that no strike could be legally declared during the pendency of preventive mediation. NCMB
Director Ubaldo in response issued another letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of strike into
a case of preventive mediation and emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner. Additional grounds were set
forth therein, including discrimination, coercion of employees, illegal lockout and illegal closure. The NCMB however found
these grounds to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the
consolidation of the second notice with the preceding one that was earlier reduced to preventive mediation. On the same date,
the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention to hold a strike vote on May 27, 1994.
The Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike. In reply, NCMB
issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have been
filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance with the notice requirement. Despite this and the
pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed the operations
of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth P29.98 million in daily lost production.
Two days after the declaration of strike, petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order. After due
hearing and ocular inspection, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and egress from
petitioner’s plants, without prejudice to the union’s right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction
case.
To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA with the respondent-union,
calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of “good faith talks” between the management and
the labor management committees. The MOA, signed in the presence of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
officials, expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be affected in any manner
whatsoever by the agreement. The picket lines ended and work was then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to dismiss the injunction case in view of the
cessation of its picketing activities as a result of the signed MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and academic there
being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened. Petitioner, however, opposed and submitted
copies of flyers being circulated by IBM, as proof of the union’s alleged threat to revive the strike.
Petitioner’s contention: There is a no-strike provision in the CBA. Hence, violated.
NLRC Decision: The NLRC did not rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse. The NLRC issued the challenged
decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis. It found that the circumstances at the time did not
constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts.It likewise denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration in its resolution.
Issue: WON THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ENFORCE, BY INJUNCTION, THE PARTIES’
RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AND NOT TO STRIKE.
Ruling: Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case
involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entitye xce p t as otherwise provided in
Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor Code. Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the
NLRC the power to “enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to
require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.” The second exception, on
the other hand, is when the labor organization or the employer engages in any of the “prohibited activities” enumerated in
Article 264.
Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful
strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, where the same issue of NLRC’s duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was
raised, we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain the
union from declaring a strike based on non-strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC, we held that it is the “legal duty and
obligation” of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of the law. Failure promptly to issue an injunction by the
public respondent was likewise held therein to be an abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondent’s strike. A strike is considered as the
most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment.
However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the
purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of
which shall render a strike illegal.
In the present case, NCMB converted IBM’s notices into preventive mediation as it found that the real issues raised are non-
strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMB’s duty to exert “all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the
parties to settle the dispute amicably,” and in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor disputes.
In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing the notices of
strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v. Drilon, where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike,
in view of the NCMB’s conversion of the notice therein into a preventive mediation case.
Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the NCMB ordered the preventive mediation on May
2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost the notices of strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it still defiantly proceeded
with the strike while mediation was ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of NCMB warning it of its lack of notice
of strike. In the case of NUWHRAIN v. NLRC, where the petitioner-union therein similarly defied a prohibition by the NCMB,
we said: Petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the NCMB when the latter dismissed the
notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts of discrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not “strikeable.” The
refusal of the petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith.
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the Implementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the
parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.
Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor Code explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first
having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with
Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by
the unlawful strike.
Also noteworthy is public respondent’s disregard of petitioner’s argument pointing out the union’s failure to observe the CBA
provisions on grievance and arbitration. In the case of San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, we ruled that the union therein violated the
mandatory provisions of the CBA when it filed a notice of strike without availing of the remedies prescribed therein.
As to petitioner’s allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses
only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices. The notices filed in the case
at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor
arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need to discuss this issue.
Deltaventure Resources Inc. Vs Judge Cabato, 327 SCRA 521
Facts: In 1992, a Decision was rendered by Executive Labor Arbiter Norma Olegario, NLRC-Regional Arbitration Board,
Cordillera Administrative Region entitled “Bernardino et al. v. GreenMountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe” which
declared the respondents guilty of Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice, ordering them to pay the complainants in
solidum in the amount respective of the illegally dismissed employees.In June 1994, the LA issued a writ of execution directing
NLRC Deputy Sherriff Ventura to execute judgment against respondents then proceeded to enforce the writ by garnishing
certain properties of respondents.Finding that the respondents do not have sufficient personal properties to satisfy the
monetary award, Sherriff Ventura proceeded to levy upon a real property registered in Roberto Ongpin’s name—one of the
respondents.Meanwhile, before the scheduled auction sale, Deltaventures filed before the Commission a third party claim
asserting ownership over the property levied upon and subject of the Sherriff notice of sale. LA thus issued an order to
suspend the auction sale until Deltaventures’ claim is resolved.However, in August 1994, Deltaventures filed with the RTC a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO against Sherriff Ventura reiterating the same
allegation raised in the third party claim it filed with the Commission.
Further, Deltaventures filed with the NLRC a manifestation, questioning the NLRC’s authorityto hear the case, the matter being
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The manifestationhowever was dismissed by the LA.Meanwhile, respondent-
laborers, moved for the dismissal of the civil case on the ground oflack of jurisdiction.
Issue: May the trial court take cognizance of the complaint filed by Deltaventures?
Ruling: The Court notes that the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction —
but in essence, it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis-à -vis the alias writ of execution, including
the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sherriff implementing the writ.
Thus, the complaint was in effect a motion to quash on the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter—to wit:Illegal Dismissal and ULP.

Considering the factual setting, it is then logical to conclude that the subject matter or the third party claim is but an incident
of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
Jurisdiction—once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Whatever
irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the writ should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which
rendered the decision.
This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.
The broad powers granted to the LA and NLRC by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as
vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy
under consideration is to the exclusion of the regular courts.Further, the Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits
issuance of a TRO or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any
court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264). As correctly observed by the court a quo, the
main issue and subject of the amended complaint for injunction are questions interwoven by the execution of the
Commission’s decision.
G.R. No. 105090 September 16, 1993

BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., (BIMCAI) FSM, AND ITS UNION OFFICERS & MEMBERS,
ETC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ERNILO V. PEÑALOSA and
CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORP., respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Summary: So etong case na to, may pagkaHSM to kasi may wild-cat strike, once a wildcat, always a wildcat. CHAROT OMG. So nagstrike
yung union nila without a valid notice of strike. Ngayon nagfile si ER ng petition for injunction to enjoin the petitioners kesyo
unlawful act daw yun kasi walang valid notice of strike. Edi ayun na nga, nung naghearing hindi nakatanggap ng notice si union
mga bes, so nawalan sila ng right to due process, but that’s not the issue, eto na yung juicy part, si company (ER) mali yung
binigay na address ni union so hindi nila nareceive (SOBRANG IN BAD FAITH NILA OKAY) ngayon, grinant ni NLRC yung TRO kahit in ex-parte
hearing ang naganap. Ngayon, nagfile din sila ng TRO nila against company para maenjoin yung mga police sa pag aid ng
pagcounter sa strike nila. ANOTHER JUICY PART mga bes, si company inoppose yung finile kesyo sesementuhin daw sila after ng
lapse ng TRO tapos nangcocoerce daw mga union na wag pumasok kundi sasaktan (YUNG FRIEND MONG DEMONYO HAHAHA CHOS) NGAYON,
Pasabog si NLRC, grinant on the same day yung Preliminary Injunction. So ang issue nila ditto kung tama ba ginawa ni NLRC na
grinant yung Preliminary Injunction. Sabi ni Court, nagfail si NLRC magcomply with Art. 218 ng Labor Code, kasi nagfail sila
iconsider yung other remedies (i.e. arbitration, mediation etc.) Tapos sabi pa ni SOLGEN very bad faith daw si Concrete, kasi nga mali mali
binibigay na address tapos nagpapapirma ng affidavit na di naman pinabasa and not true kasi wala naman palang coercion na
nagaganap. Tapos unfair din si NLRC kasi grinant na yung Prelim. Inj. Ni company tapos sila di man lang pinansin.
Facts:
On April 6, 1992, at around 7:00 p.m., respondents led by its officers and some members staged a wild-cat strike, without a
valid notice of strike, nor observing cooling-off period, and made even during the pendency of a preventive mediation
proceedings which was still scheduled for April 10, 1992; And during the said wild-cat strike, respondents have set-up
makeshifts, tents, banners and streamers and other man-made obstructions at the main plant and offices of petitioner which
effectively impeding, as in fact still effectively impeding the ingress and egress of persons who have lawful business with the
petitioner; Furthermore, respondents have resorted, as in fact still resorting to, unlawful and illegal acts including among
others threats, intimidations and coercions against persons who have lawful business with the petitioner and the non-striking
employees who wish to return to work; Without complying with the legal requirements for a valid strike, respondents' staging
of the said "wild-cat strike", is by law considered as illegal or unlawful act which must be enjoined;
As a direct result of the aforesaid unlawful and illegal acts of the respondents, petitioner which has on-going projects for the
government and other private entities which require completion on and agreed schedule, is at great and imminent danger to
suffer substantial damages and injury, which if not urgently redressed, will inevitably become irreparable; Said prohibited and
unlawful acts have been threatened and will continuously be committed unless the injunction or temporary restraining order
be issued against the respondents. The injury and damages to the government of Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner
and other persons are unavoidable, so much so that the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order without notice becomes
imperative, as the police officers or agents of authority called upon to enforce the right to ingress and egress are unable to do
so;
The petition was set for hearing on April 13, 1992 at 3 p.m. The union, however, claimed that it was not furnished a copy of the
petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented its address to be at Rm. 205-6 Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila.
On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the evidence of the company alone. The ex parte hearing started at 2:30 p.m. where
testimonial and documentary evidence were presented. Some thirty (30) minutes later, an Ocular Inspection Report was
submitted by an unnamed NLRC representative.
NLRC (First Division): issued a temporary restraining order against the union.
PET: No copy of this Order was furnished the union. The union learned of the Order only when it was posted on April 15, 1992
at the premises of the company. On April 21, 1992, it filed its Opposition/Answer to the petition for Injunction. It alleged
among others, that the question of strike legality is outside the original jurisdiction of the NLRC except if the labor dispute has
been certified to it for compulsory arbitration. On April 24, 1992, the union also filed its own Petition for Injunction to enjoin
the company "from asking the aid of the police and the military officer in escorting scabs to enter the struck establishment."
RES: The records show that the case was heard on April 24 and 30, May 4 and 5, 1992 by respondent Labor Arbiter Enrilo
Peñ alosa. On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction wherein it
alleged, respondents are still committing illegal acts, by resorting to grave threats, intimidation against the non-striking
employees and persons with lawful transactions with the company, either by actual threats and intimidation whenever these
persons attempt to report to work or transact business with the company, or by calling at their houses or places of residence,
and then and there coerce not to report for work on pain of bodily harm and that the president of the Union, supported by the
leaders of the strikers, threatened that upon the expiration of the validity of the temporary restraining order, they will
"sisimentuhin namin and gates ng Concrete Aggregates na kahit ipis ay hindi makakapasok at makakalabas"
PET: The respondent opposed the motion alleging: They were never furnished by the petitioner with a copy of the original
petition for injunction filed on April 8, 1992 because as seen from the petition, petitioner addressed the respondents at a
wrong location. The suspicion is that same is deliberate in order for the union not to be able to immediately oppose the
petition praying for a temporary restraining order and so petitioner was scot-free when it presented ex-parte evidence. The
allegation of damages if no injunction is secured is therefore premature and irrelevant in this proceedings because there is no
proof that the strike is illegal. For if the strike is legal then both sides must bear their own losses in an economic contest: the
company — loss of income; the workers — loss of wages.
NLRC: issued on that same day granting the company’s motion for preliminary injunction.
The union then filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue:
WON NLRC can issue a Preliminary Injunction
WON NLRC and LA have unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from
office considering that after petitioner also filed on April 24, 1992 a petition asking a temporary restraining order
and injunction it continuously set the motion for immediate issuance of preliminary injunction of private
respondents on April 30, 1992, May 4 and 5, 1992 and issued a temporary restraining order in favor of the
respondent corporation in an hour.
Held:
Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of employees to improve the terms and
conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly developed countries, the significance of strike as a coercive weapon
has shrunk in view of the preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor disputes. In underdeveloped countries,
however, where the economic crunch continues to enfeeble the already marginalized working class, the importance of the
right to strike remains undiminished as indeed it has proved many a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses
against labor. It remains as the great equalizer.
In the case at bar, the records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e),
(4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5, 1992. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both the
procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary or permanent injunction
can issue in a labor dispute.
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission.
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except
after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint
made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the commission
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.
SOLGEN: Cited various evidence on record showing the failure of public respondents to fulfill the requirements; That
witnesses are executing an affidavit to charge Ramon Banas, Ricardo Manalang, Rodrigo Lauihon and Ernesto Lascana with
Grave Coercion. However, when presented before the Labor Arbiter, the affiants themselves controverted the allegations in
said joint-affidavit. They innocently divulged having signed the prepared affidavit without first reading the same. Likewise,
they admitted that they did not see or hear Banas, Manalang, Lacuna and Lacejon threatened the group of "non-strikers"
including themselves of bodily harm. (Si ATTY. daw gumawa nung affidavit as per cross examination) (Feel ko important yung
mga person sa cross examination part, gagawan ko nalang ng summary ng Monday haha).
Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategies to secure ex parte temporary restraining orders
against striking employees. Petitioner union did not receive any copy of private respondent's petition for injunction filed on
April 8, 1992. Its address as alleged by the private respondent turned out to be "erroneous". Consequently, the petitioner was
denied the right to attend the hearing held on April 13, 1992 while the private respondent enjoyed a field day presenting its
evidence ex parte. On the basis of uncontested evidence, the public respondent, on the same day April 13, 1992, temporarily
enjoined the petitioner from committing certain alleged illegal acts. Again, a copy of the Order was sent to the wrong address
of the petitioner. Knowledge of the Order came to the petitioner only when its striking members read it after it was posted at
the struck areas of the private respondent.
To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order in a labor dispute is not per se prohibited. Its issuance,
however, should be characterized by care and caution for the law requires that it be clearly justified by considerations of
extreme necessity, i.e., when the commission of unlawful acts is causing substantial and irreparable injury to company
properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft of an adequate remedy at law (Emphasis mine charot). This is as it
ought to be, for imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike.
Often times, they unduly tilt the balance of a labor warfare in favor of capital. When that happens, the deleterious effects of a
wrongfully issued, ex parte temporary restraining order on the rights of striking employees can no longer be repaired for they
defy simple monetization.
Sadly contrasting is the haste with which public respondent heard and acted on a similar petition for injunction filed by the
private respondent. In the case of the private respondent, its prayer for an ex parte temporary restraining order was heard on
April 13, 1992 and it was granted on the same day. Its petition for preliminary injunction was filed on April 30, 1992, and was
granted on May 5, 1992. In the case of petitioner, its petition for injunction was filed on April 24, 1992, and to date, the records
do not reveal whether the public respondent has granted or denied the same. The disparate treatment is inexplicable
considering that the subject matters of their petition are of similar importance to the parties and to the public.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted.
G.R. No. 119293 June 10, 2003

