Implied Trusts:

A. Huang vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 108525 September 13, 1994

Discussion:

1. Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence
of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it
for the benefit of another. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one
in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is
known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is
referred to as the beneficiary or cestui que trust. Trust is either express or implied.
Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trust
comes into being by operation of law. The latter kind or neither constructive or
resulting trust. A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the
property arises because it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or
mistake, or through breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of
another's property. On the other hand, a resulting trust arises where a person makes
or causes to be made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an
inference that he does not intend that the person taking or holding the property should
have the beneficial interest in the property. It is founded on the presumed intention of
the parties, and as a general rule, it arises where, and only where such may be
reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to
be established.

Application:

In the present case, Dolores provided the money for the purchase ofLot 20 but the
corresponding deed of sale and transfer certificate of title were placed in the name of
Ricardo Huang because she was advised that the subdivision owner prohibited the
acquisition of two (2) lots by a single individual. Guided by the foregoing definitions,
we are in conformity with the common finding of the trial court and respondent court
that a resulting trust was created. Ricardo became the trustee of Lot 20 and its
improvements for the benefit of Dolores as owner. The pertinent law is Art. 1448 of
the New Civil Code which provides that there is an implied trust when property
is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by
another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest for the property. A
resulting trust arises because of
 the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein
for himself

2. Prescription as to Trust

But the action to compel the trustee to convey the property registered in his
name for the benefits of the cestui que trust does not prescribe. If at all, it is only
when the trustee repudiates the trust that the period of prescription commences to run.

The prescriptive period is ten (10) years from the repudiation of the trust. It is ten (10)
years because just as a resulting trust is an offspring of the law, so is the
corresponding obligation to convey the property and the title thereto to the true
owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code,
which is the law applicable, provides: "The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (a) Upon a written contract; (b)
Upon an obligation created by law; (c) Upon a
judgment."

Thus, the reckoning point is repudiation of the trust by the trustee because from that
moment his possession becomes adverse, which in the present case gave rise to a
cause of action by Dolores against the Huang spouses. However, before the period of
prescription may start, it must be shown that:
(a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the cestui que trust;
(b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust;
and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.
In Laguna v. Levantino 32 and Valdez v. Olorga, we held that acts which may be
adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the cestui que trust. A mere
silent possession of the trustee unaccompanied by acts amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust cannot be construed as an adverse possession. Mere perception of
rents and profits by the trustee, and erecting fences and buildings adapted for the
cultivation of the land held in trust, are not equivalent to unequivocal acts of ouster of
the cestui que trust

B. (The Intestate Estate of Ty v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112872 & 114672, [April
19, 2001], 408 PHIL 792-802)

In the cases at hand, private respondent contends that the pieces of property were
transferred in the name of the deceased Alexander for the purpose of taking care of the
property for him and his siblings. Such transfer having been effected without
cause of consideration, a resulting trust was created.||| 
 A resulting trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase
money of an estate and places the title in the name of another,
because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a
beneficial interest therein for himself. The trust is said to result in law
from the acts of the parties. Such a trust is implied in fact (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. 4, p. 678).
If a trust was then created, it was an implied, not an express trust, which may be proven
by oral evidence (Article 1457, Civil Code), and it matters not whether property is real or
personal (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. 4, p. 814).
Petitioner's assertion that private respondent's action is barred by the statute of limitations
is erroneous. The statute of limitations cannot apply in this case. Resulting trusts
generally do not prescribe (Caladiao vs. Vda. de Blas, 10 SCRA 691 [1964]), except
when the trustee repudiates the trust. Further, an action to reconvey will not prescribe so
long as the property stands in the name of the trustee (Manalang, et. al. vs. Canlas, et. al.,
94 Phil. 776 [1954]). To allow prescription would be to permit a trustee to acquire title
against his principal and the true owner. acCTIS
C. Pigao v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 150712, [May 2, 2006], 522 PHIL 506-523
A resulting trust is exemplified by Article 1448 of the Civil Code . . .
The trust created under the first sentence of Article 1448 is sometimes
referred to as a purchase money resulting trust. The trust is created in order to
effectuate what the law presumes to have been the intention of the parties in the
circumstances that the person to whom the land was conveyed holds it as trustee
for the person who supplied the purchase money.
To give rise to a purchase money resulting trust, it is essential that there
be:
1. an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent,
constituting valuable consideration;
2. and such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary o
f a resulting trust. aHSAIT
There are recognized exceptions to the establishment of an implied
resulting trust. The first is stated in the last part of Article 1448 itself. Thus,
where A pays the purchase money and title is conveyed by absolute deed to A's
child or to a person to whom A stands in loco parentis and who makes no
express promise, a trust does not result, the presumption being that a gift was
intended. Another exception is, of course, that in which an actual contrary
intention is proved. Also where the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the
party who is guilty of the fraud. 28

Another exception to the establishment of an implied resulting trust under Article 1448
is when its enforcement contravenes public policy. We have already ruled that the
transfer of rights by Eusebio to respondent was null and void ab initio for being
contrary to public policy. As we held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals: 29

Otherwise stated, as an exception to the law on trusts, "[a] trust or a

provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if the enforcement of the trust or
provision would be against public policy, even though its performance does
not involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee." The
parties must necessarily be subject to the same limitations on allowable
stipulations in ordinary contracts, i.e., their stipulations must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. What the parties then
cannot expressly provide in their contracts for being contrary to law and public
policy, they cannot impliedly or implicitly do so in the guise of a resulting
trust. 30 (emphasis supplied)