Labor-Case Digests-Marquez-P14-16

LABOR 1 | JMM | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – TOPICS 14-16
14.MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A.SPECIAL TYPES OF WORKERS
1. BERNARDO V. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917 July 12, 1999 (ANDRIN)

Petitioners are deaf-mutes employed under a contract Private respondent is Far East Banks who employed
with Far East Bank. petitioners via a contract as money sorters and
counters
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
● In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be
given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the
Magna Carta provides: Sec. 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. — No disabled person shall be denied
access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the
same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe
benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.
FACTS:
● The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same
terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the
status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written
or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but
on justice for all.
● Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far
East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called
"Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers."
o Accordingly, they were illegally dismissed on different dates.
● RULINGS:
o LA and NLRC: Petitioners could not be deemed regular under Art. 280 of the Labor Code.
complainants were hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented
personalities whose employments were covered by Employment Contracts with special
provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the
Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties and the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons is not applicable.
PETITTIONERS ARGUMENTS: RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:
1. They be considered regular employees. 1. They were hired as special workers.
2. The contract served merely to preclude the 2. Their contracts were renewed several times,
application of Article 280 and to bar them from not because of need "but merely for
becoming regular employees. humanitarian reasons.
ISSUES: Are Petitioners Regular Employee?

RULING:
Except 16 of the petitioners, should be deemed as regular employees. These employees have acquired legal rights
that should be protected, not out of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice. The employment contract
indubitably conforms with Art. 80 of the labor code. Succeeding events, and the enactment of RA No. 7277 justified
the application of Art. 280 of the Labor code. The bank entered into the contract and renewed them, which shows
that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. Moreover, it shows that they were qualified to perform
the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the
tasks assigned to them.
The fact that they were qualified disabled persons, removed their employment contracts in the ambit of Art. 80.
Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article
280 of the Labor Code. The test of whether an employee is regular is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the
nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Without
a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With
the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the following
twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees.
The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the
employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary
period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the
fitness of its employees. As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure.
Page 1 of 55
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not entitled
to the same benefits.
NOTES: (NA)
B.EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
1. PT&T vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 596 [1997] (SEE: TOPIC 3)
2. Del Monte Phils. v. Velasco, GR NO. 153477, March 6, 2007, (Cabasag)

Petitioner: Del Monte Philippines Inc. Respondent: Lolita Velasco
- started working with Del Monte Philippines on
October 21, 1976 as a seasonal employee and
was regularized on May 1, 1977. Her latest
assignment was as Field Laborer.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
Article 137 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 137. Prohibited acts. — It shall be unlawful for any employer:
(1) To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to discharge any woman employed
by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code;
(2) To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy;
or
(3) To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her work for fear that she may again
be pregnant.
FACTS:
● Respondent was warned in writing due to her absences. Through a letter, respondent was again warned in
writing by petitioner about her absences without permission and a forfeiture of her vacation leave
entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was imposed against her. Her vacation entitlement for the said
employment year affected was consequently forfeited.
● A notice of hearing was sent to respondent notifying her of the charges filed against her for violating the
Absence Without Official Leave rule: that is for excessive absence without permission on August 15-18, 29-
31 and September 1-10, 1994.
● After hearing, the petitioner terminated the services of respondent effective January 16, 1994 due to
excessive absences without permission.
● Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner asserting that her dismissal was illegal
because she was on the family way suffering from urinary tract infection, a pregnancy-borne, at the time
she committed the alleged absences.
● She explained that for her absence from work on August 15-18, 1994 she had sent an application for leave
to her supervisor. She went to the company hospital for check-up and was advised accordingly to rest in
quarters for four (4) days. Still not feeling well, she failed to work on September 1, 1994 and was again
advised two days of rest in quarters.
● Unable to recover, she went to see an outside doctor who ordered her to rest for another five (5) consecutive
days. She declared she did not file the adequate leave of absence because a medical certificate was already
sufficient per company policy.
● She failed to report to work but sent an application for leave of absence to her supervisor, which was not
anymore accepted.
LA: Ruled in favor of the petitioner.
NLRC: Under the company rules, the employee may make a subsequent justification of her absenteeism, which she
was able to do in the instant case. The respondent incurred absences exceeding six days within one employment
year — a ground for dismissal under the company rules — the petitioner actually admitted the fact that the
respondent had been pregnant, hence, negating petitioner's assertion that the respondent failed to give any
explanation.
CA:
Page 2 of 55
ARGUMENTS: Petitioner COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: Respondent

- Respondent violated the Absence Without - her dismissal was illegal because she was on
Official Leave rule: that is for excessive the family way suffering from urinary tract
absence without permission on August 15-18, infection, a pregnancy-borne, at the time she
29-31 and September 1-10, 1994. committed the alleged absences
ISSUES: W/N the Respondent’s dismissal was illegal (YES)
RULING:
● In this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is controlling is the finding of the NLRC and the
CA that respondent was pregnant and suffered from related ailments. It would be unreasonable to isolate
such condition strictly to the dates stated in the Medical Certificate or the Discharge Summary. It can be
safely assumed that the absences that are not covered by, but which nonetheless approximate, the dates
stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate, are due to the continuing condition of pregnancy
and related illnesses, and, hence, are justified absences.
● As the CA and the NLRC correctly noted, it is not disputed that respondent was pregnant and that she was
suffering from urinary tract infection, and that her absences were due to such facts. The petitioner admits
these facts in its Petition for Review. It was no less than the company doctor who advised the respondent
to have "rest-in-quarters" for four days on account of a pregnancy-related sickness.
● The Court agrees with the CA in concluding that respondent's sickness was pregnancy-related and,
therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondent's services because in doing so, petitioner will, in
effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of
the latter's pregnancy.
● Under petitioner's company rules, absences may be subsequently justified. The Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA that the respondent was able to subsequently justify
her absences in accordance with company rules and policy.
● The Court is convinced that the petitioner terminated the services of respondent on account of her
pregnancy which justified her absences and, thus, committed a prohibited act rendering the dismissal
illegal.
NOTES:
C.EMPLOYMENT OF NURSING EMPLOYEES

D.EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHTWORKERS
E.EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN
F.EMPLOYMENT OF DOMESTIC WORKERS
1. Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. Castaneda, GR NO. 169295-96, Nov. 20, 2006 (Cabasag)
Petitioner: Remington Industrial Sales Corporation Respondent: Erlinda Castaneda
- she started working in August 1983 as
company cook with a salary of Php 4,000.00 for
Remington, a corporation engaged in the
trading business
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial
company was a regular employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant"
are defined as follows:
"The term 'househelper' as used herein is synonymous to the term 'domestic servant' and shall refer to any person,
whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family."
● The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of
the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even
for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and
should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or
domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
FACTS:
Page 3 of 55
● Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
overtime services, non-payment of service incentive leave pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against
Remington before the NLRC, Quezon City. The complaint impleaded Mr. Antonio Tan in his capacity as the
Managing Director of Remington.
● Erlinda alleged that she worked for six days a week, starting as early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do
the marketing and would end at around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the employees, had left the
company premises
● She continuously worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work
when Remington transferred to a new site in Caloocan. She averred that she reported for work at the new
site in Caloocan City only to be informed that Remington no longer needed her services.
● Erlinda believed that her dismissal was illegal because she was not given the notices required by law. She
filed her complaint for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, salary differentials, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay and 10% attorney's fees.
● Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a
regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington's business of
trading in construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products. (check also counter-
arguments)
LA: Dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the personal service of
Antonio Tan, finding that her work as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade
and business of the petitioner corporation.
NLRC: Reversed the labor arbiter ruling.
CA: it ruled that respondent has attained the status of a regular employee in her service with the company.
ARGUMENTS: Respondent COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: Petitioner
- her dismissal was illegal because she was not - Erlinda's duty was merely to cook lunch and
given the notices required by law "merienda", after which her time was hers to
spend as she pleased.
- Remington did not exercise any degree of
control and/or supervision over Erlinda's work
- Erlinda did not have to punch any time card in
the way that other employees of Remington did;
she was free to roam around the company
premises
- Allegedly, it was Erlinda who refused to report
for work when Remington moved to a new
location in Caloocan City
ISSUES:
1. W/N the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's ruling that the respondent was petitioner's regular employee and
not a domestic helper
2. W/N the CA erred in holding that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal
RULING:
We affirm that respondent was a regular employee of the petitioner and that the latter was guilty of illegal dismissal.
● In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial
company was a regular employee of the said firm. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant
is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its
business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion
that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the
employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section
1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
● In the case at bar, the petitioner admits that respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was
to cook and prepare its employees' lunch and merienda. The nature of respondent's work as a cook, who
caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner's employees, makes
her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex
Mining case. That she works within company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the
personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioner's right of control
over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
● It is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employer's business, then the person
performing such work could not be considered an employee of the latter. The determination of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is defined by law according to the facts of each case,
regardless of the nature of the activities involved.
Page 4 of 55
● We note the findings of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that no less than the company's
corporate secretary has certified that respondent is a bonafide company employee; she had a fixed
schedule and routine of work and was paid a monthly salary of P4,000.00; she served with the company
for 15 years starting in 1983, buying and cooking food served to company employees at lunch and
merienda, and that this service was a regular feature of employment with the company.
NOTES:
2. Co vs. Vargas, G.R. No. 195167. November 16, 2011 (Odchigue)

PETITIONER: FERNANDO CO (formerly doing business RESPONDENT: LINA B. VARGAS
under the name “Nathaniel Mami House”)
Filed a complaint for underpayment or non-payment of
He is the owner of a bakery where the respondent was wages and holiday pay as well as illegal dismissal as a
allegedly an employee. However, he contended that cause of action and the non-payment of service
responded was hired as a housemaid and not an incentive leave.
employee of the bakeshop.
● Started working at the bakeshop in 1994.
● Shift: 8 AM to 8:30 PM, Monday-Saturday
● Wage: 220 per day, paid every Saturday
● Duties: baking, served customers, supervised
other workers when owner is absent
● Extra Duty: sometimes cook and do the
housemaid chores when the latter was not
available.
● No payslip and never asked to sign a payroll
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
An employee is entitled to security of tenure.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)
FACTS:
● 22 April 2003 - respondent Lina Vargas filed against Nathaniel Bakeshop and its owner Fernando Co a
complaint for underpayment or non-payment of wages and holiday pay. The complaint was later amended
to include illegal dismissal as a cause of action and the non-payment of service incentive leave.
● 6 April 2003 - petitioner Co's wife, Nely Co, told respondent to cook their lunch because the housemaid
was ironing clothes which she wasn’t able to do as she was busy with customer orders. Nely, irate, cussed
respondent and told her to leave and never to return because she was not needed anymore. Respondent
was humiliated and could not bear the treatment of her employees anymore, so she took her salary and
left. She later filed a complaint against Nathaniel Bakeshop and its owner Fernando Co.
● Petitioner denies respondent's claim that she was employed as a baker in their business and instead was
hired as a housemaid. He told his version of the story, that her wife reprimanded respondent for not cooking
lunch on time and respondent was angered then demanded her salary and walked out of the residence and
never reported for work again.
LA RULING (30 October 2004) – in favor of respondent
● found that the place of business of petitioner is the same as his place of residence and that respondent
works for petitioner as well as for his business which is based in his home. Thus, LA concluded that "while
complainant may have started her employ doing chores for the [petitioner's] family, she also fulfilled tasks
connected with the [petitioner's] business such as cooking, filling orders, baking orders, and other clerical
work, all of which are usually necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of the respondent.
Inescapably, complainant is a regular employee and thus, entitled to security of tenure."
● Order to reinstate complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
with full backwages.
Page 5 of 55
● If reinstatement becomes impossible, Co is ordered to also pay complainant’s separation pay, SIL, 13th
month pay and salary differential.
NLRC RULING – reversed LA ruling
● respondent was not employed as a baker at petitioner's bakeshop but was merely petitioner's housemaid
who left her employ voluntarily.
CA RULING (29 June 2010) – annulled NLRC decision and reinstated LA ruling
● The evidence shows that petitioner is working within the premises of the business of private respondent
Co and in relation to or in connection with such business.
● Place of business is the same as place of residence. Thus Co exercised control and supervision over
Vargas’ functions.
● Even if petitioner was actually working as domestic servant in private respondent's residence, her act of
taking orders, which was ratiocinated by the NLRC as not leading to the conclusion that petitioner in fact
took the orders, would warrant the conclusion that petitioner should be considered as a regular employee
and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant of respondent Co.
● Since Vargas is an employee and is entitled to security of tenure, she is illegally dismissed. Witnesses
presented by Co who told that it was Vargas who left her job, were employees of Co. The alleged person
who helped Vargas to be employed as housemaid submitted an affidavit written in English. The question if
she understood what was written in her affidavit or if the same was explained to her in her native language
(resident of Naga Cebu). All the affidavits cannot be given credence to refute the fact that Vargas is an
employee of said bakeshop
ARGUMENTS: COUNTER-ARGUMENTS:
Respondent Petitioner:
● Filed a complaint for underpayment or non- ● Petitioner denies respondent's claim that she
payment of wages and holiday pay as well as was employed as a baker in their business and
illegal dismissal as a cause of action and the instead was hired as a housemaid.
non-payment of service incentive leave. ● Petitioner further avers that respondent
● She was an employee of the bakeshop - Aside badmouthed petitioner's daughter and
from baking, respondent also served the displayed defiance, disrespect and
customers and supervised the other workers in insubordination towards them.
the absence of the owner.
ISSUES:
W/N CA erred in finding that respondent is an employee of the petitioner. (NO)
RULING:
Petitioner only raised that place of residence is not the same as the place of business in his Supplement to the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision and even have this Court evaluate additional
documentary evidence which were not offered during the proceedings in the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner raises a question of fact and SC is not a trier of facts.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law, thus:
Section 1. Filing of petition with the Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner failed to show that this case falls under any of the exceptions. The finding of the Labor Arbiter that
petitioner's bakery and his residence are located at the same place was not reversed by the NLRC. Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals upheld this finding of the Labor Arbiter. We find no justifiable reason to deviate from the findings
and ruling of the Court of Appeals.
NOTES:
Page 6 of 55
Assuming further that petitioner abandoned her job, the Supreme Court held in Ultra Villa Food Haus and/or Rosie
Tio vs. NLRC that to constitute abandonment, two requisites must concur:
(1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts, with the second
requisite as the more determinative factor.
The burden of proving abandonment as a just cause for dismissal is on the employer. Private respondents failed to
discharge this burden. The only evidence adduced by private respondents to prove abandonment were the affidavits
of their househelpers and employees.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank:
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law,
and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Court's function to
analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions
to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; or
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
G.EMPLOYMENT OF HOMEWORKERS
H.EMPLOYMENT OF NON-RESIDENT ALIENS
I.EMPLOYMENT OF STUDENTS & WORKING SCHOLAR
J.EMPLOYMENT OF ACADEMIC/NON-ACADEMIC PERSONNEL IN PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
K.EMPLOYMENT OF SENIOR CITIZENS
L.EMPLOYMENT OF DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS IN THE PUBLIC UTILITY TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
CASES:
1. University of the East vs. Pepanio, G.R. No. 193897. January 23, 2013 (Odchigue)
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, DEAN ELEANOR JAVIER, ANALIZA F. PEPANIO and MARITI D. BUENO
RONNIE GILLEGO and DR. JOSE C. BENEDICTO
Employees of UE who did not possess the minimum
Hired employees on a semester to semester basis in requirement set by the government to have a master's
consonance with Government regulation. It gave degree as a minimum educational qualification for
employees opportunities to comply with the acquiring regular status. They were given opportunities
postgraduate degree requirement mandated by the to comply but were not able to. They filed an illegal
government. dismissal case against UW and contended they are
regular employees.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
Page 7 of 55
Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools - Article IX, Section 44, par. 1 (a), of which requires college
faculty members to have a master's degree as a minimum educational qualification for acquiring regular status.
DECS-CHED-TESDA-DOLE Joint Order 1 which reiterated the policy embodied in the Manual of Regulations that
"teaching or academic personnel who do not meet the minimum academic qualifications shall not acquire tenure or
regular status."
FACTS:
This case is about the employment status of college teachers with no postgraduate degrees who have been
repeatedly extended semester-to-semester appointments as such.
● 1992 – Department of Education, Culture and Sports issued that private schools’ college faculty members
to have a master's degree as a minimum educational qualification for acquiring regular status.
● 1994 – UE and UE Faculty Association issued a CBA (effective until 1999): UE shall extend only semester-
to-semester appointments to college faculty staffs who did not possess the minimum qualifications. Those
with such qualifications shall be given probationary appointments and their performance on a fulltime or
full-load basis shall be reviewed for four semesters.
● February 7, 1996 – DECS-CHED-TESDA-DOLE Joint Order 1 which reiterated the policy embodied in the
Manual of Regulations that "teaching or academic personnel who do not meet the minimum academic
qualifications shall not acquire tenure or regular status." UE’s Presidents issued a policy for SY 1996-1997
to hire those who have no postgraduate units or master's degree for its college teaching staffs, in the
absence of qualified applicants, only on a semester-to-semester basis.
● Respondent Bueno was hired in 1997 (no evidence that she finished her course) and Pepanio in 2000
(earned 27 units but could not be credited since she didn’t finish within 5 years) who both lacked
postgraduate degrees - could not qualify for probationary or regular status.
● 2001 – new CBA: extend probationary full-time appointments to full-time faculty members who did not yet
have the required postgraduate degrees provided that the latter comply with such requirements within their
probationary period. The CBA granted UE, however, the option to replace these appointees during their
probationary period if a qualified teacher becomes available at the end of the semester.
● October 2003- petitioner Dean Eleanor Javier sent notices to probationary faculty members reminding of
the expiration of the probationary status of those lacking in postgraduate qualification by the end of SY
2003-2004. Pepanio replied that she was enrolled and Bueno replied she was not interested in acquiring
tenure as she would return to her province.
● Dean’s memorandum: would recommend extension of 2 more semesters to those who want it. Pepanio
requested 3 semesters extension but was granted only 2. Bueno has no record of submission of extension.
School eventually wrote to both their extension but neither reported to work.
● Respondents wrote UE that they be considered regular employees since 1994 CBA was in force when they
were hired contending their years of service on a full-load basis. UE did not heed demand, thus they filed
for illegal dismissal against the school to the LA’s office.
LA RULING (March 10,2005)
● Respondents are regular employees since they taught at UE for at least 4 semesters under old CBA. New
CBA could not deprive them of employee benefits that they already enjoyed.
● Pepanio who was enjoined from teaching and Bueno with no teaching load were dismissed without just
cause.
● Directed UE to reinstate them with back wages.
NLRC Decision (September 27,2006) – set aside LA decision
● 4 semesters probationary period under the old CBA did not automatically confer permanent status to Bueno
and Pepanio. They still had to meet the standards for permanent employment provided under the Manual
of Regulations and the Joint Order mentioned above. The non-renewal of their contract was based on their
failure to obtain the required postgraduate degrees and cannot, therefore, be regarded as illegal.
CA RULING (July 9, 2010) – reinstating LA’s decision
By reason of technicality - 10-day period for appeal already lapsed when UE filed it on April 14, 2005 since the
reckoning period should be counted five days from March 17, when the postmaster gave notice to UE's legal counsel
to claim his mail or from March 22, 2005.
Respondents: Petitioners:
They be regarded as regular employees since 1994 CBA ● Not regarded as regular employees since they
was in force when they were hired contending their years did not hold the required master's degree that
Page 8 of 55
of service on a full-load basis. CBA did not yet require a government rules required as minimum
master's degree for acquiring a regular status and since educational qualification.
respondents had already complied with the three
requirements of the CBA, namely, (a) that they served
full-time; (b) that they rendered three consecutive years
of service; and (c) that their services were satisfactory,
On the timeliness issue of their NLRC appeal:
they should be regarded as having attained permanent
or regular status. ● Appeal should be counted from April 4, 2005,
the date appearing on the registry return receipt
of the mail addressed to its counsel.
Filed present petition.

