THE ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

Basic Writings in Transcendental

Phenomenology

EDITED BY DONN WELTON

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bloomington and Indianapolis
© 1999 by Indiana University Press

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Husserl, Edmund. 1859-1938.

[Selections. English. 1999]
The essential Husserl : basic writings in transcendental
phenomenology/ edited by Donn Welton.
p. cm. - (Studies in Continental thought)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-253-21273-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Phenomenology. I. Welton, Donn. II. Title. III.
Series.
B3279.H92E52 1999
193-dc21 98-34973
1 2 3 4 5 03 02 01 00 99
 Studies in Continental Thought
John Sallis, general editor

Consulting Editors
Robert Bernasconi William L. McBride
Rudolf Bernet J. N. Mohanty
John D. Caputo Mary Rawlinson
David Carr Tom Rockmore
Edward S. Casey Calvin 0 . Schrag
Hubert L. Dreyfus tReiner SchUrmann
Don Ihde Charles E. Scott
David Farrell Krell Thomas Sheehan
Lenore Langsdorf Robert Sokolowski
Alphonso Lingis Bruce W. Wilshire
David Wood
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Vil
INTRODUCTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY
BY DONN WELTON ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xvii

PART ONE: CONTOURS OF A TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

I. ANTITHESES
1. The Critique of Psychologism 3
Normative and Theoretical Disciplines 3
The Arguments o f Psychologism 5
The Prejudices o f Psychologism 9
2. The Critique of Historicism 22
Philosophy as Rigorous Science 22

II. PHENOMENOLOGICAL CLUES

3. Expression and Meaning 26
Essential Distinctions 26
Fluctuation in Meaning and the Ideality o f Unities o f Meaning 39
The Phenomenological and Ideal Content o f the Experiences o f Meaning 48
4. Meaning-Intention and Meaning-Fulfillment 52

III. PHENOMENOLOGY AS TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

5. The Basic Approach of Phenomenology 60
The Natural Attitude and Its Exclusion 60
Consciousness as Transcendental 66
The Region o f Pure Consciousness 79

IV. THE STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONALITY

6. The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 86
Noesis and Noema 86
The Question o f Levels 96
Expressive Acts 100
Noema and Object 102
Horizons 108

V. THE QUESTION OF EVIDENCE

7. Varieties of Evidence 113
8. Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 121

VI. FROM SUBJECTIVITY TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY

9. Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 135
Primordial Abstraction 13 5
The Appresentation o f the Other 146
vi CONTENTS

PART TWO: TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE

PROBLEM OF THE LIFE-WORLD

VII. TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETICS

10. Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 163
Objective Reality, Spatial Orientation, and the Body 163
The Self-Constitution o f the Body 17S
11. A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 186
Analysis o f the Consciousness o f Time 186
Levels o f Constitution o f Time and Temporal Objects 212
12. Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 221

VIII. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICS

13. Formal and Transcendental Logic 234
The Discipline o f Formal Logic 234
Formal Logic as Apophantic Analysis 24S
The Transcendental Grounds o f Logic 2S9
14. Individuals and Sets 272
Explication o f Individuals 2 72
Constituting Sets 279
15. Universals 282
The Constitution o f Empirical Universals 282
Eidetic Variation and the Acquisition o f Pure Universals 292
16. The Genesis of Judgment 300

IX. STATIC AND GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY

17. Time and the Self-Constitution of the Ego 307
18. Sta tic and Genetic Phenomenological Method 316

X. TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE WAY THROUGH THE

SCIENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
19. Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 322
"Phenomenology'" 322

XI. TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE WAY

THROUGH THE LIFE-WORLD
20. The Mathematization of Nature 337
21. Elements of a Science of the Life-World 363

BIBLIOGRAPHY 379
INDEX 383
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Gratefui acknowledgment is made to the fol- translated by James S. Churchill and Karl
lowing publishers for permission to reprint Ameriks. ©1973 by Northwestern University
works by Edmund Husserl in this anthology: Press.
Kluwer Academic Publishers for selections Routledge & Kegan Paul for selections
from Cartesian Meditations, translated by from Logical Investigations, translated by J.
Dorion Cairns. © 1960 by Kluwer Academic N. Findlay. © 1968 by Routledge & Kegan
Publishers; Formal and Transcendental Logic, Paul.
translated by Dorion Cairns. © 1969 by Kluwer University of Notre Dame Press for "Phi-
Academic Publishers; Ideas Pertaining to a losophy as Rigorous Science," in Husserl:
Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenologi- Shorter Works, edited by Peter McCormick
cal Philosophy, First Book, translated by Fred and Frederick Elliston. © 1981 by University
Kersten. © 1982 by Kluwer Academic Publish- of Notre Dame, Ind.
ers; Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenol- I am greatly indebted to Anthony Steinbock
ogy and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, for his help in selecting the materials to be in-
Second Book, translated by R. Rojcewicz and cluded in this collection, to Gina Zavota and
A. Schuwer. © 1989 by Kluwer Academic Pub- Lanei Rodemeyer for their help with the task
lishers; On the Phenomenology of the Con- of editing and preparing them for publication,
sciousness o f Internal Time (1893-/9/7), trans- and especially to Lanei Rodemeyer for her skill
lated and edited by John Barnett Brough. and exceptional dedication to the task of proof-
© 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. ing and indexing this volume. The reader
Northwestern University Press for selec- should understand that they were more than
tions from Crisis o f European Sciences and assistants and were collaborators in this project,
Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by for without their special contributions this col-
David Carr. ©1970 by Northwestern Univer- lection would not be what it is.
sity Press; and Experience and Judgment,
INTRODUCTION
The Development o f Husserl's Phenomenology

From what rests on the surface one is led into the depths.
-Husserl (1936) 1

As we look back upon the course of Con- ing manuscripts (some forty thousand pages)
tinental philosophy in the twentieth century, in which we find him building, and then re-
there is one work, a work which introduced building, the very foundations upon which
a novel conception of the relationships be- his phenomenology stands. In many ways, he
tween language and experience, meaning and remained a fellow traveler of seminal think-
reference, and subject and object, that stands ers along the winding course of philosophy
at its threshold. This work established an open- throughout the century. Perhaps this is why, as
ing that would eventually take philosophy be- we read him today, we sense that he is our con-
yond the older, tired alternatives of psycholo- temporary.
gism and formalism, realism and idealism, While there have been translations of indi-
objectivism and subjectivism. Its efforts to in- vidual volumes for some time. this collection
tegrate a theory of meaning with one of truth, is the first anthology in English of Husserl's
a theory of the subject with one of the object, major writings. It is designed to be a first read-
turned philosophical thought in a direction er. providing access to the scope of his philo-
that it had not envisioned. ln this sense we sophical studies. Though it concentrates on
might say that this work made twentieth-cen- materials that he published. it also contains ex-
tury Continental philosophy possible. The new cerpts from some of the works that remained
work was Edmund Husserl's Logical Investi- in manuscript form. This introduction will not
gations, published in two vo.lumes in the years attempt to provide a systematic analysis of ei-
1900 and 190 I,' and the opening it created was ther the specific ideas or the method of Hus-
called phenomenology. serl's phenomenology as a whole. That task,
If the Logical Investigations established a made unusually complicated by the existence
new opening for Continental philosophy. the of his manuscript materials. has been done in
course of Husserl's own thought, culminating a volume that one might consider a compan-
in his last work. The Crisis o f European Sci- ion to this collection. 1 Here I will restrict my-
ences and Transcendental Phenomenology, self to a brief historical sketch of Husserl's
imaged its movement. He progressed from career in order to explain why I have includ-
foundational studies in mathematics and log- ed the texts that I have and why I have placed
ic. through a phenomenology of intentional them in the order found here.
acts. to a reframing of his phenomenology as
transcendental, and, finally, into a diachronic.
I
dynamic phenomenology of phenomena, well
beyond the scope of his synchronic. structural Husserl was born on April 8, 1859, in ProB-
account. Disciplined yet restless in his think- nitz in Mahren. He began his university stud-
ing. he would often move beyond what he dis- ies with three semesters in Leipzig but then
covered before it was solidified and brought spent six semesters in Berlin. where he stud-
to publication. Behind the published works ied mathematics and philosophy. attending
there is a rich profusion of lectures and work- lectures by the mathematicians Karl Weier-
X INTRODUCTION

straB and Leopold Kronecker and by the phi- Husserl began to rethink both the content and
losopher Friedrich Paulsen. 4 He then moved the methodological framework of his theory
to Vienna, where he completed his doctoral of intentionality. The changes took place gradu-
dissertation, Beitriige zur Theorien der Varia- ally in his lectures during this period, finding
tionsrechnung, in 1882. After another year in their first published formulations in his Ideas
Berlin (with WeierstraB) and military service, Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
he attended lectures by Franz Brentano in Phenomenological Philosophy, Book 1: Gen-
Vienna. As a result, he decided to devote him- eral Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology
self to the study of philosophy. At the recom- (1913). 9 This was to be followed by two other
mendation of Brentano, he moved in 1886 to volumes, but they remained in manuscript form
Halle an der Saale to do his Habilitation with and were not printed during his lifetime. We
Carl Stumpf. 5 He concentrated on the intersec- now know them as Book 2: Studies in the Phe-
tion of philosophy and mathematics, writing nomenology o f Constitution (first published in
his Habilitation dissertation, Ober den Beg riff 1950), 10 and Book 3: Phenomenology and the
der 'Zahl, on the concept of number. Four years Foundations o f the Sciences (first published in
later he published his first book, Philoso- 1952). 1 1
phie der Arithmetik, 6 in which he attempted to In Ideas I Husserl introduced needed modi-
ground certain basic concepts, such as mani- fications into his theory of intentional acts.
fold, unity, and number, in a descriptive, psy- He argued that their structure consists of an a
chological analysis of acts. 7 Husserl remained priori correlation between what he called noe-
in Halle as a Privatdozent until the publica- sis and noema (Section IV). In addition, he
tion of his Logical Investigations, in which he stressed the importance of securing different
turned from questions of mathematics to issues kinds of claims through various types of evi-
in logic and developed his groundbreaking dence (Section V, Selection 7) and continued
theory of intentionality. Altogether, he spent to employ his crucial distinction between sen-
fifteen years in Halle. suous and categorial intuition developed in
Husserl's critiques of psychologism (Selec- the Investigations (Selection 8), a contrast that
tion 1), developed in the Investigations, and Heidegger valued above all others in Husserl. 12
historicism (Selection 2), published nine years During his years at Gottingen, he further ex-
later but very much a part of his thinking in panded the scope of his interests, devoting ex -
this first period, open this collection (Section tensive lectures and manuscript studies to
I). "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (Selec- new problems, in particular to a phenomenol-
tion 2) also sketches Husserl's concept of phi- ogy of time and space. These studies, for rea-
losophy as a strict discipline; its developed sons I will indicate in a moment, belong to Part
form promised to dispel the fog of ungrounded 2 of this collection. At the same time, he also
philosophical speculation and place thinking became convinced that phenomenology could
on sure foundations. This promise opens the become philosophy proper only if it became
question of what should be our point of access transcendental, as Kant had taught. Rejecting
to philosophical analysis. Husserl's own path the hypothetical, deductive approach of Kant
in his First Investigation (Section II, Selection and the Neo-Kantians, however, he developed
3) was through an analysis of signs, in particu- his famous theory of the transcendental reduc-
lar of expressions, and of the way in which their tion, using Descartes to give insight into how
meaning can be connected to intentional acts, the region of pure consciousness could be se-
an idea he developed further in the Fifth and cured as the absolute and irreducible founda-
Sixth Investigations (see Selection 4). 8 tion for philosophical analysis (Section III).
Husserl's first formulation of the reduction
was Cartesian, as he came to put it, and thus
II faced the threat of solipsism. Husserl attempt-
After the publication of his Investigations ed to handle this problem within the scope of
and his move from Halle to Gottingen in 1901, the Cartesian program by developing a theory
INTRODUCTION XI

of intersubjectivity consistent with its start- ing, with all the humanly possible expendi-
ing point. The result is what we find in the ture of energy, only for my posthumous
now famous Fifth Meditation of his Carte- works. 10
sian Meditations 13 (Section VI). The introduc-
tion of the idea of transcendental intersubjec- This anthology is organized from the per-
tivity gave Husserl a notion commensurate with spective of Husserl's belief that phenomenol-
the concept of the world, which he already un- ogy is systematic in nature. From this perspec-
derstood in Ideas I in terms of the notion of tive we can say that the foundations discovered
horizons (Selection 6, Horizons). Though it is in Ideas I turn out to be provisional, being
a later text published in 1931, the Fifth Medi- themselves in need of deeper grounds. Part 2
tation is best understood, I would suggest, as of this collection is designed both to reflect
employing what Husserl calls "static analysis," Husserl's effort to complement his earlier
an idea I will introduce momentarily. synchronic, structural phenomenology with a
genetic analysis, his first Cartesian way with
III other "paths" into transcendental analysis, and
to follow Husserl as he expanded his initial
In 1916 Husserl assumed a post as full notion of the world with his important concept
professor (Ordinarius) in Freiburg, where he of the life-world. His "systematic" reflections
taught until his retirement in 1928. After the not only required a transcendental grounding
personal and political difficulties of the first to logic, the program of both Ideas I and For-
World War, Husserl envisioned writing a ma- mal and Transcendental Logic, 17 but also at-
jor work on the system of phenomenology. At tempted to situate within that ground an ex-
the level of method he began to distinguish panded transcendental aesthetics (Section VII)
between what he called static and genetic before the transcendental analytics, which it-
phenomenology (Selection 18), and to differ- self grounds logical reason (Section VIIl). 18 In
entiate various paths or ways into the tran- other words, he developed not just a certain
scendental reduction. In 1922 he wrote to protologic to his logic, but also, within that pro-
Adolf Grimme that "this year was a time of tologic, a difference between a transcendental
great interpretative reflections [Besinnungen]. analysis of different types of what he called
I thought through yet a final time { sic J the "passive" syntheses (Section VII) and that of
principle, basic ideas and lines of direction of different types of "active" syntheses (Section
phenomenology." 14 Four years earlier he had VIII). Some of the selections in Part 2 deep-
even written to Paul Natorp that "for more than en the content of Part I - a s in the analyses
a decade I have already overcome the stage gathered under Section VIII-and some extend
of static Platonism and have framed the idea it into new areas-as in his treatment of the
of transcendental genesis as the main theme body, time, and perception in Section VII. As
of phenomenology." 15 In another letter to Na- a whole, however, they reconstruct the ground
torp in 1922 Husserl spoke of both the upheav- upon which the studies in Part I stand.
al in his thinking and the frustration of bring- The "recrystallization" of Husserl's thought
ing his new ideas to publication: in the early 1920s, first of all, cast his earlier
studies in a new light. His important theories
I am in a much worse situation than you be- of spatial orientation and the body (Selection
cause the greatest part of my work is stuck I 0), which were first developed between 1907
in my manuscripts. I almost curse my inabil-
and 1912, contribute to our understanding of
ity to bring my works [mich] to an end, and
the inescapable background of all speech and
that first quite late, partly only now, the uni-
versal, systematic thoughts have come to me, understanding. They also account for the in-
which, though demanded by my previous, terconnection between motility, action, and
particular investigations, now also compel conscious life, a nexus richly explored by Mer-
me to rework them all. Everything is in the leau-Ponty in his Phenomenology o f Percep-
stage of recrystallization! Perhaps I am work- tion. 19 Husserl's earlier studies on the con-
XU INTRODUCTION

sciousness of time (Selection 11 ), which he this text is especially valuable in outlining the
expressly eliminated from consideration in range of issues and areas that are to be cov-
Ideas I, become part of an analysis of how our ered by genetic analysis.
experience of perceptual objects involves a Husserl was asked to write an article on
process and is built up over time. The distinc- phenomenology for the Encyclopaedia Britan-
tion he makes between retention and recollec- nica, which appeared in 1927. His efforts to
tion, on the one hand, and protention and ex- co-author it with Heidegger led to exchanges
pectation, on the other, contributes much to of manuscripts but ultimately came to naught.
our understanding of how the present spans The occasion, however, did produce a short,
what is past and what is future, and how pres- dense summary of Husserl's own approach
ence includes absence. Husserl extensively about 1925, and a clear case of an "indirect"
reworked his theory of the consciousness of way (in contrast to the "direct" way of his first
time in 1917 and 1918, as he was speaking to Cartesian approach) in which Husserl em-
Natorp of "transcendental genesis"; but these ployed an existing science as his "guiding
texts are still being prepared for publication. 20 thread" into the realm of transcendental phe-
It will be interesting to see how they compare nomenology. In this article (Selection 19) he
with his first theory. chose psychology and used its differences
The second result of Husserl's recrystalli- from transcendental phenomenology as a way
zation was to introduce a new and richer theo- of clarifying both disciplines.
ry of perception, which integrated the account The way through psychology, however,
of horizons into an account of phenomena, brought with it a new threat of psychologism
and which partially replaced his earlier form- at a deeper level, namely transcendental psy-
content scheme with a theory of interlocking chologism. Husserl thought he could over-
aesthetic syntheses. 2 1 Anthony Steinbock has come the danger, but he eventually found that
provided a translation of a sample from Hus- this way was not as productive as ones that
serl's important lectures from 1920-1926 on use other regional ontologies or the notion of
the analysis of passive synthesis (Selection the life-world as their leading clue. The final
12). 22 readings are from his last work, The Crisis o f
The outlines of what Husserl thought about European Sciences; they employ a genetic
the relationship between formal and tran- analysis, expanded by the concept of history,
scendental logic in general (Selection 13), and in an effort to understand the development
about the constitution of individuals, sets, and of the concept of nature in the physical sci-
universals in particular (Selections 14 and 15), ences at the beginning of the modem age (Se-
are captured in Section VIII. His theory of ei- lection 20), and to frame an alternative ap-
detic variation (Selection 15) has been of value proach to the world, employing the concept of
in a wide range of disciplines. This is another the life-world, one of the most important and
case where a notion used in his earlier writ- fruitful ideas in all of Husserl's writings (Se-
ings, that of eidetic intuition, is reconstructed lection 21).
in an effort to do justice to the diachronic pro-
cess of constitution involved.
IV
Husserl's attempt to connect time to the
self-constitution of the ego gives us unusual Husserl labored with exceptional energy
insight into what he meant both by the ego between 1918 and 1936. As we look at the con-
and by genetic phenomenology (Selection 17). tent of Husserl's ongoing studies, we can see
This selection is complemented by a sketchy, that the expansion of his phenomenology
working manuscript, also translated by An- through the genetic method facilitated the de-
thony Steinbock, devoted expressly to the velopment of rich theories of perception, ge-
distinction between static and genetic method netic logic, cultural renewal, the life-world,
(Selection 18). While not easy to interpret, and history. Ongoing efforts to bring his new
INTRODUCTION XIII

ideas to publication, however, met with fail- were developed not in print but in his lecture
ure time and time again. One very brief and courses given between 1920 and 1926 and in
programmatic essay, the Encyclopaedia Bri- countless working manuscripts composed be-
tannica article, did reach the public in 1927 tween 1918 and 1937. Of course, an anthol-
(see Selection 19), but there was a gap of some ogy of this kind, designed to introduce the
sixteen years between Ideas I and Formal and reader to the broad range of Husserl's writ-
Transcendental Logic ( 1929). Even at that, the ings, cannot do justice to his published works,
latter was yet another "introduction" that did let alone these manuscripts. But this collection
not apprise the reader of the full scope of the does include translations of a lecture manu-
changes in Husserl's thought, though it did script (Selection 12) and a working manuscript
contain new ideas on the grounds of logical (Selection 18), both previously unpublished
reason (Selections 13 and 16), and clear indi- in English translation, from the early 1920s.
cations that Husserl had progressed beyond In addition, Selections 10, 20, and 21 contain
the method of Ideas I in his understanding of manuscript materials. Fortunately, there is al-
the genesis of logical formations. Two other ready a translation of Phenomenological Psy-
works published around this time also failed chology, 27 a lecture course given in 1925, and
to alert the public to the most recent develop- forthcoming translations of two additional
ments in his understanding of phenomenol- courses: Analyses Concerning Passive Synthe-
ogy. The bulk of his Phenomenology o f the sis, given three times between 1920 and 1926,
Consciousness o f Internal Time ( 1928), 23 while and First Philosophy, given in 1923 and 1924.
moving into an area of study excluded from One would hope that this anthology will give
consideration in Ideas I but essential to genet- the reader the sources necessary not only to
ic analysis, consisted of older materials writ- understand the main contours of Husserl's tran-
ten between 1905 and 1909. The Cartesian scendental phenomenology and to glimpse
Meditations, published only in a French trans- how that phenomenology deepened as it dealt
lation in 1931, 24 introduced an important ex- with the problem of the life-world, but also to
pansion to his constitutive phenomenology, situate the forthcoming translations of these
as we see in Section VI. But it was deemed lecture courses from the 1920s.
unsuitable for a "German" public and, after Except for correction of obvious errors and
several attempts to rework the materials, it regularization of minor discrepancies in punc-
was finally abandoned. Husserl had also tuation and spelling, the selections published
worked with Ludwig Landgrebe on the text of in this anthology have not been changed from
Experience and Judgment ( 1938) 25 during this their original translations. Creating a uniform
period; using manuscripts from as far back terminology for some key terms throughout
as about I915, he concentrated, as he had in would have made for greater consistency, but
Formal and Transcendental Logic, entirely on requirements of the copyright holders pre-
a genealogy of logic (Selections 14 and 15). cluded this. Cross-references by Husserl and/
Husserl finally left the Cartesian Meditations or his editors to his own texts are preserved
in the hands of Eugen Fink 26 and Experience only if they refer to a text in this collection.
and Judgment in the hands of Landgrebe as All square brackets "[ ]" in the text indicate
he turned to the text that we know as The Cri- translator's insertions; all angle brackets"<>"
sis, a project that occupied him until his death indicate editors' interpolations. Critical appa-
in 1938 but was not published until some four- ratus and many of the translators' comments
teen years later. from the sources reprinted here have not been
As a result, a number of Husserl's new ideas included, except in the case of Crisis.
xiv INTRODUCTION

Notes nomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-

phie, vol. 2: Phiinomenologische Untersuchungen
1. Edmund Husserl, Die Kris is der europiiischen zur Konstitution, ed. Marly Biemel, Husserliana,
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phii- vol. 4 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952); Ideas
nomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phiino- Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phe-
menologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel, nomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies
Husserliana, vol. 6 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, in the Phenomenology o f Constitution, trans. Rich-
1954), p. 366; The Crisis o f European Sciences and ard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, Collected
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Works, vol. 3 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub-
Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr lishers, 1989).
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 11. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phii-
1970), p. 355. nomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
2. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, phie, vol. 3: Die Phiinomenologie und die Fun-
2 vols. (Halle a.d. Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1900 and damente der Wissenschaften, ed. Marly Biemel,
1901). The second edition appeared in 1913 and Husserliana, vol. 5 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1921. Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd rev. ed., 2 1952); Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology
vols. (Halle a.d. Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1913 and and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third
1921); Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Find- Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations o f the
lay, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Sciences, trans. Ted Klein and William Pohl, Col-
1970). lected Works, vol. I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
3. Donn Welton, The Other Husserl: The Hori- 1980).
zons o f Transcendental Phenomenology (forthcom- 12. See Jacques Taminiaux, "Remarques sur
ing). For a recent study that moves even further into Heidegger et !es Recherches Logiques de Husserl,"
Husserl's later thought, see Anthony J. Steinbock, Le regard et l 'excident, Phaenomenologica, vol. 75
Home and Beyond (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 156-182;
University Press, 1996). "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations,"
4. For an overview of Husserl's career, see Dialectic and Difference, ed. and trans. Robert
Edmund Husserl und die Phiinomenologische Crease and James Decker (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Bewegung: Zeugnisse in Text und Bild, ed. Hans Humanities Press, 1985), pp. 91-114.
Rainer Sepp (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988). On his 13. Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Medita-
student years, see pp. 131-132. For a detailed chro- tionen und Pariser Vortriige, ed. S. Strasser, Hus-
nology of Husserl's life, see Karl Schuhmann, serliana, vol. I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Husserls, I 963); Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to
Husserliana Dokumente, vol. I (The Hague: Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).
5. Edmund Husserl und die Phiinomenologische 14. Letter to Adolf Grimme, September I,
Bewegung, p. 159. In the German university sys- 1922, Briefwechsel, ed. Karl Schuhmann with Elisa-
tem the Habilitation is a degree over and above the beth Schuhmann, Husserliana Dokumente, 3/3
doctorate. It requires an additional dissertation. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994 ),
6. Edmund Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik: p. 85.
Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen, vol. 15. Letter to Paul Natorp, June 29, 1918, Brief-
1 (Halle a.d. Saale: C.E.M. Pfeffer, 1891). wechsel, vol. 3/5, p. 137.
7. Edmund Husserl und die Phiinomenologische 16. Letter to Paul Natorp, February I, 1922,
Bewegung, p. 160. Briefwechsel, vol. 3/5, pp. 151-152.
8. Since we get a fuller, revised theory of inten- 17. Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzen-
tionality in Husserl's Ideas I (see Section IV), I do dentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen
not include further selections from the Investiga- Vernunft, in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phiino-
tions. menologische Forschung, vol. 10 (Halle a.d. Saale:
9. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phii- Max Niemeyer, 1929), pp. v-xiii, 1-298; Formal
nomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philo- and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns
sophie, vol. I: Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
Phiinomenologie, in Jahrbuchfilr Philosophie und 18. See Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passiven
phiinomenologische Forschung, vol. 1 (Halle a.d. Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanu-
Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1913), pp. 1-323; Ideas Per- skripten 1918-1926, ed. Margot Fleischer, Hus-
taining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenom- serliana, vol. 11 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
enological Philosophy, First Book: General Intro- 1966), pp. 295, 361-362, and esp. 498.
duction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten, 19. Maurice Mer!eau-Ponty, Phinominologie de
Collected Works, vol. 2 (The Hague: Martinus la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945); Phenome-
Nijhoff, 1983). nology o f Perception, trans. Colin Smith (Lon-
I 0. Edmund Husserl, Ide en zu einer reinen Phii- don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).
INTRODUCTION xv

20. They are being prepared by Rudolf Bernet 25. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil: Un-
in Louvain. tersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, ed. L.
21. For an account of this see Donn Welton, The Landgrebe (Prague: Academia-Verlag, 1938; Ham-
Origins 'of Meaning: A Critical Study o f the Thresh- burg: Claasen, I 954 ); Experience and Judgment:
olds o f Husserlian Phenomenology, Phaenomeno- Investigations in a Genealogy o f Logic, trans. James
logica, vol. 88 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston, Ill.:
Part 2. Northwestern University Press, 1973).
22. His complete translation of Analysen zur 26. See Eugen Fink, VI. Cartesianische Medi-
passiven Synthesis is forthcoming from Kluwer tation, Part l: Die !dee einer transzendentalen
Academic Publishers. Methodenlehre, Part 2: Ergiinzungsband, Husserli-
23. Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen zur Phiino- ana Dokumente, vol. 2/1 and 2/2 (Dordrecht:
menologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, ed. Mar- Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988); Sixth Carte-
tin Heidegger, Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phii- sian Meditation: The Idea o f a Transcendental
nomenologische Forschung, vol. 9 (Halle a.d. Saale: Theory o f Method, trans. Ronald Bruzina (Bloom-
Max Niemeyer, 1928), pp. viii-ix, 367--498; On ington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
the Phenomenology o f the Consciousness o f Inter- 27. Edmund Husserl, Phiinomenologische Psy-
nal Time (1893-1917), trans. John Brough, Col- chologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, ed.
lected Works, vol. 4 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academ- Walter Biemel, Husserliana, vol. 9 (The Hague:
ic Publishers, I 991 ). Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); Phenomenological Psy-
24. Edmund Husserl, Meditations Cartesiennes, chology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925, trans.
trans. E. Levinas and G. Pilfer (Paris: A. Colin, John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).
1931 ).
PART ONE
Contours o f a Transcendental Phenomenology
Edmund Husserl, 1894. Courtesy o f Anna-Maria Husserl.
 I.
Antitheses

1. The Critique of Psychologism

Normative and Theoretical ositions in which, with an eye to a normative

Disciplines,:. standard, an Idea or highest goal, certain fea-
tures are mentioned whose possession guaran-
tees conformity to that standard, or sets forth
§ 11. Logic o r theory o f science as an indispensable condition of the latter. A nor-
normative discipline and as technology mative science also establishes cognate propo-
sitions in which the case of non-conformity is
From our discussions up to this point log- considered or the absence of such states of af-
i c - i n the sense of the theory of science here fairs is pronounced. Not as if one had to state
in question-emerges as a normative disci- general marks in order to say what an object
pline. Sciences are mental creations which are should be to conform to its basic norm: a nor-
directed to a certain end, and which are for that mative discipline never sets forth universal cri-
reason to be judged in accordance with that end. teria, any more than a therapy states universal
The same holds of theories, validations and in symptoms. Special criteria are what the theory
short of everything that we call a "method." of science particularly gives us, and what it
Whether a science is truly a science, or a meth- alone can give us. If it maintains that, having
od a method, depends on whether it accords regard to the supreme aim of the sciences and
with the aims that it strives for. Logic seeks to the human mind's actual constitution, and
search into what pertains to genuine, valid sci- whatever else may be invoked, such and such
ence as such, what constitutes the Idea of Sci- methods M 1, M 2 . . . arise, it states general
ence, so as to be able to use the latter to mea- propositions of the form: "Every group of men-
sure the empirically given sciences as to their tal activities of the sorts AB . . . which realize
agreement with their Idea, the degree to which the combinatory form M, (or M2 . . . ) yield a
they approach it, and where they offend against case of correct method," or, what amounts to
it. In this logic shows itself to be a normative the same "Every (soi-disant) methodical pro-
science, and separates itself off from the com- cedure of the form M, (or M 2 • • •) is a correct
parative mode of treatment which tries to con- one." If one could really formulate all intrin-
ceive of the sciences, according to their typi- sically possible valid propositions of this and
cal communities and peculiarities, as concrete like sort, our normative science would certainly
cultural products of their era, and to explain possess a measuring rod for every pretended
them through the relationships which obtain method, but then also only in the form of spe-
in their time. For it is of the essence of a nor- cial criteria.
mative science that it establishes general prop- Where the basic norm is an end or can be-

*LI, I, 70-72, 87-88 (Sections 11 and 16).

4 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

come an end, the normative discipline by a theoretical proposition "Only an A which is B

ready extension of its task gives rise to a tech- has the properties C," in which "C" serves to
nology. This occurs in this case too. If the indicate the constitutive content of the stan-
theory of science sets itself the further task of dard-setting predicate "good" (e.g., pleasure,
investigating such conditions as are subject to knowledge, whatever, in short, is marked down
our power, on which the realization of valid as good by the valuation fundamental to our
methods depends, and if it draws up rules for given sphere). The new proposition is purely
our procedure in the methodical tracking down theoretical: it contains no trace of the thought
of truth, in the valid demarcation and construc- of normativity. If, conversely, a proposition of
tion of the sciences, in the discovery and use, the latter form is true, and thereupon a novel
in particular, of the many methods that advance valuation of a C as such emerges, and makes a
such sciences, and in the avoidance of errors normative relation to the proposition seem req-
in all of these concerns, then it has become a uisite, the theoretical proposition assumes the
technology o f science. This last plainly includes normative form "Only an A which is Bis a good
the whole normative theory of science, and it A," i.e., "An A should be B." Normative propo-
is therefore wholly appropriate, in view of the sitions can therefore make an appearance ev-
unquestionable value of such a technology, that en in theoretical contexts: our theoretical in-
the concept of logic should be correspondingly terest in such contexts attaches value to the
widened, and should be defined in its sense. being of a state of affairs of a sort-to the equi-
lateral form, e.g., of a triangle about to be de-
§ 16. Theoretical disciplines as the termined-and then assesses other states of af-
foundation o f normative disciplines fairs, e.g., one of equiangularity, in relation to
this: If the triangle is to be equilateral, it must
It is now easy to see that each normative, be equiangular. Such a modification is, how-
and, a fortiori, each practical discipline, pre- ever, merely passing and secondary in theoreti-
supposes one or more theoretical disciplines cal sciences, since our last intention is here di-
as its foundations, in the sense, namely, that it rected to the theoretical coherence of the things
must have a theoretical content free from all themselves. Enduring results are not therefore
normativity, which as such has its natural lo- stated in normative form, but in the forms of
cation in certain theoretical sciences, whether this objective coherence, in the form, that is,
these are already marked off or yet to be con- of a general proposition.
stituted. It is now clear that the theoretical relations
The basic norm (or basic value, or ultimate which our discussion has shown to lie hidden
end) determines, we saw, the unity of the dis- in the propositions of normative sciences, must
cipline: it also is what imports the thought of have their logical place in certain theoretical
normativity into all its normative propositions. sciences. If the normative science is to deserve
But alongside of this general thought of mea- its name, if it is to do scientific work on the
surement in terms of a basic norm, these propo- relations of the facts to be normatively consid-
sitions have their own theoretical content, ered to their basic norms, it must study the con-
which differs from one case to another. Each tent of the theoretical nucleus of these relations,
expresses the thought of a measuring relation and this means entering the spheres of the rel-
between norm and what it is a norm for, but evant theoretical sciences. In other words: Ev-
this relation is itself objectively character- ery normative discipline demands that we know
i z e d - i f we abstract from valuational inter- certain non-normative truths: these it takes
e s t - a s a relation between condition and con- from certain theoretical sciences, or gets by
ditioned, which relation is set down as existent applying propositions so taken to the constel-
or non-existent in the relevant normative lation of cases determined by its normative
propositions. Every normative proposition of, interest. This naturally holds, likewise, in the
e.g., the form "An A should be B" implies the more special case of a technology, and plainly
The Critique o f Psychologism 5

to a greater extent. The theoretical knowledge it is a part or branch of psychology, distin-

is there added which will provide a basis for a guished from it on the one hand as the part is
fruitful realization of ends and means. from the whole, and on the other hand as the
art is from the science. It owes all its theoreti-
cal foundations to psychology, and includes as
The •Arguments of Psychologism * much of that science as is necessary to estab-
lish the rules of the art" (An Examination o f
§ 17. The disputed question as to Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 461).
whether the essential theoretical According to Lipps it even seems that logic is
foundations o f normative logic lie in to be ranked as a mere constituent of psychol-
psychology ogy for he says: "The fact that logic is a spe-
cific discipline of psychology distinguishes
If we now apply the general results arrived them satisfactorily from one another" (Lipps,
at in the last chapter to logic as a normative Grundziige der Logik [1893], §3).
discipline, a first, very weighty question arises:
Which theoretical sciences provide the essen- § 18. The line o f proof o f the psychol-
tial foundations of the theory of science? And ogistic thinkers
to this we forthwith add the further question:
Is it correct that the theoretical truths we find If we ask for the justification of such views,
dealt with in the framework of traditional and a most plausible line of argument is offered,
modem logic, and above all those belonging which seems to cut off all further dispute ab
to its essential foundations, have their theoreti- initio. However one may define logic as a tech-
cal place in the sciences that have been already nology-as a technology of thinking, judging,
marked off and independently developed? inferring, knowing, proving, of the courses
Here we encounter the disputed question as followed by the understanding in the pursuit
to the relation between psychology and logic, of truth, in the evaluation of grounds of proof,
since one dominant tendency of our time has a e t c . - w e find invariably that mental activities
ready answer to the questions raised: The es- or products are the objects of practical regula-
sential theoretical foundations of logic lie in tion. And just as, in general, the artificial work-
psychology, in whose field those propositions ing over of a material presupposes the knowl-
belong-as far as their theoretical content is edge of its properties, so this will be the case
concerned-which give logic its characteris- here too, where we are specially concerned
tic pattern. Logic is related to psychology just with psychological material. The scientific in-
as any branch of chemical technology is re- vestigation of the rules according to which this
lated to chemistry, as land-surveying is to ge- stuff should be worked over naturally leads
ometry, etc. This tendency sees no need to mark back to the scientific investigation of these
off a new theoretical discipline, and, in par- properties. Psychology therefore provides the
ticular, not one that would deserve the name theoretical basis for constructing a logical tech-
of logic in a narrower and more pointed sense. nology, and, more particularly, the psychology
Often people talk as if psychology provided of cognition. t
the sole, sufficient, theoretical foundation for Any glance at the contents of logical litera-
logical technology. So we read in Mill's po- ture will confirm this. What is being talked of
lemic against Hamilton: "Logic is not a sci- throughout? Concepts,judgments, syllogisms,
ence separate from and coordinate with psy- deductions, inductions, definitions, classifica-
chology. To the extent that it is a science at all, tions, etc.-all psychology, except that they are

*LI, I, 90-97 (Sections 17-20).

t"Logic is a psychological discipline just as surely as knowing only arises in the mind, and as thinking which
terminates in knowledge is a mental happening." Lipps, op. cit.
6 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

selected and arranged from normative and prac- badly in error as a moral theory which tried to
tical points of view. Draw the bounds of pure begin with the natural history of human ten-
logic as tightly as one likes, it will not be pos- dencies, urges and weaknesses, and by point-
sible to keep out what is psychological. This is ing to the normative character of logic as of
implicit in the concepts constitutive for logi- ethics (Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft,
cal laws: truth and falsehood, affirmation and II, § 119, original ed. II, p. 173).
negation, universality and particularity, ground Such arguments do not dismay the psychol-
and consequent, etc. ogistic logicians. They answer: A necessary
use of the understanding is none the less a use
§ 19. The usual arguments o f the of the understanding, and belongs, with the un-
opposition and the psychologistic derstanding itself, to psychology. Thinking as
rejoinder it should be, is merely a special case of think-
ing as it is. Psychology must certainly investi-
Remarkably enough, the opposition believes gate the natural laws of thinking, the laws
that it can base a sharp separation of the two which hold for all judgments whatever, whether
disciplines on precisely the normative charac- correct or false. It would, however, be absurd
ter of logic. Psychology, it is said, deals with to interpret this proposition as if such laws only
thinking as it is, logic with thinking as it should were psychological as applied with the most
be. The former has to do with the natural laws, embracing generality to all judgments what-
the latter with the normative laws of thinking. ever, whereas special laws of judgment, like
It reads in this sense in fasche's version of the laws of correct judgment, were shut out
Kant's Lectures on Logic: "Some logicians from its purview. (Cf., e.g., Mill, An Examina-
presuppose psychological principles for log- tion, pp. 459f.) Or does one hold a different
ic, but to introduce such principles into logic opinion? Can one deny that the normative laws
is as absurd as to derive morality from Life. If of thinking have the character of such special
we take principles from psychology, i.e., from laws? This also will not do. Normative laws of
observations of our understanding, we shall thought, it is said, only try to say how one must
only see how thought proceeds, and what hap- proceed provided one wants to think correctly.
pens under manifold subjective hindrances and "We think correctly, in the material sense, when
conditions. Those would only lead to a knowl- we think of things as they are. But for us to
edge of merely contingent laws. Logic does not say, certainly and indubitably, that things are
however ask after contingent, but after neces- like this or like that, means that the nature of
sary laws-not how we think but how we ought our mind prevents us from thinking of them
to think. The rules of logic must therefore be otherwise. For one need not repeat what has
taken, not from the contingent, but from the been so often uttered, that one can obviously
necessary use of reason, which one finds in not think of a thing as it is, without regard to
oneself apart from all psychology. In logic we the way in which one must think of it, nor can
do not wish to know what the understanding is one make of it so isolated an object of knowl-
like and how it thinks, nor how it has hitherto edge. The man, therefore, who compares his
proceeded in its thinking, but how it ought to thought of things with the things themselves
proceed in its thinking. It should teach us the can in fact only measure his contingent think-
correct use of the understanding, the use in ing, influenced by custom, tradition, inclina-
which it is consistent with itself' (Introduc- tion and aversion, against a thinking that is free
tion, I. Concept of Logic. Kant's Werke, ed. from such influences, and that heeds no voice
Hartenstein [1867], VIII, p. 15). Herbart takes but that of its own inherent lawfulness."
up a similar position when he objects to the "The rules, therefore, on which one must
logic of his time and "the would be psycho- proceed in order to think rightly are merely
logical stories about understanding and reason rules on which one must proceed in order to
with which it starts," by saying that this is as think as the nature of thought, its specific law-
The Critique o f Psychologism 7

fulness, demands. They are, in short, identical We cannot be content-such will be the
with the natural laws of thinking itself. Logic psychologistic rejoinder-with such half-
is a physics of thinking or it is nothing at all." truths. The task of logic is of course quite dif-
(Lipps, "'Die Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie," ferent from that of psychology: who would
Philos. Monatshefte XVI [1880], pp. 530f.) deny it? It is a technology of knowledge, but
It may perhaps be said from the antipsy- how could such a technology ignore questions
chologistic side:* Of course the various kinds of causal connection, how could it look for
of presentations, judgments, syllogisms, etc., ideal connections without studying natural
also have a place in psychology as mental phe- ones? "As if every 'ought' did not rest on an
nomena and dispositions, but psychology has 'is,' every ethics did not also have to show it-
a different task in regard to them than logic. self a physics." (Lipps, "Die Aufgabe der Er-
Both investigate the laws of these activities, kenntnistheorie," op. cit., p. 529.) "A question
but "law" means something quite different in as to what should be done always reduces to
the two cases. The task of psychology is to in- a question as to what must be done if a defi-
vestigate the laws governing the real connec- nite goal is to be reached, and this question in
tions of mental events with one another, as well its tum is equivalent to a question as to how
as with related mental dispositions and corre- this goal is in fact reached" (Lipps, Grundziige
sponding events in the bodily organism. "Law" der Logik, §1). That psychology, as distinct
here means a comprehensive formula cover- from logic, does not deal with the opposition
ing coexistent and successive connections that of true and false "does not mean that psychol-
are without exception and necessary. Such con- ogy treats these different mental conditions on
nections are causal. The task of logic is quite a like footing, but that it renders both intelli-
different. It does not inquire into the causal gible in a like manner" (Lipps, op. cit., §2, p.
origins or consequences of intellectual activi- 2). Theoretically regarded, Logic therefore is
ties, but into their truth-content: it inquires related to psychology as a part to a whole. Its
what such activities should be like, or how main aim is, in particular, to set up proposi-
they should proceed, in order that the result- tions of the form: Our intellectual activities
ant judgments should be true. Correct judg- must, either generally, or in specifically char-
ments and false ones, evident ones and blind acterized circumstances, have such and such a
ones, come and go according to natural laws, form, such and such an arrangement, such and
they have causal antecedents and consequences such combinations and no others, if the result-
like all mental phenomena. Such natural con- ant judgments are to have the character of evi-
nections do not, however, interest the logician; dence, are to achieve knowledge in the pointed
he looks rather for ideal connections that he sense of the word. Here we have an obvious
does not always find realized, in fact only ex- causal relation. The psychological character of
ceptionally finds realized in the actual course evidence is a causal consequence of certain an-
of thoughts. He aims not at a physics, but an tecedents. What sort of antecedents? This is
ethics of thinking. Sigwart therefore rightly just what we have to explore.:j:
stresses the point that, in the psychological The following often repeated argument is
treatment of thought, "the opposition of true no more successful in shaking the psycholo-
and false has as little part to play as the oppo- gistic ranks: Logic, it is said, can as little rest
sition of good or bad in human conduct is a on psychology as on any other science; since
psychological matter."t each science is only a science in virtue of its

*Cf., e.g., W. Hamilton's Lectures III, p. 78, Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik, ed. IV, §2; cf. also B. Erdmann,
Logik l, p. 18.
tLogik. vol. I, p. 10. Sigwart's own way of treating logic (as we shall see in Ch. VIII) is altogether on psychologis-
tic lines.
:j:This point of view is expressed with increasing clearness in the works of Mill, Sigwart, Wundt, and Hofler-Mein-
ong. Cf. on this the quotations and criticisms in Ch. VIII, §49f.
8 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

harmony with logical rules, it presupposes battle at all, that the same arguments have re-
the validity of these rules. It would therefore peatedly been adduced while their refutations
be circular to try to give logic a first founda- have not been acknowledged as cogent. If ev-
tion in psychology.* erything really were so plain and clear as the
The opposition will reply: That this argu- psychologistic trend assures us, the matter
ment cannot be right, is shown by the fact that would not be readily understandable, since
it would prove the impossibility of all logic. there are unprejudiced, serious and penetrat-
Since logic itself must proceed logically, it ing thinkers on the opposite side as well. Is
would itself commit the same circle, would it- this not again a case where the truth lies in the
self have to establish the validity of rules that middle? Has each of the parties not recognized
it presupposes. a valid portion of the truth, and only shown
Let us, however, consider more closely what incapacity for its sharp conceptual circumscrip-
such a circle could consist in. Could it mean tion, and not even seen that they only had part
that psychology presupposes the validity of of the whole? Is there not perhaps an unre-
logical laws? Here one must notice the equivo- solved residuum in the arguments of the anti-
cation in the notion of "presupposing." That a psychologists-despite much unclearness and
science presupposes the validity of certain rules error in detail which has made refutation easy;
may mean that they serve as premisses in its are they not informed by a true power, which
proofs: it may also mean that they are rules in always re-emerges in unbiased discussion? I
accordance with which the science must pro- for my part would answer "Yes." It seems to
ceed in order to be a science at all. Both are me that the greater weight of truth lies on
confounded in our argument for which reason- the anti-psychologistic side, but that its key
ing according to logical rules, and reasoning thoughts have not been properly worked out,
from logical rules, count as identical. There and are blemished by many mistakes.
would only be a circle if the reasoning were Let us go back to the question we raised
from such rules. But, as many an artist creates above regarding the essential foundations of
beautiful works without the slightest knowl- normative logic. Have the arguments of psy-
edge of aesthetics, so an investigation may chologistic thinkers really settled this? Here a
construct proofs without ever having recourse weak point at once appears. The argument only
to logic. Logical laws cannot therefore have proves one thing, that psychology helps in the
been premisses in such proofs. And what is true foundation of logic, not that it has the only or
of single proofs is likewise true of whole sci- the main part in this, not that it provides log-
ences. ic's essential foundation in the sense above
defined(§ 16). The possibility remains open that
§20. A gap in the psychologistic line o f another science contributes to its foundation,
proof perhaps in a much more important fashion.
Here may be the place for the "pure logic"
In these and similar arguments the anti- which on the other party's view, has an exist-
psychologistic party seems undoubtedly to ence independent of all psychology, and is a
have got the worst of it. Many think the battle naturally bounded, internally closed-off sci-
quite at an end, they regard the rejoinders of ence. We readily grant that what Kantians and
the psychologistic party as completely victori- Herbartians have produced under this rubric
ous. One thing only might arouse our philo- does not quite accord with the character that
sophical wonder, that there was and is such a our suggested supposition would give it. For

*Cf. Lotze's Logik, ed. II, 332, pp. 543-544; Natorp, "Uber objektive und subjektive Begrtindungen der Erkenntnis,"
Philos. Monatshefte XXIII, p. 264; Erdmann's Logik, vol. I, p. 18. As against this cf. Stumpf, "Psychologie und
Erkenntnistheorie," p. 5 (Proceedings o f Kais. Bay. Akad. d. Wiss., I Kl., vol. XIX, Section II, p. 469). That Stumpf is
discussing epistemology, not logic, obviously makes no essential difference.
The Critique o f Psychologism 9

they always talk of normative laws of thinking abandons general argumentation and turns to
and particularly of concept-formation, judg- the "things themselves."
ment-framing, etc. Proof enough, one might We must first put an end to a distorted no-
say, that their subject-matter is neither theo- tion which both parties share, by pointing out
retical nor wholly unpsychological. But this that logical laws, taken in and for themselves,
objection would lose weight if closer investi- are not normative propositions at all in the
gation confirmed the surmise suggested to us sense of prescriptions, i.e., propositions which
above in § 13, that these schools were unlucky tell us, as part of their content, how one should
in defining and building up the intended disci- judge. One must always distinguish between
pline, yet none the less approached it closely, laws that serve as norms for our knowledge-
in so far as they discerned an abundance of activities, and laws which include normativity
interconnected theoretical truths in traditional in their thought-content, and assert its univer-
logic, which did not fit into psychology, nor sal obligatoriness.
into any other separate science, and so permit- Let us take as an example the well-known
ted one to divine the existence of a peculiar syllogistic principle we expressed in the words:
realm of truth. And if these were the truths to A mark of a mark is also a mark of the thing
which all logical regulation in the last resort itself. This statement would be commendably
related, truths mainly to be thought of when brief if its expression were not also an obvi-
"logical truths" were in question, one could ous falsehood. t To express it concretely, we
readily come to see in them what was essential shall have to adjust ourselves to a few more
to the whole of logic, and to give the name of words. "It is true of every pair of characters A,
"pure logic" to their theoretical unity. That this B, that if every object which has the character
hits off the true state of things I hope actually A also has the character B, and if any definite
to prove. object S has the character A, then it also has
the character B." That this proposition con-
tains the faintest thought of normativity must
The Prejudices of Psychologism · be strongly denied. We can employ our propo-
sition for normative purposes, but it is not
§41. First prejudice therefore a norm. Anyone who judges that
every A is also B, and that a certain S is A,
A first prejudice runs: Prescriptions which ought also to judge that this S is B. Everyone
regulate what is mental must obviously have sees, however, that this proposition is not
a mental basis. It is accordingly self-evident the original proposition of logic, but one that
that the normative principles of knowledge has been derived from it by bringing in the
must be grounded in the psychology of knowl- thought of normativity.
edge. The same obviously holds of all syllogist-
One's delusion vanishes as soon as one ic laws, as of all laws of pure logic as such.:j:

*LI, I, 168-174, 177-182, 185-196 (Sections 41, 42, 44-46, and 48-51).
t A mark of a mark is, generally speaking, plainly not a mark of the thing. If the principle meant what it literally
says, we could infer: This blotting-paper is red, Red is a color, therefore this blotting-paper is a color.
:j:ln this view. that the normative notion of "ought" does not form part of the content of logical laws, I am glad to
find myself in agreement with Natorp, who has recently made the brief and clear remark in his Sozialpiidagogik (Stuttgart,
1899), §4, that "logical principles, we maintain, are as little about what people actually think in such and such circum-
stances, as they are about what they ought to think." He says of the equational reasonings "If A = B and B = C, A = C"
that "I perceive its truth when only the terms to be compared, and the relations given together with them, are before me,
without having to think in the least of the actual or proper conduct of some corresponding act of thought" (pp. 20-21 ).
There are certain other equally important rapprochements between these Prolegomena and the distinguished thinker's
present work, which unhappily came too late to assist in forming and expounding these thoughts. Two previous writ-
ings of Natorp, the above quoted article from Phil. Monatshefte XXIII and the Einleitung in die Psychologie, stimu-
lated me, however-though other points in them provoked me to controversion.
10 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

But not of such laws alone. A capacity for words: May not the laws of logic and pure
normative use is shared by the truths of other mathematics have a distinctive meaning-con-
theoretical disciplines, and above all by those tent which gives them a natural right to regu-
of pure mathematics, which are usually kept late our thought?
separate from logic.* The well-known prin- This simple treatment shows us how both
ciple sides have made their mistakes.
The anti-psychologists went wrong by mak-
(a+b)(a-b) = a 2- b2 ing the regulation of knowledge the "essence,"
as it were, of the laws of logic. The purely theo-
tells us, e.g., that the product of the sum and retical character of formal logic, and its iden-
the difference of any two numbers equals the tity of character with formal mathematics, were
difference of their squares. Here there is no ref- thereby insufficiently recognized. It was cor-
erence to our judging and the manner in which rectly seen that the set of laws treated in tra-
it should be conducted; what we have before ditional syllogistic theory were remote from
us is a theoretical law, not a practical rule. If, psychology. Their natural right to regulate
however, we consider the corresponding prac- knowledge was recognized, for which reason
tical proposition: "To arrive at the product of they must be made the kernel of all practical
the sum and difference of two numbers, one logic. The difference between the proper con-
should find the difference of their squares," we tent of these laws, and their function, their prac-
have conversely uttered a practical rule and not tical application, was, however, ignored. Men
a theoretical law. Here, too, the transformation failed to see that so-called basic laws of logic
of law into rule involves a bringing in of the were not in themselves norms, though they
notion of normativity; the rule is the obvious, could be used normatively. Concern with this
apodeictic consequence of the law, but it none normative use had led men to speak of such
the less differs from it in thought-content. laws as laws of thought, and so it appeared that
We can even go further. It is clear that any these laws, too, had a psychological content,
theoretical truth belonging to any field of theo- and that their only difference from what are
ry can be used in a like manner as the foun- ordinarily called psychological laws lay in this
dation for a universal norm of correct judg- normative function, not possessed by other
ment. The laws of logic are not at all peculiar psychological laws.
in this respect. In their proper nature, they are The psychologistic thinkers, on the other
not normative but theoretical truths, and as hand, went wrong in putting forward a pre-
such we can employ them, as we can the truths sumed axiom whose invalidity we may expose
of all other disciplines, as norms for our judg- in a few words: It is entirely obvious that each
ment. general truth, whether psychological or not,
We cannot, however, treat the general per- serves to found a rule for correct judgment, but
suasion that the laws of logic are norms of this not only assures us of the meaningful pos-
thinking as quite baseless, nor the obviousness sibility, but even of the actual existence of rules
with which it impresses us as a mere delusion. of judgment which do not have their basis in
These laws must have some intrinsic preroga- psychology.
tive in the regulation of our thought. But does Not all rules which set standards for cor-
this mean that the idea of regulation, or of an rectjudgment are on that account logical rules.
"ought," must therefore form part of the con- It is, however, evident that, of the genuinely
tent of such laws? Can it not follow from that logical rules which form the nucleus of a tech-
content with self-evident necessity? In other nology of scientific thinking, only one set per-

*"Pure" or "formal" mathematics, as I use the term, includes all pure arithmetic and theory of manifolds, but not
geometry. Geometry corresponds in pure mathematics to the theory of a three-dimensional Euclidean manifold. This
manifold is the generic Idea of space, but not space itself.
The Critique o f Psychologism 11

mits and demands a psychological establish- all particular sciences to the critical evaluation
ment: the technical precepts concerning the ac- of theoretical knowledge and its methods in
quisition and criticism of scientific knowledge. general, as well as practical rules for its pro-
The remaining, much more important group motion.
consists o f normative transformations This is exactly what logic as a technology
of laws, which belong solely to the objective aims at, and if it aims at this as a scientific dis-
or ideal content of the science. Psychological cipline, it must itself presuppose certain items
logicians, even such as are of the stature of a of theoretical knowledge. It is clear from the
Mill or a Sigwart, treat science from its sub- start that it must attach exceptional worth to
jective side (as a methodology of the spe- all knowledge resting only on the notions of
cifically human acquisition of knowledge), Truth, Proposition, Subject, Predicate, Object,
rather than from its objective side (as the Idea Property, Ground and Consequent, Relation
of the theoretical unity of truth), and therefore and Relatum, etc. For all science in its objec-
lay one-sided stress on the methodological tive, theoretical aspects, i.e., in respect of what
tasks of logic. In doing so they ignore the fun- it tells us, consists of truths, truth pertains to
damental difference between the norms o f propositions, all propositions have subjects
pure logic and the technical rules o f a spe- and predicates, and refer by way of these to
cifically human art o f thought. These are to- things or properties, propositions are connected
tally different in character in their content, ori- as grounds and consequents, etc. Those truths,
gin and function. The laws of logic, seen in it is now clear, which have their roots in such
their original intent, concern only what is ideal, essential constituents o f all science considered
while these methodological propositions con- as an objective theoretical unity, truths which,
cern only what is real. If the former spring accordingly, cannot be thought away without
from immediately evident axioms, the latter thinking away all that gives science as such its
spring from empirical facts, belonging mainly objective purchase and sense, such truths ob-
to psychology. If the formulation of the former viously provide the fundamental standards by
promotes our purely theoretical interests, and which we can decide whether anything claim-
gives only subsidiary practical help, the latter, ing to be a science, or to belong to one, whether
on the other hand, have an immediate practi- as premiss, conclusion, syllogism, induction,
cal aim, and they only give indirect help to our proof or theory, really lives up to its intentions,
theoretical interests, in so far as they aim at or does not rather stand in an a priori conflict
the methodical progress of scientific knowl- with the ideal conditions of the possibility of
edge. theory and science as such. Men should admit
that truths which have their roots in the con-
§42. Elucidations cepts which constitute the objectively con-
ceived Idea of Science, cannot also belong to
Every theoretical statement, we saw above, the field of any particular science. They should
permits of a normative transformation. But the see that such truths, being ideal, cannot have
rules for correct judgment which thus arise are their home-ground in the sciences of matter
not, in general, such as logic, considered as a of fact, and therefore not in psychology. If
technology, requires: few of them are, as it these facts were realized, our case would be
were, predestined to normativity. If such a logi- won, and it would be impossible to dispute
cal technology is to be of real help in our sci- the existence of a peculiar science of pure log-
entific endeavors, it must not presuppose that ic, absolutely independent of all other scien-
full knowledge of the complete sciences which tific disciplines, which delimits the concepts
we hope to achieve by its means. We shall not constitutive of the Idea of System or of theo-
be helped by the mechanical restatement of all retical unity, and which goes on to investigate
given theoretical knowledge as norms: what the theoretical connections whose roots lie
we need are general norms, extending beyond solely in these concepts. This science would
12 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

have the unique peculiarity of itself, qua form, lated in science: it occurs in combination with
underlying the content of its laws; the elements other truths in theoretical connections bound
and theoretical connections of which it, as a by relations of ground and consequent. This
systematic unity of truths, consists, are gov- objective content of science, to the extent that
erned by the very laws which form part of it really lives up to its intent, is quite indepen-
its theoretical content. dent of the scientist's subjectivity, of the pecu-
That the science which deals with all sci- liarities of human nature in general. It is ob-
ences in respect of their form should eo ipso jective truth.
deal with itself; may sound paradoxical, but Pure logic aims at this ideal side of science,
involves no inner conflict. The simplest exam- in respect of its form. It does not aim at the
ple will make this clear. The law of contradic- peculiar material of the various special sci-
tion governs all truth, and since it is itself a ences, or the peculiarity of their truths and
truth, governs itself. To realize what such self- forms of combination: it aims at what relates
government means one need only apply the to truths and theoretical combinations of truths
law of contradiction to itself: the resultant as such. For this reason every science must, on
proposition is an obvious truism, having none its objective, theoretical side, conform to the
of the marks of the remarkable or the ques- laws of logic, which are of an entirely ideal
tionable. This is invariably the case where pure character.
logic is used to regulate itself. In this way these ideal laws acquire a meth-
This pure logic is therefore the first and odological significance, which they also have
most essential foundation of methodological since mediate justification is provided by
logic. The latter, however, has other quite dif- proofs whose norms are merely normative
ferent foundations contributed by psychology. transformations of the ideal laws whose sole
Every science, as we stated above, permits of grounds lie in logical categories. The charac-
a double treatment: it is, on the one hand, an teristic peculiarities of proofs mentioned in
aggregate of human devices for acquiring, sys- the first chapter of this work (§7) all have
tematically delimiting and expounding this their origin and complete explanation in the
or that territory of truth. These devices are fact that inner evidence in demonstration-
called methods, e.g., calculation by abacus or whether in the syllogism, in connected, apo-
slide-rule, by written signs on a slate, by this deictic proof, or in the unity of the most com-
or that computer, by logarithmic, sine- or tan- prehensive, rational theory, or also in the unity
gent-tables, astronomical methods involving of an argument in probabilities-is simply our
cross-wires or telescopes, physiological meth- consciousness of an ideal law. Purely logical
ods involving microscopy, staining, etc. All reflection, whose first historic awakening oc-
these methods, and also all forms of exposi- curred in the genius of Aristotle, abstracts the
tion, are adapted to the human constitution as underlying law itself, and then brings the mul-
it at present normally is, and are in fact in part tiplicity of laws discoverable in this man-
expressive of contingent, national features. ner, and at first seen in isolation, under primi-
Even physiological organization has a not tive basic laws, and so creates a scientific
unimportant part to play. Would our most system which, in a purely deductive order, per-
refined optical instruments be of much use to a mits the derivation of all possible laws of pure
being whose sense of sight was attached to an logic, all possible forms of syllogisms, proofs,
end-organ differing considerably from our etc. The forms of logic transform themselves
own? into norms or rules telling us how we should
But all science permits of quite another conduct proofs, a n d - i n relation to possible
treatment; it can be considered in regard to illegal formations-into rules telling us how
what it teaches, in regard to its theoretical we should not conduct them.
content. What each statement states i s - i n the Norms accordingly fall into two classes.
ideal c a s e - a truth. No truth is, however, iso- One class of norms regulates all proof and all
The Critique o f Psychologism 13

apodeictic connection a priori; it is purely §45. Refutation. Pure mathematics

ideal, and only relates to our human knowl- would likewise be made a branch o f
edge by way of a self-evident application. psychology
The other' class is empirical, and relates essen-
tially to the specifically human side of the sci- Obvious as all this may seem, it must be
ence. It consists of what might be called mere mistaken. This is shown by the absurd conse-
auxiliary devices or substitutes for proofs quences which, as we know, psychologism
(above §9). It has its roots in our general hu- cannot escape. There is, however, another rea-
man constitution, in the main, in our mental son for misgiving: the natural affinity between
constitution, since this is more important for purely logical and mathematical doctrine,
logical technology, but also in part in our physi- which has often led to an assertion of their theo-
cal constitution.* retical unity.
We have already mentioned by the way that
§44. Second prejudice even Lotze taught that mathematics must be
regarded as "an independently developed
To confirm its first prejudice that rules for branch of general logic." "Only a practically
cognition must rest on the psychology of motivated division of teaching" can, he thinks,
cognition, the psychologistic party appeals to blind us to the fact that mathematics "has its
the actual content of logic (cf. the arguments whole home-ground in the general field of
of §18 above, pp. 3-4, par. 2). What is logic logic" (Logik, ed. II, §18, p. 34 and §112, p.
about? Everywhere it concerns itself with pre- 138). To which Riehl adds that "one could well
sentations and judgments, with syllogisms and say that logic coincides with the general part
proofs, with truth and probability, with neces- of purely formal mathematics (taken in the
sity and possibility, with ground and conse- sense of H. Hankel)" (A. Riehl, Der philoso-
quent, and with other closely related or con- phische Kritizismus und seine Bedeutung fur
nected concepts. But what can be thought of die positive Wissenschaft, vol. II, Part I, p.
under such headings but mental phenomena 226). However this may be, an argument that
and formations? This is obvious in the case of is correct for logic must be approved in the case
presentations and judgments. Syllogisms, how- of arithmetic as well. Arithmetic sets up laws
ever, are proofs of judgments by means of for numbers, for their relations and combina-
judgments, and proof is plainly a mental ac- tions: numbers, however, are the products of
tivity. Talk of truth, probability, necessity, pos- colligation and counting, which are mental
sibility, etc., likewise concerns judgments: activities. Relations arise from relating activi-
what they refer to can only be manifested or ties, combinations from acts of combination.
experienced in judgments. Is it not, therefore, Adding and multiplying, subtracting and divid-
strange that one should wish to exclude from ing-these are merely mental processes. That
psychology propositions and theories which they require sensuous supports makes no dif-
relate to psychological phenomena? In this ference, since this is true of any and every act
regard the distinction between purely logical of thinking. Sums, products, differences and
and methodological propositions is pointless, quotients, and whatever may be determined in
the objection affects both equally. Every at- arithmetical propositions, are merely mental
tempt, therefore, to extrude even a part of log- processes, and must as such obey mental laws.
ic from psychology, on ground of its pretend- It may be highly desirable that modem psy-
ed "purity," must count as radically mistaken. chology with its earnest pursuit of exactness

*Elementary arithmetic provides good examples of this last. A being that could intuit three-dimensional arrange-
ments (with difference of sign) as clearly and with as much practical mastery as men are able to intuit two-dimensional
arrangements would possibly have quite different methods of calculation. My Philosophie der Arithrnetik deals with
such questions, and, in particular, with the influence of physical circumstances on methodical set-up, pp. 275f., 312ff.
14 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

should be widened to include mathematical psychological. How is this to be explained?

theories, but it would hardly be much elevated Only one answer is possible. Counting and ar-
by the inclusion of mathematics itself as one ithmetical operation as facts, as mental acts
of its parts. For the heterogeneity of the two proceeding in time, are of course the concern
sciences cannot be denied. The mathematician, of psychology, since it is the empirical science
on the other hand, would merely smile if psy- of mental facts in general. Arithmetic is in a
chological studies were pressed upon him as totally different position. Its domain of re-
supposedly providing a better and deeper search is known, it is completely and exhaus-
grounding for his theoretical pronouncements. tively determined by the familiar series of ideal
He would rightly say that mathematics and species 1, 2, 3 . . . In this sphere there can be
psychology belong to such different worlds no talk of individual facts, of what is tempo-
that the very thought of interchange among rally definite. Numbers, Sums and Products and
them was absurd: here, if anywhere, talk of a so forth are not such casual acts of counting,
µEta acni; di; ij.')-..).o yEvoi; is applicable.* adding and multiplying, etc., as proceed here
and there. They also differ obviously from pre-
§46. The territory to be investigated by sentations in which they are given. The num-
pure logic is, like that o f mathematics, ber Five is not my own or anyone else's count-
an ideal territory ing of five, it is also not my presentation or
anyone else's presentation of five. It is in the
These objections may have taken our argu- latter regard a possible object of acts of pre-
ment far afield, but, when we attend to their sentation, whereas, in the former, it is the
content, they help us to state the basic errors ideal species of a form whose concrete in-
of our opponents' position. The comparison o f stances are found in what becomes objective
pure logic with pure mathematics, its mature in certain acts of counting, in the collective
sister discipline, which no longer needs fight whole that these constitute. In no case can it
for its right to independent existence, provides be regarded without absurdity as a part or side
us with a reliable Leitmotiv. We shall first of a mental experience, and so not as some-
glance at mathematics. thing real. If we make clear to ourselves what
No one regards the theories of pure math- the number Five truly is, if we conceive of it
ematics, e.g., the pure theory of numbers, as adequately, we shall first achieve an articulate,
"parts or branches of psychology," though we collective presentation of this or that set of
should have no numbers without counting, no five objects. In this act a collection is intui-
sums without addition, no products without tively given in a certain formal articulation, and
multiplication, etc. The patterns of all arith- so as an instance of the number-species in ques-
metical operations refer back to certain men- tion. Looking at this intuited individual, we
tal acts of arithmetical operation, and only in perform an "abstraction," i.e., we not only iso-
reflection upon these can we "show" what a late the non-independent moment of collective
total, sum, product, etc., is. In spite of the "psy- form in what is before us, but we apprehend
chological origin" of arithmetical concepts, the Idea in it: the number Five as the species
everyone sees it to be a fallacious µEta rxcrti; of the form swims into our conscious sphere
to demand that mathematical laws should be of reference. What we are now meaning is not

*See in addition the fine statement of Natorp "Uber objektive und subjektive Begriindung der Erkenntnis," Phi/as.
Monatshefte XXIII, pp. 265f. Cf. also G. Frege's stimulating work Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), pp. vif. I
need hardly say that I no longer approve of my own fundamental criticisms of Frege's antipsychologistic position set
forth in my Phi/osophie der Arithmetik, I, pp. 124-132. I may here take the opportunity, in relation to all of the discus-
sions of these Prolegomena, to refer to the Preface of Frege's later work Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. I (Jena,
1893).
The Critique o f Psychologism 15

this individual instance, not the intuited object reduces to one that has empirical generality,
as a whole, not the form immanent in it but not even to the widest case of such generality,
still inseparable from it: what we mean is rather one that applies without exception to the en-
the ideal form-species, which is absolutely one tire real world.
in the sense of arithmetic, in whatever mental What we have here said in regard to pure
act it may be individuated for us in an intu- arithmetic carries over at all points to pure
itively constituted collective, a species which logic. In the latter case, too, we accept as obvi-
is accordingly untouched by the contingency, ous the fact that logical concepts have a psy-
temporality and transience of our mental acts. chological origin, but we deny the psycholo-
Acts of counting arise and pass away and can- gistic conclusion to which this seems to lead.
not be meaningfully mentioned in the same In consideration of the domain that must be
breath as numbers. granted to logic in the sense of a technology
Arithmetical propositions are concerned of scientific knowledge, we naturally do not
with such ideal unities ("lowest species" in a doubt that logic is to a large extent concerned
heightened sense quite different from that of with our mental states. Naturally the method-
empirical classes), and this holds both of nu- ology of scientific research and proof must take
merical propositions (arithmetical singulars) full cognizance of the nature of the mental
and of algebraic propositions (arithmetical gen- states in which research and proof take their
eralizations). They tell us nothing about what course. Logical terms such as "presentation,"
is real, neither about the real things counted, "concept," "judgment," "syllogism," "proof,"
nor about the real acts in which they are count- "theory," "necessity," "truth," etc., may there-
ed, in which such and such indirect numerical fore, and must therefore, come up as general
characteristics are constituted for us. Concrete names for psychical experiences and disposi-
numbers and numerical propositions belong tions. We deny, however, that this ever occurs
in the scientific fields to which the relevant in the purely logical parts of logical technol-
concrete units belong: propositions about arith- ogy. We deny that the theoretical discipline of
metical thought-processes belong in psychol- pure logic, in the independent separateness
ogy. In strict propriety, arithmetical proposi- proper to it, has any concern with mental facts,
tions say nothing about "what is contained in or with laws that might be styled "psychologi-
our mere number-presentations": as little as cal." We saw that the laws of pure logic, e.g.,
they speak of other presentations, do they speak the primitive "laws of thought," or the syllo-
of ours. They are rather concerned with abso- gistic formulae, totally lose their basic sense if
lute numbers and number-combinations in their one tries to interpret them as psychological. It
abstract purity and ideality. The propositions is therefore clear from the start that the con-
of universal arithmetic-the nomology of arith- cepts which constitute these and similar laws
metic we may call i t - a r e laws rooted in the have no empirical range. They cannot, in other
ideal essence o f the genus Number. The ulti- words, have the character of those mere uni-
mate singulars which come within the range versal notions whose range is that of individual
of these laws are ideal singulars: they are the singulars, but they must be notions truly ge-
determinate numbers, i.e., the lowest specific neric, whose range is exclusively one o f ideal
differences of the genus number. It is to these singulars, genuine species. It is clear, for the
singulars that arithmetically singular proposi- rest, that the terms in question, and all such as
tions relate, propositions which belong to the function in purely logical contexts, must be
arithmetic of definite numbers. These arise equivocal; they must, on the one hand, stand
through the application of universal arithmeti- for class-concepts of mental states such as be-
cal laws to numerically specific numbers, they long in psychology, but, on the other hand, for
express what is purely part of the ideal essence generic concepts covering ideal singulars,
of these numbers. None of these propositions which belong in a sphere of pure law.
16 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

§48. The fundamental differences knowing is plainly quite different from that of
what is investigated and known.
We shall conclude by stressing the funda- (c) The logical pattern of connection, i.e.,
mental differences on whose recognition or the specific pattern of connection of the theo-
non-recognition one's total response to the retical Ideas in which the unity of the truths of
psychologistic line of argument depends. These a scientific discipline, and those, in particular,
are as follows: of a scientific theory or proof or inference, are
1. There is an essential, quite unbridgeable constituted (the unity of concepts in a true
difference between sciences of the ideal and proposition, of simple truths in truth-combi-
sciences of the real. The former are a priori, nations, etc.).
the latter empirical. The former set forth ideal In the case, e.g., of physics we distinguish
general laws, grounded with intuitive certain- between the pattern of connection of the men-
ty in certain general concepts: the latter estab- tal states of the physical thinker from that of
lish real general laws, relating to a sphere of the physical nature that he knows, and both
fact, with probabilities into which we have in- from the ideal pattern of connection of the
sight. The extension of general concepts is, in truths in physical theory, e.g., in the unity of
the former case, one of lowest specific differ- analytical mechanics, of theoretical optics, etc.
ences, in the latter case one of individual, tem- Even the form of an argument in probability,
porally determinate singulars. Ultimate objects which governs the connection between facts
are, in the former case, ideal species, in the and hypotheses, is part of this logical line. The
latter case, empirical facts. The essential dif- logical pattern of connection is the ideal form
ferences between natural laws and ideal laws, for the sake of which we speak in specie of the
between universal propositions of fact (per- same truth, the same syllogism or proof, the
haps disguised as general propositions: "All same theory and rational discipline, by whom-
ravens are black," "The raven is black") and soever these "same things" may be thought.
genuine generalizations (such as the universal This unity of form is one of legal validity, of
propositions of pure mathematics), between the the validity oflaws under which all these "same
notion of an empirical class and that of an ideal things" stand, the validity, i.e., of the laws of
genus, etc. A correct assessment of these dif- pure logic, which accordingly overshadow all
ferences presupposes the complete abandon- science, and do so, not in respect of the psy-
ment of the empiricistic theory of abstraction, chological or objective content of science, but
whose present dominance renders all logical in respect of its ideal meaning-load. The pecu-
matters unintelligible. We shall have to speak liar patterns of combination of the concepts,
in detail of this matter later on (cf. Investiga- propositions and truths which form the ideal
tion II). unity of a particular science can of course only
2. In all knowledge, and particularly in all be called "logical," in so far as they are in-
scientific knowledge, there are three fundamen- stances falling under logic. They do not be-
tally distinct patterns of connection: long among the actual parts of logic.
(a) A pattern of connection of cognitive ex- The three patterns of combination just dis-
periences, in which science is subjectively re- tinguished naturally concern logic and arith-
alized, a psychological pattern o f connection metic like all other sciences. Only in their case,
among the presentations, judgments, insights, the matters investigated are not, as in physics,
surmises, questions, etc., in which research is real matters of fact, but ideal species. The
carried out, in which a theory already discov- specific nature oflogic involves the previously
ered receives its insightful thinking out. noted peculiarity that the ideal patterns of com-
(b) A pattern of connection among the mat- bination which make up its theoretical unity
ters investigated and theoretically known in the are themselves subordinate instances of the
science, which constitute its sphere a territory. laws that it sets up. Logical laws are at once
The pattern of connection of investigation and parts and rules of such patterns of combina-
The Critique o f Psychologism 17

tion: they belong to the theoretical structure, up in Sigwart. "Logic," he says, "can only pro-
but at the same time to the field, of logical sci- ceed by becoming conscious of the way this
ence. subjective feeling of necessity [the 'inner feel-
ing' of the evident of our previous paragraph]
§49. Third prejudice. Logic as the makes its appearance, and then expressing
theory o f inner evidence these conditions in a general manner" (Logik,
I, ed. 2, p. 16). Many statements of Wundt's
We shall state a third prejudice-one par- tend in a similar direction. We read, e.g., in his
ticularly to the fore in the arguments of chap- Logik that "the properties of self-evidence and
ter 11, § 1 9 - i n the following words: All truth universal validity involved in certain thought-
pertains to judgment. Judgment, however, is connections, permit us to derive the logical
only recognized as true when it is inwardly from the psychological laws of thought." The
evident. The term "inner evidence" stands, it normative character of the former "has its sole
is said, for a peculiar mental character, well- foundation in the fact that certain psychologi-
known to everyone through his inner experi- cal thought-connections actually do have self-
ence, a peculiar feeling which guarantees the evidence and universal validity, without which
truth of the judgment to which it attaches. If it would not be possible for us to approach
logic is the technology which will assist us thought with the demand that it should satisfy
to know the truth, logical laws are obviously the conditions of the self-evident and univer-
psychological propositions. They are, in fact, sally valid." "The conditions that must them-
propositions which cast light on the psycho- selves be fulfilled if we are to have self-evi-
logical conditions on which the presence or dence and universal validity are called the
absence of this "feeling of inner evidence" logical laws of thought." But Wundt empha-
depends. Practical prescriptions are naturally sizes that "psychological thinking is always the
connected with such propositions, and help us more comprehensive form of thinking."*
to achieve judgments having this distinctive In the logical literature at the end of last
character. Such psychologically based rules of century the interpretation of logic as a practi-
thought must surely be meant where we speak cally applied psychology of the inwardly evi-
of logical laws or norms. dent certainly became more penetrating and
Mill hits on this conception when he at- more widely entertained. The Logik of Hofler
tempts to draw a line between logic and psy- and Meinong here deserves special mention,
chology, and says: "The properties of thought since it may be regarded as the first properly
which concern logic are some of its contingent carried out attempt to make a thorough, con-
properties, those namely on the presence of sistent use of the notion of the psychology of
which depends good thinking as distinguished inward evidence over the whole field of logic.
from bad" (An Examination o f Sir William Hofler says that the main task of logic is the
Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 462). In his further investigation of "those laws, primarily psy-
statements, he repeatedly calls logic the (psy- chological, which express the dependence of
chologically conceived) "theory" or "philoso- emergent inward evidence on the particular
phy of evidence" (op. cit., pp. 473, 475-76, properties of our presentations and judgments"
478); he was of course not immediately con- (Logik [Vienna, 1890], p. 16). "Among all ac-
cerned with the propositions of pure logic. In tually given thought-phenomena, or even such
Germany this point of view occasionally crops as we can conceive possible, logic must pick

*Wundt, Logik, I, ed. 2, p. 91. Wundt regularly couples inner evidence with universal validity in this passage. As
regards the latter, he distinguishes between a subjective form of universal validity, a mere consequence of inner evi-
dence, and an objective form, which also covers the postulate of the intelligibility of experience. But as the justification
and adequate fulfillment of this postulate itself rests on inner evidence, it does not seem feasible to drag in "universal
validity" into discussions of basic principles.
18 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

out the types or forms of thinking to which tween purely logical and methodological
inner evidence attaches directly, or which are propositions, we expressly concede that the
necessary conditions for the emergence of former have a relation to the psychological
inner evidence" (op. cit., p. 17). The serious- datum of inner evidence, that they in a sense
ness of such psychologism is shown by the rest state its psychological conditions.
of the treatment. Thus the method of logic, in Such a relation must, however, be regarded
its concern with the theoretical groundwork as purely ideal and indirect. The pure laws of
of correct thinking, is said to be the same meth- logic say absolutely nothing about inner evi-
od that psychology applies to all mental phe- dence or its conditions. We can show, we hold,
nomena: it must describe such phenomena, in that they only achieve this relation through a
this case those of correct thinking, and reduce process of application or transformation, the
them as far as may be to simple laws, i.e., ex- same sort of process, in fact, through which
plain more complex laws by way of simple every purely conceptual law permits applica-
ones (op. cit., p. 18). Further on, one reads tion to a generally conceived realm of empiri-
that the logical doctrine of the syllogism is cal cases. The propositions about inner evi-
given the task of "formulating the laws, which dence which arise in this manner keep their a
tell us what features in our premisses deter- priori character, and the conditions of inner
mine whether a certain judgment can be de- evidence that they assert bear no trace of the
duced from them with inward evidence." Etc., psychological or the real. They are purely con-
etc. ceptual propositions, transformable, as in ev-
ery like case, into statements about ideal in-
§50. Transformation o f logical propo- compatibilities or possibilities.
sitions into equivalent propositions A little reflection will make matters clear.
about the ideal conditions for inner Every law of pure logic permits of an (inward-
evidence. The resultant propositions ly evident) transformation, possible a priori,
are not psychological which allows one to read off certain proposi-
tions about inward evidence, certain conditions
We turn to criticism. We are far from re- of inward evidence, from it. The combined
garding as unobjectionable the nowadays principles of contradiction and excluded mid-
commonplace but far from clear assumption dle are certainly equivalents to the proposition:
with which the argument starts, that all truth One and only one of two mutually contradic-
lies in our judgments. We do not of course tory judgments can manifest inner evidence.*
doubt that to know truth and to utter it justi- The mood Barbara is likewise certainly
fiably presupposes the prior seeing of it. Nor equivalent to the proposition: The inner evi-
do we doubt that logic as a technology must dence of the necessary truth of a proposition
look into the psychological conditions in of the form All A's are C's (more precisely, its
which inner evidence illuminates our judg- truth as a necessary consequence), may appear
ments. We may even go a further step in the in a syllogizing act whose premisses are of the
direction of the conception we are refuting. forms All A's are B's and All B's are C's. The
While we seek to preserve the distinction be- like holds of every proposition of pure logic.

*If we really had to interpret the theory of inner evidence in the manner of Hofler on p. 133, op. cit., it would have
been corrected by our previous critique of empiricistic misunderstandings of logical principles (see §23). Hofler's
statement "that an affirmative and a negative judgment about the same object are incompatible" is, as an exact state-
ment, false, and can even less count as a statement of the logical principle. A similar mistake slips into the definition of
the correlatives "ground" and "consequence": if it were correct, it would falsify all syllogistic rules. It runs: "A judg-
ment C is the consequence of a ground G, if the belief in the falsity of C is incompatible with the (imagined) belief in
the truth of G" (op. cit., p. 136). Note that Hofler explains incompatibility in terms of evident non-coexistence (op. cit.,
p. 129). He plainly confuses the ideal non-coexistence (i.e., lack of joint truth) of the propositions in question, with the
real non-coexistence of the corresponding acts of affirmation, presentation, etc.
The Critique o f Psychologism 19

Understandably so, since there evidently is a bers with trillions of places, and there are truths
general equivalence between the proposition relating to them. No one, however, can actu-
A is true and It is possible for anyone to judge ally imagine such numbers, nor do the addi-
A to be.true in an inwardly evident manner. tions, multiplications, etc., relating to them.
The propositions, therefore, whose sense lies Inward evidence is here a psychological im-
in stating what necessarily is involved in the possible, yet, ideally speaking, it undoubtedly
notion of truth, that the truth of propositions represents a possible state of mind.
of certain forms determines the truth of propo- The turning of the notion of truth into the
sitions of corresponding other forms, can cer- notion of the possibility of evident judgment
tainly be transformed into equivalent proposi- has its analogue in the relation of the concepts
tions which connect the possible emergence of Individual Being and Possibility o f Perception.
inner evidence with the forms of our judg- The equivalence of these concepts, if by "per-
ments. ception" we mean adequate perception, is un-
Our insight into such connections will, how- deniable. A perception is accordingly possible
ever, provide us with the means to refute the in which the whole world, with the endless
attempt to swallow up pure logic in a psychol- abundance of its bodies, is perceived at one
ogy of inner evidence. In itself, plainly, the glance. But this ideal possibility is of course
proposition A is true does not state the same no real possibility, we could not attribute it to
thing as the equivalent proposition It is pos- any empirical subject, particularly since such
sible f o r anyone and everyone to judge that A a vision would be an endless continuum of vi-
is the case. The former says nothing about sion: unitarily conceived, it would be a Kant-
anyone's judgment, not even about judgments ian Idea.
of anyone in general. The position here re- Though we stress the ideality of the possi-
sembles that of propositions of pure mathemat- bilities of evident judgment which can be de-
ics. The statement that a + b = b + a states that rived from logical principles, and which we see
the numerical value of the sum of two num- to reveal their a priori validity in cases of
bers is independent of their position in such a apodeictic self-evidence, we do not deny their
sum, but it says nothing about anyone's acts of psychological utility. If we take the law that,
counting or addition. The latter first enters the out of two contradictory propositions, one is
picture in an inwardly evident, equivalent trans- true and one is false, and deduce from it the
formation. It is an a priori truth that no num- truth that, one only out of every pair of possi-
ber can be given in concreto unless we count, ble contradictory judgments can have the char-
and no sum unless we add. acter of inward evidence, we may note this to
But even when we abandon the original be a self-evidently correct deduction, if self-
forms of the propositions of pure logic, and evidence be defined as the experience in which
tum them into corresponding equivalents re- the correctness of his judgment is brought home
garding inward evidence, nothing results which to a judging subject, the new proposition ut-
psychology could claim as its own. Psychol- ters a truth about the compatibilities or incom-
ogy is an empirical science, the science of patibilities of certain mental experiences. In
mental facts, and psychological possibility is this manner, however, every proposition of
accordingly a case of real possibility. Such pure mathematics tells us something about
possibilities of inner evidence are, however, possible and impossible happenings in the
real ones, and what is psychologically impos- mental realm. No empirical enumeration or
sible may very well be ideally possible. The calculation, no mental act of algebraical trans-
solution of the generalized "3-body problem," formation or geometrical construction, is pos-
or "n-body problem" may transcend all human sible which conflicts with the ideal laws of
cognitive capacity, but the problem has a solu- mathematics. These laws accordingly have a
tion, and the inner evidence which relates to it psychological use. We can read off from each
is therefore possible. There are decimal num- of them a priori possibilities and impossibili-
20 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ties relating to certain sorts of mental acts, acts concepts essentially related to this concept.
of counting, of additive and multiplicative com- They state, in relation to possible acts of judg-
bination, etc. These laws are not thereby made ment, and on the basis of their mere form, the
into psychological laws. Psychology, the natu- ideal conditions of the possibility or impossi-
ral science concerned with what we mentally bility of their inner evidence. Of these two sorts
live through, has to look into the natural con- of conditions of the inwardly evident, the
ditions of our experience. In its field are spe- former relates to the special constitution of the
cifically to be found the empirically real rela- sorts of psychical being which the psychology
tionships of our mathematical and logical of the period recognizes, psychological induc-
activities, whose ideal relations and laws make tion being limited by experience. The other
up an independent realm. This latter realm is conditions, however, have the character of ideal
set up in purely universal propositions, made laws, and hold generally for every possible
up out of "concepts" which are not class-con- consciousness.
cepts of mental acts but ideal concepts of es-
sence, each with its concrete foundation in such §51. The decisive points in this dispute
mental acts or in their objective correlates.
The number Three, the Truth named after Py- A final clearing-up of our present dispute
thagoras, etc., are, as our discussion showed, depends likewise on a correct discernment of
neither empirical singulars nor classes of singu- the most fundamental of epistemological dis-
lars: they are ideal objects ideationally appre- tinctions, the distinction between the real and
hended in the correlates of our acts of count- the ideal, or the correct discernment of all the
ing, of inwardly evident judging, etc. distinctions into which this distinction can be
In relation to inner evidence, psychology has analyzed. We are here concerned with the re-
therefore merely the task of tracking down the peatedly stressed distinctions between real and
natural conditions of the experiences which fall ideal truths, laws, sciences, between real and
under this rubric, of investigating the real con- ideal (individual and specific) generalities and
texts in which, as experience shows, inward also singularities, etc. Everyone, no doubt, has
evidence arises and perishes. Such natural con- some acquaintance with these distinctions:
ditions are concentration of interest, a certain even so extreme an empiricist as Hume draws
mental freshness, practice, etc. Their investi- a fundamental distinction between "relations
gation does not lead to knowledge which is of ideas" and "matters of fact," a distinction
exact in its content, to inwardly evident, truly which the great idealist Leibniz drew before
lawlike generalizations, but only to vague, him, using the rubrics verites de raison and
empirical generalizations. The inward evidence verites de fait. To draw an epistemologically
of our judgments does not merely depend on important distinction does not, however, mean
such psychological conditions, conditions that that one has as yet grasped its epistemological
one might also call external and empirical, essence. One must clearly grasp what the ideal
since they are rooted not purely in the specific is, both intrinsically and in its relation to the
form and matter of our judgment, but in its real, how this ideal stands to the real, how it
empirical context in mental life: it depends also can be immanent in it and so come to knowl-
on ideal conditions. Each truth stands as an edge. The basic question is whether ideal ob-
ideal unit over against an endless, unbounded jects of thought a r e - t o use the prevailing jar-
possibility of correct statements which have its gon-mere pointers to "thought-economies,"
form and its matter in common. Each actual verbal abbreviations whose true content merely
judgment, which belongs to this ideal mani- reduces to individual, singular experiences,
fold, will fulfill, either in its mere form or in mere presentations and judgments concern-
its matter, the ideal conditions for its own pos- ing individual facts, or whether the idealist is
sible inward evidence. The laws of pure logic right in holding that such an empiricistic doc-
are truths rooted in the concept of truth, and in trine, nebulous in its generality, can indeed
The Critique o f Psychologism 21

be uttered, but in no wise thought out, that all judgment of a certain class, i.e., the so-called
attempts to reduce ideal unities to real singu- "true" judgments, so that the phenomenologi-
lars are involved in hopeless absurdities, that cal content of such a judgment, considered in
its splintering of concepts into a range of and for itself, would be the same whether or
singulars, without a concept to unify such a not it had this character. The situation is not at
range in our thought, cannot be thought, etc. all like the way in which we like to conceive
The understanding of our distinction be- of the connection between sensations and the
tween the real and the ideal "theory of inner feelings which relate to them: two persons, we
evidence" presupposes, on the other hand, cor- think, have the same sensations but are differ-
rect concepts of inner evidence and truth. In ently affected in their feelings. Inner evidence
the psychologistic literature of the last decades is rather nothing but the "experience" of truth.
we have seen inner evidence spoken of as a Truth is of course only experienced in the sense
casual feeling which attends on certain judg- in which something ideal can be an experience
ments, and is absent from others, which at best in a real act. Otherwise put: Truth is an Idea,
has a universally human linkage with certain whose particular case is an actual experience
judgments and not with others, a linkage in in the inwardly evident judgment. The inwardly
every normal human being in normal circum- evident judgment is, however, an experience
stances of judgment. There are certain normal of primal givenness: the non-self-evident judg-
circumstances in which every normal person ment stands to it much as the arbitrary posit-
feels self-evidence in connection with the ing of an object in imagination stands to its
proposition 2 + 1 = 1 + 2, just as he feels pain adequate perception. A thing adequately per-
when he gets burnt. One might then well ask ceived is not a thing merely meant in some
what gives such a special feeling authority, how manner or other: it is a thing primarily given
it manages to guarantee the truth of our judg- in our act, and as what we mean it, i.e., as it-
ment, "impress the stamp of truth" on it, "pro- self given and grasped without residue. In like
claim its truth," or whatever the other meta- fashion what is self-evidently judged is not
phor one cares to use. One might also ask what merely judged (meant in a judging, assertive,
such vague talk of normal endowment and nor- affirmative manner) but is given in the judg-
mal circumstances precisely covers, and might ment-experience as itself present-present in
point to the fact that even this recourse to nor- the sense in which a state of affairs, meant in
mality will not make inwardly evident judg- this or that manner, according to its kind,
ments coincide with true ones. It is in the last whether singular or general, empirical or ideal,
resort undeniable that even the normal man in etc., can be "present." The analogy which con-
normal circumstances must pass, in an unnum- nects all experiences of primal givenness then
bered majority of cases, possible correct judg- leads to analogous ways of speaking, and in-
ments which lack inner evidence. One would ner evidence is called a seeing, a grasping of
surely not wish to conceive the "normality" in the self-given (true) state of affairs, or, as we
question in such a way that no actual human say with tempting equivocation, of the truth.
being, and no possible human being living in And, as in the realm of perception, the unseen
our finite natural conditions, could be called does not at all coincide with the nonexistent,
"normal." so lack of inward evidence does not amount
Empiricism altogether misunderstands the to untruth. The experience o f the agreement
relation between the ideal and the real: it like- between meaning and what is itself present,
wise misunderstands the relation between truth meant, between the actual sense o f an asser-
and inner evidence. Inner evidence is no ac- tion and the self-given state o f affairs, is in-
cessory feeling, either casually attached, or at- ward evidence: the Idea of this agreement is
tached by natural necessity, to certain judg- truth, whose ideality is also its objectivity. It is
ments. It is not the sort of mental character that not a chance fact that a propositional thought,
simply lets itself be attached to any and every occurring here and now, agrees with a given
22 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

state of affairs: the agreement rather holds be- Our conception alone escapes the doubt which
tween a self-identical propositional meaning, the conception of inner evidence as a causal-
and a self-identical state of affairs. "Validity" ly connected feeling never can escape, and
or "objectivity," and their opposites, do not which plainly amounts to a complete skepti-
pertain to an assertion as a particular temporal cism: the doubt whether, when we have insight
experience, but to the assertion in specie, to that J is the case, another might not have the
the pure, self-identical assertion 2 x 2 = 4, etc. insight that J', incompatible with J, is the case,
This conception alone accords with the fact that insights in general might not clash with
that it makes no difference whether we per- insights, without a hope of settlement. We un-
form a judgment (a judgment with the content, derstand, accordingly, why the "feeling" of
the meaning J) insightfully, or whether we have inner evidence has no other essential precon-
insight into the truth, the being of J. We ac- dition but the truth of the judged content in
cordingly also have insight into the fact that question. It is obvious that where there is noth-
no one's insight can be at variance with our ing, nothing can be seen, but it is no less obvi-
own (to the extent that either of us really has ous that where there is no truth, there can be
insight). This has its source in the essential re- no seeing something to be true, i.e., no inward
lation between the experience of truth and truth. evidence (cf. Investigation VI, chapter 5).

2. The Critique of Historicism

"Philosophy as Rigorous every kind of social unity, ultimately the unity

Science"* of the individual itself and also every kind of
cultural formation-has its intimate structure,
Historicism and Weltanshauung its typology, its marvelous wealth of external
philosophy and internal forms which in the stream of spirit-
life itself grow and transform themselves, and
Historicism takes its position in the factu- in the very manner of the transformation again
al sphere of the empirical life of the spirit. To cause to come forward differences in structure
the extent that it posits this latter absolutely, and type. In the visible outer world the struc-
without exactly naturalizing it (the specific ture and typology of organic development af-
sense of nature in particular lies far from his- ford us exact analogies. Therein there are no
torical thinking and in any event does not enduring species and no construction of the
influence it by determining it in general), there same out of enduring organic elements. What-
arises a relativism that has a close affinity to ever seems to be enduring is but a stream of
naturalistic psychologism and runs into simi- development. If by interior intuition we enter
lar skeptical difficulties. Here we are interest- vitally into the unity of spirit-life, we can get
ed only in what is characteristic of historical a feeling for the motivations at play therein
skepticism, and we want to familiarize our- and consequently "understand" the essence
selves more thoroughly with it. and development of the spiritual structure in
Every spiritual formation-taking the term question, in its dependence on a spiritually
in its widest possible sense, which can include motivated unity and development. In this man-

*PRS, pp. 122-129. Also reprinted in Husserl: Shorter Works, edited by Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981 ), pp. 185-188.
The Critique o f Historicism 23

ner everything historical becomes for us "un- the view that embraces the earth and all past
derstandable," "explicable," in the being pecu- events, the absolute validity of any particular
liar to it:which is precisely "spiritual being," a form of life-interpretation, of religion, and of
unity of interiorly self-questioning moments philosophy disappears. Thus the formation of
of a sense and at the same time a unity of in- a historical consciousness destroys more thor-
telligible structuration and development ac- oughly than does surveying the disagreement
cording to inner motivation. Thus in this man- of systems a belief in the universal validity of
ner also art, religion, morals, etc., can be any of the philosophies that have undertaken
intuitively investigated, and likewise the Welt- to express in a compelling manner the coher-
anschauung that stands so close to them and at ence of the world by an ensemble of concepts"
the same time is expressed in them. It is this (p. 6).
Weltanschauung that, when it takes on the The factual truth of what is said here is ob-
forms of science and after the manner of sci- viously indubitable. The question is, however,
ence lays claim to objective validity, is custom- whether it can be justified when taken as uni-
arily called metaphysics, or even philosophy. versal in principle. Of course, Weltanschauung
With a view to such a philosophy there arises and Weltanschauung philosophy are cultural
the enormous task of thoroughly investigating formations that come and go in the stream of
its morphological structure and typology as well human development, with the consequences
as its developmental connections and of mak- that their spiritual content is definitely moti-
ing historically understandable the spiritual vated in the given historical relationships. But
motivations that determine its essence, by re- the same is true of the strict sciences. Do they
living them from within. That there are sig- for that reason lack objective validity? A thor-
nificant and in fact wonderful things to be ac- oughly extreme historicist will perhaps answer
complished from this point of view is shown in the affirmative. In doing so he will point to
by W. Dilthey's writings, especially the most changes in scientific views-how what is to-
recently published study on the types of Welt- day accepted as a proved theory is recognized
anschauung. * tomorrow as worthless, how some call certain
Up to this point we have obviously been things laws that others call mere hypotheses and
speaking of historical science, not of histori- still others vague guesses, etc. Does that mean
cism. We shall grasp most easily the motives that in view of this constant change in scien-
that impel toward the latter if in a few sentences tific views we would actually have no right to
we follow Dilthey's presentation. We read as speak of sciences as objectively valid unities
follows: "Among the reasons that constantly instead of merely as cultural formations? It is
give new nourishment to skepticism, one of the easy to see that historicism, if consistently car-
most effective is the anarchy of philosophical ried through, carries over into extreme skepti-
systems" (p. 3). "Much deeper, however, than cal subjectivism. The ideas of truth, theory, and
the skeptical conclusions based on the contra- science would then, like all ideas, lose their
dictoriness of human opinions go the doubts absolute validity. That an idea has validity
that have attached themselves to the progres- would mean that it is a factual construction of
sive development of historical consciousness" spirit which is held as valid and which in its
(p. 4). "The theory of development (as a theory contingent validity determines thought. There
of evolution based on natural science, bound would be no unqualified validity, or validity-
up with a knowledge of cultural structures in-itself, which is what it is even if no one has
based on developmental history) is necessari- achieved it and though no historical humanity
ly linked to the knowledge of the relativity will ever achieve it. Thus too there would then
proper to the historical life form. In face of be no validity to the principle of contradiction

*Wilhelm Dilthey et al., Weltanschauung, Philosophie und Religion in Darstellungen (Berlin: Reichel & Co., 1911 ).
24 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

nor to any logic, which latter is nevertheless possibility of a philosophical science that is
still in full vigor in our time. The result, per- valid in itself? And what would he have to add
haps, will be that the logical principles of non- that could make the philosopher uncertain with
contradiction will be transformed into their regard to his idea, i.e., that of a true philoso-
opposites. And to go even further, all the propo- phy? Whoever denies a determined system, and
sitions we have just enunciated and even the even more, whoever denies the ideal possibil-
possibilities that we have weighed and claimed ity of a philosophical system as such, must ad-
as constantly valid would in themselves have vance reasons. Historical facts of development,
no validity, etc. It is not necessary to go further even the most general facts concerning the
here and to repeat discussions already given in manner of development proper to systems as
another place. We shall certainly have said such, may be reasons, good reasons. Still, his-
enough to obtain recognition that no matter torical reasons can produce only historical
what great difficulties the relation between a consequences. The desire either to prove or to
sort of fluid worth and objective validity, be- refute ideas on the basis of facts is nonsense-
tween science as a cultural phenomenon and according to the quotation Kant used: ex pum-
science as a valid systematic theory, may offer ice aquam.
an understanding concerned with clarifying Consequently, just as historical science can
them, the distinction and opposition must be advance nothing relevant against the possibil-
recognized. If, however, we have admitted sci- ity of absolute validities in general, so it can
ence as a valid idea, what reason would we still advance nothing in particular against the pos-
have not to consider similar differences be- sibility of an absolute (i.e., scientific) metaphys-
tween the historically worthwhile and the his- ics or any other philosophy. It can as historical
torically valid as at least an open possibility- science in no way prove even the affirmation
whether or not we can understand this idea in that up to the present there has been no scien-
the light of a critique of reason? The science of tific philosophy; it can do so only from other
history, or simply empirical humanistic science sources of knowledge, and they are clearly
in general, can of itself decide nothing, either philosophical sources. For it is clear that philo-
in a positive or in a negative sense, as to wheth- sophical criticism, too, in so far as it is really
er a distinction is to be made between art as a to lay claim to validity, is philosophy and that
cultural formation and valid art, between his- its sense implies the ideal possibility of a sys-
torical and valid law, and finally between his- tematic philosophy as a strict science. The un-
torical and valid philosophy. It cannot decide conditional affirmation that any scientific phi-
whether or not there exists, to speak Platoni- losophy is a chimaera, based on the argument
cally, between one and the other the relation that the alleged efforts of millennia make prob-
between the idea and the dim form in which it able the intrinsic impossibility of such a phi-
appears. And even if spiritual formations can losophy, is erroneous not merely because to
in truth be considered and judged from the draw a conclusion regarding an unlimited fu-
standpoint of such contraries of validity, still ture from a few millennia of higher culture
the scientific decision regarding validity itself would not be a good induction, but erroneous
and regarding its ideal normative principles is as an absolute absurdity, like 2 x 2 = 5. And
in no way the affair of empirical science. Cer- this is for the indicated reason: if there is some-
tainly the mathematician too will not turn to thing there whose objective validity philosophi-
historical science to be taught about the truth cal criticism can refute, then there is also an
of mathematical theories. It will not occur to area within which something can be grounded
him to relate the historical development of as objectively valid. If problems have demon-
mathematical representations with the question strably been posed "awry," then it must be pos-
of truth. How, then, is it to be the historian's sible to rectify this and pose straight problems.
task to decide as to the truth of given philo- If criticism proves that philosophy in its his-
sophical systems and, above all, as to the very torical growth has operated with confused con-
The Critique o f Historicism 25

cepts, has been guilty of mixed concepts and this regard we obviously still maintain that the
specious conclusions, then if one does not wish principles of even such relative evaluations lie
to fall into nonsense, that very fact makes it in the ideal sphere, which the evaluating histo-
undeniable that, ideally speaking, the concepts rian who will understand more than mere de-
are capable of being pointed, clarified, distin- velopments can only presuppose and not-as
guished, that in the given area correct conclu- historian-justify. The norm for the mathemati-
sions can be drawn. Any correct, profoundly cal lies in mathematics, for the logical in logic,
penetrating criticism itself provides means for for the ethical in ethics, etc. He would have to
advancing and ideally points to correct goals, seek reasons and methods of verification in
thereby indicating an objectively valid science. these disciplines if he also wanted to be really
To this would obviously be added that the his- scientific in his evaluation. If from this stand-
torical untenableness of a spiritual formation point there are no strictly developed sciences,
as a fact has nothing to do with its untenable- then he evaluates on his own responsibility-
ness from the standpoint of validity. And this let us say, as an ethical or as a religious man,
applies both to all that has been discussed so but in any case not as a scientific historian.
far and to all spheres whatever where validity If, then, I look upon historicism as an epis-
is claimed. temological mistake that because of its conse-
What may still lead the historicist astray is quences must be just as unceremoniously re-
the circumstance that by entering vitally into a jected as was naturalism, I should still like to
historically reconstructed spiritual formation, emphasize expressly that I fully recognize the
into the intention or signification that is domi- extraordinary value of history in the broadest
nant in it as well as into the ensembles of moti- sense for the philosopher. For him the discov-
vations that belong to it, we not only can un- ery of the common spirit is just as significant
derstand its intrinsic sense but also can judge as the discovery of nature. In fact, a deeper
its relative worth. If by a sort of assumption penetration into the general life of the spirit
we make use of the premises a past philoso- offers the philosopher a more original and hence
pher had at his disposition, then we can even- more fundamental research material than does
tually recognize and even marvel at the rela- penetration into nature. For the realm of phe-
tive "consistency" of his philosophy. From nomenology, as a theory of essence, extends
another point of view, we can excuse the in- immediately from the individual spirit over the
consistencies along with shifts and transforma- whole area of the general spirit; and if Dilthey
tions of problems that were inevitable at that has established in such an impressive way that
stage of the problematic and of the analysis of psychophysical psychology is not the one that
signification. We can esteem as a great accom- can serve as the "foundation for the human-
plishment the successful solution of a scientific istic sciences," I would say that it is the phe-
problem that would today belong to a class of nomenological theory of essence alone that is
problems easily mastered by a high-school stu- capable of providing a foundation for a phi-
dent. And the same holds true in all fields. In losophy of the spirit.
 II.
Phenomenological Clues

3. Expression and Meaning

Essential Distinctions ,.. Expressions function meaningfully even in

isolated mental life, where they no longer serve
§ 1. A n ambiguity in the term "sign" to indicate anything. The two notions of sign
do not therefore really stand in the relation of
The terms "expression" and "sign" are of- more extensive genus to narrower species.
ten treated as synonyms, but it will not be amiss The whole matter requires more thorough
to point out that they do not always coincide discussion.
in application in common usage. Every sign is
a sign for something, but not every sign has §2. The essence o f indication
"meaning," a "sense" that the sign "expresses."
In many cases it is not even true that a sign Of the two concepts connected with the
"stands for" that of which we may say it is a word "sign," we shall first deal with that of an
sign. And even where this can be said, one has indication. The relation that here obtains we
to observe that "standing for" will not count shall call the indicative relation. In this sense
as the "meaning" which characterizes the ex- a brand is the sign of a slave, a flag the sign of
pression. For signs in the sense of indications a nation. Here all marks belong, as character-
(notes, marks, etc.) do not express anything, istic qualities suited to help us in recognizing
unless they happen to fulfill a significant as the objects to which they attach.
well as an indicative function. If, as one un- But the concept of an indication extends
willingly does, one limits oneself to expres- more widely than that of a mark. We say the
sions employed in living discourse, the notion Martian canals are signs of the existence of in-
of an indication seems to apply more widely telligent beings on Mars, that fossil vertebrae
than that of an expression, but this does not are signs of the existence of prediluvian ani-
mean that its content is the genus of which an mals, etc. Signs to aid memory, such as the
expression is the species. To mean is not a much-used knot in a handkerchief, memorials,
particular way o f being a sign in the sense o f etc., also have their place here. If suitable
indicating something. It has a narrower appli- things, events or their properties are deliber-
cation only because meaning-in communi- ately produced to serve as such indications, one
cative speech-is always bound up with such calls them "signs" whether they exercise this
an indicative relation, and this in its turn leads function or not. Only in the case of indications
to a wider concept, since meaning is also ca- deliberately and artificially brought about does
pable of occurring without such a connection. one speak of standing for, and that both in re-

*LI, I, 269-271, 273-295 (First Investigation, Sections I, 2, and 4-15).

Expression and Meaning 27

spect of the action which produces the mark- §4. Digression on the associative origin
ing (the branding or chalking, etc.), and in the o f indication
sense of the indication itself, i.e., taken in its
relation to the object it stands for or that it is to The mental facts in which the notion of in-
signify. dication has its "origin," i.e., in which it can
These distinctions and others like them do be abstractively apprehended, belong to the
not deprive the concept of indication of its es- wider group of facts which fall under the his-
sential unity. A thing is only properly an indi- torical rubric of the "association of ideas."
cation if and where it in fact serves to indicate Under this rubric we do not merely have those
something to some thinking being. If we wish facts which concern the "accompaniment" and
to seize the pervasively common element here "reactivation" of ideas stated in the laws of
present we must refer back to such cases of association, but the further facts in which as-
"live" functioning. In these we discover as a sociation operates creatively, and produces
common circumstance the fact that certain ob- peculiar descriptive characters and forms of
jects or states of affairs o f whose reality some- unity.* Association does not merely restore
one has actual knowledge indicate to him the contents to consciousness and then leave it to
reality o f certain other objects or states o f af- them to combine with the contents there pres-
fairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality ent, as the essence or generic nature of either
o f the one is experienced (though not at all may necessarily prescribe. It cannot indeed
evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in disturb such unified patterns as depend solely
the reality o f the other. This relation of "moti- on our mental contents, e.g., the unity of vi-
vation" represents a descriptive unity among sual contents in the visual field. But it can cre-
our acts of judgment in which indicating and ate additional phenomenological characters
indicated states of affairs become constituted and unities which do not have their necessary,
for the thinker. This descriptive unity is not to law-determined ground in the experienced con-
be conceived as a mere form-quality founded tents themselves, nor in the generic forms of
upon our acts of judgment, for it is in their uni- their abstract aspects. t If A summons B into
ty that the essence of indication lies. More lu- consciousness, we are not merely simultane-
cidly put: the "motivational" unity of our acts ously or successively conscious of both A and
of judgment has itself the character of a unity B, but we usually feel their connection forc-
of judgment; before it as a whole an objective ing itself upon us, a connection in which the
correlate, a unitary state of affairs, parades it- one points to the other and seems to belong to
self, is meant in such a judgment, appears to it. To tum mere coexistence into mutual perti-
be in and for that judgment. Plainly such a state nence, or, more precisely, to build cases of
of affairs amounts to just this: that certain the former into intentional unities of things
things may or must exist, since other things which seem mutually pertinent, is the constant
have been given. This "since," taken as ex- result of associative functioning. All unity of
pressing an objective connection, is the objec- experience, all empirical unity, whether of a
tive correlate of "motivation" taken as a de- thing, an event or of the order and relation of
scriptively peculiar way of combining acts of things, becomes a phenomenal unity through
judgment into a single act of judgment. the felt mutual belongingness of the sides and

*To use personification and to talk of association as "creating" something, and to employ other similar figurative
expressions in common use, is too convenient to be abandoned. Important as a scientifically exact but circumlocutory
description of the relevant facts may be, ready understanding absolutely requires that we talk figuratively wherever
ultimate exactness is not needed.
t i talk above of "experienced contents," not of meant, apparent objects or events. Everything that really helps to
constitute the individual. "experiencing"' consciousness is an experienced content. What it perceives, remembers, in-
wardly presents, etc., is a meant or intentional object. This point will be further discussed in Investigation V.
28 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

parts that can be made to stand out as units in them, as is the case with speech. In such mani-
the apparent object before us. That one thing festations one man communicates nothing to
points to another, in definite arrangement and another: their utterance involves no intent to
connection, is itself apparent to us. The single put certain "thoughts" on record expressively,
item itself, in these various forward and back- whether for the man himself, in his solitary
ward references, is no mere experienced con- state, or for others. Such "expressions," in short,
tent, but an apparent object (or part, property, have properly speaking, no meaning. It is not
etc., of the same) that appears only in so far to the point that another person may interpret
as experience (Erfahrung) endows contents our involuntary manifestations, e.g., our "ex-
with a new phenomenological character, so pressive movements," and that he may there-
that they no longer count separately, but help by become deeply acquainted with our inner
to present an object different from themselves. thoughts and emotions. They "mean" some-
In this field of facts the fact of indication also thing to him in so far as he interprets them, but
has its place, in virtue whereof an object or state even for him they are without meaning in the
of affairs not merely recalls another, and so special sense in which verbal signs have mean-
points to it, but also provides evidence for the ing: they only mean in the sense of indicating.
latter, fosters the presumption that it likewise In the treatment which follows these distinc-
exists, and makes us immediately feel this in tions must be raised to complete conceptual
the manner described above. clarity.

§5. Expressions as meaningful signs. § 6. Questions as to the phenomeno-

Setting aside o f a sense o f "expression" logical and intentional distinctions
not relevant for our purpose which pertain to expressions as such

From indicative signs we distinguish mean- It is usual to distinguish two things in re-
ingful signs, i.e., expressions. We thereby em- gard to every expression:
ploy the term "expression" restrictively: we 1. The expression physically regarded (the
exclude much that ordinary speech would call sensible sign, the articulate sound-complex, the
an "expression" from its range of application. written sign on paper, etc.);
There are other cases in which we have thus to 2. A certain sequence of mental states, asso-
do violence to usage, where concepts for which ciatively linked with the expression, which
only ambiguous terms exist call for a fixed ter- make it be the expression of something. These
minology. We shall lay down, for provisional mental states are generally called the "sense"
intelligibility, that each instance or part of or the "meaning" of the expression, this being
speech, as also each sign that is essentially of taken to be in accord with what these words
the same sort, shall count as an expression, ordinarily mean. But we shall see this notion
whether or not such speech is actually uttered, to be mistaken, and that a mere distinction be-
or addressed with communicative intent to any tween physical signs and sense-giving experi-
persons or not. Such a definition excludes fa- ences is by no means enough, and not at all
cial expression and the various gestures which enough for logical purposes.
involuntarily accompany speech without com- The points here made have long been ob-
municative intent, or those in which a man's served in the special case of names. We distin-
mental states achieve understandable "expres- guish, in the case of each name, between what
sion" for his environment, without the added it "shows forth" (i.e., mental states) and what
help of speech. Such "utterances" are not ex- it means. And again between what it means (the
pressions in the sense in which a case of speech sense or "content" of its naming presentation)
is an expression, they are not phenomenally one and what it names (the object of that presenta-
with the experiences made manifest in them in tion). We shall need similar distinctions in the
the consciousness of the man who manifests case of all expression and shall have to explore
Expression and Meaning 29

their nature precisely. Such distinctions have cative speech function as indications. They
led to our distinction between the notions of serve the hearer as signs of the "thoughts" of
"expression" and "indication," which is not in the speaker, i.e., of his sense-giving inner ex-
conflict with the fact that an expression in liv- periences, as well as of the other inner experi-
ing speech also functions as an indication, a ences which are part of his communicative in-
point soon to come up for discussion. To these tention. This function of verbal expressions
distinctions other important ones will be added we shall call their intimating function. The con-
which will concern the relations between mean- tent of such intimation consists in the inner ex-
ing and the intuition which illustrates mean- periences intimated. The sense of the predicate
ing and on occasion renders it evident. Only "intimated" can be understood more narrow-
by paying heed to these relations can the con- ly or more widely. The narrower sense we may
cept of meaning be clearly delimited and can restrict to acts which impart sense, while the
the fundamental opposition between the sym- wider sense will cover all acts that a hearer may
bolic and the epistemological function of mean- introject into a speaker on the basis of what he
ings be worked out. says (possibly because he tells us of such acts).
If, e.g., we state a wish, our judgment concern-
§7. Expressions as they function in ing that wish is what we intimate in the nar-
communication rower sense of the word, whereas the wish it-
self is intimated in the wider sense. The same
Expressions were originally framed to fulfill holds of an ordinary statement of perception,
a communicative function: let us, accordingly, which the hearer forthwith takes to belong to
first study expressions in this function, so that some actual perception. The act of perception
we may be able to work out their essential logi- is there intimated in the wider sense, the judg-
cal distinctions. The articulate sound-complex, ment built upon it in the narrower sense. We at
the written sign, etc., first becomes a spoken once see that ordinary speech permits us to
word or communicative bit of speech, when a call an experience which is intimated an expe-
speaker produces it with the intention of "ex- rience which is expressed.
pressing himself about something" through its To understand an intimation is not to have
means; he must endow it with a sense in cer- conceptual knowledge of it, not to judge in
tain acts of mind, a sense he desires to share the sense of asserting anything about it: it con-
with his auditors. Such sharing becomes a pos- sists simply in the fact that the hearer intuitive-
sibility if the auditor also understands the ly takes the speaker to be a person who is ex-
speaker's intention. He does this inasmuch as pressing this or that, or as we certainly can say,
he takes the speaker to be a person who is not perceives him as such. When I listen to some-
merely uttering sounds but speaking to him, one, I perceive him as a speaker, I hear him
who is accompanying those sounds with cer- recounting, demonstrating, doubting, wishing,
tain sense-giving acts which the sounds reveal etc. The hearer perceives the intimation in the
to the hearer, or whose sense they seek to com- same sense in which he perceives the intimat-
municate to him. What first makes mental com- ing person-even though the mental phenom-
merce possible, and turns connected speech in·- ena which make him a person cannot fall, for
to discourse, lies in the correlation among the what they are, in the intuitive grasp of anoth-
corresponding physical and mental experiences er. Common speech credits us with percepts
of communicating persons which is effected by even of other people's inner experiences; we
the physical side of speech. Speaking and hear- "see" their anger, their pain, etc. Such talk is
ing, intimation of mental states through speak- quite correct, as long as, e.g., we allow out-
ing and reception thereof in hearing, are mutu- ward bodily things likewise to count as per-
ally correlated. ceived, and as long as, in general, the notion of
If one surveys these interconnections, one perception is not restricted to the adequate, the
sees at once that all expressions in communi- strictly intuitive percept. If the essential mark
30 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

of perception lies in the intuitive persuasion to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e.,
that a thing or event is itself before us for our as indications, of one's own inner experiences?
grasping-such a persuasion is possible, and I cannot think such a view acceptable. Words
in the main mass of cases actual, without ver- function as signs here as they do everywhere
balized, conceptual apprehension-then the re- else: everywhere they can be said to point to
ceipt of such an intimation is the mere perceiv- something. But if we reflect on the relation of
ing of it. The essential distinction just touched expression to meaning, and to this end break
on is of course present here. The hearer per- up our complex, intimately unified experience
ceives the speaker as manifesting certain in- of the sense-filled expression, into the two fac-
ner experiences, and to that extent he also per- tors of word and sense, the word comes before
ceives these experiences themselves: he does us as intrinsically indifferent, whereas the sense
not, however, himself experience them, he has seems the thing aimed at by the verbal sign
not an "inner" but an "outer" percept of them. and meant by its means: the expression seems
Here we have the big difference between the to direct interest away from itself towards its
real grasp of what is in adequate intuition, and sense, and to point to the latter. But this point-
the putative grasp of what is on a basis of inad- ing is not an indication in the sense previously
equate, though intuitive, presentation. In the discussed. The existence of the sign neither
former case we have to do with an experienced, "motivates" the existence of the meaning, nor,
in the latter case with a presumed being, to properly expressed, our belief in the meaning's
which no truth corresponds at all. Mutual un- existence. What we are to use as an indication
derstanding demands a certain correlation must be perceived by us as existent. This holds
among the mental acts mutually unfolded in also of expressions used in communication, but
intimation and in the receipt of such intima- not for expressions used in soliloquy, where we
tion, but not at all their exact resemblance. are in general content with imagined rather than
with actual words. In imagination a spoken or
§8. Expressions in solitary life printed word floats before us, though in reali-
ty it has no existence. We should not, however,
So far we have considered expressions as confuse imaginative presentations, and the im-
used in communication, which last depends age-contents they rest on, with their imagined
essentially on the fact that they operate indica- objects. The imagined verbal sound, or the
tively. But expressions also play a great part imagined printed word, does not exist, only its
in uncommunicated, interior mental life. This imaginative presentation does so. The differ-
change in function plainly has nothing to do ence is the difference between imagined cen-
with whatever makes an expression an expres- taurs and the imagination of such beings. The
sion. Expressions continue to have meanings word's nonexistence neither disturbs nor in-
as they had before, and the same meanings as terests us, since it leaves the word's expressive
in dialogue. A word only ceases to be a word function unaffected. Where it does make a dif-
when our interest stops at its sensory contour, ference is where intimation is linked with mean-
when it becomes a mere sound-pattern. But ing. Here thought must not be merely expressed
when we live in the understanding of a word, as meaning, but must be communicated and
it expresses something and the same thing, intimated. We can only do the latter where we
whether we address it to anyone or not. actually speak and hear.
It seems clear, therefore, that an expression's One of course speaks, in a certain sense,
meaning, and whatever else pertains to it es- even in soliloquy, and it is certainly possible to
sentially, cannot coincide with its feats of inti- think of oneself as speaking, and even as speak-
mation. Or shall we say that, even in solitary ing to oneself, as, e.g., when someone says to
mental life, one still uses expressions to inti- himself: "You have gone wrong, you can't go
mate something, though not to a second per- on like that." But in the genuine sense of com-
son? Shall one say that in soliloquy one speaks munication, there is no speech in such cases,
Expression and Meaning 31

nor does one tell oneself anything: one merely realized as being confined to a mere meaning-
conceives of oneself as speaking and commu- intention. A name, e.g., names its object what-
nicating. In a monologue words can perform ever the circumstances, in so far as it means
no function of indicating the existence of men- that object. But if the object is not intuitively
tal acts, since such indication would there be before one, and so not before one as a named
quite purposeless. For the acts in question are or meant object, mere meaning is all there is to
themselves experienced by us at that very mo- it. If the originally empty meaning-intention is
ment. now fulfilled, the relation to an object is real-
ized, the naming becomes an actual, conscious
§9. Phenomenological distinctions relation between name and object named.
between the phenomena o f physical Let us take our stand on this fundamental
expression and the sense-giving and distinction between meaning-intentions void of
sense-fulfilling act intuition and those which are intuitively ful-
filled: if we leave aside the sensuous acts in
If we now tum from experiences specially which the expression, qua mere sound of words,
concerned with intimation and consider expres- makes its appearance, we shall have to distin-
sions in respect of distinctions that pertain to guish between two acts or sets of acts. We shall,
them equally whether they occur in dialogue on the one hand, have acts essential to the ex-
or soliloquy, two things seem to be left over: pression if it is to be an expression at all, i.e., a
the expressions themselves, and what they ex- verbal sound infused with sense. These acts we
press as their meaning or sense. Several rela- shall call the meaning-conferring acts or the
tions are, however, intertwined at this point, and meaning-intentions. But we shall, on the other
talk about "meaning," or about "what is ex- hand, have acts, not essential to the expression
pressed," is correspondingly ambiguous. If we as such, which stand to it in the logically basic
seek a foothold in pure description, the con- relation of fulfilling (confirming, illustrating)
crete phenomenon of the sense-informed ex- it more or less adequately, and so actualizing
pression breaks up, on the one hand, into the its relation to its object. These acts, which be-
physical phenomenon forming the physical come fused with the meaning-conferring acts
side of the expression, and, on the other hand, in the unity of knowledge or fulfillment, we
into the acts which give it meaning and possi- call the meaning-fulfilling acts. The briefer ex-
bly also intuitive fullness, in which its relation pression "meaning-fulfillment" can only be
to an expressed object is constituted. In virtue used in cases where there is no risk of the ready
of such acts, the expression is more than a confusion with the whole experience in which
merely sounded word. It means something, and a meaning-intention finds fulfillment in its
in so far as it means something, it relates to correlated intuition. In the realized relation of
what is objective. This objective somewhat can the expression to its objective correlate,* the
either be actually present through accompany- sense-informed expression becomes one with
ing intuitions, or may at least appear in repre- the act of meaning-fulfillment. The sounded
sentation, e.g., in a mental image, and where word is first made one with the meaning-in-
this happens the relation to an object is real- tention, and this in its tum is made one (as in-
ized. Alternatively this need not occur: the tentions in general are made one with their
expression functions significantly, it remains fulfillments) with its corresponding meaning-
more than mere sound of words, but it lacks fulfillment. The word "expression" is normal-
any basic intuition that will give it its object. ly understood-wherever, that is, we do not
The relation of expression to object is now un- speak of a "mere" expression-as the sense-

*I often make use of the vaguer expression "objective correlate" (Gegenstdndlichkeit) since we are here never
limited to objects in the narrower sense, but have also to do with states of affairs. properties, and non-independent
forms. etc., whether real or categorial.
32 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

informed expression. One should not, there- Such pointing is not to be described as the
fore, properly say (as one often does) that an mere objective fact of a regular diversion of
expression expresses its meaning (its intention). interest from one thing to another. The fact that
One might more properly adopt the alternative two presented objects A and B are so linked by
way of speaking according to which the ful- some secret psychological coordination that
filling act appears as the act expressed by the the presentation of A regularly arouses the pre-
complete expression: we may, e.g., say, that a sentation of B, and that interest is thereby shift-
statement "gives expression" to an act of per- ed from A to B - s u c h a fact does not make A
ceiving or imagining. We need not here point the expression of the presentation of B. To be
out that both meaning-conferring and mean- an expression is rather a descriptive aspect of
ing-fulfilling acts have a part to play in intima- the experienced unity of sign and thing sig-
tion in the case of communicative discourse. nified.
The former in fact constitute the inmost core What is involved in the descriptive differ-
of intimation. To make them known to the hear- ence between the physical sign-phenomenon
er is the prime aim of our communicative in- and the meaning-intention which makes it into
tention, for only in so far as the hearer attri- an expression becomes most clear when we turn
butes them to the speaker will he understand our attention to the sign qua sign, e.g., to the
the latter. printed word as such. If we do this, we have an
external percept (or external intuitive idea) just
§ 10. The phenomenological unity o f like any other, whose object loses its verbal
these acts character. If this object again functions as a
word, its presentation is wholly altered in char-
The above distinguished acts involving the acter. The word (qua external singular) remains
expression's appearance, on the one hand, and intuitively present, maintains its appearance,
the meaning-intention and possible meaning- but we no longer intend it, it no longer prop-
fulfillment, on the other, do not constitute a erly is the object of our "mental activity." Our
mere aggregate of simultaneously given items interest, our intention, our thought-mere syn-
in consciousness. They rather form an inti- onyms if taken in sufficiently wide s e n s e s -
mately fused unity of peculiar character. Ev- point exclusively to the thing meant in the
eryone's personal experience bears witness to sense-giving act. This means, phenomenologi-
the differing weight of the two constituents, cally speaking, that the intuitive presentation,
which reflects the asymmetry of the relation in which the physical world-phenomenon is
between an expression and the object which constituted, undergoes an essential phenomen-
(through its meaning) it expresses or names. al modification when its object begins to count
Both are "lived through," the presentation of as an expression. While what constitutes the
the word and the sense-giving act: but, while object's appearing remains unchanged, the in-
we experience the former, we do not live in such tentional character of the experience alters.
a presentation at all, but solely in enacting its There is constituted (without need of a fulfill-
sense, its meaning. And in so far as we do this, ing or illustrative intuition) an act of meaning
and yield ourselves to enacting the meaning- which finds support in the verbal presentation's
intention and its further fulfillment, our whole intuitive content, but which differs in essence
interest centers upon the object intended in from the intuitive intention directed upon the
our intention, and named by its means. (These word itself. With this act, the new acts or act-
two ways of speaking have in fact the same complexes that we call "fulfilling" acts or act-
meaning.) The function of a word (or rather of complexes are often peculiarly blended, acts
an intuitive word-presentation) is to awaken whose object coincides with the object meant
a sense-conferring act in ourselves, to point to in the meaning, or named through this mean-
what is intended, or perhaps given intuitive ing.
fulfillment in this act, and to guide our inter- In our next chapter we shall have to con-
est exclusively in this direction. duct additional researches into the question as
Expression and Meaning 33

to whether the "meaning-intention," which on conferring or sense-fulfilling experience, we

our view characteristically marks off an expres- wish to consider what is, in a certain fashion,
sion from empty "sound of words," consists in given "in" these: the expression itself, its sense
the mere 'association of mental imagery of the and its objective correlate. We tum therefore
intended object with the sounded words, or at from the real relation of acts to the ideal rela-
least necessarily involves such an act of fancy, tion of their objects or contents. A subjective
or whether, on the other hand, mental imagery treatment yields to one that is objective. The
lies outside of the essence of an expression, and ideality of the relationship between expression
rather performs a fulfilling role, even if only and meaning is at once plain in regard to both
of a partial, indirect or provisional character. its sides, inasmuch as, when we ask for the
In order not to blur the main outlines of our meaning of an expression, e.g., "quadratic re-
thought, we shall not here enter more deeply mainder," we are naturally not referring to the
into phenomenological questions. In this whole sound-pattern uttered here and now, the van-
investigation, we need only do as much phe- ishing noise that can never recur identically:
nomenology as is required to establish essen- we mean the expression in specie. "Quadratic
tial, primary distinctions. remainder" is the same expression by whom-
The provisional description so far given will soever uttered. The same holds of talk about
have shown how complex is the correct descrip- the expression's meaning, which naturally does
tion of a phenomenological situation. Such not refer to some meaning-conferring experi-
complexity appears inevitable once we clearly ence.
see that all objects and relations among objects Every example shows that an essential dis-
only are what they are for us, through acts of tinction must here be drawn.
thought essentially different from them, in IfI sincerely s a y - w e shall always presume
which they become present to us, in which they sincerity-"The three perpendiculars of a tri-
stand before us as unitary items that we mean. angle intersect in a point," this is of course
Where not the phenomenological but the na- based on the fact that I judge so. If someone
ively objective interest dominates, where we hears me and understands my assertion, he like-
live in intentional acts without reflecting upon wise knows this fact; he "apperceives" me as
them, all talk of course becomes plain sailing someone who judges thus. But is the judging
and clear and devoid of circumlocution. One here intimated the meaning of my assertion, is
then, in our case, simply speaks of "expression" it what my assertion asserts, and in that sense
and of "what is expressed," of name and thing expresses? Plainly not. It would hardly occur
named, of the steering of attention from one to to anyone, if asked as to the sense or meaning
the other, etc. But where the phenomenologi- of my assertion, to revert to my judgment as an
cal interest dominates, we endure the hardship inner experience. Everyone would rather reply
of having to describe phenomenological rela- by saying: What this assertion asserts is the
tionships which we may have experienced on same whoever may assert it, and on whatever
countless occasions, but of which we were not occasion or in whatever circumstances he may
normally conscious as objects, and we have also assert it, and what it asserts is precisely this,
to do our describing with expressions framed that the three perpendiculars o f a triangle in-
to deal with objects whose appearance lies in tersect in a point, no more and no less. One
the sphere of our normal interests. therefore repeats what is in essence "the same"
assertion, and one repeats it because it is the
§ 11. The ideal distinctions between (I) one, uniquely adequate way of expressing the
expression and meaning as ideal unities same thing, i.e., its meaning. In this selfsame
meaning, of whose identity we are conscious
We have so far considered "the well-under- whenever we repeat the statement, nothing at
stood expression" as a concrete experience. all about judging or about one who judges is
Instead of considering its two types of factor, discoverable. We thought we were sure that a
the phenomenal expression and the sense- state of affairs held or obtained objectively,
34 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

and what we were sure of we expressed by sponding intuitions, and the formative acts in-
way of a declarative sentence. The state of af- volved in these-involves a thought, in which
fairs is what it is whether we assert that it ob- thought, as its unified specific character, its
tains or not. It is intrinsically an item, a unity, meaning is constituted.
which is capable of so obtaining or holding. It is this ideal unity men have in mind when
But such an obtaining is what appeared before they say that "the" judgment is the meaning of
us, and we set it forth as it appeared before us: "the" declarative sentence. Only the fundamen-
we said "So the matter is." Naturally we could tal ambiguity of the word "judgment" at once
not have done this, we could not have made tends to confuse the evidently grasped ideal
the assertion, if the matter had not so appeared unity with the real act of judging, to confuse
before us, if, in other words, we had not so what the assertion intimates with what it as-
judged. This forms part of an assertion as a psy- serts.
chological fact, it is involved in its intimation. What we have here said of complete asser-
But only in such intimation; for while what is tions readily applies also to actual or possible
intimated consists in inner experiences, what parts of assertions. If I judge If the sum o f the
we assert in the judgment involves nothing sub- angles in a triangle does not equal two right
jective. My act of judging is a transient experi- angles, the axiom o f parallels does not hold,
ence: it arises and passes away. But what my the hypothetical antecedent is no assertion, for
assertion asserts, the content that the three per- I do not say that such an inequation holds. None
pendiculars o f a triangle intersect in a point, the less it says something, and what it says is
neither arises nor passes away. It is an identity once more quite different from what it inti-
in the strict sense, one and the same geometri- mates. What it says is not my mental act of
cal truth. hypothetical presumption, though I must of
It is the same in the case of all assertions, course have performed this in order to speak
even if what they assert is false and absurd. sincerely as I do. But it is rather the case that,
Even in such cases we distinguish their ideal when this subjective act is intimated, something
content from the transient acts of affirming and objective and ideal is brought to expression:
asserting it: it is the meaning of the assertion, a the hypothesis whose conceptual content can
unity in plurality. We continue to recognize its appear as the same intentional unity in many
identity of intention in evident acts of reflec- possible thought-experiences, and which evi-
tion: we do not arbitrarily attribute it to our as- dently stands before us in its unity and identity
sertions but discover it in them. in the objectively-ideal treatment characteris-
If "possibility" or "truth" is lacking, an as- tic of all thinking.
sertion's intention can only be carried out sym- The same holds of the other parts of our
bolically: it cannot derive any "fullness" from statements, even of such as do not have the form
intuition or from the categorial functions per- of propositions.
formed on the latter, in which "fullness" its
value for knowledge consists. It then lacks, as §12. Continuation: The objective
one says, a "true," a "genuine" meaning. Later correlate o f an expression
we shall look more closely into this distinction
between intending and fulfilling meaning. To Talk of what an expression expresses has,
characterize the various acts in which the rel- in the discussion so far, several essentially dif-
evant ideal unities are constituted, and to throw ferent meanings. It relates, on the one hand, to
light on the essence of their actual "coinci- intimation in general, and especially in that
dence" in knowledge, will call for difficult, connection to sense-giving acts, at times also
comprehensive studies. It is plain, however, that to sense-fulfilling acts (if these are present at
each assertion, whether representing an exer- all). In an assertion, e.g., we express our judg-
cise of knowledge or not-whether or not, i.e., ment (we intimate it), but we also express per-
it fulfills or can fulfill its intention in corre- cepts and other sense-fulfilling acts which il-
Expression and Meaning 35

lustrate our assertion's meaning. On the other terloo"; "the equilateral triangle"-"the equi-
hand, such talk relates to the "contents" of such angular triangle." The meaning expressed in our
acts, and primarily to the meanings, which are pairs of names is plainly different, though the
often enough said to be "expressed." same object is meant in each case. The same
It is d9ubtful whether the examples ana- applies to names whose indefiniteness gives
lyzed, in our last section, would suffice even to them an "extension." The expressions "an equi-
lend provisional intelligibility to the notion of lateral triangle" and "an equiangular triangle"
meaning, if one could not forthwith introduce have the same objective reference, the same
a new sense of "expression" for purposes of range of possible application.
comparison. The terms "meaning," "content," It can happen, conversely, that two expres-
"state of affairs" and all similar terms harbor sions have the same meaning but a different
such powerful equivocations that our intention, objective reference. The expression "a horse"
even if expressed most carefully, still can pro- has the same meaning in whatever context it
mote misunderstanding. The third sense of "be- occurs. But if on one occasion we say "Bu-
ing expressed," which we must now discuss, cephalus is a horse," and on another "That cart-
concerns the objective correlate meant by a horse is a horse," there has been a plain change
meaning and expressed by its means. in our sense-giving presentation in passing from
Each expression not merely says something, the one statement to the other. The expression
but says it o f something: it not only has a mean- "a horse" employs the same meaning to pre-
ing, but refers to certain objects. This relation sent Bucephalus on one occasion and the cart-
sometimes holds in the plural for one and the horse on the other. It is thus with all general
same expression. But the object never coincides names, i.e., names with an "extension." "One"
with the meaning. Both, of course, only per- is a name whose meaning never differs, but one
tain to an expression in virtue of the mental should not, for that reason, identify the vari-
acts which give it sense. And, if we distinguish ous "ones" which occur in a sum: they all mean
between "content" and object in respect of such the same, but they differ in objective reference.
"presentations," one's distinction means the The case of proper names is different,
same as the distinction between what is meant whether they name individual or general ob-
or said, on the one hand, and what is spoken jects. A word like "Socrates" can only name
of, by means of the expression, on the other. different things by meaning different things,
The necessity of distinguishing between i.e., by becoming equivocal. Wherever the word
meaning (content) and object becomes clear has one meaning, it also names one object. The
when a comparison of examples shows us that same holds of expressions like "the number
several expressions may have the same mean- two," "redness," etc. We therefore distinguish
ing but different objects, and again that they equivocal names that have many meanings from
may have different meanings but the same ob- general or class-names that have many values.
ject. There is of course also the possibility of The same holds of other types of expres-
their differing in both respects and agreeing in sion, though in their case talk of objective ref-
both. The last occurs in the cases of synony- erence involves certain difficulties in virtue of
mous expressions, e.g., the corresponding ex- its manifoldness. If we consider, e.g., state-
pressions in different languages which mean ments of the form "S is P " we generally re-
and name the same thing ("London," "Lon- gard the subject of the statement as the object
dres"; "zwei," "deux," "duo," etc.). about which the statement is made. Another
Names offer the plainest examples of the view is, however, possible, which treats the
separation of meaning from the relation to ob- whole state of affairs which corresponds to the
jects, this relation being in their case usually statement as an analogue of the object a name
spoken of as "naming." Two names can differ names, and distinguishes this from the object's
in meaning but can name the same object, e.g., meaning. If this is done one can quote as ex-
"the victor at Jena"-"the vanquished at Wa- amples pairs of sentences such as "a is bigger
36 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

than b " - " b is smaller than a," which plainly from the varying intellectual forms through
say different things. They are not merely gram- which intuited objects first become intelligibly
matically but also "cogitatively" different, i.e., determined, mutually related objects. And so
different in meaning-content. But they express expressions, even when they function outside
the same state of affairs: the same "matter" is of knowledge, must, as symbolic intentions,
predicatively apprehended and asserted in two point to categorially formed unities. Different
different ways. Whether we define talk of the meanings may therefore pertain to the same
"object" of a statement in one sense or the intuitions regarded in differing categorial fash-
other---each has its own claims-statements are ion, and may therefore also pertain to the same
in either case possible which differ in meaning object.But where a whole range of objects cor-
while referring to the same object. responds to a single meaning, this meaning's
own essence must be indeterminate: it must
§13. Connection between meaning and permit a sphere of possible fulfillment.
objective reference These indications may suffice for the mo-
ment. They must guard in advance against the
Our examples entitle us to regard the dis- error of seriously thinking that sense-giving acts
tinction between an expression's meaning and have two distinct sides, one which gives them
its power to direct itself as a name to this or their meaning, while the other gives them their
that objective correlate-and of course the dis- determinate direction to objects.*
tinction between meaning and object i t s e l f -
as well-established. It is clear for the rest that §14. Content as object, content as
the sides to be distinguished in each expres- fulfilling sense, and content as sense or
sion are closely connected: an expression only meaning simpliciter
refers to an objective correlate because it means
something, it can be rightly said to signify or Relational talk of "intimation," "meaning"
name the object through its meaning. An act of and "object" belongs essentially to every ex-
meaning is the determinate manner in which pression. Every expression intimates some-
we refer to our object of the moment, though thing, means something and names or other-
this mode of significant reference and the mean- wise designates something. In each case, talk
ing itself can change while the objective refer- of "expression" is equivocal. As said above,
ence remains fixed. relation to an actually given objective corre-
A more profound phenomenological clari- late, which fulfills the meaning-intention, is not
fication of this relation can be reached only by essential to an expression. If this last impor-
research into the way expressions and their tant case is also taken into consideration, we
meaning-intentions function in knowledge. note that there are two things that can be said
This would show that talk about two distin- to be expressed in the realized relation to the
guishable sides to each expression, should not object. We have, on the one hand, the object
be taken seriously, that the essence of an ex- itself and the object as meant in this or that
pression lies solely in its meaning. But the same manner. On the other hand, and more properly,
intuition (as we shall show later) can offer ful- we have the object's ideal correlate in the acts
fillment of different expressions: it can be of meaning-fulfillment which constitute it, the
categorially apprehended in varying ways and fulfilling sense. Wherever the meaning-inten-
synthetically linked with other intuitions. Ex- tion is fulfilled in a corresponding intuition, i.e.,
pressions and their meaning-intentions do not wherever the expression actually serves to name
take their measure, in contexts of thought and a given object, there the object is constituted
knowledge, from mere intuition-I mean phe- as one "given" in certain acts, and, to the ex-
nomena of external or internal sensibility-but tent that our expression really measures up to

*Cf. with this Twardowski 's assumption of a "presentative activity moving in two directions" in his work Zur Lehre
vom lnhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (Vienna, 1894 ), p. 14.
Expression and Meaning 37

the intuitive data, as given in the same manner and a content in an objective sense. In the lat-
in which the expression means it. In this unity ter respect we must distinguish between:
of coincidence between meaning and meaning-
fulfillment, the essence of the meaning-ful- The content as intending sense, or as sense,
fillment corresponds with, and is correlative to, meaning simpliciter,
the essence of meaning: the essence of the the content as fulfilling sense, and
meaning-fulfillment is the fulfilling sense of the content as object.
the expression, or, as one may also call it, the
sense expressed by the expression. One says, §15. The equivocations in talk o f
e.g., that a statement of perception expresses a meaning and meaninglessness con-
perception, but also that it expresses the con- nected with these distinctions
tent of a perception. We distinguish, in a per-
ceptual statement, as in every statement, be- The application of the terms "meaning" and
tween content and object; by the "content" we "sense," not merely to the content of the mean-
understand the self-identical meaning that the ing-intention inseparable from the expression,
hearer can grasp even if he is not a percipient. but also to the content o f the meaning-
We must draw the same distinction in the case fulfillment, engenders a most unwelcome am-
of fulfilling acts, in the case, therefore, of per- biguity. It is clear from previous indications,
ceptions and their categorial formations. where we dealt with the fact of fulfillment, that
Through these acts the objective correlate of the acts on either side, in which intending and
our act of meaning stands before us intuitive- fulfilling sense are constituted, need not be the
ly as the very object we mean. We must, I say, same. What tempts us to transfer the same terms
distinguish again, in such fulfilling acts, be- from intention to fulfillment, is the peculiar way
tween their content, the meaning-element, as it in which the unity of fulfillment is a unity of
were, in the categorially formed percept, and identification or coincidence: the equivocation
the object perceived. In the unity of fulfillment, which one hoped a modifying adjective might
the fulfilling content coincides with the intend- render innocuous can scarcely be avoided. We
ing content, so that, in our experience of this shall continue, of course, to understand by
unity of coincidence, the object, at once in- "meaning" simpliciter the meaning which, as
tended and "given," stands before us, not as the identical element in our intention, is essen-
two objects, but as one alone. The ideal con- tial to the expressions as such.
ception of the act which confers meaning yields "Meaning" is further used by us as synony-
us the Idea of the intending meaning, just as mous with "sense." It is agreeable to have par-
the ideal conception of the correlative essence allel, interchangeable terms in the case of this
of the act which fulfills meaning, yields the concept, particularly since the sense of the term
fulfilling meaning, likewise qua Idea. This is "meaning" is itself to be investigated. A fur-
the identical content which, in perception, per- ther consideration is our ingrained tendency to
tains to the totality of possible acts of percep- use the two words as synonymous, a circum-
tion which intended the same object perceptu- stance which makes it seem rather a dubious
ally, and intend it actually as the same object. step if their meanings are differentiated, and if
This content is therefore the ideal correlate of (as G. Frege has proposed)* we use one for
this single object, which may, for the rest, be meaning in our sense, and the other for the ob-
completely imaginary. jects expressed. To this we may add that both
The manifold ambiguities in talk about what terms are exposed to the same equivocations,
an expression expresses, or about an expressed which we distinguished above in connection
content, may therefore be so ordered that one with the term "expression," and to many more
distinguishes between a content in a subjective, besides, and that this is so both in scientific and

*G. Frege, Ober Sinn und Bedeutung, Zeitschr. f philos. Kritik, vol. 100, p. 25; "On Sense and Reference," Trans-
lations from the Philosophical Writings o f Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford, 1966), pp. 56-78.
38 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

in ordinary speech. Logical clarity is much and to refer expressively to an object (to form
impaired by the manner in which the sense or a presentation of it), are one and the same. It
meaning of an expression is, often in the same makes no difference whether the object exists
thought sequence, now looked upon as the acts or is fictitious or even impossible. But if one
intimated by it, now as its ideal sense, now as gives a very rigorous interpretation to the
the objective correlate that it expresses. Since proposition that an expression, in so far as it
fixed terminological landmarks are lacking, has meaning, relates to an object, i.e., in a sense
the concepts themselves run confusedly into which involves the existence of the object, then
one another. an expression has meaning when an object cor-
Fundamental confusions arise from these responding to it exists, and it is meaningless
facts. General and equivocal names are, e.g., when no such object exists. Meanings are of-
repeatedly lumped together, since both can be ten spoken of as signifying the objects meant,
predicatively referred to a plurality of objects. a usage that can scarcely be maintained con-
Lacking fixed concepts, men did not know how sistently, as it springs from a confusion with
to distinguish the multiple senses of the equivo- the genuine concept of meaning.
cal names from the multiple values of the gen- 3. If the meaning is identified with the ob-
eral ones. Here we also meet with the frequent jective correlate of an expression, a name like
unclearness as to the true essence of the differ- "golden mountain" is meaningless. Here men
ence between collective and general names. generally distinguish objectlessness from
For, where collective meanings are fulfilled, meaninglessness. As opposed to this, men tend
we intuit a plurality of items: fulfillment is ar- to use the word "senseless" of expressions in-
ticulated into a plurality of individual intui- fected with contradiction and obvious incom-
tions, and so, if intention and fulfillment are patibilities, e.g., "round square," or to deny
not kept apart, it may well seem that the collec- them meaning by some equivalent phrase.
tive expression in question has many meanings. Sigwart,* e.g., says that a self-contradictory
It is more important for us to set forth pre- formula such as "square circle" expresses no
cisely the most detrimental equivocations in concept we can think, but that it uses words to
talk which concerns meaning and sense, on the set up an insoluble task. The existential propo-
one hand, or meaningless or senseless expres- sition "There is no square circle," on his view
sions, on the other. If we separate the blurred denies the possibility of connecting a concept
concepts, the following list emerges: with these words, and by a concept he express-
1. It is part of the notion of an expression to ly wants us to understand (if we get him right)
have a meaning: this precisely differentiates the "general meaning of a word," which is just
an expression from the other signs mentioned what we mean by it. Erdmannt has similar
above. A meaningless expression is, therefore, opinions in regard to the instance "A square
properly speaking, no expression at all: it is at circle is frivolous." We should, in consistency,
best something that claims or seems to be an have to apply the word "senseless" not mere-
expression, though, more closely ·considered, ly to expressions immediately absurd, but to
it is not one at all. Here belong articulate, word- those whose absurdity is mediate, i.e., the
like sound-patterns such as "Abracadabra," and countless expressions shown by mathemati-
also combinations of genuine expressions to cians, in lengthy indirect demonstrations, to be
which no unified meaning corresponds, though objectless a priori. We should likewise have
their outer form seems to pretend to such a to deny that concepts like regular decahedron,
meaning, e.g., "Green is or." etc., are concepts at all.
2. In meaning, a relation to an object is Marty raises the following objection to the
constituted. To use an expression significantly, thinkers just mentioned. "If the words are sense-

*Die lmpersonalien. p. 62.

tLogik, I, p. 233.
Expression and Meaning 39

less, how could we understand the question as ference left over here at a l l - i t readily seems
to whether such things exist, so as to answer it as if the expression first got its meaning here,
negatively? Even to reject such an existence, as if it drew meaning from the act of fulfill-
we must, it is plain, somehow form a presenta- ment. The tendency therefore arises to treat the
tion of such contradictory material"* . . . "If fulfilling intuitions-categorially formative acts
such absucdities are called senseless, this can are here in general passed o v e r - a s meanings.
only mean that they have no rational sense."t But fulfillment is often imperfect-we shall
These objections are clinching, in so far as these have to devote closer study to all such possibili-
thinkers' statements suggest that they are con- ties-and expressions often go with remotely
fusing the true meaninglessness mentioned relevant, only partially illustrative intuitions,
above under 1, with another quite different if with any at all. Since the phenomenological
meaninglessness, i.e., the a priori impossibility differences of these cases have not been closely
o f a fulfilling sense. An expression has mean- considered, men have come to locate the
ing in this sense if a possible fulfillment, i.e., significance of expressions, even of such as
the possibility of a unified intuitive illustration, could make no claim to adequate fulfillment,
corresponds to its intention. This possibility is in accompaniments of intuitive imagery. This
plainly meant ideally. It concerns no contin- naturally led to a total denial of meaning to
gent acts of expression or fulfillment, but their absurd expressions.
ideal contents: meaning as an ideal unity, here The new concept of meaning therefore origi-
to be called "intending meaning," on the one nates in a confusion of meaning with fulfilling
hand, and fulfilling meaning, standing to it in a intuition. On this conception, an expression
certain relation of precise adequacy, on the has meaning if and only if its intention-we
other. We apprehend this ideal relation by should say its "meaning-intention"-is in fact
ideative abstraction based on an act of unified fulfilled, even if only in a partial, distant and
fulfillment. In the contrary case we apprehend improper manner. The understanding of the
the real impossibility of meaning-fulfillment expression must be given life through certain
through an experience of the incompatibility "ideas of meaning" (it is commonly said), i.e.,
of the partial meanings in the intended unity of by certain illustrative images.
fulfillment. The final refutation of highly attractive, op-
The phenomenological clarification of these posed notions is an important task which re-
relationships calls for long, difficult analyses, quires lengthy discussions. These we shall post-
as will appear in a later investigation. pone to the next chapter, and here go on
4. If we ask what an expression means, we enumerating different concepts of meaning.
naturally recur to cases where it actually con-
tributes to knowledge, or, what is the same,
where its meaning-intention is intuitively ful- Fluctuation in Meaning and the
filled. In this manner the "notional presenta- Ideality of Unities of Meaning+
tion," i.e., the meaning-intention, gains clarity,
it shows itself up as "correct," as "really" ca- §24. Introduction
pable of execution. The draft it makes on intu-
ition is as it were cashed. Since in the unity of In our last chapter we dealt with the act of
fulfillment the act of intention coincides with meaning. But among the conclusions of our first
the fulfilling act, and fuses with it in the most chapter was a distinction between the act of
intimate fashion-if indeed there is any dif- meaning, on the one hand, and meaning itself,

*A. Marty, "Uber subjektlose Satze und das Verhaltnis der Grammatik zur Logik und Psychologie," Art. VI,
Vierteljahrsschrift f wiss. Phil. XIX, 80f.
tlbid., p. 81 note. Cf. Art. V, Vol. XVIII, p. 464.
:j:LI, I, 312-326 (First Investigation, Sections 24-29).
40 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

on the other, the ideal unity as against the mul- possible, in, e.g., the words "the state of mind
tiplicity of possible acts. This distinction, like intimated by the words I am now uttering,"
the others which go along with i t - t h e distinc- though the interpretation of our example breaks
tion between expressed content taken in a sub- down on closer examination. But intimation
jective, and the same taken in an objective and the state of affairs asserted fall quite apart
sense, and, in the latter respect, the distinction in statements such as "2 x 2 = 4." This state-
between content as significatum and content as ment does not say what is said by "I judge that
norninatum-are in countless cases undoubt- 2 x 2 = 4." They are not even equivalent state-
edly clear. This holds of all expressions which ments, since the one can be true when the oth-
occur in the context of an adequately ex- er is false.
pounded scientific theory. There are, however, One must of course stress that if the notion
cases where the situation is different, which of "intimation" is given the narrower sense
require particular consideration if they are not defined above, the objects named in the above
to plunge all our hard-won distinctions back examples are not among the experiences they
into confusion. Expressions whose meaning intimate. A man saying something about his
shifts, especially such as are occasional or contemporary mental state communicates its
vague, here raise serious problems. To solve presence through a judgment. Only as intimat-
these problems by distinguishing between shift- ing such a judgment (whose content is that he
ing acts of meaning, on the one hand, and ideal wishes, hopes, etc., this or that) is the man ap-
units of meaning, on the other, is the theme of perceived by the hearer as one who wishes,
the present chapter. hopes, etc. The meaning of such a statement
lies in this judgment, whereas the inner experi-
§25. Relations o f coincidence among ences in question are among the objects judged
the contents o f intimation and naming about. If we limit intimation in the narrower
sense to experiences which carry an expres-
Expressions may relate to the contemporary sion's meaning, the contents of intimation and
mental state of the person using them as much naming remain as distinct here as they are gen-
as they relate to other objects. They accordingly erally.
divide into those that also intimate what they
name (or what they generally stand for) and §26. Essentially occasional and objec-
those in whose case named and intimated con- tive expressions
tents fall asunder. Instances of the former class
are interrogative, optative and imperative sen- The expressions which name the momen-
tences, of the latter, statements relating to ex- tary content of intimation belong to a wider
ternal things, to one's own past experiences, to class of expressions whose meaning varies from
mathematical relationships, etc. If someone case to case. This happens, however, in so pe-
utters the wish "I should like a glass of water," culiar a manner that one hesitates to speak of
this serves to indicate to the hearer the speak- "equivocation" in this case. The same words "I
er's wish, which is also the object of the state- wish you luck" which express my wish, can
ment. What is intimated and what is named here serve countless other persons to express wishes
coincide in part. I say "in part," since the inti- having "the same" content. Not only do the
mation obviously goes further. It extends to wishes themselves differ from case to case,
the judgment expressed in the words "I should but the meanings of the wish-utterances do so
like, etc." The like naturally holds of state- too. At one time a person A confronts a person
ments about the ideas, judgments, and surmises B, at another time a person M confronts a per-
of the speaker which are of the forms "I imag- son N. If A wishes B "the same" that M wishes
ine that . . . ," "I am of the opinion that . . . ," "I N, the sense of the wish-utterances, which in-
judge that . . . ," "I conjecture that . . . . " A case cludes the idea of the confronting persons, is
even of total coincidence seems at first sight plainly different. This ambiguity is, however,
Expression and Meaning 41

quite different from that of the word "dog," On the other hand, we call an expression
which at one time means a type of animal, and essentially subjective and occasional, or, more
at anothe a foot or a grate.* The class of am- briefly, essentially occasional, if it belongs to
biguous expressions illustrated by this last ex- a conceptually unified group of possible mean-
ample are what one usually has in mind when ings, in whose case it is essential to orient ac-
one speaks of "equivocation." Ambiguity in tual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and
such cases does not tend to shake our faith in the situation. Only by looking to the actual
the ideality and objectivity of meanings. We circumstances of utterance can one definite
are free, in fact, to limit our expression to a meaning out of all this mutually connected class
single meaning. The ideal unity of each of the be constituted for the hearer. Since we regu-
differing meanings will not be affected by their larly understand such expressions in normal cir-
attachment to a common designation. But how cumstances, the very idea of these circum-
do things stand in the case of the other expres- stances, and of their regular relation to the
sions? Can we there still stick to self-identical expression, involves the presence of generally
meaning-unities, elsewhere made clear in their graspable, sufficiently reliable clues to guide
opposition to varying persons and their ex- the hearer to the meaning intended in the case
periences, when here our meanings must vary in question.
with such persons and their experiences? Ob- Among objective expressions we have, e.g.,
viously we are here dealing with a case of un- all expressions in theory, expressions out of
avoidable rather than chance ambiguity, one which the principles and theorems, the proofs
that cannot be removed from our language by and theories of the "abstract" sciences are made
an artificial device or convention. up. What, e.g., a mathematical expression
To promote clearness we shall define the means, is not in the least affected by the cir-
following distinction between essentially sub- cumstances of our actual use of it. We read and
jective and occasional expressions, on the one understand it without thinking of a speaker at
hand, and objective expressions, on the other. all. The case is different with expressions which
For simplicity's sake we shall deal only with serve the practical needs of ordinary life and
expressions in their normal use. with expressions which, in the sciences, pre-
We shall call an expression objective if it pare the way for theoretical results. I mean by
pins down (or can pin down) its meaning merely the latter expressions with which the investi-
by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be gator accompanies his own thought, or ac-
understood without necessarily directing one's quaints others with his considerations and en-
attention to the person uttering it, or to the cir- deavors, with his methodical preparations and
cumstances of the utterance. An objective ex- his provisional beliefs.
pression may be in varying ways equivocal: it Every expression, in fact, that includes a
may stand in the stated relation to several mean- personal pronoun lacks an objective sense. The
ings, so that it depends on the psychological word "I" names a different person from case to
context (on the chance drift of the hearer's case, and does so by way of an ever altering
thoughts, on the tenor of the talk already in meaning. What its meaning is at the moment,
progress and the tendencies it arouses, etc.) can be gleaned only from the living utterance
which of these meanings it arouses and means. and from the intuitive circumstances which
It may be that a glance at the speaker and his surround it. If we read the word without know-
situation may help all this. But whether or not ing who wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless
the word can be understood in one or other of but is at least estranged from its normal sense.
such meanings does not depend on this glance Certainly it strikes us differently from a wan-
as a sine qua non. ton arabesque: we know it to be a word, and a

*Husserl's example is of the German word Hund, meaning both a dog and a truck used in mines. -Translator's
note.
42 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

word with which whoever is speaker desig- ion. The one, relating to the word's general
nates himself. But the conceptual meaning function, is so connected with the word that its
thus evoked is not what the word "I" means, indicative function can be exercised once some-
otherwise we could simply substitute for it the thing is actually presented: this indicative func-
phrase "whatever speaker is designating him- tion is, in its tum, exercised/or the other, sin-
self." Such a substitution would lead to expres- gular presentation, and, by subsumption, makes
sions, not only unusual, but also divergent in the latter's object known as what is here and
sense, if, e.g., instead of saying "I am pleased" now meant. The former meaning can be called
I said "Whatever speaker is now designating the indicating meaning, the latter the meaning
himself is pleased." It is the universal seman- indicated.
tic function of the word "I" to designate who- What is true of personal pronouns is of
ever is speaking, but the notion through which course also true of demonstratives. If someone
we express this function is not the notion im- says "this," he does not directly arouse in the
mediately constitutive of its meaning. hearer the idea of what he means, but in the
In solitary speech the meaning of "I" is es- first place the idea or belief that he means some-
sentially realized in the immediate idea of one's thing lying within his intuitive or thought-
own personality, which is also the meaning of horizon, something he wishes to point out to
the word in communicated speech. Each man the hearer. In the concrete circumstances of
has his own I-presentation (and with it his in- speech, this thought is an adequate guide to
dividual notion ofl) and this is why the word's what is really meant. "This" read in isolation
meaning differs from person to person. But likewise lacks its proper meaning, and is un-
since each person, in speaking of himself, says derstood only to the extent that it arouses the
"I," the word has the character of a universally notion of its demonstrative function (which
operative indication of this fact. Through such we call its indicating meaning). In each case of
indication the hearer achieves understanding normal use, its full, actual meaning can only
of the meaning, he takes the person who con- grow out of the prominent presentation of the
fronts him intuitively, not merely as the speaker, thing that it makes its object.
but also as the immediate object of this speak- We must grant, of course, that a demonstra-
er's speech. The word "I" has not itself direct- tive often works in a manner that can claim
ly the power to arouse the specific I-presenta- equivalence with an objective use. A "this" in
tion; this becomes fixed in the actual piece of a mathematical context points to something
talk. It does not work like the word "lion," determined in a conceptually fixed manner,
which can arouse the idea of a lion in and by that is, understood as meant in this manner,
itself. In its case, rather, an indicative function without our needing to regard the actual utter-
mediates, crying as it were, to the hearer "Your ance. A mathematical exposition, after ex-
vis-a-vis intends himself." pressly stating a proposition, may go on to
We must, however, add something to what say "This follows from the fact that. . . . " Here
has been said. Properly speaking, we should the proposition in question could itself have
not suppose that the immediate presentation of been substituted for the word "this" without
the speaker sums up the entire meaning of the greatly altering the sense; this follows from
word "I." The word is certainly not to be re- the exposition's objective sense. One must of
garded as an equivocal expression, with mean- course attend to the continuous exposition
ings to be identified with all possible proper since, not the intended meaning, but only the
names of persons. Undoubtedly the idea of self- thought of an indication, belongs to the demon-
reference, as well as an implied pointing to the strative considered by itself. Mediation by in-
individual idea of the speaker, also belong, af- dicating meanings merely promotes brevity and
ter a certain fashion, to the word's meaning. increases mastery over the main drift of one's
We shall have to admit that two meanings are thought-intentions. The same plainly does not
here built upon one another in peculiar fash- apply in the common case where the demon-
Expression and Meaning 43

strative "this" and similar forms stand for the do not fit into Paul's useful division of expres-
house confronting the speaker, for the bird sions into those of usual and those of occasion-
flying up before him, etc. Here individual intu- al meaning. His division is based on the fact
ition, varied from case to case, must do duty: it "that the meaning which a word has in each
is not enough to look back to previously ut- application need not coincide with what usage
tered objective thoughts. accords in it in and for itself' (H. Paul, Prinzi-
In the sphere of essentially occasional ex- pien der Sprachgeschichte, p. 68). Paul has,
pressions one has also the subject-bound de- however, included our essentially occasional
terminations "here," "there," "above," "below," expressions in his treatment, for he says: 'There
"now," "yesterday," "tomorrow," "later," etc. are some words in occasional use which are
"Here" (to think out a last example) designates essentially framed to designate the concrete, but
the speaker's vaguely bounded spatial environ- which none the less lack their own relation to a
ment. To use the word is to refer to one's place definite concretum till individual application
on the basis of an intuitive, believing presen- gives them one. Here belong personal pro-
tation of one's own person and location. This nouns, possessive and demonstrative adjec-
changes from case to case, and changes like- tives, demonstrative adverbs, also words like
wise from person to person, though each can "now," "today," "yesterday."* It seems to me
say "here." It is again the general function of that occasional expressions in this sense fall
the word to name the spatial environment of outside of Paul's definitory antithesis. For it
the speaker, so that the genuine meaning of the pertains to the usual sense of this class of ex-
word is first constituted in the variable presen- pressions, that they owe their determinate
tation of this place. The meaning of "here" is meaning to the occasion, and are therefore oc-
in part universal and conceptual, inasmuch as casional in a somewhat different sense. Expres-
it always names a place as such, but to this uni- sions of usual meaning (in Paul's sense) can be
versal element the direct place-presentation at- divided into those usually univocal and those
taches, varying from case to case. In the given usually equivocal, and the latter into expres-
circumstances of speech, it acquires heightened sions usually varying among definite meanings
intelligibility by subsumption under the con- assignable in advance (such as the casual
ceptual indicating presentation of "here." equivoca "cock," "bear," etc.) and those in
An essentially indicating character natural- which this is not so, since their meaning is ori-
ly spreads to all expressions which include ented in each case to the individual instance,
these and similar presentations as parts: this though the manner of this orientation is a mat-
includes all the manifold speech-forms where ter of usage.
the speaker gives normal expression to some-
thing concerning himself, or which is thought §27. Other sorts o f fluctuating expres-
of in relation to himself. All expressions for stons
percepts, beliefs, doubts, wishes, fears, com-
mands belong here, as well as all combinations The variation of essentially occasional ex-
involving the definite article, in which the lat- pressions is heightened by the incompleteness
ter relates to something individual and merely with which they often express the speaker's
pinned down by class- or property-concepts. meaning. The distinction between essentially
When we Germans speak of the Kaiser we of occasional and objective expressions cuts
course mean the present German Kaiser. When across many other distinctions standing for new
we ask for the lamp in the evening, each man forms of ambiguity, the distinctions, e.g., be-
means his own. tween complete and incomplete (enthyme-
Note. Expressions with essentially occa- matic) expressions, between expressions func-
sional meaning, as dealt with in this section, tioning normally and expressions functioning

*The restriction to concreta is not essential. Demonstratives. e.g., can also refer to abstracta.
44 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

abnormally, between exact and vague expres- thought. The types, stemming from what are,
sions. The impersonalia of ordinary speech are or from what seem to be, genuinely unified
good examples as to how apparently firm, ob- fields, yield a number of concepts, more or
jective expressions really vary subjectively in less cognate or related, which emerge in tum
virtue of enthymematic abbreviation. No one according to the circumstances of our talk and
would understand the sentence "There are its varied thought-promptings. These do not
cakes" as he understands the mathematical sen- permit, for the most part, of definite identifi-
tence "There are regular solids." In the first cations and distinctions such as might guard
case we do not mean that cakes exist absolute- against unnoticed confusions among closely
ly and in general, but that there are cakes here connected concepts.
and now-for coffee. "It is raining," likewise, Similar to the haziness of such vague ex-
does not have the general meaning that rain is pressions, is the haziness of expressions stand-
falling, but that it is doing so now, outside. What ing for relatively simple genera and species of
the expression lacks is not merely unspoken, it phenomenal properties, which shade continu-
is not even expressly thought: it certainly be- ously into one another, whether spatially, tem-
longs, however, to what our speech means. If porally, qualitatively or intensively. The typi-
additions are made, we plainly get expressions cal characters which press in upon us in
that must be called "essentially occasional" in perception and experience, characters, e.g., of
the sense defined above. space- and time-pattern, of color- and tone-pat-
There is an even greater difference between tern, etc., lead to significant expressions which,
the properly expressed content of speech, i.e., in virtue of the fluid transitions among such
the content picked out and pinned down by the types (i.e., among their higher genera) must
uniform meaning-functions of the words in- themselves be fluid. Within certain ranges and
volved, and its meaning on occasions when limits their application is unhesitant, i.e., in
expressions are so shortened as not to express fields where the type appears clearly, where it
complete thoughts without the aids given to can be evidently identified and evidently dis-
understanding by the fortuitous occasion, e.g., tinguished from remotely unlike characters,
"Onward!," "You!," "Man alive!," "But my e.g., "signal-red" and "coal-black," andante and
dear, my dear," etc. Through the common in- presto. But these fields have vague borders, and
tuitive situation in which both speaker and flow over into correlative spheres compre-
hearer find themselves, these last can supple- hended in the same genus, and so give rise to
ment or differentiate mutilated and subjective- transitional regions where application varies
ly indeterminate meanings: the defective ex- and is wholly uncertain.*
pressions thus become understandable.
Among the distinctions relating to ambigu- §28. Variations in meanings as varia-
ity of expressions, we mentioned those between tions in the act o f meaning
exact and vague expressions. Most expressions
used in ordinary life, such as "tree," "shrub," We have become acquainted with various
"animal," "plant," etc., are vague, whereas all classes of expressions changeable in meaning,
expressions integral to pure theories and laws which count as subjective and occasional, since
are exact. Vague expressions have no single chance circumstances of speaking influence
meaning-content, the same in all cases of their their change. To these expressions other expres-
application: their meaning is oriented towards sions stand opposed, which are, in a corre-
types, only partially conceived with clearness spondingly wide sense, objective and fixed,
and definiteness, types which tend to vary from their meaning being normally free from all
case to case, perhaps even in a single train of variation. If we take this freedom from all varia-

*Cf. B. Erdmann, "Theorie der Typeneinteilungen," Philos. Monatshejte XXX.

Expression and Meaning 45

tion quite strictly, only exact expressions are and position in space and time, its quite defi-
ranged on this side, whereas vague expressions nite ways of persisting and changing. But what
and expressions which, for differing reasons, is objectively quite definite must permit ob-
vary with the occasion, stand ranged on the jective determination, and what permits objec-
other side'. tive determination must, ideally speaking, per-
We have now to consider whether these im- mit expression through wholly determinate
portant facts of fluctuation of meaning are word-meanings. To being-in-itself correspond
enough to shake our conception of meanings truths-in-themselves, and, to these last, fixed,
as ideal (i.e., rigorous) unities, or to restrict its unambiguous assertions. Of course, to be able
generality significantly. Those ambiguous ex- to say all this actually, would require, not
pressions we called essentially subjective, in merely the necessary number of well-distin-
particular, as also our distinction between vague guished verbal signs, but a corresponding num-
and exact expressions, might make us doubtful ber of expressions having precise meanings-
on this point. Do meanings themselves divide in the strict sense of expressions. We must be
into objective and subjective, into meanings able to build up all expressions covering all
fixed and meanings changeable on occasion? meanings entering into our theory, and to iden-
Must we, in other words, so interpret this dif- tify or distinguish such meanings with self-
ference, with seeming obviousness, that it be- evidence.
comes one between meanings that are ideal We are infinitely removed from this ideal.
unities, on the one hand, fixed species un- One need only think of the defective way in
touched by the flux of our subjective picturing which we pin down time- and space-positions,
and thinking, and such, on the other hand, as our necessary recourse to relations to previously
live submerged in the flux of subjective mental given individual existents, these last themselves
experiences, and are transitory events, at one inaccessible to an exact pinning down without
time there, and at the next moment not? making use of expressions having an essentially
We shall have to look on such a notion as subjective sense. Strike out the essentially oc-
invalid. The content meant by the subjective casional expressions from one's language, try
expression, with sense oriented to the occasion, to describe any subjective experience in unam-
is an ideal unit of meaning in precisely the same biguous, objectively fixed fashion: such an at-
sense as the content of a fixed expression. This tempt is always plainly vain.
is shown by the fact that, ideally speaking, each Plainly therefore, considered as such, mean-
subjective expression is replaceable by an ob- ings do not differ essentially among themselves.
jective expression which will preserve the iden- Actual word-meanings are variable, often
tity of each momentary meaning-intention. changing in a single spell of thought, by their
We shall have to concede that such replace- nature mainly adjusted to the occasion. Rightly
ment is not only impracticable, for reasons of seen, however, such change in meanings is re-
complexity, but that it cannot in the vast ma- ally change in the act o f meaning. In other
jority of cases, be carried out at all, will, in fact, words, the subjective acts which confer mean-
never be so capable. ing on expressions are variable, and that not
Clearly, in fact, to say that each subjective merely as individuals, but, more particularly,
expression could be replaced by an objective in respect of the specific characters in which
expression is no more than to assert the un- their meaning consists. But the meanings them-
bounded range o f objective reason. Everything selves do not alter: this is in fact an absurd
that is, can be known "in itself." Its being is a manner of speech if we adhere to our view of
being definite in content, and documented in meanings as ideal unities, whether in the case
such and such "truths in themselves." What is, of equivocal, subjectively defective expres-
has its intrinsically definite properties and re- sions, or in the case of univocal, objectively
lations, and if it has natural, thinglike reality, fixed ones. This is not merely a view demanded
then it has also its quite definite extension by our ordinary orientation to fixed expres-
46 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

sions, and by our talk of meanings which stay tween meanings which have, and meanings
the same, whenever anyone uses the same ex- which have no objects, between true and false
pression; it fits in with the whole guiding aim meanings, and, among such laws, we have the
of our analyses. pure "laws of thought," which express the a
priori connection between the categorial form
§29. Pure logic and ideal meanings of meanings and their objectivity or truth.
This notion of logic as a science of mean-
Pure logic, wherever it deals with concepts, ings is of course at odds with the mode of
judgments, and syllogisms, is exclusively con- speech and treatment of the traditional logic,
cerned with the ideal unities that we here call which operates with psychological or psycho-
"meanings." If we take the trouble to detach logically slanted terms such as "idea," "judg-
the ideal essence of meanings from their psy- ment," "affirmation," "denial," "presupposi-
chological and grammatical connections, if we tion," "inference," etc., and which thinks it is
try, further, to clear up their a priori relations really only establishing differences of psychol-
of adequacy, founded in this essence, to the ogy and tracking down psychological laws re-
objective correlates that they mean, we are al- lating to these. After the critical investigations
ready within the domain of pure logic. of our Prolegomena we can no more be taken
This is clear from the start if we first think in by all this. It only shows how far logic still
of the position logic takes up to the many sci- is from a proper understanding of the objects
ences, the position of nomological science, which make up its own true field of research,
concerned with the ideal essence of science as and how much it has still to learn from the ob-
such, or, what is the same, the position of no- jective sciences, whose essence it none the less
mological science, of scientific thought in gen- claims to make theoretically intelligible.
eral, taken purely in its theoretic content and Where the sciences unfold systematic theo-
connection. It is clear, secondly, when we note ries, when they no longer merely communicate
that the theoretic content of a science is no the progress of personal research and proof,
more than the meaning-content of its theoreti- but set forth the objectively unified, ripe fruit
cal statements, disembarrassed of all contingent of known truth, there is absolutely no talk of
thinkers and occasions of judgment, and that judgments, ideas and other mental acts. The ob-
such statements are given unity by the theo- jective researcher of course defines his ex-
ry's pattern, which in its tum acquires objec- pressions. He says: By "vis viva, " by "mass,"
tive validity through the ideally guaranteed by an "integral," by a "sine," etc., this or that is
adequacy of its unified meaning to the objec- meant. But he only points thereby to the objec-
tive correlate meant by it (which is "given" to tive meaning of his expressions, he indicates
us in self-evident knowledge). Undeniably what what "contents" he has in mind, which play
we call "meaning" in this sense covers only their part as constitutive moments in the truths
ideal unities, expressed through manifold ex- of his field. He is not interested in understand-
pressions, and thought of in manifold act-ex- ing, but in the concepts, which are for him ideal
periences, but none the less clearly separable unities of meaning, and also in the truths, which
from such chance expressions and from such themselves are made up out of such concepts.
chance experiences of thinking subjects. The investigator then propounds proposi-
If all given theoretic unity is in essence a tions, and naturally, in so doing, he asserts or
unity of meaning, and if logic is the science of judges. But he has no wish to speak of his own
theoretic unity in general, then logic evidently or of anyone else's judgments, but of the cor-
is the science of meanings as such, of their es- related states o f affairs, and when his critical
sential sorts and differences, as also of the ideal discussions concern propositions, he means by
laws which rest purely on the latter. Among the latter the ideal meanings of statements. He
such essential differences we have those be- does not say that judgments are true or false,
Expression and Meaning 47

but that propositions are so: his premisses are the true, and of the ideal in general, suspends
propositions, and so are his conclusions. Propo- all reality, including such as is subjective. If
sitions are not constructed out of mental acts some scientists at times think differently on this
of presentation or belief: when not constructed point, they do so, not in their professional sci-
out of other propositions, they ultimately point entific settings, but on subsequent reflection.
back to concepts. If, with Hume, we may hold that men's true
Propositions are themselves the elements beliefs are better documented by their deeds
of inferences. Here too there is a distinction be- than by their words, then we may twit such
tween acts of inferring and their unified con- thinkers with not understanding themselves.
tents, syllogisms, i.e., the self-identical mean- They pay no unprejudiced heed to what they
ings of certain complex statements. The relation think in their unreflective inquiries and dem-
of necessary consequence in which the form of onstrations, but are led astray by the supposed
an inference consists is not an empirical-psy- authority of logic, with its psychologistic fal-
chological connection among judgments as lacies and subjectively distorted terminology.
experiences, but an ideal relation among pos- All theoretical science consists, in its ob-
sible statement-meanings, among propositions. jective content, of one homogeneous stuff: it is
It "exists" or "subsists," i.e., it is valid, and such an ideal fabric of meanings. We can go even
validity is something without essential relation further and say that the whole, indefinitely com-
to an empirical thinker. If a natural scientist plex web of meanings that we call the theoreti-
deduces a machine's working from the laws of cal unity of science, falls under the very cat-
the lever, gravitation, etc., he no doubt experi- egory that covers all its elements: it is itself a
ences all sorts of subjective acts. What, how- unity of meaning.
ever, he thinks of, and what he knits together If meaning, rather than the act of meaning,
in unity, are concepts and propositions together concept and proposition, rather than idea and
with their objective relations. An objective judgment, are what is essential and germane in
unity of meaning, i.e., one adequate to the ob- science, they are necessarily the general object
jectivity which is self-evidently "given," of investigation in the science whose theme is
thereby corresponds to his subjective thought- the essence of science. Everything that is logi-
connections: this is whatever it is, whether any- cal falls under the two correlated categories of
one realizes this in thought or not. meaning and object. If we speak in the plural
This holds in general. Though the scientific of logical categories, we have only to do with
investigator may have no reason to draw ex- the pure species distinguishable a priori with-
press distinctions between words and symbols, in the genus of meaning, or with the correlated
on the one hand, and meaningful thought-ob- forms of categorially considered objectivity. In
jects, on the other, he well knows that expres- such categories the laws formulable in logic
sions are contingent, and that the thought, the have their foundation. We have, on the one
ideally selfsame meaning, is what is essential. hand, such laws as abstract from the ideal rela-
He knows, too, that he does not make the ob- tions between meaning-intention and meaning-
jective validity of thoughts and thought-con- fulfillment, and so from any possible knowl-
nections, of concepts and truths, as if he were edge-use of meanings, and consider only how
concerned with contingencies of his own or of meanings can be compounded to form novel
the general human mind, but that he sees them, meanings (whether "real" or "imaginary").* We
discovers them. He knows that their ideal be- have, on the other hand, logical laws, in the
ing does not amount to a psychological "be- more emphatic sense, which consider meanings
ing in the mind": the authentic objectivity of in respect of their having or not having objects,

*More on this point in Investigation IV.

