Case 2. Dimatulac V Villon (127107)

9/6/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 679

Dimatulac vs. Villon
*
G.R. No. 127107. October 12, 1998.
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA

DIMATULAC, petitioners, vs. HON. SESINANDO
VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice;
MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT,
MARTIN YABUT and FORTUNATO MALLARI,
respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Department of Justice Order

No. 223 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the
accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations.—DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes
the right of both the offended parties and the accused to appeal
from resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations.
Same; Same; Nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul,

reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals, forecloses the power or
authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in

court.—The underlined portion indisputably shows that the
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745fc6f2292651b57f003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/40
section refers to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held in

Marcelo v. Court of Appeals that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v.
Mogul, reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals, forecloses the
power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an
information already having been filed in court. The Secretary of
Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any
case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may
file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution,
is subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went
further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said
power or authority of the Secretary of Justice “without doing
violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court” which is quoted above.
Same; To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the

issuance of a hold departure order could obviously defeat the
purpose of said order.—As to the second issue, we likewise hold
that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in
his order of 26 March 1996, he deferred resolution on the motion
for a hold departure order until “such time that all the accused
who are out on bail are arraigned” and denied the motion to defer
proceedings for the reason that the “private prosecution has not
shown any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by
the Secretary of Justice.” Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic,
supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion.
Precisely, immediate action thereon was called for as the accused
were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the
country if they wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a
prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order could
obviously defeat the purpose of said order.
Same; Fiscals; Prosecutors are the representatives not of an

ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win every case but that justice be done.—Prosecutors
must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, they
are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obliga-
681
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 681

tion to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal

prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be
done. As such, they are in a peculiar and every definite sense the
servants of the law, whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.
Same; Judges; The judge “should always be imbued with a

high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice."—The
judge, on the other hand, “should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation
to promptly and properly administer justice.” He must view
himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a
religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest “in
the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious
liturgy,” the judge must render service with impartiality
commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in
him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge
lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his
discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within
reasonable confines. The judge’s action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law.
Same; When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal

case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case is
void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.—It
is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a
criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the
accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the
arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as
above discussed.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Rivera, Valdez & Associates for petitioners.
Florante A. Miano for private respondents.
682

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

1
The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum and 2
by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment in
this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners, children of the deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3)
Virgilio Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, may be
summarized as follows:
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL

PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM
WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED BUT
WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO
THE CUSTODY OF THE LAW; and (2) FILING
THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE DESPITE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID
PROSECUTOR’S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE
ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND
IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTIONS TO SET
ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT AND
RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE
APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND
NOT HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY THE
ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER
FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
MURDER AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE INFORMATION
FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the

antecedents.
________________
1 Rollo, 90.
2 Id., 51-52.
683
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 683

On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot

dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol,
Pampanga.
On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1
Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against
private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut,
Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti
David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit,
Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda,
SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir
Yumul, a certain “Danny,” and a certain “Koyang/Arding.”
The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360.
After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of
searching questions and answers, and finding probable
cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC
issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed
them to file their counter-affidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan
Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; while 3
only
Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.
On 1 December 1995, after 4 appropriate proceedings,
Judge David issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 95-
360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and that the accused were
probably guilty thereof. His findings of fact and conclusions
were as follows:
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the

leadership of Mayor Santiago “Docsay” Yabut, including two John
Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went to
Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3
Virgilio Dimatulac.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the
Municipal Hall of Masantol, Pampanga inquiring about PO3
Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of Mayor
Lacap for
________________
3 Original Record (OR), 9.

4 Id., 19-21.
684

the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of

PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they were able to reach the
house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol,
Pampanga.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck
the accused were all riding, stopped and parked in front of the
house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused
descended from the truck and positioned themselves around the
house while others stood by the truck and the Mayor stayed [in]
the truck with a bodyguard.
Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went
inside the house of Virgilio Dimatulac [and] were even offered
coffee.
[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to
Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to see the Mayor outside in front of
his house to say sorry.
[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down from his house, suddenly
[a] gun shot was heard and then, the son of Virgilio Dimatulac,
Peter Paul, started to shout the following words: “What did you do
to my father?!”
One of the men of Mayor “Docsay” Yabut shot Virgilio
Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he died; and before he expired,
he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor
“Docsay” Yabut as the one responsible.
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused “Docsay”
Yabut ordered his men to go on board the truck and immediately
left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago “Docsay”
Yabut gave money to accused John Doe Dan/Danny and Francisco
“Boy” Yambao was asked to bring the accused John Doe to Nueva
Ecija which he did.
Further, accused Santiago “Docsay” Yabut told his group to
deny that they ever went to Masantol.
The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on
the complainant and the witnesses presented, [is] satisfied that
there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder was committed and that the accused in conspiring and
confederating with one another are probably guilty thereof.
Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of
conspiracy.
685
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 685

