IAEA Safety Standards

for protecting people and the environment

Radiation Safety
of Gamma, Electron
and X Ray Irradiation
Facilities

Specific Safety Guide

No. SSG-8
 IAEA SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish
or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life
and property, and to provide for the application of these standards.
The publications by means of which the IAEA establishes standards are issued in
the IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers nuclear safety, radiation safety,
transport safety and waste safety. The publication categories in the series are Safety
Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides.
Information on the IAEA’s safety standards programme is available at the IAEA
Internet site
http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/
The site provides the texts in English of published and draft safety standards. The
texts of safety standards issued in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish, the
IAEA Safety Glossary and a status report for safety standards under development are
also available. For further information, please contact the IAEA at PO Box 100,
1400 Vienna, Austria.
All users of IAEA safety standards are invited to inform the IAEA of experience
in their use (e.g. as a basis for national regulations, for safety reviews and for training
courses) for the purpose of ensuring that they continue to meet users’ needs.
Information may be provided via the IAEA Internet site or by post, as above, or by
email to Official.Mail@iaea.org.

OTHER SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS

The IAEA provides for the application of the standards and, under the terms of
Articles III and VIII.C of its Statute, makes available and fosters the exchange of
information relating to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an intermediary among
its Member States for this purpose.
Reports on safety and protection in nuclear activities are issued as Safety
Reports, which provide practical examples and detailed methods that can be used in
support of the safety standards.
Other safety related IAEA publications are issued as Radiological Assessment
Reports, the International Nuclear Safety Group’s INSAG Reports, Technical Reports
and TECDOCs. The IAEA also issues reports on radiological accidents, training
manuals and practical manuals, and other special safety related publications. Security
related publications are issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
RADIATION SAFETY OF GAMMA,
ELECTRON AND
X RAY IRRADIATION FACILITIES

Safety standards survey

The IAEA welcomes your response. Please see:
http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/feedback.htm
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The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
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contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
 IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. SSG-8

RADIATION SAFETY OF GAMMA,

ELECTRON AND
X RAY IRRADIATION FACILITIES

SPECIFIC SAFETY GUIDE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 2010
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© IAEA, 2010
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
July 2010
STI/PUB/1454

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Radiation safety of gamma, electron and x ray irradiation facilities : specific

safety guide. — Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 2010.
p. ; 24 cm. — (IAEA safety standards series, ISSN 1020–525X ;
no. SSG-8)
STI/PUB/1454
ISBN 978– 92–0–103710–7
Includes bibliographical references.

1. Irradiation plants. 2. Irradiation devices. 3. Gamma ray sources.

4. Work environment — Safety measures. I. International Atomic Energy
Agency. II. Series.

IAEAL 10–00641
 FOREWORD

The IAEA’s Statute authorizes the Agency to establish safety standards to

protect health and minimize danger to life and property — standards which the
IAEA must use in its own operations, and which a State can apply by means of its
regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. A comprehensive body of
safety standards under regular review, together with the IAEA’s assistance in their
application, has become a key element in a global safety regime.
In the mid-1990s, a major overhaul of the IAEA’s safety standards
programme was initiated, with a revised oversight committee structure and a
systematic approach to updating the entire corpus of standards. The new
standards that have resulted are of a high calibre and reflect best practices in
Member States. With the assistance of the Commission on Safety Standards, the
IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its safety standards.
Safety standards are only effective, however, if they are properly applied in
practice. The IAEA’s safety services — which range in scope from engineering
safety, operational safety, and radiation, transport and waste safety to regulatory
matters and safety culture in organizations — assist Member States in applying
the standards and appraise their effectiveness. These safety services enable
valuable insights to be shared and all Member States are urged to make use of
them.
Regulating nuclear and radiation safety is a national responsibility, and
many Member States have decided to adopt the IAEA’s safety standards for use in
their national regulations. For the contracting parties to the various international
safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of
ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions. The
standards are also applied by designers, manufacturers and operators around the
world to enhance nuclear and radiation safety in power generation, medicine,
industry, agriculture, research and education.
The IAEA takes seriously the enduring challenge for users and regulators
everywhere: that of ensuring a high level of safety in the use of nuclear materials
and radiation sources around the world. Their continuing utilization for the
benefit of humankind must be managed in a safe manner, and the IAEA safety
standards are designed to facilitate the achievement of that goal.
.
 THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

BACKGROUND

Radioactivity is a natural phenomenon and natural sources of radiation

are features of the environment. Radiation and radioactive substances have
many beneficial applications, ranging from power generation to uses in
medicine, industry and agriculture. The radiation risks to workers and the
public and to the environment that may arise from these applications have to
be assessed and, if necessary, controlled.
Activities such as the medical uses of radiation, the operation of nuclear
installations, the production, transport and use of radioactive material, and the
management of radioactive waste must therefore be subject to standards of
safety.
Regulating safety is a national responsibility. However, radiation risks
may transcend national borders, and international cooperation serves to
promote and enhance safety globally by exchanging experience and by
improving capabilities to control hazards, to prevent accidents, to respond to
emergencies and to mitigate any harmful consequences.
States have an obligation of diligence and duty of care, and are expected
to fulfil their national and international undertakings and obligations.
International safety standards provide support for States in meeting their
obligations under general principles of international law, such as those relating
to environmental protection. International safety standards also promote and
assure confidence in safety and facilitate international commerce and trade.
A global nuclear safety regime is in place and is being continuously
improved. IAEA safety standards, which support the implementation of
binding international instruments and national safety infrastructures, are a
cornerstone of this global regime. The IAEA safety standards constitute
a useful tool for contracting parties to assess their performance under these
international conventions.

THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

The status of the IAEA safety standards derives from the IAEA’s Statute,
which authorizes the IAEA to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where
appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations
and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection
of health and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for
their application.
With a view to ensuring the protection of people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, the IAEA safety standards establish
fundamental safety principles, requirements and measures to control the
radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the
environment, to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of
control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source
or any other source of radiation, and to mitigate the consequences of such
events if they were to occur. The standards apply to facilities and activities that
give rise to radiation risks, including nuclear installations, the use of radiation
and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the
management of radioactive waste.
Safety measures and security measures1 have in common the aim of
protecting human life and health and the environment. Safety measures and
security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner
so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not
compromise security.
The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what
constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They are issued in the IAEA Safety
Standards Series, which has three categories (see Fig. 1).

Safety Fundamentals
Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and
principles of protection and safety, and provide the basis for the safety
requirements.

Safety Requirements
An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establishes the
requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the
environment, both now and in the future. The requirements are governed by
the objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If the requirements
are not met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of
safety. The format and style of the requirements facilitate their use for the
establishment, in a harmonized manner, of a national regulatory framework.
The safety requirements use ‘shall’ statements together with statements of

1
See also publications issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
 Safety Fundamentals
Fundamental Safety Principles

General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements

Part 1. Governmental, Legal and 1. Site Evaluation for

Regulatory Framework for Safety Nuclear Installations

Part 2. Leadership and Management

2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
for Safety
2.1. Design and Construction
Part 3. Radiation Protection and the 2.2. Commissioning and Operation
Safety of Radiation Sources

Part 4. Safety Assessment for 3. Safety of Research Reactors

Facilities and Activities

Part 5. Predisposal Management 4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel

of Radioactive Waste Cycle Facilities

Part 6. Decommissioning and 5. Safety of Radioactive Waste

Termination of Activities Disposal Facilities

Part 7. Emergency Preparedness 6. Safe Transport of

and Response Radioactive Material

Collection of Safety Guides

FIG. 1. The long term structure of the IAEA Safety Standards Series.

associated conditions to be met. Many requirements are not addressed to a

specific party, the implication being that the appropriate parties are responsible
for fulfilling them.

Safety Guides
Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply
with the safety requirements, indicating an international consensus that it is
necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative
measures). The Safety Guides present international good practices, and
increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high
levels of safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed
as ‘should’ statements.

APPLICATION OF THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

The principal users of safety standards in IAEA Member States are

regulatory bodies and other relevant national authorities. The IAEA safety
standards are also used by co-sponsoring organizations and by many
organizations that design, construct and operate nuclear facilities, as well as
organizations involved in the use of radiation and radioactive sources.
The IAEA safety standards are applicable, as relevant, throughout the
entire lifetime of all facilities and activities — existing and new — utilized for
peaceful purposes and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks.
They can be used by States as a reference for their national regulations in
respect of facilities and activities.
The IAEA’s Statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in
relation to its own operations and also on States in relation to IAEA assisted
operations.
The IAEA safety standards also form the basis for the IAEA’s safety
review services, and they are used by the IAEA in support of competence
building, including the development of educational curricula and training
courses.
International conventions contain requirements similar to those in the
IAEA safety standards and make them binding on contracting parties.
The IAEA safety standards, supplemented by international conventions,
industry standards and detailed national requirements, establish a consistent
basis for protecting people and the environment. There will also be some
special aspects of safety that need to be assessed at the national level. For
example, many of the IAEA safety standards, in particular those addressing
aspects of safety in planning or design, are intended to apply primarily to new
facilities and activities. The requirements established in the IAEA safety
standards might not be fully met at some existing facilities that were built to
earlier standards. The way in which IAEA safety standards are to be applied
to such facilities is a decision for individual States.
The scientific considerations underlying the IAEA safety standards
provide an objective basis for decisions concerning safety; however, decision
makers must also make informed judgements and must determine how best to
balance the benefits of an action or an activity against the associated radiation
risks and any other detrimental impacts to which it gives rise.

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

The preparation and review of the safety standards involves the IAEA
Secretariat and four safety standards committees, for nuclear safety (NUSSC),
radiation safety (RASSC), the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC) and the
safe transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC), and a Commission on
Safety Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety standards programme
(see Fig. 2).
 Outline and work plan
prepared by the Secretariat;
review by the safety standards
committees and the CSS

Secretariat and
consultants:
drafting of new or revision
of existing safety standard

Draft

Review by Draft
safety standards Member States
committee(s)
Comments

Final draft

Endorsement
by the CSS

FIG. 2. The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an existing standard.

All IAEA Member States may nominate experts for the safety standards
committees and may provide comments on draft standards. The membership of
the Commission on Safety Standards is appointed by the Director General and
includes senior governmental officials having responsibility for establishing
national standards.
A management system has been established for the processes of planning,
developing, reviewing, revising and establishing the IAEA safety standards.
It articulates the mandate of the IAEA, the vision for the future application of
the safety standards, policies and strategies, and corresponding functions and
responsibilities.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of

Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the recommendations of international
expert bodies, notably the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP), are taken into account in developing the IAEA safety
standards. Some safety standards are developed in cooperation with other
bodies in the United Nations system or other specialized agencies, including
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United
Nations Environment Programme, the International Labour Organization, the
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and
the World Health Organization.

INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT

Safety related terms are to be understood as defined in the IAEA Safety

Glossary (see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety-glossary.htm). Otherwise,
words are used with the spellings and meanings assigned to them in the latest
edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary. For Safety Guides, the English
version of the text is the authoritative version.
The background and context of each standard in the IAEA Safety
Standards Series and its objective, scope and structure are explained in
Section 1, Introduction, of each publication.
Material for which there is no appropriate place in the body text
(e.g. material that is subsidiary to or separate from the body text, is included in
support of statements in the body text, or describes methods of calculation,
procedures or limits and conditions) may be presented in appendices or
annexes.
An appendix, if included, is considered to form an integral part of the
safety standard. Material in an appendix has the same status as the body text,
and the IAEA assumes authorship of it. Annexes and footnotes to the main
text, if included, are used to provide practical examples or additional
information or explanation. Annexes and footnotes are not integral parts of the
main text. Annex material published by the IAEA is not necessarily issued
under its authorship; material under other authorship may be presented in
annexes to the safety standards. Extraneous material presented in annexes is
excerpted and adapted as necessary to be generally useful.
 CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background (1.1–1.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Objective (1.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Scope (1.7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Structure (1.8–1.10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. JUSTIFICATION OF PRACTICES (2.1–2.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3. TYPES OF IRRADIATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Gamma irradiation facilities (3.1–3.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Irradiation facilities with radiation generators (3.7–3.9) . . . . . . . . . . 8

4. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF PRACTICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Notification and authorization of the practice (4.1–4.2) . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Responsibilities of the operating organization (4.3–4.12) . . . . . . . . . 11
Management and organizational responsibilities (4.13–4.37) . . . . . . . 14
Local rules (4.38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Training and education (4.39–4.47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5. INDIVIDUAL MONITORING OF WORKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Individual dose assessment and record keeping (5.1–5.12) . . . . . . . . 27

Investigation of doses (5.13–5.16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

6. WORKPLACE MONITORING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Monitoring of the workplace (6.1–6.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Radiation survey meters and radiation monitors (6.3–6.8) . . . . . . . . . 31
Maintenance and calibration (6.9–6.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Use of radiation survey meters (6.13–6.16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Records of radiation surveys (6.17–6.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

7. CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES (7.1–7.7) . . . . . . . . 37

8. IRRADIATOR DESIGN (8.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Gamma, electron and X ray irradiators (8.2–8.47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Gamma irradiators (8.48–8.97) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Electron beam irradiators and X ray irradiators (8.98–8.120) . . . . . 62
Facility modifications (8.121–8.122) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

9. TESTING AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT (9.1–9.2) . . . 67

Weekly tests (9.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Monthly tests (9.4–9.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Semiannual tests (9.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Leak testing of radioactive sources (9.7–9.11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Records (9.12–9.14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Facility maintenance and modification (9.15–9.26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

10. TRANSPORT, LOADING AND

UNLOADING OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Transport (10.1–10.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Loading and unloading of sources (10.3–10.8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

11. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (11.1–11.4) . . . 77

Development of emergency plans (11.5–11.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Emergency equipment (11.13–11.14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Training for emergencies (11.15–11.17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Periodic reviews of emergency plans (11.18–11.19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
BODIES FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
 1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1.1. The applications of ionizing radiation bring many benefits to humankind,

ranging from power generation to uses in medicine, industry and agriculture.
Irradiators that utilize ionizing radiation are used in a variety of beneficial
applications such as food irradiation and sterilization of medical products.
However, ionizing radiation can also be harmful unless it is properly controlled.
Industrial irradiators produce very high dose rates during irradiation, such that a
person accidentally present in the radiation room1 could receive a lethal dose
within minutes or even seconds.

1.2. Several fatalities have occurred in gamma irradiators in various States. In

addition, serious overexposures have occurred at electron beam irradiators in
several States. The IAEA has investigated these and other accidents, and has
published a report [1] on lessons learned so that similar accidents may be
prevented in the future.

1.3. The accidents described in Ref. [1] involved workers who entered radiation
rooms unaware of the high dose rates. There are also other potential radiation
hazards at gamma irradiators, including contamination from damaged radioactive
sources, sources becoming dislodged from source racks, accidents in handling
sources, fires and breaches in security.

1.4. The International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing
Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS) [2] establish the basic
requirements for protection of people against exposure to ionizing radiation and
for the safety of radiation sources2. The implementation of these requirements at
irradiation facilities is intended to prevent accidents of the type described here
and, generally, to provide for the best possible protection and safety measures
under the prevailing circumstances. The magnitudes and likelihood of exposures
and the numbers of individuals exposed are required to be kept as low as
reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account.

1
The radiation room is that region of the irradiator that is enclosed by radiation
shielding and is made inaccessible when the radiation source is in use.
2
The term ‘radiation source’ includes radioactive sources and radiation generators.
‘Radiation’ as used in the IAEA safety standards means ionizing radiation.

1
1.5. Unless otherwise stated, terms are used with the meanings ascribed to them
in the IAEA Safety Glossary (2007 Edition) [3].

OBJECTIVE

1.6. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how

to meet the requirements of the BSS with regard to irradiation facilities. This
Safety Guide provides specific, practical recommendations on the safe design and
operation of gamma, electron and X ray irradiators for use by operating
organizations and the designers of these facilities, and by regulatory bodies.

SCOPE

1.7. The facilities considered in this publication include five types of irradiator,
whether operated on a commercial basis or for research and development
purposes. This publication is concerned with radiation safety issues and not with
the uses of irradiators, nor does it cover the irradiation of product3 or its quality
management. The five types of irradiator are:

— Panoramic dry source storage irradiators (see Fig. 1);

— Underwater irradiators, in which both the source and the product being
irradiated are under water (see Fig. 2);
— Panoramic wet source storage irradiators (see Fig. 3);
— Electron beam irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an
area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible
during the irradiation process (see Fig. 4);
— X ray irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that
is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the
irradiation process (see Fig. 5).

Consideration of non-radiation-related risks and of the benefits resulting

from the operation of irradiators is outside the scope of this Safety Guide. The
practices of radiotherapy and radiography are also outside the scope of this Safety
Guide. Category I gamma irradiators (i.e. ‘self-shielded’ irradiators) are outside
the scope of this Safety Guide.

3
Product in this context means the objects or materials that are intentionally irradiated.

2
STRUCTURE

1.8. Designs of irradiation facilities are categorized according to radiation type

and methods of accessibility and shielding, as described in Section 3 of this
Safety Guide. The notification and authorization of irradiation practices, the
responsibilities of the operating organization and general radiation safety issues
are discussed in Section 4. The individual monitoring of workers and workplace
monitoring are described in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.

1.9. Section 7 provides a description of security measures for controlling

radioactive sources. Section 8 deals with design and operational safety aspects of
irradiation facilities. Section 9 discusses the testing and maintenance of equipment.

1.10. Section 10 focuses on the transport and loading and unloading of

radioactive sources. Section 11 addresses emergency preparedness and
emergency response.

2. JUSTIFICATION OF PRACTICES

2.1. The Fundamental Safety Principles [4] state the fundamental safety
objective as being to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of
ionizing radiation. Principle 4, Justification of facilities and activities, states that
“Facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks must yield an overall
benefit.” This may be taken as being equivalent to the well established principle
of justification of practices, the operation of irradiation facilities being one
example [2].

2.2. The basic requirements for radiation protection for practices established in
the BSS [2] are: justification of practices, individual dose limits, and optimization
of protection and safety. The basic requirement for the justification of practices is
expressed as follows:

“No practice or source within a practice should be authorized unless the

practice produces sufficient benefit to the exposed individual to offset the
radiation harm that it might cause; that is: unless the practice is justified,
taking into account social, economic and other relevant factors” (Ref. [2],
para. 2.20).

3
2.3. When the principle was first formally expressed, many practices such as the
operation of irradiators were already in widespread use, and in general their
justification was implicit. Under normal conditions, the design, construction,
operation and maintenance of irradiators result in negligible doses to workers and
the public. However, as indicated above, the operation of irradiators occasionally
results in doses to workers in excess of authorized limits as a result of accidents.
Also, the operation of irradiators carries with it other radiation risks, including
those associated with the security of radioactive sources, the transport of
radioactive sources and, ultimately, the disposal of radioactive sources.

