Iraq - ISF PMF Orders of Battle - 0 - 0-6

DECEMBER 2017
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND

POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES:
ORDERS OF BATTLE
JESSA ROSE DURY-AGRI, OMER KASSIM, AND PATRICK MARTIN,

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrick Martin, Institute for the Study of War
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND

POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES:
ORDERS OF BATTLE
Cover: Armored vehicles of Iraqi security forces with Popular
Mobilization Forces Units are driven past smoke arising from a
clash with Islamic State militants in the town of al-Alam March
10, 2015. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
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Published in 2017 in the United States of America
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understandingwar.org
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Patrick Martin is a former Iraq Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Patrick received
his B.A. from Colby College with a major in History and is a M.A. candidate at George Washington University’s
Elliott School of International Affairs.
Omer Kassim is an Iraq Research Assistant at ISW. Omer received his B.A. from the University of Texas at
Austin with a major in Middle East Studies. He previously conducted research on Iraqi Politics at the Middle
East Institute.
Jessa Rose Dury-Agri is the Evans Hanson Fellow at ISW. Rose received her B.A. from Claremont McKenna
College with a major in International Relations concentrating on Middle East and North African Security.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Jessica Lewis McFate, Dina Shahroki, Jennifer Cafarella, and Maseh Zarif for
their contributions to this paper. We would also like to thank the Iraq Team interns throughout this paper’s
development. The authors also thank Caitlin Forrest and Lisa Suchy, who helped bring this report to light.
Finally, we would like to offer special thanks to Dr. Kimberly Kagan for her mentorship and guidance during
this report.
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DECEMBER 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS
8 Introduction 28 POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES

9 Methodology 30 Popular Mobilization Forces
Chain of Command
10 IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
34 Directorates
10 Chain of Command
36 Regional Committees
11 Counter Terrorism Services
36 Iranian Proxy Militias
11 Presidential Brigades
42 “Iraqi Syrian Battalions” /
12 Prime Minister’s Special “Syrian Hezbollah” Units
Forces Division
43 Lesser Proxies
12 Ministry of Defense
45 Minority Militias
12 Operations Commands
12 Joint Operations Command 47
Hawza Militias
and CTS Director 48 Co-opted Hawza Militias
12 Regional Operations Commands 49
Politically Affiliated Militias
14 Anbar Operations Command 49 Sadrist Trend
14 Babil Operations Command 50 Co-opted Sadrist Militias
14 Baghdad Operations Command 50 Islamic Supreme Council Brigades
16 Basra Operations Command 52 Other Politically Affiliated Militias
17 Dijla Operations Command
18 Jazeera and Badia 56 Appendix A: Acronyms and Abbreviations
Operations Command
57
Appendix B: Operations Commands:
19 Mid-Euphrates Areas of Responsibility
Operations Command
20 Ninewa Operations Command 58 Appendix C: Graphics
22 Salah al-Din Operations 64
Appendix D: Iraqi Security Forces Commanders
Command
67 Endnotes
23 Samarra Operations Command
23 Rafidain Operations Command
24 Temporary Operations
Commands
24 Ministry of Interior
24 Federal Police
26 Emergency Response Division
27 Border Guards Command
28 Provincial Emergency Police Battalions
28 Facilities Protection Service
and Oil Police
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 7
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND POPULAR
MOBILIZATION FORCES: ORDERS OF BATTLE
Pushing back on Iran in Iraq and preventing ISIS from returning require
a clear assessment of the nature of the security forces on the ground.
Introduction Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have filled crit-

ical gaps left by thinning ISF in Baghdad, Kirkuk,
and Salah al-Din Provinces in particular.
The liberation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sh-
A spectrum of Iraqi groups comprise the PMF,
am’s (ISIS) urban holdings in Iraq was necessary
including some loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sis-
but not sufficient to secure America’s vital national
tani, Iraqi clergy, Iraqi tribes, and Iranian actors.
interests. ISIS has lost neither the will nor the
This wide spectrum of groups should not obscure
capability to fight, even as it withdraws into desert
the dangerous threat the PMF poses to Iraqi state
hideouts and sleeper cell formations in November
institutions and U.S. interests. The PMF are a vector
2017. Rather, dispersed ISIS militants have begun
by which Iranian-backed proxies have compromised
an insurgent campaign in northern and western
some of the ISF. The PMF are not guarantors of
Iraq as some of its foreign fighters have returned
Iraqi state security because they challenge the Iraqi
to their home countries to serve in ISIS’s external
government’s monopoly on the use of force, even as
operations network.
they are nominally integrated into the state through
ISIS reconstituted from the remnants of Al Qaeda complex structures.
in Iraq in just three years by exploiting political and
The formal, nominal integration of the PMF into
security conditions. The U.S. must therefore ensure
state-tolerated structures obfuscates rather than
conditions do not allow jihadist groups to continue
controls Iranian-backed powerbrokers. The Deputy
this cycle by forming under a new banner in coming
Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission
years. The U.S. has partnered with the Iraqi Security
(PMC) that oversees the PMF, Abu Mahdi al-Mu-
Forces (ISF) to defeat ISIS in Iraq and progress
handis, was designated by the U.S. Treasury as a
toward this objective. The ISF must clear remaining
terrorist in 2009. He is a dual Iranian-Iraqi citizen.
ISIS cells, secure liberated areas, stabilize them, and
He advised Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards
enable their reconstruction. Ethnic, sectarian, and
Corps (IRGC) — Quds Force Commander Qassim
political tensions will likely prolong the conflict and
Suleimani, facilitated attacks against U.S. forces in
potentially create openings for jihadists to exploit.
2007 and 2008 as the commander of the terrorist
U.S. decision makers will determine the number
organization Kata’ib Hezbollah, and has been con-
of troops and other forms of assistance necessary to
victed by Kuwait of bombing Western embassies in
stabilize the country and facilitate a viable political
that country in the 1980s.1 The official PMF spokes-
outcome that secures an independent, representa-
person, Ahmad al-Asadi, overtly threatened U.S.
tive, and unitary Iraqi state.
forces in Iraq on August 14, 2017.2 An Iranian sig-
The U.S. must also ensure Iraq does not become nature weapon, the Explosively Formed Penetrator
a safe haven for, or beholden to, the leading state (EFP), killed a U.S. soldier in Iraq less than two
sponsor of terror, Iran. Iranian-backed actors have months later on October 1, 2017.3
compromised formal Iraqi security structures. Iraq’s
Ministry of Interior (MoI) is led by a member of the PMF units, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Badr
Badr Organization, which Iran created in the 1980s. Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat
The MoI is augmenting ISF operations in Ninewa al-Nujaba, conduct operations based on Iran’s pri-
and Diyala Provinces. The predominantly-Shi’a orities in both Iraq and Syria. They have occupied
positions along both sides of the Iraq-Syria border
8 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG
DECEMBER 2017
to block anti-ISIS operations by U.S.-backed forces help U.S. decision makers and forces on the ground
in eastern Syria. The PMF and the Iranian-directed recognize and remediate the presence of Iranian-
forces have expanded their role in Iraq following backed militias within the ISF. The study updates
the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum in and deepens previous scholarly works.4 The data
September 2017. Iranian proxies and ISF launched cutoff for unit locations presented in this study is
military operations against Iraqi Kurdish forces in August 17, 2017; however, this report’s text and
October 2017. They seized Kirkuk and surrounding conclusions are based on unit movements through
security and economic infrastructure before advanc- late November 2017.
ing further north and forcing Iraqi Kurdish forces This work juxtaposes the original areas of respon-
to retreat across Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries. sibility of the various Iraqi Army (IA) and Federal
Iranian proxies extended their control of terrain Police (FP) divisions with what were assessed to be
through this campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan and their areas of deployment in August 2017, high-
the campaign to recapture ISIS’ last urban hold- lighting potential future security risks outside of
ings in western Anbar Province. Iran now has the current battle zones in Iraq. It also provides
increased leverage over Iraq’s federal government information on IA brigades’ affinity toward and
and greater ability to coerce Iraqi Prime Minister cooperation with the PMF, highlighting increasing
Haider al-Abadi. Iranian proxy forces are posi- Iranian influence within the ISF.
tioned in increasing numbers along the Iraq-Syria
border and poised to seize key border crossings as
of November 2017. Iranian proxies are destabiliz-
ing Iraq, creating opportunities for jihadists, and
positioning themselves to further disrupt the U.S.
Methodology
ability to operate against jihadists across the Iraq-
The authors derived this Order of Battle from unit
Syria border. The effects of this destabilization will
sightings and positions publicly reported by the
prevent the establishment of a stable and secure
Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD), Iraqi media, ISF
Iraqi state capable of defending its sovereignty and
units, the PMC’s War Media Team, and individual
territorial integrity.
militias’ social media accounts. Picture intelligence
The PMC will likely endure as a permanent security from regional media organizations, Iraqi soldiers’
institution in Iraq. The PMF’s elaborate command social media accounts, and reporters supplemented
structure includes directorates that deliver mean- this material. Reporting consistently resolved unit
ingful combat support and combat service support designation to the brigade level. Units for which
to Iranian proxies. The PMF is, therefore, likely to current locations are uncertain are listed according
constitute a permanent wing of Iranian-led forces to their last known location. The dates of infor-
within Iraq’s security apparatus, undermining Iraq’s mation are specified in each case. Many of the
monopoly on the use of force essential to its sover- units within this Order of Battle are assessed to
eignty. The U.S. should not accept the PMC as a occupy multiple positions at once. IA units gen-
component of the ISF, even if the Iraqi government erally display unit integrity at the brigade level. FP
does. The U.S. must constrain Iran by supporting and PMF units often deploy as small detachments,
Iraqi forces intelligently and robustly as operations such that one unit may be depicted in multiple
to clear ISIS from Iraq’s cities conclude. geographically disparate locations. This Order of
Any U.S. strategy relying on a partnered force must Battle does not include data on the Iraqi Air Force,
proceed from a realistic assessment of its capabili- Army Aviation, or Navy, or Iraqi Kurdish secu-
ties and intentions. The Institute for the Study of rity forces, such as the Peshmerga. It organizes ISF
War completed an Order of Battle study to evalu- units by their original assignments to Operational
ate the capabilities and disposition of the ISF. This Commands in 2013.5 It organizes ISF units by their
study also presents an Order of Battle of the PMF to original assignments to Operational Commands in
2013. It organizes militias within the PMF accord- from which forces can be withdrawn to prepare for
ing to their affiliations. It lists their most current follow-on operations. Meanwhile, intra-Shi’a vio-
locations as of August 17, 2017 and comments upon lence plagues security in southern Iraq and ISIS
their capabilities when known. The authors have remains operational throughout the country.
withheld citations when they have judged that their
publication could lead to significant changes to the
Iraqi information and social media environment.
Chain of Command
Professional readers may contact the Institute for Prime Minister / Commander in Chief of the Armed
the Study of War for more information regarding Forces: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi – Shi’a
withheld citations or unit location data citations. Minister of Defense:
Mag. Gen. Irfan Mahmoud al-Hayali – Sunni
•
Joint Operations Command (JOC) Commander:
Lt. Gen. Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani – Shi’a
Iraqi Security Forces •
Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) Commander:
Lt. Gen. Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi6 (JOC
The ISF consists of the formal military and security Field Commander) – Shi’a Iraqi Air Force
Commander: Lt. Gen. Anwar Hamamayn
forces that report to the MoD, MoI, and Council – Unknown
of Ministers. This Order of Battle outlines the
known combat units within both ministries and •
Iraqi Navy and Costal Defense Commander:
Marine General Salam Muhammad Ahmed
their assessed locations as of their last documented – Unknown
sighting. It is organized according to the framework
of the Operational Commands that had been in
•
Iraqi Air Defense Commander:
Lt. Gen. Jabar Obeid Kadhim – Shi’a
place prior to the fall of Mosul in 2014. The major-
ity of operations commands are still functional. Minister of the Interior:
They likely function as Corps-level headquarters Qasim al-Araji – Shi’a
for units deployed forward in their operating areas •
Federal Police Commander:
Maj. Gen. Raid Shakir Jawdat – Shi’a
rather than as administrative headquarters for the
units that had previously been assigned to them. •
Border Guards Commander:
Lt. Gen. Hamid Abdullah – Shi’a
This Order of Battle depicts units based on their
June 2014 administrative assignments in order to •
Emergency Response Division Commander:
Brig. Gen. Thamir Muhammad Ismail – Shi’a
showcase the geographic disparity between points of
origin and current locations of each unit.
Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi is the Commander
ISIS’ capture of Mosul and other terrain fundamen-
in Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces. He overhauled
tally changed the disposition and organization of the
much of the ISF’s leadership cadre upon taking
ISF. The U.S. replaced the 2nd and 3rd IA Divisions
office. He replaced the previous Iraqi Ground
with the 15th and 16th IA Divisions after their dis-
Forces Commander and Ninewa Operations
solution in Mosul. The 4th and 12th IA Divisions,
Commander with Lt. Gen. Tawfiq and Maj. Gen.
formerly headquartered in Tikrit and Kirkuk
Najm al-Juburi, respectively, both of whom are
respectively, have not been replaced. The 10th, 11th,
Sunnis, marking a departure from Maliki’s dispro-
and 14th IA Divisions are deployed to northern
portionately large appointment of Shi’a officers to
Baghdad and Anbar, away from Iraq’s restive south-
division commands and other senior leadership
ern provinces. The principal unit assigned to the
positions.7 Prime Minister Abadi also abolished
Baghdad Operations Command (BOC), the 6th IA
the Maliki-era Office of the Commander in Chief
Division, is deployed forward. FP Divisions are fully
(OCINC), allowing the JOC to supersede it. The
engaged in clearing operations across Iraq. There
echelons of the MoI, however, fall largely out of the
is no available reserve force. There is no mission
Prime Minister’s reach, as the Minister of Interior
DECEMBER 2017
is an Iranian proxy militia leader and the ministry’s the three CTS units and has the longest relationship
top leadership support Iranian proxies. with U.S. special operations advisers. It is so effec-
tive that the ISF relies on it to lead all major clearing
Counter Terrorism Services (CTS) operations and divides its battalions across multi-
— Lt. Gen. Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani, Lt. Gen. ple operations commands. The Golden Division
Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi (Field Commander)8 has therefore faced the most difficult fighting, and
consequently incurred the most casualties during
The CTS is a force attached to the Council of counter-ISIS operations. Maj. Gen. Maan al-Saadi
Ministers. It exists outside the MoD and MoI. The leads the 2nd ISOF unit. The 2nd unit is less capable
CTS reports directly to the Prime Minister and than the Golden Division, and its units forward
coordinates operations with the JOC.9 U.S. Special deploy for major operations less frequently. Mag.
Operations Forces trained the CTS from its incep- Gen.–Sami al-Aridhi leads the 3rd ISOF unit. The
tion into 2017, even after the U.S. withdrawal in 3rd ISOF unit is the newest of the three and has far
December 2011.10 ISF utilize the CTS as an elite less exposure to U.S. training or mentorship than
light infantry force to spearhead its most important the Golden Division. It is the least capable of the
operations, including defense of the Green Zone three ISOF units, though it is still more advanced
and major clearing operations such as in Tikrit and than many regular IA units.
Mosul. It had as many as 13,000 members prior to
ISIS’s capture of Mosul.11 The CTS has a reputation 1st ISOF unit, aka Golden Division:
for sectarian and ethnic inclusivity and for profes-
sionalism stemming from their long relationship
• Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
[as of August 10, 2017]
with U.S. trainers, surpassing most of Iraq’s other
security branches.12 2nd ISOF unit:
The CTS is not a perfect force. Former Prime

•
Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of November 14, 2016]
Minister Maliki expanded the CTS faster than U.S.
advisers recommended and attempted to insert 3rd ISOF unit:
Dawa Party loyalists into the CTS’s battalion-level • Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
leadership, eroding the quality of the junior leader-
ship.13 Maliki-era appointees, notably Abdul-Ghani Unattributed [ISOF]:
al-Asadi, remain in their positions. Politicization
and militia ties remain an issue even in the Iraqi
•
[as of July 12, 2017]16
Special Operations Forces (ISOF). One junior
commander in Salah al-Din, who was linked to the
•
Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province
[as of July 12, 2017]
Dawa Party and killed in action in January 2017,
wore a PMF badge on his uniform, reflecting the
Dawa Party’s affinity for the PMF.14 The CTS’s upper Presidential Brigades
leadership ranks remain largely uncompromised by The Presidential Brigades are nominally assigned
the Dawa Party, as shown by the unflattering rumors for the protection of Iraq’s President, who is cus-
that Dawa media puts out about senior CTS com- tomarily a Sunni Kurd from the Patriotic Union
manders.15 The CTS remains largely responsive to of Kurdistan (PUK) Party under the Iraqi political
Prime Minister Abadi and is Iraq’s most profes- quota system (muhassasa). They are predominantly
sional and capable ground force. Kurdish units, which has raised questions about
their loyalty and efficacy in the protection of key
The CTS is comprised of three ISOF units that facilities in the Green Zone such as the Council of
are not geographically bound. Maj. Gen. Fadhil Representatives Building.17 They are not Peshmerga
Barwari leads the first of the ISOF units, known as units, are not exclusively Kurdish, and technically
the Golden Division. The Golden Division is the operate under the MoD, but are ultimately loyal
most capable unit in the ISF. It is also the oldest of
to current President Fuad Masoum.18 Previously, 61st Brigade:

Maliki used them in addition to the 56th Brigade •
Baghdad International Airport
[as of March 6, 2016]
of the Prime Minister’s Special Forces Division to
secure personal control over key security forces
in Baghdad. However, they are closely linked with Ministry of Defense
the PUK and deploy into Iraqi Kurdistan as PUK-
controlled security forces.19 They also have some
responsibilities for securing parts of Baghdad, espe- Operations Commands
cially during Shi’a pilgrimages. They are not readily
available for forward deployment.20 Joint Operations Command (JOC) and
CTS Director — Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani
1st Presidential Brigade: The JOC forms the highest headquarters of ISF lead-
•
Possibly deployed to PUK-controlled Iraqi
Kurdistan [as of February 12, 2016]
ership and has oversight of all operations commands.
The JOC frequently assumes direct command of
2nd Presidential Brigade: an operations command and its subordinate units
•
South of Baghdad [as of July 3, 3016] during security crises or major operations, such as
the anti-ISIS operation in Mosul. All operations
Prime Minister’s Special Forces commands report to the JOC.25
Division (SFD) — Maj. Gen. Karim Aboud
Muhammad al-Tamimi21 Regional Operations Commands
The Prime Minister’s SFD is responsible for secu- ISF units are mobile rather than permanently
rity in Baghdad’s Green Zone and for protecting assigned to any regional operations command.
the Prime Minister.22 The SFD answers to the MoD ISF divisions maintain headquarters across Iraq,
through the BOC and JOC.23 Its primary role is as a however, an ISF division’s forces are typically
bodyguard unit – SFD units accompany senior Iraqi forward deployed far from their headquarters. This
government officials, including the Prime Minister paper organizes ISF divisions by their June 2014
or the Minister of Interior, on tours of frontline assignments in order to display the geographic dis-
areas. The SFD, rather than the 56th Brigade itself, parity between security requirements during the
has this responsibility. Abadi reshuffled the previ- Maliki-era and those under Prime Minister Abadi
ous security arrangement, in which the historically in August 2017.
Maliki-aligned 56th Brigade controlled Green Zone
Regional operations commands act as standing oper-
security. The SFD is not likely manned as a full
ational-level headquarters that supervise all types
division, however, it possesses some advanced capa-
of ISF units within a geographically-bounded area
bilities and armored vehicles. It is not a unit able to
of responsibility. Prime Minister Abadi appointed
forward deploy easily, though some of its members
new commanders for the Anbar, Baghdad, Basra,
deployed to the Makhoul Mountains in Salah al-Din
and Samarra Operations Commands in November
for reasons that remain unclear.24
2014 to reform the ISF. A Maliki loyalist never-
56th Mechanized Brigade: theless commands the Dijla Operations Command
•
Green Zone, Baghdad
[as of April 17, 2016]
(DOC). The Babil, Salah al-Din, and Samarra,
Operations Commands did not exist in 2013 and
were likely created to support forward operations in
57th Brigade: the fight against ISIS.26
•
Green Zone, Baghdad
•
Amiriyat al-Fallujah, Dawilibah, SE of Fallujah
/ SW of Baghdad [as of November 6, 2014]
DECEMBER 2017
Regional Operations Commanders

Operations Formation Commander — as of
Predecessor
Command Date November 2017
Anbar Operations Maj. Gen. Mahmoud al-Felahi Ismail al-Mahalawi

August 2008
Command (2017 – present)27 (2015 – 2017)28
Babil Operations
March 2014 Riad al-Khikhani (2016 – present) Unknown
Command
Baghdad Operations Jalil Jubbar al-Rubaie Abdul-Amir al-Sham-

February 2007
Command (2016 – present)29 mari (2013 – 2016)30
Basra Operations Jamil al-Shammari Samir Abdul-Karim

August 2007
Command (2016 – present)31 (2014 – 2016)32
Dijla Operations Mazhar al-Azzawi Abd al-Amir al-Zaydi

July 2012
Command (2015 – present)33 (2012 – 2015)34
Jazeera and Badia Maj. Gen. Ibrahim

Qassim al-Muhammadi
Operations February 2013 Dab’oun al-Maqsusi
(2016 – present)35
Command (2014 – 2016)36
Middle Euphrates
Prior to Othman al-Ghanimi
Operations Qais Khalaf Rahimah
November 2010 (2011)
Command
Ninewa Operations Maj. Gen. Najim Abdullah Lt. Gen.Mahdi

January 2008
Command al-Jobouri (2015 – present)37 al-Gharrawi (2014)38
Rafidain Operations Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Dab’oun Lt. Gen. Jamil al-Sham-
November 2012
Command al-Maqsusi (2016 – present)39 mari (2015 – 2016)40
Salah al-Din 2014, after

Lt. Gen. Juma Anad al-Jobouri Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab
Operations ISIS takeover of
(2015 – present)41 al-Saidi (2014 – 2015)42
Command Mosul
2006, post
Samarra Operations al-Askari Imad Yassin al-Zuhairi Lt. Gen. Sabah al-Fat-
Command Mosque (2014 – present)43 lawi (2012 – 2014)44
bombing
Anbar Operations Command (AOC) – Maj. Gen. Babil Operations Command (BabOC) – Riad
Mahmoud al-Felahi45 al-Khikhani
The AOC is responsible for the security of Ramadi The BabOC is responsible for Babil Province and the
and Fallujah, as well as surrounding desert areas. southern Baghdad Belts. Its commander deployed
ISF leadership replaces AOC commanders fre- to southwestern Ramadi during shaping efforts to
quently, either for performance issues or because recapture Ramadi, particularly around the 7 Kilo
they are wounded on the frontlines. The AOC com- area. It is unclear how he secured this supporting
mander is always a Sunni, though not always of the role during the Ramadi operation. The BabOC’s
same tribe. Maj. Gen. Mahmoud al-Felahi replaced area of responsibility includes Jurf al-Sakhr, an
former AOC Commander Ismail al-Mahlawi in old ISIS stronghold and the first major area ISF
January 2017. Mahlawi was fired for disobey- and PMF cleared in October 2014. Northern Babil
ing orders during a bungled operation to advance remains intentionally depopulated more than
toward the then-ISIS-held town of Anah that the two years after it was recaptured from ISIS, as the
JOC appears to have not approved.46 BabOC and the PMF prevent internally displaced
persons (IDPs) from returning.49 The BabOC did
1st Iraqi Army Rapid Intervention Division
not exist in 2013.50
(RID) – Musa Kata Kadhim
The 1st IA RID was heavily damaged during fighting Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) – Jalil
in June 2014 and operates at low strength. It was Jubbar al-Rubaie 51
originally part of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
The BOC is responsible for security in both
alongside the 4th, 7th, and 9th IA Divisions.47 The 4th
Baghdad and much of the Baghdad Belts that
IA Brigade was destroyed in June 2014.48 Originally
surround the capital. The BOC’s area of responsi-
deployed to secure the western Baghdad Belts, the
bility is a merger of the former Karkh and Rusafa
mobile force has been split and redeployed to prior-
Operations Commands’ areas of responsibility.
ity areas after the ISF cleared Fallujah in June 2016.
Iraqi Shi’a militias, including lethal proxy militias
1st Brigade: and Sadrist loyalists, operate outside the BOC’s
•
Akashat, Anbar Province
command and control. They have conducted crimes
and kidnappings with impunity, established bases
and unilateral control zones in northeastern and
2nd Brigade: southern Baghdad, and even clashed with the ISF on
•
Possibly Mosul, Ninewa Province
rare occasions.52 Meanwhile, the Prime Minister’s
SFD, attached to the JOC, maintains security in the
3rd Brigade: Green Zone and for critical infrastructure around
•
Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of July 23, 2016]
Baghdad. The BOC is nevertheless ordinarily one
of the best-resourced of the ISF’s operations com-
•
Harariyat, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of May 11, 2016]
mands. It is assesed to have the most frontline
on-duty strength of all the operations commands
given its role in securing the capital.53
Unattributed:
•
Al-Mithaq, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa
Province [as of April 1, 2017] Karkh Area Command
•
Rutba, Anbar Province
[as of October 7, 2016]
6th Iraqi Army Division (Ahmed Salim Bahjat)
Ahmed Salim Bahjat replaced a Maliki appoin-
•
Garma, near Fallujah, Anbar Province
tee as Commander of the 6th IA Division, and is
the youngest Major General in the IA. He favors
support, including airstrikes, from the U.S.-led
DECEMBER 2017
anti-ISIS coalition.54 The 6th IA Division is one • Kadhimiyah, northwest of Baghdad

of several units allocated to securing the western
Baghdad Belts. It is thus a critical unit for prevent- • Nuamiyah, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of February 2, 2016]
ing the resurgence of Salafi-Jihadi groups in the
former ISIS stronghold of Fallujah.
22nd Brigade: Rusafah Area Command
• Al-Salman and Albu Shalal, north of Baghdad
[as of January 23, 2017]
9th Iraqi Army Division (Qassim Jassim Nazal
al-Maliki)
• Hayy al-Tadbir, north of Baghdad
The 9th IA Armored Division is the IA’s only
armored division. The ISF frequently splits the 9th
• Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad
[as of June 19, 2015]
IA Division into detachments and forward deploys
them to any area requiring armored support. The
• Tel Tasa, north of Baghdad
[as of December 19, 2014]
9th IA Division therefore has a functional rather
than a geographical area of responsibility. It has
24th Brigade: played a major role in Mosul operations and, based
• Al-Maqalah, northeast of Baghdad
[as of July 4, 2017]
on its performance, is the most capable of the IA
Divisions fielded against ISIS.
• Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad
34th Brigade:
• Al-Abbadi and al-Kabishat, east of Fallujah,