That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of

arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut,
Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David,
Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda
and Juan Magat with no bail recommended.
However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and
Koyang/Arding, the court directed the police authorities to furnish
the court [a] descriptio personae of the accused for the purpose of
issuing the needed warrant of arrest.
The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and
affidavits of witnesses for them to file their counter-affidavits in
accordance to [sic] law.
As of this date, only accused Francisco “Boy” Yambao filed his
counter-affidavit and all the others waived the filing of the same.
A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused
Francisco Yambao which the court finds it [sic] straightforward
and more or less credible and seems to be consistent with truth,
human nature and [the] natural course of things and lack of
motives [sic], the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak
[compared to] the others, which [is why] the court recommends a
cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty, and the court’s
previous order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is
directed to forward the entire records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action,
together with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and 5
Juan
Magat to be remanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga. (Italics
supplied)
6
In a sworn statement, petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac
narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a
number of bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3
Virgilio Dimatulac to talk about a problem between the
Mayor and Peter Paul’s uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio
warmly welcomed the group and even prepared coffee for
them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio to come
down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but
hardly had Virgilio descended
________________
5 OR, 20-21.
6 Id., 5.
686

when Peter Paul heard a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not
see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor
Yabut’s companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was
killed because the latter spoke to the people of Minalin,
Pampanga, against the Mayor. Peter Paul added 7
in a
supplemental statement (Susog na Salaysay) that he
heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio 8killed.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Police Officer Leopoldo
Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police Station in
Masantol, Pampanga, declared that on 3 November 1995,
between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., while he was at the police
station, three men approached him and asked for directions
to the house of Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized
one of the men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of Minalin,
Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them
directions, but one of the three returned to ask whether
PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano
replied that Dimatulac was at home. The group left on
board a military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol,
Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray received a
telephone call at the police station reporting that someone
had shot Virgilio Dimatulac.
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation.
However, it is not clear from the record whether she
conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private
respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin
Yabut (hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not
submitted their counter-affidavits before the MCTC, except
accused “Danny” and “Koyang/Arding,” submitted their
counter-affidavits to Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Alfonso Flores. 9
In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the
YABUTs and the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the
other accused,
________________
7 OR, 6.
8 Id., 7.
9 Id., 9-18.
687
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 687

were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense

committed was only homicide, not murder. In support of
such finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:
The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder

qualified by treachery. It must be noted that to constitute
treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: 1) the
employment of the [sic] means of execution were give [sic] the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted x x x.
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was
clearly established by the evidence, such that the attack upon the
victim while descending the stairs was so sudden and unexpected
as to render him no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
However, the circumstances, as portrayed by witness Peter Paul
Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second requisite. According
to the said witness, the victim was already descending when
Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant to shoot him, and
immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would
therefore show that the assailant did not consciously adopt the
position of the victim at the time he fired the fatal shot. The
command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford no
opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of
attack. The act of Mayor Yabut in giving the command to shoot
further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not concert the
means and method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise
there would have been no necessity for him to give the order to
the assailant. The method and manner of attack was adopted by
the assailant at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable
position of the victim was not deliberately and consciously
adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the
crime reasonably believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide
as no circumstance would qualify the killing to murder.
Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended

that:
1. An information be filed with the proper court charging
Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and one
John Doe alias Danny as conspirators in the crime of Homicide;
688

2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino

Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat,
Arturo Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano
Magnaye, Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito
Miranda.
Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise
recommended.
The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a

hearing on 11 January 1996 and clarificatory questions
were propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.
On 23 February 1996, before the Information for
homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners,
appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores
10
to the Secretary
of the Department of Justice (DOJ). They alleged in their
appeal that:
1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
NOT ONLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER,
BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:
(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME

WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN AND WITH
THE USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR
AFFORD IMPUNITY;
(B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN
CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR
PROMISE;
(C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE
OCCASION OF A DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE,
WHEN THE SUPER TYPHOON “ROSING” WAS
RAGING ON NOVEM-BER 3, 1995;
(D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING

ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI
AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT
CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS
________________
10 OR, 36-50.
689
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 689

AS AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT

CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO AS AN ACCESSORY
TO MURDER.
To refute Alfonso-Flores’ finding that the means of
execution were not deliberately adopted, petitioners
asserted that the meeting of the accused and the victim
was not accidental as the former purposely searched for the
victim at the height of a typhoon, while accused Mayor
Santiago Yabut even remarked to his co-accused “Danny,”
“Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo,
bahala ka na” (Just stay close to him, you know what to
do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the stairs to goad
the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato
Mallari represented to the deceased that the latter was
being invited by a certain General Ventura. When the
victim declined the invitation by claiming he was sick,
accused Servillano Yabut persuaded the victim to come
down by saying, “[T]o settle this matter, just apologize to
the Mayor who is in the truck.” In view of that enticement,
the victim came down, while Danny waited in ambush. To
emphasize the accused’s resolve to kill the deceased,
petitioners further narrated that when the deceased ran
away after the first shot, the gunman still pursued him,
while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept away
at a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, “Tama
na, bilisan ninyo,” (That’s enough, move quickly) without
giving medical assistance to the deceased and without
exerting any effort to arrest the gunman.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was
furnished with a copy of the Appeal.
On 26 February 1996, Provincial11
Prosecutor Jesus Y.
Manarang issued a Resolution ordering the release of
accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and
Arturo Naguit (who were then detained) in view of the
aforementioned resolution of Alfonso-Flores, which, as
stated in the order, the Provincial Prosecutor approved “on
February 7, 1996.”
________________
11 OR, 4.
690