48 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

in respect of their truth or their falsity, their sists of contents, in the ordinary sense of psy-
consistency or their absurdity, to the extent that chology. Here belong primarily all the sensu-
such things are merely determined by the ous elements of our experience, the appearances
categorial form of such meanings. Correspond- of words, in their purely visual, auditory or
ing with these latter laws, we have equivalent, motor content, and, in the next place, the acts
correlated laws for objects in general, objects of objective reference which locate such words
determined in thought by mere categories. All in space and time. The psychic stuff here in-
valid assertions regarding existence and truth, volved is well-known to be vastly manifold,
that are capable of being framed in abstrac- varying greatly from one individual to the
tion from all material of knowledge on a mere next, and for the same individual from one
foundation of meaning-forms, find their place moment to another, even in respect of "one
among such laws. and the same" word. The verbal presentations
which accompany and support my silent think-
ing sometimes involve picturings of words
The Phenomenological and Ideal spoken by my own voice, sometimes of letters
Content of the Experiences of written by me in shorthand or longhand-all
Meaning' these are individual peculiarities, and belong
merely to the psychological content of my
§30. The content o f the expressive presentational experience. Among contents in
experience taken in its psychological this psychological sense are also many differ-
sense and in the sense o f a unified ences in respect of act-character, not always
meaning easily seized descriptively, such as the subjec-
tive difference which constitutes reference or
The essence of meaning is seen by us, not understanding. If I hear the name "Bismarck"
in the meaning-conferring experience, but in it makes not the slightest difference to my un-
its "content," the single, self-identical inten- derstanding of the word's unified meaning,
tionalt unity set over against the dispersed whether I imagine the great man in a felt hat
multiplicity of actual and possible experiences or coat, or in a cuirassier's uniform, or what-
of speakers and thinkers. The "content" of a ever pictorial representation I may adopt. It
meaning-experience, in this ideal sense, is not is not even of importance whether any imag-
at all what psychology means by a "content," ery serves to illustrate my consciousness of
i.e., any real part or side of an experience. If meaning, or to enliven it less directly.
we understand a name-whether standing for Battling against a seductive notion, we laid
what is individual or general, physical or psy- it down that the essence of expression lies in
chic, existent or non-existent, possible or im- a meaning-intention, and not in the more or
possible-or if we understand a statement- less perfect, more or less close or remote, il-
true in content or false, consistent or absurd, lustration that accompanies or fulfills that in-
believed or figmentary-then what either ex- tention. If, however, such illustrations are
pression "says"-the meaning which forms its present, they will be intimately fused with the
logical content and which, in contexts of pure meaning-intention. It is therefore understand-
logic, is called either an idea or concept, or a able that our unified experience of the mean-
judgment or proposition-is nothing which ingfully functioning expression should, from
could, in a real sense, count as part of our act case to case, reveal considerable psychologi-
of understanding. This experience naturally has cal differences even on the meaning side,
its psychological components, is a content, con- whereas its meaning remains strictly the same.

*LI, I, 327-333 (First Investigation, Sections 30-35).

tThe word "intentional" is so framed as to permit application both to the meaning and the object of the intentio.
Intentional unity does not therefore necessarily mean the intended. the objective unity.
Expression and Meaning 49

We have also shown that there is something meanings; the judgment in the ideal, logical
in the correlated acts which really corresponds sense remains single.
to such selfsameness of meaning, that what That we here insist on the strict identity of
we call a meaning-intention is not an un- what is meant, and oppose it to the constant
differentiated character to which a connection mental character of meaning it, does not spring
with fulfiJling intuitions first imparts an exter- from our personal fondness for subtle distinc-
nal differentiation. Meaning-intentions of in- tions, but from the firm theoretical belief that
trinsically different character belong rather so alone can we do justice to a fact fundamen-
with differing meanings, or with expressions tal for the understanding of logic. We are not
used with differing meanings, whereas all ex- here dealing with a mere hypothesis, justifia-
pressions understood with like sense are ble only by explanatory fruitfulness; we are
clothed with the same meaning-intention as an appealing to an immediately graspable truth,
invariant mental character. Through this char- following in this the self-evidence which is the
acter, expressive experiences strongly differ- final authority in all questions of knowledge. I
ing in psychological make-up first become ex- see that in repeated acts of presentation and
periences endowed with the same meaning. judgment I mean, or can mean, the same con-
Fluctuation of meaning here certainly involves cept or proposition: I see that, wherever there
restrictions which make no essential differ- is talk of the proposition or truth that 7t is a
ence. transcendental number, there is nothing I have
less in mind than an individual experience, or
§31. The act-character o f meaning and a feature of an individual experience of any
the ideally unified meaning person. I see that such reflective talk really has
as its object what serves as a meaning in
We have opposed what is psychologically straightforward talk. I see lastly that what I
common to what is psychologically variable, mean by the sentence in question or (when I
but we have not thereby hit off the distinction hear it) grasp as its meaning, is the same thing,
we wanted to clarify: that between the psycho- whether I think and exist or not, and whether
logical and logical content of our expressions or not there are any thinking persons and acts.
and expressive acts. For the psychological con- The same holds of all types of meanings, sub-
tent as much includes what is constant from ject-meanings, predicate-meanings, relational
case to case as what varies with the occasion. and combinatory meanings, etc. It holds, above
It is not, therefore, our doctrine that an act-char- all, in the case of the ideal properties which
acter which stays the same in all cases is itself pertain primarily to meanings. Here belong, to
our meaning. What, e.g., the statement "1t is a mention a few only of the most important, the
transcendental number" says, what we under- predicates true and false, possible and impos-
stand when we read it, and mean when we say sible, general and singular, determinate and
it, is no individual feature in our thought-expe- indeterminate, etc.
rience, which is merely repeated on many oc- The genuine identity that we here assert is
casions. Such a feature is always individually none other than the identity o f the species. As a
different from case to case, whereas the sense species, and only as a species, can it embrace
of the sentence should remain identical. If we in unity ( uµ &Unv Et <; iiv), as an ideal unity,
or others repeat the same sentence with like the dispersed multiplicity of individual singu-
intention, each of us has his own phenomena, lars. The manifold singulars for the ideal uni-
his own words and his own nuances of under- ty Meaning are naturally the corresponding
standing. Over against this unbounded multi- act-moments of meaning, the meaning-inten-
plicity of individual experiences is the selfsame tions. Meaning is related to varied acts of mean-
element expressed in them all, "selfsame" in i n g - L o g i c a l Presentation to presentative
the very strictest sense. Multiplication of per- acts, Logical Judgment to acts of judging, Logi-
sons and acts does not multiply propositional cal Syllogism to acts of syllogism-just as
50 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

Redness in specie is to the slips of paper which demand of the craft of knowledge runs: "Use
lie here, and which all "have" the same red- words with an absolutely selfsame meaning:
ness. Each slip has, in addition to other consti- exclude all meaning-variations. Distinguish
tutive aspects (extension, form, etc.), its own meanings and keep them distinct in declarative
individual redness, i.e., its instance of this thought, and employ sharply distinct sensible
color-species, though this neither exists in the signs."
slip nor anywhere else in the whole world, and This prescription relates, however, as it only
particularly not "in our thought," in so far as can relate, to the formation of meaningful terms,
this latter is part of the domain of real being, to care in the subjective sifting out and expres-
the sphere of temporality. sion of one's thoughts. Meanings "in them-
Meanings constitute, we may say further, a selves" are, as we have argued, specific uni-
class of concepts in the sense of "universal ties, however much the act of meaning may
objects." They are not for that reason objects vary: they themselves are not ideals. Ideality
which, though existing nowhere in the world, in the ordinary, normative sense does not ex-
have being in a 't07t0<; oupavto<; or in a divine clude reality. An ideal is a concrete original that
mind, for such metaphysical hypostatization may exist, and that may confront one in real-
would be absurd. If one has accustomed one- ity, as when a young artist takes the work of a
self to understand by "being" only real being, great master as the ideal that he relives and that
and by "objects" only real objects, then talk of he strives after in his own creations. Even where
universal objects and of their being may well an ideal is not realizable, it is at least an indi-
seem basically wrong; no offense will, how- vidual in our presentative intention. The ideal-
ever, be given to one who has first used such ity of what is specific is, contrariwise, the com-
talk merely to assert the validity of certain plete opposite of reality or individuality; it
judgments, such in fact as concern numbers, represents no end of possible endeavor, its ide-
propositions, geometrical forms, etc., and who ality lies in a "unity in multiplicity." Not the
now asks whether he is not evidently obliged, species itself, but the individual falling under
here as elsewhere, to affix the label "genuinely it, can be a practical ideal.
existent object" to the correlate of his judg-
ment's validity, to what it judges about. In so- §33. The concepts Meaning and
ber truth, the seven regular solids, are, logically Concept (in the sense o f Species) do not
speaking, seven objects precisely as the seven coincide
sages are: the principle of the parallelogram
of forces is as much a single object as the city Meanings, we said, constitute a class of
of Paris.* "universal objects" or species. Each species, if
we wish to speak of it, presupposes a meaning,
§32. The ideality o f meanings is no in which it is presented, and this meaning is
ideality in the normative sense itself a species. But the meaning in which an
object is thought, and its object, the species it-
The ideality of meanings is a particular case self, are not one and the same. Just as in the
of the ideality of what is specific in general. It sphere of individuals we distinguish, e.g., be-
has not the sense of normative ideality, as if tween Bismarck himself and presentations of
we were here dealing with an ideal of perfec- Bismarck, e.g., Bismarck-the greatest o f Ger-
tion, an ideal limiting value, over against par- man statesmen, etc., so also, in the field of spe-
ticular cases which realized it more or less ap- cies, we distinguish between, e.g., the number
proximately. No doubt the "logical concept," 4 itself and the presentations, i.e., meanings,
i.e., the term in the sense of normative logic, which have 4 as their object, as, e.g., the num-
is an ideal in respect of its meaning. For the ber 4 - t h e second even number in the number-

*Regarding the question of the essence of universal objects see Investigation II.
Expression and Meaning 51

series, etc. The universality that we think of an identical propositional meaning is continu-
does not therefore resolve itself into the uni- ously meant in it, idealized and identified in
versality of the meanings in which we think of our unified thought-context, and thought of as
it. Meanings, although as such they are univer- one and the same. The same is the case wher-
sal objefts, fall, in respect o f the objects to ever a unified theoretical demonstration is be-
which they refer, into individual and specific ing wound up. We could utter no "therefore"
meanings, or (to conform to a readily under- unless there was also a glance at the meaning-
standable linguistic preference) into individu- content of the premisses. In judging the pre-
al and general meanings. Individual presenta- misses, we not merely live in our judgments,
tions, e.g., are therefore generalia, qua unities but reflect on their contents: only by glancing
of meaning, though their objects are indi- back at these does the conclusion appear "mo-
vidualia. tivated." Thus and only thus can the logical
form of the premisses-which of course is not
§34. In the act o f meaning we are not stressed in that universal, conceptual way that
conscious o f meaning as an object finds expression in syllogistic formulae-de-
termine with insight the drawing of the con-
In the actual experience of meaning an in- clusion.
dividual feature, a singular case of the species
(we said) corresponds to the unitary meaning, §35. Meanings "in themselves" and
just as to the specific difference Redness the meanings expressed
aspect of red in the object corresponds. If we
perform the act and live in it, as it were, we We have so far preferred to speak of mean-
naturally refer to its object and not to its mean- ings which, as the normal, relational sense of
ing. If, e.g., we make a statement, we judge the word suggests, are meanings of expressions.
about the thing it concerns, and not about the There is, however, no intrinsic connection be-
statement's meaning, about the judgment in the tween the ideal unities which in fact operate as
logical sense. This latter first becomes objec- meanings, and the signs to which they are tied,
tive to us in a reflex act of thought, in which i.e., through which they become real in human
we not only look back on the statement just mental life. We cannot therefore say that all
made, but carry out the abstraction (the Ide- ideal unities of this sort are expressed mean-
ation) demanded. This logical reflection is not ings. Wherever a new concept is formed, we
an act that takes place only under exceptional, see how a meaning becomes realized that was
artificial conditions: it is a normal component previously unrealized. As numbers-in the
of logical thinking. What is characteristic of ideal sense that arithmetic presupposes-nei-
such thought is the context of theory, and the ther spring forth nor vanish with the act of
theoretical consideration of the latter, which is enumeration, and as the endless number-series
carried out in step-by-step reflections on the thus represents an objectively fixed set of gen-
contents of the thought-acts just performed. A eral objects, sharply delimited by an ideal law,
very common form of thoughtful pondering which no one can either add to or take away
may serve as an instance: "Is S P? That could from, so it is with the ideal unities of pure log-
very well be. But from this proposition it would ic, with its concepts, propositions, truths, or in
follow that M is the case. This cannot be, and other words, with its meanings. They are an
so what I first thought possible, that Sis P, must ideally closed set of general objects, to which
be false, etc." The italicized words should be being thought or being expressed are alike
noted, as well as the idealizations they express. contingent. There are therefore countless mean-
This proposition, that S is P, which is the per- ings which, in the common, relational sense,
vasive theme of discussion, is plainly not the are merely possible ones, since they are never
fleeting moment of meaning in the thought-act expressed, and since they can, owing to the lim-
in which the notion first occurred to us. Logi- its of man's cognitive powers, never be ex-
cal reflection rather sets in at later stages, and pressed.
52 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

4. Meaning-Intention and Meaning-Fulfillmene =·

§ 6. The static union o f expressive Following our repeated demonstration of the

thought and expressed intuition. descriptive essence of perception, this means
Recognition (das Erkennen) no more phenomenologically than that we un-
dergo a certain sequence of experiences of the
We shall now absorb ourselves in a closer class of sensations, sensuously unified in ape-
investigation of the relations holding among in- culiar serial pattern, and informed by a certain
tuitive acts, on the one hand, and expressive act-character of "interpretation" (Auffassung),
acts, on the other. We shall confine ourselves, which endows it with an objective sense. This
in the present section entirely, to the range of act-character is responsible for the fact that an
the simplest possible cases, and so naturally to object, i.e., this inkpot, is perceptually appar-
expressions and significant intentions which ent to us. In similar fashion, the phenomenal
belong to the sphere of naming. We shall make, word is constituted for us in an act of percep-
for the rest, no claim to treat this field exhaus- tion or imaginative presentation.
tively. We are concerned with nominal ex- Not word and inkpot, therefore, but the act-
pressions, which refer themselves in the most experiences just described, in which they make
perspicuous of possible fashions to "corre- their appearance, are here brought into relation:
sponding" percepts and other forms of intuition. in these word and inkpot appear, while yet be-
Let us first glance in this field at a relation- ing nothing whatever in the acts in question.
ship o f static union, where a sense-giving But how does this happen? What brings these
thought has based itself on intuition, and is acts into unity? The answer seems clear. The
thereby related to its object. I speak, e.g., of relation, as one of naming, is mediated, not
my inkpot, and my inkpot also stands before merely by acts of meaning, but by acts of rec-
me: I see it. The name names the object of my ognition (Erkennen), which are here also acts
percept, and is enabled to name it by the sig- of classification. The perceived object is rec-
nificant act which expresses its character and ognized for an inkpot, known as one, and in so
its form in the form of the name. The relation far as the act of meaning is most intimately
between name and thing named has, in this state one with an act of classification, and this latter,
of union, a certain descriptive character that as recognition of the perceived object, is again
we previously noticed: the name "my inkpot" intimately one with the act of perception, the
seems to overlay the perceived object, to be- expression seems to be applied to the thing and
long sensibly to it. This belonging is of a pecu- to clothe it like a garment.
liar kind. The words do not belong to the ob- Ordinarily we speak of recognizing and clas-
jective context of physical thing-hood that sifying the object of perception, as if our act
they express: in this context they have no place, busied itself with this object. But we have seen
they are not referred to as something in or at- that there is no object in the experience, only a
taching to the things that they name. If we turn perception, a thus and thus determinate mind-
to the experiences involved, we have, on the edness (Zumutesein): the recognitive act in the
one hand, as said before, t the acts in which the experience must accordingly base itself on the
words appear, on the other hand, the similar act o f perception. One must not of course mis-
acts in which the things appear. As regards the understand the matter and raise the objection
latter, the inkpot confronts us in perception. that we are putting the matter as if perception

*LI, II, 687-697, 699-702 (Sixth Investigation, Sections 6-8, 10, and 11).
tLog. Inv. I, 2, 10.
Meaning-Intention and Meaning-Fulfillment 53

was classified rather than its object. We are ition, but belongs rather to an endless array of
not doing this at all. Such a performance would possible intuitions.
involve acts of a quite different, much more In what, however, does this belonging con-
complex constitution, expressible through ex- sist?
pressions of corresponding complexity, e.g., Let us deal with an extremely simple ex-
"the perception of the inkpot." It follows that ample, that of the name "red." In so far as it
the recognitive experience of this thing as "my names a phenomenal object as red, it belongs
inkpot," is nothing but a recognition which, in to this object in virtue of the aspect of red that
a definite and direct fashion, fuses an expres- appears in this object. And each object that
sive experience, on the one hand, with the rel- bears an aspect oflike sort in itself justifies the
evant percept, on the other. same appellation: the same name belongs to
The same holds of cases in which picture- each, and does so by way of an identical sense.
presentations serve in place of percepts. The But in what does this appellation by way of
imaginatively apparent object, e.g., the identi- an identical sense consist?
cal inkpot in memory or in fancy, is felt to bear We observe first that the word does not at-
the expression which names it. This means, tach externally, and merely through hidden
phenomenologically speaking, that a recogni- mental mechanisms, to the individual, specific-
tive act in union with an expressive experience ally similar traits of our intuitions. It is not
is so related to an imaginative act as to be, in enough, manifestly, to acknowledge the bare
objective parlance, spoken of as the recogni- fact that, wherever such and such an individual
tion of an imaginatively presented object as, trait appears in our intuition, the word also ac-
e.g., our inkpot. The imagined object, too, is companies it as a mere pattern of sound. A mere
absolutely nothing in our presentation of it, concomitance, a mere external going with or
our experience is rather a certain blend of im- following on one another would not forge any
ages, fancied sensations, informed by a certain internal bond among them, and certainly not
interpretative act-character. To live through an intentional bond. Yet plainly we have here
this act, and to have an imaginative presenta- such an intentional bond, and one of quite pe-
tion of the object, are one and the same. If we culiar phenomenological character. The word
therefore express the situation in the words "I calls the red thing red. The red appearing be-
have before me an image, the image of an fore us is what is referred to by the name, and
inkpot," we have plainly coupled new acts with is referred to as "red." In this mode of naming
our expressions, and, in particular, a recogni- reference, the name appears as belonging to
tive act which is intimately one with our act of the named and as one with it.
imagining. On the other hand, however, the word has
its sense quite apart from an attachment to this
§7. Recognition as a character o f acts, intuition, and without attachment to any "cor-
and the "generality o f words" responding" intuition. Since this sense is ev-
erywhere the same, it is plain that it is not the
The following more exact argument would mere phoneme, rather the true, complete word,
seem to show conclusively that, in all cases endowed on all occasions with the constant
where a name is applied to a thing intuitively character of its sense, that must be held to un-
given, we may presume the presence of a re- derlie the naming relation. Even then it will
cognitive act-character mediating between the not be enough to describe the union of mean-
appearance of the word-sounds, on the one hand ingful word and corresponding intuition in
(or the complete sense-informed word), and the terms of mere concomitance. Take the word,
intuition of the thing on the other. One often present in consciousness and understood as a
hears of the generality o f words, and usually mere symbol without being actually used to
understands by this highly ambiguous phrase name anything, and set the corresponding in-
that a word is not bound to an individual intu- tuition beside it: these two phenomena may at
54 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

once, for genetic reasons, be brought together must include the noise "red" as a part. The
in the phenomenological unity of naming. Their members of different speech-communities feel
mere togetherness is, however, not as yet this different verbal sounds to be fitting, and include
unity, which grows out o f it with plain novelty. these in the unity of "knowing something." But
It is conceivable, a priori, that no such unity the meaning attaching to such words, and the
should emerge, that the coexistent phenomena recognitive act actually attaching this meaning
should be phenomenologically disjoined, that to its object, remains everywhere the same, so
the object before us should not be the thing that these verbal differences are rightly re-
meant or named by the meaningful word, and garded as irrelevant.
that the word should not belong to the object The "generality of the word" means, there-
as its name, and so name it. fore, that the unified sense of one and the same
Phenomenologically we find before us no word covers (or, in the case of a nonsense-word,
mere aggregate, but an intimate, in fact inten- purports to cover) an ideally delimited mani-
tional, unity: we can rightly say that the two fold of possible intuitions, each of which could
acts, the one setting up the complete word, and serve as the basis for an act of recognitive
the other the thing, are intentionally combined naming endowed with the same sense. To the
in a single unity o f act. What here lies before word "red," e.g., corresponds the possibility of
us can be naturally described, with equal cor- both knowing as, and calling "red," all red ob-
rectness, by saying that the name "red" calls jects that might be given in possible intuitions.
the object red, or that the red object is recog- This possibility leads on, with an a priori guar-
nized (known) as red, and called "red" as a antee, to the further possibility of becoming
result o f this recognition. To "call something aware, through an identifying synthesis of all
r e d " - in the fully actual sense of "calling" such naming recognitions, of a sameness of
which presupposes an underlying intuition of meaning of one with the other: this A is red,
the thing so called-and to "recognize some- and that A is the same, i.e., also red: the two
thing as red," are in reality synonymous expres- intuited singulars belong under the same "con-
sions: they only differ in so far as the latter cept."
brings out more clearly that we have here no A dubious point emerges here. We said
mere duality, but a unity engineered by a single above that a word could be understood even if
act-character. In the intimacy of this fusion, we not actually used to name anything. Must we
must nonetheless admit, the various factors not, however, grant that a word must at least
implicit in our unity-the physical word-phe- have the possibility of functioning as the ac-
nomenon with its ensouling meaning, the as- tual name of something and so of achieving an
pect of recognition and the intuiting of what actual recognitive relation to corresponding
one names-do not separate themselves off intuition? Must we not say that without such
clearly, but our discussion compels us to pre- a possibility it could not be a word at all?
sume them all to be there. We shall have more The answer, of course, is that this possibility
to say on this point later on. depends on the possibility of the recognitions,
It is plain that the recognitive character of the "knowings," in question. Not all intended
certain acts, which gives them their significant knowing is possible, not all nominal meaning
relation to objects of intuition, does not pertain can be realized. "Imaginary" names may be
to words as noises, but to words in their mean- names, but they cannot actually be used to
ingful, their semantic (bedeutungsmdssigen) name anything, they have, properly speaking,
essence. Very different verbal sounds, e.g., the no extension, they are without generality in
"same" word in different languages, may in- the sense o f the possible and the true. Their
volve an identical recognitive relation: the ob- generality is empty pretension. But how these
ject is essentially known for the same, though last forms of speech are themselves to be
with the aid of quite different noises. Naturally made clear, what phenomenological facts lie
the complete recognition of something red, behind them, will be a matter for further inves-
being equivalent to the actually used name, tigation.
Meaning-Intention and Meaning-Fulfillment 55

What we have said applies to all expressions, different proper names apply to the same thing.
and not merely to such as have generality of This generality of the proper name, and of
meaning in the manner of a class-concept. It the peculiar meaning which corresponds to it,
applies lso to expressions having individual is plainly quite different in kind from that of
reference, such as proper names. The fact spo- the general name.
ken of as the "generality of verbal meaning" The former consists in the fact that a syn-
does not point to the generality accorded to thesis of possible intuitions belongs to a single
generic, as opposed to individual concepts, but, individual object, intuitions made one by the
on the contrary, embraces either indifferently. common intentional character imparted by
The "recognition," the "knowing," of which we every relation to the same object, despite all
speak when a significantly functioning ex- phenomenal differences among individual in-
pression encounters corresponding intuition, tuitions. On this unified basis, the particular
must not, therefore, be conceived as an actual unity of recognitive knowing reposes, which
classification, the ranging of an intuitively or belongs to the "generality of verbal meaning,"
cogitatively presented object in a class, a rang- to its range of ideally possible realizations. In
ing necessarily based on general concepts and this way the naming word has a recognitive
verbally mediated by general names. Proper relation to a boundless multitude of intuitions,
names, too, have their generality, though, when whose identical object it both knows and
actually used to name anything, they can eo ip- thereby names.
so not be said to classify it. Proper names, like The case of the class-name is quite differ-
other names, cannot name anything, without ent. Its generality covers a range o f objects, to
thereby also "knowing" it. That their relation each of which, considered apart, a possible
to corresponding intuition is, in fact, as indi- synthesis of percepts, a possible individual
rect as that of any other expression, can be meaning and proper name belongs. The gen-
shown by a treatment exactly analogous to the eral name "covers" this range through being
one conducted above. Each and every name able to name each item in the whole range in
obviously belongs to no definite percept, nor general fashion, i.e., not by individually rec-
to a definite imagination nor to any other pic- ognizing it in the manner of the proper name,
torial illustration. The same person can make but by classifying it, in the manner of the com-
his appearance in countless possible intuitions, mon name. The thing that is either directly
and all these appearances have no merely in- given, or known in its authentic self-being
tuitive but also a recognitive unity. Each ap- (Eigenheit), or known through its properties,
pearance from such an intuitive manifold will is now known as an A and named accordingly.
justify a precisely synonymous use of the
proper name. Whichever appearance is given, §8. The dynamic unity o f expression
the man using the name means one and the same and expressed intuition. The conscious-
person or thing. And he means this not merely ness o f fulfillment and that o f identity
in being intuitively oriented to it, as when he
deals with an object personally strange to him; From the tranquil, as it were static coinci-
he knows it as this definite person or thing. dence of meaning and intuition, we now tum
He knows Hans as Hans, Berlin as Berlin. To to that dynamic coincidence where an expres-
recognize a person as this person, or a city as sion first functions in merely symbolic fash-
this city, is again an act not tied to the particu- ion, and then is accompanied by a "more or
lar sensuous content of this or that word-ap- less" corresponding intuition. Where this hap-
pearance. It is identically the same act in the pens, we experience a descriptively peculiar
case of a variety (in possibility of an infinite consciousness o f fulfillment:* the act of pure
variety) of verbal noises, as, e.g., when several meaning, like a goal-seeking intention, finds its

*Cf. my Psych. Studies o f elementary Logic, II, "Concerning Intuitions and Representations," Philos. Monatshefte,
1894, p. 176. I have given up the concept of intuition supported there, as the present work makes plain.
56 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

fulfillment in the act which renders the matter while the objects are sometimes non-existent.
intuitive. In this transitional experience, the Talk of fulfillment therefore characterizes the
mutual belongingness of the two acts, the act phenomenological essence of the recognitive
of meaning, on the one hand, and the intuition relation more satisfactorily. It is a primitive phe-
which more or less corresponds to it, on the nomenological fact that acts of signification*
other, reveals its phenomenological roots. We and acts of intuition can enter into this peculiar
experience how the same objective item which relation. Where they do so, where some act of
was "merely thought of" in symbol is now pre- meaning-intention fulfills itself in an intuition,
sented in intuition, and that it is intuited as be- we also say: "The object of intuition is known
ing precisely the determinate so-and-so that it through its concept" or "The correct name has
was at first merely thought or meant to be. We been applied to the object appearing before us."
are merely expressing the same fact if we say We can readily do justice to the obvious phe-
that the intentional essence o f the act o f intu- nomenological difference between the static
ition gets more or less perfectly fitted into the and the dynamic fulfillment or recognition. In
semantic essence o f the act o f expression. the dynamic relationship the members of the
In the previously considered static relation relation, and the act of recognition which re-
among acts of meaning and intuition, we spoke lates them, are disjoined in time: they unfold
of a recognition, a knowing. This represents the themselves in a temporal pattern. In the static
sense-informed relation of the name to the in- relationship, which represents the lasting out-
tuitive datum that it names. But the element of come of this temporal transaction, they occur
meaning is not here itself the act of recogni- in temporal and material (sachlicher) coinci-
tion. In the purely symbolic understanding of a dence. There we have a first stage of mere
word, an act of meaning is performed (the word thought (of pure conception or mere signifi-
means something to us) but nothing is thereby cation), a meaning-intention wholly unsatisfied,
known, recognized. The difference lies, as the to which a second stage of more or less adequate
foregoing paragraphs have established, not in fulfillment is added, where thoughts repose as
the mere accompanying presence of the intu- if satisfied in the sight of their object, which
ition of the thing named, but in the phenom- presents itself, in virtue o f this consciousness
enologically peculiar form of unity. What is of unity, as what is thought of in this thought,
characteristic about this unity of knowing, of what it refers to, as the more or less perfectly
recognition, is now shown up by the dynamic attained goal of thinking. In the static relation-
relationship before us. In it there is at first the ship, on the other hand, we have this conscious-
meaning-intention, quite on its own: then the ness of unity alone, perhaps with no noticeably
corresponding intuition comes to join it. At the marked-off, precedent stage of unfulfilled in-
same time we have the phenomenological uni- tention. The fulfillment of the intention is not
ty which is now stamped as a consciousness here an event of self-fulfillment, but a tranquil
of fulfillment. Talk about recognizing objects, state of being-fulfilled, not a coming into coin-
and talk about fulfilling a meaning-intention, cidence, but a being coincident.
therefore express the same fact, merely from From an objective point of view we may
differing standpoints. The former adopts the here also speak of a unity o f identity. If we com-
standpoint of the object meant, while the latter pare both components of a unity of fulfill-
has the two acts as its foci of interest. Phe- ment-whether treating them in dynamic tran-
nomenologically the acts are always present, sition into one another, or holding them apart

*I use this expression without specially introducing it as a term, since it is the mere translation of "meaning." I shall
accordingly often speak of significative or signitive acts, instead of acts of meaning-intention, of meaning, etc. "Mean-
ing-acts" can scarcely be talked of, since expressions are used as the normal subjects of meaning. "Signitive" also
offers us a suitable terminological opposite to "intuitive." A synonym for "signitive" is "symbolic," to the extent that
the modern abuse of a word "symbol" obtains-an abuse already denounced by Kant-which equates a symbol with a
"sign," quite against its original and still indispensable sense.
Meaning-Intention and Meaning-Fulfillment 57

analytically in their static unity, only to see fulfillment-the former is in fact only another
them at once flowing back into one another- name for the latter-can be called an act of
we assert their objective identity. For we said, identification.
and said with self-evidence, that the object of
intuition is the same as the object of the thought Addendum. I cannot here suppress a diffi-
which fl!llfills itself in it, and, where the fit is culty connected with the otherwise illuminat-
exact, that the object is seen as being exactly ing notion of the unity of identity or recogni-
the same as it is thought of or (what always tion, as an act of identification or recognition.
says the same in this context) meant. Identity, This is particularly the case, since this difficulty
it is plain, is not first dragged in through com- will reveal itself as a serious one as our clari-
parative, cogitatively mediated reflection: it is fications proceed and progress, and will inspire
there from the start as experience, as unex- fruitful discussions. Closer analysis makes it
pressed, unconceptualized experience. In other plain that, in the cases detailed above, where
words, the thing which, from the point of view a name is actually applied to an object of in-
of our acts is phenomenologically described as tuition, we refer to the intuited and named
fulfillment, will also, from the point of view object, but not to the identity of this object,
of the two objects involved in it, the intuited as something at once intuited and named.
object, on the one hand, and the thought ob- Shall we say that an emphasis of attention de-
ject, on the other, be expressively styled "ex- cides the matter? Or ought we not rather to
perience of identity," "consciousness of iden- grant that there is not here a fully constituted
tity," or "act of identification." A more or less act of identification: the nucleus of this act, the
complete identity is the objective datum which connective union of significant intention and
corresponds to the act o f fulfillment, which corresponding intuition is really present, but
"appears in it." This means that, not only sig- it "represents" no objectifying interpretation
nification and intuition, but also their mutual (Auffassung). On the experienced unity of co-
adequation, their union of fulfillment, can be incidence no act o f relational identification is
called an act, since it has its own peculiar in- founded, no intentional consciousness of iden-
tentional correlate, an objective something to tity, in which identity, as a unity referred to,
which it is "directed." Another side of the same first gains objective status. In our reflection on
situation is again, we saw above, expressed in the unity of fulfillment, in analyzing and op-
talk about recognizing or knowing. The fact posing its mutually connected acts, we natu-
that our meaning-intention is united with intu- rally, and indeed necessarily, also framed that
ition in a fulfilling manner gives to the object relational interpretation which the form of its
which appears in such intuition, when it pri- union, with a priori necessity, permits. Our
marily concerns us, the character of a thing second section will deal with this question in
known. If we try to say more exactly "as what" its widest form, which concerns the categorial
we recognize something, our objective re- characters of acts (see Chapter VI, §48, and the
flection points, not to our act of meaning whole of Chapter VII). Meanwhile we shall
(Bedeutens), but to the meaning (Bedeutung), continue to treat the sort of unity in question as
the self-identical "concept" itself; talk of rec- a full act, or we shall at least not differentiate it
ognition therefore expresses our view of the expressly from a full act. This will not affect
same unified state from the standpoint of the the essential point in our treatment, in so far as
object of intuition (or of the fulfilling act), in the passage from a consciousness of unity to a
its relations to the meaning-concept of the relational identification always remains open,
signitive act. Conversely we say, though per- has a possibility guaranteed a priori, so that we
haps in more special contexts, that our thought are entitled to say that an identifying coinci-
"grasps" ( begreife) the matter, that it is the dence has been experienced, even if there is
latter's concept (Begriff) or "grasp." After our no conscious intention directed to identity,
exposition it is obvious that recognition, like and no relational identification.
58 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

§ 10. The wider class o f experiences o f cally different, and the same holds of ful-
fulfillment. Intuitions as intentions fillments of intentions whose indefiniteness
which require fulfillment points in this or that direction of possible ful-
fillment.
We may now further characterize the con- In our previous example there is also a re-
sciousness of fulfillment by seeing in it an ex- lation between expectation and fulfillment of
periential form which plays a part in many other expectation. It would, however, be quite wrong
fields of mental life. We have only to think of to think, conversely, that every relation of an
the opposition between wishful intention and intention to its fulfillment was a relationship
wish-fulfillment, between voluntary intention involving expectation. Intention is not expect-
and execution, of the fulfillment of hopes and ancy, it is not of its essence to be directed to
fears, the resolution of doubts, the confirmation future appearances. If I see an incomplete pat-
of surmises, etc., to be clear that essentially the tern, e.g., in this carpet partially covered over
same opposition is to be found in very differ- by furniture, the piece I see seems clothed with
ent classes of intentional experiences: the op- intentions pointing to further completions-we
position between significant intention and ful- feel as if the lines and colored shapes go on "in
fillment of meaning is merely a special case of the sense" of what we see-but we expect noth-
it. We have dealt with this point previously, and ing. It would be possible for us to expect some-
delimited a class of intentional experience un- thing, if movement promised us further views.
der the more pregnant name of "intentions": But possible expectations, or occasions for pos-
their peculiarity lies in being able to provide sible expectations, are not themselves expec-
the basis for relations of fulfillment. In this class tations.
are ranged all the acts which are in a narrower The external perceptions of the senses offer
or wider sense "logical," including the intui- us an indefinite number of relevant examples.
tive, whose role it is to fulfill other intuitions in The features which enter into perception al-
knowledge. ways point to completing features, which them-
When, e.g., a familiar melody begins, it stirs selves might appear in other possible percepts,
up definite intentions which find their fulfill- and that definitely or more or less indefinitely,
ment in the melody's gradual unfolding. The according to the degree of our "empirical ac-
same is the case even when the melody is un- quaintance" with the object. Every percept, and
familiar. The regularities governing melody every perceptual context, reveals itself, on
as such, determine intentions, which may be closer analysis, as made up of components
lacking in complete objective definiteness, but which are to be understood as ranged under two
which nonetheless find or can find their ful- standpoints of intention and (actual or possi-
fillments. As concrete experiences, these in- ble) fulfillment. The same applies to the paral-
tentions are of course fully definite: the "in- lel acts of imagining and picture-thought in
definiteness" of what they intend is plainly a general. In the normal case intentions lack the
descriptive peculiarity pertaining to their char- character of expectancy, they lack it in all cases
acter. We may say, in fact, with correct para- of tranquil perceiving or picturing, and they
dox (as we did before in a similar case) that acquire it only when perception is in flux, when
"indefiniteness" (i.e., the peculiarity of demand- it is spread out into a continuous series of per-
ing an incompletely determined completion, cepts, all belonging to the perceptual manifold
which lies in a "sphere" circumscribed by a law) of one and the same object. Objectively put:
is a definite feature of such an intention. Such the object then shows itself from a variety of
an intention has not merely a range of possible sides. What was pictorially suggested from one
fulfillment, but imports a common fulfillment- side, becomes confirmed in full perception from
character into each actual fulfillment from this another; what was merely adumbrated or giv-
range. The fulfillment of acts which have defi- en indirectly and subsidiarily as background,
nite or indefinite intentions is phenomenologi- from one side, at least receives a portrait-sketch
Meaning-Intention and Meaning-Fulfillment 59

from another, it appears perspectivally fore- the object of the intending act. These distinc-
shortened and projected, only to appear "just tions point to wider classes of cases than we
as it is" from another side. All perceiving and have hitherto preferred to deal with. Not only
imaginirrg is, on our view, a web of partial in- significative, but even intuitive intentions are
tentions, fused together in the unity of a single fulfilled in identifications and frustrated in
total intention. The correlate of this last inten- conflicts. We shall have to explore the whole
tion is the thing, while the correlate of its par- question of the natural circumscription of the
tial intentions are the thing's parts and aspects. acts to which the terms "same" and "other" (we
Only in this way can we understand how con- can as well say "is" and "is not") have applica-
sciousness reaches out beyond what it actually tion.
experiences. It can so to say mean beyond it- The two syntheses are not, however, com-
self, and its meaning can be fulfilled. pletely parallel. Each conflict presupposes
something which directs its intention to the
§ 11. Frustration and conflict. The object of the conflicting act; only a synthesis
synthesis o f distinction of fulfillment can give it this direction. Con-
flict, we may say, presupposes a certain basis
In the wider sphere of the acts to which dis- of agreement. If I think A to be red, when it
tinctions of intention and fulfillment apply,frus- shows itself to be "in fact" green, an intention
tration may be set beside fulfillment, as its in- to red quarrels with an intention to green in this
compatible contrary. The negative expression showing forth, i.e., in this application to intu-
that we normally use in this case, e.g., even the ition. Undeniably, however, this can only be
term "non-fulfillment," has no merely priva- the case because A has been identified in the
tive meaning: it points to a new descriptive fact, two acts of signification and intuition. Were this
a form of synthesis as peculiar as fulfillment. not so, the intention would not relate to the in-
This is so even in the narrower case of sig- tuition. The total intention points to an A which
nificant intentions as they stand to intuitive is red, and intuition reveals an A which is green.
intentions. The synthesis of recognition, of It is in the coincidence of meaning and intu-
"knowing," is the consciousness of a certain ition in their direction to an identical A that the
agreement. The possibility correlated with moments intended in union with A in the two
agreement is, however, "disagreement" or "con- cases come into conflict. The presumed red (i.e.,
flict": intuition may not accord with a signifi- red of A) fails to agree with the intuited green.
cant intention, but may "quarrel" with it. Con- It is through identity that such non-coincident
flict "separates," but the experience of conflict aspects correspond with each other: instead of
puts things into relation and unity: it is a form being "combined" by fulfillment, they are "sun-
of synthesis. If the previously studied synthe- dered" by conflict. An intention is referred to
sis was one of identification, this new synthe- an appropriate aspect in intuition from which
sis is one of distinction (unfortunately we pos- it is also turned away.
sess no other positive name). This "distinction" What we have here said with special regard
must not be confused with the other "distinc- to significant intentions and the frustrations
tion" which stands opposed to a positive liken- they encounter applies also to our whole previ-
ing. The oppositions between "identification ously sketched class of objectifying intentions.
and distinction" and between "likening and dis- We may generally say: An intention can only
tinction" are not the same, though it is clear be frustrated in conflict in so far as it forms
that a close phenomenological affinity explains part o f a wider intention whose completing part
our use of the same word. In the "distinction" is fulfilled. We can therefore not talk of con-
which is here in question, the object of the frus- flict in the case of simple, i.e., isolated, acts.
trating act appears not the same as, distinctfrom
 Phenomenology as Transcendental
Philosophy

5. The Basic Approach of Phenomenology

The Natural Attitude and Its within them, what they wish or will. They are
Exclusion* also present as actualities in my field of intu-
ition even when I do not heed them. But it is
§27. The world o f the natural attitude: not necessary that they, and likewise that oth-
I and my surrounding world er objects, be found directly in my field o fper-
ception. Along with the ones now perceived,
We begin our considerations as human be- other actual objects are there for me as deter-
ings who are living naturally, objectivating, minate, as more or less well known, without
judging, feeling, willing "in the natural atti- being themselves perceived or, indeed, pres-
tude." What that signifies we shall make clear ent in any other mode of intuition. I can let my
in simple meditations which can best be car- attention wander away from the writing table
ried out in the first person singular. which was just now seen and noticed, out
I am conscious of a world endlessly spread through the unseen parts of the room which
out in space, endlessly becoming and having are behind my back, to the verandah, into the
endlessly become in time. I am conscious of garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to
it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find all the Objects I directly "know of" as being
it immediately, that I experience it. By my see- there and here in the surroundings of which
ing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the there is also consciousness-a "knowing of
different modes of sensuous perception, cor- them" which involves no conceptual thinking
poreal physical things with some spatial dis- and which changes into a clear intuiting only
tribution or other are simply there for me, "on with the advertence of attention, and even then
hand" in the literal or the figurative sense, only partially and for the most part very im-
whether or not I am particularly heedful of perfectly.
them and busied with them in my considering, But not even with the domain of this intui-
thinking, feeling, or willing. Animate beings tionally clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct,
too--human beings, let us s a y - a r e immedi- co-present-which makes up a constant halo
ately there for me: I look up; I see them; I hear around the field of actual perception-is the
their approach; I grasp their hands; talking world exhausted which is "on hand" for me in
with them I understand immediately what the manner peculiar to consciousness at every
they objectivate and think, what feelings stir waking moment. On the contrary, in the fixed

*Ideas I, pp. 51-62 (Sections 27-32).

The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 61

order of its being, it reaches into the unlim- and I myself am a member of it. Moreover,
ited. What is now perceived and what is more this world is there for me not only as a world
or less clearly co-present and determinate (or of mere things, but also with the same immedi-
at least somewhat determinate), are penetrat- acy as a world o f objects with values, a world
ed and surrounded by an obscurely intended to o f goods, a practical world. I simply find the
horizon o f indeterminate actuality. I can send physical things in front of me furnished not
rays of the illuminative regard of attention in- only with merely material determinations but
to this horizon with varying results. Determin- also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and
ing presentations, obscure at first and then be- ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and
coming alive, haul something out for me; a disagreeable, and the like. Immediately, physi-
chain of such quasi-memories is linked togeth- cal things stand there as Objects of use, the
er; the sphere of determinateness becomes wid- "table" with its "books," the "drinking glass,"
er and wider, perhaps so wide that connection the "vase," the "piano," etc. These value-char-
is made with the field of actual perception as acteristics and practical characteristics also
my central surroundings. But generally the re- belong constitutively to the Objects "on hand"
sult is different: an empty mist of obscure in- as Objects, regardless of whether or not I tum
determinateness is populated ith intuited pos- to such characteristics and the Objects. Natu-
sibilities or likelihoods; and only the "form" rally this applies not only in the case of the
of the world, precisely as "the world," is pre- "mere physical things," but also in the case of
delineated. Moreover, my indeterminate sur- humans and brute animals belonging to my
roundings are infinite, the misty and never fully surroundings. They are my "friends" or "en-
determinable horizon is necessarily there. emies," my "servants" or "superiors," "strang-
What is the case with the world as existing ers" or "relatives," etc.
in the order of the spatial present, which I have
just been tracing, is also the case with respect §28. The cogito. M y natural surround-
to its order in the sequence o f time. This world, ing world and the ideal surrounding
on hand for me now and manifestly in every worlds
waking Now, has its two-sidedly infinite tem-
poral horizon, its known and unknown, imme- The complexes of my manifoldly changing
diately living and lifeless past and future. In spontaneities of consciousness then relate to
the free activity of experiencing which makes this world, the world in which I find myself
what is present intuited, I can trace these in- and which is, at the same time, my surround-
terrelations of the actuality immediately sur- ing world-complexes of investigative inspect-
rounding me. ing, of explicating and conceptualizing in de-
I can change my standpoint in space and scriptions, of comparing and distinguishing,
time, tum my regard in this or that direction, of collecting and counting, of presupposing and
forwards or backwards in time; I can always inferring: in short, of theorizing conscious-
obtain new perceptions and presentations, more ness in its different forms and at its different
or less clear and more or less rich in content, levels. Likewise the multiform acts and states
or else more or less clear images in which I of emotion and of willing: liking and dislik-
illustrate to myself intuitionally what is pos- ing, being glad and being sorry, desiring and
sible or likely within the fixed forms of a spa- shunning, hoping and fearing, deciding and act-
tial and temporal world. ing. All of them-including the simple Ego-
In my waking consciousness I find myself acts in which I, in spontaneous advertence and
in this manner at all times, and without ever seizing, am conscious of the world as immedi-
being able to alter the fact, in relation to the ately present-are embraced by the one Carte-
world which remains one and the same, though sian expression, cogito. Living along natural-
changing with respect to the composition of ly, I live continually in thisfundamentalform
its contents. It is continually "on hand" for me o f "active" [aktuellen] living whether, while
62 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

so living, I state the cogito, whether I am di- freely direct my regard and my acts into the
rected "reflectively" to the Ego and the cogi- one or the other.
tare. If I am directed to them, a new cogito is
alive, one that, for its part, is not reflected on §29. The "other" Ego-subjects and the
and thus is not objective for me. intersubjective natural surrounding
I always find myself as someone who is per- world
ceiving, objectivating in memory or in phan-
tasy, thinking, feeling, desiring, etc.; and I find All that which holds for me myself holds,
myself actively related in these activities for as I know, for all other human beings whom I
the most part to the actuality continually sur- find present in my surrounding world. Experi-
rounding me. For I am not always so related; encing them as human beings, I understand and
not every cogito in which I live has as its cogi- accept each of them as an Ego-subject just as
tatum physical things, human beings, objects I myself am one, and as related to his natural
or affair-complexes of some kind or other that surrounding world. But I do this in such a way
belong to my surrounding world. I busy my- that I take their surrounding world and mine
self, let us say, with pure numbers and their Objectively as one and the same world of which
laws: Nothing like that is present in the sur- we all are conscious, only in different modes.
rounding world, this world of "real actuality." Each has his place from which he sees the
The world of numbers is likewise there for physical things present; and, accordingly, each
me precisely as the Object-field of arithmeti- has different physical-thing appearances. Also,
cal busiedness; during such busiedness single for each the fields of actual perception, actual
numbers of numerical formations will be at memory, etc., are different, leaving aside the
the focus of my regard, surrounded by a partly fact that intersubjectively common objects of
determinate, partly indeterminate arithmeti- consciousness in those fields are intended to
cal horizon; but obviously this factual being- as having different modes, different manners
there-for-me, like the factually existent itself, of apprehension, different degrees of clarity,
is of a different sort. The arithmetical world is and so forth. For all that, we come to an under-
there for me only if, and as long as, I am in the standing with our fellow human beings and in
arithmetical attitude. The natural world, how- common with them posit an Objective spatio-
ever, the world in the usual sense of the word temporal actuality as our factually existent sur-
is, and has been, there for me continuously as rounding world to which we ourselves none-
long as I go on living naturally. As long as this theless belong.
is the case, I am "in the natural attitude," in-
deed both signify precisely the same thing. That §30. The general positing which
need not be altered in any respect whatever if, characterizes the natural attitude
at the same time, I appropriate to myself the
arithmetical world and other similar "worlds" What we presented as a characterization
by effecting the suitable attitudes. In that case of the givenness belonging to the natural atti-
the natural world remains "on hand": after- tude, and therefore as a characterization of
wards, as well as before, I am in the natural that attitude itself, was a piece of pure descrip-
attitude, undisturbed in it by the new attitudes. tion prior to any "theory." In these investi-
If my cogito is moving only in the worlds gations, we keep theories-here the word desig-
pertaining to these new attitudes, the natural nates preconceived opinions of every sort
world remains outside consideration; it is a -strictly at a distance. Only as facts of our sur-
background for my act-consciousness, but it is rounding world, not as actual or supposed
not a horizan within which an arithmetical unities of validity, do theories belong in our
world finds a place. The two worlds simulta- sphere. But we do not set for ourselves now
neously present are not connected, disregard- the task of continuing the pure description and
ing their Ego-relation by virtue of which I can raising it to the status of a systematically com-
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 63

prehensi ve characterization, exhausting the do is to convince ourselves of the essential pos-

breadths and depths of what can be found as sibility of the alteration in question.
data accepted in the natural attitude (to say The general positing, by virtue of which
nothing bf the attitudes which can be hannoni- there is not just any continual apprehensional
ously combined with it). Such a task can and consciousness of the real surrounding world,
must be fixed-as a scientific task; and it is but a consciousness of it as a factually exist-
an extraordinarily important one, even though ing "actuality," naturally does not consist o f
barely seen up to now. It is not our task here. a particular act, perchance an articulated
For us, who are striving toward the entrance- judgment about existence. It is, after all, some-
gate of phenomenology, everything needed thing that lasts continuously throughout the
along that line has already been done; we need whole duration of the attitude, i.e., throughout
only a few quite universal characteristics of natural waking life. That which at any time is
the natural attitude which have already come perceived, is clearly or obscurely presentiated
to the fore with a sufficiently full clarity in our - i n short, everything which is, before any
descriptions. Just this full clarity was of par- thinking, an object of experiential conscious-
ticular consequence to us. ness issuing from the natural world-bears, in
Once more, in the following propositions we its total unity and with respect to all articulat-
single out something most important: As what ed saliencies in it, the characteristic "there,"
confronts me, I continually find the one spatio- "on hand"; and it is essentially possible to base
temporal actuality to which I belong like all on this characteristic an explicit (predicative)
other human beings who are to be found in it judgment of existence agreeing with it. If we
and who are related to it as I am. I find the "ac- state such a judgment, we nevertheless know
tuality," the word already says it, as afactual- that in it we have only made thematic and con-
ly existent actuality and also accept it as it ceived as a predicate what already was some-
presents itself to me as factually existing. No how inherent, as unthematic, unthought, un-
doubt about or rejection of data belonging to predicated, in the original experiencing or,
the natural world alters in any respect the gen- correlatively, in the experienced, as the char-
eral positing which characterizes the natural acteristic of something "on hand."
attitude. "The" world is always there as an ac- We can now proceed with the potential and
tuality; here and there it is at most "otherwise" inexplicit positing precisely as we can with the
than I supposed; this or that is, so to speak, to explicit judgment-positing. One procedure,
be struck out o f it and given such titles as "illu- possible at any time, is the attempt to doubt
sion" and "hallucination," and the like; <it is universally which Descartes carried out for an
to be struck out of "the" world> which-ac- entirely different purpose with a view toward
cording to the general positing-is always fac- bringing out a sphere of absolutely indubitable
tually existent. To cognize "the" world more being. We start from here, but at the same time
comprehensively, more reliably, more perfectly emphasize that the attempt to doubt universal-
in every respect than naive experiential cogni- ly shall serve us only as a methodic expedient
zance can, to solve all the problems of scientific for picking out certain points which, as includ-
cognition which offer themselves within the ed in its essence, can be brought to light and
realm of the world, that is the aim of the sci- made evident by means of it.
ences belonging to the natural attitude. The attempt to doubt universally belongs to
the realm of our perfect freedom: we can at-
§31. Radical alteration o f the natural tempt to doubt anything whatever, no matter
positing. "Excluding," "parenthesiz- how firmly convinced of it, even assured of it
ing" in an adequate evidence, we may be.
Let us reflect on what lies in the essence o f
Instead o f remaining in this attitude, we pro- such an act. Someone who attempts to doubt
pose to alter it radically. What we now must some "being" or other, or predicatively expli-
64 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

cated, a "that exists," a "that is how it is," or iter (whether this is or not an actional [aktuelle J
the like. The sort of being does not matter. For and even a predicative positing of existence)
example, someone who doubts whether an ob- and, likewise in a specifically peculiar manner,
ject, the being of which he does not doubt, is changes its value. This changing o f value is a
qualified thus and so, doubts precisely the be- matter in which we are perfectly free, and it
ing-qualified-thus-and-so. Obviously this is stands over against all cogitative position-tak-
carried over from doubting to attempting to ings coordinate with the positing and incom-
doubt. Furthermore, it is clear that we cannot patible with the positing in the unity of the
doubt a being and, in the same consciousness "simultaneous," as well as over against all po-
(with the form of unity belonging to the simul- sition-takings in the proper sense of the term.
taneous) posit the substrate of this being, thus In the attempt to doubt which accompanies
being conscious of the substrate as having the a positing which, as we presuppose, is certain
characteristic, "on hand." Equivalently ex- and continued, the "excluding" is brought about
pressed: The same material of being cannot be in and with a modification of the counter posit-
simultaneously doubted and held to be certain. ing, namely the "supposition" o f non-being
In like manner, it is clear that the attempt to which is, therefore, part of the substratum of
doubt anything intended to as something on the attempt to doubt. In Descartes this part is
hand necessarily effects a certain annulment so predominant that one can say that his attempt
o f positing and precisely this interests us. The to doubt universally is properly an attempt to
annulment in question is not a transmutation negate universally. Here we disregard this part;
of positing into counter positing, of position we are not interested in every analytically dis-
into negation; it is also not a transmutation in- tinguishable component of the attempt to doubt,
to uncertain presumption, deeming possible, and consequently we are not interested in the
undecidedness, into a doubt (in any sense what- exact and fully sufficient analysis of it. We
ever of the word): nor indeed is anything like single out only the phenomenon o f "parenthe-
that within the sphere of our free choice. Rather sizing" or "excluding" which, while obviously
it is something wholly peculiar. We do not give not restricted to the phenomenon of attempt-
up the positing we effected, we do not in any ing to doubt, is particularly easy to analyze out
respect alter our conviction which remains in and which can, on the contrary, make its ap-
itself as it is as long as we do not introduce pearance also in other combinations and,
new judgment motives: precisely this is what equally well, alone. With regard to any posit-
we do not do. Nevertheless the positing un- ing we can quite freely exercise this peculiar
dergoes a modification: while it in itself re- £7tOX, a certain refraining from judgment
mains what it is, we, so to speak, "put it out o f which is compatible with the unshaken convic-
action," we "exclude it," we "parenthesize it." tion o f truth, even with the unshakable convic-
It is still there, like the parenthesized in the tion o f evident truth. The positing is "put out
parentheses, like the excluded outside the con- of action," parenthesized, converted into the
text of inclusion [wie das Ausgeschaltete aufi- modification, "parenthesized positing"; the
erhalb des Zusammenhanges der Schaltung]. judgment simpliciter is converted into the "pa-
We can also say: The positing is a mental pro- renthesized judgment."
cess, but we make "no use" o f it, and this is not Naturally one must not identify this con-
understood, naturally, as implying that we are sciousness with the consciousness called "mere
deprived of it (as it would if we said of some- phantasying," let us say, that nymphs are per-
one who was not conscious, that he made no forming a round dance. In the latter conscious-
use of a positing); rather, in the case of this ness, after all, no excluding of a living convic-
expression and all parallel expressions it is a tion, which remains alive, takes place. The
matter of indicative designations of a definite, consciousness of which we are speaking is even
specifically peculiar mode o f consciousness further from being a matter of just thinking of
which is added to the original positing simplic- something in the sense o f "assuming" or pre-
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 65

supposing, which, in ordinary equivocal lan- er I am exercising the "phenomenological"

guage, can also be expressed by "It seems to £1tOXll which also completely shuts me offfrom
me (I make the assumption) that such and such any judgment about spatiotemporal factual
is the case.,, being.
It should also be said that nothing prevents Thus I exclude all sciences relating to this
speaking correlatively o f parenthesizing with natural world no matter how firmly they stand
respect to a positable objectivity belonging to there for me, no matter how much I admire
no matter what region and category. When them, no matter how little I think of making
speaking thus, we mean that every positing re- even the least objection to them; I make ab-
lated to this objectivity is to be excluded and solutely no use o f the things posited in them
converted into its parenthetical modification. {von ihren Geltungen]. Nor do I make my own
Furthermore, when the metaphor of parenthe- a single one o f the propositions belonging to
sizing is closely examined it is seen to be, from <those sciences>, even though it be perfectly
the very beginning, more suitable to the object- evident; none is accepted by me; none gives
sphere; just as the locution of "putting out of me afoundation-let this be well noted: as long
action" is better suited to the act- or conscious- as it is understood as it is presented in one of
ness-sphere. those sciences as a truth about actualities of
this world. / must not accept such a proposi-
§32. The phenomenological £1tOX1) tion until after I have put parenthesis around
it. That signifies that I may accept such a propo-
We could now let the universal foox11, in sition only in the modified consciousness, the
our sharply determinate and novel sense of the consciousness of judgment-excluding, and
term, take the place of the Cartesian attempt to therefore not as it is in science, a proposition
doubt universally. But with good reason we which claims validity and the validity o f which
limit the universality of that. Since we are com- I accept and use.
pletely free to modify every positing and every The £7tOXll in question here is not to be mis-
judging [Urteil] and to parenthesize every ob- taken for the one which positivism requires, but
jectivity which can be judged about if it were which indeed, as we had to persuade ourselves,
as comprehensive as possible, then no province is itself violated by such positivism. It is not
would be left for unmodified judgments, to say now a matter of excluding all prejudices that
nothing of a province for science. But our pur- cloud the pure objectivity of research, not a
pose is to discover a new scientific domain, one matter of constituting a science "free of theo-
that is to be gained by the method o f paren- ries," "free of metaphysics," by groundings all
thesizing which, therefore, must be a definitely of which go back to the immediate findings,
restricted one. nor a matter of means for attaining such ends,
The restriction can be designated in a word. about the value of which there is, indeed, no
We put out o f action the general positing question. What we demand lies in another di-
which belongs to the essence o f the natural at- rection. The whole prediscovered world pos-
titude; we parenthesize everything which that ited in the natural attitude, actually found in
positing encompasses with respect to being: experience and taken with perfect "freedom
thus the whole natural world which is continu- from theories" as it is actually experienced, as
ally "there for us," "on hand," and which will it clearly shows itself in the concatenations of
always remain there according to conscious- experience, is now without validity for us; with-
ness as an "actuality" even if we choose to pa- out being tested and also without being con-
renthesize it. tested, it shall be parenthesized. In like manner
If I do that, as I can with complete free- all theories and sciences which relate to this
dom, then I am not negating this "world" as world, no matter how well they may be
though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its grounded positivistically or otherwise, shall
factual being as though I were a skeptic; rath- meet the same fate.
66 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

Consciousness as within the same natural actuality. And likewise

Transcendental* all my other mental processes, out of the chang-
ing stream of which the specific Ego-acts flash
§33. Preliminary indication o f "pure" in so specifically peculiar a manner, pass over
or "transcendental" consciousness as into one another, become connected in synthe-
the phenomenological residuum ses, become incessantly modified. In a broad-
est sense, the expression consciousness com-
We have learned to understand the sense of prehends (but then indeed less suitably) all
the phenomenological inox but not by any mental processes. "In the natural attitude," as
means its possible effect. Above all, it is not we are even in our scientific thinking, by vir-
clear to what extent the previous delimitation tue of extremely firm habits which have never
of the total sphere of the inox actually in- been contravened, we take all these findings of
volves a restriction of its universality. What psychological reflection as real worldly occur-
can remain, i f the whole world, including our- rences, just as mental processes in the lives of
selves with all our cogitare, is excluded? animate beings. So natural is it for us to see
Since the reader already knows that the in- them only as such that now, when already ac-
terest governing these meditations concerns a quainted with the possibility of an altered atti-
new eidetics, he will at first expect that, more tude and searching for the new Object-prov-
particularly, the world as matter of fact is ex- ince, we do not even note that it is from these
cluded but not the world as Eidos, not any other very spheres of mental processes that the new
sphere of essences. Indeed, the exclusion of the province arises by virtue of the new attitude.
world actually does not signify the exclusion As a consequence, it follows that instead of
of the world of, e.g., the number series or arith- keeping our regard turned toward those spheres,
metic as relating to it. we turned it away from them and sought the
Nevertheless we shall not take this path; it new Objects in the ontological realms of arith-
does not lead toward our goal, which we can metic, geometry, and the like-where, after all,
also characterize as the acquisition o f a new nothing genuinely new could be attained.
region o f being never before delimited in its We shall therefore keep our regard fixed
own peculiarity-a region which, like any other upon the sphere of consciousness and study
genuine region, is a region of individual be- what we find immanently within it. First of all,
ing. What that means we shall learn, more par- without as yet effecting the phenomenological
ticularly, from the findings that follow. judgment-exclusions, we shall subject it to a
We shall proceed, first of all, with a direct systematic, though by no means exhaustive,
demonstrable showing and, since the being that eidetic analysis. What we absolutely need is a
we want to demonstrably show is nothing else certain universal insight into the essence of
than what we shall designate, for essential rea- any consciousness whatever and also, quite
sons, as "pure mental processes," "pure con- particularly, of consciousness in so far as it
sciousness" with its pure "correlates of con- is, in itself, by its essence consciousness of
sciousness" and, on the other hand, its "pure "natural" actuality. In these studies we shall go
Ego" <we shall> start with the Ego, the con- as far as is necessary to effect the insight at
sciousness, and the mental processes which are which we are aiming, namely the insight that
given to us in the natural attitude. consciousness has, in itself, a being o f its own
I, the actual human being, am a real Object which in its own absolute essence, is not
like others in the natural world. I effect cogita- touched by the phenomenological exclusion. It
tiones, acts of consciousness in both the broad- therefore remains as the "phenomenological
er and narrower sense and these acts, as be- residuum," as a region of being which is of
longing to this human subject, are occurrences essential necessity quite unique and which can

*ldeas I. pp. 63-75, 86--104 (Sections 33-36 and 41-46).

The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 67

indeed become the field of a science of a novel to the "external world" in a natural manner and,
kind: phenomenology. without relinquishing the natural attitude, we
The "phenomenological" bwx will de- effect a psychological reflection on our Ego
serve its name only by means of this insight; and its mental living. Quite as we should if we
the fully •conscious effecting of that £7tOX had heard nothing of the new sort of attitude,
will prove itself to be the operation necessary we engross ourselves in the essence o f the "con-
to make "pure" consciousness, and subse- sciousness o f something," in which, for ex-
quently the whole phenomenological region, ample, we are conscious of the factual exist-
accessible to us. Precisely that makes it com- ence of material things, animate organisms,
prehensible why this region and the novel sci- human beings, the factual existence of techni-
ence correlated with it remained necessarily un- cal and literary works, and so forth. We follow
known: In the natural attitude nothing else but our universal principle that every individual
the natural world is seen. As long as the pos- event has its essence, which can be seized upon
sibility of the phenomenological attitude had in eidetic purity and, in this purity, must be-
not been recognized, and the method for bring- long to a field of possible eidetic research. Ac-
ing about an originary seizing upon the ob- cordingly, the general natural fact, "I am," "I
jectivities that arise with that attitude had not think," "I have a world over against me," and
been developed, the phenomenological world the like, has its essential content with which
had to remain unknown, indeed, hardly even we shall now busy ourselves exclusively. We
suspected. therefore effect, as examples, any single men-
Concerning our terminology we may add the tal processes whatever of consciousness and
following. Important motives, grounded in the take them as they themselves are given to us in
epistemological problematic, justify our des- the natural attitude, as real human facts; or else
ignating "pure" consciousness, about which we we presentiate such mental processes to our-
shall have so much to say, as transcendental selves in memory or in freely inventive phan-
consciousness and the operation by which it is tasy. On the basis of such examples which, let
reached the transcendental £1tOX- As a meth- us presuppose, are perfectly clear, we seize
od this operation will be divided into differ- upon and fix, in an adequate ideation, the pure
ent steps of "excluding," "parenthesizing"; and essences that interest us. In the process, the
thus our method will assume the characteristic single facts, the facticity of the natural world
of a step-by-step reduction. For this reason we taken universally, disappear from our theoreti-
shall, on most occasions, speak of phenomeno- cal regard-as they do wherever we carry out
logical reductions (but also, with reference to a purely eidetic research.
their collective unity, we shall speak of the phe- Let us limit our theme still more narrowly.
nomenological reduction) and, accordingly, Its title runs: consciousness or, more distinctly,
from an epistemological point of view, we shall any mental processes whatever o f conscious-
refer to transcendental reductions. It should be ness in an extraordinarily broad sense, the ex-
added that these terms and all our others must act limitation of which fortunately does not
be understood exclusively in the senses that our matter. Such a limitation does not lie at the be-
expositions prescribe for them and not in any ginning of analyses of the sort which we are
others which history or the terminological hab- carrying on here, but is a late result of great
its of the reader may suggest. labors. As the starting point, we take conscious-
ness in a pregnant sense and one which offers
§34. The essence o f consciousness as itself first, which we can designate most sim-
theme ply by the Cartesian term cogito, by the phrase
"I think." As is well known, cogito was under-
We begin with a series of observations which stood so broadly by Descartes that it comprised
we shall make without troubling ourselves with every "I perceive, I remember, I phantasy, I
any phenomenological £7tOX- We are directed judge, I feel, I desire, I will," and thus all egoical
68 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

mental processes which are at all similar to with respect to these qualities, appearing to
them, with their countless flowing particular me precisely with this relative obscurity, with
formations. The Ego itself, to which they are this imperfect determinateness in this orienta-
all related or which, in very different manners, tion, is a cogitatio, a mental process of con-
lives "in" them actively, passively or sponta- sciousness. The sheet of paper itself, with its
neously, which "comports" itself receptively Objective determinations, its extension, its Ob-
and otherwise in them, shall be at first left out jective position relative to the spatial thing
of consideration; more particularly, the Ego in called my organism, is not a cogitatio but a
every sense shall be left out of consideration. cogitatum; it is not a mental process of per-
Later on the Ego shall be dealt with thorough- ception but something perceived. Now some-
ly. For now, enough is left that gives support to thing perceived can very well be itself a men-
analysis and the apprehension of essences. In tal process of consciousness; but it is evident
that connection, we shall find ourselves imme- that such an affair as a material physical thing,
diately referred to those comprehensive con- for example, this sheet of paper given in the
catenations of mental processes that compel a mental process of perception, is by essential
broadening of the concept, mental process of necessity not a mental process but a being of
consciousness, beyond this sphere made up of a wholly different mode of being.
cogitationes in the specific <Cartesian> sense. Before we investigate that further, let us
We consider mental processes of conscious- multiply the examples. In perceiving proper,
ness in the entire fullness o f the concreteness as an attentive perceiving, I am turned toward
within which they present themselves in their the object, for instance, the sheet of paper; I
concrete context-the stream o f mental pro- seize upon it as this existent here and now.
cesses-and which, by virtue of their own es- The seizing-upon is a singling out and seizing;
sence, they combine to make up. It then be- anything perceived has an experiential back-
comes evident that every mental process ground. Around the sheet of paper lie books,
belonging to the stream which can be reached pencils, an inkstand, etc., also "perceived" in a
by our reflective regard has an essence o f its certain manner, perceptually there, in the "field
own which can be seized upon intuitively, a of intuition"; but, during the advertence to the
"content" which allows of being considered by sheet of paper, they were without even a sec-
itself in its ownness. Our concern is to seize ondary advertence and seizing-upon. They were
upon and to universally characterize this own appearing and yet were not seized upon and
content of the cogitation in its pure ownness picked out, not posited singly for themselves.
by excluding everything which does not lie in Every perception of a physical thing has, in this
the cogitatio with respect to what the cogitatio manner, a halo of background-intuitions (or
is in itself. It is equally our concern to charac- background-seeings, in case one already in-
terize the unity o f consciousness required, and cludes in intuiting the advertedness to the re-
therefore necessarily required, purely by what ally seen), and that is also a "mental process o f
belongs to the cogitationes as their own such consciousness" or, more briefly, "conscious-
that they could not exist without that unity. ness," and, more particularly, "of" all that
which in fact lies in the objective "background"
§35. The cogito as "act." Non-action- seen along with it. Obviously in saying this we
ality modifi.cation are not speaking of that which is to be found
"Objectively" in the Objective space which may
Let us begin with examples. Lying in front belong to the seen background; we are not
of me in the semi-darkness is this sheet of speaking of all the physical things and physi-
paper. I am seeing it, touching it. This percep- cal occurrences which valid and progressing
tual seeing and touching of the sheet of paper, experience may ascertain there. We speak ex-
as the full concrete mental awareness o f the clusively of the halo of consciousness which
sheet of paper lying here and given precisely belongs to the essence of a perception effected
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 69

in the mode of "advertence to the Object" and, Cartesian examples we note something similar
furthermore, of what is inherent in the essence in no matter what other cogitationes: with re-
proper of this halo. In it, however, there is the spect to all mental processes of thinking, feel-
fact that certain modifications of the original ing, or willing, except that, as the next section
mental process are possible which we charac- will show, the "directedness to," the "advert-
terize as a free turning of "regard"-not pre- edness to," which distinguishes actionality [Ak-
cisely nor merely of the physical, but rather of tualitiit] does not (as in the preferred-because
the "mental regard" {"geistigen Blickes"}- the simplest-examples of sensuous objecti-
from the sheet of paper regarded at first, to the vations) coincide with that heeding of Objects
objects appearing, therefore intended to "im- of consciousness which seizes upon and picks
plicitly" before the turning of the regard but them out. It is likewise obviously true of all
which become explicitly intended to (either such mental processes that the actional ones
"attentively" perceived or "incidentally heed- are surrounded by a "halo" of non-actional
ed") after the regard is turned to them. mental processes; the stream o f mental pro-
Physical things are intended to not only in cesses can never consist o f just actionalities.
perception but also in memories and in Precisely these, when contrasted with non-
presentiations similar to memories as well as actionalities, determine with the widest univer-
in free phantasies. All this, sometimes in "clear sality, to be extended beyond the sphere of our
intuition," sometimes without noticeable intu- examples, the pregnant sense of the expression
itedness in the manner of "obscure" objec- "cogito, ""I have consciousness of something,"
tivations; in such cases they hover before us "I effect an act of consciousness." To keep this
with different "characteristics" as actual physi- fixed concept sharply separated, we shall re-
cal things, possible physical things, phantasied serve for it exclusively the Cartesian terms,
physical things, etc. Of these essentially dif- cogito and cogitationes-unless we indicate the
ferent mental processes obviously everything modification explicitly by some such adjunct
is true that we adduced about mental processes as "non-actional."
of perception. We shall not think of confusing We can define a "waking" Ego as one which,
the objects intended to in these modes of con- within its stream of mental processes, continu-
sciousness (for example, the phantasied water ously effects consciousness in the specific form
nymphs) with the mental processes themselves of the cogito; which naturally does not mean
of consciousness which are consciousness o f that it continually gives, or is able to give at
those objects. We recognize then that, to the all, predicative expression to these mental pro-
essence of all such mental processes-these cesses. There are, after all, brute animal Ego-
always taken in full concreteness-there be- subjects. According to what is said above, how-
longs that noteworthy modification which con- ever, it is of the essence of a waking Ego's
verts consciousness in the mode o f actional {ak- stream of mental processes that the continu-
tueller] advertence into consciousness in the ously unbroken chain of cogitationes is con-
mode o f non-actionality {Inaktualitiit J and con- tinually surrounded by a medium of non-
versely. At the one time the mental process is, actionality which is always ready to change into
so to speak, "explicit" consciousness of its the mode of actionality, just as, conversely
objective something, at the other time it is im- actionality is always ready to change into non-
plicit, merely potential. The objective some- actionality.
thing can be already appearing to us as it does
not only in perception, but also in memory or §36. Intentive mental processes. Mental
in phantasy; however, we are not yet "directed" process taken universally
to it with the mental regard, not even second-
arily-to say nothing of our being, in a pecu- However thorough the alteration which men-
liar sense, "busied" with it. tal processes of actional consciousness undergo
In the sense pertaining to the sphere of the in consequence of their going over into non-
70 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

actionality, the modified mental processes still By mental processes in the broadest sense
continue to have a significant community of we understand everything and anything to be
essence with the original ones. Universally it found in the stream of mental processes; ac-
belongs to the essence of every actional cogito cordingly not only the intentive processes, the
to be consciousness o f something. In its own actional and potential cogitationes taken in their
manner, however, according to what was set full concreteness, but also whatever is to be
forth previously, the modified cogitatio is also found in the way of really inherent moments in
consciousness, and consciousness of the same this stream and its concrete parts.
thing as that <intended to in> the correspond- One easily sees, that is, that not every really
ing unmodified consciousness. Accordingly the inherent moment in the concrete unity of an
universal essential property pertaining to con- intentive mental process itself has the funda-
sciousness is still preserved in the modification. mental characteristic, intentionality, thus the
All mental processes having these essential property of being "consciousness of some-
properties in common are also called "intentive thing." That concerns, for example, all data o f
mental processes" (acts in the broadest sense sensation which play so great a role in percep-
of the Logische Untersuchungen); in so far as tual intuitions of physical things. Within the
they are consciousness of something, they are mental process of perceiving this sheet of white
said to be "intentively referred" to this some- paper, more precisely, within those components
thing. of the perceiving which relate to the quality,
As a consequence, it should be well heeded whiteness, belonging to the sheet of paper, we
that here we are not speaking o f a relation be- find, by a suitable turning of regard, the Datum
tween some psychological occurrence---called of sensation, white. This white is something
a mental process-and another real factual ex- which belongs inseparably to the essence of the
istence-called an object-nor of a psycho- concrete perception, and belongs to it as a re-
logical connection taking place in Objective ally inherent concrete component. As the con-
actuality between the one and the other. Rather tent that is "presentive" with respect to the ap-
we are speaking of mental processes purely pearing white of the paper, it is the bearer of an
with respect to their essence, or of pure essences intentionality; however, it is not itself a con-
and of that which is "a priori" included in the sciousness of something. The very same thing
essences with unconditional necessity. obtains in the case of other really inherent Data,
That a mental process is consciousness of for example, the so-called sensuous feelings.
something-for example: that a phantasying is Later on we shall discuss this in greater detail.
phantasying of the determinate centaur, but
also that a perception is perception of its "real" §41. The really inherent composition o f
object, that a judgment is judgment of its perception and its transcendent object
predicatively formed affair-complex, etc.-this
concerns, rather than the fact of the mental pro- Now, all of that being presupposed, what is
cess in the world, specifically, in the complex included in the concrete, really inherent com-
of psychological facts, the pure essence which position o f perception itself as the cogitatio?
is seized upon in ideation as a pure idea. In the Obviously not the physical thing as determined
essence of the mental process itself lies not on- by physics, that utterly transcendent t h i n g -
ly that it is consciousness but also whereof it transcendent to the whole "world of appear-
is consciousness, and in which determinate or ance." But not even the latter, although it is
indeterminate sense it is that. It therefore also called "merely subjective," with all the particu-
lies implicit in the essence of non-actional con- lar physical things and occurrences belong-
sciousness as to what sort of actional cogi- ing to it, is excluded from the really inherent
tationes non-actional consciousness can be con- composition of perception; it is "transcen-
verted into by the modification, discussed dent" to perception. Let us consider this more
above, which we characterize as a "turning of closely. We have already spoken, though only
heeding regard to the formerly unheeded." in passing, of the transcendence of the physi-
The Basic Approach of Phenomenology 71

cal thing. We now must acquire a deeper in- be called a primary or a secondary quality. The
sight into how the transcendent stands with color of the seen physical thing is, of essen-
respect to the consciousness which is a con- tial necessity, not a really inherent moment of
sciousness o f it, into how this mutual relation- the consciousness of color; it appears, but while
ship, which has its paradoxes, should be un- it is appearing the appearance can and must,
derstood. in the case of a legitimating experience, be con-
Let us therefore exclude the whole of phys- tinually changing. The same color appears "in"
ics and the whole domain of theoretical think- continuous multiplicities of color adumbra-
ing. Let us remain within the limits of simple tions. Something similar is true of every sen-
intuition and the syntheses belonging to it, suous quality and also of every spatial shape.
among which perception is included. It is evi- One and the same shape (given "in person" as
dent then that intuition and intuited, perception the same) appears continuously but always
and perceived physical thing are, more particu- "in a different manner," always in different ad-
larly, essentially interrelated but, as a matter umbrations of shape. That is a necessary situa-
of essential necessity, are not really inherently tion, and obviously it obtains universally. Only
and essentially one and combined. for the sake of simplicity have we taken as our
Let us start with an example. Constantly example the case of a physical thing appear-
seeing this table and meanwhile walking around ing in perception as unchanging. The applica-
it, changing my position in space in whatever tion to cases involving changes of any kind is
way, I have continually the consciousness of obvious.
this one identical table as factually existing Of essential necessity there belongs to any
"in person" and remaining quite unchanged. "all-sided," continuously, unitarily, and self-
The table-perception, however, is a continual- confirming experiential consciousness {Erfahr-
ly changing one; it is a continuity of changing ungsbewufitsein] o f the same physical thing
perceptions. I close my eyes. My other senses a multifarious system o f continuous multi-
have no relation to the table. Now I have no plicities o f appearances and adumbrations in
perception of it. I open my eyes; and I have the which all objective moments falling within per-
perception again. The perception? Let us be ception with the characteristic o f being them-
more precise. Returning, it is not, under any selves given "in person" are adumbrated by
circumstances, individually the same. Only the determined continuities. Each determination
table is the same, intended to as the same in the has its system of adumbrations; and each of
synthetical consciousness which connects the them, like the physical thing as a whole, is there
new perception with the memory. The per- as the Same for the seizing-upon conscious-
ceived physical thing can exist without being ness which synthetically unites memory and
perceived, without even being potentially in- new perception as the Same, despite any inter-
tended to (in the already described* mode of ruption of the continuous course of actional
non-actionality); and it can exist without chang- perception.
ing. The perception itself, however, is what it At the same time we now see what actually
is in the continuous flux of consciousness and and indubitably is included in the really inher-
is itself a continuous flux: continually the per- ent composition of those concrete intentive
ceptual Now changes into the enduring con- mental processes called perceivings of physi-
sciousness of the Just-Past and simultaneously cal things. Whereas the physical thing is the
a new Now lights up, etc. Like the perceived intentional unity, the physical thing intended
thing as a whole, whatever parts, sides, mo- to as identical and unitary in the continuously
ments accrue to it necessarily, and always for regular flow of perceptual multiplicities which
the same reasons, transcends the perception interpenetrate and change into one another, the
regardless of whether the particular property perceptual multiplicities themselves always

*Cf. §35, above, especially p. 69.

72 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

have their determinate descriptional composi- ally inherent moments of the perception as
tion essentially coordinated with that unity. For cogitatio (in contrast to the moments of the
example, each phase of the perception neces- cogitatum, which is transcendent to it) are to
sarily contains a determined content of adum- be separated from one another and character-
brations of color, adumbrations of shape, etc. ized with respect to their sometimes very dif-
They are included among "the Data o f sensa- ficult differences, is a theme for extensive in-
tions, " Data of an own peculiar region with vestigations.
determined genera and which join together with
one of these genera to make up concrete uni- §42. Being as consciousness and being
ties of mental processes sui generis ("fields" as reality. Essentially necessary differ-
o f sensation). Furthermore, in a manner which ence between the modes o f intuition
we shall not describe here more precisely, the
Data are animated by "construings" within the Our considerations have established that
concrete unity of the perception and in the ani- the physical thing is transcendent to the per-
mation exercise the "presentive function," or ception of it and consequently to any conscious-
as united with the construings which animate ness whatever related to it; it is transcendent
them, they make up what we call "appearings not merely in the sense that the physical thing
of" color, shape, and so forth. These moments, cannot be found in fact as a really inherent com-
combined with further characteristics, are the ponent of consciousness; rather the whole situ-
really inherent components making up the per- ation is an object of eidetic insight: With an
ception which is a consciousness of one and absolutely unconditional universality and ne-
the same physical thing by virtue of joining cessity it is the case that a physical thing can-
together, grounded in the essence of those not be given in any possible perception, in any
construings, to make up a unity o f construing, possible consciousness, as something really
and again by virtue of the possibility, grounded inherently immanent. Thus there emerges a fun-
in the essence of various unities of construing, damentally essential difference between being
to make up syntheses o f identification. as mental process and being as a physical thing.
It must be borne clearly in mind that the Data Of essential necessity it belongs to the regional
of sensation which exercise the function of ad- essence, Mental Process (specifically to the re-
umbrations of color, of smoothness, of shape, gional particularization, Cogitatio) that it can
etc. (the function of "presentation") are, of es- be perceived in an immanental perception;
sential necessity, entirely different from color fundamentally and necessarily it belongs to the
simpliciter, smoothness simpliciter, shape sim- essence of a spatial physical thing that it can-
pliciter, and, in short, from all kinds of moments not be so perceived. If, as we learn from a deep-
belonging to physical things. The adumbration, er analysis, it is of the essence of any intuition
though called by the same name, o f essential presentive of a physical thing that, along with
necessity is not o f the same genus as the one to the physical-thing datum, other data analogous
which the adumbrated belongs. The adumbrat- to physical things can be seized upon in a cor-
ing is a mental process. But a mental process is responding turn of the regard in the manner,
possible only as a mental process, and not as let us say, of detachable strata and lower levels
something spatial. However, the adumbrated is in the constitution of the appearing physical
of essential necessity possible only as some- thing-e.g., "sight thing" with its different
thing spatial (it is spatial precisely in its es- particularizations-still precisely the same is
sence), and not possible as a mental process. true of them: They are of essential necessity
In particular it is a countersense to take the ad- transcendencies.
umbration of shape (e.g., the adumbration of a Before tracing this contrast between some-
triangle) for something spatial and possible in thing immanent and something transcendent
space; and whoever does so confuses the ad- somewhat further, let us introduce the follow-
umbrating with the adumbrated, i.e., with the ing remark. Disregarding perception, we find
appearing shape. As for how the different re- intentive mental processes of many bnds that,
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 73

by virtue of their essence, exclude the really through mere adumbrations of them. Rather is
inherent immanence of their intentional objects it evident and drawn from the essence of spa-
no matter what the objects may otherwise be. tial physical things (even in the widest sense,
That hold , for example, of any presentation: which includes "sight things") that, necessar-
of any memory, of the empathic seizing upon ily a being of that kind can be given in percep-
someone else's consciousness, etc. Naturally tion only through an adumbration; and in like
we must not confuse this transcendence with manner it is evident from the essence of cogi-
the transcendence with which we are concerned tationes, from the essence of mental processes
here. To the physical thing as physical thing, to of any kind, that they exclude anything like that.
any reality in the genuine sense, the sense of For an existent belonging to their region, in
which we have yet to clarify and fix, there be- other words, anything like an "appearing," a
longs essentially and quite "universally"* the being presented, through adumbrations makes
incapacity of being immanently perceived and no sense whatever. Where there is no spatial
accordingly of being found at all in the con- being it is senseless to speak of a seeing from
catenation of mental processes. Thus the physi- different standpoints with a chdnging orienta-
cai thing is said to be, in itself, unqualifiedly tion in accordance with different perappear-
transcendent. Precisely in that the essentially ances, adumbrations. On the other hand, it is
necessary diversity among modes of being, an essential necessity, to be seized upon as es-
the most cardinal of them all, becomes mani- sential in apodictic insight, that any spatial
fest: the diversity between consciousness and being whatever is perceivable for an Ego (for
reality. any possible Ego) only with the kind of given-
Our exposition has brought out the further ness designated. A spatial being can "appear"
fact that this contrast between something im- only in a certain "orientation," which neces-
manent and something transcendent includes sarily predelineates a system of possible new
an essentially fundamental difference between orientations each of which, in tum, corresponds
the corresponding kinds o f givenness. Percep- to a certain "mode of appearance" which we
tion of something immanent and of something can express, say, as givenness from such and
transcendent do not differ merely in that the such a "side," and so forth. If we understand
intentional object, which is there with the char- modes of appearance in the sense of modes of
acteristic of something it itself, "in person," is mental processes (the phrase can also have a
really inherently immanent in the perceiving corresponding ontic sense, as is evident from
in one case but not in the other: rather they are the description just offered), then this signifies:
differentiated by modes of givenness the es- It is essential to certain sorts o f mental pro-
sential difference between which is carried over cesses which have a peculiar structure, more
mutatis mutandis into all the presentational precisely, it belongs to certain concrete per-
modifications of perception, into the parallel ceptions which have a peculiar structure, that
memorial intuitions and phantasy intuitions. what is intended to in them is meant as a spa-
We perceive the physical thing by virtue of its tial physical thing; to their essence belongs the
being "adumbrated" in respect of all the deter- ideal possibility of their changing into deter-
minations which, in a given case, "actually" and minately ordered continuous multiplicities of
properly "fall within the scope of" perception. perception which can always be continued, thus
A mental process is not adumbrated. It is nei- which are never completed. It is then inherent
ther an accident of the own peculiar sense of in the essential structure of those multiplicities
the physical thing nor a contingency of "our that they bring about the unity of a harmoni-
human constitution," that "our" perception can ously presentive consciousness and, more par-
arrive at physical things themselves only ticularly, of the one perceptual physical thing

*Here, and throughout this essay, we use the word "prinzipiell" in a strict sense. referring to the highest and
therefore the most radical, eidetic universalities or necessities.
74 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

appearing ever more perfectly, from ever new tial physical thing which we see is, with all its
sides, with an ever greater wealth of determi- transcendence, still something perceived, giv-
nations. On the other hand, the spatial thing is en "in person" in the manner peculiar to con-
nothing other than an intentional unity which sciousness. It is not the case that, in its stead, a
of essential necessity can be given only as the picture or a sign is given. A picture-conscious-
unity of such modes of appearance. ness or a sign-consciousness must not be sub-
stituted for perception.
§43. The clarification o f a fundamental Between perception, on the one hand, and
error depictive-symbolic or signitive-symbolic ob-
jectivation, on the other hand, there is an un-
It is therefore fundamentally erroneous to bridgeable essential difference. In the latter
believe that perception (and, after its own fash- kinds of objectivation we intuit something in
ion, any other kind of intuition of a physical consciousness as depicting or signitively indi-
thing) does not reach the physical thing itself. cating something else; having the one in our
The latter is not given to us in itself or in its field of intuition we are directed, not to it, but
being-in-itself. There belongs to any existent to the other, what is depicted or designated,
the essential possibility of being simply intu- through the medium of a founded apprehend-
ited as what it is and, more particularly, of be- ing. Nothing like that is involved either in per-
ing perceived as what it is in an adequate per- ception or in simple memory or in simple phan-
ception, one that is presentive of that existent tasy.
itself, "in person," without any mediation by In immediately intuitive acts we intuit an
"appearances. "God, the subject possessing an "it itself'; on their apprehendings no mediate
absolutely perfect knowledge and therefore apprehendings are built up at a higher level;
possessing every possible adequate perception, thus there is no consciousness of anything for
naturally has that adequate perception of the which the intuited might function as a "sign"
very physical thing itself which is denied to us or "picture." And just on that account it is said
finite beings. to be immediately intuited as "it itself." In per-
But this view is a countersense. It implies ception the "it itself' is further characterized
that there is no essential difference between in its peculiarity as "in person" in contrast to
something transcendent and something imma- its modified characteristic as "floating before
nent, that, in the postulated divine intuition, a us," as "presentiated" in memory or in free
spatial physical thing is present as a really in- phantasy. * One would fall into a countersense
herent constituent, that it is therefore itself a if one were to confuse these modes of objecti-
mental process also belonging to the divine vation of essentially different structures, and if
stream of consciousness and divine mental pro- one were, accordingly, to mix up, in the usual
cesses generally. The holders of this view are fashion, the correlative objects given in these
misled by thinking that the transcendence be- modes: thus confusing simple presentation with
longing to the spatial physical thing is the tran- symbolizing (whether depictive or signitive)
scendence belonging to something depicted or and-even worse-simple perception with both
represented by a sign. Frequently the picture- of them. The perception of a physical thing does
theory is attacked with zeal and a sign theory not presentiate something non-present, as
substituted for it. Both theories, however, are though it were a memory or a phantasy; per-
not only incorrect but countersensical. The spa- ception makes present, seizes upon an it-itself

*In my Gottingen lectures (beginning with the summer semester of 1904) I substituted an improved exposition for
the inadequate one which I (being still too greatly influenced by the concepts involved in the dominant psychology) had
given in the Logische Untersuchungen concerning the relationships between these simple and founded intuitions, and
offered a detailed report of my further research-which, incidentally, has meanwhile exerted both a terminological and
a material influence on the literature. I hope to be able to publish these and other investigations, long since utilized in
my lectures. in the next volumes of the Jahrbuch.
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 75

in its presence "in person." Perception does this into the non-presented, etc. To be in infinitum
according to its own peculiar sense; and to at- imperfect in this manner is part o f the un-
tribute something other than that to perception anullable essence o f the essence o f the corre-
is preciseJy to contradict its sense. If we are lation between "physical thing" and percep-
dealing, as here, with the perception of a physi- tion o f a physical thing. If the sense of the
cal thing then it is inherent in its essence to bephysical thing is determined by the data of
an adumbrative perception; and, correlatively, physical-thing perception (and what else could
it is inherent in the sense of its intentional ob-determine it?), then that sense demands such
ject, the physical thing as given in it, to be es-an imperfection and necessarily refers us to con-
sentially perceivable only by perceptions of that tinuously unitary concatenations of possible
kind, thus by adumbrative perceptions. perceptions which, starting from any percep-
tion effected, extend in infinitely many direc-
§44. Merely phenomenal being o f tions in a systematically and rigidly regular
something transcendent, absolute being manner and, moreover, extend in every direc-
o f something immanent tion without limit, being always dominated
throughout by a unity of sense. Necessarily
Moreover, and this is also an essential ne- there always remains a horizon of determin-
cessity, the perception of a physical thing in- able indeterminateness, no matter how far we
volves a certain inadequacy. Of necessity a go in our experience, no matter how extensive
physical thing can be given only "one-sidedly"; the continua of actual perceptions of the same
and that signifies, not just incompletely or im- thing may be through which we have passed.
perfectly in some sense or other, but precisely No god can alter that no more than the circum-
what presentation by adumbrations prescribes. stance that 1 + 2 = 3, or that any other eidetic
A physical thing is necessarily given in mere truth obtains.
"modes of appearance" in which necessarily a It can already be seen universally that, no
core o f "what is actually presented" is appre- matter what its genus may be, the being of
hended as being surrounded by a horizon of something transcendent, understood as a being
"co-givenness," which is not givenness proper. for an Ego, can become given only in a manner
and of more or less vague indeterminateness. analogous to that in which a physical thing is
And the sense of this indeterminateness is, given, therefore through appearances. Other-
again, predelineated by the universal essence wise it would be precisely a being of something
of this type of perception which we call physi- which might become immanent; but anything
cal-thing perception. Indeed, the indeterminate- that is perceivable immanently is perceivable
ness necessarily signifies a determinableness only immanently. Only if one is guilty of the
which has a rigorously prescribed style. It above-indicated confusions, which now have
points ahead to possible perceptual multiplici- been cleared up, can one believe it possible for
ties which, merging continuously into one an- one and the same affair to be given on one oc-
other, join together to make up the unity of one casion by appearance in the form of a percep-
perception in which the continuously enduring tion of something transcendent and, on another
physical thing is always showing some new occasion, by a perception of something imma-
"sides" (or else an old "side" as returning) in a nent.
new series of adumbrations. Accordingly, those First of all, let us still develop the other side
moments of the physical thing which are also of the specific contrast between a physical thing
seized upon, but not in the proper sense of the and a mental process. No mental process, we
word, gradually become actually presented, i.e., said, is presented [stellt sich . . . nicht dar}.
actually given; the indeterminacies become That means that the perception of a mental pro-
more precisely determined and are themselves cess is a simple seeing of something which is
eventually converted into clearly given deter- (or can become) perceptually given as some-
minations; conversely, to be sure, the clear is thing absolute, and not as something identical
changed again into the unclear, the presented in modes of appearance by adumbration. Ev-
76 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

erything which we have worked out about the inherently belong to the mental process of per-
givenness of the physical thing loses its sense ceiving a physical thing, function, more par-
here, and one must make that fully clear to ticularly, as adumbrations of something but
oneself in detail. A mental process of feeling is are not themselves given in turn by adumbra-
not adumbrated. If I look at it, I have some- tions.
thing absolute; it has no sides that could be pre- The following distinction should also be
sented sometimes in one mode and sometimes noted. It is the case also of a mental process
in another. I can think something true or some- that it is never perceived completely, that it can-
thing false about a feeling, but what I see when not be adequately seized upon in its full unity.
I look at it is there, with its qualities, its inten- A mental process is, with respect to its essence,
sity, etc., absolutely. A violin tone, in contrast, in flux which we, directing the reflective re-
with its objective identity, is given by adum- gard to it, can swim along after it starting from
bration, has its changing modes of appearance. the Now-point, while the stretches already cov-
These differ in accordance with whether I ap- ered are lost to our perception. Only in the form
proach the violin or go farther away from it, in of retention do we have a consciousness of the
accordance with whether I am in the concert phase which has just flowed away, or else in
hall itself or am listening through the closed the form of a retrospective recollection. And
doors, etc. No one mode of appearance can my whole stream of mental processes is, finally,
claim to be the one that presents the tone ab- a unity of mental processes which, of essential
solutely although, in accordance with my prac- necessity, cannot be seized upon completely in
tical interests, a certain appearance has a cer- a perceiving which "swims along with it." But
tain primacy as the normal appearance: in the this incompleteness or "imperfection," pertain-
concert hall and at the "right" spot I hear the ing to the essence of the perception of a mental
tone "itself' as it "actually" sounds. In the same process, is radically different from the incom-
way we say that any physical thing in relation pleteness or "imperfection" pertaining to the
to vision has a normal appearance; we say of essence of the perception of something "tran-
the color, the shape, the whole physical thing scendent," perception by means of adumbra-
which we see in normal daylight and in a nor- tive presentation, by means of something such
mal orientation relative to us, that this is how as appearance.
the thing actually looks; this is its actual color, All the modes of givenness, and all the dif-
and the like. But that points to what is only a ferences among modes of givenness, which we
kind o f secondary objectivation within the lim- find in the sphere of perception are also pres-
its of total objectivation of the physical thing, ent, but in a modified fashion, in the sphere of
as we can easily be persuaded. For, indeed, it reproductive modifications. The presentiations
is clear that if we were to retain the "normal" of physical things make those things "present"
mode of appearance while cutting off the oth- by virtue of presentations such that the adum-
er multiplicities of appearances and the essen- brations themselves, the apprehensions and, ac-
tial relationships to them, none of the sense of cordingly, the whole phenomenon, are repro-
the givenness of the physical thing would re- ductively modified throughout. We also have
main. reproductions of mental processes and acts of
We therefore hold fast to the following: reproductively intuiting mental processes in the
Whereas it is essential to givenness by appear- manner characteristic of presentation and of
ances that no appearance presents the affair as reflection in presentiation. Naturally we do not
something "absolute" instead of in a one-sided find any reproductive adumbrations here.
presentation, it is essential to the givenness of We now add the following contrast. Gradual
something immanent precisely to present some- differences in relative clarity or obscurity be-
thing absolute which cannot ever be present- long to the essence of presentiations. Obvious-
ed with respect to sides or be adumbrated. It ly this difference in perfection has nothing to
is indeed evident also that the adumbrative do with the one related to givenness by virtue
sensation-contents themselves, which really of adumbrative appearances. A more or less
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 77

clear objectivation is not adumbrated by the ground" when they are not reflected on and thus
degree of clarity, namely in the sense which of essential necessity are "ready to be per-
determine,s our terminology, according to which ceived" in a sense which is, in the first place,
a spatial shape, any quality which covers a analogous to the one in which unnoticed physi-
shape, and therefore the whole "appearing cal things in our external field of regard are
physical thing as appearing" is manifoldly ad- ready to be perceived. Physical things can be
umbrated-whether the objectivation of them ready to be perceived only in so far as already,
is clear or obscure. A reproductive objectiva- as unnoticed things, they are intended to and
tion of a physical thing has its various possible this signifies: only if they are appearing. Not
degrees of clarity and, more particularly, for all physical things fulfill this condition: the
each of its modes of adumbration. One sees "field of attentive regard" embracing everything
that it is a matter of differences that lie in dif- which appears is not infinite. On the other hand,
ferent dimensions. It is also obvious that the the mental process which is not reflected on
distinctions we make within the sphere of per- also must fulfill certain conditions of readiness,
ception itself under the headings of "clear and although in quite different ways and as befits
unclear," "distinct and indistinct" seeing do in- its essence. After all, it cannot be "appearing."
deed exhibit a certain analogy with the differ- Nevertheless it fulfills those conditions at all
ences in clarity of which we were just now times by the mere mode of its existence; it
speaking in so far as, in both cases, it is a mat- fulfills them, more particularly, for the particu-
ter of gradual increases and decreases in the lar Ego to which it belongs, the Ego-regard
fullness with which the objectivated affair is which, perchance, lives "in" it. Only because
given; but these differences also belong to oth- reflection and the mental process have those
er dimensions. essential peculiarities which have been men-
tioned here, is it possible for us to know some-
§45. Unperceived mental processes, thing about mental processes, including re-
unperceived reality flections themselves, which are not reflected on.
That reproductive (and retentional) modifi-
If we penetrate more deeply into this situa- cations of mental processes have the same de-
tion we also understand the following differ- termination, correspondingly modified, is ob-
ence in essence between mental processes and vious.
physical things with respect to their perceiv- Let us develop that contrast further. We see
ableness. that the sort o f being which belongs to the men-
The kind of being belonging to mental pro- tal process is such that the latter is essentially
cesses is such that a seeing regard of percep- capable o f being perceived in reflection. The
tion can be directed quite immediately to any physical thing is also essentially capable o f
actual mental process as an originary living being perceived, and it is seized upon in per-
present. This occurs in the form of "reflection," ception as a physical thing belonging to my
which has the remarkable property that what is surrounding world. Even without being per-
seized upon perceptually in reflection is char- ceived it belongs to that world; and, therefore,
acterized fundamentally not only as something even when it is not perceived it is there for the
which exists and endures while it is being re- Ego. But still not in such a manner that, in gen-
garded perceptually but also as something eral, a regard of simple heeding could be di-
which already existed before this regard was rected to it. The background field, understood
turned to it. "All mental processes are intended as a field of simple observability, includes only
to": This signifies, then, that in the specific case a small piece of my surrounding world. That
of intentive mental processes not only are they the unperceived physical thing "is there" means
consciousness of something and present as con- rather that, from my actually present percep-
sciousness of something when they themselves tions, with the actually appearing background
are the Objects of a reflecting consciousness, field, possible and, moreover, continuously-
but also that they are there already as a "back- harmoniously motivated perception-sequences,
78 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

with ever new fields of physical things (as un- necessarily that I am, this life is, I am living:
heeded backgrounds), lead to those concatena- cogito.
tions of perceptions in which the physical thing To each stream of mental processes and to
in question would make its appearance and each Ego, as Ego, there belongs the essential
become seized upon. Fundamentally, nothing possibility of acquiring this evidence; each
essential is altered if, instead of a single Ego, a bears in itself, as an essential possibility, the
plurality of Egos is taken into consideration. guarantee of its absolute factual being. But, one
Only by virtue of the relationship of possible might ask, is it not conceivable that an Ego have
mutual understanding can my experienced only phantasies in its stream of mental pro-
world become identified with that of others and, cesses, that this stream consists of nothing but
at the same time, enriched by their more exten- inventive intuitions? Such an Ego would find
sive experience. Thus a transcendency which only phantasies [ Fiktionen] of cogitationes; its
lacked the above-described connection by har- reflections, because of the nature of these men-
monious motivational concatenations with my tal processes as the medium <in which it re-
current sphere of actually present perceptions flected> [bei der Natur des Erlebnismediums],
would be a completely groundless assumption; would be exclusively reflections in imagina-
a transcendency which lacked such a concat- tion. - But that is an obvious countersense.
enation essentially would be nonsensical. Such What hovers before one may be a mere figment;
then is the kind of presence characterizing what the hovering itself, the inventive consciousness,
is not currently perceived pertaining to the is not itself invented and there belongs to its
world of physical things; it is something es- essence, as to any other mental process, the pos-
sentially different from the necessarily in- sibility of a perceiving reflection which seizes
tended-to being of mental processes. upon absolute factual being. No countersense
is implicit in the possibility that every other
§46. Indubitability o f the perception o f consciousness, which I posit in empathic ex-
something immanent, dubitability o f perience, is non-existent. But my empathizing,
the perception o f something transcen- my consciousness of whatever sort, is origi-
dent narily and absolutely given not only with re-
spect to its essence but also with respect to its
From all of this there emerge important con- existence. Only for an Ego, or a stream of men-
sequences. Every perception of something im- tal processes, in relation to itself, does this dis-
manent necessarily guarantees the existence tinctive state of affairs exist; here alone there
of its object. If reflective seizing-upon is direct- is, and here there must be, such a thing as per-
ed to a mental process of mine, I have seized ception of something immanent.
upon something absolute itself, the factual In contradistinction, as we know, it is of the
being of which is essentially incapable of be- essence of the physical world that no percep-
ing negated, i.e., the insight that it is essential- tion, however perfect, presents anything abso-
ly impossible for it not to exist; it would be a lute in that realm; and essentially connected
countersense to believe it possible that a men- with this is the fact that any experience, how-
tal process given in that manner does not in ever extensive, leaves open the possibility that
truth exist. The stream of mental processes what is given does not exist in spite of the con-
which is mine, of the one who is thinking, no tinual consciousness of its own presence "in
matter to what extent it is not grasped, no mat- person." According to eidetic law it is the case
ter how unknown it is in the areas of the stream that physical existence is never required as nec-
which have run their course and which have essary by the givenness of something physi-
yet to c o m e - : as soon as I look at the flowing cal, but is always in a certain manner contin-
life in its actual present and, while doing so, gent. This means: It can always be that the
apprehend myself as the pure subject of this further course of experience necessitates giv-
life (later we shall busy ourselves particularly ing up what has already been posited with a
with what that means), I say unqualifiedly and legitimacy derivedfrom experience. Afterwards
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 79

one says it was a mere illusion, a hallucina- The deliberations just carried out also make
tion, merely a coherent dream, or the like. Fur- it clear that no conceivable proofs gathered
thermore, as a continuously open possibility in from experiential consideration of the world
this sph;re of givenness, there exists such a could make the existence of the world certain
thing as alteration of construing, a sudden for us with an absolute assurance. The world is
changing of one appearance into another which dubitable not in the sense that rational motives
cannot be united harmoniously with it and thus are present to be taken into consideration over
an influx of the latter upon the earlier experi- against the tremendous force of harmonious
ential positings owing to which the intentional experiences, but rather in the sense that a doubt
objects of these earlier positings suffer after- is conceivable because, of essential necessity,
wards, so to speak, a transformation-occur- the possibility of the non-being of the world is
rences all of which are essentially excluded never excluded. Any force of experience, no
from the sphere of mental processes. In this matter how great, can gradually become coun-
absolute sphere there is no room for conflict, terbalanced and outweighed. The absolute be-
illusion, or being otherwise. It is a sphere of ing of mental processes is in no respect altered
absolute positing. thereby; in fact, they always remain presup-
Thus in every manner it is clear that what- posed by all of that.
ever is there for me in the world of physical Our considerations now have succeeded in
things is necessarily only a presumptive actu- reaching a point of culmination. We have ac-
ality and, on the other hand, that / myself for quired the cognitions we needed. Already in-
whom it is there (I, when the "part of me" be- cluded in the concatenations of essences dis-
longing to the world of physical things is ex- closed to us are the most important premises
cluded) am absolute actuality or that the present from which we shall draw the inferences con-
phase of my mental processes is an absolute cerning the essential detachableness of the
actuality, given by an unconditional, absolutely whole natural world from the domains of con-
indefeasible positing. sciousness, of the sphere of being pertaining to
Over against the positing o f the world, which mental processes; we can persuade ourselves
is a "contingent" positing, there stands then that, in these inferences, justice is at last done
the positing o f my pure Ego and Ego-life which to a core of Descartes's Meditations (which
is a "necessary," absolutely indubitable posit- were directed to entirely different ends) which
ing. Anything physical which is given "in per- only lacked a pure, effective development. Sub-
son" can be non-existent; no mental process sequently, to be sure, we shall need some eas-
which is given "in person" can be non-exis- ily acquired additional supplementations in or-
tent. This is the eidetic law defining this neces- der to reach our final goal. In a preliminary way
sity and that contingency. we draw our consequences within the bounds
. Obviously that does not imply that the ne- of a restricted application.
cessity of the being of this or that present men-
tal process is a pure essential necessity, that is:
a purely eidetic particularity subsumed under The Region of Pure Conscious-
an eidetic law; it is the necessity of a fact, and ness ::-
is called so because an eidetic law is involved
in the fact and indeed, in this case, involved in
the existence of the fact as fact. The ideal pos- §47. The natural world as a correlate
sibility of a reflection having the essential char- o f consciousness
acteristic of an evidently indefeasible positing
of factual existence is grounded in the essence Taking the results of the last chapter as our
of any Ego whatever and of any mental pro- point of departure, we may take the following
cess whatever. into consideration. The de facto course of our

*Ideas I. pp. 105-113. 128-130 (Sections 47-50 and 55).

80 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

human experiences is such that it constrains which does so in its definitely ordered experi-
our reason to go beyond intuitionally given ential concatenations. But if the kinds of men-
physical things (those of the Cartesian imagi- tal processes included under experience, and
natio) and base them on the "truth of physics." especially the fundamental mental process of
But that course might be different. It is not perceiving physical things, can be submitted
as though human development had never pro- by us to an eidetic consideration, and if we can
gressed, nor would ever progress, beyond the discern essential possibilities and necessities in
prescientific stage so that, while the world of them (as we obviously can) and can therefore
physics indeed had its truth, we should nev- eidetically trace the essentially possible vari-
er know anything about it. And it is not as ants of motivated experiential concatenations:
though the world of physics were different then the result is the correlate of our factual
and ordered according to laws different from experience, called "the actual world," as one
the ones that in fact obtain. Rather it is con- special case among a multitude o f possible
ceivable that our intuited world were the ulti- worlds and surrounding worlds which, for their
mate one, "behind" which would be no world part, are nothing else but the correlates o f es-
of physics whatever, i.e., that perceived physi- sentially possible variants o f the idea, "an ex-
cal things would lack mathematical or physi- periencing consciousness, " with more or less
cal determination, that the data of experience orderly concatenations of experience. As a con-
would exclude any physics belonging to the sequence, one must not let oneself be deceived
same kind with ours. The concatenations of by speaking of the physical thing as transcend-
experience would then be correspondingly ing consciousness or as "existing in itself." The
other and different in kind from what they in genuine concept of the transcendence of some-
fact are in so far as the experiential motives thing physical which is the measure of the ra-
fundamental to the fashioning of the concepts tionality of any statements about transcendence,
and judgments of physics would be absent. can itself be derived only from the proper es-
But, on the whole, within the limits of the pre- sential contents of perception or from those
sentive intuitions which we comprehend un- concatenations of definite kinds which we call
der the name "simple experience" (perception, demonstrative experience. The idea of such
recollection, etc.), "physical things" can still transcendence is therefore the eidetic correlate
be presented as they are now as intentional uni- of the pure idea of this demonstrative experi-
ties persisting continuously in multiplicities ence.
of appearances. This is true of any conceivable kind of tran-
But we can go further in this direction: No scendence which could be treated as either an
limits check us in the process of conceiving the actuality or a possibility. An object existing in
destruction of the Objectivity of something itself is never one with which consciousness or
physical-as the correlate of experimental con- the Ego pertaining to consciousness has noth-
sciousness. It must always be borne in mind ing to do. The physical thing is a thing belong-
here that whatever physical things are-the ing to the surrounding world even if it be an
only physical things about which we can make unseen physical thing, even if it be a really
statements, the only ones about the being or possible, unexperienced but experienceable, or
non-being, the being-thus or being-otherwise perhaps experienceable, physical thing. Experi-
of which we can disagree and make rational enceableness never means a mere logical pos-
decisions-they are as experienceable physi- sibility, but rather a possibility motivated in
cal things. It is experience alone that prescribes the concatenations of experience. This concat-
their sense; and, since we are speaking of physi- enation itself is, through and through, one of
cal things in fact, it is actual experience alone "motivation,"* always taking into itself new

*It should be noted that this fundamental phenomenological concept of motivation, which arose immediately with
the isolation of the purely phenomenological sphere in the Logische Untersuchungen (and in contrast to the concept of
causality, as relating to the transcendent sphere of reality), is a universalization of that concept of motivation in accor-
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 81

motivations and recasting those already formed. possible; obviously it involves no formal con-
With respect to their apprehension-contents tradiction. But when we ask about the essen-
or determination-contents, the motivations dif- tial conditions on which its validity would de-
fer, are more or less rich, are more or less defi- pend, about the mode of demonstration
nite or vague in content depending on wheth- demanded by its sense, when we ask about the
er it is a matter of physical things which are mode of demonstration taken universally es-
already "known" or "completely unknown," sentially determined by the positing of some-
"still undiscovered" or in the case of the seen thing transcendent-no matter how we might
physical thing, whether it is a matter of what legitimately universalize its essence-we rec-
is known or unknown about it. It is exclusively ognize that something transcendent necessar-
a matter of the essential structures of such con- ily must be experienceable not merely by an
catenations which, with respect to all their Ego conceived as an empty logical possibility
possibilities, can be made the objects of a pure- but by any actual Ego as a demonstrable uni-
ly eidetic exploration. It is inherent in the es- ty relative to its concatenations of experience.
sence that anything whatever which exists in But one can see (here, to be sure, we are not
reality but is not yet actually experienced can yet advanced enough to establish it in detail;
become given and that this means that the only our later analyses can provide all the
thing in question belongs to the undetermined premises for doing so) that what is cognizable
but determinable horizon of my experiential by one Ego must, of essential necessity, be cog-
actuality at the particular time. This horizon, nizable by any Ego. Even though it is not in
however, is the correlate of the components of fact the case that each stands, or can stand, in
undeterminateness essentially attached to ex- a relationship of "empathy," of mutual under-
periences of physical things themselves; and standing with every other, as, e.g., not having
those components-again, essentially-leave such relationship to mental lives living on the
open possibilities of fulfillment which are by planets of the remotest stars, nevertheless there
no means completely undetermined but are, exist, eidetically regarded, essential possibili-
on the contrary, motivated possibilities pre- ties o f effecting a mutual understanding and
delineated with respect to their essential type. therefore possibilities also that the worlds of
Any actual experience points beyond itself to experience separated in fact become joined
possible experiences which, in tum, point to by concatenation of actual experience to make
new possible experiences and so ad infinitum. up the one intersubjective world, the correlate
And all of that is effected involving species and of the unitary world of mental lives (the uni-
regulative forms restricted to certain a priori versal broadening of the community of human
types. beings). When that is taken into account the
Any hypothetical formulation in practical formal-logical possibility of realities outside
life or in empirical science relates to this chang- the world, the one spatiotemporal world, which
ing but always co-posited horizon whereby the is fixed by our actual experience, materially
positing of the world receives its essential proves to be a countersense. If there are any
sense. worlds, any real physical things whatever,
then the experienced motivations constituting
§48. The logical possibility and the them must be able to extend into my experi-
material countersense o f a world ence and into that of each Ego in the general
outside ours manner characterized above. Obviously there
are physical things and worlds of physical
The hypothetical assumption of something things which do not admit of being definitely
real outside this world is, of course, "logically" demonstrated in any human experience; but

dance with which we can say, e.g., that the willing of the end motivates the willing of the means. Incidentally, the
concept of motivation undergoes, for essential reasons, a variety of modifications; the corresponding equivocations
become harmless, and even appear to be necessary as soon as the phenomenological situations are clarified.
82 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

that has purely factual grounds which lie with- necessarily modified by an annihilation o f
in the factual limits of such experience. the world o f physical things its own existence
would not be touched. Modified, to be sure.
§49. Absolute consciousness as the For an annihilation of the world means, cor-
residuum after the annihilation o f the relatively, nothing else but that in each stream
world of mental processes (the full stream-the total
stream, taken as endless in both directions,
On the other hand, all of that does not im- which comprises the mental processes of an
ply that there must be some world or some Ego), certain ordered concatenations of ex-
physical thing or other. The existence of a world perience and therefore certain complexes of
is the correlate of certain multiplicities of ex- theorizing reason oriented according to those
perience distinguished by certain essential concatenations of experience, would be exclud-
formations. But it cannot be seen that actual ed. But that does not mean that other mental
experiences can flow only in such concatenated processes and concatenations of mental pro-
forms; nothing like that can be seen purely on cesses would be excluded. Consequently no real
the basis of the essence of perception taken being, no being which is presented and legiti-
universally, and of the essences of other col- mated in consciousness by appearances, is nec-
laborating kinds of experiential intuition. It is essary to the being o f consciousness itself (in
instead quite conceivable that experience, be- the broadest sense, the stream of mental pro-
cause of conflict, might dissolve into illusion cesses).
not only in detail, and that it might not be the lmmanental being is therefore indubitably
case, as it is de facto, that every illusion mani- absolute being in the sense that by essential
fests a deeper truth and that every conflict, in necessity immanental being nulla "re" indiget
the place where it occurs, is precisely what is ad existendum.
demanded by more inclusive contextures in In contradistinction, the world o f transcen-
order to preserve the total harmony; in our ex- dent "res" is entirely referred to consciousness
periencing it is conceivable that there might and, more particularly, not to some logically
be a host of irreconcilable conflicts not just conceived consciousness but to actual con-
for us but in themselves, that experience might sciousness.
suddenly show itself to be refractory to the de- In so far as its most universal sense is con-
mand that it carry on its positings of physical cerned, that has already been made clear by
things harmoniously, that its context might the exposition above (in the preceding sec-
lose its fixed regular organizations of adum- tions). A something transcendent is given by
brations, apprehensions, and appearances-in virtue of certain concatenations of experience.
short, that there might no longer be any world. As given directly and with increasing perfec-
Nevertheless, in that case it could be that, to tion in perceptual continua which show them-
some extent, crude unity-formations become selves to be harmonious and in certain methodi-
constituted, transient supports for intuitions cal forms of thinking based on experience, a
which were mere analogues of intuitions of something transcendent acquires, more or less
physical things because quite incapable of immediately, its insightful, continually pro-
constituting conservable "realities," enduring gressive determination. Let us assume that con-
unities "which exist in themselves, whether or sciousness, with its constituent mental pro-
not they are perceived." cesses and with the course it runs, is actually
Now let us add the results reached at the of such a nature that the conscious subject, in
end of the last chapter; let us recall the possi- his free activity of theoretical experiencing
bility of non-being of everything physically and of thinking oriented according to experi-
transcendent: it then becomes evident that while ence, could effect all such concatenations (in
the being o f consciousness, of any stream of which connection we should also have to take
mental processes whatever, would indeed be into account the reinforcement received by mu-
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 83

tual understanding with other Egos and other be within any spatiotemporal complex, which
streams of mental processes); let us assume, cannot be affected by any physical thing and
furthermore, that the pertinent regularities of cannot exercise causation upon any physical
consciousness are actually maintained, that, thing-it being presupposed that causality has
in the course of consciousness taken univer- the normal sense of causality pertaining to Na-
sally, nothing whatever is lacking which is req- ture as a relationship of dependence between
uisite for the appearance of a unitary world realities.
and for the rational theoretical cognition of such On the other hand, the whole spatiotempo-
a world. All that being assumed, we now ask: ral world, which includes human being and the
is it still conceivable and not rather a counter- human Ego as subordinate single realities is,
sense that the corresponding transcendent world according to its sense, a merely intentional be-
does not exist? ing, thus one has the merely secondary sense
Thus we see that consciousness (mental pro- of a being for a consciousness. It is a being
cess) and real being are anything but coordi- posited by consciousness in its experiences
nate kinds of being, which dwell peaceably side which, of essential necessity, can be determined
by side and occasionally become "related to" and intuited only as something identical be-
or "connected with" one another. Only things longing to motivated multiplicities of appear-
which are essentially akin, the respective proper ances: beyond that it is nothing.
essences of which have a like sense, can be-
come connected in the true sense of the word, §50. The phenomenological attitude.
can make up a whole. An immanental or abso- Pure consciousness as the field o f
lute being and a transcendent being are, of phenomenology
course, both called "existent," an "object," and
have, more particularly, their objective deter- Thus the sense commonly expressed in
mining contents. But it is evident that what is speaking of being is reversed. The being which
called "an object" and "an objective determi- is first for us is second in itself; i.e., it is what
nation" in the one case, and what is called by it is, only in "relation" to the first. <But it is>
the same name in the other case, are called so not as though there were a blind regularity
only with reference to the empty logical cat- such that the ordo et connexio rerum necessar-
egories. In so far as their respective senses are ily conformed to the ordo et connexio idearum.
concerned, a veritable abyss yawns between Reality, the reality of the physical thing taken
consciousness and reality. Here, an adumbrat- sing Iy and the reality of the whole world, lacks
ed being, not capable of ever becoming given self-sufficiency in virtue of its essence (in our
absolutely, merely accidental and relative; strict sense of the word). Reality is not in it-
there, a necessary and absolute being, essen- self something absolute which becomes tied
tially incapable of becoming given by virtue secondarily to something else; rather, in the ab-
of adumbration and appearance. solute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no "ab-
Thus it becomes clear that, in spite of all solute essence" whatever; it has the essential-
our assuredly well-founded statements about ity of something which, of necessity, is only
the real being of the human Ego and its con- intentional, only an object of consciousness,
scious mental processes, in the world and about something presented [Vorstelliges] in the man-
everything in the way of "psychophysical" in- ner peculiar to consciousness, something ap-
terconnections pertaining to them-that, in parent <as apparent>.
spite of all that, consciousness considered in We now turn our thoughts back again to
its "purity" must be held to be a self-contained the first chapter, to our observations concern-
complex o f being, a complex o f absolute be- ing the phenomenological reduction. It now
ing into which nothing can penetrate and out becomes clear that, in contrast to the natural
of which nothing can slip, to which nothing theoretical attitude, the correlate of which is
is spatiotemporally external and which cannot the world, a new attitude must in fact be pos-
84 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

sible which, in spite of the "exclusion" of this latter with the all of being, and thus to abso-
psychophysical universe of Nature, leaves us lutize it itself is a countersense. An absolute
something: the whole field of absolute con- reality is just as valid as a round square. Real-
sciousness. Instead, then, of living naively in ity and world are names here precisely forcer-
experience and theoretically exploring what tain valid unities o f sense, unities of "sense"
is experienced, transcendent Nature, we effect related to certain concatenations of absolute,
the "phenomenological reduction." In other of pure consciousness which, by virtue of their
words, instead of naively effecting the acts per- essence, bestow sense and demonstrate sense-
taining to our Nature-constituting conscious- validity precisely thus and not otherwise.
ness with their positings of something trans- If anyone reading our statements objects
cendent, and letting ourselves be induced, by that they mean changing all the world into a
motives implicit in them, to effect ever new subjective illusion and committing oneself to
positings of something transcendent-instead a "Berkeleyan idealism," we can only answer
of that, we put all those positings "out of ac- that he has not seized upon the sense of those
tion," we do not "participate in them"; we di- statements. They take nothing away from the
rect our seizing and theoretically inquiring fully valid being of the world as the all of re-
regard to pure consciousness in its own abso- alities, just as nothing is taken away from the
lute being. That, then, is what is left as the fully valid geometrical being of the square by
sought-for "phenomenological residuum," denying that the square is round (a denial ad-
though we have "excluded" the whole world mittedly based, in this case, on what is imme-
with all physical things, living beings, and hu- diately obvious). The real actuality is not "re-
mans, ourselves included. Strictly speaking, we interpreted," to say nothing of its being denied;
have not lost anything but rather have gained it is rather that a countersensical interpreta-
the whole of absolute being which, rightly un- tion of the real actuality, i.e., an interpretation
derstood, contains within itself, "constitutes" which contradicts the latter's own sense as
within itself, all worldly transcendencies. clarified by insight, is removed. That interpre-
tation stems from a philosophical absolutiz-
§55. Conclusion. All reality existent by ing of the world completely alien to the natural
virtue of "sense-bestowal." Not a way of considering the world. This is, precisely,
"subjective idealism" natural; it lives naively in the effecting of the
general positing described by us; thus it can
In a certain way, and with some caution in never become a countersense. The counter-
the use of words, we can also say that all real sense only arises when one philosophizes and,
unities are "unities o f sense." Unities of sense while seeking ultimate intelligence about the
presuppose (as I again emphasize: not because sense of the world, never even notices that the
we can deduce it from some metaphysical world itself has its whole being as a certain
postulates or other, but because we can show it "sense" which presupposes absolute conscious-
by an intuitive, completely indubitable proce- ness as the field where sense is bestowed;* and
dure) a sense-bestowing consciousness which, when, at the same time, one fails to notice that
for its part, exists absolutely and not by virtue this field, this sphere o f being o f absolute ori-
of another sense-bestowal. If one derives the g ins, is accessible to insightful inquiry
concept of reality from natural realities, from [schauenden Forschung] yielding an infinite
unities of possible experience, then "all the wealth of cognitions given in insight with the
world" or "all of Nature" is, of course, equiva- highest scientific dignity. The latter, to be sure,
lent to the all of realities; but to identify the is something which we have yet to show; only

*Here, in passing, I am allowing myself an extraordinary and yet, in its way, admissable broadening of the concept
"sense" in order to state the contrast more effectively.
The Basic Approach o f Phenomenology 85

as these investigations progress wi II it be- concrete development of the sketches previ-

come clear. ously given. It should be noted. however, that
Let us note in conclusion that the universal- our aim here has not been to give a finished
ity with which, in the deliberations carried out theory of that transcendental constitution and.
above, we have spoken about the constitution accordingly. to project a new "theory of knowl-
of the natural world in absolute conscious- edge" pertaining to the various spheres of real-
ness, should not be found objectionable. That ity; <our aim has been instead> only to bring
we have not ventured empty philosophical about insight into certain general thoughts
conceits from on high but, on the basis of sys- which can help one to acquire the idea of tran-
tematic fundamental work in this field. have scendentally pure consciousness. For us what
concentrated in universal statements cautious- is essential is the evidence that the phenom-
ly acquired cognitions will be evident to the enological reduction. as an excluding of the
scientifically experienced reader from the con- natural attitude. or of the latter's general posit-
ceptual definiteness of the exposition. The need ing, is possible, the evidence that, after we ef-
for more detailed statements and for filling in fect that reduction, absolute or transcendental-
gaps which have been left open may be felt, ly pure consciousness remains as a residuum
and rightly so. The further presentations will to which reality cannot be ascribed without
furnish considerable contributions to a more absurdity.
 The Structure of Intentionality

6. The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness

N oesis and N oema * phenomenological basis, one may of course use

the word, phenomenology; but one does not
§87. Preliminary remarks have the matter itself. In addition, it does not
suffice, let us say, to merely change the atti-
The peculiarity of the intentive mental pro- tude, or to merely carry out the phenomeno-
cess is easily designated in its universality; logical reduction in order to make something
we all understand the expression "conscious- like phenomenology out of pure logic. For
ness of something," especially in ad libitum how far logical and, in a like way, pure onto-
exemplifications. It is so much more difficult logical, pure ethical, and whatever other a pri-
to purely and correctly seize upon the phe- ori propositions one may cite, actually ex-
nomenological essence-peculiarities corre- press something phenomenological, and to
sponding to it. That this heading circumscribes which phenomenological strata the respective
a large field of painfully achieved findings <propositions> may belong, is not obvious. On
and, more particularly, of eidetic findings, the contrary, the most difficult problems of
would seem even today alien to the majority all are hidden, <problems> the sense of which
of philosophers and psychologists (if we can is naturally concealed from all those who
judge by the literature). This is because noth- still have no inkling of the determinative fun-
ing is accomplished by saying and discern- damental distinctions. In fact, it is (if I may be
ing that every objectivating relates to some- allowed a judgment from my own experience)
thing objectivated, that every judging relates a long and thorny way starting from purely
to something judged, etc. Or that, in addition, logical insights, from insights pertaining to
one refers to logic, theory of knowledge, eth- the theory of signification, from ontological
ics, with their many evidences, and now des- and noetical insights, likewise from the cus-
ignates these as belonging to the essence of tomary normative and psychological theory of
intentionality. This is, at the same time, a knowledge, to arrive at seizing upon, in a genu-
very simple way of taking the phenomeno- ine sense, the immanent-psychological and
logical doctrine of essences as something then phenomenological data, and finally to ar-
very old, as a new name for the old logic and rive at all at the concatenations of essence
those disciplines which must be ranked with which make the transcendental relations intel-
it. For without having seized upon the pecu- ligible a priori. Something similar is the case
liar ownness of the transcendental attitude no matter from where we might set out on the
and having actually appropriated the pure way from objective insights to acquire phe-

*Ideas I, pp. 211-221. 226-233 (Sections 87-90 and 93-95).

The Noetic and Noematic Structure o f Consciousness 87

nomenological insights which essentially be- proceedings, then with respect to intentional-
long to them. ity we immediately confront a wholly funda-
"Consciousness of something" is therefore mental distinction, namely the distinction be-
something obviously understandable of itself tween the components proper of intentive
and, at the same time, highly enigmatic. The mental processes and their intentional cor-
labyrinthically false paths into which the first relates and their components. We already
reflections lead, easily generate a skepticism touched upon this distinction in the prelimi-
which negates the whole troublesome sphere nary eidetical deliberations of Part II. In that
of problems. Not a few already bar access by connection, in making the transition from
the fact that they cannot bring themselves to the natural to the phenomenological attitude,
seize upon the intentive mental process, e.g., the distinction served us to make clear the
the perceptual process, with the essence proper own peculiar being of the phenomenological
to it as perceptual process. Rather than living sphere. But that it acquired a radical signifi-
in the perception, adverted to the perceived in cation within this sphere itself, thus in the
considering and theorizing they do not man- frame of the transcendental reduction, con-
age to direct the regard instead to the perceiv- ditioning the entire set of problems pertain-
ing, or to the own peculiarities of the mode of ing to phenomenology: of that we could not
givenness of the perceived, and to take what speak there. On the one side therefore, we
is offered in analysis of something immanent have to discriminate the parts and moments
with respect to its essence, just as it is given. If which we find by an analysis of the really in-
the right attitude has been won, and made se- herent pertaining to mental processes, where-
cure by practice, above all, however, if one has by we deal with the mental process as an ob-
acquired the courage to obey the clear eidetic ject like any other, inquiring about its pieces
data with a radical lack of prejudice so as to or non-selfsufficient moments really inherent
be unencumbered by all current and learned in it which make it up. But, on the other side,
theories, then firm results are directly produced, the intentive mental process is consciousness
and the same thing occurs for everyone hav- of something, and it is so according to its es-
ing the same attitude; there accrue firm possi- sence, e.g., as memory, as judgment, as will,
bilities of communicating to others what one etc.; and we can therefore inquire into what is
has himself seen, of testing descriptions, of to be declared as a matter of essential neces-
making salient the unnoticed intrusions of sity about the side of this "of something."
empty verbal meanings, of making known and Owing to its noetic moments, every inten-
weeding out errors by measuring them again tive mental process is precisely noetic;* it is
against intuition-errors which are also pos- of its essence to include in itself something
sible here just as in any sphere of validity. But such as a "sense" and possibly a manifold
now to the matters at hand. sense on the basis of this sense-bestowal and,
in unity with that, to effect further productions
§88. Really inherent and intentive [Leistungen] which become "senseful" pre-
components o f mental processes. The cisely by <this sense-bestowal>. Such noetic
noema moments are, e.g., directions of the regard of
the pure Ego to the objects "meant" by it ow-
If, as in the present deliberations generally, ing to sense-bestowal, to <the object> which
we begin with the most universal distinctions is "inherent in the sense" for the Ego; further-
which, so to speak, can be seized upon at the more, seizing upon this object, holding it fast
very threshold of phenomenology, and which while the regard adverts to other objects
are determinative for all further methodic which appear in the "meaning"{" Vermeinen "];

*Cf. §41.
88 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

likewise, producings pertaining to explicat- the perception, as well as the liking, is for us
ings, relatings, comprisings, multiple position- a psychical state belonging to real people.
takings of believings, deemings likely, valu- Between the one and the other real things, be-
ings; and so forth. All of these are to be found tween the real person or the real perception,
in the mental processes in question, no matter and the real apple tree, there exist real relations.
how differently structured and varied they are. In such situations characterizing mental pro-
Now, no matter to what extent this series of cesses, it may be in certain cases that percep-
exemplary moments refer to really inherent tion is "mere hallucination," the perceived, this
components of mental processes, they never- apple tree before us, does not exist in "actual"
theless also refer to what is not really inherent, reality. Now the real relation, previously meant
namely by means of the heading of sense. as actually existing, is destroyed. Only the per-
Corresponding in every case to the multi- ception remains, but there is nothing actual
plicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent there to which it is related.
noetic content, there is a multiplicity of Data, Let us now go to the <transcendental> phe-
demonstrable in actual pure intuition, in a cor- nomenological attitude. The transcendent world
relative "noematic content" or, in short, in the receives its "parenthesis," we exercise the
"noema "-terms which we shall continue to £7tOXT) in relation to <positing> its actual be-
use from now on. ing. We now ask what, of essential necessity,
Perception, for example, has its noema, most is to be discovered in the complex of noetic
basically its perceptual sense,* i.e., the per- processes pertaining to perception and in the
ceived as perceived. Similarly, the current case valuation of liking. With the whole physical
of remembering has its remembered as remem- and psychical world, the actual existence of
bered, just as its <remembered>, precisely as the real relation between perceiving and per-
it is "meant," "intended to" in <the remember- ceived is excluded; and, nonetheless, a rela-
ing>; again, the judging has the judged as tion between perceiving and perceived (as well
judged, liking has the liked as liked, and so as between liking and liked) remains left ov-
forth. In every case the noematic correlate, er, a relation which becomes given essentially
which is called "sense" here (in a very extended in "pure immanence," namely, purely on the
signification) is to be taken precisely as it in- ground of the phenomenologically reduced
heres "immanentally" in the mental process of mental processes of perceiving and liking pre-
perceiving, of judging, of liking; and so forth; cisely as they fit into the transcendental stream
that is, just as it is offered to us when we in- of mental processes. Precisely this situation,
quire purely into this mental process itself. the purely phenomenological one, will occupy
How we understand all of this will become us now. Concerning hallucinations, illusions
clear by carrying out an exemplary analysis and perceptual deception of whatever sort, it
(which we will effect in pure intuition). may be that phenomenology has something to
Let us suppose that in a garden we regard say, and perhaps even a great deal: but it is evi-
with pleasure a blossoming apple tree, the dent that here, in the role which they played
freshly green grass of the lawn, etc. It is obvi- in the natural attitude, they undergo exclusion.
ous that the perception and the accompanying Here, in the case of perception and also in
liking are not, at the same time, what is per- the case of any progressive concatenation of
ceived and liked. In the natural attitude, the perceptions whatever (as when we consider
apple tree is for us something existing in the the blossoming tree ambulando), there is no
transcendent realm of spatial actuality, and question to be raised of the sort whether or

*Cf. Logische Untersuchungen, !J I Jte Unters., §14, p. 50 <[English translation. p. 290]> on the "fulfilling sense"
(in that connection, 6te Unters., §55, p. 642 <[2nd ed., p. 170; English translation, p. 807]> on "perceptual sense");
furthermore, for what follows, Ste Unters., §20, on "matter" pertaining to the act; likewise 6te Unters., §§25-29.
The Noetic and Noematic Structure o f Consciousness 89

not something corresponds to it in "the" actu- tual sense, inseparably belongs to the per-
ality. This posited actuality is indeed not there ception. The tree simpliciter can bum up, be
for us in consequence of judging. And yet, so resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But
to speak, everything remains as of old. Even the sense-the sense of this perception, some-
the phenomenologically reduced perceptual thing belonging necessarily to its e s s e n c e -
mental process is a perceiving of "this blos- cannot bum up; it has no chemical elements,
soming apple tree, in this garden," etc., and, no forces, no real properties.
likewise, the reduced liking is a liking of this Everything which is purely immanent and
same thing. The tree has not lost the least nu- reduced in the way peculiar to the mental pro-
ance of all these moments, qualities, charac- cess, everything which cannot be conceived
teristics with which it was appearing in this per- apart from it just as it is in itself, and which eo
ception, <with which> it <was appearing as> ipso passes over into the Eidos in the eidetic
"lovely," "attractive," and so forth "in" this attitude, is separated by an abyss from all of
liking. Nature and physics and no less from all psy-
In our <transcendental> phenomenological chology-and even this image, as naturalistic,
attitude we can and must raise the eidetic ques- is not strong enough to indicate the difference.
tion: what the "perceived as perceived" is, Obviously the perceptual sense also belongs
which eidetic moments it includes in itself as to the phenomenologically unreduced percep-
this perception-noema. We receive the answer tion (perception in the sense of psychology).
in the pure directedness to something given Thus one can make clear here at the same time
in its essence, and we can faithfully describe how the phenomenological reduction can ac-
the "appearing as appearing" in complete evi- quire for psychologists the useful methodic
dence. It is only another expression for this function of fixing the noematic sense by sharp-
to say that we "describe perception in its noe- ly distinguishing it from the object simplici-
matic respect." ter, and recognizing it as something belonging
inseparably to the psychological essence of
§89. Noematic statements and state- the intentive mental process.
ments about actuality. The noema in On both sides, in the psychological as well
the psychological sphere as in the phenomenological attitude, one must
therefore not lose sight of the fact that the
It is clear that all these descriptive state- "perceived" as sense includes nothing in itself
ments, even though they may sound like state- (thus nothing should be imputed to it on the
ments about actuality, have undergone a ground of "indirect cognizances") other than
radical modification of sense; similarly, the what "actually appears" in the given case in
described itself, even though it is given as something perceptually appearing and, more
"precisely the same," is yet something radical- precisely, in the mode of givenness in which it
ly different by virtue of, so to speak, an inverse is precisely something intended to in the per-
change of signs. "In" the reduced perception ception. At any time a specifically peculiar
(in the phenomenologically pure mental pro- reflection can be directed to this sense as it is
cess), we find, as indefeasibly belonging to its immanent in the perception, and the phenom-
essence, the perceived as perceived, to be ex- enological judgment has to conform in faith-
pressed as "material thing," "plant," "tree," ful expression to what is seized upon in it.
"blossoming"; and so forth. Obviously, the in-
verted commas are significant in that they ex- §90. The "noematic sense" and the
press that change in sign, the correspondingly distinction between "immanental" and
radical significational modification of the "actual objects"
words. The tree simpliciter, the physical thing
belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this Like perception, every intentive mental pro-
perceived tree as perceived which, as percep- cess-just this makes up the fundamental part
90 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

of intentionality-has its "intentional Object," ly faithful description of what is actually pres-

i.e., its objective sense. Or, in other words: to ent in phenomenological purity and in keeping
have sense or "to intend to" something [etwas at a distance all the interpretations transcend-
"im Sinne zu haben "], is the fundamental char- ing the given. Here denominations already
acteristic of all consciousness which, there- evince interpretations, and often quite false
fore, is not just any mental living [Erlebnis] ones. These interpretations betray themselves
whatever, but is rather a <mental living> hav- here in expressions such as "mental," "imma-
ing sense, which is "noetic." nental" Object, and the expression "intention-
Certainly what has become prominent as al Object" requires them the least of all.
"sense" in the analysis of our examples does It would even be tempting to say: In the
not exhaust the full noema; correspondingly, mental process the intention is given with its
the noetic side of the intentive mental process intentional Object which, as intentional Ob-
does not merely consist of the moment of ject, inseparably belongs to it, therefore itself
"sense-bestowal" proper specifically belonging inherently dwells within <the intention>. In-
to the "sense" as correlate. It will be shown di- deed, it is and remains its <Object> meant, ob-
rectly that the full noema consists of a com- jectivated, and the like, no matter if the corre-
plex of noematic moments, that in <that com- sponding "actual Object" precisely is or is not
plex> the specific sense-moment only fashions in actuality, if it has been annihilated in the
one kind of necessary core-stratum in which meantime, etc.
further moments are essentially founded which, But if, in this way, we try to separate the
therefore, should likewise be designated as actual Object (in the case of perception of some-
sense-moments, but in an extended meaning. thing external, the perceived physical thing
Nevertheless, let us remain at first with what pertaining to Nature) and the intentional Ob-
alone has clearly emerged. Without doubt we ject, including the latter <as> really inherently
have shown that the intentive mental process in the mental process as "immanent" to the
is of such a character that in a suitable focus- perception, we fall into the difficulty that now
ing of regard a "sense" is to be drawn from it. two realities ought to stand over against one
The situation defining the sense for us cannot another while only one <reality> is found to be
remain concealed: the circumstance, namely, present and even possible. I perceive the physi-
that the non-existence (or the conviction of cal thing, the Object belonging to Nature, the
non-existence) of the objectivated or thought tree there in the garden; that and nothing else
of Object pure and simple pertaining to the is the actual Object of the perceptual "inten-
objectivation in question (and therefore to any tion." A second immanental tree, or even an
particular intentive mental process whatever) "internal image" of the actual tree standing out
cannot steal its something objectivated as there before me, is in no way given, and to sup-
objectivated, that therefore the distinction pose that hypothetically leads to an absurdity.
between both must be made. Such a striking The image as a really inherent component in
distinction has required expression in the lit- the psychologically real perception would be
erature. As a matter of fact, the Scholastic dis- again something real-something real which
tinction between the "mental," "intentional" would function as a depicturing of another
or "immanental" Object on the one hand, and something real. But that can only be by virtue
the "actual" Object on the other hand, refers of a depicturing consciousness in which some-
back to it. Nevertheless, it is an immense step thing first appears-with which we would
to go from seizing upon a distinction pertain- have a first intentionality-and this would func-
ing to consciousness for the first time to its tion again in consciousness as a "picture Ob-
right, phenomenologically pure, fixing and ject" representing another "picture O b j e c t " -
correct valuation-and precisely this step, for which a second intentionality founded in
which is decisive for a harmonious, fruitful the first intentionality would be necessary. It
phenomenology, has not been effected. Above is no less evident that each particular one of
all, what is decisive consists of the absolute- these modes of consciousness already requires
The Noetic and Noematic Structure o f Consciousness 91

the distinction between the immanental and or which "joins in" <that positing>. As phe-
actual object, thus comprising the same prob- nomenologists we abstain from all such posit-
lem which should have been resolved by the ings. But on that account we do not reject
construction. Over and above this, in the case them by not "taking them as our basis," by not
of perception, the construction is subject to the "joining in" them. They are indeed there, they
objection which we have discussed earlier:* also essentially belong to the phenomenon.
to include depictive functions in the perception Rather we contemplate them; instead of join-
of something physical signifies ascribing to it ing in them, we make them Objects, take them
a picture-consciousness which, descriptively as component parts of the phenomenon-the
considered, is something of an essentially dif- positing pertaining to perception as well as its
ferent kind of constitution. Nevertheless, the components.
main point here is that perception and, then And, keeping these excludings in their clear
consequently, every mental process, requires sense, we therefore ask quite universally, then,
a depictive function, unavoidably (as can be about what is evidentially "inherent" in the
seen at once from our critique) leads to an in- whole "reduced" phenomenon. Now, inherent
finite regress. too precisely in perception is this: that it has its
In contradistinction to such errors we have noematic sense, its "perceived as perceived,"
to abide by what is given in the pure mental "this blossoming tree there, in space"-under-
process and to take it within the frame of clar- stood with inverted commas-precisely the
ity precisely as it is given. The "actual" Object correlate belonging to the essence of phenom-
is then to be "parenthesized." Let us reflect on enologically reduced perception. Figuratively
what that signifies: if we begin as people in the stated: the "parenthesis" undergone by percep-
natural attitude, then_ the actual Object is the tion prevents any judgment about perceived
physical thing there, outside <us>. We see it, actuality (i.e., any <judgment> having its ba-
we stand before it, we have directed our eyes sis in unmodified perception, thus taking up in-
fixingly to it, and then we describe it and make to itself its positing). But it does not prevent
our statements about it just as we find it there the judgment about the fact that perception
in space as what confronts us. Likewise we take is consciousness o f an actuality (the positing
a position toward it in valuing; what confronts of which, however, should not be "effected");
us, what we see in space, pleases us, or deter- and it does not prevent any description of this
mines us to act; we seize upon or manipulate perceptually appearing "actuality" as appear-
what is given there, etc. If we now effect the ing with the particular ways in which it is here
phenomenological reduction, then every pos- intended to, appearing only "one-sidedly," in
iting of something transcendent, thus above this or that orientation; and so forth. With
all what is inherent to perception itself, re- minute care we must now take heed against at-
ceives its excluding parentheses, and this is tributing to the mental process anything which
passed on to all of the founded acts, to every is not actually included in its essence, and <we
judgment of perception, to the positing of val- must> "attribute" <what is included> exactly
ue, and possibly to the value judgment ground- and just as it precisely is "inherent" in it.
ed in it. Implicit in this is that we only allow
all these perceivings, judgings, etc., to be §93. Transition to the noetic-noematic
considered, to be described, as the essentiali- structures o f the higher spheres o f
ties which they are in themselves, to pin down consciousness
what is evidently given with or in them. But
we do not tolerate any judgment which makes In the next series of considerations we wish
use of the positing of the "actual" physical to examine the structures which belong to the
thing, nor of the whole "transcendent" Nature, "higher" spheres of consciousness in which a

*Cf. above, §43.pp. 74ff.

92 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

number o f noeses are built up on one another concrete judgmental process, is the "judged
in the unity o f a concrete mental process and as judged"; that, however, is nothing else, or
in which, accordingly, the noematic correlates at least with respect to its main core, it is noth-
are likewise founded. Thus the eidetic law, ing else than what we usually call simply the
confirmed in every case, states that there can judgment.
be no noetic moment without a noematic mo- If the full noema is to be seized upon, the
ment specifically belonging to it. judgment must be taken here in the full noe-
Even in the case of noeses of a higher level matic concreteness intended to in the concrete
- t a k e n in concrete completeness-there at judging. What is judged must not be confused
first emerges in the noematic composition a with what is judged about. If the judging is
central core thrusting itself to the fore in a pre- based on perceiving or on some other simply
dominate way, the "meant Objectivity as Ob- "positing" objectivating, the noema of the
jectivity," the Objectivity in inverted commas objectivating goes into the full concretion
as required by the phenomenological reduc- of the judgment (just as the objectivating noe-
tion. There this central noema must also be sis becomes an essential component of the
taken precisely in the modified Objective com- concrete judgmental noesis) and takes on cer-
position in which it is just that noema, some- tain forms in the judging. That which is ob-
thing intended to as intended to. Because the jectivated (as objectivated) receives the fonn
Objective something taken in a modified way of the apophantic subject, or that of the apo-
itself becomes, to be sure, under the heading phantic predicate, or some other such form.
of sense, as, e.g., in our scientific investiga- Here, for the sake of simplicity, let us disre-
tion of it, again an Objective something al- gard the higher stratum pertaining to verbal
though of a dignity peculiar to it, one will sub- "expression." These "objects about which," es-
sequently see here that this novel Objectivity pecially the ones which take on <apophantic>
has its modes of givenness, its "characteris- subject <-forms> [Subjektgegenstand] are the
tics," its manifold modes with which it is in- objects judged about. The whole which is
tended to in the full noema pertaining to the formed out of them, the total What which is
noetic mental process or to the species of judged-and, moreover, taken precisely in the
mental process in question. Of course, here fashion (with the characterization, in the
again all the distinctions in the noema must mode o f givenness) in which it is "intended to"
also correspond to parallel distinctions in the in the mental process-makes up the full noe-
unmodified Objectivity. matic correlate, the "sense" (in the broadest
It is then a further undertaking of more pre- signification of the word) of the judgmental pro-
cise phenomenological study to discover what cess. Stated more pregnantly, it is the "sense
is prescribed according to eidetic law precise- in the How of its mode of givenness" in so far
ly by the species, and what is so prescribed by as this mode of givenness is to be found as a
the differentiating particularities, for noemata characteristic belonging to it.
of changing particularities of a fixed species In this connection, we must not overlook
(e.g., perception). But the restriction holds the phenomenological reduction which requires
throughout: in the sphere of essences there is us to "parenthesize" the making of the judg-
nothing accidental; everything is connected by ment if we wish to acquire the pure noema of
eidetic relations, thus especially noesis and our judgmental process. If we do so, then we
noema. have in its phenomenological purity the full
concrete essence of the judgmental process or,
§94. Noesis and noema in the realm as we now express it, the judgment-noesis,
o f judgment taken concretely as an essence, and the judg-
ment-noema belonging to and necessarily
As an example from this sphere of founded united with that noesis, the "made judgment"
essences let us consider the predicative judg- as an Eidos, and it also in its phenomenologi-
ment. The noema of the judging, i.e., of the cal purity.
The Noetic and Noematic Structure o f Consciousness 93

Psychologistic readers will object to all these is interested in the noema, not with respect to
statements; they are not inclined to distinguish its components, but only in so far as it is con-
between judging [Urteilen] as an empirical ceived as exclusively determined by a narrow-
mental process and judging [Urteil] as an er essence, to the more precise definition of
"idea," an essence. For us this distinction has which the above-mentioned attempt at a dis-
already been thoroughly established. But the tinction in the Logische Untersuchungen
reader who accepts it will also be perplexed. pointed the way. If we wish to obtain the full
For he is required to recognize that this one noema of a determinate judgmental process
distinction is by no means sufficient and that it we must, as has already been said, take "the"
is necessary to fix a number of ideas which lie judgment precisely as it is intended to in just
on two different sides within the essence of that process; whereas, for formal logic, the iden-
judgmental intentionality. It must above all be tity of "the" judgment extends much further.
recognized that here, as in the case of any other An evident judgment, S is p, and "the same"
intentive mental process, the two sides, noesis judgment as a "blind" judgment are noemati-
and noema, must by essential necessity be dis- cally different but identical with respect to
tinguished. a core of sense which alone is decisive from
Critically it may be remarked here that the the standpoint of formal logic. The difference
concepts of the "intentive" and the "cogni- here is similar to that already mentioned be-
tional essence" which were established in the tween the noema of a perception and that of
Logische Untersuchungen* are indeed correct a parallel presentiation which intends to the
but are capable of a second interpretation since same object, with precisely the same set of de-
they can be essentially understood as expres- terminations and with the same characteriza-
sions not only of noetic but also of noematic tion (as "certainly existing," "doubtfully exist-
essences, and that the noematic interpretation, ing," or the like). The act-species are different,
as carried through there one-sidedly in fram- and there is wide room for phenomenological
ing the concept of the judgment in pure logic is differences in other respects-but the noemat-
precisely not the one to be used in framing the ic What is identical. Let us add that the idea of
judgment-concept of pure logic (i.e., the con- the judgment which has just been character-
cept demanded by pure logic as pure mathesis ized and which functions as the fundamental
in contrast to the concept of noetic judging concept in formal logic (that discipline within
demanded by normative logical noetics). The mathesis universalis pertaining to predicative
difference between the making o f a judgment significations) has as its correlate the noetic
and the judgment made, a difference already idea: "the judgment" in a second sense under-
recognized in ordinary speech, can serve to stood, namely, as any judging whatever, with
point out the correct view, namely that to the an eidetic universality determined purely by the
judgmental mental process there belongs cor- form. It is the fundamental concept in the for-
relatively as noema the judgment simpliciter. mal noetic theory of correct judging. t
The latter, then, should be understood as Everything just said is also true for other
the "judgment" or proposition in the sense of noetic mental processes; for example, it obvi-
the word in pure logic-except that pure logic ously holds good for all those which are es-

*Cf. op. cit. Vol. II, Part One, "Fifth Investigation," §21, pp. 391 f. <[2nd ed., pp. 417f.; English translation pp.
590f.].>
t As for Bolzano's concept of the "judgment in itself' or "the proposition in itself," the exposition in the
Wissenschaftslehre (Sulzbach, 1837) shows that Bolzano had not made clear to himself the proper sense of his pioneer
conception. He never saw that we have here two essentially possible interpretations, each of which yields something
which might be called "the judgment in itself': the specific essence of the judging process (the noetic idea) and the
noematic idea correlative to the noetic idea. His descriptions and explanations are ambiguous. Given a mathematician's
objective interest, he undoubtedly had the noematic concept in mind-though an occasional phrase seems to indicate
the contrary (cf. op. cit., Vol. I, p. 95, the approving quotation from Mehmel's Denklehre <sci. Versuch einer vollstandigen
analytische Denklehre als Vorphilosophie und im Geiste der Philosophie (Erlangen, 1803)>). He had it in mind, pre-
94 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

sentially akin to judgings as predicative cer- a likelihood (or a deeming likely), with a ques-
tainties: for the corresponding deemings pos- tion (or an asking), and with other act-noemas
sible, deemings likely, doubting, also reject- or noeses.
ings. Among these the agreement can go so far
that, in the noema, a sense-content occurs which §95. The analogous distinctions in the
is identical throughout and is merely furnished emotional and volitional spheres.
with different "characterizations." The same "S
is p," as a noematic core, can be the "content" Analogous statements hold, then, as one can
of a certainty, a deeming possible, a deeming easily see, for the emotional and volitional
likely, etc. In the noema the "S is p" does not spheres, for mental processes of liking or dis-
stand alone; rather, as singled out of the noe- liking, of valuing in any sense, of wishing, de-
ma by thinking, it is something non-selfsuf- ciding, acting. All these are mental processes
ficient; it is intended to with changing char- which contain many and often heterogeneous
acterizations indispensable to the full noema: intentive strata, the noetic and, corresponding-
it is intended to with the characteristic of ly, also the noematic ones.
something "certain," "possible," "probable," In that connection, the stratifications, gen-
"null," or the like--characteristics, to which erally speaking, are such that the uppermost
the modifying inverted commas collectively be- strata of the total phenomenon can be removed
long and which, as correlates, are specifically without the remainder ceasing to be a con-
coordinated with the noetic moments of con- cretely complete intentive mental process, and,
sidering-possible, considering-probable, con- conversely, a concrete mental process can al-
sidering-null, and the like. so take on a new noetic total stratum: as when
With this, as we see at the same time, two a non-selfsufficient moment of "valuing" is
fundamental concepts of "judgment-content" stratified on a concrete process of simply ob-
and likewise of likelihood-content, question- jectivating or, on the other hand, is removed
content, etc., are separated from one another. again.
Not infrequently logicians use the term judg- If, in this manner, a perceiving, phantasy-
ment-content in such a way that obviously ing, judging, or the like, founds a stratum of
(even though without the so necessary distinc- valuing which overlays it completely, we have
tion) the noetic or the noematic-logical con- different noemata or senses in the stratified
cept of judgment is meant, the two concepts whole which is called a concrete mental pro-
which we previously characterized. The cor- cess of valuing by being designated according
responding pairs of concepts pertaining to like- to the highest level within it. The perceived
lihoods, questions, doubts, etc., run parallel as perceived specifically belongs as sense to
with them, naturally without ever coinciding the perceiving, but it is also included in the
with them or with one another. Here, however, sense of the concrete valuing, founding the lat-
a second sense of judgment-content results- ters's sense. We must distinguish accordingly:
as a "content" which the judgment <(or the the objects, the physical things, the qualities,
judging)> can have identically in common with the predicatively formed affair-complexes,

cisely as the arithmetician has number in mind-being interested in operations with numbers but not in the phenom-
enological problem of the relationship between number and consciousness of number. Here in the sphere of logic, as
well as everywhere else. phenomenology was something quite alien to the great logician. That cannot fail to be clear to
anyone who has actually studied Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre (which has unfortunately become so scarce) and who,
in addition to that, is not inclined to confuse every working out of fundamental eidetic concepts-the phenomenologi-
cally naive production-with a phenomenological production. If one did this, then, in the interest of consistency one
would have to say that every mathematician who creates concepts, e.g., Georg Cantor, as the genius who framed the
fundamental concepts of the theory of sets, is a phenomenologist, including the unknown creator of the fundamental
geometrical concepts in hoary antiquity.
The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 95

which are present as valued in the valuing, or and the latter's being truly a value). One must
else the corresponding noemata of the objecti­ exclude ali actional positings in order to seize
vatings, tpe judgings, or the like, which found upon the noema. Moreover, careful attention
the value-consciousness; on the other hand, must be paid to the fact that the ful! "sense"
the value-objects themselves and the predica­ of the valuing includes its What in which it is
tively formed value-complexes themselves, or intended to in the mental process of valuing
else the noematic modifications correspond­ in question, and that the value-Objectiveness
ing to them; and then, universally, the complete in inverted cornmas is not, by itself, the full
noemata belonging to the concrete value-con­ noema.
sciousness. In like manner the distinctions made here
By way of explanation let us say first of ali can be made in the volitional sphere.
that, for the sake of greater distinctness, we do On one side we have the deciding which
well (here and in all analogous cases) to intro­ we effect together with the mental processes
duce distinctive relative terms in order to keep which it demands as a substratum, and which,
sharply separate valuable object and value­ when it is taken in its concreteness, it includes.
object, valuable predicatively formed affair­ To it belong many different noetic moments.
complex and predicatively formed value-com­ Volitional positings are based on valuing posit­
plexes, valuable property and value-property ings, physical-thing positings, and the like. On
(a term having itselftwo senses). We shall speak the other side we find the decision as a pecu­
of the mere "thing" which is valuable, which liar kind of Objectiveness specifically belong­
has a value-characteristic, which has value­ ing to the province of volition; and it is an Ob­
quality; in contradistinction, we speak of con­ jectiveness obviously founded on other such
crete value itself or the value-Objectiveness noematic Objectivenesses. If, as phenomenol­
[Wertobjektitdt]. Likewise we shall speak of ogists, we exclude all our positings, the voli­
the mere predicatively formed affair-complex tional phenomenon, as a phenomenologically
or the mere lay of things [Sachlage] and the pure intentive mental process, still retains its
predicatively formed value-complex or the "willed as willed, " as a noema belonging pe­
lay of values [Wertlage], namely where the culiarly to the willing: the "volition-meaning,"
valuing has a consciousness of a predicative­ precisely as it is a "meaning" in this willing (in
ly formed affair-complex as its founding sub­ the full essence <of the willing>) and with ev­
stratum. The value-Objectiveness involves erything being willed and "aimed at."
its mere materially determinate thing [Sache]; We said, "the meaning." This word suggests
it introduces, as a new Objective stratum, the itself in ali these contexts, just as do the words
value-quality. The predicatively formed value­ "sense" and "signification." To the meaning
complex contains the mere predicati vely [Meinen] or intending to [Vermeinen], then,
formed affair-complex belonging to it; in like corresponds the meant [Meinung]; to signify­
manner the value-property contains the mate­ ing, the signijication. But the greatest precau­
rially deterrninate thing-property and, in addi­ tion is called for with respect to these words
tion the value-quality. because they all have been infected with so
Here too one must distinguish between the many equivocations by transference, not least
value-Objectiveness simpliciter and the value­ of ali by equivocations which arise from slip­
Objectiveness in inverted commas which is in­ ping from one to another ofthe correlative strata
cluded in the noema. Just as the perceived as which we are trying to separare with scientific
perceived stands over against the perceiving rigor. The scope of our present observations is
in a way excluding the question of whether the broadest extension of the essential genus,
the perceived truly exists, so the valued as val­ "intentive mental process." "Meaning," on the
ued stands over against the valuing, and Jike­ other hand, is normally spoken of in referring
wise in a way excluding the question of the to narrower spheres which, however, function
being ofthe value (the being ofthe valued thing as substrata for other phenomena in the wid-
96 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

er sphere. As technical terms, therefore, this actual relationship to our real psychophysi­
word and cognate expressions should be used cal subjectivity and sometimes, finally, to the
only with reference to those narrower spheres. latter itself. But now we must describe what
In referring to the universalities involved, we is left of that as a phenomenological residuum
are undoubtedly better served by our new terms if we reduce it to its "pure immanence" and
and the attached analyses of examples. what therefore may or may not hold good for
the really inherent component of the pure
mental process. And here it must be made per­
The Question of Levels ::- fectly clear that, more particularly, there be­
Iongs to the essence of the mental process of
§97. The hyletic and noetic moments as perception in itself the "perceived tree as per­
really inherent moments, the noematic ceived," or the full noema, which is not touched
moments as real/y non-inherent mo­ by excluding the actuality of the tree and that
ments, o( mental processes of the whole world; on the other hand, how­
ever, this noema, with its "tree" in inverted
When introducing the distinction between commas, is no more contained inherently than
the noetic and the noematic in the last chap­ is the tree which belongs to actuality.
ter, we used the expressions, analysis of the What do we find really inherent in <the per­
real/y inherent and intentional analysis. Let us ception> as pure mental process, contained in
start with that. A phenomenologically pure it as the parts, the pieces and the moments not
mental process has its really inherent compo­ divisible into pieces, of a whole? We have, on
nents. For the sake of simplicity, Jet us restrict occasion, distinguished such genuine really
ourselves to noetic mental processes of the inherent component parts by the names stuff­
lowest leve), namely to those which are not component parts and noetic component parts.
complicated in their intentionality by a variety Let us contrast them with the noematic com­
of noetic strata built one upon another such ponents.
as we found to be the case in acts of thinking The color of the tree trunk, pure as the col­
and in emotional and volitional acts. or of which we are perceptually conscious, is
A sensuous perception may possibly serve precisely the "same" as the one which, before
as an example: the tree-perception simpliciter the phenomenological reduction, we took to
which we have while Iooking out into the gar­ be the color ofthe actual tree (at least as "natu­
den when, in a unity of consciousness, we are ral" human beings and prior to intervention
looking at that tree over there which is now of information provided by physics). Now,
motionJess and then appears blown by the wind, this color, put into parenthesis, belongs to the
and which is also presented in greatly differ­ noema. But it does not belong to the mental
ing modes of appearance as we, during our process of perception as a really inherent com­
continuing observation, change our spatial po­ ponent piece, although we can also find in it
sition relative to the tree-perhaps we go to "something like color": namely, the "sensed
the window or simply alter the position of our color," that hyletic moment of the concrete
head or eyes, while perhaps at the same time mental process by which the noematic, or "ob­
relaxing and concentrating our <visual> accom­ jective," color is "adumbrated."
modation, etc. In this way the unity of one per­ Accordingly, however, one and the same
ception can include a great multiplicity of modi­ noematic color which is intended to through­
fications which we, as observers in the natur­ out the continuous unity of changeable per­
al attitude, sometimes ascribe to the actual ob­ ceptual consciousness as an identical and, in
jects as its changes, sometimes to a real and itself, unchanged color, is being adumbrated

*Ideas/, pp. 236--243 (Sections 97-98).

The Noetic and Noematic Structure o( Consciousness 97

by a continuous multiplicity of sensed colors. sensed colors, sounds, etc.), but also the ani­
We see a tree unchanged with respect to color mating construals-thus both together: the ap­
-its color, the color of the tree-while the pearing of the color, the sound and thus of
positions.of the eyes <and our> relative orien­ any quality whatever of the object-belong to
tations are changing and our regard is inces­ the "really inherent" composition of the men­
santly moving over the trunk and branches, tal process.
and while, at the same time, we come closer Now, the following is universally true: In
and thus, in various ways, bring the mental pro­ itself the perception is a perception of its ob­
cess of perception into a flow. Let us reflect on ject; and to every component which is singled
sensations, on adumbrations: we then seize out in the object by "objectively" directed de­
upon them as evident data and, in perfect evi­ scription there corresponds a really inherent
dence, changing the focus and direction of at­ component of the perception; but, note well,
tention, we can also relate them and the corre­ only in so far as the description faithfully con­
sponding objective moments, cognize them forms to the object as it "is there" in that per­
as corresponding and, in so doing, see at once ception itself. Moreover, we can designate all
that, e.g., the adumbrative colors pertaining to those noetic components only by appealing to
any fixed physical-thing color are related to it the noematic Object and its moments: thus
as a continuous "multiplicity" is related to a saying, for example, consciousness, more par­
"unity." ticularly, perceptual consciousness, of a tree
Effecting the phenomenological reduction, trunk, of the color of the trunk, etc.
we even acquire the generical eidetic insight On the other hand, our considerations have
that the object, tree, can only appear at ali in a shown indeed that the really inherent unity
perception as Objectively determined in the within the mental process of hyletic and noet­
mode in which it does appear in the percep­ ic component pieces is totally different from
tion if the hyletic moments (or, in the case of the <unity> of noematic component pieces "in­
a continuous series of perceptions, if the con­ tended to" in the noesis; and it is also differ­
tinuous hyletic changes) are just those and no ent from the unity which unites ali those really
others. This therefore implies that any changes inherent components in the mental process
of the hyletic content of the perception, if it with that whereof, as a noema, we are conscious
does not quite do away with perceptual con­ in and through them. That which is "transcen­
sciousness, must at least result in what appears dentally constituted" "on the ground of' the
becoming objectively "other," whether in itself material {stofflich J mental processes "by" the
or in the orientation in which it is appearing, or noetic functions is, to be sure, something
the like. "given"; and in pure intuition we faithfully de­
It is also absolutely indubitable, then, that scribe the mental process and its noematic ob­
here "unity" and "multiplicity" belong to wholly ject intended to [sein noematisch BewujJtes },
different dimensions and, more particularly, that it is something evidently given; but it belongs
everything hyletic belongs in the concrete men­ to the mental process in a sense entirely differ­
tal process as a really inherent component, ent from the sense in which the really inherent
whereas, in contrast, what is "presented," "ad­ and therefore proper constituents belong to
umbrated," in it as multiplicity belongs in the the mental process.
noema. The characterization of the phenomeno­
But the stuffs, we said earlier, are "animated" logical reduction and, likewise, of the pure
by noetic moments; they undergo (while the sphere of mental processes as "transcendental"
Ego is tumed, not to them, but to the object) rests precisely on the fact that we discover in
"construings," "sense-bestowals," which, in this reduction an absolute sphere of stuffs and
reflections, we seize upon precisely in and along noetic forros whose determinately structured
with the stuffs. In view of this it immediately combinations possess, according to immanent­
follows that not only the hyletic moments (the al eidetic necessity, the marvelous conscious-
98 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ness of something determinate and determin­ ly noted that any transition from a phenome­
able, given thus and so, which is something over non into the reflection which itself is an analy­
against consciousness itself, something funda­ sis of the really inherent, or into the quite dif­
mentally other, non-really inherent {Irreelles}, ferently articulated <reflection> which dissects
transcendent; <the characterization of mental its noema, generates new phenomena, and that
processes as "transcendental" further rests on we would fall into error were we to confuse
the fact> that this is the primal source in which the new phenomena-which, in a certain way,
is found the only conceivable solution of those are recastings of the old-with the old phe­
deepest problems of cognition conceming the nomena, and were we to impute to the old what
essence and possibility of an objectively valid really inherently or noematically is included
knowledge of something transcendent. "Tran­ in the <new>. Thus it is not meant, e.g., that
scendental" reduction exercises the E7tüXTJ the material contents, Jet us say the adumbra­
with respect to actuality: but what it retains of tive color-contents, are present in the percep­
<actuality> includes the noemas with the noe­ tual mental process in just the same way in
matic unity included within them themselves which they are present in the mental process
and, accordingly, the mode in which something of analyzing. To mention only one <differ­
real is intended to and, in particular, given in ence,> in the former they were contained as
consciousness itself. The knowledge that ev­ really inherent moments, but they were not
erywhere it is a matter of eidetic, therefore un­ perceived therein, not seized upon as objects.
conditioned, necessary concatenations opens But in the analyzing mental process they are
up a great field of research into the eidetic re­ objects, targets of noetic functions which
lations between the noetic and the noematic, were not present before. Although these stuffs
between the mental process of consciousness are still lacten with their presentive functions,
and the correlate of consciousness. Toe latter even these have undergone essential changes
term, however, includes: consciousness of ob­ (to be sure, of other dimensions). That will be
jectivity as consciousness of objectivity and, discussed later. Obviously, this difference has
at the same time, the forms of the noematic an essential importance for the phenomeno­
How of meantness of givenness. Within the do­ logical method.
main from which we have taken our example, Following this remark !et us tum our at­
there arises, first of ali, the universal evidence tention to the following points belonging to
that perception is not an empty presentive our particular theme. In the first place, every
having of the object, but that instead it belongs mental process is so structured that there ex­
("a priori") to the essence proper of perception ists the essential possibility of tuming one's re­
to have "its" object, and to have it as the unity gard to it and its really inherent components
of a certain noematic composition which is al­ and, likewise, in the opposite direction to the
ways a different, yet always eidetically prede­ noema, perchance to the seen tree as seen. That
lineated composition in the case of other per­ which is given in this focusing of regard is
ceptions of "the same" object; or that it is of now, more particularly, stated logically, an
the essence of the object in question, objective­ object, but utterly non-selfsufficient. lts esse
ly determined thus and so, to be and only to be consists exclusively of its "percipi"- except
able to be a noematic object precisely in per­ that this proposition does not have the Berke­
ceptions of such a descriptive sort, etc. leyian sense because here the esse does not
include the percipi as a really inherent com­
§98. The mode of being of the noema. ponent piece.
Theory of forms of noeses. Theory of This is naturally transferred to the eidetic
forms of noemata mode of consideration: the Eidos of the noe­
ma points to the Eidos of the noetic conscious­
Important supplementations are still, how­ ness; both belong together eidetically. The in­
ever, necessary. First of ali, it must be careful- tentive as intentive [Jntentionale als so/ches]
The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 99

is what it is as the intentiveness [lntentional­ must describe the formations on both sides
es] belonging to consciousness structured thus and in their essentially mutual correspondence.
and so, consciousness which is consciousness The noematic is the field of unities, the noet­
of it. ic is the field of "constituting" multiplicities.
In spite of this non-selfsufficiency the noe­ The consciousness which unites the manifold
ma allows far being considered by itself, com­ "functionally" and, at the same time, consti­
pared with other noemas, explored with respect tutes unity never in fact shows an identity ev­
to its possible transformations, etc. One can en where an identity of the "object" is given in
project a theory of the universal and pure forms the noematic correlate. Where, far example, dif­
of noemata which would have as its contrast­ ferent segments of an enduring perceiving
ing correlate a theory of the universal and no which is constituting a physical-thing unity
less pure forms of concrete noetic mental pro­ shows something identical, the one tree un­
cesses with their hyletic and specifically noet­ changing according to the sense of this perceiv­
ic components. ing-given now in this, then in that orienta­
Naturally these two theories would by no tion, now from the front, now from the back,
means be related as, so to speak, mutual re­ at first indistinctly and indeterminately, then
fiections; nor would the one be transformed in­ distinctly and determinately with respect to
to the other by a mere change of sign, let us the properties of one or another place seized
say, by substituting "consciousness of N" far upon visually-: there the object found in the
each noema N. That already follows from what noema is intended to as an identical object
we explained befare in connection with the way in the literal sense, but the consciousness of it
in which unitary qualities belong together in is a non-identical, only combined, continuous­
the physical thing-noema with their hyletic ly united consciousness in the different seg­
adumbration-multiplicities contained in pos­ ments of its immanental duration.
sible perceptions of physical things. No matter to what extent these statements
It would now seem as though the same contain something right, the conclusions drawn
would also be true with respect to the spe­ are still not wholly correct; indeed, the great­
cifically noetic moments. More particularly, est caution is required in dealing with these
one can refer to those moments which bring it difficult questions. The parallelisms obtaining
about that a complex multiplicity of hyletic here-and there are many which are only too
Data, e.g., color-Data, etc., acquire the func­ easily confused with one another-involve
tion of a manifold adumbration of one and great difficulties which are still in need of
the same objective physical thing. Indeed, it clarification. We must carefully keep in view
only need be recalled that in the stuffs them­ the difference between concrete noetic mental
selves, by virtue of their own essence, the rela­ processes, the mental processes together with
tion to the Objective unity is not unambiguous­ their hyletic moments, and the pure noeses as
ly predelineated; the same material complex, mere complexes of noetic moments. Again,
instead, can undergo a diversity of mutually we must preserve the distinction between the
discrete and shifting construings by virtue of full noema and, e.g., in the case of perception,
which different objectivities are intended to. the "appearing object as appearing." If we take
Is it not therefore already clear that essential this "object" and ali its objective "predicates"
differences Iie in the animating construings -the noematic modifications of the predi­
themselves as moments of mental processes, cates of the perceived physical thing, posited
and which are differentiated along with the in normal perception simply as actual predi­
attendant adumbrations and by virtue of the cates-then this object and these predicates
animation of which they constitute "sense"? are indeed unities in contradistinction to mul­
One may therefore draw the following con­ tiplicities of constituting mental processes of
clusion: A parallelism between noesis and noe­ consciousness (concrete noeses). But they are
ma is indeed the case, but it is such that one also unities of noematic multiplicities. We rec-
100 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ognize that as soon as we take into consider­ or "mental" side. We need not enter into a clos­
ation the noematic characterizations of the er examination of the first side; likewise, we
noematic "object" (and its "predicates"), char­ need not consider the manner of unifying both
acterizations which until now we have gross­ sides. Obviously they too designate headings
ly neglected. Thus it is certain, for instance, for not unimportant phenomenological prob­
that the appearing color is a unity in contradis­ lems.
tinction to noetic multiplicities and, specifi­ We shall restrict our regard exclusively to
cally, multiplicities of noetic construing-char­ "signifying" and "signification." Originally,
acteristics. But more precise investigations these words concerned only the Iinguistic
revea) that changes in these characteristics sphere, that of "expressing." But one can
correspond to noematic parallels-if not in scarcely avoid and, at the same time, take an
the "color itself," which continues to appear important cognitive step, extending the sig­
there, then at least in their changing "modes nification of these words and suitably modi­
of givenness," e.g., in their appearing "orien­ fying them so that they can find application of
tation with respect to me." In this way, then a certain kind to the whole noetic-noematic
noetic "characterizations" are mirrored in the sphere: thus application to all acts, be they
noematic ones. now combined with expressive acts or not. t
Thus we have continued to speak of "sense"
in the case of ali intentive mental processes­
Expressive Acts ,:. a word which is used in general as equivalent
to "signification." For the sake of distinctness
§124. The noetic-noematic stratum of we shall prefer the term signification for the
"Lagos." Signifying and signification old concept and, in particular, in the complex
locution of "logical" or "expressive" significa­
lnterwoven with ali the acts considered be­ tion. We shall continue to use the word sense
fore are the expressive act-strata, which are as before in the most all-inclusive range.
"logical" in the specific sense, in which the For example: an object is present to percep­
parallelism between noesis and noema is to tion with a determined sense, posited mono­
be made evident no less than in the other acts. thetically in determined fullness. As is our
The universal and unavoidable ambiguity of normal custom after first seizing upon some­
locutions conditioned by this parallelism, and thing perceptually, we effect an explicating of
shown to be at work wherever the relevant re­ the given and a relational positing which unifies
lationships are expressed in language, is, natu­ the parts or moments singled out-perhaps
rally, also found in the terms expression and according to the schema, "This is white." This
signification. The ambiguity is dangerous only process does not require the mínimum of "ex­
as long as one does not recognize it as dan­ pression," nor of expression in the sense of
gerous, or else has not separated the parallel verbal sound, nor of anything like a verbal sig­
structures. But if that occurs, care must be tak­ nifying, the latter also being capable of be­
en so that there can be no doubt as to which of ing present independently of the verbal sound
the structures the terms ought to be referred. (as when this would be "forgotten"). But if we
We begin with the familiar distinction be­ have "thought" or asserted, "This is white,"
tween the sensuous, so to speak, the corporeal then a new stratum is co-present, unified with
side of the expression, and its non-sensuous the purely perceptually "meant as meant." In

*Ideas/, pp. 294-297 (Section 124).

tln this respect, cf. the Philosophie der Arithmetik. pp. 28f. [Husserliana. XII, pp. 31f.]. where the distinction is
already made between the "psychological description of a phenomenon" and the "declaration of its signification." and
where we speak of a "logical" in contras! to the psychological "content."
The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 101

this fashion anything remembered as remem­ ed to the phenomena subsumed under the
bered, anything phantasied as phantasied, is headings of "signifying" and "signification."*
also explicatable and expressable. Anything Because every science is objectivated in the
"meant as meant," anything meant in the noe­ specifically "logical" medium, in that of ex­
matic sense (and, more particularly, as the pression, in accord with its theoretical content
noematic core) pertaining to any act, no mat­ and with everything which is "doctrine" in it
ter which, is expressable by means of "signifi­ (theorem, proof, theory), the problems of ex­
cations." Quite universally we may say: pression and signification are the most imme­
Logical signification is an expression. diate for philosophers and psychologists guid­
The verbal sound can only be called an ex­ ed by universal logical interests; and they are,
pression because the signification belonging therefore, the first to require a phenomenologi­
to it expresses; expressing inheres in it origi­ cal inquiry into essence as soon as one seri­
naliter. "Expression" is a distinctive form which ously comes to seek out their ground.t From
allows for adapting to every "sense" (to the there, on that basis, one is led to the question
noematic "core") and raises it to the realm of of how the "expressing" of the "expressed" is
"Logos," of the conceptual and, on that ac­ to be understood, how expressive mental pro­
count, the "universal." cesses are related to non-expressive ones, and
As a consequence, the last words are under­ what the latter undergo in supervening expres­
stood in a quite determínate signification to be sings: one finds himself referred to their "in­
separated from other significations of these tentionality," to the "sense immanent" in them,
words. Universally, what has just been indicat­ to the "matter" and "quality" (i.e., the act-char­
ed designates a major theme for phenomeno­ acteristic of the positing); <one is referred to>
logical analysis which is fundamental for ei­ the difference between these senses, to the es­
detically clarifying logical thinking and its sential moments which lie in the pre-expressed,
correlates. In the noetic respect, a particular act­ and to the signification of the expressive phe­
stratum should be designated under the head­ nomenon itself and its own moments; and so
ing of "expressing" to which, in their own pe­ forth. In many ways, one still sees in the cur­
culiar way, ali other acts are to conform and rent literature how little justice is done to the
with which they are to fuse in a distinctive man­ major problems indicated here with respect to
ner so that every noematic act-sense, and con­ their full and profound sense.
sequently the relationship to objectivity Iying Apart from the fact that it confers expres­
in it, is "conceptually" stamped on the noemat­ sion precisely on all other intentionalities, the
ic correlate of the expressing. An appertinent stratum of expression-and this makes up its
intuitional medium is present which, accord­ own peculiarity-is not productive. Or, if one
ing to its essence, has the distinction, so to wishes: its productivity, its noematic produc­
speak, of mirroring every other intentionality tion, is exhausted in the expressing and with
according to form and content, depicturing it theform of the conceptual which is introduced
in its own colors and hence imprinting on it its with <the expression>.
own form of "conceptuality." To be sure, these As a consequence, the expressive stratum,
locutions of mirroring or depicturing imposed with respect to the posited characteristic, is
upon us are to be taken with care since their perfectly identical in essence with the stratum
metaphorical use can easily lead to error. undergoing the expression, and in the coinci­
Extraordinarily difficult problems are relat- dence takes up its essence into itself to such

* As can be seen from the second volume of the Logische Untersuchungen where they form a majar theme.
tln fact, this was the way in which the Loxische Untersuchungen endeavored to penetrate into phenomenology.
A second way. starting from the opposite side, namely from the side of experience and sensuous givenness followed
by the author since the beginning of the l 890s. was not fully expressed in that work.
102 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

an extent that we call the expressive objectivat­ in itself, is syntactically formless in compari­
ing just objectivating itself, the expressive be­ son to the different universalities of signifi­
lieving, <expressive> deeming likely, <expres­ cation just touched upon.
sive> doubting themselves, and as a whole,
just believing, deeming likely, doubting; simi­
larly, we call the expressive wishing or will­ Noema and Object >:·
ing just wishing or willing. It is evident that
even the distinction between positionality and § 12 8. Introduction
neutrality passes over into the expressive, and
we have already considered it above. The ex­ Toe phenomenological excursions of the last
pressive stratum can have no other qualified chapter have led us into almost all spheres of
posited or neutral position than the stratum intentionality. Guided by the radical point of
subject to the expression, and in the coincidence view of the distinction between analysis of the
we find not two positions which are to be sepa­ really inherent and intentional analysis, be­
rated but only one position. tween noetic and noematic analysis, we encoun­
The full clarification of the structures be­ tered in all cases structures which always and
longing here raises considerable difficulties. again became newly ramified. In the case of
Already it is not easy to recognize that, after this distinction, we can no longer avoid the in­
abstraction from the sensuous verbal sounds, a sight that it is indeed a matter of a fundamen­
stratification of the kind we presuppose here is tal structure pervading all intentional structures
actually present, thus in every case--even in which must, therefore, determine a goveming
that of a thinking which is still quite unclear, Leitmotiv of phenomenological methods and
empty, merely verbal-a stratum of expressive the course of all inquiries into problems of in­
signifying and a substratum of the expressed; tentionality.
nor is it easy to understand the essential con­ With this distinction it is clear at the same
nections of these stratifications. For not too time that there becomes salient a distinction
much should be expected of the metaphor between two realms of being which are radi­
stratification; expression is not something Iike cally opposed and yet essentially related to one
a coat of vamish, or like a piece of clothing another. We emphasized earlier that conscious­
covering it over; it is a mental formation ex­ ness taken universally must be accepted as a
ercising new intentive functions on the intent­ proper region of being. We recognized then,
ive substratum and which, correlatively, is however, that eidetic description of conscious­
subjected to the intentive functions of the ness leads back to that of what is intended to
<substratum>. What this new metaphor signi­ in it, that the correlate of consciousness is in­
fies for its part must be studied in the phe­ separable from consciousness and yet is not
nomena themselves and in all their essential really inherent in it. The noematic became dis­
modifications. Of particular importance is the tinguished as an objectivity belonging to con­
understanding of the different sorts of "uni­ sciousness and yet specifically peculiar. In that
versality" which make their appearance there: connection, we notice that while objects sim­
on the one side, those which belong to each pliciter (understood in the unmodified sense)
expression and moment of expression, also to stand under fundamentally different highest
the non-selfsufficient "is," "not," "and," "if," genera, all object-senses and ali noemas taken
and so forth; on the other side, the universality completely, no matter how different they may
of "universal names" such as "human being" be otherwise, are of essential necessity of one
in contrast to proper names such as "Bruno"; single highest genus. lt then also obtains, how­
again, those which belong to an essence which, ever, that the essences, Noema and Noesis, are

*Ideas/, pp. 307-318 (Sections 128-133).

