DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL POLITICS IN INDIA:

A STUDY OF COALITION OF POLITICAL

PARTIB IN UHAR PRADESH

ABSTRACT

THB8IS
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

fioctor of ^IHloKoplip
IN
POLITICAL SaENCE

BY
TABRBZ A b A M

Un<l«r tht SupMvMon of

PBOP. N. SUBSAHNANYAN

DEPARTMENT Of POLITICAL SCIENCE

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALI6ARH (INDIA)
 The thesis "Development of Regional Politics in India : A Study of
Coalition of Political Parties in Uttar Pradesh" is an attempt to analyse the
multifarious dimensions, actions and interactions of the politics of regionalism in
India and the coalition politics in Uttar Pradesh. The study in general tries to
comprehend regional awareness and consciousness in its content and form in the
Indian sub-continent, with a special study of coalition politics in UP., which of late
has presented a picture of chaos, conflict and crise-cross, syndrome of democracy.

Regionalism is a manifestation of socio-economic and cultural forces in a

large setup. It is a psychic phenomenon where a particular part faces a psyche of
relative deprivation. It also involves a quest for identity projecting one's own
language, religion and culture. In the economic context, it is a search for an
intermediate control system between the centre and the peripheries for gains in the
national arena.

The study begins with the analysis of conceptual aspect of regionalism in

India. It also traces its historical roots and examine the role played by Indian
National Congress. The phenomenon of regionalism is a pre-independence problem
which has got many manifestation after independence. It is also asserted that
regionalism is a complex amalgam of geo-cultural, economic, historical and psychic
factors. These factors often interact and overlap each other. The development of
regiional feelings in India goes back to British rule. The various acts of the British
Government had planted and sustained the regional feelings. It could perhaps be
traced to the centralisation of power during the British Empire and its consequent
delegation to regional middle classes. The growth of pan-Indian forces also saw the
growth of regionalism in India. The Indian National Congress which was the premier
political party in India's struggle for independence is also held equally responsible
for development of regionalism in India. The urge of the Congress to organise the
country on linguistic basis since 1905 down to its 1948 Jaipur session made the
growth of regionalism more easier. However, the trauma of partition of the country
on the basis of religion restrained the Indian National Congress for the time being to
held up the idea of linguistic states in the larger interest of the nation. The creation
of first linguistic State of Andhra in 1953, after indefinite fast of Potti Sriramulu
and his subsequent death for the creation of separate Andhra gave a new impetus to
the regional movements in India In the said circumstances, the Indian National
Corgress in itsfifty-eighthsession at Hyderabad in January 1953, recommended the
division of India on linguistic basis. Accordingly the Government of India
constituted the States Reorganisation Commission which submitted its report in
1955. However, the Government enacted and implemented States Reorganisation
Acts to meet the regional aspirations of the people in due course.

The study goes further highlighting the problem of regionalism in the

southern part of India. The Dravidian movement which stems out of the differences,
real and imaginary, between the North Aryan Brahminical culture and the southern
Dravidian culture has been analysed. Dravidian movement witnessed various
changes in its programme in the course of its agitational politics. The demands
stretches from extreme posture of a separate sovereign republic to emancipate the
Dravidian from the Brahminical domination, to more autonomy and less control by
the Centre. The change in their style and tactics yielded positive results. There
participation in the mainstream politics and their experience with the political
power in the state gradually subsided the separatist tone of the movement.

Unlike Dravidian movement, the Andhra regionalism never claimed as a

separate nationality or an identification outside the national framework of India.
Their regionalism is only a projection of the love for their language and opposition
towards domination and big brother approach of Tamil speaking people. The
Andhra regionalism was based on the cultural variables such as language and culture
and aimed to acquire its due political place in India as the second biggest 'language
grrup of people after Hindi'. As far as the Telangana movement is concerned, it
was purely a case of sub-regionalism and intra-regionalism based on the fear of
domination over them by more developed Andhras. The overall effect of this sub-
regional assertion in regional politics added a new dimension to the already complex
Indian politics, a dimension which rejected both region and language as the basis of
political re-organisation and projected the significance of 'cultural uniformity' and
'historical identity' as the only criterion of a political existence.
 The regional aspiration and assertion in Punjab and Maharashtra has also
been basically moved around the language. The regionalism in Punjab is based on
ruthls-ss pursuit of self identity and self fulfillment by the Sikhs and is characterised
as communal and ethno-centric. The Akali Dal, the sole representative of the Sikh
community has played very profound role in achieving the objective of a separate
state based on Sikh culture and religion. The creation of Punjabi suba in 1966
fmally set rest to regional aspiration in the state.

The regional feeling in Maharashtra also grew primarily out of the demand
fon.a unilingual Marathi speaking state. A number of organisations particularly
Mahavidharbha Samiti, Samyukta Maharashtra Sabha and Samyukta Maharashtra
Parishad worked very hard to achieve the said goal. These organisations were
represented by both Congress and non-Congress leaders and intellectuals. After the
defeat in 1957 general election, primarily in western Maharashtra districts, the
leaders of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress became more outspoken and vocal.
They strived to convince the party's central leadership to the necessity of formation
of unilingual Marathi speaking state. Consequently the Bombay reorganisation bill
was passed by the Parliament which gave birth to a separate Marathi speaking state
in May 1960. However, a sense of fulfillment remained incomplete which
consequently gave incentives to a new kind of regionalism in the form of Shive Sena
ba^ed on the 'Sons of the Soil' theory. It was a protest '^y natives against their
economic exploitation by the migrants which has not only hampered their own
progress but also resulted in the cultural changes which they fear would cloud their
own identity.

The study also takes into account the problem of regionalism in North-East
which is the offshoot of the 'Sons of the Soil' theory. Neither the Britishers nor the
Indian Government paid due attention towards the tribal upliftment and integrating
them into the socio-economic and political mainstream of India. The sheer
negligence by the Central Government, non-recognition of their aspiration and their
right to protect their own identity and heritage, the fear of being treated as inferior
to the rest of India and too much interference by Indian Government in the affairs of
these states are some of the important factors which can be attributed to the
problem of legionaKsm in the N^rth-East. The suitable economic and political
reforms for all round development and strict vigil over the border is perhaps the
best remedy for the North-East malady.

The study also includes the problem of regional aspiration and assertion in
the Hindi speaking areas. The problem in this area has neither been a demand for an
independent or separate state nor the sheer negligence by the Central Government.
Basically the regionalism in this area is a movement by sub-regional elites for the
assertion of sub-regional identity based on common history and grievances
emanating from an under developed economy of the region and an anxiety for the
proper share in the political power which has lead to upheavals and movements for
separate states like Uttarakhand, Bundelkhand, Purvanchal in Uttar Pradesh,
Jharkhand and Mithilanchal in Bihar Chhattisgarh, Baghelkhand and Gondwana in
Madhya Pradesh and Brij Pradesh in Rajasthan.

The problem of regionalism has posed a serious threat to the political

stability in India. People's affiliation to the parties who aspire the interest of either
their own region or community, has given the birth to many political parties. The
emergence of regional parties can also be attributed to the fact that ai^er Jawahar
La! Nehru, the Congress party failed to maintain a balance between different regions,
community, castes, class and cultural groups. Though failure of Congress provided
strong incentives for the emergence of different political parties who had their base
in particular region.

Ahhough political destablisation seems to be a recent phenomenon but its

origin can be traced from the very beginning of the emergence of independent India.
The Ind ian National Congress, which functioned as a broad based nationalist
movement before independence, transformed itself into a dominant political party of
the nation. We find all shades of ideological groups in the Congress. Every group
have different approach towards the social and economic development of the nation.
Under these circumstances, political contention was internalised and carried on
within the Congress. The politics in the Congress more and more revolved around
personality cuh and groups of factional politics because with no issue of substantial
importance left after the departure of the Socialist and the defeat of the Hindu
revivalist to fight about. Factionalism existed in the Congress before independence
alongside a politics of issues. But after independence, politics of personalities and
factions have come to dominate the internal affairs of the Congress.

The coming of non-Congress parties at the helm of affairs in 1967 is

considered a turning point in the history of Indian politics as it gave birth to
hitherto a new concept - coalition government. The coalition became inevitable
because though the opposition parties succeeded to defeat the Congress at the
hustings, but individually did not muster enough strength in the state legislatures to
form the government on their own. But the non-Congress parties, who had come to
power on the basis of anti-Congressism agenda, could not last for a long because of
se^'sre inbuilt internal differences. They had been united to oust the Congress rule
but failed to keep this unity to run the government. Once the Congress was ousted
their ideological differences suddenly erupted to the extent of their formal
disintegration. However, this short lived coalition government had been a trend
setter in Uttar Pradesh, because this experiment has been repeated again and again
in Uttar Pradesh. A cursory look at the political development in Uttar Pradesh
would demonstrate how the anti-Congressism could not be translated into stable
non-Congress rule. Several time the non-Congress parties got clubbed under the
different banners to oust the alleged corrupt and ineffective Congress government
from the state. But utterly failed to provide a stable political alternative.

The recent phase of coalition politics in Uttar Pradesh started in 1990's. In

1992 a new factor entered into political arena of state politics. For the first time in
the political history of independent India an attempt was made to form an alliance
or front between the two age old hostile groups i.e. Backwards and Dalits, under
the banner of SP-BSP of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshi Ram respectively. This
new born alliance yielded into spectacular victory in 1993 Assembly elections.
Though the alliance was short of majority, formed the government beaded by
Mulayam Singh with the outside support of Congress and other secular parties. But
this new born alliance could not survive beyond one and half year due to their age
old animosity with each other and fell on June 1, 1995 vsath the withdrawal of BSP
from the alliance.

After the fall of Mulayam Singh, Mayawati the leader of the BSP became the
Chief Minister with the outside support of BJP. But the relationship developed
strained within a month. The state unit of BJP led by a powerful leader Kalyan
Singh claims himself as the leader of the backward caste had realised that
continuance with Mayawati would damaged the BJP and his own political prospects
in the state. This finally led to the withdrawal of support by the BJP from Mayawati
in October, 1995.

Once again after more than a year of President's rule, because in 1996
Assembly election, no political party or alliance were able to form the Government
had led to the re-imposition of President's rule in the state brought the two strange
bed fellows of Indian politics - the ESP and the BJP together. This time they came
with an novel formula of power sharing - rotatory Chief Ministership. Howsoever
novel was the formula of power sharing, it could not harmonise the two age old
hostile communities. The leader of the BJP legislature party Kalyan Singh and Chief
Minister Mayawati - a Dalit were critical to each other. However, the political
compulsion forced them to reconciled for a short time. But finally they parted away.

A careful analysis of political alignment, re-alignment, disintegration,

extension and withdrawal of support determine how important the caste factor has
been in the State politics of Uttar Pradesh. The implementation of Mandal
Commission report opened a new chapter in the Indian politics. It gave birth to a
strong political leadership who were heavily backing on the support of Backward
communities. At the same time another development took place in Uttar Pradesh
when the Dalits got united under the leadership of Kanshi Ram. The Congress party
which ruled the state for almost four decades was heavily dependent on the Dalits.
As long as they were with Congress, the party remained in power. With the failure
of the Congress to keep its traditional votes bank - Dalits and minorities, few new
forces emerged to replace the Congress hegemony i.e. backwards led by Samajwadi
party of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kalyan Singh of BJP and Dalit led by Kanshi
Ram's BSP. But the animosities between DaUts and backwards did not allow them
to come closer for a long time. In 1992 an attempt was made by Mulayam Singh and
Kanshi Ram to bring the backwards and dalits on one platform to fulfill the dream
of their mentor philosopher i.e. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
respectively. But these two communities could not join together for long time due
to their traditional animosity with each other. These two could not remain closer
because it was the backward who were seen by Dalits as their immediate suppressor
and perpetuater of atrocities on them Dalits were somewhat comfortable with upper
caste because they did not see them as their direct and immediate enemy. This led
them to forge an alliance with the BJP This alliance also ended on the same
reasons. In the fall of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Mayawati and Kalyan Singh
government, the caste factor worked heavily. Although the immediate political
benefits brought the backward and Dalits several time together but the traditional
castes apprehensions at the grass-root level did prevent the emergence of strong
and durable alliance in Uttar Pradesh combining the backwards and Dalits.

-V I ^/S.1

w
C*'^
DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL POLITICS IN INDIA:
A STUDY OF COALITION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN UTTAR PRADESH

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

l^ottor of $I|ila£(opl)p
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
TABREZ AbAM

Under the Supervision of

PROF. M. SUBRAHMANYAM

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)
T5289
Prof. M. Subrahmanyam Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh-202 002, India
Tel: 401720 (Off.)
404137 (Res.)

Date : 30.12.1999

(Uttixdtnh

Certified that the thesis of Mr. Tabrez Alam, titled as

"Development of Regional Politics in India : A Study of Coalition
of Political Parties in Uttar Pradesh ", is a original contribution
of research, submitted for the award of the Degree, of Doctor of
Philosophy in Political Science, under my supervision.

I affirm that the present work is suitable for the award of the
above said Degree.

(M. Subrahmanyam)
 CONTENTS
Page No.

PREFACE 11"
Chapter - /
REGIONAL ASPIRATION IN INDIA 1-27
(i) Concept of Regionalism; Its Nature 1-6
(ii) Genesis of Regionalism in India 6-17
(iii) Indian National Congress and Regionalism 17-27

Chapter - / /
REGIONALISM IN SOUTH INDIA 28-49
(i) Regionalism in Telugu Speaking Areas 28-42
(ii) Dravidian Movement 42-49

Chapter - / / /
REGIONALISM IN NORTH AND WEST INDIA 50-84
(i) Regionalism in Punjab 50-75
(ii) Movement for Maharashtra 75-84

Chapter - IV
REGIONALISM IN NORTH-EAST INDIA 85-107
(i) The Problem of Assam 87-92
. (ii) The Problem of Nagaland 92-95
(iii) The Problem of Tripura 95-100
(iv) The Problem of Meghalaya 100-107

Chapter - V
REGIONALISM IN HINDI-BELT 108-143
(i). Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal) Problem 109-121
(ii). Jharkhand (Vananchal) Problem 121-143

Chapter - VI
PARTIES AND POLITICS IN UTTAR PRADESH (1950-67) 144-170
(i) Development of Factionalism in U.P. Congress 144-149
(ii) Non-Congress Parties in U P . Politics 149-161
(iii) Fourth General Election and Politics in UP. 161-164
(iv) Choudhary Charan Singh and Political Dynamics in U.P. 164-170
 Page No.

Chapter - VII
COALITION POLITICS IN UTTAR PRADESH - PHASE I 171-202
(i) Fourth General Election (1967) and Politics in U P . 173-184
(ii) The Mid-Term Poll (1969) and Politics in U P . 184-202

Chapter - VIII
COALITION POLITICS IN UTTAR PRADESH - PHASE II 203-239
(i) The 1993 Assembly Election and Politics in U P . 203-218
(ii) Thirteenth Vidhan Sabha (1996) Election and Politics in U P 218-239

CONCLUSION 240-251

BIBLIOGRAPHY 252-264
 PREFACE

The national politics of India does not operate in isolation. It is the outcome
of the totality of certain problems at regional and state levels. Any study of Indian
politics will be lacking in depth without taking those problems into account. The
growing academic importance of the study of regional and coalition politics need
not be emphasised. The present study "Development of regional politics in India :
A study of coalition of political parties in Uttar Pradesh", is an attempt to analyse
the multifarious dimensions, actions and interactions of the politics of regionalism in
India and the coalition politics in U.P. The work in general tries to comprehend
regional awareness and consciousness in its content and form in the Indian sub-
continent, with a special study of coalition politics in U.P. The study is distributed
into eight chapters.

The first chapter attempts to analyse the conceptual aspect of regionalism in

India. It also traces its historical roots and examine the role played by Indian
National Congress. The phenomenon of regionalism is a pre-independence problem
and got many manifestation after independence. The political parties have exploited
to the maximum possible extent the sentiments of local people, there comparative
backwardness and underdevelopment for the purpose of gaining poHtical power.

The second chapter highlights the problem of regionalism in South India. Its
main emphasis is on Dravidian movement and the problem of Andhras. Although it
is difficult to draw a parallel between these two movements but there is no doubt
that these movements posed very serious challenge to the functioning of the
federalism in India.

The third chapter strive to focus on the problem of regionalism in Punjab and
Maharashtra. The regional aspiration and assertion in these two are has been
basically moved around the language. The regionalism in Punjab had been based on
language which played a very significant role in arousing regional sentiments and
consolidating the people for political purposes. The creation of Punjab in 1966
finally set rest to regional aspiration in the state. The demand for a separate Marathi
speaking unilingual state from the central province's was the cultivation of the
regional aspiration in this part of the country. However, a creation of separate
Marathi speaking state did not end the whole problem in Maharashtra. The conflict
between the local Marathi and migrants has undertaken a new dimension in
Mahrashtra with the Shive Sena playing the leading role.

The fourth chapter endeavours to explore the problem of regionalism in a

very sensitive area - North-East. The problem in North-Eastern area basically
emanates from the sheer negligence by the successive central government. After the
five decades of independence the region remain underdeveloped and people face the
severe problem of unemployment which has finally alienated the people from the
rest of the country and gave birth to the secessionist movements.

The fifth chapter examine the problem of regionalism in the Hindi-belt. The
problem in the Hindi-belt has neither been a demand for a separate state on the basis
of language nor the sheer negligence by the central government. It emanate from
uneven economic development of the different areas within the state and also due to
the migrants. The case of Uttarakhand and Jharkhand are the best example of
discontent born out of this phenomenon.

The sixth chapter touches upon some aspect of political development of the
politically conscious state of Uttar Pradesh particularly the factional politics in
Congress party, the emergence of non-Congress parties and the role played by
Charan Singh in Uttar Pradesh politics.

The chapter seven is devoted to highlight the first phase of coalition politics
in Uttar Pradesh. The UP. experienced its first coalition government in 1967.
Though this government was short-lived but it has important bearing on the state
politics in the coming years.

The chapter eight and last delve in to the current phase of coalition politics
in Uttar Pradesh.

First and foremost, I take this opportunity to express my deep sense of

gratitude to my supervisor Prof M. Subrahamanyam for his generously given
attention to every aspect of this study, for his patient and stimulating criticism and
 Ill

for his brilliant suggestions without which this study would have not seen the light
of the day.

I should also express my deep gratitude to Prof M.A. Kishore, Chairman,

Department of Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh, who cooperated and encouraged
me for the accomplishment of this study. I am also thankful to all other teachers and
friends in the department specially to Dr. Aftab Alam for his valuable suggestions
which has helped me a great deal in the comprehending this study.

I must record my deep obligation to the eminent scholars and researchers all
over the world whose works have been consulted and used both directly and
indirectly with or without their permission. Citations from authoritative sources
reflect the debt I owe to them and convey a message of special thanks.

My parents have gladly financed my studies during my years at Aligarh. Only

their blessings and good wishes have encouraged me to go in for my research
programme. It is my pleasure and privilege to register my special thanks to them.

I would be failing in my duty if I don't thank to my fellow researchers and

those who help me in one way or other to complete this work of mine. I am also
thankful to all my friends and well-wishers for their encouragements and
cooperations.

I also owe my affectionate thanks to my sisters and brother Mohd. Azwer

and cousins especially Dr. Saharuddin and Mr. Jawed Alam for their encouragement,
cooperation and emotional support whenever I was in need.

My thanks are also due to Mr. Pradeep Sharma for typing this thesis much
more than professional interest.

Last but not least my affectionate thanks are also due to my wife 'Neelu' for
her constant encouragement and for having under gone the ordeal of loneliness at
home during my stay in Aligarh.

(Tabrez Alam)
 Chapter -1
REGIONAL ASPIRATION IN INDIA
(i) Concept of Regionalism; Its Nature
(ii) Genesis of Regionalism in India
{in) Indian National Congress and Regionalism
(i) Concept of Regionalism : Its Nature

Regionalism in the ordinary usage refers to particularism or regional

patriotism. The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences describes it as a manifestation
of federalism and an intermediate stage between administrative decentralization and
federalism. It involves such diverse problems of modem political and cultural life as
those of minorities, administrative decentralization, local self-government and
autonomy, the cult of homeland and earth and local patriotism. It is not immediately
related to particularism and opponents make the charge that it leads to separatism.
In a very general way regionalism may be defined as a counter movement to any
exaggeration or oppressive form of centralization. It must not however, be
considered solely from the view of political control as governmental administration.
Regionalist problems arise only where there is a combination of two or more such
factors or geographical isolation, independent historical traditions, racial, ethnic or
religious peculiarities and local economic or class interests.'

Regionalism is derived from the word region. A region is homogeneous area

with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from those of neighbouring area,
as part of a national domain. A region is sufficiently unified to have a consciousness
of its customs and ideals and thus possesses a sense of identity distinct from the rest
of the country. The term "regionalism" properly represents the regional idea in
action as an ideology or as a social movement or as the theoretical basis for the
regional planning, it is also applied to the scientific task of delimiting and analysing
regions as entities lacking formal boundaries."^

Regionalism can be conceptualised as a multi-dimensional composite

phenomena as well as a built-in process within nationalism. Regionalism generally
speaking is regarded as a divisive trend detrimental to national unity.-* Regionalism

1. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 13, MacMillan, New York, 1962. pp. 208-
209.
2. International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Vol. 13, MacMillan. New York,
1968, pp. 377-378.
3. Arun K. Chatterji, "Sociological Context of Regionalism in India : A Concetual
Framework", in Satish Chandra and Others (ed.). Regionalism and National
Integration (Proceeding of a Seminar held at Jaipur, January 25-28, 1970), Aalekh
Publications, Jaipur, 1976, p. 30.
is an ideology. Regional consciousness is based on linguistic, religious, ethnic and
cultural identity of the people residing in a specific geographical area. The ideology
of regionalism is manufactured by the elite belonging to these groups. In a culturally
heterogeneous society the factors like language and religion which demarcate the
differences between the people are always existent though mostly in a dormant form
... Regional movement is initially based on some vague ideas. Later on in the course
of the movement, certain more or less defined set of arguments or justification are
developed by the key personalities of the region.^

Regionalism is in fact a conflict between national elites and regional elites. A

regional movement which is the manifestation of regional ideology is an attempt by
regional elites to acquire larger support so that they could increase their competitive
strength vis-a-vis the national elites.^

Nationalism and regionalism are often termed as antonyms. Whereas the

farmer represents forces of cohesion and tries to assimilate the minorities, the latter
strives to keep the identity of such groups alive. The maintenance and preservation
of such separate and independent identities become more desirable and crucial when
a particular minority is linguistic or religious. Any religious minority is bound to
become the victim of a fear psychosis that if merged completely into the national or
cultural mainstream, it might have to pay a heavy price and consequently lose
raison de etre of its distinctive identity. Such kind of minority fear psychosis is
more relevant in a society like India where inspite of the existence of a number of
cultures and sub-cultures, the Hindus represent the dominant religious majority.
Any attempt to assimilate the minority in such a set-up is sure to give rise to certain
misgivings. Thus, regional consciousness is generated by the euphoria created by
the establishment of nation state.^

Regionalism is a nebulous concept. It has both a positive and a negative

dimension. Speaking in positive terms, it embodies a quest for self-fulfillment on the

4. Aran Audholkar and Rajendra Vera, "Regionalism in Maharashtra", in Akhtar Majeed

.. (ed) Regionalism Developmental Tensions in India, Cosmo Publication. New Delhi,
1984, p. 41.
5. Ibid, p. 42.
6. Rasheeduddin Khan, "National Integration", Seminar, New Delhi, April. 1979.
part of the people of an area. It is worthwhile to emphasis that the positive thrust of
regionalism has more often than not, been ignored by political analysis of the Indian
situation. Every regional movement thus becomes suspect and is taken as an earnest
of the balkanization of the country.^

It is obviously an advantage that constituent units of a federation should

have a minimum measure of internal cohesion. Likewise, a regional consciousness,
not merely in the sense of a negative awareness of absence of repression or
exploitation but also in the sense of scope for positive expression of the collective
personality of a people inhabiting a state or region may be conducive to the
contentment and well-being of the community. Common language may not only
promote the growth of such regional consciousness but also make for administrative
convenience. Indeed, in a democracy, the people can legitimately claim and the
government have a duty to ensure that the administration is conducted in a language
which the people can understand.^

Negatively speaking, regionalism reflects a psyche of relative deprivation on

the part of a people of an area not always viable in terms of rational economic
analysis, let alone prone to rationalization. More often than not, it is also believed,
whether correctly or not, that deprivation is deliberately inflicted by the powers that
be and this leads to acuteness of feeling on the part of those who carry the psyche
of deprivation. The belief is easily cultivated in a milieu characterized by politics of
scarcity as in India. The redeeming feature, however, is that to the extent the
psyche of deprivation is the consequence of specific grievance, its growth could be
halted and even the process reversed if the grievances are remedied. It is here that
the politico-bureaucratic elite have to be up and doing. If they earnestly work and
succeed, the quest for regional identities may ultimately mean areas of relative
autonomy and partial dependence and not result in demands of secession."'

A distinction has to be made between regionalism and sub-regionalism.

Regionalism is a kind of political counter movement aiming to achieve greater

7. Ibid.
8. Iqbal Narain, "A Conceptual Analysis in the Indian Context," in Akhtar Majeed (ed).
Regionalism Development Tensions in India, op.cit., pp. 22-23.
9. Ibid, p. 23.
autonomy for the region through greater degree of self government within the
federal structure of a nation. Regionalism may also manifest in the form of a
movement for special privileges for the 'sons of the soil' as against the 'outsiders' a
phenomenon resulting from native-migrant conflict.

Though sub-regionalism shows similar signs, there are some differences. It is

a movement by sub-regional elites for the assertion of sub-regional identity based
on common history and grievances emanating from an underdeveloped economy of
that sub-region. The main considerations behind the sub-regional movement
however, are economic development and an anxiety for a proper share in political
power. It cuts across the linguistic loyalties and other cultural similarities, and
emphasizes the finer and subtle differences in the historical background and cultural
patterns. It stresses on an independent identity transcending the linguistic unity with
the other groups of the region.'"

But whatever the nature of the sub-regional movement, it is usually triggered

off intentionally by the sub-regional elites. The movement, especially its violent
eruption is meant for exhibiting strength by sub-regional leaders to the regional
leaders and strengthen their claims to the share of power.''

Region represents more of an analytic category than geographical entity. The

region is a socio-cultural concept. Man is born with a territorial loyalty. He imbibes
loyalty from the soil of his birth. Several variables when remain in operation for a
long period of time, in a certain territory form the concept of regionalism, such as
geography, topography, religion, language, customs and mores, political and
economic stages of development, way of living and commonly shared historical
experiences etc. Regionalism to be sure needs all these ingredients but the concept
is much more inclusive and even when is said and done, it remains at least partially
elusive. The essential fact is that a region is characterized more than anything else,
by a widely shared sentiment of'togetherness' in the people, internationalised from a
wide variety of sources, which might even include common prosperity, comrades
development in a common struggle.'^

10. Arun Audholkar and Rajendra Vora, Op.Cit., p. 92.

11. /*/f/, pp. 92-93.
12. Maheshwari, Sri Ram, "Regionalism in India : Political Administrative Response".
Indian Journal of Public Administration^ IIPA, New Delhi, October-December, 1973.
p. 442.
 Regionalism as a phenomena emerges out of the cumulation of variations
pertaining to the socio-cultural, economic and political spheres. The extent to which
regionalism has the potentiality of determining the cleavages and unity within a
nation in terms of the balance between the centripetal and centrifugal forces
emanating from it, depends on the nature and intensity of these variations. Two sets
of components, subjective and objective, determine the nature of regionalism. The
subjective components are ways of living, customs and traditions, art forms,
language and literature, social heritage, beliefs, attitudes and values as related to a
group of the people termed as a regional group. The objective component includes
the territorial region and the accompanied man environment complex within which
the regional group lives together with others, these components are the determinants
of regionalism.'^

From the theoretical point of view, regionalism has often been characterized
both as a doctrine as well as a tendency implying many things, for example;

(i) decentralization of administration on a regional basis within a nation where

there is excessive centralisation and concentration of administrative and
political power;
(ii) a socio-cultural counter-movement against the imposing of a monolithic
national unity by imposing a particular political ideology, language as cultural
pattern to foster national integration;

(iii) a political counter-movement aiming to achieve greater autonomy of sub-

cultural regions through greater degree of self-government within the federal
structure of a nation;

(iv) a tendency for separatism to fulfil the political aspirations of a regional

group living in a specified sub-cultural region.
The objectives of regionalism in this instance are mainly four viz;
a) revival of regional cuhures and rebuilding of such sub-cultural regions having
distinctive identity within a nation;

13. Arun K. Chatterji, Sociological Context of Regionalism in India : A Conceptual

Framewoork, Op.Cit., pp. 30-31.
b) administrative and political devolution;
c) devising principles to solve centre-state confrontations and confrontations
between two or more sub-cultural regions;
d) to maintain economic and political equilibrium between the centre and the
states; nation and sub-cultural regions.

It can be inferred from these objectives that regionalism involves many kinds
of problems, socio-cultural, economic and political etc.'^

(ii) Genesis of Regionalism in India

The genesis of regionalism in India dates back to the partition of the Bengal
in 1905. The various acts of the British government had planted and sustained the
regional feelings. The Congress had also helped the growth of regional idea through
the commitment and struggle for creating linguistic states since 1917 down to its
1948 Jaipur session. However, the trauma of partition of the country on the basis of
religion restrained the Linguistic Provinces Commission (Dar Commission), and
JVP Committee (consisting of Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel) for the time being, to held up the idea of linguistic
States, in the larger interests of the country. The creation of first linguistic State of
Andhra in 1953 set a chain reaction for demands of linguistic states. The government
constituted State Reorganisation Commission in 1953, enacted and implemented
State Reorganisation Act to meet the regional aspiration of the people.

The non-judicial, non-statutory, primordial and parochial factors in India

were sadly ignored by the Constitution. As a resuU with the initiation of the
constitutional process, a process of regionalisation along primordial lines also
commenced. This non-constitutional regionalism was inspired not merely by
primordial factors like caste, linguistic, minority groups, sub-cultures but also, and
perhaps the most significant among these, by the prevailing economic conditions of
the different regional communities.

The origins and causes of this regionalism could perhaps be traced to the
centralization of power during the British Empire and its consequent delegation to

14. /*/</, pp. 31-32.

regional middle classes. The intention of administration to remote areas of land and
consequent induction of large masses in to the administration and other
infrastructures and had paved the way for the emergence and alignment of linguistic
middle classes. The growth of pan-Indian forces also saw the growth of regionalism
in India for both implied participation of large and hitherto static masses in the new
political development. If the horizontal process of mobility led to the national
movement of freedom, the vertical process completed to a large extent the
attitudinal integration of the growth of linguistic middle classes.

The process, however, acquired cast overtones in the South, while in the
North, it was expressed either in the Hindu-Muslim antagonism or linguistic
antagonism. In all cases, however, language or community or caste remained at
periphery as cultural factors, for these factors had already assumed economic
dimensions.'^

Rasheeduddin Khan has developed following criteria for recognising a region

in India. "Maximum homogeneity within and maximum identify without. Where
homogeneity are to be established on ten counts :

(i) Language dialect

(ii) Social Composition (communities/states)
(iii) Ethnic groups.
(iv) Demographic features,
(v) Area (geographic contiguity),
(vi) Cultural pattern,
(vii) Economy and economic life,
(viii) Historical antecedents,
(ix) Political backgrounds
(x) Psychological make up felt consciousness of group identify.

The main concern in this exercise is to eliminate factors contributing to

heterogeneity and to coalesce factors promoting homogeneity."'^

15. G. Ram Reddy, and Sharma, B.A.V., Regionalism in India : A Study of Telangana,
Concept Publication, New Delhi, 1979, pp. 3-4.
16. Rasheedudin Khan, "The Regional Dimension", Seminar, New Delhi, No. 164 April
1973, p. 39.
 Regionalism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon in terms of its components,
such as geographical, historico-cultural, linguistic, economic, political and
administrative forces have been the main determinants of regionalism in India. As
these determinants are inter-related but over lap with each other, the precise role of
each have always been mutually conditioned by one another.

Geographical Components
Geographical area or territory is one component on which regional identities
are formed, and it is this which differentiates peoples of one area from that of
another, if not in kind at least in degrees. After independence, several old Princely
states were merged in the neighbouring big states in India. Such states bore a split
personality, even if for the time being. The people and even elite and civil servants
of merged Princely states maintained their regional identities on the basis of their
royalties to old territorial units.'^

This royalties of old territories helped the ex-rulers to win elections in the
new states. However, such territorial orientations are only symbolic. Their survival
now, require support of economic and political factors. The old memories are
yielding place to new territorial identities of states.

Historico-Cultural Components

The historico-cultural components constitute the bedrock of the phenomenon

of regionalism in India. The several components in this category are not only
important individually but also in conjuction with each other. This is also true of
other groups which have more than one component as also of groups inter se : a
conjunctional perspective alone will, therefore, bring out the real import of these
components.'*

History

To began with, there is the factor of history which buttresses regionalism by

way of cultural heritage, folk lore, myths and symbolism. The historical trends.

17. Iqbal Narain (ed). State Politics in India, Meerut, 1967, pp. XXI-XXII.
18. Iqbal Narain, A Conceptual Analysis in the Indian Context, Op.Cit., p. 24.
upheavals and crises not only led to territorial redemarcations and reorganisation of
sub-cultural regions, but also through periods of stress and strain enhance regional
awareness and ethnocentrism. The historico-forces act as catalytic agents in
fostering regional awareness at the inter-regional as well as intra-regional levels,
particularly because of the shared socio-cultural experiences and memories of a
common post. In this instance the very name of the sub-cultural region or regional
group awakens and re-awakens in the people memories of the whole series of
thoughts, customs and traditions, art forms, habitat-behavioural patterns, and images
corresponding to them, which are partly geographical, socio-cultural and historico-
political facts. Documented historical evidences reveal that in most of the sub-
cultural region of India, regionalism has evolved in this way.''

Culture

The cultural forces operating through the gamut customs, traditional ways
and mannerisms, value and various institutional complexes; social, economic and
religious have traded to reinforce the historical memories and determined the
distinctive forms of mental sets and behavioural pattern of different regional groups.
In this way the groups have gradually acquired individually and uniqueness in
different degrees which is more perceptible and understood in terms of intra-regional
comparisons. Thus, any regional group which has internalised most of the elements
of its own sub-culture can infer, and also asserts its own individuality and
uniqueness through such comparisons, and consequently, perpetuates a distinctive
brand of regionalism and maintains its continuity through generations.^"

Radha Kumud Mukerji emphasising importance of culture observes: "the

supreme end of the state is to promote culture because culture is one's country and
the country is one's culture. India's culture is a synthetic complex made up of a
number of diverse elements, each of which makes its own contribution to the
comprehensive whole."^*

19. Arun K. Chatterji,, Sociological Context of Regionalism in India : A Conceptual

Framework, Op.Cit., p. 33.
20. Ibid, p. 34.
21. Quated in Kodesia Krisha, The Problem of Linguistic State in India. Sterling
Publishers, New Delhi, 1969, p. 22.
 10

This distinctive brand of regionalism pertaining to any particular regional

group spreads spontaneously and less through deliberate efforts, although in times
of regional crises, it can be deliberately intensified. Depending upon the extent and
nature of the cumulation of regional variations, currently held beliefs, values, and
interests, it may either precipitate schism and create cultural and linguistic barriers,
leading to greater social distance and alienation or promote inter and intra regional
cohesion, identification and integration. Therefore, it follows that the demand for
greater regional autonomy or separatism gain strength from the schimistic influences
of regionalism and the urge for national integration on account of its cohesive
influences. When the cohesive influences of regionalism is more intense than its
schismatic influences, the different regional groups feel a conscious need and
identify themselves as interdependent and inter-related constituents of a greater
entity; the nation. They may even consciously try to foster national integration.^^

Language

Among the cultural forces, language has assumed a significant role in India
today. It is fairly well known that language is perhaps the most important mark of
group identification. It is more precisely discriminating than either colour or race.
Linguistic homogeneity strengthens regionalism both in positive and negative senses;
in the former in terms of strength in unity and in the latter through emotional
frenzy. Language as an expression of shared life, thought structures and value-
patterns' has the potential to unite people emotionally and make them work to
improve their common destiny as also to add to their bargaining strength.^^ The
creation of Punjabi Suba and division of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujrat
provides testimony to this. However, intra-state regionalism surpasses the bond of
common language where economic grievances of a sub-region takes precedence
over language as is illustrated by the Telangana issue. While language help a group
to form an emotional identity it also helps to make it highly inflammable, as is
illustrated by the language riots in Tamil Nadu and Assam.^^

22. Arun K. Chatterji, Sociological Context of Regionalism in India : A Conceptual

Framework, Op.Cit., p. 34.
23. Iqbal Narain, A Conceptual Analysis in the Indian Context, Op.Cit., p. 25.
24. Ibid, pp. 25-26.
 11

The rise of linguism has alarmed some observers and sections of people who
fear that linguistic territorial fragmentation is strengthening the foundation of sub-
nationalism and encouraging the regional royalties and separatist tendencies. The
confusion in the linguistic situation can be analysed in terms of:

(i) The growth of linguism as an exclusive and separatist trend giving paramount
importance to the regional language of respective states, over all other
language which happen to co-exit with it. The people are becoming more
conscious of the legal status and role ascribed to their mother-tongues,
whether it is Hindi, Assamees, Teluga, Punjabi, or Tamil.
(ii) The superimposition of Hindi as Rastra-Bhasha and how to reconcile the
idea in those non- Hindi region where the accepted language of education
and culture are the regional languages with superior literary standing than
Hindi.
(iii) The controversy over the role of Hindi as the national or link language, or
regional languages as official state languages and the double advantage of
Hindi in being the national language as well as the official regional language
of all the Hindi-speaking states.^'

The importance of language component is well established by the re-

organisation of states in 1956, on the recommendation of the States Reorganisation
Commission. Linguistic and cultural homogeneity was considered desirable for
according statehood. The linguistic reorganisation of states gave ascendancy to
linguistic regionalism, and as a result there were demands for according statehood
from different part of the country. However, it ought to be submitted that "together
with language many variables are critical factors like ethnic-cum-economic
considerations (Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura); language-cum-culture
(Maharashtra and Gujrat); historical and political factors (U.P. and Bihar); religion,
script and sentiments (Haryana and Punjab); integration of princely states and the
need for viable groupings (MP. and Rajasthan) and language-cum-social
disticntiveness (Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Bengal and Orrissa) have played a
decisive role in the composition of the Indian federation.^^

25. Arun K. Chatteijee, Sociological Context of Regionalism in India : A Conceptual

Framework, Op.Cit., pp. 36-37.
26. Rasheeduddin Khan, "The Regional Dimension", Seminar, Op.Cit., pp. 35-36.
 12

Economic Component

The cnix of regionalism lies in economic under development of the country.

It is common knowledge that India is economically underdeveloped in spite of the
many achievements registered since independence. The resources are scarce and
demands disproportionately heavy and evergrowing on account of continued
population explosion. The scarcity of technical know-how, corruption, deteriorating
law and order situation have created a dismal mosaic of politico-economic life in the
nation. There is thus acute competition among individuals, groups and regions
within a state far acquiring more and more economic gains. This has also resulted in
the emergence of local leadership who very of^en raise the bogey of regionalism to
strengthen their bargaining posture with the centre. In this period of nation-building,
some regions of a state may acquire an advantage over the other. Thus,
economically, "regionalism is the outcome of some real or perceived sense of
internal colonialism, the result of mal-development or a symmetrical development
Regionalism is the response of unequal sharing of benefits of developmental
activity. "^^

The economic imbalances are exploited by the regional elite, who engineer
regional movements taking benefit of the economic grievances of a region and
demand distributive justice for their region. According to the report of States
Reorganisation Commission, the demands for creation of new states were mainly
based on allegedly unfair and unequal distribution of developmental benefits and
expenditure in the muhi-lingual states.^* Telangana movement is the best example of
this type of regionalism. The conflict between the migrant and the son of the soil is
a manifestation of the economic factor. The Assamees-Bengali conflict in Assam
and Shive Sena movement to oust non-Maharashtrian from Maharashtra are
motivated mainly by economic compulsions.

In a seminar on "Regionalism and National Integration in India" while

analysing the texture and structure of the phenomenon of regionalism in various

27. Amba Dutt Pant, "Introduction", Akhtar Majeed (ed). Regionalism Developmental
Tensions in India, Op.Cit., p. VI.
28. Report of the State Re-organization Commission, New Delhi, 1955, p. 225.
 13

parts of India, several participants^^ advocated a 'reductionist' explanation in terms

of the awakening economic urges of the people and maintained that even such
apparently non-economic as a economic phenomenon such as the demand for
'linguistic States' were solidly grounded in such economic factors as employment
and economic development. Discussing the question of "linguistic Regionalism",
K.C. Pande maintained that inter-regional rivalaries were ostensibly motivated by
linguistic royalties the real forces operating behind such movements stemmed from
economic frustration of the people in one area being deprived of employment
opportunities or being unable to compete with outsiders in this sphere. Language, in
such cases only provided a convenient cloak for the deep rooted economic maladies
and added that most of the so-called 'communal riots' are also rooted in economic
maladjustment as in the case of Ranchi and Ahemadabad riots, where economic
tensions and not religious differentials tregg the communal violence.

Despite pulls and pressures for distributive justice, economic integration is at

work. The national five year planes have provided economic development to many
backward regions. The impact of this economic benefit is that even economically
backward regions, have developed their separate identity and demand separate state,
but they do not want to secede from the union. Because they have realised that their
economic well being lies in continuing as a part of the union. Thus, it can be argued
that regional pressures emanating from economic compulsions are mere bargaining
centres than secessionist moves. The balance of economic advantages in India at
any rate is still in favour of union rather than secession. This is further buttressed by
safeguards for cultural autonomy.-^^

Politico-Administrative Component

The political component of regionalism is also important even though politics

does not so much create, as accentuate and exploit the situation of regional feelings.

29. P.C. Mathur, "Regionalism and National Integration in India", (A Report of the
Discussion-Sessions of the Seminar on Regionalism and National Integration held at
Jaipur. January 25-28, 1970) in Satish Chandra & Others (ed) Regionalism and
National Integration, Aalekh Publications, Jaipur, 1976, p. 178.
30. Iqbal Narain, A Conceptual Analysis in the Indian Context, Op.Cit., p. 29.
 14

Politicians, in their self-interest, exploit situations of regional deprivation and unrest

and convert them into movements, just to create base for their political survival and
strengthen their individual and factional support bases. Regional political parties
like the DMK, Akali Dal, Shiv Sena etc. would in fact, built up and survive on the
accentuation of the regional sentiment. Border disputes, like the one between
Maharashtra and Karnataka, also thrive on fomenting regional sentiments.^'

In the beginning the ideology of a regional support remains vaguely defines

and puts arguments for the justification of regional movement. The regional elites
legitimise the movement on regional ideology. Thus, regionalism is in fact a conflict
between national elites and regional elites. It was the infighting in the Congress
party that generated Telangana agitation. The regional political parties are thriving
by exploiting the regional sentiment of the people. Even national parties have to
depend on regional influences and, therefore, they recruit regionally influential
persons in the party who can mobilize support for the party.

It is undisputable that since the independence, all kinds of inter and intra-
regional tensions and conflicts are increasing. The parties in power, although claim
to be guided by a common policy and objectives for national development, in actual
practice act as if the national and regional interests are incompatible. As aptly stated
by H. Abayavardhan :

" a new generation of provincial leaders without national reputation is

advancing to the front. These are not starry eyed visionaries but ambitious
politicians willing to concede nothing to none in their quest of a career. Their rise
has made a fundamental difference to the Congress party. Already the party's
decisions increasingly take the form of compromises among its strong men belonging
to different regions "^^

As far as administration is concerned, it more often than not, easily, if not

willingly, becomes the instrument of political discrimination. It also does not always
succeed in rising above the regional psyche in favour of the national sentiment. This

31. Ibid, p. 30.

32. Arun K. Chatterji, Sociological Context of Regionalism in India : A Conceptual
Framework, Op.Cit., p. 35.
 15

is true both of the All-India and State services - more, of course, of the latter than
of the fanner.

Psychic Component

Regionalism in India, as elsewhere, is a psychic phenomenon, and in the

ultimate analysis its roots lie in the winds of men. Each individual, by and large,
carries a split personality. Every individual is partly regionalistic and partly
nationalistic. There is always a natural tendency of regionalistic sentiment taking
primacy over the nationalistic. There is always a natural tendency of regionalistic
sentiment taking primacy over the nationalistic sentiment though one does not
usually post the two as an either/or situation. To be Indian' is not necessarily 'not to
be a Maharashtrian'.^^ Similarly "national royalties do not demands that other
royalties should be eliminated. The split personality phenomenon can be best
illustrated by an observation of Lokanath Mishra :

"My first ambition is the glory of Mother India. I know it in my heart of

hearts that I am Indian first and an Indian last. But when you say, you are a Bihari, I
say I am an Oriya. When you say, you are a Bengali, I say I am Oriya. Otherwise, I
am an Indian."-^^

Regionalism can be classified in to three categories, supra-state regionalism,

inter-state regionalism and intra-state regionalism. The boundaries of state are not
necessarily co-terminus with region yet this type can be illustrated through the
example of state :

The supra-state regionalism is formed by forging an identity by a group of

states against other groups of state or even against the union. The group identity
formed here is usually negative in character. Such type is also 'issue-specific' in the
sense that it is confined to certain matter on which the group would like to take a
common and joint stand. It is not at all a case of a total and permanent merger of
state identities in the group identity's; in fact, rivalaries, tensions and even conflicts

33. Rasheeduddin Khan, The Regional Dimension, Op.Cit., p. 35.

34. Lok Nath Mishra, Debates on the Report of the State Reorganizaton, Lok Sabha
Secretatriat. New Delhi, 19th December, 1955, Vol. 23, Column, 3270-3271.
 16

continue to take place at times even simultaneously with group postures. It's
example can be cited by south vs. north in India on the language issue.^^

The inter-state regionalism is coterminus with state boundaries and involves

juxtaposing of one or more state identities against another on specific issues which
threaten their interest. River water disputes in general and the Maharashtra-
Karnataka border disputes in particular can be cited as example.-^^

The intra-state regionalism, a part of a state develops the quest for self
identity and self development positively, and negatively, it expresses a psychic of
deprivation or exploitation in relation to the other parties of the same states. This
phenomenon is also called sub-regionalism. The main considerations behind the sub-
regional movement however, are economic development and an anxiety for a proper
share in political power. It cut across the linguistic royalties and other cultural
similarities, and emphasis the fmer and subtle differences in the historical
background and cultural patterns."^' This type of regionalism is most rampant,
typified by a Vidarbha in Maharashtra, Saurashtra in Gujrat, Telangana in Andhra
Pradesh etc.

Regionalism and sub-regionalism are unavoidable in a country as vast and

expansive as India. Nothing is more basic to the very concept of federalism than
regionalism and sub-regionalism. Once the federal nation-state comes into being and
national freedom becomes a reality, the regional sentiments and demands also
manifest and assert. Not in frequently, those supporting the cause of 'unity and
integrity' of the country and the nation, consider every attempt to support or defend
sub-regional and regional interests as divisive, fissiparous and disintegrative. This is
not a correct approach, we must remember in a country of manifest diversities like
India, unity does not mean uniformity, nor close integration means centralisation.''*

In India, there is a strong case not only for the existence but also for the
growth of healthy regionalism perceived from a democratic perspective and political

35. Iqbal Narain, A Conceptual Analysis in the Indian Context, Op.Cit., p. 32.
36. Ibid.
37. Arun Audhalkar and Rajendra Vera, Regionalism in Maharashtra, Op.Cit., p. 92.
38. Rasheeduddin Khan, "Federal-Nation Building; The Problem of Regionalism and
National Integration", in Democracy in India, New Delhi, NCERT, 1990, p. 78.
 17

angle. It manifests the genuine democratic ethos of the country and needs a proper
accommodation in the Indian federation. The need, therefore, is to discard this
notion that regionalism is unpatriotic and poses threat to national integration.
Regional sentiment is an important factor in the political ordering of affairs in a
democracy. For proper management of regionalism, administrative institutions can
be set up at regional level in the states and for the proper regional coordination
units of political parties should be set up at the regional level also.

(iii) Indian National Congress and Regionalism

The attachment to one's own region, language, culture and other societal
royalties have deep roots in the soil and history of India. As early as 1903, linguistic
principles for partition of the then Bengal figured in a letter from Sir Herbert Risley,
Home Secretary, Government of India, to the Government of Bengal, dated 3rd
December, 1903, in which the proposal for the partition of Bengal was first
mooted.^' The Britishers, in their efforts to 'divide and rule' India, partitioned
Bengal in 1905 which aroused bitter opposition. The Indian National Congress gave
indirect support to the idea of linguistic provinces in 1905 "when it backed the
demand for annulling the partition of Bengal which has resulted in the division of
the Bengali-speaking people into two units.'"*" The partition of Bengal was annulled
in 1911 due to linguistic and cultural considerations.

The seeds of iinguism were sown in India by the Indian National Congress,
and the principle was approved ... in the Government of India's despatch of August
25, 1911, and the consequent sqjaration of Bihar from Bengal. The seeds struck
roots in 1917 when the Congress recognised the demand of the Telugu speaking
people to have separate province.^' The Indian National Congress to enlist popular
support favoured the idea of constituting political units on rational and linguistic
basis. As a result Andhra and Sind became separate Congress province in 1917."*^

39. Report of the S R C , New Delhi, 1955, p. 10.

40. Ibid, pp. 13-14.
41. K.M. Munshi, "Indian Constitutional Documents", Vol. I, Piligrimage to Freedom
1902-50, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1967, pp. 226-227.
42. Report of the S R C , Op.Cit., p. 13.
 18

Mahatma Gandhi who entered Indian politics in 1919, thought, it imperative

that units of Indian National Congress be organised on linguistic basis then alone his
message could be transmitted to people at large. The Indian National Congress was
supporting the movement for the creation of linguistic states consistently and
consciously. Beginning in 1920, the Congress had organised itself on the basis of
linguistic and cultural regions, despite conflicting British administrative patterns.'*^
The formation of Bihar, Sind and Orissa as Congressional provinces on the linguistic
principle was a deliberate departure from the normal organisational pattern which
had so far followed the boundaries of existing administrative provinces.'*'* At the
Nagpur session in 1920, Indian National Congress decided to organise its structure
on the basis of linguistic units and from thereon attacked as arbitrary and irrational
the provincial boundaries drawn by the British. It reorganized the existing provinces
in to twenty-one Congress provinces on linguistic basis in 1921. The Indian National
Congress encouraged the creation of "more or less" linguistic units such as Ajmer,
Bombay, Maharashtra and Vidarbha.^^

On December 18, 1927, A. Rangaswami Iyengar, General Secretary of the

Indian National Congress prepared a Draf^ Constitution of India Bill, for the
consideration of the working committee. While referring to New Provinces Article
114 of the Draft read, "parliament shall, as soon as may be after the coming into
force of this Act, appoint a commission for the purpose of making proposals for
reconstituting the provinces on the basis of language groupings. "^^

The Indian National Congress, adopted a resolution in 1927, session,

regarding the reorganisation of provinces on the linguistic basis.

"b(i) That Sind should be constituted into a separate province, this Congress is of
the opinion that the time has come for the redistribution of provinces on

43. M.F. Franda, West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1968, p. 10.
44. Report of the S R C , Op.Cit., pp. 12-13.
45. Suman Sharma. State Boundary Changes in India : Constitutional Provisions and
Consequences. Deep & Deep Publications, Delhi, 1995, p. 77.
46. A. Rangaswami Iyengar, Draft Constitution of India Bill, Thompson & Co., 1927, p.
33 (Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Trust Library, New Delhi).
 19

linguistic basis - a principle that has been adopted in the constitution of the
Congress.
(ii) that such readjustment of provinces be immediately taken in hand and that
any province which demands such reconstitution on linguistic basis be deah
with accordingly;
(iii) that a beginning may be made by constituting Andhra, Utkal, Sind and
Karnataka into separate provinces.'*^

The All parties conference convened on May 19, 1928, appointed a

committee under the chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru to consider and
determine the principle of the constitution for India before July 1, 1928. The
committee observed that at present the 'distribution of provinces was not on
'rational basis' and there was need of regrouping the provinces on a linguistic basis.
"Language as a rule corresponds with a special variety of culture, of traditions and
literature."^* The Nehru report referred to the 'sentiment' as more important than
fact in such matters. "Administrative convenience is often a matter of arrangement
and must as a rule how to the wishes of the people."^' The report recommended
that "the redistribution of provinces should take place on a linguistic basis on the
demand of the majority of the population of the area concerned, subject to fmancial
and administrative considerations."'°

The Indian National Congress in 1937, at the Calcutta session, passed a

resolution, "The All India Congress Committee reaffirms the Congress policy
regarding the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis and recommend to the
Madras and Bombay Governments to consider the formation of a separate Andhra
and Karnataka Province respectively. The A.I.C.C. also asks the Congress
Government in Bihar to take early steps to restore Bengali-speaking areas at present
comprised in Bihar to the province of Bengal."''

47. Indian National Congress, Congress Working Committee Resolutions. 1927.

Allahabad: Swaraj Bhawan, p. 47 (Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Trust Librar>.
New Delhi).
48. Nehru Report, Allahabad, The General Secretary, All India Congress Committee.
1929, pp. 61-62.
49. Ibid, p. 62.
50. Ibid, p. 122-123.
51. Indian National Congress (Resolutions passed during the period betvseen April. 1936
to January, 1938), A.I.C.C. Swaraj Bhawan, Allahabad, p. 18.
 20

In 1938, the working committee of Indian National Congress met at Wardha

under the presidentship of Subhash Chandra Bose. After hearing the views of the
deputations of the Andhra, Karnataka and Kerala provincial Congress committees
on the question of the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis for
administrative purposes, the committee declared that the resolution of the Madras
Legislature on linguistic provinces and of the Bombay legislature on the separation
of the Karnataka province were passed with the previous sanction of the
parliamentary sub-committee and the full approval of the committee itself The
committee desired to assure the people of the area concerned that the solution of
the question should be undertaken as a part of the future scheme of the Government
of India as soon as the Congress had the power to do so and called upon the people
of the concerned areas to desist from any further agitation which might divert
attention from the main issue existing before the country.^^ In its 1938, Haripura
session, the President Indian National Congress, Subhash Chandra Bose, while
referring to the A . I C C . pronouncement in Calcutta, October, 1937 remarked that
"the culture, language and script of the minorities and of the different linguistic
areas shall be protected."^^ The Indian National Congress stood firm on its election
manifesto of 1945-46, it repeated the view that administrative units should be
constituted as far as possible on linguistic and cultural basis.^^

S. Nijalingappa, President Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee and

members of the Indian Constituent Assembly and of the Provincial Legislature from
Karnataka wrote a letter,^^ in reference to the immediate formation of the karnataka
to the president and members of the working committee of the Indian National
Congress on January 25, 1948. The letter regretfully referred to the comments made
by some about their efforts as 'fissiparous'. They tried to remind the efforts made on

52. Indian National Congress, (Resolution passed during the period between February
1938 to January 1939) A.I.C.C, Swaraj Bhawan, Allahabad, p. 43. (Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Trust Library, New Delhi).
53. A.M. Zaidi, (ed). Congress Presidential Address (1921-39), Vol. 4, Indian Institute
of Applied Political Research, New Delhi, 1988, p. 251.
54. Report of the S R C , Op.Cii., p. 14.
55. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Papers Files No. l-P/48, 25.1.1948, pp. 4-7.
 21

the part of the Congress to form linguistic provinces in 1920 for its own
organization and for the fight for freedom under Gandhi's leadership. But "logical
sequence of the formation of linguistic provinces for purposes of administration was
yet to come We would like to point out that we believe with large number of
eminent Congressmen that it would be a great act of constructive statesmanship to
form linguistic provinces immediately so that they may develop to their full stature
as live units of the Indian Union. *^

They appealed that, speedy solution of local problems would make people
"form strong and homogeneous provincial governments and be a source of positive
strength and support to the central government and the Congress as a whole rather
than the dissatisfied peoples and disunited and weak Governments now obtaining in
these composite areas."^^ Each linguistic group believed the independence should
bring the fulfillment of its particular wishes.

In view of repeated demands, the Indian National Congress passed a

resolution in 1948, Jaipur session, to form a committee of the members of the party,
to study the issue of reorganisation of states on linguistic basis. This Congress
appointed a committee known as Linguistic Provinces Committee in Dec. 1948, of
the following three members. Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, "to review the position and to examine the question in
the light of the decision taken by the Congress in the past and the requirements of
the existing situation, (i) in view of the report of the Linguistic Provinces
Commission (Dar Commission), appointed by the President of the Constituent
Assembly, and (ii) the new problems that have arisen out of the achievement of
independence.'*

The Linguistic Provinces Committee (JVP) submitted its report in April

1949, deviated from the old policy of the Congress when it maintained that the need
is that of "ensuring security, stability, strength and unity of India, as rapidly as
possible. In particular, we should avoid taking any step which may delay or come in

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Suman Sharma. State Boundary Changes in India, Op.Cit., pp. 96-97.
 22

the way of this consolidation... The context demands above everything, the
consolidation of India and her freedom, the progressive solution of her economic
problems in terms of the masses of her people, the promotion of unity in India and
of close cooperation among the various provinces and states in most spheres of
activity."^' The committee further observed "...it is impossible to have clear and
rigid demarcation on linguistic areas.... When conditions are more static and the
state of peoples mind calmer, the adjustment of these boundaries or the creation of
new provinces can be undertaken with relative ease and with advantage of all
concerned. "^°

The committee was conscious of the fact that "the present is not an
opportune time for the formation of new provinces on lingual basis. It would
unmistakably retard the process of consolidation of our gains, dislocate our
administrative, economic and financial structure, let loose, while we are still in a
formative state, forces of disruption and disintegration, and seriously interfere with
the progressive solution of our economic and political difficulties."^' But the
committee ultimately suggested, "if public sentiment is insistent and overwhelming,
the practicability of satisfying public demand with its implications and consequences
must be examined the case of Andhra Province to be taken up first and the
question of its implementation examined before we can think of considering the
question of any other province."^^ The J.V.P. report suggested that "if there were
an insistent demand the question should receive further and more detailed
examinations...".^-'

The Congress Working Committee adopted and endorsed the report of the
Linguistic Provinces Committee in April 1949. The working committee received

59. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee, appointed by the Jaipur Congress (Dec,
1948), The AICC, New Delhi, 1948, pp. 4-5. (Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Trust
Library, New Delhi).
60. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
61. Ibid, pp. 9-10.
62. Ibid, pp. 15-16.
63. Michael Brecher, Nehru : A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, London.
1959, p. 481.
 23

various deputations and memoranda on the formation of linguistic provinces from

Andhra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Nagpur, Vidarbha, Maharashtra, Bombay and
Gujrat Provincial Congress Committee and the provincial Governments of Bombay,
Madhya Pradesh and Madras. Accordingly the working committee recommended, in
view of the general agreement between Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee and
Tamil Nadu Pradesh Congress Committee and the Madras Government, the
formation of the Andhra Province in Accordance with the report of the Linguistic
Provinces Committee*^ and the Government of India should be requested to form
forthwith the Andhra Province consisting generally of undisputed Andhra districts
but without the city of Madras, the exact demarcation should be made by a boundary
commission.

The demand for a separate state of Andhra had deep roots among the Telugu
people. The regional feelings came to the forefront in the Madras Presidency that
comprised of the Telugu, Tamil, Kanada, Malayalam and Odissi speaking people.
Among them Andhras were in majority both in number and area wise. But the
politics of Madras was dominated by the Tamil Congressmen, therefore, Andhra
Congress leaders felt suffocated. They wanted to make an Andhra Congress but the
National leaders did not pay heed to it. Despite, they formed Andhra Congress
Committee in May 1913, and ultimately Central Congress leadership granted
permission for the establishment of Telugu Unit in April 1917. This provided a
fittings to the regional sentiments created Telugu identity and fastered an awareness
of linguistic autonomy.