• Bab Sinjar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of June 15, 2017]
Anbar Province [as of February 14, 2016]
• Hamdaniyah, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa
Province [as of October 18, 2016]
54th Brigade:
• Qadisiyah, northwest of Baghdad
[as of June 11, 2015]
35th Brigade:
• Mansour, central Baghdad

• Al-Hitawin, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province
• Al-Shurtan, west of Baghdad
• Southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province
36th Brigade:
59th Brigade:
• Al-Halabsa, north of Baghdad
• Gwer, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province
• Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad
• Southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of June 19, 2015]
• Jazirat al-Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar 37th Brigade:
Province [as of June 7, 2015] • Halilah, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province
• Al-Manari and al-Zambaniyah, south of [as of April 12, 2017]
Baghdad [as of May 18, 2016] • North of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
[as of July 18, 2016]
Unattributed:
• Amiriyat al-Fallujah, southwest of Baghdad
1st Federal Police Division (Dhafir al-Muhammadawi)
• Al-Qinatir crossing, north of Garma, Anbar

Province [as of March 9, 2015]
The 1st FP Division contains four brigades. The 1st
FP Brigade is responsible for securing southwest
Baghdad, an area especially important for Sh’a pil-
• Albu Shajal, west of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of May 28, 2016] grims.55 The 2nd FP Brigade is split between Baghdad
and northern Salah al-Din. Its participation in
operations around Baiji indicate it coordinates with institution in Basra because it lacks manpower. The
the PMF, as the majority of security forces in the majority of Basra-based 14th IA Division forward
Baiji area and the Alas and Ajil oil fields are com- deployed to Baghdad in June 2014, allowing Iraqi
posed of Iraqi Shi’a militias operating under the Shi’a militias and criminal gangs to operate in Basra
PMF banner. The 3rd FP Brigade’s disposition like- with impunity.58 The PMF views Basra as a key hub
wise suggests it cooperates closely with the PMF. All due to its wealth and position as a recruitment pool
its operating areas outside of Baghdad have signif- for Shi’a youth. The most dominant PMF units
icant PMF presence. Units from the 3rd FP brigade operating in Basra and its ports reportedly include
clashed with Harakat al-Nujaba, an Iranian proxy the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Saraya
militia, in the Zafraniyah area of East Baghdad, al-Salam, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Saraya Talia al-Kho-
according to one report in September 2016.56 rasani, and Kata’ib Jund al-Imam.59 They fiercely
defend their freedom of action in Basra and resist
1st Brigade: any effort by the ISF to establish control over the
•
Al-Suwaib, southwest of Baghdad
province. The most prominent sign of resistance
to the ISF came in January 2016 when they ejected
2nd Brigade: units from the 9th IA Armored Division deployed to
•
Al-Ghadir, east of Baghdad
[May 17, 2017]
Basra by Prime Minister Abadi to suppress crimi-
nality and tribal violence.60
•
West of Baghdad
14th Iraqi Army Division (Abd Muhsin al-Abbas)
The 14th IA Division is based in Basra, but all its
3rd Brigade: brigades other than the 64th Brigade deployed out
•
Zafraniyah, southeast of Baghdad
[as of May 2, 2017]
of Basra Province.
•
Al-Fatha, east of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province 50th Brigade:
[as of October 12, 2016] •
Al-Hamdiyyah, northeast of Ramadi, Anbar
•
Canal Zone, east of Baghdad Province [as of June 3, 2016]
Ramadi, Anbar Province
•
Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit,
Salah al-Din Province [as of July 24, 2016]
51st Brigade:
4th Brigade: •
Shuhada, Fallujah, Anbar Province
•
Central Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 24, 2017]
[as of May 5, 2017] •
Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
•
South of Mosul, Ninewa Province
Province [as of May 23, 2016]
52nd Brigade:
•
Umm Obeid, northwest of Baghdad
West of Baghdad
[as of May 15, 2016]
•
[as of June 29, 2016] 53rd Brigade:
•
Jazeera Khalidiyah, northeast of Ramadi,
Anbar Province [as of October 8, 2016]
Basra Operations Command (BasOC) – Jamil
al-Shammari57 •
West of Baghdad
[as of May 15, 2016]
The BasOC has de jure responsibility for all of Basra
Province, Iraq’s commercial hub, including Umm •
Jisr Yabani, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
Province [as of January 7, 2016]
Qasr, Iraq’s only major port. The BasOC has been
unable to assert itself as the predominant security
DECEMBER 2017
64th Brigade: security arrangements between the central Iraqi

• Basra, Basra Province
[as of June 14, 2016]
government and the Kurds, particularly in Kirkuk,
before the 12th Division dissolved. The 12th
Division’s dissolution following the rise of ISIS in
Unattributed:
2014 allowed Peshmerga forces to hold the oil-rich
• Saqlawiyah, Albu Shajal, northwest of
Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 25, 2016] Kirkuk Province after clearing it of ISIS presence
until October 2017, when Iranian proxies and the
• Albu Khanfar, Garma, northeast of Fallujah,
Anbar Province [as of May 24, 2016]
ISF ejected them from key terrain.64
• Fallujah, Anbar Province

5th Iraqi Army Division (Akram Saddam
Mudannaf)
• North of Baghdad
The 5th IA Division is compromised by the Iranian
proxy Badr Organization, to which it is more
responsive than the Prime Minister and the formal
Dijla Operations Command (DOC) – Mazhar
Iraqi chain of command.65 It has responsibility for
al-Azzawi61
Diyala and the Hamrin Mountains stretching into
The DOC currently has responsibility for areas northern Salah al-Din and west towards al-Alam
Iran and the Badr Organization prioritize. This sub-district.66 It operates as an extension of the
includes all of Diyala Province, eastern Salah al-Din Badr Organization, though it was briefly led by a
Province and its mixed Kurd-Turkmen-Arab town commander with a negative view of the PMF.67
of Tuz Khurmatu, the Alas and Ajil oil fields, and
the Hamrin Mountain Range. Diyala is a vital mil- 18th Brigade:
itary and economic entry point for Iran into Iraq. • Alas, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din
Province [as of July 12, 2016]
Salah al-Din holds religious significance for Shi’as
due to the Samarra Mosque, and serves as Iran’s • Hamrin mountains, northern Diyala Province
gateway to a land bridge from Iran to Syria through
central Iraq. Control over Diyala and Salah al-Din • Buhriz, south of Baqubah, Diyala Province
[as of May 1, 2016]
Provinces also provides Iranian proxies the neces-
sary staging grounds to intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan, • Udhaim, north of Baqubah, Diyala Province
as they did alongside ISF in October 2017 following
the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum of 19th Brigade:
September 2017.
• Udhaim, north of Baqubah, Diyala Province
Mazhar al-Azzawi nominally commands the
DOC, but the DOC responds to the leader of the • Khan Bani Saad, south of Baqubah, Diyala
Province [as of June 30, 2016]
Iranian proxy Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri.
Former Prime Minister Maliki put Hadi al-Ameri • Hamrin mountains, eastern Salah al-Din
Province and northern Diyala Province
in charge of the Diyala Province security portfolio
in 2014. Prime Minister Abadi has since left the [as of July 12, 2015]
DOC largely under Ameri’s control.62 The DOC, 20th Brigade:
created in 2012, commanded the Diyala-based 5th
Division and the now-dissolved 12th Division in
• Lake Hamrin, northeast of Muqdadiyah,
Diyala Province [as of June 16, 2017]
Kirkuk.63 The DOC amassed power in Disputed
Internal Boundaries contested by Baghdad and the
• Abu Saida, northeast of Baqubah, Diyala
Province [July 23, 2016]
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), particu-
larly in Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din Provinces.
• Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
[April 2, 2016]
The DOC’s development destabilized pre-existing
• Al-Saidat, near Qara Tapa, Diyala Province

[as of June 15, 2015]
River Valley, the far western district of Rutba, and
the Baghdad-Amman highway. It also has responsi-
• Udhaim Dam, north of Baquba, Diyala
Province [as of November 12, 2014]
bility over much of the Jazeera and Badia Deserts,
giving JBOC one of the largest geographic areas of
• Shalgham al-Nida, east of Baquba, Diyala
Province [as of April 13, 2016]
responsibility. JBOC is undermanned. It consists of
one understaffed IA Division, the 7th IA Division,
and one FP brigade, the 18th FP Brigade – which
21st Brigade: has since redeployed to fight in Mosul – supported
•
Salah al-Din Province [as of January 16, 2017]
by tribal fighters and a small number of Iraqi Shi’a
militiamen.
•
[as of June 11, 2016] 7th Iraqi Army Infantry Division (Nauman
•
Hamrin mountains, eastern Salah al-Din
Abdul-Zobaie)
The 7th IA Division is responsible for western
•
Udhaim, north of Baquba, Diyala Province
Anbar, though it received temporary support from
the 16th IA Division until the latter redeployed for
Unattributed: Mosul operations in 2016.69 It is one of the most
•
Ghalibiyah and al-Hashimiyat, west of
Baquba, Diyala Province [as of June 13, 2017]
severely undermanned units in the IA. It relies
heavily on assistance of Jughaifi tribal fighters, who
•
Mtaibijah, north of Baquba, Diyala Province
view the key district of Haditha as their fiefdom.
Small Iraqi Shi’a militias also operate alongside
•
Al-Khawalis, south of Baquba, Diyala
Province [as of December 3, 2016]
the 7th IA Division and deploy as a hold force in
recaptured Sunni villages from the villages south
•
Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province
[as of September 7, 2016]
of Haditha and as far west as the Walid Border
Crossing with Syria. The 7th IA Division also works
•
[as of June 30, 2016]
alongside Border Guards brigades, which cluster
near the Walid and Trebil Border Crossings and the
Baghdad-Amman highway.
•
Abu Saida, southwest of Muqdadiyah, Diyala
Province [as of June 15, 2016] 27th Brigade:
•
Al-Zarga, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din
Province [April 25, 2016]
•
Haditha-Baiji road, northeast of Haditha,
Anbar Province [as of June 13, 2017]
•
Salah al-Din Province [March 18, 2016]
•
Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
•
Hamrin mountains, eastern Salah al-Din
•
Al-Dulab, west of al-Baghdadi, Anbar
•
Sansal and al-Sadour, north of Muqdadiyah,
Diyala Province [as of January 15, 2015]
•
Amlijiya, south of Haditha, Anbar Province
[as of July 10, 2015]
•
Saadiyah and Jalula, Diyala Province
[as of November 18, 2014] 28th Brigade:
•
Udhaim, north of Baquba, Diyala Province •
Southeast of Anah, Northwest of Haditha,
Anbar Province [as of June 13, 2017]
•
Al-Sakra, northwest of Haditha, Anbar
Jazeera and Badia Operations Command
(JBOC) – Qassim al-Muhammadi68 •
Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
The JBOC has responsibility for most of Anbar
west of Ramadi, including the western Euphrates •
Albu Hayah, south of Haditha, Anbar
Province [March 16, 2016]
DECEMBER 2017
29th Brigade: 8th Brigade:

• Hit, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of
July 5, 2017]
• Amiriyat al-Fallujah, south of Fallujah, Anbar
• Hit and Kubaisa, west of Ramadi, Anbar
• Albu Duayij, south of Fallujah, Anbar
Province [as of February 26, 2016]
• Kilo 160, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
[as of June 15, 2015] 30th Brigade:
Province [November 22, 2016]
Unattributed:
[as of June 18, 2016]
• Al-Hossa and al-Nasaf, east of Ramadi, Anbar
• Jazeera al-Dulab, east of Haditha, Anbar
Province [as of September 28, 2016]
• Zankurah, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
• Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
• Albu Harat, near Ramadi, Anbar Province
• Al-Sakra, west of Haditha, Anbar Province
• Albu Duayij, south of Fallujah, Anbar
• Hit-Baghdadi road, south of Fallujah, Anbar
Province [as of February 5, 2016] 31st Brigade:
• Al-Hossa and al-Nasaf, east of Ramadi, Anbar
Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC)
– Qais Khalaf Rahimah • Zankurah, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
The MEOC has responsibility over the key shrine
cities of Karbala and Najaf, their prodigious
desert sectors, and the southern Anbar district of
Nukhaib. Chief among the MEOC’s priorities is 32nd Brigade:
ensuring the security of Shi’a religious pilgrims and • Rutba, Anbar Province [as of April 25, 2017]
preventing ISIS from infiltrating through the desert • Al-Felahat, southwest of Fallujah, Anbar
into Karbala, Najaf, and Iraq’s southern provinces.
Large numbers of Iraqi Shi’a militias supplement • Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
security in the MEOC, and many of them have
headquarters in Karbala, obtaining legitimacy and
33rd Brigade:
popular support by securing pilgrimage routes.
8th Iraqi Army Division (Ali al-Maliki)
• Albu Alwan, west of Baghdad
The 8th IA Division is based in Babil and falls under 39th Brigade:
BabOC Commander Riad al-Kikhani’s command,
though it reportedly has detachments, including a
• Al-Felahat, southwest of Fallujah, Anbar
logistics company, in Najaf and Karbala for the pur-
poses of protecting holy sites.70 The 8th Division was Unattributed:
originally part of the MEOC before transitioning • Al-Tash al-Awla, south of Ramadi, Anbar
operations to Babil, where it worked with the BOC,
the AOC, the MEOC, and more recently the JBOC • Juwaybah and Husaybah, east of Ramadi,
Anbar Province [as of August 2, 2016]
in different military operations. The 8th IA Division
operated under BabOC control during the Ramadi • Jazeera Khalidiyah, northwest of Ramadi,
Anbar Province [as of July 30, 2016]
operation rather than the MEOC, AOC, and BOC.
• Fallujah Dam, south of Fallujah, Anbar

[as of May 22, 2016]
• Zankurah, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
• West of Ishaqit, south of Tikrit, Salah al-Din
• Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
• Al-Qinatir crossing, north of Garma, Anbar
• Al-Mlahimah,
[May 18, 2015]
east of Ramadi, Anbar Province
Ninewa Operations Command (NOC) – Maj.
Gen. Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri72
17th Iraqi Army Division (Jabbar Naima)
The NOC dissolved in June 2014 when ISIS seized
23rd Brigade: Mosul. It was reinstated in April 2015.73 The NOC
•
South of Baghdad [as of December 24, 2016] held responsibility for all operations to recapture
•
Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad
Ninewa Province from ISIS control.74 The 15th and
16th IA Divisions are the units from the 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th IA Divisions that the U.S. and its partners
25th Brigade: trained and reconstituted. They are combat capable,
•
Latifiyah, south of Baghdad
but struggled with tactical tasks such as “seize” and
“clear” during the Mosul operation. Elements of
•
Tel al-Thahab, south of Baghdad
the U.S.-trained 15th IA Division never deployed
to Mosul from the northern Baghdad Belts, where
•
Al-Akhsaf, south of Baghdad
ISIS has historically had a presence and in which
numerous Iraqi Shi’a militias are present.
55th Brigade: 15th Iraqi Army Division (Imad al-Silawi)
•
Dawilibah, south of Baghdad
[as of June 8, 2017] The 74th Brigade, 15th Division was relegated to
•
Al-Bzaibiz Bridge, southeast of Baghdad
[as of July 19, 2016]
holding towns in southern Salah al-Din Province
like Dujail and Sayyid Gharib. It was intended to
deploy to Anbar in April 2016, but the Salah al-Din
•
Bustan al-Tikriti, southwest of Baghdad
[as of March 23, 2016] provincial government blocked the move.75 The
91st Brigade, 15th Division is an all-Kurdish brigade
60th Brigade: that pre-dates the 15th Division’s formation. It has
•
[as of March 17, 2017]71
operated primarily around Mosul and southwestern
Arbil Province.76 The 92nd Brigade is an all-Shi’a
•
East of Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province
Turkmen brigade. It operates near militias with sig-
nificant Shi’a Turkmen components as well, raising
•
Al-Abadi, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of May 23, 2016]
questions about whether it is fully responsive to
Baghdad or is more aligned with lethal Iranian
•
Albu Obeid, west of Baghdad
proxy Shi’a militias. It played a leading role in the
fight to recapture the Turkmen town of Tel Afar,
where it fought alongside Iranian proxy Shi’a mili-
Unattributed: tias like Kata’ib Hezbollah.77
•
East of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of May 24, 2016] 52nd Brigade:
•
Al-Kuam, Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad
•
Last known location: Sur Shanas, north of
Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
•
Nuamiyah, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province
DECEMBER 2017
71st Brigade: Unattributed:

• Rihanah, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa
• Al-Buwayr, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of June 15, 2017]
• Al-Milayeen, north of Mosul, Ninewa
• Qayyarah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
• Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province
• Makhmour, southwest of Arbil
[April 13, 2016]
• Nasr, west of Makhmour, southwest of Arbil
• Asariyah, northwest of Ramadi, Anbar
72nd Brigade: • Sijariyah, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province
• Sheikh Ibrahim, near Tel Afar, Ninewa
Province [as of May 11, 2017] 16th Iraqi Army Division (Sabah Fadhil Matar
al-Azzawi)
• West of Makhmour, southwest of Arbil

[as of June 5, 2016]
75th Brigade:
• Al-Balgha, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of June 11, 2017]
73rd Brigade:
• Al-Zinjili, west Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of June 20, 2017]
• South of Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province
76th Brigade:
• Baysan al-Rashidiyah, west of Mosul, Ninewa
• Albu Risha, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
[as of February 2, 2016] •
Bawiza, north of Mosul, Ninewa Province
74th Brigade:
• Yathrib, south of Samarra, Salah al-Din
91st Brigade:
• Last known location: Juizat Tahtani and Juizat
• Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
Fuqani, near Makhmour, southwest of Arbil
• Muthanna Facility, west of Samarra, Salah Unattributed:

al-Din Province [as of January 27, 2016] • Shalalat, north of Mosul, Ninewa Province
• Sayyid Gharib, southeast of Samarra, Salah [as of November 1, 2016]
al-Din Province [as of January 27, 2016] • Khazar, east of Mosul, Ninewa Province
91st Brigade:
• Mosul, Ninewa Province • Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province
3rd Federal Police Division (Saleh al-Amiri)
The 3rd FP Division is compromised by Iranian
92nd Brigade: proxies within the PMF. The disposition of the 9th
Brigade suggests it operates alongside Iranian proxy
militias like Kata’ib al-Imam Ali in Baiji. The 10th
• Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province
[as of June 13, 2016]
Brigade is concentrated in Samarra and partici-
pates in PMF-led clearing operations in the Jazeera
Desert. The 11th Brigade commander Hussein
al-Bahadali appears to be friendly with senior Salah al-Din Operations Command (SDOC) –
(Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada) KSAS members, Lt. Gen. Juma Anad al-Jabouri80
including official spokesperson Faleh al-Khazali.78
The SDOC, which formed after ISIS captured
The 12th Brigade appears to be mostly based in
Iraqi terrain, has responsibility for the northern
Salah al-Din Province in areas that see a significant
half of Salah al-Din Province, including the cities
number of PMF fighters. The 21st Brigade is a pre-
of Tikrit, Baiji, and Shirqat. The PMF operates
dominantly Turkmen FP unit that is customarily led
freely in Salah al-Din Province without coordinat-
by a Turkmen commander.79
ing with the SDOC. Iranian proxy militias operate
9th Brigade: out of Baiji and the Speicher Air Base, northwest of
•
Al-Jawsaq, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[February 25, 2017]
Tikrit, and station themselves along the key Baiji-
Haditha highway. Iranian proxy militias ousted
•
South of Mosul [as of October 22, 2016] the previous SDOC commander, Abdul-Wahhab
al-Saadi, during operations to recapture Tikrit in
•
North of Qayyarah, Ninewa Province
[as of October 21, 2016] May 2015 because he insisted on introducing U.S.-
led Coalition airstrikes to what was until then a
•
Siniyah, west of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
[October 2, 2016]
militia-dominated operation. The PMF have since
cowed the SDOC and exercise freedom of move-
10th Brigade: ment and action within its area of responsibility.
•
Fourth Bridge, Mosul, Ninewa Province
20th Iraqi Army Infantry Division (Proposed)
•
Near Camp al-Ghazlani, south of Mosul,
Ninewa Province [as of December 20, 2016]
The 20th IA Division has yet to be formed. A leaked
MoD document from February 14, 2017 indicates
•
Al-Harariat area, east of Fallujah, Anbar
four brigades from pre-existing divisions would
consolidate into the 20th IA Division and base out
•
Lake Thar Thar, Anbar Province
[as of June 14, 2016]
of Speicher Air Base, northwest of Tikrit.81 The
new division would deploy for operations in SDOC
and Samarra Operations Command (SOC) areas
11th Brigade: of responsibility. The new division appears to be a
•
method of consolidating MoD forces in Salah al-Din
Province and improving the ability of IA units sta-
•
[as of June 22, 2016]
tioned in SDOC and SOC to operate as a unit.
The 66th Brigade appears to be attached directly
12th Brigade: to the SDOC as of October 2017. It was originally
•
Hamrin Mountains, east of Tikrit, Salah
al-Din Province [as of September 11, 2016]
intended to be part of the 18th IA Division based in
Maysan, however, the 66th Brigade was the only unit
•
Thar Thar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
of the division that actually formed. Limited picture
intelligence suggests the unit has low capabilities
and exhibits signs of poor discipline.82
21st Brigade:
The proposed units in the 20th Division are:
•
HQ at Muthanna Facility, near Thar Thar,
Salah al-Din Province [as of June 1, 2015] 43rd Brigade, 11th IA Division
•
Nadhim al-Thar Thar, northwest of Fallujah,
Anbar Province [as of June 1, 2015] 60th Brigade, 17th IA Division
•
Diyala Province [as of December 3, 2016] 66th Brigade (new)
•
Hariariat, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
[as of May 10, 2016]
DECEMBER 2017
• Salah al-Din Province [as of August 27, 2016] forces are stretched thin. Intra-Shi’a violence esca-
lated in September 2016 to a point that Prime
74th Brigade, 15th IA Division (SOC) Minister Abadi personally intervened with a large
military force from Baghdad and to work towards
Samarra Operations Command (SOC) – Imad
reconciliation between warring tribes.88
Yassin al-Zuhairi 83
10th Iraqi Army Division (Hamid al-Fatlawi)
The SOC has responsibility over Samarra, much
of the Jazeera Desert west of Samarra, and south- The 10th IA Division is responsible for securing
ern Salah al-Din Province including part of the Ramadi and much of the Jazeera Desert north of
northern Baghdad Belts. The 5th FP Division, par- Ramadi. It currently bases at the AOC headquar-
ticularly the 17th Brigade, also operates in Samarra. ters north of Ramadi. The 10th IA Division’s area
It is unclear to which operations command the 5th of responsibility is small compared to the units
Division was originally attached to upon creation, of JBOC, though more populous, but the 10th IA
but former SOC head Sabah Fatlawi stated the 5th Division was also undermanned after facing tough
Division was formed under his command in March ISIS resistance during the months-long operation
2014.84 The 5th FP Division was absent from the to clear Ramadi.
news until 2014. The 74th Brigade, 15th IA Division
operates in Samarra but is originally designated 4th Brigade:
to be with the NOC. The 12th FP Brigade, 3th FP • Last known location: Dawilibah, south of
Baghdad [as of October 23, 2014]
Division also operates in this area of responsibility
but is originally linked to the NOC. Iraqi Shi’a mili- 38th Brigade:
tias proliferate the SOC area of responsibility, given
their interest in protecting the holy al-Askari Shrine
• Albu Bali, northeast of Ramadi, Anbar
in central Samarra. Its area of responsibility has a
significant Sunni population, and the SOC focuses
• Albu Thaib and al-Juraishi, north of Ramadi,
Anbar Province [as of September 15, 2016]
on either returning Sunni IDPs to their homes –
with mixed effects – or securing Samarra alongside 39th Brigade:
the PMF. Prime Minister Abadi appointed Zuhairi • Al-Juraishi, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province
to replace a less capable commander, just one year
after being removed from his division command • Al-Bakr, near Hit, Anbar Province
to make room for a Maliki loyalist.85 However, the
freedom of movement and action of the PMF indi- 40th Brigade:
cates it is unlikely Zuhairi is able to shape PMF
operations in his own area of responsibility. The
• Al-Bakr, near Hit, Anbar Province
SOC did not exist in 2013.
• Al-Juraishi, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province
Rafidain Operations Command (ROC) – Maj.
Gen. Ibrahim Dab’oun al-Maqsusi86 41st Brigade:
The ROC oversees security in Muthanna, Dhi
• al-Bakr, near Hit, Anbar Province
Qar, Maysan, Qadisiyah, and Wasit Provinces.
The majority of ISF based in the ROC area of
• Thar Thar, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province
responsibility forward deployed to fight ISIS or
protect Baghdad. The ROC deployed several of its • Albu Obeid, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province
Emergency Police Battalions, police units that are
rarely forward deployed from their home provinces, • Jazeera Khalidiyah, northeast of Ramadi,
Anbar Province [February 7, 2016]
to protect Samarra or to secure pilgrimage routes.87
Security remains vulnerable as the ROC’s security
Unattributed: of temporary operations commands began with

