CHRISTOPHER A .

BARTLETT

Unilever's Lifebuoy in India:

Sustainability Plan
In early 2013, Samir Singh faced a challenge- in fact, a i·~.ouble cqallenge. When he was named
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Global Brand VP for Lifebuoy soap in early 2010, this iconic ljfM.!,ff'-~P,'brand was suffering. I~ glo~al
market share had fallen from -11.2% in 2005 to 9.7% in~2009. In Iiiclia, its largest market, the situation
was even worse: its 2009 share had dropped to 15.5%~~ qm 18.4% four years earlier. But just as Singh
and his team managed to reverse the decline, his bqss c~\Jenged them to double sales in five years.
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As large as this task was, it was made ev~1 tm~w?fr~ti¥~~~ing by another commitment Singh had
made- to improve the health and hygiene gf{~billioqi)?eopl~ ~y 2015. This ambitious goal was part of
the Unilever Sustainable Living Program '(W.~!,P), a~ !initia(fve introduced by the company's newly
appointed CEO, Paul Polman. Aiming _t9 _q.e~?·upJ~iU nilever's growth from its impact on earth, USLP
challenged the company to halve th~~:envfron,menta}~footprint of its products, to source 100% of its
agricultural raw materials sustainably, and to;:;: help improve the health and well-being of a billion
people worldwide. Singh' s <;haH~nge *1l:~l?dP~ke Lifebuoy the standard-bearer of this last goal while
simultaneously doubling ~:~Ies and m~f tmg ·ambitious profit objectives. It would be quite a test.
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Unilever' s History, L'if~fbA, g ffts Heritage
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Despite an uneve~ performance in recent decades, by 2012 Unilever had reemerged as a very
effective global competltor challenging companies like Procter & Gamble and Nestle for a share of the
fast-moving co~r~!? go~l (F~CG) industry. (F?r financial results, Exhibit 1.) But its business
and managemep,t phdo~ophies still had deep roots m the company's ongms.
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Lifebuoy,:~J?,ri~i1,~:J,j·<frn of a Company with a Conscience

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B,or.!1;,i,_D.,~9?~tJJ~JJh of England in 1851 at the height of the Industrial Revolution William Hesketh
Lever._,grew"ui:?'i:ft an era when Britain's squalid urban environments were a br~eding ground for
typ~oid, ~~ol~ra, anfi smallpox. In his early 20s, he left a thriving family grocery store to start his own
bu smess ma'l<mg soap, a product he felt could help ameliorate the wretched conditions.

In l888, Lever built Port Sunlight as a model village for employees working at his nearby Sunlight
so apb. factory. By today's values, Port Sunlight would be viewed as paternalistic but at the time it was
ce1e rated as a benevolent offerin g of a generous emp1oyer. Lever expressed' strong ideals 'for his
914-417 Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustaina'6ilify Plan
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fledgling Lever Brothers Ltd.: "I believe that nothing can be greater than a business, h<;>weve:r' ~ma1,1Tit
may be, that is governed by conscience," he said. And that nothing can be mewer~r\ mofe;petty
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than a business, however large, governed without honesty and without brot~~:hoo~F' ·: j
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The philosophy gave rise to Lever's conviction that business succJ~~V- wel'}~?hand:-gt~_Hand with
ethical practices and a sense of social responsibility. He believed that if~l!e toc;,1$J1c:are of his workers,
they would be more productive, and if he sold innovative products tnat~p:ertefited the public, the
business would prosper. It was a philosophy he described as "doing well by doiJ::1~. good."
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These values were evident at the birth of the company's iconic tjfebuoy soap in 1894. Lever held
that Joseph Lister's discovery of antiseptic properties in carbolic afl~.qffered a solution to the disease
rampant in Britain's grimy urban centers. At a time when s9,._aI? wcis1'. ~\ill regarded as a luxury, he
introduced Lifebuoy at a price the working class could affor'ci~With,i,n J ,year, he was exporting his
"soap that could save lives" to the United States and much ofthe Brit.ish Empire.

Managing Global Expansion: New Strategic and Organizational Challenges

In 1930, seeking sourcing economies for their com~ on raw material of palm oil, Lever Brothers
and Dutch margarine producer Margarine Unie me)::g~q. ~q create a new company called Unilever. As
the company expanded abroad, it manageqAJS/:p,ffsh.ore''.J >perations through a classic geographic
organization in which strong, independent,;Jiatioif~Jtp peratt:tig companies (referred to internally as ·
Opcos) held prime responsibility. Opco co~htry ,, I'!'~ .
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issues, while business and product group~:,

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~upport and advisory roles.
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But as competitive forces demanded new technologies, distribution systems, and marketing skills,
the need for more cross-market, product-based coordination became clear. Over the following four
decades, Unilever struggled · to retain. the Gpcos' historic local responsiveness while also capturing
these regional- and global-scale effici~~cies. In the process, it developed a complex multilayered
organization structure that made flex\13le decision-making difficult. By the end of the 20th century,
the company had come to be,i ~9;~J3fJf'as a formidable but slow-moving giant in the FMCG industry.
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100-Year-Old Lif~buoy Enters 21st-Century India
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In 1995, as Lifebuoy celebrated its l00th-year anniversary on the Indian market, the familiar red,
carbolic soap brkk was·t~e country's leading health soap. But its age was beginning to show.

Marketplhc~-llpneav~ls:
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Threat or Opportunity?
-Iii zo'0d~l~ftei l~aecade of rapid growth, the Indian economy stalled and its FMCG market ground
to a nijt1, .In 2001, total demand in the personal soap market declined 9.3%. 1 Aggressive new local
c~mpetifoft?}~egan offering attractive beauty soaps, particularly in the lower-priced segment where
Lifebuoy had long been dominant. The result was that Lifebuoy became seen as a cheap old-
fa~~oned ~oap, and its market s~are fell from 15.4% in 1997 to 12.1 % in 2001. 2 Alarmingly, its sales
value declmed by more than 20% ma single year between 2000 and 2001. 3

Since mos~ of this d_ecline occurred in rural areas- markets accounting for nearly 70% of Lifebuoy
sa1es-executives at Hmdustan Unile (HUL) d 'd d f
50% of India' 8 0
these P
.
pul_a~ion that lived m its 635,000eci
. ~e: e to ocus rebuilding efforts on the more than
villages. It was a bold move since the residents of
rura1 communities with an 1 .
they had limited ' h average popu ation of 1,000, were largely illiterate. Furthermore,
access to sc ools, telephones, electricity, or media.
I
Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan

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. d 1t· ma d e 1·1tt1e sense to try boosting share in locations where HUL SOc!P~ ora
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s (~J:ix,
Dove, etc.) already had a market share of almost 60% . But the Lifebuoy team had_.ia'ta~sll0,r~1that
soap was used on only 20% of rural bathing occasions.4 Also, current distrib1:c1tiorr ,r eached only 46%
of rural residents. 5 Far from being saturated, they believed the growth pot~~'tf~l?;~ is;q'l;;!ge.
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O~e _innovative respons~ was to recruit women as local distributors{~ e~rJtemote commu~i~es,
appomtmg them as Shaktz Ammas ("strength mothers"). The compan i ~ ?fered them trammg,
microcredit, and products in small pack sizes affordable to people on lo~V~~)..comes. These Shakti
~k"' o usehold income.
women entrepreneurs could earn Rs. 1,000 a month or more, often dg1;1bling the1i."t-i:
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But better distribution could not solve Lifebuoy's core problen~:'f~ 9 in 2001 management decided
to relaunch the 107-year-old brand. In a break from tradition, t~·W,wep!'~ ~-d the chunky carbolic brick
soap with a shaped, milled toilet bar that promised a "cont(A{pdr~ ht?£1th fragrance" and "better
germ protection." (See Exhibit 2.) Supported by extensive}~~verti~~g, L~f~buoy was rep~sitioned
from a male-oriented personal hygiene bar to a family healtRisp.a.p,;,k dvertismg and promotion were
aimed at women, and the new package featured a fa.rwly on the\~fapper. But price remained largely
unchanged at an economical nine Indian rupees (Rs. 9)P:., about $0.18-for a 125-gram bar.6
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Rural Outreach through Swasthya Chetna ••., ·x;•t\} .; •..,~:
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The company also launched a rural ouq~f~ch pf5gram c~lled Swasthya Chetna (SC) that translated
as "Health Awakening." In addition to re.ii~fitrg ne' } mail<ets, SC aimed to reduce a major public
health problem. According to the Worl<;l"'t1i tth;11©1ganization (WHO), diarrhea killed 2.2 million
people every year. In India, it took tJ:i4?ffJ-~ ;tqf 6o~r~,(10 children under age five annually. Yet WHO
claimed that by washing hand~ prop~f}Y, halfJ,~f the'l i:eaths could be avoided, making handwashing
the single most cost-effectiv~~fiealth inte~~~~j9n available to developing countries.
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Launched in May 2002;,'. SC' s objectiy~ was to contact remote, media-inaccessible communities, and
grow Lifebuoy' s sales thro.u&h educa~H:m. With a primary target of schoolchildren, teams of trained
"health development facilitat9r~~;.,,:.e9..f;l1' visited 72 villages quarterly, delivering their scripted health
and hygiene mess~ges through a: Jfriety of illustrated stories, visual aids, and quizzes with prizes.
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Their most po;~f~,.J pol was the "Glo-Germ" demonstration in which children rubbed w~te UV
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powder on their, _~<Y;s!s 'Bet9;{~~be~ng told to wash them clean wi_th only water. Whe~ they then held
their hands under an··ulµ-av1olet light, the powder glowed, showmg how germs remained even when
hands looked clean. A :follow-up Glo-Germ inspection of hands washed with soap verified that all
dirt and germs ·wen~ !emoved, illustrating the central message that "visibly clean is not really clean."

The Turrzar;ol{pd,: Some Wins, Some Worries

The:ir1,pact of these initiatives was mixed. On the sales front, Lifebuoy's revenues grew by 20% in
2003-20d4, ,}rnd the following year, by an additional 10%.7 By 2005, the brand had an 18.4% share in
the $880 miilion Indian personal soap market, and was again the brand leader. However, because no
price increase accompanied its i:elaunch, profit margins continued to decline.

. The social impact of the SC rural outreach program was also initially impressive. By mid-decade,
it had reached more than 120 million people in 50,600 villages. Immediate post-visit awareness of
germs grew ~y 30%, and short-term soap use increased among 79% of parents and 93% of children.8
~ut no sustamed change in handwashing habits was found, and while Lifebuoy's brand recognition
increased, sales rose only modestly. As a result, the program's cost significantly exceeded its returns.
 914-417
Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sust , bil'
ama 1ty Plan
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Late-Decade Reversals: New Market Challenges
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Any glimmer of a turnaround was extinguished when a combination of strate gic miscal culations 1

and market forces resulted in Lifebuoy's renewed decline in the second ha~dfWe. d~oade.
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Serial Missteps: Repositioning and Relaunch Failures ~·;. •"?
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Buoyed by the sales boost following the 2002 relaunch, management d~ i'fl~d to reposition the
brand again in 2005. A "Life without Fear" campaign was built aro~ d the the~e' that mothers need
not worry about sending their children outside to get dirty. But wl\fle the TV ads were emotionally
engaging, they failed to communicate product advantages or to '4iatjvate consumers to buy. From
2005 to 2007, Lifebuoy' s germ-protection attribute scores dro~p.;;~-~ ,~ ~5.~/'5 to 50.5, and market share
declined from 18.4% to 17.6%. 9 Meanwhile, the category was~Hssaulte_d bf mounting competition and
steep cost increases, particularly a 50% rise in vegetable oil prices.

The crisis led to yet another relaunch, this time based on ~,tf,fifK~r than emotions. In 2007, HUL
sponsored a clinical trial that collected evidence of thi }~ffect of handwashing on disease. A scientific
study involving 2,000 Mumbai families showed)~;t_dfiJgren who practiced handwashing ha_d 26%
~ewer_ days of school absenc_e, du_e to 25% fewer~1.d~~,f,~~:~,, events, 15% fewer cases of respiratory
infection, and 46% fewer eye mfechons. 10 .t..><'1:.&"{i.~li';,.,,
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Excited by these findings, the HUL tea ~ ed thl to stipport a product relaunch. But it proved
difficult to communicate research resulJ~,&f. : t soap usage to school attendance. It was simply
too big a conceptual leap for people !ffi'o<'lW
' \)t u ,;~~re of the basic concept of germs, let alone the
link between germs and disease. So I/ ebuoy' s@narkJ~share kept falling- to 15.5 % by 2009.
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Rejuvenating Lifebuoy if,,tquid -,\. · · ~:~v

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At about this time, a w'~~Wwide sw,~ e flu pandemic broke out, ultimately resulting in the death of
more than 18,000 people iri~SQ~t A,,r?/,I and Africa. When public health officials began stressing the
importance of handwashing, H"'l tjgered a widespread switch from beauty bars to health soaps.
Moreover, the Lifehuqy
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team discovered that when consumers were assured of germ protection, they
became price insensHiv ~i,It was an important insight that the team planned to exploit.
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SerendipitoMsly, ".:fV~is fiine, the Indian-based R&D team responsible for Lifebuoy was working
on a new liqufli soap fof~mulation. (In Unilever' s network of R&D centers, the Bangalore center had
global ;e:; .g °'nsi5.,Uig<f'~~.,fi51- Lifebuoy.) As a late entrant to the fast-growing liquid handwash segment,
Lifebuoy Liquid Handwash had met with only moderate success. Responding to research showing
thaJ the, a¾er.ag~•~me spent washing hands was far less than the recommended 20 to 30 seconds, the
R&E> team deveidped a new formulation able to get hands germ free in 10 seconds.

The .innovation instantly caught the attention of Lifebuoy's marketing team, and in 2010, Lifebuoy
Liquid Handwash was relaunched with a campaign highlighting its germ-killing capability. The
pt oduct was an immediate success, not only for its formulation but also its futuristic package that
becaqte a symbol identifying homes in which it was displayed as "modern households." However,
management knew that overtaking liquid hand wash pioneer Dettol would be quite a challenge.