The arguments, which JVP committee had given in favour of reorganisation

on linguistic provinces, were the result of the commitment of Congress to it. "No
body denies that fact; but that can be an argument only if and when it is
accepted...".^^ The Congress itself realised that its decision could not be
implemented at that time, (in 1948-49) and the issue was postponed. The months of

64. Report of the General Secretaries, January 1949-Sept. 1950, The All India Congress
Committee, New Delhi, p. 57. (Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Trust Librar>', New
Delhi).
65. K.P. Mukerji and Suhasini Ramaswamy, Reorganization of Indian States. The
Popular Book Depot. Bombay, 1955, p. 22.
 24

confused lobbying followed outside the Constituent Assembly but did not produce
the desired results. "This was primarily because the oligarchy - Nehru, Patel,
Prasad and Azad - opposed the re-distribution of provinces on a linguistic basis.^^
Pandit Jawahalal Nehru believed that some kind of reorganization was 'inevitable'
but wanted to solve the problem, "at a suitable moment when the time is ripe for
it -67

The situation in Andhra was take a very serious turn in 1952. The differences
between Rajagopalachari's and T. Prakasam, popularly known as Andhra Kesari,
were well known. Their differences accentuated the clash between the Tamil and the
Telugu speaking Andhras. The Andhras now revived their demand that the Madras
state, as formed by the British be carved into two separate Tamil and Telugu
speaking states. This movement got a big fillip when Potti Sriramalu, a respected
Gandhian, undertook a fast unto death. Prime Minister Nehru was not in a mood to
succumb to such tactice. But af^er 56 days of fast, Sriramulu died on December 19,
1952. The death of Patti Sriramulu resulted in widespread violence all over the
Telugu speaking areas of Madras Presidency. "At the first assault by linguism, the
Congress lost its nerve... Jawaharlal Nehru, in spite of his strong opposition to re-
distribution of the provinces on the basis of language, surrendered to the emotional
upsurge among the Telugu-speaking people,^* and announced the formation of
Andhra State on December 19, 1952, on the principle of the J.V.P. Committee.

Till September 1952, the Prime Minister Nehru was known to have been
against the formation of linguistic states but 'Public Sentiment' pressurised the
government, and in January 1953, All India Congress Committee at its fif^y-eighth
session at Hyderabad recommended the division of India on linguistic basis. Prime
Minister Nehru in his Presidential Address on January 17, 1953, had said, "the
decision to form the Andhra state has led to a renewal of demands for some other
linguistic provinces... I would earnestly suggest that while establishing the Andhra

66. Granuille Austin, The Indian Constitution : Corner Stone of a Nation, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1966, p. 243.
67. Constituent Assembly Debates : Official Reprot, Vol. VII, 1948-49 Nov.-Dec, Lok
Sabha Secretariate, New Delhi, p. 320.
68. K.M. Munshi, Indian Constitutional Documents. Vol. 1, Op.Cit., p. 231.
 25

State, we should wait to see the consequences that flow from it and then take into
consideration any like problems elsewhere."^' After the formation of Andhra
Pradesh on linguistic basis, in October 1953, the Prime Minister Nehru, made a
statement in Parliament that a commission would be appointed. It was stated that
the commission would examine "objectively and dispassionately the question of the
reorganization of the states of the Indian Union "'^ Accordingly a State
Reorganization Commission under the chairmanship of Justice Saiyed Fazal Ali,
with two members Hiriday Nath Kunzru and K.M. Panikar was formed on December
22, 1953, to examine the issue of reorganization. It submitted its report on 30th
September 1955. The commission acted as a 'neutral' body. The commission was
commissioned to suggest broad principles on which reorganization of states should
be effected. The appointment of this commission suggested that the Government
was in favour of the reorganization of states on a rational basis and the task of the
commission was to recommend what should constitute the rational basis.^'

The States Reorganization Commission received various documents and

different proposals. Different demands were made on the basis of linguistic and
cultural factors. The Commission pointed out that there is a wide variation in our
life, but the strength of the nation is undoubtedly the sum total of the combined
strength of the people of the component states. But while the building of contented
units, strong enough to bear their share of the burden, is an important objective, it
is no less necessary that the links between the units and the nation should be equally
strong so that under the strength of regional royalties the Union does not fall
apart.^^

The commission was conscious of the importance of the language and culture
of an area as they represent a pattern of living, common in that area. But there are
some other factors which are of great importance. The first essential consideration

69. Presidential Address, Indian National Congress, Fifty Eighth Session, Deccan.
Hyderabad, Januar> 17, 1953, p. 14.
70. Report of the States Reorganization Commission, Appendix A, Ministr>' of Home
Affairs Resolution, New Delhi, Dec. 29, 1953, p. 265.
71. Suman Sharma, Slate Boundary Changes in India, Op.Cit., p. 108.
72. K.P. Mukerji and S. Ramas>\amy, Reorganization ofIndian States, Op.Cit.,pp. 31-32.
 26

is the preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India. The
commission realised that the theory of one language in one state was neither always
justified, nor practical. It suggested that the practice of'linguisticism' needed certain
constitutional and ideological correctives. The resources - financial, administrative
and technical should be the criterion along with language. The commission made it
clear that "the states based on languages only are intolerant, aggressive and
expansionist in character. "^-^

After discussing the recommendations of the States Reorganisation

Commission, the Congress Working Committee suggested, in November 1955, that
the commission's recommendations should be generally accepted except in cases
where it is possible to fmd alternate solutions which receive a more general
agreement or in certain cases of adjustments of boundaries. The Congress Working
Committee clarified its stand that "the reorganization of states is only a means to an
end, the basic objective being the unity of the nation and the prosperity of the
people."^'*

The Indian National Congress made its stand more clear in Amritsar session,
in February 1956. "More than thirty years ago, the Congress encouraged the
formation of linguistic provinces from the point of view of its own constitution, and
such Congress provinces were constituted regardless of state administrative units.
The object aimed at was to break the barriers which had been created under British
rule between the English knowing classes in India and the masses and to encourage
the growth of the Indian languages and the cultures associated with them. This was
necessary step both from the political and cultural point of view. "'^

The Indian National Congress, in its 1956, Amritsar session, emphasized that
"...If linguistic demarcation of states leads to conflict between states and to
considerations of provincialism, overriding the vital necessity of unity and the good

73. Ibid, p. 39.

74. Indian National Congress, Resolutions on States Reorganization, 1920-56, All India
Congress Committee, New Delhi, pp. 13-14. (Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Trust
Library, New Delhi).
75. Ibid, p. 21.
 27

of India as a whole, then linguism has over-stepped its proper sphere and became a
danger. The full development of a language and the culture associated with it can be
secured, where considered necessary, by the proposal to have regions within a state
and the Congress therefore, welcomes suggestions which have been made to this
end. In this way linguistic homogeneity will be secured and at the same time, the
larger interests of the state preserved."'^

The history of the movement for linguistic states indicates that the largest
and most influential party in the country (i.e. Indian National Congress) had been
giving support to it, probably just to quiet down agitations or probably just to
manufacture another anti-British bias among the people and win popularity for the
party. As a result, an atmosphere has been created in which emotion and politics
have gained so much prominence than reasons.

76. Ibid, pp. 22-23.

 Chapter - / /
REGIONALISM IN SOUTH INDIA
(i) Regionalism in Telugu Speaking Areas
(ii) Dravidian Movement
 2S

(i) Regionalism in Telugu Speaking Areas

The concept of regional feeling came into the forefront as a first instance in
the Presidency of Madras. The composite Madras State was comprised of the
Telugu, Tamil, Kannada, Malayalam and Odissi speaking people. Among these the
Telugu speaking people were of majority. The leadership in the Provincial Congress
Party was by and large held by the Tamilians. Hence, the important Andhra leaders
became suffocated and expressed to organise a Regional Congress Committee of
Andhra area. But both the Provincial and National leadership expressed their
discontent. But the Andhra leaders were adamant and met at Bapatala, a town in
Guntur district in May 1913, and declared the formation of Andhra Congress
Committee. Almost all important Congress leaders belonging from the Andhra area
attended the Conference. They aimed to get more freedom at action to Telugu
people and reduce the influence of the Tamilians in Andhra affairs, and to use the
new Telugu Congress (Andhra Congress) as means of achieving a separate Telugu
Province. The pressure of the group on the Congress party was successful, and on
April 8, 1917, the Congress granted permission for the establishment of a Telugu
unit.'

The Andhra regionalism was based on the Cultural variables such as language
and local culture and aimed to acquire its due place in India as the second biggest
language group of people after Hindi. The Andhra regionalism both the pre and post
independence politics of India never claimed as a separate nationality or an
identification outside the national framework of India. Their regionalism is only a
projection of the love for their language, economic development and opposition
towards domination and big brother approach of their counterparts.^

The Indian National Congress had accepted in principle, during the freedom
movement and resolved at the Nagpur session of 1920, that the Federal set up of
India will be based on the principle of language for fuller development and

1. M. Subrahmanyam, "Nationalism-Regionalism vs Separatism in the developing

politics of India", Indian Journal of Politics, Deptt. of Pol. Science, A.M.U., Aligarh,
Vol. XV, No. 3, December 1981, p. 54.
2. Ibid, pp. 54-55.
 29

protection of India's various languages. The 1928, Nehru report, keeping the 1920
resolution in view, recommended the necessity of restructuring the Provinces on the
linguistic basis.

The Andhra leaders belonging to all political shades resolved to acquire a

separate Andhra Province in the first instance and later to combine all the Telugu
speaking areas and people who were the major component of the Dominion of
Hyderabad. It should be noted that linguistic identity and the fight for linguistic
states always cut across caste loyalties, unlike the Tamilians. The caste never
became a variable in the regional problem of the Andhra. The Andhra Maha Sabha,
mostly a literary and cultural organisation and an undeclared semi-political
organisation was a broad based association of all castes. As the Indian National
Congress was banned organisation in the State of Hyderabad, the Congress
functioned under the cover of Andhra Maha Sabha.-^

After the first general elections in 1952, the seat of the Chief Minister of
composite Madras State was occupied by a Tamilian leader C. Rajagopalachari. The
people of Andhra in general and the leaders in particular started feeling suffocated
and they initiated the demand of re-structuring the Province on the linguistic basis
as recommended by the historical Nehru Committee. But the Central leadership was
reluctant to undertake such a move, keeping in view a variety of problems the
Nation was facing at that time. But almost all the legislators from the Telugu
speaking area were firmly determined to achieve their goal.'' On July 27, 1952,
seventy (70) out of the one hundred and sixty (160) Andhra legislators met under
the chairmanship of an old veteran Congress leader Hari Sarrothama Rao despite
the official or non-official ban by their respective parties. The Conference was a
great success. The convention resolved to achieve their objective through
democratic and Gandhian means of agitation. Potti Sri Ramulu, a sarvodya leader of
Gandhian order went on 'Deeksha' (Hunger Strike) till death to attain a separate
Andhra State from the composite Madras multi-lingual province. The central

3. Ibid, p. 55.
4. M. Subrahmanyam, "Intra-Regionalism in Andhra Pradesh", in Akhtar Majeed (ed.)
Regionalism Developmental Tensions in India, Cosmo Publications, New Delhi,
1984, p. 119.
 30

leadership at Delhi did not pay much attention towards the people's demand of
Andhra. The Sattayagrah was continued till the death of Sri Ramulu. During that
period much tension was generated among the Andhras, but their agitational
approach was on the democratic ways of strife, such as demonstrations, hartal and
bandhs. On the precedent of the civil disobedience movement of Indian libration
movement, the student boycotted the educational institutions and other groups also
joined with the common cause of the people. On 56th day of satyagrah Sri Ramulu
died and that made the emotional Andhras to resort to some kind of violence. The
people lost faith in the peaceful means of agitation. There was total panic in the
Telugu-speaking districts of the province. Scores of people were killed in the police
firing. It is a sorry state of affairs in India that the Union Government takes it in
easy way, with indifference, till the democratic means of agitations in demand of
gehuine public interest shape into violence. Though the Union Government refused
the demand of the Andhras, stating that it could not be coerced, but finally it
climbed down from such an untenable position and Nehru made a statement that he
was willing to take early steps to form an Andhra state out of the Telugu areas
excluding Madras city on December 19, 1952.' Ultimately, as a first step in the
spirit of Nagpur Congress resolution of 1920, and with the spirit of constitutional
recommendations of Nehru committee of 1928, for reorganisation of Indian
Federalism on linguistic basis came into being.

The state of Andhra was carved out of the then Madras state after a long
protracted struggle for a separate province by the Telugu speaking areas of Ciracars
and Rayalseema, on October 1, 1953 Andhra Kesari T. Prakasam became the first
Chief Minister of the newly constituted state, who headed a coalition ministry with
its capital at Kumool and the High Court at Guntur.

The dominion of Hyderabad was also, like the Presidency of Madras, a

multilingual state consisting of Telugu, Kanada and Marathi speaking areas. Among
them the Telugu speaking area was the largest both in the area and population. The
Nizam like any feudals did not pay any attention towards the development of the

Prakas, Karat, Language and Nationality Politics in India, Orient Longmans,

Madras, 1973, pp. 37-41.
 31

area or promotion of the language. The people of Telangana organised a literary

association known as 'Andhra Mahasabha' in 1920, to promote the linguistic and
cultural interest and activities in the region. Simultaneously it became a cover for
the underground political activities of Telangana against the autocracy and feudal
rule. The Mahasabha expressed its desire to unite all the Telugu speaking people
into a single unit, as the Telugu speaking areas of both Andhra and Telangana were
contiguous geographical areas. The Andhra Mahasabha had consisted of the
Congress and Communist activists and sympathesisers.

After independence, both the Congress and Communist parties endorsed their
previous commitment of uniting the Telugu speaking people into a single political
unit. The separation of Andhra state from the Madras presidency in 19S3, gave fillip
to that movement. But the States Reorganisation Commission, proposal to form two
Telugu linguistic State i.e. Andhra and Telangana encouraged certain sections of the
Congress party to demand a separate Telangana state. They contended that the
integrated Telugu state will hinder the economic interest of the backward Telangana
people.*"

The Telangana agitation was mainly motivated by economic backwardness,

and political dominance of developed regions over under-developed regions In
pursuance to the recommendations of States Reorganisation Commission ( S R C ) ,
the old state of Hyderabad was trifurcated in 1956. The Kanada and Marathi
speaking areas were merged with the state of Mysore and Bombay and the nine
Telugu speaking districts known as Telangana remained with Hyderabad. Regarding
Telangana the States Reorganisation Commission opined, all will be in the interest
of Andhra as well as Telangana if, for the present, the Telangana is constituted as a
separate state with a provision for its unification with Andhra after the general
elections likely to be held in or about 1961, if by a two third majority, the
legislature of the residuary Hyderabad state expressed itself in favour of such
unification.^

6. M. SuhTahm&nyam. Intra-Regionalism in Andhra Pradesh, Op.Cit. pp. 121-22

7. Report of the Slates Re-organisation Commission (SRC), New Delhi, 1955, p. 107.
 32

Contrary to the suggestion of the S R C , a compromise took place. The

people of Andhra and Telangana were brought together into the common regional
fold through the hectic efforts of the then Home Minister G.B.Pant. The Telangana
agitation was mainly motivated by economic backwardness, and political dominance
of developed regions over under-developed regions. The agreement was reached
between the leaders of the Telengana and Andhra regions called "A Gentlemen's
Agreement" providing a scheme of safeguards for Telangana region. Consequently
an enlarged Andhra state covering areas of Telugu speaking people was formed on
1st November 1956, comprising of three regions of Telangana, coastal Andhra and
districts of Circars and Royalseema.

According to the Agreement, (a) All the members representing Telangana in

the State Assembly would form a Regional Committee for the purpose of dealing
with matters relating to their regions, (b) The entire revenue from Telangana area,
after making some allowance for the common expenditure of the state would be
spent on the development of the region, (c) recruitment to certain posts in the
region would be made from amongst the persons who had lived in Telengana for
atleast fifteen years. Clause thirteen (13), of the agreement is politically very
significant, and it reads "if the Chief Minister is from Andhra, the Deputy Chief
Minister will be from Telangana and vice versa. Two out of the following portfolios
will be assigned to Ministers from Telangana : Home, Finance, Revenue, Planning
and Development, and Commerce and Industry. The 'Gentlemen's Agreement' paved
a smooth way for the process of integrating of Telugu speaking people, the second
largest linguistic group in India.* The twice born state of Andhra Pradesh which
came into being on Nov. 1, 1956, established its capital at Hyderabad city and
Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy became the first Chief Minister of the newly emerged state,
and thus the Andhra or Telugu regionalism became a reality.

During the year of joint existence, the people of Telangana developed a

feeling of sub-regionalism based on "the territorial identity". The historical factors
were equally responsible for the development of Telangana consciousness. Most of
the Andhra regions remained under the British rule and were exposed to modern

8. M. SuhTahnanyum, Intra-Regionalism in Andhra Pradesh, Op.Cit, p. 122.

 33

development while Telangana people remained backward under the feudal rule of
the Nizam of Hyderabad. This developed a different "attitudinal sub-culture"
between the people of Telangana and Andhra despite their language affmity to a
large extent. Commenting on this type of sub-regionalism Duncon B. Forester says,
"historical and economic factors produce sub-regional problems and encourage the
growth of compelling political subcultures which not only do not correspond but
conflict with larger unities of language, culture, caste represented by the linguistic
state. In so far as sub-regionalism is the result of economic imbalances between
historically defmed subregions, it may be considered a by product of modernization.
If sub-regional distinctiveness can not often be traced to caste, cultural or linguistic
factors. It is clear that a history of division goes for to create subregional feelings
within a broad cultural region"'.

Apart from Telangana consciousness, the economic exploitation and political

domination by the people of Andhra on Telangana people created a chasm between
the two resulting in the Telangana agitation in January 1969. Its immediate cause
was the judgement of Andhra High Court which ruled that the State Electricity
Board does not come under the purview of the public employment (Recruitment as
to residence) Act of 1957, which was passed by the Parliament to permit the Andhra
Government to impose domicile rules on employment within the regions of the
state. These rules popularly known as 'Mulki Rules' were prevailing in Telangana
region since the time of Nizam.

Initially, the agitators were pressing for the implementation of the

'Gentlemen's Agreement' which remained under the carpet. The agitation was
initiated by the students of Osmania University demanding the security of jobs
reserved for the Telangana region. Later the focus was shifted from employment to
the creation of a separate Telangana State, and very soon, the agitation spread to
other areas of Telangana and took violent turn which provided a heaven sent device
for the anti-Brahmanand Reddy faction in the Congress to fish in the trouble water.

Several theories are advanced to explain the causes of the agitation.

Frustration of a few disgruntled politicians, economic exploitation of Telanganas by

Duncan B. Forester, 'Sub-regionalism in India; The case of Telangana, Pacific

Affairs, Vol. XI, III, No. 1 Spring. 1970, pp. 6,7.
 34

Andhras, injustice to the Telangana employees and Cultural diversities in the two
regions etc.'"

The over all effect of this sub-regional assertion in regional politics added a
fresh dimension to the already complex Indian politics, a dimension which rejected
both region and language as the basis of political re-organization, and projected the
significance of "cultural uniformity" and "Historical Identity " as the only criterion
of a political existence''.

The cultural differences between the two region is an important factor from
the sociological point of view. The Telangana identity is based on Islamic culture
differ in their mannerism, food habits, way of life etc. The Telangana people are
more close to the North in their habits while the Andhras are more akin to Madras.
The agitation and Telangana ethos amply testifies that a common language and
linguistic affmity can not cross the barriers of culture and deep rooted historical
traditions. Prof Rashiduddin Khan rightly observes that "The Telangana agitation
for a separate state has at least demonstrated for purpose of theorising the
inadequacy of language factor as the primary point of political cohesion and has
brought into sharper relief the necessity of taking into account for purposes of
political stability and national growth. Such critical factors like varied pattern of
economy, demographic and sociological differentiation, political traditions and sub-
cultural divergencies, which can not be taken for granted of a viable identity has to
be mentioned.'^

The Telangana Praja Samithi, the successor of Telangana peoples convention

was formed by the dissident leaders of the Congress party of Telangana, and non-
Communist opposition party leaders to achieve the goal of separate Telangana.
Immediately after the formation of Telangana Praja Samithi, the agitation was
spread to the nook and corner of the area. The masses, unprecedently, participated

10. G. Rama Reddy, "Andhra Pradesh, Citiadal of Congress" in Iqbal Narain (ed.) State
Politics in India, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1967, p. 21.
11. G. Rama Reddy & Sharma. B.A.V.. Regionalism in India : A Study of Telangana,
Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi. 1979, p. 8.
12. Rashiduddin Khan, 'National Integration', Seminar, April 1970, p. 25.
 35

in the agitation. Though, started as a peaceful agitation by the matured leaders, the
younger generation, who felt more affected turned it into violent, and more than
300 people died in the police firings and the state was put to a loss to the tune of
Rs. 42 crores.'^

The Telangana Praja Samithi persuaded M. Chenna Reddy, a dissident

Congressman to join them to strengthen the cause of 'separate Telangana', and
unanimously offered him its presidentship. With the entry of Chenna Reddy in the
Telangana Parja Samithi, the agitation got converted in to a mass movement. Being
a skilful and experienced organizer he was able to bring most of the unsatisfied
political groups into the fold of Telangana Parja Samithi. It should be noted that,
young and dynamic leaders, who were not either encouraged or patronized by the
Congress leadership, strengthened the agitation in Telangana, and played a very
important role to accelerate the tempo of the agitation.'''

One of the important factors behind the movement were the hegemony of the
Andhra leaders over the state administration. The leaders of Telangana were not
given their due share in political power which created a sense of frustration and
bitterness against Andhras. According to the Gentlemen's Agreement, the post of
Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister were to be distributed between persons
belonging to the two regions. The first Chief Minister, Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, an
Andhrite, abolished the post of Deputy Chief Minister calling it as the sixth finger
For very brief periods two Telangana leaders K.V. Ranga Reddy and J.V. Narsinga
Rao could hold second rank in cabinet. As regards the presiding officers of
Assembly and Council, they were always held by Andhrites except once when
Pitamah Madapati, was made the Presiding officer. The post of Congress President
since 1957 was continuously held by the Andhra despite many representations to the
contrary.

Even in the educational field the Telangana lag for behind the Andhrites. The
literacy rate in Andhra constituted 22.3% while it is 17.4% in the Talangana region

13. "Challenges to Political Stability : A Case Study of Andhra Pradesh", Secular

Democracy (Annual), January 1977, p. 57.
14. M. Subrahmanyam, Intra-Regionalism in Andhra Pradesh, Op.Cit., p. 126.
 36

Further, excluding. State capital the literacy rate was only 13.5% in Telangana
region.'^ There was only one university, the Osmania University in the entire
Telangana region to cater to the educational requirements of its inhabitants.

Irrigation which constitutes the backbone of agricultural prosperity, was a

much neglected field in Telangana area. Telangana was denied its due share of
irrigation facilities from Pochamped and Nagarjuna Sagar Projects. And as regards
the irrigation potential created during second and third five years plan periods,
Andhra region shared 78.5% while Telangana's share was 21.5% which was far
below the ratio of 2:1.'^

Carolyn Elliot traces the movement to the dissident social classes who were
no longer able to obtain benefits within the existing system of patronage. She
identifies three such social classes, university students seeking urban employment at
a time when Government was no longer hiring their services, the domination of the
Andhrites in various state services in Hyderabad and in Telangana region, the
resentment of peasants in Nizamabad and Nalgonda districts, who had sold their
land to richer Andhra migrants and finally, the bitterness of the middle-level
Government employees, especially non-gazetted officers over the Andhrites getting
promotions.'^

One of the important factors behind the movement were the employees from
Telangana. They developed a feeling that the Andhra employees were exercising
hegemony over them, and the Andhra officers were discriminating against them. The
Gentlemen's Agreement was not followed in its true spirit. There was a lapse in the
implementation of the 'Mulki Rules' also. On the other hand, the Government
employees from Andhra areas, who were posted in Telangana areas, also developed
discontentment against the Telangana employees and they started thinking that they
were the privileged class of people, but the Telangana employees with less efficiency
were getting more opportunities against them. Another problem was also before

15. B.A.V. Shartna, "Socio-Economic and Political Dimension of Sub-Nationalism : The

Case of Telangana", Indian Journal of Politics, A.M.U., Aligarh.
16. Ibid.
17. Grey, Hugh, 'The Demand for a Separate Telangana State, Asian Survey, May 1971.
Vol. XI. No. 5, p. 468.
 37

them, i.e. due to the necessity of the Mulki or domicile certificate for the admission
into the educational institutions in Telangana, they felt that their children were
deprived of educational facilities in Telangana.

Meanwhile, overlooking the Telangana safeguards, the Government of

Andhra Pradesh prepared an integrated list of seniority of their employees for the
purpose of promotions. But the Telangana employees were totally unhappy as that
was a violation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. Hence, they challenged the list in the
Andhra Pradesh High court and brought a stay order against the implementation of
the integrated promotion list.

After getting the stay order by the Telengana employees against the
implementation of the integrated promotion list, the Andhra employees challenged
the very validity of the 'Mulki Rules' in the High Court. The judgement went in
favour of the Andhra employees, the 'Mulki Rules' were declared as a violation of
fundamental rights. The government of Andhra Pradesh appealed in the Supreme
Court against the judgement of the High Court. Because the judgement of the High
Court caused a great anxiety and frustration among the student community and the
non-gazetted employees of Telangana.

Though the government of Andhra Pradesh was awaiting the Supreme Court
judgement, the Telangana 'non-gazetted officers' association launched a strike to
press their demand of safeguarding their service conditions. The strike was
continued for 46 days. During that period, practically the government machinery
was at stand still, and there was no government order in effect in Telangana.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court admitted the plea of the State Government and
declared the 'Mulki Rules' as valid under the Article 35(b) of the constitution. After
the Supreme Court judgement, the N.G.O. Association was persuaded by the
Telangana minister to call of the strike, and convinced them that the government
was interested to protect their service conditions. The Government also assured
them, that the Andhra employees, if they were posted in the vacancies of Telangana
would be transferred to Andhra area by creating superannuary posts and the
vacancies would be filled by the Telangana personnel. With these assurance the
Telangana N.G.O. Association called of their 46 days old strike.
 38

On January 19, 1969, an all party meeting was called by the government to
find out a solution to clear off the tension and the conflict of Telangana problem at
Hyderabad. The all party meet examined the irritant problems such as employment,
revision of the integrated list of seniority, utilization of Telangana surplus funds for
the economic development of Telangana to remove the existing economic imbalance
and passed a resolution that "we of different political persuasions, firmly resolve to
bend our energies towards achieving quicker development and follow integration of
our state. Andhra Pradesh, hold a pre-eminent position in the map of India, and in
order to be able to contribute our own share of the national integration of the
country, it is of paramount importance that within our own state we achieve full
unity. We, therefore, vehemently and unequivocally condemn the slogan that is
raised in certain quarters for the creation of a separate state.'* But the all party
meet and its resolution did not convince the agitators in Telangana to depart from
their agitation. The people in general and the youth in particular lost their faith in
the promise of the politicians.

In the 1971 mid-term Lok Sabha poll, the Telangana Praja Samithi fought
the election on the issue of constant neglect of the development of the Telangana
region coupled with the discrimination in services and non-availability of other
opportunities to their people and won ten out of fourteen seats of Telangana. After
the thumping victory of Telangana Praja Samithi in the mid-term Lok Sabha poll,
the centre realised its strength and popularity. Due to this realisation by the centre a
compromise took place between the Prime Minister and Telangana Praja Samithi
leader M. Chenna Reddy in September 1971'^ which provided :

(i) Statutory powers for the Telangana regional committee,

(ii) Separate budget and separate account of Telangana.
(iii) A separate Telangana Pradesh Congress Committee,
(iv) The separation issue to be re-opened at a later date,
(v) Implementation of the Mulki Rules,
(vi) A change in the Congress party state leadership.

18. M. Subrahmanyam, Intra-Regionalism in Andhra Pradesh", Op.Cit., p. 125.

19. Hugh Grey, "The Failure of the Demand for a Separate Andhra State", Asian Survey,
April, 1971, p. 338.
 39

The main achievement was the stepping down of Brahmananda Reddy from
the Chief Ministership, which was a personal triumph for Chenna Reddy. Most of
the members of the Telangana Parja Samithi crossed over to the Congress which
proves that it was merely a manifestation of factional differences within the
Congress party. After the exit of Brahmananda Reddy, P.V. Narsimha Rao, a
Brahmin from the Telangana region, was made the Chief Minister with a view to
placate the feelings of the people of the region and in view of the victory of the
Telangana Parja Samithi in the 1971 Lok Sabha polls in the Telangana region.

After the Congress victory in 1972, State Assembly elections, Narsimha Rao
was again made the Chief Minister. Rao vigorously carried out land reform and
urban property ceiling programmes, much to the chagrin of the land owners. The
Farm Ceiling Bill was described by a Jana Sangh leader as "discriminatory and
inhuman". Besides "the attempt by the Congress party at the centre to restructure
the state leadership, particularly to break the power of the dominant agricultural
castes and to establish a direct contact with politicians at the grass roots, without
the link of strong factional leaders,"^^ had also created a feeling of uncertainty
among the leaders of the Andhra region.

In this surcharged atmosphere came the judgement of the Supreme Court

reversing the judgement of the High Court that 'Mulki rules' are 'law in force' for
the Telangana region which had remained valid and operative after the formation of
Andhra Pradesh, under the Article 33(b) of the constitution. The judgement sparked
off an agitation in the Andhra region for separate Andhra. A section of land owning
Congressmen, who were not happy with the socialistic measures of Narsimha Rao
supported the agitation thinking that lawlessness may invite President's rule and
mark the exit of the Chief Minister from Telangana region. The Andhra Congress
legislators at the same time demanded shifting of state capital to some Andhra
region. The Andhras wanted 'the elimination of all concessions, root and branch'.
While the Telangana N.G.O.'s demanded full implementation of the 'Mulki Rules'.

20. Dagmar Bemstroff'Eclipse of Reddy Raj': The Attempted Restructuring of Congress

Party leadership in Andhra Pradesh', Asian Survey, October 1973, p. 959.
 40

The agitation was called off by the Andhras on the announcement of five
point formula by the Prime Minister on November 27, 1972. It provides :

1. The Mulki Rules should be applied for recruitment to non>gazetted posts

upto the level of Tahsildar, Civil Asstt. Surgeon and Asstt. Engineer
throughout Telangana.

2. In the case of composite offices such as the secretariat, the Mulki Rules
safeguards should apply for every second vacancy out of every three direct
recruitment vacancies in non-gazetted posts.

3. The various service cadres upto the first or second gazetted level should be
regionalised.

4. The educational facilities in Hyderabad and Secunderabad would be

extended.

5. There would be a composite police force drawn from both regions, for
Hyderabad and Secunderabad.^'

The Prime Minister stated that these points would have no retrospective
effect that there would be no reopening of the time set for the termination of the
Mulki Rules (1977 of the city of Hyderabad and 1980 for the rest of the Telangana).
Later on speaking in the Lok Sabha (December 21, 1972) the Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi observed rightly that there is a strong feeling in the country that any
residential qualification for public employment goes against the very concept of
common citizenship which is enshrined in our constitution. But at the same time, the
framers of the constitution did realise that the safeguards available to people who
suffer from special hardships could not be abrogated straightway.^^

The five point formula got the approval of the State cabinet and the Congress
Legislative Party, but was rejected by the NGOs (Non-Gazetted Officers
Association) students and other groups. On December 7, 1972, the Andhra non-
gazetted employees went on indefinite strike. The situation further deteriorated

21. Hugh Grey, "The Failure of the Demand for a Separate Andhra State" Op.Cit., pp.
341-342.
22. 'Counsel for Despair', The Statesman, New Delhi, December 27, 1972.
 41

when on December 18, nine out of twenty nine Andhra Ministers resigned from the
cabinet. These resignations resulted in the proclamation of President's rule which
brought the dead lock to an end. And a fresh attempt to keep an integrated Andhra
Pradesh was sought by the then Home Minister K.C. Pant through the six points
formula providing for :

(i) The setting up at the state level of a planning board as well as sub-
committees for backward areas.

(ii) A new central university at Hyderabad

(iii) Local candidates to be given preference to a specified extent in direct

recruitments to :

(a) non-gazetted posts (other than those in the secretariat, officers of

head of departments, other state level officers and institutions and the
Hyderabad city police).

(b) corresponding posts under local bodies and

(c) the posts of Tahsildar, junior engineer and civil assistant surgeons. In
order to improve the promotion prospects, service cadre should be
organised to the extent possible on appropriate local basis specified
gazetted level.

(iv) A high power administrative tribunal to be constituted to deal with the

grievances of services regarding seniority promotion and other allied matters.

(v) To avoid litigation, the constitution should be suitably amended.

(vi) The above approach would render the continuance of 'Mulki Rules' and
Regional Committee for the Telangana unnecessary.^^

As the single party dominance since the inception of the state, the Congress
and the opposition parties failed to evolve a distinct ideological orientation, the
politics in Andhra Pradesh was dominated by intra-party conflicts in the ruling

23. Hugh Grey, "The Failure of the Demand for a Separate Andhra State", Op.Cit., pp.
348-349.
 42

party. The factional politics of the Congress dominated the political scene of the
state. The Telangana and the Andhra agitation were initially started by the Congress
dissident leaders. The opposition parties could carry on the agitations as long as the
Congress factional leaders worked against their rivals and as soon as the differences
were sorted out they conveniently gave up the 'struggle' and rushed for political
patronage.

N. Sanjeeva Reddy, the first Chief Minister of the newly emerged Andhra
Pradesh consolidated his position in the state and had an iron grip both on the state
administration and the party organisation. He independently functioned as Chief
Minister of the state. After Sanjeeva Reddy, the doyen of the weaker section D.
Sanjeevaiah becomes the Chief Minister in 1960. His tenure as Chief Minister from
1960 to 1962 was nothing but a stop gap arrangement.

The decision making power in the state politics was shifted to the centre
when Brahmananda Reddy took over as the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.
Though he could buih up his own castle, which was shattered by the Telangana
agitation in 1969. The democratic principles was sacrificed in the state politics to
satisfy the ego of certain personalities at the centre.

Instead of party politics, personal decisions of Indira Gandhi decided the

fat3 of the state since 1971. As such, there was no politics of party or parties in the
state except, politics of persons and personalities as 'directed' by Indira Gandhi. The
Congress leaders of Andhra Pradesh were fully conscious of the charismatic
leadership of Indira Gandhi. She was virtually treated as mother Goddess with a
magic power to solve all problems from rising prices to poverty. They gave her a
free hand in the state politics because their own electoral success were mainly
depends upon her favour.

(ii) Dravidian Movement

The regional movement in Tamil Nadu is a manifestation of the urge to retain

the Dravidian culture, different from the Aryan culture of the north. Dravidian claim
that they are the original inhabitants of the sub-continent and that their culture is
three thousand years old and the north Indian Aryan-Brahmin who originally came
 43

from somewhere in Central Asia pushed them southward by crossing the formidable
Vindhyas. They are equally conscious of the rich heritage of the Tamil language.^"*

The Aryan-Brahmins who came from north brought Sanskrit and Hindu
religion with them. They learnt Tamil and adopted it and at the same time spread
Sanskrit and Hinduism in South India. As a Brahmin, they maintained their
superiority for cleanliness and holiness by not mixing with Dravidian society.
Brahmins, an endogamous group, proud of their colour and Aryan lineage, never
care to mix with non-Aryan ethnic group. They regarded themselves holy against
the rest of society which had mostly adopted their Hindu religion but was non-
Aryan, therefore, untouchable and un-sociotable for them. Later on when British
came, the Brahmins imparted English education to their children. Due to the modern
education and early exposition to social changes, the Brahmins occupied the
important positions in both administration and as well as in the national struggle for
freedom. This dominance of Brahmins in every walk of life in Madras Presidency
created a feeling of inferiority complex in the non-Brahmin Dravidians. The 'two
race' theory is a projection of cultural differences between the oppressed Dravidian
non-Brahmin and the oppressor, Aryan Brahmin. The superiority of the Brahmin
was resented as it relegated the non-Brahmins to the lowest stratum of social and
cultural hierarchy.^^ This feeling and their socio-economic exploitation at the hands
of Brahmins resulted in the Dravidian movement in Madras is "a socio-religious
revolt against Hinduism and the way of social life it represents, it is an aggressive
and violent manifestation of the inferiority complex of Dravidian who under the
influence of western oriented education have became self conscious and also realised
the political potentiality of their numerical majority. Hinduism has been dubbed as a
foreign religion by the protagonists of the Dravidian movement.

The consciousness of separate identity and the exploitation at the hands of

Brahmin have created a special awareness among the Dravidians resulting in the
Tamilisation of politics. The regional feelings in the non-Brahmins of Madras

24 C. Annadurai, "DMK AS I SEE IT" in Iqbal Narain (ed.) State Politics in India.
Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1967, p. 466.
25. S.N. Balasundram, "The Dravidian (non-Brahmin) movement in Madras" in Iqbal
Narain (ed)/A/£/, p. 171.
 44

Presidency resulted in a strong demand for separate electorate for non-Brahmins in

Madras at the time when Montague-Chelmsford reforms were under discussion. The
anti-Brahmin upsurge of Dravidians found manifestation in 1915 in the Dravidian
Association, aiming at the creation of a Dravidian state. In 1916, this association
was rechristened as "South Indian People's Association", soon after its
establishment the association issued the 'non-Brahmin Manifesto' and publication of
three daily news papers, 'Justice' in English, 'Dravidian' in Tamil and 'Andhra
Prakasika' in Telugu.

In August 1917, the name of the Association was changed to South Indian
Liberal Federation. The 'Federation' was popularly known as Justice party after its
English daily "Justice". The Justice Party formed the two successive ministries in
Madras in 1920 and 1923 under the leadership of the Raja of Ponagal with the
support of the non-Brihmin members. The Justice Party hailed the British rule in
India as divine dispensation. The party manifesto pronounced, "We are not in favour
of any movement to undermine the influence and authority of British rulers who
alone in the present circumstances are able to hold the scale even between class and
creed"^**. The Justice Party demanded from the British "Progressive political
development of a well defined policy of trust in the people, qualified by prudence,
and of timely and liberal concessions in the wake of proved fitness. India has
earned, the right to demand that basis of her constitution should be broadened and
deepen, that her sons, .representing every class, caste and community according to
their acknowledged position in the country and their respective numerical strength,
should be given fiscal freedom and legislative autonomy in matters affecting the
domestic policy and economic position and that she should be accorded a place in
the empire conducive to the self respect of her children as British subjects and not
inferior in dignity and power to that occupied by any self governing colony. "^^

The rise of Justice Party and the dravidian movement were the development
of the caste politics in the Presidency of Madras. The middle order caste groups.

26. S.P. Rastogi, "Emergence and rise of the D.M.K." in Subhash C. Kashyap (ed)"
Indian Political Parties, Research, Delhi, 1971, p. 159.
27. Ibid, p. 156.
 45

who fall in the category of Sudras according to the Varnadharma of Hindu social
system, have been organised first as socio-cultural Associations and finally shaped
into political organization by the intellectuals of such caste groups.^^

By the death of Tayagaraja Chetti - the Justice Party became deflected. At

that stage, E.V. Ramasway Naicker a Congressmen of a Telugu-Kaonada Balija
caste origin, emerged as the spokesman of Tamilian new Brahmin Movement. In
1925, he resigned from the Congress as the Congress opposed the communal
representation in the legislative assembly. He started the 'Self Respect' movement
which included the new Brahmin movement cherishing Tamilian language and
Dravidian cuhure.^'

In 1937, a Congress government headed by C. Rajagopalchari, a Brahmin by

caste and a staunch nationalist by creed, was formed in Madras. Rajaji under the
impulse of nationalistic zeal introduced Hindi as a compulsory subject at the school
level in Madras Presidency. This was opposed by the ethnically conscious Dravidians
as imposition of a North-Indian language on them. Thousands of persons courted
arrest including its leader E.V. Ramasway Naicker. Ultimately, the government had
to revise its decision and Hindi was made optional-^". The achievement made Naicker
the champion of Dravidian movement and the women conference went to the extent
of conferring upon him the title of Periyar i.e. Mahatma^' on Novemeber 13, 1938.

In 1938, E.V. Ramasway Naicker, while serving jail term for his ami Hindi
agitation was elected president of the Justice Party. To save the Tamilian people
from the serfdom of Hindi. He thought, a Dravidian state would be the only way
out. The Justice Party in its December 1938, convention resolved that Tamil Nad
should be made a separate state, "directly under the Secretary of States for India""*^.

28. M. Subrahmanyam, "Nationalism-Regionalism vs. Separatism in the Developing

Politics of India", Op.Cit., p. 59.
29. Ibid, pp. 59-60.
30 Ibid, p. 60.
31 S.P. Rastogi, "Emergence and Rise of the DMK", Op.Cit., p. 158.
32. P.D. Devananadam, "The Dravida Kazagham : A Revolt Against Brahmin", Op.Cu.,
pp. 9-10.
 46

The demand was reiterated time and again. The Muslim League's "Pakistan
resolution further boosted his morale. Naicker supported wholeheartedly the scheme
of Pakistan and sought Muslim League's support for the creation of Dravidistan
The argument behind separate Dravidistan state was that Dravidian non-Brahmin
peoples i.e. Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam were of single racial stock and
culture which separate them from the Aryan Brahmin. A.V. Nathan, one of close
associates of Naicker, wrote an Article in the 'Deccan Times', Muslim league special
for April 1941, " Some thoughts on Dravidanad : Why we believe the separation lies
our salvation". In that he said "if it is understood that India is a much geographical
expression and that there are within its boundaries at least three large entities each
entitled to be called a nation, and wishing to be called as such, the internal problems
of India solve of themselves - these three nations (are) the Muslims, the Dravidians
and the Aryans, and their nation States one called Pakistan, Dravidanad and
Aryavarta. "^^

On August 27, 1944, at Salem, the Justice Party was formally dissolved and
a new organisation was set up in its place under the guidance of Naicker, the
Dravida Kazhagam or Dravidian Federation. The objective was realisation of a
separate new Brahmin or Dravidian country. After its Salem conference it was
converted in to a mass militant organiastion. The achievement of sovereign
independent Dravidian Republic was made its creed. The Proposed State was to be
a federation with four units of the southern language with residuary powers and
internal autonomy. It would be a caste less society based on an egalitarian order to
which the down trodden and depressed could pledge allegiance. The militant
Dravida Kazhagam now opposed and denounced everything Hindu, Aryan and
North. E.V. Ramasaway Naicker declared " A Hindu in the present concept may be
a Dravidian, but a Dravidian in the real sense of the term can not and shall not be
Hindu."^^

The Dravida Kazhagam not only continued its tirade against Brahmin but

33. M. Subrahmanyam, "Nationalism-Regionalism vs. Separatism in the Developing

Politics of India", Op.Cit., p. 60.
34. A.S. Venu, Dravidistan, Madras, Kalai Manram, 1954, p. 13.
 47

talked of North Indian imperialism on south and promised to save Dravidian from
any such North Indian domination. As a mode of political action Dravida Kazhagam
preferred agitational methods. Naicker sought the help of Jinnah at the time of
partition so that Dravidistan could be formed simultaneously with Pakistan, but
Jinnah refused to help and British also ignored him. Enraged at the British "Betrayal
of Dravida people, Naicker boycotted the independence day celebrations."^^ He
refused to honour the national flag and did not recognise the Indian constitution
which he considered as a tool of Brahimin tyranny.

The popularity and image of Naicker suffered disastrous blow in 1949. when
he at the Age of 72, married a young girl of 17, an active Dravida Kazhgam worker
whom he brought up as she was an orphan child, which distrusted the rank and file
of Dravida Kazhagam under the prevailing circumstances a split took place in the
Dravida Kazhagam when C.N. Anna Durai a close associate of Naicker, along with
his large group of followers and associates broke away with him on 17th September
1949, formed a more effective political organisation named Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (Progressive Dravida Association). The DMK adhered to the basic
principles of Dravida Kazhagam (D.K.) i.e. secession of southern states from India
and establishment of a classless society. The caste issue was later thrown to
background and the D.M.K. threw its doors wide open to Brahmins.'^ The reality is
that a large section of the non-Brahmin castes did not approve such a demand put
forward by the D.M.K. and on the other hand in the composite Madras state, it
failed to influence their counter parts among the Andhras, Kannadas and the
Malayalis, though all of them belong to Dravidian races, language and culture. On
the other side of the picture ail of them opposed to the theory of separate
nationhood and contributed towards Indian Nationalism and integration. By and
large they stood with the Indian National Congress and the Communist Party of
India.

Earlier the D.M.K. boycotted the parliamentary institutions but it started

35. P.D. Devananadam, "The Dravida Kazagham : A Revolt Against Brahmin", Op.Cit..
p. 15.
36. S.P. Rastogi, "Emergence and Rise of the D.M.K." Op.Cit., p. 159.
 48

participating in election since 1957, but could not get much success till 1967
elections. Till 1967 it was aimed towards secession and separate Tamilnadu and
opposing Hindi, the so called Aryan language as a national language and its
introduction in Tamilnadu. The protagonist of Dravidian movement opposed Hindi
as they felt it was a cultural expansion of an Aryan race. After the reorganisation of
states on linguistic basis in 1956, Tamilnadu was left with only Tamil speaking areas
in it. The D.M.K. got changed the name of Madras to Tamil Nadu. The greatest
change in its regional politics came in 1963 when secession was banned by
amendment in the Indian constitution. After the amendment, the D.M.K. also
changed its constitution and gave up the secession demand. And the focus was
shifted to retention of English as the official language of India and it has been
constantly opposing the imposition of Hindi. In 1965 when Hindi was to become the
official language of India, the D.M.K. once again took the matter to the streets and
was successful to retain English as a parallel official language in India. On
November 3, 1963 the D.M.K. dropped the demand of independent 'Dravida Nadu'
and instead of it pledged to strive for the formation of a closer Dravida Union of
the four linguistic states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Kamataka and Kerala,
with as large powers as possible within the framework of the sovereignty and
integrity of India and of the Indian constitution.

Shedding the separatist and secessionist demand and replaced that with more
autonomy to the state, the D.M.K. was able to win the support of the Tamil masses
in 1967, and thus elected to power in the state with absolute majority. The Tamilian
masses are neither separatist nor anti-national, they are a proved people of
preserving their cultural heritage. It is not fair to say that they are against Hindi as
such, but definitely opposed to chauvinistic tendencies as put forward by certain
individual leaders and political parties.-^'

It is equally sore over the present union-state relations and the role of the
planning commission. Consequently it appointed the Rajamannar Committee in 1971,
to look into and suggest improvements in the union-states relations. The committee

37. M. Subrahmanyam, "Nationalism-Regionalism vs. Separatism in the Developing

Politics of India", Op.Cit., p. 61.
 49

recommended for the re-organisation of the planning commission on statutory basis,

removal of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court except in cases involving
interpretation of the constitution, transfer of the power to issue licences to
industries to the state list and "barest minimum of the concurrent list". The report of
the Rajamannar committee was put before the central government which hardly
took any note of it as its acceptance would severely curtailed the powers of the
Union Government.

The Dravidian movement has lost its earlier ferocity. It is more concerned
with the maintenance of a separate Tamil identity rather than with secession from
the Indian Union. As Ram Mohan has rightly pointed out, "it is not the southern
backwardness or the alleged North Indian economic exploitation that has promoted
secessionism in Madras. The revolt in Madras is over basic attitudes against the
imposition of a way of life repugnant to them. It is a revolt against the centre and
the sum total of central policies which seek to perpetuate the midland's domination
of coast lands.-^^

Tamilian politics is a reflection of inter-caste rivalaries in the same religious

community in India. Due to the advantage of modern education, economic
impediments and early exposition to social change, the Brahimins occupied the
important positions in both administration and as well as in the national struggle for
freedom. It was an all India phenomenon when a minority group in the society starts
to play dominated role in the socio-political system of a society, the majority group
or groups feel sour of that and attempt to surpass them by adopting counter moves,
and try to legitimize their aspirations through a number of variables such as
language, cultures and laws with the increase in levels of literacy and economic
appliances they aspire and attempt to move vertically. To fulfill their demands they
even try to collide with the ruling stratum and search for new identities.

38. Ram Mohan, Hindi Against India : The Meaning of D.M.K., Rachna Prakashana.
1968. p. 117.
 Chapter - III
REGIONALISM IN NORTH AND
WEST INDIA
(i) Regionalism in Punjab
(ii) Movement for Maharashtra
 50

(i) The Regionalism in Punjab

The study of regionalism in Punjab or even its understanding is incomplete

without a study of the Akali Dal, as it is the main instrument of all regional
movements in Punjab, since its inception in 1920.

The Akali Dal fully comes in the category of a regional political party
because it contains almost all the contents of regionalism, which include modern
political and cultural life; minorities; administrative decentralisation; local self
government; autonomy; cult of homeland and earth; local patriotism; separation;
independent historical traditions; racial ethnic or religions peculiarities and local
economic or class interests. 1

The Akali Dal is one of the oldest regionally based organisation in India,
owes its origin to the 1920's Gurudwara Reform Movement. The movement was
born during 1920's when the Sikhs decided to get rid of Mahants and government
agents from their shrines. Its ruthless suppression by the government provided
political orientation to the movement. After the Gurudwara reform movement the
Sikh community met at Amritsar to form the 'Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak
Committee' for the management of the Guradwaras. The Shiromani Guradwara
Prabandhak Committee came into being on 12th December, 1920 with one objective
to reform the Gurudwara managements. Their movement against the Mahant of the
Nankana Sahib Gurudwara was supported by the Indian National Congress. "The
more radical elements organised a semi-military corps of volunteers known as the
Akali Dal (Army of Immortals). The Akali Dal was to raise and train men for
'action' in taking over the Gurudwaras from the recalcitrant Mahants. A Gurumukhi
paper, the Akali was started.^

Basically, the aim of the Akali Dal was liberating the Gurudwaras from the
Government control. Latter with the passage of time, it became a highly organised
political party with branches in the Gurudwara known as the Akali Jattha all over

1. Encyclopaedia of the Social Science, Vol. 13, the Macmillan Campany, New York.
1962, pp. 208-209.
2 Khuswant Singh, A History of the Sikhs. Vol. 2, 1839-1974, Oxford UniversitN
Press, Delhi, 198, p. 198.
 51

the country. The biggest source of strength of Akali Dal is the Shiromani
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (S.G.P.C.) with its large funds and vast
patronage constitutes the backbone of the Akali Dal.

The Akali Dal is a "socio-religious and political organisation of Sikh

community of Punjab. It has been the spearhead of all political demands made on
behalf of the Sikhs for the last 75 years. The aim of the Akali Dal is the protection
of the Sikh's rights and ensuring their continued existence as an independent entity.
According to Baldev Raj Nayar, "not only does the Akali Dal proclaims itself as the
only representative body of the Panth, but it goes further and equates itself with the
Panth; it consider itself to be the Panth. ^ The closeness of the Akali Dal with the
Panth gives it all the features of the Panth. As Pannikar has pointed out, "The
philosophical conception of the community as a body in which the will of God
manifests and through which the purpose of human life can be fulfilled, gives the
Sikhs a conception of the State and the Church which has made them a compact and
united nation."'* Pannikar has further said that the Hegelian sub-ordination of
individual will to the collective will here, "exists as a real will and not merely as a
metaphysical fiction for the Sikhs but as a result of the belief that the Guru is
present in the Khalsa and the opinion of the community is the will of the Guru. It is
this feeling that has given the Sikhs their political and social unity and their loyalty
to the Panth. It gives them an ideal for which no sacrifice is deemed too much."^
The leader of the Akali Dal Master Tara Singh, had claimed that the; "Shiromani
Akali Dal exists as a political body and it is the only representative organisation of
the Sikhs, unlimited in its scope and activities."^ Akali Dal proclaims that the party
stands for the Sikh community, and is committed to maintain its identity for which it
seeks territory to establish a Sikh state where Sikh community should enjoy power.
Being a minority community asserts Akali Dal, the Sikhs must have an organisation
of their own to protect their interests against the onslaughts of the majority
community.

3. B.R. Nayar, Minority Politics in Punjab. Princeton University Press, Princeton. New
Jersey, 1966, p. 170.
4. K.M. Pannikar, The Ideals ofSikhism, Amritsar, Sikh Tract Society 1924, p. 20.
5. ' Ibid, pp. 16, 17.
6. The Tribune, June 17, 1956.
 52

The Akali movement marked the entry of middle class people like Master
Tara Singh and the transfer of political leadership from the landed aristocracy to the
Sikh middle class. The Akali Dal was dominated by Master Tara Singh for thirty
years since 1930. He trained his leadership through skilful control of the party
treasury, press and through the employment of political workers. The success of
Master Tara Singh's leadership owes to his identification with the Panth. It helped
him in getting the mass support of the Sikh community. However, a new trend of
religious leadership under Sant Fateh Singh emerged during the Punjab Suba
movement. Religious leadership combined with rich Jat peasantry, who dominate
the SGPC. However, the religiously oriented Jat Sikh leadership from the rural
areas has maintained its complete dominance on the SGPC which has enabled it to
control the Akali Dal.

The Akali Dal entered into political alliance with the Congress party in the
non-cooperation movement. It is assumed that Akali movement and the non-
cooperation movement reinforced each other in the Panjab. Gandhiji praised the
success of Akali March of Amratsar in early 1922 by sending a telegram to Baba
Kharak Singh that "the first decisive battle for independence won, congratulation."
So complete was the understanding between the Akali Dal and the Congress that
one could be a member of both the organisations simultaneously^.

During the period of national movement, though the Akali Dal co-operated
with the Congress party many times but it always maintained its separate
organisation to act as the political spokesman of the Sikh community. The first
achievement of the Akali Dal was the passage of the Gurudwara Act in 1925 which
made the S.G.P.G. a statutory authority. During the Civil Disobedience movement,
the Akali Dal under the guidance of Master Tara Singh, resolved to support the
movement. The Punjab Provincial Congress Committee formed a 'war council' to
coordinate the Civil Disobedience Movement in the Punjab. Master Tara Singh was
included in the council.* Later he was appointed 'dictator' of the 'war council' after
the arrest of Kitchlew.

7. Gopal Singh, "Genesis of Akali Agitation", The Times of India, New Delhi, March
15. 1984.
8. KG. Gulaty, The Akalis : Past and Present, Ashajanek Publications, Delhi, 1974, p.54.
 53

The participation of Sikhs in the Civil Disobedience Movement was cautious

and limited. The minority psychosis of the Sikhs made them think more in terms of
communal representation then bigger issues like the Civil Disobedience Movement.
In 1931, Master Tara Singh on behalf of the Akalis put a memorandum of 17
demands. The most important demand was made regarding the reorganisation of
Punjab to create a communal balance in a Muslim dominated province, Gandhiji had
characterized this demand as communal.

On the eve of 1937, elections of Punjab Assembly, Akali Dal joined hands
with the Congress party. The main cause of Akali alliance with the Congress were
revision of its attitude on the 1932, communal award. The alliance would help the
Akalis to fight against Khalsa National Party. Finally the Congress support would
safeguard their community's interest against domination of the Muslim community.
However, the liberty of the Sikhs in all religious and social matters were retained by
the Akali Dal. The general consensus among the Akali Dal leaders was that the Sikh
should choose such a path which is consistent with their self interest and that it
should not stand in the way of India's freedom. The Akali Dal decided to support
the recruitment of the Sikhs in the Army. Master Tara Singh believed that future
influence of the Sikh community depends mainly on their strength in the Army.

In 1940, the Akali Dal made its demand clear for a special political position
for the Sikhs in Punjab. The Akali Dal demanded a separate state for the Sikhs
when a partition proposal of the Punjab in to Muslim majority and Hindu majority
areas was made, that would have divided the Sikh community into two parts.

Thus we see in the pre-independence period the Akali Dal first emerged as a
religious reformation party but turned into a regional communal political party with
the sole aim of safeguarding the interests of the Sikh community. Despite its alliance
with Congress and participation in several national movements it could not shed its
communal overtones and kept the interest of the Sikh community or the Panth
Supreme.
 54

The regional structure of the post independence Punjab was three

dimensional - communal, linguistic and cultural with economic overtones.' The
bond of common language and cultural heritage which could have helped in the
development of a common Punjabi sub-nationalism too wore communal overtones.
The Akali Dai's programmes and policies since independence have always moved
around Sikh communalism and regionalism. As a communal party, it looks upon all
problems of politics from a sectional angle, and as a regional party, it necessarily
seeks for a larger degree of autonomy within the framework of Indian federalism.'^

After the partition of the country on communal basis, the Akali Dal emerged
as a political force in Punjab representing the Sikh community. The division of
Punjab on communal lines, which affected every sphere of life-political, economic,
social, linguistic, administrative cultural and moral equally influenced the population
pattern. The Sikhs who were a religious minority in the pre-independent Punjab
continues to be a religious minority even in post independent Punjab. The Hindus,
who constituted the minority in the United Punjab now became a majority. Muslims
who were in majority in pre-partition Punjab, were reduced to microscopic minority.
Thus, the fear of losing Sikh identity persists even in post independence Punjab. The
Akali Dal during its pre-independence agitations and movements, however, did not
succeed in satisfying its political demands yet it worked as a device for establishing
cultural boundaries of Sikh community. The partition transformed the Sikh
communalism of pre-independence into Sikh regionalism of post independence.

Baldev Raj Nayar has assigned three factors for Akali Dai's constant
endeavour to acquire a territorial unit in which the Sikhs as a community should
exercise political power.''

9. M.S. Rai, 'The structure of regional politics in the Punjab', in Paul Wallace &
Surendra Chopra (ed). Political Dynamics of Punjab, Deptt. of Pol. Science, Guru
Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1981, p. 115.
10. i.e. Anand, 'Punjab' in Iqbal Narain (ed). State Politics in India, Meenakshi
Prakashan, Meerut, 176, p. 294.
11. BR. Nayar, 'Sikh Separatism', in Donald Evgene Smith (Ed.), South Asian Politics
and Religion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, p. 154.
 55

1. The nature of the Sikh community as interpreted by Akali leaders and

intellectuals.

2. The fear of the possible disintegration of the community resulting from

religious unorthodoxy, and

3. A sense of grievance over alleged discrimination against the Sikh community.

The idea of a sovereign Sikh state has never been far away from the Sikh
mind. The demand for a Sikh majority Punjabi Suba was taken over by the Akali Dal
when in 1948 the Government created Patiala and East Punjab States Union
(PEPSU) a Sikh majority State and declared the Punjab a bilingual state. The Indian
National Congress which had committed to linguistic states changed its attitude
over the subject after the partition specially in case of the Punjab and the Sikhs. The
Constituent Assembly appointed a Linguistic Provinces Commission headed by S.K.
Dar, a retired High Court Judge in February 1948 followed by the JVP Committee
to discuss the feasibility of the proposal, but excluded the Punjab from its purview
on account of the various problems being faced by the province. Linking the change
in the Congress attitude with partition Nehru said, "partition in the country has
undoubtedly made many of us hesitant about changing the map of India... for
to unsettle and uproot the whole of India on the basis of theoretical approach on
linguistic division seems to me an extraordinarily unwise thing."'^ Master Tara
Singh, the Akali leader criticised the Government of India's policy of not referring
the question of demarcation of boundaries of the Punjab to the Dar Commission.
Master Tara Singh considered these steps as discrimination against the Sikhs and
raising the slogan of a Sikh state, he said "we have a culture different from the
Hindus. Our culture is Gurumukhi culture and our literature is also in the
Gurumukhi script". He added "We want to have a province where we can safeguard
our culture and our tradition."'^ Answering the criticism that his demand smacked
of communalism, he declared that he wanted the right of self-determination for
Panth in religious, social, political and other matters and added that "if this was

12. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi)

1954, p. 273.
13. Sat>a M. Rai, Punjab Since Partition, Durga Publications, Delhi, 1986, p. 273.
 56

dubbed as communalism, he was a communalist.'^ He, however, made it clear that

they did not want a separate and independent sovereign state. It would be "a part of
the federal unit which will have to give financial aid and help in the defence."'^

Almost immediately after Nehru's announcement, the Gopichand Bhargava

ministry declared the Punjab a bilingual state in April 1948, giving Hindi and Punjabi
equal status in government schools for primary classes. The decision to change the
status of Urdu as the only medium of instruction and to replace it with Hindi and
Punjabi was partly due to the communal atmosphere prevalent in the province and
partly on account of partition of the province since it was no longer a Muslim
majority state. The education department of the East Punjab Government ordered
that :
"All education in the schools of east Punjab shall be given in the
mother-tongue of the children and either Devnagari or Gurumukhi
script can be used in the 1st and 2nd class, provided arrangements be
made to teach Gurumukhi in the third class in schools where initially
Hindi is taught. The same rule is required to be observed in such
schools where the initial education was in Gurumukhi."'^

The order contained the seeds of what later came to be known as Sacher
formula. Although this government order included all the elements round which
acute controversies developed subsequently, surprisingly enough during that period
no one objected to its implementation.'^

The language issue assumed its political dimensions only in the year 1949,
for it was preceded by the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state and other
concessions by the Akali Party. The question was referred to the Punjab University
with the expectation that the academicians would fmd a solution mutually
satisfactory to both the communities. But the educationists proved to be as
susceptible to political and religious pressure as the politicians. The Hindu members
constituted a majority in the University Senate and when the Sikh members

14. The Tribune, 29, February, 1948.

15. Sat>a M. Rai, Op. Cit., p. 274.
16. Amarnath Vidyalankar, Bahmi Itihad Aur Regional Formula (Regional Formula and
Canununal Unity) Jallundur, 1956, pp.20-21.
17. Ibid, p. 21.
 57

discovered that their demand could not be met, they walked out of its meeting in
protest. The Hindu members adopted a resolution embodying their point of view
which in the absence of the support of the representatives of the other community
was not considered a workable solution. Consequently, the Punjab Government
decided to take the initiative in the matter.'*

The Punjab Government submitted its proposals popularly known as "Sachar

Formula" on the language question on 1st October, 1949. According to this formula,
the State was divided into two linguistic regions, Punjabi and Hindi. The language
of the region was to be the medium of instruction in all the school till matriculation
stage, and the children were required to learn the other language at the secondary
stage. The choice for the medium of instruction in the educational institutions was
left entirely to the parents or guardians of the pupils. The formula, however was not
obligatory for un-aided recognized schools where the medium of instruction was to
be determined by the management concerned. It was decided that the English and
Urdu would remain the official and court language and were to be progressively
replaced by Hindi and Punjabi.'^

The formula was widely acclaimed by the Sikhs including the Akalis, though
they criticised the right of the parents to choose the medium of instruction for the
education of their children^". The proposal however, met with sever criticism at the
hands of the Hindu Organizations like the Arya Samaj, the Jan Sangh and the Hindu
Maha Sabha. In order to counter the Akali demand of the Punjabi Suba, and the
claim of Punjabi as the regional language of the Punjabi-speaking area, these
organizations and the Hindu vernacular press started a campaign that the Hindus of
this area should declare Hindi as their mother-tongue^'.

