Selected CICP Publications 2016

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We are proud to share this research publication with you and hope that you can share it with
other colleagues and friends to further our goal of informing the public at large about the latest
social, political and economic developments in both Cambodia as well as the Southeast and East
Asia region. This past year has been both exciting and industrious at CICP as we have brought
in speakers from around the world to present informative public lectures on important events
every month. We are proud to continue our mission of educating the public about both regional
and international issues that impact Cambodia and the region coupled with conducting original
research, the creation of a network on Friends of R2P -Cambodia, publishing the proceedings of
regional conferences, publishing original research and opinion pieces in a yearly “Selected CICP
Publications”.
This publication is a collection of selected original papers and articles that CICP would like to
disseminate to a broad audience of academics, policy makers, students, the diplomatic
community, NGO’s and think tanks, and citizens within Cambodia’s society. Our goal is to raise
awareness and also stimulate both critical thinking and debate on challenging issues and
emerging trends in Cambodia and Southeast Asia. Our work is imperative to disseminate
relevant and interesting research materials, essays, and opinion pieces that contribute to the
maintenance of political and social stability as well as to the promotion of a vibrant research
community in Cambodia.
We would like to take this opportunity to first thank our contributors for giving CICP the
authorization to publish their articles for the benefit of sharing their views on regional and
international issues. Our sincere appreciation also goes to Mr. Rene Gradwohl, Country
Representative, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) for his generous financial support for making
this publication possible and available to the general public.
CICP is prepared to be proactive about and involved with regional issues that are critical to the
national and regional interest in the year ahead. We realize that the future of our success hinges
on our ability to bring significant issues affecting Cambodia and the wider region to generate
critical and constructive discussion among the scholarly community and professionals.
Ambassador Pou Sothirak

Executive Director
The Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
CONTENTS
1. Impacts of Mainstream Hydropower Dams 1

H.E. Amb. Pou Sothirak
2. The Cambodian-Thai Border Dispute 9

3. China’s Belt and Road Cooperation with ASEAN and Cambodia 15

4. My Reflection on the Paris Peace Agreements 21

H.E Amb. Pou Sothirak
5. Maritime Cooperation 27
6. Aspects and Aims of Security Sector Reform 33

Prof. Kevin Nauen
7. The Paris Peace Agreements Remain Relevant Today 49

Prof. Kevin Nauen
8. Roles of China’s Aid to Cambodia’s Socio-Economic Development 53

Prof. Huot Sokunthea and Prof. Nuch Ramo
9. Mass Atrocities under the Khmer Rouge 63

Dr. Peou Sorpong
10. Cambodia’s Political Outlook 65

Dr. Chheang Vannarith
11. Nation Building and National Identity – the Case of Germany 69

H.E. Amb. Joachim Baron von Marschall
12. Chinese Investments in Cambodia: View of Chinese Soft Power from the Ground Up 79
Dr. David Koh
13. Promoting and Advancing the Responsibility to Protect: The Role of Academia 89
Prof. Pou Sovachana
14. The Continual Unraveling of Human Security in Cambodia 95

Prof. Pou Sovachana
15. Doing Research in Cambodia: Making Models that Build Capacity 105
Prof. Pou Sovachana
16. Achievements and Challenges of SSR-SSG and the Effectiveness of Multi-Stakeholder

Approaches in Cambodia through Cooperation between CICP and DCAF 109
Prof. Pou Sovachana
CONTRIBUTORS
Pou Sothirak is currently holding a position as Executive Director of the

Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace since June 2013. He also
serves as Advisor to the Royal Government of Cambodia as of February
2014. He was appointed as Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia from September 2013
to January 2014. He was Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore from January 2009 to
December 2012. He was appointed as Cambodian Ambassador to Japan
from April 2005 to November 2008. He was elected as a Cambodian
Member of Parliament twice during the general election in 1993 and
2003. He was appointed as Minister of Industry Mines and Energy of the
Royal Government of Cambodia from 1993 to 1998. He has written
extensively on various issues confronting the development of Cambodia
and the region.
Baron von Marschall joined the German Foreign Service in 1984. After
serving in Colombo and Athens from 1986 to 1991, he was posted as a
desk officer to the Department of EU affairs at the Foreign Ministry in
Bonn. From 1995 to 1998 he served as the Deputy Consul General in
Montreal, followed by another posting at the Foreign Ministry (Legal
Department). From 2001 to 2004 Baron von Marschall served as a
political officer at the German UN Representation in New York, and then
moved on to assume the position of Deputy Head of Mission at the
Embassy in Almaty. After completion of this assignment in 2007, he
assumed the position of Head of Division in the Economic Department
of the Foreign Office in Berlin and, in 2010, moved to London to head the
Embassy’s Economic Department. On 17 October 2013, Baron von
Marschall was accredited by H.M. the King of Cambodia. Ambassador
von Marschall holds two German law degrees and an MPA-degree from
Indiana University. He is married and has three sons.
Dr. Vannarith Chheang is currently a consultant for Southeast Asia

Program of the Nippon Foundation. He is also a Senior Fellow at the
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, a co-founder and
chairman of Cambodian Institute for Strategic Studies and a columnist of
the Khmer Times. He was lecturer at the University of Leeds from 2013
to 2016. He previously served as the Executive Director of Cambodian
Institute for Cooperation and Peace (2009-2013). He used to serve as a
technical adviser to the Cambodian National Assembly, helping to
organize the 32nd ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, and supported
the Ministry of National Defence of Cambodia to host the Sixth ASEAN
Defence Ministers Meeting. He has been awarded numerous fellowships,
including T-wai's Global Emerging Voices programme (2013), the
Nippon Foundation Fellowship for Asian Public Intellectuals (2013-
2014), France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Personalités d'avenir (2012),
the CSIS Pacific Leadership Program (2010) and the East-West Center's
Asia Pacific Leadership Program (2008). He has also been a Visiting
Research Fellow at the Institute for Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO)
in Tokyo (2012) and a South-East Asia Fellow at the East-West Center in
Washington (2010).
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Contributors
Dr. Sorpong Peou: (BA, the University of Waterloo, Canada, and MA

and PhD, York University, Canada). He is Professor of International
Security, Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson
University. He was a Professor of International Security at Sophia
University in Tokyo, a Canada-ASEAN Fellow and Fellow at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore). His academic expertise
includes security and democracy studies, with a regional focus on the
Asia-Pacific. His major publications include Human Security Studies:
Theories, Methods and Themes (World Scientific, 2014); Peace and
Security in the Asia-Pacific (Praeger 2010), Human Security in East Asia:
Challenges for Collaborative Action, ed. (Routledge 2008), International
Democracy Assistance for Peace building: Cambodia and Beyond
(Palgrave Macmillan 2007), Intervention and Change in Cambodia:
Toward Democracy (St. Martin’s Press, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies and Silkworms, 2001) & Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia
War: From Battlefield to Ballot-box (Oxford University Press, 1997). He is
also Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Cambodian Institute for Peace
and Cooperation, Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the Cambodian
Development Research Institute, an adjunct professor of global affairs at
American University of Phnom Penh and a member of an International
Experts Group on UN Peacekeeping.
David Koh is Singaporean and Director of David Koh & Associates.

Until April 2013, he was a Senior Fellow at Singapore’s Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). He was the Coordinator of ISEAS’
Regional Strategic and Political Studies Program and was a visiting
scholar at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Jinan University of
China, and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Rajaratnam School of
International Studies and the National University of Singapore. His book
“Wards of Hanoi” continues to be a key reference to the understanding
of state-society relations in Vietnam. His other book is an edited
volumed entitled: “Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia”
published in 2007. David regularly pens his thoughts on Vietnam in op-
ed pieces in international and Vietnamese media (in Vietnamese). His
current research interests are Vietnamese politics and foreign policy,
Vietnamese in Singapore, political and strategic developments in
Indochina, and international politics in Southeast Asia. David Koh
graduated with a Doctorate of Philosophy from the National University
in Singapore and majored in Political Science, Chinese Studies,
Economics, and History. He also studied Strategic Studies for his MA.
Other than English, he also speaks Vietnamese and Chinese fluently.
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Contributors
Pou Sovachana is the Deputy Director of Research and Publication at the

Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP). In that position
he oversees the work of several research fellows. He is also a part time
lecturer at ZAMAN University Cambodia. He has written extensively
concerning the development of Cambodia, including various books,
book chapters and articles. Recently, he just published a final report on
“Doing Research in Cambodia: Making Models that Build Capacity”
with his research team. In 2015, he authored the book “The Voices of
Change in Cambodia” and co-authored “Human Security and Land
Rights in Cambodia”. His research interests include human capital
development and human security. He holds an MA degree in
Curriculum and Instruction from Portland State University, Oregon,
USA.
Kevin Nauen is an Associate Professor of Social Sciences and

International Relations at Pannasastra University of Cambodia. He has
an MA in Ideology and Discourse Analysis from University of Essex, and
has taught at State University of New York at Binghamton and Northern
Arizona University. At PUC he specializes in courses on Human Rights,
United Nations, Democratization, Globalization and Political Theory.
He is also Senior Research Fellow at CICP where he contributes to
projects on Responsibility to Protect and Security Sector Reform. His
current research centers on social accountability and democratic
ownership of development programming.
Currently, Nuch Ramo is a research fellow at Cambodian Institute for

Cooperation and Peace (CICP) and a head of Public Policy and
Governance Department at National Institute of Social Affairs (NISA).
He used to be a visiting research fellow at the China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS). His research interests include Sino-
Cambodia relations as viewed through an impact assessment of Chinese
aid to Khmer society. He holds a Master’s degree in Political Science,
majoring Public Policy Evaluation at Sciences Po Lyon, France.
Huot Sokunthea is a Research Fellow at the Cambodian Center for

Cooperation and Peace (CICP) since January 2015. He teaches Conflict
Resolution, Research in International Studies, and Professional
Communication at the Department of International Studies, Institute of
Foreign Languages, Royal University of Phnom Penh. His research
interests include Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management and
Transformation, Peace building, and Social Capital and Peace building.
He holds two undergraduate degrees: English Language Education and
Marketing and two post graduate degrees: MA in Conflict Resolution
and International Small and Medium Enterprise.
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IMPACTS OF MAINSTREAM HYDROPOWER DAMS
ALONG THE MEKONG RIVER ON HUMAN SECURITY
By Ambassador Pou Sothirak
Executive Director of
During
ASEAN Talking: Water Resource Security in the Mekong Region
Organized by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and

The Habibie Center, Indonesia
At Raffles Hotel Le Royal, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 11thMarch, 2016
Source: Richard Cronin and Thimothy Hamlin “Mekong Tipping Point”
-- 11 --
Impacts of Mainstream Hydropower Dams along the Mekong River on Human Security

I am delighted to be among the eminent speakers to deliver my remarks concerning the

impact on human security of mainstream hydropower dams along the Mekong River. I
would like to thank the Habibie Center for supporting this Talking ASEAN public dialogue
on “Water Resource Security in the Mekong Region”.
I find the topic of this public dialogue most appropriate for those of us who are
concerned with the future of the Mekong River as the effects of hydroelectric dams have
begun to take their toll on the environment and humans. There are real concerns whether
the great Mekong River continues to be the source that provides food and livelihoods or is a
River infested with hydroelectric dams, compromising the nature-given-wealth of this
magnificent river which has historically given mankind an abundance of fish, provided
sanctuary for animals and birds, gave a home for rich biodiversity, and renewed fertile soil
for agriculture production over thousands of years.
My remarks will focus mainly on the negative impact of the development of
hydropower on the Mekong River. I shall reflect briefly on the importance of the Mekong
River to the population whose livelihoods depend on it. I will then discuss how
hydroelectricity development affects the downstream countries. I will address a couple of
questions: “How do dams affect future fishing and the Tone Sap Lake? How do economic
improvements by developing hydropower stations damage the environment surrounding
the Mekong River and its people?” In conclusion, I intend to make some comments on what
can be done about these issues.
The importance of the Mekong River

The Mekong River passes through more countries than any other river in Asia. A Chinese
scientist in 2002 found that at the Jifu Mountains in Yushu Tibet Autonomous Prefecture of
northwest China’s Qinghai Province at some 5,200 meters above sea level the Mekong River
is spanning 4,909 km. 1
The Mekong River is one of the great river systems of the world. The river and its
numerous tributaries, backwaters, lakes, and swamps supports many unique ecosystems
and a wide array of globally-threatened species such as the Irrawaddy Dolphin, Siamese
Crocodile, Giant Catfish and different bird species. Its rich biodiversity is surpassed only by
that of the Amazon and the Congo, with over 1,300 species of fish inhabiting the main
channels, tributaries, and associated wetlands. 2
This mighty river has long been regarded as the foundation of economic growth and
prosperity in mainland Southeast Asia and it is known to be home to the most productive
freshwater fish system in the world, 3 providing a constant supply of fish and other
resources for the river system. The Mekong River provides food, drinking water, irrigation,
transport, and energy to more than 60 million people in China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia, and Vietnam who live on its basin.
But the river’ benefits are now at risk due to inappropriate water resource
development projects, such as hydropower plans, which have the potential to cause
destructive damage. Some of these impacts include: the reduction of sediments as they are
trapped by dams, making the Mekong Basin more vulnerable to rising sea levels; the

1 See People Daily, 27 October 2002 <http://www.chinapage.com/river/mekong/mekong01.html>
(accessed 8 March, 2016)
2 See “the Mekong” published by Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use
Program
<http://www.mekongwetlands.org/Programme/mekong.htm> (accessed 8 March 2016)
3 WWF for a Living Planet, 10 World’s Top Ten River at Risk: the Mekong River
<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/32070530/Worlds-Top-10-Rivers-at-risk> (accessed 8 March 2016)
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decrease in fish diversity as damming the mainstream impedes the migration of fish and
other aquatic animals; and the harmful effect on livelihoods as over 75% of rural households
in the Lower Mekong Basin are involved in fisheries. Furthermore, any impact on the
ecological balance of the river also threatens the sustainability of the aquatic resources they
depend on. 4
Hydropower Stations Effect Downstream Countries

For several millenniums, the hydrological condition of the Mekong River has maintained its
natural function in tune with the natural habitat of the river basin. However in the past two
decades, the development of man-made hydropower dams on the mainstream and the
tributaries has begun to alter the balanced rhythm of the river, causing the transformation of
the river’s natural flow system which can lead to dreadful consequences for the inhabitants
living along the basin.
Countries along the Mekong basin are keen to exploit this natural water resource to
produce electricity for their development needs. However, the development of the Mekong
River Basin is highly controversial, and is one of the most prominent components in the
discussion about the river and its management. This debate occurs in both the academic
literature, as well as the media, and is a focus for many activist groups.
Currently there are numerous dams already constructed in the Mekong River Basin
and many more are under construction. 5
China has built seven hydropower dams on the upper Mekong River (known as the
Lancang in China), and plans to build 21 more. The Lower Mekong countries have
expressed many concerns as their lives and livelihoods have been affected. According to
International River, these Lancang dams bear negative impacts on downstream hydrology,
fisheries and the sedimentation of lower Mekong countries.
These dams have the ability to increase water in the dry season which will reduce the
exposed riverbank areas that are needed for seasonal agriculture. Millions of villagers who
live along the Mekong River depend on the riverbank to grow vegetables, and if the
waterfronts along the Mekong are flooded, their livelihoods will be significantly impacted as
they lose the harvest from their gardens. In the wet season, the marshlands are reduced,
cutting down nutrients deposited on floodplains and blocking fish migration channels,
which are critical for reproduction. 6
Another report by the Economist cited that the cascade dams build on the Lancang
River by China not only trap nearly all of the sediment coming from China, cutting the
water’s sediment load in half, affecting the movement of fish but also force more than 20
million Chinese people to seek new settlements on sheer hillside plains ill-suited for
farming. 7
The same report mentioned that the 11 proposed dams in Laos and Cambodia will
also make things yet harder for the nutrient-deprived fish as dams have the ability to block
the migration of around 70% of the Mekong’s commercial fish catch. This will impede food

4 WWF, Mekong River Basin Damming the Mekong
<http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/water/dams_initiative/examples/mekong/> (accessed
8 March 2016)
5 Hydropower in the Mekong River Basin from Wikipedia,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydropower_in_the_Mekong_River_Basin> (accessed 8 March 2016)

6 See World Rivers Review: Understanding the Impacts of China’s Upper Mekong Dams, Internal River,
<https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/8477> (accessed 9 March2016)

7 See Requiem for a river: Can one of the world’s great waterways survive its development? Published by
the Economist <http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21689225-can-one-world-s-great-waterways-

survive-its-development> (accessed 8 March 2016)
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security of the populations across the lower Mekong basin, where the average person eats
some 60kg of freshwater fish per year, more than 18 times what is on the menu in Europe or
America. Considering how poor many of the people here are, replacing fish as a primary
protein source is virtually impossible. 8
Damming the Mekong River causes unprecedented environmental and social
problems and imposes severe ecological deterioration of this mighty River. Downstream
countries, with the exception of Myanmar, have to bear a huge burden, and they must
mobilize a large amount of their development funds and other resources to mitigate adverse
effects, and to wrestle largely unsuccessful efforts to protect themselves against China and
try to restore the damage to their agriculture, fisheries, forests, and way of life. 9
For more details on the adverse effects of Chinese damming the mainstream Mekong
River, here are four recommended readings:
(1) Final Report “Strategic Environmental Assessment” by the International Centre for
Environmental Management for the Mekong River Commission in October 2010.
<http://www.mrcmekong.org/ish/SAE/SAE-Main-Final-Report.pdf>
(2) Paper by Evelyn Goh titled “China in the Mekong river Basin: The Regional Security
Implication of Resource Development on the Lancang Jiang”
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP69.PDF
(3) Article by Milton Osborne published in the Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus dated 11
January 2010 “the Mekong River under Threat”<http://www.japanfocus.org/-Milton-
Osborne/3286>
(4) Paper by Tyson R. Roberts “Downstream ecological implications of China's Lancang
Hydropower and Mekong Navigation project”
<http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/tyson%20roberts%20paper%20on%20yunna
n.pdf>
Dams Affect Future Fishing and Tonle Sap

The Tonle Sap, known as the Great Lake, is considered to be the largest fresh water lake in
Southeast Asia. During the monsoon season when the Mekong floods, a large amount of
water enters the lake, increasing its size extensively. The lake is rich with biodiversity which
makes the Tonle Sap floodplain one of the most productive inland fisheries in the world,
supporting over 3 million people and providing at least 60% of Cambodians’ protein intake. 10
Cambodia has a unique relationship with the Mekong River. During the dry season,
the Tonle Sap River flows southeastward to the Mekong River. But when the rainy season
starts from May to November, the Mekong River swells, forcing the Tonle Sap River to
reverse its direction in the northeastward into the Tonle Sap Lake.
According to a report, 11 the Tonle Sap is in crisis as the weakening flows due to the
Chinese dams upstream have triggered declining fish yields. The fishermen can tell the same
story as their catches have never been so poor, and they all blame the low river-flows these days.

8 Ibid
9 Tyson R. Roberts “Downstream ecological implications of China’s Lancang Hydropower and
Mekong Navigation project”
<http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/tyson%20roberts%20paper%20on%20yunnan.pdf>
(accessed 9 March 2016)
10Nargiza Salidjanova, Chinese Damming of Mekong and Negative Repercussion for Tonle Sap, ICE
Case Studies Numer 210, May 2007. <http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/mekong-china.htm>

11Where have all the fish gone?<http://www.mongabay.com/external/dying_mekong_river.htm>
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What is worse now is that the price of fish has increased considerably as the fish population
in the Tonle Sap has declined significantly. 12 This has a dreadful effect on poor Cambodian
people. As for the Great Lake, a nightmare scenario would be for the flood to subside so
much that the Tonle Sap stops reversing its flow during the monsoon. That would dry up
the river's major nursery for fish.
Being the main source for fish catch in Cambodia, the Tonle Sap Lake accounts for
about 230,000 tons annually 13 of the Mekong fisheries with an estimated catch of 2.6 million
tons ($2 billion worth) of wild fish and other aquatic resources a year, according to the
Mekong River Commission report. These life-line benefits are now being traded off with
hydropower projects that are supposed to provide cheaper electricity to fuel economic
development. 14
Whatever the outcome will be, a rational national policy on how best to secure power
supply with Mekong mainstream dams must be weighed very carefully against the co-
existence and reliance on fish for food in Cambodia, so as to avoid harming the over one
million people who live around the Tonle Sap Basin. 15
Economic Improvement at the Expense of the Mekong River’s Environment

For years some experts and dam builders have suggested that poverty can be eradicated by
the exploitation of hydroelectricity. Recently hydropower promise further charms
governments seeking to reduce the high cost of energy in order to fuel economic growth in
their respective countries.
However, this rush for hydro power must not be based on ill-thought and poorly
coordinated projects, if at all, across the Mekong basin stretching from China through
Yunnan province to Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Accurate
assessment on the impact of these dams, despite the difficulty, must be carried out
deliberately.
The battle for the Mekong is gathering pace. Engineers and developers see the
Mekong as one of the world's last great unexploited sources of hydroelectricity and a
potential powerhouse for the industrialization of Southeast Asia. Although there are reports
on several potential benefits of Mekong flow regulated by China’s Lancang cascade of
hydropower and the willingness of the Chinese government to cooperate, yet the severity of
the impact on environment cannot be overlooked. 16
There are plenty of reports that can verify hydropower as a valuable resource so long
as the cost-benefit tradeoffs are fully examined and understood. Most dams in China and

12 See article “Dams, Climate Change Lead to Fish Decline in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap: Fishermen” by Radio
Free Asia, published on 4 September, 2015

<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/fish-09042015154247.html> (accessed 9 March 2016)
13See“Tonle Sap: Experience and Lesson Learned Brief”, 1 June 2007
<www.ilec.or.jp/en/wp/wp.../25_Lake_Tonle_Sap_27February2006.pdf > (accessed 10 March 2016)

14 Michelle L. Change, “Cambodia Fish and Mekong Dams: Can They Coexist?”
<http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2011/02/09/cambodia%E2%80%99s-fish-and-mekong-dams-can-
they-co-exist/ > (accessed 9 March 2016)
15 Olivier Serrat, The Asian Development Bank “Future Solution Now-the Tonle Sap Initiative”, published
in November 2005 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268516605_Future_Solutions_Now_-

_The_Tonle_Sap_Initiative > (accessed 9 March 2013)
16ZaoNoam and Piaporn Deetes, “Chinese Hydropower Industry Investment in the Mekong Region –
Impacts and Opportunities for Cooperation: Perspectives from Civil Society”
<www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/ChinaHydroPowerInMekon.pdf > (accessed 9 March 2016)
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Southeast Asia are assessed on the basis of a very narrow commercial cost-benefit analyses
and revenue calculation. 17
Furthermore, there is plentiful evidence that points to large dam projects around the
world having resulted in environmental degradation and creating disastrous social
consequences. As a result of the growing public criticism of large dam projects, a World
Commission on Dams, led by the World Bank and the International Union for Conservation
of Nature (IUCN) was established to look into a comprehensive analysis of the challenges
posed by these enormous dams. This initiative should serve as an authoritative discussion of
the costs and benefits related to hydropower projects based on sustainable and equitable
project planning and implementation, However the findings have thus far had a restricted
impact on the proponents, developers, and governments alike. Many of the dam projects
proposed for the Mekong mainstream do not appear to meet environmental or
socioeconomic criteria layed out by the Commission, nor follow the guidelines of the WB or
the ADB and were proven to be damaging to the environment and fisheries. 18
People in the Mekong region and especially in the lowermost downstream countries
such as Cambodia and Vietnam are especially vulnerable to floods. Drought is even more
threatening as it can occur over a long period of time which ultimately produces more
upsetting results including the long term inability of a country to feed itself. It is known that
because of the huge size of China’s dams, there is reduced water flow downstream into the
Mekong River during the flooding season and more water is discharged during the dry
season to run the turbines of the hydroelectric power plans.
The Mekong ecosystem will also be negatively affected by the seizure of upstream
sediments and nutrients trapped in reservoirs and by the regulated outflow of water
controlled by the hydropower dams. The cumulative impact on the environment by the
massive loss of biodiversity is eminent which will adversely affect people whose lives
depend on the Mekong River.
As much as the Chinese engineers forecast that the dams will reduce the number of
annual floods and increase the dry season flow, scientists are concerned that fertile
sediments are trapped behind by large-scale dams preventing the revitalization of the
fertility, carried mostly in the monsoon floods, which is vital to the Mekong’s fisheries and
to natural fertilization of the floodplains for agricultural crops. It is this lessening of the
flood pulse and the sustained lifeline of the river’s ecosystem that will have a lasting effect
on the environment causing the loss of an essential source of food for millions of people and
eliminating an important source of income.
Governments are easily seduced by the prospect of abundant energy sources but if
this is acquired at the expense of the Mekong River’s environment, the next generation will
have to bear the consequences.
What Can Be Done?

Construction of dams for the purpose of hydropower stations can help one country to
achieve its economic prosperity but it can also cause the region to feel insecure as friction
between and among states along the Mekong River could develop as a result of competition
for water resources. The uncontested exploitation of the free flow of the Mekong River by
any single country can threaten food security for millions of people and inflict severe
environmental damage.

17 Richard Cronin and Thimothy Hamlin “Mekong Tipping Point”, page 5
<http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Mekong_Tipping_Point-Complete.pdf>
18 Ibid, page 7
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There have been major science-policy gaps between the decision makers and the
scientific community where environmental and socioeconomic costs can far exceed the
expected benefits. This is usually the case, when the decision to go ahead with projects
ignores extensive scientific research highlighting the highly negative environmental and
socioeconomic consequences of the proposed projects. Lack of human capacity and weak
governance are considered a cause of inadequately informed decision-making at the
national and sub-national level. There is also a growing worry that among the development
partners, public and private stakeholders are not being properly consulted and that the
cumulative impacts of dams on fisheries and food security are not being given adequate
attention. 19
The lower riparian countries Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam formed the
Mekong River Commission in 1995, signing an agreement that stated dam construction on
the mainstream must be subjected to prior notification between countries in order to foster
environmentally sustainable development and any development involving the diversion of
water out of the Mekong in the dry season must proceed on the basis of agreement by all
members. However, China and Burma, the other two countries sharing the river, are mere
observers in this agreement.
Under these circumstances, mutual and transparent collaboration of development
efforts of MRC, Greater Mekong Sub-region, ASEAN and other initiatives in the
development of the Mekong River Basin, and in particular the cooperation with China and
Myanmar is deemed essential for the search for effective measures to mitigate the impacts
hydropower dams on human security and bring about greater prosperity to our region. This
would enable all of us to advance in the right direction of sustainable development of the
Mekong River Basin.
It is generally acknowledged that the issues surrounding dams and hydropower are
sensitive, but that is even more reason why they should be deliberated in an open and
objective forum. One practical way to go about minimizing the risks is to call upon the
regional approach to take responsibility on the rights and risks and to properly assess each
hydropower project. This should involve the development of a clear understanding on how
to build a dam to ensure that the benefit of one country will not dramatically affect other
nations and people who share the river. The question here is how to strike a balance
between who benefits and who pays the cost associated with the impact of each dam project.
Another way is by strengthening the role and responsibility as well as enforcing the
decision making of the MRC with whom a model for regional cooperation has been
entrusted, based on sound appropriation for the Mekong region as a whole. Whenever a
major decision on hydropower is made, a basin-wide integrated approach taking into
account fisheries, environmental management, irrigation, navigation of the river, flood
control, tourism development must be considered to mitigate the impact of the dam on the
wellbeing of the rural people and the environment.
It is most sensible that when governments of the Mekong countries make a decision
to go ahead with the construction of a hydroelectricity dam, they should conduct a full cost-
benefit analysis by impartial experts and thoroughly weigh in the development-
environment tradeoffs in terms of electric power and food security and livelihoods. As such,
they should consider the recommendations made by the Strategic Environmental
Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream 20 commissioned by the MRC on

Ibid, page 9
19
For more details recommendations, see Final Report on Strategic Environment Assessment of
20
Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream, October 2010
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how to address the broader strategic issues within the mainstream hydroelectricity proposal.
This would enable these governments to adopt the right approach to pursue in relation to
regional distribution of costs and benefits with respect to economic development, social
equity and environmental protection among all affected stakeholders.
Therefore, the regional perspective on the Mekong can ensure that decisions leading
to any development of hydropower are reflective of everyone’s interests and the vision for
an economically prosperous, socially just and environmentally sound Mekong Basin will
indeed promote human security and regional stability and prosperity.
The governments sharing the Mekong River must be willing to fully balance
economic development with a well-coordinated and careful study based on environmental
concerns where construction ensures sustainable regeneration, peace, stability and
prosperity. Without this type of environmentally-sensitive approach any development will
not open up new threats to human security and regional security by exploiting the Mekong
River and putting severe stress on regional relations as well as water resource security in the
Mekong Region.
Thank you very much for your kind attention.