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW AT
BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), respondents.
AZCUNA, J.:
Summary: So etong case na to naman, may CBA sila na kelangan magundergo muna lahat ng dispute to grievance and
arbitration proceedings tapos bawal magstrike and lockout. Kaso si union, omg, nagfile ng notice of strike, walang grievance
machinery na inexperience or ano basta nagfile na sila agad ng notice to strike because of so many reasons. Ngayon, hindi
inapprove ni NCMB yung notice to strike but rather ginawa niyang preventive mediation kasi non-strikeable daw yung reasons.
Habang nag uundergo sila ng mediation, naagfile pa rin ng notice of strike vote(magvovote sila kung magsstrike ba sila) si union.
So magsstrike daw sila accdg. sa vox populi. Soooo, after ng declaration of strike, nagfile si company ng Preliminary Injunction
with TRO, free ingress and egress etc. ngayon, ang grinant lang ni NLRC yung free ingress-egress lang not the TRO. So si union MR
niya yung TRO, kasi moot and academic na daw because of the cessation ng strike pursuant sa MOA nila ni company. Pero
inoppose yun ni company kasi may paflyer daw si union. Dineny ni NLRC yung TRO. Ang issue dito is kung may grave abuse of
discretion ba si NLRC. Sabi ni court, yup, kasi illegal na daw yung strike ni union, dahil nung kinonvert na to preventive
mediation, nadismiss na yung notice nila to strike. Therefore, mali na hindi grinant ni NLRC yung TRO, kasi illegal na yung strike
na ginagawa ni union, hence, entitled na sila for the grant of TRO pero dinisregard ni NLRC (NAKO PARANG SI CRUSH)
Facts:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of
petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to
submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-
lockout agreement.
ARTICLE IV
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
Section 1. - The parties hereto agree on the principle that all disputes between labor and management may be solved through
friendly negotiation;. . . and that, therefore, every effort shall be exerted to avoid such an open conflict. In furtherance of the
foregoing principle, the parties hereto have agreed to establish a procedure for the adjustment of grievances…
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE V
ARBITRATION
Section 1. Any and all disputes of any kind between the COMPANY and the UNION and/or the workers involving or relating to
wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations arising during the effectivity of this
Agreement or any renewal thereof, shall be settled by arbitration through a Committee in accordance with the procedure
established in this Article. No dispute, disagreement or controversy which may be submitted to the grievance procedure in
Article IV shall be presented for arbitration until all the steps of the grievance procedure are exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE VI
STRIKES AND WORK STOPPAGES
Section 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary
boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any
other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the term of this Agreement.
Section 2. The COMPANY agrees that there shall be no lockout during the term of this Agreement so long as the procedure
outlined in Article IV hereof is followed by the UNION.
On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a notice of strike, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal
transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6)
harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair
labor practice.
The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1)
illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5) other acts
of unfair labor practice. They subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda
group, to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvez’s lack of authority in filing the same.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices
raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other.
NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo: After several meetings, Dir. found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on
May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive
mediation.
While separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a
strike vote. Petitioner opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote Illegal, invoking the case
of PAL v. Drilon, which held that no strike could be legally declared during the pendency of preventive mediation. Director
Ubaldo in response issued another letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of strike into a case of
preventive mediation and emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict, which is not
strikeable.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner. Additional grounds were set
forth therein, including discrimination, coercion of employees, illegal lockout and illegal closure. The NCMB however found
these grounds to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the
consolidation of the second notice with the preceding one that was earlier reduced to preventive mediation. On the same date,
the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention to hold a strike vote on May 27, 1994.
The Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike. In reply,
NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have
been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance with the notice requirement. Despite this
and the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed the
operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth P29.98 million in daily lost production.
Two days after the declaration of strike, or on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended Petition
for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization
Order.
After due hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13, 1994 resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO)
directing free ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and
continuous hearings on the injunction case.
To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner on June 16, 1994, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the
respondent-union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of good faith talks between the
management and the labor management committees. The MOA, signed in the presence of Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) officials, expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be affected
in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. The picket lines ended and work was then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to dismiss the injunction case in view of the
cessation of its picketing activities as a result of the signed MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and academic there
being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened. Petitioner, however, opposed and submitted
copies of flyers being circulated by IBM, as proof of the unions alleged threat to revive the strike. The NLRC did not rule on the
opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse.
NLRC: On November 29, 1994, the challenged decision was issued, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis.
It found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of
unlawful acts. It likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated February 1, 1995.
Issue:
WON the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to enforce, by injunction, the parties reciprocal obligations to
submit to arbitration and not to strike.
WON the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in withholding injunction which is the only immediate and effective substitute for
the disastrous economic warfare that arbitration is designed to avoid (Kasi yung inano lang nila yung peaceful ingress and
egress, not the strike itself)
WON the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in allowing the TRO to lapse without resolving the prayer for injunction, denying
injunction without expressing the facts and the law on which it is based and issuing its denial five months after the lapse of the
TRO.
BASTA: WON the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
Held:
Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving
or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and
264 of the Labor Code. Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power
to enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to require the performance
of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage
to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party x x x. The second exception, on the other hand, is when
the labor organization or the employer engages in any of the prohibited activities enumerated in Article 264. Pursuant to
Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful strike.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondents strike. A strike is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment.
However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the
purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of
which shall render a strike illegal. In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive mediation as it found that
the real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMBs duty to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably, and in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary modes of
settling labor disputes. In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of
dismissing the notices of strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v. Drilon, where we declared a strike illegal for lack
of a valid notice of strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of the notice therein into a preventive mediation case. Clearly,
therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the NCMB ordered the preventive mediation on May 2, 1994,
respondent had thereupon lost the notices of strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it still defiantly proceeded with the
strike while mediation was ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of
strike. Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the Implementing Rules, which explicitly oblige
the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.
The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner sought recourse from the public respondent. The NLRC issued a
TRO only for free ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, but did not enjoin the unlawful strike itself. It ignored the fatal
lack of notice of strike, and five months after came out with a decision summarily rejecting petitioners cited jurisprudence.
Also noteworthy is public respondents disregard of petitioners argument pointing out the unions failure to observe the CBA
provisions on grievance and arbitration. As in the abovecited case, petitioner herein evinced its willingness to negotiate with
the union by seeking for an order from the NLRC to compel observance of the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
Respondent however resorted to force without exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of the
aforecited CBA provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As we said long
ago: Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they
provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be
achieved.
As to petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses
only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices. The notices filed in the case
at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor
arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need to discuss this issue.
We cannot sanction the respondent-unions brazen disregard of legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out the state
policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. The states commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to
foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution. Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of
labor granted by our statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall grave
injury to a business enterprise.
[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998]

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MARTINEZ, COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Summary: Complaint for illegal dismissal to, kasi sabi ni kyah, empleyado daw siya nung punerarya pero wala siya employment
contract and wala siya sa payroll. Ngayon sabi ni punerarya, di siya employee kasi nangutang si kyah tapos as a sign of gratitude
para sa financial assistance na prinovide, tumutulong siya sa business. Nategi si mudrabels, original owner ng punerarya,
nagtake over si daughter, nalaman na kumukubra ng pera si kyah. Ngayon di na siya pinapahelp sa business kasi natimbog na
ang kanyang modus. So nagfile siya ng complaint. Tapos nagrule si LA in favor ni funeral, NLRC, set aside. CERTIORARI kay SC.
Ang issue dito is kung may jurisdiction si SC to review NLRC decisions. Sabi ng court, meron kahit hindi provided by law meron
silang power to review administrative agencies as part of checks and balances. Pero, sabi din ni court, merong hierarchy ang
courts so, kelangan kay CA muna dadaan since sila [SC] ay hindi trier of facts but rather of questions of law.
Facts:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6,
1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the
semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00
which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the
owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an
overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude,
private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took over the management of the business. She then
discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to
show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and
his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
LA: rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
NLRC: rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate
appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution
dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC
Held:
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its
promulgation. Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program and policy coordination only. Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an
aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. The present
Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all
cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after
ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies
on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of
the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court
of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x. This would necessarily
contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such
excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by
necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be
properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned
amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that
procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the
further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact,
has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and
that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection
to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
[G.R. No.100518. January 24, 2000]

ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU), RODOLFO MONTECLARO and EDGAR JUESAN, petitioners, vs. HON.
COMISSIONERS OSCAR N. ABELLA, MUSIB N. BUAT, LEON GONZAGA JR., ALGON ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION CORP.,
ALEX GONZALES and EDITHA YAP, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Respondent company is a domestic corporation engaged in road construction projects of the government. From 1968 to 1989,
it engaged the services of the following workers to work on various projects on different dates: Rodolfo Monteclaro
(mechanic), Edgar Juesan (painter), Victorio Lunzaga (tanker driver), Alfredo Jalet (batteryman), Julito Macabodbod (trailer
helper), Ramon Tabada (carpenter), Remsy, Asensi (machinist), Armand Acero (helper mechanic), Lordito Tatad (painter
helper), Rogelio Tantuan (painter), Teodoro Tabio (checker), Gemudo Asejo (electrician), Roland Olivar (latheman), Valeriano
Mijas (driver), Jose Noval (welder), Felimon Lagbao (mechanic), Pedro Roche (head welder), and Justiniano Sollano
(carpenter). Their contracts indicate the particular project they are assigned, the duration of their employment and their daily
wage.
In February 1989, the above-named workers joined petitioner union as members. Accordingly, petitioner union filed a petition
for certification election with the regional office of the labor department. Respondent company opposed the petition on the
ground that the workers were project employees and therefore not qualified to form part of the rank and file collective
bargaining unit. Not for long, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election. On appeal, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment reversed the Med-Arbiter's decision and ordered the immediate holding of a certification election.
Meanwhile, the national president of petitioner union sent a demand letter to respondent company seeking the payment of
wage differentials to some affected union members. As said demand was unheeded, petitioner union and the concerned
workers filed a complaint for payment of wage differentials and other benefits before the Regional Office of the Department of
Labor and Employment.
Shortly thereafter, respondent company terminated the employment of aforementioned workers owing to the completion of
its projects or the expiration of workers' contracts. Respondent company explained the circumstances surrounding the
separation of the workers from the service as expired, contract is nearly completed and such work is no longer needed and
some went on AWOL.
However, the affected workers claim that they were dismissed because of their union activities. In view of the alleged illegal
dismissals and harassment by their employer, the workers staged a strike on May 17, 1989. Employer filed a complaint.
Labor Arbiter Newton Sancho: declared said strike illegal and decreed further that Victorio Lunzaga, Alfred Jalet, Julito
Macabodbod, Ramon Tabada and Remsy Asensi, who had participated in the strike, were deemed to have lost their
employment status.
NLRC: affirmed said decision. Petitioner union then elevated the matter to this Court by way of petition for certiorari which
was eventually dismissed.
Meanwhile, the aggrieved workers filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC their individual complaints against
private respondent company for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, 13th month pay, holiday pay
and overtime pay. They also sought reinstatement with back wages. The cases were consolidated and assigned to Labor
Arbiter Nicolas Sayon for arbitration.
LA: However, noting that a similar case had been filed before the regional office of the labor department, the labor arbiter
refrained from resolving the issue of underpayment of monetary benefits. He also found the charge of unfair labor practice
untenable. But, on the charge of illegal dismissal, he ruled in favor of the aggrieved workers who were dismissed by reason
that their work is near completion.
Petitioners and private respondents separately appealed the Labor Arbiters ruling to the National Labor Relations
Commission. Pending appeal, Edgar Juesan, Lordito Tatad and Ramon Tabada filed their respective duly sworn affidavits of
desistance and motions to withdraw their complaints and money claims against private respondents. Said motions were
seasonably granted.
On May 17, 1991, the NLRC promulgated its resolution modifying the decision of Labor Arbiter Nicolas Sayon. It held that the
labor arbiter erred in not resolving the issue of underpayment of wages because not all of the original complainants filed the
same money claims with the labor department. Thus, it awarded monetary benefits to qualified workers. The claims for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice were dismissed for lack of merit.
Private respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Herein petitioners did not move for
reconsideration, as the petition did not so indicate and none appears on the records before us.
Filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed resolution generally
warrants the petition's outright dismissal. As we consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration by a
concerned party is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed
before resort to the courts can be had.
Issue:
1. WON the honorable commission erred committed grave abuse of discretion
2. WON the petitioners are regular or project employees
Held:
In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it may be noted that "want of jurisdiction" and "grave abuse of
discretion," and not merely reversible error, are the proper grounds for review. The respondent acts without jurisdiction if he
does not have the legal authority to decide a case. There is excess of jurisdiction if the respondent, having the power to
determine the case, oversteps his lawful authority. And there is grave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, in effect equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Here, petitioners neither assail
the jurisdiction of public respondent nor attribute any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Necessarily,
this petition must fail, for lack of substantial requisites under Rule 65.
Regular employees are those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer even if the parties enter into an agreement stating otherwise. In contrast, project
employees are those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
In the case at bar, the contracts of employment of the petitioners attest to the fact that they had been hired for specific
projects, and their employment was coterminous with the completion of the project for which they had been hired. Said
contracts expressly provide that the workers' tenure of employment would depend on the duration of any phase of the project
or the completion of the awarded government construction projects in any of their planned phases. Further, petitioners were
informed in advance that said project or undertaking for which they were hired would end on a stated or determinable date.
Considering that petitioners were project employees, whose nature of employment they were fully informed about, at the time
of their engagement, related to a specific project, work or undertaking, their employment legally ended upon completion of
said project. The termination of their employment could not be regarded as illegal dismissal.
[G.R. No. 104302. July 14, 1999]

REBECCA R. VELOSO, petitioner, vs. CHINA AIRLINES, LTD., K.Y. CHANG and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner was employed as supervisor of the ticketing section at the Manila branch office of respondent China Airlines Ltd.
(CAL). At the ticketing section, petitioner was assisted by a senior ticketing agent, Eleanor Go; and two ticketing agents, Julie
Chua and Josephine Lobendino.
On October 29, 1986, private respondent K.Y. Chang, then district manager of the Manila branch office of CAL, informed
petitioner that management had decided to temporarily close its ticketing section in order to prevent further
losses. Petitioner's three assistants were likewise notified that they too will be temporarily laid off from employment effective
October 30, 1986.
Thereafter, CAL decided to permanently close said ticketing section. Thus, on November 5, 1986, petitioner and her staff
members were informed that their recent lay-off from employment will be considered permanent, effective one month from
receipt of such notice. A notice of said retrenchment was filed with the labor department on November 11, 1986.
Later, petitioner was advised to claim her retirement pay and other benefits. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner sent a letter to
private respondent Chang assailing the validity of her termination from the service.
On July 1, 1987, petitioner filed with the Arbitration Branch of NLRC a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal
with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorney's fees.
LA: in favor of petitioner, Respondent guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal.
NLRC: set aside the decision of the LA, the charge of unfair labor practice had no factual and legal basis. It noted that petitioner
was not an elective officer of the union; and she was just an adviser with no formal designation. The labor tribunal also
observed that only those in the ticketing section were affected by the retrenchment program and not one of the elective union
officers were laid off. Hence, public respondent declared that dismissing a union adviser while retaining all union officers is far
from any intent to bust the union.
However, instead of filing the required motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. In doing
so, petitioner boldly avers that a recourse to the NLRC via a motion for reconsideration is futile and will only injure further her
rights to a speedy and unbiased judgment of the case. She did not expect the labor tribunal to rectify itself.
Issue:
WON the petition for certiorari would prosper
Held:
This precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we have consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for
reconsideration is indispensable, for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed
before resort to the courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against acts of public respondent. In this case, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a
motion for reconsideration of the impugned resolution, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this
case is patently violative of prevailing jurisprudence and will not prosper without undue damage to the fundamental doctrine
that undergirds the grant of this prerogative writ.
The resolution of the NLRC had become final and executory on January 17, 1992, insofar as petitioner is concerned, because
she admits under oath having received notice thereof on January 7, 1992. The merits of her case may no longer be reviewed to
determine if the public respondent might be faulted for grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in her petition dated March 14,
1992. Thus, the court has no recourse but to sustain the respondent's position on jurisdictional and other grounds, that the
petition ought not be given due course and the case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
Cases 30-35
30. Association of Trade Unions vs. Abella, 323 SCRA 50
Facts:
 Some members of the petitioner-union filed for a petition for certification election with the regional
office of the labor department.
 However, Algon Engineering Construction Corp., herein respondent-company, denied the petition
saying that such workers are not qualified to form part of any collective bargaining unit as they are just
project employees.
 The mediation arbiter dismissed the petition. However, the Secretary of Labor reversed the decision
on appeal, and even ordered the immediate holding of a certification election.
 The president of the petitioner-union sent a demand letter to the respondent-company seeking
payment of wage differentials, and when such was not heeded, it filed a petition to the Regional Office
of DOLE.
 Furthermore, these member-workers further alleged that they were illegally dismissed on the ground
of their membership in the petitioner-union. Thus, another appeal was elevated to the NLRC.
 The member-workers did not stop there. They filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, 13 th month pay, holiday pay, and
overtime pay. They also sought reinstatement with back wages.
 The Labor Arbiter did not comment on the other issues, while found the issue on unfair labor practice
untenable. Also, he affirmed the charge of illegal dismissal.
 Another appeal was filed with the NLRC, some member-workers retracted their appeals, but those who
pursued their petitions received approval from the NLRC.
 The NLRC held that the Labor Arbiter erred in his decision, thus NLRC awarded monetary benefits to
the workers. Thus, this petition.
Issue: W/N project employees entitled to termination pay.

Ruling: NO.
It was clearly stated that such member-workers were only project employees. Considering this fact, their employment legally
ended upon completion of their project with herein respondent-company, making their termination legal in all aspects. Thus,
since they are project employees who are legally terminated, they are not entitled to termination pay.
31. PAL, Inc. vs. NLRC, 328 SCRA 273