The Akali press and leader started a counter-propaganda, which was

intensified during the census. Both the Hindu communal and Akali papers warned

18. Papers relating to Hindi Agitation in Punjab (Public Relations Department

Chandigarh), 1975, p. 11.
19. Satja M. Rai, Op.Cit., pp. 269-270.
20. Akali Patrika, 22 October, 1949.
21. /A/</. 23 January, 1951.
 58

their communities that they should be careful about false entries by the census
staf!^^, as it was openly alleged that the enumerators deliberately made false entries
in favour of Hindi or Punjabi in accordance with their own preference for one or the
other language. The atmosphere was so much charged with communal passion that
the members of two communities clashed in a number of places.^^ The situation,
thus, took a bitter turn. "This led during the last census operations to a situation in
which the separate tabulation of Hindi and Punjabi-speaking people had to be
abandoned. "^^

The conflict between the Hindus and Sikhs, however, took a sharp turn from
this day onward. The Sikhs felt that the Hindus by denying the right of the Punjabi
as their mother tongue wanted to gain a position of superiority over them. The
Hindu communal organizations objecting to this right of Punjabi, argued that the
government by declaring Gurumukhi as the only script for Punjabi had denied to
them their right to name their mother tongue. They were, they declared left with no
other alternative but to declare Hindi as their mother-tongue.^^

The demand for 'Punjabi Suba' and Punjabi language got impetus when
minority rights were being discussed by the Constituent Assembly. The question
relating to the treatment to be accorded to the Sikhs was referred to a committee of
the Constituent Assembly which included Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabbhai Patel, Dr.
Rajendra Prasad and Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar.^^ This Committee appointed a ten-
member sub-committee to evolve on agreed formula in respect of all communal
questions affecting the East Punjab. The sub-committee recommended that "in view
of the fact that seats in the House of People and the Legislative Assemblies of the
States had been reserved for other religious minorities, provisions for reservation of
(seats for religious minorities of) the East Punjab and other States should also be
made if and where demanded."^^ Some of the members of the sub-committee urged

22. Ibid, 14 February, 1951.

23. /*/</. 23 Februar>', 1951.
24. Report of the States Reorganization Commission (SRC), 1955. New Delhi, p. 14 J.
25. Akali Patrika, Jullundur, 18 January, 1951.
26. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 8 November 1948.
27. Jbid., Delhi, 15 NOvember 1948.
 59

that the Sikhs should be given more seats in the Legislature than was their due on
population basis, but the sub-committee could not come to a unanimous decision on
this part.
The Minority Committee, however, disapproved the suggestion of the
reservation of seats for religious minorities, and consequently no seats were
reserved for the Sikhs in any legislature.

The communal issue in Punjab was further complicated when the Sikh
members of the East Punjab Legislative Assembly, except Pratap Singh Kairon,
presented a list of thirteen demands in November, 1948 for consideration to the
Constituent Assembly of India. The important among them were^* .

1. Representation be given to the Sikhs on the basis of 1941 census without

excluding Sikhs who had migrated to other provinces.

2. They should be given five per cent representation in the centre and
reservation of seats in other provinces.

3. One Sikh minister and one deputy minister be taken in the central cabinet.

4. Post of the Governor and the Premier of the East Punjab should go
alternatively to a Hindu or a Sikh.

5. Fifty per cent representation in the provincial cabinet and the Assembly be
reserved for them.

6. Forty per cent seats in services should be reserved for Sikhs.

7. If the above demands were rejected, Sikhs should be allowed to form a new
province of seven districts including Ambala.

These demands, however, were not acceptable to the Congress or the

Constituent Assembly, who were committed to the secular state, and were against
the communal politics that had dominated pre-independence politics. Hukam Singh
pleaded the case of the Sikhs in the Constituent Assembly, but Sardar Pate!
reminded him that the Sikh members had agreed that they would not ask for any

28. The Statesman,'November 4. I94i.

 60

further concessions if the Siich backward castes were given rights equivalent to the
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and the Constituent Assembly decided that
there was to be no reservation for minorities in services except for the backward
and scheduled castes.^' Since the Sikhs backward castes had been given equal
concessions like those given to scheduled castes, the Akali demand could not be
acceptable.

The suspicious, hostile and rather aggressive attitude of the Hindu

communalists, further complicated the political situation in the Punjab. Majority of
them were of the opinion that the Muslim League could achieve Pakistan because of
the appeasement policy of the Congress. Now that the partition was a fact and a
majority of the Muslims had gone over the other side, the Government of India
should follow a strong policy towards all religious minorities. The Akali demand for
a separate Punjabi Suba, was interpreted by them as a strategy designed to create a
separate Sikh State and the press other than Akali, condemned the move as
following the foot-steps of the Muslim League.^®

By 1950 the Akali Dal has secured important political concession from the
government by working within the Congress party, but it encountered resistance to
the demand of Punjabi Suba. The Akali Dal then decided to break away from the
Congress party on the issue of a Punjabi speaking state within the Indian Union, and
participate as an independent political party in the first general elections to be held
in 1951-52. The manifesto published by the Akali Dal for the 1951-52 elections
declared, "the true test of democracy, in the opinion of the Shromani Akali Dal, is
that the minorities should feel that they are really free and equal partners in the
distiny of their country; (a) to bring home this sense of freedom to the Sikhs, it is
vital that a Punjabi speaking province should be carved out from the different states
of the country on the basis of Punjabi language and culture, (b) The Shiroman Akali
Dal is in favour of formation of provinces on linguistic and cultural basis throughout
India, but holds it is a question of life and death for the Sikhs for a new Punjab to
be created immediately, (c) The Shromani Akali Dal has reasons to believe that a

29. The Tribune, Ambala, 18 November, 1948.

30. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, November II, 1948.
 61

Punjabi speaking province may give Sikhs the needful security. It believes in a
Punjabi speaking province as an autonomous unit of India. "^'

The Akali Dal went into the first general elections as an independent political
party with great enthusiasm. It fought the election on the basic issue of Punjabi
Suba, but the result were a great disappointment to the Akali leaders. The Akali Dal
was able to win only 14 seats in a house of 126. Some Akali leaders were of the
opinion that the interests of the Sikhs as conceived by the Akali Dal could best be
pursued through sharing political power by either an alliance or merger with the
Congress party, especially since even the S.G.P.C. was under the control of a group
opposed to the Akali Dal. At the same time, it was felt that the Akali Dal should
secure political concessions on the demand for Punjabi Suba and favourable terms
for entry into the Congress party.^^

In October 1952, as a result of a new coalition of groups, the Akali Dal once
again assumed control of the S.G.P.C. after being out of office for a period of four
years. Meanwhile, the Akali Dal began to press vigorously the demand for Punjabi
Suba and threats were made about the use of other methods of struggle for its
achievement. Master Tara Singh declared that "we are prepared to make any amount
of sacrifice for the achievement of our objective. "^-^

With the appointment of States Reorganisaiton Commission (SRC) by the

Government of Indian under the Chairmanship of Justic S. Fazal Ali, to go into the
problem of redrawing of state boundaries in the winters of 1953, the Akalis once
again asserted that the Punjab too should be carved on a linguistic basis. Punjabi
according to them, is the oldest language among the languages originating from the
Aryan language.^"* Besides, it has got its own script-Gurumukhi-which had
originated from Brahmi script. It has its own separate culture and folk music and
dances.^^ The case for a Punjabi speaking state was supported by the Communist

31. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Op. Cit., p. 295.

32. BR. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1966, p. 237.
33. The Tribune, Ambala, January 19, 1953.
34. Memorandum to the States Reoganisation Commission (Punjabi) (Amritsar, n.d),
pp. 3-4.
35. Ibid, pp. 11.
 62

party and the Socialist party. On the contrary a case for the Maha Punjab comprising
of Punjab, PEPSU, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi and few districts of Western UP. was
presented by the Hindu Maha Sabha, the Jan Sangh and the Arya Samaj. The Hindu
organisations characterised Punjabi Suba demand as communal. This was actually a
counter move by the Hindu organisations and Hindi supporters to defeat the case of
the Akali Dal.

The case for greater Punjab, however, had the support of the Hindus in
Punjab Congress as well, though it did not advocate the merger of western districts
of UP. and Delhi.'^ The working committee of the Congress party in its meeting in
April, 1954, decided that all Congress committees and Congressmen should have
full freedom to represent their points of view before the SRC. In case of any
difference of opinion, the minority in any Congress committee was free to represent
its views before the commission. The Punjab Congress committee, accordingly,
decided that Congress members would meet the S.R.C. in their individual capacity.
It is an open secret that majority of the Hindu Congressmen advocated merger of
Himachal Pradesh and PEPSU in the Punjab, while a large number of Sikh
Congressmen supported the demand of the Punjabi-speaking province.^^

The Punjab government, in its memorandum to the States Reorganization

Commission advocated the formation of the Greater Punjab which was more or less
on the same lines as suggested by the Hindu organisations.

The sharp division between the Punjabi speaking people themselves and
irrational attitude taken by the Hindus led by Arya Samaj and other communal
organisations and ambivalent attitude of the Akalis, however, created a very
complicated situation in the Punjab. The Akalis raised the slogan of Punjabi Suba
while the Hindu organizations raised the bandwagon of Maha Punjab. Communalism
was writ large on Punjab politics.

With a view to check the popular upsurge and maintain peaceful conditions,
the Punjab government put a ban on 6th April, 1955 on the shouting of slogans

36. Satya M. Rai, Op.CU., p 290.

37. /6;<y. pp. 290-291.
 63

including that of the "Punjabi Suba". Akali took it as a challenge on their right of
free expression and they adopted a resolution at Amritsar on April 24, 1955, that
they would launch a peaceful satyagraha to establish their right to raise a slogan of
Punjabi Suba zindabad unless the order was withdrawn by 10th May, 1955. The ban
was not lifted, therefore. Master Tara Singh along with others courted arrest on
May 10, 1955 by raising the slogan and defying the ban. The Akali Morcha,
however, attracted mass support from the villagers and enjoyed both implicit and
explicit support from a number of political parties.^* On July 4, 1955 a clash in the
precincts of the Golden Temple took place between the processionists and the
police led to widespread resentment all over the state against the unwarranted
official action and agitation assumed unthinkable proportions. Realizing the inherent
danger in the situation, the government withdrew ban on 12th July, 1955, which
was followed by Akali declaration of suspension of 64 days old campaign against
the government.^^

Many Congress leaders thought this action of Punjab Chief Minister Sachar a
mistake tactically, since the ban was to lapse two days later in any case, but the
Akalis interpreted it as a 'surrender' by Sachar and a 'victory' for the Akalis.^^

Soon after the end of the agitation the Akali Dal initiated moves to take
advantage of the 'victory' it had won. After a meeting of the executive committee of
the Akali Dal on July 14, 1955, an Akali spokesman announced that Akali leaders
would be willing to meet with Prime Minister Nehru, if invited, in order 'to discuss
the problems of the Sikh community".'" The Akali Dai's acting president stated in
Amritsar that Akali leaders would accept a decision by Nehru 'regarding Sikh
grievances and creation of Punjabi speaking state, if our leaders are convinced and
satisfied by his arguments and reasoning through mutual consultation and
negaotiation."'*^

38. ne Tribune, Ambala. 16 June, 1955.

39. Satya M. Rai, Punjab Since Partition, op.cit. p. 291.
40. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 13, 1955.
41. Ibid. July, 16 1955.
42. The Statesman, New Delhi, July 19, 1955.
 64

The States Reorganisation Commission submitted its report on 30

September, 1955, to the government of India. The report of the S R C . gave a new
turn to the Akali agitation in Punjab. The problem in the Punjab, thus, was observed
as unique by the S.R.C.
"while other demands for separation from existing composit stat have
had the backing of an overwhelming majority of the people of the
language group seeking such separation, the demand for a Punjabi-
speaking state is strongly opposed by large sections of people
speaking the Punjabi language and residing in the areas proposed to
be constituted into a Punjabi-speaking state. The problem, therefore,
is sui generis. It has to be examined against its own peculiar
background."'*^

The Commission was of the opinion that linguistic homogeneity was

considered an instrument to ensure clear association of the government with the
people, but this criterion did not apply to the Punjab because both Hindi and Punjabi
were understood by the people with equal ease. According to the Commission, "the
problem of language in the Punjab is therefore, primarily one of scripts and in this
battle of script sentiment is arrayed against sentiment.^^

The Commission was of the opinion that the formation of the proposed
Punjabi-speaking state would neither help to solve the script problem, nor the
communal problem. The imposition of Gurumukhi script on a section of the people
strongly opposed to it would create a number of other problems for "whatever the
legitimacy of such a demand may be, there is no method by which a person can be
compelled to adopt a mother-tongue other than that for which he himself shows his
preference...."''' Therefore, even a Punjabi speaking province would remain a
bilingual state for intsructions in Hindi would have to be arranged on an extensive
scale, particularly when Hindi was being used by 62.2 per cent of the candidates
from Juliundur Division, as shown in the Punjab University examinations from
1950-55."'"'

43. Report of the States Reorganization Commission, New Delhi, 1955, p. 144.
44. Ibid, p. 143.
45. /6»rf, p. 144.
46. Ibid
 65

Finally the States Reorganization Commission rejected the case of a Punjabi

speaking state assigning several short comings to it. According to the S R C . the
demand lacks the general support of the people inhabiting the area, and secondly,
because it will not eliminate any of the cause of friction from which the demand for
a separte Punjabi speaking state emanates. The proposed state will solve neither the
language problem nor the communal problem and for from remaining internal
tension, which exists between communal and not linguistic and regional groups, it
might further exacerbate the existing feelings.''^

The States Reorganization Commission while rejecting the case for division
of Punjab , recommended that the existing states of the Punjab (except the Loharu
sub-tehsil of Hisar Distt.) PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh should be merged in a
single integrated unit. It appealed to the Sikhs not to press their point for their
immense creative energy needed "greater opportunities than those which a small
unit (could) offer".'**

The report of the S R C . evoked violent reactions in the Sikh quarters. The
Akalis were very much disappointed with the report, and alleged that it was a
conspiracy to destroy the Sikh nation and that the S.R.C. had delivered 'Sikhs
bound hand and foot to the slavery of an aggressively communal group.''^ Master
Tara Singh declared on 11 October, 1955 at Manji Sahib that they had already
announced their no confidence in the commission and, therefore, they were not
bound by its recommendations.^'' Gyani Kartar Singh said that out of the 14
recognized languages in the Indian Constitution, 13 States had been formed on
linguistic basis. Only 'Punjab Suba' had not been formed because Sikh loyalty was
suspected.^' Even the Congress Sikhs in a convention on 5th November 1955,
disapproved of the S R C . report on the Punjab, stated that justice had not been
done to the minority community.^^ Hukam Singh referred to it as 'another deadlier

47. Ibid, p. 146.

48. Ibid, p. 258.
49. The Tribune, Ambala, 7 Oct. 1953.
50. Akali (Punjabi), JuUundar, 13, Oct. 1955.
51. Ibid, 14 Oct. 1955.
52. The Tribune, Ambala, 7 Oct. 1955.
 66

blow to Sikhs"" and threatened that the Akalis would launch an agitation if peaceful
negotiation failed.^^

The report of the commission met with scathing criticism at the hands of the
Sikh legislators both Akali and non-Akali. Bhai Jodh Singh speaking on the subject
said that if Punjabi Suba had been formed, the communal parties would have
vanished and the parties would have been formed on political rather than communal
basis.'* Sohan Singh Jash, the communist leader, was of the opinion that the conflict
was mainly between the Hindu and Sikh leaders of the Jullundur Division. The
people of the Punjab, the Himachal and PEPSU were agreed in favour of linguistic
states."

The Akali Dal launched a massive agitation against the report of the S.R.C.
in 19S5. Apparently this agitation convinced the government that the Akali Dal was
a powerful political force, and the government made a conciliatory gesture to bring
the agitation to a close. A five-member Akali delegation headed by Master Tara
Singh met the Prime Minister Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Pandit G.B.
Pant on 23 November, 1955 to represent their point of view.'^ As a result of the
negotiations a compromise formula was evolved known as 'Regional Formula', which
the Akali Dal formally accepted on March 11, 1956, in a convention of its general
body.

Under the regional formula the state of PEPSU was merged in the Punjab but
Himachal Pradesh - which was over-whelmingly Hindu - was retained as a separate
territorial unit. The new state was divided into two so-called Punjabi-speaking and
Hindi-speaking regions, with a view to safeguard the interests of the two language
groups. To ensure, however, administrative unity of the reorganised state a single
Governor and a single legislature, with a single council of ministers, was provided.

53. The Spokesman, No. 39, Oct. 12 1955, p. 1.

54. /6if/,No. 40, 1966, p. 1.
55. Punjab Legislative Council Debates, 12: 1, 11 November, 1955 (Chandigarh, 1955)
p. 32.
56. Ibid, 12 : 2, 25 November 1955, p. 26.
57. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 24 November, 1955.
 67

Two regional committees, consisting of the members of the State Assembly

belonging to each region were constituted to deal with specified matters. Any
proposed legislation on some fourteen subjects, dealing with economic and social
development, had to be referred to the regional committees, and the state
government and the state legislature were normally expected to accept the advice
given by the regional committees; in case of difference of opinion, the decision of
the Governor was to be final and binding.'* The regional committees were further
empowered to make proposals, not involving financial commitments, on those
fourteen subjects for either legislation or executive policy. The provisions regarding
the regional committee, even if without a majority in the state legislature, could still
implement its programme on the fourteen subjects that were listed in the formula.'^

The Government of India empowered the State government to demarcates

the Hindi and Punjabi regions. The regional language of each region was declared as
the official language. With a view to promote the development of the two languages
- Hindi and Punjabi - it recommended establishment of the two separate
departments.^ The demarcation of the state into two region, Punjabi and Hindi
speaking regions was not included in the regional formula but was left for later
determination. However, as in the case of the Sachar formula, the actual
demarcation was not made solely on a linguistic basis. Certain overwhelmingly
Hindu areas were excluded from the Punjabi-speaking region, even though they
were linguistically no different from other areas that were included in the region,
with the result that the Punjabi region turned out to be a Sikh-majority region.^'
The regional formula further provided that the provisions of the Sachar Formula
concerning the medium of instruction would continue to apply in the areas of the
Punjab before the merger,and that in the areas of the former PEPSU state the
arrangement already existing therein regarding language instruction would
continue."

58. B.R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, Op.Cit., p. 222.

59. Ibid, pp. 222-223.
60. Satya M.Rai, Op. Cit., 296.
61. B.R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab. Op.Cit., p. 223.
62. Ibid, p. 223.
 68

Regional Plan, however, was not acceptable to the Hindu communalist and
the people of Haryana. The Maha Punjabees were opposed to the suggestion of
Hindi being made a second language in the proposed Punjabi region and accused the
government of yielding the Akali pressure. The Maha Punjab Samiti threatened
"direct action", if a mutually satisfactory solution to the Punjab tangle was not
found by 17 June, 1956. They opppsed the government-Akali settlement for they
had not been previously consulted. They suggested that a round table conference of
Akalis and other parties should be called to recommend agreed changes.*^^

The Government of India neither with drew the Regional Plan as suggested
by the Maha Punjab Samiti, nor did they call a round table conference. The Samiti
launched a movement known as Hindi-Satyagraha and brought the Arya Samaj for
the forefront to fight the cause of Hindi both in the Punjabi and Hindi speaking
areas. By raising the slogan of "Hindi in danger", it not only united the Hindus of
the Jullender Division and Haryana, but aroused sympathies of Hindi lovers from
outside the Punjab. There was near unanimity of opinion among Hindus irrespective
of party lables that no language should be made compulsory medium of instruction
while a majority of the Sikhs insisted on Punjabi in Gurumukhi letters as the
compulsory regional language.^ The division was sharp in the legislatures, urban
areas and educational institutions.

With the acceptance of the regional formula by the Akali Dal, a section of it
felt that the party had no utility now. A prominent Akali leader Gian Singh Rarewala
issued a statement in May 1956 urging that, under the changed circumstances, the
Akali Dal should leave the political field and confine itself to only social, cultural,
religious and educational activities of the Sikhs.^^ He wanted the Akali Dal to allow
its members "to join the progressive and national forces and take fiill part in the re-
building of the country." Rarewala later started discussion with Congress leaders in
order to facilitate the entry into the Congress party of his group. Master Tara Singh
immediately branded Rarewala's move as a "treachery and made it clear that the

63. Organiser, 7 May 1956, p. I.

64. SatyaM. Rai, 0;j.C;7.,p. 299.
65. The Tribune, Ambala, May 25, 1956.
 69

Akali Dal would maintain its independent exitence because of his belief in the
independent political entity of the Sikhs".^''

In October 1956, the Akali Dal decided through a resolution that the Akali
Dal "would in future concentrate and confine itself to religious, educational,
cultural, social and economic betterement of the Sikhs, " and that " in regard to
political activities the members and supporters of the Akali Dal will be advised to
join the Congress party.^' The Congress party said that it was unwilling to entertain
the demand that Akali members be allowed dual membership both in the Akali Dal
and the Congress party. It was up to the Akali Dal to change its position. After
some hesitation, the Akali constitution was amended in accordance with the wishes
of the Congress party. In its endeavour to join the Congress party, the Akali Dal
thus gave up its political character despite its repeated assertions over the years
about the separate political entity of the Sikhs. Most of the prominent Akali leaders
and their supporters joined the Congress party, but Tara Singh decided to stay out,
saying : I will consider the question of joining the Congress after the general
election.^* Nonetheless, an era of close and cordial relations between the Congress
party and the Akali Dal seemed to have begun, and Tara Singh remarked that
"Nehru's honour is our (Sikhs) honour.^'

The period of cordiality did not last long. The Akalis who had accepted the
Plan were now faced with the opposition from the Hindu communal section and
unwilingness of the Punjab Government to enhance the status of Punjabi language,
once again renewed the demand for Punjabi Suba and revived the Akali Dal as an
opposition party against the government in repudiation of the settlement under
which most of the Akali leaders functioned within the Congress party and
government.

The Akali Dal pressed even more stridently for Punjabi Suba and resort to
organise Shahidi Jattha (group of potential martyrs), court-arrest, dharna, and even

66. The Times of India, New Delhi, June 9, 1956.

67. The Spokesman, VI, No. 40, October 8, 1956. p.2.
68. The Hindustan Times., Delhi. October 5, 1956.
69. The Spokesman, VI, No. 40 October 8, 1956, p. 1
 70

go to fast unto-death by its leader Sant Fateh Singh and Master Tara Singh in 1960
and 1961 respectively. But the Government was not willing to heed their demand
for a separate Punjabi Suba. The Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promised to do
everything possible for the advancement of the Punjabi language, but left no doubt
about his opposition to the demand for Punjabi Suba. In his opinion Punjabi Suba
was not in the interest of Sikhs, Punjab or India. He said that the non-formation of
Pujabi Suba was not due to any discrimination against the Sikhs, but making clear
his conviction that Punjabi Suba would be harmful to all concern. On the linguistic
re-organisation of states, Nehru reiterated that "many matters have to be taken into
consideration for each area" and that "language is not the sole consideration".^" He
assured the Akali Dal that there was no question of discrimination against Punjabor
distrust of the Sikhs, "and that Punjabi would have the position of dominant
language". He refused to accept the contention that the denial of Punjabi Suba
amounted to discrimination against the Sikhs. He declared on the floor of the Lok
Sabha on August 28, 1961, that Punjabi Suba demand even if made on the language
basis would be a communal demand."

In the meantime, certain fundamental changes were taking place at the level
of support structure of the Akali Dal. The urban Sikhs-businessmen, professional
and intelligentia and those aspiring to benefit from wider opportunity at All-India
level were losing interest in the sectarion demand of the party. But in the rural
areas there was greater response to the Akali programme mainly on the basis of its
emotive appeal which is evident from the composition of the agitators who
responded to the call of the Morcha in 1960-61. The landed forming community
was dismayed at the pricing policy of agricultural production, restrictions on grain
trade under zonal scheme and apprehensive about the land reforms, which attracted
them to regional and anti-centre programme of the Akali Dal.'^

The change in the support base of the Akali Dal and growing popularity of
Sant fateh Singh finally led to a split in the party in July 1962 and transfer of

70. /6/c/,,XI,No. 2, (1961), p.I2.

71. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, August 29, 1961.
72. Satya M. Rai, Op.Cit, pp. 305-306.
 71

leadership of the majority being to Sant Fateh Singh. The new party made out that
they had fundamental difference with the parent body on the question of nature and
concept of Punjabi Suba. Sant Fateh Singh announced that the question of Punjabi
Suba would be pursued by his party on purely linguistic basis and a Suba at the cost
of Hindu-Sikh unity would not be worth fighting for7^

The 'new approach' of Sant Fateh Singh couched in the secular-political

ethos of the Indian political system led to getting sympathetic response from the
forces who were feeling shy of coming out openly in support of a Sikh majority
state. The Communist party argued that the Sant Akali group represented the
'progressive' elements in the party and had succeeded in weeding out of reactionary
and fundamentalist elements. It also got support from a large section of
Congressman as well as the people in Himachal Pradesh and Haryana region. The
central leadership too could no longer resist it as the Sant's unequivocal demand for
linguistic reorganization and emphasis on communal harmony, unity and integrity of
the country, left them with no choice but to accept it or otherwise it could be a
clear case of discrimination against Punjab and suspicion regarding loyality of the
Sikhs."''*

In a strategic move, Sant Fateh Singh temporarily suspended the Punjabi

Suba movement in the wake of Indo-Chinese war in 1962 and offered unconditional
support to Nehru government in war efforts - an important factors to soften the
attitude of Nehru government. While the demand for Punjabi Suba was slowly but
steadly making an advance, but untimely death of Prime Minister Nehru in 1964
hastened its process for some time.'' In 1965 however, Lai Bahadur Shastri, the
new Prime Minister, had a round of talks with Sant Fateh Singh, but reiterated the
old position for the advancement of Punjabi language and redressal of Sikh
grievances but was convinced that there was no basis for the establishment of
Punjabi Suba. At this juncture Sant Fateh Singh announced from the Akal Takhat on

73. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba : The Story of the Struggle, U.C. Kapoor and Sons,
Delhi, 1970, p. 386.
74. Satya M. Rai, Op.Cit., p. 309.
75. Ibid,
 72

15 August, 1965 that he would go on a 15 days fast from 10 September 1965 inside
the Golden Temple in support of Punjabi Suba demand and in case the demand was
not conceded till then, he would immolate himself on 25 September while the Sant
Fateh Singh was still to start fast and Shastri invited him for talks to Delhi, the
Indo-Pak war in early September intervened and the Sant Fateh Singh gave up the
idea of his fast in face of emergency facing the nation.^^

After the war the Central Government took initiative to resolve the Punjab
problem. A Cabinet Committee, consisting of Y.B. Chauan, Indira Gandhi and
Mahavir Tyagi and assisted by a 22 member Parliamentary Consultative Committee,
headed by Lok Sabha speaker Hukam Singh, was appointed to tackle the
longstanding issue of reorganization of the Punjab. In the meantime, Indira Gandhi
had become the Prime Minister after the sad demise of Lai Bahadur Shastri. She got
the following resolution passed in a meeting of the Congress Working Committee
without waiting for the report by the Cabinet and Consuhative Commiteees.
"Out of the existing State of Punjab a State with Punjabi as the State
language be formed. The Government is requested to take necessary
steps for the purpose."^'
The Consultative Parliamentary committee submitted its report on 18 March,
1966. It recommended that the Punjabi speaking region be reconstituted into a
unilingual Punjabi State, that the Hindi-speaking region be formed into Haryana
State and the hill areas of the erstwhile Punjab be merged with Himachal Pradesh. It
was also suggested that for the adjustment of boundaries between the three states a
committee should be appointed. The recommendation was officially accepted on 21
March, 1966 by the Government of India and a Punjab Boundary Commission under
the chairmanship of Justice J.C. Shah with Subimal Dutt and MM. Philip as
members was appointed. The term of reference apart from linguistic factor included
(i) administrative convenience, (ii) economic well-being, (iii) geographical
contiguity, and (iv) facility of communications.^*

76. /6/i/, pp. 309-310.

77. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 10 March 1966.
78. Satya M. Rai, Op. Cit., p. 311.
 73

In its report the commission reorganised the state by giving Hindi speaking
areas to Haryana, Punjabi speaking areas to reorganised Punjab and Hill areas
(including Kangra and Shimla ditricts) to Himachal Pradesh. Kharar Tehsil and
Chandigarh were awarded to Haryana by a majority decision (of two members). In
his dissenting note Subimal Dutt argued for the inclusion of Kharar and Chandigarh
into Punjab. The Shah commission report with minor modification was introduced
as Punjab Reorganization Bill, 1966 and was approved by both houses of the
Parliament in September 1966. Taking note of Subimal Dutt's comments, Kharar
Tehsil was included in the Punjab but Chandigarh and neighbouring villages were
formed into a Union Territory. A significant feature of the bill was regarding "the
common links between the two states which provided for a common Governor, a
common High Court, common university, common electricity board and
warehousing corporation, a common State Finance Corporation, etc. It was,
however, made clear by the Home Minister, that the two successor states would be
free to swap the links after a lapse of one year.^^

On 18 September, 1966 Punjab Reorganization Bill (1966) received the

President's assent and Punjab was divided once again, this time into three parts. The
new Punjab with 56 per cent Sikh population came into existence on 1st November,
1966. Thus for the first time the Akalis had not only been able to get Punjabi Suba
but also a Sikh majority state. It was hoped that this would mean their 'last
demand'*^ as Sant Fateh Singh promised.

The demand of Punjabi suba in post independence India was the result of the
Akalis firm commitment to achieve a Sikh state in pre-independence India. This
demand in the pre-independence has established certain doctrines that "the Sikhs
constitute a separate political entity , that they must act as a single group in politics,
that they can be only rulers or rebels and that religion and politics are inseparable"*'.
The failure of the Akali leaders and Sikhs to achieve political power for Sikhs in

79. Most of the Common Links between Punjab and Haryana, as had been Anticipated
Disapeared Except a Common High Court.
80. M. J. Akbar, India : The Siege Within, New York, 1985, p. 163.
81. BR. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, Op.Cit., p. 101.
 74

pre-independence peresisted even ofter independence. They thought it essential for

the Sikh community and even for the survival of their leadership.

Another important motive for the demand of Punjbi Suba was growth of
religious unorthodoxy among the Sikhs. This was the result of the impact of modern
scientific and industrial age. This religious unorthodoxy culminated into the
absorption of the Sikhs in the Hindu community and ultimatly their assimilation.
The basis of this assimilation is stated to be the close cultural and social relations
between the Hindus and the outer-forms and symbols from the reformed sections of
Hinduism. The Sikh leader approached the Prime Minister to provide legal
protection to check the phenomena of unorthodoxy and maintain the traditions of
the Sikh religion. However, Nehru expressed his helplessness to implement the
teaching of any particular religion under a secular state. This is why Master Tara
Singh declared that Hinduism and secular nationalism are equally dangerous for
Sikhism. The Sikhs think that they can check the unorthodoxy if they are in majority
in a Punjabi Suba. The sense of political power, they think will work as check on
the unorthodoxy.

Solution to the problem of unorthodoxy is sought by the Akalis through the

demand for establishment of a Punjabi Suba. Master Tara Singh explained the
relationship between unorthodoxy and the Punjabi Suba like this :
"The Sikh must be preserved as a distinct community and they can be
preserved only in a 'home land' of Sikhs. Sikhs will be gradually
"observed" by the majority community if left in their present position.
This he must avoid at least in his own life time. Sikhs with their
distinct exterior symbol can last as a separate community only when
they enjoy power and can extend patronage for the continuance of the
symbols. "^^

The issue of unorthodoxy and Punjabi Suba reveals "how a social

phenomenon makes for demands on the political system. It poses at the same time a
challenge for the Sikh Community in its confrontation with a secular state and the
era of science, industry and urbanisation."*-^

82. The Times of India, New Delhi, September 12, 1955.

83. B.R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, Op.Cit., p. 111.
 75

A valid analysis of Shiromani Akali Dai's concept of state autonomy must

take cognizance of the party commitment to the preservation of distinct Sikh
identity, the achievement of an independent political state for the community and its
self perception "as integral with the panth and as a political arm of the religious
body. The creation of a Punjabi speaking state of Punjab was undoubtedly a major
landmark in Akali Dal pursuit of its political goal. In terms of political clout, the
new state offered the Sikhs less than what was implied in the vaguely defined idea
of an 'independent' Sikh state officially approved as a goal by the Akali Dal and the
Shiromani Gurudawara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) in March 1946, but it did
place the community in a much better possition politically. For the first time, the
sikhs achieved a territorial unit in which they would have a clear majority.
Therefore, the community and the Akali Dal would have ample opportunities of
exercising and sharing political power.

(ii) Movement for Maharashtra

The origins of an idea that Maharashtra is a different society from other can
be traced in the writings of Mahanvbhav sect of 12the century. The Mahanvbhav
were proud of Marathi language and the region of Marathi speaking people. This
consciousness was based on common language though the society was divided into
various sects, castes and sub-castes. The foundation of Marathi as a language of the
people and social norms, institutions and religious traditions and customs peculiar
to Maharashtra region were laid down in the 12th Century. The great saint poets
liks Dayaneshwar and Tukaram continued the tradition. This continuity over a
period of time gave regional, linguistic and cultural unity to today's Maharashtra.
The rise of Shivaji and development of Marathi empire afterwards helped in more
than one ways the continuation of Maharashtra Consciousness and distinctiveness.
During the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century Maharashtrian
leaders were in the fore front of social reform and national movement. Ball
Gangadhar Tilak supported the demand for linguistic provinces and his Kesari had
condemned the division of Marathi speaking people in different provinces and
Princely states. The intelectuals like N.C.Celkar, V.V. Tamhankar, Vinoba Bhave,
 76

DR. Gadgil and K.S. Thackray during 1908 to 1928, envisaged a province of
Marathi speaking people by unification of Marathi speaking areas.*''

The movement for separate Marathi speaking province had started first in
Nag-Vidarbha. Nagpur was part of the British Central Provinces when Vidarbha,
having been takan from the Nizam of Hyderabad was added to it. In 1917, the Berar
(Vidarbha) Provincial Congress committee petitioned the Secretary of state for
India and the Viceroy, to recommend the creation of a Marathi speaking province in
central India. They argued that Vidarbha was being exploited by the Central
Province's Hindi-speaking majority. By 1938, the demand for a separate Marathi
Province had spread to the Nagpur Provincial Congress Committee. The Maha
Vidarbha Samiti was formed in 1940 under the leadership of one of the area's most
prominent Congressman Dr. M.S. Aney. The Samiti's demand was to carve out a
unilingual Marathi speaking province from the central province's Vidarbha division
(Amaravti, Akola, Yeotmal and Buldhana) and the four districts of its Nagpur
division (Nagpur, Wardha, Bhandara and Chanda).*^

Simultaneously with the Maha Vidarbha Samiti, another organization named

Samyukta Maharashtra Sabha was formed in 1940. But a really effective campaign
for the unification of Marathi speaking areas started only in the year 1946 with the
formation of Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad. Congress, other parties and
intellectuals were represented on the Parishad.

In August 1946, the movement for Maha Vidarbha and the movement of
Samyukta Maharashtra joined in an uncertain and qualified alliance and signed a
pact known as 'Akola Pact'. The Akola Pact provided for one Maharashtra
composed of two autonomous sub-regions, western Maharashtra and Mahavidarbha.
After the appointment of Dar Commission (S.K. Dar a retired High Court judge) by
the President of the Constituent Assembly in 1948, to report on the question of
formation of the Provinces of Andhra, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra. The

84. Arun Audholkar and Rajendra Vora. "Regionalism in Maharashtra", in Akhtar Majeed
(ed). Regionalism Developmental Tension in India, Cosmo Publication, New Delhi.
1984, pp. 93-94.
85. Ibid, pp. 97-98.
 77

leaders of all the political parties met the commission and presented their case and
evidences. But the commission dismissed the Akola Pact on the ground that it
reflects conflicting demands of Maha Vidarbha and Maharashtra and recommended
that language should not be the criteria for reorganisation of states in future, and
said that a United Province should not be formed.*^

After the report of the Dar Commission, a committee was appointed by the
Indian National Congress at Jaipur session in 1948, to study the issue of
reorganization of states on linguistic basis. The Linguistic Provinces Committee
known as 'J.V.P.' committee consisted of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar
Vallabbhai Patel and Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, "to revive the position and to
examine the question in the light of the decision taken by the Congress in the past
and the requirements of the existing situation."" The J.V.P. committee also
supported the Dar Commission's recommendation but kept it negotiable by allowing
the formation of a joint province if the leaders of the Vidarbha and Nagpur
wanted it.

After the appointment of State Reorganization commission under the

chairmanship of Justice FazI Ali, with two members H.N. Kunzru and K.M. Panikar
on December 22, 1953, to examine the issue of reorganization. The leaders of the
Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad thought that movement for Samyukta Maharashtra
should be revived at that historic movement. The leaders of the Samyukta
Maharashtra movement from Bombay and Western Maharashtra were against the
formation of separate state of Mahavidarbha. Y.B. Chauhan was not in favour of
agitation, but suggested that an effort should be made immediately to bring about an
agreement among the Congress units of Vidarbha, Nagpur and Marathwada etc.
Therefore negotiations were held with Marathwada and Vidarbha leaders and an
agreement was signed at Nagpur (Nagpur Pact) on 28 Sept., 1953.** The Nagpur
pact stood for one state of Marathi speaking population and assured Nag-Vidarbha

86. Ibid, p. 98
87. Suman Sharma, Stales Boundary Changes in India : Constilud^^^firfijfgi^i
Consequences, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, \ 995^;^^^^6^91. " ^ -^"^fj^
88. Arun Audholkar and Rajendra Vora, Op.Cit., pp. 94-95./^ f'^ Ao« N». ^^
 78

of equitable treatment in allocation of resources. Cabinet portfolios, government

jobs and educational opportunities. It also promised a second seat of High Court
and one session of legislative assembly to Nagpur. The Samyukta Maharashtra
Parishad decided to present a united demand for Samyukta Maharashtra supported
by opposition and Congress leaders of different regions. The Congress High
Command opposed joint representation to the Commission. The High Command
tried to discourage regional demands by the Congress units. Efforts were made to
dissuade them from co-operating with opposition. The Congressmen who were in
favour of Samyukta Maharashtra had to face the challenge of bosses at national
level. Those who disregarded directives from above had to pay the price. But in
spite of pressures Congressmen continued their support to the cause. Bhausaheb
Hiray requested Congress Working Committee to consider the decision. Ultimately
because of the support of Karnatak leaders, like Nijlingappa, Congress Working
Committee allowed regional Congress unit to present joint memorandum to the
State Reorganization Commission.*'

The Parishad delegation met the State Reorganization Commission under the
leadership of Hiray. The demands of Parishad were rejected by the Commission.
The Commission recommended that a bilingual state balanced between the Marathi
and Gujrati speaking Kutch and Saurashtra and Marathi speaking Marathwada (and
not Vidarbha). The leaders of Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee and
Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad turned down these recommendations. The
Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee suggested to Congress Working
Committee that a bilingual Bombay state of all Marathi and Gujrati areas be
established and if Gujrat wants, it can go out after five years from this big state.
Because of the fear of majority of Marathi areas Gujrat Pradesh Congress
Committee did not accept it. Instead they suggested formation of three political
units - Maharashtra, Gujrat and Bombay. But this was not acceptable to Maharashtra
Pradesh Congress Committee. Hence they dropped the point about Gujrat's inclusion
in the big-bilingual state from the proposed demand. This formula was accepted by
the centre and big-bilingual state was formed in November, 1956.'"

89. Ibid, p. 95.

90. Ibid, pp. 95-96.
 79

The Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad was not at all satisfied with the formula,
according to which a big-bilingual state was formed in November 1956. The
Parishad became a different body afterwards. The new organization named
Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti was formed by the opposition in February 1957, the
movement for Samyukta Maharashtra became an affair of the opposition parties.
But Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee continued its efforts within the
Congress system. An association named Samyukta Maharashtra Congress Jana
Parishad was formed by Bombay city Congressmen which supported the Samiti. The
Samiti followed agitational methods and became increasingly popular in the Marathi
speaking areas while Congressmen due to their ambivalent posture were regarded as
traitors by the people. After the defeat in 1957 general election primarily in western
Maharashtra districts, the leaders of Maharashtra Congress became more outspoken
in their demand for dissolution of the bilingual Bombay state. They revived their
efforts to convince the High Command of the necessity of formation of unilingual
Marathi speaking state. Ultimately, the Congress Working Committee had to
approve the bifurcation. The Bombay Reorganization Bill was accordingly passed
by the Parliament and the Marathi speaking state with Bombay as its capital was
inaugurated at the hands of Prime Minister Pt. Nehru in May, I960."

With the formation of state of Maharashtra with Bombay city as its capital in
May 1960, Marathi people achieved their cherished goal of Samyukta Maharashtra
for which they were agitating. However, the sense of fulfilment of the cherished
goal did not last very long. The people began to realise that the inclusion in
Maharashtra State of the rich metropolis of Bombay, did not bring about any change
in their status as citizens of this city. In this commercial, industrial and westernized
megapolis, the language or 'culture' of Marathi people still has no place of honour.
Marathi people still were 'nobodies'. The frustrating feeling of being alien, being
nobody, though feh earlier, was more poignant now because Bomaby was no more
just another metropolis, but a capital of their own state. If in one's own state, there
is no 'status' for oneself, where else can one have it? This was the germ of the
psychology which later gave rise to the regionalist movement for Marathi people.'^

91. Ibid, pp. 96-97.

92. Sudha Cogate, "Roots of Marathi Regionalism and Rise of Shiv Sena in Bombay
City", in Satish Chandra and others (ed.). Regionalism and National Integration
(Proceeding of a Seminar), Aalekh Publication, Jaipur, 1976, pp. 44-45.
 80

The regionalism of Samyukta Maharashtra days did not die after the creation
of unilingual state of Maharashtra. The regionalism re-emerged in the form of Shiva
Sena in 1966 in Bombay city. Shiva Sena mainly talked about the intrests of the
Marathi people as being jeopardised by the non-Maharashtrians, especially the South
Indians. It spoke of 'Maharashtra for Maharashtrians' and asserted the doctrine of
'sons of the soil' demanding prefrential treatment to the Maharashtrians especially
the Marathi youth in the field of employment. It had emerged to safeguard the
welfare of the people of Maharashtra. Shiv Sena obviously arose as a response to
the peculiar socio-economic conditions of Bombay."'

An important factor responsible for the regionalist demands everywhere in

Bombay - was obviously the sharp rise in socio-economic aspirations of the
Maharashtrian after the formation of the unilingual state of Maharashtra in 1960.
Their non-fulfilment produced much frustration and bitterness as they realised that
Bombay, though in Maharashtra, is not of it. All this encouraged the "crystallization
of a sub-nationalism forged by premordial sentiments of language and region.""'*

The most important and immediate backdrop for the emergence of Shiv Sena
was the native-migrant conflicts. The Shiv Sena inculcated and encouraged, in the
Maharashtrian mind, the stereotyped threat posed by the migrant in the socio-
political and economic fields against the native community. After the creation of
Maharashtra state in 1960, the socio-economic position of the Maharashtrians,
creating a fertile ground for the emergence of Shiv Sena."^

The Shiv Sena was formed on June 19, 1966,by a cartoon journalist Bal
Thakrey, as a regional organisation for safeguarding the interest of the Marathi
people in Bombay city. Bal Thakrey was earlier working as a cartoonist in a Bombay
daily, owned and run by a South Indian Editor. However, the cartoonist Thakery
and the editorial staff often had differences of opinion in professional matters which

93. Arun Audholkar and Rajendra Vora, "Regionalism in Maharashtra", Op.Cit., p. 109.
94. SudhaCogate, Op.Ci/., p. 45.
95. Akbtar Majeed, 'Sons of the Soil Agitations' (Madras Anti-Hindi Agitation; Shiv Sena
Phenomenon; Telangana Separatist Movement; Anti-Migrant Agitation in Assam) in
Akhtar Majeed (ed.). Regionalism Developmental Tension in India. Cosmo
Publications, New Delhi, 1984, p. 168.
 81

are of usual nature in newspaper offices. But he thought differently. He thought his
difficulties were due to the non-Maharashtrian in whose company he was working.
When the owner editor died a number of journalist left the job. All of them together
started a newspaper. After some time Bal Thakery left this newspaper as well and
founded his own cartoon weekly called Marmeik in the year 1960. Now he
approached advertisement agencies mostly administerd by South Indian. But no one
gave him advertisement because advertisement agencies did not book any space in
newspapers and weekly without much circulation. Hence, he looked around for
other methods of increasing the circulation of his weekly and found one very
effective. He began to dip deeper into a technique of propaganda which has already
been used and perfected during the Samyukta Maharashtra movement. Once he
began to revive the paranoid feeling of his readers, his readership increased and
populist political movement began.'^ He adopted the tactice of cultural revivalism
for strengthing the organization. History was revived by erecting memorials to
honour the Maratha heroes. A regional consciousness was fosterd among the people
through hectic propaganada, and Shivaji cult was established.

The propaganda techniques and the symbols used by Shiv Sena provided a
new dimension to the Indian regionalism. In the existing pattern of regionalism in
Maharashtra in spite of its industrial advancement and specialy urban setting, it
appears that not the class basis but the ethnocentric regionalism which provides the
perspective and makes the people to see and understand the situations. Bal Thakery,
through his weekly Marmik tried several propaganda techniques and at last touched
a very vulnerable area of appeal when he raised the non-Maharashtrian bogey
especialy the South Indians.'^ He took up the plea that non-Maharashtrian should
be turned out of Bombay. This was at a critical juncture when recession was at its
peak in Bombay. Unemployment was increasing and educated youth was getting
frustrated. He charged the south Indian office-goer as one who deprives the
Maharashtrians of his job-opportunity. Bal Thakery started publicising half truths

96. K.K. Gangadharan, 'Structure and Symbols of Regional Social Movements ; The Case
of Shiv Sena in Maharashtra", in Satish Chandra and Others (ed.). Regionalism and
National Integration, Op.Cit., p. 57.
97. Ibid. p. 58.
 82

statistics of persons employed in varions offices and showed how the South Indians
and non-Maharashtrians are monopolising jobs in Maharashtra at the cost of
Maharashtrians. The frustrated unemployed Maharashtians youth found its cause
being championed by Marmik and Shiv Sena.'*

It is intresting to ponder as to why would the Shiv Sena have pinpointed

responsibility for Maharashtrian economic difficulties on an ethnic target instead of
a class of industrialists and businessmen. And why particularly the South Indians
(who constituted only 8.5% of the city's population) among all the other ethnic
groups? This can be explained by the middle class economic competition.
Complaints against the South Indians were directed because they held jobs that the
Maharashtrians coveted. Maharashtrians do not generally take intrest in commercial
occupation, and there is a tradition among then to look for a "Secure" office job.
And it was in these white collar office jobs that the South Indians were to be found
in some number. The bulk of the Hindi speakers in Bombay were labourers and
present no problem or competition for the Maharashtrian middle class.''

The Shiv Sena movement generated regional consciousness among

Maharashtrians based on ethnocentric and 'Sons of the Soil' feelings, a logical
corollary of modernisation and mal-development. Modernisation and urbanisation
besides throwing open new avenues of employment, inviting persons from different
parts of the country have the tendency of establishing the system and uttering the
status quo. Shortage of accommodation, entry of outsiders in State and geogrphical
mobility affecting social ties and causing social tensions are the unavoidable
compulsions of modernisation and development polity. Bal Thakery, through the
press and the plateform, appealed to the sentiments of the Maharashtrians and
successfully inculcated a sense of persecution among them. He invoked the spirit of
Shivaji, the Maratha hero, to oust the aliens from the land. This resulted in the
crystallisation of a sub-nationalism forged by the primordial sentiments of language
and religion. •''^

98. Akhtar Majeed, "Sons of the Soil Agitation", Op.Cit., pp. 169-170.
99. Ibid, pp. 170-171.
100. Ram Joshi, "The Shiv Sena : A Movement in Search of Legitimacy". Asian Survey,
November, 1970, p. 969.
 83

The Shiv Sena touching the pulse of the people when it raised the non-
Maharashtrian bogey and demanded the 'Sons of the Soil' must be given preference
in employment in Maharashtra. At the time Shiv Sena was founded it was announced
that it would fight gangsterdom in Bombay and it was made to appear that the
gangland was dominated by the South Indians.'°' Bal Thankeray delcared off and on
that "all the lungiwalas are criminals, gamblers, illicit liquor distillers, pimps,
goondas and communists. I want the illicit liquor distiller to be Maharashtrian the
goondas to be Maharasthrians, pimps and gamblers to be Maharashtrians."'^^ This
type of propaganda had to yield good results because there were always inter-gang
rivalries, and it was no wonder that the Maharashtrian gang found a 'godfather' in
Bal Thackeray. Encouraged by the public response, Bal Thackeray demanded 80%
reservation for Maharashtrians in all lower cadre posts and in support of his demand
he had cited the convention of reservation for local peoples in other state-like
Madras and Bengal 85%, Bihar and U.P. also has 85% reservation for the local
people.'^^

Shiv Sena's anti-communist and anti-trade union posture became a source of

political attraction to other organizations who went out to patronise Sena. The
rightist parties like Swatantra, Jan Sangh and P.S.P., showed willingness to join
hands with Sena to throw communists out of the country. The capitalist used it for
breaking the trade unions in the state. The PSP was willing to have electoral pact
with Sena Congress leaders like S.K. patil supplied necessary support to it to use it
as a violent instrument against their sworn opponents like Communists. Sena then
was patronized by the Naik government. This perfectly suited the political
aspirations of the Sena leaders.'"''

Starting as a militant pressure group in its first phase Shive Sena made its
base among Maharashtrians in Bombay. Shiv Sena sought a programme of social

101. Free Press Journal, February 2, 1970.

102. K.K. Gangadharan, 'Shiv Sena-I, Anti Social Movement', Mainstream, March 28,
1970, p. 19.
103. H.R. Pardiwala, The Shiv Sena Why? and Why Not?, Popular Prakashan, Bombay,
1967, p. 111.
104. Arun Audhalkar and Rajendra Vora, "Regionalism in Maharashtra", in Akhtar Majeed
{ed), Op.Cit., pp. 110-111.
 84

and economic transformation of the Maharashtrians. Bal Thakeray declared that

Shiv Sena is 80 percent social organization and 20 percent political.

Shiv Sena, later changed its tactice and strategy which it adopted earlier for
securing the hold on the masses and to consolidate the base of the party. Earlier
violent postures against non-Maharashtrians were adopted to secure a hold on the
masses and to consolidate the party base. When it emerged as a party from a
movement, it had to secure wider political support and, therefore, it started
shedding its xenophobia. A continuous efforts was then made to soft pedal the
earliar hostility against the outsiders. Bal Thackeray started saying "the Shiv Sena
was not against any person belonging to any other state living or employed in
Maharashtra. After all, all of us are Indians and we have to live as one nation" '"^
Shiv Sena as a political party, was now in need of a sufficiently wide base of
support for its electoral politics. The alternatives were a limited success in electoral
politics or a wide appeal to non-Maharashtrians. Shiv Sena choose the later course,
confirming that its earlier militancy was not ideological but political.'^^ So, with the
change of attitude and policies, the Shiv Sena became a force in the State politics of
Maharashtra.

105. Ram Joshi, "The Shiv Sena : A Movement in Search of Legitimacy", Op.Cit.. p. 974.
106. Akhtar Majeed, 'Sons of the Soil Agitations', Op.Cil., pp. 171-172.
 Chapter - IV
REGIONALISM IN NORTH-EAST INDIA
(i) The Problem of Assam
(ii) The Problem of Nagaland
(iii) The Problem of Tripura
(iv) The Problem of Meghalaya
 85

(The study is confined only to the state of Assam, Nagaland, Tripura and Meghalya
The other states have been excluded for want of space)

The North-Eastern region comprise the states of Assam, Manipur, Meghalya,

Nagaland, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh The seeds of separation were
sown in the North-Eastern region as is the case with other regions of the country,
leading to regional consciousness According to Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences, Regionalism "involves such diverse problems of modern political and
cultural life as those of minorities, administrative decentralization, local self-
government and autonomy, the cult of homeland and earth and local patriotism It
becomes complicated only where there is a combination of two or more such factors
as geographical isolation, independent historical traditions, racial, ethnic or
religious peculiarities and local economic or class interests "' Such a combination of
factors loom large the north-eastern region The British administration kept the
colourful people of the area out of the mainstream of the national life and neglected
their economic development Apartfromthat they did not pay much attention to the
infrastructure and its systematic growth. The seven sisters of the north-east region
of India have some similar problems which are understood only by a few of the
national politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals The biggest common problems
seem to be (i) neglect, (ii) non-recognition of their aspirations, (iii) non-recognition
of rheir right to protect their own identity and heritage, (iv) the fear that they are
being treated as inferior to the rest of India, and (v) too much interference by the
Government of India in the affairs of these territories ^ A senior official who has
served in Assam for some years tried to explain the problem of this region as
follows

"The problem is not new It has taken a violent stance now because it
was building up for many years One must remember that in all of the
North-Eastern area, the tribals have been a fiercely free lot Nobody,
not even the British, has ever really ruled them Then in 1950, the
Tribal chiefs were abolished and though the Tribal councils were

1 Encyclopedia of Social Science, Macmillan, New York, 1962, pp 208-209

2. Amiya Kumar Das, Assam's Agony : A Socw-Economic and Political Analysis,
Lancers Publications, New Delhi, 1982, p. 243.
 86

retained, short sighted politicians and bureaucrats ignored their role.

Then the Laldenga movement started in Mizoram and the lAF had to
be called in for large-scale action. Indian planes bombed Aizwal and
there were large scale atrocities. The people of the North-East have
not forgotten things like that. Ever since, the Army and the BSF have
been in the North-East region, also because it is a sensitive border
area. Foreign agencies have been having a field day in most North-
Eastem states and have been very active. There are too many issues.
But since things have been messed up so far and the political initiative
has been lost, it is important now to work out a political solution only
after the law and order situation is contained. Then the insurgents
must be identified and isolated and the prevailing sense of insecurity
be removed. The people of these states genuinely want peace. That
must be understood. Now is the time to negotiate and to give them
peace. Without ever forgetting that the people in the north-east states
are as much Indian as you and I."-^

North-Eastern region of the country faced a very complex, situation such as

migrants, ethnicity, tribals etc. The region is a multi-tribal area with the bulk of
people converted to Christianity by the European Christian Missionaries. Among
the tribes there are immense diversities, in Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram there
are 23 tribes, in Manipur 28, in Tripura 19, in Arunachal Pradesh 24, and in
Nagaland 14; these are the main tribes.* The tribes inhabiting this area were not
touched of the National movement, many of the tribes have no conception of loyalty
to the nation. The North-Eastern region is connected with the rest of India by a
narrow neck of land which is only a few-mile wide. The area of this region touches
thousands of kilometers of international boundaries with Bangladesh, Burma, China,
Nepal and Bhutan. There are so many extremist groups operating in the region and
create a serious law and order problem in the region.

Regionalism among the North - Eastern people's, primarily the out- come of
the Bengali domination on culture and administration. Neither the British nor the
Indian National Congress paid due attention towards the tribal upliftment and
integrating or assimilating into the socio-economic and political mainstream of

3. "lAF" Bombed them". The Weekly Sun, New Delhi, June 28, 1980.
4. M. Subrahmanyam, "Nationalism-Regionalism v/s Separatism in the Developing
Politics of India", Indian Journal of Politics, A.M.U., Aligarh, Vol. XV, No. 3,
December 1981, p. 63.
 87

India. The North-East has been witness to a large scale influx of refugees,
particularly after 1971, from Bangla Desh. For the refugees, the sparsely-populated
verdant hill of the North-East were an ideal place to settle down in.' As no concrete
programme of linking the region with physical and economic infrastructure with the
national mainstream, is further promoting the separatist groups among the tribes.
Lack of democratic foundation of political party system in the region too is another
impetus for political instability and thus political nerve centre being very week no
political solution is sufficiently mooted to resolve the problem amicably in the
national and regional interest.

(i) The Problem of Assam

"Assam can never be a digestible part of India now or in the future-
All Assam Tribes and Races Federation, 1945."^
The state of Assam is connected with the rest of India by a narrow 18 miles
wide corridor. It was comprises of Brahamputra and Surma river valleys and the
hilly areas of the north, south and east of these two river basins. The valley basins
are the richest tracts of lands, but the thick forests and hills have made transport
and communication difficult. It is a multi-tribal area with the bulk of people
converted to Christianity by the European Christian Missionaries. Assam has
common boundaries with Bangladesh and Bhutan, with China and Burma not far
away. Until a few years ago Arunachal, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram were
parts of Assam. After the bifurcation of its former hill areas into separate states,
consists of only Brahmputra valley and the Bengali dominated districts of Cachar.
The Brahamputra valley is dominated by the Assamees speaking people. The
creation of new states has reduced the cultural heterogeneity of Assam to some
extent but despite that cultural conflicts and tension persists in the truncated Assam
between indigenous Assamees and the migrant communities. The early phase of
regionalism in Assam culminated into the creation of separate hill states. The states
faced two linguistic movements in 1960 and 1972. In October 1962, Assammees
was declared the official language and a bill to that effect was passed.'

5. The Hindutan Times, New Delhi, February 19, 1997.

6. 77je Pioneer, New Delhi, August 31, 1997.
7. Amiya Kumar Das, O/J.C//., p. 49.
 88

The introduction of Assameese as official language was protested by the

Bengali speaking people of Assam, which sparked off Bengali-Assameese riots
taking major toll of human lives. The Bengali demanded postponement of State
Language Bill and the declaration of Bengali as the second official language. The
Assameese charged the Bengalis as committing cultural genocide and find shelter in
linguistic chaunism. It was in fact a protest against the migrants who appropriated
high positions in the state that belong to the sons of the soil. The Assameese felt
that if this process remain unchecked it will result in their assimilatism into Bengali
fold. Moreover, their educational backwardness and economic under-development
provided an upper hand to the Bengalis to dominate in all sections of life-added the
encirclement of Assam by Bengal, Bangladesh and Tripura where millions of Bengali
speaking population reside, further strengthened the Assameese fear of cultural
contamination.

