Persons and Family Relations:

Digests by: John Glenn Lambayon

Dayot v. Dayot  The Court of Appeals said that since the marriage was
solemnized without the requisite marriage license, it is
therefore void ab initio.
Promulgated a month after De Castro.
Issue:
Case: Simply, whether the marriage between JOSE and FELISA is void ab
Consolidated petition challenging the Court of Appeals decision initio for being solemnized without a marriage license.
declaring the marriage between JOSE and FELISA void ab initio.
MORE SPECIFICALLY, like in De Castro, the Court answers
Facts: what is the impact of the falsification of the affidavit of marital
cohabitation on the validity of exceptional marriages (i.e. whether it
 The marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code. The
is a mere irregularity or a total failure to comply with the marriage
applicable provision is Art. 76 on exceptional marriages, where
requisites).
a marriage license is dispensed with by executing an affidavit of
cohabitation.
Ruling:
 In lieu of a marriage license, JOSE and FELISA executed an
The marriage is VOID AB INITIO for the falsification of the
affidavit attesting that both had attained the age of maturity, and
affidavit of marital cohabitation.
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least 5 years.
The Court anchors its decision under Article 76 and 80 of the
 JOSE filed for a complaint for annulment and/or declaration of Civil Code.
the nullity of marriage claiming the following things:
 There is no disputing the fact that the marriage was
 No marriage ceremony was celebrated. celebrated under the Civil Code, which requires a marriage
 His consent was secured through fraud. license, except for marriages of exceptional character, for
 He did not execute the affidavit of cohabitation (stating that the solemnization of marriages. Under Article 80 of the Civil
JOSE and FELISA had lived as husband and wife for at least Code, a marriage performed without the corresponding
5 years) marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
 FELISA opposed the complaint and defended the validity of the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license
marriage: is the essence of a marriage contract.
 Both FELISA and JOSE had maintained a relationship as man  Exceptional marriages include the ratification of marital
and wife, without marriage, in the early part of 1980. The cohabitation. This is provided under Art. 76:
marriage was only deferred on account of their age difference.  Art. 76, no marriage license shall be necessary when a man
 While the marriage was subsisting, JOSE contracted a and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
marriage with RUFINA in August 1990. being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
 FELISA filed an action for bigamy against JOSE in June at least five years, desire to marry each other….
1993.
Marriages of exceptional character, as the name suggests, are
Lower Courts Rulings: exceptions to the rule on the dispensability of the formal
 RTC ruled in favor of FELISA, stating that the marriage was requisite of a marriage license. As a general rule, they should be
VALID. strictly but reasonably construed.
 RTC said that JOSE should have been more prudent in  The marriage between JOSE and FELISA is considered
examining the documents he was made to sign. The fact that it exceptional in character because they availed of the exception
took him at least 3 months to ascertain the contents of the under Art. 76. In lieu of a marriage license, JOSE and FELISA
documents was implausible. executed an affidavit of marital cohabitation.
 JOSE wrote FELISA as his wife in his SALN  For Art. 76 of the Civil Code to apply, the following conditions
 JOSE’s sister testified that she signed her name voluntarily as must be present:
a witness to the marriage. This kills/destroys JOSE’s claim  That the man and the woman must have attained the age of
that his consent was secured through fraud. majority; and
  Being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
 The Court of Appeals originally affirmed RTC’s decision but wife for at least 5 years.
later reversed it in favor of JOSE declaring the marriage was  The Court said there is no other recourse but to read the law as it
VOID ab initio. is plainly written:
 JOSE’s central opposition was that the requisites for the  The exception only applies to those who have lived together
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
under Art. 76 of the Civil Code was not attendant to the case each other.
at bar.  No other reading of the law can be had because the language
 Specifically, Art. 76 provides for the “legal condition that the of Art. 76 is precise.
man and woman must have been living together as husband  The requisite 5-year cohabitation period is an indispensability
and wife for at least 5 years before the marriage.” carved in the language of the law. It is embodied in the law
 JOSE basically says that the affidavit of cohabitation was not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
falsified. mandatory character.
 The Court of Appeals cited Ninal v. Badayog, stating that:  IN THIS CASE, it is indubitable that JOSE and FELISA have
1. The 5-year period of cohabitation should be the years not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
immediately before that day of the marriage and it sworn affidavit and contracted marriage
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by  In fact, JOSE and FELISA started living together only in June
exclusivity… that it is unbroken. 1986 barely 5 months before the celebration of the marriage.
 Persons and Family Relations:
Digests by: John Glenn Lambayon
 The falsity of the affidavit executed is without question.
 THEREFORE, for the failure of the parties to comply with the
required period of cohabitation under Art. 76, the marriage was
effectively celebrated without a marriage license and thus VOID
AB INITIO.
 Persons and Family Relations:
Digests by: John Glenn Lambayon
The following are the points raised in the petition and the ruling
of the Court:
 According the Republic, the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit will not affect the validity of the marriage, since all the
essential and formal requisites were complied with.
 The Court said that this is WRONG. There is no disputing
that the marriage was celebrated license (in fact, they
executed an affidavit IN LIEU OF the marriage license).
However, both JOSE and FELISA failed to comply with the
EXPLICIT requirement under Article 76.

 According to FELISA and the Republic, the Court must hold the
presumption of marriage.
 The Court said that this is NOT APPLICABLE. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption
still needs to be applied.
 The marriage between JOSE and FELISA was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance.

 According to the Republic, if a marriage under a license is not

invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained,
why must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated affidavit
of cohabitation?
 The Court said that when a license is wrongfully obtained,
this only refers to an IRREGULARITY of the marriage
license. In this case, there is NO marriage license at all.
 In fact the Court has said, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of JOSE and FELISA’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, CANNOT
be a mere irregularity. For it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested
to by the parties under oath.
 Similar to De Castro, if the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.