Robust and Universal Seamless Handover
Robust and Universal Seamless Handover
Robust and Universal Seamless Handover
ABSTRACT: The evolving fifth generation (5G) collection of highly flexible and multi-tier
cellular networks will be a collection of
heterogeneous and backward-compatible
heterogeneous networks (HetNets). The 5G
networks. With the increased heterogeneity and HetNets consist of densified small cell
densification of 5G heterogeneous networks deployment and overlay coverage through
(HetNets), it is important to ensure security and 5G new radio access networks (RANs) and
efficiency of frequent handovers in 5G wireless coexisting networks [6], such as Long Term
roaming environments. However, existing
handover authentication mechanisms still have
Evolution (LTE), LTE-Advanced (LTE-A)
challenging issues, such as anonymity, robust specified by Third Generation Partnership
traceability and universality. In this paper, RUSH Project (3GPP), and other non-3GPP radio
(Robust and Universal Seamless Handover) access networks including wireless local
authentication protocol is introduced to address area network (WLAN), code division
these issues for 5G HetNets. RUSH achieves
universal handover authentication for all the
multiple access (CDMA) 2000, and
diverse mobility scenarios, as exemplified by the worldwide interoperability for microwave
handover between 5G new radio and non-3GPP access (WiMAX). Along with the promising
access regardless of the trustworthiness of non- benefits, the heterogeneity of 5G HetNets
3GPP access and the consistency of the core inevitably introduces new challenges.
network. Comprehensive performance evaluation
results show that RUSH outperforms.
In 5G HetNets, a handover operation
KEY WORDS: RUSH (Robust and Universal involves user equipment (UE), access points
Seamless Handover), 5G Het-Nets, Handover (APs) and authentication servers which
authentication, Block chain and Chameleon typically refer to authentication,
hashing.
authorization, and accounting (AAA)
servers specified by the 3GPP committee.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the consistency of description, the
The explosive growth of wireless data traffic
authentication server function in a 5G core
driven by mobile Internet and smart
network (5GC) is target AP must engage in
terminals has triggered intensive research of
mutual authentication and key agreement
the fifth generation (5G) wireless networks,
which are the two fundamental security
which are designed to achieve lower cost
requirements of handover authentication.
and more energy efficiency as well as
The concrete form of an AP is determined
improved quality of service in terms of
by the type of the underlying access
communication delay, reliability, and
network. For instance, an AP can be an
security [5]. In particular, 5G will be
Evolved Node B (eNB) or a Home eNB
backward compatible tying any new air
(HeNB) in LTE-A, a base station in
interface with the existing solutions to
WiMAX or a WiFi hotspot. In 5G networks,
provide better user experiences and will be a
a 5G New Radio NodeB (gNB) can act as an The general concept is that each node has to
AP. More precisely, there are different tiers aware the location of a target node and its
in 5G HetNets, in which each tier models neighbour node only to make a transmission
base stations of a particular class such as decision. The self-description nature of
femto cells, pico cells, microcells, and location information is essential to
macro cells [7]. accomplish such stateless property.
optimality, which motives the simple network. An adversary may try to launch
separate consideration of NU and LSU typical protocol attacks including
decisions in practice [2]. From this impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-
separation principle and the monotonicity middle attacks, etc. Therefore, a handover
properties of optimal actions, we have authentication protocol for 5G HetNets
further showed that 1) for the LSU decision should realize mutual authentication
subproblem, there always exists an optimal between the UE and the target AP. After the
threshold-based update decision rule; and 2) UE comes to the area covered by the target
for the NU decision subproblem, an optimal AP, the communication between them may
threshold-based update decision rule exists be eaves dropped by adversaries, and hence
in a low-mobility scenario. To make the a session key agreement should be enabled
solution of the location update problem to be by the UE and the target AP during
practically implementable, a model-free handover authentication. To resist potential
low-complexity learning algorithm (LSPI) attacks due to the compromise of long-term
has been introduced, which can achieve a secret keys of UEs and APs, the compromise
near optimal solution. of the master secret key of AAA servers,
and the leakage of session-specific
The LSPI approach uses a single location temporary random data, a handover
server. The network is unlikely to scale to a authentication protocol should realize
large number of mobile nodes. Long round perfect forward secrecy, master key forward
trips to server even for distant nodes are secrecy and known randomness secrecy,
some of the problems in this approach. SO respectively. Additionally, user identity
this approach can be extended to use a privacy is taken into account in our security
distributed Grid Location Service (GLS) model. In the process of handover
oriented servers that is fault-tolerant, authentication, the UE does not need to
independent of specially designated nodes transmit its actual identity. It only transmits
and importantly scales to large number of a pseudo identity chosen by itself for
nodes. Our results hold for general mobility anonymity.
