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*
G.R. No. 141524. September 14, 2005.

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,

LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO
CABACUNGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON,
JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, respondents.

Remedial Law; Appeals; The right to appeal is neither a natural right

nor a part of due process; It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
—First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part
of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of
the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The
period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
Same; Same; An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or final order appealed from.—Based on the foregoing, an
appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more for the

_______________

* EN BANC.

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634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.
Same; Same; Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules.—To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Romualdo M. Jubay for petitioners.
       Miguel M. Gonzales, Rosemarie M. Osoteo and Antonio M.
Chua for respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.
     Jose Rico P. Domingo for private respondents.

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito

Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action
for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the
Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe,
Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and
respondents) filed various motions with the trial

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Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to

declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed
by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by
public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing
motions as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in
default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as
against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted
service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because
there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be
determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by
respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also
denied because there were factual matters that could be determined
1
only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial
court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial
proper.
2
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed
petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
the trial court3 issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27,

_______________

1 “Exh. B,” Records, p. 37.

2 “Exh. E,” Records, p. 47.
3 “Exh. G,” Records, pp. 56-57.

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636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

4
1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied5
the notice of appeal,
holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration
6
but this too was denied in an order dated September
3, 1998.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of
the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998
since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed
7
and
they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed
the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to
the appellate court, the order was the

“final order” appealable under the Rules. It held further: Perforce the
petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law
is jurisdictional and non-compliance

_______________

4 “Exh. H,” Records, p. 58.

5 “Exh. I,” Records, pp. 61-62. The trial court received the notice of appeal dated July 27,
1998 on July 31, 1998. According to the court, it was eight days late, counted from July 23,
1998, which was the last day to file the notice since petitioners had one (1) day left to file it.
6 “Exh. K,” Records, pp. 67-69.
7 Rollo, p. 41.

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Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment
8
final and executory.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned

decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6,
2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,
petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the
appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING

THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO
N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN
CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE
PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN

RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE
RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS
RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY
22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998
AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE WORDS “FINAL ORDER” IN SECTION 3, RULE
41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL

_______________

8 Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Justices Godardo O. Jacinto and
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the 16th Division.

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638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON.

ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF
THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF
WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL
ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN

FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. v.
IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID
DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE
9
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within

which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the10Rules. Failure to do so
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period
11
to appeal is
fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as amended,
provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals.—The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, That in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours
from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

_______________

9 Rollo, p. 12.
10 M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Zenaida Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477,
November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 525.
 11 The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

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Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within

fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days

from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties
12
are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed
as the “final order,” not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the
denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the
15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the “final order,” receipt of
which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
—the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July
1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

_______________

12 Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. (ITC), et al. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, et al.,
G.R. No. 135630, 26 September 2000, 341 SCRA 90.

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640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

13
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial
court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed—for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within
15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial
court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there.
This pronouncement was14 reiterated in the more recent case of
Apuyan v. Haldeman, et al. where we again considered the order
denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view
that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start
of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact
file their notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On
the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a
motion for reconsideration. Accord-

_______________

13 G.R. No. 145911, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 631.

14 G.R. No. 129980, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 402.

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Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

ing to the trial court,

15
the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-
day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR
on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only
one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice
of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were
entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of
the “final order” or the order dismissing their motion for
reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that
they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file
the notice
16
of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar
cases, premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of
an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
 17
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The rule is also founded
on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice
that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards
18
of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law.
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken.—Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the

adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from
notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a
record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the
judgment or order or for

_______________

15 Supra.
16 Bank of America v. Gerochi, G.R. No. 73210, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 9; Dayrit v.
Philippine Bank of Communications, 435 Phil. 120; 386 SCRA 117 (2002); Gallego v. Spouses
Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 275.
17 BPI Data Systems Corp. v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 324 Phil. 267; 254 SCRA 56 (1996).
18 Borre v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57204, 14 March 1988, 158 SCRA 561.

642

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day
of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day
following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of
19
said motion. (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously

consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to
15 days. In 20 the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization that drafted BP 129, the raison21d’etre behind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal and enhance the
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict
observance of this reglementary period of appeal.
22
Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal, and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks23and Sewerage Authority and Authority v.
Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared

_______________

19 Appeals from the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and the Social Security
Commission to the Court of Appeals.
20 Created by virtue of Executive Order No. 611.
 21 MR. MILLORA: Mr. Speaker, although I am a Member of the committee I have
been granted permission to ask questions about some unresolved matters and I would
like to begin with the period of appeal.
Under Section 39, Mr. Speaker, the period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen
days. This is very good because it will shorten the period to appeal. Under our rules
today, the period to appeal is 30 days. x x x
(February 2, 1981, Record of the Batasan, Volume IV, p. 2004.)
22 Ramos v. Bagasao, No. L-51552, 28 February 1980, 96 SCRA 395; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 453; Olacao v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 81390, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 38.
23 No. L-27197, 28 April 1980, 97 SCRA 138.

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Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of
procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion
advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party
of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
24
In Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule,
periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed
unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we
condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong
considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due
course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful
of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with,
our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity
of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare
cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given 25
the
full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
The26 Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive

_______________

24 345 Phil. 678; 280 SCRA 444 (1997).

25 Allied Banking Corp. and Pacita Uy v. Spouses Eserjose, G.R. No 161776,
October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 199.
26 Article VIII, Section 5 (5), 1987 Constitution.
 644

644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing

27
appeals
28
to it 29
and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,
43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on
justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals.
These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order
30
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court
31
of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals

_______________

27 Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals.
28 Appeals from (the Court of Tax Appeals and) Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the
Court of Appeals. RA 9282 elevated the Court of Tax Appeals to the level of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction.
29 Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
30 Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time—In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to
run is to be excluded and the date of performance included x x x. (1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
31 Before the effectivity of RA 9282 (AN ACT EXPANDING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS [CTA], ELEVATING ITS
RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL
JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP) on March 30, 2004,
decisions or rulings of the CTA were appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. With the passage of the new law, Section 19
thereof provides that a party adversely affected by a decision or

645

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Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

32
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should,33as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the
use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal
may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for
a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39
of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15
days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal
(in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for
strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In

_______________

ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure.
32 As far as Rule 65 (Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition) is
concerned, Section 3 thereof, as amended by SC Adm. Memo. No. 00-2-03, states
that no extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding 15 days.
33 Katindig v. People, 74 Phil. 45 (1942) as cited in Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 3rd Edition (1995).

646

646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to
resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become
final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice
fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion
as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted—from
receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of
notice of “final order” appealed from (July 22, 1998).
 To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final
order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of
only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided
in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or
five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was
well within34
the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.
We deem it unnecessary 35
to discuss the applicability of Denso
(Philippines), Inc. v. IAC since the Court of Appeals never even
referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and

_______________

34 Rules of procedure may be applied retroactively to actions pending and

undetermined at the time of their passage. (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil.
289; 363 SCRA 779 [2001] as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 Edition,
p. 294)
35 No. L-75000, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 280.

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VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 14, 2005 647

People vs. Dimaano

SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded

to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-

Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.

Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set aside.

Note.—Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period

and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.
(Workers of Antique Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 333 SCRA 181 [2000])
 ——o0o——

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