In 1972, large scale anti-Bengali riots erupted throughout the Brahmaputra

valley, when the Academic Council of the Gauhati University passed a resolution
for the introduction of Assameese as the medium of instruction following the
practice of other states universities in India to have regional language as medium of
instruction. However, the council made two concession to the linguistic minorities :

(i) English was to be retained as medium of instruction for a period of time.

(ii) Students would be permitted to answer their examination in English or

Assameese or Bengali.

The All Assam Student Union launched an agitation to withdraw the option
of Bengali. Consequently, the Academic Council met and deleted the option of
Bengali language. This created an uproar in Bengali speaking Cachar district and
they got a stay order from the Supreme Court for the retention of Bengali medium.
In September 1972, the Assam Assembly unanimously passed a resolution
reaffirming the decision of the Academic Council of Gauhati and Dibrugarh
Universities, and resolved to establish a separate University in the Cachar district.

The All Assam Students Union declared that the Assam Assembly had 'failed
to give due recognition to the Assameese language' and that the resolution would
 89

'endanger' the existence of Assam and the Assameese people.* The AASU issued an
uhimatum to the Chief Minister that unless the Gauhati University make Assamese
the sole medium of instruction, the AASU would launch 'direct action'. Soon
violence broke out throughout the state. The President of the Gauhati University
Teachers Association in a public letter said that this organisation opposed the
establishment of a separate University in Cachar. "Since this would be detrimental
to the accepted principle of linguistic states and regional languages as the medium
of higher education."^ The large scale arson and rioting broke out against Bengalis
throughout Brahmaputra valley and ultimately the Chief Minister had to issue a
statement that his government had no intention of implementing the Assembly
resolution since it has proven unacceptable to the people both in the Brahmaputra
valley and Cachar. He further declared that Assamese would be introduced as a
compulsory subject throughout the states in non-Assamese secondary schools,
following this, AASU suspended its movements. But the Bengali leaders in Cachar
denounced it as cultural genocide perpetrated on the linguistic minorities in Assam.
The Assam plain tribal, Bodos also denounced the government policy of
Assamisation and compulsory introduction of Assameese in Bodo medium secondary
schools.

The post 1972, regional agitation in Assam are mainly directed against the
migrants from the Indian states and outside specially from Nepal and Bangladesh.
Myron Weiner rightly argues that as long as the Assamese are unable to compete
effectively in the employment and investment market against non-Assamese, who
remain culturally distinct, it seems likely that the Assamese will continue to remain
nativist in their politics and protectionist in their practices. Regional antagonism,
attacks against the alien business community, and aggressive cultural nationalism in
relation to linguistic minorities are variant political orientations of people who suffer
from status deprivation, feel culturally threatened and lack the skill and out look to
compete in the economic market.'°

8. Myron Wiener, Sons of the Soil, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
1978, p. 119.
9. The Statesman, Delhi, November 6, 1972.
10. Myron Wiener. Op.Cit., p. 136.
 90

The regional parties and organisation have played leading roles spearheading
different movements in Assam and the North-East India. There is a strong
conviction in Assam that National parties can not serve its interests and that it
needs a DMK of its own.

In a widely circulated document, AASU and AAGSP asserted, we declared

unequivocally that we are not secessionist our struggle is only against the illegal
foreigners whose presence in Assam threatens the economic, cultural and political
existence of the indigenous people of Assam. It is only against non-Indians staying
illegally in India and not against people from the rest of India who are residing in
Assam Time and again, we have said that only those people should be deported,
who fail to qualify as citizens of India. To the detractors of this movement, our firm
answer has been a foreigners is a foreigner, a foreigner shall not be judged by the
language he speaks or by the religion he follows command-consideration can not be
taken into account while determining the citizenship of a person. The secular
character of the Indian constitution does not allow that.*' Nothing substantial
emerged despite several round of talks between the agitators and the Union
government. There is dispute over fixation of cut-off year for the deportation of
foreign nationals. The Central government is agreeable to March 1971, the year of
the Birth of Bangladesh as cut-off year, while AASU and AAGSP representatives
insist on 1951 as cut of year. So consequently, the stalemate continues. The Assam
case brings into focus 'ethnicity' demographic imbalance and the contradictions of
plural society fragmented by separate communities. Neither the political leaders nor
the social engineers have tried to foster genuine integration of the communities, and
evolution of a composite cultural pattern. Amalendu Guha believes that the
movement is not spontaneous, not are the students its originator. Its ideological and
organisational roots are in Assamiya upper classes who control the state's powerful
local press... He asserts that the movement in national in form, chauvinist and
undemocratic in content and proto facist in its methods. It has two faces, one non-
violent and peaceful turned towards Delhi, and other, coercive and often violent

11 "Save Assam Today Save India Tomorrow - An Appeal from the People of Assam
(AASU & AAGSP), Gauhati, May 15, 1980", The Statesman, Delhi, May 17, 1980.
 91

towards the dissident minorities. The solution of the issue of foreigners lies mostly
in assimilation and in sealing off the Bangia Desh border rather than in
deportation.'2 Political parties like CPI and CPI(M) are in favour of accepting 1971
as the cut off year, and on the other hand BJP and RSS have supported the
agitation. The government of India is dilly-dallying the issue with a view to exhaust
the agitators.

Amiya Kumar Das argues that the present problem of Assam is due to
exploitation and negligence of Assam. Assam has been treated as nothing better
than a colony within a republic for exploitation by the rest of the country and
foreigners. He traces the agitation to the following :'^

(i) exploitation of the resources by taking our raw materials from the North-
East and developing industries outside the region.

(ii) employment of own people of the colonizer as much as possible, especially in

the key position in administration, industry, law enforcement etc.

(iii) neglect in overall development such as transportation and communication,

electricity, education, agriculture, health and social services etc.

(iv) marketing the products of the colonizer in the colony.

(v) appropriating a lion's share of the revenue created by the colony.

(vi) deprivation of democratic rights such as mass opinion, freedom of speech,

self-determination, right to exist as an ethnic group, non-application of
constitutional provisions and non-protection from foreign invasion and

(vii) subjection through political tactics, deprivation of democratic rights and

repressive measures including terrorist by the military.

The aforesaid seven factors mentioned by Das fully endorse our premises on
regionalism in Assam and North-East region. Besides covering the different factors

12. Amalendu Guha, "Little Nationalism Turned Chauvinist, Assam's Anti-Foreigners

' Upsurge, 1979-80", Economic and Political Weekly, Special Number, October 1980
p. 1699.
13. Amiya Kumar Das, Op.Cit., p. 222.
 92

of regionalism like historical, geographical, cultural and ethnic, the economic

interest of the Assam has also contributed its mite to the development of the
movement.

(ii) The Problem of Nagaland

The British rulers annexed this part of our country in the nineteenth century,
though they in pursuance of their wise policy set up their 'loose' administration
thereafter designing these territories as "Naga Hills Excluded Area"'^, and their
inhabitants as 'subjects people of Nagas'; thus they granted more or less a self-
governing states to the Naga people whom they, once again in pursuance of their
Machiavellian policy, labelled as 'true Nagas' living outside the pole of British
Administration.

Zapu Angami Phizo, the Naga separatist leader and his brother extended
their support to the Japanese in 1942 in return for a promise of independent Naga
State after the defeat of the British in the war. But Phizo was arrested and
imprisoned in Burma. When he was released in 1946, he manipulated and captured
the leadership of the Naga National Council (NNC) with a gospel of the
independence to the Nagas.'' On the eve of independence, on 20th February, 1947,
the NNC submitted a memorandum to the Governor General Lord Mountbatten
suggesting that to set up an interim government for a period often years, and India
might act as a guardian, at the end of which the Naga people would determine their
political future. The same view was reiterated to the sub-committee of the Advisory
Committee (^Aboriginal Tribes on May 20, 1947, at Kohima. Sir Akbar Hydari,
then Governor of Assam, held discussions with the Naga leaders at Kohima from 27
to 29 June, 1947, and a nine-point agreement was reached. The clause 9 of the
agreement which created controversy whether the Nagas have the liberty to be
completely separate reads as follows :
"The Governor of Assam as Agent of the Government of Indian Union
will have a special responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the
due observance of this agreement; at the end of this agreement; at the

14. Ibid, p.m.

15. Ibid.
 93

end of this period the Naga National Council will be asked whether
the require the above agreement to be extended for a further period
or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people be arrived

The government of India attempted to solve the problem amicably, but the
attitude of the extremists under the leadership of Phizo made the attempts futile.
Ultimately Nehru's Government declaring the whole episode of Phizo as anti-
national and forced to withdraw all offers of administrative autonomy. From 1951,
onward the Nagas intensified their movement for independence. Phizo was jailed
and after release he became the President of the NNC. Phizo, declared a civil
disobedience movement and thus lead the gellant people to violent and arms
insurrection against their own government at the state and central level. The Nagas
also demonstrated non-acceptance of the Indian constitution by total boycott of the
elections. No nomination was field.

In 1952, there was violence and shooting in Kohima. Since then violence has
continued. In 1953, the police raided Khonoma and nine police outposts were
opened in Naga Hills. The insurgents also blasted railway lines and passenger trains.
In March 1956, the underground Naga Federal Government was formed with a
Parliament, a President, a Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers. They also
formed a "Nagaland Federal Army". From 1956 to 1958, Naga Hills witnessed a
maximum amount of violence. Indian Armed Forces moved in. Thousands of Nagas
lost their lives. Some leaders of the NNC, who were not in favour of violence, left
the organization. Phizo escaped to England with his family.*^

Sakhris - one time brain trust of Phizo, severed his links with NNC and
Phizo. He himself organized the Naga National Council Reforming Committee and
expressed his desire to solve the problem within the framework of Indian Union and
Indian Constitution. That encouraged the Government of India to issue a statement
on 18 February, 1957, that "it stand by the Prime Minister's assurance that when
peace is restored, administrative changes would set up in the Naga country in full
consultation with Naga people of all tribes - it also claims for the Naga people their

16. V.I.K. Sarin, India's North-East in Flames, New Delhi, 1980, p. 97.
17. Amiya Kumar Das, Op.Cit., pp. 273-274.
 94

rightful share of India's independence and is convinced that the majority desire of
the Nagas is for separate administrative unit in keeping with the Naga tradition
within the framework of the constitution of India. As the situation so demands the
Naga National Council Reforming Committee is prepared to send Naga
representatives to the Union Parliament."'*

That assurance along the amnesty to the surrendered rebels with arms
encouraged the rebels to surrender. On 22 August 1957, the first Naga Peoples
Convention (NPC) was called. It endorsed the moves taken by the All Tribes
Conference towards a peaceful settlement of the Naga problem within the context
of Indian Union. It also recommended that Naga Hills district and the Tuensang
Area under the External Affairs Ministry. On December 1, 1957, the Government of
India declared the formation of Naga Hill District and released number of Naga
prisoners and under trials.'^

The second Naga People's Convention was held on 21, May 1958, at Ungma,
appointed a Liaison Committee to contact the underground Nagas to bring about a
political settlement. It was a mile stone in bringing more peace in the area and a
victory to the Nationalist Naga forces. In its 3rd convent in October 1959, at
Mokokchung, the NPC proposed statehood and a delegation met Prime Minister
Nehru in July, 1960.^° The Government of India willingly conceded most of the
proposals and thus Prime Minister Nehru on August 1, 1960, announced the
decision of the Government to convert the Naga Hill Territory Area into the State
of Nagaland in due course with due representation of the Nagas in the Indian
Parliament. On December 13, 1963, Nagaland the 16th State of Indian Union was
inaugurated by President Dr. Radhakrishnan.^'

However, insurgency started again in 1970s. Several groups of underground

Nagas took guerrilla warfare training in the foreign countries and procured arms.
There were outbreaks of violences. Many rebels were killed or captured and some

18. M. Subrahmanyam, Op.Cit., p. 64.

19. Ibid, p. 65.
20. Amiya Kumar Das, Op.Cit., p. 274.
21. Ibid, p. 274.
 95

of them surrendered. The extremist groups realized that the underground movement
could not continue in the face of massive Indian Army. They initiated a peace talk
which was held at Shillong. On November 11, 1975, the historic Shilong Accord
was signed. The Nagas agreed to accept the Indian constitution, given up violence
and surrender areas. The Government of India suspended the action under the
Unlawful Activities Act by which the NNC, the NFG, and the NFA were outlawed.
Most of the underground rebels came back and joined there families to lead a
normal life. Peace returned to Nagaland at least for the time being.^^

A lasting solution of the Naga problem has yet to be found even after
formation of the Naga State in 1963. Some Nagas even rejected the Shillong Accord
which was signed on November 11, 1975, on the ground that it was signed "at
gunpoint". Some Nagas argue a point on the Shillong Accord. They interpret the
third clause of the agreement "that the underground leaders would formulate issue
for a final solution with the Government of India" to mean that the whole issue of
Nagaland future can be re-opened. Since then talks between the extremists Naga
groups and the Government of India were held at many times but the problems
remained unresolved.

(iii). The Problem of Tripura

Formerly a princely state, Tripura secured its statehood in January 1972. The
Government of India, keeping in consideration of the sensitiveness of the area and
its geo-political importance and the need of perpetual peace among the people of
the Hill belt introduced a Bill in the Parliament (the North-Eastern Reorganization
Bill), the Parliament passed the North-Eastern Reorganization Bill in December
1971 and granted statehood to Tripura alongwith Manipur and Meghalaya and
Union Territory status to Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. It has an area of 4,116
square mile, had a population of over 27 lakh in 1991. Three sides of this state is
surrounded by 560 miles of frontiers with Bangladesh. The east border of 180 miles
has a connection with Mizoram and Assam. The kingdom of Tripura existed for
over 1000 years. It became part of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century and of

22. Ibid, pp. 274-275.

 96

British India in the I9th century. Tripura is inhabited by 19 tribes. Most of the
groups possess similar ethnic characteristics, culture and social traits.23

At the time of India's independence, Tripura was ruled by Maharaja Bir

Bikram Deb Barman. Afier the partition of India, the Maharaja gave shelter to
thousands of refugees on humanitarian grounds. On the death of the Maharaja,
Maharani Kanchanprabha signed accession of Tripura to India on October 15, 1949.
The Government of India appointed A.B. Chatterjee, a Bengalee ICS officer as
"dewan", de facto ruler of Tripura. On his appointment the tribals became outraged.
He dismissed the Royal guards and allowed unrestricted immigration from East
Pakistan.

During 1949-52, there was an uprising and armed struggle by the Communist
Party of India in Tripura against feudal exploitation and the influx of Bengalees.
Nripen Chakraborty, a young man from Camilla district took over the leadership of
the Communist party in Tripura and organized tribal movements. The royal guards
formed a militant insurgent group named "Sangkrak" meaning strongmen and joined
the "Ganamukti Parishad" which was formed against domination by the immigrants
under the leadership of Dasrath Deb Barma.^'*

In Tripura, tribals formed the largest population but massive and continuous
migration of foreign nationals from East Pakistan, particularly during the Bangladesh
liberation war transformed the ethnic composition of the population. Due mostly to
infiltration, Tripura's population increased from 6.46 lakh in 1951 to over 27 lakh in
1991. In 1947, 93 per cent of Tripura's population were tribals but by 1991, they
were reduced to 30.44 per cent.^^ Tribals, who were largely illiterate, sold their
fertile land to Bengalee immigrants and receded to the hills with reserved forest
land. About 80 per cent of the land in the possession of non-tribals had been
secured by fraud. The poor tribals easily fell a pray to money-landers, traders and
other non-tribals, who persuaded them to part with their land for a small price.^^

23. Ibid, p. 276.

24. Ibid, p. 277.
25. S.K. Ghosh, Indian Democracy Derailed : Politics and Polilicians, APH Publishing
Corporation, New Delhi, 1997, p. 79.
26. Ibid.
 97

The tribals finally, realised their mistake, and since then they have been trying to
protect their land and fighting against domination by the immigrants.

The cause of the tribals was taken by a non-political and tribal welfare
organization, namely, Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) formed in 1967,
demanding restoration of land taken away by the non-tribals, recognition of their
language Kak-Borak and creation of a separate autonomous district council for the
tribals. Since the TUJS is anti-Communist, the non-Communist forces specially the
Congress supported it against the Communist. The TUJS also supported the
emergency rule of the Congress government in mid 1970s. The TUJS tried to draw
the attention of the Union Government through innumerable petitions and
memorandums on the problems of the tribals. But the Central Government paid no
attention.

In the December-1977 Assembly election, the Communist Party of India

(Marxist) for the first time won overwhelmingly. The CPI(M) won 56 seats and the
TUJS contested as a political party and won only four seats out of a total of 60
seats. The CPI(M) was sympathetic to the causes of the tribals, and to retain its
base in the tribal areas it began to work on the problem. The CPI(M) ministry under
Nripen Chakraborty introduced the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous Districts
Council Bill in the Assembly on January 17, 1979, which gives the tribals exclusive
rights to own and occupy land in 47 Tehsils and 164 villages, the Bill was passed.
The President of India gave his assent on July 20, 1979. This Bill became
controversial, the Bengalees as well as the tribals turned to violence, looting, arson
and killings. The Bengalees raised the slogan : "Come let us pledge that we will give
life but not allow a partition of Tripura". The TUJS declared : "It is a question of
our survival. Either they (the Bengalees) survive or we."^''

In early January, 1979, the "Amra Bangalee" (We Bengalees) group was
formed in Tripura. On January 17, 1979, this group called for Tripura Bandh to
protest the Bill. It was also the beginning of organised violence by "Amra
Bengalee". They attacked the Tehamiurs Police Station and a few dozen of the

27. Amiya Kumar Das, Op. Cit., p. 281.

 98

CPI(M) workers were severely beaten and one died. The mob violence spread to
many other areas. At Bisramganj, one Amra Bangalee supporter was killed in Police
firing. On April 19, 1979, the Amra Bengalee group became violent at the town of
Amarpur. One person died in Police firing. The Bengalee merchants kept their shops
closed for three days protesting against Police firing.

The trouble increased when the government started implementing the law
which provides for restoration of land to the tribals which were sold to non-tribals
without securing the district magistrate's permission. By the end of August 1979,
lands were restored to 677 families. In face of strong opposition the Government
slowed down the process.

The Tripura Tribals National Volunteer Force (TNVF) under B.K. Rankhal
was formed towards the end of 1977-78, with the objective of raising volunteers.
Over six lakh of Tripura Tribals joined the TNVF. Some members took training in
the Chittagong hill tract of Bangladesh. From June 1979, sporadic acts of violence
broke out between extremist groups : the TUJS on one side and the Amra Bengalee
and Ananda Margi on the other side.^^

On March 5, 1980, the TUJS in its 12th Annual Conference demanded

deportation of "foreigners" who had come to Tripura after October 15, 1949, the
day Tripura formally acceded to India. It urged the regional parties of the North-
East to launch a combined agitation against the foreigners. The TUJS asked Stanley
Nichols-Roy, Secretary of the Forum of Hill Regional parties of the North-East
India to summon a meeting immediately to prepare a joint programme against
foreigners. At this point of Sangkrak and the Tripura Sena became active. On May
21, the Tribal Joint Action Committee of the TUJS announced that it would begin a
movement in Tripura's hill areas to remove foreigners. On May 22, the Forum of
Hill Regional Parties of the North-East India endorsed the TUJS stand on
foreigners.

On June 6 and 7, 1980, the simmering violence erupted in Tripura. The

tribals attacked so many places. Men, women and children were slaughtered in cold

28. Ibid, p. 282.

 99

blood. Some families were entirely wiped out. It is one of the worst episodes of
violence in Indian history. Although the official estimate of the number of dead was
about 540, the un-official death toll was about 2000. Probably 90 per cent of the
victims were Bengalee settlers. About 250,000 people, both Bengalee and tribal,
became refugees. Government declared TNVF as "unlawful' after the June 1980
massacre. After it was declared "unlawful" it operated from inside Chittagong Hill
Tracts area in Bangladesh with the support of the Bangladesh army. The two anti-
tribal organizations "Amra Bangalee" and "Anand marg" which expanded rapidly
clashed with the TNVF frequently. After TNVF was declared "unlawful" it was
replaced by another underground militant organisation known as All Tripura Tribal
Force (ATTF). It maintained close links with the CPI(M) and clashed with TUJS
who were supported by the Congress Government. The ATTF guerrillas surrendered
on 6th September 1993, along with 350 guns, 8 canons, 6 grenades and eighteen
303 rifles with ammunition to the CPI(M) government being assured of their
rehabilitation by the government.^'^ The massacre of over 40 non-tribals at Gorango
Tilla in Khowai sub division in West Tripura district on Feb. 16, 1997 by suspected
ATTF militants who made the Bengali refugees their main target again brought into
focus the problem of illegal immigration.-^^ However, as Brigadier B.S. Choudhary,
DIG, Assam Rifles and Sector Commander of the Army and AR personnel told the
Presspersons that, "insurgency is not a serious problem in Tripura". "The
demographic inversion, where the 70 per cent majority tribal population of the
State in 1947 has been reduced to a 3] per cent minority in the 1991 census has
created a grave communal situation".-^' Former Agriculture Minister Nagendra
Jamatiya agreed with the analysis and said that only way to protect the tribal
interests was to "carve out a state within the state under Article 254 of the
constitution."-^^

The marginalisation of the tribals is not restricted to the demographic

disturbance. Even culturally they have lost their pre-eminence. Today, Bengali

29. S.K. Ghosh, Op.Cit., p. 80.

30. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 19, 1997.
31. /&;f/; February 24, 1997.
32. Ibid.
 00

culture dominates social activities in the state. Even the tribal language, Kok-Borok,
has been marginalised. Although it has been accorded the official status Bengali is
the lingua franca and dominates officials proceedings.

The situation in Tripura is for from peaceful and clashes between tribals and
non-tribals still continue, para-military forces and army are operating to keep the
peace and maintain harmony in the state.

(iv). The Problem of Meghalaya

The state of Meghalaya occupies a mountainous plateau of great scenic

beauty. It is bound on the south by Bangladesh and on the north and east by Assam.
Meghalaya was raised to the status of a state on February 21, 1972. It consists of
two districts. The Garo Hills and the Khasi and Jaintia Hills. Until 1972, these two
districts were part of Assam State. Meghalaya is a disturbed state due to ill-feelings
between the tribals mostly Khasis, Garos and Jaintias and the immigrants from
Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan settled there.

The tribals are indigenous inhabitants and may trace their origin to pre-Aryan
time in India. The Garos are Tibeto-Burmese and the Khasis are Mon-Khmers in
origin. The most commonly spoken languages are Khasi, Garo, Synteng, Jaintia and
Haijong. The state has a rich tribal cuhure and folklore. It is a predominantly
matriarchal society.-^-^

The Garo Hills and the Khasi-Jaintia Hills were not a part of Assam until
1826. After the treaty of Yandabu with the Burmese in 1826, the British annexed
Garo Hills first and then Khasi-Jaintia Hills. In 1874, the province of Assam was
formed under a Chief Commissioner and Shillong was made its capital. Being a hill
station with tourism amenities and education facilities for the affluent it developed.
Besides the administrative set-up, military cantonments, business and commerce
also came along. So did the non-Khasi population which became a majority in
Shillong and Tura. Even though the majority of the people of these two hill districts
became Christians, adopted western music and dress, and also the Roman script, the
tribes felt that their cultural heritage was in danger and that the non-tribals were

33. Amiya Kumar Das, Op.O/., p. 256.

 101

exploiting them. When India became independent, 25 Syiems (Khasi Rajas, who
were elected monarchs_) of tiny states in Khasi Hills resisted signing the instrument
of accession to India. In 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to a conditional accession
similar to that of Kashmir. The Syiems continued to hold their 'durbars' and rule
with the will of the people till the District Councils under the Sixth Schedule of the
Constitution of India were set-up. As a part of Assam they felt that they were being
dominated by the Assamese. They felt the need for a separate State in order to
preserve their language and identity. So the All Party Hill Leader's Conference
(APHLC) demanded and got a separate state in 1972.

Meghalaya, even after statehood, became apprehensive on the issues of influx

of foreign nationals, danger to the tribal heritage, employment, and economic
development. Even though land sale to non-tribals is prohibited by law, according
to opposition leaders there are 150,000 Bangladeshis in Meghalaya who occupy
land illegally. The state shares a longer border with Bangladesh. The Border
Security Force checkposts are 10 miles apart and the jungles are dense on the
border. The Bangladeshis cross the border generally at night. They dig at the bottom
of the hillock which marked the border point till it caved in. They would remove the
flag and plant it on the next hillock to the north. Borsora, which was 18 miles inside
Meghalya territory, is now on the border.^^ Martin Narayan Majaw, the leader of
the Public Demands Implementation Committee (PDIC) Party, said : "I complained
to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta at the time. Both the Governments were aware of
what is happening but nothing was done, thanks to diplomatic niceties. "^^ He also
said that an area of Meghalaya was given to Bangladesh by India and "we were not
even consulted about it. They called it rectification. In human terms it meant taking
Indians and making them Bangladeshis."-^^ Thus Meghalaya lost hundreds of square
miles to Bangladesh.

Majwa also complained : "Others have come to live and they (Bangladeshis)
interfere with our politics". In the 1978 election, seven non-tribal MLA's were

34. Ibid, p. 257.

35. Neerja Chowdhury, The North-East in Turmoil, Special Supplemeat of Himmat,
Bombay, 1980, p. 37.
36. Ibid, p. 37.
 102

elected to the State Assembly. Six of them were Bengalees and one Nepali. They
have a decisive voice because Chief Minister B.B. Lyngdoh's Government depends
on their support to survive. The District councils were set up under the sixth
schedule of the constitution to protect the tribal way of life. But more than two
Bengalees were elected to the Khasi Hills District council.^'

Economic disparity is increasing between the tribals and non-tribals. The

entrants manage to get government jobs. Although there are strict Home Ministry
instructions that the scheduled tribe must be given at least 45 per cent of the jobs in
Central Government offices, in practice not more than 10 per cent of the jobs are
given to them. The key positions are held by the Bengalees, so they hire other
Bengalees. The tribals react saying : "We don't want to be colonised by others".
APHLC Legislator Stanley Nichols - Roy says : "In the North-East we cannot
forget the prime example of Tripura, where till 1967, the Tripuris were the majority
and now the refugees have totally taken over. It is only place in the world where
this has happened."^*

Because of apathy by non-tribal Indian citizens and the Government of India

the difference between a "foreigner" and outsiders is getting blurred. Incidence of
violence against non-tribals was very high between 1977 and 1980. The Chief
Minister admitted to not less than 335 incidents of violence, vandalism and arson
during the last few months of 1979.^^ On October 22, 1979, violence erupted in
Shillong at a 'Kalipuja'. In the next two months of violence 23 people died, 147
persons sustained injuries, 84 shops were burst, and over 100 shops were looted.''^

The movement against foreigners has spread to Meghalaya from Assam. The
Khasi Students Union (KSU) started the agitation and subsequently the Meghalaya
Students Union (MSU) took over the issue. The All Party Hill Leaders Conference
(A?HLC), and the Public Demands Implementation Committee (PDIC) also
supported the movement against foreign nationals. They demand that the foreigner

37. Ibid, p. 37.

38. Ibid, p. 38.
39. S.K. Ghosh, Op.Cil., p. 80.
40. V.I.K. Sarin, Op.Cit., p. 75.
 103

should be removed from the voter's list. They are also demanding detection and
deportation of foreigners who came after 1951. There has been Police repression
against the movement leaders. They were tortured. The lifting of more and more
units of the CRP to the state is resented by the tribal population. Anger and
frustration have driven a small section of Khasis to the secessionist path. But largely
they are exercising a moderate path.

The situation in the North-East is rapidly getting out of control especially in

the four states of Assam, Nagaland, Tripura and Meghalaya. Terrorist and
Secessionist groups run parallel governments which are more powerful and popular
than the elected governments. Insurgency has became a way of life or a means of
livelihood. A senior Police officer of the region said that the terrorist (though they
would all like to be called insurgent) control almost every aspects of life in the
region : "The transport system is at their mercy. They block the national highway at
will and force the administration to cancel trains and flights. The rule of law? It is
dead hear. Bandhs are as frequent as rains in the area."'" Successive governments at
the Centre have paid a fair amount of attention to solve the insurgency problem of
the North-Eastern region and try to bring the normalcy and peace through dialogue
and economic packages.

To find out a way, the Central government constituted a Parliamentary

Consultative Committee on insurgency situation in the North-Eastern region. The
45 member committee comprising members from both the houses of Parliament,
headed by Som Pal Shastri, Rajya Sabha member, visited the North-Eastern states in
groups to interact with the various state governments, official, and prominent
citizens, presented its report in Parliament on 26 February, 1997.''2 The committee
in its report expressed serious concern about the law and order situation in the
region. The committee states that the insurgency problem in the region has become
a matter of national concern and has many dimensions. It needs to be viewed with
seriousness and concerted efforts are needed to curb militancy and bring peace in
the politically volatile region.

41. The Pioneer, New Delhi, August 31, 1997.

42. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 27, 1997.
 104

The phenomenon of insurgency in the North-Eastern region, which was

earlier rural based, got transformed into an urbanised one, with threats to life,
extortions and kidnapping assuming a dangerous trend. The insurgents and
subversive groups are getting training and arms and ammunition from Bangladesh,
Mayanmar and Thailand. They have made the entire region vulnerable from the
security point of view. The committee urged the centre to take steps to seal the
borders effectively by fencing and increasing the vigil along them. It also suggested
that the first and foremost duty before the government is to boost the morale of the
local Police, which is deteriorating every day. The Police in the region are not well-
equipped and properly trained. There is also a need to improve the intelligence
network of the region, the committee suggested streamlining of the system to ensure
effective collection, collation and dissemination of the information for optimum
results in counter-surgency operations.

The Committee recommended the development of basic transport

infrastructure such as rail, road and air link in the whole region. The committee
suggested that the whole gamut of communication network deserved highest
priority. The committee recommend that National Highway 44 be extended from
Agartala to Sabroom, the southern boarder of Tripura. The committee specifically
referred to the laying of the railway line from Danshree to Imphal that needed
immediate attention to ensure speedy economic and industrial development of the
region.

Analysing the wide ethnic, religious and cultural diversities in the region
particularly the danger faced by numerous tribes, sub-tribes and ethnic minorities to
their present-day status, the committee has suggested constitutional safeguards to
protect the interests of these groups. Apart from the constitutional safeguards, the
committee has suggested the creation of a separate All India Service Cadre for the
North-Eastern states. The report pointed out that the clubbing of services within the
region caused discontentment among the populace with many officers being ignorant
about the local customs, traditions and developmental needs of the region.

The committee in its report had been apprised about the poor utilisation of
funds with hardly any benefits reaching to the common people. While suggesting
 105

allocation of more funds for the development of the region, the committee has
opined that there should be regular and close monitoring of funds to ensure their
proper utilisation. The committee opined that the North-Eastern states face the
problem of large-scale unemployment, especially among the youths who fall an easy
pray to insurgent activities. The committee suggested that it is very essential, that
these youths are used for constructive work and brought into the national
mainstream. The unemployed youths should be provided gainful employment under
various self-employment programmes.

The committee feels that a permanent solution to the ongoing insurgency in

the region could be found only through political negotiations, the committee called
upon the Centre to make efforts in creating a conducive atmosphere for a dialogue
with the militants, without any preconditions. There should be initiative from the
government to bring all the groups to the negotiating table. The committee also
suggest that the centre should immediately implement the various accords signed
with various insurgent groups in the past, such as Shillong accord, MNF accord,
TNU accord, ATTF accord and Assam accord in true spirit to mitigate the
discontentment among the inhabitants of the region.

The road to peace in the trouble-torn North-East is not very easy, for peace
to come in the area where failed accords are too many - the politicians must be
ready to sacrifice their narrow interests in favour of peace. Mizoram Chief Minister
Lalthanhawla, speaking at a seminar, 'Road to Peace' said"*^ : "there has to be strong
political will, an understanding bureaucracy and a determined people to fight against
violence and in favour of peace", he further added that "the unrest, violence and
separatist ideas in the region have been the offshoots of certain grave
miscalculations and unrealistic appreciation of historical facts, geophysical
peculiarities and the ethos of ethnic groups and their political and economic
aspirations at the national level", he further said, "without a qualitative change in
the attitude towards the region through adequate and sympathetic appreciation of
its socio-political and economic compulsions, no lasting solution to the problems of
the North-East can be found". He further added, "Durable peace in the North-East

43. Ibid, February 26, 1998.

 106

can be ensured only if the distinct identities of the various ethnic groups are
protected and, at the same time, their economic welfare is promoted. Armed
repression alone cannot subdue a people in search of identity".

The Central Governments have paid a fair amount of attention to the North-
Eastern region in recent past and try to bring the normalcy and peace in the region.
The present Central Government and its two predecessors have shown a positive
interest in the region and its development. After all, it is widespread feeling of
economic deprivation and glaring economic disparity among different sections of
the people that has given rise to militancy among the youth. The successive Prime
Ministers in the last two-three years visited the region extensively and announced
huge economic packages for the development of the seven states. Former Prime
Minister H.D. Deve Gowda, during his extensive visit to the North-Eastern state in
October 1996, alone had announced release of Rs. 6,000 crore for the development
of the region. He also offered unconditional talks with militants. After Prime
Minister offers for unconditional talks to militants, the North-East Regional Parties
Forum has appealed to all the insurgent groups to eschew violence and accept the
government's invitation for unconditional talks to restore peace in the region.'*'* The
present Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee has also shown his Government's
determination to solve the problem of insurgency that has plagued the region for
long. He has done well to clarify that "the offer of unconditional talks doesn't mean
outside the constitution.""*^ At the same time, the Prime Minister said his
Government would be willing to consider even amending the constitution if that
would help resolve the problem.

The Government's decision to hold talks with the leaders of the insurgent
groups to resolve the North-Eastern problem shows the centre's keenness to tackle
contentious issues through dialogue. The Government will do well to avoid the
mistakes committed during earlier peace accords. The experience suggests that the
country has paid a heavy price for arriving at a solution on the cheap. The best
models work holistically.

44. /A/c/, February 21, 1997.

45. Ibid, April 18, 1998.
 107

While pursuing a political settlement, it is no less important that the

Government makes serious efforts to set its house in North-Eastern states in order.
The State's governments must be made to deliver and firmly told that any parallel
set-up functioning side by side must be put down with a heavy hand.
 Chapter - V
REGIONALISM IN HINDI-BELT
(i). Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal) Problem
(ii). Jharkhand (Vananchal) Problem
 08

Regional identities have always remained a very important means of political

assertion in the working of the Indian federal system. While the reorganisation of
states in the 1950's and 60's facilitated the process of creation of linguistic identities,
a large number of "identities" which could not necessarily be included in the
linguistic formula, remained unaffected by the process of creation of states. It was
latter realised by the elites of these "sub-regional" communities that while the
linguistic elites could consolidate the gains of the reorganisation of the some extent,
the "sub-regional" groups which were not the "dominant" groups in these linguistic
states, continued to suffer at the hands of the linguistic elites. Once this perception
got converted into a grievance, the latter was articulated by mobilising the masses
for the bifurcation or trifurcation of the existing states.

The case of the assertion of an identity in the Hindi speaking areas has come
under the category of sub-regionalism. It is a movement by sub-regional elites for
the assertion of sub-regional identity based on common history and grievances
emanating from an under developed economy of the region and an anxiety for a
proper share in political power. At the time of reorganisation of the states after
independence, certain backward areas were included in different states considering
that there will be even development of all parts of the state. But uneven economic
and political development of the regions led to upheavals and movements for
separate states.

The demands for Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal), Bundelkhand, Braj Pradesh,

Poorvanchal in Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand (Vananchal), Mithalanchal in Bihar,
Chhatisgarh, Baghelkhand, Gondwana in Madhya Pradesh and Brij Pradesh
comprising Bharatpur, Dholpur and Alwar districts of Rajasthan is basically an
outcome of the economic and political neglect by their respective governments.
Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh are the best examples of discontent born out of sheer
negligence. Both parts are very rich in natural resources which were exploited by
the respective state governments but little was done to improve the social and
economic status of the local people who became impoverished.' It has always been

1 Mahadev Chavhan, "Recognising Identity; Are the regions of Chhatisgarh, Uttaranchal

and Vananchal prepared for their new status?" Rashtriya Sahara, New Delhi, August
1998, pp. 21-22.
 109

true, or most other movements too that the perception of economic deprivation, if
only accompanied by feeling of alienation, get easily translated into assertions for
separation. It is faster when the geographical or ethnic factors extend a helping
hand.

The present study is confined only to study of the Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal)

and Jharkhand (Vananchal) region of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The other region
have been excluded, because these two regions fully represents the ingredients
which other region faces and also want of space.

(i) Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal) Problem

The case of the assertion of an identity in the hills of western Uttar Pradesh
is quite different from various other movement for a statehood. The Himalayan hills,
popularly known as Uttarakhand, had always had a distinct cuhure due to their
topography. The region differs from the U P . plains not merely in topography but
also in demography, its caste and religious composition, the economy, the language,
history and culture etc. Interestingly, despite series of ditinct characteristics, the
political assertion of the Uttarakhand identity until recently could not take place at
any appreciable level. It was only a Garhwali or a Kumaoni identity that was hitherto
referred to by the plains people, that too in a very diffused sense.

Uttarakhand is situated in the central sector of the Himalayan belt, spread in

more than 51 thousand square kms, with around seven million population. This part
of Himalaya is well described in Indian mythology and less in history. Historical
ethnic migration spread over different periods of time, pilgrimage and trans-
Himalayan trade also connected this region with Tibet as well as with the Indian
plains. Tibet lies in the north, Nepal in the east and the Indian state of Himachal
Pradesh in the west of Uttarakhand, which touches the northern fringe of the Indo-
Gangetic plains in the south from the Tarai-Bhabhar-Dune and the outer Himalaya.
The region rises to the great Himalaya up to the 7,816 meter above sea level and
trans-Himalayan region touching the Tibetan plateau. With hundreds of sacred
places, temples, caves, lakes, monstries, confluence and river origins, the region has
many pilgrim centres. The present pilgrim route to Kailas-Monsarowar goes
through the eastern part of the Uttarakhand. Different shades of Hindu religious
beliefs find expressions in different shrines, temples, caves, peaks of Uttarakhand,
which exist side by side with the different folk traditions. In this 'abode of Gods'
many micro-societies and culture co-exist with different form of subsistence living
and folk expressions. Different Indian empires touched this region in different
historical periods and had many local dynasties reigning at the same time in different
parts of Uttarakhand.^ Before the coming of the colonial system different local
communities with partly agrarian, partly pastoral and partly barter trade economies
had open access to all kinds of natural resources. The region is a unique wilderness
area and very rich in biodiversity.

The colonial system, which worked in Uttarakhand for nearly thirteen

decades, first under the East India company and latter under British Crown, was a
new oppressive system. The industrial revolution had radically altered the priorities
of British colonialism in India and exploitation took on new forms. As a clever
operator, the colonial system also introduced schools, hospitals, roads etc. Although
in the surface it looked as though the colonial system had put an end to feudalism,
yet in reality the new system carried within it many of the characteristics of the old
system. By the years 1857, the colonial system was reasonably established in
Uttarakhand. Except for the present districts of Uttarkashi and Tehri (during the
colonial period this area was known as Tehri state or Tehri Riyasat), the entire
Uttarakhand was under the colonial power.

The colonial government may be seen as liberal in imperial framework. It

knew the art of exploitative management. The bureaucracy was small and was under
the powerful Commissioners, who initially worked as 'guardians' and then a 'rulers'.
Apart from the administrative bureaucracy, the colonial system introduced the
survey, forest, excise, archaeology and many other departments. The so-called
'scientific' state forestry was introduced. Different laws regarding land, property
forest, excise etc. were framed. Recruitment in the British Indian army started and
new cantonments and hill stations were developed. During the early decades of
colonial rule in Uttarakhand, the impact in the distant regions was minimal. The

Sbeker Patbak, "State, Society and Natural Resoruces in Himalaya : Dynamics of

change in colonial and Post-colonial Uttarakhand," Economic and Politcal Weekly,
32(17), April 26-May 2, 1997, p. 908.
 111

traditional society was divided into the upper and lower strata and there were also a
few pockets of tribes. Initially, the society in Uttarakhand was changing slowly in
the vicinity of new towns and cities. With the recruitment in army and nominal
outmigration, the subsistence economy was pastoral-agrarian. But within hundred
years of the colonial rule, with increasing migration, 'money-order economy' became
dominant. While the base of traditional pastoral-agrarian society remained intact,
the younger folk started to migrate to other areas in search of jobs. Initially the
people welcomed the colonial system as they had been much oppressed by the
Gorkhas between 1790 and 1850. It was rather difficult for them at that time to
understand the exploitative intricacies of the new system.

The British started introducing new land tenure system, forest laws etc. With
the land settlements initiated by Batten (1815), Traill (1828), Ramsay (1874),
Backet (1874), Pavw (1896) and Ibbotson (1925), the history of individual land
ownership started and developed in the hills.' Before 1815, all natural resources
were symbolically the sole property of the ruler, though people had natural rights
upon land, forest and pastures. By giving individual land ownership to the people,
the colonial system started to take over the forests as state property, especially after
1850. With the coming up of the forest department in 1864 and the introduction of
forest laws in 1865, 1878 and 1893, the encroachment upon the traditional rights or
privileges of the people began."• The forest settlement made by Stiff and Nelson
(1911-1917) was seen by the local people as an interference in their lives.

By the first two decades of 20th century the Uttarakhand society was in a
mood of overall protest, a mood channelised by the newly emerging local press. The
protest movements were provided organisation and leadership by the newly
emerging middle class. The 'begar' and forest movements which had started as local/
regional movements, finally merged into the national struggle. During these years a
new multi-dimensional leadership, with representative from different sections of the
local society emerged. Most of them had been educated in Christian missionary
schools and had come under the impact of Indian renaissance which brought the
region within the ambit of the broader national consciousness of the 19th century.

3. Ibid. p. 909.
4. Ibid.
 112

The post-colonial scene started with independence and the partition of India.
The people were hopeful and had much expectations from their own rulers.
Uttarakhand, like many other far-flung or peripheral areas was brought under all
India or all Uttar Pradesh rules/regulations. Though the provincial government did
not introduce the Zamindari abolition act in the hills, yet the region had long lost
the status of a 'non-regulated province'. The political leadership at the centre and
the province was busy in 'more important works' and had no time to understand the
Himalayan problems. The new democratic set up was built upon colonial laws of
land, forest, excise, crime etc. So it was really difficult to work differently and
originally.^ Exploitation of the natural resources, socio-economic dislocation of the
people, destruction of folk culture increased rapidly under our own system. The
new forest act of 1953 was not very different from the act of 1927. A form of
internal colonialism emerged in the 'silent regions' of the country with native
defnocratic apparatus.

A special feature, which emerged in post 1947 Uttarakhand, can be identified

as the politician-bureaucrat-industrialist-mafia nexus.^ The nexus was so powerful
that individual citizens always failed even to highlight the matters. Naturally, this
situation paved the way far social protests. Apart from numerous protest movements
in post-independence Uttarakhand, the following three are very important : (i) The
movement against the use of alcohol in the local society and the excise policy at
large; (ii) The movement for the conservation of forests and restoration of villagers
natural rights upon forests and (iii) The movement for the creation of autonomous
Uttarakhand state.

After independence, whatever the governments have done in this region is a

fallout of these movements. The Indo-China conflict also motivated the government
of India to pay some attention to Uttarakhand. In this way whatever is being done
in the hills was never decided as a natural long-term policy. Pressures from below
and above shaped the government decisions.^ The Indo-China war may be seen as a

5. Ibid, p. 90%.
6. Ibid, p. 909.
7. Ibid, p. 909.
 1 13

major even in the post independent Uttarakhand. This event forced the centre as
well as the provincial government to look at the Himalayan mountains and its
inhabitants from a new angle. But again things have done merely for defence
purposes. The real first line of defence, the mountain peoples, were again neglected
The defence concern of the Indian government was natural, since the 'Panchsheel' of
Nehru and 'Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai' of Chzhou En-Lai proved short lived, but the
government was unable to think of making the real defence line of the people living
in the region.*

The Uttarakhand region has articulated its grievances by mobilising support

for a separate identity. In the last few years an attempt has been made to unite the
Garhwal and Kumaon regions around the issue of the identity of the Hill-dwellers
who have been given a raw deal by the successive governments both at the central
as well as provincial level, despite the region providing three Chief Ministers,
besides a host of famous literatures, statesmen and social activists. The region tops
in India by way of providing the largest number of able bodied persons (in term of
percentage population) to the Indian armed forces. While the demand for a separate
state of Uttarakhand is being attributed to the decades of economic deprivation and
exploitation of the resources of the hills by the "apathetic and callous" leadership
of the plains. The political consequences of the formation of an Uttarakhand identity
could be for more serious than any other movement in India'.

The issue of granting autonomy to Uttarakhand is not new, it was first raised
in a special session of the Congress in 1938 at Srinagar (Garhwal) in the presence of
Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru and G.B. Pant***. Nehru supported the sentiment for autonomy
of the U P . hills. But the demand for a separate hill states was formally made at the
time of the 'Second Round Table Conference' and when the 'Cabinet Mission' visited
India. After independence, PC. Joshi of the undivided Communist Party of India
(CPI) in 1952 raised the issue of granting autonomy to the hill districts of U P .
throughs a memorandum to the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Even Pt. Nehru

8. Ibid, p. 910.
9. Pradeep Kumar, "Demand for a Hill state in UP. : New Realities", Mainstream, Vol.
34, No. 30, June 29, 1996, pp. 21-22.
10. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 8 Sept. 1998.
 114

envisaged division of UP., with complete statehood for Uttarakhand, but G.B. Pant
(the then Chief Minister of U P ) , who hailed from the Uttarakhand region, opposed
the idea and that was the end of the matter as for as the Congress party was
concerned.**

The demand for a separate hill state was again raised before the States
Reorganisation Commission (SRC) in the fifties, which was fully endorsed by Sardar
K.M. Panikkar but he was overruled by the other two members. One of the
important grounds given was that this area would develop better if it formed part of
the bigger state of U.P.'^. And after that the demand for a separate hill state of
western Uttar Pradesh was confined to some intellectual and political circles till
I990's.

After four decade the demand for a separate hill state inter into a new and
decisive phase. What was a subdued demand in the intellectual and political circles
during the last 40 years, has now become a mass movement. Nearly five years ago,
there was a sudden eruption and agitation started initially by students of
Universities, Colleges and Schools of the region following the announcement of a
27 per cent reservation by the State Government headed by Muiayam Singh Yadav
for other Backward Castes (OBC) in addition to the existing 23 per cent for the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs, STs) in the educational institutions
and government offices, to the Muzaffarnagar, Khatima and Massoorie firings that
completely alienated the hill dwellers and convinced them that nothing short of a
separate state, will solve their long standing grievances against the Lucknow
politicians. Most men and women including students, shopkeepers, government
employees, advocates, social and political workers and intellectuals of the region,
held the erstwhile Muiayam Singh Yadav regime responsible for the unrest in the
region. The regime as would be recalled, had at Pauri in August 1994 fired and
lathichorged the satayagrahis who were peaceftilly protesting against the extension
of 27 per cent reservations for the O.B.C.s in the educational institutions and

11. J.C. Agrawal, and S.P. Agarwal, Uttarakhand : Past. Present and Future, Concept
Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1995, p. 425.
12. B.D. Pande, "Why Uttarakhand?" A/om^rreom, February 18, 1995. p. 12.
 115

government offices. The alienation became irreversible only after the humiliation of
the railyists at Rampur Ka Tiraha (Muzaffarnagar) on October 2, 1994, where over
a dozen Uttarakhand activists were killed in Police firing and several women
molested by the Police and PAC personnel while they were in their way to attend a
rally in New Delhi, and the subsequent attempts of the government to protect the
guilty ironically gave a purpose to the movement and it got transformed into an
agitation for severing all links with Lucknow. To add insult to injury, Mulayam
Singh Yadav called the agitationists Deshdrohis (traitors to the nation). This single
characterisation of their movement by their Chief Minister, has gone into indelible
memory of the people. This became all the more painful when the agitationists had
not even remotely talked about any recessionist demand.'^ It is just unthinkable to
expect an Uttarakhandi to talk in such terms in view of his/her complete
identification with what goes by the name of national "mainstream". In fact they
would rather fall in the category of those "national Chauvinists" who claim to
monopolise nationalism in India in the name of being true defenders of Indian
culture and traditions.

The agitation against the extention of 27 per cent reservation to the OBC
was directed more against the "outsiders" than against these caste groups. The
region has a very scanty OBC population, it being only 2 to 3 per cent. What the
agitationists demanded was that the OBC reservation should bear a relationship to
the OBC population of this region, as they became apprehensive of the future of
their children. The new reservation policy seemingly denied the local youth
percentage of employment because people from outside the region would take
advantage of the reservation quota at the expense of the locals. Against this
background, when the state government announced that they could not have a
separate reservation quota for this region (in the neighbouring state of Himachal
Pradesh, where the conditions are fairly similar to those prevailing in Uttarakhand
region, the reservation for them was only 10 per cent)'^, the demand for a separate
state gathered momentum and began to occupy the centre-stage.

13. Pradeep Kumar, "The Post-Election Scenario", Mainstream, January 11, 1997, p. 26.
14. B.D. Pande, "Why Uttarakhand?" Op.Cil., p. 12.
 116

Interestingly to note, the region has always get a separate treatment in many
spheres both in the colonial and post colonial period. In the pre-independence days
the civil laws applicable here were different. For example, under the Hindu law
while the Mitakshara system prevailed in all parts of U.P. and most of India, it was
the Dayabhag system that prevailed in Uttarakhand. Even this was modified by
special customary laws applying to Khasa families. Among several communities
their customary law had precedence over the Hindu traditional laws. The revenue
law was also different in the Uttarakhand region. There was no Zamindari system as
in the plains. Therefore, when the 'Zamindari Abolition Act' of 1950 was passed by
the U.P. legislature, it did not extend to Uttarakhand region. In fact a separate and
very different law was passed by the U.P. legislature for this area in 1960, which
came into force in 1966. The Police system was and still is different. Here the
village revenue officials have Police powers of registering criminal cases and
investigating them. Not only these, but over the last thirty or more years a separate
hill department has been created in the UP. Secretariat with a separate minister-
incharge. There are separate heads of various departments like education, health,
agriculture etc. for this region. There is a separate additional Chief Secretary. There
is a separate hill cadres in rural departments of the government. And there is a
separate budget for this hill region specially sanctioned by the Planning
Commission.'^ Thus, while the government of Uttar Pradesh (and even the
government of India via Planning Commission) recognise that for all practical
purposes this is a separate region, then the people of the region asked why the state
government denounced a separate reservation quota for this region.

The economic neglect and difficulties in administering the region from

Lucknow, constituted the rationale behind demanding the separate Uttarakhand
state, but this neglect and indifference became 'insufferable" only after the events
that took place one after the other following the August 1994 Dharna at Pauri in
protest against the extension of 27 per cent reservation for OBCs in the region. It
has always been true, or most other movements, too, that the perception of
economic deprivation, if only accompanied by feeling of alienation, get easily

15. Ibid, p. 12.

 117

translated into assertions for separation. It is faster when the geographical or ethnic
factors extend a helping hand, but in the case of Uttarakhand, it was the insensitive
(mis) handling of the agitation since August 1994, more than any other reason, that
what could not be achieved despite decades of neglect, has been achieved so
miraculously in less than four years.

Needless to say what favours the formation of an identity, is the process of

"alienation", alienation from the dominant groups of the region, and fmally a
perception of neglect and discrimination at the hands of powers that be. It is
important to note that this perception of discrimination need not necessary condition
of this alienation process, but definitely not the sufficient condition. It has to be the
economic factor plus something else, and this something else, more often than not,
is the perception of cultural and social discrimination/humiliation. In the
Uttarakhand region, some such process of alienation has all along been at work. It
began with the callous attitude of Lucknow in imposing every plan formulated
without any consideration to the topographical distinctness of the hills, and
continued with the uninterrupted drain of the human and material resources of the
mountains till it culminated in a more crude form of attempts to silence the agitators
by physically assaulting them. As if it was not enough, the state government even
allowed its Police force to molest the womenfolk and commit rape on them, in the
true tradition of "victor" humiliating the "vanquished" by letting its armed forces
loose on the people.'^

One of the important outcome of the agitation, the two diverse and a little
hostile region, Garhwal and Kumaon came together on the issue of separation from
Uttar Pradesh. The formation of an Uttarakhandi identity has been a major gain.
Almost everyone today talks in terms of this identity which is relatively new in view
of the hitherto dominant Garhwali and Kumaoni identities. The relatively uneven
economic development of the two regions, with two distinct dialect, and the Tarai-
Bhabhar and Jaunsar belts with pockets of Scheduled Tribes and 'migrant'
population, had generally kept the Uttarakhandi identity divided. But ultimately, the
people of Garhwal and Kumaon have realised that they do not have different

16. Pradeep Kumar, "Demand for a Hill State in UP., New Realities", Op.Cit., p. 23.
 118

political ends to pursue or for that matter different identities to adopt, since they
are a single people in all respects. The rise of Garhwal and Kumaon as two
independent principalities have become irrelevant for them and a thing of the past.
The only salvation if there is one, lies in their identity.'^ It is this newly acquired
militancy of the Uttarakhand identity has only helped assert vis-a-vis the State and
Central government to draw attention towards the long standing problems of the
region.

Acknowledging the wishes of the region, the U.P. Vidhan Sabha (Legislative
Assembly) had thrice adopted unanimous resolutions on the creation of Uttarakhand,
during the tenures of three different political parties in the State : BJP, Samajwadi
Party and BSP, and supported by all other political parties including the Congress,
urged the Union Government to create a separate hill state by adopting the
necessary amendments under Article 2 & 3 of the constitution. The boundaries of
this proposed hill state were also clearly defined in the two out of the three
aforesaid resolutions.

Finally, the demand for Uttarakhand State was accepted by the Union cabinet
on August 3, 1998** with the approval of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation
(Uttaranchal) Bill 1998 on a hill state comprising Pauri Garhwal, Tehri Garhwal,
Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, Dehra Dun, Nainital, Almora, Pithoragarh, Udhamsingh
Nagar, Bageshwar, Champavat, Rudraprayag and Hardwar districts. The BJP
preferred "Uttaranchal" to Uttarakhand and gave several reasons. According to the
party literature, the name Uttarakhand was initially given to the new division created
in the wake of the Sino-Indian border tensions when the newly carved out districts
of Chamoli (out of Pauri Garhwal), Uttarkashi (out of Tehri Garhwal) and
Pithoragarh (out of Almora) were put together to constitute the Uttarakhand
division. Later in the northern parts of West Bengal, a movement was launched for
a separate State of Uttarakhand comprising of Darjeelings, Kamatpur, Dinajpur,
Cooch Bihar etc. The BJP's objection to the use of this word Uttarakhand is that if
used for the UP. Hills, it is bound to create the confusion about the exact

17. J.C. Agarwal and S.P. Agarwal, Op.Cit., p. 424.

18. The Times of India, New Delhi, August 15, 1998.
 119

geographical boundaries of the proposed state. Moreover, the party maintains, the
name Uttaranchal will be in tune with the names like Arunachal and Himachal.'^

The nod of approval by the Union Cabinet to the Uttar Pradesh

Reorganisation Bill, has drawn angry protest from certain sections in Udhamsingh
Nagar and Hardwar districts. They are unhappy, not with the creation of the new
state, but with the centre's decision to include their districts in it. The Union
Cabinet's decision to include the Hardwar district in the proposed hill state came as
a surprise because in all the three resolutions passed by the U.P. legislature for the
creation of Uttarakhand the inclusion of Hardwar was never sought. All most all the
non-BJP party's, even its government allies like Loktantrik Congress and Jantantrik
ESP vehemently opposed the inclusion of Hardwar in the proposed hill state. They
asserted that Hardwar had always been a part of the plains of Uttar Pradesh, and
should not go to the hill state.^"

The decision to include Hardwar in the new State was taken by the Union
Cabinet in view of the recommendations made by the Uttar Pradesh Home
department to the President of India during the President rule in the state. The
recommendations were made after the Union Government circulated a draft bill for
the new state following the announcement made by Prime Minister H.D. Deve
Gowda on August 15, 1996 from the Red Fort. The State Home Department after
considering various aspects of management of the Kumbha Mela area and
maintenance of law and order there, had recommended that Hardwar should be
included in the proposed Hill State. The report said Kumbh Mela area comprises
Hardwar and Rishikesh districts, the inclusion of Hardwar in the proposed hill State
would mean a uniform command for the maintenance of law and order in the Kumbh
Mela area. The report further suggested that division of Kumbh Mela area between
proposed Uttarakhand State and Uttar Pradesh would create serious administrative
problems.^'

Finally, the demand for exclusion of Hardwar district from the Uttarakhand/
Uttaranchal was accepted by the UP. Cabinet obviously under pressure from its

19. Pradeep Kumar, "Demand for a Hill State in UP. : New Realities", Op.Cit., p. 29.
20. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 5, 1998.
21. Ibid, September 22, 1998.
 120

allies Loktantrik Congress and Jantantric BSP on 19 September 1998. The UP.
Cabinet decision to drop the Hardwar district from the draft Bill, which was
approved by the state legislature unanimously, is reversal of the stand taken by its
own Home Department. The reversal of the State Home Department's
recommendation is bound to have far reaching implications which may pose serious
problems in the maintenance of law and order in the Kumbha Mela area, if accepted
by the Union Cabinet and approved by the Parliament.

Another controversy arose regarding the inclusion of Udhamsingh Nagar

district in the proposed Uttarakhand State. The Akali Dal, one of the allies of the
BJP at national level demanded that Udhamsingh Nagar should not be transferred to
the proposed hill State, because in its opinion the area has no cultural, economic,
geographical, Unguistic or social affinity with the proposed districts and hence it
should not become a part of the new State. They even threatened to withdraw their
support from the government if Udhamsingh Nagar is not excluded from the
proposed Uttarakhand State. Akali Dal president and Punjab Chief Minister Prakash
Singh Badal stated that, "while Uttarakhand is being created because of the demand
of the hill people, Udhamsingh Nagar is included in it against the wishes of the
people there".^^ He further said that more than ninety (90%) per cent of the people
wanted it to remain with Uttar Pradesh.

Till a couple of years back, Udhamsingh Nagar was a part of Nainital district
and it was carved out in September 1995 by Mayawati government, fulfilling the
long standing demand of the people in the area and named after the great martyr
Udham Singh. The area which was under Rohilkhand and Moradabad state was
brought under Nainital district by the British in 1901 for administrative reasons.^^
Tharu and Baxa tribals were the only inhabitants of the area. It was only in the early
1950 Sikh refugees who had fled from Pakistan and Hindus who fled from
Bangladesh after the partition were allotted plots in the area as part of the
rehabiliation programme. The first Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh Pandit G.B. Pant
was the man responsible for the rehabilitation programme and he saw to it that the

22. Ibid, August 7, 1998.

23. Utpal Parashar, "A Journey from Obscurity to Prosperity", The Hindustan Times,
New Delhi, July 12, 1998.
 121

allotees were given due incentives to stay in the area. At present the total population
of the area is more than ten lakh with Sikh comprising about 20%. In the last fifty
years, it has emerged as one of the most prosperous areas in Uttar Pradesh with
nearly 200 rice mills 6 sugar mills and nearly 400 big and small scale industrial
units^^. This district is perhaps the only district in India where there is tremendous
progress both in field of Agriculture and industry.

This interference of the AkaJi Dal in the affairs of IJttar Pradesh is uncalled
for. It is constitutionally incorrect and ethically wrong. The founding fathers of our
constitution under Article three(3) clearly made a provision that views of only the
state legislature will be obtained whose territory is likely to be affected by the
formation of a new state or states. Udhamsing Nagar had been a part of Uttaranchal
since the very beginning and by interfering on this issue the Akalis are trying to
spoil the cordial and peacefiil atmosphere in Udhamsing Nagar. The demand for
exclusion or inclusion of a district on the basis of religion or sect is dangerous for
the health of the nation. India never formed or carved out any state on the basis of
religion. The most vital need of the time is to create among the masses the feeling
not only that they are Indians first, but that they are nothing but Indians, Indians
first and Indian last.

(ii). Jharkhand (Vananchal) Problem

Jharkhand, the land of forests, variously called as 'Nagadesh' and

'Dasharanya' in different periods of history, has time and again, given rise to various
social and political groups championing the cause of the local people against the
exf>loitation by the outsiders.^^ The tribes of Chotanagpur plateau and Santhal
Parganas in Bihar began to regard themselves as 'Jharkhandis', and extended this
appellation to the residents in the contiguous areas of tribal concentration in three
other states namely. West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.

