Tiu Peck Bayotas

G.R. No.
104404 May 6, 1993
SPOUSES TIU PECK and LEE YOK YAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and SPOUSES CONCHITA M.
RUBIATO and TAN KING, respondents.
J.P. Villanueva & Associates for petitioners.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for private respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Facts:
Parties entered into an agreement. Later, private respondents wrote petitioners demanding partition
of the properties subject of the Agreement. Eventually, private respondents filed an action against
petitioners for partition of the parcel of land where the lumber and hardware business was conducted
and the parcel of land where the piggery business was located.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, declaring, among other, things, that the parcels of land are
owned in common by the plaintiffs (private respondents) and the defendants in pro-indiviso equal
shares; that the plaintiffs (private respondents) are the owners of the building covered by Tax
Declaration No. 59345 built on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-24999; and ordering
plaintiffs and defendants to partition the said parcels of land among themselves.
Issue:
whether or not the agreement of 31 August 1983 is valid and binding between the petitioners and
private respondents.
Held:
Yes. There is no question that petitioners and the private respondents voluntarily entered into the
agreement to apportion or divide their businesses, whether as partners or co-owners. That
agreement is the law between them. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have
been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The fact that
after signing the agreement both parties immediately took possession of their respective shares is
the most compelling evidence that there was indeed a binding partition of the properties. Contracts,
once perfected, have the force of law between the parties who are bound to comply therewith in
good faith, and neither one may, without the consent of the other, renege therefrom.
And, as held by respondent court, even though petitioner Lee Yok Yan and respondent Conchita M.
Rubiato were not actual signatories to the agreement, nonetheless, such agreement is persuasive
for or against them. Indeed, private respondents have no justification to refuse delivery of TCT No.
T-24999 to petitioners after they agreed to the partition and consequently took possession of the
piggery business and operated it for three (3) years before changing their minds and seeking a new
partition. It has not been explained by them — as perhaps explanation is not possible — why it took
them three (3) years before they decided for another partition of the same properties subject of their
agreement on 31 August 1983.
. . . Contracts solemnly and deliberately entered into may not be overturned by
inconclusive proof or by reason of mistake of one of the parties to which the other in
no way has contributed.
The respondent court, in our view, erred in ordering another partition after ruling that there is no
partnership but a co-ownership of the real properties and businesses between the petitioners and
private respondents.
Moreover, the title of the contract does not necessarily determine its true nature.
The acts of the contracting parties, subsequent to, and in connection with, the
performance of the contract must be considered in the interpretation of the contract
To determine the nature of a contract, courts do not have or are not bound to rely
upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties . . . but the way the
contracting parties do or perform their respective obligations, stipulated or agreed
upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such performance conflict with the
name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 ROMERO, J. EN BANC
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of rape. Pending appeal, he died in prison.
Issue: W/n the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
Held:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensostrictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability
is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the Court held that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is
hereby dismissed without qualification.

Tiu Peck Bayotas

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Tiu Peck Bayotas

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Tiu Peck Bayotas

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No.

104404 May 6, 1993

SPOUSES TIU PECK and LEE YOK YAN, petitioners,

J.P. Villanueva & Associates for petitioners.

Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for private respondents.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA

You might also like