•
Tarabsha, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province
[June 14, 2017]
the Fallujah operation in 2015, when the JOC
appointed the former SDOC commander Abdul-
•
Jazeera Khalidiyah, northeast of Ramadi,
Anbar Province [as of July 31, 2016]
Wahhab al-Saadi as the overall commander for
operations in the area, with the BOC and AOC
acting in supporting roles. Similarly, the ISF estab-
11th Iraqi Army Division (Sa’ib Obeid Mohsin
lished the Mosul Liberation Operations Command
Alwan)
under the JOC deputy director’s leadership for the
42nd Brigade: Mosul operation. There were persistent rumors
•
Rashidiyah, north of Baghdad
the ISF would establish the East DOC, a temporary
operations command to recapture Hawija, but the
•
JOC denied any such body ever formed.89
•
Al-Madain, south of Baghdad Ministry of Interior
•
Garma, Albu Awdah, al-Sajar, northeast
of Fallujah, Anbar Province
Federal Police (FP) —
[as of June 28, 2016] Raed Shakir Jawdat
43rd Brigade: The FP is a deployable gendarmerie under the MoI.
•
Rashidiyah, north of Baghdad
Its capabilities fall on the spectrum between an IA
Army unit and the local police. FP units possess
•
Al-Khadr, east Mosul, Ninewa Province
anti-tank rockets, Humvees, Infantry Fighting
Vehicles such as Russian BMP-2s, and pickup
trucks outfitted with heavy weapons. They are
44th Brigade: recruited at the provincial level but forward deploy
•
Adhamiyah, north Baghdad
outside of their home provinces. FP units, includ-
ing a “Sniper Battalion” received training from the
•
Karrada, central Baghdad
Italian Carabinieri, a historical partner for police
training partnerships.90 Italy trains local police
•
Hayy al-Basatin, north Baghdad
and FP (as many as 900) but it is unclear which
units receive training, as local Emergency Police
Battalion uniforms are identical to those of the
45th Brigade:
FP.91 Italy’s training program is based in Baghdad
•
Sadr City, northeast Baghdad
[as of December 20, 2016] while the Danish trainers are based at Ain al-Asad.
This suggests that the 18th FP Brigade has received
•
Al-Dhabitiah, northwest of Baghdad
[as of December 2, 2016] FP training, as they are the only FP unit based in
western Anbar.92
•
North of Baghdad [as of June 10, 2016]
•
Al-Anaz, west of Baghdad
FP units accompany the PMF during every major
PMF-led operation. The current FP commander,
Qasim al-Araji, and his predecessor are both
Temporary Operations Commands members of the Badr Organization, an Iranian
proxy.93 FP commanders who are not sympathetic
The JOC establishes temporary operations com- to PMF are likely intimidated into cooperating with
mands specific to a major operation. Major PMF or ordered to do so by the sympathetic FP senior
operations previously fell under the target area’s leadership.94 Non-compliant FP commanders may
operations commander: Ramadi fell under the be retired or moved to administrative positions to
AOC, while Tikrit fell under SDOC. The practice free up positions for Badr Organization and other
DECEMBER 2017
militia members.95 The FP is more likely to become • Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad
more compromised during Araji’s tenure.
The 1st Federal Police Division [listed under the • Al-Zaidan, south of Baghdad
Baghdad Operations Command]96
2nd Federal Police Division (Ahmed al-Asadi) 3rd Federal Police Division [listed under the Ninewa
Operations Command, as it has been based there since its
The 2nd FP Division is the only mechanized FP divi- creation.]98
sion, and it is deployed to secure Baghdad.97 The 2nd
FP Division’s units are largely occupied with coun- 4th Federal Police Division (Majid Ghadir Ghazal)
terterrorism operations around Baghdad and the The 4th FP Division appears to have responsibility
Baghdad Belts, securing pilgrimage routes, and law for southern Baghdad and areas south of the capital,
enforcement. Haidar Yusuf Abdullah, also known such as the Karkh Prison.99 The 13th Brigade has con-
as Abu Dargham al-Maturi, commanded both nections with the Iranian-backed Kata’ib al-Imam
the 5th FP Brigade and the 5th Badr Brigade until Ali militia as a result of their overlapping areas
his promotion to command the 6th FP Division in of responsibility in Salah al-Din Province.100 It is
February 2017. The unit is effectively an extension also one of the few units with a security presence in
of the Badr Organization. At least one of its units, southern Iraq, maintaining a detachment in Basra.
the 6th Brigade, forward deployed some of its forces The 16th Brigade is concentrated in western Karbala
to Mosul for clearing operations. and the desert district of Nukhaib, west of Karbala.
Iraqi Shi’a militias heavily supplement security
5th Brigade: forces in the Karbala area to protect Karbala’s pro-
• Hammam al-Alil, south of Mosul, Ninewa
vincial borders and to monitor the expansive Jazeera
Desert. It also maintains presence in southern Iraq
• Cement Plant, east of Fallujah, Anbar
with a detachment in Wasit Province.
• Sayyid Muhammad Shrine, Balad district, 13th Brigade:

Salah al-Din Province [as of May 13, 2016] • Makhoul, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din
6th Brigade:
• Ghaziliyah, northwest of Baghdad • Basra Prison, Basra Province
[as of July 22, 2016]
[as of June 17, 2017]
• Hamam al-Alil, south of Mosul, Ninewa 14th Brigade:
Province [November 8, 2016] • Mosul, Ninewa Province
• Al-Harariyat, near Garma, northeast of [as of January 14, 2017]
Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 23, 2016] • Nasiriyah Prison, Dhi Qar Province
[as of June 13, 2015]
7th Brigade:
• Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad 15th Brigade:
[as of June 3, 2017] • Al-Shathra, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
• Al-Rayy, south of Baghdad Province [May 17, 2017]
[as of September 14, 2016] • Al-Hweish, north of Baghdad
8th Brigade:
• Saba al-Bour, north of Baghdad 16th Brigade:
[as of January 10, 2017] • Western Karbala Province
• Kadhimiyah, northwest of Baghdad [as of October 9, 2016]
[as of November 15, 2016] • Wasit Province
• Taji, north of Baghdad
5th Federal Police Division (Imad Ali al-Lami) 20th Brigade:

The 5th FP Division participated in the Mosul oper- •
South of Mosul, Ninewa Province
ation’s southern axis, which was dominated by FP
units compromised by Iranian proxies.101 The 5th •
FP Division currently operates alongside the 6th FP
Division, led by a Badr Organization commander.102 Unattributed:
The 17th Brigade has responsibility for security in
south and east Salah al-Din Province and the Jazeera
•
Al-Dandan, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of June 15, 2017]
Desert west of Samarra, which place it proximate to
PMF units. The 19th Brigade exhibits close coordi-
•
Southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province
nation with the Sadrist militia Saraya al-Salam due
to their overlapping areas of responsibility around
•
Umm al-Asafir, Lake Thar Thar, west of
Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
Samarra.103 [as of March 3, 2016]
17th Brigade: 6th Federal Police Division – Abu Dargham

• Al-Zankur, near Samarra, Salah al-Din
al-Maturi
The 6th FP Division formed in 2016 and contains,
• Jazeera west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
according to an unconfirmed report, the 4th, 5th,
and 6th FP Brigades of the 6th FP Division. It is
• Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala
Province [August 10, 2016]
closely tied with and appears to operate alongside
Iranian proxy militias. The FP promoted the 5th
• Al-Jilam, east of Samarra, Salah al-Din
Province [July 19, 2016]
Badr Brigade commander, Abu Dargham al-Maturi,
to command the 6th FP Division in February 2017,
• Dhuluiya, Salah al-Din Province
effectively placing Iranian proxy militias inside
Mosul under the formal chain of command.104 The
18th Brigade: 6th FP Division originally intended to integrate
• West Mosul, Ninewa Province
Sunnis into the FP, according to Anbar officials.105
The behavior of the 6th FP Division, however, indi-
• South of Mosul, Ninewa Province
cates it is a compromised unit and not representative
of Anbari Sunni populations.
• Akashat, Trebil Border area, Anbar Province
Unattributed:
• 70 Kilo, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province

•
Mosul Old City, Ninewa Province
[as of May 21, 2017]
[February 15, 2016]
•
Al-Tayran and Wadi al-Hajar, southern
[as of December 5, 2015] [as of February 28, 2017]
19th Brigade: •
Saqlaqiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
• South of Mosul, Ninewa Province
Province [ May 30, 2016]
• Jazeera, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din

Emergency Response Division
(ERD) —Thamir Muhammad Ismail
• Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
[as of May 1, 2016] al-Husseini (“Abu Turab”)
• Khat al-Lein, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
The ERD (sometimes referred to as the Rapid
Response Division or Emergency Response
Brigades) is a mobile special operations force under
DECEMBER 2017
MoI control. It was formed with the intention of forts. Border Guards in Iraqi Kurdistan are respon-
consolidating into the ISOF after the liberation sive to the KRG, not the MoI. The Border Guards
of Mosul from ISIS. It has remained under MoI, operate under five distinct border regions:113
rather than MoD, chain of command, however.106 It
operates mostly in AOC, BOC, and SDOC areas of
• 1st Region of Iraqi Kurdistan’s borders with
Iran and Turkey
responsibility, but it can be expected to shift loca-
tions depending on manpower requirements given
• 2nd Region of western Anbar’s borders with
Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
its more advanced capabilities. All three ERD bri-
gades have deployed in some capacity to Ninewa for
• 3rd Region of the Diyala-Wasit border with
Iran
operations to recapture Mosul.107
• 4th Region of Basra and Maysan’s borders
with Iran and Kuwait
The unit and its commander have close ties to the
Badr Organization.108 The U.S. Joint Forces Special • 5th Region of Najaf and Muthanna’s borders
with Saudi Arabia
Operations Command Component — Iraq tempo-
rarily ended its relationship with the unit because of
indigenous leadership failures.109 The U.S. has since The Border Guards are heavily concentrated in the
rekindled its advising relationship with the ERD. 2nd Region as of August 2017, particularly around
U.S. and European advisers accompanied the ERD Trebil Border Crossing with Jordan, the Ar Ar
into southern Mosul during clearing operations.110 Border Crossing with Saudi Arabia, the al-Walid
No discernible change to the ERD’s leadership Border Crossing with southeastern Syria, and
explains the return of U.S. advisors.111 It has been along the International Highway running between
less disciplined than other ISOF units and likely Trebil and Ramadi. The Border Guard 3rd, 4th, and
more compromised. Abu Turab is a Maliki appoin- 5th Regions with Kuwait, southern Saudi Arabia,
tee whose unit operates alongside the PMF. He was and Iran are undermanned. Lack of manpower at
rumored at one point to be Prime Minister Abadi’s Iran-Iraq border posts may have contributed to a
replacement for Minister of Interior, again implic- stampede by Iranian pilgrims in November 2016.114
itly linking him with the Badr Organization.112 Most of the Syria-Iraq border has few Border Guards
present, though the Kurdish Peshmerga controlled
1st Brigade: a portion of it in northern Iraq as of August 2017.
• Maysan Province [as of September 25, 2016]
Border Guards Division (Hamid Abdullah)
2nd Brigade:
•
Subaihat, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[May 4, 2016]
1st Brigade:
• Mahfur Majna border crossing, Iraq-Saudi
Arabia border [as of February 28, 2015]
3rd Brigade:
•
West of Baghdad [as of May 16, 2016] 2nd Brigade:
•
Historically operated in Arbil Province
•
Al-Fatha, East of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
[as of July 1, 2016] 3rd Brigade:
Unattributed: •
Daquq, Kirkuk Province
•
Central Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of May 4, 2017] 4th Brigade:
•
Arkaban border crossing, Iraq – Jordan border
Border Guards Command [as of January 25, 2015]
The Border Guards are a motorized infantry force 5th Brigade:
attached to the MoI. They oversee Iraq’s ports of
entry and its borders from watchtowers and border
• Rutba, Anbar Province
6th Brigade: Facilities Protection Service (FPS)

•
Najaf, Najaf Province
[as of December 16, 2015] and Oil Police
•
Iraq – Jordan border
Iraq’s FPS forces are essentially security guards pro-
tecting critical infrastructure, such as electricity
stations, power lines, railways, government offices,
7th Brigade:
and other infrastructure.117 They fall nominally
• Ar Ar Border Crossing, Iraq-Saudi Arabia
border [as of January 13, 2016]
under the MoI but respond more regularly to the
ministry whose facilities they protect. The FPS gen-
8th Brigade: erally have limited maneuver and firepower. The
•
Diyala Province, Iraq-Iran border
Iraqi Oil Police are more capable than the other
FPS forces and have slightly better equipment. They
are motorized units attached to the Ministry of Oil
9th Brigade: and responsible for the protection of the country’s
•
Anbar Province [as of June 16, 2014] oil fields. Most of the oil police concentrate around
10th Brigade: the oil fields in Basra and southern Iraq. Oil police
•
Al-Tib border crossing, Iran-Iraq border
in Kirkuk and Iraqi Kurdistan are responsive to the
KRG, not the Ministry of Oil or the MoI.118
11th Brigade:
• Najaf, Najaf Province
Popular Mobilization
12th Brigade:
• Historically responsible for the border area Forces
between Saudi Arabia and Najaf
14th Brigade: The PMF are led by senior Iranian proxy leaders
who respond to Iran’s IRGC-Quds Force. PMF
• Historically responsible for the border between
Iran, Basra, and Maysan institutions are responsive to the directives of
an unofficial executive commission, or “Shura
Council,” dominated by senior leaders of Asa’ib Ahl
Provincial Emergency Police al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization,
Battalions and other pro-Iranian figures.121
Emergency Police Battalions are localized combat The PMC was first created by former Prime Minister
formations of local police tied to provincial police Nouri al-Maliki in 2014 after the collapse of the ISF
commands that fall under the leadership of the against ISIS.122 The PMC gained increasing power
FP. They are not intended to mobilize like the and popular legitimacy among Shi’as as its sub-
FP, and most often remain in the area in which ordinate militias participated actively in the fight
formed. They are only forward deployed in unique against ISIS. Prime Minister Abadi maintained the
circumstances, the most common being the alloca- PMC and its militias after he took office in 2014
tion of southern provinces’ emergency battalions due to the precariousness of security in Iraq. The
to pilgrimage routes or sites, such as the al-Askari Iraqi CoR approved the “Popular Mobilization
Shrine in Samarra.115 Emergency Police Battalions Commission’s Law” in November 2016, legalizing
near the frontlines have limited combat capabil- both the entity as an independent body within the
ities and are most frequently used to hold rather ISF and its subordinate militias.123 The PMC over-
than to clear territory.116 sees the administrative needs of its forces, from
training, arming, and the provision of salaries and
DECEMBER 2017
Above: A February 8, 2016 meeting of senior Iranian proxy leaders to discuss Mosul operations.119 Senior leaders like Qais al-Khazali, Hadi
al-Ameri, and Abu Alaa al-Wila’i frequently hold meetings, either bilaterally or as a group, to discuss major developments and plan for operations. Picture
intelligence suggests that there is an agreed-upon PMF leadership cadre composed of the most senior militia commanders that oversees the operations and
activities of the PMF and PMC.120
supplies to the planning of military operations. The particularly IRGC Ground Forces Commander
PMC’s deputy chairman, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Muhammad Pakpour and IRGC-Quds Force
controls the PMC’s subordinate directorates.124 Commander Qassim Suleimani, demonstrates that
The centralization of the PMF’s command struc- the IRGC and its Quds Force exercise influence over
ture under Muhandis’ leadership has increased the PMF campaign design.125 Consistent Iranian advi-
coherence of the organization’s military and admin- sory presence suggests that the PMF require Iranian
istrative operations over time. assistance to operate capably in high-end combat.
The PMC has created several directorates for Iran initially provided military and financial backing
overseeing the planning and execution of mili- to the PMF, particularly its proxy units.126 The PMC
tary operations since its inception in mid-2014. Law — championed by pro-Iranian parties in the
This administrative structure has enabled Iranian Iraqi CoR — not only legalized the PMF as part of the
proxy militias to conduct joint operations with one state security apparatus but also provided funding
another and with non-Iranian affiliated units and from the Iraqi budget, thereby alleviating finan-
increased the speed and efficiency of such opera- cial pressure on Tehran.127 The PMF received $1.63
tions. The operations directorate manages forward billion from the GoI in 2017 – about six percent
operations and examines the readiness of forward of Iraq’s security budget – which exceeds the $683
troops, directly supervised by Muhandis and heavily million allotted to the CTS.128 This budget increase
overseen by Badr Organization head Hadi al-Ameri. followed a three percent cut to the salaries of civilian
A highly effective military engineering directorate employees in the government following the decline
augments this work. The intelligence directorate in oil prices. The Iraqi CoR also voted to match
provides signals intelligence and drone surveillance, PMF salaries to those of ISF service members in the
while the logistics directorate supplies ammunition, 2018 federal budget, further expanding the PMF’s
fuel, and other needs to deployed units. financial standing and institutionalization.129
The presence of Iranian advisers with several PMF The implementation of a centralized administration
groups throughout the campaign to defeat ISIS, has also streamlined PMF finances, recruitment,
Above: Iraqi Vice President Nouri al-Maliki holds a meeting with PMF leaders in January 2015, the first major meeting by a senior Iraqi state offi-
cial.130 Senior proxy militia leaders are notably absent except for commander of Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Shibl al-Zaidi, whose face is obscured but sits on the
far left of the photo. Maliki attempts to position himself as a leader of the PMF, and frequently meets with the organization’s leaders and praises them in an
attempt to curry favor among Iran’s proxies.
and the provision of care for fighters and their responds to the IRGC–Quds Force and, thus, to
families. The administrative directorate also pro- Tehran. Such parallel structures steered by Iranian
fessionalized recruitment procedures using the proxies had emerged in Iraq in 2005 – 2007.132
MoD model. Medical care and rehabilitation assis- The U.S. campaign plan to create an effective Iraqi
tance is provided to PMF fighters through a separate Army involved removing militia control over the
directorate. A specialized directorate oversees the National Police. Iran’s theory and implementation
provision of administrative and financial assistance of the “deep state” in Hezbollah also creates parallel
to wounded fighters and their families as well as the structures and serves as a model for its engagement
families of deceased fighters. A new directorate was in Iraq.133
established as the lobbying arm of the PMC within
The PMF is a critical mechanism of Iran’s deep state
the government. It advocates for favorable laws,
in Iraq. The formal chain of command obscures
regulations, and budgetary increases for the PMC.
the power relationships. Iranian proxies within
A media directorate was also established to be the
the PMF operate outside the Government of Iraq’s
official source of all PMF activities.
chain of command and in many cases contrary to
the Government of Iraq’s interests. Prime Minister
Popular Mobilization Forces Abadi and the ISF issue formal orders to the PMF,
but Iranian proxy commanders decide whether to
Chain of Command implement or take a different approach. The rela-
The PMF’s formal chain of command may run from tionships between Abadi and the proxies and the
the Prime Minister down, but power and political manner in which they are expressed have evolved
realities create an informal chain of command that over time.
DECEMBER 2017
Above: Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi meets with senior PMF leaders on July 22, 2017 and praises the PMF as an essential security institution
that is a part of the Iraqi state.131 Senior proxy militia leaders like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Qais al-Khazali, Hadi al-Ameri, Akram al-Kaabi, Sami
al-Masouri, and Abu Alaa al-Wila’I are shown meeting with Abadi, who did not hold such meetings or take such photos early in his tenure as premier.
The PMF and senior IRGC “advisors” like Qassim Iranian proxy forces in the PMF not only operate in
Suleimani played a lead role in the April 2015 a separate chain of command from the ISF, but in
anti-ISIS operation in Tikrit.134 When Iraqi Shi’a fact can command ISF units or dictate ISF actions
militias began shelling civilian areas near Tikrit, with use of force. PMF commanders also have exer-
the senior U.S. military officer in Iraq from 2013 cised near wholesale control of components of the
to July 2015 Lt. Gen. Mick Bednarek stated “the ISF. Iranian proxy Hadi al-Ameri has been seen
Iraqi security forces had no clue. And Abadi had no leading the 5th Army Division Commander and
idea…They didn’t seek his permission.”135 The U.S. others in prayer137 and advising on military maneu-
withheld its air support from the Tikrit operations vers over a map.138 Picture intelligence suggests
until the PMF backed down, stung by their failure Hadi al-Ameri is commanding what appear to be
to secure Tikrit from ISIS. Yet the tense relation- ISF officers at the Bai Hasan oil field after ISF and
ship between Abadi’s campaign plans and Iranian PMF forces assumed control of it in October 2017.
proxies’ campaign plans continued, and could be Ameri is also seen in a commanding position with
observed in places such as Fallujah and Tal Afar. an ERD officer walking next to him.139 PMF Deputy
Prime Minister Abadi lamented the PMF’s insub- Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis has been seen
ordination in June 2017, stating “The [PMF] have in the center of a group of ISF officers, including
not implemented a plan by which they agreed to the commander of the ERD Thamir al-Husseini,
recapture the areas surrounding Tel Afar District greeting the commander of the 3rd PMF brigade of
where they were ordered to four months ago to cut Asad Amerli, Abu Turab al-Tamimi.140 Iraqi Shi’a
off ISIS supplies from Syria.”136 militias operating in Basra City expelled units from
the 9th IA Armored Division deployed by Prime
Minister Abadi to suppress crime and tribal vio- PMF commanders frequently state the PMC is sub-
lence in the province in January 2016.141 Finally, ordinate to Prime Minister Abadi and exists at the
PMF do not abide by the same military standards will of the Iraqi government. De facto commander
and practices as the ISF often upholds, despite of the PMF Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis has described
claims to be subordinate to Iraqi law, often engag- the PMF’s relationship with Abadi as “soldiers
ing in intimidation of and vindictive attacks against with a commander,”146 The PMC Chairman has
Sunni Arabs.142 stated the PMF serve “…under the command of
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,”147
Top PMF commanders Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis
and spokesperson for Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Naim
and Hadi al-Ameri have also both acknowledged the
al-Aboudi has stated the PMC belongs “to the Iraqi
PMF’s dependence on Iran rather than the govern-
government,”148 to cite several examples. The PMC
ment of Iraq. Muhandis has stated “It’s no secret”
has released visualizations of a chain of command
that he seeks guidance from Iran’s
that does not reach up to Prime
leadership and that the PMF gets
Minister Abadi, but does place
material support from Tehran.143
the Chairman of the PMC and
He further stated the “Iraqi Army
Iraqi National Security Advisor
and Iraqi Police say they cannot
Faleh al-Fayadh as the lead
operate without the support of the
commander.149
Hashed,” using a shortened Arabic
word referring to the PMF.144 Hadi
al-Ameri has gone further, stating Left: An official PMF infographic
“If it wasn’t for Iran’s support, Iraq on the organization’s structure, originally
would have fallen into the hands posted on the PMC’s Ideological Directorate
of the Islamic State…We had a website.150 From top to bottom and left
real issue with weapons, prepara- to right, the text of the infographic reads:
tion. When the battle started, the Chairman of the Popular Mobilization
army and the police didn’t even Commission; Deputy Chairman of the
have ammunition…The volunteer Popular Mobilization Commission;
forces are the main force defending Logistics Support Directorate, Operations
Iraq. The international coalition is Directorate, Planning Directorate, Financial
Directorate, Administrative Directorate,
there but we can’t see any impact
General Inspections Directorate; Training
at all. It’s like an anesthetic for the Directorate, Medical Directorate, Religious
government, which makes them Guidance Directorate, Media Directorate,
think it will lead to Iraq’s freedom. Martyrs and Injured Directorate, Scouts
If we get rid of this anesthetic and Directorate, Central Security Directorate,
believe that we can liberate our Communications Directorate, Military
country ourselves, I don’t believe Engineering Directorate, Intelligence
it would take longer than a year to Directorate; Tank Companies, Anti-Tank
do it…This experience has proved Companies, Artillery Companies; Popular
to the state that it needs another Mobilization Brigades. This infographic
force.”145 pre-dates the Aviation Directorate, formed
in 2017 to coordinate between the Popular
The PMC heads deliberately Mobilization Forces, Iraqi Army Aviation,
obscure the PMF subordination and Iraqi Air Forces.
to Iranian leaders through public
statements regarding subordina-
tion to Prime Minister Abadi. Top
DECEMBER 2017
The PMF has also obscured its real chain of who is believed to maintain good relations with
command by using a numerical ranking system the U.S and the Arab states in the region. Maliki
akin to that of the IA in order to increase the appointed Fayadh as the head of the PMF when it
veneer of professionalism and integration into the formed in 2014. Abadi kept him in his position as
IA, as few Iraqi media outlets are able or choose to a counterweight to the Iranian proxy PMF opera-
define a unit as belonging to the IA or the PMF.151 tions commanders such as Muhandis and Ameri.
Conscious of significant, overt evidence for the Fayadh’s appointment also allows Abadi to balance
PMF’s subordination to Iranian leaders, the PMC’s against the Maliki wing of his own party, as Fayadh is
Media Directorate has gone so far as to release a close ally of the Foreign Affairs Minister Ibrahim
media in which PMF soldiers recount allegiance to al-Jafari. Although Fayadh, who has very minimal
the Iraq government and upholding the country’s media appearances, is nominally the top official,
laws and values.152 Muhandis leads the de facto hierarchy of the PMF
as he oversees the operational, administrative, and
The PMF is not subordinate to the ISF, but it does
financial dynamics within the force.
coordinate many activities. Many ISF units in Diyala,
Ninewa, and Salah al-Din Provinces are coordinat- Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization
ing with Iranian-backed Shi’a PMF units to clear or Commission: Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Kata’ib
hold terrain as of November 2017, as ISF and PMF Hezbollah [KH]) is the U.S.-designated terrorist
units jointly swept up formerly Kurdish-held terrain serving as the functional head of the PMF, answer-
in October 2017 following the Iraqi Kurdistan ing to the IRGC - Quds Force.
independence referendum in September 2017.153
Assistant Chairman of the Population Mobilization
The PMC media directorate published photos of
Commission: Thamir al-Tamimi (Badr
Combined JOC Director, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Organization). Tamimi is a representative of the Badr
Operations Lt. Gen. Abdul-Amir Rashid Yarallah,
Organization and an assistant to Muhandis.
CTS Commander and JOC Field Commander Lt.
Gen. Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi, and PMC Deputy Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization for
Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis sitting together, Administrative and Provisional Matters: Lt. Gen.
reportedly near al-Qaim, to “oversee operations” on Mohsen al-Kaabi. Prime Minister Abadi appointed
October 27, 2017.154 Lt. Gen. Yarallah has also coor- Kaabi, a former ISF senior officer, on February 17,
dinated with unofficial PMF Field Commander Hadi 2016 as co-deputy chairman in charge of the PMF’s
al-Ameri and ERD Commander Thamir al-Hus- finances and monitoring all PMF institutions.157
seini.155 Coordination is not always smooth, as ISF Muhandis was reportedly put in charge of military
and PMF units do clash occasionally.156 Coordination operations.158 Kaabi’s appointment led to specu-
which produces images of horizontal communica- lation that Prime Minister Abadi was attempting
tion also obscures the formalities of hierarchical to oust Muhandis from his position. Pro-Iranian
command and control. media circulated false reports that Kaabi imme-
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces: Haidar diately resigned in a blatant attempt to pressure
al-Abadi. The PMC and Iranian proxy militia Kaabi into leaving his post. Muhandis successfully
leaders insist Prime Minister Abadi, in his capacity sidelined Kaabi, who dropped out of the news cycle
as the head of all security forces in Iraq, commands shortly after his appointment. Muhandis continues
the PMF. Iranian proxy militia leaders who are to represent the face of the force and is intimately
responsive to Iran play at least an equally import- involved in both the administrative and military
ant role in commanding and controlling the PMF operations of the force.
in reality. Chief of Staff: Sadiq al-Saadawi. Saadawi is a Badr
Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission: Organization member. He joined the IRGC during
Faleh al-Fayadh (Dawa Party). Fayadh, the National the Iran-Iraq war.159
Security Adviser, is a pro-Iranian Dawa Party figure
PMC Central Administration Director: Majid has tight control over operational expenses of the
Rahim Saleh al-Wasiti. The PMC Central force without much input from the government.
Administration is the body responsible for the This has reportedly allowed Muhandis to focus
administrative affairs, including payroll, distribu- resources, arms, and salaries, to the pro-Iranian
tion of recruits, and martyrs affairs.160 factions creating tensions with Grand Ayatollah
Sistani and Sadr-affiliated factions.164 The PMC in
PMC Central Operations Director: Abu Muntadhir
collaboration with the MoI reportedly manage the
al-Husseini. The PMC Central Operations
recruitment process within the force, likely favor-
Directorate is likely responsible for overseeing the
ing the recruitment of pro-Iranian factions.165 The
execution of PMF forward operations. His presence
Central Administration Directorate manages a
at meetings of senior proxy leaders suggests that he
range of issues from the issuance and modification
is a senior figure within the PMC and a key deputy
of recruitment forms, medical examinations, and
to the PMC’s field commanders.
background and security checks, likely through the
Field Commander: Hadi al-Ameri. Media formally regional PMC directorates and governorates.166
refers to Ameri as the “secretary general” of the
Aviation Directorate:167 This directorate was formed
Badr Organization, and he does not have a formal
in 2017 to coordinate between the PMF, Iraqi
title within the PMC leadership. Ameri, in addi-
Army Aviation (IAA), and Iraqi Air Force (IAF).
tion to overseeing the DOC’s operations on top of
The directorate and does not yet have any formal
its formal chain of command, is the top field com-
responsibilities, though PMF sources highlighted
mander of the PMF alongside Muhandis and may
using IAA helicopters to medivac wounded PMF
have a role in commanding PMF elements outside
fighters.168
of the Badr Organization. He is often present on
the front lines and plays an integral role in major Central Security Directorate:169 Abu Zaynab
clearing operations in a way that distinguishes him al-Lami.170 The Central Security Directorate pro-
from other senior leaders such as Qais al-Khazali. vides internal security mechanisms and aims to
prevent violations or criminal activities by PMF
members.171 It is highly unlikely to be a well-re-
Directorates sourced or important branch of the PMF, given its
Muhandis is the deputy-chairman of the PMC, and near-total absence of promotional materials.
supervises directorates that manage administrative
affairs. Iranian proxy militia leaders likely maintain Communications Directorate:172 Assad Malek
independent access to PMC combat support and al-Zabidi.173 There is insufficient information
service support capabilities, such as ambulances, available on the Communications Directorate’s
engineering, and intelligence.161 PMC director- functions.
ate personnel deliberately obscure the militias Financial Directorate:174 Qassim Dahif.175 The
with which they are affiliated as part of the PMC’s Financial Directorate presumably manages PMF
transition to an independent and professional mil- finances.176 It may be subordinate to the Central
itary force with the legal backing to pursue Iranian Administration Directorate.
interests in both Iraq and the region.162 All PMC
General Inspections Directorate:177 There is insuf-
directorate leaders are assessed to be affiliated with
ficient information openly available on the General
Iranian proxy militias either by membership or by
Inspection Directorate’s functions. Iraqi state
willing collaboration with them.
inspectors most frequently handle corruption
Administrative Directorate: Majid Rahim Saleh issues, so presumably the Directorate handles inter-
al-Wasiti. The PMC Central Administration is nal investigations. However, it is unclear as to how
responsible for the administrative affairs, includ- large, well-resourced, or important the Directorate
ing payroll, distribution of recruits, and managing is to the PMC leadership.
elements of “martyrs’ affairs.”163 The directorate
DECEMBER 2017
“High Committee of the PMC (for administra- PMF have forward medical teams in field hospitals
tive and legal status of the PMC):” - Muhammad to care for PMF fighters.198 The Medical Directorate
al-Ghabban. The High Committee does not have organizes blood drives, sets up emergency hospitals
a formal name, but it drafts legislation to solidify for IDPs, and coordinates with IA medical staff, in
the legal status of the PMF and pass PMF-related some cases using IAA helicopters.199
laws, including those setting salaries, pensions, and
Military Engineering Directorate:200 Zulfiqar
regulations.178 The Committee head is Muhammad
al-Ardhi.201 PMF Engineers erect headquarters,
al-Ghabban, a senior Badr Organization member
build trench and berm systems, maintain bulldoz-
and the former Minister of the Interior.179
ers used for construction and IED clearing, conduct
Intelligence Directorate:180 The Intelligence construction tasks, and disarm IEDs.202 Individual
Directorate manages the rudimentary intelligence militias also maintain their own engineering units
capabilities of the PMF, including signals intelli- that disarm IEDs as well, however, so this capability
gence and drone surveillance.181 may not be fully centralized.203
Logistics Support Directorate:182 Abu Hawra’ al-Ah- Operations Directorate:204 Abu Muntadhir al-Hus-
madi.183 The PMF logistics wing is responsible for seini.205 The Operations Directorate is likely
resupplying the PMF with food, water, ammunition, responsible for overseeing the execution of forward
fuel, and other supplies. It manages fleets of trucks, operations. Directorate personnel oversee the read-
some of which may be contracted private trucks, to iness of forward-deployed PMF units and their
transport supplies and on occasion IDPs.184 positions during regular tours alongside senior
PMF leaders like Hadi al-Ameri.206 Husseini is
Martyrs and Injured Directorate:185 Ibrahim
likely a senior Iranian proxy leader, given his pres-
al-Quraishi.186 The Martyrs and Injured Directorate
ence alongside other proxy leaders during major
handles the affairs of PMF fighters killed or wounded
meetings such as an October 2016 meeting between
during battle.187 It distributes financial assistance
the PMF leadership and Sadr in Najaf.207
and support for deceased fighters’ families, such as
rebuilding their homes.188 Planning Directorate:208 Haidar al-Furaiji.209 There
is insufficient information openly available on the
Media Directorate:189 Mihnad al-Aqabi.190 The
Planning Directorate’s functions.
Media Directorate operates the War Media Team,
the official PMF media outlet.191 It centralizes PMF Religious Guidance Directorate:210 There is insuffi-
reporting and communications, produces graphics cient information openly available on the Religious
and infographics, and manages PMF war corre- Guidance Directorate’s functions.
spondents and photographers. Individual militias
Scouts Directorate:211 Abu Aqil (Abdul-Rahman)
also operate their own media and social media
al-Kadhimi.212 The PMF Scouts unit is a youth
outlets separately, however.
organization designed to give military training and
Medical Directorate:192 Dr. Ali al-Khafaf.193 The cultural courses to students and youth volunteers.213
Medical Directorate manages the care and rehabili- The Directorate also organizes youth events and
tation of wounded PMF fighters and FP members.194 summer courses for students.214
It also manages the deployment and maintenance of
Training Directorate:215 Abu Bilal al-Jabiri.216 The
a standardized fleet of ambulances for PMF fighters
Training Directorate reportedly oversees training
that accompany the PMF during forward opera-
camps for PMF fighters, providing them training
tions.195 PMF medical staff are largely based in major
on subjects such as weapons usage, intelligence, and
hospitals and use advanced medical equipment.196 It
military engineering.217 It is unclear how much of
is likely that they co-opted or commandeered civil-
this is centralized, as militias usually operate their
ian hospital capabilities for their own purposes in
own training camps. Iranian proxy militias operate
addition to medical services already provided by the
their training camps in Syria that the PMC cannot
state to the force.197 Picture intelligence suggests the
monitor.218 The Directorate may standardize some militia.231 Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri’s
elements of training or run basic training courses role as the head of Diyala security renders this posi-
for new PMF recruits, but the delineation of respon- tion inert.
sibilities and their execution remains unclear.
Karbala: Hussein Ismail Khalil.233 Khalil may be
affiliated with Liwa Ali al-Akbar, a militia associated
Regional Committees with the Hawza, Iraq’s indigenous Shi’ite clerical
PMC Regional Committees are smaller components establishment.234
of the Central Administration that deal with pro- Kirkuk: Unknown. The Kirkuk PMC regional office
vincial-level administrative issues. The regional head does not give his name, but he is affiliated with
committees handle martyrdom benefits, local-level Turkmen militias and may be related to the Kirkuk
logistics, and civil society outreach. The placement PMF spokesperson Ali al-Husseini.235
of smaller militia leaders and non-proxy figures to
Maysan: Haidar Jabar al-Baidhani.236 Baidhani is
regional committee, rather than directorate level
likely a member of Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah, a
positions, suggests a direct relationship between
Maysan-based pro-Iranian militia.237
militia strength and political capital within the PMC
organization. It therefore follows that smaller mili- Muthanna: Ahmed al-Hassani.238 Hassani is likely a
tias are more dependent on large proxy forces for member of the Badr Organization.239
regional resource distribution and political support.
Salah al-Din: Asham Sabhan al-Jubouri.240 Sabhan
Anbar: Rashid Fleih. Fleih is a former 7 IA
219 th
is the commander of Liwa Salah al-Din, a Sunni
Division, SOC, and AOC leader appointed under tribal fighter formation based in Salah al-Din
former PM Nouri al-Maliki.220 Province that works closely with Iranian proxy mili-
tias in eastern Salah al-Din.241
Babil: Hassan Fadaam al-Janabi.221 Janabi is also
the deputy chairman of the Babil Provincial Najaf: Karim al-Khaqani.242 Khaqani is the com-
Council and a leader in ISCI-affiliated Saraya al-Ji- mander of Firqat al-Imam Ali al-Qitaliyah, a Hawza
had. Janabi became the deputy chairman of the militia.243
Provincial Council on May 28, 2015 as a member
Ninewa: Luwais Yusuf Ashaq Yusuf. Yusuf is a
of the Mowatin Bloc.222
Christian figure who may have defected from Atheel
Basra: Ammar Faris Matouq al-Jaafari / Abu al-Nujaifi’s Ninewa Guards militia.244
Yasser.223 Abu Yasser al-Jaafari assumed this role
Wasit: Jaafar al-Safi.245 Safi is possibly affiliated
on July 26, 2015 after the former leader, a Badr
with Kata’ib Jund al-Imam.246
Organization official, died in July 2015. Abu Yasser,
prior to his promotion, was the Assistant Director
for PMC in Basra and is also a member of the Badr Iranian Proxy Militias
Organization.224 Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias act as armed
Dhi Qar: Abu Da’ al-Shatri.225 Shatri assumed proxies of the Iranian regime acting under the
his position around November 2015 and appears direction of the IRGC-Quds Force. Iranian proxies
to have been a fighter previously.226 Shatri likely are generally the most capable militias active inside
remains a commander of the Badr Organization of Iraq. Iranian proxy militias operate indepen-
military wing in Dhi Qar Province.227 dent of one another. Each unit is led by a secretary
general with subordinate commanders, and each
Diwaniyah: Ahmed al-Awadi.228 Awadi is a member
unit operates its own battalions with fighters who
of the Badr Organization.229
self-identify as members of the militia and openly
Diyala: Faraj al-Maghmas.230 Maghmas was a leader display its logos. The PMC masks militia identity by
in Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi, a small Diyala-based assigning unit numbers to many of them.247
DECEMBER 2017
Badr Organization – Hadi al-Ameri likely involved in the Syrian war earlier by sending
fighters along with other Iraq militias, particularly
Iran formed the Badr Brigade during the Iran-Iraq
Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.253
War in 1983 to fight Saddam Hussein’s Baathist
regime. The Badr Organization was the armed wing Badr 1st Brigade (Liwa al-Imam Muhammad
of a Shi’a political party that Iran had protected al-Jawad) – Abu Jinan al-Basri 254
during the Saddam era, the Supreme Council of
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, led by the promi-
• Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syrian border, Ninewa
nent cleric Ayatollah Abdul Aziz al-Hakim until
his death. The Supreme Council of the Islamic
• Iraq-Syria Border west of Mosul, Ninewa
Revolution in Iraq used the Badr Organization to
capture Iraqi security institutions when the U.S.
• Qayrawan, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of May 25, 2017]
and the Iraqi government co-opted its units whole-
sale into the MoI in 2005.248 The party renamed
• Badush, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of May 16, 2017]
itself the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
in June 2007.
• Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit,
Salah al-Din Province [as of May 10, 2017]
Hadi al-Ameri broke the Badr Organization from
ISCI in 2012, fracturing ISCI’s parliamentary
• Hamrin Mountains, northeast Salah al-Din
bloc.249 Ameri, a prominent figure within the ISCI
party, was reportedly angered by the selection of the
[as of June 22, 2016]
then inexperienced Ammar al-Hakim as the leader
of ISCI following the death of Hakim’s father in
• Dujail, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din
2009. Hakim began reorienting the council away
from Iran and closer to the leadership of Najaf-based Badr 3rd Brigade (Special Tasks – Lions of Amerli
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who leads a “qui- Formation) – Hajj Abu Turab255
etist” and non-politicized Shi’a tradition. Ameri • Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syria border, Ninewa
disagreed with this shift as a supporter of Vilayat
al-Faqih, an ideology that accords full political and • Qayrawan, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
[as of May 22, 2017]
religious authority to Iran’s Supreme Leader, and
prompted the split. The Badr Organization dedi- • West of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
cated time and resources to augmenting Iranian
efforts to support the Bashar al-Assad regime’s • “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad
[as of May 1, 2016]
campaign to crush the Syrian opposition. It allowed
Iranian resources to pass through Iraqi airspace and • Diyala Province [as of January 22, 2015]
airports, which its leader Hadi al-Ameri regulated Badr 4th Brigade – Abu Hana al-Kinani256
as Minister of Transportation, a position he held
from 2010 to 2014.250 • Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as
of April 9, 2017]
The Badr Organization is one of the largest compo-
nents of the PMF and remains a loyal Iranian proxy.
• Hamam al-Alil in vicinity of Mosul, Ninewa
It frequently operates alongside FP units and the
ERD. The organization’s fighters are active inside of
• “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad
[as of May 1, 2016]
Syria as evidenced by videos portraying the return
of its fighters killed in pro-Assad operations to Iraq Badr 5th Brigade – Abu Dargham al-Maturi257
for burial.251 Badr formed a Syrian expeditionary • South of Sinjar, Salah al-Din Province
force of 1,500 fighters named Quwet al-Shahid
Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr to fight in support of the • West of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
Syrian regime along with the expeditionary forces of
other Iraqi militias in 2013.252 The organization was