2.4. The decision as to whether the operation of irradiators is justified is specific

to the circumstances and benefits of their use, taking into account national
priorities; thus definitive recommendations regarding justification cannot be
provided. Ultimately, the decision as to whether the operation of an irradiator is
justified should be made on a case by case basis by the appropriate governmental
authority, which should weigh the various benefits and risks associated with its
use in determining whether the specific practice is justified. The governmental
authority’s decision as to whether the operation of irradiators in the State is
justified may also be made on a general basis for all irradiators of a specific type.

3. TYPES OF IRRADIATOR

GAMMA IRRADIATION FACILITIES

3.1. For the purposes of this Safety Guide, there are four general categories of
gamma irradiator, defined on the basis of the design of the facility and, in
particular, the accessibility and shielding of the radioactive source4,5. Category I
gamma irradiators (i.e. self-shielded irradiators) are not dealt with in this Safety
Guide, since they are distinct for the purposes of radiation safety. For the
purposes of this Safety Guide, the relevant categories of gamma irradiator are

4
The four categories of gamma irradiator have historically been designated with Roman
numerals I–IV. The categories of gamma irradiator should not be confused with the categories
used in the IAEA’s Categorization of Radioactive Sources [5], which uses Arabic
numerals 1–5.
5
In this context the term ‘radioactive source’ may apply to one individual sealed source
or collectively to a number of radioactive sources in a source array.

4
Category II (panoramic dry source storage irradiators), Category III (underwater
irradiators) and Category IV (panoramic wet source storage irradiators).

Category II (panoramic dry source storage irradiators)

3.2. A panoramic dry source storage irradiator is a controlled human access

irradiator in which the radioactive source is: enclosed in a dry container
constructed of solid materials, fully shielded6 when not in use and exposed within
an area that is kept inaccessible during operation by means of an entry control
system (Fig. 1).

3.3. Dry source storage facilities generally consist of either a built-in or a

transportable radioactive source storage container constructed of solid materials.
Inserts, brackets and other hardware are used to anchor or hold in place such
items as the source holder7, guide rods or cables, and various pipes for other
services.

3.4. Components of irradiators that are subjected to high dose rates should be
resistant to radiation damage. Surfaces in close proximity to radioactive sources
should be able to be easily decontaminated and should be constructed of materials
that are corrosion resistant and metallurgically compatible with each other and
with other components, including the source capsules8. The irradiator should be
designed to maintain the integrity of its radiation shielding under conditions of
normal use, anticipated operational occurrences and plausible accident conditions
such as fire conditions.

Category III (underwater irradiators)

3.5. A self-contained wet source storage irradiator is an irradiator in which the

radioactive source is stored in a pool of water, the source is shielded at all times,
and human access to the source and to the volume undergoing irradiation is
physically restricted in its designed configuration and proper mode of use
(Fig. 2).

6
‘Fully shielded’ means the condition in which the source is stored is such that dose
rates in the radiation room are optimized, allowing the room to be occupied by workers.
7
The source holder is that component of the irradiator within which the radioactive
source is positioned, including any retaining screws, pins, clips, etc.
8
The source capsule is the protective envelope of a sealed source which prevents
leakage of radioactive material.

5
6
Personnel access door

Turntable

Source holder

Control panel

FIG. 1. Category II gamma irradiation facility: Panoramic dry source storage irradiator.
 Source
storage pool

Product hoist
cable
Approximately 7 m

Sample or
product container

Source rod

Source array

FIG. 2. Category III gamma irradiation facility: Underwater irradiator.

7
Category IV (panoramic wet source storage irradiators)

3.6. A panoramic wet source storage irradiator is a controlled human access

irradiator in which the radioactive source is stored and fully shielded in a pool of
water when not in use. The source is exposed within a radiation room that is kept
inaccessible during operation by means of an entry control system (Fig. 3).

IRRADIATION FACILITIES WITH RADIATION GENERATORS

3.7. A similar categorization may be applied to irradiators utilizing radiation

generators, with Category I irradiators being integrally shielded units with safety
interlocks9. Category I electron beam irradiation facilities and X ray irradiation
facilities are not within the scope of this Safety Guide. Category II units are
housed in shielded rooms which are kept inaccessible during operation by means
of an entry control system (Figs 4 and 5).

3.8. Irradiators with radiation generators include equipment that accelerates

electrons within a vacuum system. The electron beam is used to irradiate product
directly or, in X ray irradiators, is directed at a target to generate X rays that
irradiate product.

3.9. Category II electron beam irradiators and X ray irradiators may give rise
to radiation protection issues that are not relevant for gamma irradiators, with
regard to neutron radiation fields and the activation of materials. The thresholds
above which these issues may be relevant are dependent upon a number of
factors, such as product material and target material, but are typically only
significant at energies above 10 MeV for electron beams and 5 MeV for X ray
irradiators.

9
A safety interlock is an engineered device for precluding exposure of an individual,
either by preventing entry to the controlled area or by automatically removing the cause of the
hazard.

8
 Source hoist
cylinder
Access for source
2 m concrete transport container
shielding

Product conveyor
Hoist
cable

Personnel
access door

Source
storage pool

Guide cable

Control panel
Source array
(safe position)
Source transport container
FIG. 3. Category IV gamma irradiation facility: Panoramic wet source storage irradiator.

9
 High voltage
system

Oscillator
cabinet
Scan
horn

Concrete
shield

Product
Access conveyor
maze

FIG. 4. Category II electron beam irradiation facility: Unit housed in shielded rooms kept
inaccessible during the irradiation process.

4. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF PRACTICES

NOTIFICATION AND AUTHORIZATION OF THE PRACTICE

4.1. The BSS [2] require, in paras 2.10 and 2.11, that a person or organization
intending to build or operate an irradiation facility notify the regulatory body of
this intention and submit an application for authorization. This application should
contain information that demonstrates the safety of the practice. The type and
amount of information that should be provided in the application is discussed in
Ref. [6]. Specific guidance relating to the preparation of an application for the
authorization of an irradiator, and its subsequent review by the regulatory body, is
included in a supplement to that Safety Guide [7]. As required by the BSS [2], in
paras 2.11 and 2.12, given the risks involved in the operation of an irradiator, the
authorization granted by the regulatory body should take the form of a licence
rather than registration.

10
 Electrical room
Conveyor system

Shield walls Equipment room

Control room

Accelerator

Scan horn

X ray target

FIG. 5. Category II X ray irradiation facility: Unit housed in shielded rooms kept inaccessible
during the irradiation process (courtesy of Sterigenics International).

4.2. The operating organization should obtain the approval of the regulatory
body before implementing any modifications of the irradiator that may have
significant implications for radiation protection. The manufacturer(s) of the
irradiator and of its sources and key components should also be contacted, where
appropriate, regarding proposed modifications of the irradiator (see para. 9.15).

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OPERATING ORGANIZATION

4.3. The operating organization’s management is responsible for the operation

of the irradiator and for its safety. For new facilities, the operating organization
will obtain a licence from the regulatory body for the siting, design, construction,
acquisition, storage and operation of the irradiator. The operating organization is
responsible for the operation of the irradiator in accordance with regulatory
requirements.

11
4.4. The operating organization of an irradiator should ensure that the facility is
designed to meet the radiation safety objectives given in paras 4.13–4.16, as well
as any more specific safety requirements of the regulatory body pertaining to site
selection and evaluation, construction, installation, operation, maintenance and
decommissioning. This should be achieved by:

— Using a qualified expert in radiation safety who is accredited according to

criteria specified by the regulatory body and who is knowledgable about the
safe design of irradiation facilities.
— Ensuring that the following items are provided:
• A detailed description of the design and operation of the safety systems,
including control circuit diagrams.
• Detailed operating procedures and maintenance procedures, including the
type and frequency of checks of safety and control systems, routine
monitoring and radiation surveys.
• Safety assessments using formal methods of analysis appropriate to the
level of risk associated with the facility. The operating organization
should also carry out a safety assessment on the basis of information
provided by the supplier and the operating organization’s own
administrative rules.
• Instructions and procedures to be followed in an emergency, as outlined in
Section 11.

4.5. The operating organization of an irradiation facility should ensure that all
documents provided by the manufacturer, supplier and installer (operating
manuals, operating rules and procedures, and emergency procedures) are
available in the local language and are understandable to the users.

4.6. The BSS [2], in para. IV.23, require operating organizations to ensure that
information on both normal and abnormal operations significant to protection and
safety is disseminated or made available, as appropriate, to the regulatory body
and to manufacturers and/or suppliers, as specified by the regulatory body. This
information would cover, for example, maintenance data, descriptions of events,
information regarding defects in materials and equipment, weaknesses in
operating procedures and corrective actions. The operating organization should
ensure that any new information of this type that is known to manufacturers and
suppliers is obtained from them as rapidly as possible. It may be necessary for the
operating organization to periodically seek this information from the
manufacturer and/or supplier, rather than relying upon them to provide it.

12
4.7. The operating organization of a facility should ensure that construction and
installation work does not compromise the safety of the facility. On completion of
the installation, or at appropriate stages during construction, the operating
organization should ensure that a qualified expert10 thoroughly and critically
reviews the facility and any component part before it is commissioned. This
should ensure that:

— Safety features and warning signals and alarms have been properly installed
and operate correctly;
— Radiation protection for workers and members of the public and protection
of the environment are adequate.

4.8. The operating organization of a facility should ensure that the constructor or
installer provides it with adequate information about the proper operation,
maintenance and decommissioning of the facility. The operating organization
should also ensure that designers, manufacturers, constructors and installers
cooperate to provide employees with the necessary theoretical and practical
training to enable them to work in a safe manner.

4.9. The operating organization should permit inspection of its facilities and
records by the regulatory body.

4.10. The operating organization should notify the regulatory body of any
proposed modifications of the irradiator or changes to key personnel, in particular
senior managers, the principal radiation protection officer, qualified experts and
irradiator operators.

4.11. The operating organization should notify the regulatory body of, and should
submit a plan for, the transfer or disposal of radioactive sources when they are no
longer in use.

4.12. At the end of the operating lifetime of the irradiation facility, the operating
organization should ensure that: buildings and equipment are free from
radioactive material and contamination before disposal or resale; all radioactive

10
The term ‘qualified expert’ is used in various places in this Safety Guide without
modification. It should be noted that the individual should be a qualified expert in a field (e.g.
radiation protection or design and operation of irradiation facilities) that is relevant to the issues
being described.

13
sources are properly accounted for11 before they are returned to the supplier or
disposed of in accordance with national regulations; and any radioactive waste
resulting from decontamination is disposed of in accordance with regulatory
requirements.

MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

General

4.13. Operating organizations should provide the human and material resources
necessary to ensure safe working conditions and compliance with regulatory
requirements.

4.14. Operating organizations should ensure that all aspects of protection and
safety are provided for in a systematic manner. To meet this objective, operating
organizations should establish and maintain a radiation protection programme
that includes a commitment by management to developing and promoting a
safety culture that encourages a questioning and learning attitude to protection
and safety, and that discourages complacency. The commitment should also
include the allocation of adequate time, personnel and equipment.

Radiation protection programme

4.15. The general objective of a radiation protection programme is to discharge

the management’s responsibility for radiation protection and safety through the
adoption of management structures, policies, procedures and organizational
arrangements that are commensurate with the nature and extent of the radiation
risks. The radiation protection programme represents the totality of actions
undertaken to achieve the stated aims of the operating organization for radiation
protection and safety. Doses received by workers and members of the public
should thus be kept well below the relevant dose limits specified in the BSS [2].

4.16. Application of the optimization principle should be the principal driving

force behind the establishment and implementation of radiation protection
programmes, including in many cases measures to prevent or reduce potential

11
‘Accounting’ in this context means physically checking that all radioactive sources
are present in their intended locations. This may be undertaken by means of an appropriate
radiation survey.

14
exposures and to mitigate the consequences of accidents. The existence of a
radiation protection programme is not sufficient in itself; managers and workers
should demonstrate their ongoing commitment to the programme and its
objectives. Detailed guidance on establishing and maintaining a radiation
protection programme that focuses on the protection of workers is provided in
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.1 [8].

Structure of the radiation protection programme

4.17. The radiation protection programme may include a top level policy
document supported by detailed and specific procedures or ‘local rules’ and a
comprehensive system of records. These components should consist of the
following:

— A policy document specifying:

• Objectives;
• Responsibilities;
• Training;
• Safety assessment;
• Quality management.
— Procedures and local rules covering:
• Operation (e.g. access control, startup and shutdown procedures);
• Maintenance and loading and unloading of radioactive sources12;
• Transport of radioactive sources (see footnote 12);
• Individual monitoring;
• Training;
• Leakage testing of radioactive sources (see footnote 12);
• Testing of radiation monitors;
• Routine checks by a radiation protection officer;
• Audits and safety assessments by a qualified expert;
• Response to visible and audible alarms;
• Incident reporting and investigation;
• Emergency response.
— A system of records covering:
• Documentation of authorization and any correspondence between the
operating organization and the regulatory body;
• Name of the authorized person responsible for the radiation protection
programme;

12
This applies for gamma irradiation facilities only.

15
 • Safety assessment reports;
• Operation logbook;
• Routine checks of safety systems by a radiation protection officer;
• Individual doses (current and prior work history);
• Results of workplace monitoring;
• Radiation monitor test reports;
• Results of leakage tests of radioactive sources (see footnote 12);
• Inventory of radioactive sources (see footnote 12)13;
• Records of movements of radioactive sources (see footnote 12);
• Reports on investigations of incidents and accidents;
• Audits and reviews of the radiation safety programme (by a qualified
expert);
• Installation, maintenance and repair work;
• Facility modifications;
• Training provided (initial and refresher);
• Transport of radioactive sources (see footnote 12):
 Transport documentation;

 Contamination surveys and radiation level surveys;

• Disposal or return of radioactive sources (see footnote 12);

• Records of training, which should include the following information:
 Name of the person who received the instruction or training;

 Name of the institution or person who provided the instruction or

training;
 Date and duration of the instruction or training;

 A summary or list of the topics addressed;

 Results of examinations taken;

 Copies of training certificates.

Safety assessment

4.18. In order to comply with the requirement in para. IV.3 of the BSS [2], a
formal method of safety assessment such as probabilistic safety assessment
(PSA) should be used. Examples of the application of techniques of probabilistic
safety assessment to industrial irradiators are given in ICRP Publication No. 76
[9]. Guidance on methods of probabilistic safety assessment is provided in IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.10 [10].

13
‘Inventorying’ means conducting a campaign to physically check all radioactive
sources under the responsibility of a person or organization, by specifically and uniquely
identifying each individual source using appropriate means such as serial numbers.

16
4.19. In 2003, an IAEA coordinated research project studied the benefits and
limitations of the application of techniques of probabilistic safety assessment to
radiation sources. In this research project, techniques of probabilistic safety
assessment were applied to a Category IV gamma irradiator. The results of this
project were presented in IAEA-TECDOC-1494 [11].

4.20. The operating organization should demonstrate to the regulatory body how
the design of the irradiation facility and the related operational procedures will
contribute to the prevention of accidents or to the mitigation of the effects of
accidents. This information should be provided in the form of a documented
safety assessment describing and evaluating the predicted response of the plant to
incidents (including postulated malfunctions or failures of equipment, common
cause failures and human errors) and external events that could lead to accident
conditions. These analyses should include consideration of combinations of such
malfunctions, failures, errors and events.

4.21. Examples of issues to be examined in the safety assessment include:

— Loss of access control;

— Malfunctions and failures of structures, systems and components;
— Loss of control over the system for the movement of radioactive sources,
including a source rack becoming stuck in the unshielded position
(see footnote 12);
— Loss of integrity of systems or components, including shielding integrity,
encapsulation of sealed sources and pool integrity (see footnote 12);
— Electrical distribution faults, from localized faults to complete loss of
external energy sources;
— Failures of safety systems caused by fires within the facility;
— Failures of safety systems resulting from external causes such as storms,
floods, earthquakes or explosions;
— Failures of personnel to observe proper, safe procedures (for whatever
reasons);
— Breakdown of procedures for preventing access to the facility by
unauthorized persons;
— Breakdown of administrative procedures, leading to unsafe practices;
— Detection of contamination;
— High radiation levels in locations where high levels would not be expected.

17
Verification of safety

4.22. Paragraphs 2.38–2.40 of the BSS [2] require that monitoring and
measurements be conducted of the parameters necessary for the verification of
compliance with the safety standards. The BSS also require that equipment used
for this purpose be properly maintained, and be tested and calibrated at
appropriate intervals against standards that are traceable to national or
international reference standards.

4.23. Operating organizations should conduct periodic audits to verify

compliance with the requirements of the regulatory body. However, the
regulatory body has the overall responsibility for ensuring that practices within its
jurisdiction remain in compliance with regulatory requirements. Audits that are
conducted by the regulatory body when the irradiator is being commissioned, as
well as at regular intervals during its operation, should be part of the verification
process. General information about the inspection of radiation sources and
regulatory enforcement, including examples of checklists for the inspection of
industrial irradiators, are included in IAEA-TECDOC-1526 [12].

Radiation protection officer

4.24. A radiation protection officer should be a person technically competent in

radiation protection matters of relevance for a given type of irradiator who is
designated by the operating organization to oversee compliance with the
requirements of the safety standards. Radiation protection officers play a
supervisory role in assisting the operating organization in discharging its
responsibilities with regard to radiation safety. A principal radiation protection
officer should report directly to senior management and should have sufficient
authority to discharge his/her duties.

4.25. In cases where there is a potential conflict between operational

responsibilities, such as responsibilities for meeting production targets and
responsibilities for radiation safety, radiation safety requirements should always
take priority. At least one radiation protection officer should be available, though
not necessarily physically present, at all times. In addition to a principal radiation
protection officer, irradiation facilities will often have several radiation protection
officers who are present at the facility during different work shifts throughout the
day. The operating organization should notify the regulatory body of the
appointment of radiation protection officers in accordance with regulatory
requirements.