12
On 28 February 1996, an Information for Homicide,
signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Flores and
Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before
Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe,
Pampanga, against the YABUTs and John Doe alias
“Danny Manalili” and docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-
1667(M). The accusatory portion of the information read as
follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the

municipality of Masantol, province of Pampanga, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with deliberate intent to take the life of PO3
Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on his
abdomen with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting, upon him
a gunshot wound which cause[d] the death of the said victim.
All contrary to law.
The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was

signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on “2/27/96,”
i.e., a day before its filing in court.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura,
presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of
the YABUTs, each in the amount13 of P20,000.00, and
recalled the warrants for their arrest.
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had
entered his appearance as private prosecutor, filed two (2)
motions with the trial court: (1) a Motion 14
to Issue Hold
Departure Order Against All Accuseds 15
[sic]; and an (2)
Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, copies of which were
furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga. The second motion was grounded on the
pendency of the appeal
________________
12 Id., 1.
13 Id., 33.
14 OR, 52-53.
15 Id., 54-56.
691
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 691

before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was

attached to the motion. Judge 16
Roura set the motions for
hearing on 8 March 1996.
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered 17
the arrest of the
remaining accused, Danny Manalili. 18
On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition to
the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order and the Motion
to Defer Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the
first, by posting bail bonds, they submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court and were bound by the
condition therein to “surrender themselves whenever so
required by the court, and to seek permission from the
court should any one of them desire to travel”; and, as to
the second, the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary
of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment;
moreover, the trial court had to consider their right to a
speedy trial, especially since there was no definite date for
the resolution of the appeal. Then invoking19
this Court’s
rulings in Crespo 20
v. Mogul and Balgos v.
Sandiganbayan, the YABUTs further asserted that
petitioners should have filed a motion to defer the filing of
the information for homicide with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from the Secretary of
Justice, an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to
defer the filing21 of the information in court.
In a Reply to the opposition, the private prosecution,
citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted
on the need for a hold-departure order against the accused;
argued that the accused’s right to a speedy trial would not
be impaired because the appeal to the Secretary of Justice
was filed pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the
DOJ and
________________
16 Id., 59.
17 Id., 62.
18 Id., 63-71.
19 151 SCRA 462 [1987].
20 176 SCRA 287 [1989].
21 OR, 78-83.
692

there was clear and convincing proof that the killing was
committed with treachery and other qualifying
circumstances not absorbed in treachery; and contended
that the accused’s invocation of the right to a speedy trial
was inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory
motions during the 22
preliminary investigation. The YABUTs
filed a Rejoinder to this Opposition.
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of
the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until “such
time that all the accused who are out on bail are
arraigned,” but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as
he found no compelling reason therefor, considering that
although the appeal was filed on 23 February 1996, “the
private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the]
appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice.”
Judge Roura 23
also set the arraignment of the accused on 12
April 1996.
It would appear that the private prosecution moved to
reconsider the order denying the Motion to Defer
Proceedings
24
since, on 12 April 1996, Judge Roura issued an
Order giving the private prosecutor “ten (10) days from
today within which to file a petition for certiorari
questioning the order of the Court denying his motion for
reconsideration of the order of March 26, 1996.”
Arraignment was then reset to 3 May 1996.
On 19 April25
1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit
Judge Roura from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M)
on the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for
arraignment while the former’s appeal in the DOJ was still
pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having
remarked in open court that there was “nothing in the
records of the case that would qualify the case into
Murder.” At 26
the same time, petitioners filed a petition for
prohibition with the Court of
________________
22 Id., 92-97.
23 Id., 100.
24 Id., 118.
25 OR, 139-141.
26 Id., 129-136.
693
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 693

Appeals docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to

enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).
On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor 27
Olimpio R. Datu
filed a Manifestation and Comment with the trial court
wherein he opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura;
manifested that “there is nothing in the record . . . which
shows that the subject killing is qualified into murder”; and
announced that he “will no longer allow the private
prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of [the]
case” in view of the latter’s petition to inhibit Judge Roura.
On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited
himself and ordered the case transferred to Branch 54 of
the RTC, presided28 over by herein public respondent Judge
Sesinando Villon.
On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch
54 of the29RTC received the record of Criminal Case No. 96-
1667(M).
On 30 April30 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a
Manifestation submitting, in connection with their Motion
to Defer Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura,
documentary evidence to support their contention that the
offense committed was murder, not homicide. The
documents which they claimed were not earlier submitted
by the public prosecution were the following:
a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.

b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y
Dimatulac.
c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.
d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.
e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.
f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.
________________
27 Id., 142-143.
28 Id., 146-149.
29 Id., 210.
30 Id., 150-151.
694

g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary

Investigation of Criminal Case No. 95-360, containing the
testimony of:
a. Peter Paul Dimatulac

b. Vladimir D. Yumul
c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan
d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao
h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.

i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.
j. Sketch
k. Unscaled Sketch
Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals 31

promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a Resolution
directing respondent therein to file his comment to the
petition within ten days from notice and to show cause
within the same period “why no writ of preliminary
injunction should be issued as prayed for in the petition.”
However, the Court of Appeals “deferred action” on the
prayer for a temporary restraining order “until after the
required comment [was] submitted.”
On 3 May 32
1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte
Manifestation with the RTC, furnishing the trial court
with a copy of the aforementioned resolution of the Court of
Appeals and drawing the attention of the trial court to the
rulings of this Court in “Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA
150), Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals . . . as well as the
decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals.”
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an 33 order resetting
arraignment of the accused to 20 May 1996. On the 34
latter
date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty.
________________
31 OR, 224.
32 Id., 213-215.
33 Id., 218.
34 Id., 227-228.
695
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 695

Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed,

on 27 May 35 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment, citing the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 which, inter
alia, deferred resolution on the application for a temporary
restraining order “until after the required comment is
submitted by the respondent”; stressed that the filing of the
information for the lesser offense of homicide was “clearly
unjust and contrary to law in view of the unquestionable
attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to
murder”; and asserted that a number of Supreme Court
decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in view
of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ. 36
On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order
directing the accused to file their comment on the Urgent
Motion to Set Aside Arraignment within fifteen days from
notice. 37
In a letter addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated
7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary Teofisto
Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of
petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled that treachery was
present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, Pampanga “to amend the information filed
against the accused from homicide to murder,” and to
include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended
information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary
Guingona read as follows:
Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that

attended the killing of PO3 Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the victim
was suddenly shot while he was descending the stairs. The attack
was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and on his way to
make peace with Mayor Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to speak.
From the circumstances surrounding his killing, PO3 Dimatulac
was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of
attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by the
respondents to
________________
35 OR, 231-237.
36 Id., 244.
37 Id., 247-252.
696

ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The

admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on how
the principal respondent, Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the
assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately adopted
means to ensure the execution of the crime. According to him,
while they were on their way to the victim’s house, Mayor Yabut
already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, “Dikitan mo lang,
alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na.” This
explains why Danny positioned himself near the stairs of the
victim’s house armed with a handgun, such positioning was
precisely adopted as a means to ensure the accomplishment of
their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered nobody else but Danny
to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position was
very strategic to ensure the killing of the victim.
As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two
conditions must be present, to wit: (1) employment of means of
execution that gives the person [attacked] no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA
281 [1994]). In the case at bar, these (2) requisites are present as
established from the foregoing discussion. Hence, there being a
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed herein
is murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728
[1994]).
Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato
Mallari and Francisco Yambao, we find sufficient evidence
against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against Yambao.
As can be gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao, which
appears to be credible, Mallari tried also to persuade the victim to
go with them, using as a reason that he (victim) was being invited
by General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun which
was used in killing the victim. These actuations are inconsistent
with the claim that his presence at the crime scene was merely
passive.
On the other hand, we find credible the version and
explanation of Yambao. Indeed, under the obtaining
circumstances, Yambao had no other option but to accede to the
request of Mayor Yabut to provide transportation to the assailant.
There being an actual danger to his life then, and having acted
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear,38
reason dictates that
he should be freed from criminal liability.
________________
38 OR, 250-251.
697
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 697

39
The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, citing
Section 4 of 40“Administrative/Administration Order No. 223
of the DOJ.” 41
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation dated 21 June 1996,
petitioners called the trial court’s attention to the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, a copy of which was 42
attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation and Motion
dated 1 July 1996, petitioners asked the trial court to grant
their motion to set aside arraignment. Attached43 thereto
was a copy of the Manifestation and Motion of the
Solicitor General dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 wherein the Solicitor
General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that “in
the better interest of justice, [the] Petition for Prohibition
be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED
forthwith.” In support of said prayer, the Solicitor General
argued:
2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the

Secretary of Justice would find their Appeal
meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be
directed to upgrade the Information to Murder and
extreme prejudice if not gross injustice would
thereby have been avoided.
3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no
objection to the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining respondent Judge from holding further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-
________________
39 Id., 253-255.
40 The YABUTs must have had in mind DOJ Department Order (D.O.)
No. 223 dated 30 June 1993 and entitled “1993 Revised Rules on Appeals
from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations.” Sec. 4
thereof states:
[N]o appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned.
If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall
be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
41 OR, 256-257.
42 Id., 260-265.
43 Id., 266-269.
698

1667-M, particularly in holding the arraignment of the

accused,pending resolution of the Appeal with the
Secretary of Justice. 44
The YABUTs opposed petitioners’ Manifestation and
Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been
arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double
jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor—not the private
prosecutor—had45control of the prosecution of the case.
In his letter dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary of
Justice set aside his order to amend the information from
homicide to murder considering that the appeal was
rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the
accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas
of not guilty. The Secretary stated:
Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin

Yabut had already been arraigned on May 20, 1996 and had
pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as shown by a copy of
the court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition for review insofar
as the respondents-Yabut are concerned has been rendered moot
and academic.
However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari

should be included in the information for homicide.
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a
Motion for Leave to 46Amend Information and to 47
Admit
Amended Information. The Amended Information merely
impleaded Fortunato
48
Mallari as one of the accused.
In his Order of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied
petitioners’ motion to set aside arraignment, citing Section
4, DOJ Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the
Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996. Petitioners forthwith
moved for recon-
________________
44 OR, 270-273.
45 Id., 274-275.
46 OR, 300-301.
47 Id., 302.
48 Id., 306-307.
699
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 699

