FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 213687, January 08, 2020 ]

SIMON R. PATERNO, PETITIONER, VS. DINA MARIE LOMONGO

PATERNO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
The Facts and The Case

Assailed in this Petition for Review on   Certiorari[1]   are the

Decision[2] dated October 31, 2013 and Resolution[3] dated July 31,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124473, which
affirmed the Orders dated November 29,2011[4]   and February
27,2012[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, Makati
City (Branch 136) which ordered the partial delivery of respondent
Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno's share in the conjugal partnership and
directed petitioner Simon R. Paterno to increase the monthly support
to P250,000.00.

The petitioner and the respondent were married on December 27,

1987. After living together for about a decade, the petitioner left the
family abode in June 1998. On June 9, 2000, petitioner filed a
petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to the respondent on the ground of the latter's psychological
incapacity. This was granted by Branch 144 of RTC Makati (Branch
144) in a Decision dated March 11, 2005, where both parties were
adjudged to be psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital
obligations to each other. The March 11, 2005 Decision had attained
finality. However, the proceedings for the liquidation, partition,
distribution of the common properties and the delivery of their
children's presumptive legitimes remain pending before Branch
144.[6]

On September 26, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for the

issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum seeking to
present the petitioner as a hostile witness for him to testify and
present documents relative to the salaries he received and the
properties he acquired from the time the parties separated in fact
until the declaration of nullity of their marriage had become
final.[7]   The same was granted by the trial court, prompting the
petitioner to move for the quashal of the subpoena.[8]

In an Order dated November 22, 2006, Branch 144 ruled in favor of

the petitioner and recalled the subpoena   duces tecum   and   ad
testificandum. It held that under Article 147 of the Family Code,
salaries and wages earned by either party after the   de facto
separation of the parties in June 1998 are not considered part of the
co-owned properties but belong solely to the earning spouse.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but the trial court denied it.[9]

Aggrieved, the respondent filed a Petition for  Certiorari   before the

CA assailing the Decision and Resolution of Branch 144 for allegedly
being issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. In a Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed
the petition. The respondent moved for reconsideration but the CA
denied it in a Resolution dated October 22, 2007.[10]

Not accepting defeat, the respondent filed a Petition for Review

on Certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 180226.

In the meantime, the proceedings for the liquidation, partition,

distribution of the common properties of the parties was re-raffled to
Branch 136.[11]

On May 6, 2009, without prejudice to the outcome of her Petition for

Review (G.R. No. 180226), respondent filed an Omnibus Motion
before Branch 144 which sought the following affirmative reliefs: (a)
appraisal of the purportedly admitted co-owned properties of the
dissolved union of the parties; (b) partition of the purportedly
admitted co-owned properties of the dissolved union and delivery of
respondent's share therein; (c) require the petitioner to render full
accounting of all fruits accruing from the purportedly admitted co-
owned properties; and (d) in the alternative the delivery of
respondent's share, and the appointment of an independent
administrator/receiver of the purportedly admitted co-owned
properties.[12] The following are the properties which the respondent
alleged were admitted by both parties to be co-owned by them:
(1) House and lot in Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City;
(2) Condominium unit in Rockwell, Makati City;
(3) Club membership at the Riviera Gold and Country Club;
(4) Shares of stock in Little Gym;
(5) Shares of stock in Mamita Realty;
(6) Dodge Caravan;
(7) Paintings by various known artists;
(8) Pieces of accent furniture; and
(9) Collection of books by various known authors.[13]
Petitioner opposed the Omnibus Motion in his
Comment/Opposition dated June 1, 2009. He vehemently objected to
the characterization of the above-listed properties as being
admittedly co-owned properties. Petitioner contended that while the
Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were purchased during the
parties' union, the mortgage payments for these properties have been
made after they separated in fact solely from his exclusive funds. As
such, the trial court cannot as yet make a true and accurate
appraisal of the said properties without ruling on the status of the
payments made by the petitioner in servicing the loans taken for the
said properties. Thus, the trial court should defer the proceedings
before it pending the resolution of the case (G.R. No. 180226) before
the Supreme Court (SC).[14]