18
4.26. While the radiation protection officer oversees the application of the safety
standards, the prime responsibility for safety remains with the operating
organization. Paragraph 1.9 of the BSS [2] states that the operating organization
is required to have the primary responsibility for establishing protection and
safety objectives in conformity with the relevant requirements of the safety
standards and to develop, implement and document a protection and safety
programme. These responsibilities cannot be delegated to the radiation protection
officers or the qualified expert. The duties of radiation protection officers at
irradiation facilities should include the following, some of which may require
consultation with, or assistance from, the qualified expert:

— Ensuring that all irradiator operators, maintenance staff, contractors and

other relevant individuals and organizations are provided with copies of the
operating instructions in the local language, and that they have read and
understood and are complying with these instructions;
— Identifying controlled areas and supervised areas;
— Controlling access to controlled areas;
— Optimizing exposure controls and maintaining engineering features and
other equipment that contributes to controlling exposure of workers and
members of the public;
— Deciding whether any special restrictions are needed with regard to the
exposure of female employees who might be pregnant;
— Arranging for testing of fixed radiation monitors, and for calibration and
testing of radiation survey meters;
— Maintaining records of the radioactive source (see footnote 12) and relevant
training and safety records;
— Performing routine radiation surveys and environmental monitoring;
— Supervising the issuing and return of personal dosimeters and reviewing
dosimetry results;
— Arranging statutory tests for leakage of radioactive material (see
footnote 12);
— Undertaking a programme of periodic safety checks of safety systems and
warning signals and alarms, and of general conditions at the facility, as
described in Section 9;
— Liaising with contractors, designers and suppliers with regard to radiation
protection matters and significant changes to physical or operational
aspects of the facility;
— Arranging radiation protection training for irradiator operators,
maintenance staff, contractors and other staff, as appropriate;

19
 — Ensuring the adequacy of safety assessments and contingency plans for any
reasonably foreseeable incidents with consequences for radiation
protection;
— Arranging periodic exercises to test the effective implementation of these
contingency plans;
— Investigating any incidents including near misses at the facility such as:
• Any of the operational parameters subject to periodic quality control
being out of the normal ranges established for operational conditions;
• Any equipment failures, accidents, errors, unusual events or
circumstances that cause, or have the potential to cause, doses in excess of
regulatory dose limits (e.g. failure of the radioactive source to return to
the shielded position).

Irradiator operator

4.27. Irradiator operators are the workers who work most closely with a
particular irradiator and who generally have day to day responsibility for its safe
operation. Only qualified irradiator operators should be authorized to operate the
irradiator.

4.28. A qualified irradiator operator should:

— Complete a course of training that is acceptable to the regulatory body;

— Be knowledgable about the basic design, operation and preventive
maintenance of the irradiator and the written procedures for routine and
emergency operation of the irradiator;
— Be knowledgable about the dose rate at all areas around the irradiator;
— Be knowledgable about features that contribute to the security of
radioactive sources, such as locks, posted signs, warning lights, visible and
audible signals and safety interlock systems;
— Be knowledgable about the radiation detection instruments and the
requirements for individual monitoring;
— Be able to operate the irradiator in a safe manner and to maintain the
required operation logs and records;
— Be knowledgable about the overall organizational structure pertaining to
management of the irradiator, including specific delegations of authority
and responsibility for operation of the irradiator.

20
Other workers

4.29. In addition to qualified irradiator operators, other workers should be

employed by the operating organization to undertake a range of routine activities.
These include moving product in and out of the radiation room, housekeeping
duties with potential implications for radiation safety and routine maintenance
activities. The competence of these workers to perform their duties in a safe
manner should be verified by a radiation protection officer.

4.30. There may be occasions when other workers perform services at a facility
on a temporary basis; for example, during the loading and unloading of
radioactive sources, or in response to mechanical malfunctions (see footnote 12).
Safety in these operations depends, in part, on cooperation between those
responsible for radiation protection at the facility and those performing services.
In many cases, services will be performed by the radioactive source supplier or
the irradiator designer. Specific authorization may be granted to outside
organizations such as the irradiator designer or the radioactive source
manufacturer to perform specific activities that are outside the scope of the
normal operation of irradiators. Ultimately, however, responsibility for safety
while radioactive sources are on site rests with the operating organization.

Qualified experts

4.31. A qualified expert is an individual who is duly recognized, by virtue of

certification by appropriate boards or societies, professional licences or academic
qualifications, and experience, as having expertise in a relevant field of
specialization. Such fields include medical physics, radiation protection,
occupational health, fire safety, quality assurance and any relevant engineering or
safety specialty.

4.32. The operating organization may identify one or more qualified experts to
provide advice on various matters concerning radiation safety in the design and
operation of the facility. A qualified expert need not be a full time employee of
the operating organization but could be employed on a part-time or an ad hoc
basis. However, arrangements should be made for the advice of a qualified expert
to be available when necessary. As with the radiation protection officer, the
operating organization cannot delegate its responsibility for safety to a qualified
expert.

21
4.33. A qualified expert should be experienced in radiation protection matters
and should have:

— Theoretical training that includes training in the properties of radiation as

used in the irradiator;
— A thorough knowledge of the hazards associated with the radiation present
and the ways in which these hazards can be controlled and minimized;
— An understanding and detailed knowledge of the working practices used in
the facility, as well as a general knowledge of the working practices in other
similar facilities;
— A detailed working knowledge of all regulatory provisions, relevant codes
of practice and protection standards, guidance materials and other
information necessary for giving advice in connection with the work with
radiation undertaken by the operating organization;
— An awareness of legislation that could affect the work with radiation on
which the qualified expert gives advice;
— The ability to give advice so that the operating organization can comply
with regulations and follow good radiation protection practices;
— The ability to communicate with workers and their representatives;
— The ability to keep up to date with developments in the use of radiation in
the field in which the qualified expert gives advice and with developments
in radiation protection.

4.34. The operating organization should provide the qualified expert with the
information and resources necessary for the expert to work effectively. The
information should include a clear statement of the scope of the advice that the
expert is expected to give.

4.35. The operating organization may consult the qualified expert on a wide
range of issues relating to radiation safety, including:

— Optimization of protection and safety;

— Maintenance of engineering features and other equipment;
— Dosimetry and radiation monitoring;
— Investigation of abnormally high exposures and overexposures;
— Staff training;
— Safety assessment and contingency arrangements;
— Examination of any plans for a new plant or premises, or for modifications
of an existing plant or premises;

22
 — Independent audits of radiation protection systems;
— Quality management;
— Performance of emergency drills;
— Assistance following an emergency.

4.36. The BSS [2], in para. 2.31, require that qualified experts be identified and
made available for providing advice on application of the safety standards.

4.37. Paragraph 2.32 of the BSS [2] states that registrants and licensees shall
inform the regulatory body of their arrangements to make available the expertise
necessary to provide advice on application of the safety standards. The
information provided shall include the scope of the functions of any qualified
experts identified.

LOCAL RULES

4.38. The operating organization should ensure that operational instructions are
fully understood by the qualified irradiator operators and other workers.
Operational instructions should, at a minimum, include:

— A description of the nature of the hazards posed by the facility and the
safety features used to minimize the risks.
— A reference to the existence and the location of the written emergency
procedures.
— A description of the functions, duties and responsibilities with regard to
radiation safety of key individuals within the operating organization,
including the qualified expert and radiation protection officers.
— The method of implementing the operating instructions and ensuring that
the facility is being operated safely. This should include:
• A description and schedule of the inspections and test procedures for
ensuring that all safety interlock systems and components associated with
the irradiator are functioning properly. Each safety item and the
appropriate test, check and inspection for it should be specified.
• A requirement for the operating procedures to be available at the control
console and for the emergency procedures to be conspicuously posted.
— The method of ensuring that persons entering the controlled area are
wearing appropriate radiation monitoring devices and that the results of the
monitoring are recorded.

23
 — The method of controlling access to the controlled area and ensuring that
only qualified irradiator operators can use the irradiator at appropriate
times. This can involve controlling access to the operating console keys and
the keys to the door of the room containing the operating console, or other
active methods of preventing access. Operating console keys should be
controlled to ensure that the qualified irradiator operator who is entering the
radiation room has the only key in the operating area that could initiate
startup or provide access. Spare keys should be kept in a secure location
away from the vicinity of the control room, such as in a safe under the
control of a senior manager.
— Written instructions covering actions to be taken in the event of
malfunctions. These instructions should identify individuals to be notified
in the event of a malfunction and should provide a general outline of the
corrective actions to be taken. Necessary corrective actions may involve
technical aspects of safety systems of the irradiator that are outside the
scope of the normal maintenance procedures; they may also involve the
manipulation of tools and equipment that could potentially lead to radiation
overexposures of personnel. Any such corrective actions should be
attempted only by persons specifically trained and authorized to perform
such work, or by those who are under the supervision of such persons.
Following such corrective action, persons should never enter the radiation
room alone. The safe operation of a facility will depend on the qualified
irradiator operators’ following clearly defined procedures laid down by the
manufacturer or the supplier and approved by the regulatory body.
— Written instructions to ensure that the irradiator is maintained as prescribed
by the manufacturer, with particular attention paid to ensuring that all
components of the product positioning system14, product boxes and carriers
continue to meet design specifications. For example, it should be ensured
that the correct product boxes or carriers are used and that they are
maintained in a condition that will not cause an irradiator malfunction.
— Written instructions to require that the irradiator operator carry a portable
radiation survey meter when entering the radiation room. A check source
should be used to verify that the survey meter is operating before each entry
into the room. A similar spare survey meter should be available for use
when the calibration or repair of a monitor is necessary.

14
The product positioning system is the means by which the product is conveyed around
the irradiation room and past the radiation source to be irradiated.

24
 — Written instructions to require that the irradiator operator check that all
visual indicators of the plant conditions show that it is safe to enter the
radiation room. In addition, procedures should be established for the
continuous monitoring of radiation levels with a portable radiation survey
meter when a person enters the radiation room.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

4.39. Training and education requirements for workers should be commensurate

with the duties and responsibilities of their jobs with respect to the operation of
the irradiator. Categories of workers that are trained usually include:

— Managers having line responsibility;

— Radiation protection officers;
— Qualified irradiator operators;
— Other workers who may be required to enter controlled areas to perform
duties, such as for the purposes of product movement, routine maintenance
and housekeeping.

4.40. People who may be required to render assistance in emergencies should be

given training to familiarize them with the facility and the hazards that could arise
from its operation. This should include personnel from fire and police services
and medical organizations.

4.41. Operating organizations should ensure that women who may enter
controlled areas or supervised areas are provided with information regarding the
risks to an embryo or fetus from exposure to radiation and the importance of
notifying their employer as soon as pregnancy is suspected.

4.42. A radiation protection officer and a qualified expert should provide advice
on staff training needs and on how those needs may best be satisfied. In many
cases, a radiation protection officer can provide much of the necessary training.

4.43. The BSS [2], in para. I.4(h), require employers and operating organizations
to ensure, for all workers who are or who could be subject to occupational
exposures, that “appropriate training in protection and safety be provided, as well
as periodic retraining and updating as required in order to ensure the necessary
level of competence”.

25
4.44. Workers who could be subject to occupational exposures should be trained
in the following topics:

— The nature of radiation;

— Health hazards due to exposure to radiation;
— Basic principles and methods of protection (e.g. time, distance, shielding);
— Measurement of radiation fields and the units of measurement;
— Actions to be taken in response to visible and audible warning signals and
alarms;
— Actions to be taken in emergencies.

4.45. The BSS [2], in para. 2.30(a), require operating organizations to ensure that
“all personnel on whom protection and safety depend be appropriately trained
and qualified so that they understand their responsibilities and perform their
duties with appropriate judgement and according to defined procedures”.

4.46. In addition to the topics described above, operating organizations should

also ensure that qualified irradiator operators and radiation protection officers
know about and understand the following:

— The functioning of the irradiator, including safety features;

— Applicable regulations;
— Licence conditions;
— The radiation protection programme;
— Requirements for individual monitoring and workplace monitoring;
— Requirements for accountability for and control and security of radioactive
sources;
— Hazards identified in the safety assessment;
— Local rules;
— Procedures to be followed in emergencies;
— Case histories of accidents or problems involving irradiators.

4.47. The operating organization should prepare and maintain records of the
initial and ongoing training of all workers. These training records should include
the following information:

— Name of the person who received the instruction or training;

— Name of the institution or person who provided the instruction or training;
— Date and duration of the instruction or training;
— A summary or list of the topics addressed;

26
 — Results of examinations taken;
— Copies of training certificates.

Training records should be made available to the recipients of the training,

especially in the event of a person’s moving to another employer.

5. INDIVIDUAL MONITORING OF WORKERS

INDIVIDUAL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND RECORD KEEPING

5.1. Paragraphs I.33 and I.34 of the BSS [2] state respectively:

“For any worker who is normally employed in a controlled area, or who

occasionally works in a controlled area and may receive significant
occupational exposure, individual monitoring shall be undertaken where
appropriate, adequate and feasible.”

“For any worker who is regularly employed in a supervised area or who

enters a controlled area only occasionally, individual monitoring shall not
be required but the occupational exposure of the worker shall be assessed.
This assessment shall be on the basis of the results of monitoring of the
workplace or individual monitoring.”

5.2. For irradiation facilities, controlled areas should consist of the following:

— Underwater gamma irradiators (Category III): the room in which the

irradiator is housed;
— Panoramic gamma irradiators (Categories II and IV): the radiation room
and roof of the radiation room;
— Electron beam irradiators (Category II) and X ray irradiators (Category II):
the radiation room.

5.3. The following areas should be designated as supervised areas, unless

circumstances warrant their designation as controlled areas:

27
 — Underwater gamma irradiators (Category III): control room;
— Panoramic gamma irradiators (Categories II and IV): product entry and exit
areas and service areas such as where the source rack hoist is located, water
treatment rooms and control room;
— Electron beam irradiators (Category II) and X ray irradiators (Category II):
product entry and exit areas, service areas, power supply room and control
room.

5.4. The designation of these areas should be reviewed regularly, and may be
changed or extended during initial installation, maintenance and operations for
the loading and unloading of radioactive sources.

5.5. A programme for individual monitoring of external radiation exposure is

intended to demonstrate that worker exposures are being controlled, to provide
information for the optimization of protection and to verify the adequacy of work
procedures. Guidance on establishing monitoring programmes for external
exposure, selection of appropriate dosimeters, interpretation of results, record
keeping and quality management is given in IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. RS-G-1.3 [13].

5.6. Irradiator operators, radiation protection officers and maintenance staff who
routinely enter controlled areas should be subject to individual dose monitoring.
These individuals should wear whole body monitors (e.g. a film badge,
thermoluminescent dosimeter, optically stimulated luminescent dosimeter).

5.7. The tools and procedures for individual monitoring of exposure of workers,
including the type of dosimeter required and the necessary frequency of
replacement, should be chosen in consultation with a radiation protection officer
or qualified expert, in accordance with the requirements of the regulatory body.
The dosimeters should be provided and processed by a laboratory or company
that has been authorized by the regulatory body and is traceable to a standards
dosimetry laboratory approved by the regulatory body.

5.8. The operating organization should make arrangements to ensure that dose
records are maintained for each worker in the manner specified in regulatory
requirements. Operating organizations should ensure that personal dose records
are provided to workers upon termination of their employment and are available
to individuals at other times.

28
5.9. Operating organizations should prepare procedures describing the way in
which individual dosimeters are to be administered, and these procedures should
include the following:

— Ordering and receipt of dosimeters from the dosimetry laboratory;

— Distribution of dosimeters to monitored workers;
— Collection and dispatch of dosimeters to the dosimetry laboratory for
processing;
— Review and maintenance of dose records.

5.10. Operating organizations should provide suitable storage facilities for

personal dosimeters that are not in use; these storage facilities should protect the
dosimeters from inadvertent exposure to radiation and from adverse
environmental conditions such as temperature extremes and/or humidity.
Personal dosimeters should not be stored close to any area where dose rates are
above normal background levels. Dosimeters should not be put through mail
inspection systems that utilize X rays.

5.11. Monitored workers should be required to take good care of their dosimeters,
and to take precautions to protect them from loss, theft, tampering or damage and
from inadvertent exposure to radiation. Workers should return dosimeters
promptly at the end of the specified wearing period. Workers should inform a
radiation protection officer without delay if a dosimeter is missing or damaged, or
if it has been exposed to radiation when it was not being worn.

5.12. If a dosimeter is lost, operating organizations should take all reasonable

steps to recover it. If the dosimeter cannot be located, operating organizations
should carry out an investigation and should prepare a report that includes an
estimate of the dose received by the worker for the relevant period of time. In
some Member States, the approval of regulatory bodies may be required prior to
the entry of such estimates into a person’s dose record.

INVESTIGATION OF DOSES

5.13. The operating organization should instruct workers to notify a radiation

protection officer immediately if they know or suspect that they have been
exposed to high level radiation. If the individual concerned was wearing a
personal dosimeter, it should be sent to the dosimetry laboratory immediately, and
the laboratory should be informed of the urgency of the case.

29
5.14. A radiation protection officer should inspect the results of personal
dosimeter readings promptly to determine whether any unexpectedly high doses
have been reported and to determine whether individuals are keeping their doses
as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account their workload and any dose
constraints.

5.15. The operating organization should conduct a formal investigation, as

required by the regulatory body, whenever the recorded dose exceeds the
investigation level. The investigation should be initiated as soon as possible
following the event, and a written report should be prepared concerning its cause.
This report should include a determination or verification of any doses received,
details of corrective or mitigating actions, and instructions or recommendations
on how to avoid a recurrence.

5.16. The report should be provided to all concerned parties within the
appropriate time frame as required by the regulatory body.

6. WORKPLACE MONITORING

MONITORING OF THE WORKPLACE

6.1. The BSS [2] require, in paras I.37–I.39, that:

“Registrants and licensees, in co-operation with employers if appropriate,

shall establish, maintain and keep under review a programme for the
monitoring of the workplace under the supervision, if so required by a
[regulatory body], of a qualified expert and a radiation protection officer.

“The nature and frequency of monitoring of workplaces shall:

(a) be sufficient to enable:

(i) evaluation of the radiological conditions in all workplaces;
(ii) exposure assessment in controlled areas and supervised areas; and
(iii) review of the classification of controlled and supervised areas; and
(b) depend on the levels of ambient dose equivalent and activity
concentration, including their expected fluctuations and the likelihood
and magnitude of potential exposures.

30
 “The programmes for monitoring of the workplace shall specify:

(a) the quantities to be measured;

(b) where and when the measurements are to be made and at what
frequency;
(c) the most appropriate measurement methods and procedures; and
(d) reference levels and the actions to be taken if they are exceeded.”

6.2. To assess and control occupational exposure, it is necessary to know the

dose equivalent rates in the various working areas. Workplace radiation surveys
are primarily intended to provide information on dose rates within these areas.
This information will be used to designate the area as a controlled area or a
supervised area and to make decisions about its occupancy.

RADIATION SURVEY METERS AND RADIATION MONITORS

6.3. Guidance on the selection of the proper radiation survey instrument for a
given application is provided in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.3
[13]. Guidance is also given in an IAEA Practical Radiation Technical Manual on
Workplace Monitoring for Radiation and Contamination [14].

6.4. For portable radiation survey meters, general criteria include portability
(e.g. weight, size, physical configuration), ruggedness, ease of use and reading,
ease of servicing and reliability. Appropriate portable X ray and gamma radiation
survey meters should be provided. At electron beam irradiation facilities
operating above 10 MeV and at X ray facilities operating above 5 MeV,
monitoring for neutrons may also be required. The survey meters used should be
capable of clearly indicating the dose rates encountered during normal operation
of the irradiator and should have a satisfactory overload performance. It should
be noted that some ionization chambers might also respond to radiofrequency
radiation, and could possibly give false readings in surveys around accelerator
facilities.

