Developmental Psychology

developmental
PSYCHOLOGY
Editors: Jacki Watts, Kate Cockcroft and Norman Duncan
Developmental Psychology
First published 2002 by UCT Press, an imprint of Juta & Company Ltd
Reprinted January 2004
Reprinted January 2009
Second edition June 2009, ISBN 978-1-91989-515-4
Reprinted 2013 by Juta & Company Ltd
Reprinted 2015
Published by Juta & Company Ltd

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CONTENTS
Notes on contributors vi
Acknowledgements x
Introduction 1
Jacki Watts
1. Basic concepts and principles in developmental psychology 5

Derek Hook and Kate Cockcroft
SECTION ONE: Psychoanalytic approaches to

development and personality 21
2. A basic introduction to psychoanalytic thought 22

Jacki Watts
3. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of development and personality 37

Jacki Watts and Derek Hook
4. Klein’s object relations theory of development and personality 73

Jacki Watts
5. Fairbairn’s contributions to object relations theory 88

Cora Smith
6. Wilfred Bion: Thinking, feeling and the search for truth 112
Gavin Ivey
7. Donald Winnicott 138

Jacki Watts
8. Kernberg’s theory of normal and pathological development 153

Carol Long
9. Heinz Kohut: Self psychology 183

Sally Swartz
10. Attachment theory 215
Lee Senior
11. Jung’s analytic theory of the development of personality 234

Jacki Watts
12. Lacan’s mirror stage 261

Derek Hook
13. Erikson’s psychosocial stages of development 283

Derek Hook
SECTION TWO: Cognitive development 313

14. Introduction to cognitive development 314
Kate Cockcroft
15. Piaget’s constructivist theory of cognitive development 324

Kate Cockcroft
16. Intellectual development 344

Kate Cockcroft and Nicky Israel
17. Memory development 365

Kate Cockcroft
18. Language development 378

Kate Cockcroft
19. Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning 396

James Grant
20. Evolutionary psychology 417

Michael Greyling
21. Contributions of cognitive science approaches to cognitive

developmental psychology 436
Kevin G F Thomas, Susan Malcolm-Smith, Marianne Ball and Michelle Robberts
22. Vygotsky’s theory of the development of cultural tools 458

Gillian Mooney
SECTION THREE: Psychosocial and socio-political contexts

of development 493
23. Developmental psychology: Critiques and contextual considerations 494
Norman Duncan
24. Bronfenbrenner’s ecological theory of development 501

Derek Hook
25. Violent crime and human development in South Africa 514

Garth Stevens
26. The effects of trauma on child development: Children in South Africa 539
Patrick Connolly and Gillian Eagle
27. Critical issues in developmental psychology 563

Derek Hook and Norman Duncan
28. Race, culture and psychological theory 586

Mambwe Kasese-Hara
29. Gender identity: Contestations and questions 600

Gillian Mooney and Peace Kiguwa
30. Theory and South African developmental psychology

research and literature 619
Catriona Macleod
References 639
Index 678
vi Developmental Psychology
Notes on contributors
The editors
Dr Jacki Watts is a clinical psychologist in private practice in Johannesburg. She was a senior lecturer
in the psychology department at the University of the Witwatersrand where she ran the Clinical
Psychology Professional Training programme for six years. Her primary academic interests are within
the arena of psychopathology, relating to its development and to clinical intervention problems, areas
in which she has published. She is actively involved in the psychoanalytic community in Johannesburg.
She is a keen gardener, assisted by her cats and disadvantaged by her dogs. Unlike some of the
contributors she thought of running a marathon but sanity prevailed.
Associate Prof Kate Cockcroft is an associate professor at the University of the Witwatersrand where
she works as an academic/psychologist. She has published both nationally and internationally in the
field of cognitive psychology, especially language, intelligence and memory. Her original career goal
was to be a graphic designer but fate intervened and she has found her niche in academia. She has,
however, been going to art classes with two professional artists for more than 20 years and considers
herself ‘still an amateur artist’.
Prof Norman Duncan holds a professorship in psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand,
where he currently also serves as the Head of the School of Human and Community Development.
His research and publications are primarily in the fields of racism and community psychology. He has
co-edited a range of volumes, including ‘Race’, racism, knowledge production and psychology in South
Africa (Nova Science Publications, 2001).
All three editors are also contributors to this textbook.
The contributors
Dr Derek Hook is a lecturer in the Institute of Social Psychology at the London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science. He is also a research fellow in psychology at the University of the
Witwatersrand. The overarching focus of his research concerns the attempt to develop an ‘analytics
of power’ that is able to grapple with the unconscious and psychological dimensions of racism
and ideological subjectivity. He is the author of Foucault, Psychology & the Analytics of Power
(Palgrave, 2007), the editor of Critical Psychology (University of Cape Town Press, 2004) and the co-
ordinator of Psychoanalysis@LSE, a multi-disciplinary research group that aims to advance the use
of psychoanalysis as a distinctive means of sociological and political analysis. Dr Hook was the
recipient of an LSE teaching award in 2008, and is one of the founding editors of the Palgrave-
Macmillan journal Subjectivity. Aside from the distractions of academic life, Derek is a taster of
wines, shiraz, merlot and cabernet being his favourite cultivars and is a half-marathon runner.
Prof Cora Smith is a clinical psychologist and an adjunct professor in the Department of Neurosciences,
Division of Psychiatry at the University of the Witwatersrand. She coordinates the Wits Clinical
Internship Programme within the Faculty of Health Sciences. She obtained her PhD and MA (Clin.
Psych.) at the University of the Witwatersrand. Her interests lie in the development and treatment of
personality pathology while her passion lies in driving sexy sports cars.
Prof Gavin Ivey is an associate professor and coordinator of the PhD Programme at the University
of the Witwatersrand. He is the current editor of the journal Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in
Notes on contributors vii
South Africa. He is a member of the Institute for Psychodynamic Child Psychotherapy, where
he runs seminars on W R Bion’s contribution to psychoanalysis. He has published papers on
psychoanalytic theory and therapy in The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, British Journal of
Psychotherapy, British Journal of Medical Psychology, American Journal of Psychotherapy and Psycho-
therapy: Theory/Research/Practice/Training. He is a keen runner and yoga enthusiast but has yet to master
the headstand.
Dr Carol Long is a senior lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand where she co-ordinates the
Clinical Masters professional training programme. She is also a practising clinical psychologist. Her
recent publications include papers on psychoanalytic theory and practice, on HIV-positive motherhood
and on the relationships between gender and race. She is interested in studies of identities, particularly
marginalised identities, and in psychoanalytic theory and practice. She loves cooking and painting.
Her loved ones enjoy her cooking and tolerate her paintings on the walls.
Associate Prof Sally Swartz is an associate professor in the Psychology Department of the University
of Cape Town, where she is both an academic and a psychotherapist. Sally has published widely
in the areas of psychotherapy and the history of psychiatry in South Africa. She has particular
interest in the challenges of working as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist in South Africa, and her
work explores the effects of race, class and gender divides on experiences of trauma and healing. She
has been involved with clinical psychology training at the University of Cape Town for many years
and, more recently, has become involved with senior leadership in her university, first as Head of the
Department of Psychology, and more recently as Deputy Dean in the Faculty of Humanities. She is
managed at home by two demanding dogs that walk her regularly on the mountain. Free head-space
is used for writing poems.
Dr Lee Senior is a clinical psychologist who holds a PhD from the University of the Witwatersrand.
She has pursued her interest in children’s emotional, social and intellectual development through her
work in private practice and within a remedial school environment, and has lectured in the area of
personality development. Lee assists at ICAS as a researcher. She has a family and is a devoted mother
of beautiful children.
Nicky Israel is a senior tutor in the Department of Psychology at the University of the Wit-
watersrand. She has published locally with her special areas of interest being research design,
psychometrics and assessment, intelligence and cognition, teaching and learning, particularly
learning styles and strategies, motivation and performance and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Aside from her passion for academics she has seen Star Wars: Episode IV over 100 times, a feat not many
could match!
James Grant B Proc LLB, BA Hons (Psyc), PhD (Candidate), advocate of the High Court of South
Africa and senior lecturer in the School of Law at the University of the Witwatersrand. James lectures
and specialises in criminal law. He completed his psychology honours on the moral reasoning of Moses
Sithole, South Africa’s most notorious serial killer, and continues this research presently. His PhD is
entitled ‘The Responsible Mind in South African Criminal Law’ and concerns an investigation of the
foundation for the insanity plea and, more generally, conditions for criminal responsibility in criminal
law known as the requirement of voluntariness and criminal capacity. He has published in the areas
of psychological development, the law of delict and criminal law, and has addressed international con-
ferences on the compatibility of determinism, neuroscience and criminal responsibility, and the effect
of emotion on moral reasoning and criminal responsibility. He lives in the country with his wife, his
dogs, a pony and many chickens.
viii Developmental Psychology
Michael Greyling, MSc [Statistics], BSc Hons [Industrial Psychology] is a lecturer in the Department
of Psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand. He is a statistician seconded to the Psychology
Department to lecture on Statistics and Research. He has published widely on various research topics.
His primary academic interests are within the field of applied cognitive psychology and problems of
applied statistical analysis. He is currently doing a PhD that looks at a longitudinal analysis of person-
ality as it applies to trauma experiences. He acts as a consultant to businesses, using statistical tools to
understand various organisational problems. Mike trains dogs [and handlers] on the weekend and his
Boxer competes in working trials.
Dr Kevin Thomas is a senior lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the University of Cape
Town. He teaches neuropsychology to undergraduates, and research methods, neuropsychology and
cognitive-behavioural therapy to postgraduates. His primary academic interests and areas in which
he has published include the neuropsychology of spatial cognition and the effects of stress/trauma on
various aspects of memory. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the South African Neuro-
psychological Association. Outside of academia, he is a warden at one of UCT’s student residences,
and he works with his wife to maintain the delicate balance of power between Buddy, the prince of
Toy Poodles, and Suzi, the Maltese princess.
Susan Malcolm-Smith is a lecturer at the Department of Psychology at the University of Cape

Town where she teaches neuropsychology, cognitive neuroscience and quantitive research
methods. She has published in the areas of consciousness and cognition, on evolutionary theory of
dreaming and in the Handbook of Sleep Disorders Medicine, and co-written a chapter with Mark
Solms on dreaming in neurological disorders. Her research interests lie in investigating emotion
in the brain and its impact on cognition and social functioning, hence her interest in the Theory of
Mind. Susan is currently completing her PhD, which investigates the impact of right-hemisphere
damage on personality and adaptive social function. She is also working on two other projects, using
functional imaging to investigate emotional processing in the brain. She has worked with marine
mammals for 15 years and her previous job was a swim-programme with dolphins on an island
facility in the Bahamas. Remarkably, she gave it all up to come back to Cape Town and think about
the brain.
Marianne Ball is a postgraduate student in psychological research at the University of Cape Town. She
is presently studying neuropsychology and doing research in the field of forensic psychology, investi-
gating the experiences of child witnesses. She is very interested in developmental issues and has spent
time working with children with behaviour disorders in school environments. She is an avid traveller,
gardener and yoga enthusiast.
Michelle Robberts is a postgraduate student at the University of Cape Town. She completed her BSc
at Stellenbosch University. She currently studies research psychology and has a particular interest in
developmental neuropsychology and cognitive psychology. Her research focuses on the development
of theory of mind in children, particularly children with autism. She waits for the day that she can get
a genetically modified hypo-allergenic cat.
Dr Gillian (Gill) Mooney is a lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the University of the Wit-
watersrand. Gill teaches Human Development to undergraduate students. In terms of postgraduate
commitments, she teaches Gender to the MA Research students, Graduate Writing Skills to Honours
and Masters students and is involved in the bursar training programme, ie both tutoring and marking.
She has published in the areas of teaching and learning in higher education. In the department, Gill is
thought to have some idiosyncratic value because of her wicked wit.
Notes on contributors ix
Dr Garth Stevens is a clinical psychologist and senior lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand.
His research interests include violence and its prevention, as well as studies in social inequality and
difference in the context of racialised, gendered and classist social formations. He has published and
presented much of his research both nationally and internationally, and is a co-editor of the book,
A RACE against time: Psychology and challenges to deracialisation in South Africa (University of South
Africa Press, 2006). A Capetonian by birth, he now resides in Johannesburg with his partner and two
children. During his free time he actively fantasises about grand schemes that will one day allow them
all to spend long, lazy days on white, sandy beaches with crystal-clear, blue waters.
Patrick Connolly has taught psychology at university level since 2004 and currently holds a lectureship
at the University of the Witwatersrand. He has a Masters degree from Wits in community-counselling
psychology and is registered as a counselling psychologist. He trains on the Clinical Masters programme
at Wits, and supervises students’ work at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR),
which is a trauma clinic in Johannesburg. He also trains student counsellors on the Wits trauma model.
Since 2002 he has worked at Gateway House, a residential psychiatric commune, and continues to provide
psychotherapy and training services to the organisation. His fields of interest include trauma studies,
psychoanalytic studies and psychopathology, particularly schizophrenia and bipolar mood disorders. He
currently runs a part-time private practice. His hobbies include Kung-fu, Tai-chi, and he can also play a
fairly serious game of chess. He is currently unmarried and is unsure of how long this will last!
Gillian Eagle is a professor of psychology in the School of Human and Community Development at
the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. She is a qualified clinical psychologist and has been
involved in academia for over 20 years. She has a particular interest in traumatic stress and in gender
issues and has published a number of articles in these areas as well as co-edited a book with Derek Hook.
She runs a small private therapeutic practice and has done extensive work in the NGO sector, primarily
involving training, supervision and consulting in the traumatic stress field. Gill is a very accomplished
potter. She also loves to dance and given the right music can get a party mood going.
Dr Mambwe Kasese-Hara is a senior lecturer at the School of Human & Community Development,
at the University of the Witwatersrand. She holds a PhD from Manchester University. Her teaching
and research interests lie in the areas of developmental and health psychology, specifically maternal
and child psychology, race and cultural issues, and HIV/AIDS. Her interests in psychology are broad-
based and reflect a study and work background of over 15 years in South Africa, Zambia and the
United Kingdom. Apart from her academic interests she loves to tend to her garden, and loves a good
sitcom or stand-up comic as her philosophy is that a good laugh helps one to unwind.
Peace Kiguwa lectures in gender studies and critical social psychology in the School of Human and
Community Development at the University of the Witwatersrand. She is co-editor of Critical Psychology
and The Gender of Psychology (both pubished by UCT Press). Her research interests include critical
race theories, critical psychology, gender and teaching and learning. She is also an avid photographer
and is known to inundate friends and family with rather ‘interesting’ snapshots of life.
Prof Catriona Macleod is head of the Department of Psychology at Rhodes University. She has
published widely in national and international journals on teenage pregnancy, abortion and feminist
theory. She has two children and practises yoga when time allows.
Acknowledgements
Illustrations and Photographs:
Belinda Karpelowsky: pp 37, 73, 138, 215, 261, 283, 324, 346, 347, 354, 358, 379, 380, 396, 458, 501.
Andre Plant: pp 10, 57, 234, 237, 247, 330, 336.
We would like to thank the following photographers for allowing us to use their work:
Bridget Corke at Bridget Corke Photography
iAfrika
Cha Johnston
David Lurie from his title, Cape Town Fringe
MediaClub South Africa
Zoë Moosman
Guy Stubbs
Michele Vrdoljak
Text:
Pg 172: Borderline organisation in the nursery: Tinker Bell
HarperCollins Publisher Ltd © James, L (2007). Tigger on the couch: The neuroses, psychoses,
disorders and maladies of our favourite childhood characters.
Pg 218: Table 10.1

Bowlby J (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1): Attachment. London: Hogarth Press. Used by
permission of The Random House Group Ltd.
Bowlby J (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1): Attachment. London: Hogarth Press. Reprinted by
permission of BASIC BOOKS, a member of Perseus Books Group.
Pg 362: Figure 16.3

Lahey, B B (2001). Psychology: An introduction 6/e Boston: McGraw-Hill © 1998. Used by permission
of The McGrawHill Companies.
Pg 382: Figure 18.1

Cognitive Psychology: A student’s handbook by Michael W Eysenck & Mark T Keane, Lawrence
Earlbaum, 1990: 230. Used by permission of Taylor and Francis Books UK.
Pgs 404-405: Table 19.1

The six stages of moral judgement from Moral stages and moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental
Approach by L Kohlberg 1976, in T Lickona (Ed.) Moral Development and Behaviour: Theory, Research,
and Social Issues (p 34-35). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Used by permission of Dr T Lickona.
Pg 440: Figure 21.2

From Cognition: Exploring the science of the mind by Daniel Reisberg. Copyright © 1997 by W W
Norton & Company, Inc. Used by permission of W W Norton & Company, Inc.
Pgs 581-582:
This Be The Verse from Collected Poems by Phillip Larkin. Used by permission of Faber and Faber Ltd.
Excerpt from “This Be The Verse” from COLLECTED POEMS by Philip Larkin. Copyright ©
1988, 2003 by the Estate of Philip Larkin. Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, LLC.
Introduction
Jacki Watts
This second edition of Developmental Psychology draws together three perspectives

which are not usually placed together in a developmental text, namely psychoanalytic
theory, cognitive psychology and psychosocial, socio-political contexts. We have found in
lecturing students that psychoanalytic thinking and cognitive understandings offer deep
and relevant bridges to understanding the development of the human personality which
is essentially a product of the human mind. As a progression from this premise we move
into considering a broader range of questions about development, particularly within
the South African context. The focus on psychosocial and socio-political contexts brings
a lens to bear on the complex and sometimes troublesome aspects of human behaviour.
The authors offer ways of understanding how these behaviours may affect human
development and place their understandings within a South African context.
It might be helpful to describe the structure of the book. Within the three sections
the chapters are structured along similar lines. There is a short précis of what the chapter
covers, followed by the main body of theory and a number of thinking tasks that have
been set to assist you in focusing on some aspects of critique, application or expansion.
The Recommended Reading list is useful in that it gives short descriptions about why a
particular text may be interesting or useful to read. A few authors have given mind maps
of the theories to assist in retaining the essential concepts of the theory. Here and there
Interest Boxes have been added, as well as a few clinical vignettes, to bring the theory
more to life.
The Psychoanalytic Section looks at principal theorists who have laid the foundations
for psychoanalytic thought. It is important to remember that new and very exciting
theories are emanating from various corners of the globe and that in this book we look at
a relatively small number of significantly influential theorists from the United Kingdom,
the United States and one from France. However, psychoanalytic theorising continues
with vigour in a number of other countries, including Germany and South America. In
South Africa there is also a thriving community of theorists attempting to make their
contribution in the world arena.
Given that our easiest access to theory is through English-speaking countries, in South
Africa we are generally more familiar with theories emanating from United Kingdom,
the United States and translated French theorists. Thus in Section One we focus first
upon Sigmund Freud as the original foundational architect of the psychoanalytic edifice
who offers us Classical Psychoanalysis. We then turn to the radical additions, revisions
and reformulations offered by a number of theorists. The end result is that in some cases
it is hard to recognise that the edifice is still based upon the Freudian foundation. Yet if
2 Developmental Psychology
you think through the basic assumptions you will see that these assumptions still hold: the
foundation is firm but the style of the building has been revised and/or adapted to meet
ever-increasing knowledge and experience which affects how we see and understand the
human psyche. Nonetheless the role of the unconscious remains as the principle under-
pinning to human functioning. This section reflects on various ways of conceptualising
how the unconscious is lived, influenced and structured through development especially
during the formative years of childhood, and how the environment may assist or hamper
relatively optimum development.
We focus on Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion as the purists of object relations
thinking; on the work of Ronald Dodds Fairbairn who essentially worked alone and
yet effected a significant influence upon the development of psychoanalytic theory; on
Donald Winnicott, the charismatic paediatrician who changed forever the way
psychoanalysts think about mothers and babies. We then go to the United States and
consider two of the most influential American psychoanalysts, Otto Kernberg and Heinz
Kohut. We also look at Erik Erikson and his conceptualisation of development across
the life-span. We cross back to France and take a look at one aspect of Lacan’s theorising:
what he terms the ‘mirror phase’ of development. We also examine how psychoanalytic
theory has influenced thinking about the role of attachment and its importance in the
development of the personality.
As you go through the Section One it will be very evident how far psychoanalytic
theorising has moved from Classical Psychoanalysis. This divergence is not new to the
history of psychoanalysis. From its inception, despite Freud’s firm attempts to prevent
his disciples straying from the mainstream of his thought, there have been significant
breakaways. Take a look at the genealogy of psychoanalysis in Chapter 3 to see quite
how expanded and diverse the family tree has become. One of the most significant, and
perhaps the most emotionally troubling, events for Freud was his break with Carl Jung,
whose theory is also described in this book.
This broad overview indicates very clearly the depth and diversity of psycho-
analytic thought and hopefully motivates you to pursue avenues which have caught
your imagination.
Section Two, on Cognitive Development, reflects on the hows and whys of the
development of a thinking mind. Explanations are given of how humans develop their
ability to function cognitively, based on the notion that humans are active processors of
information, not passive receivers of information. Thus the theories focus on the ways in
which people acquire various cognitive abilities and how these abilities change in structure
and function over time. In this overall understanding one has also to consider individual
differences in cognitive performance which cover not only differences with regards to age
but also alternate patterns of development and alternate developmental outcomes.
This section examines three theorists, namely Piaget, Vygotsky and Kohlberg. In
addition it investigates a number of ‘themes’ related to cognitive development.
With regard to the theorists, Piaget’s constructivist theory of cognitive development
concerns his understanding of how we start life with limited cognitive capacities and
hopefully, and eventually, reach a level of being able to think symbolically. His theory links
our cognitive development to adaptations to the environment. Vygotsky offers a socio-
historical account of cognitive development, postulating the importance of internalised
cultural and environmental mores and values while Kohlberg focuses upon moral
development as an aspect of cognitive development and thus offers an account of the
development of moral reasoning based upon levels of cognitive capacities.
Introduction 3
The thematic approach offered in this section considers the development of memory,
language and intelligence, each within a chapter devoted to the exploration of each
theme. Two additional chapters lead to a deeper understanding of cognitive psychology:
the chapter on Evolutionary psychology, which considers the impact of our evolutionary
history on our cognitive development. (Although a challenging chapter it provides some
intriguing links to both cognitive development and psychoanalytic postulations.) Finally
there is the chapter that explores the contributions of cognitive science approaches to
cognitive developmental psychology.
Section Three, on Psychosocial and socio-political contexts of development has two
foci. One highlights particular areas of concern as they impact upon development, such
as violent crime, childhood trauma, gender and race and culture in the South African
context. The authors consider how development may be compromised by experiences of
these difficult contexts.
The second focus is theory-based. The authors reflect on Bronfenbrenner’s ecological
theory of development, overview critical issues inherent in developmental psychology,
and offer a review of theory and South African developmental psychology research and
literature.
I would like to make brief mention here of the use of the male pronoun in many
chapters of this textbook. When denoting the baby or child we have used the pronoun
‘he’ as opposed to ‘he or she’ or ‘it’. We felt that using the format of ‘he or she’ or ‘he/she’
is clumsy and distracting, and therefore have opted to use only ‘he’. We hope that this
does not offend any readers.
CHAPTER
1
Basic concepts and
principles in developmental
psychology
Derek Hook and Kate Cockcroft
This chapter presents certain fundamental concepts in the

study of human development. It also covers the following
debates and controversies in the theory of developmental
psychology:
1. Debates within developmental psychology

* Stability versus change
* The life-span perspective
* Nature versus nurture
* Continuity versus discontinuity
* Ontogeny and phylogeny
* Critical periods
* Normative and non-normative influences
2. Does development follow theory, or does theory
follow development?
3. Considering the contexts within which
development occurs
This chapter discusses certain important ideas and debates

within contemporary developmental psychology. It provides
a basic conceptual vocabulary for human development and
enables the reader to relate different theories to one another. It
examines a series of theoretical tensions, debates and concepts
within the field before asking two critical questions: does
theory follow development or does development follow theory;
and is psychological development a political phenomenon?
Debates within developmental psychology
Stability versus change

Earlier psychological theory supposed that personality was fundamentally
shaped during the early childhood years and remained, in relative terms,
the same thereafter. The modern approach in developmental psychology
differs from this view that the first five years of childhood influence people
permanently. Children are no longer seen as passive recipients of environmental
influences, but as active protagonists in influencing and moderating these
environmental factors. As Louw, Louw & Schoeman (1995: 491) emphasise,
‘[t]his does not mean that there is no underlying continuity regarding certain
characteristics such as basic temperament, but rather that children do not have
to be passive reflections of their environment’. This debate has lost much of its
importance since the advent and dominance of the life-span perspective.
The life-span perspective

The life-span perspective is one of the basic approaches of current
Life-span perspective. developmental psychology. Whereas many earlier approaches strongly
An approach to human prioritised the first six years of life as a blueprint that would determine the
development which pattern and course of an individual’s life, most contemporary approaches in
examines changes
developmental psychology—including the life-span perspective—examine
at all ages, through
adolescence and
the entire life-span. Researchers look at the ways in which changes can and do
adulthood, to late occur at all ages, from birth through childhood, adolescence and adulthood,
adulthood, up until to late adulthood, up until death. Development is not something that only
death. happens to children. As Sears & Feldman (cited in Santrock 1999: 8) suggest:
The next five or six decades [after childhood] are every bit as impor-
tant, not only to those adults who are passing through them but to
their children, who must live with and understand parents and grand-
parents. The changes in body, personality and abilities through these
later decades are great. Developmental tasks are imposed by marriage
and parenthood, by the waxing and waning of physical prowess and
of some intellectual capacities, by the children’s flight from the nest, by
the achievement of an occupational plateau and by retirement and the
prospect of final extinction. Parents have always been fascinated by
their children’s development, but it is high time adults began to look
objectively at themselves, to examine the systematic changes in their
own physical, mental and emotional qualities, as they pass through the
life-span, and to get acquainted with the limitations and assets they
share with so many others of their age.
The advantages of the life-span perspective

If we study development with the object of facilitating health and avoid-
ing problems, then clearly the study of ageing must be as important as the
study of growth. Indeed, ageing is often accompanied by problems of
loneliness, bereavement, depression and by a lack of social networks,
supports and relationships. Each of these problems represents a valid
focus for developmental psychology. A further important feature of the
life-span approach is that it recognises the importance of social setting and
Basic concepts and principles in developmental psychology 7
PHO TO S : CHA J O HNS TO N

historical situation (Gormly, 1997). In
addition, rather than believing that
behaviour is fixed and unchanging after
childhood, the life-span perspective
considers that helpful changes and
benefits can be implemented at any
developmental stage. In this respect
it is a useful complement to clinical
psychology through its assertion
that one can intervene and facilitate
beneficial change within individuals at
any age.
While this textbook has adopted
a theorist approach, the theorists
discussed also view development as continuing across the life-span. For The life-span perspective
example, Erik Erikson’s theory (discussed in Chapter 13) is one of the examines developmental
first to propose continued development across the life-span. While others, psychology across the
entire life-span from birth
such as Piaget (discussed in Chapter 15) focus on development within to death. It means that
the childhood and early adult years, this was not because they believed researchers look at the
that development ended in early adulthood, but rather that they chose way changes can and do
to focus on one developmental period. Thus, the theorists selected for occur at all ages, through
inclusion in this textbook may focus on the entire life-span or on a selected adolescence and adulthood,
to late adulthood and old
developmental period. This makes it necessary to know several theories age, up until death.
of development, as one alone is unlikely to explain all aspects of human
development.
Assumptions within developmental psychology

This text book, while not adopting the traditional life span structure, does
follow a number of guiding assumptions about development which are
also in keeping with a life span approach. Bakes (cited in Santrock 1999:
10), has seven basic characteristics, which are valuable to any developmen-
tal approach. These are explained as follows:
s Development is lifelong: development occurs across the full life-

span of the individual, including both growth and ageing, gains
and losses, all of which interact in dynamic ways.
s Development is multidimensional: biological, socio-emotional

and cognitive aspects overlap within development; for example,
intelligence contains many overlapping components such as verbal,
spatial, social and nonverbal intelligence.
s Development is multidirectional: some dimensions of development

may increase or grow while others decrease. Wisdom, for example,
may increase while mental agility may decline.
s Development is fluid: depending on an individual’s life conditions,

development may take many paths and there is often potential for
change. For example, the reasoning abilities of older adults may be
improved through training.
s Development is embedded in history: historical conditions are very

important. For example, the career orientation of many 30-year-old
females today is very different from those of women 40 years ago;
similarly the career orientation of many black South Africans today is
certainly different from those of black South Africans 40 years ago.
s Development is multidisciplinary: sociologists, psychologists, linguists,

anthropologists, medical researchers and neuroscientists all study
Heredity. Those inborn human development from different perspectives.
characteristics which we
inherit through our genes s Development is contextual: individuals continually respond to
from our parents.
and act on various contexts that in turn influence them. As
stated by Bakes, ‘individuals are changing beings in a
Nativism. The viewpoint changing world’ (cited in Santrock 1999: 10).
that our characteristics
and abilities are chiefly Nature versus nurture
determined by our inborn
The question of nature versus nurture is an ongoing debate within devel-
characteristics (often also
referred to as genetic opmental psychology. The viewpoint of ‘nature’—that our characteristics
determinism). This and abilities are chiefly determined by heredity (inborn characteristics)—is
represents the nature side often referred to as nativism or genetic determinism. On the other hand, the
of the nature-nurture view of ‘nurture’—that environmental factors are predominant in develop-
debate. ment—is known as environmental determinism (Louw et al, 1995).
Although this debate has raged for centuries, the majority of
Genetic determinism. contemporary developmental psychologists have come to accept the
See nativism. fact that the interaction between heredity and environmental influ-
ences is so complex that it is senseless to regard one of the two as more
Environmental important (Louw et al, 1995). Indeed, given this complexity, one often
determinism. The view gets the feeling that behind every genetic (or nature) explanation one
that environmental factors should look for the influences of environment (nurture), and behind
exert the greatest
every environmental explanation one should look for the influences
influence on human
development. This of nature. In this regard, to paraphrase Gormly & Brodzinsky (in Louw
represents the nurture et al, 1995: 490), the critical question in development nowadays is not
side of the nature-nurture which factor—heredity or environment—is responsible for behaviour
debate. but how these two factors interact so as to propel us along our devel-
opmental paths.
The riddle of the ship of Theseus
Theseus was the captain of an old ship substance. In time he even lengthened the
that he loved dearly, and that he had boat, and exchanged the sails for a
sailed for many years. His ship was rudimentary engine. Eventually the ship
dilapidated, however, and badly in need looked totally different to the vessel he
of repair. Unfortunately Theseus did not had begun with—in almost every way.
have much money. What he opted to do His friends would joke with him, teasing
was to slowly repair the broken parts of him that he now had a new ship after all.
the vessel, when he had the money. His Theseus was always dismissive of these
friends often asked him if he dreamed of a jokes, saying that despite many changes it
new ship as complete and sturdy as his was still his original boat, in all the ways it
own ship was flimsy and in need of repair. counted most. Several years later it came
Theseus always laughed at this, saying to pass that every original element of his
that he would never want a new vessel, boat had been replaced—not one tiny
because he very much loved his own ship, part of the original vessel remained. One
and felt very loyal to it. Nevertheless, he of Theseus’s friends brought this to his
made repairs when he could afford to do attention, and again asked him: ‘Do you
so. First he bought new sails. Then he still believe that is your original ship?’
pulled down the old wooden mast and Theseus could not answer him.
replaced it with a fibreglass substitute. He What would your answer be? Is this still
ran short of money for a while, and could the original ship or is it a totally different
not make many more changes. vessel? Reflect on how this story might be
A few months later, however, he an effective analogy for personal develop-
inherited a substantial amount of money ment across the life-span. To what extent
and was able to replace many of the do our bodies, our identities and our
broken parts of the ship. The first things personal psychologies change over the
to go were the old rudder and the old life-span? Do we remain the same person
anchor; they were replaced with newer before and after birth, before and after
and far more sophisticated pieces of puberty, after the birth of a child, after
equipment. He changed the wooden the death of a parent? How much do
floor of the vessel for a stronger lighter we change across our life-span?
There is no doubt that the separate roles of these two factors

blur all too quickly in practice. As Papalia, Olds & Feldman (1998)
note, people change their world even as it changes them: a baby girl
born with a cheerful disposition, for example, is likely to get positive
reactions from adults, which strengthens her trust that her smiles will
be rewarded and motivate her to smile more. Likewise, despite the fact
that there is growing evidence that language acquisition is an innate
capacity, the role of nurture, or the lack of nurture, as in the case of
the ‘Wild Boy of Avyron’, can effectively extinguish these abilities. (The
‘Wild Boy of Avyron’ was discovered by hunters at the age of 12 in a
forest in France. Despite five years of intensive teaching, his educator,
ontologist Jean Itard, never succeeded in teaching the boy more than
just a few simple words.)
The complexity of nature/nurture interactions

To accept the complexity of nature/nurture interactions is to accept that
their effect on the individual will differ from person to person and as
such there can be no fixed formula for predicting the effect of heredity
or environment upon a specific person (Louw et al, 1995). This does not
mean, however, that both factors can be assumed to play an equal role in
all stages of development. According to Gormly (1997), certain behaviours,
such as walking, can best be explained by the process of maturation that
is guided by our genetic blueprint. Likewise the universal first actions of
a newborn baby, gasping to fill its lungs and then crying to announce its
arrival, may be seen as predominantly instinctive (Craig, 1996). As Morris
& Maisto (1998: 392) note:
Neonate. A baby in the Research has disproved the old idea that neonates, or newborn
first month of life. babies, do nothing but eat, sleep and cry, while remaining oblivious
to the world ... newborns come equipped with a number of useful
reflexes ... such as those that control breathing ... Some enable
babies to nurse. The rooting reflex causes them to turn the head
towards the touch of a nipple on the cheek and grope around with
the mouth ... the swallowing reflex enables them to swallow milk
and other liquids without choking ... The grasping reflex causes
newborns to cling vigorously to an adult’s finger or to any other
object placed in their hands. The stepping reflex causes very young
babies to take what looks like walking steps if they
are held upright with their feet just touching a flat
surface.
Many of these reflexes seem fairly instinctual but there

are other, surprisingly complex, kinds of behaviours that
appear to be universal for babies and that seem to go beyond
the categories of the reflexive or the purely instinctual:
…babies are ... capable of ... imitating the facial expres-

sions of adults. If an adult opens his or her mouth or
sticks out his or her tongue, newborn babies often
respond by opening their mouths or by sticking out
their tongues ... When this ability to imitate was first
noted in newborns, psychologists could hardly be-
lieve it. How could babies carry out such complex
responses at an age when they have no idea how their
own face looks, much less how to make specific facial
expressions? (Morris & Maisto, 1998: 392).
Figure 1.1 Children act
on their environments In addition to these ‘preprogrammed’ universal tendencies
virtually from conception. observed in babies, recent evidence also suggests that they are active in
In scans, foetuses have the womb, sucking their thumbs, swinging from their umbilical cords,
been seen swinging from
their umbilical cords,
and squeezing and releasing these to moderate their oxygen flow.
performing somersaults These findings suggest that environmental factors may occur even in
and sucking their thumbs. prenatal periods.
If you or I were in the womb, what would it be like?
If you or I were in the womb, what would it senses, although at this point they are
be like? Well, it would be like being in the totally blurred:
middle of someone else’s body. Their heart,
which is bigger than you, would be Instead of having separate senses ...
thundering away. Around you would be [it seems] ... that a fetus’s senses are much
metres and metres of arteries and veins filled less distinct. Sounds, for instance, may be
with someone else’s blood. How would you ‘felt’ through the skin, as well as heard by
get any peace when, above you, two the ears. Likewise, changes in the fluid
cavernous lungs worked day and night? which surrounds the fetus will be as much
Worse still, right next to you would be the smelled as tasted. Sounds from the outside
biggest distraction of all ... [the stomach]. world will be filtered through the mother’s
Three meals a day and who knows how many body. So although no doubt a fetus will be
ice-cream and gherkin sandwiches have got familiar with the sound of its mother’s
to go somewhere. And to top it all, you voice, this voice will sound, relative to our
would be growing all the time ... (Dale, own ears [somewhat] ... distorted (Dale
De’ath, Evans, Thompson, Georgi & Spencer, et al, 1998).
1998).
It is for these reasons that infants are
In other words, the world inside the womb said to have some familiarity with their
is anything but simple, serene, silent and mother’s voice, even before they are
devoid of stimulus. born. Similarly, it is for these reasons
that rhythmic sounds, such as a vacuum
The real world inside the womb is dynamic cleaner or music, often prove soothing
and bustling ... Instead of lying quietly ... to newborns after birth even if they are
[the fetus] is having a go at a kick, or even fairly loud because they remind the child
a somersault. It gulps, and swallows up to of the womb. Indeed, in the womb,
half a cup of amniotic fluid every day. From the volume of noise around the foetus is
quite early on it sucks its thumb, a habit able to reach the formidable level of
which may take years to break ... (Dale ninety-five decibels with each beat of
et al, 1998). the mother’s heart.
This is part of what we know of the Source: The Human Body, BBC Films In
foetus around the time of mid-pregnancy. association with the Learning Channel
But what does it know? By this time it has (Dir. Dale, De’ath, Evans, Thompson,
begun to develop the basics of all five Georgi & Spencer, 1998).
Continuity versus discontinuity

Does developmental growth follow a gradual and cumulative pattern (as,
for example, a huge tree develops from a tiny seedling), or does growth
rather take place in clearly differentiated stages (as a larva transforms into a
moth) (Louw et al, 1995)? Psychological theories differ on this issue. Some see
development as a slow and even process during which experiences gradually
accumulate to make changes possible; others regard development as a series
of genetically predetermined stages or steps in which each stage differs quali-

tatively from the previous one (Louw et al, 1995). Consequently, development
may be understood as either predominantly continuous or discontinuous.
A second aspect of the continuity-discontinuity debate concerns the
nature of developmental changes: are they quantitative or qualitative?
Quantitative changes.
Quantitative changes are changes in degree or amount. For example,
Changes in degree or
amount; for example,
children’s memories improve gradually with each passing year, particularly
changes in height or weight. as they acquire increasing knowledge about the world and this provides
contexts for remembering past events or information. On the other hand,
Qualitative changes. qualitative changes are changes in kind, structure or organisation that make
Changes in kind, structure a fundamental difference to the individual. For example, the young pre-
or organisation, which linguistic infant is qualitatively different to the preschooler who can speak
make a fundamental
well, and the sexually mature adolescent is fundamentally different from a
difference to the individual.
For example, the preverbal
peer who has not yet reached puberty (Shaffer, 1996). Continuity theorists
infant is qualitatively tend to regard developmental changes as gradual and quantitative,
different to the toddler whereas discontinuity theorists regard these changes as more distinctive and
who can speak. qualitative (Shaffer, 1996).
Discontinuity theorists propose the existence of different developmental
stages, each stage characterising a fundamentally different phase of life, and
each stage having a unique set of skills, abilities, emotions and behaviours.
Ontogeny and phylogeny

An important aspect of developmental psychology is that it applies both to
the individual development of the specific child or person as well as to the
Phylogeny. Application developmental norm for a wider group of people. This distinction between
of developmental individual development (ontogeny) and group or ‘species’ development
psychology to the (phylogeny) is often a controversial one. Developmental norms refer to the
understanding of the
average ages of certain phenomena—the first word, the age at which children
development of a
wider group of people
begin to walk, and so on. It is important to emphasise, however, that these
or ‘species’. are merely averages and not absolutes. As Papalia et al (1998: 6) note:
Ontogeny. Application Although people typically proceed through the same general
of developmental sequence of development, there is a wide range of individual dif-
psychology to the ferences. Only when deviation from a norm is extreme is there
understanding of the
cause to consider a person’s development exceptionally advanced
individual development
of the specific child
or delayed.
or person.
Because people differ so widely in height, weight and build, in con-
stitutional factors such as health and energy level, and in emotional
reactions, there can be great deviance from norms across individual levels
of comparison. It is important to note here that individual differences
also increase as people grow older. Whereas many changes in childhood
seem tied to maturation of the body and brain (the unfolding of a definite
sequence of physical changes and behaviour patterns), later life changes are
more contingent on life experiences (Papalia et al,1998).
Critical period. A specific
time during development Critical periods
when a given event has Another important concept in developmental psychology is that of critical
its greatest effect. periods. A critical period is a specific time during development when a given
event has its greatest impact. Lenneberg, for example, proposed a critical
period—before puberty—for language development. As another example,
some ethologists believe that the first three years of life are the critical
period for the development of emotional and social responsiveness in
humans (Papalia et al, 1998). The concept of the critical period expresses the
crucial nature of timing, and specifies a timespan when—and only when—a
particular environmental factor can have an effect (Craig, 1996).
For example, if a pregnant woman who lacks immunity for rubella

is exposed to the virus 2 months after conception, severe birth defects
such as deafness, or even ... miscarriage ... may result. If however, that
same woman is exposed 6 months after conception, the virus will not
affect her developing baby (Craig, 1996: 10).
The application of the idea of critical periods to developmental

psychology is a controversial one, however. Although evidence for critical
periods of physical development is undeniable (especially in the case of foetal
development), for other aspects of human development the concept seems less
relevant. Indeed, while the human organism may be particularly sensitive to
certain psychological experiences at certain times of life, later events can often
reverse the effects of early ones (Papalia et al, 1998). What may be more
important is the concept of readiness, or the point at which an individual can Readiness. The point
be said to have matured sufficiently to be capable of a particular behaviour at which an individual
(Craig, 1996). For example, some 11-year-old children are obviously in the can be said to have
matured sufficiently to
concrete operational stage, as evidenced by their thinking, while other
benefit from a particular
children of the same age may have matured cognitively to a point where learning experience.
they are ‘ready’ to understand and use the qualities of thinking that define
the formal operational stage.
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
Normative history-graded
influences are common to a
particular cohort, which is a
group of people who share
a similar experience—in
this case, growing up at the
same time.
Normative. An event is Normative and non-normative influences

normative when it occurs The last in this series of important concepts for developmental psychology
in a similar manner for are normative and non-normative influences.
most people in a given
group; for example,
physical changes such as
An event is normative when it occurs in a similar way for most peo-
puberty or menopause. ple in a given group. Normative age-graded influences are highly
similar for people in a particular age group. They include biological
events (like puberty and menopause) as well as cultural events (such as
Non-normative. These
entry into formal education and retirement from paid employment).
are unusual events that
have a significant impact
Normative history-graded influences are common to a particular
on an individual’s life. cohort, which is a group of people who share a similar experience, in
this case, growing up at the same time. Non-normative life events are
Cohort. A group of unusual events that have a major impact on individual lives. They are
people born during the either typical events that happen to a person at an atypical time of
same historical period. life (such as the death of a parent when a child is young) or atypical
events (such as being in an airplane crash or having a birth defect)
(Papalia et al, 1998: 7).
Does development follow theory,

or does theory follow development?
The assumption in much developmental psychology is that one is studying,
in a naturalistic fashion, what one observes ‘out there’ in the developmental
world of children and adults. The idea is that the developmental theories
and explanations that we formulate follow observed development. This
is an assumption that we need to be particularly critical of, since there
is always the possibility that our given preconceptions influence how we
observe the world.
Take for example the idea of perceived gender differences in the
development of little boys and girls. Erikson ‘observed’ a variety of dif-
ferences in the apparently gendered behaviour of boys and girls. He claimed
PHOTOS: CHA JOHNSTON
What is normal behaviour for a five-month-old child? How should one raise a little girl as opposed to a little boy,
and why?
that boys, when left to play in a sandpit, were prone to build towering, phallic-
like structures. Girls, by contrast, would build hollow, enclosing, womb-like
structures (Erikson, 1963). Erikson is clearly showing his psychoanalytic
loyalties here. One cannot help wondering whether his dedication to certain
of these psychoanalytic ideas is affecting how he observes the world, not
only in terms of how he understands what children are building, but also
in terms of how he perceives gendered difference between what boys and
girls do. Therefore we must ask: Is Erikson correctly observing a gender
difference, or is he already, on the basis of prior assumptions, perceiving
little boys and little girls differently?
This presents a philosophical problem: At what point are we truly
observing what is out there (as a way of building explanations and theories),
and at what point are we already drawing implicitly on preconceived
explanations and theories (in our act of perception)? The implication
here is that we always need to be aware of how our prior conceptions
influence our perceptions of the world. This is the reservation we need to
keep in mind: rather than producing knowledge perhaps we are merely
reproducing certain ideological viewpoints. This is particularly important
in developmental psychology, where the knowledge of psychologists has
a very real and concrete bearing on the lives of people. If we reproduce
various forms of prejudice or discrimination in the scientific knowledge
we are producing, then clearly we are participating in forms of social
injustice, in an inequitable ‘science’ that selectively disempowers certain
members of society.
Is development a political phenomenon?