The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 103

inseparable from one another: Intima species gressing in this direction and, on the other
on the noematic side eidetically point back to side, reflecting on the parallel noeses, we tinal­
intima species on the noetic side. That becomes ly confront the question of what the "claim"
extended naturally to ali formations of genus of consciousness actually to "relate" to some­
and species. thing objective, to be "well-founded," proper­
Cognitions of the essential two-sidedness ly signities, of how "valid" and "invalid" ob­
of intentionality, according to noesis and noe­ jective relations become phenomenologically
ma, have the consequence that a systematic claritied according to noesis and noema: and
phenomenology is not allowed to direct its with that we confront the great problems of
aim one-sidedly at an analysis of what is really reason, the claritication of which within the
inherent in mental processes and specitically realm of phenomenology, the formulation of
of intentive mental processes. The temptation which as phenomenological problems, will
to do so is, however, very great at the begin­ become our aim in this <fourth> part of <the
ning because the historical and natural course First Book>.
from psychology to phenomenology brings
with it that one understands the study of what §129. "Content" and "object"; the
is immanent in pure mental processes, the study content as "sense"
of their own essence, as without question a
study of their really inherent components. * In In our previous analyses a universal noe­
truth there become opened up in respect of matic structure played its continuous role, des­
both sides great provinces of eidetic research ignated by the separation of a certain noematic
which are continually related to one another "core" from the changing "characteristics"
and which yet, as comes to light, are separated belonging to it <and> with which the noemat­
with respect to broad extents. In great measure ic concretion appears involved in the flow of
what one has held to be act-analysis, noetic different sorts of moditications. This core has
analysis, is gained entirely from the direction not yet received its scientitic due. It was intui­
of regard to the "meant as meant," and thus it tionally, unitarily, and clearly salient so that
was noematic structures which one described we could refer to it in general. Now the time
in that analysis. has come to consider it more closely and place
In our next considerations it will be our it at the center of phenomenological analysis.
purpose to direct our attention to the universal As soon as one does that, universally signiti­
structure of the noema from a point of view cant differences running throughout ali act­
which, up to now, has often been mentioned species emerge which are guiding for great
but was still not the guiding one for noematic groups of investigations.
analysis: The phenomenological problem ofthe We begin with the usual equivoca! verbal
relation of consciousness to an objectivity has reference to the content of consciousness. As
primarily its noematic side. The noema in it­ content we take the "sense," of which we say
self has an objective relation and, more par­ that in or through it consciousness relates to
ticularly, by virtue of its own "sense." If we something objective as "its" something objec­
ask, then, how the consciousness-"sense" has tive. So to speak, as title and aim of our discus­
access to the "object" which belongs to it and sions we take the propositions:
can be "the same" in manifold acts of very dif­ Each noema has a "content," that is to say,
ferent content, how we see this in the sense, its "sense," and is related through it to "its" ob­
then new structures emerge the extraordin­ ject.
ary signiticance of which is evident. For, pro- In recent times one often hears it praised as

*That is still the focus of the Logische Unrersuchungen. However great the extent to which the nature of the matters
themselves compels the carrying out of noematic analyses. the noemas are nevertheless regarded more as indices for
the parallel noetic structures: the essential parallelism of the two structures has not yet attained clarity there.
104 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

a great advance, that now at last the founda­ has its quality but it is not itself to be desig­
tion-laying differentiation among act, content, nated as quality. Obviously now the "matter,"
and object has been attained. The three words which is, in the particular case, the "what"
in this juxtaposition have become nothing which receives the posited characteristic, the
short of slogans, particularly since Twardow­ "quality," corresponds to the "noematic core."
ski 's fine treatise.* Yet, however great and The task is now to systematically develop
doubtless the service of this author in having this beginning, to clarify it more deeply, to ana­
acutely discussed certain generally ordinary lyze these concepts further and to carry them
confusions and made their error evident, it through in ali noetic-noematic provinces. Each
must still be said that in the clarification of the actually successful advance in this direction
relevant conceptual essence he did not get must be of exceptional significance for phe­
considerably beyond what was well-known to nomenology. It is indeed a question, not of side
the philosophers of earlier generations (de­ issues, but of essential moments belonging to
spite their incautious confusions). This is not, the central structure of every intentive mental
perchance, to be charged to him as a fault. A process.
radical advance was just not at ali possible In order to approach matters more closely,
before a systematic phenomenology of con­ !et us begin with the following deliberation.
sciousness. With phenomenologically unclari­ The intentive mental process, so one is ac­
fied concepts such as "act," "content," "object" customed to say, has "relation to something
of the "objectivatings," nothing is of help to objective "; but one also says that it is "con­
us. What is there which cannot be called "act" sciousness of something, " for example, a blos­
and especially which cannot be called "content soming apple tree, the one here in this garden.
of an objectivating," and an "objectivating"? To begin with, we shall not hold it to be neces­
And what can be called so must itself be cog­ sary, in the light of such examples, to discrimi­
nized scientifically. nate the two manners of speaking. If we recall
In this respect a first and, as it would ap­ the preceding analyses, we find the full noesis
pear to me, necessary step was attempted by related to the full noema as its intentional and
means of the phenomenological distinguish­ full What. It is then clear, however, that this
ing of "matter" and "quality" by means of the relation cannot be the one meant in speaking
idea of the "intentional essence" in its distinc­ of the relation of consciousness to its inten­
tion from the "cognitional essence." The one­ tional objective something; for to each noetic
sidedness of the noetic direction of regard in moment, especially to each positing noetic
which these differentiations were made and one, there corresponds a moment in the noe­
meant becomes easily overcome by taking into ma and, in the latter, there is set apart from the
consideration the noematic parallels. We can complex posited characteristics the noematic
therefore understand the concepts as noemat­ core characterized by them. If we recall, fur­
ic; the "quality" (judgment-quality, wish-qual­ thermore, the "regard-to" which, undercircum­
ity, and so forth) is nothing else than that which stances, goes through the noesis (which goes
we have dealt with up to now as "posited" char­ through the actional cogito) and which con­
acteristic ["Setzungs" Charakter, "thetíschen" verts the specifically positing moments into rays
Charakter] in the broadest sense. The expres­ of positing actionality of the Ego, and if we
sion, originating from contemporary psychol­ heed precisely how this Ego now with them
ogy (Brentano's), appears to me now hardly "directs" itself to something objective as seiz­
suitable; each specifically peculiar position ing upon being, as deeming likely, as wishing,

*K. Twardowski, Zur Lehre van lnhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen /On the Theory of the Canten/ and the
Object of Objectivatings] (Vienna, 1894).
The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 105

how its regard goes through the noematic core noema "something objective"-in inverted
-we then become attentive to the fact that, commas-with a certain noematic composi­
with the �tatements about the relation (and tion which becomes explicated in a descrip­
specifically the direction) of consciousness to tion of determínate delimitation, that is to say,
its objective something, we are referred to an in such a description which, as a description
innermost moment of the noema. It is not the of the "meant objective something, as it is
just designated core itself but rather something meant," avoids al! "subjective" expressions.
else which, so to speak, makes up the neces­ There formal-ontological expressions are ap­
sary central point of the core and functions as plied, such as "object," "determination," <and>
"bearer" for noematic peculiarities specifical­ "predicatively formed affair-complex"; mate­
ly belonging to the core, that is to say, the noe­ rial-ontological expressions, such as "physi­
matically modified properties of the "meant cal thing," "bodily figure" {"Figur"}, <and>
as meant." "cause"; determinations with a material con­
As soon as we go into it more precisely tent, such as "rough," "hard," <and> "col­
we are immediately cognitively aware that in­ ored"-all have their inverted commas, accord­
deed the distinction between "content" and ingly the noematic-modified sense. Excluded,
"object" is to be made not only for the "con­ in contrast, for the description of this meant
sciousness," for the intentive mental process, objective something as meant are such expres­
but also for the noema taken in itse(f Thus the sions as "perceptual,'' "memorial," "clearly
noema too is related to an object and posses­ intuited," "conceptual," and "given"-they be­
ses a "content" by "means" of which it relates long to another dimension of descriptions,
to the object; in which case the object is the not to the objective something which is an ob­
same as that of the noesis; as then the "paral­ ject of consciousness, but to the mode in which
lelism" again completely confirms itself. it is an object of consciousness. In contrast, in
the case of an appearing physical thing-Ob­
§130. Delimitation of the essence, ject, it would again fall in the bounds of the
"noematic sense" description to say: a "front side" is thus and
so determined with respect to color, shape,
Let us bring these remarkable structures etc., its "rear side" has "a color" but a "not fur­
closer to us. We simplify the deliberation in ther determined" one; the appearing physical
such a way that we leave the attentional modi­ thing-Object is, in these and those respects, al­
fications out of consideration; we restrict our­ together "undetermined" as to whether it is
selves further to positing acts in the positions thus or so.
of which we live, perhaps, according to the se­ That is true not only in the case of objects
quence of levels of the founding-living sorne­ belonging to Nature but quite universally; for
times in the one, sometimes in the other par­ example, in the case of objects with value. To
tía! position while the others are, it is true, in their description belongs that of the meant
effect but in a secondary function. That our "mere thing" and, in addition, the statement of
analyses do not suffer in the least with respect the "value," as when we say of the appearing
to the universality of their validity by such tree, "according to the sense" of our valuing­
simplifications is to be made evident subse­ meaning <of it>, it is covered with "delight­
quently and without further ado. We are con­ fully" scented blossoms. Moreover, the value
cerned precisely with an essence which is in­ predicates too have their inverted commas; they
sensitive to such modifications. are predicates, not of a valuable object {eines
If we then put ourselves into a living cogi­ Wertes} simpliciter, but of a value noema.
to, it has, according to its essence and in a With this, obviously, a quite fixed content
pre-eminent sense a "direction" to something in each noema is delimited. Each conscious­
objective. In other words, there belongs to its ness has its What and each means "its" objec-
106 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

tive something; it is evident that, in the case of ject" ["Gegenstand"J, the "0bject" {"0b­
each consciousness, we must, essentially speak­ jekt"], the "/dentical, " the "determinable sub­
ing, be able to make such a noematic descrip­ ject of its possible predicates"-the pure X in
tion of <"its" objective something>, "precisely abstractionfrom ali predicates-and it becomes
as it is meant"; we acquire by explication and separated from these predicates or, more pre­
conceptual comprehension a closed set of for­ cisely, from the predicate-noemas.
mal or material, materially determined or "un­ With the one Object we coordinate multi­
determined" ("emptily" meant) "predicares" ple modes of consciousness, acts, correlatively
and these in their modified signification deter­ act-noemas. Obviously this is nothing acciden­
mine that "content" of the object-core of the tal; no <Object> is conceivable without there
noema which is spoken of. also being conceivable multiple intentive men­
tal processes, connected in continuous or in
§131. The "Object," the "determinable properly synthetical (polythetical) unity-pro­
X in the noematic sense" cesses in which "it," the Object, is intended to
as an identical object and yet in a noetically
The predicates are, however, predicates of different mode: such that the characterized core
"something," and this "something" also be­ is a changeable one and the "object," the pure
longs, and obviously inseparably, to the core subject of the predicating, is precisely an iden­
in question: it is the central point of unity of tical one. It is clear that we can regard each
which we spoke above. It is the central point partía! extent of the immanental duration of an
of connection or the "bearer" of the predicates, act as an "act" and the total act as a certain har­
but in no way is it a unity of them in the sense monious unity of the continuously combined
in which any complex, any combination, of acts. We can say then: severa! act-noemata have
the predicates would be called a unity. lt is here, throughout, dijferent cores, yet in such a
necessarily to be distinguished from them, al­ manner that, in spite of this, they are joined
though not to be placed alongside and sepa­ together to make a unity of identity, to make a
rated from them; just as, conversely, they are unity in which the "something," the determin­
its predicates: unthinkable without it, yet dis­ able which inheres in each core, is intended to
tinguishable from it. We say that the intention­ as an identical "something."
al Object is continuously intended to in the con­ In just the same manner, however, separare
tinuous or synthetical course of consciousness acts, like, for example, two perceptions or a
but again and again "presents" itself "differ­ perception and a memory, can join together to
ently"; it is "the same "; it is only given in oth­ make a "harmonious" unity and by virtue of
er predicates with a different determination­ the specific character of this union, which is
content; "it" shows itself only from different obviously not alien to the essence of the acts
sides, whereby the predicates which remained joined together, there is consciousness of the
undetermined would have become more close­ possibly at one time so and at another time
ly determined; or "the" Object has remained otherwise determined something of the at first
unchanged in this stretch of givenness, now separated cores as the same something or as
however "it," the identical, becomes altered, it harmoniously the same "object."
increases in beauty through this alteration, it As a consequence, therefore, there is inher­
loses utility-value, and so forth. If this is al­ ent in each noema a pure object-something as
ways understood as noematic description of the a point of unity and, at the same time, we see
currently meant as meant and if this descrip­ how in a noematic respect two sorts of object­
tion, as is possible at any time, is made in pure concepts are to be distinguished: this pure point
adequation, then the identical intentional "ob­ of unity, this noematic "object simpliciter," and
ject" becomes evidently distinguished from the the ''object in the How ofits detemúnations "­
changing and alterable "predicates." lt becomes including undeterminednesses which for the
separated as central noematic moment: the "ob- time being "remain open" and, in this mode,
The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 107

are co-meant. This "How," moreover, is to be Our exposition becomes extended from
taken precisely as that which the particular monothetical acts to synthetical or, more dis­
act presc;ibes, as which it consequently be­ tinctly, to polythetical acts. In a positing, many­
longs actually to the noema <of the act>. The membered consciousness each member has
"sense," of which we speak repeatedly, is this the described noematic structure; each has its
noematic "Object in the How," with ali that X with the latter's "determining content"; but
which the description characterized above in addition to that the noema of the syntheti­
is able to find evidently in it and to express cal total act has, with respect to the "archon­
conceptually. tic" position, the synthetical X and its deter­
Let it be noted that now we cautiously said mining content. In the effecting of the act, the
"sense," not "core." For it will turn out that, in ray of the pure Ego's regard, dividing itself
order to gain the actual, concretely complete into a plurality of rays, goes to the X which
core of the noema, we must take into account arrives at synthetical unity. With the change
yet another dimension of differences which we call "nominalization" the svnthetical total
finds no expression in the characterized descrip­ phenomenon becomes modifieu in such a way
tion <but> which defines the sense for us. If that a ray of actionality goes to the highest
at first we keep here purely to that which this synthetic X.
<description> comprehends, the "sense" is
therefore a fundamental piece of the noema. § 132. The core as a sense in the mode
Universally it is a piece which, under circum­ belonging to its fullness
stances, changes from noema to noema, but
<which> under circumstances <is> an abso­ As we have determined it, the sense is not
lutely like <piece> and perhaps even charac­ a concrete essence in the total composition of
terized as "identical," in so far as the "object, the noema but a sort of abstractform inherent
in the How of determinations," stands there on in the noema. That is to say, if we hold the sense
both sides as the same and as one to be de­ fast, consequently the "meant," precisely with
scribed in an absolutely like manner. In no the determination-content in which it is some­
noema, however, can it or its necessary cen­ thing meant, then clearly a second concept of
ter, the point of unity, the pure determinable the "object in its How" is yielded-<the ob­
X, be missing. No "sense" without the "some­ ject> in the How of its modes of givenness. lf,
thing" and, again, without "determining con­ in addition, we disregard ali attentional modi­
tent. " In that connection, it is evident that the fications, ali differences of the sort to which
subsequent analysis and description do not differences in the modes of effecting belong,
first introduce such a thing but rather that, as there come into consideration-always with­
condition for the possibility of evident descrip­ in the preferred sphere of positionality-the
tion and prior to this, it inheres actually in the differences in fullness of clarity, which are
correlate of consciousness. cognitionally so very determinative. Some­
Through the sense-bearer (as empty X) be­ thing intended to obscurely, as obscurely in­
longing to the sense and through the possibil­ tended to, and the same thing as intended to
ity of harmonious combination to make sense­ clearly are, with respect to their noematic con­
unities of any leve! whatever-a possibility creteness, very different, just as the whole men­
grounded in the essence of the sense-not only tal processes are. But nothing stands in the
does each sense have its "object" but also dif­ way of the determination-content with which
ferent senses relate to the same object, just as the thing intended to obscurely is meant be­
far as they are to be made members of sense­ ing absolutely the same as the determination­
uni ties in which the determinable X of the content of the thing intended to clearly. The
united senses become coincident with one an­ descriptions would coincide, and a syntheti­
other and with the X of the total sense of the cal unity-consciousness could envelop the con­
particular unity of sense. sciousness on one side and that on the other
108 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

in such a way that it was actually a matter of selves ali explicit posita or, correspondingly,
the same meant something. As ful/ core we ali posita-significations.
shall, accordingly, count precisely the full con­ According to our analyses these concepts
creteness of the noematic component in ques­ designate an abstract stratum belonging to the
tion, consequently the sense in the mode be­ full web of ali noemata. For our cognitions it
longing to its fullness. is of great significance to gain this stratum in
its fully comprehensive universality, conse­
§133. The noematic positum. Posited quently to have the insight that it has its
and synthetical posita. Posita in the place actually in ali act-spheres. Also in the
realm of objectivations case of intuitions simpliciter the concepts
sense and positum have their necessary appli­
There would now be needed a careful car­ cation, necessarily the particular concepts in­
rying-through of these distinctions in ali act­ tuition-sense and intuition-positum must be
provinces as well as supplementary consider­ coined. So, for example, in the province of
ation of the posited moments which have a perception of something externa) the object­
peculiar relation to the sense as noematic. In sense, the physical thing-sense of this percep­
the Logische Untersuchungen they were (un­ tion, which is a different sense (as well as
der the title "quality") taken into the concept with respect to "the same" physical thing) from
of sense ( of significational essence) and there­ perception to perception, is to be singled out
fore in this unity the two components, "mat­ intuitively from the "perceived object as per­
ter" (sense, in the present conception) and qual­ ceived" by abstracting from the characteris­
ity, were distinguished. * But it seems more tic of perceivedness as something inhering in
suitable to define the term "sense" as merely the noema prior to ali explicating and con­
that "matter" and then to designate the unity ceiving thinking. If we take this sense <in its>
of sense and posited characteristic as "posi­ completion, with its intuitional fullness, a de­
tum." We have then one-membered posita (as termined and very important concept of ap­
in the case of perceptions and other position­ pearance results. To these senses correspond
al intuitions) and many-membered, synthetical pos ita, intuition-posita, objecti vation-posita,
posita, such as predicative doxic posita (judg­ perceptual posita, and so forth. In a phenom­
ments), uncertain likelihood-posita with predi­ enology of intuition of something externa)
catively membered material, etc. One-mem­ which, as phenomenology has to do, not with
bered as well as many-membered <posita> are, objects simpliciter in an unmodified sense,
furthermore, liking-posita, wish-posita, com­ but with noemas as correlates of noeses, con­
mand-posita, etc. The concept of the positum cepts like those brought out here stand at the
is accordingly indeed extraordinarily and per­ center of scientific research.
haps surprisingly broadened, but nevertheless
within the bounds of an important essential Horizonst
unity. Continually it is indeed to be kept in
view that the concepts sense and positum con­ § 19. Actuality and potentiality of
tain for us nothing pertaining to expression intentional life
and conceptual signification; on the other The multiplicity of the intentionality be­
hand, however, they comprehend under them- longing to any cogito-to any that relates to

*Loe. cit., Fifth lnvestigation. §§20 and 21, pp. 336-396 [second edition. pp. 411-421; English translation, pp.
586-593). Cf. in addition Sixth Jnvestigation, §25, p. 559 [second edition, p. 87; English translation, pp. 737f.] Neu­
tral having as "undecided" naturally does not now, as it does there, have for us the status of a "quality" (position)
alongside other qualities. but rather the status of a modification which mirrors ali qualities and therefore whole acts
of whatever sort.
tcM. pp. 44-49 (Sections 19 and 20).
The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 109

the world, by the very fact that such a cogito tively), up to the actual Now of perception.
not only intends something wordly but is it­ Everywhere in this connection an "I can and
self intended in the consciousness of interna] do, but I can also do otherwise than I am do­
time-is a theme not exhausted with the con­ ing" plays its part-without detriment to the
sideration of cogitationes as actual subjec­ fact that this "freedom," Iike every other, is
tive processes. On the contrary, every actu­ always open to possible hindrances.
ality invo/ves its potentialities, which are not The horizons are "predelineated" poten­
empty possibilities, but rather possibilities in­ tialities. We say also: We can ask any horizan
tentionally predelineated in respect of con­ what "lies in it," we can explicare or unfold
tent-namely, in the actual subjective process it, and "uncover" the potentialities of con­
itself-and, in addition, having the character scious life at a particular time. Precisely there­
of possibilities actualizable by the Ego. by we uncover the objective sense meant im­
With that, another fundamental trait of in­ plicitly in the actual cogito, though never with
tentionality is indicated. Every subjective pro­ more than a certain degree of foreshadowing.
cess has a process "horizon," which changes This sense, the cogitatum qua cogitatum, is
with the alteration of the nexus of conscious­ never present to actual consciousness [vor­
ness to which the process belongs and with stellig] as a finished datum; it becomes "clari­
the alteration of the process itself from phase fied" only through explication of the given
to phase of its flow-an intentional horiwn of horizon and the new horizons continuously
reference to potentialities of consciousness awakened [der stetig neu geweckten Hori­
that belong to the process itself. For example, zant,e]. The predelineation itself, to be sure, is
there belongs to every externa) perception its at ali times imperfect; yet, with its indetermi­
reference from the "genuinely perceived" sides nateness, it has a determinare structure. For
of the object of perception to the sides "also example: the die leaves open a great variety
meant"-not yet perceived, but only anticipat­ of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet
ed and, at first, with a non-intuitional empti­ it is already "construed" in advance as a die,
ness (as the sides that are "coming" now per­ in particular as colored, rough, and the like,
ceptually): a continuous protention, which, with though each of these determinations always
each phase of the perception, has a new sense. leaves further particulars open. This leaving
Furthermore, the perception has horizons made open, prior to further determinings (which per­
up of other possibilities of perception, as per­ haps never take place), is a moment included
ceptions that we could have, if we active/y in the given consciousness itself; it is precise­
directed the course of perception otherwise: ly what makes up the "horizon." As contrast­
if, for example, we turned our eyes that way ed with mere clarification by means of antici­
instead of this, or if we were to step forward pative "imaginings," there takes place, by
or to one side, and so forth. In the correspond­ means of an actually continuing perception, a
ing memory this recurs in modified form, per­ fulfilling further determination (and perhaps
haps in the consciousness that, instead of the determination as otherwise)-but with new
sides then visible in fact, r could have seen horizons of openness.
others-naturally, if I had directed my percep­ Thus, as consciousness of something, every
tual activity in a suitably different manner. consciousness has the essential property, not
Moreover, as might have been said earlier, to just of being somehow able to change into
every perception there always belongs a hori­ continually new modes of consciousness of
zon of the past, as a potentiality of awaken­ the same object (which, throughout the unity
able recollections; and to every recollection of synthesis, is inherent in them as an identi­
there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous in­ cal objective sense), but of being able to do
tervening intentionality of possible recollec­ so according to-indeed, only according to
tions (to be actualized on my initiative, ac- those horiwn intentionalities. The object is, so
110 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

to speak, a pole of identity, always meant of the Same becomes shown only by the evi­
expectantly as having a sense yet to be actu­ dence of a possible making distinct and, ulti­
alized; in every moment of consciousness it mately, of an intuitive uncovering, in the forro
is an index, pointing to a noetic intention­ of actual and possible continued perceiving
ality that pertains to it according to its sense, or of possible recollecting, as something to
an intentionality that can be asked for and be done on my initiative.
explicated. AII this is concretely accessible to The phenomenologist, however, does not
investigation. inquire with merely a naive devotedness to the
intentional object purely as such; he does not
§20. The peculiar nature of intentional consider the intentional object only straight­
analysis forwardly and explicate its meant features, its
meant parts and properties. If that were all he
It becomes evident that, as intentional, the did, the intentionality, which makes up the
analysis of consciousness is totally different intuitive or non-intuitive consciousness itself
from analysis in the usual and natural sense. and the explicative considering, would remain
Conscious life, as we said once before, is not "anonymous." In other words: There would
just a whole made up of "data" of conscious­ remain hidden the noetic multiplicities of con­
ness and therefore "analyzable" (in an ex­ sciousness and their synthetic unity, by virtue
tremely broad sense, divisible) merely into its of which alone, and as their essentially neces­
selfsufficient and non-selfsufficient elements sary unitary doing [ihre wesensmiissige Einheits­
-the forros of unity (the "form-qualities") be­ leistung], we have one intentional object, and
ing included then among the non-selfsufficient always this definite one, continuously meant
elements. To be sure, when regard is directed -have it, so to speak, before usas meant thus
to certain themes, intentional "analysis" does and so; likewise the hidden constitutive per­
lead a/so to such divisions, and to that extent formances by virtue of which (if consideration
the word can still serve in the original sense; then continues as explication) we find straight­
but everywhere its peculiar attainment (as forwardly, as explicata of what is meant, such
"intentional") is an uncovering of the potenti­ things as a "feature," a "property," a "part,"
alities "implicit" in actualities of conscious­ or mean these implicitly and can then discover
ness-an uncovering that brings about, on the them intuitively. When the phenomenologist
noematic side, an "explication" or "unfolding," explores everything objective, and whatever
a "becoming distinct" and perhaps a "clearing" can be found in it, exclusively as a "correlate
of what is consciously meant (the objective of consciousness," he does not consider and
sense) and, correlatively, an explication of the describe it only straightforwardly and only as
potential intentional processes themselves. ln­ somehow related back to the corresponding
tentional analysis is guided by the fundamen­ Ego and the ego cogito of which it is the cogi­
tal cognition that, as a consciousness, every tatum. Rather, with his reflective regard, he
cogito is indeed (in the broadest sense) a mean­ penetrates the anonymous "cogitative" life, he
ing of its meant [Meinung seines Gemeinten], uncovers the definite synthetic courses of
but that, at any moment, this something meant the manifold modes of consciousness and,
[dieses Vermeinte] is more-something meant further back, the modes of Ego-comportment,
with something more-than what is meant at which make understandable the objective af­
that moment "explicitly." In our example, each fair's simple meantness for the Ego, its intui­
phase of perception was a mere side of "the" tive or non-intuitive meantness. Or, stated more
object, as what was perceptually meant. This precisely, they make it understandable how, in
intending-beyond-itself, which is implicit in any itself and by virtue of its current intentional
consciousness, must be considered an essen­ structure, consciousness makes possible and
tial moment of it. That, on the other hand, this necessary the fact that such an "existing" and
intending is, and must be, a "meaning more" "thus determined" Object is intended in it, oc-
The Noetic and Noematic Structure of Consciousness 111

curs in it as such a sense. Thus, in the case of done in the case of each category of objects­
perception of a spatial thing, the phenomenol­ that is to say: how, in the case of each category,
ogi st (ab�tracting at first from all "signifi­ the constitutive conscious life looks, and must
cance" predicates and restricting hímself purely look, in respect of the correlative noetic and
to the "res extensa") explores the manner in noematic variants pertaining to the same ob­
which the changing "síght things," and "thíngs" ject. The horizan structure belonging to every
of the other senses, have in themselves the intentionality thus prescribes for phenomeno­
character of appearances of this same res ex­ logical analysis and description methods of a
tensa. In the case of any spatial thing, he ex­ totally new kind, which come into action wher­
plores its (potential and perhaps actual) chang­ ever consciousness and object, wherever in­
ing perspectives; furthermore, with regard to tending and sense, real and ideal actuality, pos­
its temporal modes of givenness, the modi­ sibility, necessity, illusion, truth, and, on the
fications of its being still intended while it other hand, experience, judgment, evidence,
sinks retentionally into the past and, with re­ and so forth, present themselves as names for
spect to the Ego, the modes of his specifically transcendental problems, to be taken in hand
own still-having and holding, the modes of as genuine problems concerning "subjective
attention, and so forth. lt is to be noted in this origins."
connection that phenomenological explica­ Mutatis mutandis the same is manifestly true
tion of the perceived as such is not restricted in the case of a pure "interna) psychology" or
to that perceptual explication of it, in respect a "purely intentional" psychology (within the
of its features, which comes about as percep­ realm of natural positivity), which we have al­
tion continues. On the contrary, phenomeno­ luded to as the parallel to constitutional tran­
logical explication makes clear what is includ­ scendental phenomenology. The only radical
ed and only non-intuitively co-intended in the reform of psychology consists in the pure de­
sense of the cogitatum (for example, the "oth­ velopment of an intentional psychology.
er side"), by making present in phantasy the Brentano demanded it; but unfortunately he
potential perceptions that would make the in­ failed to recognize the fundamental sense of
visible visible. That is true of any intentional an intentional analysis and therefore failed to
analysis. As intentional it reaches out beyond recognize the method that alone makes such
the isolated subjective processes that are to be a psychology possible, as the latter can gain
analyzed. By explicating their correlative ho­ access to its genuine and truly infinite field
rizons, it brings the highly diverse anonymous of problems only by that method.
processes into the field comprising those that At first, to be sure, the possibility of a pure
function "constitutively" in relation to the ob­ phenomenology of consciousness seems high­
jective sense of the cogitatum in question­ ly questionable, since the realm of phenom­
that is to say: not only the actual but also the ena of consciousness is so truly the realm of
potential subjective processes, which, as such, a Heraclitean flux. It would in fact be hope­
are "implicit" and "predelineated" in the sense­ less to attempt to proceed here with such meth­
producing intentionality of the actual ones and ods of concept and judgment formation as
which, when discovered, have the evident char­ are standard in the Objective sciences. The at­
acter of processes that explícate the implicit tempt to determine a process of conscious­
sense. Thus alone can the phenomenologist ness as an identical object, on the basis of ex­
make understandable to himself how, within perience, in the same fashion as a natural Ob­
the immanency of conscious life and in thus ject-ultimately then with the ideal presump­
and so determined modes of consciousness tion of a possible explication into identical
belonging to this incessant flux, anything like elements, which might be apprehended by
fixed and abiding objective unities can become means of fixed concepts-would indeed be
intended and, in particular, how this marvel­ folly. Processes of consciousness-not merely
lous work of "constituting" identical objects is owing to our imperfect ability to know objects
112 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

of that kind, but a priori-have no ultimate el­ however, the idea of an intentional analysis is
ements and relationships, fit for subsump­ legitimate, since, in the flux of intentional syn­
tion under the idea of objects determinable thesis (which creates unity in ali conscious­
by fixed concepts and therefore such that, in ness and which, noetically and noematically,
their case, it would be rational to set ourselves constitutes unity of objective sense), an essen­
the task of an approximative determination tially necessary confonnity to type prevails
guided by fixed concepts. In spite of that, and can be apprehended in strict concepts.
 v.
The Question of Evidence

7. Varieties of Evidence':-

If one speaks simply of objects. one nor­ "percei1•ing or "seeing" act.1·-in a broad­
mally means actual. truly existing objects be­ est sense�and non- "perceiving" acts.
Ionging to the particular category of being. Thus a memorial consciousness-for ex­
No matter what one says about such objects. ample, of a landscape-is not originarily pre­
that which is meant and stated must-if one sentive: the landscape is not perceived as it
speaks rationally-be something which can be would be in case we actually saw it. By this
"grounded," "shown," directly "seen" or me­ we do not mean to say that memorial con­
diately "seen intel/ectual/y." In the logical sciousness has no competence of its own: on­
sphere. in the sphere of statement, "heing ly that it is not a "seeing" consciousness. Phe­
trul.v" or "actual/y·· and "being something nomenology brings to light an analogue of
H'hic/z can he slwwn rationally" are necessar­ this contrast in each of the other kinds of pos­
ily correlated. This holds, moreover, for ali iting mental processes. For example: We can
modalities of being, ali doxic positional mo­ assert "blindly" that two plus one is equal to
dalities. Ohviously the possibility of the ratio­ one plus two: but we can also make the same
nal showing referred to here should be un­ judgment in the manner peculiar to intellec­
derstood, not as empírica!, but as "ideal." as tual seeing. When we do this, the predica­
an essential possibility. tively formed affair-complex, the synthetical
objectivity corresponding to the judgment­
.§ 13 6. The first fundamental form of synthesis, is given originarily. seized upon in
rational consciousness: Origínarily an originary manner. It is no longer given origi­
presentive "seeing" narily after effecting the actual {lehendigen/
intellectual seeing which becomes forthwith
If we now ask what rational showing sig­ an obscured retentional modification. Even
nifies. that is, of what rational consciousness though this may have a rational superiority to
consists, the intuitive presentiation of exam­ just any obscure or confused consciousness
ples and the beginnings of eidetic analysis with the same noematic sense-for example,
performed on them offers us at once a number an "unthinking" reproduction of something
of differences: learned and, perhaps, intellectually seen on an
First, the difference between positing men­ earlier occasion-it is not an originarily pre­
tal processes in which the posited becomes sentive consciousness.
given originarily and those in which it does These differences do not concern the pure
not become given in that mode: thus. between sense or the pure positum. since in hoth mem-

*Ideas/, pp. 326-336. 3-+4-3-18 (Sections 136-139 and !-15).

114 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

bers of any such exemplary pair this is iden­ nally motivated." That is to say, position has
tical and also can always be intentively seen its original legitimizing basis in originary giv­
as identical. The difference concerns the mode enness. With other modes of givenness legiti­
in which the bare sense ar the bare positum­ mizing bases need not be lacking; lacking,
which, as merely an abstract moment in the however, is the superiority of the original ba­
concrete noema of consciousness, requires sis which plays its pre-eminent role in the rel­
complementary moments-is or is not a ful­ ative estimating of other legitimizing bases.
filled sense ar positum. In just the same manner, the position of the
A fullness of the sense does not make all essence of predicatively formed essence-com­
the difference; the How of the fulfilledness plex given "originarily" in the seeing of es­
matters as well. One mode of consciousness sences "belongs" to the position-"material" <of
pertaining to the sense is the "intuitive" mode, the essence or predicatively formed essence­
which is such that the "meant object as meant" complex>, to the "sense" in its mode of given­
is intentively intuited; and an especially pre­ ness. lt is rational and as certainty of believ­
eminent case here is the one in which the mode ing it is an originally motivated position; it
of intuition is precisely the originarily pre­ has the specific character of an "intellectually
sentive mode. In the perception of the land­ seeing" position. If the position is blind, if the
scape the sense is fulfilled perceptually; in verbal significations are effected on the ba­
the mode of "itself in person" there is con­ sis of an obscure and confusedly intentive act­
sciousness of the perceived object with its substratum, then the rational character be­
colors, forms, and other determinations (in so longing to intellectual seeing is necessarily
far as they "are included in the perception"). lacking; that character is essentially incompat­
Similar pre-eminent cases are found in every ible with obscure givenness of the predicatively
act-sphere. Again the situation is one which formed affair-complex (if the word givenness
is two-sided in the sense of a parallelism; it is still to be used here) or with such a noemat­
is noetic and noematic. Focusing on the noe­ ic outfitting of the sense-core. On the other
ma we find, fused with the pure sense, the char­ hand, this does not exclude a secondary ratio­
acteristic "in person" (as originary fulfilled­ nal character, as is shown by the example of
ness); and the sense, with this characteristic, an imperfect re-presentiating of eidetic cogni­
now functions as the basis far the noematic tions.
posited characteristic or, this being the same Intellectual seeing, evidence of any kind, is
thing here: the being-characteristic. We find the thus a wholly distinguishing occurrence; in
parallel to this in focusing on the noesis. terms of its "core" it is the unity of a rational
But the posited characteristic has as its position with that which essentially motivates
own a specific rational character, as a distin­ the position-this whole situation being under­
guishing mark accruing to it essentially, if standable as noetic and also as noematic. The
and only 1f it is a position on the basis of a ful­ word motivation is particularly suited to the
filled, originarily presentive sense and not relation between the (noetic) positing and the
merely on the basis of just any sense. noematic positum in its mode of fulfilledness.
Here, and in the case of any other kind of The expression, "evident positum," is, in its
rational consciousness, the word "belong" noematic signification, immediately under­
takes on a peculiar signification. For example: standable.
Position belongs to any appearing "in person" The double sense of the word evidence, in
on the part of a physical thing; it is not just its application, sometimes to noetic charac­
somehow one with the appearing (perhaps even teristics or to full acts (for example, evidence
as merely a universal fact-this being out of of judging) and sometimes to noematic posita
the question here); it is one with it in a pecu­ (for example, evident logical judgment, evi­
liar manner: it is "motivated" by <the appear­ dent predicative proposition), is a case of the
ing> and again, not just somehow, but "ratio- universal and necessary double significancies
Varieties of Evidence 115

of expression relating to moments of the cor­ complex, differs essentially in its rational
relation between noesis and noema. Phenom­ character not only from an "apodictic" seeing,
enological demonstration of their source makes from the intellectual seeing of an essence or of
these do\lble significancies harmless and, in­ a predicatively formed essence-complex; but
deed, makes it possible to recognize their in­ it also differs from the modification of this
dispensability. intellectual seeing which may come about
We should note furthermore that the word through mixture of the two, namely in the
fulfillment has another double sense which case where something seen intellectually is
líes in a quite different dimension. Sometimes applied to something seen assertorically and
it signifies "fulfillment of the intention," as a in any case of knowing the necessity of the be­
characteristic which the actual positum takes ing-thus of a posited single particular.
on by virtue of the particular mode of the Evidence and intellectual seeing, in the usu­
sense; sometimes it signifies precisely the pe­ al pregnant sense, are understood as signify­
culiarity of this mode itself or the peculiarity ing the same thing: apodictic intellectual see­
of the sense in question, as including a "fill­ ing. We propose to separate the two in our
ing" which motivates rationally. terminology. We need a more universal term
which encompasses in its signification both
§ 13 7. Evidence and intellectual sight. assertoric seeing and apodictic intellectual see­
"Originary" and "pure" evidence, ing. It should be regarded as a phenomeno­
assertoric and apodictic evidence logical cognition of the greatest importance
that the two belong to one essential genus and
The pairs of examples used above illustrate that, comprehended more universally, any ra­
a second and third difference. What we usu­ tional consciousness whatever is a highest ge­
ally cal! evidence and intellectual sight ( or in­ nus of positional modalities within which the
tellectual seeing) is a positional, doxic and "seeing" (in the extremely broadened sense)
adequately presentive consciousness which related to originary givenness is precisely a
"excludes being otherwise"; the positing is rigidly delimited species. Now in order to
motivated in a quite exceptional manner by the name the highest genus one has the choice be­
adequate givenness and is, in the highest sense, tween extending either the signification of
an act of "reason." The arithmetical example the term "seeing" (as has just been done, but
illustrates that for us. In the example going very much further) or that of the terms
of the landscape we have, it is true, a seeing, "intellectual insight" and "evidence." lt seems
but not an evidence in the usual pregnant sense best to choose the term evidence for the most
of the word, an "intellectual seeing." Observ­ universal concept; then, for every rational po­
ing more precisely, we note two differences. sition characterized by a motivational relation
In the one example it is a matter of essences; to originariness of givenness, the expression
in the other, a matter of something individu­ originary evidence would be available. Fur­
al; secondly, in the eidetic example the origi­ thermore, a distinction should be made be­
nary givenness is adequate, whereas in the ex­ tween assertoric and apodictic evidence; and
ample from the sphere of experience it is in­ the term intellectual seeing should be used, as
adequate. The two differences, which cross before, to designate this apodicticity. Going
one another under sorne circumstances, will still further, one should contrast pure intellec­
prove to be significant with respect to the kind tual seeing and impure intellectual seeing (for
of evidence. example, cognition of the necessity pertain­
With regard to the first difference, it is phe­ ing to something factual, the being of which
nomenologically observable that, so to speak, need not itself be evident) and likewise, quite
the "assertoric" seeing of something indi­ universally, pure and impure evidence.
vidual, for example, the "attentive perceiving" Yet other differences result if one inquires
of a physical thing or of an individual affair- more deeply-differences in the motivating
116 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

foundations which affect the evidence-char­ celled out" in the broader context. According­
acteristic. For example, the difference between ly, the positing is only rationally motivated by
purely formal ("analytic," "logical") and ma­ the appearance (the imperfectly fulfilled per­
terial (synthetic a priori) evidence. Here, how­ ceptual sense) in and for itself, considered in
ever, we must not go beyond the first indica­ its singularization.
tions. The phenomenology of reason must there­
fore study the different occurrences which
§138. Adequate and inadequate are a priori predelineated in the sphere of the
evidence modes of being which are necessarily only in­
adequately presentive (transcendencies in the
Let us retum to the second distinction con­ sense of realities). lt must make clear how
ceming evidence indicated above, with which consciousness of inadequate givenness, how
the distinction between adequate and inad­ the one-sided appearing, is related to one and
equate givenness is connected and which, at the same determinable X in the continuous
the same time, provides us with the occasion progress to always new appearances which are
for describing a distinctive type of "impure" continually being blended with one another;
evidence. The positing of the physical thing which eidetic possibilities result here; how, on
on the ground of the appearance "itself in per­ the one hand, a continuation of experience is
son" is, to be sure, a rational positing, but the possible and always rationally motivated by
appearance is always only a one-sided, "im­ continually available rational positings: pre­
perfect" appearance; intended to as "itself in cisely the course of experience in which the
person," what "properly" appears is not only empty places of the previous appearance are
there, but simply this physical thing itself, the filled out, the indeterminacies are more pre­
whole in conformity with the total sense, though cisely determined and thus always in the man­
only one-sidedly intuited and, moreover, mul­ ner of a thoroughgoing harmonious fulfilling
tifariously indeterminate. What "properly" ap­ with a steadily increasing rational power. On
pears cannot be separated from the physical the other hand, it must make clear the contrary
thing as, !et us say, a physical thing for itself; possibilities, the cases of fusion or polytheti­
in the full sense of the physical thing, the cal syntheses of discordancy, the "determina­
sense-correlate <of what "properly" appears> tion otherwise" of the X always intended to as
fashions a non-selfrnfficient part which can the same--otherwise than in the corresponding­
only have unity and selfsufficiency of sense ly original sense-bestowal. Moreover, it must
in a whole which necessarily includes in itself show how positional components pertaining to
empty components and indeterminate compo­ the earlier perceptual flow suffer cancellation
nents. together with their sense; how, under circum­
Of essential necessity something physical­ stances, the whole perception, so to speak, ex­
ly real, a being with that sense, appears only plodes and splits up into "confiicting physical
"inadequately" in a elosed appearance. Es­ thing-apprehensions," into suppositions con­
sentially tied up with this is the fact that no ceming physical things; how the positings of
rational positing which rests upon that sort of these suppositions are annulled and unique­
inadequately presentive appearance can be "ul­ ly modified in this annulment; or else how the
timate/y va/id," "insurmountable"; and that one positing, remaining unmodified, "condi­
no <rational positing> is equivalent in its singu­ tions" the cancel!ation of the "counter posit­
larization to the <positing> simpliciter: "The ing"; and similar processes of the same kind.
physical thing is actual"; it is only equivalent To be studied in still more detail are the rel­
to the positing: "it is actual"-assuming that evant modifications which the original ratio­
the further course of experience does not bring nal positings undergo such that they incur a
forth "stronger rational motives" which show positive phenomenological increase with re­
the original positing as a positing to be "can- spect to their motivating ''force" in the fur-
Varieties of Evidence 117

ther course of harmonious fulfillment, such "inadequate" related to modes of givenness

that they continually acquire a "weight, " al­ had to be extended to the essential peculiari­
ways and essentially have a weight, to be sure, ties pertaining to the rational positings them­
but one which differs by degrees. There are, sel ves which are founded by them precisely
moreover, the other possibilities to be analyzed: by virtue of this nexus-one of those unavoid­
how the weight of positings is affected by able equivocations by extension <and> which
"counter motives," how, in the case of douht, is harmless as long as one recognizes it as
they are mutually "held in balance," how a such by being fully aware of the distinction be­
positing in competition with one of "greater" tween the original and the derived.
weight is "overcome," "abandoned," etc.
In addition, naturally, it is necessary to sub­ §139. The interweaving of ali kinds of
ject to a comprehensive eidetic analysis the reason. Theoretical, axiological and
processes in the sense, as the appertinent posi­ practica! truth
tion-materials, which are essentially determi­
native for alterations in the posited charac­ According to what has been explained so
teristics (e.g., the processes of "conflict" or far, a positing of no matter what quality has
"rivalry" of appearances). For here, as every­ its legitimacy as a positing of its sense when
where, in the phenomenological sphere there it is rational; the rational characteristic is
are neither accidents nor facticities: everything precisely itself the characteristic of legitima­
is motivated by essential determination. tion which "befits" it essentially and, there­
In the same manner an inquiry into the es­ fore, not as an accidental fact among acciden­
sence of ali kinds of immediate rational acts tal circumstances pertaining to a factually
is to be carried out in the context of a universal positing Ego. Correlatively, the positum is also
phenomenology of noetic and noematic data. said to be legitimated: it is present in rational
To every region and category of alleged ob­ consciousness, furnished with its noematic
jects there corresponds phenomenologically legitimacy-characteristic which, again, essen­
not only a fundamental sort of sense, or of tially belongs to the positum as the noematic
posita, but also a fundamental type of origi­ position qualified in this or that way, and of
narily presentive consciousness of such senses this or that sense-material. More precisely
and, belonging to it, a fundamental type of stated: there belongs to it a fullness of such a
originary evidence which is essentially moti­ character which, on its side, grounds the ratio­
vated by originary givenness of such a charac­ nal distinctiveness of the position.
ter. Here the positum has its legitimacy in it­
Every such evidence-understanding the self. But it can also be that "something speaks
term in our broadened sense-is either ad­ on behalf of the positum," that it can still
equate evidence, of essential necessity incapa­ have a share in reason without "itself' being
ble of being further "strengthened" or "weak­ rational. In order to remain within the doxic
ened," thus without degrees of weight; or the sphere, !et us recall the relevant connection of
evidence is inadequate and thus capable of the doxic modalities with the protodoxa to
being increased and decreased. Whether or which everything refers back. If, on the other
not this or that evidence is possible in a given hand, we consider the rational characteristics
sphere depends on its generic type. lt is there­ belonging to these modalities, then at the out­
fore a priori prefigured, and it is countersense set the thought thrusts itself to the fore that
to demand in one sphere the perfection be­ ali of them, no matter how different they may
longing to the evidence of another sphere (e.g., otherwise be with respect to materials and
that of eidetic relationships) which essentially motivational foundations, refer back, so to
excludes it. speak, to a primal rational character belong­
It must still be noted that the original sig­ ing to the domain of primal belief, back to
nification of the concepts of "adequate" and the case of originary and ultimately perfect
118 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

evidence. It is noteworthy that profound con­ with a protodoxic evidence of an altered sense,
catenations of essences obtain between these i.e., with the evidence or with the primal truth:
two kinds of retroreference. "That S is p is likely (probable)"; on the other
Just to indicate the following: in itself, some­ hand, <the modal evidence is also connected>
thing deemed likely can be characterized as with the truth: "Something speaks for S being
rational. If we follow the reference, inherent p"; and, again: "Something speaks for Sp be­
in it, back to the corresponding primal believ­ ing true"; and so forth. With all this eidetic
ing, and if we adopt this believing in the form connections are indicated which require
of a "supposing," then "something speaks for phenomenological inquiries into their origin.
it." It is not the belief itself, simpliciter, which But evidence is by no means a mere name
is characterized as rational, although it has a for those sorts of rational processes in the
share in reason. We see that further rational­ sphere of belief (and even less in the sphere of
theoretical distinctions and inquiries related the predicative judgment); it is rather a name
to them are needed here. Concatenations of es­ far ali positional spheres and, in particular, al­
sences are made prominent between the differ­ so for the significant rational relationships
ent qualities with the rational characteristics obtaining hetween them.
peculiar to them and, more particularly, recip­ It therefore involves the highly difficult
roca[ concatenations; and, finally, all lines run and far-reaching groups of problems of rea­
hack to primal helievings and their primal son in the sphere of emotional and volitional
reason; that is to say, to primal truth, or to positings* as well as their interwovenness
"truth" <in an absolute sense>. with the "theoretical," i.e., doxic, reason. The
Truth is manifestly the correlate of the per­ "theoretical" or "doxological truth," ar evi­
fect rational characteristics pertaining to pro­ dence, has its parallel in the "axiological and
todoxa, to certainty of belief. The expression, practica/ truths or evidence" whereby the lat­
"something posited protodoxically, for in­ ter "truths" are given expression and cognized
stance a predicative proposition, is true," and in doxological truths, that is to say, in spe­
then the expression, "perfect rational charac­ cifically logical ( apophantical) ones. t It need
teristics accrue to the corresponding believing, not be said that to deal with these problems
judging"-are equivalent correlates. Naturally there must be fundamental investigations of
nothing is said about the fact of a mental pro­ the sort which we tried to embark upon above:
cess and about the one who judges, although investigations involving the eidetic relation­
it is eidetically unquestionable that truth can ships which connect the doxic positings with
only be actually given in an actual evidential ali other kinds of positings, those of the emo­
consciousness; and this holds for the truth of tions and the will and, again, those which lead
the unquestionableness itself, the truth of the all doxic modalities back to the protodoxa.
equivalence just indicated, and so forth. If Precisely by such investigations it is made un­
the protodoxic evidence, that of certainty of be­ derstandable on the basis of ultimate grounds
lief, is lacking to us, then for its sense-content, why the certainty of belief and, correspond­
"S is p," we say, a doxic modality can be evi­ ingly, the doxological and ultimately the pri­
dent-for example, the presumed likelihood, mal truth play such a dominant role in ali of
"S ought to be p." This modal evidence is mani­ reason-a role which, at the same time, also
festly equivalent to and necessarily connected makes it obvious that, with respect to their

*A first impulse in this direction was given by Brentano"s brilliant work, Vom Unprun¡;: sittlicher Erkenntnis (Leip­
zig, 1889) [The Origin of Our Knowledge o(Right and Wrong, trans. Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schnee­
wind (New York, 1969)] a work to which I feel gratefully indebted.
tCognition is. above ali, a name for logical truth: designated from the standpoint of the subject, as the correlate
of his evidential judging: but it is also a name for every sort of evidential judging itself and, finally. for every doxical­
ly rational act.
Varieties o( Evidence 119

solution, the problems of reason in the dox­ something to say to free spirits like us and
ic sphere must take precedence over those of would not have to show its title to legitimacy.
axiological and practica} reason. We no longer need to argue with skepticism,
nor take into consideration objections of the
§ 14 5. Critica! considerations concern­ old type which cannot overcome the theory
ing the phenomenology o( evidence of evidence which resorts to indices and feel­
ing: whether an evil genius (the Cartesian fic­
It is clear from considerations carried out tion) or a fateful change in the factual course
that the phenomenology of reason, noetics in of the world could make it happen that just any
a pregnant sense, which will undertake an in­ false judgment would be outfitted with this
tuitive exploration not just of any conscious­ index, this feeling of intellectual necessity, of
ness, but of consciousness of reason, every­ the transcendent oughtness; and the like. lf one
where presupposes universal phenomenology. proceeds to the study of the phenomena them­
lt is itself a phenomenological fact that­ selves which belong here, and does so within
in the realm of positionality*-positing con­ the limits of the phenomenological reduction,
sciousness is ruled by norms in every genus; then one recognizes with fullest clarity that
the norms are nothing else than eidetic laws here it is a matter of a relevant mode of posit­
which, with respect to their kind and form, are ing (thus not of anything so insignificant as
related to noetic-noematic concatenations to sorne sort of attached content, nor of an ap­
be strictly analyzed and described. In that con­ pendage of whatever sort) which belongs to
nection, even "non-reason" is naturally every­ the eidetically determined constitutions of the
where to be regarded as the negative coun­ essence of the noema (e.g., the mode of origi­
terpart of reason, just as the phenomenology nal intellectual seenness belonging to the noe­
of evidence includes its counterpart, absurdi­ matic composition of "originarily" presentive
ty. t The universal eidetic theory of evidence seeing of essences). One then further recognizes
with its analyses related to the most univer­ that once more the eidetic laws rule the rela­
sal eidetic distinctions fashions a relatively tionship of those positing acts which do not
small, though fundamental, piece of the phe­ have this distinctive constitution to those
nomenology of reason. Accordingly, what was which do; that, e.g., there is something Iike
briefly maintained at the beginning of this consciousness of the "fulfillment of the inten­
Book:j: against the inverted interpretation of tion," of justification and confirmation spe­
evidence is confirmed-and the deliberations cifically related to posited characteristics, just
just carried out are sufficient to see that per­ as there are the corresponding counter char­
fectly. acteristics of unjustification, disconjirmation.
Evidence is, in fact, not sorne sort of con­ One further recognizes that the logical prin­
sciousness-index attached to a judgment (and cipies require a profound phenomenologi­
usually one speaks of such evidence only in cal clarification, and that, e.g., the principie
the case of judgment), calling to us like a of contradiction leads us back to concatena­
mystic voice from a better world: Here is the tions of essences of possible verification and
truth; -as though such a voice would have possible disconfirmation ( or rational cancel-

*In the sphere of phantasy and neutrality ali positional processes are carried over as "mirrored'" and "power­
less'"; thus too ali processes of reason. Neutral positings are not to be confirmed. but to be '"quasi" confirmed; they are
not evidential. but "quasi" evidential; and so forth.
tCf. Logische Untersuchungen, II. 6. Unters. §39. pp. 594ff.• especially p. 598 [second edition, II, 2, §39. pp.
122ff., especially p. 126; English translation, pp. 764ff., especially pp. 768ff.]. The whole of the Sixth Investigation
offers, universally, preliminary phenomenological studies for dealing with the problems of reason in the present
chapter.
:j:Cf. Part I, Chapter 2, especially §2 l.
120 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

lation). * Universally, one acquires the intel­ wise, how fullnesses, how, therefore, the forms
lectual insight that, above ali, it is a question of confirmation, of validation, of progressive
here, not of accidental facts, but instead of ei­ cognition, at lower and higher levels of con­
detic processes which stand in their eidetic sciousness, become clear and are intellectual­
context, and that, therefore, what takes place ly seen in analysis.
in the Eidos functions as an absolutely insur­ However, these and ali parallel studies of
mountable norm for the fact. In this phenom­ reason are carried out in the "transcendental,"
enological chapter one should also make in the phenomenological attitude. No judgment
clear that not every positing mental process which occurs there is a natural judgment pre­
(e.g., any mental judgment-process you please) supposing the positing of natural actuality as
cannot become evident in the same manner background, and not even where the phenom­
and, specifically, that not every positing men­ enology of the consciousness of actuality, of
tal process can become immediately eviden­ cognition of Nature, of seeing of values relat­
tial; furthermore, that ali manners of rational ed to Nature and intellectual seeing of values
positing, ali types of immediate or mediate is concerned. Everywhere we investigate the
evidence, are rooted in phenomenological fashionings of noeses and noemata, we pro­
complexes in which the fundamentally differ­ ject a systematic and eidetic morphology, ev­
ent regions of objects are noetically-noemati­ erywhere bring into relief essential necessities
cally distributed. and essential possibilities: the latter as neces­
In particular, it is of concern to study sys­ sary possibilities, forms of unions of com­
tematically the continuous unions of identity patibility which are prescribed in the essences
and the synthetical identifications in every and delimited by laws of essences. Everywhere
domain with respect to their phenomenologi­ "object" is the name for eidetic concatena­
cal constitution. Once one has become ac­ tions of consciousness; it appears first of ali as
quainted-which is the first step needed-with noematic X, as the subject of sense pertaining
the inner structure of intentive mental proces­ to different essential types of sense and posita.
ses with respect to ali universal structures, the Moreover, it appears as the name, "actual ob­
parallelism of these structures, the stratifica­ ject," and is then the name for certain eideti­
tion in the noema such as sense, subject of cally considered rational concatenations in
sense, posited characteristics, fullness: then it which the sense-conforming, unitary X inher­
is necessary to make fully clear in ali cases ent in them receives its rational position.
of synthetical unions how not just any act­ Similar names for determined, eidetical­
combinations whatever take place, but rather ly delimited groups of consciousness-forma­
how combination into the unity of one act tions "teleologically" belonging together, to
takes place. More particularly, how identify­ be fixed by the inquiry into essences, are the
ing unions are possible, how here and there expressions, "possible object," "probable," "du­
the determinable X is made to coincide, how, bitable" object; and so forth. The concatena­
in that case, sense-determinations and their tions there are always again other, to be de­
empty places-here that signifies their mo­ scribed strictly in their otherness: thus, e.g., it
ments of indeterminateness-are related; like- is easily seen intellectually that the possibili-

*Cf. Logische Untersuchungen, Il. 6. Unters. §34. pp. 583ff. [second edition. II. 2. pp. I 1 lff.; English translation.
pp. 756ff.]. lt is to be regretted that W. Wundt judges otherwise here. as he does about phenomenology as a whole. The
scientific inquiry. which does not in the slightest go beyond the sphere of purely intuitional data, he interprets as
"Scholasticism." He designates as a "chosen formal schema" the distinction between sense-bestowing and sense-fulfilling
acts ( Kleine Schriften [Slwrter Writings}, I <Leipzig,> 1910/11, p. 613), and the results of our analyses, he says, are the
"most primitive" "verbal repetitions": "Evidence is evidence, abstraction is abstraction." He introduces the conclusion
of bis critique with words which I may be permitted to quote: "Husserl"s foundation of a new logic, directed more
theoretically than practically, ends in each of its conceptual analyses, in so far as they possess a positive content, with
the assurance that A actually = A, and that it cannot be otherwise" (ibid., pp. 613-614).
Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 121

ty of an X determined thus and so is not jus­ produced by consciousness constitutive for

tified simply by originary givenness of this X them. Phenomenology therefore actually en­
in its sense-composition, thus by authentica­ compasses the whole natural world and ali of
tion of actuality, but rather that even merely the ideal worlds which it excludes: phenom­
reproductively founded deeming possible can enology encompases them as the "world sense"
be reciprocally confirmed in the harmonious by virtue of the sets of eidetic laws connect­
coming together; similarly, that doubtfulness ing any object-sense and noema whatever with
is justified in conflicting phenomena between the closed system of noeses, and specifically
modalized intuitions of certain descriptive by virtue of the eidetic concatenations of ra­
sorts; and so forth. As a result, the investiga­ tional positing the correlate of which is the
tions of the theory of reason are combined "actual object" which, thus, on its side, always
which relate to the distinction of materially exhibits the index for the whole determined
determínate affairs, values, practical objectivi­ system of teleologically unifying fashionings
ties, and which then investigate the formations of consciousness.

8. Sensuous and Categorial Intuition ::-

§40. The problem of the fulfillment of only the inwrought nominal presentations are
categorial meaning-forms, with a fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement finds
thought leading towards its solution fulfillment through our underlying percept.
We say likewise that the whole statement
In our discussions up to this point we have gives utterance to our percept: we do not mere­
repeatedly and strongly felt a large gap. It had ly say "I see this paper, an inkpot, severa)
to do with the categorial objective forms, or books," and so on, but also "I see that the pa­
with the synthetic functions in the sphere of per has been written on, that there is a bronze
objectifying acts through which these objec­ inkpot standing here, that severa! books are
tive forms come to be constituted, through lying open," and so on. If a man thinks the ful­
which they may come to "intuition" and there­ fillment of nominal meanings clear enough,
by also to "knowledge." We shall now attempt we shall ask him how we are to understand
to sorne extent to fil! in this gap, taking our the fulfillment of total statements, especially
point of departure from the investigation of as regards that side of them that stretches
our first chapter; this was concemed with one beyond their "matter," in this case beyond
limited aim of epistemological clarification: their nominal terms. What may and can fum­
the relation of a meaning-intention as the thing ish fulfillment for those aspects of meaning
to be expressed, with an expressed sensuous which make up propositional form as such,
intuition. We shall for the time being again build the aspects of "categorialfonn" to which, e.g.,
on the simplest cases of perceptual and other the copula belongs?
intuitive statements, and shall use them to shed Looked at more narrowly, this question al­
light on the theme of our next treatments, in so applies to nominal meanings, in so far as
the following manner: these are not totally formless like the mean­
In the case of a perceptual statement, not ings for individuals. The name, like the state-

*Ll, 11, 773-795 (Sections 40-48).

122 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ment, even in its grammatical appearance, "Cologne," in its "proper meaning," refers, as
possesses both "matter" and "form." If it com­ previously argued, to the same city "direct­
prises words, the form lies partly in the way ly": it means that city itself, and as it is. The
these words are strung together, partly in its straightforward percept here renders the ob­
own form-words, partly in the mode of con­ ject apparent without the help of further, super­
struction of the individual words, which al­ ordinate acts, the object which the meaning­
lows us to draw a distinction between its mo­ intention means, and just as the latter means
ments of "matter" and its moments of "form." it. The meaning-intention therefore finds in
Such grammatical distinctions refer us back the mere percept the act which fulfills it with
to distinctions of meaning. There is at least a complete adequacy.
rough expression of the articulations and If instead of considering directly naming,
forms which are rooted in our meaning's es­ unstructured expressions, we rather consider
sence and the articulations and forms of gram­ structured, articulated expressions, the matter
mar. In our meanings, therefore, parts of very seems quite the same. I see white paper and
different kinds are to be found, and among say "white paper," thereby expressing, with
these we may here pay special attention to precise adequacy, only what I see. The same
those expressed by formal words such as holds of complete judgments. I see that this
"the," "a," "sorne," "many," "few," "two," "is," paper is white, and express just this by saying:
"not," "which," "and," "or," etc., and further "This paper is white."
expressed by the substantival and adjectival, We are not to Jet ourselves be led astray by
singular and plural inflection of our words, such ways of speaking; they are in a certain
etc. manner correct, yet are readily misunderstood.
How does ali this stand as regards fulfill­ One might try to use them to show that mean­
ment? Can the ideal of completely adequate ing here has its seat in perception, which, as
fulfillment formulated by us in our third chap­ we have shown, is not so. The word "white"
ter still be maintained? Are there parts and certainly means something attaching to the
forms of perception corresponding to all parts white paper itself; this "meaning" therefore
and forms of meaning? In that case we should coincides, in the state of fulfillment, with the
have the parallelism between meaningful partial percept which relates to the "white-as­
reference and fulfilling intuition that talk of pect" of the object. But the assumption of a
"expression" suggests. The expression would mere coincidence with this part-percept is
be an image-like counterpart of the percept not enough: we are wont to say here that the
(i.e., in all its parts and forms to be expressed) white thus apparent is known as white and is
but reconstituted in a new stuff-an ex-pres­ called so. In our normal talk of "knowledge,"
sion in the stuff of meaning. we are, however, more inclined to call the ob­
The prototype for interpreting the relation ject which is our (logical) subject the thing
between meaning and intuiting would then be "known." In such knowledge another act
the relation of the "proper" individual mean­ plainly is present, which perhaps includes the
ing to corresponding percepts. The man who former one, but is nonetheless different from
knows Cologne itself, and therefore posses­ it: the paper is known as white, or rather as a
ses the genuine "proper meaning" of the word white thing, whenever we express our percept
"Cologne," has in his contemporary actual ex­ in the words "white paper." The intention of
perience something exactly corresponding to the word "white" only partially coincides with
the future confirming percept. lt is not, prop­ the color-aspect of the apparent object; a sur­
erly speaking, a representation of the percept, plus of meaning remains over, a form which
as, e.g., the corresponding imagination would finds nothing in the appearance itself to con­
be. But just as the city is thought to be itself firm it. White paper is paper which is white. Is
present to us in the percept, so the proper name this form not also repeated, even if it remains
Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 123

hidden, in the case of the noun "paper"? Only meaning-intentions and the above mentioned
the quality-meanings contained in its "con­ perceptually founded acts.
cept" terminate in perception. Here also the
whole ob.ject is known as paper, and here also §41. Continuation. Extension of our
a supplementary form is known which includes sphere of examples
being, though not as its sole form, in itself. The
fulfillment effected by a straight percept obvi­ If we suppose our range of examples wid­
ously does not extend to such forms. ened so as to cover the whole field of predica­
We have but to ask, further, what corre­ tive thinking, we shall encounter similar dif­
sponds in perception to the difference between ficulties and similar possibilities of resolving
the two expressions "this white paper" and them. Judgments in particular will come up
"this paper is white," which are both realized which have no definite relation to anything
on the same perceptual basis, we have but to individual which ought to be given through
ask what side of perception is really brought any intuition: they will give general expression
out by this difference-the difference, that is, to relations among ideal unities. The general
of the attributive and the predicative mode meanings embodied in such judgments can also
of statement-and what, in the case of ade­ be realized on a basis of corresponding intu­
quate adaptation, this difference brings out ition, since they have their origin, mediately or
with peculiar exactness, and we experience the immediately, in intuition. The intuited indi­
same difficulty. Briefly we see that the case vidual is not, however, what we mean here; it
of structured meanings is not so simple as the serves at best only as an individual case, an
case of a "proper" individual meaning, with example, or only as the rough analogue of an
its straightforward relation of coincidence with example, for the universal which alone inter­
perception. Certainly one can tell one's audi­ ests us. So, for instance, when we speak ge­
tors, intelligibly and unambiguously, that "I nerically of "color" or specifically of "red," the
see that this paper is white," but the thought appearance of a single red thing may fumish
behind such talk need not be that the meaning us with a documenting intuition.
of this spoken sentence expresses a mere act It also at times happens that one calls such
of seeing. It may also be the case that the epi­ a general statement an expression of intuition.
stemic essence of our seeing, in which the ap­ We say, e.g., that an arithmetical axiom ex­
parent object announces itself as self-given, presses what we find in intuition, or we raise
serves to base certain connective or relation­ objection to a geometrician that he merely ex­
al or otherwise formative acts, and that it is presses what he sees in his figure without de­
to these that our expression in its changing ducing it formally, that he borrows from his
forms is adjusted, and that it is in such acts, drawing and omits steps in his proof. Such
performed on a basis of actual perception, that talk has its good sense (as when the objection
our expression, in respect of such changing seores no mean hit against the formal validity
forms, finds fulfillment. If we now combine of Euclidean geometry) but "expression" here
these founded acts or rather act-forms with means something different from the previous
the acts which serve as their foundation, and cases. Even in their case expression was not a
give the comprehensive name "founded act" mere counterpart of intuition: this is even less
to the whole act-complexes that result from the case here, where our thought's intention is
such formal "founding," we may say: Granted not aimed at intuitively given phenomena nor
the possibility just sketched, our parallelism at their intuitive properties or relationships,
may be re-established, but it is no longer a par­ and can in our case not be aimed at them. For
allelism between the meaning-intentions of a figure understood geometrically is known
expressions and the mere percepts which cor­ to be an ideal limit incapable in principie of
respond to them: it is a parallelism between intuitive exhibition in the concrete. Even in
124 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

our case, nonetheless, and in the generic field object from the intuitions which constitute
as such, intuition has an essential relation to it. This difference in mode of relation is ex­
expression and to its meaning: these, therefore, pressed by the perspicuous tum of phrase em­
constitute an experience of general knowledge ployed above: that the intuited object is not
related to intuition, no mere togetherness here itself the thing meant, but serves only as
of them ali, but a unity of felt belongingness an elucidatory example of our true general
among them. Even in our case, concept and meaning. But if expressive acts conform to
proposition are oriented towards intuition, these differences, their significative intention
through which alone, after corresponding ad­ will not move towards what is to be intuitive­
justment, self-evidence, the crown of knowl­ ly presented, but towards what is universal,
edge, emerges. It requires Iittle reflection, on what is merely documented in intuition. Where
the other hand, to see that the meaning of the this new intention is adequately fulfilled by
expressions in question is not found in intu­ an underlying intuition, it reveals its own ob­
ition at ali, that such intuition only gives them jective possibility (or the possibility or "real­
a filling of clarity and in the favorable case ity" of the universal).
of self-evidence. We in fact know only too
well that the overwhelming majority of gen­ §42. The distinction between sensuous
eral statements, and in particular those of sci­ stuff and categorial form throughout
ence, behave meaningfully without any eluci­ the whole realm of objectifying acts
dation from intuition, and that only a vanish­
ing section, even of the true and the proven, After these provisional treatments have
are and remain open to complete intuitive il­ shown us our difficulty, and have provided us
lumination. with a thought leading to its possible removal,
Even in the general realm, as in the realm we shall embark upon our actual discussion.
of individuals, our natural talk has a relation We started by assuming that, in the case of
to intuitively founded acts of thought. Should structured expressions, the notion of a more or
intuition fall wholly away, our judgment would less mirror-like mode of expression was quite
cease to know anything. It means, in ali cases, unavailing in describing the relation which
in cogitative style, just what could be known obtains between meanings to be expressed, on
by the aid of intuition, if such judgment is the one hand, and expressed intuitions, on the
indeed true at ali. Knowledge always has the other. This is doubtless correct and need now
character of a fulfillment and an identification: only be made more precise. We need only ear­
this may be observed in every case where we nestly ponder what things can be possible
confirm a general judgment through subse­ matter for perception, and what things possi­
quent intuition, as in every other case of knowl­ ble matter for meaning, to become aware that,
edge. in the mere form of a judgment, only certain
Our difficulty then is how identification antecedently specifiable par ts of our state­
can arise where the form of the general propo­ ment can have something which corresponds
sition, and in particular its form of universal­ to them in intuition, while to other parts of
ity, would vainly seek sympathetic elements the statement nothing intuitive possibly can cor­
in individual intuition. To remove this difficul­ respond.
ty, as in the previous case, the possibility of Let us consider this situation a little more
"founded acts" suggests itself. This possibil­ closely.
ity, carried out more fully, would run more or Perceptual statements are, completely and
less as follows: normally expressed, articulate utterances of
W here general thoughts find fulfillment varying pattern. We have no difficulty in dis­
in intuition, certain new acts are built on our tinguishing such types as "A is P" (where "A"
percepts and other appearances of like order, serves as index for a proper name), "An S is
acts related quite differently to our appearing P," "This S is P," "Ali S are P," etc. Many
Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 125

complications arise through the modifying in­ objectifying presentation. We take the consti­
fluence of negation, through the introduction tuents of the .fulfillment which correspond to
of distinctions between absolute and relative the material or formal constituents of our
predicates (attributes), through conjunctive, dis­ meaning-intentions as being material or for­
junctive and determinative connectives, etc. In mal constituents respectively, so making clear
the diversity of these types certain sharp dis­ what is to count as "material" or "formal" in
tinctions of meaning make themselves clear. the general sphere of objectifying acts.
To the various letters (variables) and words Of matter (stuff) and form we often talk in
in these types correspond sometimes mem­ many other senses. We must expressly point
bers, sometimes connective.forms, in the mean­ out that our present talk of "matter," which has
ings of the actual statements which belong to its contrast in categorial form, has nothing
these types. Now it is easy to see that only at whatever to do with the "matter" which con­
the places indicated by letters (variables) in trasts with the quality of acts, as when, e.g.,
such "forms of judgment," can meanings be we distinguish the "matter" in our meanings
put that are themselves fulfilled in perception, from their assertive or merely presentative qual­
whereas it is hopeless, even quite misguided, ity, this "matter" being what tells us as what,
to look directly in perception for what could or as now determined and interpreted, an ob­
give fulfillment to our supplementary formal ject is meant in our meanings. To make the
meanings. The letters (variables), on account distinction easier, we shall not speak of "mat­
of their merely functional meaning, can doubt­ ter" in our categorial contrast, but of "stuff,"
less take complex thoughts as their values: while wherever "matter" is meant in our pre­
statements of high complexity can be seen vious sense, we shall talk pointedly of "in­
from the standpoint of very simple judgment­ tentional matter" or of "interpretative sense."
types. The same difference between "matter"
and "form" therefore repeats itself in what is §43. The objective corre/ates of cate­
looked upon, in unified fashion, as a "term." gorial forms are not "real" (rea/en)
But eventually, in the case of each perceptual moments
statement, and likewise, of course, in the case
of every other statement that in a certain pri­ lt is now time to illuminate the distinction
mary sense gives expression to intuition, we to which we have just given a name. We shall
shall come down to certain final elements of link on, for this purpose, to our previous ex­
our terms-we may call them elements of amples.
stuff-which find direct fulfillment in intui­ The form-giving flexion Beinf{, whether in
tion (perception, imagination, etc.), while the its attributive or predicative function, is not
supplementary.forms, which as forms of mean­ fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. We here
ing Iikewise crave fulfillment, can find noth­ remember Kant's dictum: Being is no real
ing that ever could fit them in perception or predicare. This dictum refers to being qua ex­
acts of like order. istence, or to what Herbart called the being of
This fundamental difference we call, in a "absolute position," but it can be taken to be
natural extension of its application over the no less applicable to predicative and attribu­
whole sphere of objectifying presentation, the tive being. In any case it precisely refers to
categorial and absolute distinction between what we are here trying to make clear. I can
the.form and mclfter ofpresentation, and at the see color, but not heing-colored. I can feel
same time separate it off from the relative or smoothness, but not being-smooth. I can hear
.functional difference which is closely bound a sound, but not that something is sounding .
up with it, and which has just been subsidiari­ Being is nothing in the object, no part of it,
ly touched on above. no moment tenanting it, no quality or inten­
We have just spoken of a natural extension sity of it, no figure of it- or no interna! form
of our distinction over the whole sphere of whatsoever. no constitutive feature of it how-
126 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ever conceived. But being is also nothing at­ in consistency have widened the notion of
taching to an object: as it is no real (reales) sense-perception suitably, so as to include "in­
intemal feature, so also it is no real extemal ner perception," and so as to include under
feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a the name "sense-object" the correlated sphere
"feature" at all. Por it has nothing to do with of "inner objects," the ego and its interna! ex­
the real forms of unity which bind objects in­ periences.
to more comprehensive objects, tones into In the sphere of sense-perception thus un­
harmonies, things into more comprehensive derstood, and in the sphere, likewise, of sensu­
things or arrangements of things (gardens, ous intuition in general-we adhere to our
streets, the phenomenal extemal world). On much widened talk of the "sensuous"-a mean­
these real forms of unity the extemal features ing like that of the word "being" can find no
of objects, the right and the left, the high and possible objective correlate, and so no possi­
the low, the loud and the soft, etc., are found­ ble fulfillment in the acts of such perception.
ed. Among these anything like an "is" is natu­ What holds of "being" is plainly true of the
rally not to be found. remaining categorial forms in our statements,
We have just been speaking of objects, their whether these bind the constituents of terms
constitutive features, their factual connection together, or bind terms themselves together in
with other objects, through which more com­ the unity of the proposition. The "a" and the
prehensive objects are created, and also, at "the," the "and" and the "or," the "if' and the
the same time, extemal features in the partial "then," the "all" and the "none," the "some­
objects. We said that something corresponding thing" and the "nothing," the forms of quanti­
to being was not to be sought among them. ty and the determinations of number, etc.
Por all these are perceptible, and they exhaust -all these are meaningful propositional ele­
the range of possible percepts, so that we are ments, but we should look in vain for their
at once saying and maintaining that being is objective correlates (if such may be ascribed
absolutely imperceptible. to them at ali) in the sphere of real objects,
Here, however a clarifying supplement is which is in fact no other than the sphere of
necessary. Perception and object are concepts objects of possible sense-perception.
that cohere most intimately together, which
mutually assign sense to one another, and which §44. The origin of the concept of being
widen or narrow this sense conjointly. But we and of the remaining categories does
must emphasize that we have here made use not lie in the realm of sense-perception
of a certain naturally delimited, natural, but
also very narrow concept of perception (or of This holds-we stress it expressly-both
object). It is well-known that one also speaks of the sphere of outer sense, and of that of "in­
of "perceiving," and in particular of "seeing," ner sense." lt is a natural but quite misguided
in a greatly widened sense, which covers the doctrine, universally put about since the time
grasping of whole states of affairs, and even of Locke, that the meanings in question (or
ultimately the a priori self-evidence of laws the corresponding substantivally hypostatized
(in the case of " insight"). In the narrower sense meanings)-the logical categories such as
of perception (to talk roughly and popularly) being and non-being, unity, plurality, totality,
we perceive everything objective that we see number, ground, consequence, etc.-arise
with our eyes, hear with our ears or can grasp through reflection upon certain mental acts,
with any "outer" or even "inner sense." In or­ and so fall in the sphere of "inner sense," of
dinary speech, no doubt, only externa! things "inner perception." In this manner, indeed,
and connective forms of things (together with concepts like Perception, Judgment, Affirma­
their immediate qualities) can count as "per­ tion, Denial, Collecting, Counting, Presup­
ceived by the senses." But once talk of an "in­ posing and Inferring arise, which are ali, there­
ner sense" had been introduced, one should fore, "sensuous" concepts, belonging, that is,
Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 127

to the sphere of "inner sense." The previous can then say: As the sensible object stands to
series of concepts do not arise in this manner, sense-perception so the state of affairs stands
since they cannot at ali be regarded as con­ to the "becoming aware" in which it is (more
cepts of mental acts, or of their real constitu­ or less adequately) given-we should like to
ents. The thought of a Judgment fulfills itself say simply: so the state of affairs stands to the
in the inner intuition of an actual judgment, perception of it. As the concept Sensuous Ob­
but the thought of an "is" does not fulfill itself ject ( Real Object) cannot arise through reflec­
in this manner. Being is not a judgment nor a tion upon perception, since this could only yield
constituent of a judgment. Being is as little a us the concept Perception (or a concept of cer­
real constituent of sorne inner object as it is of tain real constituents of Perception), so the
sorne outer object, and so not of a judgment. In concept of State of Affairs cannot arise out of
a judgment, a predicative statement, "is" func­ reflection on judgments, since this could only
tions as a side of our meaning, just as perhaps, yield us concepts of judgments or of real con­
although otherwise placed and functioning, stituents of judgments.
"gold" and "yellow" do. The is itself does not That percepts in the one case, and judg­
enter into the judgment, it is merely meant, ments ( judgmental intuitions, percepts of states
signitively referred to, by the little word "is." of affairs) in the other, must be experienced, in
It is, however, self-given, or at least putatively order that each such act of abstraction should
given, in the fulfillment which at times invests get started, goes without saying, but to be ex­
the judgment, the becoming aware of the state perienced is not to be made objective. "Re­
of affairs supposed. Not only what is meant in flection," however, implies that what we re­
the partial meaning gold, nor only what is meant flect upon, the phenomenological experience,
in the partial meaning yellow, itself appears is rendered objective to us (is inwardly per­
before us, but also gold-being-yellow thus ap­ ceived by us), and that the properties to be
pears. Judgment and judgmental intuition are generalized are really given in this objective
therefore at one in the self-evident judgment, content.
and pre-eminently so if the judgment is self­ Not in rejlection upon judgments, nor even
evident in the ideally limiting sense. upon fulfillments of judgments, hut in the
If one now understands by "judging" not fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the
merely meaning-intentions connected with ac­ true source of the concepts State of Affairs
tual assertions, but the fulfillments that in the and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in
end fit them completely, it is indeed correct these acts as ohjects, but in the objects of these
that heing can only be apprehended through acts, do we have the abstractive basis which
judging, but this does not at ali mean that the enables us to realize the concepts in question.
concept of being must be arrived at "through And naturally the appropriate modifications
reflection" on certain judgments, or that it of these acts yield just as good a basis.
can ever be arrived at in this fashion. "Reflec­ It is in fact obvious from the start that, just
tion" is in other respects a fairly vague word. as any other concept (or Idea, Specific Unity)
In epistemology it has at least the relatively can only "arise;· i.e., become self-given to us,
fixed sense that Locke gave it, that of interna! if based on an act which at least sets sorne in­
perception: we can only adhere to this sense dividual instance of it imaginatively before
in interpreting a doctrine which imagines it our eyes, so the concept of Being can arise on-
can find the origin of the concept of Being 1 y when sorne heing, actual or imaginary, is
through reflecting onjudgments. The relational set before our eyes. lf "being" is taken to mean
being expressed in predication, e.g.. through predicative being. sorne state of affairs must
"is," "are," etc., lacks independence: if we be given to us, and this by way of an act which
round it out to something fully concrete, we gives it, cm analogue of common sensuous in­
get the .1·tate of affairs in question, the objec­ tuition.
tive correlate of the complete judgment. We The like holds of ali categorialforms ( or of
128 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

all categories). An aggregate, e.g., is given, and ever the name of an "intuition," and to its
can only be given, in an actual act of assem­ intentional correlate the name of "object." If
bly, in an act, that is, expressed in the con­ we are asked what it means to say that cate­
junctive form of connection A and B and C . .. gorially structured meanings find fulfillment,
But the concept of Aggregate does not arise confirm themselves in perception, we can but
through reflection on this act: instead of pay­ reply: it means only that they relate to the ob­
ing heed to the act which presents an aggre­ ject itself in its categorial structure. The ob­
gate, we have rather to pay heed to what it ject with these categorial forms is not mere­
presents, to the aggregate it renders apparent ly referred to, as in the case where meanings
in concreto, and then to lift the universal form function purely symbolically, but it is set be­
of our aggregate to conceptually universal fare our very eyes in just these forms. In oth­
consciousness. er words: it is not merely thought of, but intu­
ited or perceived. When we wish, accordingly,
§45. Widening of the concept of to set forth what this talk of "fulfillment" is
Intuition, and in particular of the getting at, what structured meanings and their
concepts Perception and Imagination. structural elements express, what unitary or
Sensible and categorial intuition unifying factor corresponds to them objective­
ly, we unavoidably come on "intuition" (or on
If we now ask: "Where do the categorial "perception" and "object"). We cannot man­
forms of our meanings find their fulfillment, age without these words, whose widened sense
if not in the 'perception' or 'intuition' which is of course evident. What shall we call the
we tried provisionally to delimit in talking of correlate of a non-sensuous subject-presenta­
'sensibility,"' our answer is plainly prefigured tion, one involving non-sensuous structure, if
in the discussions just completed. the word "object" is not available to us? How
We have taken it for granted that forms, too, shall we speak of its actual givenness, or ap­
can be genuinely fulfilled, or that the same parent givenness, when the word "perception"
applies to variously structured total meanings, is denied us? In common parlance, therefore,
and not merely to the "material" elements of aggregates, indefinite pluralities, totalities,
such meanings, and our assumption is put be­ numbers, disjunctions, predicates (right-ness),
yond doubt by looking at each case of faith­ states of affairs, all count as "objects," while
ful perceptual assertion. This will explain also the acts through which they seem to be given
why we call the whole perceptual assertion an count as "percepts."
expression of perception, and, in a derivative Plainly the connection between the wider
sense, of whatever is intuited or itself present­ and narrower, the supersensuous (i.e., raised
ed in perception. But if the "categorial forms" above sense, or categorial) and sensuous con­
of the expression, present together with its cept of perception, is no externa! or contin­
material aspects, have no terminus in percep­ gent matter, but one rooted in the whole busi­
tion, if by the latter we understand merely ness on hand. lt falls within the great class
sense-perception, then talk of expressing a of acts whose peculiarity it is that in them
percept must here rest on a different meaning: something appears as "actual," as "self-given."
there must at least be an act which renders iden­ Plainly this appearance of actuality and self­
tical services to the categorial elements of givenness (which may very well be delusive)
meaning that merely sensuous perception ren­ is throughout characterized by its difference
ders to the material elements. The essential ho­ from essentially related acts through which
mogeneity of the function of fulfillment, as alone it achieves full clarity-its difference
of ali the ideal relationships necessarily bound from an imaginative "making present," or from
up with it, obliges us to give the name "per­ a merely significative "thinking of," which both
ception" to each fulfilling act of confirmatory exclude "presence" (so to say appearance "in
self-presentation, to each fulfilling act what- person"), though not excluding the belief in
Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 129

being. As regards the latter, imagina! or sym­ fundamental distinctions as that between
bolic representation is possible in two man­ categorial form and sensuously founded mat­
ners: in an, assertive manner, asserting some­ ter, and the similar distinction between cate­
thing's being in imagina! or symbolic fashion, gories and all other concepts, depends wholly
and in a non-assertive manner, as "mere" imagi­ on it. Our concern is therefore to seek more
nation or thinking without taking something profound descriptive characterizations, which
to be. We need not enter more closely into the will give us sorne insight into the essentially
discussion of these differences after the analy­ different constitution of sensuous and categori­
ses of the previous section, which permit of a al percepts (or intuitions in general).
sufficiently general interpretation. It is clear, For our immediate purposes it is, however,
in any case, that the concept of imagination unnecessary to carry out an exhaustive analy­
must be widened in correspondence with the sis of the phenomena involved. That would be
concept of perception. We could not speak of a task that would require extraordinarily com­
something supersensuously or categorially prehensive treatments. Here it is sufficient to
perceived, if we could not imagine this thing concentrate on sorne weightier points, which
"in the same manner" (i.e., not merely sensu­ may help to mark off both sorts of acts in their
ously). We must therefore draw a quite gener­ mutual relation.
al distinction between sensuous and categori­ It is said of every percept that it grasps its
al intuition (or show the possibility of such a object directly, or grasps this object itself. But
distinction). this direct grasping has a different sense and
Our extended concept of Perception per­ character according as we are concemed with
mits, further, of a narrower and a wider inter­ a percept in the narrower or the wider sense,
pretation. In the widest sense even universal or according as the directly grasped object is
states of affairs can be said to be perceived sensuous or categorial. Or otherwise put, ac­
("seen," "beheld with evidence"). In the nar­ cording as it is a real or an ideal object. Sen­
rower sense, perception terminates upon indi­ suous or real objects can in fact be character­
vidual, and so upon temporal being. ized as objects of the lowest leve! of possible
intuition, categorial or ideal objects as objects
§46. Phenomenological analysis of the of higher levels.
distinction between sensuous and In the sense of the narrower, "sensuous"
categorial perception perception, an object is directly apprehended
or is itself present, if it is set up in an act of
In our next treatments we shall first only perception in a straightforward (schlichter)
discuss individual percepts, then widen our manner. What this means is this: that the ob­
treatment to take in individual intuitions of the ject is also an immediately given object in the
same order. sense that, as this object perceived with this
The division between "sensuous" and "su­ definite objective content, it is not constituted
persensuous" percepts was only very super­ in relational, connective, or otherwise articu­
ficially indicated and quite roughly character­ lated acts, acts founded on other acts which
ized above. Antiquated talk of externa! and bring other objects to perception. Sensuous
interna! senses, plainly stemming from the na­ objects are present in perception at a single
ive metaphysic and anthropology of daily life, act-level: they do not need to be constituted
may be useful in pointing out the sphere to in many-rayed fashion in acts of higher lev­
be excluded, but a true determination and cir­ e!, whose objects are set up for them by way
cumscription of the sensory sphere is not of other objects, already constituted in other
thereby reached, so depriving the concept of acts.
categorial perception of its descriptive under­ Each straightforward act of perception, by
pinning. To ascertain and clarify the said dis­ itself or together with other acts, can serve as
tinction is ali the more important, since such basic act for new acts which at times include
130 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

it, at times merely presuppose it, acts which §47. Continuation. Characterization of
in their new mode of consciousness likewise sense-perception as "straightforward"
bring to maturity a new awareness of objects perception
which essentially presupposes the old. When
the new acts of conjunction, of disjunction, We shall now scrutinize the acts in which
of definite and indefinite individual appre­ sensuous concreta and their sensuous consti­
hension (that-something), of generalization, tuents are presented as given; as opposed to
of straightforward, relational and connective these we shall later consider the quite differ­
knowledge, arise, we do not then have any ent acts in which concretely determínate States
sort of subjective experiences, nor just acts of Affairs, Collections and Disjunctions are
connected with the original ones. What we given as complex thought-objects, or as objects
have are acts which, as we said, set up new of higher order, which include their founda­
objects, acts in which something appears as tional objects as real parts (reell) in themselves.
actual and self-given, which was not given, We shall then deal with acts of the type of gen­
and could not have been given, as what it eralizing or indefinitely individual apprehen­
now appears to be, in these foundational acts sion, whose objects certainly are of higher
alone. On the other hand, the new objects are leve!, but which do not include their founda­
based on the older ones, they are related to what tional objects in themselves.
appears in the basic acts. Their manner of ap­ In sense-perception, the "externa!" thing
pearance is essentially determined by this re­ appears " in one blow," as soon as our glance
lation. We are here dealing with a sphere of falls upon it. The manner in which it makes
objects, which can only show themselves "in the thing appear present is straightforward: it
person" in such founded acts. In such founded requires no apparatus of founding or founded
acts we have the categorial element in intui­ acts. To what complex mental processes it
tion and knowledge, in them assertive thought, may trace back its origin, and in what manner,
functioning expressively, finds fulfillment; the is of course irrelevant here.
possibility of complete accord with such acts We are not ignoring the obvious complex­
determines the truth, the rightness, of an asser­ ity that can be shown to exist in the phenom­
tion. So far we have of course only considered enological content of the straightforward per­
the sphere of perception, and only its most el­ ceptual act, and particularly in its unitary
ementary cases. But one sees at once that the intention.
distinction of straightforward and founded Many constitutive properties certainly per­
acts can be extended from percepts to ali intui­ tain to the thing when it appears with a given
tions . We clearly envisage the possibility of content, sorne of them themselves "falling un­
complex acts which in mixed fashion have a der perception," others merely intended. But
part-basis in straightforward percepts and a we certainly do not live through ali the articu­
part-basis in straightforward imaginations, and lated acts of perception which would arise
the further possibility of setting up new foun­ were we to attend to all the details of the
dations on intuitions which themselves have thing, or, more precisely, to the properties of
foundations, and so building up whole series the "side tumed to us," were we to make them
of foundings upon foundings. We further see objects in their own right. No doubt ideas of
that signitive intentions have structures pat­ such supplementary properties, not given in
temed on such foundings whether of lower or perception, are "dispositionally excited," no
higher order, and that again mixtures of sig­ doubt intentions which relate to them contrib­
nitive and intuitive acts emerge out of such ute to perception, and determine its total char­
"founding," founded acts, in short, that are acter. But, just as the thing does not appear
built on acts of one or the other sort. Our first before us as the mere sum of its countless indi­
task, however, is to deal with the elementary vidual features, which a later preoccupation
cases and elucidate them completely. with detail may distinguish, and as even the
Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 131

latter does not dirempt the thing into such more precisely, into one concept. In the con­
details, but takes note of them only in the tinuous running on of individual percepts we
ever complete, unified thing, so the act of per­ continuously perceive the single, selfsame ob­
ception also is always a homogeneous unity, ject. Can we now call this continuous percept,
which gives the object "presence" in a simple, since it is built out of individual percepts, a
immediate way. The unity of perception does percept founded upon them? It is of course
not therefore arise through our own synthetic founded upon them in the sense in which a
activity, as if only a form of synthesis, oper­ whole is founded on its parts, not however in
ating by way of founded acts, could give uni­ the sense here relevant, according to which a
ty of objective reference to part-intentions. It founded act manifests a new act-character,
requires no articulation and hence no actual grounded in the act-characters that underlie it
linkage. The unity of perception comes into and unthinkable apart from these. In the case
being as a straightforward unity, as an imme­ before us perception is merely, as it were, ex­
diate fusion of part-intentions, without the tended: it allows parts to be broken off from
addition of new act-intentions. itself which can function as complete, inde­
We may also be unsatisfied with a single pendent percepts. But the unification of these
glance, we may handle the thing from all sides percepts into a continuous percept is not the
in a continuous perceptual series, feeling it performance of sorne peculiar act, through
over as it were with our senses. But each single which a new consciousness of something ob­
percept in this series is already a percept of jective is set up. We find, instead, that abso­
the thing. Whether I look at this book from lutely nothing new is objectively meant in the
above or below, from inside or outside, I al­ extended act, but that the same object is con­
ways see this book. It is always one and the tinuously meant in it, the very object that the
same thing, and that not merely in sorne purely part-percepts, taken singly, were already mean­
physical sense, but in the view of our percepts ing.
themselves. If individual properties dominate One might lay stress on this sameness,
variably at each step, the thing itself, as a per­ and say that our unity is plainly a unity of
ceived unity, is not in essence set up by sorne identification, that the intention of the serial­
overreaching act, founded upon these sepa­ ly arranged acts coincides continuously, and
rate percepts. that so the unity arises. This is certainly right.
Considering things more closely, we should But unity of identification is unavoidably dis­
not present the matter as if the one sensible tinct, does not say the same as the unity of an
object could be presented in a founded act (in a act of identification. An act means something,
continuously developing act of perceiving), an act of identification means identity, pre­
while it merely does not need to be presented sents it. In our case an identification is per­
in such an act. Closer analysis shows that even formed, but no identity is meant. The object
a continuous perceptual flux involves afusion meant in the differing acts of the continuous
of part-acts in one act, rather than a peculiar perceptual series is indeed always the same,
act founded upan such part-acts. and the acts are one through coincidence, but
To prove this we embark on the following what is perceived in the series, what is ren­
discussion. dered objective in it, is solely the sensible ob­
The individual percepts of our series have ject, never its identity with self. Only when we
a continuous unity. Such continuity does not use the perceptual series to found a novel act,
amount to the mere fact of temporal adjunc­ only when we articulate our individual per­
tion: the series of individual acts rather has cepts, and relate their objects to each other,
the character of a phenomenological unity, in does the unity of continuity holding among
which the individual acts are fused. In this uni­ these individual percepts-the unity of fusion
ty, our manifold acts are not merely fused into through their coinciding intentions-provide a
a phenomenological whole, but into one act, point d'appui for a consciousness of identity.
132 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

Identity itself is now made objective, the mo­ straightforward percepts constitutes the most
ment of coincidence linking our act-characters widely conceived sphere of sensible objects.
with one another, serves as representative con­ Each concrete sensible object is percepti­
tent for a new percept, founded upan our ar­ ble in explicit fashion, and so also every piece
ticulated individual percepts. This brings to of such an object. How does the matter stand
intentional awareness that what we now see in regard to abstract moments? Their nature
and what we saw before are one and the same. makes them incapable of separate being: their
Naturally we have then to do with a regular representative content, even where there is
act of our second group. Our act of identifica­ merely representation by way of analogy, can­
tion is in sober fact a new awareness of objec­ not be experienced alone, but only in a more
tivity, which causes a new "object" to appear comprehensive concrete setting. But this does
to us, an object that can only be apprehend­ not mean that their intuition need be a found­
ed or given in its very selfhood in a founded ed act. It would be one, if the apprehension of
act of this sort. an abstract moment was necessarily preceded
Before we penetrate further into our new by the apprehension of the concrete whole or
class of acts and objects, we must, however, of its complementary moments, such an ap­
first round off our treatment of straightforward prehension being an act of intuitive turning
percepts. If we may presume to have cleared towards its object. This I do not find obvious.
up the sense of the concept of a straightfor­ It is clear, per contra, that the apprehension of
ward percept, or, what we take for the same, of a moment and of a part generally as a part of
sense-perception, then we have also cleared up the whole in question, and, in particular, the
the concept of a sensible or real object (in the apprehension of a sensuous feature as a fea­
most basic sense of "real"). We define a real ture, or of a sensuous form as a form, point to
object as the possible object of a straightfor­ acts which are all founded: these acts are in
ward percept. There is a necessary parallelism our case of a relational kind. This means that
between perception and imagination, which the sphere of "sensibility" has been left and that
guarantees that a possible imagination (or more of "understanding" entered. We shall now sub­
precisely a whole series of imaginations) hav­ ject the just mentioned group of founded acts
ing the same essence corresponds to each pos­ to a closer consideration.
sible percept, a straightforward imagination
is correlated with each straightforward per­ §48. Characterization of categorial acts
cept, thereby giving certainty to the wider con­ as founded acts
cept of sensible intuition. We can then define
sensible objects as the possible objects of sen­ A sensible object can be apprehended by
sible imagination and sensible intuition in us in a variety of ways. It can, first of all, of
general: this of course involves no essential course, be apprehended in "straightforward"
generalization of our previous definition. The fashion. It is this possibility, which like all the
parallelism just stressed makes both defini­ other possibilities here in question must be
tions equivalent. throughout interpreted as "ideal," which char­
Through the concept of a real object, the acterizes the sensible object as a sensible ob­
concept of a real part, or more particularly, the ject. Understood in this manner, it stands as it
concepts of a real piece, and a real moment were simply before us: the parts which con­
(real feature), and a real form, are determined. stitute it are indeed in it, but are not made our
Each part of a real object is a real part. explicit objects in the straightforward act. The
In straightforward perception we say that same object can, however, be grasped by us in
the whole object is explicitly given, while explicating fashion: acts of articulation can
each of its parts (in the widest sense of "parts") put its parts "into relief," relational acts bring
is implicitly given. The sum total of objects the relieved parts into relation, whether to
that can be explicitly or implicitly given in one another or to the whole. Only through
Sensuous and Categorial Intuition 133

such new modes of interpretation will the to one specific percept, the part-intention to
connected and related members assume the a will not be tom out of the total appearance
character of "parts" (or of "wholes"). The ar­ of A, so as to break up the latter's unity, but
ticulating acts, and, taken in retrospect, the an independent act will have a as its own per­
act we call "straightforward," are not merely ceptual object. At the same time one's con­
experienced one after the other: overreach­ tinuously operative total percept will coincide
ing unities of act are rather always present, in with this specific percept in respect of one im­
which, as new objects, the relationships of the plicit part-intention. The "content" which rep­
parts become constituted. resents a, will be functioning as the same
Let us first look at the relationships of parts content in a twofold fashion, and, in so far as
and wholes: limiting ourselves to the simplest it does this, it will effect a coincidence, a pe­
cases, !et us consider the relationships A is or culiar unity of the two representative func­
has a and a is in A. To point to the founded tions; we shall, in other words, have two coin­
acts in which these typical states of affairs cident interpretations, both sustained by the
become constituted as data, and to clear up representative content in question. But this
the just employed forms of categorical state­ unity of these two representative functions
ment (to lead them back to their intuitive ori­ will now itself take on a representative role. It
gin and adequate fulfillment) are one and the will not itself count in its own right as an expe­
same. We are not, however, here concemed with rienced bond among acts: it will not set it­
the qualities of acts, but only with the consti­ self up as our object, but will help to set up
tution of their interpretative forms: to that ex­ another object. lt will act representatively, and
tent our analysis, if regarded as an analysis of to such effect, that A will now appear to con­
judgment, will be defective. tain a in itself (or, with a reversed direction, a
An act of perception grasps A as a whole, will appear as contained in A).
at one "blow" and in straightforward fashion. According, therefore, to our " interpreta­
A second act of perception is trained upon a, tive standpoint," or to the "sense of our pas­
the part or dependent moment, that belongs sage" from part to whole or contrariwise­
constitutively to A. T hese two acts are not which are both novel phenomenological char­
merely performed together, or after one anoth­ acters making their contribution to the total
er, in the manner of disjoined experiences; intentional matter of the relating act-there
rather are they bound together in a single act will be two possibilities, marked off in a pri­
in whose synthesis A is first given as contain­ ori fashion, in which the "same relation" can
ing a in itself. Just so, a can, with a reversa! of achieve actual givenness. To these correspond
the direction of relational perception, achieve two a priori possibilities of relation, objective­
self-givenness as pertaining to A. ly different, yet tied together by an ideal law,
Let us now try to penetrate a little deeper. possibilities which can only be directly consti­
The total intuitive reference to our object tuted in founded acts of the sort in question,
implicitly contains an intention to a. For per­ which can achieve "self-givenness to percep­
ception purports to grasp the object itself: its tion" only in acts built up in this manner.
"grasping" must therefore reach to all its con­ Our exposition obviously applies to ali
stituents in and with the whole object. (Natu­ specific forms of the relation between a whole
rally we are here only concerned with what and its parts. All such relationships are of
constitutes the object as it appears in percep­ categorial, ideal nature. lt would be a mistake
tion, and as what it appears in perception, to try to locate them in the straightforwardly
and not with such constituents as may per­ given whole, to discover them in this whole
tain to it in "objective reality," and which only by analysis. The part certainly lies hidden in
later experience, knowledge and science will the whole before all division into members,
bring out.) and is subsidiarily apprehended in our percep­
In the narrowing down of our total percept tual grasp of this whole. But this fact, that it
134 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

thus lies hidden in the whole, is at first mere­ connection as a straightforward phenomenon,
ly the ideal possibility of bringing the part, but which are in it only as ideal possibilities,
and the fact that it is a part, to perception in the possibilities, that is, of fulfilling relevant
correspondingly articulated and founded acts. founded acts.
The matter is plainly similar in the case of A real ( ree lle) location of these relations
externa/ relations, from which predications of parts in the whole would be a confusion of
such as "A is to the right of B," "A is larger, distinct things: of sensuous or real (rea/en)
brighter, louder than B, etc.," take their rise. forms of combination, with categorial or ideal
Wherever sensible objects-directly and in­ ones. Sensible combinations are aspects of the
dependently perceptible-are brought togeth­ real ( realen) object, its actual moments, pres­
er, despite their mutual exclusion, into more ent in it, if only implicitly, and capable of be­
or less intimate unities, into what fundamen­ ing "lifted out of it" by an abstractive percept.
tally are more comprehensive objects, then a As against this, forms of categorial combina­
possibility of such external relations arises. tion go with the manner in which acts are syn­
They all fall under the general type of the re­ thesized: they are constituted as objects in
lation of part to parts within a whole. Found­ the synthetic acts built upan our sensibility. In
ed acts are once more the media in which the the formation of externa! relations sensuous
primary appearance of the states of affairs forms may serve as foundations for the cate­
in question, of such external relationships, is gorial forms which correspond to them, as
achieved. lt is clear, in fact, that neither the when, in the face of the sensuously intuited
straightforward percept of the complex whole, contact of the contents A and B within a com­
nor the specific percepts pertaining to its prehensive whole W, we observe, and perhaps
members, are in themselves the relational verbally express our observation, in the syn­
percepts which alone are possible in such a thetic forms "A is in contact with B," or "Bis
complex. Only when one member is picked in contact withA." But, in constituting the lat­
out as principal member, and is dwelt on while ter forms, we bring new objects into being,
the other members are still kept in mind, objects belonging to the class of "states of
does a determination of members by members affairs," which includes none but "objects of
make its appearance, a determination which higher arder." In the sensible whole, the parts
varíes with the kind of unity that is present A and B are made one by the sensuously com­
and plainly also with the particular members binatory form of contact. The abstraction of
set in relief. In such cases also the choice of a these parts and moments, the formation of
principal member, or of a direction of relation­ intuitions of A, B and contact, will not yet
al apprehension, leads to phenomenologically yield the presentation A in contact with B. This
distinct forms of relationship, correlatively demands a novel act which, taking charge
characterized, which forms are not genuinely of such presentations, shapes and combines
present in the unarticulated percept of the them suitably.
 VI.
From Subjectivity to Intersubjectivity

9. Empathy and the Constitution of the Other

Primordial Abstraction ,:- potentialities. And indeed it seems obvious that

such unities are inseparable from my ego and
§42. Exposition of the problem of therefore belong to his concreteness itself.
experiencing someone e/se, in rejoinder But what about other egos, who surely
to the objection that phenomenology are not a mere intending and intended in me,
entails solipsism merely synthetic unities of possible verifica­
tion in me, but, according to their sense, pre­
As the point of departure for our new cisely others? Have we not therefore done tran­
meditations, !et us take what may seem to be a scendental realism an injustice? The doctrine
grave objection. The objection concems noth­ may lack a phenomenological foundation; but
ing less than the claim of transcendental phe­ essentially it is right in the end, since it looks
nomenology to be itself transcendental phi­ for a path from the immanency of the ego to
losophy and therefore its claim that, in the the transcendency of the Other. Can we, as
form of a constitutional problematic and the­ phenomenologists, do anything but agree
ory moving within the limits of the transcen­ with this and say: "The Nature and the whole
dentally reduced ego, it can solve the transcen­ world that are constituted 'immanently' in
dental problems pertaining to the Objective the ego are only my 'ideas' and have behind
world. When I, the meditating I, reduce my­ them the world that exists in itself. The way to
self to my absolute transcendental ego by phe­ this world must still be sought"? Accordingly
nomenological epoché do I not become solus can we avoid saying likewise: "The very ques­
ipse; and do I not remain that, as long as I car­ tion of the possibility of actually transcendent
ry on a consistent self-explication under the knowledge-above ali, that of the possibility
name phenomenology? Should not a phenom­ of my going outside my ego and reaching oth­
enology that proposed to solve the problems er egos (who, after ali, as others, are not actu­
of Objective being, and to present itself actu­ ally in me but only consciously intended in
ally as philosophy, be branded therefore as me)-this question cannot be asked purely
transcendental solipsism? phenomenologically"? Is it not self-under­
Let us consider the matter more closely. stood from the very beginning that my field of
Transcendental reduction restricts me to the transcendental knowledge does not reach be­
stream of my pure conscious processes and yond my sphere of transcendental experience
the unities constituted by their actualities and and what is synthetically comprised therein?

*CM, pp. 89-108 (Sections 42-49).

136 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

Is it not self-understood that ali of that is in­ though indeed as such things in respect of
cluded without residue in my own transcen­ one side of them. They are in fact experienced
dental ego? also as governing psychically in their respec­
But perhaps there is sorne mistake in tive natural organisms. Thus peculiarly in­
thoughts like these. Before one decides in fa­ volved with animate organisms, as "psycho­
vor of them and the "self-understood" propo­ physical" Objects, they are "in" the world.
sitions they exploit, and then perchance em­ On the other hand, I experience them at the
barks on dialectical argumentations and same time as subjects for this world, as expe­
self-styled "metaphysical" hypotheses (whose riencing it (this same world that I experience)
supposed possibility may tum out to be com­ and, in so doing, experiencing me too, even
plete absurdity), it might indeed be more fit­ as I experience the world and others in it. Con­
ting to undertake the task of phenomenologi­ tinuing along this Iine, I can explicate a vari­
cal explication indicated in this connection ety of other moments noematically.
by the "alter ego" and carry it through in con­ In any case then, within myself, within the
crete work. We must, after ali, obtain for our­ limits of my transcendentally reduced pure
selves insight into the explicit and implicit conscious Iife, I experience the world (includ­
intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes ing others)-and, according to its experiential
evinced and verified in the realm of our tran­ sense, notas (so to speak) my prívate synthetic
scendental ego; we must discover in what formation but as other than mine alone {mir
intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the fremde }, as an intersubjective world, actually
sense "other ego" becomes fashioned in me there for everyone, accessible in respect of its
and, under the title, harrnonious experience of Objects to everyone. And yet each has his ex­
someone else, becomes verified as existing and periences, his appearances and appearance­
even as itself there in its own manner. These unities, his world-phenomenon; whereas the
experiences and their works are facts belong­ experienced world exists in itself, over against
ing to my phenomenological sphere. How else ali experiencing subjects and their world­
than by examining them can I explícate the phenomena.
sense, existing others, in ali its aspects? W hat is the explanation of this? Imper­
turbably I must hold fast to the insight that
§43. The noematic-ontic mode of every sense that any existent whatever has
givenness of the Other, as transcenden­ or can have for me-in respect of its "what"
tal clue far the constitutional theory of and its "it exists and actually is"-is a sense
the experience of someone else in and arising from my intentional life, be­
coming clarified and uncovered for me in con­
First of ali, my "transcendental clue" is the sequence of my Iife's constitutive syntheses,
experienced Other, given to me in straightfor­ in systems of harmonious verification. There­
ward consciousness and as I immerse myself fore, in order to provide the basis for answer­
in examining the noematic-ontic content be­ ing ali imaginable questions that can have
longing to him (purely as correlate of my any sense <here>-nay, in order that, step by
cogito, the particular structure of which is yet step, these questions themselves may be pro­
to be uncovered). By its remarkableness and pounded and solved-it is necessary to begin
multiplicity, that content already indicates the with a systematic explication of the overt and
many-sidedness and difficulty of the phe­ implicit intentionality in which the being of
nomenological task. For example: In change­ others for me becomes "made" and explicated
able harmonious multiplicities of experience in respect of its rightful content-that is, its
I experience others as actually existing and, fulfillment-content.
on the one hand, as world Objects-not as Thus the problem is stated at first as a
mere physical things belonging to Nature, special one, namely that of the "thereness-for-
Empathy and the Constitution o( the Other 137

me" of others, and accordingly as the theme is also in question, then the sense, "other
of a transcendental theory of experiencing subjects," that is in question here cannot as
someone else, a transcendental theory of so­ yet be the sense: "Objective subjects, subjects
called "empathy." But it soon becomes evident existing in the world." As regards method, a
that the range of such a theory is much great­ prime requirement for proceeding correct­
er than at first it seems, that it contributes to ly here is that first of ali we carry out, inside
the founding of a transcendental theory <Jf the the universal transcendental sphere, a pecu­
Objective world and, indeed, to the founding liar kind of epoché with respect to our theme.
of such a theory in every respect, notably as For the present we exclude from the themat­
regards Objective Nature. The existence-sense ic field everything now in question: we disre­
[ Seinssinn] of the world and of Nature in par­ gard ali constitutional effects of intentionality
ticular, as Objective Nature, includes after ali, relating immediately or mediately to other
as we have already mentioned, thereness-for­ suhjectivity and delimit first of ali the total
everyone. This is always cointended wherever nexus of that actual and potential intentional­
we speak of Objective actuality. In addition, ity in which the ego constitutes within himself
Objects with "spiritual" predicates belong to a peculiar ownness. *
the experienced world. These Objects, in re­ This reduction to my transcendental sphere
spect of their origin and sense, refer us to sub­ of peculiar ownness or to my transcenden­
jects, usually other subjects, and their active­ tal concrete I-myself, by abstraction from ev­
ly constituting intentionality. Thus it is in the erything that transcendental constitution gives
case of ali cultural Objects (books, tools, works me as Other, has an unusual sense. In the natu­
of any kind, and so forth), which moreover ral, the world-accepting attitude, I find differ­
carry with them at the same time the experi­ entiated and contrasted: myself and others. If
ential sense of thereness-for-everyone (that is, I "abstract" (in the usual sense) from others, /
everyone belonging to the corresponding cul­ "afane .. remain. But such abstraction is not
tural community, such as the European or per­ radical; such aloneness in no respect alters
haps, more narrowly, the French cultural com­ the natural world-sense, "experienceable by ev­
munity, and so forth). eryone," which attaches to the naturally un­
derstood Ego and would not be lost, even if a
§44. Reduction o( transcendental universal plague had left only me. Taken how­
experience to the sphere o( ownness ever in the transcendental attitude and at the
same time with the constitutional abstraction
If the transcendental constitution of other that we have just characterized, my (the medi­
subjects and accordingly the transcendental tator's) ego in his transcendental ownness is
sense, "other subjects," are in question, and not the usual I, this man, reduced to a mere
consequently a universal sense-stratum that correlate phenomenon and having his status
emanates from others and is indispensible to within the total world-phenomenon. What
the possibility of an Objective world for me concerns us is, on the contrary, cm essential

*Originally: constitutes himself in his peculiar ownness and synthetic unities inseparable from his peculiar own­
ness, which are therefore to be accounted as part of it.
The following comment was appended later:
*44. "inside the universal transcendental sphere"-"peculiar epoché." But it is misleading when the text goes on
to say: "in that we exclude from the theoretical <sic> field everything now in question. in that we <disregard> ali
constitutional effects that relate immediately or mediately to other subjectivity." etc.
The question after ali concerns. not other men. but the manner in which the ego (as the transcendental onlooker
experiences him transcendentally) constitutes within himself the distinction between Ego and Other Ego-a differ­
ence. however, that presents itsclf first of ali in the phenomenon, "world": as the difference between my human Ego
(my Ego in the usual sense) and the other human Ego (the other Ego <likewise in thc usual sense>).
 138 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

structure, which is part of the all-embracing cems no matter what alter egos; then however
constitution in which the transcendental ego, it concems everything that acquires sense-de­
as constituting an Objective world, lives his terminations from them-in short, an Objec­
life. * tive world in the proper and full signification
What is specifically peculiar to me as ego, of the phrase.
my concrete being as a manad, purely in my­ These problems will become more under­
self and for myself with an exclusive ownness, standable if we proceed to characterize the
includes <my> every intentionality and there­ ego's sphere of ownness or, correlatively, to
fore, in particular, the intentionality directed carry out explicitly the abstractive epoché that
to what is other; but, for reasons of method, yields it. Thematic exclusion of the constitu­
the synthetic effect of such intentionality (the tional effects produced by experience of some­
actuality for me of what is other) shall at first thing other, together with the effects of all the
remain excluded from the theme. In this pre­ further modes of consciousness relating to
eminent intentionality there becomes consti­ something other, does not signify merely phe­
tuted for me the new existence-sense that goes nomenological epoché with respect to naive
beyond my monadic very-ownness; there be­ acceptance of the being of the other, as in the
comes constituted an ego, not as "I myself," case of everything Objective existing for us in
but as mirrored in my own Ego, in my monad. straightforward consciousness. After all, the
The second ego, however, is not simply there transcendental attitude is and remains pre­
and strictly presented; rather is he constituted supposed, the attitude according to which ev­
as "alter ego"-the ego indicated as one mo­ erything previously existing for us in straight­
ment by this expression being I myself in my forward consciousness is taken exclusively
ownness. The "Other," according to his own as "phenomenon," as a sense meant and un­
constituted sense, points to me myself; the oth­ dergoing verification, purely in the manner in
er is a "mirroring" of my own self and yet not which, as correlate of uncoverable constitu­
a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own tive systems, it has gained and is gaining exis­
self and yet again not an analogue in the usu­ tential sense. We are now preparing for just
al sense. Accordingly if, as a first step, the ego this uncovering and sense-clarification by the
in his peculiar ownness has been delimited, novel epoché, more particularly in the follow­
has been surveyed and articulated in respect ing manner.
of his constituents-not only in the way of As Ego in the transcendental attitude I at­
life-processes but also in the way of accept­ tempt first of all to delimit, within my horizon
ed unities concretely inseparable from him­ of transcendental experience, what is pecu­
the question must then be asked: How can my liar/y my own. First I say that it is non-afien
ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute {Nicht-Fremdes]. I begin by freeing that hori­
under the name, "experience of something zon abstractively from everything that is at
other," precisely something other-something, all alien. A property of the transcendental phe­
that is, with a sense that excludes the consti­ nomenon "world" is that of being given in har­
tuted from the concrete make-up of the sense­ monious straightforward experience; accord­
constituting I-myself, as somehow the latter's ingly it is necessary to survey this world and
analogue? In the first place the question con- pay attention to how something alien makes

*Strasser attaches here the following note, which Husserl wrote on a separate sheet:
The total appearance of the world-the world always intended in the flux.
The total appearance of Nature.
The total intending of the world, the particular intending-the particular appearance of the particular worldly ob­
ject. But the intending has strata; I can abstract. Physical-thing appearance, stratum of culture or stratum of human
existence as <blank-space> in the flowing present. The stream of world-"appearances," of "perceptual appearances":
what is intended ontologically. Cogito-strata, such that each stratum has a stratum of the cogitatum. The ego directed to
what is intended.
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 139

its appearance as jointly determining the ture that becomes the theme of the natural
sense of the world and, so far as it does so, to scientist. This Nature, to be sure, is likewise
exclude it abstractively. Thus we abstract first a result of abstraction, namely abstraction
of ali from what gives men and brutes their from everything psychic and from those predi­
specific sense as, so to speak, Ego-like living cates of the Objective world that have arisen
beings and consequently from ali determina­ from persons. But what is acquired by this ab­
tions of the phenomenal world that refer by straction on the part of the natural scientist is
their sense to "others" as Ego-subjects and, ac­ a stratum that belongs to the Objective world
cordingly, presuppose these. For example, ali itself (viewed in the transcendental attitude, a
cultural predicates. We can say also that we stratum that belongs to the objective sense:
abstract from everything "other-spiritual," as "Objective world") and is therefore itself Ob­
that which makes possible, in the "alíen" or jective-just as, on the other hand, what is
"other" that is in question here, its specific abstracted from is Objective (the Objective
sense. Furthermore the characteristic of be­ psychic, Objective cultural predicates, and so
longing to the surrounding world, not merely forth). But in the case of our abstraction the
for others who are also given at the particular sense "Objective," which belongs to every­
time in actual experience, but also far every­ thing worldly-as constituted intersubjec­
one, the characteristic of being there for and tively, as experienceable by everyone, and so
accessible to everyone, of being capable of forth-vanishes completely. Thus there is in­
mattering or not mattering to each in his liv­ cluded in my ownness, as purified from ev­
ing and striving-a characteristic of ali Ob­ ery sense pertaining to other subjectivity, a
jects belonging to the phenomenal world and sense, "mere Nature," that has lost precisely
the characteristic wherein their otherness con­ that "by everyone" and therefore must not
sists-should not be overlooked, but rather by any means be taken for an abstract stratum
excluded abstractively. of the world or of the world's sense. Among
In this connection we note something im­ the bodies belonging to this "Nature" and in­
portant. When we thus abstract, we retain a cluded in my peculiar ownness, I then find
unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon my animate organism as uniquely singled out
world, a stratum of the phenomenon that is the -namely as the only one of them that is not
correlate of continuously harmonious, continu­ just a body but precisely an anímate organ­
ing world-experience. Despite our abstraction, ism: the sole Object within my abstract world­
we cango on continuously in our experiencing stratum to which, in accordance with experi­
intuition, while remaining exclusively in the ence, I ascribe fields of sensation (belonging
aforesaid stratum. This unitary stratum, fur­ to it, however, in different manners-a field
thermore, is distinguished by being essentially of tactual sensations, a field of warmth and
the Jounding stratum-that is to say: I obvi­ coldness, and so forth), the only Object "in"
ously cannot have the "alíen" or "other" as ex­ which I "rule and govern" immediately, gov­
perience, and therefore cannot have the sense erning particularly in each of its "organs."
"Objective world" as an experiential sense, Touching kinesthetically, I perceive "with" my
without having this stratum in actual experi­ hands; seeing kinesthetically, I perceive also
ence; whereas the reverse is not the case. "with" my eyes; and so forth; moreover I can
Let us observe more closely the result of perceive thus at any time. Meanwhile the kin­
our abstraction and, accordingly, what it leaves esthesias pertaining to the organs flow in the
us. From the phenomenon world, from the mode "I am doing," and are subject to my "I
world appearing with an Objective sense, a can"; furthermore, by calling these kinesthe­
substratum becomes separated, as the "Nature" sias into play, I can push, thrust, and so forth,
included in my ownness, a Nature that must al­ and can thereby "act" somatically-immedi­
ways be carefully distinguished from Nature, ately, and then mediately. As perceptively ac­
pure and simple-that is to say: from the Na- tive, I experience (or can experience) all of
140 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

Nature, including my own animate organism, and personal Ego-utterly unique members
which therefore in the process is reflexively re­ of this reduced "world." Manifestly predicates
lated to itself. That becomes possible because that get significance from this Ego also occur
I "can" perceive one hand "by means of" the in the reduced world-for example: "value"
other, an eye by means of a hand, and so forth predicates and predicates of "works" as such.
-a procedure in which the functioning or­ None of this is worldly in the natural sense
gan must become an Object and the Object a (therefore ali the quotation-marks); it is ali ex­
functioning organ. And it is the same in the clusively what is mine in my world-experi­
case of my generally possible original dealing ence, pervading my world-experience through
with Nature and with my anímate organism it­ and through and likewise cohering unitarily in
self, by means of this organism-which there­ my intuition. Accordingly the members we
fore is reflexively related to itself also in prac­ distinguish in this, my peculiarly own world­
tice. phenomenon, are concretely united, as is fur­
Bringing to light my anímate organism, re­ ther shown by the fact that the spatiotemporal
duced to what is included in my ownness, is form-as reduced, however, to the form in­
itself part of bringing to light the ownness­ cluded in my ownness-also goes into this re­
essence of the Objective phenomenon: "/, as duced world-phenomenon. Hence the reduced
this man." If I reduce other men to what is in­ "Objects"-the "physical things," the "psycho­
cluded in my ownness, I get bodies included physical Ego"-are likewise outside one an­
therein; if I reduce myself as a man, I get "my other.
animate organism" and "my psyche," or my­ But here something remarkable strikes us:
self as a psychophysical unity-in the latter, a sequence of evidences that yet, in their se­
my personal Ego, who operates in this aní­ quence, seem paradoxical. The psychic life of
mate organism and, "by means of' it, in the my Ego (this "psychophysical" Ego), includ­
"externa[ world," who is affected by this world, ing my whole world-experiencing life and
and who thus in all respects, by virtue of the therefore including my actual and possible
continual experience of such unique modes experience of what is other, is wholly unaf­
of Ego- and life-relatedness, is constituted as fected by screening off what is other. Conse­
psychophysically united with the anímate cor­ quently there belongs within my psychic being
poreal organism. If ownness-purification of the whole constitution of the world existing
the externa[ world, the animate organism, for me and, in further consequence, the differ­
and the psychophysical whole, has been ef­ entiation of that constitution into the systems
fected, I have lost my natural sense as Ego, that constitute what is included in my peculiar
since every sense-relation to a possible Us or ownness and the systems that constitute what
We remains excluded, and have lost likewise is other. I, the reduced "human Ego" ("psy­
ali my worldliness, in the natural sense. But, chophysical" Ego), am constituted, accord­
in my spiritual ownness, I am nevertheless ingly, as a member of the "world" with a
the identical Ego-pole of my manifold "pure" multiplicity of "objects outside me." But I my­
subjective processes, those of my passive and self constitute all this in my "psyche" and
active intentionality, and the pole of ali the bear it intentionally within me. If perchance
habitualities instituted or to be instituted by it could be shown that everything constituted
those processes. as part of my peculiar ownness, including
Accordingly this peculiar abstractive sense­ then the reduced "world," belonged to the con­
exclusion of what is alíen leaves us a kind of crete essence of the constituting subject as
"world" still, a Nature reduced to what is in­ an inseparable internal determination, then,
cluded in our owness and, as having its place in the Ego's self-explication, his peculiarly
in this Nature thanks to the bodily organism, own world would be found as "inside" and, on
the psychophysical Ego, with "body and soul" the other hand, when running through that
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 141

world straightforwardly, the Ego would find enon, "the Objective world," to what is includ­
himself as a member among its "externali­ ed in my peculiar ownness and take in addi­
ties" and' would distinguish between himself tion whatever else I find as peculiarly my own
and "the externa) world," (which can no longer contain anything "alien"
or "other," after that reduction), then ali this
§45. The transcendental ego, and self­ ownness of my ego is to be found again, in the
apperception as a psychophysical man reduced world-phenomenon, as the ownness
reduced to what is included in my of "my psyche," Here, however, as a compo­
ownness nent pertaining to my world-apperception, it
is something transcendentally secondary. Re­
These last meditations, like ali the others, stricting ourselves to the ultimate transcen­
have been carried on by us in the attitude that dental ego and the universe of what is consti­
effects transcendental reduction-carried on, tuted in him, we can say that a division of bis
that is to say, by me (the meditator) as tran­ whole transcendental field of experience be­
scendental ego. We now ask how I, the human longs to him immediately, namely the division
Ego reduced to what is purely my own and, into the sphere of bis ownness-with the co­
as thus reduced, included in the similarly re­ herent stratum consisting in bis experience of
duced world-phenomenon and, on the other a world reduced to what is included in bis
hand, I as transcendental ego are related to ownness (an experience in which everything
one another. The transcendental ego emerged "other" is "screened off')-and the sphere of
by virtue of my "parenthesizing" of the entire what is "other." Yet every consciousness of
Objective world and ali other (including ali what is other, every mode of appearance of it,
ideal) Objectivities, In consequence of this belongs in the former sphere. Whatever the
parenthesizing, I have become aware of my­ transcendental ego constitutes in that first
self as the transcendental ego, who constitutes stratum, whatever he constitutes as non-oth­
in bis constitutive life everything that is ever er, as bis "peculiarly own"-that indeed be­
Objective for me-the ego of all constitu­ longs to him as a component of his own con­
tions, who exists in bis actual and potential crete essence (as we shall show); it is insepa­
life-processes and Ego-habitualities and who rable from bis concrete being. Within and by
constitutes in them not only everything Objec­ means of this ownness the transcendental ego
tive but also himself as identical ego. We can constitutes, however, the "Objective" world,
say now: In that I, as this ego, have constitut­ as a universe of being that is other than him­
ed and am continually further constituting as a self-and constitutes, at the first level, the other
phenomenon (as a correlate) the world that ex­ in the mode: alter ego.
ists for me, I have carried out a mundanizing
self-apperception-under the title "Ego in the §46. Ownness as the sphere of the
usual sense"-in corresponding constitutive actualities and potentialities of the
syntheses and am maintaining a continuing stream of subjective processes
acceptance and further development of it. By
virtue of this mundanization everything in­ Up to now we have characterized the fun­
cluded in the ownness belonging to me tran­ damental concept of "my own" only indirect­
scendentally (as this ultimate ego) enters, as ly: as non-afien or non-other-a characteriza­
something psychic, into "my psyche." I find tion that is based on, and thus presupposes,
the mundanizing apperception; and now, from the concept of another ego. In order to clari­
the psyche as phenomenon and part of the fy the sense of this "my own" it is important,
phenomenon man, I can go back to the ali-in­ however, to bring out its positive characteris­
clusive absolute ego, the transcendental ego, tic, or the positive characteristic of "the ego
Therefore if I, as this ego, reduce my phenom- in bis ownness." This characteristic was mere-
 142 ESSENTJAL HUSSERL

ly indicated in the last sentences of the pre­ dictically given "I am" and its abiding identity
ceding section. with itself in the continuous unitary synthe­
As our point of departure !et us take some­ sis of original self-experience. Whatever is in­
thing more general. If a concrete object stands cluded in this identical being's own essence
out for us in experience as something partic­ is characterized as its actual or possible expli­
ular, and our attentively grasping regard then catum, as a respect in which I merely unfold
becomes directed to it, it becomes appropri­ my own identical being as what it, as identi­
ated in this simple grasping merely as "an un- cal, is in particular: it in itself.
. determined object of empírica! intuition." It Now the following is to be noted here .
becomes a determined object, and one under­ Though I speak rightly of self-perception, and
going further determination, in a continua­ indeed as regards my concrete ego, that is not
tion of the experience in the form of a deter­ to say that, like explication of a perceptually
mining experience, which at first unfolds given "visual thing," self-explication always
only what is included in the object itself: a goes on in particular perceptions, in the proper
pure explication. In its articulated synthetic sense, and accordingly yields just perceptual
course, on the basis of the object given as explicata and no others. After ali, when expli­
self-identical in a continuous intuitive syn­ cating the horizon of being that is included in
thesis of identification, this pure explication my own essence, one of the first things I run
unfolds, in a concatenation of particular in­ into is my immanent temporality and, with it,
tuitions the object's very own determinations, my existence in the form of an open infinite­
the "interna!" determinations. These present ness, that of a stream of subjective process­
themselves originaliter as determinations in es, and in the form of ali those "ownnesses"
which it, the Identical itself, is what it is and, of mine that are somehow included in the
moreover, exists in itself, "in and of itself'­ stream-one of which is my explicating. Since
determinations wherein its identical being be­ it goes on in the living present, self-explica­
comes explicated as the particulars making tion can find, strictly perceptively, only what
up its ownness: what it is, in particular. This is going on in the living present. In the most
own-essential content is only generally and original manner conceivable it uncovers my
horizonally anticipated beforehand; it then own past by means of recollections. Therefore,
becomes constituted originaliter-with the though I am continually given to myself origi­
sense: interna!, own-essential feature (specifi­ naliter and can explícate progressively what
cally, part or property)-by explication. is included in my own essence, this explica­
Let us apply this. When I am effecting tran­ tion is carried out largely in acts of conscious­
scendental reduction and reflecting on my­ ness that are not perceptions of the own-es­
self, the transcendental ego, I am given to my­ sential moments it discovers. Thus alone can
self perceptually as this ego-in a grasping my stream of subjective processes, the stream
perception. Furthermore I become aware that, in which I live as the identical Ego, become
although not grasped before this perception, I accessible to me: first of ali, in respect of its
was "already given," already there for myself actualities, and then in respect of the potenti­
continually as an object of original intuition alities that manifestly are likewise moments
(as perceived in the broader sense). But I am of my own essence. Ali possibilities of the
given, in any case, with an open infinite hori­ kind subsumed under the I "can" or "could
zon of still undiscovered interna! features of have" set this or that series of subjective pro­
my own. My own too is discovered by explica­ cesses going (including in particular: I can
tion and gets its original sense by virtue there­ look ahead or look back, I can penetrate and
of. lt becomes uncovered originaliter when uncover the horizon of my temporal being)­
my experiencing-explicating regard is direct­ all such possibilities manifestly belong to me
ed to myself, to my perceptually and even apo- as moments of my own essence.
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 143

In every case, however, explication is origi­ tive processes. Just as it comprises the consti­
nal if, precisely on the basis of original self­ tutive systems, it comprises the constituted
experience, it unfolds the experienced itself unities-but with a certain restriction. That is
and conters upon the experienced that self-giv­ to say: Where, and so far as, the constituted
enness which is, for it, the most original con­ unity is inseparable from the original constitu­
ceivable. The apodictic evidence of transcen­ tion itself, with the inseparableness that char­
dental self-perception (the apodictic evidence acterizes an immediate concrete oneness, not
of the "I am") extends into such explication, only the constitutive perceiving but also the
though with a previously stated restriction. In perceived existent belongs to my concrete
unqualifiedly apodictic evidence self-explica­ very-ownness.
tion brings out only the all-embracing struc­ That is not only the case with sensuous da­
tural forms in which I exist as ego-that is ta, which, taken as mere data of sensation, be­
to say: in which I exist with an essentially come constituted as peculiarly my own: as "im­
necessary all-inclusiveness and without which manent temporalities" within the limits of
I could not exist. They include (among others) my ego. lt is also the case with ali my habitu­
the mode of existence in the form of a certain alities, which are likewise peculiarly my own:
all-embracing life of sorne sort or other, that of the habitualities that begin with institutive
existence in the form of the continuous self­ acts of my own and become constituted as
constitution of that life's own processes, as abiding convictions in which / myself be­
temporal within an all-embracing time, and so come abidingly convinced of such and such,
forth. In this all-embracing apodictic a pri­ and by virtue of which I, as polar Ego (Ego in
ori, with its undetermined universality and, on the particular sense: mere Ego-pole), acquire
the other hand, its determinability, every ex­ determinations that are specifically Ego-deter­
plication of single egological data then par­ minations. But "transcendent objects" (for ex­
ticipates-for example: as a certain, albeit im­ ample: the objects of "externa[" sensuousness,
perfect, evidence contained in the recollection unities belonging to multiplicities of sensuous
of my own past. The participation in apodictic­ modes of appearance) also belong here: if I,
ity appears in the formal law (which is itself as ego, take into account just what is consti­
apodictic): So much illusion, so much being­ tuted actually originaliter as an appearing spa­
which is only covered up and falsified there­ tial object by my own sensuousness, my own
by and which therefore can be asked about, apperceptions, as itself concretely insepara­
sought, and (by following a predelineated way) ble from them. We see forthwith that the entire
found, even if only with approximation to its reduced "world," which we previously ob­
fully determined content. This fully determined tained by excluding the sense-components per­
content itself, with the sense of something taining to what is other or alien, belongs in
firmly identifiable again and again, in respect this sphere and is rightly included in the posi­
of ali its parts and moments, is an " idea," valid tively defined concrete make-up of the ego: as
a priori. something peculiarly his own. As soon as we
exclude from consideration the intentional ef­
§47. The intentional object a/so fects produced by "empathy," by our experi­
belongs to the ful/ monadic concretion ence of others, we have a Nature (including
of ownness. Immanent transcendence an anímate organism) that is constituted, to
and primordial world be sure, as a unity of spatial objects "transcend­
ing" the stream of subjective processes, yet
Manifestly (and this is of particular impor­ constituted as merely a multiplicity of ob­
tance) the own-essentially belonging to me as jects of possible experience-this experience
ego comprises more than merely the actuali­ being purely my own life, and what is experi­
ties and potentialities of the stream of subjec- enced in this experience being nothing more
144 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

than a synthetic unity inseparable from this tually existent for me-and, as that, not just
life and its potentialities. somehow meant but undergoing harmonious
In this manner it becomes clear that the verification in me-be anything else than, so
ego, taken concrete/y, has a universe oj what to speak, a point of intersection belonging to
is peculiar/y his own, which can be uncovered my constitutive synthesis? As concretely in­
by an original explication of his apodictic separable from my synthesis, is it peculiarly
"ego sum"-an explication that is itself apo­ my own? But even the possibility of a vagu­
dictic or at least predelineative of an apodic­ est, emptiest intending of something alien is
tic form. Within this "original sphere" (the problematic, if it is true that, essentially, every
sphere of original self-explication) we find al­ such mode of consciousness involves its pos­
so a "transcendent world," which accrues on sibilities of an uncovering of what is intend­
the basis of the intentional phenomenon, "Ob­ ed, its possibilities of becoming converted
jective world," by reduction to what is pecu­ into either fulfilling or disillusioning experi­
liarly the ego's own (in the positive sense, ences of what is meant, and moreover (as re­
which is now preferred). But, provided only that gards the genesis of the consciousness) points
they are subjected to our reduction to what is back to such experiences of the same intend­
included in the ego's ownness, all the corre­ ed object or a similar one.
sponding illusions, phantasies, "pure" possi­ The fact of experience of something alien
bilities, and eidetic objectivities, which offer (something that is not 1), is present as experi­
themselves as "transcendent," likewise belong ence of an Objective world and others in it (non­
in this domain-the domain of my peculiarly Ego in the form: other Ego); and an important
own essentiality, of what I am in myself, in result of the ownness-reduction performed on
my full concreteness or (as we may also say) these experiences was that it brought out a
what I am in myself as this monad. substratum belonging to them, an intentional
substratum in which a reduced "world" shows
§48. The transcendency of the Objec­ itself, as an "immanent transcendency." In
tive world as belonging to a leve! the order pertaining to constitution of a world
higher than that of primordial tran­ afien to my Ego-a world "externa!., to my own
scendency concrete Ego (but not at all in the natural spa­
tial sense)-that reduced world is the intrinsi­
That my own essence can be at all contrast­ cally first, the "primordial" transcendency (or
ed for me with something else, or that I (who "world"); and, regardless of its ideality as a
am 1) can become aware of someone else (who synthetic unity belonging to an infinite sys­
is not I but someone other than 1), presup­ tem of my potentialities, it is still a determin­
poses that not al! my own modes of conscious­ ing part of my own concrete being, the being
ness are modes of my self-consciousness. Since that belongs to me as concrete ego.
actual being is constituted originally by har­ lt must now be made understandable how,
moniousness of experience, my own self at the founded higher level, the sense-bestowal
must contain, in contrast to self-experience pertaining to transcendency proper, to consti­
and the system of its harmoniousness (the tutionally secondary Objective transcendency,
system, therefore, of self-explication into com­ comes about-and does so as an experience.
ponents of my ownness), yet other experi­ Here it is not a matter of uncovering a gene­
ences united in harmonious systems. And sis going on in time, but a matter of "static
now the problem is how we are to under­ analysis." The Objective world is constantly
stand the fact that the ego has, and can always there before me as already finished, a datum of
go on forming, in himself such intentionali­ my livingly continuous Objective experience
ties of a different kind, intentionalities with and, even in respect of what is no longer expe­
an existence-sense whereby he wholly tran­ rienced, something I go on accepting habitu­
scends his own being. How can something ac- ally. It is a matter of examining this experi-
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 145

ence itself and uncovering intentionally the ization <of constitutive intentionality>, the
manner in which it bestows sense, the manner transcendental intersubjectivity has an inter­
in whichit can occur as experience and become subjective sphere of ownness, in which it con­
verified as evidence relating to an actual exis­ stitutes the Objective world; and thus, as the
tent with an explicatable essence of its own, transcendencental "We," it is a subjectivity
which is not my own essence and has no place for this world and also for the world of men,
as a constituent part thereof, though it never­ which is the form in which it has made itself
theless can acquire sense and verification only Objectively actual. If, however, intersubjec­
in my essence. tive sphere of ownness and Objective world
are to be distinguished here, nevertheless, when
§49. Predelineation of the course to be I as ego take my stand on the basis of the in­
followed by intentional explication of tersubjectivity constituted from sources with­
experiencing what is other in my own essence, I can recognize that the
Objective world does not, in the proper sense,
Constitution of the existence-sense, "Ob­ transcend that sphere or that sphere's own
jective world," on the basis of my primordial intersubjective essence, but rather inheres in it
"world," involves a number of levels. As the as an "immanent" transcendency. Stated more
first of these, there is to be distinguished the precisely: The Objective world as an idea-the
constitutional leve! pertaining to the "other ideal correlate of an intersubjective (intersub­
ego" or to any "other egos" whatever-that is: jectively communalized) experience, which
to egos excluded from my own concrete be­ ideally can be and is carried on as constant­
ing (from me as the "primordial ego"). In con­ ly harmonious-is essentially related to inter­
nection with that and, indeed, motivated by subjectivity (itself constituted as having the
it, there occurs a universal super-addition of ideality of endless openness), whose compo­
sense to my primordial world, whereby the lat­ nent particular subjects are equipped with
ter becomes the appearance "of" a determi­ mutually corresponding and harmonious con­
nate "Objective" world, as the identical world stitutive systems. Consequently, the constitu­
for everyone, myself included. Accordingly tion of the world essentially involves a "har­
the intrinsicallyfirst other (the first "non-Ego") mony" of the monads: precisely this harmony
is the other Ego. And the other Ego makes among particular constitutions in the particu­
constitutionally possible a new infinite do­ lar monads; and accordingly it involves also
main of what is "other": an Objective Nature a harmonious generation that goes on in each
and a whole Objective world, to which ali oth­ particular monad. That is not meant, however,
er Egos and I myself belong. This constitution, as a "metaphysical" hypothesizing of monad­
arising on the basis of the "pure" others (the ic harmony, any more than the monads them­
other Egos who as yet have no worldly sense), selves are metaphysical inventions or hypoth­
is essentially such that the "others" -for-me do eses. On the contrary, it is itself part of the
not remain isolated; on the contrary, an Ego­ explication of the intentional components im­
community, which includes me, becomes con­ plicit in the fact of the experiential world that
stituted (in my sphere of ownness, naturally) exists for us. Here again it is to be noted that,
as a community of Egos existing with each as has been repeatedly emphasized, the ideas
other and for each other-ultimately a commu­ referred to are not phantasies or modes of the
nity of monads, which, moreover (in its com­ "as if," but arise constitutionally in integral
munalized intentionality) constitutes the one connection with all Objective experience and
identical world. In this world ali Egos again have their modes of legitimation and their de­
present themselves, but in an Objectivating velopment by scientific activity.
apperception with the sense "men" or "psy­ What we have just presented is a prelimi­
chophysical menas worldly Objects." nary view of the course to be followed, leve!
By virtue of the mentioned communal- by leve!, in the intentional explication that we
146 ESSENTJAL HUSSERL

must carry out, if we are to solve the transcen­ dial sphere. A certain mediacy of intentionali­
dental problem in the only conceivable way ty must be present here, going out from the
and actually execute the transcendental ideal­ substratum, "primordial world" (which in any
ism of phenomenology. case is the incessantly underlying basis) and
making present to consciousness a "there
too," which nevertheless is not itself there
The Appresentation of the and can never become an "itself-there." We
Other'' have here, accordingly, a kind of making "co­
present," a kind of "appresentation."
§50. The mediate intentionality of An appresentation occurs even in externa!
experiencing someone e/se, as "ap­ experience, since the strictly seen front of a
presentation" (analogical apperception) physical thing always and necessarily appre­
sents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more
After we have dealt with the prior stage, or less determínate content. On the other hand,
which is very important transcendentally­ experiencing someone else cannot be a mat­
namely, definition and articulation of the pri­ ter of just this kind of appresentation, which
mordial sphere-the genuine difficulties (and already plays a role in the constitution of pri­
in fact they are not inconsiderable) are occa­ mordial Nature: Appresentation of this sort
sioned by the first of the above-indicated steps involves the possibility of verification by a
toward constitution of an Objective world: corresponding fulfilling presentation (the back
the step taking us to the "other" ego. They lie, becomes the front); whereas, in the case of that
accordingly, in the transcendental clarifica­ appresentation which would lead over into
tion of experiencing "someone else"-in the the other original sphere, such verification
sense in which the other has not yet attained must be excluded a priori. How can appresen­
the sense "man." tation of another original sphere, and there­
Experience is original consciousness; and by the sense "someone else," be motivated in
in fact we generally say, in the case of experi­ my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as
encing a man: the other is himself there before experience-as the word "appresentation"
us "in person." On the other hand, this being (making intended as co-present) already indi­
there in person does not keep us from admit­ cates? Not every non-originary making-pres­
ting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither ent can do that. A non-originary making-pres­
the other Ego himself, nor his subjective pro­ ent can do it only in combination with an
cesses or his appearances themselves, nor originary presentation, an itself-giving prop­
anything else belonging to his own essence, er; and only as demanded by the originary
becomes given in our experience originally. If presentation can it have the character of ap­
it were, if what belongs to the other's own presentation-somewhat as, in the case of ex­
essence were directly accessible, it would be periencing a physical thing, what is there per­
merely a moment of my own essence, and ceptually motivates <belief in> something
ultimately he himself and I myself would be else being there too.
the same. The situation would be similar as re­ The perception proper that functions as
gards his animate organism, if the latter were the underlying basis is offered us by our per­
nothing else but the "body" that is a unity con­ ception of the primordial/y reduced world,
stituted purely in my actual and possible ex­ with its previously described articulation-a
periences, a unity belonging-as a product of perception going on continually within the
my "sensuousness" exclusively-in my primor- general bounds of the ego's incessant self-per-

*CM, pp. 108-131, 148-151 (Sections 50-56 and 62).

Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 147

ception. The problem now is: In the percep­ similarity connecting, within my primordial
tion of that reduced world, what in particular sphere, that body over there with my body can
must be of account here? How does the moti­ serve as the motivational basis for the "analo­
vation run? What becomes uncovered as in­ gizing" apprehension of that body as another
volved in the very complicated intentional animate organism.
performance of the appresentation, which There would be, accordingly, a certain as­
does in fact come about? similative apperception; but it by no means
Initial guidance can be furnished by the follows that there would be an inference from
verbal sense, an Other: an Other Ego. "Alter" analogy. Apperception is not inference, not a
signifies alter ego. And the ego involved here thinking act. Every apperception in which
is I myself, constituted within my primordial we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly
ownness, and uniquely, as the psychophysi­ grasp, objects given beforehand-for exam­
cal unity (the primordial man): as "personal" ple, the already-given everyday wodd-every
Ego, governing immediately in my animate apperception in which we understand their
organism (the only animate organism) and pro­ sense and its horizons forthwith, points back
ducing effects mediately in the primordial sur­ to a "primal instituting, " in which an object
rounding world; the subject, moreover, of a with a similar sense became constituted for
concrete intentional life, <and (?)> of a psy­ the first time. Even the physical things of this
chic sphere relating to himself and the "world." world that are unknown to us are, to speak
All of that-with the grouping under types generally, known in respect of their type. We
that arises in experiential life and the familiar have already seen like things befare, though
forms of flow and combination-is at our dis­ not precisely this thing here. Thus each every­
posal. As for the intentionalities by which it day experience involves an analogizing trans­
has become constituted (and they too are high­ fer of an originally instituted objective sense
ly complicated)-admittedly we have not in­ to a new case, with its anticipative apprehen­
vestigated them <in these meditations>. They sion of the object as having a similar sense.
belong to a distinct stratum and are the theme To the extent that there is givenness before­
of vast investigations into which we did not hand, there is such a transfer. At the same time,
and could not enter. that sense-component in further experience
Let us assume that another man enters our which proves to be actually new may function
perceptual sphere. Primordially reduced, that in turn as institutive and found a pregivenness
signifies: In the perceptual sphere pertaining that has a richer sense. The child who already
to my primordial Nature, a body is presented, sees physical things understands, let us say,
which, as primordial, is of course only a de­ for the first time the final sense of scissors;
termining part of myself: an "immanent trans­ and from now on he sees scissors at the first
cendency ." Since, in this N ature and this glance as scissors-but naturally not in an ex­
world, my animate organism is the only body plicit reproducing, comparing, and inferring.
that is or can be constituted originally as an Yet the manner in which apperceptions arise
anímate organism (a functioning organ), the -and consequently in themselves, by their
body over there, which is nevertheless appre­ sense and sense-horizon, point back to their
hended as an animate organism, must have de­ genesis-varies greatly. There are different
rived this sense by an apperceptive transfer levels of apperception, corresponding to dif­
from my anímate organism, and done so in a ferent layers of objective sense. Ultimately we
manner that excludes an actually direct, and always get back to the radical differentiation
hence primordial, showing of the predicates of apperceptions into those that, according to
belonging to an anímate organism specifical­ their genesis, belong purely to the primordial
ly, a showing of them in perception proper. lt sphere and those that present themselves with
is clear from the very beginning that only a the sense "alter ego" and, upan this sense, have
148 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

built a new one-thanks to a genesis at a high­ of whether they are noticed or unnoticed)­
er level. as data appearing with mutual distinctness,
theyfound phenomenologically a unity of simi­
§51. "Pairing" as an associatively larity and thus are always constituted precise­
constitutive component of my experi­ Iy as a pair. If there are more than two such
ence of someone e/se data, then a phenomenally unitary group, a plu­
rality, becomes constituted. On more precise
If we attempt to indicate the peculiar na­ analysis we find essentially present here an in­
ture of that analogizing apprehension where­ tentional overreaching, coming about geneti­
by a body within my primordial sphere, be­ cally (and by essential necessity) as soon as
ing similar to my own animate body, becomes the data that undergo pairing have become
apprehended as likewise an anímate organ­ prominent and simultaneously intended; we
ism, we encounter: first, the circumstance that find, more particularly, a living mutual awak­
here the primal/y institutive original is al­ ening and an overlaying of each with the ob­
ways living/y present, and the primal institut­ jective sense of the other. This overlaying can
ing itself is therefore always going on in a bring a total or a partial coincidence, which in
livingly effective manner; secondly, the pecu­ any particular instance has its degree, the lim­
liarity we already know to be necessary, name­ iting case being that of complete "likeness."
ly that what is appresented by virtue of the As the result of this overlaying, there takes
aforesaid analogizing can never attain actual place in the paired data a mutual transfer of
presence, never become an object of percep­ sense-that is to say: an apperception of each
tion proper. Closely connected with the first according to the sense of the other, so far as
peculiarity is the circumstance that ego and moments of sense actualized in what is ex­
alter ego are always and necessarily given in perienced do not annul this transfer, with the
an original "pairing. " consciousness of "different."
Pairing, occurence in configuration as a In that case of association and appercep­
pair and then as a group, a plurality, is a uni­ tion which particularly interests us-namely
versal phenomenon of the transcendental apperception of the alter ego by the ego-pair­
sphere (and of the parallel sphere of inten­ ing first comes about when the Other enters
tional psychology); and, we may add forth­ my field of perception. I, as the primordial
with, as far as a pairing is actually present, so psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in
far extends that remarkable kind of primal in­ my primordial field of perception, regardless
stituting of an analogizing apprehension-its of whether I pay attention to myself and tum
continuous primal institution in living actu­ toward myself with sorne activity or other. In
ality-which we have already stressed as the particular, my live body is always there and
first peculiarity of experiencing someone else. sensuously prominent; but, in addition to that
Hence it is not exclusively peculiar to this ex­ and likewise with primordial originariness, it
perience. is equipped with the specific sense of an ani­
First of ali, Jet us elucidate the essential mate organism. Now in case there presents it­
nature of any "pairing" (or any forming of a self, as outstanding in my primordial sphere,
plurality). Pairing is a primal form of that pas­ a body "similar" to mine-that is to say, a body
sive synthesis which we designate as "asso­ with determinations such that it must enter in­
ciation, " in contrast to passive synthesis of to a phenomenal pairing with mine-it seems
"identification." In a pairing association the clear without more ado that, with the trans­
characteristic feature is that, in the most primi­ fer of sense, this body must forthwith appro­
tive case, two data are given intuitionally, and priate from mine the sense: anímate organism.
with prominence, in the unity of a conscious­ But is the apperception actually so transpar­
ness and that, on this basis-essentially, al­ ent? Is it a simple apperception by transfer,
ready in pure passivity (regardless therefore Iike any other? What makes this organism
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 149

another's, rather than a second organism of perienced anímate organism of another con­
my own? Obviously what we designated as tinues to prove itself as actually an anímate
the secand fundamental characteristic of the organism, solely in its changing but incessant­
apperception in question plays a part here: ly harmonious "behavior." Such harmonious
that none of the appropriated sense specific to behavior (as having a physical side that indi­
an animate organism can become actualized cates something psychic appresentatively)
originarily in my primordial sphere. must present itself fulfillingly in original ex­
perience, and do so throughout the continu­
§52. Appresentation as a kind of ous change in behavior from phase to phase.
experience with its own style of The organism becomes experienced as a pseu­
veri-{ication do-organism, precisely if there is something
discordant about its behavior.
But now there arises for us the difficult prob­ The character of the existent "other" has its
lem of making it understandable that such an basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of
apperception is possible and need not be an­ what is not originally accessible. Whatever
nulled forthwith. How <loes it happen that, as can become presented, and evidently verified,
the fact tells us, the transferred sense is ap­ originally-is something / am; or else it be­
propriated with existence-status, as a set of longs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever,
"psychic" determinations existing in combina­ by virtue thereof, is experienced in that found­
tion with that body over there, even though they ed manner which characterizes a primordial­
can never show themselves as themselves in ly unfulfillable experience-an experience that
the domain of originality, belonging to the <loes not give something itself originally but
primordial sphere (which alone is available)? that consistently verifies something indicated­
Let us look at the intentional situation more is "other." It is therefore conceivable only as
closely. The appresentation which gives that an analogue of something included in my pe­
component of the Other which is not acces­ culiar ownness. Because of its sense-constitu­
sible originaliter is combined with an origin­ tion it occurs necessarily as an "intentional
al presentation ( of "his" body as part of the modification" of that Ego of mine which is the
Nature given as included in my ownness). In first to be Objectivated, or as an intentional
this combination, moreover, the Other's ani­ modification of my primordial "world": the
mate body and his governing Ego are given Other as phenomenologically a "modifica­
in the manner that characterizes a unitary tion" of myself (which, for its part, gets this
transcending experience. Every experience character of being "my" self by virtue of the
points to further experiences that would ful­ contrastive pairing that necessarily takes place).
fill and verify the appresented horizons, which It is clear that, with the other Ego, there is
include, in the form of non-intuitive antici­ appresented, in an analogizing modification,
pations, potentially verifiable syntheses of everything that belongs to his concretion: first,
harmonious further experience. Regarding ex­ his primordial world, and then his fully con­
perience of someone else, it is clear that its ful­ crete ego. In other words, another monad be­
fillingly verifying continuation can ensue only comes constituted appresentatively in mine.
by means of new appresentations that proceed Similarly (to draw an instructive compari­
in a synthetically harmonious fashion, and son), within my ownness and moreover with­
only by virtue of the manner in which these in the sphere of its living present, my past is
appresentations owe their existence-value to given only by memory and is characterized in
their motivational connection with the chang­ memory as my past, a past present-that is:
ing presentations proper, within my ownness, an intentional modification. The experiential
that continually appertain to them. verification of it, as a modification, then goes
As a suggestive clue to the requisite clari­ on necessarily in harmonious syntheses of
fication, this proposition may suffice: The ex- recollection; only thus <loes a past as such be-
150 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

come verified. Somewhat as my memorial the central "Here" as its mode of givenness;
past, as a modification of my living present, every other body, and accordingly the "oth­
"transcends" my present, the appresented oth­ er's" body, has the mode "There." This orien­
er being "transcends" my own being (in the tation, "There," can be freely changed by vir­
pure and most fundamental sense: what is in­ tue of my kinesthesias. Thus, in my primordial
cluded in my primordial ownness). In both sphere, the one spatial "Nature" is constitut­
cases the modification is inherent as a sense­ ed throughout the change in orientations, and
component in the sense itself; it is a correlate constituted moreover with an intentional re­
of the intentionality constituting it. Just as, in latedness to my anímate organism as func­
my living present, in the domain of " interna! tioning perceptually. Now the fact that my bodi­
perception," my past becomes constituted by ly organism can be (and is) apprehended as a
virtue of the harmonious memories occurring natural body existing and movable in space like
in this present, so in my primordial sphere, by any other is manifestly connected with the
means of appresentations occurring in it and possibility expressed in the words: By free
motivated by its contents, an ego other than modification of my kinesthesias, particularly
mine can become constituted-accordingly, in those of locomotion, I can change my posi­
non-originary presentations [in Vergegenwiir­ tion in such a manner that I convert any There
tigungen] of a new type, which have a modi­ into a Here-that is to say, I could occupy any
ficatum of a new kind as their correlate. To be spatial locus with my organism. This implies
sure, as long as I consider non-originary pre­ that, perceiving from there, I should see the
sentations <of something lying> within the same physical things, only in correspondingly
sphere of my ownness, the Ego in whom they different modes of appearance, such as per­
center is the one identical 1-myself. On the oth­ tain to my being there. It implies, then, that not
er hand, to everything alien (as long as it re­ only the systems of appearance that pertain to
mains within the appresented horizon of con­ my current perceiving "from here," but other
creteness that necessarily goes with it) centers quite determínate systems, corresponding to
in an appresented Ego who is not I myself but, the change of position that puts me "there," be­
relative to me, a modificatum: an other Ego. long constitutively to each physical thing. And
An actually sufficient explication of the noe­ the same in the case of every other "There."
matic complexes involved in experience of Should not these interconnections, or rath­
what is alien-such an explanation as is abso­ er these instances of belonging together, which
lutely necessary to a complete clarification of are involved in the primordial constitution of
what this experience does constitutively, by "my" Nature and are themselves character­
constitutive association-is not yet completed ized as associative-should not they be quite
with what has been shown up to now. There essential to clarification of the associative per­
is need of a supplement, in order to reach the formance, experiencing someone else? After
point where, on the basis of cognitions al­ ali, I do not apperceive the other ego simply as
ready acquired, the possibility and scope of a a duplicate of myself and accordingly as hav­
transcendental constitution of the Objective ing my original sphere or one completely like
world can become evident and transcendental­ mine. I do not apperceive him as having, more
phenomenological idealism can thus become particularly, the spatial modes of appearance
entirely manifest. that are mine from here; rather, as we find on
closer examination, I apperceive him as hav­
§53. Potentialities of the primordial ing spatial modes of appearance like those I
sphere and their constitutive function should have if I should go over there and be
in the apperception of the Other where he is. Furthermore the Other is appre­
sentatively apperceived as the "Ego" of a pri­
As reflexively related to itself, my anímate mordial world, and of a monad, wherein his
bodily organism (in my primordial sphere) has anímate organism is originally constituted and
Empathy and the Constitution o( the Other 151

experieqced in the mode of the absolute Here, therefore to be described as follows: With
precisely as the functional center for his gov­ the associative overlapping of the data found­
erning. In this appresentation, therefore, the ing the apperception, there takes place an as­
body in the mode There, which presents itself sociation at a higher level. If the one datum is
in my monadic sphere and is apperceived as a particular mode of appearance of an inten­
another's live body (the anímate organism of tional object, which is itself an index pointing
the alter ego)-that body indicates "the same" to an associatively awakened system of mani­
body in the mode Here, as the body experienced fold appearances wherein it would show it­
by the other ego in his monadic sphere. More­ self, then the other datum is "supplemented"
over it indicates the "same" body concretely, to become likewise an appearance of some­
with all the constitutive intentionality per­ thing, namely an analogous object. But it is not
taining to this mode of givenness in the oth­ as though the unity and multiplicity "thrust
er's experience. upon" the latter datum merely supplemented
it with modes of appearance taken from these
§54. Explicating the sense o( the others. On the contrary, the analogically ap­
appresentation wherein I experience prehended object and its indicated system of
someone else appearances are indeed analogically adapted
to the analogous appearance, which has awak­
Manifestly what has just now been brought ened this whole system too. Every overlap­
to light points to the course of the associa­ ping-at-a-distance, which occurs by virtue of
tion constituting the mode "Other." The body associative pairing, is at the same time afusion
that is a member of my primordial world (the and therein, so far as incompatibilities do not
body subsequently of the other ego) is for me interfere, an assimilation, an accommodation
a body in the mode There. lts manner of ap­ of the sense of the one member to that of the
pearance does not become paired in a direct other.
association with the manner of appearance If we return to our case, that of appercep­
actually belonging at the time to my anímate tion of the alter ego, it is now self-understood
organism (in the mode Here); rather it awak­ that what is appresented by the "body" over
ens reproductively another, an immediately there, in my primordial "surrounding world,"
similar appearance included in the system con­ is not something psychic ofmine, nor anything
stitutive of my anímate organism as a body else in my sphere of ownness. I am here so­
in space. It brings to rnind the way my body matically, the center of a primordial "world"
would look "if I were there." In this case too, oriented around me. Consequently my entire
although the awakening does not become a primordial ownness, proper to me as a mo­
memory intuition, pairing takes place. The nad, has the content of the Here-not the con­
first-awakened manner of appearance of my tent varying with sorne "I can and do," which
body is not the only thing that enters into a might set in, and belonging to sorne There or
pairing; my body itself does so likewise: as other; accordingly, not the content belonging
the synthetic unity pertaining to this mode, and to that definite There. Each of these contents
the many other familiar modes, of its appear­ excludes the other; they cannot both exist <in
ance. Thus the assimilative apperception be­ my sphere of ownness> at the same time. But,
comes possible and established, by which the since the other body there enters into a pair­
externa! body over there receives analogically ing association with my body here and, being
from mine the sense, anímate organism, and given perceptually, becomes the core of an ap­
consequently the sense, organism belonging to presentation, the core of my experience of a
another "world," analogous to my primordial coexisting ego, that ego, according to the
world. whole sense-giving course of the association.
The general style of this and every oth­ must be appresented as an ego now coexist­
er apperception that arises associatively is ing in the mode There, "such as I should be if I
152 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

were there." My own ego however, the ego their course in forms of their own, which I
given in constant self-perception, is actual can understand associatively on the basis of
now with the content belonging to his Here. my empirical familiarity with the style of my
Therefore an ego is appresented, as other than own life, as exemplifying roughly differenti­
mine. That which is primordially incompati­ ated typical forms. In this sphere, moreover,
ble, in simultaneous coexistence, becomes every successful understanding of what oc­
compatible: because my primordial ego con­ curs in others has the effect of opening up new
stitutes the ego who is other for him by an associations and new possibilities of under­
appresentative apperception, which, accord­ standing; and conversely, since every pairing
ing to its intrinsic nature, never demands and association is reciproca], every such under­
never is open to fulfillment by presentation. standing uncovers my own psychic life in its ·
Likewise easy to understand is the manner similarity and difference and, by bringing
in which, as the effective association goes new features into prominence, makes it fruit­
on continuously, such an appresentation of ful for new associations.
someone else continually fumishes new ap­
presentational contents-that is to say, brings §55. Establishment of the community
the changing contents of the other ego to of monads. The first form of Objectiv­
definite notice; and, on the other hand, the ity: intersubjective Nature
manner in which, by virtue of the combination
with a continua! presentation and the associa­ But it is more important to clarify the com­
tional demands expectantly addressed to this munity, developing at various levels, which is
presentation, a consistent confirmation becomes produced forthwith by virtue of experiencing
possible. The first determínate content obvi­ someone else: the comrnunity between me, the
ously must be formed by the understanding of primordial psychophysical Ego goveming in
the other's organism and specifically organ­ and by means of my primordial organism, and
ismal conduct: the understanding of the mem­ the appresentatively experienced Other; then,
bers as hands groping or functioning in push­ considered more concretely and radically, be­
ing, as feet functioning in walking, as eyes tween my monadic ego and his.
functioning in seeing, and so forth. With this The first thing constituted in the form of
the Ego at first is determined only as govem­ community, and the foundation far ali other
ing thus somatically [so leiblich waltendes] intersubjectively common things, is the com­
and, in a familiar manner, proves himself con­ monness of Nature, along with that of the Oth­
tinually, so far as the whole stylistic form of er's organism and his psychophysical Ego, as
the sensible processes manifest to me primor­ paired with my own psychophysical Ego.
dially must correspond to the form whose type Since other subjectivity, by appresentation
is familiar from my own organismal govem­ within the exclusive own-essentialness of my
ing {leibliches Walten]. It is quite comprehen­ subjectivity, arises with the sense and status
sible that, as a further consequence, an "em­ of a subjectivity that is other in its own es­
pathizing" of definite contents belonging to sence, it might at first seem to be a mystery
the "higher psychic sphere" arises. Such con­ how comrnunity--even the first community, in
tents too are indicated somatically and in the the form of a common world-becomes estab­
conduct of the organism toward the outside lished. The other organism, as appearing in
world-for example: as the outward conduct my primordial sphere, is first of all a body in
of someone who is angry or cheerful, which I my primordial Nature, which is a synthetic
easily understand from my own conduct un­ unity belonging to me and therefore, as a de­
der similar circumstances. Higher psychic oc­ termining part included in my own essence, in­
currences, diverse as they are and familiar separable from me myself. If that body func­
as they have become, have furthermore their tions appresentatively, then, in union with it,
style of synthetic interconnections and take the other Ego becomes an object of my con-
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 153

sciousness-and primarily the other Ego Therefore, in the object of such a presen­
with his,organism, as given to him in the man­ tive-appresentive perception (an object mak­
ner of appearance pertaining to bis "absolute ing its appearance in the mode, itself-there),
Here." How can I speak at ali of the same body, we must distinguish noematically between
as appearing within my primordial sphere in that part which is genuinely perceived and the
the mode There and within his and to him in rest, which is not strictly perceived and yet is
the mode Here? These two primordial spheres, indeed there too. Thus every perception of this
mine which is for me as ego the original sphere, type is transcending: it posits more as itself­
and his which is for me an appresented sphere there than it makes "actually" present at any
-are they not separated by an abyss I cannot time. Every externa! perception belongs here­
actually cross, since crossing it would mean, for example, perception of a house (front­
after ali, that I acquired an original (rather than rear); but at bottom absolutely every percep­
an appresenting) experience of someone else? tion, indeed every evidence, is thus described
If we stick to our de facto experience, our ex­ in respect of a most general feature, provided
perience of someone else as it comes to pass only that we understand "presenting" in a
at any time, we find that actually the sensuous­ broader sense.
ly seen body is experienced forthwith as the Let us apply this general cognition to the
body of someone else and not as merely an in­ case of experiencing someone else. In this
dication of someone else. Is not this fact an case too it should be noted that experience can
enigma? appresent only because it presents, that here
The body belonging to my original sphere too appresentation can exist only in the afore­
and the body constituted, after ali, quite sepa­ said functional community with presentation.
rately in the other ego become identified and That implies, however, that, from the very be­
are called the identical body of someone else. ginning, what this experience presents must
How does this identification come about? belong to the unity of the very object appre­
How can it come about? But the enigma ap­ sented. In other words: It is not, and cannot
pears only if the two original spheres have al­ be, the case that the body belonging to my pri­
ready been distinguished-a distinction that mordial sphere and indicating to me the oth­
already presupposes that experience of some­ er Ego (and, with him, the whole of the other
one else has done its work. Since we are not primordial sphere or the other concrete ego)
dealing here with a temporal genesis of such could appresent his factual existence and be­
experience, on the basis of a temporally ante­ ing-there-too, unless this primordial body ac­
cedent self-experience, manifestly only a pre­ quired the sense, "a body belonging to the other
cise explication of the intentionality actually ego," and, according to the whole associative­
observable in our experience of someone else apperceptive performance, the sense: "some­
and discovery of the motivations essentially one else 's animate organism itself." Therefore
implicit in that intentionality can unlock the it is not as though the body over there, in my
enigma. primordial sphere, remained separate from
As we said once before, appresentation as the anímate bodily organism of the other Ego,
such presupposes a core of presentation. It is as if that body were something like a signa!
a making present combined by associations for its analogue (by virtue of an obviously in­
with presentation, with perception proper, but conceivable motivation); it is not as though
a making present that is fused with the latter consequently, with the spreading of the asso­
in the particular function of "co-perception." ciation and appresentation, my primordial Na­
In other words, the two are so fused that they ture and the other's appresented primordial
stand within the functional community of one Nature-therefore my concrete ego and the
perception, which simultaneously presents and other concrete ego-remained separate. On the
appresents, and yet fumishes for the total ob­ contrary, this natural body belonging to my
ject a consciousness of its being itself there. sphere appresents the other Ego, by virtue of
154 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

the pairing association with my bodily or­ ture and this other as modes of appearance
ganism, and with my Ego governing in my or­ of the same Objective Nature. On the contrary,
ganism, within my primordially constituted the identity-sense of "my" primordial Nature
Nature. In so doing, it appresents first of ali and the presentiated other primordial Nature
the other Ego's governing in this body, the is necessarily produced by the appresentation
body over there, and mediately his governing and the unity that it, as appresentation, neces­
in the Nature that appears to him perceptual­ sarily has with the presentation co-function­
ly-identically the Nature to which the body ing for it-this appresentation by virtue of
over there belongs, identically the Nature that which an Other and, consequently, his con­
is my primordial Nature. lt is the same Nature, crete ego are there for me in the first place.
but in the mode of appearance: "as if I were Quite rightly, therefore, we speak of perceiv­
standing over there, where the Other's body is." ing someone else and then of perceiving the
The body is the same, given to me as the body Objective world, perceiving that the other Ego
there, and to him as the body here, the central and I are looking at the same world, and so
body. Furthermore, "my" whole Nature is the forth-though this perceiving goes on exclu­
same as the Other's. In my primordial sphere it sively within the sphere of my ownness. That
is constituted as an identical unity of my mani­ <loes not at all contravene the fact that the
fold modes of givenness-an identical unity in intentionality of this sphere transcends my
changing orientations around my animate or­ ownness, or the fact that accordingly my ego
ganism (the zero body, the body in the abso­ constitutes in himself another ego-and con­
lute Here), an identical unity of even richer stitutes this ego, moreover, as existent. What I
multiplicities that, as changing modes of ap­ actually see is not a sign and not a mere ana­
pearance pertaining to different "senses," or logue, a depiction in any natural sense of the
else as changeable "perspectives," belong to word; on the contrary, it is someone else. And
each particular orientation as here or there what is grasped with actual originariness in this
and also, in a quite particular manner, belong seeing-namely that corporeality over there,
to my anímate organism, which is inseparable or rather only one aspect of its surface-is
from the absolute Here. Ali of this has for me the Other's body itself, but seen just from
the originality of something included in my my position and in respect of this aspect: Ac­
particular ownness, something directly acces­ cording to the sense-constitution involved in
sible in original explication of my own self. In perceiving someone else, what is grasped ori­
the appresented other ego the synthetic sys­ ginaliter is the body of a psyche essentially
tems are the same, with all their modes of ap­ inaccessible to me originaliter, and the two
pearance, accordingly with ali the possible per­ are comprised in the unity of one psycho­
ceptions and the noematic contents of these: physical reality.
except that the actual perceptions and the On the other hand, it is implicit in the in­
modes of givenness actualized therein, and al­ tentional essence of this perception of the
so in part the objects actually perceived, are Other-the Other who exists henceforth, as I
not the same; rather the objects perceived are do myself, within what is henceforth the Ob­
precisely those perceivable from there, andas jective world-that I as perceiver can find the
they are perceivable from there. Something aforesaid distinction between my primordial
similar is true of anything else of my own and sphere and the merely presentiated primordi­
the corresponding alien thing, even where ori­ al sphere of the Other, and consequently can
ginal explication does not go on in percep­ trace the peculiarities of the division into
tions. I do not have an appresented second ori­ two noetic strata and explicate the complexes
ginal sphere with a second "Nature" and, in this of associative intentionality. The experiential
Nature, a second animate bodily organism (the phenomenon, Objective Nature, has, besides
one belonging to the other ego himself), so that the primordially constituted stratum, a super­
I must then ask how I can apprehend my Na- imposed second, merely appresented stratum
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 155

originating from my experiencing of some­ a higher level of phenomenological analysis

one else; and this fact concerns, first of ali, of the constitutional origin of the Objective
the Other's anímate bodily organism, which is, world-as the Objective world existing for us
so to speak, the intrinsically first Object, just and only by virtue of our own sense-producing
as the other man is constitutionally the intrin­ sources, a world that can have neither sense
sically first <Objective> man. In the case of nor existence for us otherwise. The Objective
this primal phenomenon of Objectivity, the world has existence by virtue of a harmonious
situation is already clear to us: If I screen off confirmation of the apperceptive constitution,
my experience of someone else, I have the low­ once this has succeeded: a confirmation there­
est constitution, the one-layered presentive of by the continuance of experiencing life with
constitution of the other body within my pri­ a consistent harmoniousness, which always
mordial sphere; if I add that experience, I have becomes re-established as extending through
appresentationally, and as coinciding syntheti­ any "corrections" that may be required to
cally with the presentational stratum, the that end. Now harmoniousness is preserved al­
same anímate organism as it is given to the oth­ so by virtue of a recasting of apperceptions
er Ego himself, and I have the further possi­ through distinguishing between normality
ble modes of givenness available to him. and abnormalities (as modifications thereof),
From that, as is easily understandable, ev­ or by virtue of the constitution of new unities
e ry natural Object experienced or experi­ throughout the changes involved in abnormali­
enceable by me in the lower stratum receives ties. Among the problems of abnormality the
an appresentational stratum (though by no problem of non-human animality and that of
means one that becomes explicitly intuited), the levels of "higher and lower" brutes are in­
a stratum united in an identifying synthesis cluded. Relative to the brute, man is, constitu­
with the stratum given to me in the mode of tionally speaking, the normal case-just as I
primordial originality: the same natural Object myself am the primal norm constitutionally
in its possible modes of givenness to the oth­ for ali other men. Brutes are essentially consti­
er Ego. This is repeated, mutatis mutandis, in tuted for me as abnormal "variants" of my hu­
the case of subsequently constituted mundani­ manness, even though among them in turn
ties of the concrete Objective world as it al­ normality and abnormality may be differenti­
ways exists for us: namely as a world of men ated. Always it is a matter of intentional modi­
and culture. fications in the sense-structure itself, as what
The following should be noted in this con­ becomes evinced. All of that, to be sure, needs
nection. lt is implicit in the sense of my suc­ a more thorough phenomenological explica­
cessful apperception of others that their world, tion. This general account, however, is enough
the world belonging to their appearance­ for our present purposes.
systems, must be experienced forthwith as After these clarifications it is no longer an
the same as the world belonging to my appear­ enigma how I can constitute in myself anoth­
ance-systems; and this involves an identity of er Ego or, more radically, how I can constitute
our appearance-systems. Now we know very in my monad another monad, and can experi­
well that there are such things as "abnormali­ ence what is constituted in me as nevertheless
ties" (for example: in the case of subjects who other than me. At the same time, this being in­
are blind or deaf); we know that therefore the deed inseparable from such constitution, it is
appearance-systems are by no means always no longer an enigma how I can identify a Na­
absolutely identical and that whole strata ture constituted in me with a Nature constitut­
(though not all strata) can differ. But abnormal­ ed by someone else (or, stated with the neces­
ity must first be constituted as such; and the sary precision, how I can identify a Nature
constituting of abnormality is possible only on constituted in me with one constituted in me
the basis of an intrinsically antecedent normal­ as a Nature constituted by someone else). This
ity. This points to new tasks, which belong to identification is no greater enigma than any
156 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

other synthetic identification. It is therefare tuted)-from my living present into my cur­

no more mysterious than any, by virtue of rently relevant separate pasts and thus makes
which, as an identification confined to my a connection between my present and these
own original sphere, no matter what objec­ pasts. With that, moreover, the supremely
tive unity acquires sense and being far me significant transcendental problem of ideal
through the medium of presentiations. Let us objectivities ("ideal" in the specific sense) is
consider the fallowing instructive example solved. Their supertemporality turns out to
and use it to bring out a thought that takes be omnitemporality, as a correlate of free
us further: the notion of a connection consti­ produceability and reproduceability at ali
tuted through the medium of presentiation. times. After constitution of the Objective
How does one of my own subjective proces­ world with its Objective time and its Objec­
ses acquire far me the sense and status of an tive men as possible thinking subjects, that
existent process, something existing with its obviously carries over to ideal structures, as
identical temporal form and identical tempo­ themselves Objectivated, and to their Objec­
ral content? The original is gane; but, in re­ tive omnitemporality. Thus the contrast be­
peated presentiations, I go back to it and do tween them and Objective realities, as spa­
so with the evidence: "I can always do so tiotemporally individuated structures, be­
again." But these repeated presentiations are comes understandable.
evidently themselves a temporal sequence; If we retum now to our case, the experience
and each is separate from the others. In spite of someone else, we find that, with its compli­
of that, however, an identifying synthesis con­ cated structure, it effects a similar connection
nects them in the evident consciousness of mediated by presentiation: namely a connec­
"the Same"-which implies the same, never tion between, on the one hand, the uninterrupt­
repeated temporal farm, filled with the same edly living self-experience (as purely passive
content. Here, as everywhere else, "the Same" original self-appearance) of the concrete ego
signifies therefare an identical intentional -accordingly, his primordial sphere-and, on
object of separate conscious processes, hence the other hand, the afien sphere presentiat­
an object immanent in them only as some­ ed therein. lt effects this, first, by its identify­
thing non-really inherent. Another case, very ing synthesis of the primordially given ani­
important in itself, is that of the constitution mate body of someone else and the same aní­
of objects that are ideal in the pregnant sense mate body, but appresented in other modes of
-far example: ali logically ideal objects. In appearance, and secondly, spreading out from
a living, many-membered thinking action I there, by its identifying synthesis of the same
produce a structure: a theorem or a numerical Nature, given and verified primordially (with
structure. Subsequently I repeat the producing, pure sensuous originality) and at the same time
while recollecting my earlier producing. At appresentationally. In that way the coexis­
once, and by essential necessity, an identify­ tence of my <polar> Ego and the other Ego,
ing synthesis takes place; furthermore a new of my whole concrete ego and his, my inten­
identifying synthesis occurs with each addi­ tional life and his, my "realities" and his-in
tional repetition (a repetition perfarmed with short, a common time-form-is primally insti­
a consciousness that the producing can be re­ tuted; and thus every primordial temporality
peated again at will): lt is identically the same automatically acquires the significance of be­
proposition, identically the same numerical ing merely an original mode of appearance
structure, but repeatedly produced or, this of Objective temporality to a particular sub­
being equivalent, repeatedly made evident. ject. In this connection we see that the tempo­
Therefare in this case, through the medium ral community of the constitutively interrelat­
of recollective presentiations, the synthesis ed monads is indissoluble, because it is tied
extends-within my stream of subjective up essentially with the constitution of a world
processes (which always is already consti- anda world time.
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 157