The Chotanagpur plateau covers the southern districts of the state of Bihar.
The word Chotanagpur is a corruption of 'Chutia Nagpur', 'Chutia' refers to a

24. Ibid.
25. Arunabha Ghosh, 'Probing the Jharkhand Question', Economic and Political Weekly,
May 4, 1991, p. 1173.
 122

village on the outskirts of Ranchi which was at one time the seat of the Nagbansi
Chief who ruled over the central plateau. The region has an unmistakable identity of
its own which distinguished it geographically, ethnically and culturally from the
surrounding plains in the neighbourhood. The early inhabitants of the plateau
consisted mostly of the tribal groups such as the Khasias, Mundas, Santhals, Hos,
Bhumij, Oraons and other smaller tribes.^^ Over the centuries these tribes developed
socio-cultural systems of their own and in terms of their cultural ethos-language,
institution, belief and customs they stand out from other population groups of the
society. However, some other sections of backward communities live in symbiosis
with the tribals such are the Mahatos, Kumhars, the Lobars, the Mahlis etc
Culturally and socially, they form a continuum with the tribal groups and may be
considered as being a part of the indigenous population of Chotanagpur without
being tribals in the strict sense of the terms. The earliest settlers in this central tribal
belt were perhaps the 'Asurs', whose occupation was iron smelting and the 'saraks'
or Jain Shravakas. They were followed by the 'Mundas' with their language family
the Kharias, the Hos and the Santhals around 500 BC. The Nagbanshis arrived
during the first century A.D. while the Dravida-speaking Oraons came even later.^^

The socio-economic exploitation of these 'original inhabitants', in the form of

land alienation and indebtedness started along with steady flow of immigrants during
the reign of the fourth Nagbanshi King Pratap Rai in the fourth century A.D. These
'diku' (outsiders) immigrants not only infiltrated tribal territory but also into their
life and culture. Around the sixth century A.D. the Mundas and the Oraons jointly
selected a 'manki' (leader) who was not the sovereign of the land but had to play a
prominent role during wars. A descendant of this 'manki' was later made a tributary
of the Mughals and by 1585 the Chotanagpur Raj was virtually annexed by the
Mughals. Another 'manki' Durjansal was imprisoned by the Mughals for his failure
to pay tributes in time and on his return from the jail in 1680, he surrounded himself
with Hindi courtiers and mercenaries whom he made 'jagirdars' of Munda and Oraon

26. Srabani Raichaudhari, "The Jharkhandis : Vision and Reality; A Micro-Study of

Singhbhum", Economic and Political Weekly, November 21, 1992, p. 2551.
27. B.P. Kesri, "Problems and Prospects of Jharkhandi Languages", in Nirmal Sengupta
(ed). Fourth World Dynamics : Jharkhand, Authors Guild Publications, Delhi. 1982.
p. 140.
 123

villages with the right to collect and enjoy taxes from those villages. The immigrant
'jagirdars' and 'thikadars' in course of time, introduced land rent in the Chotanagpur
region and gradually ousted many of the original inhabitants of the land for their
inability to pay rent or reluctance to render 'begar' or forced labour to the new
masters.^* Thus, the transfer of ancestral tribal lands to outsiders began as early as
17th century reducing the tribal peasants to mere cultivators of land, paying rent to
non-tribal 'diku' landlords, who in turns paid a share to the Maharaja of
Chotanagpur, who then paid a share to the Mughal emperor.

In 1771, the area came under the jurisdiction of the East India Company.
The company initially subordinated the Maharaja of Chotanagpur almost in the same
way as did the Mughals. But as they were actually interested in revenue from the
land, they introduced a permanent legal and administrative structure to ensure
regular and smooth collection of revenue. They gradually introduced money
economy, individual ownership of land and Police system to control tribal uprisings.
The traditional right of tribals over land and forests as well as the age-old panchayat
systems thus slowly gave way to the forces of modernisation. The permanent
settlement Act of Lord Cornwallis in 1793 legalised the individual proprietorship in
land and led to further alienation of tribal lands. Besides, indiscriminate destruction
of forests and unplanned mining in the region pauperized the tribals.^^ The 'adivasi'
pooulation, thus divested of all possible means of production, were gradually
transformed into a vast army of'coolie' labour.

By the end of the 18th century, almost all the 'rajas' of the Jharkhand region
accepted British supremacy and started paying rents to the crown. Thus, the whole
administrative machinery of the former 'rajas' became a useful instrument in the
hands of the alien rulers to exploit the indigenous people. The Chotanagpur plateau
came under the four-tier system of administration by the beginning of the 19th
century.^° The East India Company was at the top of the ladder, followed by the
Maharaja's of Chotanagpur, then a number of local 'rajas', mostly of non-tribal

28. Arunabha Ghosh, Op.Cil., p. 1173.

29.' Ibid.
30. Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1978, p. 158.
 124

origin and finally the 'thikadars', appointed by the 'rajas' to collect rent directly from
the peasants. The exploited tribals in the beginning shrunk back in their own shell
getting isolated from the mainstream of public life. However, when things
deteriorated for the worse, these peace loving people fought back with ardour and
audacity. All the tribal communities, including the Kurmis of Jharkhand joined hands
to fight against the oppression and exploitation let loose by the 'diku' migrants and
the Britishers. The effort to drive away their common enemies from their homeland
sometimes took violent forms of looting and arson, particularly in the Bankura and
Midnapur regions. The famous 'kol insurrection' of 1831-32 was led by Singray and
Binray Manki, against the 'diku thikadars'. The British administration, under the
East India Company, defended the rent collecting 'thikadars', under attack, even
with the help of troops under the Company. The Mundas, Hos, Bhunyas and Oraons
of the Chotanagpur region joined hand to fight against the double oppression of the
'diku' - British alliance. The armed rebellion was against the oppressive system
perpetuated by the non-tribal 'zamindars', traders, contractors, moneylenders and
police. Though it was primarily against the land alienation, bonded labour and loss
of honour of the tribals, it was also a protest against the ideological and cultural
domination over them.

The 'Santhal Hul' (rebellion) led by Sido and Kanhu in 185S, was a violent
expression of the simmering discontent and tension among the Santhal against the
exploitation by the non-tribal Maharajas, Zamindars and British merchant. The
Santhals claimed the right to the lands which they used to cultivate. In many areas
people were organised on the pattern of private armies. Several cases of arson,
looting and even killing of Maharajas were reported. Government troops were
deployed to control the rebellion as the local adminitration proved to be inadequate
for that purpose. McPherson opines that apart from the oppression of the Mahajans
and landlords, a deeper sense of freedom - "Santhal yearning for independence, a
dream of the ancient days when they had no overlords, perhaps a memory of pre-
historic times when... they were themselves masters of the gangetic valley and had
not yet been driven back by the Aryan invaders"^' was instrumental in giving rise to

31. H. McPherson, Final Report of the Survey and Settlement Operations in the District
of Santhal Parganas, Calcutta, 1909, as quoted by S.C. Panchbhai in "The Jharkhand
Movement Among the Santhals", in K.S. Singh (ed.) Tribal Movements in India, Vol.
II, Manohar Book Publishing, New Delhi, 1983, p. 32.
 125

the uprising. The movement, though it had on apparent ethnic bias, was not confined
to the Santhas alone. Though the Santhals provided the leadership, even the
indigenous artisan castes who had developed close relationship with the Santhals
through the ages, were intimately connected with the movement against the tyranny
of outsiders. Thus it had developed almost a class character in its organisation and
objectives rising above narrow ethnic sentiments.

The experience of the 'Santhal Hul' made the Santhals realise that such
violent uprising alone were perhaps not enough to improve their economic status
and to end exploitation by the 'dikus'. The result was a Hinduised social reforms
movement called the 'kherwar' movement which began to spread among the Santhals
during the early seventies. The term Kherwar' represented the memory of their
golden past, when the Santhals, free from outside interference, were their own
masters and were known as 'Kherwars'. This movement was more socio-religious
than political in nature and adopted many Hindu symbols to mobilise the masses.
That however could not overcome the psychological barrier between these two
communities. The Santhal retained their ambivalent attitude towards the 'dikus' as
ir

before admiring their intelligence but hating their superiority complex as well as
their exploitative tendencies.-^^
Another anti-diku agitation took shape during 1875-95, known as the 'Sardar
Larai' (leaders war) to establish the right of tribal peasants over land by driving
away alien landlords. Both the Mundas and Oraons joined the movement initially,
but later in the eighties the Oraons broke away. Sardar were the leaders of different
tribal communities at the local and regional levels. They led the tribals to fight for
their land and forest rights their social and cultural identity and religious purity. It
was a movement against the dikus', the British as well as the Christian
missionaries^-^. A 'corporate self-consciousness' was gradually developed during the
course of the movement. Thus, a group of tribal leaders - 'Sardars' fought against
the exploiters in an organised manner. Not only did they take up arms but also took
recourse to law to protect their rights and privileges.

32. Arunbha Ghosh, Op.Cit., p. 1174.

33. Ibid.
 26

The Birsa Munda uprising of 1895-1900, was primarily directed against the
British and the non-tribal landowners. It aimed at establishing a 'Birsaite Raj', with
Birsa as its 'new king', after driving away all the foreigners, not only the British but
even the Hindus and Muslims from the region. The question of alienation of land
was the main driving force of the uprising. Birsa fought on economic, social,
political and religious fronts. Land, forest, religion, culture and immigration were
the key issues in this uprising. His strategies were primarily non-cooperation but he
was not against direct confrontation, if needed. The British tried to cursh the
uprising at gun point because of its potential threat to their domination. The agrarian
revolt spearheaded by him was successful in the sense that the British, henceforth,
tried to prevent or at least to minimise the loss of tribal land to the non-tribal 'diku'.
He was a reformist and a revivalist too. He became a critic of traditional tribal
customs, religious beliefs and practices. Gradually, he gained the stature of 'Birsa
Bhagwan' in the eyes of the long exploited Mundas. With his death the movement
dissipated, but Birsa himself became a folk hero.

All these movements upto the 20th century basically centred around the issue
of exploitation and deprivation of the indigenous people by the migrants and the
ruling elite. The over all pattern of these 'messianic movements' began to change
under the influence of forces of modernisation roughly around the beginning of the
20th century. The death of Birsa Munda in 1900 marked the end of 'traditional
religious type' of leadership and was replaced by a 'rationalistic type' of leadership,
whereby the new leaders started relying mostly on education and experience gained
through contact with modem civilisation.

At the turn of the 20th century, many organisation and groups sprang up to
protect the interests and rights of the exploited tribal masses. A number of
institutions, led by christian missionaries and students emerged to introduce social
reforms and develop the tribal life in general, and to rescue them from the clutches
of moneylenders by forming co-operative societies. One such society, the Roman
Catholic Co-operative Society, was formed in 1906, which played a significant role
in raising the standard of tribal life in the region.-^'' There were also societies for the

34. K.S. Singh, Tribal Autonomy Movements in Chotanagpur in K.S. Singh (ed.).
Op.CU., p. 02.
 127

promotion of education among the tribals which provided the nucleus for the later
political movements. The first organisation in the form of a movement for the socio-
economic upliftment of the tribals of the Chotanagpur plateau was organised by the
Lutheran Christians and J. Barthalmew, a student of St. Columbia College,
Hazaribagh called Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj in 1914. The Chotanagpur Unnati
Samaj was primarily a welfare organization, aimed at the development of the
Chotanagpur area by improving the social, economic and political conditions of the
tribals. It opened its gate to non-christian 'adivasis' as well and worked for inter
tribal unity by bringing into its fold a large number of educated youth. The
leadership was provided primarily by the teachers, who demanded employment
opportunitis for the educated tribals, sought to secure reservations for them in
different services and legislative bodies and planned to form a 'sub-state of
Chotanagpur'joined either to Bengal or Orissa but certainly detached from Bihar.-^^

The demand for a 'separate administrative unit' in the Chotanagpur region

was first placed before the Simon Commission by the Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj in
1928.^^ The members of the 'Chotanagpur Unnati Samja' under the leadership of
Juel Lakra and Bishop Van Hoeck submitted a memorandum to the commission
asking for special privilages for the tribals and urging the commission to consider
the demand for a separate administrative unit in the Chotanagpur region.

In 1930, an exclusive Catholic orgnaisation, 'the Chotanagpur Catholic

Sabha', came up under the leadership of Boniface Lakra as the President and Ignes
Beck as the Secretary, and in the subsequent year 'Chotanagpur Kisan Sabha' was
born under the leadership of Theble Oraon, a non-Christian, who along with
Larentivs Burla, left the Unnati Samaj to organise the Kisan Sabha. Later under the
Government of India Act 1935, the Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana regions were
declared as 'partially excluded areas' and was put under the special responsibility of
the Governor under section 92 of the Act by the British Government in order to
keep the area within the exclusive preserves of the foreign administration. The

35. A.P. Sharma. "The Jharkhand Movement : A critique". Social Change, Vol. 18, No.
2, June 1988, p. 60.
36. Sachidanand, The Changing Munda, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1979,
p. 242.
 128

Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj, opposed the provision through a number of resolutions

and demonstrations without much success, as the government stood firm about the
provision. However, when elections were held in January 1937 in accordance with
the provisions of the new Act, all the candidates fileded by the Unnati Samaj and
the Kisan Sabha were defeated. Only the 'Chotanagpur Catholic Sabha', was able to
win two seats in the region.^' The electoral reverses of the sectarian tribal
organisations led to a change in the attitude of the tribal leaders. The need for a
powerful organisation was realised and an attempt was made to bridge the gap
between the Christians and the non-Christians among the tribes. Consequently, in
1938, Ignes Beck, brought all the tribal organisations together under a common
plateform, called the Chotanagpur Adivasi Mahasabha', a monolithic organisation to
which all the sectarian organisations were merged. In spite of its name, Adivasi
Mahasabha did allow the non-adivasis of the region to participate in its activities,
atleast officially.

However, the demand for a separate province for the tribals in the region
was mooted for the first time by the Adivasi Mahasabha, during its second session
in 1939. The Mahasabha was led by some highly educated people among the tribals.
Prominent among them was Jaipal Singh, an Oxford-returned Christian tribal. He
presided over the 1939 session of the Mahasabha and gave a call for the creation of
a separate province for the tribals.-^* The leaders of the Mahasabha met and made
representation before the Cripps Mission and demanded the grant of separate
Adivasi State out of the South Bihar with an autonomous status. From its very
inception its slogan was to carve a separate tribal state out of the South Bihar with
an autonomous status. Afler independence,the Mahasabha submitted a memorandum
to the exluded and partially excluded areas (other than Assam) sub-committee of
the Advisory Committee of the constituent Assembly in 1947 for a separate
province.

On March 5, 1949, at a conference of the Adivasi Mahasabha, held at

Hindisala in Ranchi, the 'Adivasi Mahasabha', changed its nomenclature to became

37. A.P. Sharma, Op.Cit., p. 61.

38. Ibid.
 129

the Jharkhand party.-^' The party was open to both the tribals and non-tribals. It
showed three distinct traits in the initial years (i) urban orientation in thinking and
activity, (ii) Christian domination and close links with the Churches and (iii)
predominance of Mundas and Oraons the two major tribes of Ranchi area. However,
ethnicity was gradually replaced by regionalism as the rallying point for the
Jharkhand party and the militant movement gave rise to an organised political party.
This was partly because of the recognition of the tribals need for special protection
under the constitution of free India and provision inserted under the fif^h and sixth
schedules for their emancipation. The Jharkhand leaders were probably also
influenced by the stand taken by the Congress party that language, not ethnicity
should determine the formation of a province. Many elements of the Congress
socialist party and quite a few members of the moneylender community, identified
as 'dikus', joined the Jharkhand party during this period. The area of Jharkhand was
enlarged to include lands inhabited by the Chotanagpur tribals but falling under
West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.''^ Thus a new phase of constitutional
participation based on regional sentiment dawned.

In the first general elections of 1952, the Jharkhand party fought the elections
with the call for a separate province and became the largest opposition party in the
Bihar Legislative Assembly, by winning all the 32 seats from South Bihar (the party
won 33 Assembly seats in all, out of a total of 325 seats) and three Lok Sabha
seats.'" This electoral success gave new impetus to the movement in and outside the
Assembly. Having proved their strength in the general elections of 1952, the
Jharkhand party made a forcefull representation before the States Reorganisation
Commission ( S R C . ) on 22nd April, 1954,^^ for the creation of a separate
Jharkhand State within the Indian Union, comprising the districts of Chotanagpur,
Santhal parganas and parts of Gaya, Shahabad, Bhagalpur and Monghyr districts of
Bihar, some parts of Mirzapur district of U.P., Surguja district of Madhya Pradesh
and districts of Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj in Orissa The proposed state, according

39. L.K. Mahapatra, 'The Jharkhand Party in Orissa', in K.S. Singh (ed.) Tribal
Movements in India, Op.Cit., p. 67.
40. Arunbha Ghosh, Op.Cit., p. 1175.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
 130

to the memorandum, was bigger than West Bengal in area and Orissa in population.
The Commission, however, in its report did not agree with the idea of a separate
Jharkhand state. The main reason sighted by the Commission for not granting a
separate statehood to the Chotanagpur plateau was the "lack of viability of the
region as a linguistic unit"."*-^ The tribals were shocked, but despite their
disappointment, they remain firmed on their primary goal i.e. to achieve a separate
Jharkhand state with an autonomous status.

The Jharkhand party, despite their disappointment, continued to be the

leading opposition party in Santhal pargana region. Between 1955-61, a number of
anti-moneylender agrarian struggles, took place in Santhal parganas. Interestingly,
the Jharkhand movement among the Santhals, was always oriented towards the
agrarian cause.^'* The centre of activity during these struggles was shifted from
Ranchi to Santhal Pargnas, the home of the Santhals.'*^

However, in the 1957 & 1962, general elections, the strength of the
Jharkhand party in Bihar legislative assembly was substantially reduced. This was
largely because of a Christian - non-Christian schism among the tribals, weakening
the party. The division was caused by the advantages enjoyed by the educated and
missionary-backed Christians in getting jobs and other social benefits vis-a-vis the
non-Christians. The developmental activities and industrialisation under the first
two five-year plans in the Chotanagpur region and the participation of the tribal
people in those programmes also removed them from the agitational path, atleast
temporarily. Besides, experiments in Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, where tribals
were represented in the council of ministers of the Congress government, amply
proved that sharing of power even with the Congress could protect tribal interests
up to a certain level. In the meantime, some new states had also come into being as
a result of movements launched from within the Congress. Jharkhand leaders led by

43. R.D. Munda, "The Jharkhand Movement : Retrospect and Prospect", Social Change,
Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1988, p. 30.
44. Nirmal Sengupta, "Background of the Jharkhand Question; in Nirmal Sengupta (ed.)
Fourth World Dynamics . Jharkhand, Authors Guild Publications, Delhi, 1982, pp.
31-32.
45. Arunbha Ghosh, Op.Cit., pp. 1175-1176.
 131

Jaipal Singh felt that they could perhaps serve the tribals interest better from within
the ruling Congress party. Thus the Jharkhand party merged with the Congress in
June 1963, surrendering the popular party symbol of 'cock' and its legal identity
altogether.''*

The effectiveness of the 'sub-nationalistic' demands for the creation of a

separate Jharkhand province with autonomous status was however, lost after the
merger with the Congress in 1963. For over two decades, the Mundas and other
tribals had put their trust in Jaipal Singh and suddenly, one day, he went over to the
Congress. The tribals considered it a great betrayal. Jaipal Singh's explanation that
the Jharkhand party's merger with the Congress was a strategy of 'working from
within' to make the rulers accept their demand for a separate state did not convince
anyone.''^ The rank and file of the Jharkhand party themselves did not appreciate the
merger. They considered it a devised by the tribal elites to share the spoils of the
ruling class. The merger dealt a severe blow to the movement and ushered in an era
of confusion in the politics of Chotanagpur region.

In the fourth general elections of 1967, an anti-Congress wave was evident

in the Chotanagpur plateau. Tribal leaders in the Congress, with a Jharkhand
background, faired badly. Those opposed to the merger went into the election fray
as independents, they used the name of Jharkhand party to catch the tribal votes
and succeded in winning eleven seats in Bihar legislative assembly in total.'** Those
leaders who were unhappy over the merger started reviving the old party. The party
spirit though, revived was fragmented and lapsed back to its ethnic character.''^ The
political instability in the state during this period further added the confusion among
the tribals. A number of splinter groups, claiming to the real Jharkhand party
appeared on the scene. None of these groups, backed by Christian organisations
overtly or covertly could, however, further the cause of the suffering tribals as they
were infected by mutual bickerings. The fragmentation process was so acute that 'as

46. Ibid, p. 1176.

47. Aran Sinha, "Recurrent Pattern of Jharkhand Politics", Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 45, November 7, 1987, p. 1887.
48. Arunbha Ghosh, Op.Cit., p. 1176.
49. R.D. Munda, Op.Cit., p. 30.
 132

many as nine groups sprang up to fill the vacuum created by the merger. Thus,
unprecedented factionalism marked the post Jaipal Singh period of the movement. *°

Almost during the same period a social reform organization, namely 'Sivaji
Samaj', was formed in 1969 to fight the evils of liquor and moneylending etc. Under
the initiative of Sibu Soren. He was soon joined by Binod Bihari Mahato and A.K.
Roy, who had formed the Marxist Co-ordination Committee after being expelled
from the Communist Party of India (M). The Sivaji Samaj soon took the shape of a
movement and spreaded over a large area of Jharkhand. The movement reached
even remote villages of Chotanagpur plateau, fought against the exploitation of
landlords and started 'Dhan Kato Andolan' (forcible harvesting),'' 'Gram Golas'
(collective grain storage) were established to help the poor tribals at the time of
crisis. Such measures made the movement very popular among the tribals and
mobilised a large section of the landless tribals around the Sivaji Samaj.

Sivaji Samaj was gradually transformed into 'Jharkhand Mukti Morcha', with
Binod Bihari Mahato as its President and Sibu Soren as its General Secretary. The
Marxist Co-ordination Committee of A.K. Roy also lent able support to the Morcha.
Some of the Naxalite groups operating in the Dhanbad area also provided moral
support to the movement. Thus, radicalism found a new expression under the banner
of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and the movement got transformed significantly on
many counts. The Morcha projected itself as a radical Marxist Party, fighting against
internal colonial exploitation of the Chotanagpur region. The Morcha not only
demanded a separate state, but a state free from class exploitation. It decided to
recover alienated lands from moneylenders and big peasants in North Chotanagpur,
an area where Jharkhand party was not very strong. Many cases of 'land riots' and
violent clashes between the tribals and the moneylenders were reported from the
region. The ancient practice of 'tribal self-government' was partially revived.
Traditional collective forming on common lands was re-introduced in some areas.'^

50. Aninbha Ghosh, Op.Cit. p. 1176.

51. Sat>'abrata Chakrabarty, "Jharkhand Movement in West Bental - A Case Study of
Sub-National Politics", in Rakhahari Chatterji (ed). Politics in West Bengal, World
Press, Calcutta, 1985, p. 176.
52. K.S. Singh, 'Tribal Autonomy Movements in Chotanagpur', in K.S. Singh (ed). Tribal
Movements in India, Op.Cit., pp. 12-13.
 133

The agrarian radicalism of the J.M.M. was combined with the interest in cultural
revivalism widened its base in the region. The Morcha also widened its base by
embracing the minning and industrial workers, most of whom came from the
neighbouring states. Thus, an attempt was made to bring the workers and peasants
closer on a common platform. Thus for the movement, before the advent of J.M.M.
was basically an 'Adivasi Movement' with non-tribal population being lukewarm in
their response to the cause of the movement. The morcha for the first time, could
project some non-tribal leaders like Binod Bihari Mahto, A.K. Roy etc. with
considerable mass base and thus shed its exclusively tribal character to some
extent. ^^

The J.M.M. propounded a radical ideology of change and emerged as a

major political force in tribal Bihar. It has not only revised once again the autonomy
demand but have given the tribals a radical ideology of change. The impact of the
naxalite movement and leftist parties is also visible in the agrarian progamme put
forth by its leaders. They have incited the tribals to organise themselves to fight the
enemies. The Morcha has been able to withstand the disintegration fever from which
most regional parties have suffered, because it has been able to respond successfully
to the militancy of the tribals. Its programme of socio-economic transformation is
much more elaborate, concrete and practicable than the policies and programmes so
far proposed by any tribal organisation. Its leders are aware that a social movement
is impossible unless there is an ideology, in order to legitimise it, and an
organisation that is an instrument of ideology. J.M.M. has both an ideology to
legitimise its agrarian, social and cultural reforms and an organisation of devoted
workers and supporters to implement its programmes. By the late 1970's, Sibu
Soren, emerged as a true mjss leader in Dhanbad and Santhal parganas. The
protagonists of the separate Jhirkhand State kept a low profile during the Jaya
Prakash Narayan movement. Though J.P. Narayan himself was in favour of creating
smaller states in India. In 1978, the otherwise dead political movement which saw a
virtual rout in the Chotanagpur region after the general elections of 1977, started
gaining ground once again. During 1978-80, J.M.M. organised violent rallies and

53. Arunbha Ghosh, Op.Cit., p. 1177.

 134

mass demonstrations against moneylenders, big landholders and mafia lenders of

Dhanbad and Santhal parganas.^^

In the 1980 general elections for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative
Assembly, the Congress (I) recognised the potential of the JMM and entered in an
electoral alliance. The alliance won most of the seats they contested in tribal Bihar.
The return of the Congress to power, both at the centre as well as in the state of
Bihar, signalled a virtual end to the militancy of Sibu Soren, who gradually distanced
himself from Binod Bihari Mahto and A.K. Roy.'' Sibu Soren like Jaipal Singh,
thought of fighting for the tribal cause from within the system and preferred to join
hands with the Congress party. The decision of the Sibu Soren led to the end of
post Jaipal Singh era of tribal politics.

In May 1980, a department of tribal and regional languages was opened in

the Ranchi University. B.P. Kesri, Vice President of the All India Jharkhand Party,
Horo faction and a teacher of Hindi in the GLA College, Daltanganj, joined the
department. In June 1980, A.K. Dhan, a western educated Christian tribal, who was
serving in the North-East Hill University, Shillong was appointed as Vice-
Chancellor of the University. Soon the University, especially its tribal and regional
languages department became the nerve centre of tribal activities. Quite a number of
educated tribals got appointments as lecturers and Principals in difTerent colleges of
the region. Higher post in the university administration were also filled up by tribal
candidates. The University Hostels were virtually converted into Adivasi Hostels,
providing shelters to the tribal politicians and agitators. Thus, the Ranchi University
and its department of tribal and regional languages became a training centre for
activists working under a number of frontal organisations of the tribals like,
'Chotanagpur Intelletual Forum', 'Chotanagpur Teachers Association', etc. A large
number of cadres were also supplied to the 'All Jharkhand Students Union' after its
formation in June 1986.'^

The lack of co-ordination among the different factions of the tribal movement
was a constant source of anxiety for the well-wishers of the Jharkhand movement

54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
 135

ever since the eclipse of Jaipal Singh. The idea of co-ordinating the activities of
different factions was mooted towards the end of 1986, but without much success.
In the next year, a conference was held at Ramgharh in September to bring different
Jharkhand groups, irrespective of their nature and composition on one platform, and
was attended by 438 delegates representing almost 50 political, cuhural, students
and women's organisation in which they decided to form the Jharkhand Co-
ordination Committee (JCC).^^ Prominent among the participatory groups were the
Jharkhand party led by N.E. Horo, the Binod Bihari Mahto group of JMM. Two
factions of the Jharkhand Kranti Dal led by Santosh Rana and Satyanarayan Sinha,
the Indian peoples front. All Jharkhand Students Union, Jharkhand Liberation Front
and others. Though the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Soren group) stayed away
initially, latter joined the Co-ordination Committee. B.P. Kesari, head of the
department of tribal and regional languages, Ranchi University became the convenor
of JCC. A 23-point programme was adopted in the conference to achieve the goal
of a separate Jharkhand State, comprising of 21 districts of Bihar, West Bengal,
Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. The most significant aspect of the movement under
B.P. Kesari's leadership has been its broadening of the base. The movement no
longer represents tribal chauvinism and had gradually involved the non-tribal
population of the Chotanagpur hill areas as well. Besides, a new wave of intellectual
participation has given the movement some degree of maturity, it had lacked in its
earlier phases.^*

Factionalism resurfaced in the Jharkhand Movement during the third week of

August, 1989, when the militant AJSU severed its link with the JCC, disagreeing on
the question of participation in the ninth Lok Sabha elections and thus put the
efforts of the JCC to bring different faction together under severe strain. ^^ However,
a change in the leadership of the AJSU, effected in its annual convention held at
Ranchi on January 7, 1990, reversed its earlier stand and decided to take part in the
1990 Assembly elections in Bihar on the JMM symbol. In another significant

57. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 14, 1987.

58. Arunbha Ghosh, Op.Cit., pp. 1177-1178.
59. The Statesman, Delhi, August 26, 1989.
 136

development, the two factions of the JMM, led by Sibu Soren and Binod Bihari
Mahto respectively, reunited after seven long years on January 7, 1990 at a joint
convention of both the factions held at Dumari in Gridih district of Bihar/'^
Meanwhile, in the assembly elections of February 1990, JMM emerged as the
strongest tribal group in the Chotanagpur region, by wining the 19 Assembly seats
in the Bihar legislature, all from the tribal region.

After the 1990 assembly election, the Congress party in a major policy
decision formed it regional committee, the Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana
Regional Congress Committee (CSBRCC), and appointed T. Mochi Rai Munda as
its first President. The party launched a campaign with a view to achieve a separate
Jharkhand state. It suggested a dramatic change of heart on the part of the Congress
party on the Jharkhand question. The party it may be recalled, has always remained
irreconcilably opposed to the demand for a Jharkhand statehood. The decision
indicates, the Congress party's transition from the politics of confrontation to that
of consensus under the changed atmosphere. In the winter session of the parliament
in December 1991, the then Home Minister S B . Chavan responding to a question
regarding the Jharkhand problem stated that the centre may not be averse to the
formation of a Jharkhand state for tribals if the state concerned Bihar, West Bengal,
Orissa and Madhya Pradesh - agreed to such a proposals.^' As a follow up
measures, the centre convened a conference of the Home Secretaries of these states
to discuss the matter but it failed to break any fresh ground.

The Home Minister's statement has, unintendedly stoked the flames of the
temporarily dormant Jharkhand movement and further roused the aspirations of the
region's people to manage their own affairs in a meaningful manner. Most
significantly, at this juncture, the leaders of the movement have, however, decided
to confine the agitation for a separate Jharkhand state to the geographical
boundaries of the Chotanagpur and Santhal Parganas of Bihar only, at least for the
time being. They ofcourse pledge to achieve their ultimate goal of a 'Virhat

60. Ibid. December 19, 1991.

61. Tilak D. Gupta, "Jharkhand Movement : Subdued But Resilient", Economic and
Political Weekly, Feb. 29, 1992, p. 454.
 137

Iharkhand Rajya' comprising no less than 25 districts from four states (Bihar, West
Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa) at a latter stage. A 'Jharkhand Vananchal
Action Committee' was formed for the said purpose with Sibu Soren as the
convenor of the steering committee, and latter on 'All Party Jharkhand Struggle
Committee (APJSC).

Despite fragmentation and repeated betrayals of the leadership, the

movement, one must admit has shown an amazing capacity to resurrect itself time
and again literally from the ashes. The most notable change in the situation has been
that non-tribal poor have in large numbers veered round to the Jharkhand cause as
never before. From Congressemen to Marxist Leninist groups, all now agree that
one can not be politically alive in this region without identifiying with the demand
for a separate tribal state.

Meanwhile, the Bihar Legislative Assembly has passed a bill envisaging the
constitution of an autonomous council for the Santhal parganas Chotanagpur region,
known as 'Jharkhand Development Council', to replace the Chotanagpur and Santhal
Pargana Development Authority. The bill empowers the Chief Minister to nominate
ihe Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the council. The team of the members of the
council, including among whom are the fmance minister, the planning minister and
the welfare minister, is subject to the pleasure of the government. The plans drafted
by the council will be submitted to the government for approval. Grants to the
council will be deposited in the Jharkhand Development Council Fund. And finally
•;he council can be dissolved by the government without furnishing reasons. It is
3lear that none of these will ensure autonomy for the region even though all the
major appointments are reserved exclusively for tribals. The whole seemingly
pointless exercise of dismantling an already existing body to be replaced by another
body which does not in any way represent a qualitative advance points to the
malafide intentions of the government.

The Jharkhand Students Union a strong constituent of the APJSC, denounced

the Jharkhand Development Council Bill which empowers the state government to
dissolve the Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana Development Authroity and replace
it with a Jharkhand Development Council on the ground that the council cannot be a
 138

substitute for separate statehood. The general secretary of the JMM, another
constituent of the APJSC, Shailendra Mahto has also denounced the bill
vociferously. Mahto who had opposed the JMM's growing alliance with the Janta
Dal government had retreated from the separate state demand but has made it clear
that a separate and independent administrative machinary, independent budget,
education board, freedom in appointments and direct receipt of central allocation by
the council are conditions for accepting a council.^^ All the Jharkhandis groups
headed by APJSC start a new phase of agitation to get his demands fulfill. While the
JMM and the All Jharkhand Students Union (AISU), the most powerful among
them even resort to the economic blockade to stop the outflow of minerals from the
region. Finally at the request of the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, the APJSC
leadership, withdrew the 76 day long economic blockade in May 1993, with a
warning that the agitation will be resumed if the monsoon session of the Bihar
Assembly failed to adopt a bill granting an autonomous council with real
administrative andfinancialteeth.

The Prime Minister himself has took initiative to solve the long standing
problem after he had given this assurance to Jharkhand leaders including Shibu
Soren and Suraj Mandal. But the key role in behind the scene manoeuvers for a
settlement to the dispute has been played by the Congress leaders of the region.
They had repeatedly drawn the Prime Minister attention to the weakning of the
Congress in the tribal belt mainly on account of the failure of the centre to meet the
tribal aspirations.^^ The Jharkhand Autonomous Council proposal was first
hammered out during prolong discussions between the leaders of the All-Party
Jharkhand Struggle Committee (APJSC) and with the representatives of the central
government, and they reached an agreement that the bill which was first passed by
the State Assembly should be suitably amended with a view to providing for the
formation of the Jharkhand Autonomous Council within the boundaries of the
existing states. It will have a separate 225 members House including 168 elected

62. 'Jharkhand : Little Advance', Economic and Political Weekly, August, 17, 1991, pp.
1885-86.
63. Times of India, New Delhi, Sep. 24, 1993.
 139

representatives. While ten per cent of the members will be nominated in accordance
with a criterion to be laid dawn for the purpose, some senior officials will be ex-
oflficio members of this body. The head of the council or more pricisely the leader of
the legislature of this body would be designated as the Chief Executive Councillor
(CEC). The second in command will be called the deputy Chief Executive
Councillor. Although tribals no longer constitute more than 40 per cent of the
population in the Jharkhand areas the Chief Executive Councillor will always be a
tribal. But the deputy CEC may be a non-tribal. While the state government in Patna
will continue to have overall jurisdiction, the council will be fully incharge of areas
to be specified in the amended Bill.

The adoption of the amended bill providing for an elected autonomous

council with adequate financial and administrative powers for the development of
the tribal region, is a major breakthrough in the direction of the separate tribal state
of Jharkhand with an autonomous status. The bulk of the Jharkhandi organisations
have reconciled themselves of an autonomous council with limited power because
they thought it was a right step in the direction to achieve a separate autonomous
Jharkhand state.

Gradually with the passage of time the leadership of the Jharkhand movement
were shifted from the regional parties to the national parties mainly the BJP and the
Congress. Both of them formed their regional committees of the area. They not
only formed their regional committees but vigorously campaigning to get the long
cherished dreams of the tribals fulfilled. With the pressure of the Congress party
and BJP, the state government, conceded the five decade old demand of a separate
autonomous state for the tribals of South Bihar, and moved a resolution for the said
purpose in the legislative assembly in 1997 which was unanimously adopted. The
state government send the aforesaid resolution to the centre urging them to create a
separate autonomous Jharkhand state as early as possible.

In the 1998 Lok Sabha elections all the political parties promised to form a
separate Jharkhand/Vananchal state if they voted to power in their election
manifestos. After the election, a BJP led coalition government is formed at the
Centre which includes the demands of a separate Jharkhand state in their national
 140

agenda for governnance. The central government finally announced the formation
of the Jharkhand state consisting of eighteen district of Sout Bihar along with the
formation of Uttarakhand and Chatisgarh State.

Finally on August 3, 1998, the Union Cabinet approved the Bihar Re-
organisation (Vananchal) Bill 1998,^ seeking creation of a separate Jharkhand state
comprising 18 districts of the South Bihar, recommanding to the President to send
it to the State for its perusal by the state government and subsequent ratification by
the state assembly before Sept 28, 1998.

The BJP led coalition government's move to create a separate Vananchal

state comprising 18 districts of the tribal belt in South Bihar invites the opposition
from many quarters. The Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) headed by former Chief Minister
Laloo Prasad Yadav, the Communist Party of India [CPI(M)] and the Bihar Jan
Congress led by the former Chief Minister Jagannath Mishra have strongly protested
against the move terming it as yet another "divisive policy" on part of the BJP to
establish its political sway over the tribal region of Bihar.

The CPI(M), Which has political stake in some parts of the South Bihar
plateau has decided to oppose the move on the ground that the decision to bifurcate
the state was not based on the principles of reorganisation of the state and
demanded an extensive debate on the issue. On the other hand, the Bihar Jan
Congress in a memorandum submitted to the Governor contended that there was no
justification in unilaterally creating a separate state when the States Re-organisation
Commission (SRC) had already opposed it way back in the 1955. What may have
come as a surprise to the Jharkhand supporter is the opposition by RJD. The
decision to this effect was taken at the RJD legislature party meeting held on
September 14, 1998.^^ The RJD Chief Laloo Prasad Yadav announced the
legislature party decision. He said that the RJD would oppose the Bihar
Reorganisation (Vananchal) Bill, 1998 even if it led to the downfall of the Rabri
Devi government and reiterated his earlier stand that the state could be divided only

64. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, August 4, 1998.

65. Ibid. September 15, 1998.
 141

over his dead body. He further said that the BJP wants to create Vananchal so that
it can become a colony of the RSS. He said, "Hum log Chota Nagpur ko bada
Nagpur ke kabje main nahin jaane denge. Ee log Vananchal ki baat karke
Adivasiyon ko thagtiey ki taiyari kar rahen hain. Hum RSS ka mansooba poor a
nahin hone denge". Once they get a foothold there, these new dikkus will start
controlling the tribal economy through their mafias. The communal programmes will
follow this. There will be a cleansing drive against the missionaries. There will be
river disputes. South Bihar will never be at peace."*^*^ Spewing venom at the BJP
and Samata, the RJD chief said they had no work other than breaking the state in
the name of Vananchal. About the unanimous resolution favouring the division of
the state for Vananchal passed by the state assembly in 1997, he said "The resolution
actually favoured the creation of a greater Jharkhand state comprising the tribals
areas of four states - Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, and his party
still stood for the creation of a greater Jharkhand state. "^^

One of the main objection to the bill is on the ground that the Centre by-
passed the original demand made by the people of Jharkhand for a greater Jharkhand
State comprising 27 districts; 18 districts of South Bihar, four districts of Orissa,
three districts of West Bengal and two districts of Madhya Pradesh. The original
tribals, in political terms, would have formed a clear majority in the proposed State
Legislative Assembly of Jharkhand. The tribals would have been in a positive to
formulate policies for their all-round development, social, political, economic and
cultural. But instead of that, the BJP led coalition government decided to formulate
a Bill for creation of a new state called Vananchal, consisting of 18 districts of
South Bihar only.** The tribals, in whose name the state of 'Vananchal' is being
carved out, would hardly be benifited. The people from the plains and outside Bihar
have settled there in large numbers. Economic power lies concentrated in their
hands. Apart from original tribals there are other people who are also original
inhabitants of that area; they belong to higher or intermediatory castes. Indeed,

66. Ibid, September 20, 1998.

67. Ibid, September 15, 1998.
68. Sanjeev Kumar, "The Vananchal Imbroglio", Politics India, Vol. Ill, No. 12, June
1999, p. 28.
 142

they, along with the new migrants, form a majority. This is the position in atleast
eight out of 18 districts of Vananchal, e.g., Bokaro, Dhanbad, Deoghar, Hazaribagh,
Koderma. Ranchi, Chhapra and Godda. They would exercise considerable political
and economic power.^'

The RJD chief Laloo Prasad Yadav opposed the division of Bihar on another
ground also. He has raised the question of Bihar's economic survival. He claims, the
proposed division would transform Bihar's economy from industrial to
predominantly agricultural, inflict massive losses on the state exchequer and leave
the government nothing other than the perennial problems of floods and epidemics
to tackle. Even Samata Party leader Nitish Kumar had agreed on this issue and
made a demand of Rs. 50,000 crore as compansation in lieu of the mineral-rich
territories which eventually will form part of Vananchal.

Economically, south and the rest of Bihar are as different as chalk and
cheese. The south's Chotanagpur plateau is rich in minerals and boasts several
industries; the state's north and central areas have some moribund sugar and jute
mills and are completely dependent on agriculture. The entire northern part of the
state has no viable industries to compansate the loss incurred by the separation of
the mineral rich southern plateau. The Jharkhand regions contribute almost 63 per
cent of Bihar's total revenue and 27.27 per cent of all minerals produced in the
country. Take away Jharkhand, and the State's share would be a meagre 0.47 per
cent.'*' A truncated Bihar would also be plunged in veritable darkness. The
Jharkhand region produces 70 per cent of the state's total power. The two power
stations in north and central Bihar - Barauni and Muzaffarpur cannot meet the
State's requirement because of obsolete technology. Yuvaraj Deo Prasad, director
of the prestigious AN Sinha Institute of Social Studies (ANSJSS), feels the creation
of Jharkhand will achieve nothing othe than exacerbate social strife and fan sub-
nationalist sentiments elsewhere. The special central package cannot sustain a
truncated Bihar, and it will need such "crutches" perpetually?^ The proposed
partition will only make the Bihar more uglier and dowdier than ever before.

69. Ibid, p. 27.

70. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 21, 1998.
71. Ibid.
 143

Due to aforesaid reasons, the state government decided to oppose the

bifurcation of Bihar by withdrawing the earlier resolution unanimously adopted by
the state Assembly for the creation of a separate Jharkhand state, and moved
another resolution in the House opposing the Bihar Reorganisation (Vananchal) Bill
1998, seeking creation of a separate state comprising 18 districts of the south
Bihar, which has been sent by the President to the state for its perusal by the state
government and subsequent ratification by the state Assembly, which was adopted
by the assembly despite the opposition from Congress, BJP - Samata combine and
the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. Now the future of the Jharkhand/Vananchal state is in
the court of the Union Government because Parliament is not bound to accept or
act upon the views of the state legislature.
 Chapter - VI
PARTIES AND POLITICS IN
UTTAR PRADESH (1950-67)
(i) Development of Factionalism in U.P. Congress
(ii) Non-Congress Parties in U.P. Politics
(iii) Fourth General Election and Politics in U.P.
(iv) Choudhary Charan Singh and Political Dynamics
in U.P.
 144

(i) Development of Factionalism in U.P. Congress

Indian National Congress, which functioned as a broad-based nationalist

movement before independence, transformed itself into a dominant political party of
the nation. Though a number of persons due to a variety of reasons left it and
formed different political parties based on different ideologies such as the Socialist
party and later the Swatantra party etc. But it was recognized as the chief political
party, representing a historical consensus and enjoying a continuing basis of support
and trust of the nation. Congress is instrumental to project itself as nationalist,
cutting across the heterogenous interests of the social groups. The main objective of
the Congress is wiping out the poverty of the nation which was left by imperialists.
Every body and group though subscribed to the main objective, have different
approach towards the social and economic development of the nation. We fmd all
shades of ideological groups in the Congress. Under these circumstances, political
contention was internalized and carried on within the Congress.

The Congress, which is the party of consensus, functions through an

elaborate system of factions at every level of political and governmental activities,
and a system of coordination between the various levels through vertical "faction
chains". Originating on the basis of individual competition between leaders, these
factions are then built around a factional network consisting of various social groups
and leader-client relationships. In the process a system of patronage was worked
out in the countryside, traditional institutions of kin and caste are gradually drawn
and involved, and a structure of pressures and compromises were developed. These
were mediated through two new tiers of political organization, a managerial class of
politicians occupying critical organizational positions in the state and the districts
Congress and a class of "link men" in the field through whom they operate. It was in
the course of working of this system that political competition was intensified,
changes took place, new cadres of leadership drawn from a more diffuse social basis
came to power, and a complicated structure of conflict, mediation, bargaining and
consensus was developed within the framework of the Congress.'

1. Rajni Kothari. "The Congress 'System' in India", Asian Survey, December 1964, Vol.
IV, p. 1163.
 145

Just after the independence, one of the most important development tooi(
place in the Congress; i.e. the departure of the socialists in 1948 and the defeat of
the Hindu revivalist in 1951, removed the political extremists from the Congress
organisation, a moderate consensus emerged within the party, more or less faithful
to the principles which Nehru represented. With no issues of substantial importance
left to fight about, politics in the Congress more and more revolved around
personalistic group of factional politics. Factionalism existed in the Congress before
independence, alongside a politics of issues. But after independence, politics of
personalities and factions have came to dominate the internal affairs of the
Congress, personal ambitions, group loyalties, status conflicts and caste divisions
are the major elements in the factional conflicts taking place within the Congress
organization.

The system got aggravated at the state level where individuals who had risen
to power in the party organisation, sometimes constituted the chief opposition to
the government, provided an alternative leadership, exercised controls and pressures
on it and in many instances overthrew it from power and organisation, and the
selection of party candidates for the general elections played an important role.

In the post independence period, factional and personal politics dominated

the Congress party all over the country, but the U.P. Congress is one of the worsed
affected unit. The most important aspects of factionalism in U.P. Congress is the
absence of authoritative leadership. Leadership in UP. Congress passed from the
hands of the prominent leaders of the nationalist movement into the hands of the
second line of party leaders and workers. The charismatic leaders, whose position in
the nationalist movement depended upon the esteem and awe in which they were
held by the rank and file of Congressmen were replaced by men whose positions
depend less upon their personal esteem than upon the political patronage they
distributed. These changes took place partly as a result of a natural and gradual
process of the adjustment of the Congress organization to workaday, non-agitational
politics.^

Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics. Vol. I, Faction and
Party, Chankya Publications, Delhi, 1984, p. 140.
 146

Immediately after independence a generational change took place in political

leadership of the U.P. Congress. The leaders of the nationalist movement either
withdrew from the Congress party and went into the newly born opposition parties
or joined the Central cabinet. However, this process was not finally completed until
1955, when Pandit G.B. Pant left for the centre. The departure of Pandit G.B. Pant
for the centre marked the end of an historical period in U.P. politics. Pandit Pant
had been the dominating personality in the U.P. Congress since 1937, when he
became the state first Chief Minister. Two important elements which he gave to
UP. politics i.e. stability and the art of political management went with him when
he left Uttar Pradesh. Further more in internal politics of the Congress, Pandit Pant
had performed the role of arbiter. He had rarely participated in political
controversies. He knew the art and science, how to make men work for him and
also how to make enemies work together under him. After his departure from UP.,
the whole tenor of the state politics changed. Authoritative leadership was replaced
by group and faction leaders. Men who brought personal prestige to political office
were replaced by party workers who have little statues in the society other than
what they achieve through the party organization. For the new generation of
political leadership, politics is a vocation, the contemporary faction leaders does not
bring status and prestige to office, but rather seek status and prestige through
office.^

Since 1955, the internal politics of the Congress party in UP. has revolved
around a struggle to gain or control the office of the Chief Minister by dominating
the party organization. Two broad group with a fluctuating membership have grown
up inside the Congress organization; the group in power is called the ministerialist
group and the group out of power the dissident group. Internal political debate in
the UP. Congress revolved around the issue of party v/s government. The dissident
group criticises the administration of the state and demand a share in the
government, while the ministerialist group insists upon the independence of the
state government from party dictation. The ministerialist and dissident groups have
the same structure and the same ends. Both are collection of factions, who seek

3. Ibid, pp. 142-143.

 147

position and power in the state government. The dissident group, the minority,
becomes a majority group through gradual accretions of supports, most of whom
switch allegiances for personal reasons. The pro-government forces are similarly
composed of a number of faction leaders. Each group will have a leader, the Chief
Minister or his heir apparent on the government side and the aspirant for Chief
Ministership on the dissident side.

Congress politics in U.P. were characterized by persistent internal group

factionalism since 1955, which focussed around the activities of four leading
personalities. Dr. Sampuranand, C.B. Gupta, Pt. Kamalapati Tripathi and Ch.
Charan Singh. They differed considerably in their leadership styles and composition,
in the competence and effectiveness of their leadership, in their regional support
base and the social forces supporting them.

Pandit G.B. Pant was replaced by Dr. Sampuranand as Chief Minister of the
State. Who, though a Kayastha, led a group that was solidly based upon the rural
support of elite castes in the countryside, particularly the Brahmans, who
predominated in the leadership of the group in the districts as well as in the state
government. Dr. Sampuranand continued to lead the government till 1960. Though
he enjoyed majority support in the state legislature, failed to control the party
organization. Dr. Sampuranand's candidate for the Pradesh Congress Committee
(PCC) Presidentship, Munishwar Dutt Upadhaya, was defeated by the rival group
and Dr. Sampuranand tendered his resignation from the Chief Ministership.

After the exist of Dr. Sampuranand from the Chief Ministership, Chandra
Bhan Gupta became the leader of the Congress legislature party almost unanimously.
There was no open contest for the Chief Ministership. C.B. Gupta led a group that
was solidly based upon the rural support of elite castes particularly the Brahmans,
who predominated in the district Congress as well as in the state government. It was
felt that with the assumptions of Chief Ministership by C.B. Gupta there will be no
factionalism at the state level and the state would have a stable government. It may
be noted that C.B. Gupta became the Chief Minister of the state by virtue of his
unanimous election by the party and not due to intervention of the Party High
Command.
 148

The core leadership of C.B. Gupta, in contrast to Dr. Sampuranand, came

primarily from urban groups, most notably from the Bania caste. However, through
skilful forging of alliances with powerful rural leaders from the leading agrarian
castes and through the liberal distribution of party and government patronage, a
state wide strong network was established for that group. The strength of the
Congress legislature party in the third general election, which Congress fought
under the leadership of C.B. Gupta, came down to 249 as against 286 in 1957 and
390 in 1952. But this too did not pose any threat to the continuing stronghold of
Gupta's leadership. He was continued to be in chair till August 1963, when he quit
office under the so-called Kamraj Plan. But the group led by C.B. Gupta remained
the strongest in the Congress till the 1969 Congress split.

Pandit Kamlapati Tripathi, a true follower of Dr. Sampuranand became the

leader of the dissident Congressmen, just afler C.B. Gupta succeeded Dr.
Sampuranand, as the Chief Minister. It is some what an irony that with the least
skilful leadership Pandit Kamlapati Tripathi, control the UP. Congress organization.
Under Tripathi, the composition of the leadership of the Congress party became
mush less diverse than it had ever before been. The state and district leadership of
the Congress in the state became a Brahman affair. After C.B. Gupta's resignation
under the so-called Kamraj Plan, Sucheta Kripalani became the new Chief Minister.
If nay be noted that the election of Sucheta Kripalani was not unopposed. She had
to face a rival in Kamlapati Tripathi. She succeeded C.B. Gupta against the wishes
of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Pt. Nehru told at that time that he feels that Kamlapati
Tripathi is a suitable candidate to succeed C.B. Gupta.'* Sucheta Kripalani's success
was possible only because the followers of the former Chief Minister C.B. Gupta
were not happy with Pt. Nehru. So they decided to vote for her. With this, the old
group rivalries in Uttar Pradesh once again became acute.

In contrast to the Gupta and Tripathi group, Ch. Charan Singh and his
closest allies and followers were identified with rural, peasant interests and values
Ahhough, Charan Singh in the Congress never developed a political machine based

Horst Hartmann, Political Parlies in India, Meenakshi Prakashan, New Delhi, 1982.
p. 48.
 149

on patronage ties comparable to that of Gupta and Tripathi. He did develop a

network of relationship in the districts, particularly among the intermediatery caste
groups in the state Jats and Yadavs especially. Charan Singh also developed for
himself a reputations as a man of integrity, action and clear direction in favour of
peasant oriented agriculture development, especially in the Jat and middle peasant
dominated districts of western Uttar Pradesh. Ch. Charan Singh had the courage of
his conviction. At the Nagpur session of the Congress in 1959, he stood up to
Jawaharlal Nehru and opposed the concept of collective cooperative farming, when
the profession of the socialist creed had reached a high water mark in the party
attracted wide notice.' His difference with the party bosses since then took him on a
different path. He had a series of tussles within the U.P. Congress ministry over
land reforms, which ultimately led to his exit from the Congress in 1967.

Factionalism in the Congress party are permitted by the looseness of

discipline. Due to that looseness of discipline, alliances form freely to replace the
party leadership, when a dissident group succeeds in becoming the majority group,
the process of factional alliance to replace the new leadership begins again. The
factionalism in the Congress were becoming even more acute in the post-Nehru era.
Without Nehru, the great reconciler of factional conflicts, the Congress bosses were
free to ride rough-shod and in so doing they created situations in which factional
fights even forced one or another group leader to leave the parent organization^
e.g. Charan Singh leaved the Congress due to the harsh rivalry with C.B. Gupta.
The Congress factions played an important role in the internal politics of the party
organization as well as in the political process in Uttar Pradesh.

(ii) Non-Congress Parties in U.P. Politics till 1967

Since independence there has been a multi-party system with one party, the
Indian National Congress, dominating in Uttar Pradesh politics. Ahhough it has
experienced a steady decline in its voting strength as well as its seats in the state
assembly on one hand and on the other hand no opposition party by itself has

5. Indian Express, New Delhi, May 30, 1987.

6. Iqbal Narain & Mohan Lai, "Election Politics in India : Notes Towards an Emperical
Theory", Asian Survey, March, 1969, Vol. IX, p. 204.
 150

acquired sufficient strengthen to represent a threat to the Congress. The strength of

non-Congress parties were strengths by one election to another, and by the fourth
general election, they out numbered the Congress party. In the fourth election of
1967, there were eight opposition parties and independents against the Congress
party in the state. On the left were the Communist parties [CPI and CPI(M)], the
Samyukta Socialist party, the Praja Socialist Party, and on the right were the Jana
Sangh, the Republican party and the Swatantra party. The independents varies
widely in their ideological orientation, socio-economic composition and career
background. But only the Socialist and Jana Sangh^ had the major say in the
opposition politics in Uttar Pradesh since the first general election.

(a) The Socialist Party

The history of the Socialists goes back to 1934, when a group within the
Congress was formed, known as the Congress Socialist Party (CSP). The Congress
Socialist party in Uttar Pradesh was always very strong and its leaders were among
the most prominent Congressmen in the state. In 1947, the Congress party adopted
a resolution that no organized groups should exist within itself. After that very
resolution, some Congress Socialist Party (CSP) members, including Acharya
Narendra Dev, Jaya Prakash Narain, Ashok Mehta, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, S.M.
Joshi and Achut Patwardhan then decided to withdraw formed the Socialist Party*.
The second major addition to socialist opposition came in 1950, when Acharya J.B.
Kripalani was defeated by Pursottam Das Tandon in the presidential election of
Indian National Congress and then was not even included on the working committee
left the party and formed the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party.

In the first general elections of 1952, the Socialist had expected a rousing
success but the election results shocked them. The outcome of the first general
elections was a shattering blow to the hopes of the Socialist leadership. The Kisan
Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) of Acharya J.B. Kripalani faired even worse. Many
leaders were hopeful of party's success in the election. They had hoped for the

7. Angela Sutherland Burger, Opposition in a Dominant Party System, Oxford

University Press, Bombay, 1969, p. 33.
8. Ibid, p. 36.
 151

second position in the lower house of the Parliament. The result showed that the
leadership moved in a dream world. They had no hold over the ground reality.^

A meeting of important Socialist leaders was held at Banaras soon after the
election results were out. There was some desultory about the future course of
action. It was decided to hold a special convention of the party and Dr. Ram
Munohar Lohia was requested to preside over it. The convention adopted resolution
on political line. The resolution spoke of cooperation with progressive and radical
forces so as to achieve "a consolidated party of radicalism and socialism". The
resolution did not specially mention any party. But the KMPP was in the minds of
the leaders. Immediately after the convention, Jaya Prakash Narayan, Ashok Mehta
and. D P . Mishra met Acharya Kripalani in Delhi and discussed the unity of the
Socialist and Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP). The KMPP had in its leadership
renowned people like Acharya J.B. Kripalani, T. Prakash and Prafull Ghose Dr.
Lohia thought that with their inclusion in the new executive, the Party's Working
Committee would acquire great prestige.*^ Through unity and mass action. Dr.
Lohia hoped, the united party would be able to replace the Congress. Af^er the talks
between the Socialist party's leadership and KMPP, a vague agreement was signed
between the two parties in Delhi. The matter was further discussed af^er Narendra
Dev's return from China. The talks held in Lucknow led to concrete formulation of
the merger proposal. Acharya Narendra Dev signed the agreement on behalf of the
Socialist party. On 12 September 1952, The Kisan Mazdoor Praja party and
Socialist party merged them selves and farmed a new party known as Praja Socialist
Party.*'

The course of the new party did not run smoothly. The unification was
achieved quickly, probably too quickly. As Myron Winner remarks, the fusion could
be realised, because during the negotiations, ideological questions were set aside
and only 'principles' discussed.'^ It was the intention that intra-party unity should be

9. Madhu Limaye, Birlh of Non-Congressism : Opposition Politics 1947-1975. B.R.

Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1988, p. 25.
10. Ibid, p. 28.
11. Hari Kishore Singh, A History of the PSP (1934-59), Lucknow, p. 130.
12. Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India, Princeton University Press. Princeton. New
Jersey, 1957, p. 203.
 152

maintained and the door should be left open for new entrants. From the very
beginning of the PSP showed clear sign of cohesive weakness and was unable to
stay as a united party. The party leadership remained disunited on programmatic
questions.*^ One major difference on the issue was the relationship of the party to
the Congress. One group was in favour of some kind of cooperation with the
Congress party. But a group in the party led by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia was
against any type of cooperation with the Congress party.'''

The differences between the two groups started widening day by day. The
conflicts regarding the political position came to highlight, when Jaya Prakash
Narayan and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru held a discussion regarding the possibility of
co-operation between the Congress party and the Praja Socialist party. These
deliberations were supported by Ashok Mehta whole heartedly. Ashoka Mehta also
came out with the thesis of the 'compulsions of a backward economy'. The main
objective was to bring together the democratic forces on the basis of an alternative
programme so that in case the Congress government fails, democracy and secularism
may not be discredited.'^

The group led by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, protested vigorously the holding
of the talks. Acharya Narendra Deva and Dr. Lohia were very critical of the idea to
co-operate with the Congress. The proposal brought the counter forces in the party
to the surface. They were of the opinion that the Socialist should keep an equal
distance' with Congress as well as from the Communist. Dr. Lohia constantly
championed the theory of equal-distance. At the PSP's national convention that year
they sought assurance from the party's national leaders that no overtures should be
made to or accepted from the Congress. This assurance the leaders outrightly
refused to give, insisting that they should not be forced into position which they did
not personally approve. Later that year another incident further divided the two
groups. In Kerala the PSP formed a minority government with the Congress support.
After a few months the Police fired on a mob in Kerala. Dr. Lohia, the general

13. Horst Hartmann, Op.Cit., p. 72.

14. Paul R. Brass, Op.Cit., p. 248.
15. Horst Hartmann, Op. Cit., p. 73.
 153

secretary of the PSP, ordered the Kerala PSP to resign from the government. This
action was taken without consuhation of any kind with other PSP leaders. Since
other leaders did not agree with Dr. Lohia's instructions, friction at the top level
quickly went from bad to worse.