On September 22, 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation and Urgent

Motion to Resolve Respondent's Omnibus Motion dated 06 May 2009
and For Additional Support and/or Establishment of Trust Fund.[15]

In an Order[16]   dated November 29, 2011, the RTC granted the

motion of the respondent for partial distribution of her share in the
conjugal partnership despite the pendency of the Petition for Review
before the SC. lt held that the resolution of the said motion will not
preempt the decision of the SC in the petition before it inasmuch as
the issue raised therein is whether the respondent has a share in the
properties acquired by the petitioner during their separation in fact
and prior to the final declaration of nullity of their marriage, while
the matter before the trial court only pertained to the properties of
the parties that they admitted were owned in common by them. In
this case, even if the parties were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the RTC still applied the same in resolving
questions on their property relations. The RTC ruled that when their
marriage was declared void, the conjugal partnership of gains was
automatically dissolved and their property relations was converted
into an ordinary co-ownership. As a co-owner, the respondent has the
full ownership of the part, as well as the fruits and benefits
pertaining to her share. She may alienate, assign, mortgage, or
demand its partition insofar as her share is concerned. Since no
evidence exists to show that the club membership at the Riviera Golf
and Country Club, shares of stock of Little Gym and Mamita Realty,
Dodge Caravan, paintings, pieces of accent furniture, and books are
the exclusive property of the petitioner, they are presumed to be
conjugal. While petitioner claims that he was the one paying for the
monthly amortizations of the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties
that were acquired during the marriage, he failed to present any
proof that the properties belonged to him exclusively. Thus, just like
the rest of the properties, they are also presumed to be conjugal. To
protect the interest of the respondent and taking into account the
needs of the children, the Court deemed it proper to advance her
share in the conjugal partnership upon the posting of P50,000.00
bond. The RTC also increased the monthly support to P250,000.00
taking into consideration the health condition of Juliana Paterno and
the standard of living the children have been accustomed to and the
financial resources of the petitioner.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the trial court denied it

in a Resolution[17] dated February 27, 2012.

Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

In a Decision[18] dated October 31, 2013, the CA held that the RTC

did not gravely abuse its discretion when it resolved respondent's
motion despite the pendency of respondent's Petition for Review
before the SC considering that the issue raised in the petition before
the SC centers on the ownership of the properties acquired after the
parties have separated de facto but prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of their marriage, while the properties involved in the
assailed Orders of the RTC included those properties acquired at the
time they were still living together as husband and wife. As such, the
determination of the issue before the RTC will not affect the outcome
of the case pending before the SC as would necessitate it to defer its
proceedings until after the SC shall have resolved the case before
it.[19]

The CA rejected petitioner's claim that he was deprived of due

process and that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it resolved the motion for reconsideration without waiting for his
Reply to respondent's comment (to the motion for reconsideration)
since no ground had been shown to justify why the required Reply
could not be filed on time.[20] The CA refused to rule on the other
issues raised by the petitioner, namely: whether the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in (a) ruling that the property relation
of the spouses was converted to an ordinary co-ownership after the
dissolution of the marriage; (b) ruling that petitioner claimed the
subject properties as his exclusive properties; and (c) awarding an
increase in the amount of support to P250,000.00 a month for being
not proper in a petition for certiorari as they were merely errors of
judgment, and not errors of jurisdiction.[21]