§56. Constitution of higher levels of tution of an Objective world, starting from

inter_monadic community the primordial world, have been sufficiently
clarified, the higher levels offer relatively mi­
With these considerations we have clari­ nor difficulties. Though comprehensive inves­
fied the first and lowest leve/ of communaliza­ tigations and a progressive differentiation of
tion between me, the primordial monad for problems relating to these levels are neces­
myself, and the monad constituted in me, yet sary for purposes of an all-round explication,
as other and accordingly as existing for him­ here we can be satisfied with rough general
self but only appresentationally demonstrable indications, easily understandable on the basis
to me. The only conceivable manner in which already laid. Starting from me, from the one
others can have for me the sense and status of who is constitutionally the primal monad, I
existent others, thus and so determined, con­ acquire what are for me other monads and,
sists in their being constituted in me as others. correlatively, others as psychophysical sub­
If they get that sense and status from sources jects. This implies that I do not acquire the lat­
that yield a continua! confirmation, then they ter mere/y as over against me somatically and
do indeed exist (as I am compelled to say), but -by virtue of associative pairing-as related
exclusively as having the sense with which back to my psychophysical existence (which
they are constituted: as monads, existing for indeed is universally "central," and particu­
themselves precisely as I exist for myself, yet larly the "central member" in the communal­
existing also in communion, therefore (1 em­ ized world of the present level because of
phasize the expression already used earlier) in the necessarily oriented manner in which this
connection with me qua concrete ego, qua world is given). On the contrary (and this car­
monad. To be sure, they are separate from my ries over to the sociality of brute animals), in
monad, so far as really inherent constituents the sense of a community of men and in that
are concerned, since no really inherent con­ of man-who, even as solitary, has the sense:
nection leads from their subjective processes member of a community-there is implicit a
to my subjective processes or from anything mutual being far one another, which entails
included in their peculiar ownness to anything an Objectivating equalization of my existence
included in mine. To that separation there cor­ with that of ali others-consequently: I or
responds, after all, the "real," the mundane anyone else, as a man among other men. If,
separation of my psychophysical existence with my understanding of someone else, I
from someone else's, a separation that shows penetrate more deeply into him, into his hori­
itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character zon of ownness, I shall soon run into the fact
of our Objective anímate organisms. On the that, just as his anímate bodily organism lies
other hand, this original communion is not in my field of perception, so my anímate or­
just nothing. Whereas, really inherently, each ganism lies in his field of perception and that,
monad is an absolutely separate unity, the in general, he experiences me forthwith as
"irreal" intentional reaching of the other into an Other for him, just as I experience him as
my primordiality is not irreal in the sense of my Other. Likewise I shall find that, in the case
being dreamt into it or being present to con­ of a plurality of Others, they are experienced
sciousness after the fashion of a mere phan­ also by one another as Others, and consequent­
tasy. Something that exists is in intentional com­ ly that I can experience any given Other not
munion with something else that exists. lt is an only as himself an Other but also as related in
essentially unique connectedness, an actual turn to his Others and perhaps-with a medi­
community and precisely the one that makes atedness that may be conceived as reiterable
transcendentally possible the being of a world, -related at the same time to me. lt is also clear
a world of men and things. that men become apperceivable only as find­
After the first level of communalization and ing Others and still more Others, not just in
(this being almost equivalent) the first consti- the realm of actuality but likewise in the
158 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

realm of possibility, at their own pleasure. let ourselves be guided, the objection to
Openly endless Nature itself then becomes a our phenomenology, so far as, from the
Nature that includes an open plurality of men very beginning, it claimed to be transcenden­
(conceived more generally: animalia), distrib­ tal philosophy and, as such, to have the ability
uted one knows not how in infinite space, as to solve the problems that concem the possi­
subjects of possible intercommunion. To this bility of Objective knowledge. The objection
community there naturally corresponds, in runs as follows. Starting from the transcen­
transcendental concreteness, a similarly open dental ego of the phenomenological reduction
community of monads, which we designate as and thenceforth restricted to him, phenome­
transcendental intersubjectivity. We need nology is incapable of solving those problems.
hardly say that, as existing for me, it is consti­ Without admitting that it <loes so, it lapses in­
tuted purely within me, the meditating ego, to a transcendental solipsism; and the whole
purely by virtue of sources belonging to my step leading to other subjectivity and to genu­
intentionality; nevertheless it is constituted ine Objectivity is possible only by virtue of an
thus as a community constituted also in every unacknowledged metaphysics, a concealed
other monad (who, in tum, is constituted with adoption of Leibnizian traditions.
the modification: "other") as the same com­ Our actual explications have dissipated
munity-only with a different subjective mode the objection as groundless. The following is
of appearance-and as necessarily bearing to be noted above ali. At no point was the tran­
within itself the same Objective world. Mani­ scendental attitude, the attitude of transcen­
festly it is essentially necessary to the world dental epoché, abandoned; and our "theory" of
constituted transcendentally in me (and simi­ experiencing someone else, our "theory" of ex­
larly necessary to the world constituted in any periencing others, did not aim at being and
community of monads that is imaginable by was not at liberty to be anything but explica­
me) that it be a world of men and that, in each tion of the sense, "others," as it arises from
particular man, it be more or less perfectly the constitutive productivity of that experi­
constituted intrapsychically-in intentional encing: the sense, "truly existing others," as it
processes and potential systems of intention­ arises from the corresponding harmonious
ality, which, as "psychic life," are themselves syntheses. What I demonstrate to myself har­
already constituted as existing in the world. moniously as "someone else" and therefore
By "the psychic constitution of the Objective have given to me, by necessity and not by
world" we mean, for example, my actual and choice, as an actuality to be acknowledged, is
possible experience of the world, as an experi­ eo ipso the existing Other for me in the tran­
ence belonging to me, the Ego who experi­ scendental attitude: the alter ego demon­
ences himself as a man. Such experience of strated precisely within the experiencing in­
the world is more or less perfect; it always tentionality of my ego. Within the bounds of
has its open undetermined horizon. For each positivity we say and find it obvious that, in
man, every other is implicit in this horizon­ my own experience, I experience not only
physically, psychophysically, in respect of myself but others-in the particular form: ex­
what is interna) to the other's psyche-and is periencing someone else. The indubitable tran­
thus in principie a realm of endless accessi­ scendental explication showed us not only
bilities, though in fact most other men remain that this positive statement is transcendentally
horizonal. legitimate but also that the concretely appre­
hended transcendental ego (who first becomes
§62. Survey of our intentional explica­ aware of himself, with his undetermined hori­
tion of experiencing someone else zon, when he effects transcendental reduction)
grasps himself in his own primordial being,
Let us return now, at the conclusion of this and likewise (in the form of his transcenden­
chapter, to the objection by which at first we tal experience of what is alien) grasps others:
Empathy and the Constitution of the Other 159

other transcendental egos, though they are own likewise receives existential sense-and
given, not originaliter and in unqualifiedly does so as something appresented analogical­
apodictic evidence, but only in an evidence ly. Therefore at the beginning I, the meditat­
belonging to "extemal" experience. "In" my­ or, do not understand how I shall ever attain
self I experience and know the Other; in me others and myself <as one among others>, since
he becomes constituted-appresentatively mir­ ali other men are "parenthesized." At bottom
rored, not constituted as the original. Hence it moreover Ido not yet understand, and I recog­
can very well be said, in a broadened sense, nize only reluctantly, that, when I "parenthe­
that the ego acquires-that I, as the one who size" myself qua man and qua human person,
meditatingly explicates, acquire by "self-ex­ I myself am nevertheless to be retained qua
plication" (explication of what I find in my­ ego. Thus I can as yet know nothing about a
self) every transcendency: as a transcenden­ transcendental intersubjectivity; involutarily I
tally constituted transcendency and not as a take myself, the ego, to be a solus ipse and still
transcendency accepted with naive positivity. regard ali constitutional components as mere­
Thus the illusion vanishes: that everything /, ly contents of this one ego, even after I have
qua transcendental ego, know as existing in con­ acquired an initial understanding of constitu­
sequence of myself, and explícate as constitut­ tive performances. The further explications
ed in myself, must belong to me as part of my made in the present chapter were therefore
own essence. This is true only of "immanent necessary. Thanks to them, the ful! and prop­
transcendencies." As a title for the systems of er sense of phenomenological transcenden­
synthetic actuality and potentiality that confer tal "idealism" becomes understandable to us
sense and being on me as ego in my own es­ for the first time. The illusion of a solipsism is
sentialness, constitution signifies constitution dissolved, even though the proposition that
of immanent objective actuality. At the start of everything existing for me must derive its ex­
phenomenology, when my attitude is that of istential sense exclusively from me myself,
someone who is only starting, who is institut­ from my sphere of consciousness retains its
ing phenomenological reduction for the first validity and fundamental importance. Phe­
time, as a universal condition under which to nomenological transcendental idealism has
pursue constitutional research, the transcen­ presented itself as a monadology, which, de­
dental ego who comes into view is, to be sure, spite ali our deliberate suggestions of Leib­
grasped apodictically-but as having a quite niz's metaphysics, draws its content purely
undetermined horizon, a horizon restricted on­ from phenomenological explication of the
ly by the general requirement that the world transcendental experience laid open by tran­
and ali I know about it shall become a mere scendental reduction, accordingly from the
"phenomenon." Consequently, when I am start­ most originary evidence, wherein ali conceiv­
ing in this manner, ali those distinctions are able evidences must be grounded-or from
lacking which are made only subsequently by the most originary legitimacy, which is the
intentional explication but which nevertheless source of ali legitimacies and, in particular, ali
(as I now see) pertain to me essentially. There legitimacies of knowledge. Actually, there­
is lacking, above ali, self-understanding with fore, phenomenological explication is noth­
respect to my primordial essence, my sphere ing like "metaphysical construction"; and it is
of ownness in the pregnant sense, and with neither overtly nor covertly a theorizing with
respect to what, within that sphere itself, be­ adopted presuppositions or helpful thoughts
comes constituted as an Other in experiencing drawn from the historical metaphysical tradi­
someone else, as something appresented but tion. It stands in sharpest contrast to ali that,
essentially non-given (and never to become because it proceeds within the limits of pure
given) within my primordial sphere. I must "intuition," or rather of pure sense-explication
first explicate my own as such, in arder to un­ based on a fulfilling givenness of the sense it­
derstand that, within my own, what is not my self. Particularly in the case of the Objective
160 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

world of realities (as well as in the case of ly gets solely from our experience-a sense
each ofthe many ideal Objective worlds, which which philosophy can uncover but never alter,
are the fields ofpurely a priori sciences)-and and which, because of an essential necessity,
this cannot be emphasized often enough­ not because of our weakness, entails (in the
phenomenological explication does nothing case of any actual experience) horizons that
but explicate the sense this world has for us need fundamental clarification.
ali, prior to any philosophizing, and obvious-
PARTTWO
Transcendental Phenomenology and the
Problem of the Life-World
Edmund Husserl, 1905. Courtesy of Husserl-Archief te Leuven.
 VII.
Transcendental Aesthetics

10. Perception, Spatiality, and the Body

Objective Reality, Spatial Orien­ givenness of a thing, a givenness in which

tation, and the Body�· the thing exhibits its actual reality. We need
only consider how a thing exhibits itself as
such, according to its essence, in order to rec­
§ 18. The subjectively conditíoned
ognize that such an apprehension must con­
factors of the constitution o{ the thing;
tain, at the very outset, components which re­
the constitution of the Objective
fer back to the subject, specifically the human
material thíngf
(or, better: animal) subject in a fixed sense.
Our entire analysis has been moving in a The qualities of material things as aestheta,
determínate narrow frame, the limits of which such as they present themselves to me intu­
we must fix. The real unity, which was consti­ itively, prove to be dependent on my qualities,
tuted for us in levels, has nevertheless, ,;,,ith the make-up of the experiencing subject, and
ali these levels, not reached the ultimate one, to be related to my Body and my "normal sen­
the leve! on which the Objective material sibility."
thing is actually constituted. What it is that The Body is, in the first place, the medium
we have described is the thing constituted in of ali perception; it is tbe organ of perception
the continuous-unitary manifold of the sense and is necessarily involved in all perception.
intuitions of an experiencing Ego or in the In seeing, the eyes are directed upon the seen
manifold of "sense-things" of various leve! and run over its edges, surfaces, etc. When it
multiplicities of schematic unities, of real touches objects, the hand slides over them.
states and real unities on various levels. It is Moving myself, I bring my ear closer in or­
tbe thing for the solitary subject, the subject der to bear. Perceptual apprehension presup­
thought of ideally as isolated, except that this poses sensation-contents, which play their
subject in a certain sense remains forgotten necessary role for the constitution of the sebe­
to itself and equally forgotten by tbe one mata and, so, for the constitution of the appear­
who is doing the analysis. ances of the real things themselves. To the pos­
sibility of experience there pertains, however,
A) THE fNTUITTVE QUAUT!ES OF THE
the spontaneity of the courses of presenting
MATERIAL THING IN THEIR DEPENDENCIES
acts of sensation, which are accompanied by
O THE EXPERIE CING SUBJECT-BODY
series of kinesthetic sensations and are de­
pendent on them as motivated: given with the
Nevertheless, this seif-forgetfulness is hard- localization of the kinesthetic series in the
ly appropriate for the restoration of the full relevant moving member of the Body is the

*Ideas 11, pp. 60-70, 82-95 (Seclions 18a-b and 18e-h). The term "Body" (with capital B) translates German Leib
.
hved-body; the term "body" (lower case b) translates German Korper, physical body. -Editor's note.
tConcermng this paragraph, see also the third chapter of Section Two.
164 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

fact that in ali perception and perceptual ex­ roughness-sensations, and corporeal warmth
hibition ( experience) the Body is involved as appears in relation to the sensation of warmth,
freely moved sense organ, as freely moved to­ etc.
tality of sense organs, and hence there is also The second kind are the "sensations" which
given the fact that, on this original founda­ do not undergo such apprehensions but which,
tion, all that is thingly-real in the surrounding on the other hand, are necessarily involved in
world of the Ego has its relation to the Body. all those apprehensions of the sensations of
Furthermore, obviously connected with the first kind, insofar as, in a certain way, they
this is the distinction the Body acquires as motivate those apprehensions and thereby
the bearer of the zero point of orientation, the themselves undergo an apprehension of a com­
bearer of the here and the now, out of which pletely different type, an apprehension which
the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world thus belongs correlatively to every constitut­
of the senses. Thus each thing that appears ing apprehension. In all constitution and on ali
has eo ipso an orienting relation to the Body, levels, we have, by necessity, "circumstances,"
and this refers not only to what actually ap­ related one to the other, and "that which is de­
pears but to each thing that is supposed to be pendent on" ali the circumstances: everywhere,
able to appear. If I am imagining a centaur I we find the "if-then" or the "because-there­
cannot help but imagine it as in a certain ori­ fore." Those sensations whicb undergo exten­
entation and in a particular relation to my sional apprehension (leading to the extended
sense organs: it is "to the right" of me; it is features of the thing) are motivated as regards
"approaching" me or "moving away"; it is "re­ the courses they take either actually or possi­
volving," tuming toward or away from "me" bly and are apperceptively related to motivat­
-from me, i.e., from my Body, from my eye, ing series, to systems, of kinesthetic sensations,
which is directed at it. In phantasy, I do look which freely unfold in the nexus of their fa­
at the centaur; i.e., my eye, freely moved, goes miliar order in such a way that if a free unfold­
back and forth, accommodating itself in this ing of one series of this system occurs (e.g.,
or that way, and the visual "appearances," the any movement of the eyes or fingers), then from
schemata, succeed one another in motivated the interwoven manifold as motive, the cor­
"appropriate" order, whereby they produce the responding series must unfold as motivated.
consciousness of an experience of an existing In this way, from the ordered system of sen­
centaur-object viewed in various ways. sations in eye movement, in head movement
Besides its distinction as a center of orien­ freely moved, etc., there unfold such and such
tation, the Body, in virtue of the constitutive series in vision. That is, while this is happen­
role of the sensations, is of significance for ing, there unfold, in motivated arder, " images"
the construction of the spatial world. In all of the thing that was perceptually apprehend­
constitution of spatial thinghood, two kinds of ed to begin the eye movement and, likewise,
sensations, with totally different constituting the visual sensations pertaining to the thing in
functions, are involved, and necessarily so, if each case. An apprehension of a thing as situ­
representations of the spatial are to be possi­ ated at such a distance, as oriented in such a
ble. The first kind are the sensations whicb con­ way, as having such a color, etc., is unthink­
stitute, by means of the apprehensions allot­ able, as can be seen, without these sorts of
ted to them, corresponding features of the thing relations of motivation. In the essence of the
as such by way of adumbration. For example, apprehension itself there resides the possibil­
the sensation-colors with their sensation-ex­ ity of letting the perception disperse into "pos­
pansions: it is in the apprehension of these sible" series of perceptions, ali of which are
that the corporeal colorations appear together of the following type: if the eye tums in a cer­
with the corporeal extension of these colora­ tain way, then so does the "image"; if it tums
tions. Likewise, in the tactual sphere, thingly differently in sorne definite fashion, then so
roughness appears in the apprehension of the does the image alter differently, in correspon-
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 165

dence. We constantly find here this two-fold tained then counts as the color itself in op­
articulation: kinesthetic sensations on the one position, for example, to the red light of the
side, the motivating; and the sensations of fea­ sunset which "outshines" all proper colors.
tures on the other, the motivated. The like All other color properties are "aspects of, "
holds, obviously, for touch and, similarly, ev­ "appearances of," this pre-eminent color-ap­
erywhere. Perception is without exception a pearance (which latter is called "appearance"
unitary accomplishment which arises essen­ only in an other sense: namely, with respect
tially out of the playing together of two cor­ to a higher leve!, the physicalistic thing, still
relatively related functions. At the same time, to be discussed). Yet it is inherent in the thing
it follows that functions of spontaneity be­ that its normal color keeps changing, precise­
long to every perception. The processes of the ly in dependence on whatever illuminating
kinesthetic sensations are free processes here, bodies are involved, whether the day is one
and this freedom in the consciousness of their of clear light or is hazy, etc., and it is only
unfolding is an essential part of the constitu­ with the return of the normal circumstances
tion of spatiality. that the normal color re-appears. "In itself'
there belongs to a body a color as being in it­
B) THE SICNIFICANCE OF NORMAL PERCEP­ self, and this color is grasped in seeing, but it
TUAL CONDITIONS FOR THE CONSTITUTION ever appears differently, and the aspect it pre­
OF THE INTUITED THINC AND THE SICNIFI­ sents depends thoroughly on the Objective
CANCE OF ABNORMALITIES ( CHANCE OF THE circumstances, and it can be distinguished
BüDY, CHANCE IN THE THINC) there either more or less easily (with the limit
case of complete invisibility). And the degree
Now the processes of perception, in virtue of visibility affects the form, too.
of which one and the same externa! world is lt should also be examined whether from
present to me, do not always exhibit the same the very start all Objective circumstances are
style; instead, there are distinctions which make apperceived as causal, as emanating from
themselves noticeable. At first, the same un­ things. Certain circumstances exhibit period­
changed Objects appear, according to the ic changes-e.g., the relations of night and
changing circumstances, now this way, now in day-and correspondingly the things which
another way. The same unchanged form has a otherwise are experienced as unchanged, for
changing appearance, according to its posi­ instance things given as unchanged for the
tion in relation to my Body; the form appears sense of touch, undergo periodic changes in
in changing aspects, which present "it itself" the unfolding of their visual characters. With
more or less "advantageously." If we disre­ regard to the visual mode of givenness, which
gard this and instead consider real properties, brings out the color characteristics as well as
then we find that one and the same Object, the form characteristics that become visible
maintaining one identical form, does have dif­ along with them, a privilege attaches to clear
ferent color appearances (the form as filled), daylight, such that there not only does the
according to its position relative to an illumi­ form become visible in a particularly favorable
nating body; furthermore, the color appear­ way up to its finer details, but also in this light
ances are different when it stands under differ­ such global characteristics are visible through
ent illuminating bodies, but all this happens which properties of other sense spheres are
in an ordered fashion, one which may be de­ co-announced at the same time, properties
termined more precisely in regard to appear­ given in the nexus of these experiences as not
ances. At the same time, certain conditions affected by the change of color (e.g., the mate­
prove to be the "normal" ones: seeing in sun­ rial attributes, which are disclosed when the
light, on a clear day, without the influence of surface structure becomes visible). Therefore
other bodies which might affect the color-ap­ in the series of possible appearances a certain
pearance. The "optimum" which is thereby at- givenness of the thing is privileged in that
166 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

with it is given, of the thing as a whole, what The case is the same if we take, instead of
is relatively the best, and this acquires the char­ an interposition of a medium between organ
acter of what is especial/y intended: it is the and thing, an abnormal change of an organ it­
predominating focus of the "interest," what self. If I am touching something with a blister
the experience is tending toward, terminates on my finger, or if my hand has been abrad­
in, is fulfilled in; and the other modes of giv­ ed, then all the tactual properties of the thing
enness become intentionally related to this are given differently. lf I cross my eyes, or if I
"optima!'' one. cross my fingers, then I have two "things of
lncluded in the normal experience, in which sight" or two "things oftouch," though I main­
the world is original/y constituted as world, tain that only one actual thing is present. This
"the way it is," are still other conditions of belongs to the general question ofthe constitu­
normal experience: e.g., seeing in air-which tion of a thingly unity as an apperceptive unity
counts as immediate seeing, seeing without of a manifold of different levels which them­
any mediating things-touching by immedi­ selves are already apperceived as unities of
ate contact, etc. lf I interpose a foreign medi­ multiplicities. The apperception acquired in re­
um between my eye and the things seen, then lation to usual perceptual conditions obtains
all things undergo a change in appearance; a new apperceptive stratum by taking into
more precisely, all phantom-unities undergo consideration the new "experience" of the dis­
a change. lt will be said: the same thing is seen, persion of the one thing of sight into a pair
but through different media. The thing has no and of the fusion of the pair in the form of a
dependency on such changes; it remains the continuous overlapping and convergence in
same. Only the "mode of appearance" of the the regular return to the former perceptual
thing (in this case, the appearance of the phan­ conditions. The doubled things of sight are in­
tom) depends on whether this or that medium deed completely analogous with the other
is mediating between the eye and the thing. things of sight, but only the latter have the ad­
Transparent glass is indeed a medium that can ditional meaning of "things"; and the lived
be seen through, but it changes the images of experience has the meaning of a lived experi­
things in different ways according to its dif­ ence of perception only as related to a cer­
ferent curvatures, and, if it is colored, it trans­ tain "position of the two eyes, " the homolo­
mits its color to them-all that belongs in the gous one or one from the system ofnormal eye
realm of experience. Finally, if I put on col­ positions. If a heterology now occurs, then I
ored lenses, then everything looks changed in indeed have analogous images, but they mean
color. If I knew nothing of this medium, then things only in contradiction to ali normal mo­
for me ali things would be colored. Insofar as tivations. The images now once again obtain
I have experiential knowledge of it, this judg­ the apprehension, "actual thing," precisely
ment does not arise. The givenness of sense­ through the constitutive nexus, i.e., the mo­
things counts, with regard to the color, as seem­ tivation which puts them in a concordant re­
ing ly given, and semblance again means a lation to the system of motivated perceptual
mode of givenness which could possibly also manifolds. lf I take my eyes out of a normal
occur in this way within the system of nor­ position into a disparate crossed position, then
mal givenness, under the appropriate circum­ two semblant images arise; "semblant images":
stances, and which would induce an Objective­ i.e., images which would, each for itself, pre­
ly false apprehension where there are motives sent "the thing" only if I lent them normal mo­
prompting a mixup, something those circum­ tivations.
stances are very likely to bring about. The A further important consideration deals
''false" lies in the contradiction with the nor­ with other groups of abnormalities. lf I ingest
mal system of experience. (The change of ap­ santonin, then the whole world "seems" to
pearance is a uniform one for ali the things, change; e.g., it "alters" its color. The "alter­
recognizable as a uniform change according ation" is a "seeming." Afterwards, as is the case
to type.) with every change of colored lighting, etc., I
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 167

once again have a world which matches the tant psychic facts," a material process, one
normal: everything is then concordant and which could very well, if required by the con­
changes or does not change, moves or is at rest, stitution of the world of experience, or by
as usual, and it displays the same systems of the further elaboration of the constitution of
aspects as before. the experience of this world in the course of
But here it must be observed that rest and new experiences, enter into a real relation
motion, change and permanence, get their sense with the optical change of the rest of the ma­
by means of the constitution of thinghood as terial world. In itself it is thus thinkable that
reality, in which such occurrences, especially I would find experiential motives for seeing a
the limit cases of rest and permanence, play general change in the color of the entire visi­
an essential role. ble world and for regarding the change, in this
Therefore the global coloring of all seen apprehension, as a real-causal consequence
things can easily "change," for example when of the material process of ingesting santo­
a body emits rays of light which "cast their nin (with its Bodily-material consequences). lt
shine" over all things. There is more to the con­ would be a normal perception just like any
stitution of the "change of things according to other. As long as, and whenever, I experience
color" than just a change of the filled schemata the change of all visible colors as an optical
with respect to color: ehange of things is,from change of the things, I must assume a causal
the very outset, constituted as causal change relation between whatever causing thinghoods
in relation to causal circumstances, as, for ex­ there might be; it is only in the causal nexus
ample, each advent of an illuminating body. I that a change is precisely a change of a thing.
can apprehend the change without seeing such As soon as experiential motives arise in oppo­
an illuminating body, but in that case the causal sition, then there must necessarily take place
circumstance is, in an indeterminate way, co­ a transformation in the apprehension, in vir­
apperceived. These causal circumstances, how­ tue of which the "change" that is seen loses
ever, are of the order of things. The relativity the sense of a change and forthwith acquires
of the spatial things with reference to other ones the character of "seeming." A semblant change
determines the sense of the change in things. is a schematic transformation apprehended as
But the psychophysical conditionalities do not a change under normal conditions, thus in re­
belong here in the least. This must be kept in lation to experiences constitutive of causality.
mind. lt goes without saying, however, that my But now it is given in a way which cancels
Body is indeed involved in the causal nexuses: the causal apprehension. The causal appre­
if it is apprehended as a thing in space, it is hension is suggested by the given schematic
certainly not apprehended as mere schema but transformation: it is as if it would present a
instead as the point of intersection of real cau­ change, but this is, under the given circum­
salities in the real (exclusively spatio-thingly) stances, excluded. The intake of santonin is
nexus. Belonging to this sphere is, for exam­ not, with respect to the general "change in
ple, the fact that a stroke of my hand (con­ color," a process which is or which could be
sidered purely as the striking of a corporeal apprehended as a cause. The shift in color
thing, i.e., excluding the lived experience of of all seen things is such that there is not ev­
the "I strike") acts exactly the same as a en an incentive to regard it at all as a real
stroke of any other material thing, and, simi­ change of the illumination (e.g., in the man­
larly, the fall of my Corporeal body is like any ner of a light source emitting colored rays).
other fall, etc.* lt is therefore that it presents itself as a sem­
Now concerning the intake of santonin, this blant change; everything looks "as though"
too is therefore, abstracting from all "concomí- there were a new source of light shining, or

*To be sure, it still remains to be discussed to what extent the solitary subject has the possibility of apprehending
his Body as a material body like any other. Cf. pp. 183ff. below.
168 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

"as if," in sorne other way, real causes were mere shift of focus, there emerge relations of
there effecting a general optical change (even dependency of the apperceived state of the
if these causes were undetermined, unknown). thing on the sphere of sensation and on the
But such causes may not now be presupposed; rest of the subjective sphere. Here we have
they are, given the total experiential situa­ the primordial state of psychophysical condi­
tion, excluded. tionality (under this heading are included all
We have to ask: what can, on the basis of conditional relations which run back and forth
a transformation in the sense-thing, totally between thingly and subjective being). To ev­
cancel the apperception of real change in this ery psychophysical conditionality there nec­
way, in opposition to the cases in which such essarily appertains somatological causality,
an apperception, already accomplished, mere­ which immediately always concems the rela­
ly undergoes a modification (by the fact that tions of the irreal, of an event in the subjective
a different causal nexus is substituted for the sphere, with something real, the Body: then
one that had been supposed, that is, the as­ mediately the relations with an externa! real
sumed cause abandoned but another cause thing which is in a real, hence causal, connec­
accepted)? The answer is a modification in tion with the Body....
the sphere of psychophysical "causality" or,
rather, "conditionality," to say it better. (For a E) PosSIBILITY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AN
causa in the proper sense is precisely a real "ÜBJECTIVE NATURE" ON THE SOLIPSISTIC
cause. The subjective, however, is, in opposi­ LEVEL
tion to reality, an irreality. Reality and irreali­
ty belong together essentially in the form of We have pursued the constitution of ma­
reality and subjectivity, which on the one hand terial nature through various strata and have
mutually exclude one another and on the oth­ seen that already for the "solipsistic" subject­
er hand, as is said, essentially require one an­ the subject in isolation-there exist motives
other). Besides the relations of the real to the for the distinction between an "appearing"
real, which belong to the essence of everything thing, whose qualitative content is relative to
real as spatial, temporal, and causal relations, my subjectivity, and the "Objective" thing,
there also belong to this essence relations of which remains what it is even if changes oc­
psychophysical conditionality in possible ex­ cur in my subjectivity and, dependent on it,
perience. Things are "experienced," are "intu­ in the "appearances" of the thing. Thereby
itively given" to the subject, necessarily as uni­ we have to understand under the heading
ties of a spatio-temporal-causal nexus, and "true" or "Objective" thing still something
necessarily pertaining to this nexus is a pre­ double:
eminent thing, "my Body," as the place where, 1) the thing as it presents itself to me under
and always by essential necessity, a system of "normal" conditions, in opposition to all oth­
subjective conditionality is interwoven with er thing-like unities which, constituted under
this system of causality and indeed in such a "abnormal" conditions, are degraded to "mere
way that in the transition from the natural atti­ semblance";
tude (the regard directed in experience to na­ 2) the identical content of qualities which,
ture and life) to the subjective attitude (the re­ abstraction made from ali relativity, can be
gard directed to the subject and to moments worked out and fixed logico-mathematically:
of the subjective sphere), real existence, and i.e., the physicalistic thing. Once this is known
manifold real changes as well, are given as in and once we have, in addition, Objective
conditional connection with subjective being, knowledge of the psychophysical character of
with a state of being in the subjective sphere. experiencing subjects, as well as of the exist­
Something thingly is experienced (perceptual­ ing conditionalities between thing and subject,
ly apperceived, to give privilege to the origi­ then from that it can be determined Objective­
nary experience) in such a way that, through a ly how the thing in question must be intuitive-
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 169

!y characterized for the respective subjectiv­ ence a world, and it would be exactly the same
ity-the normal or the abnormal. * as the one I actually do experience; every­
The question now, however, is whether or thing would be the same, with the only ex­
not the motives for the necessary distinction ception that in my field of experience there
between the subjectively conditioned thing would be no Bodies I could apprehend as
and the Objective thing, motives which do pre­ Bodies of other psychic subjects. If this ap­
sent themselves in solipsistic experience, are perceptive domain is lacking, then it neither
sufficient or have to be there at ali. As long determines my apprehensions of things, and
as we take cases in which changes of the ex­ insofar as it does usually determine these ap­
terna! world, feigned for us by an abnormal prehensions in my actual experience, then its
perceptual organ, are shown up as "sem­ influence would be absent from my world-im­
blances" by the testimony of the other organs, age as now modified. Moreover, I now have
to that extent the distinction between "seem­ the same manifolds of sensation; and the
ing" and what actually is is always given, ev­ "same" real things, with the same properties,
en if it may remain undecided in particular appear to me and, if everything is in harmony,
cases what is semblant and what is actual. But exhibit themselves as "actually being," or
if we assume for once that a subject would al­ otherwise, if discrepancies of a known kind
ways have only normal perceptions and would occur as exceptional, the things show them­
never undergo a modification of any of its selves as being "different" or as not being at
organs, or on the other hand would undergo ali. Seemingly, nothing essential has changed;
a modification, but one that allowed for no seemingly, only a fragment of my world of ex­
possibility of correction (loss of the entire field perience is missing, the world of animalia, as
of touch, or mental diseases which alter the well as the group of causalities precisely in­
entire typical character of perception), then volved with it in a world-nexus. Let us then
the motives of the distinction between "sem­ imagine, however, that at a point of time with­
blance" and "actuality," assumed up to now, in the time co-constituted along with the so­
would be eliminated, and the level of "Objec­ lipsistic world, suddenly in my domain of
tive nature" could not be attained by such a experience Bodies show up, things under­
subject. But the danger, that under the assumed standable as, and understood as, human Bod­
conditions the constitution of Objective na­ ies. Now ali of a sudden and for the first time
ture could not be attained, is removed as soon human beings are there for me, with whom I
as we lift the abstraction we have maintained can come to an understanding. And I come to
up to now and take into account the condi­ an understanding with them about the things
tions under which constitution takes place de which are there for us in common in this new
facto: namely, that the experiencing subject segment of time. Something very remarkable
is, in truth, not a solipsistic subject but is in­ now comes out: extensive complexes of as­
stead one among many. sertions about things, which I made in earlier
periods of time on the ground of earlier ex­
F) TRANSITION FROM SOLIPSJSTIC TO periences, experiences which were perfectly
INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERJENCE concordant throughout, are not corroborated
by my current companions, and this not be­
Let us consider a little more closely the pos­ cause these experiences are simply lacking
sibility of a solipsistic world, something we to them (after ali, one does not need to have
have assumed up to now. I (everybody should seen everything others have seen, and vice
substitute here his own "I") would experi- versa) but because they thoroughly conflictt

*Thus are determined, as will later be shown in full, the tasks of physics, psychophysics, and psychology.
tüf course, this conflict should not be considered total. For a basic store of communal experiences is presupposed
in order for mutual understanding to take place at ali.
 170 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

with what the others experience in experien­ of unfulfilled intentions it harbors. (In this re­
ces, we may suppose, that necessarily are har­ gard it must be observed that we have in fact
monious and that go on being progressively described the constitution of the thing incom­
confirmed. Then what about the actuality ex­ pletely by investigating only the manifolds of
hibited in the first period of time? And what sensation, the adumbrations, schemata, and,
about myself, the empirical subject of this ac­ in general, visual things in ali their levels. We
tuality? The answer is clear. As I communi­ must overcome in a decisive point the Ego's
cate to my companions my earlier lived ex­ self-forgetfulness we touched upon previous­
periences and they become aware of how ly.) Each thing of my experience belongs to
much these conflict with their world, consti­ my "environment," and that means first of all
tuted intersubjectively and continuously ex­ that my Body is part of it precisely as Body. lt
hibited by means of a harmonious exchange is not that we have here a matter of essential
of experiences, then I become for them an in­ necessity in any sense. That is precisely what
teresting pathological Object, and they call our solipsistic thought-experiment has taught
my actuality, so beautifully manifest to me, the us. Strictly speaking, the solus ipse is unaware
hallucination of someone who up to this point of the Objective Body in the full and proper
in time has been mentally ill. One may imag­ sense, * even if the solus ipse might possess
ine perfection in the exhibition of my solip­ the phenomenon of its Body and the corre­
sistic world and raise that perfection to any sponding system of experiential manifolds and

¡
height, still the described state of affairs as an know them in just as perfect a way as the so­
1
a priori one, the ideal possibility of which is cial man. In other words, the solus ipse does
1
beyond question, would not change at ali. not truly merit its name. The abstraction we
Light must now be shed on a certain prob­ carried out, for justifiable theoretical reasons,
lem: the relation to a multiplicity of people who does not yield the isolated man, the isolated
have dealings with one another-how does human person. This abstraction does obvious­
that enter into the apprehension of a thing and ly not consist in our arranging for a mass mur­
come to be constitutive for the apprehension der of the people and animals of our surround­
of a thing as "Objective and actual"? This ing world, sparing one human subject alone.
li "how" is at first very puzzling, because when For in that case the remaining subject, though
¡, we carry out an apprehension of a thing we one and unique, would still be a human sub­
1
do not, it seems, always co-posit a number of ject, i.e., still an intersubjective object, still
fellow men and, specifically, co-posit them as apprehending and positing himself as such.
ones who are to be, as it were, invoked. One But, on the contrary, the subject we construct­
might also wonder if we are not entangled ed knows nothing of a human environment,
here in a circle, for surely the apprehension of knows nothing of the reality or even just the
one's fellow man presupposes the apprehen­ real possibility of "other" Bodies, understood
sion of the Body and consequently also pre­ in the sense of an apprehension of the human,
supposes thing-apprehension. There is only and thus knows nothing of his own Body as
one way to salve this problem, the way pre­ understandable by others. This subject does
scribed for us by phenomenology. We must in­ not know that others can gaze upon the same
terrogate the thing-apprehension itself, there world, one that simply appears differently to
where it is an experience of an "Objectively different subjects, such that the appearances
actual" thing, and we must interrogate the ex­ are always relative to "their" Bodies, etc. It is
perience which is not yet exhibiting, but is in clear that the apprehension of the Body plays a
want of exhibition, as to what, inherent in it, special role far the intersubjectivity in which
is in need of exhibition, what components ali objects are apprehended "Objectively" as

*On this point, cf. the segments on the constitution of the Body. pp. 183ft'. below.
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 171

things in the one Objective time and one Ob­ subjects, and for that he must have Corpore­
jective space of the one Objective world. (In ality and belong to the same world, etc.
every case the exhibition of any apprehended lt pertains to perception 's very sense, as well
Objectivity whatsoever requires a relation to as to that of experience in general, that things
the apprehension of a multiplicity of subjects come to presence there which are to be deter­
sharing a mutual understanding.) The thing mined in themselves and distinguished from
which is constituted for the individual sub­ ali other things. And it pertains to the sense of
ject in regulated manifolds of harmonious ex­ experiential judgment to make a claim to Ob­
periences and which, as one for sense intui­ jective validity. If a thing is determined in it­
tion, stands continuously over and against the self and distinct from every other, then it has
Ego in the course of perception, obtains in that to allow for judgmental, therefore predicative,
way the character of a merely subjective "ap­ determination in such a way that its distinct­
pearance" of the "Objectively real" thing. Each iveness as regards ali other things stands out.
of the subjects who are intersubjectively relat­ The thing given in perception and experi­
ed in mutual understanding in regard to the ence is, in accordance with perception's very
same world and, within that, in regard to the sense, something spatio-temporal from the
same things, has his own perceptions of them, first, having form and duration and also hav­
i.e., his own perceptual appearances, and in ing a position in space and time. So we have to
them he finds a unity in the appearances, which distinguish between the appearing form and
itself is only an appearance in a higher sense, the form itself between the appearing spatial
with predicates of appearance that may not, magnitude, the appearing location, and the
without any further ado, count as predicates magnitude and location themselves. Every­
of the appearing "true thing." thing that we experience of the thing, even the
Thus we come here, in considering mutu­ form, has reference to the experiencing sub­
al understanding, to the same distinction we ject. Ali these appear in changing aspects, in
already demonstrated as possible on the so­ the change of which the things are present as
lipsistic leve!. The "true thing" is then the sensibly changed also. In addition, the space
Object that maintains its identity within the between things and the form of this space ap­
manifolds of appearances belonging to a mul­ pear under different aspects according to the
tiplicity of subjects, and specifically, again, it subjective circumstances. Always and neces­
is the intuited Object, related to a community sarily, however, the one and the same space
of normal subjects, or, abstraction made from "appears" as the form of all possible things, a
this relativity, it is the physicalistic thing, de­ form that cannot be multiplied or altered. Ev­
termined logico-mathematically. This physical­ ery subject has his "space of orientation," his
istic thing is obviously the same, whether it is "here" and his possible "there," this "there"
constituted solipsistically or intersubjective­ being determined according to the directional
ly. For logical Objectivity is eo ipso Objectiv­ system of right-left, above-below, front-back.
ity in the intersubjective sense as well. What But the basic form of ali identification of the
a cognizing subject comes to know in logi­ intersubjective givennesses of a sensuous con­
cal Objectivity (hence in such a way that this tent is of such a kind that they necessarily be­
presents no index of a dependency of its truth­ long to one and the same system of location,
content upon the subject or upon anything whose Objectivity is manifest in that every
subjective) can be similarly known by any "here" is identifiable with every relative "there"
cognizing subject as long as he fulfills the as regards every new "here" resulting from the
conditions any subject must satisfy to know subject's "moving on" and so also as regards
such Objects. That is, he must experience the every "here" from the viewpoint of another
things and the very same things, and he must, subject. This is an ideal necessity and consti­
if he is also to know this identity, stand in a tutes an Objective system of location, one that
relation of empathy to the other cognizing <loes not allow of being grasped by the vision
172 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

of the eyes but only by the understanding; relative and thereby at once intersubjective)
that is, it is "visible," in a higher kind of intu­ determinable sensible world.
ition, founded on change of location and on
empathy. In this way is solved the problem of G) MORE PRECISE CHARACTERIZATION OF
the "form of intuition" and of spatial intuition. THE PHYSICALISTIC THING
It is not a matter of the senses, although in an­
other respect it is. The primary intuitive space "Physicalistic nature," to which we have
is sensuously given though this is not yet now advanced, presents itself in the following
space itself. Objective space is not sensuous, way in accord with our expositions: the thing
although it is still intuited on a higher leve), itself in itself consists of a continuously or dis­
and it comes to givenness by means of an cretely filled space in states of motion, states
identification within a change of orientation, which are called energy forms. That which fills
but exclusively one the subject itself carries space lends itself to certain groups of differ­
out freely. Oriented space (and along with it, ential equations and corresponds to certain
eo ipso Objective space) and ali appearing fundamental laws of physics. But there are no
spatial forms already admit of idealization; sense qualities here. And that means there are
they are to be grasped in geometrical purity no qualities here whatever. For the quality of
and determined "exactly." what fills space is sense quality. But, now, filled
The Objective form is Objective as ordered space without quality, how is that thinkable?
within Objective space. Everything e/se about To attribute actuality to appearing things
a thing that is Objective (detached from ali with their sense qualities in themselves is out
relativisms) is so through a connection with of the question, as the natural scientists quite
what is fundamentally Objective, viz., space, rightly say. For the sense qualities change ac­
time, motion. Real properties manifest them­ cording to the kind and the disposition of the
selves as real substantial-causal unities in the sense organs; they are dependent on the sense
motion and deformation of the spatial form. organs and, more generally, dependent on the
These are the mechanical properties which Body and the total condition of the experi­
express the causal-lawful dependencies of the encing subject. And it tums out that the true
spatial determinations of bodies. The thing is physical facts which correspond to the quali­
always form in a situation. The form is, how­ tative distinctions of red and green, warm and
ever, in every situation a qualified one. Quali­ cold, are produced without qualitative transi­
ties are what fills, they extend over the surface tion as mere quantitative distinctions of one
and through the corporeality of the form. and the same domain, for example, tempera­
Qualifications, however, extend from the things ture, waves in the ether, etc.
into empty space: rays of light, radiations of Shall we say that God sees the things as
heat, etc. That means that thingly qualities con­ they are in themselves while we see them
dition qualities and qualitative changes in oth­ through our sense organs, which are a kind of
er things and indeed do so in such a way that distorting eyeglasses? That things are filled
the effect is a constant function of the situa­ space with absolute quality and it is only that
tion: to every change of situation there corre­ we know nothing of it? But should the things
sponds a change of effect. In virtue of such a which appear to us as they appear to us be the
subordination to spatial relations which may same as the things which appear to God as
be determined with exactitude, even the sense they appear to God, then a unity of mutual
qualities become amenable to exact determi­ understanding would have to be possible be­
nation. Thus we come to an understanding of tween God and us, just as, between different
the physicalistic world-view or world-struc­ men, only through mutual understanding is
ture, i.e., to an understanding of the method of there the possibility of knowing that the things
physics as a method which pursues the sense seen by the one are the same as those seen
of an intersubjectively-Objectively (i.e., non- by the other. But how would the identification
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 173

be thinkable if not in the sense that the sup­ the moment but for us and for everyone who
posed absolute spirit sees the things precise­ can have dealings with us and can come to a
ly also thi-ough sensuous appearances, which, mutual understanding with us about things
likewise, have to be exchangeable in an un­ and about other people. There is always the
derstanding that is reciprocal-or, at least, uni­ possibility that new spirits enter into this nex­
lateral-as is the case with the appearances us; but they must do so by means of their Bod­
we share among us men? And if not in that ies, which are represented through possible
case, then God would be blind to colors, etc., appearances in our consciousness and through
and men blind to his qualities. Is there any corresponding ones in theirs.
sense, however, to arguing about which are the The thing is a rule of possible appearances.
true qualities? The new qualities would again That means that the thing is a reality as a uni­
be secondary and would be eliminated once ty of a manifold of appearances connected ac­
more by physics, which has to be the same for cording to rules. Moreover, this unity is an in­
ali, if the things are the same. Obviously, the tersubjective one. It is a unity of states; the thing
absolute spirit would also have to have a Body has its real properties, and to each moment there
for there to be mutual understanding, and thus corresponds an active state (for the properties
the dependency on sense organs would have express faculties; they are causal properties,
to be there as well. The result is that we must related to an "if-then"). Whereas, however, for
understand the sense of the distinction between the former consideration, supported by direct
secondary and primary qualities correctly and experience, the state is identical with the space
that we are permitted to understand the non­ that is filled with sensuous qualities (schema),
Objectivity of the former only in the sense that a space which can be an intersubjective unity
in no way do they escape the relativity of ap­ only as related to a totality of normal "like-sens­
pearances, not even in the way we easily over­ ing" subjects, on the other hand the real possi­
look insofar as we spontaneously think of our­ bility and actuality of subjects endowed with
selves as normally sensing in a world of be­ dif.ferent sense faculties and the knowledge of
ings of normal sensibility. A main feature of the dependence, present in each individual, of
the relativity consists in the dependence upon the sense qualities on physiological process­
the subject. To be sure, an important distinc­ es lead to a consideration of this dependence
tion is to be found here: subjects who in gen­ precisely as a new dimension of relativities
eral share a common world of things, to which and lead to the construction, in thought, of
they actually relate, hence to which they can the purely physicalistic thing. Then to the same
relate through appearances, as is required by Objective-physicalistic state of the thing per­
thingly being, can in principie be relatively tain multiple "filled spaces" related to various
"blind" as regards color, sound, etc., i.e., as sense faculties and individual sense aberra­
regards individual senses which provide their tions. The physicalistic thing is intersubjec­
own particular sorts of sense qualities. The tively common in that it has validity for ali
senses can also be completely different, pro­ individuals who stand in possible communion
vided they make possible a common under­ with us. The Objective determination deter­
standing and constitute a common nature as mines the thing through that which belongs
an appearing one. But in principie subjects to it and must belong to it if it is going to be
cannot be blind as regards all the senses and able to appear to me or to anyone else in
consequently at once blind to space, to motion, communion with me and if it is going to be
to energy. Otherwise there would be no world able to count as the same for every member
of things there for them; in any case it would of the communicating society-even for me
not be the same as ours, precisely the spatial throughout ali possible moditications of my
world, the world of nature. sensibility. The determinations of space and
Nature is an intersubjective reality and a time are common, as is common a lawful­
reality not just for me and my companions of ness which, in virtue of its concepts related
174 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

to the "physicalistic thing," is a unitary rule still possible subjects who intuit a thing, ac­
for all the appearances, of the intersubjective complish an experience, etc., in which, as cor­
community, which constitute the same thing relate, something appearing as such comes to
and which must constitute it in rational mutual consciousness in a varying mode with mo­
understanding. lt is only from the appear­ ments of appearance such as red, warm, sweet,
ances (and the intersubjective nexus) that we round, etc. These subjects stand in a relation­
can draw the sense of what a thing is in "Ob­ ship of empathy and, in spite of the variation
jective actuality," i.e., in the actuality which in the givennesses of appearances, can inter­
appears, and which appears to all communicat­ subjectively assure themselves of the identity
ing subjects, and which is identifiable by means of what appears therein.
of intersubjective identification. Thus in principie the thing is something
The Objectively real is not in my "space," intersubjectively identical yet is such that it
or in anyone else's, as "phenomenon" ("phe­ has no sensuous-intuitive content whatsoev­
nomenal space") but exists in Objective space, er that could be given as identical intersubjec­
which is a formal unity of identification in tively. Instead, it is only an empty identical
the midst of the changing qualities. Whereas something as a correlate of the identification
it holds for my space-phenomena that they possible according to experiential-logical rules
can only be given with sensuous qualities, it and grounded through them, the identification
holds for Objective space that it cannot be giv­ of what appears in the changing "appearances"
en with sensuous qualities but can appear only with their various contents, the identification
within subjective spaces that have sensuous carried out by the subjects that stand in the
qualities. This is valid for the solus ipse as well intersubjective nexus along with their corre­
and for the space already being constituted sponding acts appropriate to appearance and
therein as Objective, though still not as inter­ to experiential-logical thinking. In physics as
subjective. (Thus the intersubjective thing is the mere natural study of the intersubjective­
the "Objective" spatial form with "Objective" Objective thing existing "in itself," the thing
qualities, the physicalistic ones.) Pure space is Objectively determined as an empty some­
(the purely Objective spatial form) arises out thing, determined through the intersubjective­
of my appearing space not through abstrac­ ly constituted forms of space and time and
tion but through an Objectification which takes through the "primary qualities" related to space
as "appearance" any sensuously appearing spa­ and time. Ali secondary qualities, indeed pre­
tial form endowed with sensuous qualities and cisely everything that can be given intuitively,
posits it in manifolds of appearances which including ali intuitive spatial and temporal
do not belong to an individual consciousness forms which are quite unthinkable without sec­
but to a societal consciousness as a total group ondary filling, all differences in orientation,
of possible appearances that is constructed etc.-these do not belong there.
out of individual groups. Each subject has the
totality of space and has particular spatial H) THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONSTITUTION
forms, but in intersubjectivity these are appear­ OF AN "ÜBJECTIVE NATURE" AT THE LEVEL
ances. OF INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
In principle, the thing is given and is to be
given only through appearances, whose ap­ Let us now examine analogously, for the
pearing content can vary with the subjects. This intersubjective level of experience as we have
content (the appearing thing just as it appears, done for the solipsistic, which conditions have
as red, as warm, etc.) is what it is as appear­ to be fulfilled so that the constitution of an
ance to an actual subject or to a possible sub­ "Objective" nature can arise, and indeed must
ject in actual connection with the former. We arise. We began with relationships as they are
find ourselves led back to a multiplicity of present de facto: we found that individual dif­
actual subjects and, in connection with them, ferences stand out from a fundamental set of
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 175

common experiences and lead to the distinc­ nature." The solipsistic subject could indeed
tion between determinations which belong to have over against itself an Objective nature,
the thing "itself" versus ones that are merely however this subject could not apprehend it­
subjectively conditioned. Now other condi­ self as a member of nature, could not apper­
tions, as well, are to be constructed a priori. ceive itself as psychophysical subject, as
We can imagine a human world in which there animal, the way this does happen on the in­
would be no illness, in which there would tersubjective leve! of experience. * Obviously,
occur no illusions, hallucinations, or the like. this can become evident only if the constitu­
We can furthermore assume that ali the per­ tion of animal nature is examined. As has in­
sons who have commerce with one another deed been shown in general by the exhibition
apprehend the world completely alike (ab­ of the relations of dependency between expe­
straction made from the always necessary dif­ rienced nature and experiencing subject, the
ferences in orientation). In that case would the study of subjectivity is unconditionally required
things with their secondary qualities simply for a ful! clarification of the sense and struc­
count as the ultimate Objectivity? Or would it ture of physical nature.
be recognized that this state of affairs is con­
tingent and not necessary? lt is to be noted in
this regard that the constitution of the sensi­ The Self-Constitution of the
ble world is obviously to be distinguished from Bodyt
the constitution of the "true" world, the world
for the scientific subject, whose activity is a §35. Transition to the study of the
spontaneous "free" thinking and, in general, constitution of "man as nature"
researching. That is to say: if we live passive­
ly, in the manner of animals, "in the world" Now, the theme of the following consid­
and in commerce with others who are like us, erations is to be the constitution of the natur­
who are as "normal" as we are, then a world of al reality, man ( or animal being), i.e., the con­
experience is constituted common to us ali. stitution of man as he presents himself to a
Now, we are, however,free intelligent beings. naturalistic point of view: as material body
Even if we encounter no abnormalities, we upon which are constructed new strata of be­
can still perform gratuitous operations on our ing, the Bodily-psychic. lt is possible that in
Bodies or on others', and then "anomalies" do this constitutive consideration much will have
appear. We pursue, in thought, the causal nex­ to be included that subsequent investiga­
uses and form for ourselves the "physicalistic tion will show as belonging to the personal or
world-image." spiritual Ego. It will be possible to provide the
In any case, we see that on the one hand ultimate distinction between "man as nature"
there exists already on the solipsistic leve] the and "man as spirit," as well as the establish­
possibility of advancing to the constitution of ment of their reciproca! relations, only when
the "Objective" (physicalistic) thing. On the both these Objectivities have been subject to
other hand, there does not exist, even on the constitutive study.
intersubjective leve!, the unconditioned neces­ If we now look for a point of departure for
sity to reach that far. But there is-abstracting our constitutive analysis, then we must take
from the circumstance that de facto constitution into account what carne to light for us as re­
is accomplished intersubjectively-a distinc­ gards the constitution of material nature,
tion in principie between these two namely, that it, with its entire intuitive con­
possible ways of constructing an "Objective tent, is related to animal subjects. Hence when

*Cf. pp. l 83ff. below.

tldeas 11, pp. 151-169 (Sections 35-42).
176 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

we approach the constitution of the natural not constitutive of properties (such as rough­
Object, "man," we may not already presup­ ness or smoothness of the hand, of this physi­
pose his Body as a fully constituted material cal thing). If I speak of the physical thing, "left
thing but instead must at first pursue what is hand," then I am abstracting from these sensa­
already constituted prior to, or correlative with, tions (a ball of lead has nothing like them and
material nature, as regards the psychophysi­ likewise for every "merely" physical thing,
cal subject. And here, as before, let us first try every thing that is not my Body). If I do in­
to see how far we can advance in a solipsistic elude them, then it is not that the physical thing
consideration. is now richer, but instead it becomes Body, it
senses. "Touch" -sensations belong to every
§36. Constitution of the Body as bearer appearing Objective spatial position on the
of localized sensations (sensings) touched hand, when it is touched precisely at
those places. The hand that is touching, which
We have seen that in all experience of spa­ for its part again appears as a thing, likewise
tio-thingly Objects, the Body "is involved"* has its touch-sensations at the place on its cor­
as the perceptual organ of the experiencing poreal surface where it touches (or is touched
subject, and now we must investigate the con­ by the other). Similarly, if the hand is pinched,
stitution of this Corporeality. We can thereby pressed, pushed, stung, etc., touched by ex­
choose immediately the special case in which terna! bodies or touching them, then it has its
the spatially experienced body, perceived by sensations of contact, of being stung, of pain,
means of the Body, is the Corporeal body it­ etc. And if this happens by means of sorne oth­
self. For this too is perceived from the out­ er part of one's Body, then the sensation is
side, although within certain limits, preventing doubled in the two parts of the Body, since
it from being considered, without qualifica­ each is then precisely for the other an externa!
tion, as a thing like any other in a thingly nex­ thing that is touching and acting upon it, and
us. Thus there are parts of this body which each is at the same time Body. Ali the sensa­
can indeed be perceived by touch but cannot tions thus produced have their localization,
be seen. t At first, however, we may disregard i.e., they are distinguished by means of their
these and begin instead with parts that we can place on the appearing Corporeality, and they
both touch and see. I can look at them and feel belong phenomenally to it. Hence the Body is
them, just like other things, and in this respect originally constituted in a double way: first, it
the appearances have entirely the same nexus is a physical thing, matter; it has its extension,
as do other appearances of things. But now in which are included its real properties, its
there is a distinction between the visual appear­ color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and what­
ances and the tactual regarding, e.g., a hand. ever other material qualities of that kind there
Touching my left hand, I have touch-appear­ are. Secondly, I find on it, and I sense "on" it
ances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I and "in" it: warmth on the back of the hand,
perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the
hand, with such a form. The indicational sen­ fingertips. I sense, extended over larger Bodily
sations of movement and the representational areas, the pressure and pull of my clothes.
sensations of touch, which are Objectified as Moving my fingers, I have motion sensations,
features ofthe thing, "left hand," belong in fact whereby a sensation in an ever changing way
to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand extends itself over and traverses the surface
I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, of the fingers, but within this sensation-com­
which are "localized" in it, though these are plex there is at the same time a content hav-

*Cf. pp. l 63ff.

t As to the constitution of the Body as a thing. cf. pp. l 83ff. below.
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 177

ing its localization in the interior of the digi­ one time as perception of the table's surface
tal space. My hand is Iying on the table. I ex­ (of a small part of it, properly speaking) and
perience the table as something solid, cold, at another time produces, with a "different
and smooth. Moving my hand over the table, I direction of attention," in the actualization of
get an experience of it and its thingly deter­ an other stratum of apprehension, sensations
minations. At the same time, I can at any mo­ of digital pressure. In the same way are relat­
ment pay attention to my hand and find on it ed the coldness of the surface of a thing and
touch-sensations, sensations of smoothness the sensation of cold in the finger. In the case
and coldness. etc. In the interior of the hand, of one hand touching the other, it is again the
running parallel to the experienced movement, same, only more complicated, for we have
I find motion-sensations, etc. Lifting a thing, then two sensations, and each is apprehend­
I experience its weight, but at the same time I able or experienceable in a double way.
have weight-sensations localized in my Body. Necessarily bound to the tactual perception
And thus, my Body's entering into physical re­ of the table (this perceptual apprehension) is
lations (by striking, pressing, pushing, etc.) with a perception of the Body, along with its con­
other material things provides in general not comitant sensation of touch. This nexus is a
only the experience of physical occurrences, necessary connection between two possible
related to the Body and to things, but also the apprehensions: pertaining correlatively to that,
experience of specifically Bodily occurrences however, is a connection between two thing­
of the type we call sensings. Such occurrences hoods that are being constituted. It is shown
are missing in "merely" material things. empirically by the possibility of a representa­
The localized sensations are not properties tion of the world in those blind from birth that
of the Body as a physical thing, but on the other everything can come into play in the extra-vi­
hand, they are properties of the thing, Body, sual sphere and that here the apperceptions
and indeed they are effect-properties. They arise have to be ordered in such a way that these cor­
when the Body is touched, pressed, stung, etc., relations can be constituted.
and they arise there where it is touched and at
the time when it is touched: only under certain §37. Differences between the visual
circumstances do they still endure after the and tactual realms
touching takes place. Touching refers here to a
physical event. Even two lifeless things can We find now a striking difference between
touch one another, but the touching of the Body the sphere of the visual and that of the tactual.
provides sensations on it or in it. In the tactual realm we have the externa! Ob­
We must now give heed to the following: in ject, tactually constituted, and a second Object,
order to bring to perception here the tactual the Body, likewise tactually constituted, e.g.,
thing, paperweight, I touch it, with my fingers, the touching finger, and, in addition, there
for example. I then experience tactually the are fingers touching fingers. So here we have
smooth surface of the glass and the delicate that double apprehension: the same touch-sen­
crystal edges. But if I attend to the hand and sation is apprehended as a feature of the "ex­
finger, then they have touch sensations which terna]" Object and is apprehended as a sensa­
still Iinger when the hand is withdrawn. Like­ tion of the Body as Object. And in the case in
wise, my finger and hand have kinesthetic which a part of the Body becomes equally an
sensations, and precisely the same sensations externa! Object of an other part, we have the
which function as indicational or presenta­ double sensation (each part has its own sensa­
tional with respect to the thing, paperweight, tions) and the double apprehension as fea­
function as touch-effects of the paperweight ture of the one or of the other Bodily part as a
on the hand and as sensings produced in it. In physical object. But in the case of an Object
the case of the hand Iying on the table, the constituted purely visual/y we have nothing
same sensation of pressure is apprehended at comparable. To be sure, sometimes it is said
178 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

that the eye is, as it were, in touch with the originally to the merely touched, and not seen,
Object by casting its glance over it. But we Objects. "Originally" is not used here in a
immediately sense the difference. An eye temporal-causal sense; it has to do with a pri­
does not appear to one's own vision, and it is mal group of Objects constituted directly in
not the case that the colors which would ap­ intuition. The eye can be touched, and it it­
pear visually on the eye as localized sensa­ self provides touch and kinetic sensations;
tions (and indeed visually localized corre­ that is why it is necessarily apperceived as
sponding to the various parts of its visual ap­ belonging to the Body. Ali this is said from
pearance) would be the same as those attrib­ the standpoint of straightforward empírica!
uted to the object in the apprehension of the intuition. The relation of the seen color of the
seen externa! thing and Objectified in it as thing to the seeing eye, the eye "with which"
features. And similarly, we do not have a kind we see, the "being directed" of the open eye
of extended occularity such that, by moving, onto the seen thing, the reference back to this
one eye could rub past the other and produce direction of the eye which is part of having vi­
the phenomenon of double sensation. Neither sual appearances, and, furthermore, growing
can we see the seen thing as gliding over the out of this, the relation of the color sensations
seeing eye, continually in contact with it, as to the eye-all that will not be confused with
we can, in the case of a real organ of touch, the givenness of these sensations in the man­
e.g., the palm of the hand, glide over the ob­ ner of locaiized "sensings."
ject or have the object slip past the hand. I do The same applies to hearing. The ear is "in­
not see myself, my Body, the way I touch my­ volved," but the sensed tone is not localized in
self. What I call the seen Body is not some­ the ear. (I would not even say that the case of
thing seeing which is seen, the way my Body the "buzzing" in the ears and similar tones
as touched Body is something touching which subjectively sensed in the ear are exceptions.
is touched. * A visual appearance of an object They are in the ear just as tones of a violin are
that sees, i.e., one in which the sensation of outside in space, but, for ali that, they do not
light could be intuited just as it is in it-that yet have the proper character of sensings and
is denied us. Thus what we are denied is an the localization proper to them.) lt would be
analogon to the touch sensation, which is an important task to thoroughly examine in
actually grasped along with the touching hand. this regard the groups of sensations of the
The role of the visual sensations in the corre­ various senses. However important that would
lative constitution of the Body and externa! be for a completely elaborated theory of the
things is thus different from that of the sen­ phenomenological constitution of material
sations of touch. Ali that we can say here is thinghood, on the one hand, and of the Body,
that if no eye is open there are no visual ap­ on the other hand, for us now the broad dis­
pearances, etc. If, ultimately, the eye as organ tinctions will suffice. To make ourselves sure
and, along with it, the visual sensations are in of them, we must be perfectly clear on the fact
fact attributed to the Body, then that happens that localization of sensings is in fact some­
indirectly by means of the properly localized thing in principie different from the extension
sensations. of all material determinations of a thing. The
Actually, the eye, too, is a field of localiza­ sensings do indeed spread out in space, cover,
tion but only for touch sensations, and, like in their way, spatial surfaces, run through them,
every organ "freely moved" by the subject, it etc. But this spreading out and spreading into
is a field of localized muscle sensations. lt is are precisely something that differs essential­
an Object of touch for the hand; it belongs ly from extension in the sense of ali the deter-

*Obviously, it cannot be said that I see my eye in the mirror, for my eye, that which sees qua seeing, I do not
perceive. I see something, of which I judge indirectly, by way of "empathy," that it is identical with my eye as a thing
(the one constituted by touch, for example) in the same way that I see the eye of an other.
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 179

minations that characterize the res extensa. The to the Body, though it does not do so in virtue
sensing which spreads over the surface of of its visibility. A subject whose only sense
the hand and extends into it is not a real quality was the sense of vision could not at ali have
of a thing (speaking always within the frame an appearing Body; in the play of kinesthetic
of intuitions and their givenness) such as, for motivations (which he could not apprehend
example, the roughness of the hand, its color, Bodily) this subject would have appearances
etc. These real properties of a thing are consti­ of things, he would see real things. lt cannot
tuted through a sensuous schema and mani­ be said that this subject who only sees sees
folds of adumbrations. To speak in a similar his Body, for its specific distinctive feature as
way of sensings would be quite absurd. If I Body would be lacking him, and even the free
turn my hand, bring it closer or take it away, movement of this "Body," which goes hand
then, for one, the unchanged color of the hand in hand with the freedom of the kinesthetic
is given to me as constantly different. Yet the processes, would not make it a Body. In that
color itself presents itself, and the color con­ case, it would only be as if the Ego, in unity
stituted first (that of the sensuous schema) with this freedom in the kinesthetic, could im­
manifests a real optical property of the hand. mediately and freely move the material thing,
Roughness, too, presents itself and does so tac­ Body.
tually in manifolds of touch sensations which The Body as such can be constituted
constantly flow into one another and to each originarily only in tactuality and in everything
of which a spreading-out belongs. The touch­ that is localized with the sensations of touch:
sensings, however, the sensations which, con­ for example, warmth, coldness, pain, etc. Fur­
stantly varying, líe on the surface of the touch­ thermore, the kinetic sensations play an im­
ing finger, are, such as they are lying there portant role. I see how my hand moves, and
spread out over the surface, nothing given without it touching anything while moving, I
through adumbration and schematization. They sense kinetic sensations, though as one with
have nothing at all to do with the sensuous sensations of tension and sensations of touch,
schema. The touch-sensing is not a state of and I localize them in the moving hand. And
the material thing, hand, but is precisely the the same holds for all the members of the
hand itself, which for us is more than a mate­ Body. If, while moving, I do touch something,
rial thing, and the way in which it is mine en­ then the touch sensation immediately acquires
tails that I, the "subject of the Body," can say localization in the touching surface of the
that what belongs to the material thing is its, hand. At bottom, it is owing only to their con­
not mine. All sensings pertain to my soul; ev­ stant interlacing with these primarily local­
erything extended to the material thing. On ized sensations that the kinetic sensations re­
this surface of the hand I sense the sensations ceive localization. But because there obtains
of touch, etc. And it is precisely thereby that here no parallelism which is exactly stratified
this surface manifests itself immediately as as there is between temperature sensations
my Body. One can add here as well: if I con­ and touch sensations, so the kinesthetic sen­
vince myself that a perceived thing does not sations do not spread out in a stratified way
exist, that I am subject to an illusion, then, along over the appearing extension, and they re­
with the thing, everything extended in its ex­ ceive only a rather indeterminate localization.
tension is stricken out too. But the sensings Yet this is indeed not without significance; it
do not disappear. Only what is real vanishes makes the unity between the Body and the
from being. freely moveable thing more intimate.
Connected to the privilege of the localiza­ Obviously, the Body is also to be seen just
tion of the touch sensations are differences like any other thing, but it becomes a Body
in the complexion of the visual-tactual appre­ only by incorporating tactile sensations, pain
hensions. Each thing that we see is touchable sensations, etc.-in short, by the localization
and, as such, points to an immediate relation of the sensations as sensations. In that case
180 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

the visual Body also participates in the local­ lated-and to perceive an externa) world by
ization, because it coincides with the tactual means of it.
Body, just as other things (or phantoms) coin­
cide, ones which are constituted both visual­ §39. Significance of the Body far the
Iy and tactually, and thus there arises the idea constitution of higher Objectivities
of a sensing thing which "has" and which can
have, under certain circumstances, certain sen­ Now, besides this, the Body is involved in
sations (sensations of touch, pressure, warmth, ali other "conscious functions," and that has
coldness, pain, etc.) and, in particular, have its various sources. Not only the sensations
them as localized in itself primarily and prop­ which exercise a constitutive function as re­
erly. This is then a precondition for the exist­ gards the constitution of sense-things, appear­
ence of ali sensations (and appearances) what­ ing spatial Objects, not only these sensations
soever, the visual and acoustic included, though have a localization given in immediate intui­
these do not have a primary localization in the tion along with the relation to a Body ground­
Body. ed therein, but that is also true of sensations
belonging to totally different groups, e.g., the
§38. The Body as organ of the will and "sensuous" feelings, the sensations of plea­
as seat of free movement sure and pain, the sense of well-being that
permeates and fills the whole Body, the gen­
The distinctive feature of the Body as a eral malaise of "corporeal indisposition," etc.
field of localization is the presupposition for Thus here belong groups of sensations which,
its further distinctive features setting it off from for the acts of valuing, i.e., for intentional lived
ali material things. In particular, it is the pre­ experiences in the sphere of feeling, or for the
condition for the fact that it, already taken as constitution of values as their intentional cor­
Body (namely, as the thing that has a stratum relates, play a role, as matter, analogous to that
of localized sensations) is an organ of the will, played by the primary sensations for what is
the one and only Object which, for the will of intentionally lived in the sphere of experience,
my pure Ego, is moveable immediately and or for the constitution of Objects as spatial
spontaneously and is a means for producing things. Moreover, ali kinds of sensations, dif­
a mediate spontaneous movement in other ficult to analyze and discuss, belong here as
things, in, e.g., things struck by my immedi­ well, ones that form the material substrate for
ately spontaneously moved hand, grasped by the life of desire and will, sensations of ener­
it, lifted, etc. Sheer material things are only getic tension and relaxation, sensations of in­
moveable mechanically and only partake of ner restraint, paralysis, liberation, etc. Ali these
spontaneous movement in a mediate way. Only groups of sensations, as sensings, have an im­
Bodies are immediately spontaneously ("free­ mediate Bodily localization. Thus, for every
ly") moveable, and they are so, specifically, by human being, they belong, in a way that is im­
means of the free Ego and its will which be­ mediately intuitable, to the Body as to his par­
long to them. lt is in virtue of these free acts ticular Body, i.e., as a subjective objectivity
that, as we saw earlier, there can be constitut­ distinguished from the Body as a mere mate­
ed for this Ego, in manifold series of percep­ rial thing by means of this whole stratum of
tions, an Object-world, a world of spatial­ localized sensations. The intentional functions,
corporeal things (the Body as thing included). however, are bound to this stratum; the matter
The subject, constituted as counter-member of receives a spiritual forming, just as, discussed
material nature, is (as far as we have seen up above, the primary sensations undergo appre­
to now) an Ego, to which a Body belongs as hension, are taken up in perceptions, upon
field of localization of its sensations. The Ego which, then, perceptual judgments are built,
has the "faculty" (the "I can") to freely move etc. Hence in this way a human being 's total
this Body-i.e., the organ in which it is articu- consciousness is in a certain sense, by means
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 181

of its hyletic substrate, bound to the Body, obviously have a succession of sensings or­
though, to be sure, the intentional lived experi­ dered in a determínate way. If it always moves
ences themselves are no longer directly and in the same way, with the same pressure, touch­
properly localized; they no longer form a stra­ ing the same parts of the Body at the same
tum on the Body. Perception, as the touching pace, then the result is obviously always the
apprehension of form, does not have its seat same. Ali this is "obvious," it is there in the
in the touching finger in which the touch sen­ apprehension; precisely under such circum­
sation is localized; thinking is not actually stances this Corporeal body behaves in such a
localized intuitively in the head, the way the way that it is not to be stimulated in just any
impressions of tension are, etc. That we very way but is stimulatable in a definite way un­
often speak as if it were so is no proof that der definite circumstances, and such that ali
we actually apprehend it that way in intui­ effects of stimulation have their system, and
tion. The co-intertwined contents of sensation to the system of thingly bodies appearing in
have a localization which is actually intuitive­ it there correspond distinctions as to place,
ly given, but the intentionalities do not, and whereby, however, to each such place per­
only metaphorically are they said to be relat­ tains a definite, dependent on the type of the
ed to the Body or to be in the Body. stimulation-effect, further dimension of pos­
sible distinctions. To the place in the extension
§40. More precision concerning the corresponds a place-moment in the sensation,
localization of the sensings and con­ and to the degrees of stimulation and kinds
cerning the non-thingly properties of of stimulation correspond definite moments
the Body which render the sensation concrete and
modifiable according to more or less known
Now, if ali that belongs to the matter is ways. Thus there lies in the sensations an ar­
Bodily localized or is, by means of localiza­ der which "coincides" with the appearing ex­
tion, related to the Body and is constitutive, tension; but that is already implicit in the ap­
therewith, for the Body in the Objectivity prehension from the outset, in such a way that
proper to it, then we need to ask how this con­ the stimulation-effects do not appear as some­
stitution is to be understood and what it is that thing alien and as just an effect, but rather as
institutes unity here. The physical Body is, of something pertaining to the appearing Corpo­
course, a constituted unity, and only to it does real body and to the extensive order, and as
the stratum of the sensings belong. How is the something ordered in a coincident order. In each
content of the sensation connected to what is Bodily sensation, the mere sensation is not
constituted, and how does the Body, which is grasped, but it is apprehended as belonging to
equally a material thing, have in itself and on a system of possible functional consequences
itself the contents of sensation? It is certainly which corresponds exactly to the extensive ar­
not in the way in which the sensation-con­ der, consequences that the material real must
tent, tone quality, and the sensation-content, in­ undergo in consistent parallels with possible
tensity, have an essential unity, nor is it the material effects. We must also note that the
way in which the sensation-content, color, is fields of sensation in question here are always
unified with the moment of spread (we do not completely filled, and each new stimulation
mean here spatial extension, talk of which does not provoke a sensation as if for the first
makes no sense with regard to sensation-con­ time, but rather, it provokes in the sensation­
tents ). Here we have on the one side not sen­ field a corresponding change in the sensation.
sation-contents but constituted real unities in­ Hence the field undergoes an apprehension as
stead, and is it really the case that we have something changeable in manifold ways and
mere sensation-contents on the other side? as dependent on extension in the type of its
Let us reflect. If an object moves mechanically changeableness. The field receives localization,
over the surface of my skin, touching it, then I and in the field each new change receives lo-
182 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

calization as a consequence of the particu­ other than the ones material things have
lar stimulating circumstances. The new strat­ amongst themselves. (lt has already been
um the thing has received by means of the lo­ mentioned, and it will be discussed with more
calization of the field acquires, with respect to precision in what follows, that the Body, in
the constancy of the field, the character of a addition, as a material thing like ali others, is
kind of real property. The Body, we can say, fit within the nexus of reality in a more strict
always has states of sensation, and which par­ sense, namely, the one of causal regulation.)
ticular ones it has depends on the concomi­ lt pertains in general to the intuition of some­
tant system of real circumstances under which thing real to leave open, in this intuition's ap­
it senses. Under the real circumstances of the prehension, further real dependencies which
"sting" in this or that part of the Body, there do not yet belong to the content of the execut­
emerges in the sensation field (as a field of ed apprehension in a determínate way (al­
states) the state of sensation, "sting-sensation." though they may be determínate in their speci­
Under the real circumstances we call entrance fic nature). The real can therefore be related,
into a hot room, a change occurs in the total in new apprehensions and in extensions of
localized field with respect to its total stratum old ones, to new circumstances as something
of warmth sensation in the sense of rising tem­ dependent on them, whereby real properties
perature, etc. The sensitiveness of the Body of the same real object are constituted. The
thus is constituted throughout as a "condition­ sense of the expanded apprehension then pre­
al" or psychophysical property. And that en­ scribes the type which the course of experi­
ters into the apprehension of the Body, as it is ence has to bear out and determine more pre­
perceived "externally." To the apprehension cisely. With this more precise determination
of Corporeality as such belongs not only the the apprehension itself then necessarily takes
apprehension of a thing but also the ca-ap­ on fuller form.
prehension of the sensation fields, and indeed In this way, even the Body is apprehended
these are given as belonging, in the mode of not only as dependent with respect to the pri­
localization, to the appearing Corporeal body. mary stratum of sensation, its properly local­
"Belonging": phenomenologically, this term ized one, but also with respect to the fields of
expresses relations of the phenomenal "if­ sensation and groups of sensation that pertain
then": if my hand is touched or struck, then to it mediately and are not properly localized,
I sense it. We do not here have the hand as thus, e.g., with respect to the field of vision.
physical body and, connected with it, an extra­ How the visual field of sensation is filled, which
physical consequence. From the very outset it motivations can occur therein, and conse­
is apperceptively characterized as a hand with quently what in the visual field can be experi­
its field of sensation, with its constantly co-ap­ enced by the subject, and in which modes of
prehended state of sensation which changes in appearance it must be exhibited, this ali de­
consequence of the externa) actions on it, i.e., pends on certain qualities of the Body, espe­
as a physical-aesthesiological unity. In the ab­ cially on those of the eye, and, furthermore,
stract, I can separate the physical and aesthe­ on the eye's Bodily connections, especially its
siological strata but can do so precisely only connections with the central nervous system,
in the abstract. In the concrete perception, and even more particularly it depends on this
the Body is there as a new sort of unity of ap­ system itself and, on the other hand, on the
prehension. lt is constituted as an Objectivity concomitant externa) stimulations. Along with
in its own right, which fits under the formal­ that, hence, are constituted new real properties
universal concept of reality, as a thing that pre­ of the Body, which, thereby, is obviously in­
serves its identical properties over against volved as already constituted from elsewhere.
changing externa] circumstances. The rela­ So the capacity to be stimulated in general be­
tions of dependency under which it stands comes a universal title for a class of real prop­
toward externa) nature are thereby, however, erties which have quite another source than
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 183

the properly extensive (and therewith materi­ ties (sense faculties, faculties of free move­
al) properties of the thing and which in fact ment, of apperception, etc.) is constituted,
pertain to a quite different dimension. For whereby the Body comes to light, at one and
through this stratum, through this new group the same time, as Body and as material thing.
of real properties which display themselves In this regard, however, we made the restric­
as real insofar as they are constituted through tion that the Body emerges as a thing of a
a relation to real circumstances within the particular type, so that one cannot, without
real, the material Body is intertwined with the qualification, assign it to nature as a part just
soul. What can be apprehended as localized like any other part. This is what we must dis­
stratum of the Body as well as what can be ap­ cuss somewhat more precisely.
prehended as dependent on the Body (in the
full sense of Body, including this stratum al­ A) THE BODY AS CENTER OF ORIENTATION
ready) and on the "sense organs," ali this forms,
under the heading of the matter of conscious­ If we consider the characteristic way in
ness, an underlying basis of consciousness and which the Body presents itself and do the
undergoes its realizing apprehension in unity same for things, then we find the following situ­
with this consciousness as soul and psychic ation: each Ego has its own domain of per­
Ego. To say that this Ego, or the soul, "has" a ceptual things and necessarily perceives the
Body does not merely mean that there exists a things in a certain orientation. The things ap­
physical-material thing which would, through pear and do so from this or that side, and in
its material processes, present real precondi­ this mode of appearing is included irrevoca­
tions for "conscious events" or even, con­ bly a relation to a here and its basic directions.
versely, that in its processes there occur depen­ Ali spatial being necessarily appears in such
dencies on conscious events within a "stream a way that it appears either nearer or far­
of consciousness." Causality belongs, if the ther, above or below, right or left. This holds
word is to retain its pregnant sense, to reality, with regard to ali points of the appearing
and conscious events participate in reality only corporeality, which then have their differences
as psychic states or as states of a psychic Ego. in relation to one another as regards this near­
Soul and psychic Ego "have" a Body; there ness, this above and below, etc., among which
exists a material thing, of a certain nature, there are hereby peculiar qualities of appear­
which is not merely a material thing but is a ance, stratified like dimensions. The Body then
Body, i.e., a material thing which, as local­ has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction
ization field for sensations and for stirrings of of bearing in itself the zero point of ali these
feelings, as complex of sense organs, and as orientations. One of its spatial points, even if
phenomenal partner and counter-part of ali not an actually seen one, is always character­
perceptions of things (along with whatever ized in the mode of the ultimate central here:
else could be said about it, based on the above), that is, a here which has no other here out­
makes up a fundamental component of the side of itself, in relation to which it would
real givenness of the soul and the Ego. be a "there." lt is thus that ali things of the
surrounding world possess an orientation to
§41. Constitution of the Body as the Body, just as, accordingly, ali expres­
material thing in contrast to other sions of orientation imply this relation. The
material things •· "far" is far from me, from my Body; the "to
the right" refers back to the right side of my
We have seen how, correlative to the mate­ Body, e.g., to my right hand. In virtue of its
rial world, a subject of Bodily-psychic facul- faculty of free mobility, the subject can now

*Cf. pp. l 76f.

184 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

induce the flow of the system of its appear­ in the perception of it itself and is a remark­
ances and, along with that, the orientations. ably imperfectly constituted thing.
These changes do not have the significance
of changes of the things of the environment e) THE Booy AS INTEGRAL PART OF THE
themselves, and specifically, they do not sig­ CAUSAL NEXUS
nify a movement of the things. The Body of
the subject "alters its position" in space; the If, despite all this, we apprehend the Body
things appearing in the environment are con­ as a real thing, it is because we find it integrat­
stantly oriented thereby; all appearances of ed into the causal nexus of material nature. We
things preserve their fixed system according spoke of the peculiarity the Body has (as Body)
to form. The form of intuition, the lawful char­ of being moved "spontaneously" or "freely"
acter of the adumbrations, and, therewith, the by the will of the Ego. Besides these free kin­
form of the arder of orientation around a esthetic processes, others emerge which, in­
center, ali this is necessarily preserved. But stead of being "done by," are characterized as
whereas the subject is always, at every now, being "done to," i.e., as passive processes in
in the center, in the here, whence it sees the which spontaneity plays no part. In that case,
things and penetrates into the world by vision, we have at the same time an experiencing of
on the other hand the Objective place, the the mechanical process of the movement of
spatial position, of the Ego, ar of its Body, is the Body and a givenness of this process with
a changing one. the "psychic" character of enduring some­
Nevertheless, at the present stage of our thing-not as if it were something painful or
investigation we are not at all so advanced repugnant but simply in the sense that "my
that we could assign to the Ego such an "Ob­ hand is moved, my foot is struck, pushed," etc.
jective place." Provisionally, we must say: I Similarly, I experience the mechanical move­
have all things over and against me; they are ment of the Body as the movement of a ma­
all "there"-with the exception of one and terial thing like any other thing even in the
only one, namely the Body, which is always case of spontaneity, and I find it characterized
"here." at the same time as a spontaneous movement
in the sense, "I move my hand," etc.
B) PECULIARITY OF THE MANIFOLDS OF Thus movements of my Body are appre­
APPEARANCE OF THE Booy hended as mechanical processes Iike those of
externa! things, and the Body itself is appre­
Other peculiar properties of the Body are hended as a thing which affects others and
conjoined with its distinctive character as upan which the others have effects. Ali the
we have described it. Whereas, with regard to cases mentioned earlier of conditional rela­
all other things, I have the freedom to change tions between things and the Body also admit
at will my position in relation to them and of changes in apprehension, thanks to which
thereby at the same time vary at will the mani­ the processes in question appear as merely
folds of appearance in which they come to physical ones. If a heavy body is resting on
givenness far me, on the other hand I do not my hand ( or perhaps the one hand on the oth­
have the possibility of distancing myself er) then I have, abstracting from the resul­
from my Body, or my Body from me, and ac­ tant sensation of pressure or pain, the physical
cordingly the manifolds of appearance of the phenomenon of one body pressing on another,
Body are restricted in a definite way: certain perhaps deforming it by its pressure. If I cut
of my corporeal parts can be seen by me only my finger with a knife, then a physical body is
in a peculiar perspectiva! foreshortening, and split by the driving into it of a wedge, the fluid
others (e.g., the head) are altogether invisi­ contained in it trickles out, etc. Likewise, the
ble to me. The same Body which serves me physical thing, "my Body," is heated or cooled
as means far all my perception obstructs me through contact with hot or cold bodies; it can
Perception, Spatiality, and the Body 185

become electrically charged through contact "outer attitude"-it presents itself as a reality
with an electric current; it assumes different sui generis. That is: on the one hand, as ama­
colors under changing illumination; and one terial thing of special modes of appearance, a
can elicit noises from it by striking it. The last thing "inserted" between the rest of the mate­
two cases, however. are different from the ear­ rial world and the "subjective" sphere (the sub­
lier ones where there was a psychophysical ject together with what was just mentioned
process that could be split apart abstractively in 1 ), as a center around which the rest of
into a physical process and its "psychical" the spatial world is arranged, and as being in
consequence (or vice versa). But the physical causal relationship with the real externa! world.
process, "red illumination of my hand," is not On the other hand, the Body appears here at
followed by the sensation of red in the same the same time as a "turning point" where the
way that the sensation of warmth follows the causal relations are transformed into condi­
heating of my hand, and the physical process tional relations between the externa! world
to which the sensation of the color is linked and the Bodily-psychic subject. And in virtue
-red light rays striking my eyes-is not giv­ of that, the Body appears as pertaining inte­
en to me at ali. The "turning point," which lies grally to this subject and its properties, both
in the Body, the point of the transformation the specifically Corporeal and the psychic
from causal to conditional process, is hidden ones bound up with them. That which is con­
from me. stituted in the outer attitude is there co-pres­
ent together with what is constituted in the
§42. Character of the Body as consti­ inner attitude.
tuted solipsistically In solipsistic experience, however, we do
not attain the givenness of our self as a spatial
If we now try, in a short summary, to char­ thing like ali others (a givenness which certainly
acterize the way a Body is constituted for the is manifest in our factual experience) nor that
solipsistic subject, then we find that: of the natural Object, "man" (animal being),
1) viewed from "within"-in the "inner at­ which we carne to know as correlate of the
titude"-it appears as a freely moving organ "naturalistic attitude," a material thing upon
( or system of such organs) by means of which which the higher strata of what is specifically
the subject experiences the externa! world. Fur­ animal are built and into which they are, in a
thermore, the Body appears as a bearer of sen­ certain way, inserted, "introjected." In order to
sations, and, thanks to their intertwining with attain that, a different path has to be followed;
the rest of psychic life in its totality, it appears one must go beyond his own subjectivity and
as forming, with the soul, a concrete unity. turn to the animalia encountered in the exter­
2) Approached from the outside-in the na! world.
186 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

11. A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of

Internal Time

Analysis of the Consciousness of as an objectivity or as a moment of an objec­

Time* tivity only through this constitution, a phenom­
enological analysis of time cannot clarify the
§7. Interpretation of the grasping of constitution of time without considering the
temporal objects as momentary grasp­ constitution of temporal objects. By temporal
ing and as enduring act objects in the specific sense we understand ob­
jects that are not only unities in time but
How are we to understand the apprehen­ that also contain temporal extension in them­
sion of transcendent temporal objects that are selves. When a tone sounds, my objectivating
extended over a duration, continuously filling apprehension can make the tone itself, which
it in the same way (as unchanging things do) endures and fades away, into an object and yet
or filling it as constantly changing (as in the not make the duration of the tone or the tone
case, for example, of physical processes, mo­ in its duration into an object. The latter-the
tion, alteration, and the like)? Objects of this tone in its duration-is a temporal object. The
kind become constituted in a multiplicity of same is true of a melody, of any change what­
immanent data and apprehensions, which them­ soever, but also of any persistence without
selves run off as a succession. Is it possible to change, considered as such. Let us take the
unite these successively elapsing representing example of a melody or of a cohesive part of
data in one now-moment? In that case, the en­ a melody. The matter seems very simple at first:
tirely new question arises: How, in addition we hear the melody, that is, we perceive it, for
to "temporal objects," immanent and tran­ hearing is indeed perceiving. However, the first
scendent, does time itself-the duration and tone sounds, then comes the second tone, then
succession of objects-become constituted? the third, and so on. Must we not say: When
These different lines of description (indicat­ the second tone sounds, I hear it, but I no long­
ed only in passing here and requiring still fur­ er hear the first tone, etc.? In truth, then, I do
ther differentiation) must indeed be kept in not hear the melody but only the single pres­
mind during the analysis, although ali of these ent tone. That the elapsed part of the melody
questions belong closely together and no one is something objective for me, I owe-or so
of them can be answered apart from the oth­ one will be inclined to say-to memory; and
ers. It is certainly evident that the perception that I do not presuppose, with the appearance
of a temporal object itself has temporality, of the currently intended tone, that this is ali,
that the perception of duration itself presup­ I owe to anticipatory expectation. But we
poses the duration of perception, that the per­ cannot be content with this explanation, for
ception of any temporal form itself has its everything that we have said carries over to
temporal form. If we disregard ali transcen­ the individual tone. Each tone has a temporal
dencies, there remains to perception in ali of extension itself. When it begins to sound, I
its phenomenological constituents the phe­ hear it as now; but while it continues to sound
nomenological temporality that belongs to its it has an ever new now, and the now that
irreducible essence. Since objective temporal­ immediately precedes it changes into a past.
ity always becomes constituted phenomeno­ Therefore at any given time I hear only the
logically and stands before us in appearance actually present phase of the tone, and the ob-

*PCIT, pp. 23 (line 15)-46, 52-75 (Sections 7-18 and 23-33), with reconstructed Appendix I (pp. 119 [lines 30-
35], 105 [line 6]-107 [line 16], 119 [line 39]-120 [line 33]) to Section 11.
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 187

jectivity of the whole enduring tone is con­ "for a time" in "retention" as having been; it
stituted in an act-continuum that is in part can be held fast and stand or remain fixed in
memory, in smallest punctual part perception, our regard. The whole extent of the tone's du­
and in fürther part expectation. This seems to ration or "the" tone in its extension then stands
lead back to Brentano's theory. Here, then, a before me as something dead, so to speak­
deeper analysis must begin. something no longer being vitally generated,
a formation no longer animated by the gen­
§ 8. Immanent temporal objects and erati ve point of the now but continuously
their modes of appearance modified and sinking back into "emptiness."
The modification of the whole extent, then, is
We now exclude all transcendent appre­ analogous to or essentially identical with the
hension and positing and take the tone purely modification that the elapsed part of the dura­
as a hyletic datum. lt begins and ends; and af­ tion undergoes in the transition of conscious­
ter it has ended, its whole duration-unity, the ness to ever new productions during the time
unity of the whole process in which it begins that the tone is actually present.
and ends, "recedes" into the ever more distant What we have described here is the man­
past. In this sinking back, I still "hold onto it," ner in which the object in immanent time "ap­
have it in a "retention." And as long as the re­ pears" in a continua! flow, the manner in which
tention lasts, the tone has its own temporality; it is "given." To describe this manner does not
it is the same, its duration is the same. I can mean to describe the appearing temporal dura­
direct my attention to the way in which it is tion itself, for it is the same tone with the
given. I am conscious of the tone and of the duration belonging to it that, indeed, was not
duration it fills in a continuity of "modes," in described but presupposed in the description.
a "continual flow." And one point, one phase The same duration is present duration actual­
of this flow is called "consciousness of the ly building itself up and then is past, "elapsed"
commencing tone"; and in this phase I am duration, duration that is still intended or that
conscious of the first time-point of the tone's is produced in recollection "as if" it were new.
duration in the mode of the now. The tone is lt is the same tone that now sounds of which
given; that is, I am conscious of it as now. But it is said in the "later" flow of consciousness
I am conscious of it as now "as long as" any that it has been, that its duration has elapsed.
one of its phases is intended as now. How­ The points of the temporal duration recede for
ever, if any temporal phase (corresponding to my consciousness in a manner analogous to
a time-point of the tone-duration) is an actu­ that in which the points of an object stationary
ally present now (with the exception of the in space recede for my consciousness when I
initial phase), then I am conscious of a conti­ remove "myself" from the object. The object
nuity of phases as "immediately past" and of keeps its place, just as the tone keeps its time.
the whole extent of the temporal duration from Each time-point is fixed, but it flies into the
the beginning-point up to the now-point as distance for consciousness. The distance from
elapsed. I am not yet conscious of the remain­ the generative now becomes greater and great­
ing extent of the duration, however. When the er. The tone itself is the same, but the tone "in
final point is reached, I am conscious of this the manner in which" it appears is continual­
point itself as the now-point and of the whole ly different.
duration as elapsed (or I am conscious of it as
elapsed at the beginning-point of the new ex­ §9. The consciousness of the appear­
tent of time, which is no longer a tonal extent). ances of immanent objects
"Throughout" this whole flow of conscious­
ness, one and the same tone is intended as On closer examination, we can distinguish
enduring, as now enduring. "Beforehand" (in still other lines of description here. 1. We can
the event that it was not expected), it is not make evident statements about the imma­
intended. "Afterwards," it is "still" intended nent object in itself: that it now endures; that
188 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

a certain part of the duration has elapsed; sort of temporal perspective (within the origi­
that the point of the tone's duration grasped in nal temporal appearance) as an analogue of
the now (with its tone-content, of course) con­ the spatial perspective. In receding into the
tinuously sinks back into the past and that an past, the temporal object contracts and in the
ever new point of the duration enters into the process also becomes obscure.
now or is now; that the elapsed duration moves Now it is a matter of investigating more
away from the actually present now-point, closely what we are able to find and describe
which is constantly filled in sorne way, and here as the phenomenon of time-constituting
recedes into the ever more "distant" past, and consciousness, of the consciousness in which
the like. 2. But we can also talk about the way temporal objects with their temporal determi­
in which we are "conscious" of all such dif­ nations become constituted. We distinguish
ferences pertaining to the "appearing" of the the enduring, immanent object and the object
immanent tone and of its duration-content. in its way of appearing, the object intended as
We speak of perception in connection with the actually present or as past. Every temporal be­
tone-duration that reaches into the actually ing "appears" in sorne running-off mode that
present now and say that the tone, the endur­ changes continuously, and in this change the
ing tone, is perceived, and that at any given "object in its mode of running off" is always
instant, of the extended duration of the tone, and ever a different object. And yet we con­
only the point of the duration characterized as tinue to say that the object and each point of
now is perceived in the fully proper sense. We its time and this time itself are one and the
say of the elapsed extent that it is intended in same. We will not be able to term this appear­
retentions; specifically, the parts of the dura­ ance-the "object in its mode of running off"
tion or phases of the duration lying closest to -"consciousness" (any more than we will give
the actually present now-point, and which can­ the name "consciousness" to the spatial phe­
not be sharply delimited, are intended with nomenon, the body in its way of appearing
diminishing clarity. The more remote phases from this side or that, from near or far). The
-those lying further back in the past-are "consciousness," the "experience," is related
entirely obscure and emptily intended. And to its object by means of an appearance in
the situation is the same after the whole dura­ which precisely the "object in its way of ap­
tion has elapsed: What lies nearest to the actu­ pearing" [ "Objekt im Wie "J stands before us.
ally present now, depending on its distance Obviously we must recognize our references
from it, perhaps has a little clarity; the whole to intentionality as ambiguous, depending on
[then] disappears into obscurity, into an empty whether we have in view the relation of the
retentional consciousness, and finally disap­ appearance to what appears or the relation of
pears altogether (if one is permitted to assert consciousness, on the one hand, to "what ap­
that) as soon as retention ceases. * pears in its way of appearing" and, on the oth­
We find in the sphere of clarity a greater er hand, to what appears simpliciter.
distinctness and separation (the more so the
closer the sphere lies to the actually present § 1 O. The continua of the running-off
now). But the further we move from the now, phenomena. The diagram of time
the greater the fusion and compression that
manifests itself. A reflective penetration of the We would prefer to avoid, then, the use of
unity of a many-membered process lets us ob­ the word "appearances" for the phenomena
serve that an articulated part of the process that constitute immanent temporal objects;
"contracts" as it sinks back into the past-a for these phenomena are themselves imma-

*lt obviously suggests itself to put these modes of appearance and consciousness of temporal objects in parallel to
the modes in which a spatial thing appears and is intended in its changing orientation; moreover, it suggests itself to
investigate the "temporal orientations" in which spatial things (which are indeed also temporal objects) appear. Never­
theless, we remain for the present within the immanent sphere.
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 189

nent objects and are "appearances" in an en­ steady progression of the running-off modes
tirely different sense. We speak here of the "run­ we then find the remarkable circumstance that
ning-off phenomena," or better still, of the each later running-off phase is itself a con­
"modes of temporal orientation"; and with re­ tinuity, a continuity that constantly expands, a
spect to the immanent objects themselves, we continuity of pasts. To the continuity of run­
speak of their "running-off characters" (e.g., ning-off modes of the object's duration, we
now, past). We know that the running-off phe­ contrast the continuity of running-off modes
nomenon is a continuity of constant changes. belonging to each point of the duration. This
This continuity forms an inseparable unity, in­ second continuity is obviously included in the
separable into extended sections that could ex­ first, the continuity of running-off modes of
ist by themselves and inseparable into phases the object's duration. The running-off continu­
that could exist by themselves, into points of ity of an enduring object is therefore a con­
the continuity. The parts that we single out by tinuum whose phases are the continua of the
abstraction can exist only in the whole run­ running-off modes belonging to the different
ning-off; and this is equally true of the phases, time-points of the duration of the object. If
the points that belong to the running-off con- we proceed along the concrete continuity, we

p
AE - The series of now-points.
AA' - Sinking into the past.
EA' - Continuum of phases (now-point
�: with horizon of the past).
A�
A....,,,.-------..::,------
1 E�- The series of nows perhaps
filled with other objects.

tinuity. We can also say of this continuity, with move forward in a process of constant modi­
evidence, that in a certain sense it is immut­ fications; and in this process, the running-off­
able; that is, with regard to its form. lt is in­ mode-that is, the running-off continuity of
concei vable that the continuity of phases the time-points in question-changes continu­
would contain the same phase-mode twice ously. Since a new now is always entering on
or even contain it as stretched over an entire the scene, the now changes into a past; and as
component section. Just as each point of time it does so, the whole running-off continuity of
(and each extent of time) differs "individually," pasts belonging to the preceding point moves
so to speak, from every other one and just as "downwards" uniformly into the depths of
no one of them can occur twice, so no running­ the past. In our diagram, the continuous series
off mode can occur twice. We will still have to of ordinates illustrates the running-off modes
make further distinctions and provide clear­ of the enduring object. They grow from A (one
er descriptions here, however. First of all, we point) into a determínate extent, which has
emphasize that the running-off modes of an the last now as its final point. Then the series
immanent temporal object have a beginning, a of running-off modes that no longer include
source-point, so to speak. This is the running­ a now (that is, a now belonging to this dura­
off mode with which the immanent object be­ tion) begins; the duration is no longer actual­
gins to exist. lt is characterized as now. In the ly present but past, and continuously sinking
190 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

deeper into the past. The diagram therefore past in the form of a series of adumbrations.
gives a complete picture of the double conti­ But it is not the case here that in the horizon­
nuity of running-off modes. tal direction of the flow each earlier retention
is simply replaced by a new one, even if con­
§11. Primal impression and retentional tinuously. Rather, each later retention is not
modi-fication only continual modification that has arisen
from primal impression; each is also continu­
The "source-point" with which the "produc­ al modification of all earlier continuous modi­
tion" of the enduring object begins is a primal fications of that same initial point.
impression. This consciousness is in a state of Up to now we have taken into considera­
constant change: the tone-now present "in per­ tion principally the perception or original
son" continuously changes (scil. consciously, constitution of temporal objects and have at­
"in" consciousness) into something that has tempted to understand analytically the time­
been; an always new tone-now continuously consciousness given in them. But conscious­
relieves the one that has passed over into ness of temporality is not achieved solely in
modification. But when the consciousness of this form. When a temporal object has elapsed,
the tone-now, the primal impression, passes when the actual duration is finished, the con­
over into retention, this retention itself is a sciousness of the now-past object by no means
now in tum, something actually existing. While expires with the object, although it now no
it is actually present itself (but not an actual­ longer functions as perceptual consciousness,
ly present tone), it is retention ofthe tone that or said better perhaps, as impressional con­
has been. A ray of meaning can be directed to­ sciousness. (As before, we have immanent ob­
wards the now: towards the retention; but it jects in view here, which properly speaking
can also be directed towards what is reten­ are not constituted in a "perception.") Pri­
tionally intended: towards the past tone. Ev­ mary memory, or as we said, retention, con­
ery actually present now of consciousness, tinuously attaches itself to the "impression."
however, is subject to the law of modification. At bottom, we have already analyzed this
lt changes into retention of retention and does consciousness in the case considered earlier.
so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed con­ For the continuity of phases that attached it­
tinuum of retention arises in such a way that self to the actual "now" was nothing other
each later point is retention for every earlier than such a retention or continuity of retentions.
point. And each retention is already a con­ In the case of the perception of a temporal ob­
tinuum. The tone begins and "it" steadily con­ ject (whether we take an immanent or tran­
tinues. The tone-now changes into a tone­ scendent object makes no difference in the
having-been; the impressional consciousness, present consideration), the perception termi­
constantly flowing, passes over into ever new nates at any moment in a now-apprehension,
retentional consciousness. Going along the in a perception in the sense of a positing-as­
flow or with it, we have a continuous series of now. During the time that a motion is being
retentions pertaining to the beginning-point. perceived, a grasping-as-now takes place mo­
Beyond that, however, each earlier point of ment by moment; and in this grasping, the
this series is adumbrated in its turn as a now actually present phase of the motion itself
in the sense of retention. Thus a continuity of becomes constituted. But this now-apprehen­
retentional modifications attaches itself to sion is, as it were, the head attached to the
each of these retentions, and this continuity comet's tail of retentions relating to the ear­
itself is again an actually present point that lier now-points of the motion. However, if
is retentionally adumbrated. This does not lead perception no longer occurs, if we no longer
to a simple infinite regress, since each reten­ see the motion, or-if it is a melody that is in
tion is in itself continuous modification that question-the melody has run its course and
carries within, so to speak, the heritage of the silence has ensued, then the perception's final
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 191

phase is not followed by a new phase of the A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a
percepti9n but simply by a phase of fresh past tone, exemplify it, pictorialize it; but that
memory, which in its tum is followed by an­ already presupposes another representation
other phase of fresh memory, and so on. Thus of the past. The intuition of the past cannot it­
a pushing back into the past continually oc­ self be a pictorialization. It is an original con­
curs. The same continuous complex inces­ sciousness. We cannot deny, of course, that
santly undergoes a modification until it dis­ there are echoes. But when we recognize and
appears; for a weakening, which finally ends distinguish them, we can easily confirm that
in imperceptibility, goes hand in hand with the they obviously do not belong to retention as
modification. The original temporal field is retention but to perception. The reverberation
manifestly limited, precisely as in perception's of a violín tone is precisely a feeble present
case. Indeed, on the whole, one might dare to violín tone and is absolutely different from
assert that the temporal field always has the the retention of the loud tone that has just
same extension. It moves, as it were, over the passed. The echoing itself and after-images of
perceived and freshly remembered motion any sort left behind by the stronger data of
and its objective time in the same way as the sensation, far from having to be ascribed nec­
visual field moves over objective space. *, t essarily to the essence of retention, have noth­
ing at all to do with it.
§ 12. Retention as a unique kind of But it surely does belong to the essence of
intentionality the intuition of time that in each point of its
duration (which we can make into an object
It still remains for us to discuss in a more reflectively) it is consciousness of what has
precise way what sort of modification it is that just been and not merely consciousness of the
we have designated as retentional. One speaks now-point of the object that appears as en­
of the dying-away, the fading, and so on, of during. And what has just been is intended in
the contents of sensation when perception this consciousness in its corresponding conti­
proper passes over into retention. Now it is nuity, and in each phase it is intended in a de­
already clear, following our explanations up terminate "mode of appearance" with the dis­
to this point, that the retentional "contents" tinctions of "content" and "apprehension." We
are not at all contents in the original sense. focus our attention on the whistle that is now
When a tone dies away, it itself is sensed at sounding: in each point an extension stands
first with particular fullness (intensity); and before me, and it stands before me in an ex­
then there follows a rapid weakening in in­ tension of "appearance." In each phase of this
tensity. The tone is still there, still sensed, but extension, the appearance has its moment of
in mere reverberation. This genuine tone-sen­ quality and its moment of apprehension. On
sation must be distinguished from the tonal the other hand, the moment of quality is not a
moment in retention. The retentional tone is real quality, not a tone that would really exist
not a present tone but precisely a tone "prima­ at present-that is, that could be taken as a
rily remembered" in the now: it is not really now-existing, though immanent, tone-content.
on hand in the retentional consciousness. But The real content of the consciousness of the
neither can the tonal moment that belongs to now possibly contains sensed tones; these
this consciousness be a different tone that is sensed tones must then necessarily be charac­
really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak terized in objectivating apprehension as per­
tone equivalent in quality (such as an echo). ceived tones, as present tones, but in no way

*The limitation of the temporal field is not taken into consideration in the diagram. No ending of retention is
foreseen there, and idealiter a consciousness is probably even possible in which everything remains preserved
retentionally.
tWith respect to the foregoing. cf. Appendix I: Primal Impression and Its Continuum of Modifications, pp. 210ff.
192 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

as past. Retentional consciousness really con­ tional phase is itself conceivable only as a
tains consciousness of the past of the tone, pri­ point belonging to such a continuum; and this
mary memory of the tone, and must not be di­ is true of every now of time-consciousness.
vided into sensed tone and apprehension as But then even a completely finished series of
memory. Just as a phantasy-tone is not a tone retentions would not be conceivable without
but the phantasy of the tone, or just as tone­ a corresponding perception preceding it. This
phantasy and tone-sensation are essentially dif­ implies that the series of retentions that be­
ferent things and not by any chance the same longs to a now is itself a limit and necessarily
thing only differently interpreted or appre­ undergoes modification; what is remembered
hended, so too the tone primarily remembered "sinks further and further into the past." But
in intuition is something fundamentally and not only that-it is necessarily something sunk­
essentially different from the perceived tone; en, something that necessarily permits an evi­
and correlatively, primary memory (retention) dent recollection that traces it back to a now
of the tone is something different from sensa­ that is given once again.
tion of the tone. But then one will say: Can I not have a
memory of A, even a primary memory, when
§13. The necessity that an impression in fact A has not even taken place? Certainly.
precede every retention. Evidence lndeed, I can go even further than that. I can
pertaining to retention also have a perception of A although A is not
occurring in reality at all. And consequently
Now does there exist a law according to when we have a retention of A (provided that
which primary memory is possible only in A is a transcendent object), we by no means
continuous annexation to a preceding sensa­ assert the having of the retention as evidence
tion or perception? A law according to which that A must have preceded it; but we do in­
each retentional phase is conceivable only as a deed assert it as evidence that A must have
phase; that is, a law according to which the been perceived. Now whether A was heeded
retentional phase cannot be expanded into an primarily or not, it was there "in person" for
extent that would be identical in all of its my consciousness, even if it was unnoticed or
phases? One will say decisively: That is abso­ noticed only incidentally. But if it is a ques­
lutely evident. The empirical psychologist, who tion of an immanent object, the following ob­
is accustomed to treating everything psychic tains: when a succession, a change, or an al­
as mere matter of fact, will deny it, of course. teration of immanent data "appears," it too is
He will say: Why should a beginning con­ absolutely certain. And within a transcendent
sciousness that commences with a fresh perception, the immanent succession that be­
memory, without having been preceded by a longs to its structure essentially is also abso­
perception, not be conceivable? Perception may lutely certain. lt is fundamentally wronghead­
in fact be necessary to the production of fresh ed to argue: How, in the now, can I know of a
memory. lt may in fact be the case that a hu­ not-now, since I cannot compare the not-now
man consciousness can have memories, even -which, of course, no longer exists-with the
primary memories, only after it has had per­ now (namely, with the memory image that I
ceptions; but the opposite is also conceivable. have on hand in the now)? As if it belonged
Over against this, we teach the a priori neces­ to the essence of memory that I take an image
sity that a corresponding perception, or a on hand in the now for another thing similar
corresponding primal impression, precede the to it and that I could and must compare them
retention. Above all, we will have to insist as I do in the case of pictorial representation.
that a phase is conceivable only as a phase, Memory-and this is equally true of reten­
without the possibility of extension. And the tion-is not image-consciousness; it is some­
now-phase is conceivable only as the limit of thing totally different. What is remembered,
a continuity of retentions, just as every reten- of course, does not now exist-otherwise it
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 193

would not be something that has been but some­ they can also occur independently without be­
thing present; and in memory (retention) it is ing joined to perceptions, and these are sec­
not give� as now, otherwise memory, or re­ ondary memories. But serious objections arise
tention, would precisely not be memory but against this view (as we have already pointed
perception (or, respectively, primal impression). out in the criticism of Brentano's theory). Let
A comparing of what is no longer perceived us consider a case of secondary memory: We
but merely intended retentionally with some­ recall, say, a melody that we recently heard at
thing beyond it makes no sense whatsoever. a concert. It is obvious in this case that the
Just as I see being-now in perception and whole memory-phenomenon has exactly the
enduring being in the extended perception as same constitution, mutatis mutandis, as the
it becomes constituted, so I see the past in perception of the melody. Like the perception,
memory, insofar as the memory is primary it has a privileged point: to the now-point of
memory. The past is given in primary memory, the perception corresponds a now-point of
and givenness of the past is memory. the memory. We run through the melody in
Now if we again take up the question phantasy; we hear, "as it were," first the ini­
whether a retentional consciousness is con­ tial tone, then the second tone, and so on. At
ceivable that would not be the continuation of any particular time there is always a tone (or
an impressional consciousness, we must say: tone-phase) in the now-point. The preceding
Such a consciousness is impossible, for ev­ tones, however, are not erased from conscious­
ery retention intrinsically refers back to an im­ ness. Primary memory of the tones that, as it
pression. "Past" and "now" exclude one an­ were, I have just heard and expectation (pro­
other. ldentically the same thing can indeed tention) of the tones that are yet to come fuse
be now and past, but only because it has en­ with the apprehension of the tone that is
dured between the past and the now. now appearing and that, as it were, I am now
hearing. The now-point once again has for
§ 14. Reproduction of temporal objects consciousness a temporal fringe, which is pro­
(secondary memory) duced in a continuity of memorial apprehen­
sions; and the total memory of the melody
We characterized primary memory or re­ consists in a continuum of such continua of
tention as a comet's tail that attaches itself to temporal fringes and, correlatively, in a con­
the perception of the moment. Secondary tinuum of apprehension-continua of the kind
memory, recollection, must be distinguished described. But when the re-presented melody
absolutely from primary memory or retention. has finally run its course, a retention attaches
After the primary memory is over with, a new itself to this quasi-hearing; what is quasi­
memory of this motion, of that melody, can heard continues to fade away for a while-a
emerge. We must now clarify in more detail continuity of apprehension is still there, but
the difference, already indicated, between the no longer as heard. Consequently everything
two. If retention attaches itself to the actually is like perception and primary memory and yet
present perception, whether during its percep­ is not itself perception and primary memory.
tual flow or in continuous union with it after Of course, we do not actually hear and we have
it has completely elapsed, it is natural to say not actually heard when we !et a melody run
at first (as Brentano did) that the actually pres­ its course tone by tone in memory or phan­
ent perception becomes constituted as pre­ tasy. In the earlier case we said: We do actually
sentation on the basis of sensations and that hear, the temporal object itself is perceived,
primary memory becomes constituted as rep­ the melody itself is the object of perception.
resentation [Repriisentation], as re-presenta­ And the times, temporal determinations, and
tion [Vergegenwiirtigung], on the basis of temporal relations are equally given and per­
phantasies. Now just as re-presentations can ceived themselves. And again: After the melo­
attach themselves immediately to perceptions, dy has died away, we no longer have it per-
194 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ceived as present, but we do still have it in sis of retention, as when a melody has elapsed
consciousness. It is not a present melody but that lies within the unity of a retention and
one just past. Its being just past is not mere­ we turn our attention back to (reflect on) a
ly something meant but a given fact, given it­ part of it without producing it afresh. This is
self and therefore "perceived." In opposition an act that is possible for everything that has
to this, the temporal present in recollection is developed in successive steps, even in steps
a remembered, re-presented present; and the of spontaneity-for example, in the successive
past too is a remembered, re-presented past steps of the spontaneity of thinking. Certain­
but not an actually present past, not a per­ ly objectivities produced by thinking are also
ceived past, not a past primarily given and in­ constituted successively. lt therefore seems
tuited. that we can say: Objectivities that are built up
On the other hand, the recollection itself is originally in temporal processes, becoming
presently and originally constituted recollec­ constituted member by member or phase by
tion and afterwards just past recollection. lt phase (as correlates of unitary acts that are
itself is built up in a continuum of primal data continuously and complexly connected), can be
and retentions and in union with them consti­ grasped in a retrospective viewing as if they
tutes (or rather: re-constitutes) an immanent were objects complete in one time-point. But
or transcendent enduring objectivity (depend­ then this givenness definitely points back to
ing on whether the recollection is directed to­ another and "original" givenness.
wards something immanent or towards some­ The looking-toward or looking-back at what
thing transcendent). Retention, on the other is given retentionally-and the retention it­
hand, produces no enduring objectivities (ei­ self-is then fulfilled in re-presentation prop­
ther originally or reproductively) but only holds er: what is given as just having been shows
in consciousness what has been produced and itself to be identical with what is recollected.
stamps on it the character of the "just past." Further differences between primary and
secondary memory will emerge if we put them
§15. Reproduction's modes of accom­ in relation to perception.
plishment
§16. Perception as presentation in
Now recollection can occur in different distinction from retention and recollec­
forms of accomplishment. Either we execute tion
it in a simple grasping, as when a memory
"rises to the surface" and we look at what is re­ The use of the word "perception" requires,
membered in a flash. In this case what is re­ of course, sorne further elucidation at this point.
membered is vague; perhaps the memory brings In the case of the "perception of the melody,"
forward, intuitively, a privileged momentary we distinguish the tone given now, calling it
phase, but it does not repeat its object. Or we the "perceived" tone, and the tones that are over
execute a memory that actually does repro­ with, calling them "not perceived." On the other
duce and repeat, a memory in which the tem­ hand, we call the whole melody a perceived
poral object is completely built up afresh in melody, even though only the now-point is
a continuum of re-presentations and in which perceived. We proceed in this way because
we perceive it again, as it were-but only "as the extension of the melody is not only given
it were." The whole process is a re-presenta­ point by point in the extension of the act of
tional modification of the perceptual process perceiving, but the unity of the retentional
with ali of the latter's phases and stages right consciousness still "holds on to" the elapsed
down to and including the retentions: but ev­ tones themselves in consciousness and pro­
erything has the index of reproductive modi­ gressively brings about the unity of the con­
fication. sciousness that is related to the unitary tem­
We also find the simple looking-at or ap­ poral object, to the melody. An objectivity
prehending [occurring] immediately on the ba- such as a melody cannot be "perceived" or
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 195

originally given itself otherwise than in this extent of time, and such objects can become
form. The constituted act, * built from con­ constituted only in acts that constitute the very
sciousness of the now and retentional con­ differences belonging to time. But time-con­
sciousness, is adequate perception of the tem­ stituting acts are---essentially-acts that con­
poral object. This object must include temporal stitute the present and the past; they have the
distinctions, and temporal distinctions are con­ character of those "perceptions of temporal
stituted precisely in such acts-in primal con­ objects" that we have fully described with
sciousness, retention, and protention. If the in­ respect to their remarkable apprehensional
tentional act of meaning is aimed at the melody, constitution. Temporal objects must become
at the whole object, then we have nothing but constituted in this way. That implies: an act
perception. But if it is aimed at the single tone claiming to give a temporal object itself must
ali by itself or at a measure by itself, then we contain in itself "apprehensions of the now,"
have perception precisely as long as what is "apprehensions of the past," and so on; spe­
meant is perceived and sheer retention as soon cifically, as originally constituting apprehen­
as it is past. With respect to objectivity, the s10ns.
measure then no longer appears as "present" Now if we relate the use of the word "per­
but as "past." But the whole melody appears ception" to the differences in givenness with
as present as long as it still sounds, as long as which temporal objects present themselves,
tones belonging to it and meant in one nexus the antithesis of perception is the primary
of apprehension still sound. It is past only after memory and the primary expectation (reten­
the final tone is gane. tion and protention) that occur here; in which
Considering our earlier explanations, we case, perception and nonperception continu­
must say that this relativity carries over to the ously blend into one another. In the conscious­
individual tones. Each tone becomes constituted ness that belongs to the directly intuitive grasp
in a continuity of tone-data; and at any given of a temporal object-of a melody, for ex­
time, only one punctual phase is presentas now, ample-the measure or tone or part of a tone
while the others are attached as a retentional now being heard is perceived, and what is mo­
tail. But we can say: A temporal object is per­ mentarily intuited as past is not perceived. The
ceived (or intended impressionally) as long as apprehensions continuously blend into one
it is still being generated in continuously emerg­ another here; they termínate in an apprehen­
ing new primal impressions. sion that constitutes the now, but which is only
We have, then, characterized the past itself an ideal limit. There is a continuum that as­
as perceived. In point of fact, do we not per­ cends towards an ideal limit, just as the con­
ceive the passing, are we not directly conscious tinuum of the species red converges towards
in the cases described of the just-having-been, an ideal pure red. But in our case we do not
of the "just past" in its self-givenness, in the have individual apprehensions corresponding
mode of being given itself? Obviously the sense to individual nuances of red that could be giv­
of "perception" obtaining here does not coin­ en by themselves; instead we always have­
cide with the earlier one. Further distinctions and, according to the essence of the matter, can
are needed. If, in the grasping of a temporal only have-continuities of apprehensions, or
object, we distinguish between perceptual and rather a single continuum that is continuously
memorial (retentional) consciousness, then to modified. If in sorne way we divide this con­
the opposition between perception and primary tinuum into two adjoining parts, then the part
memory there corresponds on the side of the that includes the now or is capable of consti­
object the opposition between "now present" tuting it is distinguished from the other part
and "past." Temporal objects-and this pertains and constitutes the "rough" now; as soon as
to their essence-spread their matter over an we divide this rough now further, it in tum im-

*On acts as constituted unities in the original consciousness of time, cf. §37, pp. 213f.
196 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

mediately breaks down into a finer now and a image, as it were, although not exactly in the
past, and so on. manner of a genuine image-consciousness.
Perception here is therefore an act-charac­ Here we do not say anything at all about a
teristic that joins together a continuity of act­ continuous mediation of perception with its
characteristics and is distinguished by the pos­ opposite. Up to this point, the consciousness
session of that ideal limit. A similar continuity of the past-the primary consciousness of the
without this ideal limit is bare memory. In past, that is-was not <called> perception be­
the ideal sense, then, perception (impression) cause perception was taken as the act that origi­
would be the phase of consciousness that con­ nally constitutes the now. But the conscious­
stitutes the pure now, and memory would be ness of the past <loes not constitute a now; it
every other phase of the continuity. But the now rather constitutes a "just past," something that
is precisely only an ideal limit, something ab­ has preceded the now intuitively. But if we
stract, which can be nothing by itself. More­ call perception the act in which ali "origin"
over, it remains to be said that even this ideal lies, the act that constitutes originally, then
now is not something toto coelo different from primary memory is perception. For only in pri­
the not-now but is continuously mediated with mary memory do we see what is past, only in it
it. And to this corresponds the continuous tran­ <loes the past become constituted-and con­
sition of perception into primary memory. stituted presentatively, not re-presentatively.
The just past, the before in opposition to the
§ 17. Perception as the act that gives now, can be directly seen only in primary
something itself in opposition to memory; it is its essence to bring this new
reproduction and original past to primary, direct intuition,
just as it is the essence of the perception of
In addition to the contrast between percep­ the now to bring the now directly to intuition.
tion, or the giving of the present itself, [and On the other hand, recollection, like phan­
primary memory], which has its correlate in tasy, merely offers us re-presentation; recol­
the given past, there is another opposition: be­ lection is as it were the same consciousness
tween perception and recollection or second­ as the act aimed at the now and the act aimed
ary memory. In recollection a now "appears" at the past, the acts that create time-as it were
to us, but it "appears" in an entirely different the same, but nonetheless modified. The
sense than the sense in which the now appears phantasied now represents a now but <loes
in perception. This now is not "perceived"­ not give a now itself; the phantasied before
that is, given itself-but represented. It repre­ and after only represent a before and after, and
sents a now that is not given. And so too the so on.
running-off of a melody in recollection repre­
sents a "just past" but <loes not give it. Even in § 18. The signi-ficance of recollection for
mere phantasy every individual is extended in the constitution of the consciousness of
time in sorne way, having its now, its before, duration and succession
and its after; but the now, before, and after are
merely imagined, as is the whole object. Here, The constitutive significance of primary and
therefore, an entirely different concept of per­ secondary memory presents itself somewhat
ception is in question. Perception in this case differently, if, instead of the givenness of en­
is the act that places something before our during objectivities, we consider the given­
eyes as the thing itself, the act that originally ness of duration and succession themselves.
constitutes the object. Its opposite is re-pre­ Let us assume that A emerges as primal im­
sentation [Vergegenwiirtigung, Re-Priisenta­ pression and endures for a while and that, to­
tion], understood as the act that <loes not place gether with the retention of A at a certain stage
an object itself before our eyes but just re­ of development, B enters on the scene and
presents it; that places it before our eyes in becomes constituted as enduring B. Through-
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 197

out this whole process, the consciousness is Now if we ask about the consciousness that
consciousness of the same A "receding into originally gives a succession of enduring ob­
the past"; of the same A in the flow of these jectivities-and, indeed, the succession of the
manners of givenness; and of the same A with durations themselves-we find that it neces­
respect to its form of being, "duration," which sarily requires retention and recollection. Re­
belongs to the content of its being, and with tention constitutes the living horizon of the
respect to all the points of this duration. The now; in it I have a consciousness of the "just
same is true of B and of the interval between past." But what becomes originally constitut­
the two durations or their time-points. But in ed here-say, in holding on to the just heard
addition something new appears here: B fol­ tone-is only the being-pushed-back of the
lows A; a succession of two enduring data is now-phase or, as the case may be, of the com­
given with a definite temporal form, an extent pletely constituted duration, which in this com­
of time that encompasses the succession. The pleteness no longer becomes constituted and
consciousness of succession is consciousness is no longer perceived. I can, however, under­
that gives its object originally: it is "percep­ take a reproduction in "coincidence" with this
tion" of this succession.We now consider the "result" that is being pushed back. Then the
reproductive modification of this perception past of the duration is given to me, given pre­
-specifically, the recollection.I "repeat" the cisely as the "re-givenness" of the duration
consciousness of this succession; I re-present simpliciter. And we must note: lt is only past
it to myself memorially. I "can" do this and durations that I can originally intuit in acts
do it "as often as I choose." A priori the re­ that repeat their objects-only past durations
presentation of an experience lies within the that I can actually intuit, identify, and have
domain of my "freedom." (The "I can" is a objectively as the identical object of many acts.
practica! "I can" and not a "mere idea.") Now I can relive the present, but it cannot be given
what does the re-presentation of the experi­ again. lf I retum to one and the same succes­
ential succession look like, and what pertains sion, as I can at any time, and identify it as the
to its essence? Initially one will say: I re-pre­ same temporal object, I produce a succession
sent to myself first A and then B; if original­ of recollecting experiences in the unity of an
ly I had A-B, I now have (if the index signi­ overlapping consciousness of succession; there­
fies memory) A' - B'. But this is inadequate, fore:
for it would mean that I now have, in the con­
sciousness of a succession of these memories, (A- B)-(A-B)'- (A- B)" ...
a memory A' and "afterwards" a memory B'.
But then I would have a "perception" of the The question is: What does this process of
succession of these memories and not a me­ identifying look like? Above ali, the succes­
morial consciousness of the succession. I must sion is a succession of experiences: the first
therefore set the situation forth by means of is the original constitution of the succession
(A - B)'. This consciousness does in fact in­ of A - B; the second is the memory of this suc­
elude an A', B', but also an -'. The succession, cession; then the same again, and so on. The
of course, is not a third part, as if the way of total succession is originally given as presence.
writing down the signs one after the other I can again have a memory of this succession,
signified the succession. Still, I can write down and I can again have a memory of such a
the law: memory, and so on in infinitum. By an eidetic
law, every memory is reiterable not only in
(A-B)' =A'-' B' the sense that an unrestricted number of levels
is possible but also in the sense that this is a
in the sense that there is a consciousness of sphere of the "I can." Each level is essentially
the memory of A and of B on hand, but also a an activity offreedom (which does not exclude
modified consciousness of "B follows A." obstacles).
198 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

What does the first recollection of that interconnected in the transition [from one to
succession look like? another] (or in their coexistence).

[(A- B) - (A - B)']'. §23. Coinciding of the reproduced now

with a past. Distinction between
I can then deduce, in conformity with the phantasy and recollection
earlier law, that (A - B)' and [(A - B)']' are
involved in this formula, therefore that a mem­ After we have differentiated the reproduc­
ory of the second level is involved in it­ tive from the original consciousness of the past,
specifically, in succession; and naturally the a further problem arises. When I reproduce a
memory of the succession (-') would be in­ melody I have heard, the phenomenal now of
cluded as well. If I repeat it again, I have the recollection re-presents a past: In phan­
still higher modifications of memory and, to­ tasy, in recollection, a tone now sounds. This
gether with them, the consciousness that I tone reproduces, let us say, the first tone of
have executed severa! times and in succession the melody, which is a past melody. The con­
a re-presentation that repeats its object. This sciousness of the past given along with the sec­
is a quite ordinary occurrence. I rap twice on ond tone re-presents the "just past" that earlier
the table. I re-present the succession to my­ was given originally, hence a past "just past."
self; then I observe that first I had the suc­ Now how does the reproduced now happen
cession given perceptually and then remem­ to re-present a past? Surely a reproduced now
bered it; then I observe that I had just carried immediately represents precisely a now. How
out precisely this observing-specifically, as does the reference to something past that can
the third member of a series that I can repeat be given originally only in the form of the "just
to myself, and so on. All of this is quite com­ past" come about?
monplace, particularly in the phenomenologi­ To answer this question, it is necessary that
cal method of working. we occupy ourselves with a distinction we
In the sequence of objects that are perfect­ have only alluded to up to this point-namely,
ly alike (identical in content) and that are giv­ the distinction between mere phantasy of a
en only in succession and not as coexisting, temporally extended object and recollection.
we have a peculiar coinciding in the unity of In mere phantasy no positing of the reproduced
one consciousness: a successive coinciding. now and no coinciding of this now with a past
Naturally we are speaking loosely, for the ob­ now is given. Recollection, on the other hand,
jects are indeed set apart from one another, posits what is reproduced and in this positing
are intended as forming a succession, and are gives it a position in relation to the actually
separated by an extent of time. present now and to the sphere of the original
And yet: if we have in succession unlike temporal field to which the recollection itself
objects with like prominent moments, then belongs. Only in original time-consciousness
"lines of likeness," as it were, run from one to can the relation between a reproduced now and
the other, and in the case of similarity, lines of a past be brought about. The re-presentational
similarity. We have here an interrelatedness flow is a flow of experiential phases that is
that is not constituted in an act of contem­ structured in precisely the way in which any
plation that relates what it contemplates; we time-constituting flow is structured, and which
have an interrelatedness that líes befare all is therefore a time-constituting flow itself. Ali
"comparison" and all "thinking" as the pre­ the adumbrations and modifications that con­
supposition of the intuitions of likeness and stitute the temporal form are found here; and
difference. Only the similar is truly "compa­ just as the immanent tone becomes constituted
rable"; and "difference" presupposes "coinci­ in the flow of tone-phases, so the unity of the
dence"-that is, that real union of like things re-presentation of the tone becomes constituted
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 199

in the flow of the phases of the re-presentation into the unitary stream of experience, we must
of the tone. It holds quite universally that we take the following into account: every memory
are led back in phenomenological reflection contains expectation-intentions whose ful­
from everything that in the widest sense ap­ fillment leads to the present. Every process
pears, is represented, thought, and so on, to a that constitutes its object originally is animat­
flow of constituting phases that undergo an ed by protentions that emptily constitute what
immanent objectivation: specifically, the ob­ is coming as coming, that catch it and bring it
jectivation [that tums them] into perceptual ap­ toward fulfillment. However, the recollective
pearances (externa! perceptions), memories, process does not merely renew these pro­
expectations, wishes, etc., as unities belonging tentions memorially. They are not only there in
to interna! consciousness. Thus re-presentations the process of catching what is coming; they
of every sort, as flows of experience possess­ have also caught it. They have been fulfilled,
ing the universal time-constituting formation, and we are conscious of this in the recollec­
also constitute an immanent object: "an endur­ tion. The fulfillment in the recollective con­
ing process of re-presentation running off in sciousness is re-fulfillment (precisely in the
such and such a way." modification that belongs to memorial posit­
But on the other hand, re-presentations have ing). And if the original protention belonging
the peculiar property that in themselves and in to the perception of the event was indefinite
ali of their experiential phases they are re­ and left open the possibility of things being
presentations of . .. in another sense, that they otherwise or not being at ali, in the recollec­
have a second and different sort of intentional­ tion we have an expectation settled in advance
ity, one proper to them alone and not to ali ex­ that does not leave ali of that open, unless in
periences. Now this new intentionality has the the form of an "unfinished" recollection, which
peculiarity that, in form, it is a "replica" [Ge­ has a different structure from the indefinite
genbild} of the intentionality that constitutes original protention. And yet this too is includ­
time; and as it reproduces in each of its ele­ ed in the recollection. Thus there are already
ments a moment of a presentational flow and difficulties of intentional analysis here for the
in its elements taken as a whole a whole pre­ event considered separately, and then in a new
sentational flow, so it produces a reproductive way for the expectations that concem the suc­
consciousness of a re-presented immanent ob­ cession of events up to the present: Recollec­
ject. It therefore constitutes something two­ tion is not expectation, but it does have a hori­
fold: first, through its form as a flow of experi­ zon directed towards the future, specifically,
ence it constitutes the re-presentation as an towards the future of what is recollected; and
immanent unity; then, since the moments of this horizon is fixed. As the recollective pro­
experience belonging to this flow are repro­ cess advances, this horizon is disclosed in ever
ductive modifications of moments belonging new ways and becomes richer and more vital.
to a parallel flow (which in the ordinary case And in this process the horizon is filled with
consists of nonreproductive moments), and ever new recollected events. Those that for­
since these reproductive modifications involve merly had only been indicated in advance are
an intentionality, the flow is joined together to now quasi-present-quasi in the mode of the
make up a constitutive whole in which I am actualizing present.
conscious of an intentional unity: the unity of
what is remembered. §25. The double intentionality of
recollection
§24. Protentions in recollection
If, in connection with a temporal object,
Now in order to understand the insertion of we distinguish the content with its duration
this constituted unity of experience "memory" -which can have a different place in the con-
200 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

text of "the" time-from its temporal position, in making its appearance, becomes determined
then, in the reproduction of an enduring being, and modifies the reproductive possibilities for
we have in addition to the reproduction of the the old, and so on. Moreover, the retroactive
filled duration the intentions that concem its power extends back along the chain, for the
position; and we have them necessarily. A du­ reproduced past bears the character past and
ration cannot even be represented, or better, an indeterminate intention aimed at a certain
cannot even be posited, without its being pos­ location in time in relation to the now. Thus it
ited in a temporal context, without the presence is not as if we had a mere chain of "associat­
of intentions aimed at the temporal context. ed" intentions, one bringing to mind another,
Moreover, it is necessary that these intentions this one recalling the next (in the flow); rather
have the form either of intentions aimed at we have one intention that in itself is an inten­
the past or of intentions aimed at the future. tion aimed at the series of possible fulfillments.
To the duality of intentions-to those directed But this is a nonintuitive, an "empty" in­
towards the filled duration and to those direct­ tention. Its object is the objective series of
ed towards the filled duration's place in time events in time, and this series is the obscure
-there corresponds a dual fulfillment. The to­ surroundings of what is actually recollected.
tal complex of intentions that makes up the Does this not universally characterize "sur­
appearance of the past enduring object has roundings": a unitary intention related to a mul­
its possible fulfillment in the system of ap­ ti tude of interconnected objectivities and
pearances that belong to that same enduring coming to fulfillment in the gradual, separate,
object. The intentions aimed at the temporal and multifarious givenness of those objectivi­
context are fulfilled by the production of filled ties? This is also the case with the spatial back­
connections up to the actual present. Hence ground. And thus each thing in perception has
we must distinguish within every re-presen­ its reverse side as background (for it is not a
tation between the reproduction of the con­ question of the background of attention but
sciousness in which the past enduring object of apprehension). The component "nonpre­
was given, that is to say, was perceived or in sentive perception," which belongs to every
sorne way originally constituted, and that which transcendent perception as an essential part, is
attaches to this reproduction as constitutive a "complex" intention that can be fulfilled in
of the consciousness "past" or "present" (si­ connections of a determinate sort, in connec­
multaneous with the actually present now) or tions of data. Foreground is nothing without
"future." background. The appearing side is nothing
Now is the latter also reproduction? This without the nonappearing side. So too in the
question can easily mislead us. Naturally the unity of time-consciousness: the reproduced
whole is reproduced, not only the then-pres­ duration is the foreground; the intentions di­
ent of consciousness with its flow but "impli­ rected towards the insertion [ of the duration in­
cite" the whole stream of consciousness up to to time] make conscious a background, a tem­
the living present. That means-and this is a poral background. And this is continued in a
fundamental part of a priori phenomenologi­ certain fashion in the constitution of the tem­
cal genesis-that memory flows continuously, porality of the enduring object itself with its
since the life of consciousness flows continu­ now, before, and after. We have the analogies:
ously and does not merely piece itself together for the spatial thing, its insertion into the sur­
link by link into a chain. Rather, everything new rounding space and spatial world; on the oth­
reacts on the old; the forward-directed inten­ er hand, the spatial thing itself with its fore­
tion belonging to the old is fulfilled and de­ ground and background. For the temporal thing:
termined in this way, and that gives a definite its insertion into the temporal form and the
coloring to the reproduction. Thus a retroac­ temporal world; on the other hand, the tempo­
tive effect, necessary and a priori, shows itself ral thing itself and its shifting orientation in
here. The new points again to the new, which, relation to the living now.
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 201

§26. Differences between memory and out the concrete image but which in many re­
expectation spects can exist otherwise than the image of­
fers it: from the beginning it is characterized
We must also investigate whether memory as being open.
and expectation stand on the same footing. In­ But there are fundamental differences in
tuitive memory offers me the living reproduc­ the manner of fulfillment. Intentions aimed at
tion of the elapsing duration of an event, and the past are necessarily fulfilled by bringing to
only the intentions that point back at what pre­ light the contexts that belong to intuitive re­
ceded the event and point ahead up to the liv­ productions. The reproduction of a past event
ing now remain nonintuitive. with respect to its validity (in interna! con­
In the intuitive representation of a future sciousness) admits of completion and of the
event, I now have intuitively the reproductive confirmation of its memorial indeterminacies
"image" of an event that runs off reproductive­ only by being converted into a reproduction
ly. Fastened to this image are indeterminate in­ in which each and every component is charac­
tentions aimed at the future and at the past, that terized as reproductive. Here it is a matter of
is, intentions that from the beginning of the such questions as: Have I actually seen this?
event concem its temporal surroundings, which Have I actually perceived it? Have I actually
termínate in the living now. To that extent, the had this appearance with precisely this content?
intuition belonging to expectation is memori­ At the same time, ali of this must be inserted
al intuition tumed upside down, for in memo­ into a nexus of like intuitions extending up to
ry's case the intentions aimed at the now do the now. A different question, of course, is the
not "precede" the event but follow after it. As following: Was what appears, real? Expecta­
empty intentions directed towards the surround­ tion, on the other hand, finds its fulfillment in
ings, they lie "in the opposite direction." Now a perception. It belongs to the essence of what
what about the way in which the event itself is expected that it is something that is going
is given? Does it make an essential difference to be perceived. Moreover, it is evident that
that in memory the content of the event is de­ when something expected occurs, that is, has
terrnined? But memory can also be intuitive and become something present, then the state of
yet not very determinate, since many of its in­ expectation itself is over with; if what was fu­
tuitive components do not have the character ture has become something present, then what
of actual memory at ali. In the case of "per­ was present has become something relatively
fect" memory, of course, everything down to past. This is also the case with the intentions
the smallest detail would be clear and would aimed at the surroundings. They too are fulfilled
be characterized as memory. But idealiter this through the actuality of an impressional expe­
is also possible in the case of expectation. In riencing.
general, expectation leaves much open, and this These differences notwithstanding, the in­
remaining-open is again a characteristic of the tuition belonging to expectation is something
components in question. B ut as a matter of prin­ just as original and unique as the intuition of
cipie, a prophetic consciousness (a conscious­ the past.
ness that passes itself off as prophetic) is con­
ceivable; that is, a consciousness for which §27. Memory as consciousness of
every characteristic belonging to the expecta­ having-been-perceived
tion of what is coming to be lies within view:
as when, for example, we have a precisely de­ The following is of the greatest significance
fined plan and, intuitively representing what is for the characterization of the positing repro­
planned, accept it, so to speak, lock, stock, and ductions we have been analyzing: not only the
barre! as future reality. Yet in the intuitive an­ reproductive positing of temporal being be­
ticipation of the future there will also be much longs to their essence, but also a certain rela­
that is insignificant, which as stopgap fills tion to interna! consciousness. That it is con-
202 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

sciousness of having-been-perceived belongs tutes the present. In order to have a now stand
fundamentally to the essence of memory. If I before me as now, I must perceive. In order to
remember an externa! event intuitively, I have represent a now intuitively, I must bring about
a reproductive intuition of it. And it is a posit­ a perception "in image," modified re-presen­
ing reproduction. But this reproduction of tatively. But I must not do it in such a way
something externa! is necessarily given in con­ that I represent the perception; rather I repre­
sciousness by means of a reproduction of some­ sent the perceived, that which appears as pres­
thing interna!. Since the externa! event is given ent in the perception. Memory therefore does
in a determínate mode of appearance, an ap­ actually imply a reproduction of the earlier
pearing of something externa! must be repro­ perception, but the memory is not in the prop­
duced. The appearing of the externa!, as an er sense a representation of it: the perception
experience, is a unity belonging to the con­ is not meant and posited in the memory; what
sciousness of the interna!; and to the con­ is meant and posited is the perception's ob­
sciousness of the interna! corresponds the re­ ject and the object's now, which, in addition, is
production of the interna!. Now there exist two posited in relation to the actually present now.
possibilities for the reproduction of an event: I remember yesterday's illuminated theater;
the reproduction of what is interna! can be a that is, I bring about a "reproduction" of the
positing reproduction, and therefore the ap­ perception of the theater. The theater then hov­
pearance of the event can be posited in the unity ers before me in the representation as some­
of immanent time; or the reproduction of what thing present. I mean this present theater, but
is externa! can also be a positing reproduction in meaning it I apprehend this present as situ­
that posits the temporal event in question in ated in the past in relation to the actual present
objective time but does not posit the appear­ of the perceptions occurring right now. Natu­
ance itself as an event belonging to interna! rally it is now evident that the perception of
time, and thus also does not posit the time­ the theater did exist, that I did perceive the
constituting stream in the unity of the total theater. What is remembered appears as hav­
life-stream. ing been present, doing so immediately and in­
Therefore memory is not immediately mem­ tuitively; and it appears in this way thanks to
ory of earlier perception. But since the memory the fact that a present that has a distance from
of an earlier event includes the reproduction the present of the actual now appears intuitive­
of the appearances in which it carne to be giv­ ly. The latter present becomes constituted in
en, there also exists at any time the possibility actual perception; the former intuitively ap­
of a memory of the earlier perception of the pearing present, the intuitive representation of
event (or the possibility of a reflection in the the not-now becomes constituted in a replica
memory that makes the earlier perception some­ of perception, in a "re-presentation of the ear­
thing given). The whole complex of the earlier lier perception" in which the theater comes to
consciousness is reproduced, and what is re­ be given "as if it were now." This re-presenta­
produced has the character of reproduction and tion of the perception of the theater must not
the character of the past. be understood to imply that, living in the re­
Let us make these relationships clear by presentation, I mean the act of perceiving; on
an example. I remember the illuminated the­ the contrary, I mean the being-present of the
ater-that cannot mean: I remember having per­ perceived object.
ceived the theater. Otherwise the latter would
mean: I remember having perceived that I per­ §28. Memory and image-consciousness.
ceived the theater, and so on. I remember the Memory as positing reproduction
illuminated theater means: "in my interior" I
see the illuminated theater as having been. In We still need to consider what sort of re­
the now I see the not-now. Perception consti- presentation is involved here. What is not in
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna/ Time 203

question is a re-presentation by means of a re­ objects and have left the mediate, or nonin­
sembling object, as in the case of conscious tuitive, expectations and memories out of ac­
depiction (paintings, busts, and the like). In count).
contrast to such image-consciousness, repro­ Whether on the basis of earlier perceptions
ductions have the character of the re-presen­ or according to a description or in sorne other
tation of something itself. The reproductions way, I can also represent to myself something
are distinguished in turn according to whether present as now existing without now having
they are nonpositing ("mere" phantasies) or it befare me "in person." In the first case, I do
positing. And then the temporal characterist­ indeed have a memory, but I give to what is
ics are added to this. Memory is the re-presen­ remembered duration up to the actually pres­
tation of ,something itself in the sense of the ent now; and for this duration I have no inter­
past. The present memory is a phenomenon nally remembered "appearances." The "mem­
wholly analogous to perception. lt has the ap­ ory image" does serve me, but I do not posit
pearance of the object in common with the what is remembered as remembered; I do not
corresponding perception, except that the ap­ posit the object of the interna! memory in the
pearance has a modified character, in conse­ duration belonging to it. We posit what endures
quence of which the object does not stand be­ as it presents itself in this appearance, and we
fare me as present but as having been present. posit the appearing now and the ever new now,
What is essential to the sort of reproductions and so on; but we do not posit itas "past."
called memory and expectation líes in the in­ We know that the "past" in memory's case
sertion of the reproduced appearance into the also does not imply that in the present act of
context of the being of interna! time, the flow­ remembering we make a picture for ourselves
ing sequence of my experiences. The positing of what existed earlier or that we produce other
normally extends also to what is given objec­ constructions of this sort. On the contrary, we
tively in the externa! appearance. But this pos­ simply posit what appears, what is intuited,
iting can be annulled, can be contradicted, and which in conformity with its temporality, of
yet memory-or, respectively, expectation­ course, is intuitable only in temporal modes.
will still remain; that is, we will not cease to And to what thereby appears we give, in the
speak of memory and expectation, even if we mode of memory by means of the intention
designate the earlier perception or the percep­ aimed at the surroundings of the appearance,
. tion to come as merely "supposed." If, from a position in relation to the actually present
the beginning, it is a question of the reproduc­ now. Thus, in the case of the re-presentation of
tion of immanent objects rather than transcen­ something that presently exists but is absent,
dent objects, then the hierarchical structure we we must also ask about the intentions direct­
have described as pertaining to reproductive ed towards the surroundings of the intuition.
intuitions disappears, and the positing of what And in this case, naturally, these intentions are
is reproduced coincides with its insertion into of an entirely different sort: they have no rela­
the sequence of experiences, into immanent tion whatsoever to the actually present now
time. through a continuous series of interna! appear­
ances that would be posited in their entirety.
§29. Memory of the present Of course, this reproductive appearance is not
without a context. lt is supposed to be some­
Yet another type of immediate reproduc­ thing enduring that appears there, something
tive intuition of temporal objects must be tak­ that has been and now is and will be. Thus by
en into consideration in the sphere of the intu­ sorne route or other I "can" go and see the thing,
ition of externa! time and externa! objectivity still find it; and I can then go back again and in
(all of our explanations, of course, have been repeated "possible" appearance-series produce
limited to the immediate intuition of temporal the intuition. And had I set out a short time ago
204 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

and gone there (and this is a prescribed possi­ tains its strict identity. Expressed phenomeno­
bility to which possible appearance-series cor­ logically: The consciousness of the now, which
respond), I would now have this intuition as a becomes constituted on the basis of material
perceptual intuition, and so on. Thus the ap­ "A," is continuously transmuted into a con­
pearance that hovers before me reproductively sciousness of the past while simultaneously
is indeed not characterized as having existed an ever new consciousness of the now is built
intemally and impressionally, and what appears up. During this transmutation, the conscious­
is not characterized as having been perceived ness undergoing modification preserves its
in its temporal duration. But a relation to the objective intention (and this belongs to the es­
hic et nunc exists here too, and the appearance sence of time-consciousness).
also bears a certain positing-character: it be­ Every original temporal field contains the
longs in a determínate nexus of appearances continuous modification with respect to the
(and of appearances that would be "positing," act-characteristics constituting the field. This
position-taking appearances throughout). And modification must not be understood as if, in
in relation to the latter it has a motivating char­ the series of apprehensions belonging to a phase
acter: the intentions aimed at the surround­ of the object-that is, the series beginning with
ings always furnish a halo of intentions for the emergence of the apprehensions as now­
the "possible" appearances themselves. This is positing and descending into the last accessible
also the case with the intuition of an enduring phenomenal past-there took place a continu­
being that I am now perceiving and that I posit ous modification in the objective intention. On
as having existed previously without my hav­ the contrary: the objective intention remains
ing perceived it previously and without my absolutely the same and identical. For ali that,
now remembering it, and that I posit as some­ however, a phenomenal shading-off does ex­
thing that will exist in the future. ist, and not only with respect to the apprehen­
sion-contents that have their fading-away-a
§30. The preservation of the objective certain descent from the highest pinnacle of
intention in the retentional modi­ sensation in the now to the point of imper­
fication ceptibility. The now-moment is characterized
above all as the new. The now that is just sink­
It often happens that while the retention of ing into the past is no longer the new but that
something just past is still living, a reproduc­ which the new has pushed aside. In this be­
tive image of the thing emerges: but naturally ing-pushed-aside there lies an alteration. But
an image of the thing as it was given in the while what has been pushed aside has lost its
now-point. We recapitulate, so to speak, what characteristic of being now, it remains abso­
was just experienced. This interna! renewal in lutel y unchanged in its objective intention,
re-presentation puts the reproductive now into which is an intention-specifically, an intuitive
relation with the now that is still living in fresh intention-aimed at individual objectivity. In
memory, and here the consciousness of iden­ this respect, therefore, no alteration at ali pre­
tity takes place that brings out the identity of sents itself. But here we must surely consider
the one and the other. (This phenomenon also what "preservation of the objective intention"
shows that, in addition to the intuitive part, there signifies. The total apprehension of the object
belongs to the sphere of primary memory an contains two components: one of them con­
empty part that extends very much further. stitutes the object with regard to its extra­
While we still have something past in fresh­ temporal determinations; the other produces
although empty-memory, an "image" of that the temporal position, the being-now, the hav­
something can simultaneously emerge.) It is a ing-been, and so on. The object as the tempo­
universal and fundamentally essential fact that ral material, as that which possesses a tempo­
every now, in sinking back into the past, main- ral position and temporal extension, as that
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 205

which endures or changes, as that which now while the past temporal moment remains what
is and then has been, springs purely from the it is. Now this raises the qUestion: How, in the
objectivati@n ofthe apprehension-contents; and face ofthe phenomenon of the constant change
therefore, in the case of sensuous objects, from oftime-consciousness, does the consciousness
the objectivation of sensuous contents. In say­ of objective time and, above ali, of identical
ing this, we do not lose sight of the fact that temporal positions come about? This question
these contents are nevertheless temporal ob­ is very closely connected with the question
jects, that they are produced in a succession as about the constitution of the objectivity of
a continuum of primal impressions and reten­ individual temporal objects and events: all
tions, and that these temporal adumbrations of objectivation is accomplished in time-con­
the data of sensation have their significance sciousness; without clarification of the identity
for the temporal determinations of the objects of the temporal position, there can be no clari­
constituted by their means. But in their prop­ fication of the identity of an object in time ei­
erty as representants ofthe qualities ofa physi­ ther.
cal thing as far as the pure "what" ofthe quali­ Set forth in more detail, the problem is the
ties is concemed, their temporal character plays following. The now-phases belonging to the
no role. The data of apprehension that are ap­ perception continuously undergo a modifica­
prehended nontemporally constitute the object tion; they are not preserved simply as they are:
in its specific composition, and where this is they flow away. What we designate as sinking­
preserved we can already speak of an identity. back in time is constituted in this process. The
But when we spoke a short time ago about pre­ tone now sounds, and it immediately sinks into
serving the relation to something objective, that the past-it, the same tone, sinks into the past.
signified that the object remains preserved not This concerns the tone in each ofits phases and
only in its specific composition but also as an therefore the whole tone as well. Now the sink­
individual object, and therefore as a temporally ing into the past appears to be intelligible to
determínate object that sinks back in time to­ sorne extent by means of our reflections up to
gether with its temporal determination. This this point. But how does it happen that in the
sinking-back is an original phenomenological face ofthe tone's sinking into the past, we nev­
modification of consciousness through which ertheless say that a fixed position in time be­
an ever-growing distance forms in relation to longs to it, that time-points and temporal dura­
the actually present now, which is always be­ tions can be identified in repeated acts, as our
ing freshly constituted. This growing distance analysis of reproductive consciousness has
comes about by virtue of the continuous series shown? The tone and every time-point in the
of changes leading away from the actual now. unity of the enduring tone certainly does have
its absolutely fixed position in "objective" (ev­
§31. Primal impression and the objec­ en if immanent) time. Time is fixed, and yet
tive individual time-point time flows. In the flow of time, in the continu­
ous sinking down into the past, a nonflowing,
At this point we are seemingly led to an an­ absolutely fixed, identical, objective time be­
tinomy: the object, in sinking back, constantly comes constituted. This is the problem.
changes its place in time; and yet in sinking To start with, let us consider somewhat more
back it is supposed to preserve its place in time. closely the situation of the same tone sinking
In truth, the object of the primary memory, into the past. Why do we speak of the same
which is being pushed back continuously, does tone that sinks into the past? The tone is built
not change its place in time at ali, but only its up in the temporal flow by means ofits phases.
distance from the actually present now. And this We know that each phase (say, the phase be­
is the case because the actually present now is longing to an actually present now), subject to
taken to be an ever new objective time-point, the law of continuous modification, must nev-
206 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ertheless appear, so to speak, as objectively the no new time-points, but constantly the same
same, as the same tone-point, since an appre­ object with the same time-points. Each actu­
hension-continuum presents itself here that is ally present now creates a new time-point be­
govemed by the identity of sense and exists in cause it creates a new object, or rather a new
continuous coincidence. The coincidence con­ object-point, which is held fast in the flow of
cems the extratemporal material, which is pre­ modification as one and the same individual
served in the flow precisely as the identity of object-point. And the continuity in which a new
objective sense. This is true for each now-phase. now becomes constituted again and again
But every new now is precisely new and is char­ shows us that it is not a question of "newness"
acterized as new phenomenologically. Even if as such but of a continuous moment of indi­
the tone continues so utterly unchanged that not viduation in which the temporal position has
the least alteration is apparent to us, hence ev­ its origin. The essence of the modifying flow is
en if each new now possesses precisely the such that this temporal position stands befare
same apprehension-content with respect to mo­ me as identical and as necessarily identical. The
ments of quality, intensity, etc., and carries pre­ now as actually present now is the givenness
cisely the same apprehension-even if all of of the present of the temporal position. When
this is the case, an original difference nev­ the phenomenon recedes into the past, the now
ertheless presents itself; a difference that be­ receives the characteristic ofbeing a past now;
longs to a new dimension. And this difference but it remains the same now, except that it
is a continuous one. Considered phenomeno­ stands befare me as past in relation to the cur­
logically, only the now-point is characterized rently actual and temporally new now.
as an actually present now, that is, as new; the The objectivation of the temporal object
preceding now-point appears as having under­ therefare rests on the following moments: the
gone its modification, the point prior to that its content of sensation that belongs to the differ­
further modification, and so on. This continu­ ent actually present now-points of the object
um of modifications in the apprehension-con­ can remain absolutely unchanged in quality,
tents and the apprehensions built on them pro­ yet still not possess true identity in this iden­
duces the consciousness of the extension of the tity of content, however far it may extend. The
tone together with the continua! sinking into same sensation now and in a different now pos­
the past of what is already extended. sesses a difference-specifically, a phenomeno­
But how, in the face of the phenomenon of logical difference-that corresponds to the ab­
the continuous change of time-consciousness, solute temporal position; this difference is
does the consciousness of objective time and, the primal source of the individuality of the
above all, the consciousness of identical posi­ "this," and thereby of the absolute temporal
tion in time and extension in time come about? position. Each phase of the modification has
The answer runs as fallows: lt comes about by "essentially" the same qualitative content and
virtue of the fact that over against the flow of the same temporal moment, although modi­
the process of being pushed back in time, over fied; and it has them in itselfin such a way that,
against the flow of the modifications of con­ by their means, the subsequent apprehension
sciousness, the object that appears pushed back of identity is made possible. This applies to the
remains apperceptively preserved precisely in side of sensation or, correlatively, to the side
absolute identity-specifically, the object to­ of the apprehensional basis. The different mo­
gether with the positing as "this" that it under­ ments support different sides of apprehension,
went in the now-point. The continuous modi­ of objectivation proper. One side of objectiva­
fication of the apprehension in the continuous tion finds its basis purely in the qualitative con­
flow does not concern the apprehension's "as tent of the material of sensation: this yields the
what," its sense. The modification intends no temporal material-the tone, far example. This
new object and no new object-phase. It yields material is maintained as identical in the flow
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 207

of the modification of the past. A second side mary memorial consciousness. The primal im­
of objectivation derives from the apprehension pression is something absolutely unmodified,
of the representants of the temporal positions. the primal source of ali further consciousness
This apprehension too is continuously main­ and being. Primal impression has as its content
tained in the flow of modification. that which the word "now" signifies, insofar as
To summarize: The tone-point in its abso­ it is taken in the strictest sense. Each new now
lute individuality is held fast in its matter and is the content of a new primal impression. Ever
in its temporal position, and it is the latter that new primal impressions continuously flash
first constitutes individuality. Add to this, fi­ forth with ever new matter, now the same, now
nally, the apprehension that belongs essential­ changing. What distinguishes primal impres­
ly to the modification and that, while holding sion from primal impression is the individual­
on to the extended objectivity with its imma­ izing moment of the impression of the original
nent absolute time, lets the continuous process temporal position, which is something funda­
of being pushed back into the past appear. In mentally different from the quality and other
our example of the tone, therefore, each now­ material moments of the content of sensation.
point of the ever new sounding and fading-away The moment of the original temporal position
has its material of sensation and its objectiva­ is naturally nothing by itself; the individuation
ting apprehension. The tone stands befare me is nothing in addition to what has individua­
as the sound of a violin string that has been tion. The whole now-point, the whole original
struck. If we again disregard the objectivating impression, under-goes the modification ofthe
apprehension and look purely at the material past; and only by means of this modification
of sensation, then, as far as its matter is con­ have we exhausted the complete concept of the
cemed, it is constantly tone c, its tonal quality now, since it is a relative concept and refers to
and timbre unchanged, its intensity perhaps a "past," just as "past" refers to the "now." This
fluctuating, and so forth. This content, under­ modification also touches the sensation above
stood purely as content of sensation underly­ all, without nullifying its universal impressional
ing the objectivating apperception, is extend­ character. lt modifies the total content of the
ed-that is to say, each now has its content of primal impression both with respect to its mat­
sensation, and each different now has an indi­ ter and with respect to its temporal position,
vidually different content, even if the content but it modifies precisely in the sense in which
is exactly the same materially. Absolutely the a phantasy-modification does; that is to say,
same c now and later is perfectly alike as far as modifying through and through and yet not al­
sensation is concemed, but the c now is indi­ tering the intentional essence (the total content).
vidually different from the c later. Thus the matter is the same matter, the tem­
What "individual" means here is the origi­ poral position the same temporal position, only
nal temporal form of sensation, or, as I can also the mode of givenness has changed: it is giv­
put it, the temporal form of original sensation, enness of the past. The objectivating appre­
here of the sensation belonging to the current hension, then, bases itself on this material of
now-point and only to this. But the now-point sensation. Even if we look purely at the con­
itselfmust, in strictness, be defined through ori­ tents of sensation (disregarding the transcen­
ginal sensation, so that the proposition asserted dent apperceptions which may perhaps be
has to be taken only as an indication of what is based on them), we carry out an apperception:
supposed to be meant. The impression, as op­ the "temporal flow," the duration, then lies
posed to the phantasm, is distinguished by the within our view as a kind of objectivity. Ob­
character of originalness. Now within the im­ jectivity presupposes consciousness of unity,
pression we have to call special attention to the consciousness of identity. Here we apprehend
primal impression, over against which there the content of every primal sensation as it­
stands the continuum of modifications in pri- itself. The primal impression gives a tone-point-
208 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

individual, and this individual is identically multaneously wells up, in relation to which
the same in the flow of the modification of the distance of the event's time-points from
the past: the apperception relative to this the actually present now continuously expands;
point abides in continuous coincidence in the and consequently the appearance of sinking
modification of the past, and the identity of the backwards, of moving away, grows up.
individual is eo ipso identity of temporal posi­
tion. The continuous welling-up of ever new §32. The role of reproduction in the
primal impressions, apprehended as individu­ constitution of the one objective time
al points, again and again yields new and dif­
ferent temporal positions. Toe continuity yields With the preservation of the individuality
a continuity of temporal positions. In the flow of the time-points as they sink back into the
of the modification of the past, therefore, a past, however, we still do not have the con­
continuous portion of time filled with sound sciousness of a unitary, homogeneous, ob­
stands before me, but in such a way that on­ jective time. In the bringing about of this con­
ly one of its points is given through primal sciousness, reproductive memory (intuitive
impression and that from there on the tempo­ memory as well as memory in the form of
ral positions continuously appear in different empty intentions) plays an important role. By
degrees of modification, receding into the virtue of a reproductive memory, every point
past. that has been pushed back in time can be
Every perceived time is perceived as a past made-and made repeatedly-the zero-point
that terminates in the present. And the present of a temporal intuition. The earlier temporal
is a limit. Every apprehension, however tran­ field, in which what is presently pushed back
scendent it may be, is bound by this law. If we was a now, is reproduced; and the reproduced
perceive a flight of birds or a troop of cavalry now is identified with the time-point still liv­
at the gallop and the like, we find in the sub­ ing in fresh memory: the individual intention
stratum of sensation the described differences: is the same. The reproduced temporal field ex­
ever new primal sensations carrying with them tends further than the actually present field. If
the characteristic that determines their tem­ we take a point of the past in this field, the re­
poral position and gives rise to their individua­ production, in partially coinciding with the tem­
tion; and, on the other side, we find the same poral field in which this point was the now,
modes in the apprehension. It is precisely in yields a further regress into the past, and so
this way that something objective itself-the on. This process must evidently be conceived
flight of birds-appears as primally given in as capable of being continued without limit,
the now-point but as fully given in a continu­ although in practice the actual memory will
um of the past that terminates in the now and soon fail. It is evident that each time-point has
continually terminates in an ever new now, its before and after, and that the points and
while what has continuously preceded recedes extended sections that are before cannot be
ever further into the continuum of the past. The compressed in the fashion of an approach to a
appearing event constantly possesses the iden­ mathematical limit, such as the limit of inten­
tical absolute temporal value. As its elapsed sity. If there were a limit, a now would corre­
portion is pushed further and further back into spond to it which nothing had preceded, and
the past, the event is pushed into the past to­ that is evidently impossible. A now is always
gether with its absolute temporal positions, and essentially a border-point of an extent of
and accordingly with its entire temporal extent: time. And it is evident that this whole extent
that is, the same event with the same absolute must sink backwards and that, as it does so,
temporal extension continually appears (as long its whole magnitude and complete individual­
as it appears at ali) as identically the same, ex­ ity are preserved. Of course, phantasy and re­
cept that the form of its givenness is different. production do not make possible an extension
On the other hand, in the living source-point of of the intuition of time in the sense that the
being, in the now, ever new primal being si- extent of temporal shadings really given in
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 209

the simultaneous consciousness would be in­ the same impressional leve!. They are modi­
creased. One will perhaps ask in this respect fied in this identity, and they continually pre­
how, in these temporal fields succeeding one serve the identity in the modification ofthe past.
another, the one objective time with its one A primal datum and a modified datum of dif­
fixed order comes about. The continuous coin­ ferent or equivalent content necessarily have
ciding of the temporal fields, which in truth is different positions in time. And two modified
not a mere ordering of temporal fields in tem­ data have either the same or different tempor­
poral succession, offers the answer. The coin­ al positions: the same, if they spring from the
ciding parts are individually identified during same now-point; different, if they spring from
their intuitive and continuous regression into different now-points. The actually present now
the past. Let us assume that we proceed back is one now and constitutes one temporal posi­
into the past from any actually experienced tion, however many objectivities are separate­
time-point-that is, from any time-point origi­ ly constituted in it: they ali have the same tem­
nally given in the temporal field of perception poral present and preserve their simultaneity
or from sorne time-point that reproduces a in flowing off. That the temporal positions have
remote past-and that we move, as it were, intervals, that these are magnitudes, and the
along a fixed chain of connected objectivities like, can be seen with evidence here; so too can
that are identified over and over again. Now further truths, such as the law of transitivity or
how is the linear order established here accord­ the law that if a is earlier than b, then b is later
ing to which any extent of time whatsoever, than a. lt belongs to time's a priori essence
even one that is reproduced without continuity that it is a continuity of temporal positions,
with the actually present temporal field, must sometimes filled with identical and sometimes
be part of a single chain continuing up to the with changing objectivities, and that the homo­
actually present now? Even every arbitrarily geneity of absolute time becomes constituted
phantasied time is subject to the requirement indefeasibly in the flow of the modifications of
that it must exist as an extent within the one the past and in the continuous welling-up of a
and only objective time if one is going to be now, ofthe generative time-point, ofthe source­
able to think ofit as actual time (that is, as the point of all temporal positions whatsoever.
time of sorne temporal object). Furthermore, it belongs to the a priori es­
sence ofthe situation that sensation, apprehen­
§33. Sorne a priori temporal laws sion, the taking of a position-all of these­
take part in the same temporal flow and that
Obviously, this a priori requirement is the objectivated absolute time is necessarily
grounded in the validity of the fundamental identically the same as the time that belongs to
temporal evidences that can be immediately sensation and apprehension. The preobjecti­
grasped and that become evident on the basis vated time belonging to sensation necessarily
of the intuitions of the data of the temporal founds the unique possibility of an objectiva­
positions. tion of temporal positions, which corresponds
If, to begin with, we compare two primal to the modification of sensation and to the de­
sensations-or rather, correlatively, two primal gree of this modification. To the objectivated
data-both actually appearing in one con­ time-point in which, for example, bells begin
sciousness as primal data, as now, then they to ring, there corresponds the time-point of
are distinguished from one another by their the matching sensation. In the beginning-phase,
matter. They are, however, simultaneous: they the sensation has the same time; that is, if it is
have identically the same absolute position in subsequently made into an object, then it nec­
time; they are both now; and in the same now essarily keeps the temporal position that coin­
they necessarily have the same value as far as cides with the corresponding temporal posi­
their temporal position is concemed. They have tion of the ringing of the bells. So too the time
the same form of individuation; they both be­ of the perception and the time of the perceived
come constituted in impressions belonging to are identically the same. The perceptual act
210 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

sinks backwards in time just as what is per­ "dies away." However, each modification can
ceived in its appearance does, and in reflection obviously be regarded in the same sense as
identically the same temporal position must be modification of any preceding modification
given to each phase of the perception as is giv­ whatsoever. lf we select any one phase of the
en to what is perceived. continuum, we can say that it dies away; and
we can say the same thing about every further
phase. This, indeed, is inherent in the essence
APPENDIX I: Primal lmpression and lts Con­ of this and of any such (one-sidedly directed)
tinuum of Modifications* continuum. The situation is precisely the same
as it is in the case of the continuum of intensi­
"A"-a tone, for example-becomes consti­ ties spreading out from O. The process of being
tuted in a time-point belonging to a specific augmented is the modification that every in­
phase from among the phases forming its du­ tensity undergoes here. Each intensity is in it­
ration by means of a primal impression a, on self what it is, and each new intensity is pre­
which follows such and such a modification cisely a new intensity. But in relation to any
together with the primal generation of new already given intensity, every intensity later in
impressions (new now-moments). Let � be a the series can be regarded as the result of an
simultaneous immanent unity, a color, say, and operation. lf b is the intensification of a, then c
Jet it be fixed in view as a point "simultane­ is the intensification of an intensification in
ous" with the tone-point mentioned above. relation to a. In virtue of the continuity, each
The primal impression � corresponds to b, the point is not simply intensification in relation
color, in the process of constitution. Now what to a preceding point but intensification of in­
do a and � have in common? What brings it tensification of intensification, and so on in
about that they constitute simultaneity and infinitum and infinitesimally. An infinity of in­
that two modifications a' and W constitute a terpenetrating modifications. Only in this case
having-been-simultaneous? there is no beginning-point that can be taken
Every primal impression is characterized as an intensity itself. The beginning here is the
as primal impression, and every modification zero-point. It is inherent in the essence of ev­
is characterized as modification. Furthermore, ery linear continuum that, starting from any
every modification is continuous modifica­ point whatsoever, we can think of every other
tion. The latter, indeed, is what distinguishes point as continuously produced from it; and
this sort of modification from phantasy-modi­ every continuous production is a production
fication and pictorial modification. Each of by means of continuous iteration. We can in­
these temporal modifications is a non-self­ deed divide each interval in infinitum and, in
sufficient limit in a continuum. And this con­ the case of each division, think of the later
tinuum has the character of a "rectilinear" point of the division as produced mediately
multiplicity Iimited on one side. It has a begin­ through the earlier points; and thus any point
ning in primal impression and proceeds as whatsoever is finally produced through a divi­
modification in one direction. Pairs of points sion of infinitely many intensifications (each
on this continuum having a certain distance of which is the same infinitely small intensi­
from one another constitute temporal phases fication). Now this is also true in the case of
of the object that, on the objective side, have temporal modification-or rather, while the use
an equivalent distance from one another. of the word "production" is a metaphor in the
When we speak of "modification," we first case of other continua, here it is used authenti­
of all have in view the change according to cally. Toe time-constituting continuum is a flow
which the primal impression continuously of continuous production of modifications of

*To § 11, titled "Primal Impression and Retentional Modification." [This is a reconstruction of the published Ap­
pendix I, based on new evidence from Husserl's manuscripts uncovered by Rudolf Bernet. -Ed.]
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 211

modifications. The modifications in the sense so on. If we follow the series of strata, each
of iterations proceed from the actually pres­ moment of origin belonging to a stratum is the
ent now, the actual primal impression i; but primal source of spontaneous productions that
they go forwards continuously and are not on­ run throughout the further strata in their con­
ly mod1fications in relation to i but also, in tinuous modifications and that represent this
succession, modifications of one another in moment of origin in these strata (that is, the
the order in which they flow away. This is what moment of origin that belongs uniquely and
characterizes continuous production. Modifi­ alone to the stratum we first had in view). Fur­
cation continuously generates ever new modi­ thermore, each moment of origin is a phase of
fication. The primal impression is the absolute a continuous series of moments of origin that
beginning of this production, the primal source, blend into one another throughout a succession
that from which everything else is continuously of strata. Or each moment of origin helps to
produced. But it itself is not produced; it does constitute a concrete duration, and it belongs
not arise as something produced but through to the constitution of a concrete duration that
genesis spontanea; it is primal generation. lt an actually present now corresponds to each
does not spring from anything (it has no seed); of its points. The now, for its part, requires its
it is primal creation. lf it is said: A new now own moment of origin for its constitution.
continuously forros on the now that becomes These moments are continuously united in the
modified into a not-now, or a source quite succession; they "pass over into one another
suddenly engenders it or originates it, these continuously." The transition is mediated
are metaphors. It can only be said: Conscious­ "qualitatively" and also temporally: the quasi­
ness is nothing without impression. When temporal character is a continuous character.
something endures, then a passes over into Multiple primal impressions, primal phan­
xa', xa' into yx'a", and so on. But the produc­ tasms, etc.-in short, multiple original mo­
tion for which consciousness is responsible only ments (we can also say: primal moments of
reaches from a to a', from xa' to x'a"; the a, x, y, interna! consciousness)-can belong to one
on the other hand, is nothing produced by con­ stratum of interna! consciousness. All of the
sciousness. lt is what is primally produced­ original moments belonging to one stratum
the "new," that which has come into being alien have the same character of consciousness,
to consciousness, that which has been received, which is essentially constitutive of the respec­
as opposed to what has been produced through tive "now": the now is the same for all of the
consciousness's own spontaneity. The peculi­ constituted contents. This common character
arity of this spontaneity of consciousness, how­ constitutes simultaneity, the "same-nowness"
ever, is that it creates nothing "new" but only [ "Gleich-Jetzigkeit "}.
brings what has been primally generated to By virtue of the original spontaneity of in­
growth, to development. Of course, what from terna! consciousness, each primal moment is
an empirical point of view we call becoming the source-point for a continuity of produc­
or production refers to objectivity, and that tions, and this continuity is of one and the same
lies somewhere else altogether. Here it is a form. The manner of production, of primal
question of the spontaneity of consciousness; temporal modification, is the same for all pri­
or put more carefully: of a primal spontaneity mal moments; one and the same law govems
of consciousness. throughout all the modifications. This law
Now depending on whether it is a question reads: The continuous producing that belongs
of the primal source for the respective now of to interna! consciousness has the form of a
the constituted content or of the spontaneous one-dimensional "rectilinear" multiplicity; ali
productions of consciousness in which the iden­ primal moments within one stratum undergo
tity of this now is maintained on into the past, the same modification (they produce the same
the moment of origin is either primal impres­ moments of the past). Therefore the modifica­
sion or primal memory, primal phantasy, and tions of two primal moments belonging to
212 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

the same stratum, modifications that have the in its various strata, it would be good to es­
same distance from their corresponding pri­ tablish and run through systematically for once
mal moments, belong to one and the same stra­ the different levels of constitution in their es­
tum; or, the modifications belonging to one sential structure.
stratum again and again produce out of them­ We found:
selves only modifications that belong to one and 1. the things of empírica! experience in ob­
the same stratum. The production always pro­ jecti ve time (in connection with which we
ceeds at the same speed. would have to distinguish still different lev­
Within each stratum, the different points of els of empirical being, which up to this point
the continuous series are at a different distance have not been taken into consideration: the
from the primal moment. This distance on the experienced physical thing belonging to the in­
part of any point is identical with the distance dividual subject, the intersubjectively identi­
the same point has from its primal moment in cal thing, the thing of physics);
the earlier stratum. The constituting primal field 2. the constituting multiplicities of appear­
of time-consciousness is a continuous exten­ ance belonging to different levels, the imma­
sion consisting of a primal moment and a de­ nent unities in pre-empirical time;
termínate series of reiterated modifications­ 3. the absolute time-constituting flow of
reiterated modifications with regard to form, consciousness.
not content. As far as form is concemed, the
determinations pertaining to these modifica­ §35. Difference between constituted
tions are always and ever the same in all pri­ unities and the constituting flow
mal fields (in their succession). Each primal
moment is precisely a primal moment (now­ Now to begin with, this absolute conscious­
consciousness); each past, consciousness of the ness that lies before ali constitution should be
past; and the degree of being past is something discussed somewhat more closely. Its peculi­
determined: a firrnly determined formal char­ arity stands out distinctly in contrast to the con­
acter corresponds to it in the primally consti­ stituted unities belonging to the most different
tuting consciousness. levels:
In the succession of strata, moments with l. Each individual object (each unity, wheth­
"contents" that are perfectly alike, that is, mo­ er immanent or transcendent, constituted in
ments whose interna! make-up is perfectly the stream) endures, and necessarily endures­
alike, can come onto the scene over and over that is, it continuously exists in time and is
again as primal moments. These primal mo­ something identical in this continuous exist­
ments belonging to different strata and pos­ ence, which at the same time can be regarded
sessing interna! contents that are entirely alike as a process. Conversely: what exists in time
are individually distinct. continuously exists in time and is the unity be­
longing to the process that carries with it in­
separably the unity of what endures in the pro­
cess as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that
Levels of Constitution of Time endures throughout the process lies in the ton­
and Temporal Objects"' al process; and conversely, the unity of the tone
is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the pro­
§34. Differentiation of the levels of cess. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as
constitution existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only
as the phase of a process, a phase in which the
Now that we have studied time-conscious­ duration of an individual being also has its
ness-starting from its most obvious phenom­ point.
ena-in sorne of its principal dimensions and 2. Individual or concrete being is necessar-

*PCIT, pp. 77-88 (Sections 34-39), with Appendices VIII and IX (pp. 120-124) to Section 39.
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 213

ily changing or unchanging; the process is which is constitutive (we cannot say "was") of
a process of change or of rest, the enduring the before. But is not the flow a succession,
object itself a changing object or one at rest. does it not have a now, an actually present
Moreover, every change has its rate or accel­ phase, and a continuity of pasts of which I am
eration of change (to use an image) with re­ now conscious in retentions? We can say noth­
spect to the same duration. As a matter of prin­ ing other than the following: This flow is some­
cipie, any phase of a change can be expanded thing we speak of in conformity with what is
into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be car­ constituted, but it is not "something in objec­
ried over into a change. Now if we consider tive time." lt is absolute subjectivity and has
the constituting phenomena in comparison with the absolute properties of something to be
the phenomena just discussed, we find a fiow, designated metaphorically as "flow"; of some­
and each phase of this flow is a continuity of thing that originates in a point of actuality, in a
adumbrations. But as a matter of principie, no primal source-point, "the now," and so on. In
phase of this flow can be expanded into a con­ the actuality-experience we have the primal
tinuous succession; and therefore the flow can­ source-point and a continuity of moments of
not be conceived as so transformed that this reverberation. For ali of this, we lack names.
phase would be extended in identity with it­
self. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find §37. Appearances of transcendent
a flow of continuous "change"; and this change objects as constituted unities
has the absurd character that it flows precise­
ly as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor We must note, in addition, that when we
"slower." If that is the case, then any object speak of the "perceptual act" and say that it is
that changes is missing here; and since "some­ the point of genuine perceiving to which a
thing" runs its course in every process, no pro­ continuous series of "retentions" is attached,
cess is in question. There is nothing here that we have not described thereby any unities in
changes, and for that reason it also makes no immanent time, but just moments of the flow.
sense to speak of something that endures. It is That is, the appearance-say, the appearance
therefore nonsensical to want to find something of a house-is a temporal being, a being that
here that remains unchanged for even an in­ endures, changes, and so on, just as much as
stant during the course of its duration. the immanent tone, which is not an appearance.
But the house-appearance is not the percep­
§36. The time-constituting -flow as tual consciousness and retentional conscious­
absolute subjectivity ness. The latter can be understood only as
time-constituting consciousness, as moments of
Time-constituting phenomena, therefore, the flow. In the same way, the memorial ap­
are evidently objectivities fundamentally dif­ pearance (or the remembered immanent ob­
ferent from those constituted in time. They are ject, perhaps the remembered immanent pri­
neither individual objects nor individual pro­ mary content) must be distinguished from the
cesses, and the predicates of such objects or memorial consciousness with its memorial re­
processes cannot be meaningfully ascribed to tentions. Everywhere we have to distinguish:
them. Hence it also can make no sense to say consciousness (flow), appearance (immanent
ofthem (and to say with the same signification) object [Objekt}), transcendent object [Gegen­
that they exist in the now and did exist previ­ stand] (when the immanent object is not a
ously, that they succeed one another in time or primary content). Not ali consciousness refers
are simultaneous with one another, and so on. to something in "objective" (that is, transcen­
But no doubt we can and must say: A certain dent) time, to objective individuality, as the
continuity of appearance-that is, a continuity consciousness that belongs to externa] percep­
that is a phase of the time-constituting flow­ tion does, for example. In every consciousness
belongs to a now, namely, to the now that it we find an "immanent content." In the case of
constitutes; and to a before, namely, as that contents that are called "appearances," this
214 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

immanent content is either the appearance of mal sensations occur "at once." And when any
something individual (of something in exter­ one of them elapses, the multitude elapses
nal time) or the appearance of something not "conjointly" and in absolutely the same mode
in time. In judging, for example, I have the with absolutely the same gradations and in ab­
appearance "judgment," namely, as a unity in solutely the same tempo: except that, in gen­
immanent time; and in this unity the judgment eral, one ceases while another still has its not­
in the logical sense "appears."* The judging yet before it-that is to say, its new primal
always has the character of the flow. Conse­ sensations that further prolong the duration of
quently, what we called "act" or "intentional what is intended in it. Or described more ad­
experience" in the Logical Investigations is equately: The many primal sensations flow
in every instance a flow in which a unity be­ away and from the beginning have at their dis­
comes constituted in immanent time (the judg­ posal the same running-off modes, except that
ment, the wish, etc.), a unity that has its imma­ the series of primal sensations constitutive of
nent duration and that may progress more or the enduring immanent objects are variously
less rapidly. These unities, which become con­ prolonged, corresponding to the varying dura­
stituted in the absolute stream, exist in imma­ tions of the immanent objects. They do not all
nent time, which is one; and in this time the make use of the formal possibilities in the same
unities can be simultaneous or have durations way. Immanent time is constituted as one for
of equal length (or perhaps have the same du­ all immanent objects and processes. Correla­
ration, that is, in the case of two immanent ob­ tively, the time-consciousness of what is im­
jects that endure simultaneously). Moreover, manent is an ali-inclusive unity. The "being­
the unities have a certain determinability with together" [Zusammen], the "being-all-at-once"
respect to before and after. [Zugleich] of actually present primal sensa­
tions is all-embracing; all-embracing too is
§38. The unity of the -flow of con­ the "before," the "having-gone-before" of all
sciousness and the constitution of the immediately preceding primal sensations,
simultaneity and succession the steady transmutation of each ensemble of
primal sensations into such a before. This be­
We have already occupied ourselves with the fore is a continuity, and each of its points is a
constitution of such immanent objects, with homogeneous, identical running-off form for
their growth from ever new primal sensations the entire ensemble. The whole "being-togeth­
and modifications. t Now in reflection we find er" of primal sensations is subject to the law
a single flow that breaks down into many flows, according to which it changes into a steady
but this multitude nevertheless has a kind of continuum of modes of consciousness, of
unity that permits and requires us to speak of modes of having elapsed, and according to
one flow. We find many flows because many which in the same continuity an ever new be­
series of primal sensations begin and end. But ing-together of primal sensations arises origi­
we find a connecting form because the law of nally, in order in its turn to pass continuous­
the transformation of the now into the no­ ly over into the condition of having elapsed.
longer-and, in the other direction, of the not­ W hat is a being-together as an ensemble of
yet into the now-applies to each of them, but primal sensations remains a being-together in
not merely to each of them taken separately; the mode of having elapsed. Primal sensations
there rather exists something like a common have their continuous "succession" in the sense
form of the now, a universal and perfect like­ of a continuous running-off, and primal sensa­
ness in the mode offlowing. Severa!, many pri- tions have their being-together, their "being-

*"Appearance" is used here in the expanded sense.

tCf.§11, pp. 190ff.
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 215

all-at-once." Actual primal sensations exist all one or the other being-all-at-once a being si­
at once; in the succession, however, one sen­ multaneous. We can no longer speak of a time
sation or group of sensations existing togeth­ that belongs to the ultimate constituting con­
er is actual primal sensation, while the others sciousness. The simultaneity of a color and of
have elapsed. But what does that mean? One a tone, for example-their being in an "actu­
can say nothing further here than "look": a pri­ ally present now"-originally becomes consti­
mal sensation or a group of primal sensations tuted with the primal sensations that introduce
that has an immanent now as object of con­ the retentional process. But the primal sensa­
sciousness (a tone-now, in the same now a color, tions are not themselves simultaneous, and
and so on) continuously changes into modes of we can no more cal! the phases of the reten­
the consciousness of the before, in which the tional being-all-at-once of fluxions simultane­
immanent object is intended as past; and "all ous phases of consciousness than we can call
at once," together with these, an ever new pri­ the succession of consciousness a temporal
mal sensation emerges, an ever new now is succession.
established, and thereby an ever new tone­ We know what this retentional being-all-at­
now, form-now, etc., is intended. In a group of once is from our earlier analyses: the continu­
primal sensations, primal sensation is distin­ um of phases that attach themselves to a pri­
guished from primal sensation by means of mal sensation, each of which is retentional
content; only the now is the same. The con­ consciousness of the earlier now ("original
sciousness, in its form as primal sensation-con­ memory" of it). Here we must note: W hen the
sciousness, is identical. primal sensation recedes and is continuously
But "together" with the primal sensation­ modified, we not only have in general an ex­
consciousness there exist continuous series of perience that is a modification of the earlier
modes pertaining to the flowing-away of "ear­ experience, but we are also able to tum our
lier" primal sensations, of earlier now-con­ glance in it in such a way that we "see," so to
sciousness. This being-together is a being-to­ speak, the earlier nonmodified experience in
gether of modes of consciousness continuously the modified experience. W hen a tonal succes­
modified with respect to form, while the be­ sion runs off (not too rapidly), we are not only
ing-together of primal sensations is a being­ able to "look at" the first tone, after it has
together of modes purely identical in form. We elapsed, as a tone that is "still present" although
can extract a point in the continuity of running­ no longer sensed, but we can also take heed
off modes, and we then find in this point too a of the fact that the mode of consciousness that
being-together of running-off modes perfectly this tone just now possesses is a "memory"
alike in form; or rather, we find an identical of the primal sensation's mode of conscious­
running-off mode. One must make an essential ness in which it was given as now. But then
distinction between these two ensembles. One we must differentiate sharply between the
is the site for the constitution of simultaneity, consciousness of the past (the retentional con­
the other the site for the constitution of tem­ sciousness as well as the consciousness that
poral succession-although it is also the case represents something "again") in which an im­
that simultaneity is nothing without temporal manent temporal object is intended as imme­
succession and temporal succession is nothing diately past, and the retention or (depending
without simultaneity, and consequently simul­ on whether the original flow of the modification
taneity and temporal succession must become of sensation or its re-presentation is in ques­
constituted correlatively and inseparably. We tion) the recollective "reproduction" of the ear­
can differentiate terminologically between the lier primal sensation. And this we must do for
retentional being-all-at-once of fluxions [flux­ every other fluxion.
ionalem Vor-Zugleich] and the impressional If any phase of the duration of an imman­
being-all-at-once of fluxions [impressionalem ent object is a now-phase and therefore intend­
Zugleich von Fluxionen]. We cannot call the ed in primal sensation, then, in the retentional
216 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

being-all-at-once, retentions that are continu­ not initially even absurd) as it may seem to
ously joined to one another are united with this say that the flow of consciousness constitutes
primal sensation. These retentions are charac­ its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it
terized in themselves as modifications of the <loes. And this can be made intelligible on the
primal sensations that belong to all of the rest basis of the flow's essential constitution. Our
of the points of the constituted duration; that regard can be directed, in the one case, through
is, to those that have elapsed in time. Each of the phases that "coincide" in the continuous
these retentions has a determínate mode to progression of the flow and that function as
which distance in time from the now-point cor­ intentionalities of the tone. But our regard can
responds. Each is the consciousness of the past also be aimed at the flow, at a section of the
of the corresponding earlier now-point and flow, at the passage of the flowing conscious­
gives it in the mode of the immediate past that ness from the beginning of the tone to its end.
corresponds to its position in the elapsed dura­ Every adumbration of consciousness of the
tion. species "retention" possesses a double inten­
tionality: one serves for the constitution of the
§39. The double intentionality of immanent object, of the tone; it is this inten­
retention and the constitution of the tionality that we call "primary memory" of the
flow of consciousness '' ( just sensed) tone, or more precisely, just re­
tention of the tone. The other intentionality is
The duality in the intentionality of reten­ constitutive of the unity of this primary mem­
tion gives us a clue to the solution of the ory in the flow; namely, retention, because it
difficulty conceming how it is possible to be is a still-being-conscious, a consciousness
aware of a unity belonging to the ultimate con­ that holds back-because it is, precisely, re­
stituting flow of consciousness. Without doubt tention-is also retention of the elapsed tone­
a difficulty <loes present itself here: If a self­ retention: in its process of being continuously
contained flow (one that belongs to an endur­ adumbrated in the flow, it is continuous reten­
ing process or object) has elapsed, I can never­ tion of the continuously preceding phases. If
theless look back on it; it forms, so it seems, a we fix our regard on sorne one phase of the flow
unity in memory. Hence the flow of conscious­ of consciousness (a phase in which there ap­
ness obviously becomes constituted in con­ pears a tone-now and an extent of the tone-du­
sciousness as a unity too. The unity of a tone­ ration in the mode of the just-having-elapsed),
duration, for example, becomes constituted in then this phase comprehends a continuity of
the flow, but the flow itself becomes constitut­ retentions united in the retentional being-all­
ed in tum as the unity of the consciousness of at-once. This continuity is retention of the to­
the tone-duration. And must we then not also tal momentary continuity of the continuously
go on to say that this unity becomes constitut­ preceding phases of the flow. (In its initial mem­
ed in an altogether analogous way and is every ber it is new primal sensation; in the member
bit as much a constituted temporal series, and that then follows next in the continuity-in the
that one must therefore surely speak of a tem­ first phase of adumbration-it is immediate
poral now, before, and after? retention of the preceding primal sensation; in
In the light of our latest explanations, we the next momentary phase, it is retention of
can give the following answer: There is one, the retention of the primal sensation preced­
unique flow of consciousness in which both ing the one above, and so on.) Now if we allow
the unity of the tone in immanent time and the the flow to flow on, we then have the flow­
unity of the flow of consciousness itself be­ continuum running off, which causes the con­
come constituted at once. As shocking (when tinuity we have just described to be modified

*Cf. Appendix VIII: The Double Intentionality of the Stream of Consciousness, pp. 218ff.
A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time 217

retentionally; and in this process, each new retentional modifications and by virtue of the
continuity of phases existing together in one circumstance that these modifications are,
moment is retention in relation to the total continuously, retentions of the retentions that
continuity belonging to the being-all-at-once have continuously preceded them. If I direct
in the preceding phase. Thus there extends my interest towards the tone, if I immerse my­
throughout the flow a horizontal intention­ self attentively in the "transverse intentional­
ality* that, in the course of the flow, continu­ ity"t (in the primal sensation as sensation of
ously coincides with itself. In the absolute pass­ the actually present tone-now, in the retention­
ing-on, in the flowing process, the first primal al modifications as primary memories of the
impression becomes changed into a retention series of elapsed tone-points and as continu­
of itself, this retention becomes changed into a ally experiencing the unity in the flow of re­
retention of this retention, and so on. But to­ tentional modifications of the primal sensa­
gether with the first retention there is a new tions and of the retentions that are already on
"now," a new primal sensation, and the latter hand), then the enduring tone stands before
is combined continuously with the former in me, constantly expanding in its duration. If I
one moment in such a way that the second focus on the "horizontal intentionality" and on
phase of the flow is primal sensation of the what is becoming constituted in it, I tum my
new now and retention of the earlier now; the reflective regard away from the tone (which has
third phase is again new primal sensation to­ endured for such and such a length of time)
gether with retention of the second primal sen­ towards what is new in the way of primal sen­
sation and retention of the retention of the sation at one point in the retentional being­
first; and so on. We must also take into account all-at-once and towards what is retained "ali
here that the retention of a retention has in­ at once" with this new primal sensation in a
tentionality not only in relation to what is im­ continuous series. W hat is retained is the past
mediately retained but also in relation to what, consciousness in its series of phases (first of
in the retaining, is retained of the second de­ ali, its preceding phase). And then, in the con­
gree, and ultimately in relation to the primal tinuous flowing-on of consciousness, I grasp
datum, which is objectivated throughout the the retained series of the elapsed conscious­
process. The situation is analogous to the re­ ness together with the limit of the actual pri­
presentation of an appearance of a physical mal sensation and the continuous being-pushed­
thing, which possesses intentionality not only back of this series, along with the new addition
in relation to the thing-appearance but also in of retentions and primal sensations.
relation to the appearing thing; or better still, Here we can ask: Can I find and apprehend
it is analogous to the memory [ of a memory] in one glance the whole retentional conscious­
of A, which makes us conscious not only of ness, included in a retentional being-all-at­
the memory but also of the A as what is re­ once, of the past course of consciousness? Ob­
membered in the memory. viously, the process necessary in this case is
We believe, therefore, that the unity of the the following: I must first grasp the retentional
flow itself becomes constituted in the flow of being-all-at-once itself, and this is continuous­
consciousness as a one-dimensional quasi­ ly modified; indeed, it is what it is only in the
temporal order by virtue of the continuity of flow. Now the flow, inasmuch as it modifies this

*Ldngsintentionalitiit, which Churchill translates as "longitudinal intentionality." I use "horizontal" because I take
the intentionality in this case to be the flow's intending of itself in its flowing; this intentionality, in other words, may be
said to run lengthwise along the flow, which the term "horizontal" is intended to suggest. -Translator's note.
tQuerintentionalitiit. Here I follow Churchill's translation. I interpret the flow's intentionality in this case to be
directed towards the immanent object enduring or running off in immanent time (and towards a transcendent object if
the immanent object is an act of the appropriate kind). I take the immanent object to be on a different leve! from the
absolute flow that intends or constitutes it; the intentionality directed towards the immanent temporal object may,
therefore, be said to cut across the direction of the flow. -Translator's note.
218 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

retentional being-all-at-once, coincides with of the same flow of consciousness become

itself intentionally, constituting a unity in the constituted phenomenally cannot be identical
flow. And what is one and identical receives with these constituted phases, nor are they.
and maintains a continuous mode of being­ What is brought to appearance in the actual
pushed-back; something new is always being momentary phase of the flow of conscious­
added "in front" in order to flow away imme­ ness-specifically, in its series of retentional
diately in its tum, together with what is con­ moments-are the past phases of the flow of
nected with it in that moment. Throughout this consciousness.
process my look can remain fixed on the mo­
mentary being-all-at-once that sinks into the
past, but the constitution ofthe retentional uni­ APPENDIX VIII: The Double Intentionality
ty reaches beyond this, always adding some­ of the Stream of Consciousness*
thing new. My look can be tumed towards that
in this process, and I am always conscious of it We have a double intentionality in the stream
in the flow as constituted unity. of consciousness. Either we consider the con­
Consequently, two inseparably united in­ tent of the flow together with its flow-form:
tentionalities, requiring one another like two then we are looking at the primal-experience
sides of one and the same thing, are interwo­ series, which is a series of intentional experi­
ven with each other in the one, unique flow of ences, consciousness of. ... Or we direct our
consciousness. By virtue of one of the inten­ regard to the intentional unities, to what is in­
tionalities, immanent time becomes consti­ tended as something unitary in the streaming
tuted-an objective time, a genuine time in on of the flow: then an objectivity stands be­
which there is duration and the alteration of fore us in objective time, the temporal field
what endures. In the other intentionality, it is proper as opposed to the temporal field of the
the quasi-temporaI arrangement of the phases stream ofexperience.
of the flow that becomes constituted-of the The stream of experience with its phases
flow that always and necessarily possesses the and extents is itself a unity identifiable through
flowing "now"-point, the phase of actuality, memory together with the directing of one's
and the series of phases that have preceded regard towards what flows: impressions and
the phase of actuality or that will follow it retentions; the emerging, changing in confor­
(those that are not yet actual). This prephenom­ mity with law, and disappearing or becoming
enal, preimmanent temporality becomes con­ obscure. This unity becomes constituted origi­
stituted intentionally as the form of the time­ nally through the fact of the flow itself; that is
constituting consciousness and in it itself. The to say, it is the flow's proper essence not only
flow of the consciousness that constitutes im­ simply to exist but to be a unity of experience
manent time not only exists but is so remark­ and to be given in interna! consciousness, in
ably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self­ which a ray of attention can extend towards it.
appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, (This ray is not itself an object of attention. It
and therefore the flow itself must necessarily enriches but does not alter the stream to be
be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-ap­ considered; it rather "fixes" it and makes it
pearance of the flow does not require a second objective.) The attentive perception ofthis uni­
flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a ty is an intentional experience with variable
phenomenon in itself. The constituting and the content; and a memory can be directed to­
constituted coincide, and yet naturally they wards what has passed away and can modify
cannot coincide in every respect. The phases it repeatedly, compare it with what is like it,
of the flow of consciousness in which phases etc. That this identification is possible, that an

*To §39, pp. 216ff.

A Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna/ Time 219

object is constituted here, depends on the sciousness and immananent (adequate) per­
structure of the experiences: namely, that each ception with respect to the temporal objects
phase of the stream changes into retention "of -at least when they are immanent, such as an
...," thanhe latter in turn changes in the same enduring tone in the tonal field or even a col­
way, and so on. Without that process, a content or datum in the visual field. If P(t) is the per­
would be inconceivable as experience; with­ ception of a sensed tone, grasping it as an en­
out it, as a matter ofprincipie, experience would during tone, then P(t) changes into a continu­
not and could not be given as a unity to the ity of retentions Rv,n- But P(t) is also given
subject and consequently would be nothing. as an experience in interna! consciousness. If
The flowing consists in the passing of each P(t) changes into Rv,,¡, then precisely the inter­
phase of the original field (thus of a linear na) consciousness of Rv(n necessarily changes
continuum) over into a retentional modification in interna! consciousness. For here indeed be­
of the same, only just past, phase. And so it ing and being-internally-intended coincide.But
continues. then the interna! consciousness of P(t) also
In the case ofthe second intentionality, I do changes into the retentional modification of
not follow the flow of fields, the flow of the this interna) consciousness, and this retention­
form "now (original)-retentional modification al modification itself is intended internally.
of different degrees" as a unitary sequence of Thus it is that the just-having-perceived is in­
change. Instead, I direct my attention to what tended.
is intended in each field and in each phase that When a tone-perception passes over into
the field as a linear continuum possesses. Each its corresponding retentions (the conscious­
phase is an intentional experience. In the case ness ofthe tone that just was), a consciousness
of the foregoing objectification, the constitut­ of the perceiving that just was is found there
ing experiences were the acts of interna! con­ (in interna) consciousness, as experience), and
sciousness whose objects are precisely the both coincide; I cannot have one without the
"phenomena" of time-constituting conscious­ other. Put differently, both necessarily belong
ness. The latter are therefore intentional ex­ together: the change of a perception of an ob­
periences themselves; their objects are the ject into a retentional modification of this per­
time-points and temporal durations with their ception and the change of the act of perceiv­
respective objective fillings. While the abso­ ing into a retentional modification of the act
lute temporal flow flows, the intentional phases of perceiving. Thus we necessarily have two
are displaced, but in such a way that they con­ kinds of retentional modifications given with
stitute unities in an interrelated manner; they every perception that is not perception of in­
pass over into one another precisely as phe­ terna! consciousness. Interna! consciousness
nomena of one thing, which is adumbrated in is a flow. If experiences that are not "interna!
the flowing phenomena in such a way that we perceptions" are to be possible in this flow,
have "objects in their ways ofappearing" [ "Ge­ two kinds of retentional series must be given.
genstiinde im Wie "J and in ever new ways of Therefore, in addition to the constitution of
appearing. The form of the way ofappearing is the flow as a unity through retentions of the
the orientation: the now, the just past, the fu­ "interna!," a series of retentions of the "ex­
ture. With regard to the objects, then, we can terna!" must also be given. The latter series
once again speak of the flow in which the now constitutes objective time (a constituted im­
changes into the past, and so on. And this is manence, externa! to the first but nonetheless
necessarily prescribed a priori by the structure immanent). Here we must note that the con­
ofthe experience-flow as the flow ofintention­ sciousness of the interna! does not have as its
al experiences. correlate immanent data that endure (such as
Retention is a peculiar modification of the a tonal datum, or enduring joys and sorrows,
perceptual consciousness, which is primal im­ or enduring processes called judgments) but
pression in the original time-constituting con- the phases constituting these unities.
220 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

APPENDIX IX: Primal Consciousness and We therefore owe it to retention that conscious­
the Possibility of Reflection* ness can be made into an object.
We can now pose the question: What about
Retention is not a modification in which im­ the beginning-phase of an experience that is in
pressional data are really preserved, only in the process of becoming constituted? Does it
modi-fied form: on the contrary, it is an inten­ also come to be given only on the basis of re­
tionality-indeed, an intentionality with a spe­ tention, and would it be "unconscious" if no
cific character of its own. When a primal da­ retention were to follow it? We must say in re­
tum, a new phase, emerges, the preceding phase sponse to this question: The beginning-phase
does not vanish but is "kept in grip" (that is to can become an object only after it has elapsed
say, precisely "retained"); and thanks to this in the indicated way, by means of retention and
retention, a looking-back at what has elapsed reflection (or reproduction). But if it were in­
is possible. The retention itself is not a look­ tended only by retention, then what confers on
ing-back that makes the elapsed phase into it the label "now" would remain incomprehen­
an object: while I have the elapsed phase in sible. At most, it could be distinguished nega­
my grip, I live through the present phase, take tively from its modifications as that one phase
it-thanks to retention-"in addition" to the that does not make us retentionally conscious
elapsed phase; and I am directed towards what of any preceding phase; but the beginning­
is coming (in a protention). phase is by all means characterized in con­
But since I keep the elapsed phase in my sciousness in quite positive fashion. It is just
grip, I can direct my regard to it in a new act nonsense to talk about an "unconscious" con­
that we call reflection (immanent perception) tent that would only subsequently become con­
or recollection, depending on whether the scious. Consciousness is necessarily conscious­
elapsed experiencing is still being generated ness in each of its phases. Just as the retentional
in new primal data and is therefore an impres­ phase is conscious of the preceding phase with­
sion, or on whether it has already elapsed as a out making it into an object, so too the primal
whole and "is receding into the past." These datum is already intended-specifically, in the
acts stand to retention in the relation of ful­ original form of the "now"-without its being
fillment. Retention itself is not an "act" (that something objective. It is precisely this primal
is, an immanent duration-unity constituted in consciousness that passes over into retentional
a series of retentional phases) but a momen­ modification-which is then retention of the
tary consciousness of the elapsed phase and primal consciousness itself and of the datum
at the same time a foundation for the reten­ originally intended in it, since the two are in­
tional consciousness of the next phase. Each separably united. lf the primal consciousness
phase, by being retentionally conscious of the were not on hand, no retention would even be
preceding phase, includes in itself the entire conceivable: retention of an unconscious con­
series of elapsed retentions in the form of a tent is impossible. Moreover, the primal con­
chain of mediate intentions: it is precisely in sciousness is not something inferred on the ba­
this way that duration-unities, which are repro­ sis of reasoning; it is rather something that can
duced by the vertical series of the time-diagram be seen as a constituting phase in reflection on
and which are the objects of retrospective acts, the constituted experiencing, exactly like the
become constituted. In these acts, the series of retentions. But we must not misunderstand this
constituting phases comes to be given along primal consciousness, this primal apprehension
with the constituted unity (e.g., the unchang­ or whatever one wants to call it, to be an appre­
ing tone continuously preserved in retention). hending act. Apart from the fact that this would

*To §39, particularly pp. 216ff.

Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 221

be an evidently false description of the situa­ posed to make into an object is long since past
tion, it would entangle us in irresolvable diffi­ and would no longer be accessible to it at all
culties. If one says that every content comes to -if we did not already presuppose the whole
consciousness only by means of an act of ap­ play of primal consciousness and retentions.
prehension directed towards it, then the ques­ But since primal consciousness and retentions
tion immediately arises about the conscious­ are there, the possibility exists, in reflection, of
ness in which this act of apprehension, which looking at the constituted experience and at
is surely a content itself, becomes conscious, and the constituting phases, and even of grasping
an infinite regress is unavoidable. But if every the distinction that obtains, for example, be­
"content" is "primally conscious"* in itself and tween the original flow as it was intended in
necessarily, the question about a further giv­ the primal consciousness and its retentional
ing consciousness becomes meaningless. modification. All the objections that have been
Furthermore, every act of apprehension is raised against the method of reflection are ex­
itself a constituted immanent duration-unity. plained on the basis of ignorance of the essen­
While it is being built up, that which it is sup- tial constitution of consciousness.

12. Horizons and the Genesis of Perceptiont

§ 1. Original consciousness and the Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the
perspectiva! adumbration of spatial perspectival adumbration through which ev­
objects:f: ery spatial object invariably appears, only
manifests the spatial object from one side. No
External perception is a constant preten­ matter how completely we may perceive a
sion to accomplish something that, by its very thing, it is never given in perception with the
nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. characteristics that qualify it and make it up
Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as as a sensuous thing from all sides at once. We
it were. My meaning will soon become clear cannot avoid speaking of these or those sides
to you once you intuitively grasp how the ob­ of the object that are actually perceived. Every
jective sense exhibits itself as unity [in and aspect, every continuity of single adumbra­
through] the unending manifolds of possible tions, regardless how far this continuity may
appearances; and seen upon closer inspection, extend, only offers us sides. And to our mind
how the continual synthesis, as a unity of co­ this statement is not just a mere fact: it is in­
inciding, allows the same sense to appear; and conceivable that external perception would
how a consciousness of ever new possibilities exhaust the sensuous-material content of its
of appearance constantly persists over against perceived object; it is inconceivable that a
the factual, lirnited courses of appearance, tran­ perceptual object could be given in the entirety
scending them. of its sensuously intuitive features, literally,

* "Urbewusst" in Husserliana X; "unbewusst" in the publication of 1928. The original manuscript for this appen­
dix has not been located. -Translator's note.
tExcerpted from Edmund Husserl. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental
Logic. Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming). The originally pub­
lished title of this selection from APS, "Self-Giving in Perception," has been modified with permission of the transla­
tor. Reprinted with permission of the translator.
:j:I would like to thank Stephanie Windolph and Tanja Stahler for their helpful remarks on an earlier draft of this
translation. -Translator's note.
222 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

from all sides at once in a self-contained per­ ceptional circumstances. It is clear that a non­
ception. intuitive pointing beyond or indicating is what
Thus, this fundamental division between characterizes the side actually seen as a mere
what is genuinely perceived and what is not side, and what provides for the fact that the
genuinely perceived belongs to the primordial side is not taken for the thing, but rather, that
structure of the correlation: externa! percep­ something transcending the side is intended in
tion and bodily "object." When we view the consciousness as perceived, by which precise­
table, we view it from sorne particular side, and ly that is actually seen. Noetically speaking,
this side is thereby what is genuinely seen. Yet perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting
the table has still other sides. lt has a non-vis­ that presents in an intuitive manner what is
ible back side, it has a non-visible interior; and originally exhibited, and of an empty indicat­
these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, ing that refers to possible new perceptions. In
a variety of complexes of possible visibility. a noematic regard, what is perceived is given
That is a very curious situation peculiar to the in adumbrations in such a way that the particu­
very essence of the matter at hand. For proper lar givenness refers to something else that is
to the very sense of every perception is percep­ not-given, as what is not given belonging to
tion' s perceived object as its objective sense the same object. We will have to understand
[gegenstiindlicher Sinn], that is, this thing, the the meaning of this.
table that is seen. But this thing is not [ merely] Let us first note that every perception, or
the side genuinely seen in this moment; rather noematically speaking, every single aspect of
(according to the very sense of perception) the the object in itself points to a continuity, to
thing is precisely the full-thing that has still multifarious continua of possible new percep­
other sides, sides that are not brought to genu­ tions, and precisely to those in which the same
ine perception in this perception, but that would object would show itself from ever new sides.
be brought to genuine perception in other per­ In every moment of perceiving, the perceived
ceptions. is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] a
Generally speaking, perception is original system of referential implications [Verwei­
consciousness. We have, however, a curious sen] with an appearance-core on which appear­
schism in externa! perception: Original con­ ances have their hold. And it calls out to us, as
sciousness is only possible in the form of an it were, in these referential implications: "There
actually and genuinely original conscious-hav­ is still more to see here, turn me so you can see
ing of sides and a co-conscious-having of oth­ all my sides, let your gaze peruse me, draw
er sides that are precisely not originally there. closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep
I say co-conscious, since the non-visible sides on looking me over again and again, turning
are certainly also there somehow for conscious­ me to see all sides. You will get to know me
ness, "co-meant" as co-present. But they do like this, all that I am, all my surface qualities,
not appear as such, genuinely. They are not all my inner sensuous qualities," etc.
there like reproductive aspects are, as intui­ You understand the meaning of this sug­
tions that exhibit them; we can nevertheless pro­ gestive manner of speaking. In the particular
duce such intuitive presentifications any time present perception I have just these aspects and
we like. Viewing the front side of the table we their modifications, and no others, just these
can, whenever we like, orchestrate an intuitive aspects that are always limited ones. In each
presentational course, a reproductive course moment the objective sense is the same with
of aspects through which the non-visible side respect to the object as such, the object that is
of the thing would be presented to us. But here meant; and it coincides with the continua!
we are doing nothing more than presentifying course of momentary appearances, as for in­
a course of perceptions to ourselves in which stance this table here. But what is identical is a
we would see the object-passing from a per­ constant x, a constant substrate of actually ap­
ception to new ones-from ever new sides in pearing table-moments, but also of indications
original aspects. Still, that only happens in ex- [Hinweisen] of moments not yet appearing.
Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 223

These indications are at the same time tenden­ gether with horizons that are inseparably af­
cies, indicative tendencies that push us toward filiated with these aspects. In the concordant
the appearances not given. They are, however, coinciding of sense, they would bring the same
not single indications, but entire indicative sys­ object as being ever newly determined to ac­
tems, indications functioning as systems of tual, fulfilling givenness. To our mind, the as­
rays that point toward corresponding mani­ pects are nothing for themselves; they are ap­
fold systems of appearance. They are pointers pearances-of only through the intentional
into an emptiness since the non-actualized ap­ horizons that are inseparable from them.
pearances are neither consciously intended as We thereby distinguish further between an
actual nor presentified. In other words, every­ inner horizon and an outer horizon of the re­
thing that genuinely appears is an appearing spective aspect-appearance. lt should be rec­
thing only by virtue of being intertwined and ognized that the division applying to what is
permeated with an intentional empty horizon, genuinely perceived and what is only co-pres­
that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo ent entails a distinction between determina­
of emptiness with respect to appearance. lt is tions with respect to the content of the object
an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but (a) that are actually there, appearing in the flesh,
an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a determin­ and (b) those that are still ambiguously pre­
able indeterminacy. For the intentional hori­ figured in full emptiness. Let us also note that
zon cannot be filled out in just any manner; it what actually appears is, in itself, also laden
is a horizon of consciousness that itself has with a similar distinction. Indeed, the call re­
the fundamental trait of consciousness as the sounds as well with respect to the side that is
consciousness of something. already actually seen: "Draw closer, closer still;
In spite of its emptiness, the sense of this now fix your eyes on me, changing your place,
halo of consciousness is a prefiguring that pre­ changing the position of your eyes, etc. You
scribes a rule for the transition to new actu­ will get to see even more of me that is new,
alizing appearances. Seeing the front side of ever new partial colorings, etc. You will get to
the table, I am also conscious of the back side see structures of the wood that were not visi­
along with everything else that is non-visible, ble just a moment ago, and that formerly were
through an empty pointing ahead, even though only viewed indeterminately and generally,"
it be rather indeterminate. But no matter how etc. Thus, even what is already seen is lacten
indeterminate it may be, it is still a pointing with an anticipatory intention. It, what is al­
ahead to a bodily shape, to a bodily coloring, ready seen, is a constant framework that pre­
etc. And only appearances that adumbrate figures something new; it is an x to be deter­
things of that kind and that determine more mined more closely. There is a constant process
closely what is indeterminate in the framework of anticipation, of preunderstanding. In addi­
of this prefiguring can be integrated concor­ tion to this inner horizon there are then also
dantly; only they can stay the course of aniden­ outer horizons, prefigurings for what is still
tical x of determination as the same, being de­ devoid of any intuitively given framework that
termined here newly and more closely. This would require only more differentiated ways
holds time and again for every perceptual phase of sketching it in.
of the streaming process of perceiving, for ev­
ery new appearance, only that the intentional §2. The relationship of fullness and
horizon has altered and shifted. Proper to ev­ emptiness in the perceptual process and
ery appearing thing of each perceptual phase is the acquisition of knowledge
a new empty horizon, a new system of deter­
minable indeterminacy, a new system of pro­ In order to gain a deeper understanding we
gressing tendencies with corresponding possi­ must pay attention to how fullness and emp­
bilities of entering into determinately ordered tiness stand in relation to one another at each
systems of possible appearances, of possible moment, how emptiness adopts fullness in
ways that the aspects can run their course, to- the flow of perception, and how fullness be-
224 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

comes emptiness again. We must understand merely consist in tracing over in intuition the
the structure of interconnections for every ap­ prefigured sense of which one is emptily con­
pearance as well as the structure that unites scious. Indeterminacy, as we said, belongs es­
all series ofappearances. In the continua! pro­ sentially to the empty premonition which is,
gression of perception, as in the case of every as it were, the presentiment of what is to come.
perception, we have protentions that are con­ We spoke as well of determínate indeter­
tinuously fulfilled by what occurs anew, occur­ minacy. Indeterminacy is a primordial form of
ring in the form ofthe primordial-impressional generality whose nature it is to be fulfilled in
Now. And here as well. In every progression of the coincidence of sense only by "specifica­
externa! perceiving, the protention has the tion." As long as this specification itself has
shape of continuous anticipations that become the character of indeterminacy (the specific in­
fulfilled. That is to say, out of the indicative determinacy as opposed to the general indeter­
systems ofthe horizons, certain indicative lines minacy just mentioned), it can attain further
are continually being actualized as expecta­ specification, etc., in new steps. But now we
tions; the latter are continuously fulfilled in should consider that this process offulfillment,
aspects that are being determined more closely. which is a specifying fulfillment, is also a pro­
In the previous lecture we approached the cess of knowing something more closely; it is
unity of every externa! perception from differ­ not only a momentary knowledge acquisition,
ent directions. Externa! perception is a temporal but at the same time a process of acquisition
run-off of lived-experience where appearances within knowledge that is abiding and that be­
concordantly pass into one another forming comes habitual. This will become clearer
the unity of coincidence corresponding to the shortly.
unity ofsense. We carne to understand this flux Let us note in advance that the primordial
as a systematic network of progressive fulfill­ place of this accomplishment is the continu­
ment ofintentions that obviously, when viewed ously co-functioning retention. First, !et us re­
from the other side, goes hand in hand with an call that the continually progressing fulfillment
emptying of intentions that are already full. is at the same time a continually progressing
Every momentary phase of perception is in it­ emptying. For, as soon as a new side becomes
self a network of partially full and partially visible, a side that has just been visible gradu­
empty intentions. For, in every phase we have ally disappears from sight, becoming finally
genuine appearances, that is, a fulfilled inten­ completely non-visible. But what has become
tion, albeit only gradually fulfilled, since there non-visible is not cognitively lost for us. The­
remains an inner horizon of unfulfilledness matic perception does not merely drive at con­
and an indeterminacy that is still determin­ tinually possessing sorne new aspect of the
able. Moreover, proper to every phase is a fully object that would be intuitively grasped from
empty outer horizon that tends toward fulfill­ moment to moment, as if what was former­
ment and, in the transition toward a definite ly given would slip away from the grasp of
direction of progress, strives toward it in the [perceptual] interest. Rather, as perception
manner of empty anticipation. progresses it drives at fashioning a unity of
Viewed more precisely, we now have to de­ originary acquisitions of knowledge through
scribe the process of perception as a process of which the object, according to its specific con­
acquiring knowledge; and we have to distin­ tent, would reach an original acquisition, and
guish further (in the following manner) between through it would become an abiding epistem­
fulfillment and the process of determining more ic possession. * And in fact we understand the
closely. While the empty horizon-both inner original acquisition of knowledge by observ­
and outer-fashions its next fulfillment in the ing the following situation: The process of de­
march of perception, this fulfillment does not termining more closely, which comes about

*Every content of an unaltered thing can be reached time and again through perception; I can go around the surface;
ideally the thing can be divided, and can be viewed time and again from ali surface sides, etc.
Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 225

with fulfillment, imparts afresh a specific that is at our disposal any time. How is some­
moment of sense. While it vanishes from the thing freely at our disposal? Although this thing
field of genuine perception in the progression that is already familiar to me has become emp­
to new perceptions, it remains held retentional­ ty, it is freely at my disposal insofar as the
ly. (That already takes place prethematically, empty retention remaining behind can be free­
already in background perceiving. In thematic ly filled up at any time; it can be made present
perception, retention has the thematic charac­ at any time by a re-perception in the sense of a
ter of keeping-a-hold-of.) Accordingly, the re-cognition. By walking around it, drawing
empty horizon (into which what is new en­ nearer to it, touching it with my hands, etc., I
ters by virtue of retention) has a character other can once more see ali the sides that are already
than the empty horizon peculiar to the stretch familiar to me; I can experience them again,
of perception, that is, before the latter origi­ they are ready for perception. And this holds
narily appeared. Having already once seen the true likewise for the next time. The fact that a
back side of an unfamiliar object and, turning re-perception, a renewed perception of the same
back to perceive the front side, the empty pre­ thing, is possible for transcendence character­
monition of the back side now has a determí­ izes the fundamental trait of transcendent per­
nate prefiguring that it did not have previously. ception, alone through which an abiding world
The unfamiliar object is thereby transformed is there for us, a reality that can be pregiven for
in the perceptual process into a familiar object; us and can be freely at our disposal.
in the end, I have exactly what I had started To this we must add yet another essential
with, namely, a perspectiva! appearance. And observation. If we have become familiar with
if the object has moved entirely out of our field a thing and a second thing appears in our field
of perception, then we have an altogether fully of vision, and if, with respect to the side genu­
empty retention of it. Nevertheless, we still have inely seen, it accords with the earlier and fa­
the entire epistemic acquisition of it, and we miliar thing, then according to an essential law
still have a hold on it in thematic perceiving. of consciousness (by virtue of an inner coin­
Our empty-consciousness now has an articu­ ciding with the earlier thing awakened through
lated, systematic sense that is sketched in, that the "association of similarity"), the new thing
did not exist previously and especially at the receives the entire epistemic prefiguring from
beginning of the perception. What was previ­ the earlier one. lt is apperceived, as we say, with
ously a mere framework of sense, a wide rang­ the same non-visible qualities as the previous
ing generality, is now specified meaningfully one. And even this prefiguring, this acquisi­
in an articulated manner; to be sure, it awaits tion of an inner tradition, is also freely at our
further experience in order to take on still rich­ disposal in the form of actualizing percep­
er epistemic contents as contents of determina­ tion.
tion. If I turn back again to the perceptions of But how does this having something freely
the earlier determination, they will issue in the at our disposal look now upon closer inspec­
consciousness of recognition, in the conscious­ tion? What makes possible the free foray into
ness: "I already know ali that." Now a mere our world that is thoroughly interwoven with
bringing to intuition takes place, and with it anticipations; what makes ali existing knowl­
fulfilling confirmation of the empty intentions, edge and new knowledge possible? Let us priv­
but no longer the process of determining more ilege here the normal and basic instance of the
closely. constitution of externa! existence, namely, the
constitution of unaltered spatial things. Whether
§3. The possibility of our acquired alterations of things can occur without being
knowledge being free/y at our disposal perceived and yet can be known in ali their
unperceived elements in a variety of percep­
By acquiring knowledge originally, percep- tions and experiences that follow-this is a
tion also acquires permanent, lasting posses­ theme for a clarification existing on a higher
sion of what it has acquired; it is a possession leve!, a theme that already presupposes clari-
226 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

fying the possibility of knowing existence in manner points to new modes of appearance
rest. through its halo which, when occurring, emerge
Thus, in order to understand at least this as partly confirming, partly determining more
basic feature of the constitutive problematic, closely. By virtue of inner intentions-un­
we ask what having acquisitions of knowledge fulfilled and those now in the process of being
freely at our disposal looks like-acquisitions fulfilled-what has already appeared itself be­
I already have, however incompletely; what comes enriched. Moreover, in this progres­
does it look like specifically in the case of un­ sion, the empty outer horizon that was inter­
altered thingliness? W hat makes it possible? twined with the appearances achieves its next
From what we have said above, we see that fulfillment, at least a partial one. The part of
every perception implicite invokes an entire the horizon that remains unfulfilled passes ov­
perceptual system; every appearance that arises er into the horizon of the new appearance, and
in it implies an entire system of appearance, it goes on like this continually. That aspect of
specifically in the form of intentional inner and the object which has already appeared is par­
outer horizons. We cannot even imagine a mode tially lost again as it progresses out of the
of appearance in which the appearing object givenness of the appearance; the visible be­
would be given completely. No final presenta­ comes non-visible again. But it is not lost. I
tion in the flesh is ever reached in the mode of remain conscious of it retentionally and in such
appearance as if it would present the complete, a way that the empty horizon of the appear­
exhausted Self of the object. Every appear­ ance present at this time receives a new pre­
ance implies a plus ultra in the empty horizon. figuring that points in a determinate manner to
And since perception does indeed pretend to what has already been given earlier as co­
give the object [completely] in the flesh in ev­ present. Having seen the back side and having
ery appearance, it in fact and by its very nature tumed back to the front side, the perceptual
constantly pretends to accomplish more than object has kept a determination of sense for
it can accomplish. In a peculiar way, every per­ me; likewise in emptiness, it points to what
ceptual givenness is a constant mixture of fa­ was previously seen. They all belong now
miliarity and unfamiliarity, a givenness that abidingly to the object. The process of percep­
points to new possible perceptions that would tion is a constant process of acquiring knowl­
issue in familiarity. And that will continue to edge that holds on to what was acquired epis­
hold in a new sense, differently from what has temically in sense; it thereby fashions an ever
come to light up to now. newly altered and ever more enriched sense.
Let us now take a look at the formation of During the ongoing perceptual process, this
unity through coinciding as it pertains to sense sense is added to the grasped object itself in its
by examining the transition of appearances, for presumed [complete] presentation in the flesh.
instance, when approaching or walking around Now, it depends upon the direction of the
an object or in eye movement. The fundamen­ perceptual processes as to which lines from the
tal relationship in this dynamic transition is system of unfulfilled intentions are brought to
that of intention and fulfillment. The empty fulfillment, that is, which continuous series of
pointing ahead acquires its corresponding full­ possible appearances out of the entire system
ness. It corresponds roughly to the rich possi­ of possible appearances of the object will be
bilities prefigured; but since its nature is deter­ realized. Advancing along this line, the empty
minable indeterminacy, it also brings, together intentions are transformed respectively into
with the fulfillment, a closer determination. expectations. Once the path is pursued, the se­
Thus here we have a new "primordial-institu­ ries of appearances runs its course in the sense
tion," or as we can say here again, a primor­ of continuously arousing and steadily fulfill­
dial-impression, since a moment of primordial ing expectations that stem from the current kin­
originality emerges. That of which we are al­ aestheses, while the remaining empty horizons
ready conscious in a primordial-impressional are left in dead potentiality.
Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 227

Lastly, we still have to mention that the etc. And they do not simply run parallel to the
harmony in the coinciding of adumbration-ap­ flow of appearances there; rather the kinaes­
pearances that pass over into one another by thetic series under consideration and the per­
way of intention and fulfillment not only con­ ceptual appearances are related to one anoth­
cems the appearances taken as wholes, but also er through consciousness. By viewing an object
all their moments and parts that can be differ­ I am conscious of the position of my eyes and
entiated. Thus, there is something correspond­ at the same time-in the form of a novel sys­
ing to every filled spatial point of the object in tematic empty horizon-1 am conscious of the
the entire series of appearances; they continu­ entire system of possible eye positions that rest
ously pass into one another such that this point at my disposal. And now, what is seen in the
in the appearance exhibits itself as a moment given eye position is so enmeshed with the
of the appearing spatial form. entire system that I can say with certainty that
If we ask, finally, what gives unity within if I were to move my eyes in this direction or
every temporal point of the momentary appear­ in that, specific visual appearances would ac­
ance-unity considered as the entire aspect in cordingly run their course in a determínate ar­
which the particular side is exhibited-we will der. If I were to let the eye movements run this
also come across reciproca! intentions that are way or that in another direction, different se­
fulfilled simultaneously and reciprocally. The ries of appearances would accordingly run their
transition of appearances following one after course as expected. This holds likewise for
the other are all in dynamic displacement, en­ head movements in the system of these possi­
richment, and impoverishment. bilities of movement, and again for the move­
The object appearing constantly new, con­ ment of walking, etc., that I might bring into
stantly different is constituted as the same in play.
these exceedingly complicated and wondrous Every series of kinaestheses proceeds in its
systems of intention and fulfillment that make own way, in a manner totally different from
up the appearances. But the object is never the series of sensuous data. It runs its course in
finished, never fixed completely. such a way as to be freely at my disposal, free
We must point here to a side of the noemat­ to inhibit, free to orchestrate once again, as an
ic constitution that is essential for the objec­ originally subjective realization. Thus, the sys­
tivation of the perceptual object-to the side tem of lived-body movements is in fact char­
of kinaesthetic motivation. We mentioned in acterized with respect to consciousness in a
passing time and again that the courses of ap­ special way as a subjectively free system. I run
pearance go hand in hand with the orches­ through this system in the consciousness of the
trating movements of the lived-body {Leib]. free "I can." lt may happen that I unintention­
But that must not remain something that we ally dwell upon something, that for instance my
only mention haphazardly in passing. The eyes tum this way or that. But I can exercise
lived-body is constantly there, functioning as my will at any time and pursue such a path of
an organ of perception; and here, it is in itself movement or whatever path of movement I
moreover an entire system of compatibly har­ like. As soon as I have an appearance of the
monizing organs of perception. Toe lived-body thing in such a situation, a system of intemally
is in itself characterized as the perceiving-lived­ coherent manifold appearances of the same
body. We recognize it then purely as a lived­ thing is thereby prefigured in the original con­
body, subjectively movable and in perceiving sciousness of the sequence of appearances.
activity, as subjectively self-moving. In this A propos the appearances I am not free:
regard it does not come into consideration as when I undertake a series of movements in the
a perceived spatial thing, but rather with re­ free system, "I move myself," the appearances
spect to the system of so-called "movement­ that are arriving are already prefigured. The
sensations" that run their course during per­ appearances form dependent systems. Only as
ception, in eye movements, head movements, dependent upon kinaestheses can they continu-
228 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ally pass into one another and constitute a uni­ ery path of actualization that we would de fac­
ty of one sense. Only by running their course to enter down in realizing this freedom would
in these ways do they unfold their intention­ yield continuous series of appearances of the
al indicators. Only through this interplay of object. Ali of these series would exhibit the
independent and dependent variables is that object for one and the same span of time; they
which appears constituted as a transcendent would ali exhibit the same object in the same
perceptual object, precisely as an object that duration, only from different sides. In accor­
is more than what we directly perceive, as an dance with the sense of what is constituted, all
object that can completely vanish from my determinations that would be known through
perception and yet still persist. We can also say this process would be co-existent.
it is constituted as such only by the fact that
its appearances are kinaesthetically motivat­ §4. The relation of esse and percipi in
ed, and consequently that it is in my freedom immanent and transcendent perception
-in accordance with the knowledge that I
have acquired-to let the appearances run their All this holds only for transcendent objects.
course randomly as original appearances in An immanent object, like a lived-experience­
their system of concordance. Through the ap­ of-black, offers itself as a lasting object, and in
propriate eye movements and other lived-bodi­ a certain way through "appearances" as well.
ly movements I can, in the case of a familiar But it only does so like any temporal object in
object, tum back at any time to the old appear­ general. The temporally extending duration re­
ances that give me back the object from the quires the constant modification of the modes
same sides. Or, by freely retuming to the ap­ of givenness in accordance with the modes of
propriate place, I can once again perceive and appearance of the temporal orientation. Now,
identify the object no longer perceived. the spatial object is also a temporal object, so
Thus, in every perceptual process we see a the same holds for it too. But it still has a sec­
constitutive duet being played: (1) The system ond, special way to appear. By directing our
of my free possibilities of movement is inten­ attention to the temporal fullness and especi­
tionally constituted as a practica!, kinaesthetic ally to the primordial-impressional phases,
horizon. This system is actualized each time I we come up against the radical difference be­
run through single paths of movements with tween the appearance of transcendent and im­
the character of familiarity, that is, of fulfill­ manent objects. The immanent object has only
ment. We are not only thereby conscious of ev­ one possible way to be given in the original in
ery eye position that we have at the moment, every Now, and therefore every mode of the
every position of the physical-body as the mo­ past also has only one single series of tempo­
mentary sensation of movement, but we are al­ ral modifications, namely that of presentifi­
so conscious of them as a place in a system of cation, with the changing past objects being
places; thus we are conscious of them with an constituted in it. But the spatial object has in­
empty horizon which is a horizon of freedom. finitely many ways [to be given in the original]
(2) Every visual sensation or visual appearance since it can appear in the Now, that is, in an
that arises in the visual field, every tactile ap­ original way from its different sides. Though it
pearance that arises in the field of touch is or­ appears de facto from this side, it could have
dered with respect to consciousness, to the cur­ been able to appear from other sides, and ac­
rent situation of the consciousness of the parts cordingl y every one of its past phases have
of the Iived-body, creating a horizon of further infinitely many ways in which it could exhib­
possibilities that are ordered together, creating it its past fulfilled points of time. We can also
a horizon of possible series of appearances be­ say: the concept of appearance has a new and
longing to the freely possible series of move­ unique sense for the transcendent object.
ment. If we consider exclusively the Now phase,
In relation to the constitution of transcen­ then in the case of the immanent object, ap­
dent temporality we should note here that ev- pearance and that which appears cannot be
Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 229

separated in the Now phase. What arises anew field, a sameness, an identical spatially ex­
in the original is the particular, new black­ tended body-color is exhibited in the altera­
phase itself, and without being exhibited. And tion of the immanently sensed colors. All the
appearing means here nothing other than a noematic moments that we, in the natural atti­
to-be devoid of any exhibiting that points be­ tude, see contained in the object and as relat­
yond, and a to-be-conscious-of in the original. ed to it, are constituted by means of the imma­
But on the other hand, with respect to the nent data of sensation, and by virtue of the
transcendent object, it is clear that the thing of consciousness that, as it were, animates them.
which we are conscious in the flesh as a thing In this regard we speak of apprehension as of
in the new Now is consciously intended only transcendent apperception: It characterizes con­
in and through an appearance; that is, exhibit­ sciousness 's accomplishment which is to be­
ing and that which is exhibited, adumbration stow on the mere immanent contents of sensu­
and that which is adumbrated part. If we ex­ ous data, on the so-called data of sensation or
change the noematic attitude that we have privi­ hyletic data, the function of exhibiting some­
leged up to now with the noetic attitude in thing objectively "transcendent." It is danger­
which we tum our reflective regard toward the ous here to speak of represented and represent­
lived-experience and its "intimately inherent"* ing, of interpreting data of sensation, or to speak
components, we can also say that a transcen­ of a function that outwardly signifies through
dent object such as a thing can only be consti­ this "interpreting" [ "durch dieses 'Deuten 'hin­
tuted when an immanent content is constitut­ ausdeutenden Funktion "}. Adumbrating, ex­
ed as substratum. Now, this immanent content hibiting in data of sensation, is totally dif­
for its part is substituted, as it were, for the ferent from an interpretation through signs
peculiar function of the "adumbration," of an [signitives Deuten].
exhibiting appearance, of a being exhibited in "Immanent" object-like formations [Gegen­
and through it. When we do not regard the stiindlichkeiten], accordingly, are for their part
appearing thing-object, but the optical lived­ not consciously intended through appercep­
experience itself, the thing-appearance that tion. In their case, "being consciously intended
arises anew in each Now-as we say, the op­ in the original" and "being," "percipi" and
tical appearance-is a complex of surface col­ "esse" converge. And indeed for every Now.
or moments that are extended in this way or However, they are to a large extent bearers of
that, which surface color moments are im­ apperceptive functions, at which time some­
manent data, and thus we are conscious of thing non-immanent is exhibited in and through
them in themselves just as originally as, say, them. Now the esse (for transcendent objects)
red or black. The manifold changing red-data is in principie distinguished from the percipi.
in which, e.g., any surface side of a red cube In every Now of externa! perception we do have
and its unaltered red is exhibited, are imma­ an original consciousness, but genuine per­
nent data. ceiving in this Now, that is, that feature in genu­
Yet, on the other hand, the matter <loes not ine perceiving that is primordial-impressional
rest with this mere immanent existence. In the (and not simply retentional consciousness of
immanent data, something is exhibited in the the past phases of the perceptual object) is a
unique manner of adumbration, which the im­ conscious-having of what is being adumbrated
manent data themselves are not; in the visual originaliter. t This is not a pure and simple hav-

* "reell." Whereas "real'" far Husserl designates the type of existence or "reality" peculiar to transcendent things,
"reell" far Husserl depicts what is actual [wirklich} without it sharing the ontological status of a real transcendent
entity [res]. Accordingly, reell concerns the intimate immanence ofconsciousness. What is "irreal" from the perspec­
tive ofthe "real" can also be "irreel/" from the perspective ofthe "reell"; this would bear on what Husserl understood
generally as "noema" or "sense." -Translator's note.
tPerception is original consciousness of an individual object, of a temporal object, and far every Now we have in
perception its primordial-impression in which the object in the Now, in its momentary point of originality, is originally
grasped. But it must be shown that original adumbration necessarily goes hand in hand with appresentation.
230 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ing of the object in which conscious-having contains unfulfilled indications that point be­
and being coincide, but a mediate conscious­ yond. The originality of exhibiting the tran­
ness, provided that only one apperception is had scendent thing in the flesh necessarily implies
immediately, a store of sense-data referring to that the object as sense has the originality of
kinaesthetic data, and an apperceptive appre­ apperceptive fulfillment and that this harbors
hension through which an exhibiting appear­ inseparably a mixture of actually fulfilling and
ance is constituted; in and through it, we are not yet filled moments of sense. This is the case
conscious of the transcendent object as adum­ whether they be moments of sense only pre­
brating or exhibiting originaliter. Time and figured according to the general structure, and
again we have the following situation in the apart from that open indeterminate and possi­
process of ongoing perceiving in every Now: ble moments, or whether they be moments al­
in principie, the externa! object is never purely ready distinguished by being specially prefig­
and simply had in its original Selfness. lt ap­ ured. This is why the talk of inadequation as
pears in principie only through apperceptive a haphazard lack that a higher intellect could
exhibition and in ever new exhibitions; as they overcome is an unsuitable way of speaking,
progress, they bring something that is new to indeed totally preposterous.
original presentation from its empty horizons. We can formulate a principie here that will
Yet, it is more important for our ends to rec­ become much clearer in our future analyses.
ognize that it is inconceivable that something W henever we speak of objects, no matter what
like a spatial object, which gets its original category of objects they may be, the sense of
sense genuinely by means of externa! percep­ this manner of speaking about objects originally
tion as adumbrating perception, would be given stems from perceptions as lived-experiences
through immanent perception, be it human or originally constituting sense and therefore an
superhuman intellect. But from this it follows object-like formation. But the constitution of
as inconceivable that a spatial object and ev­ an object as sense is an accomplishment of con­
erything like it (for instance, an object of the sciousness that is in principie unique for every
world in the natural sense), could be exhibited basic type of object. Perception does not con­
in a discrete, self-contained manner from one sist in staring blankly at something lodged in
point of time to the next, along with their en­ consciousness, inserted there by sorne strange
tire ensemble of features (as fully determined) wonder as if something were first there and then
that make up their temporal content in this Now. consciousness would somehow embrace it.
In this respect we also speak of adequate Rather, for every imaginable ego-subject, ev­
givenness as opposed to inadequate givenness. ery object-like existence with a specific con­
To express this theologically and in a drastic tent of sense is an accomplishment of con­
manner, we do God poor service by conceding sciousness. It is an accomplishment that must
him able to make an odd number even and to be new for every novel object. Every basic type
transform every absurdity into truth. Inade­ of object in principie requires a different in­
quate modes of givenness belong essentially tentional structure. An object that is, but is not
to spatial structure of things; any other way of and in principie could not be an object of a con­
givenness is simply absurd. We can never think sciousness, is pure non-sense.
the given object without empty horizons in Every possible object of a possible con­
any phase of perception and, what amounts to sciousness is however also an object for a pos­
the same thing, without apperceptive adumbra­ sible originarily giving consciousness; and that
tion. With adumbration there is simultaneous­ we call, at least for individual objects, "per­
ly a pointing beyond what is exhibiting itself ception." To demand of a material object a per­
in a genuine sense. Genuine exhibition is it­ ception that has the general structure of an im­
self, again, not a pure and simple having on the manent perception, and conversely, to demand
model of immanence with its esse = percipi; of an immanent object a perception that has
instead, it is a partially fulfilled intention that the structure of externa! perception, is absurd.
Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 231

Both sense-giving and sense require one an­ (as a self-contained process of courses of ap­
other esst;:ntially-and this concerns the essen­ pearance, continually passing into one another)
tial typicality of their correlative structures. that would furnish absolute knowledge of the
In this way it is the nature of originally tran­ object in which the tension would collapse be­
scendent sense-giving, which externa] percep­ tween the object in the How of determination
tion carries out, that the accomplishment of (which is changing and relative, remaining in­
this original sense-giving is never finished as complete), and the object itself. For evidently,
one span of perception progresses to another the possibility of a plus ultra is in principie
and so forth in whatever manner the process never excluded. lt is thus the idea of the abso­
of perception may advance. This accomplish­ lute Self of the object and of its absolute and
ment does not simply consist in bringing to in­ complete determination, or as we can also put
tuition something new in a fixed pregiven sense, it, of its absolute individual essence. In rela­
as if the sense would already be prefigured in tion to this infinite idea which is to be seen, but
a finished manner from the very beginning; which as such is not realizable, every percep­
rather in the process of perceiving, the sense tual object in the epistemic process is a flow­
itself is continually cultivated and is genuinely ing approximation. We always have the exter­
so in steady transformation, constantly leaving na] object in the flesh (we see, grasp, seize it),
open the possibility of new transformations. and yet it is always at an infinite distance men­
Let us note here that in the sense of concor­ tally. What we do grasp of it pretends to be its
dantly and synthetically progressing percep­ essence; and it is it too, but it remains so only
tion, we can always distinguish between an in an incomplete approximation, an approxi­
unceasingly changing sense and an identical mation that grasps something of it, but in do­
sense running through the changing sense. Ev­ ing so it also constantly grasps into an empti­
ery phase of perception has its sense insofar ness that cries out for fulfillment. What is
as it has the object given in the How of the de­ constantly familiar is constantly unfamiliar,
termination of the original exhibition and in and from the very beginning all knowledge
the How of the horizon. This sense is flowing; seems to be hopeless. To be sure, I said "seems."
it is a new sense in every phase. But the unity And we do not wish to commit ourselves here
of the substrate x, which holds sway in a steady straight away to a hasty skepticism.
coinciding, and which is determined ever (Of course, the situation is entirely differ­
more richly-this unity of the object itself, that ent with immanent objects. Perception consti­
is, everything that the process of perception tutes them and appropriates them in their abso­
and all further possible perceptual processes de­ luteness. They are not constituted by constant
termine in it and would determine in it-this sense modification in the sense of an approxi­
unity runs through this flowing sense, through mation; only insofar as they become in a fu­
all the modes, "object in the How of determi­ ture are they lacten with protentions and
nation." In this way an idea that lies in infinity protentional indeterrninacies. But what has been
belongs to every externa] perception, the idea constituted as present in the Now is an abso­
of the fully determined object, of the object that lute Self that <loes not have any unfamiliar
would be determined through and through, sides.)
known through and through, where every one We have rejected a hasty skepticism. In this
of its determinations would be purified of all regard we should have initially, at all events,
indeterminacy, and where the ful] determina­ made the following distinction. Given that an
tion itself would be devoid of any plus ultra object is perceived and that we progressively
with respect to what is still to be determined, come to know it in the perceptual process, we
what is still remaining open. had to distinguish (a) the particular empty ho­
I spoke of an idea lying in infinity, that is, of rizon that is prefigured by the process running
an unattainable idea. For, the essential struc­ its course and that is attached to the momen­
ture of perception itself excludes a perception tary perceptual phase with its prefiguring, and
232 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

(b) a horizon of empty possibilities without But is there nothing at all in what has already
this prefiguring. Prefiguring means that an emp­ become exhibited in the flesh that would bring
ty intuition is there that provides its general with it a definitiveness so that in fact we are
framework of sense. It belongs to the essence left stuck in an ostensibly empty business of
of such a prefiguring intention that when pur­ exchange?
suing a suitable, appropriate direction of per­ We feel that it cannot be so, and in fact­
ception this would have to occur: [either] the looking more deeply into the structure of the
process of determining more closely, which is series of perception-we come up against the
a fulfilling process, or as we shall address lat­ peculiarity that is summoned to solve the dif­
er as a counterpart, disappointment, annul­ ficulty initially for praxis and its intuitive sen­
ment of sense, and crossing-out. There are also, suous world. Also in the case of incomplete
however, partial horizons without such a firm fulfillment, that is, in the case of fulfillment
prefiguring. In other words, aside from defi­ lacten with indications, it is the nature of genu­
nite prefigured possibilities, there are counter­ ine appearances as fulfillments of prefigured
possibilities for which there is no support and intentions to point ahead to ideal limits as goals
which remain constantly open. of fulfillment that would be reached by con­
Speaking purely in terms of the sense-giv­ tinuous series of fulfillment. But that does not
ing process of perception itself, we can say, for happen right away for the entire object, but
example, that when something like an illumi­ rather for the features that have already come
nated appearance, a shooting star and the like to actual intuition in each case. In view of what
flashes in my visual field, e.g., while gazing at is genuinely exhibited in the appearance, ev­
a star-studded sky, it is a fully empty possibil­ ery appearance belongs systematically to sorne
ity that is not prefigured in the sense, but is left type of series of appearances to be realized in
open by it. So, if we confine ourselves to the kinaesthetic freedom in which at least sorne
positive sense-giving process of perception moment of the shapes would achieve its opti­
together with its positive prefigurings, the ques­ ma! givenness, and therefore its true Self.
tion we pose is both understandable and obvi­ The phantom* as a sensuously qualified
ous: whether no enduring and ultimately abid­ bodily surface functions as a basic frame for
ing Self of the object is even attainable in going the object of perception. The bodily surface
from the non-intuitable empty prefiguring to can exhibit itself in continually diverse ap­
the fulfilling process of determining it more pearances, and likewise every partial aspect
closely; put differently, whether not only newer that comes into relief. For each of them we
and newer object-like features can enter into have distant appearances and near appear­
the horizon of perception, but whether, in the ances. And again, inside each of these spheres
process of determining more closely, even these we have more favorable and less favorable ap­
features already grasped imply a further deter­ pearances, and in ordered series we arrive at
minability, in infinitum, hence themselves con­ optima. In this sense, the distant appearance of
tinually and constantly maintaining the char­ a thing and manifold of distant appearances al­
acter of the unfamiliar x which can never gain ready point back to near appearances in which
final determinacy. Is then perception an "ex­ the form given at first glance [obeifliichliche
change" that can in principie never be "cashed Gestalt] and its fullness appear at best in the
in" or "realized" by new, similar exchanges, total overview. This [optimal] form itself giv­
whose realization leads again to exchange and en at first glance, which we have for instance
likewise in infinitum? The fulfillment of an in­ when looking at a house from a well chosen
tention is carried out by being exhibited in the standpoint, gives a framework for sketching in
flesh, to be sure, with empty inner horizons. further optima! determinations that <would be

*The "phantom" for Husserl is the "schema" of the concrete material object, that is, examined without regard to a
possible nexus of causality. -Translator's note
Horizons and the Genesis of Perception 233

brought about by> drawing closer, where only I can only say in a word that ali such high­
single parts would be given, but then, optimally. ly ramified intentional analyses, which are
The thing itself in its saturated fullness is an difficult in themselves, belong for their part
idea located in a sense belonging to conscious­ to a universal genesis of consciousness, and
ness and in the manner of its intentional struc­ here especially in the genesis of the conscious­
tures; and it is, as it were a <system> of ali op­ ness of a transcendent reality. If the theme of
tima that would be won by sketching in the constitutive analyses is to make understand­
optima! frameworks. Thematic interest that able how perception brings about its sense-giv­
lives itself out in perceptions is guided by prac­ ing and how the object is constituted through
tica! interests in our scientific life. And that the­ ali empty intending as always only exhibit­
matic interest comes to a rest when certain op­ ing optima! appearance-sense in a relative man­
tima! appearances-in which the thing shows ner, and to make this understandable from
so much of its ultimate Self as this practica! perception's unique intentional constitution
interest demands-are won for the respective according to intimately inherent components
interest. Or rather, the thematic interest as prac­ of lived-experience itself, according to the in­
tica! interest prefigures a relative Self: what tentional noema and sense, then it is the theme
suffices as practica! counts as the Self. Thus of genetic analyses to make understandable
the house itself and in its true being, and speci­ how, in the development proper to the struc­
fically with respect to its pure bodily thingly ture of every stream of consciousness, which
nature, is quickly given optimally, i.e., experi­ is at the same time the development of the
enced as complete for that person who regards ego-how those complicated intentional sys­
it as a buyer or a seller. For the physicist and tems develop, through which finally an exter­
the chemist, such ways of experience would na! world can appear to consciousness and to
seem completely superficial and miles away the ego.
from its true being.
 vm.
Transcendental Analytics

13. Formal and Transcendental Logic

The Discipline of Formal Logic* thinking: not just any judicative thinking,
but one that is formed, ordered, connected,
§5. Provisional delimitation of logic as in certain manners-according to final ideas
a priori theory of science of reason. The formations generated in the
course of such thinking-in science, forma­
We shall attempt a first delimitation of the tions expressed in language and permanently
province that should be assigned to logic, by documented-have a coherence that is "logi­
keeping to the most universal part of the origi­ cal" in the sense specific to theoretical rea­
nal historical sense of that science, the part son: the coherence of theories and, at a higher
which has been, on the whole, its guiding sense level, the coherence of "systems." They are
up to within our own time. Significations and built up in determinate forms, out of funda­
signification-bestowing acts can be divided mental propositions or principies, theorems,
into visibly heterogeneous classes, such that arguments, proofs, and so forth; lingually they
concrete "senseful" locutions are grouped ac­ are built up in multi-membered locutions,
cordingly: statements (in the specific sense of which, in any one science, all belong together
assertive statements), as expressions of judg­ as making up the unity of a locution that is
ments and their modalities; expressions of af­ intemally connected by the rational sense of
fective acts such as wishes; of volitional acts all the significations. By virtue of the fact
such as commands. Obviously connected with that this significational unity is Objectively
the differences among these sorts of acts is documented and can be regenerated by any­
the differentiation of sorts of reason: judica­ one, the generated formations become com­
tive reason (including specifically theoretical mon property for mankind. Each science, in
reason), valuing reason, and practica! reason. its theoretical work, has aimed exclusively at
If we follow the signification of the word "logical" formations, formations produced by
logos which is the richest in content and has the theoretical logos. In this sense, each is it­
been, so to speak, raised to a higher power, self a "logic." But logic as usually conceived
namely reason, and if we also give pre-emi­ is the science of all that is logical: first, in the
nence to scientific reason, we have thereby sense applicable to all such formations pro­
delimited at the same time a distinctive sphere duced by judicative reason-but then, on the
of acts and significations, precisely as a sphere other hand, in the sense applicable to judica­
to which science, as a rational activity, re­ ti ve reason itself and consequently to any
lates particularly. Scientific thinking, the con­ judicative subjectivity whatever as generating
tinua! activity of the scientist, is judicative such formations.

*FTL. pp. 26-47 (Sections 5-11).

Formal and Transcendental Logic 235

Language is taken into consideration here striction; it simply has the advantage of di­
secondarily, because in science there is com­ recting attention to the highest final idea of ju­
bined with the primary purposes of theoreti­ dicative reason.
cal reason, which lie on the significational As a theory of science concerned with prin­
side and consist in the attainment of truths, an cipies, logic intends to bring out "pure" uni­
epistemo-technical purpose, namely that of versalities, "a priori" universalities. As already
furthering the work of judging by a suitable said in the lntroduction, it does not intend to
scientific language. A maximally durable docu­ investigate empirically the so-called sciences
mentation of the results, in the Objective cul­ that are given beforehand-the cultural forma­
tural world, is also relevant to this purpose. tions, going by that name, which have in fact
In 04r further considerations pertaining to come into existence-and abstract their em­
the systematic clarification of the idea of log­ pirical types; on the contrary, free from every
ic, we shall address ourselves exclusively to restriction to the factual (which supplies it on­
the significational side of scientific locutions ly with points of departure for a criticism of
-that is to say: purely to judicative reason it­ examples), it intends to make completely clear
self and the formations it produces. That the the final ideas that hover dimly before us when­
cognitive subject's primary and true aim lies ever we are actuated by a purely theoretical
on this side becomes apparent in the fact that, interest. Constantly investigating the pure pos­
although the statement-formations are the first sibilities of a cognitive life, as such, and those
to make their appearance in bis field of con­ of the cognitional formations, as such, attained
sciousness among its prominences (in the so­ therein, logic intends to bring to light the es­
called Blickfeld der Aufmerksamkeit [field of sential forms of genuine cognition and genu­
possible attentive regard]), still bis thematiz­ ine science in all their fundamental types, as
ing regard is never directed to the locutions well as the essential presuppositions by which
as sensuous phenomena, but always "clear genuine cognition and genuine science are re­
through them" to what is meant. They are not stricted and the essential forms of the true meth­
thematic ends but theme-indicators, pointing ods, the ones that lead to genuine cognition
beyond themselves to the true themes of logic. and genuine science.
Following the historical logical tradition, We have spoken of genuine cognition, genu­
we have framed the concept of logic as the sci­ ine science, genuine method. Without excep­
ence of logos in a pregnant sense: as the sci­ tion the ideas with which logic is concerned
ence of logos in the form of science, or as the are ideas of "genuineness." The genuine is what
science of the essential parts that make up genu­ reason aims at ultimately-even in its deca­
ine science, as genuine. We could, however, dent mode, the mode of unreason. The genu­
have left the concept of a science of logos in ine is what is "missed" in obscurity or confu­
its broader universality from the start; in other sion; whereas, with clarity of goal and way and
words, we could have framed this concept as in the essential forms pertaining to such clar­
the concept of a science that, with absolute ity, it is attained.
universality, explores all judicative thinking and
its products-including, therefore, rationally § 6. The formal character of logic. The
judicative thinking and its rational products formal a priori and the contingent a
(among them, those of the sub-scientific level). priori
But, because scientifically judicative reason, in
the manner characteristic of a highest level, The universality of logic, as concerned with
presupposes all the lower levels of produc­ principies, is not simply an a priori or eidetic
tions effected by thinking and, when taken con­ universality; rather it is, more particularly, a
cretely as a theme, includes them all, the refer­ formal universality. Not only the narrow and
ence to science, and therefore the conception vaguely bounded discipline usually called for­
of logic as theory of science, involves no re- mal logic (a discipline restricted by a particu-
236 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

lar concept of the formal, with which we shall necessary. If we stipulate, from the beginning
have to occupy ourselves greatly), but all logic of this variation, that the subjectivity shall al­
whatever, in its universal and (as universal) its ways have the capacity to be and remain a "ra­
only philosophic sense, is "formal" through­ tional" and, in particular, a judicatively cog­
out all its disciplines. We could say equally nizing subjectivity, we encounter restrictive
well: Reason itself, including theoretical rea­ essential structures that fall under the heading
son in particular, is a form-concept. of pure reason and, in particular, pure judica­
To characterize the most universal and most tive reason. Such a subjectivity also involves
important concept of form which is involved as a presupposition a continua! and essentially
in these propositions, we may state the follow­ necessary relatedness to sorne hyletic compo­
ing. In a certain sense every eidetic cognition nents or other: as apperceptional foundations
is a product of "pure" reason-pure from ali for the possible experiences that judging nec­
empeiria (a characteristic likewise indicated, essarily presupposes. Therefore, if we define
from another side, by the word a priori); but the concept of form, as a principie, by the es­
not every eidetic cognition is pure in a sec­ sentially necessary components of any ration­
ond sense, the one pertaining to form as a prin­ al subjectivity whatever, the c"oncept hyle (ex­
cipie. An a priori proposition about all sounds emplified by every "Datum of sensation") is a
as such, about sounds meant with "pure" uni­ form-concept and not what we shall define as
versality, is pure only in the first sense; it is, as the opposite of this, a contingent concept. On
we may say for certain reasons, a "contingent" the other hand, there is no essential require­
a priori. lt has in the eidos sound a material­ ment that a judicatively cognizing subjectivity
ly determínate core, which goes beyond the (or a rational subjectivity of any kind) be ca­
realm of the universality of "principies" in the pable of sensing colors or sounds, that it be
most radical sense, and restricts it to the "con­ capable of sensuous feelings having just such
tingent" province of ideally possible sounds. and such a differentia, or the like-though the
"Pure" reason is not only above everything em­ concepts of such matters too can be framed as
pirically factual, but also above every sphere a priori (as freed from everything empirically
of hyletic, materially determínate, essences. lt factual). Accordingly they too have their a
is the title for the self-contained system of pure priori, which, however, is contingent and not
principies that precede every hyletic, materi­ an a priori of pure reason; or, as we may also
ally determínate, a priori and all the sciences say, introducing an old word that tended blindly
concerned with such an a priori, but that, on in the same direction, it is not an "innate" a
the other hand, govern these sciences them­ priori.
selves as rational products-govern them, that If we restrict ourselves to judicative reason,
is, with respect to form. then, as pure reason, as the complete system of
To acquaint us more closely with the con­ this formal a priori in the most fundamental
cept of the contingent a priori, the following sense, it designates at the same time the high­
exposition will suffice within the bounds of our est and widest conceivable theme of logic, of
present, merely anticipatory, observations: A "theory of science." Consequently we may say
subjectivity as such (whether solitary or in com­ that logic is the self-explication of pure rea­
munication) is thinkable only as having an es­ son itself or, ideally, the science in which pure
sential form, whose highly multifarious con­ theoretical reason accomplishes a complete
stituents we obtain with progressive evidence investigation of its own sense and perfectly
when we uncover to intuition our own con­ Objectivates itself in a system of principies. In
crete subjectivity and then, with the aid of a this system pure reason or, correlatively, logic
free changing of its actuality into "other" pos­ is related reflexively to itself; the self-explica­
sibilities of any concrete subjectivity as such, tion of pure reason is itself a purely rational
direct our regard to the invariable that can be activity and comes under the very principies
seen throughout-that is to say: the essentially that thereby attain explication.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 237

§7. The normative and practica/ from that of the scientist. It is a practica! and
functions of logic not a theoretical attitude-even when the tech­
nologist incidentally runs into scientific prob­
The pre-eminent normative function of log­ lems and solves them in the interest of tech­
ic is obvious. Any a priori science is called on nology. His theorizing is then but a means to
to exercise normative functions, with respect sorne (extra-theoretical) practice. It makes no
namely to those sciences of matters-of-fact that essential difference that here the problem con­
are subordinate to it. But logic alone is a uni­ cerns, not an individual instance of practice,
versal norm in the highest sense and with the but a universal sort of practice, which is to be
greatest conceivable universality. The norms examined, subjected to rules, and furthered­
applied by logic are the principies of pure rea­ universally, by practica! reason. The situation
son itself and the tests of rationality as such. is the same if we consider by itself the mere
Its formal cognitions are the standards for applying of the norm, prior to any question of
measuring the extent to which ostensible sci­ a corresponding refashioning of practice. The
ence conforms to the idea of genuine science, aim is to help oneself or others "practically" in
the extent to which the single cognitions of a certain manner, and not to satisfy purely theo­
ostensible science are genuine cognitions and retical interests.
its methods genuine methods-methods that, To be sure, the distinction is after ali a rela­
so far as their essential form is concerned, tive one: because even purely theoretical ac­
square with the formally universal norms of tivity is indeed activity-that is to say, a prac­
pure reason. tice (when the concept of practice is accorded
In taking on normative functions, logic also its natural breadth); and, as a practice, it is part
assumes functions pertaining to the practica! of the universal nexus comprising ali practica!
shaping of science; and accordingly it can al­ activities and is subject to formal rules of uni­
so be included in a logico-practical technology versal practica! reason (the principies of eth­
and perhaps combined with an empírica! an­ ics), rules with which a science pour la science
thropological component. In exercising such can hardly be compatible. But then there re­
functions, logic is related reflexively to itself, mains the essential difference that ali sciences
not only as a science but also normatively: as a come under the idea of an interest of theoreti­
science because, as has already been said, logic cal reason that operates ad infinitum. This idea,
is the a priori science of ali science as such and moreover, is conceived relatively to the idea of
is at the same time itself a science; normative­ a community of scientific investigators, which
ly because, in its progressive practica! work, it goes on working ad infinitum, a community
must utilize its already-gained results as norms, united in respect of activities and habituali­
going back, perhaps, to apply them to what it ties of theoretical reason. Here we shall men­
has already fashioned in naive evidence. tion only the working of investigators for and
Logic becomes normative, it becomes prac­ with one another and their criticizing of one
tica!; with a suitable change of attitude, one can another's results, those obtained by one inves­
convert it into a normative-technological dis­ tigator being taken over as works that pave
cipline. But intrinsically it is itself not a nor­ the way for others, and so forth. But a life lived
mative discipline but precisely a science in the by single individuals and by the many accord­
pregnant sense, a work of purely theoretical ing to this idea is a life compatible, for exam­
reason-like ali the other sciences. As we were ple, with the conviction that ali the theoreti­
saying, a priori sciences, by virtue of being a cal results thus acquired in common, and the
priori, always function normatively and tech­ infinite science itself, have a hypertheoretical
nologically; but, for that reason, they are sci­ human function; just as, in the case of the sin­
ences and not technologies. The attitude of the gle individual, bis abiding scientific vocation,
technologist (not the technician but the person with the al ways-intermittent exercising of it, is
devising a technology) is essentially different compatible with his other, extra-theoretical,
238 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

purposes as a father, a citizen, and so forth, and unitarily combined to make up an all-embrac­
must find its place within the highest practica! ing theory, the systematically continuous de­
idea, that of an all-embracing ethical life, the velopment of which, ad infinitum, is the com­
individual's own and the life of the open com­ mon aim of the scientists, as they work with
munity of human beings. and for one another in open community. By
means of this theory the particular scientific
§8. The two-sidedness of logic; the "province" is to be made a province of system­
subiective and the Ob¡ective direction atic cognition, in an all-inclusive unity of cog­
of its thematizing activity nitional formations, called theoretical truths,
which are built one upon another to produce
Logic, as the science of all the logical as the unity-form of a truth-system.
such and-in its highest form, which embraces These Objective affairs ali have more than
all other forms of the logical-as the science the fleeting factual existence of what comes and
of all science as such, inquires in two opposite goes as a formation actually present in the the­
directions. Everywhere it is a matter of ratio­ matic field. They have also the being-sense of
nal productions, in a double sense: on one side, abiding validity; nay, even that of Objective
as productive activities and habitualities; on validity in the special sense, reaching beyond
the other side, as results produced by activities the subjectivity now actually cognizing and its
and habitualities and afterwards persisting. acts. They remain identical affairs when re­
On the side where the results lie, we have as peated, are recognized again in the manner
the theme of logic the manifold forms of judg­ suitable to abiding existents; in documented
ment-formations and cognitional formations, form they have Objective factual existence,
which accrue to cognitive subjects during the just like the other objectivities of the cultural
performance of their thinking activities and do world: Thus they can be found in an Objective
so, moreover, in the particular manner char­ duration by everyone, can be regeneratively un­
acteristic of a "theme." The formations ac­ derstood in the same sense by everyone, are
cruing on the particular occasion are indeed intersubjectively identifiable, are factually ex­
what the thinking subject is aiming at and in­ istent even when no one is thinking them.
tends to make his abiding acquisition; while The opposite direction of logic's thematiz­
at the same time they are meant to serve him ing activity is subjective. It concerns the deep­
as means for gaining similar new acquisitions. ly hidden subjective forms in which theoreti­
At any particular time, something has come in­ cal "reason" brings about its productions. The
to being, not just somehow or other, but rather first question here concerns reason in its pres­
as the thing aimed at in his thinking action: In ent activity-in other words: that intentional­
a particular manner the thinking subject "di­ ity, as it flows on during its living execution,
rects himself" to it; he has it before him "Ob­ in which the aforesaid Objective formations
jectively." In their higher forms, to be sure, have their "origin." Stated more particularly,
these formations transcend the current sphere the effect produced by this intentionality is that,
of presence to consciousness. But they remain in the executing subject's thematic field, the
nevertheless component parts of a more exten­ formations generated on the particular occa­
sive, thematically encompassed "field," a pe­ sion, the judgment-objectivities and cognitional
culiar realm of products generated by practice, objectivities, make their appearance "Objec­
products to which one can always "return" tively," with the character of generated prod­
and by means of which one can always gener­ ucts. While the corresponding intentionality is
ate new formations: new concepts, judgments, being executed, while it is flowing in this man­
arguments, proofs, and theories. In the unity of ner as an Objectivatingly productive living, it
a science all such formations, and the whole is "unconscious"-that is to say: it makes the­
field of products that have arisen within the matic, but it itself is, for that very reason and
unity pertaining to a theoretical interest, are as a matter of essential necessity, non-themat-
Formal and Transcendental Logic 239

ic. lt remains hidden, as long as it has not been disputed; but in the dispute nothing is clari­
uncovered by a reflection and has not thus it­ fied. Even the ideal Objectivity of logical for­
self become a theme, the theoretical theme of mations and the a priori character of the logi­
that logical research which is directed to the cal doctrines relating to them specifically, and
subjective. The subject who is straightforward­ then again the sense of this a priori, are strick­
ly judging or thinking in any manner (for ex­ en with this same obscurity: since the ideal does
ample: generating conceptual formations, no indeed appear as located within the subjective
matter how complicated) has "consciously" be­ sphere; it <loes indeed arise from this sphere
fore him, thematically, only the formations un­ as a produced formation.
dergoing production at that time. Everything Accordingly, what we have said so far about
that by itself is, in this sense, Objectively logi­ logic expresses a precursory survey and an in­
cal has, as its "subjective" correlate, the inten­ sight yet to be confirmed by more concrete ex­
tionalities constituting it; and, as a matter of plications and, so far as appears useful, by com­
essential necessity, there corresponds to each ing to terms with historical motivations and
form of the formations a system of productive with interpretations of logic that have arisen
intentionality, a system that may be called a from them.
subjective form. But there is also involved the
further subjective production by virtue of which §9. The straightforward thematizing
the affair now actually constituted is, for the activity of the "Objective" or "posi­
cognitive subjects (thanks to sources pertain­ tive" sciences. The idea of two-sided
ing to their habituality), more than this momen­ sciences
tarily thematic affair of the actual present. This
production makes it possible for the constitut­ As is already plain, even from our first elu­
ed to be consciously intended to as something cidations, the two-sidedness of everything logi­
Objective, something abidingly valid for the cal does not signify a parity of the two sides,
corresponding subjectivity, and makes the con­ the Objective and the subjective. To think with
stituted take on, in and for the cognitive com­ simple devotedness to the matters in question
munity, the sense of an ideal Objectivity exist­ is to create a coherent thematic field, which
ing "in itself." contains exclusively the pertinent products of
The two-sidedness of everything logical, in thinking. They are what the thinkers aim at;
consequence of which the problem-groups be­ they are results of thinking and at the same time
come separated and again combined, places bases for new thinking actions. The thinking
in the way of an explication of their true sense, itself-understood concretely as the intention­
and in the way of their correct organization, ality, qualified one knows not how, in whose
quite extraordinary difficulties. These, one can "synthesis" the products of thinking become
say, account for the fact that logic, after thou­ constituted as "unities of sense"-still requires
sands of years, has not yet entered the steady uncovering, which would take place in a new
course of a truly rational development-that thinking.
it has not become, as its peculiar vocation un­ The thinking of scientists is-actionally and
conditionally demanded, a science that has habitually, privately and intersubjectively­
pressed onward to a clear consciousness of coherent thinking. lt has coherence by virtue
its goals and, progressing surely from stage to of the unity of a theoretical interest and the
stage, made them actual. Nearly everything correlative unity of the scientific province that
that concems the fundamental sense of logic, is to be systematically explored and cognized.
of its problems and method, is infected with Whatever accrues in the process of scientific
incomprehensibilities from this turbid source, thinking, as judgment-results or cognitional
this perpetually uncomprehended and never results pertaining to that province, makes up
rightly examined Objectivity deriving from an openly endless thematic field by itself, the
subjective production. Everything is therefore expanding unity of the science as theory, a
240 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

multiplicity of themes belonging together and the openly endless, and yet systematically uni­
thematically combined. tary, edifice of the scientific theory of the prov­
This thematic field is overstepped by re­ ince.
flections tumed toward the subjective. In gen­ This plane of theory delimits the themes of
eral, therefore, the scientist, because of the ex­ science, and does so to such a degree that the
clusiveness of his theoretical interest in his positive sciences make a conscious effort to
particular province, will not introduce the in­ frame the concept of theoretical Objectivity
vestigation of any subjective theme into his even more rigorously: in such a manner that
research. Thus the geometer, for example, will positive sciences will exclude, as merely sub­
not think of exploring, besides geometrical jective, many a thing that the pre-scientifical­
shapes, geometrical thinking. lt may be that ly experiencing and thinking subject finds as
shifts to the subjective focus are occasionally an Objective theme. In this manner the scien­
helpful or even necessary to what he truly has tific investigator of Nature excludes "sensuous
in view, namely the theory of his province; as qualities." The single experiencing subject finds
in other far-seeing actions, so in theoretical natural Objects as sensuously qualified, but
actions the need may arise to deliberate re­ nevertheless as Objects, as existing in and by
flectively and ask, "What method shall I try themselves, not affected in their existence by
now? What premises can serve me?" But the the reflectively apprehensible acts of experi­
subjective that then comes into view does not encing and of experiential thinking, neither
itself belong to what the science is aiming at, determined nor determinable by the contents
its proper theme, which, as a universal theory, of those acts. Yet, with the effecting of an in­
embraces ali its separate themes. The same is tersubjective communion of experiencing and
true of other cases where subjects and their thinking, the contents of sensuously experi­
acts are brought into scientific discourse; the enced Objectivity and the descriptive concepts
subjective-the thinking or the subjects them­ fitted to its contents show a dependence on the
selves who think-is not thereby introduced experiencing subjects; though the identity of
into the theme, into the particular scientific the Objects in question nevertheless remains
province and its theory. Thus it is in ali "Ob­ intersubjectively cognizable and determinable.
jective" or "positive" sciences, which are, as a A purely Objective science aims at a theoreti­
rule, the only ones we think of when speaking cal cognizing of Objects, not in respect of such
simply of sciences. This is because the idea of subjectively relative determinations as can be
sciences that have systematically two-sided drawn from direct sensuous experience, but
themes, themes that combine the theory of the rather in respect of strictly and purely Objec­
scientific province systematically with a theo­ tive determinations: determinations that obtain
ry of the cognition of that theory, has emerged for everyone and at ali times, or in respect of
only in modem times and, moreover, so ob­ which, according to a method that everyone can
scurely that it must still contend for its pecu­ use, there arise theoretical truths having the
liar sense and its legitimacy. character of "truths in themselves"-in contrast
The positive sciences operate exclusively on to mere subjectively relative truths.
the plane of the theory that can be fashioned
straightforwardly, when the theorizer directs § 1 O. Historically existing psychology
himself to the province of cognition as his and scientific thematizing activity
theme-fashioned, that is, by the continuous directed to the subjective
categorial forming of experiential objectivi­
ties belonging to the province, as they come Though the positive sciences shut them­
within the scope of determining processes of selves off in this manner from ali that belongs
thinking, and by the systematic connecting of to the merely subjective of the experiencing
the formations thus acquired, to make cogni­ and thinking of the matters in question, and do
tional formations at higher and higher levels: · so in order to satisfy the requirements imposed
Formal and Transcendental Logic 241

by the idea of pure Object as their exclusive conceming all the sciences and all that ever
theme, nevertheless a particular positive sci­ exists for us-this may be characterized as the
ence of subjects makes its appearance among great enigma of the modem age, with its pecu­
them, the science of men and brutes-namely liar and always freshly reattempted transcen­
psychology-that makes the psychic, the spe­ dental philosophies, critiques of knowledge,
cifically subjective, in these its chief theme. If theories of knowledge, theories of the under­
this psychology were in fact the science of ev­ standing, theories of reason, or whatever the
erything subjective, it would stand in a re­ chosen names may be. We ourselves shall have
markable relationship of perfect correlation to consider this question more precisely, on
with all the sciences. All of them are subjec­ the basis of our structural researches concem­
tively prqduced formations; all of them get their ing the idea of logic. In the present context, ali
Objective themes from hidden producings. that matters is sharp illumination of the con­
Even the object-provinces of the sciences are trast between the "straightforward" thematiz­
there pre-theoretically, for persons investi­ ing activity of the positive sciences, which is
gating them, as provinces that come from sub­ determined by a particular object-province
jective sources comprised in the harmonious given beforehand by (intersubjective) experi­
experience that gives "those provinces" be­ ence-a province to which that activity is de­
forehand; as experienced or experienceable, voted with an exclusive interest-and, on the
they arouse the theoretical interest and take other hand, the thereby-excluded but still
on categorial forms-among these, the forms openly possible reflective thematizing, which
of scientific truth, given in scientific evidence. would concem experiencing-cognizing-produc­
Accordingly the universal science of the sub­ ing subjectivity.
jective would embrace every conceivable ex­
istent, precisely as something experienceable §11. The thematizing tendencies of
and theoretically true. It would be the science traditional logic
of universal subjectivity, the science in which
everything that is truth-deriving from an ac­ A) LüGIC DIRECTED ORIGINALLY TO THE
tual or possible living, with the possibilities of ÜBJECTIVE THEORETICAL FORMATIONS
experience and theory predelineated within PRODUCED BY THINKING
that living itself-would receive the sense: true
being. In relation to each science, as a devel­ From consideration of the sciences we now
oped and still developing production, it would pass on to logic, which indeed, as theory of
be the perfectly correlative science of precisely science, has adjusted itself to the sciences as
that production. Since this psychology itself examples; and we ask how the above-described
would be a science, it would be reflexively re­ essential relationships between the Objective
lated to itself; as the science of everything sub­ and the subjective work out in the historical
jective, it would include the science of those development of logic.
subjective sources by virtue of which it accom­ Obviously, from the beginning and, indeed,
plished its own productions. And this would up to within our times, logic had none but Ob­
be repeated in it at an infinitude of levels. jective, none but "positive," sciences-though
Obviously none of the historically developed at very different stages of development-be­
psychologies of ancient or modem times has fore its eyes to guide it. Accordingly it could
ever satisfied this requirement of universality find, as its first universal theme, nothing but
or even thought it through seriously as a prob­ the realm of thematic formations produced
lem. Without any question an anthropology and by scientific thinking in relation to sorne Ob­
a zoology, including a psychology and a psy­ jective provinces or other that were somehow
chophysics of men and brutes, have a valid given beforehand-that is to say: judgments
sense. But the extent to which they are capable (with the "concepts" occurring in them), argu­
of the indicated universal correlational tasks ments, proofs, complete theories, with their
242 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

modalities and the normative differences be­ taken, as its result; likewise from each actual
tween truth and falsity. To explore all these or phantasied judging [Urteil] on another's
actual and ostensible knowledge-formations part, which one performs in "following" him
with respect to their formal types and the con­ (and, in this case, depending on whether the
ditions for possible truth involved by their for­ judging is actual or phantasied, the formations
mal types, was the first task presented. are taken from it either as the judgments actu­
To be sure, the logicians' naturally predomi­ ally "made" or as possible judgments). As the
nant epistemo-practical interest, their aiming objects of experience are given, in any other
at a rational production by cognitional striv­ experiencing, so here, in "categorial experi­
ings and actions, directed their regard precisely ence," the categorial formations (the expres­
to these. But that in no way involved a revela­ sion being taken very broadly in this context)
tory penetration of constitutive intentionality, are given evidently, in the manner that charac­
which takes place out of sight in the cognition­ terizes original intuition. Later, however, we
ally striving and acting subjects; on the con­ shall learn that here, with different focusings
trary, it involved only "a viewing of' what-in of regard, different objectivities can become­
this case, as in that of any other volitive aim­ and, for the logician, must become-identi­
ing and acting-goes on in the field of con­ fiable, experienceable in corresponding evi­
sciousness, as it were visibly and outstanding­ dences.
ly, in union with the goal-setting and with the Thus the logician had steadfast objects as
realizing genesis of the results: namely what examples, to serve as substrates for "idea­
goes on under the heading, "I am striving for tions"; consequently there arose the possibil­
such and such; I generate it; it is coming into ity of those "pure formalizations" that yield
being by the volition of my Ego." In this con­ concepts of analytic-logical "forms." These
nection the produced formations, with their forms, in tum, were similarly but even more
multiform constituents and articulations and thoroughly firm and steadfast objects, which
the intermediate formations at various stages, could be described with respect to their elemen­
are, as in any other case, what can be properly tary formal components and considered, more­
described, rather than the uniform and unvary­ over, operationally. Ways of modifying and of
ing "I am aiming at it and realizing it member connecting forms-constructively, in reitera­
by member." ble operations-were given as open possibili­
We shall discuss this important point in more ties, ways in which one could always generate
detail. Here we point out, first of all, the fol­ new forms from forms already given: as one
lowing essential difference. Theoretical forma­ does in the combinative constructing of com­
tions offer themselves, not as Ego-acts do (as plex judgment-forms out of simpler judgment­
transient and merely reiterable), but as Objects forms or in the free constructing of syllogistic
do; and that signifies: as, so to speak, seizable forms out of judgment-forms. Accordingly the
objectivities, steadfast under observation, al­ logician projected in advance, with formal uni­
ways re-identifiable, and accessible to repeated versality, the conceivably possible forms of
observation, analysis, and description-not judgments, and of cognitions, that can be pro­
much otherwise than objectivities of extemal duced concretely in any conceivable province
experience. Except that theoretical formations of cognition.
are not, like the latter, given beforehand and Understandably, therefore, even beginning
accepted passively, but rather are, as categorial logic, in its sense-investigations conceming
objectivities, given in the first place only in knowledge and science [Wissen und Wissen­
consequence of theoretical action. But then they schaft], was attracted predominantly by the
too are strictly there: first of all, as in process Objective theoretical formations; though at
of construction; and then, with a reiteration of first, and for a long time afterward, there was
the activity, as identifiable. Thus from each no thought of limiting the theme quite con­
judging on one's own part, at every level of sciously and expressly to pure judgment-for­
complication, theoretical formations can be mations and cognitional formations, which nev-
Formal and Transcendental Logic 243

ertheless made up the field in which the work from non-evident premises and having their hy­
of logic was actually being done. Once work pothetical cognition-value. In their case, after
had started in this manner, the intemal consis­ all, the includedness of the conclusions, as con­
tency of the matters in question kept things sequences, in the premises is seen; and at the
going automatically. The situation, after all, is same time it is seen that the consequences
not essentially different from that obtaining in would become truths, if the premises were to
fields of research that come from any sort of show themselves in insight as truths. Thus, in
experience. Once theoretical interest has be­ genuine science, nothing in the way of propo­
come fixed on data of experience in sorne sitions or proposition-complexes occurs on
sphere or other, it carries on consistently. The the Objective side, unless it has acquired its
data taken by logic, as we again emphasize, "cognition-value"-its validity-characteristic
were also, after their own manner, data of ex­ of trueness, of hypothetical consequence, or
perience, identifiable and viewable objects­ the like-from insights.
whether or not it is customary to speak in this In such reflections-which, as initial, obvi­
connection of experience and, indeed, even if ously determine logic originally-one cannot
the essential analogy between the manner in avoid speaking continually about the subjec­
which they are given originally and the man­ tive, above all about reason and insight (a word,
ner in which objects are given originally in what by the way, that usually connotes an enduring
is generally called experience has never been accessibility to insight-an accessibility origi­
grasped. And this "experience" of logical data nally acquired, to be sure, by virtue of an actu­
(with its modifications as memory, "possible" ally operative act of insight). But, although this
experience, and the like) functions like any subjective manner of speaking presupposes a
other as a basis for the forming of descriptive tuming of regard toward the psychic, still ev­
concepts and the effecting of descriptive cog­ erything that becomes ascertained as a result
nitions, including, in particular, eidetic cogni­ in science lies purely on the Objective side; and
tions. accordingly what the logician intends to bring
out thematically with such reflections and treat
B) Loc1c's INTEREST IN TRUTH ANO THE as theory of theory, is likewise only what is
RESULTANT REFLECTION ON SUBJECTIVE Objectively logical.
INSIGHT It must be particularly heeded here that the
"true," ar "consequent," ar "non-contradic­
Now logic was focused, not on just any judg­ tory," acquired in insight, makes its appear­
ments, on supposed knowledge, but ultimately ance as a characteristic and predicate attached
on genuine knowledge and its typical forma­ to the judgment-formations themselves; that is
tions. In the first place, that unavoidably pro­ to say, it makes its appearance on the Objec­
duced a sort of turning toward the subjective. tive side, and is accordingly a theme in the for­
The logician said something like this to him­ mal theories that are to be treated by a pure
self: Genuine knowledge, truth, is seized upon logic of significations. Everything that is "logi­
in the activities of "reason," in insight-which, cal" in the pregnant sense-the "rational"-has
once it has been exercised, can be repeated by these characteristics attached to it as Objec­
the same subject, and likewise by any other tive characteristics; and logic must name them
rational subject, and remains as an intellectual expressly and seek out the conditions under
possession. Propositions that are immediate which they belong to something legitimately.
objects of insight lead, in evident elementary "Truth" is the Objective locution; "insight,"
arguments, to propositions that become evi­ "reason," is the subjective and perfectly cor­
dent therewith as consequent truths. A deduc­ relative one. Similarly in the case of each par­
tive theory, a genuine one, is a complex of el­ ticular mode among the validity-predicates.
ementary steps, built entirely with steps of in­ Every unitarily self-contained and unqualified
sight and thus making up a unity of truth. Also scientific statement has, or claims to have, this
in the case of "concrete" arguments, starting predicate truth, as a predicate derived from_in-
244 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

sight. In the sciences, since it goes without say­ ready generated are constituted as synthetic
ing and its repetition would be burdensome unities-a subjectivity that is not yet opened
and useless, it is not stated, except perhaps with up at all by such a mere tuming to the "I think."
reference to sorne previous doubt or contro­
versy. In logic, however, it is, in its relation to e) RESULT: THE HYBRIDISM OF HISTORICALLY
the bare forms of judgments, precisely the chief EXISTING LOGIC AS A THEORETICAL AND
thematic consideration. NORMATIVE-PRACTICAL DISCIPLINE
Frequent reflection on subjective doing is,
by the way, something the sciences have in After all this we understand why logic,
common with the other provinces of technical throughout its whole development up to within
action. The sense of thought-formations them­ recent times (as long as transcendental-philo­
selves, as formations that have sprung from sophic motives had not become radically ef­
actions of thinking, involves reference to the fective upon it), necessarily had as its princi­
corresponding acts, in their order and connec­ pal thematic sphere the field of theory, the
tion. Accordingly one can describe the forma­ manifold judgment-formations and cognition­
tions also from the side belonging to the agent al formations, and why the thematizing of sub­
and his doing. For example: instead of saying jective actions of thinking, though superficial­
"a - b + b = a," one can say, "Subtract b from ly it stood out in bold relief, was completely
a and then add b again," and so forth; or, in­ secondary.
stead of saying, "Q follows from the premises Yet we must not overlook the following:
M and N," one can say, "Q can be concluded While we were describing the thematizing ten­
from the judgments M and N." But one has dencies of traditional logic and how they were
gained nothing essential by this: There is, to be motivated by taking the positive sciences as a
sure, a reference to the more or less complex guide, we, in our reflections, had to dissect the
rhythm of the Ego's acts (the steps of ego cogi­ intentional interconnections with an aware­
to); but, properly speaking, no description of ness and a sharpness that were still foreign to
these acts themselves has been made. To count logic itself or to logicians who dealt with them.
is to generate numbers, to subtract is to gener­ The thing to which we have paid particular at­
ate differences, to multiply is to generate prod­ tention, namely the Objectivity of theoretical
ucts, and so forth; and, in the same way, to con­ formations as data of a specific "experience"
elude is to generate judgment-consequences ("categorial experience," as we called it), was
from judgments. One has one's eye on the far from gaining acceptance in the tradition;
generated products, on what one strives for and even today it still has to fight for its legiti­
and generates, and here lies what is solid and macy. One must not shun the indispensable
seizable; whereas the empty I-count, 1-con­ broadening of the Object-concept to cover not
clude, signifies no more than the conative aim­ only real but also irreal ("ideal") Objects; to
ing and the allowing of the products to come it there corresponds the broadening of the con­
into being [und die Erzeugnisse in ihrem Wer­ cept of experience, which, with this amplifi­
den ablaufen lassen]. Naturally that is not to cation, retains precisely the essential property:
say that there can be no analyses or descrip­ seizing upon something itself (having of some­
tions of the subjective; it is only to say that, thing itself, giving of something itself).*
over and above the generated products and The logicians' naturally predominant fo­
their subjective initiation (?) [Ablaufen] in the cusing on norms and on techniques of cogni­
mode of step-by-step actualization, an inten­ tion, as we said above, brought thinking, as a
tional subjectivity is to be explored, in which mental doing, into the foreground for them; and
the products coming into being and those al- thus it gave prominence to the real psychic pro-

*See Part II, Chapter !, §§57-59; also Logische Untersuchungen, /l. Bd., lI. Teil, pp. 142ff., the passage introduc­
ing the concept of categorial intuition.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 245

cess in which the irreal object, the ideal forma­ not until a very late date (with the instituting
tion produced by thinking, makes its appear­ of psychologistic or anti-psychologistic tran­
ance at a particular time. Rules for this doing, scendental philosophy), actually new and sub­
or for the psychic subject as a subject who is stantial investigations of the subjective, over
active in thinking, were to be ascertained. The which, to be sure, no lucky star held sway and
intrusive interest in providing norms tended which, in any case, must still struggle for their
understandably to mask the ideal Objectivity true sense. These we left out of consideration;
of the produced formations themselves and al­ and, for the time being, we shall continue to do
so to prevent the rise of a theoretical thema­ so. Meanwhile, guided by the insight that we
tizing activity relating to them consciously have acquired for ourselves conceming the
and purely. And this was the case, even though purely Objective theme of logic, and taking
the logician's work, as we saw above, dealt the original logical apophantics as our point of
continually with these ideal formations, iden­ departure, we shall first explore the essential­
tifying them, subsuming them under form­ ly determined structures of an Objective apo­
concepts, and so forth. In spite of this, they re­ phantic logic-one that is "analytic," "for­
mained thematically unseparated from the mal"-and shall then deal with the problems
subjective. In this connection-we shall have involved in ascertaining its essentially deter­
to speak of this again-there are also objec­ mined boundaries. Here we shall start with the
tive difficulties; because the matters dealt with modem mathematical disciplines that should
are not externa! products, but products gener­ likewise be characterized as "analytic" and
ated inside the psychic sphere itself. "formal" and direct our attention to the obscure
Now, however, our only concem is to gain questions that concem the relationship of this
an understanding of the essential character of "analytic" mathematics to traditional formal
historically existing logic, by means of an ex­ logic, and consequently the relationship be­
plication of the intentionality deterrnining the tween the idea of formal ontology and the idea
sense of logic most originally. Briefly summa­ of formal apophantics.
rized, the first requisite was to understand the
historically existing logic in respect of its hy­
bridism, as both a theoretical and a normative­ Formal Logic as Apophantic
practical discipline, and in respect of the con­ Analysis'�
sequent hybridism of its theme as, on the one
hand, the ideal significations (the categorial § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure
formations) and, on the other hand, the actions judgment-form
of thinking and the regulation of these by
norms. But it was further requisite to under­ From our general explanations it is already
stand that the theoretically seizable and solid understandable that, as historically the first
constituent of this hybrid, the part to be found part of a systematically executed logic, Aris­
in the historically existing syllogistic theories, totelian analytics arose, a first commencement
was essentially nothing other than a theory of of a logic of theoretical formations. Within the
a theory, though not grasped purely-a theory, limits imposed by focusing on this theme, it
therefore, of the produced judgment-forma­ was a ''formal" logic in a particular sense;
tions and cognitional formations making up though, even as that, it did not attain the ful!
the field of ideal Objects. Whatever went be­ purity and breadth prescribed by its essence.
yond that, in locutions and thoughts relating In a survey of the (always materially determí­
to the subjective, brought (as we pointed out) nate) judgments of life and science, the most
no essentially new content but only obvious universal groupings of judgments according
subjective variants. To this were added, though to types, the perfect likenesses of form among

*FTL, pp. 48-71 (Sections 12-22).

246 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

judgments pertaining even to heterogeneous be, the determinate judgment-form "S is p,"
provinces, immediately carne to the fore. Ar­ the form "If S is p, then Q is r;" or the like.
istotle was the first to bring out the idea of To be sure, in Aristotle the variability of the
form which was to determine the fundamental terms is not completely free, and consequently
sense of a "formal logic," as we understand such the idea of form is not quite pure: since, as a
a discipline today and as Leibniz already un­ matter of course, Aristotle relates his analytics
derstood it in effecting his synthesis of for­ to the real world and, in so doing, has not yet
mal logic (as apophantic) and formal analysis excluded from his analytics the categories of
to make the unity of a mathesis universalis. reality. For modem thinkers it was the emer­
Aristotle was the first, we may say, to execute gence of algebra that made possible for the
in the apophantic sphere-the sphere of asser­ first time the advance to a purely formal logic;
tive statements ("judgments" in the sense ex­ yet it seems that the Middle Ages, in the trea­
pressed by the word in traditional logic)­ tise De modis significandi, ascribed to Duns
that "formalization" or algebraization which Scotus, had already attained the conception of
makes its appearance in modem algebra with the purely formal,* admittedly without mak­
Vieta and distinguishes subsequent formal ing that insight prevail.
"analysis" from all material mathematical dis­
ciplines (geometry, mechanics, and the rest). § 13. The theory of the pure forms of
In the materially determinate statements tak­ judgments as the first discipline of
en as examples, Aristotle substituted algebra­ formal logic
ic letters for the words (terms) indicating the
material: that which is spoken about in the A) THE IDEA OF THEORY OF FORMS
statements, that which determines judgments
as judgments relating to divers material prov­ The possibility of subsuming all judgments
inces or single matters. As conceming the sense, under pure concepts of configuration or form
this implied that he substituted the moment immediately suggested the thought of a de­
"anything whatever" for each materially filled scriptive classification of judgments, exclu­
"core" in the judgments, while the remaining sively from this formal point of view: regard­
judgment-moments were held fast as moments less, that is, of all other distinctions and lines
of form, moments that persist without change of inquiry, like those concerning truth or non­
when one changes the relatedness of the giv­ contradiction. Thus one distinguished, in re­
en judgment to matters-or interchanges judg­ spect of form, simple and composite judgments;
ments pertaining to different material spheres among simple forms, one distinguished those
-at pleasure. With this taking of the materi­ of the singular, the particular, and the univer­
ally filled cores as indeterminate optional af­ sal judgment; and one went on to the complex
fairs-lingually, as indeterminate terms, S, p, configurations of the conjunctive, the disjunc­
and the like-the exemplificative determinate tive, the hypothetical, and the causal judg­
judgment becomes converted into the univer­ ment-judgments among which the judgment­
sal and pure form-idea: the pure concept of any complexes called arguments or syllogisms also
judgment whatever that has, as the case may belonged. Furthermore one took into consider-

*See Martín Heidegger, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus [Duns Scotus 's Theory of Catego­
ries and Signification (Tübingen, 1916)], particularly p. 34. Also Martín Grabmann, "Die Entwicklung der
mittelalterlichen Sprachlogik [The development of medieval linguistic logic] (Tractatus de modis significandi),"
Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Gorresgesellschaft, 1922, pp. 12lff. and 199ff., and the same article, revised and ex­
panded, in Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben: Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik (Munich,
1926). On the Grammatica speculativa, previously attributed to Duns Scotus, as in fact a work by Thomas of Erfurt,
see op. cit., particularly pp. 118-125.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 247

ation the modalizations that judgments (as ordinate to it. Thus, for example, the form "Sp
certainties) undergo and the judgment-forms is q" is subordinate to the form "S is p "; and
arising from such modalizations. the form " (Sp )q is r" is subordinate in tum to
Systematically consistent and clean execu­ "Sp is q." But each judgment-form also bears
tion of such a description would have permit­ within itself a universality with a wholly dif­
ted the sharp isolation of a peculiar discipline, ferent sense, since each takes in a multiplici­
first defined in the Logische Untersuchungen ty of possible forms as its "modifications";
and characterized there as theory of the pure for example, the form "S is p" takes in the
forms of significations (or grammar of pure modifications "if Sis p," "then Sis p," and so
logic). This theory of the pure forms of judg­ forth, which can occur as component parts of
ments is the intrinsically first discipline of whole judgment-forms. The like is true of each
formal logic, implanted as a germ in the old and every form. One would have to take heed
analytics but not yet developed. According to expressly that the forms standing thus as dif­
our explanations, it concems the mere possi­ ferents under a universal form can be derived
bility ofjudgments, as judgments, without in­ from it by construction. Furthermore, that not
quiry whether they are true or false, or even every form can be regarded as such a con­
whether, merely as judgments, they are com­ structional differentiation of another form, but
patible or contradictory. * that, on the contrary, in every case we get
back to primitive forms. Thus the form of the
B) UNIVERSALITY OF THE JUDGMENT-FORM; determining judgment, "Sis p" (where p des­
THE FUNDAMENTAL FORMS ANO THEIR ignates a deterrnination, and S its substrate), is
VARIANTS a primitive form, from which one can derive
particularizations and modifications. It is a
To have grasped the idea of this theory of primitive form: more precisely, it is primitive
pure forms, one would have had to make clear within the highest genus of apophantic logic,
to oneself that, when one aims at a classification "apophansis," if this genus is extended exclu­
of all possible judgments with regard to their sively to predicative judgment-certainties,
forms, "fundamental forms" emerge, or a closed while judgment-modalities (which, in them­
system of fundamental forms emerges, out of selves, are not subsumed under this genus) be­
which, in accordance with a set of appertinent come included in its scope by undergoing a
eidetic laws, ever new, ever more highly dif­ transmutation into judgment-certainties with
ferentiated forms, and finally the system of all an altered content: namely certainties about
conceivable judgment-forms without excep­ possibilities, probabilities, and the like.
tion, can be generated by construction, with the Naturally the genus apophansis, with its
infinity of their differentiated and always-fur­ universality left without differentiation into
ther-differentiable configurations. It is remark­ particular forms, can likewise be designated as
able that neither this nor the fundamental logi­ a form; and, with this universality, it can be
cal task implicit in it was ever seen. included in form-constructions. Thus, letting
Stated more precisely, one would have had the literal signs designate closed assertive state­
to make clear to oneself, first of all, that each ments, we rnight form "A and A'" (this being
judgment-form, no matter how it may have understood as the formation that a conjunctive
been acquired, is a generic universality, not on­ judgment has; in forma, then, as the type per­
ly with regard to possible determinate judg­ taining to the corresponding generation of
ments but also with regard to pure forms sub- forms), likewise "if A, then A'," and so forth.

*For the thorough legitimation of the idea of this "grammar of pure logic,"' see Logische Untersuchungen, II. Bd ..
l. Teil, Abschnitt IV.
248 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

We might then determine the undetermined forthwith that operation, in the sense of a
forms, A and A', first of all by primitive forms free changing of any judgment into another
of particularizations, and go on from these to one, yields a narrower concept, since modali­
new forms, continuing thus without limit, ac­ zation is plainly not a matter of arbitrary trans­
cording to any of the principies of form-con­ mutation.
struction. Such universal formation-forms as This, moreover, should be emphasized ex­
the conjunctive and the hypothetical must pressly: Every operative fashioning of one form
likewise be called fundamental forms, since out of others has its law; and this law, in the
they indicate fundamental kinds of "opera­ case of operations proper, is of such a nature
tions" that we can undertake with any two judg­ that the generated form can itself be submit­
ments or judgment-forms. ted to a repetition of the same operation. Ev­
ery law of operation thus bears within itself a
C) ÜPERATION AS THE GUIDING CONCEPT IN law of reiteration. Conformity to this law of
THE INVESTIGATION OF FORMS reiterable operation extends throughout the
whole province of judgments, and makes it
If we have become attentive to the point of possible to construct reiteratively (by means of
view of "operation" (with laws of operation fundamental forms and fundamental opera­
in which, mathematically speaking, "existen­ tions, which can be laid down) the infinity of
tial propositions" are implicit), we shall natu­ possible forms of judgments.
rally choose the concept of operation as a
guide in our investigation of forms; we shall § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non­
have to conduct this research in such a way contradiction) as the second leve/ of
that it leads to an exhibition of the fundamen­ formal logic
tal operations and their laws, and to the ideal
construction of the infinity of possible forms From the theory of the pure forms of judg­
according to these laws. Consequently the fun­ ments there is differentiated, as a higher level
damental forms will not stand side by side, but of the formal logic of judgments, the science
will be graded one above another. Thus, for of the possible forms of true judgments. lt
example, the form "S is p" is more original has been developed at least in part as a his­
than the form "Sp is q," which is an operation­ torical fact, though not in a systematic con­
al transformation of it, namely by the opera­ text such as this, and not with purity. Indeed,
tion of converting a predicate into an attribute. the obvious procedure was to inspect the mere
But the form "Sp is q" makes its appearance forms of judgments with a view to determin­
in the definition of this operation, and forth­ ing the extent to which, separately or as fash­
with bears within itself a new principie for the ioned into complex forms, they involve eideti­
construction of forms. cally universal conditions for possible truth
Finally one will be able to take the point of or falsity, conditions that apply to all conceiv­
view of operation so broadly that one regards able judgments with corresponding forms. Par­
even the fundamental form "Sis p" as an op­ ticularly in the case of argument-forms (com­
eration: the operation of determining a deter­ plex proposition-forms in which valid and
minable substrate, S. Similarly, one will then fallacious arguments proceed) it was evident
regard every modalization as a form-produc­ that not all proposition-forms can be combined
tive operation that transmutes the sense in a to make forms of genuine arguments, actually
certain manner, so that, relative to the series "consequent" arguments. lt can be seen that
of modalities, the form of the apophansis (in certain argument-forms have, at the same time,
the original sense: assertoric certainty) is char­ the value of formal eidetic laws, namely as gen­
acterized for essential reasons as the primi­ eral truths aboutjudgment-consequence: about
tive form, and the other forms are character­ the ( "analytic") includedness of judgments
ized as its variants. To be sure, one then sees having such and such a form in premise-judg-
Formal and Transcendental Logic 249

ments having an appropriate form; likewise in one judging process of meaning. Equally
that other argument-forms have the value of it concems the non-contradictory unifiability
eidetic laws of analytic anti-consequence, of judgments in other judgment-compounds:
analytic "contradictions "-that properly they for example, judgments that have unity as
are forms, not of implicative arguments { von judgment-members in any ostensible theory
Schlüssen] but, so to speak, of "exclusions" -such unity being indeed that of a single
{von Ausschlüssen]. judgment, though a very complicatedly found­
With deeper consideration of the sense of ed judgment, which belongs to a higher order.
this analytic includedness and excludedness, The like is true when we descend from com­
logical research could have attained the cog­ plex judgments to judgments that are simple
nition that the traditional formal logic is not in the usual sense. Any self-contained apophan­
a pure "logic of non-contradiction" and that, sis whose members are not themselves judg­
with the bringing out of such a logic in its pu­ ments that likewise have an apophantic self­
rity, a most significant division would have to containedness is accepted as simple in this
be made within the complex of problems and sense. But even such an apophansis still has
the theory of logic. members that must be called "judicial" uni­
To seek out systematically the eidetic laws ties, though they are not self-sufficient unities.
that govemjust the analytic includedness and Therefore the difference between non-contra­
excludedness, just the interna! and externa! dictory unifiability and contradiction extends
analytic non-contradictoriness of judgments, also to the "simple" apophansis; and so do the
singly or in combination, is a separate prob­ laws of formal analytics.
lem. In such inquiry one is not yet concerned This determines a pregnant and self-con­
with the truth of judgments, but is concemed tained concept of a "pure apophantic analyt­
merely with whether the judgment-members ics, " an analytics in which belong not only the
included in a whole judgment, no matter how whole of syllogistics, so far as its essential con­
simple or how complex it may be, are "com­ tent is concerned, but also (as we shall show)
patible" with one another or contradict one many other disciplines, namely those of for­
another and thereby make the whole judgment mal-mathematical "analysis." Nevertheless, as
itself a contradictory judgment, one that can­ may be emphasized forthwith, the original con­
not be made "properly." Reference to logical cept of analytics as an analytics in the broad­
laws that, on the basis of form, govern the mere er sense will also be indispensable; and, as our
non-contradictoriness of judgments must be investigations progress, we shall be able to de­
understood in a corresponding sense. lt is an termine its peculiar sense more strictly-pre­
important insight that questions concerning cisely on the basis of the narrower concept.
consequence and inconsistency can be asked The fundamental concepts of pure analyt­
about judgments in forma, without involving ics in the pregnant sense include, asfundamen­
the least inquiry into truth or falsity and there­ tal concepts of validity (norm-concepts), only
fore without ever bringing the concepts of truth analytic consequence and analytic contradic­
and falsity, or their derivatives, into the theme. tion; as already said, truth and falsity, along
In view of this possibility, we distinguish a lev­ with their modalities, are not present among
e! of formal logic that we call consequence­ them. This must be rightly understood: They
logic or logic of non-contradiction. are not present as fundamental concepts per­
The problem of non-contradiction natural­ taining to the thematic sphere. Therefore, in
ly extends to the compossibility of quite arbi­ this pure analytics, they play only the role that
trarily assembled judgment-collections, so far is theirs in ali the sciences, so far as ali sci­
as, in thinking of these, one normally thinks ences strive for truths and consequently talk
also of the connection of the judgments to form about truth and falsity; but that is not to say
the unity of one collective judgment-which, that truth and falsity belong among the "fun­
accordingly, is meant by one judging subject damental concepts" of every science, the con-
250 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

cepts pertaining to the proper essence of its place: not the slightest bit of an explicit sub­
particular scientific province. ject-positing, of a positing-thereupon as predi­
cate, of a passing on relatingly to another Ob­
§15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic ject, which is posited separately, or of any like
process. If the "vaguely," "confusedly," judg­
Inquiry for formal laws of possible truth ing process of meaning something that comes
and its modalities would be a higher logical to mind is followed by such a process of ex­
inquiry, after the isolation of pure analytics. plicit judging, then we say, on the basis of the
If a logic restricts itself to the bare forms of synthesis of fulfilling identification that comes
the significations of statements-that is, the about: The confused meaning or opinion "be­
judgment-forms-what means does it have of comes distinct "; now, for the first time, some­
becoming a genuine logic of truth? One can thing is "properly judged"; and the judgment,
see forthwith that non-contradiction is an es­ which previously was meant only expectantly,
sential condition for possible truth, but also now is properly and itself given.
that mere analytics becomes converted into a Similarly in the case of reading or hearing.
formal truth-logic only by virtue of a connec­ In this case we have, it is true, a sensuous unity
tion between these intrinsically separable con­ and mutual congruity of the seen or heard ver­
cepts, a connection that determines an eidetic bal signs in their sensuous configuration; but,
law and, in a logic, must be formulated sepa­ in ordinary reading, we by no means have, com­
rately. More about that later. For the present, bined with that, an accompanying articulation
let us restrict ourselves to the domain of pure of actual thinking, of thinking produced from
apophantic analytics. the Ego, member by member, in synthetic ac­
tivity. Rather, this course of thinking proper is
§ 16. The differences in evidence that only indicated (by the passively flowing syn­
substantiate the separating of levels thesis of the sensuous verbal sounds) as a course
within apophantics. Clear evidence and of thinking to be performed.
distinct evidence Let us examine the situation somewhat more
closely.
A) MODES OF PERFORMING THE JUDGMENT. The verbal sounds have their indications,
DISTINCTNESS AND CONFUSION which, in themselves, refer interdependently to
one another and are built one on another. The
Mere predelineation of the separations with sounds conjoin to make the unity of a word­
which the last sections were concemed, sepa­ formation, which in tum consists of relatively
rations that must be made in formal logic, is self-contained formations. Each of these is
not enough. There is need of more penetrat­ bearer of a unity of indication; and the whole
ing substantiations, which explícate the corre­ is a self-contained unity, which has noetically
spondingly differentiated evidences; only with the phenomenological characteristic of asso­
such substantiations, moreover, can an actual ciative self-containedness and on the parallel
insight into the necessity and the scope of these side (noematically) the phenomenological char­
separations be opened up. acteristic that consists in the self-contained­
A judgment can be given as evidently the ness of an indicated "significational" unity,
same judgment in very different manners of built correspondingly out of indicated forma­
subjective givenness. It can make its appear­ tions.
ance as something completely vague that comes Now, on the significational side, the indi­
to mind or perhaps as the completely vague cated formations, the judgments themselves,
signification of a statement read, understood, can make their appearance in the "evidence"
and believingly accepted. In such cases not of a progressive fulfillment of the indicating in­
the slightest bit of an explicit performance be­ tentions-that is, in the manner that distin­
longing to judicative spontaneity need take guishes judgments proper, judgments that are
Formal and Transcendental Logic 251

not only indicated but at the same time gener­ have to distinguish, on the one hand, a non­
ated in originary activity; or, as happens in explicit judgment, indicated by a sentence
passive reading, they can be indicated in an that makes its appearance explicitly, and, on
empty manner. the other hand, a corresponding explicit judg­
Here we have a particular case of a quite ment or, as the case may be, a subsequent
universal regularity. Within every species of explication with identification of the meant.
empty consciousness the following difference But we have to distinguish two cases of
in the empty intendedness can occur: The con­ making distinct: besides the one to which we
sciousness can flow in an intemally unseparat­ have paid exclusive attention up to now­
ed manner, in such a manner that it does not namely the case in which the distinct explicate
have particular empty meanings as its mem­ is non-contradictory and simply identifiable
bers; or else as an articulated, articulatedly ex­ <with the confusedly meant>-we must note
ercised, empty consciousness. For example, I the case in which the explicate is contradic­
may be non-intuitively conscious of, and even tory. In witnessing non-contradictory coinci­
paying attention to, the street in front of my dence, I see that the explicated is the same as
house "confusedly, all at the same time"; on the unexplicated, or that what was meant by
the other hand, perhaps subsequently, I may be the judger in the earlier confused meaning is
conscious of it in explicitly "going through" merely made distinct. In the contrasting case,
it, as, in an articulative manner, I become con­ that of contradiction, the unity of the con­
scious of the windings of the street, the trees fused total meaning, as a unitary belief, is
and houses along it-but still non-intuitively presupposed. Now, as explication progresses,
or perhaps with sorne points where members this or that newly appearing particular be­
emerge momentarily as intuited. Thus a non­ lief can undergo cancellation, annulment, by
articulated empty consciousness can become the particular beliefs that have already been
converted into a "corresponding" articulated exercised explicitly and remain firmly in force.
empty consciousness, the confusedly meant When that occurs, the underlying total belief,
sense-content (while entering into identify­ the one that is being explicated, forthwith
ing coincidence of the sort peculiar to "expli­ and necessarily assumes the characteristic of
cation") becoming "spread out" as the explí­ nullity. What has happened now to the coinci­
cate, the meaning proper of the previously con­ dence of identity between the total explicand
fused unitary content. and the total explicate? Obviously we must
The same is true in the particular case of say: With the cancellation, the belief that has
indicated judicial significations, whether they suffered this cancellational modification is
are the significations of (one's own or anoth­ still there in a certain manner, as a belief hav­
er's) actually given judgings or those of judg­ ing this sense-no longer, indeed, as a belief
ings intended to in phantasy as possible. In now actually exercised by the Ego or root­
this connection the following is to be noted: ed in him as his continuingly accepted con­
In understanding another's judgings, I "fol­ viction, but still in his consciousness as his
low"; and this, the mode understanding-in­ earlier belief, with the whole sense in its
following-another (and perhaps judging with sense-articulations and the corresponding dox­
him), is to be carefully distinguished from the ic positings.
judging that is originally one's own and from If it is a matter of another's judging, then,
the different modes of this: from the judging in case I do not believe too, I have the "mere
that is now being done actively, and likewise idea" of the other' s belief that has such and such
from one's own past, but confusedly "reawak­ a content: I have a presentiation {Vergegen­
ened," judging, which is only "still in force," wiirtigung] analogous to a memory of sorne
and so on. past belief of my own "in which I no longer
Accordingly we have to make a distinction join" but which I nevertheless accept now, in
that, in a certain manner, cuts across these: We memory, as my previously exercised believ-
252 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ing. My judgment-which I made just now indications, is called with good reason "judg­
but must reject upon explication, which there­ ing actually and properly ": because it alone
fore, from this moment on, is no longer my has the essentia! characteristic of the originari­
judgment now but only my just-past judg­ ness in which the judgment is given originalit­
ment-now has, according to the explication, er, given as the judgment itself-in that (this
such and such an explicit sense; and the situa­ being the same thing here) the judgment is
tion is the same in the case of my earlier past built up "syntactically" in the judger's actual
judgment and similar in the case of the other's action proper. The following is only a different
appresented judgment. In this connection it is expression: Explicit judging, "distinct" judg­
to be noted that, throughout the cancellational ing, is the evidence appropriate to the "distinct
change, there continues to be a coincidence of judgment, " as the ideal objectivity that becomes
identity, which concems the mere judgment­ constituted originarily in such a synthetic ac­
"material." The cancellation alters nothing in tion, and identified in the repetition of such
the judgment that is presentiated retentional­ an action.
ly, or recollectively, or in the manner charac­ This evidence is an original emerging of
teristic of empathy; and, if I explícate what is the judgment as it itself, but not yet an eviden­
implicit in it, then the judgment presentiated tially experiencing <act of> seizing upan and
in one of those manners coincides with the ex­ regarding it thematically. Subsequently what
plicate, even though, while explicating, I make has become constituted in this evidence, in
my cancellation. Naturally that is not to say that this polythetic action, is graspable "monotheti­
the other subject or I knew beforehand what cally," in one grasping ray; the polythetic for­
explication would yield as a distinct proposi­ mation becomes an object. *
tion; otherwise no one could overlook contra­ Naturally confusion and distinctness of judg­
dictions, whether immediate or mediate. ing can be intermingled; as they are if, when
After these clarifications we understand we are reading, we actually and properly per­
the essential difference between the vague or form a few judgment-steps and -sequences,
"confused" manners of judging [Urteilswei­ and then Jet ourselves be carried along for a
sen] and the "distinct" ones and can see at once while by the mere indications belonging to the
that there is no question of whether judgings word-formations-which in tum, as we said,
[Urteile} have evidence (intuitiveness) with can have their own distinctness or indistinct­
regard to their predicatively formed affair­ ness, of quite a different sort. t
complexes [hinsichthich ihrer Sachverhalte}
or not. On the one side, within vagueness it­ B) DISTINCTNESS AND CLARITY
self, the difference that is so important in rela­
tion to verbal thinking emerged for us: Even But there is also a mingling of another sort
the sensuousness of the verbal sounds and of and therefore, with appropriate purification,
their articulations can be vague; then again there another important contrast for us to take into
can be sharp articulation in this respect and, consideration: namely the mingling of "dis­
with it, an articulation of the indications. But tinctness" and "clarity," and the purely appre­
even then the very important distinctness of hended difference between them.
the judicative meanings themselves is lacking: Two evidences become separated here. First,
They are indeed believings and to that extent the evidence wherein the judgment itself, qua
judgings; yet they are not "proper" judgings. judgment, becomes itself given-the judgment
In the case of verbal judging, an explicit per­ that, as itself given, is called also a distinct
formance of the judging, concurrent with the judgment, taken from the actual and proper

*Cf. Ideen, pp. 247f. [English translation, pp. 335ff.]

tOn this whole exposition cf. Appendix II.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 253

judgment-performing. Second, the evidence not the predicatively formed affair-complex

wherein that becomes itself given which the but precisely a prefiguration, an intuitional
judger wants to attain "by way of" his judg­ anticipation, yet to be confirmed by the hav­
ment-the judger, that is, as wanting to cog­ ing of the affair-complex itself. Perfect clarity
nize, which is the way logic always conceives signifies, in the one case, clarity of "seeing,"
him. of "seizing upon," in the actual and proper
To judge explicitly is not per se to judge sense: so that the predicatively formed affair­
with "clarity": Judging with "clarity" has at complex and the affairs entering into it-they
once clarity of the affairs, in the performance themselves-are seized upon; in the other case,
of the judgment-steps, and clarity of the predi­ perfectly prefigurative clarity of the goal not
cativelyJormed affair-complex in the whole yet actualized but only striven toward in judg­
judging [im ganzen Urteil}. An unclear and a ing. Here the cognitional striving tends from
clear judging can judge one and the same "confusion" toward distinctness; and, if the
judgment; thus evidence of the self-identity of latter yields a still imperfectly intuitional judg­
the judgment can extend throughout essential­ ment or, worse yet, a judgment completely
ly different modes of givenness. But only a devoid of intuition, despite being constituted
judging with full clarity can be actual present explicitly, then the striving tends through this
cognition; and, as such, it is a new evidence, judgment, perhaps at first toward only a pre­
pertaining to a givenness originaliter of the af­ figuration of the cognitional goal. The pheno­
fairs themselves, of the predicatively formed menon of transition to synthetic coincidence
affair-complex itself, at which one aims in the is then called, in the usual sense of the word,
judging that strives toward cognition-even clarification of the judgment qua meaning or
where the judging is still quite unclear, intui­ opinion (making one's meaning clear to one­
tionally quite unfulfilled. self). The cognitional striving, however, has
not thereby reached its goal; it tends farther,
e) CLARITY IN THE HAVING OF SOMETHING toward that other clarity, toward evidence as
ITSELF AND CLARITY OF ANTICIPATION the having of the meant itself, the final goal.
These two modes of clarity have their de­
But here the differences are again ramified, grees of perfection, with the appertinent ideas
since "clarity" may designate either judging in of perfect obscurity and perfect clarity. * More­
the mode of the judging that gives its meant over, with the transition to clarity-according­
affair-complex itself-that is, what one usually ly, among "clarifications"-those cases be­
has in mind as evident judging-or else judg­ come isolated in which only single parts of
ing in the mode of a judging that makes intui­ what has become posited acquire clarity, or
ted in that it prefigures the meant affair-com­ can acquire it: because, though they indeed
plex. In the latter case, what is itself given is combine to make up either a clear picture or

*To speak of a "limit" rather than an idea of clarity would not always be appropriate, though limit is the word that
first comes to mind. Not always should one think of something like a limes. Perfect evidence of externa] experience, for
example, is a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. Externa! experience is, a priori, never a perfect giving of anything
itself; but, as long as externa! experience goes on with consistent harmony, it bears within itself, as an intentional
implication, the idea of an infinite self-contained system of possible experiences that we, starting from de facto expe­
rience, could have gone through, or could go through now or in the future-experiences such that, as harmonious
continuations of de facto experience, they would have shown (or would show) what the physical thing is, "in and of
itself," besides what it has already shown itself to be. As the correlate of this phenomenologically clarifiable infinite
anticipation (which, as an infinite anticipation, has an evidence of its own) the physical thing existing in itself is, for its
part, an idea, one that rightly guides the thinking done in natural science and enables such thinking to progress by
degrees of approximation, each having its relative evidence. For our purposes we can content ourselves with a crude
initial description of"clarity." (On the concept ofthe physical thing as an idea in the Kantian sense, cf. ldeen, pp. 390ff.
[English translation pp. 411 ff.].)
254 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

an evidently given affair-complex "itself," to a phantasy-world and become immersed in

they do so in such a fashion that this, which a judging (his own or another's) within it­
has become intuited, does not fulfill the judg­ provided only that he produces the variant of
ing intention but, on the contrary, annuls it­ distinct evidence that has the significance of
in the manner appropriate to an impossibility, evidence of possible judgments as possible.
or else (in the other case) to an "untruth," that Thus the purely analytic logician has the es­
becomes evident. sential genus, distinctjudgment, with its sphere
of possible judgments, as his province.
§ 17. The essential genus, "distinct
judgment," as the theme of "pure § 18. The fundamental question of pure
analytics" analytics

Pure apophantic analytics, in our pregnant The question now is: While remaining en­
sense, has as the superordinate concept deter­ tirely within this province, what can we state
mining its province the concept of the judg­ about possible distinct judgments informa, af­
ment: the judgment proper, which derives its ter the antecedent logical discipline, the the­
being-sense originaliter from the explicit prop­ ory of pure forms (which, in any case, contains
emess of the judgment-performing and from the forms of distinct judgments), has con­
that alone. The cognitional striving-which structed the multiplicity of possible forms and
often tends through a merely explicit judg­ placed it at our disposal?
ing and which the logician (with his interest Restricted as we are to what appertains to
in scientific judging-correlatively, scientific the own-essentiality of judgments-that is, the
judgments as judgments aimed in the direc­ constituent properties belonging to them as
tion of truth as cognition) has pre-eminently in judgments-we can expect, in addition to the
mind-remains quite beside the question in the own-essentiality explicated by the theory of
sphere of pure analytics; it is abstracted from. forms, only relationships founded a priori on
The identical judgment-whether clarified or the own-essentiality of judgments. And we do
even at all clarifiable, whether or not it can be in fact encounter here relationships with which
converted into cognition, provided only that it we are acquainted and which belong a priori
is, or can be, derived actuallyfrom distinct evi­ purely to distinct judgments as distinct: con­
dence-that is the theme. sequence (includedness); inconsistency (ana­
Like all logic as an a priori science, pure lytic contradiction, excludedness); and the
analytics has to do, not with actual judgments­ tertium, judgment-compatibility, which is nei­
that is to say, judgments actually made sorne­ ther one nor the other-empty non-contradic­
time and somewhere-but with a priori possi­ tion, as the unifiability of judgments that "have
bilities, to which all corresponding actualities nothing to do with one another."
are subordinated in an easily understood sense. On closer inspection we discover that what
If the logician, in order to obtain eidetic uni­ has just been said applies even to thejudgment­
versality in pure analytics, must begin with members of apophantic wholes-namely as
examples, which he uses as a basis for seeing members posited, or positable, with distinct­
essences, he can take actual judgments of his ness. They too, as we indicated in advance, *
own; on the other hand, he can take other per­ are "judgments" in the broader sense (but not
sons' judgments, which he perhaps rejects en­ self-sufficient ones), since, when cognition is
tirely but which, in following and understand­ the goal, they are destined to become judg­
ing them in a proper quasi-performing, he ment-members of apophantic wholes (judg­
nevertheless grasps evidently as possible judg­ ments in the pregnant sense), and only thus
ments. But he can likewise project himself in- do they acquire cognitional significance. These

*See § 14.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 255

judgments in an unusually amplified sense­ as soon as we ask questions concerning truth

which shall henceforth determine our concept or as soon as, with regard to the objects tak­
of the judgment-also stand in the above-in­ en at first only as distinct judgments, we ask
dicated fundamental analytic relationships: As questions conceming their adequation to the af­
standing in consequence-relationships, they fairs themselves: in short, as soon as we bring
can demand or exclude one another; and, in the concept of truth into our theme. The predi­
case they are mutually exclusive, they are in­ cate truth does indeed relate to judgments and
compatible in the unity of a whole judgment. only to judgments, whether we take the above­
Since, as closer consideration shows, all characterized narrower judgment-concept (the
pure analytic relationships are relationships in concept of apophansis) or the broader one as
which different judgments-we are referring our basis. But, as long as we restrict ourselves
exclusively to judgments falling under the con­ to merely distinct evidence and what is iden­
cept of the distinct judgment, the judgment tifiable in it under the name judgment, although
proper-either go together to form the unity every contradiction (every analytic counter­
of one judgment or else are impossible in such sense) is indeed excluded, an opening remains
a unity, the fundamental question of pure an­ for every material countersense and for every
alytics can be formulated as follows: other untruth. After all, we are abstracting from
When, and in what relations, are any judg­ every effect produced by clarification, by re­
ments-as judgments, and so far as mere form sorting to material possibility or to truth; we
is concerned-possible within the unity of one are abstracting, in other words from all ques­
judgment? tions of verification.
Naturally they are thus possible, only as ei­ What then does it signify, to seek formally
ther standing in a consequence-relation or un­ universal eidetic insight conceming possible
related in respect of a possible consequence. judicial truth? It obviously signifies phanta­
"Non-contradiction" therefore signifies the sying possible judgments as possibly undergo­
possibility that the judger can judge distinct ing verification, as possibly standing in a rela­
judgments within the unity of a judgment per­ tionship of adequation to the corresponding
formable with distinctness. In this connection judgments that give the supposed affairs them­
it should be noted that even mere judging to­ sel ves. Now the judgments are thought of from
gether involves a judgrnent-unity, a unity of co­ the very beginning, not as mere judgments, but
positedness. as judgments pervaded by a dominant cogni­
In formal and pure analytics the inquiry tional striving, as meanings that have to become
concemsjudgment-forms: Which forms can be fulfilled, that are not objects by themselves, like
known, and known a priori, to be universal the data arising from mere distinctness, but
forms pertaining to the performing of a distinct passages to the "truths" themselves that are to
judging; and which can be known not to be such be attained.
forms? In that question the following is in­ If, in this manner, one exchanges the theo­
cluded: Which forms of judgment-combina­ retical focusing on mere judgments for the
tions at any level are a priori forms of unitary focusing on cognition, on the predicatively
judgments that are distinctly evident as prop­ formed affair-complexes that are judgingly
erly performable? cognized or, correlatively, on the verifying ad­
equation, then one grasps forthwith, as an ei­
§ 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to detic insight, that whatever is incompatible in
the formal logic of truth. Non-contra­ the unity of a distinct judgment is incompat­
diction as a condition far possible truth ible also in the truth, or that a contradiction in
the mere judgments of course excludes the
In these researches, then, we must never go possibility of adequation. Truth and falsity are
outside the proper essence of judgments or predicates that can belong only to a judg­
judgment-forms, never go beyond distinct evi­ ment that is distinct or can be made distinct,
dence. But we go beyond this a priori sphere, one that can be performed actually and prop-
256 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

erly. Logic has never made clear to itself that that are themselves given in distinct evidence).
this concept of the judgment is at the basis of lt reads:
the old thesis that truth and falsity (in the origi­ If two judgments are contradictory, it is not
nal sense) are predicates of judgments. Thus, the case that both are possible as judgments
in a mediated fashion, a pure analytics, by vir­ proper, that both can become given in distinct
tue of its essence, is at the same time a funda­ evidence; it is not the case that both have ideal
mental part of a formal logic of truth. The di­ "mathematical existence." Nevertheless one of
vision of the universe of judg-ment-forms into them has it; one of them can become given in
those that are law-forms belonging to conse­ distinct evidence. *
quence, those that are law-forms belonging to The principies that originally connect truth
inconsistency, and those that, as standing out­ and consequence must also be reckoned among
side both classes, are non-contradictory in the the highest truth-principles of apophantic log­
"trivial" sense (as the mathematician would ic. Traditional logic offers them in the impure
express it), acquires immediate significance for form of the modus ponens and the modus
the possibility of adequation or truth. Any con­ tollens. Here too we have the same analogy.
sequence-relationship of judgments, if it can Already, in the sphere of mere analytic conse­
be effected with intuitiveness, becomes a con­ quence-relationships, there are a modus pon­
sequence-relationship of truths or of materi­ ens and a modus tollens, which, naturally, say
al possibilities. Any contradiction, on the oth­ nothing about truth or falsity thematically, but
er hand, excludes from the start all questions rather appertain, as a particular consequence­
of adequation; it is a limine a falsity. law, purely to the essence of judgments prop­
er and to the relationships of analytic conse­
§20. The principies of logic and their quence peculiar to these. Solely in this form
analogues in pure analytics are the modus ponens and the modus tollens a
genuine <purely analytic> logical principie.
The separation of a pure consequence-log­ This principie reads:
ic from truth-logic results in a two-sidedness "N" follows analytically from two judg­
that also extends to the so-called principies of ments of the forms, "If M, then N" and "M."
traditional logic-that is, the principies expli­ In the same manner, "Not M" follows from two
cating the concepts truth and falsity. judgments of the forms, "If M, then N" and
The double principie of contradiction and "NotN."
excluded middle, as a principle of truth-logic, The corresponding truth-principle then
says the following: reads:
"If ajudgment is true, then its contradictory If an immediate relationship of total analytic
opposite is false"; and "of two contradictory antecedent and total analytic consequent ob­
judgments, one is necessarily true"; combin­ tains between any two judgments, M and N,
ing the two propositions: "any judgment is ex­ then the truth of the antecedent entails the truth
clusively one or the other, true or false." of the consequent, and the falsity of the conse­
The analogue of these propositions in con­ quent entails the falsity of the antecedent.
sequence-logic is a principie that appertains to We have introduced the phrases "total an­
the essence of judgments proper (judgments tecedent" and "total consequent" to indicate

*It may be that the intent of this paragraph would be indicated less misleadingly as follows.
A judgment in which two mutually contradictory judgments are conjoined is not possible as a judgment proper;
it cannot become given as a possible judgment in distinct evidence; it does not have ideal "mathematical exist­
ence." But at least one of any two mutually contradictory judgments has such "existence"; at least one of them
can become given as a possible judgment in distinct evidence.
For a justification of the main changes involved in this rendering, see § 14, supra, the first sentence in the fourth
paragraph. -Translator's note.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 257

the immediacy of the relationship. We under­ §21. The evidence in the coinciding of
stand by these phrases nothing but the actual "the same" confused and distinct
members of a relationship of immediate con­ judgment. The broadest concept of the
sequence, no matter how they may be divisible judgment
afterwards. It is only as parts of total anteced­
ents and total consequents that the compon­ If we cast a backward glance at "confused"
ent premises and the component consequents judgments, which we have contrasted with
determine consequence-relationships, which judgments in the pregnant sense belonging
therefore are already mediate. If, in one of the to analytics (judgments as distinct), we see
consequent-wholes (which is the total conse­ that, in the identification of "confused" judg­
quent, only as being the complete whole), a ments, each with the corresponding distinct
single consequent is false, it immediately de­ judgment, yet a third evidence is concealed,
termines the falsity of the total consequent, and by virtue of which a third concept of the judg­
only thus the falsity of the total premise. ment receives being-sense. With the transition,
When applied to the above-stated modus with the making distinct to oneself of what
ponens and modus tollens-understood as a one truly meant in the vague judging process
principie of immediate pure consequence­ of meaning (what was truly said by oneself or
relationships-the principie laid down by us by another, what was truly thought in having
yields immediately the correct modes belong­ something vaguely come to mind)-with this
ing to truth-Iogic: transition the distinct judgment becomes giv­
If the antecedent in a hypothetical judg­ en as an evident mere explication of the true
ment is true, its consequent is true; if the con­ sense or meaning. There comes to pass a coin­
sequent is false, so is the antecedent. Or, put cidence of identity belonging to an originally
formally: peculiar type, which indicates a fundamental
If, at the same time, "If M, thenN" and "M" type of "evidence." This evidence, like any
are true (if they "hold good" at the same time), other (any "experience" in the widest conceiv­
then "N" is true. If, at the same time, "If M, able sense), has its degrees of perfection and
then N" and "Not N" are true, then "Not M" is its idea-here indeed an ideal Iimit* of per­
true (or, equivalently, "M" is false). fection, at which the synthetic coincidence
As for mediacies of analytic consequence: would in fact be absolutely perfect.
In the first place, it is a pure law of analytic These two manners of judging [Urteils­
consequence-relationships (pertaining there­ weisen]-with their respective correlates, the
fore to "mere," but distinct,judgments and pri­ confused judgment and the distinct judgment
or ali questions conceming their possible truth), themselves-obviously have a relationship
that an immediate analytic consequent of an similar to that between distinct but empty (or
immediate analytic consequent is itself an ana­ else imperfectly intuitive) judging and distinct
lytic consequent of the antecedent; whence it judging with insight, the judging in which the
follows, as itself a consequence, that a conse­ possible being, or the true being, of the af­
quent with any degree of mediacy is also a fairs aimed at in cognitional judging is itself
consequent of the antecedent. If we combine given in insight. Confused judging bears with­
this law with our truth-principle conceming im­ in itself-not always, but (as we have already
mediate analytic consequence-relationships said) in the nexus of a theoretical interest-an
then it follows-and, indeed, with mere ana­ aiming, which is directed to the distinct judg­
lytic consequence-that this principie, when ment and which, if it attains this, becomes
broadened, retains its validity for analytic con­ fulfilled therein. Now, in the case of a clarify­
sequences having any degree of mediacy. ing fulfillment-synthesis, a focusing of regard

*Cf. § 16 e, p. 253, note, supra. -Translator's note.

258 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

and an identification are possible, by virtue to the proper essence of these judgments. As
of which an empty judgment and afull judg­ confused, every judgment is possible that, as
ment become identified, merely as judgments, distinct, is impossible; and again, as distinct,
and gain an objectivity of their own as the same every judgment is possible that, as an evident
judgment; and the like is true of the parallel cognition, is impossible. In the theory of forms,
fulfillment-synthesis that effects the coinci­ the free construction of forms knows as yet
dence of a confused and a distinct judgment. no restraining contradictions. The whole sup­
Or, to put it differently: Just as the cognition, port of form-construction is speech, with its
the having of the predicatively formed affair­ well-differentiated indications, its references
complex itself, is also intrinsically a distinct to sense, which attach to the sensuously differ­
judgment (as truly a distinct judgment as the entiated signs and their sensuous configura­
corresponding empty judgment is), so the judg­ tions. And it is therefore not without reason that
ment with vagueness and the judgment with the theory of the forms of significations was
distinctness are "the same judgment." That is characterized in my Logische Untersuchungen
not to say that every confused judgment ad­ as the "grammar of pure logic." In a certain
mits of being converted into "the same" dis­ manner, furthermore, it is also not without
tinct judgment-any more than every distinct reason that people often say that formal logic
judgment admits of being converted into a has let itself be guided by grammar. In the case
material insight, whether as a possibility or as of theory of forms, however, this is not a re­
a truth. proach but a necessity-provided that, for guid­
The broadest concept of the judgment is ed by grammar (a word intended to bring to
therefore the one that is unaffected by the dif­ mind de facto historical languages and their
ferences among confusion, distinctness, and grammatical description), guidance by the
clarity, or that consciously abstracts from these grammatical itself be substituted. Distinctly
differences. When this concept is taken as a understanding a statement and framing it as
basis, there corresponds to each insightfully a possible judgment-this can and often does
cognitive judgment, and to each distinct judg­ signify a distinct grasping of the word-se­
ment (in view of the essential possibility-and, quences (accompanied by an internal expli­
genetically, the constant necessity-of its be­ cit following, in a quasi-speaking) and also of
coming confused), a like judgment, or rather their reference-articulations, with which there
the same one, in the confused mode; and there­ accrues the unity of a judgment, confused and
fore the concept of the confused judgment em­ yet articulated in a definite form. Thus we can
braces, in a certain manner, all judgments in understand quite definitely and articulatedly:
the broadest sense, including those that can be "No quadrangle has four angles," or "All A's
made distinct and those that can be made clear. are B 's, including sorne that are not B 's," or the
like. Such examples too pass muster in the
§22. The concept de-fining the province "grammar of pure logic"; and thus all forms
belonging to the theory of apophantic of contradictory judgments belong in the sys­
forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is tem of forms. Without the definite articulation
the judgment in the broadest sense of vague judgments by means of the sensuous
articulation of verbal signs, no theory of forms,
The importance of this discrimination of no logic whatever, would be possible-and, of
the third evidence and its correlative, the new course, no science either.
and broadest concept of the judgment, lies in By these analyses the sense of the three­
our having now acquired the basis for under­ fold stratification of formal logic, briefly char­
standing the province belonging to the theory acterized in §§13-15, has been clarified from
of the pure forms of judgments. Obviously the most original sources, and the essential ne­
the concept defining that province is the judg­ cessity of this stratification has been estab­
ment in the broadest sense; and all the laws lished. Up to now, this stratification has re­
of form that go to make up the theory are tied mained foreign to logic; only the isolation of a
Formal and Transcendental Logic 259

theory of pure forms had already been effect­ psychologism. Against the demand for logical
ed in the Logische Untersuchungen; in the pres­ researches directed to the subjective, an ap­
ent context, however, the separation has been peal is made to the first volume of my Logische
established on incomparably deeper grounds. Untersuchungen (which bears the significant
Needless to say, our separation of the formal title, "Prolegomena zur reinen Logik" [Pro­
logic of non-contradiction from the formal legomena to Pure Logic]); and the objection
logic of truth is something fundamentally and is raised that the "Prolegomena" were intend­
essentially new, however familiar its wording ed to effect the radical elimination of every­
may be to everyone. For the words in question thing psychological from the theme of logic,
meant something entirely different, namely the first from that of traditional logic and then
distinction between, on the one hand, ali the from that of logic as amplified to become the
problems of formal logic, which, as formal, ful] mathesis universalis. The empiricism that
leave out ali the non-formal "material of cog­ had become dominant (anti-Platonism in its
nition," and, on the other hand, the somehow historical origin) was blind to the peculiar Ob­
broader problems (broader in a sense that was jectivity of ali ideal formations; everywhere it
not exactly clear) to be propounded by a logic­ re-interpreted them psychologistically as the
problems that take into account precisely this concomitant psychic activities and habituali­
non-formal material: for example, questions ties: This was true, in particular, respecting
conceming the possibility of a cognition of real those objectivities (irreal, according to their
actuality or the possibility of fashioning truths own sense) which-as statements, as judg­
about the real world. ments, as truths, as arguments, proofs, and theo­
ries, and as categorial objectivities that oc­
cur as formed within ali these-make up the
The Transcendental Grounds of thematic province of logic. The judgments of
Logic* which logic speaks in its laws are not the men­
tal judgment-processes (the judgings); the
§56. The reproach of psychologism truths are not the mental evidence-processes;
cast at every consideration of logical the proofs are not the subjective-psychic prov­
formations that is directed to the ings; and so forth.
subjective The theory of cardinal numbers (which, as
we know, is itself a part of logic) has to do, not
Let us begin by considering the demand with mental processes of collecting and count­
that logical researches be two-sided, a demand ing, but with numbers; the theory of ordered
that we stated in our preparatory consider­ sets and ordinal numbers has to do, not with
ations, t but without a sufficient clarification mental processes of ordering, but with ordered
of the thematizing activity directed to the sub­ sets themselves and their forms; and, in like
jective. This demand was stated as quite uni­ manner, syllogistics does not have to do with
versal and therefore as valid in the case of the the psychic processes of judging and inferring.
logic that is first in itself, namely analytic log­ The same is true of the other Objective scien­
ic. The sense and the legitimacy of this thema­ ces. No one would designate as the province of
tizing of the subjective by logic-a thematiz­ natural science the psychic processes of expe­
ing that, to say it forthwith, will not claim the riencing Nature and thinking about it, rather
significance of a separate logical discipline, to than N ature itself. Here the psychologistic
be set apart from analytics as directed to the temptations, to which recent logic had yield­
Objective and ideal-are now in question. ed almost universally, did not exist. And, ac­
But here at the entrance stands the bogy of cording to ali this, every thematizing of the

*FTL, pp. 151-174 (Sections 56-67).

tSee §8.
260 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

subjective (instead of which most people will earlier presentations, which need improve­
immediately say "psychological thematizing") ment in particular points, but rather to give the
seems to be excluded for logic, as it is for ev­ problem a purer form and also set it in more
ery other Objective science (except human and general contexts, which will provide a transi­
animal psychology). The subjective belongs in tion to the clarification of the necessary sense
thé province, not of logic, but of psychology. of a "two-sidedly" inquiring logic, one that is,
But then what about our demand that cor­ in the genuine sense, philosophic. Our chief
relative investigations of the subjective be in­ purpose is to show that a logic directed straight­
cluded in logic? Is it not on a par with the cor­ forwardly to its proper thematic sphere, and
responding demand in the case of any other active exclusively in cognizing that, remains
science? stuck fast in a naivete which shuts it off from
Soon after publication of the Logische the philosophic merit of radical self-under­
Untersuchungen the reproach was cast that standing and fundamental self-justification, or,
the phenomenological investigations demand­ what amounts to the same thing, the merit of
ed there under the name "clarification" of the being most perfectly scientific, the attainment
fundamental concepts of pure logic, investiga­ of which is the raison d'etre of philosophy,
tions which the second volume attempted to above all as theory of science.
block out in broad outline, signified a relapse
into psychologism. §57. Logical psychologism and logical
It is noteworthy that readers regarded the idealism
"Prolegomena zur reinen Logik" as an un­
qualified overcoming of psychologism and A) THE MOTIVES POR THIS PSYCHOLOGISM
failed to take notice that nowhere in that vol­
ume was psychologism pure and simple (as We have already* spoken of the difficulty
a universal epistemological aberration) the of separating from psychological subjectivity
theme. Rather the discussion concemed a psy­ the psychically produced formations making
chologism with a quite particular sense, name­ up the thematic domain of logic-the difficul­
ly the psychologizing of the irreal significa­ ty, that is, of regarding judgments (and like­
tional formations that are the theme of logic. wise sets, cardinal numbers, and so forth) as
The obscurity still generally prevalent today anything other than psychic occurrences in
conceming the problem of a universal episte­ the human beings who are doing the judging.
mological psychologism, an obscurity that What accrues originaliter in the judicative do­
affects the fundamental sense of the whole of ing, as subjects and predicates, premise-propo­
transcendental philosophy (including so-called sitions, conclusion-propositions, and so forth,
"theory of knowledge") is something that, at does indeed make its appearance, member
the time, I myself had not entirely overcome; by member, in the field of the judger's con­
though precisely the "phenomenological" in­ sciousness. It is nothing alien to the psychic,
vestigations in the second volume, so far as they nothing like a physical process, a physical for­
paved the way to a transcendental phenome­ mation accruing in physical action. On the
nology, opened up at the same time the neces­ contrary, the judgment-members and the
sary avenues to the setting and the radical ov­ whole judgment-formation make their ap­
ercoming of the problem of transcendental pearance in the psychic activity itself, which
psychologism. goes on as a process of consciousness; they
Thus it is very necessary to go into detail make their appearance in it without separa­
again concerning the particular problem of tion from it and not outside but inside. Indeed,
psychologism treated in the "Prolegomena." the misled followers of English Empiricism
But we intend, not to confine ourselves to our do not even succeed in making a distinction

*See§lü.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 261

here between the judging mental process and judgments, arguments, and so forth, are not
the formation that takes shape "in it," mem­ merely quite alike or similar but numerical­
ber by member. What is true of originally gen­ ly, identically, the same judgments, arguments,
erative actions of thinking is true also of the and the like. Their "making an appearance" in
secondary modes of thinking-for example: the domain of consciousness is multiple. The
having something come to mind confusedly particular formative processes of thinking are
and other processes of meaning " indistinctly" temporally outside one another (viewed as
(and equally true of originally generative ac­ real psychic processes in real human beings,
tions belonging to the parallel types of ration­ they are outside one another in Objective time);
al consciousness, rational emotional and voli­ they are individually different and separated.
tional consciousness, and true also of their Not so, however, the thoughts that are thought
corresponding secondary modes). lt is in the in the thinking. To be sure, the thoughts do not
confused thinking consciousness itself, and not make their appearance in consciousness as
as something externa!, that these confused something "externa!." They are not real objects,
thoughts make their appearance. How then, in not spatial objects, but irreal formations pro­
logic, have we stepped outside the field of duced by the mind; and their peculiar essence
"psychic phenomena," "phenomena of interna! excludes spatial extension, original locality,
experience"? lt would follow that all the Data and mobility. Like other products of the mind,
for logic are real occurrences belonging to the they admit, however, of a physical embodi­
sphere of psychology; and, as such, according ment: in their case, an embodiment by the sen­
to the usual view, they would be unambiguous­ suous verbal signs; and thus they gain a sec­
ly determined within the universal causal nex­ ondary spatial existence (that of the spoken or
us of the real world and explainable by caus­ written sentence). Every sort of irreality, of
al laws. which the ideality of significations and the dif­
But this latter point may be left out of con­ ferentt ideality of universal essences or spe­
sideration. Our main concern here is the equat­ cies are particular cases, has manners of pos­
ing of the formations produced by judging (and sible participation in reality. Yet this in no way
then, naturally, of all similar formations pro­ alters the essential separation between the real
duced by rational acts of any other sort) with and the irreal.
phenomena appearing in interna! experience. But more deeply penetrating clarifications
This equating is based on their making their are indispensable here. By studying and paral­
appearance "internally," in the act-conscious­ leling the evidence of the real and the irreal we
ness itself. Thus concepts, judgments, argu­ shall gain an understanding of the universal
ments, proofs, theories, would be psychic oc­ homogeneity of objectivities-as objectivities.
currences; and logic would be, as John Stuart
Mill said it is, a "part, or branch, of psychol­ §58. The evidence of ideal objects
ogy."* This highly plausible conception is logi­ analogous to that of individual objects
cal psychologism.
The evidence of irreal objects, objects that
B) THE IDEALITY OF LOGICAL FORMATIONS are ideal in the broadest sense, is, in its effect,
AS THEIR MAKING THEIR APPEARANCE quite analogous to the evidence of ordinary so­
IRREALLY IN THE LOGICO-PSYCHIC SPHERE called interna! and externa! experience, which
alone-on no other grounds than prejudice­
In opposition to this we say: There is an is commonly thought capable of effecting an
original evidence that, in repeated acts, which original Objectivation. The identity and, there­
are quite alike or else similar, the produced fore, the objectivity of something ideal can be

*An Examination aj Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, chap. XX. -Translator's note.
tThe exposition substantiating this distinction, not yet made in the "Prolegomena," will be offered in my Logische
Studien [Logical Studies], which will soon appear. [See Edmund Husserl, EJ, §64c.]
262 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

directly "seen" (and, if we wished to give the fied) experiential evidence. This too holds for
word a suitably amplified sense, directly ex­ every evidence, for every "experience" in the
perienced) with the same originality as the amplified sense. Even an ostensibly apodictic
identity of an object of experience in the usu­ evidence can become disclosed as deception
al sense-for example: an experienced object and, in that event, presupposes a similar evi­
belonging to Nature or an experienced im­ dence by which it is "shattered."
manent object (any psychic Datum). In repeat­
ed experiences-before any repetition, in the §59. A universal characterization of
continuous modification of the momentary evidence as the giving of something
perception in retention and protention, then itself
in possible recollections, repeatable at will­
there comes about, with their synthesis, the The continua! obstacle that may have been
consciousness of The Same, moreover as an sensed during this exposition is owing solely
"experience" of this self-sameness. The possi­ to the usual, fundamentally wrong, interpreta­
bility of such original identification belongs, tion of evidence, an interpretation made pos­
as essential correlate, to the sense of every ob­ sible by the utter lack of a serious phenomeno­
ject of experience in the usual and pregnant logical analysis of the effective performance
sense, a sense determined to the effect that ex­ common to all forms of evidence. Thus it hap­
perience is an evident seizing upon and hav­ pens that evidence is usually conceived as an
ing of either an immanent or a real individual absolute apodicticity, an absolute security
Datum itself. against deceptions-an apodicticity quite in­
In just the same fashion, we say, there be­ comprehensibly ascribed to a single mental
longs to the sense of an irreal object the pos­ process torn from the concrete, essentially uni­
sibility of its identification on the basis of its tary, context of subjective mental living. The
own manners of being itself seized upon and usual theorist sees in evidence an absolute cri­
had. Actually the effect of this " identification" terion of truth; though, by such a criterion, not
is like that of an "experience," except that an only externa! but also, in strictness, all intern­
irreal object is not individuated in consequence a! evidence would necessarily be done away
of a temporality belonging to it originally. * with. If, being unable to explícate evidence as
The possibility of deception is inherent in a functioning intentionality, the theorist, by a
the evidence of experience and does not annul kind of sensualistic substitution, falls back on
either its fundamental character or its effect; so-called feelings of evidence, then their at­
though becoming evidentially aware of <ac­ tainment of truth itself (an attainment he still
tual> deception "annuls" the deceptive experi­ ascribes to evidence) becomes a miracle, nay,
ence or evidence itself. The evidence of a new at bottom a countersense.
experience is what makes the previously un­ Let no one upbraid us with the renowned
contested experience undergo that modifica­ evidence of "interna! perception," as an in­
tion of believing called "annulment" or "can­ stance counter to these statements. For interna!
cellation"; and it alone can do so. Evidence of perception's giving of its "immanent percept"
experience is therefore always presupposed itself-about this we shall have more to say­
by the process. The conscious "dispelling" of is, by itself alone, the giving of something-it­
a deception, with the originality of "now I see self which is only a preliminary to an object;
that it is an illusion," is itself a species of evi­ it is not the giving of something-itself which is
dence, namely evidence of the nullity of some­ an object in the proper sense. Perception alone
thing experienced or, correlatively, evidence is never a full Objectivating performance, if we
of the "annulment" of the (previously unmodi- understand such a performance to be indeed

*Irreal objectivities can very well assume an extra-essential relatedness to time, likewise an extra-essential related­
ness to space and an extra-essential reification.
Formal and Transcendental Logic 263

the seizing upon an object itself. We accept ness of the object itself as my past object, as
interna! perception as a seizing upon an ob­ (correlatively) the object which was perceived
ject itself, only because we are tacitly taking by me (the same Ego, but reproduced in the
into account possible recollection, repeatable mode, "past"), and with which I (the active Ego
at will. When actualized, recollection gives for as present for himself) am now "again"-with
the first time original certainty of the being of it itself.
a subjective object in the full sense, a so-called Let us note here, because we might other­
psychic Datum, as something acquired origi­ wise be misled, * that the modification of itself­
naliter and identifiable at will, something to gi ving as perception and recollection plays
which one can "always go back again" and very different roles for real and ideal objec­
which one can recognize in a reactivation as tivities respectively. This is connected with the
the selfsame. Naturally, the concomitant inten­ circumstance that the latter have no temporal
tional relation to such a "synthesis of recogni­ loci to bind them individuatingly. Merely be­
tion" plays a similar role in the case of each cause of an essentially possible alteration of
externa! objectivity-which is by no means to attitude or focus, any clear explicit recollec­
say that it makes up the full performance ef­ tion of an ideal species changes into a percep­
fected by externa! experience. tion of it-something naturally excluded in
Evidence, as has already become apparent the case of temporally individuated objects.
to us by the above explanations, designates that We are not opposing our universal char­
pe,formance on the part of intentionality which acterization of evidence to the usual one as
consists in the giving of something-itself [die though ours were a new "theory," an attractive
intentionale Leistung der Selbstgebung]. More interpretation, which is yet to be tested, who
precisely, it is the universal pre-eminent form knows how-perhaps in the end even by ex­
of "intentionality," of "consciousness of some­ periments on thinking. Rather we are present­
thing," in which there is consciousness of the ing it as an evidence attained at a higher level,
intended-to objective affair in the mode itself­ by the phenomenological explication of any
seized-upon, itself-seen-correlatively, in the experience and of any actually exercised "in­
mode: being with it itself in the manner pecu­ sight" (something that others, without reason,
liar to consciousness. We can also say that it is have separated quite essentially from what are
the primal consciousness: I am seizing upon usually called experiences). This higher evi­
"it itself" originaliter, as contrasted with seiz­ dence, in turn, can be itself explicated and un­
ing upon it in an image or as sorne other, intu­ derstood in respect of its effect only by means
itional or empty, fore-meaning. of an evidence belonging to a third level; and
Still we must immediately point out here so in infinitum. Only in seeing can I bring out
that evidence has dif.ferent modes of original­ what is truly present in a seeing; I must make
ity. The primitive mode of the giving of some­ a seeing explication of the proper essence of
thing-itself is perception. The being-with is for seeing.
me, as percipient, consciously my now-being­ Precisely because it gives its objective af­
with: I myself with the perceived itself. An in­ fair as the affair itself, any consciousness that
tentionally modified and more complicated gives something-itself can establish rightness,
mode of the giving of something itself is the correctness, for another consciousness (for a
memory that does not emerge emptily but, on mental meaning process that is merely unclear
the contrary, actualizes "it itself' again: clear or even one that is confused, or for one that
recollection. By its own phenomenological is indeed intuitive but merely prefigurative, or
composition, clear recollection is intrinsically that in sorne other manner fails to give the ob­
a "reproductive" consciousness, a conscious- ject itself)-and it does so, as we had occasion

* As I was misled at the time of the Logische Untersuchungen.