The speculation above leads logically to, and also helps to answer, the
question of whether development is a political phenomenon. The point
of the discussion above is that certain political notions (political in the
sense of power relations) permeate even our most basic understandings
of the ‘natural’ world. Political discourse is an active part, and even
forms the basis, of what we think is natural. How we understand
gendered norms of development, as in the example from Erikson, has
an important bearing on what we think is appropriate behaviour for
men and for women. But what is ‘natural’ or ‘appropriate’ behaviour
for women? How do we use such notions, what do they mean, and
what sector of society do they selectively empower or disempower?
What is normal behaviour for a five-month-old child? How should
one raise a little girl as opposed to a little boy, and why? These are some
of the many important and critical questions to be aware of: How,
and in what ways, may the knowledge we produce in developmental
psychology serve certain political functions, and how may it implicitly
be motivated by political considerations?
Considering the contexts within which

development occurs
The contextual approach holds that development must be understood
in terms of the total setting or context in which it occurs. Behaviour
cannot be understood outside of contexts. The individual cannot be
understood in isolation from her or his environment, and development

must be seen as a dynamic and changing process in which the individual
and the environment continuously interact (Gormly, 1997).
Implications of the cultural context for

developmental psychology
Culture presents a particularly broad but incisive context for develop-
ment. AS defined by Santrock (1999: 13), culture entails ‘the behaviour
patterns, beliefs and all other products of a particular group of people
that are passed on from generation to generation’. The following exam-
ple from Papalia et al, (1998: 9) gives a specific illustration of this:
When adults in the Kpelle tribe in central Liberia were asked to

sort 20 objects, they consistently sorted on the basis of functional
categories ... Western psychologists associate functional sorting with
low levels of thought; but since the Kpelle kept saying that this was
how a ‘wise man’ would do it, the experimenter finally asked, ‘How
would a fool do it?’ He then received the ‘higher-order’ categories
he had expected—four neat piles with food in one, tools in another
and so on.
The lesson here is that we must be cautious about adopting or believing

in universals when studying development; what is normal or natural for
one cultural group is quite extraordinary for another. Therefore it is
important to consider cultural differences when assessing the development
of an individual child or adult. In this regard, cross-cultural studies
are valuable in comparing the norms of one cultural group with those
of another. They help us to determine which kinds of development are
similar across cultures, which are universal, and which are neither, but
are culture-specific.
Contexts for development

Contexts for development may be understood as follows:
* Biological context: health and physical status

* Social context: family network, friends, peers and colleagues
* Cultural context: the dominant culture in which the subject grows up
* Historical context: the times in which the subject grows up
* Economic context: the subject’s financial and work environment
* Intellectual context: the subject’s ability to deal with new challenges
(Gormly, 1997).
Of the two examples from Papalia et al (1998: 9) that follow, the first presents
an apparent cultural universal, and the second illustrates a cross-cultural
comparison:
... no matter where children live, they learn to speak in the same
sequence, advancing from cooing and babbling to single words and
then to simple combinations of words. The sentences of toddlers
around the world are structured similarly, though the words might
vary. Such findings suggest that the capacity for learning language
is inborn. On the other hand, culture can exert a surprisingly large
influence on early motor development. African babies, whose par-
ents often prop them in a sitting position and bounce them on their
feet, tend to sit and walk earlier than American babies ...
Ethnicity and gender as aspects of the cultural context

for development
Santrock (1999) emphasises ethnicity and gender as two important dimen-
sions of culture that exercise a powerful effect on the development of indi-
viduals. He defines ethnicity as ‘based on cultural heritage, nationality
characteristics, race, religion and language’. These qualities are important
to bear in mind in understanding development, although, as he warns,
their influence is more useful in fixing a heterogeneous, rather than a
stereotypical, conception of a group.
He defines gender as ‘the socio-cultural dimension of being female or
male’ (1999: 14) and goes on to warn that few aspects of our development
are more central to our identity and social relationships than gender. (For
a more detailed discussion of gender identity, see Chapter 26 on gender
identity formation.)
Did you know? Some interesting facts

about early child development
* The human baby at birth is less flows through their open mouths into
matured than any other species. In the their stomachs where their lungs shut
first few months after birth the human off automatically, protecting them from
newborn seems woefully inept; other drowning. No one is exactly sure why
animals get up and walk within seconds babies have this skill; it may be a
of being born but the human infant can residual ability from their time in the
barely control its own twitching limbs. womb, or an ‘evolutionary echo’ from
our distant amphibious past.
* Babies have certain instinctual skills that
adults have lost. For example, all babies * Babies have already had a certain
can swim from the moment they are amount of kinaesthetic experience in
born—they instinctively kick to propel the womb; it is here that they first start
themselves forward in water. Water learning to move.
>>
<<
* Even above the constant ‘roar’ of the ‘in-built’ skill to control others: their
mother’s heartbeat, the in utero child (generally) cute appearance and
hears, and reacts to, his mother’s voice. behaviour and, importantly, their crying
At this early stage there is even some help ensure that they soon become the
rudimentary interaction between centre of family life. Crying is, in fact,
mother and child. This interaction the key to the survival of infants; it
between the baby and his surroundings triggers a physiological response that
fuels the baby’s own development. their mothers find practically impossible
Although babies are not simply ‘hard- to ignore, and which (among other
wired’ to become human, they are in a factors) stimulates their mothers’ breasts
sense ‘programmed’ to seek out the to produce milk. Crying is more than a
experiences that will transform them. ‘meal-ticket’ for babies; they cannot
experience the world by themselves as
* Babies trigger their own birth. Once the yet, and for now others must ‘bring the
baby is ready to survive in the outside world’ to them. Crying, then, is also the
world, he releases a hormone into his key to early learning.
mother’s bloodstream and the resulting
muscular spasms lead to the birth * At three weeks, a baby’s most active
process. Birth is even more traumatic for muscles are those that control his eyes.
the baby than it is for the mother. The Vision, however, is still less than perfect;
child’s adrenalin levels are twice that of the baby can pick up only the strongest
hers, even higher than that of an adult of contrasts, and can make out objects
experiencing a heart attack. that are only less than a metre away.
Because the baby has not yet combined
* In the first few minutes after birth, the the bifocal images of his two retinas, at
newborn infant’s senses are bombarded first he sees everything in double. His
with new sights, sounds and feelings. eyes are drawn to moving objects; this
Within the first few hours after birth sensitivity to movement draws the baby
infants can mimic certain facial to look at those things which best
expressions; this is not conscious stimulate the developing visual areas
mimicry, but babies are able to translate of the brain. This rudimentary vision is
what they see into similar actions. ideally designed to study moving, high-
Imitation is one of the best learning contrast human faces. In the first two
strategies babies have. months babies are ‘programmed’ to
search out and stare at the human,
* The brain of the newborn human child because it is from people that they
is less organised at birth than the brains learn the most.
of virtually every other species. This
sounds like a handicap but in fact it is a * Just as babies’ eyes are ‘programmed’
great advantage. Because human to seek out human faces, so their ears
babies’ brains are flexible, essential are drawn to the sound of voices.
connections between cells can develop Infants are so attuned to human speech
as a result of a baby’s experience and so that they are able to recognise their
facilitate the process of learning. mothers’ voices within the first week
after birth. It is therefore not unusual
* Although newborn infants are physically that comfort for infants often comes in
helpless, they are equipped with an the form of a mother’s soothing voice.
>>
<<
* Within weeks of birth, babies are said Moreover, at eight weeks, infants are
to be able to tell the difference between said to prefer the sound of their native
one language and another (their brains tongue to other languages.
register familiar streams of words).
Babies are able to pick out the patterns
and intonations that make their own Source: Baby It’s You, Channel 4 Television
language different from others. Films (Dir. Klein & Hickman, 1994).
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a brief overview of important concepts and ten-
sions in the study of developmental psychology. These basic concepts and
debates are certainly worth reflecting on, both on a personal level and as a
critical lens through which developmental theory can be analysed and ap-
plied. This chapter has maintained a largely meta-theoretical focus in order
to survey key debates in the field of developmental psychology. Our aim in
this has been to extend the reader’s conceptual vocabulary in this field, and
to provide a basis with which to engage, compare and relate within context
the various theories of development presented in the chapters that follow.
Specific tasks
C R I T I C A L T H I N K I N G TA S K S
➊ With reference to one of the theorists discussed in this book, explain how the cultural
perspective of that theorist and of the people he or she studied could have affected the
theory that was subsequently developed.
➋ Choose one of the theorists discussed in this book, and describe that theorist’s particular
standpoint with regard to the major debates in developmental psychology (that is,
stability versus change; nature versus nurture; continuity versus discontinuity; ontogeny
and phylogeny; critical periods; and non-normative and normative influences).
➌ Try keeping a ‘developmental journal’. In it you could try to provide illustrations

of certain of the key concepts described above, such as critical periods, normative
versus non-normative developmental influences, or ‘nature versus nurture’ factors
of development.
You might also try keeping a journal throughout the reading of this text and assess how
the various theories might apply to you.
SECTION ONE
Psychoanalytic approaches to development and personality
CHAPTER
2
A basic introduction
to psychoanalytic thought
Jacki Watts
This chapter will consist of the following broad sections:
1. Star players on the early and current psychoanalytic

stage, namely Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Bion, Winnicott,
Kernberg, Kohut and Jung
2. Key psychoanalytic developmental assumptions
3. A critique of psychoanalytic assumptions
A brief historical introduction

This chapter offers a brief historical contextualisation of the emergence of
perhaps the predominant psychoanalytic theorists of the last century. It also
presents certain basic psychoanalytic assumptions important to the study of
development that will provide a foundation for the chapters to follow.
A cautionary note:
This section covers definitive aspects of the theories of some major con-
tributors to psychoanalytic thought. It does not, however, do justice to
the breadth of the theories covered or to all the major theorists who have
contributed and continue to contribute to the development of psycho-
analytic thought. It is hoped that by offering you insight into the key
concepts you will have the confidence and curiosity to further explore the
theorists who fire your imagination, and to understand psychoanalytic
thought more broadly.
A basic introduction to psychoanalytic thought 23
Star players on the early and current

psychoanalytic stage
A little on Sigmund Freud

Austria at the turn of the 20th century was a prosperous country that was
ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty. Franz Joseph became head of the dual
Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1867 and it was only with the assassin-
ation of his nephew in Sarajevo in 1914 and the start of World War 1
that the prosperity and dominance of Austria came to an end. In 1900, at
the time of the publication of Freud’s The interpretation of dreams, Vienna
was the seat of European culture and beauty. Austria is a predominantly
Catholic country. At the turn of the century, Jews in Vienna were an
often-persecuted minority. It is significant to note that virtually all the
early pioneers of psychoanalysis were European Jews who suffered
various forms of persecution and discrimination. Freud and Klein grew
up in a society that was basically anti-Semitic. In the year of Klein’s birth,
1882, the German-Austrian student fraternities passed the Waidhofer
Resolution that declared that every human being with Jewish blood in its
veins was born without honour and must therefore lack in every decent
human feeling. It was in this culture that psychoanalysis found its home.
Grosskurth (1986) describes the role of psychoanalysis as becoming, for
many Jews, a religion with its own rites and demands of unswerving
loyalty. Freud’s elaborations of the workings of the unconscious and the
role of repression and aggression provided conceptual tools with which to
grapple and try to understand the suppression experienced by the Jews at
this time.
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) managed to build around him an inner circle
of supporters of psychoanalytic ideas. He was the undisputed leader of this
group although the group was not without its tensions and rifts. Gay
(1988) provides a well-researched biographical account of Freud’s life and
the various intense relationships and tensions that characterised his life.
Karl Abrahams and Sandor Ferenczi were influential members of Freud’s
inner circle, which also included Otto Rank and Carl Jung. This inner circle
radically influenced the Western world’s concepts of art, culture and how
we view the nature of man. No longer could the Western world see itself as
guided by rational, conscious, exclusively higher and noble principles. Their
thinking was vividly brought to life by the two tragic and unfortunate World
Wars that erupted in the early 20th century. What psychoanalysis brought into
focus was:
s The layering below the surface of conscious experience

and motivation.
s The seemingly irrational behaviours of neurosis.
s The meanings lying within the symptoms of experiences such

as hysteria, obsessive-compulsive behaviour and anxiety states.
s A demonstration of the importance of childhood for the

subsequent development of the psychic life of the individual.
s The role of psychic life in structuring the development

of personality.
A bit about Melanie Klein

Melanie Klein (1882-1960) was born in Vienna at a time when Freud was
already working as a neurologist. Although Klein had an ultimately pro-
ductive life, there were a number of tragedies and deaths. These included
the deaths of a sister, her brother, her own son, and her analyst of many
years, Karl Abrahams. Her life was fundamentally changed, however,
upon reading Freud’s The interpretation of dreams (1900) in 1914. From that
time on she immersed herself in psychoanalytic thinking. Grosskurth’s
biography (1986) describes a dynamic but difficult woman who not only
had to deal with much tragedy in her life but also much opposition to her
ideas. She appears to have been a woman who inspired fierce loyalty and
equally fierce antagonism, both from her colleagues and her own family,
particularly her daughter, Melissa. Klein had two long analyses, one with
Abrahams and the other with Ferenczi. With the encouragement of these
men, and Ernest Jones in England, Klein pioneered the psychoanalytic
treatment of children through play therapy.
(It is interesting to note that while a personal analysis is a prerequisite
to becoming a psychoanalyst, Freud himself did not undergo an analysis.
He undertook this himself through an intensive analysis of his dreams.)
In 1925 Klein went on a lecture tour to Britain. Her ideas were met
with enthusiasm, mainly because Ernest Jones was already working
in conceptual areas that were in harmony with her own. Jones had a
tempestuous relationship with Freud, so it is thus not surprising that he
would welcome Klein’s presence. Klein returned to Britain the next year
and stayed until her death in 1960. By the time Freud and his daughter
Anna arrived in Britain in 1939 (Jones assisted them to flee the Nazi
threat), Klein had established an influential presence. The meeting of
these two powerful theoretical positions resulted in a theoretical rift
Transference. that divides the psychoanalytic community to this day. There was both a
The repetition, in personal and a theoretical struggle between Klein and Anna Freud. Anna
adulthood, of infantile Freud was also working with children. Her work was strongly influenced
prototypes of self-and- by her father, Sigmund, by whom she had been analysed. Anna Freud
other relations and maintained that one could not work within transference with children,
instinctual wishes towards
as they were still too dependent upon real parents. Klein maintained that
others. Psychoanalytic
work is based on the
spontaneous transference arose towards the therapist and had to be dealt
identification of the with through neutral interpretation of the dynamics of the phenomena.
transference and its Klein also postulated ideas about the richness of the internal world of
interpretation. infancy that classical Freudians found difficult to stomach.
During this time Klein and her followers made many creative advances
in theoretical understanding. This group did, however, seem to be overly
concerned with issues of legitimacy. Klein and her immediate followers
were at pains to demonstrate their allegiance to Freud. As a result, for
some time her work was not viewed in its own right and there was little
objective evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of her theory. Rather,

her concepts were evaluated by the degree to which they did or did not
accord with Freud’s conceptualisations. Such comparisons are futile as
her theories were concerned with different aspects of psychic functioning.
However, it was as a result of Klein’s struggle to gain acceptance from
Freud that the meta-psychological differences between their theories were
missed for a number of years.
On the side, Ronald Fairbairn

While there was this heightened activity in the psychoanalytic commu-
nities in England and Europe, there was a lone psychoanalyst practising
in Scotland, some distance from the political and theoretical conflicts
that besieged the British psychoanalytic community. This was Ronald
Fairbairn. He was somewhat isolated from the mainstream ideas and the
numerous internal politics of the day. He was also a rather shy and reticent
man by nature and did not interact very much within this circle. This
isolation, combined with his work at a child guidance clinic for abused and
abandoned children, led him to view the impact of trauma and the nature
of aggression differently from the popular ideas of the time. He finally
abandoned classical Freudian drive theory and proposed his own theory
of ego defence operations. His ideas, at times unacknowledged, have been
influential in the development of the Independent School tradition.
Elusive Bion
The biographical details of Wilfred Bion’s life are found in his
posthumously published autobiographies The long weekend (1982) and
All my sins remembered (1985). These two books provide a wonderful
insight into not only the developmental influences on Bion’s life but also
the operation of his own psyche. Bion’s own presence and actions, his
own motivational strivings, are never the substance of his autobiography.
A major focus of his theory concerns containment and the functions of
containment. Bion writes as if he is a ‘pure container’, revealing little, if
any, of his own responsiveness to the world or people.
He was born in India in 1897. He and his younger sister both received
private tutoring in India. As was the practice for British colonials of the
time, Bion was sent to England at the age of eight to receive his education
at an all boy’s school, leaving his family behind in India. He did extremely
well at sport but seems to have been a lonely, intellectual child.
With the outbreak of the 1st World War, he attempted to enlist as
an officer but was refused something to do with his lack of social status.
Due to the interventions of a contact and the wonders of the British social
class, he was eventually enlisted as a tank commander where as an 18 year
old he was in command of men aged 30 or more. He relates scenes of
absolute fear and horror experienced during the war with a clinical eye
for observation. He was awarded the DSO and the Legion of Honour for
his bravery.
After the War he read for history at Oxford, an influence which is felt
in his theoretical writings, together with a strong philosophical background.
He then studied medicine at University College, London. A growing
interest in psychoanalysis led to a training analysis with John Rickman

and later Klein. This association and influence lasted until Klein’s death in
1960. It is an interesting fact that his medical training is virtually impossible
to discern in his theoretical writings. He actively repudiated the medical
model in psychoanalytic observation. He maintained that, unlike medicine,
where one can say with reasonable certainty that a particular condition does
not exist, in psychic functioning one cannot make such a statement. Man
is capable of the whole arena of psychic functioning. This is an important
aspect to his theorising as Bion maintained that while we may not observe
some aspects of psychic functioning, such as psychosis, hatred etc, these
aspects are parts of the arena of psychic functioning and are nonetheless
operational.
During World War II, Bion, as a military psychiatrist, ran groups
for the rehabilitation of neurotic soldiers. He was director of the London
Clinic of Psychoanalysis (1956-1962) and President of the British Psycho-
analytic Society (1962-1965). In 1968 he moved to Los Angeles, where
he remained until 1979 when he returned to England and died two
months later.
Some Winnicott
Donald Winnicott was the cherished son of an upper-class British family.
His father, Sir Frederick Winnicott, was the Lord Mayor of Plymouth.
Winnicott was the youngest child, with two elder sisters who were devoted to
him. He was an excellent scholar and athlete, growing up to be a handsome,
cultured and enigmatic man. He started his career as a paediatrician and
maintained an interest in children throughout his life. As a theorist he
devoted his life to exploring the implications and importance of the bond
between mother and child. He entered the British Psychoanalytic Society
The Bloomsbury group. at the time of its most creative and open debates.
A literary, artistic and Ernest Jones (who invited Klein to lecture in London) was then
intellectual circle of
president of the Society. James and Alix Strachey, and Adrian and Karen
friends who met at one
another’s homes in and
Steven represented the Bloomsbury influence. (The first of Winnicott’s
around the Bloomsbury two long personal analyses was with James Strachey.) Other influential
area of London in the people at the time were John Rickman and Sylvia Payne, who worked
early decades of the 20th with shell-shocked troops from World War I. There were also those who
century. At its core were were to become loyal to the Kleinian tradition: Joan Riviere, Susan Isaacs
the sisters Vanessa Bell and Paula Heimann, among others. (Winnicott had his second analysis
and Virginia Woolf. It also
with Joan Riviere.) The arrival of the Freud family in 1939, and the
included the novelist E. M.
Forster, the artist and critic
ensuing conflict with Klein, was to change the quality of the debates to a
Roger Fry, John Maynard more intense and acrimonious level.
Keynes (the influential Winnicott appears to have remained aloof to these ‘intrigues’,
economist), Victoria remaining a profoundly individualistic person. He gave innumerable talks
Sackville-West (the poet to a wide-ranging cross-section of people, from social workers, for instance,
and writer) and Lytton to clergymen, to mothers themselves. He preferred these forums where he
Strachey, the biographer.
could engage with his audience rather than the more cerebral discussions of
In its broad artistic and
philosophical range, the
academia and psychoanalysts. Winnicott never aligned himself with either
Bloomsbury group had party in the Freud and Klein wrangles, remaining clinically objective,
a profound influence on and providing the model for the independence and creative thinking that
English cultural life. characterises the Middle or Independent tradition. He was to have a profound
effect in influencing this branch of psychoanalytic thinking. Winnicott’s

writing is poetic and deceptively easy. You are left with the taste of an idea
but it is up to you to grapple and struggle with the concepts to appreciate
fully the richness and complexity of his thoughts. (Read Kohon [1986] for a
sample of Independent School theorists.)
Otto Kernberg: A move to America

Otto Kernberg was born in Vienna, the home of Sigmund Freud and the
birthplace of psychoanalysis, in 1928. Like Freud, he was forced to flee
Germany (Freud in 1938 as an old man; Kernberg in 1939 as a young boy)
because he was Jewish. He and his family moved to Chile where he later
became a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. In 1959 he moved to the United
States and rapidly became a leader in psychoanalytic circles. He is now
strongly associated with American psychoanalysis. Unlike many other
psychoanalytic theorists you will read about in this book, he is still alive and
continues to write and research in his field. In a way, Kernberg’s history
is the result of combining different ingredients from different countries.
Perhaps it is no surprise that he does the same thing in his theory: combining
and integrating different influences to come up with a fresh perspective.
Still in America: Heinz Kohut

Heinz Kohut was born in Vienna in 1913. When the war broke out in
1914, his father, a concert pianist, was drafted into the army. Kohut was
alone with his mother for much of his first five years of life. He was an
only child, and his parents hired tutors to teach him, so he never had the
experience of mixing with children his own age in a school context. He
obtained a medical degree from the University of Vienna in 1938 at the
age of 25, and emigrated to the United States in 1940. He graduated as a
psychoanalyst from the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute in 1950. From
1948, until his death in 1981, he was married to Elizabeth Meyer. They
had one son, Thomas.
In the early years of Kohut’s psychoanalytic career, he was an ego psy-
chologist in the classical tradition, with close professional and friendship ties
with mainstream psychoanalysts in the United States. He served as president
of the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1964, and as vice-president
of the International Psychoanalytic Association. He had a reputation as a
brilliant teacher and training analyst in the Chicago Institute for Psycho-
analysis with a deep knowledge of classical psychoanalytic theory.
Until he began to formulate his new theories about the place of narcis-
sism in development, Kohut was a central figure internationally, a friend
and respected colleague of Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, Kurt Eissler
and other influential figures on the psychoanalytic scene. He was widely
expected to become the president of the Association. This changed as it
became clear from his writings the extent to which he was reformulating
classical psychoanalytic theory. By the time of the publication of The
analysis of the self in 1971, he had been shunned by the psychoanalytic
community, lost his position in the International Psychoanalytic Associa-
tion, and was gathering around himself a new group of colleagues and
close collaborators who were to form the nucleus of the Self Tradition.
A little bit on Jung

Carl Gustav Jung was born the son of a minister, on July 26, 1875. He died
Psychosis. Generally on June 6, 1961 at the age of 85. Within his extended family many uncles
considered to be the were also ministers, and religion was therefore an important influence in
extreme of mental his life. Although Jung had been a part of Freud’s inner circle, he and
illness. The consciousness Freud had a fall-out and Jung went on to develop a theory that later came
becomes flooded with
to be known as Analytical Psychology. The issues he dealt with in his
unconscious contents, so
that the ego is partially or
theory arose in part from his own personal background, which is vividly
completely overwhelmed, described in his autobiography, Memories, dreams, reflections (1963). After
thus losing contact with his rift with Freud it is thought he experienced a period of psychosis. He
external reality. retreated from social interaction for a time and lived the life of a hermit.
During this time he explored his experiences through making sculptures
and seeking symbols to capture the nature of his psychic journey. This was
an act of courage and faith in the resilience of the psyche. The resolution
of this experience, together with the fact that throughout his life Jung
experienced periodic dreams and visions with striking mythological and
religious features, had a profound influence in shaping his interest in
myths, dreams and the psychology of religion. For many years Jung felt he
possessed two separate personalities: an outer public self that was involved
with the world of his family and peers, and a secret inner self that felt
a special closeness to God. The interplay between these selves formed a
central theme in Jung’s personal life and contributed to his later emphasis
on the individual’s striving for integration and wholeness.
Jung initially studied archaeology, confirming his interest in and
profound knowledge of ancient cultures and myths. He later completed
his medical training in Basel and spent these early years in practice at the
Burgholzli Mental Hospital in Zurich, where he conducted studies in word
association. These association tests were important to the development of
Jung’s theory. He discovered that words clustered together around certain
ideas or themes, and that it was possible to identify which of these themes
were anxiety-provoking to the participants. This work demonstrated the
workings of the unconscious through the unconscious meanings of words.
Thus it was not surprising that Jung was deeply influenced by Sigmund
Freud’s writings on mental illness and dreams. From 1907 to 1913 Jung
maintained close ties to Freud, and in 1911 he became the first president of the
Internationale Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (International Psychoanalytic
Association). During this time Jung was seen as the ‘heir apparent’, the
natural successor to Freud as theoretical leader of the psychoanalytic
movement. However, their relationship began to deteriorate over personal
and theoretical disputes. The principal theoretical disputes were concerned
with the significance of sexuality and spirituality in human life. These
disputes finally led to the breakdown of the relationship in 1913.
Freud was an extremely powerful and influential man in the psycho-
analytic world. (We have seen how his influence led Klein to expend so
much energy on demonstrating her loyalty and allegiance to his theories,
even though her ideas were strikingly original in their own right.) Jung’s
break with Freud was a significant event in the lives of both men. Their
relationship remained unresolved and the rift seems to have resulted in a
lasting inability to integrate across their theoretical divide.
Key psychoanalytic developmental assumptions

This section discusses five specific assumptions that underlie psycho-
analytic theorising. Without being familiar with the theories, this section
may be somewhat difficult. Once the whole section is completed it would
be worthwhile to come back to this chapter to re-integrate the concepts
into your more complex understanding of the theories.
Each of the theorists covered in the section has a particular way of
engaging with these assumptions. Thus, while they hold to the validity
of the assumptions, they formulate them in ways that are unique to their
theories. This is because each of the theorists has a slightly different focus
in their theorising:
s Freud focuses on childhood

s Klein on the internal world of the infant
s Fairbairn on the external influences on the infant and child
s Bion on the development of thinking in the infant mind
s Winnicott on the mother/infant unit
s Kernberg on the development of the personality structures
s Kohut on the place of narcissism and the sense-of-self in development
s Jung on man’s spiritual strivings into adulthood
s Lacan on the child within a symbolic system.
It is inevitable that these theorists would see the same phenomena

from different viewpoints. The language of each theorist allows a dif-
ferent understanding of perhaps the same phenomena as well as offering
descriptions of different phenomena. As an example, both Freud and
Klein look at instinctual life but each has provided a language that allows
us to see the phenomena from different perspectives.
The significance of childhood

All psychoanalytic theories observe the significance of childhood in the
development of personality. Childhood is seen as the developmental period
when the child is most vulnerable to the influences of social, cultural and
family demands. It is also the time when the human organism is still in its
most formative stage and is developing ways of coping with both external
and internal demands. By internal we mean physiological demands, such
as hunger, cold, discomfort, satiation, and emotional demands such as fear,
rage, neediness and love. Psychoanalytic theories propose that it is during
childhood that the relationship between culture and physiology is at its
most significant. The infant comes into the world as a bundle of sensate
‘experiencing’, that is, the baby is only an experiencing body without the
cognitive or emotional capacities to make sense of this experience. This
initial state has to be organised into some form of coherent experience that
has meaning for the infant and the developing child. Each of the theorists
in this section hypothesises certain routes by which meaning is attained.
Each focuses upon certain elements of development that elucidate certain
developmental achievements.
Phantasy. The mental Freud postulates that the progressive physiological complexity of the
activity that is mutually child’s development interacts with cultural prohibitions (in Richards
bound up with the instincts & Dickson, 1977). This process leads to an evolution whereby the child
and gives them a mental
comes to progressively harness and curb his instinctual nature, eventuat-
representation
(Isaacs, 1948).
ing in a mature capacity to love and work. Klein (1946) proposes that the
infant, initially encapsulated within an internal world of phantasy, is faced
Psychopathology. Mental with the task of moving from this internal world into a world of shared
functioning that is deemed reality. Klein’s focus is on early infancy and the internal processes that
abnormal as judged by occur to lay the foundations for future cognitive and emotional capaci-
the norms of the subject’s ties. Bion (1967) looks at the role of the mother’s containment, that is, the
culture and society. In
functioning of her mind in bringing the infant’s mind into operation and
studying psychopathology
one is concerned with
reality contact.
understanding the Winnicott (1958) theorised about the significance of the mother/child
origin, development and bond. He saw this bond as essential to the future capacities of the child to
characteristics of its various integrate and be able to relate to others in mature and fulfilling ways.
manifestations. Jung (1986) also asserted the importance of childhood. He felt, however,
that this terrain of theoretical understanding had been well documented
Psychoanalytic psycho-
therapy. A modification of by Freud. Jung’s focus was on development during adulthood. He
psychoanalysis. Whereas postulated that significant developmental challenges faced humankind
psychoanalysis is based throughout life and these were the challenges involved in the journey
upon at least thrice of individuation, a universal development towards integration of the
weekly sessions, which personality. Lacan (1977) postulated that it was important to understand
are only transference how the symbolic world of language and culture acted upon the child and
based, psychoanalytic
imposed an alienation from the self that the child can never overcome.
psychotherapy is
conducted less often and
(while transference based) Normal and pathological development
it also deals with reality- Psychoanalytic theory arose from work with pathological functioning.
based interventions. This theory derives from work within the clinical field and from work
Personality disorder.
with individuals who are struggling or suffering with various states of
Deeply ingrained and psychic pain (psychopathology). One could argue then that these theories
maladaptive patterns of are only apposite to pathology. Certainly, psychoanalytic theories have
relating to, thinking about, given clinicians the understanding and insight to treat psychological
and perceiving the world conditions that had previously been considered untreatable. For example,
and oneself. These patterns psychoanalytic psychotherapy is the treatment of choice when one considers
lead to impairment in
conditions such as personality disorders. Freud’s theoretical paradigm
functioning and distress.
Personality disorders can
is concerned with Oedipal disorders, which are termed neuroses. Post-
often be diagnosed by late psychoanalytic theory has offered insights into pre-Oedipal disorders.
latency or adolescence and These have come to be seen as disorders of the development of the self.
continue throughout life Psychoanalytic theory, in considering the development of pathology, has
unless treated. They are also inevitably offered clinicians and theorists the opportunity to see very
termed disorders of the self. clearly those contexts which foster development of children and those
Long-term psychoanalytic
which lead to pathology and psychological damage. In this sense, through
psychotherapy is the
treatment of choice.
psychoanalytic theory, one is able to trace both ‘normal’ and pathological
development. The theorists covered in this section all postulate that there
Psychic development.
are certain optimum conditions that foster psychological growth. Freud (in
The process whereby the
mental life of an individual
Richards & Dickson, 1977) and Klein (1946) tend to focus on the internal
becomes constituted to be world and conditions that impede or foster psychic development. Winnicott
able to function within both (1958) focuses on what is required from the primary caregiver to foster the
internal and external reality. child’s optimum development. Within this context he analyses those con-
ditions that lead to compromises in the child’s development. Jung (1986) Stages. Development
traces the processes whereby integration and balance between opposing that is built upon and
forces lead to integration of the personality. Each theorist, in postulating a dependent on the
attainment of prior
theory of pathology, also postulates a theory of normal development and
developmental aspects.
the conditions necessary to foster this development. Most see the role of
the environment as important in the development of pathology. Some give Positions. Independent
more priority to innate factors such as the role of innate aggression. phases that can be
returned to at various
times throughout
Stages of development development.
All psychoanalytic theories see development as proceeding through a
sequence of stages. There are differences in terminology and even subtle
PHOTOS: JACKI WATTS

conceptual differences. For example, Freud sees the individual moving
onwards, Klein sees the individual moving back and forth. The basic
concept, however, is that an individual goes through a progressive,
dynamic process of development that either builds psychic/personality
growth or hinders such growth.
Freud postulates that the child develops through the psychosexual
stages, with each stage heralding a more mature and advanced capacity to
integrate instinctual life in the service of mature heterosexuality (Richards
& Dickson, 1977). Klein (1946) postulates two primary intra-psychic
positions through which the infant must pass. These positions will
provide the matrix through which the person will interact in the world.
The paranoid-schizoid position is the more immature position and
underlies pathological states, while the depressive position informs more
mature capacities for interpersonal relating. These two positions provide
the foundation, as it were, of the internal world. Upon this foundation
the negotiations of the psychosexual stages occur. Thus if the subject is
within the paranoid-schizoid position, one would expect that there would
be difficulties in negotiating the psychosexual stages. Winnicott has
formulated his theories upon those of Freud and Klein, and therefore he
does not articulate the idea of stages or positions as such. Rather, his focus
is on the notion that the infant goes through a sequence of developmental
needs, which must be attended to by the mother or primary caregiver.
He examines this sequence of needs and the implications of the quality
of care given to these needs (Winnicott, 1958). Jung (1986) postulates the
possibilities of tensions between opposing archetypal energies and sees
development as the progressive integration of these archetypes. (Remember
that his focus is on adulthood, and that he felt that the development of the Development after 30 years,
child had been thoroughly addressed by Freud himself.) from boyhood to manhood.
The role of the unconscious

Psychoanalytic theories all maintain the view that our psychic motivation
stems largely from unconscious forces. This is not to say that we are
incapable of conscious, rational thought and higher moral reasoning.
What the theories propose is that humans are more than these conscious,
Unconscious. Denotes all
rational capacities. The infant is born into a state of unconsciousness. The those contents that are not
infant is also essentially an instinctual being, that is, one who knows the in consciousness. It can
world through his bodily experiences—feeding and defecating— and also denote contents that
his primitive capacities for love and hate. This aspect of the unconscious have been repressed.
remains with us. The unconscious is primarily an area of instinctual

functioning which influences behaviour through the prompting of
primitive instinctual psychic experience. All the theorists maintain this
notion that we are born with a primary area of psychic functioning which
is unconscious. This area of psychic functioning can never become known
directly and is only revealed through its influences on our daily life. This
understanding helps to address questions such as why we so often marry
someone who is like one or both of our parents, why we undermine
ourselves when we so want to succeed, or why an abused child marries an
abusive partner. The unconscious is at work in all those times when our
motivations for behaviour seem so strange.
Psychoanalytic theory postulates a vast array of instinctual energies.
Freud focuses on two: the sexual and the aggressive energies. Isaacs (1948),
Instinct. A dynamic a working colleague of Klein, postulated that phantasy was the mental
process consisting of correlate of the instincts. This concept opened the door to understanding
a pressure of energy the relational quality of instinctual life. By this is meant that instinctual life
that stems from the is lived in relation to others. Post-Freudians have postulated, in opposition
source, a bodily state of to Freud, that the instincts have a very specific aim. All instinctual life
tension, such as hunger. is lived in a phantasy self-and-other relational matrix. Emotions such as
The instinct directs the
greed, envy, terror, paranoia, love and guilt are all possible unconscious
organism towards the
discharge of such tension. instinctual psychic motivations. Jung (1986) goes further to hypothesise
The object, such as food, that a person has access to the ‘collective unconscious’, an innate reservoir
allows the instinct to of archaic knowledge about being human. An individual is connected
achieve its aim. to this collective reservoir through the operation of the complexes, the
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
The realm of the dream world and the unconscious underpins all psychoanalytic theory.
personalised link to archetypal energies. These concepts will be explained

and discussed in further chapters of Section One.
A destructive aspect of unconscious functioning is also postulated.
Throughout the ages, humans have attempted to harness their instinctual
natures. This has led to them being able to live with others in increasing
levels of consciousness and civilisation. This process seems to have been
bought at a price. While governments advance humanitarian principles
and notions of civilised, rational interactions between races and nations,
never before has humankind had such capacities for worldwide destruction
and mass exploitation. What we see is that the more conscious and moral
certain nations become, the more their aggressive and greedy needs
become hidden from consciousness. They are repressed and kept hidden
through various processes which we call defences. The child develops Defences. Mechanisms
in a similar fashion. As the child matures and becomes socialised, so the of the mind that act
more primitive and ‘unwanted’ aspects of normal behaviour are relegated to protect the mind
to the unconscious. Our awareness of these unwanted aspects is dealt in a number of ways.
They are central to the
with through the operation of defences, a concept we will discuss later
development of both
in the section. Thus psychoanalytic theory postulates two aspects to the health and pathology.
unconscious: an innate and universal operation of psychic motivation based Their complexity is
in bodily instinctual life, as well as those aspects of human functioning described more specifically
which are deemed unacceptable. These aspects become relegated to the in the chapter on Freud.
unconscious due to the inevitable socialisation of our instinctual natures.
The concept of psychic structure

Psychoanalytic theorists are interested in how a baby comes to be a
person with a mind of its own. They postulate various ways in which this
development occurs, ranging from Freud’s structural model of the mind
with the id, ego and superego that organises our mental functioning, to
Fairbairn’s postulation that an internal world is formed upon environ-
mental failure. This is an aspect of why infancy and childhood are given
central importance, in that the formation of psychic structure (how the
mind works) is seen to be primarily dependent upon the organising, struc-
turing impact of the external environment upon the child’s body and
internal world experiences.
Cognitive and emotional development

We have briefly considered how Freud looks at the operation of the instincts
within psychosexual development. We have also briefly considered how
Klein perceives the relational qualities of her two intra-psychic positions,
how Bion and Winnicott emphasise the role of the mother and her care
of the infant, and how Jung considers the work of the archetypes and the
complexes that give access to the collective unconscious. These assump-
tions lay the foundation for what is perhaps the major assumption of psy-
choanalytic theory: that the quality of resolution of these experiences lays
the matrix for our future emotional and cognitive capacities. The quality
of resolution would indicate the degree to which we are capable of living
relatively free from the pathology and/or the press of our unconscious
inner worlds. Where our childhood experiences have left fixations and
unmet developmental needs, we will be compromised in letting go of
these unconscious influences. Where we are relatively free of fixations and

have experienced ‘good-enough mothering’ (Winnicott, 1958) we will be
relatively capable of emotional and cognitive autonomy in both our inter-
nal and external worlds.
A critique of psychoanalytic assumptions

The critique of psychoanalytic assumptions applies across the spectrum
of theorists we have covered in this chapter. Each theorist will have areas
that attract critique yet there are general critiques that apply to all. The
foremost of these is the claim that psychoanalytic theory is unscientific.
It is claimed that most aspects of the theory lack experimental
support and that the theory is unverifiable according to normal scientific
standards. This is a particularly dated critique, which fails to acknowledge
Figure 2.1 A genealogy of the enormous amount of research data gathered over the years in
dialogues and developments support of psychoanalytic claims. This data comes from a wide range of
in psychoanalytic thinking. research interests, from infant observation, to neurological research, to
Freud
Ferenczi Cultural school Jung Analytic Body therapies Perls

Abrahams Erikson Theory Reich Gestalt therapy
Rank Fromm 1 Classical school Lowen
Horney 2 Archetypal
3 Developmental Berne
Psychodrama
Sullivan Bioenergetics
Fromm-Reichman Ida Rolf [Rolfing]
Eastern philosophies
Searles Ego Psychology and practice Zanov
Hartman Yoga/martial arts [Primal therapy]
Jacobson Eastern medicine

Mahler Maslow Acupuncture/breath
May Western dance/
Lacan Rogers theatre movement
Laing
1 Classical Fairbairn
Psychoanalysis 2 Object Relations Guntrip
Anna Freud Klein
Isaacs Kernberg Balint 4 Self Psychology
Segal Kohut
French ORT Bion 3 Middle School Wolf
Green Rosenfeld Winnicott Intersubjectivists
Rey Heimann Khan Chessick
clinical case studies. All these fields offer wide-ranging support for the
importance of childhood, for the role of parenting, and for the significance
of unconscious motivations in innate emotional capacity and in adult
personality functioning. Look at the following chapter on Freud for a
more elaborated discussion of these issues.
A more difficult critical claim concerns the deterministic nature
of psychoanalytic theory. The claim is made that the theory suggests
psychological development of the individual to be largely complete by the
time of puberty and that the individual is then imprisoned by his or her
development history. A way to think about this claim is to consider that
the theory is deterministic about the development of psychic apparatus
during certain times and conditions. However, it is not so when one comes
to the particulars of an individual’s life. The theory is not predictive. All
it claims is that at certain developmental stages, certain developmental
achievements occur, which lead to the maturing of the human organism.
Clearly all theory is worthy of critique. Nevertheless, one’s critique
must respond to the current state of theory.
Specific tasks
➊ Once you have reviewed the whole of the Psychoanalytic Section, go back and look at
the pages dealing with the assumptions of psychoanalytic theories. You will notice that
Kernberg, Kohut and Erikson are not covered. How would you capture their central
theoretical foci under these assumptions?
➋ Here is a list of serial killers. Research the development history of one of these
individuals and apply the developmental concepts of one or more of the theories in
this section. Consider whether the theory allows you an understanding of the level
of hatred and aggression expressed by the killer.
Albert DeSalvo, the Boston Strangler; Ed Gein, the man upon whom The Texas
Chainsaw Massacre movie was based; Ted Bundy; David Berkowitz, Son of Sam;
Aileen Wuornos, upon whom the movie Monster was styled; Kobus Geldenhuys,
the Norwood killer, and Moses Sithole, two of South Africa’s most notorious serial killers.
➌ Once you have reviewed the whole of the Psychoanalytic Section, consider in what
ways the theorists covered offer complementary and/or divergent views of development.
➍ Is the period of childhood—in your opinion—really as significant for personality

development as psychoanalytic theorists argue it is? Motivate your answer with
reference to your own experiences.
➎ Give careful thought to the concept of the unconscious: What evidence can we find
for the existence of this ‘area’ or aspect of psychological functioning? Again refer to
personal references drawn from your own life. >>
<<
➏ If you were formulating a theory of development, what assumptions would
underlie your theory?
➐ What do you think are the strongest critiques of the psychoanalytic approach and why?
➑ Give some thought to how the basic psychoanalytic principles discussed above
inform the clinical practice of psychoanalysis.
Recommended readings
Freud, S (1977). ‘Three essays on the theory of sexuality’. In A. Richards & A. Dickson (eds),
The Penguin Freud Library. Volume 7 on sexuality: Three essays on the theory of sexuality and
other work. London: Penguin.
(Freud lays out his theory of infantile sexuality in ways that make the theory accessible.)
Gay, P (1988). Freud, a life for our times. London: Papermac.
(A wonderful insight into the life and times and the theory of Freud.)
Grosskurth, P (1986). Melanie Klein. Her world and her work. London: Jason Aronson.
(A thorough biography of Klein. Gives insight into her life and motivations and gives human drama
to her theory.)
Isaacs, S (1948). ‘The nature and function of phantasy’. In M. Klein (ed), Contributions to
psychoanalysis, 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press.
(The first exposition of the Kleinian position on phantasy. Rather long-winded but definitive for
the serious student.)
Jung, C G (1963). Memories, dreams, reflections. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(An autobiography that gives one a personal glimpse of how Jung thought about his life.)
Jung, C G (1986). Analytic psychology: Its theory and practice. London: Ark Paperbacks.
(A very readable overview of Jung’s theories. It is based upon his lectures to the Tavistock.)
Klein, M (1946). ‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’. International journal of psychoanalysis, 27, 99-110.
(Her definitive paper. It may be a bit hard but well worth the effort to serious students.)
Kohon, G (ed) (1986). The British school of psycho-analysis: The independent tradition.
London: Free Association Books.
(This collection has some wonderful essays which illustrate the creativity characteristic of the
Independent tradition.)
Lacan, J (1979). The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. London: Penguin.
(A difficult read, but for the serious student it covers Lacan’s reading of four of Freud’s basic concepts.)
Segal, H (1964). Introduction to the work of Melanie Klein. New York: Basic Books.
(One of the best overviews of Klein’s work.)
Winnicott, D W (1958). Collected papers: Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. New York:
Basic Books.
(As always, a wonderful experience.)
CHAPTER
3
Freud’s psychoanalytic
theory of development
and personality
Jacki Watts and Derek Hook
This chapter will cover the following major concepts

of Freud:
1. The concept of the unconscious

2. Infantile and adult sexuality
3. Psychosexual stages of development
4. The Oedipus complex
5. The structure of the mind
6. The role of defences
7. Pathology and neurosis
8. The role of dreams
9. Critiques of Freud’s
developmental theory
Freud, psychoanalysis and

developmental psychology Sigmund Freud
Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking has had an enormous impact, not
only in terms of its clinical importance within the realm of treating
mental distress or psychopathology but also in terms of its impact
on critical and intellectual ways of thinking, of analysing and
explaining cultural phenomena in the 20th and 21st centuries. Freud’s
theories are also important in that they propose an understanding of
a basic structure for normal personality development. They thus offer a
broad framework through which to trace the aetiology of psychopathology.
For these reasons his theorising is strongly tied to the pragmatics of

clinical application. Another reason why Freud’s theories are so useful
is that they strive for a balance between biological and social factors of
Psyche/psychic. Initially
development, seeing man within his bio-psycho-social context. Freud
used to indicate the ‘soul’; saw that neither socio-cultural nor physiological factors could be dropped
now used to designate from developmental theory, as they work reciprocally in influencing an
the psychological, or the individual’s unique personality and particular psychological problems.
mental. Often contrasted
with soma, meaning The concept of the unconscious
the body.
Freud was not the first to discuss the operation of an unconscious
Unconscious. Term used dimension. In fact he was working within a well-established tradition
to designate those mental himself but history now places his conceptualisations as the beginning of
processes and contents not an amazingly wide and profound development within both psychology and
knowable to the individual. culture generally. What was new was Freud’s insistence that understand-
More specifically, the ing the unconscious was the Rosetta stone to understanding the human
unconscious is a region psychic life.
of the mind that operates
There were a number of different phases in the development of his
autonomously and plays
a crucial role in mental thinking—his work under Charcot, his attempt at the ‘Project for a
(psychic) functioning. Scientific Psychology’, his attempt at postulating a physiological model
It has its own mode of of psychic functioning, his work with hypnosis, dreams, and psycho-
expression and steers pathology. All these phases culminated in a broad and amazing theory
us into behaviours and postulating a particular understanding of the operation of the mind.
emotions for which the Freud postulated that psychic functioning could not be reduced to
motivations are unknown
what is conscious. His work suggested to him that there is a region of
to our conscious mind.
This region influences our the mind that operates autonomously, playing a crucial role in mental
everyday behaviours and, (psychic) functioning. This region of the mind, Freud postulated, has its
significantly, this region is own mode of expression. It steers us into behaviours and emotions for
implicated in the formation which the motivations are unknown to our conscious mind. This region
of neurotic symptoms. The influences our everyday behaviours and, significantly, it is implicated
unconscious contains a in the formation of pathological functioning. This region of the mind
massive store of memories,
he termed the unconscious.
impulses, wishes and
fantasies. The contents of the unconscious are not inherently different to
consciousness. This is an important point because it is a common error
Instincts. The biological to assume that the contents of the unconscious are appalling, horrendous,
and inborn physiological dangerous instincts which, if allowed out to play, would destroy one.
needs of the infant. This is not so.
Freud’s conception of instincts