On NLRC appeal by petitioner:
● Questioned the timeliness of appeal:

should appeal on March 22,2005 – five
days after receipt of mail (LA decision) and
notice to Atty. Mison to claim his mail or
until April 1, 2005 (10-day period)
On present petition:
● should be denied since it failed to enclose a
certification from the UE Board of Trustees,
authorizing petitioner Dean Javier to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
ISSUES:
1. W/N UE filed a timely appeal to the NLRC from the Decision of the LA (YES)
2. W/N UE's petition before this Court can be given due course given its failure to enclose a
certification from the UE Board of Trustees' empowering petitioner Dean Javier to execute the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping (YES)
3. W/N UE illegally dismissed Bueno and Pepanio. (NO)
RULING:
I.
For completeness of service by registered mail, the reckoning period starts either:
a) from the date of actual receipt of the mail by the addressee or
b) after five days from the date he received the first notice from the postmaster.
There must be a conclusive proof, however, that the registry notice was received by or at least served on the
addressee before the five-day period begins to run.
Respondents have not presented a copy of the receipt on March 22, 2005 evidencing that notice. The Court has no
choice but to consider the registry return receipt bearing the date April 4, 2005 which showed the date of Atty.
Mison's receipt of a copy of the LA Decision a conclusive proof of service on that date. Reckoned from April 4, UE
filed its appeal to the NLRC on time.
II.
As a general rule, the Board of Directors or Board of Trustees of a corporation must authorize the person who signs
the verification and certification against non-forum shopping of its petition. But the Court has held that such
authorization is not necessary when it is self-evident that the signatory is in a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition. Here the verification and certification were signed by petitioner Dean
Page 9 of 55
Javier who, based on the given facts of the case, was "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition.
III.
The policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided in the Manual of Regulations as early
as 1992. Indeed, recognizing this, the 1994 CBA provided even then that UE was to extend only semester-to-semester
appointments to college faculty staffs, like respondents, who did not possess the minimum qualifications for their
positions.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (The Education Act of 1982) - delegated the administration of the education system
and the supervision and regulation of educational institutions to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (now
Department of Education).
• DECS Manual of Regulations – an exercise of its power of regulation over educational institutions, which
includes prescribing the minimum academic qualifications for teaching personnel.
1994 - from DECS (now DepEd) to CHED: legislature transferred the power to prescribe such qualifications. CHED's
charter authorized it to set minimum standards for programs and institutions of higher learning.
2010 - CHED issued a Revised Manual of Regulations which specifically applies only to institutions involved in
tertiary education. Before this, DECS Manual of Regulations, suppletorily the Joint Order - continued to apply to
colleges and universities.
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of
educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons,
in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions.
Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public
as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be
required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.
Respondents were each given only semester-to-semester appointments from the beginning of their employment
with UE precisely because they lacked the required master's degree. It was only when UE and the faculty union
signed their 2001 CBA that the school extended petitioners a conditional probationary status subject to their
obtaining a master's degree within their probationary period. It is clear, therefore, that the parties intended to
subject respondents' permanent status appointments to the standards set by the law and the university.
Here, UE gave respondents Bueno and Pepanio more than ample opportunities to acquire the postgraduate degree
required of them. But they did not take advantage of such opportunities. Justice, fairness, and due process demand
that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had little or no participation or control.
Court grants petition. Reverses CA decision and reinstates NLRC decision.
NOTES:
Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, a school CBA must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative
regulations governing faculty qualifications. Such regulations form part of a valid CBA without need for the parties
to make express reference to it. While the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions, as they may see fit, the right to contract is still subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be
contrary to law or public policy.
2.
COLEGIO DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO v. EMMANUEL ROJO, G.R. No. 170388 September 4, 2013
(ANDRIN)
COLEGIO DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO AND SR. ZENAIDA EMMANUEL ROJO,* RESPONDENT, high school teacher
S. MOFADA, OP, PETITIONERS, on probationary basis for the school years 1992-1993,
1993-1994 and 1994-1995.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Colegio del Santisimo Rosario (CSR) hired respondent as a high school teacher on probationary
basis for the school years 1992-1993, 1993-1994 and 1994-1995.
Page 10 of 55
● Sr. Zenaida S. Mofada, OP (Mofada), decided not to renew respondent’s services.

● respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal.
● RULINGS:
o LA: The LA ruled that "three school years" means three years of 10 months, not 12 months.
Considering that respondent had already served for three consecutive school years, then he has
already attained regular employment status. Thus, the non-renewal of his contract for school year
1995-1996 constitutes illegal dismissal.
o NLRC: LA AFFIRMED.
o CA: NO GADALEJ ON NLRC. Respondent had satisfied all requirements.
Private respondent alleged: Respondent alleged:

He had served three consecutive school years which is Respondent knew that his Teacher’s Contract for school
the maximum number of terms allowed for probationary year 1994-1995 with CSR would expire on March 31,
employment, he should be extended permanent 1995. Accordingly, respondent was not dismissed but
employment. Citing paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual of his probationary contract merely expired and was not
Regulations for Private Schools (1970 Manual), renewed. Petitioners also claimed that the "three years"
respondent asserted that "full- time teachers who have mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual refer to
rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory "36 months," not three school years. And since
services shall be considered permanent. respondent served for only three school years of 10
months each or 30 months, then he had not yet served
the "three years" or 36 months mentioned in paragraph
75 of the 1970 Manual.
ISSUES: WON CA ERRED

RULING:
PETITION DENIED. No evidence to show the reasonable standards with which the respondent is to be assessed.
These flaws violated respondent’s right to due process. As such, his dismissal is, for all intents and purposes, illegal.
As a matter of due process, teachers on probationary employment, just like all probationary employees, have the
right to know whether they have met the standards against which their performance was evaluated. Should they fail,
they also have the right to know the reasons therefor.
It should be pointed out that absent any showing of unsatisfactory performance on the part of respondent, it can be
presumed that his performance was satisfactory, especially taking into consideration the fact that even while he
was still more than a year into his probationary employment, he was already designated Prefect of Discipline. In
such capacity, he was able to uncover the existence of a drug syndicate within the school and lessen the incidence
of drug use therein. Yet despite respondent’s substantial contribution to the school, petitioners chose to disregard
the same and instead terminated his services; while most of those who were involved in drug activities within the
school were punished with a slap on the wrist as they were merely made to write letters promising that the incident
will not happen again. Mofada would also have us believe that respondent chose to resign as he feared for his life,
thus, the school’s decision not to renew his contract. However, no resignation letter was presented. Besides, this is
contrary to respondent’s act of immediately filing the instant case against petitioners.
NOTES:
COURT CITING MERCADO V. AMA DISCUSSION:
In Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., we had occasion to rule that cases dealing with
employment on probationary status of teaching personnel are not governed solely by the Labor Code as the law is
supplemented, with respect to the period of probation, by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (the Manual). With regard to the probationary period, Section 92 of the 1992 Manual provides: Section 92.
Probationary Period. – Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements, the
probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory
service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory
service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the
tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. In this case, petitioners’ teachers who were
on probationary employment were made to enter into a contract effective for one school year. Thereafter, it may be
Page 11 of 55
renewed for another school year, and the probationary employment continues. At the end of the second fixed period
of probationary employment, the contract may again be renewed for the last time. Such employment for fixed terms
during the teachers’ probationary period is an accepted practice in the teaching profession.
However, this scheme "of fixed-term contract is a system that operates during the probationary period and for this
reason is subject to Article 281 of the Labor Code. In Mercado, we held that "[u]nless this reconciliation is made,
the requirements of [Article 281 on probationary status would be fully negated as the school may freely choose
not to renew contracts simply because their terms have expired." This will have an unsettling effect in the
equilibrium vis-a-vis the relations between labor and management that the Constitution and Labor Code have worked
hard to establish. That teachers on probationary employment also enjoy the protection afforded by Article 281 of
the Labor Code is supported by Section 93 of the 1992 Manual which provides: Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status.
- Those who have served the probationary period shall be made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers who have
satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent. The provision clearly
provides that full-time teachers become regular or permanent employees once they have satisfactorily completed
the probationary period of three school years. The use of the term satisfactorily necessarily connotes the
requirement for schools to set reasonable standards to be followed by teachers on probationary employment.
In Mercado, this Court, speaking through J. Brion, held that: The provision on employment on probationary status
under the Labor Code is a primary example of the fine balancing of interests between labor and management that
the Code has institutionalized pursuant to the underlying intent of the Constitution. On the one hand, employment
on probationary status affords management the chance to fully scrutinize the true worth of hired personnel before
the full force of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution comes into play. Based on the standards set at
the start of the probationary period, management is given the widest opportunity during the probationary period to
reject hirees who fail to meet its own adopted but reasonable standards. These standards, together with the just
and authorized causes for termination of employment [which] the Labor Code expressly provides, are the grounds
available to terminate the employment of a teacher on probationary status. x x x Labor, for its part, is given the
protection during the probationary period of knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the
probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards, aside from the usual standards applicable to
employees after they achieve permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be
made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their probationary period, or at the very least under
the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which the probationary
standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that
the school should show – as a matter of due process – how these standards have been applied. This is effectively
the second notice in a dismissal situation that the law requires as a due process guarantee supporting the security
of tenure provision, and is in furtherance, too, of the basic rule in employee dismissal that the employer carries the
burden of justifying a dismissal. These rules ensure compliance with the limited security of tenure guarantee the
law extends to probationary employees. When fixed-term employment is brought into play under the above
probationary period rules, the situation – as in the present case – may at first blush look muddled as fixed-term
employment is in itself a valid employment mode under Philippine law and jurisprudence. The conflict, however, is
more apparent than real when the respective nature of fixed-term employment and of employment on probationary
status are closely examined.
● The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the period agreed upon between the
employer and the employee; employment exists only for the duration of the term and ends on its own when
the term expires. In a sense, employment on probationary status also refers to a period because of the
technical meaning "probation" carries in Philippine labor law – a maximum period of six months, or in the
academe, a period of three years for those engaged in teaching jobs. Their similarity ends there, however,
because of the overriding meaning that being "on probation" connotes, i.e., a process of testing and
observing the character or abilities of a person who is new to a role or job.
● An example given of a fixed-term contract specifically used for the fixed term it offers is a replacement
teacher or a reliever contracted for a period of one year to temporarily take the place of a permanent teacher
who is on leave. The expiration of the reliever’s fixed-term contract does not have probationary status
implications as he or she was never employed on probationary basis. This is because his or her
employment is for a specific purpose with particular focus on the term. There exists an intent to end his or
her employment with the school upon expiration of this term.
However, for teachers on probationary employment, in which case a fixed term contract is not specifically used
for the fixed term it offers, it is incumbent upon the school to have not only set reasonable standards to be followed
Page 12 of 55
by said teachers in determining qualification for regular employment, the same must have also been
communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary period, or at the very least, at the start of the period
when they were to be applied. These terms, in addition to those expressly provided by the Labor Code, would serve
as the just cause for the termination of the probationary contract. The specific details of this finding of just cause
must be communicated to the affected teachers as a matter of due process. Corollarily, should the teachers not
have been apprised of such reasonable standards at the time specified above, they shall be deemed regular
employees.
1. Herrera-Manoais v St. Scholastica’s College, GR NO. 188914, Dec. 11, 2013, (Advincula)
Jocelyn Herrera-Manaois St. Scholatica’s College
-a private educational institution offering elementary,
secondary, and tertiary education.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
● The probationer can only qualify upon fulfillment of the reasonable standards set for permanent
employment as a member of the teaching personnel.
● In line with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has
the discretion and prerogative to impose standards on its teachers and determine whether these
have been met. Upon conclusion of the probation period, the college or university, being the
employer, has the sole prerogative to make a decision on whether or not to re-hire the probationer.
● The probationer cannot automatically assert the acquisition of security of tenure and force the
employer to renew the employment contract. In the case at bar, Manaois failed to comply with
the stated academic qualifications required for the position of a permanent full-time faculty
member.
FACTS:
● St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) decided to hire Jocelyn Herrera-Manaois to be it’s part-time English teacher.
● After taking a leave of absence for one year, she was again rehired by SSC for the same position. Four years
into the service, she was later on recommended by her Department Chairperson to become a full-time
faculty member of the English Department.
● Manaois thus applied for a position as full-time instructor for school year 2000-2001. She mentioned in her
application letter that she had been taking the course Master of Arts in English Studies, Major in Creative
Writing, at the University of the Philippines, Diliman (UP); that she was completing her master's thesis; and
that her oral defense was scheduled for June 2000.
● SSC hired Manaois as a probationary full-time faculty member with the assigned rank of instructor for the
school year 2000-2001 and was a probationary employee for three consecutive years. Throughout her
service as a probationary full-time faculty member with no derogatory record, she was given above-
satisfactory ratings by both the Department Chairperson and the Dean of Arts and Sciences.
● Manaois requested for an extension of her teaching load for SY 2003-2004 and in her letter restated that
she was a candidate for a master's degree in English Studies; that the schedule of her oral defense may
actually materialize anytime within the first academic semester of 2003; and that she intended to fully earn
her degree that year. She also furnished the school with a Certification from UP, stating that she had already
finished her coursework in her master's studies. Furthermore, she indicated that it was her long-term goal
to apply for a return to full-time faculty status by then and for SSC to consider the aforesaid matters.
● The Dean of College and Chairperson of the Promotions and Permanency Board officially informing her of
the board's decision not to renew her contract.
● SSC denied Manaois’ request for reconsideration.
● Manaois filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of 13th month pay, damages, and attorney's fees
against SSC.
● Labor Arbiter found Manaois to have been illegally dismissed.
● NLRC affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision.
● CA reversed NLRC’s decision.
● Case is elevated to the SC.
ARGUMENTS: COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: (SSC)