An Emerging Competitor: Dettol's Challenge

Launched in India in 1933 as an antiseptic liquid Dettol had remained focused on its first-aid
segment for half a century. But as growth stalled in th~ early 1980s, management extended the brand
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 914-417
Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustain;~i'li~; Pl
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Redefining the Strategy: Committing to Sustainability \\.'i; J
In keeping with these beliefs, the new CEO announced an ambitious goal of ,rQ<t)
'lever's
sal~s ~olum~. But he ~lso acknowledged that "growth at any cost is no~-'$ Ia:f~t~~ d co~ tted to
ach1evmg this goal while decoupling growth from the company's environmental.'impact:;;IFo translate
his bold vision into specific objectives, in October 2010 the company ciiveiled
1
the Unilever
Sustainable Living Plan (USLP). .. t

USLP had three goals: to halve the environmental footprint of making an~ ing its products, to
source 100% of its agricultural raw materials sustainably, and to hefp a billion people improve their
health and well-being. Polman emphasized that USLP was no n\~~~ orporate social responsibility
program, but was totally aligned with its commercial interests;~.t.~.Th~~~lever's core strategy built
on its long-held mission to "do well by doing good."
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As the broad goals were broken into 50 measurable objecti\'.es, management found that Unilever's
own operations accounted for only 6%-7% of its environmental fo6tprint. So the company committed
to taking responsibility for its entire value chain, and~ ver the full product life cycle. For example, it
began working with tea and palm oil suppliers (respo~ ~ble for a quarter of Unilever's footprint) to
help them meet USLP's 100% sustainable sourcingtf 0IDI}ljtment. Meanwhile, on the consumption
end, product development and marketing pr<;>graw,s,..beglh\i orking to reduce the two-thirds of their
footprint generated by consumers' use of,. 'Q'nilevl f:produ~~ s, and to increase their positive social
7
impact. (See Exhibit 3.) ,

Reshaping the Organization: New Roles, New Pl.ayers

In parallel, Polman continued to implement "One Unilever," an in-process program aimed at
streamlining its complex, multilevel matrix' by assigning responsibility to three regional heads and
three global category presidents. Thist reorganization had already shifted the power balance from
country-based Opco chaiitji~n (who rf ported to the regional heads) to global brand leaders (who
reported to the category presi~.~nts)/ 0pcos were still accountable for the profitability of their local
operations, but we~e now responsible for implementing strategies developed by global brand teams.

Building on "One,Unilever," Polman made the regional head for Asia his Chief Operating Officer
(COO), giving him responsibility for all regions. Simultaneously, the new CEO expa,n ded the three
category divisions to four-personal care, home care, food, and refreshment-and, in a signal that
reinforced the earlier power shift, had all of them report directly to himself. (See Exhibit 4.)

With strategy•,;~ 'tlie ·hands of global brand leaders, Polman wanted to ensure that Unilever was
still resporsiv,ef ,tg,Jocal consumer needs, particularly in emerging markets that now accounted for
half the compan:fs turnover. As a result, global brand management resources and responsibilities
were no,w distributed worldwide, including in the developing world. For example, Lifebuoy's Global
Brand Vice Rresident was located in Singapore, and his global brand teams responsible for bar soaps,
liquids, and social mission were based in Mumbai, Singapore, and Nairobi, respectively.

Through all this, Polman insisted that USLP targets be embedded in all key business decisions.
"This is at the core of our business strategy," he said. "It's not a separate CSR agenda. We believe that
responsible companies that make contributions to society a central part of their business model will
be successful." So while most managers' incentive compensation was still tied primarily to financial
objectives, USLP targets were monitored and independently audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) and were reported in detail through the company's management reporting system.

6
I Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan

Lifebuoy Rebooted: New Players, New Priorities ~-' ·

1)- ', ·.._,;;:
&,
''h)#i'4-417
~,.,·;;~
·':i)·

..
--~

As part of the restructuring, Samir Singh was appointed as Lifebuoy' s Globar(\Brand v,p with a
mandate to revitalize this iconic brand that had now retreated to a few deteldp~g':~ountriei -iand was
struggling in several of them, including India. Singh, a 12-year corl}&lfi.Y v(~ra~ :~~ Hi/''extensive
brand management experience, soon built a team and defined a strategy:f.o~~~f,&Lifebuoy's renewal.
'

Defining a Global Strategy: Reclaiming the Heritage '4;flr

"'1ir
The new global team's first priority was to complete what Singh.,.~ lled "an archaeological review"
of Lifebuoy's past successes and P.roblems. Concluding that the co~ ~ j the problems lay in Lifebuoy's
history of continual reinvention, repositioning, and relaunch,,,,S#J~def itfjd to return the brand to its
roots- offering protection from diseases spread by germs. ~ e ffisti~ lement of the strategy was to
educate consumers on the consequences of germs by assuring_moth$i:s that Lifebuoy provided their
families superior protection from 10 infections from flu to diar'i:h~'l~(~ e Exhibit 5.)

Next, marketing efforts focused on "hot spots" - titi\,es of the year such as monsoon season, school
re-entry, or crowded religious festivals when infectiort~r4sk was high. Tailored messages reassured
mothers that Lifebuoy could help protect their fiffiil~~~t~~ ~se times of high anxiety. The advertising
and promotional activities were customized Jf ea~J_\lfouri~~ specific calendar of hot-spot events as
well as its competitive situation and stage qf,'qygiene~,evel(!,gilnent.
-} , J.'Jr
Finally, these activities were suppoi;ted by'.-) , , P,.tcfgram of product development that resulted in
innovations such as Clinicare 10, a pte~Iu:m iproa ~gt,~laiming germ protection 10 times better than
any other soap, and Lifebuoy Color,_ Changing Hari8wash aimed at encouraging children to wash
their hands for a full 10 seconds, at whic~.tim~;the soap changed color.
! ~!'-.~·i:f"

The approach proved sticcessful, an,9 from 2009 to 2012, Lifebuoy's global sales increased by 17%
per annum (p.a.), and gros~;profit by i-%
p.a. Indeed, Singh's boss became so confident that his five-
year plan forecast that Lifebil:Q~~'~&b~~fi sales would surge from €408 million in 2010 to become a €1
billion brand by 2015. But Polm,ih1s rollout of USLP presented an even more difficult goal. With all
Unilever brands expected to contribute to the USLP objectives, Singh volunteered Lifebuoy to assume
the main role in fulfilling the global health and hygiene target. And because India was Lifebuoy' s
largest market, the ln9ian team would need to make a significant contribution.

Integrat,ing the, SociaWlyl.ission: Beyond Pilots to Performance

'·"'"~ :- ,- . ,.._}fi
When Singh. w'a~ f ppointed Lifebuoy' s Global Brand VP, Dr. Myriam Sidibe joined his team as
1

Global.);3r~.ttd·rRl ; ~tor, Social Mission. A world expert on the public health impact of handwashing,
Sidibe,had been'. recruited to the corporate office in 2006 as Lifebuoy' s Global Partnership Manager. In
that role, she had become the champion of handwash behavior-change programs, initiating
numerous activities, including the Mumbai clinical trial that led to India's 2008 product relaunch.