Instincts are traditionally considered to be involving a source—a pressure of energy
hereditary patterns peculiar to animal species. such as the bodily stimulation one feels
They are unvarying across members of the with hunger or sexual arousal—and an aim.
species, they unfold developmentally, they Reaching the aim will eliminate the tension
are generally resistant to change and they produced by the source. It is through the
appear to have a purpose. In Freud’s postula- object, such as food or a sexual object, that
tion, the instinct (trieb) is a dynamic process the instinct may obtain its aim.
F r e u d ’s p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y o f d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p e r s o n a l i t y 39
Rather, it is socialisation that has imposed the need for some feelings
and actions to remain unconscious to our functioning. As such, these
feelings and actions are associated with our natural instinctual life—our
inborn patterns of behaving towards certain stimuli. These may be sexual
and aggressive feelings. Social living dictates that some of this material
needs to remain unconscious to safeguard the coherence of the society. It
is upon this premise that Freud postulated our development towards a Soma/somatic. The body/
relatively civilised state. of the body.
Trieb
In considering the conditions that might sexuality, Freud postulates the infant in
render psychic material unconscious, Freud an initial polymorphous state, that is,
postulated the operation of the instinct or infantile sexuality occurs in several distinct
drives. Freud wrote in German, using the forms - oral, anal, phallic and genital. This
terms instinkt and trieb. English translations state is merely concerned with the aim of
have used the term instinct for both these eliminating tension at the somatic source.
terms, leaving the risk of confusing the The source could be oral, anal or phallic.
two meanings that Freud intended. In The instinct would thus attach itself to
his writing they are used in quite distinct any object that resulted in satisfaction.
ways. Instinkt is used in the classical sense Fixations at this stage of polymorphous
of animal instinct, such as an instinctual infantile sexuality could lead to what Freud
recognition of danger. His use of trieb defines as perversion in adult sexuality.
designates a dynamic, that is, something What he demonstrates in his study of
which is alive. This dynamic describes sexual perversion is that the object is
a relationship: the instinct as having a variable. It is chosen because of the
source, an aim and an object. vicissitude of the person’s history and
Freud’s concept of trieb has commonly where the fixation may lie.
come to be termed instinct, which is an In the relative normal development
unfortunate simplification. It has led some of sexuality, the aim of the instinct only
to thinking that for Freud ‘sex is all’. This becomes subordinate to the genital zone
is not so. It is instinct as designated by at the end of a complex evolution through
trieb, which underlies Freud’s complex childhood. This evolution is dependent
understanding of psychic motivation. upon biological maturation but its course
The instinct has its source in the bodily is influenced by complex forces of repres-
sensation, such as an oral need. The aim sion that may result in fixation at any of
of the instinct is then to discharge the the psychosexual stages. Thus one can see
state of tension created by the need, that, in and of itself, the instinct has no
either through eating, drinking, talking, moral rightness or wrongness about it.
smoking or screaming, etc. The object The polymorphous nature of infantile
is the means by which this may come sexuality is pressured through the
about, for example food, cigarettes, progressive demands of socialisation into
drugs or words. a genital state and the variable infantile
The popular view of sexuality is that motivations inherent in the instinct are
it means heterosexual genital contact. repressed into the unconscious.
In his study of perversions and infantile (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973)
Significantly, an intimate relationship exists between the growth of

consciousness and the growth of civilisation. Consciousness has allowed
greater control over instinctual life. Thus most of our instinctual urges
have become repressed in one way or another. We value measured living
—not too much food, sex or pleasure. The natural unconscious instincts
of the baby, when they surface to consciousness, have to be repressed in
the interests of the social world. Our instinctual life, in and of itself, is not
‘bad’ but it is the need to live with others that requires the need to control
this life. This has left us fearful of our instinctual nature.
Infantile and adult sexuality

Because he came to the study of human psychology through psychiatry and
medicine, it is understandable that Freud was always keen to emphasise
a strong biological current in human development. In fact, for Freud, the
story of human development can largely be traced through the various
primary bodily functions of the infant, functions which are necessary
for its survival and which also provide a powerful focus of socialisation
in the first few years of life. Freud’s theory of development is one that
Sexual instincts. The requires us to suspend many of our normal assumptions about childhood
inborn dynamic drive, and sexuality. For instance, the ways in which we typically discuss and
located in the id and
understand human sexuality are too narrow for Freud. For him, human
physiologically based,
that urges one to find sexuality is about far more than just penetrative genital sex between hetero-
gratification in a sexual sexual partners.
object. In Freud’s view, Because Freud maintains that sexual instincts are as present and as
this instinct is meant to active in infants as they are in adults and that infants are sexually active
serve the procreation of beings from day one (Freud, 1977), we need to qualify what he means by
the species. infantile sexuality and to clarify the crucial differences between this and
Erogenous zones. Those adult sexuality.
parts of the body that are An important understanding is to clarify that when Freud uses the
tied to necessary somatic term infantile sexuality he is not denoting an infant per se. This is a term
(physical) functions to distinguish sexuality that has not reached a genital level of expression.
(eating, excreting, Thus even an adult can manifest infantile sexuality, meaning that they are
urinating) and that are
not able to find pleasure in genital sex but require other means of gaining
the sources both of
tension and of pleasure sexual satisfaction.
for the individual. There The aim:
are three basic erogenous Infantile sexuality revolves around the pleasurable stimulation of
zones, the mucous any of the erogenous zones of the body; adult sexuality is predominantly
membranes of the mouth, focused on the genitals. Erogenous zones are those parts of the body
the anus and the genitals. that are tied to necessary somatic (physical) functions (such as eating,
Sexual aim. The specific excreting, urinating). They are the sources of both tension and pleasure
sexual act towards which for the individual. There are three basic erogenous zones: the mucous
one’s sexual instinct is membranes of the mouth, the anus and the genitals. The stimulation of
particularly drawn. As an the mouth leads to oral pleasure (sucking, smoking, eating), the emptying
example, any of a variety of the bowels produces anal pleasure, and the rubbing of the penis or
of sexual activities, such
vagina leads to genital pleasure.
as looking, touching or
even the exchange of
Unlike adults, infants have no necessary focus on their genitals as the
pain, can initially be most important source of pleasure. Due to this lack of differentiation,
prioritised as the sexual Freud suggests that infantile sexuality has not properly defined its sexual
aim for the infant. aim, in other words the specific sexual act towards which one’s sexual in-
PHO TO : CHA J O HNS TO N

In Freud’s view we are born neither innately heterosexual nor homosexual; instead, we are all innately bisexual.
stinct is particularly drawn is not defined. As a result, any one of a variety Polymorphously
of activities that provide bodily sensations of pleasure—such as looking, perverse. The phrase
touching and even the exchange of pain—can be the sexual aim for the Freud uses to describe
the sexuality of the infant
infant, or an adult functioning from a pre-genital stage of development.
before the hierachy of
Infants, therefore, are ‘polymorphously perverse’ (Freud, 1977). This term component instincts has
indicates that they have no hierarchies or ordering of sexual instincts. been established (oral,
Mature sexuality, by contrast, requires that the adult should subordinate anal and phallic) under
all the other sexual instincts (oral, anal and visual satisfaction) to the sexual the subordination of all
priority of penetrative, genital sex. This does not mean that all our other other sexual instincts to
sexual instincts disappear as we reach mature sexuality. Oral and anal sex the priority of penetrative
genital sex.
(and visual stimulation) still remain potentially pleasurable for adults; it is
just that these sexual pleasures generally become subordinated, as ‘fore-
play’ activities, to the priority and focus of genital sex.
The object:
The second important difference between infantile and adult sexuality
is that the infant, unlike the adult, has not channelled the sexual instincts Sexual object/object-
towards a specific sexual object (Freud, 1977). Freud used this term to choice. Freud’s term for
denote one’s preferred type of sexual partner, the person whom one finds one’s preferred type of
sexually attractive. Freud maintains that settling on a secure object-choice sexual partner or the
is a characteristic only of mature adult sexuality. Thus the infant is not person whom one finds
only polymorphously perverse but also inherently bisexual. The infant has most sexually attractive.
no innate predisposition to any one gender as more sexually desirable. For
Bisexuality. Having
Freud, in short, there is no genetic preprogramming making the infant no sexual preference for
male prefer females, or the female prefer males. Sexual preference, the either exclusively male
making of a stable object-choice (be it heterosexual or homosexual), is thus or female categories of
only an outcome of the process of psychosexual development. object-choice.
‘Perversions’
Perversions specifically denote deviations other forms, homosexuality, paedophilia

of the sexual instincts. The word refers to and bestiality.
the whole of psychosexual behaviour that
accompanies atypical means of obtaining 2. The orgasm is subordinate to certain
sexual pleasure. Perversion is said to be other extrinsic conditions that may of
present in adults when: themselves bring about sexual pleasure.
These could be, among other forms,
1. Orgasm is reached with other sexual fetishism, transvestism, voyeurism, exhi-
objects than through coitus with the bitionism and sado-masochism.
opposite sex. These could be, among (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973)
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
The fact that the infant has no in-built object-choice is supported by

Freud’s contention that the infant will form an erotic attachment to who-
ever nurses, cares for and feeds it in the earliest months of life. Typically
this is the mother. Significantly, infantile sexuality obeys no sexual taboos
against incest. In fact, Freud claims that infantile sexuality is innately
incestuous, and the sexual desires of the child for one or both of the
parents are so strong that they need to be resolved in the Oedipus com-
plex, which we will presently describe in more detail.
Freud formulated the broad differences between the beginning points
For Freud infantile and adult of infantile sexuality and the (ideal) end points of adult sexuality. This pic-
sexuality are qualitatively ture corresponds to the more general progression of human development
different. Freud believed,
from the infant in the unsocialised, amoral state of nature, to the adult in
against the dominant views
of the time, that sexual the socialised, moral state of culture. We can now go on to ‘fill in the gaps’
instincts were powerfully that connect infantile sexuality to adult sexuality.
present in children.
Infant ➞ Adult
‘Polymorphously perverse’ ➞ ‘Genital sexuality’
(all erogenous zones are sources ➞ (erogenous zones are subordinated to the
of sexual pleasure) primacy of the genitals)
sexual aim has not been defined ➞ defined sexual aim

(a variety of sexual acts can lead ➞ (generally genital penetrative sex is prioritised
to sexual satisfaction) as the means of sexual satisfaction)
no sexual object-choice has been made ➞ secure object-choice has been made
(any person is as good as another as a source
of sexual pleasure and desire)
➞ (a certain specific type of person is preferred
to others as a source of sexual pleasure)
innately bisexual ➞ generally heterosexual
incestuous sexuality ➞ non-incestuous sexuality
exists in state of nature ➞ exists in state of culture
Figure 3.1 Conceptualising the differences between infant and adult sexuality. (Sue van Zyl)
Psychosexual stages of development

We have established that the infant is a sexual being that receives sexual
pleasure through the stimulation of its various erogenous zones. We have Libido. The sum total of all
also established that these zones are bound to vital physical functions that of an individual’s various
the infant needs to perform in order to survive. The child experiences the and combined sexual
build-up of tension in these zones, for example, a full bladder, or the need instincts, which are inborn.
for food. Subsequent relief of these tensions leads to the child’s experience
Fixation. This is the
of pleasure. It is worth emphasising here that the infant receives these
outcome of a child’s
pleasures on a daily basis through the routines of feeding, being washed, failure to adequately
cleaned and nursed. In line with the idea of the libido being ‘schooled’ resolve and move on from
is Freud’s postulation that, although each of the erogenous zones may a specific developmental
be pleasurably stimulated from the beginning of life onwards, different challenge during one or
zones dominate at different times of the infant’s life. He also postulates other of the psychosexual
that different and important socialising challenges are tied to each of stages. A certain amount
of the libido becomes
the zones. In this way it makes sense to speak of developmental stages.
‘stuck’, permanently
Each stage requires the infant to complete an adaptive activity which will invested in a particular
contribute to the biological maturity of the child, and will also have a stage. This leads to the
foundational influence on the child’s emerging personality. development of certain
The transition from one zonal stage to the next is not always smooth. If personality dispositions.
the developing child does not properly resolve the specific developmental
challenge of each stage, then a certain amount of the libido becomes
permanently invested in these zonal stages. Freud (1977)

calls this process fixation. The result of fixation is that less
libidinal energy is available to deal with the conflicts in the
later stages. The successful resolution of later stages then
becomes more difficult. Various psychological problems
and personality traits may result from fixations at certain
stages of psychosexual development. Fixation can occur
because the child was overindulged in a certain stage and
does not wish to move on. An example might be a child
who is overfed and finds weaning a difficult time due to
the satisfying relationship to the breast. Fixation might
also occur because a child was frustrated in having the
psychosexual needs of the stage adequately satisfied. In
such a case, neither the biological needs nor the emotional
needs of the child have been adequately resolved. These
ideas will become clearer as we continue. It is important to
emphasise that the work of the instincts, their satisfaction,
and the fixations that might arise are processes that are
completely unconscious.
The oral stage (birth to 18 months)

The oral stage is the first stage by virtue of the fact
that feeding is the primary function of the child at this age. Most of the Although the oral stage
infant’s interaction with the world at this time occurs through the mouth. predominates between birth
and 18 months as a source
The mouth is the source of pleasure, through tasting, licking and sucking.
of pleasure and a means
Freud claims that at this stage, sexual activity has not yet been separated of exploration, it continues
from the ingestion of food. The mouth is also the means through which to be a powerful focus
the child may best be soothed, by giving it a bottle or the breast to suck on. throughout childhood.
At this stage it is also true

PHO TO : MI CHELE V RDO LJAK
PHO TO : CHA JO HNS TO N

to say that the mouth is an
exploratory instrument and
is in many ways the primary
means through which the in-
fant establishes contact with
the outside world. As Maier
(1988) claims, infants essen-
tially meet their society orally.
Each stage has a passive
and an active component,
or phase. In the oral stage,
the first component is pas-
sive, the incorporative phase
(sucking), which shows the
extent to which the infant is
An oral fixation might manifest Freud maintains that incorporation helpless, dependent and lim-
in an individual gaining an is the basis for the psychological ited to ‘taking in’ the outside
inordinate amount of pleasure function of identification. The world. Freud maintains that
from oral stimulations, such example Freud gives is of thumb
as smoking, eating, drinking, sucking, where the child substitutes
incorporation is the basis for
kissing, or even talking. part of its own body for the nipple. the psychological function
of identification, whereby
individuals take a part of
Incorporative phase. The the outside world into them as a way of making it part of them and as a
first part of the oral stage, way of making them more self-sufficient. The example Freud gives is of
when the infant is helpless, thumb sucking, where the child substitutes a part of his own body for the
dependent and limited
nipple. The second phase of the oral stage is an active one, the sadistic phase
to ‘taking in’ the outside
world. Freud maintained
(biting). It occurs as the infant begins teething and here pleasure becomes
that incorporation was the linked to the destructive activities of chewing and biting.
basis for the psychological This is also the time at which the infant begins eating solid foods.
function of identification, The sadistic qualities of this phase are epitomised in the action of
whereby a part of the biting the breast. A variety of aggressive tendencies may be linked to
outside world is taken this developmental phase.
within the individual as
As weaning is a goal of the oral phase, it becomes increasingly important
a means of making it
part of them.
for the child to let go of the mother and to become less reliant upon oral
gratification, which is a need that will inevitably be frustrated. A number of
Identification. The personality traits may stem from the quality of resolution of this phase. Such
process whereby an traits reside along the continua of dependence-independence, trust-mistrust
individual adopts one or and optimism-pessimism. Unsatisfactory resolution results in fixation at
more attributes of another the more ‘negative’ ends of these continuum. It is not difficult to identify
subject for himself.
the qualities of ‘oral characters’. These are the people that relate to the world
Sadistic phase. The
orally and who are more preoccupied than others, with the pleasures of eating
second part of the oral and drinking (or the avoidance of eating, such as anorexia nervosa). They
phase where the infant may have preference for oral types of sexuality such as kissing, cunnilingus
begins teething and where or fellatio. They may also choose to reduce tension by smoking, drinking
pleasure becomes linked to or nail biting (Abraham, 1927). Gullibility—the tendency to ‘swallow
the destructive activities of everything you’re told’—also derives from this phase of development
chewing and biting.
(Carver & Scheier, 1988) as does being garrulous or verbose.
The anal stage (18 months to three years)

During the anal stage the focus is on the anus as the erogenous zone.
Again, this stage of development involves first a passive phase, then an
active one. To begin with, the aim is simply to eject the object, to destroy
it and ‘be done with it’. This is the passive phase of the anal stage where
the child concedes to parental demands and ‘gives away’ or ‘sacrifices’
the faeces as a ‘gift’. This phase of the anal stage is often accompanied by
encouragement, reward and praise from the parents. The child is thus
convinced of the value of producing ‘things’ at the ‘right’ time and place.
Freud suggests that this provides the basis for adult productivity and
creativity, or the converse of obsessive anxieties over production.
The second and active phase of the anal stage relates to the retaining
of faeces, to ‘holding back’, and to the defiance of parental wishes. The
child has now learnt sphincter control and is able to increase his own sex-
ual pleasure by withholding faeces. The defiance in this ‘holding back’
provides for the possibility of a change in the child’s character. The child
not only wants to decide for himself, but for others too. He wants to own,
to dominate, and to punish others. Hence this stage of zonal development
may be linked to dominating and controlling dispositions in later life. Anal retentive traits.
The refusal of the child to ‘deliver’ faeces may lead to negative Particular fixation at
parental reactions, such as scolding and punishment, to which the child the anal stage leading
to personality traits like
may react in two ways. If he responds by withholding the faeces and
excessive orderliness,
urine, then anal retentive traits develop. Fixation at this stage can be seen stinginess and
in personality traits like excessive orderliness, stinginess and stubbornness. stubbornness.
Alternatively, the child may rebel by forcefully excreting, which may lead
to anal expulsive traits. Fixation at this stage can be seen in personality Anal expulsive traits.
traits like cruelty, hostility and messy and destructive behaviour. Particular fixation at
the anal stage leading
to personality traits like
The phallic stage (three to five years)
the tendency to be
The necessities of urination and washing of the genital areas make it cruel, hostile, messy
inevitable that children will notice the pleasure associated with these body and destructive.
parts. Freud (1977: 88) observes that ‘scarcely a single individual escapes’
some kind of infantile masturbation in this phase. This masturbation is of Infantile masturbation.
a non-orgasmic type. Non-orgasmic, pleasurable
Up until this point of psychosexual development, sexual desire is large- stimulation of the genitals.
ly auto-erotic, which is to say that sexual pleasure can, to a large extent, be
Auto-eroticism.
achieved through self-stimulation, such as thumb sucking. Although the Early quality of sexual
primary caregiver has been a central figure in the sexual life of the child development in which
up until now, it is at the phallic stage of development that sexual urges sexual pleasure can, to a
and desires towards a sexual object come to focus strongly on one external large extent, be achieved
object which is, invariably, the primary caregiver. The developing sexual through self-stimulation.
desire for the caregiver grows and it is this that leads the child into the
Phallic stage. Phase of
Oedipus complex, an aspect of the phallic stage. We shall discuss this
psychosocial development
complex in greater depth presently. where the erogenous focus
The phallic stage is characterised by the interest that children now in boys is on the penis,
show in their genitals. In boys, in particular, Freud claims, it is this organ and in girls on the clitoris.
(the penis) that best represents the child’s instincts for knowledge, through
its proneness to excitement and the wealth of sensations that it is capable of.
Freud maintains that the drive for knowledge generally springs from this
Scopophilic drive. The stage of development. Children are very curious about the sexual differ-
desire to see another’s ences of the genders and about ‘where babies come from’. This is the time
sexual organs, manifesting of games such as ‘doctor doctor’ which manifest the scopophilic drive of
in active and passive
this stage. This is the desire to see another’s sexual organs. The scopophilic
guises respectively as
exhibitionism (the
drive manifests in an active way as with exhibitionism (the sexual desire to
sexual desire to show show one’s genitals to another) and in passive ways, such as voyeurism (the
one’s genitals to others) desire to see other people naked or engaging in sexual activity).
and voyeurism (the desire It is at this stage also that girls and boys discover their anatomical sex-
to watch other people ual differences. Following the perspective of the little boy, Freud claims
naked or engaging in that it is the little boy’s assumption that all other living beings possess a
sexual activity).
penis similar to his. Inevitably though, the boy discovers that girls lack a
Exhibitionism. The
penis. The childhood reaction to this discovery in boys is one of fear, the
sexual desire to show fear that they might lose their penis, that ‘someone might take it away’. In
one’s genitals to others. girls the discovery of their lack of a penis leads to reactions of jealousy; they
see the little boy has something that they do not have, and they instantly
Voyeurism. The desire want it. These are the two respective bases for the formation of castration
to watch other people anxiety and penis envy. Castration anxiety in males is where there is either
naked or engaging in
a literal or a figurative fear of, in some way, losing the penis, or manhood
sexual activity.
generally. Penis envy in females is the desire to possess a penis, or to attain
Castration anxiety.
a certain masculine status. Both of these phenomena will be discussed in
The literal or figurative more detail in relation to the Oedipus complex.
unconscious fear in males Consider the number of ways in which Freud’s understandings about
of in some way losing having or not having a penis become manifest in the world. 1: Having
their penis, or their or not having a penis is permeated with cultural values and meanings.
manhood generally. 2: In patriarchal societies men have greater power, and little boys are ac-
corded more importance than little girls. Girls may even be killed at birth.
Penis envy. The literal
or figurative unconscious 3: The rise of feminist thought attests to the theorising that has attempted
desire in females to to understand the dominance of the male.
possess their own penis, The significance of the penis is not wholly determined by culture.
or to attain a certain The value of having a penis is also supported by a diverse range
masculine status. of influences. Consider, for example, issues of active and passive
behavioural roles where the act of penetration by the penis, by definition,
implies greater power than the more passive act of incorporation by the
vagina. Common judgements around ‘absence and presence’ are also
made where the ‘having’ of something is preferable to the ‘not having’
of it. There are also judgements around size, where ‘bigger’ or ‘more
noticeable’ is also seen as better. Within these modes of thinking, it is
understandable that male genitals are seen as preferable to the discreet or
smaller sexual organs of women.
The active-passive polarity of this phallic stage corresponds to the
penis versus non-penis, male-genital versus castrated polarity, or put
more simply, to the distinction between presence and absence. For Freud
this presence-absence distinction has important ramifications for the way
children come to understand their gender roles in society, and how they
come to be gendered into an active position or a passive position. The
parental ‘training’ that accompanies this stage is the prohibition around
masturbation and appropriate sexual behaviour. The prohibitions may or
may not be accompanied by threats of punishment. We will discuss the
implications of the prohibition as part of the Oedipus complex.
Latency (five years to puberty)

The phallic stage includes the negotiation of the Oedipus complex. This Defences. The multiple
is a time of psychic turmoil which we will discuss after this section on processes that protect the
psychosexual stages. With the resolution of the phallic stage the child ego from real or imagined
threats, and whose
enters a period of relative calm where sexual and aggressive instincts
ultimate function is to keep
become fairly inactive. The calmness of latency is largely the result of unconscious material out
the large-scale use of the defences. Defences protect the ego from real of conscious awareness.
or imagined threats. Their ultimate function is to keep unconscious Defence mechanisms may
material out of conscious awareness. Defence mechanisms may be used be used to channel or
to channel or control the forces that may otherwise lead to neurosis or control the forces that may
psychosis. Defences typically act as a compromise between wish and otherwise lead to neurosis.
Defences typically act as a
reality. Neurosis and psychosis are the result of defences breaking down.
compromise between wish
In the latency stage we see defences such as repression and sublimation and reality.
required to bring to an end the Oedipus complex and institute a
rudimentary superego, which we will describe later. Sublimation refers Repression.
to the situation where the build-up of sexual and aggressive instincts is The mechanism through
expressed in socially acceptable ways, such as running instead of fighting, which unacceptable or
the making of art, the dedication of one’s life to religion or the search disturbing impulses or
ideas are kept by the ego
for knowledge (Freud, 1977). Repression refers to the mechanism that
out of the conscious part
keeps unacceptable or disturbing impulses or ideas out of consciousness of the mind.
(Freud, 1977).
Sublimation is considered the most mature and productive defence
mechanism. Freud considers the period of latency a necessary condition for Sublimation.
our aptitude to develop ‘higher civilisation’. Significantly, the form or aim of The situation where the
the sublimation will be culturally prescribed. In one culture, sublimation buildup of sexual instincts
is expressed in socially
may take the form of the instincts being cathected to a stringent devotion
acceptable ways, like
to religion; in another it may take the form of dedication to a well-paid the making of art, the
and demanding corporate-sector job. dedication of one’s life
Given that sexual and aggressive instincts are far more moderate at to religion or the search
this stage of development, the child has the opportunity to turn its atten- for knowledge.
tion to other pursuits. This is not so much a time where conflicts are
confronted, or new traits developed, but rather a time where children Cathected. Invested
with libidinal energy.
begin to consolidate. The consolidation is based upon the breadth and
quality of earlier experience related to the developmental stages already
completed. Parental identifications picked up in the phallic stage, for
example, may now be complemented with other important social or
authority figures. The period of latency is also when children really
learn to feel love for those who have taken care of them throughout
their childhood. As Freud (1977: 146) puts it, ‘All through the period
of latency children learn to feel for other people who have helped them
in their helplessness, and who have satisfied their needs, a love which
is on the model of, and a continuation of, their relation as sucklings
to their nursing mother’. It is here that love becomes a part of the
sexual instincts.
Whereas previously nature (physiology) has been the dominant force
in the child’s psychosexual development, with the advent of the Oedipus
complex, and onwards, the force of culture now begins to be dominant
in the psychosexual life of the individual.
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS 48 Developmental Psychology
Young, latency-aged The genital stage (puberty onwards)

children unselfconsciously As latency draws to a close with the arrival of puberty, sexual and aggres-
practising gendered roles. sive urges once again become influential. Conflicts encountered at pre-
vious developmental stages may occur again, this time within the broader
demands of culture. The ability to deal with and resolve such crises is
important to the eventual identity of the adolescent. Adult sexual desires
begin to become apparent in the individual. While the adolescent may be
sexually mature in the biological sense, in some cultures, the act of sexual
intercourse is not yet socially acceptable. Other means of gratification
must be sought and masturbation and sexual fantasy become increasingly
important preoccupations of the individual.
Great physiological changes accompany this final stage of develop-
ment: menstruation in girls and the capacity for erection in boys. These
changes prove very important in adapting infantile sexuality to its final,
normal, adult shape. If all the prior psychosexual stages have been prop-
erly negotiated and no strong fixations have developed, the individual
generally enters this stage with the sexual instincts powerfully focused on
the genital organs. The auto-erotic sexual instincts now become directed
towards a sexual object and the separate and partial component instincts
of the various erogenous zones combine in subordination to the primacy
of the genital zone. The pleasures of the other erogenous zones will
generally now be little more than ‘fore-pleasures’ to the overriding focus
on penetrative heterosexual genital intercourse.
The Oedipus complex has been instrumental in instituting a non- Genitally-led. The phrase
incestuous, (generally) heterosexual, genitally-led eroticism that serves Freud uses to describe the
the purpose of reproduction. Also of great importance is the fact that sexuality of the adult after
the various component
the sexual instincts become absolutely directed towards a sexual object.
sexual instincts have
Instead of being preoccupied with his own sexual gratification, the been subordinated under
individual now develops the desire to share mutual sexual gratification the sexual priority of
with someone else. penetrative genital sex.
Whereas the phallic stage was dominated simply by the sensory organ
stimulus of the penis and the clitoris, the genital stage is dominated by the
goal of orgasm through a particular form of stimulation of the penis and
the vagina. The overarching sexual aim of this final phase is, for the male,
to penetrate the vagina with his penis and, for the female, to be penetrated
in the vagina by the penis. The ability to achieve full and free orgasm
with a heterosexual partner on an equal basis is an important foundation
for intimate relationships and life-partner choices from here on. By now,
individuals are able to share erogenous pleasure with others in a warm
and caring way, to be concerned for them, to feel love for them.
Individuals generally now have better control over their sexual and
aggressive instincts and have been transformed from pleasure-seeking,
self-centred infants into socialised and caring adults. As we know, not
all people succeed in properly entering the genital stage. Many of us
have less than adequate control over our sexual and aggressive instincts
and are also unable to gratify our sexual desires in a completely satis-
fying and acceptable way. So although the genital stage represents the
perfect culmination of psychosexual development it is, in many ways,
more of an ideal to strive for than an end that may be taken for granted
(Fenichel, 1945).
Concluding the psychosexual stages

In concluding this section it is important to emphasise that any obstruc-
tion to the resolution of a particular psychosexual stage will lead to the
development of psychosocial problems. In this sense, Freud’s ‘develop-
mental map’ is not only about tracing normal development, but is also
a way of tracing the origins of psychological problems in individuals.
This reflects the fact that his developmental psychology was very much
designed around the needs of clinical treatment. The other point that
bears repeating is that each zonal stage is distinguished by an active-
passive polarity. What this means is that there is broad latitude as to how
an individual might negotiate these stages. For Freud these polarities
largely correspond to the masculine-feminine polarity of patriarchal
societies, where males are generally accorded active and dominant roles,
and females passive and submissive roles. In this connection Freud’s
work has become an important focus for people working in the field of
gender issues, both in the sense that he seems to offer an understanding
of how the influence of gendering affects development, and also,
paradoxically, how Freud himself is seen as yet another example of
how the rights and powers of women are systematically marginalised
within society.
Is Freud homophobic?
It is important to be clear about Freud’s the end of a child’s development. These
views on homosexuality. For Freud (1977) challenges are the transformation of the
homosexuality is not abnormal in the auto-erotic, incestuous, polymorphously
morally evaluative or stigmatised sense perverse and bisexual instincts, and the
of the term. He claims in fact that: resolution of the Oedipus/Elektra complex.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable
Psychoanalytic research is most decidedly that although Freud can explain the
opposed to any attempt at separating off occurrence of the homosexual object-
homosexuals from the rest of mankind as choice, he cannot avoid seeing it as in
a group of special character. By studying some ways deviant or aberrant. For Freud
sexual excitations other than those that (1977), homosexuality stems from three
are manifestly displayed, it has found that principal sources: 1) a narcissistic object-
all human beings are capable of making choice, where one takes one’s self, or one’s
a homosexual object-choice and have in own sex as an object of sexual desire, 2)
fact made one in their unconscious (Freud, a problematic negotiation of the Oedipus
1977: 56). complex, where the individual comes to
both desire and identify with the same
This in fact is an extraordinarily sex, rather than desiring the opposite
progressive view on homosexuality, sex and identifying with the same sex, as
particularly considering the predominance occurs in the successful resolution of the
of conservative attitudes towards sexuality Oedipus complex, or 3) an early fixation
in late 19th-century Western Europe which has prevented the individual from
when Freud was writing. Indeed, Freud attaining the full genital psychosexual
(1977) rejects outright the notion that stage of development
sexual deviation should be couched in It is important to note that homo-
terms of ‘degeneracy’ or ‘disease’, or that sexuality is only psychopathological if an
the term ‘perversion’ should be used as individual experiences his object-choice as
a term of reproach. For Freud (1977), conflictual on the level of personality. This
every individual’s sexuality, like their means that there is ego/superego conflict
psychological adjustment more generally, attached to the object-choice. For Freud, it
deviates somewhat, however slightly, from is possible to be a well-adjusted and non-
the ideal norm. There is, in his words, ‘no psychopathological homosexual. Moreover,
healthy person that fails to make some it should be noted that Freud’s theory is
addition that might be called perverse to led by the evolutionary priority of species-
the normal sexual aim’ (Freud, 1977: 74). preservation as espoused by Darwin. Freud
If we consider how different and takes the stand that nature and, following
idiosyncratic each individual’s path from it, culture, demands that heterosexual,
through the zonal stages and the penetrative, genital sex be the norm within
Oedipus complex must be, we then society, for this was the only way in which
start to appreciate that each instance of the reproduction of the species could
sexuality is in some way distinct. In fact, be assured (Freud 1977). It would be
considering the challenges that Freud sees fascinating to speak to Freud today now
confronting the task of ‘normal’ sexual that medical science offers other means of
development, it is almost a miracle that ensuring the preservation of the species
a vaguely ‘normal’ sexuality emerges at for example in vitro fertilisation.
>>
<<
There is now general and widespread psychopathology, is a derisive, value-laden,
support for the view that describing and a damaging approach to a healthy and
homosexuality in terms of deviance, loving form of sexuality.
abnormality, aberrance and particularly Derek Hook
The Oedipus complex

The Oedipus complex is perhaps the central challenge to Freud’s The Oedipus Complex.
conceptualisation of the socialisation of infantile sexuality. Freud believed The boy loves his mother
that this drama took place in the phallic stage of development, and named and challenges his father
for her love.
it after the famous tragedy in classical Greek drama, Oedipus Rex. In the
The boy child enters
play, Oedipus, the heir to the Greek throne, is born under a curse and, as the Oedipus complex
a result, is given away at birth by his parents. Oedipus grows up unaware loving his mother and
of his true identity. As an adult he unknowingly meets his father, chal- desiring her as his sexual
lenges him and kills him in a sword fight. Subsequently, Oedipus meets his object. This is because it
mother and, again unknowingly, sleeps with her. After he discovers what is generally she who cares
has really happened, that he has killed his father and slept with his mother, for, cleans, and feeds
him, thus stimulating his
he punishes himself in an agonised fit of remorse by putting out his own
erogenous zones. Freud
eyes. The reason that Oedipus Rex is such a great and archetypal story, says maintains that the father
Freud, is that it is the story of all of us. We are all destined, ‘cursed’ to direct stands as a challenge to
our first sexual impulses towards our mother and our first unconscious the boy’s desires to have
jealous and murderous thoughts towards our father. Similarly, passing the mother, and to have
through this process involves guilt and self-punishment. her all to himself. As a
While these processes all happen at a deeply unconscious level, we see in consequence the boy starts
to develop jealousy and
the behaviours of children how these processes play out. Little children be-
strong resentment and
come possessive of a parent and jealous if the other parent tries to intervene. hatred towards the father.
They say things like ‘mommy or daddy is mine’ or that they ‘will marry These unconscious feelings
mommy or daddy’ when they grow up. However, at the unconscious level of hostility can become
these desires are terribly intense and might include wishes to do away with a very strong, in fact even
parent. Imagine wishing to kill one of your parents. Thus these desires need murderous, and they
to be strongly repressed, that is, kept in the unconscious part of the mind eventually induce feelings
of fear and guilt in the
and prevented from rising to the level of conscious awareness. How we
child. The child also begins
attempt to prevent these unconscious aspects from rising to consciousness to suspect that the father
will be looked at in the next section—the structure of the mind. will take concrete steps
The complex manifests somewhat differently in boys and girls. In the to prevent him from
case of girls this complex is often referred to as the Elektra complex, after acting on his desire for
another Greek character who persuades her brother to kill their mother. his mother.
Given this difference, it is better to deal with the two separately.
Castration anxiety
It is important to reiterate that the Oedipus complex overlaps, and is an
integral part of, the phallic stage, that period when children are insatiably
curious about the genitals of others. At this time, given his curiosity, the
boy notices that a girl or, for that matter, his mother does not have a penis.
This has an enormous effect on the little boy, who begins to think that
he could lose his penis as well. The boy automatically assumes that the
female must once have had a penis and that she has been castrated, that
someone has ‘taken it away’. The fear of losing his penis develops into
what Freud calls castration anxiety:

the fear that the father will take away,

or ‘cut off’ the boy’s penis to prevent
him from making sexual advances
towards the mother.
Castration anxiety is aided and
abetted by the prohibition that Freud
assumes is placed by parents on the
little boy’s attempts at masturbation,
and from the implied threats stem-
ming from that prohibition, such as
‘you will go blind’, ‘we will cut it off’
or ‘it is sinful’.
Castration anxiety eventually
causes the boy to give up his mother as
Both because little girls have a sexual object. He realises that he cannot have her as she loves his father
to take an extra step in their and his father will not allow him to. The child then takes the next best
development through the
option, which is to identify with the father. By identifying with the father,
zonal stages, and because
their first sexual object is who is physically like him by virtue of the fact that he too has a penis,
the mother, Freud concludes the little boy feels protected, feels that the father is less likely to harm
that women move far more him. This identification also helps the boy get past his ambivalent feelings
easily between homosexual towards the father, who is no longer an enemy but is like him. One can
and heterosexual object-
see how a boy’s father in this way becomes an important role model for
choices than do men.
the child. Freud holds that this identification has important implications
for the development of the superego, which we shall come to presently.
Importantly also, this identification allows the boy to have vicarious access
to the mother by imagining that he is the father. Ultimately, however, per-
haps the most important aspect of this identification is that the little boy
realises that the mother is ‘off limits’ to his sexual desires; he realises that
he cannot have her but that he can have another sexual object like her, an-
other female, and preferably one who resembles the mother in some way.
Thus there are two vital psychological processes for the successful reso-
Resolution of the lution of the Oedipus complex: identification with the same-sex parent and
Oedipus complex. the giving up of the opposite-sex parent as an object of desire. This leads to
Identification with the the substitution of the opposite-sex parent by another similar object, some-
same-sex parent and the
one similar to his mother. One of the functions of the Oedipus complex is
giving up of the opposite-
sex parent as an object
to separate identification and desire. Remember the distinction made above
of desire. that in heterosexuality we desire the opposite sex and identify with the same
sex. Failure to separate these two processes, desiring and identifying with
the same parent, leads, in Freud’s view, to homosexuality.
The female Oedipus complex and penis envy

The girl child starts the female version of the Oedipus complex in the
same way that the boy starts the male Oedipus complex, by desiring the
mother. For Freud the psychosexual development of the girl is always
more problematic and less stable than that of the boy. Freud maintains
that the girl has to switch from different erogenous foci, from the phallic
(clitoral focus) to the genital (vaginal) stage. Freud maintains that ma-
ture genital sexuality in a woman is attained through vaginal, not clitoral,
satisfaction. (Sexology research, however, indicates that this is largely a

fallacious distinction.) Further, the girl has an extra step to make in the
Oedipus complex. Whereas the boy remains desirous of the mother or her
substitute, the girl needs to shift from her desire for the mother to desiring
the father. Freud accounts for this with what he calls penis envy, which is
much like the girl’s equivalent of castration anxiety. Like the boy child,
the little girl sees a naked member of the opposite sex, usually her father.
In the instant she sees the penis, as Freud (1977) puts it, she wants it. She
turns against her mother in disgust, blaming her for not giving her one, or
worse yet, assuming that she had one and that the mother has cut it off. The
girl’s desire for the penis is so strong that she becomes increasingly attracted
to her father, whose penis she would ideally like to ‘share’. Resolved that she
can never have her own penis, the little girl looks for the next best thing.
She forms a close attachment with someone who does have a penis, namely
a male. Penis envy thus strongly influences the girl to make a heterosexual
object-choice. Like the boy child, the girl eventually resolves her hateful
feelings towards her mother by identifying with her. As the father loves the
mother, identification with the mother affords her the vicarious outlet for
her sexual desires for the father.
The girl does eventually discover a physical substitute for a penis: a
baby. In this way, Freud offers an explanation for the strong desire of many
women to have a child. Of course the desire to have a child (and preferably
a boy child, with a penis) also entails the need for the woman to incorporate
a penis into her body, so as to get pregnant. This itself is a desire driven
by penis envy. Ultimately, this capacity to bear children is something that
cements the bond of identification between mother and daughter.
The longevity and universality of the Oedipus complex

Castration anxiety and penis envy remain strong unconscious
motivational forces throughout the lives of males and females. Fixations
developing during the phallic stage (which overlaps with the Oedipus
complex) may lead to men trying their utmost to ‘prove’ that they have
not been castrated. They may thus sire many children, sleep with many
women or, more symbolically, be very ambitious in their careers. Similar
fixations in women may lead to their exhibiting penis envy in overt
ways, for example by being flirtatious and seductive with many men. In
Freud’s view, both of these processes (castration anxiety and penis envy)
have powerful effects on the morality of males and females respectively.
Because males have learned, through fear of castration, a healthy respect
for moral law, and because they have strongly identified with the male
father figure, who in patriarchal societies is largely the one ‘in charge’,
they have a far stronger regard for moral law and order than women.
(This will be explored in more detail as we progress.)
The Oedipus complex offers an important explanation of how the
child moves from incestuous to non-incestuous sexuality and from
having no object-choice to having a secure object-choice. Freud claims
that the occurrence of these complexes is universal, and that they are
universally necessary precisely because they prevent the development of
incestuous sexual relations within families and promote the preservation
PHO TO : V O S S I E G O O S EN 54 Developmental Psychology
of the species by ‘schooling’ the sexual

instincts of children towards mem-
bers of the opposite sex. Incest is taboo
in every society, says Freud, just as
heterosexual sex is the predominant
form of sexual interaction in every
culture.
The structure of the mind