Not satisfied, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
The Issues
The Petitioner submits the following Issues for this Court's
consideration:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID
NOT SET ASIDE THE ORDERS DATED 29 NOVEMBER 2011 AND
27 FEBRUARY 2012 ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE
SAID ORDERS HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED DECISION, AND AFFIRMED
THE SAME IN THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE ASSAILED DECISION DID NOT EXPRESS
THEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE
LAW ON WHICH THE SAME WAS BASED.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT'S OWN PETITION
PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT (G.R. NO. 180226,
ENTITLED "DINA MARIE LOMONGO PATERNO [V] SIMON R.
PATERNO") DID NOT NECESSITATE THE OBSERVANCE OF
JUDICIAL COURTESY.
III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT RULED THAT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS
NOT ATTENDANT IN THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDERS DATED 29
NOVEMBER 2011 AND 27 FEBRUARY 2012 THAT WERE
PATENTLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.
IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT RULED THAT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS
NOT ATTENDANT IN THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDERS DATED 29
NOVEMBER 2011 AND 27 FEBRUARY 2012 THAT WERE BASED
ON A GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
V

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT RULED THAT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS
NOT ATTENDANT WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED THE
ORDER DATED 27 FEBRUARY 2012 WITHOUT GIVING HEREIN
PETITIONER THE OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY ARGUE HIS
POSITION.[22]
The Arguments of the Parties

The petitioner contends that the Decision rendered by the CA did not
comply with the Constitutional requirement that decisions must
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
when the appellate court brushed aside its last three arguments and
simply declared that they were not proper for a petition
for   certiorari   as they were errors of judgment and not errors of
jurisdiction. Such non-compliance with the Constitutional mandate
violates petitioner's right to due process and constitutes a reversible
error on the part of the CA.[23]

Petitioner also claims that the CA seriously erred when it ruled that
the trial court need not observe judicial courtesy and correctly
proceeded to rule on the motion for the partial distribution of the
subject properties despite the pendency of the case before the SC. He
explains that the presumption of equal shares in the special co-
ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code applies only to
properties that were acquired during the parties' cohabitation. After
their separation   de facto, the presumption can no longer arise.
Although the Ayala Alabang house and Rockwell condominium were
acquired while the union was still subsisting, they were only paid
long after the parties stopped living together with petitioner's sole
efforts constituting the majority of the payments therefor. As such,
there is a need for the trial court to await the ruling of the SC on
whether the contributions made by the petitioner in the form of
amortizations for the relevant properties still form part of the co-
ownership despite having been paid after the parties had separated,
and after the presumption of equal shares had ceased to become
applicable.[24]

Petitioner likewise attacks the assailed Decision for contravening

established doctrines. He argues that it was reversible error on the
part of the CA when it ruled that the trial court did not gravely
abuse its discretion when the latter granted the motion for partial
distribution of the properties despite non-compliance with the two-
tiered procedure required for a valid partition. Petitioner explains
that in asking for a partial distribution, respondent was essentially
trying to effect the partition of co-owned properties. Before any
action for partition may be had, it must first be determined if the
parties are indeed co-owners of the properties subject of the partition
and how such properties will be divided between the claimants.
These two requisites are the very issues in G.R. No. 180266, in that
for him, there is no more co-ownership with respect to the payments
he made for the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties after the
parties had separated; whereas for the respondent, the same still
form part of the co-owned properties. The allowance by the trial court
of the partition of the subject properties without the said issues
having been first laid to rest by the SC is clearly grave abuse of
discretion.[25]

Petitioner went on to state that the CA erred when it found no grave

abuse of discretion in the trial court's pronouncement that the
parties' property relation was originally governed by conjugal
partnership of gains, which was then converted to an ordinary co-
ownership upon the declaration of nullity of their marriage. It is a
basic legal precept that a marriage declared void ab initio produces
no legal effect because the decree of nullity retroacts to the time of
the marriage. The property regime in such a situation is governed by
special co-ownership right from the beginning and without need of
conversion.[26]

It was also error on the part of the CA to have ruled that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it issued its Orders despite
the fact that they were based on misapprehension of facts. The trial
court grossly misunderstood petitioner's allegations of facts
respecting the ownership of the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell
properties. He never claimed said properties as his exclusively. He
merely stated that since portions of the mortgage payments for both
properties were made by him from his own exclusive funds after his
separation in fact with the respondent, such payments should not be
considered part of the co-owned properties, and must be adjudged to
belong to him exclusively.[27]