6.5. Some radiation survey meters using a Geiger–Müller detector, particularly

older instruments, give a zero reading when the Geiger–Müller detector has
saturated. This has been a contributory factor where individuals have entered
areas with high radiation levels believing that the zero reading on the survey
meter indicated a safe condition. Any survey meter used for measurements of the
external radiation level at an irradiator should be of a type that does not read zero

31
on saturation. This is particularly important for those instruments carried into the
radiation room to verify that the radioactive source is fully shielded.

6.6. In general, the following observations apply to instrument selection for an

irradiation facility:

— Solid state detectors, particularly sodium iodide detectors, are appropriate

for detecting low radiation levels such as might be found when monitoring
the water of the source storage pool for contamination (see footnote 12).
However, sodium iodide detectors are generally inappropriate for dose rate
measurements, owing largely to their high energy dependence.
— Pancake Geiger–Müller detectors are designed for beta response and are
appropriate for use in contamination surveys. However, the low efficiency
of pancake Geiger–Müller detectors for gamma radiation makes them
unsuitable for dose rate measurements, such as in irradiator shield surveys.
— Side window Geiger–Müller detectors are generally appropriate for dose
rate measurements, but their relative insensitivity to beta radiation makes
them unsuitable for contamination surveys.
— Survey meters using ionization chambers and energy compensated
Geiger–Müller detectors are appropriate for dose rate measurements, but
they tend to be less sensitive than side window Geiger–Müller detectors.

6.7. Irradiation facilities also use radiation monitors that are fixed rather than
portable. Specifically, the applications for fixed instruments are as radiation room
monitors and contamination monitors for storage pool water (see footnote 12).
These instruments are fixed in place and are not used for radiation surveys.
Instead, these devices should be used as ‘pass–fail’ indicators. That is, if the
radiation level reaches a preset point, the instrument triggers an alarm condition.
In this application, exposure rates and contamination levels are not quantified.

6.8. The criteria for selecting fixed radiation monitors are similar to the criteria
for selecting portable monitors. However, there are additional considerations in
selecting fixed monitors:

— Saturation level. Radiation room monitors are designed to detect high

radiation levels if an accident occurs (e.g. high radiation levels when the
radioactive sources are expected to be in the fully shielded position or the
electron beam is expected to be switched off). Other fixed radiation
monitors are designed to detect high radiation levels where product exits
the radiation room (see footnote 12), a possible indication that radioactive
material has become dislodged and is being carried out of the radiation

32
 room. In such situations, high radiation levels under fault conditions can
saturate and possibly damage the detector to the extent that the instrument is
rendered inoperable. Selection of a detector for these applications should
include consideration of the radiation level at which the detector will
saturate and the potential effects on the monitoring devices and safety
systems should the fault condition occur. Note that if the instrument fails in
such conditions, it does not necessarily mean that the particular detector is
inappropriate for this use. If the system is designed to ‘fail safe’, so that a
failure of the detector causes the same result as a high reading (i.e. denies
access to the radiation room), the instrument can achieve its purpose even
though the detector is damaged.
— Sensitivity of the pool water contamination monitor. Monitoring storage pool
water for contamination (see footnote 12) necessitates that a sensitive
instrument be used to detect contamination at the lowest practicable level to
minimize the potential spread of contamination. Typically, solid state
detectors, particularly sodium iodide detectors, are used for this purpose. In
considering the sensitivity necessary, the design of the pool water monitoring
system should be considered. If the water is being collected and monitored,
more sensitive instruments, such as a 5.1 cm × 5.1 cm (2 in × 2 in) sodium
iodide detector, should be required. If pool water is being evaluated for
contamination at monitoring points in the water treatment system where
contamination would be expected to accumulate, a less sensitive detector
such as a 2.54 cm × 2.54 cm (1 in × 1 in) sodium iodide detector may be
suitable.

MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION

6.9. Portable radiation survey meters should be calibrated before their first use,
after repair and at intervals as specified in regulatory requirements. The pre-use
test should include a test of the instrument’s overload performance; that is, the
instrument should be tested to verify that it will operate correctly up to the
maximum foreseeable dose rate.

6.10. Following calibration, a sticker should be attached to the instrument to

provide information, including the name of the organization performing the test,
the test certificate number and the date of the test or the date when the next test is
due, as appropriate. Tests should be carried out by an organization that maintains
reference radiation fields traceable to a national standards body.

33
6.11. Fixed radiation monitoring instruments are not calibrated in the same sense
as radiation survey meters. Since their operation is ‘pass–fail’, fixed instruments
should be subject to periodic operational testing to ensure that they retain the
capability to respond to relevant radiation levels. For example, check sources can
be used on a monthly basis to verify that the radiation room monitor and pool
water contamination monitor (see footnote 12) respond appropriately. In some
applications, such as the use of a single channel analyser for pool water
contamination monitoring, the instrument should be calibrated periodically to
ensure that the detector voltage and window settings are still applicable.

6.12. Further information on the establishment and operation of calibration

facilities for radiation survey instruments and recommended calibration
procedures is provided in Safety Reports Series No. 16 [15].

USE OF RADIATION SURVEY METERS

6.13. Radiation survey meters are used to evaluate radiological conditions in the
workplace, particularly in the following situations:

— Shield survey. Before operation of the facility is started, a radiation survey

of the area outside the shielding of the radiation room should be performed,
with the radioactive sources in the exposed position for a panoramic
irradiator or with the electron beam at full power for an electron beam
irradiator. Additional surveys of the area outside the shielding should be
performed at intervals not exceeding three years, and before the resumption
of operations following the introduction of new radioactive sources or
changes in the orientation, energy or power level of the electron beam. Any
modification of the structure of the radiation room shielding that might
increase the dose rate also necessitates an additional survey.
— Storage pool or storage container surveys. For gamma irradiators, an initial
radiation survey of the area above the source storage pool or the dry source
storage container should be performed. The survey should be conducted
after the radioactive sources have been loaded but before operation of the
facility is started.

34
 — Post-shutdown radiation level surveys. Dose rates may be temporarily
elevated at electron beam irradiation facilities and X ray irradiation
facilities even after the facility has been shut down, owing to dark current15
and the presence of activation products in the accelerator, the shielding and
ancillary process equipment (e.g. the beam stop or the product positioning
system). Radiation level surveys should be performed in these areas before
personnel are allowed to enter.
— Contamination surveys. The purpose of contamination surveys is to detect
contamination resulting from activation products at electron beam facilities
and X ray facilities so as to prevent its spread. Contamination surveys
should be performed in accordance with industry standards. For surveys
whose results are to be recorded and compared with the results of previous
or future surveys, consistency in the survey procedure should be ensured.

In the event of any apparent change in contamination levels that cannot be

attributed to known causes, an evaluation should be performed to determine the
cause. Such an evaluation may include:

— Verifying that the survey instrumentation is functioning properly;

— Repeating the survey to verify the apparent change in contamination levels;
— Performing more frequent surveys;
— Consulting with the supplier of the radioactive source.

6.14. Surveys should be undertaken at positions around the facility and at

intervals as advised by a qualified expert or a radiation protection officer. Such
surveys should be carried out to confirm the status of controlled areas and
supervised areas and to indicate any failure in the control of the radiation source.

6.15. An irradiator operator should make the initial entry to the radiation room,
using a portable radiation survey meter to determine the ambient radiation levels.
The portable meter should be tested for proper functioning prior to each entry into
the radiation room by using a check source (e.g. 1 × 104 Bq (0.27 μCi) of
caesium-137) located near the radiation room door.

15
‘Dark current’ refers to a condition in which an accelerator generates radiation when
there is no current to the cathode but the accelerating voltage (i.e. a high voltage) is still
applied. Electrons may still be emitted from the cold cathode and accelerated, resulting in an
electron beam even though there is no current to the cathode.

35
6.16. When visitors are permitted to enter the radiation room, they should be
issued with a personal dosimeter. The qualified irradiator operator who has
surveyed the area immediately prior to the visit should escort all visitors.

RECORDS OF RADIATION SURVEYS

6.17. The BSS [2] state, in para. I.40, that:

“Registrants and licensees, in co-operation with employers if appropriate,

shall keep appropriate records of the findings of the workplace monitoring
programme which shall be made available to workers, where appropriate
through their representatives.”

6.18. Reports on radiation levels should include the following information:

— Survey date;
— Irradiator identification (manufacturer, model number and serial number);
— Irradiator location;
— Information on the irradiator’s radiation source (i.e. X rays or electron beam)
and on the source intensity in the case of radiation generators or the calculated
activity and the radionuclide used in the case of gamma facilities;
— Information on the survey instrument (manufacturer, model number and
serial number);
— Calibration date of the survey instrument;
— Correction factors, background subtraction, conversions or other
calculations for the survey instrument if used;
— Name of the person performing the survey;
— Radiation levels and the corresponding locations outside the shield both
when the radiation source is in use and when either the radioactive source is
fully shielded or the X ray or electron beam is shut off;
— Radiation levels and the corresponding locations inside the radiation room
when either the radioactive source is fully shielded or the X ray or electron
beam is shut off;
— Any actions taken on the basis of information yielded by the the survey.

6.19. The operating organization should maintain records of contamination at the

facility. These records should be made available for inspection by the regulatory
body. In general, these surveys should be performed routinely only at X ray and
gamma irradiation facilities where neutron fields could give rise to activation
products.

36
6.20. Contamination reports should include the following information:

— Survey date;
— Irradiator identification (manufacturer, model number and serial number);
— Irradiator location;
— Information on the irradiator’s radiation source (i.e. X rays or electron
beam) and on the source intensity in the case of machine produced sources
or the calculated activity and the radionuclide used in the case of gamma
facilities;
— Information on the survey instrument (manufacturer, model number and
serial number);
— Calibration date of the survey instrument;
— Correction factors, background subtraction, conversions or other
calculations for the survey instrument if used;
— Name of the person performing the survey and/or analysis;
— Contamination levels and the corresponding locations;
— Cause of the contamination, if known;
— Any actions taken on the basis of the information yielded by the survey.

7. CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

7.1. The BSS [2], in para. 2.34, require that:

“Sources shall be kept secure so as to prevent theft or damage and to

prevent any unauthorized legal person from carrying out any of the actions
specified in the General Obligations for practices of the [BSS] (see paras
2.7–2.9), by ensuring that:

(a) control of a source not be relinquished without compliance with all

relevant requirements specified in the registration or licence and
without immediate communication to the [regulatory body], and when
applicable to the relevant Sponsoring Organization, of information
regarding any decontrolled, lost, stolen or missing source;
(b) a source not be transferred unless the receiver possesses a valid
authorization….”

37
7.2. Internationally endorsed recommendations to States on the safety and
security of Category 1, 2 and 3 sources are given in the Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [16].

7.3. The primary goal of radiation safety at irradiation facilities is to control

exposure to radiation emitted by radiation sources. This should be accomplished
by means of the use of shielding to attenuate radiation and the control of access
by means of the use of physical barriers, engineered safety systems and the
implementation of procedures. The safety aspects and the security aspects of the
control of radioactive sources are interrelated, and many of the measures
designed to enhance one will also enhance the other.

7.4. For this reason, many of the measures described in this Safety Guide, for
example, in Section 4 (on local rules, procedures and duties of personnel
concerning the control of access to controlled areas) and Section 8 (on radiation
shields, doors, safety interlocks, fixed radiation monitors and access keys), that
are intended primarily to limit exposure to radiation will also contribute to the
security of radioactive sources. For radioactive sources that are in use, the
provisions in this Safety Guide for controlling exposures arising from radioactive
sources should be sufficient to ensure their control with respect to inadvertent or
unauthorized breaches in security that are not malicious in nature. Further
guidance regarding the security of radioactive sources is provided in IAEA
Nuclear Security Series No. 11 [17].

7.5. There are special concerns regarding the security of radioactive sources that
are not in use. The level of control applied to radioactive sources that are stored
temporarily in transport packaging or other shielded containers should not be less
than the level of control over sources in use. Under certain circumstances, disused
radioactive sources that are present at an irradiation facility may be considered
vulnerable sources. The storage of disused radioactive sources at a facility that is
no longer in operation is a special case because personnel may no longer be
present at the facility on a regular basis. Provision should be made in which the
intermittent presence of personnel is taken into account to ensure that such
disused radioactive sources are kept secure. In all cases involving disused
radioactive sources, careful consideration should be given to moving the disused
sources to a storage facility or disposal facility, or to another authorized recipient
such as the manufacturer.

38
7.6. The BSS [2] require that operating organizations ensure that “a source not
be transferred unless the receiver possesses a valid authorization” (para. 2.34(b)).
Before transferring a radioactive source to another entity, the operating
organization should verify that the intended recipient possesses a valid
authorization to possess the sources. When radioactive sources are transferred
between States, the relevant recommendations of the Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [16] and the supporting Guidance on
the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources [18] should be followed.

7.7. Lost, stolen or missing radioactive sources should be reported to the

regulatory body in accordance with regulatory requirements.

8. IRRADIATOR DESIGN

8.1. Irradiation facilities should be designed to meet the requirements

established in paras 2.24 and 2.25 of the BSS [2], which state that protection and
safety are required to be optimized in order that the magnitude of individual
doses, the number of people exposed and the likelihood of incurring exposures all
be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken
into account. Requirements that apply to the design of irradiation facilities and
their radiation sources are found in the Principal Requirements of the BSS, on
security of radioactive sources (para. 2.34), defence in depth (para. 2.35) and
good engineering practice (para. 2.36). The responsibilities of the operating
organization and suppliers with regard to the design of irradiation facilities are
specified in paras IV.8– IV.14 of the BSS. Specific recommendations concerning
the application of the requirements of the BSS to the design of irradiation
facilities are provided in the remainder of Section 8 of this Safety Guide.

GAMMA, ELECTRON AND X RAY IRRADIATORS

Internal design

8.2. All equipment inside the radiation room of an irradiation facility, including
wiring, electrical equipment, notices and lighting, should be selected so as to
minimize failure due to prolonged exposure to radiation.

39
Product positioning system

8.3. Malfunctioning of the product positioning system can dislodge or damage

the radiation source, resulting in a radiation hazard. The product conveyor
mechanism should be monitored for correct operation, and any malfunction
should cause the radioactive source rack to return automatically to the fully
shielded position or cause the electron beam to be switched off.

Product movement timer

8.4. A timer should be used to monitor movement of the product past the
radiation source. If the product fails to move in the predetermined time interval,
the source rack should automatically return to the fully shielded position or the
electron beam should be switched off, the product positioning system should
stop, and visible and audible signals should be generated to alert the irradiator
operator to the malfunction. This feature helps to prevent overheating of the
product, which could possibly lead to a fire.

Shielding

8.5. Direct radiation exposure of workers and members of the public due to the
operation of irradiation facilities should be attenuated to optimized levels by the
use of appropriate shielding. Concrete is often used to construct the radiation
room shield, but other materials such as earth fill, steel and lead may also be used
in its construction. The shielding properties of particular materials are well
established [19–25], but experience from existing irradiation facilities should be
taken into account. The shielding should provide adequate reductions in radiation
levels to keep doses within the dose constraints established or agreed to by the
regulatory body.

8.6. Penetrations of the shield will be necessary for entry and exit ports for
personnel and product, and for the ventilation system and other ducting. These
penetrations pose particular problems for the shielding designer, who should
ensure both that there is no direct radiation leakage path and that the use of maze
entrances and shield plugs is sufficient to reduce external radiation fields to
optimized levels. When sufficient reduction in doses cannot be achieved, access
to the area should be restricted. Care should be taken to ensure that all significant
radiation paths are fully evaluated, including, in the case of gamma irradiation
facilities, those that arise during the transit of the radioactive source from its
shielded position to its operating position. Where practical, all tubes, pipes and

40
conduits should take a curved or stepped path through the shielding material to
reduce external radiation levels.

8.7. In irradiator systems that utilize activity levels in excess of 1.85 × 1017 Bq
(5 million Ci) of cobalt-60 or equivalent, the energy absorbed in the shield walls
and the resulting maximum shield temperatures should be evaluated. Maximum
temperatures within standard concrete shields should not exceed 315oC (600oF)
[26]. The energy absorbed in dry source storage containers due to heat produced
by the absorption of gamma radiation should also be evaluated to ensure that the
integrity of the shielding is not compromised. Also, the maximum storage
temperature of sealed sources should not exceed the manufacturer’s specification.

8.8. Although general guidance on shielding is given in this Safety Guide and in
the publications referenced in it, all shielding calculations carried out for the
purposes of design should be undertaken by specialists.

8.9. Once the shield has been designed, no subsequent changes should be made
unless they have been carefully considered and agreed to by the regulatory body.

Access to the radiation source and safety interlock systems

8.10. Particular attention should be paid to the accessibility of the radiation room
in Category II and IV gamma irradiation facilities, Category II electron beam
facilities and X ray facilities. The design of these facilities should be such that
persons cannot gain access to the radiation room while the radioactive source is in
the exposed position or while the electron beam is energized. Such control of
access relies heavily on the use of safety interlock systems.

8.11. Access by personnel to the radiation room following an irradiation,

securing of the radiation room prior to initiating an irradiation, and irradiation
start procedures should incorporate a series of sequential safety interlocks and
controls. Such safety interlocks and controls should be designed such that any
attempt to preempt the controls or to apply them out of sequence will
automatically prevent the intended operation.

8.12. The following is an example of such sequential control operations:

— Personnel access:
(1) Ensure that the radiation room access controls are energized at the
control console.

41
 (2) Verify that the radiation room monitor is functioning properly and
verify that the radiation level in the room is acceptable.
(3) Open the access door using the multipurpose key.
(4) On entry to the radiation room, continuously monitor the radiation
levels with a portable radiation survey meter.
— Sequence for securing the radiation room prior to initiating irradiation:
(1) Ensure that the radiation room is free of personnel and that the irradiator
mechanisms are operational.
(2) Actuate the safety delay timer.
(3) Actuate the control inside the radiation room, if different from the safety
delay timer.
(4) Close and lock the radiation room access door.
— Start procedure for irradiation: Actuate the source rack hoist mechanism at
the control console with the multipurpose key before the preset safety delay
time period has elapsed.

The irradiator is now in full operation, and it should not be possible to remove the
multipurpose key without stopping irradiator operation.

Safety interlock for the personnel access door

8.13. The personnel access door to the radiation room should be closed and
secured before the irradiation process can begin. The safety interlocks for the
access door should be integrated into the master control system so that violation
of the safety interlock system or use of the door will cause irradiation to be
automatically terminated. Any violation or failure of the safety interlock for the
access door should actuate visible and audible alarms. Opening the personnel
access door should disable the means of producing radiation16.