[as of June 24, 2016]
Badr 16th Brigade Turkmen Force – Abu Thaer
al-Bashiri261
[as of May 1, 2016]
•
Al-Kata, southwest of Hawija, Salah al-Din
• Albu Shajal, west of Fallujah, Anbar Province
•
Hajirat, in vicinity of Tel Afar, Ninewa
Province [ as of November 28, 2016]
• Hamrin Mountains, likely northeast of Tikrit,
•
Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
Badr 9th Brigade (Liwa Karbala) – Abu Sadiq •
Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk, Kirkuk Province
[as of May 8, 2016]
al-Hali258
•
Iraq-Syria Border west of Tel Afar, Ninewa
Badr 21st Brigade – Khudair al-Matruhi,262
Diwaniyah branch Secretary General263
•
“East Diyala Operations command” for
Hawija operations, likely in northern Diyala
•
Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
•
Hamrin Mountains, northern Diyala Province
•
Al-Dour, south of Tikrit, Salah al-Din [as of July 26, 2016]
•
“Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad
•
Tel Afar Airport, west of Mosul, Ninewa [as of May 1, 2016]
•
Meeting with SDOC commander and Hadi
•
“Albu Dalaf,” Salah al-Din Province al-Ameri [as of April 9, 2016]
•
Dujail, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din
•
Jurf al-Sakhr, north of Hilla, Babil Province Province [as of April 9, 2016]
•
Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah
al-Din Province [as of April 9, 2016]
Badr 10th Brigade – “Special Force” – Abu Huda
al-Saadi,259 formerly Abu Taha al-Nasiri260 •
Alas and Ajil oil fields, northeast
of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province
• Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syria border, Ninewa

Badr 22nd Brigade – Karim Ulaiwi Jahoush al-
Muhammadawi,264 Badr commander of Maysan265
• Eastern Diyala Province
•
Qahtaniyah, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
• Possibly Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, •
North of Baghdad [as of May 13, 2017]
Diyala Province [as of December 31, 2016]
•
• Fallujah operations, Anbar Province
[as of June 30, 2016]

[as of May 1, 2016]
Badr 23rd Brigade – Ali Salim al-Anbaki266
•
West of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
[as of May 31, 2017]
• Possibly al-Zirai neighborhood in vicinity
of Tuz Khurmatu, Salah al-Din Province •
Safra, near Udhaim, north of Baqubah, Diyala
[as of April 25, 2016] Province [as of May 13, 2017]
• Damascus, Syria [as of April 2, 2016] •
Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala
• Makhoul mountains, north of Baiji, Salah
al-Din Province [as of February 15, 2016] •
Alas and Ajil oil fields, northeast
of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province
• Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province
DECEMBER 2017
Badr 24th Brigade – Mahdi Zayni al-Tamimi267 Badr 55th Brigade – Liwa Malik al-Ashtar270
• Naft Khana, east of Baquba, Diyala Province - Special Tasks271 – leader unknown
[as of January 19, 2017] •
Saqlawiyah, northwrest of Fallujah, Anbar
• Hamrin Mountains, northern Diyala Province Province [as of May 17, 2016]
[as of January 4, 2017] •
Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province
• Mansouriyah, Muqdadiyah, Qara Tapa,
Hamrin Dam, northeast of Baquba, Diyala
Province [as of December 7, 2016] Badr 110th Brigade – formerly Haidar Ali al-
Haidari,272 current leader unknown
• Hamrin Dam, Diyala Province
[as of December 7, 2016] •
Saadiyah, northeast of Muqdadiyah, Diyala
• Qara Tapa, Diyala Province
Naft Khana-Khanaqin Road, eastern Diyala
Province [as of October 1, 2016]
• Muqdadiyah, northeast of Baquba, Diyala
Province [as of January 7, 2016] •
Naft Khana, eastern Diyala Province
Badr 27th Brigade – Abu Ahmed al-Talibawi268 Harakat al-Nujaba – 12th PMF Brigade273 – Akram
• Eastern Anbar Province [as of April 4, 2017] al-Kaabi
• West of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of March 18, 2017] Harakat al-Nujaba is the most prominent Iraqi
Shi’a militia in Syria. Its leader, Akram al-Kaabi,
• Tel al-Kurd, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of February 18, 2017] was a close associate of Qais al-Khazali, who split
from the Sadrist Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) militia
Badr 30th Brigade – Shabak and Turkmen Forces and formed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in 2006.
• Iraq-Syria border, west of Mosul, Ninewa
The newly-formed militia conducted attacks on
Coalition forces from the summer of 2006 until
• Southwest of Baaj, Ninewa Province
Coalition forces arrested Khazali. Kaabi led the
militia in Khazali’s absence, expanding its political,
social, and religious activities to secure increased
Badr 52nd Brigade – Mahdi Taqi al-Amirli269
influence in Iraq.274 Kaabi left AAH Following the
• Tuz Khurmatu and Amerli, eastern Salah
al-Din Province [as of May 22, 2017]
U.S withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 to complete his
religious studies.275 He founded the Harakat al-Nu-
• Udhaim Dam, north of Baquba, Diyala
jaba in 2013 in conjunction with Iranian efforts to
support the Syrian regime. The movement has since
• Tel Kasiba, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
actively pursued Iranian interests in both the Syrian
and Iraqi theaters.
• Al-Dour southeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din
Province [as of January 30, 2017] Harakat al-Nujaba’s March 10, 2017 announcement
• Al-Jilam, east Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
that it would form a “Golan Heights Brigade” aimed
at securing the Golan Heights from Israel demon-
• Mtaibija, northwest of Baquba, Diyala
strates that it operates in support of Iran’s regional
objectives, not Iraqi government objectives.276 Signs
• Hajirat, near Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
of Akram al-Kaabi’s rising profile include televi-
sion interviews in Iran and meetings with Iranian
• Shirqat, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Harakat al-Nu-
jaba officials also meet with Syrian parliamentary
• Jisr al-Sarha, south of Amerli, northern
Diyala Province [as of September 15, 2016]
and religious figures as well as senior Iranian proxy
militias like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis regularly.277
• Um al-Rahil, Abu Khachba, Barakt al-Miyah,

near al-Tanaf, Syria [as of July 12, 2017]
his own political purposes.282 KH is a smaller force
than other proxies, consistent with its secret and
• Possibly Daraa, south of Damascus, Syria
[as of May 31, 2017]
elite profile. It has access to M1A1 tanks, however is
otherwise a light infantry force with technical vehi-
• Halfiyah, northwest of Hama, Syria cles, Armored Personnel Carriers, and Humvees.283
• Suwaydah, Syria [as of March 17, 2017] • Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 5, 2017]
• Matih Abyad, northeast of Aleppo, Syria
• Al-Walid, western Anbar Province
[as of June 21, 2017]
• Kweris • Al-Tanaf, Syria [as of May 31, 2017]
Air Base, south of Aleppo, Syria
[as of February 4, 2017] • Iraq-Syria, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
• Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah
al-Din Province [as of January 2, 2017] • South of Aleppo, Syria
• Aleppo, Syria [as of December 18, 2016] • Jurf al-Sakhr, north of Hilla, Babil Province
• West of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of [as of December 11, 2016]
October 31, 2016]
• Qamishli Airport, Syria [January 23, 2016] • Jazeera Khalidiyah, north of Ramadi, Anbar
Province [as of August 20, 2016]
• Samarra, Salah al-Din Province • Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 23, 2016]
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) – 45th PMF Brigade278 –
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis • Borders of Karbala, Karbala Province
[as of May 8, 2016]
KH is one of the most lethal Iranian proxy Shi’a
militias, and it operates in both Iraq and Syria. It
• Palmyra, Syria [as of July 23, 2016]
keeps its activities largely secret whenever possible. • Thar Thar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
Iran has likely retained a core element of KH’s armed
members separate from the wider PMF apparatus as • Iraq-Saudi Arabia Border, southwest of
Karbala [as of February 10, 2016]
an asset to carry out terrorist and criminal activi-
ties. The militia, which was designated by the U.S. • Tuz Khurmatu, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din
Treasury Department in 2009 as a terrorist orga-
nization, participated in multiple rocket-propelled • Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah
al-Din Province [as of January 16, 2016]
grenade and improvised rocket-assisted mortar
(IRAM) attacks against U.S. forces between 2007 • Eastern Baghdad [as of September 4, 2015]
and 2008. Its members have received weapons • Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province
training and funding from Iran.279 It is linked to
high-profile criminal and terrorist activities, such • Fallujah, Anbar Province
as the kidnapping of Qatari royals in December
2015.280 • Al-Hayakil, near Fallujah, Anbar Province
KH does not have an active political wing, but it
media apparatus has grown more vocal in support- • Shula, north of Baghdad [as of May 27, 2015]
ing the PMF’s participation in the political process, • Balad, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din
suggesting it may start an independent political
party.281 Vice President Nouri al-Maliki met with • Amerli and Suleiman Beg, Salah al-Din
KH members on May 18, 2017, suggesting Maliki is
courting the most hardcore of the proxy militias for
DECEMBER 2017
Saraya al-Difaa al-Shaabi (SaDaSh) – 46th PMF • Eastern Ghouta, near Damascus, Syria
Brigade, 47th PMF Brigade284
Saraya al-Difaa al-Shaabi is a lesser wing of KH, • Garma and Fallujah, Anbar Province
which likely formed to absorb an overflow of recruits
without diluting the most capable combat units. • Near Aleppo, Syria [as of March 23, 2017]
SaDaSh members are buried with funeral ceremo- • Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
nies as if they are KH members in KH flag-draped
coffins.285 Actual KH members have no SaDaSh • Jazirat Samarra, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
logos on their funeral posters.286
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) – Qais al-Khazali
• Lake Tharthar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
• 41st PMF Brigade 287
• Siniyah and al-Hajaj, near Baiji, Salah al-Din
• 42nd PMF Brigade (Abu Musa al-Amiri
Brigade) 288
• Sayyida Zaynab Shrine, Damascus, Syria
• 43rd PMF Brigade (Saba’ al-Dujail-
“Dujail Lions”) 289
• Al-Aziziyah, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
AAH is a lethal Iraqi Shi’a militia and one of Iran’s
most potent proxies inside of Iraq and Syria. AAH • Tel Abtah, south of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
was one of the original “Special Groups” formed
from the Mahdi Army along with KH. AAH leader • Desert west of Najaf, Najaf Province
Qais al-Khazali, whom U.S. forces detained from
2007 to 2009 for orchestrating the kidnapping • Jazirat al-Khalidiyah, north of Ramadi, Anbar
and death of five American soldiers, styles himself
a political leader and frequently voices hardliner • “Baghdad Belts” [as of September 7, 2016]
positions on Iraqi politics. AAH’s political party, • Hama, Syria [as of September 22, 2016]
al-Sadiqoun Bloc, has one seat in Iraq’s parliament.
Khazali will likely seek to expand AAH’s represen-
[as of July 22, 2016]
tation in Iraq’s southern provinces based on its
participation in anti-ISIS operations.
• Al-Muqdadiyah, northeast of Baquba, Diyala
• Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
[as of July 16, 2017]
• Sayyid Gharib, southeast of Samarra, Salah
• Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province
• Alas and Ajil oil fields, northeast of Tikrit,
Salah al-Din Province [as of March 10, 2015]
• Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 5, 2017] • Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
• Tuz Khurmatu, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din [as of February 26, 2015]
Province [as of June 8, 2017] • Hamrin, northeast of Muqdadiyah, Diyala
• Near Mosul, Ninewa Province Province [as of November 28, 2014]
[as of June 7, 2017] • South of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
• Southeast of al-Baaj District, Ninewa Province [as of November 20, 2014]
[as of June 3, 2017] • Hamrin Mountains, northeast of Baiji, Salah
• Al-Qayrawan, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province al-Din Province [as of November 5, 2014]
(41st) [as of May 29, 2017] • Jurf al-Sakhar, southwest of Baghdad
• Balad District, southeast of Samarra, Salah [as of October 31, 2014]
al-Din Province (43rd) [as of May 25, 2017] • Udhaim, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala
• Al-Hadar District, Ninewa Province Province [as of October 21, 2014]
[as of April 29, 2017] • Amerli and Suleiman Beg, Salah al-Din
Province [September 1, 2014]
“Iraqi Syrian Battalions” / “Syrian Hezbollah” Units Faylaq Waad al-Sadiq298 – No PMF Number -
“Iraqi Syrian Battalions” is a generic term used to Muhammad Hamza al-Tamimi299
refer to Iraqi Shi’a militias other than the estab- Falaq Waad al-Sadiq is a staunchly pro-Iranian
lished Iranian proxy militias formed to fight in militia with reverence for Lebanese Hezbollah
Syria. Iraqi Syrian battalions tend to be small and leader Hassan Nasrallah.300 It alternately has
pro-Iranian. Images from their headquarters often described itself as the 3rd Brigade, a Badr unit, and
display Syrian Arab Republic flags, images of Assad the 43rd Brigade, an AAH unit.301 It was present
regime commanders, and images of Iranian leaders. inside of Ramadi’s al-Sufiyah area, east of Ramadi,
They may rotate between Iraq and Syria. Some Iraqi in 2017 clearing IEDs, as well as briefly inside of the
Syrian battalions, such as Kata’ib A’ima al-Baqi- city limits since 2016.302 Other Iraqi Shi’a militias
yah, report infrequently and may have disbanded or have largely stayed away from Ramadi. Its members
been integrated into larger militias. engaged in a gun battle with Ramadi police and
likely were forced to withdraw.303 It previously had
Kata’ib al-Sabiroun – No PMF Number – Leader
been more active in Syria than Iraq and likely rede-
unknown
ployed in some capacity.304
Kata’ib al-Sibaroun is a small unit judging from
training and muster images.290 They identify as
•
Iraqi but clearly operate inside of Syria, style them-
selves after KH, and have adopted Iranian leaders as
•
“Borders of Hawija,” likely northeastern Salah
al-Din Province and possibly near Kirkuk,
their religious authorities.291 Their initial logo was Kirkuk Province [as of February 1, 2-17]
almost a direct copy of the IRGC logo, but was later
transformed into one more reflective of KH.292
•
Al-Sufiyah, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province
• South of Aleppo, Syria [as of March 10, 2017] •
• Aleppo, Syria [as of February 27, 2017] [as of February 28, 2016]
• Northern Latakia, Syria
Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein305 – No PMF Number –
Asaad al-Bahadali306
Quwat Asad Allah al-Ghalib – No PMF Number - • Qaboun, near Damascus, Syria
[as of May 13, 2017]
Abdullah al-Sheibani293
The militia has close links with another “Iraqi Syrian • Harasta, near Damascus, Syria
Battalion,” Liwa Zulfiqar, and is either linked to or
intentionally mimics KH.294 Members move back This pro-Iranian Sadrist group supports Assad
and forth between Iraq and Syria, including sending regime operations and identifies itself as a compo-
their wounded to Iraq, but do all of their fighting nent of the “Islamic Resistance,” a self-designation
inside of Syria.295 Members meet with Syrian and used by pro-Iranian forces.307 Sadrist militias are
Iranian leaders, likely in Iraq, including a repre- active inside of Syria but tend to be smaller and
sentative for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.296 largely confined to the Sayyida Zeinab neighbor-
Sheibani has a PMF flag in his office but otherwise hood and Damascus, rarely venturing outside of
it is almost impossible to tell that it is an Iraqi unit, the city. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr most
given the fact that the present images are a Syrian likely does not control these formations, which
Arab Republic flag, militia flags, and images of should be considered splinters.
Khamenei and Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the
post-1979 Iranian regime.297
• Charged with protecting Sayyida Zeinab
shrine near Damascus, Syria
DECEMBER 2017
Lesser Proxies Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSAS) – 14th PMF