Furthermore, petitioner claims that the trial court committed the

same gross misapprehension of facts in ordering the increase of the
monthly support from P175,000.00 to P250,000.00. According to the
petitioner, he had been giving the respondent and their three
children support in the amount of P175,000.00 per month, the
amount approved by the trial court in 2003. The amount was for the
support   pendente lite, at the time when his marriage with the
respondent had not yet been declared void   ab initio   and the
proceedings for nullity of marriage was still pending. When the trial
court issued the November 29, 2011 Order, the circumstances of the
parties had already drastically changed which did not justify any
increase in support or even maintaining the same amount in that the
obligation of mutual support between the petitioner and the
respondent ceased after a final decree of nullity of marriage was
issued by the trial court. All three of petitioner and respondent's
children, Beatriz, Juliana and Margarita, were still minors and living
under the custody and care of the respondent at the time the trial
court ordered the petitioner to provide support in the amount of
P175,000.00 monthly. Since then, Beatriz and Juliana had reached
the age of majority and had ceased living with the respondent at the
time the November 29, 2011 Order was issued. At such time, it was
only Margarita who was under the custody of, and living with the
respondent at the Rockwell Condominium. Petitioner emphasizes
that it was he who exclusively shouldered and continued to shoulder
one hundred percent of Beatriz' living, maintenance, and educational
expenses all throughout her years in college, beginning 2007, the
year she went to the United States of America (USA) to study until
she graduated in May 2011. Now that Beatriz is studying law at
Harvard Law School, petitioner continues to shoulder all of her
expenses. As for Juliana, petitioner contends that she moved to his
house in 2010, and then left for the USA in February 2011 for her
schooling. He was also the one who shouldered 100% of her living,
maintenance, medical and educational expenses. Such expenses,
petitioner claims, were on top of the P175,000.00 monthly support
provided by him which was originally intended for the three children,
despite the fact that Beatriz and Juliana were no longer living with
the respondent. The increase in support cannot also be justified by
reason of Juliana's medical condition because he already paid for all
the expenses incurred for Juliana's medical treatment and no proof
had been presented to show that her medical condition recurred.
Petitioner adds, ever since Beatriz and Juliana became of majority
age and stopped living with the respondent, the latter ceased to have
personality or authority to claim support from the petitioner in their
behalf pursuant to Articles 234 and 236 of the Family Code as she
ceased to be their legal guardian. Petitioner claims further that
respondent is also obliged to provide support to their children, in
proportion to her salary, given that respondent is gainfully employed,
support being the joint obligation of the petitioner and the
respondent. The respondent cannot ask to be reimbursed for every
single expense she had spent. All these show that the necessities of
Beatriz and Juliana have been significantly reduced. Thus, the
ordered increase in support clearly lacked basis.[28]

Lastly, petitioner avers that the CA erred when it found no grave

abuse of discretion on part of the trial court when it issued its
February 27, 2012 Order without waiting for his Reply to
respondent's Comment and Opposition (to petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration). Since the respondent was given several extensions
of time to file various pleadings, he must likewise be accorded the
same treatment. However, instead of granting him equal treatment,
the trial court, without acting on his motion for extension of time to
file his reply, prematurely and hastily issued its February 27, 2012
Order denying his motion for reconsideration. By prematurely
deciding his motion for reconsideration, the trial court prevented him
from responding to respondent's misleading and inaccurate
allegations in her Comment and Opposition. The fact that his counsel
belonged to a law firm is not a waiver of his constitutional right to
due process.[29]

Respondent, on the other hand, claims that the CA correctly ruled

that petitioner's last three arguments are not proper for a petition
for certiorari since the alleged errors are merely errors of judgment
and not errors of jurisdiction considering that the properties covered
by the assailed Orders of the trial court pertained only to those
properties that were admitted to be part of the common properties in
petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.[30]