● Permanency may only be extended to full-time
faculty members if they had fulfilled the criteria
provided in the SSC Faculty Manual. According
to SSC, the Chair of the English Department did
Page 13 of 55
not endorse the application for permanency of

Manaois, since the latter had not finished her
master's degree within the three-year
probationary period.
● The supposed performance ratings of Manaois
was average
● Manaois’ specialization was the subject of
writing and not English Literature, which was
the subject area that they needed a faculty
member for.
ISSUES: Whether or not the completion of a master's degree is required in order for a tertiary level educator to
earn the status of permanency in a private educational institution.
RULING:
SC denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision.
On Probationary Employment:
● Probationary employment refers to the trial stage or period during which the employer examines the
competency and qualifications of job applicants, and determines whether they are qualified to be extended
permanent employment status.
○ Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides as follows:
■ Art. 281. Probationary employment. — Probationary employment shall not
exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The
services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may
be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work
after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. (Emphases
supplied).
● The SC agreed with the CA that the requirement to obtain a master's degree was made known to
Manaois.
● The contract she signed clearly incorporates the rules, regulations, and employment conditions
contained in the SSC Faculty Manual.
Probationer can only qualify upon fulfillment of the reasonable standards set for permanent employment
as a member of the teaching personnel:
● Mere completion of the three-year probation, even with an above-average performance, does not
guarantee that the employee will automatically acquire a permanent employment status.
● It is settled jurisprudence that the probationer can only qualify upon fulfillment of the reasonable
standards set for permanent employment as a member of the teaching personnel.
● In line with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has
the discretion and prerogative to impose standards on its teachers and determine whether these
have been met. Upon conclusion of the probation period, the college or university, being the
employer, has the sole prerogative to make a decision on whether or not to re-hire the probationer.
● The probationer cannot automatically assert the acquisition of security of tenure and force the
employer to renew the employment contract. In the case at bar, Manaois failed to comply with
the stated academic qualifications required for the position of a permanent full-time faculty
member.
On 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 Manual):
● SC cited its ruling in Lacuesta v. Ateneo de Manila University, where it reiterated its earlier rulings
that,
“Section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that full-time teachers
who have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered regular or
Page 14 of 55
permanent. Moreover, for those teaching in the tertiary level, the probationary period shall not be
more than six consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service. The requisites to acquire
permanent employment, or security of tenure, are (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the
teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have
been satisfactory...only when one has served as a full-time teacher can he acquire permanent
or regular status. Completing the probation period does not automatically qualify her to become
a permanent employee of the university...Consistent with academic freedom and constitutional
autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and determine whether these standards have been met. At the end of the probation
period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs to the university as the
employer alone.”
● Section 92. Probationary Period. — Subject in all instances to compliance with Department and
school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three
(3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six
(6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine
(9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate
courses are offered on the trimester basis.
● Section 93. Regular or Permanent Status. — Those who have served the probationary period
shall be made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed their
probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent. (Emphases supplied)
NOTES:
● Section 44. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. — The minimum qualifications for faculty for the
different grades and levels of instruction duly supported by appropriate credentials on file in the
school shall be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Tertiary
(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational:
(a) Holder of a master's degree, to teach largely in his major field; or, for professional
courses, holder of the appropriate professional license required for at least a
bachelor's degree. Any deviation from this requirement will be subject to regulation by
the Department.
● Section 45. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. — As a general rule, all private schools shall employ
full-time academic personnel consistent with the levels of instruction.
Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:
a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the

Department under this Manual for all academic personnel;
b. Who are paid monthly or hourly, based on the regular teaching loads as provided for
in the policies, rules and standards of the Department and the school;
c. Whose total working day of not more than eight hours a day is devoted to the school;
d. Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of

work that will conflict with the working hours in the school; and
e. Who are not teaching full-time in any other educational institution.
All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered part-
time.
xxx xxx xxx
● Section 47. Faculty Classification and Ranking. — At the tertiary level, the academic teaching
positions shall be classified in accordance with academic qualifications, training and scholarship
preferably into academic ranks of Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and
Page 15 of 55
Instructor, without prejudice to a more simplified or expanded system of faculty ranking, at the
option of the school.
● Any academic teaching personnel who does not fall under any of the classes or ranks indicated
in the preceding paragraph shall be classified preferably as professorial lecturer, guest lecturer,
or any other similar academic designation on the basis of his qualifications. (Emphases supplied).
2. Provincial Bus Operators’ Association of the Phils. v DOLE, GR NO. 202275, July 17, 2018, (Advincula)
Provincial Bus Operators’ Association of the Phils. DOLE; LTFRB
(PBOAP); Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association,
inc. (SO-LUBOA),The inter city bus operators
association (interboa),and the city of san jose del
monte bus operators association (CSJDMBOA)
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
● Laws requiring the payment of minimum wage, security of tenure, and traffic safety have been declared
not violative of due process for being valid police power legislations.
● In these cases, the test or standard is whether the law is reasonable. The interests of the State to
promote the general welfare, on the one hand, and the right to property, on the other, must be balanced.
● Bus operators must be reminded that certificates of public convenience are not property.
● Certificates of public convenience are franchises always subject to amendment, repeal, or cancellation.
Additional requirements may be added for their issuance, and there can be no violation of due process
when a franchise is cancelled for non-compliance with the new requirement.
FACTS:
Atty. Emmanuel A. Mahipus, on behalf of the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Integrated
Metro Manila Bus Operators Association, Inter City Bus Operators Association, the City of San Jose Del Monte Bus
Operators Association, and Pro-Bus, wrote to then Secretary of Labor and Employment Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz,
requesting to defer the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12
DOLE did not act upon PBOAP, et.al. request for deferment of the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12.
NWPC Guidelines No. 1 suggested formulae for computing the fixed-based and the performance-based components
of a bus driver's or conductor's wage.
Provincial Bus Operators’ Association of the Phils. (PBOAP); Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, inc. (SO-
LUBOA),The inter city bus operators association (interboa),and the City of San Jose del Monte Bus Operators
Association (CSJDMBOA) filed an original action for certiorari and prohibition against DOLE’s Department Order No.
118-12 and NWPC Guidelines No. 1, Series of 2012.
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) promulgated Department Order No. 118-12, otherwise
known as the Rules and Regulations Governing the Employment and Working Conditions of Drivers and
Conductors in the Public Utility Bus Transport Industry; and Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board’s (LTFRB) issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001.
All the implementing guidelines issued pursuant to Department Order No. 118-12, including the National
Wages and Productivity Commission's Guidelines No. 1, series of 2012, otherwise known as the
Operational Guidelines on Department Order No. 118-12; and
The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001,
the subject of which is the Labor Standards Compliance Certificate.
Case elevated to the SC.
● DOLE Department Order No. 118-12 and ● Petitioners have no legal standing to file the
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are present Petition considering that Department
unconstitutional since these issuances violate Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular
petitioners' rights to non-impairment of No. 2012-001 are directed against bus
obligation of contracts, due process of law, and operators, not against associations of bus
equal protection of the laws. Particularly with operators such as petitioners. They add that
respect to Department Order No. 118-12, its petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy
provisions on the payment of part-fixed-part- courts in directly filing their Petition before this
performance-based wage allegedly impair Court. For these reasons, respondents pray for
petitioners' obligations under their existing the dismissal of the Petition.
collective bargaining agreements where they ● Department Order No. 118-12 and
agreed with their bus drivers and conductors on Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are
a commission or boundary basis. valid issuances promulgated by the DOLE
Page 16 of 55
● Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 further and the LTFRB in the exercise of their quasi-
requires compliance with Department Order legislative powers.
No. 118-12 under threat of revocation of their ● Department Order No. 118-12 and
franchises, which allegedly deprive petitioners Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 do not
of the capital they invested in their businesses violate public utility bus operators' rights to
in violation of their right to due process of law. non-impairment of obligation of contracts,
● The initial implementation of Department Order due process of law, and equal protection of
No. 118-12 within Metro Manila allegedly the laws.
creates an arbitrary distinction between bus ● Department Order No. 118-12 and
operators operating in Metro Manila and those Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are
operating outside of Metro Manila, in violation social legislations and police power
of petitioners' right to equal protection of the measures to which petitioners' right against
laws. impairment of obligation of contracts must
yield;
● Certificates of public convenience are not
property and are always subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal. Therefore,
public utility bus operators cannot argue that
they were deprived of their property without
due process of law when the LTFRB required
further compliance with Memorandum
Circular No. 2012-001 for bus operators to
retain their franchises;
● Department Order No. 118-12 does not
violate Metro Manila public utility bus
operators' right to equal protection of the
laws since it applies to all public utility bus
operators in the country.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the DOLE Department Order No. 118-12 and the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 impair
public utility bus operators' right to equal protection of the laws
RULING:
SC dismissed the petition.
Laws requiring the payment of minimum wage, security of tenure, and traffic safety considered as valid police
power legislations:
● Laws requiring the payment of minimum wage, security of tenure, and traffic safety have been declared
not violative of due process for being valid police power legislations.
● In these cases, the test or standard is whether the law is reasonable. The interests of the State to
promote the general welfare, on the one hand, and the right to property, on the other, must be balanced.
● The SC cited its ruling in Ichong v. Hernandez, where it held that:
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification ha[ve] been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are not violative of due process, either
procedural or substantive:
● DOLE created a Technical Working Group that conducted several meetings and consultations with
interested sectors before promulgating Department Order No. 118-12. Among those invited were bus
Page 17 of 55
drivers, conductors, and operators with whom officials of the DOLE conducted focused group discussions.
The conduct of these discussions more than complied with the requirements of procedural due process.
● Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are reasonable and are valid
police power issuances.
● The pressing need for Department Order No. 118-12 is obvious considering petitioners' admission that
the payment schemes prior to the Order's promulgation consisted of the "payment by results," the
"commission basis," or the boundary system.
● These payment schemes do not guarantee the payment of minimum wages to bus drivers and
conductors. There is also no mention of payment of social welfare benefits to bus drivers and
conductors under these payment schemes which have allegedly been in effect since "time
immemorial."
● There can be no meaningful implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 if violating it has no
consequence. As such, the LTFRB was not unreasonable when it required bus operators to comply with
the part-fixed-part-performance-based payment scheme under pain of revocation of their certificates
of public convenience. The LTFRB has required applicants or current holders of franchises to comply
with labor standards as regards their employees, and bus operators must be reminded that certificates
of public convenience are not property.
● Certificates of public convenience are franchises always subject to amendment, repeal, or cancellation.
Additional requirements may be added for their issuance, and there can be no violation of due process
when a franchise is cancelled for non-compliance with the new requirement.
NOTES:
● The boundary system puts drivers in a "scarcity mindset" that creates a tunnel vision where bus drivers
are nothing but focused on meeting the boundary required and will do so by any means possible and
regardless of risks.
● This scarcity mindset is eliminated by providing drivers with a fixed income plus variable income based
on performance. The fixed income equalizes the playing field, so to speak, so that competition and
racing among bus drivers are prevented. The variable pay provided in Department Order No. 118-12 is
based on safety parameters, incentivizing prudent driving.
15.MEDICAL, DENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
1. Tolosa vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 149578, April 10, 2003 (Artillero)
EVELYN TOLOSA, petitioner NLRC, QwanaKaiun, ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS.
INC.
Widow of the deceased Captain
Employer of the deceased Captain
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
REGULAR COURTS HAVE AUTHORITY OVER ACTION FOR DAMAGES PREDICATED ON QUASI DELICT AND HAS NO
CONNECTION WITH LABOR-RELATED CLAIMS. — It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over
actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action
proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort.
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY; NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH LABOR BENEFITS COGNIZED IN LABOR DISPUTES. — It
must be noted that a worker's loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be equated with wages, overtime
compensation or separation pay, and other labor benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of
earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi delict or a similar cause within the realm of civil law.
"Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the
claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such a connection with
the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations."
FACTS:
Evelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun,through its manning agent,
Asia Bulk Transport Phils. Inc., (ASIA BULK for brevity) to be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona.
CAPT. TOLOSA had a monthly compensation of US$1700, plus US$400.00 monthly overtime allowance.
Page 18 of 55
“During ‘channeling activities’ upon the vessel’s departure from Yokohama sometime onNovember 6, 1992, CAPT.
TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following day,November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever and in the
succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his death on November 18, 1992. It was
alleged that the request for emergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.
Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner, filed aComplaint/Position Paper before the
POEA against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its resident-agent, Mr.Fumio Nakagawa, ASIA BULK, Pedro Garate and Mario Asis,
as respondents. The case washowever transferred to the NLRC, when the amendatory legislation expanding its
jurisdiction,and removing overseas employment related claims from the ambit of POEA jurisdiction.
Respondents aver that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, since her cause did not arise
from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi-delict or tort. Further, there is no reasonable causal
connection between her suit for damages and her claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows an
award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not

predicated on a quasi delict or tort, but on the failure of
private respondents — as employers of her husband
(Captain Tolosa) — to provide him with timely, adequate Sustaining the NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor
and competent medical services under Article 161 of the commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
Labor Code. of the action filed by petitioner. Her cause did not arise
from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi
Likewise, she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) of the delict or tort. Further, there is no reasonable causal
Labor Code vests labor arbiters and the NLRC with connection between her suit for damages and her claim
jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows
arising from employer-employee relations. an award of damages incident to an employer-employee
relation.
Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal
connection" rule should be applied in her favor.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2. Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter.
RULING:
1. No. As a rule, labor arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission have no power or authority to
grant reliefs from claims that do not arise from employer-employee relations. They have no jurisdiction
over torts that have no reasonable causal connection to any of the claims provided for in the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.
After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, the allegations therein are in the nature
of an action based on a quasi-delict or tort. It is evident that she sued PedroGarate and Mario Asis for gross
negligence. Petitioner’s complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the negligent acts of
shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The SC stressed
that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a
quasi-delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee
relations.
2. Petitioner contends that the labor arbiters monetary award has already reached finality, since private
respondents were not able to file a timely appeal before the NLRC.
This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-
settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, points of
law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals need not -- and ordinarily
will not -- be considered by this Court.
2. U-Bix Corp., vs. Bandiola, 525 SCRA 566 (2007) (Artillero)
Page 19 of 55
U-BIX CORPORATION, petitioner RICHEL BANDIOLA, respondent
Employer Employee who sustained an injury in the course of his