49
sideration of the order, arguing that the Motion to Defer
the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and
did not violate the accused’s right to speedy trial; and that
the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense to be charged
was murder and did not reverse such50finding. Petitioners
also cited the Solicitor General’s stand in CA-G.R. SP No.
40393 that hold-ing accused’s arraignment in abeyance was
proper under the circumstances. Finally, petitioners
contended that in proceed-ing with the arraignment despite
knowledge of a petition for prohibition pending before the
Court of Appeals, the trial court violated Section 3(d), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs
opposed the motion on the ground that 51
it raised no
argument which had not yet been resolved.
On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion
52
to Defer
Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, which the
trial court granted in view of petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order denying petitioners’53
motion to set aside private respondents’ arraignment. As
expected, Mallari moved to reconsider the trial court’s
order and54
clamored for consistency in the trial court’s
rulings. 55
In an order dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied
reconsideration of the order denying petitioners’ motion to
set aside arraignment, citing the YABUTs’ right to a
speedy trial and explaining that the prosecution of an
offense should be under the control of the public prosecutor,
whereas petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the
prosecutor before they filed various motions to defer
proceedings. Considering said
________________
49 Id., 310-320.
50 Supra note 43.
51 OR, 346-362.
52 Id., 335-337.
53 Id., 339.
54 Id., 368-373.
55 OR, 376-379.
700

order, Judge Villon deemed accused 56

Mallari’s motion for
reconsideration moot and academic.
On 16 October
57
1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 dismissing the
petition therein for having become moot and academic in
view of Judge Roura’s voluntary inhibition, the
arraignment of the YABUTs and the dismissal, by the
Secretary of Justice, of petitioners’ appeal as it had been
mooted by said arraignment.
Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura was
ordered by the Supreme Court to preside over cases
pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of
Macabebe, Pampanga,
58
which was previously presided over
by Judge Villon. Judge Roura informed the Office of the
Court Administrator and this Court that he had already
inhibited59 himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-
1667(M).
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant
Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. They
urge this Court to reverse the order of respondent Judge
denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside
arraignment of private respondents; order that no further
action be taken by any court in Criminal Case No. 96-
1667(M) until this petition is resolved; and order
respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors
concerned to amend the information from homicide to
murder.
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio
Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private
respondents tricked the victim into coming out of his house
and then shot him while he was going down the stairs.
There was, petitioners claim, “an orchestrated effort on the
part of [private respondents] to manipulate the rules on
administrative appeals with
________________
56 Id., 380.
57 Id., 382-385.
58 Id., 386.
59 Id., 390.
701
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 701

the end in view of evading prosecution for the [non-

bailable] offense of murder,” as shown by the following
events or circumstances:
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores

downgraded the nature of the crime committed to
homicide, a bailable offense, on strength of a motion
for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs who had
not yet been arrested.
(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to
Minalin after the killing and went into hiding for
four (4) months until the offense charged was
downgraded.
(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed
despite notice to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of the appeal filed with the Secretary of
Justice and request to defer any action on the case.
(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga
disallowed the private prosecutor from further
participating in the case.
(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings
and declared in open court that there was no prima
facie case for murder, notwithstanding the
pendency of petitioners’ appeal with respondent
Secretary of Justice.
(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura’s
order inhibiting himself and the order regarding
the transfer of the case to Branch 54, public
respondent Judge Villon set the case for
arraignment and, without notice to petitioners,
forthwith arraigned the accused on the information
for homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency
of the petition for prohibition before the Court of
Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.
(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor’s Office did
not object to the arraignment nor take any action to
prevent further proceedings on the case despite
knowledge of the pendency of the appeal.
702

(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the

resolution of 7 June 1996 of the Secretary of Justice
directing the amendment of the information to
charge the crime of murder.
Petitioners
60
argue that in light of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, respondent Judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction in proceeding with private respondents’
arraignment for homicide and denying petitioners’ motion
to set aside arraignment. Moreover, although respondent
Judge Villon was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No.
40393, he should have deferred the proceedings just the
same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the
RTC could proceed with the arraignment despite the
pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of
Justice. Further, Judge Villon unjustly invoked private
respondents’ right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely
three (3) months from the filing of the information on 23
February 1996; overlooked that private respondents were
estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding
after the killing, only to resurface when the charge was
reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial
Prosecutor’s bias in favor of private respondents. Judge
Villon should have been more circumspect as he knew that
by proceeding with the arraignment, the appeal with the
DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.
Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule
prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the
Secretary of Justice once the accused had already been
arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants
are the accused, since by submitting to arraignment, they
voluntarily abandon their appeal.
In their comment, private respondents contend that no
sufficient legal justification exists to set aside private
respondents’ arraignment, it having already been reset
twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 May 1996, due to petitioners’
pending appeal with the DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20
May 1996, due
________________
60 254 SCRA 307 [1996].
703
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 703