In their discussions, Singh suggested that while Sidibe's campaigning had inspired many new
initiatives, the high cost of her "pristine" forms of handwash programs had slowed implementation
and limited transferability. Stressing his belief that Lifebuoy's social mission must be fully aligned
with its commercial interests, he challenged her to take her behavior-change initiatives beyond
clinical studies, conferences, and pilots and focus on leveraging her exciting research results into
commercially viable programs that would open up new market segments for the brand.

7
This document Is auth ,
onzed for educator rAviAw 1,c,~ ..... ...... a-.. .. Al"""'- " ""' ... -·-. -
914-417
Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing th s • .,. "'r-.;-
e ustainaoilify, Plan
q,•·
f).

.eP'
On her part, Sidibe urged Singh to make the goal of reaching a billion people with h~rr£ . ~
programs a strategic priority. She explained that when she was in her corporate par,trie?s6:ip rbi~;~h~
had publicly committed Lifebuoy to this target in support of the Unit~d Na}ions Nfillennium
Development Goals, aligning her pledge with the UN goals' 2015 target daJef : · , '.:,/JJ.,,·:. .

Others were concerned, however. They told Singh that the 1 billid~ 1JSL~ goal had been set for
#1.,y tJ ·-~~-~ '
Unilever's entire product line, not just Lifebuoy. And they pointed out tlf(~T:f!SLP targets had a 2020
time horizon, not a 2015 target. But Singh decided to embrace Sidibe's co~ ~ ~nt: "I'd rather set a
goal of a billion for 2015 and 'fail' by only reaching 650 million thaq4 ake on a sl fe 100 million target
for 2020 and over-deliver with 200 million," he said. "Only bold str~Jching goals generate passion."
;;-.,
,r. l
.;v"~i-
It was a brave decision. Singh knew that USLP targets w~r~ cJoi el}{;;IJlonitored by PwC, and that
results were not only tracked by top management but wei:e alsH'h_ighlighted in Unilever's annual
report as well as in its widely circulated annual USLP report,._ Both do_c uments provided information
and presented data that was explicit and detailed-celebrat'iitg~achifvements, identifying shortfalls,
and outlining proposed adjustments and corrective a~:~on. "".-,J~:;;

Selling the Strategy: Engaging Operating Com,pariies

'
~- •, ,._
• I _Q~" '$\· • 1

In late 2010, Singh convened a workshop in j akarta-to:~which he invited brand directors from all
tit~"' , ./~~~·,. ~\\ I
Opcos with large Lifebuoy sales to identify, \!.)e mostf$ffecti~~ ways to meet the brand s USLP target.
In open sessions, they shared models, c6ippared ¢_gsts, quantified benefits, and identified what
lo:: .,; .;-:

worked. In the end, two programs atg;~,_~t~d tn~.p:nclst interest: an Indonesian partnership program
built on "training the trainer," and ~ti''lndi~ ,m:t'iltiRrand rural outreach initiative. With credibility
that he had built through the sales
-. .-; ,
profie .1""rumarc:iund, Singh was now ready to ask the Opcos to
invest in these projects. . ' · -' r+n,, ,.,1;:~,
1
~:~· r ~ , ''~tf}l;?;71vJ"

In early 2011, with the{J_n dorsemeii'.!tPf the Cleansing Category SVP (Singh's boss) and Unilever's
Chief Operating Officer (th,~,ppco cha,i:km en's boss), Singh took his USLP business case to a meeting
of Opco chairmen. Concedifig_:.,tlJ:~tP.~'¢~ious handwashing behavior-change programs had struggled,
he assured them that these twd',);m odels were worth investing in. Without disrupting existing
programs, he suggested that they take them on as pilots, funding them by reinvesting some of the
enhanced profits geh~t a;,~ed by the brand's recent turnaround.
-.:.· ,·
i . •~,r'l,!~"
Because Indi.i:l accounted•for almost half of Lifebuoy' s global sales, Singh was gratified that HUL' s
chairm.µ1 bec~me a str~ng supporter of his proposal. Although subsequent discussions within the
Indian Opco rev~aled j;,bckets of skepticism and even some resistance, he was confident that the
support ofUhil_evei s top man in the country would allow his global brand team to implement their
ag~nda.)h}:l~ ~1i'.s local Lifebuoy team would need that help: they had been allocated 450 million of
the 1 billion USt P behavior-change target. .

Implemehtation in India: Reviewing the Options

When Singh offered to help the Indian team implement the two Jakarta models, Sudir Sitapati,
HUL's Category Manager for Lifebuoy in India, told him he had a third model to consider.

The First Option: The KKD Rural Outreach Initiative

One of the models endorsed in Jakarta was based on a rural program first launched in India in
2010
• It emerged as a replacement for the SC "Health Awakening" program that had petered out due

8
I Unilmts Lifebuoy in lndi" Implementing th, Su,t,inabllity Pfan

:'"I, _,

to its unaccept~ble payback of ah~ost 10 ~ears com?ared _to th~ Unilever norm of one t~ t~ ee' yeat~~\0
1
recoup marketing expenses. The innovative Khushzyon Ki Dolz (KKD)-or "Caravapiof 'Fiapplliess" _
was a collaborative, multibrand, rural outreach effort in which brand man~&~rs }?r Surf detergent,
Close Up toothpaste, Sunsilk shampoo, Vim dishwashing liquid, and Lifeb,i,loy:s~apft?.p_oled resources
to create a direct contact program to reach remote rural villages with all ~eir prdcluct~ ~ ··,
,I;· "'. ./':j'
f ,..,
KKD involved teams visiting villages and hosting meetings at which all14:,;(0nsoring products were
presented. Lifebuoy's KKD compone~t was a scale~-back version of ~ts s'@i:,; ~~ tine, reta~g the
"Glo-Germ" demonstration but focusing on housewives rather thaR,, children. Supported by videos,
games, and prizes, the presentations were received enthusiasticall_y)9y residents of these media-dark
villages. Later, promoters went door-to-door with coupons and offer~, while other team members
ensured prominent product placement at village shops. ·

The Second Option: The MP Partnership Initiative

The second program endorsed in Jakarta was th~, Indone~\an'Ji artnership program, a clinically
proven 21-day intervention built on the Unilever H~1ndwashing Program that Sidibe and her co-
developers had published as "Five Levers for ~hange;" (See Exhibit 6.) Lifebuoy Indonesia had
integrated this scientifically based behavior modeL4lt~ a·'.national schools program in partnership
with the Indonesian government and some N90s. TI:ie ·program trained teachers and provided them
with tools to deliver the behavior change in their schools. It then leveraged that impact by requiripg
each teacher to cascade the program to three otl~er sc~~ols.