employment
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
Articles 205 and 206 of the Labor Code set the reportorial requirements in cases when an employee falls sick or
suffers an injury arising in the course of employment. An injury is said to arise "in the course of employment" when
it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
The Labor Code provides for the medical expenses, as well as disability benefits of workers suffering from work-
related injuries and recognizes such compensation as their right.
FACTS:
Sometime in April 1995, Bandiola was employed by U-BIX to install furniture for its customers. On 13 April 1997,
Bandiola and two other U-BIX employees were involved in a vehicular accident on their way to Baguio, where they
were assigned by U-BIX to install furniture for an exhibit. As a result of the accident, Bandiola sustained a fracture
on his left leg. Bandiola and his co-employees were initially brought to the Rosario District Hospital. The next day,
14 April 1997, they were transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital (Orthopedic). After his broken leg was
cemented, Bandiola was advised to go back for further medical treatment. U-BIX paid for the medical expenses
incurred in both mentioned hospitals.
When Bandiola asked for additional financial assistance for further expenses in the treatment of his leg which even
needed to be casted in fiberglass, U-BIX allegedly refused. On September 1998, Bandiola filed a Complaint before
the Labor Arbiter, where he alleged underpayment of salary; non-payment of overtime pay; premium pay for work
performed on holidays and rest days; separation pay; service incentive leave pay; 13th month pay; and the payment
of actual, moral and exemplary damages.
In its Decision, dated 16 September 1998, Labor Arbiter allowed Bandiola's claim for salary differential, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay due to U-BIX's failure to present payrolls or similar documents. Incidentally,
the award of these claims is no longer questioned in the present petition. The other claims, particularly those for
medical expenses that Bandiola allegedly incurred and for moral and exemplary damages, were dismissed. Bandiola
asserts that U-BIX failed to extend to him any financial assistance after he was injured in the performance of his
duties, and that as a result, he suffered physical pain, mental torture, fright, sleepless nights, and serious anxiety. He
claims that this entitles him to moral and exemplary damages.
Bandiola filed an appeal before the NLRC. NLRC amended the Decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter ruling that U-
BIX should reimburse Bandiola the amount for the medical expenses he incurred in connection with his fractured
leg; and further ruled that U-BIX is liable to pay Bandiola P25,000.00 in moral damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary
damages for refusing to reimburse Bandiola for the medical expenses he incurred after it failed to report to the
Social Security System (SSS) the injuries sustained by Bandiola
It affirmed Bandiola's entitlement to reimbursement of his medical expenses, but reduced the amount to P7,742.50,
the amount of actual damages he was able to prove. It also affirmed without modification the award of moral and
exemplary damages, and the monetary award granted by the Labor Arbiter.
Bandiola asserts that U-BIX failed to extend to him any U-BIX, on the other hand, denies that Bandiola notified it
financial assistance after he was injured in the of any medical expenses he purportedly incurred until
performance of his duties, and that as a result, he the complaint was filed before the Labor Arbiter.
suffered physical pain, mental torture, fright, sleepless
nights, and serious anxiety. He claims that this entitles
him to moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner U-BIX should reimburse respondent Bandiola for alleged medical expenses of P7,742.50 and pay
for moral damages of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to said respondent Bandiola.
Page 20 of 55
RULING:
Yes. Contrary to the arguments put forward by U-BIX, it is liable to reimburse Bandiola the amount of P7,742.50 for
medical expenses because its failure to comply with its duty to record and report Bandiola's injury to the SSS
precluded Bandiola from making any claims. Moreover, U-BIX, by its own admission, reimbursed its other employees
who were involved in the same accident for their medical expenses. Clearly, the reimbursement of medical expenses
for injuries incurred in the course of employment is part of the benefits enjoyed by U-BIX's employees. The only
justification for its refusal to reimburse Bandiola was that he intended to defraud the company by presenting
spurious receipts amounting to P7,742.50 that were allegedly issued four months before their presentation.
In the present case, there is no dispute that Bandiola's leg injury was sustained in the course of his employment with
U-BIX. At the time of the accident, Bandiola was on the way to Baguio, where he was ordered by U-BIX to install
furniture for an exhibit. Moreover, U-BIX was aware that Bandiola, as well as his other co-employees, were injured
during the accident. U-BIX admitted to providing Bandiola and his co-employees with medical assistance and it even
sent its representative, Rey Reynes, to Rosario District Hospital, where they were confined, and had them transferred
to the Orthopedic. U-BIX was also aware that the Orthopedic instructed Bandiola to return for further medical
treatment. It is implicit that Bandiola needed further treatment for his broken leg and was, thus, incapacitated to
work.
Given the foregoing circumstances, U-BIX had the legal obligation to record pertinent information in connection with
the injuries sustained by Bandiola in its logbook within five days after it had known about the injuries; and to report
the same to the SSS within five days after it was recorded in the logbook, in accordance with Articles 205 and 206
of the Labor Code. Had U-BIX performed its lawful duties, the SSS, or the ECC on appeal, could have properly
considered whether or not Bandiola was entitled to reimbursement for his medical expenses, as well as disability
benefits while he was unable to work. However, U-BIX did not present any evidence showing that it had complied
with these legal requirements. It had not even replied to Bandiola's allegations in his Position Paper, dated 13 April
1998, that its employees were not even members of the SSS.
NOTES:
3. Ocean Builders Construction vs. Sps. Cubacub, GR No. 150898, April 13, 2011 (Artillero)
(short bio) (short bio)
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
FACTS:
Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders
Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. Thus, he was advised by
petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company’s general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company’s
“barracks” where he lives free of charge.
Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even
cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga, a co-
worker, to bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
Bladimir was brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one
kilometer away from the office of the company. He was then confined and was not permitted to leave the hospital.
He was then transferred to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) by his parents where he was placed in the
intensive care unit and died the following day.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir’s immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest
and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the
causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
Bladimir’s parents filed before the RTC complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of
negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition leading to his death. The court dismissed the
complaint and ruled that Hao was not negligent.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that Hao’s failure to bring Bladimir to a better-
equipped hospital constituted a violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code. Thus, making them liable for damages.
Page 21 of 55
ISSUES: Did Hao exercise the diligence more than what the law requires, hence, not liable for damages?
RULING:
NOTES:
16.MIGRANT WORKER'S ACT & OVERSEAS FILIPINO ACT OF 1995 & RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT
CASES:
1. ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT,

Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent., (MOLINA)
ATCI was a local recruitment agency, represented by Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner
petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-
foreign principal. petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the
Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under
a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was

terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she
not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be
any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
FACTS:
Page 22 of 55
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal co-
petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist
under a two year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of 1 year and are covered by
Kuwait's Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001,
she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondents reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001,
shouldering her own air fare.
Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
Labor Arbiter: finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondents
dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and
accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired
portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision
MR denied. They appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government
agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly
dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one year period as required under
Kuwait's Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of
petitioner ATCI.
CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution and noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can
be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract
of employment.
As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded
to overseas workers.
 
MR denied, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
● Maintain that they should not be held liable ● Respondent was illegally dismissed and
because respondents' employment contract accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her
specifically stipulates that her employment US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the
shall be governed by the Civil Service Law three months unexpired portion of her contract.
and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus
conclude that it was patent error for the
labor tribunals and the appellate court to
apply the Labor Code provisions governing
probationary employment in deciding the
present case.
● That even the POEA Rules relative to master
employment contracts accord respect to the
customs, practices, company policies and
labor laws and legislation of the host country.
Page 23 of 55
● Finally, petitioners posit that assuming

arguendo that Philippine labor laws are
applicable, given that the foreign principal is a
government agency which is immune from
suit, as in fact it did not sign any document
agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable,
petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable,
more so since the Ministry's liability had not
been judicially determined as jurisdiction was
not acquired over it.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement which provided for the Kuwait's Civil Service Board Employment
Contract No. 2 has a binding effect.
RULING:
The petition fails. Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims
of OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a
government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability must first be
established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate
the plight of the working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign
principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be held
liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it
was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the
terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact
POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern
their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.
It is a hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
The Court's ruling in EDI<Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will
govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.).
Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should
govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved
as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed*identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where
a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the
same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they
must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Page 24 of 55
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:

a. MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee
is subject to a probationary period of one year and that the host country's Civil Service Laws and Regulations
apply;
b. a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not
pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate
of termination,both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of
Foreign Affairs Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit;
c. and respondents letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months
of employment, she was given a rating of Excellent albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the
pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the
translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ
from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject
certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa
was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were
found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
NOTES:
2. CLAUDIO S. YAP, Petitioner, vs. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME
AGENCIES, INC., Respondents., (MOLINA)
Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, Employed Claudio Yap (petitioner) as electrician of the
M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc. on behalf of its principal, Vulture Maritime Agencies, Inc. on behalf of its principal, Vulture
Shipping Limited. The contract of employment entered Shipping Limited. However, on or about 08 November
into by Yap and Capt. Francisco B. Adviento, the General 2001, they sold the vessel.
Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12 months.
On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and
commenced his job as electrician.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
Equal Protection; No law should single out one classification of OFWs and burden it with a peculiar disadvantage
Page 25 of 55
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
FACTS:
Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc. on behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. for a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001,
Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the
vessel was sold. Yap, along with the other crew members, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same
was sold and will be scrapped.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with respect
to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he was
entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment.
He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.
The Labor Arbiter
Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the
Labor Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been
constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents. LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioner’s
contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a
period of nine months.
The NLRC
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s findings that the petitioner
was indeed constructively and illegally dismissed. However, the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries
corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided under Section
108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission.
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Finding merit in petitioner’s arguments, the NLRC reversed
its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three (3) months salary for every year of the
unexpired term because there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be applied."
The Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC that the petitioner was constructively and illegally
dismissed. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LA’s interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042. In this regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
Page 26 of 55
● Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for ● Contended that Yap was not illegally
Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorney’s dismissed. They alleged that following the sale
Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Petitioner of the M/T SEASCOUT, Yap signed off from the
claimed that he was entitled to the salaries vessel on 10 November 2001 and was paid his
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his wages corresponding to the months he worked
contract. Subsequently, he filed an amended or until 10 November 2001 plus his seniority
complaint, impleading Captain Francisco bonus, vacation bonus and extra bonus. They
Adviento of respondents Intermare Maritime further alleged that Yap’s employment contract
Agencies, Inc. (Intermare) and Thenamaris was validly terminated due to the sale of the
Ship’s Management (respondents), together vessel and no arrangement was made for Yap’s
with C.J. Martionos, Interseas Trading and transfer to Thenamaris’ other vessels.
Financing Corporation, and Vulture Shipping
Limited/Stejo Shipping Limited.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the
lesser benefit of – "salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" – is unconstitutional. –YES
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his
unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term" threshold. -YES
RULING:
In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared as unconstitutional the clause "or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10
of
R.A. No. 8042 in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. on March 24, 2009. This case should not be
different from Serrano.
The said provision of law has long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and that
said provision violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed local
workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld from them up to their actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment.
Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our pronouncement of unconstitutionality should not apply in
this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals with the rights and obligations of the
parties in case of Illegal Dismissal of a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character. Thus, pursuant to
the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive application of the law in this case.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact
serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
Page 27 of 55
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the aforementioned exception. To rule otherwise
would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers
and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract
embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.
Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance should be excluded from the definition of the term
"salary."
Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this
question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. A close perusal of the contract
reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the
basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.
NOTES:
We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs. In Olarte v. Nayona, this Court held that:
Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society.
Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health,
their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy
prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just
to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum.
The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.
3. Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Doza, G.R. No. 175558, February 8, 2012 (GOPUCO)
PETITIONERS: Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers RESPONDENTS: Napoleon De Gracia (De Gracia), Isidro
Maritime Services, Inc., Ltd. (Skippers) L. Lata (Lata), Charlie Aprosta (Aprosta), and Nathaniel
Doza (Doza)
A local manning agency and its foreign principal,
respectively. They are all seafarers.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
Article 285 of the Labor Code states that termination by the employee of the employment contract by serving written
notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance.
Section 8 of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55 states that the allotment constitutes at least eighty percent (80%)
of the seafarer's salary.
Migrant Workers Act provides that salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, shall be awarded to the overseas Filipino worker, in cases of
illegal dismissal.
FACTS:
● De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta had employment contracts. Doza did not submit an employment contract.
● De Gracia, et al. failed to remit their respective allotments for almost five months.
● They aired their grievances with the Romainian Seafarers Free Union.
● The ITF Inspector sent a fax letter to Captain Savvas of Cosmos Shipping.
● The letter contained a complaint of home allotment delay, unpaid salaries (only advances), late provisions,
lack of laundry services (only one washing machine), and lack of maintenance of the vessel (perforated
and unrepaired deck.
Page 28 of 55
● Skipper failed to remit the home allotment only for the month of December.
● De Gracia, et al. were unceremoniously discharged from MV Wisdom and immediately repatriated.
● They then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.
● Skippers claims :
○ It was De Gracia’s drunken act of shouting at the master of MV Wisdom Stars that led to his
discharge, which was evidenced by the Captain’s Report.
○ Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Doza, arrived in the master's cabin and demanded immediate
repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship.
○ Since they were pre-terminated they are liable for repatriation expenses.
● Labor Arbiter’s decision: dismiss all claims
● Respondent for the pre-termination of their employment contracts
● De Gracia specifically was denied home allotment for failure to prove entitlement
● Petitioners for lack of merit
● NLRC’s decision: dismiss both claims
● CA’s decision:
○ Grant the petition
○ Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have committed a grave abuse of discretion when they relied on the
message of the Captain because the teletext message was a self-serving document
○ They were entitled to damages for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
○ De Gracia was given the modified award instead of the actual award for Skippers’ error.
○ They were awarded attorney’s fees.
○ No award was given to Doza for lack of factual basis.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondents were illegally dismissed.

2. WON petitioner is liable to pay back wages and the alleged unremitted home allotment pay.
3. WON the respondents are entitled to be awarded attorney’s fees.
RULING:
1. Yes, they were illegally dismissed. There was no written notice given to the respondents.
2. Yes, because Skipper admitted non-remittance. The repatriation expenses could not be offset with the
home allotment pay because their dismissal was illegal. The home allotment pay is considered as a salary.
Hence, they are obliged to pay the unpaid salaries.
They are also entitled to damages for unjust termination. They are entitled to the unexpired portion of the
employment contract or three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
3. Yes, since they had to secure the services of the lawyer to recover their unpaid salaries and protect their
interest. They are entitled to the amount of ten percent (10%) of the total claims as attorney’s fees.
NOTES:
Name: Napoleon O. De Gracia

Position: 3rd Engineer
Contract Duration: 10 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$800.00
Contract Date: July 17, 1998
Repatriation Expense: US$1,340.00
Home Allotment: US$600.00
Balance: US$440.00
Name: Isidro L. Lata

Position: 4th Engineer
Contract Date: April 17, 1998
Page 29 of 55
Balance: US$740.00
Name: Charlie A. Aprosta

Position: Third Officer
Contract Date: April 17, 1998
Balance: US$740.00
4. International Management Services v. Logarta, G.R. No. 163657, April 18, 2012 (GOPUCO)
PETITIONER: International Management Services RESPONDENT: Roel P. Legarta
It is a recruitment agency owned and operated by He is an OFW.

Marilyn Pascual.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
Article 283
Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing
or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing
the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment
at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one
(1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment
to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay
or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
Requisites of a valid retrenchment:

1. That the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already
incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are
reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;
2. That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
3. That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least
1/2 month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
4. That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its
interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to security of tenure; and
5. That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would
be retained among the employees, such as status, . . . efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and
financial hardship for certain workers.
FACTS:
● Respondent was deployed by petitioner to work for Petrocon in Alkhobar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
● It was for general engineering services of Petrocon for Saudi Aramco.
● Respondent was employed for two (2) years with a monthly salary of US$800.00).
● 1997- Respondent started to work for Petrocon as a piping designer.
● Saudi Aramco informed Petrocon that they will be reducing man-hours by 40%.
● Respondent was 1 of 73 that were laid off.
● Petrocon gave the respondent a written 30-day notice of termination.
● Petrocon informed the respondent that his benefits and plane ticket back to the PH will be paid for.
● Petrocon gave the respondent and his co-employees a letter of Intent which serves as a No Objection
Certificate once they find another employer before they leave Saudi Arabia, which they requested for.
● Before his departure from Saudi Arabia, the respondent received his final paycheck from Petrocon
amounting SR7,488.57.
Page 30 of 55
● When the respondent arrived he filed a complaint with the NLRC for the recovery of his unearned salaries
covering the unexpired portion of his employment contract with Petrocon on the ground that he was illegally
dismissed.
● Labor Arbiter’s decision:
● Pascual has to pay Logarta the peso equivalent of US$5,600.00 based on the rate at the time of actual
payment, as payment of his wages for the unexpired portion of his contract of employment.
● NLRC’s decision: affirm the Labor Arbiter’s decision but reduce the award to only US$4,800.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment.
● CA’s decision: dismiss the petition
● agreed with the findings of the NLRC that retrenchment could be a valid cause to terminate respondent's
employment with Petrocon but the requisites for a valid retrenchment were not followed.
ARGUMENTS: (Respondent) COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: (Petitioner)
● The 30-day notice prior to retrenchment is not ● It is not necessary based on Article 283 of the
applicable. Labor Code and yet it was complied with.
● He did not consent to his separation from the ● The respondent consented because he did not
principal company. object.
● He is entitled to receive separation pay. ● At best, the respondent is only entitled to
separation pay for one (1) month pay or at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher.
ISSUES:
1. WON retrenchment is a valid form of dismissal.
2. WON the 30-day notice was proper.
3. WON respondent is entitled to the payment of his separation pay.
RULING:
1. Retrenchment is a valid management prerogative, provided it is done in good faith and the employer
faithfully complies with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence.
The respondent enjoys the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislations whether employed
locally or overseas.
2. Petitioner failed to comply with two (2) of the requisites for a valid retrenchment. The notice was given to
the wrong party. Proper notice to the DOLE within 30 days prior to the intended date of retrenchment is
necessary and must be complied with despite the fact that respondent is an overseas Filipino worker.
3. Yes, the respondent is entitled to the payment of his separation pay. He is also entitled to P50,000 as
nominal damages because the way they exercised retrenchment was invalid.
NOTES:
5. PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC. vs. ARMANDO A. VINUYA, LOUIE M. ORDOVEZ, ARSENIO
S. LUMANTA, JR., ROBELITO S. ANIPAN, VIRGILIO R. ALCANTARA, MARINO M. ERA, SANDY O.
ENJAMBRE and NOEL T. LADEA, G.R. No. 197528. September 5, 2012.
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS
Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. (agency), and its Armando A. Vinuya, Louie M. Ordovez, Arsenio S.
President Romeo P. Nacino. Lumanta, Jr., Robelito S. Anipan, Virgilio R. Alcantara,
Marino M. Era, Sandy O. Enjambre and Noel T. Ladea
(respondents), 8 in total, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the petitioner
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
FACTS:
● Respondents alleged that the agency deployed them to work as aluminum fabricator/installer for the
agency's principal, Modern Metal Solution LLC/MMS Modern Metal Solution LLC (Modern Metal) in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates. The respondents' employment contracts, which were approved by the POEA,
provided for a two-year employment, nine hours a day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food
allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free transportation, free laundry, and free medical
and dental services. They each paid a P15,000.00 processing fee
● However, Modern Metal gave the respondents, except Era, appointment letters with terms different from
those in the employment contracts which they signed at the agency's office in the Philippines. Under the
letters of appointment, their employment was increased to three years at 1,000 to 1,200 AED and food
allowance of 200 AED.
● Respondents claimed that they were shocked to find out what their working and living conditions were in
Dubai. They were required to work from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a break of only one hour to one and a
Page 31 of 55
half hours. When they rendered overtime work, they were most of the time either underpaid or not paid at
all. Their housing accommodations were cramped and were shared with 27 other occupants. The lodging
house was in Sharjah, which was far from their jobsite in Dubai, leaving them only three to four hours of
sleep a day because of the long hours of travel to and from their place of work; there was no potable water
and the air was polluted.
● When the respondents received their first salaries (at the rates provided in their appointment letters and
with deductions for placement fees) and because of their difficult living and working conditions, they called
up the agency and complained about their predicament. The agency assured them that their concerns
would be promptly addressed, but nothing happened.
● Modern Metal required the respondents to sign new employment contracts. The contracts reflected the
terms of their appointment letters. Burdened by all the expenses and financial obligations they incurred for
their deployment, they were left with no choice but to sign the contracts. They raised the matter with the
agency, which again took no action.
● Respondents expressed to Modern Metal their desire to resign. Out of fear, as they put it, that Modern Metal
would not give them their salaries and release papers, the respondents, except Era, cited personal/family
problems for their resignation. It took the agency several weeks to repatriate the respondents to the
Philippines. They all returned to Manila in September 2007. Except for Ordovez and Enjambre, all the
respondents shouldered their own airfare. For its part, the agency countered that the respondents were not
illegally dismissed; they voluntarily resigned. Respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits of quitclaim
and release after they resigned. It thus argued that their claim for benefits, under Section 10 of Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 8042, damages and attorney's fees is unfounded.
● Labor Arbiter Ligerio V. Ancheta rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, finding that the
respondents voluntarily resigned from their jobs. He also found that four of them — Alcantara, Era, Anipan
and Lumanta — even executed a compromise agreement (with quitclaim and release) before the POEA. On
appeal, NLRC favored the respondents ruling that they had been illegally dismissed. stressed that it is illegal
for an employer to require its employees to execute new employment papers, especially those which
provide benefits that are inferior to the POEA-approved contracts
● CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It upheld the NLRC ruling that the respondents were illegally
dismissed
ISSUES: W/N agency is guilty of contract substitution and breach of contract
RULING:
Petition is dismissed.
CA committed no reversible error and neither did it commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's illegal
dismissal ruling.
First. The agency and Modern Metal are guilty of contract substitution. The respondents entered into a POEA-
approved two-year employment contract, with Modern Metal providing among others, as earlier discussed, for a
monthly salary of 1350 AED. On April 2, 2007, Modern Metal issued to them appointment letters whereby the
respondents were hired for a longer three-year period and a reduced salary, from 1,100 AED to 1,200 AED, among
other provisions. Then, on May 5, 2007, they were required to sign new employment contracts reflecting the same
terms contained in their appointment letters, except that this time, they were hired as "ordinary laborer," no longer
aluminum fabricator/installer. The respondents complained with the agency about the contract substitution, but the
agency refused or failed to act on the matter.
Clearly, the agency and Modern Metal committed a prohibited practice and engaged in illegal recruitment under the
law. Article 34 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. — It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the periods of expiration of the same without the approval
of the Secretary of Labor[.]
Further, Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 8042, defined "illegal recruitment" to include the following
act:
Page 32 of 55
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the
period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment[.]
Second. The agency and Modern Metal committed breach of contract. The respondents were made to suffer
substandard (shocking, as they put it) working and living arrangements. Both the original contracts the respondents
signed in the Philippines and the appointment letters issued to them by Modern Metal in Dubai provided for free
housing and transportation to and from the jobsite. The original contract mentioned free and suitable housing.
Although no description of the housing was made in the letters of appointment except: "Accommodation: Provided
by the company," it is but reasonable to think that the housing or accommodation would be "suitable."
Third. With their original contracts substituted and their oppressive working and living conditions unmitigated or
unresolved, the respondents' decision to resign is not surprising. They were compelled by the dismal state of their
employment to give up their jobs; effectively, they were constructively dismissed. A constructive dismissal or
discharge is "a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as, an offer
involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." Without doubt, the respondents' continued employment with
Modern Metal had become unreasonable.
We thus cannot accept the agency's insistence that the respondents voluntarily resigned since they personally
prepared their resignation letters in their own handwriting We find the resignation letters "dubious," not only for
having been lopsidedly worded to ensure that the employer is rendered free from any liability, but also for the odd
coincidence that all the respondents had, at the same time, been confronted with urgent family problems so that
they had to give up their employment and go home. The truth, as the respondents maintain, is that they cited family
problems as reason out of fear that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and their release papers. Only
Era was bold enough to say the real reason for his resignation — to protest company policy.
We likewise find the affidavits of quitclaim and release which the respondents executed suspectUnlike the
resignation letters, the respondents had no hand in the preparation of the affidavits. They must have been prepared
by a representative of Modern Metal as they appear to come from a standard form and were apparently introduced
for only one purpose — to lend credence to the resignation letters. The respondents' position is well-founded. The
NLRC itself had the same impression.
Fourth. The compromise agreements (with quitclaim and release) between the respondents and the agency before
the POEA did not foreclose their employer-employee relationship claims before the NLRC.
Under the heading "Post-Deployment," the agency agreed to pay Era and Alcantara P12,000.00 each, purportedly in
satisfaction of the respondents' claims arising from overseas employment, consisting of unpaid salaries, salary
differentials and other benefits, including money claims with the NLRC.
The compromise agreement, apparently, was intended by the agency as a settlement with the respondents and
others with similar claims, which explains the inclusion of the two (Nangolinola and Gatchalian) who were not
involved in the case with the NLRC. Under the circumstances, we cannot see how the compromise agreements can
be considered to have fully settled the respondents' claims before the NLRC — illegal dismissal and monetary
benefits arising from employment. We thus find no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the rejection by
the NLRC and the CA of said agreements.
Fifth. The agency's objection to the application of the Serrano ruling in the present case is of no moment. Its
argument that the ruling cannot be given retroactive effect has been resolved in Yap v. Thenamaris Ship's
Management, where the Court sustained the retroactive application of the Serrano ruling which declared
unconstitutional the subject clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of R.A. 8042, limiting to three months the payment of
salaries to illegally dismissed Overseas Filipino Workers.
Undaunted, the agency posits that in any event, the Serrano ruling has been nullified by R.A. No. 10022, entitled "An
Act Amending Republic Act No. 8042, Otherwise Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
As Amended, Further Improving the Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their
Families and Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and for Other Purposes." It argues that R.A. 10022, which lapsed into
Page 33 of 55
law (without the Signature of the President) on March 8, 2010, restored the subject clause in the 5th paragraph,
Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The amendment, contained in Section 7 of R.A. 10022, reads as follows:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker's salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement "of" his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
This argument fails to persuade us. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. By its
very nature, the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022 — restoring a provision of R.A. 8042 declared unconstitutional
— cannot be given retroactive effect, not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law, but
because retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue
of the Serrano ruling — entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts
NOTES:
6. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS V SALAC, ET AL. G.R. No. 152642, NOVEMBER 13, 2012
FACTS:
● Several cases were filed and consolidated questioning the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A
8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 whose purpose is to set
the Government’s policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and
promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
● Respondent Salac et.al were recruiters questioning the validity of Sections 29 and 30 of the said Act praying
that the deployment of OFWs and other workers abroad be deregulated. Petitioner, on the other hand was
the Secretary of DOLE at the time, a government instrumentality that issues orders and memorandums
which regulates the recruitment, placement, and sending or deploying of overseas workers abroad.
● Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin
deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of
overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
● On April 10, 2007 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. 9422 which expressly
repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and adopted the policy of close government regulation of the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs.
ISSUES: W/N Sections 29 and 30 of R.A 8042 which commands to deregulate the recruitment, placement, and sending
or deploying of overseas workers abroad are still valid
RULING:
R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the rrecruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb,
if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled
that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or
expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
However, on August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R. 152642 that they agree with the
Republic's view that the repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they raised by their action
moot and academic. The Court has no reason to disagree. Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710,
should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
NOTES:
7. Sameer v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139. August 5, 2014 (AMIO)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
Page 34 of 55
- Sameer Overseas Placement - Joy C. Cabiles is a Filipino who applied and was
Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and eventually accepted by the petitioner to work in
placement agency. Taiwan under a 1-year employment contract.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
• The clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” found in Section
10 of Republic Act 8042, (“Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995”) is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
• In this case, the Supreme Court resolved that Section 7 of Republic Act 10022, which amended Section 10
of RA 8042 thereby reinstating the previously declared unconstitutional clause, is in the same way
unconstitutional.
• Therefore, illegally dismissed overseas workers – whether their employment contracts had a term of less
than one year or at least a year – must be granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts, not the amount equivalent to three months of their salary.
FACTS:
• Responding to an ad, respondent submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan to petitioner.
• Respondent’s application was accepted. She was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.
• According to respondent, the petitioner required her to pay a P70,000 placement fee when she signed the
employment contract.
• Respondent was then deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.
• She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan,
she was asked to work as a cutter.
• On July 14, 1997, respondent was informed, without prior notice, that she was terminated. She was then
asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.”
• Petitioner agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her
duties, and her “failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer].”
• Ultimately, respondent filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner
and Wacoal, which she identified as identified petitioner agency's (Sameer) foreign principal. She claimed
that she was illegally dismissed.
• Respondent asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment
of her salary as well as moral and exemplary damages.
• The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent’s complaint but the NLRC reversed this, declaring that respondent
was illegally dismissed.
• The NLRC, however, awarded respondent only three months worth of salary of NT$46,080, the
reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorney's fees of NT$300.
• The CA affirmed the NLRC decision on appeal, prompting petitioner agency to elevate the case to the
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
ARGUMENT COUNTER-ARGUMENT
LA NLRC & CA
- ruled that respondent’s complaint - reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof
was based on mere allegations. to show that the dismissal was based on a just
- found that there was no excess or valid cause belongs to the employer.
payment of placement fees, based on - found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
the official receipt presented by failed to prove that there were just causes for
petitioner. termination; held that there was no sufficient
proof to show that respondent was inefficient in
Petitioner (in its certiorari petition) her work and that she failed to comply with
company requirements.
Page 35 of 55
- reiterated that there was just cause - Held further that procedural due process was
for termination because there was a not observed in terminating respondent.
finding of Wacoal that respondent
was inefficient in her work and thus
claimed that respondent's dismissal
was valid
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed
Here, the Supreme Court was also compelled to pass upon the amount of monetary claim that should be awarded to
respondent, thus this issue:
2. Whether respondent is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract or for only 3 months
RULING:
1. Respondent was illegally dismissed. (a) Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just
cause for causing Joy's dismissal. (b) The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
Here, the Labor Code applies in line with lex loci contractus doctrine.
(a) Petitioner's allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties may constitute a
just cause for termination under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, but only if petitioner was able to prove it. The
burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. Failure to show that there was valid or
just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set
standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and
workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable
time prior to the employee's performance assessment.
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer's work
requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner did
not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what
particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency. There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently
informed of the standards against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties' conflict as
to the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
(b) A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The employer is
required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. One of the written notices
must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must "[inform]
the employee of the employer's decision". Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an
opportunity to be heard."
Here, petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started working on
June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely a month
from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her termination. The
abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified and given the opportunity to be
heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.
2. Joy is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, not for only 3 months.
The award of the three-month equivalent of the respondent's salary should be increased to the amount equivalent
to the unexpired term of the employment contract. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc., it was ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less”
Page 36 of 55
found in Republic Act 8042 or the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,” is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
However, the same clause was reinstated in RA 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act 10022 in 2010. Section 7
of RA 10022 provides for such amendment in Section 10 of RA 8042.
RA 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause in RA 8042 was not
yet in effect at the time of respondent's termination from work in 1997. Thus, RA 8042 before it was amended by RA
10022 governs this case. But the Supreme Court resolved this issue to prevent confusion that may arise in the future.
Thus:
“We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in RA 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process. xxx We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that
should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process
and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no reasonable classification provided for under RA 8082 and its
amendatory law RA 10022. Reasonable classification (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
“We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less than one
year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. Meanwhile,
illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to
three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts… In both cases, the workers are deprived
of their expected salary, which they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed. [No substantial
distinction since] for both workers, this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and disparity...Putting a cap
on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard of protection afforded to them.
On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivized by the reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at
least a year because it gives them more flexibility to violate our overseas workers' rights. Their liability for arbitrarily
terminating overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated.”
Hence, Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10
of RA 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent's salary was ordered modified. Since she
started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from
July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998.
NOTES:
*Focus more on 2nd issue for labor standards class. The first issue (re illegal dismissal) is a labor relations topic.
8. Racelis v. United Philippine Lines, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014 (AMIO)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS:
- Conchita Racelis is the wife of Rodolfo Racelis - United Philippine Lines, Inc. (UPL)
(Rodolfo), an employee of the respondents. recruited and hired Rodolfo for its
principal Holland America Lines, Inc.
(HAL) to serve as "Demi Chef De
Partie" on board the vessel MS
Prinsendam.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Page 37 of 55
Presumption vis-à-vis work-related diseases
• Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in favor of compensability,
saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means
that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or
illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome
the presumption.
• This presumption should be overturned only when the employer's refutation is found to be supported by
substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
Exception to 2nd requirement under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC
• While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarer's contract of
employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the proximate
cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.
FACTS:
• Rodolfo was recruited and hired by respondents to serve as “Demi Chef De Partie” on board the vessel MS
Prinsendam, with a basic monthly salary of US$799.55.
• The Contract of Employment was for a term of 4 months, extendible for another 2 months upon mutual
consent.
• After complying with the required pre-employment medical examination where he was declared fit to work,
Rodolfo joined the vessel on January 25, 2008. Prior thereto, Rodolfo was repeatedly contracted by said
respondents and was deployed under various contracts since 1985.
• In the course of his latest employment, Rodolfo experienced severe pain in his ears and high blood pressure
causing him to collapse while in the performance of his duties.
• Rodolfo consulted a doctor in Argentina and was medically repatriated on February 20, 2008 for further
medical treatment. Upon arrival in Manila, he was immediately brought to Medical City in Pasig City, where
he was diagnosed to be suffering from Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation by Dr. Legaspi.
• Rodolfo underwent surgery twice but he developed complications and died on March 2, 2008.
• Through an e-mail, a certain Dr. Abaya informed the counsel of UPL, HAL, and its officer, Fernando Lising
(respondents), that Rodolfo's illness was congenital and may be due to familial strains, hence, his death
was not work-related.
• Rodolfo's surviving spouse, herein petitioner, sought to claim death benefits under the International
Transport Workers' Federation-Collective Bargaining Agreement (ITWF-CBA), of which her husband was a
member, but to no avail.
• Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for death benefits, burial assistance, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees against the respondents,
• The respondents maintained that petitioner is not entitled to death benefits under Section 20 (A) (1) of the
2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (2000 POEA-SEC).
• They averred that Rodolfo's illness, i.e., Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation, was not work-related,
considering that said illness is not listed as an occupational disease under the 2000 POEASEC.
• They likewise pointed out that Rodolfo's death on March 2, 2008 did not occur during the term of his
employment contract in view of his prior repatriation on February 20, 2008, hence, was non-compensable.
• The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, which the NLRC affirmed. The CA, however, ruled in favor of
respondents.
• This prompted petitioner to bring the case to the Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT COUNTER-ARGUMENT
LA CA
Page 38 of 55
- held that Rodolfo's death was compensable as - held that Rodolfo's death on March 2,
the illness that caused his death occurred in the 2008 did not occur while he was in
course of his employment contract; likewise the employ of respondents, as his
ruled that while Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous contract of employment ceased
Malformation is not among the listed when he was medically repatriated
occupational diseases under the 2000 POEA- on February 20, 2008 pursuant to
SEC, the same was still compensable, noting Section 18 (B) (1) of the 2000 POEA-
that the same may have been contracted in the SEC.
course of his engagement with respondents, - observed that Rodolfo's illness
which started back in 1985 under various cannot be presumed to be work-
employment contracts. related, absent any proof to show
- did not give credence to the medical opinion of that his death was connected to his
Dr. Abaya which was unsigned and not certified work or that his working conditions
by said doctor himself, hence, had no evidentiary increased the risk of contracting
value; further observed that there is no certainty Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous
as to the accuracy of the statement therein that Malformation that eventually caused
the disease is congenital in origin. his death.
NLRC
- held that Rodolfo's illness is disputably
presumed to be work-related and that since it
supervened in the course of his employment, the
burden is on the respondents to prove
otherwise.
- held that the medical opinion of the company-
designated physician, which showed that
Rodolfo's ailment is not work-connected and
may have pre-existed, is insufficient to rebut the
presumption of compensability.
- likewise pointed out that the occurrence of
death after the term of the contract was
immaterial since the proximate cause of
Rodolfo's death was the illness that supervened
during his employment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not death benefits should be granted to petitioner
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court said YES.
Among other basic provisions, the POEA-SEC — specifically, its 2000 version — stipulates that the beneficiaries of a
deceased seafarer may be able to claim death benefits for as long as they are able to establish that (a) the seafarer's
death is work-related, and (b) such death had occurred during the term of his employment contract.
Here, the Supreme Court held that:
(a) Rodolfo’s death is work-related.
While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an occupational disease under
Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that “[t]he liabilities of the
employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
(t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.”
Page 39 of 55
In other words, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability, saying that
those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness
is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as
work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption. This presumption should
be overturned only when the employer's refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, respondents' sole evidence to disprove that Rodolfo's illness is work-related was the medical opinion
of Dr. Abaya. However, the document presented cannot be given probative value as it was a mere print out of an e-
mail that was not signed or certified to by the doctor. Moreover, records reveal that Rodolfo was attended by Dr.
Legaspi from the time he was admitted at the Medical City up to his death, not by Dr. Abaya whose qualifications to
diagnose such kind of illness was not even established. Likewise, the medical opinion was not backed up by any
medical findings to substantiate the claim that Rodolfo's ailment was congenital in origin or that there were traces
of the disease in Rodolfo's family history.
The medical findings of Dr. Abaya are therefore cannot be considered as substantial evidence to support
respondents' postulation. Thus, with no substantial evidence on the part of the employer, the presumption under
Section 20 (B) (4) should stand. Rodolfo's death, which appears to have been proximately caused by his Brainstem
(pontine) Cavernous Malformation, was work-related.
(b) His death occurred during the term of employment.
The Supreme Court cited its ruling in Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, holding that medical repatriation
case constitutes an exception to the second requirement under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that
the seafarer's death had occurred during the term of his employment, in view of the terminative consequences of a
medical repatriation under Section 18 (B) of the same.
In essence, under such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his
employment as it is enough that the seafarer's work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death had
occurred during the term of his employment.
Employing the same spirit of liberality, the Supreme Court in this case held that it would be highly inequitable and
even repugnant to the State's policy on labor to deny petitioner's claim for death benefits for the mere technicality
triggered by Rodolfo's prior medical repatriation. As it has been clearly established that Rodolfo had been suffering
from a work-related illness during the term of his employment that caused his medical repatriation and, ultimately,
his death on March 2, 2008, it is but proper to consider the same as a compensable work-related death despite it
having occurred after his repatriation.
NOTES:
9. Pentagon International Shipping Services v. CA, GR NO. 169158, JULY 1, 2015, (CUARTEROS)
-a domestic corporation; a private manning agency (WON) -private respondent JDA Inter-Phil, also a
licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment domestic corporation, was similarly engaged in the
Administration (POEA) to engage in the recruitment of recruitment of seafarers.
seafarers to service the crewing and personnel
management needs of shipping companies accredited
to it.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
● Section 10 of the Migrant Workers' Act of 1995, to wit: SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. — The liability of the
principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall
be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall
be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to
the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors
and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period
or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or
modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
Page 40 of 55
FACTS:
● March 27, 1998, Pentagon hired respondents Madrio and Rubiano as chief officer and second engineer,
respectively, in behalf of its foreign principal, Baleen Marine, a corporation based in Singapore
● Madrio and Rubiano’s 10-month contract expired and were repatriated to the Philippines
● Alleging non-payment and underpayment of wages, and claiming damages and attorney's fees, they
separately brought claims against Pentagon and the owners and managers of Baleen Marine on January
13, 2000 and January 31, 2000, stating that Pentagon and Baleen Marine had reduced their monthly gross
salary by 20% without the prior approval by the POEA; and that Pentagon and Baleen Marine had not paid
their salaries from November 1, 1998 until their repatriation on March 24, 1999.
● Pentagon denied liability, countering that it had ceased to be the manning agency of Baleen Marine
effective October 1, 1998; and that 8 days later, Baleen Marine had appointed JDA Inter-Phil as its new local
agent for Baleen Marine's vessels;
● JDA Inter-Phil insisted that although it had applied with the POEA for the transfer and accreditation of
Baleen Marine's vessels in its favor, it withdrew the application and did not execute an affidavit of
assumption and responsibility as required; that, consequently, Pentagon continued to be jointly and
severally liable with Baleen Marine for the money claims of Madrio and Rubiano.
● LA: in favor of petitioner - declaring JDA Inter-Phil jointly and solidarily liable with Baleen Marine, citing the
decision of Labor Arbiter Pati in Abrazado, et al. v. Pentagon International Shipping Services, et. al. and
Pentagon International Shipping Services v. Baleen Marine PTE, Ltd., and/or Nicor Petroleum PTE, Ltd. that
had also involved both Pentagon and JDA Inter-Phil and their principal Baleen Marine
● NLRC: in favor of respondent but later reversed itself upon Pentagon’s MR
● CA: in favor of respondent
ARGUMENTS: (Petitioner) COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: (Respondent)
● it could not be held solidarily liable with Baleen ● JDA Inter-Phil contends that it could not be held
Marine for the money claims and other benefits liable for the money claims and other benefits
of Madrio and Rubiano, insisting that the of Madrio and Rubiano because it had
minutes of the October 9, 1998 meeting withdrawn its application in the POEA.
partook of the nature of the agreement required
by law to effectively transfer the agency and the
corresponding liability to JDA Inter-Phil.
ISSUES: WN there was a valid substitution of the manning agent from Pentagon to JDA Inter-Phil
RULING: NO.
Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment states the following:
Section 2. Requirements for Accreditation. — An agency applying for the accreditation of its principals or projects
shall submit the following: xxx xxx xxx b. For a Manning Agency for its Principals (1) Authenticated special power of
attorney and manning agreement;
(2) Crew complement and wages;
(3) List of vessels and their particulars; and
(4) Other documents which the Administration may find necessary.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers' Act of 1995, (see law/principle).
The law clearly mandates that the special power of attorney and manning agreement should be authenticated, save
only when the authorized officials of both the principal or hiring company and its local agent signed the document
in the presence of any member of the POEA Directorate or duly designated officers of the POEA.
As regards the transfer of accreditation, the following provisions apply, thus:

Section 6. Transfer of Accreditation. — The accreditation of a principal may be transferred to another agency
provided that transfer shall not involve any diminution of wages and benefits of workers. The transferee agency in
these instances shall comply with the requirements for accreditation and shall assume full and complete
responsibility to all contractual obligations of the principals to its workers originally recruited and processed by the
former agency.
Prior to the transfer of accreditation, the Administration shall notify the previous agency and principal of such
application.
Section 7. Actions on Applications for Accreditation of Projects Whose Contracting Partners or Principals Have
Outstanding Obligations. — Applications for the transfer of accreditation of principals or projects shall be acted by
the Administration upon submission of all requirements by the new transferee agency.
Page 41 of 55
The foregoing rules are clear to the effect that before a transfer of accreditation can be effected, the transferee
agency should likewise have to comply with the requirements for accreditation contained in Section 2. The POEA
can act on the transfer of accreditation only after all the requirements shall have been submitted.
In light of the foregoing, there was no effective transfer of agency from Pentagon to JDA Inter-Phil. Even assuming
arguendo that JDA Inter-Phil did not withdraw its application for accreditation with the POEA, there was still no valid
transfer of agency to speak of in the first place because JDA Inter-Phil did not submit the required authenticated
special power of attorney and manning agreement. The minutes of the October 9, 1998 meeting could not, by any
stretch of the imagination, supplant this mandatory requirement. Verily, the minutes of any meeting are simply the
notes or written record of the meeting, which usually describe what transpire during the meeting, identify the
attendees, and present the statements and related responses or resolutions of the issues discussed. Often, the
minutes are terse and meant to record only the basic information, like the actions discussed and the decisions made.
In contrast, the special power of attorney is the grant of authority by the principal to the agent to act on a particular
or specific matter, while the manning agreement states, among others, the responsibilities of both principal and
manning agencies with respect to the employment of seafarers.
It is relevant to observe that Pentagon cannot feign ignorance of Section 10, paragraph 2, of the Migrant Workers'
Act of 1995 to the effect that its liabilities would continue during the entire period or duration of the employment
contract, and would not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification of the contract made either
locally or in a foreign country. The provisions of the POEA Rules and Regulations to the effect that the manning
agreement extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the recruitment agreement are also clear enough. As such, Pentagon is not exempt from its
liabilities and responsibilities towards Madrio and Rubiano.
Although JDA Inter-Phil undertook in the meeting of October 1, 1998 to assume the responsibility as the local agent
to Baleen Marine, the actual transfer of the accreditation would not be completed without JDA Inter-Phil's
compliance with the requirements under the aforementioned rules. What actually happened between the time the
meeting took place and the eventual withdrawal of the application by the JDA Inter-Phil remained to be mere
conjecture. Nevertheless, Madrio and Rubiano should not be prejudiced by any purported transfer of accreditation
or agreement that they were not privy to. For sure, Pentagon remained under the law the only recognized manning
agent of Baleen Marine.
NOTES:
10. Austria v. Crystal Shipping, Inc., GR NO. 206256, February 24, 2016, (CUARTEROS)
(WON) hired as Chief Cook by Crystal Shipping thru its - foreign juridical entity engaged in maritime business. It
manning agent, Larvik Shipping. His employment was to is represented in the Philippines by its manning agent,
run for a period of 8mos. and he was to receive a basic and co-respondent herein, Larvik Shipping A/S, a
monthly salary of US$758.00 with an overtime pay of corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws
S$422.00 each month as evidenced by his Contract of
Employment. He was covered by the Norwegian
International Ship Register (NIS)-CBA.
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
● Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical
findings, but by law and by contract. The material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under
Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under DO No. 4, s. of
2000 of the DOLE, and the parties' CBA bind the seaman and his employer to each other.
● Section 20 (B), paragraph 6 of the 2000 POEA-SEC 12 reads: Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits
for Injury or Illness. — The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows: 6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the
seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from
an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time
the illness or disease was contracted.
● 2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of
and in the course of employment" and "work-related illness" as "any sickness resulting to disability or death
as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set
Page 42 of 55
therein satisfied." For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all
of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contacted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary
to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
FACTS:
● Petitioner underwent a thorough Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was certified as "fit to
work".
● Petitioner commenced his work on board M/V Yara Gas. He started suffering from chronic cough with
excessive phlegm and experienced difficulty breathing. He was then referred for medical examination and
it was found that he was suffering from "Bronchial Catarrh/Bronchitis; Pharnx Irritation”. The examining
physician declared him "fit for duty" and so he resumed his work in the vessel.
● Petitioner again complained of similar symptoms and was again referred for further medical examination
in the Netherlands. This time he was confined for almost 1 month where he was diagnosed with "Dilated
Cardiomyopathy secondary to Viral Myocarditis," a condition which would require further medical treatment
and management. Considering the seriousness of his ailment, petitioner's repatriation back to the
Philippines was recommended by doctors.
● He arrived here in the Philippines, was confined and was found to be suffering from "Dilated
Cardiomyopathy, Bicuspid Aortic Stenosis," rendering him unfit for any sea duty.
● Petitioner initiated an action for recovery of permanent disability benefits in accordance with the NIS CBA,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and other benefits.
● Petitioner asserted that he was in good health when he joined the vessel and assumed his duties as chief
cook as shown by his PEME. There is a high probability, however, that the extreme working conditions in
the vessel, the lifestyle on board, constant exposure to chemicals, intensive heat and extreme weather
changes caused or aggravated his illness. He asserted that he is entitled to the amount of US$110,000.00
as disability compensation under Article 12 of the NIS CBA.
● Respondents disavowed liability for the illness of petitioner citing the medical report of the company
designated physician that "Dilated Cardiomyopathy, Bicuspid Aortic Stenosis" is a condition that is
congenital in nature and is not caused or aggravated by his work as a Chief Cook. They posited that due to
the non-exploratory nature of PEME, serious diseases that require intensive test could not be discovered
before the seafarer's employ. There is a high probability therefore that petitioner could be suffering from
the said ailment prior to his engagement.
● LA: in favor of petitioner - ordered respondents to pay him total disability benefits in the amount of
US$110,000.00 pursuant to the CBA;
● NLRC: affirmed the ruling of LA.
● CA: in favor of respondent – petitioner failed to establish that his medical condition was work related or
that it contributed or exposed him to the risk of contracting the same in the course of his employment.
ISSUES: WN the illness which caused the repatriation of petitioner is an occupational disease and thus compensable
as permanent total disability under the circumstances.
RULING: YES.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC (see law/principle), two elements must
concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed
during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits
under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently
or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury
and the work for which he had been contracted.
2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as…(see law/principle).
Petitioner was employed by respondent as Chief Cook which constantly exposes him to heat while preparing the
food for the entire crew all throughout the day while he was under employ. The steady and prolonged exposure to
heat naturally causes exhaustion which could unduly burden his heart and interfere with the normal functioning of
his cardio-vascular system.
Page 43 of 55
Even if it were shown that the petitioner's condition is congenital in nature, it does automatically take his ailment
away from purview of compensability. Pre-existence of an illness does not irrevocably bar compensability because
disability laws still grant the same provided the seafarer's working conditions bear causal connection with his illness.
Petitioner’s working environment as chef constantly exposed him to factors that could aggravate his heart condition.
Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the
employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is not necessary, in order
for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he
received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain
infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them,
and assumes the risk of having the weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a
perfectly normal, healthy person.
The quantum of evidence required in labor cases to determine the liability of an employer for the illness suffered by
the employee under the POEA-SEC is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but mere substantial evidence. Petitioner
having established through substantial evidence that his illness was aggravated by his work condition, and hence,
compensable, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the NLRC in upholding the Labor Arbiter's grant
of disability benefits.
NOTES:
11. ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC. vs. DOLE, GR NO. 210308, April 6, 2016
(RUBENECIA)
The Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch of the POEA, (short bio)
pursuant to Surveillance Order No. 033, Series of 2006,
conducted a surveillance of Asian International
Manpower Services, Inc. (AIMS) with office address at
1653 Taft Avenue corner Pedro Gil Street, Malate, Manila
to determine whether it was operating as a recruitment
agency despite the cancellation of its license on August
28, 2006.
LAW/PRINCIPLE: It is true that in administrative proceedings, as in the case below, only substantial evidence is
needed, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence against AIMS to speak of, much less substantial evidence. Clearly, AIMS 's
right to be informed of the charges against it, and its right to be held liable only upon substantial evidence, have
both been gravely violated.
FACTS: POEA operatives conducted two surveillance operation on AIMS for illegal recruitment. No relevant
information was obtained on the first surveillance, but on the second surveillance, they have observed that there
were people standing outside its main entrance while there were announcements of job vacancies posted on the
main door of the office.
The operatives of POEA posed as applicants and inquired as to the requirements for the position of executive staff,
then a lady clerk handed them a flyer, containing information of AIMS hiring hotel workers for deployment to Macau
and grape pickers for California. They also saw applicants inside the office waiting to be attended to. The POEA
operatives later confirmed through the POEA Verification System that AIMS had regained its license and good
standing, but that it had no existing approved job orders yet at that time.
The POEA issued a Show Cause Order directing AIMS to submit their answer or explanation to the Surveillance
Report of the POEA operatives. However, no copy of the Surveillance Report was attached.
In compliance thereto, AIMS's President wrote to POEA maintaining that AIMS was not liable for any recruitment
misrepresentation. Invoking the Surveillance Report, he cited the POEA operatives' own admission that when they
first came posing as applicants, the AIMS staff advised them that it had no job vacancies for waiters and that its
license had been cancelled.
The POEA Administrator in an Order, ruled that on the basis of the Surveillance Report, AIMS was liable for
misrepresentation under Sec. 2(e), Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules, since the POEA records showed that AIMS
had no job orders to hire hotel workers for Macau, nor grape pickers for California, as its flyer allegedly advertised.
Page 44 of 55
AIMS filed a motion for reconsideration before the DOLE and alleged that its right to due process was violated
because the POEA did not furnish it with a copy of the second Surveillance Report, which was the basis of the POEA
Administrator's factual findings.
ARGUMENTS: AIMS was not liable for any recruitment COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: AIMS was liable for
misrepresentation. Invoking the Surveillance Report, he misrepresentation under Sec. 2(e), Rule I, Part VI of the
cited the POEA operatives' own admission that when 2002 POEA Rules, since the POEA records showed that
they first came posing as applicants, the AIMS staff AIMS had no job orders to hire hotel workers for Macau,
advised them that it had no job vacancies for waiters and nor grape pickers for California, as its flyer allegedly
that its license had been cancelled. advertised.
Its right to due process was violated because the POEA