Facts:
 Pescante and Vincente were assigned to handle Cominero’s flight to Cebu as load controller and check-
in clerk.
 A witness, Sgt. Tompong, narrated the series of even which ensued that day saying that when
Cominero was already preparing her 7 bags, Vicente uttered the words, “Ako na ang bahala diyan.” Sgt.
Tompong even added that Vicente asked for more than P1,000.00 from Cominero as he promised that
he would take care of her baggage. Cominero asked Sgt. Tompong to give Vicente the money. Sgt.
Tompong, then, asked Cominero what the money was for. Cominero answered that it would be for her
“excess baggage”, claiming that it was cheaper than what she expected. Sgt. Tompong reiterated that
when the money was given to him, Vicente hurriedly got it from him. Sgt. Tompong even stated that
Vincente wanted him to tell suspecting co-employers that Cominero just needed his help with her
baggage, and nothing more.
 During the boarding, Cominero was nowhere to be found. The passenger manifest showed that she was
travelling with 3 companions. But when such persons were asked, they apparently do not know who
Cominero was.
 Thus, a questioning ensued. Cominero insisted that she paid the P1,000.00 for her excess baggage,
however without a receipt. Informed of this situation, the duty manager immediately called the station
control in Cebu to intercept Cominero and collect the corresponding excess baggage fee.
 Thereafter, an investigation was conducted. A petition for fraud against the company was filed by PAL
against Vicente and Pescante. After several hearings, both Vicente and Pescante were found guilty.
Both respondents filed before the labor arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of back wages, damages, and attorney’s fees. But the labor arbiter denied
such.
 The respondents further appealed to the NLRC, whom which reversed the decision. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
W/N back wages are allowed even when an employee is legally dismissed.
Ruling: NO. It was justified that Vicente and Pecante’s actuations were grave misconducts, as it was also verified
through substantial pieces of evidence, which made them unqualified of any monetary award. The Supreme Court
also clarified that the order of NLRC for the reinstatement of both Vicente and Pescante has no factual and legal basis.
32. MC Engineering, Inc. vs. NLRC, 360 SCRA 180

Facts:
 Hanil is the overseas employer of all contract workers deployed by petitioner, MCEI. They deploy
contract workers in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth by POEA.
 Baldameca entered into an employment agreement with MCEI to Saudi Arabia as a plumber. Such
contract was for a term of 12 months. However, for some reason, Baldameca was not able to finish the
full term and was subsequently repatriated to Manila.
 Thereafter, Baldameca filed a petition against Hanil and MCEI for illegal dismissal and prayed for the
payment of the unexpired portion of his salary and the reimbursement of his airfare.
 It was then referred to them in 1996. The Labor Arbiter then affirmed the petition of Baldameca and
held Hanil and MCEI severally liable for the payment of $2,500.00 and 10% of the cash award as and by
way of attorney’s fees.
 However, since according to the Migrant Workers’ Act the NLRC has jurisdiction over matter like this,
the decision of the Labor Arbiter was appealed to them by Hanil and MCEI. But, NLRC denied the
petition. Hanil and MCEI filed for a motion for reconsideration, but was still denied.
 Therefore, Hanil and MCEI elevated the case to the CA and filed a petition for certiorari. But it was
denied.
 Both of them filed for a motion for reconsideration, but it was then, again, denied.
 Then, finally, the petitioners then raised the issue of the dismissal of their petition for certiorari on the
ground of non-compliance with the requirements of non-forum shopping and lack of explanation of
service by registered mail. Thus, this petition.
Issue: W/N it is enough that MCEI signed the certification of non-forum shopping.
Ruling: YES. It should be taken into consideration that Hanil is being sued in its capacity as the foreign principal of
MCEI, and that MCEI is capacitated enough to certify such. The requirement for both of them to certify is not
circumvented and is substantially complied with even if it was only MCEI who signed such. It also does not interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
33. Tancinco vs. GSIS, 369 SCRA 221

Facts:
 SPO1 Tancinco was shot by unidentified armed men while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of
his house.
 At the time of his death, SPO1 Tancinco was assigned as part of the close-in security detail of former VP
Estrada.
 Incidentally, SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty during that unfortunate event since the former VP was in the
U.S. for medical treatment.
 Thereafter, the petitioner’s widow, Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits before the GSIS. But the
GSIS denied the request on the ground that there was no proof that the death of SPO1 Tancinco was
work-related.
 She, then, appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission, but it upheld the decision of GSIS,
denying the request of the widow.
 Rufina then filed a petition for review from the aforesaid decision of the ECC to the CA, but it was also
dismissed. Thus, this petition.
Issue: W/N SPO1’s death compensable.
Ruling:
NO. Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly states that before a disability or death be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident which was done in his place of work, while preforming
official functions, and while executing an order for the employer even when such employee is elsewhere. In this case, it was
clearly stated that the deceased was off-duty. The 24-hour doctrine states that a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or the Philippine National Police is presumed to be on-duty all the time as their profession calls for it. However, an
exception would be when such officer is on leave, which is the situation in the case at bar. The death of SPO1 Tancinco is not
compensable as he did not tick any of the three requisites under Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation.
34. Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corp., 393 SCRA 134

Facts:
 A manpower audit was conducted by herein respondent, Philex Mining Corp. Such audit revealed that
241 of its employees were redundant. Thus, a retrenchment program.
 Because of the retrenchment program, the petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal, and submitted
such through a submission agreement coursed through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
 The Voluntary Arbitrator, Juan Valdez, decided that petitioners be reinstated to their former positions,
with back wages, and without loss of seniority and privileges.
 Philex wasn’t satisfied with the decision, thus, appealed to the Supreme Court, which was then
remanded to the CA. The CA upheld the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision.
 Philex, finally, elevated the case to the Supreme Court. Philex filed a manifestation and motion for leave
to offer separation pay in lieu of reinstatement before the office of Voluntary Arbitrator Juan Valdez. It
also alleged that the petitioners’ positions no longer existed and that there arose “strained relations”.
 Thus, Valdez granted the motion. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on
the ground that Valdez acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. But the CA dismissed the contention.
Thus, this petition.
Issue(s):
(1) W/N a voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode of executing an award.
(2) W/N the doctrine of strained relations applicable.
Ruling(s):
(1) YES. The Supreme Court reiterated that in a previous jurisprudence it held that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The
power of a voluntary arbitrator to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the
correctness of its execution and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire. Thus,
Valdez did not act without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
(2) NO. The doctrine of strained relations is misplaced in the case at bar. It is never applicable in situations
where the employee has no say in the operation of the employer’s business. In this case, the employees
are rank-and-file workers. It is reiterated that the reinstatement of the workers is no longer possible
since Philex has been continuously suffering business losses. Thus, there was no evidence that Philex’s
decision was capricious or whimsical, having such dismissal legal, making the reinstatement
inappropriate and impossible.
35. Sundowner Dev. Corp., vs. Drilon, 180 SCRA 14

Facts:
 Due to non-payment of rentals, a case of ejectment was filed by Syjuco against Mabuhay. Thus,
Mabuhay offered to amicably settle the case by surrendering the premises to Syjuco and to sell its
assets and personal property to any interested property.
 Sundowner Dev. Corp., then, enters the picture as Syjuco offered the premises to it. Mabuhay also
offered to sell its assets and personal properties to Sundowner, to which Sundowner agreed to. A deed
of assignment was then executed, and Syjuco formally turned over the possession of the leased
premises to Sundowner.
 Herein respondent, National Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant, and Allied Services, then
barricaded the entrance and denied the officers, employees, and guests of Sundowner to the premises.
Sundowner, then, wrote a letter-complaint to Syjuco.
 A complaint for damages with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order was filed by
Sundowner. The RTC, thus, issued the said restraining order. But, however, NUWHRAIN continued
with its strike.
 Another order was issued by herein public respondent Labor Secretary Drilon, requiring all striking
employees to return to work and for Mabuhay to accept them.
 Mabuhay contented that it could no longer reinstate them as it already sold all its assets and personal
properties to Sundowner.
 NUWHRAIN continued to allege that Mabuhay and Sundowner connived so that Mabuhay could escape
its obligations to its former employees. Thus, this petition.
Issue: W/N the former employees of Mabuhay be reinstated.
Held:
NO. As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona fide purchaser of assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its employ
the employees of the seller. Although, an exception would be when such sale is clothed with bad faith. In this case, there was
no bad faith since it appears that Sundowner agreed to purchase Mabuhay’s assets to enable Mabuhay to pay its obligations to
both its striking employees and Syjuco. It is clear that Sundowner has no liability to the employees of Mabuhay. Although, it
may consider them for re-employment, there is no implied acceptance as there is no commitment or duty to absorb them.
Filipinas Port Services, Inc vs NLRC