<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:f7aXWtCsoK8J:www.mrcmekong.org/ass
ets/Publications/Consultations/SEA-Hydropower/SEA-FR-summary-
13oct.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk> (accessed 10 March 2016)
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THE CAMBODIAN-THAI BORDER DISPUTE
By Ambassador Pou Sothirak

Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
Remarks Delivered during 28th Annual Conference

International Military Operations and Law Conference
Organized by U.S. Pacific Command

17-21st May, 2015, Auckland, New Zealand
I am delighted to speak about the Border Conflict between Cambodia and Thailand at the
International Military Operations and Law Conference, organized by the U.S. Pacific
Command. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Commander of the U.S.
Pacific Command and the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for their kind invitation and the
warm hospitality extended to me since my arrival to the beautiful city of Auckland, New
Zealand.
My presentation covers the land border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. I
will examine the factors that drive this border conflict and determine what is at stake. I will
offer my views with regard to the possible solution and conclude with some thoughts as to
where the dispute might lead to from the recent ICJ Ruling on the Cambodian request for re-
interpretation.
I hope that my presentation can contribute to better understanding of this complex
issue and can ease the tension between the two countries and bring a lasting resolution that
would allow Cambodia and Thailand to truly enjoy the warm and cordial relations that have
existed before. I also hope that my talk can help prevent unnecessary misunderstanding
between the two neighbouring countries, paving the way for Cambodian and Thai people to
enjoy their lasting fraternal friendship.
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Cambodian-Thai Border Dispute

Background and Scope of the Disputes

The border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand have been entrenched by a historical
legacy of the past and the sentiment of nationalism of the present. The dispute has led to a
border conflict and is seen as the direct result of the domestic politics of both countries.
On the Thai side, the dispute ignited from charges of treason by the royalist People
Alliance of Democrat (PAD), also known as the “Yellow Shirts”, and the Democrat Party of
Thailand against the successive governments of pro-Thaksin by accusing the latter of losing
Thai territory to Cambodia.
On the Cambodian side, the Thai military build up at the border was seen as a direct
national security threat. As the result, Cambodia has mobilized national support to defend
its sovereignty from what it considered as deliberate acts of Thai aggression.
The border dispute stirred up widespread nationalistic sentiment from both sides,
provoking bitter hostility between the two sides. A Military standoff flared up, going to the
brink of war, damaging not only the bilateral relations between the two countries, but also
threatening ASEAN’s unity and affecting its credibility to form a community by 2015.
I will give some background information on the root cause and how the dispute has
evolved since the early 1990s until the present day and discuss the scope of the dispute. I
will describe the different approaches each country has undertaken to manage the dispute
and has undertaken identify some possible solutions. I will conclude on factors that shape
and influence the different positions taken by both Cambodia and Thailand and highlight
some consequences that the dispute might harbour.
The root of the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand stemmed from not
only a historical legacy of the past but also the complications arising from the emergence of
patriotism in political game played by local politicians in recent times.
The dispute should be understood in two phases: the period between the early 1900’s
and the ICJ’s Ruling in 1962, and between the 2006 coup in Thailand until today.
In the earlier period, the border tension between Cambodia and Thailand was rooted
in the arbitration by the ICJ in The Hague, which ruled in 1962 that “the Temple of Preah
Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia”.
The ICJ’s decision was based on its review of the 1904 and the 1907 boundary treaties
between France (then ruler of Cambodia) and Siam (Thailand), and the works of the Franco-
Siamese Mixed Commissions of Delimitation, as well as the maps prepared by the
commissions. Major evidence had been the Annex I Map which revealed that the whole of
the Preah Vihear complex as being on the Cambodian side. At the time of the ICJ Ruling, the
Siamese authorities did not raise any objection about the Annex I Map between themselves
and France or Cambodia when it had many chance to do so.
In the period following the military coup which brought down Thaksin from power
in 2006, a border dispute occurred after the World Heritage Committee’s decision to list the
Temple of Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The dispute which erupted in
July 2008 was intrinsically linked to Thai domestic politics and the stirring up of nationalism
from both sides toward the use of military forces to protect national sovereignty. Border
clashes were the result of this national fervors.
At the height of heavy military fighting in February and April 2011 the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the ICJ had called on both Thailand and Cambodia to
withdraw troops, refrain from military actions and resolved the dispute peacefully through
dialogue with the help from ASEAN’s observers.
The boundary dispute between Cambodia and Thailand concerns the shared land
border which separates both countries and stretches approximately 499 miles.
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Although the border dispute centres on the unfinished demarcation process of the
border line by the Join Border Commission (JBC) the most contentious area, however, is a
piece of land of about 4.6 square kilometres surrounding the Temple of Preah Vihear.
Cambodia only recognizes the ANNEX 1 Map, drawn up by France under the 1904
and 1907 Franco-Siam Treaties, which suggests a clear boundary line between the two
countries.
Thailand relies on a unilaterally produced map, unveiled during the World Heritage
Session in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2007, which shows the area of land claimed by
Thailand.
Bilateral Approach to the Border Conflict

The border tensions had been easing substantially since the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party
won a landslide victory in the general election on 3 July 2011 and the coming into office by a
new prime minister — Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister — in August of that year.
Despite positive signs, both sides still could not agree on the different approaches to
settle the border conflict.
At this point, I would like to highlight the different approaches taken by both
countries, identify factors that have impinged on these approaches and discuss some of the
possible outcomes.
There is a bilateral mechanism sanctioned by a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), signed by both countries in June 2000.
The MOU establishes a JBC to carry out a joint survey and demarcation of land
boundary all along the Thai-Cambodian border and calls for a joint effort to demarcate the
frontier line in accordance with important documents agreed upon between France and
Siam in the 1900s.
The JBC held its meeting several times to try to complete the survey and demarcation
works. However, it has encountered difficulties related to difficult terrains and complex
survey operations and other serious factors related to the mistrust between the two sides.
Multilateral Approach to the Border Conflict

Having lost confidence in the bilateral mechanisms and fearing that the dispute may escalate
further, Cambodia looked to other multilateral approaches to settle the border dispute with
Thailand.
Cambodia has called for a meeting of the UNSC, mediation from ASEAN and a
reinterpretation from the ICJ.
On 14 February 2011, the UNSC issued a statement expressing grave concerns and
called on both sides to display maximum restraint. The UN Council members urged both
sides to establish a permanent ceasefire and to resolve the situation peacefully through
dialogue and asked for ASEAN’s active role in this matter.
On 22 February 2011 Indonesia, as the chair of ASEAN in 2011, hosted an informal
meeting to try to ease the dispute. Indonesia was prepared to send observers to support
Cambodia and Thailand in forwarding their commitment to avoid further armed clashes
and to resume their bilateral negotiations as soon as possible.
On 28 April 2011, Cambodia filed an application requesting interpretation of the
Judgment rendered on 15 June 1962 by the ICJ in the case concerning the Temple of Preah
Vihear, together with an urgent request for the indication of provisional measures.
On 18 July 2011, the Court gave its decision on the indication of a provisional
measure asking both sides to withdraw their troops from a temporary demilitarized zone,
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refrain from any armed activity directed at that zone, and allow Indonesian observers to
have access to that zone.
From 15-19 April, 2013, the Court began its hearing on oral arguments in the dispute
between Cambodia and Thailand over ownership of the land surrounding the Temple of
Preah Vihear, from Monday 15 to Friday 19 April 2013. (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/151/17280.pdf). The hearing was broadcast online.
I have observed the following:
- The Thai government has made striking efforts to publicize this event. The Thai
public is encourage to follow the hearing in French with English and Thai
translations at www.pravihearn.org.
- I was able to view some of the hearings on air in the afternoon of 18 April 2013 on the
Thai TV station myself. I tried to switch to the all Khmer TV stations, but there was
nothing being reported. Later I learnt that there was no public coverage of the ICJ
hearing on the Cambodian side.
- On 17 April, the Nation newspaper reported that there were about 1000 members of
the Khon Thai Rak Chart (Thai Patriot) group gathered at Lam Takhong reservoir in
Nakhon Rachasima's Sikhiu district to express their objection to the on-going ICJ
hearing. Similarily, the Nation reported that former PM Abhisit urged the Thai team
to point out clearly that the 1:200,000-scale map which Cambodia uses was not the
work of the Joint Boundary Commission.
- On 16 April, the Nation reported that there are Thai Senators attending the court
hearing. They were urging the Thai government not to accept the ICJ's decision, as
the court tends to rule in favor of Cambodia.
- On 17 April, in the Editorial, the Bangkok Post reported that during the period of the
military dictatorship of Gen. Thanom Kittikachorn in 1962 wanted to "fight to keep
what is Thai". The Bangkok Post went on to report that 50 years on, government
dissidents and noisy patriots are still with the Thai people. Gen. Paryuth Chan-ocha
said two months ago that Thailand might not necessarily accept the ICJ's ruling. The
force of Nationalism will protest and threaten (Cambodians) if the court decides in
Cambodian's favor. The Bangkok Post Editorial concluded that "the well-prepared
Thai legal team will fight for the country tonight at the proper venue - the ICJ."
Possible Solutions
Up until now there have been three approaches which have been pursued by Cambodia and
Thailand: the bilateral negotiation between the two countries the regional mechanism
centres on ASEAN to help mediate a settlement, and an international approach is based on
an ICJ re-interpretation of its 1962 Judgment in the case concerning the Temple of Preah
Vihear and the urgent indication of provisional measures.
But the effectiveness of each mechanism to solve the border dispute remains unclear.
For the bilateral approach to succeed Thailand must appeal to Cambodia on the merit of this
approach. Conducive atmosphere must prevail and the JBC must be able to resume its task
under the framework of the 2000 MOU allowing genuine diplomatic efforts to take effect
instead of using military means.
As for the achievement of the regional approach, both sides must be willing to accept
ASEAN intervention for a durable solution. Without goodwill and concessions by both
Cambodia and Thailand, ASEAN is not equipped with any enforcement measures and can
do little to settle the conflict.
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For the multilateral approach to work, both sides must be prepared to accept the ICJ
ruling. Cambodia appears willing but Thailand may not be so due to internal pressure.
However, neglecting the Court decision may damage Thailand’s international standing.
Conclusion
Although the border situation has improved but a lasting solution still hinges on positive
improvement in the internal politics of either or both countries.
The three approaches remain elusive and can take many more years, if there is no
genuine compromise from both countries.
To achieve a desirable goal, the military threat must be removed and sincere
dialogue must prevail.
Without a lasting solution to the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand,
the two countries cannot have good bilateral relations and conflicts may flair up again
creating security concerns at the border and can disturb peace in the region as well as
damaging the reputation of ASEAN.
With regard to the Court ruling on 11 November, 2013, the ICJ finds that its has
jurisdiction to entertain the Cambodian request and declares that Cambodia has sovereignty
over the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear, and in consequence, Thailand
has the obligation to withdraw from that territory the Thai military or police forces, or other
guards, or keepers that were stationed within the vicinity of the Temple.
However, the ICJ did not offer a "straight forward decision" on the contested land
adjacent to the Temple of Preah Vihear because it did not prescribe how big or how small
this area is under the Cambodia sovereignty. In effect, the ICJ did not delimit the frontiers
between Cambodia and Thailand.
Perhaps, this is a deliberate act from the ICJ, hoping that Cambodia and Thailand
will proceed to delineate the so-called 4.6 sq. km through peaceful negotiation.
Both sides will have difficulty in reconciling this point and may need third party
mediation and should count on genuine diplomacy (bilateral and multilateral) as the way to
solve this difficult issue.
Thank you very much for your kind attention!
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CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD COOPERATION
WITH ASEAN AND CAMBODIA
Remarks by Ambassador Pou Sothirak
During the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Conference

Organized by China Foreign Affairs University & Peace Boat
1- 6 August, 2016
I am pleased to offer some of my thoughts on China’s Belt and Road Cooperation with
ASEAN and Cambodia. My presentation covers three aspects. First I would like to highlight
briefly China’s grand strategy with respect to the “One Belt One Road” initiative. And then,
I would like to discuss China’s Belt and Road initiative in relation with ASEAN in general
and Cambodia in particular, by giving my assessment on what conditions would have to be
met to forge good cooperation for a win-win situation for all sides.
China’s Grand Strategic Strategy

At the dawn of the 21stcentury, mankind is confronted with formidable challenges, such as
the current sluggish global economy, complex and sometimes dangerous situations at the
international and regional levels, and a chronic lack of coordination in development efforts,
all of which give strong impetus for the current Chinese leader in rejuvenating the spirit of
the Silk Road.
The Belt and Road initiative or the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, and the “21st Century
Maritime Silk Road” in full, was first put forth by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his
visits to Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October 2013. This initiative aims
to boost intra-regional and inter-regional economic integration.
In March 2015, a document entitled Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road
Economic Belt and 21st – Century Maritime Silk Road, prepared by China’s National
Development and Reform Commission, Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Commerce, was
published to elaborate this initiative. 1
The “Belt and Road” initiative is the core foreign policy of China under Xi Jinping as
China embarks on its global power projection. The initiative also helps build Chinese
identity and their global image, realizing the “China Dream” and the “Rejuvenation of
China”.
OBOR features four principles:
1- The need to make sure that all countries respect one another and treat each other as
equals;
2- The need to seek win-win cooperation and common development;
3- The need to pursue common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security;
4- The need to ensure inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations.

1See ”Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road”, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, available at
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html, accessed on 29 July, 2016
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China’s Belt and Road Cooperation with ASEAN and Cambodia

The “One Belt, One Road” is considered a landmark initiative proposed by China to
cover large infrastructure projects through the Silk Road Economic Belt, linking Beijing to
Central Asia, Russia and Europe. Furthermore it seeks to spur trade ties through the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road, expanding from Quanzhou to Belgium and Australia.
Supporting the OBOR as an investment arm is the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) which was signed by 51 Prospective Founding Members in
September 2015 and is expected to be operational by early next year with authorized capital
of US$50 billion, eventually to be raised to $100 billion. The projected investment for OBOR
will be US$1.4 trillion and the economic benefits of the AIIB and OBOR will significantly
facilitate the movement of goods, services, and people across national borders. 2
China wishes to see the free and orderly flow of goods, more efficient allocation of
resources, greater market integration, better policy coordination and better regional
cooperation, which can be achieved by creating a more inclusive, more balanced and
cooperative framework. The initiative represents a new opportunity for countries along
these ancient trade routes in Asia, Europe and Africa to be more connected, making it easier
to pool their material and intellectual resources and meet their new challenges more
effectively.
I. Belt and Road and ASEAN

This new Chinese initiative is expected to firmly support ASEAN countries in promoting
sustainable economic growth.
At the China–ASEAN Expo in 2013, Premier Li Keqiang called for an ASEAN-
oriented maritime silk road to serve as a strategic propeller for hinterland development and
economic prosperity of countries along the Belt and Road and regional economic
cooperation in general. 3
TPP is a single framework that connects different economies around common rules,
provides common regulatory approaches, and ensures common market access. OBOR, in
contrast, is a multi-component framework that connects diverse parts, piece by piece, via
their common interests in national development. OBOR pursues connectivity not through
common economic rules and market liberalization, but instead through new infrastructure,
trade and investment facilitation zones, and targeted development projects.
China faces challenges of implementation at both the Chinese and the recipient ends
of the equation. Achieving a good result for OBOR depends on the kinds of resources China
is willing to commit and actually deliver as well as on the Chinese ability to coordinate and
discipline its own domestic agents, and perhaps, most of important of all, how the Chinese
government is able to balance external support without sacrificing too much or limiting local
development. Southeast Asia nations on the other hand, may reap greater benefit from
China’s Maritime Silk Road, if ASEAN states can expand their efforts to direct Beijing’s
engagement so that the Belt and Road can serve and strengthen ASEAN’s own particular
regional integration agendas, as well as security and economic interests.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China said in August last year during the China-ASEAN
Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur that China is willing to align its “One Belt, One
Road” initiative with ASEAN countries’ respective development strategies and the

2See article “China’s AIIB and 'One Belt One Road': ambitions and challenges” by Zhu Zhiqun
published on 9 October, 2015, available at
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8231-China-s-AIIB-and-One-Belt-One-
Road-ambitions-and-challenges, accessed on 29 July, 2016
3See article “Foster Synergy among MDBs, Advance the Belt and Road Initiative” by Yang Shaolin,
available at http://en.drc.gov.cn/YangShaolin.pdf, accessed on 29 July, 2016
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construction blueprint of the ASEAN Community in order to provide new impetus and
create new prospects for China-ASEAN cooperation and growth. This is a welcome sign for
ASEAN to capitalize on this new Chinese initiative.
II. The Significance of OBOR for Cambodia

Turning attention to Cambodia, the country should capitalize on China’s great emphasis
with neighborhood diplomacy, and prepare to extend investments, AIIB, and ODA to
finance infrastructure projects as a way of winning the support and goodwill of neighboring
developing countries. By utilizing constructive engagement with Beijing, Cambodia will
certainly benefit from the OBOR initiative to meet the demand of much needed
infrastructure projects to enhance national economic growth.
On 3rd June, 2016, President Xi Jinping met with His Majesty King Norodom
Sihamoni of Cambodia at the Great Hall of People. During the meeting, China and
Cambodia pledged closer friendship. President Xi Jinping pointed out the special friendship
between China and Cambodia and called for “all-dimensional, multi-field and deep-level
development” of China-Cambodia relations. In particular, Xi said both sides should
accelerate negotiation on documents related to inter-governmental cooperation on the “One
Belt One Road” initiatives, as well as expand people-to-people ties and cultural exchanges.
His Majesty King Norodom Sihamoni expressed appreciation of China’s long-term
assistance and readiness to deepen practical cooperation in all areas with China. 4
China has become one of Cambodia’s main development and strategic partners.
According to a report by the Council for the Development of Cambodia, from 1994 to 2015,
the total amount of Chinese direct flow of investment to Cambodia was $10.3 billion mainly
in garment production, agriculture, mining and infrastructure. In terms of development
assistance and loans to Cambodia, China has provided about $3.4 billion from 1992 to 2015
according to a report from the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The bilateral trade
between the two countries accounted for more than $3 billion in 2013. Recently at the
11thAsia and Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit held on July 15-16 in Ulannbaatar, Mongolia,
China pledged a three year grant and aid assistance of 3.6 billion Yuan (about $600 million)
to Cambodia in the area of electoral process, health, education, and access to clean water.
"(Sources: Khmer Times, 20 July 2016, PM Calls for More Connectivity, May Kunmakara)
In return, Cambodia has also been a vocal supporter of the “One Belt, One Road”
initiative from the start. In June 2015, Cambodia also signed a Memorandum of
Understanding regarding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as a founding member.
Due to this economic growth opportunity, the ever increasing cooperation with China along
with the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) one can expect the
continuing strengthening and expansion of ties between the two countries. Prime Minister
Hun Sen has referred to China as Cambodia’s “most trustworthy friend” because of its “no
strings attached” development assistance.
Although the OBOR initiative bears great significance to Cambodia, appropriate
consideration must be paid to the following important aspects:

4See statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with King Norodom
Sihamoni of Cambodia Both Sides Agree to Jointly Push for Constant Development of China-
Cambodia Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership”, dated 3rd June, 2016, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1370153.shtml, accessed on 30 July, 2016
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Economic Considerations
Financing infrastructure development remains the main development challenge for
Cambodia. In Cambodia’s Industrial Development Policy 2015–2025, promoting the
country’s physical infrastructure and transport systems to link to other countries constitutes
a critical part. Given the situation, OBOR presents a great opportunity for Cambodia to get
access to financial resources and technical expertise in developing and connecting its roads,
rails, and ports with the region. Detailed infrastructure development projects under OBOR
are being studied and developed. So far China has developed special economic zones, an
airport, a seaport, hydropower plants, and highways in the Kingdom.
While the significance of OBOR in Cambodia’s goal of attracting foreign direct
investment and expanding export capacity is recognized, a critical analysis of this assistance
questions the sincerity of Chinese investment. For example, some postulate that China has
incorporated Cambodia into its grand security strategy and intends the Sihanouk ville
seaport to serve as one location in a “string of pearls” strategic locations from which to
secure vulnerable sea-lanes of communication and protect seaborne energy supplies as well
as help solidify a delivery point for oil imports from the Middle East.
Cambodia should envision developing a long term plan for its infrastructure
development needs when engaging with the OBOR and AIIB. This undertaking will have an
economic logic and help prepare Cambodia to avoid any possible financial risk that might
be of concern. As a developing country, Cambodia should pay attention to large scale
infrastructure projects that are politically volatile and economically vulnerable. Cambodia
needs to properly assess the risk-benefit aspects of any large scale infrastructure project to
ensure that capital, acquired from the AIIB, can indeed provide the stability or security
necessary to see the project through, with guarantees from their Chinese counterparts
ensuring their end of the bargain. This is simply because large scale infrastructure projects
tend to galvanize public opinion toward corrupt practice and lack of proper monitoring and
accountability. Thus careful monitoring is needed to insure good quality and durability of
the project instead of being a source of local disgruntlement and resentment.
Political Considerations
There are those who think that Chinese unconditional aid assistance comes at a price. Critics
suggest that Cambodia has become a Chinese client state because China exerts political
influence over the Cambodian government. For example, the Cambodian government failed
to issue a joint communiqué after the ASEAN’s foreign ministers meeting in Phnom-Penh in
2012 for the first time in its 45-year history regarding the disputes in the South China Sea.
Critics to Cambodia have often speculated that Cambodia has favored China over the
common interests of ASEAN with regards to bloc unity and centrality. More recently, the
Cambodian position with regard to the arbitral tribunal’s decision on 12 July, 2016 in the
case instituted by the Philippines against China on the South China Sea has come under
strong criticism from other countries, without realizing that Cambodia has a genuine desire
to have ASEAN maintain good relations with China and see the PCA’s findings as a matter
only related to the Philippines and China.
Moreover, it is still unclear whether Cambodia will join the US-led TPP. Many
predict that Cambodia’s non-participation in TPP will potentially reduce foreign investment
in Cambodia. According to some, the TPP is expected to reduce investment in Cambodia’s
$6 billion garment sector as manufacturers find more incentives to open factories in
neighboring Vietnam, which as a signatory of the agreement will enjoy preferential trade
status with the US and other bloc members. In May 2016, the US ambassador to Cambodia
urged Cambodia the join TPP, saying “it would be a shame for Cambodia to miss out and be
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left behind”. How the country should respond to the opportunities and challenges brought
by TPP (when it is ratified by the US Congress) while it voices full support for OBOR will be
a tricky and important decision confronting the Cambodian government.
Military Considerations
China also stands as the biggest military aid donor in Cambodia. China has played a key
role in improving Cambodia's dilapidated military inventory since 2010, when Beijing
donated 250 jeeps and trucks to Cambodia's army after the U.S. scrapped a similar plan. In
May 2015, China handed over a batch of military equipment to the Ministry of Defense
including spare parts and trucks mounted with rocket launchers. China further pledged new
military aid to Cambodia during the recent visit of the Cambodian Minister of Defense in
November 2015. An independent research group’s study from 2006-2010 revealed that
Cambodia received $5.3 million worth of small arms and light weapons from China.
However, this aid assistance has had spillover effects, which have a negative impact for
average Cambodian citizens. China has given weapons, which are effective at suppressing
peaceful protests. China also has been perceived as one of the main beneficiaries to take
advantage of land dispossessions enabling foreign investors to gain valuable land
concessions.
Environmental Considerations
Chinese dam projects and deforestation assistance have accelerated adverse environmental
impacts in Cambodia. Many critics highlight that Chinese companies carry out extensive
mineral exploration and logging and embark on hydropower projects in the impoverished
country. Investment in hydropower projects, such as the Stung Areng and Ta Tai dams
under construction by Chinese companies in Koh Kong province, is believed to be causing
the destruction of thousands of acres of forests amid logging activities.
While Chinese companies have obtained a virtual monopoly on Cambodia’s
hydropower sector, environment impact assessments (EIAs) for Chinese investment projects
remain worryingly inadequate. One common conception of Chinese-funded development
projects is that they “violate human rights and are raping natural resources.” In combination
with a Chinese reluctance to share national data on the impacts of dams, Cambodia can
easily be interpreted as an actor in a larger scheme of Chinese power asymmetry and
external governance focusing on ensuring and securing energy to meet its own ever-
growing need.
Further downgrading the public image of Chinese investment is the “low quality” of
construction projects Chinese companies granted through loans. In 2012, for instance, the
quality of the construction of National Road 7 came under widespread criticism for shoddy
construction. Some Chinese-funded projects also have resulted in inadequately constructed
infrastructure (i.e. the national highway to Ratanakiri).
Cultural Considerations
As noted earlier, in the June 2016 meeting between President Xi and King Sihamoni, China
put expanding people-to-people ties, or enhancing the cultural aspects of OBOR as one of
the top priorities. On the one hand, China views education as an effective diplomatic tool for
engaging neighbors. Vice-Premier Liu Yandong said during his visit in Brussels in
September 2015, "We will open our door wider and wider, offering access for foreign youth
to learn and understand China". On the other hand, education and human resource
development in Cambodia remain poor and there are insufficient efforts to date from the
China side to help enhance this sector.
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In past years, educational exchanges between China and Cambodia have been
progressing. For example, the first Confucius Institute, which aimed to promote Chinese
language and culture, support local Chinese teaching, and facilitate cultural exchanges, was
unveiled in December 2009 by then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. Moreover, China
pays close attention to the development of human resources in Cambodia by offering
scholarships to 62 Cambodian students in August 2015. As Cambodia needs more
scholarships, more technical training and technology transfers from China to develop its
human capital, the cultural initiatives of OBOR will help generate understanding and
closeness between the two countries.
III. Conclusion
The “One Belt One Road” initiative, if implemented in good faith, will contribute positively
toward the enhancement of trade, investment, tourism and people to people exchange
thereby forging China-ASEAN relations even closer to one another.
To ensure that this long-lasting relationship can be mutually beneficial between
Cambodia and China, the two nations must work together to improve transparency,
promote participatory and sustainable development by involving all relevant stakeholders,
and minimize environmental degradation.
Cambodia must strengthen its institutions and implement good governance policies to
encourage responsible investment that link financial aid to poverty reduction and inclusive
development.
China needs to rebuild its image as a good neighbor and take appropriate
responsibility as an international citizen — one that can be seen as promoter of peace,
stability and prosperity and merit the trust and confidence from all as it continues to rise
and become a major power.
There is nothing wrong with Cambodia counting on China to assist it to develop as a
modern and progressive nation, so long as Cambodia can keep the country open to other
investor nations who are all sincere partners and could help the country grow in a positive
way while keeping domestic cohesiveness and prosperity for the benefit of all Cambodians.
Through the OBOR initiative, Cambodia and China can work together closer and in a
sincere manner to ensure that their mutual benefits will not just be a welcome sign between
the two sides but can contribute toward the greater good of all mankind and promote the
common interest of the region and entire globe as well.
As a close friend to China, Cambodia can look forward to receiving favorable
consideration from Beijing. The proper long term planning related to infrastructure
development can be an impetus to drive national economic growth, Cambodia could excel
in Southeast Asia by way of taking advantage of the multiple benefits that the OBOR and
the AIIB have to offer. However, it must remain vigilant to overcome unseen circumstances,
such as financial risks related to large scale infrastructure projects that might put Cambodia
in a disadvantageous condition and hamper the country’s relationship with China.
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MY REFLECTIONS ON THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENTS
Remarks by
Ambassador Pou Sothirak
During the Commemorative Event of

The 25thAnniversary of the Paris Peace Agreements
Organized by
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Organization and
The French Embassy in Phnom Penh
With the Collaboration from

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,
Phnom Penh, 20th October 2016
I would like to take this opportunity to extend my deep appreciation to H.E. Prak Sokhonn,
Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for his kind
invitation extended to me to speak in front of such a distinguished audience of eminent national
and international personalities.
Furthermore, please allow me to offer my sincere congratulations to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the French Embassy in Cambodia for taking
the wonderful initiative to commemorate the 25th Anniversary of the Paris Peace Agreements, to
reflect upon a process that led to the successful conclusion of the historic political agreements as
well as numerous other positive changes which continue to bear relevance in present day
Cambodia.
My Institute, the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, is honored to join the
celebration of this landmark Agreements for the advancement of a sustainable peace in
Cambodia.
Today, I am indeed pleased to share my reflections on the Paris Peace Agreements, also
known as a comprehensive political framework document that marked the end of the
protracted conflicts and internal strife which had devastated Cambodia for more than two
decades.
Excellencies, Distinguished Participant, Ladies and Gentlemen

Although 25 years have now passed, it is important for Cambodia as a nation as well as the
world community to seize this opportunity to recollect how an internationally guaranteed
comprehensive political settlement was achieved to end the tragic conflict and bloodshed in
Cambodia.
Perhaps a good starting point should be for all of us here today to recall the
unforgettable destruction Cambodian had faced since 1970 by massive US bombing, by civil
war, by a genocidal reign of terror of the Khmer Rouge, by military intervention and by civil
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My Reflection on the Paris Peace Agreements

war again. These unconceivable tragedies resulted in the obliteration of Cambodia’s livelihood
and national assets beyond comprehension.
The so called Cambodian problems were very complex and seen as intractable conflicts.
What happened during that time was the result of the interplay of three disruptive forces with
regard to internal conflict, peace, and the sovereignty of Cambodia.
The first level of disturbance occurred domestically, resulting from the power struggle
inside the country and among four Cambodian warring factions.
The second level of discontentment followed from regional determination on the part of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to maintain an unyielding opposition to
foreign intervention in a sovereign state, ultimately favoring the Coalition of the Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).
And the third layer of acrimony came about due to the antagonistic attitude of great
powers’ engagement in the Cambodia conflict with China, Soviet Union, and the United States
supporting their own protégé separately.
Attempting to force a breakthrough, France, with significant influence in the region,
apprehended that the time was ripe in mid- 1989 for a full international conference on
Cambodia. The first Paris Conference on Cambodia (PICC) was accordingly convened in Paris
from 30 July- 30 August 1989, with joint Indonesian-French chairmanship. This brought
together all four Cambodian factions, the six ASEAN countries, the Permanent Five Members of
the UN Security Council, Vietnam, Laos, Australia, Canada and India as well as Zimbabwe
(representing the Non-Aligned Movement) and a representative of the UN Secretary-General.
Although there was visible progress in identifying a variety of elements necessary for
reaching a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Cambodia, the first IPCC had to be
postponed over one crucial point of disagreement - on whether to include the Khmer Rouge in
the transitional administration. The conference was suspended but all parties concerned were
urged to intensify their efforts to achieve a compromise, and the co-Presidents were asked to
continue lending their good offices to facilitate these efforts.
It was the Australian peace proposal announced by the Honorable Gareth Evans in
November 1989 aiming to mend the discord which had occurred during the first PICC, by
proposing that the United Nations be directly involved in the civil administration of Cambodia
during the transitional period. The proposal called for the UN to monitor the cease-fire and
cessation of external military assistance and to organize a free and fair election. By establishing
the actual governance of Cambodia during the transitional period by the UN, this allowed the
major powers to compromise with the withdrawal of their support for the Cambodian factions.
What was entailed were grueling but steady diplomatic efforts, undertaken by all parties
involved, to refine and develop the Australian proposal so as to advocate effectively for the UN
role in the peace settlement. There were noticeable endorsements from all key players,
including the Permanent Five and Paris Conference Co-Chairmen, in close consultation with the
UN Secretariat who had begun to play a central role. The Permanent Five held six major
consultative meetings between January and August 1990, reaching an agreement in New York
on 27-28 August. The 'framework' document set out the key components of a comprehensive
political settlement, based on an enhanced UN role, and a sensible balance of the various
interests involved.
At a meeting in Jakarta on 9-10 September 1990, hosted by Indonesia and France as the
Paris Conference Co-Chairmen, the four Cambodian parties accepted this Permanent Five
framework in its entirety as a basis for settling the Cambodian conflict. They agreed to establish
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a Supreme National Council (SNC), which was part of the original Australian proposal, and
called for in the framework, that would occupy the Cambodian seat in the United Nations.
The final step was for the UN to endorse the basic elements of the peace plan. The UN
General Assembly adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 668 of 20 September 1990,1and
the UN General Assembly Resolution 45/3 of 15 October 19902 into a framework document for
a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. These Resolutions also
welcomed the agreement of the Cambodian parties to form the SNC as the unique legitimate
body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the independence,
national unity and sovereignty of Cambodia is embodied'.
As a result, twenty-five years ago, the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict were signed on 23 October 19913 by the four Cambodian
parties and the international participants at the second Paris Conference on Cambodia. The
settlement gave the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) full
authority to govern Cambodia from March 1992 to September 1993. It committed the
Cambodian parties and those supporting them to a permanent ceasefire, repatriated the
displaced Khmer along the border with Thailand, disarmed and demobilized the factional
armies, prepared Cambodia for free and fair elections, and adopted a new democratic
constitution.
Excellencies, Distinguished Participant, Ladies and Gentlemen

Please allow me to give my assessment of the Paris Agreements as follows:
The Paris Agreements were the product of landmark collaboration between Cambodia and the
international community, working together to restore the independence and sovereignty of
Cambodia and to rebuild the country into a peaceful, democratic and prosperous nation.
To assess the PPA properly, one should come to terms with the view that the
Agreements provided the bases for typical and traditional peacekeeping functions.
These included the verification of the withdrawal of foreign forces and the supervision
of the ceasefire - plus other functions being assumed by the UN, such as repatriation of refugees
and involvement in elections.
However, in Cambodia, the concept of peacekeeping was significantly expanded, to
include comprehensive efforts towards institution building and social reconstruction as integral
parts of the package designed to secure a lasting end to armed conflict and a genuine transition
to democracy.
On the basis of this understanding, the question arises, ‘To what extent have the
Agreements been beneficial for Cambodia?’
On a positive note, one can say without exaggeration that the UN Blueprint for
Cambodia succeeded where previous attempts – a confrontational approach and the use of
military forces – had failed primarily because the international community included regional
blocs such as ASEAN and domestic Cambodian parties fully supported a negotiated peace

1UN Security Council Resolution 668 “The Situation in Cambodia” available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/18/IMG/NR057518.pdf?OpenElement
2the UN General Assembly Resolution 45/3 “The situation in Cambodia” available
athttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r003.htm
3 Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, available at
http://peacemaker.un.org/cambodiaparisagreement91
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settlement. Hence, the Paris Agreements gave rise to a political solution instead of a military
one, which enabled the prospect of national reconciliation and a Cambodia that is truly
independent, free from external domination.
Other constructive benefits should be attributed to the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) during its 18-month mandate in Cambodia. It was the most
elaborate and intensive commitment from the international community, exceeding any UN
peacekeeping operation that preceded it, with the total cost of over $1.6 billion.
We must acknowledge the enormous tasks assumed by UNTAC. The overall plan for
UNTAC which was approved by the UN Security Council on 28 February 1992, called for 15,900
military personnel, 3600 civilian police and 1020 administrative personnel. Thirthy-four nations
contributed to the military operation and 45 to the peacekeeping exercise overall. Then UN
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali held, “Nothing the UN has ever done can match this
operation.” 4 Still today, UNTAC is universally regarded as one of the most successful
peacekeeping missions in the history of the UN.
On 15 March 1992, the first UNTAC units arrived in Cambodia accompanied by the
Secretary-General's Special Representative, H.E. Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the commander of the
military component, Australian Lieutenant General John Sanderson. It was incredible that
UNTAC had succeeded in establishing an effective administrative structure, for both civilian
and military components, in dealing with Cambodia which had just exited a prolonged internal
conflict and was weak in human rights protection, without effective democratic governance,
and lacking rule of law or democracy.
With the proper administration in place UNTAC began a step by step process of
constructive engagement with the different Cambodian factions through the process of grass-
roots education as well top level consultations with the Khmer leaders, as well as appealing to
NGOs to deliver good public service to meet the needs of the Cambodian society.
It is fair to say that UNTAC was able to achieve many of its main goals. One of the most
important achievements was to organize a national election. It was a remarkable undertaking
by UNTAC to organize nation-wide voter registration and general elections from the ground
up, in which 90 per cent of the electorate participated in general elections where the nation had
a neutral political environment. The national election in May 1993 which is known to have been
a free and fair election was a considerable success. A new constitution based on the Constituent
Assembly in 1993 was adopted to create a new government and return Cambodia to the path of
peace and democracy.
In this sense, UNTAC played an indispensable role in bringing to life a new Cambodian
polity, based on unity it had carefully cultivated among the major factions with the exception of
the Khmer Rouge.
On a negative note, one cannot dispute the failure of UNTAC to ensure the disarmament
and demobilization of the 40,000 strong armed forces of Democratic of Kampuchea (NADK).
This letdown and the inability of the UN blue helmets to break open Cambodian territory under
the Khmer Rouge control has led some scholars to challenge the global evaluation of the
Agreements. Critics contend that UNTAC had not been able to implement its intended
mandate properly, and because UNTAC did not end the Khmer Rouge threat, the agreements
failed to bring peace to Cambodia.