264 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

to describe, in the form of synthetic adequa­ understood manner; the places of evidence,
tion to the "affairs themselves"; or else it es­ adequation, and the rest, are taken by their as­
tablishes incorrectness, in the form of inade­ if modifications. The following obtains as a
quation, as the evidentness of nullity. Thus the fundamental law of intentionality:
givings of things themselves are the acts pro­ Absolutely any consciousness of anything
ducing evident legitimacy or rightness; they whatever belongs a priori to an openly endless
are creative primal institutings of rightness, multiplicity of possible modes of conscious­
of truth as correctness-precisely because, for ness, which can always be connected syntheti­
the objectivities themselves as existing for us, cally in the unity-form of conjoint acceptance
they are the originally constitutive acts, origi­ (con-pasito) to make one consciousness, as a
nally institutive of sense and being. In like fash­ consciousness of "the Same." To this multi­
ion, original inadequations, as givings of nul­ plicity belong essentially the modes of a mani­
lity itself, are primal institutings of falsity, of fold evidential consciousness, which fits in
wrongness as incorrectness (positio changed: correspondingly as an evidential having, either
of the trueness of the nullity or incorrectness). of the Same itself or of an Other itself that evi­
They constitute, not objectivity simpliciter­ dently annuls it.
that is: existing objectivity-but rather, on the Thus evidence is a universal mode of in­
basis of supposed or meant objectivity, can­ tentionality, related to the whole lije of con­
cellation of that "meaning"- that is: its non­ sciousness. Thanks to evidence, the life of con­
being. sciousness has an all-pervasive teleological
structure, a pointedness toward "reason" and
§60. The fundamental laws of inten­ even a pervasive tendency toward it-that is:
tionality and the universal function of toward the discovery of correctness (and, at the
evidence same time, toward the lasting acquisition of
correctness) and toward the cancelling of in­
We have already touched on the fact that correctnesses (thereby ending their acceptance
the giving of something-itself is, like every oth­ as acquired possessions).
er single intentional process, afunction in the It is not only with respect to this all-perva­
all-embracing nexus of consciousness. The ef­ sive teleological function that evidence is a
fect produced by a single intentional process, theme for far-reaching and difficult investi­
in particular its effect as a giving of some­ gations. These concem also the universal na­
thing-itself, its effect as evidence, is therefore ture of evidence as a single component of con­
not shut off singly. The single evidence, by its scious life-and here belongs the property
own intentionality, can implicitly "demand" mentioned above: that in every evidential con­
further givings of the object itself; it can "refer sciousness of an object an intentional refer­
one" to them for a supplementation of its ence to a synthesis of recognition is included.
Objectivating effect. Let us tum our attention They concem furthermore the modes of origi­
to that which pervades all conscious life, in nality of evidence and their functions, as well
order to appropriate a significant cognition that as the different regions and categories of ob­
concems evidence universally. jectivities themselves. For though, in charac­
T he concept of any intentionality what­ terizing evidence as the giving ( or, relative to
ever-any life-process of consciousness-of the subject, the having) of an object itself, we
something or other-and the concept of evi­ were indicating a universality relating to all ob­
dence, the intentionality that is the giving of jectivities in the same manner, that does not
something-itself, are essentially correlative. Let mean that the structure of evidence is every­
us confine ourselves to "positing" conscious­ where quite alike.
ness, positional consciousness. In the case of Category of objectivity and category of evi­
"neutral" consciousness everything that we dence are perfect correlates. To every funda­
shall now state becomes modified in an easily mental species of objectivities-as intentional
Formal and Transcendental Logic 265

unities maintainable throughout an inten­ nent" sphere of purely " interna!'' experience
tional synthesis and, ultimately, as unities be­ to an extra-psychic transcendency, are attrib­
longing to a possible "experience"-a funda­ utable to a blindness to the proper character of
mental species of "experience," of evidence, "externa!" experience as a performance that
corresponds, and likewise a fundamental spe­ gives us something itself and would other­
cies of intentionally indicated evidential style wise be unable to provide a basis for natural­
in the possible enhancement of the perfection scientific theories.
of the having of an objectivity itself.
Thus a great task arises, the task of explor­ I do not find that sufficient attention has
ing ali these modes of the evidence in which been paid to the clarification of evidence and
the objec,tivity intended to shows itself, now of ali the pertinent relationships between mere
less and now more perfectly, of making under­ "intention" and "fulfillment," which was first
standable the extremely complicated perfor­ effected in the Logische Untersuchungen, II.
mances, fitting together to make a synthetic Teil, and deepened in my Ideen. lt is certainly
harmony and always pointing ahead* to new in great need of improvement; still I believe
ones. To declaim from the heights about evi­ that I am right in seeing in this first clarifica­
dence and "the self-confidence of reason" is tion a decisive advance of phenomenology be­
of no avail here. And to stick to tradition­ yond the philosophic past. I am of the certain
which, for motives long forgotten and, in any conviction that only by virtue of the resultant
case, never clarified, reduces evidence to an insight into the essence, and the genuine prob­
insight that is apodictic, absolutely indubita­ lems, of evidence has a seriously scientific tran­
ble, and, so to speak, absolutely finished in it­ scendental philosophy ("critique of reason")
self-is to bar oneself from an understanding become possible, as well as, at bottom, a seri­
of any scientific production. Natural science, ously scientific psychology, conceived central­
for example, must rely on externa! experience, ly as the science of the proper essence of the
only because externa! experience is precisely psychic, an essence that (as Brentano discov­
that mode of the having of something itself ered) consists in intentionality. The new doc­
which pertains to natural Objects, and there­ trine admittedly has one inconvenience: The
fore without it there would be absolutely noth­ appeal to evidence ceases to be, so to speak,
ing conceivable to which believing about Na­ a trick of epistemological argumentation; in­
ture (spatial things) might adjust itself. And stead it mises tremendous reaches of evident­
again, only because imperfect experience is still ly seizable and soluble problems-ultimately
experience, still a consciousness that is a hav­ those of phenomenological constitution, which
ing of something itself [Bewusstsein der Selbst­ we shall develop in Chapters 6 and 7.
habe], can experience adjust itself to experi­
ence and correct itself by experience. For this §61. Evidence in general in the func­
same reason, moreover, it is wrong for a criti­ tion pertaining to al! objects, real and
cism of sensuous experience, which naturally irreal, as synthetic unities
brings out its essential imperfection (that is: its
being at the merey of further experience!), to Returning now to irreal objectivities, par­
end with rejecting it-whereupon the critic in ticularly those belonging to the sphere of ana­
his extremity appeals to hypotheses and indi­ lytic logic, we recall that in Part I we became
rect arguments, with which he attempts to seize acquainted with the evidences that in their case,
the phantom of sorne (absurdly) transcendent and according to their various strata, are legiti­
"In-ltself." Ali transcendental-realistic theories, mizing evidences, evidences that give some­
with their arguments leading from the "imma- thing-itself. In the case of the irreal objectivi-

*Reading vorweisenden instead of vorweisende. -Translator's note.

266 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ties of each stratum such evidences, then, are larly of experiencing consciousness, to objects
the corresponding "experiences"; and they have and, at most, to distinguish superficially among
the essential property of ali experiences or evi­ internal and externa! experience, ideation, and
dences of whatever sort-that is to say: with the like. The multiplicities of consciousness
the repetition of the subjective life-processes, coming under these headings must be brought
with the sequence and synthesis of different to sight in phenomenological reflection and
experiences of the Same, they make evidently dissected structurally. One must then trace them
visible something that is indeed numerically with regard to their synthetic transitions; and,
identical (and not mere/y things that are quite down to the most elementary structures, one
alike), namely the object, which is thus an ob­ must seek out the intentional role or function.
ject experienced many times or, as we may al­ One must make it understood how, in the im­
so say, one that "makes its appearance" many manence of the multiplicities of mental pro­
times (as a matter of ideal possibility, infinite­ cesses (or <in the immanence> of the chang­
ly many times) in the domain of consciousness. ing modes of appearance occurring in these
If one substituted for the ideal objectivities multiplicities), their being-directed-to and that
those temporal occurrences in the life of con­ to which they are directed are made; and one
sciousness in which they "make their appear­ must also make it understood wherein, now,
ance," then, to be consistent, one would have inside the sphere of vision belonging to the
to do likewise in the case of Data of experi­ synthetic experience itself, the transcendent
ence <in the usual narrower sense>. For exam­ object consists-as the identical pole imman­
ple, psychic Data, the Data of "internal experi­ ent in the single mental processes and yet tran­
ence," are experienced as in immanent time scending them by virtue of having an identity
and thus as intentionally identical Data given that surpasses them. It is a giving of something­
in the flow of subjective temporal modes. We itself and yet a giving of something-itself that
should therefore have to put the immanent is "transcendent": an at first "indeterminately"
constitutive complexes of "original time-con­ itself-given identical pole, which subsequently
sciousness"* in their place. displays itself, in "its" (likewise ideally identi­
But the constitutive that pertains to the iden­ cal) "determinations," throughout the giving of
tical of externa! experience is more easily ac­ it-itself, a giving that can be continued in the
cessible. Physical objects too make their ap­ synthetic form: "explication." But, in the man­
pearance "in the field of consciousness"; and, ner of something instituted originally, this tran­
in respect of what is most general, no differ­ scendence lies in the proper essence of the ex­
ently than ideal objects-that is to say: as in­ perience itself. What it signifies can be learned
tentional unities (though in the mode: "itself only by interrogating experience; just as what
given") making their appearance in the flow a legal property-right signifies and what dem­
of multiple manners of appearance built one onstrates it at any time (incidentally, a matter
upon another. In this making-of-their-appear­ that itself belongs within our province) can be
ance within the mental experience-processes, found out only by going back and examining
they are, in a legitimate sense, "immanent" in the "primal instituting" of that right.
these, but not in the usual sense, that of real The following great, and so often neglect­
immanence. ed, truism must therefore be made the center
If one intends to understand what conscious­ of all investigations of essential sense [aller
ness does and, in particular, what evidence <loes, prinzipiellen Besinnungen]. Such an affair as
it is not enough, here or anywhere else, to speak an object (even a physical object) draws the
of the "directedness" of consciousness, particu- ontic sense peculiar to it (by which it then sig-

*Regarding analysis of the constitution of temporal Data, see my PCIT.

Formal and Transcendental Logic 267

nifies what it signifies in all possible modes riential processes constituting it; nor is it the
of consciousness) originally from the mental evident possibility, connected with this pro­
processes of experience alone-from such cess, the possibility, namely, of repetitive syn­
processes as are intrinsically characterized as thesis (as a possibility pertaining to "I can").
awarenesses-of in the mode "it-itself," as ap­
pearances-of a Something itself, and (in the case § 62. The ideality of ali species of
of physical objects) as our being confronted objectivities over against the constitut­
by something itself, the being of which is cer­ ing consciousness. The positivistic
tain. The primitive form here is showing-itself­ misinterpretation of Nature is a type
as-present, which belongs to perception, or of psychologism
showing-itself- "again," which belongs to rec­
ollection in the mode of the past. Consequently a certain ideality lies in the
Experience is the primal instituting of the sense of every experienceable object, includ­
being-for-us of objects as having their objec­ ing every physical object, over against the
tive sense. Obviously that holds good equally manifold "psychic" processes separated from
in the case of irreal objects, whether their char­ each other by individuation in immanent time
acter is the ideality of the specific, or the ideal­ -the processes of an experiencing life, then
ity of a judgment, or that of a symphony, or too of potential experiencing life, and finally
that of an irreal object of sorne other kind. Ev­ of potential and actual becoming-conscious of
erywhere, and therefore even in the case of all sorts, including the non-experiencing sorts.
externa! experience, it is true that an eviden­ It is the universal ideality of ali intentional
tial giving of something itself must be charac­ unities over against the multiplicities consti­
terized as a process of constitution, a process tuting them.
whereby the object of experience arises [ein In it consists the "transcendence" belong­
Prozess ... eines Sichbildens des E,fahrungs­ ing to ali species of objectivities over against
gegenstandes] - though, to be sure, this con­ the consciousness of them (and, in an appro­
stitution is at first restricted, since the object priately altered but corresponding manner, the
claims an existence extending beyond the mul­ transcendence belonging to this or that Ego of
tiplicities of actual present experience. (This a consciousness, understood as the subject-pole
moment of the object's being-sense also re­ of the consciousness).
quires constitutional clarification; and, by vir­ If, in spite of this, we still separate imma­
tue of the intentionality implicit in experience nentfrom transcendent objects, that can involve
itself and always uncoverable, it permits such a division only within this broadest concept of
clarification.) Essentially in the continuous and transcendence. In no respect does it alter the
discrete syntheses of manifold experiences, the fact that likewise the transcendence belong­
experiential object, as such, is built up "vis­ ing to the real, and, at the highest leve!, the
ibly": in the varying show of ever new sides, intersubjectively real (the Objective in a pre­
ever new moments belonging to its own es­ eminent sense), is constituted in respect of its
sence. And from this constitutive [aujbauen­ being and sense exclusively in the immanent
den] life, which predelineates its own possi­ sphere, the sphere of the multiplicities of con­
ble harmonious flow, the sides and moments sciousness, and that the transcendence belong­
and the object itself (as showing itself only thus, ing to the real, as such, is a particular form of
variously) draw their respective senses, each "ideality" or, better, of a psychic irreality: the
as the Identical that belongs to possible and­ irreality of something that itself, with all that
after their actualization-repeatable shapings belongs to it in its own essence, actually or
of something itself [Selbstbildungen]. Here too possibly makes its appearance in the purely
the identity is evident: The object is evidently phenomenological sphere of consciousness,
not itself the actual and openly possible expe- and yet in such a manner that it is evidently no
268 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

real part or moment of consciousness, no real here, and in all seriousness, a formative do­
psychic Datum. ing, an acting, a practical directedness to aims
Accordingly we find a precise analogue of or ends, took place; as though something new
the psychologistic interpretation of logical, were not actually produced here, by purpose­
and of all other, irrealities (we might say: the ful action, out of something given beforehand
amplified region of Platonic ideas) in that well­ as a basis for practice. As a matter of fact,judg­
known type of positivism which we could al­ ing too (and naturally, in a particular manner,
so designate as Humeianism. It is represented, cognitive judging with its originality) is act­
for example, by the Machian philosophy and ing; the only difference is that, by its essential
the "philosophy of as-if"-though in a man­ nature, judging is not a treating of something
ner that, so far as originariness and depth of real, no matter how self-evidently any acting
problematics are concemed, falls far short of whatever is itself something psychically real
Hume. For this positivism, physical things be­ (Objectively real, where, with the psychologi­
come reduced to empirically regular complexes cal attitude, we take judging as a human ac­
of psychic Data ("sensations"); their identity tivity). But, from the beginning and in all its
and therefore their whole being-sense become formings at different levels, this acting has ex­
sheer fictions. lt is not merely a false doctrine, clusively the irreal in its thematic sphere; in
completely blind to the essential phenomeno­ judging, something irreal becomes intention­
logical facts; it is also countersensical, because ally constituted. In the active formation of new
of its failure to see that even fictions have their judgments out of judgments already given be­
mode of being, their manner of evidence, their forehand, we are, in all seriousness, produc­
manner of being unities of multiplicities, and tively active. As in every other acting the ends
therefore carry with them the same problem that of our action, the new judgments to be pro­
was to be theorized away by means of them. duced, are consciously intended to by us be­
forehand in modes of an anticipation which is
§63. Originally productive activity as empty, still undetermined in respect of con­
the giving of logical formations them­ tent, or in any case still unfulfilled; we are con­
selves; the sense of the phrase, their scious of them thus as the things toward which
production we are striving and the bringing of which to
an actualizing givenness of them-themselves
We have often spoken of a producing of logi­ makes up the action, as accomplished step by
cal formations in consciousness. In connec­ step.
tion with this locution, warning must be given Thus the objectivities "treated" here are no
against a misunderstanding, which, mutatis mu­ realities: The peculiar sense that ideal objec­
tandis, concems all speaking of a constitution tivities possess, in being (as we have said) ex­
of objectivities in consciousness. actly as originally certain to us in an evidence
In other cases where we speak of a produc­ of their own as are the real objectivities com­
ing, we are referring to a real sphere. We mean ing from experience, is unalterable. Equally
thereby an active bringing forth of real physi­ unalterable, on the other hand, is the fact that
cal things or real processes: Something real, they too are producible ends, final ends and
already there within the sphere of the surround­ means, and that they are what they are, only
ing world, is suitably treated, is rearranged or "as coming from" an original production. But
transformed. In our case, however, we have that is not at all to say that they are what they
before us irreal objects, given in real psych­ are, only in and during the original produc­
ic processes-irreal objects that we treat and, tion. That they are "in" the original production
by acting, form thus and so, with a practical signifies that they are intended to in it, as a
thematizing directed to them and not at all to certain intentionality having the form of spon­
the psychic realities. Accordingly, it is not as taneous activity, and more particularly in the
though the statement might be weakened, that mode belonging to the original objectivity it-
Formal and Transcendental Logic 269

self. This manner of givenness-givenness as and the irrealities "-that attempt" leads to the
something comingfrom such original activity­ highest philosophic problems, those of a uni­
is nothing other than the sort of "perception" versal ontology.
proper to them. Or, what is the same thing, this
originally acquiring activity is the "evidence" §65. A more general concept of psy­
appropriate to these idealities. Evidence, quite chologism
universally, is indeed nothing other than the
mode of consciousness-built up, perhaps, as The extraordinary broadening and, at the
an extraordinarily complex hierarchical struc­ same time, radicalizing of the refutation of logi­
ture-that offers its intentional objectivity in cal psychologism, which we have effected in
the mode belonging to the original "it itself." the foregoing investigation, have brought us
This evident-making activity of conscious­ an extreme generalization of the idea of psy­
ness-in the present case a spontaneous activ­ chologism, in a quite definite-but not the on­
ity hard to explore-is the "original constitu­ ly-sense. Psychologism in this sense is to be
tion," stated more pregnantly, the primally distinguished by the circumstance that sorne
institutive constitution, of ideal objectivities species or other of possibly evident objectivi­
of the sort with which logic is concemed. ties (or even ali species, as is the case in Hume's
philosophy) are psychologized, because, as is
§64. The precedence of real to irreal obvious, they are constituted in the manner
objects in respect of their being peculiar to consciousness-that is to say: their
being-sense is built up, in and for subjectivity,
In concluding this investigation, Jet us add by experience or other modes of conscious­
that much vehement opposition-which to be ness that combine with experience. That they
sure disregards our phenomenological find­ are "psychologized" signifies that their objec­
ings-arises from a misunderstanding of the tive sense, their sense as a species of objects
sense in which we put ideal objectivities and having a peculiar essence, is denied in favor
also categorial variants of realities (such vari­ of the subjective mental occurrences, the Data
ants as predicatively formed affair-complexes) in immanent or psychological temporality.
on a par with realities themselves. For us it is But it is not important here, whether these
merely a matter of the legitimacy of the broad­ Data be regarded as real* Data for psychology
est sense, "any object whatever" or "anything (a science of men and brutes as Objective re­
whatever," and, correlatively, of the most uni­ alities) or as Data belonging to something
versal sense of evidence, evidence as the giv­ distinguished, no matter how, as "transcenden­
ing of something itself. Otherwise than with tal" subjectivity (a subjectivity antecedent to
respect to the legitimate subsumption of ideas ali Objective realities, including human sub­
under the concept of object, and consequently jects ); nor, in the latter case, does it matter
under the concept of substrate of possible predi­ whether the Data be regarded as a bundle or
cations, there is no parity at all between real collection of absolutely posited sensations or
and ideal objectivities, as can be understood as intentional mental processes in the teleologi­
precisely on the basis of our tenets. In respect cal unity of a concrete Ego and a community
of its being, reality has precedence to every of Egos. Still the expression psychologism is
irreality whatsoever, since all irrealities relate more appropriate to any interpretation which
back essentially to an actual or possible real­ converts objectivities into something psycho­
ity. "The attempt" to survey these relations on logical in the proper sense; and the pregnant
every side and attain systematic cognition of sense of psychologism should be defined ac­
all that actually or possibly exists, the realities cordingly.

*Reading rea/e instead of irreale. -Translator's note.

270 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

§66. Psychologistic and phenomeno­ tion. This criticism concems the constituting
logical idealism. Analytic and transcen­ subjectivity corresponding to each province
dental criticism of cognition and to each scientific performance busied with
a province. Over against criticism of the prior
This psychologism, conceived so universal­ data, the actions, and the results, that make
ly and (purposely) in hybrid fashion, is the fun­ their appearance openly in the field of con­
damental characteristic of every bad "ideal­ sciousness, we have here a criticism of cogni­
ism" (lucus a non lucendo.') like Berkeley's or tion that has quite a different nature: criticism
Hume's. Yet it extends far beyond the concep­ of the constitutive sources from which the po­
tion one usually connects with the word "ide­ sitional sense and the legitimacy of cognition
alism," as this conception usually fails to take originate; accordingly criticism of the effect­
into consideration precisely the genuine ideali­ ive performances that remain hidden during
ties of the amplified Platonic sphere (though the inquiring and theorizing directed straight­
the Humeian conception is indeed to be ex­ forwardly to the province. This is the criticism
cepted here). But the phenomenological ideal­ of "reason" (taken either psychologically or
ism developed by me should not be mistaken transcendentally); or, contrasting it with ana­
for this idealism, as it is, time after time, by lytic criticism of cognition, we may say it is
superficial readers of my works (even phenom­ transcendental criticism of cognition. What we
enological readers); it gets its fundamentally have said holds good for logic as well as for
different and novel sense precisely by radical every other science; and already, in our gen­
criticism of the aforesaid psychologism, on the eral preparatory considerations, we asserted it
basis of a phenomenological clarification of under the heading, the two-sidedness of logi­
evidence. cal thematizing, though not with the distinct­
The following is pertinent here and can help ness and precision that have been possible here.
to characterize phenomenological idealism.
Every "seeing" and, correlatively, every­ § 67. The reproach o{ psychologism as
thing identified in "evidence" has its own le­ indicating f ailure to understand the
gitimacy; likewise every self-contained realm necessary logical function of transcen­
of possible "experience," as the province of a dental criticism of cognition
science, as its theme in the first and most prop­
er sense. At the same time, there belongs to Now the reproach of psychologism was, as
each science a secondarily thematic sphere, we remember, directed against precisely that
the sphere of its criticism: This is a criticism of two-sidedness-with regard to the Logische
"cognition" in a first sense "of the term criti­ Untersuchungen because, in the "Prolegom­
cism of cognition"-that is to say: relating to ena," they combatted psychologism and yet,
the ideal cognitional results (those belonging in Part 11, went over to investigations of phe­
to the "theory") and, on the subjective side, nomenological subjectivity, to investigations
relating to what is ideal in a correlative sense, conceming the intentional structures of stating
namely the acting (concluding, proving) that and signifying, of objectivation and the con­
corresponds to these idealities. Through this tent (sense) of an objectivation, of perception
criticism, which we may designate as analytic and the sense of a perception, of judging and
criticism of cognition, each science gets its re­ the supposed predicatively formed affair-com­
lation to analytics as a universal science of plex, of categorial acts and the constitution of
theory conceived with formal universality and, categorial objects as contrasted with sensuous
correlatively, its relation to the corresponding­ ones, of symbolic-empty consciousness as
ly delimited analytic practica! discipline. contrasted with intuitive, of the intentional re­
Finally, however, every science has a third lationships between bare intention and ful­
thematic sphere, likewise a sphere of criticism, fillment, of evidential consciousness, of ad­
but of a criticism turned in a different direc- equation, of the constitution of true being and
Formal and Transcendental Logic 271

predicational truth, and so forth. Such "de­ the sake of cognition of the province-some­
scriptive-psychological" researches in the psy­ thing that is not part of it, but is essentially
chology of cognition were said to be psychol­ connected with it, will also be made a theme.
ogistic transgressions of a pure logic. This was Indeed, this is already the case, as mentioned
the objection; though it was not intended to earlier, with respect to the field of "analytic"
involve the rejecting of epistemo-critical re­ criticism indispensable to every science: the
searches conceming all sciences (logic presum­ field comprising, on the one hand, its theory
ably included). On the contrary, such researches and all its judgments relating to the province
were highly regarded by everyone. But the and, on the other hand, the corresponding ideal
opinion was that they should follow quite a dif­ actions.
ferent line; they must not take our concretely And now cannot something similar be the
actual and possible cognitive living, they must case, and must it not be the case, with respect
not take its intentional analysis, as their prob­ to the total field comprising the intentional
lem. That was said to be psychology and to sig­ acts, the manners of appearance, the modes of
nify epistemological psychologism. consciousness of every sort, in which the
Such criticism and the whole ruling concep­ scientific province and its objects and com­
tion involve separating science and the criti­ plexes of objects are given beforehand for the
cism of reason; they involve granting science subject who judges, and comprising, in like
a separate existence in its own right and tak­ fashion, those in which his whole theoretical
ing criticism of reason as a science of a new living and striving relating to the province goes
sort, relating to all science and enjoying a high­ on intentionally, those in which the theory and
er dignity, but not disturbing the rightful inde­ the scientifically true being of the province
pendence of the sciences. This is above all the are intentionally constituted? Should not this
case with analytic logic; it holds in advance as too be in fact a field for a criticism necessary
an absolute norm, which all rational cognition to all sciences, a transcendental criticism-nec­
presupposes. The worth of my criticism of logi­ essary, if they are to have any capability what­
cal psychologism, and all similar criticisms be­ ever of being genuine sciences? If this could
fare and after mine, is seen to Iie precisely in be made evident and the great field of tasks
their bringing out a pure (analytic) logic, which awaiting this last and deepest criticism could
is to be separated from all psychology as a self­ be displayed, logic would naturally be served
sufficient science, Iike geometry or natural sci­ thereby; for, as the universal, and not the merely
ence in this respect. The criticism of reason may analytic, theory of science (not mere mathesis
have questions to ask about pure logic; but they universalis), logic would relate not only to all
must not disturb its independent course and genuine sciences, with respect to their univer­
must on no account del ve into the concreteness sal essential possibilities, but also to any and
of logical conscious life, for that would be psy­ all criticism pertaining to them and their genu­
chology. ineness, and here likewise with respect to its
As against this, Jet us first bear in mind that essential universalities. Universal theory of
the war against logical psychologism was in science is ipso facto universal theory of genu­
fact meant to serve no other end than the su­ ine science as such, a criticism belonging to its
premely important one of making the specific own essence, whether as criticism of judg­
province of analytic logic visible in its purity ments as produced formations, ideal compo­
and ideal peculiarity, freeing it from the psy­ nents of its ideal theories, or as criticism of the
chologizing confusions and misinterpretations intentional life that constitutes province and
in which it had remained enmeshed from the theory.
beginning. - lts "province": that is to say, its lt is not our present task to inquire about
thematic field in the first and chief sense, such any traditional or now-accepted criticisms of
a field as any science has. But that does not reason, or about their paralyzing fears of a
preclude the possibility that secondarily-for concrete consideration of cognitive subjec-
272 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

tivity (a consideration interdicted under the chologism" should still have to be obviated (a
name psychologism), their fears of every in­ psychologism with a different sense from that
troduction of psychology into observations of the phychologism which we have treated
proper to a theory of science. We are asking up to now, though allied to it), then we should
only about what pertains to the essential possi­ have to leam this by considering the require­
bility of genuine science. If the investigation ments themselves for logic. Without any com­
of constitutive consciousness, the inquiry into mitment on our part, the thematizing of the
the whole teleology of the intentionalities be­ subjective-more distinctly: of the intentional­
longing to cognitive life, could be proved es­ constitutive-a thematizing whose essential
sentially necessary for making genuineness function is still to be clarified, shall henceforth
of the sciences possible, it would have to be be designated as phenomenological.
accepted by us. And if, in this regard, a "psy-

14. Individuals and Sets

Explication of Individuals ;• gage itself and pass over into a chain of indi­
vidual apprehensions, of individual acts, in a
§24. The activity of explicative contem­ discrete succession of separate steps which,
plation and the explicative synthesis bound intemally to one another, form a poly­
thetic unity of the individual theses. The indi­
A) THE EXPLICATIVE SYNTHESIS AS THE vidual apprehensions fall into sequence with
LOCUS OF ORIGIN OF THE CATEGORIES one another, directed toward singularities in the
"SUBSTRATE" AND "DETERMINATION" AND object. The object, every object, has its pecu­
THE PROBLEM OF THEIR ANALYSIS liarities, its interna! determinations. In the terms
of phenomenology, this means that every ob­
Let us now proceed to the next leve! of ject conceivable in general as an object of pos­
objectifying activity, that of explicative con­ sible experience has its subjective modes of
templation. Provisionally, it has already been givenness: it can rise up out of the obscure
characterized as an orientation of perceptual in­ background of consciousness and from there
terest in the sense of an entering into the inter­ affect the ego and determine it to an attentive
na! horizon of the object, a horizon which is apprehension. It has thereby its differences of
immediately coawakened by the givenness of appearance according to "near" and "far," it
the object. This signifies the following: assum­ has its own way of moving from distance to
ing the case of an unobstructed exercise of per­ proximity, which allows ever more individual
ceptual interest, the ego cannot long remain moments to come to prominence and to deter­
with a merely simple contemplation and appre­ mine particular affections and orientations. For
hension; rather, the tendency inherent in the example, what first strikes the eye is its total
contemplation of an object immediately pushes surface color or its shape; then a certain part of
it beyond this. In streaming forth in a linear the object becomes prominent-in the case of
continuity, the act of contemplation would be­ a house, for example, the roof; finally, the par­
come a simple fixed view if it did not disen- ticular properties of this part-its color, shape,

*EJ, pp. 112-119, 205-209 (Sections 24a-c and 50a).

Individuals and Sets 273

and so on. And, in conformity with the nature session of the moments, the parts, one after
and mode of givenness of the object, the ex­ the other-and each one of them is precisely
pectations, which are immediately coawak­ a moment or part, i.e., what is generally called
ened and refer to what it exhibits of itself by a property or deterrnination-each is nothing
way of its properties, are more or less deter­ in itself but something of the object S, coming
mined. The object is present from the very first from it and in it. In the apprehension of the
with a character of familiarity; it is already ap­ properties we come to know it, and we come
prehended as an object of a type more or less to know the properties only as belonging to it.
vaguely determined and already, in sorne way, In the development, the indeterrninate theme
known. In this way the direction of the expec­ S tums into the substrate of the properties which
tations of what closer inspection will revea! in emerge, and they themselves are constituted in
the way of properties is prescribed. it as its determinations.
Disregarding the fact that each stage of the But how does it happen that the ego, in the
originally intuitive explication already takes apprehension of a, p, etc., is conscious ofknow­
place within this horizon of familiarity and is ing S in them? In what way is a present to con­
not the sheer bringing-to-givenness of an ob­ sciousness in another way than S or as sorne
ject completely new, but is only the more pre­ other S' toward which we tum after S? In other
cise determination and correction of anticipa­ words, what makes S the general theme in a
tions, we seek at first to bring out the general privileged sense, so that a, p, ... , even if they
essence through which the process of explica­ are apprehended successively and thus in a
tion is distinguished from a pure and simple certain way also become thematic, still lack, in
act of contemplation. Only after this is done comparison to S, equal status? Indeed, why is
should we take into account the different modes it that they are simply themes in which is real­
of accomplishment of explication which are ized in a coherent way the dominant interest
possible in view of the full concretion of the in S, and why is the transition to them not an
consciousness of horizon wherein explication entering into another object, and therewith a
is always situated-for these modes of ac­ tuming away from and weakening of the in­
complishment are all of the same fundamental terest in S, but a continuing fulfillment and
structure. augmentation of this interest? It is necessary,
Let us take an object, call it S, and its inter­ therefore, to describe the intentional functions
na! determinations a, p, ... ; the process set which determine that the "object" of explica­
going by the interest in S does not simply give tion is presented to us in the sense-form "sub­
the series: apprehension of S, apprehension of strate" and that the moments explicated are
a, of p, etc., as if the apprehensions had noth­ presented in a wholly different forrn, namely,
ing to do with one another, as if there had been as "properties," as "determinations," of the
a change of themes. This process is, therefore, object, in such a way that we can speak of an
not like the case where, after the weakening explication, of a development of S in its de­
of the interest of cognition in an object, this in­ terrninations, and say that it is the S which is
terest having been supplanted by interest in a determined as a, as p, and so on.
second and then in a third, we tum toward those The process of explication in its originality
which have forced attention on themselves by is that in which an object given at first hand is
an affection of appropriate power. On the con­ brought to explicit intuition. The analysis of
trary, in the whole process of individual acts its structure must bring to light how a two­
which lead from the apprehension of S to the fold constitution of sense [Sinngebung] is real­
apprehension of a, p, ... we come to know S. ized in it: "object as substrate" and "deterrni­
This process is a developing contemplation, a nation a ... "; it must show how this constitu­
unity of articulated contemplation. Through the tion of sense is realized in the forrn of a pro­
entire process the S retains the character of cess which goes forward in separate steps,
theme; and while, step by step, we gain pos- through which, however, extends continuous-
274 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ly a unity of coincidence-a unity of coinci­ two are together actively taken up by the ego;
dence of a special kind, belonging exclusively the indivisible ego is in both. The succession
to these sense-forms. We can also say that it is of the rays of attention and of apprehension
necessary to show that this process is one of has become a single double ray.
"self-evidence," for in it something is originally But there is an essential difference, de­
intuited as "object-substrate" as such, and, as pending on whether, in this synthetic activity,
such, having something on the order of "deter­ it is according to the objective sense that a syn­
minations." With this, we are at the place of thesis of coincidence is produced, thus in an
origin of the first of the so-called "logical cat­ entirely special identity-synthesis, or whether
egories. " It is true, we can only begin to speak such a thing does not take place. lf we pass
of logical categories in the proper sense in the from a color over to a sound, then this is not
sphere of predicative judgment, as elements the case. But if we pass, always synthetically,
of determination which belong necessarily to from one color to another, there is already a
the form of possible predicative judgments. But synthesis of coincidence; the moments which
all categories and categorial forms which ap­ overlap one another coincide according to like­
pear there are erected on the prepredicative syn­ ness or similarity. lf we now take the case of
theses and have their origin in them. the synthesis "thing and property of the thing"
and, in general, the synthesis "object and ob­
B) EXPLICATIVE COJNCIDENCE AS A PARTICU­ jective property," then a completely unique
LAR MODE OF THE SYNTHESIS OF OVERLAP­ synthesis of the coincidence of identity con­
PING [ÚBERSCHIEBUNG} fronts us here. The synthesis relative to the in­
tentional objects (the sense-content of acts of
What strikes us first of ali in the process of individual apprehension) appearing here one
explication, in the transition from the appre­ by one is a synthesis of a certain coincidence
hension of S to that of a, is a certain mental of identity which goes forward continuously
overlapping of the two apprehensions. But this and through the sharply separated stages of
is by no means sufficient to characterize ex­ the act.
plication. For such an overlapping of all ap­ This explicative coincidence, as we will call
prehensions is common to explication and all it, should not be confused with the total coin­
cases in which the ego advances from appre­ cidence of identity with regard to objective
hension to apprehension in a synthetic activi­ sense, such as occurs when we pass syntheti­
ty unified by the bond of a single interest. This cally from one representation (mode of giv­
overlapping is realized just as much when a enness) to others of the same object andthere­
thing is apprehended at first in undivided uni­ by identify that object with itself. Such a
ty and then in view of its peculiar form, sound, coincidence belongs, for example, to every
or odor, i.e., whatever elements stand out, as perception of a thing which goes forward con­
when what is apprehended synthetically is at tinuously, as the continuous synthesis of the
first a thing and then, as separated from it and multifariously changing appearances in the
not belonging to its determination, a form, a consciousness of the same thing (of a thing
sound, an odor. In every synthesis of this kind, which remains continuously one); but it also
even if wholly dissimilar objects are contem­ belongs to every synthesis of identity of sen­
plated as a unity, an overlapping takes place. suous intuitions; for example, of a perception
The ego plays a continually active role through and a remembrance of the same object. But in
the series of steps run through; in the second, the case of explicative coincidence, it is a ques­
it is still directed toward the object of the first; tion of an identification which is wholly oth­
it is directed, therefore, in spite of the privi­ er, completely unique, in which continuity and
leged position of the new object of primary discreteness are bound together in a remark­
apprehension, on both of them together: with able way. Substrate and determination are con­
the new and, through the new, on the old. The stituted originally in the process of explication
Individuals and Sets 275

as correlative members of a kind of coinci­ hended to stand out in a privileged way. These
dence. When a is present to our consciousness partial apprehensions naturally are active "op­
as a deterrnination, we are not simply conscious erations," just like the first simple apprehen­
of it as being absolutely the same as S, nor are sion.
we conscious of it as something completely If we now carry out a partial apprehension,
other. In every explicative determination of S, what happens during this time to the total ap­
S is present in one of its particularities; and in prehension, the apprehension of the bowl? lt
the different determinations which appear in still always remains what we "look at." We are
the form of explicates, it remains the same, but continually tumed toward it in an apprehen­
in conformity with the different particulari­ sion, but the partial apprehensions coincide
ties which are its properties. with the total apprehension in such a way that
in each partial apprehension we apprehend the
C) THE RETAINING-IN-GRASP OF EXPLICA­ whole to the degree that, in the coincidence,
TION IN CONTRAST TO THE RETAINING-IN­ the whole overlaps the particularity which is
GRASP OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION apprehended and is present to consciousness
in this overlapping. But here again there is the
The special nature of explicative coinci­ difference, which we have already noted re­
dence becomes clearly evident in the contrast garding simple apprehension, between origin­
to simple apprehension. If we carry out simple al grasping and still-retaining-in-grasp. In the
apprehension, still without explicative con­ initial apprehension of the whole, without
templation-for example, if for a certain time consideration of its particularities, a flux of
we are tumed toward an object enduring in activity, springing originally from the ego, is
time in order to apprehend it but without de­ directed toward the undifferentiated unified
termining anything about it-then this appre­ object. If the explicative contemplation is put
hension is an activity of the ego, a spontanei­ into play, a new flux of original activity is di­
ty which springs originally from the ego-pole. rected toward the properties in question. But
We thus distinguish the active laying-hold-of, now, on the other hand, the activity springing
which begins discretely, and the continuous up initially is not maintained and directed to­
holding-fast-to into which it is transformed. ward the whole as it was before. As soon as
This laying-hold-of is an original springing­ the explicative contemplation begins, its in­
forth of the grasping activity of the ego which tentional mode manifestly changes; to be sure,
is carried on continuously. we are and remain directed toward the entire
Let us now tum to partial apprehension. We object which we apprehend-which is precise­
observe, for example, a copper bowl which is ly the object of contemplation-but the active
before us: our glance "runs over" it, remains apprehension of the whole does not remain in
fixed for a moment on the roundness, and re­ the original form which first gave it life but is
tums to it again, attracted by a spot which stands a maintaining of the activity in an intention­
out, a variation from the uniform roundness. al modification, precisely as a still-retaining­
Then our glance jumps to a large shiny spot in-grasp.
and goes on a bit farther, following the shim­ The same thing is true in the passage from
mering glitter; then it is struck by the bosses; one explícate to the next. The moment no long­
the cluster is thrown into relief as a unity; we er apprehended momentarily in virtue of be­
run over these bosses one by one, etc. In all ing partía!, but apprehended as just having
this we are continuously oriented toward the been, continues to be retained in grasp in the
entire object; we have apprehended it and hold transition to a new stage of activity. This re­
fast to it as a thematic substrate. While we ap­ taining grasp, a grasp in the mode of the "still,"
prehend the singularities in particular, we ac­ is a state of activity which endures; it is not a
tively carry out afresh particular orientations laying-hold-of or an apprehension which is
and apprehensions which cause what is appre- carried on continuously as an act. Just as in
276 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

simple contemplation, such a grasping in the constantly tumed toward S. On the side of the
mode of retaining can be more or less firm explicates, on the other hand, the phenomena
and then become loose, or it can be loose and are different. The inaugurative activity, carried
again become firmer; but it can also stop com­ on in an original springing-forth, is one in which
pletely: the object is !et go, it slips from our an explícate comes to original apprehension
grasp. In the explication being considered here, and persists until its time is elapsed; this activ­
it hardly needs particular mention that the re­ ity again changes when a new explícate is ap­
taining-in-grasp is impressional. prehended. However, the first is certainly not
Exactly as in continuous simple apprehen­ abandoned; it remains valid during the entire
sion, therefore, there is at each stage of expli­ continuing process. To this extent, we also say
cation a retaining-in-grasp ofthe substrate. But here that it still remains in grasp. But here, this
here the retaining-in-grasp is totally different continuing-to-be-retained has its exclusive
from that which is likewise under considera­ source in the intentionality, already described,
tion in simple apprehension. That is, the ap­ of active coincidence, by means of which the
prehension of the object which is included in explicate, and everything which constitutes an
the constant retaining-in-grasp of the substrate element of determination of S, is included as
takes upon itself, step by step, ali of the par­ a sense-determinative precipitate of S which
ticularities which have been thrown into re­ subsists unchanged. After the explication of
lief: the having-in-grasp of the object being ex­ the a, the S becomes Sa; after the emergence
plicated is not a having-in-grasp which is un­ of the p, (Sa)P, and so on. Thus a, p, etc., are
changed with regard to content, i.e., a still-hav­ no longer apprehended-either primarily or
ing-in-grasp of the same, "such as" it was for secondarily; the ego is no longer directed to­
consciousness before this stage; on the contrary, ward them; it is directed toward S, which con­
thanks to constantly new partial coincidences, tains them as precipitates. Accordingly, we see
it is an always different having-in-grasp. In that the intentionality of an explication is con­
every step, what is gotten hold of as singular stantly in movement, in a continuous interna!
is incorporated by the coincidence into the transformation, and that, at the same time, it
sense content of the substrate. The individual consists of a series of discrete steps, whose in­
graspings are transformed, not into merely re­ tentionality, however, is traversed by a conti­
tenti ve individual graspings such as occur nuity. This continuity is a permanent synthesis
when something is still retained in simple con­ of coincidence which concems the content of
templation or when one passes on to a new apprehensions as well as the activities them­
object, but into modifications of a total grasp, selves: the active apprehending and being -di­
in other words, into enrichments of its con­ rected toward the "whole," or, to speak more
tent. precisely, the being-directed toward the sub­
In the clarifications presented up to now, it strate S, is implicitly "co"-directed toward the
is already implied that the way in which S is a, ... ; and, in the "emergence" of the a, it is
still retained is essentially different from the the S which is apprehended and displayed "in
ways in which a, p, ... , are retained. On the its relation to" a.
one side we have the activity, constantly spring­
ing up originally, of the inaugurative grasping §50. The fundamental structure of
and actually holding-in-grasp-which is a predication
grasping and a having-in-grasp carried on in a
continuous way-up to the point in which the A) THE TWO-MEMBERED NATURE OF THE
explication begins, and, after that, the modified PREDICATIVE PROCESS
activity of the secondary still-retaining-in­
grasp. Both forms coalesce into a permanent We will therefore take our point of depar­
unity; in them, the active ego is and remains ture from the simple perception and explica-
Individuals and Sets 277

tion of an as yet undetermined substrate S and, than in the beginning, the S which has receded
for reasons to be discussed later, will limit our­ and remains only retained in grasp, which no
selves at first to its explication according to a longer stands at the "focal point" of interest,
dependent internal determination, a moment retums again to this focal point inasmuch as
which we will designate as p. The simplest it now shows itself as extended in sense. We
case is one in which the explication (as the go back to the S, thus identifying it with itself,
contemplation of an object) does not go on to which only means, however, that, in the retum,
ever new moments at all. In our example, the it "again" stands there as S: in this new the­
contemplation stops at once and leads only to matic apprehension we have its enrichment of
p, and immediately thereafter it proceeds to a sense as mere protention, in connection with
fresh determination. What is the new achieve­ the retention of the transition which has just
ment which occurs when, on the basis of ex­ taken place. The interest now betakes itself in
plication, we come to the predicative determi­ the direction of S in its enrichment of sense,
nation "S is p"? which supposes that we again pass to p. For
We have seen that, in the explication of a originally, p emerges as the enrichment of sense
substrate S, a coincidence takes place between [of S] only in the synthetic transition [from S
S and its determining moment p. As a substrate to p] in the explicative coincidence. But the
still remaining in grasp, the substrate has ob­ transition is now guided by the cognitive will
tained in this synthesis of transition from S to to retain S in its determination. An active in­
p an accretion of sense. But when, retaining S tention aims at apprehending what previous­
in grasp, we pass to its moment p, therefore ly was a merely passive coincidence, therefore,
when we witness this coincidence, this "con­ in the active transition top, at producing in an
traction" of Sin p, we have not yet, for all that, original activity what accrues to S. As an ac­
posited S as subject in a predicative judgment, tive ego, directed toward S in its accretion of
and we have not yet determined it as having sense, and in my interest focused on this accre­
the moment p in the manner "S is p." This, tion itself, I bring about the transition and the
rather, is the achievement of a new kind of ac­ partial coincidence as free activity and thus
tivity. Already in the act of apprehension and bring about the fulfillment of the determining
receptive explication there were active steps: intention, the intention toward S in the sense
in an active turning-toward, the substrate S was accruing from the transition and coincidence. I
first apprehended in its undifferentiated uni­ have S as the substrate of a determination and
ty, made a theme, and then its determination p actively determine it. The object-substrate takes
was actively apprehended in the explicative the form of the predicative subject; it is the sub­
synthesis. The work of the activity of the ego ject-theme as terminus a qua, and the activity
went thus far. Beyond this, the explicative co­ goes over to the predicate as the opposed ter­
incidence arose passively between the sub­ minus ad quem. It is only then that there is re­
strate S, still retained in grasp, and its deter­ alized in a productive activity-which is not
mination p, and the thematic object-substrate only a synthetic activity in general but, at the
found its enrichment of sense in this passive same time, the activity of synthesis itself-the
modification (cf. above, §24). consciousness that S receives a determination
When the transition from S to p has taken by p in the mode "Sis p."
place in this way, there then develops on the We have said that what is peculiar to the
basis of active contemplation an interest of predicative synthesis consists in the active ac­
higher leve[ in the object-substrate, an inter­ complishment of the synthetic transition from
est, proceeding from this contemplation, in re­ Stop, in the active accomplishment of the uni­
taining the accretion of sense arising from it, ty of identity between S and p. We are there­
the Sin its enrichment of sense. S which, at the fore directed in a certain way toward the unity
end of the process of contemplation, is other of identity. But this must not be understood
278 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

as if we (noetically) were directed toward the of determinative identification goes from the
identifying process, toward the multiplicity of spontaneous apprehension of S as subject to
lived experience in which the synthetic unity p: the apprehending regard lives in the appre­
between S and p is established. We are in this hension of its being determined as p. In the ac­
attitude now, when we phenomenologically tivity of explication, the object is already im­
elucidate the predicative synthesis; but when plicitly "determined" as p, i.e., it is clarified
we accomplish this synthesis itself, we are di­ and made explicit as such, but the "being­
rected objectively toward S in its partial iden­ determined-as" is not apprehended. It is first
tity with p. On the other hand, this does not apprehended in the repeated active accomp­
mean that we then explicate the result of the lishment of the synthesis, an accomplishment
receptive explication, namely, this successively which presupposes the preceding explication.
constituted unity of identity which is precon­ As present to consciousness, the S must be
stituted in the explication. This would mean already explicated, but it is now posited predi­
running through the succession anew, therefore catively simply as S, which is identical, no
renewing the explication "in memory." Such a matter how it may be explicated. On the other
repetition of the explication generally takes hand, it pertains to its form that it is the ex­
place in receptive experience (cf. §25) [only] plicand; it is posited in the form of subject, and
when we endeavor to impress an object on p expresses the determination. In the "is," the
ourselves in its intuitive determinations ("at­ form of the synthesis between explicand and
tributes"). For this, a simply apprehending re­ explicate is expressed in its active accomplish­
gard is first directed toward the unity of coin­ ment, i.e., as the apprehension of being-deter­
cidence already constituted; this unity becomes mined-as, and in the predication this form is a
a theme in a simple thesis with a single ray of component of the total "state of affairs" which
attention, and then the explication is accom­ attains expression.
plished anew. But this still does not lead to a To sum up: essentially, the predicative syn­
predication. thesis always has two levels:
On the contrary, in order for the substrate 1. In the transition from S to the moments
of the explication to become a subject and for p, q, ... , emerging in coincidence: the p, q,
the explicates to become predicates, it is nec­ are apprehended for themselves. The interest
essary that the regard turn back to the unity which followed the objective sense of the pre­
which is passively preconstituted within the constitution, or, correlatively, the quidditive
receptive activity of the process of explication content of the object coming to prominence
and is in a sense concealed. Being turned to­ therein, drains off into the determinations, but
ward this unity in arder to apprehend it im­ S and each of the moments already apprehend­
plies repeating the process in a changed atti­ ed remains in grasp.
tude, making an active synthesis from a passive 2. But then there is something new; name­
one. This synthesis is not something which can ly, the ego in its interest turns back to S and,for
be originally apprehended in a simple turning­ example, first taking p particularly in grasp
toward in the manner in which, at the lower again and directing a new ray of attention to­
level, everything was apprehended in acts of ward it, becomes aware of the enrichment of
simple turning-toward; rather, they can be per­ sense and is saturated with it, while it again re­
ceived only by repeating the act of running­ produces it by an original activity in a new pas­
through. This takes place, as was mentioned, sage top; and thus for each of the determina­
in a change of attitude: we do not again carry tions. Determination always has two members.
out a merely contemplative explication but an Thus is described the process of predication
activity of predicative identification, and this which tradition always already had in view
is an apprehending consciousness, whose ac­ under the terms "synthesis" and "diaeresis"
tivity is characterized not by a single ray but by without actually being able to come to grips
severa[ rays (a polythetic activity). The action with it.
Individuals and Sets 279

Constituting Sets,:- is now fulfilled through the particular and

continues on to new particulars, a uniform ac­
§24. The activity of explicative contem­ tive process grows up in which each of the as­
plation and the explicative synthesis pects already apprehended still remains in grasp
in such a way that in fact not only a succession
D) EXPLICATION ANO APPREHENSION OF of activities but also a unity of activity grows
PLURALITY up which persists throughout the succession.
In this way the pervading activity moves con­
Now that we have made sure of this spe­ stantly on the permanent background which
cific mode of the process of explication, it is this plurality constitutes by appearing continu­
easy to contrast it with a mode of synthesis re­ ously in a uniform configuration; thus, we have
lated to it but from which it must be rigorous­ to do here in a certain way with partial appre­
ly differentiated, namely, the synthesis which hensions within what is present to conscious­
occurs in the apprehension of plurality. To be ness as a whole.
sure, a plurality-for example, a cluster of stars, But however far the analogy with the case
a cluster of colored dots-can also, on the ba­ of the explication of a particular object ex­
sis of a unified prominence and affection, be­ tends, and however true it may be that what we
come a unitary theme, and its objective par­ have shown, up to the last point, with respect
ticulars can be explicated as determinative to the process of running through a plurality
parts. Then we have befare us only a special also holds in its essentials for explication in our
case of explication. lt is also an ideal limiting sphere, still an essential difference comes into
case if plurality is apprehended as a unitary view. The thematic object which is explicated
whole and all apperception of plurality is lack­ belongs to the explication and in it assumes
ing. the character of substrates for its explicates. But
But the normal case is one in which the uni­ in the present case, however much it may ap­
ty of configuration is apperceived from the pear as a uniform configuration in original in­
first as existing in a pluralistic way, as a plu­ tuition, the plurality is not a goal of effective
rality of objects, and this apperception is "real­ activity; it is not a goal of knowledge gained
ized." This means that the coming-into-promi­ through experience. lt is not seized in advance
nence of plural existents <loes not lead to a and retained in active grasp in particular ap­
unitary objective tuming-toward but that, on prehensions; in the progress of these appre­
the contrary, it is the individual members of hensions, that specific partial identification
the plurality which excite the interest in ad­ which we have called explicative coincidence
vanee and which are immediately thematized <loes not take place-a coincidence in which
as individuals-but not as mere isolated indi­ activities of both sides have a share. lt is also
viduals but as individuals linked together the­ clear that the individual activities of running
matically. This linking occurs to the extent that through a plurality, precisely for this reason,
the interest follows the likeness or similarity are not united according to the same principie
already given by an association in the back­ as those of explication. In general: the unity of
ground with other moments of a configuration, the activities in the running-through of a plu­
and each individual interest works not only to rality has its source, not in activity itself, but in
the benefit of each new particular, by a kind of connection arising from passivity. If, when a
coincidence of interest which flows over it, plurality is run through, it is also actively taken
but also to the benefit of everything which has together, then matters evidently stand other­
already been apprehended previously and to wise. But then the uniting activity is obviously
which it remains attached. In that the interest completely other than that which gives unity

*EJ, pp. 119-121, 244-248 (Sections 24d and 61).

280 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

to an explication. It is an activity of a higher another in particular, and nothing beyond this.

level, one to be described later on, a spontane­ We can then, while we hold on to the appre­
ity in which the plurality is constituted as a hension, again carry out a new act of taking­
specific object, as a "set." But in explication as together [ of, let us say,] the inkwell and a noise
such we do not perforrn separate acts taking that we have just heard, or we retain the first
the explicates together; it requires a special in­ two objects in apprehension and look at a third
terest of a new kind in order to bring about, in object, as one separate from the others. The
addition, an explication in the form of an ex­ connection of the first two is not loosened
plicating which collectively links the expli­ thereby.It is another thing to take the third ob­
cates together. However, such a collective as­ ject into the combination or to take a new ob­
semblage [Zusammennehmen] of the explicates ject into consideration in addition to the two
is not necessary for explication considered in objects already in special combination. And
its normal course. From the very first, the ex­ then we have a unity of apprehension in the
plication has its unity in that the object is con­ forrn of ([A, BJ, C): likewise ([A, BJ, [C, D}),
tinuously the theme and as such remains con­ etc. It is necessary to say again here that each
stantly in grasp in a modified activity such as apprehension of complex forrn has as objects
we have described. A B C . .. and not, for example (A, B) as one
object, and so on.
§61. The set as a further example of an On the other hand, we can direct the regard
objectivity of understanding. Its of attention [Zuwendung] and the apprehen­
constitution in productive spontaneity sion toward the pair, toward the one and the
other of the pair, whereby these are objects. If
States of affairs are not the only objectivi- we do this, then the repeated individual con­
ties of the understanding which are constituted centration, the concentrated partial apprehen­
in predicatively productive spontaneity. They sion, now of the A and then of the B, functions
have a privileged position which is grounded as a kind of explication, as an act of running­
in the basic function of the predicative judg­ through the total object A + B. Looking into
ment in the narrow sense ofthe copulative unity the matter more closely, the act of representa­
of linkage. We have contrasted the copulative tion (A, B) has priority over the act of collec­
linkage to the collective, which, to be sure, does tion (A + B), in which the sum is the object.
not lead to the logical forrnation of sense, to That, is, in order that the sum may be given, in
deposits of sense in object-substrates in the order that it may be apprehended in self-giv­
same way as copulative spontaneity, but which enness and contemplated as such, we must
is still to be counted as predicative spontaneity apprehend the A and B together; in the unity
in the broader sense. It leads, like all predicative of this apprehension of the two objects, the
spontaneity, to the preconstitution of a new new object is preconstituted as its result, so to
objectivity, that of the object "set." speak, as something which we now apprehend
In the domain of receptivity there is already as one and which we can explícate in the indi­
an act of plural contemplation in the act of col­ vidual apprehension of A, B . ...
lecti vely taking things together; it is not the Thus, in order for the collective connection,
mere apprehension of one object after the other originally sprung from the act of plural expli­
but a retaining-in-grasp of the one in the ap­ cation of A and B to become a substrate-i.e.,
prehension ofthe next, and so forth (cf. §24d). a true object, something identifiable-a turn­
But this unity of taking-together, of collection, ing of regard is first required. But this implies
does not yet have one object: the pair, the col­ that, as long as we carry out a merely collec­
lection, more generally, the set of the two ob­ tive assemblage, we have, more than ever, only
jects. In a limited consciousness, we are tumed a preconstituted object, a "plurality," and only
toward one object in particular, then toward in retrospective apprehension, following the
Individuals and Sets 281

active constitution, do we have as an object first givenness as substrate there is already

plurality as unity: as set. lt is the same here as present a pregiven multiplicity of particular
with ali objects produced in predicative spon­ affections which we actualize by its apprehen­
taneity: a syntactical objectivity is preconsti­ sion. To be sure, it is not precluded that, by
tuted in a spontaneity, but only after it is com­ "approaching," intuition can put new affections
pleted can it become a theme, it being an object into play which previously were not yet avail­
only in retrospective apprehension {Rückgreif­ able, so that the intended unities are again re­
en]. The collective synthesis, the "A and B and solved into pluralities. But, in spite of this, ev­
C," is, indeed, the noetic unity of a conscious­ ery set must be conceived a priori as capable
ness but not yet the unity of an object in the of being reduced to ultimate constituents, there­
proper sense, that is, in the sense of a themat­ fore to constituents which are themselves no
ic object-substrate. Here A, then B, then C is longer sets.
thematic, but the collective is not yet thematic. But we can still add that, within the unity
The colligating consciousness contains sev­ of a set, it is possible to delimit different par­
era! objects encompassed in unity but not a tial sets by affectively particularizing connec­
unique object having severa! members. Nev­ tions, that in this way mutually overlapping sets
ertheless, through every synthetically unified are possible, and that, in general, sets in rela­
consciousness, a new object is essentially pre­ tion to other sets can exhibit ali possible rela­
constituted, precisely one having many mem­ tions of containment.
bers; there is then required only an act of the­ Consequently, a set is an original objectiv­
matic apprehension, possible at any time, to ity, preconstituted by an activity of colligation
make what is thus preconstituted into an ob­ which links disjunct objects to one another; the
ject and thereby a substrate of judgment. In active apprehension of this objectivity consists
the present case, the colligating is a polythet­ in a simple reapprehension or laying-hold of
ic operation through which a collective is es­ that which has just been preconstituted. As a
sentially preconstituted. It becomes a themat­ pure formation of spontaneity, the set repre­
ic object after completion of the act of colli­ sents a pre-eminent form in which thematic
gation through a retrospective apprehension objects of every conceivable kind enter as mem­
{rückgreifendes Eifassen} by which the set is bers and with which they can themselves func­
given to the ego as an object, as something tion again as members of determining judg­
identifiable. Subsequently, it is an object like ments of every kind. One of the syntheses of
any other; not only can it be totally identified predicative objectivation is the "and," and one
as the identical element of many modes of of the syntheses of relation-which, to be sure,
givenness, but it can be explicated in an ever belongs to a wholly different orientation-is
renewed identification; and this act of expli­ the "disjunct." These are the basic components
cation in its tum is always an act of colliga­ of the particular syntactical form which is the
tion. But, like any substrate-objectivity, it can collection or set.
again also enter as subject in new connections There are, therefore, no originally passively
of judgment, etc. preconstituted sets. Passivity can only create
Naturally, sets can also be colligated in their the preconditions; but it is not necessary that,
tum with other disjunctive sets and can there­ in advance, the many objects as preconstituted
fore be constituted as sets ofa higher arder and in disjunction be already available and exer­
then be thematically objectified. The objects, cise their combined affective power. The ob­
disjunctively united in a set, can thus be sets in jects can also enter into the thematic field of
their tum. But finally, every set, preconstitut­ vision one after the other; and while we are al­
ed in intuition, leads to ultimate constituents, ready occupied with judging in various ways
to particularities which are no longer sets. For what has gone before, they fulfill by their suc­
it belongs to the idea of such a set that in its cession the described conditions of the collec-
282 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

tion. The unity of affection is constituted suc­ in its disjunctive properties and these proper­
cessively, it provides the channels for changes ties at the very beginning attain collective con­
of interest; and if the emerging objects are dis­ nection. In any case, a turning of regard which
junctive, the collection can make its appear­ makes the collective into an object is always
ance. But it can also spring into activity from possible here.
the first, as when an S is explicated step by step

15. Uni versais

The Constitution o f Empirical the more or less clearly remembered; these

U niversal* relations found the characteristics of typical
knowledge, through which the empirical types
§81. The original constitution o f the are preconstituted. Of all this, therefore, we
universal must first take no account and limit ourselves
to what is self-given in the unity of a presence
in a perception, in order to track down how gen­
a) T he a s s o c ia t iv e s y n t h e s is o f lik e w it h

LIKE AS THE BASIS OF THE PROMINENCE OF

eralities are originally constituted in self­
THE UNIVERSAL
givenness on the basis of the self-given.
We return to the result of our analysis of
The fact that all objects of experience are the associative constitution of unity. Every ob­
from the first experienced as known accord­ ject affects us from a plurality of cogiven ob­
ing to their type has its basis in the sedimenta­ jects present in a field, and it may happen that
tion of all apperceptions and in their habitual the plurality as such, as a multiplicity of dis­
continued action on the basis of associative tinct objects, can also affect us as a unity. It is
awakening. Association originally produces not a mere assemblage of distinct givens, but
the passive synthesis of like with like, and this already in the passivity of its preconstitution it
not only within a field of presence but also essentially includes a bond of internal affinity
through the entire stream of lived experience, insofar as the individual objects belonging to
its immanent time, and everything which is it have common properties, on the basis of
constituted in it. Thus the synthesis of like which they can then be taken together as enter­
with like is constituted by associative awaken­ ing into the unity of one thematic interest. In
ing, and the two terms can then be brought to­ the activity of colligation which runs through
gether in the unity of a presentifying intui­ the individual members there takes place a co­
tion. If we would seek out the universal in its incidence of similarity as regards what is com­
most original production, we must not first mon to them, and a distinction as regards what
have recourse to syntheses of likeness which is different. In conformity with the “magnitude”
lead to empirical types, because in this case of similarity, the common elements have a
what is brought together through association power of mutual evocation of corresponding
is not necessarily self-given. To be sure, asso­ importance; in a pair of objects closely bound
ciative relations of likeness also subsist be­ together in this way there may come to promi­
tween the self-given in an actual perception and nence colors which are alike or very similar;

EJ, pp. 321-338 (Sections 81-85).

Universals 283

in another pair the shapes may become promi­ as we pass from like to like we often simply
nent; and so on. As we carry out a colligation, say: “This is surely the same thing.” But the
each of the members coincides with its part­ like are two distinct objects, and not one and
ner in that it is an identical substrate, namely, the same. And yet in every such duality, and in
the substrate of the moments of similarity or any manifold of like things, there is actually a
likeness. In the moment of coincidence, the unity and a sameness in the strictest sense. It
similar blends with the similar in proportion to makes its appearance in the synthesis of the
their similarity, while the consciousness of a coincidence of likeness; in other words, it is
duality of what is united in this blending still preconstituted originally as an object through
persists. These similarities have their degrees, this synthesis. It is on this that a new mode of
which are called contrasts of similarity, or “dif­ judging is then grounded.
ferences” in a determinate sense. In the case of
complete likeness, the blending is, for con­ b ) T h e u n iv e r s a l as c o n s t it u t e d in
sciousness, a perfect blending, that is, a blend­ PRODUCTIVE SPONTANEITY. INDIVIDUAL
ing without contrast and without difference. JUDGMENT AND GENERAL [GENERELLES]
These are all processes taking place entirely JUDGMENT
within passivity. Blending and the coincidence
of likeness arise quite independently of wheth­ To begin with, we assume that the themati­
er we actually spontaneously run through and cally determinative interest concentrates and
colligate individual members coming into co­ particularizes itself on S and does this without
incidence or whether there is only a passive loss of the general interest in what is connect­
preconstitution of multiplicity. ed with S. The affection which provides the
As has already been shown, the form of the impulse for the excitation of an ongoing inter­
states of affairs of the judgment of relation can est, bringing about an encompassing synthe­
be constituted on the basis of such syntheses sis and a continuous activity of unification, is
of likeness. As we pass from one ink spot to constantly efficacious. In the restriction to S,
another, a coincidence is accomplished in the the moment p, which comes to prominence as
form of a synthesis of likeness, and the state of its property, is first apprehended in the form S
affairs “A is like B” is engendered by the fact is p. Suppose that the interest now shifts over
that they are both kept apart and synthetically to S'—which coaffects us on the basis of a com­
combined. pletely like moment p, an individual moment
But the act of judgment can go in still an­ belonging to S'. This S' must become predica-
other direction: whereas on the basis of the tively determined by its moment p in the same
associative awakening of like by like, an ob­ way that just previously was true of S. The pas­
ject no longer affects us merely for itself but sive synthesis of coincidence between S and
in community with those akin to it, likewise, S', which was the ground of the common af­
every judgment which is valid for an object fection, can now be actively apprehended; we
taken for itself can enter into connection with say that S and S' are the same—are p: although
judgments which are valid for kindred objects. S still has its moment p, and S', in turn, has its
Otherwise expressed: in the unity of a plurali­ moment p. Like the substrates, their properties
ty founded on kinship, a singular judgment can are separated; but in the thematic transition we
enter into community with another singular make, they are coincident, and there is an ac­
judgment, whereby new kinds of judgments tivity of identification. But this does not mean
going beyond singularities arise. This becomes that the qualitative moments on both sides, or
intelligible in view of the unique character of even that the S and the S', are present to con­
the synthesis of like with like. Its peculiarity sciousness as identical, although we say that S
lies in the fact that, though it indeed very much and S' are the same. With this, obviously, there
resembles a synthesis of identity, it still is not is no question of a total identification; but, on
one. It resembles such a synthesis so much that the other hand, there is also no question of a
284 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

partial identification of the kind which we though it is individualized in them, it is not in

have called explicative coincidence and to them as a part.
which we owe the qualitative moment as de­ First of all, we take note of the fact that
termination. here different forms of judgment must be dis­
In any case, it is clear that when we pass tinguished from one another and that a new
from like moment to like moment a unity form is constituted, different from those which
emerges in the coincidence, a unity in the du­ we have considered up to now. The judgment
ality of elements which are both separated S is p* in which p designates the individual
and linked together, and that this unity emerges moment in the individual object S is complete­
over and over again as totally and identically ly different from the judgment S is p in which
the same when we pass to a new member S", p designates the universal, the eidos, and, in
then again to S'", in which we have a moment the same way, the judgment p' is p (the indi­
p which is always like. The unity first emerges vidual moment p' is of the kind p). In the one
on the basis of the passive coincidence of like­ case, there is an identification between the
ness of the individual moments; and if one substrate and its individual moment, in the
comes back to it, it can then be apprehended other, a universal is predicated of the substrate.
for itself. We must, therefore, distinguish the It is determined as being of the kind p; or p',
first series o f judgments, in which there is on the basis of coincidence with other like
predicated of each substrate its own individual moments p", is determined as being of the kind
moment—S' is p', S" is p", etc.—and, in con­ p. In the one case we thus have a judgment
trast to this, the judgments in which the same which contains individual cores in itself and
p, as everywhere like, is predicated as the uni­ predicates something individual of them; we
versal, as the identically one in all, that which call it an individual judgment. In the other case,
emerges in p', p", and so on. This means that new cores appear, namely, generalities, at least
the unity is preconstituted in the passive coin­ on one side: the judgment is a universal judg­
cidence of likeness of the moments p', p", and ment. This is a new form of judging because
so on, as the unity of the species p: on the the difference of the cores has as a consequence
strength of this, an act of judgment oriented in a modification of the form o f the synthesis of
a new direction is possible, in which, if we re­ identity in contrast to the simple explicative
turn to S' and re-effect the identification, we no synthesis, such as we conceived it as originally
longer determine S' by p' as its individual underlying our basic form of the categorical
moment but by p as identically the same in S, judgment: S is p; this is a synthesis which natu­
S', and so on. There result the judgments S' rally can occur only on the basis of such a
is p, S" is p, and so on, in which p no longer simple explicative synthesis or a plurality of
designates an individual predicative core but such syntheses.
a general one, namely, the universal as that Speaking genetically and as a matter of prin­
which is common to two or more S ’s succes­ ciple, such a general core, a hen epi pollón,
sively apprehended. Instead of being deter­ naturally can be present to consciousness as
mined by the fleeting and variable moment, this the unity of an a priori generality, and can be
is determined, therefore, by an element ideally ready for a possible thematic apprehension,
and absolutely identical, which, in the mode only after the active accomplishment of the
of repetition or assimilation, goes through all separate apprehension of like objects in a syn­
the individual objects and their multiform mo­ thetic transition. But no act of relational judg­
ments as an ideal unity. As we will see later ment of comparison need necessarily have
on, this is a unity which is not at all a function preceded, for example a judgment of the form
of the actuality of the moments; it does not pS (the moment p of S) is like pS'; rather, this
come into being and disappear with them, and, requires another attitude. The direction of in-

Reading p instead of p '. — Translator’s note.

Universali 285

terest toward the universal, toward unity as tity, different from all other such relations. If
opposed to multiplicity, does not aim at the the universal a which is brought into promi­
determination of the like in relation to another nence in the same way in A and B is appre­
as its like. Hence it is not the synthesis of coin­ hended objectively, it gives itself as in A, in
cidence of the like, presenting itself passive­ B, and in the corresponding transitions. States
ly, which is actualized in the form of an “is”- of affairs of a new kind can arise: A is an in­
predication. What awakens interest is rather stance of the universal, it participates in the uni­
what is passively preconstituted in the coinci­ versal, it is conceived through oc. If we make
dence of the like as individually apprehended; a the subject, this means: a, the predicate, be­
this is the one which comes into prominence longs to the particular, to A, to B; the concept
on the basis of the coincidence, the identical dwells in the particular (koinönia). To express
which is one and always the same, no matter the first state of affairs in ordinary language,
in what direction we may continue; it is this we say, for example: “This is red, that is also
which is actively apprehended. red.” We should notice here that the adjectival
Furthermore, what is achieved is obviously form belongs essentially to the state of affairs
no longer something on the order of an expli­ and is not an accident of grammar. It will be
cation of like objects. The one which comes to necessary later on to discuss the way in which
light here is not in the objects as their part, as the forms of judging “in general” emerge on
a partial-identical; otherwise, it would indeed the basis of these relations.
be only a like which is present everywhere, and The relation of participation is not to be
the like elements would be in a relation of in­ confused with that of mere likeness. We must
tersection. not think that the identity of the universal is
Hence, the one does not repeat itself in the only an exaggerated way of speaking. Through
like; it is given only once, but in many. It con­ overlapping, the like here and there stands out
fronts us as an objectivity of a new kind, as from the different. But just as the concrete in­
an objectivity of understanding, arising from dividual objects are separated in multiplicity
original sources of activity, although obvious­ or plurality, wherein the coincidence by over­
ly on the foundation of sensibility; for the ac­ lapping which makes its appearance in the ac­
tivity of apprehending and running through par­ tive accomplishment of colligation changes
ticulars and bringing them into coincidence is nothing, so also the moments of likeness which
necessary if the universal is to be preconstituted become objects of attention are separated and,
at all and then become a thematic object. Its in the same way, the moments which differ;
original apprehension has a field of interest of each object has its indwelling moment, for ex­
a different sort, which the interest must run ample, that of redness, and each of the many
through as in the case of an individual object objects which are red has its proper individu­
of simple receptivity. The glancing ray of at­ al moment, but in likeness.
tention must go through the individual objects As against this, it should be emphasized
already constituted; and, as it pursues the bond that likeness is only a correlate of the identity
of likeness and brings about the coincidence, of a universal, which in truth can be consid­
the one which is thus constituted is thematized ered as one and the same and as a “counter­
as something which is inherent in the individu­ part” of the individual. This identical moment
al objects and yet is not part of them; for the is first “particularized” [vereinzelt] into two,
objects compared can also be completely sepa­ and then, as we will soon see, into as many as
rated. desired. All of these particularizations have a
relation to one another through their relation
c) P a r tic ip a tio n in t h e id e n tity o f t h e to the identical and are then said to be like.
UNIVERSAL, AND MERE LIKENESS Metaphorically speaking, the concrete objects
which have such particularizations in them­
This kind of self-giving inherent in particu­ selves are then said to be like “with regard to
lars points to a wholly unique relation of iden­ red” and can themselves be considered in an
286 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

improper sense as particularizations of the really possible objects, and as soon as it be­
universal. comes intuitive as an open infinity, it gives it­
self as an infinitude o f particularizations of
§82. Empirical generalities and their the SAME universal. The generalities individu­
extension. The ideality o f concepts ally apprehended and combined then get an
infinite extension and lose their tie to precisely
We first thought of the universal as given those individuals from which they were first
to us by the cohesion of two substrates. And, in abstracted.
fact, a universal is already constituted in this In addition, it should be noted that a syn­
case; it is, to be sure, a universal of the lowest thetic linking-on to an original constitution of
level—precisely, what is common to two ob­ the generality is by no means required in or­
jects. However, the comparison can go further, der to apprehend a particular object as the
at first from A to B, then from B to C, to D, particular instance of a universal. If the con­
etc.; and, with each new step, the universal ac­ cept, e.g., the concept flower, previously ap­
quires a greater extension. As we have already peared in an original comparison, then a new
indicated, not only the singular judgments A is flower making its appearance is recognized
red, B is red, C is red, and so on can emerge on on the basis of associative awakening of the
the basis of this coincidence of likeness, but type “flower,” established in the past, without
also new forms o f the state of affairs as plu­ an intuitive recollection of the earlier cases
ral: A and B are red, A and B and C are red, of comparison being necessary. But actual
where “red” designates the species. By invert­ givenness of the universal then requires that
ing the terms, the judgments read: Red (now we pass beyond what is particular in the like­
as the main substrate, as the subject in a new nesses, eventually toward an open horizon of
syntactical form) belongs to A, B, C ... . In the possible continuation. Whether the earlier
first form there is then a multiple subject, a cases are individually represented in addition
plural; a synthetic ray goes out from each does not matter. Thus it is evident that the
member, directed toward the general predi­ universal is not bound to any particular actu­
cate, which is posited only once. Conversely: ality.
the one general term as subject discharges a We can now also go beyond experience, and
multiple ray of predication. Each individual the comparison of objects actually given in
ray terminates in a member of the collection: A experience, and pass over to free imagination.
and B, etc. We imagine similar particulars—similar to ac­
In these cases, the comparison which leads tualities which have been actually experienced
to a universal concerns individually determined to begin with—and thereupon as many as we
objects, which appear in a finite closed experi­ choose, that is, always new, individually dif­
ence in their individual determinateness. Al­ ferent from one another, as similar particulars,
though opposite to them as irreal, yet still bound and such that, if the experience had continued,
to them, the universal then appears as some­ they could actually have been given to us. Thus,
thing standing out in them, as a concept dwell­ to every concept belongs an infinite extension
ing in them. However, as soon as the experi­ of purely possible particulars, of purely pos­
ence broadens and leads to new like objects, sible conceptual objects. If I imagine things,
while the first are still in hand or associatively I apprehend in them as pure possibilities the
awakened in a recollection, a resumption of concept of a thing. I can find this same concept
the synthesis immediately occurs; new ele­ in actual things; stated more precisely, in in­
ments of likeness are immediately recognized tended things which I posit as actualities on
as particularizations of the same universal. the basis of actual experience. In the transition
This can proceed to infinity. As soon as an open from imagination to actual experience, these
horizon of like objects is present to conscious­ give themselves as particulars realizing the
ness as a horizon of presumptively actual and same universal which, in imagination, is not
üniversals 287

truly realized but only quasi-realized in the pos­ a being-in-itself devoid of reference to any
sibilities discerned. subject. On the contrary, like all objectivities
Consequently, the possibility o f the forma­ of understanding, it refers essentially to the
tion o f general objectivities, of “concepts,” processes o f productive spontaneity which be­
extends as far as there are associative synthe­ long to it correlatively and in which it comes
ses of likeness. On this rests the universality of to original givenness. The being of the univer­
the operation of the formation of concepts; sal in its different levels is essentially a being-
everything which, in some way or other, is ob­ constituted in these processes.
jectively constituted in actuality or possibility, In accordance with our starting from expe­
as an object of actual experience or of imagi­ rience and from the comparison and formation
nation, can occur as a term in relations of com­ of concepts taking place on the basis of experi­
parison and be conceived through the activity ence, we have, up to this point, not yet been
of eidetic identification and subsumption un­ able to deal with pure generalities. What we
der a universal. have described is the acquisition of empirical
The concept in its ideality must be under­ generalities. All the concepts of natural life
stood as something objective which has a pure­ bring with them, without harm to their ideali­
ly ideal being, a being which does not presup­ ty, the copositing of an empirical sphere in
pose the actual existence of corresponding which they have the place of their possible re­
particulars; it is what it is even if the corre­ alization in particulars. If we speak of animals,
sponding particulars are only pure possibili­ plants, cities, houses, and so on, we intend
ties, though, on the other hand, in the realm of therewith in advance things of the world, and
experienced actuality, it can also be the real­ in fact the world of our actual, real experience
ized concept of actual particulars. And if there (not of a merely possible world); accordingly,
are actual particulars, other like ones can just we think of these concepts as actual generali­
as well be taken in their place. Correlative to ties, that is, as bound to this world. The exten­
the pure being o f the universal is the being of sion of such concepts is indeed infinite, but it
the pure possibilities which participate in it and is an actual extension, the extension of things
which must be constructed as its bases and as actually and really possible in the given world.
an ideally infinite extension of the bases of the These real possibilities, which belong to the
pure abstraction giving access to the universal. extension of empirical concepts, must not be
Naturally, concepts as pure concepts can, confused with the pure possibilities to which
from the first, originate outside o f all relation pure generalities refer. On this, more later on.
to current actuality, namely, by the compari­
son of pure possibilities of the imagination. It §83. Empirico-typical generality and its
is clear thereby that every actual likeness, ac­ passive preconstitution
quired in this way, of possibilities given as ex­
isting (as existing, not in the sense of a reality a) T h e a t t a in m e n t o f e m p ir ic a l c o n ­
of experience, but precisely as a possibility) cepts FROM TYPES IN NATURAL EXPERIEN­
intentionally includes in itself a possible like­ TIAL APPERCEPTION
ness of possible actualities and a possible uni­
versal in which they can possibly participate. In the first place, there are still important
On the other hand, even if they were formed distinctions to be made in the domain of em­
originally on the basis of experience as actual pirical generalities; above all, it is necessary to
generalities, concepts can always be appre­ examine more closely the path which leads
hended as pure concepts. from passively preconstituted typifications to
Despite all the Platonic turns of phrase by empirical concepts, specifically to empirical
which we have described its relation to the par­ concepts understood not only in the sense of
ticular, the ideality of the universal must not everyday concepts but, on a higher level, to
be understood as if it were a question here of concepts of the empirical sciences.
288 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

We return to what has been said previous­ unthematic. But on the basis of this reference
ly. The factual world of experience is experi­ we can always constitute a general concept
enced as a typified world. Things are experi­ “dog,” represent other dogs known by experi­
enced as trees, bushes, animals, snakes, birds; ence to ourselves; in an arbitrary creation of
specifically, as pine, linden, lilac, dog, viper, the imagination we can also represent other
swallow, sparrow, and so on. The table is char­ dogs to ourselves in an open multiplicity and
acterized as being familiar and yet new. What hence discern the universal “dog.” If we are
is given in experience as a new individual is once attuned to apprehension of the universal,
first known in terms of what has been genu­ then in conformity with the synthesis discussed
inely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the in §81, each part, each particular moment in
similar). But what is apprehended according an object, furnishes us something to appre­
to type also has a horizon of possible experi­ hend conceptually as general; every analysis
ence with corresponding prescriptions of fa­ will then go hand in hand with a general predi­
miliarity and has, therefore, types of attributes cation. Thus the uniform general type, the uni­
not yet experienced but expected. When we see versal first apprehended on the basis of the
a dog, we immediately anticipate its addition­ associatively awakened relation of the like­
al modes of behavior: its typical way of eat­ ness of one object with other objects, will be
ing, playing, running, jumping, and so on. We a universal, a concept which includes many
do not actually see its teeth; but although we particular concepts. But if the objects are real
have never yet seen this dog, we know in ad­ objects, then a sensuous type coming to promi­
vance how its teeth will look—not in their in­ nence does not exhaust every like element
dividual determination but according to type, which we can find in continuing experience
inasmuch as we have already had previous and and, consequently, in the exposition of the true
frequent experience of “similar” animals, of being of these objects as that in which they are
“dogs,” that they have such things as “teeth” like. The more the objects reveal themselves
and of this typical kind. To begin with, what is as they are, the more each of them enters into
experienced about a perceived object in the intuition, then all the more numerous are the
progress of experience is straightway assigned possibilities which present themselves of find­
“apperceptively” to every perceived object with ing likenesses. But it then also becomes evi­
similar components of genuine perception. We dent that further determinations are as a rule
anticipate this, and actual experience may or in regular connection with the determinations
may not confirm it. In the confirmation, the already apprehended or, what is the same thing,
content of a type is extended, but the type can that in the course of experience they must be
also be subdivided into particular types; on the expected as copresent.
other hand, every concrete real thing still has To the type “dog,” e.g., belongs a stock of
its individual attributes, though at the same time typical attributes with an open horizon of an­
they have their typical form. ticipation of further such attributes. This im­
Everything apprehended according to type plies that, according to the “universal,” one dog
can lead us to the general concept of the type is like every other, specifically, in such a way
in which we apprehend it. On the other hand, that the universal, which, through the previous
we are not necessarily directed toward the experiences of dogs, even if these were only
universal in this way; notwithstanding the pos­ superficial and wholly incomplete, has been
sible utilization of the name “dog” in its gen­ prescribed as characterizing all dogs and which
eral signification, we need not thematize a is already known according to its type, brings
dog according to its type as a particular of with itself an indeterminate horizon of typical
the universal “dog”; rather, we can also be di­ attributes still unknown. If we were to go on in
rected toward it as an individual: then, the pas­ experience, at first to this or that particular
sively preconstituted reference to its type, in dog, we would in the end constantly discover
which it is apprehended from the first, remains ever new attributes, belonging not merely to
Universals 289

these dogs but to dogs in general and deter­ life, something already indicated in the verb­
mined by the typical attributes which we have al designation.* In such cases we speak of non-
ascribed to them up to that point. Thus, super­ essential types. In the comprehensive experi­
seding the actual concept, specifically acquired ence of concrete nature, individuals are ordered
in actual experience, a presumptive idea arises, increasingly under essential types, in different
the idea of a universal, to which belongs, in levels of generality. Scientific investigation
addition to the attributes already acquired, a of empirical natural history is based on this.
horizon, indeterminate and open, of unknown Necessarily underlying it is the prescientific
attributes (conceptual determinations). Specifi­ and multifariously nonessential typification
cally, this is a horizon in the sense of a con­ carried out by natural experiential appercep­
stant presumption, of a constant empirical cer­ tion. Scientific concepts of species seek to de­
tainty, according to which what is identified as termine essential types by a systematic and
a dog through the known attributes will also methodical experience. Scientific concepts can
have, through empirical induction relative to include only a finite number of determinate at­
dogs given and examined more closely, new tributes, but they also carry, with a scientifically
attributes which are found in conformity with extraordinary probability, an infinitely open
a rule, and so on and on. Thus empirical con­ horizon of typical attributes, codetermined by
cepts are changed by the continual admission this conceptual content, although these at­
of new attributes but according to an empirical tributes are at first unknown; this horizon can
idea of an open, ever-to-be-corrected concept be explored and circumscribed in subsequent
which, at the same time, contains in itself the investigations. In addition, the typical also con­
rule of empirical belief and is founded on the cerns causality: the causality of the “life” of
progress of actual experience. animals or plants of the relevant types (species)
under the conditions of life, the mode of their
b) E s s e n t ia l a n d n o n e s s e n t ia l t y p e s . “development,” their reproduction, etc., with
S c ie n t if ic e x p e r ie n c e as l e a d in g t o t h e regard to which it is not necessary to go into
e x p o s it io n o f t h e e s s e n t ia l ty pes more detail at this point.

To be sure, there are certain typical gener­ §84. Levels o f generality

alities of experience already passively precon­
stituted and then apprehended thematically, a) C o ncrete g e n e r a l it y as t h e g e n e r a l ­
e.g., grass, shrubs, and the like, in connection it y DERIVED FROM THE REPETITION OF
with which no such infinitely open typical ho­ COMPLETELY LIKE INDIVIDUALS. INDEPEN­
rizon is linked to the attributes which are de­ DENT AND ABSTRACT, SUBSTANTIVAL AND
terminative in the beginning. This means that, ADJECTIVAL GENERALITIES
in conformity with the nature of experience,
the eventual presupposition that there will al­ The typical generalities under which the
ways be typical attributes to discover is not content of experience is ordered are of differ­
confirmed. Immediate experience often sepa­ ent levels. For example, when we juxtapose the
rates and distinguishes things solely on the types “fir” and “conifer,” which we come by in
basis of certain obvious differences which the course of experience, the latter has a great­
can mask an actually existing internal correla­ er “extension” and is, therefore, a higher gen­
tion; for example, the membership of the ani­ erality. The levels of generality are conditioned
mals called “whales” in the class of mammals by the degrees of likeness of the members of
is masked by the outward analogy which whales the extension.
have with fishes with regard to their mode of If we start from the experience of individu­

a n e of the elements in the German word for “whale,” Walfisch, is the word for “fish." — Translator’s note.
290 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

al objects, then the lowest universal, which, likeness as the limit of similarity. With the tran­
from a genetic point of view, we come upon sition from the similar to the similar a coinci­
from the very first, is that one which arises from dence appears which is still not a complete co­
the mere “repetition” of individuals capable of incidence. The similar members which have
being experienced as independent and com­ overlapped one another are divergent. Differ­
pletely like. We call it a cone return. Every in­ ent similarities can have different divergences,
dividual object can be thought more than once; and the divergences are themselves again com­
a second object completely like it is always parable, have, themselves, their own similari­
conceivable in comparison with it. Every indi­ ties. Similarity, therefore, has a gradation, and
vidual is an individual particular of its con- its limit, complete similarity, signifies an ab­
cretum; it is a concrete individual. This univer­ sence of divergence in coincidence, i.e., the co­
sal, bom o f the repetition o f like independent incidence of elements which merely repeat
objects (that is, from individuals), is the lowest themselves. It is the foundation for the lowest
generality, the most independent; this implies level of similarity. In what concerns the mere
that it is one which is not founded in other gen­ similarity in which the higher levels of gener­
eralities, therefore, which does not presuppose ality are grounded, we have found as its princi­
them. Thus, e.g., the universal “brightness” is pal differences those of total similarity (simi­
founded in the universal “color,” which in­ larity in relation to all the individual moments
cludes brightness; in turn, color is only con­ of the similar objects) and partial similarity
ceivable as formed color; and this—in other (similarity in relation to individual moments,
words, the colored shape (the spatial shape), each with its limit of likeness, while the oth­
more precisely, the formed spatial thing itself— ers are not similar).* Generalities of different
is the complete concretum, i.e., the universal, levels emerge, depending on these differences.
which, as a universal, is completely indepen­ Levels of generality are thus conditioned not
dent. only by the magnitude o f the divergences in
We see by this that the lowest concrete gen­ similarity of all the similar moments which
eralities found other generalities, those of their are found in the individual members of the ex­
abstract moments, which, in turn, naturally tension of the generality in question—in the
yield a universal of repetition, but one that is case of total similarity these are all the mo­
dependent: a member of the class of the lowest ments—but also by the number o f similar mo­
dependent generalities, the abstract species. As ments, i.e., by the degree of approximation to
generalities which have an extension of origi­ total similarity. Stated more precisely, complete
nally dependent particulars, predestined to an likeness is the limit of total similarity, while,
originally adjectival apprehension, they are in the case of merely partial similarity (even if,
themselves originally adjectival generalities. in relation to the individual moments, this at­
To them we contrast the originally independent tains the limit of complete likeness), this limit
generalities as substantival generalities. can never be attained in relation to the whole.
It always remains the merely similar. Never­
b) H ig h e r - le v e l g e n e r a l it ie s as g e n e r ­ theless, the universal of similarity àlso con­
a lities ON THE BASIS OF MERE SIMILARITY tains, by virtue of its relation to its limit, a
universal of likeness, but only of a partial, me­
If the likeness of the individual members diate likeness, likeness “ in relation to this or
of the extension of a generality is no longer that moment.” Thus, even in the coincidence
complete likeness, then generalities of higher of likeness, a common moment comes to light,
levels emerge. We have understood complete or, rather, a moment which originally shines

*On the concepts “total similarity” and “partial similarity,” as well as “distance of similarity,” cf. §§44, 45.
Universals 291

through as a common moment. It comes to per­ sal, arising from the mere repetition of the com­
fect givenness in the process of the transition pletely like, is obviously a limiting case.
from the universal of the repetition of com­
pletely like members to the next-higher spe­ §85. Material generalities and formal
cies, to the universal of mere similarity—of generalities
total similarity, to begin with, and then to the
universal of partial similarity (likeness), which Another important difference is that be­
does not include the absolutely like or totally tween material and formal generalities. In or­
similar but the like (similar) in relation to this der to understand it, we must remember our
or that moment. breakdown of objectivities into those devoid
The universal of mere similarity is one of of logicosyntactical form and those which are
a higher level since the members of its exten­ syntactically formed, namely, the objectivities
sion, even if it is formed only by the coinci­ of the understanding. Depending on the kinds
dence of two similar objects, can already be of objects compared for the purpose of appre­
conceived as a universal arising from the pos­ hending the universal, two kinds of fundamen­
sible repetition of like members. It is thus a tally different generalities result.
specific universal, which already has under it­ 1. The synthesis of coincidence of the like
self two or more concrete generalities; later can obviously link objects as objects of simple
on we come to higher species, genera, and so experience, thus objects which still have un­
on. These are dependent generalities, and this dergone no syntactical formation. They acquire
because they spring from the comparison of a syntactical form only from this synthesis of
generalities (at the lowest level those of repe­ coincidence and the abstraction inherent in it.
tition). Thus, universals can be compared like Thus concepts arise which are purely material
other objects, e.g., red and blue; and in this as well as concrete—concepts which, to be sure,
synthetic activity a generality of a higher lev­ do not have a name. For concepts expressed
el is constituted. In this activity, the generali­ verbally, like tree, house, etc., already include,
ty comes to self-givenness as a generality in addition, a variety of predicates acquired in
which has generalities under itself as particu­ the activity of judgment. However, it is impor­
lars. Thus, on the basis of like concreta there tant to fix the simple limiting case at the out­
arises a “concrete ” species and, from concrete set. It is a matter here of concrete concepts pre­
species, a “concrete” genus. Naturally, this is ceding all explication and syntactical linking
not to say that the “concrete” species, and so of predicates.
on, would itself be a concretum. We call it a 2. But if we then compare syntactical struc­
“concrete species” only to call attention to its tures, new likenesses appear in them, namely:
origin from the concrete, since there are also a) Those which belong to contents elicited
species which have under them dependent gen­ from passive experience by explication, which
eralities, universals arising from the repeti­ thus depend on a material community. They
tion of abstract moments, e.g., species of shapes yield material general concepts.
and so on. In contrast to generalities of higher b) Likenesses which belong to the syntacti­
levels, we call these abstract: abstract genera cal forms springing from spontaneous produc­
and species. tion, i.e,, those which refer to merely formal
It hardly needs to be emphasized that em­ communities. For example, in the statement
pirical types, as the kind of generality which “Red is different from blue,” in addition to the
first thrusts itself on our attention and rests on material concepts red and blue, pure forms are
the passive preconstitution of typical famili­ also expressed in our talk about difference and
arities, are for the most part universals which in the whole form of the proposition: subject-
belong to a higher level, to that of the general­ form, predicate-form, object-form. Concepts
ity of species or genus; for the lowest univer­ such as likeness, difference, unity, plurality,
292 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

group, whole, part, object, property—in short, empirical concepts, pure concepts are formed,
all so-called purely logical concepts and all concepts whose constitution does not thus de­
concepts which can and must be expressed in pend on the contingency of the element actu­
the diversity of state-of-affairs forms and, ver­ ally given as the point of departure and its em­
bally, in statement forms are, if we merely al­ pirical horizons. These concepts do not envelop
low what is material in the propositions to be an extension which, as it were, is open merely
undetermined, purely formal concepts, formal after the event, but beforehand, a priori. This
generalities. envelopment beforehand signifies that they
must be capable of prescribing rules to all em­
pirical particulars. With empirical concepts,
Eidetic Variation and the Acqui­ infinity of extension implies only that I can
sition of Pure Universalst imagine an arbitrary number of like particu­
lars without its actually being evident whether,
§86. The contingency o f empirical in the progress of actual experience, this pre­
generalities and a priori necessity sumptively posited “again and again” might
perhaps undergo a cancellation, whether this
Empirical generalities, we said, have an ex­ being able to continue might one day actually
tension of actual and really possible particu­ reach a limit. With pure concepts, on the other
lars. Acquired at first on the basis of the repeti­ hand, this infinity of actually being-able-to-
tion of like and then merely similar objects continue is given with self-evidence, precisely
given in actual experience, these generalities because, before all experience, these concepts
refer not only to this limited and, so to speak, prescribe rules for its later course and, conse­
denumerable extension of actual particulars, quently, rule out a sudden change, a cancella­
from which they have been originally acquired, tion. This idea of a priori generality and neces­
but as a general rule they have a horizon which sity will become even clearer in the course of
presumptively exhibits a broader experience our presentation.
of particulars which can be acquired in free ar­
bitrariness by opening up this presumptive ho­ §87. The method o f essential seeing
rizon of being. When it is a question of the re­
alities of the infinite pregiven world, we can a) F r ee v a r ia t io n as t h e f o u n d a t io n o f
imagine an arbitrary number of particulars ca­ ESSENTIAL SEEING
pable of being given later on, which likewise
includes this empirical generality as a real pos­ From the preceding it has already become
sibility. The extension is then an infinitely open clear that, for the acquisition of pure concepts
one, and still the unity of the empirically ac­ or concepts of essences, an empirical compari­
quired species and the higher genus is a “con­ son cannot suffice but that, by special arrange­
tingent” one. This means that a contingently ments, the universal which first comes to promi­
given particular object was the point of depar­ nence in the empirically given must from the
ture of the formation of the concept, and this outset be freed from its character of contin­
formation led beyond the likewise contingent gency. Let us attempt to get a first concept of
likenesses and similarities—contingent because this operation. It is based on the modification
the member acting as the point of departure for of an experienced or imagined objectivity, turn­
the comparison was contingent, given in actu­ ing it into an arbitrary example which, at the
al experience. The concept opposed to this con­ same time, receives the character of a guiding
tingency is that of a priori necessity. It will be “model,” a point of departure for the produc­
necessary to show how, in contrast to these* tion of an infinitely open multiplicity of vari-

*EJ, pp. 339-354 (Sections 86-90).

XJnìversals 293

ants. It is based, therefore, on a variation. In another sound-phenomenon in order to vary it

other words, for its modification in pure imagi­ arbitrarily, in the new “example” we do not
nation, we let ourselves be guided by the fact apprehend another eidos sound; rather, in jux­
taken as a model. For this it is necessary that taposing the old and the new, we see that it is
ever new similar images be obtained as copies, the same, that the variants and the variations
as images of the imagination, which are all con­ on both sides join together in a single varia­
cretely similar to the original image. Thus, by tion, and that the variants here and there are,
an act of volition we produce free variants, each in like fashion, arbitrary particularizations of
of which, just like the total process of varia­ the one eidos. And it is even evident that in
tion itself, occurs in the subjective mode of the progressing from one variation to a new one
“arbitrary.” It then becomes evident that a uni­ we can give this progress and this formation of
ty runs through this multiplicity of successive new multiplicities of variation the character of
figures, that in such free variations of an origi­ an arbitrary progress and that, furthermore, in
nal image, e.g., of a thing, an invariant is nec­ such progress in the form of arbitrariness the
essarily retained as the necessary general form, same eidos must appear “again and again”: the
without which an object such as this thing, as same general essence “sound in general.”
an example of its kind, would not be thinkable
at all. While what differentiates the variants b) T h e a r b it r a r y s t r u c t u r e o f t h e
remains indifferent to us, this form stands out PROCESS OF THE FORMATION OF VARIANTS
in the practice of voluntary variation, and as an
absolutely identical content, an invariable what, That the eidos depends on a freely and arbi­
according to which all the variants coincide: a trarily producible multiplicity of variants at­
general essence. We can direct our regard to­ taining coincidence, on an open infinity, does
ward it as toward the necessarily invariable, not imply that an actual continuation to infini­
which prescribes limits to all variation prac­ ty is required, an actual production of all the
ticed in the mode of the “arbitrary,” all varia­ variants—as if only then could we be sure that
tion which is to be variation of the same origi­ the eidos apprehended at the end actually con­
nal image, no matter how this may be carried formed to all the possibilities. On the contrary,
out. The essence proves to be that without what matters is that the variation as a process
which an object of a particular kind cannot be of the formation of variants should itself have
thought, i.e., without which the object cannot a structure of arbitrariness, that the process
be intuitively imagined as such. This general should be accomplished in the consciousness
essence is the eidos, the idea in the Platonic of an arbitrary development of variants. This
sense, but apprehended in its purity and free does not mean—even if we break off—that we
from all metaphysical interpretations, there­ intend an actual multiplicity of particular, in­
fore taken exactly as it is given to us immedi­ tuitive variations which lead into one another,
ately and intuitively in the vision of the idea an actual series of objects, offering themselves
which arises in this way. Initially, this givenness in some way or other and utilized arbitrarily,
was conceived as a givenness of experience. or Actively produced in advance; it means,
Obviously, a mere imagining, or rather, what rather, that, just as each object has the charac­
is intuitively and objectively present in it, can ter of exemplary arbitrariness, so the multi­
serve our purpose just as well. plicity of variations likewise always has an ar­
For example, if we take a sound as our point bitrary character: it is a matter of indifference
of departure, whether we actually hear it or what might still be joined to it, a matter of in­
whether we have it present as a sound “in the difference what, in addition, I might be given
imagination,” then we obtain the eidos sound to apprehend in the consciousness that “I could
as that which, in the course of “arbitrary” vari­ continue in this way.” This remarkable and tru­
ants, is necessarily common to all these vari­ ly important consciousness of “and so on, at
ants. Now if we take as our point of departure my pleasure” belongs essentially to every mul-
294 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

tiplicity of variations. Only in this way is giv­ hen epi pollan. If, for example, we occupy our­
en what we call an “infinitely open” multiplic­ selves with the inventive imagining of a thing
ity; obviously, it is the same whether we pro­ or a figure, changing it into arbitrarily new
ceed according to a long process, producing or figures, we have something always new, and
drawing arbitrarily on anything suitable, thus always only one thing: the last-imagined. On­
extending the series of actual intuitions, or ly if we retain in grasp the things imagined
whether we break off prematurely. earlier, as a multiplicity in an open process,
and only if we look toward the congruent and
c) T h e r e ta in in g -in -g ra s p o f t h e e n tir e the purely identical, do we attain the eidos.
MULTIPLICITY OF VARIATIONS AS THE Certainly, we need not ourselves actively and
FOUNDATION OF ESSENTIAL SEEING expressly bring about the overlapping coinci­
dence, since, with the successive running-
In this multiplicity (or, rather, on the ground­ through and the retaining-in-grasp of what is
work of the open process of the self-constitu­ run through, it takes place of itself in a purely
tion of variation, with the variants actually ap­ passive way.
pearing in intuition) is grounded as a higher
level the true seeing of the universal as eidos. d ) T h e RELATION OF ESSENTIAL SEEING TO
Preceding this seeing, there is the transition THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUALS. TH E
from the initial example, which gives direction ERROR OF THE THEORY OF ABSTRACTION
and which we have called a model, to ever new
images, whether these are due to the aimless The peculiar character of essential seeing
favor of association and the whims of passive on the basis of variation will become still
imagination (in which case we only seize upon clearer if we contrast it with the intuitive expe­
them arbitrarily as examples) or whether we rience of individual objects. Over against the
have obtained them by our own pure activity specific freedom of variation, there is in all ex­
of imaginative invention from our original perience of the individual a wholly determined
model. In this transition from image to image, commitment. This means that when we recep­
from the similar to the similar, all the arbitrary tively experience an individual on the basis of
particulars attain overlapping coincidence in a passive pregivenness, when we turn toward
the order of their appearance and enter, in a it in order to apprehend it, when we take it in
purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in as existing, we thereby take our stand, so to
which they all appear as modifications of one speak, on the ground of this apperception. By
another and then as arbitrary sequences of par­ it, horizons are prescribed for further possi­
ticulars in which the same universal is isolat­ ble experiences which will take place on this
ed as an eidos. Only in this continuous coinci­ ground, pregiven from the first step. Everything
dence does something which is the same come which we further experience must be brought
to congruence, something which henceforth can into a context of unanimity if it is to count as
be seen purely for itself. This means that it is an object for us; failing this, it is canceled,
passively preconstituted as such and that the nullified, is not taken in receptively as actual;
seeing of the eidos rests in the active intuitive unanimity must prevail on the ground of a uni­
apprehension of what is thus preconstituted— ty of experience, a ground already prescribed
exactly as in every constitution of objectivities for each individual object of experience; every
of the understanding, and especially of general conflict is excluded or, rather, leads to a can­
objectivities. cellation. Every experience in the pregnant
Naturally, the presupposition for this is that sense, which includes activity, at least of the
the multiplicity as such is present to conscious­ lowest level, thus signifies “taking a stand on
ness as a plurality and never slips completely the ground of experience."
from our grasp. Otherwise, we do not attain the The same thing holds for imagination inso­
eidos as the ideally identical, which only is as far as we imagine within a context such that
Universals 295

the individual imaginings are to be linked to­ ists, then a' belongs to it in the canceled form
gether in the unity of one act of imagination. non-a, and conversely. To be sure, the identi­
Here, in the mode of the quasi, is repeated all cal substrate is not an individual pure and
that has already been said about actual experi­ simple. The sudden change is that of an indi­
ence. We have a quasi-world as a unified world vidual into a second individual incompati­
of imagination. It is the “ground” on which we ble with it in coexistence. An individual pure
can take our stand in the course of a unified and simple is an existing individual (or one
act of imagination—only with this difference: capable of existing). However, what is seen
that it is left to our free choice to decide how as unity in the conflict is not an individual but
far we will allow this unity to extend; we can a concrete hybrid unity of individuals mutu­
enlarge such a world at our pleasure, whereas ally nullifying and coexistentially exclusive:
fixed boundaries are set to the unity of an ac­ a unique consciousness with a unique con­
tual world by what was given previously. tent, whose correlate signifies concrete unity
In contrast to this constraint in the experi­ founded in conflict, in incompatibility. This re­
ence of the individual object, the specific free­ markable hybrid unity is at the bottom of es­
dom o f essential seeing becomes intelligible sential seeing.
to us: in the free production of the multiplicity The old theory of abstraction, which implies
of variations, in the progress from variant to that the universal can be constituted only by
variant, we are not bound by the conditions of abstraction on the basis of individual, particu­
unanimity in the same way as in the progress lar intuitions, is thus in part unclear, in part in­
of experience from one individual object to an­ correct. For example, if I construct the general
other on the ground of the unity of experience. concept tree—understood, of course, as a pure
If, for example, we envisage to ourselves an concept—on the basis of individual, particular
individual house now painted yellow, we can trees, the tree which is present in my mind is
just as well think that it could be painted blue not posited in any way as an individually de­
or think that it could have a slate instead of a termined tree: on the contrary, I represent it in
tile roof or, instead of this shape, another one. such a way that it is the same in perception and
The house is an object which, in the realm of in the free movement of imagination, that it is
the possible, could have other determinations not posited as existing or even called into ques­
in place of, and incompatible with, whatever tion, and that it is not in any way held to be an
determinations happen to belong to it within individual. The particular, which is at the bot­
the unity of a representation. This house, the tom of essential seeing, is not in the proper
same, is thinkable as a and as non-a but, natu­ sense an intuited individual as such. The re­
rally, if as a, then not at the same time as non- markable unity which is at the bottom here is,
a. It cannot be both simultaneously; it cannot on the contrary, an “individual” in the exchange
be actual while having each of them at the same of “nonessential” constitutive moments (those
time; but at any moment it can be non-a in­ appearing, as complementary moments, outside
stead of a. It is, therefore, thought as an identi­ the essential moments, which are to be appre­
cal something in which opposite determina­ hended as identical).
tions can be exchanged. “Intuitively,” in the
attainment of this self-evidence, the existence e) C ongruence a n d d if f e r e n c e in t h e
of the object is certainly bound to the posses­ OVERLAPPING COINCIDENCE OF MULTIPLICI­
sion of one or the other of the opposing predi­ TIES OF VARIATION
cates and to the requirement of the exclusion
of their joint possession; however, an identi­ What has already been said implies the fol­
cal substrate of concordant attributes is evi­ lowing: with the congruence present in the co­
dently present, except that its simple thesis is incidence of the multiplicities of variation there
not possible, but only the modified thesis: if is connected, on the other hand, a difference in
this identical something determined as a ex­ various aspects. If, for example, we pass from
296 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

a given red color to a series of any other red 3. The active identification which brings out
colors whatsoever—whether we actually see the congruent over against the differences.
them or whether they are colors floating “in
the imagination”—we obtain the eidos “red,” f) V a r ia t io n a n d a l t e r a t io n
which, as the necessarily common, is what is
congruent in the alteration of the “arbitrary” One point still requires clarification. We
variants, while the different extensions in the speak of variation and of variants, not of alter­
coincidence, instead of being congruent, on ation and phases of alteration. In fact, the two
the contrary come to prominence in conflict. concepts are essentially different, despite a cer­
The idea of the difference, therefore, is only tain affinity.
to be understood in its involvement with the idea An alteration is always alteration of a real
of the identically common element which is the thing, understood in a completely general sense
eidos. Difference is that which, in the overlap­ as a temporal existent, something which en­
ping of the multiplicities, is not to be brought dures, which continues through a duration. Ev­
into the unity of the congruence making its ery real thing is subject to change and is only
appearance thereby, that which, in consequence, in alteration or nonalteration. Nonalteration is
does not make an eidos visible. To say that a only a limiting case of alteration. Alteration
unity of congruence is not attained means that signifies a continual being-other or, rather, a
in the coincidence the different elements are becoming-other and yet being the same, indi­
in conflict with one another. Consider, for ex­ vidually the same, in this continual becom­
ample, an identical color; at one time it is the ing-other: the alteration of a color, its fading,
color of this extension and shape, at another and so on, is an example of this. A real thing
time of that. In the overlapping, the one con­ changes as this individual real thing; its state
flicts with the other, and they mutually supplant changes, but it retains its individual identity
each other. in this change of state. Nonalteration, on the
But, on the other hand, it is clear that things other hand, implies: being the same in dura­
cannot enter into conflict which have nothing tion but, in addition, remaining continually the
in common. In our example, not only is an iden­ same in every phase of duration. With altera­
tical color already presupposed; it is even more tion, the state of being in duration and through
important that, even if the one colored object the phases of duration is a state of being-other,
were square, they still could not enter into or becoming-other, in each new phase, i.e., cer­
conflict if both were not extended figures. Thus, tainly remaining individually the same but, at
every difference in the overlapping with oth­ the same time, not remaining continually the
ers and in conflict with them points toward a same.
new universal to be brought out (in our ex­ When we direct our attention to the phases
ample, shape) as the universal of the superim­ of the duration of the real thing and to that
posed differences which have momentarily which occupies these phases, we have a multi­
come into the unity of conflict. This point will plicity of figurations of the same thing: the same
be of great importance for the theory of the hi­ thing now, the same then, and so on,, and, cor­
erarchical structure of ideas up to the highest respondingly, from phase to phase, the same
regions. as like or unlike. But when we change the ori­
By way of summary, we survey the three entation of our regard, directing our attention
principal steps which pertain to the process of to the one enduring thing which presents itself
ideation: in the phases, which “gradates” itself through
1. The productive activity which consists in time as the same, we experience the unity, the
running through the multiplicity of variations. identity, which alters or does not alter, which
2. The unitary linking in continuous coinci­ continues and endures through the flux of
dence. multiplicities of figurations. This unity is not
Universals 297

the universal of the individual temporal phases, seeing is more complex here. It is a seeing re­
any more than these are its variants. This unity sulting from the actively comparative overlap­
is precisely what constitutes the unity of the ping of congruence. This is true of every kind
individual which endures and which, as endur­ of intuitive apprehension of commonalities
ing, changes or remains the same. In all al­ [Gemeinsamkeiten] and generalities, though
teration, the individual remains identically where a pure eidos is to be seen as an a prio­
the same. On the other hand, variation depends ri, this seeing has its special methodological
precisely on this: that we drop the identity of form—precisely that which has been described,
the individual and change it imaginatively in­ namely, that indifference with regard to actu­
to another possible individual. ality which is generated in variation, whereby
On the other hand, it pertains to the alter­ what presents itself as actual acquires the char­
ation of an individual that we can also deal with acter of an arbitrary example, an indifferent
its phases as variants (although by changing our point of departure of a series of variations.
point of view). Then we see that no alteration
is possible in which all the phases of the al­ §89. The necessity o f an explicit
teration do not belong together generically. A exclusion o f all positing o f being for
color can change only into a color and not, e.g., the purpose o f attaining pure generality
into a sound. From this it is clear that every
possible alteration is accomplished within a It might now be thought that our descrip­
highest genus, which it can never contravene. tion of essential seeing makes the task appear
too difficult and that it is unnecessary to oper­
§88. The meaning o f the phrase: ate with the multiplicities of variation, which
“seeing” generalities are stressed as allegedly fundamental, and like­
wise with the functions of imagination which
We speak of an essential “seeing” and, in participate therein in so peculiar a way. Would
general, of the seeing of generalities. This way it not be enough to say that any arbitrary red
of talking still requires justification. We use the here and red there, any arbitrary, pregiven plu­
expression “to see” here in the completely rality of red things, pertaining to experience
broad sense which implies nothing other than or to any other representation, furnishes the
the act of experiencing things oneself the fact possibility of an essential seeing of the eidos
of having seen things themselves, and, on the red? What would be necessary to describe is
basis of this self-seeing, of having similarity only the activity of running through what is
before one’s eyes, of accomplishing, on the given in overlapping coincidence and bring­
strength of it, that mental overlapping in which ing the universal into view. However, it should
the common, e.g., the red, the figure, etc., “it­ be noted here that the word “arbitrary” in the
self” emerges—that is, attains intuitive appre­ context of our remarks must not be taken as a
hension. This, naturally, does not mean a sen­ mere manner of speaking, or as constituting a
suous seeing. One cannot see the universal red nonessential attitude on our part, but that it be­
as one sees an individual, particular red; but longs to the fundamental character of the act
the extension of the expression “seeing,” which of seeing ideas.
not without reason is customary in ordinary But if in such a way of talking there is the
language, is unavoidable. With this, we wish notion that a determinate plurality of similar
to indicate that we appropriate, directly and as objects is enough to enable us to obtain a uni­
itself, a common and general moment of as versal by a comparative coincidence, it is nec­
many examples as desired, seen one by one, in essary to emphasize the following once more:
a manner wholly analogous to the way in which certainly we obtain for this red here and that
we appropriate an individual particular in sen­ red there an identical and general element
suous perception; although, to be sure, the present in both, but precisely only as what is
298 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

common to this and that red. We do not obtain nection to pregiven actuality is most carefully
pure red in general as eidos. To be sure, taking excluded. If we practice variation freely but
account of a third red or several, whenever they cling secretly to the fact that, e.g., these must
present themselves to us, we can recognize that be arbitrary sounds in the world, heard or able
the universal of the two is identically the same to be heard by men on earth, then we certainly
as the universal of the many. But in this way have an essential generality as an eidos but
we always obtain only commonalities and gen­ one related to our world of fact and bound to
eralities relative to empirical extensions; the this universal fact. It is a secret bond in that,
possibility of progress in infinitum is still not for understandable reasons, it is imperceptible
given intuitively by this. However, as soon as to us.
we say that every arbitrary like moment, new­ In the natural development of universal
ly to be taken account of, must yield the same [universalen] experience, the unity of which
result, and if we repeat once more; the eidos is continually being realized, the experienced
red is one over against the infinity of possi­ world is granted to us as the universal perma­
ble particulars which belong to this and any nent ground of being and as the universal field
other red capable of being in coincidence with of all our activities. As the firmest and most
it, then we are already in need of an infinite universal of all our habitualities, the world is
variation in our sense as a foundation. This vari­ valid and remains in its actual validity for us,
ation provides us with what belongs to the ei­ no matter what interests we may pursue; like
dos as its inseparable correlate, the so-called all interests, those involving eidetic cognition
extension of the eidos, of the “purely conceptu­ are also related to it. With all exercise of imagi­
al essence,” as the infinity of possible particu­ nation, like the one which we have already con­
lars which fall under it as its “particular ex­ sidered, set in motion by the supposition of
emplifications” and, Platonically speaking, are possible particulars, chosen arbitrarily and
found with it in a relation of participation; ev­ falling under a concept attained empirically,
ery conceivable particular in general is referred and so also with every imaginative variation
to the essence, participates in it and in its es­ involving the intention of seeing ideas, the
sential moments. How the totality of the par­ world is coposited; every fact and every eidos
ticulars which fall under the pure universal remains related to the factual world, belong­
belong correlatively to it as its extension we ing to this world. Because of its universality,
will discuss forthwith. we, of course, do not notice in the natural atti­
First of all, it is necessary to point out that tude this hidden positing of the world and this
even totally free variation is not enough to ac­ bond to being.
tually give us the universal as pure. Even the Only if we become conscious of this bond,
universal acquired by variation must not yet be putting it consciously out of play, and so also
called pure in the true sense of the word, i.e., free this broadest surrounding horizon of vari­
free from all positing of actuality. Although ants from all connection to experience and all
the relation to the contingent example, actu­ experiential validity, do we achieve perfect
ally existing as a point of departure, is already purity. Then we find ourselves, so to speak, in
excluded by the variation, a relation to actual­ a pure world of imagination, a world o f abso­
ity can still cling to the universal, and in the lutely pure possibility. Every possibility of this
following way: For a pure eidos, the factual kind can then be a central member for possible
actuality of the particular cases by means of pure variations in the mode of the arbitrary.
which we progress in the variation is com­ From each of these possibilities results an ab­
pletely irrelevant. And this must be taken liter­ solutely pure eidos, but from any other only if
ally. The actualities must be treated as possi­ the series of variations of the one and the other
bilities among other possibilities, in fact as are linked together in a single series in the man­
arbitrary possibilities of the imagination. This ner described. Thus for colors and for sounds a
treatment is achieved only when every con­ different eidos emerges; they are different in
Universals 299

kind, and this with respect to what is purely of free variation and the consequent exclusion
intuited in them. of all positing of actual being, pure generality
A pure eidos, an essential generality, is, e.g., naturally can have no extension consisting of
the species red or the genus color, but only if it facts, of empirical actualities which bind it [to
is apprehended as a pure generality, thus free experience], but only an extension of pure pos­
from all presupposition of any factual exist­ sibilities. On the other hand, eidetic generality
ent whatsoever, any factual red or any real col­ must always be posited in relation to admitted
ored actuality. Such is also the sense of the state­ actualities. Every color occurring in actuality
ments of geometry, e.g., when we designate the is certainly, at the same time, a possible color
circle as a kind of conic section, that is, when in the pure sense: each can be considered as an
we apprehend it in an eidetic intuition; we are example and can be changed into a variant.
then not speaking of an actual surface as an Thus, in the realm of arbitrary freedom we can
instance belonging to a real actuality of nature. lift all actuality to a plane of pure possibility.
Accordingly, a purely eidetic judging “in gen­ But it then appears that even arbitrary freedom
eral, ” such as the geometrical, or that con­ has its own peculiar constraint. What can be
cerned with ideally possible colors, sounds, and varied, one into another, in the arbitrariness of
the like is, in its generality, bound to no pre­ imagination (even if it is without connection
supposed actuality. In geometry, we speak of and does not accord with the understanding of
conceivable figures, in eidetic color-theory of a reality conceivable in the imagination) bears
conceivable colors, which constitute the exten­ in itself a necessary structure, an eidos, and
sion of purely seen generalities. therewith necessary laws which determine what
The whole of mathematics also operates must necessarily belong to an object in order
with concepts originally created in this way; it that it can be an object of this kind. This neces­
produces its immediate eidetic laws (axioms) sity then also holds for everything factual: we
as truths which are “necessary and universal in can see that everything which belongs insepa­
the strict sense,” “admitting of no possible ex­ rably to the pure eidos color, e.g., the moment
ception” (Kant). It sees them as general [ge­ of brightness, must likewise belong to every
nerelle] essence-complexes [Wesensverhalte], actual color.
producible in an absolute identity for every The universal truths, in which we merely
conceivable exemplification of its pure con­ display what belongs to pure essential gener­
cepts—for those rigorously circumscribed mul­ alities, precede all questions bearing on facts
tiplicities of variations or a priori extension— and the truths which concern them. Hence,
and, as such, self-evidently cognizable. From these essential truths are called a priori; this
them, in a deductive intuition (a priori “self­ means, by reason of their validity, preceding
evidence” of a necessary inference), mathe­ all factuality, all determinations arising from
matics then produces its theories and derived experience. Every actuality given in experience,
“theorems,” again as ideal identities, percep­ and judged by the thinking founded on experi­
tible in the arbitrary repetition of the activity ence, is subject, insofar as the correctness of
which produced them. such judgments is concerned, to the uncondi­
tional norm that it must first comply with all
§90. Pure generality and a priori the a priori “conditions of possible experience”
necessity and the possible thinking of such experience:
that is, with the conditions of its pure possibil­
We now turn to the problem, already touched ity, its representability and positability as the
upon above, of the extension of pure generali­ objectivity of a uniformly identical sense.
ties and to the problems, closely linked to this, Such a priori conditions are expressed for
concerning the relation of pure possibility and nature (for the actuality of physical experience)
empirico-factual actuality. by the mathematics of nature with all its propo­
In conformity with its origin in the method sitions. It expresses them “a priori,” i.e., with-
300 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

out dealing with “nature” as a fact. The refer­ it in its general essential features in mathe­
ence to facts is the business of the application, matical thinking, as an exclusive property of
which is always possible a priori and is self- the mathematical sphere.* Indeed, in view of
evidently intelligible in this possibility. And the general essential relationship of actuality
now we can say in general: judging actualities and possibility, of experience and pure imagi­
according to the laws o f their pure possibili­ nation, even to admit such a limitation would
ty, or judging them according to “laws of es­ be completely absurd. From every concrete
sences,” a priori laws, is a universal and abso­ actuality, and every individual trait actually
lutely necessary task which must be carried out experienced in it or capable of being experi­
for all actuality. What is easy to make clear in enced, a path stands open to the realm of ideal
the example of mathematical thinking and or pure possibility and consequently to that
mathematical natural science is valid in a com­ of a priori thinking. And in conformity with
pletely general way for every objective sphere. this completely general method, the method
To each belongs the possibility of an a prio­ of formation of pure individual possibilities,
ri thinking, consequently an a priori science as well as of the infinite “extensions” of the
having the same functional application as this possibilities which merge into one another in
science—insofar as we give the a priori ev­ the transformations of variation, is everywhere
erywhere the same strict sense, the only one the same, and thus naturally also the originally
which is significant. There is not the slightest intuitive formation of pure essential generali­
reason to consider the methodological struc­ ties pertaining to them: “ideas” (essences, pure
ture of a priori thinking, as we have exhibited concepts) and laws of essences.

16. The Genesis of Judgment!

§82. Reduction o f judgments to As we remember, the formalization which

ultimate judgments. The primitive analytics carries out, and which determines its
catégorial variants o f Something; the peculiar character, consists in thinking of the
primitive substrate, individual syntactical stuffs, or “cores,” of judgments as
mere anythings whatever, so that only the syn­
We must start by going back from the judg­ tactical form, the specifically judicial (including
ment to the judgment-substrates, from truths the core-forms, such as the forms substantivity
to their objects-about-which. and adjectivity), becomes determinant for the
In the first place, we require here an impor­ conceptual essences that, as “judgment-forms,”
tant supplementation of the pure logic of non­ enter into the logical laws of analytics. Here
contradiction, a supplementation that, to be we must note the relativity in which these laws
sure, goes beyond formal mathematics proper, leave the indeterminately universal cores. For
but still does not belong to truth-logic. It is a example, the forms of the categorical judgment,
matter, so to speak, of a transitional link be­ and more particularly of the adjectivally deter­
tween them. mining categorical judgment, says nothing

*In this connection, however, it should be emphasized that the method of mathematical thinking of essences is, as
a method o f idealization, in important points to be distinguished from the intuition of essences in other subjects, whose
fluid types cannot be apprehended with exactitude; this analogy thus holds only in the most general respects. On this
difference, see also Edmund Husserl, CES, esp. pp. 17ff., 48ff.
tFTL, pp. 202-212 (Sections 82-86).
The Genesis o f Judgment 301

about whether the subject or predicate of the ants of the sense, absolute something: absolute
judgment already contains a syntactical form properties, relations, and so forth, as senses.
in the core itself. The subject S, taken as a form, For mathesis universalis, as formal math­
is formally particularized equally well by “S, ematics, these ultimates have no particular in­
which is a,” “S, which is a, b,” “S, which has a terest. Quite the contrary for truth-logic: be­
relation to Q,” or the like. Meanwhile it remains cause ultimate substrate-objects are individuals,
undetermined whether, in each of these forms, about which very much can be said in formal
the S itself already has syntactical structures of truth, and back to which all truth ultimate­
the same sort within it. In the same manner, on ly relates. If one keeps to the formal of pure
the predicate side, the p may already bear within analytics, if the evidence—the evidence serv­
itself a categoria! determination (perhaps “p, ing this discipline—accordingly relates only to
which is q”—for example: blood-red); and thus pure judgment-senses as distinct, one cannot
there may be forms within forms, to any de­ establish this last proposition; it is by no means
gree of complexity. But it can be seen a priori an “analytic” proposition. To have insight into
that any actual or possible judgment leads back it, one must make ultimate cores intuited, one
to ultimate cores when we follow up its syn­ must draw fullness of adequation, not from
taxes; accordingly that it is a syntactical struc­ evidence of the judgment-senses, but instead
ture built ultimately, though perhaps far from from evidence of the “matters” or “affairs” cor­
immediately, out of elementary cores, which no responding to them. In analytic logic one can
longer contain any syntaxes. Also, in follow­ go so far, and only so far, as to say that, in the
ing up the sense of the substantivized adjec­ sense, there must be certain sense-elements as
tive, we are led back to the original adjective the ultimate core-stuffs in all syntactical forms,
and to the more original judgment of which it and that one is brought back to judgment-com­
is a member and in which it occurs as an irre­ plexes of ultimate judgments having “indi­
ducible primitive form. In the same manner, a vidual” substrates. Analytically one can assert
universality of a higher level (for example: nothing about the possibility or the essential
the logical form-genus, judgment-form) leads structure of individuals. Even that, for example,
us back to universalities of a lower level (in a time-form necessarily belongs to them—du­
our example, the particular judgment-forms). ration, qualitative filledness of duration, and so
And always it is clear that, by reduction, we forth—is something one can know only from a
reach a corresponding ultimate, that is: ultimate material evidence; and it can enter the judg­
substrates—from the standpoint of formal ment-sense only by virtue of an antecedent syn­
logic, absolute subjects (subjects that are not tactical performance.
nominalized predicates, relations, or the like),
ultimate predicates (predicates that are not §83. Parallel reduction o f truths.
predicates of predicates, or the like), ultimate Relation o f all truths to an antecedent
universalities, ultimate relations. world o f individuals
But this must be understood correctly. In the
logic of judgments, judgments (as we have ex­ To the reduction of judgments to ultimate
plained) are senses, judicial meanings (or opin­ judgments with an ultimate sense, there corre­
ions) as objects. Consequently the reduction sponds a reduction o f truths: of the truths be­
signifies that, purely by following up the mean­ longing to a higher level to those belonging
ings, we reach ultimate something-meanings ; on the lowest level, that is: to truths that relate
first of all, then, as regards the meant or sup­ directly to their matters and material spheres,
posed judgment-objects, supposed absolute or (because the substrates play the leading
objects-about-which. — Furthermore that, in role here) that relate directly to individual ob­
the ultimate judgments, the ones on which the jects in their object-spheres—individual ob­
other judgments at different levels are built, jects, objects that therefore contain within
we get back to the primitive catégorial vari­ themselves no judgment-syntaxes and that, in
302 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

their experienceable factual being, are prior material content. With all its freedom in the
to all judging. That judgments (not judgment- reiterative forming of forms, and with all its
senses) relate to objects signifies that, in the reflexive relatedness to its own scientific char­
judgment itself, these objects are meant as sub­ acter, formal logic still intends—and even in
strates, as the objects about which something these reiterations and this reflexiveness—not
is stated; and reductive deliberation teaches, as to remain a playing with empty thoughts, but
an a priori, that every conceivable judgment to become an aid to cognition that has materi­
ultimately (and either definitely or indefinite­ al content. Thus the ultimate applicability of
ly) has relation to individual objects (in an ex­ formal analytics to individuals is, at the same
tremely broad sense, real objects), and there­ time, a teleological relatedness to all possible
fore has relation to a real universe, a “world” spheres of individuals. And therefore these
or a world-province, “for which it holds good.” spheres are, for logic, what is first in itself.
(The second thesis takes us further and is yet
to be grounded.) §84. The hierarchy o f evidences; the
To ground the first thesis more strictly let us intrinsically first evidences those o f
point out that universal judgments say nothing experience. The pregnant concept o f
with definiteness about individuals, but that experience
extensionally, according to their sense, they
bear an immediate or a mediate relation ulti­ Now, if truth is in question and, correlatively,
mately to individual singles. This is clear, first an evidence by which it becomes one’s own
of all, in the case of universalities with a mate­ originarily, then what has just been stated is of
rial content. However much, as upper-level obvious significance. The hierarchy o f evi­
universalities, they may relate extensionally dences goes with that of judgments and their
to other universalities, they evidently must senses; and the truths and evidences that are
lead back by a finite number of steps to singles first in themselves must be the individual ones.
with a material content that are themselves not A priori, the judgments made subjectively in
universalities but individuals. But, if it is a the form belonging to the evidence which is
case of formal-analytic universalities—num­ actually most original, the evidence that seizes
bers, for example, or multiplicities—then “ev­ upon its substrates and predicatively formed
erything and anything” belongs to their exten­ affair-complexes originally and quite directly,
sion or that of their units. That involves their must be individual judgments.
possible determination by any arbitrarily se­ Individuals are given by experience, expe­
lectable objects whatever; and these could rience in the first and most pregnant sense,
themselves be analytico-formal formations, which is defined as a direct relation to some­
with respect to whose units the same is true; thing individual. In this connection however,
and so in infinitum. But, according to their if we take as experiential judgments the group
sense, it also involves their possible applica­ of judgments that have the most original evi­
tion to arbitrarily selectable objects with mate­ dence, then in a certain manner we must take
rial content; which would take us back to the experience in a broad sense: not only as the
preceding case. Thus it is indeed true that ab­ simple giving of an individual existence itself
solutely every universality has an ultimate ex- —that is: with certainty of its being—but also
tensional relation of applicability to individu­ as extending to the modalizations of this cer­
als that are either delimited by universalities tainty, which can, after all, change into like­
with material content or else themselves left lihood, probability, and so forth. But, over
open to choice in this respect. Now, in accor­ against all these forms of “actual” (that is: po­
dance with its sense, formal logic—and there­ sitional) experience, there comes into question
fore all forming of formal-analytic universali­ “neutralized” experience, “as-if experience,”
ties, as a function of the theory of science—is we can also say “experience in phantasy,”
intended to serve the ends of sciences that have which, with a suitable and freely possible al-
The Genesis o f Judgment 303

teration of one’s attitude, becomes positional 2. If this first series of investigations has
experience of a possible individual. Naturally, been carried out—the ones we attempted in the
as-if experience has parallel as-if modalities of earlier parts of this book—then reductive de­
its primitive mode, as-if certainty of being. liberations such as were occupying us a little
while ago* become necessary. They uncover
§85. The genuine tasks o f so-called the hidden intentional implications included in
judgment-theory. The sense-genesis o f judging and in the judgment itself as the prod­
judgments as a clue in our search for uct of judging. Judgments as senses accord­
the hierarchy o f evidences ingly have a sense-genesis.
What that signifies can be understood from
The considerations just pursued give us ac­ the phenomenological pointing back that, for
cess to an understanding of the proper task of example, a nominalized predicate (as ex­
judgment-theory, a discipline that, although pressible by such nouns as “red” and “the red”)
much discussed, has remained rather fruit­ bears, in that it points back to a nominalizing
less, because it has lacked all understanding activity, on the noetic side, and to the original
of the specific character of the investigations predicate (as expressible by such adjectives
directed to the subjective that are necessary as “red”), on the noematic side. Such phenom­
in the case of judgments, in the logical sense, enological pointings-back are shown by every
and in the case of the fundamental concepts other nominalized sense-formation (like “the
relating to these. similarity” and “this, that S is />”)—pointings
1. If the general confusion was reduced to back to the corresponding more original for­
the extent that (overcoming the psychologistic mation and, correlatively, to the pertinent nomi­
confounding of them) one distinguished judg­ nalizing activities; likewise, each attributive
ing and the judgment itself (the ideal forma­ determination in the subject points back to
tion, the stated proposition), it then was even the originality of that determination as a predi­
less possible to set a senseful problem concern­ cate; and so forth.
ing the subjective as long as the peculiar es­ This yields, even for the theory o f forms
sence of all intentionality, as a constitutive per­ and, subsequently, for procedure in an analyt­
formance, was not understood and therefore ics of consequence-relationships, a principle of
judicative intentionality in particular was not genetic order, which at the same time deter­
understood as the constitutive performance mines the specifically logical aim conferred on
in the case of ideal judgment-formations—and, analytics with the concepts and laws of truth.
still more particularly, the intentionality of With respect to the subjective, that signifies that
evidential judging was not understood as the the predelineated order of judgment-forms in­
constitutive performance in the case of ideal volves a predelineated order in the process of
truth-formations. Therefore, after the afore­ making materially evident and in the different
said distinction between judging and judg­ levels of true materialities themselves.
ment has been made, the. first judgment-prob­ Uncovering the sense-genesis of judgments
lem that must be set in logic, starting from there, signifies, more precisely, an unravelling of the
is that of going back to the variously effective sense-moments that are implicit in, and belong
intentionality and carrying out the reflective essentially to, the sense that has plainly come
phenomenological clarifications in which log­ to light. Judgments, as the finished products of
ic 's different concepts of the judgment become a “constitution” or “genesis,” can and must be
separated, according to their origins, as fun­ asked about this genesis. The essential pecu­
damental concepts for its disciplines and be­ liarity of such products is precisely that they
come, at the same time, understandable in their are senses that bear within them, as a sense-
interrelatedness. implicate of their genesis, a sort of historical-

See §§82 and 83.

304 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ness; that in them, level by level, sense points know, to judgments about individuals; and
back to original sense and to the correspond­ consequently, in the case of evident judgments,
ing noetic* intentionality; that therefore each in the sense of seeings of the predicatively
sense-formation can be asked about its essen­ formed affair-complexes themselves, it brings
tially necessary sense-history. us to those evidences of something individual
This wonderful peculiarity is concomitant that belong to the simplest type. These are the
with the universality of consciousness of ev­ pure and simple experiential judgments, judg­
ery sort as effective intentionality. All inten­ ments about data of possible perception and
tional unities come from an intentional gene­ memory, which give norms for the correctness
sis, are “constituted” unities; and everywhere of categorical judicial meanings at the lowest
one can ask the “finished” unities about their level concerning individuals.
constitution, about their total genesis, and Let us utilize a proposition from the gener­
particularly about the eidetically apprehensi­ al theory of consciousness—more particularly,
ble essential form of this genesis. This funda­ from the phenomenology of universal gene­
mental fact, embracing in its universality the sis in consciousness. It states that, for objec­
whole of intentional living, is what determines tivities of every sort, consciousness in the mode,
the proper sense o f intentional analysis, its giving them-themselves, precedes all other
sense as an uncovering of the intentional im­ modes of consciousness relating to them, all
plications, with which there come to the fore, these other modes being genetically secondary.
as contrasted with the overt, the finished, sense Consciousness that gives us something itself
of the unities, their hidden sense-moments and is indeed always passing over, by way of re­
“causal” sense-relations. At any rate, we un­ tention and protention, into consciousness that
derstand this so far as the judgment is con­ does not give us something itself: empty con­
cerned; and it now becomes understandable in sciousness. Even recollection, though it can be
particular that not only the overt, or finished, intuitive, is the awakening of an empty con­
but likewise the implied sense must always have sciousness and points back to earlier original
its say, and that it too exercises an essential consciousness. Accordingly, from these ge­
function, particularly in the process of making netica! points of view, the intrinsically first
evident—here, in our logical sphere, the pro­ judgment-theory is the theory of evident judg­
cess of making logical principles evident. But, ments, and the intrinsically first thing in the
as will be seen forthwith, that applies not only theory o f evident judgments (and therefore in
to the syntactical implications but also to the judgment-theory as a whole) is the genetical
deeper-lying genesis pertaining to the ultimate tracing of predicative evidences back to the
“cores” and pointing back to their origination non-predicative evidence called experience.
from experiences. Without being clear about With suitable further intentional formings, the
all that, we cannot actually have the principles experience enters into the judging done at
of logic at our command, we do not know what the lowest genetic level, and the product of ex­
hidden presuppositions may lie within them. perience enters into the judgment-formation
itself.
§86. The evidence o f pre-predicative Here one has indeed reached the intrinsically
experience as the intrinsically primary first beginning of a systematic judgment-theory,
theme o f transcendental judgment- as a theory that traces the essentially determined
theory. The experiential judgment as systematic genesis pertaining to the judgment
the original judgment employed originally on the matters themselves
(the “evidential” judgment) and then follows
The lowest level reached by tracing back the the predelineated ways leading upward from
clue of sense-genesis brings us, as we already what is intrinsically first in this genesis.

Reading noetische instead of noematische. —Translator's note.

The Genesis o f Judgment 305

This beginning, moreover, is the place sys­ same method: as problems concerning reali­
tematically, starting from the judgment, to ty, problems for a psychology as the science
discover that certainty and modalities of cer­ of “psychic phenomena,” of Data of “internal
tainty, suppositive intention and fulfillment, experience,” including belief-Data. Because
identical existent and identical sense, evident of this blindness to all intentionality and—ev­
having of something itself, trueness of being en after intentionality had been insisted upon
(being “actual”) and truth as correctness of by Brentano—because of a blindness to its
sense—that none of these is a peculiarity ex­ Objectivating function, all the actual prob­
clusively within the predicational sphere, that, lems concerning judgment were indeed lost
on the contrary, they all belong already to from view. If their genuine sense is brought
the intentionality of experience. Starting from out, the intentionality of predicative judgments
there, one can trace them into the givings of leads back ultimately to the intentionality of
things themselves, the evidences, on a higher experience.
level—for example: those of the proximate According to what was indicated „above, the
variants of the individual (property, relation, theory of the evidence of the pure and simple
and so forth) and particularly the evidence of categorical experiential judgment should be
the universal (derivable from the experience called the “intrinsically primary” judgment-
of individuals), with its extensional sense as theory because, in respect of intentional gen­
embracing individuals. esis, the non-evident judgment, even the
Thus one comes from the experiential judg­ countersensical judgment, points back to an
ment—more particularly, from the most im­ origin from experiential judgments. It should
mediate experiential judgment having the cate­ be emphasized that this referring back, just
gorical form—to experience and to the motive like the predicational sense-genesis discussed
for that broadening o f the concept of judgment a little while ago, is not inferred from an in­
already indicated by Hume’s concept of be­ ductive empeiria on the part of the psycho­
lief. Historically, to be sure, the apprehension logical observer, perchance the experimen­
of this broadest concept remains crude, even talist in the “psychology of thinking”; on the
countersensical. Its inadequacy is shown by the contrary, as can be shown in phenomenology,
mere fact that the identification of judgment it is an essential component of the intentional­
and “belief’ presently necessitates introduc­ ity, a component uncoverable among the in­
tion of a “presentation [Vorstellungj" alleged­ tentional contents thereof in the corresponding
ly founding this belief. This is not the place productions of fulfillment. Accordingly it is
to submit the doctrine to extensive criticism. the case that, for us, to be sure, as carrying on
Lockean sensualism, which reaches comple­ a philosophico-logical sense-investigation,
tion in Hume and John Stuart Mill and becomes the non-evident and the evident judgment are
almost all-prevailing in modern philosophy, presented on an equal plane and the course of
finds in this belief a mere Datum of "internal naively positive logic is therefore the natural
sense,” not much different from a Datum of one; whereas, considered in itself, the evident
“external sense,” such as a sound-Datum or a judgment—most fundamentally, the experien­
smell-Datum. To those prepossessed by the tial judgment—is nevertheless the original
parallelizing of “internal” and “external” ex­ judgment. From its syntaxes, the ones that are
perience—correlatively, the sphere of indi­ first in themselves, genesis of the higher syn­
vidual psychic being (the sphere grasped in its taxes goes upward, the ones with which for­
real being by immanent experience, so they mal analytics is exclusively occupied in its theo­
supposed) and the sphere of physical being— ries, concerning itself with the conditions for
it appeared to be without question that, at possible judicative evidence that are implicit
bottom, problems concerning judgment and in the a priori forms of distinct judgings and of
psychic problems generally must have essen­ their intentional correlates.
tially the same sense as problems concerning Now, even though formal analytics, in re­
physical Nature and should be treated by the spect of its province and its theory, has to do
306 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

only with the forms of possible judgments ence is to be characterized as itself the first
and truths, and even though no such thing as and most fundamental judgment-theory. Natu­
evidence or experience is to be found <as the- rally this explication of experience, as the ac­
m a tio in its province or its theory, still, in tivity that precedes the specifically catégorial
its “epistemo-critical” investigations of the activities and takes on shape in them, must be
subjective, which concern the radical method restricted to a "formal” universality consistent
of intentional performances, it must investi­ with the purpose of formal logic—a univer­
gate the catégorial mediacies of evidence sality that is “formal” in the sense that, on the
and verification, and accordingly must clarify subjective side, is the correlate of the sense in
the performance o f the original judgments. which analytics is formal. The relevant and by
Through these all truth and all judicative evi­ no means easy unravelling of the multiform
dence, so we see, are related back to the primi­ experiential performance carried out in the ex­
tive basis, experience; and, because experience periential judgment, and the unravelling of
itself functions in and not beside the original this original judgment itself, will be done
judgments, logic needs a theory o f experi­ elsewhere.* Here let us mention in particular
ence—in order to be able to give scientific in­ only the fact that even this founding experi­
formation about the legitimating bases, and ence has its style of syntactical performances,
the legitimate limits, of its a priori, and con­ which, however, are still free from all the
sequently about its own legitimate sense. If conceptual and grammatical formings that
experience itself is accounted as judgment in characterize the catégorial as exemplified in
the broadest sense, then this theory of experi­ the predicative judgment and the statement.f

*In the studies in logic that were announced above. [See Erfahrung und Urteil, I. Abschnitt and II. Abschnitt.]
tin my Logische Untersuchungen, II. Bd., II. Teil, 6. Untersuchung, the concept of the catégorial was first intro­
duced with exclusive attention to that which is syntactical in the judgment. No separation was yet made between, on the
one hand, the syntactical as such, which makes its appearance already in the pre-predicational sphere and, moreover,
has its analogues in the spheres of emotion and volition and, on the other hand, the syntactical that belongs to the
specific sphere comprising judgments.
 IX.
Static and Genetic Phenomenology

17. Time and the Self-Constitution of the Ego51'

§30. The transcendental ego insepa­ essential property of the ego, constantly to have
rable from the processes making up his systems of intentionality—among them, har­
life monious ones—partly as going on within him
<actually>, partly as fixed potentialities, which,
Objects exist for me, and are for me what thanks to predelineating horizons, are avail­
they are, only as objects of actual and possible able for uncovering. Each object that the ego
consciousness. If this is not to be an empty ever means, thinks of, values, deals with, like­
statement and a theme for empty speculations, wise each that he ever phantasies or can phan­
it must be shown what makes up concretely tasy, indicates its correlative system and exists
this existence and being-thus for me, or what only as itself the correlate of its system.
sort of actual and possible consciousness is
concerned, what the structure of this conscious­ §31. The Ego as identical pole o f the
ness is, what “possibility” signifies here, and subjective processes
so forth. This can be done solely by constitu­
tional investigation—first, in the broader sense Now, however, we must call attention to a
introduced initially, and then in the narrower great gap in our exposition. The ego is himself
sense just now described. Moreover there is existent for himself in continuous evidence;
but one possible method, the one demanded thus, in himself, he is continuously constitut­
by the essence of intentionality and of its hori­ ing himself as existing. Heretofore we have
zons. Even from the preparatory analyses lead­ touched on only one side of this self-constitu-
ing us upward to the sense of the problem, it tion, we have looked at only the flowing cogito.
becomes clear that the transcendental ego (in The ego grasps himself not only as a flow­
the psychological parallel, the psyche) is what ing life but also as I, who live this and that
it is solely in relation to intentional objectivi­ subjective process, who live through this and
ties. Among these, however, are necessarily that cogito, as the same I. Since we were bus­
included for the ego existing objects and, for ied up to now with the intentional relation of
him as related to a world, not only objects consciousness to object, cogito to cogitatum,
within his (adequately verifiable) sphere of only that synthesis stood out for us which “po­
immanent time but also world Objects, which larizes” the multiplicities of actual and possi­
are shown to be existent only in his inadequate, ble consciousness toward identical objects,
merely presumptive, external experience—in accordingly in relation to objects as poles, syn­
the harmoniousness of its course. It is thus an* thetic unities. Now we encounter a second po-

*CM, pp. 65-81 (Sections 30-39).

308 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

larization, a second kind of synthesis, which poral enduring, of such determining proper­
embraces all the particular multiplicities of ties of the Ego, or the peculiar change that the
cogitationes collectively and in its own man­ Ego undergoes in respect of them, manifestly
ner, namely as belonging to the identical Ego, is not a continuous filling of immanent time
who, as the active and affected subject of con­ with subjective processes—just as the abiding
sciousness, lives in all processes of conscious­ Ego himself, as the pole of abiding Ego-prop­
ness and is related, through them, to all object- erties, is not a process or a continuity of pro­
poles. cesses, even though, with such habitual deter­
mining properties, he is indeed related back to
§32. The Ego as substrate o f ha- the stream of subjective processes. Since, by
bitualities his own active generating, the Ego constitutes
himself as identical substrate o f Ego-proper-
But it is to be noted that this centering Ego ties, he constitutes himself also as a “fixed and
is not an empty pole of identity, any more than abiding” personal Ego—in a maximally broad
any object is such. Rather, according to a law sense, which permits us to speak of sub-human
of “transcendental generation,” with every act “persons.” Though convictions are, in general,
emanating from him and having a new objec­ only relatively abiding and have their modes
tive sense, he acquires a new abiding property. of alteration (through modalization of the ac­
For example: If, in an act of judgment, I decide tive positings—for example, “cancellation" or
for the first time in favor of a being and a be- negation, undoing of their acceptance), the Ego
ing-thus, the fleeting act passes; but from now shows, in such alterations, an abiding style with
on / am abidingly the Ego who is thus and so a unity of identity throughout all of them: a
decided, “I am of this conviction.” That, how­ “personal character.”
ever, does not signify merely that I remember
the act or can remember it later. This I can do, 533. The full concretion o f the Ego as
even if meanwhile I have “given up” my con­ monad and the problem o f his self-
viction. After cancellation it is no longer my constitution
conviction; but it has remained abidingly my
conviction up to then. As long as it is accepted From the Ego as identical pole, and as sub­
by me, I can “return” to it repeatedly, and re­ strate of habitualities, we distinguish the ego
peatedly find it as mine, habitually my own taken in full concreteness—in that we take, in
opinion or, correlatively, find myself as the Ego addition, that without which the Ego cannot
who is convinced, who, as the persisting Ego, after all be concrete. (The ego, taken in full
is determined by this abiding habitus or state. concreteness, we propose to call by the Leib-
Likewise in the case of decisions of every other nizian name: monad.) The Ego can be concrete
kind, value-decisions, volitional decisions. I only in the flowing multiformity of his inten­
decide; the act-process vanishes but the deci­ tional life, along with the objects meant—and
sion persists; whether I become passive and in some cases constituted as existent for him
sink into heavy sleep or live in other acts, the —in that life. Manifestly, in the case of an ob­
decision continues to be accepted and, corre­ ject so constituted, its abiding existence and
latively, I am so decided from then on, as long being-thus are a correlate of the habituality
as I do not give the decision up. If it aims at constituted in the Ego-pole himself by virtue
a terminating deed, it is not “revoked” by the of his position-taking.
deed that fulfills it; in the mode characteristic That is to be understood in the following
of fulfilled decision it continues to be accept­ manner. As ego, I have a surrounding world,
ed: “I continue to stand by my deed.” / myself, which is continually “existing for me”; and, in
who am persisting in my abiding volition, be­ it, objects as “existing for me”—already with
come changed if I “cancel” my decisions or the abiding distinction between those with
repudiate my deeds. The persisting, the tem­ which I am acquainted and those only antici-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 309

pated as objects with which I may become ac­ point. Thus we have touched the level of ge­
quainted. The former, the ones that are, in the netic phenomenology. Before we clarify the
first sense, existent for me, are such by origi­ more precise sense of genetic phenomenolo­
nal acquisition—that is: by my original taking gy, a renewed meditation concerning phenom­
cognizance of what I had never beheld previ­ enological method is needed. At last we must
ously, and my explication of it in particular bring to bear a fundamental methodological
intuitions of its features. Thereby, in my syn­ insight, which, once it is grasped, pervades
thetic activity, the object becomes constituted the whole phenomenological method (and
originally, perceptively, in the explicit sense- likewise, in the natural realm, the method of a
form: “something identical having its mani­ genuine and pure internal psychology). We
fold properties,” or “object as identical with have delayed mentioning it, only to facilitate
itself and undergoing determination in respect entrance into phenomenology. The excessive­
of its manifold properties.” This, my activity ly great multiplicity of novel discoveries and
of positing and explicating being, sets up a ha- problems was meant to act at first in the sim­
bituality of my Ego, by virtue of which the pler attire of a merely empirical description
object, as having its manifold determinations, (though conducted purely within the sphere of
is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions transcendental experience). The method of ei­
make up my surrounding world, so far as 1 am detic description, however, signifies a transfer
acquainted with it at the time, with its horizons of all empirical descriptions into a new and
of objects with which I am unacquainted—that fundamental dimension, which at the begin­
is: objects yet to be acquired but already an­ ning would have increased the difficulties of
ticipated with this formal object-structure. understanding; on the other hand, it is easy to
I exist for myself and am continually giv­ grasp after a considerable number of empiri­
en to myself,* by experiential evidence, as “I cal descriptions.
myself.” This is true of the transcendental ego By the method of transcendental reduction
and, correspondingly, of the psychologically each of us, as Cartesian meditator, was led back
pure ego; it is true, moreover, with respect to to his transcendental ego—naturally with its
any sense of the word ego. Since the monadi- concrete-monadic contents as this de facto ego,
cally concrete ego includes also the whole of the one and only absolute ego. When I keep on
actual and potential conscious life, it is clear meditating, I, as this ego, find descriptively
that the problem of explicating this monadic formulable, intentionally explicatable types;
ego phenomenologically (the problem of his and I was able to progress step by step in the
constitution for himself) must include all intentional uncovering of my “monad” along
constitutional problems without exception. the fundamental lines that offer themselves.
Consequently the phenomenology of this self­ For good reasons, in the course of our descrip­
constitution coincides with phenomenology tions such expressions as “essential necessi­
as a whole. ty” and “essentially determined” forced them­
selves upon us—phrases in which a definite
§34. A fundamental development o f concept of the a priori, first clarified and de­
phenomenological method. Transcen­ limited by phenomenology, receives expres­
dental analysis as eidetic sion.
What is involved here will become clear
With the doctrine of the Ego as pole of his directly in particular examples. Let us pick out
acts and substrate of habitualities, we have al­ no matter what type of intentional proces­
ready touched on the problems of phenomeno­ ses (of perception, retention, recollection, dec­
logical genesis and done so at a significant laration, liking something, striving for it, and

Reading: Ich bin fu r mich selbst und <bin> mir . . . gegeben. —Translator’s note.
310 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

so forth) and think of it as explicated and de­ "eidetic” analyses. All that we have set forth
scribed in respect of its sort of intentional per­ concerning syntheses belonging to the type,
formance—accordingly: in respect of noesis perception, concerning horizons of potential­
and noema. This can signify (and so we have ity, and so forth, holds good, as can easily be
understood it up to now) that types of de facto seen, “essentially ” for everything formable in
occurrences in the de facto transcendental ego this free variation, accordingly for all imagin­
are in question and that the transcendental able perceptions without exception—in other
descriptions are therefore meant to have an words: with absolute "essential universality,”
“empirical” significance. But involuntarily we and with "essential necessity” for every par­
confined our description to such a universali­ ticular case selected, hence for every de facto
ty that its results remain unaffected, regardless perception, since every fact can be thought of
of what the situation may be with respect to merely as exemplifying a pure possibility.
the empirical factualness of the transcendental The variation being meant as an evident
ego. one, accordingly as presenting in pure intui­
Let us make this clear to ourselves, and tion the possibilities themselves as possibili­
then fruitful for our method. Starting from this ties, its correlate is an intuitive and apodictic
table-perception as an example, we vary the consciousness o f something universal. The
perceptual object, table, with a completely free eidos itself is a beheld or beholdable univer­
optionalness, yet in such a manner that we keep sal, one that is pure, “unconditioned”—that is
perception fixed as perception of something, to say: according to its own intuitional sense,
no matter what. Perhaps we begin by Actively a universal not conditioned by any fact. It is
changing the shape or the color of the object prior to all “concepts, ” in the sense of verbal
quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its per­ significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these
ceptual appearing. In other words: Abstaining must be made to fit the eidos.
from acceptance of its being, we change the Though each singly selected type is thus el­
fact of this perception into a pure possibility, evated from its milieu within the empirically
one among other quite “optional” pure possi­ factual transcendental ego into the pure eidet­
bilities—but possibilities that are possible per­ ic sphere, the intentional outer horizons point­
ceptions. We, so to speak, shift the actual per­ ing to its uncoverable connexus within the ego
ception into the realm of non-actualities, the do not vanish; only this nexus-horizon itself
realm of the as-if, which supplies us with “pure” becomes eidetic. In other words: With each ei-
possibilities, pure of everything that restricts detically pure type we find ourselves, not in­
to this fact or to any fact whatever. As regards deed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos
the latter point, we keep the aforesaid possi­ ego; and constitution of one actually pure
bilities, not as restricted even to the co-posit- possibility among others carries with it implic­
ed de facto ego, but just as a completely free itly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego,
“imaginableness” of phantasy. Accordingly a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego.
from the very start we might have taken as our We could have started out by imagining this
initial example a phantasying ourselves into a ego to be freely varied, and could set the prob­
perceiving, with no relation to the rest of our lem of exploring eidetically the explicit con­
de facto life. Perception, the universal type thus stitution of any transcendental ego whatever.
acquired, floats in the air, so to speak—in the The new phenomenology did so from the be­
atmosphere of pure phantasiableness. Thus re­ ginning; and accordingly all the descriptions
moved from all factualness, it has become the and all the problem-delimitations treated by us
pure "eidos” perception, whose "ideal” exten­ up to now have in fact been translations from
sion is made up of all ideally possible percep­ the original eidetic form back into that of an
tions, as purely phantsiable processes. Analy­ empirical description of types. Therefore, if we
ses of perception are then “essential” or think of a phenomenology developed as an in-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 311

tuitively a priori science purely according to through, the legitimate sense of a transcenden­
the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches tal phenomenology).
are nothing else but uncoverings of the all-
embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, §35. Excursus into eidetic internal
which comprises all pure possibility-variants psychology
of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua pos­
sibility. Eidetic phenomenology, accordingly, We go outside the closed sphere of our
explores the universal a priori without which meditations, which restricts us to transcen­
neither I nor any transcendental Ego whatev­ dental phenomenology, if we cannot repress
er is “imaginable”; or, since every eidetic uni­ the remark that, with only slight modifica­
versality has the value of an unbreakable law, tions (which, to be sure, abolish its transcen­
eidetic phenomenology explores the all-em­ dental sense), the whole content of the funda­
bracing laws that prescribe for every factual mental methodological observation that has
statement about something transcendental the just been made remains ours when, on the ba­
possible sense (as opposed to the absurdity or sis of the natural world view, we strive for a
inconsistency) of that statement. psychology as a positive science and, in that
To me as the meditating ego, guided by the connection, strive primarily for the psychology
idea of a philosophy as the all-embracing sci­ that is first in itself and necessary to any psy­
ence, grounded with absolute strictness, a sci­ chology: purely intentional psychology. To the
ence whose possibility I took as a tentative concrete transcendental ego there corresponds
basis, it becomes evident after these last con­ then the human Ego, concretely as the psyche
siderations that, first of all, I must develop a taken purely in itself and <as it is> for itself,
purely eidetic phenomenology and that in the with the psychic polarization: I as pole of my
latter alone the first actualization of a philo­ habitualities, the properties comprised in my
sophical science—the actualization of a “first character. Instead of eidetic transcendental phe­
philosophy”—takes place or can take place. nomenology we then have an eidetic pure psy­
After transcendental reduction, my true inter­ chology, relating to the eidos psyche, whose
est is directed to my pure ego, to the uncov­ eidetic horizon, to be sure, remains unexam­
ering of this de facto ego. But the uncover­ ined. If, however, it did become examined, the
ing can become genuinely scientific only if I way to overcome this positivity would become
go back to the apodictic principles that per­ open—that is, the way leading over into abso­
tain to this ego as exemplifying the eidos ego: lute phenomenology, the phenomenology of
the essential universalities and necessities by the transcendental ego, who indeed no long­
means of which the fact is to be related to its er has a horizon that could lead beyond the
rational grounds (those of its pure possibility) sphere of his transcendental being and thus
and thus made scientific (logical). It should be relativize him.
noted that, in the transition from my ego to an
ego as such, neither the actuality nor the possi­ §36. The transcendental ego as the
bility of other egos is presupposed. I phantasy universe o f possible forms o f subjective
only myself as if I were otherwise; I do not process. The compossibility o f subjec­
phantasy others. “In itself,” then, the science tive processes in coexistence or succes­
of pure possibilities precedes the science of sion as subject to eidetic laws
actualities and alone makes it possible, as a
science. With this we attain the methodologi­ After the significant new formulation of
cal insight that, along with phenomenological the idea of a transcendental phenomenology
reduction, eidetic intuition is the fundamen­ according to the eidetic method, when we re­
tal form of all particular transcendental meth­ turn to the task of discovering the problems
ods (that both of them determine, through and of phenomenology, we naturally confine our-
312 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

selves thenceforth within the limits of a pure­ opment, but not in its own nexus, the type
ly eidetic phenomenology, in which the de “scientific theorizing” can occur. Restriction of
facto transcendental ego and particular data this kind has its grounds in an a priori univer­
given in transcendental experience of the ego sal structure, in a conformity to universal ei­
have the significance merely of examples of detic laws of coexistence and succession in
pure possibilities. Likewise we understand the egological time. For indeed whatever occurs
already discovered problems as eidetic, in that in my ego, and eidetically in an ego as such
we think of the possibility of making them ei- —in the way of intentional processes, consti­
detically pure (a possibility shown in our ex­ tuted unities, Ego habitualities—has its tem­
ample) as actualized. Satisfying the ideal prob­ porality and, in this respect, participates in the
lem of an actually systematic discovery of the system of forms that belongs to the all-inclu­
essential components belonging to a concrete sive temporality with which every imaginable
ego as such, or initiating an actually system­ ego, every possibility-variant of my ego, con­
atic sequence of problems and investigations, stitutes himself for himself.
involves extraordinary difficulties. Only in the
last decade has this system begun to make it­ §37. Time as the universal form o f all
self clear, above all because we have gained egological genesis
new ways of access to the specifically univer­
sal problems of the transcendental ego’s con­ The eidetic laws of compossibility (rules that
stitution. The universal a priori pertaining to a govern simultaneous or successive existence
transcendental ego as such is an eidetic form, and possible existence together, in the fact) are
which contains an infinity of forms, an infini­ laws of causality in a maximally broad sense
ty of a priori types of actualities and potenti­ —laws for an If and Then. Yet it is better to
alities of life, along with the objects consti- avoid here the expression causality, which is
tutable in a life as objects actually existing. But laden with prejudices (deriving from natural­
in a unitarily possible ego not all singly pos­ ism), and to speak of motivation in the tran­
sible types are compossible, and not all corn- scendental sphere (and in the sphere of “pure”
possible ones are compossible in just any or­ psychology). The universe o f subjective pro­
der, at no matter what loci in that ego’s own cesses, which are the “really inherent” con­
temporality. If I form some scientific theory or sciousness-constituents of the transcendental
other, my complex rational activity, with its ego, is a universe of compossibilities only in
rationally constituted existent, belongs to an the universal unity-form o f the flux, in which
essential type that is possible, not in every pos­ all particulars have their respective places as
sible ego, but only in one that is “rational” in a processes that flow within it. Accordingly ev­
particular sense, the same that, with the mun- en this most universal form, which belongs to
danization of the ego, presents itself in the all particular forms of concrete subjective pro­
essential form: man (“rational” animal). When cesses (with the products that are flowingly
I reduce my de facto theorizing to its eidetic constituted in the flux of such processes) is the
type, I have varied myself too (regardless of form of a motivation, connecting all and gov­
whether I am aware of it)—not however in a erning within each single process in particu­
wholly optional manner, but within the frame lar. We can call it furthermore a formal regu­
of the corresponding essential type, “rational” larity pertaining to a universal genesis, which
being. Manifestly I cannot imagine the theo­ is such that past, present, and future, become
rizing I do or can do now as shifted arbitrarily unitarily constituted over and over again, in a
within the unity of my life; and this too car­ certain noetic-noematic formal structure of
ries over into the eidetic. Eidetic apprehen­ flowing modes of givenness.
sion of my (transcendentally reduced) child­ But, within this form, life goes on as a mo­
hood life and its possibilities of constitution tivated course of particular constitutive perfor­
produces a type, such that in its further devel­ mances with a multiplicity of particular moti-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 313

vations and motivational systems, which, ac­ voluntarily by the circumstance that he takes
cording to universal laws of genesis, produce himself as his initial example. Transcendental-
a unity of universal genesis of the ego. The ego ly he finds himself as the ego, then as generi-
constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, cally an ego, who already has (in conscious
the unity of a “history.” We said that the con­ fashion) a world—a world of our universally
stitution of the ego contains all the constitu­ familiar ontological type, with Nature, with
tions of all the objectivities existing for him, culture (sciences, fine art, mechanical art, and
whether these be immanent or transcendent, so forth), with personalities of a higher order
ideal or real. It should now be added that the (state, church), and the rest. The phenomenol­
constitutive systems (systems actualizable by ogy developed at first is merely “static”; its de­
the Ego), by virtue of which such and such scriptions are analogous to those of natural
objects and categories of objects exist for him, history, which concern particular types and, at
are themselves possible only within the frame best, arrange them in their systematic order.
of a genesis in conformity with laws. At the Questions of universal genesis and the genetic
same time they are bound, in their constitut­ structure of the ego in his universality, so far
ing, by the universal genetic form that makes as that structure is more than temporal forma­
the concrete ego (the monad) possible as a unity, tion, are still far away; and, indeed, they be­
as having particular constituents of his being long to a higher level. But even when they are
that are compossible. That a Nature, a cultural raised, it is with a restriction. At first, even ei­
world, a world of men with their social forms, detic observation will consider an ego as such
and so forth, exist for me signifies that pos­ with the restriction that a constituted world al­
sibilities of corresponding experiences exist ready exists for him. This, moreover, is a nec­
for me, as experiences I can at any time bring essary level; only by laying open the law-forms
into play and continue in a certain synthetic of the genesis pertaining to this level can one
style, whether or not I am at present actually see the possibilities of a maximally universal
experiencing objects belonging to the realm eidetic phenomenology. In the latter the ego
in question. It signifies furthermore that oth­ varies himself so freely that he does not keep
er modes of consciousness corresponding to even the ideal restrictive presupposition that a
them—vague intendings and the like—exist world having the ontological structure accept­
as possibilities for me, and also that these oth­ ed by us as obvious is essentially constituted
er modes of consciousness have possibilities for him.
of becoming fulfilled or disappointed by ex­
periences of predelineated types. This involves §38. Active and passive genesis
a firmly developed habituality, acquired by a
certain genesis in conformity with eidetic laws. If we inquire first about principles of con­
We are reminded here of the long-familiar stitutive genesis that have universal signifi­
problems concerning the psychological ori­ cance for us, as possible subjects related to a
gin of the “idea of space,” the “idea of time,” world, we find them to be divided according
the “idea of a physical thing,” and so forth. In to two fundamental forms, into principles of
phenomenology such problems present them­ active and principles of passive genesis. In
selves as transcendental and, naturally, as prob­ active genesis the Ego functions as produc­
lems of intentionality, which have their particu­ tively constitutive, by means of subjective pro­
lar places among the problems of a universal cesses that are specifically acts of the Ego.
genesis. Here belong all the works of practical reason,
Access to the ultimate universalities in­ in a maximally broad sense. In this sense even
volved in problems of eidetic phenomenolo­ logical reason is practical. The characteristic
gy is, however, very difficult. This is particu­ feature (in the case of the realm of logos) is
larly true with respect to an ultimate genesis. that Ego-acts, pooled in a sociality—whose
The beginning phenomenologist is bound in- transcendental sense, to be sure, we have not
314 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

yet brought to light—become combined in a characteristics that make it knowable as, for
manifold, specifically active synthesis and, on example, a hammer, a table, an aesthetic cre­
the basis of objects already given (in modes of ation) is given, with the originality of the “it
consciousness that give beforehand), consti­ itself,” in the synthesis of a passive experi­
tute new objects originally. These then present ence. As such a thing, it is given beforehand to
themselves for consciousness as products. “spiritual” activities, which begin with active
Thus, in collecting, the collection <is consti- grasping.
tuted>; in counting, the number; in dividing, While these are making their synthetic prod­
the part; in predicating, the predicate and the ucts, the passive synthesis that supplies all their
predicational complex of affairs; in inferring, “material” still goes on. The physical thing giv­
the inference; and so forth. Original universal­ en beforehand in passive intuition continues
ity-consciousness is likewise an activity, one to appear in a unitary intuition; and, no matter
in which the universal becomes constituted how much the thing may be modified therein
objectively. On the Ego side there becomes by the activity of explication, of grasping parts
constituted a consequent habituality of con­ and features, it continues to be given before­
tinuing acceptance, which thereupon is part of hand during and in this activity: The manifold
the constitution of the object as simply exist­ modes of appearance, the unitary visual or tac­
ing for the Ego: an object that can always be tual “perceptual images” continue their flow;
seized again, be it in reiterated producings, with and, in their manifestly passive synthesis, the
synthetic consciousness of the same objectiv­ one physical thing, with its one shape and oth­
ity as given again in “catégorial intuition, ” or er unitary features, appears. Yet precisely this
be it in a synthetically appertinent vague con­ synthesis, as a synthesis having this form, has
sciousness. The transcendental constitution of its “history,” evinced in the synthesis itself. It
such objects (cultural objects, for example), is owing to an essentially necessary genesis
in relation to intersubjective activities, presup­ that I, the ego, can experience a physical thing
poses the antecedent constitution of a trans­ and do so even at first glance. This is true, more­
cendental intersubjectivity—about which we over, not only as regards phenomenological
shall not speak until later. genesis but also as regards genesis in the usu­
As already mentioned, the higher forms of al sense, psychological genesis. With good rea­
such activities of “reason” in a specific sense son it is said that in infancy we had to learn
and, correlatively, the higher forms of products to see physical things, and that such modes
of reason, all of which have the character of of consciousness of them had to precede all
irreality (that of “ideal” objects), cannot be re­ others genetically. In “early infancy,” then, the
garded forthwith as belonging to every con­ field of perception that gives beforehand
crete ego as such. This is already shown by does not as yet contain anything that, in a mere
memory of our childhood. However, as regards look, might be explicated as a physical thing.
the lowest levels, such as experiential grasp­ Yet, without putting ourselves back into the
ing, explicating the experienced in respect of realm of passivity, to say nothing of using
its parts, taking together, relating, and the the external psycho-physical point of view of
like, the situation may well turn out to be dif­ psychology, we can, the meditating ego can,
ferent. In any case, anything built by activity penetrate into the intentional constituents of
necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a experiential phenomena themselves—thing-
passivity that gives something beforehand; experiencing phenomena and all others—and
and, when we trace anything built actively, we thus find intentional references leading back
run into constitution by passive generation. to a “history” and accordingly making these
The “ready-made” object that confronts us in phenomena knowable as formations subse­
life as an existent mere physical thing (when quent to other, essentially antecedent forma­
we disregard all the “spiritual” or “cultural” tions (even if the latter cannot be related to pre-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 315

cisely the same constituted object). There, how­ as objects in immanent time, and the constitu­
ever, we soon encounter eidetic laws govern­ tion of all real natural objects belonging to the
ing a passive forming of perpetually new syn­ Objective spatiotemporal world. Association is
theses (a forming that, in part, lies prior to a fundamental concept belonging to transcen­
all activity and, in part, takes in all activity it­ dental phenomenology (and, in the psycho­
self); we encounter a passive genesis of the logical parallel, a fundamental concept be­
manifold apperceptions, as products that per­ longing to a purely intentional psychology). The
sist in a habituality relating specifically to old concepts of association and of laws of as­
them. When these habitual apperceptions be­ sociation, though they too have usually been
come actually operative, the already given ob­ related to the coherencies of pure psychic life
jects formed for the central Ego appear, affect by Hume and later thinkers, are only naturalis­
him, and motivate activities. Thanks to the tic distortions of the corresponding genuine,
aforesaid passive synthesis (into which the per­ intentional concepts. From phenomenology,
formances of active synthesis also enter), the which was very late in finding avenues to the
Ego always has an environment of “objects.” exploration of association, this concept receives
Even the circumstance that everything affect­ a completely new aspect, an essentially new
ing me, as a “developed” ego, is apperceived delimination, with new fundamental forms.
as an “object,” a substrate of predicates with Here belongs, for example, sensuous configu­
which I may become acquainted, belongs here, ration in coexistence and in succession. It is
since this is an already familiar goal-form for phenomenologically evident, but strange to
possible explications as acquaintive explica­ the tradition-bound, that association is not a ti­
tions—explications that would constitute an tle merely for a conformity to empirical laws
object as an abiding possession, as some­ on the part of complexes of data comprised in
thing accessible again and again; and this goal- a “psyche”—according to the old figure, some­
form is understandable in advance as hav­ thing like an intrapsychic gravitation—but a
ing arisen from a genesis. It itself points back title (moreover an extremely comprehensive
to a “primal instituting” of this form. Every­ one) for a conformity to eidetic laws on the
thing known to us points to an original becom­ part of the constitution of the pure ego. It des­
ing acquainted; what we call unknown has, ignates a realm of the “innate ” a priori, with­
nevertheless, a known structural form: the out which an ego as such is unthinkable. Only
form “object” and, more particularly, the form through the phenomenology of genesis does
“spatial thing,” “cultural Object,” “tool,” and the ego become understandable: as a nexus,
so forth. connected in the unity of an all-embracing gen­
esis, an infinite nexus of synthetically congru­
§39. Association as a principle o f ous performances—at levels, all of which fit
passive genesis the universal persisting form, temporality, be­
cause the latter itself is built up in a continual,
The universal principle of passive genesis, passive and completely universal genesis,
for the constitution of all objectivities given which, as a matter of essential necessity, em­
completely prior to the products of activity, braces everything new. In the developed ego,
bears the title association. Association, it should this many-leveled structure is conserved as a
be clearly noted, is a matter of intentionality, persistent form-system of apperception and
descriptively demonstrable as that, in respect consequently of constituted objectivities—
of its primal forms, and standing, in respect among them, the ones belonging to an Objec­
of its intentional performances, under eidetic tive universe having a fixed ontological struc­
laws. Owing to these, each and every passive ture; and this conserving is itself only a form
constitution is to be made understandable— of genesis. In all of that, the particular fact is
both the constitution of subjective processes. irrational; but it is possible only in the a priori
316 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

form-system pertaining to it as an egologi- tary comprehensive title, “the (static and ge­
cal fact. Nor should it be overlooked here netic) constitution of objectivities of possible
that "fact,” with its “irrationality,” is itself a consciousness,” phenomenology seems to be
structural concept within the system of the rightly characterized also as transcendental
concrete a priori. Now that the problems of theory of knowledge.
phenomenology have been reduced to the uni­

18. Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method"'

We must make the following distinction of something as perceived which is not self­
under the rubric of the laws of genesis: given in these lived-experiences (not com­
( 1) Laws of genesis in the sense of the dem­ pletely); and they are called apperceptions to
onstration of laws for the sequences of particu­ the extent that they have this trait, even if in
lar events in the stream of lived-experience. this case they also consciously intend what in
They are either laws of immediate, necessary truth is self-given in them. Apperceptions tran­
succession for concrete events or for abstract scend their immanent content, and belonging
phases, moments of such events like the nec­ essentially to this transcending is the fact that
essary connection of retentions to lived-expe- within the same stream of consciousness whose
riences that have lapsed, or the necessary con­ segments are being continually connected, a
nection of retentional phases to the respective fulfilling lived-experience is possible that, in
impressionai phase. Or they are also laws of a the synthesis of fulfillment, supplies its self-
mediated sequence, for instance, the laws of givent as the same, and in that other lived-ex­
association, laws for the emergence of repro­ perience supplies what is not-self-given and the
ductions for a present lived-experience with­ same [self-given]. Insofar as this is the case,
in the present and the like for the emergence there is a law here regulating the future, but a
of intentions of expectation—in the widest law merely for future possibilities, concerning
sense of empty intentions, fulfilled or unful­ a possible continuation of the stream of con­
filled processes of pointing-toward or point­ sciousness, one that is ideally possible.
ing-back. Defined in this general way, apperception is
(2) Lawful regularities that regulate the for­a concept that encompasses every self-giving,
mation of apperceptions. Apperceptions are thus every intuitive consciousness.]: Origin­
intentional lived-experiences that are conscious* ary apperception is perception, and every modi-

* Excerpted from Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental
Logic. Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming). Reprinted with per­
mission of the translator.
From 1921. —Editor's note.
tW hat is meant here is not immanently inherent, adequate givenness, but being perceived in the genuine sense.
¿Consider how the concept of apperception is to be circumscribed. Apperception: a consciousness that is conscious
of something individual that is not self-given in it (self-given does not mean being contained in perception in an
intimately inherent manner); and it is called apperception to the extent that it has this trait, even if it has something in
addition that is self-given in it. Namely, a consciousness can be apperceptively conscious of something, and that same
something can also still be self-given in the same consciousness that extends even further than this apperceiving. For
example, if in this way we call a consciousness of a sign an apperception, then that which is signified ¡das Bezeichnete]
can also be self-given along with the consciousness of a sign in the unity of a consciousness. Or in the unity of a
perception of a hexagon there appears a hexagonal plane and at the same time another; but one of them appears with
Static and Genetic Phenomenological M ethod 317

fication of apperception in imagination con­ To the latter belong the intentions that cus­
tains an apperception precisely in the shape of tomarily come into question under the rubric
this modification. If we consider here that ev­ of association. At each place in the stream it is
ery present consciousness (every span of pres­ possible for constellations that are similar (I
ence belonging to the stream of lived-experi- use an empty term [constellations] whose sci­
ence) not only is, but is “perceived,” that is, is entific content is still to be specified) to be pro­
present now to consciousness in an impres­ duced again with earlier ones, to recall the
sionai manner, then we also mean that an “ap­ earlier similar ones, to point back to them, to
perception” lies in every present conscious­ bring them perhaps to intuitive presence, and
ness. In fact, we cannot even conceive of a then as fulfillments to show them synthetical­
consciousness that would not go beyond the ly unified with the present ones, etc. Yet even
strict present in its essential flux from pres­ these apperceptions, and likewise these ap­
ence to new presences; consciousness is incon­ perceptive combinations—which exhibit the
ceivable without retentional and protentional unities of a combined phenomenon, whose
horizons, without a co-consciousness (although combinations presuppose apperceptions and en­
a necessarily non-intuitive one) of the past of compass them—these apperceptions can only
consciousness and an anticipation of an ap­ take place when other, especially suited apper­
proaching consciousness (no matter how inde­ ceptions have preceded them.
terminate it may be). Thus if something “arises (Could we not also define apperception in
out of something” at all in the stream of con­ the following way: a consciousness that is not
sciousness, then apperceptions necessarily arise only conscious of something within itself in
from apperceptions. We do not need to consid­ general, but at the same time intends this some­
er here whether there are primordial appercep­ thing as a motivation for a consciousness of
tions that could be placed at the “beginning” something else; thus, a consciousness that is
of the stream of consciousness. In any case, not merely conscious of something, and then
there are apperceptive horizons, kinds of such still something else that it does not include,
horizons, kinds of apperceptive intentions (I but rather, a consciousness that points to this
also say appresenting intentions) that must arise other one as one that belongs to it, as what
at each place in the stream according to the is motivated through it. In any case, we will
universal lawful regularities of conscious life— have to expand and give sharper contours to
like the examples given above show. But this our previous definition.)
also holds likewise for those that can arise— In addition, types of complicated appercep­
even if they must not arise—at every place in tions can occur, which, once they are there, are
the stream, namely, insofar as they are bound repeated in a further stream of consciousness
to conditions that are possible at each place. according to primordial laws under universally

reference to the other one, and the other one is itself appearing. This holds in general with respect to the components of
self-givenness peculiar to external appearing phenomena.
Every motivation is apperception. The emergence of a lived-experience A motivates the lived-experience of a B in
the unity of a consciousness; the consciousness of A is equipped with an intention that points beyond, “indicating” a
coexistence. But here we must add that every unfulfilled intention, every unfulfilled horizon contains motivations,
systems of motivations. It is a potentiality of motivation. When fulfillment takes place, a current motivation is there.
One can also say that apperception is itself a motivation, that it motivates whatever may occur as fulfilling, that it
motivates beyond itself into an emptiness. But that will depend upon more precise definitions of apperception and
motivation. Moreover, one will certainly not be able to say that a sign ¡Zeichen] motivates if it is not an indication
[Anzeichen], a word-sign, for example. But we must also ask whether one will want to speak of apperception in that
case. Admittedly, we have formulated our concept in an extraordinarily broad manner. Deeper investigations are needed
here. If one speaks of apperception, perception will not necessarily express a positing consciousness, for the co-per-
ceived is then not necessarily co-posited, to say nothing of perceived in the [broader] sense of "perception" [perzipiert
im Sinne von '’wahrgenommen "].
Fundamental for the theory of consciousness is the universal exploration of the relations of consciousness intend­
ing beyond itself (beyond its Self)— what we call here apperception—to association.
318 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

producible conditions; indeed, they run through laws of necessary succession in which con­
this stream of consciousness steadily, like all crete apperceptions of different typicalities
natural apperceptions, all objective appercep­ (among them all the apperceptions that give rise
tions of reality, apperceptions which in accor­ to the universal apperception of a world) grow
dance with their essence themselves have a his­ out of primordial apperceptions or out of ap­
tory, a genesis according to primordial laws. perceptive intentions of a primitive kind.
Thus, it is a necessary task to establish the uni­ Every apperception exhibits the structure
versal and primitive laws under which stands of noesis and noema. Every apperception car­
the formation of an apperception arising from ries out in its own way a sense-giving and a
a primordial apperception, and to derive sys­ positing of objects in doxic modalities. We have
tematically the possible formations, that is, to to undertake a unique form of analysis in or­
clarify every given structure according to its der to elucidate the intentionality of an apper­
origin. ception, in order to describe, according to their
This “history” of consciousness (the history noetic and noematic structures, the possible
of all possible apperceptions) does not concern types of fulfillment and the systems of possi­
bringing to light a factical genesis for factical ble omni-faceted, complete fulfillment, or the
apperceptions or factical types in a factical systems of a fulfillment that is continually in
stream of consciousness, or even in all facti­ the process of becoming complete. With these
cal human beings; thus it is not at all similar descriptions, namely the constitutive ones, we
to the development of plant or animal species. are in no way inquiring into an explanatory
Rather, every shape of apperception is an es­ genesis. In our descriptions of all the modal
sential shape and has its genesis in accordance modifications in retentions, rememberings, ex­
with essential laws; accordingly, included in pectations, etc., we likewise do not inquire in­
such an idea of apperception is that it must to genesis when we pass from the original im­
undergo a “genetic analysis.” And what is giv­ pressions (perceptions) as a generally typical
en is not the necessary becoming of the par­ generic character that concerns all appercep­
ticular, single apperception (when it is under­ tions, over to a constitutive character, and there­
stood as a fact); rather, the mode of genesis is fore tracing a principle of systematic ordering
only given with the genesis of essence; in this of apperceptions, a principle of ordering that
mode of genesis any kind of apperception of intersects the division of apperceptions ac­
this type must have arisen originally (in one cording to the highest genera of objects (actu­
stroke or piecemeal) in an individual stream of al and possible existing regions of objects). A
consciousness. And after it had arisen (as pri- universal doctrine of consciousness is thus a
mordially instituting, so to speak), individual universal doctrine of apperceptions, correlative
apperceptions of the same type were able to to a universal doctrine of the highest catego­
arise in an entirely different manner, namely ries of possible objects and their catégorial
as genetic after-effects of the earlier ones al­ modifications—a universal constitutive phe­
ready formed—in accordance with intelligible nomenology. The latter is preceded by a uni­
laws of a primitive form. The theory of con­ versal phenomenology of the most general
sciousness is directly a theory of appercep­ structures and modalities that encompass all
tions; the stream of consciousness is a stream categories of apperceptions. To this one must
of a constant genesis; it is not a mere series add a universal theory of genesis.*
[Nacheinander], but a development [Ausein­ In a certain way, we can therefore distinguish
ander], a process of becoming according to “explanatory” phenomenology as a phenom-

*Phenomenology:
1) Universal phenomenology of the general structures of consciousness
2) Constitutive Phenomenology
3) Phenomenology of Genesis
Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method 319

enology of regulated genesis, and “descrip­ dant,” ratifying experience of the respective
tive” phenomenology as a phenomenology of object-like formations), and we want to gain
possible, essential shapes (no matter how they its essential shape. Likewise, we investigate
have come to pass) in pure consciousness and in the free realm of possibility the essential
their teleological ordering in the realm of pos­ structures of the formal lawful regularity of a
sible reason under the headings, “object” and reason in general as formal-logical reason,
“sense.” In my lectures, I did not say “descrip­ etc. Aside from the fact that we form the cor­
tive,” but rather “static” phenomenology. The responding thoughts and realize truths in our­
latter offers an understanding of intentional selves—we recognize through them how pos­
accomplishment, especially of the accomplish­ sible rational subjects would think; through
ment of reason and its negata. It reveals to us this we construe in an indeterminate generali­
the graduated levels of intentional objects that ty subjects of pure reason and their shapes of
emerge in founded apperceptions of a higher rational activities in which they live toward
level as objective senses and in functions of and attain true being and truths, as well as true
sense-giving, and it reveals to us how they func­ values and goods. But even with all this, we do
tion in them, etc. But in these investigations not gain knowledge concerning how a monad,
we are concerned in the first place with apper­ as it were, looks in its completeness, and which
ceptive forms, with modes of consciousness possibilities are prefigured for such complete
that are conceived so generally (that is, left so monadic individualities, and through which
indeterminate) that they must belong to the lawful regularity of individuation.
make-up of every monad (e.g., perception, Let us note that we remain here within the
memory, etc.). Other ones have a different uni­ sphere of reason, within the realm of the active
versality and necessity. If we take as our point ego, and that we cannot describe a shape of
of departure the “natural concept of the world” active apperception, that is, any coherent unity
and the human ego as subject of knowledge, of active configuration (which as a unity of
then what we have gained through an eidet­ consciousness is intentional and accordingly
ic analysis is the idea of a monad that is pre­ is apperceptive configuration) without also con­
cisely in relation to a “world” of this corre­ stantly speaking of genesis. Every inferring is
sponding concept, and in this way we have a an active apperceiving, and as an active pro­
pure range of monads in whose stream of cess of configuring, it is a judging, because
consciousness “necessarily” emerge the cor­ another judging has preceded it—one judg­
responding types of apperceptions (spatial- ment is passed on other judgments that have
causal thing, animal being, human being), al­ been passed. The conclusion follows from the
though perhaps they do not necessarily belong premises, it is generated from them; the lived-
to the idea of a monad as such—what in any experience genetically issues from the ground­
case is not immediately certain a priori from ing lived-experiences, even if other genetic in­
the start. terconnections play a founding role there. Thus,
Further, in monads that correspond to hu­ every activity is motivated, and we have pure
man beings within the natural attitude, we find genesis in the sphere of acts as a pure act-gen­
factically peculiar occurrences of reason in esis in such a form that I, who execute acts, am
particular shapes. We <want to investigato the determined by the fact that I have executed
intentional typicality that is made available to other acts. Further, we have acts that are moti­
us through the phenomenological-eidetic analy­ vated through affections and that stand in a ge­
sis of the ideas “human being” and “world,” netic relation to spheres that fall outside of the
we want to investigate it systematically accord­ sphere of activity. We have, finally, genesis in
ing to all possible nexuses of reason (that is, the sphere of pure passivity, even though for­
we want to investigate its nexuses and ulti­ mations which have their origin in an earlier
mately the entire world of these monads most activity may play their part in them; but now
basically in the possible nexuses of “concor­ they themselves emerge passively.
320 ESSENTIA!. HUSSERL

Accordingly, in the doctrine of genesis, in ing understandable monadologically the natu­

“explanatory” phenomenology, we have: ral psychophysical world and the communal
(1) Genesis of passivity, that is, a general world.*
lawful regularity of genetic becoming in pas­ (6) Again, all this relates to the question
sivity that is always there and, without a doubt, concerning the genetic explanation of a mo­
has origins that lie further back, just as apper­ nad within which a unitary nature and a world
ception itself does. Special types that belong in general is constituted genetically, and how
to the general idea of passive genesis. a unitary nature and a world in general remain
(2) The participation of the ego and relation­ constituted from this point onward through­
ships between activity and passivity. out its entire life, or through an exceptional
(3) Interrelations, formations of pure activ­ span of life, and further how a world with ani­
ity; genesis as an active accomplishment of mals and humans is constituted in a constant
ideal objects and as an accomplishment of real process of identifying itself.
generation. Secondary sensibility: general laws Having preceded this is the static elucida­
of the consciousness of what is habitual. Ev­ tion of world-apperception and of the sense­
erything habitual belongs to passivity. Even giving that is carried out in it. But, it seems, it
the activity that has become habitual. is only possible to undertake an absolute con­
(4) Once we have gained all the kinds of sideration of the world, a “metaphysics,” and
genesis and their laws, we will then ask to what to understand the possibility of a world first
extent one can assert something about the in­ through a genetic consideration of individua­
dividuality of a monad, about the unity of its tion.
“development,” about the regulative system (7) My passivity stands in connection with
that essentially unites all the particular geneses the passivity of all others: one and the same
in the form of one monad, and about which thing-world is constituted for us, one and the
types of individual monads are a priori possi­ same time as objective time such that through
ble and construable. this, my Now and the Now of every other—
(5) And connected to all of the preceding and thus his life-present (with all immanences)
we ask: in what sense the genesis of a monad and my life-present—are objectively “simul­
can be implicated in the genesis of another, and taneous.” Accordingly, my objectively experi­
in what sense a unity of genesis can, accord­ enced and ratified locations and the locations
ing to laws [of genesis], combine a multiplic­ of every other share the same locality; they are
ity of monads. On the one hand, passive gen­ the same locations, and these are indices for
esis, which in the case of the constitution of an ordering my and others’ phenomenal systems,
anthropological world (or rather, an animal not as separated orders, but coordinated orders
world) refers to the constituted physiological in “the same time.” That is, my life and the life
processes and to their conditions in the unity of another do not merely exist, each for them­
of the physical world with the lived-body of selves; rather, one is “directed” toward the
another; on the other hand, active genesis in other. Not only have sensations occurred in me
the form of the motivation of my thinking, valu­ in this or that order such that, in accordance
ing, willing through that of others. Thus, con­ with the laws of genesis, a nature had to be
sidering the individuality of the monad leads constituted for me, and not only has this nature
to the question of the individuality of a multi­ endured, but a typically stable lived-body is
plicity of coexisting monads, monads geneti­ mediated in this process. Realized is also the
cally combined with one another. With respect possibility that there are things similar to my
to “our” world it leads to the question of mak­ lived-body in the nature that is given to me.