processes (possibly non uniform) and our
analytical technique can be extended to Under the protection of anonymity, some
other models with additional scheduling users may maliciously behave and harm
constraints. We also proposed two simple others in the system without worrying about
scheduling strategies that can achieve these being punished. Therefore, a handover
bounds arbitrarily closely at the cost of an authentication protocol should enable
increased delay. Both these schemes restrict traceability by revealing the malicious user’s
packets to at most 2 hops and make real identity. It is noted that the AAA server
scheduling decisions purely based on the is not fully trusted by users in our security
current user locations and independent of the model. Specifically, an innocent user might
actual queue backlogs. For both schemes, be framed by a dishonest or compromised
we computed bounds on the average packet AAA server. A secure handover
delay using a Lyapunov drift technique. . authentication protocol should realize
robustness which enables users to prove to
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM any third party that it is framed by the AAA
In RUSH, air interfaces are public and hence server. In order to realize secure
any adversary may compromise wireless communication without eavesdropping by
transmissions between UEs and the access any third party including the compromised
AAA server, key escrow freeness should be 2.3.2 Key Agreement with PFS, MKFS
realized for a UE to choose its long-term and KRS
secret key by itself. Currently, in 5G To achieve PFS and MKFS, leverage the
networks, the trusted SEEP is involved in idea of ECDH key agreement by adopting
communication between two 5GCs of two random values from each participant.
different operators. To eliminate trusted To realize KRS, we let the long-term secret
entities, we aim to realize universality for keys of both participants and the random
handover in 5G HetNets. In other words, values mentioned above contribute equally
inter domain handover authentication should to the generation of a session key.
be supported. Moreover, the two
fundamental requirements, mutual 2.3.3 Anonymity, Traceability and
authentication and key agreement, should be Robustness
proved formally. To guarantee the quality of Existing solutions only realize limited
service in 5G HetNets, handover anonymity because pseudo identities are
authentication protocols should be as specified in advance by an AAA server. In
efficient as possible. RUSH, a UE chooses a random pseudo
identity in real time. To address the issue of
The main idea behind RUSH is presented traceability, RUSH allows the AAA server
for realizing the aforementioned design to trace and reveal the actual identity of the
goals. malicious UE based on public authentication
messages. In fact, the AAA server just needs
2.3.1 Inter-domain Mutual to calculate the chameleon hash value and
Authentication with KEF compare it with the one in the block chain.
A secure chameleon hash function allows an To protect an honest UE from being framed
entity who has a secret key (i.e., trapdoor) to in the process of traceability, RUSH realizes
compute a collision. Therefore, given a pre- robustness based on chameleon hash
registered hash value, the ability to generate function and digital signature.
a new collision of the same hash value
implicitly indicates a UE (resp. AP) knows The interfaces at the top level have been
the trapdoor and hence is legitimate. In categorized as A Console based Server
RUSH, a chameleon hash value is first User Interface. The Server is limited to
generated by the UE (resp. AP) and then is console mode because it just offers services,
recorded in a block chain by an AAA server. performs pre coded operations and actions.
The correctness of the chameleon hash value For an effective representation we construct
in the block chain can be checked by the UE client interface in GUI mode. It involves
(resp. AP) which ensures the global from joining the network, implementing
consistency of the hash value. The trapdoor authentication procedures (with batch
is completely chosen by the UE (resp. AP), authentication schemes), operations such as
which enables mutual authentication with sending, receiving (using message ciphering
the property of KEF. Immutability and schemes), finding other neighbor nodes,
finality of block chain records allow cache implementations.
handover authentication between
heterogeneous access networks of different
domains.
VI. REFERENCES
Fig. 2: NODE 1 GENERATION
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Fig. 4: NODE 3 GENERATION
1
M. SANJEEV KUMAR
working as Assistant professor at
Nalanda Institute of Engineering
And Technology, Kantepudi,
Guntur Dist., Andhra Pradesh.
2
D. SRI LAYSA Pursuing
B.Tech at Nalanda Institute of
Engineering And Technology,
Kantepudi, Guntur Dist., Andhra
Pradesh.