200 SCRA 773
FACTS:
In view of the government policy which ordained that cargo handling operations should be limited to only one cargo handling
operator-contractor for every port the different stevedoring and arrastre corporations operating in the Port of Davao were
integrated into a single dockhandlers corporation, known as the Davao Dockhandlers, Inc., which was registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 13, 1976.
Due to the late receipt of its permit to operate at the Port of Davao from the Bureau of Customs, Davao Dockhandlers, Inc.,
which was subsequently renamed Filport, actually started its operation on February 16, 1977.
As a result of the merger, Filport's labor force was mostly taken from the integrating corporations, among them the private
respondents.
Private respondent Paterno Liboon and 18 others filed a complaint with the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City, alleging that
they were employees of Filport since 1955 through 1958 up to December 31, 1986 when they retired; that they were paid
retirement benefits computed from February 16,1977 up to December 31, 1986 only; and that taking into consideration their
continuous length of service, they are entitled to be paid retirement benefits differentials from the time they started working
with the predecessors of Filport up to the time they were absorbed by the latter in 1977.
Labor Arbiter held Filport liable for retirement benefits due private respondents for services rendered prior to February 16,
1977. Said decision was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal.
Filport filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, claiming that it is an entirely new corporation with a separate
juridical personality from the integrating corporations; and that Filport is not a successor-employer, liable for the obligations
of private respondents' previous employers.
ISSUE:
WON Filport is liable for the retirement benefits due private respondents for services rendered prior to February 16,
1977.
HELD:
YES.
It was mandated that Filport shall absorb all labor force and necessary personnel complement of the merging operators, thus,
clearly indicating the intention to continue the employer-employee relationships of the individual companies with its
employees through Filport.
Thus, Filport has the obligation not only to absorb the workers of the dissolved companies but also to include the length of
service earned by the absorbed employees with their former employees as well. To rule otherwise would be manifestly less
than fair, certainly, less than just and equitable.
Bibiano Elegir vs Philippine Airlines

GR No. 181995
FACTS:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial pilot, specifically designated as HS748
Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971.
In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently, it sent an
invitation to bid to all its flight deck crew, announcing the opening of eight (8) B747-400 Captain positions. The petitioner
submitted his bid and was fortunately awarded the same. The petitioner, together with seven (7) other pilots, was sent for
training at Boeing in Seattle, Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995, to acquire the necessary skills and
knowledge in handling the new aircraft. He completed his training on September 19, 1995.
On November 5, 1996, after rendering 25 years, 8 months and 20 days of continuous service, the petitioner applied for
optional retirement authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), in which he was a member of good standing. In response, PAL asked him to reconsider
his decision, asseverating that the company has yet to recover the full value of the costs of his training. It warned him that if he
leaves PAL before he has rendered service for at least three (3) years, it shall be constrained to deduct the costs of his training
from his retirement pay.
On November 6, 1996, the petitioner went on terminal leave for thirty (30) days and thereafter made effective his retirement
from service. Upon securing his clearance, however, he was informed that the costs of his training will be deducted from his
retirement pay, which will be computed at the rate of ₱ 5,000.00 per year of service. The petitioner, through his counsel, sent
PAL a correspondence, asserting that his retirement benefits should be based on the computation stated in Article 287 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7641, and that the costs of his training should not be deducted therefrom.
In its Reply dated August 4, 1997, PAL refused to yield to the petitioner’s demand and maintained that his retirement pay
should be based on PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan of 1967 (PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan) and that he should reimburse the
company with the proportionate costs of his training. Thus, on August 27, 1997, the petitioner filed a complaint for non-
payment of retirement pay, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against PAL.
The LA ratiocinated that PAL had no right to withhold the payment of the petitioner’s retirement benefits simply because he
retired from service before the lapse of 3 years. To begin with, there was no document evidencing the fact that the petitioner
was required to stay with PAL for 3 years from the completion of his training or that he was bound to reimburse the company
of the costs of his training should he retire from service before the completion of the period.
NLRC took a different stance and modified the decision of the LA. Considering that petitioner was only 52 years when he opted
to retire on November 6, 1996, he was, strictly, not yet qualified to receive the benefits provided under said Article 287 of the
Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 7641. However, petitioner is eligible for retirement under the CBA between respondent PAL
and ALPAP, as he had already served for more than 25 years with said respondent. This is covered by the provision in the first
paragraph of Article 287 of the Labor Code which states that an employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract, inasmuch as the CBA in question
does not provide for any retirement age, but limited itself to the number of years of service or flying hours of the employee
concerned. Consequently, anytime that an employee of respondent PAL reaches 20 years of service or 20,000 (flying) hours as
a pilot of PAL, then his age at that precise time would be considered as the retirement age, as far as he is concerned.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner’s retirement benefits should be computed based on Article 287 of the Labor Code or on PAL’s
retirement plans.
HELD:
The petitioner’s retirement pay should be computed based on PAL’s retirement plans.
The petitioner maintains that it is Article 287 of the Labor Code which should be applied in the computation of his retirement
pay since the same provides for higher benefits. He contends that the CA erroneously resorted to the ruling in Philippine
Airlines, Inc. since the circumstances in the said case, which led this Court to rule in favor of the applicability of PAL’s
retirement plans in computing retirement benefits, are unavailing in the present case. Specifically, he pointed out that the pilot
in Philippine Airlines, Inc. retired at the age of forty-five (45), while he opted to retire at fifty-two (52). He further emphasized
that the ruling was anchored on a finding that the retirement benefits that the pilot would get under Article 287 of the Labor
Code are less than those he would get under PAL’s retirement plans.
It bears reiterating that there are only two retirement schemes at point in this case: (1) Article 287 of the Labor Code, and; (2)
the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots’ Retirement Benefit Plan. The two retirement schemes are alternative in
nature such that the retired pilot can only be entitled to that which provides for superior benefits.
PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. NLRC
FACTS:
Interasia Container Industries, Inc. (INTERASIA) was embroiled in three labor cases which were all resolved against it.
Monetary awards consisting of 13th month pay differentials and other benefits were granted to complainants. It was
recomputed and separation pay totaling P125,788.30 was included due to the illegal closure of operations of INTERASIA plus
P1, 188,466.32 as wage differentials, separation pay and other benefits.
Upon finality writs of execution were issued and the Sheriff levied on execution personal properties located in the factory.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim asserting ownership over the seized properties on the strength of trust
receipts executed by INTERASIA in its favor. As a result, the Sheriff suspended the public auction sale. But the LA denied the
petitioner’s claim and declared Angel Peliglorio as highest bidder.
LA ordered the release of the properties to Peliglorio. Peliglorio alleged that the public auction wa conducted without notice
and in a place other than the premises of INTERASIA.
It also raises issue on the extent of its security title over the properties subject of the levy on execution, submitting that while
it may not have absolute ownership consisting of a security title which attaches to the properties.
Petitioner differentiates a trust receipt, which is a security for the payment of the obligations of the importer, from a real
estate mortgage executed as a security for the payment of an obligation of a borrower. Petitioner argues that in the latter the
ownership of the mortgagor may not necessarily have any bearing on its acquisition, whereas in the case of a trust receipt the
acquisition of the goods by the borrower results from advances made by the bank. It concludes that the security title of the
bank in a trust receipt must necessarily be of the same or greater extent than the nature of the security arising from a real
estate mortgage. Petitioner maintains that it is a preferred claimant to the proceeds from the foreclosure to the extent of its
security title in the goods which are valued at P46,100,253.92 otherwise its security title will become useless.
Private respondent submits that petitioner’s negligence to immediately assert its right to cancel the Trust Receipt Agreements,
upon INTERASIA’s failure to comply with its obligation, is fatal to its claim.
NLRC: Trust Receipts are mere security transactions which do not vest upon petitioner any title of ownership, and that
although the Trust Receipt Agreements described petitioner as owner of the goods, there was no showing that it canceled the
trust receipts and took possession of the goods.
ISSUE: WON trust receipts are mere security transactions which do not vest upon petitioner any title of ownership,
and that although the Trust Receipt Agreements described petitioner as owner of the goods, there was no showing
that it canceled the trust receipts and took possession of the goods
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. We cannot subscribe to NLRC's simplistic interpretation of trust receipt
arrangements. In effect, it has reduced the Trust Receipt Agreements to a pure and simple loan transaction.
The mechanics and effects flowing from a trust receipt transaction, particularly the importance given to the security held by
the entruster, i.e., the person holding title over the goods, were fully discussed in earlier decisions, as follows
By this arrangement a banker advances money to an intending importer, and thereby lends the aid of capital, of credit, or of
business facilities and agencies abroad, to the enterprise of foreign commerce. Much of this trade could hardly be carried on
by any other means, and therefore it is of the first importance that the fundamental factor in the transaction, the banker's
advance of money and credit, should receive the amplest protection. Accordingly, in order to secure that the banker shall be
repaid at the critical point - that is, when the imported goods finally reach the hands of the intended vendee - the banker takes
the full title to the goods at the very beginning; he takes it as soon as the goods are bought and settled for by his payments or
acceptances in the foreign country, and he continues to hold that title as his indispensable security until the goods are sold in
the United States and the vendee is called upon to pay for them. This security is not an ordinary pledge by the importer to the
banker, for the importer has never owned the goods, and moreover, he is not able to deliver the possession; but the security is
the complete title vested originally in the bankers, and this characteristic of the transaction has again and again been
recognized and protected by the courts. Of course, the title is at bottom a security title, as it has sometimes been called, and the
banker is always under the obligation to reconvey; but only after his advances have been fully repaid and after the importer
has fulfilled the other terms of the contract.
From the legal and jurisprudential standpoint it is clear that the security interest of the entruster is not merely an empty or
idle title. To a certain extent, such interest becomes a "lien" on the goods because the entruster's advances will have to be
settled first before the entrustee can consolidate his ownership over the goods.
The NLRC argues that inasmuch as petitioner did not cancel the Trust Receipt Agreements and took possession of the
properties it could not claim ownership of the properties.
We do not agree. Significantly, the law uses the word "may" in granting to the entruster the right to cancel the trust and take
possession of the goods.[11] Consequently, petitioner has the discretion to avail of such right or seek any alternative action,
such as a third-party claim or a separate civil action which it deems best to protect its right, at any time upon default or failure
of the entrustee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the trust agreement.
Besides, as earlier stated, the law warrants the validity of petitioner's security interest in the goods pursuant to the written
terms of the trust receipt as against all creditors of the trust receipt agreement.[12] The only exception to the rule is when the
properties are in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. The records however do not show that the
winning bidder is such purchaser.
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the third-party claim of petitioner. Necessarily the auction sale
should be set aside. For there would be neither justice nor equity in taking the funds from the party whose means had
purchased the property under the contract.
Yngson, Jr. v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 171132, [August 15, 2012],
(
Weird Case, sa held lang meron labor)
Doctrine: Right of First Preference as regard to unpaid wages
“The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 of the Labor Code, does not constitute a lien on
the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in application.”
FACTS:
ARCAM & Company, Inc. (ARCAM) is engaged in the operation of a sugar mill in Pampanga. ARCAM applied for and was
granted a loan by respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB). To secure the loan, ARCAM executed a Real Estate Mortgage
and a Chattel Mortgage. ARCAM, defaulted on its obligations and PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The SEC
issued, upon petition filed by ARCAM, a TRO and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining PNB and the Sheriff
from proceeding with the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties.
The SEC later ruled that ARCAM can no longer be rehabilitated. Thus, the SEC decreed that ARCAM be dissolved and placed
under liquidation. The SEC Hearing Panel also granted PNB's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and appointed
Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. & Associates as Liquidator for ARCAM. With this development, PNB revived the foreclosure case.
Contending that foreclosure during liquidation was improper, petitioner filed with the SEC a Motion for the Issuance of a TRO
to enjoin the foreclosure sale of ARCAM's assets. The SEC en banc issued a TRO effective for seventy-two (72) hours, but said
TRO lapsed without any writ of preliminary injunction being issued by the SEC. Consequently, PNB resumed the proceedings
for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties. PNB emerged as the highest winning bidder in the auction
sale.
Petitioner Contention:
Petitioner filed with the SEC a motion to nullify the auction sale. Petitioner posited that all actions against companies which
are under liquidation, like ARCAM, are suspended because liquidation is a continuation of the petition for suspension
proceedings. Petitioner argued that the prohibition against foreclosure subsisted during liquidation because payment of all of
ARCAM's obligations was proscribed except those authorized by the Commission.
Respondent Contention:
In its Opposition, PNB asserted that neither Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A nor the SEC rules prohibits secured creditors
from foreclosing on their mortgages to satisfy the mortgagor's debt after the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings and
during liquidation proceedings.
SEC Ruling:
On January 4, 2005, the SEC issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to nullify the auction sale. It held that PNB was
not legally barred from foreclosing on the mortgages.
CA:
Aggrieved, a petition for review in the CA questioning the Resolution of the SEC. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground
that petitioner failed to attach material portions of the record and other documents relevant to the petition as required
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed the petition for failure to attach material documents
referred to in the petition; and
2. Whether PNB, as a secured creditor, can foreclose on the mortgaged properties of a corporation
under liquidation without the knowledge and prior approval of the liquidator or the SEC.|||
*In Petition to SC, petitioner claimed that mortgage should not foreclosed because it violates the lien of the workers due to
their unpaid wages under Labor Code Sec 110.
HELD:
1. No, the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure to attach material documents
A perusal of the petition for review filed with the CA, and as admitted by PNB, reveals that certified true copies of the assailed
January 4, 2005 SEC Resolution and the February 9, 2000 SEC Order appointing petitioner Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as
liquidator were annexed therein.
We find the foregoing attached documents sufficient for the appellate court to decide the case at bar considering that the SEC
resolution contains statements of the factual antecedents material to the case.
2. Yes, PNB may foreclose