Having examined the workings
of the psychosexual stages and the
Oedipus complex, it is now important
to consider briefly Freud’s theory
of the structure of the mind. Freud
developed two models of the mind,
A young girl able to enjoy the earlier topographical model and the later structural model. This later
her love of her father model is useful in understanding how the unconscious can work at the
demonstrates a successful
level of not only the id, but also the ego and the superego.
resolution to the Oedipal
situation. At its most basic, the mind may be thought of as comprising two fun-
damental regions, one which is conscious and one which is unconscious.
Topographical model (Freud also postulates a third region: the preconscious.) The conscious
of the mind. Freud’s first part of the mind contains all those thoughts, feelings and behaviours you
‘mapping’ of the mind,
are aware of at the moment. All psychoanalytic theorists hold to the view
in which the mind is
divided into three basic
that consciousness is always infiltrated and influenced by the unconscious.
sections: the conscious, Thus while we may assume ourselves to be conscious, even this experience
the preconscious and of consciousness is suffused with unconscious material. Consciousness
the unconscious. relies upon making connections with the world of language and consensual
reality. Thinking from the conscious system maintains the relationships
Structural model of between words and meaning. What is significant is that while the
the mind. Freud’s later
word relates to the meaning in consciousness, it is always also related to
adaptation of the original
topographical model
meaning at the unconscious level. This link between consciousness and the
of mind. The structural unconscious is made through a chain of associations. This understanding
model includes the has allowed the development of assessment tools such as projective
understandings of the tests where what one might see in consciousness is associatively linked
ego, the id and the to meanings in the unconscious. It has also significantly led to ‘the
superego. These are the talking cure’, that is psychotherapy. It is understood that by listening to
basic components of
the latent (hidden) meanings of the client’s words you are given access
personality functioning,
and it is their complex
to unconscious material. An example might be a patient who discusses
interaction that produces having seen a violent film where the murderer is caught. You surmise
human behaviour. If the that he is struggling with violent anger towards someone and thus may
first topography of mind hypothesise to him that he would like to harm someone but is afraid of
outlined the ‘territories’ being, or even wishes to be, caught. The client might be articulating his
of the mind, the second thoughts from the level of consciousness but the assumption is made that
topography outlines
this conscious content is informed by unconscious motivations.
the central ‘players’
(or ‘agencies’) within the
mind, adding a dynamic, The topographical model
or interactive, explanation In Freud’s conception of the regions of the mind, the preconscious has
to a descriptive a fluid boundary with consciousness, in that the content of the precon-
explanation of the mind. scious system can be conscious at one time and unconscious at another.
Is Freud a chauvinist?
Many feminist writers have taken excep- superego as do men (see below), paints
tion to the way Freud has characterised a picture of women as less moral and far
women (Horney, 1967; Chodorow, more likely to disturb the moral order
1978). The focus of the feminist critique than men. This fear is seen in many
of Freud is often the notion of penis aspects of myth, religion and art. It
envy, which sees women as haunted was Eve, for example, who brought
throughout their lives by feelings of the downfall of paradise.
emptiness and jealousy stemming from In Freud’s defence, some argue,
their earlier ‘castration‘. The implication perhaps superficially, that it should be
of this idea is that women always will noted that he lived in a very different
be inferior in some way and that they historical and cultural era to our own,
always (unconsciously or consciously) will where equal rights and equality were
want to be like men, or want to possess in no way as prioritised as they are
men. It is argued that this is a demeaning now. In this way, rather than being
and unbalanced view of women, which automatically sexist, Freud has shown us
portrays women from an insulting, and how certain psychosexual developments
irredeemably masculine, point of view. and anatomical distinctions came to be
It is also a point of view that serves male particularly culturally loaded in the era in
interests (take, for example, the idea that which he lived. In fact, Freud (1977) does
women want, because of penis envy, to suggest that what is important in the little
incorporate the penis into their body girl’s evaluation of and desire for the penis
through intercourse). Peterson (1980) is not merely her perception of the penis in
has humorously mocked the idea of penis isolation but reflects the social desirability
envy by suggesting that today men and privilege of the male penis.
seem to exhibit what she calls ‘vagina It can also be argued that placing
envy’. This idea makes a certain amount Freud merely within his time and ‘excusing’,
of sense when one considers that female as it were, his difficult concepts as merely
anatomy enables women to bear children, products of his era negates the deep
an ability that, in some cultures, makes significance Freud gave to the unconscious.
women more socially powerful than men. Freud’s work and that of subsequent
In Western ‘First World’ societies, it may psychoanalysts has become an important
be argued that this ability is sometimes basis for much critical thinking in the
thought to disempower women, and intellectual world. One such theorist is
to put them at a disadvantage in a Juliet Mitchell who has used psychoanalysis
professional working environment. to engage critically with issues of
Similarly, the idea that women do feminism, gender, patriarchal power
not experience castration anxiety, and and politics.
therefore do not develop as powerful a Jacki Watts and Derek Hook
The preconscious part of the mind works continually to keep uncon-

scious material, the true motivation and impetus behind most of our acts
and behaviours, repressed and hidden. Note that whereas material can
pass relatively freely between the conscious and preconscious portions
of the mind, it can only pass freely into the unconscious portion of the
mind. That is, unconscious material cannot pass freely into consciousness.
Conscious
Preconscious
One-way mental gate
Unconscious
(Unconscious contents: representatives
of the instincts.
Governed by primary process, and by the operations

of condensation and displacement.
Access to preconscious-conscious mind is through compromise

formation i.e. distortions of censorship.
Childhood wishes ‘fixated’ in the unconscious.)
Figure 3.2 Freud’s topographical model of the mind, which divides the mind into conscious, preconscious
and unconscious parts. Note that whereas material can pass relatively freely between conscious and
preconscious portions of the mind, unconscious material cannot pass freely into consciousness (hence the
idea of the one-way gate). It is only under special conditions that any unconscious material can impinge
upon the conscious mind. Dreaming is one such special circumstance, where especially disguised and
moderated unconscious material is able to have some entry into the preconscious. Because the individual
is asleep, this material does not impinge directly on consciousness.
Exceptions are when unconscious material is allowed some penetration

into the preconscious part of the mind, which is seen in slips of the tongue,
jokes, dreams and the emergence of neurotic or psychotic symptoms.
The content of Freud’s unconscious is twofold. The unconscious
contains the innate instinctual drives, our sexual and aggressive strivings.
These strivings form the basis of our instinctual life. These innate instincts
are not personal drives, they are part of our nature as human beings. From
an evolutionary perspective, we need to have sex to keep the species going
and we need to defend ourselves to stay alive. The unconscious, however,
also contains repressed instinctual material. Throughout the psychosexual
development of the child, the innate instincts take on a personal dimen-
sion. The child wishes to love the father or mother and kill the other
parent. These desires are just too shocking and the child represses them
into the unconscious. In Freud’s theory, these repressions are adap-
tive, leading to identifications with the same-sex parent and a healthy
heterosexual life. Thus the concept of the unconscious articulates Freud’s
understanding of how we are able to curtail the press of our instinctual
nature, where instead of living out our ‘animal nature’—in other words,
fighting and raping—we are able, some of the time, to be civilised,
controlled and adaptive in our lives.
The structural model Id. The original and

Freud later adapted his first topography by adding his understandings structural component
of personality, the id is
of the id, the ego and the superego. These are the basic components of
the ‘instinctual bedrock’
personality functioning and it is their complex interaction that produces that the child is born
human behaviour. Where the first topography of the mind outlines the with, and upon which
‘territories’ of the mind, the second model outlines the central ‘players’ (or his eventual personality
‘agencies’) within the mind, adding a dynamic, or interactive, explanation will be built. The id is
to a descriptive explanation of mind. entirely unconscious
and is strongly tied to
the biological needs of
The id
the child. It supplies the
Freud claims that the id is the original component of personality; it is the ‘psychical energy’ that
‘instinctual bedrock’ with which the child is born and upon which his drives the mind and can in
eventual personality will be built. The id is entirely unconscious and is this way be thought of as
strongly tied to the biological needs of the child. It supplies the ‘psychical the ‘engine’ of personality.
energy’ that drives the mind and can in this way be thought of as the
‘engine’ of personality. The id is regulated by the pleasure principle, that
Ego. The ‘executive’
or adaptive agency of
the mind that mediates
between the demands
of reality, the superego
and the id. The ego arises
from the need to master
instinctual impulses and
to operate independently
of parental figures, and
from the self-preservative
imperative for the id to
adapt to the conditions
of objective reality.
Superego. The last part

of the personality to
develop, the superego
arises as a result of the
resolution of the Oedipus
complex, and is largely
the product of the
internalisation of parental
authority, although it also
involves the influence of
other authority figures
and of social values
Figure 3.3 Freud’s structural model of the mind. Freud often likened the
structure of mind to the proportions of an iceberg, dramatising the size more generally. It is the
difference between ego and id by noting that the ego was proportionate superego that determines
to the tip of the iceberg that juts above the surface, while the id was what is right and wrong
proportionate to the large area of the iceberg that remained submerged. for the moral individual.
Note how the first topography of mind has been transposed on this
structural model, and that, whereas the id is completely unconscious, Pleasure principle. The
the ego has conscious and preconscious aspects, and the superego regulating ideal of the
straddles all levels. The preconscious is that part of the mind that, id, that all instinctual
in the iceberg metaphor, is just beneath the surface of the sea. urges should be satisfied
Derek Hook immediately.
is, by the idea that all needs (for example, hunger or the need to urinate)
Primary process. The should be satisfied immediately. According to the pleasure principle we
id’s main mechanism for should eat at the first feelings of hunger or should seek sexual gratifica-
dealing with the build-up tion at the first twinges of sexual arousal. If such needs are not satisfied
of tension. The primary
quickly, then there is a resulting build-up of pressure, which the child
process involves the
conjuring up of a mental experiences as discomfort (un-pleasure). It is this discomfort that the
image that would satisfy pleasure principle hopes to avoid. The pleasure principle is clearly prob-
the instinctual need that is lematic, however, especially if one considers what would happen to us if
building up. we went around acting on our slightest desires, demanding gratification
in the most immediate fashion. The pleasure principle, in short, does not
Hallucinatory take into account reality, or what the outcome might be of acting in such
gratification. The
ways; it is unconcerned with what is rational or appropriate.
conjuring up of a mental
image that would provide The id’s main mechanism for dealing with the build-up of tension is
some (limited) satisfaction called the primary process. The primary process involves the conjuring up
of the instinctual need that of a mental image that would provide hallucinatory gratification of the
is building up. instinctual need that is building up. The hungry child may imagine the
mother’s breast, just as we might imagine a fantasy image of something
Wish fulfillment. The that we desire sexually, or the image of a person close to us whom we have
experience of generating
not seen for a long while. This experience of generating an image that
an image that would fulfill
a pressing need and the would fulfill a pressing need is termed wish fulfillment by Freud, and it is
basis of dream activity. the basis of dream activity. Wish fulfillment activity does not bring about
a real end to the need in question. No matter how much a hungry person
imagines food, that imagined food will not satisfy his hunger. This is yet
another demonstration of how the id—and the pleasure principle—do
not take reality into account in their functioning.
The ego
As the child gets older, it becomes increasingly important that he is able
to adapt to objective reality as this is vital for the survival of the child. It is
because of this need that the ego develops. The ego then arises out of the
inadequacy of the id, as a ‘negotiator’ between the id and the requirements
of external reality. The ego develops out of the id, and it harnesses part
of the id’s energy for itself. Thus part of the ego is also unconscious.
However, because the ego is also involved with transactions with the
outside world, it also needs to exist in the conscious and preconscious
levels of the mind.
Reality principle. The ego is regulated by the reality principle, which is the idea that
Regulates the ego, behaviour must adapt to the state and conditions of the external world
and aims to adapt the rather than just obeying the instinctual needs and urges arising from
instincts and impulses
within the individual (Freud, 1991). The reality principle introduces the
of the organism to the
state and conditions
standard of rationality into behaviour and leads one into considering
of the objective and the consequences of one’s actions within a certain environment. Rather
external world. than obeying the pleasure principle, to steal food, for example, when we
are hungry, the ego alerts us to the fact that such an act may well have
undesirable consequences. The ego attempts instead to delay gratification
and to redirect the individual to attain food in a more appropriate or
legal manner.
Delaying gratification to a more opportune, safe, sensible or later time
is hence one of the overriding functions of the ego. In this respect the ego
relies on the secondary process which finds a match

between unconscious and external factors. This entails
matching the image of what is desired, which stems
from the unconscious hallucinatory image of the pri- Reality
Superego
mary process, to a real and achievable perception of
that object in the world (Freud, 1991). It is this ability
for realistic thought, claims Freud, which enables the Ego
ego to come up with plans of action for the satisfac-
tion of its needs. The ego can weigh up such plans, and
decide which will work and which will not, a process Id
known as reality-testing. It is in this way that the ego is
the home of intellectual processes and problem solving
within the individual. Figure 3.4 The ego as the ‘slave with three
We must be careful not to assume that the ego is masters’ has to mediate between the often
the same as the ‘self’. Although the ego is that part of conflicting demands of the id, the superego
the personality structure that is best adapted to the and external reality.
constraints of external reality, it is still just one of the
dynamic agents that make up the personality. It is the sum of these dynamic Secondary process. The
agents [id, ego and superego] that constitutes the ‘self’ of the individual. secondary process finds
Another important aspect of the ego is that it is amoral. We cannot assume a match between the
image of what is desired
that the ego is ‘all good’, just because it affords us some control over the id. In
(from the primary process)
fact, the ego has no moral sense and spends a good deal of time deceiving us, and a real and achievable
particularly about the unconscious stimuli coming from the id. In fact the ego perception of that object
itself would be unconcerned with dishonesty and with allowing the pleasure in the world. It is the
principle to ‘go wild’ as long as there was no chance of the individual being basis of problem-
caught or reprimanded for these actions. There is another agent that takes solving behaviour and
care of the moral aspects of our personality, the superego. intellectual activity.
The superego
The superego is the last part of the personality to develop. It arises as a Ego-ideal. The positive
result of the resolution of the Oedipus complex and is largely the product side of the superego,
of the internalisation of parental authority. It also involves identification the ego-ideal stems
with the influence of other authority figures, such as teachers, heroes from the individual’s
and the like, as well as more general social values, such as religion. It is identification with their
same-sex parent, but more
initially the parents who determine what is right and wrong for the child.
generally embodies all
Identification with these parental roles allows the child to act increasingly of the highly respected
in a moral fashion and to develop the superego. The superego has both values and standards of
positive and negative sides, which stem from the resolution of the Oedipus excellence that the child
complex. The positive side of the superego is called the ego-ideal. It stems has inherited from both
from identification with the same-sex parent as well as embodying more parents. Strongly felt
generally all of the highly respected values and standards of excellence moral standpoints come
from the ego-ideal, and
that the child has inherited from both parents (Freud, 1991). Strongly felt
one feels a sense of pride
moral standpoints come from the ego-ideal, and one feels a sense of pride and identity when one
and identity when one engages in behaviours that are congruent with the engages in behaviours that
ego-ideal. are congruent with the
The negative side of the superego develops from the threat of pun- ego-ideal.
ishment that parents use to discipline their children. The child can also
develop a particularly harsh superego due to either innate or heightened
fantasies of aggression and damage to others. This aspect of the superego
Conscience. The negative is called the conscience, and it consists of a collection of rules and prohibi-
side of the superego, tions about what is and what is not allowed. If an individual indulges in
which develops from the bad acts or thoughts, the superego punishes him with feelings of guilt.
threats of punishment that
Remember that Freud theorised that because males have a very severe
parents use to discipline
their children, it consists and frightening form of prohibition in the form of castration anxiety,
of a collection of rules and they have a more fully developed superego than women do. If, for what-
prohibitions about what is ever reason, an individual does not properly develop a superego, he will
and what is not allowed. lack respect for social laws and order. People suffering from antisocial
If an individual indulges in personality disorders (once called ‘sociopaths’ or ‘psychopaths’) have
bad acts or thoughts, the insufficiently developed superegos.
superego punishes them
The primary function of the superego is to inhibit and squash any un-
with feelings of guilt.
conscious impulse of the id. It also tries to make the ego act in a moral way,
to take moral as well as rational considerations into account when decid-
ing how to act in a certain situation. Lastly, the superego tries to guide the
person towards perfection in what he says, does and thinks. In this regard
the superego is a hard taskmaster. It is not realistic but perfectionist in the
demands it makes upon the ego, and it can be vindictive and even sadistic
in punishing the ego when it acts in a wayward manner. The superego op-
erates on all levels of the mind: conscious, preconscious and unconscious.
Ego strength. The term The dynamic interaction of id, ego and superego
used to describe the ability Having briefly sketched the three agencies of the mind one can see that
of the ego to moderate and the ego has a difficult task in attempting to balance the demands of the
to deal with the effects of
superego and the id, and to keep them both congruent with the conditions
the opposing forces of the
id, the superego and reality.
of external reality. Conflict is unavoidable. This is easy to see if one
considers how strongly opposed the objectives of the id and the superego
actually are. How well the ego copes is dependent upon ego strength. This
is the term that has been used to describe the ability of the ego to moderate,
and deal with, the effects of these opposing forces (Freud, 1991). The more
ego strength one has, the more one is able to deal with these competing
pressures. Conversely, the less ego strength one has, the more one is at the
mercy of these conflicting forces. The clinical objective for an individual
should thus be to increase his ego strength so that there is a healthy balance
between the forces of their personality.
The role of defences

Given that one of the ego’s main tasks is negotiation between the id’s
Signal anxiety. This term demand for discharge and the superego’s censorship, the ego must have
indicates one of the prime a means of doing this. Freud postulated that anxiety operates to assist the
functions of anxiety, ego in this task. One of the functions of anxiety is to alert the ego to the
namely the alerting of
danger inherent in the press of the id for discharge. This is signal anxiety.
the ego to a potential
(unconscious) id discharge.
The ego responds to the signal anxiety by harnessing the mechanisms of
defence. At an unconscious level the mechanisms of defence are more or
Defence. Mechanism that less integrated into the ego and act to reduce or eliminate any excitation
acts to reduce or eliminate that is liable to threaten the integrity and stability of the psyche. Repression
any excitation liable to is the cornerstone of the defences, with all other defences arising out of its
threaten the integrity and workings. Repression smothers or ‘censors’ awareness of the forbidden
stability of the psyche.
desire. Once this has happened other defences may come into play if
additional protection is needed.
Types of defences
A defence mechanism is a specific, the attributes that are admired or envied,
unconscious, intrapsychic adjustment that but can also be those which are feared.
occurs in order to resolve emotional conflict
and to reduce an individual’s anxiety. A Introjection: the symbolic internalisation
defence can be called a mental mechanism, or assimilation of another person who is
an ego-defence mechanism or an adjustive either loved or hated.
technique. A few of the major defences that
have been identified are: Projection: attributing to another person
or object one’s own thoughts, feelings
Repression: the involuntary and automatic or unacceptable impulses.
placing of unacceptable impulses or feelings
or images into the unconscious. That is, an Rationalisation: an unconscious
unconsciously motivated forgetting. mechanism which can be thought of
as retrospective justification. One gives
Suppression: the voluntary, intentional acceptable motives to what essentially
putting of unacceptable feelings, etc. does not have recognisable motives.
into the preconscious. In other words,
intentional forgetting. Idealisation: overestimation of the
qualities of another, while devaluation
Regression: the unconscious return to an is the underestimation of such qualities.
earlier level of emotional functioning.
Intellectualisation: using intellectual
Reaction formation: behaviour or attitudes concepts and words to avoid experiencing
that are the opposite of unacceptable or expressing emotions.
conscious or unconscious impulses.
Dissociation: the separation of a group of
Fixation: the arrest of maturation at usually connected mental processes, such
an immature level of psychosexual as emotion and understanding, from the
development. rest of the mind.
Identification: the unconscious adoption Sublimation: channelling unacceptable

or internalisation of the personality instincts into socially acceptable activity.
characteristics of another person, usually Jacki Watts
Consider a situation where someone is very angry. The individual may

repress the anger, and if this defence is successful, the experience of anger will
be buried in the unconscious. However, if the anger is so great or the ego does
not have sufficient resources, then the repression may be only partly successful
and the emotion of anger continues to press for discharge. The defences
used to provide additional protection could range from immature, infantile
levels of defence such as denial (I am not angry), projection (It is you who is
angry), reaction formation (I am inordinately peaceful), to more mature forms
of defence, such as intellectualisation (One is only angry when there has been
a sufficient amount of frustration to warrant an amount of tension release)
Defence fails Symptom

Anxiety
Consciousness
Defence
Preconscious
Unconscious
Instinctual impulses
Figure 3.5 Model of symptom formation. The model shows the experience of signal anxiety indicating the
press of instinctual impulses. Defences are then brought into operation, which, being successful, reduce the
anxiety and push the instinctual impulse back into the unconscious. When the defence is not effective, then
the impulse continues to press for discharge into consciousness and a symptom develops in order to hide
the meaning of the impulse from becoming known to consciousness.
Jacki Watts
Compromise formation. to rationalisation (I am only angry because you provoked me). The defence
The form taken by of sublimation is a constructive defence, allowing one to channel, rather than
repressed material in repress, sexual and aggressive energies into socially acceptable forms of
order for it to be admitted
discharge, such as sport, arts, learning and love. In our example, sublimation
into consciousness. The
repressed idea becomes might have led you to go for a run or complete an amount of work.
so distorted as to be
unrecognisable. Thus both Pathology and neurosis
the unconscious urge Defences may not be able to cope with the pressure of the instinctual urges.
and the demands of the This may be due to the intensity of the urge or a weak ego structure. The
superego can be satisfied. ego is then forced to form a compromise between the id and the superego.
This is a compromise formation, which safeguards against being over-
Symptom. The (neurotic) whelmed by the id as well as satisfying the superego demands. The com-
compromise formation promise formation is the form taken by the repressed material (such as
taken by repressed
anger or sexuality) in order for it to be admitted into consciousness. Thus
material in order for
it to be admitted into the compromise formation is the formation of a symptom. The symptom,
consciousness. for example obsessive behaviour, is a symbolic expression. Symbolically,
the wish of the id is allowed, hence satisfying the id, while at the same time
Neurosis. An emotional it is not allowed, hence satisfying the superego. The symptom both hides
disorder; the displaying of and reveals the psychic conflict.
emotional distress via the Classic psychoanalysis is concerned with the manifestation of symptoms
formation of a symptom.
as indicative of neurosis. A neurosis is an emotional disorder. Thus when
It is a functional disorder,
a conflict phenomenon
we speak of a neurotic we mean someone who is displaying emotional
involving the thwarting distress via the formation of a symptom. The symptom could range from
of an instinctual urge. anxiety, panic attacks or depression, to lying or promiscuity, amongst other
Neurosis is understood symptoms. The psyche is amazingly creative in both hiding and revealing
as a psychogenic state. the nature of the emotional pain with which the person is struggling.
Did you know? The relationship between

pathology and the superego
The development of neurosis is linked to a compromise the child’s capacity to

harsh superego. Thus oppressive, critical or develop a strong and healthy superego.
repressive child-rearing practices are more Such developmental circumstances are
likely to induce the development of neurotic more likely to induce psychopathic
behaviour as the child identifies with the behaviour. A psychopath is someone
superego functioning of the parents. who exhibits antisocial behaviours and is
Psychopathy, on the other hand, is indifferent to morality. There is a distinct
linked to ineffective superego functioning. film genre that gives excellent portrayals
Thus cruel, neglectful or disinterested of psychopathic functioning. Some
child-rearing practices, which inhibit the examples are David Lynch’s Blue Velvet,
possibility of the child identifying with Wild at Heart and Lost Highway, and
suitable and loving authority figures, have Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, Reservoir
serious consequences. These authority Dogs, True Romance and Natural Born
figures should symbolise the moral values Killers. Danny Boyle’s Shallow Grave also
of the society. However, either through provides an interesting unfolding of
their poor treatment of the child or their psychopathic behaviour.
own lack of superego functioning, they Jacki Watts
Neurosis is understood as a psychogenic state. This is an illness caused Psychogenic. Term

by psychological factors. Neurotic symptoms may indicate conflict over used to signify that
something already done. A classic example is Lady Macbeth’s compulsive illnesses and symptoms
are of a mental origin.
attempts to clean her hands after the murder of the king. By compulsively
washing her hands, she betrays her id’s murderous act as well as satisfying
the superego demand for punishment: the hand washing. Conflict may
also occur if something is unconsciously wished for but is not achieved in
reality. Freud’s work with hysteria revealed that an inability to successfully Hysteria. Inability to
repress instinctual sexual desires resulted in hysterical symptoms. These successfully repress
were somatic complaints, such as blindness and paralysis, which have no instinctual sexual desires,
which results in a variety of
basis in physiological impairment. The symptom can be traced as sym-
somatic complaints, such
bolically expressing the psychic conflict, for example, paralysis of the hand as blindness and paralysis,
that had been touched by the desired but forbidden husband of a sister. In which have no basis in
the symbolism of the paralysis, we see that while the touch is desired, the physiological impairment.
paralysis precludes the pleasure.
The role of dreams

Freud (1978) saw dreams as expressions of unconscious wishes. Hence Dream-work. The
dreams allow a certain amount of instinctual discharge, releasing instinc- multiple processes
tual pressure in the form of instinctual wish fulfillment. Given that Freud’s through which the latent
content is transformed
theory revolves around the notion of unconscious material surfacing into
into the manifest content
consciousness, dreams have a special relationship to consciousness. This of a dream. Condensation
relationship is mediated by the censorship of the ego. To allow access to and displacement are
the dream material, the ego is involved in the operation of what Freud vital mechanisms of
terms dream-work. The dream-work undertakes to disguise the un- the dream-work.
PHO TO : CHA J O HNS TO N 64 Developmental Psychology
conscious meaning of
the dream (the latent
content). The result is that
consciousness has access
to the dream, but only in
its surface meaning, or
manifest content. The
manifest dream, which is
remembered in conscious-
ness, is sparse in compari-
son to the richness of the
latent content. The ego
disguises the dream prin-
cipally through the pro-
cesses of displacement,
Dreams, for Freud, are condensation and symbolism, which operate as follows:
‘the royal road to the ● Displacement occurs when the meaning of an image or idea becomes
unconscious’.
detached from the image and is passed onto or displaced onto another
image or images. The new image is related to the first idea through
Latent content.
a chain of associations. The classic example would be dreaming of
The unconscious content a steeple or a cigar, which could be interpreted as the penis having
of a dream as revealed by become displaced onto the image of the steeple or cigar.
interpretation. ● Condensation is an unconscious process whereby two or more ideas
or images combine to form one symbol. An example may be the

Manifest content. image of a church, which for a particular individual stands for the
The surface meaning of
spirituality of God, the strictness of the father and the protection of
the dream; the content as
reported by the dreamer.
the mother.
● Symbolism is the figurative representation of an unconscious idea,
conflict or wish.
In his The interpretation of dreams (1900) Freud proposed a model for

understanding dreams as the censored wish fulfillment of the id strivings.
In a process that is similar to the formation of neurotic symptoms, the
manifest dream becomes the conscious compromise of the unconscious
wish. The mechanisms of displacement, condensation and symbolism, as
well as the operation of the other defences, result in the compromise, that
is, the manifest dream.
Critiques of Freud’s developmental theory

Theories are an important way of coordinating and explaining
phenomena, and of making sense of the world. However, theories have
limitations in their applicability and application. If theories have serious
shortcomings or are applied indiscriminately across too wide a diversity
of contexts, then they can in fact limit the understandings one has of the
world and prevent one from looking for different answers.
In considering Freud’s theories we see that they have certainly had
an enormously important influence not only upon the history of psychol-
ogy and psychoanalytic thought but also upon intellectual endeavours
in many fields.
The practice of psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysis is based upon the premise the free association of the patient. Over a
that the patient is always communicating period of time, latent meanings and nodal
at an unconscious (latent) level to the points of censorship start to cohere around
psychoanalyst. In fact all psychoanalytic the fixation issues of the patient.
psychology holds to the idea that all our It can also be observed how the
conscious thought processes are linked to patient attempts to draw the analyst into
unconscious meanings and motivations. certain repetitions of the past (the
Freud discovered that by remaining neutral repetition compulsion). Through these
and listening to these communications, the attempts to repeat and heal the past, it
latent meanings were eventually revealed. becomes clear where and why there is
The method employed is that of free fixation at certain psychosexual stages.
association. The patient is encouraged to As the analyst comes to understand these
speak without censorship about whatever meanings, he is able to offer interpretations
comes into his or her mind. By remaining about the unconscious operation of the
neutral and observing, the psychoanalyst patient’s psyche.
can note a number of latent aspects to the
patient’s speech which are embedded in Derek Hook
Critical evaluation of Freud’s work leads to three oft-cited criticisms:
Lack of verifiable scientific evidence

One of the most frequently heard criticisms of Freud, and of psychoanalysis in
general, is that the theories lack experimental support and are unverifiable by the
normal methods of science (Erdelyi & Goldberg, 1979). In terms of the normal
criteria of science, it is claimed that psychoanalytic theories cannot be thought of
as scientifically true and from a scientific point of view may even be considered to
be unfalsifiable. This means that there is no reasonable way to dispute them (just
as there is no reasonable way to dispute something like astrology).
There are a few ways of answering such criticism. Good science does not claim
that only what is directly measurable is accessible to scientific investigation. For
example, while we cannot ‘see’ the unconscious, we are certainly able to observe
its influence and manifestation.
Further, in terms of Freud’s theories being unfalsifiable, let us assume that
he is wrong that the function of dreams is to allow instinctual discharge. If you
deprive a person of dream sleep it should have no effect on him. Yet research
within cognitive neuropsychology indicates that when someone is deprived of
dream sleep, he suffers the exact consequences that Freud postulated. There is
a build-up of tension and the development of neurotic symptoms (Solms, 1995).
Thus it would seem that as we become more sophisticated, both in conceptualising
research and science and in our methods of investigation, Freud would stand up
well to scientific scrutiny.
While it may be true that we cannot verify all of Freud’s theorising, cer-
tainly many aspects of the theory have been researched and verified. To name
a few areas, cross-cultural research indicates the operation of Oedipal taboos,
A fictional vignette
Henry is 28 and presents himself for to attain autonomy are symbolised in his
psychotherapy with a number of obses- mother’s frequent invasive attempts to empty
sional complaints. These include his inability and control his ‘bad’ insides. Henry is left with
to leave the house without first washing his pathological fantasies of the dirtiness of his
hands for about an hour. He has become insides (his dirty urges) and with anal
seriously constipated. He also has never retentive attempts to control these instinctual
been able to have sex with a woman urges. The anal fixation has precluded him
because he is repulsed by how dirty it is. It from attaining full genital sexuality. His
is revealed that Henry’s father left the sexuality is still of an infantile nature, with
family when Henry was about two-and-a- the sexual aim satisfied through a fetish.
half—at the time his mother started his
toilet training. His father moved in with a Neurotic dynamics
woman whom Henry’s mother referred to The neurotic symptoms (hand washing,
as ‘the whore’. Henry has an enmeshed constipation and fetishism) arose as a
(overly close) relationship with his mother consequence of Henry’s weakened ego
and the two of them have lived alone since being unable to negotiate between the
his father left. Neither Henry nor his id’s demand for sexual discharge and
mother has had any significant relationship the severity of the superego’s prohibition.
outside of their mother and son unit. His Henry’s superego identification appears
mother is a very religious and controlling to be based upon his mother’s moralistic
woman. She instilled into Henry the idea and sadistic attitude towards bodies and
that he must be a ‘good, clean boy’. She sexuality, viewing instinctual life as dirty
gave him regular enemas to ensure that he and bad. Henry’s attempt at sublimation,
was ‘clean inside’. It is further revealed that the move to masturbation fetishism, was
Henry has recently met a woman at work not a successful enough compromise for the
to whom he finds himself attracted. There superego. In fact it only served to increase
is great difficulty and shame in revealing the tension, with the masturbation providing
that he has been having sexual thoughts evidence of the ‘dirty contents’ of the insides
about this woman and masturbating into of his body. All other defences having failed,
his mother’s panties. These activities leave the symptom formation of hand washing
him feeling dirty and ashamed. and constipation served as the compromise
between the id and the superego. The
Character diagnosis constipation prevented any discharge of
Analysis of the clinical material suggests that dirty contents and the hand washing
Henry has strong anal personality traits cleansed and punished the dirty act of
stemming from fixation at the anal stage masturbation. Both these symptoms reveal
of psychosexual development. His infantile the hidden desires to discharge aggressive
attempts at autonomy became identified and sexual impulses towards his mother. The
with the needs of his mother for cleanliness. use of her panties highlights his fixation on
He also became her substitute love object. his mother as the love object. The symptoms
Her controlling and intrusive attitude towards also hide the nature of the psychic conflict
him left him with passive anal retentive from Henry’s consciousness.
tendencies and an inability to assert his
separateness. His initial struggles and failure Jacki Watts
infant observation endorses the innateness of certain aspects of personality,

and even cognitive and social learning theorists have come to promote the
idea of unknown internal motivations influencing behaviours. Advances in
cognitive neuropsychology have brought about a better understanding of
the significance of dreams and have supported Freud’s postulations about
the function of dreams (Solms, 1995; Solms & Saling, 1990).
Cultural bias
A second very general criticism of Freud is that his theories emerge from a
particular socio-cultural and historical location and hence exhibit a strong
cultural bias (Cloninger, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1988). In Europe at the
end of the 19th century, when Freud wrote, men had far greater powers
and importance within society than did women. Likewise, homosexuality
was strongly frowned upon. The critique suggests that
PHOTO: MICHELE VRDOLJAK

it remains open to speculation as to what extent these
political and social contexts have permeated Freud’s
theories and limited the degree to which they may be
universally applied. Freud himself claimed his theory
to be universally applicable.
Problems of cultural bias need to be taken
seriously and researched to investigate the validity of
their claims. Psychoanalytic understanding of class,
ethnicity, ageing and cognitive disabilities requires
further research. Gender understandings have been
quite fruitfully engaged with by theorists like Eichen-
baum & Orbach (1982), Chodorow (1989) and more
recently by Juliet Mitchell. They have taken Freud’s
theories as the lens through which to analyse and
understand the reality of political and social gen-
der imbalances. These understandings have not only
been applied to First World countries but to gender
relations in general and to the deeply unconscious
motivations for such gendered relations.
It may also be tempting to agree that Freud’s
emphasis upon sexuality was a product of his time in
history. However, psychoanalytic thinking today still How relevant is Freudian theory to South Africa in
prioritises the body as the vehicle through which the the 21st century? Cultural bias is one of the most
infant engages with the world. All the theorists in this frequent criticisms of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory.
book place the body and the way it relates to the world
as the basis through which meaning and personality
are given coherence.
Deterministic and reductionist trends

A final critique comes from humanistic psychology which sees Freud’s
view of the unconscious as the force that drives our actions and largely
determines who and what we are as a restrictive and overly deterministic
view. They claim that this view allows little latitude for change or for
meaningful agency within individuals and reduces the finest qualities of
human achievement to unconscious instinctual motivations. This critique
comes from within a tradition that has rejected the notion that humans
have the capacity for innate aggression. Humanistic views of people are
imbued with optimism but are challenged to account for the widespread
horror that has characterised much of humankind’s history. Freud’s
theorising arose within a context of racial hatred and two world wars. He
was, as a Jew at that time, almost forced to theorise about the potential
inhumanity of man to man. Humanistic views appear loath to make
human beings responsible for the horror of which they are capable in the
way that Freud proposed.
This criticism does not take into account Freud’s basic principle, which
is about the dynamic nature of the psyche. The psyche is always attempting
to negotiate and re-negotiate itself in relation to both external and internal
realities. It is only in psychosis that external reality does not impact upon
the ego’s negotiations with the demands of our social and cultural milieu.
What Freud postulates is that where there has been fixation, the conflictual
aspects of the fixation will impact upon the individual and his external
reality, influencing the ways in which ego negotiations operate. Freud
does not hypothesise men or women as encapsulated psychic automatons
that act only from internal motivations. These motivations are always
in contact with the demands of external reality except, as mentioned, in
psychotic states.
Some replies to critiques of Freud
In assessing the cogency of any criticism, it is useful to identify and examine the assumptions
that underlie the specific criticism. This will reveal the philosophical context from which the
criticism is launched and provide a basis for establishing the relative power of the criticism to
render a theory unsubstantiated, irrelevant or invalid.
1. Freudian theory is unscientific * Recent research studies (for example,

This is probably the most common criticism Western, 1998; 1999) indicate that
of Freudian theory. It is claimed that most many Freudian concepts are now
aspects of Freud’s theory lack experimental supported experimentally, including
support, thus rendering it scientifically the function of dreams, the existence
unsubstantiated. In addition, since the of unconscious cognitive, affective and
theory is claimed to be unverifiable motivational processes, the operation
according to normal scientific standards, of Oedipal taboos across different
it is regarded as inherently unscientific. A cultures, and the innateness of certain
closer look at the assumptions underlying aspects of personality.
these criticisms reveals the presence of an
empiricist epistemology, where the truth * Even if there were no experimental
or factual nature of a theory depends support for aspects of Freudian theory,
exclusively on directly measurable empirical good science does not claim that the
evidence. There are a number of ways in only criterion for scientific evidence is
which to think about this criticism: the direct measurability of phenomena.
>>
<<
The empiricist approach is only one support aspects of Freudian theory
among many in the debate around (Western, 1998; 1999).
what constitutes scientific evidence.
Consider the theory of gravity as an * Current psychoanalytic thinking still
example—the only evidence for gravity prioritises the body as the vehicle
(an intangible causal agency) is the through which the infant engages the
tangible effect it produces. Gravity itself world, and by which meaning and
is thus not directly measurable, and personality are given coherence. Infant
can only be evidenced by its effects. Yet observation studies support the notion
the theory of gravity has the status of a that the infant comes to understand
fully credible scientific theory. The same itself initially through the body.
consideration can be applied to Freud’s
theories of the unconscious or of the * Even if there were no empirical
psychic apparatus. There is no directly support for the universal applicability of
measurable evidence for either, but the Freudian theory, this would not
visible effects can be accounted for by necessarily demonstrate its inherent
invoking Freudian theory. cultural bias. Consider the following
problem: to hold that there are no
2. Freudian theory is culturally relative universally applicable conditions is itself
A consistent criticism of Freudian theory a universal statement, and therefore
is that it is steeped in 19th century socio- a contradiction in terms. We must
cultural and political thought and as such is acknowledge at least the possibility of
more of a biased intellectual legacy from a universally applicable conditions if we
particular historical period than a universally are to remain logically coherent, and
applicable theory. In particular, Freud’s view so entertain the possibility that Freudian
of human sexual development is regarded as theory is universally applicable.
a product of the restrictive Victorian attitude
towards sex. 3. Freudian theory is deterministic
The perspective that culture determines This criticism stems from the perception
thought has recently been restated with that Freud regarded the psychological
the rise of post-modern theory, which development of the individual to be largely
claims that reality is socially constructed complete by the onset of puberty. By this
via language and culture. In terms of measure, the individual is imprisoned by his
post-modern theory, there are no universal developmental history and significant
realities, only contextual ones, and thus change is impossible. The assumption that
Freudian theory is only a representation underlies this criticism is that human
of a cultural discourse of that era. The development is not determined only by
fundamental assumption underlying this prior events, nor can it be reduced to
perspective is that reality is culture- and instinctual biological drives. The problem
language-dependent and not objectively with this criticism is that it fails to take full
defined. In assessing the validity of this account of Freudian theory and thus
view, consider the following points: misrepresents the theory to a certain
extent. Consider the following aspects of
* Cultural bias may well inform some Freudian theory:
aspects of Freudian theory, but this issue
needs to be evaluated in terms of current * Freudian theory is deterministic about
cross-cultural research, which seems to the development of the psychic
>>
<<
apparatus (id, ego and superego), development. The underlying assumption
but not about the particularities that here is that human beings naturally tend
transpire in an individual’s internal and towards growth and self-actualisation and
external experience of life once these consequently the capacity for aggression
structures are in place. is not innate, but a response to the
environment. In assessing the validity of
* The contents of the psyche are unique to this perspective, it is useful to consider
each individual, even though the basic the following points:
structure of the psyche is the same for all.
* Freudian theory does postulate a
* The dynamic nature of the psyche means hidden relation between human
that an individual is always negotiating behaviour and motivation, namely
and renegotiating the self in relation to unconscious instinctual drives. Yet this
both external and internal realities. The does not imply that all human
instinctual motivations are always in endeavour is reduced to instincts.
contact with the demands of external Freudian theory places great emphasis
reality and always tempered by cultural on the role that culture (external reality)
injunctions. Thus internal psychological plays in curtailing and modifying these
processes (such as sublimation, defences instincts (including aggression), and on
or associations) occur continuously the role of defence mechanisms in the
throughout the life-span in response to service of making communal life possible
external realities and these processes and cultural and creative life pleasurable.
produce changes in behaviour, cognition
and affect. Freudian theory can therefore * If human aggression is only a
be described as deterministic at the level response to the environment, there
of psychic structure, but not at other must be an innate capacity for people
levels of functioning. to be aggressive, much as there is an
innate capacity for the acquisition of
4. Freudian theory reduces human language. Innate capacity for aggression
activity to biological instincts can partly explain the widespread horror
This criticism comes from the humanist and destruction that has characterised
tradition, which rejects Freudian theory the history of humankind since the dawn
on the grounds that it reduces the finest of time. By rejecting the notion of innate
qualities of human achievement to uncon- aggression, the humanist perspective
scious instinctual drives and, by so doing, fails to hold humankind responsible
fails to account for human agency and for the horror of which it is so
choice as a factor in psychological obviously capable.
Sue Williamson
Specific tasks
➊ In the clinical vignette, there is no report of a male authority figure or role models.
Consider how this lack might impact upon Henry’s psychosexual development and
later symptoms.
➋ Freud contends that the ego is a ‘slave of three masters’. Apply this statement to a careful
consideration of Henry’s personality structure as exhibited in his neurotic symptoms.
➌ Do you feel that Freud’s ideas of penis envy and his general portrayal of women within
his developmental theory are reasonable? Try to consider both sides of the argument.
General tasks
➊ Think about a character in a movie or a novel or even someone you know well who
has done something extraordinary. Having worked through this explanation of Freud’s
developmental theory, write an essay that will attempt to account for this extraordinary
action. Involve an understanding of the psychosexual stages of development, the
Oedipus complex, and the ego/id/superego structure of mind and what use has been
made of defences in your answer.
➋ In what ways do you think Freud’s theory might be limited? If you have completed
the specific tasks above, refer specifically to any possible limitations in accounting
for Henry’s actions. Are there gaps in the theory that need to be filled, and if so,
what are they?
➌ Give some thought to how Freud’s developmental theory applies to your own life.
Do you think that it helps explain much about you? If so, what and how? If you feel
that Freud’s theories are not able to explain significant aspects of your life, reflect on
why you think this is so.
Appignansi, R & Zarate, O (1992). Freud for beginners. New York: Icon.
(True to its title, this text utilises an impressive spread of illustrations, in a near comic-book format,
to lead its readers through the theory and history of Freudian analysis.)
Freud, S (1977). ‘Three essays on the theory of sexuality’. In A. Richards and A. Dickson (eds), The
Penguin Freud Library. Volume 7 on sexuality: Three essays on the theory of sexuality and other works.
London: Penguin.
(A collection of the classic papers that laid the foundations for Freud’s distinction between adult and
infant sexuality and the theory of the psychosexual stages.)
Freud, S (1978). The interpretation of dreams. London: Penguin.
(A fascinating read. Shows Freud at his most accessible. How he develops his concepts is intriguing.
This book covers most of the outline of his understanding of the unconscious.)
Freud, S (1982). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press.
(Freud is very easy to read and this volume introduces you to the basic concepts of psychoanalysis.)
Gay, P (1988). Freud: A life for our time. London: Papermac.
(A wonderful tale that traces Freud’s life and theoretical developments. There are also some
intriguing accounts of the intense relationships Freud had with certain people.)
Laplanche, J & Pontalis, J B (1973). The language of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press.
(An academic read, defining psychoanalytic terminology.)
Osborne, R (1993). Freud for beginners. London: Writers and Readers.
(Rival publication to Appignansi & Zarate [1992].)
Storr, A (2000). Freud: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A very concise ‘primer’ to Freudian psychoanalysis that can be read in an hour or two. It usefully
blends anecdotes from Freud’s own life with explanations of key theoretical terms and principles.)
Western, D (1998). ‘The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a psychodynamically informed
psychological science’, Psychological Bulletin, 124 (3), 333-371.
Western, D (1999). ‘The scientific status of unconscious processes: Is Freud really dead?’ Journal
of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 47 (4), 1061-1112.
Wolheim, R (1977). Freud. Glasgow: Fontana/Modern Masters.
(Nearly a classic in its own right, Wolheim’s slender volume does an admirably succinct job of accurately
tying together the main theoretical strands of Freud’s thought.)
CHAPTER
4
Klein’s object relations
and personality
]acki Watts
This chapter explains Klein’s theory of object relations,

focusing upon the following areas:
1. Introductory concepts
2. Theoretical focus
3. Psychological birth and selfhood
4. The concept of an internal world
5. The concept of psychic structure
6. Innate capacity
7. The paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions
8. A critique of Kleinian theory
Introductory concepts
In this chapter we examine the ideas of Melanie
Klein whose work resulted in the development of
object relations theory. This first section introduces
the key concepts of the intra-psychic world, phan-
tasy, and object relations.
The intra-psychic world