4BoutrosBoutros-Ghali “The 'Second Generation': Cambodia Elections 'Free and Fair', but Challenges
Remain” in United Nations Chronicle, 30:5 (1993): 26.
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At the end of the UN operation in September 1993, the territory under the control of the Khmer
Rouge remained intact. The Cambodian government then had to deal with the security problem
left by UNTAC.
During the government’s first term from 1993-1998Khmer Rouge threats remained real,
limiting the transition to peace and stability. The agreement recognized the interdependence
between 'stabilizing the security situation' and 'confidence building among the parties to the
conflict' (Art. 11). However, in the UNTAC period the process of confidence building was not
completed and as a result, although the security situation was significantly improved, full
stabilization was not achieved. 5
The Win-Win Policy of Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen succeeded in removing these
threats as the last groups of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas were integrated into the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces in late 1998. This marked the historical end and total dissolution of
the Khmer Rouge’s political and military organs and the return of all secession areas to
government control.
In more recent times, the usefulness and continued relevance of the Paris Peace
Agreements has been called into question.
Looking ahead and considering how to render more credibility to international
agreements such as the Paris Peace Agreements in Cambodia, it would be a tragic missed
opportunity that all the instruments adopted under the framework Agreements on a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict have not been able to consistently
perpetuate the cooperation and goodwill from all parties to the Agreements.
Despite all the positive policy of the PPA and practical contributions of UNTAC, the
international community disengaged after 1993 and was too eager to both “pat itself on the
back” for its achievements and “wash its hands” of a complex and controversial situation.
There has been minimal international pressure to ensure that signatories complied with their
commitments, and democratic peace in Cambodia was reinterpreted in terms of the
international opinion of the 'intractability' of factional conflicts. Peace in Cambodia was
superseded by impressions formed from the more recent experiences of failed internationalism,
such as the Rwandan genocide, the failed Somalia intervention, and the arduous process of
peacemaking in the former Yugoslavia. Regionally, the primary concern of states became
weathering the storm of the Asian financial crisis.
The record of the international community remains then, at best, mixed. On the one
hand, it has consistently donated large amounts of ODA as well as guaranteeing the long-term
activities of multiple UN related international organizations. On the other hand, the
international community has been negligent in demanding that national actors and
stakeholders abide by the commitments they made in the PPA. This mix is reflected in the
assessment of UN Human Rights expert and former Special Rapporteur for Cambodia,
Professor Subedi, who has noted that in the long-term peace and stability have brought
“enormous dividends” to the country, and at the same time, “the Agreements will remain
relevant until their vision is a reality for all Cambodians.” 6
For the 1991 PPA to continue to be a relevant testament with great promise into the 21st
century, remaining challenges must be overcome, for both Cambodia and other signatory states.
Together we must honor our pledge in accordance with the spirit and essence of the
Agreements for the achievement of lasting positive peace, the protection of sovereignty and

5Karns and Mingst, p. 315.
6http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Cambodia-20yearsonfromtheParisPeace.aspx
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independence of Cambodia, and the fulfillment of all commitments as stipulated in the

Declaration on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia.
Conclusion
The Paris Peace Agreements constituted a breakthrough moment for Cambodia and the
international community by successfully crafting a comprehensive political resolution to end
the Cambodia dramatic past and bring forward the much anticipated peace and development. It
was truly a watershed event for the country, aiming for the respect of its political independence
and territorial integrity, as supportive of rebuilding the country into a progressive democratic
and developed state.
As we commemorate the 25th Anniversary of the Paris Agreements today, we should
express gratitude to the two Co-Chairman of the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, namely
France and Indonesia and the unwavering supports from the United Nations and other
signatory states to the Agreements, namely Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China,
France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Vietnam, and
Yugoslavia.
We should also recognize and pay homage to the indispensable spirit of national
reconciliation under the auspicious leadership of the late King Father, His majesty King
Norodom Sihanouk and the Cambodian leaders for their bravery and sacrifice allowing us to
unite as one Khmer family.
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MARITIME COOPERATION
Remarks by Ambassador Pou Sothirak
During the 10th CSCAP General Conference

On Confidence Building in the Asia Pacific – the Security Architecture of
the 21st Century
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 21-23 October, 2015
I am privileged to be able to share some thoughts on maritime cooperation. I hope to

contribute some ideas to enhance the ongoing regional efforts related to finding suitable
measures to keep the sea in the region ‘open, safe, and stable’.
In the Asia-Pacific region, maritime security, if not properly handled, could spawn
deep sense of distrust among nations and create a gamut of rivalry beyond anyone’s
expectation as fierce competition persists over the unresolved maritime-based territorial
disputes along with the growing maritime crimes.
The main challenge to maritime security is how countries in Asia Pacific region could
come together to address the ongoing competition to secure access to sea resources such as
energy and fisheries, the rising tension in the South China Sea and East China Sea as
claimants states exhibit inflexible behavior toward their maritime claims and the
proliferation of interconnected networks of transnational crime of terrorism, drug deals,
piracy, trafficking in person, and smuggling which the International Maritime Bureau
reported to be on the rise, especially in ASEAN countries since 2009. These manifestations
remain as major barrier to enhancing and ensuring ‘freedom of navigation’, preventing the
much needed cooperation in the use of the seas to promote peace and prosperity.
For the purpose of promoting confidence building in the Asia Pacific region and
enhancing maritime cooperation, allow me to touch upon two issues that, in my view,
deserve attention. First, I would like to focus on the essence of trust to help nurture
confidence and mutual understanding in the region and to reduce tensions on issues related
to maritime security so as to avoid possible miscalculation and manage the emerging
security threats at sea properly in order to prevent this region from plunging into chaos and
conflict. Second, I would like to share my views on how maritime cooperation under various
ASEAN frameworks could be enhance to maintain safety of navigation and to forge concrete
and cooperative actions to lower the tensions at sea as well as effectively control maritime
crimes such as sea piracy, hijacking and smuggling from happening.
I. Improving Mutual Trust

In recent years in the Asia Pacific region, there have been escalating tensions as countries in
the region have shown an inflexible posture to compete rather than compromise and
cooperate on the issues of mutual disagreements at seas.
There are circumstances which feed into the deepening of mistrust among countries
in the Asia Pacific region. First, there is a lingering suspicion about the U.S. Pivot to Asia
strategy when Washington transferred extensive military resources to the Asia Pacific and
China’s national revitalization concept based on consolidating control of its core interests
and pressing demands to reform the international order through a policy to harness good
relations with its neighbors with military buildup and presence in countries across Asia.
Second there is deep resentment among the countries in East Asia over historical animosities
and their strategic differences. And third, the persistence of disputes and flashpoints in the
-- 26
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Maritime Cooperation

East and South China Seas have prompted countries to take a harder stand and start exerting
their influence to secure greater national security of their own individually instead of seeking
a common aspiration to settle their differences.
Giving the complex security landscape in the Asia Pacific region, emphasis on trust
among nations should not be taking lightly. I am mindful that it is much harder to define
and qualify trust, but without it, a nation suffers the lack of motivation to think in a sensitive
way toward other countries. It is this sensitivity that enables the act of diplomacy in a
reciprocal way among states. However, trust should not be taken for an excuse to refuse
exploring alternative options such as peaceful means beside confrontation and serve to
endorse putting the blame on others for the ongoing state of affairs. We are better off to
acknowledge that trust can fortify cooperation to steer the state of the maritime affairs of this
region toward accommodating actions rather than entrench in never ending rivalry.
It is very important for all countries in the Asia Pacific region to focus their utmost
attention on the building of mutual confidence and develope their friendly and cooperative
behavior amidst ongoing crises and challenges which continue to feed into the increased
pessimism among states. To promote mutual trust in Asia Pacific region, here are some of
my views:
1- Encourage open dialogue and frank discussion among all countries in the Asia Pacific
to address common maritime security challenges in order to build stronger
partnership based on trust to achieve common peace through upgraded cooperation
in politics and security, mutual growth through strengthened economic cooperation
and shared development through boosted social and cultural ties.
2- Promote better understanding and avoid any act of miscalculation among parties
concerned for peace, security and stability, especially in the East and South China
Seas.
3- Improve all communication channels and provide better clarification on issues
related to an individual country’s historical interpretation so as to minimize domestic
patriotic sentiment and allow diplomacy to prevail over the narrow nationalistic
interest.
4- Avoid provocative gestures or aggressive actions through the creation of multi-
dialogue mechanism at all official levels and engage in peaceful discussion for the
purpose of reconciling any differences amicably on issues related to maritime
territorial claims and other maritime crimes.
5- Keep an open channel of communication among the coast guard and maritime safety
agencies of the East and South China Sea littorals. Hotlines for networking and
sharing of information for a coordinated response should be established. This can
promote better understanding and improve trust among all sides in dealing with any
emergency occurring at sea.
6- Enhance soft cooperation such as disaster relief, sea environment protection, and
search and rescue for people and ships in distress at sea. Through soft cooperation
the culture of dialogue and cooperation can be enhanced to achieve trust building
and preventive diplomacy.
If all countries vigorously pursue these ideas and can effectively maintain the habit of
negotiation and compromise, they will definitely enhance mutual trust and promote
cooperation among themselves which in turn able to reduce tensions and keep the Asia
Pacific region as prospering as possible and free from conflicts.
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II. Enhancing ASEAN Framework on Maritime Cooperation
The Asia Pacific, without a doubt, is a region of huge economic, political and security
significance. Amidst this significance, the future of the seas in the Northeast Asia and
Southeast Asia is at stake due to uncontested competition among the major powers as they
exert their influence relentlessly in the pursuit of their national strategic interest. Maritime
threats such as crimes and tradition security concerns are still eminent as illicit maritime acts
coupled with tensions and rivalry remain a real possibility, threatening peace and stability in
the region.
Regional flashpoints could erupt into open conflicts and maritime crimes, if left
unattended could destabilize hard earn peace and jeopardize the prosperity the seas have to
offer. No countries in the region can dismiss the enormous task and challenges of
maintaining good order at sea and the vital need for the adoption of peaceful means to
manage and resolve maritime disputes based on international law. These countries must
cooperate to find viable mechanisms to settle inter-state maritime disputes, coordinate
responses to transnational security threats at sea and balance the competing powers to
safeguard peace, stability and prosperity in this region.
Over the years, ASEAN has been instrumental in ensuring maritime connectivity to
allow ‘freedom of navigation’ and keep the sea lanes open and safe from unintended crimes.
ASEAN frameworks such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and the East Asia Summit (EAS)
as well as the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community which is expected to be
launched at the end of 2015 have been dedicated to facilitate the free flow of people, goods
and services, allowing intra-regional economic integration to thrive.
ASEAN member countries and their dialogues partners in the EAS have been keen to
realize various cooperation agreements through collaborative actions to keep the seas in the
region unhindered for trade and commerce, protected from piracy and terrorism, and free
from tension and conflicts based on a firm observance of the international law, including the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Some of the joint actions and measures to enhance maritime cooperation to secure
safety of navigation and to strengthen closer cooperation in combating against sea piracy,
hijacking and smuggling were a part of the APT Cooperation Work Plan 2013 – 2017 which
was adopted at the 15thASEAN Plus Three Summit in 2013. In addition, based on a proposal
by the Japanese government during the 6th EAS Summit in 2011, a forum to discuss maritime
cooperation in the region has been established – known as the Expanded ASEAN Maritime
Forum (EAMF) which includes the EAS participating countries coupled with the existing
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF). I understand that as of now, three meetings of EAMF have
been convened to discuss the enhancement of regional cooperation on maritime issues and
the idea of freedom of navigation.
Notwithstanding these efforts, there remain issues which require greater attention
such as the growing tension in East and South China Seas and other maritime crimes such as
illegal businesses including smuggling of arms, illicitly logged lumber, drugs, transportation
of illegal immigrants and human trafficking which are conducted on extorted fishing boats
using a forged registry. These incidents and crimes, which are still prevalent at seas in the
present, are occurring against the existing loopholes of the international institutions and the
lack of effective countermeasures.
While ASEAN has been keen to pursue a desirable maritime security regime which
must remain open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking, the 10-member states must
work harder to gain more unwavering commitment from other EAS countries, especially the
U.S. China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and India to address the persistent
challenges caused by transnational and non-traditional security along with traditional
security concerns.
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I have some suggestions for ASEAN and other countries in the EAS to consider as
follows:
1- First of all ASAEN member states need to strengthen its liberal agenda, deepen
further their economic interdependence and construct viable institutions through
which they conduct their affairs multilaterally. They need to overcome their
differences quietly so as to foster stronger intra-ASEAN unity and centrality which
could provide opportunities for external partners to gain leverage and strike a
common purpose in keeping the region peaceful and prosperous. More importantly,
ASEAN needs to formulate a common voice and act in unison when dealing with
issues related to political-security, economic and social issues.
2- ASEAN-led frameworks on maritime cooperation need to exhibit a clear and
collective leadership to overcome challenges posed upon the “ASEAN Way” and be
able to tackle sensitive and hard security issues such as territorial conflicts, arm
control, nuclear proliferation, as well as other transnational and non-traditional
security concerns all of which continue to threaten regional peace and stability.
3- Other EAS partners should work together with ASEAN in a concerted manner to
maintain peace, stability and progress in the region by engaging in frank and open
discussions with each other and to explore new initiatives and creative approaches to
jointly manage the tensions and contain conflicts which flare up from time to time
rather than simply defending their respective national interests.
4- On a practical approach, all EAS member countries should create an effective crisis
management scheme at the operational level between navies and coast guard units of
all regional states. All sides should agree on prior notification of military exercises in
the Northeast and Southeast seas, and facilitate the rescue at sea of people and vessels
in distress. Crisis management capabilities should be based on rules and procedures
aimed at defusing tensions, preventing conflict from happening, and promote
transparency and reciprocal respect.
5- The EAMF participating countries should be reinforced and aspire to become a forum
in which strategic and comprehensive discussions can be made on maritime issues as
well as on maritime cooperation.
6- All major powers should avoid pushing and pulling each other over their strategic
interests in the maritime domain. Instead, all sides should join together in stepping
up their coordination with ASEAN partners on issues related to the maintenance of
‘freedom of navigation’ in accordance to international norms and ensure that
emergencies at seas are well managed.
7- Given the complexity of maritime crimes which are far-ranging in categories, actors
and locations and the segmentation of different frameworks which sometimes
overlap each other, the first order of business to enhance cooperation in maritime
affairs should be to streamline the confluence of numerous frameworks, ensure
uniformity of information, and undertake clear assessment as well as identification of
concrete measures to implement regional maritime cooperation.
8- Prior to the formulation of policies at the governmental level, ASEAN and the EAS
Countries should promote the engagement at a track 2 level among research
institutes in the region to rigorously debate the maritime issues so as to attain sharing
of common awareness, nurture common understanding of relevant maritime issues,
and to engage in a frank and open exchange of views on measures to be taken as
possible resolutions which is difficult to propose at the governmental level due to
domestic restrictions. After that, the results could be presented to the relevant
governments. In this way, the realization of the intellectual exchange among various
institutes in the region can contribute viably for governments’ consideration on the
appropriate negotiation policies based on cooperative aspects of the maritime issues.
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III. Conclusion
Maritime cooperation will definitely define the future of the Asia Pacific region and freedom
of navigation centering on keeping the sea lanes open and free from maritime crimes will
continue to provide lasting benefits for all of the regional states.
For cooperation to prevail, all countries in Asia Pacific region must find their
common position to address maritime security earnestly, amidst the complex shifting of
major power relations. They need to be more vigilant and recognize that potential tension
and miscalculation which can serve as fault lines and create difficulties and conflicts as
nations often strive to maximize their interests. They must surrender the conviction that
national survival is all about one’s ability to accumulate as much resources for oneself
without consideration for others and give up uncooperative behavior to build stronger trust
and confidence based on common interest and mutual respect, so as to help the region
withstand and resolve serious tensions as they arise.
To ensure freedom of navigation and get rid of maritime crimes at seas, regional
states must harness the necessary means available at their dispositions to adhere to the
principle that guide maritime activities and maintain maritime order based on international
law, especially on UNCLOS. They need to hasten their collaboration and manage their
relations through the habit of dialogue and diplomacy without the reliance on military might
to resolve maritime conflicts at sea.
For the ASEAN-led maritime frameworks to be enhanced usefully in making current
peace and prosperity at seas more durable, ASEAN and other EAS member countries must
do more and be willing to tackle sensitive and common regional interest more convincingly
and project their collective resolve on issues of regional and international concern instead of
clinging to their individual state interests
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ASPECTS AND AIMS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Kevin R. Nauen
CICP Senior Research Fellow
Working Paper
November 2016
“Security sector reform will achieve little without a broader process of

transformation of the society. But the reverse is also true. The political reform
process will get stalled without a thorough transformation of the security sector.
It is a process that goes beyond the civil control of the armed forces; it needs to
be a process of democratic control.” 1
This essay is intended as an introduction to Security Sector Reform. It is aimed at providing a

foundation and reference guide to CICP work in this area. It does not seek to be an exhaustive
analysis to the topic, but rather a supportive literature review which can serve as a useful
taxonomical tool for civil society and/or parliamentarians. Section I of the essay examines SSR
in detail to elucidate the different understandings, its definition and dimensions, and indicate
any potential overlap between them. Section II of the essay looks at SSR in relation to
peacekeeping with a focus on DDR and transitional justice, local ownership, and the role of
parliaments.
I. Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Considerations

A. Historical Development of SSR
Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a concept and practice has followed from the redefinition of
security threats and increased cooperation of the international community in the aftermath of
the Cold War, from the recognition that failure to address the security sector is a key
impediment to development, and from the proliferation of the ideal of human security in terms
of people-centered national interests. 2 On the one hand, there is now general agreement that
security and peace are public goods, and in terms of collective goods there are issues of relative
degrees of scarcity. On the other hand, the amount and efficiency of resources needed for
public order link to questions concerning the transparency and accountability of military
budgets, along with democratic civilian management. Effective security sector reform is thus
oriented toward both effective civil oversight and forming security institutions that effectively
and efficiently provide form for the public in each state.
SSR is the offspring of a conjunction of a multiple historical roots. First, it is based in the
paradigm of civil-military relations (1970s) which centered on making the armed forces
accountable to and supervised by civilian authorities. Second, it is rooted in the principle of

1 Herbert Wulf, Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries”. Bergh of Research
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, July 2004, p. 16.
2 David Chuter, “Understanding Security Sector Reform” in Journal of Security Sector Management, vol.4,
no.2, April 2006, pp. 3-5.
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Aspects and Aims of Security Sector Reform

democratic control (1980s) which focused on achieving accountability and transparency of the
security sector. Third, it reflects the OSCE initiative of the ‘Code of Conduct’ whereby the
democratic principle was extended to non-military components of security such as police,
intelligence agencies, and paramilitary organizations. Fourth, the impact of the shift to focus on
non-traditional security threats and human security linking the risks of social and economic
factors to personal and communal well-being. 3
SSR discussion has evolved out of the ideologically laden security policies of the Cold
War and the failure of development policies which can be partly attributed to a lack of inclusion
of the security sector as a key ingredient to economic progress. The role of the security sector
and its links to development programs was consistently considered contentious and outside the
mandate of development agencies. In this context, relations with the military of developing
states were left to the military institutions of developed states. SSR due to the experience of
persistent authoritarianism, including in some cases military coups and sustained military rule,
discussions of the security sector turned to address the resources consumption and waste of
resources, the importance of the military in the process of nation-building, and importance of
the military in modernization. 4
Another approach to the history of SSR sees the military and development issues as
imbricated from the outset. As such, SSR can be traced to the question of the proper role of the
military in developing countries, bridging CMR and development concerns. Three interrelated
questions arose: whether resources consumed by the military should be put to other purposes
for better use; how the military could contribute to overall nation-building qua territorial and
institutional integrity; and, how the armed forces affected modernization. Initially, the
perspective on the armed forces was positive, but this shifted in the 1970s in the wake of
widespread intervention of the military into politics, in Asia and even more so in Africa and
Latin America. Attention turned to the causes of coups and the ultimate effects of military rule.
In the context of the Cold War military studies and development studies disassociated, not
surprisingly given the priority on alliance of specific states irrespective of the form of the
government regime. 5
The transformation that follows the Cold War where in military and development issues
are again linked is rooted to several factors. First, development donors became increasingly
concerned about the effect of military expenditures in draining potential resources for
development. Second, the second wave of democratization correlate to the end of military rule
in Latin America and spread of democracy in Africa allowed for increased examination of the
importance of professionalization of the military and increasing the governance capacity of
civilian institutions. Third, the concept of good governance was expanded to include measures
of efficiency of resource expenditure. Fourth, both development and conflict resolution efforts
agreed on the need for effective demobilization in post-conflict scenarios. Fifth, reconstruction
following conflicts became increasingly aware of the importance of rule of law and effective
legal institutions including police. Sixth, threats to personal physical security were recognized
as obstacles to economic growth. Finally, the notion of security was expanded from traditional

3 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone “Promoting peace and democracy through security sector reform”, Insights:
Research Findings for Development and Policymakers. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.
No.70, November, 2009, p. 1.
4 Herbert Wulf, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Eschborn, 2000.

5 Michael Brzoska, “The Concept of Security Sector Reform”, in Herbert Wulf ed. Security Sector Reform.
Bonn International Center for Conversion. Brief 15. Bonn, 2000, p.
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issues to include human and people-centered issues. As such, the conception of security has
transformed beyond physical conditions to a broader understanding of individual and
communal well-being. Ultimately, development practices could evolve in a new security
environment. Whereas initially they avoided security issues, the end of the Cold War made it
possible to see security challenges as more complex and requiring longer-term solutions in line
with developmental approaches. Over time, an awareness of indirect or structural violence
made it possible for donor security aims to recognize the need to prioritize the well-being of
vulnerable groups, and a refocusing on the human security of populations and fomenting
institutional and normative structures for positive peace in order to prevent destabilization in
the long-term. 6
Alternatively, SSR can be viewed as the outcome of a historical process of collaboration
of the original civil-military relations paradigm with the development sector, that occurs in such
a way that it results in broad generalizations of the concept of SSR, making it difficult to apply
to particular cases and limiting the ability to cooperatively engage the security sector in the
process of reform. 7 Civil-military relations risks placing civilian authority and the military in a
zero-sum game relation where only one can succeed and its success is its dominance over the
other. 8 Moreover, it allows for the simplification wherein civilian rule is, in contrast to the
invariable authoritarianism of military rule, assumed to be democratic. The potential for
biasing the understanding of SSR is evident in two forms: that military interference or
dominance over politics need not be explained, but those cases in which the military does not
interfere do warrant an explanation 9 ; and, in the often underlying idealism that opines
eliminating militaries would result in the cessation of war, rather than seeing the military as
something that develops in response to war. 10
The detrimental bias of development studies finds its practical manifestation in policies
which see all military expenditure as a form of waste, following from the wholesale
disassociation of the security sector from any potential positive contribution to development.
What began as efforts to channel military resources into development projects, ended as an
adversarial relationship between development aims and the function of the military. 11 The
conjunction of these two historical trajectories may result in an SSR paradigm which overlooks
the critical issue of what the security sector is actually supposed to do. Successful reform must
take as its guideline the purpose of the security sector, rather than its subjugation and
elimination. The CMR approach risks reducing the security sector to the status of a threat in
need of minimization, and the development approach risks understanding SSR as merely a loss
of resources. 12 An adequate management of these risks must begin with the admission that the
security sector has a function, for society and social order, but as well for democratic
governance and development. It is now recognized by the UN that without sustained stability
provided by security, economic and social development is impossible. 13

6 Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform,
International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007.
7 David Chuter “Understanding Security Sector Reform”, Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol.4,
No.2, April 2006, pp. 3-5.

8 Chuter, p. 4.
9 Chuter, p. 4.
10 Chuter, p. 17.
11 Chuter, p. 5.
12 Chuter, p. 6.
13 Brzoska, p. 7.
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B. Definitions of SSR
SSR as an aim of development has become increasingly popularized following its articulation
by the UK Minister for International Development in 1998. Her formulation of SSR entailed
several components: reduction of military expenses for developing states accompanied by
redirection of those resources towards development; development programs with a security
dimension; donor commitment to conflict prevention and resolution; and, more efficient
governance over security providing institutions. 14 The UK Government Global Conflict
Prevention Pool (GCPP) defines SSR as: “a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of
disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security related policy,
legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognized democratic norms and
principles.” 15
The DFID defines SSR as resulting in security provision consistent with democratic
governance, such that security forces are accountable, reduce the risk of conflict, and create a
condition enabling sustainable development. 16 This functional definition of SSR centers on the
output in terms of an improvement for states in “accountability and transparency of their
security sectors.” 17 The OECD definition is grounded on the development of democratic norms
in conjunction with good governance resulting in the ‘well-functioning’ of the security
sector. 18 The OECD DAC stipulates SSR is: “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet
the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms
and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but
extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence,
intelligence and policing.” 19 The U.S. State Department, Department of Defense and Agency for
International Development have an agreed upon definition of SSR: “the set of policies, plans,
programs and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety,
security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes
effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and
responsive to the needs of the public.” 20
The Stability Pact for Southern Europe defines SSR as a “right-sizing, reorientation, and
reform, and capacity-building of national defense forces.” 21 The Bonn International Centre for

14 See Michael Brzoska. 2003. Security sector reform in development donor perspective: origins, theory and
practice. Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Occasional Paper 4.
Geneva.
15 Department of International Development, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 2004.
16 Department for International Development. 2003. The Global Conflict Prevention Pool. A joint UK
Government approach to reducing conflict. London.

17 DFID Terms of Reference for the Provision of Consultancy Services on Conflict, Security and
Development Issues, ref 01/2892, undated, para. 8.

18 OECD. 2004. Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, A DAC Reference
Document. Paris: OECD, p. 16. Note that The OECD Guidelines for Conflict, Peace and Development
Cooperation, of the Development Assistance Committee includes child soldiers as an area of SSR focus.
19 OECD, 2004.
20 “Security Sector Reform” U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense and
Department of State, February 2009, p. 3.

21 Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Working Table III, Security and
Defense Issues, “Security Sector Reform”, paper for the Regional Conference, Bucharest, 25-26 October
2001.
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Conversion (BICC) understands SSR as the process “to create armed, uniformed forces which
are functionally differentiated, professional forces under objective and subjective political
control, at the lowest functional level of resource use.” 22 Some definitions link SSR to
disarmament. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo conceives of SSR in terms of the successful
reduction of small arms. 23
Both security sector governance and rule of law are understood as indispensable
components to security reform. SSG involves oversight and management of the security sector
that is transparent, accountable and legitimate. Rule of law is the practice of the “principle
under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself,
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights law.” 24
C. Dimensions of SSR
There are four related elements of SSR: political, economic, social, and institutional. First, the
political element entails the creation of civilian authority over the military, police and
intelligence sectors. Second, the economic element involves balancing over-consumption of
resources with underfunding of the security apparatus. Third, the social element focuses on
practicing the ideal of human security or a people-centered order. Fourth, the institutional
element is supported by a division of labor between the different security actors, and excluding
the military from a role in domestic politics. 25
The United Nations Security Council understands SSR to involve various areas of
governance such as strategic planning, institutional structures, resource management,
operational capacity, civilian oversight, and good governance standards. 26 Although no absolute
agreement on what SSR entails, a fairly comprehensive list of components includes: building
capacity of security sector institutions so that they can effectively carry out legitimate functions;
augmenting civilian oversight and control; building adherence to the norms of human rights
and rule of law for security sector actors; augmenting oversight by civil society organizations;
maintaining transparency for security budgeting and spending; increasing regional confidence-
building and collaboration; assisting or enacting disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration; reducing the availability of small arms; including security sector reform as part of
the political discourse of elected and non-elected officials. 27
These components can be divided into two generations. 28 First-generation reform is rooted in
the insights and reasoning of civil-military relations. It centers on the depoliticizing of the
security sector actors and fomenting democratic civilian control. It entails the transparent

22 Michael Brzoska, “The Concept of Security Sector Reform” in Security Sector Reform, BICC Briefing
Paper No. 15, Bonn, 2000, p. 9.

23 See www.prio.no/research/project.asp. See also: Dominick Donald and Funmi Oloisakin, “Security
Sector Reform and the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons,” Ploughshares Briefing 01.7.

25 Wulf, 2004, p. 5.
26 UNSC Resolution, 20 February 2007.
27 Chuter, p. 6.
28 Timothy Edmunds “Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation”, Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Working Paper no. 86, October 2002, pp. 7-11.
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division of labor between security sector actors and procedures and norms for democratic
control based on a transparent and accepted chain of command. Moreover, there must be a
clear and consistent demarcation of the various levels and parts of government institutions
contributing to the provision of security. This should be based on legislation such as
constitutional standards which also include clear limitations on the powers of the different
security sector institutions.
A key aspect of first generation SSR is the establishment of oversight and transparency.
This occurs by granting the parliament or legislative branch the constitutionally declared
capacity for decision-making power over the security budget along with committees to
investigate and monitor the practices of security sector actors. This is correlate to the overall
rearticulation of the civilian-military relationship and the depoliticization of the security sector
which requires removing elements from that sector that are vehemently partisan or with strong
ties to any prior authoritarian regime or ideological commitment to the identity cleavages
contributing to conflict. First generation SSR should begin the process of professionalizing the
security sector following from a detailed assessment of actual security needs and the tasks of
the component elements of the security sector. 29
Second generation SSR refers to the combination of emphases on strengthening
democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight, making transparency of security
funding transparent, improving efficiency of policy implementation and effectiveness of
provision of security for all, and increasing the contribution of an interaction with civil society.
It is important to generate civilian management with the knowledge and capacity related to
security sectors needs, aims, and processes. Without this there is little possibility of effective
management and it becomes unlikely that security sector actors will submit to civilian
authorities. The bureaucratic levels and institutions of the security sector should have the
capacity to implement policy, and to contribute to the oversight of other sectors so as to foster
transparency. Weaknesses of the capacity include: absence of information about the resources
delegated to and used by the security sector, weak analysis of policy options, poor strategies
linking goals and resources, and bureaucracies that are unable or unwilling to implement
policies. 30
The security community is composed of the actors relevant to SSR. It has four parts31 :
core institutions of military, police and intelligence services; managing bodies such as
legislatures, executives and ministries; non-core institutions including the judiciary and
correctional services; and, non-statutory institutions such as insurgent organizations, militias,
political party armed wings, and private security companies. 32 Oversight bodies include both
the executive and legislative, security sector actors may be considered to include both law
enforcement and the judiciary, and non-state actors must be addressed in their capacity as
effective security providers. 33 The U.S. conception articulates a different set of four related
groups: state security providers, government management and oversight bodies, civil society,

29 Edmunds, p. 8.
30 Edmunds, pp. 9-10.
31 OECD. 2004. Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, A DAC Reference
Document. Paris: OECD, pp. 16-17.

32 Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska, “Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector”, Bonn International
Center for Conversion. Paper 21. Bonn, 2002, p. 8.

33Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform,
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and non-state providers of justice and security. 34 Note that this categorization has the added
value of recognizing the importance of civil society in overall democratization and ensuring
that SSR goes beyond simple CMR in contributing to achieving development and human
security. Another approach defines the security sector as including traditional security actors
including both armed forces and police, oversight bodies including both the executive and
legislative branches of state, civil society organizations, judiciary and law enforcement
institutions including prisons, and non-state security providers. 35
Empirical studies on SSR have generated a significantly increased understanding of the
aspects of reform: reasons for reform, types of reform, and potential for reform in conflict
situations based on the specifics of the case. The following reasons are now generally
recognized as motives for reform: budget demands which apply to all cases, post-conflict peace-
building, ongoing conflict requiring stronger security services, transitioning away from military
rule, transitioning away from authoritarianism, transitioning away from single-party rule,
enabling participation in international peacekeeping efforts, and, membership in military
alliances or regional organizations. 36 One or more of these reasons account for domestic
commitment to reform, but also indicate why domestic intentions and ownership may be
limited. Successful SSR fundamentally depends on the existence of democratic institutions and
the internalization of democratic norms. Empirically observed cases of success often involve a
committed executive supported by external donors. 37 Nevertheless, strengthening the
executive also runs the risk of personifying power and enabling a monopolization of authority
that runs counter to democratic standards.
There are eight types of SSR. These are: collaboration between security services and
civilian institutions to foster democratization; democratization and growth of civil society with
only minimal SSR; top-down reform without public involvement; reform rhetoric without
significant change; donor driven reform without local initiative or acceptance; restructuring of
the security sector in accordance externally derived standards; inclusion of parties in generating
a post-conflict environment; and, constructing wholly new security institutions at the behest of
external pressure and utilizing external assistance. 38
Successful SSR must occur in the context of broader efforts to address and remedy
modes of structural violence. These operate as underlying obstacles to reform which ensure
achievements will be limited, reversible, and perhaps even counterproductive. Structural
violence exists as persistent authoritarianism, weak and ineffective governance, poverty and
exclusion, and discrimination of minorities (ethnic and religious prejudices). 39 Efforts which
only seek to remedy violence will falter without a broader commitment to prevention of conflict
through addressing its structural causes. This is correlate to recognizing the importance of local
ownership and case specific needs of the host nation population, which is in part based on
developing SSR programs as component of longer-term objectives. 40

Department of State, February 2009, pp. 3-4.

35 Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform.
International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007, p. 1.

36 Wulf 2004, p. 8.
37 Wulf, p. 9.
38 Wulf, p. 8.
39 Lauri Nathan, 2001, p.
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It is also important the reform of the security sector be supported a long-term commitment and
in collaboration with the right domestic partners. Strategies for security reform must
acknowledge the fact that external involvement will most likely blur the line between aid and
intervention 41 due to the targeting of aid and recommendations. Moreover, without internal
intentions of domestic actors it may be more useful to restrict modes of cooperation and offers
of assistance as resources can be co-opted for practices that are detrimental to the ‘human’
security of the populace. In overcoming entrenched authoritarianism and protracted civil
conflict, security reform can only progress with the support of national and local leadership.
Cultivating this support, moreover, will only occur by way of confidence-building practices that
generate legitimacy and trust between the core security actors and civilian leadership and
population. 42 One must also keep in mind that, threats to human security may come from the
military as it despotically seeks to dominate over political decision-making, but military control
may also be a response to despotism and corruption of civilian political rulers. 43
Donor policy related to SSR suffers from three primary weaknesses: Lack of
coordination among policies of donor states, lack of coordination among agencies and
ministries of individual donor states, and most detrimentally, the separation of defense
relations which are often characterized by arms trade from efforts for development and SSR. 44
Development ministries push for reduction of arms expenditures while economics and trade
ministries seek out arms sales. Policy coordination to achieve debt relief is cancelled out by
arms imports which add to national debt. These problems are compounded by an overall
selectivity of interventions and aid by the international community. 45
Resource allocation for the security sector should aim to minimize the amount of
resources that are deviated from development purposes, recognize that order and stability are
themselves prerequisites for development, and admit that this recognition alone is not sufficient
to develop a targeted policy blueprint for prioritizing the distribution of limited resources. 46
SSR literature demonstrates a universal consensus that one primary aim of reform is
civilian rule. Thus, the first and most obvious challenge is limiting the political role of the
military. This is, however, predicated on discipline and professionalization of the armed forces.
A professional military is subject to civilian control but is also itself protected from politicians
who seek to turn it into a tool for personal ends or party loyalty. Civilian decision-makers must
be inculcated with a certain minimum of human resources so as to be capable of managing the
military even without themselves being of military background. 47 To do so they must be made
aware of the needs, interests, limitations and priorities of security sector institutions.
Civilian leadership must have the technical and resource capacities to control the
security services, as well as the foresight to decline opportunities to co-opt them for the
purposes of concentrating power and reinvigorating authoritarian rule. This means that support
and training aid must include a focus on building the capacities of the legislative and executive
branches and civil society, as well as aiming for legislative control over the executive and the
strengthening of the sector of civil society organizations. Reform is potentially more rapid in

41 Some analysts take the position that any donor supported or directed efforts for SSR are a mode of
intervention. See Wulf, p. 13.
42 Ball and Brzoska, 2002.
43 Wulf, p. 15.
44 Wulf, pp. 13-14.
45 Wulf, p. 16.
46 Wulf, p. 14.
47 Wulf, p. 15.
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post-conflict conditions, as situations of political stability involve governments that are slow to
make transformations. It follows that successful reform efforts are not wholly contingent upon
a specific type of regime and that democratization does not by itself guarantee security
reforms. 48
Significant domestic obstacles often exist which pressure maintaining the status quo. As
a result, reform efforts often focus on improving the capacity of the armed forces and cutting
costs rather than increasing security of the population. Moreover, the transparency necessary
for SSR directly challenges the capacities of the intelligence institutions in their function as
‘secret’ services. This makes it necessary that intelligence services are subjected to rigorous
civilian oversight. 49 Four primary challenges in implementing SSR are: achieving genuine local
ownership in conditions where security forces are part of the problem; the financial and human
resource cost for the reforming states; the diversity of activities entailed in successful reform
which leads to inconsistencies in programming and reform efforts; and the long-term
commitment from donors seeking maximum outcome gains in the short-term. 50
Several key principles must be adhered to ensure best practices in reform programming.
As agreed to by the OECD, the most important of these are: building understanding and
political will at the local level by ensuring the progressive development of effective governance
and accountability; increasing cooperation between security bodies and non-security
institutions; recognizing that reform is long-term through the necessary commitment; and
integrating different types of government authority instead rather than carrying out disjoined
efforts. 51
II. SSR and Peace building

A. General Considerations
“The underlying structural causes of inter- and especially intra-state crises cannot be resolved
through quick fixes. Security sector reform does not end with the cessation of the most obvious
gross violence and warfare. It is a medium-range reform programme, which has to be
embedded in a long-term process of peace-building.” 52
In conflict situations lacking developed political and administrative bodies, the conflict
can be exacerbated by conditioned aid which, albeit with the best intentions, is poorly designed
for the practical situation on the ground. When the ideals and commitment of civilian rulers
and military officials is in questions, donors would do better to focus on strengthening civil
society. 53 The dilemma for SSR efforts in a post-conflict situation centers on finding the right
balance to the size, resources and influence of the security sector. On the one hand, post-conflict
situations are characterized by an excess in the size of the armed forces such that they are larger
than what is “politically desirable and economically sustainable.” On the other hand, the

48 Wulf, p. 17.
49 Wulf, pp. 7-8.
50 Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform,

51 OECD DAC Handbook, pp. 10-12.
52 Wulf, p. 18.
53 Wulf, p. 16.
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prevalence of internal security problems in post-conflict conditions demand a build-up and

strengthening of relevant security institutions. 54
The potential for SSR in cases of conflict is dependent upon the conditions of the specific
state. These conditions vary from ongoing war to post-conflict communities. Between these
two poles there are cases capable of varying degrees of reform, each evidencing their own types
of obstacles. In cases of war and ongoing civil conflict, disarmament and demobilization are
extremely difficult. SSR efforts in such cases should focus on building civil society and
increasing its capacity to normalize peace and the practice of accountability for security forces.
In countries characterized as areas of conflict SSR efforts should seek to counter the tendency
towards armament by building practices in civil society to increase human security. In failed
states where there is a loss of monopoly over the use of force, such a monopoly may have to be
rebuilt in order to initiate a process of security reform. More potential exists in states involved
in a process of conflict mediation, but to harness this potential trust and confidence-building is
necessary. The limits to reform in post-authoritarian states can be surpassed by eroding
persistent authoritarianism and nepotism as well as criminal activities carried out by the police.
In states that are transitioning from conflict to peace, there is a need to overcome the resistance
of the security sector to change due to the threat of a loss of power and privilege by security
institutions. In situations of post-conflict, SSR can build on the optimism and enthusiasm for
progress change that follow peace agreements. 55
The evolution of emphasis on SSR correlates with the progressive acceptance of the
concept of human security in development and the transformation of peacekeeping into peace
building at the United Nations. The concept of peace building was first set out by SG Boutros-
Ghali as he defined post-conflict reconstruction as the task of building structures to avoid
relapse into conflict. 56 It was furthered by SG Kofi Annan who emphasized the need to address
the underlying structural factors which induce conflict and create conditions for both
reconciliation and reconstruction. 57
Post-conflict recovery demands coordination among the top levels of different relevant
actors including concordance on normative, administrative and strategic aims. Sustainability of
reforms is predicated on involving local partners and ultimately transitioning to full local
ownership. Post-conflict peace-building includes revitalizing political, economic, and security
institutions which can only be done in secure conditions, and such conditions require external
military forces. External military forces must be an integral part of the overall transformation
process. Conflict resolution based on positive and sustainable peace includes SSR which must
meet the demands places on a ‘post-modern’ military. These demands include: a general
historical tendency of decreasing influence of traditional values of honor and nationalism and
increasing influence of universal values of rights and democracy; a rise in non-traditional
security threats and correlate increase in military tasks other than war; increased acceptance
and pressure for international intervention into conflict situations; internationalization of
military forces through into regional security forces; changes in the practice of war following

54 Brzoska, p. 7.
55 Wulf, pp. 6-7.
56 Boutros Boutros-Ghali. 1992. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,
A/47/277-S/24111. New York: United Nations, para. 21.

57 United Nations. 1998. The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development
in Africa, Report of the UN Secretary-General, A/52/871-S/1998/318. New York: United Nations, para.
63.
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increase in counterinsurgency and changes in technology; and, privatization of conflict through

involvement of non-state actors and privately funded forces. 58
B. The importance of DDR and Transitional Justice

Following the increased international concern with post-conflict peace building there has been a
significant development in terms of institutional arrangements and efforts as well as research
and funding aimed at conflict prevention, resolution, and reconciliation to prevent relapse.
DDR is an important first step for all of these processes. The UNSC has recognized the link
between SSR and other processes needed for both stabilization and reconstruction, including
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Its conception of DDR extends to include
repatriation, rehabilitation, and small arms control. 59
In the context of generalized contemporary conditions, SSR must focus on delimiting the
role of the military so as to restrict it from politics and establish civilian rule. Problematically, at
the same time, national militaries must evolve beyond the traditional tasks of external defense
and responding to aggression. Specific post-conflict societies can be characterized as sharing
several traits: dependency on aid, confronting organized violence and persistent insecurity,
weak state structures, little strategic value for advanced economies and/or consolidated
democratic states. 60
Post-conflict situations entail military forces and armed groups that must be
reintegrated into the society. Moreover, political institutions must be restored and endowed
with capacities. Civilian control over the military is needed, and this depends on an overall
increase in trust and confidence building between civil society and state and between civilian
leaders and military elites. Military involvement of foreign forces must be augmented while
simultaneously demobilizing national level military actors and restricting the parameters of
their activities. 61
Schnabel and Ehrhart denote several requirements to establishing SSR as a component to
peace-building. The delimitation of the military’s involvement in domestic politics must be
followed with a clear and consistent mechanism of accountability for military spending and
actions. The separation of the police and military must correlate making the police serve the
populace including self-censoring its capacities to violate human rights. Corruption of the
judicial system must be minimized and appointments of judges should be based on experience
and capacity rather than political affiliation or personal loyalty to power-holders.
Strengthening of civilian management depends on effective oversight by parliamentary
institutions to bring together bipartisanism, financial transparency, and democratic
accountability. Budget transparency demands regular periodic statements making public
information and allowing for accounting and auditing of military resource consumption.62
Increasing respect for human rights by security forces and adherence to the rule of law
will generate trust in the security sector actors and enable legitimation of their monopoly over
the use of force. Public trust as well as institutional transparency require an active civil society

58 Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 4.
59 United Nations Security Council Resolution, 20 February 2007.
60 Dylan Hendrickson, “A Review of Security Sector Reform” The Conflict, Security and Development
Group, Working Paper no. 1, London, 1999, p. 7.

62 Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 7-8.
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which can promulgate democratic norms and continue monitoring military and police forces
after the withdrawal of foreign armies or aid. Civil society should be included in regional
forums and dialogues in conjunction with an overall emphasis on regional integration and
cooperation. Specifically focusing on core security actors, the most immediate and urgent aim
of conflict resolution involves SSR in the form of demobilization and reintegration of military
personnel and limiting the proliferation of weapons, especially small arms. 63
DDR can only be successful if it is approached as one element of a larger agenda
supporting SSR, transitional justice, good governance and rule of law, and development. 64
Transitional justice has been a major element to societal reconciliation and redress of grave
violations of human rights, at least since the 1980s. Both DDR and transitional justice seek
sustainable conflict resolution involving positive peace based on trust and reconciliation that
precludes the renewal of violence. 65
There are four key elements to transitional justice that are compatible with DDR:
prosecution, illumination of truth, reparations for victims of human rights violations, and
reform of institutions. First, prosecutions aim to erase the persistent impunity for combatants
that occurs in conflict conditions. This is a first step to grounding the rule of law in post-conflict
cases and separates combatants who seek to undermine reconciliation from those who support
it by isolating those who resist DDR. Second, if combatants are not included from processes of
establishing accountability and finding the truth they may resist those processes and it makes it
increasingly likely that they will not be successfully reintegrated in the society. Third,
reparations for rights violations and other injustices support reintegration by reducing the
feelings of animosity and desire for vengeance experienced by individuals and communities in
post-conflict situations. Fourth, institutional reform supports the development of a security
sector following conflict which does not include former combatants who were involved in or
ideologically supportive of atrocities.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration set out a foundation for security sector
reform in post-conflict conditions. Both aim for improvements in the security situation, and for
alterations of the actors involved in providing security. Both DDR and SSR programs now
accept the concept of human security or security that is focused on the well-being of the people
rather than on the military capacity of the state. Without coordinating DDR in the overall SSR
framework, violators of human rights can be included in the reformed security sector. 66
Transitional justice initiatives and efforts at SSR aim for reform violent elements in the
security sector and creating security sector actors that respect human rights and value an end to
impunity. Prosecutions of rights violators foments rule of law and deters repetitions of
violations. By removing violators from the security services obstacles to reform can be
overcome. Moreover, transitional justice practices establish trust and confidence in the
community and among warring factions that support the legitimacy of the security sector
institutions, as well as increasing accountability which is a primary aim of SSR efforts.
Transitional justice initiates the oversight and vetting practices which are integral to reform of
the security sector. Transitional justice practices also improve the empowerment of the
citizenry which supports civilian control and democratic accountability of the security sector. 67

64 Ana Cutter Patel “Transitional Justice, DDr and Security Sector Reform”, International Center for
Transitional Justice Research Brief, February 2010, p. 1.
65 Cutter Patel, pp. 1-2.
66 Cutter Patel, p. 3.
67 Cutter Patel, pp. 3-4.
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C. Local Ownership and Elites

Although the ultimate end of SSR is democratic control and good governance, the process often
begins with external donors and their commitment to mainstream reform into political dialogue
and modes of cooperation. Donor aid should be made dependent on the achievements of
practical and significant security reforms, and until that is achieved external assistance should
be restricted to non-security sectors along with strong accounting and auditing practices in
place. External actors must initiate the reform process through concerted commitment in post-
conflict scenarios, and ensure that local actors are sufficiently endowed with the capacities to
carry on the process. The greatest challenge to SSR is two-fold: it is inhibited by domestic elites
who do not value accountability or transparency, and it is limited by external actors who are
reluctant to commit the time and resources necessary for successful reform. 68 Multiple studies
have come to highlight the importance of domestic level actors, especially the national elites. 69
In post-conflict situations, although the recipients of assistance, these national level actors are
suspicious of conditions put on aid and view the efforts of external actors as forcing policy
preferences on that state. 70
Accordingly, SSR projects should focus more on cultivating cooperation between donor
and local stakeholders. The component of SSR derived from the contribution or cooperation of
internal actors requires strong national level leadership capable of fomenting consensus and
executing concrete steps to adjust legislation and budget policy, as well as manage ‘spoiler’
interest groups that seek to block reforms or even reinitiate hostilities. 71 Moreover, once the
limitations of donor driven reform are recognized in the absence of broad based societal
support and consensus among key internal actors, strong leadership can function as the catalyst
for generating the conditions for reform at the domestic level. Lessons learned from empirical
studies on SSR demonstrate that, without such supportive leadership, reform efforts must turn
to civil society and seek to generate inertia for reform among the public and other officials. 72
Post-conflict SSR must first address significant social chasms, which primarily form
along the lines of ethnic identity but can also be just as divisive when formed in terms of
political parties. Reconciliation between the different camps requires generating a minimum of
trust between groups by focusing on shared interests and common aims. 73 National
reconciliation manifest as national identity is a precondition for even negotiating the
relationship between civilian political authorities and the military hierarchy. 74 However,
moving beyond the groundwork of the reconciliation that characterizes negative peace in a post
conflict situation, requires recognizing that national elites, while having the potential to greatly
further SSR, tend to be the primary obstacles to significant reform.

69 This awareness correlates with the recognition of the limits of externally driven reform. See
Hendrickson, p. 7.
70 Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzei Karkoszka “Security sector reform and donor policies” in Schnabel
and Ehrhart, p. 19 ff.

71 Stefan Wolff “The politics of fear versus the politics of intimidation: Security sector reform in Northern
Ireland” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, p. 183 ff.

72 David Darchiashvili “Civil-military relations and security sector reform in a newly independent
transitional state: The Georgian case” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 156-160.
73 Biljana Vankovska “Ethnic-military relations in Macedonia” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 93-96.
74 Nibaldo H. Galleguillos “Civil-military relations and national reconciliation in Chile in the aftermath of
the Pinochet affair” in Schnabel and Ehrhart, pp. 243-245.
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Scholars recognize that national level political elites have prevented the consolidation of
democratic governance in some cases 75 that the support of such elites is needed for reforms, and
that such support can be cultivated by generating an “intersectoral consensus” on the general
aims and strategies for developing democratic accountability. Moreover, elites can be economic
elites, political elites, or military elites. The situation of elites is transforming as they become
increasingly linked to elites in other states through ties of economic globalization. 76
Elites often maintain colonial strategies of rule in post-colonial conditions, and following
conflicts often utilize the military and police to create authoritarian systems by repressing
opposition groups or parties. 77 Empirical studies of SSR have shown that elites can weaken
bureaucracies in order to consolidate power and use centralized authority to wield security
forces against opposition. 78 Deterioration of the security forces may also come from intentionally
fragmenting them, resulting in poorly coordinated components, as an intentional strategy to
hold on to power when the allegiance of those forces to the leadership is undermined. 79 On the
other hand, in post-conflict situations, the lack of a functioning bureaucracy, economic
instability, and absence of legitimacy due to low public trust and social capital may pressure
even reluctant elites into greater and greater reliance on security forces to maintain order and
implement policy. 80 Two specific difficulties arise related to military elites arise when it comes
to technical and financial assistance for SSR provided to the core actors. The first is that it is
challenging to assess the sincerity of their rhetoric for reform. The second is that the resources
received will be utilized to redraw the relationship between military elites and civilian
authorities, empowering the former over the latter. 81
D. Role of Parliaments
Given that democratic control of the security sector is one of the most primary aims of SSR, the
most apparent role of parliaments is to provide effective and legitimate oversight for security
institutions and monitor both their financing and activities. Parliaments can work to ensure
that military officials are held accountable, socialized with norms of good governance, and
emphasize political neutrality among the corps. Importantly, “A democratic system of civilian
oversight can vary in its design but serves the critical function of ensuring that the security
sector is held accountable to the needs and priorities of the public.” 82
Democratic government is predicated in part on control of the security sector by
democratically elected authorities. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector in new
democracies is linked to three aims. First, states in post-conflict conditions involved in

75 Galleguillos, p. 239 ff.
76 Hendrickson, p. 11.
78 William Reno “War, Markets and the Reconfiguration West Africa’s Weak States,” Comparative Politics,
Vol. 29 (4), 1997.

79 Alex de Waal “Contemporary Warfare in Africa: Changing Context, Changing Strategies”, Institute for
Development Studies Bulletin, Vol. 27(3) , (Brighton: University of Sussex, Institute for Development
Studies, 1996).
81 Chris Smith “Preparing Security Forces for Their Role in Civil Society”, Brassey’s Defence Yearbook,
(London: Brassey’s, 1999).

82 Craig Kowalik “Parliaments and Security Sector Oversight: An Emerging Area for Capacity
Development”, Parliamentary Centre, Ottawa, 2006.
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generating political stability face an immediate demand for increased capacity of security
institutions. Second, without democratic accountability the security sector can evolve into the
ruling institutions of the state. In such conditions the security sector maintains influence and
control of the political process, disregards the rule of law and exercises authority with impunity
by engaging in potentially systematic abuses of human rights, and becomes the tool of
authorities for the personal or partisan monopolization of power and pursuit of self-interest.
Third rule of law requires equal treatment under the law, disallowing exemptions for military
figures or privileged treatment for actors involved in law enforcement. 83 Security sector actors
as well as the executive branch must be held accountable and the legislature can significantly
contribute to doing so.
The problems stemming from the security sector in transitional political systems are
rooted in the political and economic influence of the security sector which enables it to pressure
or even dominate politics. In such conditions, the security sector institutions can be
manipulated by politicization to serve partisan or personal interests. Where civilian politicians
abuse their authority over the security sector it becomes increasingly likely that the security
institutions will themselves become abusive. The security sector in transitional states is
supported by an inflated budget which is itself not subject to transparent oversight and so lends
itself to mismanagement. There is generally poor management and budgeting and high levels
of corruption and waste, as well as, low human resource development among security officials
and the civilians tasked with oversight functions. 84 The ‘Security Deficit’ refers to a security
sector that either does not effectively provide for security or is itself a source of insecurity by
contributing to violence and conflict. However, authoritarian states often have effective
security systems for the protection and preservation of the regime, but without civilian control
and democratic accountability the security sector suffers from a ‘Governance Deficit’. 85 If
efforts are made including training and financing of the security sector in order to remedy the
Security Deficit without also addressing the Governance Deficit, then the risk increases that the
security sector will assert control over politics or be used by politicians for partisan or personal
aims. 86
In post-conflict conditions the role of the parliament is to prevent internal factionalism
and build public trust in the institutions of state. In a general sense the relation of authority
between the military and parliament must be redefined. 87 Moreover, the parliament must work
toward the proliferation of the norms of good governance and democratic accountability. The
parliament must debate and negotiate the proper balance between transparency and secrecy of
national security. Parliament must strive to achieve an integrated and coordinated policy
producing system among the different ministries, departments and organizations of the state.
All elements of SSR for core security actors should be mirrored with corresponding training and
capacity-building of parliamentarians. 88
There are many other ways that parliaments can support SSR. Parliaments should
exercise their authority to debate and enact legislation supporting security reforms. Related to
such debate they should seek to publicize and popularize relevant norms. In some cases,

83Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. European Union, Office for Promotion of Parliamentary
Democracy. Brussels, 2013, p. 44.
84 EU, p. 48.
85 EU, pp. 49-50.
86 EU, p. 50.
88 Kowalik, op cit.
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parliaments have the power to choose the head of military forces. In all cases, parliaments
should work closely with the executive to ensure that human security is a guiding principle of
military activities. In relation to the executive, the parliament must act as an effective balance to
ensure that monopolization of power does not occur and enable abuse. One aspect of doing this
is to practice parliamentary supervision over the budget for the security forces. Another way to
do this is to hold the executive accountable for policy problems with the security sector.
The parliaments of donors providing resources for SSR and development should work
to provide capacity-building support of the parliament in the recipient state.89 Donors should
stress technical assistance in the area of ability to effectively conduct parliamentary oversight.
Both recipient and donor parliaments should cultivate a sense of duty among officials for the
support of SSR aims. Donor and recipient parliaments should cooperate to build a learning
network of parliamentarians for sharing information and knowledge, and fostering
intergovernmental ties which will strengthen the sense of security of the post-conflict state. 90

90 Kowalik, op cit.
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THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENTS REMAIN RELEVANT TODAY
Prof. Kevin Nauen
Senior Research Fellow at CICP
Working Paper
October 2016
Brief Background
This event was a landmark moment for both Cambodia and the international system,
evidencing an unprecedented development of an international society of states who joined
together to work to ensure interstate security, as well as to delimit intrastate insecurity and
prevent the most serious and egregious human rights violations.
18 states joined together with the UN and Cambodia to demonstrate the possibilities for
post-Cold War collaboration, as is clearly evident from the state parties that were signatory to
the agreement which included major powers with previously conflicting fundamental security
interests such as the US, UK, France, USSR, China, and Vietnam. It involved the collaboration
of major regional powers such as Australia, India and Japan. As well, the PPA sedimented
already existing cooperation between regional states such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore and Vietnam fostering future collaboration and strengthening of the ASEAN system.
The agreement was a watershed event in terms of security for small states in that it
concretized their political independence and territorial integrity, and supported their neutrality
vis-à-vis (in relation to) large power politics. More generally, the PPA was an event which
contributed to the foundations of what has today evolved into universalizing conceptions and
practices such as responsibility to protect, a duty to intervene in cases of mass atrocity, conflict
prevention and early warning systems, and human security.
The Agreement involved three component emphases from which both negative and
positive peace in Cambodia can be derived. These were an agreement on a Comprehensive
Political Settlement to the conflict in Cambodia, an agreement on the Sovereignty and
Independence of Cambodia, and an agreement on a commitment to the Rehabilitation and
Rebuilding of Cambodia. It is with regards to both its achievements and its failures that the
PPA remains relevant today for both Cambodia and the international community as a whole.
Achievements and Beneficial Impacts

Achievements can be elaborated upon in the language of both negative and positive peace. In
terms of negative peace, the PPA extended and secured a process to end the conflict. It
established a cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign forces while calling for limits on their
military assistance for warring parties inside the country, and initiated the essential process of
disarmament. In fact, Art. 10 of Annex 2 (in support of Art. 10, Section V of the Agreements)
fortified the cease-fire and disarmament process by providing for monitoring and investigation
to prevent supplies of arms by external actors. This practice can and should be emulated in
current and future attempts at peace building.
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The Paris Peace Agreements Remain Relevant Today
The international guarantee of Independence articulated the commitment to end a lengthy

period of intervention in Cambodian affairs by external powers, which can be interpreted as
recognition that such intervention was significantly responsible for the political conditions
which enabled and perpetuated the genocidal regime. By establishing areas of common
concern or shared values and producing strategies and policies for future cooperation between
factions (as well as states in the international system), the PPA set the foundation for national
reconciliation.
Moreover, with the support of HRH Sihanouk the PPA initiated the process of building
a democratic electoral system and groundwork towards free and fair elections. This set the tone
for positive peace in Cambodia. The convening parties proclaimed that Cambodia will develop
and practice a liberal democracy based on pluralism. Political science and Peace Studies now
recognize that democracy and human rights are integral components to sustainable political
reconciliation. The PPA and the UNTAC greatly contributed to Cambodia in these areas. Then
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali held, “Nothing the UN has ever done can match
this operation.” 1 Still today, UNTAC is universally regarded as one of the most successful
peacekeeping missions in the history of the UN. 2 The PPA established policy and practices for
positive peace in multiple forms: recognition of the importance of a parliamentary system and
the procedures for a process of democratic elections, emphasis on the promotion and protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the principles for a constitution and rule of law, a
focus on territorial integrity, and support for economic and financial resources for
reconstruction.
Persistent Problems or Challenges

Nevertheless, it is possible to look on the 1991 PPA as a Declaration of great promise that
remains to be fulfilled. This allows us to mark the failures of the accords, but also to recognize
their persistent potential, as well as for generating recommendations for future peace
agreements in other contexts.
1) To begin with, considering the international system as a whole, it is a tragic missed
opportunity that the P5 has not been able to consistently perpetuate the cooperation and
goodwill achieved in the 1991 PPA. 3 Regarding Cambodian domestic affairs, questions
remain whether all state parties have adhered to Art. 28 which stipulates that “The
Signatories shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in this
Agreement”. 4
2) The agreement recognized the interdependence between 'stabilizing the security
situation' and 'confidence building among the parties to the conflict' (Art. 11). However,
in the UNTAC period the process of confidence building was not completed and as a
result, although the security situation was significantly improved, full stabilization was
not achieved. 5
1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali “The 'Second Generation': Cambodia Elections 'Free and Fair', but Challenges
Remain” in United Nations Chronicle, 30:5 (1993): 26.
2 Karns, Margaret P. and Karen A. Mingst. International Organizations: The politics and processes of global
governance. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 315-16.
3 Dedring, Juergen “The Security Council” in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom eds. The United Nations at the
Millenium: The prinicpal organs. Continuum, 2000, pp. 84-87.
4 http://www.cambodia.org/facts/?page=1991+Paris+Peace+Agreements
5 Karns and Mingst, p. 315.
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The Paris Peace Agreements Remain Relevant Today
3) While most of the stipulations set forth in Annex 3 to the 1991 PPA on Elections have
been fulfilled, in the eyes of civil society and the international community there has not
been a realization of point 9 regarding freedom of speech and assembly. General John
Sanderson, the Australian commander of UNTAC from 1992 to 1993 has stated,
“UNTAC was a peacekeeping mission which achieved its objectives but failed to leave
the country in a progressive democratic state intended by those who set up the peace
process.” 6 He argued that this failure followed from insufficient dedication to
constructing rule of law and an effective judicial system, as well as lack of involvement
in the constitutional process. After the successful democratic elections of 1993,
factionalism returned and the military took control of the political system in 1997. 7
Electoral problems, factionalism, and an absence of sustainable reconciliation are still
evident today as demonstrated by the problems that followed the national elections of
2013.
4) The PPA sets out a commitment by the signatory parties to the territorial integrity of
Cambodia, but this remains an issue. There is, first, the intergovernmental border
dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, and second, numerous voices in Cambodia
that contest the border demarcations with Vietnam.
Conclusion
Despite all the positive policy of the PPA and practical contributions of UNTAC, the
international community disengaged after 1993 and was too eager to both 'pat itself on the back'
for its achievements and 'wash its hands' of a complex and controversial situation. There has
been minimal international pressure to ensure that signatories comply with their commitments,
and democratic peace in Cambodia was reinterpreted in terms of the international opinion of
the 'intractability' of factional conflicts. Peace in Cambodia was superseded by impressions
formed from the more recent experiences of failed internationalism, such as the Rwandan
genocide, the failed Somalia intervention, and the arduous process of peacemaking in the
former Yugoslavia. Regionally, the primary concern of states became weathering the storm of
the Asian financial crisis.
The record of the international community remains then, at best, mixed. On the one
hand, it has consistently donated large amounts of ODA as well as guaranteeing the long-term
activities of multiple UN related international organizations. On the other hand, the
international community has been negligent in demanding that national actors and
stakeholders abide by the commitments they made in the PPA. This mix is reflected in the
assessment of UN Human Rights expert and former Special Rapporteur for Cambodia,
Professor Subedi, who has noted that in the long-term peace and stability have brought
“enormous dividends” to the country, and at the same time, “the Agreements will remain
relevant until their vision is a reality for all Cambodians.” 8

8 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Cambodia-20yearsonfromtheParisPeace.aspx
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THE ROLES OF CHINA’S AID TO CAMBODIA’S
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Mr. HUOT Sokunthea and Mr. NUCH Ramo

Research Fellows at Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP)
ASEAN-China: Deepening the Strategic Partnership

in Commemoration of the 25thAnniversary of the ASEAN-China
Economic cooperation - One Belt One Road Initiative
Beijing, 24th June 2016
Abstract
Being Cambodian young scholars, we would like to take the opportunity of 25th Anniversary of
ASEAN-China dialogue partnership to discuss achievements, opportunities and challenges
with regards to regional economic integration at the end of 2015 and beyond. The paper takes a
case of Cambodia, which is a member State of ASEAN as well as one of China’s closest friends
in the region. The phenomena related to Cambodia-Sino relations can basically be explained by
politico-economic interest exchange along with Chinese foreign aid policy. In this case study,
the main objective of the paper is to understand what roles China plays in helping Cambodian
socio-economic development.
Introducing the overview of Cambodia-Sino relations, the paper describes the nature
and the development of China aid to Cambodia since over the past 25 years. On one hand, the
paper assesses the results from the implementation of Chinese aid to Cambodia. Nevertheless,
the paper also raises existing controversies among local stakeholders regarding the domination
of China in Cambodia. On the other hand, this paper discusses the implication of the One Belt
One Road initiative for Cambodia. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion about how the
Cambodia-Sino relationship will develop in the future.
I. Introduction
Cambodia and China are known as close and old friends. The Sino-Cambodia relations can be
traced back to the early history of Cambodia, when a Chinese diplomat paid a visit to
Cambodia in the 13th Century. Their relations have always been described as harmonious.
China's foreign assistance to Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s was more political in nature,
with assistance being directed to Cambodian factions such as Ex-King Sihanouk and the Khmer
Rouge, who enjoyed the political, military, and financial support respectively from China. With
China rising as one the world's powerhouses, China's aid capacity has undoubtedly grown. In
modern times, particularly when economic issues gain a more prominent role in determining
foreign policy, China has focused more on increasing its influence in the region and the world
through development aid and investment. China’s rise it is argued seeks to be peaceful,
avoiding domestic interference, while promoting prosperity. There are two questions that we
will address: What is the nature of Chinese aid to Cambodia? How has this aid changed over
time and political exigencies?
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Roles of China’s Aid to Cambodia’s Socio-Economic Development