With the endorsement of HUL's c.hairiri~n,, Sing,h., had convinced Sitapati to sign an agreement
with UNICEF to bring a similar han4\w ashingip,rogrf in to Madhya Pradesh (MP), an extremely poor
Indian state with a literacy_,{ ate -of 80%l t~~.J?},c!l'es and 60% for females. 15 Under the agreement, HlJL
would create the materi~Js, deliver ~tl,le' training, provide the soap, and manage the evaluation
process; the MP gover111I1~nt would pi;pvide school access and support; and UNICEF would print
activity kits and link the mirtners. As· a condition of its support, however, the MP government
insisted that the training and mat~rials.'could not be branded with Lifebuoy's name.

This pilot program would adapt Indonesia's proven "School of Five" materials for the 900,000
children initially target~d in 5,700 government schools. Implementation would conform with the
"five non-negotiable( oLrS,idibe's change program: the four key phases of behavior change-
awareness, commitmeii..,.,.,.1t1 reinforcement, and reward-all applied over a 21-day program, the fifth
key element.
,--, : '. ':/''
The Third Option.: 'The Urban Schools Liquids Initiative
While Sitapati ·was ready to consider expanding these two programs in 2013, he also wanted to
offer a third option. He felt that Lifebuoy Liquid Handwash had the potential to change behavior
while also boosting revenue and profits. Arguing that liquid soap had a higher usage rate, and
potentially a much higher margin, in 2011 he had launched a new urban schools liquids initiative.

Like KKD, this program was designed primarily as a marketing initiative, but differed from KKD
on several dimensions: it was focused solely on Lifebuoy, not on multiple products; it was aimed at
ur~an.markets r~ther than rural locations; it targeted children not housewives; and most critically, its
obiective was to mcrease the use of Lifebuoy Liquid Hand wash rather than Lifebuoy soap bars.
To implement the program, Indonesia's "School of Five" educational program was adapted for
ur ban schools by emplo · · teractive
• games, songs, dances, and the classic Gia-Germ demon-
ymg m

9
 914-417
I
Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustain~ (ih, Pl
(1- "''• an
, -
'
m

'
stration. Because children fo~nd the use of a pump more fun, they washed their., nfs' IJl!l-e
frequently. And as School of Five research had shown, they took the lessons home aifc¥itffluef'cfcf'th
hand washing behavior of the whole household. {K ·; e
1_ -1
The Decision: Singh' s Balancing Act ·r ~r~.,:
,~.., '
1

In early 2013, Singh was pleased that Lifebuoy' s three-year 17% aver~geliinnual growth rate not
only made it Unilever's fastest-growing brand, but also outpaced Dettol's i/o~t
for the first time.
But he worried that its handwash program had only reached 119 mi!J,ion people' globally. If Lifebuoy
was to achieve its 1 billion USLP target, India would have to step upfio the challenge.
~:....~
""'iir-4
Lifebuoy India's Achievements - and Shortfalls ., ·,1t:, ·, '

Ufebuoy's excellent global performance had been greatly;.,pelped ,;by strong growth in India, its
largest market. (See Exhibit 7.) But despite strong recovery fuc;~~l¢s1 and profitability, handwashing
behavior-change programs in India had reached justir.17 million people in 2012, taking its total to 47
million since 2010. While impressive, the performant t1}Vas well below the trajectory necessary to
achieve the country's allocated behavior-change t~:e~\ of\:1~0 million by 2015.
~~t· -~~·~Ji!
·«~.
Singh knew that Sitapati also had to mee~ftu 'C ~ ancialte>,bjectives, and accepted that most of his
advertising and promotion (A&P) budget wO:uld be ~llocatecf" to media expenditure, typically with a
payback of one to three years. Nonetheless, sine~ 20J0 Sitapati had boosted the share of A&P budget
that he allotted to behavior-change p~~grams·f!_o m ~trp to 5%. Singh felt that such programs offered a
great opportunity to reach the 40o/( of the\{~opul~fion in media-dark locations unreachable by
traditional broadcast or prin_t media. For-J,hi~ re'ason, he hoped that Sitapati would at least double the
ue~ause the paybac k on th es~ ~rograms was thr ee or f our
BW,,-,fg,,=;J"
1 ' .,
behavior-change A&P pej ~e'nt~ge.
times that of traditional marketing outl~ys, 1t was a tough sell. (See Exhibit 8.)
,1. ,. Iii
Evaluating Progress, FocusJn,g Irrgfltments:
As the team disCU$Sed the three behavior-change options, different perspectives emerged:

In its first two years; "'I5IS:D had reached 25 million people in 70,000 villages, with research
showing that soap co'ns,umption increased by 8% following a KKD visit. In rural Utter Pradesh, after
two yea;-s of ~ D visitj 1Lifebuoy's market share increased from 13.9% to 15.6%. While the cost per
contact ·:na,~,,fallen~tP ~ i 6 (about $0.10), Sitapati was concerned that as KKD moved to smaller, more
remote vill1g¢_~,3mdi. visits were now becoming decreasingly cost effective .
.,
Singh's global~tearn was more concerned that brief KKD Lifebuoy demonstrations to housewives
were no,t resulting in sustainable behavior change that would satisfy the PwC auditors. To ensure
that KKD estimates counted towards India's 450 million target, Sidibe's team was helping add a
school component to KKD visits and the "five non-negotiables" into its presentations. But as Sitapati
noted, such efforts further slowed KKD's delivery and increased its cost.

. I~ 2013, for Rs. ~4.5 million (about $780,000), KKD could bring its handwashing message to 8.5
million peo?le .. But it would take Lifebuoy India 8.6 years to break even on the investment. Sitapati
had marketing investments that would yield much higher returns much faster.

~ 1th0ugh Sitapati knew that the MP Partnership would be time consuming with a long payback
pen od h
' e was WI·wmg to consider it as a pilot. But he was troubled that it would
' reach only 900,000

10

This ClOcumrml la<> • ,,1-.. __ . • •

Unilever's Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
,~4:411
~·',',

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7
children. He also worried .about
11 relying on external funding, and was unhappy abou t d eij :~f!- .'~
l,~rveiing.i,~as
an unbran d e d program. Fma y, he felt that 13.5 years was just far too long a payba~~}~.

The global brand team was more excited. Because studies proved ~ ·. ~ ·. mal children
effective change agents who could influence family behavior, they est4rutl~d t · .9CiO~ ids could
change the behavio: of 4.5 ~llion people. M~re~ver, the team believ/if(~~ , ·· ccessful pilot could
lead to the program s adoption by all 47 MP districts, and eventually by oth'f! ian states. The huge
potential impact of rolling out this program across India had led Singh to ini egotiations with a
potential new funding partner that could significantly leverage this· . portant ini ative.