The term intra-psychic refers to the internal world
of experience, that is, the activities of the
mind. Klein’s theory is based upon a model
of intra-psychic functioning that postulates
that the infant’s physiological life provides
the stimulus for primitive cognitive or mental
functioning. Thus she prioritises the stimulation
Melanie Klein
Intra-psychic. The internal of the body, in other words, the instincts, as does Freud, in the psychic
world of emotional or development of the individual. However, where Freud conceived a
mental functioning. drive model of conflicting instinctual urges as the model of psychic
functioning (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983), Klein’s theory postulates a
relational model of psychic functioning.
Klein’s focus is on the content of the intra-psychic world. She postulates
that this content is made up of phantasy relationships that mirror or
reflect the physiological state of the infant.
Phantasy
Phantasy. The mental Phantasy refers to the intra-psychic experience of unconscious relations
correlate (equivalent) between good and bad experiences. Phantasy is postulated to be the mental
of the instincts.
correlate (the equivalent) of instinctual life (Isaacs, 1948). Phantasy is the
term used to denote the most primitive origins of thought. Klein (1932)
postulates that we have innate knowledge of certain images, such as the
breast, and it is these innate images that constitute the origins of thought.
For example, when a young infant suckles it has an innate phantasy of
the breast that correlates to the experience of suckling. Phantasy is thus a
reservoir of innate unconscious images and knowledge that has been built
up as a result of phylogenetic inheritance, just as a duckling ‘knows to
follow’ when it is born.
Pre-Oedipal. The time,
in Freudian terms, which Object relations
is focused upon the oral In phantasy the infant is able to develop an awareness of the breast. It is
and anal stages. It is the
also in phantasy that the infant has a relationship with the breast. Such
time when the child is
still within a dyadic focus
relationships are innate to our capacity to be human. Thus the experience
(the mother), and has of the body is linked to innate knowledge about what the body is
not as yet come to see experiencing. This concept is central to object relations thinking and will
the father and mother be explored in detail later.
as conflicting objects to Klein’s concepts introduced a way of understanding the individual that
love. These conflicts arise has led to creative and innovative advances in post-Kleinian writings about
with the Oedipal stage
the quality and nature of our personalities. Object relations thinking has pro-
where loving the mother
and father is no longer an
vided the major impetus for understanding the development and treatment
uncomplicated affair. of pre-Oedipal personality structures, such as borderline and narcissistic
personality disorders.
Triad. A three-person You will remember from the chapter on Freud that ‘pre-Oedipal’
relationship such as denotes a pre-genital psychosexual stage, hence infantile sexuality
the relationship that functioning. Freud’s focus had been on the importance of Oedipal issues
characterises the Oedipal
(a triadic, three-person, conflict model of understanding intra-psychic
situation—mother,
father, and child.
functioning). His interest was in the importance of psychosexual drives
in the development of the personality and of neurosis and, of course, on
the nature of the unconscious. Freud’s contribution to understanding
development and pathology lay in his focus on the psychosexual stages
and the child’s eventual resolution of the Oedipal situation—of the
three-person relationships between parents and child. Object relations
theory focuses on the first years of development, where the infant is
Dyadic. A dyadic primarily involved in a two-person interaction, or a dyadic relationship.
relationship refers to The focus is thus on early primitive mental operations, which are
a relationship of two. postulated as largely biological in origin. These early primitive mental
K l e i n ’s o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s t h e o r y o f d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p e r s o n a l i t y 75
operations have a fundamental impact on the development of the

quality and nature of our intra-psychic relational object phantasies and
hence on our interpersonal perceptions of the world and others. What
Klein (1946) postulates is that the quality of our intra-psychic object
relations will provide the lens through which we are able to see and
interact in the world and with others and our self.
Theoretical focus
Klein’s work was with young children, the youngest being two
years old. From these analyses she worked backwards to capture the
significance of the experiences of early infancy. This method of
theory-building followed the route pioneered by Freud. Freud had
pieced together a theory of the significance of childhood psychic
development by working backwards from the free associations and
symptoms of adults.
Initially, in working with children, Klein was faced with the limita-
tions of the language of children. By chance, she came to conceptualise
play as giving us access to the internal unconscious world of children—
the manifest symbolic representations (Klein, 1926). Manifest symbolic Manifest symbolic
representation refers to the idea that what we see the child doing in play representations.
The readily seen symbolic
is a symbolic representation of latent (that is, unconscious) meanings.
presentation of something
(This is equivalent to the free association of adult patients in psycho- else such as a person,
analysis that provides clues to latent, unconscious meanings.) an idea, or an image.
Unconcious conflicts and wishes make up the world of children. The remembered dream
Play therapy allows the working through of the conflicts and wishes is a manifest symbolic
associated with significant others in the child’s life. Material from these representation of the
therapies led Klein to make theoretical formulations about the nature unconscious images.
of the early psychic life of infants. The psychoanalytic play process
Play therapy. The
revealed how the child is continually engaged in sifting ideas about self psychoanalytic method
and others. This information led Klein to closely examine the child’s of intervention that is
self-other configurations. (This is a term used to denote an intra- used with children.
psychic relational meaning. In our phantasy life we construct images The play is seen as the
(objects) of self and significant others in continually changing patterns equivalent of the free
of relationships with each other, which are not necessarily related associations of adults in
psychoanalysis in revealing
to the reality of our external circumstances. These configurations
unconscious material.
inform our perceptions of external reality and explain how, in some
circumstances, we can be so wrong about what is happening around us.) Configurations. The
Klein postulated that play revealed these configurations as patterns of composition of internal
internal relationships with phantasy objects. The nature and function object relations, which
of these internal, unconscious object relationships was to hold her consist of characteristic
theoretical interest for most of her life. (The concepts of phantasy and self-other representations.
In other words, how we
objects will be further explored later.)
experience ourselves
Klein’s concern was to understand the preverbal, precognitive world and others.
of the infant’s experience (Klein, 1975a; 1975b). The infant’s world is
initially a world of only sensate (bodily) experiences. It is through the
experiences of the body that the infant makes contact with the world. For
the infant, there is a seamless experiencing where the self and the world
are experienced as one with no boundaries or edges marking where the
baby’s body stops and the other person or the world starts. There is little
Pre-personal needs. cognitive ability, and at this stage certainly no interpolated ‘I’ to mediate
The time in early infancy cognition. To capture this infantile experience in words is clearly very
when the infant is not difficult, which is why the language of object relations theory is sometimes
cognitively aware that
clumsy and odd in that it is trying to grasp, in language, what essentially
his needs are experiences
of his own body. Rather has no language.
these experiences are felt Klein examines the processes through which the infant—initially an
as impersonal experiences, undifferentiated bundle of pre-personal needs—evolves into a unique person,
which merely happen to with a distinct character, personality, and way of relating both to the world
the infant. Note the baby’s and to himself. The means through which Klein explored this focus
curiosity when he finds his was through play. The play of the children in analysis revealed a complex
hands and feet.
set of phantasy relations both with the self and with significant others—the
self-other configuration.
Psychological birth and selfhood

Psychodynamic theorists agree that the attainment of selfhood or personhood
is a developmental achievement and not a biological given. This is clearly seen
in the compromised development of children who are severely abandoned
and struggle to attain intimacy and self-reflection in adulthood. Selfhood is
not the same as physical birth. Some individuals never achieve a sense of stable
selfhood, but are left feeling that their existence is dependent upon certain
conditions for survival. This is understandable when we consider that selfhood
emerges gradually out of the infant’s initial state of total dependence upon
the mother or primary caregiver.
Like Freud, Klein held that early experience is characterised by the quali-
Primary narcissism. ties of primary narcissism and omnipotence. This means that in the infant’s
The first relationship initial early experience, the infant is both the centre of the world and the
that the infant is capable
world. The infant is all. This is the state of primary narcissism. Omnipotence
of having. It is the
relationship to the self.
is the infant’s sense of making the world happen. The infant does not have
the cognitive capacity for a sense of person, place, and time, neither is there a
Omnipotence. sense of people and events separate from the infant. Rather, ‘things’ happen
The initial state of as an extension of the infant, through its own omnipotence. The breast does
the infant where the not appear of its own volition; rather it is the infant’s need of the breast that
experience is of unlimited makes it appear. Thus, initially, the infant is lived through the experiencing of
power. For instance, the
his body in a fundamentally unconscious way. Psychological birth is that jour-
breast comes because the
infant makes it come.
ney whereby the infant slowly moves from an unconscious, solipsist state to
engagement with outside realities. This is a journey fraught with attacking
Solipsism. The belief that demons and dragons, and warm, nurturing breasts.
the self is all that there is
or that one can know. The concept of an internal world
Early intra-psychic experience is concerned with the task of separating
out the various emotional experiences that accompany bodily states, hence
the phrase: the infant is lived through the experiencing body. Feeding
can be a pleasurable experience as well as one fraught with conflict. A
feed can be a good feed or a bad feed. Similarly, defecating could be
the giving of good things, or the expelling of bad things. Because the
infant has no cognitive ability to conceptualise inside/outside, me/not
me, the infant can only know of these good and bad experiences in the
most basic terms, that is, in terms of the pleasure or un-pleasure of the
body experiences. Thus the infant experiences good and bad ‘bits’ in
relation to bodily experience. Typically, a satisfying feed will result in a

good bodily feeling and the experience of taking in a good bit—the good
breast. As such the ‘breast’ is not a person but an experience. A bad feed
results in an experience of a bad feeling. This feeling is like taking in a Objects. The word used by
bad bit—the bad breast. Freud and object relations
It is important to note that, at this stage of development, ‘bits’ of theorists to convey the
experience, for example hunger, are experienced as if they were bits or idea that the infant,
parts of the infant. This is due to the infant’s limited cognitive ability while relating to people in
external reality, is internally
to distinguish between what is ‘me’ and what is ‘not me’. Pleasurable
not yet capable of relating
and un-pleasurable bodily experiences are thus experienced as concrete to real people. Instead the
bits or parts of the infant, as well as objects that have good or bad infant relates to a phantasy
intent towards the infant. Klein (1946) termed this the experience of construction, which is the
part objects. object of the person.
Part object relating

A baby who is hungry has the bodily cancellation as being a personal attack
experience that there is an object that is against them. They will feel compelled to
attacking it. Thus the experience is one of attack back or to withdraw, thereby
being attacked and having to defend protecting themselves from further attack.
against this attack. Adults also have this They will not be able to see that the
experience. Some adults who are paranoid cancellation may have been within the
do not consider that what is happening to natural course of events and had no
them may be normal or even of their own particular personal meanings attached to it.
doing. They will have the experience of The person who cancelled will be
being attacked by the world and having experienced as a hated part object that is
to defend themselves from these attacks. attacking; he will not be remembered as
Thus a paranoid person who has someone the person who only minutes before the
cancel a date will experience the cancellation was desired and liked.
Klein (1946) postulates that from birth, the intra-psychic life of the Part objects. State in
infant is concerned and taken up with its relations to these good and bad which the infant is unable
cognitively to apprehend
experiences (or part objects). One can see that at this stage of development,
real people, or whole
to speak of relations to people is much too complicated given the infant’s objects. Objects can only
limited cognitive abilities. The infant can only have phantasy relations to parts be experienced in terms
of bodily experience. of their functions, such
as the giving or with-
The role of phantasy holding breast instead
The term ‘phantasy’ denotes the primitive mental functioning of the of the mother.
mind. They are not fantasies or daydreams as an adult might experience
them. Neither are they concerned with reality, as in the reality principle
described by Freud. Rather, phantasy is postulated to be the reservoir of
innate, unconscious images and knowledge that has been built up as a
result of phylogenetic inheritance.
Isaacs (1948) elaborates the concept of phantasy as constituting the
basic substance of all mental processes. She postulates that mental activity is
operating from birth. The level of mental activity is, however, too primitive
to think of it as constituting ‘thinking’. Thus the term phantasy denotes
this first mental activity. As such, phantasy is the early psychic or mental
representation of the experience of the body, that is, of the instincts. Freud
had postulated that psychic motivation results from the instincts of libido
and aggression, which he later conceptualised as the life and death instincts.
What Isaacs postulates is that phantasy occurs along with instinctual life
Psyche. The psyche is and forms the psychic (mental) content of the instinct—the baby may be
the term for the mental having a good feed which feels good. The baby knows about this good feeling
processes of our mind. It because of the phantasy of having a good relationship with a good breast.
thus refers to the content Object relations theory thus moved psychic motivation out of the
and manner of operating
arena of Freud’s drive model and into a relational model of psychic
which characterises our
thinking, feelings and
functioning. In other words, object relations theory postulates that it is our
general mental life. relational needs that inform/motivate our psychic functioning rather than
our instinctual urges. Phantasy came to be seen as the primary mental
Psychic structure. Refers activity and the primary content of all thought. There is no impulse or
to the quality, as it were, of instinctual urge that is not experienced also as unconscious phantasy. All
our psyche. The contents thought, however rational, is seen to be based in unconscious phantasy. It
of our mental life built
is this concept that underlies the psychoanalytic understanding that every
up over the course of
development, based
action and thought has significance and that even feelings of emptiness are
upon processes such rich with unconscious meanings.
as internalisation and
projections of experiences, The concept of psychic structure
may lead to a sound It is important to emphasize that there is no such place in the brain as the
capacity for contact with psyche. Rather, by psyche we mean mental processes that progressively build
reality and thinking or
up through cognitive development and make possible the ability to think, feel,
it may lead to a fragile
contact with reality and
and have a mental life. These processes are conceptualised as the building of
psychotic thinking. psychic structure, the gradual building up of the contents of an internal object
relations world and the particular quality of these relations. Early structure is
Introjection. The taking
based upon physiological experience and the accompanying phantasy relations
in of experiences. In
psychoanalytic terms it
that lay the foundation for an individual’s particular psychic life. How this
refers to the internalisation happens is initially through introjections (taking in) and projections (expelling
of others and their values out). The earliest interactions that the child has with the world are through:
to build psychic structure.
1. Introjection of the world through the senses. This process starts
Projection. A mental with the internalisation of the world through the physiological
mechanism by which the
experiences of the body, such as feeding.
infant expels unwanted
or terrifying aspects of his
internal world. In Kleinian 2. Projection occurs when unwanted, or even valued, bodily sensations
theory, projection is are projected out. This occurs through physiological processes of
initially a developmentally the body, such as defecation, crying, and screaming. With feeding
normal mechanism that the infant takes in (introjects) the good or bad milk. With defecation
assists in the safe-keeping the infant expels (projects) what is either good or bad. These
of the good object. With
physiological experiences occur concomitantly with phantasy, that
development, its use
comes to be associated
is, phantasy accompanies the physiological experiences. A baby may
with a defence mechanism be having a good feed. In phantasy there is introjection of the good.
whereby one’s own If the feed feels bad, then in phantasy the baby may expel the bad
traits and emotions are by screaming. At this early stage of development the experience
attributed to someone else. is of taking in or expelling the good or bad part object, for example
the breast. Internalisation and the building of structure are brought

about through the continual interplay between introjection and
projection of good and bad. A good introject leads to the development
and internalisation of good phantasy objects, the good breast, good
babies, good penis. A bad introject leads to the development and
internalisation of bad phantasy objects, the bad breast, etc.
The quality and content of the ongoing process of the interplay of

the infant’s projection and introjections builds up the basic contents of the
psychic structure of the personality. The quality of the phantasy relations
between our good and bad objects or introjects, which are inevitable aspects
of development, determines how well we negotiate our concept of self and our
relations to others.
This history of early intra-psychic object relating determines the scenario,
as it were, of what will be available ‘to be experienced’. Out of all the possible
and potential ways of being and experiencing in the world, the contents and
quality of our early object relations lay down a matrix for our psychic structure.
It is through this matrix that a particular life can be lived. This unconscious Matrix. The determining
matrix provides the patterns that allow for what is experientially available to factor which has the power
be experienced by that individual.This concept is similar to Lacan’s notion or quality of deciding
an outcome or process.
that the unconscious is like a language. It is through language that we are able
Thus the phantasy object
to be aware and conceptualise our world. Without a language that offers this relations act as the matrix,
ability we are unable to conceptualise our experience. Consider that Eskimos or the power, that will
have numerous words to describe the various qualities of snow. These words determine how we see
offer them the opportunity to see a number of different and discriminating the world.
aspects of snow. A non-Eskimo, with only the word snow to describe or speak
of snow, is not able to make these discriminations.
Some interesting snippets

about early infant observation
The skill of detailed and considered group’ to make observations of children
observation has long held an important place they came across, specifically noting
in psychoanalytic thought and practice. material which might relate to sexuality
Freud’s observation of his grandson and sexual development. Graf made
playing with a cotton reel stands out as diligent note of his three-year-old son’s
an early example of detailed observation. development, recording Hans’s interest in
Freud offers some thoughts around the his mother’s pregnancy, his own penis and
possible meaning of the details he observes. that of his father’s, and his curiosity about
The first recorded psychoanalytic child possible differences between men and
case, that known as ‘Little Hans’, had been women. Many of these observations served
initiated as part of a series of observations as a precursor to what later came to be
by Max Graf, the child’s father. Freud, who written up as ‘An obsessional neurosis in
at the time was increasingly interested in a three-year-old boy’, the treatment
exploring ideas around infantile sexuality, undertaken by Hans’s father, under the
had asked colleagues who met regularly supervision of Freud.
with him in his professional ‘Wednesday Shayleen Peek
The implication for development is enormous. An infant whose

experience may have been of neglect and consequent physiological
deprivation, may have an unconscious object relational world that is about
neglect and deprivation. They may then, as a consequence, be dominated
by unconscious phantasies of murderous destruction and paranoia about
the world. The personality structure of such an individual may have
difficulties with impulse control over disappointments and with trust in
self and others. An infant with good-enough mothering (Winnicott, 1958)
will have an internal world that contains loving and balanced measurements
of love and hate. They would not be dominated by murderous destructive
phantasies. Their personality structure will have attained an ability to
tolerate disappointment and frustration and allow trust in self and others.
In other words, their psychic structure would be built up by sufficient
internalisation of ‘good’ object relational configurations.
Innate capacity
Klein’s major focus is on the intra-psychic world. While she acknowledges
the role of the environment (the mother) in influencing this capacity, it was
only in the last phase of her career that she started to explore the implications
of external influences. This focus arose because of the growing interest in
infant observation in Britain. Have a look at the box on infant observation
and those in Chapter 7.
Klein was greatly influenced by Freud’s concepts of the life and
death instincts. She saw these instincts as being the prime motivators for the
anxieties that characterise internal object relations. Libidinal and aggressive
phantasies are seen as the direct mental/psychic representations of the life
and death instincts (Klein, 1946).
Klein saw aggression as a fundamental human potential, in the same
Constitutional/innate. way as she saw love. Love and aggression are constitutional givens. Klein
Aspects that exist at birth (1957) postulates that the level of normality and stability of psychic structure is
but are not hereditary. dependent upon the child’s constitutional or innate capacity for aggression
They are acquired during
and love. The infant has a genetic potential for greater or lesser capacities
foetal development.
An example is the level
to love and hate. This varies from infant to infant. This means that love
or amount of innate and hate are the basis of our motivational life or, once again, that our psychic
aggression in the infant. motivation is relational. Our need to live, which is seen as a relational need,
is co-existent and in continual tension with our need to die, which we are
Paranoia. State of mind doing from the moment of birth.
characterised by feelings The death instinct is operative from birth. The infant therefore suffers
of being persecuted. In the
from paranoid anxieties and attempts to deal with these anxieties through
paranoid-schizoid position,
for instance, paranoia is
schizoid mechanisms, which consist of splitting and projective defences. The
the primary anxiety that operations of the life and death instincts are important in Kleinian theory
one is under threat. and underpin the idea that behind all psychic motivation is an element
of aggression. The implication of this concept is that an individual’s
Schizoid. A way of being psychoanalysis is not complete until the aggressive components of the
in relation to others psyche have been analysed. Klein’s conceptualisations facilitated a way of
that is characterized by
under-standing some of the anomalies of human behaviour. An example is
withdrawal and an inability
to form close relationships.
an individual who in reality is talented, attractive and admired but whose
internal phantasy object relations are suffused with aggressive impulses,
leaving them feeling worthless, unattractive and empty.
Later object relations theorists took more note of the impact of

external reality. Theorists such as Wilfred Bion (1962; 1967) elaborated
the fundamental role of the mother in facilitating the child’s capacity to
think, and Winnicott (1958) elaborated a theory of the mother-infant unit
as the basis of the development of a self. These theorists are examined in
the chapters that follow.
Envy
Envy is seen as a particularly malignant form of aggression (Klein, 1957). In all
other forms of hatred, aggression is directed towards the bad object. The bad
object is hated because it is seen as persecutory and/or withholding. It is seen
as persecutory largely because it contains the projections of one’s own sadism.
When we hate someone it is because we have projected a part of our selves that
we hate. This is not to say that he may not be an objectionable person. However,
it is through the mechanism of projection that we invest emotionally in that per-
son. The hated person is invested with aspects of our own split-off hated parts.
We are linked through the operation of projection, this is why we experience
the emotional involvement or reaction. As an example, you may hate someone
because they are lazy. The interpersonal dynamic would suggest that laziness is
part of yourself, which you have denied or split off. If laziness were not a split-off
aspect of yourself you would probably not have any particularly strong feelings
about the lazy person. Thus, once you have come to terms with split-off or de-
nied aspects of your psyche there is no energy or need to hate the other person.
Envy, however, is different to hatred. It is directed towards the good
object. It hates the goodness that is possessed by the good object and wishes
to destroy the very goodness that it envied. Klein (1975b: 56) makes some
interesting distinctions between envy, greed and jealousy:
In greed, destruction is a consequence of the greed, not a motive.
In jealousy, destruction is directed towards a third person. Jealousy

occurs in triadic, three-person relationships. You are jealous that a
third person has the goodness of a special other. You want the goodness
for yourself and hate the third. Siblings are jealous of the love a mother
may give to one of the other siblings, wanting it all for themselves.
A case of envy
Mary appears to be a successful accountant. happen and she could enjoy the success,
She has a husband and two children yet she she is even more unhappy, feeling that it
is unhappy with her life and feels that she was all worthless and not satisfying. The
always has to prove that she has the best of dynamic here is that she is envious of the
everything. Consequently she pushes both good of things and when she achieves
herself and her family to be the best at the good, she destroys its meaningfulness
everything and is most upset when this does and is left feeling empty and greedy.
not happen. Significantly, when it does Developmentally, Mary has a sister who was
>>
<<
her mother’s favourite. The two girls were her mother. Klein would propose that
not that close as children but managed to Mary’s innate capacity for envy was evoked
get along well enough. But in relation to the by her relationship with her mother. A child
mother, Mary was a rebellious child. She with less envy would perhaps have directed
behaved as if she did not care about her her aggression, in the form of jealousy,
mother and went out of her way to upset towards the sister.
Positions/stages. In
Kleinian terms, positions In envy, destruction is the motive. In envy there is a dyadic, two-
refer to a particular person relationship where you wish to destroy the goodness of the
arrangement of object other. Thus in envy, a sibling would hate the mother rather than
relation configurations experience jealousy of another sibling.
to which one returns
depending upon Positions
developmental and
Klein postulated the concept of positions rather than stages. The concept
contextual issues. For
example, a person in the of positions emphasises that there is a process that persists throughout life
depressive position may and that one may alternate between the positions. Klein (1946) postulated
return to the paranoid- two positions, an early paranoid-schizoid position and a depressive
schizoid position if there is position. The depressive position never fully supersedes or overcomes the
trauma in their life. A person paranoid-schizoid position and throughout life we may oscillate between
in the paranoid-schizoid
the two. These positions provide the phantasy contents or object relational
position may move to the
depressive position by
dynamics that constitute the matrix through which we will negotiate our
working through various intra-psychic (internal to the mind) and inter-personal (external to the
psychological conflicts. mind) relations to the world.
Freud’s stages refer to
distinct time periods which The paranoid-schizoid position
are sequential and which The paranoid-schizoid position is the earliest position, laying foundations
affect the quality of the
from birth to approximately three months. In the infant’s experience, plea-
next stage.
sure (satisfaction) and un-pleasure (frustration) experiences are either good
or bad bodily sensations. An experience is either good or bad,
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
there is no grey or in-between in paranoid-schizoid functioning.

Sensations of the body are experienced as objects, as things in
themselves. This is because there is little cognitive ability to
conceptualise the experience. We could speak of the infant
experiencing something that is happening—a body experiencing
an experience. This is part object experiencing. For example,
hunger cannot be understood by the infant. It would be felt
as something, a ‘thing’ hurting the infant. This is a part object
experience for the infant. The infant would not know that it was
his or her hunger or even that it was hunger. It is an experience.
Similarly, the mother’s breast is a part object. Either it is a
Paranoid-schizoid function good object because it has brought pleasure and good milk or
is characterised by a it is a bad object because it has withheld or has been an absent breast. The
feeling of alienation and infant cannot cognitively know about the breast being the same good and
fragmentation. bad breast.
Un-pleasure (frustration) is experienced as persecutory due to the
operation of the death instinct. In the early state frustration is experienced
as an attacking object. The pain in the hungry baby’s tummy is an attacking
concrete object. The attack must be defended against. This is achieved Re-introject. Psychic
through the defence mechanisms of projection and splitting. However, aspects that had initially
the projection increases persecutory anxiety due to the increasing fear that been projected. They are
then re-incorporated into
the bad object will retaliate and return. This anxiety is about the return
one’s inner world.
of the bad through re-introjection. The function of splitting (splitting the
good from the bad) allows the good to be protected from aggressive attack
by splitting it off to safety.
While part objects prevail, the infant’s phantasy relations are domi-
nated by paranoia anxieties. There is anxiety about the potential dangers
of the bad objects. By keeping the part objects split and separate the infant
is able, in phantasy, to keep the bad part objects separate and isolated from
the good part objects.
The paranoid-schizoid position is characterised by paranoid anxieties
and by the most primitive mechanisms of splitting, projection, denial and
projective identification. Splitting has two functions. One is as a defence
mechanism, which keeps good and bad separate. The other is as a normal
mechanism of development. It is through successful splitting, keeping the
good safe from attack, that the infant can accumulate ‘good’ experiences.
This accumulation allows the infant to develop a psychic structure that is
stable, with a coherent ego, able progressively to survive attack and acquire a
sense of continuity of self through time.
Projection is concerned with expulsion. It is usually expulsion of the ‘bad’
in order to rid the self of the bad object, for example there may be an attempt to
expel the physical sensation of hunger through screaming. Sometimes the ‘good’
is expelled, if the ‘good’ is felt to be under threat by attack from the ‘bad’.
Klein introduced the concept of projective identification to describe
the psychic phenomenon of putting as aspect of self experience into the
other. She did not elaborate this concept herself but later object relations
theorists have demonstrated that projective identification may be used as
an unconscious means of communication or as a means of unconsciously
getting the other to contain a projected part. As an example of projective
identification as a communication, we might be moved to feel sadness
when seeing someone else in distress. This emotion is not ours but one
which has been induced in us. This is the basis of empathy. An example of
projective identification as a way of getting the other to contain a projected
part, might be listening to someone speaking of a traumatic experience
that they have had. You feel overwhelmed by the tale yet the speaker is
unmoved. In this instance you feel an emotion that they are at the time
unable to experience.
The operation of envy undermines development, with serious conse-
quences. Splitting is a necessary and healthy aspect of development
but due to the operation of envy, the good object is no longer safe from
attack. The good object is attacked in phantasy in an attempt to destroy the
envied good. Splitting is then no longer an effective method for protecting
the good object. As a consequence, persecutory anxiety increases because
clearly there can be no good, only bad. Envy destroys hope because the very
goodness inherent in hope is destroyed. You will notice that envious people are
also paranoid people who find little good in the world.
The depressive position

With cognitive development, the infant’s awareness that the good and
Whole objects. Internal the bad breast are one begins to occur. This is the beginning of whole
representations of object object relating. When whole objects come to dominate, the nature of the
relations that have anxieties changes to depressive anxieties. The greater cognitive capacities
become more cognitively
of the infant facilitate the recognition that the good and bad objects are
sophisticated and which
are able to incorporate
one and the same. Anxieties then cluster around guilt over the damage
the image of the whole the infant has done, in phantasy, to the good object—the infant expelled
object—the mother and not the hated bad breast but discovers that it is the same breast as the loved
merely her breast. We would breast. Guilt leads to attempts at reparation for the damage done.
still speak of objects, as the The achievement of the depressive position is to tolerate ambivalent
phantasy world does not feelings towards one and the same object, that is, to love and hate the same
entail reality-based cognition
object and to be able to allay guilt through attempts at reparation.
of other people and
ourselves. Rather this world
Where reparation is successful, healthy development occurs, with the indi-
is pervaded by phantasy vidual negotiating the various developmental stages through the matrix of the
representations that reflect depressive position. (These are the stages postulated by, for example, Freud and
the infantile needs, desires, Erikson.) Throughout life we will continue to negotiate our ambivalence and
and conflicts of the primitive the fact that we both love and hate the ones closest to us. Under times of stress or
mind. These part or whole trauma we will revert to the more primitive modes of functioning of the para-
object relational matrices
noid-schizoid position and our paranoid anxieties will come to the fore again.
inform all future adult
rational thought.
Successful negotiation of the depressive position does not mean that one
must be depressed or have had a depression to be healthy. Rather, what
is meant is that the dynamic components of loss—loss of the good object and
a capacity to mourn, to feel guilt and concern for the other, and to desire
to make reparation (or to love another)—are integrated into the personality.
Integration is never complete and the individual may oscillate between the
two positions depending upon the particular context of his or her life.
Unsuccessful integration results from unsuccessful reparative attempts. The
child is left with the phantasy that the damage done to the good object was too
great to repair. The despair in this awareness leads to two alternatives:
1. There will be a retreat to the paranoid-schizoid level of functioning

with an increase in paranoid anxieties.
2. There may be a retreat to what Klein (1948) termed the manic
defence. The manic defence involves omnipotent denial of the
damage done and denial of anxiety. A manic defence is commonly
seen in everyday life where people cope by denying the seriousness
of situations. It also underlies the structure of manic-depressive
states. Klein thus postulates that unsuccessful reparative attempts
have serious implications for the development of a pathological
personality structure.
Manic defence
(denial)
Paranoid-schizoid position Depressive position

(paranoid anxiety) (depressive anxiety)
Figure 4.1 Diagram of movement between positions and development of pathology.

For Klein (1948) all psychopathology originates from a failure to

achieve reparation and from the subsequent retreat to more pathological
or infantile internal object relations.
A critique of Kleinian theory

Klein has given centrality to the constitutional nature of aggression.
However, later theorists have questioned this role to varying degrees.
The Independent School and Self Psychology see aggression as a result
of environmental failure. This approach suggests that it is the failure
that invites an aggressive response and the subsequent development
of object relations. This critique, by definition, must still hold to
the notion that aggression is an innate possibility. Support for either
position appears to depend upon the theoretical frame of reference.
Theory appears to dictate the findings, with each position claiming
evidence for its postulations.
A similar argument applies when thinking about the function of envy.
A coherent critique of innate aggression and envy sees manifestations of
aggression and self-destructive phenomena as arising from a number of
other possible factors:
s Inevitable frustration of an infant’s intense greedy neediness
s Inevitable failures of good-enough mothering
s The primitive nature of the infant’s cognitive abilities
In other words, the intense neediness and dependence of the infant,

means that inevitably mothering will fail. Perhaps it is important to
understand that Klein’s theory does not stand or fall on the grounds of
the innateness of aggression. What her theory demonstrates, in clinical
practice, is the central role played by aggression in the development of
destructive self-other phantasy object relations.
Klein has also been criticised for seeing love and hate as not only the
central, but the exclusive, thematic concerns of the human psyche. The
conceptualisation has been seen as too narrow. The point is probably
that Klein’s focus was only on the first year of life. At this time cognitive
abilities are very limited and her postulation is that the infant can only be
concerned with the most primitive and basic of human emotions, which
are love and hate. She postulates that it is upon these two basics of human
emotions that a later emotional life is developed.
In relation to real parenting, Klein appears to see the impact of the
parents as uniformly positive, and while she acknowledges some parental
states such as depression in the mother, she does not build the implications
of these states into her theory. The origins of pathology seem to lie in the
infant’s own aggression.
Klein has, however, made enormous contributions to psychoanalytic
thought. Her theorising has opened up the possibility of clinical intervention
in severe pathologies such as psychotic states—for example schizophrenia—
as well as self-pathologies such as borderline and narcissistic conditions.
Paranoid-schizoid position
Omnipotence
Good part object relations

Phantasy
Bad part object relations
Projection and splitting
Envy, jealousy, and greed
Paranoid anxieties
Depressive position
Loss
Whole object relations Failure
Damage
Phantasy
Guilt
Reparation
Manic defence
Success
Damage
Denial
Depressive anxieties Anxiety
Figure 4.2 Mind map of Klein’s theory.
Specific tasks
➊ Find a biography or an autobiography of someone. Examine their early life and see if
you can make any links or postulations about what influences may have dominated in
their early object relations. In other words see if you can identify the matrix through
which they then developed through life.
See if you can identify whether they are operating in the paranoid-schizoid or
depressive position and say what gives you this information.
➋ Think about Mary in the ‘A case of envy’. Using your imagination, write a case study
describing other difficulties Mary might have, given that envy is a strong motivator in
her psychic life. Think about Klein’s postulation that we are motivated by relational
needs yet envy attacks the good and undermines the development of psychic structure
and hence the possibility of functioning from within a dominant depressive position.
General tasks
➊ Organise an infant observation over a period of about six weeks. In the observation,
be sensitive to the baby’s responses to the world. See what deductions you can make
about the internal experience of the child.
>>
<<
➋ Splitting and projection are two defence mechanisms that are quite easy to see in
operation. While they are characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position, they also occur
in the everyday functioning of people who operate mostly in the depressive position. Try
to identify instances of splitting—when a situation or an emotion is split—for example,
‘I am good and they are bad’. What do you understand about the need to behave in this
way? You might also see instances of projection, when the subject attributes to others
his own personality traits or emotions. It might be more difficult to see splitting and
projection operating in yourself because of their unconscious function, but you might be
able to become aware of engaging in such defences.
Bion, W (1967). Second thoughts. New York: Jason Aronson.
(Bion is one of the most prominent object relations theorists. He is difficult and challenging. To consider
yourself a serious student you will have to read him at some stage.)
Greenberg, J K & Mitchell, S A (1983). Object relations in psycho-analytic theory. London: Harvard
University Press.
(A scholarly but readable examination of the theoretical developments among the post-Freudian
theorists. Covers theorists such as Klein and Winnicott to Kohut and Kernberg, among a number
of other significant figures.)
Grosskurth, P (1986). Melanie Klein: Her world and her work. London: Jason Aronson.
(A thorough biography of Klein. As the title implies, the book gives access to Klein’s life and motivations
and gives human drama to her theory. This is the only complete biography on Klein. It is an excellent read.)
Isaacs, S (1948). ‘The nature and function of phantasy’. In M. Klein (ed.), Contributions to psychoanal-
ysis, 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press.
(The first exposition of the Kleinian position on phantasy. Rather long-winded but definitive for the
serious student. Contributions to psycho-analysis contains a collection of papers from the greats of early
Kleinian theorising. It is interesting both from a historical point of view and for laying the foundations
of Kleinian thought.)
Klein, M (1946). ‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’. International journal of psycho-analysis, 27, 99-110.
(Her definitive paper. It may be a bit difficult but well worth the effort as it summarises her most
salient concepts and gives an overview of the two positions.)
Klein, M (1948). ‘Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states’. Contributions to psycho-
analysis, 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press.
Klein, M (1957). Envy and gratitude: A study of unconscious forces. New York: Basic Books.
Klein, M (1975a). Love, guilt and reparation and other works, 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press.
Klein, M (1975b). Envy and gratitude and other worlds, 1946-1963. London: Hogarth Press.
(These two 1975 collections of papers cover the essential concepts explored by Klein.)
Kohon, G (ed) (1986). The British school of psycho-analysis: The independent tradition. London:
Free Association Books.
(Has some wonderful essays from the Independent School and an informative introduction that details
the development of the Middle School, also known as the Independent School.)
(One of the best overviews of the work of Klein.)
CHAPTER
5
Fairbairn’s contributions
to object relations theory
Cora Smith
This chapter will explain Fairbairn’s theory of object relations

with a focus on the following concepts:
1. Introductory concepts
2. Infantile dependency and the theory
of motivation
3. Theory of development and primary
identification
4. Endopsychic structure and the schizoid condition
5. Fairbairn’s model of psychopathology
6. Treatment implications
7. A mind map of Fairbairn’s ideas
8. Limitations and achievements of
Fairbairn’s theory
Ronald Dodds Fairbairn
Introductory concepts
In this chapter we will be introduced to the ideas of W R D Fairbairn
(1941-1963) and how they differed from the mainstream body of British
psychoanalytical thinking at the time.
Fairbairn’s core contributions can be summarised as follows:
1. Fairbairn was the first to formulate a true object related nature of the
self. Fairbairn believed that the ego or self was present at birth and
its prime aim was to attach to a parent figure. Fairbairn argued that
the infant needed to be treated as a person in his own right. When he
experiences significant parental failures, the unacceptable portions of
the parent are internalised in order to be controlled. Thus for Fair-
bairn, ‘object relations’ relates to failed interpersonal relations with a
F a i r b a i r n ’s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s t h e o r y 89
needed parent. However, it is the external person who is the disap- True object related
pointing object. Although Fairbairn emphasised the importance nature of the self.
of the real relationship he nevertheless retained the value of the Fairbairn believed that the
ego or self was present at
phantasied relationship.
birth. Its prime aim was to
attach to a parent figure.
2. Fairbairn argued against primary auto-erotic infantile sexuality
in favour of the concept of infant dependence. Infant dependence Infant dependence. The
refers to the infant’s dependence on a real external parent figure. infant’s dependence on a
He asserted that libido is primarily object seeking rather than real external parent figure.
pleasure seeking and discharging. The infant is primarily object
Object seeking. The
seeking because Fairbairn regarded the infant as driven to seek an infant is primarily object
attachment with a real external parent figure in order to survive. seeking. Fairbairn regarded
Implicit in this assumption is the absence of conscious or uncon- the infant as driven to seek
scious destructiveness within the infant. The infant is regarded an attachment with a real
as innocent and experiences automatic entitlement to a breast or external parent figure in
mother figure whose responsibility it is to provide nurturance. order to survive.
3. Fairbairn’s conceptual contributions adopt a theory of development Primary identification.

based not on erotogenic zonal dominance but on the quality of The process of
dependence. From the outset infantile dependence is characterised incorporating the object
so completely that the
by its incorporative qualities and by primary identification.
distinction between ego
Fairbairn used the term primary identification in order to describe and object (self and other)
the process of incorporating the object so completely that the is merged.
distinction between ego and object (self and other) is merged.
The gradual separation from the object throughout childhood Mature dependence.
and adolescence constitutes a transitional phase from which The individual’s capacity
the healthy individual with a capacity for mature dependence for reciprocity in
relationships and the
emerges. Mature dependency refers to the individual’s capacity for
ability to see oneself and
reciprocity in relationships and the ability to see oneself and others others as separate and
as separate and autonomous beings. The desired object constitutes autonomous beings.
one capable of reciprocity in relationships, and one who is separate
with an independent identity.
4. Fairbairn formulated the endopsychic structure of the internal

world in which he maintained that the psyche is a closed system Endopsychic structure
of egos and internalised objects, as it is split off from conscious of the internal world.
Fairbairn’s proposed
awareness. The endopsychic structure of the internal world refers
theory of the internal
to Fairbairn’s proposed theory of the internal world consisting of world consisting of split
split sub-ego systems. (See Figure 5.1). In this system, splitting and sub-ego systems.
repression function as defensive operations.
5. By broadening the narrow definition of the term schizoid from a

narrow class of disorders, to include all persons who are affected
Schizoid. Fairbairn
by splits in the ego, Fairbairn considered schizoid behaviour to be
broadened this term to
a universal phenomenon. The term schizoid as used by Fairbairn include all persons who
is synonymous with the contemporary use of the word borderline, are affected by splits in the
as well as related characterological disorders such as inadequate ego. Fairbairn considered
personalities, withdrawn personalities, narcissistic and dissociative schizoid behaviour to be a
personality disorders. universal phenomenon.
Schizoid personality. The concept of the schizoid personality can thus be understood
A discrete personality both as a discrete personality entity that is characterised by with-
entity characterised by drawal, alienation and dissociation or as referring generally to self
withdrawal, alienation
and object relating issues within an individual. Fairbairn’s theory
and dissociation or as
referring generally to self
emphasised the schizoid and dissociative aspects of individual
and object relating issues suffering in contrast with the more melancholic focus of Klein.
within an individual.
6. Fairbairn viewed the infant as object seeking and dependent on his
objects for survival. By contrast, Freud’s infant was far more ‘demonic’
and instinct-driven. Klein’s infant remained a ‘demon’ and was driven
by the death instinct and its derivatives, namely envy, aggression
and omnipotence. Winnicott however extended Fairbairn’s views
even further by defining the positive aspects of infant entitlement
as ‘primary creativity’. In sum, it may be considered that while
Freud emphasised the father and Klein the mother, Fairbairn and
Winnicott emphasised the child.
Infantile dependency and the theory of

motivation
One of the most important contributions of Fairbairn to the psycho-
dynamic paradigm is his alternative viewpoint regarding drive theory or
the concept of libido. At the core of Fairbairn’s theory is his critique and
reformulation of the classical theory of motivation. Fairbairn regarded
libido as object seeking and not pleasure seeking or discharging. He
argued that the infant is motivated by the need to be in a relationship and
not driven by instincts. Fairbairn viewed people as being object-related by
their very nature. This led to one of the most significant debates within
the history of the psychoanalytic paradigm, between the original Freudian
model, which is considered a drive/structural model, and Fairbairn’s
alternative perspective, which is regarded as a relational/structural model.
For Fairbairn there is no id. Instead there is, from birth, a pristine,
undifferentiated ego. He retained the Freudian tradition of using the
term ‘object’ to refer to the infant’s experience of the mother, and the
Libidinal. The tendency term libidinal to refer to the tendency to seek the satisfaction of being
to seek the satisfaction of in a relationship. Fairbairn does not, however, negate the importance of
being in a relationship. pleasure. Rather, he locates it in a different context in which pleasure
becomes a means to an end, a ‘signpost to the object’, rather than an end
in itself. Fairbairn thought that the libido was not primarily aimed at
pleasure but at forming relationships with others. Fairbairn said that
the real libidinal aim is the establishment of a satisfactory relationship
with other people. The first of these relationships, usually between the
Primary bond. The first child and the mother is the primary bond formed by the child. This
relationship, usually early relationship shapes the emotional life of the child and has a strong
between the child and influence on the relationships and emotional experiences that take place
the mother.
later in adult life. This is because these early libidinal objects become the
blueprints for all later relationship experiences.
Fairbairn argued that classical psychoanalytic attempts to explain
why individuals repeat unpleasant experiences or remain in unpleasant
relationships, as offered by Freud’s concept of the death instinct and the
PHOTO: BRIDGET CORKE PHOTOGRAPHY

notion of repetition compulsion, were unpersuasive. Fairbairn argued This image shows a
instead that neurotic or traumatised people attach to bad objects because newborn infant bonding
they need them for survival. Fairbairn observed that where parents offer with his mother and
captures Fairbairn’s
only painful or rejecting relationships, their children do not abandon them pristine state.
for more pleasurable and rewarding objects. Fairbairn had worked in an
orphanage in Scotland, where he was struck by the fact that physically
abused children still wished to return to the care of their abusive parents.
He noticed that the child’s dependency on the abusive or rejecting parent
for survival was so strong that the child compromises the relationship
with the parent by developing compensatory internal object relations. In Abusive. Not necessarily
his description of the many abused and neglected children with whom he physical or sexual abuse.
worked, Fairbairn wrote that the emotionally frustrated child comes to It could mean that the
child’s needs for love
feel: (a) that he is not really loved as a person by the mother and (b) that
and attachment are
his own love for the mother is not really valued and accepted by her. The denied or compromised
consequence is that the child views himself as ‘bad’ and his own love as by the parents.
devalued. As a consequence, in later life the individual withholds from
others. In addition such early frustration can result in a pervasive turning
inwards to the self, that is, becoming withdrawn or schizoid, as real
relationships are viewed as unsatisfying or toxic.
Fairbairn introduced the notion of a stubborn attachment to describe
the observation that the deprived or rejected child appears more, rather
than less, attached to the parent that frustrated or rejected him. Fairbairn
argued that children who are rejected or frustrated by their parents in Stubborn attachment.
early life have some of the following features: The deprived or rejected
child appears more, rather
than less, attached to the
1. They have gained the conviction, whether through apparent
parent that frustrated or
indifference or through apparent possessiveness on the part of rejected him.
their mother, that their mother did not really love and value them
as persons in their own right
2. Influenced by a resultant sense of deprivation and inferiority, they

remain profoundly fixated upon the mother.
He described these features as aetiological factors leading to the develop-

ment of splits in the individual’s inner world.
Repression of bad Fairbairn also introduced his concept of the repression of bad objects as
objects. The abused a major defence. Fairbairn observed that abused children were unwilling
child is unwilling to to perceive their parents as bad. Instead they tended to excuse their
perceive his parent/s as
abusive behaviour and to justify the abuse they received as deserved and
bad. Instead he will tend
to excuse their abusive
due to some intrinsic ‘badness’ within themselves. An additional valuable
behaviour and justify it clinical insight was Fairbairn’s observation that when a child’s need to
as due to some intrinsic be loved was frustrated, the child became the source of reactive hate by
‘badness’ within himself. others. Fairbairn argued that hate is not an innate drive but a response
to a frustrating parent. He argued that since the child feels that his own
love is bad, he is liable to interpret the love of others in similar ways. As a
result, the child will often take active measures to push relationships away
and to distance themselves. The child thus mobilises the resources of hate
and directs this aggression against others—and more particularly against
their libidinal objects. Thus the child may fight with his parents and
others, or be objectionable in some way. In doing so, he not only induces
them to hate and reject him but the pushing away keeps these primary
relationships at a distance.
In this clinical observation Fairbairn recognised what is now termed
Negative therapeutic the negative therapeutic reaction. This reaction is activated by empathic
reaction. This is activated therapeutic interventions and met with hostile rejection on the part of
by empathic therapeutic certain patients. In Fairbairn’s view, pleasure is an affect [emotion] which
interventions and met with
both signals and accompanies a successful mother-child relationship.
hostile rejection on the
part of certain patients.
However, displeasure is viewed by Fairbairn as an affective signal of a
frustrated or toxic mother-child relationship, rather than as evidence of
an abstract notion such as the death instinct. Only an excessively rejecting
or abusive parent could produce behaviours in a child aimed exclusively
at sexual and aggressive discharge. Fairbairn viewed such evidence of
drive activity as a relational derivative and not as a primary motivational
instinctual energy.
Theory of development and primary identification

