Light Humor and The Dark Underside
Light Humor and The Dark Underside
Light Humor and The Dark Underside
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Culture
"It may be Life, but it's not Art" is the implicit and fre
quently the explicit argument put by the American satire of re
alism at the turn of the century.4 This is an argument which
draws behind it two corollaries: first, that there is an entity, Life,
which is "dull, amoral, lacking in heroes, excessively detailed"
and so on; and second, that the function of Art is not to repro
duce reality but rather to refurbish it, to improve on Life, to
supply interest, morality, heroes, clarity of signification and hi
erarchies of meaning, and generally to be edifying. Art, that is,
was that which transformed Life, while Realism reproduced it.
By the 1920s the situation had altered radically. Real
ism—by this time taken to be represented by the work of Hem
ingway—had become centred as Literature; Art, accordingly, was
being displaced, marginalized, its transformative function re
duced to the skillful editing and revision of Life for the popular
press. Art could, of course, still mean and be used interchange
ably with Literature; but a new, reductive meaning of Art was
emerging, a meaning which drew on the old associations of Art
and craft or skill, and which might well have developed along
side, and in the service of, the simultaneous perception of a split
in culture between high culture and popular culture. This sec
ond, degraded sense of Art was, then, lined up against both Life
and Literature in a manner typified by P. G. Wodehouse in his
literary instructions to William Townend:
cial codes. The Code of the Woosters, the code of the preux cheva
lier, the code of "the unwritten law" and the "gentleman's
agreement"—even "honor among thieves"—these constitute the
rules/roles which preempt much of the need for characterization:
decision-making and motivation are minimized; as Bertie
Wooster invariably points out, one either is or one is not a preux
chevalier. So far as villainy goes, it is simply beyond the pale of
characterization. "You must not", Wodehouse pointed out "take
any risk of humanizing your villains in a story of action. And
by humanizing I mean treating them subjectively instead of ob
jectively" (Performing Flea, 21). To treat a (non-professional) vil
lain subjectively is to risk moving out of the area of coded be
havior into that of ethical decision. In Pigs Have Wings Sir Gre
gory Parsloe is permitted reflections on the arduousness of his
diet, the appropriateness of his romantic connections and the
health and security of his pig. But the rationale behind his code
breaking behavior lies outside the discursive range of the novel.
The codes themselves are typically from sources as diverse as
Kipling and Oklahoma! and the less distinguished of the Victorian
songbooks. They are given to characters with the appropriate
generic affiliations and carry all the irresistible force of an ex
ternal event.
Like the characterization, the discourse of Wodehouse's fic
tion is largely a composite of undisguisedly borrowed models
(including received Wodehouse-isms) delivered through citation
and mimicry. Such is inevitably the case insofar as "baffled
Baronet" is as much a component of style as of characterization;
but the technique is arguably the most prominent feature of
Wodehouse's style. It is on the level of style, for example, that
the "high culture" borrowings "squash in" most observably with
the popular culture material. Consider Sir Gregory Parsloe dis
cussing his diet:
can't expect happy endings in real life"; "don't wait for a knight
in shining armor to turn up"—all this is patently true because
Life isn't Art. And because Life isn't Art any attempt to
change it, to rewrite in practice "human nature" or social rela
tions is clearly and repeatedly diagnosed as "unrealistic." Con
servative anti-realism associated itself with "natural" dissatisfac
tions—lack of social or economic or emotional fulfillment; the
"human condition" in general—dissatisfactions which it simul
taneously naturalizes and assuages with the artificial but inno
cent and well-earned "binges" of comedy. What happens on
these binges is that the consolations of stereotyping and codified
behavior are applied to the reader worn down by a life which is
"dull, amoral, lacking in heroes, excessively detailed" and, in
short, unreadable. That is, while the text entertains it also natu
ralizes Life as a sort of anti-text from which only the naive will
expect clarity in the versions they are able to make for them
selves of themselves and of the situations which structure their
lives. By not just unrealizing the text but by strategically signi
fying unrealism, anti-realism brings out the cynicism, the expec
tation of dissatisfaction, which is the latent underside of wish
fulfillment. The more insistently the Utopian fantasy is fore
grounded, the more insistently Life lurks in the wings. The
Thurber text is actually about this syndrome; it crops up occa
sionally in the work of Benchley and Perelman; and once a
"real-life" coincidence drove Alexander Woollcott out into the
open:
But more often the little piece poses itself as a site at once
of entertainment and anxiety, the very thing for the sickbed or
the dentist's waiting room or the Depression:
Ainslee
Australian Capital Territory
Australia
NOTES
"Alexander Woo
Penguin, 1934), p.
14Philip Melling
Genre, " Approa
Popular Press, 197
15Cecil Smith,
1950), p. 351.
l6Weales, 245.