Backup access control — Personnel entry

8.14. In addition to the safety interlock for the personnel access door, each
entrance to the radiation room should have an independent backup control to
detect the entry of personnel either while the radioactive source is in the
unshielded position or while the electron beam is energized. Examples of backup
access controls are pressure mats, light beam interruption detectors (‘photo eyes’)

16
‘Disabling the means of producing radiation’ means ensuring either that the source
rack cannot be raised from the fully shielded position or, for an accelerator based system, that
the high voltage is disabled.

42
and motion sensors. Detection of entry by personnel while the source rack is
exposed or while the electron beam is energized should disable the means of
producing radiation and should actuate visible and audible alarms to make the
individual entering the room aware of the hazard.

Safety interlocks for product entry and exit ports

8.15. Suitable means should be provided at the product entry and exit ports to
prevent inadvertent entry of personnel into high radiation areas. Methods for
accomplishing this include the use of gates or doors that open only to allow
product to pass through and then close immediately, and the use of detectors that
require that a product carrier always be present in the opening and that cause a
safety interlock violation if none is present. The ports should be interlocked so
that a visible or audible alarm indicates when the control mechanism for the entry
or exit port has malfunctioned or has been overridden or tampered with. It should
be arranged that any violation of the safety interlock system disables the means of
producing radiation.

Backup access control — Product entry and exit ports

8.16. In addition to the safety interlocks for the product entry and exit ports, each
product entry and exit port should have an independent backup control to detect
entry of personnel either while the radioactive sources are unshielded or while the
electron accelerator is energized. Examples include pressure mats, light beam
interruption detectors (photo eyes), infrared detectors and other means of
detecting the presence of a person. Detection of the entry of personnel when
radiation levels are high should disable the means of producing radiation and
actuate visible and audible alarms.

Removable radiation room shield plugs

8.17. Removable radiation room shield plugs should be interlocked with the
control system to disable the means of producing radiation if a plug is removed.
To prevent tampering, the safety interlock should not be accessible from outside
the radiation shield.

Fixed radiation monitor with alarms

8.18. A monitoring system should be provided to monitor the ambient radiation

level in the radiation room. The radiation monitor should be used to provide
independent verification when the means of producing radiation has been

43
disabled. The monitor should be integrated with the safety interlocks of the
personnel access door to prevent access to the radiation room when the monitor
detects radiation above a preset level, malfunctions or is switched off. The preset
alarm level should be as low as practicable, but high enough to avoid false
alarms. The radiation monitor should be designed so that the reading or output
does not go to zero under conditions of detector saturation. Before the personnel
access door is opened, the irradiator operator should verify that the radiation
monitor is operating and that its reading corresponds to background levels of
radiation.

8.19. The monitor should actuate visible and audible alarms if the radiation level
exceeds the preset level.

Control console

Access key

8.20. Irradiator controls should be designed so that a single multipurpose key can
be used to operate the irradiator in normal use. This key should be used both to
operate the control console and to gain access to the radiation room, and it may
also be the key used to actuate the safety delay timer.

8.21. The multipurpose key should be attached to a portable radiation survey

meter by a chain or cable that is long enough to allow easy operation of all key
switches. Only one multipurpose key should be available to all authorized
personnel.

8.22. In systems in which two or more keys are used, one key should remain
captive (i.e. held in the lock) when the other keys are being used.

Emergency stop device at the control console

8.23. In addition to any other means normally available at the control console to
shut down the irradiator, a clearly labelled emergency stop device should be
provided at the control console for preventing, quickly interrupting or aborting
irradiator operations and disabling the means of producing radiation.

Disabling the radiation source

8.24. For the purpose of servicing the irradiator, a method should be provided for
disabling the means of producing radiation so that the radiation source cannot be

44
started while servicing operations are being carried out (e.g. by means of a source
rack hoist lockout or a high voltage lockout for an accelerator).

Radiation room

Safety delay timer with alarms

8.25. The irradiator should be equipped with a safety delay timer inside the
radiation room that is actuated to begin the irradiator startup sequence. The timer
should be placed in a location such that, to actuate the timer, the irradiator
operator needs to pass through all areas of the radiation room where a person
might be present. This encourages the irradiator operator to check the entire
radiation room visually prior to starting the radiation source.

8.26. The safety timer will automatically actuate visible and audible warning
signals and alarms to alert any personnel who may be in the radiation room that
the irradiator startup sequence has begun. The alarms should provide personnel
sufficient time to leave the area or to operate a clearly identified emergency stop
device that will abort the startup sequence.

8.27. The safety timer should be integrated with the control system so that
operation of the radiation source cannot be initiated unless the startup sequence
has been completed within the preset time and the control console indicates that it
is safe to start the irradiator.

Emergency stop device

8.28. An emergency stop device should be provided within the radiation room for
promptly aborting irradiator operations and disabling the means of producing
radiation at any time. The emergency stop device should be clearly labelled and
should be readily accessible to personnel in the radiation room. It should cause a
visible or audible alarm to be generated outside the radiation room.

Emergency exit

8.29. For the safety of anyone inadvertently shut inside the radiation room, a
means should be provided to ensure that personnel can leave the radiation room at
any time. The individual should first actuate the emergency stop device and then
leave the radiation room. Alternatively, the individual should leave the radiation
room through the emergency exit, which should actuate visible and audible
alarms and should disable the means of producing radiation. In case the

45
emergency stop device does not actuate before the person leaves the radiation
room, the most direct exit route that avoids the area near the radiation source
should be taken.

Considerations with regard to external events

8.30. External natural events such as events relating to geological and extreme
meteorological phenomena and human induced events that could adversely affect
the integrity of radiation shielding should be evaluated in accordance with
specific characteristics of the irradiation facility and the local site.

8.31. Conventional norms, codes or standards that address hazards due to

external events may be used for assessing the potential hazards, and for designing
facilities that can withstand such hazards, the radiation risks associated with the
facility being taken into account.

8.32. In seismic areas, all irradiation facilities should be equipped with

instrumentation to warn of the occurrence of a seismic event and to disable the
means of producing radiation. The seismic instrumentation should be firmly
anchored to a concrete shield wall. The instrumentation may be of a horizontal,
omni-axial type or a vertical, uni-axial type. It should be set to actuate at the
lowest practicable level that will not generate false alarms.

8.33. During the process of site selection and evaluation, particular consideration
should be given to potential hazards that cannot be addressed by means of
engineering measures, such as hazards relating to flooding and hazards relating to
geological phenomena in areas of potential or actual subsidence, uplift, collapse
or faulting.

Ventilation

8.34. Radiolysis of air produces ozone (O3), which is unstable and in time reverts
to oxygen (O2). The operating organization of an irradiation facility should assess
the levels of ozone produced by the irradiator and should protect personnel
against exposure to ozone in concentrations above the limits established by the
competent health authority.

8.35. Personnel should be prevented from entering any area where concentrations
of ozone may be high. Irradiation facilities should be designed so that ozone will
not migrate to occupied areas.

46
8.36. The following control measures for ozone should be used:

— A ventilation system to exhaust ozone and to maintain a low pressure

differential in the irradiator, to prevent the migration of ozone to occupied
areas;
— A safety interlock with entry delay to allow for reduction in ozone levels by
reversion to diatomic oxygen or removal of ozone by the ventilation
system.

8.37. The irradiator control system should be designed to monitor the ventilation
system to ensure that it is operating. If the ventilation system fails, either the
source rack should be returned to the fully shielded position or the electron beam
should be switched off. Entry to the radiation room should not be permitted until
ozone levels have fallen.

Notices and symbols

8.38. The radiation symbol (trefoil) [27] and other notices should be placed at
entrances to the radiation room and in proximity to the radiation generator or the
radioactive source, in accordance with regulatory requirements (Fig. 6). Any

FIG. 6. Basic ionizing radiation symbol (trefoil) (ISO standard 361).

47
 FIG. 7. Ionizing radiation supplementary symbol (ISO standard 21482).

notices and symbols placed inside the radiation room should be made from
materials that will resist damage due to high radiation levels and that are durable
under the ambient conditions.

8.39. In addition to the radiation symbol (trefoil), the ionizing radiation

supplementary warning symbol [28] should also be used on Category II, III and
IV gamma irradiators (Fig. 7). This supplementary symbol is intended to inform
members of the public that the radioactive source poses a significant danger to
them and that they should move away from it. The supplementary symbol should
be placed in close proximity to the source; since radioactive sources are small in
size, it is normally not practicable to put the supplementary symbol on individual
sources.

8.40. In general, the supplementary symbol should not be placed so that it is

visible when the radioactive source is in normal use or in storage. Examples of
locations on gamma irradiators where the supplementary symbol should be
placed are as follows:

48
 — Category II: On the source holder where it may be seen after the cover has
been removed;
— Category III: On the structure that holds the source array in place;
— Category IV: On the source rack.

8.41. In general, the addition of the supplementary symbol cannot be justified for
operating gamma irradiators if the removal of the radioactive sources would be
necessary. Ideally, the symbol should be installed during the construction of the
irradiator. The symbol should be installed in an operating irradiator only by an
individual who is qualified by training and experience, and who is authorized by
the regulatory body to perform servicing and maintenance activities on
irradiators.

Irradiation (source) status indicators

8.42. Irradiation status indicators should be provided to show:

— When the irradiation has been terminated (source ‘down’ or beam

de-energized).
— When the irradiation is in progress (source ‘up’ or beam energized).
— When either the radioactive source is in transit or the X ray or electron
beam is about to be energized. (An audible signal should also be used to
indicate this condition.)

8.43. An irradiation status indicator should be clearly visible at the control

console and at each access door for personnel and product entry and exit port.

Irradiation status indicator colours

8.44. When illuminated or colour coded controls are used, the following colours
should be considered for indicating the specified conditions:

Condition Colour
Emergency (stop buttons or warning lights) Red
Warning or hazard International trefoil or red
Critical information (irradiator malfunction) Red
Caution (not an emergency but heightened
awareness is called for) Yellow or orange
Normal (irradiator is not in use or is
functioning safely) Green
Information Blue

49
Audible signals

8.45. Each audible signal used in the irradiator control system should be distinct
and loud enough to immediately gain the attention of persons in the area. It
should not be capable of being confused with any other signals in use in the area.
An audible signal should be used to indicate when either a radioactive source is in
transit or the X ray or electron beam is about to be energized.

Labelling and posting

8.46. Indicators and visual signals used to alert individuals should be clearly
labelled as to the conditions that prompt actuation of the indicator. Visual
warning signals and alarms, such as flashing lights or messages on the control
console, should provide the irradiator operator with unambiguous information
that is adequate to determine the cause of the warning signal or the alarm so that
the appropriate corrective actions can be initiated.

8.47. In addition to notices and symbols, certain information relevant to the

operation of the irradiation facility should be posted in clearly visible locations
within the facility. This information should include:

— A copy of the licence, registration or other document from the regulatory

body authorizing operation of the irradiator. If it is not practicable to post a
copy of the authorization, a notice should be posted informing persons of
where a copy of the document is available within the facility.
— Emergency contact information, including the names and telephone
numbers (or other means of immediate contact) of individuals to be
contacted in an emergency.

GAMMA IRRADIATORS

Design of sealed sources

8.48. Radioactive sources used in gamma irradiation facilities meet the design
requirements of the BSS [2] when they satisfy the performance and safety testing
standards for this practice, for which methods are specified in ISO standards [29,
30]. ISO Standard 2919 [29] establishes a classification system for sealed
radioactive sources on the basis of test performance and specifies general
requirements, performance tests, production tests, markings and certification.

50
8.49. The performance tests that apply to radioactive sources used in gamma
irradiation facilities vary in severity with the shape of the sources (for bending
tests) and the environmental conditions to which the sources are expected to be
subjected. The environmental tests for sources used in Category II, III and IV
irradiators have been given the classification number 53424, with each digit
relating to the severity of the following environmental test conditions,
respectively: temperature, external pressure, impact, vibration and puncture.

8.50. This classification does not consider the effects of various other factors
including fire, explosion and corrosion, or the possible consequences of events
and effects under the conditions in which radioactive sources will be used. ISO
Standard 2919 specifies that the manufacturer and user will take into account the
probability of fire, explosion and corrosion, and the possible consequences of
events and effects if the activity of the sealed sources exceeds the values shown in
table 3 of Ref. [29]. Factors that should be considered in determining the need for
special testing are:

— Consequences of leakage or dispersion of radioactive material;

— Quantity of radioactive material contained in the sealed source;
— Radiotoxicity;
— Chemical and physical form of the radioactive material;
— Environment in which the sealed source is stored, moved and used;
— Protection afforded to the sealed source or to the source–device
combination.

Specific requirements for wet storage conditions

8.51. The outer capsule material of a sealed source should be such that it does not
corrode under the conditions of storage of the sealed source in the storage pool.
Account should be taken in the selection of the capsule material of the need to
withstand thermal fatigue.

8.52. The radioactive material should be substantially insoluble in water so that

the possible consequences of a breach in the capsule are mitigated. Caesium
chloride should not be used in wet source storage gamma irradiators. Caesium
chloride is highly soluble in water, and thermal cycling such as would be
encountered in a Category IV irradiator tends to increase the probability of failure
of the sealed source encapsulation.

51
Certification and documentation

8.53. The manufacturer or supplier and users of sealed sources should maintain
records relating to the sealed source. The regulatory body may require this
information for such purposes as licensing the facility and transporting the
radioactive source. The records should include the following:

— Model number, serial number and identification number of the radioactive

source, the radionuclide contained, the source activity and the date to which
the stated source activity relates;
— ISO Standard 2919 source certificate [29];
— Bend test certificate (if required);
— Leak test certificate;
— Contamination test certificate;
— Special form radioactive material approval certificate, if available (see
Ref. [31]);
— Any other documentation as required by the regulatory body.

Internal design

8.54. All equipment inside the radiation room of an irradiation facility, including
wiring, electrical equipment, notices and lighting, should be selected so as to
minimize failure due to prolonged exposure to radiation.

Source holder and source rack

8.55. The typical gamma irradiator design consists of radioactive sources that are
placed in a source holder, referred to as a module, several of which are placed in
an array in a source rack. This arrangement is depicted in Fig. 8. The source rack
should be designed so that there are no crevices in the source holder, or between
the radioactive source and the source holder, that would promote corrosion.

8.56. The sealed source should be firmly fixed within its source holder and source
rack so that it cannot be readily dislodged from them. Means should be provided
for placing and retaining the sealed source in the design position. Devices used

52
 Guide cables

20.96 cm
0.81 cm

1.11 cm

49.5
cm
47.5 cm

45.2 cm
Hoist cable

Source rack holding six

source modules
Source module containing
42 source pencils Source pencil
containing
two standard
source elements

FIG. 8. Typical gamma irradiator source rack and components: Source rack with six source
modules, each containing up to 42 source pencils (courtesy of MDS Nordion).

for the purpose of positioning and removing radioactive sources (e.g. tools for
manipulating sources from above the water surface of the storage pool) should be
capable of being safely operated from outside the radiation shields17.

8.57. In the event of failure of the source module or source rack, it should not be
possible for the sources to move into a position that may cause a radiation hazard.
In the event of power failure, the sources and source rack should be able to return
to the fully shielded position without damage to either. Failure of hoist cables
(or of alternative means of support) should not result in the source rack’s moving
in such a way that damage is caused to the sealed sources. If the source rack sticks

17
Radiation shields are structures that have as their primary function the attenuation of
radiation emitted by the radiation source to acceptable levels.

53
in the exposed position, there should be a means of freeing it with minimal risk to
personnel (e.g. by using an emergency access port; see para. 8.62).

Source guard

8.58. The source rack should be provided with a source guard for adequate
mechanical protection against interference and damage by items such as product
boxes or carriers. The source guard may take the form of a protective shroud,
guide bars or floor guides on the product positioning mechanism, for example.
Product positioning mechanisms should be designed to prevent product from
coming into contact either directly or indirectly with the source rack.

8.59. Irradiators should employ a mechanical device for preventing product

collisions; this device should be located at the ends of the source rack to sense
products or product carriers that are improperly positioned as they enter the
source pass18 closest to the source rack and that could potentially collide with the
sources. When actuated, this device should stop the product carrier, return the
source rack to the fully shielded position and generate a fault signal on the control
console.

Emergency source cooling system

8.60. Some Category IV irradiators use an emergency source cooling system

consisting of a water spray head located at the top of the source pass above the
source racks. Water from the source storage pool can be diverted to the water
spray head via valves outside the shielding. If the source rack were to stick in an
unshielded position, generating heat that could cause the product to ignite, pool
water would be sprayed onto the source rack to lower the temperature to ensure
source integrity.

Source travel timer

8.61. A source travel timer should be connected to the ‘source up’ and ‘source
down’ switches to ensure that the source travel time (when moving either up or
down) is not in excess of a preset level. If the preset level is exceeded, the control
system should indicate a fault, shut down the irradiator, and actuate visible and

18
The source pass is the component of the product positioning system that carries the
product past the source rack.

54
audible alarms. This safety interlock could give an early warning of a problem
with the source rack hoist mechanism for which an inspection is necessary.

Emergency access ports

8.62. Emergency access ports allow access to the radiation room through the
shield if there is a malfunction that leaves the radioactive source in an exposed
position. Emergency access ports should be used only by authorized personnel for
emergency action and recovery.

Source rack position indicators

8.63. The switches of the source rack position (‘up’ or ‘down’) indicators should
be hardwired directly to the control system and not through a programmable logic
controller. Defence in depth can be achieved by ensuring that indicator switches
are installed at different locations, such as on the source rack hoist mechanism
and on the source rack itself. Supplementary means of confirming the position of
the source rack, such as by means of a radiation detector or a camera at the
bottom of the storage pool, may be considered in addition to the indicator
switches.

8.64. If the indicator switches malfunction or do not respond to the presence of

the source rack, whether in the ‘down’ (fully shielded) or in the ‘up’ position,
with account taken of source rack transit times, visible and audible alarms should
be actuated to alert personnel in the area and to prevent access to the radiation
room.

Access to radioactive sources and safety interlock systems

Access to storage pools in Category III (self-contained wet source storage)

irradiators

8.65. Self-contained wet source storage irradiators (Category III irradiators)

should have a personnel access barrier around the source storage pool that is
locked to prevent access when the irradiator is unattended. Only irradiator
operators and facility managers should have access to keys to the personnel
access barrier. An intrusion alarm should be installed to detect entry when the
personnel access barrier is locked.

55
Backup access control — Product entry and exit ports

8.66. In addition to the safety interlocks for the product entry and exit ports (see
para. 8.15), each product entry and exit port at a panoramic irradiator should have
an independent backup control to detect the entry of personnel while the
radioactive source rack is exposed. Examples include pressure mats, light beam
interruption devices (photo eyes), infrared detectors or other means of detecting
the presence of a person. Detection of entry by personnel while the source rack is
in the exposed position should cause the source rack to return to the fully shielded
position and should actuate visible and audible alarms to warn the individual
entering the room of the hazard.