The court has already settled and upheld the right of the secured creditor to foreclose the mortgages in its favor during the
liquidation of a debtor corporation.
In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that if rehabilitation is no longer feasible
and the assets of the corporation are finally liquidated, secured creditors shall enjoy preference over unsecured creditors,
subject only to the provisions of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits.
Creditors of secured obligations may pursue their security interest or lien, or they may choose to abandon the preference and
prove their credits as ordinary claims.
In this case, PNB elected to maintain its rights under the security or lien; hence, its right to foreclose the mortgaged properties
should be respected.
*As to petitioner's argument on the right of first preference as regards unpaid wages, the Court has elucidated in the case
of Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC that a distinction should be made between a preference of credit and a lien.
A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a particular property.
The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 of the Labor Code, does not constitute a lien on
the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in
application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should be paid in the final distribution
of the proceeds of the insolvent's assets. It is a right to a first preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor.
Consequently, the right of first preference for unpaid wages may not be invoked in this case to nullify the foreclosure sales
conducted pursuant to PNB's right as a secured creditor to enforce its lien on specific properties of its debtor, ARCAM.
42. Laureano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114776, [February 2, 2000]

Doctrine: Money Claims arising from Employee-employer relationship prescribes after 3 years, use labor code and not civil
code for prescription of cause of action.
Facts:
Petitioner Laureano applied for employment with the respondent Singapore Airlines Limited (Company). The Company
offered to him a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two years commencing
January 21, 1978. Laureano accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. On July 21, 1979, the Company
offered an extension of his two-year contract to five years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms
and conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted. Sometime in 1982, the Company was hit by
a recession, hence, it initiated cost cutting measures. Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, the Company
decided to terminate its excess personnel and Laureano was among those chosen. The Company informed Laureano of his
termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three months salary in lieu of three months notice.
Aggrieved, Laureano instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The complaint was, however, withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo
(RTC).
Petitioner Contention:
1. where the items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an
obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute;
2. the case involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters;
3. if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal
and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts.|||
SG Airlines:
1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and
2. that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the
complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of
plaintiff's employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of
his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that
Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction
Trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff.|||

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination,
estoppel, and damages.
The appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Does PH Courts have jurisdiction
2. Whether or not the action for damges has prescribed under correct Civil Code provision. Art.
1144,10 years if for contracts, and Art. 1146, 4 years if for injury.
3. Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed
HELD:
1. Yes. PH courts have jurisdiction.
a. Defendant failed to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. The
defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of
proof, and failed to do so.
b. Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court. Estopped from questioning jurisdiction of said court.
2. Neither Art. 114 or 1146; Labor Code should apply as the injury arises from employment contract.
Apply Article 291 of Labor Code on money claims- All money claims arising from employee-employer
relations shall be filed 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
Why? Special Law over General Law.