The Avadi resolution of the Congress party (socialist pattern of society)

added to the already existing differences within the party. Once again the question
of co-operation with the Congress became a topic of dispute among the leadership.
To pacify the agitated discussion Acharya Narendra Dev came out with a mild
criticism of the Congress programme. Madhu Limaye, however condemned it
outrightly.'* A final blow of the socialist unity came when Madhu Limaye, made
accusations in the press, that Ashok Mehta, were planning to join the Congress.
This was denied, but Madhu Limaye refused to offer an apology. Following this he
was suspended from the party. After his suspension, the UP. branch of the party
whose leaders were from Dr. Lohia's group invited Madhu Limaye to inaugurate the
sate convention of the party. This affront against party discipline destroyed
uhimately the solitary of the party. Unable to order or persuade the branch to with
draw the invitation, the national executive suspended the entire state executive and
its national general secretary Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia from the party and set ad-
hoc committee in the state.

After their suspension from the Praja Socialist party , Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia along with Madhu Limaye formed the Socialist Party (SP) on December 28,
1955.'^ The new party was very much anti Congress and was violently anti Nehru.
It had the advantage of being led by colourful personalities like Dr. Lohia and
Madhu Limaye. Both the leaders have been great strategists and very sharp in their
attacks against the myth of the so called socialistic policies of the Congress. Dr
Lohia drafted a seven year plan to capture the power from Congress. The party
being firmly determined to dislodge the Congress party availed of every opportunity
for concluding anti-Congress electoral arrangements with other opposition parties
Its policy regarding co-operation with other opposition parties had fluctuated. At

16. Free Press Journal, Bombay, 24 January-, 1955.

17. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Decembter 29, 1955.
 154

times he had sought close co-operation with the Jana Sangh and the Communist and
some times had fervently opposed it'*.

The Socialist led by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and Madhu Limaye believed in
agitational politics, civil disobedience movements, walkout from the assembly and
noisy demonstrations in the assembly. They put less emphasis on economic policy
than on two related matter; language and backward castes. They urged that English
be abolished forth-with and regional languages utilised solely except for Hindi as
the link language, and that sixty per cent of all government jobs and political seats
be reserved for members of the backward and scheduled castes and for women. It
also stood for ending economic disparities and abolishing the caste system. Its
appeal was directed towards the rural areas and the lower and backward caste.

In the second general elections (1957) of U.P. assembly, the Socialist led by
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and Praja Socialist party despite the split made substantial
gain by winning 25 and 44 seats respectively. After the elections they realised their
mistake, and a new beginning was sought for the re-union of both the parties. The
heaps of rains, on which the parties found themselves, should again be the basis of a
new start. But the talks pertaining to reunification, however, failed because of Dr.
Lohia's adamant attitude. He insisted that PSP must accept the programme of
Socialist party without reservation, which was not acceptable to the PSP leadership.
It would have resulted into an abject surrender. The status quo was maintained till
the third general elections of 1962. In the third general elections (1962), both the
parties concentrated its efforts in assembly election of U.P. so much but unable to
increase or even maintain its previous tally.

So after the 1962 general elections, the discussions about a re-unification of

the Socialist parties were revived once again. It could not be overlooked that both
the parties in Uttar Pradesh assembly elections had lost many seats, as they fought
against each other. They realised that an integrated Socialist party might have had
better chances in the electoral politics. Apart from the stagnant condition of the

18. Nand Lai, "General Survey of Party Position in State Legislative Assemblies in India;
A Study of the Fourth General Election, "The Indian Political Science Review, Vol. I,
April-Oct. 1967, p. 282.
 155

Socialists in the state, the emergence of the Jana Sangh as the largest opposition
party in the state assembly and the co-operation between the Congress and the
Communist had led to the thoughts of a fresh attempt for the merger of the Socialist
forces in U P . The demand for merger came from the rank and file of both parties.
Responding to this situation, the PSP and SP legislators of UP. created a single
united Socialist legislature party in the assembly on 12th December 1962. The term
of the merger was the acceptance of the Socialist party manifesto of 1962 by the
PSP legislators." Apart from the aforesaid reasons the most important factor behind
the merger was that it promised the immediate benefit of recognition, in place of
Jana Sangh, as the main opposition in the assembly.^°

Contradictory trends soon developed in U P . socialist politics, with division

developing within both parties on the question of unification. Doctrinally, the lines
of division were over Socialist policy on language and caste. There were also
disputes over the Socialist policy of alliance with Jana Sangh and Communist in
opposition to the Congress and on the use of militant tactics by the Socialists to
oppose the Congress. So the merger of the Socialist in the UP. assembly soon
broke up on the said issues.

Despite, the new split in the UP. assembly, considerable support continued
to be expressed among UP. socialist for further efforts of unification. In June 1963,
a conference of Socialists of both parties was held in Lucknow at which an appeal
was made to the leadership of both the parties "to take note of the mass urge for the
unity of the Socialist forces in the country." These unity move were soon
complicated however, by the development of an opposite trend among some PSP
members for unity with the Congress rather than with the Socialist party. The move
among some PSP members to join the Congress received impetus with the
acceptance by Ashok Mehta, the national PSP leader, of the position of the Deputy
Chairmanship of the Planing Commission in September 1963, an act which was
followed by his forced resignation from the party and his formally joining of the

19. Sunder D. Ram (ed.) Reading in the Indian Parliamentary Opposition, Kanishka
Pubhshers, New Delhi, J 996, Vol 11, p. 78.
20. Benamin H. Schoenfeld, The Birth of India's Samyukta Socialist Party', Pacific
Affairs, Colombia, Fall and Winter, 1965-66, pp. 246-247.
 156

Cotigress in June 1964^'. The departure of Asoka Mehta from the PSP and Lohia's
change towards unconditional merger paved the way for temporary merger. At its
Bhopal session the PSP asserted that it is essentially an opposition party vis-a-vis
the Congress. This statement removed the main obstacle from the path of
reunification^^. In any case Lohia advised his party in January 1964 to merger
'unconditionally' with the PSP. This proposal found a unanimous support in the
leadership circles of both the parties.

A Committee of 28 members was formed and authorised to formulate the

programme and to suggest the name, the flag and the symbol of the proposed party.
In May 1964, both the parties convened their session. The PSP met in Ramgarh and
the SP in Gaya. The delegates in both conferences voted with an overwhelming
majority in favour of the proposed merger. In the beginning of June 1964, the new
party came into existence. It was named as Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP). S.M.
Joshi was elected as chairman and Raj Narain Singh (SP), as General Secretary.^^
But the 'honeymoon' did not last long.^'' Before the SSP could acquire a profile and
dynamism it fell again to pieces.

The creation of the SSP as a union of the two parties on an 'unconditional'

basis merely converted an inter-party into an intra-party conflict, in which each side
jockeyed for control of organization, leadership, policy and tactics. By the time of
the first foundation national conference at Varanasi, the strain erupted into another
division as a truncated PSP 'annulled' the merger and re-emerged as a separate
political party. The chief benefitor of the short lived union was the former Socialist
party, which now had full control of the newly created and strengthened Samyukta
Socialist Party, while the PSP emerged in an inferior position organizationally and
in terms of legislative strength.^^ Thus, the PSP entered into the fourth general
elections without a firm and strong organization. In losing Ashok Mehta, the PSP

21. Paul R. Brass, Op.Cit., pp. 251-252.

22. Horst Hartmann, Op. C/V., p. 75.
23. Ibid, p. 76.
24. The Statesman, Delhi, March 25. 1965.
25. Sunder D. Ram, Op. Cit., pp. 79-80.
 157

had suffered not merely a very important fund raiser but their best known figure at
the national level. Fragmentation hurt the Praja Socialist party very badly in the
fourth general elections of 1967. In the first three general elections of U.P.
assembly, PSP was one of the major opposition party in the state, but in the 1967
election, PSP lost their position and its strength in the state assembly. Come to II
from 38 which PSP secured in the third general election.

As for as the Samyukta Socialist party is concerned, its organizational

structure and the election strategy have been for superior to that of other non-
Congress parties. Only the Jana Sangh can stand in organizational structure. In the
1967 general elections it concentrated its efforts mainly in the assembly elections
and emerged as a major opposition group in the U P . legislative assembly after the
Jana Sangh by winning 44 seats. The reasons behind the success of SSP was its
greatest appeal to the lower castes and in the rural areas of the state. A militant
party par excellence, it always active, engaging in noisy demonstration and various
other forms of civil disobedience. It laid heavy stress on the language issue, which
was vital issue during the period in the Hindi heartland.^^

The history of the Socialist parties is a history of mergers and split. The
question of differentiation with the socialism of the Congress has always been a
dividing force in party hierarchy. The Socialist parties have been afflicted with
factionalism and with the struggles of individual leaders for personal prestige.

(b) Bharatiya Jana Sangh

The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was founded on October 21, 1951 to give impetus
to the Hindu ideology. The final touch in the creation of the party was given by Dr.
Shyamaprasad Mookerjee (1901-1953), a distinguished statesman of national repute.
He became its founding President. Even though he was once the President of the
Hindu Mahasabha, an organization opposed to the policies of the Congress party,
he was invited by Pandit Nehru when he constituted his first government to join his

26. Lewis P. Fickett Jr., "The Major Socialist Parties of India in the 1967 election".
Asian Survey, June 1968, Vol. VIII, pp. 493-94.
 158

Cabinet only because of his administrative experience and personal integrity.^' Later
on, however because of policy differences with Pt. Nehru, on the question of
Kashmir and on the handling of the East Bengal situation, he resigned from the
cabinet. Appeal from Pt. Nehru and V.B. Patel that, in the national interest, he
should not press his resignation, failed to persuade him to alter his decision, and on
the 19th April 1950, the day that a presidential communique announced his
departure from the Cabinet.^*

Shortly after his resignation from the Cabinet he began to think of forming a
political party at the national level. In his efforts to organize an alternative to the
Congress party, he sought the support of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS),
a nationalist Hindu organization with a large cadre. Such an organization he
believed, could provide his party a mass base. After some discussion, Golwalkar,
the RSS chief agreed to assist him and chose some of his colleagues, 'staunch and
tried workers' to help in establishing a new party.^'

During his first year out of the Cabinet Dr. Mookerjee traveled extensively in
India and met and discussed about the formation of a political party with many
individuals and groups. The consultation gave him an opportunity to assess the
ground situation, while he surely did not picture a new party sweeping the polls
either on an all-India level or in any province he was too realistic for that - he came
to believe there was a place for a new party. His decision was announced in an
address at Gobardanga, near Calcutta, on April 8, 1951:

"I have been out from the central Cabinet for nearly a year. People
from all parts of the country have been asking me as to what they
should do . I have deeply thought over the matter. And in the course
of the next few weeks I hope to give my considered opinion in the
matter. One thing is clear. Congress policies are disintegrating the
country. The need of the hour is a new All Bharat political party to
give a new programme, a new ideal and a more valid idiom to the
country".''".

27. S.R. Bakshi, Shyama Prasad Mookherji : Founder of the Jana Sangh, Anmol
Publications, New Delhi, 1992, p. 7.
28. The Statesman, Delhi, April 20, 1950.
29. 'A Tribute to Dr. Shyamaprasad : How Jana Sangh was Bom', Organiser, 25 June,
1956.
30. /6/f/, April 16, 1951.
 159

Finally, on May 5, 1951, Dr. Mookerjee announced the formation of the

"People's party" at a conference in Calcutta.^' The party appointed Dr. Mookerjee
as its leader and adopted an eight point programme. A major party unit representing
the whole of the 'greater Punjab' was established at a conference at Jullundur on 27
may 1951, with Lala Balraj Bhalla as President and Balraj Madhok as general
secretary.32 The territory of this group included Punjab, PEPSU, Himachal Pradesh
and Delhi. The movement to form parties similar to the Punjab and Bengal groups
began apace. Provincial Jana Sangh was formed during the next three months in
UP. Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat, Gujrat, Karnatka, Saurashtra, Assam and Bihar. A
meeting was convened by Dr. Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, Balraj Madhok and Lala
Balraj Bhalla in Delhi on the 8th September, 1951, at which the then existing units
of the Jana Sangh were represented. The meeting prepared a draft manifesto and
decided to hold a convention at Delhi in October to establish the national party.^^
And finally on 21 October, 1951, the Bhartiya Jana Sangh was officially created on
the national level at a convention held in New Delhi. About three hundred delegates
from various units and other interested groups were attended the convention and
elected Dr. Shyamaprasad Mookerjee as the president.^'* The new party was to be
open to all India citizens who believed in its ideology.

The Bhartiya Jana Sangh differs from the other major opposition parties in
many ways. It was not a disgruntled, dissident or discredited group of Congressmen
who formed the nucleus of the party, as is the case with all other political parties
Its inspiration came from those who basically differed from the Congress outlook
and policies. It was an expression of the nascent nationalism. Most of the people
have joined the Jana Sangh because they felt that Congress policies had threatened
Hindu culture and religious values.

In Uttar Pradesh, the Jana Sangh was formed in mid 1951. The working
committee of the party appointed a parliamentary board early in October 1951 and

31. /Airf, May 7, 1951.

32. The Tribune, Ambala, May 28, 1951.
33. The Times of India, Delhi, September 11, 1951.
34. Motilal A. Jhangiani, Jana Sangh and Swalantra : A Profile of the Rightist Parties in
India, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1967, p. 16.
 160

issued detailed instructions on how district units should select candidates, recruit
members and organise constituencies. The UP. unit of Jana Sangh was one of the
most vigorous and best supported among all other state unit of the party. The
principal figures who played an important role in the establishment and development
of the party in the state were Rao Krishna Pal Singh, Deendayal Upadhyaya, Kunj
Bihari Lai Rathi, Nana Deshmukh, Raj Kumar Shrivastava, Atal Bihari Vajpayee
and Man Singh Verma. The Jana Sangh started out from an urban support base in
Uttar Pradesh, as it did in most other states, but it made a concerted effort to build
up support in rural areas. Yagya Dutt Sharma an important UP Jana Sangh leader
put it : "We have national leader enough. What we need are local leaders, the
leaders of the street and the village- gali ka neta' and 'gaon ka neta'. Let us
therefore, not look up to now Delhi but feel our feet in the villages. "^^ The party
was aware of the need to build up a social base, the attempt to cover the state
entailed what may be termed on organizational approach designed to construct a
widespread net of local workers and managers and to employ that net together in a
diffuse and heterogeneous anti-Congress vote.

The development of the Jana Sangh in Uttar Pradesh since its formation upto
the fourth general elections has been one of steady growth. It made its electoral
debut on the UP. political scene just after its formation. In the first general elections
of 1952 the Jana Sangh secured two seats to the U.P. legislative assembly by
obtaining 6.43 per cent of valid votes poll. It improved its position in the second
general election of 1957, securing 17 seats and 9.84 per cent of the valid votes poll.
In the third general elections, the Jana Sangh improved its position significantly by
securing 49 seats and 16.46% of the valid votes poll. Thus the Jana Sangh has been
recognised as the official opposition party in the legislative assembly. The party in
1967 general elections received its most strongest support. It emerged as the second
largest party in U.P. legislative assembly after the Congress. The Jana Sangh
increased its percentage of the vote by about 5 percent, winning 98 of the 425
assembly seats and securing 21.67 per cent of the valid votes poll.^^ The party

35. Bruce Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics : The Origins and
Development of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Foundation Books, New Delhi, 1993, p.
239.
36. Ibid.
 161

played a significant role in the formation of the first non-Congress government in

the state under the umbrella of Samyukta Vidhayak Dal led by Choudhary Charan
Singh a defector of the Congress party. Thus the Jana Sangh has increased its
percentage of votes as well as its seats in between the first and fourth general
elections from 6.43 per cent of votes to 21.67 per cent and with two member in the
1952 general election to 98 in the fourth general election of the U.P. legislative
assembly.

(iii) Fourth General Election (1967) and Politics in U.P.

The political scene in U.P. has been radically transformed as a result of the
fourth general elections. After 1967, general elections the Congress monolith, which
for so long has dominated the India political landscape had been badly cracked, but
not shattered. It was the first general election without Nehru whose presence in the
first three general elections was a formidable asset for the Congress party. Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru was a great mobilizer of votes for the Congress. His charismatic
leadership always contributed to the success of his party.-^' For some time the
erosion of Congress strength had been apparent. It was reflected in defections,
internal factionalism and the growing alienation of influential elements in Indian
society. For a variety of reasons, some of which could hardly have been averted
while others were of its own making, the Congress after many years as the
spearhead of the nationalist movement and nearly two decades as the dominant
party with a virtual monopoly of governmental power had become soft and flabby, a
house divided against itself open to charges of moving away from the people in post
Pt. Nehru era.

So the situation on the eve of the fourth general election was very much
unfavourable to the Congress party. The economic situation had considerably
deteriorated. The third five years plan had failed on many counts. The targets of
economic growth remained unfulfilled. In the unrealistic approach to planning, the
seed for the acute economic crises was sown. It was aggravated by two successive

37. C.P. Bhambhari, "General Elections and Political Competition in India", Political
Science Review, July-Sept, and Oct.-Dec., 1968, Vol. 7, p. 761.
 162

bad harvests and the military conflicts with China and Pakistan. The economic crises
affected mainly the poorer sections of the society. The economic status of the
agricultural labourers and factory workers of the small and the middle class peasants
and of the salaried class hardly improved during the third five years plan. The year
1966 was generally described as "the worse since independence."^* The
deterioration of the law and order situation, with increasing resort to bandhs, strikes
and other forms of public protest and mass agitation, often resulting in destruction
of property and some time loss of life.

The growing crisis provided a fertile ground for the rise of opposition
parties. The widespread discontent among the masses was favourable for their
election strategy. The demonstration in the streets and the go-slow tactics in the
factories which were organised by the opposition forces demonstrated their desire
to radicalise the masses. At the same time they repeatedly created violent scene in
the state assembly so to say, as a corollary to these actions. Similarly the orthodox
religious forces intensified their activities with the objective of pressing government
to concede their demand for a ban on cow slaughter. The agitations were carried on
by the Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sanatan
Dharm Sabha and the Sadhu Samaj. Jana Sangh were also co-operated with them.
Emotions were roused and let loose, it appeared as though secular democracy in
India was on the brink of collapse. The Congress government failed to tackle the
emotional outbursts and it looked as if the nation was without any competent
leader.^' Even in this situation Congress emerged as the most important party, but
this time it losses in seats in the assembly even greater than the marked decline in its
vote.''"

At the time of 1967 general elections, therefore, the opposition parties tried
its hard to form a united front to avoid contest among themselves. In the previous
elections, the success of the Congress party was partly explained by 'the splitting of
the opposition vote.' The Samyukta Socialist party believed that the United front

3 8. Horst Hartmann, Op. C it, p. 160.

39. Ibid, p. 161.
40. Norman D. Palmer, "India's Fourth General Election", Asian Survey, May 1967. Vol.
VII, p. 275.
 163

should be formed at any cost to defeat the Congress. According to them, unless the
Congress was defeated, no healthy development could take place in Indian politics.
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, the tallest opposition leader, came out with a formula of
united opposition with a common minimum economic policy to face the electoral
challenge of Indian Nati9nal Congress. On the other hand, Parja Socialist Party
(PS?) took a 'purist' approach in politics and with minor adjustments at the local
level, it opposed the strategy of united fronts. The arguments of the PSP was that if
the united fronts were to be formed with all sorts of political parties irrespective of
ideological considerations, there was no need for the existence of a separate political
party, and thus it was not prepared to merge its identity with such disparate united
fronts. On the other hard the Jana Sangh had followed its own strategy and
objective. The main objectives of the Jana Sangh were to prove, that it was an
alternative to the Congress party in the State and refused to accept the united fronts
proposal mooted by SSP leader Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. It tried to use the fourth
general election as a real vehicle to extend its area of influence.'" Thus the Jana
Sangh was more interested in projecting its image over the people as on alternative
to Congress with an emphasis on nationalist ideology of Hindu cultural ethose, as a
long term approach then forging any formal united front.

The Congress party on the other hand adopted the strategy to divert the
attention of the voters from the critical socio-economic onslaught and reminded
them of the priority of the political problems. It expressed its doubt in the ability of
the heterogenous opposition parties to maintain 'law and order' in the state while
maintaining that the Congress alone could ensure 'stability and progress'. The voters
were reminded again and again of the historical role played by the Congress party,
and asked to neglect the short-term difficulties and decide about the future
perspective of the Indian society. This strategy, however, did not came up the level
of the previous performance of the party. Because on the one hand no one within
the Congress after Nehru, Shastri and G.B Pant was capable to carrying the masses
with him.^2 and on the other hand. Congress suffered with groupism and

41. Horst Hartmann, Op.Cit.,p. 162.

42. Ibid, p. 164.
 164

factionalism, which weakened the party very much in the state. Hundreds of party
members left the party on the eve of the 1967 general elections; and many of them
stood for election against Congress candidates, either as independent or as new
recruits to various opposition parties. The 1967 election have proved to be an
unexpected momentous episode in the history of India as and independent state. It
stands as a landmark and a turning point into the history of Indian democracy. The
myth of Congress invincibility was shattered. The year 1967, have been described as
a 'silent revolution' against the Congress monopoly of power or as Eric da Costa
suggests, herald the "second Indian revolution", against the Congress monopoly of
power.*^

The conflict between India and China in Oct. 1962, on the borders with a
bone of contention on "NEFA" in favour of the two nation, damaged the personality
of Nehru. Opposition both in and outside of Congress started simmering. The
dissident groups or individuals took it as a plea and withdrew from the Congress.
This particular issue had caused considerable damage to the Congress in the north
more particularly in the Hindi speaking lands of India, and given a fillip to the
opposition parties like Socialists and Jana Sangh. Though, the opposition parties
succeeded to defeat Congress at the hustings, but individually did not muster enough
strength in the state-legislatures to form their own government. Hence gave birth to
coalition among the parties opposed to the Congress even without a single point of
political principle in common except non-Congressism i.e. a negative approach to
politics.

(iv) Chaudhary Charan Singh and Political Dynamics in U.P.

Chaudhary Charan Singh (1902-1987) belonged to a now vanishing

generation which saw India wins freedom and was called upon to consolidate it,
nurture it and guide the country for almost half a century. He was known to be
shrewd tactician and a strong-willed person. Though his shadow confined itself to
Uttar Pradesh until he occupied the highest political executive office of the country.

43. Eric da Costa, "Poll Results Herald Second Indian Revolution", The Statesman, New
Delhi, March 9, 1967.
 165

the Prime Ministership of India. It was not merely a dream come true for the son of
a poor peasant. It was also a tribute to a system to Chaudhary Charan Singh had
made some significant, though not necessarily always constructive contribution.

Chaudhary Charan Singh was born on December 23, 1902, in a similar

environment like Chaudhuri Chhotu Ram into a poor peasant family at Noorpur
village in Meerut district of U.P. He had his primary education in a modest village
school. For his matriculation, he went to the Government High School Meerut.
Later, he went to Agra and graduated in science from Agra College in 1923.
Curiously, he choose to post-graduate in History from Agra University in 1925 and
also obtained a degree in Law.

Meerut region had, for more than a century, been the symbol of the country's
fight against alien rule. The town was in the forefront of the first 'war of
independence'. The atmosphere did not leave Ch. Charan Singh unaffected and
spurning comforts of a Government job, he launched his legal practice in Meerut.
The independence provided by his profession enabled Ch. Charan Singh to devote
himself to political and public welfare activities as well. Besides, as a lawyer, he
came in contact with a variety of people, mostly farmers, and got a first hand feel of
their problems. The subsequent years drew him towards the vortex of the freedom
movement. He joined the Indian National Congress in 1929 and participated actively
in the freedom struggle. He was jailed several time. Between 1932 and 1936 he
served as Vice-Chairman of the Meerut District Board.

Provincial elections were held in the country following the promulgation of

the Government of India Act 1935. Ch. Charan Singh was successfully contested
the UP. Legislative Assembly as a member of the Congress Party from Chhaprauli,
which he represented till 1977. His active participation in provincial politics brought
him close to national leadership of the party. He was served as General Secretary
and President of the Meerut district Congress. He was appointed Parliamentary
Secretary, Uttar Pradesh Congress Government in 1946 by the then Chief Minister
of the United Provinces, Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, a post he held till 1951. He
was attached to various ministries including revenue, medical and public health,
justice and information till June 1951, when he was made a cabinet minister in-
 166

charge of justice and information and later of agriculture, animal husbandry and
information. He had given the revenue and agriculture portfolio, and later revenue
and transport in Dr. Sampumanand cabinet. He was resigned in April 1959, and was
later appointed Minister for Home and Agriculture in Chandra Bhan Gupta Cabinet
in 1960. After the 1962 assembly election, he took charge of agriculture which held
it till 1965. In February 1966, he was given the portfolio of local self-government.
After 1967 general election, he opposed the C.B. Gupta's candidature for the Chief
Ministership, but Gupta managed to form the government. Ch. Charan Singh joined
the Cabinet with some future plan in mind, and left the ministry and the Congress on
April 1st, 1967, as the right opportunity arrived. He led the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal
(SVD), a non-Congress opposition group in the State assembly, and formed the first
non-Congress government on April 3, 1967.^''

Chaudhary Charan Singh's defection falls into the category of defections

which arose out of inner party conflicts. The proximate cause of his defection was
the failure of negotiations between him and C.B. Gupta over the composition of the
ministry. The justification for the defection was the alleged administrative
incompetence of the previous Congress regime and some of its members who was
re-inducted in the ministry. Ch. Charan Singh said that the Congress had failed to
catch the message of the general election. The result of the general election was a
warning to the Congress and its managers. Congress members themselves had hoped
that the new government would present a better picture of itself than the one
before, but it had failed to do so.^^

Chaudhary Charan Singh and his followers were identified with rural, peasant
interests and values. He developed a network of relationship in the districts
particularly among the middle caste groups in the state-Jats and Yadavas especially.
He also developed for himself a reputation as a man of action and clear direction in
favour of peasant-based agricultural development, especially in the Jat and middle
peasant dominated districts of western Uttar Pradesh. Chaudhary Charan Singh's
network of relationship and his personal reputation stood him for better than his

44. Paul R. Brass, Op.Cii., pp. 316-17.

45. The Statesman, Delhi, April 2, 1967.
 167

rival in the Congress party.''^ In his policy position and in his political actions, Ch.
Charan Singh developed a unique position for himself as the defender of rural
values, of peasant proprietorship and of the backward cultivating castes. The
economic philosophy and ideas about society of Chaudhary Charan Singh was
deeply influenced by the philosophy of Chaudhuri Chhotu Ram (1881-1945), the
greatest Jat leader of the 20th century/*' In the first post-independence government
he was minister for revenue. In that capacity he became the principal architect of
the government's major piece of legislation, the famous Zamindari Abolition Act,'*^
which abolished the system of intermediaries in the collection of land revenue and

46. Paul R. Brass, Op.Cit., pp. 303-304.

47. Chaudhuri Chhotu Ram was bom on 24 November, 1881 in a poor peasant family at
Garhi Sampla in Rohtak district. Ram Rochpal was the name given to the little one
but soon every one called him Chhotu - and Chhotu Ram he reamined for the rest of
his life. He was not bom to fame and fortune. He was a completely self-made man.
His fame was not inherited, it was earned and acquired by sustained hard work
against heavy odds.
The sources of his inspiration never ran dry, his secular vision was never clouded. In
his single-minded dedication to improving the lot of his people he never wavered. He
believed in his own star of destiny.
During the first world war Chaudhuri Chhotu Ram became President of the Rohtak
Congress, edited Jat Gazette. Like Gandhiji he helped to recruit personnel for the
army during the 1914-18 war. While he held Gandhiji in highest esteem he broke with
the Congress in 1920 as he could not go all the way with Mahatma's non-cooperation
programme and resigned from the Congress. He thus deliberately cut himself off from
the maintream of national political activity and concentrated on the Punjab.
The Punjab's geo-political position gave it a unique place in the north Indian affairs.
For almost a quarter of a century Chaudhuri Chhotu Ram was among the leading
figures in the Province. He along with Mian Sir Fazl-i-Hussain founded
(1923),nurtured, directed and led the Unionist Partj'. After the election in 1937, the
Unionist party formed the Government in the Punjab. Ch. Chhotu Ram was appointed
Revenue Minister. He went ahead full steam to fulfil his election campaign promises.
The Governor through Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan suggeted to Chaudhuri Chhotu Ram
to go slow. The Revenue Minister replied that the policies of the Punjab Government
were not formulated to please either the Governor or the reactionar>- vested interests
and Mahajans.
During his various tenures as Minister for Agriculture, Industr>', Education and
Revenue, he carried through enlightened and progressive legislation which helped the
backward classes and the agriculturists winning the everlasting gratitutde and affection
of the agricultural communities of the Punjab and the poorer sections of society as a
whole. No longer could the Kisans be pushed around, neglected or ignored. From
1937 to 194S he was without doubt the most influential, capable and powerful man in
Punjab Politics.
48. Paul R. Brass, Op.Cit., p. 305.
 168

attempt to establish a uniform pattern of land ownership based on an ideal of

peasant proprietorship on personally-cultivated land holdings of moderate but
economic size in place of the old complicated system of land tenures.

Chaudhary Charan Singh had been known in the political circle as a man of
considerable political skill and a man of integrity and principles. He spoke
consistently within the party on behalf of the values of rural life, peasant economy,
backward castes and rural democracy. It was generally recognised that Ch. Charan
Singh had well-formed views, which he expressed with intellectual clarity on most
public issues, especially those affecting agriculture. He was also known to have
been politically and intellectually dissatisfied with his colleagues in the Congress.
Ch. Charan Singh's defence of peasant agriculture in India was based not only on
economic grounds, but also on ideological and political grounds. In an agricultural
society, he insisted, democracy was dependent upon the existence of small farms.
Large farms, whether capitalist or collectivist were inimical to democracy. In large
capitalist farms, the few gives orders to many, and in collective farms, bureaucratic
control, compulsion and political propaganda restrict the liberty of the cultivators
and were used to extract capital from them for large-scale industrialization.''^ Both
these types of farms inevitably involve concentration of power and the direction of
farm operations by a few offering to the peasantry the prospect of a countryside
turned into huge barracks of gigantic agricultural factories. In contrast, peasants
and peasant agriculture offer the greatest support for democracy, where the worker
himself is the owner of the land under his plough, the people will be independent in
"outlook and action", conservative but not reactionary, non-exploitative, giving
order to none and taking order from none. The system of family-size farm ensures
stability because the operator or the peasant has a stake in his farm and would lose
by instability.^"

Chaudhary Charan Singh had the courage of his conviction, and stood up to
Pandit Jawaharlal Nerhu and opposed the concept of co-operative farming at the

49. Chaudhary Charan Singh, Joint Farming X-Rayed : The Problem and its Solution,
Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1959, p. 94.
50. Ibid,pp. 103-104.
 169

Nagpur session of the Congress in 1959. He struggled to convince Pt. Jawaharlal

Nehru and his supporters that agriculture being a "biological process", co-operative
farming or collective farming would not succeed. But his contention was not
accepted. His differences with the party since than took him on a different path.
Despite his ideological disagreement with the Congress leadership, he remained in
the party and in the state government till 1967 general election. During this period
he continued to disagree with the party leadership on matters of peasant and
agricultural policy of the Congress party.

In his opinion, the principal obstacle to economic growth lies in the fact that
our political leadership, infact, all our planners and economist has had no
understanding of the real issues involved, which had no support with the mud-huts
or the slums where the country lives, which wanted to apply copy-book maxims
borrowed from foreign lands to solve our problems, irrespective of our conditions,
and which wanted to create a communistic economic set-up within the framework
of a political democracy.^' Ch. Charan Singh had sought to give first priority to
agriculture, accompanied by college industry or handicrafts, followed by light or
small-scale industry and, then, heavy industry. He had sought to build India from
the bottom upward, that is from the poorest and the weakest. The essential genius
of Chaudhary Charan Singh was his down-to-earth grass-root planning. India could
be better and more expeditiously served by agriculture which provides food and
clothing and domestics or small-scale industries which requires an increase, and not
a reduction in manual labour, uses the simplest devices or equipments, and is based
on purely local materials and local talent.

Finally, when we look at Chaudhary Charan Singh's economic philosophy

and ideas about society which evolved and developed around the politics of agrarian
community, we find that he had the kind of ideological stuff that may deliver the
goods within the limits of the present political system in the country. Chaudhary
stood as a rock against zamindari and feudalism on one side and protecting the
interests of the tillers of the soil in the rural India with a total understanding of the

51. Chaudhari Charan Singh, Economic Nightmare of India : Its Causes and Cure,
National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, pp. v-vi.
 170

need of the community with realistic approach of the structural and functional
system of rural India. Ultimately, he was able to make the agrarian community to an
organised political group to check the urban and bourgeois industrialist take-over of
the political power in the post independent India.
 Chapter - VII
COALITION POLITICS IN
UTTAR PRADESH - PHASE I
(i) Fourth General Election (1967) and Politics in U.P.
(ii) The Mid-Term Poll (1969) and Politics in U.P.
 171

The term 'Coalition' is derived from the Latin word 'Coalitio' which is the
verbal substantive of 'Coalescere', 'co', which means together, and 'alescere', means
to go or to grow together. The term 'coalition' commonly denotes a co-operative
arrangement under which distinct political parties or at all even members of such
parties unite to form a government or ministry.' According to Riker: "Regardless of
the number of persons conventionally believed to be decisive, the process of forming
a sub-group which, by the rules accepted by all members can decide for the whole.
This group is a Coalition."^ In the strict political sense, the term 'coalition' as it is
used in political science as a direct descendent of the exigencies of a multi-party
system in a democratic set-up. It is a phenomenon of a multi-party government
where a number of minority parties join hands for the purpose of running the
government. A coalition is formed when many splinter groups in a House agree to
join hands on a common platform by sinking their broad differences and form a
majority in the House. Though, outwardly a coalition appears to be one solid mass,
inwardly it is ridden by party foibles and frantic party fervours and it is for this
reason that coalitions prove to be transient.^

In Parliamentary democracy, coalition arises mainly as a result of political

compulsion. Coalitions might result from racial, communal, religious, economic,
social or political conflicts. It may also be formed due to emergency. Coalition
governments have been functioning in a climate of distrust, hostility and contempt
because ministers are representatives of their respective parties'*. William Riker says
that the "general decision making policy of a coalition depends upon its leader who
might be an opportunist, selfish or selfless".^

Coalition government acquires a relevance only in a parliamentary

democracy. It is, therefore, understandable that this question could arise here only

1. The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. Ill, New York, 1967, p. 600.
2. W.H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1962, p. 12.
3. N.C. Sahni, "The Theory of Coalitions", in N.C. Sahni (ed.). Coalition Politics in
/«M//a, Jalundur, 1971, pp. 17-18.
4. P. John John., Coalition Government in Kerala, Trivendrum, 1983, p. 30.
5. W.H. Riker, Op.Cit.
 172

when India was firmly put on the path of parliamentarism. It was under the
government of India Act 1935, that the concept of parliamentary democracy as it is
understood took root and was put into operation at the provincial level in the 1937
elections. It is politically significant that in the election held in 1937, no single party
could win a majority in Punjab and Sindh, and both these provinces were ruled by
coalitions.^

The credit of having the first ever coalition under the present constitution
goes to PEPSU and the then Madras Presidency. A broad non-Congress united front
with T. Prakasam as the leader and undivided Communist party of India as the main
component won a majority in the assembly election of Madras Presidency. In the
State assembly of BEPSU, no party could muster a majority in the first general
election of 1952, a coalition consisting of non-Congress parties was formed in April
1952.

The other states having coalition government in the first decade of

independence were Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Kerla. Significantly, all these
coalitions were non-Congress ones.

The fourth general election can be considered as a major watershed in the

political development of India as well as that of Uttar Pradesh. It stands as a
landmark and turning point into the history of India democracy. The year 1967,
have been described as a 'silent revolution' against the Congress monopoly of power.
The growing political, social, economic and regional tensions gave rise to the
emergence of different parties which wielded varying influences in states, in course
of time as uneven political pattern was evolved in those states where non-Congress
parties mustard sufficient combined strength to have the working majority in state
legislatures, formed the coalition governments. The myth of Congress invincibility
was shattered. In eight of the seventeen States the Congress lost its majority and
non-Congress coalition government came into power. It was a period of extreme
political fluidity in the country. The coalitions of this phase were generally in the
nature of getting together of strange bed fellows with the sole motivation of spiting

6. Shriram Maheshwari, Political Development in India, Concept Publishing Company,

New Delhi, 1984, p. 74.
 173

the Congress and retaining political power in their hands. In short Congress rule
was replaced by a heterogeneous coalition of ail sorts of parties from the extreme
left to the extreme right.

(i) Fourth General Election (1967) and Politics in U.P.

After the general elections of 1967, Congress lost the majority in the U.P.
legislative assembly for the first time. It could secure only 198 seats-14 short of an
absolute majority. The combined strength of the remaining political parties was IBS
and 37 were independents. In the total House of 425 members, excluding the
nominated members, elections in two constituencies could not be held.^

Encouraged by the failure of the Congress party to secure an absolutes

majority in the House the Jana Sangh and SSP, the two largest opposition parties in
the newly elected House started to explore the possibilities of forming a non-
Congress Government. On February 26, the SSP sent out invitations for a meeting
of the leaders of the opposition parties and independents.^

The meeting of the leaders of all opposition parties was held on February 28
and a unanimous decision was taken to try to form a non-Congress Government in
the State, either a coalition or a one-party Government, enjoying the support of all
the other opposition parties. It was also decided that each party should prepare
drafts of minimum common programme for forming the basis of a non-Congress
Government. Raj Narain Singh, the SSP leader and a member of the Rajya Sabha,
was deputed to contact all the non-Congress members of the Vidhan Sabha.' To
achieve this aim the parties were even prepared to forget their ideologies and
principles. Their main objective was to get the Congress out of power. The Jana
Sangh offered to support any non-Congress Government, even headed by the
Communists. On the other hand the Communists were also ready to support a Jana
Sangh - led coalition Government. However, the idea of forming an all opposition
party Government was favoured.'°

7. National Herald, Lucknow, Februar>' 27, 1967.

8. S.C. Kashyap. The Politics of Defections : A Study of State Politics in India,
National Publication House, New Delhi, 1969, p. 133.
9. National Herald, Lucknow, March i, \9(>1.
10. Ibid.
 174

Congress also did not remain a silent spectator and started sounding the
rebel Congressmen, elected as Independents, to join the Congress. The main aim
was to get the absolute majority, anyhow. On March 2, 1967, C.B. Gupta met the
Governor, perhaps, with the view to apprise him of the situation regarding the
strength of the Congress and the Opposition parties in the Fourth General
Elections.''

The Opposition parties attached a great significance to this meeting and

intensified their activities to come closer with a view to form a non-Congress
Government in the State. The SSP leaders sent a letter to the Governor and claimed
that they had the absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly because they had the
support of 213 MLAs. Several meetings of the representatives of various political
parties were held in this connection.*^

On March 3, M.P. Tripathi (Jana Sangh) leader of the opposition in the out
going Vidhan Sabha in separate telegrams to the President and the Election
Commissioner, sought their intervention in the matter of constitution of the new
House. Writing simultaneously to the State Governor he accused the Congress of
trying to induce to its fold some of the Independent MLAs.'^

The balance was held by the Independent MLAs, as such, both groups tried
hard to woo maximum number of them. The Independent MLAs, being in great
demand, formed a group of their own and elected Harish Chandra Singh (a retired
District and Sessions Judge) as their leader.''' However, the eflForts were not limited
to Independents only and all temptations were given for defections from other
parties also.

On March 5, 1967 all the opposition parties and the Independent group went
a step further. They formally formed a United Legislature party, known as
"Samyukta Vidhayak Dal" and elected Ram Chandra Vikal as its leader. The newly
formed group claimed a strength of 215 members (188 from all the non-Congress

11. /6ic/, March 3, 1967.

12. Ibid.
13. S.C. Kashyap. Op.Cit., p. 134.
14. National Herald, Lucknow, March 3, 1967.
 175

party and support of 27 Independent) in a House of 423 (excluding the nominated

member and two vacant seats). The same day several leaders of the opposition
parties met the Governor, pressed their claim and requested him to allow their
legislature party to form the Government.'^

The Central leadership of the Congress party was in favour of C.B. Gupta's
candidature for the leadership of the Congress legislature party in the belief that he
commanded the support of the majority. But Ch. Charan Singh staked his claim on
March 4, and offered himself as a candidate for the leadership. He said that the
verdict of the general election had shown that the people were disillusioned with the
Congress. The reason for this he thought, was that Congressmen had lost faith in
the ideals and values on which the party had been nurtured and had "come to
believe it can bring us immediate gain", with the result the unscrupulous elements
were being brought to the fore, both in the political and economic life of the state.
He further said that the party had neither been able to provide the people "with the
means for a better life to the extent they and we desired," nor had it succeeded in
ensuring a clean and efficient administration. The administration of law and order
particularly in the countryside was far from satisfactory and that even the judiciary
no longer enjoyed the reputation of incorruptibility as it did in British times. "A
storm may break over our heads any day" he said, Charan Singh said "I offer myself
as a candidate because, I believe, I can meet this challenge successfully."'^

After Charan Singh's Announcement for the candidacy, vigorous efforts were
made by the central leadership of the Congress party to avoid the contest. The party
high command sent Dinesh Singh, Minister of States for External Affairs and Uma
Shankar Dixit, M.P. as an observer to Lucknow to persuade Charan Singh to
withdraw his candidature. After his meeting with the emissaries from Delhi, Charan
Singh announced that he had withdrawn his candidacy in the interest of the party
after his meeting with the central observers and at the bidding of his principal
advisers. He said he had, realized that he would not have a majority in the party and
that a conflict over the leadership would only weaken it.*^ C.B. Gupta, as such, was

15. /6/rf, March 6, 1967.

16. The Statesman, Delhi, March 5, 1967.
17. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 8, 1967.
 176

unanimously elected as the leader of the Congress Legislature party. The most in
interesting part of this election was that his name was proposed by Charan Singh
himself. •*

As soon as the leader was elected, no efforts were left to increase the
strength of the Congress Legislature party. It was understood that all kinds of
temptations were given to the Independents and other rebel Congress MLAs. The
efforts became fruitful when a good number of MLAs joined the Congress group.

The SVD's claim of having a strength of 215 members was repudiated by

Newal Kishore, Secretary of the U.P. Congress Legislature party. He stated that on
the other hand Congress had- secured a clear majority. On March 7, the leaders of
the non-Congress parties met the Governor and submitted to him a list of 214
members constituting the SVD.'^ On the next day a list of 224 names was submitted
by the Congress group.^° Both groups, separately, impressed upon the Governor
that their list was the only correct one. This added upto 438, while the Vidhan
Sabha at that time had only 424 members (including one nominated). Twelve names-
7 Independents, 2 Swatantra, 2 Republicans and 1 SSP were found to be common in
both the Iists.2'

The Governor started personal verifications of the two lists. The disputed
MLAs were called by the Governor and were asked to put the name of the party to
which they owed their allegiance. They were also asked to sign a declaration before
him that they were making known their allegiances free from any duress,
whatsoever. After verification, the Governor gave a detailed statement on March
11, stating that the Congress party had the support of 220 members.^^ On the said
ground the Governor invited C.B. Gupta, the leader of the Congress Legislature
party to form the ministry and he immediately accepted the invitation.^-'

18. National Herald, Lucknow, March 8, 1967.

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid, March 9, 1967.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid, March 12, 1967.
23. Ibid, March 13, 1967.
 177

The non-Congress parties reacted sharply to the act of the Governor for
inviting C.B. Gupta to form the Government. The effigy of the Governor was taken
out in a procession and burnt in front of Raj Bhawan. A public meeting was held
and members of the Opposition parties including Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and Raj
Narain of SSP, Nanaji Deshmukh (JS), Jharkhande Rai (CPI) and Bhanu Pratap
Singh (Swat.) addressed the meeting and described the role of the Governor as
impartial, unjust, immoral and dishonest. The meeting also passed a resolution
giving a call for 'Lucknow Bandh' the next day.^''

A 13-member Ministry, headed by C.B. Gupta, was swarn in at Raj Bhawan

on the morning of March 14, 1967.^^ The composition of the new Ministry could
not satisfy a good number of MLAs belonging to the Congress party itself Ch.
Charan Singh also could not be persuaded to join the Ministry. The agreement
leading to Charan Singh's withdraw from the Congress Legislature party leadership
was said to have made it incumbent upon C.B. Gupta to consult. Charan Singh in
the Choice of the personnel for the ministry. Charan Singh made some proposal. He
wanted a radical change in the personnel of the Ministry for which C.B. Gupta did
not agree. The dissatisfaction became public when a Congress member. Raj Bahadur
Diwedi criticised the Gupta Ministry in the Vidhan Sabha. While speaking on the
Governor's address he said that the Gupta Cabinet had been formed on communal
and caste basis. He also made an attack on the policies of the Congress Government.
Next day another Congress member, Om Prakash demanded that the corrupt
ministers in the Cabinet should be thrown out forthwith to regain the confidence of
the people. A former Deputy Speaker, Ram Narain Tripathi also bitterly criticised
the policies of the Congress Government.^^

This was not enough and the things developed fast. The same day, after
criticising the party in the Vidhan Sabha, a section of the Congress Legislature,
numbering over 30, met at the residence of Ch. Charan Singh and decided that if no
steps to remove their grievances were taken by the party leadership, they would
secede from Congress and form a separate group of their own in the Legislature.^^

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid, March 15, 1967.
26. Ibid, March, 30 and 31, 1967.
27. /*/rf, March 31, 1967.
 178

The threat given by the dissatisfied MLAs came out to be true when Charan
Singh made a dramatic declaration in the House on April 1, 1967 that he and his
followers decided to form a separate party known as Jan Congress. He made this
announcement immediately after the Speaker called for a division on the amendment
to the motion of thanks to the Governor. He announced that Gupta's intransigence
had compelled them to take this painful decision. Charan Singh said that after being
in the Congress for 45 years, it was not easy to take this fateful decision. He said
that his decision had given a new turn to the political lives of himself and his
followers. He said he had no place in the Congress now, which had failed to be an
instrument of service to the people. He further said that if we wanted to preserve
our democratic way of life, it could be done only outside the Congress.^* After
making this announcement Charan Singh and 16 of his followers finally crossed the
floor and joined hands with the opposition parties.

With the declaration of Charan Singh in the House that he and his followers
in the Congress had formed a new party and had decided to cross the floor, sealed
the fate of the 18 day old Gupta ministry. The 20 year Congress regime in Uttar
Pradesh came to an end with C.B. Gupta's resignation, following the passing by the
U.P. Assembly of an opposition amendment to the motion of thanks to the
Governor's address, a policy statement of the Government by 215 votes to 198.
Immediately after that the Speaker announced the result of the division, C.B. Gupta
stood up to say that since the opposition was in majority he would submit his
resignation to the Governor. He asked the speaker to postpone further proceedings,
and shortly after that the assembly adjourned, he went to the Governor House and
submitted the resignation of his ministry.^' The decision of C.B. Gupta was
appreciated by all including Ram Chandra Vikal leader of SVD who thanked C.B.
Gupta for establishing a healthy tradition.

Soon after the downfall of the Congress Government, the activities of the
SVD, which was rather impatient to form the Government, moved very fast. Within
a few hours, the newly formed party - Jan Congress became its (SVD) partner; Ram

1%. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 2, 1967.

29. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 2, 1967.
 179

Chandra Vikal, leader of the SVD resigned and proposed the name of Ch. Charan
Singh for the leadership vacated by him. Charan Singh was unanimously accepted as
the leader and his name, as the new leader of the SVD, was sent to the Governor
with the request to call Charan Singh to form the Government/'"

Finally, on April 3, 1967, Charan Singh was sworn in as the first non-
Congress Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. A large number of SVD members
overcrowded the hall where the Governor administered the oath of office. The first
Coalition Government in the State was formed on April 6, when a 28-member
Ministry of the SVD took the oath of office. In all there were 16 Cabinet Ministers
(including the Chief Minister) and 12 deputy ministers. Out of the 16 Cabinet
Ministers (including the Chief Minister) S belong to the Jana Sangh, 4 to Jan
Congress, 3 to SSP and 1 each to PSP, CPI(R), Swatantra Party and Independent
group. Among the deputy ministers, 3 each were drawn from the Jana Sangh and
Jan Congress, 2 each from the SSP and Republicans and 1 each from the CPI(R)
and Independents.-^'

In the functioning of the Charan Singh's coalition government two kind of

issues arose - those which divided parties and groups consistently over time on an
intelligible basis, and those on which the lines of conflict were not entirely clear, but
were proximately related to shifts of alignment affecting the fates of governments.
The first category included such conflict as those over the status of Urdu, over
procurement of foodgrains, and over the abolition of the land revenue. There were
other issues relating to the intra-party cohesion within the large parties making up
the coalition and there were inter-party conflicts over question of local power, of
party building in the districts. In fact it is difficult to identify unequivocally the
decisive factors which led to the fall of the first coalition government.

The Urdu issue continued to divide and distinguish the parties in the coalition
during the functioning of the SVD government. The left parties, particularly pressed
for concessions to Urdu, including the declaration of Urdu as the second language.

30. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 2, 1967.

31. M.S. Verma, Coalition Government : U.P.'s First Experiment, Deptt. of Public
Administration, Lucknow University, Lucknow, 1971, p. 44.
 180

However, the Jana Sangh remained firmly opposed to the declaration of Urdu as a
second language, while permitting certain concessions to be made, such as the
printing of important government notices in Urdu.'^

Another issue which early appeared to threaten the survival of the Uttar
Pradesh government occurred over the decision of the cabinet to procure 500,000
tones of foodgrains. Two separate threats to the stability of the government arose
on this issue - one from the organizational wing of the Jana Sangh, the predominant
party in the coalition and second from an adhoc legislative inter-party interest group
of big former members of the legislative assembly and council. The Jana Sangh
ministers maintained cabinet responsibility on the issue and succeeded in persuading
members of their organizational wing to refrain from making public announcements
opposing procurement. However, the objections of the inter-party legislative group,
which itself included many Jana Sangh members, were satisfied only by a
compromise whose effect was to reduce the amount of foodgrains to be procured
from 500,000 tons to 200,000 tons.''-''

The most serious and prolonged issue of this type, which divided the parties
on clear lines, occurred again on the land revenue issue. The demand for land
revenue abolition was a major public commitment of the SSP especially and one to
which all other parties had committed themselves in the formation of the common
programmes. However, the Chief Minister Charan Singh refused to agree to abolish
the land revenue completely until alternative resources could be found. Charan
Singh, was a man who had well-formed views on the issues of both land revenue
and state financial resources in general. The result was a stalemate and crisis which
threatened to bring the government down. An initial decision on the issue was taken
by the government in July, by which it was agreed that 50 per cent of the land
revenue would be abolished on holdings upto 6.25 acres, beginning after the current
Kharif crop. Internal divisions in the SSP on the issue developed, however, and the
SSP continued to insist on further concessions. The crisis in the government

32. Paul R. Brass, "Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics", Vol. I, Faction and
Party, Chankya Publications, Delhi, 1984, p. 112.
33. Ibid, pp. 112-13.
 181

continued for several months, leading ultimately to an SSP-CPI alliance on the issue
and their joint resignation from the government. Later a compromise was reached
which permitted the return of the two parties to the government at the end of
October, 1967.'^

Between the months of November 1967 and February 1968 a three-way split
developed among the parfies in the cabinet. Charan Singh continued to be supported
primarily by the group of defectors who had crossed the floor with him and by the
smaller parties and independents in the coalition. The leadership of the Chief
Minister was, however, increasingly opposed and thwarted by the actions of the CPI
and the SSP on the one hand and by the Jana Sangh on the other hand. The
disaffection of the three large parties with the Chief Minister was closely interwoven
with intra-party struggle for power between the Jana Sangh and all other
components of the SVD.-^^

A central source of strain arose out of attempts by the Jana Sangh ministers
to use their portfolios, particularly those of the cooperation, local self-government,
and education departments, to nominates members of the Jana Sangh to powerful
district cooperations, local government and educational institutions. Open
dissatisfaction with the actions of the Jana Sangh ministers was expressed on several
occasions by members of all parties in the SVD. A second source of strain related to
the efforts of a faction in the SSP led by Raj Narain, a Member of Parliament to
assert a dominant role in state SSP politics and in the SVD government. In these
efforts, the SSP adopted agitational tactics to pressure the SVD government while
continuing to support the government in the legislature.

The sequence of events which ultimately led to the resignation of Charan

Singh began with the resignation of the CPI ministers on November 20, 1967,
ostensibly because of differences with the Chief Minister on issues related to the use
of the police in political agitations and the release of government employees and
others who had been jailed for their activities in various agitations in the past.
Although the CPI ministers withdrew from the government, they continued to

34. Ibid, p. 113.

35. Ibid, p. 122.
 182

support the government in the assembly. The SSP contingent continued in the
government until January 6, 1968, but increasingly oriented its activities toward
public agitations on the land revenue issue, on the release of government employees
held in detention, and on the demand for elimination of English from use for
government purposes.^^

On December 16, 1967 Charan Singh mooted his resignation from the
leadership of the SVD coalition at a joint meeting of legislators and the state
executive of his party.^' While Charan Singh kept on forcing his resignation for the
second time in three months, the ruling coalition parties requested him to continue
as Chief Minister and promised to devise a machinery to ensure proper conduct of
the coalition and the government. These promises were made in an unanimous
resolution of the general body of SVD, while this resolution was passed on by the
Chief Minister to a high power committee of his own party for consideration, and
fmally the party had unanimously decided that Charan Singh should certainly resign.

The third National Conference of the SSP which was held on January 1,
1968 at Gaya adopted a resolution directing the party's five ministers in U P . to
resign from the SVD ministry immediately in protest against the non-implementation
of accepted minimum programmes, particularly land revenue abolition, release of
detenus and discontinuing of use of English in administration.^* On January 6, 1968
the SSP ministers resigned on these issues, but like the CPI continued to vote with
the SVD in the assembly. On the other side the national executive of PSP, in a
resolution directed its legislators to insist on the government for the abolition of
land revenue and introduction of graded sales tax. Although both the CPI and the
SSP related their withdrawals to public issues, one persuasive interpretation of their
motives was that the public issues were secondary and that the primary factor was
"the discomfiture of the two parties", which "arose from the fear that the Jana
Sangh by exploiting the portfolios in its control was worsting them in the struggle
for political influence at the district and lower level".•^'^ Under the circumstances,

36. Ibid, pp. 122-23.

37. The Statesman, Delhi, December 17, 1967.
38. The Times of India, New Delhi, Januar>' 2, 1968.
39. "Charan Singh's Shrewed Politics", Economic and Political Weekly, Januar\' 20,
1968, pp. 1983-84.
 183

there was little profit for the two parties to remain in the government. Nor could
they incure public displeasure and precipitate an undesired general election by
bringing down the government. The only alternative, therefore, was to continue to
support the government, but to built their party strength and public appeal by
agitational methods. The withdrawal of two of the three large parties in the cabinet
was followed within a few days by a split between Charan Singh and Jana Sangh.
The break came when the Chief Minister reshuffled the Jana Sangh portfolios
without the consent of the party leaders. The Jana Sangh accepted the reshufRing
without withdrawing from the government,*^ but the working committee of the U.P.
unit of the Jana Sangh warned the Chief Minister that if he did not change his
arbitrary ways the SVD might be left with no alternative but to elect a new leader in
his place.

The ministerial crisis deepened further more on the decision of Chief Minister
Charan Singh to boycott the meeting of the coordination committee and the general
body of the SVD being held in Lucknow to take stock of the latest developments in
the State. Charan Singh's complaint was that since he had not been consulted about
the holdings of these meetings, he and other members of his party did not propose
to attend them. He felt that the Jana Sangh and other constituent unit of the Dal
should have sounded him before calling these meetings because he was still the
leader of the SVD.

The demand for a new leader intensified both inter-party and intra-party
differences. Swatantra, the Republicans and the independents continued to support
Charan Singh, while the Jana Sangh insisted upon his replacement. The SSP, the
PSP and the CPI divided on the issue. And finally, on February 17, 1968 Charan
Singh had resigned and advised the Governor to dissolve the assembly and to order
mid term elections unless another leader elected by the SVD was thought capable of
forming the government. After Charan Singh resignation was accepted by the
Governor, the SVD requested and tried to persuade Charan Singh to continue as its
leader. But Charan Singh was not agree to accept the leadership anymore. On the
confusion created by the SVD and its obvious failure to elect a leader acceptable to

40. Paul R. Brass, Op.Cit., p. 123.

 184

all its constituents, the Governor of UP. sent a report to the centre recommending
to takeover of the state administration. The Union Cabinet took the decision to
suspend the State Assembly on the report of the governor and finally on February
25, 1968 President's rule was declared in U.P. and the assembly had been suspended
in view of the political stalemate there.'" Attempts by the SVD and the Congress to
build internal cohesion and win the support of a majority in the assembly were made
over the next two months, but the Governor ultimately decided that no stable
government was possible and dissolved the assembly on April 16, 1968.''^

(ii) The Mid-Term Poll (1969) and Politics in U.P.

After the dissolution of the U.P. assembly in April, 1968, preparations were
made by all political parties to contest the mid-term elections. The Jana Sangh
which won 98 seats in 1967 elections and emerged as the second largest party in
UP. assembly, decided to contest atleast 400 seats. There was a revolt of large
number of SSP workers in the state, some of them joining the Congress and others
joined the Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD).''-' Those who belonged to scheduled castes
joined the Republican Party. Among the leftist parties, the PSP and the Communist
party were very weak. The Communists were opposed to the Jana Sangh and the
PSP objected to Marxist Communists. This made the pattern of disunity in the anti-
Congress ranks.^'*

The party which offered a formidable challenge to the Congress party was
the BKD. It commanded solid support of the underprivileged and backward classes.
The BKD emerged as the second largest party in the assembly after the Congress,

41. The Statesman. Delhi, Februar>' 26, 1968.

42. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 17, 1968.
43. After his resignation from the SVD government and the dissolution of state legislative
assembly, Charan Singh formally launched the Bhartiya Kranti Dal in September
1968, which, however had come into being earlier in November 1967.It was launched
with an aim "to promote the ideal of nationalism and democratic socialism, with
emphasis on democracy then socialism". It was a party which tried to project an
alternative to both capitalism and socialism. The alternative was to be within the
broad framework of Gandhian thought.
44. R.N. Mathur, 'Mid-Term Elections in U.P.', Indian Political Science Review, Vol.
rv, 1969-70, Delhi, p. 163.
 185

which had secured the largest number of seats (211) and 33.7% of the votes poll by
securing 98 seats and 21.3 per cent of the votes polled, thereby becoming the
largest non-Congress party in the assembly. The other parties excluding the Jana
Sangh and the SSP were practically wiped out, and the strength of the independents
was reduced to 18 from 37.

The Congress party being the largest single party formed the government on
February 16, 1969 with the help of Independents and Swatantra members under the
leadership of C.B. Gupta.^' The Gupta Ministry could not last for a long time and
stability were shaken due to split in the Congress on November 12, 1969. Chief
Minister Gupta supported the Congress (O), while the Kamla Pati Tripathi, the
dissident leader supported the Congress (R), with the result Gupta ministry fell into
the minority. A stable ministry was possible only with the support of the BKD. Both
the groups, therefore, started wooing Charan Singh, who eventually decided to
cooperate with the Tripathi group in toppling the Gupta government.

The Congress (R) had joined hands with the BKD to topple the Gupta
government but the question of leadership that in coalition government who would
be the leader, was in their way to come together. Both were interested in their
leaders to head the government. For the solution of this issue both Kamalapati
Tripathi and Charan Singh met on January 27, 1970 and declared that the issue of
leadership would be resolved to the satisfaction of both; they had not reached any
agreement as to who would head the government in case the Gupta government
fell.'*^

The Congress (R) legislature party in U.P. passed a resolution on February

3, 1970 authorising its leader Kamalapati Tripathi to hold negotiation with other
political parties to topple the government headed by C.B. Gupta.**' Whereas Charan
Singh on the other hand declared on the issue of leadership that "even if he was not

45. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 17, 1969.

46. Ibid, New Delhi, January 28, 1970.
47. The Statesman, Delhi, Februar>' 4, 1970.
 186

made the leader of the combined opposition, the BKD would extend full support to
Kamalapati Tripathi unconditionally in toppling the minority government headed by
C.B. Gupta and forming an alternative government.'**

Realising the unity and determination of the opposition parties to topple the
government, Chief Minister C.B. Gupta tendered his resignation on February 10,
1970 to the Governor advising him to invite the opposition leader Charan Singh to
form the government. The Jana Sangh and SSP endorsed Gupta's recommendation
that the BKD leader be invited to form the government. While, the Governor B.
Gopala Reddy accepting the resignation of C.B. Gupta, said that he would consult
legal opinion before he gave his decision.

