FACTS: On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with

Application
for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access
Highway Act" enacted in 1957:

a) DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; (which prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways)
b) DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; (which declares the Balintawak to Tabang Sections of the North
Luzon Expressway, and the Nichols to Alabang Sections of the South Luzon Expressways, to be LIMITED ACCESS
HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES)
c) Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
d) DPWH Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited
access facilities. (which declares the R-1 Expressway, C-5 Link Expressway and the R-1 Extension Expressway
Sections of the Manila Cavite Toll Expressway to be LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES)

Consequently, the Trial Court denied or dismissed the petition insofar as to declare null and void ab initio DPWH
Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993, Administrative Order No. 1, and Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on
Limited Access Facilities promulgated by the DPWH thru the TRB because under Section 4 of RA 2000 expressly
authorized the DPWH to design limited access facilities and to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to serve the traffic
for which such facilities are intended. According to the RTC, such authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit logically
includes the determination of who and what can and cannot be permitted entry or access into the limited access
facilities, but the petition is granted insofar as DPWH Department Order No. 123 is concerned, declaring the same to be
invalid for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioners claim that DO 74, DO 215, and the TRB’s Rules and Regulations issued under them violate the provisions of
RA 2000. They contend that the two issuances unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in Section 4 of RA 2000 to
regulate toll ways. Petitioners assert that the DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or
central dividing sections. They claim that the DPWH is only allowed to re-design the physical structure of toll ways, and
not to determine "who or what can be qualified as toll way users."

ISSUE:

1) WHETHER DO 74, DO 215 AND THE TRB REGULATIONS CONTRAVENE RA 2000? YES. VOID.
2) WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL? DO 123 IS VOID. AO 1 IS VALID.

RULING:

1st issue: WHETHER DO 74, DO 215 AND THE TRB REGULATIONS CONTRAVENE RA 2000? YES. VOID.

The RTC’s ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH derived its authority from its
predecessor, the Department of Public Works and Communications, which is expressly authorized to regulate, restrict,
or prohibit access to limited access facilities under Section 4 of RA 2000. However, such assumption fails to consider the
evolution of the Department of Public Works and Communications.

Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, approved on 10 March 1917, there were only
seven executive departments and one of them is the Department of Public Works and Communications.

On 16 May 1974, Presidential Decree No. 458 (PD 458) separated the Bureau of Public Highways from the Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications and created it as a department to be known as Department of Public
Highways. Under Section 3 of PD 458, the Department of Public Highways is "responsible for developing and
implementing programs on the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and airport runways."
On 23 July 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546 (EO 546), the Ministry of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications was divided into two agencies – the Ministry of Public Works and
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications – by virtue of EO 546.

Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH) assumed the public works functions of

the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. On the other hand, under Section 8 of EO 546,
among the functions of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation and
Communications [DOTC]) were to (1) formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation
and implementation of an integrated and comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national,
regional, and local levels; and (2) regulate, whenever necessary, activities relative to transportation and communications
and prescribe and collect fees in the exercise of such power. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which
has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.

Even under Executive Order No. 125 (EO 125) and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125-A), 25 which further reorganized the
DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation is clearly with the
DOTC.

Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access
facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in
the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.

Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the TRB 27 cannot derive its power from
the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which
it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are
likewise void.

2nd issue: WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

DO 123 – “By virtue of the authority granted the Secretary of Public Works and Highways under Section 3 of R.A. 2000,
otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, the following revised rules and regulations governing limited
access highways are hereby promulgated for the guidance of all concerned:

1. Administrative Order No. 1 dated February 19, 1968, issued by the Secretary of the then Department of Public Works
and Communications, is hereby amended by deleting the word "motorcycles" mentioned in Section 3(h) thereof.
Therefore, motorcycles are hereby allowed to operate inside the toll roads and limited access highways, subject to the
following:

a. Motorcycles shall have an engine displacement of at least 400 cubic centimeters (cc) “

We need not pass upon the constitutionality of the classification of motorcycles under DO 123. As previously discussed,
the DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to the DOTC.
Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.

AO 1 -VALID

Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide "scientific" and "objective" data on the danger of having motorcycles
plying our highways. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. Petitioners belabor the fact
that there are studies that provide proof that motorcycles are safe modes of transport. They also claim that AO 1
introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport.

AO 1 states: “Section 3. On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to:

(h) Drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized);”

Section 3 of RA 2000 authorized the issuance of the Administrative Order No. 1.

The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state.  The
police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers.  The
tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
reasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of
reasonableness exists, for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.

We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary measures, to
which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic
within limited access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a certain vehicle, to
maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules violates
reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The
special purpose for which a toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and
operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are restricted does not
invalidate the rules.