to the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of

the latter date, the DOJ had not yet resolved petitioners’
appeal and the DOJ did not request that arraignment be
held in abeyance, despite the fact that petitioners’ appeal
had been filed as early as 23 February 1996, at least 86
days prior to private respondents’ arraignment. They point
out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the RTC’s
26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer, opting
instead for Judge Roura’s refusal and recourse to the Court
of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued by the
Court of Appeals, it was but proper for respondent Judge to
proceed with the arraignment of private respondents, to
which the public and private prosecutors did not object.
Private respondents further argue that the decision of
respondent Secretary, involving as it did the exercise of
discretionary powers, is not subject to judicial review.
Under the principle of separation of powers, petitioners’
recourse should have been to the President. While as
regards petitioners’ plea that the Secretary be compelled to
amend the information from homicide to murder, private
respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as the
determination as to what offense was committed is a
prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the
President.
As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private
respondents theorize that appeal by complainants is
allowed only if the complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor
and not when there is a finding of probable cause, in which
case, only the accused can appeal. Hence, petitioners’
appeal was improper.
Finally, private respondents stress the fact that
petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the public
prosecutor of the private prosecutor’s authority to handle
the case.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the petition be
denied because: (a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ
Order No. 223, upon arraignment of the accused, the
appeal to the Secretary of Justice shall be dismissed motu
proprio; (b) the filing of the information for homicide was in
compliance with the
704

directive under Section 4(2), D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or

motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding
probable cause shall not hold the filing of the information
in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated petitioners
by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution by
the Court of Appeals of the petition for prohibition, and
since said Court did not issue any restraining order,
arraignment was properly had; and (d) reliance on Roberts
is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and others had not
been arraigned and respondent Judge had ordered the
indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending
resolution of their petitions before the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court.
We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of
this ponencia.
Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with
procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude that
something had gone awry in the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in manifest advantage to
the accused, more particularly the YABUTs, and grave
prejudice to the State and to private complainants, herein
petitioners.
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were
issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for their
temporary liberty. However, for one reason or another
undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs were not arrested;
neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never brought
into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal
Alfonso-Reyes, either motu proprio or upon motion of the
YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused
were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not have done so.
While it may be true that under the second paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial
prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation, as here, this
difference of opinion must be on the basis of the review of
the record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were
that all she did, as she had no other option under the
circumstances, she was without any other choice but to
sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs and all other
accused, except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of
their
705
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 705

counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching her

magnanimity in favor of the accused, Alfonso-Reyes
allowed the YABUTs to submit their counter-affidavits
without first demanding that they surrender because of the
standing warrants of arrest against them. In short,
Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make a mockery of
the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty
pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense of
homicide.
Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only
P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused “Danny,”
despite the fact that they were charged with homicide and
they were, at the time, fugitives from justice for having
avoided service of the warrant of arrest issued by the
MCTC and having failed to voluntarily surrender.
Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private
prosecution’s appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. She
could not have been ignorant of the fact that the appeal
vigorously assailed her finding that there was no qualifying
circumstance attending the killing, and that the private
prosecution had convincing arguments to support the
appeal. The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of
Justice confirmed the correctness of the private
prosecution’s stand and exposed the blatant errors of
Alfonso-Reyes.
Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-
Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28 February
1996. It is interesting to note that while the information
was dated 29 January 1996, it was approved by the
Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996. This
simply means that the Office of the Prosecutor was not,
initially, in a hurry to file the Information. No undue
prejudice could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were
filed even later for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact,
they filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the
filing of the Information. If Alfonso-Flores was extremely
generous to the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why
she could not afford the offended parties the same courtesy
by at least waiting for instructions from the Secretary of
Justice in view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to
voluntarily ask the latter for instructions. Clearly, under
the
706
circumstances, the latter course of action would have been

the most prudent thing to do.
Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs,
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga did not
even bother to motu proprio inform the trial court that the
private prosecution had appealed from the resolution of
Alfonso-Flores and had sought, with all the vigour it could
muster, the filing of an information for murder, as found by
the MCTC and established by the evidence before it.
Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to
accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor did not even have the decency to agree to defer
arraignment despite its continuing knowledge of the
pendency of the appeal. This amounted to defiance of the
DOJ’s power of control and supervision over prosecutors, a
matter which we shall later elaborate on. Moreover, in an
unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu,
had the temerity, if not arrogance, to announce that “he
will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or
handle the prosecution of [the] case” simply because the
private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge
Roura. Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended
parties here had not waived the civil action nor expressly
reserved their right to institute it separately from the
criminal action, then they had the right to intervene in the
criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal
to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last
paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
provides:
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice

reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the
corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the dismissal
of the complaint or information.
It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to

therein could be either the offended party or the accused.
707
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 707

More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of

the Secretary’s power of control
61
over prosecutors. Thus, in
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we emphatically held:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the

62
secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8,
and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of
justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The
scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in
Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
“(1) Supervision and Control.—Supervision and control shall include

authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law
or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x x.”
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A.

3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
“Section 3. x x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the
Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform
such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice
in the interest of public service.”
x x x x x x x x x
“Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the
same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department
Head who shall have
________________
61 278 SCRA 656, 676-678 [1997].