did not furnish it with a copy of the second Surveillance
Report, which was the basis of the POEA Administrator's
factual findings.
ISSUES: Whether or not AIMS' right to due process was violated because it was never furnished with a copy of the
POEA Surveillance Report, upon which both the POEA and DOLE anchored their factual findings that it misrepresented
to job applicants that it had existing job orders
RULING: Yes, the POEA itself admitted that it did not furnish AIMS with a copy of its Surveillance Report, which
contains the allegations of misrepresentation supposedly committed by AIMS. It is incomprehensible why the POEA
would neglect to furnish AIMS with a copy of the said report, since other than the fact that AIMS was represented at
the hearing, there is no showing that Lugatiman was apprised of the contents thereof. In fact, as AIMS now claims,
the alleged recruitment flyer distributed to its applicants was not even presented.
Moreover, AIMS points out that the flyer advertising the jobs in Macau and California was never presented or made
part of the record of the proceedings, and neither was the AIMS lady clerk who allegedly distributed the same even
identified, as AIMS demanded. Besides, granting that AIMS did advertise with flyers for hotel workers or grape
pickers, for which it allegedly had no existing approved job order, it is provided in Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule VII, Part II of
the 2002 POEA Rules that the said activity is permitted for manpower pooling purposes, without need of prior
approval from the POEA, upon the following conditions: (1) it is done by a licensed agency; (2) the advertisement
indicates in bold letters that it is for manpower pooling only; (3) no fees are collected from the applicants; and (4)
the name, address and POEA license number of the agency, name and worksite of the prospective
registered/accredited principal and the skill categories and qualification standards are indicated.
It is true that in administrative proceedings, as in the case below, only substantial evidence is needed, or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Unfortunately, there is no
evidence against AIMS to speak of, much less substantial evidence. Clearly, AIMS 's right to be informed of the
charges against it, and its right to be held liable only upon substantial evidence, have both been gravely violated.
NOTES:
12. DAGASDAS vs. GRAND PLACEMENT, GR NO. 20527, January 18, 2017, (RUBENECIA)
Petitioner: Respondent:
Industrial and Management Technology Methods Co. Grand Placement and General Services Corp. is a
Ltd. Is the principal of GPGS, a company existing in Saudi licensed recruitment agency in the Philippines and Saudi
Arabia. Aramco is its counterpart in Saudi Arabia.
GPGS, for an on behalf of ITM, employed Dagasdas as

Network Technician. He was to be deployed in Saudi
Arabia under a one-year contract with a monthly salary
of Saudi Riyal 5,112.00. His job Officer indicated that he
was accepted by Aramco and ITM for the position of
"Supt."
LAW/PRINCIPLE: Unless, the employment contract of an OFW is processed through the POEA, the same does not
bind the concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA, certainly the State has no means of
determining the suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers.
FACTS: Grand Placement and General Services Corp. is a licensed recruitment agency in the Philippines and Saudi
Aramco is its counterpart in Saudi Arabia. Industrial and Management Technology Methods Co. Ltd. Is the principal
of GPGS, a company existing in Saudi Arabia.
Page 45 of 55
GPGS, for an on behalf of ITM, employed Dagasdas as Network Technician. He was to be deployed in Saudi Arabia
under one-year contract with monthly salary of Saudi Riyal 5,112.00. His job Officer indicated that he was accepted
by Aramco and ITM for the position of "Supt."
When Dagasdas arrived in Saudi, he signed with ITM a new employement contract which stipulated that the letter
contracted him as Superintendent or in any capacity within the scope of his abilities with salay of SR 5,112.00 and
allowance of SR 2,045.00 per month. Under his contract, Dagasdas shall be placed under a 3-month probationary
period, and this new contract shall cancel all contracts prior to its date from any source.
Dagasdas was allegedly given a task for Mechanical Engineer, but seeing that he would not be able to perform well
in his work, he was transferred to the Civil Engineering Department. He was issued an identification card good for
one month and was directed to exit the worksite, but the Site Coordinator Manager advised him to remain in the
premises while promising to secure him the position he applied for. However, before Dagasdas' case investigated,
the manager had already severed his employment with ITM.
Later, ITM gave him a termination notice indicating that his last day of work was on April 30 work was on April 30,
2008, and he was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract, which provided that ITM reserved the right to
terminate any employee within the three-month probationary period without need of any notice to the employee.
Before his repatriation, Dagasdas signed a Statement of Quitclaim with Final Settlement stating that ITM paid him
all the salaries and benefits for his service from February 11, 2008 to A s from February 11, 2008 to April 30, 2008
in the total amount of SR7,156.80, and ITM was relieved from all financial obligations due om all financial obligations
due to Dagasdas. He returned to the Philippines. Thereafter, he filed an illegal dismissal case against GPGS, ITM
illegal dismissal case against GPGS, ITM, and Aramco.
A dismissed the case for lack of merit. LA declared that this new contract was more advantageous for Dagasdas as
his position was upgraded. Being more favorable, this new contract was not prohibited by law. She also decreed
that Dagasdas fell short of the expected work performance; as such, his employer dismissed him as part of its
management prerogative.
NLRC issued a Resolution finding Dagasdas' dismissal illegal. It held that GPGS erroneously recruited Dagasdas,
and failed to inform him that he was hired as a "Mechanical Superintendent" meant for a Mechanical Engineer. It
declared that while ITM has the prerogative to continue the employment of individuals only if they were qualified,
Dagasdas' dismissal amounted to illegal termination since the mismatch between his qualifications and the job
given him was no fault of his.
CA set aside the NLRC rulings and reinstated the LA Decision dismissing the case. In holding that Dagasdas'
dismissal was legal, the CA ruled that for having voluntarily accepted money from his employer, Dagasdas accepted
his termination and released his employer from future financial obligations arising from his past employment with
it. Hence, Dagasdas filed this Petition.
ISSUES: Whether Dagasdas validly dismissed from work?
RULING:
Dagasdas' new contract is in clear violation of his right to security of tenure. There is no clear justification for the
dismissal of Dagasdas other than the exercise of ITM's right to terminate him within the probationary period. The
above-cited clause is contrary to law. To allow employers to reserve a right to terminate employees without cause
is violative of this guarantee of security of tenure.
Even assuming that Dagasdas was still a probationary employee, his dismissal may be allowed only if there is just.
Here, ITM failed to prove that it informed Dagasdas of any predetermined standards from which his work will be
gauged. The job for which Dagasdas was hired was not definite from the beginning. Indeed, Dagasdas was not
sufficiently informed of the work standards for which his performance will be measured. Even his position based on
the job title given him was not fully explained by his employer.
Furthermore, the new contract was not shown to have been processed through the POEA. Under our Labor Code,
unless, the employment contract of an OFW is processed through the POEA, the same does not bind the concerned
Page 46 of 55
OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA, certainly the State has no means of determining the
suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers.
This new contract also breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was entered into even before the expiration of the
original contract approved by the POEA. Therefore, it cannot supersede the original contract; its terms and
conditions, including reserving in favor of the employer the right to terminate an employee without notice during the
probationary period, are void.
Third, under this new contract, Dagasdas was not afforded procedural due process when he was dismissed from
work. As regards the latter, the employer must give the concerned employee at least two notices before his or her
termination. Specifically, the employer must inform the employee of the cause or causes for his or her termination,
and thereafter, the employer's decision to dismiss him. Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must be
accorded the opportunity to be heard.
Lastly, while it is shown that Dagasdas executed a waiver in favor of his employer, the same does not preclude him
from filing this suit. Unless it can be established that the person executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with full
understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding
undertaking. Moreover, the burden to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the
employer. In this case, GPGS and/or ITM failed to show that Dagasdas indeed voluntarily waived his claims against
the employer. Even if Dagasdas signed a quitclaim, it does not necessarily follow that he freely and voluntarily agreed
to waive all his claims against his employer.
NOTES:
13. CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT and COLUMBIAN SHIPMANAGEMENT vs. EDUARDO * J.

GODINEZ
LAW/PRINCIPLE:"The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's
fitness to work or to determine the degree of his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation, as
the case may be. If after the lapse of the 120/240-day period the seafarer remains incapacitated and the company-
designated physician has not yet declared him fit to work or determined his degree of disability, the seafarer is
deemed totally and permanently disabled."
FACTS:
● Eduardo J. Godinez (Godinez) was hired by local manning agency Career Philippines Shipmanagement,
Inc. (Career), for its foreign principal Columbian Ship management, Ltd. (Columbian). He was assigned as
Deck Cadet onboard the vessel "M/V Norviken."
● Prior to his employment, Godinez underwent a pre-employment medical examination consisting of a
physical medical examination and psychological evaluation, involving an intelligence and personality test,
after which he was declared fit to work.
● On the evening of December 17, 2003, just before the start of his look-out duty at midnight, Godinez failed
to wake up despite attempts by the crew to rouse him from sleep.
● As a result, his Superior Dayo took his place and acted as look-out, together with the outgoing look-out. For
this, Dayo became strict with Godinez, requiring the latter, as punishment, to clean toilets instead of
performing his regular look-out duty. Also, Dayo became rude, always finding fault and humiliating,
accusing, shouting, insulting, nagging, and snapping at Godinez, who was also prevented from preparing
his food for breakfast and snacks.
● Two reports about Godinez’ strange change in behavior were sent to Career via electronic mail.
● Upon the vessel's arrival in Egypt on December 25, 2003, a physician was called on board to assist Godinez,
and he was brought to a local medical facility.
● In January 2004, Godinez was repatriated and was referred to and confined at Sachly International Health
Partners, Inc. (Sachly), the company-designated medical facility, for evaluation and treatment.
● The resulting Initial Medical Report on Godinez's case, which was unsigned, contains an admission made
by the latter that when he was 15 years old, he began to have episodes of insomnia and paranoia, for which
he sought psychiatric evaluation and management.
● Thereafter, Godinez underwent psychological tests. On March 12, 2004, another unsigned Medical
Progress Report was issued by Sachly which contains findings that Godinez was "asymptomatic and doing
well with no recurrence of depressive episodes;" that Godinez "verbalized a feeling of wellness;" that his
"vital signs were stable;" that he was in a "euthymic mood, and is able to sleep and eat well;" and finally,
that he was "found to be functionally stable at present."
Page 47 of 55
● On that very same day, Godinez was made to sign a prepared form/document entitled "Certificate of Fitness
for Work" whose particulars were mechanically filled out. Godinez signed this document as the declarant,
and Sachly's Medical Coordinator, Dr. Salvador, signed as witness.
● All the expenses incurred prior to Godinez's above certification were paid for by Career and Columbian.
Godinez also received his sickness allowance for the period beginning from his repatriation up to March
12, 2004.
● Godinez now sought to be re-hired by Career, but he was denied. Also, his application was rejected by other
manning agents.
● At Godinez expense, he consulted an independent specialist who diagnosed him to be suffering from
bipolar disorder. Godinez was declared "unfit to work as a seaman," placed on "maintenance medication,"
and advised to undergo "regular counseling and psychotherapy" as he was "prone to relapses due to
emotional triggers."
● On March 7, 2016, Godinez 9led a labor case with a claim for disability benefits, sickness allowance,
medical and hospital expenses, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and other relief against
Career, Columbian, and Verlou Carmelino (Carmelino), Career's Operations Manager.
RULINGS:
● LABOR ARBITER: Declared jurisdiction over the case. Held that Godinez's bipolar disorder was work-
connected and thus compensable, pursuant to Section 20 (B) (4) of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract; and that based on substantial evidence, the nature of Godinez's work and/or his working
conditions on board "M/V Norviken," as well as Dayo's harsh treatment, which caused trauma and anxiety,
increased the risk of contracting his illness.
● NLRC: The appealed Decision is hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only, insofar as Our order for
individual respondent-appellant to be deleted from the dispositive portion.
● CA: Affirmed appealed decision with modification on the award of damages by decreasing such.
ISSUES: w/ n the honorable court of appeals committed clear error of law and in its appreciation of the facts and
evidence when it affirmed the award of total and permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, and
reimbursement of medical expenses despite the following:
a. Godinez’ alleged malicious concealment of a past mental disorder is fraudulent misrepresentation.
b. In the present case, respondent's allegations that his mental breakdown was due to the maltreatment of
Second Officer Dayo is a falsity as the latter had already been signed-off prior to the material period.
c. Respondent was provided necessary treatment until he was declared fit to work, a fact he himself confirmed
and never disputed for almost two (2) years. Clearly therefore, petitioners can no longer be rendered liable for
respondent's subsequent mental condition.
RULING:
a. Defense of Fraudulent Concealment
It is claimed that Godinez concealed his past medical history when he failed to disclose during the PEME that when
he was 15, he suffered from insomnia and paranoia for which he sought psychiatric evaluation and management.
This is based on an unsigned document, an Initial Medical Report, containing a supposed admission by Godinez that
he was treated in the past for insomnia and paranoia. However, this unsigned report cannot have any evidentiary
value, as it is self-serving and of dubious character.
In Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission this Court held that the handwritten listing and unsigned
computer print-outs were unauthenticated and, hence, unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence of which the listing and
print-outs are of that nature should be rejected as evidence without any rational probative value even in
administrative proceedings.
Thus, there could be no fraudulent concealment on Godinez's part.
b. Nature and Cause of Godinez's Illness

This Court believes that Godinez was unjustifiably maltreated by his superior, 2 nd Officer Dayo.
The conditions of work, the elements, the environment, the fear and loneliness, the strange surroundings, and the
unnecessary cruelty and lack of understanding and compassion of his immediate superior, the weight of all these
was too much for the young man to handle. Like a tender twig in a vicious storm, he snapped.
To complicate matters, Godinez was never given medical care onboard as soon as he became ill. The December 24
and 25, 2003 reports of the vessel master, Capt. Vicente A. Capero, sent to Career proved that even as Godinez was
Page 48 of 55
already exhibiting the symptoms of a nervous breakdown, his superiors and the crew provided no medical
intervention or support.
The Court concludes that Godinez's grave illness was directly caused by the unprofessional and inhumane
treatment, as well as the physical, psychological, and mental abuse inflicted upon him by his superiors, aggravated
by the latter's failure and refusal to provide timely medical and/or professional intervention, and their neglect and
indifference to his condition even as it was deteriorating before their very eyes.
c. Permanent and Total Disability, Benefits and Medical Expenses

The Court finds as well that Godinez suffered permanent total disability, as there has been no definite medical
assessment by the company-designated physician regarding his condition — even up to now.
"The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or
to determine the degree of his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation, as the case may be. If
after the lapse of the 120/240-day period the seafarer remains incapacitated and the company-designated physician
has not yet declared him fit to work or determined his degree of disability, the seafarer is deemed totally and
permanently disabled."
The defense that Godinez was cured and became fit for work is founded on an unsigned March 12, 2004 Medical
Progress Report. Being unsigned, it has no evidentiary value as well, just like the January 10, 2004 Initial Medical
Report containing Godinez's supposed admission to a past history of mental illness.
Neither can the Certificate of Fitness for Work executed by Godinez serve as proof of his state of health. He is not a
trained physician; his declaration is not competent and cannot take the place of the company-designated physician's
assessment required by law and the POEA contract. Nor can Salvador's signature as witness on the certificate
validate the document or be considered as substitute for the legally required medical assessment; quite the contrary,
it proves her unethical and unprofessional conduct.
Evident Malice and Bad Faith

It has become evident, without need of further elaboration, that in dealing with Godinez and in prosecuting their case,
Career and Columbian acted in evident malice and bad faith thus entitling Godinez to an award of moral and
exemplary damages.
NOTES:
14. PRINCESS TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION, INC., AND/OR LUCHI SINGH MOLDES vs. DESIREE T.
MASAGCA [G.R. No. 191310. April 11, 2018.]
LAW/PRINCIPLE: Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in
the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor
apply in this case.
Monetary claims governed by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. (see notes)
FACTS:
● Sometime in November 2002, respondent auditioned for a singing contest at ABC-Channel 5 in Novaliches,
Quezon City when a talent manager approached her to discuss her show business potential.
● Enticed by thoughts of a future in the entertainment industry, respondent went to the office of petitioner
PTCPI, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of training and development of actors, singers,
dancers, and musicians in the movie and entertainment industry.
● At the office, respondent met petitioner Moldes, President of petitioner PTCPI, who persuaded respondent
to apply for a job as a singer/entertainer in South Korea.
● A Model Employment Contract for Filipino Overseas Performing Artists (OPAS) to Korea (Employment
Contract) was executed on February 3, 2003 between respondent and petitioner PTCPI as the Philippine
agent of SAENCO, the Korean principal/promoter.
● Respondent left for South Korea on September 6, 2003 and worked there as a singer for nine months, until
her repatriation to the Philippines sometime in June 2004. Believing that the termination of her contract
was unlawful and premature, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners and SAENCO with the NLRC.
Page 49 of 55
● LABOR ARBITER: Dismissed Responndent’s complaint on the ground that the facts of the case and the
documentary evidence submitted by both parties would show that herein respondent was not illegally
dismissed.
● NLRC: Initially ruled in respondent's favor and reasoned but after the Reconsideration, reinstated the Labor
Arbiter’s decision.
● Respondent now sought remedy from CA.
● CA: took a liberal approach by excusing the technical lapses of respondent's appeal before the NLRC for
the sake of substantial justice; held that respondent was dismissed from employment without just cause
and without procedural due process, and that petitioners and SAENCO were solidarily liable to pay
respondent her unpaid salaries for one year and attorney's fees
ISSUES: w/n CA erred and abused its action when it ruled that private respondent is entitled to recover from the
petitioners her alleged unpaid salaries during her employment in South Korea
RULING: PARTLY GRANTED
a. Petitioner's Illegal Dismissal

The Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure extends to Filipino overseas contract workers as the Court
declared in Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles: Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the
law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules
and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
Since respondent's Employment Contract was executed in the Philippines on February 3, 2003, Philippine
Constitution and labor laws governed respondent's employment with petitioners and SAENCO. An employee's right
to security of tenure, protected by the Constitution and statutes, means that no employee shall be dismissed unless
there are just or authorized causes and only after compliance with procedural and substantive due process. A lawful
dismissal by an employer must meet both substantive and procedural requirements; in fine, the dismissal must be
for a just or authorized cause and must comply with the rudimentary due process of notice and hearing.
The Court finds that respondent was illegally dismissed.