1. Nature of Chinese Aid

It has been observed that China's foreign assistance does not involve political implications or
conditionality – the approach is the opposite if compared to those of Western donors. China
seemingly does not employ a carrot and stick norm in its foreign policy, particularly foreign aid
given to developing countries. China tends to respect state sovereignty and refrains from
interfering in internal affairs of other countries that receive their foreign assistance. China's
foreign aid is described as "no strings attached." Western donors, on the other hand, attach their
foreign assistance to human rights, good governance, political freedom, transparency and more.
Such conditions inevitably interfere with recipient countries' sovereignty and domestic affairs to
a certain extent. Chai Zhizhou describes China's aid policy as "non-conditional".1
Besides, the financial aid to Cambodia lacking conditionality, loans given to Cambodia by
China are concessional and interest-free.2China's aid to Cambodia tends to provide mutual
benefit. When China pledged to provide combined loans and grants of up to USD 220 million in
1999, the Post quoted Chai Zhizhou, an Economic and Commercial Counselor at the Embassy of
the People's Republic of China, as saying that the package was "a way to bring together Chinese
and Cambodia expertise to help develop Cambodia." 3 It can be argued that China takes a soft
approach toward aid-dependent countries, showing an understanding of the constraints that
those countries have to endure. China's foreign assistance prioritizes economic development
and fosters a positive relationship.
2. Development of Chinese Aid

Presently, Cambodia-China friendship is stronger than ever, as they have upgraded their
comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010.4This comprehensive strategic partnership is
believed to facilitate investment and trade between the two countries. China is one of the key
contributors to socio-economic development, particularly in recent times. China is now the
biggest investor with a total investment worth USD 9.6 billion and trade increased to USD 3.7
billion in 2013.5 China is also a Cambodia's major donor, providing up to USD2.85 billion in soft
loans between 1992 and 2014,6 putting the EU and Japan behind. The investment, trade, and aid
that China has been providing serves as a solid foundation as Cambodia has shown an average
growth of about 7 percent per year. The commitment of the leadership of the two countries
ensures further cooperation, more comprehensive cooperation as well as further sustainable
development.
II. Impacts of Chinese Aid

1. Contribution to Economic Growth
Cambodia is one of the least developed countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of USD
1,094.6 in 20147 – the lowest GDP per capita in ASEAN, except Timor-Leste whose GDP per
capita is USD 1169 in the same year. Cambodia is one of the aid-dependent countries whose
economic development relies heavily on foreign investment and financial and technical
assistance from outside countries. Therefore, the fact that China has become a major trading
partner, investor, and donor provides a promising foundation for Cambodian economic
development.
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With a population of 1,360.7 billion8, China is one of the biggest markets for Cambodia.
Therefore, increased trade ties with China are obviously a tremendous boost to the Cambodian
economy. During a State visit of 200 Government officials and private business representatives
lead by Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee for the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference, the leadership of the two countries announced their firm commitment
to "greater economic and trade relations"9. Trade between the two countries continues to
increase at a noticeable pace. In 2007, "the trade flow reached USD 933 million, up from USD
482,426,000 in 2004"10. In 2013, Cambodian exports to China reached USD 483 million, an
increase of 33 per cent.11 Local businesses in Cambodia look to boost bilateral trade relations
with China to USD 5 billion in 2017.12 Development experts agree that as long as China's
economy continues to grow, it is very likely that trade between Cambodia and China will
increase more quickly compared to that of Cambodia with Western countries.13
In 2008 alone, more than 3,000 Chinese companies registered and operated in Cambodia;
there was a significant increase (43.5 per cent of FDI from China) in Chinese investment in
Cambodia in the same year.14 China has been the biggest foreign investor in Cambodia since
1994.15The Prime Minister of Cambodia has acknowledged that China's foreign direct
investment, financial, and technical assistance are contributions to Cambodia's steady economic
growth.
Figure 1: Investments Approved by CDC by Major Countries (1994- September 2012)
(Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia, p. II.4)
With China's successive lead in foreign direct investment in Cambodia, China's

contribution to Cambodia's economic growth is irrefutable. Cambodia's economic growth rate
of about 7 per cent per year between 2010 and 2015 (projected to grow by 7.5 per cent in 2016)16
has been driven mainly by foreign direct investment, particularly in the mining, textile, and
industrial sectors which are dominated by Chinese investors. Therefore, China has played a key
role in accelerating Cambodia's significant economic growth.
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2. Employment Generation
Civil wars that plagued Cambodia for three decades destroyed the fundamental structures of
Cambodia's economy that secures employment for the Cambodian people. In the past,
agriculture was the main sector providing employment for people. However, in contemporary
Cambodia, the manufacturing industry and service sector have gradually created more jobs.
China is a foreign investor that contributes largely to job creation in Cambodia. China registers
as one of the top investors in a wide range of sectors that are the pillars of the Cambodian
economy. Among many other sectors, China is a major investor in the mining, manufacturing,
and textile industries. These sectors, particularly textile and footwear, generate a large number
of jobs for less educated, unskilled laborers, especially women. The garment sector has the
biggest share of the manufacturing industry, accounting for 66 per cent between 1998 and 2008
(constituting an average of 10.5 per cent of the Cambodian GDP)16 and the export of textile and
footwear reached USD 6 billion in 2014, an increase of 10.7 per cent from last year17, making
textiles the largest segment in the manufacturing industry. Among many countries investing in
textile, China owns 16 per cent of the total investment in the industry.18 Cambodia's footwear
and garment industry currently employs 600,000 workers.19 Given this sheer number of jobs,
China is obviously a key contributor to job creation in the Kingdom which helps reduce poverty
in rural areas through remittances. Although mining is a relatively smaller sector compared to
textile and footwear, China ranks at the top in mining investment. Despite the fact that the
mining industry is in its infancy, this is a sector that the Government of Cambodia can tap into
in the future. Because China is among the leading investors in this industry, this has the
potential for job creation of Cambodians who remain under employed in agriculture. The
investment trend in Cambodia shows that China is the largest investor, accounting for 90
percent of total foreign investments.20 The continued prominent role of China in terms of foreign
direct investment in Cambodia promises an increasing number of jobs for Cambodians – an
important contribution to the decreased unemployment in the Kingdom.
3. Infrastructure Development
Civil Wars have left Cambodia with ruined roads and bridges. Infrastructure is an indispensible
foundation for socio-economic development. Good infrastructure reduces the cost of production
and eases the transportation of finished goods to markets. It also facilitates trade domestically,
regionally, and globally. Compared to its ASEAN neighbors, Cambodia's infrastructure remains
underdeveloped, thus hindering its trade competitiveness. With increased regionalization,
infrastructure in Cambodia desperately needs development if Cambodia wishes to increase its
competitiveness in the regional market.
It is recognized that Cambodia's infrastructure is developing, with more roads and
bridges being built, many of which are funded by the Chinese Government. The GMS
cooperation program initiated by Asian Development Bank which was implemented with other
ASEAN members (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and the Yunnan Province of
China) has devoted resources to physical infrastructure development that connects countries
within this region. It also signifies China's firm commitment to help develop important
infrastructure in Cambodia and its neighbors so that cross-border trade and investment is less
burdensome.21
China funded the rehabilitation of National Road No.7, which is 509 km long running
from Skuon in Kampong Cham Province, through the Kratieand Stueng Treng Provinces to
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Laos's border. The project began in 2014 and is going to be finished in 2017. The project is
funded with concessional loans of USD 60.98 million and grants of USD 2.43 million by the
Chinese Government.22The Road connects Cambodia and Laos and is an important linkage for
ASEAN countries and is part of ASEAN Highway No. 11.23China has also funded the
construction of the Prek Tamak Bridge in Kandal Province. This funding is in the form of
concessional loans of USD 43.5 million.24 The Bridge serves to link the east and west regions of
the country. The Road and the Bridge mentioned here are just a few examples of infrastructure
projects funded by the Chinese Government. China actually has been funding many other
similar projects throughout Cambodia. Between 2000 and 2011, China provided Cambodia USD
1.16 billion in concessional loans to develop the country's infrastructure.25
“Generally, China has helped Cambodia a lot, in terms of infrastructure, particularly
roads and bridges … and electricity,” said Mey Kalyan, a senior adviser to the government’s
Supreme National Economic Council. “…Without having that help from China, Cambodia
would have faced so many problems…".26
4. Education and Human Resource Development

Besides foreign direct investment, infrastructure development, trade relations, and ODA, China
also provides funding to support education and human resource development in Cambodia. As
a country emerging from decades of civil conflicts, Cambodia lacks human capital, which is a
crucial requirement undergirding all forms of development. The lack of well-trained teachers,
limited schools, low teacher salaries, and other necessary facilities constrain the quality of
Cambodian education. Given this, educational support is needed to ensure the development of
human resources. Many countries and international organizations have provided financial and
technical support for Cambodia to provide better quality education to her people, particularly
the younger generation which will be an important force behind Cambodia's future prosperity
and development.
Distinctively, "China’s education aid includes higher education, vocational training,
Chinese language instruction in developing countries, school construction, and collaboration
with multilateral organizations."27 In contrast to other sectors, such as infrastructure,
agriculture, community and social welfare, and energy, power, and electricity, China funded
only one project for the Ministry of Education in Cambodia, providing USD 80,000 for the
setting up an electronic library for the Royal Academy of Cambodia. 28 According to Reilly, one
reason for China not providing a lot of funding to education in Cambodia is that education is
not a top priority labeled by the Royal Government of Cambodia. Therefore, with its soft
approach, China aligns its aid with the priorities of the Government of Cambodia. However,
China has contributed significantly to human resource development in Cambodia through
scholarships, training programs, and volunteer programs. Yet, China does not report this
assistance to the CDR as development aid. If it did, the education aid to Cambodia from China
would be comparable to that of Japan and South Korea who provided USD100.6 million and
USD 89 million respectively in education aid.29 As such, the official aid data underestimates
China's educational aid to Cambodia.
Between 1993 and 2005, 260 Cambodian officials attended trainings in China, and China
sent 35 experts to provide trainings in Cambodia (30). The number of funded trainings have
grown steadily. In 2010, 95 experts from Cambodia attended 27 trainings conducted in China; in
2011, 204 Cambodian experts received 59 trainings in China; and in 2012, 195 officials attended
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51 programs.31 At least 50 scholarships are provided annually for Cambodian students to study
in various universities in China.32
With regard to Chinese language training, China sent 38 volunteer teachers in 2010, and
the number grew to 58 teachers in 2012.33These volunteer teachers worked within universities
and high schools across Cambodia. The Confucius Institute was established in 2009 in
partnership with the Royal Academy of Cambodia. A Chinese language certificate course was
introduced at the Institute of Foreign Languages, Royal University of Phnom Penh by the DHY
Center in 2007, and in 2010 a Department of Chinese was officially launched to provide a
Bachelor’s Degree Program for Cambodian students. A research center attached to the Royal
University of Phnom Penh funded by the Chinese Embassy in Cambodia has been established
to conduct various research projects related to the Maritime Silk Road.
III. Controversies over Chinese Aid to Cambodia

Chinese aid and investment in Cambodia have sparked considerable controversies. The issue
can be explained by the fact that China has just emerged as an international donor in the 1990s
after its economic growth blossomed. China needs to compete with other existing international
donors. Often there is some controversy among local stakeholders with regards to all foreign
aid. The Cambodian Government has warmly welcomed China’s aid, explaining that it comes
with no strings attached. There is still the question concerning the role of Chinese aid as well as
any hidden agendas by the Chinese government.
Supporters argue that Chinese aid and investment brought economic prosperity. For
example, Chinese investment in the garment sector boosted Cambodia's exports and generated
employment. Cambodia also benefited from taxes and royalties from Chinese companies
operating in Cambodia. Chinese aid and investment in infrastructure provided the foundation
for economic development, and as result, it indirectly helped to reduce poverty. Reilly provides
five reasons for China's approach to foreign aid.34 First, as a developing country itself, China
focuses on "equality and mutual benefits." Second, China sets economic development as a top
priority, emphasizing practical economic outcomes which is a core objective of China's aid.
Third, China avoids prescription, recognizing that the recipient countries know how to develop
their economies and societies. Fourth, China's aid is request driven, with the aid correctly
responding to the local needs and priorities. Finally, China respects State sovereignty, adhering
to the principle of non-interference.
However, skeptics criticize China for its soft, unquestioned approach to the way its aid
and investment funds are used. The critics associate such an approach with the exacerbation of
already widespread corruption, erosion of good governance, and human rights abuses. Chinese
investment comes with the price of depletion to Cambodia's environment and natural resources
caused by the lack of transparency. Human rights activists often report the abuse of workers'
rights, such as unpaid overtime work, salary deductions, and limited permission for sick
allowance.35 China investment in the Agriculture and Forestry sectors has also triggered
controversy. For example, a concession of 200,000 hectares of land jointly handled by
Pheapimex and China's Wuzhishan led to the displacement of indigenous people whose very
livelihood depends largely on the forest and land.36 Hydropower projects run by Chinese
companies ruined the environment and its biodiversity as well as a wildlife sanctuary.37
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IV. The Belt and Road Initiative: Its Implications for Cambodian Economy
1. Overview of The Belt and Road Initiative
The development of ASEAN-China dialogue partnership is basically bound by economic
cooperation including trade, investment and transportation as well as people-to-people
connectivity in the region. China has become a primary regional development partner and
assistance provider, especially in reducing the development gap among members states of
ASEAN. Therefore, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have gotten a lot of benefits from
the implementation of China’s economic integration policy as well as the China-ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA).1 In 2013, the One Belt One Road initiative was included as part of
China’s Foreign Policy, by President Xi Jinping to enhance political, economic, trade, and socio-
cultural relations among China, Europe and Asia, especially for people living along the ancient
Silk Roads.2 Within a geo-political perspective, the two components of OBOR will allow China
to connect with the rest of Asia, Africa and Europe via land and sea. In economic terms, China’s
OBOR aims to connect major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, trade and
investment.3 Legally, the One Belt One Road initiative is not considered an international treaty
but rather a cultural initiative; the Silk Road is viewed as a symbol of communication and
cooperation between different nations and cultures.4 From a political perspective, the initiative
is seen as an attempt to strengthen the power of China (soft power) if compared to other super
powers in the region and the world, allowing China to boost its growth by utilizing its capital,
technology and capacity.
2. Cambodia’s Involvement in the Initiative

Cambodia along with other ASEAN Members States also jointly created the ASEAN-Free Trade
Area as well as contributed to the development of the Belt and Road initiative including the
land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the ocean-based “21stCentury Maritime Silk Road.
On 24thOctober 2014, the Cambodian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, founded by China. On 13thJanuary 2016, the National
Assembly of Cambodia approved the Agreement on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
in order to permit participants to build a branch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Aun Pon Moniroth, Minister of Economy and Finance, said that AIIB is very important for
development of Cambodia. On 7thMarch 2016, Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia, reminded
people that the Cambodian Government strongly supports AIIB. This is because Cambodia
needs the combination of capital from countries as development partners for use in building
infrastructure, promoting economic development, and production and meeting the needs for
societal and the economic development.
3. One Belt and One Road Initiative: Implications for Cambodia's economy
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road offers Cambodia and the region the opportunity to
promote and boost sustainable development. For Cambodia, the initiative is complementary
and compatible to Cambodia's current foreign policies dedicated to foster domestic
development and development in the region. It deepens Sino-ASEAN trade, particularly the
Free Trade Agreement that benefits the countries in the agreement, including Cambodia. It also
secures Cambodia's average economic growth of 7 per cent per year through increased
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agricultural and garment exports. The Maritime Silk Roads also brings in more tourists, which
injects foreign exchange into the Cambodian economy.
"The Belt and Road Initiative has provided a new opportunity for China and Cambodia to
open a new chapter of cooperation and to strengthen it."38 The Belt and Road Initiative will
strengthen economic and social development of the respective countries in ASEAN and
beyond.39Thiswill add a new chapter of Sino-Cambodia cooperation, which provides more
opportunities for Cambodia to be better connected domestically, regionally, and beyond. It also
increases people-to-people connectivity, which further strengthens cooperation and increases
understanding, and contributes to peace and harmony in the region. "The Silk Road has
benefited a large number of participant countries, and as such, it has become a symbol of peace,
cooperation, […] and mutual learning and understanding for shared prosperity." (40) With the
Initiative, Cambodia as an ASEAN member can play a more active role than ever. Part of the
Initiative is infrastructure development. This has a direct benefit for Cambodia. With it,
Cambodia is more connected to the world, and as a result, Cambodia is more integrated
regionally and internationally, providing an unprecedented opportunity for Cambodia to trade
with more countries. This should help to ensure economic prosperity and multilateral
cooperation with China, ASEAN, and globally.
In short, The Belt and Road Initiative can be beneficial to Cambodia in three ways. First,
Cambodia's physical infrastructure will be better developed. With this Initiative, Cambodia
needs to prioritize building infrastructure domestically to align with the Initiative, which is
good for local development. With increased infrastructure, Cambodia will be more connected to
other ASEAN member States, China, and beyond, and therefore, Cambodia will be able to
increase trade with those countries – a major drive behind economic growth in Cambodia.
Second, the Initiative fosters cooperation with China, ASEAN, and countries beyond this
region. The cooperation is necessary for ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity through
mutual understanding. Finally, the Initiative allows people-to-people connectivity, which
promotes cultural understanding – an indispensable factor in maintaining and fostering
comprehensive cooperation.
V. Conclusion
Over the two past decades, Cambodia-Sino relations have been solidified through bilateral
partnership as well as ASEAN-China dialogue. In the political domain, Cambodia is viewed as
diplomatically aligned to China at the regional and international level. Also, China politically
strongly supports the current ruling party in Cambodia. Economically, China is Cambodia’s top
foreign investor, a major donor and an important trading partner. This is needed as Cambodia
still relies on its natural resources and agricultural products. China is undisputedly playing an
important political and economic role in Cambodia.
Chinese aid and assistance are considered important material and financial tools for
State reform in Cambodia as well as preparing Cambodia to integrate into the ASEAN
Economic Community at the end of 2015. Moreover, Cambodia and China are strongly bound
by the One Belt One Road initiative, especially the AIIB in which Cambodia is one of the
founding members. This is an excellent opportunity for Cambodia to profit from the bank. The
presence of China in Cambodian society causes controversies among stakeholders and scholars
in Cambodia as there is the challenge between Chinese aid with that of traditional donors.
Many Chinese scholars are also concerned about the future of relations between Cambodia and
China after their is experience with Myanmar.
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To keep Cambodia-Sino relations strong and durable, Beijing should not focus only on
the national level (key persons) but also at the local level with ordinary people. Chinese aid
should provide both quantitative and qualitative benefits because there is an electoral
competition every 5 years in Cambodia which is different than the political process in China. In
this regard, the question on the effectiveness of Chinese involvement will be a sensitive topic of
debate among political parties as well as Cambodian scholars. Who is the real beneficiary from
China investment and aid? What are impacts of Chinese aid on society, economics, environment
and politics in Cambodia? China should improve people-to-people connectivity and
understanding. China should provide confidence among stakeholders in order to clarify the
objective of Chinese aid through impact assessments.
References
1. PhelimKyne (1999, April 30). From China with cash. The Phnom Penh Post. Retrieved
from http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/china-cash
2. Ibid., 4
3. Ibid., 4
4. Mu Xuequan (2014, September 07). Cambodian deputy PM says strategic partnership with China
creates more opportunities for businesses. Xinhuanet News. Retrieved
fromhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/…/world/2014-09/07/c_126962873.htm
5. Ibid., 1
6. Van Vichar (2014, November 10). China Pledges Multimillion-Dollar Development Aid to
Cambodia.Cambodia Khmer Service. Retrieved fromhttp://www.rfa.org/…/chinese-
development-aid-11102014171429…
7. World Bank.(2016). GDP per capita (current USD).Retrieved
fromhttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
8. UNDP (2016).About China.Retrieved from http://www.cn.undp.org/
9. Global Security.(2000). Cambodia-China relations. Retrieved
fromhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/…/wor…/cambodia/forrel-prc.htm
10. Xueying Chen (2015, June 22). Cambodia to boost China trade to $5 billion. The Phnom Penh
Post. Retrieved fromhttp://www.phnompenhpost.com/…/cambodia-increase-china-trad…
11. Ibid., 10
12. Ibid., 10
13. TSZ-Kwan Ho and Kang Sothear (2015, June 23). Cambodia-China trade to top $5 billion by
2017.The Cambodia Daily.Retrieved fromhttps://www.cambodiadaily.com/…/cambodia-china-
trade-to-to…/
14. Ibid., 9
15. Council for the Development of Cambodia.(2013). Cambodia Investment Guidebook.Retrieved
fromhttp://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/#fragment-3-tab
16. Cambodian Development Resource Institute. (2011). Annual development review 2010-
2011.CDRI Publication.
17. B2B Cambodia. (n.d.).Key industry.Retrieved from http://b2b-cambodia.com/key-industries/
18. Ibid., 16
19. International Labour Organization. (2015). Labour standard in global supply chains: A program
of action for Asia and Garment sector. Cambodia Garment and Footwear Bulletin, 1, 1-8
20. Council for the Development of Cambodia.(2016). Investment trend. Retrieved
from http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/…/investment-trend.html
21. Ibid., 16
22. Ibid., 16
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23. Ibid., 16
24. Ibid., 16
25. VOA Khmer (2016, May 23). Infrastructure funding puts Cambodia frontline of global politics.
Retrieved fromhttp://www.voacambodia.com/a/infrastructure-fu…/3341913.html
26. Ibid., 25
27. James Reilly. (2015). The role of China as an education aid donor. Education for All Global
Monitoring Report 2015.UNESCO.
28. Ibid., 27
29. Ibid., 27
30. Ibid., 27
31. Ibid., 27
32. Ibid., 27
33. Ibid., 28
34. Ibid., 27
35. Heng Pheakdey. (2012). Cambodia-China relations: A positive-sum game?. Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs, 31(2), 57-85.
36. Ibid., 35
37. Ibid., 35
38. Mrs. BuJianguo. (2015). The Belt and Road initiative and its implication for Cambodia.
Symposium Proceedings: Department of International Studies, Royal University of Phnom Penh
39. Ibid., 38
40. Sok An. (2015). The Belt and Road initiative and its implication for Cambodia. Symposium
Proceedings: Department of International Studies, Royal University of Phnom Penh
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MASS ATROCITIES UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE
REIGN OF TERROR: SOME LESSONS FOR R2P
Dr. Peou Sorpong

Professor, Ryerson University, Canada
Speech Delivered at International Conference on

“The Responsibility to Protect at 10:
Progress, Challenges, and Opportunity in the Asia-Pacific
Organized by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace

Sofitel, Phnom Penh, 26-27 February 2016
My discussion is focused less on normative issues related to R2P and more on empirical
evidence. Before I proceed to advance my argument, let me say a word about myself and my
thinking: I was a survivor the Khmer Rouge killing fields, but I consider my view -- first and
foremost -- strictly academic. Cambodia offers some of the most important lessons for
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in that the country has experienced a series of armed conflicts
and waves of repressive violence, but it is also a case of relative success in the context of R2P.
We all know about Cambodia’s tragedy and there is no need for me to repeat it. But it is
worth noting that the tragedy began in the late 1960s and lasted until the late 1990s
encompassing an armed rebellion in the late 1960s, a civil war that broke out early in 1970 and
ended when the Khmer Rouge revolutionary army took power in April 1975, followed by the
‘killing fields’ that lasted until the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia late in December 1978. The
invasion did not end the war. It was not until 1998 that Cambodia began to experience peace
(defined in negative terms), when the Khmer Rouge armed movement finally collapsed.
Whether the Khmer Rouge committed genocide is subject to debate, but it is beyond
doubt that the Khmer Rouge regime committed mass atrocities. It has been estimated that
between 1 and 2 million people perished.
The prevailing wisdom is that racialism was the cause, but this is a flawed argument
(whose explanatory logic is extremely weak). My perspective is based not only on my
experience as a survivor of the atrocities and the experiences of other survivors but also on my
research over the past few decades. I have often heard Cambodian people raise this question:
“Why did Khmer kill Khmer?” The truth of the matter is that members of other ethnic groups
were also killed. The question is not whether they were killed but why they were killed.
In my view, the Khmer Rouge regime’s ideological extremism (shaped and driven by
Maoism) is the preliminary cause of the mass atrocities. The regime was hostile to those who
were not considered part of the revolutionary movement and sought to build a classless society.
What this means is that the largest majority of the Cambodian population was regarded more or
less as an ‘enemy of the state’. But ideology alone was not responsible for the atrocities. The
mass atrocities would not have been as extensive or severe as they were had the regime not
adopted the policy of autarchy or self-isolation allowing members of the regime to exercise
power and killed unrestrained. Maoism was hostile not only to local capitalism but also to
foreign influence and appears to have shaped the policy of autarchy. The biggest mistake that
the regime leadership made, also driven by the extremist ideology, was the complete
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Mass Atrocities under the Khmer Rouge

destruction of all existing institutions; this mistake left the new regime totally dependent on the
excessive use of violence as the dominant policy instrument to build a utopian society. My
educated guess is that the new regime was so weak in institutional terms that the leadership
decided to leave enemies or potential reactionaries untouched or alive, and the dream of a
utopian society quickly turned out to be killing fields.
This argument can be further validated by the fact that the return to peace and stability
in Cambodia rests on three major factors that did not exist during the Khmer Rouge reign of
terror. First, the Khmer Rouge’s extreme ideology was rejected and replaced by liberal
pluralism. Second, Cambodia has been reintegrated into the international community since the
intervention of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in the early 1990s.
Isolationism has since given way to regionalism and globalism, as Cambodia has begun to join
regional and global organizations. Third, international efforts at institution building at both
state and civil society levels have put a constraint on state power, although the level of
institutional effectiveness is far from ideal. Ongoing violent repression has resulted from weak
democratic and civil society institutions.
So what are the lessons for the global norm of R2P? There are several lessons. First and
foremost, the Cambodian experience shows that R2P can make a big difference. Second, what
the international community has done in Cambodia shows that a number of policy instruments
have worked to help protect people. Replacing ideological extremism (such as Maoism,
Stalinism and Islamism) with liberal pluralism has helped prevent mass atrocity crime. Ending
the policy of autarchy has been essential to peace building. Building democratic institutions is
the best strategy for peace building, because they place a constraint on power holders.
However, democratic institution building is unlikely to be successful unless the effort is also
accompanied by economic development. A poor democracy is unlikely to become
institutionally strong, since institutional development is a very time-consuming and expensive
process.
Third, other policy instruments must be avoided, if possible. The case of Cambodia
shows that the Vietnamese military intervention helped put an end to the Khmer Rouge reign of
terror but it did not end the war. The war did not end with the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia. The war became internationalized and did not end until after the Soviet Union
collapse, the end of the Cold War, and the end of Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge. In
short, unilateral military intervention helped end the Khmer Rouge atrocities but prolonged the
military conflict. Economic sanctions did not end the war either and, in fact, punished the poor
and vulnerable in Cambodia, especially when this policy instrument isolated the country from
the international community. Whether the pursuit of retributive justice by trying Khmer Rouge
leaders has been effective is a matter of debate, but empirical evidence does not strongly
support the optimistic assumption that this policy instrument has worked as intended. The
threat of judicial punishment in extremely weak institutions tends to exacerbate the insecurity
dilemma that former combatants still face. When threatened by the prospects of punishment,
those who are in positions of power or well-armed may not be willing to give up power or
promote democracy which is seen as undermining their security.
In sum, R2P is more effective when international intervention is preventive through
long-term and steady democratic and judicial institution building, rather than through military
intervention -- or punitive measures such as economic sanctions and judicial enforcement. To
make R2P more effective, it is important to move from the power- to the security-based
approach, from the use of punitive instruments to ones based on trust- or confidence-building
measures.
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CAMBODIA’S POLITICAL OUTLOOK
Dr. Chheang Vannarith
Senior Research Fellow,
Public Lecture
CICP, Phnom Penh, 8th January 2016
Cambodia is entering a new phase of political uncertainty after the eruption of political tension
between the two main political parties – the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the
opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) late last year. Two lawmakers from the
opposition CNRP were violently beaten near the gate of the National Assembly by a group of
protesters allegedly orchestrated by the ruling CPP. Kem Sokha, Vice President of CNRP, was
then removed from his position as first Vice President of the National Assembly in October 2015
after a legally dubious vote, which was boycotted by CNRP. A series of arrest warrants were
issued against Sam Rainsy, the President of CNRP, in late 2015. The move, some local and
international observers argued, was aimed to weaken the opposition CNRP.
Regardless of these democratic backward steps and apparent regression, democracy in
Cambodia will eventually prevail. No one no matter how powerful they are can stop the
democratization process in Cambodia due to the fact that the Cambodian society has embraced
the values of democracy. Young Cambodians are the main driving force in promoting
democratic values and fundamental freedom. Power competition and transition will be surely
done through democratic processes. Nevertheless, the key challenge for Cambodia is how to
have a peaceful and smooth power transition taking into account that the past experiences of
power transition were violent and bloody. How can Cambodia move from the “political culture
of revenge and violence” to a “political culture of peace and dialogue”?
As local and national elections are approaching, competition for power between the CPP
and CNRP is intensifying. The 2018 election will be the most competitive race between the two
political forces to date. It is still too early to predict who will win, as the election results will be
very much defined by the votes cast by young voters. In 2014, 30 percent of the population was
aged between 15 and 29 years old and this will increase to 40 percent in 2020.
The party likely to win the next election needs to have a convincing and realistic strategy
to win the hearts of young voters. Political leaders must change their behavior and approach to
the youth. Both political parties have doubled their efforts in developing a policy platform and
strategy to empower and generate opportunities for youth.
Cambodian politics is also very much shaped by historical memories, cultural values,
economic conditions, social transformations, external factors and foreign intervention. After the
collapse of the Khmer Empire in the early 14th century, when the Khmer King abandoned
Angkor and moved to Phnom Penh, Cambodia experienced more than five centuries of foreign
intervention, colonialism and occupation. The lack of national unity was the root cause of
national weaknesses and humiliation.
In more recent times, Cambodia went through three decades of civil war, lasting from
early 1970s to the late 1990s. Only after 1998, was Cambodia able to unite the whole country
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Cambodia’s Political Outlook

under one legitimate government after the remaining Khmer Rouge forces were completely
disintegrated and reintegrated into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.
However, the power struggle and competition between different political parties and
factions remains acute. Due to lack of trust and weak institutions, Cambodia’s political culture
is prone to conflict and instability. Zero sum games and the survival of the fittest characterize
how the parties behave.
It was expected that political reconciliation under the “culture of dialogue” between the
CPP and CNRP would transform their power struggle from a negative-sum game into a
positive-sum game in which all political parties could co-exist and benefit.
Yet the political detente was unfortunately short-lived due to the lack of substance and
working mechanisms to sustain and nurture political trust. Mutual personal attacks and deep
distrust between the leaders of the two parties were the main factor derailing the dialogue.
To revive and sustain political dialogue and trust building, both parties need to focus on
institutional reforms, nation building and democratic consolidation. Such processes of political
trust building are the foundation of long-term peace and stability for the country. The two main
political parties need to take leadership roles and be role models for other smaller political
parties.
Some of the issues and challenges faced are political polarization and the widening gap
between state and society. The speed of social change far surpasses state reforms. Political
leaders need to adjust their way of thinking, behavior, and approach so that they can meet the
aspirations and needs of young people.
Although Cambodia has done well in terms of economic development and poverty
reduction, economic inequality and bad governance remain the key development issues.
Corruption is rampant and difficult to root out. Cambodia was ranked number 150 out of 168
countries surveyed by the Transparency International in 2015.
The controversial law on Associations and NGOs (LANGO) created a certain degree of
tensions between state and civil society. The State-society gap has further widened. To narrow
the gap, the state should largely perceive civil society as a mirror rather than as smoke. Civil
society plays a critical role in shaping public opinion, monitoring public policy, keeping
political leaders and public authorities in check and providing social services. State-society
interactions are crucial in democratic consolidation.
Social media has become the means in political communication. To quickly outreach to
the active 2.5 million social media users in Cambodia, politicians have intensively spent their
time and efforts on their social media page with updated news or live talks. Prime Minister Hun
Sen has taken into consideration quite seriously the complaints and suggestions posted on his
Facebook page. The head of the opposition party, Sam Rainsy, uses social media to stay
connected with his supporters and followers in Cambodia, while he is in exile. The political
power competition ground has been transformed to include online/virtual space.
Garnering political support for the upcoming commune elections in 2017 and national
election in 2018 is the main focus of political parties. The key issues are poverty, corruption,
social injustice, land disputes, economic inequality, depletion of natural resources (particularly
deforestation) and territorial sovereignty. It is predicted that the upcoming commune elections
in 2017 and the national election in 2018 will be relatively peaceful, less violent, and reasonably
free. However the question is “fairness”. If the opposition leader, Sam Rainsy, is not granted a
pardon and allowed to return to the country in time for the election, the question of “fairness”
will be questionable.
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Cambodia’s Political Outlook

The opposition party has effectively capitalized on the weaknesses and shortcomings of
the ruling party. So far, the ruling CPP has not satisfactorily implemented the reform agenda as
set out in its national development strategy. Corruption and social injustices remain serious.
Public dissatisfaction is on the rise, particularly with regard to weak public institutions. The
poor are starting to ask more questions about the “unjustifiable wealth” of some rich politicians
and government officials.
It is a massive challenge for the ruling party to speed up reforms and deliver concrete
results for the upcoming elections. The symptoms of bad governance are clear. Now, leaders
need to decide whether to undergo simple treatment or surgery. As society is changing so
rapidly, adaptive, service-oriented and transformative political leadership is required. Political
leaders need to understand both existing and emerging social problems and needs, develop the
necessary mechanisms and mobilize energy and resources to solve them.