The Urban Schools Liquids program targeted 25 cities with ulation of 1 million or more
where liquid soap had achieved 7% to 10% penetration, an~ .,.;Pati hoped to build brand
preference for Lifebuoy. Although India's total liquid iffe,ndwa market was only about $65
:~,.,......
million-5% of the total personal soap market-it was growi'1g,at up}cl 40% annually.
-.""'..o!¢'.-V'
While Singh accepted that education was also va1uable to urban populations, he was concerned
that liquids were too expensive for the poor rural If(~ ss market that was the target of behavior
change, and worried that the initiative would d' organization's attention. But knowing that
the brand had to be profitable in order to supg: . :ous handwash programs, he had agreed
to support the urban schools initiative if illlf Yfm~ id, an <,his team had offered to help integrate
"the five non-negotiables" into the design. · ,~
~r-
Although the program was expecte\iYQf ~a , rn1~\ .s million people, Sitapati believed the higher
margins of liquid handwash wouldf, fansla:t\ii n~~payback period of 3.5 years-not as good as
alternative marketing investments,
~- m)i
bubthe
1.:,pj,-~"".\..
mol,,,\ if.:tattractive of the behavior-change
.
options.
( . •. ..,~.~ r,tl!~'i'
~-·"' "'~***
{;/ ~,t.,
I,
It was a complex decisf~p with im~lJtant implications both locally and globally. In India, Sitapati
would have to ~eci~e whicff. ~ rl{>' ¢.rthese t~ee behavior-c~ange pro~ects he s~o~ld inclu_de in his
Indian budget; m Singapore, Singn"fiad to decide whether to intervene m the dec1s10n, and if so, how;
and in London, Pdh:nan would be considering whether this tension reflected the shift in strateoic
vl\:, (:)'"'

process he had envis'ioh~d when he introduced his USLP goals.

11
 - ~

914-417 -12-

Exhibit 1 Unilever Financial Perfor~ance, 1990-2012 ($ millions)

2012 2011 · 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990

Unilever ....,,....
Revenues 67,669.6 60,366.4 59,352.3 45,488.0 44,694:7 45,651.4 39,620.0
----:+
Europe ...-,-:-
18,299.2
,.. 17,529.1 17,753.9 17,697.2 17,816.1 24,169.0
Americas . .'· •.22,530.2 19,812.9 19,526.7 15,611.2 27,790.8 8,247.0
'-t. -~;"7' . -~ - -·
Deyelopin~ Coun_tries "· ? 26;1340.3 23,024.4 22,071.7 12,179.6 16,640.6 7,204.0
~-~--..., fy
Earnings fro_m co_ntj r_:i_ui_ng operati~ns
Loss frC?_m disco~ti~L!_ed operations -.
- - - r _, ~
·· 1 6,376.2
- :1
..·. .
5,834.4
,, ..
-.
,;..__•
6,165.6 3,950.5
{7?8.1)
1,239.9 2,066.3
(361.4)
3,650: 0

Net E_:arn!ngs -,.... . 5,:7-_5.fT ·5,35~ 4 5,690.9 4,461.0 1,037.9 2,325.4 2,081.:0
- - declared
Dividends __ (3,5~ ~6) (3,228:'3) (3,115_.0) (2,136.9) (1,320.7) (970.7) (3,172.0)
5,1sil!:1-
,

_Earned_on aye_rage shareholde(s equity 5,519._7 , 5,693.5 3,884.3 996.2 2,2n.1 2,138.4
Per share: (US$) _ _ - '"'*"f. :ii~ _Ji_f:--r-1,·; ~ -
Net e_a_r::nin_~ _ _ -,-
$2.04 {($1.9
·-.fi;
}:,, $2.02
,&- -.-':fd.·
-. -·-
$1.53 $0.34 $0.n
Net e~r_:iings-~i!_ut~d $1.98 ~$}-.?4 <'~if _a1~96] ,, $~.48 $0.33 1 $0.75
Dividends declared $}-_. 25 $1:2'! t ~~"$1.111.;', .,_, $0.78 $0.43 $0.28
- ·---- -- .t.fJ"' ,-!'"i'";.,
Stoc~pric~_~nge (US_~)
$34.32{J;:'
• i f.~l-·$32.~h9 / &?IA.~$23.58- - $19.02 ·
_H_!.g !:!_ $39.45 _____ -- .,. --~•.,··· -~ f;jj - ;~ ... $11.47 $7.43
- ·--·- -· - . 1

$30.87 $28.79 $25.75 i~';, ,$20.23 $11.86' $9.91 $5.55

Low
- - -·· - - -
Total assets_of continuing operations (Current assets) • 16,44~ .o 18!886. 7_• ~7,23t~$ :;: ~~!508.2 I t!.~Jl-i 15,807.0 13,~¥ ----~
9,990.3 3,394.9
Long-:_t ~ l'l:!-~orr.9_win__~~- __ _ _ '- 9,T?,_7.7 - t - -9,479.0
-- 7,648.7 t,:l.2,273z-2
- i}!!l- - - ~
3,406.4
2,~9_!.8 2,966.1 2,879.4 2,791.7 ~J 2,820.~; _ 2,831.8
Sha ~e~ ou! st~n~!_n~-ay~ rage_( ~r_:i_ th~usands) -- -, -· p
Employees at ye~ r-en_d : (in thou_sa_nds) . ~ - ~--=,;:;· -~ ~--=-
; ·, ...
35 29 41 ·--,~'~-- 80~ 101 114
Europ e 35 -- - - ~ .-
Americas 43 42'.J.' 40 47 ___ 29 J'f~~35'
w·
94 92 96 118 176
1_7.~f~~
1
_
Developing Countries
.-'-. ci""~
, 172 169 I 165 206 1 295 '.;,308, . 3.Q.4.t ":½,
=-~
!
Total em_e_loyees I -,

-
~<:>_l:lr~~: _C apital IQ, Th~ms-onOne J.~c~es~ed 4[ 29/14) and ~ mpany financial stater;ents.ff
v ~ ' !~
Researcher: E. Mccaffrey, Baker Research .
Services -.· ii. ~-
1_
.

\;':,_
).;.•l",1
··'
·- 41:;
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 914-417 -13-

Exhibit 2 Lifebuoy's Indian Relaunch, February 2002

LIFEBUOY' S 2002 TRANSFORMATION:

FROM A CARBOLIC SOAP TO A MILLED SOAP

;,. _t;_-.,,.~~
!,~'·" -:..
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~ - --• ff"r"P -·;,,:-

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l'~ !J°ift~n 1D M i l ~ i

Red, Chunky, & Powerful

Lifebuoys Iconic Gemtic:idal Carbolic: Soap

I-----"-
""~
Source: ~;f
Unilever internal company document. .. . . .......
~:..,-,. ·;}_#f+'
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914-417 Unilever's Lifebuoy in I d' .
n ia. Implement' h
ing t e Sustainability Plan

Exhibit 3 Unilever Sustainable Living Program (USLP): Original Targets 2010

Press Release: ft' l ,.,

' .,,. )ii

Unilever announces plans to decouple future growth from environmental lhlpac+.t2r:
/I "'" •
Global firm announces plans to: ·
• halve the environmental footprint of its products

•
help 1 billion people improve their health and wellbeing
source 100% of its agricultural raw materials sustainably <!,
At the launch of Unilever's Sustainable Living Plan, announced sim~lf~ eously in London, Rotterdam,
New Delhi and New :or_k, CEO _Paul Polman explained: "We:hfl~e•i~
E _po~s,1pla~ to gro~ the ~ompany.
But growth at any pnce 1s not viable. We have to develop new, ays of\domg busmess which will ensure
that our growth does not come at the expense of the world's d' _'' _: hing,ffli tural resources."
He also announced plans to help over 1 billion people t~ ~n to improve their health and
wellbeing, mostly in developing countries, over the next~ , ears.
The Sustainable Living Plan sets out over 50 s0€~~•.,.~c0b.omic and environmental targets. It will see
Unilever, whose global brands include Dove, 0 91~d.<~orl 'aR-4}Lipton, halve the greenhouse gas emissions,
water and waste used not just by the compcWY fu~ l~, direcf(eperations, but also by its suppliers and
• i\; f
consumers. ¾; 'is 1¥.~ ~:>
Over two-thirds of greenhouse gas J}P!~§10

.,
)~~ ;1,falf the water used in Unilever products' lifecycle
"''
come from consumer use, so this is a m~or coi'ii~ itmel{~n an unprecedented scale ...
;,,.