Respondent likewise insists that there was no reason for the trial
court to defer its proceedings until after the SC shall have decided
G.R. No. 180226 because whatever may be the findings of the trial
court in such case will not render the petition pending before the SC
moot because the issue before the trial court and concomitantly, its
Orders, only referred to properties which the petitioner himself
admitted (in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage) as
having been acquired by him and the respondent during their
marriage. In other words, the properties involved are only those
recognized as common properties. It has no bearing on the matter
before the SC in G.R. No. 180226, which involves the issue of
whether the properties acquired by the petitioner after he left the
respondent and before the finality of the Decision nullifying his
marriage with the respondent, would still form part of the common
assets. Besides, no Temporary Restraining Order had been issued to
forestall the proceedings before the trial court.[31]

Respondent labels as devoid of merit petitioner's claim that he is

entitled to more share in the subject properties than her because he
was the one who continued paying for their amortizations after their
separation. The second paragraph of Article 147 of the Family Code
created a presumption that the properties acquired by the parties
while they live together were obtained by their joint effort, work or
industry. Thus, they own such properties in equal shares. The said
provision likewise laid down an equitable rule in favor of a party who
did not actually participate in property acquisition but exerted
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and the household.
Furthermore, respondent avers that the deliberations of the Civil
Code and Family Code show that Article 147 was intended to prevent
injustice in the property relation of spouses in a void marriage and to
recognize that the wife helped in the acquisition of the property by
providing inspiration, among other things, regardless of the period of
acquisition. Thus, respondent posits that co-ownership of the parties
did not end when one spouse stopped living with the other. The
marital relationship, as well as the consequences and effects of a
marital union, end upon the finality of the declaration of nullity of
the marriage. Considering that the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell
properties were acquired during their marriage and before petitioner
left his family, respondent's efforts in the care and maintenance of
the children and of the household were sufficient, if not more than
enough contribution to the acquisition of said properties. Hence, the
petitioner could not claim more right to any property than her on
account of his contention that he was the one who paid for the
amortizations of those properties. The fact that the petitioner took
with him the salaries he already earned before their separation and
that he continue to have full access to their joint bank account where
she also deposited her earnings and savings could not also be
overlooked. Petitioner's use of common funds in paying for the
monthly amortizations for the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell
properties would not make such properties or any portion thereof,
belong exclusively to him and place them beyond the co-
ownership.[32]

Lastly, respondent avers that petitioner could not claim that he was
denied of due process just because his Motion for Reconsideration
was resolved without waiting for his Reply inasmuch as petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration should already contain all arguments and
objections against the questioned Order, and that petitioner was also
afforded an actual hearing on his motion. Given also that he had a
number of lawyers at his disposal, petitioner may not claim a right to
demand additional period of time to file his Reply.[33]
The Ruling of the Court

Stripped of verbiage, the pivotal issues in this case are the ownership
of the Ayala Alabang house and the Rockwell condominium and how
these properties should be partitioned between the parties; and the
propriety of the increase in the amount of support granted to the
respondent.

There is no quarrel that the marriage of the petitioner and the

respondent had long been declared an absolute nullity by reason of
their psychological incapacity to perform their marital obligations to
each other. The property relations of parties to a void marriage is
governed either by Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the
petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal impediment and
exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their
property relation is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The said provision finds application in this case even if
the parties were married before the Family Code took effect by
express provision of the Family Code on its retroactive effect for as
long as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.[34]   Here, no vested
rights will be impaired in the application of the said provision given
that Article 147 of the Family Code is actually just a remake of
Article 144 of the 1950 Civil Code.[35]
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while

they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or

her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
The co-ownership envisioned under this article was explained by
this Court in Barrido v. Nonato,[36] viz:
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for
Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (I) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are
present. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have
existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their
marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses

through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
(Citations omitted)
While the parties concede that their property regime is governed
by co-ownership, they do not agree on the properties covered therein.
For the respondent, all properties acquired by them, before the
judicial decree of nullity of their marriage, including the time they
were already separated, form part of the co-ownership. On the other
hand, for the petitioner, only those properties acquired by them while
they were living together are common assets. Thus, petitioner
theorizes that since the amortizations for the Ayala Alabang and
Rockwell properties were paid by him after the parties stopped living
together, the payments made should not form part of the co-
ownership but must belong solely to him. It is for this reason that he
insists that the Supreme Court must first be allowed to rule on G.R.
No. 180226 before the trial court should have ruled on the motion for
the partial distribution of the above-listed properties because the
decision of the High Court therein would have determined whether
such contributions form part of the co-ownership.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the Court already

resolved G.R. No. 180226 in a Resolution of the Third Division dated
April 26, 2017, rendering the issue on whether the CA correctly ruled
that the trial court need not await the ruling in G.R. No. 180226
before it rules on the propriety of respondent's motion for partial
distribution, moot and academic.

The Court must further note that G.R. No. 180226 and the present
petition involve, in the main, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the union, the natural consequence of the grant of the
petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage that was
earlier filed. Undeniably, these cases refer to the same set of facts
and involve the same arguments, considering that the present
petition is actually an offshoot of G.R. No. 180226 in that the present
petition merely seeks the partial distribution of the parties' common
assets. Such being the case, the Court must take into account the
pronouncement in G.R. No. 180226, the Resolution therein being the
law of the case, as it proceeds to resolve the issues pending herein.

In the case of Spouses Sy v. Young,[37] the Court rules, thus:

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.
Law of the case applies only to the same case and relates entirely
to questions of law. Furthermore, in law of the case, the rule made by
an appellate court cannot be departed from in subsequent
proceedings in the same case.[38]

In the April 26, 2017 Resolution in G.R. No. 180226, the Court
affirmed the holding of the CA that Article 147 of the Family Code
only applies to properties acquired by the parties while they lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. The relevant
portion of the Resolution is quoted hereunder:
The [respondent] did not discharge her burden of showing in this
appeal that the CA committed reversible error in applying Article
147 of the Family Code to the case. In disposing of the issues raised
for its consideration and resolution, the CA correctly applied the law
and its relevant jurisprudence, as the following exposition clearly
indicates:

The parties do not argue that co-ownership of properties acquired

during the union governs them under Article 147 of the Family Code.
xxx

xxxx

So what are the common properties included in the dissolution of the

co-ownership?

[Respondent's] argument implies that despite already being

separated de facto, as long as a couple remains married (in paper),
pending a court declaration of nullity of their union, all the
properties gained by each in the meantime before the judicial
declaration will be included in the co-ownership regime.

[Respondent] however should be reminded of the legal effect of a

confirmation of a void ab initio marriage: it is retroactive to the time
when the marriage ceremony transpired. In short, after the trial
court declared her marriage to [petitioner] void in 2005 because of
both parties' psychological incapacity, the marriage ceremony on
December 27, 1987 was invalidated as if no marriage took place. This
means then that during their ten-year cohabitation, [respondent] and
[petitioner] lived together merely as common-law spouses. This is
where Article 147 comes in, dealing with those "properties acquired
while they lived together...obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry..." and the joint effort includes "the care and maintenance of
the family and of the household."

Her insistence of the common ownership of the moneys and

properties accumulated subsequent to the de facto separation would
have been correct if the prope1iies had to be liquidated (such as in a
spouse's death) and an official declaration of nullity of marriage was
never secured. Her stand would have been supplied by the case
of   Cariño v. Cariño   wherein two women were fighting over the
government death benefits of the man they married. The first wife
was married to the deceased in 1969 but in 1992, without having his
previous marriage nullified for lack of a marriage license, the
husband still married another woman with whom he cohabited in
1982. The High Court refused to award the death benefits to the
second wife and gave the monetary benefits to the first one. Although
Article 147 applies to the first wife, the Court awarded the benefits
to her in full because the presumption of a valid marriage stood in
her favor by reason of a lack of a judicial declaration of nullity. To
stress, in the case at bar, there was a judicial declaration of nullity,
and Cariño cannot apply to her.