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NATION BUILDING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY –
THE CASE OF GERMANY
H.E. Amb. Joachim Baron von Marschall
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Kingdom of Cambodia
Public Lecture Delivered at

6th April 2016
I would like to thank H.E. Pou Sothirak for the opportunity to speak at this forum.
I have been privileged to attend your conferences often, and there has never been a dull
moment. Thank you very much.
Before beginning my presentation, I would like to make two interrelated points:
− Firstly, the views and statements given are not based on scientific research or theory but
are my own views and subjective observations, and
− Secondly, they do not reflect in any way the official position of the German government,
although they may to a greater or lesser extent coincide.
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
In my presentation I would like to look at four aspects:
− Firstly, I would like to give you a brief account of the recent German history in
highlighting those events which in my view have had an impact on German national
identity,
− I will then draw some general conclusions on what constitutes national identity,
− Thirdly I will address today's challenges to national identity,
− And finally I would like to touch upon the question of how national identity can be
preserved and strengthened.
Germany and National Identity

German national identity, ladies and gentlemen, is inextricably linked to German nation
building. Germany really is a relatively young nation. The foundations for modern Germany
were laid after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. Until then, Germany had consisted of
numerous sovereign principalities. The only thing which united them was the common German
language.
The new nation which came into being in 1871 had no customs borders separating the
principalities which together formed the new German Empire; there was a common currency,
common governmental institutions and a head of state, the Emperor. Gradually, the nation
building process carried on to the tune of a phenomenal demographic and economic growth.
Then, in 1914, Germany together with its ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, declared war on
Russia and France, setting off WWI and consequently bringing 40 years of continuous growth
and prosperity to an abrupt halt. Immediately after the end of WWI and German defeat, civil
unrest emerged. Large parts of the German population, including the middle class, blamed the
disastrous outcome of the war for Germany on the ruling aristocracy and – successfully –
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Nation Building and National Identity – the Case of Germany

demanded that they give up their legal privileges and – in the case of the princes - the sovereign
positions which they held. Germany became a republic and the regions which had been ruled
by the German princes became provinces more closely tied to the central powers in Berlin.
However, German national pride had been deeply wounded as a consequence of the Treaty of
Versailles of 1919 which had laid the entire blame for the disastrous consequences of WWI on
Germany. It is mainstream view among today’s historians that this wounded national pride has
been one of the major causes for the rise of National Socialism in the early 1920s. Adolf Hitler
promised Germans to reinstate the country to its former power and glory and to improve the
economic situation of six million people unemployed. No sooner had Hitler assumed power in
1933 did he start to systematically dismantle the powers of those national institutions whose
role it had been to uphold democracy and the rule of law. The notorious secret police, the
Gestapo, ensured that those political opponents who had not already been incarcerated would
be “neutralised” or at least discouraged to continue opposing the dictator. And worst of all,
Hitler systematically started eliminating Jewish life with the consequences we all know. No
doubt, the majority of the German people agreed with Hitler and his approach, and those who
didn’t were for the most part too scared to say so in public out of fear for their societal, if not
physical existence. What had started as a new national identity building process at the time the
German Empire was founded in 1871 now had turned into blind nationalism, aimed at
excluding the Jewish population whose loyalty to the nation was – unjustly – questioned and
also against parts of the rest of the world (notably France and the Soviet Union) who Hitler
considered the enemies of Germany and to be racially inferior to Germans at that. We know all
too well where all of this ended: in a horrible war, a holocaust and the loss of millions of lives,
untold suffering and the loss of huge economic and cultural assets. When Germany capitulated
on 8 May 1945, the situation was very different from the one at the end of WWI in 1918: nobody
now could possibly claim that Germany was unjustly blamed for having started the war and
that it had to take the full responsibility for all the consequences of this war. German national
pride had dropped to zero – most people were deeply ashamed and embarrassed of what had
happened in the German name even though not all Germans would have been willing to openly
admit this.
So how was German National Identity rebuilt?

It may sound terribly cynical when I say that only the unconditional capitulation and
with it the total eradication of nationalist views which united most Germans during the Third
Reich enabled Germans to take an entirely fresh view on who they were and what their role
should be in the world. The path from a pariah state back to being a fully recognized member of
the international community has been quite arduous – we are immensely lucky and grateful
that the international community for the most part has forgiven us. Unlike in 1918, the allied
powers in 1945 refrained from seeking revenge from Germany. Instead, after having divided
the country into four sectors under their respective military rule, they made enormous efforts to
“re-educate” the Germans: in the Western parts of the country according to the principles of
Western democracies, in the East according to the principles of Socialism. A “new German” was
to be created, a German who would never again try to impose himself on his neighbours
and/or commit the acts against humanity which had become the sad hallmark of Nazi
Germany.
The most important order of the day in the years immediately following WWII was to
recreate an economic basis on which to survive. With an enormous national effort, but also
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with the financial support of the Marshall plan in the Western part of the divided nation,
Germans created the “Wirtschaftswunder”, the Economic Miracle; East Germans managed to
rebuild their economy, too, under much more adverse conditions. West Germany, by becoming
one of the founding nations of the European Economic Community, the forerunner of today’s
EU, showed its willingness to subject itself to a supranational regime which would prevent
henceforth any new German attempt to strive for hegemony in Europe. Without this
confidence-building measure, I am convinced; Germany would not have been able to regain
national unity after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
In the realm of German foreign affairs, cultural policy played an important role in the
first two decades after the war. Germany reminded the world (and also itself) of the great
cultural achievements in happier days: the enormous wealth which philosophers, scientists,
technicians, authors, painters, composers had created and contributed to the whole world. The
great success of this cultural foreign policy, together with the economic achievements, forged
the face of a new, much more agreeable Germany, which in turn helped Germans to come to
terms with themselves.
However, these accomplishments could not entirely erase the huge stain which the
inhuman cruelty of the Holocaust had created on Germany’s image. After two decades during
which German society both in the West and the East was too preoccupied with rebuilding the
country, the younger generation in West Germany, agitated by the Vietnam war which they
considered deeply unjust and inhuman, started getting at the older generation which had for
the most part been tight-lipped about the Nazi past. Young West Germans wanted to know
what had happened during the “Third Reich”. They wanted to know how their parents and
teachers had thought and acted during that period and why they had done nothing to avert the
catastrophe. This was the beginning of a painful public discussion which in its course brought
to light more and more facts on what Nazism had meant. It was this openness towards past
wrongdoing, the willingness to address even the most painful and shameful acts and to assume
responsibility for them, both individually and collectively, which eventually helped German
society to find its peace with both the victims and with itself. (East German society, however,
had taken a different attitude: living in a socialist country, they felt morally superior to the
“capitalist”, if not “fascist” West. All that Nazism had done to the world was blamed on the
people living in West Germany.)
Apart from the question of dealing with a troubled past, Germans had also to come to
terms with another burden on their national sentiments: the loss of a third of German territory
in the former Eastern part of the Reich (now belonging to Poland and Russia), home to German
families since the Middle Ages, and the division of what was left of the nation through an “Iron
Curtain”, as the fortified border between West and East Germany was called. However, what
originally had been an open wound to German national sentiment, with countless German
families separated by the Iron Curtain, eventually became a great source of newly found
national pride. In a peaceful revolutionary act (some would call it today a “colour revolution”)
East Germans managed to force the sclerotic government of Erich Honecker to open the
hermetically sealed border to West Germany and eventually to step down, thus bringing
freedom of movement and opinion to East Germans. Not one shot had been fired, not one
person killed during these stormy days of November 1989. This peaceful German reunification
has no doubt given German national sentiment a tremendous boost. But no doubt there still is a
certain share of the older East German population who do not fully identify themselves with
reunited Germany. Also, as in the two decades following the end of national socialism, East
Germans had to deal with the atrocities which the notorious East German secret police, the
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Stasi, had committed against people who they had considered enemy of the state. Hundreds of
thousands of East German citizens had collaborated with the Stasi, denouncing fellow citizens
and thus delivering them to torture and long years of imprisonment. Again, Germans were
forced to deal with a painful and shameful past.
A new chapter in German national sentiment started when Germany hosted the games
for the 2006 Soccer World Cup. It was the first global sports event by which the united
Germany presented itself to the world as a cosmopolitan country, open to the world and able to
create a mood of joy and lightness. Almost overnight, Germans learned to view themselves
with new eyes. Yes, we can do it: be open to the world, enjoy ourselves in the community of our
foreign visitors, and to be in the limelight without feeling strange and uneasy about it. In the
years to follow, the debt crisis shaking much of Europe provided Germany with plenty of
opportunity to prove to Europe and the world its newly gained national self-confidence.
Increasingly, our neighbors and allies have come to expect leadership from Germany. Yet, there
still is a degree of reluctance in many Germans who would prefer Germany to understate its
strength and stay in the background of global politics, at least as far as military engagement is
concerned. To Germans associating leadership with overboarding nationalism and the excesses
of Nazism, being assertive on the world stage seems to border on the verge of hubris.
General Conclusions
I would like to base my conclusions on what makes national identity on a utilitarian hypothesis,
namely that national unity is an important determining factor for what constitutes national
identity. In other words, only those factors can be considered key elements of national identity
which at the same time help to preserve or foster national unity.
Looking at the constituent elements of German national identity, the first thing that
springs to my mind is the common language. And I should think that such a common language
is a key element of national identity in most countries of the world, multi-ethnic ones included.
What would a country like India be if people would speak nothing but their regional
languages? Or the US, if immigrants had refused to learn English and instead insisted on
continuing to speak their original languages? A modern society can only hold together if there
is communication and mutual understanding at least in a linguistic sense. Only through public
debate can important and difficult questions be solved and a national consensus be shaped
through dialogue and consensus. I do not ignore that there are multi-lingual nations with a firm
national identity – take the example of Switzerland, where four national languages exist. But in
Switzerland, every child learns at least one if not two more of the national languages at school,
making it bi-, if not trilingual, thus enabling large parts of the Swiss society to communicate
freely and easily with each other in more than one language. The power of a common language
to create a unique identity may even reach beyond national boundaries – the English speaking
Commonwealth or La Francophonie are points in case. On the other hand, I believe that all
attempts to create a common identity among the more than half a billion citizens living in the
European Union have been severely hampered by the fact that there are 24 languages spoken,
with only a relatively small fraction of that population being able to freely communicate with
each other in a shared language (mostly English).
A common culture, which comprises customs, traditions, fairy tales and legends, food
and drink, etc. shared and cherished by the majority of the nation’s population seems at first
glance to be an important element of national identity as well. Germany being a country which
emerged from the union of a large number of principalities about 150 years ago, has a very
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diverse cultural landscape. And yet, this enormous diversity has not in any way affected
national unity. Hence it is the phenomenon of cultural diversity, not the substance of the
differing cultures, which forms the characteristic of German national identity. Or reversely put:
cultural uniformity – unlike a common language – is no fundamental element of national unity
(and thus, according to my working hypothesis, national identity).
Unlike cultural identity, religious belief, or, more generally termed, a value system, is an
indispensable element of national identity. The area of present day Germany had been
Christianized from the early Middle Ages onwards; by the 11th century, the entire German
speaking population of Central Europe had turned to Christianity. But then, almost exactly 500
years ago, the teachings of Martin Luther changed things dramatically. What originally was
merely meant to be a proposal for renewing the Catholic church and their dogmas ended in a
schism of the Christian faith into Catholics and Protestants until our present day. Germany had
suffered badly from this schism, if we think of the 30-Year War 400 years ago which laid waste
to much of the areas which are now modern Germany. In Switzerland, severe political clashes
in the mid-19th century along the lines of Catholic vs. Protestant cantons almost led to the
breaking apart of that country. And if we think of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, we deal
with events less than twenty years ago. And yet, the values on which Protestantism and
Catholicism are based - below the surface of dogmatic argument – are uniform and immensely
powerful. Christianity, in combination with classical Greek philosophy, has helped to shape a
whole body of enlightened and secular Western thinking which today forms the core of a
universal code of rules, among others the human rights; it also is the basis of virtually all
Western constitutions. German national identity, in fact the national identities of all European
nations, cannot be imagined and understood without this powerful value system. So while
without doubt disputes over Christian dogmas have threatened national unity in some
countries, including Germany, the underlying values have, indeed, held together European
nations for over a thousand years. There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that a common
value system is a fundamental element of national identity. At the same time, religion is a good
example to demonstrate that such an element of national identity may well be abused by
demagogues and populists to divide a nation for their own political purposes.
A national identity, furthermore, is linked to symbols. The head of state, the flag, the
national anthem, possibly landmark buildings and of course, the national soccer or cricket
teams are all in one way or another part of a national identity. The importance of these symbols
varies. For many decades, West Germans were rather reluctant to make use of their national
symbols in public – you would hardly see any private household exposing the German flag and
the national anthem still is rarely played at public events. People have associated them with the
excessive use of these symbols during the Third Reich and the false pride linked to these
symbols. East Germans, as I pointed out earlier, did not have these reservations – their flag and
anthem were used generously to boost the national pride for the new socialist fatherland. To
West Germans instead, their solid currency, the German mark, became the symbol of economic
success, a token of national pride. Also, the West German Grundgesetz, one of the most modern
and liberal constitutions in the world, became the object of a certain national pride of the
educated middle class. Some authors called this phenomenon the “Verfassungspatriotismus”
(constitutional patriotism). Indeed, after the horrors of an arbitrary and abusive judicial system
in the Nazi era, the Grundgesetz stood for a new and just Germany. And I do not have to
explain to you the importance which “Bayern München” or soccer heroes like Franz
Beckenbauer have for Germans and their feeling of national identity. It is interesting to note in
this context that the identification of Germans with their soccer clubs is not in any way affected
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by the increasing number of foreigners playing in German soccer teams.
Another important element is a collective sense of history with an emphasis on
landmark events, particularly an extended struggle for freedom from a dominant nation (take
Cambodia and almost all countries which used to be colonies). The case of Germany may be
almost unique: the reunification of two separate parts of one nation. In the case of France as in
some other countries (like the former Soviet Union), a revolution, changing the social and/or
political fabric of a nation has been a key element determining national identity.
Important achievements of a nation also help to form national identity, especially if they
reflect a collective effort. Rebuilding Germany after the massive destruction of WWII, instilled
a great degree of satisfaction and pride in the population. There was hardly any German man or
woman who had not contributed to this success story through their tireless work. But also
individual accomplishments in the fields of the arts and sciences still play a role in the collective
German mind at least of the educated middle class. Germany is the country of "thinkers and
poets". Often national achievements are represented by symbols, such as a particular brand
name (think of BMW, Mercedes, Porsche, Bayern München etc.). Even achievements
accomplished ages ago, like Angkor or the Greek temples, still have their impact on national
identity, are the object of national pride of those who can more or less legitimately claim that it
had been their ancestors who had contributed to that accomplishment.
Lastly, the ability of a society to practice solidarity and mutual trust seems to me a key
element of a national identity as well. The German welfare system and the social protection in a
capitalist market economy are examples of an approach which reflects the concept of solidarity
– they have been firmly engrained in German national identity.
Challenges to National Identity

There are manifold factors which may influence and possibly threaten national identity. Firstly,
and perhaps most importantly, there are endemic factors: shame and guilt, lack of
achievements, the collective feeling of inferiority, lack of trust in fellow countrymen. In the case
of (West) Germany, the evil spirits of the National socialist past, the holocaust and the lost war,
were haunting the nation for a long time. As was to be expected, in the first decade after the end
of WWII, Germans often were greeted with frosty distance, if not outright hostility when
travelling abroad. As a consequence, Germans often tried to hide their nationality and pretend
they weren't German. Also, as I have pointed out, many Germans were feeling uneasy when in
situations where national symbols were presented and celebrated (like national flags, anthems
etc.) - the pathos and sentiments of such celebrations seemed to evoke memories of the
bombastic demonstrations of national pride during the Hitler era. The order of the day was for
many decades: "Keep a low profile and do not raise attention". And still today, many Germans
feel uptight when they meet a Jewish person, for fear that that person may have lost relatives in
the holocaust, making it difficult then to enter into an uninhibited, easy-going dialogue.
But there also are external factors which may erode national identity. There are people
who blame globalisation for a loss of national identity because it takes its toll on cultural life.
Blue jeans and T-shirts have driven away traditional clothing; Coca Cola has squeezed
traditional local drinks out of the markets etc. In Germany, with the advent of the Beatles in the
1960s, Germans took to English pop music and the German music scene soon evaporated. But
as I tried to argue, culture in a specific form is determining national identity only to a limited
extent, and its alteration hardly affects national unity. Also I firmly believe that, reacting to
outside influences, the creative powers of a people will always produce new indigenous forms
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of cultural expression. External cultural influences do not destroy – they stimulate culture.
A very pressing question which we Germans ask ourselves these days is what effect
immigration may have on our national identity, or whether immigration will become a new
element of our national identity. It is telling that post-war Germany so far has always
considered itself a "non-immigrant" country despite a steady flow of foreigners to West
Germany since the late 1950s: first the so-called "guest workers" from southern Europe and
Turkey who helped to rebuild the German economy, most of whom later settled in Germany
for good; then, in the 1970s and 80s, asylum seekers from Asia and Africa; in the 1980s and
1990s ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and in the 1990s refugees fleeing the war on the
Balkans. It is rather surprising that, despite a share of foreigners amounting to 10% of the 80
million people living in Germany, my country until today still does not officially consider itself
an immigration country. All refugees who have arrived in my country are staying on the basis
of our asylum laws and the Geneva Convention for the protection of refugees (the latter
granting only temporary refuge).
The recent influx of refugees, the biggest since the end of WWII when huge numbers of
German refugees moved from the Soviet Army to seek refuge in the West, has
created considerable uproar in parts of the German population. Some people who are now
rallying around the new political party “Aktion für Deutschland” (AfD) or participating in
public anti-refugee demonstrations organised by the “PEGIDA” movement (PEGIDA meaning
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) fear that Germany will lose its
national identity as a consequence of this influx of foreigners from the Islamic world. Recent
elections in three German state assemblies have shown considerable gains of the AfD and
severe losses in the ranks of the moderate party spectrum. To me, this massive reaction which
has the potential to polarize German society, reflects a deep-seated fear that our national
identity will be severely transformed as a consequence of this influx of refugees. The attraction
which the teachings of Islam seems to have on younger people in almost all Western countries,
including Germany, is seen as the beginning of a process which eventually may undermine or
erode our traditional value system. I would not rule out that this fear has some of its roots in
European history. Since the early middle ages until the 17th century, first the Arabs from North
Africa and later the Turks repeatedly expanded into European territory, ruling much of Spain
and the Balkans for centuries. But has Europe and its value system changed as a consequence of
this? I do not believe so. I strongly feel that the present fear as articulated in these movements
has more to do with our own insecurity and possibly lack of awareness for our value system
than with an objective danger.
Perhaps the most dangerous challenges to national identity, however, are nationalism
and sectoral egotism. Nationalism builds on a narrative which comprises existing or fictional
elements of national identity, usually glorifying these and often suggesting the superiority of
the own national identity to others; this narrative then is instrumentalised for political
purposes, usually by one or more populist politicians. The characteristic trait of such a narrative
is its potential to stir emotions which, more often than not, are directed against groups of
persons, be they within the national community or outside, with the aim of excluding them
from resources vital for society. It probably is no coincidence that such trends towards
nationalism are manifesting themselves in times of economic downturns, i.e. when resources do
not multiply any longer and people feel that the status quo is eroding. Germany at the eve of
Hitler's ascent is a good example to state my case: apart from the national humiliation which
many Germans perceived after the Versailles Treaty, the effects of the world economic crisis at
the end of the 1920's and the huge reparations Germany had to pay to the allied powers had
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brought the German economy down to its knees. Hitler was quick to blame the Jews and started
to systematically excluding them from German society and sending them to the death camps. -
As we have seen, today the huge influx of immigrants form the Middle East and North Africa
has again stimulated nationalist feelings in parts of the German population. But these feelings
are not limited to Germany – we see similar phenomena in France, Britain, Scandinavia and
Eastern Europe, not only as a consequence of immigration but also caused by a crisis of the
European political and economic system. Nationalism erodes national identity by discrediting it
and creating a fictitious image of the nation often far removed from the realities. Where such
developments lead to we have seen in the more recent German history. In the end, national
unity and the national identity are seriously affected, if not destroyed.
Strengthening National Identity

As we have seen in the case of Germany, national identity is a very complex matter. It has
accompanied German nation building, even though some elements of present day German
national identity had already existed before 1871. We have seen that national identity may grow
with national achievements but also weaken with failure and defeat. In this, the identity of a
nation is not dissimilar to an individual's identity. And as in the case of a human being, the
success of a nation ultimately depends on its ability to mature and to find inner peace, i.e. to
know and to accept its own strengths and weaknesses, to know its own history and to come to
terms with it, mostly of course with the things that have gone wrong. This implies rigorous
honesty. It also means that fears are identified and a self-confidence be developed which helps
to cope with threats, be they real or imagined. National identity forms the glue which keeps
people together in a society; it is the common denominator among millions of individuals living
within the boundaries of a given country. It is the guarantor of national unity.
We also have seen that national identity may deteriorate into nationalism when people
feel challenged or threatened.
From this follows that fostering a national identity and averting nationalism lies in the
interest of every nation. Education plays a major role in this context: conveying to students the
relevant historic facts, encourage them to get to know their country, and instill in them a sense
of communal responsibility and solidarity. In this context I would like to refer again to my own
country: Dealing with the dark chapters of our history in public debate and in education has
been a vital part in strengthening our national identity.
Furthermore, the creation of institutions is an important factor as well, institutions
whose mechanisms are understood by the population and whose advantage is evident,
institutions which assure a decent life standard as well as fairness and justice within society so
as to uphold social peace (what I called earlier the "inner peace").
Raising awareness for common beliefs, values and principles which the whole nation
shares is another crucial matter. It is important to note that this does by no means imply
uniformity in public opinion and political beliefs. When we are looking at national identity, we
are referring to the foundation of a house – when we are looking at pluralism in society we are
looking at the various rooms in this house. Common beliefs and values also are a matter of
education from an early age onward. But it is important to keep in mind that they are not static
but that their shape is changing over generations. Therefore, fora are needed where there can be
a public debate on national beliefs and values as well. Only in this way it can be assured that
national consensus – and hence national unity - will be preserved over the generations.
The rise of nationalism is a constant danger in every society. Therefore, it is important to
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have institutional safeguards built into the system. These can be laws which sanction actions
threatening minorities or glorifying past or future violence, including wars – laws which then
will be enforced systematically and uniformly. Education, again, plays an important part as
well. Young human beings need to learn early in life to develop a critical political mind so as to
be able to distinguish between sound politics and political demagoguery. Also, students need to
be helped to become mature, self confident human beings – in that way they will most likely be
immune to populism and nationalist rhetoric.
Royal Highness, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I hope I have been able to provide you with some food for thought regarding a subject which is
pertinent not just to my own country but to your own home countries as well, including of
course, Cambodia. You may not agree with my views in all respects. But one way or the other,
please do share your own views with me, be it now or at a later point.

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CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN CAMBODIA:
VIEW OF CHINESE SOFT POWER FROM THE GROUND UP
David Koh
Director, David Koh & Associates
Working Paper
December 2016
Introduction: The Research Problem

In the big picture of a rising and peaceful China, pockets of negative make dents into it.
Compared to the late 1990s when it was described as “responsible” and its rise often
perceived as “peaceful”, China today is more often seen as “assertive” or “ambitious”,
suggestive even of being hegemonic. China is also seen as an actor that wants to alter the
rules of the global economic and political system, what with its initiatives for global
engagements and groups to counter the influence of western/developed countries, such as
the BRICS, AIIB, and OBOR, although China remains a key member of global institutions
such as the WTO, World Bank, IMF, and others.
Arguably, the negative images may be what Western media wish to paint of China,
to constrain China’s rise. China denies it has bad intentions, and takes initiatives and make
declarations that basically carries the message that it will never seek hegemony and
dominance. Among pockets of developing countries and groups, who have been affected by
China’s rise directly or indirectly, however there has been reaction against China. Even
within the BRICS itself, China takes care to counter a faint suggestion that it will become the
dominant country and leader of the group. In truth, China remains the most enthusiastic
BRICS proponent and has the best economic potential and governance among BRICS
countries, which makes it the natural and deserving leader.
Where local, societal interests in countries receiving Chinese investments are
concerned, China could be seen as acting in cahoots with the host government at worst, or at
best seen as negligent of local and societal interest. One such country where such opinion
exists is Cambodia. How China is perceived and received in Cambodia is the concern of this
paper.
China’s image is manifested in Chinese activities in Cambodia, including its
economic and development aid activities, and their impact. After giving Cambodia a large
chunk of aid and loans that Cambodia should do best not to do without, China’s image
should logically be largely positive. While there is acknowledgement of the benefits of
investments and trade, as well as aid, China also suffers from negative images, which this
paper will point out.
This paper comprises three parts. The first sets out the research question, addressing
the issue of how Cambodia features in China’s economic and political strategy. The first
part ends with a description of the methodology of research of this paper. The second part
presents the main themes about Chinese investments that are seen and recorded from the
interviews and written sources that the author has consulted. The third and final part
attempts an assessment of Chinese investments’ reception by Cambodians, and suggests
how Chinese investments can improve the image of China – and hence Chinese soft power –
in Cambodia.
Material for this paper was gathered through interviews with ten Cambodians
familiar with the issue, who work as academics/researchers and as NGO activists. There
was insufficient time to conduct more interviews or do a lengthy literature review, but an
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Chinese Investments in Cambodia: View of Chinese Soft Power from the Ground Up

academic paper is not the intended-goal for my writing. Rather, this is an effort to raise
awareness and understanding, through a preliminary paper, that the social dimensions of
the matter of Chinese investments can get more serious by the day, even though the fault for
the problems may not lie entirely or chiefly with Chinese investors. In fact, affecting people
to people relations negatively can impact proportionally the long-term interests of China
that money alone cannot buy in the country concerned.
Why Does China Invest in Cambodia?

In a purely economic sense, the business consideration of profits should drive investment
decisions by economic entities, more so if the investment is overseas and thus carries a
higher risk than investments at home. In this sense, Cambodia has much lower labour costs
than China, and should have much lower business costs in general than most first-ranking
cities of China. The presence of many Chinese enterprises now in Cambodia show this to be
an attraction to invest in Cambodia. This is seen especially in the number of Chinese
enterprises manufacturing garments there. 1 The investments may not be coming directly
from China, but might have been channelled through China, or has supervisors and
managers from China, or seen as a “Chinese” venture because of the collaboration among
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Chinese, or even Singaporean parties.
Chinese investments in Cambodia consist as well of economic land concessions
(timber, minerals, gems, hydropower dams, irrigation works, agricultural plantations)
involving thousands of hectares of land, as well as development loans given for
infrastructure construction. There are also urban real estate investments by Chinese
companies, as well as oil companies prospecting offshore for oil. Of note are the projects,
mostly by China, in the Butom Sakur National Park in Koh Kong Province just next to
Thailand, with concessions given out amount to around 1,200 km2. These projects aim to
develop tourism projects as well as plantations. Areas like Butom Sakur offer a region close
to China that has natural resources and cheap labour, and which also has near-sea access for
easy transportation.
Other than the strong argument for securing cheap and accessible factors of
production, there are political reasons for China to give more aid to Cambodia, and to
encourage its enterprises to invest there. In the strategic, geopolitical game of Indochina,
where there has been recent history of mistrust, tensions, and conflict among Indochina
countries and between them on the one side and China and other major powers on the other
side, having a strong ally in Cambodia means China occupying a central position on
Indochina. Cambodia is a string that China can pull to give the Vietnamese and Laotians
some worries on their southern flank; similarly, Thailand would need to think about the
impact of Chinese presence and influence in Cambodia on Thailand’s eastern flank.
Allegedly, China has also exercised influence over Cambodia to stop ASEAN from adopting
a strong united front against China on the South China Sea issue. A large portion of the
history of Indochina also showed it is a competitive arena of great power rivalry,
particularly among western powers, and between western powers and Northeast Asia
powers namely China and Japan.

1 According to South China Morning Post, about 65 percent of garment factories are owned by
investors from mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The garment industry accounts for around
80 percent of exports. Chan Cheuk Yin and Holly Robertson, “Chinese Factory Owners Living in a
World Apart”, The Cambodian Daily 31 July 2014.
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/chinese-factory-owners-living-in-a-world-apart-65395/
accessed 3 November 2016.

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On Cambodia’s part, it also understands the pivotal role China can play to ensure its own
survival, as a small country wedged between two bigger countries. The narrative that many,
if not all, Cambodians have of their history in the past hundreds of years is that of immense
amount of territories lost to Thais and Vietnamese, especially the latter. In fact, this was one
reason the Khmer Rouge cited for their attacks on Vietnam after the end of the Vietnam War,
which led to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979. China sought to buy time for
Cambodians resisting the Vietnamese forces by opening a short, military campaign in
northern Vietnam. For Cambodians, China is faraway and there is safety in distance; but
more importantly China has played the role of a military ally in the past to counter
aggression from neighbouring countries. What more, now China has nuclear weapons,
strong conventional military forces, and the world’s biggest economy, if not the most
generous of donors.
To understand the issue from the perspective of people on the ground, the author
decided to conduct a fieldwork of ten days, which admittedly was not a long enough time to
adequately cover every angle of the issue. Regrettably, there was no contact with
government officials and Chinese businessmen because of the difficulty of getting them to
agree to interviews. Ultimately, it was easy logically to approximate what the government
officials and Chinese business would say, without having to meet them. This is because their
views can be found on official reports and news articles in the media. The author met people
who were working and writing on the issues of concern – (over ten) NGO activists,
researchers and academics, and friends in his private network, and teased out the unsaid
parts of the contestation in Cambodian society over the issue of Chinese investments. For
instance, what was left mainly unsaid was that Chinese investment is still welcome but
Cambodians wish it was a better kind of investments than what has been seen. One is not
able to ascertain this point purely from reading the media.
How Have Chinese Investments Been Received in Cambodia?