On February 11, 1970 the Congress (R) legislature party leader Kamalapati
Tripathi met Governor B. Gopala Reddy to stake his claim as leader of the largest
single party to form the government. Claiming majority support, he told the
Governor that if he did not have it, his government could be voted out on the floor
of the house; it would be grossly unfair to deny him the first opportunity to form
the government.^'

In a sudden and dramatic move on February 14, 1970 Congress (R) and BKD
reached an agreement which was announced by the Congress(R) treasurer B.P.
Mishra that "full accord had been reach between the two parties, the agreement
provided for the formation of a single party government headed by the BKD party
leader Charan Singh with the Congress (R) supporting it from outside. ^^

After the formal announcement of an alliance between the Congress(R) and

BKD, the coordination committee of the Congress (O), SSP, Jana Sangh and
Swatantra selected former PWD minister Gridhari Lai for leading the alliance and
sent a letter to the Governor withdrawing the support it had pledged to Charan
Singh following the resignation of C.B. Gupta. A delegation of the alliance met the
Governor and delivered to him a letter from C.B. Gupta informing him that

48. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 7, 1970.

49. Ibid, February 12, 1970.
50. Ibid, February 15, 1970.
 187

Gridharilal had been elected the leader of the alliance and requested him that he be
invited to form the government. The letter also withdrew the support to Charan
Singh. C.B. Gupta said in his letter that he was not defeated on the floor of the
house. He had resigned and recommended Charan Singh's name for being invited to
form the government on his "solemn commitment to the economic programme of
the alliance". But he said that since Charan Singh had now declined to accept the
programme, and broken the agreement, he was free to suggest another name and
that he was doing so in favour of Gridharilal.^'

Reacting to the C.B. Gupta's letter to the Governor, Charan Singh said that
his party never made any commitment about forming government with the help of
the alliance led by the Congress (O). About the stability of the government by
cooperation between the Congress (R) and BKD, he claimed that the strength of the
Congress (R) was 131 while his party has about 100 members in the 425 member
state assembly. About the Congress (R) - BKD alliance Charan Singh had not
agreed to give in writing that the BKD will be supporting the Indira Gandhi
government in the Parliament. Charan Singh was of the view that it was not
necessary to put it in writing. The agreement was to cover mainly three conditions :

(i) The BKD would form the one party government led by Ch.Charan Singh.

(ii) The Congress (R) would give full support to Ch. Charan Singh government,
and

(iii) After working together when the leaders came closer and consider it timely
the Congress (R) could join the ministry, making it a coalition government.

After reaching an agreement with the Congress (R), Ch. Charan Singh met
the governor B. Gopala Reddy, with the list of his supporters. He claimed a strength
of 235 legislators including 96 of BKD, 131 of Congress (R), 5 Communists and 3
others in the 425 member State legislative assembly. On the same day the rival
candidate Gridhari Lai also met the Governor and claimed the strength of 236
legislators including 129 of the Congress (O). But the Governor on Feb. 17, 1970,
invited Charan Singh to form the government. The same day, the oath taking

51. Ibid.
 188

ceremony took place and Charan Singh, the BKD leader returned to power for the
second time exactly after two years after he resigned as the SVD Chief Minister. ^^
The Congress (R) group in the assembly, though numerically bigger than the BKD,
decided to support the Government from out-side.

On the formation of Charan Singh ministry, the Congress (O), Jana Sangh
and the SSP alliance alleged that the Governor, B. Gopala Reddy was persuaded by
the Central Government to invite Charan Singh to form the ministry. They criticised
the manner in which Charan Singh had been sworn in and alleged that "democratic
norms and well known constitutional principles had not only been ignored but
violated." According to the Congress (O) president Nijalingappa, the Governor had
acted under pressure from New Delhi in inviting Charan Singh to form a ministry
"without verifying the claim of the SVD leader Gridhari Lai, particularly when
nearly 50 members were common in the list submitted by the two leaders." He
described the BKD chairman as the "king of defectors" and complained that
"politicians in India had lost honesty, integrity and political morality." He demanded
that the U.P. legislature should meet immediately so that the strength of new
Government could be tested.^-^

The coordination committee of the alliance of Congress (O), SSP, Jana

Sangh and Independents accused the Governor of installing Charan Singh's ministry
as "part of a conspiracy to strengthen the Prime Minister's hands". It alleged that
the Governor had already decided to commission Charan Singh even before the rival
candidate Gridhari Lai put his case before him. This was evident from the fact that
the order had already been issued for making arrangements for the oath taking
ceremony before these interviews". The leader of the alliance, Gridhari Lai alleged
that the process of assessment started by Dr. Reddy was "only a make believe to
camouflage the decision he had already taken to invite the BKD leader to form the
Ministry. ^'*

52. Ibid, February 18, 1970.

53. The Times of India, New Delhi, February 19, 1970.
54. The Statesman, Delhi, Februar>' 20, 1970.
 189

While on one hand the opposition alliance was putting forward its claim to a
majority, Charan Singh on the other was persuading Indira Gandhi that Congress
(R) should join his ministry soon so as to clear the atmosphere of instability in the
state. Kamalapati Tripathi had talks with Indira Gandhi on February 24, 1970
regarding the participation in the government headed by BKD leader Charan Singh.
During the meeting Chief Minister Charan Singh urged such coalition to lend
stability to the administration instead of supporting his government from outside.
While agreeing that the party should join Charan Singh ministry without unnecessary
delay, the UPCC (R) Executive Parliamentary Board and the legislature party
authorised Kamalapati Tripathi to take a fmal decision about the timing, personnel
and the number of its representatives.^'

On the day of opening of the joint session of the U.P. Legislature on

February 26, 1970, there was great tension in the air as member assembled in the
House. As Chief Minister Charan Singh took his seat, followed by Kamlapati
Tripathi next to him, they were greeted with cheers from the BKD and Congress
(R) benches and with shouts of "shame shame" from the opposition. Tension grew
up further in the House as the Governor entered, a chorus of "shame, shame", and
"Governor go back" emerged from the opposition benches. Ignoring opposition
leader Gridhari Lai's protest Governor B. Gopala Reddy started reading his address.
The SSP leader A.R. Jaiswal and Jana Sangh leader Madhav Prasad Tripathi charged
the Governor with acting in a partisan manner against the consitution in installing a
minority government headed by Charan Singh "to retain his own job".'^ In his
protest speech the SSP leader A.R. Jaiswal said "the Governor had violated his oath
of allegiance to the constitution by swearing Charan Singh as Chief Minister on the
basis of the list he had himself declared bogus." The first day debate on the
Governor's address in the assembly on February 27, 1970 was "marked by a bitter
two hour indictment of Chief Minister Charan Singh by SSP leader Anant Ram
Jaiswal". He moved an amendment to the motion of thanks on behalf of the
opposition leader Gridhari Lai "regarding that no motion had been made of the
ordinances by the Gupta Ministry for exemption of 6.25 acres from land revenue".

55. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 26, 1970.

56. /6/i/, February 27, 1970.
 190

accused Chief Minister Charan Singh of "conducting deceptive horse trading with
both side for getting Chief Ministership" and said "such a leader could never give a
clean and efficient administration to the state." He charged the Chief Minister with
constantly shifting his stand for retaining power. He said that one of the main
reasons given by Charan Singh for breaking with Gupta was that he could not agree
to land revenue exemption, yet under the pressure of Congress(R), which was
committed to it, he had now agreed to it for the fear of being toppled.^^

On March 6, 1970 the U.P. assembly adopted by voice vote the motion of
thanks on the Governor's address with the Congress (O), SSP and Jana Sangh
groups abstaining, after the Speaker had declared, "division procedure irregular".
He however confirmed his ruling that the opposition amendment had also been
lost.'* Chief Minister Charan Singh scored a convincing victory on March 22, 1970,
when a no-confidence motion against him was rejected by the assembly by a large
margin of 67 votes, as many as 236 voted against the motion and 169 for it.'^

Charan Singh was finally succeeded in pursuing Congress (R) to participate

in the ministry in April 1970. On April 18, 1970 it was stated that Congress (R)
would formally inter into the coalition with BKD. The ministry was expanded after
about two months of its installation with the induction of 27 representatives of the
Congress (R), which had raised the strength of the Council of Minister to 38.
Originally the ministry was comprised of only ten (10) members, all belonging to the
BKD. After the induction of the Congress (R) representatives in the ministry. Chief
Minister Charan Singh said that the ministry would be further expanded sometime
later, to include some BKD men. Representation to the two parties was given on the
basis of their representative strength in the Assembly. The BKD was to have 21
representative and the Congress (R) was 29. Kamlapati Tripathi, the leader of the
Congress (R) legislature party kept himself out from the ministry. The Congress (R)
list of 27 ministers, consisted of 14 cabinet ministers, seven ministers of state and
six deputy ministers.^°

57. Ibid, February 28, 1970.

58. Ibid, March 7, 1970.
59. The Statesman, Delhi, March 23, 1970.
60. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 19, 1970.
 191

Within a short period, strains developed between the two coalition partners.
The strain of uneasy partnership between the two parties had come out into open.
Congress (R) as coalition partner in the ministry had been openly critical on the
promulgation of the Preventive Detention Ordinance and the Uttar Pradesh
Universities (Amendment) Ordinance whereby the membership of students unions
was made optional. The friction between them was further accentuated following
the decision of the BKD members of Parliament to vote against the abolition of
Privy purses Bill in Parliament.

General Secretary of the Congress (R) Parliamentary party criticised the

"repressive policy" of the UP. government towards the students, public servents
and the working class. He said that "U.P. should not be ruled by the promulgation
of undemocratic ordinances". He said that the Congress party in U.P. could not
therefore extend the unconditional support to Charan Singh for all times to come.^'
After the BKD vote in Rajya Sabha against the abolition of Privy Purses Bill,
Congress (R) High command, it appeared, had given a free hand to the state unit to
plan its strategy in the light of the new situation.

The UPCC (R) President Kamlapati Tripathi, there after, wrote to the Chief
Minister Charan Singh requesting him to call a session of the Assembly not later
than the end of September. So that all issues concerning important policy matters
may be thrashed out in the House. He further said that after the BKD vote in Rajya
Sabha on the Privy Purses issue it was impossible for the Congress (R) to continue
in the coalition. In his letter Tripathi stated that the Chief Minister had publically
accepted the Congress (R) Bombay resolution on economic policy of which the
abolition of the Privy Purses and privileges of the former rulers was an important
item. He further said in his letter that "we depended upon your good faith voting of
your party members under your direction on the Privy Purses bill has proved to be
the last straw. You have thus created a situation under which it has become 'well
nigh impossible' for his party to continue in the coalition." The Chief Minister

61. The Statesman, New Delhi, August 5, 1970.

62. Ibid, September 9, 1970.
 192

initially indicated that the House could be summoned on the 2nd of November, but
thereafter at the instance of the Congress (R) the council of ministers advanced the
date to 6th of October.

The Congress (R) High Command was said to have made up its mind that
'coalition with Charan Singh was totally untenable. It had to be broken off even if
that led to the imposition of President's rule in the state. The Congress (R) High
Command on September 18, 1970 gave the green signal to its U.P. unit to part
company with BKD in case the context remains unchanged.63

The gulf between the two parties the BKD and the Congress (R)
progressively widened and on 24th September 1970, the coalition finally
disintegrated. The chief Minister Charan Singh issued a long press statement
denouncing the policies and programmes of the Congress (R). He said that it was no
longer possible to continue the coalition and announced a break with him.^ The
Chief Minister Charan Singh relived 13 Congress (R) Ministers of their portfolios
and asked them to resign, but they refused to comply with his request than he asked
the Governor to dismiss them.

The leader of the Congress (R) legislature party Pt. Kamalapati Tripathi
reacted heavily and took the decision of with drawing his party from the ministry
and wrote to the Governor requesting him to ask Charan Singh to resign since the
Congress (R) had withdrawn itself from the ministry and that Charan Singh no
longer commanded majority in the House.^' He asked the Governor, that in case
Charan Singh resign, he should be invited to from the ministry.

To forestall possible difficulties from Congress (R) for the coalition

government, the Chief Minister Charan Singh has established contact with the
Congress (O) Central leadership through a trusted lieutenant well in advances, and
the Congress (O), it appeared, had reacted positively. He also negotiated with the
leadership of Jana Sangh and Swatantra.

63. Ibid, September 19, 1970.

64. Ibid, September 25, 1970.
65. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 25, 1970.
 193

After Congress (R) withdrawal from the Charan Singh ministry and demand
the resignation of Charan Singh ministry on the ground that it fell into minority
after her withdrawal fi-om the government. In the meantime, the Congress (O), the
Jana Sangh and the Swatantra party rallied to support Charan Singh and informed
the Governor that they had decided to extend their support to the Chief Minister. In
their letter to the Governor they said that with their support, Charan Singh enjoyed
a majority in the House. They asked the Governor to let Charan Singh continue as
Chief Minister. The opposition leaders who met the Governor declared that the
mere withdrawal of Congress (R) support did not necessarily and conclusively
reduce the Chief Minister and his government into a minority unless the same was
established on the floor of the House. The opposition leader advised the Governor
in the same letter that he should dismiss the Ministers whom Charan Singh had
asked to dismiss. They made the point that the advice of the Chief Minister on this
matter was binding on the Governor.^''

In such a situation, however, the Governor on the advice of the Attorney

General asked the Chief Minister Charan Singh to resign by the evening of
September 28, 1970. The Governor in his letter to Charan Singh told him that the
matter of his having obtained the support of other parties can be gone into at the
time of the question of a new government after his resignation.'''

The UPCC (R) executive in a meeting considered the action of the Governor
in demanding the resignation of Chief Minister appropriate and constitutional and
requested him that "failing immediate submission of resignation, the Governor may
be pleased to withdraw his pleasure from the Chief Minister Charan Singh." The
UPCC (R) in his meeting urged the Governor that Kamalapati Tripathi was not only
the leader of the largest party in the legislature but also commanded the support of
other members in the legislative assembly. He was competent to from a stable
government and hence he should be called upon to form the new ministry.^*

66. The Statesman, Delhi, September 26, 1970.

67. /A/^, September 29, 1970.
68. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 29, 1970.
 194

On the other hand the leader of the Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra and
SSP sharply reacted to the Governor decision. They criticised the Governor's
action and termed it as a dictatorial approach. Acharya Kirpalani in a statement
said that by not waiting for the meeting of the assembly the Governor had made
suspect the impartiality of his office. The chairman of the state PSP, Urga Sen said
that "since a no-confidence motion against Charan Singh had already been tabled in
assembly, the Governor's action in asking Charan Singh to resign was an insult to
the House. ^'Former Chief Minister of UP. and Congress (O) leader, C.B. Gupta in
a letter to the Governor had protested against the demand for Charan Singh's
resignation. He said that the post of Attorney General being political, his opinion
was not impartial. The following was the text of C.B. Gupta's letter to the
Governor:
"You will kindly consider the matter and not blindly accept the
opinion of Attorney General, whose office being political is in the
grip of the government in power at the centre. And it is well known
that the Prime Minister wants her own party to come in power or
failing that President's rule. The Attorney General's opinion is
therefore not like the verdict of the Supreme Court coming from an
impartial judicial body. It is to be examined in the light of the
provision of the constitution and practice of Parliamentary democracy
in other countries on which our constitutional conventions and
provisions are so largely based. The meeting of the legislative
assembly was fixed for October 6th, 1970 where it can be
constitutionally and indisputably established whether the Chief
Minister commands or does not command a majority. If you do not
want to wait for the meeting of legislature on October 6, 1970, you
may call it at the earliest you can for a proper determination of the
question. That is what the constitution provides for, and that is what,
I may add, is your sacred duty to enforce regardless of advice from
the centre or any one else. To do otherwise would be making a
mockery of our constitution, democratic practices and traditions. The
question who is in and who remains Chief Minister is not so
important as the maintenance and preservation of our democracy, its
constitutional convention and traditions. I therefore appeal to you to
be true to your oath as Governor and not to be misled or pressurised
by a partisan centre. The office of the Governor exists to save and
preserve. It may involve some risk and sacrifice on your part. But

69. The Statesman, Delhi, September 29, 1970.

 195

that will be worthwhile for preserving our democracy and saving it

from dictatorship... I write as I have laboured, worked for, and am
still working for the establishment and strengthening of democratic
traditions, and resigned my office twice as Chief Minister in
persuance of it. The consequence of disregard evasion of the
constitution will be disastrous as it will lead the people to lose their
faith in democracy and democratic process".^^

The Jana Sangh leader Nanaji Deshmukh described the Governor's action as
"a murder of the constitution and rape of democracy." We shall fight such dictatorial
methods of Indira Gandhi with all the power at our command." In New Delhi the
SSP leader Madhu Limaye demanded removal of U.P. Governor B. Gopala Reddy
"for his partisan conduct in the State constitutional crises. No Governor or President
can usurp the power of legislature or remove a government or give it confidence"^^
In Bombay the Swatantra Party General Secretary R.C. Koopers charged Indira
Gandhi government with "resorting to devious means to seek power in U P " . He
said that "loss of the state to Congress (R) would be a shattering blow to Mrs.
Gandhi's prestige and plans. "'^

Ch. Charan Singh was not in a hurry to resign. His main argument was that
since the assembly was meeting only eight days later, there seem to be little point in
his resignation are being dismissed, and an adhoc government being installed to face
the assembly or in the governor assessing through legislators parades, the respective
strength of the claimants to Chief Ministership. Charan Singh reminded the
Governor through his letter, that he himself in April 1968 had enunciated and acted
upon the speakers conference recommendation that the question of majority or
minority support should be tested on the floor of the House and there alone. The
Governor had himself set a precedent which he was not following in the present
case.^**

The following was the text of Charan Singh's letter to the Governor: "My

70. Ibid.
71. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, October 1, 1970.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. The Statesman, Delhi, September 30, 1970.
 196

reply to your letter of this morning asking me to tender my resignation by the

evening is as follows :
You rely upon the opinion of the Attorney General while you had
simultaneously asked for the opinion of Advocate General also. It
seems you did not wait for his opinion to arrive which it did this
morning before you reached your conclusion and wrote to me
perhaps.... As the coalition government is now no longer in existence.
I cannot, under the constitution, function as the Chief Minister any
longer. Now may I point out to you in all humility that the constitution
does not speak of one party or muUi-party government at all ? It
speaks of the state government whether it is made by one political
party or more than one, being immaterial so the Attorney General's
reasoning on the basis of the coalition government no longer existing
is fallacious in the extreme.
A Chief Minister's position cannot be called illegal or
unconstitutional simply because his party does not enjoy a majority in
the House all by itself That a minority government can function with
the support of other parties is clear from the case of the present central
government headed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The case of a purely PSP
ministry led by Mr. Thana Pillai, which functional for a considerable
time in Kerala supported from outside is well known to constitutional
history in our country.
There have been many minority governments in England also
both in 19th and 20th centuries which functioned for years and years
together. Whether a government starts as a minority government or is
later reduced to a minority is immaterial. Our legislative assembly is
already under summons and it is on the floor of the House as you
yourself and others have said to many times that claim of majority and
minority can and should be tested.
One of the guidelines which was unanimously framed by the
Presiding Officers Conference in April 1968 and upon which you took
a stand when the minority government of C.B. Gupta was functioning
in the State, ran as follows : "The question whether the Chief Minister
has lost the confidence of the Assembly shall at all time be tested in
the assembly." Governor Dharam Vira of West Bengal had dismissed
the Chief Minister Ajay Mookerjee for evading the legislature; here in
case I fail to resign you propose to dismiss me while the assembly is
scheduled to meet on October 6th which is hardly a week away. A
monstrous situation indeed, the Governor asking the Chief Minister to
resign the government that he is in minority, and yet not allowing him
to prove his majority on the floor of the house. I may tell you, I am
prepared to face the assembly even earlier, say, on September 30th or
 197

October 1st, only if you summon it as you can under rule 4(2) of the
Rules of Business of the Assembly.
In exactly a similar case viz., when the Jana Sangh had
withdrawn itself from Akali Dal coalition government in Punjab
recently, thus reducing it a minority and demanded the removal of the
Chief Minister. The Governor instead of calling upon the Chief
Minister to resign asked for the summoning of the assembly.
You had sought the opinion of the Attorney General on
September 25th, 1970. A day after, however, viz, on September 26th,
1970 the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra and the Congress (O) sent you
their letters of unqualified support to the government. According to
the papers in Speaker's Secretariat, their support amounts to a figure
between 235 and 240. I may add, however I told you in my previous
letter that acceptance of my advice regarding removal of certain
minister did not turn on whether I commanded a majority or minority
in the house at the time. As Jennings, an eminent authority on
constitutional law had pointed out, 'a minister can and ought to be
removed on the advice of the Prime Minister although the minister may
enjoy majority in the House of Commons. For in the case, the Prime
Minister could be thrown out by an adverse vote of the House, but in
as much as the minister was appointed on the advice of the Prime
Minister, he has to go out in any case if the Prime Minister, so desires'.
Yet another point, the Attorney General's opinion is presumably based
on the assumption that the present government began or came into
being as coalition ministry whereas in fact it was started on February
17th, 1969 as a purely BKD ministry, of course with the Congress (R)
support. A coalition government was actually formed two months later,
viz. on April 9, 1970. The only change that has occurred since is that
the position Congress (R) has taken up by the other parties, viz. the
Jana Sangh, the Swatantra and the Congress (0).
.... I hope to be forgiven if I say that the Governor who has
written this morning a letter to me appears to be a different person
from the one whom I saw on September 24th who seemed to be
convinced of the propriety of my stand and wanted to consuh the legal
remembrance simply for formality's sake as also from the Governor
who told leaders of Jana Sangh and Congress (O) on September 26th
that their support to the present government had materially changed
the situation. Even after accepting my resignation or dismissing me as
you please you will obviously have a government in order that the
business of the House is transacted on October 6th and the following
days. What is the method which you went to adopt in order to choose
a leader of government in my place? Ostensibly either by asking all the
members of the assembly to appear before you in order to express their
 198

wishes in this regard or taking an adhoc decision without reference to

any principle.
May I enquire whether any of these course will be proper or
constitutional? Is this how we propose to preserve democracy in our
country? You must have made up your mind either way by now. I hope
you would not mind disclosing it to me. You have said that the correct
stage of evaluating the quantum of my support will arrive when the
question of formation of new government comes up after my
resignation. May I enquire why it cannot be gone into today? Should it
be necessary for me first to resign or to get dismissed before you can
go into the quantum of my support? If that is your stand, may I
respectfully enquire raison d'etre behind it? Cannot a Chief Minister
change partners? If not, may I know where the prohibition is
contained, in which Article of the constitution please? Is their a
convention to this effect in any of the parliamentary democracies of
the world? If so, where? After I have heard from you, I will let you
know my final reply."'*

On September 30, 1970, the principal opposition parties, the Congress (O),
Jana Sangh, Swatantra and BKD sent a cable to the President V.V. Giri who was in
Kiev (USSR) stating that the U.P. Governor could have tested the strength of
Charan Singh's government on the floor of the assembly which was due to meet
shortly. In another cable to the President, Charan Singh requesting him not to sign
any order for President's Rule in UP. till his return to India. "Constitutional
propriety and natural justice require that you should be fully informed and hear the
other side before reaching any conclusion."'^ Charan Singh said in his cable. At a
press conference, Charan Singh said that "the Supreme Court in a judgement had
emphasised that the President must personally satisfy himself about a situation
before issuing orders."''

But on October 1, 1970, the President's rule was proclaimed in the state on
the recommendation of the Governor under Article 356, on the plea of the break
down of the constitutional machinery. The State legislative assembly was only
suspended not dissolved because the Governor B. Gopal Reddy in his report had

75. Ibid, September 30, 1970.

76. Ibid, October 1, 1970.
77. Ibid.
 199

asked only for the suspension of legislative assembly, presumingiy anticipating the
possibility of formation of an alternative ministry in due course with a possibility of
some agreement to be concluded among some of the political groups7^

Signing of documents by President V.V. Giri relating to imposition of

President's rule in U.P. have evoked widespread adverse reaction from many leaders
of the opposition parties. The Congress (0), PSP, Jana Sangh and SSP opposed the
imposition of President's rule and called it "a. blow to the people's faith in
democracy. "^^ The dismissed Chief Minister Ch. Charan Singh issued a statement in
which he said that the imposition of President's rule in the state was "a denial of the
right of the Assembly to determine not only the question of majority but also of
stability." He further said :
"If the Congress (R) could not attain a majority all
constitutional process could be suspended in U.P. This had happened
but it would be north while to recall how the Congress (R) had shifted
its ground. At first my removal was sought because it was alleged that
the majority in the Council of Ministers wanted my removal. Later it
was argued that I should have been dismissed because I had refused
to resign when I was asked to do so by the Governor. When I had
asked for the removal of certain ministers consequent on their own
and their leadership's attempt to wean members of BKD, the assembly
was due to meet only about 10 days ahead. Also it became manifest
despite the withdrawal of Congress (R) support the government
continued to enjoy a majority in the House.
So for as the majority in the Council of Ministers wanting my
removal is concerned it was not due to any friction in the working of
the council, but because of external pressure following the withdrawal
of Congress (R) from the coalition. In fact once its leadership had
decided upon withdrawal which it was proclaiming from the House
tops for weeks past. It is the Congress (R) ministers who should have
resigned for before I have to ask for their removal. I had not refused
to comply with the Governor's letter asking me to resign. I had sought
only some clarifications vital to the functioning of representative
government and promised to reply to the Governor af^er receipt of his
clarification. "*^

78. 76/4 October 2, 1970.

79. Ibid.
80. /6/f/, Octobers, 1970.
 200

UP. the nation's most populous state, came under President's rule on
October 2, 1970 with the notification by the Union Home Ministry for the
Presidential proclamation taking over the administration of the state. The President
has assumed all the powers of the legislature and the administration for six months.
The legislative assembly has been kept under suspension and has not been
dissolved.*' The publication of the proclamation notification completes the process
of imposition of central rule in U.P, for which the President signed the proclamation
at Kieu on October 1, 1970.

After two weeks of President's rule in the state another coalition came into
being. This time five political parties Congress (O), Jana Sangh, BKD, Swatantra
and SSP got together and formed a United Front known as Samyukta Vidhayak Dal.
Initially, the alliance failed to agree on their joint leadership. But only after Charan
Singh withdrew from the contest for the leadership of the revived SVD, a consensus
emerged around Tribhuwan Narayan Singh a Rajya Sabha member of the Congress
(O), to whom the new front chose as their leader.

On October 7, 1970 Charan Singh issued the following statement :

"It is being propagated in certain quarters that the SVD has not come
into friction because of my insistence of being elected as its leader.
This is not entirely correct. I have expressed it as my desire to ftiends
of the BKD more than once that they should allow me to retire. But
they would not. I made a last attempt today and fortunately they have
agreed to my proposal though much against their better judgement.
This is just to declare to the people that I am no longer a
candidate for leadership of the proposed SVD and would extend
whole hearted support to my friend whom the parties opposed to the
Prime Minister may elect to this Office of great responsibility. It
should be the aim of all those who are concerned with the future of
the country, to ensure that the conspiracy of Prime Minister to
become a dictator or handover the country to communism is defeated
and democracy saved. She split her organization into two parts for
the sake of her personal power. She has now decided to subvert the
constitution itself to that end."'^

81. Ibid.
82. /6/f/, Octobers, 1970.
 201

After Ch. Charan Singh's statement, legislators belonging to the proposed

SVD and some Independents met to elect their leader but they failed to arrive at a
decision on the leadership. The matter than was referred to the national leadership
of the parties. Finally the Central leadership of the SVD chose Tribhuwan Narayan
Singh as their leader. Soon after they staked a claim to form a ministry in the state
with the support of 250 members in a House of 425. The Governor was immediately
informed and asked to invite Tribhuwan Narayan Singh to form a popular ministry.

Pt. Kamlapati Tripathi, the leader of the Congress (R) legislature party in
U.P. submitted a memorandum to the Governor in which he said that the newly
formed SVD in U.P. assembly was "neither a recognised party in the assembly nor
was it known to functioning outside the House." He further said that his party could
provide a stable and progressive government in the State.^^

The delay by the Governor in inviting Tribhuwan Narayan Singh to form the
government and delay in submitting his report to the President had added doubt and
suspense in the minds of the opposition parties. So they decided to meet the
President and to ask him to urge the Governor to invite Tribhuwan Narayan Singh
to form the government in the state.

After the hectic campaign by the opposition parties, Tribhuwan Naryan Singh
the leader of the newly formed SVD was invited by the Governor to form the
ministry on October 18, 1970 and he was sworn in as Chief Minister on the same
day.*^ Gridhari Lai, Congress (O) and Virendra Verma (BKD) were administered
the oath of office as Cabinet Minister along with the Chief Minister. Initially
Tribhuwan Naryan Singh ministry was a three members Cabinet but later it was
expanded and one out of every five legislators of the SVD was rewarded with a
ministership. This was the largest council of Ministers till that date in the State.

Tribhuwan Naryan Singh was not a member of the state legislature. He,
therefore, contested the assembly election from the Maniram constituency, but was
defeated. This gave a serious jolt to the SVD government followed the land-slide
victory of the Congress (R) in the 1971 mid-term poll to the Lok Sabha from UP.
gave a new dimension to state politics.

83. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, October 15. 1970.

84. The Statesman, Delhi, October 19, 1970.
 202

Soon after the mid-term poll the UP. Chief Minister Tribhuwan Naryan
Singh declared that he would quit on March 18, 1971. He said that he would be
placing his resignation before the SVD general body on March 18, 1971 and ask it
to elect a new leader. The SVD general body rejected the resignation of the Chief
Minister on the same day and asked him to continue as the leader.

In a surprise move many BKD MLA's defected from the party and joined the
Congress (R). They said that they did so because of differences with their party
leader Charan Singh. Followed a mass defections from the SVD began to take place
and the government was reduced to a minority. The Congress (R) and its allies
could thus muster an official strength of 222 in an effective House of 416, and
urged the Governor to dissolve the SVD ministry and invite its leader Kamiapati
Tripathi to form a popular ministry.

The five and a half months old SVD Government of Tribhuwan Naryan Singh
which was sworn in on October 18, 1970 came to an end on April 3, 1971 with the
resignation of the Chief Minister immediately after his government was defeated on
the floor of the House.*^ The Governor B. Gopala Reddy immediately invited the
opposition leader Pt. Kamiapati Tripathi to form a government. He was sworn in as
the new Chief Minister of UP. on the same day. The installation of Pt. Kamiapati
Tripathi as a new Chief Minister brought an end to the first phase of non-Congress
rule in Uttar Pradesh.

The period from April 1, 1967 to April 3, 1971 was marked by a rapid
change in the state governments. These governments formed from time to time were
founded on a negative basis, namely non-Congressism. A common agreed
programme had, no doubt been chalked out, but soon after the formation of these
governments, the inner contradictions among the various constituents began to
surface as a result of which none of these government could last for more than two
years at a time. The main cause for the downfall of these governments was
defections and counter defections. Thus in the absence of a common ideology, the
coalition governments were bound to meet this fate.

85. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 4, 1971.

 Chapter - VIII
COALITION POLITICS IN
UTTAR PRADESH - PHASE II
(i) The 1993 Assembly Election and Politics
in U.P.
(ii) Thirteenth Vidhan Sabha (1996) Election
and Politics in U.P.
 203

(i) The 1993 Assembly Election and Politics in U.P.

The November 1993 assembly polls were a direct outcome of the events that
took place in Uttar Pradesh. The Babri masjid at Ayodhya was demolished by the
Hindu fundamentalist on 6 December 1992. It was followed by the resignation of
the Chief Minister Kalyan Singh and banning of communal organisations by the
Central government along with the dismissal of the BJP led government in Madhya
Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan.

In such a situation, exposing the real face of the BJP and its sister
organisations to the masses and a meaningful realignment of the social and secular
forces was the prime responsibility. Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshi Ram, the
leader of the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party understood this historical
necessity and therefore, both these leaders pragmatically decided to make common
cause for the cause of uniting the backwards, untouchables and minorities together.
This alliance would enable them to take on the BJP and its sister organisations.

The alliance between Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram on December 14,
1992' was a significant attempt to bring together the dalits, the backward and the
minorities at one platform. This brought a new ray of hope for all these sections of
society which had been forced to endure unjustifiable hardships down the ages for
no fault of theirs.

The Hindutva that the BJP swears by, in fact, means an attempt to preserve
the status quo both in the social and economic fields in the garb of cultural heritage.
Being a conglomeration of the higher castes, it wants to undo the forward march of
the backward classes and dalits by trying to recreate the centuries old social order
that stood for the exploitation of many for the personal aggrandisement of a few.

Ever since the Manu authored the reprehensible code by which some were
born to rule and the rest meant to serve, the Hindu caste system had entranced itself
to ensure that a person was doomed to a life of subjugation merely by the accident
of his birth. Over the years, both through religious preaching and political
maneuvering, the system got so ingrained in the minds of the subject castes that

1. The Times of India, New Delhi. December 15. 1992.

 204

they came to accept it as virtuous. They felt that god had willed them to suffer and
this suffering at the hands of the higher castes lay their salvation.

The British might have used the policy of divide and rule on an alien people
but the perverted leaders of the Hindu society had the temerity to divide the people
of their own religious fold into compartments whose boundaries were completely
insular. The division were effected in such a graded manner that the exploited
groups could never became united. Thus the intermediate castes like the Ahirs,
Yadas, Kurmis and Lodhis were given an advantage vis-a-vis others called the
untouchables. Illiterate and ill informed, the former lost no opportunity to flex their
mgscles against their fellowmen just to win small favoures from their higher castes.

Ancient India had reacted to such abuse through the emergence of religions
like Budhism and Jainism which emphasised the equality of men and deplored the
exploitative caste system. Their emphasis on doing away with rituals and sticking to
right conduct was an attempt to unshakle the lower castes from the stranglehold of
those who had become insensitive to their needs and aspiration.^ The Bhakti
movement in the middle ages was another time when lower castes came to command
some respect. But by and large, the history of Hinduism has been the history of
exploitation of the lower rungs of society by the caste Hindus. It has been a religion
by the few and for the few. The few who enjoyed power managed to do so because
they could formulate and grasp ideas, an opportunity that was denied to other.
Vedas could be read only by a select few. There is nothing to prove that such ability
did not exist in others. But enslavement of these castes could not have been possible
had they been given an opportunity to share the fruits of knowledge. The sanctity of
the so-called divine origin of institutions ensured that the deprived would never
question the basis of these inequalities.

Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram brought the intermediate castes and the
untouchables on a single platform by forging (entering) an alliance to fulfill the
dream of their mentor philosopher i.e. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and Dr. BR.
Ambedkar respectively. Dr. Lohia, who had understood the complexities of the

2. Ram Singh and Anshuman Yadav, Mulayam Singh : A Political Biography, Konark
Publishers, Delhi, 1998, p. 139.
 205

Hindu caste system, had felt that only by eradicating the caste system could a truly
democratic India be created. He had, therefore, consciously promoted the Shudras/
untouchables in his party. Dr. Ambedkar, who had championed the cause of the
untouchables, was not only a great visionary but a revolutionary who wanted to put
an end to this vicious cycle of exploitation by asking for political, economic and
social equality for the downtrodden. Dr. Lohia who. regarded Ambedkar as the
greatest thinker of the times, second only to Mahatma Gandhi, had a desire to work
with him for altering the very foundation of the Hindu society. Unfortunately the
dream he nurtured could not materialised because of the death of Ambedkar.^

With the alliance between Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshi Ram
intermediate castes, which derived a certain satisfaction from the fact that they were
above the untouchables in the social ladder and the untouchables who had also
developed a serious contemptuous attitude towards these castes, found that the
privileged few revelled and enjoyed because of their differences. The reconciliation
of these antagonisms was a stupendous task which Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram
accepted, because they think that only and only a reconciliation could ensure that
revivalist Hinduism championed by the BJP could be checked in its tracks.

Both Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram were aware of the futility of the
alliance if its rationale failed to reach the party workers in particular and the masses
in general. They launched a tireless campaign to explain to the people the need of
uniting under the SP-BSP banner. Addressing hundreds of meeting in all over the
states they exhorted their partymen and the section of the society which they
represented and convinced them that they were a strong political entity, capable of
taking their own decisions in their own interests. The response that they received
from the masses convinced them that their alliance was formidable and that there
was no need for them to be panic.

The consolidation of the Dalit and other backward classes, which began with
the forging of the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party (SP-BSP) alliance
in December 1992 by Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram continued despite speculation

3. /6/rf, pp. 140-141.

 206

to the contrary. They did not allow any acrimony to develop between the alliance
during the November 1993 assembly elections on account of seat sharing and
leading the government in case of the alliance victory in the elections. Kanshi Ram
declared in a very clear word that his party's aim was to help Mulayam Singh to
become the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Both, Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram
mutually agreed to contest 254 and 167 seats respectively.

The 1993 assembly elections in UP assumed a historic significance. For the

first time in the political history of independent India an attempt to carve out an
independent alliance or front between the two age old hostile groups i.e. the OBCs
and SCs and an autonomous political space for these social forces were made.'*
Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshi Ram led the SP-BSP combine to a spectacular
victory with 176 (SP 109 and BSP 67) assembly seats just one short to the BJP's
177 seats. For the Congress and the Janata Dal which won 28 and 27 seats
respectively, the election proved to be a trauma.^

In the post-election development, the BJP was isolated even though it

emerged as the single largest party. All the non-BJP parties consented to support
the SP-BSP combine and the Governor Motilal Vora had little option left. He did
not accept the BJP pleas that the party should be asked to form the government
being the single largest party and then asked to establish its majority on the floor of
the house. The Governor invited the SP-BSP alliance legislature party leader
Mulayam Singh Yadav to form the government on December 3, 1993.^ There were
minor ripples on the penultimate day of government formation. Part of the Janata
Dal led by Ajit Singh was in a mood to break off from its support to the SP-BSP
combine but it could not crystallise in to a situation where the BJP could claim even
a remote chance of securing majority support among the elected legislature.^

And on December 4, 1993, for the second time in four years Mulayam Singh
Yadav was back at the K.D. Singh Babu stadium in Lucknow for the swearing in

4. K. Srinivasuiu, "Centrality of Caste : Understanding U.P. Elections", Econmic and

Political Weekly, January 22, 1994, p. 159.
5. Ram Singh and Anshuman Yadam, Op.Cii., p. 145.
6. The Times of India, New Delhi. December 4. 1993.
7. N.K. Chowdhary, Assembly Elections 1993, Shipra Publication, Delhi, 1994. p. 242
 207

ceremony.* A 27 member (16 SP and 11 BSP) three-tier (13 cabinet, 11 state and 2
deputy ministers) coalition ministry was administered the oath of office and secrecy
by the Governor at an impressive ceremony. The ministry was a judicious mix of the
SP-BSP combine. Of the 13 cabinet ministers, eight belong to the Samajwadi Party
and five from the Bahujan Samaj Party. Of the 11 ministers of state, seven belong to
the SP and four from the BSP. And both the deputy ministers belong from the
Bahujan Samaj party. The ministry's cast composition reflected that the
downtrodden were given the widest possible representation. Of the 27 ministers, 17
belong to the OBCs, and six to the SCs.' The structure of the ministry demonstrated
the desire of Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram to consolidate the Dalit-OBC alliance.

The SP-BSP combine had defied conjecture by political observers that it was
cobbled together for short term gains to grab power and would fall apart once the
formation of the government began. The BSP did not even press for the deputy
Chief minister's post for one of its members, as was being speculated. There was no
wrangUng over the selection of Ministers and the distribution of portfolios either.'^

The election resuhs show that the SP-BSP combine, with the support of the
Muslim community had managed to contain the BJP in the state. It also proved, that
tactical voting by the Muslims can ensure victory of a party or alliance in states
where they are in sizeable numbers. The Congress party had been 'squeezed' between
the BJP and SP-BSP combine getting 28 seats, while the Janata Dal had made a
very poor showing by just winning 27 seats, in spite of its recent attempts at
unification. The electoral result indicated the astuteness of the voters in opting for
what they clearly regarded as a combination with a better chance than either the
Janata Dal or the Congress. The electoral results were popularly perceived as a
victory for the secular forces in the State, which had combined together against the
BJP."

8. The Sunday Times, New Delhi, December 5, 1993.

9. Ibid.
10. The Times of India, New Delhi, December 9. 1993.
11. Sudha Pai, "Emergence of New Social Forces in Uttar Pradesh", Mainstream,
December 18, 1993, p. 3.
 208

The voters firmly reiterated their endorsement of the political equations

which Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram made. They put a combination representing
upwardly mobile backward castes and similar sections of Dalits, supported by the
minorities. This section of electorates showed a canny preference for the SP-BSP
combine over the desperate coalition called the Janata Dal despite the fact that both
the SP-BSP and the Janata Dal appealed broadly to the same social forces. This
ability to distinguish on the basis of 'winability' is a tributes to the sharp political
sense of the voter's groups and particularly of the minorities who hold the electoral
balance since the majority community is fragmented on the basis of caste.

The local concerns of the upwardly mobile sections had also influenced the
verdict. The perverse opposition by students and teachers to the anti-copying
ordinance and the more genuine cause of the politically emergent commercial
farmers of eastern UP (regarding sugarcane prices and resentment over police firing
on peasants) were obviously important factors among voters. The 'new' social forces
in UP. had yet to crystallise into a stable political formation. Nevertheless it was
apparent that the issues raised at Ram Kola in eastern U.P.'^ where the firing took
place have prevailed over the BJP's communal and constitutionally impermissible
attempts to use Ram as its electoral mascot.

The 1993 assembly elections, in which Ayodhya played an uneven role, had
merely confirmed the existing stalemate on the issue. As expected, the Muslims had
voted resoundingly and tactically against the BJP. Their overwhelming turn-out and
enblock local consolidation had also ensured that the Muslim vote had a greater
strategic weightage than formal numbers would suggest. It would not be an
exaggeration to suggest that Muslims contributed some one-fifth of the 27 per cent
vote polled by the SP-BSP alliance.'^

However, the most important trend seems to have been set in UP. This was
the forging and formalisation of a new Backward caste-Harijan-Muslim alliance in
the shape of the SP-BSP, which had emerged as a sort of plebeian block with
significant wider appeal. The phenomenon derived in part from the growing strength

12. The Times of India, New Delhi, December 1, 1993.

13. Ibid, December 8, 1993.
 209

of the Mandal platfarm and the politics of popular empowerment, which had seized
the imagination of the people. This was undoubtedly a historic development which
were already uttering the terms of political contention in large parts of the country.
A powerful form of plebeian assertion seems to be underway, encompassing the
lower, dispossessed layers of the population but reflected through the prism of
caste. This had far-reaching implications.

The entirely expected assertiveness on the part of the Dalits and the
aggressive response to this from the backward castes after the formation of the
government, posses a challenge to the SP-BSP government both with regard to
fulfilling the aspirations of its most important social support base and maintenance
of the fragile backward-Dalit alliance.

The atrocities on Dalits should have logically declined with the formation of
alliance between the SP and the BSP. Logic, however, probably takes a back seat
when people indulge in fights. In any case, the obliteration of animosity between the
intermediate castes and the Dalits was a task that could not have been accomplished
just because Mulayam and Kanshi Ram had agreed to contest the election together
Their joining up could only have been the beginning of a process rather than the end
of it. The situation called for both these leaders working together and to go out
with their message to the remotest corners of the state. Far from taking any such
exercise, Kanshi Ram decided to put the blame for failures squarely on Mulayam
Singh. He assumed a high moral position and fault-finding seemed his pastime

Cracks developed in the alliance just after the formation of the government
due to the big brother attitude of Kanshi Ram and his press statements that he
would judge the performance of Mulayam Singh after six months and Mayawati will
keep a close and constant watch on the government made it appear as if Mulayam
was not heading a government but was on a mercenary contact with Kanshi Ram.'''
Barely three months after formation of the government, when Kanshi Ram joined
Mulayam Singh to express SP-BSP solidarity on March 5, 1994 at Allahabad, the
BSP supremo said, "we will have to pull down this government if it does not mend

14. Amaresh Mishra, "Challenge to SP-BSP Government", Economic and Political

Weekly, Feb. 19, 1994, p. 409.
 210

its ways".'* There could not have been a more inopportune moment than this to
make such an irresponsible statement because the meeting had been specifically
convened to express SP-BSP solidarity.

On the other hand, differences were brewing in the BSP over the style of
their party chief and Mayawati. Elected representatives were receiving a humiliating
treatment. While all the ministers and ML As would be made to sit on the floor,
Mayawati would occupy a chair as if to lord over her subjects. Coming from a lady
who was supposedly fighting for equality among humans such behaviours outraged
several BSP legislators. Dr. Masud Ahmad, the state education minister and a high
ranking BSP leader revolted against the leadership of his party due to said reasons.
He resigned from the government in June 1994 alleging a pronounced 'anti-Muslim'
bias in the party leadership. His tirade was specifically directed at Mayawati whom
he accused of making wild statements which amounted to questioning the loyalty of
Muslims. He also went on to allege widespread factionalism in the ranks of the BSP
largely due to the efforts of Mayawati to run the party as her personal property with
the tacit support of party supremo Kanshi Ram.'^

Instead of resolving the internal crises of their party, the BSP chief and his
lieutenants started issuing statements against Mulayam Singh and accused him of
trying to engineer defections from the BSP. Kanshi Ram went on to organise an
anti-defection rally in Lucknow on July 10, 1994. The political temperature of the
state had risen, and on the eve of rally the newspapers and analysts began predicting
the fall of the government.

As it turned out, the outcome proved to be anti-climatic Kanshi Ram

refrained from going all out against Mulayam Singh, preferring to point out only
some obvious anomalies like his weak resistance to Brahmanical forces. By stating
that since the same forces are also arraigned against the Chief Minister, •' the BSP
chief bailed out the government and offered his continued support.

15. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 6, 1994.

16. Amaresh Mishra. "Cracks in the Alliance", Economic and Political Weekly, July 23,
1994, p. 1907.
17. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 11, 1994.
 21 1

Kanshi Ram's apparent climbdown, however, was only natural. All indications
were that if support was withdrawn, the BSP would split and a number of its
legislators would cross over to the SP. Internally the BSP was actually jolted by the
trouble in its rank and it was doubtful whether it could have sustained a split. The
BSP has clearly moved away from even its characteristic 'grass roots rhetorics' and
mobilisation. Its failure, however, to cultivate a second constituency beyond the
Dalits left the BSP devoid of a mainstream position of supremacy. But since its
existence depends on maintaining this slot, withdrawal from the Mulayam Singh
government at that time could have proved suicidal.'^

Ironically, these development took place after the successful conclusion of

the mid-summer assembly by-election in the state. The Samajwadi party dominated
the elections by winning three out of six assembly seats. The BJP, despite capturing
two seats returned from the poll with its vote percentage down by more than two
per cent and the loss of the Bhagwantnagar seat from Unnao district, formerly held
by the party. The defeat in Unnao as also the lowering of the victory margin in
Kasganj, Etah which was one of the two seats that had returned the former chief
minister Kalyan Singh with a comfortable majority in the last elections, showed
what is increasingly becoming evident after the political consolidation of Mulayam
Singh.

Yet even though Kanshi Ram had won a reprieve for his party, his position
had actually weakened. He had to offer concessions to Mulayam Singh like
restraining Mayawati and very significantly, his support to the Mulayam regime did
not include the extracting of any conditions like protection to the dalits and effective
governance. In the past the BSP chief used to demarcate his position by raising
certain issues against the government.

The ruckus within the BSP, however, possessed both an internal and external
dimension; for one it had more than a casual link with Mulayam Singh's strategy to
weaken the party from within so that if it decides to withdraw support from the
government at any future date, the chief minister can wean away a substantial

18. Amaresh Mishra, "Cracks in the Alliance", Op.Cit.

 212

number of legislators. Here the Chief Minister's apparent effort had been to isolate
the BSP by slowly weaning away the support of the backwards and the Muslims so
that ultimately the BSP is left with only its Dalit base.

Such a scenario will virtually amount to ousting the BSP from the mainstream
political arena and reverse the party's trend; for the BSP, which in any case was not
into any form of radical politics, the extension and consolidation of its constituency
beyond the dalits, especially amongst the backwards and Muslims was vital if it had
to remain in the mainstream. It was perhaps with this in mind that Kanshi Ram had
taken several steps to specifically the Muslims. The BSP chief was visualising a
probable Dalit-Muslim combination for the future which would have proved
detrimental to Mulayam Singh.

The politics of Mandal and that of Dalitism in UP, especially after the rise of
the Kanshi Ram phenomenon, had not proceeded in tandem. Here, while Mandal
politics aimed at an alliance among the backward castes, the minorities and a section
of the upper castes like the Thakurs, which then had sought to win over the Dalits.
Dalitism was based on an assertion of the Dalits who then sought to bring together
the backward castes, the minorities etc. The conflict between Mulayam Singh and
Kanshi Ram was thus one between two political strategies which sought to win over
a common social base.

The differences came out on the surface between the SP-BSP combine once
again immediately after the election to the three tier panchayat system which saw
the SP letting loose a reign of terror through both the Police and its own goon
machinery against rival candidates and parties which included in a big way its own
ally, the BSP. All over the state there were incidents of abduction of candidates.
Police lathi-charges, open intimidation by goonda elements led by SP legislators,
buying off of opposing forces, open courting of many power and mafia forces and
support to any candidates irrespective of party affiliation who could ensure the
personal domination of Mulayam Singh. The total but 'planned' anarchy which
started with the panchayat elections reached its apogee during the election
of the Presidents of the new District Boards, Zilla Panchayats or Zilla
 213

Parishads.'' Mulayam Singh turned the contest into a personal test of strength and
trained his guns, apart from at the BJP, at the BSP as well. At many places, the BSP
candidates were made to bite the dust and the SP supported the Janata Dal and
other parties, who could ensure the personal domination of Mulayam Singh.

These happenings, however, had a design of their own. They were evidently
part of Mulayam Singh's strategy to ensure the emergence of the SP as a powerful
political force not dependent on any allies. The readiness of the SP to go to any
lengths to achieve this had also a lot to do with the prevailing situation where other
political forces in the state stood markedly weakened. The BSP's position had
reached an all-time low. The party did badly in the panchayat elections. The
Samajwadi Party dominated the panchayat elections and its candidates were elected
as Chairman in 31 out of 56 Zilla Panchayats. The BSP managed only one victory in
Bijnore while the BJP bagged almost one-third of the Zilla Panchayat Chairman. In
the election of the Zilla Panachayats, nearly everywhere the SP and BSP faced each
other as rivals and nearly every where the BSP was badly mauled.

Against this backdrop, the options open to Kanshi Ram were getting
increasingly limited. Continuing with Mulayam Singh would have meant accepting
the role of the junior partner in the alliance, something which the BSP was loath to
do. On the other hand the BJP felt that if Mulayam continued to remain in power,
their prospects in the politics of Uttar Pradesh would be seriously threatened. The
BJP decided to do something to arrest its agrowing marginalisation in the state
politics. The best way to achieve such an end was to break up the SP-BSP alliance
which had already developed serious cracks.

With the assistance of Jayant Malhotra, the trouble shooter of Kanshi Ram,
BJP managed to develop a contact with BSP supremo to dislodge the Mulayam
Singh. The BSP had begun attacking Mulayam Singh and on one occasion Kanshi
Ram criticised Mulayam Singh bitterly before journalists. After that Mulayam called
on Kanshi Ram in Lucknow on May 23, 1995 to discuss alliance issues but the BSP
leader insisted that they speak in the presence of journalists. Mulayam Singh felt

19. Amaresh Mishra, "Limits of OBC-Dalit Politics", Economic and Political Weekly.
June 10, 1995, p. 1356.
 214

that such a demand was preposterous. He suggested that they hold exclusive
discussions first before appearing at a joint briefing for the press. Kanshi Ram
refiised to oblige and Mulayam Singh was forced to walk-out without any
discussion.^^

From May 24, Jayant Malhotra organised a number of secret meetings

between the BJP leaders and Kanshi Ram at Delhi where the deal was clinched. And
on June 1, 1995 the BSP informed the Governor that it had withdrawn support to
the Mulayam government. It also staked its claim to form a new government with
the assistance of the BJP.2'

After the withdrawal of support to the Mulayam Singh government by the

BSP, a sizeable number of BSP MLA's led by Raj Bahadur, the social welfare
minister in Mulayam's cabinet decided to walk-out of the BSP and threw their lot
with Mulayam Singh. The political situation became highly fluid and it became a
question mark whether Mulayam Singh had actually lost majority in the assembly.
With assurance of support increasing for him, Mulayam Singh asked the Governor
to allow him to test his strength in the assembly. Meanwhile, on June 2, 1995 there
was a scufHe between the supporters of the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj
Party outside the state Guest House in Lucknow where Mayawati was camping.^^
Allegations followed, and a case was built up that the law and order machinery had
broken down and that the state might slide into anarchy if Mulayam Singh was
allowed to remain in office even a single day. Constitutional propriety demanded
that Mulayam Singh be given an opportunity to prove his majority in the assembly.
But Governor Motilal Vora did not feel that way and come to the judgement that
Mulayam Singh had lost his majority and asked him to resign from the Office of the
Chief Minister which Mulayam Singh declined. With his refusal, the Governor
dismissed the government and invited the BSP leader Mayawati to form a new
government.^^ Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of UP. on the same day.

20. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 24, 1995.

21. The Times of India, New Delhi, June 2, 1995.
22. Ibid, June 3, 1995.
23. Ibid.
 215

The dramatic development in UP. had exposed the political opportunism and
ideological bankruptcy which always lay at the heart of the SP-BSP alliance. Elected
with high hopes, after the defeat of the BJP in its area of social and political
concentration by the unique assertion of the Dalits combined with the backward
castes and Muslims, the Mulayam Singh government had come crashing down, not
on any issue of principle, but as a result of the lowest level of political maneuvering.
The BSP which had spared nothing in declaring its opposition to all forms of
Brahmanism and its political representatives such as the BJP, while basing itself
solely on the Dalits who for centuries have suffered at the hands of forces
symbolised by the BJP, had chosen to form the government with the support of the
same forces.^''

Rank opportunism that had led to this new equation was illustrated by the
fact that there was nothing common between the BSP-BJP except their hate for
Mulayam Singh. The BSP had from its very inception fought against the social
order that the BJP sworn by. Dalits had rallied around it because it gave them hope
that it would restore their dignity and would ftght the evil forces of casteism which
planned to re-establish themselves in the garb of "Hindutva". All these things did
not matter for Kanshi Ram and Mayawati whose sole aim was to attain power even
if it be at the cost of whatever semblance of ideology that the BSP had. Their new
found love for each other was nothing more than an alliance to be little and write
off Mulayam Singh.

The much-trumpeted 'Bahujan' ideology, which had made much of achieving

social change through the traditional categories of caste and community and which
had projected itself as an alternative to class-based left parties, stood discredited as
never before as a force representing the interests of the power-brokers and newly-
risen elites from within the Dalits and the backward castes, backed by dubious
figures like Jayant Malhotra and wanting basically nothing more than a place in the
power establishment. Similarly discredited were the attempts to combat
communalism through the so-called 'new phenomenon of backward caste assertion'
and the supposed 'political acumen' of politicians such as Kanshi Ram and Mulayam

24. Amaresh Mishra, "Limits of OBC-Dalit Politics". Op.Cii., p. 1355.

 216

Singh. Both these figures had come to symbolise instead the turning of Dalit-
Backward caste politics into a cynical form of bargaining and manipulation under
which alliances can be struck and broken to gain narrow political advantages.^^

The BSP had by this act not only broken the alliance but also betrayed the
dalits, backwards and minorities of the state. Millions of the people had voted the
SP-BSP combine to power with the hope of building a new society. By aligning
with the BJP, the BSP supremo had not on)y betrayed these peop)e but a)so the
great cause for which they had got together.

Though the immediate blame for breaking up the alliance may rest with the
BSP, Mulayam Singh too has been exposed as a figure who had relied on muscle
power and all the customary machination of ruling class power politics rather than
on people oriented politics to sustain his rule. His region was one in which people's
rights were trampled upon, all notions of socialism were turned upside down.
Welfare schemes were jettisoned in favour of reckless, pro-liberalisation, pro-
privatisation and anti-democratic, criminal tendencies were sought to be
institutionalised. That is why his fall has been met with silence from even his close
allies like the CPI and CPI(M), and the former chief minister was unable to organise
any public protest in his support. Mulayam Singh may give any reasons, but the fact
remains that he felt a victim to the type of politics he had done so much to initiate.^^

The honeymoon between BSP and BJP had ended within a month of the
formation of government by Mayawati. The BJP had began feeling that continuance
of support to the Mayawati government was not yielding the desired result. The
BJP had a tacit understanding with the BSP wherein both stuck opposite postures
only to climb down later, as seen in the episode of Mathura, reservations to
backward Muslims and the Periyar Mela. The alliance of convenience had begun
showing cracks, especially with the reported bid of Mayawati to emerge as a
powerful figure in her own right. This had brought her in to conflict with the state
leadership of the BJP.

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid, pp. 1355-1356.
 217

The BJP began to question her methods of governance. The neglect of

developmental work and her irresponsible attitude began to draw flok from the BJP
leadership. The BJP legislature party leader and former chief minister Kalyan Singh
launched a frontal attack on the government. He was particularly sour at the
government shunting of officers and alleged that transfers had become a racket in
which much money was changing hands. On the other hand, the BSP chief Kanshi
Ram's anti-BJP statements were causing anxiety at the central level. Morever, the
nominations to the Vidhan Parishad, the upper house had become due and it was
feared by the BJP that Mayawati, who were not the member of either house, will
use the opportunity to get herself nominated and then demanded a dissolution in
hope of continuing as a caretaker chief minister till the next elections. This would
have been disastrous for the BJP, what is more the party wanted some of its
nominees in the list of the Vidhan Parishad nominations to which Mayawati was not
willing to accede. Apparently, Mayawati had decided to pursue her political
ambitions without the BJP for the time being, though there were reports that Kanshi
Ram too, in order to forestall Mayawati's swearing in as a caretaker chief minister,
instigated the BJP to withdraw support. He openly criticised the BJP leadership
along Mulayam Singh in a public meeting at Lucknow on the occasion of a much
hyped Periyar Mela.^^ His attack on the BJP who had brought him to the power
showed that Kanshi Ram wanted to have his cake and eat it too. After that the
unholy alliance was on it logical course of falling apart.

Precisely, one month after the BSP's show at Lucknow, the BJP pulled the
rug from under Mayawati's government on October 17, 1995.^^ As it was,
opportunist convenience, rather than a minimum understanding on issues, was the
bedrock of the BSP-BJP alliance which came off precisely, at an opportune moment.

The withdrawal of support from the BSP government by the BJP forced the
Mayawati to resign. The dissolution of the assembly became inevitable because
there was no party or alliance in a position to form another government. But
Governor Motilal Vora in his report on a constitutional breakdown in the State had

27. The Times of India, New Delhi, September 19. 1995.

28. /A/</, October 18, 1995.
 218

asked only for the Assembly suspension presumably anticipating the possibility of an
alternative government being formed on some later stage.

After the suspension of the assembly, major parties like the BJP and the SP
played a dubious role. Both demanded dissolution and holding of fresh elections but
very soon involved in all sorts of legal-extra legal means in order to form a
government. They also tried manipulating the position of the Congress and Janata
Dal for this purpose and at one stage both the parties were hopeful of getting the
support of the Governor. The ESP for its part, was forced with the threat of a
virtual breakup with its MLAs showing an inclination to join whichever party
appeared close to power. There was a virtual state of anarchy with parties claiming
the support of members more than the actual strength of the assembly. Horse-
trading, threats of political violence and factious discord also hung like a shadow on
the fragile environment of the state.^'

The curtains came down on this drama of claims and counter-claims with the
Governor's recommendation to the President for the dissolution of the assembly
when it became clear that no party was in the actual state of forming the
government. Finally the President signed a proclamation dissolving the Assembly on
October 27, 1995.^° The state came under President's rule.

(ii) Thirteenth Vidhan Sabha (1996) Election and Politics in U.P.

The spell of President's rule in Uttar Pradesh was to expire on October 17,
1996 and elections to the assembly were due before that deadline. The way the
secular forces had got together at the Centre after the 1996 Lock Sabha elections to
isolate the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), it was expected that similar attempts
would be made in Uttar Pradesh. But the equations that emerged showed nothing of
that kind. The precise reason for this was surely the individual ambitions and short -
sightedness of leaders like Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshi Ram/Mayawati. The
Bahujan Samaj Party and Samajwadi party did not have any ideological differences.
On the other hand, they would not get together. It was merely on grounds of a clash

29. Amaresh Mishra, "UP. : Opportunity for the Left", Economic and Political Weekly,
November 18. 1995, p. 2410.
30. The Times of India, New Delhi, October 28. 1995.
 219

of personalities. The "Guest House" incident of 2nd June 1995, ruled out any
understanding between the BSP and Samajwadi party. Under no circumstances could
one imagine that Mayawati would have any truck whatsoever with Mulayam Singh
Yadav. The attitude of Mulayam Singh Yadav towards Mayawati was equally
strident.