As adverted to earlier, after the judicial declaration, [petitioner] and

[respondent's] relationship has relegated to a common-law marriage,
and their cohabitation,   i.e., living together exclusively as husband
and wife, was only for a period of ten years. Obviously, the
'cohabitation' of the parties will definitely not include the years since
[petitioner] left [respondent] and the family home. The period of
cohabitation of a couple without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage has been sufficiently explained and has been applied
by the Supreme Court in the case of  Aznar   x x x. Expounding on
Article 144 of the Civil Code, the provision which Article 147 of the
Family Code is based, the Court said:
It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the
man and the woman thus living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realized
during their cohabitation be acquired through the work, industry,
employment or occupation of both or either of them. And the same
thing may be said of those whose marriages are by provision of law
declared void ab initio. While it is true that these requisites are
fully met and satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember
that the deceased and herein appellee were already
estranged as of March, 1950. There being no provision of law
governing the cessation of such informal civil partnership, if
it ever existed, [the] same may be considered terminated
upon their separation or desistance to continue said
relations.[39]
This Court's earlier pronouncement in G.R. No. 180226 that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies only to properties acquired by
the parties during the period of their cohabitation is thus binding in
this case. The question now that comes to the fore is the proper
application of the said ruling with respect to the Ayala Alabang and
Rockwell properties.

It is not disputed that the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties

that were acquired during the period of the parties' cohabitation had
not yet been fully paid at the time they separated. From the
arguments advanced by the petitioner, it can be inferred that he
made much of the term "acquired" in that he distinguished portions
of the disputed property to that which had been paid for during the
period of cohabitation, and to the portion which was yet unpaid when
the parties separated. For him, only the paid portion should be
encompassed in the term "acquired" and thus, be presumed to belong
to the parties in equal shares.

The Court does not agree. In the construction of the term "acquired,"
this Court must be guided by the basic rule in statutory construction
that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
court.[40] A reading of Article 147 of the Family Code would show
that the provision did not make any distinction or make any
qualification in terms of the manner the property must be acquired
before the presumption of co-ownership shall apply. As such, the
term "acquired" must be taken in its ordinary acceptation. For as
long as the property had been purchased, whether on installment,
financing or other mode of payment, during the period of
cohabitation, the disputable presumption that they have been
obtained by the parties' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares, shall arise. Applied in this case,
since the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were purchased
while the petitioner and the respondent were living together, it is
presumed that both parties contributed in their acquisition through
their joint efforts (which includes one's efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household), work or industry.
Thus, the properties must be divided between them equally.

The fear of the petitioner that the respondent will get more than her
just share in the properties is unfounded.[41] It must be borne in
mind that the presumption that the properties are co-owned and
thus must be shared equally is not conclusive but merely disputable.
The petitioner may rebut the presumption by presenting proof that
the properties, although acquired during the period of their
cohabitation, were not obtained through their joint efforts, work and
industry. In such a case, the properties shall belong solely to the
petitioner. If the respondent is able to present proof that she
contributed through her salary, income, work or industry in the
acquisition of the properties, the parties' share shall be in proportion
to their contributions. In the event that the respondent had not been
able to contribute through her salary, income, work or industry, but
was able to show that she cared for and maintained the family and
the household, her efforts shall be deemed the equivalent of the
contributions made by the petitioner. However, equal sharing of the
entire properties is not possible in this scenario since the Ayala
Alabang and Rockwell properties were still being amortized when the
parties' separated. As such, respondent's equal share shall only
pertain to the paid portion before their separation, for in this
peculiar kind of co-ownership, and in keeping with the
pronouncement in G.R. No. 180226, the partnership is considered
terminated upon the parties' separation or desistance to continue
said relations. Hence, from the moment of separation, there is no
more family or household to speak of that the respondent could have
cared for or maintained. If the allegation of the respondent that the
payments for the amortizations of these properties were taken from
their common funds, then the respondent would have an equal share
in such portions because the payments made therefor were actually
taken from the co-ownership.