Liwa al-Hussein – 53rd PMF Brigade,308 previously Brigade – Abu Alaa al-Wala’i.313
77th Brigade309 – Sayyid Mukhtar KSAS is an Iranian proxy militia formed to fight in
Liwa al-Hussein is a majority Shi’a Turkmen Syria. Unlike many of the “Syrian Battalions,” KSAS
militia, but includes a minority Yazidi unit, the is a fully capable militia with members active in both
“Lalish Battalion.”310 It may be a component of the Iraq and Syria in the vein of the Nujaba Movement,
Badr Brigades. though on a smaller scale. Its most notable engage-
ment was with an IA detachment in Basra in January
• Kojo, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
[as of May 15, 2017] 2016, when members of KSAS clashed with IA
members at a checkpoint. The clash led PMF groups
• Tel Afar Airport, south of Tel Afar, Ninewa
Province [as of January 29, 2017] to band together and demand the expulsion of the
IA force, which exited Basra Province later that
al-Din Province [as of November 13, 2015]
month.314
Harakat al-Abdal – No PMF number – Abu Akram

• Likely North of al-Walid, western Anbar
al-Majidi.311 • Tanaf, Syria [as of May 20, 2017]
Harakat al-Abdal is an Iranian proxy group that • Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
primarily draws its strength from Basra. It is small
but has a presence in Syria. It is also active on the • Sayyida Zeinab Shrine, Syria
front lines of military operations and was the first
group to reach the Iraq-Syrian border during • Aleppo, Syria [as of September 9, 2016]
western Ninewa Province clearing operations.312 Its • Palmyra, Syria [as of August 21, 2016]
activities have largely been restricted to Garma, the
western Baghdad Belts, and the southern Iraq-Syria
• Near Homs, Syria [as of August 2, 2016]
border, likely because of small size and a manpower • Khanasser, southeast of Aleppo, Syria
[as of June 12, 2016]
split between Iraq and Syria. Harakat al-Abdal is
likely linked to Iranian proxy militia KH. • Baiji, north of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province
[as of May 14, 2016]
• Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 4, 2017] • Bashir, south of Kirkuk [as of May 1, 2016]
• Likely north of of al-Walid, western Anbar
• Al-Maamir, west of Baghdad
• Iraq-Syria border, eastern Syria
[as of May 29, 2017] Qiyadat Quwat Abu Fadl al-Abbas (QQAFA) – No
PMF number – Aws al-Khafaji.315
Khafaji founded the small pro-Iranian militia of
• Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
Qiyadat Quwat Abu Fadl al-Abbas in 2015 after a
split within the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, which
• Khalidiyah and 1070 Apartments, near
Aleppo, Syria [as of September 2, 2016]
he also founded in 2012 to be one of the first con-
glomerations of Iraqi Shi’a militiamen active in
• Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of May 15, 2016]
Syria.316 Khafaji was the former head of Promised
Day Brigade – the Sadrist successor to the JAM –
• Thar Thar basin, north of Ramadi, Anbar
before splitting from JAM after Sadr expelled him
in 2010.317 Khafaji has called for the execution
• Eastern Husaybah, east of Ramadi, Anbar
of prisoners against the Iraqi government’s wishes
and has been effectively advocating for the ethnic
• Sayyida Zeinab Shrine, near Damascus, Syria
cleansing of Fallujah.318 He affirmed in June 2017
his readiness to run in the upcoming elections – in
violation of the PMC law – adding that “nobody can Kata’ib al-Imam Ali (KAIA) – 40th PMF Brigade325
deny the PMF from entering the elections.”319 It is – Shibl al-Zaidi.326
likely that Khafaji is using his militia as a platform
Kata’ib al-Imam is a lethal Iranian-backed Iraqi
to enter Iraqi politics and to appeal to hardliner
Shi’a militia that operates in both Iraq and Syria.
Iraqi Shi’a elements.
It models itself after the CTS, using black-painted
• Near Mosul, Ninewa Province
Humvees. Its commander largely avoids media
appearances and statements, suggesting he is more
• Western Karbala, Karbala Province
[as of May 11, 2017]
interested in operations than politics. KAIA is
best known for being the militia of Abu Azrael, a
• Karbala, Karbala Province
[as of May 10, 2017]
celebrity Iraqi Shi’a militia fighter known for car-
rying a sword or an axe in battle and his popular
catchphrase, “Ila al-Tahin,” which roughly trans-
lates into “nothing but flour,” meaning “you will be
• Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
pulverized.”327
• “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad • South of al-Tanaf, Iraq-Syria border

[as of July 21, 2017]
• Jazeera Samarra, west of Samarra, Salah • Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 5, 2017]
al-Din Province [as of March 4, 2016] • Iraqi-Syrian border, Ninewa Province
[as of May 31, 2017]
Kata’ib Ansar al-Hojja (KAAH) – 29th PMF
Brigade320 – Ahmed al-Furaiji321
• Al-Qayrawan, northwestern Ninewa Province
[as of May 25, 2017]
Kata’ib Ansar al-Hojja is a pro-Iranian militia pos- • Al-Tanaf, Syria [as of May 19, 2017]
sibly with embedded Iranian advisers. It has close • Al-Hadar District, southwest of Qayyarah,
Ninewa Province [as of May 9, 2017]
links with other proxy militias, including Saraya
Talia al-Khorasani and Nujaba.322 Maliki is courting • Tel Afar District, west of Mosul, Ninewa
its political and military support as well.323 A Dawa
Party militia attempted to mimic Kata’ib Ansar • Hama, Syria [as of April 4, 2017]
al-Hojja by adopting almost identical names and • Damascus, Syria [as of March 13, 2017]
logos, indicating Maliki’s early and failed attempts
to mimic the success of the proxies and build his
• Diyala Province [as of November 15, 2016]
own militia base using Dawa Party loyalists.324 Maliki • Aleppo, Syria [as of October 14, 2016]
instead courts established militias rather than trying • Al-Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
to build his own.
• Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province • Palmyra, Syria [as of July 23, 2016]
[as of December 10, 2016] • Al-Saqlawiyah, Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of June 25, 2016]
• Baiji, north of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province
[as of July 24, 2016] • Karbala Province [as of May 24, 2016]
• Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah • Jazirat Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
al-Din Province [as of July 11, 2017]
DECEMBER 2017

• Tel Abtah, Ninewa Province
• Kirkuk, Kirkuk Province
• Damascus Airport, near Damascus, Syria
• Aleppo, Syria [as of November 11, 2016]
• Darayya, Syria [as of September 3, 2016]
• Al-Zarka bridge and Yankaja, near Tuz
Khurmatu, Salah al-Din Province
Above: A PMF convoy, in a promotional video from the Iranian [as of July 22, 2016]
proxy militia Kata’ib al-Imam Ali in May 2016 during Fallujah • Damascus, Syria [as of August 28, 2016]
operations. 328 The PMF is a largely motorized force, making it adept at
covering terrain quickly. The still shows, from left to right, typical vehicles
• Amerli, near Tuz Khurmatu, eastern Salah
al-Din Province [as of July 13, 2016]
that PMF units deploy in their operations, including a commandeered
police technical, a Toyota Hilux pickup truck model popular among PMF • “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad and
Baghdad [as of May 4, 2016]
units for its reliability to transport supplies and fighters, an ambulance to
care for the wounded, and several Humvees. The video also shows buses • Al-Saadiyah, northeast of Muqdadiyah, Diyala
to transport fighters, U.S.-made Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Province [as of March 26, 2016]
(MRAP) vehicles, trucks to transport ammunition and supplies, and
flatbed trucks to transport armored vehicles and Multiple Launch Rocket Minority Militias
Systems (MLRS) platforms, often surrounded by a fleet of repurposed
civilian Sports Utility Vehicles and sedans. PMF units often deploy Iranian proxy militias have tried to co-opt militias
Iranian Safir light tactical vehicles with recoilless rifles and construction from minority populations in Iraq since the PMF’s
equipment as well, including armored bulldozers, though these are not inception. These include Sunni tribal fighter for-
shown in the video. mations, Christian self-defense militias, and Yazidi
militias linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
Saraya Talia al-Khorasani (STaK) – 18th PMF (PKK). The PMF cultivates an image of inclusivity
Brigade329 – Ali al-Yassiri,330 supported by Hamid and nationalism to increase its legitimacy and shrouds
al-Jaza’iri.331 Iranian influence. PMF co-optation of minority
STaK, often referred to simply as Saraya al-Kho- militias often exacerbates intra-communal political
rasani, is an Iranian proxy militia reportedly divisions, empowering a localized armed element of
formed by now-deceased IRGC commander Hamid a minority group and giving them localized political
Taghavi.332 It formed quickly after June 2014 with power at the expense of other communal leaders.
direct assistance from Iran.333 Its fighters have Shabak militias east of Mosul, for example, align
deployed to Syria, but its role in Iraq has been minor themselves with the Badr Organization and promi-
compared to the main proxy forces, as it is primarily nent Shabak politician Hanin Qado. Qado opposes
tasked with holding the Hamrin Mountain ridge and integration of the Shabak territories into the Iraqi
southern Salah al-Din Province. STaK has a history Kurdistan Region, which other Shabak leaders close
of poor discipline, including gun battles with the to the Kurdish political blocs advocate.335 Qado is
police and the Peshmerga in Salah al-Din.334 positioned to influence the ultimate direction of the
Shabak community given his control over the local
• Hamrin Mountains, northeast of Tikrit, Salah
al-Din Province [as of June 2, 2017]
security forces in Shabak villages.
• Al-Hadar District, southwest of Qayyarah,

Ninewa Province [as of April 28, 2017]
Kata’ib Babiliun – 50th PMF Brigade336 - Rian
al-Kaldani,337 though his brother Osama al-Kaldani
is likely the field commander.338
Kata’ib Babiliun is a Chaldaean Christian militia Unconfirmed sources claim that Liwa Salah al-Din
from the Ninewa Plains area east of Mosul. It is a is a component of the Badr Organization.348
small, low-capability militia with close ties to Iranian
proxies. Rian al-Kaldani attended the funeral of a
• Al-Shirqat and Tulul al-Baj, north of Baiji,
Salah al-Din Province [as of June 13, 2017]
Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Mustafa Zulfiqar, in the
Dahia area in south Beirut on May 20, 2016, along
with official PMF spokesperson Ahmed al-Asadi.339
Kata’ib Babiliun members pictured at graduation Quwat al-Shahida Omayyat al-Jibara (QSOJ) –
processions have been seen wearing images of a 88th PMF Brigade – Wans Ahmed Naji al-Jibara.349
Shi’a Imam along with the logo of KAIA, a proxy QSOJ is a small, pro-Iranian Sunni tribal militia
militia.340 Kaldani is also the head of the Harakat from al-Alam sub-district, north of Tikrit. Al-Alam
Babiliun political office and behaves like a political is a major Iranian proxy support base. It is closely
party leader, meeting with political leaders and even integrated with Badr Organization units like the 21st
traveling abroad as a representative of the PMF.341 IA Brigade.350 It may be a sub-component of the 21st
The Iraqi Chaldaean Church has denounced Kata’ib Badr Organization, who has responsibility for much
Babiliun, stating that it has no connection with the of the eastern sector of Salah al-Din Province, and
militia and that Rian al-Kaldani does not represent has close ties with Liwa Salah al-Din.351 The QSOJ
Iraq’s Chaldaean Christian community.342 hometown of al-Alam is unusual in that it is an almost
• Al-Tanak, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
exclusively Sunni town that is a strong Shi’a militia
support zone; other QSOJ figures serve in Asa’ib Ahl
• East Mosul, Ninewa Province
al-Haq, which has a strong support base.352
• Tel Kayef, East of Mosul, Ninewa Province

• Al-Fatha, northeast of Baiji, Salah al-Din
• Zab River, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa
• Al-Dour, south of Tikrit, Salah al-Din
[as of June 10, 2017]
Liwa Salah al-Din – 51st PMF Brigade343 – Asham
al-Sabhan al-Jubouri.344 • Hamrin Mountains, northeast of Tikrit, Salah
Liwa Salah al-Din is a tribal fighter formation
drawn from Jubour tribesmen in Salah al-Din • Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit,
Province. Liwa Salah al-Din received assistance
from U.S. and Coalition airstrikes, but it was also • Al-Aith, east of Samarra, Salah al-Din
armed by Iran and is far closer to Iranian proxy
forces than to other tribal fighters.345 The PMF Liwa Kirkuk al-Thani (Second Kirkuk Brigade)
generated intra-Jubour tribal tension by sponsor-
The PMF established Liwa Kirkuk al-Thani in
ing Liwa Salah al-Din. Many prominent Jubouris,
August 2017 in anticipation of anti-ISIS operations
such as Salah al-Din governor Ahmed Abdullah
in Hawija. It is based in Daquq district, Kirkuk
al-Jubouri and Parliament Speaker Salim al-Ju-
Province. It is composed of 1,500 Arabs, Kurds
bouri from Diyala, oppose Iranian proxy militias
and Turkmen. The brigade’s spokesman indicated
and are nervous about the PMF structure as a
the brigade is under the supervision of the Mufti
whole.346 Other Jubour tribal figures are closer to
of Iraqi Sunnis, Mahdi al-Samid’i. There are no
the PMF and pro-Iranian figures. These include
obvious connections to Iranian proxies, but the
Liwa Salah al-Din’s commander and prominent
creation of the brigade fits the overall pattern of
Sunni politician Mishaan al-Jubouri, a Sunni figure
establishing local minority brigades attributed to
with a history of opposition to the U.S. and whose
Iranian proxies elsewhere.353
son, Yazan, is one of the unit’s commanders.347
DECEMBER 2017
Hawza Militias • Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk

Hawza militias are smaller PMF groups affiliated
with the Najaf Shi’a religious establishment (Hawza)
and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Unlike other
PMF groups, Hawza militias are not connected to Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyah – No PMF number –
political parties. They are instead linked to a shrine Hamid al-Yasiri.364
complex (‘utbah). Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyah leader Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyah is the smallest of the four
Hamid al-Yasiri postulated in July 2016 that Hawza Hawza militias and the least capable. It is linked to
militias would likely enter Mosul, however, they did the Abbasiyah shrine complex in Karbala.
not.354
• Tel al-Misraj al-Faraj, west of Tel Afar, west of
Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 4, 2017]
Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliyah (FAQ) – 26 PMF th
Brigade355 – Maitham al-Zaidi.356 • Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah

al-Din Province [as of May 16, 2017]
FAQ is linked to the Abbasiyah shrine establish-
ment in Karbala and is the least integrated Shi’a
militia within the PMF establishment after Saraya
al-Salam. FAQ denies it will run in elections.357 • Amiriyat al-Fallujah and Zoba, south of
Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 14, 2016]
Senior proxy militias and the PMF leaders have
failed to release the group’s salaries and the deleted Firqat al-Imam Ali al-Qitaliyah (FIAQ) – 2nd
FAQ members’ names from PMF registries, causing PMF Brigade – Karim al-Khaqani.365
tensions.358 The PMF leadership over time have FIAQ is a large Hawza militia that exists in an
worked to include FAQ within the PMF superstruc- unusual space between FAQ and Liwa Ali al-Akbar.
ture, including resolving differences between FAQ It is largely uncompromised by Iranian proxies but
and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri.359 operates alongside Iranian proxy militias during
FAQ appears in well-funded promotional pictures forward operations. It is linked to the Alawiyah
and military parades that show matching uniforms, shrine complex in Najaf.
Hazmat suits, and FAMAS rifles associated with the
ERD.360 FAQ possesses arms factories and man- • Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
ufactures its own MLRS rocket systems,361 sniper
rifles,362 and repurposed T55 tanks to acquire AT • Qayrawan, Ninewa Province
[as of July 23, 2017]
guns / recoilless rifles.363
• Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province • Iraq-Syrian border, Ninewa Province
[as of July 16, 2017]
• Khanifis, near al-Hadar, south of Qayyarah, • Al-Jurn, southwest of Mosul, Ninewa
[as of July 13, 2017]
Ninewa Province [as of July 14, 2017]
• Badush, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province • Sinjar air base, Ninewa Province
• Tel Kaysoum, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province • Umm al-Shababit, near Qayrawan, west of Tel
Afar, Ninewa Province [as of May 12, 2017]
• Nukhaib-Ar Ar road, southwest of • Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
Karbala Province, Anbar Province
[as of August 20, 2016] • Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
• Balad District, southeast of Samarra, Salah
al-Din Province [as of July 24, 2016] • Badush, northwesr of Mosul, Ninewa
• Karbala borders, Karbala Province
[as of June 30, 2016] • Najaf borders with Anbar Province
• West of Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa

Liwa al-Tufuf – 13th PMF Brigade370 – Qasim Musleh.
Liwa al-Tufuf is a splinter group from Liwa Ali al-Ak-
• Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of April 29, 2017] bar, led by the former Liwa Ali al-Akbar commander
Qasim Musleh. Hamdani replaced Musleh as com-
• Jazeera Khalidiyah, north of Ramadi, Anbar
mander of Liwa Ali al-Akbar in late 2015 or early
2016, though it is unclear why.371 Liwa Ali al-Akbar
• Balad, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din
maintains good relations with Liwa al-Tufuf, sug-
gesting the split was amicable.372 Liwa al-Tiff appears
• Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk, Kirkuk Province
[as of May 1, 2016]
to be sanctioned by the Hawza, as it receives visits
from senior shrine officials like Grand Ayatollah
• Tuz Khurmatu, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din
Ali al-Sistani’s official spokesperson Abdul-Mahdi
al-Karbalai.373 The PMF may rely on Liwa al-Tufuf
• Thar Thar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din
more for technical skills, such as re-opening water
infrastructure, assigned to engineering and IED
Liwa Ali al-Akbar – 11th PMF Brigade366 – Ali removal tasks, protecting engineers, delivering aid
al-Hamdani.367 to IDPs in camps, and trench digging than combat
Liwa Ali al-Akbar is the most active of the Hawza tasks.374
militias in forward operations. It is linked to the • Sahl Sinjar Airbase, south of Qayrawan, west of
Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 18, 2017]
Husseiniyah shrine complex in Najaf, is the Hawza
militia most integrated into the PMF structure, • Al-Saadiyah, east of al-Hadhar, south of
Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 26, 2017]
and is the closest militia to Iranian proxy militias.
It operates alongside Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a • Wadi Amhufah, west of Karbala
[as of May 4, 2017]
militias and explicitly follows the PMF leadership,
unlike FAQ. Human rights organizations have
accused Liwa Ali al-Akbar of abuses in areas with
• Tel Abtah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
Iranian proxy militia activity.368 • Anbar border northwest of Karbala
• Al-Risala, near Baaj, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa
Province (with AAH) [as of June 3, 2017]
• Qayrawan, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province

[as of May 23, 2017]
Co-opted Hawza Militias
Hawza militias compete with Iranian proxy militias
because they embody different values. Hawza mili-
tias reject participation in politics and are loyal to
a religious establishment opposed to Iran’s ruling
ideology. Some PMF leaders have tried to fracture
al-Din Province [as of August 4, 2016]
Hawza militias from their parent units in order
to consolidate those rival forces under more pro-
• Harariyat, north of Fallujah, Anbar Province
[as of June 20, 2016]
Iranian leadership.
• Bashir, south of Kirkuk

Liwa al-Tiff – 20th PMF Brigade – Abu Sajad376 /
Engineer Hashim Ahmed al-Tamimi.377
• Karbala Borders with Anbar Province
The PMF split Liwa al-Tiff, composed of approx-
imately 850 fighters from its parent unit, FAQ,
in late 2016 without permission of FAQ or the
Abbasiyah shrine complex.378 FAQ leader Maitham
al-Zaidi alleged that the PMF “tricked” fight-
ers in FAQ into joining the new unit, calling it a
DECEMBER 2017
move to weaken FAQ. Funeral marches for Liwa Sadrist Trend

al-Tiff members often include FAQ members and Saraya al-Salam / Peace Brigades (PB) – 313 PMF
signs that the deceased identify as FAQ members, Brigade – Abu Zahra al-Saadi.385 Saraya al-Salam
suggesting that the split was not voluntary.379 The is the armed wing of the Sadrist Trend loyal to
creation of Liwa al-Tiff may have been an attempt Muqtada al-Sadr. Saadi is commander of Samarra
by the PMF leadership to weaken FAQ’s main fight- operations, which is the militia’s most important
ing force, al-Ilqami Brigade, as its leader may have area of responsibility. Sadrist media avoids using
been the leader of al-Ilqami Brigade at the time of the official designation of Liwa 313 to refer to Saraya
the split.380 Social media suggests that the overlap al-Salam. Saraya al-Salam organizes itself into a
between units was not voluntary.381 division, brigade, battalion, and company structure
• Possibly Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa
separate from the PMF.386 The separate structure
and masking of the Liwa 313 designation reflects
• North of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
Sadr’s reluctance to integrate Saraya al-Salam into
the PMF. Saraya al-Salam deploys primarily around
• Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala
Samarra. It also has presence in Karbala as well as
the northern Baghdad Belts area. Each division’s
• Jazeera Salah al-Din, west of Shirqat, Salah
subordinate units likely rotate into Samarra from
their home provinces. Saraya al-Salam units can
have as many as 30 companies per battalion, though
Politically Affiliated Militias companies are closer to platoon-sized formations
and mostly consist of low-capability fighters with
Political party-linked militias are the armed wings of
limited arms and training.387 Sadrist battalion
political parties. Only Saraya al-Salam and the ISCI sizes juxtaposed with the limitations of its area of
militias have meaningful military capabilities. The responsibility suggest that most of the force is held
remainder of these militias largely promote their in reserve, likely to control the cost of maintaining
political party or act as outlets for party patronage. a large militia in a resource-constrained envi-
These militias will nevertheless become important ronment. The Sadrist trend has reportedly been
constituencies and sources of leverage in provincial undergoing serious financial difficulties forcing it to
and parliamentary elections in 2018. cut the salaries of its members by half.388 This comes
The political parties and organizations law – as the trend’s leader cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has
passed by the Iraqi Council of representatives in increasingly distanced himself from Iran’s policies
November 2015 – stipulates that the activities of in both Iraq and Syria, calling for the incorpora-
political parties or organizations must not be that tion of the Iranian-backed PMF into the ISF and on
of military or semi-military organizations.382 The Assad to step down as Syria’s president.389
PMF law also stipulates that members of the PMC
must relinquish all political, social and party affili- • Rapid Intervention Brigade. This unit is
equipped with tanks, Humvees, MLRS, and
ations. PMC members are also prohibited from any high-level equipment. It is likely the best
political engagements while they remain within its equipped force in Saraya al-Salam.390 The
ranks.383 The Iranian-backed PMF, however, are following locations are attributed to Saraya
determined to turn their military victories on the
al-Salam generally, not the Rapid Intervention
ground into political capital to block attempts for
Brigade specifically. The Rapid Intervention
PMF integration into the army. This independence
Brigades’s resourcing and eminence suggests it
may give them leeway to pursue Iranian interests
was likely the sub-unit of to Saraya al-Salam on
in the country. It may also deter any future Iraqi
the ground, however.
government from taking measures against Tehran’s
interests. • Samarra, Salah al-Din Province
[as of May 23, 2017]
• West of Karbala [as of May 1, 2017]
• Balad, Salah al-Din Province