Other key goals Unilever pJ~]to acl i:!;v.~ by/cir before 2020 include:
l.i" \"IJ~,
• sourcing 100% of its' agricultur.t\ raw materials sustainably including, by 2015, 100% sustainable
Palm oil·I ,, ·•.~
t-\f
~:f
!<'
• changing the hygien~-•~abits i.i billion people in Asia, Africa and Latin America so that they
wash their hands with ·1'if~btioy soap at key times during the day-helping to reduce diarrhoeal
disease, the~~ <?rld's second biggest cause of infant mortality;
• making safe~~ iaj<ing water available to half a billion people by extending sales of low-cost in-
home water p~lf~~f ureit, from India to other countries;
• improying li~i'U;tood; in developing countries by working with Oxfam, Rainforest Alliance and
fs
~thers 1 link o1f 500,000 smallholder farmers and small-scale distributors into its supply chain.
Commen.~ g fhat~pl'nilever wants to be sustainable 'in every sense of the word', Polman said: "There
ar_e billions or<..·p~ople who want the improvements to their health and wellbeing and who want to live
~ustainably. durn\m is to help people in developing countries improve their quality of life without a big
mc~e~se in their environmental impacts, and to help those in developed markets maintain a good standard
of hvmg while reducing theirs."
:au! ~?Iman sees no conflict between Unilever achieving its sustainability goals and growing its
bu&in:ess. We are already finding that tackling sustainability challenges provides new opportunities for
su5t~mable ~owth: it creates preference for our brands, builds business with our retail customers, drives
our mnovahon' grows our markets and, m . many cases, generates cost savmgs.
. "
Polman
. emphasised tha t Um·1ever did. not have all the answers and that the company would need to
W or k m partnershiP wi·th customers, suppliers, governments and NGOs if it was to achieve its goals.
Source: Uru·1ever press release, November 15, 2010.

14
 91A-41.7 -1.5--

Exhibit4 Unilever Corporate Organization Structure

CEO,Uollw~1

,., /·' . I
I I •~ - "."I::l:! 1 1
.c- . -~ - ':"" ". ,.-,~,,.l ,,---~·
1
CFO f · COO, Ui:tllever f . \ _';~~-~~- - . HPresldenf; , ·\ '
ome Ca.!'e . ,
Presl~ ... _ -.,
Pers '• - •
] ~..; _ .... ~ . ! lll- X5,,,.,,.., ,. ,,, - . • ;'.'
{
EVPsif, ~ l --~
Regitirial,
~- ~ 7.;·
·- _
- .... ~P-Sldr{~
t . . ·: '

l.·~"'#~~_
=~--c=~,:_'
', ,..

....... :,-.....:i,...

~:,_R
~~ ~~~
1iit.:~~
~ it-
' ' ·-·
P_-
•~': SEAA .. ·
__.........,._~~. ~-:..·>,::_ ' ;;
'.f,GM
·-Cl
1
• ~1,1d1

L =:~\
Source: Casewriter's construction from company documents. '~o
fl
ii
.

-\ !:_~
_:
""'er -

I
 91.4-41.7 -1.6-

Lifebuoy Core Claim: Protection against Germs

Exhibit5

LIFEBUOY~S CORE CLAIM:

CATEGORY DEFINING , SUPERIOR, ANO CON SI STENT

PROTEctlON f'ROM 19 l~fECTION CAUSING GERMS

,_ .._;.

. ·,t; :;,,.,~
-
.;;,'i ~· 1,,. ll t tJ{;•
- A,!0ft)f;1~
-Flu
!:iORE
'A'Jin~ :J:-
- ~litHQEA
iHROJ'.-\1 Btir;y
~ , = ,_ me er .....~I,?
\
EA't ~"'\\,
·:..rt"'•'~. ~!J,:;ft':ff''
[·f':;:~,

10 Infections, '

---
1 Solution
J ::.;~;~

,~
w.rj
~;:,-,.,Jc·~)
~P-"
Source: ~-
Unilever internal company document. ,-;.
- y"'
,
~I
,i
,,
I.Yi:'
,.fi,~~',;,/.:tv
I unilcvcr's Lifebuoy in Ind' .
ia. Irnplernentin
g the Sustainability Plan
914417

Exhibit 6
Unilever Behavior-Ch
ange Model

FIVE LEVERS FOR CHANGE '. " ' ~ . l'.V

V

Lifebuoy has used U ·1 , . .. , ~--

interventions to ensur th m ever s Five Levers for Chan e meth 0 I
sets out five • . e at people understand wh h g .
.
.d~lgy t~Jl~ e
' f.
a series of
lasting imp ~nnc1ples, which, if applied to behavi~ut~wash_mg w1tn ~0~~,ii:important. The model
ac . ange interventions/ ~\Qhave a positive and
.,,
LEVER 1: MAKE IT UNDERSTOOD
. Visibly Clean Not Necessarily Clean· One ke .
is the , glo-germ' demonstration Thi . y element of ~f;>ehaviour change approach
'h . . · s counters the comm nu· V.ti. th , • 'bl
ygiemcally clean'. When held un . . , , ep on at VISi y clean' is
behind on hands washed onl ·tier ultra;:let hght,. glo~ttrm p"'~ der illuminates the germs left
soap provides great t w1 :water. s makes it clear.l~~\MW!lerstood that handwashing with
er pro ection agamst germs than ~,gtshing with water alone.
"-!;1.
'~'-
LEVER 2: MAKE IT EASY .If.••
'%I~,:
. Mother and ~hild Interact~on: As part o.if,9.,~ • ' i es we encourage interaction between
children and their mothers. This helps to _e~ j fe ~h :' hi :s start and stick. For example with our
sc~ool prograrru:n~s, _mothers p~ay a r~le mftJ~~ g ,,. ., rr cHiltl s handwashing compliance via a daily
sticker chart. This 1s important m helpm ,C\!Ji'he behaviour in the home environment as well
as at school.