Anent the issue on the propriety of the increase in the amount of

support, Article 198 of the Family Code provides that the obligation
of mutual support between the spouses ceases when a judgment
declaring a marriage void becomes final and executory. As the
parties' marriage was declared void on March 11, 2005, petitioner
was only obliged to support, after such date, their three children,
Beatriz, Juliana and Margarita.

According to the petition, at the time the assailed Order of the RTC
dated November 29, 2011 was issued, two of their three daughters
already attained the age of majority. If such is the case, respondent
ceased to have the authority to claim support in their behalf. In
increasing the amount of support due from petitioner based on the
needs of all three children, the RTC gravely abused its discretion.

It is also to be noted that the instant petition was filed in 2014. Since
then, the parties' youngest daughter had likewise reached the age of
majority. In view of this change in circumstance, petitioner can no
longer be obliged to pay P250,000.00 to respondent. This is without
prejudice to petitioner's liability for support in arrears, if any, and for
any subsisting obligation to provide support directly to his daughters.
Indeed, petitioner is not precluded from seeking the reduction of the
amount of support he was obliged to provide in the event that he can
sufficiently prove that its reduction is warranted. After all, judgment
of support does not become final, and may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.[42]

This Court, not being a trier of facts, must necessarily remand the
case to the trial court for the accounting, reception of evidence and
evaluation thereof for the proper determination of the ownership and
share of the parties in the nine properties mentioned above, which
include the Ayala Alabang house and Rockwell condominium, based
on the guidelines set forth in this case, as well as the determination
of arrears in support of the parties' daughters, if any.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is   GRANTED.

The assailed October 31, 2013 Decision and the July 31, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124473
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

This case is ordered remanded to Regional Trial Court, Branch 136,

Makati City for accounting, reception of evidence, and evaluation
thereof for the proper determination of the ownership and share of
the parties in the nine (9) properties mentioned above, which
includes the Ayala Alabang house and Rockwell condominium, based
on the guidelines set forth in this case, as well as the determination
of arrears in support of the parties' daughters, if any.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C. J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, and   Lazaro-Javier, JJ.,

concur.
Lopez, J., on official leave.

[1] Rollo, pp. 10-42.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate

Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar-
Padilla, concurring; id. at 49-56.

[3] Id. at 57-58.

[4] Id. at 165-168.

[5] Id. at 169-171.
[6] Id. at 11-12, 254-255.

[7] Id. at 12.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at 13.

[12] Id. at 13, 95-102.

[13] Id. at 13, 96.

[14] Id. at 14, 104-107.

[15] Id. at 132-143.

[16] Id. at 165-168.

[17] Id. at 169-171.

[18] Supra note 2.

[19] Id. at 54-55a.

[20] Id. at 55a.

[21] Id. at 54-55a.

[22] Id. at 19-20.

[23] Id. at 21-23.

[24] Id. at 23-26.

[25] Id. at 26-28.

[26] Id. at 28-32.

[27] Id. at 32-33.

[28] Id. at 34-39.

[29] Id. at 39-40.
 [30] Id. at 357-358.

[31] Id. at 358-360.

[32] Id. at 360-364.

[33] Id. at 364-365.

[34] ART. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it

does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.

[35] See Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1295
(1996).

[36] 745 Phil. 608, 615-616 (2014).

[37] Spouses Sy v. Young, 711 Phil. 444, 449-450 (2013).

[38] Id.

[39] Third Division Resolution, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 475-476.

[40] Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 79

Phil. 268, 282 (2016).

[41] Rollo, p. 25.

[42] Lim-Lua v. Lua, 710 Phil. 211, 233 (2013).

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