Jaish al-Mu’amil is a Sadrist offshoot that joined
Iranian proxy militias in the PMF.403 Jaish
• Suleiman Beg, eastern Salah al-Din
al-Mu’amil illustrates Iranian efforts to split the
Sadrist movement and reduce Tehran’s primary
• PB 1 Division. Haidar Abu Zainab
st 391 political and paramilitary rival. Some of the unit’s
fighters likely remain active in Syria.404 Its com-
• Baghdad / Rusafa [as of August 31, 2017] mander, Saad Sawar, was a Jaish al-Mahdi member
• PB 2 Division. Abu Tammar al-Utaibi
nd 392
who fought in Syria under Liwa Abu Fadl al-Ab-
• Wasit Province [as of May 30, 2017] bas.405 He may have done so as a member of the
• Babil Province [as of October 24, 2013] Sadrist Trend but without Muqtada al-Sadr’s per-
mission, leading to his eventual expulsion from the
• PB 3 Division. Abu Hassan al-Zubaidi,
rd 393
movement.406 He likely returned and formed his
possibly replaced Abu Mustafa al-Khazali 394
new unit, Jaish al-Mu’amil, around June 2016. At
• Najaf Province [as of April 27, 2017] that time, an offshoot of the Sadrist Trend began
• Karbala Province [as of January 17, 2016] accusing Muqtada al-Sadr of leading Iraq into
• Diwaniyah, Qadisiyah Province
[as of December 2015]
“civil war” and denounced his refusal to commit
Saraya al-Salam fighters to operations to recap-
ture Fallujah.407 Jaish al-Mu’amil’s formation
• PB 4 Division. Abu Jaafar
th 395
sparked an uproar within the Sadrist Trend. Senior
• Maysan Province [as of April 20, 2017] Sadrist leaders at the time claimed that there was no
• PB 5 Division. Nabil al-Ghazi
th 396 split within the Sadrist Trend, but the facts prove
otherwise.408
• Basra Province [as of June 1, 2017] • Makhoul mountains, north of Baiji,
• PB 6 Division. Ali Ibrahim or Muhammad
th 397
Ramadan 398
• Al-Zawiya, northern Salah al-Din
• Muthanna Province [May 7, 2017] [as of May 1, 2017]
• Dhi Qar Province [as of April 6, 2016] • Near Qayyarah, west of Mosul, Ninewa
• PB 7 Division. Haitham Abbas al-Bahadli
th 399 Province [as of April 29, 2017]
• Siniya-Hadith road, near Baiji, Salah
• Baghdad / Karkh [as of May 26, 2017] al-Din Province [as of April 6, 2017]
Co-opted Sadrist Militias

• Near Mosul, Ninewa Province
Numerous PMF fighters and their leaders have
roots in the defunct Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army), Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI) Brigades
Muqtada al-Sadr’s first militia, mobilized to fight ISCI brigades are militias linked with several leaders
the U.S. presence in 2004. The movement evolved, of the ISCI, the most prominent of which was
so that many fighters who view Sadr’s venerated Ammar al-Hakim before he split off in July 2017 to
deceased father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq form the Hikma Trend. ISCI has close historical ties
al-Sadr, now serve in pro-Iranian or Iranian proxy to Iran but does not respond to Iranian command
groups.400 and control in the manner of other Iranian proxies.
Jaish al-Mu’amil – 99th PMF Brigade401 - Hajj ISCI Brigades nevertheless exhibit close ties with
Saad Sawar.402 Iranian proxy leaders, and are interoperable with
Iranian proxy militias.
DECEMBER 2017
Above: The senior-most leaders in the PMF met with Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr at his home on October 18, 2016.409 The units led by
the above commanders are the most prominent of the PMF groups and demonstrate how thoroughly the organization is compromised by Iranian proxies.
From left to right: Badr Organization Council of Representatives member for Ninewa Province Hanin Qado; Kata’ib al-Imam Ali Secretary General
Shibl al-Zaidi; Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa; Kata’ib Jund al-Imam Secretary General and Official Popular Mobilization
Forces Spokesperson Ahmed al-Asadi; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Secretary General Qais al-Khazali; Kata’ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali Secretary General Adnan
al-Shahmani; Unknown.; Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr; Kata’ib Babilun Secretary General Rian al-Kaldi; Popular Mobilization Forces Deputy
Chairman and probable Kata’ib Hezbollah commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis; Shi’a Endowment Administrative and Financial Agent for Samarra
Sami al-Masoudi (Obstructed); Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al-Ameri; Popular Mobilization Commission Central Operations Director
Abu Muntadhir al-Husseini; Nujaba Movement Secretary General Akram al-Kaabi; Minister of Interior and senior Badr Organization member Qasim
al-Araji; and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada official spokesperson Faleh al-Khazali.
Saraya Ansar al-Aqida – 28th PMF Brigade410 – Jalal Liwa al-Muntadhir – 7th PMF Brigade – Daghir
al-Din al-Saghir411 al-Mousawi412
• Ansar al-Aqida is known for its unique
improved armored vehicles.
Liwa al-Muntadhir is an armed wing of Harakat
al-Shahid al-Shuhada.413 Liwa al-Muntadhir has
• Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syrian border, Ninewa
worked closely with pro-Iranian militias including
Badr. It is unknown if the brigade will remain with
• Sakkar, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
ISCI or join the Hikma Trend as the two sides con-
tinue to compete for ISCI’s resources.414
[as of April 29, 2017] • Likely north of al-Walid, western Anbar
• Tel Abtah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of April 20, 2017] • Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of May 23, 2017]
• Siniyah, west of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
[as of October 1, 2016] • Shirqat / Outskirts of Mosul Operations area,
north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
• Hamrin Mountains, east of Tikrit, Salah [as of October 21, 2016]
al-Din Province [as of February 6, 2016] • Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar
Saraya Ashura – 8th PMF Brigade415 – Kadhim It works closely with Iranian proxies, self-identi-
al-Jabiri416 fying as a component of the Islamic Resistance in
Iraq. The group also attempts to appeal to the fol-
Saraya Ashura is an armed wing of ISCI. The
lowers of the Sadrist trend – prominent in Maysan
brigade, while seen to be mostly affiliated with
– by incorporating pictures of the late Ayatollah
Hakim, allowed its members the choice between
Mohammad Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr. LA4 is
joining Hakim or ISCI.417
small and its missions are limited, comparable to
•
Tulul al-Baj, west of Shirqat, Salah al-Din
newer pro-Iranian militias like Kata’ib al-Tiyyar
al-Risali. LA4’s social media presence demonstrates
•
Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 3, 2017] how mixed PMF-political party entities can operate
•
Al-Hadhar District, south of Mosul, Ninewa
in a post-Mosul environment. LA4 focuses on
political messaging, including propaganda, glitzy
•
Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
graphics, association with top Iranian proxy figures
such as Qais al-Khazali, and promotion of Gharawi
as a leader.425 However, it shows almost no actual
Other Politically Affiliated Militias military activity. LA4 units are reportedly active in
Syria, though it is unclear how many fighters are in
Saraya al-Jihad – 17th PMF Brigade418 – Hassan
Syria and where they are specifically.426
al-Sari.419
Saraya al-Jihadh is affiliated with Harakat al-Jihad
•
Kilo 160, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province
[as of May 30, 2017]
wa al-Bina. The militia was part of ISCI before
splitting away in September 2017.420 Saraya al-Ji-
•
Quwat al-Buraq, Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi,
Anbar Province [as of October 1, 2016]
had fighters are active inside of Syria, but likely only
in a limited capacity, as they had only one fighter
•
Quwat al-Buraq, Sagar and Kilo 160, west of
Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 23, 2017]
confirmed killed inside of Syria as of June 2017.421
Saraya al-Jihad is known for its homemade IRAMs.
•
[as of June 7, 2017] Kata’ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali – 31st PMF Brigade427 –
• Tel al-Harada, near Mosul and Tel Afar,
Ninewa Province [as of June 3, 2017]
Adnan al-Shahmani.
Kata’ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali is the armed wing of the
Risali Trend, a small party within the SLA that is
aligned with Maliki and largely draws personnel
• Aziz Balad, near Samarra, Salah al-Din
from Wasit Province. Shahmani is the head of the
small “Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc” formed of
• Al-Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
5 members of the State of Law (SLA), using the
same name as the Lebanese Hezbollah bloc within
Lebanese parliament.428 The Risali Trend is the best
example of how a small political party can capital-
Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah (LA4) – 19th PMF ize on militia activity for political gain. Shahmani
Brigade422 – Haidar al-Gharawi. maneuvered himself into a position of influence
within the PMF, give his frequent attendance of
• Notable subordinate unit: Kata’ib al-Shahid
al-Awal, also known as Quqat al-Buraq – 423 meetings with senior proxy leaders, despite leading
Wathiq al-Fartousi. a small militia with limited capabilities.429
Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah is a pro-Iranian militia •
Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 3, 2017]
created to be the military wing of the Kayan al-Sadiq •
Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
wa al-Ata’ political party in Maysan Province.424
DECEMBER 2017
Above: FP-patterned Humvees acquired by Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah, a pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi’a militia next to an American-made Mine-
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle.430 A wide range of PMF groups now deploy assets like Humvees, a capability that historically was limited to a
select few Iranian proxy militias.
Quwat Waad Allah / al-Shabab al-Risali (QWA) – • Umm Gharba, southwest of Shirqat, Salah
33rd PMF Brigade431 – Sami al-Masoudi.
QWA is the armed wing of al-Fadhila Party, the • Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province
Sadrist break-away party in Basra. It pays deference
to the spiritual leader of Fadhila, the controversial • Mosul, Ninewa Province
Ayatollah Muhammad al-Yaqoubi.432 Fadhila adver-
tises the martyrdom of QWA members.433 It draws • Al-Taji gas plant, north of Baghdad
[as of May 5, 2016]
its base from Basra, the Fadhila Party stronghold. It
formerly operated under the name Liwa al-Shabab • Jazeera Samarra, west of Samarra, Salah
al-Risali. Masoudi is the Deputy Head of the Shi’a
Waqf and “General Supervisor” of QWA. Masoudi • Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province
is a high-profile PMF member who is close to pro-
Iranian figures.435 His high rank within the Shi’a Quwat al-Shahid al-Sadr – 35th PMF Brigade – Abu
Waqf is troubling because this PMF group can Aqil al-Mousawi.436
secure access to resources from the Shi’a religious Quwat al-Shahid al-Sadr is the armed wing of the
establishment through his position. Islamic Dawa Party – Iraq Organization, an off-shoot
of the Islamic Dawa Party headed by Maliki.437 The Kata’ib Jund al-Imam – 6th PMF Brigade – Ahmad
militia is rarely mentioned in official PMF media, al-Asadi.443
indicating its low profile and capabilities. Other
Kata’ib Jund al-Imam, often referred to as Jund
Dawa Party offshoots, like the Dawa Party - Internal
al-Imam, is the militia of Ahmed al-Asadi, the
Organization (Kata’ib al-Ghadhab), have their own
official spokesperson of the PMF and a parliamen-
militias with minimal capabilities.438
tarian with the SLA. Jund al-Imam was one of the
• Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province
first militias to produce a persistent, high-quality
social media campaign featuring high-definition
Quwat al-Shahid al-Sadr al-Awal (QSSA) – 25th videos and images. Its social media portrayed Jund
PMF Brigade439 – Abu Jassim al-Nasiri.440 al-Imam as far larger and more active than it ever
was. Asadi, in his role as the official PMF spokes-
Quwat al-Shahid al-sadr al-Awal is a small militia person, is one of the most visible officials within the
linked to the Dawa Party and Maliki.441 Dawa Party PMF, making overseas visits to garner support for
militias frequently use the distinctive domed Dawa the PMF, including one visit to Dearborn, Michigan
Party-style logo.442 in June 2015.444
al-Din Province [as of May 20, 2017] •
Ain Talawi, west of Tel Afar, west of Mosul,
Ninewa Province [as of August 17, 2017]
• Shakran, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province
Al-Siniyah, west of Baiji, Salah al-Din
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq KAAH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kata’ib Ansar al-Hojja
AOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anbar Operations Command KAIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kata’ib al-Imam Ali
BabOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Babil Operations Command KH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kata’ib Hezbollah
BasOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Basra Operations Command KSAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada
BOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Baghdad Operations Command KRG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kurdistan Regional Government
CTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Counter Terrorism Services LA4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah
DOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dijla Operations Command MEOC . . . . . . . . . . . Mid-Euphrates Operations Command
ERD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Response Division MoD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ministry of Defense
FPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facilities Protection Service MoI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ministry of Interior
FAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliyah NOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ninewa Operations Command
FIAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Firqat al-Imam Ali al-Qitaliyah OCINC . . . . . . . . . . . . . Office of the Commander in Chief
FP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Police PMC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Popular Mobilization Commission
IA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraqi Army PMF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Popular Mobilization Forces
IRGC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps PUK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
ISOF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraqi Special Operations Forces QSOJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quwat al-Shahida Omayyat al-Jibara
ISCI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq QWA. . . . . . . . . . . . . Quwat Waad Allah / al-Shabab al-Risali
JAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jaish al-Mahdi ROC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rafidain Operations Command
JBOC. . . . . . . . . . . Jazeera and Badia Operations Command SaDaSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Saraya al-Difaa al-Shaabi
JOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Operations Command SDOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . Salah al-Din Operations Command
SFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Special Forces Division
SOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Samarra Operations Command
STaK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Saraya Talia al-Khorasani
DECEMBER 2017
Appendix B: Operations Commands: Areas of Responsibility

Operations Commands: Areas of Responsibility
Operations Command Area of Responsibility
Ramadi, Fallujah, surrounding desert areas in eastern

Anbar Operations Command (AOC)
Anbar Province
Babil Operations Command (BabOC) Babil Province, southern Baghdad Belts
Baghdad Province—split into Karkh (Western) and

Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) Rusafa (Eastern) area commands—majority of Baghdad
Belts
Basra Operations Command (BasOC) Basra Province
Diyala Province, eastern Salah al-Din Province,

Dijla Operations Command (DOC) Disputed Internal Boundaries of Diyala, Kirkuk, and
Salah al-Din Provinces
Jazeera and Badia Operations Command Anbar Province west of Ramadi, much of Jazeera and
(JBOC) Badia Deserts
Mid-Euphrates Operations Command Karbala, Najaf, and surrounding desert areas, Nukhaib
(MEOC) District of Anbar Province
Ninewa Operations Command (NOC) Ninewa Province’s high population centers
Salah al-Din Operations Command (SDOC) Northern half of Salah al-Din Province
Samarra, much of the Jazeera Desert west of Samarra,

Samarra Operations Command (SOC) southern Salah al-Din Province including part of the
northern Baghdad Belts
Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Qadisiyah, and Wasit
Rafidain Operations Command (ROC)
Provinces
Appendix C: Graphics
Iraqi Security Forces - September 2014
Formal Chain of Command Informal Chain of Command
Issues Orders To Operations Commands
Popular Mobilization Forces Affiliations

Hawza (Najaf Shi’a Religious
Politically-Linked Militias Establishment led by Grand Ayatollah Iranian Proxy Militias
Ali al-Sistani) Militias
Sadrist Trend Misc. Politically-Linked Militias Hawza Militias Badr Organization Misc. Iranian Proxy Militias
313th PMU 17th PMU 19th PMU 26th PMU No PMU # 2nd PMU 11th PMU 13th PMU 1st Badr 3rd Badr 12th PMU 14th PMU 18th PMU 29th PMU 40th PMU 41st PMU
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade 4th Badr 5th Badr Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
(Ansar Allah (Firqat al-Abbas (Liwa Ansar (Firqat al-Imam (Ali al-Akbar (al-Tufuf Brigade)
(Saraya al-Salam / (Saraya al-Jihad)
al-Awfiya Brigade) al-Qitaliyah) al-Marjaiyah) Ali al-Qitaliyah) Brigade) (Imam Muhammad (Special Tasks - Brigade Brigade (Harakat (Kata’ib Sayyid
al-Shuhada)
(Saraya Talia
al-Khorasani)
(Kata’ib Ansar
al-Hojja)
(Kata’ib al-Imam (Asa’ib Ahl
Peace Brigades) al-Jawad Brigade) Lions of Amerli al-Nujaba) Ali) al-Haq)
Formation)
42nd PMU 43rd PMU 53rd PMU

9th Badr 10th Badr 16th Badr 45th PMU 46th PMU 47th PMU
Brigade Brigade Brigade
(Kata’ib al-Shahid Brigade Brigade Brigade 21st Badr (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Brigade Brigade Brigade
Rapid al-Awal / Quwat Popular Mobilization (Karbala Brigade) (“Special Force”) (Turkmen Force) Brigade / Brigade Abu
Musa al-Amiri)
(Asa’ib Ahl
al-Haq / Saba’
(Kata’ib
Hezbollah)
(Saraya al-Difaa
al-Shaabi)
(Saraya al-Difaa
al-Shaabi)
(Liwa al-Hussein)
Interven- PB 1st PB 2nd PB 3rd PB 4th PB 5th PB 6th PB 7th al-Buraq) al-Dajil)
tion “Division” “Division” “Division” “Division” “Division” “Division” “Division” Affiliation Key
Brigade No PMU No PMU No PMU No PMU
22nd Badr Number Number Number Number
23rd Badr 24th Badr 27th Badr
Updated as of August 17, 2017 Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
(Kata’ib (Quwat Asad
Allah al-Ghalib)
(Faylaq Waad
al-Sadiq)
(al-Imam
al-Hussein (Lalish Battalion)
al-Sabiroun)
Brigade)
Islamic Supreme Council Brigades Fadhila Party Units are marked with the Iraqi Security Forces Operations
Command responsible for its last known location: 30th Badr 55th Badr
No PMU No PMU
52nd Badr 110th Badr Number Number
Brigade Brigade (Harakat (Qiyadat Quwat
7th PMU 8th PMU 28th PMU 33rd PMU Anbar OC AoR Baghdad OC AoR (Shabak and Brigade (Malik al-Ashtar Brigade al-Abdal) Abu Fadl
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Turkomen Forces) Brigade - Special
Tasks)
al-Abbas)
(Quwat Waad Allah
(al-Muntadhir (Saraya Ashura) (Saraya Ansar / Liwa al-Shabab Basra OC AoR Dijla OC AoR
Brigade) al-Aqida) al-Risali)
Jazeera Badia OC AoR Mid-Euphrates OC AoR

Iranian Co-opted Hawza Militias Iranian Co-opted Minority Militias
Ninewa OC AoR Salah al-Din OC AoR
Dawa Party State of Law Alliance Rafidain OC AoR Samarra OC AoR
20th PMU 50th PMU 51st PMU 88th PMU No PMU
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Number
(al-Tuff Brigade) (Chaldaean (Jabour (Quwat al-Shahida
(Liwa Kirkuk
25th PMU 35th PMU 6th PMU 31st PMU Christian-Kata’ib Tribesmen-Liwa Omayyat al-Jibara)
al-Thani)
Babiliun) Salah al-Din)
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
(Quwat al-Shahid (Quwat al-Shahid (Kata’ib Jund (Kata’ib al-Tiyyar Brigade By: Jessa Rose Dury-Agri
al-Sadr al-Awal) al-Sadr) al-Imam) al-Risali)
©2017 by the
Institute for the Study of War Iranian Co-opted Sadrist Militias
99th PMU
Brigade
(Jaish al-Mu’amil)
DECEMBER 2017
Popular Mobilization Forces Chain of Command
Informal Chain of Command

Iranian Supreme Leader - Ali Khamenei
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - Quds

Forces Commander - Qassim Suleimani
Deputy Chairman / Vice Chairman - Abu Mahdi

al-Muhandis (Kata’ib Hezbollah)
Chief of Staff - Sadiq al-Saadawi Field Commander - Hadi al-Amiri (Head- Iraqi
Assistant Chairman - Thamir al-Tamimi
Security Forces Dijla Operations Command)
Central Administration Directorate - Majid Central Operations Directorate - Abu Shura Council
Rahim Saleh al-Wasiti Muntadhir al-Husseini
Politically-Linked Militias Hawza Militias Iranian Proxy Militias

Financial Directorate - Qassim Dahif General Inspection Directorate
See ISW’s “Popular Mobilization Forces Affiliations and Locations” for more information
Logistics Support Directorate - Abu Hawra’ See ISW’s “Popular Mobilization Forces Affiliations” for more information
Planning Directorate - Haidar al-Furaiji
al-Ahmadi
Babil - Hassan Fadaam al-Janabi (Babil Provincial

Popular Mobilization Forces
Aviation Directorate Central Security Directorate Anbar - Rashid Fleih Council Deputy Chairman, Saraya al-Jihad) Chain of Command Legend
Communications Directorate - Assad “High Committee for Adminstrative and Legal Basra- Ammar Faris Matouq al-Jaafari / Abu
Yasser
Dhi Qar - Abu Da’ al-Shatri Updated as of August 17, 2017
Malek al-Zabidi Status” - Muhammad al-Ghabban
Badr Organization Member.
Diwaniyah- Ahmed al-Awadi Diyala- Faraj al-Maghmas
Intelligence Directorate Martyrs Directorate - Ibrahim al-Quraishi Faleh al-Fayadh is nominally the Popular Mobilization Commission’s most senior
official, however Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is the de-facto head of the PMC
Karbala - Hussein Ismail Khalil Kirkuk- Unknown hierarcy. He oversees the operational, administrative, and financial aspects of the
PMF.
Media Directorate Medical Directorate - Dr. Ali al-Khafaf
Maysan - Haidar Jabar al-Baidhani Muthanna - Ahmed al-Hassani Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi likely attempted to sideline Abu Mahdi
al-Muhandis, head of the PMC’s military operations, by appointing Lt. Gen.
Military Engineering Directorate - Zulfiqar Scouts Directorate - Abu Aqil (Abdul- Mohsen al-Kaabi as a co-eputy Chairman of finances and monitoring all PMU
al-Ardhi Rahman) al-Kadhimi Najaf - Karim al-Khaqani (Firqat al-Imam Ninewa - Luwais Yusuf Ashaq Yusuf institutions. Muhandis has successfully sidelined Kaabi, however.
Ali al-Qitaliyah)
Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri’s position as head of Diyala Security
Salah al-Din - Asham Sabhan al-Jubouri (Liwa renders this position inert.
Training Directorate - Abu Bilal al-Jabiri Religious Guidance Directorate Wasit - Jaafar al-Safi
Salah al-Din)
Unofficial executive commission, or “Shura Council,” dominated by senior leaders
of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, and other
pro-Iranian figures.
Formal Chain of Command

Popular Mobiliation Forces brigades report to leaders of their affiliation, therefore
some report to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi just as they are intended to
according to the official chain of command. This graphic depicts Popular
Mobilization Forces brigades as subordinate to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei in the unofficial chain of command because the majority of its brigades
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces - are Iranian-co-opted.
Haidar al-Abadi
Chairman - Faleh al-Fayadh (Iraqi National

Security Advisor, Dawa Party member)
Deputy Chairman - Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis Deputy Chairman for Administrative and
(Kata’ib Hezbollah) Provisional Matters - Lt. Gen Mohsen al-Kaabi
Chief of Staff - Sadiq al-Saadawi Assistant Chairman - Thamir al-Tamimi
Central Administration Directorate - Majid Central Operations Directorate - Abu

Rahim Saleh al-Wasiti Muntadhir al-Husseini
Financial Directorate - Qassim Dahif General Inspection Directorate
Logistics Support Directorate - Abu Hawra’

Planning Directorate - Haidar al-Furaiji
al-Ahmadi
Aviation Directorate Central Security Directorate Babil - Hassan Fadaam al-Janabi (Babil Provincial
Anbar - Rashid Fleih Council Deputy Chairman, Saraya al-Jihad)
Communications Directorate - Assad “High Committee for Adminstrative and Legal Basra- Ammar Faris Matouq al-Jaafari / Abu Dhi Qar - Abu Da’ al-Shatri
Malek al-Zabidi Status” - Muhammad al-Ghabban Yasser
Diwaniyah- Ahmed al-Awadi Diyala- Faraj al-Maghmas

Intelligence Directorate Martyrs Directorate - Ibrahim al-Quraishi
Karbala - Hussein Ismail Khalil Kirkuk- Unknown
Media Directorate Medical Directorate - Dr. Ali al-Khafaf