At the same time there was an alliance between the Congress Party and the
BSP. The Congress which had continuously been marginalised in the politics of
Uttar Pradesh since 1989 general elections decided to ally with the BSP on June 24,
19Q6 when the then Congress President Narasimha Rao and BSP supremo Kanshi
Ram shook hands.^' Congress even acceded to the status of a junior partner in the
alliance and committed itself to project Mayawati as Chief Minister.

On the other hand. Congress was extending outside support to a United

Front (UF) Government at the Centre to which Samajwadi party of Mulayam Singh
Yadav was an important constituent. They could naturally expect that the UF should
reciprocate by extending support to the Congress-BSP alliance in Uttar Pradesh. All
these viz the United Front and the Congress-BSP alliance were all together in
opposing the BJP. But, and this was the joker in the pack, they could not get
together and work jointly.

The Congress President bitterly complained that the United Front by not
joining forces with the Congress-BSP combine, was out to benefit the BJP by
fragmenting the anti-BJP votes. He went on to question the very sincerity of the
United Front much touted plank of "putting down communal forces with all the
might". He further said, "if BJP emerges victorious in UP. the UF should be held
solely responsible". He repeatedly dwelling on the "irony of the situation" said "at
the Centre, they have taken our support to form the government in order to keep
out the BJP, but here in U.P., they are fighting us. Is this the way to keep out the
BJP in UP.?""

In the three-cornered contest the media and the political analysts foresaw
smooth sailing for the BJP. The conclusion was based on the performance of various

31. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 26, 1996.

32. Ibid, Oct. 2, 1996.
 220

political parties in the Vidhan Sabha segments of Lok Sabha constituencies. BJP
candidates had held impressive leads in 235 assembly segments good enough for an
absolute majority. But the results gave the state a hung assembly. For the front
runner BJP, these results were a stunning shock. The fact it could not improve upon
its 1993 tally even by a single seat despite the parting of ways between the SP and
BSP. Its popular vote share infact declined from 33.28 per cent in 1993 elections to
32.4 per cent.^^ The Congress-BSP alliance had certainly helped the Congress to
win 33 seats. The BSP strength had remained almost the same as it was in the 1993
elections. The United Front led by Samajwadi party captured 134 seats, the majoiity
share being contributed by the SP, which won 110 seats. One of the constituent of
the UP, the BKKP of Ajit Singh which contested 41 seats failed miserably ai.
only 8 seats. The myth of BKKP being a strong force in western Uttar Pradesh was
exploded by these results. Similarly, Narain Dutt Tewari failed to impress the people
of Uttarakhand and won not even a single seat in the hills. The Janata Dal, another
constituent of the UF had contested 65 seats and gave its poorest performance by
winning only 7 seats.^^ The main reason of the poor showing was the lack of
cohesion within the United Front. The results only seemed to re-confirm that the
battle in Uttar Pradesh was basically between the BJP, the SP and the BSP

The voters of Uttar Pradesh, more or less conformed to the pattern set by
the people of India during 1996 Parliamentary elections by returning a fractured
verdict. The results of the assembly elections made one thing very clear No single
party, or even a pre-poll grouping/alliance, came anywhere even near having a
majority. The post poll scenario in U.P. has never been so buflfling. The formation
of a government would therefore be a very difficult task. The electorate of UP. has
hardly made a clear choice task. The electorate of U.P. has hardly made a clear
choice from among their political leaders. It would require concession and
compromises on the part of leaders of political parties, which was not within their
capacity, nor indeed would the major political players in Uttar Pradesh show their
willingness to make any sacrifices. The three major ones were Kalyan Singh,

33. Ram Singh and Anshuman Yadav, Op.Cit., p. 186.

34. /6irf, p. 187.
 221

Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati. They were all antagonistic to each other.
Perhaps political instability has become the fate accompli of this development-
starved state. Its six years of turbulence has neither taught a lesson to the politicians
or the voters, and has once again plunged the state into an abyss of political
uncertainty. History had repeated itself in Uttar Pradesh, primarily because the
voter has refused to change the very complexion of the thirteenth Vidhan Sabha.

Soon after the election results were out, an immediate demand was made by
the Congress party that the United Front should support the BSP-Congress alliance
with Mayawati as Chief Minister.^' Their logic was simple. The Congress was
supporting the United Front at the Centre, the UF should reciprocate by supporting
the Congress-BSP alliance in UP. Furthermore, all the secular parties were openly
declaring their commitment for the upliftment of the backwards. An excellent
example would be set by supporting a Dalit as Chief Minister, and that too a
woman. The Congress said the cause of social justice should not be sacrificed
because of individual hatred, which can not solve the national, social malaise. The
party further said, the Congress support for Mayawati was to give symbolic
representation to the Scheduled Castes, particularly women of this class, who had
been under subjugation for more than three thousand years. The party further said
"She (Mayawati) symbolized the Dalit aspiration, we should stand by her."-^^

The logic was extremely sound. It appealed to all political and social
anallrsts. Not totally unforeseen, yet neither fully unexpected, was the
uncc mpromising and rigid stand of the Samajwadi party leader Mulayam Singh
Yadi V. He was not prepared to even consider this possibility. The bitter experience
of 1<|95 was too recent to be forgotten. The BSP and the Congress had withdrawn
supp)rt from the government led by Mulayam Singh in 1995. He was adamant. Any
coali ion involving the BSP, or support by the SP to the BSP, would mean political
harattin for Mulayam Singh in U.P. His workers would revolt and he would not be
able to ke^p them together. Mulayam Singh was not prepared to pay such a heavy
price to install a government which had only one thing in common, namely, being

35. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, Oct. 12, 1996.

36. Ibid, Oct. 14, 1996.
 222

anti-BJP. Even this, in his view was questionable as the BSP had formed a
government in UP. with outside support of the BJP.

In the meanwhile, BSP chief Kanshi Ram demanded that the Congress
withdraw its support to the UF government at the centre, if it did not support
Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh.^' The Congress readily agreed and decided to talk
tough for using the situation to its advantage. The UF, under the Congress pressures
began to mount pressures on Mulayam Singh to go in for a coalition with the
Congress-BSP alliance in order to instal a secular government in Uttar Pradesh.

But the Samajwadi Party Chief Mulayam Singh Yadav was not even ready to
consider of supporting a coalition government led by Mayawati. He said that there
had been no change in their stand on the formation of a secular government. But all
political parties who claim to be secular must write to the Governor dissociating
themselves with the communal forces and urging him not to invite the BJP for
forming the government in UP., before any dialogue could commence with them.^*

Finally, the UF fell on the Mulayam Singh's line and requested the Congress
and BSP to give a written undertaking to the Governor that they would not support
the BJP in forming a government. The steering committee of the UF made it clear
that once this was done all other issues including that of deciding the Chief
Ministership could be sorted out later. The BSP refused to make any such
commitment.

Realizing the personal animosity and the contradiction amongst those who
termed themselves as the secular forces. The BJP had started exploring the
possibility of forming its own government with the help of smaller parties in the
state. The hectic efforts were being made to woo the smaller political parties and
try and break some of the larger political parties. Kalyan Singh afler his unanimous
election as the leader of the BJP legislature party, started looking for friends in
other political parties. He even advise his MLAs to use their contacts and influences
for the said purpose.^'

37. Ibid, Oct. 12, 1996.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
 223

In the meantime the leaders of the BJP asked the Governor to fulfil his
constitutional obligation by inviting the single largest party to form the government
in the state. They were of the view that the Governor has no option but to invite the
single largest party to form the government. The party President even accused the
Governor of failing to discharge his constitutional duty. He said the Governor
should act as per tradition and ask the BJP as it had one more seats than others to
form the government in the state.'*" The BJP president demanded that the
notification with regard to constitution of the U.P. assembly be issued immediately.
He said it was unprecedented that the Governor had neither invited the single
largest party nor set in motion the process of constitution of the assembly even five
days after the election result had been declared. He went on to say the Governor
had made up his mind about not allowing the BJP to form the government. He said
this sort of political discrimination does not befit the high post of Governor.'*^

On the other hand the Governor was thinking differently. In his opinion, the
stability was be the bottomline for inviting any political party to form the
government. He said that the state had suffered tremendously on account of political
instability for the past six years. Hence it was important to assess which political
party would be able to give stability to the state. He further said that as per the
provisions of the constitution, it was the responsibility of the Governor to determine
which party or alliance could provide stability. He said people of the state wanted
stability "I don't know how I will be forgiven of I sworn in a leader who is not able
to prove his government's majority in a matter of day's.'"'^ He said it will be
reasonable for the largest party to at least indicate from where the support was
coming to them. "Merely stating that we will prove it on the floor of the House is
not enough, every one is against horse-trading. Will it not be encouraging horse-
trading?''^-^

However, the Governor said that every situation had its own peculiarities-
no situation is similar-the constitution only says the Governor would appoint a

40. Ibid.
41. rtmes ofIndia. New Delhi, Oct. 16, 1996.
42. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Oct. 11, 1996.
43. Ibid.
 224

Chief Minister. "Rest is only practice." I can only say that I will also exercise my
discretion with utmost objectivity and without any prejudice. He further said "any
party which has the support to provide a stable government which will end for a
reasonable period of time, even if not five years. I will consider their claim and if
there is any justification, I will have no hesitation whatsoever in inviting the leader
of that political party or combination for forming the government. "On my own I
will not extend any invitation to any political party to form the government."*'*

In the meantime, the BJP staked its claim to form the government on 16
October 1996. Kalraj Mishra, President of the state unit of the BJP, along with
former Assembly speaker Kesri Nath Tripathi and Lok Sabha member Satyadeo
Singh called on the Governor to stake their party's claim. They handed over a letter
to the Governor urging him to invite Kalyan Singh, leader of the single largest party
in the newly elected assembly to form a government and they would prove their
majority on the floor of the House.''* Having seen the futility of inviting the single
largest party and the BJP's failure to prove its majority at the Centre, Governor
Ramesh Bhandari posed a very simple question to the BJP leader's as to how their
party would prove majority and from where it could get additional numbers.
Banking on defections, the party of "high morality" could only say that it would
prove the majority if administered the oath of Office and failed to answer the "how"
part of the Governor's question.

Later, the Governor called the major political parties to ascertain their
respective position. While the Congress and United Front delegations rushed to the
Raj Bhawan and informed the Governor about their position. Both of them were
common on one ground that they would not support the BJP. As such they
maintained there was no way that BJP would get a majority without indulging in
horse-trading. Former Chief Minister and BSP leader Mayawati also told the
Governor that there was no question of BSP rendering support to the BJP. Under
the circumstances. Governor Romesh Bhandari was left with no option other than
to recommend the reimposition of President's rule under Article 356 of the

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid, Oct. 17, 1996.
 225

constitution. He also recommended that the newly elected Assembly can be kept in
suspended animation.^^ So that parties could continue to explore the possibilities of
government formation at later stage.

The United Front government was divided when it came to take a decision
on the Governor's report for the re-imposition of President's rule. Home Minister
Indrajit Gupta felt that the BJP ought to be given a chance especially because
constitutional properiety so demanded. But finally the Union Cabinet came to the
conclusion, that re-imposition of President's rule was the only option in the present
circumstances and approved the re-promulgation of President's rule which was
signed by the President within hours.''' The proclamation on October 17, 1996
saved Lucknow from another repetition of the "13-day wonder" experiment in New
Delhi.

Enraged by the Centre's decision to re-impose of President's rule in Uttar

Pradesh, the BSP declared its resolve to "go all-out to bring down the undemocratic
UF government". The effigies of the Governor and Prime Minister were burnt in
front of Raj Bhawan. In a sharp reaction to the development, the BJP termed the
action "a fraud on the constitution and a subversion of democracy."''* The BJP
legislature party leader Kalyan Singh and UP. unit President Kalraj Mishra marched
to Raj Bhawan to hand over a memorandum to the Governor. Kalyan Singh was
most bitter. He described the re-imposition of President's rule as a murder of
Democracy and a conspiracy of the Centre and the Governor. He said, "it was from
day one that the Governor had made up his mind not to invite the BJP." He went on
to allege that "the Governor had no moral right to remain in office. He has played
mischief...".'''

On the other hand, the Congress leadership lashed out strongly at the United
Front government's decision to extend President's rule in Uttar Pradesh. The party
said it was doubtful whether the decision was constitutionally valid. The Congress

46. The Times of India, New Delhi, Oct. 17, 1996.

47. Ibid, Oct. 18, 1996.
48. Ibid.
49. Romesh Bhandari, "As I Saw It", Har-Anand Publications, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 82-83.
 226

spokesman, V.N. Gadgil said, "It was politically wrong and morally unjustified". He
further said that the motive behind the move was not to keep the BJP at bay, but to
prevent "a poor Dalit woman" from becoming Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. He
said there could not have been a great mockery of social justice and empowerment
of women.^'* Having backed Mayawati's candidature for the Chief Ministership as a
symbolic gesture towards the Dalits, the Congress leadership made it clear that it
took a very serious view of the decision of the United Front government. The
Congress President Sita Ram Kesri expressed unhappiness on the decision to extend
President's rule in UP., stating that "democracy should function without any
obstacles". He said the U.F. government had the option of supporting Mayawati and
should have helped her in forming the government in Uttar Pradesh. He said, he was
deeply hurt by the decision of the United Front government.''

Justifying his decision of recommending re-imposition of President's rule in

the state, Governor Romesh Bhandari said that he was neither compliant nor power
hungry as was alleged. He said that the decision to re-impose President's rule was
both painful and difficult for him, "but my endeavour was to provide a level playing
ground to all the political parties with none-given any privilege or advantage". He
further said he was in favour of installing a popular government at the earliest, he
said "if today some leader approached me with the support of 213 legislators I
would hold the swearing in ceremony without any delay".^^ Defending his decision
of not inviting the single largest party in the newly elected assembly to form the
government the Governor said that he had no "reasonable expectation" that the BJP
could prove its majority. Would it have been proper for the Governor to invite the
BJP first and then allow it to muster support, he asked. He said, af^er one week of
the announcement of poll results, the BJP announcing the support of 181 MLAs "I
tried to find out from them as to how they would manage to fill up the gap of 32
MLAs, but they insisted that they would prove the majority on the floor of the
House and did not furnish any list of supporters. Then I contacted the leaders of the
U.F., the Congress and the BSP to find out whether they would support the BJP but

50. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Oct. 18, 1996.

51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
 227

all of them replied in the negative. As such "there were little options left before me
and after consultations with legal experts, I recommended the re-imposition of
President's rule in the state."^-^

After the months of President's rule, the two strange bedfellows of Indian
politics, the BSP and BJP decided to form a coalition Government which ended the
five-months old political stalemate in the state, which returned a hung Assembly in
the October 1996 elections. In a dramatic turn of events the BJP-BSP once again
decided to tying the knot, putting behind them the acrimony that saw their first
'marriage' breakup even before the honeymoon was over. Now two years latter, they
had come together again.

On March 19, 1997, Kanshi Ram and L.K. Advani announced an

extraordinary formula for power sharing in UP. The understanding was that, BSP
General Secretary and former Chief Minister Mayawati would be chief Minister for
the first six months and the BJP legislature party leader and another former Chief
Minister Kalyan Singh for the next six months. ^"^ The deal hammered out by the two
parties provided for equal representation in the ministry. It was also agreed that the
post of Speaker would go to the BJP. The one year experiment did not talk of any
programmes which the coalition would try to implement. Antipathi to Mulayam
Singh was the only common point that brought the two parties together.

This understanding had been kept a closely guarded secret. Discussions

between Kanshi Ram and Atal Behari Vajpayee had been taking place for some
time. An agreement had been reached at the end of February but an announcement
was stalled as the question of a Speaker of the Assembly had still to be finalised.
Both the parties insisted that the speaker would be their nominees Kanshi Ram said
the BSP was the smaller party and as such could only feel secure if it was their
Speaker. But the BJP was not prepared to relent. Kanshi Ram ultimately dropped
this demand. As soon as he had done this, the two parties had decided to go
ahead.'^

53. Ibid.
54. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 20, 1997.
55. Romesh Bhandari, Op.Cit., p. 133.
 228

Soon after the announcement of this novel formula of power sharing by the
BJP-BSP leadership in New Delhi a delegation consisting of Atal Behari Vajpayee,
L.K. Advani, Kalyan Singh and Kalraj Mishra of the BJP and Kanshi Ram,
Mayawati, Barkhu Ram Verma and Bhagwat Pal of the BSP went to the Raj Bhawan
and staked their claim to form a coalition government headed by Mayawati. A letter
jointly signed by Kalyan Singh and Mayawati was handed over to the Governor.
After receiving the letter. Governor Romesh Bhandari invited Mayawati to form the
government. The Governor with the consultations of the delegation fixed March 21,
1997 for the swearing in of Mayawati as the Chief Minister. ^^

Immediately after inviting Mayawati, he send a report to the Centre asking

for the revocation of the President's rule in the State. After receiving the Governor's
report, the Union Cabinet met and decided the revocation of President's rule to
facilitate the formation of a popular government by the BJP-BSP alliance. The
President on the recommendation of the Union Cabinet revoked the President's rule
which was imposed on October 17, 1995. The Governor Romesh Bhandari,
administered the oath of Office and secrecy to Mayawati and her four Cabinet
Ministers - two each from the BJP and BSP. The oath taking ceremony was held at
the K.D. Singh Babu Stadium on 21 March, 1997, which was witnessed by a large
and cheering workers of the parties.^' The swearing-in of Mayawati, ended the 17
months of President rule in Uttar Pradesh.

On 26th March, 1997 the full expansion took place. But the distribution of
portfolios took place a little later. There had been heated discussion on this matter
as both sides wished to have the more important portfolios entrusted to their sides.
Ultimately Atal Behari Vajpayee and Kanshi Ram were able to sort this out
cordially. The understanding was that once the change over took place, the
portfolios would remain as they were. Mayawati kept the major portfolios of
General Administration, Home, Election, Finance, Industrial Development, Civil
Aviation, Appointments, Energy, Information, Excise, health. Education and

56. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 21, 1997.

57. The Hindustan Times, March 22, 1997.
 229

Irrigation with her.'* A new chapter of popular government being installed after a
lapse of almost a year and a half had started.

The leader of the BJP legislature party, Kalyan Singh was bitterly opposed to
this arrangement. His grave apprehensions were that the BSP would use the BJP,
and then discord the party after Mayawati had achieved her objective and taken the
fullest advantage of her tenure as Chief Minister. The Central leadership of the BJP
finally prevailed upon Kalyan Singh. The BJP had its own reasons for going in to
such coalition. Even five months after the assembly elections, the BJP had still not
been able to break away sufficient number of MLAs from other parties to be able to
reached the magic figure of 213. All the pressures exerted on the Governor, through
the media and otherwise, to give them an opportunity to form a government being
the single largest party had failed. The BJP wanted power at all cost. Their MLAs
were getting restless. They did not wish to go back to the electorate. At the same
time, the RSS-mind and soul of the BJP had their own calculations. According to
them, if the BJP was to have any hope of coming into power at the Centre, they
must secure the support of the Dalits. If an experiment of an alliance with BSP
could succeed in UP., they could have it extended to other states as well. On its
own merits alone, it would be enough to have an alliance in U.P. by itself With the
assured BSP vote bank, which is transferable, the BJP could sweep the polls in UP.
be it for the Assembly or Parliament. It was an alliance which would be well worth
trying out.'^

On the other hand, the past experience of the BSP with BJP had also not
been very pleasant. They had been betrayed only a couple of years earlier by the
BJP. It was therefore most unusual and unexpected that the BSP would again rely
upon the BJP. But the BSP had many compulsions. The party did not wish that
President's rule should continue. Unless some understanding could be reached, the
state would have to go back to the polls. Their MLAs did not wish that. Further,
President's rule with the UF at the Centre, would be an advantage to the UF,

58. Romesh Bhandari, Op.Cit., p. 137.

59. Ibid,^. 139.
 230

principally Mulayam Singh Yadav. The party did not wish either. There was,
therefore, a common compulsion for both the parties to come together.

By the end of August 1997, the political situation in U.P. started to hot up
Mayawati had some apprehensions about Kalyan Singh. She felt that he was not
dependable. Mayawati was aware of the fact that Kalyan Singh had opposed the
BSP-BJP alliance tooth and nail and that he had been overruled. He had been
sulking ever since Mayawati was sworn in and may wish to embark upon a path of
seeking revenge, or trying to undo all that Mayawati had done when he become
Chief Minister. She was not too happy at the prospect of handing over charge. Yet,
her public posture was exemplary. The change over would be smooth. The BSP
would respect and faithfully implement their agreement with the BJP.

On the other hand, Mayawati was very satisfied with the cooperation she
was receiving from the BJP members of her council of Ministers, particularly Kairaj
Mishra and Lalji Tandon, who had made her his 'Rakhi Sister'. They were in favour
of a flexible stand towards BSP but Kalyan Singh was very rigid. His view was that
the image of the BJP had taken a severe beating. Their traditional vote banks had
become disillusioned and were tending to drift away. For him, keeping the party
together was the most important objective. He felt that the BJP had compromised
enough and any further giving in would be disastrous. At the same time he fully
realised that unless the BJP was able to take over power on 21st September, 1997,
and then take the necessary steps to restore the image of the party and rectify ail
damage that had been done, the BJP would have lost on all counts. The coalition
agreement with the BSP would have only given advantage to the BSP. If the BSP
did not hand over power, the BJP would suffer even a further setback.

Already, some issues had surfaced which could lead to a collapse of the
BSP-BJP coalition. The major ones were that along with a change of Chief Minister,
there should also be change in the Speaker. The second, though not expressed
openly, was that the BJP Chief Minister should not be Kalyan Singh, but anyone
else. The other issues were an assurance that the BSP policies and programmes
would be continued and not diluted in any way, after the BJP took over the Chief
Ministership. The BJP leadership appeared to be divided on these matters. A section
 231

was ready to accommodate the BSP as far as possible. But other section led by
Kalyan Singh was opposed to any concessions at all.

The issue in regard to the change of Speaker soon became public. Kesri Nath
Tripathi, the Speaker of the U.P. Assembly made a very strong statement that he
would not resign under any circumstances regardless of the outcome of the talks
between the Central leadership of the alliance.^" He thought it would be a slur on
his reputation, namely that he might not be objective in dealing with matters which
came before him. He would not let the dignity of the House to be compromised.
The battle lines were now very clearly drown. Whether there would be a change in
the Speaker or not, was the main issue Mayawati was firm about the demand for a
change of the Speaker along with the change of the Chief Minister. She opined that
it would be injurious to the interests of the BSP, if the BJP Speaker remained
unchanged. The main argument of the BSP leaders was that being the smaller
partner in the coalition, there was a greater danger of the BJP trying to break the
BSP then the other way around Mayawati asserted that her party did not want to
break the six-month old alliance with the BJP, nor did it have any quarrel with
Speaker Kesri Nath Tripathi. It was the non-cooperative attitude of Kalyan Singh
over the last six months which forced us to seek a change of Speakership for fear
that Kesri Nath Tripathi may be pressurised by Kalyan Singh and misused the office
of the Speaker.^' Mayawati was very critical of the role played by Kalyan Singh
during the budget session of the assembly. She said "not only did Kalyan Singh not
cooperative with us to the desired level, but he also created difficulties for us by
issuing statements against the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act." On the said ground she said "we feared that after taking over as
the Chief Minister, he may try to engineer defection in the BSP and other parties. "^^

Intensive discussion took place between the central leadership of the alliance
to resolve the sensitive issue. In the initial stage, there was an impass and it
appeared that the coalition would break. But lastly, the coordination committee

60. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 10, 1997.

61. /A/</, Sept. II, 1997.
62. The Times of India, New Delhi, Sept. 11, 1997.
 232

worked out the modalities for the coalitions once again. A public announcement
were made by the BJP leadership that it would not encourage 'defections'. The BJP
would not change officers except those in regard to whom it became necessary for
functional reasons. All the policies of the BSP would be pursued without dilution.
The Speaker would act with full impartiality and no effort would be made to break
the BSP and to try and form a government on their own. In a joint statement BJP
President L.K. Advani and BSP chief Kanshi Ram "unequivocally" rejected the
politics of "horse-trading, sheep-steaVmg and withdrawal of support at convenient
time". The two leaders declared they believed in "honest coalition formed in open
agreements and based upon mutual respect."^'

After getting full assurance from the BJP leadership that the letter and the
spirit of the understanding reached between the two parties would be observed
faithfully and honestly. Mayawati started to prepare herself for the change over.
During the last six months, she had kept a large number of portfolios with her. Now
she started to divest some of these and gave them to BSP Ministers. On 20th
September 1997, she formally handed over her letter of resignation to the Governor
along with another letter stating that Kalyan Singh would be the new Chief
Minister." The Governor immediately accepted the resignation of Mayawati and
invited Kalyan Singh to form a new government. He was sworn in as Chief Minister
on September 21, 1997.^' j ^ ^ ceremony was organised at the K.D. Singh babu
Stadium in the same manner as it was done when Mayawati took over as Chief
Minister.

No sooner had Kalyan Singh taken over, trouble started with the BSP. One
of the first acts of the new Government was to issue a Government order, popularly
referred as a GO, wherein all district authorities were directed to see that there was
no abuse of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act. The provision of this Act are very severe. Punishment is required to be quick
through special courts. This ranges from imprisonment for a term of not less than

63. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Sept. 15, 1997.

64. /A/V/, Sept. 21, 1997.
65. Ibid, Sept. 22, 1997.
 233

one month and not more than six months for rather minor offences. The GO was
issued the day after Kalyan Singh was sworn-in, namely on 22nd September 1997.^^
It stated that the State Government was committed to stop crimes against the
members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. At the same time it was the
intention of the State Government to ensure that the provisions of the SC/ST Act
are not misused. It stated that such cases of abuse had occurred in the recent past.
The district authorities were told that before registering cases these should be
carefully examined.

This had infuriated Mayawati. She criticised the Chief Minister Kalyan Singh
for the GO he had issued. It implied that what she had been doing was arbitrary and
loaded in favour of the SC/ST. Mayawati had dubbed her successor as "Kalyan
Singh Yadav" with the explanation that he was talking the "anti-Dalit language" of
Samajwadi party President Mulayam Singh Yadav.^^ She demanded that similar
instruction be issued in regard to the Arms Act and the Excise Act where she said
that the Dalits were beings discriminated against.

Trouble started to brew on the law and order front. An incident occurred on
the 7th October 1997 in a village called Rohana in Muzaffarnagar. A number of
villagers belonging to the Scheduled Castes had been killed as a result of firing
having been ordered by the Police against a gathering which had got together to
protest on some issue. The incident has perceptibly widened the rift in the ruling
coalition in U.P. Mayawati's close confident and Minister in the Kalyan Singh
Government, Nasimuddin Siddiqui severely criticised the Chief Minister Kalyan
Singh after the spot visit. The fuming BSP Minister have put the blame on the anti-
Dalit policies of the Kalyan Singh led government.^* At this time both Mayawati
and Kanshi Ram were in the South. They immediately returned and visited Rohana
and saw all that happened. The two of them made very strident statements against
the BJP. Kanshi Ram said that he would throw the BJP into the ditch.^^ The BSP

66. The Times of India, New Delhi, Sept. 23, 1997.

67. The Hindustan Times, Sept. 23, 1997.
68. Ibid, Oct. 8, 1997.
69. Romesh Bhandari, Op.Cit.,p. 191.
 234

leaders complained the 20 major cases of atrocities on the Dalits in UP. had been
reported during the three-weeks rule of Kalyan Singh. They described the
Muzaffarnagar killings as a fallout of the controversial GO issued by the Kalyan
Singh government to check the misuse of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

After this incident, Kalraj Mishra who is known to be close to Mayawati

became belligerent. He criticised Nasimuddin Siddiqui for his critical comments and
said that the Nasimuddin, as a Member of the Cabinet, had broken the tradition of
collective responsibility. He said the BSP minister is misleading the people as part
of the BSP's efforts to portray the BJP as anti-Dalit. He further said that the
coalition could not continue like this. If the BSP wished, they could break the
alliance. He said "They will enjoy the facilities of Ministership and at the same time
abuse our Chief Minister. This could not go on. They will have to choose whether
they (the BSP) want to remain in the Government or not."^® The minister also
targeted former Chief Minister Mayawati, saying that cases of Dalit atrocities were
abundant in her regime also. But a government should be judged by its action in
such cases. He deplored the BSP leadership for not reciprocating the cooperation
the BJP had given to Mayawati when she was the Chief Minister.

In just over three weeks, since Kalyan Singh took over, the relations had
soured to an extent that differences appeared to have become irreconcilable.
Continuing with the BJP was becoming a major problem for Mayawati. She was
being attacked personally on the grounds of corruption. Her ministers were
dissatisfied as transfers of Officers were taking place without their consent. Her
Mulsim MLA's were feeling shaky as the alliance with the BJP could well mean that
they would not win again. There was dissatisfaction in the BSP camp. But Kanshi
Ram had a different perception than Mayawati. He was looking at the interests of
BSP from a national angle. With all the alliance he had forged in the past, most of
which had soured or been unsuccessful, he apparently realised that he could
became a political outcast if he was seen to have broken the alliance with the BJP.

70. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Oct. 11, 1997.

 235

Meanwhile, a meeting of the coordination committee of the alliance were

held on October 12, 1997, to sort out the differences arrived between the alliance.
The meeting described as crucial for the survival of the Government and the
alliance, ended with a mollified Behenji addressing her successor as "Kalyan Singhji
Bhaisahib". But infact, the maximum the BSP leadership could extract from their
counterparts was an assurance that Kalyan Singh would consult the BSP Ministers
before making any administrative change in their respective departments. In return
the BSP leaders made two commitment, first, that the BSP leaders Kanshi Ram and
Mayawati-would not dub BJP as anti-Dalit and second, the Ministers would not
make any public utterances against the Chief Minister.''

Mayawati was expected to mellow down her attack after October 12, meeting
between the top leaders of both the parties. But defying all such expectations she
lambasted the BJP-especially Chief Minister Kalyan Singh on October 15, 1997 for
"completely ignoring" the atrocities on the Dalits. She minced no words while
attacking the BJP for 'encouraging atrocities against Dalits in Uttar Pradesh' by
bringing out a GO on name to curb the misuse of the SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act. She warned the BJP in no uncertain terms, asserting that "we want
to continue the coalition government, but the BSP will not remain a mute spectator
if atrocities on Dalits continue at this rate. We will not wait for long.'^ She said
Kalyan Singh's talks of curbing the misuse of the Act, on the other hand, his entire
government machinery is now misusing the Government Order (GO) to encourage
atrocities on the Dalits. She even went a step further and alleged that Kalyan Singh
and Mulayam Singh were 'anti-Dalits', and had been opposing the SC/ST Act in one
voice. She said "during my regime when the Act was being used in the interest of
the oppressed, both Kalyan Singh and Mulayam Singh Yadav kept complaining of
its misuse. She blamed the BJP for hatching a "conspiracy and misusing the Police
and administration" against the Dalits. "The BJP and SP want to demoralised the
Dalits so that whatever awareness we have created amongst them, is eroded and the
oppressed sections can once again be used to serve the interests of the "Manuwadi
forces,'^ Mayawati Charged.

71. /6;</, Oct. 13, 1997.

72. Ibid, Oct. 16, 1997.
73. Ibid.
 236

The BJP leadership took the very strong note of the Mayawati outburst on
the Chief Minister and the party. Raj Nath Singh, the President of the BJP Uttar
Pradesh Unit strongly condemned the BSP and Mayawati who were dubbing Kalyan
Singh and BJP as Anti-Dalit. He said that neither the BJP nor the Chief Minister
needed anybody's certificate in this regard. One should not forget that the maximum
numbers of SC/ST and Dalits MPs, MLAs and MLCs were from the BJP.''' He said,
even if the BSP withdraw support, the Kalyan Singh Government would survive. He
said, being the single largest party, the BJP would immediately stake claim to form
the Government in the case of coalition fails and the Governments falls. Within five
days of calling the truce, the ruling parties in U P . , have once again locked homes.
Both targeted each other while issuing wiled threats of pulling out of the coalition if
"things went out of control." An infuriated Kalyan Singh issued a statement in
which he said "we have to stand on our feet without crutches. He said during the
last few days the BJP workers have suffered lot of humiliation "Walls have been
painted blue against me, you know there is little difference between blue and the
black - the black which depicts the 'virodh'.'^

Chinks in the BJP-BSP coalition government deepened further, as the BSP

Ministers boycotted the Cabinet meeting summoned by the Chief Minister Kalyan
Singh on October 18, 1997.'^ The decision to boycott the Cabinet meeting was
taken by the BSP Ministers on the directives of the party President Kanshi Ram and
former Chief Minister Mayawati. The Ministers got in touch with the party leaders
soon after the Cabinet's agenda was circulated. The Cabinet meeting was, however,
held as scheduled minus the BSP Ministers and reversed many decisions taken by
Mayawati Government in the last six months.

The 29-day-old political drama in Uttar Pradesh reached a climax with the
reversal of some decisions taken by Mayawati in her six-months tenure as Chief
Minister at a Cabinet meeting chaired by Chief Minister Kalyan Singh himself on
October 18, 1997. On the very next day of the Cabinet decision, the coalition

74. The Times of India, New Delhi, Oct. 17, 1997.

75. Ibid, Oct. 18, 1997.
76. Jbid, Oct. 19, 1997.
 237

collapsed with the withdrawal of support by the BSP from the governments^
Mayawati along with the BSP Ministers, MLAs and MLCs met the Governor
Romesh Bhandari and handed over a letter stating the she was withdrawing support
from the BJP and demanded that the Assembly should be dissolved and President's
rule imposed. She listed out all the reasons which had forced her and her party to
having to take this hard decision. She alleged in her letter that the BJP had violated
all the assurance given to the BSP. In fact, Kalyan Singh Government had done
every thing to hit at her personally and to destroy the BSP, she said in her letter.

After the announcement of Mayawati's withdrawal of support to the Kalyan

Singh Government, hectic political activities started on the rival camp. Kalyan Singh
along with Raj Nath Singh, President of the BJP, U P . unit and two of his Ministers
met the Governor and handed over a letter, in which he requested that even though
the BSP has withdrawn support, as prescribed under a court judgement, he should
be provided an opportunity to prove his majority on the floor of the Assembly.
Other political parties- the SP, the Congress, BKKP, the Janata Dal, the Left parties
- also met the Governor and demanded immediate dismissal of the Government and
the dissolution of the Assembly, apprehending that continuance of Kalyan Singh
Government would lead to horse-trading and intimidation of the MLAs. However,
Governor Romesh Bhandari, after studying all the pros and cons asked the Chief
Minister Kalyan Singh to prove his majority on the floor of the Assembly on October
21; 1997.''*

Frantic efforts by the BJP to mobilise majority support for the crucial
trial of strength on the floor of the Assembly paid dividends, when 19
Congress MLAs formed the 'Uttar Pradesh Lok Tantrik Congress' under the
leadership of Naresh Aggarwal.^' The group was immediately accorded recognition
by the Speaker of the Assembly Kesri Nath Tripathi. The group decision to support
the 30-day old Kalyan Singh Government had turned the table in favour of the Chief
Minister Kalyan Singh.

77. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Oct. 20. 1997.

78. Ibid.
79. Ibid, Oct. 21, 1997.
 238

The BJP won the vote of confidence in the State Assembly amidst
unprecedented violence and walkout by the opposition MLAs. The day turned out
to be the blackest day in the history of the U.P. Assembly. The opposition had come
prepared to defeat the government even after the split in the Congress and the
Janata Dal. They were, however, in for a rude shock when they saw BJP benches in
the Assembly overflowing with non-members as alleged by the Congress legislature
party leader Promod Tewari. He was quick to bring this to the Speaker's attention.
When he was ignored, he felt compelled to walk towards the well of the House. The
treasury benches were up in arms at that and there was a scufHe which culminated
in violence which is unprecedented. The conduct of the electoral representatives put
the entire state to shame. *° The victory of the confidence vote, as declared by the
speaker as 222 in favour of the motion come under suspicion.

The Governor Romesh Bhandari in these circumstances recommended to the

Centre for the imposition of the President's rule in the State along with the
dissolution of the Assembly.*' Given the background of the UP. events the Cabinet
sent the recommendation to the President. The heat which the issue had generated
in the media prompted the President to ask the cabinet to reconsider its decision.
Many in the Government saw this as a rejection of its advice, and developed cold
feet. A fidgety Prime Minister, backed by the people who had no idea as to what
was happening in UP., took the decision not to again recommend imposition of
President's rule in the State. Kalayan Singh was allowed to stay on. The BJP
celebrated its 'victory' with the expansion of its ministry on October 27, 1997.*^ The
ethics for which it had been crying hoarse were thrown to the winds and all the
defectors (22 from Congress, 12 from BSP, 3 from JD) irrespective of their
antecedents were made Ministers. History-sheeters overnight became the law-
makers in Uttar Pradesh. The jumbo sized ministry turned out to be the largest ever
in any state in India Kalyan Singh government had survived constitutionally but at
what cost to the morality of politics.

80. /A/rf, Oct. 22, 1997.

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid, Oct. 28, 1997.
 239

A careful analysis of the second phase of coalition politics shows how

important the caste factor has been in the State politics of Uttar Pradesh. The
implementation of Mandal Commission report opened a new chapter in Indian
politics. It gave birth to a strong political leadership who were heavily backing on
the support of Backward communities. At the same time another development took
place in Uttar Pradesh when the Dalits got united under the leadership of Kanshi
Ram. The Congress party which ruled the state for almost four decades was heavily
dependent on the Dalits. As long as they were with Congress, the party remained in
power. With the failure of the Congress to keep its traditional votes bank - Dalits,
few new forces emerged to replace the Congress hegemony i.e. backwards led by
Samajwadi party of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kalyan Singh of BJP and Dalit led
by Kanshi Ram's ESP. But the animosities between Dalits and backwards did not
allow them to come closer for a long time. In 1992 an attempt was made by
Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram to bring the backwards dalits on one platform to
fulfill the dream of their mentor philosopher i.e. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and Dr.
BR. Ambedkar respectively. But these two communities could not unite for long
time due to their traditional animosity with each other. These two could not remain
closer because it was the backward who were seen by Dalits as their immediates
suppressor and perpetuater of atrocities on them. Dalit were somewhat comfortable
with upper caste because they did not see them as their direct and immediate
enemy. This led them to forge an alliance with the BJP. This alliance were also
ended on the same reasons. In the fall of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Mayawati and
Kalyan Singh government, the caste factor worked heavily. Although the immediate
political benefits brought the backward and Dalits several time together but the
traditional casts rivalries did prevent the emergence of strong and durable alliance in
Uttar Pradesh combining the backwards and Dalits.
CONCLUSION
 240

India is a vast country inhabited by people of different races, speaking

different languages, having many religions who are further divided into various
castes, and sub-castes. Some of the ethnic, linguistic and religious groups have a
concentration of populations in certain areas which they identify as their own. They
are primarily interested in the economic development of their own region and the
same time want to preserve their distinct cultural identities. All these economic,
political and cultural factors have combined together giving birth to regionalism
which appears in various forms, without disturbing the national concept.

At the centre of regionalism is a deep sense of self identity, which is as real

and as dear to a people as their feeling of identity with a nation, state, linguistic
group or religious group. Regionalism is in fact a conflict between national elites
and regional elites and in some cases between regional elites and sub-regional elites.
A regional movement which is the manifestation of regional interest is an attempt
by regional and sub-regional elites to acquire larger support so that they could
increase their competitive strength vis-a-vis the national elites.

The development of regional feelings in India goes back to British rule. The
various Acts of the British Government had planted and sustained the regional
feelings. It could perhaps be traced to the centralization of power during the British
Empire and its consequent delegation to regional middle classes. The growth of
pan-Indian forces also saw the growth of regionalism in India - for both implied
participation of large and hitherto static masses in the new political development. If
the horizontal process of mobility led to the national movement of freedom, the
vertical process completed to a large extent the attitudinal integration of the growth
of linguistic middle classes. The process, however, acquired caste overtones in the
South, while in the North, it was expressed either in the Hindu-Muslim antagonism
or linguistic antagonism. In all cases, however, language or community or caste
remained at periphery as cultural factors, for these factors has already assumed
economic dimensions.

At the thrust of regionalism the caste has always been a dominating factor.
Due to the advantage of modern education, economic impediments and eariy
exposition to social change, the upper caste particulariy the Brahmin occupied the
 241

important position in both administration as well as in the national struggle for

freedom. It was an all India phenomenon when a minority group in the society starts
to play dominating role in the socio-political system of a society, the majority group
or groups feel sour of that and attempt to surpass them by adopting counter moves
and try to legitimise their aspirations through a number of variables such as language
and culture. With the increase in levels of literacy and economic appliances they
aspire and attempts to move vertically. To fulfill their demands they even try to
collide with the ruling stratum and search for new identities.

The Indian national Congress has also been held equally responsible for
arousing regional sentiments in India. The urge of the Congress to organise the
country on linguistic basis since 1905 down to its 1948 Jaipur session made the
growth of regionalism easier. However, the trauma of partition of the country on
the basis of religion restrained the Indian National Congress for the time being to
held up the idea of linguistic states in the larger interests of the nation. The
creation of first linguistic state of Andhra Pradesh in 1953 set a chain reaction for
demands of linguistic state. In the said circumstances, the Indian National Congress
in January 1953 at itsfifty-eightsession at Hyderabad recommended the division of
India on linguistic basis. Accordingly, the Government of India constituted States
Reorganization Commission in 1953 itself which submitted its report in 1955.
However, the Government enacted and implemented States Reorganization Acts to
meet the regional aspirations of the people. So the history of the movement for
linguistic states indicates that the largest and most influential party in the country
i.e. Indian National Congress, had been giving support to regional sentiments.

The regional feeling in India can be witnessed in different part of the country.
In South India two strong currents of regional sentiments are seen, one in the form
of Dravidian movement and another veered round the Telugu language. The
Dravidian movement began with more of its emphasis on anti-Brahminical culture
rather than the region. The caste factors which was witnessed elsewhere in India
also provided a platform for political movement. Thus beginning with caste politics
Dravidian movement was latter on transformed in to a political agitationfightingfor
the cause of local autonomy and restoration of English as national language.
Dravidian movement witnessed various change in its programmes in the course of
 242

its agitational politics. Emanating from the casts system they began demanding a
separate sovereign republic for their own. But with the change of time, they
changed not only their agenda but also the tactics. Because they come to realised
that they would be in a better bargaining position if they start participation in
electoral politics. The change in their style and tactics yielded positive resuhs. In
the 1967 general election, DMK the flag bearer of the Dravidian movement emerged
with absolute majority in the Assembly which was certainly a reflection of massive
mass support they have mustered during their course of movement. Their
participation in the main stream politics and their test with the political power in the
State gradually subsided the movement.

Unlike Dravidian movement, the Andhra regionalism never claimed as a

separate nationality or an identification outside the national framework of India.
Their regionalism is only a projection of the lov* for their language and opposition
towards domination and big brother approach of Tamil speaking people. The
Andhra regionalism was based on the cultural variables such as language and culture
and aimed to acquire its due place in India as the second biggest 'language group of
people after Hindi'. As far as the Telangana movement is concerned, it was purely a
case of sub-regionalism based on the fear of domination over them by more
developed Andhras. The overall effect of this sub-regional assertion in regional
politics added a new dimension to the already complex Indian politics, a dimension
which rejected both region and language as the basis of political re-organisation and
projected the significance of 'cultural uniformity' and 'historical identity' as the only
criterion of a political existence.

The regionalism in Punjab is based on a ruthless pursuit of self identity and

self fulfillment by the Sikhs. Therefore the regionalism in Punjab is characterized as
communal and ethno-centric. The separatist tendencies in the Punjab traces the
genesis and nature of Sikh community which claims itself a nationality on historical,
religious and linguistic grounds, the fear of the possible disintegration of the
community resuhing from religious unorthodoxy and a sense of grievance over
alleged discrimination against the Sikh community. This prompted them to place the
demand for a separate state 'Azad Punjab' as a device to save the Sikhs culture and
religion. Freedom and independence also failed to solve the problem of Sikh
 243

community. They however, could not hide for a long their quest for religious,
linguistic and cultural identity. This marked the emergence of a new type of
regionalism in Punjab with communal overtones. Akali Dal, the sole representative
of Sikh community has played very dominating role. To achieve its objective, the
Akali Dal adopted all possible means and tactics including constitutional and
otherwise. These tactics paid dividend. Finally, the demand for a separate Punjab
Suba on the basis of language was conceded in 1966. The creation of Punjabi Suba,
to a large extent did satisfy the ego of the Sikhs for a separate entity which not only
helped them in holding political power but also in protecting the Sikh 'Panth'.

The regionalism in Maharashtra embodies two important phase, the first

phase was purely based on language. The Marathi speaking areas (Vidarbha and
Nagpur) was part of the British central province which was dominated by the Hindi-
speaking people. Both Vidarbha and Nagpur provincial Congress committee
demanded a separate Marathi speaking province from the central province's
Vidarbha division and the four districts of its Nagpur division. A number of
organization was formed in the region for the said purpose. Prominent among them
were the Maha Vidarbha Samity, Samyukta Maharashtra Sabha and Samyukta
Maharashtra Parishad. These organisations were represented by both Congress and
non-Congress leaders and intellectuals. The leaders of the movement met and
presented their case and evidences before the Dar commission, the JVP committee
and the S.R.C. without any success.

In a conciliatory move the Union Government decided in 1956 to form a big-

bilingual state. But the supporter of Samyukta Maharashtra was not satisfied with
this formula and they formed their separate organization Samyukta Maharashtra
Samiti. The movement for Samyukta Maharashtra became an affair of the opposition
parties the Samiti received a massive support in Marathi speaking areas while
Congressmen due to their ambivalent posture were regarded as traitors by the
people. After the defeat in 1957 general election primarily in western Maharashtra
districts, the leaders of Maharashtra Congress became more outspoken in their
demand for dissolution of the bilingual Bombay State. They revived their efforts to
convince the party High command of the necessity of formation of unilingual
Marathi speaking State. Ultimately, the Congress Working Committee had to
approve the bifurcation. The Bombay Reorganization Bill was accordingly passed
 244

by the Parliament and the Marathi speaking state with Bombay as its capital was
inaugurated at the hands of Prime Minister Pt. Jawahar Lai Nehru in May 1960.

With the formation of state of Maharashtra with Bombay city as its capital,
Marathi people achieved their long cherished goal of Samyukta Maharashtra.
However, the sense of fulfillment of the cherished goal did not last very long and it
gave birth to the second phase of Marathi regionalism in the form of Shiv Sena. The
Shiv Sena agitation set an example of protective and militant regionalism based on
the 'Sons of the soil' theory. It was a protest by the natives against their economic
exploitation by the migrants which has not only hampered their own progress but
also resulted in the cultural contamination, which they fear would cloud their own
identity.

The turmoil in North-East are the offshoot of the 'Sons of the soil' theory
Neither the British nor the Indian government paid due attention towards the tribal
upliftment and integrating or assimilating into the socio-economic and political
mainstream of India. The planner and administrators did not pay desired attention to
the infrastructure and its systematic growth. The North-East have some similar
problems. The biggest common problems seem to be neglect, non-recognition of
their aspiration, non-recognition of their rights to protect their own identity and
heritage, the fear that they are being treated as inferior to the rest of India and too
much interference by the Union Government in the affairs of these territories.

Regionalism in the North-East is primarily a protest by the natives against

their economic exploitation by the Bengali migrants, which has not only hampered
their own progress but also resulted in the cultural contamination, which they fear
would cloud their identity. This explain the frequent flare-up between the natives
and the migrants. Apart from this, the infiltration of large number of foreigner has
also added to economic plight and cultural agony of the North-Eastern people. The
first phase of regionalism in North-East saw the carving out of several hill states.
The second phase witnessed the linguistic movements. The latest phase is directed
against heterogeneity caused by the infihration of foreign nationals on a mass scale.
The suitable economic and political reforms for all round economic development
and strict vigil over the borders is perhaps the best remedy for North-East malady.
 245

Regionalism in Hind-belt is some what different from other parts of the

country, it could be rather put in the category of sub-regionalism. Basically it is a
movement by sub-regional elites for the assertion of sub-regional identity based on
common history and grievances emanating from an under developed economy of the
region and an anxiety for a proper share in political power and this led to upheavals
and movements for separate states.

The demand for Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal), Bundelkhand and Poorvanchal

etc. in Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand (Vananchal) and Mithlanchal in Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Baghelkhand and Godvana in Madhya Pradesh and Brij Pradesh in Rajasthan is
basically an outcome of the economic and political neglect by their respective
governments. The case of Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal) and Jharkhand (Vananchal) are
the best example of discontent bom out of sheer negligence. Both the region are
very rich in natural resources which were exploited by the respective state
governments but little was done to improve the social and economic status of the
local people who become impoverished.

Due to the said reasons the people of Uttarakhand (Uttaranchal) and

Jharkhand (Vananchal) are fighting for a separate state for themselves in which they
could ensure the all round development. The lack of political will among the political
parties has prevented from taking a firm decision on their demand. The union
government due to the lack of political consensus with held the creation of
Uttarakhand and Jharkhand. Inspite assurance and commitment shown by various
political parties and central government, their objective still appears to be a distant
dream.

The problem of regionalism has posed a serious threat towards political

stability in India. People affiliation to the parties who aspire their interest of either
their own region or community, has given the birth to many political parties. The
emergence of regional parties can also be attributed to the fact that after Jawahar
Lai Nehru, the Congress party failed to maintain a balance between different regions,
community castes, class and cuhural groups. Though failure of Congress provided
strong incentives for the emergence of different political parties who had their base
in particular region.
 246

Although political destablisation seems to be recent phenomenon but its

origin can be traced from the very beginning of the emergence of independent India.
The Indian National Congress, which functioned as a broad based nationalist
movement before independence, transformed itself into a dominant political party of
the nation. We find all shades of ideological group in the Congress. Every group
have different approach towards the social and economic development of the nation.
Under these circumstances, political contention was internalised and carried on
within the Congress. The politics in the Congress more and more revolved around
personalistic group of factional politics because with no issues of substantial
imoortance left after the departure of the Socialist and the defeat of the Hindu
revivalist to fight about. Factionalism existed in the Congress before independence
alongside a politics of issues. But after independence, politics of personalities and
factions have come to dominate the internal affairs of the Congress.

But during the first two decade after independence the Congress party
remained unchallenged in Uttar Pradesh. Although there were several political
parties like Jana Sangh, Communist party, Praja Socialist party, the Socialist party,
Swatantra party and the Samyukta Socialist party who played the role of opposition,
but due to their weak numerical strength and their influence in some particular
region or caste either of them independently or collectively could not emerge a
force to be reckoned till the fourth general election, when for the first times a non-
Congress coalition government were installed, and that too due to the defection in
the Congress party.

The coming of non-Congress parties at the helm of affairs in 1967 is a

turning point in the history of Indian politics as it gave birth to hitherto a new
concept coalition government. The coalition become inevitable because though the
opposition parties succeeded to defeat the Congress at the hustings, but individually
d.d not muster enough strength in the state legislature to form their ov.n
governmem. But the non-Congress parties, who had come to power on the basis of
anti-Congressism agenda, could not last for a long because of severe internal
differences. They had been united to oust the Congress rule but failed to keep this
un,ty to run the government. Once the Congress was ousted their ideological
differences suddenly erupted to the extent of their formal disintegration. However ]
 247

this short lived coalition government had been a trend setter in Uttar Pradesh,
because this experiment was again and again repeated in Uttar Pradesh. A cursory
look at the political development in Uttar Pradesh would demonstrate how the anti-
Congressism could not be translated into stable non-Congress rule. Several times
the non-Congress parties got united under the different banner to oust the alleged
corrupt and ineffective Congress government from the state. But utterly failed to
provide a stable political alternative.

The second phase of coalition politics in Uttar Pradesh started in 1990's. In

1992 a new factor entered into political arena of state politics. The historical Babri
Mosque was razed to earth on 6th December 1992, giving birth to a new political
alignment. Non-Hindutva and secular forces in Uttar Pradesh under the leadership
of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshi Ram got united to fight unitedly against the
communal forces in the state and take common cause of backwards, untouchables
and minorities. This brought a new ray of hope for all these downtrodden section of
society which had been formed to endure unjustification hard ships down the ages
for no fault of theirs. The Muslims whose identity was at stake after the demolition
of Babri Mosque, to some extent feh at ease due to new coming support from
backwards and Dalits, who had also been sufferer at the hands of "Manuvadi"
forces.

For the first time in the political history of independent India an attempt was
made to form an alliance or front between the two age old hostile group, who were
now out of their shell to fight against the communal and oppressive forces. This
new born alliance yielded in to spectacular victory in 1993 Assembly elections with
176 seats. The Congress party which had ruled the State around four decades
performed very poorly / all time low and could back only 28 seats. Although this
time the BJP managed to remain the single largest party in the State Assembly with
177 seats. But its efforts to formed the government were thwarted by the non-BJP
parties including the Congress who consented to support the SP-BSP combine. As
expected this new born coalition could not survive beyond one and half year. The
growing differences between the SP and BSP finally led to BSP's withdrawal of
support from the government on June I, 1995.
 248

After the fall of Mulayam Singh, Mayawati the leader of the BSP managed to
became Chief Minister with the outsides support of BJP. The BJP had no other
option but to support the Mayawati to disintegrate the Dalit-Backward alliance
which could have really posed a serious challenge to its political survival. The BJP's
support to Mayawati accelerated the fall of new born alliance, and the BJP were
fmally succeeded in their strategy to keep away these two forces.

This development had exposed the political opportunism and ideological

bankruptcy which always lay at the heart of the SP-BSP alliance. Elected with high
hopes by the unique assertion of the Dalits combined with the backward castes and
Muslims, the first non-Congress non-BJP coalition government had come crashing
down, not on any issue of principles but as a result of the lowest level of political
maneuvering. The BSP which had spared nothing in declaring its opposition to all
forms of Brahmanism and its political representatives had chosen to form the
government with the support of the same forces.

Though the immediate blame for the breaking up the alliance may rest with
the. BSP, Mulayam Singh too had been exposed as a figures who had rallied on
muscle-power and all the customary machination of ruling class power politics
rather than on people oriented politics to sustain his rule. His regime was one in
which people's rights were trampled upon, all notion of socialism were turned
upside down, criminal tendencies were sought to be institutionalised. That is why
his fall has been met with silence and he was unable to organise any public protest
in his support. He may given any reason, but the fact remains that he felt a victims
to the type of politics he had done so much to initiate.

The relationship between the BSP and BJP developed strained within a month
of the formation of the government by Mayawati. The BJP had realised that
continuance with Mayawati would damage its own political prospect in the state.
The BSP-BJP alliance was nothing in common except their hate for Mulayam Singh.
This alliance was purported to achieve short term objective i.e. to bi-furcate the
growing alliance between Dalits and Backwards, which was not in any way fruitful
for its own prospects. So the withdrawal of support from Mayawati was neither
based on any firm ideological ground or any sever dispute over policies and
 249

programmes of the government. This represents the sheer political opportunism of

the political parties.

The fall of Mayawati government resulted in political anarchy in the States.

Every political party on the one hand demanded the dissolution of the Assembly and
imposition of President's rule and on the other started maneuvering to form the new
government with whatever means available or possible at their disposal. The political
morality reached to its nadir that even one or two MLA's were claiming to form the
government in the State. This was a brazen mockery of democracy ever witnessed
in Indian politics. MLA's belonging to several party's were ready to changed their
loyalties in overnight, to any how capture the power. This high level drama finally
came to an end with the declaration of President rule.

The President's rule continued for more than one year. Because in 1996
Assembly election, no political party was again in a position to form the government
on its own. The bitter experience of 1993 and 1995 alliance was too fresh that the
main political players in Uttar Pradesh politics was not ready to inter into an
alliances once again for the forming of the new government. Perhaps political
instability had became the fate-accomplai of this development starved state. Its six
years of turbulents had neither taught a lesson to the politicians nor the voters, and
has once again plunged the State into abyss of political uncertainty. History had
repeated itself in UP. Primarily because the voters had refused to change the very
complexion of the 13th Vidhan Sabha. The failure on the part of the political parties
to reach and agreement had slipped the State once again in the era of political
uncertainty.

Within few months of President's rule, the anti-pathy against Mulayam Singh
once again brought together the two strange bed fellows of Indian politics - the
BSP and the BJP. This time they came with an extraordinary formula of power
sharing - rotatory Chief Ministership. But devoid of any concrete programmes for
the development of the State.

How so ever novel was the formula of power sharing, it could not satisfied
the power hungry politicians of the State. The cracks started appearing in the
alliance immediately after the government formation. The leader of the BJP
 250

legislature party Kalyan Singh and Chief Minister Mayawati both were critical to
each other. However, the political deliberation and understanding of the national
leaders of the two party's were able to continue the alliance. Mayawati after
completing her six nionths tenure as agreed upon resigned and facilitated Kalyan
Singh coming in to power. Although, Mayawati had herself proposed the name of
Kalyan Singh as the next Chief Minister, she was not happy with him. She was in
search of an opportune time to pull down the support from Kalyan Singh. The first
Act of the new government to issue direction to all district Magistrate to see that
SC's and ST's (prevention of Atrocities) Act was not misused, irked Mayawati and
the incident of police firing at Rohana Village in MuzaflFar Nagar district where
seven Dalits were killed further infuriated Mayawati. Both Kanshi Ram and
Mayawati made very strident statement against the BJP which had further widened
the gape between them. The relation had soured to an extent that differences
appeared to have become irreconcilable. Chinks in the coalition depend further, as
the BJP ministers boycotted the crucial Cabinet meeting in which the Cabinet
reversed many of the decision taken by Mayawati government during her regime.
This was the last knill in the coffin and consequently the BSP withdraw its support
from Kalyan Singh government but the BJP leader Kalyan Singh proved more
smarter than Mayawati as he managed to ensure the confidence of the Assembly
with the defection he engineered not only in the BSP but also in the Congress and
Janta Dal. The day turned out to be the blackest day in the history of Uttar Pradesh
Assembly. The conduct of the electorate representative put the entire State to
shame. The BJP which was claiming to be a party of principle and the ethics for
which it had been crying hoarse were thrown to the winds and all the defectors
irrespective of their antecedents were made Ministers. History-sheeters over night
became the law-maker in Uttar Pradesh. Kalyan Singh government had survived
constitutionally but at what cost to the morality of politics.

A careful analysis of political alignment, re-alignment, disintegration,

extension and withdrawal of support determine how important the caste factor has
been in the State politics of Uttar Pradesh. The implementation of Mandal
Commission report opened a new chapter in Indian politics. It gave birth to a strong
political leadership who were heavily backing on the support of Backward
 251

communities. At the same time another development took place in Uttar Pradesh
when the Dalits got united under the leadership of Kanshi Ram. The Congress party
which ruled the state for almost four decades was heavily dependent on the Dalits.
As long as they were with Congress, the party remained in power. With the failure
of the Congress to keep its traditional votes bank - Dalits, few new forces emerged
to replace the Congress hegemony i.e. backwards led by Samajwadi party of
Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kalyan Singh of BJP and Dalit led by Kanshi Ram's
BSP. But the animosities between Dalits and backwards did not allow them to come
closer for a long time. In 1992 an attempt was made by Mulayam Singh and Kanshi
Ram to bring the backwards dalits on one platform to fulfill the dream of their
mentor philosopher i.e. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and Dr. BR. Ambedkar
respectively. But these two communities could not unite for long time due to their
traditional animosity with each other. These two could not remain closer because it
was the backward who were seen by Dalits as their immediates suppressor and
perpetuater of atrocities on them. Dalit were somewhat comfortable with upper
caste because they did not see them as their direct and immediate enemy. This led
them to forge an alliance with the BJP. This alliance were also ended on the same
reasons. In the fall of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Mayawati and Kalyan Singh
government, the caste factor worked heavily. Although the immediate political
benefits brought the backward and Dalits several time together but the traditional
casts rivalries did prevent the emergence of strong and durable alliance in Uttar
Pradesh combining the backwards and Dalits.
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 252

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