Removable radiation room shield plugs at gamma irradiators

8.67. Roof plugs designed for access for the purpose of moving transport
packages of radioactive material to the source storage pool should be located such
that a shipping package, if dropped, will not fall on the source rack.

Fixed radiation monitor with alarms at Category III (self-contained wet source
storage) irradiators

8.68. Underwater irradiators that are not in a shielded radiation room should have
a radiation monitor over the source storage pool to detect abnormal radiation
levels. The monitor should generate visible and audible alarms at entrances to the
access barrier around the source storage pool.

Backup system for lowering the source rack

8.69. A backup system should be provided for lowering the source rack to the
fully shielded position in the event of a failure of the source rack hoist
mechanism. For mechanical hoist systems, this may be a manual brake release to
allow the controlled descent of the source rack to the fully shielded position. In
pneumatic hoist systems, there should be a second solenoid valve on the source
rack hoist as a backup to the main solenoid valve for the source rack hoist. If the
main valve fails to exhaust, the second valve should provide a means of
exhausting air from the source rack hoist, thus allowing the source rack to
descend into the fully shielded position. Failure of the primary means of lowering
the source rack should create a fault condition and should actuate visible and
audible alarms.

56
Product exit radiation monitor

8.70. A fixed radiation monitoring system should be located such that monitors
will detect any radioactive material being brought out of the radiation room.
These monitors should be interlocked with the irradiator controls so that if
radiation levels at the exit port exceed a predetermined level, the product
positioning system carrying product from the radiation room to the exit port will
stop, the radioactive source will automatically be returned to the fully shielded
position, and visible and audible alarms will be actuated.

Wet source storage irradiators

8.71. Water is used as the radiation shielding medium in wet source storage
irradiators. An automatic water level control should be provided to maintain the
water at a level that provides adequate shielding to enable personnel to be in the
room while radioactive sources are in the fully shielded position. All components
of the automatic water level control system that are below water level, except for
float switches, should be made of a material with a specific gravity of 1.0 g/cm3
or higher. If hollow tubing is used, it should be fully vented19 to allow water to
flood the tubing so as to eliminate the risk of a beam of high level radiation up the
tube.

8.72. The source storage pool should be cleaned as necessary to remove foreign
matter that has accumulated at the bottom.

8.73. Any vacuum system used for cleaning the source storage pool should be
fitted with an in-line filter. The filter should be continuously checked for the
presence of radioactive material during the vacuum cleaning operation. If
radioactive material is detected, the vacuuming operation should be terminated.
All sediment collected in the filter should meet relevant criteria before its
disposal. The vacuum system should be designed to recirculate the storage pool
water back into the storage pool after filtering. This will ensure that there is no
inadvertent release of storage pool water before it has been ensured that the level
of contamination is below the authorized limits established by the regulatory
body.

19
‘Fully vented’ means having the design feature for hollow tools, tubes or control rods
for full venting to allow air to escape at a rate sufficient to allow water to flood the immersed
section as it enters the storage water pool.

57
8.74. All tools used for underwater vacuum cleaning should meet the
recommendations for venting provided in para. 8.71.

Radiation monitor of the water treatment system

8.75. A fixed radiation monitor should be located on the water treatment system
to detect contamination that may arise if a radioactive source leaks. Examples of
methods used to install fixed radiation monitors include affixing a radiation
detector to the deionization column or particulate filter, and measuring the
activity in water directly by means of a continuous flow sampling system.

8.76. If radiation levels exceed a predetermined value, the fixed radiation monitor
should actuate visible and audible alarms. The monitor should be interlocked
with the irradiator controls so that the source rack is returned to the fully shielded
position and the normal circulation of water is stopped if the alarm is actuated.
The alarm level should be set sufficiently above the natural background level of
radiation to avoid an excessive number of false alarms.

Storage pool integrity

8.77. The source storage pool should be watertight and should be designed to
retain water under all reasonably foreseeable circumstances. The storage pool
should be constructed of materials that are metallurgically compatible with each
other and with the other components that will be in the storage pool, including the
radioactive sources. A stainless steel pool liner that is resistant to corrosion and
radiation damage and is easily decontaminated should be used. The storage pool
should be designed to support the transport packages used during operations for
the loading and unloading of sources without compromising the integrity of the
pool.

8.78. There should be no penetration (such as pipes or plugged holes) through the
bottom of the storage pool. Any penetration through the pool liner should be no
more than 30 cm below the normal water level.

Materials of pool components

8.79. All permanent storage pool components should be made of corrosion

resistant materials, since corrosion products may affect the integrity of the sealed
sources. Where practicable, stainless steel components (such as brackets or
pulleys) should be passivated, in particular after fabrication.

58
Water level control — Level normal

8.80. Means should be provided to replenish water losses from the storage pool;
these losses will be principally due to evaporation. The system should be capable
of maintaining the pool water above a level sufficient to maintain adequate
radiation shielding. A water level control should cause make-up water to flow
into the storage pool through a water treatment system when the level reaches the
normal low water level position, and should cause water to stop flowing when the
level reaches the normal high water level position.

8.81. A metering device should be installed to record the use of replenishment

water, changes in which may be associated with pool leakage (such as by the
siphoning of water back through the piping of the water supply).

8.82. The storage pool water should be prevented from migrating into municipal
water supplies.

Water level control abnormal — Level low

8.83. Visible and audible signals should be generated if the storage pool water
falls to a level that would compromise radiation shielding, typically
approximately 30 cm below the normal low water level. The signal should alert
personnel to investigate and to take corrective action.

Water level control abnormal — Level high

8.84. Visible and audible signals should be generated if the storage pool water
continues to rise above the normal high water level cut-off point. The signal
should alert personnel to investigate and to take corrective action to prevent the
pool water from overflowing.

Water conditioning

8.85. The storage pool should be equipped with a water conditioning system
capable of keeping the water clean and at a level of conductivity not exceeding
1000 µS/m for routine operation and not exceeding 2000 µS/m for temporary
excursions not exceeding 90 days. Conductivity measurements serve as an
indicator of potentially high halide (e.g. chloride and fluoride) levels, which are
known to be corrosive to stainless steel. The conductivity of the storage pool
water should be monitored continuously.

59
8.86. Great care should be exercised to avoid the introduction of contaminants
into the pool water system (e.g. deionizer regenerants, cleaning materials, fire
extinguishing materials, spilled product). Manufacturers of sealed sources have
established recommendations for acceptable levels and testing frequencies for
water quality indicators such as conductivity, pH and chloride concentrations.

8.87. All filters and resin beds in water treatment systems should be tested for
contamination before the removal, backwashing or regeneration of the system.
Fluids resulting from backwashing or regeneration should only be released if the
level of contamination is below authorized limits established by the regulatory
body.

Cooling of storage pool water

8.88. The radioactive decay process generates significant amounts of heat, which
will cause water temperatures in the storage pool to rise. Increased water
temperature can result in high humidity levels, which can damage electrical
equipment and can lead to greater evaporative losses from the storage pool,
potentially compromising radiation shielding. If the activity of sealed sources in
the source rack is high enough to cause the water temperatures in the storage pool
to rise too high, a means of cooling the water during its circulation should be
provided. High water temperatures can also cause deionization resins to degrade
more rapidly.

In-pool piping

8.89. Since pipes are used in the source storage pool for the water level and water
quality control systems, suitable siphon breakers should be provided to prevent
the siphoning of storage pool water down to levels that could compromise
radiation shielding, typically levels more than 30 cm below the normal make-up
water level. Suction pipes for providing circulation of the pool water should have
intakes no lower than 30 cm below the normal make-up water level.

Storage pool guard and cover

8.90. A physical barrier, such as a railing or a metal cover, should be installed to

prevent personnel from falling into the source storage pool. This physical barrier
should be removable for maintenance or service operations.

60
Fire protection

8.91. A fire extinguishing system should be provided in the radiation room. The
control system for the fire extinguishing system should be located outside the
radiation room to allow the system to be actuated without the need for personnel
to enter the radiation room.

8.92. Radiation rooms equipped with water sprinkler systems should have a
shutoff valve outside the radiation room to prevent flooding into unrestricted
areas. The maximum ceiling temperature inside the radiation room and the effects
on the sprinkler heads of long term subjection to radiation and to ozone should be
taken into consideration in selecting a suitable automatic sprinkler head.

8.93. Devices for sensing heat and smoke equipped with visible and audible
alarms should be provided to detect combustion in the radiation room. The
radioactive source rack should automatically be returned to the fully shielded
position and the product positioning system and ventilation systems should shut
down if either the heat sensing device or the smoke sensing device is actuated.

8.94. Chemicals and corrosive substances that could adversely affect the integrity
of sealed sources should not be used in fire extinguishing systems.

Power failure

Electrical power

8.95. If an electrical power failure of longer than ten seconds occurs20, the
radioactive source rack should automatically be returned to the fully shielded
position.

8.96. Critical electronic components used in the irradiator control system should
be connected to an uninterruptible power supply capable of providing the
necessary electrical power for a controlled shutdown of the irradiator. The
radiation room monitor, safety interlocks for access control and source rack

20
In some areas, short term power failures of not more than ten seconds occur
frequently. In such cases, it could be detrimental to some products if automatic irradiator
shutdown were to be actuated as a result of the short term power failures. It is acceptable for
means to be provided for preventing unnecessary and avoidable shutdowns of the irradiator
under conditions of short term power failure.

61
position indicators should also be powered by the uninterruptible power supply to
ensure safe system shutdown.

Non-electrical power

8.97. Failure of non-electrical power (e.g. pneumatic power or hydraulic power)

used to control or to operate any safety feature of the irradiator should cause the
radioactive source rack to be automatically returned to the fully shielded position.

ELECTRON BEAM IRRADIATORS AND X RAY IRRADIATORS

Safety considerations in the design of electron accelerators

8.98. It is an objective of manufacturers of industrial accelerators to design

electron beam irradiation facilities for simplicity and reliability of operation. In
pursuit of this end, the designer should be mindful of the possibility of a radiation
accident with severe consequences. Inadvertent exposure may result from the
investigation of equipment failure or from the maintenance of operating
accelerator subsystems while the accelerating stages are improperly or only
partially disabled. Also, as long as the capability for electron acceleration
remains, there is the possibility of X ray generation by dark current (see
footnote 15).

8.99. The possibility of activation of accelerator equipment and ancillary process

equipment (such as the beam stop and the product positioning system) and
shielding should be taken into account in the design of electron beam irradiation
facilities using 10 MeV or higher energy electrons. Depending on the energy and
power output of the accelerator, radiation levels due to activated materials in such
components may be substantial immediately following shutdown of the
accelerator.

8.100. Procedures for maintenance and repair of the equipment, in particular for
removal and disposal of potentially activated components, should provide for
adequate radiation safety for the protection of individuals who could be exposed
owing to the radioactive material. While most activation products would be
expected to be relatively short lived, the activity soon after shutdown of the
accelerator could be significant in terms of both external and internal exposure of
personnel if operations such as welding or drilling were to be performed on
activated system components.

62
8.101. While reliability of operation of the accelerator reduces the risk of
inadvertent exposure by reducing the need for repair and maintenance, a further
reduction of risk can be achieved by designing for ease of troubleshooting. This
may also reduce the likelihood of other hazardous occurrences such as electric
shock or overexposure to radiofrequency radiation. In this regard, the following
features should be considered in the design of an industrial accelerator:

— Physical or mechanical means of disabling the main acceleration system;

— Built-in monitoring of machine parameters;
— Built-in remote machine diagnostics.

8.102. The operating parameters of accelerators (voltage and current) should be

interlocked with the product positioning system.

8.103. Commissioning and testing should be carried out up to maximum

operating parameters (voltage and current) and with the product handling
equipment in operation.

Disabling mechanism for the main acceleration system

8.104. The disabling mechanism for the main acceleration system, which should
remove the applied voltage, should inactivate the means of acceleration without
causing harm to machine components. The mechanism should disable the
acceleration system in a manner that allows as many other subsystems as possible
to function for diagnostic purposes. The disabling feature should be clearly
identified, and it should be explained by the manufacturer in the documentation
accompanying the accelerator.

Built-in monitoring of machine parameters

8.105. Continuous monitoring of operating parameters for the accelerator should

be carried out. Monitoring of operating parameters provides the opportunity for
event logging of information on failure sequences for use by maintenance
engineers and for the purpose of planning repairs.

Built-in remote machine diagnostics

8.106. Strategic electronic test points should be located outside the radiation
room to permit irradiator operators and maintenance crews to carry out machine
diagnostics on the total system of the accelerator without having to resort to
disabling the main acceleration system or bypassing safety interlocks for access

63
control. For some types of accelerator, closed circuit television monitoring should
be considered.

Shielding

8.107. For the application of high energy electrons, the electron beam has to be
brought out of vacuum in the accelerator into an atmosphere at ambient pressure
(in a chamber filled with air or an inert gas) through a thin window that allows the
electrons to pass through with as little energy loss as possible.

8.108. Electrons have a finite range in matter that is a function of their initial
energy and the density of the absorbing material. The maximum range of
electrons is small compared with that of the X rays that are generated as a
consequence of the interaction between the electrons and the matter onto which
they impinge. In calculations of the shielding requirements for electron
accelerator facilities, only the X rays generated should be taken into account.

8.109. There are two types of X ray generated by the interaction of electrons with
matter: bremsstrahlung and characteristic X rays. Characteristic X rays should be
considered only for electron accelerators up to 300 keV that are shielded with a
heavy element such as lead or depleted uranium. In most cases, bremsstrahlung
should be considered more important than characteristic X rays when
determining radiation shielding requirements.

8.110. Materials containing elements with a low atomic number should be used
as far as possible for structures that are subject to irradiation by electron beams, to
minimize the generation of X rays. Shielding calculations should be performed
under the assumption that all electrons are absorbed by the heaviest element that
may be subject to irradiation by the beam. Account should be taken of the
composition of structural materials and the product that might be irradiated in the
facility. The shielding calculations are generally performed for the maximum
energy and the maximum current that the electron accelerator can deliver.

8.111. Attention should be paid to ‘spurious’ X rays, particularly in accelerators

operating at high voltage levels with accelerator tubes located outside the
radiation room. There are several causes of this spurious radiation:

— Backscattered electrons can possess sufficient energy to stream back

through the accelerator tube. This effect is particularly pronounced when
high energy electrons impinge on a target material containing elements with
a high atomic number, causing X ray generation.

64
 — During conditioning of the electron accelerator and during operation under
relatively poor vacuum conditions, there can be a dark current in the
accelerator tube which generates X rays.

8.112. Except in the case of accelerators in the lower energy range (up to about
500 keV) and special purpose machines operating at higher energies, standard
concrete will be the preferred shielding material, for economic reasons and to
minimize the potential for activation. Examples of the calculation of shielding
thickness and the layout of the mazes for access by persons and for the transport
of product to and from the radiation room are given in Refs [20, 25].

8.113. In the commissioning of an electron beam irradiation facility, special

attention has to be paid to ‘hot spots’; that is, small areas of high intensity
radiation due to spurious radiation passing through penetrations in the shielding.
Radiation passing through the penetrations should be reduced to acceptable
levels. This is often accomplished by means of the use of extra shielding such as
shielding made of lead or steel shot. The experience of the manufacturer with
existing installations of the same or a similar type should be made available.

Safety considerations in the design of X ray irradiation facilities

8.114. For an X ray irradiation facility, the recommendations made previously for
electron beam accelerators should be followed, since the X ray system consists of
an electron beam irradiation facility coupled with a high atomic number target in
which bremsstrahlung is produced. Specifically, the main disabling mechanism
for the acceleration system, built-in monitoring of machine parameters and
built-in remote machine diagnostics, as described for electron accelerators, also
apply for X ray irradiation facilities.

8.115. Since shielding design for electron irradiation facilities is predicated on

the probable production of X rays within the system components and the shield,
evaluation of the shielding requirements for an X ray irradiation facility is
comparable with that for electron irradiation facilities. The exception is that in an
X ray irradiation facility electrons are converted to X rays in a known and
predictable manner. This makes the assumptions regarding the generation of
bremsstrahlung radiation less uncertain than those for electron irradiation
facilities. The efficiency of conversion of electrons to X rays, and consequently
the intensity of the emerging X ray beam, is higher for a specially designed X ray
target than for the secondary process of generation of bremsstrahlung radiation by
electrons impinging on process equipment or product positioning equipment, as
would occur in an electron beam irradiation facility.

65
8.116. Consequently, the barrier thickness directly in front of the beam (primary
barrier) should be substantially greater for an X ray irradiation facility than for an
electron beam irradiation facility. Similarly, scattered X rays will have a higher
intensity in an X ray irradiation facility than in an electron beam irradiation
facility. Additional shielding should be provided on secondary barriers and on
additional scattering pathways along entrance and exit mazes in an X ray
irradiation facility.

8.117. For X ray irradiation facilities operating at 5 MeV and above, the
generation of neutrons in the X ray target and their propagation should be
considered in the shielding calculations. While the neutron fluence rate may not
be a significant factor in the activation of the product being irradiated, the neutron
source term can have a substantial influence on the final design of the shield and
the mazes.

8.118. Owing to potential for activation at higher energies, shields for X ray
irradiation facilities, and in particular for the primary barrier, should not be
constructed of metal. Concrete, which has a relatively low effective atomic
number, is the preferred construction material for such shields.

8.119. The possibility of activation of the X ray target, accelerator equipment and
ancillary process equipment (such as the beam stop and the product positioning
system) and shielding should be taken into account in the design of X ray
irradiation facilities. Depending on the energy and power output of the X ray
accelerator, radiation levels due to activated materials in such components may
be substantial immediately following shutdown of the accelerator.

8.120. Procedures for maintenance and repair of the equipment, in particular for
removal and disposal of potentially activated components, should provide for
adequate radiation safety for the protection of individuals who could be exposed
owing to the radioactive material. While most activation products would be
expected to be relatively short lived, the hazards due to radioactive material
present soon after shutdown of the accelerator could be significant in terms of
possible external and internal exposure of personnel if operations such as welding
or drilling were to be performed on activated system components.

FACILITY MODIFICATIONS

8.121. Any proposed modifications of the irradiation facility may require the
approval of the regulatory body. Modifications should be undertaken only by

66
appropriately qualified persons. Modifications should be thoroughly checked to
ensure that they have been carried out properly and that the safety of the
irradiation facility has not been compromised.

8.122. The operating organization of the irradiation facility should consult a

knowledgeable individual such as a qualified expert and should seek the approval
of the regulatory body before carrying out any modifications that have the
potential to cause a radiation hazard. Some examples of such modifications are:

— Modifications of operating procedures;

— Modifications of the safety control system;
— Major modifications of the irradiator;
— Loading, replenishment, removal or redistribution of radioactive sources, or
electron beam reorientation, in any way at variance with what was approved
by the regulatory body;
— Changes in key personnel or advisers.