LEVER 3: MAKE IT DE~·i R~ BLE t.t:·-. ,t.fl

,; •Jf.~ftff/t'
Pledging: Studies show.f that peop1~ who commit to a future action in public are more likely to
deliver on this com_mitmeiii: _Our sc~o9,ijpro~amme uses the Classroom S?ap Pledge, where children
pledge to wash their hands"l~.~-t !;;,;~ ccas1ons that matter, for the duratio~ of the pro?1'amme. This
is done in class so that peer pressmeJand teacher approval makes the behaviour more hkely. The use
of aspirational c@~i.<;;;>book characters in our schools programmes and local celebrities in our
campaigns is also k~y~ en well-known celebrities emp~asise the iI~portance of handwashi1:g with
soap for a healt[!Y, ,natioii~~~!!],ple are encouraged to practise the habit and emulate the behaviour of
.i.·l•t ' ' ' ~
people they a d mire: ·~:'.
1i••~;,

.,,·
LEVER 4: MAKE rriREWARD ING
J .1,;_

Positive Reinforcement: Lifebuoy understands the power of the positive influences to motivate
social changer ,l?,Q'~;itive reinforcement runs throughout the school programme-a strong rewards
systein~ ~kes mothers and children feel good for taking positive steps in changing their habits .
.... /J•

LEVEii1'sYMAKE IT A HABIT
21 Days Practice: Habits build up over time through repetitive behaviour. This is why practising
handwashing with soap for a minimum of 21 days is a critical element in our programmes. Our
classroom materials - comic books, posters, quizzes and songs- all work over 21 days to remind
students about the message of handwashing at key occasions. A 21-day compliance diary is also used
to record hand washing behaviour over the course of the intervention.

Source: Company document, "Unilever's Five Levers for Change."

17
 914-417

Unilever's Lif
ebuoy in India: lmpleme
nHng the SustainablJi~,
, ~;, Pl an
Exhibit 7
Lifebuoy India P&L· 2006
. to 2012 (€ thousands)

2006 2007
Turnover ' 2008 2009
Growth% 125,191 136,658 012
166,424 162,266
Su I Chain Costs 9.2% ) 8,629
88,271 21.8% -2.5%
97,879 123,062 1.8% 25.7%
Gross Mar in 127,638 1 ,149 188,832
36,920 38,779
Gross Ma in% 43,363
29.5% 49,798
28.4% 26.1%
Advertisin and Promotion 20.9%
8,693 8,438 9,698 13,536
Profit Before Overheads 17,199
28,227 30,341 ' 33,664
PBO% 18,169 32,598
22.5% 22.2% ,20.2% 9.6% 13.7%

Source: Unilever internal company documents (all data disguisedJ!i

_,~:r,\,_
v~
Exhibit 8 Lifebuoy Behavior-Change Progr~JllJ )_
~ tiJ~s:::l2Q\3 Projected Costing (values in Rs.)
,:1 ~ ~l;i""'· ~:._;,

-~':11
I
,<l:?/
KKD Ni'I Urbaii
t--201_3_P_r_o....__gr,a_m_P_ar_a_m_e-'--'t-'-er-'s-+-..c:Oc.:u:.::tr:..:ec:cac=h=--l"'!"'~•f::.=~"";kn,~
Al'"' ;,;;"'~-~
tJ.;;, Liquids Assumotions/Comments
~ __;;:::.:.i.:=:::..._+:======:!!!::~-----1
. (All ';f ,ues in . ian R~ ees)

Estimated number of 1,500,000 KKD and MP usage impact assume that

contacts in 2013 they both influence family behavior,
iustifvina an X5 multiolier.
Total Program Cost for 35,000,000 Lifebuoy's Share of costs (KKD: 20%;
Lifebuoy (in Rs.) MP: 33%; Urban Liquid: 100%.)

Cost per Contact (in' ~§.)•' 6.4 6.2 23.3

Incremental Lifebuoy '·•' t~lt . 25,250,000 8,285,000 19,800,000 Post-program soap consumption
Revenue (in Rs.).,,,~1 ·,~, assumptions: Lifebuoy obtains 30% of
; ' ~:;,, forecast post-KKD increase; 20% of
post-MP's increase (due to unbranded
. '~
soap); Urban Liquids program converts
12% of households to Lifebuoy
Handwash averai:iina Rs. 110 use p.a.

Gross Margin (in Rs.) 6,312,500 2,071,250 9,900,000 25% for bar soap; 50% for liquid.

Investment Payback for 8.6 years 13.5 years 3.5 years

Lifebuoy
Investment Payback for 5.7 years 8.9 years 3.5 years Post-KKD and MP programs, Unilever
Unilever retains 45% rural market share for its
soao brands.

Source: Internal documents (all data disguised) .

Note: Exchange rate January 2013: 70 INR = €1.

18
 rJ/l ilever's Lifebuoy in India• J...
· ... p1ementt
ng the Sustainability Plan
...
914-417
En'dnotes

2
1 HUL, 2001 Annual Report, page XXI

"A Fresh Lease of Lifebuoy? ,, B . '

, usmess Standard, February 25 2002 ,l.'iJ,,
h.~)'1,''l.
_-,f.io~

3 "HLL Uses Health Card to Push L'f , ' j ~.•

1
4
ebuoy Sales in Rural Areas," Business Standard, October 25 002.
HUL, 2001 Annual Report, page XXI. '<t!:~
5
,1-
6
fl 2,
HUL, "Repositioning Strengthens Lifebuoy's 107-Year Heritage," press release 31

"HLL Relaunches Lifebuoy, Eyes Healthy Sales Nounbe"'," •••"'~ Sta,,.,d~J" ,il;200'·
7
"Lif b S th A '°' · 1 MKTG/147, 2006.
e uoy wa, ya Chetna, Uniieve,'s Social Mackeling Campaign," ICFM a,,, s"'
8
"Lifebuoy - Swasthya Chetna," posted by bsaikrishna on October 3, 2010, L ~alyzl
http://brandaiyzer,wordpress.com/2010/10/03/lifebuoy-swasthya-chetna/,"?€~sfd May 18, 2013 ..
9
Shailesh Oururani, "The Lifebuoy Story: Repositioning of a Brand~ ovember 3, 2012,
http://www.slideshare,net/ shaileshgururani/lifebuoy-15005646. .. '
IO "Sustainable Living· Hand washing Behavior Change" ht · · l· .uni.lever.com
t:~ / sus tama
· bl e-
,
living/healthandhygiene/handwashing/handwashingb ' ""-¼""~
geTf~ffx.aspx, accesse dJl132013
uY ' ·
11
"Sustainable Living: Handwashing Behavior Chang

12 Andrew Saunders, "The MT Interview: Paul P(l-

olF . nagement Today, March 1, 2011.
Ai
.,, ··
13 Andrew Saunders, "The MT Interview: Pau man i:l'

14
Stefan Stern, "O u ts1"d er m
, a hul .i/'•ti• tsl:iake u nilev .,t,Financia/ Times, April 4, 2010. ,,

15 U , d N tions Development /il,-. ogram, "Madhya

,,, Pradesh: Economic and Human
df Development Indicators,
http :/rute a
/www.undp.org / con ten,,.,,
t i iJ.am/india/ dol:s1/
:'.·,, madhyapradesh_factsheet.p .
• ,<

19