Dismissal from employment has two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive
due process; and, second, the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.
The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the disciplinary action was made for lawful cause or that
the termination of employment was valid. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of the
employer do not provide legal justification for dismissing the employee. When in doubt, the case should be resolved
in favor of labor pursuant to the social justice policy of our labor laws and the 1987 Constitution.
In this case, the Court stresses that the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of notice and hearing
prior to respondent's dismissal from employment falls on petitioners and SAENCO, but there had been no attempt
at all by petitioners and/or SAENCO to submit such proof. Neither petitioners nor SAENCO described the
circumstances of how the respondent was informed of the causes for her dismissal from employment and/or the
fact of her dismissal.
Moreover, respondent could only be dismissed for just and authorized cause, and after affording her notice and
hearing prior to her termination. SAENCO had no valid cause to terminate respondent's employment. Neither did
SAENCO serve two written notices upon respondent informing her of her alleged club policy violations and of her
dismissal from employment, nor afforded her a hearing to defend herself. The lack of valid cause, together with the
failure of SAENCO to comply with the twin-notice and hearing requirements, underscored the illegality surrounding
respondent's dismissal.
b. The Liabilities of Petitioners and SAENCO

From the findings herein that: (1)respondent's Employment Contract had been extended for another six months,
ending on September 5, 2004; and (2) respondent was illegally dismissed and repatriated to the Philippines in June
2004, the Court next proceeds to rule on the liabilities of petitioners and SAENCO to respondent.
Respondent's monetary claims against petitioners and SAENCO is governed by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. (see notes)
Page 50 of 55
The Court finds that respondent had been paid her salaries for the nine months she worked in Ulsan, South Korea,
so she is no longer entitled to an award of the same.
It is a settled rule of evidence that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff
must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on
the plaintiff to prove nonpayment
Thus, absent any corroborating evidence, the Court in this case is left only with respondent's bare allegations on the
matter. Pelzer's statements in his Affidavit concerning the nonpayment of respondent's salaries are hearsay,
dependent mainly on what respondent confided to him. It makes no sense to the Court that respondent would agree
to an extension of her Employment Contract for another six months if she had not been receiving her salaries for
the original six-month period.
Nonetheless, pursuant to the 6th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, respondent is entitled to an
award of her salaries for the unexpired three months of her extended Employment Contract, i.e., July to September
2004. Given that respondent's monthly salary was US$600.00, petitioners and SAENCO shall pay respondent a total
of US$1,800.00 for the remaining three months of her extended Employment Contract.
Moreover, the award of attorney's fees to respondent is likewise justified. It is settled that in actions for recovery of
wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his/her right and interest, he/she
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the award.
Finally, all of the foregoing monetary awards in respondent's favor shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from
the time this Decision becomes 6nal and executory until fully satisfied.
NOTES:
This case involves Questions of Fact:
Normally, it is not the task of the Court to re-examine the facts and weigh the evidence on record, for basic is the
rule that the Court is not a trier of facts, and this rule applies with greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact are
for the labor tribunals to resolve. It is elementary that the scope of this Court's judicial review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law and does not extend to questions of fact. However, the present case
falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, i.e., when the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and/or
the Court of Appeals are in conflict with one another.
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
Section 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after the 6ling of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and
shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be 6led by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all monetary claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners
as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the
aforesaid claims and damages. Xxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less. (Emphases supplied.)
15. AUGUSTIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs . ELFRENITO B. BARTOLOME and RUMBY L.
YAMAT, respondents. G.R. No. 226578. January 28, 2019 , (ALOLOR)
Page 51 of 55
LAW/PRINCIPLE: Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter : LAs have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
claims arising out of employer-employee relations or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment.
FACTS: In 2010, Bartolome and Yamat applied as carpenter and tile setter, respectively, with AICI, an employment
agency providing manpower to foreign corporations. They were eventually engaged by Golden Arrow Company,
Ltd. (Golden Arrow), which had its office in Khartoum, Republic of Sudan. Thereafter, they signed their respective
employment contracts stating that they would render services for a period not less than twenty-four (24) months.
In their contracts, there was a provision on dispute settlement that reads:
14. Settlement of disputes: All claims and complaints relative to the employment contract of the employee shall
be settled in accordance with Company policies, rules[,] and regulations. In case the Employee contests the
decision of the employer, the matter shall be settled amicably with [the] participation of the Labour Attaché or any
authorised representative of the Philippines Embassy nearest the site of employment.
In March and April 2011, Golden Arrow transferred their employment to its sister company, Al Mamoun Trading
and Investment Company (Al Mamoun). A year later, or on May 2, 2012, Al Mamoun served Notices of Termination
of Service to respondents, causing them to return to the Philippines. On May 22, 2012, they filed their complaint
before the NLRC seeking that AICI and Al Mamoun be held liable for illegal dismissal, breach of contract, and
payment of the unexpired portion of the contract. For their part, AICI and Al Mamoun claimed that respondents
abandoned their duties by mid-2012, based on the e-mail message.
The LA's Ruling: the LA held that respondents were illegally dismissed, and accordingly, ordered AICI and Al
Mamoun to pay the former P69,300.00 each, representing their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract.
The LA explained that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to overcome their burden to prove that the dismissal was for a
just or authorized cause. They likewise failed to show that respondents abandoned their duties.
The NLRC's Ruling: the NLRC affirmed the LA's ruling, noting that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to discharge their
burden to prove by substantial evidence that the termination of respondents' employment was valid.
CA’s Ruling: the CA denied the petition. It held that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to comply with procedural and
substantive due process in dismissing respondents from their employment.
ISSUES: : whether or not: (a) the LA correctly took cognizance of this case; and (b) AICI is liable for respondents'
illegal dismissal
RULING: The Court denies the petition.
A. LAs have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising out of employer-employee relations or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, as in this case. The relevant portion of
the provision reads:
Section 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
B. Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended, expressly provides that a recruitment agency, such as AICI, is solidarily
liable with the foreign employer for money claims arising out of the employee-employer relationship between the
latter and the overseas Filipino worker. Jurisprudence explains that this solidary liability is meant to assure the
aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him, as well as to afford overseas workers
an additional layer of protection against foreign employers that tend to violate labor laws. In view of the express
provision of law, AICI's lack of an employee-employer relationship with respondents cannot exculpate it from its
Page 52 of 55
liability to pay the latter's money claims. Nevertheless, AICI is not left without a remedy. The law does not preclude
AICI from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of any payment it has made to respondents to
answer for the money claims against the foreign employer.
NOTES:
16. ALDOVINO vs. GOLD AND GREEN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC.,
SAGE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., and ALBERTO C. ALVINA, G.R. No. 200811.
June 19, 2019 (ALOLOR)

LAW/PRINCIPLE: See notes.
FACTS: Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision and January
26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that Julita M. Aldovino (Aldovino) et. al,
all illegally dismissed from service. Aldovino and her co-applicants applied for work at Gold and Green Manpower,
a local manning agency whose foreign principal is Sage International. Eventually, they were hired as sewers for
Dipper Semi-Conductor, a Taiwan-based company. Their respective employment contracts provided an eight (8)-
hour working day, a fixed monthly salary, and entitlement to overtime pay, among others.
Gold and Green Manpower required each applicant to pay a P72,000.00 for placement fee. But applicants were
unable to produce the amount on their own so Gold and Green Manpower referred them to E-Cash Paylite and
Financing, Inc. (E-Cash Paylite) to loan their placement fees. Once Aldovino and her co-workers arrived in Taiwan,
Gold and Green Manpower took all their travel documents, including their passports. They were then made to sign
another contract that provides that they would be paid on a piece-rate basis instead of a fixed monthly salary. They
were forced to work on Sundays without any overtime premium. 9 Because they were paid on a piece-rate basis,
they received less than the fixed monthly salary stipulated in their original contract.
On January 19, 2009, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, filed before a local court in Taiwan a
Complaint against their employers, Dipper Semi-Conductor and Sage International. Parties met before the Bureau
of Labor Affairs for a dialogue. There, Dipper Semi-Conductor ordered Aldovino and her co-workers to return to
the Philippines as it was no longer interested in their services. Eventually, the parties entered into a Compromise
Agreement. Based on the Compromise Agreement, Aldovino and her co-workers, executed an Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Release. On July 28, 2009, all of them returned to the Philippines. 16 They eventually filed before
the Labor Arbiter a case for illegal termination, underpayment of salaries, human trafficking, illegal signing of
papers, and other money claims such as overtime pay, return of placement fees, and moral and exemplary
damages.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for illegal dismissal, on the other hand the National Labor Relations
Commission, in its July 29, 2010 Decision, 20 affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It found that Aldovino and her
coworkers were not illegally dismissed and that they voluntarily returned to the Philippines. Moreover, the
Compromise Agreement barred any further claims arising from their employment. The Court of Appeals reversed
the labor tribunals' rulings. It not only ruled that Aldovino and her co-workers had been illegally dismissed from
service, but also declared that the Compromise Agreement did not bar them from filing an illegal dismissal case
but ordered Gold and Green Manpower and Sage International to pay the workers their salaries "for the unexpired
portion of their contract in accordance with Section 7 of [Republic Act No.] 10022
Aldovino and her co-workers moved for partial reconsideration, 30 praying that the three (3)-month cap stated in
the Decision's dispositive portion be annulled, pursuant to Serrano. However, their Motion was denied in the Court
of Appeals' January 26, 2012 Resolution.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Compromise Agreement barred all other claims against respondents Gold and Green
Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International Development Company, Ltd., and
Alberto C. Alvina;
Page 53 of 55
2. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and, consequently, entitled to the reimbursement of their
placement fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
RULING: 1. Waivers and quitclaims executed by employees are generally frowned upon for being contrary to public
policy. This is based on the recognition that employers and employees do not stand on equal footing. Quitclaims
do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled. They
are "ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits
therefrom does not amount to estoppel." The law does not recognize agreements that result in compensation less
than what is mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from subsequently claiming benefits
to which they are legally entitled.
Here, the parties entered into the Compromise Agreement to terminate the case for underpayment of wages, which
petitioners had previously filed against respondents in Taiwan. The object and foundation of the Compromise
Agreement was to settle the payment of salaries and overtime premiums to which petitioners were legally entitled.
Hence, it should not be construed as a restriction on petitioners' right to prosecute other legitimate claims they
may have against respondents.
Paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement, which stipulates that petitioners "shall give up other rights of
compensation . . . [and] shall not ask for any compensation based on any other causes[,]" cannot bar petitioners
from filing this case and from being indemnified should respondents be adjudged liable. Blanket waivers
exonerating employers from liability on the claims of their employees are ineffective.
Besides, at the time the parties' Compromise Agreement was executed, respondents had just terminated
petitioners from employment. Petitioners, therefore, had no other choice but to accede to the terms and conditions
of the agreement to recover the difference in their salaries and overtime pay. With no means of livelihood, they
signed the Compromise Agreement out of dire necessity.
Thus, Compromise Agreement cannot bar all other claims against respondents Gold and Green Manpower
Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International Development Company, Ltd., and Alberto C.
Alvina.
2. Yes, they were illegally dismissed. A review of the records here shows that the termination of petitioners'
employment was effected merely because respondents no longer wanted their services. This is not an authorized
or just cause for dismissal under the Labor Code. Employment contracts cannot be terminated on a whim.
Moreover, petitioners did not voluntarily sever their employment when they signed the Compromise Agreement,
which, again, cannot be used to justify a dismissal.
Furthermore, petitioners were not accorded due process. A valid dismissal must comply with substantive and
procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The employer must comply with the
two (2)-notice requirement, while the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard. Here, petitioners were
only verbally dismissed, without any notice given or having been informed of any just cause for their dismissal.
NOTES: On the Jurisdiction of Philippine Courts of this case
It must be noted that this case is governed by Philippine laws. Both the Constitution and the Labor Code guarantee
the security of tenure. It is not stripped off when Filipinos work in a different jurisdiction. We follow the lex loci
contractus principle, which means that the law of the place where the contract is executed governs the contract.
In Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission : First, established is the rule that
lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no
question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor
Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore,
settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
Page 54 of 55
policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution
itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and
by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage
illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts. Indeed, because petitioners' employment contracts
were executed in the Philippines, Philippine laws govern them. Respondents, then, must answer and be held liable
under our laws.
Page 55 of 55

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LABOR 1 | JMM | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – TOPICS 14-16

A.SPECIAL TYPES OF WORKERS

1. BERNARDO V. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917 July 12, 1999 (ANDRIN)

ISSUES: Are Petitioners Regular Employee?

1. PT&T vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 596 [1997] (SEE: TOPIC 3)

2. Del Monte Phils. v. Velasco, GR NO. 153477, March 6, 2007, (Cabasag)

Art. 137. Prohibited acts. — It shall be unlawful for any employer:

ARGUMENTS: Petitioner COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: Respondent

C.EMPLOYMENT OF NURSING EMPLOYEES

2. Co vs. Vargas, G.R. No. 195167. November 16, 2011 (Odchigue)

An employee is entitled to security of tenure.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court:

Petitioner raises a question of fact and SC is not a trier of facts.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank:

Filed present petition.

● Questioned the timeliness of appeal:

Court grants petition. Reverses CA decision and reinstates NLRC decision.

● Sr. Zenaida S. Mofada, OP (Mofada), decided not to renew respondent’s services.

Private respondent alleged: Respondent alleged:

ISSUES: WON CA ERRED

COURT CITING MERCADO V. AMA DISCUSSION:

ARGUMENTS: COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: (SSC)

not endorse the application for permanency of

On 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 Manual):

xxx xxx xxx

(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational:

a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the

d. Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of

e. Who are not teaching full-time in any other educational institution.

xxx xxx xxx

15.MEDICAL, DENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not

2. U-Bix Corp., vs. Bandiola, 525 SCRA 566 (2007) (Artillero)

U-BIX CORPORATION, petitioner RICHEL BANDIOLA, respondent

Employer Employee who sustained an injury in the course of his

1. ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT,

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was

R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

● Finally, petitioners posit that assuming

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution

Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

The Labor Arbiter

The Court of Appeals

1. WON the respondents were illegally dismissed.

Name: Napoleon O. De Gracia

Name: Isidro L. Lata

Name: Charlie A. Aprosta

It is a recruitment agency owned and operated by He is an OFW.

Requisites of a valid retrenchment:

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

1. Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Presumption vis-à-vis work-related diseases

1. Whether or not death benefits should be granted to petitioner

1. The Supreme Court said YES.

Here, the Supreme Court held that:

(a) Rodolfo’s death is work-related.

(b) His death occurred during the term of employment.

Section 10 of the Migrant Workers' Act of 1995, (see law/principle).