9. TESTING AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT

9.1. The BSS [2], in para. IV.16(g) of appendix IV, state that the operating
organization should “ensure that adequate maintenance, testing, inspection and
servicing be carried out as needed so that sources remain capable of meeting their
design requirements for protection and safety throughout their lifetime.”

9.2. To ensure the continued safe operation of the irradiation facility, the
operating organization should set up a formal programme of maintenance and
testing to test all safety functions regularly. The following actions should be
performed periodically (or as otherwise specified below):

— Particular attention should be paid to regular testing of components of the

safety interlock system for correct operation, in accordance with the
instructions of the equipment manufacturer. These tests should be carried
out by appropriately qualified persons in the presence of a radiation
protection officer.

67
 — Portable radiation survey meters should be calibrated before their first use,
after repair and at the intervals specified in regulatory requirements. The
pre-use test should include a test of the instrument’s overload performance;
that is, the instrument should be tested to verify that it operates correctly up
to the maximum foreseeable dose rate.
— Periodic examination should be made of the source rack hoist cable and
guide cables (see footnote 12). The cables should be replaced at the
intervals recommended by the manufacturer.
— Periodic leak tests of radioactive sources (see footnote 12) should be carried
out in the manner and at the frequency recommended by the source supplier
and in accordance with regulatory requirements.

WEEKLY TESTS

9.3. The following tests should be carried out weekly:

— Category II and IV gamma irradiators. If air filtration is provided for the

irradiation room exhaust system, a portable survey meter should be used to
check radiation levels at the air filter banks. All readings should be
recorded.
— Category III and IV gamma irradiators. A portable survey meter should be
used to check radiation levels at the deionizer filter and resin beds. All
readings should be recorded. If the deionizer resin bed has a continuous
monitor to check for contamination of the storage pool water, additional
surveys are not necessary.
— Category III and IV gamma irradiators. The water deionizer system should
be checked for correct operation.
— Category III and IV gamma irradiators. The storage pool water cooler
should be checked, and it should be ensured that the temperature of the
storage pool water is within authorized limits.
— It should be checked that the access control system, the emergency stop
device inside the radiation room and the system for the detection of entry by
personnel are functioning. This test may be carried out when each
component is tested or actuated during the irradiator startup sequence.

68
MONTHLY TESTS

9.4. The following additional tests should be carried out on a monthly basis:

— Test that the radiation room radiation monitor is functioning properly; the
test should be carried out by exposing the monitor probe to a check source
until the alarm sounds.
— Check, in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, that access to
the radiation room is prevented when the radiation room monitor alarm
sounds upon exposing the monitor probe to a check source. Check the
emergency exit procedure by ensuring that the personnel access door can be
opened from the inside and that other means of exit in an emergency are
operating properly.
— Test that the product exit radiation monitor is functioning properly; the test
should be carried out with the irradiator operating by exposing the monitor
probe to a check source until the alarm sounds. The product positioning
system should stop, and the means of producing radiation should be
disabled.
— Category III and IV gamma irradiators. Check that the continuous radiation
monitoring device on the circulation system for the storage pool water is
functioning correctly.
— Test irradiator shutdown controls during operation where possible. Check
the high temperature switch, the source rack position switches, the backup
access control and the earthquake detector.
— Test the source rack hoist mechanism, the ventilation system and any
similar hardware that contributes to the safe operation of the irradiator, and
the product positioning mechanism.
— Check that other main items of equipment associated with the means of
producing radiation function properly and show no signs of excessive wear
or potential failure.
— Check that all product containers are undamaged and in good condition.
— Category III and IV irradiators. Check the water level control switches
(normal level and abnormal level) for correct operation.
— Check for correct functioning of the emergency stop device on the control
console and at any other locations.
— Check all visual warning signals and alarms for correct operation. Check all
control indicator lights to ensure that they illuminate.
— Attempt to operate the irradiator after deliberately violating the approved
startup procedure, to ensure that the safety interlocks and sequential
controls are functioning correctly.

69
 — Verify that the uninterruptible power supply21 (see footnote 12) is
functioning properly and is capable of providing adequate electrical power
to allow safe shutdown of the irradiator.
— Verify that the heat detectors and smoke detectors are operating properly.
— Verify that safety interlocks on removable shield plugs in the radiation
room are operating properly.
— Category III and IV gamma irradiators. Evaluate the amount of water
added to the source storage pool to determine whether the amount of make-
up water added is abnormal (too high or too low). If the amount of water
added to the storage pool is abnormally high, investigate whether water is
leaking from the pool. If the amount of water added to the storage pool is
abnormally low, investigate the operation of the supply system for make-up
water.
— Verify that posted notices (e.g. emergency call lists) and symbols are still
present, legible and clearly visible.
— Test the safety delay timer by actuating the timer, waiting until the time
limit has expired and then attempting startup to verify that the system
cannot be started.

9.5. If any of the checks indicate a fault or if safety interlocks do not function
properly, the irradiator should not be used until repairs have been made. The
return of the irradiator to normal operation should be subject to approval by a
radiation protection officer.

SEMIANNUAL TESTS

9.6. Semiannually (or at other approved intervals), for gamma irradiators of

Categories II and IV, an inspection of the entire length of the cables in the source
rack hoist and suspension system should be carried out. Cables showing signs of
excessive wear should be replaced. In addition, the source guard should be
visually inspected to ensure that its integrity is maintained.

21
An uninterruptible power supply is a backup power supply that, in the event of power
failure or power fluctuations, allows enough time for an orderly shutdown of the system or for
a standby generator(s) to start up.

70
LEAK TESTING OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

9.7. Routine tests should be conducted to detect possible leakage of radioactive

material from sealed sources (see footnote 12). In storage pool type irradiators
(Categories III and IV), radiation monitors for the storage pool water or the water
treatment system can be used as indicators of source leakage, or pool water
samples may be collected for analysis. For dry storage irradiators, samples,
typically wipe samples, should be collected from locations where contamination
from a possible leaking source would be expected to accumulate.

9.8. Leak tests should be conducted at the intervals prescribed by the regulatory
body. Typically, for storage pool type irradiators, for which leak testing consists
of monitoring radiation levels in the water or the water treatment system, leak
tests for sealed sources are performed on a continuous basis. Leak tests should be
conducted every six months for dry storage irradiators.

9.9. If the leak tests do not show activity above the prescribed action level, the
test results should be documented and retained for future reference. Leak test
records should include:

— Identification of the irradiator;

— Date of the test;
— Leak test method;
— Identification of the measuring instrument by manufacturer, and model and
serial number;
— Date of the most recent calibration of the measuring instrument;
— Calculation of the activity detected;
— Evaluation of test results;
— Name of the person responsible for the test.

9.10. Tests that reveal the presence of contamination at levels higher than the
prescribed action level should be considered evidence that the sealed source is
leaking. In this case, the irradiator should be immediately withdrawn from
operation and appropriate actions should be taken to prevent exposure of
personnel and further dispersal of radioactive material. Such actions should
include stopping operation of the radiation room ventilation system and stopping
circulation of the storage pool water. The operating organization should
immediately isolate the area and should notify the regulatory body, the
manufacturer of the equipment and the supplier of the radioactive source.

71
9.11. Removal of a damaged or leaking radioactive source and its transfer to an
authorized recipient may require special authorization from the regulatory body.
The source should be removed promptly once the decision to remove it has been
made. Removal should be performed by, or under the supervision and in the
physical presence of, an individual who is qualified and, if required by the
regulatory body, specifically authorized to perform such activities. Unauthorized
or untrained persons should not attempt to examine or decontaminate the
irradiator under any circumstances.

RECORDS

9.12. A logbook or file should be kept in which all tests, maintenance tasks,
modifications of and changes to the irradiator are recorded. Every use of the
irradiator should also be recorded in a logbook or file.

9.13. The results of all tests described above should be recorded on a formal
checklist signed by a radiation protection officer who has witnessed the tests.

9.14. Since the failure of safety systems could cause exposure of personnel,
inspectors from the regulatory body should pay particular attention to these
records. The records should be kept for the periods of time prescribed by the
regulatory body.

FACILITY MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION

9.15. Maintenance operations at the facility should be coordinated with the

manufacturer of both the irradiator and the radiation source to ensure that
appropriate repairs, modifications and system upgrades are instituted at the
facility. Lack of coordination of maintenance with the source manufacturer has
been cited as a contributory factor to an accident at a gamma irradiator [1].

9.16. Suppliers and manufacturers of radioactive sources may be specifically

authorized by the regulatory body to provide specialized expertise and to perform
maintenance functions that the operating organization finds impossible to
perform or prohibitive in cost. The operating organization should coordinate with
the manufacturer to determine the type and extent of services that can and should
be offered.

72
9.17. For accelerator systems, the manufacturer can provide expertise for the
tuning of magnets, upgrades to specific equipment components, and/or
replacement of or improvements to wave guides. For gamma irradiators, the
source supplier can provide equipment and expertise for inspection of source
integrity. This may include the use of underwater cameras to inspect sealed
sources at the irradiation facility or the destructive testing of source capsules,
performed at the manufacturer’s hot cell facilities.

9.18. Regular maintenance of all components of an irradiation facility should be

performed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.

9.19. The operating organization should not be required to notify the regulatory
body when performing routine maintenance procedures, including the changing
of components that will not give rise to a radiation hazard or compromise the
safety of the irradiator, provided that regulatory requirements and conditions are
not violated.

9.20. Manufacturers should issue notifications to advise operating organizations

and the regulatory body of any previously unforeseen conditions that could cause
accidents, or that have given rise to hazards or potential hazards. Notifications
should explain the corrective actions to be taken. Operating organizations should
ensure that the corrective actions are implemented, unless there are good reasons
for not doing so. In the latter case, the agreement of the regulatory body should be
sought, and the reasons should be recorded and reported to the manufacturer.

9.21. In certain situations, it may be necessary to bypass or defeat a safety

interlock to repair components of irradiator systems. For example, failure of the
radiation room radiation monitor should preclude access to the radiation room,
because it cannot be independently verified with the control system that the
means of producing radiation has been disabled. In such circumstances, it could
become necessary to disable part of the safety interlock system to gain access to
the radiation room to replace or repair equipment.

9.22. Bypassing or disabling a safety interlock should be done only with the
express, written approval of a radiation protection officer. All circumstances
necessitating any component of a safety interlock to be bypassed or disabled
should be documented with a description of the circumstances and the actions
taken, and with the specific approval of a radiation protection officer.

9.23. If it becomes necessary to bypass or disable a safety interlock, independent

verification should be obtained either that the radioactive source is in the fully

73
shielded position or that the accelerator is switched off. Verification may be
obtained by means such as the interruption of power to the accelerator,
determination of the position of the source rack by observation of the source rack
hoist or cables, the use of sensors or detectors that monitor the position of the
source rack (e.g. underwater limit switches or cameras), or other methods that do
not necessitate entry into the radiation room. All these methods should be defined
in procedures that are available at the irradiator.

9.24. The affected component of the safety interlock system should be bypassed
or disabled only long enough to allow entry into the radiation room to remedy the
problem (e.g. to repair or replace the monitor), during which time the irradiator
will not be in operation. Entry into the radiation room should be accomplished by
following routine procedures, including the use of a portable survey meter to
monitor radiation levels on entry.

9.25. If it is necessary to bypass or disable a component of a safety system, the

affected component should be tested for proper operation upon being reinstated.
The specific test will depend on which component is to be tested, but the test
should be the same as the routine test performed to verify proper operation. After
verifying that the safety interlocks have been restored to their design function,
approval of a radiation protection officer should be obtained for a return to
normal operations.

9.26. Since bypassing or disabling any component of the safety interlock system
is to be avoided except under abnormal circumstances, routine and preventive
maintenance functions should be designed to obviate the necessity to bypass
safety interlocks. For example, the radiation room radiation monitors should be
periodically replaced to avoid failure during operation. The interval for replacing
the detectors will depend on the number of irradiator operating hours and the
intensity of the radiation field to which the detectors are subjected.

74
 10. TRANSPORT, LOADING AND
UNLOADING OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

TRANSPORT

10.1. The BSS [2], in para. 2.9, state that the transport of radioactive sources is
subject to the requirements of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material [31] and to any applicable international convention. When
irradiator sources are transported between States, the relevant portions of the
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [16] and the
supporting Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources [18]
should be considered.

10.2. Measures should be taken to ensure that radioactive material is kept secure
during transport so as to prevent theft or damage and to ensure that control over
the material is not relinquished inappropriately. Further recommendations and
guidance on the security of radioactive material in transport is given in IAEA
Nuclear Security Series No. 9 [32].

LOADING AND UNLOADING OF SOURCES

Handling of radioactive sources

10.3. The unloading and handling of radioactive sources on arrival at the

irradiation facility or the loading and handling of sources on dispatch from the
facility are potentially hazardous operations and should be undertaken under
close supervision for radiation protection purposes. Safety in these operations
depends on cooperation between those primarily responsible for radiation
protection and those who load or unload the radioactive sources. In many cases
the latter will be the source supplier, who may be specifically authorized by the
regulatory body to perform this activity. The prime responsibility for safety while
radioactive sources are at the irradiation facility resides with the operating
organization.

10.4. Source containers, which are normally transport packages, may be

introduced into the irradiator by different routes (e.g. through the roof, along the
maze, through the wall), depending on the type of irradiator. For wet source
storage irradiators, the transport package should be placed at the bottom of the
storage pool and should be fully vented. Long handled instruments should be

75
used to manipulate radioactive sources under water. For dry source storage
irradiators, remote instruments should be used to manipulate radioactive sources.

10.5. The operating organization should ensure that an assessment is made of any
hazards associated with the loading, unloading and handling of radioactive
sources. For these activities, the operating organization should ensure the
optimization of protection and safety, and should specifically ensure that the
safety interlocks and control system of the irradiator are not compromised. Any
necessary contingency plans should be incorporated into the written instructions
for operation of the facility.

Survey of transport packages

10.6. Radiation surveys of transport packages including radioactive sources

should be performed when they are received at irradiation facilities. The
following surveys should be performed by appropriately trained individuals.

— External radiation survey. Prior to performing the contamination surveys,

the operating organization should verify that dose rates due to the transport
package do not exceed regulatory requirements. This should be done by
means of measurements made at the surface of the package and at one metre
from its surface. A survey of the transport vehicle, including occupied
areas, should be performed to verify that any shifting of the package that
may have occurred during transport has not resulted in high radiation levels
in and around the vehicle.
— External removable contamination survey. The operating organization
should perform a contamination survey of the external surface of the
radioactive source transport package, which should consist of a series of
wipes to check for the presence of removable contamination.
— Internal removable contamination survey. The sealed sources should have
been tested for leakage before being placed into the transport package. The
operating organization should perform tests to determine whether source
integrity has been compromised during transport by checking for the
presence of removable contamination inside the transport package. This
test, procedures for which will be provided by the supplier of the transport
package, consists of passing a fluid (air or water) through the interior cavity
of the transport package, filtering particulate from the fluid stream and
measuring the filters to detect contamination.

76
10.7. If exposure rates or contamination levels exceed authorized limits,
including those specified in transport documentation, or exceed the limits set by
the supplier, actions should be taken to protect workers and members of the
public from the hazard. A radiation protection officer should be informed of the
situation immediately. The consignor of the shipment should also be notified, and
the relevant regulatory bodies should be notified as required by regulations. An
investigation into the cause of the elevated dose rates and/or the contamination
should be made, and corrective actions should be taken before the source loading
procedure is started.

10.8. For returning empty transport packaging following the loading of a source,
the same series of surveys should be performed, except that the internal
contamination survey should consist of taking wipe samples from inside the
packaging cavity, in place of the test described above. If sealed sources are being
returned to the manufacturer, the same series of surveys should be performed as
described for the receipt of radioactive sources at the facility, except for the
internal removable contamination survey.

11. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

11.1. The basic obligations, responsibilities and requirements for emergency

preparedness and response are established in Ref. [33] and in the BSS [2].
Guidance on preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency is provided in
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1 [34]. Information on developing
and maintaining an effective emergency response capability is provided in
Ref. [35].

11.2. If a safety assessment concludes that an accident is likely to affect workers

or members of the public, it is the responsibility of the operating organization to
prepare emergency plans designed to ensure the protection and safety of anyone
who may be affected by the accident. A qualified expert may be consulted when
drawing up emergency plans.

11.3. Response to an emergency consists of initial actions to be taken

immediately and follow-up actions to be taken subsequently. Some follow-up
actions may be taken by the manufacturer of the irradiator or the radioactive

77
source rather than by the operating organization, depending on the resources
necessary to implement the actions.

11.4. In specifying actions to be taken in response to an emergency, the

emergency plan should provide for minimizing radiation exposure, regaining
control of the situation to restore the site to its normal conditions, and treating any
persons who have been injured or overexposed. In general, apart from potential
hazards due to any activation products that may be present, disconnecting the
electrical power to an accelerator will reduce or eliminate further radiation
hazards at an electron beam irradiator or an X ray irradiator.

The possibility of contamination should be considered in specifying immediate

actions that may be taken in response to an emergency involving a gamma
irradiator. Immediate actions in response to an emergency involving a gamma
irradiator should include the following, depending on the circumstances:

— Evacuating the area in the proximity of the hazard;

— Informing persons in the immediate vicinity of the accident;
— Rendering first aid to any injured persons;
— Notifying a radiation protection officer;
— Evaluating the cause and extent of the hazard;
— Setting up appropriate notices and barriers to secure the area against
unauthorized entry, including the construction of temporary shielding in the
event that shielding integrity has been compromised, until post-accident
recovery operations have been completed.

DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGENCY PLANS

11.5. On the basis of the safety assessment performed for the facility, the
operating organization should draw up an emergency plan. Emergency planning
should incorporate measures for defence in depth to cope with identified events.
The reliability of safety systems (including administrative and operational
procedures and design of the facility and equipment) should be evaluated.
Operational experience, lessons learned from emergencies at similar facilities [1],
and errors made in maintenance and in quality management programmes also
serve as sources of information for developing emergency plans.

11.6. In general, the following situations should be considered reasonably

foreseeable events:

78
 — For gamma irradiators, electron beam irradiators and X ray irradiators:
• Malfunction or deliberate defeat of the safety interlock system and access
control systems;
• Fire or explosion inside the radiation room;
• Jamming of automatic conveyor systems;
• Natural phenomena, including earthquakes, tornadoes, floods or other
phenomena as appropriate for the location of the facility.
— For gamma irradiators only:
• Radioactive source rack stuck in an unshielded position;
• Radiation alarm from the product exit port monitor or the radiation
monitor for the storage pool water;
• Detection of leaking radioactive sources or contamination of the source
storage pool, or an alarm caused by contamination of pool water;
• Abnormal (low or high) water level indicator, an abnormal water loss or
leakage from the source storage pool;
• Prolonged loss of electrical power.