62 The 1987 Revised Administrative Code, Executive Order No. 292.
708

authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review,

modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau,
office, division or service.”
“Supervision” and “control” of a department head over his

subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:
“In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or

authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.”
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice

secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds
that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps
of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency
should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not
directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies
are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of

both the offended parties and the accused to appeal from
resolutions in preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations, as provided for in Section 1 and Section 4,
respectively. Section 1 thereof provides, thus:
SECTION 1. What May Be Appealed.—Only resolutions of the

Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or
City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the
subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as
otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a

criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not barred
from appealing from the resolution holding that only
homicide was committed, considering that their complaint
was for murder. By holding that only homicide was
committed, the Provincial
709
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 709

Prosecutor’s Office of Pampanga effectively “dismissed” the

complaint for murder. Accordingly, petitioners could file an
appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to
forever bar redress of a valid grievance, especially where
the investigating prosecutor, as in this case, demonstrated

what unquestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in
favor of the accused. Section 1 is not to be literally applied
in the sense that appeals by the offended parties are
allowed only in cases of dismissal of the complaint,
otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, Rules
of Court would be meaningless.
We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor
General and private respondents that Section 4 of DOJ
Department Order No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence,
pursuant to the second paragraph thereof, the appeal of
petitioners did not hold the filing of the information. As
stated above, Section 4 applies even to appeals by the
respondents or accused. The provision reads:
SEC. 4. Non-appealable Cases. Exceptions.—No appeal may be

taken from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional
State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable
cause except upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where
the appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is
arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be
dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding
probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the
information in court. (Italics supplied)
The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section

refers to appeals by respondents
63
or accused. So we held in
Marcelo v. Court of64Appeals that nothing in the ruling in
Crespo 65v. Mogul, reiterated in Roberts v. Court of
Appeals,
________________
63 235 SCRA 39, 48-49 [1994].

64 Supra note 19.
65 Supra note 60.
710

forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice

to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases
despite an information already having been filed in court.
The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far

as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint
or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a
motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the
Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is
subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went
further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed
said power or authority of the Secretary of Justice “without
doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court” which is quoted
above.
Indubitably then, there was, on the part of the public
prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the information
for homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties
of due process.
As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge
Roura acted with grave abuse
66
of discretion when, in his
order of 26 March 1996, he deferred resolution on the
motion for a hold departure order until “such time that all
the accused who are out on bail are arraigned” and denied
the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that the
“private prosecution has not shown any indication that
[the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of
Justice.” Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic, supports
the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely,
immediate action thereon was called for as the accused
were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to
leave the country if they wanted to. To hold that
arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold
departure order could obviously defeat the purpose of said
order. As to the second motion, Judge Roura was fully
aware of the pendency of petitioner’s appeal with the DOJ,
which was filed as early as 23 February 1996. In fact, he
must have
________________
66 OR, 100.
711
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 711

taken that into consideration when he set arraignment of

the accused only on 12 April 1996, and on that date, after
denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider the denial of the
motion to defer proceedings, he further reset arraignment

to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within
which to file a petition for certiorari to question his denial
of the motion to defer and of the order denying the
reconsideration. In any event, the better part of wisdom
suggested that, at the very least, he should have asked
petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned
them that if the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a
certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of
Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same time, moved to
inhibit Judge Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge
Roura to “voluntarily”
67
inhibit himself from the case on 29
April 1996 and to transfer the case to the branch presided
by public respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the
record of the case on 30 April 1996. From that time on,
however, the offended parties did not receive any better
deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch, Judge Villon issued
an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused
on 20 May 1996. If Judge Villon only perused the record of
the case with due diligence, as should be done by anyone
who has just taken over a new case, he could not have
helped but notice: (1) the motion to defer further
proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners
ten days within which to file a petition with the Court of
Appeals; (3) the fact of the filing of such petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 40393; (4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals
directing respondents to comment on the petition and show
cause why the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted and deferring resolution
of the application for a temporary restraining order until
after the required comment was filed, which indicated a
prima facie showing of merit; (5) the motion to inhibit
Judge Roura precisely because of his prejudgment that the
crime
________________
67 OR, 146-149.
712

committed was merely homicide; (6) Judge Roura’s

subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary
evidence submitted by petitioners on 30 April 1996
supporting a charge of murder, not homicide; and (8) most

importantly, the pending appeal with the DOJ.
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind,
especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these
were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a
miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately
held. However, Judge Villon cursorily ignored all this.
While it may be true that he was not bound to await the
DOJ’s resolution of the appeal, as he had, procedurally
speaking, complete control over the case and 68 any
disposition thereof rested on his sound discretion, his
judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the
documents submitted on 30 April 1996 and to initially
determine, for his own enlightenment with serving the
ends of justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder was
the offense committed; or, he could have directed the
private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal
within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances,
Judge Villon
69
should have heeded our statement in
Marcelo that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least, respect
for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he
should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then
pending before the DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not
have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public
prosecutor.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon
committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the
arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed information for
homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties were
deprived of due process.
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the
criminal justice system failed in this case to function in a
manner consistent with the principle of accountability
inher-
________________
68 Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 19 at 471.

69 Supra note 63.
713
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 713

ent in the public trust character of a public office. Judges

Roura and Villon and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu
need be reminded that it is in the public interest that every
70
70
crime should be punished and judges and prosecutors play
a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate duty to
see justice done, i.e., 71
not to allow the guilty to escape nor
the innocent to suffer.
Prosecutors must72
never forget that, in the language of
Suarez v. Platon, they are the representatives not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case
but that justice be done. As such, they are in a peculiar and
every definite sense the servants of the law, whose two-fold
aim is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the
community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected to
prosecute the public action with such zeal and vigor as if
they were the ones personally aggrieved, but at all times
cautious that they refrain from 73improper methods designed
to secure a wrongful conviction. With them lies the duty to
lay before the court the pertinent facts at the judge’s
disposal with strict attention to punctilios, thereby
clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in the
evidence, with a view to erasing all doubt from the court’s
mind as to the accused’s innocence or guilt.
The judge, on the other hand, “should always be imbued
with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer jus-
________________
70 United States v. Montaner, 8 Phil. 620, 629 [1907].