Fairbairn’s view that psychopathology originated from failed object
relationships rather than from fixated biological energies, resulted in
his revision of classical psychoanalytic developmental theory. In this way
his theory of object relations differed radically from other psychoanalytic
theories of his time. However, he was also closely influenced by Klein’s
concept of ego development as a series of phases of object relationships.
As a result of her influence, Fairbairn redefined developmental stages
in terms of mature object relations. For Fairbairn the core feature of
emotional development is a natural sequence in the development of mature
object relations from infancy through to adulthood. Fairbairn’s stages are
not based on the development of erogenous bodily zones or identifiable
cognitive tasks but, rather, on the maturation of the quality and integrity
of relations with others.
Fairbairn reasoned that libidinal development represented stages in
the maturation of the ego, from total infantile dependence on relatively
undifferentiated objects, through a phase of transition, to mature depen-
dence on well-differentiated objects. For Fairbairn, pathology emerges

in the transitional phase, that is, between infantile dependence on the
undifferentiated object and mature dependence on the differentiated
object. He termed the earliest phase in the infant’s relationship with the
parent the ‘period of primary identification’ with the mother. Fairbairn’s
conception of this early state resembles an experience of merger between
infant and mother.
Fairbairn used the term, primary identification, in order to describe
the process of incorporating the parent so completely that the distinction
between self and other is merged. In Fairbairn’s theory of development,
the primary anxiety is that of separation or loss of the primary parent Primary anxiety. Anxiety
figure, specifically the loss of the love of the mother. For Fairbairn, of the separation or loss
aggression is not an innate, independent instinct. Instead it occurs as a of the primary parent
figure, specifically the
reaction to frustration by the mother. It is the emphasis on the need for
loss of the mother.
attachment to the mother and its maintenance at any cost that indicates
why separation is the primary anxiety for Fairbairn.
It is the transitional phase that serves as a bridge between object The transitional phase.
relations characterised by infantile dependence and object relations The bridge between
characterised by mature dependence. During the transitional phase object relations
characterised by infantile
the child is required to release his compulsive attachment to the
dependence and object
mother, based on primary identification and a merger with her, in relations characterised by
exchange for a relationship based on differentiation and reciprocity. mature dependence.
This process has both internal and external qualities. While the
child now has the capacity to form a relationship not entirely based
on primary identification, his continued dependency on the mother
raises a new type of ambivalence. If the child becomes too close to the
mother he is in danger of regressively becoming identified with the
mother and thereby losing the newly established differentiated sense
of self. Conversely, if the child becomes too distant, he risks the threat
of abandonment or separation anxiety. The conflict between the fear
of abandonment and the risk of engulfment are the primary anxieties
of the relationship with the external object in the transitional phase.
Interestingly, Celani (1993) has argued that the transitional stage that
lies between infantile dependence and fear of abandonment is the
emotional battleground of the modern-day borderline personality.
Fairbairn’s ideas have influenced contemporary conceptualisations by
theorists such as Rinsely (1988) and Masterson (1984) on the nature of
relationships experienced by the borderline personality. They describe
the ‘withdrawing and rewarding object relations unit’.
The crucial task in the transitional phase is to:
1. Learn to separate from primary parent figures without losing them.
2. To form dependent relationships while maintaining

differentiation between self and other.
3. This developmental task is not only an extremely difficult one,

it is also a life-long process.
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS 94 Developmental Psychology
Fairbairn did not focus on the phase of

mature dependence as he identified all
psychopathology as originating in the
earlier phases. Fairbairn’s conceptu-
alisation of healthy maturity includes
emotional interdependence in relation-
ships where the dependency is condi-
tional.
Fairbairn regarded healthy
parenting as resulting in a child with an
outward orientation, directed at real
people, who provide real interaction
and connectedness. Internal objects
were regarded by Fairbairn to be the
result of inadequate parenting. If the
child’s dependency needs are not recip-
This infant is beginning to rocated there occurs a pathological turning away from reality to fantasised
explore an exciting world. internal objects with which one maintains a fantasised connection.
Fairbairn insisted that only bad objects were structurally internalised
Internal objects. (Rubens, 1984; 1994) because he argued that it is difficult to find any
If dependency needs adequate motive for the internalisation of objects that are satisfying
are not met there is a and good. Fairbairn felt that good parent figures are never structurally
pathological turning away
internalised because there would be no explanation for the repression that
from reality to fantasised
internal objects with which
is an essential ingredient of the formation of the endopsychic structure, were
one maintains a fantasised it not for the intolerable ‘badness’ of the experience of the objects.
connection. It must be noted that Fairbairn used the term ‘internalisation’ in two
distinctly different ways when referring to the internalisation of ‘good’
and ‘bad’ objects. When referring to the internalisation of ‘bad’ objects, he
used the term to denote a process that results in the formation of repressed
endopsychic structures within the ego. For purposes of clarity this process
Structural internalisation.
will be referred to as ‘structural internalisation’.
The process that occurs
with the internalisation
When Fairbairn referred to the internalisation of good objects he was
of ‘bad’ objects, and that referring to the internalisation of the idealised object or parent figure
results in the formation which he felt did not require any form of repression. Because there is no
of repressed endopsychic repression involved in this process, there is no self-splitting, and therefore
structures within the ego. no involvement in the formation of endopsychic structure. Thus ‘good’
objects are internalised in a non-structured way and are integrated into
Internalisation. There
the self in a manner that remains conscious and openly available to the
is no repression in this
process, there is no self
individual. Thus non-structured internalisation can be viewed as mani-
splitting, and therefore festing in memories and the conscious organisation of emotional experi-
no involvement in ence. Fairbairn, unlike Klein, considered internal objects as not essential
the formation of the and inevitable companions of all experience, but instead as compensatory
endopsychic structure. substitutes for real, actual people in the interpersonal environment.
Thus good objects are
internalised in a non-
Endopsychic structure and the schizoid condition
structured way and are
integrated into the self
A key feature of Fairbairn’s theory is his proposal of the structure of the
in a manner that remains individual’s internal world. This is where he deviated radically from Freud’s
conscious and openly ideas of motivation and internal mental structures. It is also important to
available to the individual. note that Fairbairn’s use of the term ego is not equivalent to structural
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS

connotations of Freud’s ego. For Fair-
bairn there exists at the outset of life a
‘whole, pristine and unitary’ ego that only
splits as a consequence of environmental
failure or parental frustration.
The immature ego, which desper-
ately needs to remain dependent on the
mother figure for his survival, is forced to
split his experiences. Then the ego struc-
ture too is split in order to defend against
the anxiety of being dependent on an un-
reliable or rejecting parent figure. The
immature ego in these circumstances
resorts to splitting and defensive inter-
nalisation of these ‘bad’ objects. Fairbairn
regarded this structural differentiation as
both unavoidable and universal because he argued that no parent/child The distress seen on this
relationship could be perfect and a certain amount of frustration was baby’s face indicates how
the baby struggles to cope
inevitable in any relationship. Essentially no individual can escape being
with a grandfather who is
mildly ‘pathological’ within this theoretical construction. unable to soothe him.
When faced with an unresponsive or rejecting parent, the child
responds by differentiating between the responsive aspects of the parent
or ‘good object’ and the frustrating aspect of the parent or ‘bad object.’
This results in the splitting of the original object into an accepting object
and a rejecting object, with corresponding splits in the infant’s own ego.
He called these resultant splits of the object and substructures of the self,
the ‘endopsychic structure’. The splitting occurs in the earliest phase of Endopsychic structure.
dependency when the infant’s love is frustrated or rejected. The result of the splitting
Fairbairn’s theory of object relations constitutes the first deficit theory of the original object into
an accepting object and
of pathology within psychoanalysis which is based on environmental
a rejecting object, with
failures, as opposed to the conflict theories of pathology, as espoused by corresponding splits in the
Freud and Klein. Deficit theories of pathology regard pathology as being infant’s own ego. Fairbairn
based on environmental failures while drive theories regard pathology as called these resultant
being based on inadequate resolution of internal conflicts which are linked splits of the object and
to environmental failures. While Klein stressed that pathology results the substructures of the
from the infant’s sense that there is no reparation for the guilt caused by self the ‘endopsychic
structure’.
having hated the depended-upon parent figure, Fairbairn maintained that
the schizoid infant believes that his love is ‘bad’ because it has been rejected Deficit theory. Pathology
by the actual external parent figure. The infant comes to believe that his is based on environmental
love is inherently destructive because he attributes maternal rejection to failures. In contrast, drive
his internal badness. theories regard pathology
Fairbairn was influenced by Klein, who emphasised ego-splitting as a as based on inadequate
normal process in early development to manage the persecutory anxiety resolution of internal
conflicts that are linked
of frustration. Thus, for both Klein and Fairbairn, the psychic defence
to environmental failures.
against pain or frustration in relationships came to constitute the splitting
of the object. Klein emphasised the role of the infant in projection and
splitting of the object, whereby the infant attempted to get unpleasant
experiences and affect outside of the self, by locating them in the mother
who is then perceived as bad.
Fairbairn, on the other hand, emphasised the splitting of the self as

the result of the infant taking these frustrating experiences and affects
inside the self and disposing of them by splitting them off from the central
core self. These splits are in the form of objects and subsidiary egos, which
are then concealed in the unconscious.
Original Object Original Ego
Concious
Unconcious
Idealized Object Central ego
Exciting Rejecting Libidinal Anti

Object Object ego Lidinal
ego
Exciting/alluring internal
object relationship
Rejecting object. Rejecting internal object relationship

Represents the
internalised aspects
Figure 5.1 Representation of Fairbairn’s model of endopsychic structure.
of the rejecting
parent figure on
whom the infant As a result of continued frustration, the original ego splits the object into
depends. The rejecting a rejecting object and an exciting object. Correspondingly there are resultant
object corresponds to splits in the ego. The rejecting object corresponds to the split antilibidinal
the split antilibidinal ego, initially called the ‘internal saboteur’. The exciting object corresponds to
ego, initially called the
a split in the ego called the libidinal ego.
‘internal saboteur’.
The antilibidinal ego identifies with the rejecting object, while the libidinal
Exciting object. The ego identifies with the exciting object (See Figure 5.1). Fairbairn indicated
exciting or alluring that the central ego and its ideal object remain conscious topographically,
object represents the whereas the endopsychic structure is repressed and thus unconscious. In
internalised aspects of Fairbairn’s theory, what is repressed is not a forbidden impulse but the
the object (parent) that attachment of a sub-ego to a frustrating object that is then overwhelmingly
promises but frustrates
anxiety-provoking.
delivery of nurturance to
the infant. The exciting The central ego is responsible for learning, thinking and feeling in
object corresponds to relation to others, as well as for repressing the frustrating or painful object
a split in the ego called relation systems, in order to preserve attachment. The frustrating or rejecting
the libidinal ego. object represents the memory trace of the parent figures experienced as
rejecting of the child’s needs. The antilibidinal ego is connected to the Antilibidinal ego.
rejecting object by affects of rage and frustration. The memory traces in This refers to the aspect
the sub-ego of the mother figure, which represents hope and promise of of the ego that remains
identified with the
future gratification, constitute the libidinal ego. These are attached to the
rejecting aspects of
exciting or alluring object by affects of craving and longing. The rejecting the internalised object.
object represents the internalised aspects of the actual rejecting or frustrating This aspect of the ego
parent figure on whom the infant depends. The exciting or alluring object is therefore hostile and
represents the internalised aspects of the object that promise but frustrates devaluing toward any
delivery of nurturance to the infant. potential contact
Fairbairn theorised that ‘bad’ internal object relationships, which or gratification.
represent the internalisation of painful or frustrating interactions with
Libidinal ego.
parental figures, become split off from the central ego and repressed by it. This refers to the aspect
Consequently, an aspect of the ego is split off in relation to split-off and of the ego that remains
repressed objects and associated affects. The libidinal and antilibidinal identified with the
selves, by virtue of their existence, limit the range and depth of the conscious exciting aspects of the
functioning open to the central self. internalised object.
The size of the sub-egos is reciprocal to the size of the central ego and This aspect of the ego
is therefore perpetually
is thus a barometer of the severity of pathology. The sub-egos are based on
seeking and longing
actual interpersonal experiences between the child and the object. Each sub- for the promise
ego represents accumulated memories of rejecting or alluring experiences. of relatedness.
Should a growing child be subject to an overwhelming amount of frustration,
abandonment or abuse, then a densely occupied antilibidinal ego would, as Central ego.
a result, contain a vast repository of rage, disappointment and grief. In a This is responsible
similar vein, the libidinal ego will need to be equally invested with hope and for learning, thinking
and feeling in relation
longing in order to ensure continued attachment to the object.
to others, as well as
For continued attachment to the bad object to be maintained, a balance for repressing the
is found between the libidinal and antilibidinal egos. It is clear that an frustrating or painful
overwhelming antilibidinal ego would result in increased anxiety and object relation
ultimately in abandonment. Where a child is forced to continue attachment to systems, in order to
a rejecting mother figure, the emotionally deprived libidinal ego is compelled preserve attachment.
to expand itself by overvaluing those rare experiences of gratification that
actually do occur. An example would be that of a neglected child in a
children’s home who carries a birthday card sent some years earlier from
a parent, as evidence of the parent’s love and commitment. In this way the
child can remain attached to the neglectful parent, which he needs to do for
emotional survival. This is how Fairbairn accounted for the phenomenon of
repetition compulsion. There exists in the very structure of these subsidiary Repetition
selves an attachment to some negative aspect of experience that is felt as part compulsion.
of the definition of the self. As a result the individual continues to seek out An attachment to some
negative aspect of
unsatisfactory relationships in later life.
experience which is felt
In situations of extreme deprivation the antilibidinal ego may become as part of the definition
oversupplied with abusive or toxic memories leaving the child to surrender of self. As a result the
attachment to the frustrating or alluring bad object. Such individuals may individual continues to
become so resentful or disillusioned that they compensate through an unreal- seek out unsatisfactory
istic and grandiose investment in themselves. These individuals are usually relationships in
overly independent and self-reliant. later life.
The configuration of both the rejecting internal object relations system
and the exciting object relations system occurs in order to avoid awareness of
pain and threat of abandonment. It is important to recognise that the exciting
object is ‘bad’ precisely because it is alluring but also frustrating. It evokes

the promise of satisfaction without delivery.
Fairbairn’s model of psychopathology

In his papers (1940; 1941) Fairbairn viewed psychopathology as
dichotomous and based on early or late oral fixation. He later proposed a
different view of psychopathology (1943). In the early view of pathology,
the infant fails in his effort to establish satisfactory object relations,
which results in the experience of being unloved by the mother figure. In
addition, the child feels that his love for the mother is not valued. If this
failure occurs in the early oral phase, the child feels that it is his love that
is at fault, that his neediness is excessive or overwhelming. The result
is a schizoid presentation in which the child withdraws from the object
relationship, as he believes their love to be ‘bad’. But if the object relations
failure should occur in the late oral phase, then the development of biting
and aggression are potentiated. Consequently, the child feels that it is his
or her hate or destructiveness that is to blame.
Fairbairn suggests that the resulting presentation is one of depression.
This formulation allowed Fairbairn to retain a degree of compatibility with
Klein. He acknowledged two distinct phases in infancy with concomitant
yet separate psychodynamic tasks and consequent pathologies, as well
as Klein’s conceptualisation of the depressive position. Fairbairn does
however modify his understanding of the early oral phase in which
he emphasises intense dependency and frustrated love as opposed to
aggression and hate.
Early traumatic experience influencing

Fairbairn’s theorising
One of Fairbairn’s childhood experiences a horse and carriage that ran over her
that shaped his notion of the trauma of before his eyes. The trauma haunted
loving objects is captured in one horrifying him for the rest of his life and most
memory. He had called to a little girl friend likely influenced his view that for the
across the road and had watched her run schizoid individual the gift of love
toward him only to see her killed by could be deadly.
In his third major theoretical paper, Fairbairn (1943a) surrendered

his adherence to a two-phase model of psychopathology as exemplified
The moral defence. by an early and late oral phase. He formulated his concept of the moral
Constitutes the abused defence against ‘bad’ objects as the cornerstone of psychopathology. The
or rejected child’s efforts moral defence constitutes the abused or rejected child’s efforts to retain an
to retain an attachment attachment to a needed parent through viewing his rejection as deserved
to a needed parent
because of his own ‘badness’ and thereby keeping the depended-upon,
through viewing his
rejection as ‘deserved’
abusive parent ‘good’. In this theory of psychopathology, Fairbairn regarded
and thereby keeping the attachments to bad objects as constituting the core of repression and as
depended-upon, abusive underlying all pathology. Fairbairn’s formulation of the moral defence
parent ‘good’. is an attempt to understand the child’s ego defence against the problem
of being dependently attached to a frustrating or rejecting mother figure.

Fairbairn was dissatisfied with the classical psychoanalytic explanation,
which claimed that libidinal memories were inherently positive, given
the concept of the pleasure principle, and had to be repressed because
of the guilt associated with the Oedipal complex. Given his experience
with deprived and neglected children, Fairbairn was unconvinced by
the explanation of Oedipal conflict underlying the defence of repression. Repression. Fairbairn felt
Instead, he proposed a different function. Fairbairn felt that repression that repression was an
was constructed on the need to protect the child not from his instinctually attempt by the child to
protect himself not from
generated phantasies and projections, but from actual memories of
his instinctually generated
deprivation, abuse and humiliation. phantasies and projections,
Fairbairn observed that sexually abused children were often reluctant but from actual memories
or unable to describe their experiences of abuse. Initially, he accepted the of deprivation, abuse
classical view that they were repressing these memories due to the guilt and humiliation.
they associated with the pleasurable libidinal gratifications it was assumed
these children had experienced during their sexual abuse. Later, he
rejected this view completely, arguing that the victim of the sexual assault
resists the revival of the traumatic memory primarily because this memory
represents a record of a relationship with a bad object.
Influence of early parenting experiences on

later theoretical development
Prior to qualifying as a physician Fairbairn the product of stern, religious Scottish
studied philosophy. Notably he claimed parents. Both developed theories that
that he was strongly influenced by the are believed to have been considerably
utilitarian philosopher of ethics, John influenced by their restrictive and
Stuart Mill. Fairbairn, like Mill, was also traumatic upbringings.
The moral defence against ‘bad’ objects represents the child’s denial
or repression of any memories of a frustrating object in order to retain
their dependency on that frustrating object and retain the hope of future
needed fulfilment. In addition, the child solves the fundamental problem
of staying attached to a frustrating or abusive parent figure without
becoming overwhelmed by rage or anxiety through internalising the ‘bad’
object. This internalisation transforms the child into a ‘bad’ object and
thereby keeps the parent ‘good’.
Fairbairn indicated that the self that emerges from a childhood of
deprivation or frustration is ‘bad’, for three essential reasons:
1. The self is bad because it is inextricably associated with, and undif-

ferentiated from, the rejecting parent figure.
2. The self is intrinsically bad because the child has internalised the
‘badness’ of the frustrating object in order to keep the parent ‘good’.
3. The child has not been loved by the parent in his own right and
his own love has been devalued, therefore he feels unworthy

and ‘bad’.
The full extent of the betrayal of an abused child is finally understood

when in adulthood these patients continue to be attracted to, and identify
with, frustrating or abusive objects and to avoid gratifying or mature object
relations. This leaves them unhappy individuals. Fairbairn’s definition of
pathology is based on the following:
1. The extent to which bad objects have been installed in the uncon-
scious and the degree of badness by which they are characterised.
2. The extent to which the ego is identified with internalised bad

objects.
3. The nature and strength of the defences which protect the ego
from these objects.
Basic endopsychic In his later work, Fairbairn indicates that the ego is universally split,
situation. The splitting resulting in the basic endopsychic situation. This splitting of the ego into a
of the ego into a libidinal libidinal ego, antilibidinal ego and a central ego underlies all psychopathol-
ego, antilibidinal ego and
ogy. Fairbairn’s explanation of the universality of schizoid phenomena is
a central ego underlies
all psychopathology.
that their primary determinants comprise splits in the initially whole ego,
Fairbairn’s explanation of a progression from which no one essentially escapes.
the universality of schizoid The more serious development of schizoid features manifests with
phenomena is that their the presentation of superiority and a narcissistic inflation of the ego. This
primary determinants is due to the identification with idealised parental objects and the over-
comprise splits in the valuation of the contents of the self. Fairbairn regarded these attitudes
initially whole ego, a
as both defensive and as compensating against the experience of
progression from which no
one essentially escapes.
intrinsic badness or worthlessness. These formulations have formed the
groundwork of our current understanding of narcissistic and borderline
personality disorders as well as depersonalisation and dissociated states of
multiple personality disorders.
A clinical case illustrating some

of Fairbairn’s concepts
A case vignette of ‘Eternal Hope’. was referred to the Child, Adolescent and
Family Unit of The Memorial Institute for
The following case of a 15-year-old Child, Health and Development, for
adolescent referred for psychotherapy enuresis, aggression, lying, truancy,
illustrates the allure of the bad object and the inadequate school performance, poor
moral defence against any attempt to release social integration with her peer group and
the repression of the rejecting but alluring withdrawal. E H had been removed from
internal object, so eloquently described in the care of her biological parents at the
Fairbairn’s object relations theory. age of four and was reared in a multitude
Eternal Hope (E H) as she shall be called, of children’s homes. Although she never
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returned to the fulltime care of her parents, described her mother as follows: ‘She is a
she retained contact with them through caring woman, she’s always got nice food
weekend and holiday visits. Several to eat and she’s got the house clean.
attempts to place her in foster care were She’s willing to help. I wish that she will
unsuccessful and largely thwarted by her always be there for me when I am old’.
mother, who regarded any attachment to Her description of her father was as
such parents as an act of disloyalty on E H’s follows: ‘My Dad, well I think you know
part and subject to the threat of severing he takes drugs but he limits them
contact with her. E H was the second nowadays. He is a very caring person as
youngest of several siblings, six boys and well, he says he loves us’. When
one girl. Notably, the youngest male describing her greatest fear, E H said it
sibling had been permitted to remain in would be, ‘to lose my family’. She
the care of his parents and appeared to be indicated further that once adult herself
a favoured child. Two older siblings who she would, ‘like to give my parents back
were now adults had returned to the what they gave me’. E H described herself
parental home after they were released as motivated at school and distant from
from state care and had found her peers. She added that she feared that
employment. Their presence in the she was a disappointment to her parents
household was conditional on their for her lack of achievement and
contributing to the financial upkeep of the popularity. In addition E H indicated that
home. Needless to say, neither parent was her aggression, lying, stealing and truant
employed and the burden of financial behaviours had understandably offended
support resided entirely on these adult her parents and contributed to their
offspring. E H’s father was described in reluctance to allow her to return home.
numerous court reports as unstable, This also accounted, in her view, for her
abusive, drug-dependent and seldom, or parents’ preference for her younger sibling
dubiously, employed. He appears to have who was living in the home. E H reported
been rather immature, self-involved and that she responded very negatively to
without concern for the needs or welfare criticism levelled at her by persons, other
of his children. The mother similarly was than her parents, stating, ‘When I am
described as always unemployed, criticised, I get angry and throw that
emotionally dependent, inadequate and criticism back in their face’. She added,
unreliable. Despite her obvious ‘I could hate someone who doesn’t
insufficiency as a mother, she behaved as respect me as a person’.
though her children owed her a debt of It seems a rather poignant observation
gratitude for her imaginary efforts. to note this latter comment in the light of
Although E H had requested repeatedly to Fairbairn’s observation that an emotionally
move back home, her mother refused to deprived child comes to feel that, ‘he is
take her in, having stated that she would not really loved for himself as a person by
be ‘too much to handle’. Despite his mother’ (1940: 17). Despite precious
numerous open statements of rejection little care and nurture from her parents,
from her parents, E H regarded the and evidence of significant neglect, abuse
obstacle to her return home to be due to and rejection, E H had managed to repress
the resident school social worker and her her hatred for, and her fear that she is
own bad behaviour. dependent upon, dangerous and
During a background history and unreliable objects. Her dependency and
psychotherapy assessment interview, E H fear of abandonment have rendered her
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repression of any negative attributes bad himself than have bad objects; and
in the internalised parent objects. The accordingly we have some justification for
internalisation of these bad objects is an surmising that one of his motives in
attempt to control these objects where becoming bad is to make his objects
external influence of their treatment of “good”’ (1943: 65). E H’s fear of
her is beyond hope. Notably, E H regards abandonment and rejection by her objects
herself as intrinsically bad and the cause is so acute that she has demonstrated
of her parents’ rejection of her, illustrating from a young age an unwillingness to risk
her use of the moral defence. This her mother’s wrath should she engage in
defence allows her to blame herself for the a relationship with foster parents. E H
failures of her objects, thereby keeping currently remains loyal to her mother
them ‘good’. through her schizoid withdrawal from her
Fairbairn noted, ‘It becomes obvious present peer group. She also can then
therefore, that the child would rather be protect herself from further rejection.
Treatment Implications
Although Fairbairn (1958) wrote extensively on the limitations of classical
psychoanalytic theory and contributed to a radical transformation of
psychoanalytic thought, he only addressed clinical treatment implications
of his work briefly in his final paper. Unfortunately, his ill health and
untimely death foreclosed the development of his psychotherapeutic
endeavour. Because of limited publications by Fairbairn on the clinical
application of his theory, a great deal of reliance is placed on Guntrip’s
(1975) description of his own analysis with Fairbairn. However, his per-
sonal interpretation of Fairbairn’s theory has been criticised as being
both distorted and contradictory and therefore cannot be regarded as an
accurate record of Fairbairn’s work.
Nevertheless, Fairbairn himself maintained that rigid adherence to
the details of classical psychoanalytic technique, as standardised by Freud,
was not only unjustifiably defensive of the analyst but also exploitative
of the patient. Fairbairn was critical of the requirement, by traditional
psychoanalysts of that time, that the analysands [patients] should possess
a relatively mature, strong and unmodified ego. He reasoned that such
an individual, if one existed, would be unlikely to seek psychoanalysis.
Within the classical psychoanalytic model, structural defects were not
considered analysable because only the id was seen as dynamic, with the
ego considered static. Fairbairn obviated this problem with his reformula-
tion of the concept of dynamic structure, wherein aspects of the ego are in
dynamic conflict with each other and possess a dynamic capacity. Analysis
aims at resolving the conflicts between the libidinal and antilibidinal egos
and thus healing the ego splits. According to Fairbairn, because structure
itself is dynamic, the difficulties and conflicts within it are thus accessible
to analysis. Fairbairn argued that patients seek psychoanalytic treatment
because they become aware of their own suffering. Fairbairn’s notion of
the universal nature of schizoid phenomena ultimately led to the broaden-
ing of the concept of pathology and has given a wider collective of patients
access to psychoanalytic treatment.
Fairbairn also voiced the criticism that the Freudian impulse-conflict

model limited and even distorted therapeutic practice by encouraging an
impersonal style of interpretation. Fairbairn suggested that interpretations
aimed at impulses allow the patient to become a detached observer of the
clinical material. Fairbairn reviewed the whole area of classical technique
because he recognised that aspects of unsatisfying, distant and remote
parental relations were perpetuated in the analytic situation with similar
unsatisfactory results. He thus abandoned the use of the couch.
In short, Fairbairn’s approach to treatment reformulated the aims of
traditional psychoanalytic treatment. Traditional psychoanalytic treatment
aims at making the unconscious conscious. Fairbairn’s approach aims at
repairing ego splits and re-integrating the personality. He maintained that
if unconscious impulses were rendered conscious without re-integration
and repair of the ego, the treatment could not promote personality
growth.
Fairbairn described one of the major tasks of therapy as facilitating the
patient’s release of his bad objects from repression, by working through
the childhood attachment to them. However, it is clear that the patient
might fear the release of these negative, internalised parent experiences
and experience a re-traumatisation by releasing them from repression.
As a result, Fairbairn was careful to distinguish between an unchecked
release of bad objects and a controlled release of these objects in the
relative security of the analytic situation. Fairbairn maintained that it was
necessary for the patient to experience the therapist as a good object in
order to feel secure enough to risk releasing his internalised bad objects
from repression. The patient needs to experience them as bad and to
experience them in the transference in anticipation that they will be
changed through contact with the therapist.
Because psychopathology arises from the effects of unsatisfactory and
unsatisfying object relationships experienced in early life and in a more
intense form in inner reality, and not just from the distortion of early
experiences with objects, interpretation is insufficient. Fairbairn indicated
that the real relationship between analyst and patient constituted a new
alternative experience and therefore became an essential therapeutic
factor. Fairbairn includes the notion of the ‘actual relationship’ between
analyst and patient to mean not only the transference relationship but also
the total relationship between patient and analyst, as real people.
Although Fairbairn acknowledged the crucial role of transference
in treatment, he believed that the therapeutic kernel of psychoanalysis
lies in the whole patient-analyst relationship. As a result he argued that
impulse-driven psychology could not account for the analytic emphasis on
transference. This reasoning eventually led Fairbairn to emphasise the
‘personalisation’ of the analytic process. His belief that the therapeutic
efficiency of psychoanalysis depended on the maintenance of a positive
object relationship between patient and analyst produces a responsibility
on the part of the analyst to provide a setting most conducive to such
a relationship. For Fairbairn the personal relationship is the only way
for the analyst to break through the resistance to the repression of bad
objects. The transference, he argued, was the patients ‘counter effort’ to
bring the analyst into his inner world (Fairbairn, 1958: 378). The patient
maintains the internal configuration because he is attached to the internal
objects represented within. While the analyst attempts to penetrate this
closed system, the patient clings to his transference perception that is in
accordance with his internal world. The analyst’s leverage is derived
from his capacity to develop a personal relationship with the patient that
challenges the long-held transference perceptions. Fairbairn regards
transference analysis as therapeutic when it develops a new relationship
that impedes the patient’s previously closed system of object relationships.
Despite its lack of completion, Fairbairn’s model of psychoanalytic ther-
apy based on his own object relation’s theory was revolutionary. Subsequent
theorists have developed and expanded on Fairbairn’s ideas in no small
measure (Kernberg, 1980; Kohut, 1977; Masterson, 1981; Rinsley, 1988).
Fairbairn’s personality style as a clinician
Guntrip (1975) described his own analysis his therapy was to attribute it to
with Fairbairn, which he contrasted with Fairbairn’s reticent personality and the
the one that followed with Winnicott. ongoing illness that plagued Fairbairn
Ironically, Guntrip found that Fairbairn was throughout the analysis. Guntrip felt that
more orthodox in practice than in theory, his negative transference in sessions was
while he thought Winnicott was more fostered by Fairbairn’s intellectually precise
revolutionary in practice than in theory. interpretations. He also found it odd that
Guntrip’s account of his analysis with the patient’s couch in Fairbairn’s drawing
Fairbairn describes him as orthodox, room had its head away from the desk
formal and lacking in personal relatedness behind which Fairbairn sat. He only later
in his sessions. Guntrip’s explanation of realised that there were other chairs facing
the contradiction between his theory and Fairbairn, which he could have chosen.
A mindmap of Fairbairn’s ideas

• The ego is present from birth.
• Libido is a function of the ego.
• There is no death instinct, and aggression is a reaction to

frustration. As a result there is no id.
• The infant is object-seeking from the start and a unitary ego or

self mediates this process.
• The reality principle is active from the outset.
• Impulses exist only through the activation of the ego or self and
are not conceived of as sources of energy existing independently
from structures.
• While aggression is a reaction to frustration, pleasure is viewed as

an accompaniment to satisfying relationships with objects.
• Erotogenic zones are not themselves primary determinants of

libidinal strivings but only channels that mediate the primary
object-seeking aims of the ego or self.
• The original form of anxiety experienced by the child is

separation anxiety.
• Internalisation of the object is not just a product of the phantasy

of incorporating the object orally, but a distinct psychological
process of compensation to deal with and maintain an attachment
to the unsatisfying original object or mother figure.
• The unsatisfying object arouses frustration because it rejects and

excites, but is still needed. As a result of frustrating experiences
with the original object or maternal figure, the exciting and
rejecting aspects of the object are split off together with the part
of the ego related to them.
• Each of these sub-egos contains the object and the part of the ego
related to it.
• The central core of the internalised object becomes an ideal object

or ego ideal. The part of the ego related to the ideal object is
termed the central ego. The central ego is unrepressed but acts
as an agent of repression.
• The resulting internal situation is one of three dynamic systems,

each of which functions as a sub ego. The central ego is related
to the ideal object or ego ideal and represses both (a) the needy
libidinal ego in relation to the exciting or alluring object and
(b) the antilibidinal ego linked to the rejecting object. However, as
the antilibidinal ego is attached to the rejecting object, it attacks
the libidinal ego and thus enforces the repression of the latter.
• The superego comprises the ego ideal, the antilibidinal ego and
the rejecting object.
Fairbairn’s ‘bashful kidney’

Fairbairn has been described as suffering anxiety restricted Fairbairn from travelling
from a ‘bashful kidney’. This meant that and meeting with his colleagues in
he had a fear of urinating in public London, and this further isolated him
facilities and resulted in a significant from their debates.
limitation of movement. Naturally, this
Limitations and achievements of Fairbairn’s theory

In offering a critique of Fairbairn it is important to consider the context,
the information and the knowledge that was available to Fairbairn at the
time of his writing. Given that his contributions were made in an indif-
ferent, and at times, hostile climate, and that he wrote without the benefit
of attachment theory or contemporary infant research, Fairbairn emerges
as a formidable and original theoretical contributor.
Fairbairn has been regarded as the most theoretically profound,
consistent and provocative writer of the British ‘middle group’ of psycho-
analysis (Grotstein, 1993; 1994; Sutherland, 1989). His view of the primary
relational aspects of instinctual drives, as dynamic aspects of egos directed
toward objects, resulted in the abandonment of the classical psycho-
analytic concept of the id. In this regard Fairbairn and subsequent ‘middle
group’ object relations theorists are distinguished from orthodox/classical
theorists, as well as Kleinian theorists whose ideas remain predicated on
drive theory. His focus on the conflict between dependency and autonomy
in the dynamics of pathology anticipated much of the work of Mahler and
her colleagues and their focus on separation-individuation as a primary
process in psychopathology (Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1975).
Fairbairn’s emphasis on the relational aspects of object-seeking
drives in contrast to the hedonistic aspects of classical drives as indicated
by Freud’s pleasure principle, introduced the foundation of the reality
principle to object relations. The enormous impact of real object influence
on infant development has been substantiated by recent infant research. In
addition, Fairbairn’s personalisation of psychoanalytic theory attempted
to make psychoanalysis more a psychology of persons than of impersonal
forces. In this respect Fairbairn introduced the interactional perspective of
psychoanalysis and anticipated the contemporary ideas of inter-subjectivity
and dialectical constructivism within psychoanalytic thinking.
Fairbairn’s most significant contribution to the theory of
psychopathology is his insightful understanding of schizoid dynamics in a
range of pathological presentations. Fairbairn regarded structural conflict
and an overuse of guilt in psychoanalytic formulations as obscuring
underlying pathology characterised by shame, fear and inadequacy. In
essence, Fairbairn maintained that treatment needs to access deep levels
of schizoid withdrawal, shame and fear of object attachment, in order to
reach patients. In this regard Fairbairn’s theory is a forerunner toward the
development of psychological deficit theory manifest in self psychology
and interpersonal theory.
However, the prominence of schizoid dynamics within Fairbairn’s
theory is also its Achilles’ heel. The critique of Fairbairn is that his complete
emphasis on schizoid mechanisms reduces all pathology to the schizoid
position. Although Fairbairn recognised both schizoid and depressive
pathology, his focus remained on the schizoid fear of destroying the object
with love. Irrevocably, all psychopathology, be it borderline, narcissistic,
substance abuse or trauma, is reduced to a single psychopathological
formulation of fear of object love. This homogenisation of pathology by
Fairbairn has resulted in the limited influence of his theory.
Additional criticism has been levelled at Fairbairn’s lack of clarity in
dealing with the inter-relationship between Freud’s topographic structural

model and his own endopsychic structural model. Fairbairn did not regard his
own concept of the endopsychic situation as a reframing of Freud’s tripartite
division of the psyche. However, the two concepts of mental structure are
incompatible. While the libidinal ego and the id both manifest themselves
in the form of longings and wishes, the libidinal ego is inherently object-
related and bound to specific, personal features of the relationship with the
parents. By contrast the id is by definition without structure or direction.
The theoretical consequence of Fairbairn’s explanation of schizoid and
depressive positions is an increasing focus on the primary nature of libidinal
relations, the object-directed nature of libido and the secondary nature of
aggression, conceived of as a consequence of frustrated infant libidinal
needs by the mother. Fairbairn has been heavily criticised for his rejection
of aggression as an instinct. Despite sharing this criticism, Kernberg (1980)
nevertheless is one of the few prominent theorists who acknowledged the
value of Fairbairn’s work and it is clear that he has integrated aspects of
Fairbairn’s work into his own theory. In particular, Kernberg has accepted
the concept that internalisations, at every level, have the basic form suggested
by Fairbairn, namely: an element of self; an element of object; and the
affective relationship between them. Kernberg also agrees that higher forms
of internalisation involve less splitting in the self and more self-cohesion and
integration. However, a fundamental difference between Fairbairn and
Kernberg is that the latter integrates these insights into a drive theory, while
Fairbairn abandoned this model. There is a chapter devoted to Kernberg’s
theories further in this section.
Nevertheless, Fairbairn regarded his model of internal mental
structure as avoiding the limitations of Freud’s model by not divorcing energy
from structure. This division, he maintained, results in a cumbersome set of
explanations on transformation of energy into structure, which he thought
implausible. Fairbairn thought his theory was more representative of the
authentic experience of patients and regarded the id as an abstract theoretical
artefact and not as something actually experienced. Fairbairn’s theory is also
regarded as giving a more satisfactory explanation of the attachment of libido
to its objects, particularly when objects are frustrating or rejecting. Freud’s
concept of the death instinct was conceived in order to resolve the complex
problem of explaining why, if driven by the pleasure principle, patients return
to or recreate painful object-relation experiences. Fairbairn’s object-relations
model holds that attachment to objects, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and the internalisation
of the ‘bad’ object, is essential for the survival of the child. The realisation
that the infant himself is unworthy or ‘bad’ ensures the continued attachment
to the original frustrating object or to subsequent ones.
In Fairbairn’s conceptualisation, the ego is not just a structure in charge
of mediating reality, as in Freudian terms, but a truly executive structure
managing the development of the self. The ego forms its own psychic
structure from its experience with the object and develops in relation to the
original object and subsequent objects. Fairbairn’s radical contribution is
that the psyche at birth is whole and capable of organising itself. Fairbairn
has been criticised for his concept that introjections and the identifications
with these introjected objects are pathological. Only bad objects are
internalised in order to control them and to compensate for the lack of

gratification of infantile dependence. Fairbairn leaves no space for good
internal objects to function apart from defences and against bad internal
object relations. Even though Fairbairn maintains that good relationships
are desired and needed for mature development he does not explain the
influence of the accumulation of good experiences, the experiencing of
gratifying relationships, the establishment of positive identifications and
the development of moral values. However, it appears that for Fairbairn,
good objects are internalised in a different way from bad objects. While
bad objects are structurally internalised as concrete phantasies of objects
that are persecuting (rejecting and exciting), good objects are internalised
in terms of the real experiences with them. In this way, experiences
with objects lead to an accumulation of memories from objects and this
establishes object permanence, object constancy, faith, hope, security and
trust. In essence what is being suggested is that gratifying experiences
with good objects are not symmetrical with being hurt by bad objects.
Bad objects are felt and noticed, while good objects tend to be taken for
granted and occupy more of a background space.
It is important to recognise that although Fairbairn and Klein wrote
during the same period in history and often used the same terms, the
meanings of the terms often differed. For Klein, ‘bad objects’ whether
internal or external, refer to malevolence resulting from the child’s own
inherent destructiveness projected onto others. These bad objects are
creations from the child’s own inherent destructiveness. For Fairbairn
the bad object is one who is depriving or frustrating in reality. Bad objects
are aspects of the child’s parents, which frustrate his inherent longing for
contact or relatedness.
Fairbairn’s developmental theory has also been criticised for being
limited and lacking in detail. Relationships are characterised either by
a continual longing for infantile gratification, as in the case of infantile
dependence, or by mature dependence wherein infantile forms of grati-
fication have been conceded. Fairbairn’s view of the transitional stage
between infantile dependency and maturity remains vague. His theory
reduces the role of parental developmental function to gratification of
infantile dependency and does not address issues of separation, individu-
ation, impulse-control development, boundary setting, infant grandiosity
and general accommodation of the child to the world. It could be argued
that these aspects of child development have been substantiated by recent
infant research and can easily be filled into the gaps left by Fairbairn. A
further criticism is that Fairbairn underestimated the differential role
played by fathers in their distinctive relationship with their children.
While Fairbairn wrote extensively on his theoretical formulations
he wrote little on psychoanalytic technique. He conformed to standard
psychoanalytic technique and rejected the abandonment of the historical
and genetic approaches advocated by existential and culturalist psycho-
analytic approaches. He has however been criticised for not progressing
his technique in relation to his theoretical development.
Although eclipsed in his lifetime by such acclaimed theorists as
Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott, William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn
has emerged in his own right as an original and important psychoanalytic

thinker. Nevertheless, Fairbairn made less impact than he should have
made even in his native Britain. Members of the British Independent
group, such as Winnicott, were also strangely critical of him. Many writers
have commented on the irony of Winnicott’s attack of Fairbairn’s work
when Winnicott’s own versions of Freud’s theories are strikingly at odds
with what Freud postulated and are more similar to Fairbairn’s notions,
especially as regards the concept that infants are primarily object seeking.
Although Fairbairn challenged libido theory, he remained completely
respectful of Freud himself. Winnicott never acknowledged Fairbairn’s
anticipations of his work in several avenues and nor, ironically, did Kohut,
whose contributions bear a striking resemblance to Fairbairn’s work.
Fairbairn, by contrast, openly acknowledged the contributions of Melanie
Klein and her idea of internal objects in his ideas. Fairbairn is currently
represented by Padel (1985) and Symington (1986) from the Independent
School and by Celani (1993; 1999), Giovachini (1987), Modell (1968),
Rinsley (1979; 1988), Sullivan (1972) and Scharff (1992) in the United
States. (The work of Freud, Klein, Winnicott, Kohut and Kernberg are
discussed in this section of Psychoanalytic thought.)
Specific tasks
➊ Watch the film Shine or any equivalent film which shows the early experiences
of the protagonist [the central character]. How would Fairbairn’s theory formulate
the development of endopsychic structure or constellation of sub-egos in the case
of the protagonist?
➋ How would you use Fairbairn’s theory to describe the protagonist’s relationship with
his or her mother?
➌ Using Fairbairn’s theory give examples of schizoid personality formation which you
see in the protagonist’s various relationships.
General tasks
➊ Given the common practice of many South African families in which children are
initially reared by their grandmothers or aunts and then later by their biological
mothers (who have spent the child’s formative years either working or perhaps
studying and developing their careers), what impact do you think this would have
on primary identification and the development of the internal endopsychic structure
of the self?
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➋ Many South African infants and toddlers are being orphaned by the HIV/
Aids pandemic. What impact do you think this phenomenon could have on the
development of the libidinal and antilibidinal selves as proposed by Fairbairn?
➌ How would you apply Fairbairn’s concept of schizoid splitting to a contemporary

borderline personality disorder?
Fairbairn, W R D (1940). ‘Schizoid factors in the personality’, In Psychoanalytic Studies of the
Personality. London: Tavistock, 3-27.
Fairbairn, W R D (1941). ‘A revised psychopathology of the psychoses and psychoneuroses’,
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 22, 250-279.
Fairbairn, W R D (1943). ‘The repression and the return of bad objects (with special reference
to the ‘war neurosis’)’, British Journal of Medical Psychology, 19, 327-341.
Fairbairn, W R D (1944). ‘Endopsychic structure considered in terms of object relationships’,
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 25, 70-73.
Fairbairn, W R D (1946). ‘Object relationships and dynamic structure’, International Journal
of Psychoanalysis, 27, 30-37.
Fairbairn, W R D (1958). ‘On the nature and aims of psychoanalytic treatment’, International
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 39, 374-386.
Fairbairn, W R D (1963). ‘Synopsis of an object relations theory of personality’, International
(These seven papers provide the essential coverage of Fairbairn’s theory. Although his writing style is
rather dry and abstract, his papers are thankfully short. They are essential reading and will assist you in
discriminating between what Fairbairn actually said and what some erroneously attribute to him.)
Grotstein, J S (1993). ‘A reappraisal of W.R.D. Fairbairn’, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 57, 421-449.
(A sound, succinct, summary of Fairbairn’s work applied in the contemporary setting.)
Grotstein, J S & Rinsley, D B (eds). (1994). Fairbairn and the origins of object relations. New York/
London: Guilford Press.
(A comprehensive collection of papers reviewing the contribution of Fairbairn by various
interesting theorists.)
Kernberg, O F (1980). ‘The object relations theory of W. Ronald D. Fairbairn’, Bulletin of the
Association of Psychoanalytic Medicine, 19, 131-135.
(A sound critique of Fairbairn’s theory.)
Rinsley, D B (1979). ‘Fairbairn’s object relations theory: A reconsideration in terms of newer
knowledge’, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 43, 489-514.
(An interesting application of Fairbairn’s theory to the contemporary clinical personality theory.)
Rinsley, D B (1988). ‘Fairbairn’s ‘Basic Endopsychic Situation’ considered in terms of classical and
‘deficit’ meta-psychological models’, Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 16, 461-477.
(This paper places Fairbairn’s theory in the map of psychoanalytic debates.)
Rubens, R L (1984). ‘The meaning of structure in Fairbairn’, Internal Review of Psychoanalysis,