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to
illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed. |||
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no
legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff
leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all.|||

3. No. Dismissed on Valid Grounds. The appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner
allowed for pre-termination of employment. Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show
that respondent court's decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings,
including the reason for the retrenchment|||
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination from employment was
for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error
nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate court.
43. Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race, G.R. No. 164820, [March 28, 2007]
FACTS:
In June 1993, respondent was employed by the petitioner as a bus driver. On the night of 24 August 1994, the bus he was
driving was bumped by a Dagupan-bound bus. As a consequence thereof, respondent suffered a fractured left leg and was
rushed to the Country Medical and Trauma Center in Tarlac City where he was operated on and confined from 24 August 1994
up to 10 October 1994. One month after his release from the said hospital, the respondent was confined again for further
treatment of his fractured left leg at the Specialist Group Hospital in Dagupan City. His confinement therein lasted a month.
Petitioner shouldered the doctor’s professional fee and the operation, medication and hospital expenses of the respondent in
the aforestated hospitals.
In January 1998, the respondent, still limping heavily, went to the petitioner’s office to report for work. He was, however,
informed by the petitioner that he was considered resigned from his job. Respondent refused to accede and insisted on having
a dialogue with the petitioner’s officer named Yolanda Montes. During their meeting, Montes told him that he was deemed to
have resigned from his work and to accept a consideration of P50,000.00. Respondent rejected the explanation and offer.
Thereafter, before Christmas of 1998, he again conversed with Montes who reiterated to him that he was regarded as resigned
but raised the consideration therein to P100,000.00. Respondent rebuffed the increased offer. On 30 June 1999, respondent,
through his counsel, sent a letter to the petitioner demanding employment-related money claims.
Respondent Claims:
There being no response from the petitioner, the respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter on 1 September 1999 a complaint
for (1) unfair labor practice; (2) illegal dismissal; (3) underpayment of wages; (4) nonpayment of overtime and holiday
premium, service incentive leave pay, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay; (5) excessive deduction of
withholding tax and SSS premium; and (6) moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner Claims:
In its Position Paper dated 27 March 2000,
1. petitioner claimed that respondent was paid strictly on commission basis; that respondent was a mere
field personnel who performed his duties and functions outside the petitioner's premises and whose
time of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; therefore, was exempted from paying
the respondent overtime compensation, night shift differential, holiday pay and service incentive
leave;
2. furthermore, petitioner claimed that the respondent’s cause of action against petitioner had already
prescribed because when the former instituted the aforesaid complaint on 1 September 1999, more
than five years had already lapsed from the accrual of his cause of action on 24 August 1994.
LA Decision:
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of respondent for lack of merit. He stated that the prescriptive period for filing an
illegal dismissal case is four years from the dismissal of the employee concerned. Since the respondent stated in his complaint
that he was dismissed from work on 24 August 1994 and he filed the complaint only on 1 September 1999, Labor Arbiter
Nambi concluded that respondent's cause of action against petitioner had already prescribed.
Further, Labor Arbiter Nambi opined that respondent was not a regular employee but a mere field personnel and, therefore,
not entitled to service incentive leave, holiday pay, overtime pay and 13th month pay.
NLRC
Decision reversing the decision of Labor Arbiter Nambi. It ordered the reinstatement of the respondent to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and benefits with full back-wages computed from the time of his illegal
dismissal in January 1998 up to his actual reinstatement. It held that the respondent's cause of action accrued, not on 24
August 1994, but in January 1998, when the respondent reported for work but was rejected by the petitioner.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the action has prescribed
Held:
1. No. The action has not prescribed
In illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four years from the time of his dismissal within which to
institute a complaint. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years.
The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker. It is settled
that in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of action accrues from the time the employment of the worker was unjustly
terminated. Thus, the four-year prescriptive period shall be counted and computed from the date of the employee’s dismissal
up to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of employment.
In the case at bar, it is error to conclude that the employment of the respondent was unjustly terminated on 10 November
1994 because he was, at that time, still confined at the hospital for further treatment of his fractured left leg. He must be
considered as merely on sick leave at such time. Likewise, the respondent cannot also be deemed as illegally dismissed from
work upon his release from the said hospital in December 1994 up to December 1997 since the records show that the
respondent still reported for work to the petitioner and was granted sick and disability leave by the petitioner during the
same period.
The respondent must be considered as unjustly terminated from work in January 1998 since this was the first time he was
informed by the petitioner that he was deemed resigned from his work. During that same occasion, the petitioner, in fact,
tried to convince the respondent to accept an amount of P50,000.00 as a consolation for his dismissal but the latter rejected it.
Thus, it was only at this time that the respondent’s cause of action accrued. Consequently, the respondent’s filing of complaint
for illegal dismissal on 1 September 1999 was well within the four-year prescriptive period.
44. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 151407, February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Ireneo Panganiban (respondent) was employed as Assistant General Manager of the Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation (petitioner) from May 1986 until his preventive suspension on August 26, 1988. Respondent resigned from his
employment on September 2, 1988. On April 12, 1989, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, against
the members of the Board of Administrators (BOA) of petitioner alleging, among others, non-payment of his unpaid
commissions.
A motion to dismiss was filed by Joselito Santiago, one of the defendants, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, as respondent's
claim was a labor money claim, but this was denied by the RTC per Orders dated October 19, 1990 and November 23, 1990.
Thus, Santiago filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, and in a Decision dated October 29, 1991, the CA granted Santiago's
petition for lack of jurisdiction and set aside the RTC's Orders dated October 19, 1990 and November 23, 1990.
Thereafter, respondent was elected by the BOA as Vice-President for Marketing in July 1992. He resigned in April 1993.
On July 24, 1996, respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits,
unpaid commissions, and damages.
LA
In a Decision dated September 23, 1997, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ordered respondent's reinstatement with full backwages, and
the payment of his unpaid commission in the amount of P2,521,769.77, damages and attorney's fees.
NLRC
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC but due to petitioner's failure to post a bond, the appeal was dismissed on February 26, 1998,
in a Decision that was deemed final and executory.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's dismissal, which was denied per Resolution dated March 25, 1998.
Petitioner then filed a petition with this Court but the same was referred to the CA in view of the ruling in St. Martin Funeral
Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, 356 Phil. 811 (1998).
CA
Approved petition of petitioner, and annulled LA’s ruling on payment of backwages and reinstatement.
The complaint in connection with his appointment as Vice-President for Marketing from July, 1992 to April 26, 1993 is within
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and NLRC NCR 00-07-04614-96 is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent's claim for unpaid commissions in the amount of P2,521,769.77 has
already prescribed.
HELD:
1. Yes.
The prescription of an action is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor,
and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. On this point, the Court ruled that although the commencement
of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by
plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all.
Hence, while the filing of Civil Case No. Q-89-2244 could have interrupted the running of the three-year prescriptive period, its
consequent dismissal by the CA due to lack of jurisdiction effectively canceled the tolling of the prescriptive period within
which to file his money claim, leaving respondent in exactly the same position as though no civil case had been filed at all. The
running of the three-year prescriptive period not having been interrupted by the filing of Civil Case No. Q-89-2244,
respondent's cause of action had already prescribed on September 2, 1991, three years after his cessation of employment on
September 2, 1988. Consequently, when respondent filed his complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement
benefits, and damages in July 24, 1996, his claim, clearly, had already been barred by prescription.

LABOR CASES WEEK 2 Final

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What was the proposal made by Mr. Vega?

What was the proposal made by Mr. Vega?

What were the contentions of both parties regarding Mr. Vega's proposal?

What were the contentions of both parties regarding Mr. Vega's proposal?

LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS UNDER ATTY.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

Proposed lnnovation (Attach necessary information)

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

ISSUE: WON LA HAS JURISDICTION IN THE TERMINATION DISPUTE HEREIN?

ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE G. ONG, petitioners,

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al V Estanislao Surio

POEA dismissed the complaint in 1996.

Philippine Touristers Inc. V Mas Transit Workers UNION-ANGLO-KMU

Mt. Carmel Employee’s Union V Mt. Carmel School

Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union –FFW V CA

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC vs Brillantes

1No. It was illegal

2. what are the Liabilities of the UNION Personnel

3.yes PHIMCO failed to observe due process

PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), vs Secretary of Labor

2. What extent could DOLE determine?

ODIN SECURITY AGENCY, petitioner, vs.HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA

Ruling of public respondent Luna C. Piezas:

Issue: WON the petitioner was denied due process

1) the Sec. of Labor has jurisdiction

2. No, Petitioner was not denied due process

Tabigue et al., vs International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO)

Goya Inc.vs. Goya Employees Union

Master Iron Labor Union vs. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47

NLRC: Affirmed the decision of LA.

San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC, 304 SCRA 1

Petitioner’s contention: There is a no-strike provision in the CBA. Hence, violated.

Deltaventure Resources Inc. Vs Judge Cabato, 327 SCRA 521

G.R. No. 105090 September 16, 1993

G.R. No. 119293 June 10, 2003

[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998]

Hence, the present petition.

[G.R. No.100518. January 24, 2000]

[G.R. No. 104302. July 14, 1999]

30. Association of Trade Unions vs. Abella, 323 SCRA 50

Issue: W/N project employees entitled to termination pay.

31. PAL, Inc. vs. NLRC, 328 SCRA 273

32. MC Engineering, Inc. vs. NLRC, 360 SCRA 180

33. Tancinco vs. GSIS, 369 SCRA 221

34. Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corp., 393 SCRA 134

35. Sundowner Dev. Corp., vs. Drilon, 180 SCRA 14

Filipinas Port Services, Inc vs NLRC

Bibiano Elegir vs Philippine Airlines

PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. NLRC

2. Yes, PNB may foreclose

42. Laureano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114776, [February 2, 2000]

Trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff.|||

Why? Special Law over General Law.

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