11.7. For gamma irradiators, the possibility of an accident during transport of

radioactive sources should be considered. Planning for emergency response to
transport accidents will probably not be the sole responsibility of the operating
organization. The operating organization should liaise with the radioactive source
supplier and the carrier to ensure that emergency planning for the transport of
radioactive sources to and from the facility is adequately addressed.

11.8. The emergency plan should be specific to each situation and should include,
as appropriate:

— Identification of reasonably foreseeable accidents and other incidents or

occurrences and their predicted consequences;
— Communication procedures, including an emergency call out list;
— Recommended actions for specified situations, a list of persons able to
implement and take responsibility for stated parts of the plan, and
specification of situations requiring evacuation together with procedures for
implementation;
— A statement regarding immediate life-saving actions;
— Statutory responsibilities and the names of persons able to take actions to
discharge them;
— Availability of emergency equipment, including a list of the equipment that
should be available and its location;

79
 — Availability of first aid equipment, including a list of the equipment that
should be available, its location and the names of persons trained to use it
(where applicable);
— An outline of the post-emergency recovery procedures designed to restore
normal operating conditions.

11.9. Emergency procedures should consist of concise, unambiguous and easily

followed instructions. They should identify situations requiring emergency
actions and specify the immediate action to be taken to minimize radiation
exposures to persons in the vicinity of the irradiator. They should foresee the
development of a written contingency plan for effecting entry into the irradiation
room.

11.10. The plan should contain the names and telephone numbers of the
responsible individuals to be contacted. Notices should be clearly visibly inside
the facility at locations where they might be needed, showing:

— How to contact a radiation protection officer or an alternative person, who

should be notified immediately of any emergency;
— How to call the fire brigade and medical services;
— Where to find emergency equipment.

11.11. In an emergency, liaison should be maintained with relevant off-site

services or agencies, as appropriate to the situation. These services or agencies
will include ambulance, fire, police and hospital services, and local and national
authorities. In the event of an accident, it is the duty of the operating organization
to initiate the emergency procedures, to coordinate the initial response of the
emergency services and other bodies, and to inform the regulatory body and all
relevant parties.

11.12. For emergencies in which follow-up action is required to remedy the

situation, such as a stuck source rack in a gamma irradiator, the manufacturer or
equipment supplier should be contacted, along with the regulatory body. The
equipment supplier should have specialized knowledge in dealing with such
situations and may be able to offer immediate advice by telephone.

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

11.13. Operating organizations should ensure that all necessary equipment is

readily available to deal with foreseeable emergencies. For accidents at gamma

80
irradiators, the items listed below should be included. Irradiator facilities with
machine produced radiation sources may not require all the radiation detection
instruments listed below. The specific equipment required would be determined
in the development of the facility emergency plan.

— Appropriate and functioning survey meters to measure both dose rates and
contamination;
— Personal alarm and direct reading dosimeters (preferably electronic);
— Additional personal dosimeters (thermoluminescent dosimeters or film
badges);
— Barrier materials and notices;
— Communication equipment (e.g. mobile phones, walkie-talkies);
— Spare batteries for survey meters, personal electronic dosimeters, mobile
phones and torches;
— Suitable stationery supplies, including an incident logbook;
— Equipment manuals;
— First aid equipment;
— A copy of the emergency procedures.

11.14. Emergency equipment should be kept in a clearly labelled cabinet in a

readily accessible place. A list of the emergency equipment should be affixed to
the cabinet. Audits should be made periodically and immediately after use of the
equipment to ensure that all items are present and functioning correctly, or that
they are replaced as necessary.

TRAINING FOR EMERGENCIES

11.15. All persons with a role in the emergency plans should be adequately
trained to ensure efficient and effective performance of their roles. This should
include both familiarization with and understanding of the emergency plans,
together with training in the use of the emergency equipment. Training should be
reviewed and recorded at appropriate intervals.

11.16. The operating organization is required to inform staff of any emergency

plan that might affect their area of work, and of their role if the plan has to be
implemented, and it should arrange for staff training and emergency drills
appropriate to each situation. Training should include the review of lessons
learned from previous emergencies.

81
11.17. At intervals commensurate with the potential hazards, emergency
exercises should be held to test critical components of the emergency plans. In
addition to personnel training, these exercises serve as an evaluation of the
adequacy of the emergency plan. Any lessons learned from the conduct of
emergency exercises should be reviewed, documented and incorporated into
training programmes or emergency plans as appropriate.

PERIODIC REVIEWS OF EMERGENCY PLANS

11.18. The operating organization should review the emergency plan at

appropriate intervals, normally not exceeding 12 months. This is to ensure that:

— Names of persons and contact details (telephone and fax numbers, email
addresses, etc.) are up to date;
— Emergency equipment is readily available and is maintained;
— Contingency planning is still adequate to address reasonably foreseeable
events.

11.19. Emergency plans should always be reviewed following relevant

operational changes and in conjunction with analysis of and lessons learned from
accidents in similar facilities or with similar radiation sources.

82
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[13] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
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[31] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe Transport
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Radioactive Material, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 9, IAEA, Vienna (2008).
[33] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
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CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH
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Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, IAEA, Vienna (2002).
[34] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
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85
.
 CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW

MacKenzie, C International Atomic Energy Agency

McKinnon, D. Consultant, Canada

Plante, J. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canada

Reber, E. International Atomic Energy Agency

Smith, M. Sterigenics International, United States of America

Tattersall, P. Health Protection Agency, United Kingdom

87
.
 BODIES FOR THE ENDORSEMENT
OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

An asterisk denotes a corresponding member. Corresponding members receive

drafts for comment and other documentation but they do not generally participate
in meetings. Two asterisks denote an alternate.

Commission on Safety Standards

Argentina: González, A.J.; Australia: Loy, J.; Belgium: Samain, J.-P.; Brazil:
Vinhas, L.A.; Canada: Jammal, R.; China: Liu Hua; Egypt: Barakat, M.; Finland:
Laaksonen, J.; France: Lacoste, A.-C. (Chairperson); Germany: Majer, D.; India:
Sharma, S.K.; Israel: Levanon, I.; Japan: Fukushima, A.; Korea, Republic of:
Choul-Ho Yun; Lithuania: Maksimovas, G.; Pakistan: Rahman, M.S.; Russian
Federation: Adamchik, S.; South Africa: Magugumela, M.T.; Spain: Barceló
Vernet, J.; Sweden: Larsson, C.M.; Ukraine: Mykolaichuk, O.; United Kingdom:
Weightman, M.; United States of America: Virgilio, M.; Vietnam: Le-chi Dung;
IAEA: Delattre, D. (Coordinator); Advisory Group on Nuclear Security:
Hashmi, J.A.; European Commission: Faross, P.; International Nuclear Safety
Group: Meserve, R.; International Commission on Radiological Protection:
Holm, L.-E.; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Yoshimura, U.; Safety Standards
Committee Chairpersons: Brach, E.W. (TRANSSC); Magnusson, S. (RASSC);
Pather, T. (WASSC); Vaughan, G.J. (NUSSC).

Nuclear Safety Standards Committee

Algeria: Merrouche, D.; Argentina: Waldman, R.; Australia: Le Cann, G.; Austria:
Sholly, S.; Belgium: De Boeck, B.; Brazil: Gromann, A.; *Bulgaria:
Gledachev, Y.; Canada: Rzentkowski, G.; China: Jingxi Li; Croatia: Valčić, I.;
*Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech Republic: Šváb, M.; Egypt: Ibrahim, M.;
Finland: Järvinen, M.-L.; France: Feron, F.; Germany: Wassilew, C.; Ghana:
Emi-Reynolds, G.; *Greece: Camarinopoulos, L.; Hungary: Adorján, F.; India:
Vaze, K.; Indonesia: Antariksawan, A.; Iran, Islamic Republic of:
Asgharizadeh, F.; Israel: Hirshfeld, H.; Italy: Bava, G.; Japan: Kanda, T.; Korea,
Republic of: Hyun-Koon Kim; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Abuzid, O.; Lithuania:
Demčenko, M.; Malaysia: Azlina Mohammed Jais; Mexico: Carrera, A.; Morocco:
Soufi, I.; Netherlands: van der Wiel, L.; Pakistan: Habib, M.A.; Poland:
Jurkowski, M.; Romania: Biro, L.; Russian Federation: Baranaev, Y.; Slovakia:
Uhrik, P.; Slovenia: Vojnovič, D.; South Africa: Leotwane, W.; Spain:
Zarzuela, J.; Sweden: Hallman, A.; Switzerland: Flury, P.; Tunisia: Baccouche, S.;

89
Turkey: Bezdegumeli, U.; Ukraine: Shumkova, N.; United Kingdom:
Vaughan, G.J. (Chairperson); United States of America: Mayfield, M.; Uruguay:
Nader, A.; European Commission: Vigne, S.; FORATOM: Fourest, B.;
IAEA: Feige, G. (Coordinator); International Electrotechnical Commission:
Bouard, J.-P.; International Organization for Standardization: Sevestre, B.;
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Reig, J.; *World Nuclear Association:
Borysova, I.

Radiation Safety Standards Committee

*Algeria: Chelbani, S.; Argentina: Massera, G.; Australia: Melbourne, A.;

*Austria: Karg, V.; Belgium: van Bladel, L.; Brazil: Rodriguez Rochedo, E.R.;
*Bulgaria: Katzarska, L.; Canada: Clement, C.; China: Huating Yang; Croatia:
Kralik, I.; *Cuba: Betancourt Hernandez, L.; *Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech
Republic: Petrova, K.; Denmark: Øhlenschlæger, M.; Egypt: Hassib, G.M.;
Estonia: Lust, M.; Finland: Markkanen, M.; France: Godet, J.-L.; Germany:
Helming, M.; Ghana: Amoako, J.; *Greece: Kamenopoulou, V.; Hungary:
Koblinger, L.; Iceland: Magnusson, S. (Chairperson); India: Sharma, D.N.;
Indonesia: Widodo, S.; Iran, Islamic Republic of: Kardan, M.R.; Ireland:
Colgan, T.; Israel: Koch, J.; Italy: Bologna, L.; Japan: Kiryu, Y.; Korea, Republic
of: Byung-Soo Lee; *Latvia: Salmins, A.; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Busitta, M.;
Lithuania: Mastauskas, A.; Malaysia: Hamrah, M.A.; Mexico: Delgado
Guardado, J.; Morocco: Tazi, S.; Netherlands: Zuur, C.; Norway: Saxebol, G.;
Pakistan: Ali, M.; Paraguay: Romero de Gonzalez, V.; Philippines: Valdezco, E.;
Poland: Merta, A.; Portugal: Dias de Oliveira, A.M.; Romania: Rodna, A.;
Russian Federation: Savkin, M.; Slovakia: Jurina, V.; Slovenia: Sutej, T.; South
Africa: Olivier, J.H.I.; Spain: Amor Calvo, I.; Sweden: Almen, A.; Switzerland:
Piller, G.; *Thailand: Suntarapai, P.; Tunisia: Chékir, Z.; Turkey: Okyar, H.B.;
Ukraine: Pavlenko, T.; United Kingdom: Robinson, I.; United States of America:
Lewis, R.; *Uruguay: Nader, A.; European Commission: Janssens, A.; Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Byron, D.; IAEA: Boal, T.
(Coordinator); International Commission on Radiological Protection: Valentin, J.;
International Electrotechnical Commission: Thompson, I.; International Labour
Office: Niu, S.; International Organization for Standardization: Rannou, A.;
International Source Suppliers and Producers Association: Fasten, W.; OECD
Nuclear Energy Agency: Lazo, T.E.; Pan American Health Organization:
Jiménez, P.; United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation: Crick, M.; World Health Organization: Carr, Z.; World Nuclear
Association: Saint-Pierre, S.

90
 Transport Safety Standards Committee

Argentina: López Vietri, J.; **Capadona, N.M.; Australia: Sarkar, S.; Austria:
Kirchnawy, F.; Belgium: Cottens, E.; Brazil: Xavier, A.M.; Bulgaria:
Bakalova, A.; Canada: Régimbald, A.; China: Xiaoqing Li; Croatia:
Belamarić, N.; *Cuba: Quevedo Garcia, J.R.; *Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech
Republic: Ducháček, V.; Denmark: Breddam, K.; Egypt: El-Shinawy, R.M.K.;
Finland: Lahkola, A.; France: Landier, D.; Germany: Rein, H.; *Nitsche, F.;
**Alter, U.; Ghana: Emi-Reynolds, G.; *Greece: Vogiatzi, S.; Hungary: Sáfár, J.;
India: Agarwal, S.P.; Indonesia: Wisnubroto, D.; Iran, Islamic Republic of:
Eshraghi, A.; *Emamjomeh, A.; Ireland: Duffy, J.; Israel: Koch, J.; Italy:
Trivelloni, S.; **Orsini, A.; Japan: Hanaki, I.; Korea, Republic of: Dae-Hyung
Cho; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Kekli, A.T.; Lithuania: Statkus, V.; Malaysia:
Sobari, M.P.M.; **Husain, Z.A.; Mexico: Bautista Arteaga, D.M.; **Delgado
Guardado, J.L.; *Morocco: Allach, A.; Netherlands: Ter Morshuizen, M.; *New
Zealand: Ardouin, C.; Norway: Hornkjøl, S.; Pakistan: Rashid, M.; *Paraguay:
More Torres, L.E.; Poland: Dziubiak, T.; Portugal: Buxo da Trindade, R.; Russian
Federation: Buchelnikov, A.E.; South Africa: Hinrichsen, P.; Spain: Zamora
Martin, F.; Sweden: Häggblom, E.; **Svahn, B.; Switzerland: Krietsch, T.;
Thailand: Jerachanchai, S.; Turkey: Ertürk, K.; Ukraine: Lopatin, S.; United
Kingdom: Sallit, G.; United States of America: Boyle, R.W.; Brach, E.W.
(Chairperson); Uruguay: Nader, A.; *Cabral, W.; European Commission: Binet, J.;
IAEA: Stewart, J.T. (Coordinator); International Air Transport Association:
Brennan, D.; International Civil Aviation Organization: Rooney, K.; International
Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations: Tisdall, A.; **Gessl, M.; International
Maritime Organization: Rahim, I.; International Organization for
Standardization: Malesys, P.; International Source Supplies and Producers
Association: Miller, J.J.; **Roughan, K.; United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe: Kervella, O.; Universal Postal Union: Bowers, D.G.; World Nuclear
Association: Gorlin, S.; World Nuclear Transport Institute: Green, L.

Waste Safety Standards Committee

Algeria: Abdenacer, G.; Argentina: Biaggio, A.; Australia: Williams, G.; *Austria:
Fischer, H.; Belgium: Blommaert, W.; Brazil: Tostes, M.; *Bulgaria:
Simeonov, G.; Canada: Howard, D.; China: Zhimin Qu; Croatia: Trifunovic, D.;
Cuba: Fernandez, A.; Cyprus: Demetriades, P.; Czech Republic: Lietava, P.;
Denmark: Nielsen, C.; Egypt: Mohamed, Y.; Estonia: Lust, M.; Finland: Hutri, K.;
France: Rieu, J.; Germany: Götz, C.; Ghana: Faanu, A.; Greece: Tzika, F.;
Hungary: Czoch, I.; India: Rana, D.; Indonesia: Wisnubroto, D.; Iran, Islamic

91
Republic of: Assadi, M.; *Zarghami, R.; Iraq: Abbas, H.; Israel: Dody, A.; Italy:
Dionisi, M.; Japan: Matsuo, H.; Korea, Republic of: Won-Jae Park; *Latvia:
Salmins, A.; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Elfawares, A.; Lithuania: Paulikas, V.;
Malaysia: Sudin, M.; Mexico: Aguirre Gómez, J.; *Morocco: Barkouch, R.;
Netherlands: van der Shaaf, M.; Pakistan: Mannan, A.; *Paraguay: Idoyaga
Navarro, M.; Poland: Wlodarski, J.; Portugal: Flausino de Paiva, M.; Slovakia:
Homola, J.; Slovenia: Mele, I.; South Africa: Pather, T. (Chairperson); Spain: Sanz
Aludan, M.; Sweden: Frise, L.; Switzerland: Wanner, H.; *Thailand: Supaokit, P.;
Tunisia: Bousselmi, M.; Turkey: Özdemir, T.; Ukraine: Makarovska, O.; United
Kingdom: Chandler, S.; United States of America: Camper, L.; *Uruguay:
Nader, A.; European Commission: Necheva, C.; European Nuclear Installations
Safety Standards: Lorenz, B.; *European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards:
Zaiss, W.; IAEA: Siraky, G. (Coordinator); International Organization for
Standardization: Hutson, G.; International Source Suppliers and Producers
Association: Fasten, W.; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: Riotte, H.; World
Nuclear Association: Saint-Pierre, S.

92
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10-09131
 R ELATED PUBLICATIONS

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES

IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1
STI/PUB/1273 (37 pp.; 2006)
ISBN 92–0–110706–4 Price: €25.00
INTERNATIONAL BASIC SAFETY STANDARDS
FOR PROTECTION AGAINST IONIZING RADIATION
AND FOR THE SAFETY OF RADIATION SOURCES
Safety Series No. 115
STI/PUB/996 (322 pp.; 1996)
ISBN 92-0-104295-7 Price: €78.50
SAFETY OF RADIATION GENERATORS AND
SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.10
STI/PUB/1258 (71 pp.; 2006)
ISBN 92–0–107506–5 Price: €25.00
CATEGORIZATION OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9
STI/PUB/1227 (70 pp.; 2005)
ISBN 92–0–103905–0 Price: €18.00
MANAGEMENT OF WASTE FROM THE USE OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN MEDICINE, INDUSTRY,
AGRICULTURE, RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.7
STI/PUB/1217 (88 pp.; 2005)
ISBN 92–0–113704–4 Price: €20.00
REGULATORY CONTROL OF RADIATION SOURCES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-1.5
STI/PUB/1192 (83 pp.; 2004)
ISBN 92–0–105004–6 Price: €25.00
BUILDING COMPETENCE IN RADIATION PROTECTION
AND THE SAFE USE OF RADIATION SOURCES
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.4
STI/PUB/1108 (44 pp.; 2001)
ISBN 92–0–100701–9 Price: €13.00
OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.1
STI/PUB/1081 (83 pp.; 1999)
ISBN 92–0–102299–9 Price: €14.50

www.iaea.org/books
Safety through international standards

The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the

environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

This fundamental safety objective of protecting people — individually

and collectively — and the environment has to be achieved without
unduly limiting the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that
give rise to radiation risks.

— Fundamental Safety Principles: Safety Fundamentals,

IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 (2006)

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA
ISBN 978–92–0–103710–7
ISSN 1020–525X