Maysan - Haidar Jabar al-Baidhani Muthanna - Ahmed al-Hassani
Military Engineering Directorate - Zulfiqar Scouts Directorate - Abu Aqil (Abdul-

al-Ardhi Rahman) al-Kadhimi Najaf - Karim al-Khaqani (Firqat al-Imam Ninewa - Luwais Yusuf Ashaq Yusuf
Ali al-Qitaliyah)
Training Directorate - Abu Bilal al-Jabiri Religious Guidance Directorate Salah al-Din - Asham Sabhan al-Jubouri (Liwa
Wasit - Jaafar al-Safi
Salah al-Din)
Artillery Companies Anti-Tank Companies Tank Companies
Politically-Linked Militias Hawza Militias Iranian Proxy Militias
See ISW’s “Popular Mobilization Forces Affiliations and Locations” for more information
Iraqi Security Forces Chain of Command
ISF Order of Battle Legend Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Council of Ministers
Updated as of August 17, 2017
If operating outside its 2014 Operations Command (OC) Area of
Responsibility (AoR), a unit is marked by the Operations Command
Counter Terrorism Services (CTS) Ministry of Defense Prime Minister’s Special Forces Division Presidential Brigades * Ministry of Interior Popular Mobilization Commission
responsible for its last known location:
Anbar OC AoR Baghdad OC AoR See ISW’s “Popular Mobilization Forces Affiliations” for more information
Counter Terrorism Command Joint Operations Command
Basra OC AoR Dijla OC AoR 1st 2nd
56th
57th 61st Presidential Presidential
Iraqi Ground Forces Command Mechanized
Jazeera Badia OC AoR Mid-Euphrates OC AoR Brigade Brigade
Ninewa OC AoR Salah al-Din OC AoR
Regional Operations Commands
Rafidain OC AoR Samarra OC AoR
Federal Police Provincial Emergency Police Command Border Guards Facilities Protection Service and Oil Police Emergency Response Division
The Ministry of Defense also commands the Iraqi Navy, the Iraqi
Air Force, the Iraqi Army Aviation, and the Iraqi Air Defense.
The Presidential Brigades are ultimately loyal to the president 2nd
* though they nominally fall under the Ministry of Defense. 1st Federal Mechanized 3rd Federal 4th 5th Federal 6th Federal
Emergency Police Local Police
Police Police Federal Police
The Prime Minister’s Special Forces Division answers to the Federal Police
Division Division Police Division
Ministry of Defense through the Joint Operations Command Police Division
Division
(JOC) and Baghdad Operations Command (BOC). Division
The Joint Operations Command coordinates much of the

Counter Terrorism Service’s activities though it does not fall 1st Region: N Borders 2nd Region: SW Border with 3rd Region: E Border 4th Region: SE Borders 5th Region: S Borders
under the Ministry of Defense. with Iran and Turkey Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia with Iran with Iran and Kuwait with Saudi Arabia
1st ISOF 1st FP 2nd FP 3rd FP 4th FP 17th FP 18th FP 19th FP 20th FP
Federal Police frequently, though do not always, operate under Brigade 2nd ISOF 3rd ISOF Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
regional operations commands. (Golden Brigade Brigade
Responsive to the Kurdistan Regional Government. Division)
Iranian proxy militia commanders who respond to Iran’s

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds Force exercise 7th FP 8th FP 13th FP 14th FP 15th FP 16th FP 2nd Border 14th Border 11th Border 12th Border
5th FP 6th FP 3rd Border 8th Border 10th Border
command and control a significant portion of the Popular Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Guards Guards Guards Guards
Brigade Brigade Guards Guards Guards
Mobilization Forces. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi interacts Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
with these leaders, but does not control them. (Historic) (Historic) (Historic)
Compromised by 1st Border 4th Border 5th Border 6th Border 7th Border 9th Border
Brigade 9th FP 10th FP 11th FP 12th FP 21st FP
Division Iranian proxy forces Guards Guards Guards Guards Guards Guards 1st ERD 2nd ERD 3rd ERD
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
By: Jessa Rose Dury-Agri
©2017 by the Institute for the Study of War
Jazeera Badia Operations Baghdad Operations Salah al-Din Operations Temporary Operations Rafidain Operations Basra Operations Samarra Operations Mid-Euphrates Dijla Operations Babil Operations Ninewa Operations Anbar Operations
Command Command Command (SDOC) Commands Command Command Command (New) Operations Command Command Command (New) Command Command
Karkh Area Rusafah Area

Command Command
20th IA
7th IA 6th IA 9th IA 5th IA 1st IA Rapid
Infantry 10th IA 11th IA 14th IA 8th IA 17th IA 15th IA 16th IA
Division Division Division DIvision Intervention
Division Division Division Division Division Division Division Division
Division
(Proposed)
22nd IA 24th IA 54th IA 59th IA 34th IA 35th IA 36th IA 37th IA 4th IA 38th IA 39th IA 40th IA 41st IA 42nd IA 43rd IA 44th IA 45th IA 8th IA 30th IA 31st IA 32nd IA 33rd IA 39th IA 23rd IA 25th IA 55th IA 60th IA 52nd IA 71st IA 72nd IA 73rd IA 74th IA 91st IA 92nd IA 75th IA 76th IA 91st IA
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
1st IA 2nd IA 3rd IA

27th IA 28th IA 29th IA 43rd IA 60th IA 66th IA 74th IA 50th IA 51st IA 52nd IA 53rd IA 64th IA 18th IA 19th IA 20th IA 21st IA Rapid Rapid Rapid
Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Intervention Intervention Intervention
(new) Brigade Brigade Brigade
DECEMBER 2017
Appendix D: Iraqi Security Forces Commanders
Iraqi Security Forces High Commanders

Commander —as of
Position Predecessor
November 2017
Prime Minister and Commander
Haider al-Abadi Nouri al-Maliki
in Chief of the Armed Forces
Maj. Gen. Irfan Mahmoud al-Hayali Khalid al-Obaidi

Minister of Defense
(January 2017 – present) (2014 – 2016)
Qasim al-Araji Mohammed al-Ghabban

Minister of the Interior
(January 2016 – present) (2014 – 2016)
Joint Operations Command Lt. Gen. Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani Gen. Abboud Qanbar
(JOC) Commander (2014 – present) (2013 – 2014)
Counter-Terrorism Service No Predecessor,

Lt. Gen. Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi
(CTS) Field Commander Created in 2014
Combined JOC Director, Deputy Lt. Gen. Abdul-Amir Rashid

Unknown
Chief of Staff for Operations Yarallah (2014 – present)
Iraqi Ground Forces Lt. Gen. Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan
Commander (2014 – present) (2006 – 2014)
Lieutenant General-Staff
Lt. Gen. Uthman al-Ghanimi
Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Khorshid Rashid Doski
(2015 – present)
(2014 – 2015)
Iraqi Army Aviation Commander Lt. Gen. Hamid Atiyah al-Maliki Unknown
Iraqi Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Anwar Hama Amin Unknown
Iraqi Navy and Costal Defense Marine General Ahmed Jasim Maarij Marine General Salam
Commander (2015 – present) Mohammed Ahmed
Iraqi Air Defense Commander Lt. Gen. Jabar Obeid Kadhim Unknown
Maj. Gen. Raid Shakir Jawdat

Federal Police Commander Muhsin al-Kaabi (2014)
(2014 – present)
Border Guards Commander Lt. Gen. Hamid Abdullah Unknown
Emergency Response Division Brig. Gen. Thamir Muhammad