71 United States v. Mamintud, 6 Phil. 374, 376 [1906]; Suarez v. Platon,
69 Phil. 556, 565 [1940]; People v. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453, 459 [1948];
Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 19; Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192, 206, 210
[1994].
72 Supra note 71.
73 Supra note 71.
714

74
tice.” He must view himself as a priest, for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade.
Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest “in the
performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious
liturgy,” the judge must render service with impartiality

commensurate
75
with the public trust and confidence reposed
in him. Although the determination of a criminal case
before a judge76
lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and
competence, his discretion is not unfettered, 77
but rather
must be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge’s
action must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused, nor the right
78
of the State and offended party to
due process of law.
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance;
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of society and the offended parties which have
been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict
of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the
society offended
79
and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to
both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended
party, on the other.
In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the
public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was gross,
grave and palpable, denying the State and the offended
parties their day in court, or in a constitutional sense, due
process. As to said judges, such amounted to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the
jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby nullifying as having
been done without juris-
________________
74 Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA 705, 711 [1994].

75 People v. Bedia, 83 Phil. 909, 916 [1949].
76 Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 19 at 471.
77 See, e.g., Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 773
[1946].
78 Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 19 at 470, citing People v. Zabala, 58 OG
5028 and Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, 101 [1986].
79 People v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 450, 467 [1980].
715
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 715

diction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings,

the denial of the motion to reconsider such denial, the
arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty.
These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors

concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must remedy the
situation before the onset of any irreversible effects. We
thus have no other recourse, for as Chief Justice Claudio
80
Teehankee pronounced in Galman v. Sandiganbayan:
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict
and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all
alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice.
We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal

justicesystem that theirs is not a mere ministerial task to
processeach accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty
to preserveour democratic society under a rule of law.
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the
DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that
murder was committed and directing the Provincial
Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on
the basis of the information that the YABUTs had already
been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its
power of control and supervision over the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of
Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter’s
inappropriate conduct or even hostile attitude, which
amounted to neglect of duty or conduct preju-dicial to the
best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste of
Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of
the YABUTs. The sins of omission or commis-
________________
80 Supra note 78 at 86.
716

sion of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the

finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was murder,
in unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice
to the State and the offended parties. The DOJ should have
courageously exercised its power of control by taking bolder
steps to rectify the shocking “mistakes” so far committed
and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and
fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if
belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside
arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the
public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for
neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service in not, inter alia, even asking the trial court to
defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal,
informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status of the
case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in
disallowing the private prosecutor from further
participating in the case.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the
vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of
arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by
the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.
We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio
“reconsideration” of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ
was attended with grave abuse of discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due
process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of
discretion
81
on the part of the trial court,
82
the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case is void, hence double
jeopardy cannot be
________________
81 People v. Balicasan, 17 SCRA 1119, 1123 [1966]; People v. Court of

Appeals, supra note 79; Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 78 at 89.
82 People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121, 127 [1934]; People v. Gomez, 20 SCRA
293, 298 [1967]; People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, 404 [1971]; Serino v.
Zosa, 40 SCRA 433, 438-440 [1971]; People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 273
[1975]; Silvestre v. Military Commission
717
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 717

invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must

it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void,
as in this case as above discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of

Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the
Motion to Defer Proceedings and of 12 April 1996 denying
the motion to reconsider the denial of said Motion to Defer
Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando
Villon of 3 May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May
1998 and of 15 October 1996 denying the Motion to Set
Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are
declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of
private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano
Yabut and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not
guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE.
Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of
Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7
June 1996 REINSTATED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is
DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of the
Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with
the trial court the amended information for murder.
Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in said case with all
reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ.,

concur.
Petition granted, orders voided and set aside,

arraignment voided and set aside, order of Secretary of
Justice of 1 July 1996 set aside, while that of 7 June 1996
reinstated.
——o0o——
________________
No. 21, 82 SCRA 10, 18-19 [1978]; People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 170-
171 [1985]; People v. Castañeda, 165 SCRA 327, 343 [1988]; Portugal v.
Reantaso, 167 SCRA 712, 720 [1988]; Aquino v. Sison, 179 SCRA 648; 651-
652 [1989]; Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Br. 17, 213 SCRA 138,
148 [1992].
718
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9/6/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 679

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA

Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Department of Justice Order

Same; Same; Nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul,

680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimatulac vs. Villon

criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in

section refers to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held in

Same; To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the

Same; Fiscals; Prosecutors are the representatives not of an

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 681

Dimatulac vs. Villon

tion to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal

Same; Judges; The judge “should always be imbued with a

Same; When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimatulac vs. Villon

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL

The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 683

On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot

That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the

3 Original Record (OR), 9.

684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 685

That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of

686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 687

were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense

The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder

Alfonso-Flores then ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended

688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino

The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a

(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME

2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 689

AS AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the

The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 691

before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was

692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 693

Appeals docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to

a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary

a. Peter Paul Dimatulac

h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.

Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals 31

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 12, 1998 695