Opinion about Chinese investment in Cambodia that can be found among Cambodians can
largely be divided into three groups. While the author could not speak to representatives of
each and every group, there are many sources for the views other than meeting them for
interviews.
The first group consists of the government and the business community. As entities
that should promote and benefit from Chinese investment, naturally the government and
the business community form the core of a group that actively supports and facilitates
Chinese investment. The chief benefits are the creation of jobs, creation of exports (given
Cambodia’s position under MFN terms with EU and USA), and business opportunities. The
government has gained through economic growth and can legitimately use that as a basis to
campaign for votes. Cambodia is now going through a period of high growth that has been
sustained for the last decade. With greater growth, job opportunities become abundant, and
poverty rates in Cambodia are on the decline, and so has urbanisation as well as general
standards of living in urban areas.
The NGOs and the research community that work on social issues, the second group,
have different opinions. Interviewees emphasized greatly the neglect of the social
dimensions of the issue. Chinese investment has impacted on Cambodian lives in both rural
and urban areas, through land concessions’ various activities, as well as manufacturing
activity in urban and peri-urban areas. For instance, there are now 700,000 garment workers
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in 1,200 garment companies invested in Cambodia. 2 This is compared to a total labour force
of around 8.6 million in 2014, according to the World Bank.3 The chief complaints by local
people were:
‐ Factory conditions are poor. Workers have fainted due to either malnutrition, lack of
proper health care, or due to bad working conditions. Management however would
like to think of such a phenomenon as due to collective hysteria or some mysterious,
psychological forces.
‐ Chinese factory enterprises pay low salaries that are merely enough to survive. Yet,
given plentiful supply of labour, labourers cannot say no to the job offers.
Employment with such factories also do not have maternity leave, medical insurance,
and long-term contracting (most workers are on one year contracts). Western and
local NGOs have researched the matter and documented the issues in a number of
films and documentaries. 4
‐ Chinese managers do not understand Khmer culture and consequently mannerisms
and an inability to accommodate each other due to this lack of understanding has led
to personal conflicts.
‐ There has been abuse of power, sexual harassment, physical abuse, and Chinese
managers who were prosecuted but ran away before court action started.
‐ The Chinese instigate demanding working schedules, with insufficient time for rest;
frequent overtime. Also pregnant workers are fired, and so are trouble-making
workers who have joined unfriendly unions. 5
If the above complaints concern the garment industry or perhaps manufacturing in general,
the following complaints concern economic land concessions:
‐ Land concession owners’ exploitation of natural resources, such as timber and mines,
is not environmentally friendly. Once the mines and timber are exhausted, the
concession owners left in a huff and have not done the necessary terminal work, such
as covering up mines, replant trees, or even document their departure with
authorities.
‐ Environmental Impact Assessment reports, as required by law, are not done prior to
the granting of concessions and if they were done, were often procedural rather than
professional or serious. Indeed, as will be mentioned below, government line
ministries are not the ultimate approving authority for foreign investments.
‐ Compensation for land requisition is usually meagre as compared to the value of the
land. This point is controversial, as most interviewees agreed with the interviewer,
because of the lapse in time between the moment that compensation was agreed

2 According to Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/11/cambodia-labor-
laws-fail-protect-garment-workers accessed on 3 November 2016.
3http://www.tradingeconomics.com/cambodia/labor-force-total-wb-data.html;
and https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/176283/cambodia-addressing-skills-
gap.pdf p. 23.
4 For instance: A wage you can live on - Textile workers in Cambodia, produced by Clean Clothes
Campaign Denmark 2012 and accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yTehggY29Xg on 3

November 2016; A Day in the Cambodian Garment Factory by Germany’s Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,
accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_qg7dx27gM on 3 November 2016.
5“Cambodian textile workers hang by a thread under Chinese bosses” South China Morning Post 23
July 2016. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1291466/cambodias-textile-workers-hang-

thread-under-chinese-bosses. Accessed 3 November 2016; Cambodia: Garment Workers Fired for
Being Pregnant. Youtube video posted by Human Rights Watch, 11 March 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hb1gi5oCfFI accessed on 3 November 2016.
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upon (rates fixed and not dynamic) and the moment that money was paid. Once a
land project is announced, market prices tended to rise quickly. In places where there
was resistance to eviction, stayers could get a higher amount of payout, and early
takers thought was unfair to them. Government prices of land are often lower than
market rates, and government prices are the benchmark for deciding on the quantum
of compensation.
‐ Corrupt officials could have taken a big part of the compensation meant for local
residents, and they gave out only a small portion of that to the residents. There is a
lack of transparency because the land concessions are arranged between the central
government and the investors.
‐ In the case of the Boeung Kak Lake in central Phnom Penh where a big land conflict
is still inconclusive, the government’s point was that the land was state land and
some therefore squatters could not be entitled to compensation. However, a
compromise was struck when the investor agreed to compensate half the value of the
land, but some land victims are staying put in the hope for more. There is also
information that people who cleared out are moving back to ask for more money.
‐ Land concessions at earlier times of the exercise were given out without clear
demarcation of where the boundaries of the land concession are, and the residents in
the land concessions usually might not even know about the concession until they
were asked to vacate the land. 6
‐ Efforts at resettlement by concession owners, such as Union Development
Corporation who owned one of the Botum Sakur concessions, did a poor job of
resettling people. Small wooden houses without strong foundation and built in the
jungle in a disparate way were built as resettlement housing, and in areas that were
far from amenities without basic electricity and water needs being met. Many of
these houses are now left vacant because they are inhabitable and there is also no
livelihood whatsoever to be found near those houses.
The Pivotal Role of Domestic Governance

While the activists in the NGO community did not explicitly acknowledge it but the
academics did, the point that emerged from the interviews was basically the lack of
governance lied at the heart of problems. In a logical way, given that all interviewees said
Cambodia had “all the works” in terms of regulations that can prevent the above complaints,
the only problem left was inspection and enforcement, and perhaps even disallowing the
investors the license to invest if the EIAs were not found to be favourable to the granting of
the licence. In fact, there is nowhere in the bureaucratic process, as described by the
interviewees, that could allow an EIA to stop the track of a foreign investment proposal.
Two interviewees from civil society agreed totally that foreign investments are needed
because they create jobs. One organisation charged with assessing EIAs that were prepared
by investors even acknowledged that his organisation was happy that it played a role, but
often took the approach that it should not say no to the investor, despite problems with
social impact that could be foreseen. Instead, it took pains to recommend to the ministry
empowered to review the investor’s application that if any problems are highlighted and are
serious, their resolution should be a prior to the granting of the license. But the NGOs have
no power to ensure this. Furthermore, licences are not granted by functional ministries but

6Michael B. Dwyer, Emily Polack and Sokbunthoeun So, “’Better-practice Concessions?’ Some
Lessons from Cambodia’s Leopard Skin Landscape” in International Development Policy 6.1/2015.
Https://poldev.revues.org/2046.
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by the Cambodian Development Council, the statutory organisation of the government.
Therefore, whether the NGOs opinion and recommendations are taken up is anybody’s
guess.
The third group of people are the ordinary people and people affected as well as
unaffected by Chinese investment projects. Among them there seemed to be a sense of
acceptance; that the government knows best and their inferior self-image could have been
buttressed by the fact that they did not have land titles (in the case of them being evicted
from land concessions) or that they had no skills and landed a job simply because of
availability, enthusiasm, and lack of options. There is, NGOs say, among the people a group
who genuinely believed that infrastructure projects were good for the country, until the
projects affected their land and caused them to protest. The case of a hydroelectric power
dam, where local people had initially supported it until the dam started operations and
restricted the flow of water to the locality, which affected local agriculture. This group of
people largely felt helpless, some are illiterate and did not know their rights (including the
lack of rights in the sense of squatters not having the right to monetary compensation,
although morally they have a right to be resettled).
An Assessment
Doing this paper has been a journey of discovery and maturity. It started with the premise,
formed by reading Western media as well as earlier conversations with Cambodian NGO
activists before a decision on the topic is made. While it started with the premise that
something must be terribly wrong with Chinese investments, the finding is now that there
are generic problems with investment into low-end manufacturing in Cambodia. These
include the exploitation of cheap and abundant labour, lack of state enforcement of its
regulations, which are entangled with societal opposition to a regime that is not only
incompetent, but also authoritarian/undemocratic, and oppressive. The conclusion
inevitably is that the government has to maintain a better regime than it is now doing,
through better policing and gate keeping, as well as striking a better balance in its
investments policies towards taking better care of unsettled residents and workers.
In this journey, interviewer and interviewees came to agree at the end that while the
fault is chiefly not with the Chinese side but instead is with domestic governance, there are
some measures that investors in general can take, which Japanese and western investors
have done more than the Chinese have. Following are some areas of suggestions.
Engagement with all levels

Chinese investors must seek to engage all stakeholders at all levels, and must consider
people who live in the neighbourhood/concession area as legitimate stakeholders. There
are local elections and local people who have suffered from land concessions are banding
together to pressure the government and companies. The opposition parties are riding on
this anti-government mood, and are gaining votes and seats. This political instability is not
good for business. Neither is local resistance.
Companies need to go deep, deep down into locality to do its research to understand
local culture and local aspirations. In an authoritarian country, the valves of differing
opinions are usually closed-up. However, as investors, companies can take initiatives of
doing impact assessments and to make its own decision of not going ahead with
investments if the impact assessments are not favourable.
In terms of the organisation of production and investments, interviewees suggested
that what could be done immediately and urgently was for the physical conditions at the
factory as well as at the workers’ living quarters to be improved. The documentaries that
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were available on Youtube show the living conditions to be overly crowded, lacking in the
most basic of amenities and standards of decency – such as women having to take baths in
the open. Interviewees suggested that the words EIA – or Environmental Impact Assessment
are insufficient. The term should be revised to “ESIA,” meaning Environmental and Social
Impact Assessment. This is to reflect more fully the impact on nature as well as on human
beings and their society brought about by investments.
Activists who have campaigned for years to raise the minimum salary from $80 per
year to $128 in 2015 said this amount is still insufficient to live on, going by costs of living in
2016. They also said companies should raise the benefits for in-house welfare, such as
maternity leave, regular health checks for occupational hazards, and appropriate
compensation for industrial accidents such as inhaling of chemicals and other hazards.
Academics, taking in their breadth the development of China-Cambodia relations in
the long term, suggested that China asked its companies to take every investment in
Cambodia, especially those from government companies, as a long-term commitment to
develop the Cambodian economy rather than to try to move away from Cambodia when
costs rise. They should commit to Cambodia through raising the value-added of products of
Cambodia. New investments should always try to bring newer (not necessary the latest but
should not be too old) technologies. To help Cambodian workers move up the value chain,
there must be in-house skills training to upgrade workers, on an extensive scale. Better still,
a national level generic technical skills training centre, which Japan and Germany still do in
many places and also in Cambodia, could be done by China in Cambodia. 7
Last but not least, interviewees agree on the need for Corporate Social Responsibility
by Chinese companies: Put it into the Chinese business DNA.
(a) Take a more coordinated and national approach by China towards CSR in less
developing countries, particularly in a neighbour as important to China’s regional
strategy as Cambodia, instead of emphasizing the benefits of doing business and
working only with the government;
(b) Establish a Foreign Country Philanthropy Foundation for Southeast Asia, funded by
government companies invested in Southeast Asia, and adopt a direct approach
rather than dumping the money on the foreign government and allowing it to do – or
failing to do – the rest;
(c) Encourage more Chinese companies to adopt a high presence in the CSR field in
Cambodia (as well as in the rest of Southeast Asia) by having CSR advisors, and
identify worthwhile CSR projects in their own locality as well as within the company
for its employees.
(d) There are already codes for Chinese companies (China Telecom, Green Credit
Directive eg.) investing overseas but these codes need to be taken more seriously,
and there should be investigations by the Chinese government if Chinese companies
infringe on ethical codes either of China or of the foreign government that are related
to business activities. Enforcement is the key. CEOs must take the lead.
(e) Pressures should be put on OEM and subcontractors. Factor in social costs, not
always awarding the contract for production, which would be done in Cambodia, to
the lowest bidder.

7 Jozef De Coster, “Cambodia Goes Through A Difficult Transition Period”, undated article written in
late 2016, provided by interviewee.
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Conclusion
The problems of factory conditions and low salary (correlated to inflation) in Cambodia may
be the doing of investors but then investors are merely responding to market conditions, for
which the government plays a significant role of ensuring the market works. If the
government has been enforcing its rules strictly, then complaints and societal opposition
would not exist. More important, while there are many Chinese investors reportedly
involved in such behaviour, other countries’ investors are also doing the same. Blame
should not be placed solely on Chinese investors. Logically this means that domestic
governance is pivotal in preventing abuse.
However, factory conditions and low salary do not have to depend on government
regulations. Chinese companies can emulate western and Japanese companies in extending
excellent employment conditions that can be sustained by profits, rather than languishing on
the end of the laggards of the world. The Chinese renaissance should have high human
standards – no?
China now has power, and power comes with responsibility. It has a responsibility to
human kind, not just Chinese. In the 1990s Chinese sense of responsibility was not to rock
the boat, but today China must also Step Out in the social arena where it must play a role in
shaping the social mores of human kind. China must support development and growth that
are humane; this was an ideal that gave birth to the socialist movement, which China has
adopted as its ideology. China can not in the same breath seek to promote and achieve such
ideals at home, while turning a blind eye to opposite and ghastly practices in countries
where its companies invest. Non-interference in another country’s affairs is good to
maintain international peace, but much can be done short of interfering in other countries.
For instance, China can actively promote and even enforce a national code of conduct and
guidelines for its companies and development aid activities, implementing extra-territorially.
In fact, it is already doing so, as it had arrested foreign nationals in foreign lands who
committed crimes against citizens of China and brought them home.
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The Cambodian Daily 31 July 2014.
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65395/ accessed 3 November 2016.
Clean Clothes Campaign Denmark 2012, A wage you can live on - Textile workers in Cambodia. Accessed
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yTehggY29Xg on 3 November 2016.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung A Day in the Cambodian Garment Factory. Accessed at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_qg7dx27gM on 3 November 2016
Jozef De Coster, “Cambodia Goes Through A Difficult Transition Period”, undated article written in
late 2016, provided by interviewee.
Jozef De Coster, “Cambodian Trade Unions Blame ‘Modern Slavery’ in Garment Industry”, undated
article written in late 2016, provided by interviewee.
Michael B. Dwyer, Emily Polack and Sokbunthoeun So, “’Better-practice Concessions?’ Some Lessons
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Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Labor Laws Fail to Protect Garment Workers
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Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Garment Workers Fired for Being Pregnant. Youtube video posted
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2016.
Kang Sothear, “Vietnamese Rubber Firm opens $10m Plant” in The Cambodia Daily 28 August
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thread-under-chinese-bosses. Accessed 3 November 2016.
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Sokny Say, “A Hungry Life: Protests, Violence, Killing, and Prison” in International Union Rights
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PROMOTING AND ADVANCING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT IN CAMBODIA: THE ROLE OF ACADEMIA
Pou Sovachana
Deputy Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
Remarks during “The Responsibility to Protect at 10:

Progress, Challenges and Opportunities in the Asia Pacific”
Sofitel, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

26 - 27th February 2015
- Mr. Chair,
- Excellencies,
- Ambassadors, Diplomats,
- Distinguished Scholars, Advocates and Participants,
Today, I am very pleased to participate in this important conference to assess the progress,
challenges, and opportunities in implementing R2P in the Asia Pacific and to discuss the future
direction with senior leaders, diplomats, academics and advocates. First, I wish to express my
sincere appreciation to the organizing committee for the warm hospitality extended to me and
all the guests. It is an honor for me to share with you my view on “The Role of Academia to
Promoting and Advancing the Responsibility to Protect in Cambodia.”
We are here today because we share common values and a common goal. The
Responsibility to Protect is a global issue and together we need a strong commitment as well as
innovative strategies and fresh thinking for the promotion and implementation of the norm in
order to completely put an end to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. I believe that it is through multi-stakeholder dialogues such as this one that we can
foster public building awareness about translating R2P from ‘words to deeds’, as stated in the
objective of the conference.
Introduction
“The suffering of Cambodia has been deep,” reflected Preah Moha Ghosananda. Perhaps no
other country on earth has suffered as much from as many forms of human insecurity as
Cambodia has. The list from the 1970s is staggering: massive bombardments, civil wars,
interstate wars, and the ‘killing fields’ with mass atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge
regime from April 1975-January 1979 claiming two million lives and displacing nearly the entire
population. Given this reality and many other cases where the state it failed to adequately
ensure the security and the safety of its citizens, protection against mass atrocities is an urgent
priority and concern for all of international society. The “Responsibility to Protect” is about the
issues of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention as well. International communities and
actors also have a responsibility to do what states were supposed to do when these same states
are either unable or unwilling to do so: to protect human lives from mass atrocities. These
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Promoting and Advancing the Responsibility to Protect: The Role of Academia
norms of human protection have been included in a Security Council resolution, in treaties and
conventions, and in international practice.
As a victim of horrific crimes, but also failing to decisively act in the face of them by the
international community, Cambodia has a unique role to play in promoting R2P and mass
atrocity prevention. Considering this, attention should be paid to the role of academia to
promote and advance R2P in Cambodia.
I. The Role of Academia in Promoting and Advancing R2P

The goal of academia is to assist the state with building institutions, which are weak in
Cambodia. Without solid institutions in place, wars may continue to happen because of a
concentration of personal power. Strong civil society can serve as contributors to improve
resilience, create coping and mitigation mechanisms from multiple threats and support the state
to uphold its responsibility. Academics are crucial players in advancing R2P, in terms of
research, teaching, building awareness of mass atrocity prevention and lobbying governments.
They can cooperate with different actors in civil society as well as engage the state and inter-
governmental organizations at the regional and global level. Furthermore, academics can
develop curricula and educational materials on R2P, organize workshops and conduct teacher
trainings on how to inculcate the principles of R2P.
The R2P toolkit has been translated into Khmer in partnership with CICP. A large
number of academics participates in the International Coalition for the Right to Protect (ICRP),
which seeks to raise global awareness and endorsement of R2P while aiming to stop or prevent
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Academics form a core of
the epistemic community of international civil society within the international community and
transnational movements. As such, academics are crucial to the second pillar of R2P in terms of
international assistance and capacity building. Through workshops, social media, publication of
literature and lectures, academics can connect with both members of civil society and state
officials in order to build coalitions to translate R2P from ‘words into deeds’ with respect to
prevention of mass atrocity.
In addition, academia has played an important role in the following: initially
conceptualizing and establishing specific norms; drawing up guidelines for early warning and
early response to R2P crimes; cultivating a cooperative culture and supporting political culture;
providing action-oriented policy recommendations for cooperation; becoming a networking
force; and, incorporating the norm into the regional community building process itself.
Now let me give you two examples of research and academic institutions - the
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) and Institute of Foreign Languages (IFL)
– to mention how they work together to promote and advance R2P in Cambodia with the
support of the cooperation of Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. CICP and IFL
are grateful to Dr. Noel Morada, Director of the Centre’s Regional Diplomacy and Capacity
Building Program, for delivering a public lecture and a workshop on promoting R2P in ASEAN
on 6-8 August 2014 to government officials, diplomats, academics, students and CSOs. During
the presentation, he stressed that “R2P should be viewed as a friend – rather than an enemy – of
sovereignty because it is first and foremost about helping states to fulfill their responsibilities and
strengthen their legitimacy.” (Spotlight on R2P, September 2014, Issue 13)
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Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP)

As one of leading research and academic institutes in Cambodia, CICP has thus far played
many crucial roles in promoting and advancing the principles and norms of R2P, particularly in
ASEAN countries, of which Cambodia is a member. With its experience of past atrocities and
national reconciliation after the cold war, Cambodia and its researchers are especially suited to
taking a leading role in promoting R2P.
- Seminars: CICP has organized a variety of seminars which are attended by
representatives of ASEAN, Australia and European Diplomatic Missions, government
officials, think tanks researchers, especially academia and university students. These
events help promote public awareness of the principles and norms of R2P, which are a
relative new concept for Cambodians. Two of our most recent seminars to build public
awareness of the concept of R2P were conducted by CICP in cooperation with Dr. Noel
Morada, and they took place at the CICP conference hall and the auditorium of Royal
University of Phnom Penh’s Institute of Foreign Languages. In addition, CICP will begin
a series of biannual workshops on R2P and human security with Pannasastra students
and faculty, and is currently in the process of developing a joint promotional and
research events involving PUC and ZAMAN university.
- Intensive Capacity Building: CICP also nominates five researchers and academia from
various research and academic institutions to attend a two-week intensive training
through the Australian Awards Fellows on the topic of ‘Toward a Culture of Prevention:
Advancing Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN’ at the University of Queensland. The
purpose of this training is to build and develop the capacity of these academics so that
they can continue advocacy to promote and advance the concept of R2P in their
institutions.
- International Conference: Like other seminars, the first international conference on R2P
at 10 will be hosted by CICP in partnership with the Asia Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect of the University of Queensland. The ambition is to promote
and advance the principles and norms of R2P regionally and globally. This conference
will provide an important opportunity for senior leaders, academics and advocates to
exchange ideas and experiences and to develop a common agenda for action to end
genocide and mass atrocities in the coming decade.
- Research and Trainings: CICP has also given students from many universities in
Phnom Penh the opportunities to build their capacity by learning to conduct practical
scientific research in both Phnom Penh and in the provinces. These intensive experiences
of training and research help them greatly to understand not only research
methodologies but also how to advance the concept of human security and R2P.
Royal University of Phnom Penh: Institute of Foreign Languages (IFL)

- Interactive Seminar: The Institute of Foreign Languages’ Department of International
Studies hosted its first interactive seminar on 08 August 2014 with students from both
IFL and Pannasastra University of Cambodia. The discussion points in the seminar
covered (1) the relevance of R2P in the Cambodian context; (2) the contribution of
Cambodia promoting R2P in ASEAN; (3) the prospect of any of the four R2P crimes
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- Research Partnership/Cooperation: As an academic institution, the Institute of Foreign

Languages has partnered with several international and regional universities and
research institutes. This institutional cooperation helps create opportunities to conduct
joint research projects that may advance the principles and norms of R2P at national,
regional and international levels.
- Research the Institute ofAs
Partnership/Cooperation:
Staff Development: an academic
Foreign institution,
Languages’ the Institute
Department of Foreign
of International
Languages
Studies alsohas partneredits with
encourages staff several
to writeinternational
at least two and regional
research papersuniversities
annually. and
The
research institutes. This institutional cooperation helps create opportunities
topics covered are often relevant to the promotion and advancement of R2P norms. to conduct
joint research projects that may advance the principles and norms of R2P at national,
- Academic
regional and Curriculum: The
international norm and principles of R2P are also incorporated into the
levels.
academic curricula (e.g. in Public International Law and other International Relations
- Staff Development:
subjects) the students’
so as to enrich Institute of Foreign Languages’
understanding of R2P. Department of International
There is a pressing need for
Studies alsothroughout
universities encouragesCambodia
its staff totowrite at leastthese
incorporate two ideas
research
andpapers annually.about
teach students The
topics covered are often relevant
mass atrocity and its prevention. to the promotion and advancement of R2P norms.
- Academic Curriculum: The norm and principles of R2P are also incorporated into the
Future academic To increase
Direction:curricula (e.g.public awareness
in Public and support
International Law and for other
the norm, include the
International norm
Relations
into thesubjects)
discoursesoofasCSOs, acculturate government officials to the idea, and increase
to enrich students’ understanding of R2P. There is a pressing need for awareness
of the universities
compatibility of the norm
throughout with existing
Cambodia national
to incorporate lawideas
these and and
policies,
teach astudents
broad based
about
grassroots
masspublic
atrocityinformation campaign would be extremely impactful. Combining the
and its prevention.
activities of curriculum development, training, and seminars, workshops or public lectures in
rural
Futureareas is needed
Direction: to movepublic
To increase the norm out ofand
awareness the support
limited forscope
the of certain
norm, epistemic
include and
the norm
professional circles and into the mindset of the broader public. CICP, working with
into the discourse of CSOs, acculturate government officials to the idea, and increase awareness university
and CSO
of the partners, hopes
compatibility to develop
of the and implement
norm with this planlaw
existing national for and
bringing together
policies, a variety
a broad of
based
stakeholders through linking shared issues or policy concerns which accord
grassroots public information campaign would be extremely impactful. Combining the with R2P aims such
as humanofrights,
activities human
curriculum security andtraining,
development, sustainable development,
and seminars, and rule
workshops or of law lectures
public and good in
governance.
rural areas is needed to move the norm out of the limited scope of certain epistemic and
professional circles and into the mindset of the broader public. CICP, working with university
andThe
II. CSO Challenges
partners, hopes to develop and implement this plan for bringing together a variety of
stakeholders through linking shared issues or policy concerns which accord with R2P aims such
There
as humanare ofrights,
coursehuman
multiple challenges
security and facing this work.
sustainable Besides theand
development, issues
ruleofof
time
lawandandmoney,
good
there is the
governance. perennial problem of suspicion. Academics are often suspected by state officials of
potentially subversive behavior. Therefore gaining the trust of state officials so they can
cooperate fruitfully with civil society (including academics) remains a major challenge.
II. The Challenges
Facilitating cooperation between academics and other civil society actors as well as academics
and representatives of international
There are of course multiple organizations
challenges facing thisalso poses
work. similar
Besides thechallenges.
issues of time and money,
Academics can reduce such suspicion by building bridges
there is the perennial problem of suspicion. Academics are often suspected by between state officials
state and
officials of
civil society.subversive
potentially This can be done by
behavior. inviting gaining
Therefore both groups to workshops
the trust that focuses
of state officials so they on can
the
prevention fruitfully
cooperate of mass atrocities. Similarly,
with civil societyacademics
(including canacademics)
spearhead the writing
remains a of reports
major by joint
challenge.
groups of civil
Facilitating society and
cooperation state academics
between officials about the prevention
and other of actors
civil society mass atrocities
as well asin national
academics
security strategies, defense white-papers, and so on. Academics can
and representatives of international organizations also poses similar challenges. also work together as lead
actors with civil society
Academics and also
can reduce such state officials
suspicion to campaign
by building for between
bridges the adoption of domestic
state officials and
civil society. This can be done by inviting both groups to workshops that focuses on the
prevention of mass atrocities. Similarly, academics can spearhead the writing of reports by joint
- 86 -the prevention of mass atrocities in national
groups of civil society and state officials about
security strategies, defense white-papers, and so on. Academics can also work together as lead
actors with civil society and also state officials to campaign for the adoption of domestic
- 86 -
- 92 -
legislation and for agreements in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
United Nations regarding R2P crimes as well as issues such as the rights for minorities, women,
refugees and other vulnerable groups.
Recalling Cambodian suffering through decades of civil war, interstate war and the truly
suffering events under the Khmer Rouge, academia can do more research to assess the ability of
civil society to aid future prevention of mass atrocities as well as to investigate the function of
the international organizations in breaking the cycle of violence. Academics have often been at
the forefront of efforts to lobby the government to encourage greater understanding of
Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge era of mass atrocities. Additionally, Cambodian academics have also
been deeply involved in human rights, human security and support for the consolidation of
democracy in Cambodia.
III. Conclusion
In sum, when it comes to moving forward the agenda of R2P, academics matter. Although those
working in R2P often prioritize bureaucrats and politicians within states as well as diplomats
within international bodies, I want to emphasize the essential role that academics can play. Not
only are they responsible for educating the people of the world about the need to prevent mass
atrocities but they are also key actors in building trust and cooperation between civil society
and the state.
It is essential for Cambodian academics to join together in active networks and proactive
projects to research and promote R2P, to increase dialogue on key obstacles and challenges to
furthering the norm, and to catalyze harnessing the potential of the lessons learned in the
Cambodian case. The key to advancing R2P in Cambodia is to educate the youth, develop local
champions and build awareness among scholars, government officials and communities. If it
can take the difficult steps as describe above, Cambodia could lead the region toward greater
recognition of R2P.
Thank you!
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THE CONTINUAL UNRAVELING OF
HUMAN SECURITY IN CAMBODIA
Pou Sovachana
Working Paper
March 2015
Introduction
“The suffering of Cambodia has been deep 1 ,” reflected Preah Moha Ghosananda, the Ghandhi
of Cambodia. Perhaps no country on earth has suffered so much from as many forms of
conflicts and grave human threats as Cambodia. Direct physical violence and indirect non-
physical violence have plagued Cambodia since the 1970s, 1980s, through most of the 1990s,
and has not yet stopped completely. The threat of direct physical violence (peace challenge or
freedom from fear) has taken various forms such as armed conflicts, mass exodus of people
from their homelands, land mine victims and crimes against humanity, which affect the safety
of individuals and communities. Indirect forms of violence (developmental challenge or
freedom from want) include non-physical sources of threat to human rights and human
development such as poverty, hunger, disease, and homelessness, as well curtailed freedom to
exercise political rights and enjoy civil liberties 2 . Massive bombardments, civil wars, interstate
wars, human rights violations, starvation, the repatriation of 360,000 Cambodian refugees from
the Thai border camps 3 , small arms conflicts, one of the world’s highest rates of deforestation 4 ,
grinding poverty, and land grabs have ravaged this once proud and influential country of
Southeast Asia since the early 1960s. Cambodians have lived with wars, internal conflicts and
various types of violence. Freedom, peace and safety have remained elusive for most
Cambodians for almost three decades since the 1960s due to a complex interplay of domestic,
regional and international factors 5 .
Human Security in Cambodia Prior to 1998

For nearly four years (17 April 1975 – 7 January 1979), the Khmer Rouge completely isolated
Cambodia from the world, emptied the cities, eliminated currencies, abolished education,
destroyed key social-cultural institutions and economic activities and held a reign of terror and
violence in Cambodia - a return to “year zero 6 .” This regime deprived Cambodians of human
security through a systematic mass exodus, forced labor, torture, mass execution, starvation,
ignorance and disease. This was the most tragic and darkest moment of Cambodian history;
1http://www.ghosananda.org/how_we_work.html retrieved on June 6, 2014

2 Peou Sorpong (2013). Chapter 7: Human Security in Post Cold War Cambodia
3 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
4http://news.mongabay.com/2005/1115-forests.html retrieved on June 6, 2014.
5 Quinn, Peter (2007). Human Security and Development in Cambodia. Paper prepared for the
conference “Mainstreaming Human Security: the Asian Contribution”

6 Ponchaud, François (1978). Cambodia: Year Zero (N. Amphous, Translation). London: Allen Lane.
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The Continual Unraveling of Human Security in Cambodia
three years, eight months, and twenty days 7 during which 1.7 million people lost their lives 8 (21
percent of the population) and many endured immeasurable suffering. Human lives counted
little for the Khmer Rouge’s fanatical communist leaders. This repressive regime used excessive
violence and terror to rule with the aim of creating a utopian communist country based on
agricultural values. People lived in extreme fear and insecurity. This atrocious tragedy
continues to live in the hearts and minds of many Cambodians and had dire consequences in
terms of human security.
In December 1978 over the course of just two short weeks, the Vietnamese invaded
Cambodia, ousted the brutal regime and liberated the capital on 7 January 1979 installing a new
government in Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge fled into the jungles of the western and
northern parts of Cambodia, near and beyond the Thai border. The new socialist regime offered
Cambodian people more freedom and security but could not destroy the externally funded
Khmer Rouge. Throughout the 1980s, the government forces engaged in frequent and fierce
battles with the Khmer Rouge units which continued to terrorize the Cambodian countryside,
using civilians as a human shield. Both factions (the Khmer Rouge, the Heng Sarim and Hun
Sen regimes) planted million of land mines across the country 9 . The Cambodian Mine Action
Centre (CMAC) estimates that there may be as many as four to six million mines and other
pieces of unexploded ordnance in Cambodia 10 .
Human insecurity persisted in terms of war, land mines and repressive violence with
varying degrees of intensity. During the socialist regime, hundreds of thousands of
Cambodians were forced to cross the densely forested mountains and take refuge in camps
across the border in Thailand 11 . They were classified as illegal immigrants and denied UNHCR
protection (the United Nations High Commission for Refugees). People inside the country were
also subject to attack by opposition forces and to hardships caused by recruitment into the
government’s armed forces. They were forced to clear the forest, build roads, and provide
defenses along the border (known as K5 Plan 12 engineered by a Vietnamese General Le Duc
Anh in Cambodia focusing on five key points for the defense of Cambodia against Khmer
Rouge re-infiltration). Working in the forest like this, citizens regularly endured malaria,
diseases, exhaustion, malnutrition and the never-ending danger of military ambushes 13 .
Political instability and human insecurity did not end with the Vietnamese ouster of the Khmer
Rouge, but persisted throughout socialist rule, denying the Cambodian people freedom from
fear and freedom from want.
With the help of the United Nations and after years of tense factions between the
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the three resistance factions the United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative (FUNCINPEC) founded and led by Norodom
7 The length of time that the Khmer Rouge occupied Phnom Penh.
8 The Cambodian Genocide Project at Yale University.
9 Pelton, Robert and Dulles Wink (1994). Southeast Asia, Fielding Worldwide Inc, Redondo Beach,
California, USA.
10http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_mines_in_Cambodia retrieved on June 6, 2013
11 Personal fieldwork at the Thai/Cambodian refugee camp Site B in 1987.
12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K5_Plan retrieved on June 6, 2014
13 Gottesman, E. (2003). Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the politics of Nation Building. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
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Sihanouk, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by former Prime Minister
Son Sann, and the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) led by Pol Pot, an agreement was reached to
end the civil war in Paris in October 1991. This treaty enabled the United Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) to undertake a massive peace keeping operation and to call and
supervise the first free and fair election held in May 1993. From a human security perspective,
the Paris Peace Agreement promised to usher in a brighter chapter in Cambodian political
history and bring a new dawn for the people in terms of ending conflicts and in offering an
assurance of economic development and human rights. This Agreement was intended as a
blueprint to ensure security, peace, safety and fundamental freedoms to all Cambodians.
In the aftermath of the 1993 election, a coalition government between FUNCINPEC and
the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was formed and headed by a system of two incompatible
Prime Ministers. This political arrangement was not a recipe for lasting peace and the road to
national reconciliation was paved with bad intentions. After wide-ranging tensions and
contentious disagreements between the two governing parties eventually led to deadly fighting
between the CPP and FUNCINPEC armed forces. On 5-6 July 1997, in the middle of the capital
city Phnom Penh, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen used his loyal military force to oust the First
Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh resulting in a number of human casualties and
mass lootings. Since that time, he has become the undisputed heavyweight political leader in
Cambodia. This turmoil led to the postponement of Cambodia’s membership to ASEAN in July
1997 along with Laos and Myanmar. Cambodia was not admitted as an ASEAN Member State
until April 1999, and the threat of violent conflict continued to haunt the people of Cambodia.
On the other front, the security threats from the Khmer Rouge remained high. The
regime boycotted the 1993 election, defied the international community, rejected peace talks and
continued its armed rebellion against the coalition government in the western and northern
regions. These battles waged until final disintegration of the Khmer Rouge and complete
integration of its forces from Malai and Pailininto the Royal Government armed forces, in 1998.
Total peace was only established throughout the country in early 1999 14 after UNTAC failed to
prevent and stop civil war in Cambodia. The mission of UNTAC was not wholly successful 15
however in terms of preventing human suffering, the savings would be substantial. The
termination of internal conflict by Prime Minister Hun Sen brought a real end to decades-long
armed politics, gave value to national security, cemented peace and provided Cambodia its best
opportunities for development and growth in all sectors. The Cambodian people deserved
better after so much suffering. This long desired peace has come at the price of a zero sum game
politics (one winner takes all), rapid environment degradation, limited access liberties, and
profoundly unequal distribution of wealth. While the world defines peace as the absence of
hostility, lasting peace in Cambodia must include the capacity to obtain education and health,
human rights and democracy, and to prevent environmental depletion, while promoting good
governance and the economic and social wellbeing of the individuals and communities 16 .
14 Nem Sowath (2012). Civil War Termination and the Source of Total Peace in Cambodia. Reaho, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
15 Sundaranaman, Shankari. Cambodia Since UNTAC: Deep into the Quagmire. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-
sep-8.htmlretrieved June 6, 2014.