11, 159-429.
(This paper is very helpful in helping to clarify psychoanalytic terms used by Fairbairn in
idiosyncratic ways.)
Scharff, J S & Scharff, PE (1998). Object relations individual therapy. London: Karnac Books.
(This is a thorough text reviewing the theoretical contributions of all the major psychodynamic
contributors.)
Sutherland, J D (1989). Fairbairn’s journey into the interior. London: Free Association Books.
(A sound and insightful overview of Fairbairn’s work.)
Symington, N (1986). Fairbairn: in the analytic experience. London: Free Association Books, 236-253.
(A brief but useful summary of Fairbairn’s work.)
CHAPTER
6
Wilfred Bion: Thinking,
feeling and the search
for truth
Gavin Ivey
This chapter explores Wilfred Bion’s psychoanalytic

contribution to understanding the nature and function of
thought and thinking in managing and investigating our
emotional experience. It comprises the following sections:
1. Introduction
2. The significance of thinking in normal and thought-
disordered people
3. The development of thinking and the capacity for thought:
the role of maternal reverie and containment
4. Projective identification and the intersubjective origins
of thinking
5. The application of Bion’s container-contained
model: Infant observation
and child and adult psychological
impairment
6. Love, hate and the search for
psychological truth
7. Understanding experience and
relationship interaction in terms of
linking, containing and paranoid-
schizoid↔depressive position interaction
8. A psychoanalytic theory of psychotic
mental functioning
9. Psychotic and non-psychotic parts of
the self
10. Psychological growth and mental health
11. Critiques of Bion
Wilfred Bion
Wi l f r e d B i o n : T h i n k i n g , f e e l i n g a n d t h e s e a rc h f o r t r u t h 113
Introduction
W R Bion (1897-1979) is one of the foremost psychoanalytic development
theorists. This is because of his efforts to understand the origins of the
human mind and the ability to think—about our own experience, that of
other people, and about the nature of external reality. For Bion, nothing
was more important than the ability to think one’s own thoughts, and to
strive against the grain of received opinion, accepted theories, and personal
internal resistance to acknowledging painful realities.
Despite being one of the most radical and innovative psychoanalytic
theorists, Bion’s points of reference throughout his career remained Freud
and Klein. (His work builds on and extends their theories, therefore it is
important to be familiar with the two previous chapters on Freud and
Klein before reading this chapter.) Freud was concerned with the nature,
origin, and fate of thoughts that were repressed because of the anxiety
they evoked in the thinker. Klein was concerned with how thoughts
attached to parts of the self were split off and located outside of the self,
and what impact this had for the thinker’s internal world. Both Freud
and Klein thus took the ability to think largely for granted. Bion’s unique
contribution to psychoanalysis was to investigate the fundamental nature
of ‘thinking’, and what made it possible. To do this he studied a ‘thought
disordered’ clinical population, that is, psychotics, whose thoughts were
distorted by primitive defensive processes, or who used their minds to
destroy the very capacity for thought. It is this inquiry into thinking—or
the refusal to think as a means of engaging with, or disengaging from,
psychic reality, that is the key to understanding how the various aspects of
Bion’s work fit together.
This chapter begins by exploring what thinking is, how it becomes
possible and how the capacity to think evolves in the interpersonal
context of the mother-infant relationship. This will entail a discussion of
Bion’s ‘interpersonalisation’ of Klein’s concept of projective identification,
and the container-contained model that Bion devised to understand how
we acquire the internal space in which to ‘house’ thoughts. Bion did not
separate thinking and feeling; in fact, he argued that thinking arises in
order to manage frustrating emotional experience. For this reason Bion is
not simply another cognitive theorist. The significance of this for living
authentically and staying aware of our internal and external reality will be
outlined in this chapter.
Bion’s theories have had a profound influence on adult and child
psychoanalytic psychotherapy and the training of psychoanalysts. In
Britain an extended period of infant observation is a necessary part of
psychoanalytic training. Infant observation and how Bion’s theories are
used to make sense of early childhood experience will also be described.
Bion had a profound understanding of psychotic experience, and
his unique contribution to understanding why ‘thought disorder’ is
the hallmark of much serious psychopathology will be outlined. Bion
also accorded central importance to the role played by truth—the
ambivalent need to both know it and flee from it—in human existence.
The chapter concludes with a critique of Bion’s theories and his practice
of psychoanalysis.
The significance of thinking in normal and

thought-disordered people
How do we grow psychologically from neonate bundles of physiological
processes and reflex responses into thinking beings, capable of symbolising
and reflecting on our feelings, learning about ourselves, distinguishing
phantasy from reality, and using understanding to relate to others and
to manage frustrating experience? For Bion the emergence of all of
these psychological capacities is encapsulated in one question: What
is the developmental origin of thoughts and thinking, and under what
conditions will an infant evolve psychologically to become a thought-
full adult? This question, which lies at the heart of Bion’s developmental
psychoanalysis, cannot be answered simply in terms of neurological
development. We know this because there are ‘thought-disordered’ adults
whose malfunctioning minds cannot be simply understood in terms of
neurological impairment alone.
All of us have painful or anxiety-provoking thoughts that we avoid,
often by making them unconscious. However, for psychotic (thought-
disordered) patients, it is not the specific thought that is dangerous but
the process of thinking itself. This poses particular problems for the
Talking cure. psychoanalyst attempting to treat psychotic patients with the ‘talking cure’,
By expressing or which is based upon the idea that by expressing or symbolising painful or
symbolising painful or frightening feelings in words we can come to better understand (think
frightening feelings in
about), accept and manage them. Bion noted that while his psychotic
words we can come
better to understand,
patients certainly expressed feelings (often impulsively and destructively)
accept and manage them. they felt terribly persecuted by his efforts to get them to think about and
give meaning to these feelings. Bion persisted in his efforts and spent
many years psychoanalysing psychotics, and he began to speculate that the
origin of his patients’ hallucinations, delusions and inability to think about
themselves did not arise from biological defects. Instead, he concluded,
some quality of their early infantile experience had felt intolerable and
they had mobilised primitive and rigid psychological defence mechanisms
to protect themselves from these painful early experiences. The cost of
this, however, was that they were unable to use their minds to think about
and process experience. By studying the regressed ways his adult patients
related to him, Bion began to build conceptual models about what had
happened to them in infancy and what he, as a psychoanalyst, could offer
them that would facilitate their mental growth.
The development of thinking and the capacity

for thought: the role of maternal reverie and
containment
Thinking is essential to the attainment of subjectivity or selfhood, that
is, the experience of ourselves as separate centres of agency and initiative,
relating to others while simultaneously relating to and understanding
Mentalisation. The
ourselves by means of introspective mental activity. Bion uses the term
capacity to reflect upon
one’s own and others’
thinking in its broadest sense to refer to what is today commonly called
mental states, based ‘mentalisation’. A narrow definition of mentalisation concerns the capac-
on feelings, thoughts, ity to reflect upon one’s own and others’ mental states, based on feelings,
intentions and desires. thoughts, intentions and desires. However, mentalisation refers more
generally to a set of mental operations that transform and elaborate primi-

tive sensations into experiences that may be represented, symbolised and
expressed via various communicative modalities. When Bion speaks about
thinking he had in mind a continuum of mental phenomena, ranging
from the pre-verbal representation of sensations in the form of images, to
the abstract symbolic language that we use to communicate with others—
and with ourselves—about our experiences. The statement ‘I feel rather
sad today’ is an example of a highly mentalised ‘feeling’ state that the ex-
periencer can think about, symbolise and express via language. A far less
mentalised manifestation of an equivalent bad feeling might be a painful
physical sensation in the chest which the sufferer cannot label ‘sadness’,
cannot give meaning to, and cannot clearly articulate to another person.
Bion argued that thinking implies two things: thoughts and a mind
or ‘mental apparatus’ for thinking. How do these come about? Bion
argued that in order to be able to think and reflect on experience sensory
impressions and raw emotions have to be transformed or processed by the
psyche into thoughts. Bion was indebted to Freud’s notion that the child’s
accomplishment of the reality principle is based on the ability to think,
which arises from the frustration experienced during the time delay between
an instinctual wish (for example hunger) and its gratification through
appropriate action (for example the mother’s presentation of her breast).
Freud postulates that instinctual tension/frustration is relieved either
through actual gratification of the instinctual wish, or the employment of
wish fulfilment to unburden the psyche of frustrating stimuli. The first
mental representation, according to Freud, is the hallucinated image of
the breast that the infant creates in response to delayed gratification of an
instinctual wish. This visual representation later becomes more abstract,
represented by words (‘I am feeling hungry’) when language develops. In
order for this to occur an internal bodily excitation (the physiological need
for nutrition) must be changed into psychic representation of the need (a
phantasy) that is directed toward a need-satisfying object. For Bion, this
process of increasing representational abstraction, culminating in verbal
thought, was neither obvious nor inevitable.
However, he did use Freud’s theory as a starting point to show
how thinking arose from what he calls ‘learning from experience’. The
original experience referred to is the baby’s registration of the temporary
absence of the mother’s breast. The value of Freud’s theory, for Bion, was
its demonstration that thought is the end product of mental pain caused Thought. The end
by the absent object, that is, instinctual frustration, and the intrapsychic product of mental
pain caused by the
modification and growth brought about by tolerance of this frustration.
absent object, and the
In other words, Bion’s primary interest is in the shift from the pleasure intrapsychic modification
principle to the reality principle, as manifest in the process of modulating and growth brought
instinctual frustration by thinking about, and thereby transforming about by tolerance of
(digesting) it into experience that may be used for emotional growth. this frustration.
Thought arises when the infant’s preconception or innate phantasy of a
breast to satisfy its instinctual need is temporarily frustrated, resulting
in the experience of an absent breast. What we call hunger is not an
experience, that is, a meaningful event, for the infant, but rather a
painful raw sensation associated with primitive bad object images. Bion
Beta-elements. called these raw sensations beta-elements. Beta-elements are not felt as
These are sense comprehensible phenomena that may be labelled and understood, but
impressions and primitive
rather as sense impressions and primitive affects that are felt as concrete
affects that are felt
as concrete ‘things
‘things in themselves’. They are thus ‘unmentalised’ and meaningless
in themselves’. They sensations that haven’t yet evolved to the status of feelings.
are unmentalised and
meaningless sensations
that have not yet evolved
to the status of feelings.
Alpha and Beta Symbols
α The Greek sign for β The Greek sign for
Alpha, the first letter Beta, the second letter
of the alphabet. of the alphabet.
The raw experience of sensory stimulation can be responded to in

one of two ways: it can either be evaded or modified. The prototype of
evasion in infantile phantasy is evacuation (expelling experience), whereas
modification of the experience is through thought, that is, representing
experience and mentally ‘digesting’ it. If the infant can tolerate this
frustration then the missing object becomes a thought of something
wished for but absent, and the mind, which is an ‘apparatus for thinking’,
develops. The absence of frustration, experienced as a ‘good breast’ inside,
results in feelings of oneness and merger with the object. These sensations
are not conducive to defining a sense of distinction or separation however
which is why frustration is so central to Bion’s theory of thinking.
This baby is in the midst of How do thoughts and the capacity to think arise from beta-elements,
a beta experience where his which are emotionally concrete objects of raw experience that are not
feelings are overwhelming
yet symbolised, that is, given a meaningful status as cognitive referents
him. His father is attempting
to soothe him. or links to other experiences? Without any mental elaboration beta-
elements can ‘only be acted upon as things are: They are to be broken
up and thrown out; or, with some luck, sent out for detoxicating and
refining’ (Boris, 1986: 166). In order to become proper experiences, Alpha-elements.

beta-elements have to be processed and transformed into ‘food for Originally primitive sensory
thought’, which Bion called alpha-elements. Bion uses these unusual events that have been
processed and transformed
labels (taken from the Greek alphabet) because he did not find existing
into experiences that can
psychoanalytic language adequate to the task of describing these be represented and linked
elemental building blocks of mental life. What enables this processing to other experiences.
of sensations into elemental experiences that may be stored in the psyche
for representation as thoughts, symbols, memories, and dream material,
Bion called the alpha function. The infant has no innate alpha function, Alpha function. A basic
and hence cannot transform beta-elements into alpha-elements on its psychological capacity
own. Instead, the infant uses projective identification to locate distressing that enables the
processing of sensations
beta-elements in the mother.
into elemental experiences
According to Bion, mother uses her ‘reverie’ to mentally give ‘shape’ that may be stored in the
and meaning to what her infant has projected into her containing mind. psyche for representation
In ordinary usage the word ‘reverie’ means a daydream or undirected as thoughts, memories
train of thought. In Bion’s usage reverie describes a maternal function that and dream material.
allows a mother to be open to her infant’s primitive feeling states, which
have been projected into her, and which assume a meaningful significance
as mother allows her thoughts and feelings of being with him to evolve
into an understanding of what the baby is experiencing.
Here is a typical example of maternal reverie: A sleeping baby is This father has succeeded
woken by the telephone. While his mother is talking to her friend he in containing the beta
projections of the baby
notices that she is not there and starts crying. Mother hears him but
who is now soothed by an
finishes her conversation before going to him. He is now crying vigorously experience of containment.
and she picks him up and cuddles him, talking to him as she does: ‘Are This leads to an experience
you hungry, little chap?’ She then notes a distressing intensity in his crying of alpha functioning.
and that he is squirming against her cradled arms. ‘No, I don’t think
so. Did that loud noise wake you? And Mommy wasn’t here when you
woke up. Did you feel left on your own? Were you scared? And cross!
Bad Mommy left you on your own and now you’re so cross’. The baby’s
crying has lessened and become more whimpering at this stage. At this
point she recalls an incident when she was pregnant, in which her husband
had to go on a business trip for a week, at a time when she was feeling very
vulnerable. She remembers feeling irrational hatred toward him and that
it had taken some time upon his return to feel emotionally reconnected
with him. She smiles now at how intensely this separation affected her
and how emotionally destabilised she had felt at the time. She returns
her attention to the baby and feels his body start to relax. She squeezes him
gently and says, ‘It’s terrible to feel left all alone, isn’t it?’
In the example above we notice how the mother puts aside an incorrect
assumption (her baby is crying because he is hungry) to become aware that
the cause of his distress may be something else. By paying close attention
to his cries and bodily tension she identifies his feeling state as distress
and tries to make sense of it. She relates it to the disruption of his sleep
and wonders if he was frightened by the noise of the telephone. Then,
however, she refines her interpretation of his distress and identifies it as
anger in response to her not immediately attending to him. This triggers
an association to a time when she felt vulnerable and was separated from
someone she loved, and had irrationally hated him for ‘leaving’ her. We
could say that this memory was triggered by her baby’s projection of his
infantile hatred toward the ‘bad’ mother for leaving him alone with his
distress. Her containing mind entertains and processes these feelings of
vulnerability, abandonment and anger, without judging them or trying to
dispel them. Her final words to her baby—‘It’s terrible to feel all alone’—
contextualises his anger toward her. She has unconsciously allowed the
baby’s temporary hatred toward her to ‘take shape’ in her mind in the form
of her reverie about an incident in which she hated her husband. Instead
of ignoring or feeling threatened by her baby’s anger, she understands this
as a normal response to feeling left alone when in a vulnerable emotional
state. Her baby, of course, does not understand what she is saying to
him but, as she vocally expresses her emerging understanding of what
his distress was all about, her quality of engagement with him will give
him some sense that previously unmanageable angry feelings have been
mindfully ‘transformed’ into something else. His previous experience
of a ‘bad-abandoning-mommy’ changes into one of a ‘responsive-and-
containing-good-mommy’ and his distress recedes, to be replaced by a
mood of relaxed contentment.
A containing mind. A containing mind provides a ‘mental skin’ in which the projected
The mother’s mind, contents of the infant’s primitive internal world are kept safe and given
which provides a meaning. Repeated experiences of containment will eventually result in
‘mental skin’ in which
the child’s internalisation of mother’s containing function. As Hobson
the projected contents
of her infant’s primitive
(2004: 257) succinctly puts it, the developmental accomplishment of
internal world are kept thinking is due to a ‘process by which things that happen between
safe and given meaning. people become things that happen in the individual’s mind’. This will
later be evident in the child’s growing capacity to tolerate frustration, to
soothe himself when distressed, and to think about and make sense of
his emotional experience, rather than evacuating it through projective
identification or impulsive behaviour.
The distinction between containing and holding
While Winnicott’s ‘holding’ and Bion’s mental activity in which the mother uses
‘containing’ both describe maternal her mind to process, mentally digest and
functions developmentally necessary for give meaning to her infant’s frightening
normal infantile psychic growth, there phantasies. While the end-stage of
are important distinctions between them. containing will involve some appropriate
These distinctions are based, at least partly, physical activity based on the mother’s
on different theoretical models of infantile understanding of her infant, the core
mental life. reverie phase involves meaning-making,
Firstly, holding is considered a necessary rather than sensory-physical handling
prelude to confronting the ‘not-me’ of the baby’s psychosomatic needs.
world of external objects, whereas Containing is thus a more psychologically
containing presupposes an awareness specific activity.
of something not-me (a container) into Thirdly, while holding is something the
which primitive experience may be mother does for her infant, containing is
projected. Containment and projective a joint product of an interaction between
identification go hand-in-hand, whereas the container (the mother’s mind) and the
holding does not presuppose infantile contained (the infant’s projections). While
projective identification. Thus, instead of holding is thus always mentally growth-
needing a mind into which to project, the inducing, some container-contained
Winnicottian baby needs to feel initially dynamics may be destructive, either
that his mother is an extension of him, because of excessive infantile hatred or
and hence not separate from him. While envy directed towards the container, or
containment also presupposes a blurring because maternal emotional difficulties
of the separateness of self and object, since create a pathological container. Related
projective identification locates ‘parts’ of to this is that while the baby-being-held
oneself in the mother, the Bionian baby does not have to do anything, the baby-
has an innate awareness of his mother as being-contained does, namely to take back
something beyond or outside himself that or re-introject the projections that have
may contain his projections. been made more ‘digestible’ by mother’s
Secondly, containment is more of a meaning-making mental processing.
Projective identification
and the intersubjective origins of thinking
Whereas for Melanie Klein projective identification was a purely
defensive and intrapsychic process, for Bion it was also communicative
and interpersonal, insofar as the mother feels her infant’s projected distress
registering in her own affective experience. She is thus called upon to
mentally process and give meaning to the projected meaningless beta-
elements of the infantile experience, using her alpha function to think
about what is as yet unthinkable for the infant.
Nascent capacity for
Bion’s contention that the infant’s nascent capacity for thought is a thought. This capacity
product of the mother’s mind is important for three reasons. Firstly, it is as yet more a product
addresses a significant criticism of Klein’s model of mind, that is, that of the mother’s
psychological life is from the beginning an intrapsychic phenomenon ‘container’ mind.
and that the experiences of objects in the external world are primarily
Interpsychic. determined by phantasy. For Bion, psychological life is interpsychic
The interaction between from the beginning, and the infant’s mind only develops to the extent
separate psyches, rather that the external mother can sensitively lend her mind (the container) to
than between parts
the processing of her infant’s primitive experience (the contained). The
of the same psyche
(intrapsychic).
development of a reflective psychic space to contain thoughts is thus an
interpsychic accomplishment rather than an automatic consequence of
individual neurological development.
Secondly, it provides a relational model of projective identification,
in which projective identification bridges the intrapsychic and inter-
personal domains by linking the infant’s projective phantasies to the
affective responsiveness of the mother. Projective identification is thus
not merely a primitive defence (as Klein contended) but also the earliest
communicative modality we have, a non-verbal means of alerting external
others to our internal events. As noted above, containment is essential to
the transformation of the infant’s terrifying phantasies and experiences.
Bion describes this process as follows:
‘(T)he infant projects a part of its psyche, namely its bad feelings
into a good breast. Thence in due course they are removed and
reintrojected. During their sojourn in the good breast they are
felt to have been modified in such a way that the object that is
reintrojected has become tolerable to the infant’s psyche. From
the above theory I shall abstract for use as a model the idea of a
container into which an object is projected and the object that can
Pathogenic.
be projected into the container; the latter I shall designate by the
Having a pathological
influence. term contained’ (Bion, 1962:90).
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
This model in which projected anxiety-provoking

mental contents are tolerated, given meaning and trans-
formed by the containing mind of another person is not
only relevant to parenting. It is also useful for under-
standing what happens inside us when we are distressed
about something and are lucky enough to find person
who listens patiently to our incoherent experiences, and
then communicates some understanding of what it is we
are going through. This containing function of another’s
mind is now understood to be a central ingredient of the
psychotherapeutic relationship and a precondition for
psychological change in this context.
Thirdly, whereas Klein only acknowledged the positive
Imagine the difficulties role of the maternal object in modulating the infant’s primitive phantasies,
involved for a mother of Bion alerted us to the pathogenic consequences of the maternal object’s
twins in being able to fulfill failure to receive and contain infantile experience. An infant only comes to
the functions described by
Bion. Such a situation places
be a thinking being by having a thought-full mother, that is, a mother who
upon the mother the need can intuitively lend her alpha functioning to the processing of the infant’s
to contain, differentiate and yet unthinkable beta-element sensations. It is only by internalising his
process the experiences of mother’s capacity for unconsciously working over the infant’s experience
both babies. in her own mind that he comes to have a mind of his own with which
to mentally elaborate and think about (give meaning to) the emotional
stirrings inside him. If mothers, because of their own anxieties, cannot be
mindful of their infants’ experience, then infants cannot develop minds
of their own to think about feelings; instead, they simply discharge these
emotional ‘happenings’ in the form of projective identifications. Whether,
and how, psychologically troubled adults think about their experience tells
us a great deal about their earliest relational transactions with their maternal
environments.
The application of Bion’s container-contained

model: Infant observation and child and adult
psychological impairment
Klein used her careful observations of her own children, as well as her
analysis of very young children with psychological difficulties, to develop
her account of the world of internal object relations. Bion did not himself
analyse children or observe babies; rather, he analysed the infantile aspects
of his adult psychotic patients and made inferences about their early
development that were based on his observations of them in the analytic
setting. In Britain the rich integration of these two traditions gave rise to
the discipline of infant observation, which forms one of the cornerstones
for psychoanalytic training today. It also provides a ‘laboratory’ in which
to observe the infant-mother processes that Bion had inferred.
Infant observation is a naturalistic research method in which observers Infant observation.
(usually trainee psychoanalysts) spend two hours a week closely observing A naturalistic research
the interaction between a mother and her baby, from shortly after the in- method in which observers
closely observe the
fant’s birth until his second birthday. The observers avoid engaging with
interaction between a
the mother and baby, concentrating instead on noting in fine detail what mother and her baby,
happens between mother and baby, and the effects of this interaction on from shortly after the
the baby’s and mother’s behaviour. They also note their own emotional infant’s birth until his
reactions to the mother-baby interaction, including this as potentially second birthday.
relevant data concerning the mother-child relationship. The observers
write up their detailed observations in ordinary descriptive accounts
before reporting their observations in a weekly seminar group.
Psychoanalytic theory is used to interpret what might be happening in
the mother–infant couple and what the developmental effects of this
might be for the specific baby.
Here is an example of an infant observation (from Sorensen, 1995: 12).

Baby N (his mother’s second child) is 11 weeks old:
‘It is a rainy day. Mother is very tired and has a cold. She is un-
characteristically giggly and a little giddy on the day of this obser-
vation. Baby N is lying on his back on a blanket on the floor. His
movements are jerky and asymmetrical. Mother is sitting nearby
eating some toast. When N cries she picks him up and offers him
the breast. He latches on, but after a few seconds he startles and
throws his head back. Without hesitation, Mother stands up and
gets a pacifier which the baby sucks on briefly then rejects. Mother
offers the other breast but N cannot settle down. The observer feels
tension between Mother and herself which she has never felt
before. Mother, standing, bounces the baby vigorously up and
down. His body seems stiff and his hands are in fists. His body
relaxes a little, but he startles violently again, then stiffens. Mother
continues to bounce him and tells the observer that N is fighting
sleep and that she herself used to do this when she was a baby’.
This mother-baby interaction is conspicuously different from the ex-

ample of containment provided earlier. In this example we see a temporary
failure in the mother’s containing function and its immediate effect on
her child. The mother, owing to her tiredness and not feeling well, is not
attuned to her baby’s experience and responds to his cry in a mechanical
way (giving him first the breast and then the pacifier), rather than using
her experience of the situation to thoughtfully consider what he is feeling
and what he might need. She doesn’t allow herself to register her baby’s
distress (evident in his jerky movements, violent startling and stiff body)
and the emotional effect of this on her; instead she projects her own tension
into the observer, who ends up feeling Mother’s disowned emotional
state. Instead of trying to investigate her baby’s negative experience, she
thoughtlessly attempts instead to shake it out of him (by inappropriately
bouncing him). Rather than using her own mind to make sense of and
contain the baby’s feelings she then projects her own feelings onto him by
saying that he is fighting sleep.
Compromised con- We may expect that when mother is feeling better she will regain her
tainment. Containment containing capacity. However, should her compromised containment
that is less than adequate persist, because she is chronically depressed or because she wasn’t adequately
to meet the individual’s
contained as a baby herself, we could easily imagine this child not being
developmental needs.
able to adequately internalise a containing function for himself, and as an
adult having an impaired ability to make sense of and manage his own
feeling states and emotional experiences. There is empirical evidence to
support Bion’s theory that thinking is dependent on how mothers interact
with and ‘lend their minds’ to their engagement with their babies. Hobson
(2004) reports on experiments performed using mother-child samples
Borderline personality in which mothers suffered from either borderline personality disorder
disorder. A psychological (emotionally labile, with problematic interpersonal relationships and who
disorder characterised by struggle to distinguish between their own feelings and those of others),
poor affect regulation,
depressed mothers, and insecurely attached mothers. It was hypothesised
emotional lability and
intense but unstable, inter-
that because all of these psychological conditions impair the sensitivity
personal relationships. of mothers’ emotional attunement to their infants, that the children of
these mothers would grow up with some form of impaired psychological
adjustment. This hypothesis was supported in all three experimental
conditions. The psychological impact of these defectively attuned—and
hence uncontaining—mothers was clearly evident in the infants’ and young
children’s inability to manage their emotions and establish harmonious
contact with their mother after mildly stressful situations. These infants
were also less responsive to a stranger’s communicative gestures than
were the control group. In the case of 18-month-old children of depressed
mothers, poor performance on intellectual tasks was evident: ‘Both at this
stage and later at five years of age, what was most predictive of a child’s
intellectual skills was the mother’s ability to focus on her two month-old’s
experience and to sustain the infant’s attention in early mother-infant
interaction’ (Hobson, 2004:136).
If this is the observable impact of poor containment on infants between
two and 18 months old, what about the longer-term effects on adult
psychological adjustment? We often see evidence of defective containment
in the form of adult psychological disorders. For example, a young woman
in therapy was unable to experience and acknowledge feelings of loss
and aloneness following the death of her mother, with whom she’d had
a complex and problematic relationship. Instead, years later, she would
feel compelled to get drunk, take drugs or impulsively engage in reckless
sexual behaviour, without being able to resist or think about these impulses.
Despite being intelligent she was extremely concrete in her thinking and
struggled to understand her therapist’s simplest comments about what she
might be feeling. Only after years of treatment, in which she gradually
started to tolerate, name and think about her feelings, did this impulsive
behaviour cease. As an adult, she thus had to internalise her therapist’s
containing alpha functioning in a way that she had not been able to do as
a baby with her mother.
Love, hate and the search for psychological truth

Bion recasts Freud’s notion of instinctual impulses into the language of Links.
emotional experience by using the word ‘links’ to describe the emotional The emotional connections
connections or relationships between people, and also between different or relationships between
people and also between
aspects of our own minds. The notion of links is important because an
different aspects of our
emotional experience cannot arise in isolation from a relationship. For own minds.
example, we never experience disgust, compassion or lust without these
being linked to someone or something. To relate to self or other invari-
ably involves emotional engagement, even when we use defences to protect
ourselves from threatening aspects of emotional relating. While there are
many possible emotional nuances and admixtures, Bion was interested in
three emotional groupings that are present in some form in every interper-
sonal and internal object relationship. He referred to these as Love (L),
Hate (H), and Knowledge (K). Each of these refers to a spectrum of feeling
states that relates to a self-object interaction, whether the object is internal
or external. For example: ‘I could kill that driver for cutting me off’ = H; ‘I
feel warm inside when I remember the dog I had when I was a child’ = L;
‘I wonder why my boyfriend seemed a bit distant last night’ = K.
Bion believed that L and H had been adequately accounted for by
Freud and Klein, as they had thoroughly explored the permutations of
libidinal (loving) and aggressive (hating) object relating. What impressed
Bion, however, was the extent to which human beings are motivated to
understand themselves and others, to seek truth through introspection, Truth. A state of awareness
conversation or artistic expression. Whereas Freud and Klein considered of one’s emotional
the pursuit of knowledge to be in the service of sexual or aggressive motives, reality—a precondition for
emotional growth.
as with voyeurism or the wish to control, Bion considered the desire
for knowledge (particularly self-understanding) to be an independent
expression and precondition for emotional growth. In other words, he
believed that people have an innate need to know the truth about themselves.
Bion famously claimed that mental growth depends on truth in the same
way that living organisms depend on food. Truth here does not imply the
intellectual pursuit of abstract knowledge, but the emotional truth about our
own experience of ourselves and of others. Psychological growth and health
is thus dependent on our capacity to continually think about our feelings,
despite the discomfort this may cause. Psychoanalytic therapy, defined as
the pursuit of inner truth, is thus an extraordinary historical manifestation
of a universal human disposition. K is directly related to healthy containing
because containing is an expression of a K mental attitude or state-ofmind. A
containing mother uses her mind as an instrument to know and understand
what her baby is experiencing. When the baby grows up and becomes curious
abut his own feelings and ways of relating to people, this is an expression of
his internalisation of the inquiring or knowledge-seeking function of his
mother’s early relationship with him. When we find ourselves tolerating or
suffering emotions that would otherwise feel intolerable, this is due to an
internalised containing object, the intrapsychic manifestation of a container-
contained dynamic derived from our mothers’ thinking about our feelings
before we could do this for ourselves.
However, human beings are not simply truth-seeking organisms; at
any one time we experience a conflict between knowing the truth and
distorting it. This is how we may explain the fact that so many people
seem invested in fleeing from, rather than seeking knowledge of, their
inner life. The emotional knowing that is a hallmark of K needs to be
distinguished from the defensive use of intellectual knowing that is used
Curiosity. How we to evade pain and anxiety, and thereby mental growth. Curiosity, which
experience the desire is how we experience K, is always in the service of the reality principle.
to know the truth about Thinking can only be K when it is emotionally informed and driven
ourselves and the world
by the search for truth about ourselves and our environment. However,
we inhabit.
Bion’s theory of emotional links is complicated by the realization that L, H,
and K have their opposite negative equivalents, namely –L, –H, and –K.
The privilege Bion grants to K in his theory of psychic functioning arises
from two observations: Firstly, the universal developmental significance
of thinking as a means of tolerating and modifying painful sensory
experience, need frustration and object loss characteristic of infancy and,
indeed, the whole life-span. Secondly, the peculiar and disabling absence
of the capacity for thoughtful mental functioning implicated in psychotic
and borderline-psychotic psychological disorders. Bion’s curiosity about
the ‘thought-disordered’ aspects of psychotic mental processes led him to
formulate a ‘link’ that is the opposite of K, namely –K. K is what allows
us to perceive meaning, to connect different experiences, to distinguish
phantasy from reality, internal objects from external objects, and to learn
from experience. When envy or hatred predominates, or a containing
function has not been internalised, some people refuse or are simply
unable to think about feelings. Alpha-elements are transformed into beta-
elements, rather than the other way round, resulting in the destruction
of meaning and the evacuation of feelings. For example, a psychotic
person may turn his aggression into a delusion that a demonic presence
is attempting to control his mind, thereby ‘solving’ the problem within
him by locating it outside of him in the form of an evil entity. In another
example, a narcissistic individual may expel his feelings of dependency and

inferiority, and replace these with a defensive grandiosity and intellectual
or moral arrogance. He may appear to consider what other people say
to him, only to pick apart and devalue their opinions, or claim their
insights as his own. This intellectual functioning, while it may be clothed
in ostensibly logical arguments, is the antithesis of thinking because it
cultivates lies rather than personal truths. Lies. Defensive evasion
K, and the personal truths it involves, although a defining feature of or distortions of some
human existence, is extremely threatening, both at an individual and social truthful realisation. Lies
‘starve’ the mind while
level. Not only psychologically disturbed people employ –K, it is an inherent
truth ‘nourishes’ it.
tendency in all of us. Our capacity to tolerate truths about ourselves is perma-
nently fragile because truthful realisations confront us with painful facts that
are unpleasant and make us feel vulnerable, helpless, guilty or frightened.
Truth is thus a permanent source of pain and so the mind is always prepared
to deceive itself in order to oppose psychological discomfort. –K is evident
whenever anybody uses their thinking abilities in the service of lying to or
deceiving themselves or other people. For example, when someone says ‘I’m
not afraid of death because I know that everybody has to die eventually’, he
is using his knowledge of an established fact (we will all die) to hide from
himself the terrifying truth of his personal and inescapable death.
Psychoanalysis, we could say, emerged as a response to –K, to the
fact that human beings are invested in systematic self-deception while
simultaneously wishing to understand themselves. This constant tension
between K and –K explains the fact that resistance is an inevitable aspect
of every psychotherapy session. Curiosity about what is going on inside of
us (K) keeps us coming back to the next psychotherapy session even while
we use our minds to resist acknowledging fundamental truths about
ourselves, for example, that we have sexual feelings toward our parents,
that we experience aggressive feelings towards people we love, and that
intimate relationships inevitably involve dependency, vulnerability and
loss, and so on. ‘Minus’ K can also manifest socially and politically. For
example, many white people in South Africa who lived through the
country’s apartheid past claim not to have known about the suffering of
black people or, when confronted today by the racist legacy of the former
government, say, ‘What is past is past and should be forgotten’.
If –K always manifests as the avoidance of knowing something about
our emotional realities, then –L and –H describe the defensive negative
transformation of loving and hating feelings. ‘Minus’ L and H do not
imply the opposites of these emotional states, but rather the defensive
blocking of them and hence self-deception about their existence. –L and
–H may manifest in a variety of ways. For example, –L may be expressed
as a feeling of indifference toward a significant person, a feeling of not
needing an intimate relationship, the compulsive sexualisation of intimacy
or even defensive hostility in situations of emotional closeness with
someone. –H may take the form of a pious religious identity, habitual
conflict avoidance, indifference to provocation, an inauthentic attitude
of ‘niceness’ or the conviction that ‘I never experience angry feelings’.
All emotional experiences may be classified under one of the six (three
positive, three ‘minus’) affective links outlined above.
Bion’s theory of unconscious mental functioning
Bion’s understanding of unconscious to Bion, dreaming is a model of this

mental functioning differs from that of unconscious alpha functioning, and
both Freud and Klein. The unconscious, not simply the disguised fulfillment of
for Freud, was a psychic ‘locality’ repressed wishes (a concealing function),
containing repressed instinctual impulses, as Freud had claimed. In fact, claimed
and the role of analysis was to make the Bion, the psychoanalytic use of the dream
unconscious conscious. For Klein the as a means for decoding the unconscious,
unconscious is constituted by phantasies and thereby making it conscious is an
about interactions between the self and unnatural reversal of the natural function
internal objects, and the spatial metaphor of dreaming, which is to transform the
is extended by the idea of locating split-off constant stream of conscious experience
‘parts’ of oneself in others via projective into ‘usable’ mental material that gives
identification. For Klein, analysis involved rise to personal meaning. For Bion,
the retrieval and integration of these split- dream-work is something that goes
off parts. Bion’s model of the unconscious on continuously, whether asleep or
is much harder to grasp because he does awake. In dreaming, in other words,
not consider it to be the antithesis of experiences are unconsciously retained,
consciousness; nor does he think of it as transformed, linked, and symbolically
a ‘space’ into which mental contents are represented. For Bion it is not what
put. Rather, unconsciousness is primarily we dream that is important, but that
considered an essential function of our we dream. Importantly, Bion’s model
minds that ‘metabolises’ or transforms of unconsciousness does not replace
primitive sensations and experiences Freud’s or Klein’s, but contains them.
(beta-elements) by turning them into A functioning alpha-process makes
images, thoughts and memories that possible an internal container in which
can be put to psychological use (alpha- the expressive and defensive unconscious
elements). Psychoanalysis, consequently, processes that Freud and Klein describe
is not about undoing repression or can occur. In the absence of this internal
retrieving split-off parts of one’s mind but container, however, these unconscious
about transforming poorly elaborated dynamics take on a malignant quality
experiences and sensations into thoughts and the internal world becomes full
that can be entertained (thought about) of terrorising objects, resulting in very
and tolerated, despite the discomfort debilitating psychological symptoms.
that often accompanies them. According
Understanding experience and

relationship interaction in terms of linking,
containing, and paranoid-schizoid↔depressive
position interaction
All relationship behaviour and experience at any time can be understood
in terms of emotional links (L, H, K and their ‘minus’ variations), the
interaction between paranoid-schizoid (PS) and depressive position (D)
functioning, and the extent to which the individual has internalised a
healthy containing function. The following hypothetical example of an

adult psychotherapy patient illustrates how these three conceptual models
work together. This patient’s mother may have been unable to contain her
infant’s aggressive feelings, thereby causing him to use excessive projective
identification as a defence against his intolerable anger. Consequently, the
pull toward depressive position integration of his aggressive aspects causes
him intense anxiety, resulting in a defensive flight to paranoid-schizoid
relating and the refusal to think about his suspicion that the therapist
dislikes him and wishes him harm. The therapist intuits the rage and
despair underlying the patient’s reaction to her and, after processing her
intuitions and feelings into an understanding of what is happening to him,
empathically interprets to him the pain and anxiety of confronting the
hostile feelings that the therapy relationship has stirred up in him. The
patient, previously angry and upset, feels understood and contained by
this interpretation. He now becomes sad and regretful about how angry
he often feels and wonders about people’s experience of the hurtful things
he says at these times. He anxiously notes that he has no understanding of
why he reacts this way. His defensiveness has momentarily subsided, he
has stopped attributing hidden motives to the therapist’s comments, and
thoughtfully begins to reflect on how emotionally volatile and threatened
he feels in certain social situations.
Formulated in terms of Bion’s concepts, we may understand the
patient’s shifting states of mind and relationship with the therapist in the
following terms: The patient splits off his threatening hostile feelings
(H) toward the therapist, who becomes identified in the patient’s mind
with these hateful aspects of himself (defensive projective identification
of H). Paranoid-schizoid functioning is dominant and the patient cannot
investigate his irrational conviction that the therapist wishes to harm him
(–K). By sitting with and silently sorting out the resentful and anxious
feelings the patient’s behaviour has evoked in her, the therapist starts to
sense that he has unconsciously got her to feel emotions that he is too
frightened to allow himself to feel (communicative aspect of projective
identification). This understanding makes the problematic emotions
aroused in her more tolerable (new containment phase), and she uses her
new understanding about what has happened to make an interpretation
about the patient’s fear of his hostile feelings. With the patient’s relief at
feeling understood comes his temporary introjection of the therapist’s
containing function that his own deficient mothering has deprived him
of. He now withdraws his projected aggression (a shift from PS to D
relating), and starts to feel concerned (L) about the destructive impact
of his behaviour on others, especially his therapist. He realises he does
not understand himself and begins to try and explore the reason for his
intense emotional reactions (K).
Every moment of every person’s life can be understood in terms of the
dynamic relationship between these aspects of psychic functioning, which
are constantly in a state of flux. The psychotherapy session, it should be
noted, is a useful ‘laboratory’ for closely observing the same psychological
processes that happen in our everyday lives and interactions with people
generally. If you carefully observe your own changing experiences, feeling
states and perceptions of yourself and others in the course of a typical day,
you should start to see evidence of these dynamic psychological processes
at work in you and your relationships.
A psychoanalytic theory
of psychotic mental functioning
Psychotic psychological disorders are identified by impaired reality
testing, as evidenced in delusional thinking and/or the experience of
hallucinations. As was noted earlier, Bion was very invested in developing
a psychoanalytic understanding of psychotic psychological disorders and
their developmental origins. This was partly motivated by his commitment
to providing psychoanalytic treatment to a population Freud had believed
were unanalysable, and partly because the developmental distortion of early
infantile life that gives rise to psychotic mental processes simultaneously
reveals the early origin of normal psychological development. It is difficult
for someone with a normally functioning mind to imagine the horrifying
nature of a psychotic person’s internal world. Bion not only vividly described
Psychosis. A pathological the experiential reality of psychosis but provided us with a powerful
mental state characterised explanation of the mental processes giving rise to psychotic experience.
by impaired reality testing The infant destined for psychotic disturbance cannot tolerate the frust-
in the form of hallucina-
ration of early experience and so develops a mind invested in ridding
tions or delusions.
itself of experience, rather than processing and modifying it through
Thinking apparatus. the development of a thinking apparatus. Failed containment results in
Bion’s metaphor for a persecutory anxiety of the violent re-entry of the bad experience that was
functioning mind. temporarily expelled through projective identification. This mobilises
further destructive phantasy-based attacks on the frightening ‘invaders’,
thereby resulting in an increasingly vicious cycle that, at best, results in a
primitive and savage superego that interferes with the ability to think about
experience. At worst, it results in chronic psychosis that not only destroys
thoughts but the very mental apparatus that makes thinking possible. The
psychotic, in other words, mentally attacks his own mind so that its fragile
ability to make meaning out of experience is progressively eroded.
Bion did not dwell on the issue of what mothers bring to these failed
projective-introjective transactions, although he was not oblivious to the role
of the environment (mother) in the origin of psychosis. For Bion, the crucial
issue is the infant’s capacity for frustration tolerance. An infant able to tolerate
frustration will, to a degree, be able to manage the frustration arising from less
than optimal maternal care. He will experience some containment and inter-
nalise a containing alpha-function. However, an infant with poor frustration
tolerance will not be able to endure the inevitable distresses of baby sensations
and anxieties, even when mother’s containing abilities are adequate.
Bion contended that there are innate personality features that predispose
individual infants to excessive projection. These include a preponderance of
innate destructive impulses, which smother impulses to loving linkage with
objects (L) and curiosity to know reality (K). These are replaced by sadism and
an envious hatred of reality, both internal and external, which extends to every
thing which would make for an awareness of reality, that is, thinking. Terror
is the consequence of the failure to transform bad object experience into some-
thing ‘thinkable’, and the psychotic lives in dread of imminent annihilation by
what Bion called an ‘ego-destructive superego’, an amalgam of attacking bad Ego-destructive superego.
objects that impedes any efforts to understand one’s experience. A hostile internal presence
The question of which comes first, excessive infantile aggression or that attacks one’s attempts
to think realistically about
the maternal failure to contain destructive projective identifications, did
an experience.
not concern Bion. His focus was on the end result of the failed containing
process. What is important is not the origin of these experiences, but whether
these experiences can be endured and given meaningful representation,
rather than evacuated as unthinkable horrors. The evacuation of the
psyche of undigested experience and intolerable sensation is the opposite
of thought, that is, ‘anti-thought’. These ejected beta-elements, because
they cannot be processed and thought about, are experienced as destructive
external forces or physical objects attacking and invading the self. Internal
experience identified with these objects is split, along with the self’s nascent
capacity for awareness of reality. Anti-thought manifests as ‘attacks on
linking’, whereby all mental connections (implicit in memory, symbolism,
word and sentence construction, and so on), are obliterated because they
are associated with bringing dangerous parts of the mind into even more
terrifying conjunctions. In this pathological variant of the paranoid-schizoid
position, projective identification is used solely for ridding the mind of all
content, rather than for communication. Rather than representing mental
contents through symbols, these contents are instead manipulated through
increasingly desperate and chronic projective identification. Unthinkable
experience becomes something unthinkably alien and frightening, fit only to
be expelled from the mind. For example, the psychotic’s destructive impulses,
instead of being perceived as aggressive thoughts to be owned or disowned,
are transformed into visual hallucinations of savage reptilian creatures
waiting to attack him. He has evacuated the internal terror, the emotion as
object, as a hallucination of an external threat.
To review, whether due to excessive infantile destructiveness, poor
frustration tolerance, failure of maternal containment, or some combination
of these, where the operation of alpha function is disturbed, the sense impres-
sions of which the infant is aware, and the accompanying emotions, are not
worked over. They remain ‘undigested’ (and undigestable) beta-elements,
which become discharged as malevolent projective identifications. Any
contact with the receptacle of these toxic projections is dreaded, leading to
attacks on the link between infant and breast. The desire to know and to be
curious, on which all learning and self-understanding depends, is destroyed.
Lack of containment of the infant’s primitive emotional life leads to emo-
tions themselves becoming hated and, because external reality stimulates
emotions, reality also becomes hated, leading to hatred of life itself.
Schizophrenia is a severe consequence of the excessive use of uncon- Schizophrenia.
tained projective identification, with consequent fragmentary splitting of A chronic psychotic
the ego and objects. This type of splitting, under the influence of excessive disorder characterised
by fragmentary splitting
destructive impulses, produces the characteristic psychotic experience of
and massive projective
personality fragmentation and the destruction of the capacity for coherent identification, resulting in
verbal thought, hence the common reference to schizophrenia as a ‘thought bizarre delusions
disorder’. Furthermore, the typical paranoid delusions and hallucinations or hallucinations.
that are hallmarks of psychosis indicate the extreme deployment of
projective identification as a defence against the psychotic’s unmanageable
sadism and envy. Bion made intensive use of his own emotional experi-
ences with psychotic patients to recognise and identify the operation of
projective identification into the analyst. According to Bion, in the primitive
world of paranoid-schizoid phenomena the infant relates to his own
perceptual capacities and functions as part-objects. Thus seeing, hearing,
feeling and, later, thinking are felt to be concrete parts of the self to which
the infant relates. They may thus be subject to splitting and introjective-
projective identification, as we will see in the following section.
Psychotic and non-psychotic parts of the self