*The expression "o u r' world designates a first person plural world constituted through various historical and
intersubjective processes of appropriation and disappropriation: as such it becomes for Husserl in the 1930s a term for
the "generative” phenomenon of “homeworld.” —Translator’s note.
Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method 321

Furthermore, not only has empathy ensued, to the eidetic level, analyzes it according to
but this empathy has been ratified by the fact its strata, extracts types of constituting objects
that the interior life of the other ego has ex­ and describes constituting consciousness, and
pressed itself in a regular manner, and from finally the constitution of this type, world—
then on newly determined and ratified my ap- all without paying any attention to genesis.
presentations again and again. Perhaps I can be more clear by writing:
Primordial laws of genesis are the laws of Necessary successions in the open sphere
original time-consciousness, the primordial of lived-experience: that which is arriving is
laws of reproduction and then of association then not only arriving, but following necessar­
and associative expectation. In relation to this ily according to the evident law of necessary
there is genesis on the basis of active motiva­ succession. Naturally, one can call that a law
tion. of genesis.
If we compare static and genetic nexuses, All “horizons” or all “apperceptions” natu­
then we will have to ask whether one can rally arise in this way. But in a “static” regard,
achieve a systematic phenomenology of static we have “finished” apperceptions. Here apper­
nexuses (like that of noesis and noema), that ceptions emerge and are awakened as finished,
is, whether the genetic dimension can be fully and have a “history” reaching way back. A con­
suspended here. On the whole, the question is stitutive phenomenology can regard the nex­
how the investigations are to be ordered. It is uses of apperceptions in which the same object
clear that one will initially proceed from par­ is constituted eidetically, in which it shows it­
ticular fundamental types, some of which—as self in its constituted ipseity in the way it is
I already said above—will occur necessarily, expected and can be expected. Another “con­
others which will be presented as possibilities. stitutive” phenomenology, the phenomenolo­
The question concerns the leading clues of the gy of genesis, follows the history, the neces­
system. As leading clues, we have types of ob­ sary history of this objectivation and thereby
jects, that is, leading clues from the standpoint the history of the object itself as the object of
of ontology. And with this constitutive teleolo­ a possible knowledge. The primordial history
gies. Here ideal possibilities of concordant of objects leads back to hyletic objects and to
modes of givenness are elaborated, ideal pos­ the immanent ones in general, that is, to the
sibilities of monadic streams in which the uni­ genesis of them in original time-conscious­
ty of an accomplishment is constituted, and ness. Contained within the universal genesis of
other possibilities outside of these are to be a monad are the histories of the constitution
considered as opposing forms. of objects that are there for this monad, and
Another leading clue is the unity of a monad within the universal eidetic phenomenology
as a unity of a genesis, and then the investi­ of genesis this very process is [explicated as]
gation of the typicality of possible monads, accomplished for all conceivable objects in
namely, of possible types of the unity of an in­ relation to all conceivable monads. And con­
dividual monad, of an individual ego, and of versely, one gains graduated levels of monads
that which it had to find [in its environing- corresponding to the levels of objects.
world], and how it had to encounter itself, or I must now go through the Ideas once more
how it bears within itself a rule of individual to become clearer about what still distinguish­
character traits that are then recognizable (per­ es the doctrine of the structures of conscious­
haps through others). ness from the constitutive considerations if
Beginning with the natural attitude, one I also regard everything immanent “constitu-
can also take the “natural concept of the world” tively.”
as a leading clue. One raises the natural world
282 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

tion. The unity of affection is constituted suc­ in its disjunctive properties and these proper­
cessively, it provides the channels for changes ties at the very beginning attain collective con­
of interest; and if the emerging objects are dis­ nection. In any case, a turning of regard which
junctive, the collection can make its appear­ makes the collective into an object is always
ance. But it can also spring into activity from possible here.
the first, as when an S is explicated step by step

15. Uni versais

The Constitution o f Empirical the more or less clearly remembered; these

U niversal* relations found the characteristics of typical
knowledge, through which the empirical types
§81. The original constitution o f the are preconstituted. Of all this, therefore, we
universal must first take no account and limit ourselves
to what is self-given in the unity of a presence
in a perception, in order to track down how gen­
a) T he a s s o c ia t iv e s y n t h e s is o f lik e w it h

LIKE AS THE BASIS OF THE PROMINENCE OF

eralities are originally constituted in self­
THE UNIVERSAL
givenness on the basis of the self-given.
We return to the result of our analysis of
The fact that all objects of experience are the associative constitution of unity. Every ob­
from the first experienced as known accord­ ject affects us from a plurality of cogiven ob­
ing to their type has its basis in the sedimenta­ jects present in a field, and it may happen that
tion of all apperceptions and in their habitual the plurality as such, as a multiplicity of dis­
continued action on the basis of associative tinct objects, can also affect us as a unity. It is
awakening. Association originally produces not a mere assemblage of distinct givens, but
the passive synthesis of like with like, and this already in the passivity of its preconstitution it
not only within a field of presence but also essentially includes a bond of internal affinity
through the entire stream of lived experience, insofar as the individual objects belonging to
its immanent time, and everything which is it have common properties, on the basis of
constituted in it. Thus the synthesis of like which they can then be taken together as enter­
with like is constituted by associative awaken­ ing into the unity of one thematic interest. In
ing, and the two terms can then be brought to­ the activity of colligation which runs through
gether in the unity of a presentifying intui­ the individual members there takes place a co­
tion. If we would seek out the universal in its incidence of similarity as regards what is com­
most original production, we must not first mon to them, and a distinction as regards what
have recourse to syntheses of likeness which is different. In conformity with the “magnitude”
lead to empirical types, because in this case of similarity, the common elements have a
what is brought together through association power of mutual evocation of corresponding
is not necessarily self-given. To be sure, asso­ importance; in a pair of objects closely bound
ciative relations of likeness also subsist be­ together in this way there may come to promi­
tween the self-given in an actual perception and nence colors which are alike or very similar;

EJ, pp. 321-338 (Sections 81-85).

Universals 283

in another pair the shapes may become promi­ as we pass from like to like we often simply
nent; and so on. As we carry out a colligation, say: “This is surely the same thing.” But the
each of the members coincides with its part­ like are two distinct objects, and not one and
ner in that it is an identical substrate, namely, the same. And yet in every such duality, and in
the substrate of the moments of similarity or any manifold of like things, there is actually a
likeness. In the moment of coincidence, the unity and a sameness in the strictest sense. It
similar blends with the similar in proportion to makes its appearance in the synthesis of the
their similarity, while the consciousness of a coincidence of likeness; in other words, it is
duality of what is united in this blending still preconstituted originally as an object through
persists. These similarities have their degrees, this synthesis. It is on this that a new mode of
which are called contrasts of similarity, or “dif­ judging is then grounded.
ferences” in a determinate sense. In the case of
complete likeness, the blending is, for con­ b ) T h e u n iv e r s a l as c o n s t it u t e d in
sciousness, a perfect blending, that is, a blend­ PRODUCTIVE SPONTANEITY. INDIVIDUAL
ing without contrast and without difference. JUDGMENT AND GENERAL [GENERELLES]
These are all processes taking place entirely JUDGMENT
within passivity. Blending and the coincidence
of likeness arise quite independently of wheth­ To begin with, we assume that the themati­
er we actually spontaneously run through and cally determinative interest concentrates and
colligate individual members coming into co­ particularizes itself on S and does this without
incidence or whether there is only a passive loss of the general interest in what is connect­
preconstitution of multiplicity. ed with S. The affection which provides the
As has already been shown, the form of the impulse for the excitation of an ongoing inter­
states of affairs of the judgment of relation can est, bringing about an encompassing synthe­
be constituted on the basis of such syntheses sis and a continuous activity of unification, is
of likeness. As we pass from one ink spot to constantly efficacious. In the restriction to S,
another, a coincidence is accomplished in the the moment p, which comes to prominence as
form of a synthesis of likeness, and the state of its property, is first apprehended in the form S
affairs “A is like B” is engendered by the fact is p. Suppose that the interest now shifts over
that they are both kept apart and synthetically to S'—which coaffects us on the basis of a com­
combined. pletely like moment p, an individual moment
But the act of judgment can go in still an­ belonging to S'. This S' must become predica-
other direction: whereas on the basis of the tively determined by its moment p in the same
associative awakening of like by like, an ob­ way that just previously was true of S. The pas­
ject no longer affects us merely for itself but sive synthesis of coincidence between S and
in community with those akin to it, likewise, S', which was the ground of the common af­
every judgment which is valid for an object fection, can now be actively apprehended; we
taken for itself can enter into connection with say that S and S' are the same—are p: although
judgments which are valid for kindred objects. S still has its moment p, and S', in turn, has its
Otherwise expressed: in the unity of a plurali­ moment p. Like the substrates, their properties
ty founded on kinship, a singular judgment can are separated; but in the thematic transition we
enter into community with another singular make, they are coincident, and there is an ac­
judgment, whereby new kinds of judgments tivity of identification. But this does not mean
going beyond singularities arise. This becomes that the qualitative moments on both sides, or
intelligible in view of the unique character of even that the S and the S', are present to con­
the synthesis of like with like. Its peculiarity sciousness as identical, although we say that S
lies in the fact that, though it indeed very much and S' are the same. With this, obviously, there
resembles a synthesis of identity, it still is not is no question of a total identification; but, on
one. It resembles such a synthesis so much that the other hand, there is also no question of a
284 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

partial identification of the kind which we though it is individualized in them, it is not in

have called explicative coincidence and to them as a part.
which we owe the qualitative moment as de­ First of all, we take note of the fact that
termination. here different forms of judgment must be dis­
In any case, it is clear that when we pass tinguished from one another and that a new
from like moment to like moment a unity form is constituted, different from those which
emerges in the coincidence, a unity in the du­ we have considered up to now. The judgment
ality of elements which are both separated S is p* in which p designates the individual
and linked together, and that this unity emerges moment in the individual object S is complete­
over and over again as totally and identically ly different from the judgment S is p in which
the same when we pass to a new member S", p designates the universal, the eidos, and, in
then again to S'", in which we have a moment the same way, the judgment p' is p (the indi­
p which is always like. The unity first emerges vidual moment p' is of the kind p). In the one
on the basis of the passive coincidence of like­ case, there is an identification between the
ness of the individual moments; and if one substrate and its individual moment, in the
comes back to it, it can then be apprehended other, a universal is predicated of the substrate.
for itself. We must, therefore, distinguish the It is determined as being of the kind p; or p',
first series o f judgments, in which there is on the basis of coincidence with other like
predicated of each substrate its own individual moments p", is determined as being of the kind
moment—S' is p', S" is p", etc.—and, in con­ p. In the one case we thus have a judgment
trast to this, the judgments in which the same which contains individual cores in itself and
p, as everywhere like, is predicated as the uni­ predicates something individual of them; we
versal, as the identically one in all, that which call it an individual judgment. In the other case,
emerges in p', p", and so on. This means that new cores appear, namely, generalities, at least
the unity is preconstituted in the passive coin­ on one side: the judgment is a universal judg­
cidence of likeness of the moments p', p", and ment. This is a new form of judging because
so on, as the unity of the species p: on the the difference of the cores has as a consequence
strength of this, an act of judgment oriented in a modification of the form o f the synthesis of
a new direction is possible, in which, if we re­ identity in contrast to the simple explicative
turn to S' and re-effect the identification, we no synthesis, such as we conceived it as originally
longer determine S' by p' as its individual underlying our basic form of the categorical
moment but by p as identically the same in S, judgment: S is p; this is a synthesis which natu­
S', and so on. There result the judgments S' rally can occur only on the basis of such a
is p, S" is p, and so on, in which p no longer simple explicative synthesis or a plurality of
designates an individual predicative core but such syntheses.
a general one, namely, the universal as that Speaking genetically and as a matter of prin­
which is common to two or more S ’s succes­ ciple, such a general core, a hen epi pollón,
sively apprehended. Instead of being deter­ naturally can be present to consciousness as
mined by the fleeting and variable moment, this the unity of an a priori generality, and can be
is determined, therefore, by an element ideally ready for a possible thematic apprehension,
and absolutely identical, which, in the mode only after the active accomplishment of the
of repetition or assimilation, goes through all separate apprehension of like objects in a syn­
the individual objects and their multiform mo­ thetic transition. But no act of relational judg­
ments as an ideal unity. As we will see later ment of comparison need necessarily have
on, this is a unity which is not at all a function preceded, for example a judgment of the form
of the actuality of the moments; it does not pS (the moment p of S) is like pS'; rather, this
come into being and disappear with them, and, requires another attitude. The direction of in-

Reading p instead of p '. — Translator’s note.

Universali 285

terest toward the universal, toward unity as tity, different from all other such relations. If
opposed to multiplicity, does not aim at the the universal a which is brought into promi­
determination of the like in relation to another nence in the same way in A and B is appre­
as its like. Hence it is not the synthesis of coin­ hended objectively, it gives itself as in A, in
cidence of the like, presenting itself passive­ B, and in the corresponding transitions. States
ly, which is actualized in the form of an “is”- of affairs of a new kind can arise: A is an in­
predication. What awakens interest is rather stance of the universal, it participates in the uni­
what is passively preconstituted in the coinci­ versal, it is conceived through oc. If we make
dence of the like as individually apprehended; a the subject, this means: a, the predicate, be­
this is the one which comes into prominence longs to the particular, to A, to B; the concept
on the basis of the coincidence, the identical dwells in the particular (koinönia). To express
which is one and always the same, no matter the first state of affairs in ordinary language,
in what direction we may continue; it is this we say, for example: “This is red, that is also
which is actively apprehended. red.” We should notice here that the adjectival
Furthermore, what is achieved is obviously form belongs essentially to the state of affairs
no longer something on the order of an expli­ and is not an accident of grammar. It will be
cation of like objects. The one which comes to necessary later on to discuss the way in which
light here is not in the objects as their part, as the forms of judging “in general” emerge on
a partial-identical; otherwise, it would indeed the basis of these relations.
be only a like which is present everywhere, and The relation of participation is not to be
the like elements would be in a relation of in­ confused with that of mere likeness. We must
tersection. not think that the identity of the universal is
Hence, the one does not repeat itself in the only an exaggerated way of speaking. Through
like; it is given only once, but in many. It con­ overlapping, the like here and there stands out
fronts us as an objectivity of a new kind, as from the different. But just as the concrete in­
an objectivity of understanding, arising from dividual objects are separated in multiplicity
original sources of activity, although obvious­ or plurality, wherein the coincidence by over­
ly on the foundation of sensibility; for the ac­ lapping which makes its appearance in the ac­
tivity of apprehending and running through par­ tive accomplishment of colligation changes
ticulars and bringing them into coincidence is nothing, so also the moments of likeness which
necessary if the universal is to be preconstituted become objects of attention are separated and,
at all and then become a thematic object. Its in the same way, the moments which differ;
original apprehension has a field of interest of each object has its indwelling moment, for ex­
a different sort, which the interest must run ample, that of redness, and each of the many
through as in the case of an individual object objects which are red has its proper individu­
of simple receptivity. The glancing ray of at­ al moment, but in likeness.
tention must go through the individual objects As against this, it should be emphasized
already constituted; and, as it pursues the bond that likeness is only a correlate of the identity
of likeness and brings about the coincidence, of a universal, which in truth can be consid­
the one which is thus constituted is thematized ered as one and the same and as a “counter­
as something which is inherent in the individu­ part” of the individual. This identical moment
al objects and yet is not part of them; for the is first “particularized” [vereinzelt] into two,
objects compared can also be completely sepa­ and then, as we will soon see, into as many as
rated. desired. All of these particularizations have a
relation to one another through their relation
c) P a r tic ip a tio n in t h e id e n tity o f t h e to the identical and are then said to be like.
UNIVERSAL, AND MERE LIKENESS Metaphorically speaking, the concrete objects
which have such particularizations in them­
This kind of self-giving inherent in particu­ selves are then said to be like “with regard to
lars points to a wholly unique relation of iden­ red” and can themselves be considered in an
286 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

improper sense as particularizations of the really possible objects, and as soon as it be­
universal. comes intuitive as an open infinity, it gives it­
self as an infinitude o f particularizations of
§82. Empirical generalities and their the SAME universal. The generalities individu­
extension. The ideality o f concepts ally apprehended and combined then get an
infinite extension and lose their tie to precisely
We first thought of the universal as given those individuals from which they were first
to us by the cohesion of two substrates. And, in abstracted.
fact, a universal is already constituted in this In addition, it should be noted that a syn­
case; it is, to be sure, a universal of the lowest thetic linking-on to an original constitution of
level—precisely, what is common to two ob­ the generality is by no means required in or­
jects. However, the comparison can go further, der to apprehend a particular object as the
at first from A to B, then from B to C, to D, particular instance of a universal. If the con­
etc.; and, with each new step, the universal ac­ cept, e.g., the concept flower, previously ap­
quires a greater extension. As we have already peared in an original comparison, then a new
indicated, not only the singular judgments A is flower making its appearance is recognized
red, B is red, C is red, and so on can emerge on on the basis of associative awakening of the
the basis of this coincidence of likeness, but type “flower,” established in the past, without
also new forms o f the state of affairs as plu­ an intuitive recollection of the earlier cases
ral: A and B are red, A and B and C are red, of comparison being necessary. But actual
where “red” designates the species. By invert­ givenness of the universal then requires that
ing the terms, the judgments read: Red (now we pass beyond what is particular in the like­
as the main substrate, as the subject in a new nesses, eventually toward an open horizon of
syntactical form) belongs to A, B, C ... . In the possible continuation. Whether the earlier
first form there is then a multiple subject, a cases are individually represented in addition
plural; a synthetic ray goes out from each does not matter. Thus it is evident that the
member, directed toward the general predi­ universal is not bound to any particular actu­
cate, which is posited only once. Conversely: ality.
the one general term as subject discharges a We can now also go beyond experience, and
multiple ray of predication. Each individual the comparison of objects actually given in
ray terminates in a member of the collection: A experience, and pass over to free imagination.
and B, etc. We imagine similar particulars—similar to ac­
In these cases, the comparison which leads tualities which have been actually experienced
to a universal concerns individually determined to begin with—and thereupon as many as we
objects, which appear in a finite closed experi­ choose, that is, always new, individually dif­
ence in their individual determinateness. Al­ ferent from one another, as similar particulars,
though opposite to them as irreal, yet still bound and such that, if the experience had continued,
to them, the universal then appears as some­ they could actually have been given to us. Thus,
thing standing out in them, as a concept dwell­ to every concept belongs an infinite extension
ing in them. However, as soon as the experi­ of purely possible particulars, of purely pos­
ence broadens and leads to new like objects, sible conceptual objects. If I imagine things,
while the first are still in hand or associatively I apprehend in them as pure possibilities the
awakened in a recollection, a resumption of concept of a thing. I can find this same concept
the synthesis immediately occurs; new ele­ in actual things; stated more precisely, in in­
ments of likeness are immediately recognized tended things which I posit as actualities on
as particularizations of the same universal. the basis of actual experience. In the transition
This can proceed to infinity. As soon as an open from imagination to actual experience, these
horizon of like objects is present to conscious­ give themselves as particulars realizing the
ness as a horizon of presumptively actual and same universal which, in imagination, is not
üniversals 287

truly realized but only quasi-realized in the pos­ a being-in-itself devoid of reference to any
sibilities discerned. subject. On the contrary, like all objectivities
Consequently, the possibility o f the forma­ of understanding, it refers essentially to the
tion o f general objectivities, of “concepts,” processes o f productive spontaneity which be­
extends as far as there are associative synthe­ long to it correlatively and in which it comes
ses of likeness. On this rests the universality of to original givenness. The being of the univer­
the operation of the formation of concepts; sal in its different levels is essentially a being-
everything which, in some way or other, is ob­ constituted in these processes.
jectively constituted in actuality or possibility, In accordance with our starting from expe­
as an object of actual experience or of imagi­ rience and from the comparison and formation
nation, can occur as a term in relations of com­ of concepts taking place on the basis of experi­
parison and be conceived through the activity ence, we have, up to this point, not yet been
of eidetic identification and subsumption un­ able to deal with pure generalities. What we
der a universal. have described is the acquisition of empirical
The concept in its ideality must be under­ generalities. All the concepts of natural life
stood as something objective which has a pure­ bring with them, without harm to their ideali­
ly ideal being, a being which does not presup­ ty, the copositing of an empirical sphere in
pose the actual existence of corresponding which they have the place of their possible re­
particulars; it is what it is even if the corre­ alization in particulars. If we speak of animals,
sponding particulars are only pure possibili­ plants, cities, houses, and so on, we intend
ties, though, on the other hand, in the realm of therewith in advance things of the world, and
experienced actuality, it can also be the real­ in fact the world of our actual, real experience
ized concept of actual particulars. And if there (not of a merely possible world); accordingly,
are actual particulars, other like ones can just we think of these concepts as actual generali­
as well be taken in their place. Correlative to ties, that is, as bound to this world. The exten­
the pure being o f the universal is the being of sion of such concepts is indeed infinite, but it
the pure possibilities which participate in it and is an actual extension, the extension of things
which must be constructed as its bases and as actually and really possible in the given world.
an ideally infinite extension of the bases of the These real possibilities, which belong to the
pure abstraction giving access to the universal. extension of empirical concepts, must not be
Naturally, concepts as pure concepts can, confused with the pure possibilities to which
from the first, originate outside o f all relation pure generalities refer. On this, more later on.
to current actuality, namely, by the compari­
son of pure possibilities of the imagination. It §83. Empirico-typical generality and its
is clear thereby that every actual likeness, ac­ passive preconstitution
quired in this way, of possibilities given as ex­
isting (as existing, not in the sense of a reality a) T h e a t t a in m e n t o f e m p ir ic a l c o n ­
of experience, but precisely as a possibility) cepts FROM TYPES IN NATURAL EXPERIEN­
intentionally includes in itself a possible like­ TIAL APPERCEPTION
ness of possible actualities and a possible uni­
versal in which they can possibly participate. In the first place, there are still important
On the other hand, even if they were formed distinctions to be made in the domain of em­
originally on the basis of experience as actual pirical generalities; above all, it is necessary to
generalities, concepts can always be appre­ examine more closely the path which leads
hended as pure concepts. from passively preconstituted typifications to
Despite all the Platonic turns of phrase by empirical concepts, specifically to empirical
which we have described its relation to the par­ concepts understood not only in the sense of
ticular, the ideality of the universal must not everyday concepts but, on a higher level, to
be understood as if it were a question here of concepts of the empirical sciences.
288 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

We return to what has been said previous­ unthematic. But on the basis of this reference
ly. The factual world of experience is experi­ we can always constitute a general concept
enced as a typified world. Things are experi­ “dog,” represent other dogs known by experi­
enced as trees, bushes, animals, snakes, birds; ence to ourselves; in an arbitrary creation of
specifically, as pine, linden, lilac, dog, viper, the imagination we can also represent other
swallow, sparrow, and so on. The table is char­ dogs to ourselves in an open multiplicity and
acterized as being familiar and yet new. What hence discern the universal “dog.” If we are
is given in experience as a new individual is once attuned to apprehension of the universal,
first known in terms of what has been genu­ then in conformity with the synthesis discussed
inely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the in §81, each part, each particular moment in
similar). But what is apprehended according an object, furnishes us something to appre­
to type also has a horizon of possible experi­ hend conceptually as general; every analysis
ence with corresponding prescriptions of fa­ will then go hand in hand with a general predi­
miliarity and has, therefore, types of attributes cation. Thus the uniform general type, the uni­
not yet experienced but expected. When we see versal first apprehended on the basis of the
a dog, we immediately anticipate its addition­ associatively awakened relation of the like­
al modes of behavior: its typical way of eat­ ness of one object with other objects, will be
ing, playing, running, jumping, and so on. We a universal, a concept which includes many
do not actually see its teeth; but although we particular concepts. But if the objects are real
have never yet seen this dog, we know in ad­ objects, then a sensuous type coming to promi­
vance how its teeth will look—not in their in­ nence does not exhaust every like element
dividual determination but according to type, which we can find in continuing experience
inasmuch as we have already had previous and and, consequently, in the exposition of the true
frequent experience of “similar” animals, of being of these objects as that in which they are
“dogs,” that they have such things as “teeth” like. The more the objects reveal themselves
and of this typical kind. To begin with, what is as they are, the more each of them enters into
experienced about a perceived object in the intuition, then all the more numerous are the
progress of experience is straightway assigned possibilities which present themselves of find­
“apperceptively” to every perceived object with ing likenesses. But it then also becomes evi­
similar components of genuine perception. We dent that further determinations are as a rule
anticipate this, and actual experience may or in regular connection with the determinations
may not confirm it. In the confirmation, the already apprehended or, what is the same thing,
content of a type is extended, but the type can that in the course of experience they must be
also be subdivided into particular types; on the expected as copresent.
other hand, every concrete real thing still has To the type “dog,” e.g., belongs a stock of
its individual attributes, though at the same time typical attributes with an open horizon of an­
they have their typical form. ticipation of further such attributes. This im­
Everything apprehended according to type plies that, according to the “universal,” one dog
can lead us to the general concept of the type is like every other, specifically, in such a way
in which we apprehend it. On the other hand, that the universal, which, through the previous
we are not necessarily directed toward the experiences of dogs, even if these were only
universal in this way; notwithstanding the pos­ superficial and wholly incomplete, has been
sible utilization of the name “dog” in its gen­ prescribed as characterizing all dogs and which
eral signification, we need not thematize a is already known according to its type, brings
dog according to its type as a particular of with itself an indeterminate horizon of typical
the universal “dog”; rather, we can also be di­ attributes still unknown. If we were to go on in
rected toward it as an individual: then, the pas­ experience, at first to this or that particular
sively preconstituted reference to its type, in dog, we would in the end constantly discover
which it is apprehended from the first, remains ever new attributes, belonging not merely to
Universals 289

these dogs but to dogs in general and deter­ life, something already indicated in the verb­
mined by the typical attributes which we have al designation.* In such cases we speak of non-
ascribed to them up to that point. Thus, super­ essential types. In the comprehensive experi­
seding the actual concept, specifically acquired ence of concrete nature, individuals are ordered
in actual experience, a presumptive idea arises, increasingly under essential types, in different
the idea of a universal, to which belongs, in levels of generality. Scientific investigation
addition to the attributes already acquired, a of empirical natural history is based on this.
horizon, indeterminate and open, of unknown Necessarily underlying it is the prescientific
attributes (conceptual determinations). Specifi­ and multifariously nonessential typification
cally, this is a horizon in the sense of a con­ carried out by natural experiential appercep­
stant presumption, of a constant empirical cer­ tion. Scientific concepts of species seek to de­
tainty, according to which what is identified as termine essential types by a systematic and
a dog through the known attributes will also methodical experience. Scientific concepts can
have, through empirical induction relative to include only a finite number of determinate at­
dogs given and examined more closely, new tributes, but they also carry, with a scientifically
attributes which are found in conformity with extraordinary probability, an infinitely open
a rule, and so on and on. Thus empirical con­ horizon of typical attributes, codetermined by
cepts are changed by the continual admission this conceptual content, although these at­
of new attributes but according to an empirical tributes are at first unknown; this horizon can
idea of an open, ever-to-be-corrected concept be explored and circumscribed in subsequent
which, at the same time, contains in itself the investigations. In addition, the typical also con­
rule of empirical belief and is founded on the cerns causality: the causality of the “life” of
progress of actual experience. animals or plants of the relevant types (species)
under the conditions of life, the mode of their
b) E s s e n t ia l a n d n o n e s s e n t ia l t y p e s . “development,” their reproduction, etc., with
S c ie n t if ic e x p e r ie n c e as l e a d in g t o t h e regard to which it is not necessary to go into
e x p o s it io n o f t h e e s s e n t ia l ty pes more detail at this point.

To be sure, there are certain typical gener­ §84. Levels o f generality

alities of experience already passively precon­
stituted and then apprehended thematically, a) C o ncrete g e n e r a l it y as t h e g e n e r a l ­
e.g., grass, shrubs, and the like, in connection it y DERIVED FROM THE REPETITION OF
with which no such infinitely open typical ho­ COMPLETELY LIKE INDIVIDUALS. INDEPEN­
rizon is linked to the attributes which are de­ DENT AND ABSTRACT, SUBSTANTIVAL AND
terminative in the beginning. This means that, ADJECTIVAL GENERALITIES
in conformity with the nature of experience,
the eventual presupposition that there will al­ The typical generalities under which the
ways be typical attributes to discover is not content of experience is ordered are of differ­
confirmed. Immediate experience often sepa­ ent levels. For example, when we juxtapose the
rates and distinguishes things solely on the types “fir” and “conifer,” which we come by in
basis of certain obvious differences which the course of experience, the latter has a great­
can mask an actually existing internal correla­ er “extension” and is, therefore, a higher gen­
tion; for example, the membership of the ani­ erality. The levels of generality are conditioned
mals called “whales” in the class of mammals by the degrees of likeness of the members of
is masked by the outward analogy which whales the extension.
have with fishes with regard to their mode of If we start from the experience of individu­

a n e of the elements in the German word for “whale,” Walfisch, is the word for “fish." — Translator’s note.
290 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

al objects, then the lowest universal, which, likeness as the limit of similarity. With the tran­
from a genetic point of view, we come upon sition from the similar to the similar a coinci­
from the very first, is that one which arises from dence appears which is still not a complete co­
the mere “repetition” of individuals capable of incidence. The similar members which have
being experienced as independent and com­ overlapped one another are divergent. Differ­
pletely like. We call it a cone return. Every in­ ent similarities can have different divergences,
dividual object can be thought more than once; and the divergences are themselves again com­
a second object completely like it is always parable, have, themselves, their own similari­
conceivable in comparison with it. Every indi­ ties. Similarity, therefore, has a gradation, and
vidual is an individual particular of its con- its limit, complete similarity, signifies an ab­
cretum; it is a concrete individual. This univer­ sence of divergence in coincidence, i.e., the co­
sal, bom o f the repetition o f like independent incidence of elements which merely repeat
objects (that is, from individuals), is the lowest themselves. It is the foundation for the lowest
generality, the most independent; this implies level of similarity. In what concerns the mere
that it is one which is not founded in other gen­ similarity in which the higher levels of gener­
eralities, therefore, which does not presuppose ality are grounded, we have found as its princi­
them. Thus, e.g., the universal “brightness” is pal differences those of total similarity (simi­
founded in the universal “color,” which in­ larity in relation to all the individual moments
cludes brightness; in turn, color is only con­ of the similar objects) and partial similarity
ceivable as formed color; and this—in other (similarity in relation to individual moments,
words, the colored shape (the spatial shape), each with its limit of likeness, while the oth­
more precisely, the formed spatial thing itself— ers are not similar).* Generalities of different
is the complete concretum, i.e., the universal, levels emerge, depending on these differences.
which, as a universal, is completely indepen­ Levels of generality are thus conditioned not
dent. only by the magnitude o f the divergences in
We see by this that the lowest concrete gen­ similarity of all the similar moments which
eralities found other generalities, those of their are found in the individual members of the ex­
abstract moments, which, in turn, naturally tension of the generality in question—in the
yield a universal of repetition, but one that is case of total similarity these are all the mo­
dependent: a member of the class of the lowest ments—but also by the number o f similar mo­
dependent generalities, the abstract species. As ments, i.e., by the degree of approximation to
generalities which have an extension of origi­ total similarity. Stated more precisely, complete
nally dependent particulars, predestined to an likeness is the limit of total similarity, while,
originally adjectival apprehension, they are in the case of merely partial similarity (even if,
themselves originally adjectival generalities. in relation to the individual moments, this at­
To them we contrast the originally independent tains the limit of complete likeness), this limit
generalities as substantival generalities. can never be attained in relation to the whole.
It always remains the merely similar. Never­
b) H ig h e r - le v e l g e n e r a l it ie s as g e n e r ­ theless, the universal of similarity àlso con­
a lities ON THE BASIS OF MERE SIMILARITY tains, by virtue of its relation to its limit, a
universal of likeness, but only of a partial, me­
If the likeness of the individual members diate likeness, likeness “ in relation to this or
of the extension of a generality is no longer that moment.” Thus, even in the coincidence
complete likeness, then generalities of higher of likeness, a common moment comes to light,
levels emerge. We have understood complete or, rather, a moment which originally shines

*On the concepts “total similarity” and “partial similarity,” as well as “distance of similarity,” cf. §§44, 45.
Universals 291

through as a common moment. It comes to per­ sal, arising from the mere repetition of the com­
fect givenness in the process of the transition pletely like, is obviously a limiting case.
from the universal of the repetition of com­
pletely like members to the next-higher spe­ §85. Material generalities and formal
cies, to the universal of mere similarity—of generalities
total similarity, to begin with, and then to the
universal of partial similarity (likeness), which Another important difference is that be­
does not include the absolutely like or totally tween material and formal generalities. In or­
similar but the like (similar) in relation to this der to understand it, we must remember our
or that moment. breakdown of objectivities into those devoid
The universal of mere similarity is one of of logicosyntactical form and those which are
a higher level since the members of its exten­ syntactically formed, namely, the objectivities
sion, even if it is formed only by the coinci­ of the understanding. Depending on the kinds
dence of two similar objects, can already be of objects compared for the purpose of appre­
conceived as a universal arising from the pos­ hending the universal, two kinds of fundamen­
sible repetition of like members. It is thus a tally different generalities result.
specific universal, which already has under it­ 1. The synthesis of coincidence of the like
self two or more concrete generalities; later can obviously link objects as objects of simple
on we come to higher species, genera, and so experience, thus objects which still have un­
on. These are dependent generalities, and this dergone no syntactical formation. They acquire
because they spring from the comparison of a syntactical form only from this synthesis of
generalities (at the lowest level those of repe­ coincidence and the abstraction inherent in it.
tition). Thus, universals can be compared like Thus concepts arise which are purely material
other objects, e.g., red and blue; and in this as well as concrete—concepts which, to be sure,
synthetic activity a generality of a higher lev­ do not have a name. For concepts expressed
el is constituted. In this activity, the generali­ verbally, like tree, house, etc., already include,
ty comes to self-givenness as a generality in addition, a variety of predicates acquired in
which has generalities under itself as particu­ the activity of judgment. However, it is impor­
lars. Thus, on the basis of like concreta there tant to fix the simple limiting case at the out­
arises a “concrete ” species and, from concrete set. It is a matter here of concrete concepts pre­
species, a “concrete” genus. Naturally, this is ceding all explication and syntactical linking
not to say that the “concrete” species, and so of predicates.
on, would itself be a concretum. We call it a 2. But if we then compare syntactical struc­
“concrete species” only to call attention to its tures, new likenesses appear in them, namely:
origin from the concrete, since there are also a) Those which belong to contents elicited
species which have under them dependent gen­ from passive experience by explication, which
eralities, universals arising from the repeti­ thus depend on a material community. They
tion of abstract moments, e.g., species of shapes yield material general concepts.
and so on. In contrast to generalities of higher b) Likenesses which belong to the syntacti­
levels, we call these abstract: abstract genera cal forms springing from spontaneous produc­
and species. tion, i.e,, those which refer to merely formal
It hardly needs to be emphasized that em­ communities. For example, in the statement
pirical types, as the kind of generality which “Red is different from blue,” in addition to the
first thrusts itself on our attention and rests on material concepts red and blue, pure forms are
the passive preconstitution of typical famili­ also expressed in our talk about difference and
arities, are for the most part universals which in the whole form of the proposition: subject-
belong to a higher level, to that of the general­ form, predicate-form, object-form. Concepts
ity of species or genus; for the lowest univer­ such as likeness, difference, unity, plurality,
292 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

group, whole, part, object, property—in short, empirical concepts, pure concepts are formed,
all so-called purely logical concepts and all concepts whose constitution does not thus de­
concepts which can and must be expressed in pend on the contingency of the element actu­
the diversity of state-of-affairs forms and, ver­ ally given as the point of departure and its em­
bally, in statement forms are, if we merely al­ pirical horizons. These concepts do not envelop
low what is material in the propositions to be an extension which, as it were, is open merely
undetermined, purely formal concepts, formal after the event, but beforehand, a priori. This
generalities. envelopment beforehand signifies that they
must be capable of prescribing rules to all em­
pirical particulars. With empirical concepts,
Eidetic Variation and the Acqui­ infinity of extension implies only that I can
sition of Pure Universalst imagine an arbitrary number of like particu­
lars without its actually being evident whether,
§86. The contingency o f empirical in the progress of actual experience, this pre­
generalities and a priori necessity sumptively posited “again and again” might
perhaps undergo a cancellation, whether this
Empirical generalities, we said, have an ex­ being able to continue might one day actually
tension of actual and really possible particu­ reach a limit. With pure concepts, on the other
lars. Acquired at first on the basis of the repeti­ hand, this infinity of actually being-able-to-
tion of like and then merely similar objects continue is given with self-evidence, precisely
given in actual experience, these generalities because, before all experience, these concepts
refer not only to this limited and, so to speak, prescribe rules for its later course and, conse­
denumerable extension of actual particulars, quently, rule out a sudden change, a cancella­
from which they have been originally acquired, tion. This idea of a priori generality and neces­
but as a general rule they have a horizon which sity will become even clearer in the course of
presumptively exhibits a broader experience our presentation.
of particulars which can be acquired in free ar­
bitrariness by opening up this presumptive ho­ §87. The method o f essential seeing
rizon of being. When it is a question of the re­
alities of the infinite pregiven world, we can a) F r ee v a r ia t io n as t h e f o u n d a t io n o f
imagine an arbitrary number of particulars ca­ ESSENTIAL SEEING
pable of being given later on, which likewise
includes this empirical generality as a real pos­ From the preceding it has already become
sibility. The extension is then an infinitely open clear that, for the acquisition of pure concepts
one, and still the unity of the empirically ac­ or concepts of essences, an empirical compari­
quired species and the higher genus is a “con­ son cannot suffice but that, by special arrange­
tingent” one. This means that a contingently ments, the universal which first comes to promi­
given particular object was the point of depar­ nence in the empirically given must from the
ture of the formation of the concept, and this outset be freed from its character of contin­
formation led beyond the likewise contingent gency. Let us attempt to get a first concept of
likenesses and similarities—contingent because this operation. It is based on the modification
the member acting as the point of departure for of an experienced or imagined objectivity, turn­
the comparison was contingent, given in actu­ ing it into an arbitrary example which, at the
al experience. The concept opposed to this con­ same time, receives the character of a guiding
tingency is that of a priori necessity. It will be “model,” a point of departure for the produc­
necessary to show how, in contrast to these* tion of an infinitely open multiplicity of vari-

*EJ, pp. 339-354 (Sections 86-90).

XJnìversals 293

ants. It is based, therefore, on a variation. In another sound-phenomenon in order to vary it

other words, for its modification in pure imagi­ arbitrarily, in the new “example” we do not
nation, we let ourselves be guided by the fact apprehend another eidos sound; rather, in jux­
taken as a model. For this it is necessary that taposing the old and the new, we see that it is
ever new similar images be obtained as copies, the same, that the variants and the variations
as images of the imagination, which are all con­ on both sides join together in a single varia­
cretely similar to the original image. Thus, by tion, and that the variants here and there are,
an act of volition we produce free variants, each in like fashion, arbitrary particularizations of
of which, just like the total process of varia­ the one eidos. And it is even evident that in
tion itself, occurs in the subjective mode of the progressing from one variation to a new one
“arbitrary.” It then becomes evident that a uni­ we can give this progress and this formation of
ty runs through this multiplicity of successive new multiplicities of variation the character of
figures, that in such free variations of an origi­ an arbitrary progress and that, furthermore, in
nal image, e.g., of a thing, an invariant is nec­ such progress in the form of arbitrariness the
essarily retained as the necessary general form, same eidos must appear “again and again”: the
without which an object such as this thing, as same general essence “sound in general.”
an example of its kind, would not be thinkable
at all. While what differentiates the variants b) T h e a r b it r a r y s t r u c t u r e o f t h e
remains indifferent to us, this form stands out PROCESS OF THE FORMATION OF VARIANTS
in the practice of voluntary variation, and as an
absolutely identical content, an invariable what, That the eidos depends on a freely and arbi­
according to which all the variants coincide: a trarily producible multiplicity of variants at­
general essence. We can direct our regard to­ taining coincidence, on an open infinity, does
ward it as toward the necessarily invariable, not imply that an actual continuation to infini­
which prescribes limits to all variation prac­ ty is required, an actual production of all the
ticed in the mode of the “arbitrary,” all varia­ variants—as if only then could we be sure that
tion which is to be variation of the same origi­ the eidos apprehended at the end actually con­
nal image, no matter how this may be carried formed to all the possibilities. On the contrary,
out. The essence proves to be that without what matters is that the variation as a process
which an object of a particular kind cannot be of the formation of variants should itself have
thought, i.e., without which the object cannot a structure of arbitrariness, that the process
be intuitively imagined as such. This general should be accomplished in the consciousness
essence is the eidos, the idea in the Platonic of an arbitrary development of variants. This
sense, but apprehended in its purity and free does not mean—even if we break off—that we
from all metaphysical interpretations, there­ intend an actual multiplicity of particular, in­
fore taken exactly as it is given to us immedi­ tuitive variations which lead into one another,
ately and intuitively in the vision of the idea an actual series of objects, offering themselves
which arises in this way. Initially, this givenness in some way or other and utilized arbitrarily,
was conceived as a givenness of experience. or Actively produced in advance; it means,
Obviously, a mere imagining, or rather, what rather, that, just as each object has the charac­
is intuitively and objectively present in it, can ter of exemplary arbitrariness, so the multi­
serve our purpose just as well. plicity of variations likewise always has an ar­
For example, if we take a sound as our point bitrary character: it is a matter of indifference
of departure, whether we actually hear it or what might still be joined to it, a matter of in­
whether we have it present as a sound “in the difference what, in addition, I might be given
imagination,” then we obtain the eidos sound to apprehend in the consciousness that “I could
as that which, in the course of “arbitrary” vari­ continue in this way.” This remarkable and tru­
ants, is necessarily common to all these vari­ ly important consciousness of “and so on, at
ants. Now if we take as our point of departure my pleasure” belongs essentially to every mul-
294 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

tiplicity of variations. Only in this way is giv­ hen epi pollan. If, for example, we occupy our­
en what we call an “infinitely open” multiplic­ selves with the inventive imagining of a thing
ity; obviously, it is the same whether we pro­ or a figure, changing it into arbitrarily new
ceed according to a long process, producing or figures, we have something always new, and
drawing arbitrarily on anything suitable, thus always only one thing: the last-imagined. On­
extending the series of actual intuitions, or ly if we retain in grasp the things imagined
whether we break off prematurely. earlier, as a multiplicity in an open process,
and only if we look toward the congruent and
c) T h e r e ta in in g -in -g ra s p o f t h e e n tir e the purely identical, do we attain the eidos.
MULTIPLICITY OF VARIATIONS AS THE Certainly, we need not ourselves actively and
FOUNDATION OF ESSENTIAL SEEING expressly bring about the overlapping coinci­
dence, since, with the successive running-
In this multiplicity (or, rather, on the ground­ through and the retaining-in-grasp of what is
work of the open process of the self-constitu­ run through, it takes place of itself in a purely
tion of variation, with the variants actually ap­ passive way.
pearing in intuition) is grounded as a higher
level the true seeing of the universal as eidos. d ) T h e RELATION OF ESSENTIAL SEEING TO
Preceding this seeing, there is the transition THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUALS. TH E
from the initial example, which gives direction ERROR OF THE THEORY OF ABSTRACTION
and which we have called a model, to ever new
images, whether these are due to the aimless The peculiar character of essential seeing
favor of association and the whims of passive on the basis of variation will become still
imagination (in which case we only seize upon clearer if we contrast it with the intuitive expe­
them arbitrarily as examples) or whether we rience of individual objects. Over against the
have obtained them by our own pure activity specific freedom of variation, there is in all ex­
of imaginative invention from our original perience of the individual a wholly determined
model. In this transition from image to image, commitment. This means that when we recep­
from the similar to the similar, all the arbitrary tively experience an individual on the basis of
particulars attain overlapping coincidence in a passive pregivenness, when we turn toward
the order of their appearance and enter, in a it in order to apprehend it, when we take it in
purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in as existing, we thereby take our stand, so to
which they all appear as modifications of one speak, on the ground of this apperception. By
another and then as arbitrary sequences of par­ it, horizons are prescribed for further possi­
ticulars in which the same universal is isolat­ ble experiences which will take place on this
ed as an eidos. Only in this continuous coinci­ ground, pregiven from the first step. Everything
dence does something which is the same come which we further experience must be brought
to congruence, something which henceforth can into a context of unanimity if it is to count as
be seen purely for itself. This means that it is an object for us; failing this, it is canceled,
passively preconstituted as such and that the nullified, is not taken in receptively as actual;
seeing of the eidos rests in the active intuitive unanimity must prevail on the ground of a uni­
apprehension of what is thus preconstituted— ty of experience, a ground already prescribed
exactly as in every constitution of objectivities for each individual object of experience; every
of the understanding, and especially of general conflict is excluded or, rather, leads to a can­
objectivities. cellation. Every experience in the pregnant
Naturally, the presupposition for this is that sense, which includes activity, at least of the
the multiplicity as such is present to conscious­ lowest level, thus signifies “taking a stand on
ness as a plurality and never slips completely the ground of experience."
from our grasp. Otherwise, we do not attain the The same thing holds for imagination inso­
eidos as the ideally identical, which only is as far as we imagine within a context such that
Universals 295

the individual imaginings are to be linked to­ ists, then a' belongs to it in the canceled form
gether in the unity of one act of imagination. non-a, and conversely. To be sure, the identi­
Here, in the mode of the quasi, is repeated all cal substrate is not an individual pure and
that has already been said about actual experi­ simple. The sudden change is that of an indi­
ence. We have a quasi-world as a unified world vidual into a second individual incompati­
of imagination. It is the “ground” on which we ble with it in coexistence. An individual pure
can take our stand in the course of a unified and simple is an existing individual (or one
act of imagination—only with this difference: capable of existing). However, what is seen
that it is left to our free choice to decide how as unity in the conflict is not an individual but
far we will allow this unity to extend; we can a concrete hybrid unity of individuals mutu­
enlarge such a world at our pleasure, whereas ally nullifying and coexistentially exclusive:
fixed boundaries are set to the unity of an ac­ a unique consciousness with a unique con­
tual world by what was given previously. tent, whose correlate signifies concrete unity
In contrast to this constraint in the experi­ founded in conflict, in incompatibility. This re­
ence of the individual object, the specific free­ markable hybrid unity is at the bottom of es­
dom o f essential seeing becomes intelligible sential seeing.
to us: in the free production of the multiplicity The old theory of abstraction, which implies
of variations, in the progress from variant to that the universal can be constituted only by
variant, we are not bound by the conditions of abstraction on the basis of individual, particu­
unanimity in the same way as in the progress lar intuitions, is thus in part unclear, in part in­
of experience from one individual object to an­ correct. For example, if I construct the general
other on the ground of the unity of experience. concept tree—understood, of course, as a pure
If, for example, we envisage to ourselves an concept—on the basis of individual, particular
individual house now painted yellow, we can trees, the tree which is present in my mind is
just as well think that it could be painted blue not posited in any way as an individually de­
or think that it could have a slate instead of a termined tree: on the contrary, I represent it in
tile roof or, instead of this shape, another one. such a way that it is the same in perception and
The house is an object which, in the realm of in the free movement of imagination, that it is
the possible, could have other determinations not posited as existing or even called into ques­
in place of, and incompatible with, whatever tion, and that it is not in any way held to be an
determinations happen to belong to it within individual. The particular, which is at the bot­
the unity of a representation. This house, the tom of essential seeing, is not in the proper
same, is thinkable as a and as non-a but, natu­ sense an intuited individual as such. The re­
rally, if as a, then not at the same time as non- markable unity which is at the bottom here is,
a. It cannot be both simultaneously; it cannot on the contrary, an “individual” in the exchange
be actual while having each of them at the same of “nonessential” constitutive moments (those
time; but at any moment it can be non-a in­ appearing, as complementary moments, outside
stead of a. It is, therefore, thought as an identi­ the essential moments, which are to be appre­
cal something in which opposite determina­ hended as identical).
tions can be exchanged. “Intuitively,” in the
attainment of this self-evidence, the existence e) C ongruence a n d d if f e r e n c e in t h e
of the object is certainly bound to the posses­ OVERLAPPING COINCIDENCE OF MULTIPLICI­
sion of one or the other of the opposing predi­ TIES OF VARIATION
cates and to the requirement of the exclusion
of their joint possession; however, an identi­ What has already been said implies the fol­
cal substrate of concordant attributes is evi­ lowing: with the congruence present in the co­
dently present, except that its simple thesis is incidence of the multiplicities of variation there
not possible, but only the modified thesis: if is connected, on the other hand, a difference in
this identical something determined as a ex­ various aspects. If, for example, we pass from
296 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

a given red color to a series of any other red 3. The active identification which brings out
colors whatsoever—whether we actually see the congruent over against the differences.
them or whether they are colors floating “in
the imagination”—we obtain the eidos “red,” f) V a r ia t io n a n d a l t e r a t io n
which, as the necessarily common, is what is
congruent in the alteration of the “arbitrary” One point still requires clarification. We
variants, while the different extensions in the speak of variation and of variants, not of alter­
coincidence, instead of being congruent, on ation and phases of alteration. In fact, the two
the contrary come to prominence in conflict. concepts are essentially different, despite a cer­
The idea of the difference, therefore, is only tain affinity.
to be understood in its involvement with the idea An alteration is always alteration of a real
of the identically common element which is the thing, understood in a completely general sense
eidos. Difference is that which, in the overlap­ as a temporal existent, something which en­
ping of the multiplicities, is not to be brought dures, which continues through a duration. Ev­
into the unity of the congruence making its ery real thing is subject to change and is only
appearance thereby, that which, in consequence, in alteration or nonalteration. Nonalteration is
does not make an eidos visible. To say that a only a limiting case of alteration. Alteration
unity of congruence is not attained means that signifies a continual being-other or, rather, a
in the coincidence the different elements are becoming-other and yet being the same, indi­
in conflict with one another. Consider, for ex­ vidually the same, in this continual becom­
ample, an identical color; at one time it is the ing-other: the alteration of a color, its fading,
color of this extension and shape, at another and so on, is an example of this. A real thing
time of that. In the overlapping, the one con­ changes as this individual real thing; its state
flicts with the other, and they mutually supplant changes, but it retains its individual identity
each other. in this change of state. Nonalteration, on the
But, on the other hand, it is clear that things other hand, implies: being the same in dura­
cannot enter into conflict which have nothing tion but, in addition, remaining continually the
in common. In our example, not only is an iden­ same in every phase of duration. With altera­
tical color already presupposed; it is even more tion, the state of being in duration and through
important that, even if the one colored object the phases of duration is a state of being-other,
were square, they still could not enter into or becoming-other, in each new phase, i.e., cer­
conflict if both were not extended figures. Thus, tainly remaining individually the same but, at
every difference in the overlapping with oth­ the same time, not remaining continually the
ers and in conflict with them points toward a same.
new universal to be brought out (in our ex­ When we direct our attention to the phases
ample, shape) as the universal of the superim­ of the duration of the real thing and to that
posed differences which have momentarily which occupies these phases, we have a multi­
come into the unity of conflict. This point will plicity of figurations of the same thing: the same
be of great importance for the theory of the hi­ thing now, the same then, and so on,, and, cor­
erarchical structure of ideas up to the highest respondingly, from phase to phase, the same
regions. as like or unlike. But when we change the ori­
By way of summary, we survey the three entation of our regard, directing our attention
principal steps which pertain to the process of to the one enduring thing which presents itself
ideation: in the phases, which “gradates” itself through
1. The productive activity which consists in time as the same, we experience the unity, the
running through the multiplicity of variations. identity, which alters or does not alter, which
2. The unitary linking in continuous coinci­ continues and endures through the flux of
dence. multiplicities of figurations. This unity is not
Universals 297

the universal of the individual temporal phases, seeing is more complex here. It is a seeing re­
any more than these are its variants. This unity sulting from the actively comparative overlap­
is precisely what constitutes the unity of the ping of congruence. This is true of every kind
individual which endures and which, as endur­ of intuitive apprehension of commonalities
ing, changes or remains the same. In all al­ [Gemeinsamkeiten] and generalities, though
teration, the individual remains identically where a pure eidos is to be seen as an a prio­
the same. On the other hand, variation depends ri, this seeing has its special methodological
precisely on this: that we drop the identity of form—precisely that which has been described,
the individual and change it imaginatively in­ namely, that indifference with regard to actu­
to another possible individual. ality which is generated in variation, whereby
On the other hand, it pertains to the alter­ what presents itself as actual acquires the char­
ation of an individual that we can also deal with acter of an arbitrary example, an indifferent
its phases as variants (although by changing our point of departure of a series of variations.
point of view). Then we see that no alteration
is possible in which all the phases of the al­ §89. The necessity o f an explicit
teration do not belong together generically. A exclusion o f all positing o f being for
color can change only into a color and not, e.g., the purpose o f attaining pure generality
into a sound. From this it is clear that every
possible alteration is accomplished within a It might now be thought that our descrip­
highest genus, which it can never contravene. tion of essential seeing makes the task appear
too difficult and that it is unnecessary to oper­
§88. The meaning o f the phrase: ate with the multiplicities of variation, which
“seeing” generalities are stressed as allegedly fundamental, and like­
wise with the functions of imagination which
We speak of an essential “seeing” and, in participate therein in so peculiar a way. Would
general, of the seeing of generalities. This way it not be enough to say that any arbitrary red
of talking still requires justification. We use the here and red there, any arbitrary, pregiven plu­
expression “to see” here in the completely rality of red things, pertaining to experience
broad sense which implies nothing other than or to any other representation, furnishes the
the act of experiencing things oneself the fact possibility of an essential seeing of the eidos
of having seen things themselves, and, on the red? What would be necessary to describe is
basis of this self-seeing, of having similarity only the activity of running through what is
before one’s eyes, of accomplishing, on the given in overlapping coincidence and bring­
strength of it, that mental overlapping in which ing the universal into view. However, it should
the common, e.g., the red, the figure, etc., “it­ be noted here that the word “arbitrary” in the
self” emerges—that is, attains intuitive appre­ context of our remarks must not be taken as a
hension. This, naturally, does not mean a sen­ mere manner of speaking, or as constituting a
suous seeing. One cannot see the universal red nonessential attitude on our part, but that it be­
as one sees an individual, particular red; but longs to the fundamental character of the act
the extension of the expression “seeing,” which of seeing ideas.
not without reason is customary in ordinary But if in such a way of talking there is the
language, is unavoidable. With this, we wish notion that a determinate plurality of similar
to indicate that we appropriate, directly and as objects is enough to enable us to obtain a uni­
itself, a common and general moment of as versal by a comparative coincidence, it is nec­
many examples as desired, seen one by one, in essary to emphasize the following once more:
a manner wholly analogous to the way in which certainly we obtain for this red here and that
we appropriate an individual particular in sen­ red there an identical and general element
suous perception; although, to be sure, the present in both, but precisely only as what is
298 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

common to this and that red. We do not obtain nection to pregiven actuality is most carefully
pure red in general as eidos. To be sure, taking excluded. If we practice variation freely but
account of a third red or several, whenever they cling secretly to the fact that, e.g., these must
present themselves to us, we can recognize that be arbitrary sounds in the world, heard or able
the universal of the two is identically the same to be heard by men on earth, then we certainly
as the universal of the many. But in this way have an essential generality as an eidos but
we always obtain only commonalities and gen­ one related to our world of fact and bound to
eralities relative to empirical extensions; the this universal fact. It is a secret bond in that,
possibility of progress in infinitum is still not for understandable reasons, it is imperceptible
given intuitively by this. However, as soon as to us.
we say that every arbitrary like moment, new­ In the natural development of universal
ly to be taken account of, must yield the same [universalen] experience, the unity of which
result, and if we repeat once more; the eidos is continually being realized, the experienced
red is one over against the infinity of possi­ world is granted to us as the universal perma­
ble particulars which belong to this and any nent ground of being and as the universal field
other red capable of being in coincidence with of all our activities. As the firmest and most
it, then we are already in need of an infinite universal of all our habitualities, the world is
variation in our sense as a foundation. This vari­ valid and remains in its actual validity for us,
ation provides us with what belongs to the ei­ no matter what interests we may pursue; like
dos as its inseparable correlate, the so-called all interests, those involving eidetic cognition
extension of the eidos, of the “purely conceptu­ are also related to it. With all exercise of imagi­
al essence,” as the infinity of possible particu­ nation, like the one which we have already con­
lars which fall under it as its “particular ex­ sidered, set in motion by the supposition of
emplifications” and, Platonically speaking, are possible particulars, chosen arbitrarily and
found with it in a relation of participation; ev­ falling under a concept attained empirically,
ery conceivable particular in general is referred and so also with every imaginative variation
to the essence, participates in it and in its es­ involving the intention of seeing ideas, the
sential moments. How the totality of the par­ world is coposited; every fact and every eidos
ticulars which fall under the pure universal remains related to the factual world, belong­
belong correlatively to it as its extension we ing to this world. Because of its universality,
will discuss forthwith. we, of course, do not notice in the natural atti­
First of all, it is necessary to point out that tude this hidden positing of the world and this
even totally free variation is not enough to ac­ bond to being.
tually give us the universal as pure. Even the Only if we become conscious of this bond,
universal acquired by variation must not yet be putting it consciously out of play, and so also
called pure in the true sense of the word, i.e., free this broadest surrounding horizon of vari­
free from all positing of actuality. Although ants from all connection to experience and all
the relation to the contingent example, actu­ experiential validity, do we achieve perfect
ally existing as a point of departure, is already purity. Then we find ourselves, so to speak, in
excluded by the variation, a relation to actual­ a pure world of imagination, a world o f abso­
ity can still cling to the universal, and in the lutely pure possibility. Every possibility of this
following way: For a pure eidos, the factual kind can then be a central member for possible
actuality of the particular cases by means of pure variations in the mode of the arbitrary.
which we progress in the variation is com­ From each of these possibilities results an ab­
pletely irrelevant. And this must be taken liter­ solutely pure eidos, but from any other only if
ally. The actualities must be treated as possi­ the series of variations of the one and the other
bilities among other possibilities, in fact as are linked together in a single series in the man­
arbitrary possibilities of the imagination. This ner described. Thus for colors and for sounds a
treatment is achieved only when every con­ different eidos emerges; they are different in
Universals 299

kind, and this with respect to what is purely of free variation and the consequent exclusion
intuited in them. of all positing of actual being, pure generality
A pure eidos, an essential generality, is, e.g., naturally can have no extension consisting of
the species red or the genus color, but only if it facts, of empirical actualities which bind it [to
is apprehended as a pure generality, thus free experience], but only an extension of pure pos­
from all presupposition of any factual exist­ sibilities. On the other hand, eidetic generality
ent whatsoever, any factual red or any real col­ must always be posited in relation to admitted
ored actuality. Such is also the sense of the state­ actualities. Every color occurring in actuality
ments of geometry, e.g., when we designate the is certainly, at the same time, a possible color
circle as a kind of conic section, that is, when in the pure sense: each can be considered as an
we apprehend it in an eidetic intuition; we are example and can be changed into a variant.
then not speaking of an actual surface as an Thus, in the realm of arbitrary freedom we can
instance belonging to a real actuality of nature. lift all actuality to a plane of pure possibility.
Accordingly, a purely eidetic judging “in gen­ But it then appears that even arbitrary freedom
eral, ” such as the geometrical, or that con­ has its own peculiar constraint. What can be
cerned with ideally possible colors, sounds, and varied, one into another, in the arbitrariness of
the like is, in its generality, bound to no pre­ imagination (even if it is without connection
supposed actuality. In geometry, we speak of and does not accord with the understanding of
conceivable figures, in eidetic color-theory of a reality conceivable in the imagination) bears
conceivable colors, which constitute the exten­ in itself a necessary structure, an eidos, and
sion of purely seen generalities. therewith necessary laws which determine what
The whole of mathematics also operates must necessarily belong to an object in order
with concepts originally created in this way; it that it can be an object of this kind. This neces­
produces its immediate eidetic laws (axioms) sity then also holds for everything factual: we
as truths which are “necessary and universal in can see that everything which belongs insepa­
the strict sense,” “admitting of no possible ex­ rably to the pure eidos color, e.g., the moment
ception” (Kant). It sees them as general [ge­ of brightness, must likewise belong to every
nerelle] essence-complexes [Wesensverhalte], actual color.
producible in an absolute identity for every The universal truths, in which we merely
conceivable exemplification of its pure con­ display what belongs to pure essential gener­
cepts—for those rigorously circumscribed mul­ alities, precede all questions bearing on facts
tiplicities of variations or a priori extension— and the truths which concern them. Hence,
and, as such, self-evidently cognizable. From these essential truths are called a priori; this
them, in a deductive intuition (a priori “self­ means, by reason of their validity, preceding
evidence” of a necessary inference), mathe­ all factuality, all determinations arising from
matics then produces its theories and derived experience. Every actuality given in experience,
“theorems,” again as ideal identities, percep­ and judged by the thinking founded on experi­
tible in the arbitrary repetition of the activity ence, is subject, insofar as the correctness of
which produced them. such judgments is concerned, to the uncondi­
tional norm that it must first comply with all
§90. Pure generality and a priori the a priori “conditions of possible experience”
necessity and the possible thinking of such experience:
that is, with the conditions of its pure possibil­
We now turn to the problem, already touched ity, its representability and positability as the
upon above, of the extension of pure generali­ objectivity of a uniformly identical sense.
ties and to the problems, closely linked to this, Such a priori conditions are expressed for
concerning the relation of pure possibility and nature (for the actuality of physical experience)
empirico-factual actuality. by the mathematics of nature with all its propo­
In conformity with its origin in the method sitions. It expresses them “a priori,” i.e., with-
300 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

out dealing with “nature” as a fact. The refer­ it in its general essential features in mathe­
ence to facts is the business of the application, matical thinking, as an exclusive property of
which is always possible a priori and is self- the mathematical sphere.* Indeed, in view of
evidently intelligible in this possibility. And the general essential relationship of actuality
now we can say in general: judging actualities and possibility, of experience and pure imagi­
according to the laws o f their pure possibili­ nation, even to admit such a limitation would
ty, or judging them according to “laws of es­ be completely absurd. From every concrete
sences,” a priori laws, is a universal and abso­ actuality, and every individual trait actually
lutely necessary task which must be carried out experienced in it or capable of being experi­
for all actuality. What is easy to make clear in enced, a path stands open to the realm of ideal
the example of mathematical thinking and or pure possibility and consequently to that
mathematical natural science is valid in a com­ of a priori thinking. And in conformity with
pletely general way for every objective sphere. this completely general method, the method
To each belongs the possibility of an a prio­ of formation of pure individual possibilities,
ri thinking, consequently an a priori science as well as of the infinite “extensions” of the
having the same functional application as this possibilities which merge into one another in
science—insofar as we give the a priori ev­ the transformations of variation, is everywhere
erywhere the same strict sense, the only one the same, and thus naturally also the originally
which is significant. There is not the slightest intuitive formation of pure essential generali­
reason to consider the methodological struc­ ties pertaining to them: “ideas” (essences, pure
ture of a priori thinking, as we have exhibited concepts) and laws of essences.

16. The Genesis of Judgment!

§82. Reduction o f judgments to As we remember, the formalization which

ultimate judgments. The primitive analytics carries out, and which determines its
catégorial variants o f Something; the peculiar character, consists in thinking of the
primitive substrate, individual syntactical stuffs, or “cores,” of judgments as
mere anythings whatever, so that only the syn­
We must start by going back from the judg­ tactical form, the specifically judicial (including
ment to the judgment-substrates, from truths the core-forms, such as the forms substantivity
to their objects-about-which. and adjectivity), becomes determinant for the
In the first place, we require here an impor­ conceptual essences that, as “judgment-forms,”
tant supplementation of the pure logic of non­ enter into the logical laws of analytics. Here
contradiction, a supplementation that, to be we must note the relativity in which these laws
sure, goes beyond formal mathematics proper, leave the indeterminately universal cores. For
but still does not belong to truth-logic. It is a example, the forms of the categorical judgment,
matter, so to speak, of a transitional link be­ and more particularly of the adjectivally deter­
tween them. mining categorical judgment, says nothing

*In this connection, however, it should be emphasized that the method of mathematical thinking of essences is, as
a method o f idealization, in important points to be distinguished from the intuition of essences in other subjects, whose
fluid types cannot be apprehended with exactitude; this analogy thus holds only in the most general respects. On this
difference, see also Edmund Husserl, CES, esp. pp. 17ff., 48ff.
tFTL, pp. 202-212 (Sections 82-86).
The Genesis o f Judgment 301

about whether the subject or predicate of the ants of the sense, absolute something: absolute
judgment already contains a syntactical form properties, relations, and so forth, as senses.
in the core itself. The subject S, taken as a form, For mathesis universalis, as formal math­
is formally particularized equally well by “S, ematics, these ultimates have no particular in­
which is a,” “S, which is a, b,” “S, which has a terest. Quite the contrary for truth-logic: be­
relation to Q,” or the like. Meanwhile it remains cause ultimate substrate-objects are individuals,
undetermined whether, in each of these forms, about which very much can be said in formal
the S itself already has syntactical structures of truth, and back to which all truth ultimate­
the same sort within it. In the same manner, on ly relates. If one keeps to the formal of pure
the predicate side, the p may already bear within analytics, if the evidence—the evidence serv­
itself a categoria! determination (perhaps “p, ing this discipline—accordingly relates only to
which is q”—for example: blood-red); and thus pure judgment-senses as distinct, one cannot
there may be forms within forms, to any de­ establish this last proposition; it is by no means
gree of complexity. But it can be seen a priori an “analytic” proposition. To have insight into
that any actual or possible judgment leads back it, one must make ultimate cores intuited, one
to ultimate cores when we follow up its syn­ must draw fullness of adequation, not from
taxes; accordingly that it is a syntactical struc­ evidence of the judgment-senses, but instead
ture built ultimately, though perhaps far from from evidence of the “matters” or “affairs” cor­
immediately, out of elementary cores, which no responding to them. In analytic logic one can
longer contain any syntaxes. Also, in follow­ go so far, and only so far, as to say that, in the
ing up the sense of the substantivized adjec­ sense, there must be certain sense-elements as
tive, we are led back to the original adjective the ultimate core-stuffs in all syntactical forms,
and to the more original judgment of which it and that one is brought back to judgment-com­
is a member and in which it occurs as an irre­ plexes of ultimate judgments having “indi­
ducible primitive form. In the same manner, a vidual” substrates. Analytically one can assert
universality of a higher level (for example: nothing about the possibility or the essential
the logical form-genus, judgment-form) leads structure of individuals. Even that, for example,
us back to universalities of a lower level (in a time-form necessarily belongs to them—du­
our example, the particular judgment-forms). ration, qualitative filledness of duration, and so
And always it is clear that, by reduction, we forth—is something one can know only from a
reach a corresponding ultimate, that is: ultimate material evidence; and it can enter the judg­
substrates—from the standpoint of formal ment-sense only by virtue of an antecedent syn­
logic, absolute subjects (subjects that are not tactical performance.
nominalized predicates, relations, or the like),
ultimate predicates (predicates that are not §83. Parallel reduction o f truths.
predicates of predicates, or the like), ultimate Relation o f all truths to an antecedent
universalities, ultimate relations. world o f individuals
But this must be understood correctly. In the
logic of judgments, judgments (as we have ex­ To the reduction of judgments to ultimate
plained) are senses, judicial meanings (or opin­ judgments with an ultimate sense, there corre­
ions) as objects. Consequently the reduction sponds a reduction o f truths: of the truths be­
signifies that, purely by following up the mean­ longing to a higher level to those belonging
ings, we reach ultimate something-meanings ; on the lowest level, that is: to truths that relate
first of all, then, as regards the meant or sup­ directly to their matters and material spheres,
posed judgment-objects, supposed absolute or (because the substrates play the leading
objects-about-which. — Furthermore that, in role here) that relate directly to individual ob­
the ultimate judgments, the ones on which the jects in their object-spheres—individual ob­
other judgments at different levels are built, jects, objects that therefore contain within
we get back to the primitive catégorial vari­ themselves no judgment-syntaxes and that, in
302 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

their experienceable factual being, are prior material content. With all its freedom in the
to all judging. That judgments (not judgment- reiterative forming of forms, and with all its
senses) relate to objects signifies that, in the reflexive relatedness to its own scientific char­
judgment itself, these objects are meant as sub­ acter, formal logic still intends—and even in
strates, as the objects about which something these reiterations and this reflexiveness—not
is stated; and reductive deliberation teaches, as to remain a playing with empty thoughts, but
an a priori, that every conceivable judgment to become an aid to cognition that has materi­
ultimately (and either definitely or indefinite­ al content. Thus the ultimate applicability of
ly) has relation to individual objects (in an ex­ formal analytics to individuals is, at the same
tremely broad sense, real objects), and there­ time, a teleological relatedness to all possible
fore has relation to a real universe, a “world” spheres of individuals. And therefore these
or a world-province, “for which it holds good.” spheres are, for logic, what is first in itself.
(The second thesis takes us further and is yet
to be grounded.) §84. The hierarchy o f evidences; the
To ground the first thesis more strictly let us intrinsically first evidences those o f
point out that universal judgments say nothing experience. The pregnant concept o f
with definiteness about individuals, but that experience
extensionally, according to their sense, they
bear an immediate or a mediate relation ulti­ Now, if truth is in question and, correlatively,
mately to individual singles. This is clear, first an evidence by which it becomes one’s own
of all, in the case of universalities with a mate­ originarily, then what has just been stated is of
rial content. However much, as upper-level obvious significance. The hierarchy o f evi­
universalities, they may relate extensionally dences goes with that of judgments and their
to other universalities, they evidently must senses; and the truths and evidences that are
lead back by a finite number of steps to singles first in themselves must be the individual ones.
with a material content that are themselves not A priori, the judgments made subjectively in
universalities but individuals. But, if it is a the form belonging to the evidence which is
case of formal-analytic universalities—num­ actually most original, the evidence that seizes
bers, for example, or multiplicities—then “ev­ upon its substrates and predicatively formed
erything and anything” belongs to their exten­ affair-complexes originally and quite directly,
sion or that of their units. That involves their must be individual judgments.
possible determination by any arbitrarily se­ Individuals are given by experience, expe­
lectable objects whatever; and these could rience in the first and most pregnant sense,
themselves be analytico-formal formations, which is defined as a direct relation to some­
with respect to whose units the same is true; thing individual. In this connection however,
and so in infinitum. But, according to their if we take as experiential judgments the group
sense, it also involves their possible applica­ of judgments that have the most original evi­
tion to arbitrarily selectable objects with mate­ dence, then in a certain manner we must take
rial content; which would take us back to the experience in a broad sense: not only as the
preceding case. Thus it is indeed true that ab­ simple giving of an individual existence itself
solutely every universality has an ultimate ex- —that is: with certainty of its being—but also
tensional relation of applicability to individu­ as extending to the modalizations of this cer­
als that are either delimited by universalities tainty, which can, after all, change into like­
with material content or else themselves left lihood, probability, and so forth. But, over
open to choice in this respect. Now, in accor­ against all these forms of “actual” (that is: po­
dance with its sense, formal logic—and there­ sitional) experience, there comes into question
fore all forming of formal-analytic universali­ “neutralized” experience, “as-if experience,”
ties, as a function of the theory of science—is we can also say “experience in phantasy,”
intended to serve the ends of sciences that have which, with a suitable and freely possible al-
The Genesis o f Judgment 303

teration of one’s attitude, becomes positional 2. If this first series of investigations has
experience of a possible individual. Naturally, been carried out—the ones we attempted in the
as-if experience has parallel as-if modalities of earlier parts of this book—then reductive de­
its primitive mode, as-if certainty of being. liberations such as were occupying us a little
while ago* become necessary. They uncover
§85. The genuine tasks o f so-called the hidden intentional implications included in
judgment-theory. The sense-genesis o f judging and in the judgment itself as the prod­
judgments as a clue in our search for uct of judging. Judgments as senses accord­
the hierarchy o f evidences ingly have a sense-genesis.
What that signifies can be understood from
The considerations just pursued give us ac­ the phenomenological pointing back that, for
cess to an understanding of the proper task of example, a nominalized predicate (as ex­
judgment-theory, a discipline that, although pressible by such nouns as “red” and “the red”)
much discussed, has remained rather fruit­ bears, in that it points back to a nominalizing
less, because it has lacked all understanding activity, on the noetic side, and to the original
of the specific character of the investigations predicate (as expressible by such adjectives
directed to the subjective that are necessary as “red”), on the noematic side. Such phenom­
in the case of judgments, in the logical sense, enological pointings-back are shown by every
and in the case of the fundamental concepts other nominalized sense-formation (like “the
relating to these. similarity” and “this, that S is />”)—pointings
1. If the general confusion was reduced to back to the corresponding more original for­
the extent that (overcoming the psychologistic mation and, correlatively, to the pertinent nomi­
confounding of them) one distinguished judg­ nalizing activities; likewise, each attributive
ing and the judgment itself (the ideal forma­ determination in the subject points back to
tion, the stated proposition), it then was even the originality of that determination as a predi­
less possible to set a senseful problem concern­ cate; and so forth.
ing the subjective as long as the peculiar es­ This yields, even for the theory o f forms
sence of all intentionality, as a constitutive per­ and, subsequently, for procedure in an analyt­
formance, was not understood and therefore ics of consequence-relationships, a principle of
judicative intentionality in particular was not genetic order, which at the same time deter­
understood as the constitutive performance mines the specifically logical aim conferred on
in the case of ideal judgment-formations—and, analytics with the concepts and laws of truth.
still more particularly, the intentionality of With respect to the subjective, that signifies that
evidential judging was not understood as the the predelineated order of judgment-forms in­
constitutive performance in the case of ideal volves a predelineated order in the process of
truth-formations. Therefore, after the afore­ making materially evident and in the different
said distinction between judging and judg­ levels of true materialities themselves.
ment has been made, the. first judgment-prob­ Uncovering the sense-genesis of judgments
lem that must be set in logic, starting from there, signifies, more precisely, an unravelling of the
is that of going back to the variously effective sense-moments that are implicit in, and belong
intentionality and carrying out the reflective essentially to, the sense that has plainly come
phenomenological clarifications in which log­ to light. Judgments, as the finished products of
ic 's different concepts of the judgment become a “constitution” or “genesis,” can and must be
separated, according to their origins, as fun­ asked about this genesis. The essential pecu­
damental concepts for its disciplines and be­ liarity of such products is precisely that they
come, at the same time, understandable in their are senses that bear within them, as a sense-
interrelatedness. implicate of their genesis, a sort of historical-

See §§82 and 83.

304 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ness; that in them, level by level, sense points know, to judgments about individuals; and
back to original sense and to the correspond­ consequently, in the case of evident judgments,
ing noetic* intentionality; that therefore each in the sense of seeings of the predicatively
sense-formation can be asked about its essen­ formed affair-complexes themselves, it brings
tially necessary sense-history. us to those evidences of something individual
This wonderful peculiarity is concomitant that belong to the simplest type. These are the
with the universality of consciousness of ev­ pure and simple experiential judgments, judg­
ery sort as effective intentionality. All inten­ ments about data of possible perception and
tional unities come from an intentional gene­ memory, which give norms for the correctness
sis, are “constituted” unities; and everywhere of categorical judicial meanings at the lowest
one can ask the “finished” unities about their level concerning individuals.
constitution, about their total genesis, and Let us utilize a proposition from the gener­
particularly about the eidetically apprehensi­ al theory of consciousness—more particularly,
ble essential form of this genesis. This funda­ from the phenomenology of universal gene­
mental fact, embracing in its universality the sis in consciousness. It states that, for objec­
whole of intentional living, is what determines tivities of every sort, consciousness in the mode,
the proper sense o f intentional analysis, its giving them-themselves, precedes all other
sense as an uncovering of the intentional im­ modes of consciousness relating to them, all
plications, with which there come to the fore, these other modes being genetically secondary.
as contrasted with the overt, the finished, sense Consciousness that gives us something itself
of the unities, their hidden sense-moments and is indeed always passing over, by way of re­
“causal” sense-relations. At any rate, we un­ tention and protention, into consciousness that
derstand this so far as the judgment is con­ does not give us something itself: empty con­
cerned; and it now becomes understandable in sciousness. Even recollection, though it can be
particular that not only the overt, or finished, intuitive, is the awakening of an empty con­
but likewise the implied sense must always have sciousness and points back to earlier original
its say, and that it too exercises an essential consciousness. Accordingly, from these ge­
function, particularly in the process of making netica! points of view, the intrinsically first
evident—here, in our logical sphere, the pro­ judgment-theory is the theory of evident judg­
cess of making logical principles evident. But, ments, and the intrinsically first thing in the
as will be seen forthwith, that applies not only theory o f evident judgments (and therefore in
to the syntactical implications but also to the judgment-theory as a whole) is the genetical
deeper-lying genesis pertaining to the ultimate tracing of predicative evidences back to the
“cores” and pointing back to their origination non-predicative evidence called experience.
from experiences. Without being clear about With suitable further intentional formings, the
all that, we cannot actually have the principles experience enters into the judging done at
of logic at our command, we do not know what the lowest genetic level, and the product of ex­
hidden presuppositions may lie within them. perience enters into the judgment-formation
itself.
§86. The evidence o f pre-predicative Here one has indeed reached the intrinsically
experience as the intrinsically primary first beginning of a systematic judgment-theory,
theme o f transcendental judgment- as a theory that traces the essentially determined
theory. The experiential judgment as systematic genesis pertaining to the judgment
the original judgment employed originally on the matters themselves
(the “evidential” judgment) and then follows
The lowest level reached by tracing back the the predelineated ways leading upward from
clue of sense-genesis brings us, as we already what is intrinsically first in this genesis.

Reading noetische instead of noematische. —Translator's note.

The Genesis o f Judgment 305

This beginning, moreover, is the place sys­ same method: as problems concerning reali­
tematically, starting from the judgment, to ty, problems for a psychology as the science
discover that certainty and modalities of cer­ of “psychic phenomena,” of Data of “internal
tainty, suppositive intention and fulfillment, experience,” including belief-Data. Because
identical existent and identical sense, evident of this blindness to all intentionality and—ev­
having of something itself, trueness of being en after intentionality had been insisted upon
(being “actual”) and truth as correctness of by Brentano—because of a blindness to its
sense—that none of these is a peculiarity ex­ Objectivating function, all the actual prob­
clusively within the predicational sphere, that, lems concerning judgment were indeed lost
on the contrary, they all belong already to from view. If their genuine sense is brought
the intentionality of experience. Starting from out, the intentionality of predicative judgments
there, one can trace them into the givings of leads back ultimately to the intentionality of
things themselves, the evidences, on a higher experience.
level—for example: those of the proximate According to what was indicated „above, the
variants of the individual (property, relation, theory of the evidence of the pure and simple
and so forth) and particularly the evidence of categorical experiential judgment should be
the universal (derivable from the experience called the “intrinsically primary” judgment-
of individuals), with its extensional sense as theory because, in respect of intentional gen­
embracing individuals. esis, the non-evident judgment, even the
Thus one comes from the experiential judg­ countersensical judgment, points back to an
ment—more particularly, from the most im­ origin from experiential judgments. It should
mediate experiential judgment having the cate­ be emphasized that this referring back, just
gorical form—to experience and to the motive like the predicational sense-genesis discussed
for that broadening o f the concept of judgment a little while ago, is not inferred from an in­
already indicated by Hume’s concept of be­ ductive empeiria on the part of the psycho­
lief. Historically, to be sure, the apprehension logical observer, perchance the experimen­
of this broadest concept remains crude, even talist in the “psychology of thinking”; on the
countersensical. Its inadequacy is shown by the contrary, as can be shown in phenomenology,
mere fact that the identification of judgment it is an essential component of the intentional­
and “belief’ presently necessitates introduc­ ity, a component uncoverable among the in­
tion of a “presentation [Vorstellungj" alleged­ tentional contents thereof in the corresponding
ly founding this belief. This is not the place productions of fulfillment. Accordingly it is
to submit the doctrine to extensive criticism. the case that, for us, to be sure, as carrying on
Lockean sensualism, which reaches comple­ a philosophico-logical sense-investigation,
tion in Hume and John Stuart Mill and becomes the non-evident and the evident judgment are
almost all-prevailing in modern philosophy, presented on an equal plane and the course of
finds in this belief a mere Datum of "internal naively positive logic is therefore the natural
sense,” not much different from a Datum of one; whereas, considered in itself, the evident
“external sense,” such as a sound-Datum or a judgment—most fundamentally, the experien­
smell-Datum. To those prepossessed by the tial judgment—is nevertheless the original
parallelizing of “internal” and “external” ex­ judgment. From its syntaxes, the ones that are
perience—correlatively, the sphere of indi­ first in themselves, genesis of the higher syn­
vidual psychic being (the sphere grasped in its taxes goes upward, the ones with which for­
real being by immanent experience, so they mal analytics is exclusively occupied in its theo­
supposed) and the sphere of physical being— ries, concerning itself with the conditions for
it appeared to be without question that, at possible judicative evidence that are implicit
bottom, problems concerning judgment and in the a priori forms of distinct judgings and of
psychic problems generally must have essen­ their intentional correlates.
tially the same sense as problems concerning Now, even though formal analytics, in re­
physical Nature and should be treated by the spect of its province and its theory, has to do
306 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

only with the forms of possible judgments ence is to be characterized as itself the first
and truths, and even though no such thing as and most fundamental judgment-theory. Natu­
evidence or experience is to be found <as the- rally this explication of experience, as the ac­
m a tio in its province or its theory, still, in tivity that precedes the specifically catégorial
its “epistemo-critical” investigations of the activities and takes on shape in them, must be
subjective, which concern the radical method restricted to a "formal” universality consistent
of intentional performances, it must investi­ with the purpose of formal logic—a univer­
gate the catégorial mediacies of evidence sality that is “formal” in the sense that, on the
and verification, and accordingly must clarify subjective side, is the correlate of the sense in
the performance o f the original judgments. which analytics is formal. The relevant and by
Through these all truth and all judicative evi­ no means easy unravelling of the multiform
dence, so we see, are related back to the primi­ experiential performance carried out in the ex­
tive basis, experience; and, because experience periential judgment, and the unravelling of
itself functions in and not beside the original this original judgment itself, will be done
judgments, logic needs a theory o f experi­ elsewhere.* Here let us mention in particular
ence—in order to be able to give scientific in­ only the fact that even this founding experi­
formation about the legitimating bases, and ence has its style of syntactical performances,
the legitimate limits, of its a priori, and con­ which, however, are still free from all the
sequently about its own legitimate sense. If conceptual and grammatical formings that
experience itself is accounted as judgment in characterize the catégorial as exemplified in
the broadest sense, then this theory of experi­ the predicative judgment and the statement.f

*In the studies in logic that were announced above. [See Erfahrung und Urteil, I. Abschnitt and II. Abschnitt.]
tin my Logische Untersuchungen, II. Bd., II. Teil, 6. Untersuchung, the concept of the catégorial was first intro­
duced with exclusive attention to that which is syntactical in the judgment. No separation was yet made between, on the
one hand, the syntactical as such, which makes its appearance already in the pre-predicational sphere and, moreover,
has its analogues in the spheres of emotion and volition and, on the other hand, the syntactical that belongs to the
specific sphere comprising judgments.
 IX.
Static and Genetic Phenomenology

17. Time and the Self-Constitution of the Ego51'

§30. The transcendental ego insepa­ essential property of the ego, constantly to have
rable from the processes making up his systems of intentionality—among them, har­
life monious ones—partly as going on within him
<actually>, partly as fixed potentialities, which,
Objects exist for me, and are for me what thanks to predelineating horizons, are avail­
they are, only as objects of actual and possible able for uncovering. Each object that the ego
consciousness. If this is not to be an empty ever means, thinks of, values, deals with, like­
statement and a theme for empty speculations, wise each that he ever phantasies or can phan­
it must be shown what makes up concretely tasy, indicates its correlative system and exists
this existence and being-thus for me, or what only as itself the correlate of its system.
sort of actual and possible consciousness is
concerned, what the structure of this conscious­ §31. The Ego as identical pole o f the
ness is, what “possibility” signifies here, and subjective processes
so forth. This can be done solely by constitu­
tional investigation—first, in the broader sense Now, however, we must call attention to a
introduced initially, and then in the narrower great gap in our exposition. The ego is himself
sense just now described. Moreover there is existent for himself in continuous evidence;
but one possible method, the one demanded thus, in himself, he is continuously constitut­
by the essence of intentionality and of its hori­ ing himself as existing. Heretofore we have
zons. Even from the preparatory analyses lead­ touched on only one side of this self-constitu-
ing us upward to the sense of the problem, it tion, we have looked at only the flowing cogito.
becomes clear that the transcendental ego (in The ego grasps himself not only as a flow­
the psychological parallel, the psyche) is what ing life but also as I, who live this and that
it is solely in relation to intentional objectivi­ subjective process, who live through this and
ties. Among these, however, are necessarily that cogito, as the same I. Since we were bus­
included for the ego existing objects and, for ied up to now with the intentional relation of
him as related to a world, not only objects consciousness to object, cogito to cogitatum,
within his (adequately verifiable) sphere of only that synthesis stood out for us which “po­
immanent time but also world Objects, which larizes” the multiplicities of actual and possi­
are shown to be existent only in his inadequate, ble consciousness toward identical objects,
merely presumptive, external experience—in accordingly in relation to objects as poles, syn­
the harmoniousness of its course. It is thus an* thetic unities. Now we encounter a second po-

*CM, pp. 65-81 (Sections 30-39).

308 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

larization, a second kind of synthesis, which poral enduring, of such determining proper­
embraces all the particular multiplicities of ties of the Ego, or the peculiar change that the
cogitationes collectively and in its own man­ Ego undergoes in respect of them, manifestly
ner, namely as belonging to the identical Ego, is not a continuous filling of immanent time
who, as the active and affected subject of con­ with subjective processes—just as the abiding
sciousness, lives in all processes of conscious­ Ego himself, as the pole of abiding Ego-prop­
ness and is related, through them, to all object- erties, is not a process or a continuity of pro­
poles. cesses, even though, with such habitual deter­
mining properties, he is indeed related back to
§32. The Ego as substrate o f ha- the stream of subjective processes. Since, by
bitualities his own active generating, the Ego constitutes
himself as identical substrate o f Ego-proper-
But it is to be noted that this centering Ego ties, he constitutes himself also as a “fixed and
is not an empty pole of identity, any more than abiding” personal Ego—in a maximally broad
any object is such. Rather, according to a law sense, which permits us to speak of sub-human
of “transcendental generation,” with every act “persons.” Though convictions are, in general,
emanating from him and having a new objec­ only relatively abiding and have their modes
tive sense, he acquires a new abiding property. of alteration (through modalization of the ac­
For example: If, in an act of judgment, I decide tive positings—for example, “cancellation" or
for the first time in favor of a being and a be- negation, undoing of their acceptance), the Ego
ing-thus, the fleeting act passes; but from now shows, in such alterations, an abiding style with
on / am abidingly the Ego who is thus and so a unity of identity throughout all of them: a
decided, “I am of this conviction.” That, how­ “personal character.”
ever, does not signify merely that I remember
the act or can remember it later. This I can do, 533. The full concretion o f the Ego as
even if meanwhile I have “given up” my con­ monad and the problem o f his self-
viction. After cancellation it is no longer my constitution
conviction; but it has remained abidingly my
conviction up to then. As long as it is accepted From the Ego as identical pole, and as sub­
by me, I can “return” to it repeatedly, and re­ strate of habitualities, we distinguish the ego
peatedly find it as mine, habitually my own taken in full concreteness—in that we take, in
opinion or, correlatively, find myself as the Ego addition, that without which the Ego cannot
who is convinced, who, as the persisting Ego, after all be concrete. (The ego, taken in full
is determined by this abiding habitus or state. concreteness, we propose to call by the Leib-
Likewise in the case of decisions of every other nizian name: monad.) The Ego can be concrete
kind, value-decisions, volitional decisions. I only in the flowing multiformity of his inten­
decide; the act-process vanishes but the deci­ tional life, along with the objects meant—and
sion persists; whether I become passive and in some cases constituted as existent for him
sink into heavy sleep or live in other acts, the —in that life. Manifestly, in the case of an ob­
decision continues to be accepted and, corre­ ject so constituted, its abiding existence and
latively, I am so decided from then on, as long being-thus are a correlate of the habituality
as I do not give the decision up. If it aims at constituted in the Ego-pole himself by virtue
a terminating deed, it is not “revoked” by the of his position-taking.
deed that fulfills it; in the mode characteristic That is to be understood in the following
of fulfilled decision it continues to be accept­ manner. As ego, I have a surrounding world,
ed: “I continue to stand by my deed.” / myself, which is continually “existing for me”; and, in
who am persisting in my abiding volition, be­ it, objects as “existing for me”—already with
come changed if I “cancel” my decisions or the abiding distinction between those with
repudiate my deeds. The persisting, the tem­ which I am acquainted and those only antici-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 309

pated as objects with which I may become ac­ point. Thus we have touched the level of ge­
quainted. The former, the ones that are, in the netic phenomenology. Before we clarify the
first sense, existent for me, are such by origi­ more precise sense of genetic phenomenolo­
nal acquisition—that is: by my original taking gy, a renewed meditation concerning phenom­
cognizance of what I had never beheld previ­ enological method is needed. At last we must
ously, and my explication of it in particular bring to bear a fundamental methodological
intuitions of its features. Thereby, in my syn­ insight, which, once it is grasped, pervades
thetic activity, the object becomes constituted the whole phenomenological method (and
originally, perceptively, in the explicit sense- likewise, in the natural realm, the method of a
form: “something identical having its mani­ genuine and pure internal psychology). We
fold properties,” or “object as identical with have delayed mentioning it, only to facilitate
itself and undergoing determination in respect entrance into phenomenology. The excessive­
of its manifold properties.” This, my activity ly great multiplicity of novel discoveries and
of positing and explicating being, sets up a ha- problems was meant to act at first in the sim­
bituality of my Ego, by virtue of which the pler attire of a merely empirical description
object, as having its manifold determinations, (though conducted purely within the sphere of
is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions transcendental experience). The method of ei­
make up my surrounding world, so far as 1 am detic description, however, signifies a transfer
acquainted with it at the time, with its horizons of all empirical descriptions into a new and
of objects with which I am unacquainted—that fundamental dimension, which at the begin­
is: objects yet to be acquired but already an­ ning would have increased the difficulties of
ticipated with this formal object-structure. understanding; on the other hand, it is easy to
I exist for myself and am continually giv­ grasp after a considerable number of empiri­
en to myself,* by experiential evidence, as “I cal descriptions.
myself.” This is true of the transcendental ego By the method of transcendental reduction
and, correspondingly, of the psychologically each of us, as Cartesian meditator, was led back
pure ego; it is true, moreover, with respect to to his transcendental ego—naturally with its
any sense of the word ego. Since the monadi- concrete-monadic contents as this de facto ego,
cally concrete ego includes also the whole of the one and only absolute ego. When I keep on
actual and potential conscious life, it is clear meditating, I, as this ego, find descriptively
that the problem of explicating this monadic formulable, intentionally explicatable types;
ego phenomenologically (the problem of his and I was able to progress step by step in the
constitution for himself) must include all intentional uncovering of my “monad” along
constitutional problems without exception. the fundamental lines that offer themselves.
Consequently the phenomenology of this self­ For good reasons, in the course of our descrip­
constitution coincides with phenomenology tions such expressions as “essential necessi­
as a whole. ty” and “essentially determined” forced them­
selves upon us—phrases in which a definite
§34. A fundamental development o f concept of the a priori, first clarified and de­
phenomenological method. Transcen­ limited by phenomenology, receives expres­
dental analysis as eidetic sion.
What is involved here will become clear
With the doctrine of the Ego as pole of his directly in particular examples. Let us pick out
acts and substrate of habitualities, we have al­ no matter what type of intentional proces­
ready touched on the problems of phenomeno­ ses (of perception, retention, recollection, dec­
logical genesis and done so at a significant laration, liking something, striving for it, and

Reading: Ich bin fu r mich selbst und <bin> mir . . . gegeben. —Translator’s note.
310 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

so forth) and think of it as explicated and de­ "eidetic” analyses. All that we have set forth
scribed in respect of its sort of intentional per­ concerning syntheses belonging to the type,
formance—accordingly: in respect of noesis perception, concerning horizons of potential­
and noema. This can signify (and so we have ity, and so forth, holds good, as can easily be
understood it up to now) that types of de facto seen, “essentially ” for everything formable in
occurrences in the de facto transcendental ego this free variation, accordingly for all imagin­
are in question and that the transcendental able perceptions without exception—in other
descriptions are therefore meant to have an words: with absolute "essential universality,”
“empirical” significance. But involuntarily we and with "essential necessity” for every par­
confined our description to such a universali­ ticular case selected, hence for every de facto
ty that its results remain unaffected, regardless perception, since every fact can be thought of
of what the situation may be with respect to merely as exemplifying a pure possibility.
the empirical factualness of the transcendental The variation being meant as an evident
ego. one, accordingly as presenting in pure intui­
Let us make this clear to ourselves, and tion the possibilities themselves as possibili­
then fruitful for our method. Starting from this ties, its correlate is an intuitive and apodictic
table-perception as an example, we vary the consciousness o f something universal. The
perceptual object, table, with a completely free eidos itself is a beheld or beholdable univer­
optionalness, yet in such a manner that we keep sal, one that is pure, “unconditioned”—that is
perception fixed as perception of something, to say: according to its own intuitional sense,
no matter what. Perhaps we begin by Actively a universal not conditioned by any fact. It is
changing the shape or the color of the object prior to all “concepts, ” in the sense of verbal
quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its per­ significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these
ceptual appearing. In other words: Abstaining must be made to fit the eidos.
from acceptance of its being, we change the Though each singly selected type is thus el­
fact of this perception into a pure possibility, evated from its milieu within the empirically
one among other quite “optional” pure possi­ factual transcendental ego into the pure eidet­
bilities—but possibilities that are possible per­ ic sphere, the intentional outer horizons point­
ceptions. We, so to speak, shift the actual per­ ing to its uncoverable connexus within the ego
ception into the realm of non-actualities, the do not vanish; only this nexus-horizon itself
realm of the as-if, which supplies us with “pure” becomes eidetic. In other words: With each ei-
possibilities, pure of everything that restricts detically pure type we find ourselves, not in­
to this fact or to any fact whatever. As regards deed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos
the latter point, we keep the aforesaid possi­ ego; and constitution of one actually pure
bilities, not as restricted even to the co-posit- possibility among others carries with it implic­
ed de facto ego, but just as a completely free itly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego,
“imaginableness” of phantasy. Accordingly a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego.
from the very start we might have taken as our We could have started out by imagining this
initial example a phantasying ourselves into a ego to be freely varied, and could set the prob­
perceiving, with no relation to the rest of our lem of exploring eidetically the explicit con­
de facto life. Perception, the universal type thus stitution of any transcendental ego whatever.
acquired, floats in the air, so to speak—in the The new phenomenology did so from the be­
atmosphere of pure phantasiableness. Thus re­ ginning; and accordingly all the descriptions
moved from all factualness, it has become the and all the problem-delimitations treated by us
pure "eidos” perception, whose "ideal” exten­ up to now have in fact been translations from
sion is made up of all ideally possible percep­ the original eidetic form back into that of an
tions, as purely phantsiable processes. Analy­ empirical description of types. Therefore, if we
ses of perception are then “essential” or think of a phenomenology developed as an in-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 311

tuitively a priori science purely according to through, the legitimate sense of a transcenden­
the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches tal phenomenology).
are nothing else but uncoverings of the all-
embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, §35. Excursus into eidetic internal
which comprises all pure possibility-variants psychology
of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua pos­
sibility. Eidetic phenomenology, accordingly, We go outside the closed sphere of our
explores the universal a priori without which meditations, which restricts us to transcen­
neither I nor any transcendental Ego whatev­ dental phenomenology, if we cannot repress
er is “imaginable”; or, since every eidetic uni­ the remark that, with only slight modifica­
versality has the value of an unbreakable law, tions (which, to be sure, abolish its transcen­
eidetic phenomenology explores the all-em­ dental sense), the whole content of the funda­
bracing laws that prescribe for every factual mental methodological observation that has
statement about something transcendental the just been made remains ours when, on the ba­
possible sense (as opposed to the absurdity or sis of the natural world view, we strive for a
inconsistency) of that statement. psychology as a positive science and, in that
To me as the meditating ego, guided by the connection, strive primarily for the psychology
idea of a philosophy as the all-embracing sci­ that is first in itself and necessary to any psy­
ence, grounded with absolute strictness, a sci­ chology: purely intentional psychology. To the
ence whose possibility I took as a tentative concrete transcendental ego there corresponds
basis, it becomes evident after these last con­ then the human Ego, concretely as the psyche
siderations that, first of all, I must develop a taken purely in itself and <as it is> for itself,
purely eidetic phenomenology and that in the with the psychic polarization: I as pole of my
latter alone the first actualization of a philo­ habitualities, the properties comprised in my
sophical science—the actualization of a “first character. Instead of eidetic transcendental phe­
philosophy”—takes place or can take place. nomenology we then have an eidetic pure psy­
After transcendental reduction, my true inter­ chology, relating to the eidos psyche, whose
est is directed to my pure ego, to the uncov­ eidetic horizon, to be sure, remains unexam­
ering of this de facto ego. But the uncover­ ined. If, however, it did become examined, the
ing can become genuinely scientific only if I way to overcome this positivity would become
go back to the apodictic principles that per­ open—that is, the way leading over into abso­
tain to this ego as exemplifying the eidos ego: lute phenomenology, the phenomenology of
the essential universalities and necessities by the transcendental ego, who indeed no long­
means of which the fact is to be related to its er has a horizon that could lead beyond the
rational grounds (those of its pure possibility) sphere of his transcendental being and thus
and thus made scientific (logical). It should be relativize him.
noted that, in the transition from my ego to an
ego as such, neither the actuality nor the possi­ §36. The transcendental ego as the
bility of other egos is presupposed. I phantasy universe o f possible forms o f subjective
only myself as if I were otherwise; I do not process. The compossibility o f subjec­
phantasy others. “In itself,” then, the science tive processes in coexistence or succes­
of pure possibilities precedes the science of sion as subject to eidetic laws
actualities and alone makes it possible, as a
science. With this we attain the methodologi­ After the significant new formulation of
cal insight that, along with phenomenological the idea of a transcendental phenomenology
reduction, eidetic intuition is the fundamen­ according to the eidetic method, when we re­
tal form of all particular transcendental meth­ turn to the task of discovering the problems
ods (that both of them determine, through and of phenomenology, we naturally confine our-
312 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

selves thenceforth within the limits of a pure­ opment, but not in its own nexus, the type
ly eidetic phenomenology, in which the de “scientific theorizing” can occur. Restriction of
facto transcendental ego and particular data this kind has its grounds in an a priori univer­
given in transcendental experience of the ego sal structure, in a conformity to universal ei­
have the significance merely of examples of detic laws of coexistence and succession in
pure possibilities. Likewise we understand the egological time. For indeed whatever occurs
already discovered problems as eidetic, in that in my ego, and eidetically in an ego as such
we think of the possibility of making them ei- —in the way of intentional processes, consti­
detically pure (a possibility shown in our ex­ tuted unities, Ego habitualities—has its tem­
ample) as actualized. Satisfying the ideal prob­ porality and, in this respect, participates in the
lem of an actually systematic discovery of the system of forms that belongs to the all-inclu­
essential components belonging to a concrete sive temporality with which every imaginable
ego as such, or initiating an actually system­ ego, every possibility-variant of my ego, con­
atic sequence of problems and investigations, stitutes himself for himself.
involves extraordinary difficulties. Only in the
last decade has this system begun to make it­ §37. Time as the universal form o f all
self clear, above all because we have gained egological genesis
new ways of access to the specifically univer­
sal problems of the transcendental ego’s con­ The eidetic laws of compossibility (rules that
stitution. The universal a priori pertaining to a govern simultaneous or successive existence
transcendental ego as such is an eidetic form, and possible existence together, in the fact) are
which contains an infinity of forms, an infini­ laws of causality in a maximally broad sense
ty of a priori types of actualities and potenti­ —laws for an If and Then. Yet it is better to
alities of life, along with the objects consti- avoid here the expression causality, which is
tutable in a life as objects actually existing. But laden with prejudices (deriving from natural­
in a unitarily possible ego not all singly pos­ ism), and to speak of motivation in the tran­
sible types are compossible, and not all corn- scendental sphere (and in the sphere of “pure”
possible ones are compossible in just any or­ psychology). The universe o f subjective pro­
der, at no matter what loci in that ego’s own cesses, which are the “really inherent” con­
temporality. If I form some scientific theory or sciousness-constituents of the transcendental
other, my complex rational activity, with its ego, is a universe of compossibilities only in
rationally constituted existent, belongs to an the universal unity-form o f the flux, in which
essential type that is possible, not in every pos­ all particulars have their respective places as
sible ego, but only in one that is “rational” in a processes that flow within it. Accordingly ev­
particular sense, the same that, with the mun- en this most universal form, which belongs to
danization of the ego, presents itself in the all particular forms of concrete subjective pro­
essential form: man (“rational” animal). When cesses (with the products that are flowingly
I reduce my de facto theorizing to its eidetic constituted in the flux of such processes) is the
type, I have varied myself too (regardless of form of a motivation, connecting all and gov­
whether I am aware of it)—not however in a erning within each single process in particu­
wholly optional manner, but within the frame lar. We can call it furthermore a formal regu­
of the corresponding essential type, “rational” larity pertaining to a universal genesis, which
being. Manifestly I cannot imagine the theo­ is such that past, present, and future, become
rizing I do or can do now as shifted arbitrarily unitarily constituted over and over again, in a
within the unity of my life; and this too car­ certain noetic-noematic formal structure of
ries over into the eidetic. Eidetic apprehen­ flowing modes of givenness.
sion of my (transcendentally reduced) child­ But, within this form, life goes on as a mo­
hood life and its possibilities of constitution tivated course of particular constitutive perfor­
produces a type, such that in its further devel­ mances with a multiplicity of particular moti-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 313

vations and motivational systems, which, ac­ voluntarily by the circumstance that he takes
cording to universal laws of genesis, produce himself as his initial example. Transcendental-
a unity of universal genesis of the ego. The ego ly he finds himself as the ego, then as generi-
constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, cally an ego, who already has (in conscious
the unity of a “history.” We said that the con­ fashion) a world—a world of our universally
stitution of the ego contains all the constitu­ familiar ontological type, with Nature, with
tions of all the objectivities existing for him, culture (sciences, fine art, mechanical art, and
whether these be immanent or transcendent, so forth), with personalities of a higher order
ideal or real. It should now be added that the (state, church), and the rest. The phenomenol­
constitutive systems (systems actualizable by ogy developed at first is merely “static”; its de­
the Ego), by virtue of which such and such scriptions are analogous to those of natural
objects and categories of objects exist for him, history, which concern particular types and, at
are themselves possible only within the frame best, arrange them in their systematic order.
of a genesis in conformity with laws. At the Questions of universal genesis and the genetic
same time they are bound, in their constitut­ structure of the ego in his universality, so far
ing, by the universal genetic form that makes as that structure is more than temporal forma­
the concrete ego (the monad) possible as a unity, tion, are still far away; and, indeed, they be­
as having particular constituents of his being long to a higher level. But even when they are
that are compossible. That a Nature, a cultural raised, it is with a restriction. At first, even ei­
world, a world of men with their social forms, detic observation will consider an ego as such
and so forth, exist for me signifies that pos­ with the restriction that a constituted world al­
sibilities of corresponding experiences exist ready exists for him. This, moreover, is a nec­
for me, as experiences I can at any time bring essary level; only by laying open the law-forms
into play and continue in a certain synthetic of the genesis pertaining to this level can one
style, whether or not I am at present actually see the possibilities of a maximally universal
experiencing objects belonging to the realm eidetic phenomenology. In the latter the ego
in question. It signifies furthermore that oth­ varies himself so freely that he does not keep
er modes of consciousness corresponding to even the ideal restrictive presupposition that a
them—vague intendings and the like—exist world having the ontological structure accept­
as possibilities for me, and also that these oth­ ed by us as obvious is essentially constituted
er modes of consciousness have possibilities for him.
of becoming fulfilled or disappointed by ex­
periences of predelineated types. This involves §38. Active and passive genesis
a firmly developed habituality, acquired by a
certain genesis in conformity with eidetic laws. If we inquire first about principles of con­
We are reminded here of the long-familiar stitutive genesis that have universal signifi­
problems concerning the psychological ori­ cance for us, as possible subjects related to a
gin of the “idea of space,” the “idea of time,” world, we find them to be divided according
the “idea of a physical thing,” and so forth. In to two fundamental forms, into principles of
phenomenology such problems present them­ active and principles of passive genesis. In
selves as transcendental and, naturally, as prob­ active genesis the Ego functions as produc­
lems of intentionality, which have their particu­ tively constitutive, by means of subjective pro­
lar places among the problems of a universal cesses that are specifically acts of the Ego.
genesis. Here belong all the works of practical reason,
Access to the ultimate universalities in­ in a maximally broad sense. In this sense even
volved in problems of eidetic phenomenolo­ logical reason is practical. The characteristic
gy is, however, very difficult. This is particu­ feature (in the case of the realm of logos) is
larly true with respect to an ultimate genesis. that Ego-acts, pooled in a sociality—whose
The beginning phenomenologist is bound in- transcendental sense, to be sure, we have not
314 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

yet brought to light—become combined in a characteristics that make it knowable as, for
manifold, specifically active synthesis and, on example, a hammer, a table, an aesthetic cre­
the basis of objects already given (in modes of ation) is given, with the originality of the “it
consciousness that give beforehand), consti­ itself,” in the synthesis of a passive experi­
tute new objects originally. These then present ence. As such a thing, it is given beforehand to
themselves for consciousness as products. “spiritual” activities, which begin with active
Thus, in collecting, the collection <is consti- grasping.
tuted>; in counting, the number; in dividing, While these are making their synthetic prod­
the part; in predicating, the predicate and the ucts, the passive synthesis that supplies all their
predicational complex of affairs; in inferring, “material” still goes on. The physical thing giv­
the inference; and so forth. Original universal­ en beforehand in passive intuition continues
ity-consciousness is likewise an activity, one to appear in a unitary intuition; and, no matter
in which the universal becomes constituted how much the thing may be modified therein
objectively. On the Ego side there becomes by the activity of explication, of grasping parts
constituted a consequent habituality of con­ and features, it continues to be given before­
tinuing acceptance, which thereupon is part of hand during and in this activity: The manifold
the constitution of the object as simply exist­ modes of appearance, the unitary visual or tac­
ing for the Ego: an object that can always be tual “perceptual images” continue their flow;
seized again, be it in reiterated producings, with and, in their manifestly passive synthesis, the
synthetic consciousness of the same objectiv­ one physical thing, with its one shape and oth­
ity as given again in “catégorial intuition, ” or er unitary features, appears. Yet precisely this
be it in a synthetically appertinent vague con­ synthesis, as a synthesis having this form, has
sciousness. The transcendental constitution of its “history,” evinced in the synthesis itself. It
such objects (cultural objects, for example), is owing to an essentially necessary genesis
in relation to intersubjective activities, presup­ that I, the ego, can experience a physical thing
poses the antecedent constitution of a trans­ and do so even at first glance. This is true, more­
cendental intersubjectivity—about which we over, not only as regards phenomenological
shall not speak until later. genesis but also as regards genesis in the usu­
As already mentioned, the higher forms of al sense, psychological genesis. With good rea­
such activities of “reason” in a specific sense son it is said that in infancy we had to learn
and, correlatively, the higher forms of products to see physical things, and that such modes
of reason, all of which have the character of of consciousness of them had to precede all
irreality (that of “ideal” objects), cannot be re­ others genetically. In “early infancy,” then, the
garded forthwith as belonging to every con­ field of perception that gives beforehand
crete ego as such. This is already shown by does not as yet contain anything that, in a mere
memory of our childhood. However, as regards look, might be explicated as a physical thing.
the lowest levels, such as experiential grasp­ Yet, without putting ourselves back into the
ing, explicating the experienced in respect of realm of passivity, to say nothing of using
its parts, taking together, relating, and the the external psycho-physical point of view of
like, the situation may well turn out to be dif­ psychology, we can, the meditating ego can,
ferent. In any case, anything built by activity penetrate into the intentional constituents of
necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a experiential phenomena themselves—thing-
passivity that gives something beforehand; experiencing phenomena and all others—and
and, when we trace anything built actively, we thus find intentional references leading back
run into constitution by passive generation. to a “history” and accordingly making these
The “ready-made” object that confronts us in phenomena knowable as formations subse­
life as an existent mere physical thing (when quent to other, essentially antecedent forma­
we disregard all the “spiritual” or “cultural” tions (even if the latter cannot be related to pre-
Time and the Self-Constitution o f the Ego 315

cisely the same constituted object). There, how­ as objects in immanent time, and the constitu­
ever, we soon encounter eidetic laws govern­ tion of all real natural objects belonging to the
ing a passive forming of perpetually new syn­ Objective spatiotemporal world. Association is
theses (a forming that, in part, lies prior to a fundamental concept belonging to transcen­
all activity and, in part, takes in all activity it­ dental phenomenology (and, in the psycho­
self); we encounter a passive genesis of the logical parallel, a fundamental concept be­
manifold apperceptions, as products that per­ longing to a purely intentional psychology). The
sist in a habituality relating specifically to old concepts of association and of laws of as­
them. When these habitual apperceptions be­ sociation, though they too have usually been
come actually operative, the already given ob­ related to the coherencies of pure psychic life
jects formed for the central Ego appear, affect by Hume and later thinkers, are only naturalis­
him, and motivate activities. Thanks to the tic distortions of the corresponding genuine,
aforesaid passive synthesis (into which the per­ intentional concepts. From phenomenology,
formances of active synthesis also enter), the which was very late in finding avenues to the
Ego always has an environment of “objects.” exploration of association, this concept receives
Even the circumstance that everything affect­ a completely new aspect, an essentially new
ing me, as a “developed” ego, is apperceived delimination, with new fundamental forms.
as an “object,” a substrate of predicates with Here belongs, for example, sensuous configu­
which I may become acquainted, belongs here, ration in coexistence and in succession. It is
since this is an already familiar goal-form for phenomenologically evident, but strange to
possible explications as acquaintive explica­ the tradition-bound, that association is not a ti­
tions—explications that would constitute an tle merely for a conformity to empirical laws
object as an abiding possession, as some­ on the part of complexes of data comprised in
thing accessible again and again; and this goal- a “psyche”—according to the old figure, some­
form is understandable in advance as hav­ thing like an intrapsychic gravitation—but a
ing arisen from a genesis. It itself points back title (moreover an extremely comprehensive
to a “primal instituting” of this form. Every­ one) for a conformity to eidetic laws on the
thing known to us points to an original becom­ part of the constitution of the pure ego. It des­
ing acquainted; what we call unknown has, ignates a realm of the “innate ” a priori, with­
nevertheless, a known structural form: the out which an ego as such is unthinkable. Only
form “object” and, more particularly, the form through the phenomenology of genesis does
“spatial thing,” “cultural Object,” “tool,” and the ego become understandable: as a nexus,
so forth. connected in the unity of an all-embracing gen­
esis, an infinite nexus of synthetically congru­
§39. Association as a principle o f ous performances—at levels, all of which fit
passive genesis the universal persisting form, temporality, be­
cause the latter itself is built up in a continual,
The universal principle of passive genesis, passive and completely universal genesis,
for the constitution of all objectivities given which, as a matter of essential necessity, em­
completely prior to the products of activity, braces everything new. In the developed ego,
bears the title association. Association, it should this many-leveled structure is conserved as a
be clearly noted, is a matter of intentionality, persistent form-system of apperception and
descriptively demonstrable as that, in respect consequently of constituted objectivities—
of its primal forms, and standing, in respect among them, the ones belonging to an Objec­
of its intentional performances, under eidetic tive universe having a fixed ontological struc­
laws. Owing to these, each and every passive ture; and this conserving is itself only a form
constitution is to be made understandable— of genesis. In all of that, the particular fact is
both the constitution of subjective processes. irrational; but it is possible only in the a priori
316 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

form-system pertaining to it as an egologi- tary comprehensive title, “the (static and ge­
cal fact. Nor should it be overlooked here netic) constitution of objectivities of possible
that "fact,” with its “irrationality,” is itself a consciousness,” phenomenology seems to be
structural concept within the system of the rightly characterized also as transcendental
concrete a priori. Now that the problems of theory of knowledge.
phenomenology have been reduced to the uni­

18. Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method"'

We must make the following distinction of something as perceived which is not self­
under the rubric of the laws of genesis: given in these lived-experiences (not com­
( 1) Laws of genesis in the sense of the dem­ pletely); and they are called apperceptions to
onstration of laws for the sequences of particu­ the extent that they have this trait, even if in
lar events in the stream of lived-experience. this case they also consciously intend what in
They are either laws of immediate, necessary truth is self-given in them. Apperceptions tran­
succession for concrete events or for abstract scend their immanent content, and belonging
phases, moments of such events like the nec­ essentially to this transcending is the fact that
essary connection of retentions to lived-expe- within the same stream of consciousness whose
riences that have lapsed, or the necessary con­ segments are being continually connected, a
nection of retentional phases to the respective fulfilling lived-experience is possible that, in
impressionai phase. Or they are also laws of a the synthesis of fulfillment, supplies its self-
mediated sequence, for instance, the laws of givent as the same, and in that other lived-ex­
association, laws for the emergence of repro­ perience supplies what is not-self-given and the
ductions for a present lived-experience with­ same [self-given]. Insofar as this is the case,
in the present and the like for the emergence there is a law here regulating the future, but a
of intentions of expectation—in the widest law merely for future possibilities, concerning
sense of empty intentions, fulfilled or unful­ a possible continuation of the stream of con­
filled processes of pointing-toward or point­ sciousness, one that is ideally possible.
ing-back. Defined in this general way, apperception is
(2) Lawful regularities that regulate the for­a concept that encompasses every self-giving,
mation of apperceptions. Apperceptions are thus every intuitive consciousness.]: Origin­
intentional lived-experiences that are conscious* ary apperception is perception, and every modi-

* Excerpted from Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental
Logic. Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming). Reprinted with per­
mission of the translator.
From 1921. —Editor's note.
tW hat is meant here is not immanently inherent, adequate givenness, but being perceived in the genuine sense.
¿Consider how the concept of apperception is to be circumscribed. Apperception: a consciousness that is conscious
of something individual that is not self-given in it (self-given does not mean being contained in perception in an
intimately inherent manner); and it is called apperception to the extent that it has this trait, even if it has something in
addition that is self-given in it. Namely, a consciousness can be apperceptively conscious of something, and that same
something can also still be self-given in the same consciousness that extends even further than this apperceiving. For
example, if in this way we call a consciousness of a sign an apperception, then that which is signified ¡das Bezeichnete]
can also be self-given along with the consciousness of a sign in the unity of a consciousness. Or in the unity of a
perception of a hexagon there appears a hexagonal plane and at the same time another; but one of them appears with
Static and Genetic Phenomenological M ethod 317

fication of apperception in imagination con­ To the latter belong the intentions that cus­
tains an apperception precisely in the shape of tomarily come into question under the rubric
this modification. If we consider here that ev­ of association. At each place in the stream it is
ery present consciousness (every span of pres­ possible for constellations that are similar (I
ence belonging to the stream of lived-experi- use an empty term [constellations] whose sci­
ence) not only is, but is “perceived,” that is, is entific content is still to be specified) to be pro­
present now to consciousness in an impres­ duced again with earlier ones, to recall the
sionai manner, then we also mean that an “ap­ earlier similar ones, to point back to them, to
perception” lies in every present conscious­ bring them perhaps to intuitive presence, and
ness. In fact, we cannot even conceive of a then as fulfillments to show them synthetical­
consciousness that would not go beyond the ly unified with the present ones, etc. Yet even
strict present in its essential flux from pres­ these apperceptions, and likewise these ap­
ence to new presences; consciousness is incon­ perceptive combinations—which exhibit the
ceivable without retentional and protentional unities of a combined phenomenon, whose
horizons, without a co-consciousness (although combinations presuppose apperceptions and en­
a necessarily non-intuitive one) of the past of compass them—these apperceptions can only
consciousness and an anticipation of an ap­ take place when other, especially suited apper­
proaching consciousness (no matter how inde­ ceptions have preceded them.
terminate it may be). Thus if something “arises (Could we not also define apperception in
out of something” at all in the stream of con­ the following way: a consciousness that is not
sciousness, then apperceptions necessarily arise only conscious of something within itself in
from apperceptions. We do not need to consid­ general, but at the same time intends this some­
er here whether there are primordial appercep­ thing as a motivation for a consciousness of
tions that could be placed at the “beginning” something else; thus, a consciousness that is
of the stream of consciousness. In any case, not merely conscious of something, and then
there are apperceptive horizons, kinds of such still something else that it does not include,
horizons, kinds of apperceptive intentions (I but rather, a consciousness that points to this
also say appresenting intentions) that must arise other one as one that belongs to it, as what
at each place in the stream according to the is motivated through it. In any case, we will
universal lawful regularities of conscious life— have to expand and give sharper contours to
like the examples given above show. But this our previous definition.)
also holds likewise for those that can arise— In addition, types of complicated appercep­
even if they must not arise—at every place in tions can occur, which, once they are there, are
the stream, namely, insofar as they are bound repeated in a further stream of consciousness
to conditions that are possible at each place. according to primordial laws under universally

reference to the other one, and the other one is itself appearing. This holds in general with respect to the components of
self-givenness peculiar to external appearing phenomena.
Every motivation is apperception. The emergence of a lived-experience A motivates the lived-experience of a B in
the unity of a consciousness; the consciousness of A is equipped with an intention that points beyond, “indicating” a
coexistence. But here we must add that every unfulfilled intention, every unfulfilled horizon contains motivations,
systems of motivations. It is a potentiality of motivation. When fulfillment takes place, a current motivation is there.
One can also say that apperception is itself a motivation, that it motivates whatever may occur as fulfilling, that it
motivates beyond itself into an emptiness. But that will depend upon more precise definitions of apperception and
motivation. Moreover, one will certainly not be able to say that a sign ¡Zeichen] motivates if it is not an indication
[Anzeichen], a word-sign, for example. But we must also ask whether one will want to speak of apperception in that
case. Admittedly, we have formulated our concept in an extraordinarily broad manner. Deeper investigations are needed
here. If one speaks of apperception, perception will not necessarily express a positing consciousness, for the co-per-
ceived is then not necessarily co-posited, to say nothing of perceived in the [broader] sense of "perception" [perzipiert
im Sinne von '’wahrgenommen "].
Fundamental for the theory of consciousness is the universal exploration of the relations of consciousness intend­
ing beyond itself (beyond its Self)— what we call here apperception—to association.
318 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

producible conditions; indeed, they run through laws of necessary succession in which con­
this stream of consciousness steadily, like all crete apperceptions of different typicalities
natural apperceptions, all objective appercep­ (among them all the apperceptions that give rise
tions of reality, apperceptions which in accor­ to the universal apperception of a world) grow
dance with their essence themselves have a his­ out of primordial apperceptions or out of ap­
tory, a genesis according to primordial laws. perceptive intentions of a primitive kind.
Thus, it is a necessary task to establish the uni­ Every apperception exhibits the structure
versal and primitive laws under which stands of noesis and noema. Every apperception car­
the formation of an apperception arising from ries out in its own way a sense-giving and a
a primordial apperception, and to derive sys­ positing of objects in doxic modalities. We have
tematically the possible formations, that is, to to undertake a unique form of analysis in or­
clarify every given structure according to its der to elucidate the intentionality of an apper­
origin. ception, in order to describe, according to their
This “history” of consciousness (the history noetic and noematic structures, the possible
of all possible apperceptions) does not concern types of fulfillment and the systems of possi­
bringing to light a factical genesis for factical ble omni-faceted, complete fulfillment, or the
apperceptions or factical types in a factical systems of a fulfillment that is continually in
stream of consciousness, or even in all facti­ the process of becoming complete. With these
cal human beings; thus it is not at all similar descriptions, namely the constitutive ones, we
to the development of plant or animal species. are in no way inquiring into an explanatory
Rather, every shape of apperception is an es­ genesis. In our descriptions of all the modal
sential shape and has its genesis in accordance modifications in retentions, rememberings, ex­
with essential laws; accordingly, included in pectations, etc., we likewise do not inquire in­
such an idea of apperception is that it must to genesis when we pass from the original im­
undergo a “genetic analysis.” And what is giv­ pressions (perceptions) as a generally typical
en is not the necessary becoming of the par­ generic character that concerns all appercep­
ticular, single apperception (when it is under­ tions, over to a constitutive character, and there­
stood as a fact); rather, the mode of genesis is fore tracing a principle of systematic ordering
only given with the genesis of essence; in this of apperceptions, a principle of ordering that
mode of genesis any kind of apperception of intersects the division of apperceptions ac­
this type must have arisen originally (in one cording to the highest genera of objects (actu­
stroke or piecemeal) in an individual stream of al and possible existing regions of objects). A
consciousness. And after it had arisen (as pri- universal doctrine of consciousness is thus a
mordially instituting, so to speak), individual universal doctrine of apperceptions, correlative
apperceptions of the same type were able to to a universal doctrine of the highest catego­
arise in an entirely different manner, namely ries of possible objects and their catégorial
as genetic after-effects of the earlier ones al­ modifications—a universal constitutive phe­
ready formed—in accordance with intelligible nomenology. The latter is preceded by a uni­
laws of a primitive form. The theory of con­ versal phenomenology of the most general
sciousness is directly a theory of appercep­ structures and modalities that encompass all
tions; the stream of consciousness is a stream categories of apperceptions. To this one must
of a constant genesis; it is not a mere series add a universal theory of genesis.*
[Nacheinander], but a development [Ausein­ In a certain way, we can therefore distinguish
ander], a process of becoming according to “explanatory” phenomenology as a phenom-

*Phenomenology:
1) Universal phenomenology of the general structures of consciousness
2) Constitutive Phenomenology
3) Phenomenology of Genesis
Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method 319

enology of regulated genesis, and “descrip­ dant,” ratifying experience of the respective
tive” phenomenology as a phenomenology of object-like formations), and we want to gain
possible, essential shapes (no matter how they its essential shape. Likewise, we investigate
have come to pass) in pure consciousness and in the free realm of possibility the essential
their teleological ordering in the realm of pos­ structures of the formal lawful regularity of a
sible reason under the headings, “object” and reason in general as formal-logical reason,
“sense.” In my lectures, I did not say “descrip­ etc. Aside from the fact that we form the cor­
tive,” but rather “static” phenomenology. The responding thoughts and realize truths in our­
latter offers an understanding of intentional selves—we recognize through them how pos­
accomplishment, especially of the accomplish­ sible rational subjects would think; through
ment of reason and its negata. It reveals to us this we construe in an indeterminate generali­
the graduated levels of intentional objects that ty subjects of pure reason and their shapes of
emerge in founded apperceptions of a higher rational activities in which they live toward
level as objective senses and in functions of and attain true being and truths, as well as true
sense-giving, and it reveals to us how they func­ values and goods. But even with all this, we do
tion in them, etc. But in these investigations not gain knowledge concerning how a monad,
we are concerned in the first place with apper­ as it were, looks in its completeness, and which
ceptive forms, with modes of consciousness possibilities are prefigured for such complete
that are conceived so generally (that is, left so monadic individualities, and through which
indeterminate) that they must belong to the lawful regularity of individuation.
make-up of every monad (e.g., perception, Let us note that we remain here within the
memory, etc.). Other ones have a different uni­ sphere of reason, within the realm of the active
versality and necessity. If we take as our point ego, and that we cannot describe a shape of
of departure the “natural concept of the world” active apperception, that is, any coherent unity
and the human ego as subject of knowledge, of active configuration (which as a unity of
then what we have gained through an eidet­ consciousness is intentional and accordingly
ic analysis is the idea of a monad that is pre­ is apperceptive configuration) without also con­
cisely in relation to a “world” of this corre­ stantly speaking of genesis. Every inferring is
sponding concept, and in this way we have a an active apperceiving, and as an active pro­
pure range of monads in whose stream of cess of configuring, it is a judging, because
consciousness “necessarily” emerge the cor­ another judging has preceded it—one judg­
responding types of apperceptions (spatial- ment is passed on other judgments that have
causal thing, animal being, human being), al­ been passed. The conclusion follows from the
though perhaps they do not necessarily belong premises, it is generated from them; the lived-
to the idea of a monad as such—what in any experience genetically issues from the ground­
case is not immediately certain a priori from ing lived-experiences, even if other genetic in­
the start. terconnections play a founding role there. Thus,
Further, in monads that correspond to hu­ every activity is motivated, and we have pure
man beings within the natural attitude, we find genesis in the sphere of acts as a pure act-gen­
factically peculiar occurrences of reason in esis in such a form that I, who execute acts, am
particular shapes. We <want to investigato the determined by the fact that I have executed
intentional typicality that is made available to other acts. Further, we have acts that are moti­
us through the phenomenological-eidetic analy­ vated through affections and that stand in a ge­
sis of the ideas “human being” and “world,” netic relation to spheres that fall outside of the
we want to investigate it systematically accord­ sphere of activity. We have, finally, genesis in
ing to all possible nexuses of reason (that is, the sphere of pure passivity, even though for­
we want to investigate its nexuses and ulti­ mations which have their origin in an earlier
mately the entire world of these monads most activity may play their part in them; but now
basically in the possible nexuses of “concor­ they themselves emerge passively.
320 ESSENTIA!. HUSSERL

Accordingly, in the doctrine of genesis, in ing understandable monadologically the natu­

“explanatory” phenomenology, we have: ral psychophysical world and the communal
(1) Genesis of passivity, that is, a general world.*
lawful regularity of genetic becoming in pas­ (6) Again, all this relates to the question
sivity that is always there and, without a doubt, concerning the genetic explanation of a mo­
has origins that lie further back, just as apper­ nad within which a unitary nature and a world
ception itself does. Special types that belong in general is constituted genetically, and how
to the general idea of passive genesis. a unitary nature and a world in general remain
(2) The participation of the ego and relation­ constituted from this point onward through­
ships between activity and passivity. out its entire life, or through an exceptional
(3) Interrelations, formations of pure activ­ span of life, and further how a world with ani­
ity; genesis as an active accomplishment of mals and humans is constituted in a constant
ideal objects and as an accomplishment of real process of identifying itself.
generation. Secondary sensibility: general laws Having preceded this is the static elucida­
of the consciousness of what is habitual. Ev­ tion of world-apperception and of the sense­
erything habitual belongs to passivity. Even giving that is carried out in it. But, it seems, it
the activity that has become habitual. is only possible to undertake an absolute con­
(4) Once we have gained all the kinds of sideration of the world, a “metaphysics,” and
genesis and their laws, we will then ask to what to understand the possibility of a world first
extent one can assert something about the in­ through a genetic consideration of individua­
dividuality of a monad, about the unity of its tion.
“development,” about the regulative system (7) My passivity stands in connection with
that essentially unites all the particular geneses the passivity of all others: one and the same
in the form of one monad, and about which thing-world is constituted for us, one and the
types of individual monads are a priori possi­ same time as objective time such that through
ble and construable. this, my Now and the Now of every other—
(5) And connected to all of the preceding and thus his life-present (with all immanences)
we ask: in what sense the genesis of a monad and my life-present—are objectively “simul­
can be implicated in the genesis of another, and taneous.” Accordingly, my objectively experi­
in what sense a unity of genesis can, accord­ enced and ratified locations and the locations
ing to laws [of genesis], combine a multiplic­ of every other share the same locality; they are
ity of monads. On the one hand, passive gen­ the same locations, and these are indices for
esis, which in the case of the constitution of an ordering my and others’ phenomenal systems,
anthropological world (or rather, an animal not as separated orders, but coordinated orders
world) refers to the constituted physiological in “the same time.” That is, my life and the life
processes and to their conditions in the unity of another do not merely exist, each for them­
of the physical world with the lived-body of selves; rather, one is “directed” toward the
another; on the other hand, active genesis in other. Not only have sensations occurred in me
the form of the motivation of my thinking, valu­ in this or that order such that, in accordance
ing, willing through that of others. Thus, con­ with the laws of genesis, a nature had to be
sidering the individuality of the monad leads constituted for me, and not only has this nature
to the question of the individuality of a multi­ endured, but a typically stable lived-body is
plicity of coexisting monads, monads geneti­ mediated in this process. Realized is also the
cally combined with one another. With respect possibility that there are things similar to my
to “our” world it leads to the question of mak­ lived-body in the nature that is given to me.

*The expression "o u r' world designates a first person plural world constituted through various historical and
intersubjective processes of appropriation and disappropriation: as such it becomes for Husserl in the 1930s a term for
the "generative” phenomenon of “homeworld.” —Translator’s note.
Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method 321

Furthermore, not only has empathy ensued, to the eidetic level, analyzes it according to
but this empathy has been ratified by the fact its strata, extracts types of constituting objects
that the interior life of the other ego has ex­ and describes constituting consciousness, and
pressed itself in a regular manner, and from finally the constitution of this type, world—
then on newly determined and ratified my ap- all without paying any attention to genesis.
presentations again and again. Perhaps I can be more clear by writing:
Primordial laws of genesis are the laws of Necessary successions in the open sphere
original time-consciousness, the primordial of lived-experience: that which is arriving is
laws of reproduction and then of association then not only arriving, but following necessar­
and associative expectation. In relation to this ily according to the evident law of necessary
there is genesis on the basis of active motiva­ succession. Naturally, one can call that a law
tion. of genesis.
If we compare static and genetic nexuses, All “horizons” or all “apperceptions” natu­
then we will have to ask whether one can rally arise in this way. But in a “static” regard,
achieve a systematic phenomenology of static we have “finished” apperceptions. Here apper­
nexuses (like that of noesis and noema), that ceptions emerge and are awakened as finished,
is, whether the genetic dimension can be fully and have a “history” reaching way back. A con­
suspended here. On the whole, the question is stitutive phenomenology can regard the nex­
how the investigations are to be ordered. It is uses of apperceptions in which the same object
clear that one will initially proceed from par­ is constituted eidetically, in which it shows it­
ticular fundamental types, some of which—as self in its constituted ipseity in the way it is
I already said above—will occur necessarily, expected and can be expected. Another “con­
others which will be presented as possibilities. stitutive” phenomenology, the phenomenolo­
The question concerns the leading clues of the gy of genesis, follows the history, the neces­
system. As leading clues, we have types of ob­ sary history of this objectivation and thereby
jects, that is, leading clues from the standpoint the history of the object itself as the object of
of ontology. And with this constitutive teleolo­ a possible knowledge. The primordial history
gies. Here ideal possibilities of concordant of objects leads back to hyletic objects and to
modes of givenness are elaborated, ideal pos­ the immanent ones in general, that is, to the
sibilities of monadic streams in which the uni­ genesis of them in original time-conscious­
ty of an accomplishment is constituted, and ness. Contained within the universal genesis of
other possibilities outside of these are to be a monad are the histories of the constitution
considered as opposing forms. of objects that are there for this monad, and
Another leading clue is the unity of a monad within the universal eidetic phenomenology
as a unity of a genesis, and then the investi­ of genesis this very process is [explicated as]
gation of the typicality of possible monads, accomplished for all conceivable objects in
namely, of possible types of the unity of an in­ relation to all conceivable monads. And con­
dividual monad, of an individual ego, and of versely, one gains graduated levels of monads
that which it had to find [in its environing- corresponding to the levels of objects.
world], and how it had to encounter itself, or I must now go through the Ideas once more
how it bears within itself a rule of individual to become clearer about what still distinguish­
character traits that are then recognizable (per­ es the doctrine of the structures of conscious­
haps through others). ness from the constitutive considerations if
Beginning with the natural attitude, one I also regard everything immanent “constitu-
can also take the “natural concept of the world” tively.”
as a leading clue. One raises the natural world
 X.
Transcendental Phenomenology
and the Way through the Science of
Phenomenological Psychology

19. Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental

Phenomenology:
i
"Phenomenology" t can be established. An outline of this psycho-
logical phenomenology, standing nearer to our
Introduction natural thinking, is well suited to serve as a
preliminary step that will lead up to an under-
The term 'phenomenology' designates two standing of philosophical phenomenology.
things: a new kind of descriptive method which
made a breakthrough in philosophy at the tum I. Pure Psychology: Its Field of
of the century, and an a priori science derived Experience, Its Method, and Its
from it; a science which is intended to supply Function
the basic instrument (Organon) for a rigorous-
ly scientific philosophy and, in its consequent 1. Pure natural science and pure
application, to make possible a methodical re- psychology
form of all the sciences. Together with this
philosophical phenomenology, but not yet Modem psychology is the science dealing
separated from it, however, there also came into with the "psychical" in the concrete context of
being a new psychological discipline parallel spatiotemporal realities, being in some way so
to it in method and content: the a priori pure or to speak what occurs in nature as egoical, with
"phenomenological" psychology, which raises all that inseparably belongs to it as psychic
the reformational claim to being the basic processes like experiencing, thinking, feeling,
methodological foundation on which alone a willing, as capacity, and as habit s. Experi-
scientifically rigorous empirical psychology ence presents the psychical as merely a stra-

*SW, pp. 22-35. This article appeared in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1927).
tThe translator gratefully acknowledges the help he received from Professor Herbert Spiegelberg (Washington
University, St. Louis, Missouri) and Professor Gisela Hess (MacMurray College, Jacksonville, Illinois) in the prepara-
tion of the original translation. The translator has revised his earlier effort in accordance with corrections received from
various sources. Principally, the translator wishes to thank Herbert Spiegelberg for his continued help as well as Karl
Schuhmann, who forwarded a marked-up copy of the translation, which he had used as the text for a seminar in parallel
with the German original. Under the impetus of the criticisms of Professor Schuhmann, the translator has reviewed the
entire text and devised many new renderings (not always those suggested by Professor Schuhmann) which he hopes
have improved the present translation.
Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 323

tum of human and animal being. Accordingly, Focusing our experiencing gaze on our
psychology is seen as a branch of the more own psychic life necessarily takes place as re-
concrete science of anthropology, or rather flection, as a turning about of a glance which
zoology. Animal realities are first of all, at a had previously been directed elsewhere. Ev-
basic level, physical realities. As such, they ery experience can be subject to such reflec-
belong in the closed nexus of relationships in tion, as can indeed every manner in which
physical nature, in Nature meant in the primary we occupy ourselves with any real or ideal
and most pregnant sense as the universal theme objects-for instance, thinking, or in the modes
of a pure natural science; that is to say, an of feeling and will, valuing, and striving. So
objective science of nature which in deliber- when we are fully engaged in conscious activi-
ate one-sidedness excludes all extra-physical ty, we focus exclusively on the specific thing,
predications of reality. The scientific investi- thoughts, values, goals, or means involved, but
gation of the bodies of animals fits within this not on the psychical experience as such, in
area. By contrast, however, if the psychic as- which these things are known as such. Only
pect of the animal world is to become the top- reflection reveals this to us. Through reflection,
ic of investigation, the first thing we have to instead of grasping simply the matter straight-
ask is how far, in parallel with the pure sci- o u t - t h e values, goals, and instrumentalities
ence of nature, a pure psychology is possible. - w e grasp the corresponding subjective ex-
Obviously, purely psychological research can periences in which we become "conscious" of
be done to a certain extent. To it we owe the them, in which (in the broadest sense) they "ap-
basic concepts of the psychical according to pear." For this reason, they are called "phe-
the properties essential and specific to it. These nomena," and their most general essential char-
concepts must be incorporated into the oth- acter is to exist as the "consciousness-of" or
ers, into the psychophysical foundational con- "appearance-of" the specific things, thoughts
cepts of psychology. (judged states of affairs, grounds, conclusions),
It is by no means clear from the very out- plans, decisions, hopes, and so forth. This re-
set, however, how far the idea of a pure psy- latedness [of the appearing to the object of ap-
chology-as a psychological discipline sharp- pearance] resides in the meaning of all ex-
ly separate in itself and as a real parallel to pressions in the vernacular languages which
the pure physical science of nature-has a relate to psychic experience-for instance, per-
meaning that is legitimate and necessary of ception o f something, recalling o f something,
realization. thinking o f something, hoping for something,
fearing something, striving/or something, de-
2. The purely psychical in self-experi- ciding on something, and so on. If this realm
ence and community experience. The of what we call "phenomena" proves to be the
universal description o f intentional possible field for a pure psychological disci-
experiences pline related exclusively to phenomena, we
can understand the designation of it as phe-
To establish and unfold this guiding idea, nomenological psychology. The terminologi-
the first thing that is necessary is a clarifica- cal expression, deriving from Scholasticism,
tion of what is peculiar to experience, and es- for designating the basic character of being
pecially to the pure experience of the psychi- as consciousness, as consciousness of some-
c a l - a n d specifically the purely psychical that thing, is intentionality. In unreflective holding
experience reveals, which is to become the of some object or other in consciousness, we
theme of a pure psychology. It is natural and are turned or directed towards it: our "inten-
appropriate that precedence will be accorded tio" goes out towards it. The phenomenologi-
to the most immediate types of experience, cal reversal of our gaze shows that this "being
which in each case reveal to us our own psy- directed" [Gerichtetsein] is really an imma-
chic being. nent essential feature of the respective experi-
324 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ences involved; they are "intentional" experi- responding to each process, in a flowing in-
ences. tentionality. For psychology, the universal task
An extremely large and variegated number presents itself: to investigate systematically
of kinds of special cases fall within the general the elementary intentionalities, and from out
scope of this concept. Consciousness of some- of these [unfold] the typical forms of inten-
thing is not an empty holding of something; tional processes, their possible variants, their
every phenomenon has its own total form of syntheses to new forms, their structural com-
intention [intentionale Gesamtform], but at the position, and from this advance towards a de-
same time it has a structure, which in inten- scriptive knowledge of the totality of mental
tional analysis leads always again to compo- process, towards a comprehensive type of a life
nents which are themselves also intentional. of the psyche [Gesamttypus eines Leben der
So for example in starting from a perception of See le]. Clearly, the consistent carrying out of
something (for example, a die), phenomeno- this task will produce knowledge which will
logical reflection leads to a multiple and yet have validity far beyond the psychologist's own
synthetically unified intentionality. There are particular psychic existence.
continually varying differences in the modes Psychic life is accessible to us not only
of appearing of objects, which are caused by through self-experience but also through expe-
the changing of "orientation"-of right and rience of others. This novel source of experi-
left, nearness and famess, with the consequent ence offers us not only what matches our self-
differences in perspective involved. There are experience but also what is new, inasmuch as,
further differences in appearance between in terms of consciousness and indeed as expe-
the "actually seen front" and the "unseeable" rience, it establishes the differences between
[ "unanschaulichen "J and relatively "undeter- own and other, as well as the properties pe-
mined" reverse side, which is nevertheless culiar to the life of a community. At just this
"meant along with it." Observing the flux of point there arises the task of also making phe-
modes of appearing and the manner of their nomenologically understandable the mental
"synthesis," one finds that every phase and life of the community, with all the intention-
portion [of the flux] is already in itself "con- alities that pertain to it.
sciousness-of"-but in such a manner that there
is formed within the constant emerging of 3. The self-contained -field o f the purely
new phases the synthetically unified awareness psychological. - Phenomenological
that this is one and the same object. The inten- reduction and true inner experience
tional structure of any process of perception
has its fixed essential type { seine feste Wesens- The idea of a phenomenological psycholo-
typik}, which must necessarily be realized in gy encompasses the whole range of tasks aris-
all its extraordinary complexity just in order ing out of the experience of self and the expe-
for a physical body simply to be perceived as rience of the other founded on it. But it is not
such. If this same thing is intuited in other yet clear whether phenomenological experi-
modes-for example, in the modes of recol- ence, followed through in exclusiveness and
lection, fantasy or pictorial representation- consistency, really provides us with a kind of
to some extent the whole intentional content closed-off field of being, out of which a sci-
of the perception comes back, but all aspects ence can grow which is exclusively focused on
peculiarly transformed to correspond to that it and completely free of everything psycho-
mode. This applies similarly for every other physical. Here [in fact] difficulties do exist,
category of psychic process: the judging, valu- which have hidden from psychologists the
ing, striving consciousness is not an empty possibility of such a purely phenomenological
having knowledge of the specific judgments, psychology even after Brentano's discovery
values, goals, and means. Rather, these consti- of intentionality. They are relevant already to
tute themselves, with fixed essential forms cor- the construction of a really pure self-experi-
Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 325

ence, and therewith of a really pure psychic by the respective meaning of each in conscious-
datum. A particular method of access is re- ness [Bewusstseinssinn] in its various modes
quired for the pure phenomenological field: (perceptual meaning, recollected meaning, and
the method of "phenomenological reduction." so on).
This method o f "phenomenological reduction" With this, we have clarified and supplement-
is thus the foundational method of pure psy- ed our initial determination of the phenome-
chology and the presupposition of all its spe- nological experience and its sphere of being.
cifically theoretical methods. Ultimately the In going back from the unities posited in the
great difficulty rests on the way that already natural attitude to the manifold of modes of
the self-experience of the psychologist is ev- consciousness in which they appear, the uni-
erywhere intertwined with external experience, ties, as inseparable from these multiplicities-
with that of extra-psychical real things. The ex- but as "bracketed"-are also to be reckoned
perienced "exterior" does not belong to one's among what is purely psychical, and always
intentional interiority, although certainly the ex- specifically in the appearance-character in
perience itself belongs to it as experience- which they present themselves. The method
o f the exterior. Exactly this same thing is true of phenomenological reduction (to the pure
of every kind of awareness directed at some- "phenomenon," the purely psychical) accord-
thing out there in the world. A consistent epo- ingly consists (I) in the methodical and rigor-
che of the phenomenologist is required, if he ously consistent epoche of every objective
wishes to break through to his own conscious- positing in the psychic sphere, both of the indi-
ness as pure phenomenon or as the totality of vidual phenomenon and of the whole psychic
his purely mental processes. That is to say, in field in general; and (2) in the methodically
the accomplishment of phenomenological re- practiced seizing and describing of the multiple
flection he must inhibit every co-accomplish- "appearances" as appearances of their objec-
ment of objective positing produced in unre- tive units and these units as units of compo-
flective consciousness, and therewith [inhibit] nent meanings accruing to them each time in
every judgmental drawing-in of the world as their appearances. With this is shown a two-
it "exists" for him straightforwardly. The spe- fold direction-the noetic and noematic of phe-
cific experience of this house, this body, of a nomenological description. Phenomenologi-
world as such, is and remains, however, ac- cal experience in the methodical form of the
cording to its own essential content and thus phenomenological reduction is the only genu-
inseparably, experience "of this house," this ine "inner experience" in the sense meant by
body, this world; this is so for every mode of any well-grounded science of psychology. In
consciousness which is directed towards an its own nature lies manifest the possibility of
object. It is, after all, quite impossible to de- being carried out continuously in infinitum
scribe an intentional experience-even if il- with methodical preservation of purity. The re-
lusionary, an invalid judgment, or the l i k e - ductive method is transferred from self-expe-
without at the same time describing the object rience to the experience of others insofar as
of that consciousness as such. The universal there can be applied to the envisaged [vergegen-
epoche of the world as it becomes known in wiirtigten] mental life of the Other the corre-
consciousness (the "putting it in brackets") sponding bracketing and description accord-
shuts out from the phenomenological field ing to the subjective "How" of its appearance
the world as it exists for the subject in simple and what is appearing ("noesis" and "noema").
absoluteness; its place, however, is taken by As a further consequence, the community that
the world as given in consciousness (perceived, is experienced in community experience is re-
remembered, judged, thought, valued, e t c . ) - duced not only to the mentally particularized
the world as such, the "world in brackets," or intentional fields but also to the unity of the
in other words, the world, or rather individu- community life that connects them all togeth-
al things in the world as absolute, are replaced er, the community mental life in its phenom-
326 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

enological purity (intersubjective reduction). Phenomenological psychology in this man-

Thus results the perfect expansion of the genu- ner undoubtedly must be established as an "ei-
ine psychological concept of "inner experi- detic phenomenology"; it is then exclusively
ence." directed toward the invariant essential forms.
To every mind there belongs not only the For instance, the phenomenology of perception
unity of its multiple intentional life-process of bodies will not be (simply) a report on the
{intentionalen Lebens] with all its inseparable factually occurring perceptions or those to be
unities of sense directed towards the "object." expected; rather it will be the presentation of
There is also, inseparable from this life-pro- invariant structural systems without which per-
cess, the experiencing I-subject as the identi- ception of a body and a synthetically concor-
cal I-pole giving a center for all specific inten- dant multiplicity of perceptions of one and
tionalities, and as the carrier of all habitualities the same body as such would be unthinkable.
growing out of this life-process. Likewise, then, If the phenomenological reduction contrived
the reduced intersubjectivity, in pure form and a means of access to the phenomenon of real
concretely grasped, is a community of pure and also potential inner experience, the meth-
"persons" acting in the intersubjective realm od founded in it of "eidetic reduction" pro-
of the pure life of consciousness. vides the means of access to the invariant es-
sential structures of the total sphere of pure
4. Eidetic reduction and phenomeno- mental process.
logical psychology as an eidetic science
5. The fundamental function o f pure
To what extent does the unity of the field of phenomenological psychology for an
phenomenological experience assure the pos- exact empirical psychology
sibility of a psychology exclusively based on
it, thus a pure phenomenological psychology? A phenomenological pure psychology is
It does not automatically assure an empirically absolutely necessary as the foundation for the
pure science of facts from which everything building up of an "exact" empirical psychol-
psychophysical is abstracted. But this situa- ogy, which since its modem beginnings has
tion is quite different with an a priori science. been sought according to the model of the ex-
In it, every self-enclosed field of possible ex- act pure sciences of physical nature. The fun-
perience permits eo ipso the all-embracing tran- damental meaning of "exactness" in this natu-
sition from the factual to the essential form, ral science lies in its being founded on an a
the eidos. So here, too. If the phenomenologi- priori form-system-each part unfolded in a
cal actual fact as such becomes irrelevant; if, special theory (pure geometry, a theory of pure
rather, it serves only as an example and as the time, theory of motion, etc.)-for a Nature con-
foundation for a free but intuitive variation of ceivable in these terms. It is through the utili-
the factual mind and communities of minds in- zation of this a priori form-system for factu-
to the a priori possible (thinkable) ones; and al nature that the vague, inductive empirical
if now the theoretical eye directs itself to the approach attains to a share of eidetic neces-
necessarily enduring invariant in the variation; sity [Wesensnotwendigkeit] and empirical natu-
then there will arise with this systematic way ral science itself gains a new sense-that of
of proceeding a realm of its own, of the "a working out for all vague concepts and rules
priori." There emerges therewith the eidetical- their indispensable basis of rational concepts
ly necessary typical form, the eidos; this eidos and laws. As essentially differentiated as the
must manifest itself throughout all the poten- methods of natural science and psychology may
tial forms of mental being in particular cases, remain, there does exist a necessary common
must be present in all the synthetic combina- ground: that psychology, like every science, can
tions and self-enclosed wholes, if it is to be at only draw its "rigor" ("exactness") from the
all "thinkable," that is, intuitively conceivable. rationality of the essence. The uncovering of
Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 327

the a priori set of types without which "I," tions about being, value-convictions, volition-
"we," "consciousness," "the objectivity of con- al decisions, and so on), as the personal sub-
sciousness," and therewith mental being as such ject of habits, of trained knowing, of certain
would be inconceivable-with all the essen- character qualities.
tially necessary and essentially possible forms Throughout all this, the "static" description
of synthesis which are inseparable from the idea of essences ultimately leads to problems of
of a whole comprised of individual and com- genesis, and to an all-pervasive genesis that
munal mental life-produces a prodigious field governs the whole life and development of
of exactness that can immediately (without the personal "I" according to eidetic laws [ ei-
the intervening link of Limes-Idealisierung) be detischen Gesetzen]. So on top of the first "stat-
carried over into research on the psyche. Ad- ic phenomenology" will be constructed in
mittedly, the phenomenological a priori does higher levels a dynamic or genetic phenomenol-
not comprise the complete a priori of psychol- ogy. As the first and founding genesis it will
ogy, inasmuch as the psychophysical relation- deal with that of passivity-genesis in which
ship as such has its own a priori. It is clear, the "I" does not actively participate. Here lies
however, that this a priori will presuppose that the new task, an all-embracing eidetic phenom-
of a pure phenomenological psychology, just enology of association, a latter-day rehabilita-
as on the other side it will presuppose the pure tion of David Hume's great discovery, involv-
a priori of a physical (and specifically the or- ing an account of the a priori genesis out of
ganic) Nature as such. which a real spatial world constitutes itself for
The systematic construction of a phenom- the mind in habitual acceptance. There follows
enological pure psychology demands: from this the eidetic theory dealing with the
(1) The description of the peculiarities uni- development of personal habituality, in which
versally belonging to the essence of intention- the purely mental "I" within the invariant struc-
al mental process, which includes the most tural forms of consciousness exists as personal
general law of synthesis: every connection of "I" and is conscious of itself in habitual con-
consciousness with consciousness gives rise tinuing being and as always being transformed.
to a consciousness. For further investigation, there offers itself an
(2) The exploration of single forms of in- especially interconnected stratum at a higher
tentional mental process which in essential ne- level: the static and then the genetic phenom-
cessity generally must or can present them- enology of reason.
selves in the mind; in unity with this, also the
exploration of the syntheses they are members II. Phenomenological Psychology and
of for a typology of their essences: both those Transcendental Phenomenology
that are discrete and those continuous with
others, both the finitely closed and those con- 6. Descartes's transcendental turn and
tinuing into open infinity. Locke's psychologism
(3) The showing and eidetic description
[Wesensdeskription} of the total structure [Ge- The idea of a purely phenomenological
samtgestalt] of mental life as such; in other psychology does not have just the function
words, a description of the essential character described above, of reforming empirical psy-
[Wesensart} of a universal "stream of con- chology. For deeply rooted reasons, it can also
sciousness." serve as a preliminary step for laying open
(4) The term "I" designates a new direc- the essence of a transcendental phenomenol-
tion for investigation (still in abstraction from ogy. Historically, this idea too did not grow
the social sense of this word) in reference to out of the peculiar needs of psychology proper.
the essence-forms of "habituality"; in other Its history leads us back to John Locke's no-
words, the "I" as subject of lasting beliefs or table basic work, and the significant develop-
thought-tendencies-"persuasions"- ( convic- ment in Berkeley and Hume of the impetus
328 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

it contained. Already Locke's restriction to 7. The transcendental problem

the purely subjective was determined by ex-
tra-psychological interests: psychology here To the essential sense of the transcenden-
stood in the service of the transcendental prob- tal problem belongs its all-inclusiveness, in
1em awakened through Descartes. In Des- which it places in question the world and all
cartes's Meditations, the thought that had be- the sciences investigating it. It arises within a
come the guiding one for "first philosophy" general reversal of that "natural attitude" in
was that all of "reality," and finally the whole which everyday life as a whole as well as the
world of what exists and is so for us, exists on- positive sciences operate. In it [the natural at-
ly as the presentational content of our pre- titude] the world is for us the self-evidently ex-
sentations, as meant in the best case and as isting universe of realities which are continu-
evidently reliable in our own cognitive life. ously before us in unquestioned givenness. So
This is the motivation for all transcendental this is the general field of our practical and theo-
problems, genuine or false. Descartes's meth- retical activities. As soon as the theoretical in-
od of doubt was the first method of exhibit- terest abandons this natural attitude and in a
ing "transcendental subjectivity," and his ego general turning around of our regard directs
cogito led to its first conceptual formulation. itself to the life of consciousness-in which
In Locke, Descartes's transcendentally pure the "world" is for us precisely that, the world
mens is changed into the "human mind," whose which is present to u s - w e find ourselves in a
systematic exploration through inner experi- new cognitive attitude [or situation]. Every
ence Locke tackled out of a transcendental- sense which the world has for us (this we now
philosophical interest. And so he is the founder become aware of), both its general indetermi-
of psychologism-as a transcendental philoso- nate sense and its sense determining itself ac-
phy founded through a psychology of inner cording to the particular realities, is, within
experience. The fate of scientific philosophy the intemality of our own perceiving, imagin-
hangs on the radical overcoming of every trace ing, thinking, valuing life-process, a conscious
of psychologism, an overcoming which not sense, and a sense which is formed in subjec-
only exposes the fundamental absurdity of tive genesis. Every acceptance of something
psychologism but also does justice to its tran- as validly existing is effected within us our-
scendentally significant kernel of truth. The selves; and every evidence in experience and
sources of its continuous historical power are theory that establishes it, is operative in us
drawn from out of a double sense [an ambigu- ourselves, habitually and continuously moti-
ity] of all the concepts of the subjective, which vating us. This [principle] concerns the world
arises as soon as the transcendental question is in every determination, even those that are
broached. The uncovering of this ambiguity self-evident: that what belongs in and for itself
involves [us in the need for] at once the sharp to the world, is how it is, whether or not I, or
separation, and at the time the parallel treat- whoever, become by chance aware of it or
ment, of pure phenomenological psychology not. Once the world in this full universality has

·1
(as the scientifically rigorous form of a psy- been related to the subjectivity of conscious-
chology purely of inner experience) and tran- ness, in whose living consciousness it makes
scendental phenomenology as true transcen- its appearance precisely as "the" world in its
dental philosophy. At the same time this will varying sense, then its whole mode of being ·'
justify our advance discussion of psychology acquires a dimension of unintelligibility, or
as the means of access to true philosophy. We rather of questionableness. This "making an '
will begin with a clarification of the true tran- appearance" [Auftreten], this being-for-us of
scendental problem, which in the initially ob- the world as only subjectively having come to
scure unsteadiness of its sense makes one so acceptance and only subjectively brnught and
very prone (and this applies already to Des- to be brought to well-grounded evident pre-
cartes) to shunt it off to a side track. sentation, requires clarification. Because of its
Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 329

empty generality, one's first awakening to periences, possible theoretical evidences, pos-
the relatedness of the world to consciousness sible practical life. But obviously this varia-
gives no understanding of how the varied life tion leaves untouched the pure ideal worlds of
of consciousness, barely discerned and sink- the kind which have their existence in eidetic
ing back into obscurity, accomplishes such universality, which are in their essence invari-
functions: how it, so to say, manages in its im- able; it becomes apparent, however, from the
manence that something which manifests it- possible variability of the subject knowing
self can present itself as something existing such identical essences [/dentitiiten], that their
in itself, and not only as something meant but cognizability, and thus their intentional relat-
as something authenticated in concordant ex- edness does not simply have to do with our
perience. Obviously the problem extends to de facto subjectivity. With the eidetic formula-
every kind of "ideal" world and its "being-in- tion of the problem, the kind of research into
itself' (for example, the world of pure num- consciousness that is demanded is the eidetic.
bers, or of "truths in themselves"). Unintelligi-
bility is felt as a particularly telling affront to 8. The solution by psychologism as a
our very mode of being [as human beings]. For transcendental circle
obviously we are the ones (individually and
in community) in whose conscious life-pro- Our distillation of the idea of a phenomeno-
cess the real world which is present for us as logically pure psychology has demonstrated the
such gains sense and acceptance. As human possibility of uncovering by consistent phe-
creatures, however, we ourselves are supposed nomenological reduction what belongs to the
to belong to the world. When we start with the conscious subject's own essence in eidetic,
sense of the world {weltlichen Sinn] given universal terms, according to all its possible
with our mundane existing, we are thus again forms. This includes those forms ofreason [it-
referred back to ourselves and our conscious self] which establish and authenticate validi-
life-process as that wherein for us this sense ty, and with this it includes all forms of poten-
is first formed. Is there conceivable here or tially appearing worlds, both those validated
anywhere another way of elucidating [it] than in themselves through concordant experiences
to interrogate consciousness itself and the and those determined by theoretical truth. Ac-
"world" that becomes known in it? For it is cordingly, the systematic carrying through of
precisely as meant by us, and from nowhere this phenomenological psychology seems to
else than in us, that it has gained and can gain comprehend in itself from the outset in foun-
its sense and validity. dational (precisely, eidetic) universality the
Next we take yet another important step, whole of correlation research on being and
which will raise the "transcendental" problem consciousness; thus it would seem to be the
(having to do with the being-sense of"transcen- [proper] locus for all transcendental eluci-
dent" relative to consciousness) up to the final dation. On the other hand, we must not over-
level. It consists in recognizing that the rela- look the fact that psychology in all its empiri-
tivity of consciousness referred to just now cal and eidetic disciplines remains a "positive
applies not just to the brute fact of our world science," a science operating within the natu-
but in eidetic necessity to every conceivable ral attitude, in which the simply present world
world whatever. For if we vary our factual is the thematic ground. What it wishes to ex-
world in free fantasy, carrying it over into ran- plore are the psyches and communities of
dom conceivable worlds, we are implicitly psyches that are [actually] to be found in the
varying ourselves whose environment the world world. Phenomenological reduction serves as
is: we each change ourselves into a possible psychological only to the end that it gets at the
subjectivity, whose environment would always psychical aspect of animal realities in its pure
have to be the world that was thought of, as a own essential specificity and its pure own spe-
world of its [the subjectivity's] possible ex- cific essential interconnections. Even in eidet-
:no E'i'iENTl:\L llll'i ERL

ic research [then]. the psyche retains the sense world. of whatever kind. is constituted as
of being which belongs in the realm of what present. However. a self-evident basic require-
is present in the world: it is merely related to ment of any rational method is that this ground
possible real worlds. Even as eidetic phenom- presupposed as beyond question is not confused
enologist. the psychologist is transcendentally with what the transcendental question, in its
naive: he takes the possible . minds"' ('"!''-sub- universality, puts into question. Hence the realm
jects) completely according to the relative sense of this questionability includes the whole realm
of the word as those of men and animal con- of the transcendentally naive and therefore ev-
sidered purely and simply as present in a pos- ery possible world simply claimed in the natu-
sible spatial world. If. however. we allow the ral attitude. Accordingly, all possible sciences,
transcendental interest to be decisive. instead including all their various areas of objects, arc
of the natural-worldly. then psychology as a transcendentally to be subjected to an cpochc.
whole receives the stamp of what is transcen- So also psychology. and the entirety of what is
dentally problematic: and thus it can by considered the psychical in its sense. It would
no means supply the premises for transcenden- therefore be circular. a transcendental circle.
tal philosophy. The subjectivity of conscious- to base the answer to the transcendental ques-
ness. which. as psychic being. is its theme. tion on psychology. be it empirical or cidetic-
cannot be that to which we go back in our ques- phenomenological. We face at this point the
tioning into the transcendental. paradoxical ambiguity: the subjectivity and
In order to arrive at an evident clarity at this consciousness to which the transcendental
decisive point. the thematic sense of the tran- question recurs can thus really not be the sub-
scendental question is to be kept sharply in jectivity and consciousness with which psy-
view. and we must try to judge how. in keep- chology deals.
ing with it. the regions of the problematical
and unproblematical are set apart. The theme 9. The transcendental-phenomenologi-
of transcendental philosophy is a concrete cal reduction and the semblance o f
and systematic elucidation of those multiple transcendental duplication
intentional relationships. which in conformi-
ty with their essences belong to any possi- Are we then supposed to be dual b c i n g s -
ble world whatever as the surrounding world psychological. as human objectivities in the
of a corresponding possible subjectivity. for world, the subjects of psychic life, and at the
which it [the world] would be the one present same time transcendental, as the subjects of
as practically and theoretically accessible. In a transcendental. world-constituting life-pro-
regard to all the objects and structures present cess? This duality can be clarified through be-
in the world for these subjectivities. this acces- ing demonstrated with self-evidence. The psy-
sibility involves the regulations of its possible chic subjectivity. the concretely grasped ' T and
conscious life, which in their typology will have ··we" of ordinary conversation, is experienced
to be uncovered. [Among l such categories arc in its pure psychic ownness through the method
.. lifeless things." as well as men and animals of phenomenological-psychological reduction.
with the internalities of their psychic life. From Modified into eidetic form it provides the
this starting point the full and complete being- ground for pure phenomenological psychol-
sense of a possible world. in general and in re- ogy. Transcendental subjectivity, which is in-
gard to all its constitutive categories, shall be quired into in the transcendental problem. and
elucidated. Like every meaningful question. which subjectivity is presupposed in it as an
this transcendental question presupposes a existing basis. is none other than again "I my-
ground of unquestioned being. in which all self' and "we ourselves": not. however. as
means of solution must be contained. This found in the natural attitude of everyday or of
ground is here the [anonymous] subjectivity of positive science; i.e .. apperccivcd as compo-
that kind of conscious life in which a possible nents of the objectively present world before
Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 331

us, but rather as subjects of conscious life, in my transcendental mental processes if through
which this world and all that is present-for a radical epoche I posit as mere phenomena the
.. us"---makes" itself through certain apper- world. including my own human existence .
ceptions. As men, mentally as well as bodily and now follow up the intentional life-pro-
present in the world, we are for '"ourselves"; cess wherein the entire apperception "of" the
we are appearances standing within an ex- world, and in particular the apperception of
tremely variegated intentional life-process, my mind, my psychologically real perception-
"our" life, in ll'hich this being on hand consti- processes, and so forth, are formed. The con-
tutes itself .. for us" apperceptively, with its tent of these processes. what is included in their
entire sense-content. The (apperceived) I and own essences, remains in this fully preserved.
we on hand presuppose an (apperceiving) I and although it is now visible as the core of an ap-
we, for which they are on hand, which, how- perception practiced again and again psycho-
ever, is not itself present again in the same logically but not previously considered. For
sense. To this transcendental subjectivity we the transcendental philosopher, who through a
have direct access through a transcendental previous all-inclusive resolve of his will has
experience. Just as the psychic experience re- instituted in himself the firm habituality of the
quires a reductive method for purity, so does transcendental "bracketing," even this "mun-
the transcendental. danization" l Verweltlichung, treating every-
We would like to proceed here by intro- thing as part of the world] of consciousness
ducing the transcendental reduction as built which is omnipresent in the natural attitude is
on the psychological reduction-as an addi- inhibited once and for all. Accordingly, the
tional part of the purification which can be consistent reflection on consciousness yields
performed on it any time, a purification that is him time after time transcendentally pure da-
once more by means of a certain epoche. This ta. and more particularly it is intuitive in the
is merely a consequence of the all-embracing mode of a new kind of experience. transcen-
epoche which belongs to the sense of the tran- dental "inner" experience. Arisen out of the
scendental question. If the transcendental rel- methodical transcendental epoche. this new
ativity of every possible world demands an all- kind o f " inner" experience opens up the limit-
embracing bracketing, it also postulates the less transcendental field of being. This field
bracketing of pure psyches and the pure phe- of being is the parallel to the limitless psy-
nomenological psychology related to them. chological field. and the method of access [to
Through this bracketing they are transformed its data] is the parallel to the purely psycho-
into transcendental phenomena. Thus, while logical one, i.e., to the psychological-pheno-
the psychologist, operating within what for menological reduction. And again. the trans-
him is the naturally accepted world, reduces to cendental I [or ego] and the transcendental
pure psychic subjectivity the subjectivity oc- community of egos. conceived in the full con-
curring there (but still within the world), the cretion of transcendental life are the transcen-
transcendental phenomenologist, through his dental parallel to the I and we in the customary
absolutely all-embracing epoche, reduces this and psychological sense, concretely conceived
psychologically pure element to transcenden- as mind and community of minds. with the psy-
tal pure subjectivity, [i.e.,] to that which per- chological life of consciousness that pertains
forms and posits within itself the appercep- to them. My transcendental ego is thus evi-
tion of the world and therein the objectivating dently ·'different" from the natural ego, but by
apperception of a "psyche [belonging to] ani- no means as a second, as one separated from
mal realities." For example, my actual current it in the natural sense of the word, just as on
mental processes of pure perception. fantasy, the contrary it is by no means bound up with
and so forth, are, in the attitude of positivity, it or intertwined with it, in the usual sense of
psychological givens [or data] of psychologi- these words. It is just the field of transcenden-
cal inner experience. They are transmuted into tal self-experience (conceived in full concrete-
332 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ness) which in every case can, through mere lies in an essential transcendental semblance
alteration of attitude, be changed into psycho- which [because] undisclosed had to remain
logical self-experience. In this transition, an effective. Also from the clarification we have
identity of the I is necessarily brought about; gained we begin to understand on the one hand
in transcendental reflection on this transition the independence of the idea of a transcenden-
the psychological Objectivation becomes vis- tal phenomenology. and the systematic devel-
ible as self-objectivation of the transcenden- oping of it. from the idea of a phenomenologi-
tal I. and so it is as if in every moment of the cal pure psychology; and yet on the other hand
natural attitude the I finds itself with an apper- the propaedeutic usefulness of the prelimi-
ception imposed upon it. If the parallelism of nary project of a pure psychology for an ascent
the transcendental and psychological experi- to transcendental phenomenology, a useful-
ence-spheres has become comprehensible out ness which has guided our present discussion
of a mere alteration of attitude, as a kind of here. As regards this point [i.e., the indepen-
identity of the complex interpenetration of dence of the idea of transcendental phenom-
senses of being, then there also becomes intel- enology from a phenomenological pure psy-
ligible the consequence that results from it, chology], clearly the phenomenological and
namely the same parallelism and the interpen- eidetic reduction allows of being immediately
etration of transcendental and psychological connected to the disclosing of transcendental
phenomenology implied in that interpenetra- relativity, and in this way transcendental phe-
tion, whose whole theme is pure intersubjec- nomenology springs directly out of the tran-
tivity, in its dual sense. Only that in this case it scendental intuition. In point of fact, this di-
has to be taken into account that the purely rect path was the historical path it took. Pure
psychic intersubjectivity, as soon as it is sub- phenomenological psychology as eidetic sci-
jected to the transcendental epoche, also leads ence in positivity was simply not available. As
to its parallel, that is, to transcendental inter- regards the second point, i.e., the propaedeutic
subjectivity. Manifestly this parallelism spells preference of the indirect approach to transcen-
nothing less than theoretical equivalence. Tran- dental phenomenology through pure psychol-
scendental intersubjectivity is the concrete- ogy, [it must be remembered that] the transcen-
ly autonomous absolute existing basis [Seins- dental attitude involves a change of focus from
boden] out of which everything transcendent one's entire form of life-style, one which goes
(and, with it. everything that belongs to the so completely beyond all previous experienc-
real world) obtains its existential sense as that ing of life that it must. in virtue of its absolute
of something which only in a relative and there- strangeness, needs be difficult to understand.
with incomplete sense is an existing thing, This is also true of a transcendental science.
namely as being an intentional unity which in Phenomenological psychology, although also
truth exists from out of transcendental bestow- relatively new, and in its method of intentional
al of sense, of harmonious confirmation, and analysis completely novel, still has the acces-
from an habituality of lasting conviction that sibility which is possessed by all positive sci-
belongs to it by essential necessity. ences. Once this psychology has become clear,
at least according to its sharply defined idea,
10. Pure psychology as propaedeutic to then only the clarification of the true sense of
transcendental phenomenology the transcendental-philosophical field of prob-
lems and of the transcendental reduction is re-
Through the elucidation of the essentially quired in order for it to come into possession
dual meaning of the subjectivity of conscious- of transcendental phenomenology as a mere
ness, and also a clarification of the eidetic sci- reversal of its doctrinal content into transcen-
ence to be directed to it, we begin to under- dental terms. The basic difficulties for penetrat-
stand on very deep grounds the historical ing into the terrain of the new phenomenology
insurmountability of psychologism. Its power fall into these two stages, namely that of un-
Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 333

derstanding the true method of "inner experi- scendental subjectivity itself, whose nature it
ence," which already belongs to making pos- is demonstrably to be constituted transcenden-
sible an "exact" psychology as rational science tally in and for itself. Accordingly, a phenom-
of facts, and that of understanding the distinc- enology properly carried through is the truly
tive character of the transcendental methods universal ontology, as over against the only il-
and questioning. True, simply regarded in it- lusory all-embracing ontology in positivity-
self, an interest in the transcendental is the high- and precisely for this reason it overcomes the
est and ultimate scientific interest, and so it is dogmatic one-sidedness and hence unintelligi-
entirely the right thing (it has been so histori- bility of the latter, while at the same time it
cally and should continue) for transcendental comprises within itself the truly legitimate con-
theories to be cultivated in the autonomous, tent [of an ontology in positivity] as grounded
absolute system of transcendental philosophy; originally in intentional constitution.
and to place before us, through showing the
characteristic features of the natural in contrast 12. Phenomenology and the crisis in
to the transcendental attitude, the possibility the foundations o f the exact sciences
within transcendental philosophy itself of re-
interpreting all transcendental phenomeno- If we consider the how of this inclusion, we
logical doctrine [or theory] into doctrine [or find that what is meant is that every a priori is
theory] in the realm of natural positivity. ultimately prescribed in its validity of being
precisely as a transcendental achievement; i.e.,
III. Transcendental Phenomenology it is together with the essential structures of its
and Philosophy as Universal Science constitution, with the kinds and levels of its
with Absolute Foundations givenness and confirmation of itself, and with
the appertaining habitualities. This implies that
11. Transcendental phenomenology as in and through the establishment of the a prio-
ontology ri the subjective method of this establishing is
itself made transparent, and that for the a priori
Remarkable consequences arise when one disciplines which are founded within phenom-
weighs the significance of transcendental phe- enology (for example, as mathematical sci-
nomenology. In its systematic development, it ences) there can be no "paradoxes" and no "cri-
brings to realization the Leibnizian idea of a ses of the foundations." The consequence that
universal ontology as the systematic unity of arises [from all this] with reference to the a
all conceivable a priori sciences, but on a new priori sciences that have come into being his-
foundation which overcomes "dogmatism" torically and in transcendental naivete is that
through the use of the transcendental phe- only a radical, phenomenological grounding
nomenological method. Phenomenology as can transform them into true, methodical, fully
the science of all conceivable transcendental self-justifying sciences. But precisely by this
phenomena and especially the synthetic total they will cease to be positive (dogmatic) sci-
structures in which alone they are concretely ences and become dependent branches of the
possible-those of the transcendental single one phenomenology as all-encompassing ei-
subjects bound to communities of subjects is detic ontology.
eo ipso the a priori science of all conceivable
beings. But [it is the science] then not merely 13. The phenomenological grounding
of the Totality of objectively existing beings, o f the factual sciences in relation to
and certainly not in an attitude of natural posi- empirical phenomenology
tivity; rather, in the full concretion of being in
general which derives its sense of being and its The unending task of presenting the com-
validity from the correlative intentional con- plete universe of the a priori in its transcen-
stitution. This also comprises the being oftran- dental relatedness-back-to-itself [or self-refer-
334 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ence], and thus in its self-sufficiency and per- tersubjectivity that synthetically comprises all
fect methodological clarity, is itself a function facta. First philosophy is the universe of meth-
of the method for realization of an all-embrac- ods for the second, and is related back into it-
ing and hence fully grounded science of em- self for its methodological grounding.
pirical fact. Within [the realm of] positive re-
ality [Positivitiit], genuine (relatively genuine) 15. The "ultimate and highest" prob-
empirical science demands the methodical es- lems as phenomenological
tablishing-of-a-foundation [ Fundamentie-
rung] through a corresponding a priori sci- In phenomenology all rational problems
ence. If we take the universe of all possible have their place, and thus also those that tra-
empirical sciences whatever and demand a ditionally are in some special sense or other
radical grounding that will be free from all philosophically significant. For out of the ab-
"foundation crises," then we are led to the all- solute sources of transcendental experience,
embracing a priori of the radical and that is or eidetic intuiting, they first [are able to] ob-
[and must be] phenomenological grounding. tain their genuine formulation and feasible
The genuine form of an all-embracing science means for their solution. In its universal relat-
of fact is thus the phenomenological [form], edness-back-to-itself, phenomenology recog-
and as this it is the universal science of the nizes its particular function within a possible
factual transcendental intersubjectivity, [rest- life of mankind [ Menschheitsleben] at the tran-
ing] on the methodical foundation of eidetic scendental level. It recognizes the absolute
phenomenology as knowledge applying to norms which are to be picked out intuitively
any possible transcendental subjectivity what- from it [life of mankind], and also its primor-
ever. Hence the idea o f an empirical phe- dial teleo-logical-tendential structure in a di-
nomenology which follows after the eidetic is rectedness towards disclosure of these norms
understood and justified. It is identical with and their conscious practical operation. It rec-
the complete systematic universe of the posi- ognizes itself as a function of the all-embrac-
tive sciences, provided that we think of them ing reflective meditation of (transcendental)
from the beginning as absolutely grounded humanity, [a self-examination] in the service
methodologically through eidetic phenome- of an all-inclusive praxis of reason; that is, in
nology. the service of striving towards the universal
ideal of absolute perfection which lies in in-
14. Complete phenomenology as al/- finity, [a striving] which becomes free through
embracing philosophy [the process of] disclosure. Or, in different
words it is a striving in the direction of the
Precisely through this is restored the most idea (lying in infinity) of a humanness which
primordial concept of philosophy-as all-em- in action and throughout would live and move
bracing science based on radical self-justifi- [be, exist] in truth and genuineness. It recog-
cation, which is alone [truly] science in the nizes its self-reflective function [of self-ex-
ancient Platonic and again in the Cartesian amination] for the relative realization of the
sense. Phenomenology rigorously and system- correlative practical idea of a genuine human
atically carried out, phenomenology in the life [Menschheitsleben} in the second sense
broadened sense [which we have explained] (whose structural forms of being and whose
above, is identical with this philosophy which practical norms it is to investigate), namely as
encompasses all genuine knowledge. It is di- one [that is] consciously and purposively di-
vided into eidetic phenomenology (or all-em- rected towards this absolute idea. In short, the
bracing ontology) as first philosophy, and as metaphysically teleological, the ethical, and
second philosophy, [it is] the science of the the problems of philosophy of history, no less
universe of facta, or of the transcendental in- than, obviously, the problems of judging rea-
Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology 335

son, lie within its boundary, no differently solute" being-over against all "objective" be-
from all significant problems whatever, and ing that is relative to it-namely, as the "for-
all [of them] in their inmost synthetic unity itself"-being of transcendental subjectivity.
and order as [being] of transcendental spiritu- Likewise: Empiricism can only be overcome
ality {Geistigkeit]. by the most universal and consistent empiri-
cism, which puts in place of the restricted [term]
16. The phenomenological resolution "experience" of the empiricists the necessari-
o f all philosophical antitheses ly broadened concept of experience [inclu-
sive] of intuition which offers original data, an
In the systematic work of phenomenology, intuition which in all its forms (intuition of
which progresses from intuitively given [con- eidos, apodictic self-evidence, phenomenologi-
crete] data to heights of abstraction, the old cal intuition of essence, etc.) shows the man-
traditional ambiguous antitheses of the philo- ner and form of its legitimation through phe-
sophical standpoint are resolved-by them- nomenological clarification. Phenomenology
selves and without the arts of an argumenta- as eidetic is, on the other hand, rationalistic:
tive dialectic, and without weak efforts and it overcomes restrictive and dogmatic ration-
compromises: oppositions such as between ra- alism, however, through the most universal ra-
tionalism (Platonism) and empiricism, rela- tionalism of inquiry into essences, which is re-
tivism and absolutism, subjectivism and ob- lated uniformly to transcendental subjectivity,
jectivism, ontologism and transcendentalism, to the I, consciousness, and conscious objec-
psychologism and antipsychologism, positiv- tivity. And it is the same in reference to the oth-
ism and metaphysics, or the teleological ver- er antitheses bound up with them. The tracing
sus the causal interpretation of the world. back of all being to the transcendental subjec-
Throughout all of these, [one finds] justified tivity and its constitutive intentional functions
motives, but throughout also half-truths or im- leaves open, to mention one more thing, no
permissible absolutizing of only relatively and other way of contemplating the world than
abstractively legitimate one-sidednesses. the teleological. And yet phenomenology also
Subjectivism can only be overcome by the acknowledges a kernel of truth in naturalism
most all-embracing and consistent subjectiv- (or rather sensationism). That is, by revealing
ism (the transcendental). In this [latter] form associations as intentional phenomena, indeed
it is at the same time objectivism [of a deeper as a whole basic typology of forms of passive
sort], in that it represents the claims of what- intentional synthesis with transcendental and
ever objectivity is to be demonstrated through purely passive genesis based on essential laws,
concordant experience, but admittedly [this is phenomenology shows Humean fictionalism
an objectivism which] also brings out its full to contain anticipatory discoveries; particular-
and genuine sense, against which [sense] the ly in his doctrine of the origin of such fictions
supposedly realistic objectivism sins by its fail- as thing, persisting existence, causality-an-
ure to understand transcendental constitution. ticipatory discoveries all shrouded in absurd
Relativism can only be overcome through the theories.
most all-embracing relativism, that of transcen- Phenomenological philosophy regards itself
dental phenomenology, which makes intelli- in its whole method as a pure outcome of me-
gible the relativity of all "objective" being [or thodical intentions which already animated
existence] as transcendentally constituted; but Greek philosophy from its beginnings; above
at one with this [it makes intelligible] the most all, however, [it continues] the still vital inten-
radical relativity, the relatedness of the tran- tions which reach, in the two lines of rational-
scendental subjectivity to itself. But just this ism and empiricism, from Descartes through
[relatedness, subjectivity] proves its identity Kant and German idealism into our confused
to be the only possible sense of [the term] "ab- present day. A pure outcome of methodical in-
336 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

tentions means real method which allows the the phenomenologist foreswear the ideal of a
problems to be taken in hand and completed. philosophic system and yet as a humble worker
In the way of true science this path is endless. in community with others, live for a perennial
Accordingly, phenomenology demands that philosophy {philosophia perennis].
 XI.
Transcendental Phenomenology and the
Way through the Life-World

20. The Mathematization of Nature ·

§ 8. The origin o f the new idea o f the ometry had grown up the highly impressive
universality o f science in the reshaping idea of a systematically coherent deductive
o f mathematics theory, aimed at a most broadly and highly
conceived ideal goal, resting on "axiomatic"
The first thing we must do is understand fundamental concepts and principles, proceed-
the fundamental transformation of the idea, ing according to apodictic arguments-a total-
the task of universal philosophy which took ity formed of pure rationality, a totality whose
place at the beginning of the modem age when unconditioned truth is available to insight
the ancient idea was taken over. From Des- and which consists exclusively of uncondi-
cartes on, the new idea governs the total de- tioned truths recognized through immediate
velopment of philosophical movements and and mediate insight. But Euclidean geometry,
becomes the inner motive behind all their ten- and ancient mathematics in general, knows
sions. only finite tasks, a finitely closed a priori. Ar-
The reshaping begins with prominent spe- istotelian syllogistics belongs here also, as
cial sciences inherited from the ancients: Eu- an a priori which takes precedence over all
clidean geometry and the rest of Greek math- others. Antiquity goes this far, but never far
ematics, and then Greek natural science. In enough to grasp the possibility of the infinite
our eyes these are fragments, beginnings of task which, for us, is linked as a matter of
our developed sciences. But one must not ov- course with the concept of geometrical space
erlook here the immense change of meaning and with the concept of geometry as the sci-
whereby universal tasks were set, primarily for ence belonging to it. To ideal space belongs,
mathematics (as geometry and as formal-ab- for us, a universal, systematically coherent a
stract theory of numbers and magnitudes)- priori, an infinite, and y e t - i n spite of its infini-
tasks of a style which was new in principle, ty-self-enclosed, coherent systematic theory
unknown to the ancients. Of course the an- which, proceeding from axiomatic concepts
cients, guided by the Platonic doctrine of ideas, and propositions, permits the deductively uni-
had already idealized empirical numbers, units vocal construction of any conceivable shape
of measurement, empirical figures in space, which can be drawn in space. What "exists"
points, lines, surfaces, bodies; and they had ideally in geometric space is uni vocally decid-
transformed the propositions and proofs of ed, in all its determinations, in advance. Our
geometry into ideal-geometrical propositions apodictic thinking, proceeding stepwise to in-
and proofs. What is more, with Euclidean ge- finity through concepts, propositions, infer-

*CES, pp. 21-59, 68-73 (Sections 8-9 and 14-15).