16 Kraft, Herman Joseph, (2012). The Millennium Development Goals: A Pathwway Towards Mainstreaming Human
Security in ASEAN, Volume II, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, INC. Quezon City, The
Phillippines.
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- 97 -

After the political integration of the remnants of the Khmer Rouge and the national election in
1998, Cambodia witnessed a real transition from war to peace 17 . The overall security situation
in Cambodia has been improved in terms of freedom from fear and want. Cambodians started
enjoying more personal security when armed politics ended. Under the dominant party (CPP),
the government has worked hard to improve the living conditions and dignity of its people. The
Triangular Strategy in the second mandate was adopted with the aim of reforming all sectors,
restoring peace and stability, promoting sustainable development, as well as maintaining
security for the country and its people 18 . The strategy was, in general, successfully
implemented. In the second mandate, the “Rectangular Strategy” was launched on 16 July 2004.
This strategy defined the action of the government and focused on good governance (see figure
1). It was reviewed, refined and updated and is currently under implementation.
Figure 1. Rectangular Strategy of Cambodian government.
Cambodia has seen notable progress in the normalization of life, which has resulted in a
steady improvement in economic growth and social development with steady poverty
reduction. The country economy is one of the success stories in terms of high and consistent
growth averaging economic, 7.9 percent during 2000-2012 and 11.1 percent between 2004 and
17 Peou Sorpong (2007). International Democracy Assistance for Peace building: Cambodia and Beyond.
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
18 Naron Hang Chuon (2012). The Cambodian Economy: Charting the Course of a Brighter Future, Cambodia
Progress and Challenges since 1991 Edited by Pou Sothirak, Geoff Wade And Mark Hong, ISEAS,
Singapore.
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2007 19 before the economic crisis in 2008-2009. Growth registered 7.2 percent in 2013. The
outlook for 2014 is forecast at 7 percent because of the political tensions and risk of the labor
unrest since the national election in July 2013. The GDP per capita has increased from $760 in
2008 to nearly $1000 in 2012 20 . The progress in human development can be measured also by
the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures life expectancy, education and income.
Between 1995 and 2012, the country HDI’s score has improved from .411 to .543, an increase of
32 percent or an average of annual increase of about 1.7 percent 21 . Cambodia was 138 out of 187
countries, ahead of Myanmar on the HDI measure. The poverty rate dropped drastically from
47.8 percent in 2007 to about 19 percent in 2012 22 .
By reducing the poverty rate by more than half, Cambodia has achieved the Millennium
Development Goal poverty target (CMDG1) and is one of the best performers in poverty
reduction worldwide according to a World Bank Poverty Assessment Report released in
February 2014. It is a huge accomplishment for Cambodia 23 .Today, approximately two out of 10
Cambodians are poor, compared with five out of 10 in 2004, however Neak Samsen, Poverty
Analyst of the World Bank in Cambodia and the co-author of the Poverty Assessment Report,
cautioned, “Despite impressive reduction in poverty, these hard won gains are fragile. Many
people who have escaped poverty are still at high risk of falling back into poverty. For
example, the loss of just 1,200 riel (about $0.30) per day in income would throw an estimated
three million Cambodians back into poverty, doubling the poverty rate to 40%.” The end of
armed conflict facilitate a return to normal life for Cambodian citizens. Life expectancy has risen
from only 30.7 in 1980 to 65.1 in 2011 24 . Now, ordinary people have better access to key goods
and services and more and more children are now going to school 25 .
Human security in Cambodia is considered by the Royal Government to be the highest
priority 26 . Right after the government was formed in September 2013, Prime Minister Hun Sen
reaffirmed the government’s commitment to sustainable development for Cambodia and
responded to the people’s will by promising reduction of poverty. In his speech that focused on
reforms, he proclaimed that “Reforms are the top priority for Cambodia, and the country will
continue deepening reforms in all fields in order to increase competition, to sustain economic
growth and to reduce poverty…Deep reforms will be focused on legal and judicial reforms,
anti-corruption, good governance and land and forest management 27 .” According to the
Guidelines for Formulating National Strategic Development Plan 28 (NSDP 2014-2018), the
19 Annual Development Review 2013-2014: Development Inclusiveness, Sustainability and Governance in

Cambodia. A CRDI (Cambodia’s leading independent development policy research institute)
Publication, February 2014.
20 Rectangular Strategy, Phase III.
21 Human Development Report 2013.
22 Ministry of Planning
23 Ministry of Planning
24 World Health Ranking
25 Pou Sovachana (2012). Progress and Challenges of Education in Cambodia Today, Cambodia Progress and
Challenges since 1991 Edited by Pou Sothirak, Geoff Wade And Mark Hong, ISEAS, Singapore.
26 Nem Sowath (2012). Civil War Termination and the Source of Total Peace in Cambodia. Reaho, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
27Marathon PM speech focuses on reforms, The Phnom Penh Post, 26 September 2014.
28 Ministry of Planning retrieved 6 June 2014
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government of Cambodia is committed to ensuring a better quality of life for its people, and to
building a democratic, rule-based society, with equitable rights and opportunities for the
population in terms of economic, political, cultural and other spheres. It aims at maintaining an
open market economy, and will formulate policies that provide an enabling and conducive
environment for a better quality of life. Despite strong economic growth indicators and
sensitive government policies, the overall development of human security in Cambodia remains
far from ideal and thus requires an explanation 29 .
In light of this commendable high level of economic growth and socio-economic
development, not everyone is experiencing the same benefits, as poverty persists mainly in the
rural areas and the country is still considered a third world country by the World Bank and the
UN and a fourth world country by some. According to Christine Lagarde, International
Monetary Fund Managing Director, too many people are still living in extreme poverty, earning
less than $1.25 per day, despite the incidence of poverty falling from over 50 percent in 2004 to
20 percent in 2011 30 . Hence, human security issues remain and are becoming harder to disguise
under the veil of economic advancement. These issues of human security as defined by The
UNDP in 1994 include “…safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression,
and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in
homes, jobs or communities 31 .”
Despite governmental claims of continuous growth and development, Cambodians
remain insecure in terms of freedom from want. For many people, dire poverty caused by
factors accompanying economic growth, continues undiminished due to the weakness of formal
institutional capacity for human protection and empowerment. The ultimate objective of any
meaningful development is to raise the standard of living of the people and end poverty and
inequality. For ordinary Cambodians, this high growth has brought hope and a sense of
optimism but for the most part not any real change in their personal security and safety. While
the government promises inclusive growth, the benefits have not been evenly distributed and
the widening inequalities of wealth distribution are profound. There are sizeable disparities
between the rich and the poor, and between the urban and the rural areas. According to a report
from the UN Capital Fund in 2010 on local development, 3.7 million people were estimated to
live below the poverty threshold. This includes 92 percent of the poor who are residing in the
countryside, of which only 10 percent own a title to their land. It is clear that the level of
poverty remains a source of threat to personal security. The benefits of direct government
support should go to the people as a whole rather than to the few elites. Inclusive growth must
reach the poor just as much as the middle class and the wealthy. Any sustainable economic
development needs to embrace inclusive growth as a basic government strategy – through
right, transparent and effective social policies which put people’s interest first. The Royal
Government needs to implement much needed reforms targeting corruption and inclusiveness
and to provide a more just and equal society.
30 Lagarde, Christine. Cambodia at the New Frontier: an Address to the Royal School of Administration.
Phnom-Penh, December 3, 2013.
31 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security
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Human security calls for people-centered or people oriented and prevention-oriented

responses. Based on the constitution of Cambodia and the principles of democracy, the
government must pay full attention to the needs and welfare of its citizens. The current
emphasis on economic development shouldn’t override democratization and human rights.
Social injustice continues to be a common occurrence in the daily life of the people, due to the
lack of proper individual protection and ineffective governance. Corrupt governance is also a
major problem in Cambodia. For years, Transparency International has placed the country as
one of the most corrupt nations in the world. In 2013, Cambodia was ranked 160 out of 170 of
the most corrupt countries 32 . Furthermore, Cambodia’s judicial system is generally recognized
both for its lack of legal know-how and political independence. According to the report issued
in September 2010 by UN human rights envoy Surya Subedy, the judiciary of Cambodia is
corrupted and incompetent. The report stated, “Corruption seems to be widespread at all levels
of the judiciary.”
In recent years, there has been a surge in forced displacement of rural and indigenous
communities resulting from large-scale land concessions granted by the government for agro-
businesses in an effort to increase GDP. Since 2000, Amnesty International estimates some
420,000 people have been affected by forced evictions to make way for development projects
that are said to be in the “national interest” but are invariably also very much in the business
interests of senior members of the regime 33 . According to data from rights group Licadho, local
and foreign firms now control 3.9 million hectares of concession land, or more than 22 percent
of Cambodia’s total surface. The land grabbing issue is the latest example of the state struggling
to meet the needs of its citizens and the growth expectations of the international community.
Needs as basic as providing clean water, decent housing, health care, social justice and
education are undercut by the need to increase GDP and to de-regulate social services. In his
September 2012 report, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia,
Surya Subedi, concluded that there are “well documented serious and widespread human
rights violations associated with land concessions 34 .” To uphold the spirit of the 1991’s Paris
Peace Agreement, Cambodians need a more responsive style of government that provides
political, economic, and socio-cultural benefits for all citizens
Political insecurity is also evident currently. After the last national election in July 2013,
Cambodia remains trapped in a political row due to the opposition’s refusal to accept the
election outcome, which some claim was marred by fraud and election irregularities 35 . Peaceful
mass demonstrations were commonplace during the months after the election. The government
showed restrictive restraint and the protesters used Freedom Park to stage their resistance
marches. However, the post-election violence has already led to the death of seven persons and
to dozens being injured. A bystander was shot in the head by police during a clash between
protesters and police on the Monivong Bridge on September 15, 2013 and a food vendor was
killed by a police bullet after officers opened fire during a violent protest in Phnom Penh’s
32 Transparency International
33 Gregory, Peter. Cambodian Government Must Reform Land Rights Laws, The Cambodia, June 6, 2013.
34 Surya Subedy. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia.
United Nations General Assembly. October 11, 2012.
35 The Joint Report on the Conduct of the 2013 Cambodian Elections compiled by a coalition of human
rights NGOs ERA (Election Reform Alliance).
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Meanchey district on November 12, 2013. A few months later, on January 3, 2014, a strike by
garment workers demanding a monthly living wage of $160 turned fatal as the military police
used AK-47 rifles to fire bullets directly into a crowd of protesters, some of whom were
throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. At least five were killed and many more wounded.36
The next day, a large group of military police accompanied by a group of men wielding sticks,
batons, metal pipes and axes, drove the protestors out of Phnom-Penh’s Freedom Park. The
impact of this deadly clash has grave consequences in terms of human security. The
government needs to embrace a constructive and cooperative resolution by discarding the
excessive use of violence and intimidation to address workers’ demands and to deal with
political dissent peacefully. Military intervention might stop the uprisings, but peace
established by using bullets won’t last. Ensuring social order through peaceful means is in the
best interest of all people.
On the latest headlines regarding migrant workers, the Thai junta (after the military
coup in may 2014) has launched a massive crackdown of all foreign illegal workers in which
more than 250,000 Cambodian migrant workers, mostly undocumented, were inhumanely
expelled and deported home in early June 2014. This mass exodus has created severe
disruption and insecurity particularly to the most vulnerable including women, children, and
migrants. It challenges the role of the government on the protection aspect of human security.
“This is the largest-ever repatriation we have met. It is like a flood that strongly hits
Cambodia 37 ,” said Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. While the government struggles to deal
with the displaced workers, one of the best solutions is to provide better economic
opportunities and decent paying jobs in the country to stop the flow before it begins.
The impact of this deadly clash has grave consequences in terms of human security. In a
democratic society, the authorities cannot ignore the demands of the citizens. The government
needs to embrace a constructive and cooperative resolution by discarding the excessive use of
violence to address workers’ demands and to deal with political dissent. Ensuring social order
and the continued peace is in the best interest of all people. Given the current levels of tension,
the ruling party must abandon confrontational rhetoric and exercise restraint towards
protestors to build stability and prosperity. Political reconciliation norms through dialogue,
compromise, and a legislature that is enjoyed by all are keys to solve this deadlock. The
alternative is untenable. Good governance cannot come from force. The search for lasting peace
and security has not been easy and it is yet not completed. In terms of downside risk of human
security in practice in Cambodia, UN rights envoy Surya Subedy offered a solution at the end of
his 10-visit to Cambodia in June 2014,
“Having studied Cambodian society and history carefully, and interacting with
people from all forms of life, it is my duty to state that if real reforms are not
effected soon, the country runs the risk of a return of violence 38 .”
36 The Cambodia Daily, Unions Tell Garment Workers to Suspend Strike, January 8, 2014.
37 Xinhua, Over 250,00 Cambodian migrants workers flee Thailand in fear of junta’s crackdown, June 26, 2014
38 The Phnom Penh Post, June 25 2014, Violence threatens still, Says Subedi.
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Conclusion
In summary, the outlook for the entire country is in a very positive place in terms of human
security according to the official government. But the reality on the streets is different for many
people. The answer you receive depends on whom you ask. One can conclude that more
Cambodians enjoy better security in the last two decades in terms of freedom from fear and
from want 39 . The fear of direct physical violence associated with armed conflict and violent
crimes has disappeared with the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge Regime in 1998. But armed
conflict is only one threat to human security, rapid and unchecked economic growth with no
pro-poor policy continues to threaten the lives and livelihoods of Cambodian people in ways
that do not correspond with the positive reports of rising GDP and per-capita income levels. In
a public forum on land issues one indigenous representative summarized the gravity of another
type of human suffering in Cambodia by saying: “All this development is destroying our
lives 40 .”
40 19 June 2014, Meeting of the Prey Lang Network at Foreign Correspondence Club, Phnom Penh.
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DOING RESEARCH IN CAMBODIA:
MAKING MODELS THAT BUILD CAPACITY1
Pou Sovachana
Deputy Director at the Institute for Cooperation and Peace
Summary of Findings at The Launching of The Final Report

“Doing Research in Cambodia: Making Models that Build Capacity”
Hotel Cambodiana, 1st April 2016
Synopsis
Cambodia has a missing older generation, many of whom were executed during the Khmer
regime. This has meant missing academics and a limited understanding of the role of research,
marked by a large gap between policy makers who undervalue research and social science
researchers, who do understand the value that research brings to society. Expectedly, clearing
bureaucratic roadblocks is one of the impediments to doing research in the country, as are
opportunities for funding, multi-stakeholders collaboration and capacity building. In addition,
there is an overabundance of donor-driven agendas. However, the research environment in
Cambodia is in transition, given the vibrancy of youth and other groups willing to engage in it,
as well as the emergence of action-oriented research, especially by civil society. Gender gaps in
research need to be closed (nearly all research is conducted by men), and more attention needs
to be paid to the quality of research being conducted. Researchers in Cambodia also recommend
finding ways to incentivize research, improve access to literature and research data, and create
national standards for research.
Doing Research in Cambodia

Cambodia’s bitter and tragic past has had a detrimental impact on the number of educated
professionals available to conduct endogenous research. It is therefore unsurprising that
previous studies have found that social science research is frequently conducted by foreign
consultants, while donors and external stakeholders often dictate the research agenda. 2 To
address this lack of endogenous research, there was still a need to profile the ongoing evolution
of the Cambodian research landscape and provide actionable recommendations to build future
capacity on both sides of the policy-research community.
With support from the Global Development Network and the ‘Doing Research’ peer
review workshop, a research team from CICP undertook a one year action research study to
capture – and to help transform – the current state of Cambodian research. In early 2015, a
roundtable of experts created a list of 25 institutions to interview, including both rural and
urban universities (president, senior academic staff, faculty members, researchers, and
students), NGOs, think tanks, donor representatives, and government ministries. Our bottom-
1 “Doing Research in Cambodia: Make Models that Build Capacity” final report, 2016
2 “Doing Research in Cambodia: Make Models that Build Capacity” final report, page 15
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Doing Research in Cambodia: Making Models that Build Capacity
up approach focused on giving voice to participants and achieving practical problem-solving

outputs. It aimed to reduce dependence on donors in the long term by strengthening the
endogenous capacity of the research community and improving collaborations between
researchers.
Barriers
Our findings show that the primary impediment to research is insufficient funds for research,
training, and dissemination. The government cannot adequately fund projects necessary to
guide policy decisions, as even the national census is donor financed. Furthermore, instructors
and students are generally responsible for funding their own projects. Since universities are
tuition-driven, instructors are given little time or money to conduct research. This implicitly
communicates that research is a non-critical afterthought.
Respondents admitted that many staff lack the ability to conduct research, while
dissemination activities are limited. Researchers commonly present findings at academic
workshops. Therefore findings, embedded in reports, often overly technical and written in
English, remain largely inaccessible to a wider audience.
English proficiency proved another obstacle, preventing many Cambodian researchers
from conducting literature reviews and increasing their workload when translating results for
publication. With few academic publications, no accessible research database, and insufficient
provincial libraries, research outreach is severely limited. And, since reports are written using
technical English, it is unclear whom the research is targeting.3
Due to funding and human resource limitations, most research is dictated by donors, led
by outside consultants, and financed on a short-term basis – as in this study.4 Consequently
local capacity is stunted and short-term studies do not capture complex societal issues
adequately. Donor institutions are often reticent to tackle controversial issues or report results
without government consent.
Cambodian research production is at a transitional stage. While we found general
ambivalence toward research among older interviewees, younger Cambodians demonstrated a
growing enthusiasm and receptivity. Few women participated in our study due to a gender
imbalance in senior positions. Equal opportunity policies and equal access to education are
needed to reverse this trend. However, Cambodia is improving; as evidenced by the increasing
number of female students in tertiary education.5
The Policy-Research Environment

Policy-research connections are restricted by entrenched structural challenges. For instance,
policy makers often lack the education required to understand reports. Perhaps consequently,
scientific research is often not perceived as valuable within this sector. As one government
official admitted, “Government policy is not produced through research”. 6 Instead government
officials make policy decisions based predominantly on personal connections, entrenched
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Doing Research in Cambodia: Making Models that Build Capacity
beliefs, and potential profit. Some policy uptake indifference may be due to many researchers
gearing their research toward academia.
Some NGOs can exert pressure on the government by publishing polished research that
is read by foreign officials. Donor institutions with close governmental relationships can
influence policy by avoiding flash point human rights issues and playing an important and
constructive role on non-sensitive issues like job creation. However the most troubling human
rights issues often remain either ignored or watered down.
The elephant in the room is that taboo, politically sensitive research topics remain too
dangerous and difficult for most researchers to attempt. Results that are openly critical of the
government are usually self-censored or diluted in order to avoid anticipated political pressure.
Going Forward
Our respondents made many constructive recommendations: increase institutional cooperation;
mentor Cambodian staff/students; create collaborative research; plan research dissemination
prior to collecting data; incentivise research; fund an accessible national research database; and
promote capacity building.
There is cause for optimism. Respondents noted that the government increasingly uses
local research on issues like migration flow and job creation. Human rights NGOs continue to
have success using their research and international advocacy networks to pressure government
on key issues. More universities are creating funds for research through international
collaborations and even creating in-house publications.
This research project has provided an essential empirically-based understanding of the
state of research in Cambodia and potential avenues for improvement. It also serves as a
pioneer model for reciprocal, action research designed to build capacity within the research
community. Specifically we went beyond data collection in 3 ways:
1. Provided a research methods training course for students.
2. Presented results at several institutions to increase dissemination and discussion.
3. Created an on-going website (www.researchkh.org) to inform people about available
funding and serve as a networking conduit.
It is our intention that this project, and the conversations that emerge from it, will play a
part in transforming Cambodia’s research environment. There is still much to uncover about
research in Cambodia but hopefully this study will provide an impetus for further research.
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ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF SSR/SSG AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACHES IN
CAMBODIA THROUGH COOPERATION
BETWEEN CICP AND DCAF
Pou Sovachana
Deputy Director at the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
Remarks Delivered at The Inter-Parliamentary Forum on Security Sector Governance in

Southeast Asia (IPF-SSG) 10th Anniversary Workshop
Good Governance of the Security Sector in Southeast Asia: What Role for Parliaments?
Apsara Hotel, Siem Reap, 15-16 September 2016
First of all, I would like to thank the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation (SDC) for their support in co-organizing this very relevant and important
10th Anniversary Workshop on Good Governance of the Security Sector in Southeast Asia. It
gives me great pleasure to be here today and be given the opportunity to share my views on
this important session regarding “Security Sector Governance Initiatives in Southeast Asia:
Country Updates”. Since I represent the Kingdom of Cambodia, I will frame much of what I
say on the achievements and challenges of SSR/SSG and the effectiveness of Multi-
Stakeholder Approaches in Cambodia. I will highlight my talk on the numerous activities
which have taken place in the context of SSR and SSG in my country through the
cooperation between CICP and DCAF. I will also address the challenges and offer lessons
learned.
I want to begin by quoting a Chinese proverb that we all know “Give a man fish and
he will eat for a day. Teach him how to fish and he will eat for a lifetime”. The issues of SSR
and SSG in some Southeast Asian Countries are more fundamental and complex. The fish
are there. The people, at this globalization age and social media explosion, know how to fish.
Yet, there are barbed wire fencing, hindrances and obstacles around the pond, literally and
factually, forbidding them to live free from fear, free from want, and free to live in dignity
(human security issues). The voices of the general population must be taken into account in
measuring the effectiveness of the implementation of SSG and SSR.
With this mind, the aim of the Inter-Parliamentary Forum on Security Sector
Governance in Southeast Asia (IPF-SSG) is to promote ongoing dialogue between Southeast
Asian parliamentarians, with the intention of increasing civilian oversight, public
accountability and national parliamentary involvement in security sector governance. After
all, SSG is about promoting and implementing good governance, rule of law, and social
justice and welfare for all. History has reminded us that peace cannot last with social justice.
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” said Martin Luther King Jr., Letter
from the Birmingham Jail.
To achieve this end, the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace has been
involved in the IPF-SSG in cooperation with DCAF and FES since the forum’s inception a
decade ago here in Siem Reap and since has hosted the IPF-SSG workshops three times: in
2008, 2011 and this year. A wide range of Cambodian stakeholders have participated in the
IPF-SSG’s workshops throughout the last ten years. This has been provided an important
avenue to introduce Cambodian stakeholders involved in the security sector to the concepts
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Achievements and Challenges of SSR-SSG and the Effectiveness of Multi-Stakeholder Approaches in Cambodia
through Cooperation between CICP and DCAF

of security sector governance and reform and especially to open dialogue among the
Cambodian stakeholders, as well as for exchanging experiences and lessons learned with
other Southeast Asian states.
Furthermore, CICP’s involvement in the IPF-SSG contributed to the launch of a
multi-stakeholder dialogue process on security sector governance and reform in Cambodia
in 2012 in cooperation with DCAF. The principal objective of this process was to generate
informed dialogue and inclusive discussion among a large variety of Cambodian
stakeholders in view of fostering potential approaches and challenges to good security
sector governance in Cambodia. This platform was especially important in the current
political climate in this country because it focused on consensus-building through open
dialogue and inclusiveness. It allowed actors who would not normally meet in an informal
setting to exchange their perspectives. This process took place in the form of a background
study, two expert workshops, a national conference and a final report.
The multi-stakeholder dialogue process concluded that there are multiple reasons for
the increasing importance of security sector governance and reform in Cambodia. First, in
Cambodia, the exact separation of powers and the lack of check and balance between the
executive, the legislature, and the judicial branches of government are quite limited
eventhough the constitution enshrines the basic governing principles of: separation of
powers; organization and functions of state institutions; election; and appointment and
status of military officers. Second, there has been an insufficient willingness of security
forces to seek peaceful dialogue when confronted with demonstrating citizens and workers.
Peaceful protests are a way to voice injustices and complaints and responding with violence
does not reflect well on the advancement of Cambodia nor its valuing of Buddhist principles
of non-violence. I believe that good never comes from force. Third, the political tensions
have remained high. The country is dealing with structural power politics. Fourth, the
government is under pressure from a growing middle class to enhance the effectiveness and
accountability of the security sector. Fifth, the government’s deepening integration into
ASEAN has increased pressure to enhance democratic governance, which includes
governance over the security sector. Sixth, the government is committed to diversifying its
external relations, which will benefit from achieving an international standard of security
sector governance. Seventh, it is necessary to increase security sector reform efforts in
Cambodia as a means of reining in corruption in the security services. Eighth, as part of SSR,
Cambodia’s security forces need to more fully involve themselves in human rights trainings.
Ninth, Cambodia’s security forces need to become more involved in combating natural
disasters and other problems associated with climate change. Tenth and finally, Cambodia’s
security sector needs to realize that it is responsible to the Cambodian monarch and people
rather than to any partisan interests.
On the basis of these conclusions, CICP in cooperation with DCAF formed an
inclusive around 30-odd member Cambodian study group to examine security sector
governance and security sector reform. The study group held its inaugural workshop in
early 2014. It was recognized that the enhancement of security sector governance through
security sector reform is crucial because the country needs to provide security in an
effective, efficient and accountable way to ensure political, economic and social
development, which is sustainable over the long-term. In 2015, the study group concluded
that it was time to organize a series of specific group discussions (e.g. among members of
parliament, civil society organizations, etc.) to consult and increase capacities within each
group before meeting again in the plenary format.
Finally, as part of the broader efforts by CICP in cooperation with DCAF to engage
Cambodian stakeholders in the democratic governance of the security sector, CICP has
focused its activities in 2016 on the role of parliaments. In this vein, CICP has translated the
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Achievements and Challenges of SSR-SSG and the Effectiveness of Multi-Stakeholder Approaches in Cambodia
through Cooperation between CICP and DCAF

Inter-Parliamentary Union and DCAF Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security
Sector into Khmer, which will soon be published. The objective of this is to enhance the
capacity of Cambodian security sector actors and in particular of members of and staffs of
parliament. Also, the hosting of the IPF-SSG in Siem Reap has to be seen in the context of
parliamentary capacity-building, as it allows Cambodian members of parliament and
parliamentary staffers to share experience and good practices with their colleagues from
other ASEAN countries.
It is my hope that my brief presentation here offers lessons for participants to foster a
more useful understanding on the important role of parliaments regarding SSG and SSR as
well as to inspire national security sector governance activities in Cambodia and the region
as mentioned above.
Thank you!
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Ambassador Pou Sothirak

1. Impacts of Mainstream Hydropower Dams 1

2. The Cambodian-Thai Border Dispute 9

3. China’s Belt and Road Cooperation with ASEAN and Cambodia 15

4. My Reflection on the Paris Peace Agreements 21

6. Aspects and Aims of Security Sector Reform 33

7. The Paris Peace Agreements Remain Relevant Today 49

8. Roles of China’s Aid to Cambodia’s Socio-Economic Development 53

9. Mass Atrocities under the Khmer Rouge 63

10. Cambodia’s Political Outlook 65

11. Nation Building and National Identity – the Case of Germany 69

14. The Continual Unraveling of Human Security in Cambodia 95

16. Achievements and Challenges of SSR-SSG and the Effectiveness of Multi-Stakeholder

Pou Sothirak is currently holding a position as Executive Director of the

Dr. Vannarith Chheang is currently a consultant for Southeast Asia

Dr. Sorpong Peou: (BA, the University of Waterloo, Canada, and MA

David Koh is Singaporean and Director of David Koh & Associates.

Pou Sovachana is the Deputy Director of Research and Publication at the

Kevin Nauen is an Associate Professor of Social Sciences and

Currently, Nuch Ramo is a research fellow at Cambodian Institute for

Huot Sokunthea is a Research Fellow at the Cambodian Center for

Organized by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and

Source: Richard Cronin and Thimothy Hamlin “Mekong Tipping Point”

I am delighted to be among the eminent speakers to deliver my remarks concerning the

The importance of the Mekong River

<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/32070530/Worlds-Top-10-Rivers-at-risk> (accessed 8 March 2016)

Hydropower Stations Effect Downstream Countries

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydropower_in_the_Mekong_River_Basin> (accessed 8 March 2016)

<https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/8477> (accessed 9 March2016)

the Economist <http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21689225-can-one-world-s-great-waterways-

Dams Affect Future Fishing and Tonle Sap

Case Studies Numer 210, May 2007. <http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/mekong-china.htm>

Economic Improvement at the Expense of the Mekong River’s Environment

Free Asia, published on 4 September, 2015

<www.ilec.or.jp/en/wp/wp.../25_Lake_Tonle_Sap_27February2006.pdf > (accessed 10 March 2016)

in November 2005 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268516605_Future_Solutions_Now_-

What Can Be Done?

Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream, October 2010

Thank you very much for your kind attention.

By Ambassador Pou Sothirak

Remarks Delivered during 28th Annual Conference

Organized by U.S. Pacific Command

Background and Scope of the Disputes

Bilateral Approach to the Border Conflict

Multilateral Approach to the Border Conflict

Thank you very much for your kind attention!

During the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Conference

China’s Grand Strategic Strategy

Road”, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission,

I. Belt and Road and ASEAN

available at http://en.drc.gov.cn/YangShaolin.pdf, accessed on 29 July, 2016

II. The Significance of OBOR for Cambodia

Thank you very much for your kind attention!

During the Commemorative Event of

With the Collaboration from

Excellencies, Distinguished Participant, Ladies and Gentlemen

Excellencies, Distinguished Participant, Ladies and Gentlemen

independence of Cambodia, and the fulfillment of all commitments as stipulated in the

Thank you very much for your kind attention!