Unknown
Commander Ismail (2013 – present)
Iraqi Army Divisions Commanders

Iraqi Army Division Area of Operations Current Commander Previous Commander
1st Iraqi Army Anbar Province, Ninewa Musa Kata Kadhim Hasan Abbas Tofan
Division Province (2015 – present)445 (2014 – 2015)
2nd Iraqi Army
Division
Dissolved and replaced with 15th and 16th Divisions.
3rd Iraqi Army
Division
4th Iraqi Army
Dissolved Dissolved Dissolved
Division
Akram Saddam
5th Iraqi Army Diyala Province, northern Ali Fadhil Imran
Mudannaf;
Division Salah al-Din Province (2014 – 2016)
(2016 – present)
6th Iraqi Army Western belts of Baghdad Ahmed Salim Bahjat; Najim Abdullah al-Sudani
Division Province (2014 – present)446 (Unknown)
7th Iraqi Army Nauman Abdul-Zobaie Qasem al-Mohammadi
Western Anbar
Division (2015 – present)447 (2013 – 2015)448
8th Iraqi Army Anbar Province, Babil Ali al-Maliki Hassan Mohamed
Division Province (2015 – present) Mowhoush (2012 – 2015)449
Salah al-Din Province,
Abdulla Mohammed
9th Iraqi Army Ninewa Province, Anbar Qassim Jassim Nazal
Khamis al-Dafi
Division Province, Salah al-Din al-Maliki (Unknown)
(Unknown)
Province
10th Iraqi Army Jazeera Desert North of Hamid al-Fatlawi Mahmoud al-Felahi
Division Ramadi, Anbar Province (2014 – present) (2015 – 2017)450
11th Iraqi Army Sa’ib Obeid Mohsin Imad Yasin al-Zuhayri
Baghdad Province
Division Alwan (2014 – present) (Unknown – 2014)451
12th Iraqi Army
Dissolved Dissolved Dissolved
Division
14th Iraqi Army Basra Province, Anbar Abdul Muhsin al-Abbas Ali ghazi haidar al-
Division Province (2015 – present)452 Hashemi (2014 – 2015)453
15th Iraqi Army Salah al-Din Province,
Imad al-Silawi N/A
Division Ninewa Province
16th Iraqi Army Salah al-Din Province, Jabbar al-Daraji Sabah Fadhil Matar al-
Division Ninewa Province (2017 – present)454 Azzawi (Unknown – 2017)455
Baghdad province, Salah Ali Abdul-Hussein
17th Iraqi Army Jabbar Naima al-Tai’i
al-Din Province, Anbar Kadhim al-Majidi
Division (Unknown – 2017)
Province (2017 – present)456
ENDNOTES
1. “Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” The 18. [“The Presidency: Presidential Brigade Continued to Defend and Succeeded
U.S Treasury Department, July 2nd, 2009, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ in Securing Jadiriyah through the Years and our Denied Responsibility
press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx. for Delivering the Person Responsible for the Death of Budaiwi to the
2. “Treasury Designates Individual…,” The U.S Treasury Department, July 2nd, 2009. Court,”] Al-Mada Press, March 23, 2014, https://almadapress.com/ar/
news/28111/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A
3. Kareem Fahim and Liz Sly, “Lethal Roadside Bomb that Killed Scores of U.S.
7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A
Troops Reappears in Iraq,” Washington Post, October 12, 2017, https://www.
%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-
washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/lethal-roadside-bomb-that-killed-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-
scores-of-us-troops-reappears-in-iraq/2017/10/11/87c5a57c-aeb7-11e7-9b93-
%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9 ; [“Presidential Brigades Deny Handing
b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.e1633bcafa84.
Responsibility Over to Baghdad Operations: We Will Not Withdraw Without the
4. Michael Knights, Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, “The Future of Approval of the Office of Talabani,”] Buratha, March 23, 2014, http://burathan-
Iraq’s Armed Forces,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2016, https:// ews.com/arabic/news/232589.
www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/The-future.pdf ; Michael Knights,
19. Michael Knights, “The Long Haul…,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
“The Long Haul: Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq,” The Washington
January 2015.
Institute for Near East Policy, January 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus137_Knights4.pdf ; David Witty, “The 20. [“Presidential Brigade Participated with Baghdad Operations in Securing
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,” Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, March 16, Visit for the Imam al-Kadhim,”] Al-Iraq Net, May 25, 2014, http://aliraqnet.
2015, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-iraqi-counter-terrorism-ser- net/2014-05-25-16-26-51/.
vice/ ; Michael Knights, “Mini Hezbollahs, Revolutionary Guard Knock-Offs, 21. Amre Sarhan, [“Abadi Exempts Special Forces Commander from His
and the Future of Iran’s Militant Proxies in Iraq,” War on the Rocks, May 9, 2017, Position,”] Iraqi News, May 5, 2016, http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/
https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/mini-hizballahs-revolutionary-guard- abadi-exempts-special-forces-commander-position/.
knock-offs-and-the-future-of-irans-militant-proxies-in-iraq/ ; Renad Mansour, 22. Patrick Martin, “Iraq’s Political Crisis Can Constrain the U.S. Campaign Against
Faleh Abduljabar, “The Popular Mobilization Units and the Future of Iraq,” ISIS,” Institute for the Study of War, April 17, 2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot.
Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/ com/2016/04/iraqs-political-crisis-can-constrain-us.html.
ar-pub-68812.
23. [“Masoum Blames Abadi and Questions the Complicity of the Armed Forces
5. Marisa Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” Institute for the Study of War, in Providing Security,”] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 2, 2016, https://aawsat.com/
April 2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis- home/article/629996/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85-
Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf. %D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3
6. Muhannad al-Ghazi, [“Iraqi Special Forces Stand to Gain Stature with Victory %D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%-
Over ISIS,”] Al-Monitor, February 21, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B4%D
originals/2017/02/counterterrorism-bureau-iraq-us-mosul.html. 9%83%D9%8A%D9%83-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%
7. Marisa Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” Institute for the Study of War, April B7%D8%A4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-
2013. %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3
8. Muhannad al-Ghazi, [“Iraqi Special Forces…,”] Al-Monitor, February 21, 2017.
%D9%85%D9%86.
9. [“Counter Terrorism Law Number 21 Year 2016,”] The Iraqi Ministry of Justice,
24. [“The 56th Brigade Leads Armed Forces to Liberate Makhoul Mountains,”]
October 17, 2016, https://moj.gov.iq/uploaded/4420.pdf.
Youtube Video, posted by “Captain 21529,” November 16, 2015, https://www.you-
10. [“Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve,”] tube.com/watch?v=y4QmFlOcaPo.
Facebook Post, May 3, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/pg/CJTFOIR/
25. [“After the Chief of Staff… Yarallah Arrives at Dijla Operations Command in
photos/?tab=album&album_id=1718604988405635.
Diyala,”] Al-Ghad Press, July 3, 2017, https://www.alghadpress.com/new
11. David Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism…,” Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, s/%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-
March 16, 2015. %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-
12. [“About Us,”] Iraqi Special Operations Forces, accessed December 19, 2016. %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/116646/%
http://www.isof-iq.com/about.html. D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-
13. [“Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service … Established by Washington and Adopted by %D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%
Maliki,” Al-Arabiya, October 22, 2016, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/10 D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-
/21/%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9% %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-
81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A
7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A- 7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9. [Operations commands
%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B evolved from ad-hoc headquarters that allowed coordination of Iraqi forces in
4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A temporary operational main efforts during the Surge into standing headquar-
7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A. ters that cover the country; see Marisa Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,”
14. [“The Commander of Special Operations in the Makhoul Mountains is Institute for the Study of War, April 2013.]
Killed in an ISIS Attack,”] Shafaaq, January 13, 2017, http://www.shafaaq. 26. Marisa Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” Institute for the Study of War, April
com/ar/Ar_NewsReader/35d5c73b-5c03-4a17-ae07-647890a13abf/%D9% 2013.
85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF- 27. [“Mahmoud al-Falahi Appointed as Commander of Anbar Operations Rather
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8% than Mahlawi,”] Maaloumah, November 1, 2017, http://www.almaalomah.
A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D com/2017/01/11/120756/.
8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84- 28. [“General Ismael al-Mahlawi Appointed as Commander of Anbar Operations,”]
%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84- Al-Ghad Press, October 12, 2015, https://www.alghadpress.com/news/38620/%D
%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D8%A- 8%AA%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%
F%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-. D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%86-
15. [“Golden Division Soldiers Tell the Story of the Bitter Withdrawal from Ramadi %D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%
… Fadhil al-Barwari was the First to Retreat!”] Center for Iraq Studies, May 21, 2015, A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-
http://www.markazaliraq.net/?state=news&viewId=20592. %D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%
16. [“Politicians by Accident,”] Facebook Post, July 12, 2017, https://www.google.com D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA.
/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2FSiasiu.alssudfa%2Fvideos 29. [“Appointment of General Jabeel Jabar as Commander of Baghdad Operations,”]
%2F473472739652843%2F. Al-Mada Press, July 14, 2016, http://www.almadapress.com/ar/NewsDetails.
17. [“Replacing the Presidential Brigade Charged with Protecting the aspx?NewsID=73274.
Parliament,”] Sotal Iraq, May 9, 2016, http://www.sotaliraq.com/newsitem. 30. [“Lieutenant General Abdul Rahman al-Shamari,”] Youtube Video, posted by Al
php?id=331132#axzz4Qm7Etrot\. Fayhaa TV, August 4, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzEz4YbzHGQ.
31. [“Breaking… al-Abadi Appoints Jamil al-Shamari as Commander of Basra
Operations,”] Forat News, May 10, 2016, http://alforatnews.com/modules/news/
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32. [“Appointment of a New Commander Responsible for Basra Operations,
Successor to Lieutenant General Bassem al-Ta’i,”] Sumaria, November 16, 2014,
http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/116266/.
33. [“Transfer of Commander of Dijla Operations Abdul Amir al-Zaidi and the
Appointment of Mazhir al-Azzawi Rather than Him,”] NRT, November 11, 2015,
http://www.nrttv.com/ar/Detail.aspx?Jimare=13826.
DECEMBER 2017
34. [“Appointment of Azzawi as Commander of Dijla Operations,”] Fo Iraq, 46. [“Document … Removal of the Commander of Anbar Operations Ismail
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265. [“Al-Muhammadawi Attends the First Conference of Ideas in Remembrance of 287. Contact ISW for more information.
Victorious Badr’s Martyrs,”] Badr Organization General Secretariat, May 16, 2017, 288. [“Al-Ahad Exclusive–Operations of the Popular Mobilization Units’ 42nd
http://badr.iq/ar/15469. Brigade –The Martyr Abu Musa al-Amiri–in Tel al-Khazaf Western Ninewa,”]
266. “Siwan Ali Sabah,” Facebook Post, May 31, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/Ialamm. Youtube Video, posted by “al-Ahad,” March 8, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
al23/videos/vb.100009661866275/502796346719090/?type=2&theater/. watch?v=4C9X1NAd09g.
267. Contact ISW for more information. 289. Contact ISW for more information.
268. Contact ISW for more information. 290. Contact ISW for more information.
269. [“52nd Brigade Digs a Security Berm in Salah al-Din to Prevent the Infiltration 291. Contact ISW for more information.
of Terrorists,”] Badr News Agency, Janaury 25, 2017, http://badrnews.net/home/ 292. Contact ISW for more information.
single_news/46707.
270. [“A Tour in Fallujah with the Popular Mobilization Units, the Heroes of the
55th Special Tasks Brigade of Badr’s Military Wing,”] Youtube Video, posted 294. Contact ISW for more information.
by “Mohammed al-Jabiri,” June 26, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/ 295. Contact ISW for more information.
watch?v=PTdzYaC158M. 296. Contact ISW for more information.
271. [“The 55th Special Operations Brigade – Badr Demolishes the ISIS Terrorist 297. Contact ISW for more information.
Dens”], Youtube Video, posted by “The Central Media Bureau in the Badr 298. Contact ISW for more information.
Organization,” May 17, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yu4D0Zw8Aac.
272. [“Commander of the 110th Brigade Martyred - Along With 5 Mujihideen During
300. Phillip Smyth, “Iranian Proxies Step Up Their Role in Iraq,” Washington Institute for
their Pursuit of Terrorists Northeast of Diyala,”] Badr News Agency, January 14,
Near East Policy, June 13, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-anal-
2017, http://www.badrnews.net/home/single_news/45474#.WHngU0FgN-4.
ysis/view/iranian-proxies-step-up-their-role-in-iraq ; Phillip Smyth, “Faylak
facebook.
Wa’ad al-Sadiq: The Repackaging of an Iraqi ‘Special Group’ for Syria,” Jihadology,
273. [“Harakat Al-Nujaba Accuses Force from Police in al-Zaafiraniyah of Complicity January 13, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/01/13/hizballah-cavalcade-faylak-
with ISIS,”] Buratha, September 8, 2016, http://burathanews.com/arabic/ waad-al-sadiq-the-repackaging-of-an-iraqi-special-group-for-syria/.
news/300484.
274. Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq,” Institute for the Study of
War, December 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ 303. Contact ISW for more information.
ResurgenceofAAH.pdf. 304. Contact ISW for more information.
275. Ali Hashem, “Iraq’s Shi’a Militias Claim Victory over ISIS,” Al-Monitor, 305. Contact ISW for more information.
March 16, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/ 306. Contact ISW for more information.
iraq-Shi%E2%80%99a-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html.
276. [“Harakat Al-Nujaba: Golan Heights Liberation Brigade has Qualitative Combat
308. [“The PMF Confirms the Presence of a Yazidi Force Within the Forces of the
Experience in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria,”] Al-Nujaba, March 10, 2017, http://
Liberators for Sinjar Villages,”] All Iraq News, May 15, 2017, http://www.alli-
alnujaba.com/8286--.html.
raqnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=61948.
DECEMBER 2017
310. [“The PMF Confirms the Presence…,”] All Iraq News, May 15, 2017. 331. @MesutUdaySaddam, Twitter Post, February 28, 2017, https://twitter.com/
311. @alabdal3, Twitter Post, August 25, 2016, https://twitter.com/alabdal3/ MesutUdaySaddam/status/836556483013771264.
status/768925240269348865. 332. [“Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Killed in
312. Contact ISW for more information. Samarra,”] Deutsche Welle, December 28, 2014, http://www.dw.com/
fa-ir/%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%
D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-
314. Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team, “Iraq Situation Report: January 20-25, %D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8
2016,” Institute for the Study of War, January 25, 2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot. %A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-
com/2016/01/iraq-situation-report-january-20-25-2016.html. %D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7-
315. Contact ISW for more information. %DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF/a-18154597.
316. [“Secretary General of the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade Declares Independence 333. Abbas Qaidaari, [“Iran’s New Group in Iraq: Saraya al-Khorasani,”] Al-Monitor,
from Syria Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade,”] Mawazin News Agency, June 21, January 11, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/iran-
2015, http://www.mawazin.net/%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86- iraq-saraya-al-khorasani.html.
%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- 334. [“Eight People Killed in Armed Clashes Between ‘Militia’ and Police West
%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%84- of Balad and the First Crossing of the Road with al-Dujail,”] Al-Mada Press,
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3- April 3, 2015, http://www.almadapress.com/ar/news/46498/%D9%85%
%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9
%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%86- %8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%
%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%- A8%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-
B6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3- %D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A ;
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A/%D8%A3 [“Saraya al-Khorasani Calls on Abadi to Open Immediate Investigation
%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; [“Forces of ‘Abu Fadl al-Ab- into the ‘Events of the Country’ and Confirms: We can Arrest those
bas’ for ‘al-Nihar’: ‘We Did Not Fight the Revolution and We Remain in the who Caused Them,”] Al-Mada Press, April 5, 2015, http://www.almada-
Vicinity of the Sayyed Zaineb Shrine,”] Nihar, December 14, 2014, https:// press.com/ar/news/46612/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D
www.annahar.com/article/197903-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%8 8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%
5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85- A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-
%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9% %D8%A8%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD- ; [“Release of Balad Police
D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7% Station Officer and Associates After Hours of their Detention,”] Sumaria,
D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84- April 3, 2015, http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/129788/%D8%A5%D8%B
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9- 7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD-
%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B2%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7- %D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7- %D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF-
%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85. %D9%88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D
317. [“Aws al-Khafaji… Militia Leader Set Against Fallujah,”] Al-Jazeera, May 25, 9%86-%D9%85/ar ; [“Gunmen Hold Balad Police Station Officer, the
2016, http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/icons/2016/5/25/%D8%A3%D Intelligence Officer, and other Police Officers,”] Sumaria, April 3, 2015,
9%88%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AC http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/129781/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%
%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%84%D9 D8%AD%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC
%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B6- %D8%B2%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-
%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC %D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-
%D8%A9. %D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7/
318. @sozako91, Twitter Post, July 4, 2016, https://twitter.com/sozako91/sta- ar ; [“PMF Militants Kill a Kurd in Tuz Khurmatu,”] Rudaw, June 18, 2015,
tus/750056580809363456 ; Kareem Shaheen, “Iraqi Troops http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/180620159.
Seize Control of Districts of Fallujah from ISIS,” The Guardian, May 335. Saad Salloum, [“Division Among Iraq’s Shabak Minority Reveals Kurdish-Arab
30, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/30/ Land Rivalry,”] Al-Monitor, August 16, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
iraqi-forces-enter-fallujah-in-attempt-to-drive-out-islamic-state. originals/2016/08/shabak-minority-iraq-kurdistan-baghdad-erbil.html.
319. [“PMF Disowns Aws al-Khafaji,”] Rudaw, September 6, 2017, http://www.rudaw. 336. Contact ISW for more information.
net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/090620173. 337. “Rian al-Kaldani,” Facebook Post, June 21, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/ryan.
320. [“PMF Brigades Support Directorate of Media with Martyrdom of aliraqe77/photos/a.583360338398167.1073741828.583236031743931
‘Haydar al-Mayahi’,”] Hashed, April 29, 2017, http://al-hashed.net /877295779004620/?type=1&theater.
/2017/04/29/%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9- 338. Contact ISW for more information.
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4
339. “Osama al-Kaldani al-Kildani Shared Rian al-Kaldani’s Post,” Facebook Post, May
%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A-%D9%85-
20, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=161677034864
%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%
2881&id=100009297933188.
D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7/.
340. [“Babliun Armed Battalions for Sayyed Rian al-Kaldani do not Represent the
Christian Component in Iraq,”] Ankawa, June 19, 2016, http://www.ankawa.com/
322. Contact ISW for more information. forum/index.php?topic=812714.0.
323. Contact ISW for more information. 341. “Rian al-Kaldani Added 3 New Photos,” Facebook Post, February 14, 2017,
324. Contact ISW for more information. https://www.facebook.com/ryan.aliraqe77/posts/1288800854520775.
325. Contact ISW for more information. 342. [“Kata’ib Babiliun are the First Armed Christian Faction in the Iraqi
326. [“Video… The Injury of the Kata’ib Imam Ali (Ain) Shibl al-Zaidi,”] Hashed, PMF,”] Al-Quds al-Arabi, October 22, 2016, https://web.archive.org/
November 25, 2016, https://al-hashed.net/2016/11/25/%D8%A8%D8% web/20161023185722/http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=617870.
A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A5%D8% 343. Contact ISW for more information.
B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF- 344. [“The Popular Mobilization Units’ 51st Brigade during Operations to Liberate
%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5 al-Shirqat,”] Youtube Video, posted by “Nayraz al-Jobouri,” https://www.youtube.
%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A/. com/watch?v=FRlSAkq86Ws.
327. “Abu Azrael,” Snopes, November 2015, http://static.snopes.com/app/ 345. Nour Samaha, “Iraq’s ‘Good Sunni’: Yazan al-Jabouri, with Help from Iranian
uploads/2015/11/abu-azrael-ISIS.jpg ; Nabih Bulos, “Iraq’s Rambo is the Scourge Weapons and U.S. Airstrikes, Built a Sunni Faction of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias. But
of Islamic State Militants,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2015, http://www.latimes. the Fight Against ISIS Won’t be his Last,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2016, http://
com/world/great-reads/la-fg-c1-iraq-rambo-20150402-story.html. foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/iraqs-good-sunni/.
328. [“Kata’ib al-Imam Ali Progresses Continuously in Columns to Liberate
Fallujah,”] Youtube Video, posted by “Kata’ib al-Imam Ali,” May 25, 2016, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zbch2K4JWNY.
329. “Aqeel al-Hamidawi is with Salam al-Musawi and 31 Others,” Facebook Post,
April 28, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/100015238362161/videos/
vb.100015238362161/197950330722911/?type=2&theater.
330. @famazamaf, Twitter Post, February 27, 2017, https://twitter.com/famazamaf/
status/836159503670333441.
346. [“Salah al-Din’s Governor Accuses ‘al-Hashed’ of Smuggling Weapons to 357. [“Al-Abbas Combat Force: The PMF Will Not Run Any Elections and Will
Damascus,”] Al-Arabiya, February 3, 2017, http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab Remain Jihadi and a Fortified Shield,”] WR News, April 16, 2017, http://wr-news.
-and-world/iraq/2017/02/03/%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8 net/arabic/local/4175.
-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF 358. [“Firqat al-Abbas Denies its Intention to Break from PMF,”]
%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9 Hashed, July 14, 2016, http://al-hashed.net/2016/07/14/%D9%81
%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%87%D8% %D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8
B1%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9- %A8%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4.html ; [“Salim al-Ja- %D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%
bouri: PMF Will Not Enter Ninewa During the Battle for Mosul,”] A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-
France 24, October 12, 2016, http://www.france24.com/ar/20161012- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD/ ; [“In Documents: Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya
%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8% Filed a Complaint Against the PMF and al-Abadi Orders an Investigation,”] WR
B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D News, April 23, 2017, http://wr-news.net/arabic/local/4234.
9%88%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-
359. [“Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya Repeats Demand of Nouri for Clarification or
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-
Apology for his Remarks About Them,”] WR News, June 11, 2016, http://wr-news.
%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF
net/arabic/local/1364.
%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9.
360. “The War Media Team Added 2 New Photos,” Facebook Post, March 10, 2016,
347. [“Salah al-Din Governor: A Group of 51 PMF are Conducting Smuggling
https://www.facebook.com/teammediawar/posts/836627869782995?match=2Y-
Operations Under the Leadership of Yazan al-Jabouri,”] Iraqi Communist Party
HYsdmC2Kkg2KfZhNi52KjYp9iz ; “The War Media Team Added 3 New
Official Website, February 3, 2017, http://www.iraqicp.com/index.php/sections/
Photos,” Facebook Post, March 20, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/teammediawar/
news/54111-2017-02-03-08-01-33 ; Nour Samaha, [“Iraq’s ‘Good Sunni’:
photos/pcb.842933782485737/842933649152417/?type=3&theater.
Yazan al-Jabouri, with Help from Iranian Weapons and U.S. Airstrikes, Built
a Sunni Faction of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias. But the Fight Against ISIS Won’t be his 361. [“Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya Draws Back the Curtain from al-Rajma (Raad 1) in
Last,”] Foreign Policy, November 16, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/ Preparation for Liberation Battle of Tel Afar,”] WR News, May 29, 2017,
iraqs-good-sunni/. http://wr-news.net/arabic/local/4591.
348. [“Popular Mobilization Forces,”] Facebook Post, May 18, 2017, https://www.face- 362. [“Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya Contributes with Three Devices and Sponsors
book.com/395529017283750/videos/722964951206820/. Another to Enter the Battles of Liberation,”] WR News, April 13, 2017,
http://wr-news.net/arabic/local/4168.
349. @amroaljbara, Twitter Post, September 29, 2017, https://twitter.com/amroaljbara/
status/913662502654939136. 363. [“Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya Modifies 57 Millimeter Cannon on a Tank,”] WR
News, September 17, 2016, http://wr-news.net/arabic/local/2097.
350. [“The Martyr Sheikha Omayya Najji al-Jibara al-Jabouri Added 3 New Photos,”]
Facebook Post, May 18, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbi 364. Mohamed Zwain and Ahmed Helil, [“Forces of the Holy Shrines are the Most
d=744536319041216&id=313409052153947 ; [“The Martyr Sheikha Omayya Likely to Enter Mosul,”] WR News, July 13, 2016, http://wr-news.net/arabic/
Najji al-Jibara al-Jabouri Added 8 New Photos,”] Facebook Post, November 26, local/1601.
2017, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=654585244702991 365. [“Imam Ali Fighting Division Honors the Families of 30 Martyrs and 185
&id=313409052153947. Wounded in Najaf al-Ashraf,”] WR News, April 5, 2017, http://wr-news.net/
351. [“The Martyr Sheikha Omayya Najji al-Jibara al-Jabouri Shared the arabic/local/4107.
Popular Mobilization Commission / 88th Brigade / War Media’s 366. [“Engineering Effort of Liwa Ali al-Akbar Begins by Securing Roads for the
Photo,”] Facebook Post, April 24, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/per- Advance of Units West of al-Baaj,”] WR News, June 6, 2017, http://wr-news.net/
malink.php?story_fbid=733396686821846&id=313409052153947 ; arabic/local/4659.
[“The Martyr Sheikha Omayya Najji al-Jibara al-Jabouri,”] Facebook Post, 367. [“Liwa Ali al-Akbar Confirms its Participation in Battles of Hawija and Mosul,”]
March 4, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/313409052153947/pho- Hashed, September 25, 2016, http://al-hashed.net/2016/09/25/%D9%84%D9
tos/a.319676018193917.1073741829.313409052153947/706426742852174/?- %88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%
type=3. D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-
352. @9363Ali, Twitter Post, October 17, 2015, https://twitter.com/9363Alii/ %D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%87-
status/655321217059057664 ; [“The Martyr Sheikha Omayya Najji %D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%AA%D9
al-Jibara al-Jabouri Added a New Photo,”] Facebook Post, March 9, %8A/.
2016, https://www.facebook.com/313409052153947/pho- 368. [“PMF / Liwa Ali al-Akbar / Receives Modern Military Equipment,”] Hashed,
tos/a.313521502142702.1073741828.313409052153947/534472590047591/?- June 13, 2016, http://al-hashed.net/2016/06/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A
type=3&theater. D%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9
353. [“Announcement of the Formation of the First Brigade in Kirkuk, %8A-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-
its Members of the Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen,”] Sumaria, %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-
August 10, 2017, http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/212517/%D8% %D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B9/.
A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86- 369. “Iraq: Scores of Men Imprisoned in Schoolhouse – Government-Allied Troops
%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84- Hold, Torture Mosul-Area Residents,” Human Rights Watch, May 22, 2017, https://
%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D- www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/22/iraq-scores-men-imprisoned-schoolhouse.
8%A8%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8 370. Contact ISW for more information.
%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8
%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88/ar ; [“Kirkuk… Formation of a New Brigade 371. Contact ISW for more information.
Calls on Sons of Hawija to Volunteer in its Ranks to Restore their Areas,”] NRT, 372. Contact ISW for more information.
August 2017, http://www.nrttv.com/AR/Details.aspx?Jimare=53762 ; “Breaking 373. [“A Delegation of Officials from the Husseiniyah Shrine Visits al-Tufuf Brigade
News,” Facebook Post, August 10, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/kabr.ajal.iq/ West of Mosul,”] News of Iraq, March 28, 2017, http://newsaliraq.com/inews.
posts/1663815703636903. php?NewsID=713496.
354. [“The Holy Sepulcher Forces are the Most Likely to Enter Mosul,”] WR News, July 374. “The War Media Team Added 2 New Photos,” Facebook Post, January 22, 2017,
13, 2016, http://wr-news.net/arabic/local/1601. https://www.facebook.com/teammediawar/posts/1098568696922243?-
355. [“26th Brigade Announces the Use of All of its Capabilities for the match=2YTZiNin2KEg2KfZhNi32YHZiNmB ; [“PMF Tasked ‘Liwa al-Tu-
Relief of Internally Displaced Persons of Mosul,”] Hashed, March 13, fuf’ with Securing Protection of the Engineering Effort West of Mosul,”] Hashed,
2017, http://al-hashed.net/2017/03/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84% January 21, 2017, http://al-hashed.net/2017/01/21/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD
D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-26-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86- %D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-
%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1- %D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-
%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D9- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%AA
%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A %D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86/ ; [“PMF Disarms Minefield Including
A%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%BA%D8%A7/. Dozens of IEDs,”] Hashed, April 8, 2017, http://al-hashed.net/2017/04/08/%D
356. [“26th Brigade Announces the Use of All of its Capabilities for the 8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%
Relief of Internally Displaced Persons of Mosul,”] Hashed, March 13, D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC-
2017, http://al-hashed.net/2017/03/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84% %D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%
D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-26-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86- D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B6%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-
%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1- %D8%B9%D8%B4/ ; “The War Media Team,” Facebook Post, April 11, 2017,
%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D9- https://www.facebook.com/teammediawar/videos/1177061092406336/ ; [“In
%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A Photos: Liwa al-Tufuf Provided More than 1200 Food Baskets for Displaced
A%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%BA%D8%A7/. Mosulites,”] WR News, March 25, 2017, http://wr-news.net/arabic/local/3989.
DECEMBER 2017
377. Contact ISW for more information. 405. [“A Sadrist Leader Defects and Forms a Militia in Syria and Iraq,”] Bawaba,
378. [“850 Fighters Join al-Tuff After their Split from the Abbas Forces, the Latter June 17, 2016, https://www.albawaba.com/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%
Describes Some Leaders of the PMF as ‘Gangs’,”] Al-Mada Press, August 27, 2016, A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-
http://www.almadapress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=75657. %D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1-
%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B4%
D9%83%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-
380. Contact ISW for more information. %D8%A8%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%
381. Contact ISW for more information. D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-852982.
382. [“The Text of the Political Parties Law Which the Parliament Approved Today,”] 406. [“Will Iran Succeed in Dismantling the Sadrist Movement through al-Ma-
NRT, August 27. 2015, http://www.nrttv.com/ar/Detail.aspx?Jimare=922. liki?”] Illa al-Imam, June 16, 2016, http://www.ilalamam.com/Detail.aspx-
383. [“Get to Know the Law of the Popular Mobilization Commission,”] Al-Jazeera, ?id=12017&LinkID=8#.WcATpq1pxOS.
November 27, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2016 407. [“The Television of Iraq / The General Establishment for Radio and Television,”]
/11/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- Facebook Post, June 19, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/1.PAGE.IRAQ.TV/
%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A%D posts/1399175650109000.
8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF- 408. [“Jaish al-Mu’amil, a New Faction in the Sadrist Movemet,”]
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A. Al-Ghad Press, June 15, 2016, https://www.alghadpress.com/ar/
384. [“Al-Khazali Renews Calls to Achieve a Political Victory Parallel to the news/57704/%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%
Military Victory and Preserve the Unity of Iraq,”] Sumaria, July 1, 2017, http:// D8%A4%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%A
www.alsumaria.tv/news/208451/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B2 7%D9%82-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8-
%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF- %A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%
%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%AA%D B5%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A ; [“Who are the ‘Freedom of Sadr’ that Declared
8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8% Dissent from the Sadrist Movement?”] Maaloumah, November 6, 2016, http://
B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A- www.almaalomah.com/2016/06/11/57235/.
%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3% 409. [“Deputy for the Reform Front: Meeting of the Leaders of the Popular
D9%83%D8%B1/ar. Mobilization Forces with Muqtada al-Sadr and the United Shia Front,”] Alebaa TV,
385. Contact ISW for more information. October 19, 2016, https://www.alebaatv.com/archives/53225.
386. [“The Procession of the Third Company of the Fourth Regiment of the Second 410. Contact ISW for more information.
Brigade of the First Division of the Peace Brigades,”] Youtube Video, posted by 411. Contact ISW for more information.
“The Broadcaster Abu Hashem,” June 5, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/
412. [“Popular Mobilization Units Brigade: Diplomatic and Military Conditions
watch?v=uo9nb6tFvkw.
Necessary to Expel Turkish Troops,”] Hashed, October 6, 2016, http://al-hashed.
387. [“The Demonstration of the Fourth Regiment of the Second Brigade of the Peace net/2016/10/06/%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%81%D9%8A-
Brigade,”] Youtube Video, posted by Emad al-Tarfi, May 4, 2015, https://www.you- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8
tube.com/watch?v=KAri4nktaqA. %B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%A8-%D8%A-
388. [“Sadr: The Trend is Undergoing Financial Difficulties and We Decided to A%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D8%B1
Lower Salaries by Half,”] Rudaw, April 17, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/ %D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A7/.
middleeast/iraq/170420177. 413. [“Harakat al-Shahid al-Shuhada,”] Al-Rashead Encyclopedia, March 12, 2007, http://
389. “Iraqi Shia Cleric Sadr Calls on Government to Disband Iran-backed Militia,” www.alrashead.net/index.php?partd=18&derid=641.
Middle East Eye, August 4, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraqi-shia- 414. [“Hakim’s Trend Loses One of its Armed Groups,”] Hayat, September 27,
cleric-sadr-calls-government-disband-iran-backed-militia-849365799 ; “Sadr 2017, http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/24294599/%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8
Becomes First Iraqi Shi’ite Leader to Urge Assad to Step Down,” Reuters, April %A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85-
9, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-syria-sadr/ %D9%8A%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-
sadr-becomes-first-iraqi-Shi’a-leader-to-urge-assad-to-step-down-idUSKB- %D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%
N17B070. D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9.
390. Contact ISW for more information. 415. [“Saraya Ashura Mourns the Leader of the Engineering Effort,”] Hashed,
391. [“The Men of Salam in Balad,”] Saraya al-Salam, July 2016, http://www.sarayasa- May 7, 2017, http://al-hashed.net/2017/05/07/%D8%B3%D8%B1%
lam.net/2016/07/blog-post_79.html. D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%88%
392. [“Samarra Operations Commander Recieves Second Division Commander and D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%89-
Accompanies Him on a Field Tour,”] Saraya al-Salam, January 2017, http://www. %D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%AF
sarayasalam.net/2017/01/blog-post_64.html. %D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B3/.
393. [“Commander of the Third Division of Saraya al-Salam Inspects the Holy Wall 416. [“Kadhim al-Jabiri,”] Al-Ahed News, March 9, 2017, https://www.alahednews.com.
of Karbala,”] Saraya al-Salam, March 2017, http://www.sarayasalam.net/2017/03/ lb/uploaded1/images/2017/03/19/jabiri-1.png.
blog-post_42.html. 417. [“Saraya Ashura Gives its Fighters the Choice Between Joining al-Hikma or
394. [“Commander of the Third Division: Saraya al-Salam is the Striking Hand and Staying in the Supreme Council,”] Aletejah, July 31, 2017, http://aletejahtv.org/
the Fortified Fortress of the Hawza,”] Saraya al-Salam, June 2016, http://www. permalink/174847.html.
sarayasalam.net/2016/06/blog-post_84.html. 418. [“PMF Downs ISIS Plane West of Mosul,”] All Iraq News, January 17, 2017,
395. [“The Commander of the 4th Division Inspects Peace Brigades Stationed in Holy http://www.alliraqnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=56760.
Samarra,”] Saraya al-Salam, August 2016, http://www.sarayasalam.net/2016/08/ 419. [“Saraya al-Jihad Welcomes the Adoption of the Popular Mobilization Units
blog-post_1.html. Law,”] Hashed, November 26, 2016, http://al-hashed.net/2016/11/26/%D8%
396. [“Commander of the 5th Division of Saraya al-Salam Receives the Chairman of B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D
the Security and Defense Committee of Parliament,”] Saraya al-Salam, November 9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-
2015, http://www.sarayasalam.net/2015/11/blog-post_83.html. %D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-
397. [“6th Division of Saraya al-Salam Urges Mujahideen to Contribute to the %D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-
Campaign ‘Wa Yu’Athiroun’ to Help the Displaced,”] Saraya al-Salam, April 2017, %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7/.
http://www.sarayasalam.net/2017/04/blog-post_95.html. 420. [“Hakim’s Trend Loses One of its Armed Groups,”] Hayat, September 27,
398. [“Commander of the 6th Brigade Inspects the Military Units of the Peace 2017, http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/24294599/%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8
Brigades in Ishaqi,”] Saraya al-Salam, June 2016, http://www.sarayasalam. %A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85-
net/2016/06/blog-post_48.html. %D9%8A%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-
%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%
399. Contact ISW for more information. D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9.
400. Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq Report 12: The Fragmentation of the Sadrist 421. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “The U.S.-Iranian Confrontation on the
Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009, http://www.understanding- Syria-Iraq Borders: Interview with an Iraqi Militia Official,” Aymenn Jawad
war.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Report%2012%20Sadrist%20Movement%20 al-Tamimi Blog, June 10, 2017, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2017/06/
Fragmentation.pdf. the-us-iranian-confrontation-on-the-syria-iraq.
401. Contact ISW for more information. 422. [“The War Media Team Added 5 New Photos,”] Facebook Post, March 13, 2016,
402. “The Supporting Team of War Media,” Facebook Post, January 24, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/teammediawar/posts/838658699579912?match=2K-
https://www.facebook.com/yqeenq/photos/a.657101201121845.1073741828. fZhti12KfYsSDYp9mE2YTZhyDYp9mE2KfZiNmB2YrYp9ih.
657083437790288/710365122462119/?type=3&theater. 423. [“Fighting the Islamic State with Iraq’s Golden Division: The Road to Fallujah”],
403. Contact ISW for more information. Youtube Video, posted by “Vice News,” June 7, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/
404. Contact ISW for more information. watch?v=R6axTxU30yo.
424. [“Maysan, Formation of Ansar Allah al-Awfiya to Support 446. [“General Ahmad Salim Assumed Command of the 6th Division, Succeeding its
Security Services Against Terrorist Organizations,”] Mirbad, Martyred Commander,”] Al-Ghad Press, July 14, 2014, https://www.alghadpress.
August 12, 2014, http://www.almirbad.com/news/view. com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%
aspx?cdate=12082014&id=ba57b9d2-907f-4221-a0c7-e1b42c294747. 84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/16668/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%8
425. Contact ISW for more information. 4%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%-
A7%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-
426. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, [“The U.S.-Iranian Confrontation…,”] Aymenn Jawad
%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%
al-Tamimi Blog, June 10, 2017.
D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF%D
427. “War Media Team,” Facebook Post, April 10, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/ 8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%82.
teammediawar/videos/1176008849178227/.
447. [“General Norman al-Zubaie Receives His Duties as Commander
428. [“The Media for Representative Adnan al-Shahmani,”] Facebook Post, September 3, of the 7th Division in Anbar,”] Sumaria, April 14, 2015, http://
2014, https://www.facebook.com/alshahmanyadnan/photos/a.1502723816 www.alsumaria.tv/news/130905/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D
625172.1073741827.1502723486625205/1543457309218489/? 9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%86-
type=1&theater ; “Kata’ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali,” Sumarian Priest Blog, September 14, %D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A
2014, http://sumerianpriest.blogspot.ae/2014/09/blog-post_14.html. 7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%-
429. [“Al-Amiri and al-Khafali Lunch at al-Sadr House in Najaf,”] Hashed, October 8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%85%D
18, 2016, http://al-hashed.net/2016/10/18/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85% 9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7/ar.
D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B 448. [“Appointment of Brigadier General Qassem Mohammad Talib as
9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 Commander of the 7th Division, Succeeding Karawi,”] Sumaria, December
%AE%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A- 22, 2013, http://www.alsumaria.tv/mobile/news/88827/%D8%AA%D8
%D9%85%D8%A3%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%BA/. %B9%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%
430. Contact ISW for more information. 85%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%86-
431. Contact ISW for more information. %D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-
432. [“The Supporters of Quwat Waad Allah in Basra province, the sons of %D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF
Sheikh al-Yaqoubi,”] Facebook post, July 15, 2017, https://www.facebook. %D8%A7.
com/1534713520146225/photos/a.1635062613444648.10737418 449. [“Abadi Carries Out Major Changes in Leadership of Army and
29.1534713520146225/1956861324598107/?type=3&theater. Police,”] Kitabat, April 8, 2015, https://kitabat.com/news/%D8
433. [“The Fadhila Party / al-Rumaitha Office,”] Facebook Post, January %A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-
29, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/1646850618889971/pho- %D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8
tos/a.1646861305555569.1073741828.1646850618889971/186006946 A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A-
4234751/?type=3&theater. 9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8
%AA-%D8%A7/.
434. [“‘Waad Allah’ Forces Respond to ISIS Attack in Karmah,”] Sumaria, September
25, 2015, http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/147202/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7% 450. [“Prime Minister Orders the Appointment of Brigadier General Mahmoud
D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87- al-Falahi as Commander of the 10th Division,”] Sumaria, August 29, 2015, http://
%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7- www.alsumaria.tv/news/144742/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A
%D9%84%D9%80%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A- 7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A9/ar. http:// A3%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%8
www.alsumaria.tv/news/147202/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%
%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87- A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85/ar.
%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7- 451. [“Appointment of General… Retirement,”] Buratha, November 12, 2014.
%D9%84%D9%80%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8 452. [“Abadi Orders Transfer and Replacement of 12 Military and Security
1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A9/ar Commanders,”] Mawazin, April 8, 2015, http://www.mawazin.net/%
435. Contact ISW for more information. D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-
436. Contact ISW for more information. %D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7-
%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D
437. Contact ISW for more information. 8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A
438. Contact ISW for more information. 7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84-12-
439. [“The 25th Brigade Greatly Frustrates ISIS in Makhoul,”] Hashed, May 20, 2017, %D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%
http://al-hashed.net/2017/05/20/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84 D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D
%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8025-%D9%8A% 8%A7/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9.
D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7- 453. Ali Muhasan Radi, [“General Ali al-Hashimi Receives his Duties as Commander
%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%AF% of the 14th Infantry Division in Basra,”] Buratha, May 7, 2014, http://burathan-
D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%B9%D9%84/. ews.com/arabic/news/236058.
440. [“The 25th Brigade Greatly…,”] Hashed, May 20, 2017. 454. [“New Military Commander Leads the Army North of Mosul,”] NRT, February
441. Contact ISW for more information. 2017, http://www.nrttv.com/ar/Detail.aspx?Jimare=40165.
442. Contact ISW for more information. 455. [“New Military Commander…,”] NRT, February 2017.
443. [“The Jund al-Imam Brigade,”] Twitter, May 31, 2017, https://twitter. 456. [“Our Media Correspondent Kajal Conducted an Extensive Interview with
com/J_Alimam/status/869825208663846912. the Commander of the 17th Infantry Division Brigadier General Ali al-Ma-
444. Teresa Duhl, “Leaders Denounce Islamic State, Push for Peace During jidi,”] Youtube Video, posted by “Al-Mahmoudiyah News Channel,” June 30, 2017,
Conference,” Press and Guide, June 8, 2015, http://www.pressandguide.com/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlyqtTjj7yQ.
news/leaders-denounce-islamic-state-push-for-peace-during-conference/arti-
cle_67e260b5-ec07-5ae0-be24-96f451ffa317.html.
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First Division in the Army,”] Sumaria, April 28, 2015, http://www.alsumaria.tv/
news/132461/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9
%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D
8%B3%D9%89-%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B9-%D9%83%D
8%A7%D8%B8%D9%85-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF%D8%A7/ar.
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DECEMBER 2017

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND

JESSA ROSE DURY-AGRI, OMER KASSIM, AND PATRICK MARTIN,

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

Praescient Analytics is a Veteran Owned Small Business based in Alexandria,

Neo4j is a highly scalable native graph database that helps organizations

Ntrepid enables organizations to safely conduct their online activities.

Linkurious’ graph visualization software helps organizations detect and

8 Introduction 28 POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES

Introduction Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have filled crit-

The CTS is not a perfect force. Former Prime

to current President Fuad Masoum.18 Previously, 61st Brigade:

Regional Operations Commanders

Anbar Operations Maj. Gen. Mahmoud al-Felahi Ismail al-Mahalawi

Baghdad Operations Jalil Jubbar al-Rubaie Abdul-Amir al-Sham-

Basra Operations Jamil al-Shammari Samir Abdul-Karim

Dijla Operations Mazhar al-Azzawi Abd al-Amir al-Zaydi

Jazeera and Badia Maj. Gen. Ibrahim

Ninewa Operations Maj. Gen. Najim Abdullah Lt. Gen.Mahdi

Salah al-Din 2014, after

anti-ISIS coalition.54 The 6th IA Division is one • Kadhimiyah, northwest of Baghdad

• Al-Abbadi and al-Kabishat, east of Fallujah,

• Mansour, central Baghdad

• Al-Qinatir crossing, north of Garma, Anbar

64th Brigade: security arrangements between the central Iraqi

• Fallujah, Anbar Province

• Al-Saidat, near Qara Tapa, Diyala Province

29th Brigade: 8th Brigade:

• Fallujah, Anbar Province

71st Brigade: Unattributed:

• West of Makhmour, southwest of Arbil

• Muthanna Facility, west of Samarra, Salah Unattributed:

Unattributed: of temporary operations commands began with

• Sayyid Muhammad Shrine, Balad district, 13th Brigade:

5th Federal Police Division (Imad Ali al-Lami) 20th Brigade:

17th Brigade: 6th Federal Police Division – Abu Dargham

• 70 Kilo, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province

• Jazeera, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din

6th Brigade: Facilities Protection Service (FPS)

• Fallujah, Anbar Province

• Tel Afar, Ninewa Province

• “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad

• Um al-Rahil, Abu Khachba, Barakt al-Miyah,

Lesser Proxies Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSAS) – 14th PMF

Harakat al-Abdal – No PMF number – Abu Akram

• “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad • South of al-Tanaf, Iraq-Syria border

• Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province

• Al-Hadar District, southwest of Qayyarah,

• Tel Kayef, East of Mosul, Ninewa Province

Hawza Militias • Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk

Brigade355 – Maitham al-Zaidi.356 • Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah

• West of Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa

• Qayrawan, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province

• Bashir, south of Kirkuk

move to weaken FAQ. Funeral marches for Liwa Sadrist Trend

• Balad, Salah al-Din Province

Co-opted Sadrist Militias

Appendix A: Acronyms and Abbreviations