338 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

ences, proofs, only "discovers" what is already an science, as it was rightly called for a long
there, what in itself already exists in truth. time. As soon as the latter begins to move to-
What is new, unprecedented, is the con- ward successful realization, the idea of phi-
ceiving of this idea of a rational infinite total- losophy in general (as the science of the uni-
ity of being with a rational science systemati- verse, of all that is) is transformed.
cally mastering it. An infinite world, here a
world of idealities, is conceived, not as one §9. Galileo's mathematization o f nature
whose objects become accessible to our knowl-
edge singly, imperfectly, and as it were acci- For Platonism, the real* had a more or less
dentally, but as one which is attained by a ra- perfect methexis in the ideal. This afforded
tional, systematically coherent method. In the ancient geometry possibilities of a primitive
infinite progression of this method, every ob- application to reality. [But] through Galileo's
ject is ultimately attained according to its full mathematization o f nature, nature itself is
being-in-itself [ nach seinem vollen An-sich- idealized under the guidance of the new math-
sein]. ematics; nature itself becomes-to express it
But this is true not only in respect to ideal in a modern w a y - a mathematical manifold
space. Even less could the ancients conceive [Mannigfaltigkeit].
of a similar but more general idea (arising from What is the meaning o f this mathematiza-
formalizing abstraction), that of a formal math- tion o f nature? How do we reconstruct the train
ematics. Not until the dawn of the modem pe- of thought which motivated it?
riod does the actual discovery and conquest of Prescientifically, in everyday sense-experi-
the infinite mathematical horizons begin. The ence, the world is given in a subjectively rela-
beginnings of algebra, of the mathematics of tive way. Each of us has his own appearances;
continua, of analytic geometry arise. From here, and for each of us they count as [gelten als]
thanks to the boldness and originality peculiar that which actually is. In dealing with one an-
to the new humanity, the great ideal is soon other, we have long since become aware of
anticipated of a science which, in this new this discrepancy between our various ontic
sense, is rational and all-inclusive, or rather validities. t But we do not think that, because
the idea that the infinite totality of what is in of this, there are many worlds. Necessarily, we
general is intrinsically a rational all-encom- believe in the world, whose things only ap-
passing unity that can be mastered, without pear to us differently but are the same. [Now]
anything left over, by a corresponding univer- have we nothing more than the empty, neces-
sal science. Long before this idea comes to sary idea of things which exist objectively in
maturity, it determines further developments themselves? Is there not in the appearances
as an unclear or half-clear presentiment. In themselves a content we must ascribe to true
any case it does not stop with the new math- nature? Surely this includes everything which
ematics. Its rationalism soon overtakes natural pure geometry, and in general the mathemat-
science and creates for it the completely new ics of the pure form of space-time, teaches us,
idea of mathematical natural science-Galile- with the self-evidence of absolute, universal

*das Reale. I have used "real" almost exclusively for the German real and its derivatives. For Husserl this term
refers to the spatiotemporal world as conceived by physics (or to the psychic when it is mistakenly conceived on the
model of the physical). The more general Wirklichkeit has usually been translated by the etymologically correct term
"actuality." -Translator's note.
t Seinsgeltungen. Ge/tung is a very important word for Husserl, especially in this text. It derives from gelten, which
is best translated "to count (as such and such) (for me)," as in the previous sentence, or "to be accepted (as, etc.)," or "to
have the validity (of such and such) (for me)." Giiltigkeit is the more common substantive but is less current in Husserl.
Thus "validity" ("our validities," etc.) seems an appropriate shortcut for such more exact but too cumbersome expres-
sions as "that which counts (as)," "those things which we accept (as)," etc., in this case, "those things that we accept as
existing." I have used "ontic" when Husserl compounds Sein with this and other words, e.g., Seinssinn, Seinsgewissheit.
-Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 339

validity, about the pure shapes it can construct to bring to light what was implicitly included
idealiter-and here I am describing, without in his guiding model of mathematics, even
taking a position, what was "obvious"* to Gali- though, because of the direction of his inter-
leo and motivated his thinking. est, it was kept from his view: as a hidden, pre-
We should devote a careful exposition to supposed meaning it naturally had to enter in-
what was involved in this "obviousness" for to his physics along with everything else.
Galileo and to whatever else was taken for In the intuitively given surrounding world,
granted by him in order to motivate the idea of by abstractively directing our view to the mere
a mathematical knowledge of nature in his spatiotemporal shapes, we experience "bod-
new sense. We note that he, the philosopher of i e s " - n o t geometrical-ideal bodies but pre-
nature and "trail-blazer" of physics, was not cisely those bodies that we actually experi-
yet a physicist in the full present-day sense; ence, with the content which is the actual con-
that his thinking did not, like that of our math- tent of experience. No matter how arbitrarily
ematicians and mathematical physicists, move we may transform these bodies in fantasy, the
in the sphere of symbolism, far removed from free and in a certain sense "ideal" possibilities
intuition; and that we must not attribute to him we thus obtain are anything but geometrical-
what, through him and the further historical ideal possibilities: they are not the geometri-
development, has become "obvious" to us. cally "pure" shapes which can be drawn in ideal
space-"pure" bodies, "pure" straight lines,
A) "PURE GEOMETRY" "pure" planes, "pure" figures, and the move-
ments and deformations which occur in the
Let us first consider "pure geometry," the "pure" figures. Thus geometrical space does not
pure mathematics of spatiotemporal shapes mean anything like imaginable space or, gen-
in general, pregivent to Galileo as an old tra- erally speaking, the space of any arbitrarily
dition, involved in a process of lively forward imaginable (conceivable) world. Fantasy can
development-in other words, in generally the transform sensible shapes only into other sen-
same way we still find it: [on the one hand] as sible shapes. Such shapes, in actuality or fan-
a science of "pure idealities" which is, on the tasy, are thinkable only in gradations: the more
other hand, constantly being practically ap- or less straight, flat, circular, etc.
plied to the world of sense-experience. So fa- Indeed, the things of the intuitively given
miliar to us is the shift between a priori theo- surrounding world fluctuate, in general and in
ry and empirical inquiry in everyday life that all their properties, in the sphere of the merely
we usually tend not to separate the space and typical: their identity with themselves, their
the spatial shapes geometry talks about from self-sameness and their temporally enduring
the space and spatial shapes of experiential sameness, are merely approximate, as is their
actuality, as if they were one and the same. If likeness with other things. This affects all
geometry is to be understood as the founda- changes, and their possible samenesses and
tion for the meaning [Sinnesfundament] of ex- changes. Something like this is true also of
act physics, however, we must be very pre- the abstractly conceived shapes of empirically
cise here as elsewhere. In order to clarify the intuited bodies and their relations. This gradu-
formation of Galileo's thought we must ac- alness can be characterized as that of greater
cordingly reconstruct not only what conscious- or less perfection. Practically speaking there
ly motivated him. It will also be instructive is, here as elsewhere, a simple perfection in

*Selbstverstdndlichkeit is another very important word in this text. It refers to what is unquestioned but not neces-
sarily unquestionable. "Obvious" works when the word is placed in quotation marks, as it is here. In other cases I have
used various forms of the expression "taken for granted." -Translator's note.
tvorgegeben. Implying "already there," as material to be worked with. This term is much used later on as applied to
the life-world. -Translator's note.
340 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

the sense that it fully satisfies special practi- man accomplishment, they remain objective-
cal interests. But when interests change, what ly knowable and available without requiring
was fully and exactly satisfactory for one is no that the formulation of their meaning be repeat-
longer so for another; and of course there is a edly and explicitly renewed. On the basis of
limit to what can be done by means of the nor- sensible embodiment, e.g., in speech and writ-
mal technical capacity of perfecting, e.g., the ing, they are simply apperceptivelyt grasped
capacity to make the straight straighter and the and dealt with in our operations. Sensible "mod-
flat flatter. But technology progresses along els" function in a similar way, including espe-
with mankind, and so does the interest in what cially the drawings on paper which are con-
is technically more refined; and the ideal of stantly used during work, printed drawings in
perfection is pushed further and further. Hence textbooks for those who learn by reading, and
we always have an open horizon of conceiv- the like. It is similar to the way in which cer-
able improvement to be further pursued. tain cultural objects (tongs, drills, etc.) are un-
Without going more deeply into the essen- derstood, simply "seen," with their specifical-
tial interconnections involved here (which has ly cultural properties, without any renewed
never been done systematically and is by no process of making intuitive what gave such
means easy), we can understand that, out of properties their true meaning. Serving in the
the praxis of perfecting, of freely pressing to- methodical praxis of mathematicians, in this
ward the horizons of conceivable perfecting form of long-understood acquisitions, are sig-
"again and again," limit-shapes* emerge to- nifications which are, so to speak, sedimented
ward which the particular series of perfectings in their embodiments. And thus they make
tend, as toward invariant and never attainable mental manipulation possible in the geometri-
poles. If we are interested in these ideal shapes cal world of ideal objects. (Geometry represents
and are consistently engaged in determining for us here the whole mathematics of space-
them and in constructing new ones out of those time.)
already determined, we are "geometers." The But in this mathematical praxis we attain
same is true of the broader sphere which in- what is denied us in empirical praxis: "exact-
cludes the dimension of time: we are mathema- ness"; for there is the possibility of determin-
ticians of the "pure" shapes whose universal ing the ideal shapes in absolute identity, of
form is the coidealized form of space-time. In recognizing them as substrates of absolutely
place of real praxis-that of action or that of identical and methodically, univocally deter-
considering empirical possibilities having to minable qualities. This occurs not only in par-
do with actual and really [i.e., physically] pos- ticular cases, according to an everywhere
sible empirical bodies-we now have an ideal similar method which, operating on sensibly
praxis of "pure thinking" which remains exclu- intuitable shapes chosen at random, could carry
sively within the realm of pure limit-shapes. out idealizations everywhere and originally
Through a method of idealization and con- create, in objective and univocal determinate-
struction which historically has long since ness, the pure idealities which correspond to
been worked out and can be practiced intersub- them. For this, [rather,] certain structures stand
jectively in a community, these limit-shapes out, such as straight lines, triangles, circles.
have become acquired tools that can be used But it is possible-and this was the discovery
habitually and can always be applied to some- which created geometry-using these elemen-
thing n e w - a n infinite and yet self-enclosed tary shapes, singled out in advance as univer-
world of ideal objects as a field for study. Like sally available, and according to universal op-
all cultural acquisitions which arise out of hu- erations which can be carried out with them,

*Limesgestalten. Husserl has in mind the mathematic concept of limit. -Translator's note.
tapperzeptiv. Husserl uses this term in the Leibnizian sense to denote a self-conscious act (but not necessarily an
act of reflection) under a certain point of view or "attitude" (Einstellung), here the mathematical. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 341

to construct not only more and more shapes by means of the relations which obtain (or
which, because of the method which produces can be discovered) between these and other
them, are intersubjectively and univocally de- body-shapes it determines the latter intersub-
termined. For in the end the possibility emerg- jectively and in practice univocally-at first
es of producing constructively and univocally, within narrow spheres (as in the art of survey-
through an a priori, all-encompassing system- ing land), then in new spheres where shape is
atic method, all possibly conceivable ideal involved. So it is understandable how, as a con-
shapes. sequence of the awakened striving for "phi-
The geometrical methodology of operatively losophical" knowledge, knowledge which de-
determining some and finally all ideal shapes, termines the "true," the objective being of the
beginning with basic shapes as elementary world, the empirical art of measuring and its
means of determination, points back to the empirically, practically objectivizing function,
methodology of determination by surveying through a change from the practical to the theo-
and measuring in general, practiced first primi- retical interest, was idealized and thus turned
tively and then as an art in the prescientific, into the purely geometrical way of thinking.
intuitively given surrounding world. The un- The art of measuring thus becomes the trail-
dertaking of such measurement has its obvi- blazer for the ultimately universal geometry and
ous origin in the essential form of that surround- its "world" of pure limit-shapes.
ing world. The shapes in it that are sensibly
experienceable and sensibly-intuitively con- B) THE BASIC NOTION OF GALILEAN PHYSICS:
ceivable, and the types [of shapes] that are con- NATURE AS A MATHEMATICAL UNIVERSE
ceivable at any level of generality, fade into
each other as a continuum. In this continuity The relatively advanced geometry known
they fill out (sensibly intuited) space-time, to Galileo, already broadly applied not only to
which is their form. Each shape in this open the earth but also in astronomy, was for him,
infinitude, even if it is given intuitively in real- accordingly, already pregiven by tradition as a
ity as afact, is still without "objectivity"; it is guide to his own thinking, which [then] relat-
not thus intersubjectively determinable, and ed empirical matters to the mathematical ideas
communicable in its determinations, for every- of limit. Also available to him as a tradition, of
o n e - f o r every other one who does not at the course-itself partially determined in the mean-
same time factually see it. This purpose [of pro- time by geometry-was the art of measuring,
curing objectivity] is obviously served by the with its intention of ever increasing exactness
art o f measuring. This art involves a great deal, of measurement and the resulting objective
of which the actual measuring is only the con- determination of the shapes themselves. If
cluding part: on the one hand, for the bodily the empirical and very limited requirements
shapes of rivers, mountains, buildings, etc., of technical praxis had originally motivated
which as a rule lack strictly determining con- those of pure geometry, so now, conversely, ge-
cepts and names, it must create such concepts ometry had long since become, as "applied"
- f i r s t for their "forms" (in terms of pictured geometry, a means for technology, a guide in
similarity), and then for their magnitudes and conceiving and carrying out the task of system-
relations of magnitude, and also for the deter- atically constructing a methodology of mea-
minations of position, through the measure- surement for objectively determining shapes
ment of distances and angles related to known in constantly increasing "approximation" to
places and directions which are presupposed the geometrical ideals, the limit-shapes.
as being fixed. The art of measuring discovers For Galileo, then, this was given-and of
practically the possibility of picking out as course he, quite understandably, did not feel
[standard] measures certain empirical basic the need to go into the manner in which the
shapes, concretely fixed on empirical rigid bod- accomplishment of idealization originally arose
ies which are in fact generally available; and (i.e., how it grew on the underlying basis of
342 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

the pregeometrical, sensible world and its prac- interpretations which is, after all, essential to
tical arts) or to occupy himself with questions the empirically intuited world. For in this man-
about the origins of apodictic, mathematical ner we attain an identical, nonrelative truth of
self-evidence. There is no need for that in the which everyone who can understand and use
attitude of the geometer: one has, after all, stud- this method can convince himself. Here, then,
ied geometry, one "understands" geometri- we recognize something that truly is-though
cal concepts and propositions, is familiar with only in the form of a constantly increasing
methods of operation as ways of dealing with approximation, beginning with what is em-
precisely defined structures and of making pirically given, to the geometrical ideal shape
proper use of figures on paper ("models"). It which functions as a guiding pole.
did not enter the mind of a Galileo that it would However, all this pure mathematics has to
ever become relevant, indeed of fundamental do with bodies and the bodily world only
importance, to geometry, as a branch of a uni- through an abstraction, i.e., it has to do only
versal knowledge of what is (philosophy), to with abstract shapes within space-time, and
make geometrical self-evidence-the "how" with these, furthermore, as purely "ideal" limit-
of its origin-into a problem. For us, proceed- shapes. Concretely, however, the actual and
ing beyond Galileo in our historical reflec- possible empirical shapes are given, at first in
tions, it will be of considerable interest to see empirical sense-intuition, merely as "forms" of
how a shift of focus became urgent and how a "matter," of a sensible plenum;* thus they
the "origin" of knowledge had to become a are given together with what shows itself,
major problem. with its own gradations, in the so-called "spe-
Here we observe the way in which geom- cific" sense-qualities:t color, sound, smell, and
etry, taken over with the sort of naivete of a the like.
priori self-evidence that keeps every normal To the concreteness of sensibly intuitable
geometrical project in motion, determines bodies, of their being in actual and possible
Galileo's thinking and guides it to the idea experience, belongs also the fact that they are
of physics, which now arises for the first time restricted by the [type of] changeability that is
in his life-work. Starting with the practically essential to them. Their changes of spatiotem-
understandable manner in which geometry, in poral position, or of form- or plenum-charac-
an old traditional sphere, aids in bringing the teristics, are not accidental and arbitrary but
sensible surrounding world to univocal de- depend on one another in sensibly typical
termination, Galileo said to himself: Wherev- ways. Such types of relatedness between bod-
er such a methodology is developed, there we ily occurrences are themselves moments of
have also overcome the relativity of subjective everyday experiencing intuition. They are ex-

*einer sinnlichen Fiil/e. I have used the word plenum to translate this strange use of Fiille: the sensible content
which "fills in" the shapes of the world, the "secondary qualities" that are left over after pure shape has been abstracted.
Cf. the related but not identical use of Fiille in LI, Investigation VI, §21. -Translator's note.
t i t is a bad legacy of the psychological tradition since Locke's time that the sense-qualities of actually experienced
bodies in the everyday, intuited surrounding world-colors, touch-qualities, smells, warmth, heaviness, etc., which are
perceived as belonging to the bodies themselves, as their properties-are always surreptitiously replaced by the [so-
called] "sense data" [sinnliche Dalen, Empfindungsdaten. Both terms must be translated by the same expression. -
Translator's note]; these are also indiscriminately called sense-qualities and, at least in general, are not at all differen-
tiated from [properties as such]. Where a difference is felt, instead of thoroughly describing the peculiarities of this
difference, which is quite necessary, one holds to the completely mistaken opinion (and we shall speak of this later) that
"sense-data" constitute what is immediately given. What corresponds to them in the [perceived] bodies themselves is
then ordinarily replaced by their mathematical-physical [properties ] - w h e n it is precisely the origin of the meaning [of
these properties] that we are engaged in investigating. Here and everywhere we shall speak-giving faithful expression
to actual experience-of qualities or properties of the bodies which are actually perceived through these properties.
And when we characterize them as the plena of shapes, we also take these shapes to be "qualities" of the bodies
themselves, indeed sense-qualities: except that, as aicr0rp:a Kotva they are not related to sense-organs belonging to
them alone, as are the aicr0rrra ilha.
The Mathematization o f Nature 343

perienced as that which gives the character experience or is prefigured about future ex-
of belonging together to bodies which exist perience.
together simultaneously and successively, i.e., This universal causal style of the intuitively
as that which binds their being [Sein] to their given surrounding world makes possible hy-
being-such [Sosein/. Often, though not always, potheses, inductions, predictions about the un-
we are clearly confronted in experience with knowns of its present, its past, and its future.
the connected elements which make up these In the life of prescientific knowing we remain,
real-causal interdependencies. Where that is however, in the sphere of the [merely] approxi-
not the case, and where something happens mate, the typical. How would a "philosophy,"
which is strikingly new, we nevertheless im- a scientific knowledge of the world, be possi-
mediately ask why and look around us into ble if we were to stop at the vague conscious-
the spatiotemporal circumstances. The things ness of totality whereby, amidst the vicissitudes
of the intuited surrounding world (always tak- of temporary interests and themes of knowl-
en as they are intuitively there for us in every- edge, we are also conscious of the world as
day life and count as actual) have, so to speak, horizon? Of course we can, as has been shown,
their "habits"-they behave similarly under also thematically reflect on this world-whole
typically similar circumstances. If we take the and grasp its causal style. But we gain thereby
intuitable world as a whole, in the flowing only the empty, general insight that any experi-
present in which it is straightforwardly there enceable occurrence at any place and at any
for us, it has even as a whole its "habit," i.e., time is causally determined. But what about the
that of continuing habitually as it has up to specifically determined world-causality, the
now. Thus our empirically intuited surround- specifically determined network of causal in-
ing world has an empirical over-all style. How- terdependencies that makes concrete all real
ever we may change the world in imagination events at all times? Knowing the world in a
or represent to ourselves the future course of seriously scientific way, "philosophically," can
the world, unknown to us, in terms of its possi- have meaning and be possible only if a meth-
bilities, "as it might be," we necessarily repre- od can be devised of constructing, systemati-
sent it according to the style in which we have, cally and in a sense in advance, the world, the
and up to now have had, the world. We can infinitude of causalities, starting from the mea-
become explicitly conscious of this style by ger supply of what can be established only re-
reflecting and by freely varying these possi- latively in direct experience, and of compel-
bilities. In this manner we can make into a lingly verifying this construction in spite of the
subject of investigation the invariant general infinitude [of experience]. How is this think-
style which this intuitive world, in the flow of able?
total experience, persistently maintains. Pre- But here mathematics offers its services as
cisely in this way we see that, universally, things a teacher. In respect to spatiotemporal shapes
and their occurrences do not arbitrarily appear it had already blazed the trail, in two ways in
and run their course but are bound a priori by fact. First: by idealizing the world of bodies
this style, by the invariant form of the intuit- in respect to what has spatiotemporal shape
able world. In other words, through a univer- in this world, it created ideal objects. Out of
sal causal regulation, all that is together in the the undetermined universal form of the life-
world has a universal immediate or mediate world, space and time, and the manifold of em-
way of belonging together; through this the pirical intuitable shapes that can be imagined
world is not merely a totality [Allheit} but an into it, it made for the first time an objective
all-encompassing unity [Alleinheit], a whole world in the true sense-i.e., an infinite total-
(even though it is infinite). This is self-evident ity of ideal objects which are determinable
a priori, no matter how little is actually experi- univocally, methodically, and quite universally
enced of the particular causal dependencies, for everyone. Thus mathematics showed for the
no matter how little of this is known from past first time that an infinity of objects that are
344 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

subjectively relative and are thought only in world, give rise to the following thought and
a vague, general representation is, through an the conjectural question:
a priori all-encompassing method, objectively Must not something similar be possible for
determinable and can actually be thought as the concrete world as such? If one is already
determined in itself or, more exactly, as an firmly convinced, moreover, like G a l i l e o -
infinity which is determined, decided in ad- thanks to the Renaissance's return to ancient
vance, in itself, in respect to all its objects and philosophy-of the possibility of philosophy
all their properties and relations. It can be as episteme achieving an objective science of
thought in this way, I said-i.e., precisely be- the world, and if it had just been revealed that
cause it is constructible ex datis in its objec- pure mathematics, applied to nature, consum-
tively true being-in-itself, through its method mately fulfills the postulate of episteme in its
which is not just postulated but is actually cre- sphere of shapes: did not this also have to
ated, apodictically generated.* suggest to Galileo the idea of a nature which
Second: coming into contact with the art of is constructively determinable in the same
measuring and then guiding it, mathematics manner in all its other aspects?
- t h e r e b y descending again from the world But is this not possible only if the method
of idealities to the empirically intuited world of measuring through approximations and
- s h o w e d that one can universally obtain ob- constructive determinations extends to all
jectively true knowledge of a completely new real properties and real-causal relations of the
sort about the things of the intuitively actual intuitable world, to everything which is ever
world, in respect to that aspect of them (which experienceable in particular experiences? But
all things necessarily share) which alone inter- how can we do justice to this general antici-
ests the mathematics of shapes, i.e., a [type pation, [and] how can it become a practicable
of] knowledge related in an approximating method for a concrete knowledge of nature?
fashion to its own idealities. All the things of The difficulty here lies in the fact that the
the empirically intuitable world have, in ac- material plena-the "specific" sense-qualities
cord with the world-style, a bodily character, - w h i c h concretely fill out the spatiotempor-
are res extensae, are experienced in change- al shape-aspects of the world of bodies can-
able collocations which, taken as a whole, not, in their own gradations, be directly treat-
have their total collocation; in these, particu- ed as are the shapes themselves. Nevertheless,
lar bodies have their relative positions, etc. these qualities, and everything that makes up
By means of pure mathematics and the practi- the concreteness of the sensibly intuited world,
cal art of measuring, one can produce, for ev- must count as manifestations of an "objective"
erything in the world of bodies which is ex- world. Or rather, they must continue to count
tended in this way, a completely new kind of as such; because (such is the way of thinking
inductive prediction; namely, one can "calcu- which motivates the idea of the new physics)
late" with compelling necessity, on the basis the certainty, binding us all, of one and the
of given and measured events involving shapes, same world, the actuality which exists in itself,
events which are unknown and were never ac- runs uninterrupted through all changes of sub-
cessible to direct measurement. Thus ideal ge- jective interpretation; all aspects of experienc-
ometry, estranged from the world, becomes ing intuition manifest something of this world.
"applied" geometry and thus becomes in a It becomes attainable for our objective knowl-
certain respect a general method of knowing edge when those aspects which, like sensible
the real. qualities, are abstracted away in the pure math-
But does not this manner of objectifying, ematics of spatiotemporal form and its possi-
to be practiced on one abstract aspect of the ble particular shapes, and are not themselves

*Reading erzeugte for erzeugende. -Translator's note.

The Mathematization o f Nature 345

directly mathematizable, nevertheless become stractly speaking-an extension of its own

mathematizable indirectly. and that all these extensions are yet shapes of
the one total infinite extension of the world.
C) T H E PROBLEM OF THE MATHEMATIZA- As world, as the universal configuration of all
BILITY OF THE "PLENA" bodies, it thus has a total form encompassing
all forms, and this form is idealizable in the
The question now is what an indirect math- way analyzed and can be mastered through
ematization would mean. construction.
Let us first consider the more profound rea- To be sure, it is also part of the world-struc-
son why a direct mathematization (or an ana- ture that all bodies have their specific sense-
logue of approximative construction), in re- qualities. But the qualitative configurations
spect to the specifically sensible qualities of based purely on these are not analogues of spa-
bodies, is impossible in principle. tiotemporal shapes, are not incorporated into a
These qualities, too, appear in gradations, world-form peculiar to them. The limit-shapes
and in a certain way measurement applies to of these qualities are not idealizable in an anal-
them as to all gradations-we "assess" the ogous sense; the measurement ("assessing") of
"magnitude" of coldness and warmth, of rough- them cannot be related to corresponding
ness and smoothness, of brightness and dark- idealities in a constructible world already ob-
ness, etc. But there is no exact measurement jectivized into idealities. Accordingly, the con-
here, no growth of exactness or of the meth- cept of "approximation" has no meaning here
ods of measurement. Today, when we speak of analogous to that within the mathematizable
measuring, of units of measure, methods of sphere of shapes-the meaning of an objecti-
measure, or simply of magnitudes, we mean as fying achievement.
a rule those that are already related to ideali- Now with regard to the "indirect" mathema-
ties and are "exact"; so it is difficult for us to tization of that aspect of the world which in
carry out the abstract isolation of the plena itself has no mathematizable world-form: such
which is so necessary here: i.e., to consider mathematization is thinkable only in the sense
-experimentally, so to speak-the world of that the specifically sensible qualities ("plena")
bodies exclusively according to the "aspect" that can be experienced in the intuited bodies
of those properties belonging under the title are closely related in a quite peculiar and regu-
"specific sense-qualities," through a universal lated way with the shapes that belong essen-
abstraction opposed to the one which gives rise tially to them. If we ask what is predetermined
to the universal world of shapes. a priori by the universal world-form with its
What constitutes "exactness"? Obviously, universal causality-i.e., if we consult the in-
nothing other than what we exposed above: variant, general style of being to which the in-
empirical measuring with increasing precision, tuited world, in its unending change, adheres:
but under the guidance of a world of idealities, on the one hand the form of space-time is pre-
or rather a world of certain particular ideal determined, and everything that belongs to it
structures that can be correlated with given a priori (before idealization), as encompassing
scales of measurement-such a world having all bodies in respect to shape. It is further pre-
been objectified in advance through idealiza- determined that, in each case of real bodies,
tion and construction. And now we can make factual shapes require factual plena and vice
the contrast clear in a word. We have not two versa; that, accordingly, this sort of general
but only one universal form of the world: not causality obtains, binding together aspects of
two but only one geometry, i.e., one of shapes, a concretum which are only abstractly, not re-
without having a second for plena. The bodies ally, separable. What is more, considering ev-
of the empirical-intuitable world are such, in erything as a totality, there obtains a univer-
accord with the world-structure belonging to sal concrete causality. This causality contains
this w o r l d - a priori, that each body h a s - a b - the necessary anticipation that the intuitively
346 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

given world can be intuited as a world only as member) arose, as the practical art of mea-
an endlessly open horizon and hence that the suring, guided by idealities and the construc-
infinite manifold of particular causalities can tions ideally carried out with them: i.e., an
be anticipated only in the manner of a horizon objectification of the concrete causal world of
and is not itself given. We are thus in any case, bodies within corresponding limited spheres.
and a priori, certain, not only that the total As soon as we bring all this to mind, the con-
shape-aspect of the world of bodies generally ception proposed above, which at first ap-
requires a plenum-aspect pervading all the peared almost eccentric, loses its strangeness
shapes, but also that every change, whether it for us and takes o n - t h a n k s to our earlier
involves aspects of shape or of plenum, oc- scientific schooling-the character of some-
curs according to certain causalities, immedi- thing taken for granted. What we experienced,
ate or mediate, which make it necessary. This in prescientific life, as colors, tones, warmth,
is the extent, as we said, of the undetermined and weight belonging to the things themselves
general anticipation a priori. and experienced causally as a body's radiation
This is not to say, however, that the total of warmth which makes adjacent bodies warm,
behavior of plenum-qualities, in respect to and the like, indicates in terms of physics, of
what changes and what does not change, fol- course, tone-vibrations, warmth-vibrations, i.e.,
lows causal rules in such a way that this whole pure events in the world of shapes. This uni-
abstract aspect of the world is dependent in a versal indication is taken for granted today as
consistent way on what occurs causally in unquestionable. But if we go back to Galileo,
the shape-aspect of the world. In other words, as the creator of the conception which first
we do not have an a priori insight that every made physics possible: what came to be taken
change of the specific qualities of intuited for granted only through his deed could not be
bodies which is experienced or is conceivable taken for granted by him. He took for granted
in actual or possible experience refers causal- only pure mathematics and the old familiar
ly to occurrences in the abstract shape-stratum way of applying it.
of the world, i.e., that every such change has, If we adhere strictly to Galileo's motiva-
so to speak, a counterpart in the realm of shapes tion, considering the way in which it in fact
in such a way that any total change in the laid the foundation for the new idea of physics,
whole plenum has its causal counterpart in the we must make clear to ourselves the strange-
sphere of shapes. ness of his basic conception in the situation
Put in this way, this conception might ap- of his time; and we must ask, accordingly, how
pear almost fantastic. Still, let us take into he could hit upon this conception, namely,
account the long-familiar idealization of the that everything which manifests itself as real
form of space-time with all its shapes, carried through the specific sense-qualities must have
out (in large areas, though by no means com- its mathematical index in events belonging to
pletely) for thousands of years, together with the sphere of shapes-which is, of course, al-
the changes and configurations of change re- ready thought of as idealized-and that there
lating to this form. The idealization of the must arise from this the possibility of an indi-
art of measurement was, as we know, includ- rect mathematization, in the fullest sense, i.e.,
ed in this, not merely as the art of measur- it must be possible (though indirectly and
ing things but as the art of empirical causal through a particular inductive method) to con-
constructions (in which deductive inferences struct ex datis, and thus to determine objec-
helped, of course, as they do in every art). tively, all events in the sphere of the plena. The
The theoretical attitude and the thematiza- whole of infinite nature, taken as a 'concrete
tion of pure idealities and constructions led to universe of causality-for this was inherent in
pure geometry (under which we include here that strange conception-became [the object
all pure mathematics of shapes); and later of] a peculiarly applied mathematics.
- i n the reversal which has by now become But first let us answer the question of what,
understandable-applied geometry (as we re- in the pregiven world which was already mathe-
The Mathematization o f Nature 347

matized in the old limited way, could have in- of the world and a rational praxis. There must
cited Galileo's basic conception. be measuring methods for everything encom-
passed by geometry, the mathematics of shapes
D) THE MOTIVATION OF GALILEO'S CONCEP- with its a priori ideality. And the whole con-
TION OF NATURE crete world must tum out to be a mathema-
tizable and objective world if we pursue those
Now there were some occasions, rather individual experiences and actually measure
scanty, to be sure, of manifold but disconnected everything about them which, according to the
experiences, within the totality of prescientific presuppositions, comes under applied geom-
experience, which suggested something like the etry-that is, if we work out the appropriate
indirect quantifiability of certain sense-quali- method of measuring. If we do that, the sphere
ties and thus a certain possibility of character- of the specifically qualitative occurrences must
izing them by means of magnitudes and units also be mathematized indirectly.
of measurement. Even the ancient Pythagore- In interpreting what was taken for granted
ans had been stimulated by observing the func- by Galileo, i.e., the universal applicability of
tional dependency of the pitch of a tone on the pure mathematics, the following must be not-
length of a string set vibrating. Many other ed: In every application to intuitively given
causal relations of a similar sort were, of course, nature, pure mathematics must give up its ab-
generally known. Basically, all concrete intu- straction from the intuited plenum, whereas it
itively given events in the familiar surround- leaves intact what is idealized in the shapes
ing world contain easily discernible dependen- (spatial shapes, duration, motion, deforma-
cies of plenum-occurrences on those of the tion). But in one respect this involves the per-
sphere of shapes. But there was generally no formance of coidealization of the sensible plena
motive for taking an analytical attitude toward belonging to the shapes. The extensive and in-
the nexus of causal dependencies. In their vague tensive infinity which was substructed through
indeterminateness they could not incite inter- the idealization of the sensible appearances,
est. It was different in cases where they took going beyond all possibilities of actual intu-
on the character of a determinateness which ition-separability and divisibility in infinitum,
made them susceptible to determining induc- and thus everything belonging to the math-
tion; and this leads us back to the measurement ematical continuum-implies a substruction of
of plena. Not everything which concomitantly infinities for the plenum-qualities which them-
and visibly changed on the side of shapes was selves are eo ipso cosubstructed. The whole
measurable through the old, developed mea- concrete world of bodies is thus charged with
suring methods. Also, it was a long way from infinities not only of shape but also of plena.
such experiences to the universal idea and hy- But it must also be noted once again that the
pothesis that all specifically qualitative events "indirect mathematizability" which is essenti-
function as indices for precisely correspond- al for the genuine Galilean conception of phys-
ing constellations and occurrences of shape. ics is not yet given thereby.
But it was not so far for the men of the Renais- As far as we have come, only a general idea
sance, who were inclined to bold generaliza- has been attained or, more precisely, a gener-
tions everywhere and in whom such exuber- al hypothesis: that a universal inductivity* ob-
ant hypotheses immediately found a receptive tains in the intuitively given world, one which
audience. Mathematics as a realm of genuine announces itself in everyday experiences but
objective knowledge (and technology under its whose infinity is hidden.
direction)-that was, for Galileo and even be- To be sure, this inductivity was not under-
fore him, the focal point of "modem" man's stood by Galileo as a hypothesis. For him a
guiding interest in a philosophical knowledge physics was immediately almost as certain as

*eine universa/e lnduktivitiit, i.e., that all types of occurrence in the world are such as to be susceptible to induction.
-Translator's note.
348 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

the previous pure and applied mathematics. occurrences-or rather the ways in which fac-
The hypothesis also immediately traced out tual plena and shapes stand in causal relation-
for him [its own] path ofrealization (a realiza- must be included in the method. The applica-
tion whose success necessarily has the sense, tion of mathematics to plena of shape given in
in our eyes, of a verification o f the hypothesis reality makes, because of the concreteness in-
- t h i s by no means obvious hypothesis re- volved, causal presuppositions which must be
lated to the [previously] inaccessible factual brought to determinateness. How one should
structure of the concrete world).* What mat- actually proceed here, how one should regu-
tered for him first, then, was the attainment late methodically the work to be accomplished
of farther reaching and ever more perfectible completely within the intuitively given world;
methods in order actually to develop, beyond how the factually accessible bodily data, in a
those which had thus far in fact been devel- world charged through hypothetical idealiza-
oped, all the methods of measuring that were tion with as yet unknown infinities, are to be
prefigured as ideal possibilities in the ideality brought to causal determination in both as-
of pure mathematics-to measure, for exam- pects ;t how the hidden infinities in these data
ple, speeds and accelerations. But the pure are to be progressively disclosed according to
mathematics of shapes itself required a rich- methods of measuring; how, through growing
er development as constructive quantification approximations in the sphere of shapes, more
- w h i c h later on led to analytic geometry. and more perfect indices of the qualitative ple-
The task now was to grasp systematically, by na of the idealized bodies become apparent;
means of these aids, the universal causality- how the bodies themselves, as concrete, be-
or, as we may say, the peculiar universal in- come determinable through approximations
ductivity-of the world of experience which in respect to all their ideally possible occur-
was presupposed in the hypothesis. It is to be rences: all this was a matter of discovery in
noted, [then,] that along with the new, concrete, physics. In other words, it was a matter for the
and thus two-sided idealization of the world, passionate praxis o f inquiry and not a matter
which was involved in Galileo's hypothesis, for prior systematic reflection upon what is
the obviousness of a universal, exact causality possible in principle, upon the essential pre-
was also g i v e n - a universal causality which is suppositions of a mathematical objectification
not, of course, first arrived at by induction which is supposed to be able to determine the
through the demonstration of individual cau- concretely real within the network of universal
salities but which precedes and guides all in- concrete causality.
duction of particular causalities-this being Discovery is really a mixture of instinct and
true even of the concretely general, intuitable method. One must, of course, ask whether such
causality which makes up the concretely intu- a mixture is in the strict sense philosophy or
itable form of the world as opposed to particu- science-whether it can be knowledge of the
lar, individual causalities experienceable in world in the ultimate sense, the only sense that
the surrounding world of life {Lebensumwelt]. could serve us as a [genuine] understanding of
This universal idealized causality encom- the world and ourselves. As a discoverer,
passes all factual shapes and plena in their ide- Galileo went directly to the task of realizing
alized infinity. Obviously, if the measurements his idea, of developing methods for measur-
made in the sphere of shapes are to bring about ing the nearest data of common experience;
truly objective determinations, occurrences on and actual experience demonstrated (through
the side of the plena must also be dealt with a method which was of course not radically
methodically. All the fully concrete things and clarified) what his hypothetical anticipation in

*"Our eyes," referring to us who are engaged in this historical reflection. Once we have removed our own preju-
dices, we see this as a strange hypothesis rather than simply taking it for granted. -Translator's note.
tI.e., the aspect of shape and the aspect of plenum. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 349

each case demanded; he actually found causal a universal physics, with its (as we have seen)
interrelations which could be mathematically highly complicated meaning-content, gave as
expressed in "formulae." a task to scientific humanity and in what the
The actual process of measuring, applied to process of its fulfillment through successful
the intuited data of experience, results, to be physics results i n - a process of developing
sure, only in empirical, inexact magnitudes and particular methods, and mathematical formu-
their quantities. But the art of measuring is, in lae and "theories" shaped by them.
itself, at the same time the art of pushing the
exactness of measuring further and further in E) T H E VERIFICATIONAL CHARACTER OF
the direction of growing perfection. It is an art NATURAL SCIENCE'S FUNDAMENTAL HYPOTH-
not [only] in the sense of a finished method for ESIS
completing something; it is at the same time a
method for improving [this very] method, again According to our remark [above, pp. 347-
and again, through the invention of ever new- 348]-which of course goes beyond the prob-
er technical means, e.g., instruments. Through lem of merely clarifying Galileo's motivation
the relatedness of the world, as field of appli- and the resulting idea and task of physics-the
cation, to pure mathematics, this "again and Galilean idea is a hypothesis, and a very re-
again" acquires the mathematical sense of the markable one at that; and the actual natural sci-
in infinitum, and thus every measurement ac- ence throughout the centuries of its verifica-
quires the sense of an approximation to an un- tion is a correspondingly remarkable sort of
attainable but ideally identical pole, namely, verification. It is remarkable because the hy-
one of the definite mathematical idealities or, pothesis, in spite of the verification, continues
rather, one of the numerical constructions be- to be and is always a hypothesis; its verifica-
longing to them. tion (the only kind conceivable for it) is an end-
From the beginning, the whole method has less course of verifications. It is the peculiar
a general sense, even though one always has essence of natural science, it is a priori its way
to do with what is individual and factual. From of being, to be unendingly hypothetical and
the very beginning, for example, one is not unendingly verified. Here verification is not, as
concerned with the free fall of this body; the it is in all practical life, merely susceptible to
individual fact is rather an example, embedded possible error, occasionally requiring correc-
from the start in the concrete totality of types tions. There is in every phase of the develop-
belonging to intuitively given nature, in its em- ment of natural science a perfectly correct
pirically familiar invariance; and this is natu- method and theory from which "error" is
rally carried over into the Galilean attitude of thought to be eliminated. Newton, the ideal of
idealizing and mathematizing. The indirect exact natural scientists, says "hypotheses non
mathematization of the world, which proceeds fingo, " and implied in this is the idea that he
as a methodical objectification of the intuitive- does not miscalculate and make errors of
ly given world, gives rise to general numeri- method. In the total idea of an exact science,
cal formulae which, once they are formed, can just as in all the individual concepts, proposi-
serve by way of application to accomplish the tions, and methods which express an "exact-
factual objectification of the particular cases ness" (i.e., an ideality)-and in the total idea
to be subsumed under them. The formulae ob- of physics as well as the idea of pure math-
viously express general causal interrelations, ematics-is embedded the in infinitum, the
"laws of nature," laws of real dependencies in permanent form of that peculiar inductivity
the form of the "functional" dependencies of which first brought geometry into the histori-
numbers. Thus their true meaning does not lie cal world. In the unending progression of cor-
in the pure interrelations between numbers (as rect theories, individual theories characterized
if they were formulae in the purely arithmeti- as "the natural science of a particular time," we
cal sense); it lies in what the Galilean idea of have a progression of hypotheses which are in
350 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

every respect hypotheses and verifications. In are hypothetically substructed in advance in

the progression there is growing perfection, undetermined generality but still have to be
and for all of natural science taken as a totality demonstrated in their determined form. If one
this means that it comes more and more to it- still has a vivid awareness of this correlation
self, to its "ultimate" true being, that it gives in its original meaning, then a mere themat-
us a better and better "representation" [ " V<Jr- ic focus of attention on this meaning is suffi-
stellung "] of what "true nature" is. But true cient in order to grasp the ascending orders of
nature does not lie in the infinite in the same intuitions (now conceived as approximations)
way that a pure straight line does; even as an indicated by the functionally coordinated quan-
infinitely distant "pole" it is an infinity of theo- tities (or, more briefly, by the formulae); or
ries and is thinkable only as verification; thus rather one can, following these indications,
it is related to an infinite historical process of bring the ascending orders of intuitions vivid-
approximation. This may well be a topic for ly to mind. The same is true of the coordina-
philosophical thinking, but it points to ques- tion itself, which is expressed in functional
tions which cannot yet be grasped here and do forms; and thus one can outline the empirical
not belong to the sphere of questions we must regularities of the practical life-world which
now deal with. For our concern is to achieve are to be expected. In other words, if one has
complete clarity on the idea and task of a phys- the formulae, one already possesses, in ad-
ics which in its Galilean form originally deter- vance, the practically desired prediction of what
mined modern philosophy, [to understand it] is to be expected with empirical certainty in
as it appeared in Galileo's own motivation, and the intuitively given world of concretely actual
to understand what flowed into this motivation life, in which mathematics is merely a special
from what was traditionally taken for granted [form of] praxis. Mathematization, then, with
and thus remained an unclarified presupposi- its realized formulae, is the achievement which
tion of meaning, as well as what was later added is decisive for life.
as seemingly obvious, but which changed its Through these considerations we see that,
actual meaning. from the very first conceiving and carrying-
In this connection it is not necessary to go out of the method, the passionate interest of
more concretely into the first beginnings of the the natural scientist was concentrated on this
enactment of Galileo's physics and of the de- decisive, fundamental aspect of the above-
velopment of its method. mentioned total accomplishment, i.e., on the
formulae, and on the technical* method ("natu-
F) THE PROBLEM OF THE SENSE OF NATURAL- ral-scientific method," "method of the true
SCIENTIFIC "FORMULAE" knowledge of nature") of acquiring them and
grounding them logically and compellingly
But one thing more is important for our for all. And it is also understandable that some
clarification. The decisive accomplishment were misled into taking these formulae and their
which, in accord with the total sense of natu- formula-meaning for the true being of nature
ral-scientific method, makes determined, sys- itself.
tematically ordered predictions immediately This "formula-meaning" requires a more
possible, going beyond the sphere of immedi- detailed clarification, now, in respect to the su-
ately experiencing intuitions and the possible perficialization of meaningt which unavoid-
experiential knowledge of the prescientific life- ably accompanies the technical development
world, is the establishment of the actual corre- and practice of method. Measurements give rise
lation among the mathematical idealities which to numbers on a scale, and, in general proposi-

*kunstmdssig, i.e .. having the character of a technique. - Translator's note.

t Sinnesverdusserlichung. literally, "externalization of meaning," but with the sense of rendering it superficial,
separating it from its origin. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 351

tions about functional dependencies of mea- ple, to pure analysis, treated as a science in
sured quantities, they result not in determined its own right; and the results achieved in this
numbers but in numbers in general, stated in science can be applied to geometry. We must
general propositions which express laws of go into this briefly in more detail.
functional dependencies. Here we must take This process of method-transformation, car-
into account the enormous effect-in some ried out instinctively, unreflectively in the prax-
respects a blessing, in others portentous- is of theorizing, begins in the Galilean age and
of the algebraic terms and ways of thinking leads, in an incessant forward movement, to
that have been widespread in the modem pe- the highest stage of, and at the same time a
riod since Vieta (thus since even before Gali- surmounting of, "arithmetization"; it leads to
leo's time). Initially this means an immense a completely universal "formalization." This
extension of the possibilities of the arithme- happens precisely through an improvement and
tic thinking that was handed down in old, prim- a broadening of the algebraic theory of num-
itive forms. It becomes free, systematic, a bers and magnitudes into a universal and thus
priori thinking, completely liberated from all purely formal "analysis," "theory of mani-
intuited actuality, about numbers, numerical re- folds," "logistic"-words to be understood
lations, numerical laws. This thinking is soon sometimes in a narrower, sometimes a broad-
applied in all its extensions-in geometry, in er, sense, since until now, unfortunately, there
the whole pure mathematics of spatiotemporal has been no unambiguous characterization of
shapes-and the latter are thoroughly formal- what in fact, and in a way practically under-
ized algebraically for methodical purposes. standable in mathematical work, a coherent
Thus an "arithmetization of geometry" devel- mathematical field is. Leibniz, though far ahead
ops, an arithmetization of the whole realm of of his time, first caught sight of the universal,
pure shapes (ideal straight lines, circles, tri- self-enclosed idea of a highest form of alge-
angles, motions, relations of position, etc.). braic thinking, a mathesis universalis, as he
They are conceived in their ideal exactness as called it, and recognized it as a task for the
measurable; the units of measurement, them- future. Only in our time has it even come close
selves ideal, simply have the meaning of spa- to a systematic development. In its full and
tiotemporal magnitudes. complete sense it is nothing other than a for-
This arithmetization of geometry leads al- mal logic carried out universally (or rather to
most automatically, in a certain way, to the be carried out in infinitum in its own essential
emptying of its meaning. The actually spa- totality), a science of the forms of meaning of
tiotemporal idealities, as they are presented the "something-in-general" which can be con-
firsthand {originiir] in geometrical thinking structed in pure thought and in empty, formal
under the common rubric of "pure intuitions," generality. On this basis it is a science of the
are transformed, so to speak, into pure numeri- "manifolds" which, according to formal ele-
cal configurations, into algebraic structures. In mentary laws of the noncontradiction of these
algebraic calculation, one lets the geometric constructions, can be built up systematically
signification recede into the background as a as in themselves free of contradiction. At the
matter of course, indeed drops it altogether; highest level it is a science of the universe of
one calculates, remembering only at the end the "manifolds" as such which can be con-
that the numbers signify magnitudes. Of course ceived in this way. "Manifolds" are thus in
one does not calculate "mechanically," as in or- themselves compossible totalities of objects
dinary numerical calculation; one thinks, one in general, which are thought of as distinct on-
invents, one may make great discoveries-but ly in empty, formal generality and are con-
they have acquired, unnoticed, a displaced, ceived of as defined by determinate modalities
"symbolic" meaning. Later this becomes a ful- of the something-in-general. Among these to-
ly conscious methodical displacement, a me- talities the so-called "definite" manifolds are
thodical transition from geometry, for exam- distinctive. Their definition through a "com-
352 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

plete axiomatic system" gives a special sort of manifolds itself, as in the previous algebra-
totality in all deductive determinations to the ic theory of number and magnitude and in all
formal substrate-objects contained in them. the other applications of what has been ob-
With this sort of totality, one can say, the for- tained by a technique, without recourse to the
mal-logical idea of a "world-in-general" is genuine scientific meaning; this includes also
constructed. The "theory of manifolds" in the the application to geometry, the pure mathemat-
special sense is the universal science of the ics of spatiotemporal shapes.
de.finite manifolds.* Actually the process whereby material math-
ematics is put into formal-logical form, where
G) THE EMPTYING OF THE MEANING OF expanded formal logic is made self-sufficient
MATHEMATICAL NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH as pure analysis or theory of manifolds, is per-
"TECHNIZATION" t fectly legitimate, indeed necessary; the same
is true of the technization which from time to
This most extreme extension of the already time completely loses itself in merely techni-
formal but limited algebraic arithmetic has cal thinking. But all this can and must be a
immediate applications, in its a priori fashion, method which is understood and practiced in a
within all "concretely material" [konkret sach- fully conscious way. It can be this, however,
haltige] pure mathematics, the mathematics only if care is taken to avoid dangerous shifts
of "pure intuitions," and can thus be applied of meaning by keeping always immediately in
to mathematized nature; but it also has appli- mind the original bestowal of meaning [Sinn-
cations to itself, to previous algebraic arith- gebung] upon the method, through which it has
metic, and, again by extension, to all its own the sense of achieving knowledge about
formal manifolds; in this way it is related the world. Even more, it must be freed of the
back to itself. Like arithmetic itself, in techni- character of an unquestioned tradition which,
cally developing its methodology it is drawn from the first invention of the new idea and
into a process of transformation, through which method, allowed elements of obscurity to flow
it becomes a sort of technique; that is, it be- into its meaning.
comes a mere art of achieving, through a cal- Naturally, as we have shown, the formulae
culating technique according to technical rules, - t h o s e obtained and those to be obtained-
results the genuine sense of whose truth can be count most for the predominant interest of the
attained only by concretely intuitive thinking discovering scientist of nature. The further
actually directed at the subject matter itself. physics has gone in the actual mathematiza-
But now [only] those modes of thought, those tion of the intuited, pregiven nature of our
types of clarity which are indispensable for a surrounding world, the more mathematical-
technique as such, are in action. One operates scientific propositions it has at its disposal,
with letters and with signs for connections the further the instrument destined for it, the
and relations (+, x, =, etc.), according to rules mathesis universalis, has been developed: the
o f the game for arranging them together in a greater is the range of its possible deductive
way essentially not different, in fact, from a conclusions concerning new facts of quanti-
game of cards or chess. Here the original think- fied nature and thus the range of indicated cor-
ing that genuinely gives meaning to this tech- responding verifications to be made. The latter
nical process and truth to the correct results devolve upon the experimental physicist, as
(even the "formal truth" peculiar to the formal does the whole work of ascending from the in-
mathesis universalis) is excluded; in this man- tuitively given surrounding world, and the ex-
ner it is also excluded in the formal theory of periments and measurements performed in it,

*For a more exact exposition of the concept of the definite manifold, see Ideas I, §72. On the idea of the mathesis
universalis, see LI, I, §§60, 69, 70, and, above all, FTL, §23.
tTechnisierung, i.e., the process of becoming a technique. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 353

to the ideal poles. Mathematical physicists, belonging to natural science. It is not only that
on the other hand, settled in the arithmetized these methods are later "mechanized." To the
sphere of space-time, or at the same time in essence of all method belongs the tendency to
the formalized mathesis universalis, treat the superficialize itself in accord with techniza-
mathematical-physical formulae brought to tion. Thus natural science undergoes a many-
them as special pure structures of the formal sided transformation and covering-over of its
mathesis, naturally keeping invariant the con- meaning. The whole cooperative interplay be-
stants which appear in them as elements of tween experimental and mathematical phys-
functional laws of factual nature. Taking into ics, the enormous intellectual work constantly
account all the "natural laws already proved or accomplished here, takes place within a trans-
in operation as working hypotheses," and on formed horizon of meaning. One is, of course,
the basis of the whole available formal system to some degree conscious of the difference be-
of laws belonging to this mathesis, they draw tween TEXVTJ and science. But the reflection
the logical consequences whose results are to back upon the actual meaning which was to be
be taken over by the experimenters. But they obtained for nature through the technical
also accomplish the formation of the availa- method stops too soon. It no longer reaches far
ble logical possibilities for new hypotheses, enough even to lead back to the position of
which of course must be compatible with the the idea of mathematizing nature sketched
totality of those accepted as valid at the time. out in Galileo's creative meditation, to what
In this way, they see to the preparation of those was wanted from this mathematization by Gali-
forms of hypotheses which now are the only leo and his successors and what gave mean-
ones admissible, as hypothetical possibilities ing to their endeavors to carry it out.
for the interpretation of causal regularities to
be empirically discovered through observa- H) T H E LIFE-WORLD AS THE FORGOTTEN
tion and experiment in terms of the ideal poles MEANING-FUNDAMENT OF NATURAL SCIENCE
pertaining to them, i.e., in terms of exact laws.
But experimental physicists, too, are constantly But now we must note something of the
oriented in their work toward ideal poles, to- highest importance that occurred even as ear-
ward numerical magnitudes and general formu- ly as Galileo: the surreptitious substitution of
lae. Thus in all natural-scientific inquiry these the mathematically substructed world of ide-
are at the center of interest. All the discoveries alities for the only real world, the one that is
of the old as well as the new physics are dis- actually given through perception, that is ever
coveries in the formula-world which is coordi- experienced and experienceable-our every-
nated, so to speak, with nature. day life-world. This substitution was promptly
The formula-meaning of this world lies in passed on to his successors, the physicists of
idealities, while the whole toilsome work of all the succeeding centuries.
achieving them takes on the character of a Galileo was himself an heir in respect to
mere pathway to the goal. And here one must pure geometry. The inherited geometry, the in-
take into consideration the influence of the herited manner of "intuitive" conceptualizing,
above-characterized technization of formal- proving, constructing, was no longer original
mathematical thinking: the transformation of geometry: in this sort of "intuitiveness" it was
its experiencing, discovering way of thinking, already empty of meaning. Even ancient ge-
which forms, perhaps with great genius, con- ometry was, in its way, TEXVTJ, removed from
structive theories, into a way of thinking with the sources of truly immediate intuition and
transformed concepts, "symbolic" concepts. In originally intuitive thinking, sources from
this process purely geometrical thinking is al- which the so-called geometrical intuition, i.e.,
so depleted, as is its application to factual na- that which operates with idealities, has at first
ture in natural-scientific thinking. In addition, derived its meaning. The geometry of ideali-
a technization takes over all other methods ties was preceded by the practical art of sur-
354 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

veying, which knew nothing of idealities. Yet entific] work back to its true meaning always
such a pregeometrical achievement was a stop at idealized nature; they do not carry out
meaning-fundament for geometry, a funda- the reflection radically, going back to the ulti-
ment for the great invention of idealization; mate purpose which the new science, together
the latter encompassed the invention of the with the geometry which is inseparable from
ideal world of geometry, or rather the method- it, growing out of prescientific life and its sur-
ology of the objectifying determination of ide- rounding world, was from the beginning sup-
alities through the constructions which create posed to serve: a purpose which necessarily lay
"mathematical existence." It was a fateful omis- in this prescientific life and was related to its
sion that Galileo did not inquire back into the life-world. Man (including the natural scien-
original meaning-giving achievement which, as tist), living in this world, could put all his prac-
idealization practiced on the original ground tical and theoretical questions only to it-could
of all theoretical and practical life-the imme- refer in his theories only to it, in its open, end-
diately intuited world (and here especially the less horizons of things unknown. All knowl-
empirically intuited world of bodies)-result- edge of laws could be knowledge only of pre-
ed in the geometrical ideal constructions. He dictions, grasped as lawful, about occurrences
did not reflect closely on all this: on how the of actual or possible experiential phenomena,
free, imaginative variation of this world and predictions which are indicated when experi-
its shapes results only in possible empirically ence is broadened through observations and
intuitable shapes and not in exact shapes; on experiments penetrating systematically into
what sort of motivation and what new achieve- unknown horizons, and which are verified in
ment was required for genuinely geometric the manner of inductions. To be sure, everyday
idealization. For in the case of inherited geo- induction grew into induction according to
metrical method, these functions were no longer scientific method, but that changes nothing of
being vitally practiced; much less were they the essential meaning of the pre given world as
reflectively brought to theoretical conscious- the horizon of all meaningful induction. It is
ness as methods which realize the meaning of this world that we find to be the world of all
exactness from the inside. Thus it could appear known and unknown realities. To it, the world
that geometry, with its own immediately evi- of actually experiencing intuition, belongs the
dent a priori "intuition" and the thinking which form of space-time together with all the bodi-
operates with it, produces a self-sufficient, ly [korperlich] shapes incorporated in it; it is
absolute truth which, as such-"obviously" in this world that we ourselves live, in accord
- c o u l d be applied without further ado. That with our bodily [leiblich}, * personal way of
this obviousness was an illusion-as we have being. But here we find nothing of geometrical
pointed out above in general terms, thinking idealities, no geometrical space or mathemati-
for ourselves in the course of our exposition of cal time with all their shapes.
Galileo's thoughts-that even the meaning of This is an important remark, even though
the application of geometry has complicated it is so trivial. Yet this triviality has been bur-
sources: this remained hidden for Galileo and ied precisely by exact science, indeed since
the ensuing period. Immediately with Galileo, the days of ancient geometry, through that sub-
then, begins the surreptitious substitution of stitution of a methodically idealized achieve-
idealized nature for prescientifically intuited ment for what is given immediately as actual-
nature. ity presupposed in all idealization, given by a
Thus all the occasional (even "philosophi- [type of] verification which is, in its own way,
cal") reflections which go from technical [sci- unsurpassable. This actually intuited, actual-

*Karper means a body in the geometric or physical sense; Leib refers to the body of a person or animal. Where
possible, I have translated Leib as "living body" (Leib is related to Leben); Karper is translated as "body" or sometimes
"physical body." In cases where adjectival or adverbial forms are used, as here, it is sometimes necessary to insert the
German words or refer to them in a footnote. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 355

ly experienced and experienceable world, in Mathematics and mathematical science, as

which practically our whole life takes place, a garb of ideas, or the garb of symbols of the
remains unchanged as what it is, in its own es- symbolic mathematical theories, encompasses
sential structure and its own concrete causal everything which, for scientists and the edu-
style, whatever we may do with or without cated generally, represents the life-world,
techniques. Thus it is also not changed by the dresses it up as "objectively actual and true"
fact that we invent a particular technique, the nature. It is through the garb of ideas that we
geometrical and Galilean technique which is take for true being what is actually a method
called physics. What do we actually accomplish - a method which is designed for the pur-
through this technique? Nothing but predic- pose of progressively improving, in infinitum,
tion extended to infinity. All life rests upon through "scientific" predictions, those rough
prediction or, as we can say, upon induction. In predictions which are the only ones originally
the most primitive way, even the ontic cer- possible within the sphere of what is actually
tainty* of any straightforward experience is experienced and experienceable in the life-
inductive. Things "seen" are always more than world. It is because of the disguise of ideas
what we "really and actually" see of them. See- that the true meaning of the method, the for-
ing, perceiving, is essentially having-some- mulae, the "theories," remained unintelligible
thing-itself [Selbsthaben] and at the same time and, in the naive formation of the method, was
having-something-in-advance [Vor-haben], never understood.
meaning-something-in-advance [Vor-meinen]. Thus no one was ever made conscious of
All praxis, with its projects [Vorhaben], in- the radical problem of how this sort of naivete
volves inductions; it is just that ordinary in- actually became possible and is still possible
ductive knowledge (predictions), even if ex- as a living historical fact; how a method which
pressly formulated and "verified," is "artless" is actually directed toward a goal, the system-
compared to the artful "methodical" inductions atic solution of an endless scientific task, and
which can be carried to infinity through the which continually achieves undoubted results,
method of Galilean physics with its great pro- could ever grow up and be able to function
ductivity. usefully through the centuries when no one pos-
In geometrical and natural-scientific math- sessed a real understanding of the actual mean-
ematization, in the open infinity of possible ing and the internal necessity of such accom-
experiences, we measure the life-world-the plishments. What was lacking, and what is still
world constantly given to us as actual in our lacking, is the actual self-evidence through
concrete world-life-for a well-fitting garb o f which he who knows and accomplishes can
ideas, that of the so-called objectively scien- give himself an account, not only of what he
tific truths. That is, through a method which does that is new and what he works with, but
(as we hope) can be really carried out in every also of the implications of meaning which are
particular and constantly verified, we first con- closed off through sedimentation or tradi-
struct numerical indices for the actual and tionalization, i.e., of the constant presupposi-
possible sensible plena of the concretely intu- tions of his [own] constructions, concepts,
ited shapes of the life-world, and in this way propositions, theories. Are science and its
we obtain possibilities of predicting concrete method not like a machine, reliable in accom-
occurrences in the intuitively given life-world, plishing obviously very useful things, a ma-
occurrences which are not yet or no longer chine everyone can learn to operate correctly
actually given. And this kind of prediction without in the least understanding the inner
infinitely surpasses the accomplishment of possibility and necessity of this sort of accom-
everyday prediction. plishment? But was geometry, was science,

*Seinsgewissheit. i.e., certainty of being. -Translator's note.

356 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

capable of being designed in advance, like a the above elucidation of it as t'EXVTJ or by the
machine, without* an understanding which critique in terms of principle, which shows
was, in a similar sense, complete-scientific? that the true meaning of these theories-the
Doest this not lead to a regressus in infinitum? meaning which is genuine in terms of their
Finally, does this problem not link up with origins-remained and had to remain hidden
the problem of the instincts in the usual sense? from the physicists, including the great and
Is it not the problem of hidden reason, which the greatest. It is not a question of a meaning
knows itself as reason only when it has be- which has been slipped in through metaphysi-
come manifest? cal mystification or speculation; it is, rather,
Galileo, the discoverer-or, in order to do with the most compelling self-evidence, the
justice to his precursors, the consummating dis- true, the only real meaning of these theories,
coverer-of physics, or physical nature, is at as opposed to the meaning of being a method,
once a discovering and a concealing genius which has its own comprehensibility in oper-
[entdeckender und ve rdeckende r Genius}. He ating with the formulae and their practical ap-
discovers mathematical nature, the methodi- plication, technique.
cal idea, he blazes the trail for the infinite num- How what we have said up to now is still
ber of physical discoveries and discoverers. one-sided, and what horizons of problems,
By contrast to the universal causality of the in- leading into new dimensions, have not been
tuitively given world (as its invariant form), dealt with adequately-horizons which can be
he discovers what has since been called simply opened up only through a reflection on this
the law of causality, the "a priori form" of the life-world and man as its subject-can be shown
"true" (idealized and mathematized) world, the only when we are much further advanced in
"law of exact lawfulness" according to which the elucidation of the historical development
every occurrence in "nature"-idealized na- according to its innermost moving forces.
ture-must come under exact laws. All this is
discovery-concealment, and to the present day I) PORTENTOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS
we accept it as straightforward truth. In prin- RESULTING FROM LACK OF CLARITY ABOUT
ciple nothing is changed by the supposedly THE MEANING OF MATHEMATIZATION
philosophically revolutionary critique of the
"classical law of causality" made by recent With Galileo's mathematizing reinterpreta-
atomic physics. For in spite of all that is new, tion of nature, false consequences established
what is essential in principle, it seems to me, themselves even beyond the realm of nature
remains: namely, nature, which is in itself math- which were so intimately connected with this
ematical; it is given in formulae, and it can be reinterpretation that they could dominate all
interpreted only in terms of the formulae. further developments of views about the world
I am of course quite serious in placing and up to the present day. I mean Galileo's famous
continuing to place Galileo at the top of the list doctrine of the merely subjective character of
of the greatest discoverers of modem times. the specific sense-qualities,+ which soon after-
Naturally I also admire quite seriously the great ward was consistently formulated by Hobbes
discoverers of classical and postclassical phys- as the doctrine of the subjectivity of all con-
ics and their intellectual accomplishment, crete phenomena of sensibly intuitive nature
which, far from being merely mechanical, was and world in general. The phenomena are only
in fact astounding in the highest sense. This in the subjects; they are there only as causal
accomplishment is not at all disparaged by results of events taking place in true nature,

*Reading ohne ein for aus einem. -Translator's note.

tReading/iihrt forfiihrte. -Translator's note.
:j:This doctrine is perhaps best expressed in Galileo's fl Saggiatore (The Assayer). See Discoveries and Opinions of
Galileo, trans. Stillman Drake (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Original, 1957), pp. 274ff. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 357

which events exist only with mathematical mathematics. Compared to the absolute knowl-
properties. If the intuited world of our life is edge we ascribe to God the creator, one says
merely subjective, then all the truths of pre- to oneself, our knowledge in pure mathematics
and extrascientific life which have to do with has only one lack, i.e., that, while it is always
its factual being are deprived of value. They absolutely self-evident, it requires a systemat-
have meaning only insofar as they, while them- ic process in order to bring to realization as
selves false, vaguely indicate an in-itself which knowing, i.e., as explicit mathematics, all the
lies behind this world of possible experience shapes that "exist" in the spatiotemporal form.
and is transcendent in respect to it. In respect to what exists concretely in nature,
In connection with this we arrive at a fur- by contrast, we have no a priori self-evidence
ther consequence of the new formation of at all. The whole mathematics of nature, be-
meaning, a self-interpretation of the physi- yond the spatiotemporal form, we must arrive
cists which grows out of this new formation of at inductively through facts of experience. But
meaning as "obvious" and which was domi- is nature in itself not thoroughly mathemati-
nant until recently: cal? Must it not also be thought of as a coher-
Nature is, in its "true being-in-itself," math- ent mathematical system? Must it not be ca-
ematical. The pure mathematics of space-time pable of being represented in a coherent
procures knowledge, with apodictic self-evi- mathematics of nature, precisely the one that
dence, of a set of laws of this "in-itself' which natural science is always merely seeking, as
are unconditionally, universally valid. This encompassed by a system of laws which is
knowledge is immediate in the case of the axi- "axiomatic" in respect of form, the axioms of
omatic elementary laws of the a priori construc- wh_ich are always only hypotheses and thus
tions and comes to be through infinite media- never really attainable? Why is it, actually, that
tions in the case of the other laws. In respect to they are not? Why is it that we have no pros-
the space-time form of nature we possess the pect of discovering nature's own axiomatic
"innate" faculty (as it is later called) of know- system as one whose axioms are apodictically
ing with definiteness true being-in-itself as self-evident? Is it because the appropriate in-
mathematically ideal being (before all actual nate faculty is lacking in us in a factual sense?
experience). Thus implicitly the space-time In the superficialized, more or less already
form is itself innate in us. technized meaning-pattern of physics and its
It is otherwise with the more concrete uni- methods, the difference in question was "com-
versal lawfulness of nature, although it, too, is pletely clear": it is the difference between
mathematical through and through. It is in- "pure" (a priori) and "applied" mathematics,
ductively accessible a posteriori through fac- between "mathematical existence" (in the sense
tual experiential data. In a supposedly fully in- of pure mathematics) and the existence of
telligible way, the a priori mathematics of the mathematically formed real (i.e., that of
spatiotemporal shapes is sharply distinguished which mathematical shape is a component in
from natural science which, though it applies the sense of a real property). And yet even such
pure mathematics, is inductive. Or, one can al- an outstanding genius as Leibniz struggled
so say: the purely mathematic relationship of for a long time with the problem of grasping
ground and consequent is sharply distinguished the correct meaning of the two kinds of exist-
from that of real ground and real consequent, ence-i.e., universally the existence of the
i.e., that of natural causality. spatiotemporal form as purely geometrical and
And yet an uneasy feeling of obscurity the existence of universal mathematical nature
gradually asserts itself concerning the relation with its factual, real form-and of understand-
between the mathematics of nature and the ing the correct relation of each to the other.
mathematics of spatiotemporal form, which, The significance of these obscurities for
after all, belongs to the former, between the the Kantian problem of synthetic judgments a
latter "innate" and the former "non-innate" priori and for his division between the syn-
358 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

thetic judgments of pure mathematics and back into the original meaning of all his mean-
those of natural science will concern us in de- ing-structures and methods, i.e., into the his-
tail later [see §25]. torical meaning of their primal establishment,
The obscurity was strengthened and trans- and especially into the meaning of all the in-
formed still later with the development and herited meanings taken over unnoticed in this
constant methodical application of pure form- primal establishment, as well as those taken
al mathematics. "Space" and the purely for- over later on.
mally defined "Euclidean manifold" were con- But the mathematician, the natural scien-
fused; the true axiom (i.e., in the old, customary tist, at best a highly brilliant technician of the
sense of the term), as an ideal norm with un- method-to which he owes the discoveries
conditional validity, grasped with self-evi- which are his only a i m - i s normally not at all
dence in pure geometric thought or in arithmeti- able to carry out such reflections. In his actual
cal, purely logical thought, was confused with sphere of inquiry and discovery he does not
the inauthentic [uneigentliches} "axiom"-a know at all that everything these reflections
word which in the theory of manifolds signi- must clarify is even in need of clarification,
fies not judgments ("propositions") but forms and this for the sake of that interest which is
of propositions as components of the definition decisive for a philosophy or a science, i.e., the
of a "manifold" to be constructed formally interest in true knowledge of the world itself,
without internal contradiction. nature itself And this is precisely what has
been lost through a science which is given as a
K) FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE tradition and which has become a 1:EXVTJ, inso-
PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN OF MATHEMATICAL far as this interest played a determining role at
NATURAL SCIENCE''· all in its primal establishment. Every attempt
to lead the scientist to such reflections, if it
Like all the obscurities exhibited earlier, comes from a nonmathematical, nonscientific
[the preceding] follow from the transforma- circle of scholars, is rejected as "metaphysi-
tion of a formation of meaning which was ori- cal." The professional who has dedicated his
ginally vital, or rather of the originally vital con- life to these sciences must, after a l l - i t seems
sciousness of the task which gives rise to the so obvious to him-know best what he is at-
methods, each with its special sense. The de- tempting and accomplishing in his work. The
veloped method, the progressive fulfillment of philosophical needs ("philosophicomathemati-
the task, is, as method, an art (1:EXVTJ) which is cal," "philosophicoscientific" needs), aroused
handed down; but its true meaning is not even in these scholars by historical motives to
necessarily handed down with it. And it is be elucidated later, are satisfied by themselves
precisely for this reason that a theoretical in a way that is sufficient for t h e m - b u t of
task and achievement like that of a natural sci- course in such a way that the whole dimension
ence (or any science of the world)-which can which must be inquired into is not seen at all
master the infinity of its subject matter only and thus not at all dealt with.
through infinities of methodt and can master
the latter infinities only by means of a techni- L) CHARACTERIZATION OF THE METHOD OF
cal thought and activity which are empty of OUR EXPOSITION
meaning-can only be and remain meaning-
ful in a true and original sense i f the scientist In conclusion let us say a word about the
has developed in himself the ability to inquire method we have followed in the very intricate

*There is no section "j." In German one does not distinguish between "i" and "j" in an enumeration of this sort. -
Translator's note.
tl.e., the infinite pursuit of its method. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 359

considerations of this section, in the service gained fully only by starting with science as
of our over-all aim. The historical reflections given in its present-day form, looking back
we embarked upon, in order to arrive at the at its development. But in the absence of an
self-understanding which is so necessary in understanding of the beginnings the devel-
our philosophical situation, demanded clarity opment is mute as a development o f meaning.
concerning the origin o f the modern spirit Thus we have no other choice than to pro-
and, together with that-because of the signifi- ceed forward and backward in a zigzag pattern;
cance, which cannot be overestimated, of math- the one must help the other in an interplay. Rel-
ematics and mathematical natural s c i e n c e - ative clarification on one side brings some
clarity concerning the origin of these sciences. elucidation on the other, which in turn casts
That is to say: clarity concerning the original light back on the former. In this sort of his-
motivation and movement of thought which torical consideration and historical critique,
led to the conceiving of their idea of nature, then, which begins with Galileo (and immedi-
and from there to the movement of its realiza- ately afterward with Descartes) and must fol-
tion in the actual development of natural sci- low the temporal order, we nevertheless have
ence itself. With Galileo the idea in question constantly to make historical leaps which are
appears for the first time, so to speak, as full- thus not digressions but necessities. They are
blown; thus I have linked all our considerations necessities if we take upon ourselves, as we
to his name, in a certain sense simplifying and have said, the task of self-reflection which
idealizing the matter; a more exact historical grows out of the "breakdown" situation of our
analysis would have to take account of how time, with its "breakdown of science" itself. Of
much of his thought he owed to his "predeces- first importance for this task, however, is the
sors." (I shall continue, incidentally, and for reflection on the original meaning of the new
good reasons, in a similar fashion.) In respect sciences, above all that of the exact science of
to the situation as he found it and to the way nature; for the latter was and still is, through
in which it had to motivate him and did moti- all its shifts of meaning and misplaced self-
vate him according to his known pronounce- interpretations, of decisive significance (in a
ments, much can be established immediately, manner to be pursued further) for the becom-
so that we understand the beginning of the ing and being of the modern positive sciences,
whole bestowal of meaning [Sinngebung] upon of modern philosophy, and indeed of the spirit
natural science. But in this very process we of modern European humanity in general.
come upon the shifts and concealments of The following also belongs to the method:
meaning of later and most recent times. For we readers, especially those in the natural sci-
ourselves, who are carrying out these reflections ences, may have become irritated by the fact
(and, as I may assume, my readers), stand un- - i t may appear to them almost as dilettan-
der the spell of these times. Being caught up tism-that no use has been made of the natu-
in them, we at first have no inkling of these ral-scientific way of speaking. It has been con-
shifts of meaning-we who all think we know sciously avoided. In the kind of thinking which
so well what mathematics and natural science everywhere tries to bring "original intuition"
"are" and do. For who today has not learned to the fore-that is, the pre- and extrascien-
this in school? But the first elucidation of the tific life-world, which contains within itself
original meaning of the new natural science all actual life, including the scientific life of
and of its novel methodical style makes felt thought, and nourishes it as the source of all
something of the later shifts in meaning. And technical constructions of meaning-in this
clearly they influence, or at least make more kind of thinking one of the greatest difficulties
difficult, the analysis of the motivation [of sci- is that one must choose the naive way of speak-
ence]. ing of [everyday] life, but must also use it in a
Thus we find ourselves in a sort of circle. way which is appropriate for rendering evi-
The understanding of the beginnings is to be dent what is shown.
360 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

It will gradually become clearer, and finally losophy to carry this out universally. Through
be completely clear, that the proper return to these one arrives at what ultimately is; beyond
the naivete of life-but in a reflection which this, no further questions would have a ratio-
rises above this naivete-is the only possible nal sense.
way to overcome the philosophical naivete Transcendentalism, on the other hand, says:
which lies in the [supposedly] "scientific" char- the ontic meaning [Seinssinn] of the pregiv-
acter of traditional objectivistic philosophy. en life-worldt is a subjective structure [Ge-
This will open the gates to the new dimension bilde ], it is the achievement of experiencing,
we have repeatedly referred to in advance. prescientific life. In this life the meaning and
We must add here that, properly understood, the ontic validity [Seinsgeltung] of the world
all our expositions are supposed to aid under- are built u p - o f that particular world, that is,
standing only from the relative [perspective of which is actually valid for the individual ex-
our] position and that our expression of doubts, periencer. As for the "objectively true" world,
given in the criticisms [of Galileo, etc.] (doubts the world of science, it is a structure at a high-
which we, living in the present, now carrying er level, built on prescientific experiencing and
out our reflections, do not conceal), has the thinking, or rather on its accomplishments of
methodical function of preparing ideas and validity [Geltungsleistungen]. Only a radical
methods which will gradually take shape in us inquiry back into subjectivity-and specifically
as results of our reflection and will serve to lib- the subjectivity which ultimately brings about
erate us.* All reflection undertaken for "exis- all world-validity, with its content and in all its
tential" reasons is naturally critical. But we prescientific and scientific modes, and into the
shall not fail to bring to a reflective form of "what" and the "how" of the rational accom-
knowledge, later on, the basic meaning of the plishments-can make objective truth compre-
course of our reflections and our particular kind hensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic mean-
of critique. ing of the world. Thus it is not the being of the
world as unquestioned, taken for granted, which
§ 14. Precursory characterization o f is primary in itself; and one has not merely to
objectivism and transcendentalism. The ask what belongs to it objectively; rather, what
struggle between these two ideas as the is primary in itself is subjectivity, understood
sense o f modern spiritual history as that which naively pregives:j: the being of
the world and then rationalizes or (what is the
What characterizes objectivism is that it same thing) objectifies it.
moves upon the ground of the world which is Yet already one is threatened with absurdity
pregiven, taken for granted through experi- here. For it first appears obvious that this sub-
ence, seeks the "objective truth" of this world, jectivity is man, i.e., psychological subjectiv-
seeks what, in this world, is unconditionally ity. Mature transcendentalism protests against
valid for every rational being, what it is in it- psychological idealism and, questioning objec-
self. It is the task of episteme, ratio, or phi- tive science as philosophy, claims to have ini-

*This is a rough guess at a passage which is so obscure that I suspect something is missing. The sense, borne out by
subsequent sentences, seems to be: In the historical but also critical reflections of this section, it is not yet clear (at least
to the reader)Jram what point of view we are criticizing Galileo, Descartes, et al., or where it will all lead. This point of
view or attitude will gradually emerge as the phenomenological attitude which takes the form (in this case a historical-
critical form) of liberating us from our prejudices. -Translator's note.
tHusserl probably means to include Hume under transcendentalism, as is his usual practice. This sentence would
not strictly apply to Kant, according to Husserl (see §28), since Kant's transcendentalism did not penetrate to the role
of the pregiven life-world in subjective life. In this sense Hume was for Husserl the more radical transcendental phi-
losopher. -Translator's note.
tvorgibt. A peculiarly Husserlian twist: that which is (pre)given is (pre)given by subjectivity through its meaning-
bestowing acts. -Translator's note.
The Mathematization o f Nature 361

tiated a completely new sort of scientific pro- time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who
cedure, the transcendental. Past philosophy are the bearers of this teleology, who take part
had not even the slightest conception of a in carrying it out through our personal inten-
subjectivism in this transcendental style. Ef- tions. We are attempting to elicit and under-
fective motives for the appropriate change of stand the unity running through all the [philo-
attitude were lacking, although such a change sophical] projects of history that oppose one
might have been conceivable from the direc- another and work together in their changing
tion of ancient skepticism, precisely through forms. In a constant critique, which always
its anthropologistic relativism. regards the total historical complex as a per-
The whole history of philosophy since the sonal one, we are attempting ultimately to dis-
appearance of "epistemology" and the serious cern the historical task which we can acknowl-
attempts at a transcendental philosophy is a edge as the only one which is personally our
history of tremendous tensions between ob- own. This we seek to discern not from the
jectivistic and transcendental philosophy. It is outside, from facts, as if the temporal becom-
a history of constant attempts to maintain ob- ing in which we ourselves have evolved were
jectivism and to develop it in a new form and, merely an external causal series. Rather, we
on the other side, of attempts by transcen- seek to discern it from the inside. Only in this
dentalism to overcome the difficulties entailed way can we, who not only have a spiritual
by the idea of transcendental subjectivity and heritage but have become what we are thor-
the method it requires. The clarification of the oughly and exclusively in a historical-spiritu-
origin of this internal split in the philosophi- al manner, have a task which is truly our own.
cal development, the analysis of the ultimate We obtain it not through the critique of some
motives for this most radical transformation of present or handed-down system, of some
the idea of philosophy, is of the utmost impor- scientific or prescientific "Weltanschauung"
tance. It affords the first insight into the thor- (which might as well be Chinese, in the end),
oughgoing meaningfulness [Sinnhaftigkeit] but only through a critical understanding of
which unifies the whole movement of philo- the total unity of history-our history. For it
sophical history in the modem period: a unity has spiritual unity through the unity and driv-
of purpose binding generations of philoso- ing force of the task which, in the historical
phers together, and through this a direction process-in the thinking of those who philoso-
for all the efforts of individual subjects and phize for one another and with one another
schools. It is a direction, as I shall try to show across time-seeks to move through the vari-
here, toward a.final form of transcendental phi- ous stages of obscurity toward satisfying clar-
losophy-as phenomenology. This also con- ity until it finally works its way through to per-
tains, as a suspended moment {aufgehobenes fect insight. Then the task stands before us
Moment], the final form o f psychology which not merely as factually required but as a task
uproots the naturalistic sense of modem psy- assigned to us, the present-day philosophers.
chology. For we are what we are as functionaries of
modem philosophical humanity; we are heirs
§ 15. Reflection on the method o f our and cobearers of the direction of the will
historical manner o f investigation which pervades this humanity; we have become
this through a primal establishment which is
The type of investigation that we must carry at once a reestablishment [Nachstiftung] and
out, and which has already determined the a modification of the Greek primal establish-
style of our preparatory suggestions, is not that ment. In the latter lies the teleological begin-
of a historical investigation in the usual sense. ning, the true birth of the European spirit as
Our task is to make comprehensible the tele- such.
ology in the historical becoming of philosophy, This manner of clarifying history by in-
especially modem philosophy, and at the same quiring back into the primal establishment of
362 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

the goals which bind together the chain of as the historical beings we are. Self-reflection
future generations, insofar as these goals live serves in arriving at a decision; and here this
on in sedimented forms yet can be reawakened naturally means immediately carrying on with
again and again and, in their new vitality, be the task which is most truly ours and which
criticized; this manner of inquiring back into has now been clarified and understood through
the ways in which surviving goals repeated- this historical self-reflection, the task set for
ly bring with them ever new attempts to reach us all in the present.
new goals, whose unsatisfactory character But to every primal establishment [Urstif-
again and again necessitates their clarification, tung] essentially belongs a final establishment
their improvement, their more or less radical [Endstiftung] assigned as a task to the histori-
reshaping-this, I say, is nothing other than cal process. This final establishment is accom-
the philosopher's genuine self-reflection on plished when the task is brought to consum-
what he is truly seeking, on what is in him as mate clarity and thus to an apodictic method
a will coming from the will and as the will of which, in every step of achievement, is a con-
his spiritual forefathers. It is to make vital stant avenue to new steps having the character
again, in its concealed historical meaning, the of absolute success, i.e., the character of
sedimented conceptual system which, as tak- apodictic steps. At this point philosophy, as an
en for granted, serves as the ground of his pri- infinite task, would have arrived at its apodic-
vate and nonhistorical work. It is to carry for- tic beginning, its horizon of apodictic forward
ward, through his own self-reflection, the movement. (It would, of course, be completely
self-reflection of his forebears and thus not wrong to confuse the sense of the apodictic
only to reawaken the chain of thinkers, the so- which is indicated here, and which is the most
cial interrelation of their thinking, the commu- fundamental sense, with the usual sense taken
nity of their thought, and transform it into a from traditional mathematics.)
living present for us but, on the basis of the But we must be warned of a misunderstand-
total unity thus made present, to carry out a ing: Every historical philosopher performs his
responsible critique, a peculiar sort of critique self-reflections, carries on his dealings with the
which has its ground in these historical, per- philosophers of his present and past. He ex-
sonal projects, partial fulfillments, and ex- presses himself about all this, fixes through
changes of criticism rather than in what is these confrontations his own position, and thus
privately taken for granted by the present phi- creates a self-understanding of his own deeds
losopher. If he is to be one who thinks for him- in accord with the way his published theories
self [Selbstdenker}, an autonomous philoso- have grown up within him in the conscious-
pher with the will to liberate himself from all ness of what he was striving for.
prejudices, he must have the insight that all But no matter how precisely we may be in-
the things he takes for granted are prejudices, formed, through historical research, about such
that all prejudices are obscurities arising out "self-interpretations" (even about those of a
of a sedimentation of tradition-not merely whole series of philosophers), we learn noth-
judgments whose truth is as yet undecided*- ing in this way about what, through all these
and that this is true even of the great task and philosophers, "the point of it" ultimately was,
idea which is called "philosophy." All judg- in the hidden unity of intentional inwardness
ments which count as philosophical are relat- which alone constitutes the unity of history.
ed back to this task, this idea. Only in the final establishment is this revealed;
A historical, backward reflection of the sort only through it can the unified directedness of
under discussion is thus actually the deepest all philosophies and philosophers open up.
kind of self-reflection aimed at a self-under- From here elucidation can be attained which
standing in terms of what we are truly seeking enables us to understand past thinkers in a way

*I.e., prejudices (Vor-Urteile) in the literal sense. - Translator's note.

Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 363

that they could never have understood them- philosophers. This truth is established only in
selves. the self-evidence of a critical over-all view
This makes it clear that the peculiar truth of which brings to light, behind the "historical
such a "teleological consideration of history" facts" of documented philosophical theories
can never be decisively refuted by citing the and their apparent oppositions and parallels,
documented "personal testimony" of earlier a meaningful, final harmony.

21. Elements of a Science of the Life-World::-

§33. The problem o f the "life-world" new civilization (philosophical, scientific civi-
as a partial problem within the general lization), rising up in Greece, saw fit to recast
problem o f objective science the idea of "knowledge" and "truth" in natural
existence and to ascribe to the newly formed
Briefly reminding ourselves of our earlier idea of "objective truth" a higher dignity, that
discussions, let us recall the fact we have em- of a norm for all knowledge. In relation to this,
phasized, namely, that science is a human spiri- finally, arises the idea of a universal science
tual accomplishment which presupposes as encompassing all possible knowledge in its
its point of departure, both historically and for infinity, the bold guiding idea of the modem
each new student, the intuitive surrounding period. If we have made this clear to ourselves,
world of life, pregiven as existing for all in then obviously an explicit elucidation of the
common. Furthermore, it is an accomplish- objective validity and of the whole task of sci-
ment which, in being practiced and carried for- ence requires that we first inquire back into
ward, continues to presuppose this surrounding the pregiven world. It is pregiven to us all
world as it is given in its particularity to the quite naturally, as persons within the horizon
scientist. For example, for the physicist it is of our fellow men, i.e., in every actual connec-
the world in which he sees his measuring in- tion with others, as "the" world common to us
struments, hears time-beats, estimates visi- all. Thus it is, as we have explained in detail,
ble magnitudes, etc.-the world in which, fur- the constant ground of validity, an ever avail-
thermore, he knows himself to be includ- able source of what is taken for granted, to
ed with all his activity and all his theoretical which we, whether as practical men or as sci-
ideas. entists, lay claim as a matter of course.
When science poses and answers questions, Now if this pregiven world is to become a
these are from the start, and hence from then subject of investigation in its own right, so that
on, questions resting upon the ground of, and we can arrive, of course, at scientifically de-
addressed to, the elements of this pregiven fensible assertions, this requires special care in
world in which science and every other life- preparatory reflections. It is not easy to achieve
praxis is engaged. In this life-praxis, knowl- clarity about what kind of peculiar scientific
edge, as prescientific knowledge, plays a con- and hence universal tasks are to be posed un-
stant role, together with its goals, which are in der the title "life-world" and about whether
general satisfactorily achieved in the sense something philosophically significant will arise
which is intended and in each case usually in here. Even the first attempt to understand the
order to make practical life possible. But a peculiar ontic sense of the life-world. which

*CES, pp. 121-147 (Sections 33-38).

364 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

can be taken now as a narrower, now as a habitually with long-established scientific in-
broader one, causes difficulties. terests. The life-world was always there for
The manner in which we here come to the mankind before science, then, just as it contin-
life-world as a subject for scientific investi- ues its manner of being in the epoch of sci-
gation makes this subject appear an ancillary ence. Thus one can put forward by itself the
and partial one within the full subject of objec- problem of the manner of being of the life-
tive science in general. The latter has become world; one can place oneself completely upon
generally, that is, in all its particular forms (the the ground of this straightforwardly intuited
particular positive sciences), incomprehensible world, putting out of play all objective-scientific
as regards the possibility of its objective ac- opinions and cognitions, in order to consider
complishment. If science becomes a problem generally what kind of "scientific" tasks, i.e.,
in this way, then we must withdraw from the tasks to be resolved with universal validity,
operation of it and take up a standpoint above arise in respect to this world's own manner of
it, surveying in generality its theories and re- being. Might this not yield a vast theme for
sults in the systematic context of predicative study? Is it not the case that, in the end, through
thoughts and statements, and on the other side what first appears as a special subject in the
we must also survey the life of acts practiced theory of science, that "third dimension" is
by working scientists, working with one an- opening up, immediately destined in advance
other-their setting of goals, their termination to engulf the whole subject matter of objective
in a given goal, and the terminating self-evi- science (as well as all other subject matters
dence. And what also comes under consider- on the "plane")? At first this must appear pecu-
ation here is precisely the scientists' repeated liar and unbelievable. Many paradoxes will
recourse, in different general manners, to the arise; yet they will be resolved. What imposes
life-world with its ever available intuited data; itself here and must be considered before ev-
to this we can immediately add the scientists' erything else is the correct comprehension of
statements, in each case simply adapted to this the essence of the life-world and the method of
world, statements made purely descriptively a "scientific" treatment appropriate to it, from
in the same prescientific manner of judging which "objective" scientific treatment, how-
which is proper to the "occasional"* statements ever, is excluded.
of practical, everyday life. Thus the problem
of the life-world, or rather of the manner in §34. Exposition o f the problem o f a
which it functions and must function for sci- science o f the life-world
entists, is only a partial subject within the
above-designated whole of objective science A) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBJECTIVE
(namely, in the service of its full grounding). SCIENCE AND SCIENCE IN GENERAL
It is clear, however, that prior to the general
question of its function for a self-evident ls not the life-world as such what we know
grounding of the objective sciences there is best, what is always taken for granted in all
good reason to ask about the life-world's own human life, always familiar in its typology
and constant ontic meaning for the human be- through experience? Are not all its horizons
ings who live in it. These human beings do not of the unknown simply horizons of what is
always have scientific interests, and even sci- just incompletely known, i.e., known in ad-
entists are not always involved in scientific vance in respect of its most general typol-
work; also, as history teaches us, there was not ogy? For prescientific life, of course, this type
always in the world a civilization that lived of acquaintance suffices, as does its manner

*okkasione/le. A term from the second of the Logische Untersuchungen, §26 (1913 ed., vol. 11, p. 81): an expres-
sion is "essentially subjective and occasional" if its actual meaning depends "on the occasion [Gelegenheit], the person
speaking, and his situation." -Translator's note.
Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 365

of converting the unknown into the known, truth has its ultimate and deepest source of
gaining "occasional" knowledge on the basis verification in experience which is "pure" in
of experience (verifying itself internally and the sense designated above, in all its modes of
thereby excluding illusion) and induction. This perception, memory, etc. These words, how-
suffices for everyday praxis. If, now, some- ever, must be understood actually as presci-
thing more can be and is to be accomplished, if entific life understands them; thus one must
a "scientific" knowledge is supposed to come not inject into them, from current objective sci-
about, what can be meant other than what ob- ence, any psychophysical, psychological inter-
jective science has in view and does anyway? pretation. And above a l l - t o dispose of an im-
Is scientific knowledge as such not "objective" portant point right a w a y - o n e must not go
knowledge, aimed at a knowledge substra- straight back to the supposedly immediately
tum which is valid for everyone with uncondi- given "sense-data," as if they were immedi-
tioned generality? And yet, paradoxically, we ately characteristic of the purely intuitive data
uphold our assertion and require that one not of the life-world. What is actually first is the
let the handed-down concept of objective sci- "merely subjective-relative" intuition of pre-
ence be substituted, because of the century-old scientific world-life. For us, to be sure, this
tradition in which we have all been raised, for "merely" has, as an old inheritance, the disdain-
the concept of science in general. ful coloring of the o6 a. In prescientific life
The* title "life-world" makes possible and itself, of course, it has nothing of this; there it
demands perhaps various different, though is a realm of good verification and, based on
essentially interrelated, scientific undertak- this, of well-verified predicative cognitions and
ings; and perhaps it is part of genuine and full of truths which are just as secure as is neces-
scientific discipline that we must treat these sary for the practical projects of life that de-
all together, though following their essential termine their sense. The disdain with which ev-
order of founding, rather than treating, say, erything "merely subjective and relative" is
just the one, the objective-logical one (this par- treated by those scientists who pursue the
ticular accomplishment within the life-world) modern ideal of objectivity changes nothing
by itself, leaving the others completely out of of its own manner of being, just as it does not
scientific consideration. There has never been change the fact that the scientist himself must
a scientific inquiry into the way in which the be satisfied with this realm whenever he has
life-world constantly functions as subsoil, into recourse, as he unavoidably must have recourse,
how its manifold prelogical validities act as to it.
grounds for the logical ones, for theoretical
truths. t And perhaps the scientific discipline B) THE USE OF SUBJECTIVE-RELATIVE
which this life-world as such, in its universal- EXPERIENCES FOR THE OBJECTIVE SCIENCES,
ity, requires is a peculiar one, one which is pre- AND THE SCIENCE OF THEM
cisely not objective and logical but which, as
the ultimately grounding one, is not inferior The sciences build upon the life-world as
but superior in value. But how is this complete- taken for granted in that they make use of what-
ly different sort of scientific discipline, for ever in it happens to be necessary for their
which the objective sort has always been sub- particular ends. But to use the life-world in
stituted up to now, to be realized? The idea of this way is not to know it scientifically in its
objective truth is predetermined in its whole own manner of being. For example, Einstein
meaning by the contrast with the idea of the uses the Michelson experiments and the cor-
truth in pre- and extrascientific life. This latter roboration of them by other researchers, with

*This whole paragraph is crossed out in the MS. - Translator's note.

tThis sentence was added by Fink. It does not seem to fit in, and it breaks the continuity between the preceding and
following sentences. -Translator's note.
366 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

apparatus copied from Michelson's, with ev- used as actually existing things, not as illu-
erything required in the way of scales of mea- sions; thus that which actually exists in the life-
surement, coincidences established, etc. There world, as something valid, is a premise.
is no doubt that everything that enters in here
- t h e persons, the apparatus, the room in the c ) Is THE SUBJECTIVE-RELATIVE AN OBJECT
institute, etc.-can itself become a subject of FOR PSYCHOLOGY?
investigation in the usual sense of objective
inquiry, that of the positive sciences. But Ein- Now the question of the manner of being
stein could make no use whatever of a theo- of this subjective sphere, or the question of
retical psychological-psychophysical construc- the science which is to deal with it in its own
tion of the objective being of Mr. Michelson; universe of being, is normally disposed of by
rather, he made use of the human being who the natural scientist by referring to psycholo-
was accessible to him, as to everyone else in gy. But again one must not allow the intrusion
the prescientific world, as an object of straight- of what exists in the sense of objective science
forward experience, the human being whose when it is a question of what exists in the life-
existence, with this vitality, in these activities world. For what has always gone under the
and creations within the common life-world, is name of psychology, at any rate since the found-
always the presupposition for all of Einstein's ing of modern objectivism regarding knowl-
objective-scientific lines of inquiry, projects, edge of the world, naturally has the meaning
and accomplishments pertaining to Michelson's of an "objective" science of the subjective, no
experiments. It is, of course, the one world of matter which of the attempted historical psy-
experience, common to all, that Einstein and chologies we may choose. Now in our subse-
every other researcher knows he is in as a hu- quent reflections the problem of making pos-
man being, even throughout all his activity of sible an objective psychology will have to
research. [But] precisely this world and every- become the object of more detailed discus-
thing that happens in it, used as needed for sions. But first we must grasp clearly the con-
scientific and other ends, bears, on the other trast between objectivity and the subjectivity
hand, for every natural scientist in his the- of the life-world as a contrast which deter-
matic orientation toward its "objective truth," mines the fundamental sense of objective-
the stamp "merely subjective and relative." scientific discipline itself, and we must secure
The contrast to this determines, as we said, this contrast against the great temptations to
the sense of the "objective" task. This "subjec- misconstrue it.
tive-relative" is supposed to be "overcome";
one can and should correlate with it a hypo- D) THE LIFE-WORLD AS UNIVERSE OF WHAT
thetical being-in-itself, a substrate for logi- JS INTUITABLE IN PRINCIPLE; THE "OBJECTIVE-
cal-mathematical "truths-in-themselves" that TRUE" WORLD AS IN PRINCIPLE NONINTUITA-
one can approximate through ever newer and BLE "LOGICAL" SUBSTRUCTION
better hypothetical approaches, always justi-
fying them through experiential verification. Whatever may be the chances for realizing,
This is the one side. But while the natural sci- or the capacity for realizing, the idea of ob-
entist is thus interested in the objective and is jective science in respect to the mental world
involved in his activity, the subjective-relative (i.e., not only in respect to nature), this idea of
is on the other hand still functioning for him, objectivity dominates the whole universitas of
not as something irrelevant that must be passed the positive sciences in the modem period, and
through but as that which ultimately grounds in the general usage it dominates the meaning
the theoretical-logical ontic validity for all ob- of the word "science." This already involves
jective verification, i.e., as the source of self- a naturalism insofar as this concept is taken
evidence, the source of verification. The vis- from Galilean natural science, such that the sci-
ible measuring scales, scale-markings, etc., are entifically "true," the objective, world is al-
Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 367

ways thought of in advance as nature, in an dences. One must fully clarify, i.e., bring to
expanded sense of the word. The contrast be- ultimate self-evidence, how all the self-evi-
tween the subjectivity of the life-world and the dence of objective-logical accomplishments,
"objective," the "true" world, lies in the fact through which objective theory (thus math-
that the latter is a theoretical-logical substruc- ematical and natural-scientific theory) is
tion, the substruction of something that is in grounded in respect of form and content, has
principle not perceivable, in principle not ex- its hidden sources of grounding in the ulti-
perienceable in its own proper being, where- mately accomplishing life, the life in which
as the subjective, in the life-world, is distin- the self-evident givenness of the life-world for-
guished in all respects precisely by its being ever has, has attained, and attains anew its
actually experienceable. * prescientific ontic meaning. From objective-
The life-world is a realm of original self- logical self-evidence (mathematical "insight,"
evidences. t That which is self-evidently given natural-scientific, positive-scientific "insight,"
is, in perception, experienced as "the thing it- as it is being accomplished by the inquiring
self,":j: in immediate presence, or, in memory, and grounding mathematician, etc.), the path
remembered as the thing itself; and every oth- leads back, here, to the primal self-evidence in
er manner of intuition is a presentification of which the life-world is ever pregiven.
the thing itself. Every mediate cognition be- One may at first find strange and even ques-
longing in this sphere-broadly speaking, ev- tionable what has been simply asserted here,
ery manner of induction-has the sense of an but the general features of the contrast among
induction of something intuitable, something levels of self-evidence are unmistakable. The
possibly perceivable as the thing itself or re- empiricist talk of natural scientists often, if
memberable as having-been-perceived, etc. not for the most part, gives the impression that
All conceivable verification leads back to these the natural sciences are based on the experi-
modes of self-evidence because the "thing it- ence of objective nature. But it is not in this
self" (in the particular mode) lies in these in- sense true that these sciences are experiential
tuitions themselves as that which is actually, sciences, that they follow experience in prin-
intersubjectively experienceable and verifia- ciple, that they all begin with experiences, that
ble and is not a substruction of thought; where- all their inductions must finally be verified
as such a substruction, insofar as it makes a though experiences; rather, this is true only in
claim to truth, can have actual truth only by that other sense whereby experience [yields] a
being related back to such self-evidences. self-evidence taking place purely in the life-
It is of course itself a highly important task, world and as such is the source of self-evi-
for the scientific opening-up of the life-world, dence for what is objectively established in the
to bring to recognition the primal validity of sciences, the latter never themselves being ex-
these self-evidences and indeed their higher periences of the objective. The objective is pre-
dignity in the grounding of knowledge com- cisely never experienceable as itself; and sci-
pared to that of the objective-logical self-evi- entists themselves, by the way, consider it in

*In life the verification of being, terminating in experience, yields a full conviction. Even when it is inductive, the
inductive anticipation is of a possible experienceability which is ultimately decisive. Inductions can be verified by
other inductions, working together. Because of their anticipations of experienceability, and because every direct per-
ception itself includes inductive moments (anticipation of the sides of the object which are not yet experienced). every-
thing is contained in the broader concept of "experience" or "induction." [Cf. p. 355, above.]
tHusserl's use of Evidenz does not permit of its always being translated in the same way. But when used in its most
special or technical sense, as it is here, "self-evidence" is better than simply "evidence." As can be seen from the
context here, it means "self-givenness"; whereas the English word "evidence" usually has a very different meaning,
that of something testifying to the existence of something else (e.g., evidence in a trial). -Translator's note.
:j: "es selbst." The use of the word "thing" in this expression is not out of place as long as Husserl is talking about
perception. But in another context that which is "itself' given might not be a "thing"; it could be an ideal state of
affairs, for example in mathematical or logical intuition. -Translator's note.
368 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

this way whenever they interpret it as some- ing to it. Thanks to this rootedness objective
thing metaphysically transcendent, in con- science has a constant reference of meaning
trast to their confusing empiricist talk. The ex- to the world in which we always live, even as
perienceability of something objective is no scientists and also in the total community of
different from that of an infinitely distant geo- scientists-a reference, that is, to the general
metrical construct and in general no different life-world. But at the same time, as an accom-
from that of all infinite "ideas," including, for plishment of scientific* persons, as individu-
example, the infinity of the number series. als and as joined in the community of scien-
Naturally, "rendering ideas intuitive" in the tific activity, objective science itself belongs to
manner of mathematical or natural-scientific the life-world. Its theories, the logical con-
"models" is hardly intuition of the objective structs, are of course not things in the life-world
itself but rather a matter of life-world intui- like stones, houses, or trees. They are logical
tions which are suited to make easier the con- wholes and logical parts made up of ultimate
ception of the objective ideals in question. logical elements. To speak with Bolzano, they
Many [such] conceptual intermediaries are are "representations-in-themselves" ["Vorstel-
often involved, [especially since] the concep- lungen an sich "} "propositions in themselves,"
tion itself does not always occur so immedi- inferences and proofs "in themselves," ideal
ately, cannot always be made so self-evident unities of signification whose logical ideality
in its way, as is the case in conceiving of geo- is determined by their telos, "truth in itself."
metrical straight lines on the basis of the life- But this or any other ideality does not change
world self-evidence of straight table-edges in the least the fact that these are human for-
and the like. mations, essentially related to human actuali-
As can be seen, a great deal of effort is in- ties and potentialities, and thus belong to this
volved here in order to secure even the pre- concrete unity of the life-world, whose con-
suppositions for a proper inquiry, i.e., in order creteness thus extends farther than that of
first to free ourselves from the constant mis- "things." Exactly the same thing is true, cor-
constructions which mislead us all because of relative to this, of scientific activities-those
the scholastic dominance of objective-scien- of experiencing, those of arriving at logical
tific ways of thinking. formations "on the basis of" experience-ac-
ti vities through which these formations appear
E) THE OBJECTIVE SCIENCES AS SUBJECTIVE in original form and original modes of varia-
CONSTRUCTS-THOSE OF A PARTICULAR tion in the individual scientists and in the com-
PRAXIS, NAMELY, THE THEORETICAL- munity of scientists: the original status of the
LOGICAL, WHICH ITSELF BELONGS TO THE proposition or demonstration dealt with by all.
FULL CONCRETENESS OF THE LIFE-WORLD But here we enter an uncomfortable situa-
tion. If we have made our contrast with all nec-
If the contrast [under discussion] has been essary care, then we have two different things:
purified, we must now do justice to the essen- life-world and objective-scientific world,
tial interrelatedness [of the elements con- though of course [they are] related to each oth-
trasted]: objective theory in its logical sense er. The knowledge of the objective-scientific
(taken universally: science as the totality of world is "grounded" in the self-evidence of
predicative theory, of the system of statements the life-world. The latter is pregiven to the sci-
meant "logically" as "propositions in them- entific worker, or the working community, as
selves," "truths in themselves," and in this sense ground; yet, as they build upon this, what is
logically joined) is rooted, grounded in the life- built is something new, something different.
world, in the original self-evidences belong- If we cease being immersed in our scientific

*The text reads "prescientific persons," which must be a mistake. -Translator's note.
Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 369

thinking, we become aware that we scientists propriate scientific discipline-to the all-en-
are, after all, human beings and as such are compassing, so paradoxically demanding,
among the components of the life-world which manner of being of the life-world?
always exists for us, ever pregiven; and thus We are posing questions whose clarifying
all of science is pulled, along with us, into the answers are by no means obvious. The contrast
- m e r e l y "subjective-relative"-life-world. and the inseparable union [we have been ex-
And what becomes of the objective world it- ploring] draw us into a reflection which en-
self? What happens to the hypothesis of be- tangles us in more and more troublesome dif-
ing-in-itself, related first to the "things" of the ficulties. The paradoxical interrelationships of
life-world, the "objects," the "real" bodies, real the "objectively true world" and the "life-
animals, plants, and also human beings within world" make enigmatic the manner of being
the "space-time" of the life-world-all these of both. Thus [the idea of a] true world in any
concepts being understood, now, not from the sense, and within it our own being, becomes
point of view of the objective sciences but as an enigma in respect to the sense of this be-
they are in prescientific life? ing. In our attempts to attain clarity we shall
Is it not the case that this hypothesis, which suddenly become aware, in the face of emerg-
in spite of the ideality of scientific theories ing paradoxes, that all of our philosophizing
has direct validity for the scientific subjects up to now has been without a ground. How
(the scientists as human beings), is but one can we now truly become philosophers?
among the many practical hypotheses and We cannot escape the force of this motiva-
projects which make up the life of human be- tion. It is impossible for us to evade the issue
ings in this life-world-which is at all times here through a preoccupation with aporia and
consciously pregiven to them as available? Do argumentation nourished by Kant or Hegel,
not all goals, whether they are "practical" in Aristotle or Thomas.
some other, extrascientific sense or are practi-
cal under the title of "theory," belong eo ipso F) T H E PROBLEM OF THE LIFE-WORLD NOT
to the unity of the life-world, if only we take AS A PARTIAL PROBLEM BUT RATHER AS A
the latter in its complete and full concrete- UNIVERSAL PROBLEM FOR PHILOSOPHY
ness?
On the other hand, we have seen also that Of course, it is a new sort of scientific dis-
the propositions, the theories, the whole edi- cipline that is required for the solution of the
fice of doctrine in the objective sciences are enigmas which now disquiet us: it is not math-
structures attained through certain activities of ematical, nor logical at all in the historical
scientists bound together in their collabora- sense; it cannot already have before it, as an
tive work-or, to speak more exactly, attained available norm, a finished mathematics, logic,
through a continued building-up of activities, or logistic, since these are themselves objec-
the later of which always presuppose the re- tive sciences in the sense which is presently
sults of the earlier. And we see further that all problematical and, as included in the problem,
these theoretical results have the character of cannot be presuppositions used as premises.
validities for the life-world, adding themselves At first, as long as one only makes contrasts,
as such to its own composition and belonging is only concerned with oppositions, it could
to it even before that as a horizon of possi- appear that nothing more than or different
ble accomplishments for developing science. from objective science is needed, just as ev-
The concrete life-world, then, is the ground- eryday practical life undertakes its rational
ing soil {der grundende Boden] of the "scien- reflections, both particular and general, with-
tifically true" world and at the same time en- out needing a science for them. It just is this
compasses it in its own universal concreteness. way, a fact familiar to all, unthinkingly accept-
How is this to be understood? How are we ed rather than being formulated as a funda-
to do justice systematically-that is, with ap- mental fact and thought through as a subject
370 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

for thinking in its own right-namely, that ing it may repeatedly become, and properly
there are two sorts of truth: on the one side, so-appears now as a problem of secondary
everyday practical situational truths, relative, and more specialized interest. Though the pe-
to be sure, but, as we have already emphasized, culiar accomplishment of our modem objec-
exactly what praxis, in its particular projects, tive science may still not be understood, noth-
seeks and needs; on the other side there are ing changes the fact that it is a validity for
scientific truths, and their grounding leads the life-world, arising out of particular activi-
back precisely to the situational truths, but in ties, and that it belongs itself to the concrete-
such a way that scientific method does not suf- ness of the life-world. Thus in any case, for
fer thereby in respect to its own meaning, since the sake of clarifying this and all other acqui-
it wants to use and must use precisely these sitions of human activity, the concrete life-
truths. world must first be taken into consideration;
Thus it could appear-if one allows oneself and it must be considered in terms of the tru-
to be carried along by the thoughtless naive- ly concrete universality whereby it embraces,
te of life even in the transition from the ex- both directly and in the manner of horizons,
tralogical to the logical, to the objective-sci- all the built-up levels of validity acquired by
entific praxis of thinking-that a separate men for the world of their common life and
investigation under the title "life-world" is an whereby it has the totality of these levels re-
intellectualistic enterprise born of a mania, pe- lated in the end to a world-nucleus to be dis-
culiar to modem life, to theorize everything. tilled by abstraction, namely, the world of
But, on the other hand, it has at least become straightforward intersubjective experiences.
apparent that we cannot let the matter end To be sure, we do not yet know how the life-
with this naivete, that paradoxical enigmas world is to become an independent, totally
announce themselves here: merely subjective self-sufficient subject of investigation, how it
relativity is supposedly overcome by objective- is supposed to make possible scientific state-
logical theory, yet the latter belongs, as the ments-which as such, after all, must have their
theoretical praxis of human beings, to the own "objectivity," even if it is in a manner dif-
merely subjective and relative and at the same ferent from that of our sciences, i.e., a neces-
time must have its premises, its sources of sary validity to be appropriated purely methodi-
self-evidence, in the subjective and relative. cally, which we and everyone can verify
From here on this much is certain: that all prob- precisely through this method. We are absolute
lems of truth and of being, all methods, hypoth- beginners, here, and have nothing in the way
eses, and results conceivable for these prob- of a logic designed to provide norms; we can
lems-whether for worlds of experience or for do nothing but reflect, engross ourselves in the
metaphysical higher worlds-can attain their still not unfolded sense of our task, and thus
ultimate clarity, their evident sense or the evi- secure, with the utmost care, freedom from
dence of their nonsense, only through this sup- prejudice, keeping our undertaking free of alien
posed intellectualistic hypertrophy. This will interferences (and we have already made sev-
then include, certainly, all ultimate questions eral important contributions to this); and this,
of legitimate sense and of nonsense in the busy as in the case of every new undertaking, must
routine of the "resurrected metaphysics" that supply us with our method. The clarification of
has become so vocal and so bewitching of late. the sense of the task is, indeed, the self-evi-
Through this last series of considerations the dence of the goal qua goal; and to this self-
magnitude, the universal and independent evidence belongs essentially the self-evidence
significance, of the problem of the life-world of the possible "ways" to it. The intricacy and
has become intelligible to us in an anticipatory difficulty of the preliminary reflections which
insight. In comparison with this the problem are still before us will justify themselves, not
of the "objectively true" world or that of ob- on! y because of the magnitude of the goal, but
jective-logical science-no matter how press- also because of the essential strangeness and
,
,I
Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 371

precariousness of the ideas which will neces- to logic, as the a priori theory of norms for
sarily become involved. everything "logical"-in the overarching sense
Thus what appeared to be merely a prob- of what is logical, according to which logic is
lem of the fundamental basis of the objective a logic of strict objectivity, of objective-logi-
sciences or a partial problem within the uni- cal truths. No one ever thinks about the predi-
versal problem of objective science has in- cations and truths which precede science, about
deed (just as we announced in advance that it the "logic" which provides norms within this
would) proven to be the genuine and most uni- sphere of relativity, or about the possibility,
versal problem. It can also be put this way: the even in the case of these logical structures con-
problem first appears as the question of the re- forming purely descriptively to the life-world,
lation between objective-scientific thinking of inquiring into the system of principles that
and intuition; it concerns, on the one hand, give them their norms a priori. As a matter of
then, logical thinking as the thinking of logi- course, traditional objective logic is substitut-
cal thoughts, e.g., the physicist's thinking of ed as the a priori norm even for this subjec-
physical theory, or purely mathematical think- tive-relative sphere of truth.
ing, in which mathematics has its place as a
system of doctrine, as a theory. And, on the §35. Analysis o f the transcendental
other hand, we have intuiting and the intuited, epoche. First step: The epoche o f
in the life-world prior to theory. Here arises the objective science
ineradicable illusion of a pure thinking which,
unconcerned in its purity about intuition, al- Because of the peculiar nature of the task
ready has its self-evident truth, even truth about which has arisen for us, the method of access
the world-the illusion which makes the sense to the new science's field of work-which must
and the possibility, the "scope," of objective be attained before the working problems of
science questionable. Here one concentrates the science are g i v e n - i s articulated into a
on the separateness of intuiting and thinking multiplicity of steps, each of which has, in a
and generally interprets the nature of the new way, the character of an epoche, a with-
"theory of knowledge" as theory of science, holding of natural, naive validities and in gen-
carried out in respect to two correlative sides* eral of validities already in effect. The first nec-
(whereby science is always understood in terms essary epoche, i.e., the first methodical step,
of the only concept of science available, that has already come into view through the pre-
of objective science). But as soon as the emp- liminary reflections hitherto carried out. But
ty and vague notion of intuition-instead of an explicit, universal formulation is needed.
being something negligible and insignificant Clearly required before everything else is the
compared to the supremely significant logical epoche in respect to all objective sciences.
sphere in which one supposedly already has This means not merely an abstraction from
genuine truth-has become the problem of the them, such as an imaginary transformation, in
life-world, as soon as the magnitude and dif- thought, of present human existence, such that
ficulty of this investigation take on enormous no science appeared in the picture. What is
proportions as one seriously penetrates it, there meant is rather an epoche of all participation
occurs the great transformation of the "theory in the cognitions of the objective sciences, an
of knowledge" and the theory of science epoche of any critical position-taking which
whereby, in the end, science as a problem and is interested in their truth or falsity, even any
as an accomplishment loses its self-sufficien- position on their guiding idea of an objective
cy and becomes a mere partial problem. knowledge of the world. In short, we carry
What we have said also naturally applies out an epoche in regard to all objective theo-

*I.e., the subjective and the objective. -Translator's note.

372 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

retical interests, all aims and activities be- philosophers. This way of looking at it makes
longing to us as objective scientists or even sim- it appear as if, once again, a new, purely theo-
ply as [ordinary] people desirous of [this kind retical interest, a new "science" with a new
of] knowledge. vocational technique, is to be established, car-
Within this epoche, however, neither the ried on either as an intellectualistic game with
sciences nor the scientists have disappeared very ideal pretensions or as a higher-level in-
for us who practice the epoche. They continue tellectual technique in the service of the posi-
to be what they were before, in any case: facts tive sciences, useful for them, while they them-
in the unified context of the pregiven life-world; selves, in turn, have their only real value in their
except that, because of the epoche, we do not usefulness for life. One is powerless against
function as sharing these interests, as cowork- the misrepresentations of hurried readers and
ers, etc. We establish in ourselves just one listeners who in the end hear only what they
particular habitual direction of interest, with want to hear; but in any case they are part of
a certain vocational attitude, to which there the indifferent mass audience of the philoso-
belongs a particular "vocational time."* We pher. The few, for whom one [really] speaks,
find the same thing here as elsewhere: when will know how to restrain such a suspicion,
we actualize one of our habitual interests and especially after what we have said in earlier
are thus involved in our vocational activity (in lectures. They will at least wait to see where
the accomplishment of our work), we assume our path leads them.
a posture of epoche toward our other life-in- There are good reasons for my stressing so
terests, even though these still exist and are sharply the vocational character of even the
still ours. Everything has" its proper time," and "phenomenologist's" attitude. One of the first
in shifting [activities] we say something like: things to be described about the epoche in ques-
"Now it is time to go to the meeting, to the tion is that it is a habitual epoche of accom-
election," and the like. plishment, one with periods of time in which
In a special sense, of course, we call sci- it results in work, while other times are devot-
ence, art, military service, etc., our "vocation," ed to other interests of work or play; further-
but as normal human beings we are constantly more, and most important, the suspension of
(in a broadened sense) involved in many "vo- its accomplishment in no way changes the in-
cations" (interested attitudes) at the same time: terest which continues and remains valid with-
we are at once fathers, citizens, etc. Every such in personal subjectivity-i.e., its habitual di-
vocation has its time of actualizing activities. rectedness toward goals which persist as its
Accordingly, this newly established vocation- validities-and it is for this very reason that it
al interest, whose universal subject matter is can be actualized again and again, at different
called the "life-world," finds its place among times, in this identical sense. This by no means
the other life-interests or vocations and it has implies, however, that the life-world epoche
"its proper time" within the one personal time, - t o which further significant moments be-
the form of the various exercised vocational long, as we shall show-means no more for
times. human existence, practically and "existen-
Of course, to equate the new science in this tially," than the vocational epoche of the
way with all "bourgeois" {biirgerliche] voca- cobbler, or that it is basically a matter of in-
tions, or even with the objective sciences, is a difference whether one is a cobbler or a phe-
sort of trivialization, a disregard for the great- nomenologist, or, also, whether one is a phe-
est value-distinction there can be between sci- nomenologist or a positive scientist. Perhaps
ences. Understood in this way, it was so hap- it will even become manifest that the total I

pily criticized by the modern irrationalistic phenomenological attitude and the epoche be-

*Berufszeit, colloq., "working hours." But I have translated it literally as "vocational time" in order to preserve the
notion of Beruf a "calling." -Translator's note.
Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 373

longing to it are destined in essence to effect, relative, even though normally, in our experi-
at first, a complete personal transformation, ence and in the social group united with us in
comparable in the beginning to a religious con- the community of life, we arrive at "secure"
version, which then, however, over and above facts; within a certain range this occurs of its
this, bears within itself the significance of own accord, that is, undisturbed by any no-
the greatest existential transformation which ticeable disagreement; sometimes, on the oth-
is assigned as a task to mankind as such. er hand, when it is of practical importance, it
occurs in a purposive knowing process, i.e.,
§36. How can the life-world, after the with the goal of [finding] a truth which is se-
epoche o f the objective sciences, cure for our purposes. But when we are thrown
become the subject matter o f a science? into an alien social sphere, that of the Ne-
The distinction in principle between the groes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc.,
objective-logical a priori and the a we discover that their truths, the facts that
priori o f the life-world for them are fixed, generally verified or veri-
fiable, are by no means the same as ours. But
If our interest is exclusively in the "life- if we set up the goal of a truth about the ob-
world," we must ask: Has the life-world, jects which is unconditionally valid for all
through the epoche in respect to objective sci- subjects, beginning with that on which nor-
ence, already been laid open as a universal mal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc.,
scientific subject matter?* Do we already have agree in spite of all relativity-beginning,
thereby the subject matter for statements that that is, with what makes objects of the life-
are generally valid scientifically, statements world, common to all, identifiable for them
about facts that are to be established scien- and for us (even though conceptions of them
tifically? How do we have the life-world as a may differ), such as spatial shape, motion,
universal field, fixed in advance, of such estab- sense-quality, and the like-then we are on
lishable facts? It is the spatiotemporal world the way to objective science. When we set up
of things as we experience them in our pre- this objectivity as a goal (the goal of a "truth in
and extrascientific life and as we know them itself") we make a set of hypotheses through
to be experienceable beyond what is [actually] which the pure life-world is surpassed. We
experienced. We have a world-horizon as a have precluded this [type of] "surpassing"
horizon of possible thing-experience [Ding- through the first epoche (that which concerns
erfahrung]. Things: that is, stones, animals, the objective sciences), and now we have the
plants, even human beings and human prod- embarrassment of wondering what else can be
ucts; but everything here is subjective and undertaken scientifically, as something that

*First let us recall that what we call science is, within the constantly valid world, as life-world, a particular type of
purposeful activities and purposeful accomplishments like all human vocations in the usual sense of the word; to this
sphere also belong those practical intentions of a higher level which do not involve types of vocation or goal-oriented
interrelations and accomplishments at all, the more or less isolated, incidental, more or less fleeting interests. All these
are, from the human point of view, peculiarities of human life and of human habitualities, and they all lie within the
universal framework of the life-world into which all accomplishments flow and to which all human beings and all
accomplishing activities and capacities always belong. Of course, the new theoretical interest in the universal life-
world itself, in its own manner of being, requires a certain epoche in regard to all these interests, i.e., in regard to the
pursuit of our ends, in regard to all the criticism, always belonging to the purposeful life, of the means and the goals or
ends themselves, e.g., whether we should factually persist in them, whether certain paths should be taken as general
directives, etc. Living toward our ends, which are valid for us habitually, we do, of course, live in the horizon of the
life-world, no matter which ends are "having their turn"; everything that happens and develops here exists in the life-
world and in the manner of the life-world; but being oriented toward what exists within the life-world is not the same
as focusing on the [life-world] as the universal horizon, not the same as making thematic the end in view as a being
within this horizon, the newly thematic life-world. Thus the first thing we must do is refrain from the pursuit of all
scientific and other interests. But the epoche alone is not enough: even all setting of ends, all projecting, presupposes
something worldly; the wherewith, i.e., the life-world, is given prior to all ends. [This last sentence is only a rough
guess at the sense of this somewhat garbled stenographic note. -Translator's note.]
374 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

can be established once and for all and for ev- is. And this includes, as we have said, every-
eryone. thing objectively a priori, with its necessary
But this embarrassment disappears as soon reference back to a corresponding a priori of
as we consider that the life-world does have, the life-world. This reference-back is one of
in all its relative features, a general structure. a founding of validity [Geltungsfundierung].
This general structure, to which everything A certain idealizing accomplishment is what
that exists relatively is bound, is not itself rela- brings about the higher-level meaning-forma-
tive. We can attend to it in its generality and, tion and ontic validity of the mathematical
with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a and every other objective a priori on the basis
way equally accessible to all. As life-world of the life-world a priori. Thus the latter ought
the world has, even prior to science, the "same" first to become a subject of scientific investi-
structures that the objective sciences presup- gation in its peculiarity and purity, and then
pose in their substruction of a world which one ought to set the systematic task of under-
exists "in itself' and ·is determined through standing how, on this basis and in what man-
"truths in themselves" (this substruction be- ners of new meaning-formation, the objective
ing taken for granted due to the tradition of a priori comes about as a mediated theoreti-
centuries); these are the same structures that cal accomplishment. What is needed, then,
they presuppose as a priori structures and would be a systematic division of the universal
systematically unfold in a priori sciences, sci- structures-universal life-world a priori and
ences of the logos, the universal methodi- universal "objective" a priori-and then also a
cal norms by which any knowledge of the division among the universal inquiries accord-
world existing "in itself, objectively" must be ing to the way in which the "objective" a prio-
bound. Prescientifically, the world is already ri is grounded in the "subjective-relative" a
a spatiotemporal world; to be sure, in regard priori of the life-world or how, for example,
to this spatiotemporality there is no question mathematical self-evidence has its source of
of ideal mathematical points, of "pure" meaning and source of legitimacy in the self-
straight lines or planes, no question at all of evidence of the life-world.
mathematically infinitesimal continuity or of This consideration has a particular interest
the "exactness" belonging to the sense of the for us even though we have already detached
geometrical a priori. The bodies familiar to us our problem of a science of the life-world from
in the life-world are actual bodies, but not the problem of objective science in that we,
bodies in the sense of physics. The same thing caught up through our schooling in the tradi-
is true of causality and of spatiotemporal in- tional objectivistic metaphysics, at first have
finity. [These] categorical features of the life- no means of access whatever to the idea of a
world have the same names but are not con- universal a priori belonging purely to the life-
cerned, so to speak, with the theoretical world. What we need first is a separation in
idealizations and the hypothetical substruc- principle of the latter from the objective a prio-
tions of the geometrician and the physicist. ri which is [always] immediately substituted
As we already know, physicists, who are men for it. It is this very separation that is effect-
like other men, who know themselves as liv- ed by the first epoche of all objective sciences,
ing in the life-world, the world of their hu- if we understand it also as the epoche of all
man interests, have, under the title of physics, objective a priori sciences and make it com-
a particular sort of questions and (in a broader plete through the considerations we have just
sense) practical projects directed toward the carried out. The latter provide us, in addition,
things of the life-world, and their "theories" with the fundamental insight that the univer-
are the practical results. Just as other proj- sal a priori of the objective-logical l e v e l -
ects, practical interests, and their realizations that of the mathematical sciences and all oth-
belong to the life-world, presuppose it as ers which are a priori in the usual sense-is
ground, and enrich it with their activity, so it is grounded in a universal a priori which is in it-
with science, too, as a human project and prax- self prior, precisely that of the pure life-world.
Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 375

Only through recourse to this a priori, to be variant in the life-world throughout all alter-
unfolded in an a priori science of its own, can ations of the relative, we involuntarily stop at
our a priori sciences, the objective-logical ones, what alone determines for us in life the sense
achieve a truly radical, a seriously scientific, of talking about the world: the world is the
grounding, which under the circumstances they universe of things, which are distributed with-
absolutely require. in the world-form of space-time and are
Here we can also say: The supposedly com- "positional" in two senses (according to spa-
pletely self-sufficient logic which modern tial position and temporal position)-the spa-
mathematical logicians {Logistiker] think they tiotemporal onta. Here would thus be found
are able to develop, even calling it a truly the task of a life-world ontology, understood
scientific philosophy, namely, as the univer- as a concretely general doctrine of essence for
sal, a priori, fundamental science for all ob- these onta. For our interest in the present con-
jective sciences, is nothing but naivete. Its text it suffices to have indicated this. Rather
self-evidence lacks scientific grounding in the than spend our time here, we prefer to move
universal life-world a priori, which it always on to a task which is much greater, as will soon
presupposes in the form of things taken for be s e e n - o n e which in fact encompasses
granted, which are never scientifically, uni- such a doctrine. In order to prepare the way
versally formulated, never put in the general for this new subject of investigation, which al-
form proper to a science of essence. Only when so essentially concerns the life-world but is
this radical, fundamental science exists can not ontological, we shall undertake a general
such a logic itself become a science. Before reflection-we, that is, as waking, living hu-
this it hangs in mid-air, without support, and man beings in the life-world (and thus natu-
is, as it has been up to now, so very naive that rally within the epoche regarding all inter-
it is not even aware of the task which attaches ference of positive scientific discipline).
to every objective logic, every a priori science This general reflection will at the same time
in the usual sense, namely, that of discovering have the function of making evident an essen-
how this logic itself is to be grounded, hence tial distinction among the possible ways in
no longer "logically" but by being traced back which the pregiven world, the ontic universe
to the universal prelogical a priori through {das ontische Universum], can become the-
which everything logical, the total edifice of matic for us. Calling to mind what has repeat-
objective theory in all its methodological forms, edly been said: the life-world, for us who
demonstrates its legitimate sense and from wakingly live in it, is always already there,
which, then, all logic itself must receive its existing in advance for us, the "ground" of all
norms. praxis whether theoretical or extratheoreti-
Yet this insight surpasses the interest in the cal. The world is pregiven to us, the waking,
life-world which governs us now; for this, as always somehow practically interested sub-
we have said, all that counts is the distinction jects, not occasionally but always and neces-
in principle between the objective-logical and sarily as the universal field of all actual and
the life-world a priori; and the purpose of this possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always
is to be able to set in motion a radical reflection to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. Waking life
upon the great task of a pure theory of essence is being awake to the world, being constantly
of the life-world. and directly "conscious" of the world and of
oneself as living in the world, actually experi-
§37. The formal and most general encing {erleben] and actually effecting the on-
structures o f the life-world: thing and tic certainty of the world. The world is pregiven
world on the one side, thing-conscious- thereby, in every case, in such a way that indi-
ness on the other vidual things are given. But there exists a fun-
damental difference between the way we
If we seek out, simply looking around us, are conscious of the world and the way we are
what is formal and general, what remains in- conscious of things or objects (taken in the
376 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

broadest sense, but still purely in the sense of ward whatever objects are given, thus to-
the life-world), though together the two make ward the world-horizon, in normal, unbroken
up an inseparable unity: Things, objects (al- constancy, in a synthetic coherence running
ways understood purely in the sense of the through all acts. This normal, straightforward
life-world), are "given" as being valid for us living, toward whatever objects are given, in-
in each case (in some mode or other of ontic dicates that all our interests have their goals
certainty) but in principle only in such a way in objects. The pregiven world is the horizon
that we are conscious of them as things or ob- which includes all our goals, all our ends,
jects within the world-horizan. Each one is whether fleeting or lasting, in a flowing but
something, "something of" the world of which constant manner, just as an intentional hori-
we are constantly conscious as a horizon. On zon-consciousness implicitly "encompasses"
the other hand, we are conscious of this ho- [everything] in advance. We, the subjects, in
rizon only as a horizon for existing objects; our normal, unbroken, coherent life, know no
without particular objects of consciousness it goals which extend beyond this; indeed we have
cannot be actual [aktuell]. Every object has its no idea that there could be others. All our theo-
possible varying modes of being valid, the retical and practical themes, we can also say,
modalizations of ontic certainty. The world, lie always within the normal coherence of the
on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, life-horizon "world." World is the universal
as an object, but exists with such uniqueness field into which all our acts, whether of experi-
that the plural makes no sense when applied encing, of knowing, or of outward action, are
to it. Every plural, and every singular drawn directed. From this field, or from objects in
from it, presupposes the world-horizon. This each case already given, come all affections,
difference between the manner of being of an transforming themselves in each case into ac-
object in the world and that of the world it- tions.
self obviously prescribes fundamentally dif- Yet there can be a completely different sort
ferent correlative types of consciousness for of waking life involved in the conscious hav-
them. ing of the world. It would consist in a trans-
formation of the thematic consciousness of
§38. The two possible fundamental the world which breaks through the normality
ways o f making the life-world the- of straightforward living. Let us direct our at-
matic: the naive and natural straight- tention to the fact that in general the world or,
forward attitude and the idea o f a rather, objects are not merely pregiven to us
consistently reflective attitude toward all in such a way that we simply have them as
the "how" o f the subjective manner o f the substrates of their properties but that we
givenness o f life-world and life-world become conscious of them (and of everything
objects ontically meant) through subjective manners
of appearance, or manners of givenness, with-
These most general features of waking life out noticing it in particular; in fact we are for
make up the formal framework within which the most part not even aware of it at all. Let
it now becomes possible to distinguish the us now shape this into a new universal direc-
different ways this life is carried on, though in tion of interest; let us establish a consistent
all cases the world is pregiven and, within this universal interest in the "how" of the manners
horizon, objects are given. These ways result of givenness and in the onta themselves, not
in the different manners, we could also say, in straightforwardly but rather as objects in re-
which we are awake to the world and to the spect to their "how"-that is, with our inter-
objects in the world. The first, the naturally est exclusively and constantly directed toward
normal one which absolutely must precede how, throughout the alteration of relative va-
the others not for accidental but for essential lidities, subjective appearances, and opinions,
reasons, is that of straightforwardly living to- the coherent, universal validity world-the
Elements o f a Science o f the Life-World 377

world-comes into being for us; how, that thematic horizon. This horizon is, in the natur-
is, there arises in us the constant conscious- al attitude, precisely the world always pregiv-
ness of the universal existence, of the univer- en as that which exists. Simply living on in
sal horizon, of real, actually existing objects, this manner, one does not need the word "pre-
each of which we are conscious of only through given"; there is no need to point out that the
the alterations of our relative conceptions world is constantly actuality for us. All natural
[Auffassungen] of it, of its manners of appear- questions, all theoretical and practical goals
ing, its modes of validity, even when we are taken as themes-as existing, as perhaps ex-
conscious of it in particularity as something isting, as probable, as questionable, as valu-
simply being there. able, as project, as action and result of action
In this total change of interest, carried out - h a v e to do with something or other within
with a new consistency founded on a particu- the world-horizon. This is true even of illu-
lar resolve of the will, we notice that we ac- sions, nonactualities, since everything charac-
quire a number of never thematically investi- terized through some modality of being is, af-
gated types, not only of individual things but ter all, related to actual being. For, in advance,
also of syntheses, in an inseparable synthetic "world" has the meaning "the universe of the
totality which is constantly produced by in- 'actually' existing actualities": not the merely
tentionally overlapping horizon-validities; and supposed, doubtful, or questionable actuali-
the latter influence each other reciprocally in ties but the actual ones, which as such have ac-
the form of corroborating verifications of ex- tuality for us only in the constant movement of
istence, or refuting cancelings-out, or other corrections and revisions of validities [ Umgel-
modalizations. This is the essential character tungen von Geltungen]-all this considered as
of the synthetic totality in which we can take the anticipation of an ideal unity.
possession of something previously complete- Instead of persisting in this manner of
ly unknown, something never envisioned or "straightforwardly living into the world," let
grasped as a task for knowledge; this is the us attempt a universal change of interest in
universal accomplishing life in which the world which the new expression "pregivenness of the
comes to be as existing for us constantly in world" becomes necessary because it is the ti-
flowing particularity, constantly "pregiven" to tle for this differently directed and yet again
us. We can also say: this is the synthetic total- universal theme of the manners of pregiven-
ity in which we now discover, for the first time, ness. In other words, nothing shall interest us
that and how the world, as correlate of a dis- but precisely that subjective alteration of man-
coverable universe of synthetically connected ners of givenness, of manners of appearing
accomplishments, acquires its ontic meaning and of the modes of validity in them, which, in
and its ontic validity in the totality of its on- its constant process, synthetically connected as
tic [ ontische] structures. it incessantly flows on, brings about the coher-
But here we do not need to go into more ent consciousness of the straightforward "be-
detailed expositions, into everything that can ing" of the world.
become thematic. What is essential for us here Among the objects of the life-world we al-
is the distinction between the two types of in- so find human beings, with all their human ac-
vestigation,* each regarded as a universal in- tion and concern, works and suffering, living
vestigation. in common in the world-horizon in their par-
The natural life, whether it is prescientifi- ticular social interrelations and knowing them-
cally or scientifically, theoretically or practi- selves to be such. All this, too, then, shall be
cally interested, is life within a universal un- included as we carry out our new universal di-

*This could refer either to the "two ways of making the life-world thematic" (cf. section heading) or to the investi-
gation of the "how·· of the objects vs. the investigation of the subjective syntheses. -Translator·s note.
378 ESSENTIAL HUSSERL

rection of interest. A coherent theoretical in- as grounds of validity, by no means suffices.

terest shall now be directed exclusively to- In carrying out this epoche, we obviously
ward the universe of the subjective, in which continue to stand on the ground of the world;
the world, in virtue of the universality of syn- it is now reduced to the life-world which is valid
thetically bound accomplishments in this for us prescientifically; it is just that we
universe, comes to have its straightforward may use no sort of knowledge arising from the
existence for us. In the natural and normal sciences as premises, and we may take the
world-life this subjective manifold constantly sciences into consideration only as historical
goes on, but there it remains constantly and facts, taking no position of our own on their
necessarily concealed. How, by what method, truth.
is it to be revealed? Can it be shown to be a But nothing about this affects our interest-
self-enclosed universe with its own theoreti- ed looking-around in the prescientifically intu-
cal and consistently maintained inquiry, re- ited world or our paying attention to its rela-
vealing itself as the all-encompassing unity of tive features. In a certain way, concern with
ultimately functioning and accomplishing sub- this sort of thing belongs continually even to
jectivity which is to account for the existence [one type of] objective investigation, namely,
of the world-the world for us, our natural life- that of the historians, who must, after all, re-
horizon? If this is a legitimate and a necessary construct the changing, surrounding life-worlds
task, its execution implies the creation of a new of the peoples and periods with which they
science of a peculiar sort. In opposition to all deal. In spite of this, the pregiven world is still
previously designed objective sciences, which valid as a ground [for them] and has not been
are sciences on the ground of the world, this transposed into the universe of the purely sub-
would be a science of the universal how of the jective, a universal framework in its own right,
pregivenness of the world, i.e., of what makes which is our concern now.
it a universal ground for any sort of objectiv- The same thing holds [even] if we take as
ity. And included in this is the creation of a sci- our subject of investigation, in the unity of a
ence of the ultimate grounds [Grunde] which systematic survey, all [historical] periods and
supply the true force of all objective ground- peoples and finally the entire spatiotemporal
ing, the force arising from its ultimate bestow- world, paying constant attention to the rela-
al of meaning. tivity of the surrounding life-worlds of par-
Our historically motivated path, moving ticular human beings, peoples, and periods as
from the interpretation of the interplay of mere matters of fact. It is clear that the same
problems between Hume and Kant, has now thing is true of this world survey, in the form
led us to the postulate of clarifying the pre- of an iterated synthesis of relative, spatiotem-
given world's character of universally "being poral life-worlds, that is true of a survey of
the ground" for all objective sciences a n d - one such life-world individually. It is taken one
what followed of itself-for all objective prax- part at a time and then, at a higher level, one
is; it has led us, then, to the postulate of that surrounding world, one temporal period, at a
novel universal science of subjectivity as time; each particular intuition [yields] an on-
pregiving the world. We shall now have to see tic validity, whether in the mode of actuality
how we can fulfill this postulate. We notice or possibility. As each intuition occurs, it pre-
thereby that the first step which seemed to help supposes others having objective validity-pre-
at the beginning, that epoche through which supposes for us, the observers, the general
we freed ourselves from all objective sciences ground of the validity of the world.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Works o f Edmund Husserl

Books Published in Husserl's ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und

Lifetime phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Band I:
Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phano-
menologie. Ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana,
Philosophie der Arithmetik: Psychologische und
vol. 3. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1950.
logische Untersuchungen. Vol. I. Halle a.d.
ldeen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phd-
Saale: C.E.M. Pfeffer, I 89 I.
nomenologischen Philosophie. Band I: A/1-
Logische Untersuchungen. 2 vols. Halle a.d. Saale:
gemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phiino-
Max Niemeyer, 1900 and 190 I.
menologie. Band 2: Ergiinzende Texte ( 1912-
Logische Untersuchungen. 2nd rev. ed. 2 vols. Halle
1929). Ed. Karl Schuhmann. Husserliana vol
a.d. Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1913 and 1921. [All
3/a and 3/b. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff:
page references are to this edition.]
1976.
ldeen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phii-
ldeen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phii-
nomenologischen Philosophie. Vol. I: All-
nomenologischen Philosophie. Band 2: Phii-
gemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phdnome-
nomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konsti-
nologie, in Jahrbuch f u r Philosophie und
tution. Ed. Marly Biemel. Husserliana, vol. 4.
phanomenologische Forschung, vol. I. Halle
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.
a.d. Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1913. Pp. 1-323.
1deen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phd-
[All page references are to this edition.]
nomenologischen Philosophie. Band 3: Die
Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeit-
Phanomenologie und die Fundamente der
bewusstseins, ed. Martin Heidegger. Jahrbuch
Wissenschaften. Ed. Marly Biemel. Hus-
f u r Philosophie und phdnomenologische
serliana, vol. 5. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
Forschung, vol. 9. Halle a.d. Saale: Max Nie-
1952.
meyer, 1928. Pp. viii-ix, 367-498.
Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die
Formate und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer
transzendentale Phdnomenologie: Eine
Kritik der logischen Vernunft, in Jahrbuch
Einleitung in die phdnomenologische Phi-
f u r Philosophie und phdnomenologische
losophie. Ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana, vol.
Forschung, vol. I 0. Halle a.d. Saale: Max
6. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.
Niemeyer, 1929. Pp. v-xiii, 1-298.
Erste Philosophie (1923/24 ). Part 1: Kritische
Meditations Cartesiennes. Trans. E. Levinas and G.
ldeengeschichte. Ed. Rudolf Boehm. Hus-
Pilfer. Paris: A. Colin, 1931.
serliana, vol. 7. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Ge-
1956.
nealogie der Logik, ed. L. Landgrebe. Prague:
Erste Philosophie ( 1923124). Part 2: Theorie der
Academia-Verlag, 1938; Hamburg: Claasen,
phiinomenologische Reduktion. Ed. Rudolf
1954.
Boehm. Husserliana, vol. 8. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.
Husserliana Edition Phdnomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen
Sommersemester 1925. Ed. Walter Biemel.
Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage, Husserliana, vol. 9. The Hague: Martinus
ed. S. Strasser. Husserliana, vol. 1. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968.
Martin us Nijhoff, 1963. Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
Die !dee der Phdnomenologie: Funf Vorlesungen. ( 1893-1917). Ed. Rudolf Boehm. Husserliana,
2nd. ed. Ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana, vol. vol. 10. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs-
380 BIBLIOGRAPHY

und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926. Aufsiitze und Vortriige (1911-1921 ). Ed. Thomas

Ed. Margot Fleischer. Husserliana, vol. 11. Nenon and Hans Sepp. Husserliana, vol. 25.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Philosophie der Arithmetik: Mit ergiinzenden Tex- Vorlesungen iiber Bedeutungslehre: Sommer-
ten (1890-1901 ). Ed. Lothar Eley. Husser- semester 1908. Ed. Ursula Panzer. Hus-
liana, vol. 12. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, serliana, vol. 26. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1970. 1987.
Zur Phiinomenologie der lntersubjektivitiit, Erster Aufsiitze und Vortriige ( 1922-1937). Ed. Thomas
Tei!: 1905-1920. Ed. Iso Kern. Husserliana, Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp. Husserliana,
vol. 13. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. vol. 27. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
Zur Phiinomenologie der lntersubjektivitiit, Zweiter ers, 1989.
Tei!: 1921-1928. Ed. Iso Kern. Husserliana, Vorlesungen iiber Ethik und Wertlehre, 1908-1914.
vol. 14. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Ed. Ullrich Melle. Husserliana, vol. 28.
Zur Phiinomenologie der lntersubjektivitiit, Dritter Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Tei!: 1929-1935. Ed. Iso Kern. Husserliana, 1988.
vol. 15. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und
Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907. Ed. U. die transzendentale Phiinomenologie: Ergiin-
Claesges. Husserliana, vol. 16. The Hague: zungsband. Texte aus dem Nachla.fJ 1934-
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. 1937. Ed. Reinhold Smid. Husserliana, vol.
Formate und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer 29. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Ed. P. Janssen. 1993.
Husserliana, vol. 17. The Hague: Martin us Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie.
Nijhoff, 1974. Vorlesungen 1917/18, mit ergiinzenden Texten
Logische Untersuchungen. Vol. I: Prolegomena zur aus der ersten Fassung 1910/11. Ed. Ursula
reinen Logik. Ed. Elmar Holenstein. Husser- Panzer. Husserliana, vol. 30. Dordrecht:
liana, vol. 18. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1968.
1975.
Logische Untersuchungen. Vol. 2: Untersuchun-
gen zur Phiinomenologie und Theorie der
Other Editions of Husserl's Works
Erkenntnis, Part I. Ed. U. Panzer. Husserli-
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Erkenntnis, Part 2. Ed. U. Panzer. Husserli- Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam, 1986.
ana, vol. 20. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1984. Studienausgabe o f the Felix Meiner
Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie: Texte aus Verlag, Hamburg
dem Nachla.fJ ( 1886-1901 ). Ed. I. Strohmeyer.
Husserliana, vol. 21. The Hague: Martinus Cartesianische Meditationen: Eine Einleitung in die
Nijhoff, 1983. Phiinomenologie [text from Husserliana, vol.
Aufsiitze und Rezensionen ( 1890-1910). Ed. B. 1]. Ed. E. Stroker. 1977.
Rang. Husserliana, vol. 22. The Hague: Fiinfte Logische Untersuchung: Uber intentionale
Martinus Nijhoff, 1979. Erlebnisse und ihre "lnhalte" [text from the
Phantasie, Bildbewu.fJtsein, Erinnerung: Zur I st ed., 190 I, of the Logische Untersuchun-
Phiinomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegen- gen]. Ed. E. Stroker. 1975.
wiirtigungen: Texte aus dem Nachla.fJ (1898- Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie, 1910/1911.
1925). Ed. E. Marbach. Husserliana, vol. 23. Ed. I. Kern. 1977.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. Die /dee der Phiinomenologie [text from Husser-
Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: liana, vol. 2]. Ed. P. Janssen. 1986.
Vorlesungen 1906/1907. Ed. Ullrich Melle. Die Konstitution der geistigen Welt [text from
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Nijhoff, 1984. Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und
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INDEX

Activity, 320-21 Causal nexus, I 67-68 Einstein, Albert, 366

Acts Churchill, James, 217 Empathy, 137-60, 321
Categorial, 121-34 Cogito, 61-63 Empiricism, 21
Expressive, 31-33, 44--46, 4 9 - As act, 68-69 Episteme [Em<H µ-rJ], 344
50, 100-102 Other as correlate of, 136 Epoche [foox l
Of meaning, 44--46 Communication, 29-30 Phenomenological-psychologi-
Sense-giving and sense-fulfill- Conditionality cal vs. transcendental, 322-33
ing, 31-33 Psychophysical, 165--68 To sphere of ownness, 137
Sensuous, 121-34 Consciousness Transcendental, 65-67, 371-73
Alter ego, 136, 147--48 Being of, 72 Erdmann, B., 7-8, 38
As pairing association, 148, Co-consciousness, 222, 317 Esse and Percipi, 228-33
151-53, 154 Essence of, 67-68 Essence
See also Association As field, 83-84 Intentional, 56
Analysis Higher spheres, 91-92 Of mental processes, 73
Eidetic, 311-12 Region of, 79-85 Semantic, 54, 56
Historical, 362-63 As residuum, 82-83 Evidence, 17-22
Intentional, I 10-12 Transcendental or pure, 66-67 Adequate, 116-17
See also Method Content Within apophantics, 250--52
Anticipation, 186,201, 223-24, As intentional unity, 48 Assertoric and apodictic, I 15-16
316-18,321 Psychological, 48 Clear and distinct, 250-54
Appearance, 74 Constitution Givenness, 262--64
Apperception, 316-21 OfBody, 175-85 Hierarchy of, 302-304
And the Other, 145, 151-52 Of Other, 96-98, 135-37, 150- In historicism, 23
Appresentation 51, 157-58 Of immanent, 78-79
And the Other, 146-56 Of thing, 163-69, 174 Inadequate, I 16-17
A priori Of time, 212-18 And intentionality, 264--69
Vs. empirical, 16 Critique And logic, 261-62
Formal, 116 Of cognition, 270-72 Originary and pure, 115-16
Formal and contigent, 235-36 As originary seeing, 113-16
Ideal, 16 Data, 72, 88, 227 Of transcendent, 78-79
Material, 116 Descartes, Rene, 67, 327, 337, 359, Varieties, 113-21, 318
And pure generality, 299-300 360 Expectation, see Anticipation
Of science, 322 Description Expression, 26--48
Validity, 19 As static analysis, 3 I 8-19 Fluctuating, 43--44
Aristotle, 337, 369 See also Intentional analysis Occasional and objective, 40--43
Arithmetic, 15, 352 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 23 Subjective and objective, 45--46
Association (pairing), 148, 151-52, Doxa [86 a], 365
154, 157 Duration, 186-93, 196-98, 199- Fink, Eugen, 365
Principle of passive genesis, 315 200, 228 Foundation, 132-34, 333-36
See also Alter ego Dynamic union, 55-57 Frege, Gottlob, 14, 37
Attitude
Natural, 60-63, 319,321 Ego,61,67, 80, 87,138,332 Galileo, 356, 360
Phenomenological, 63-65, 83- Concrete, 157 And mathematization of nature,
84, 87-89, 120,372 Concretion, 308-309 338-60
Theoretical, 346 Pole of identity, 307-308 And motivation, 347-50
Transcendental, 86 Psychophysical, 140--41, I4 8 - Generative, 187,209,211
49, 152-56 Genesis, 200
Being, 126-28 Substrate, 308 Active and passive, 313-15
Bernet, Rudolf, 210 Transcendental, 135, 137-38, Association, 315
Body, see Lived-body 141--42, 146--4 7, 158-60, 307, Ego logical, 3 I 2
Bolzano, Bernard, 93 311-12 Factical, 318
Bracketing, 63-65 Eidetic method/analysis, 319, 321 Of judgment, 303-304
Brentano, Franz, I 87, I 93 Eidetic variation, 292-97 Laws of, 312-13, 316,318
384 INDEX

Genetic analysis, 316-21 Expressive, 52-59 Pure, 1 1-16, 46-48

Geometry, 10, 337-59 Fulfilling, 39 Pure analytics, 254-56
Arithmetization of, 351-52 Of generalities, 297-99 Subjective and objective direc-
Euclidean, 337, 358 Sensuous, 124-29 tion, 238-40
Formalization of, 350-52 And theory of pure forms, 246-
Idealization, 346-49, 354 Judgment, 92-94 48
As measuring, 341-42, 345-50 Broad concept, 257-59 Traditional, 241-45
As method, 348-49 Confused and distinct, 257-58 And truth, 243-45
And prediction, 342-45, 355 Fulfillment, 127 Truth-logic, 250
"Pure," 339-41 Genesis of, 300-306 Lotze, Rudolf Hermann, 8, 13
See also Mathematics Original, 304-306
God, 230 Pure form, 245-48 Marty, Anton, 39
Mathematics, 10, 19-20, 337-60,
Habituality, 320 Kant, Immanuel, 6, 357, 360, 369 368
Hamilton, William, 5, 17 Kinaestheses, 139-41, 150, 163-65, Infinite horizons in, 338
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 227 Of nature, 338-60
369 Pure, 356-58
Herbert, J., 6 Language In "pure geometry," 339-45
Historical, 22-23 Scientific vs. ordinary, 235 Uni versa! tasks, 3 37
Path, 378 Laws Mathematization, 345-47, 356-58
Sciences, 22-25 Normative, 3-6 Mathesis universalis, 351-53
Historicism, 22-25 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 20, 357 Meaning, 28-32
History of consciousness, 318 Life-world, 353-56, 360 And concept, 50-51
Hobbes, Thomas, 356 Categorial features of, 374 Essence of, 48-51
Hofler, 5, 17-18 Concreteness, 368-69 As ideal unities, 33-36, 39-48
Horizon, 61-62, 108-12, 321, 354 Evidence, 367 Intention and fulfillment, 52-
And genetic perception, 223-24, Intuitability, 366-68 59
226-28,230-32,317,321 Problem of, 363-64, 370-71 And perception, 122
Inner and outer, 223-24, 226 Science of, 364-78 And reference, 36-37
Of my ownness, 138, 159-60 Structures of, 375-76 And sense, 37-38
Origin of, 321 Universal field, 376 As species, 49-50
Of the Other, 158 Way through, 376-78 Vs. sense, 95-96
And "pure geometry," 340 Limit-shapes [Limesgestalten], Mehmel, 93
Of recollection, 199 340,345 Meinong, Alexius, 7, 17
Temporal, 61 Lipps, Theodore, 5, 7 Memory, 88, 186-221
World, 346 Lived-body [Leib], 227-28, 320 Primary, see Retention
Hume, David, 360 As bearer of sensing, 176-77, Secondary, 193-221
Hyle, 96-98 181-83 Method
And causal nexus, 184-85 Eidetic, 309-11
Immanence and transcendence, 72- As center of orientation, 183-84 Genetic, 316-21
74 Constitution of, 176-80 Historical, 361-63
Indication, 26-28, 70, 222-23 Eye, 178 Phenomenological, 309-11
Individuals Hearing, 178 Phenomenological reduction,
Explication of, 272-76 And higher objectivities, 180-81 60-65
And substrate, 301-302 As organ of perception, 163-65 Static, 144, 316-21
Insight, see Intuition As organ of will, 180 Transcendentalism, 360-61
Intentionality, 70, 89-90 Visual vs. tactual, 177-80 Mill, John Stuart, 5-6
Double, 216-21 Living present, 200 Monad, 138, 143-45, 149, 155,
Fulfilled and unfulfilled, 316 And my ownness, 149-50 157-60, 319-21
And genetic perception, 224, Locke,John, 327,342 Motivation, 164-65
226-27 Logic, 3-22
Horizontal, 217 As a priori theory of science, Natorp, Paul, 8-9, 14
Intentional life, 108-10 234-35 Nature
Noetic-noematic structure, 87- Consequence-logic, 248-50 And man, 175-76
97 And evidence, 250-54 My own sphere, 139
Partial intentions, 13 I Formal and transcendental, 234- Objective, 174-75
Transverse, 217 72 And the Other, 152-55, 158
Universal description of, 323-24 Ideality, 261-62 Newton, John, 349
Intersubjectivity, 62, 135-60, 169- Normative and practical func- Noema, 87-100
72 tions, 237-38 Core, 107-108
Transcendental, 158, 314 Normative and theoretical, 3-8 And object, 102-108
Intimation, 40 Operation, 248 Noematic color, 96-97
Intuition, 14, 55, 58-59, 74, I 13-16 Principles, 256-57 And posited moments: 108
Categorial, 121-29 Production of logical forma- Noesis, 87-100
Eidetic, 97 tions, 268-69 Now-phase, 205-208, 213-18
INDEX 385

Now-point, 189-96, 204-209, 213- Presentification, 222, 228 Sets

16 See also Representation Constituting, 279-80
See also Primal impression Primary expectation, see Protention Signs, 26-30
Primal impression, 190-98, 205-21, Sigwart, Christoph, 7, 38
Object 224,228-29 Simultaneity, see Succession
Actual, 91 See also Now-point Solipsism, 135-36, 158-59, 168-
Adumbrations of spatial, 221-23 Primordial impression, see Primal 69
As determinable X, 106-107, impression And body, 185
116, 120-21 Propositions, 47 Space
In the "how," 107-108 Protention, 109, 195, 199, 224, 231 Objective, 172, 174
Intentional, 90 Psychologism, 3-22, 259-61, 267- Sphere of ownness, 137-60
Pathological, 172 68, 269-72,329,332 Vs. objective world, 144-45
Sensible, 130-32 Psychology,6-9,240-41,366 Spiritual formations, 22-25
As synthetic unities, 265-67 Eidetic, 311 Static analysis, 144, 316-21
Objectivation, 74 Empirical, 19, 192-93, 326-27 States of affairs, 127-30, 280-82
Objectifying acts, 124-25 General concept, 269-70 Static union, 52-53
Reproductive, 76-77 Phenomenological or "pure," Steinbock, Anthony, 221, 316
Secondary, 7 6 lll,322-24,326-27,332-33 Stumpf, Carl, 8
Of temporal objects, 205-208 Pythagoreans, 347 Subjectivity, 360
Objectivism, 360-61 Transcendental, 335
Objectivity, 172-74, 240 Reason, 334 See also Consciousness
Ontology, 333 Objective, 45 Substrate
Organism Phenomenology of, l 13-21 And determinations, 272-74
Bodily, 150 And truth, 117-21 Primitive, 300--302
And the Other, 152-55 Reduction, 63-65, 84, 86-87, 97- Succession, 196-98
Orientation 98 And simultaneity, 214-16
Spatial, 183-84 Eidetic, 326 Synthesis
Phenomenological, 324-26, Of distinction, 59
Pairing, see Alter ego, Association 329-30 Identifying, 54
Parenthesizing, see Bracketing Psychological, 331 Of recognition, 59
Parts and wholes, I I 6 Transcendental, 330-31
Passivity, 320-21 Reference, 36, 55 Techne [,Exv ], 353,356,358
Perception, 70-74, 89, 96-98, 194- Representation, l 93-212 Technization, 352-53
97, 201-202,213-14 Reproduction, 194--212, 222, 316- Teleology, 321
Abnormal, 167-70 18, 321 Temporal constitution, 212-18
And appresentation, 153 Retention, 76, 187-221, 225-26, Of consciousness, 216-21
Categorial and sensible, 128-32 316-18,321 Temporal objects, 186-221
Of color, 96-97 Retaining-in-grasp, 275-76, 294 Temporality
External, 224, 231 Riehl, A., 13 Genesis, 3 I 5
Fullness and emptiness, 223-25, Of judging, 214
226-33 Science Time
And imagination, 128-29 As construct, 368 Form of egological genesis,
Of immanent, 78 Exact, 333 312-15
Immanent and transcendent, Factual, 333-34 And genesis, 321
228-33 Idea of, 11 Immanent, 186-221
Normal, 167-70 Origins, 358-59 Laws of, 321
As original consciousness, 221- Philosophy as rigorous science, Thing
33 22-25 Material, 163-68
Of transcendent, 78 Theory of, 3-4 Physicalistic, 171-74
Wide and narrow sense, 129 As universal, 337-60 Thomas Aquinas, 369
Phantasy, 198, 208-209 Secondary sensibility, 320 Touch, 176-78
Phenomenology Sensation Transcendence, 71, 73, 78
Descriptive, 319 Two types, 163-65 Vs. immanence, 75
Explanatory, 318-20 Sense Truth, 11, 21
Systematic, 321 Bearer as X, 107 Andreason, 117-21
See also Description Bestowal, 84, 97 Twardowski, Kasimir, 36
Physics, 16 As content, 103-105
Platonic ideas, 337, 338 Fulfilling, 39, 113-15 Universals
Posited moments, 108 Fullness, 114 And a priori necessity, 299-300
Predication And meaning, 37-38 Constitution of, 282-86
Structure of, 276-79 Vs. meaning, 95-96 And eidetic variation, 292-97
Presentation, 194 Noematic, 89-91, 105-106 Empirical, 286-89
And appresentation, 153 Objective, 222 Levels of generality, 289-91
Presentiation Perceptual, 88-89, 232-33 Material and formal generalities,
And the Other, 156 Sensings, 176-80, 181-83 291-92
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DONN WELTON is Professor of Philosophy at the
State University of New York at Stony Brook.