Psychotic modes of experiencing are not unique to psychotic people. Bion
hypothesised that our minds comprise two co-existing types of mental
functioning that he called psychotic and non-psychotic. There is thus a
sane (reality-oriented) part present even in psychotic people, however
much it is hated and sadistically attacked, and it is this part to which Bion
directed his psychoanalytic interpretations. The perception that contact
with reality has been lost completely in psychosis is a defensive illusion of
that part of the personality which is intent upon destroying the connection
Neurotic. A term to reality. There is, likewise, a psychotic part in normal and neurotic
describing the presence individuals, however hidden this may be. It becomes most apparent in
of anxiety-provoking
micro-psychotic episodes under conditions of extreme stress, in regressed
mental conflict between
opposing thoughts and
emotional states, and even in our ‘crazy’ emotional reactions to events on
feelings in a relatively those ordinary ‘bad’ days. At these times our ability to see things clearly,
integrated personality. to stay connected to other people, to think about our feelings and to
contextualise our reactions to events temporarily disappears. Can you, for
example, relate to the following scenario, in which we see the momentary
emergence of the psychotic part of an otherwise normal person:
Lebo wakes up feeling a bit tired and irritable. She recalls a bad
dream in which she was attacked by a vicious dog. She hates dogs
and consciously pushes away further thoughts of the dream. A hot
shower revives her and she goes to the kitchen for breakfast. She
finds her husband reading the newspaper and, feeling intensely
irritated, wonders why he doesn’t want to talk to her instead. He
smiles at her and she feels a little reassured. He reads her a story
about a woman who was raped in her apartment, close to where
Lebo lives. She feels suddenly angry and blurts out that all rapists
should be castrated. Her husband lowers his newspaper and says,
‘Is that really a solution to…’. She interrupts him, saying that he is a
man so of course he is siding with the rapist. She feels momentarily
frightened of him, has the impulse to leave the house, and is struck
by the possibility that the person she has married has a dark side
she hasn’t seen before. Here we see the blurring of internal and
external reality, which evokes a paranoid state of mind and distorts
Lebo’s experience of and connection to a former positive internal
representation of her husband. The dream—perhaps symbolising
an aggressive, biting aspect of her own personality—and the
newspaper article did not cause Lebo’s reaction, but catalysed the
psychotic aspect of her mental functioning.
When the psychotic personality dominates psychic life in a more

permanent fashion we find the disturbing symptoms characteristic
of madness. Here we witness a disabling intolerance of frustration, a
consequent hatred of reality, and the minute splitting and fragmentation
of that part of the personality concerned with awareness of reality, both
internal and external. These fragments are expelled and in phantasy enter
into or engulf their objects, leaving the individual surrounded by a hostile,
terrifying external world of ‘bizarre objects’, animated by split-off aspects
of the individual’s own self and sensory apparatus. For example, the
person may believe that the television is spying on her, or the radio is
listening to her thoughts. The psychotic part acts to undermine, through
expulsion, all the features of the personality that provide the foundation of
a reality-based, intuitive understanding of self and others. These features
include consciousness of sense impressions, and the cognitive functions of
attention, memory, judgement and thought.
Due to the operation of the non-psychotic part of the personality
the person may become aware that introjection involves linking and the
formation of a mental space in which thoughts can happen. Projective
identification thus becomes used to expel the link between consciousness
(manifest in thought) and the sense impressions of reality. Links are also
attacked, so symbol formation becomes impossible because two objects
cannot be brought together without their resemblance and difference
being confused. Because the psychotic cannot symbolise, words are felt
to become the actual things they name. The psychotic can thus equate
but not symbolise, which is evident in the psychotic’s concrete thinking
and idiosyncratic use of, and response to, language. In these cases words
themselves can be terribly frightening because they are experienced
as real things, rather than symbols of real things. For example, a
psychotherapist suggests to a patient that it sounds as if he (the patient) is
talking angrily. The patient becomes very fearful because the comment
is experienced as the therapist forcing anger into the patient. In the
absence of symbolism thoughts are terrifying because they are equated
with actions. To think hateful or angry thoughts about someone makes
one responsible for having attacked or harmed them. Phantasies thus
are reality, not thoughts about reality, which is why one cannot get
psychotic patients to ‘own’ their projections in the way that one can with
less disturbed people. To re-introject projected destructive parts of the
self is terrifying for patients because it feels like they are being invaded
and attacked by aggressive foreign objects. Psychotic patients thus
frequently cannot ‘take in’ the therapist’s words because it feels like the
therapist is attempting to force something alien and toxic (the projected
parts of the self) back into them. This makes it understandable why the
therapist’s understanding is experienced as persecutory, and thus feared
and hated by psychotic patients.
Psychological growth and mental health

It should be clear that psychological growth, for Bion, is not about lift-
ing repressions or moving from one developmental position to another;
rather, it is about something more fundamental: allowing oneself to have
experiences and to think about these in ways that transform them into
different experiences, which in turn are tolerated and thought about.
In other words, mental growth naturally occurs as long as we are able to
think about feelings rather than doing something to evade or get rid of
them, whether through drugs, sleep, denial, projective identification,
fundamentalist religion or any of the manifold ways in which people avoid
or distort their experience of reality. Curiosity about and tolerance of feelings
results in an openness to experience and an inquiring attitude toward reality,
whether this is internal reality (what is going on inside our own minds) or
external reality (what is really happening in the world around us).
This mental attitude, which requires a mind that can contain
experience while allowing itself to be changed by experience, results in
a truthful way of relating to oneself and others and an acceptance of life
as it is. Whatever pleasures and gratifications it brings, life is intrinsically
painful and frustrating. From Bion’s perspective, a healthy mind is not a
happy mind but one that has a capacity for both suffering and tolerating
what life presents us with.
Some people are able to think about their feelings in a more-or-
less consistent way, without requiring professional help. Others need
psychotherapy, either because they lack or have a defective containing
function, or because certain ‘pockets of experience’ result in a defensive
constriction of their ability to think about particular kinds of feelings.
A capacity to contain Psychoanalytic psychotherapy, as Bion sees it, provides an interpersonal
experience while being space in which intolerable experience—and an intolerant attitude toward
able to be changed by experience—may be transformed into tolerable experience and a more
experience, results in a receptive openness to experience.
truthful way of relating
to oneself and others and
The aim of psychoanalytic therapy is to use the relationship and its
the possibility of enduring products (feelings, thoughts, utterances, silences, and suchlike) to illuminate
relationships. the truth of patients’ psychic reality, and to help them think about this truth
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
despite the pain, anxiety and frustration this process inevitably involves.
This confrontation with intrapsychic and interpersonal truth, what the
patient really thinks, feels and does in interactions with self and others,
produces ‘emotional turbulence’ and ‘catastrophic change’. Catastrophic
change, essential for therapeutic growth, at first sounds extreme, until
we pay attention to the degree of anxiety and resistance that accompanies
people’s realisation of some significant truth about themselves. For
example, a therapy patient who considers himself gentle and emotionally
controlled recalls a disturbing dream in which a psychotic killer attacks his
family with a knife, while he remains powerless to intervene. Although
the dream is unpleasant, he relates to it as he would to a horror film he
has reluctantly watched, as an observer offended by the alien images that
another mind (the film director’s) has subjected him to. During the course
of the therapy session, aided by the therapist’s interpretations, this patient
begins to relate differently to the dream, discovering that the deranged
killer is not ‘other’, but a representation of a hateful, destructive part of
himself. If he is to entertain this idea, rather than denying, repressing or
evacuating it, the fundamental question of who he is—his very identity—has
to change, and he has to experience the guilt and anxiety that accompanies
this disturbing new understanding. Such change, says Bion, is necessarily
violent because something (a familiar picture of himself) is destroyed, and
subversive, because a comfortable and familiar self-understanding has been Resistance. The person’s
challenged and overturned. The patient understandably experiences such defensive reaction to the
a revelation of psychic truth, or even its possibility, as an emotional crisis. emergence of a personal
Resistance is the person’s resistance to the emergence of a personal truth truth because of the
because of the emotional turmoil this transformation involves. emotional turmoil this
transformation involves.
However, although this change is catastrophic, it is not disastrous
because it opens up an enlarged experience of oneself. The real danger is
that the person cannot contain this new self-understanding, and subjects
it instead to psychotic defensive procedures in order to maintain psychic
stability and avoid thinking truthful thoughts about himself.
Critiques of Bion
Most critiques of Bion have been aimed at his rather purist approach to
psychoanalytic clinical practice and the mystical aspects of his later post-
Kleinian approach to psychoanalysis. In fact, these criticisms are two sides
of the same coin. They both concern Bion’s preoccupation with truth
and what we can know about reality: psychic reality, external reality,
and ultimate reality. Whereas external reality can be known through our
senses, psychic reality (a person’s subjective experience) cannot because,
while behaviour can be observed, experience is simply not observable.
For Bion, psychoanalysis is a relationship exclusively devoted to
discovering the truth of the patient’s experience. However, the analyst’s
desire to know the patient, and his belief that he can do so by using
psychoanalytic theory and his memories of the patient’s words and actions
in previous sessions, is an obstacle to discovering the evolving truth of
the patient’s psychic reality at this moment. Bion urged psychoanalysts
to consciously suspend memory (what they remember about the patient),
desire (the personal need to cure or change the patient) and understanding
(their theoretically informed ideas about the patient) in order to apprehend

the patient’s truth. The psychoanalytic establishment understandably
reacted with hostility to these ideas, which appeared to reject key aspects
of psychoanalytic knowing. If psychoanalysts cannot discover the truth
about their patients by means of actively recalling their words and actions,
by observing them, and understanding them in terms of psychoanalytic
theory, then how can this truth be apprehended? Through disciplined
‘intuition’ and an ‘act of faith’, was Bion’s answer. Intuition refers to an
experiential insight that is not based on logical thought, whereas faith
implies the tolerance of the painful mental state of uncertainty, of not-
knowing, until a compelling realisation presents itself. In this way the
analyst does not come to know something intellectually about the patient’s
experience, but intuits and becomes one with the patient’s experience,
thereby encountering the patient’s truth.
This anti-intellectual approach to truth resonates with aspects
of religious mysticism, by which ultimate reality (‘God’) is allegedly
revealed. Indeed, the numinous domain of unconscious experience, which
is the individual’s truth, refers to an ultimate reality, which cannot be
rationally known. Bion designated this absolute truth with the symbol ‘O’,
which, because it is unknown and unknowable through rational means,
corresponds to the religious notion of ‘God’. The experience of ‘God’ is
the consequence of divine revelation that cannot be willed or consciously
summoned. Similarly, the analyst’s knowledge (K) has to become ‘O’
if he is to access the patient’s truth, something approximating a divine
revelation. Unlike analysts before him, who regarded religion merely
as a neurotic defence against infantile anxieties, Bion regarded religious
mythology as an alternative and potentially useful perspective from
which to view ‘O’. This further alienated him from his atheist colleagues,
who sought to reduce numinous experiences to intrapsychic dynamics.
However, Bion’s openness to religious mythology did not incline him to
any identification with a particular religious ideology or specific image of
‘God’. In an imaginary dialogue between a psychoanalyst and a Christian
priest, Bion contrasts religious dogma with the activity of psychoanalysis:
‘I think that our activity is different from yours. You aspire to tell others
how and what to think. We aspire only to show what people think—the
rest is their choice’.
Although his fellow analysts frowned upn Bion’s mystical approach
to psychoanalytic truth, it resonates strongly with oriental philosophy,
specifically the Buddhist spiritual tradition (See the box on the following
page for a discussion of this).
Another criticism of Bion, which may resonate with those readers who
decide to engage with his original work, is that he does not try to make
himself accessible. Whereas other authors struggle to make their work
easily understandable, Bion deliberately writes in a manner that prevents
any easy assimilation. All human beings, including psychoanalysts,
strenuously avoid thinking their own thoughts, instead relying on
established meanings and pre-packaged understandings. For this reason
many of Bion’s admirers would rather quote him than engage with his
work, a difficult task that would force them to think about their personal—
Bion and Buddhism

Buddhism is not a religion (it does not of psychic frustrations, rather than trying
involve worship of a God or gods), but an to control, rationalise, or get rid of them,
ancient Eastern spiritual tradition focused feels dismayingly difficult. However,
on mental development through non- persistence over many years results in
judgemental awareness of experience. greater understanding of the workings
From a Buddhist perspective, while pain of one’s mind, a loosening of defensive
is a necessary part of life, suffering is not, identity structures, an acceptance of life
because suffering results from clinging as it is, and a mental state of unconditional
to experience judged pleasurable or friendliness towards oneself. This state of
‘good’ and avoiding experience judged enlightenment and equanimity cannot
unpleasurable or ‘bad’. This results in be attained through study or intellectual
addictive attachment to some experiences insight, and the more one desires it and
and phobic avoidance of others, filling us strives for it the more unattainable it
with fears and cravings while generally becomes. Meditation is thus very difficult
restricting our experiential openness. to practise and sustain, and it generates
Psychological health, we could say, results considerable mental distress. For this
from experiencing ourselves as we are. The reason the novice meditator requires
consequent identification with selected guidance from a more experienced
aspects of experience produces a narrow Buddhist ‘master’ or mentor, who in his
and illusory identity that we defensively own meditation has experienced what
protect. The Buddhist solution to this is to the novice has and thus understands the
use the technique of mindful meditation mind’s resistance to letting go of its old
to cultivate a non-judgemental awareness defensive and addictive patterns.
of all thoughts and feelings that emerge, Does this sound familiar? It should do!
without trying to dispel or hold on to any While Bion was not a Buddhist and did
of them. not discuss Buddhism in his writings,
Notice how different this is from the parallels between this spiritual path
religious doctrines, which insist on telling and Bion’s conception of psychological
us what we should (or should not) think change through psychoanalysis
and be. Mindful meditation requires that are striking. It appears that Bion’s
you sit quietly with your eyes closed and psychoanalysis and the spiritual practice
‘simply’ observe whatever presents itself of Buddhism converge on a shared
to your awareness, without interfering understanding of what restricts and
in, judging, or trying to control this facilitates psychic growth, and on what
experiential process. Sound easy? Try it psychological work on oneself is required
and see what happens. This discipline of to foster the mental attitude of absolute
‘just sitting’ with and tolerating all manner openness to experience.
and necessarily frustrating—experience of reading him. Consequently,

whereas Freud and Klein demanded allegiance from their followers, and
denounced those who ceased to be loyal Freudians or Kleinians, being a
‘Bionian’ is a contradiction in terms. Bion’s writing evokes the frustration
analogous to an infant whose needs are not immediately gratified: ‘I want
feeding (understanding) and I want it now’. Bion was less interested in
being understood by his readers than in provoking them to think about
his words and arrive at their own understanding.
Strenger (1997:122), identifies Bion as the quintessential psychoanalytic

purist and comments that, more than any other author, Bion demonstrates
‘the greatness and misery of purism in psychoanalysis’. The greatness is
evident in Bion’s demonstration of the extent to which human beings will
go to avoid real thought, and the suffering involved emphasises the exacting
demands that the analytic enterprise imposes on both patient and therapist.
He has shown us that the pursuit of personal truth cannot be undertaken
lightly because it necessarily entails the stoical forbearance of much mental
pain, frustration, and uncertainty. More than any other psychoanalytic
author, he has exposed the lengths that individuals, institutions and
ideologies will go to avoid real thought by embracing lies, half-truths, clichés
and theoretical abstractions. Consequently, notes Strenger, he:
… turned psychoanalysis into a strict, ascetic discipline tolerating

pain without distortion: the pain of frustration, of uncertainty, and
of the existential isolation of the individual … Bion’s ideal is that
of the skeptic, the relentless, uncompromising seeker of purity, the
ascetic who demands the utmost in terms of being able to bear uncer-
tainty, isolation, and the pain of nonfulfillment. Bion is a mystic who
seeks modes of expression that are unconventional in order to break
through the molds of what has become too familiar and automatic
to still count as thought. He seeks emptiness, translucency, the peace
engendered by pure being without desire, the monastic silence beyond
the endless chatter in which most of our lives are immersed’.
There is much to admire and learn from in Bion’s unflinching and rigorous
approach to what is existentially real and true beneath the habitual patterns,
evasions, deceptions, encrusted meanings, and anaesthetised responses that
constrict our authentic individuality. However, misery is the flip-side of Bion’s
ascetic and purist stance insofar as stoical suffering—by both patient and ther-
apist—is considered the hallmark of psychoanalytic investigation. It may ap-
pear that there is little room for playfulness or rest in this austere atmosphere.
Specific tasks
➊ Find a biography or an autobiography of someone who has a criminal history. Discuss

what ideas you might have about this individual’s mother’s ability to function as an
adequate container for her son or daughter’s projective identifications. Refer to specific
thoughts and behaviours in your consideration of her containing capacity. Is it possible
that she may have reversed the container-contained relationship by using her child as a
container? What evidence do you have for your conclusion in this regard?
➋ What capacities does your person demonstrate for mentalisation (the ability to
think about feelings)?
➌ Can you apply Bion’s theory of psychotic and non-psychotic parts of the self in this
case? Identify specific behaviour that points toward these personality sub-organisations.
>>
<<
General tasks
➊ Think about a recent conflictual or frustrating encounter with a friend or family member,
preferably one that had a positive resolution. Can you identify L, H, and K, as well as
paranoid-schizoid and depressive moments in your experience of this encounter?
➋ In what specific ways are Buddhist meditation and a psychoanalytic session alike?
In what ways do you think they are different?
➌ The next time you feel uncomfortable (you may be cold, have a headache, or be
feeling anxious or depressed) consciously avoid doing anything to alleviate your
discomfort. Instead, just allow yourself to feel and identify the various sensations
and feelings that make it uncomfortable. After a while, do you note any change in
your experience of the discomfort? How would you understand this in terms of
Bion’s theory?
➍ Observe a mother interacting with a baby for a few minutes. What aspects of the
mother’s behaviour would you identify as being either containing or uncontaining?
How does the baby appear to be responding to the mother’s behaviour?
Bion’s own writing is notoriously difficult to read and understand. He did not attempt to make his
work accessible to readers, but expected them to grapple with the difficult concepts and discoveries he made.
I suggest you read some of the excellent commentaries available on Bion’s writing before reading his own
books and papers. The following are particularly useful:
Bleandonu, G (1994). Wilfred Bion: His Life and Works 1897-1979. London: Free Association.
(This is a good biography of Bion that balances an account of his life with his contributions to
psychoanalysis.)
Bion, P, Talamo, F Borgogno & Merciai S A (eds) W.R. Bion: Between Past and Future. London &
New York: Karnac Books.
(This edited book contains some very good papers. Highly recommended is C.S. Sandler’s paper, ‘What
is thinking – an attempt at an integrated study of W.R. Bion’s contributions to the processes of knowing’,
200-219.)
Grotstein, J (2007). A Beam of Intense Darkness: Wilfred Bion’s Legacy to Psychoanalysis. London: Karnac.
(Grotstein tends to write in a very poetic and mystical way, which some readers find off-putting.
However, he was analysed by Bion and is one of the leading Bion scholars.)
Sandler, P C (2005). The Language of Bion: A Dictionary of Concepts. London: Karnac.
(This comprehensive dictionary of Bion’s concepts is indispensable for those interested in thoroughly
exploring Bion’s work.)
Symington, J & Symington, N (1996). The Clinical Thinking of Wilfred Bion. London: Routledge.
(This book, although emphasising the psychotherapeutic implications of Bion’s work, is one of the most
readable overviews of his work.)
CHAPTER
7
Donald Winnicott
Jacki Watts
This chapter consists of the following sections:
1. Introduction
2. Winnicott’s focus
3. Impingement and appropriate failure
4. The process of un-integration to integration
5. Holding
6. Primary maternal preoccupation
7. The role of the father
8. Good-enough mothering
9. Transitional phenomena: transitional space
and the transitional object
10. The true self and the false self
11. Critiques of Winnicott
Introduction
Donald Winnicott In this chapter we examine Donald Winnicott’s contributions to under-
standing the significance of the mother and infant bond. Winnicott’s sense
True self. The true of the importance of this relationship is fundamental to his understanding
self is based upon what of the development of the individual. He explores how the quality of this
is true about sensate relationship between mother and infant influences the degree to which
experienceing, that is,
one can become a person. We look at Winnicott’s concept of the develop-
id or instinctual needs.
By remaining in touch ment of personhood, which reflects his remarkable creativity and genius.
with this level of integrity Theorists had previously taken it for granted that one was a person.
with the body we are Winnicott did not. He suggests that we become persons, and that we
living close to the
can only achieve this state given the necessary environmental provisions
true self.
and innate potential. He would suggest that some people do not become
False self. Means that persons but remain extensions of others, that is, false selves. We shall
we’ve had to abandon the explore his conceptualisations of true and false self development.
integrity of the body and Winnicott’s writings, while stemming from a Kleinian base, shifted psy-
adapted to the demands of
choanalytic emphasis from the intrapscyhic which is the mental activity that
external reality, eg implies
cleanliness is the only issue occurs within the personality, to the interpsychic or the interpersonal realm.
as it were. Interpsychic is the psychic activity that involves relations between people.
Within this focus, his exploration of the mother-infant relationship has
provided invaluable insight into infant development. His understanding
D o n a l d Wi n n i c o t t 139
of the role of the mother has also provided a model for therapeutic Free association. Speaking
intervention. The classic free association of Freudian analysis is indicated for about the first things that
intervention with neurotic conditions, but it is not applicable in personality come into your mind
without censoring them.
disorders. Individuals with personality disorders cannot withstand the
Psychoanalysis is based
frustrations and lack of gratification that occur in a psychoanalytic analysis. upon this method as it
While the advances offered by Kleinian theory have opened avenues becomes clear when it is
for intervention with self-pathology, Winnicott’s model has suggested a difficult for the patient to
new metaphor for psychotherapy intervention. This model is based upon speak, indicating conscious
modification of the strict psychoanalytic method and offers a focus on certain or unconscious censorship.
specific aspects of the relationship between therapist and client. It allows Personality disorders.
the individual to re-visit, within the relationship to the therapist, the early Enduring, maladaptive
damage of the pre-Oedipal development stage. ways of relating in
the world that affect
perceptions, thinking and
Winnicott’s focus interpersonal relations.
Winnicott (1945; 1960), like Klein, was concerned with examining the Such individuals struggle
processes through which the little bundle of sensate experiencing becomes with damage to their
a person. Winnicott focused upon the relationship between the mother and personality structure and
the infant. While guided by Klein’s (1946) understanding of the internal phan- have not fully developed
tasy world of the infant, he gave central importance to the reality of the external their ‘personhood’.
Developmentally, they
mother. Winnicott saw the mother as influencing both the extent to which one
have not had optimum
could become a person—that is, living one’s life in relation to one’s true self— conditions to develop
and the stability of the person. We shall discuss the idea of the true self presently. stable personality
(Winnicott’s term ‘mother’ refers to the real mother of the child. However, the structures and struggle
term can also be applied to the function served by the primary caregiver. This with problems of the ‘self’.
extended understanding of the term has implications for South Africa where a Self-pathology.
large proportion of children are reared within extended family contexts.) Personality pathology that
results from disruptions
Psychological birth and personhood prior to the Oedipal years.
Freud took the entity, or even the existence, of the ‘person’ of the individual The disruption occurs due
to compromises within
for granted. This was not the case with Winnicott. He was fascinated
the infant/mother/primary
with what enabled the making or ‘becoming’ of the person. Winnicott caregiver relationship.
was foremost a paediatrician and he saw the mysteries of the mother- These lead to unstable
infant bond as fundamental to understanding what was involved in development of the child’s
becoming a ‘person’. Winnicott coined the famous clinical understanding sense of self.
that there is no such thing as an infant; there is only a mother and infant. Grandiosity. The exag-
This formulation means definitively that, where there is an infant, there gerated belief in one’s own
is maternal care (1956). If maternal care is not there, there is no infant— importance or power. For
the infant will die. What is unique about Winnicott is that he took this ob- the infant this is an essential
vious fact and explored its implications in a creative and distinctive way. experience as it allows a
The basic understanding is that initially the infant is in a state of safeguarding of the infantile
ego against its own reality-
omnipotence. It does not have the cognitive capacities to understand that
based helplessness.
the world and the mother are separate entities. Rather, for the infant, the
world and the mother are products of his own making. This experience is Wish fulfilment.
an aspect of the infant’s initial hallucinatory relationship to the world and The state in which the
imaginary wish seems to
people. The world and the infant are all one. Through this experience the
have been fulfilled. Thus
infant’s grandiosity and wish fulfilment remain intact, safeguarding the dreams, symptoms and
stability of the infantile ego. Winnicott draws attention to the need for an hallucinations are all wish
infant not to experience frustration that goes beyond the capacities of the fulfilment in which the
infantile ego to bear. Thus when a baby is hungry the baby needs to be fed. wish has found expression.
To not feed the baby and make the baby wait would constitute an
Impingement. Demand impingement upon the infantile ego.
made by the environment
(the mother) upon the Impingement and appropriate failure
infant to be separate from The distinction that Winnicott makes between impingement and appro-
her. The infant is unable to
priate failure is central to his understanding of the role of a good-enough
meet the demand due to
the unintegrated state of mother (Winnicott, 1958). Winnicott maintains that the initial state of the
the infantile ego. infant’s ego is one of fragility and fragmentation. In this state, the ego cannot
tolerate impingements. An impingement is experienced when the mother
Appropriate failure. acts towards the infant as if the infant were able to tolerate degrees of
Failure of the environment frustration and separateness from her, which he is not capable of tolerating.
(the mother), under the Winnicott defines this experience as a demand made by the environment (that
controlled conditions
is, the mother), which the infant is unable to meet due to the unintegrated state
of holding, to meet the
infant’s needs. This kind of the infantile ego. The experience is a demand made upon the infant to be
of failure is necessary in able to be separate from the mother and to be able to react to this separateness.
order to stimulate the Remember that psychoanalytic theory sees the infant’s experience as initially
infant’s development of an an omnipotent state where the infant and the world are experienced by
active and positive sense of the infant as one, a seamless experiencing where there is no experience of
separate being, leading ‘something else’ outside of the infant. When the environment brings to the
to a sense of ‘me’ and
baby’s experience the fact that there is ‘something else’ then the infant has
‘not me’.
to react. The ‘something else’ may be that the baby is hungry and the milk
Omnipotence. State of does not appear seamlessly in the baby’s omnipotent world. The need for
believing that one has the infant to react indicates that there has been maternal failure to meet his
unlimited powers. needs. In short, there has been impingement.
Effects of impingements
An example of an impingement is a will fall into despair. Winnicott (1952)
hungry infant who is not fed. The child refers to this experience as ‘nameless
will experience the hunger as a threat dread’. Many adults are familiar with the
or an outside demand that threatens anxiety of what is essentially associated
his cohesion. There is not the cognitive with nameless dread. It is an experience
ability to know what the experience is, or of an acute anxiety that one will fall to
that eventually the mother will come to pieces. This experience stems from such
feed the child. For the infant, the demand early impingements when the child was
is terrible and life-threatening. The lack unable to cope with the experience of
of feeding makes a demand upon the separateness from its mother. With such
child for frustration tolerance that the experiences, the infant must deny its
infant is incapable of meeting. The child hunger and the infant begins to develop
will reach a peak of desperation, and compliance to the outside world. This is
then when the feeding does not come, a false self compliance.
Impingements have serious implications for the development of the

infant. Demands upon the infant to react to the environment result in the
ego falling to bits. The demand to react to ‘separateness’ comes at a time when
there is not sufficient infant ego strength to sustain the reaction. Thus the
reaction results in a loss of cohesion and the experience of ‘falling to bits’.
If the demand is persistent, the infant then has a need for some armour. ‘The
infant that is disturbed by being forced to react is disturbed out of a state of
being’, (Winnicott, 1960).
Winnicott does not imply that the pair must always have this mother-
infant unit whereby the infant can live in a hallucinatory relationship forever. Hallucinatory
Rather, he proposes that failure must occur but that it must occur within relationship. A false
specific parameters (Winnicott, 1960). He terms this kind of failure, appropriate sensory perception that
is not based upon reality.
failure. As the infant develops there must be the experience of separateness from
In terms of infantile
the mother. This experience of separateness allows the infant to develop a development this is an
sense of its own being as a separate and independent person in the world. extremely important
These experiences must, however, be appropriate to the capacity of the infant experience as it safeguards
ego to experience separateness. When this is so the infant can experience the infantile ego from
his separateness from the environment as building up the ego rather then fragmentation.
breaking it down.
Therefore, providing that the environment is sensitive to adapting to the
needs of the infant’s experience of going-on-being—not putting the infant in
the situation where it will ‘fall to bits’—the demand for separateness will not
be impingement but will be appropriate failure.
Is birth an impingement?
Winnicott did not see birth as an impinge- constitutes the impingement; rather it is
ment upon the infant. He saw birth as the way that the environment may fail
something for which the infant has been the infant. This could occur through the
innately prepared. He was too much of alienating processes that characterise some
a pragmatist to hold that something as gynaecological hospitals, or through the
natural and normal as the birth process nature of the mother’s bonding with her
could be construed as traumatic for infant in the first days after birth.
the infant. It is not the actual birth that
The process of un-integration to integration

Integration into personhood is a developmental achievement. Winnicott
(1945) saw the infant as having at first an unintegrated personality, a Unintegrated personality.
primary un-integration. This state is characterised by total dependence The state of the infant’s
upon the mother. Winnicott (1958) proposed that it is the mother who early ego development.
The infant’s ego is not
provides the ego support necessary for the infant’s fragile ego. This
able to function as a
maternal ego support allows the infant to live and develop, despite his separate ego but relies
helplessness. Where this support is missing, integration will not occur, on the mother for
resulting in various degrees of pathology. Where the maternal ego support containment and auxiliary
is compromised, some integration of the infantile ego will occur, but the ego containment.
infant’s ego will also be compromised. This will be due to his need to
react to the failures of the mother (her impingements). In this case the
integration is based on a false self integration.
The infant must react and adapt to the failures of the mother, and
it is through this reaction and adaptation that the true self of the person
either becomes hidden or does not exist (Winnicott 1960). It is no wonder that
we are often so ambivalent about our mothers. For a critical period of our
PHOTO: VOSSIE GOOSEN
lives, it is they who keep us alive. In consciousness we are grateful to people

to whom we owe our lives, but at an unconscious level it is much more
complicated. Many cultures reflect this complication through their
rituals and beliefs about what is involved when someone saves your life. In
psychotherapy we see the psychological implications of this dependence and
the ambivalent feelings of gratitude and resentment that an adult might
feel towards their parent.
Holding
Holding is a fundamental concept of Winnicott (1958). By holding he means
the quality of the mother’s provision of infant care. Without holding the
inherited potential of the infant cannot come into being. The quality of
the mother’s holding has a fundamental influence upon the actualisation
of the infant’s selfhood. Winnicott means by this that literally the infant
A young boy emerging cannot start to be, except through the holding of the mother. The quality of
into selfhood. the infant’s being will be largely dependent upon the quality of the mother’s
holding capacities. For the infant, where holding confirms the aliveness of
Holding. The quality of
the mother’s provision
its body, it has experiences of the aliveness of the true self. This means that the
of infant care. infant then has an experience of existing. Thus infant care, or holding,
which confirms the bodily experience of the infant rather than substituting
the mother’s experience, results in experiences of existing. An example that
illustrates this concept is an infant who is fed when hungry. The feeding—
that is, holding—will confirm the experience of a hungry body. On the other
hand, a hungry child who has his nappy changed will not have the experi-
ence of the body confirmed.
Empathy. The ability to Winnicott maintains that holding is based upon empathy and not upon
understand and enter into understanding. Thus Winnicott’s concept of mothering has nothing to do
the feelings of another. with intelligence or education. Good mothering is about a mother’s capacity
to feel her way appropriately into her child’s experience. Winnicott (1958)
classifies holding into three stages:
1. Absolute dependence, where the infant is totally dependent upon the

quality of maternal care and has no means of controlling what is well
or badly done.
2. Relative dependence, where the infant gradually becomes aware of
the details of maternal care. The infant begins to experience the
mother as possibly separate and can start to relate the mother’s
activities to his own personal impulses.
3. Approaching independence, when the infant can start to do with-
out actual care.
These three stages of holding are supported by the infant’s growing

cognitive capacities. The infant can begin to rely upon memories of care.
These memories form the basis of the infant’s introjection of the details of
care. This means that the infant learns about caring through taking in the
model of care given by the mother. Clearly, failure of maternal care will
affect the quality of the infant’s sense of care and compromise both the
introjection of care that is available to the infant as well as the confidence
that the infant can have in the environment.
PHOTOS: MICHELE VRDOLJAK

Mediating meaning. The mother introduces the world to the child. She does this by appropriately interpreting the
child’s experience, that is, by responding to the true self of the child. In this way she mediates meaning.
Primary maternal preoccupation Primary maternal

Winnicott maintains that for a mother to be able to do all the things that are preoccupation. Innate,
required of her to be a mother, a special characteristic is required, which natural state of the mother
whereby she is primarily
he formulates as primary maternal preoccupation (Winnicott, 1958). He
preoccupied with her infant.
conceptualises this as occurring during the last period of her pregnancy Winnicott speaks of this
and a few days to a couple of weeks after the birth of the child. This is an time as an illness, a form
innate, natural state of the mother whereby her world becomes focused on of psychosis, whereby the
the child. It is a state where the mother is primarily preoccupied with her infant. mother is able to relax her
The mother and infant form a psychological oneness. The mother is able to psychological boundaries
feel her way into the body-needs and later the ego-needs of her infant. to become fused with
the infant.
The distinction between body- and ego-needs is an important one in
psychoanalytic theory. Body-needs and ego-needs refer back to Freud’s Body-needs and ego-
distinction between the id and the ego. Body-needs are id needs. The child needs. Concepts that refer
needs to have its id needs attended to for it to be contained and appropriately back to Freud’s distinction
nurtured. If these needs are not met the child will be overwhelmed and ‘fall between the id and the
to bits’. However, with the development of the child’s cognitive capacities, ego. Body-needs are id
the id needs have to become contained by the ego. Initially it is the mother’s needs. Development
of the child’s cognitive
ego that provides this auxiliary function. Her ego contains the id needs of
capacities, the id needs
the child. With development the child learns—gradually, at its own pace, and to become contained by
through appropriate failures on the mother’s part—that it is able to take on the ego. Initially it is the
the functions of the mother’s ego and contain his own id needs. It is vitally mother’s ego that provides
important initially, in the first few days of life, that the mother provides this auxiliary function.
this containment. She does this, according to Winnicott, through primary Her ego contains the id
maternal preoccupation. Winnicott represents this state as an illness, a form of needs of the child. With
development the child
psychosis, whereby the mother is able to relax her psychological boundaries
gradually learns, through
to become fused with the infant. It is important that the mother is able appropriate failure, that
to experience this state, and for this she must be psychologically healthy it is able to take on the
enough; she must have the necessary ego resources to allow herself to be functions of the mother’s
fused with the infant. In this state of primary maternal preoccupation she ego and contain his own
is able to identify with the baby. She can make sense of the cries and bodily id needs. The mother must
gestures of the baby and translate these sensate experiences into meaningful provide an appropriate
model of containment,
experiences. This capacity for primary maternal preoccupation allows the
which the child is able
mother either to bring or not to bring meaning to the child’s experience. to introject.
If the mother’s reaction (her holding) matches the bodily experience of the
infant, she brings meaning to experience. She feeds when the infant is
hungry; she warms when the infant is cold. How a mother knows these
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
things about her infant is through her ability to be attuned to her infant, to
be in a state of primary maternal preoccupation.
If the mother can be in this state and adapt appropriately to the needs
of the infant, there is little disturbance and need for reaction. The infant’s
existence remains intact and relatively seamless. When the mother gets it right,
there is no awareness of the mother and the infant’s developmentally needed
state of omnipotence remains intact. Where a mother is not psychologically
healthy enough to move into a state of primary maternal preoccupation, the
result is that she enforces impingements upon the infant. She substitutes
Primary maternal her own needs and understandings onto the id needs of the infant. When
preoccupation. For the last this happens the id experiences (the body experiences) of the child are not
few weeks of pregnancy and given meanings that make sense of the child’s experience. The result is that
the first few days after birth,
the mother loses her interest
the potential aliveness of the body is killed and the child must then adapt to
in the outside world and the meanings imposed by the external world to understand his experience.
becomes preoccupied with Should this happen at this early stage of the infant’s life it is least able to cope
the baby. with such failure. The impingements interrupt the going-on-being of the
infant and produce the threat of annihilation. For Winnicott (1945) the fear
of annihilation is the most primitive anxiety.
Eating disorders
It is a common experience of people with own needs and not the hungry needs of
eating disorders to use food to calm or the baby. The child then becomes confused
comfort themselves. They have learned and learns to associate emotions with
to see food as a substitute for emotional food. The basis of the establishment of a
holding. Developmentally we can postulate stable ego is a sufficiency of the experience
that in their childhood their mothers of going-on-being. For the infant, the
were either anxious or unable to meet possibility of this state of going-on-being is
their emotional needs. Instead food was totally dependent upon the quality of the
given as a substitute. The mother might mother’s management of infant care, that
misinterpret the baby’s needs or the is, her capacity to hold the infant’s id and
mother might feed the baby to satisfy her developing ego-needs.
The role of the father

Apart from the mother’s own psychic conflicts which may compromise
her capacity for primary maternal preoccupation, the mother also
needs, during this period, the strong containment of the environment.
This containment facilitates her ability to become preoccupied with
the infant. It is in this capacity that the father plays a fundamental role.
He provides the safety and containment for the mother that allows
her to relax her psychological boundaries and become devoted to and
fused with the infant, providing perfect attunement, or matching, of
the infant’s needs. Together the parents form the parental dyad, which
is the macro containment of the infant.
Given the economic and social conditions of some communities or
families where the father is absent, this is often very difficult to achieve.
A potentially ‘good-enough’ mother is then compromised in her mothering

due to the stress engendered by the lack of environmental support. Some
countries, such as the United Kingdom, have government subsidised
support for mothers with financial or emotional needs. This might take
the form of housing or regular visits by a social worker. While this does
not substitute for the family unit or extended family unit, it does go some
important way to alleviating the stress of child rearing.
Good-enough mothering
Winnicott postulates mothering as a process, which matches the changing Good-enough mothering.
needs and cognitive development of the infant. While a period of almost The mother’s capacity
perfect attunement—that is, the state of primary maternal preoccupation—is to fail appropriately in
meeting the infant’s needs.
necessary for the infant’s initial development, this harmony between infant
Winnicott makes the point
and mother needs to come to an end. If the mother continues in this state clear that it is ‘appropriate’
and continues to pre-empt the infant’s needs, the infant will not have the failure that is needed,
opportunity of experiencing where the mother leaves off and the infant not impingements. These
himself begins. The infant must begin to have experiences that define it as an failures give the infant
entity, separate from the mother. For this to happen, the mother must begin slow, measured, small
to appropriately fail in meeting the infant’s needs. Winnicott points out that it doses of frustration and
anxiety. These experiences
is ‘appropriate’ failure that is needed, not impingements. These failures give
allow the infant to
the infant slow, measured, small doses of frustration and anxiety. This anxiety experience separateness
begins to disrupt the infant’s omnipotence in ways that do not threaten it from the mother without
with annihilation. being overwhelmed by
The infant begins to experience that he is not the whole world. the experience.
Appropriate failure disrupts this omnipotent phantasy, forcing upon the
infant experiences that start the rudimentary distinctions between me and
not me, between inside and outside. Appropriate failures allow the infant to
come slowly to experience an outside reality over which he does not have
omnipotent control. Each failure results in bodily tensions and experiences of Daddy and baby bonding
which not only assists
relative terror and disintegration. Survival of each of these experiences leads
the child’s emotional
to a growing stability and trust in a sense of going-on-being. These experi- development but also
ences allow the infant to experience separateness from the mother without enhances mother’s
being overwhelmed by it. capacities to mother.
For this developmental transition to occur appro-
priately, Winnicott (1960) postulates the concept of the

good-enough mother. Such a mother is attuned to her
infant and will fail the infant appropriately to enhance
her child’s growth. Such appropriate failures are not
deliberate attempts to fail the infant. Rather, the mother
who is attuned to her child will, unconsciously, begin
the process of moving away from merger with the child.
Lack of merger will, by definition, result in the child
experiencing separateness, that is, failure.
As the initial experience for the infant is that he is
both the world and the creator of the world, the mother
has the very important role of upholding this phantasy.
She does this initially in a state of primary maternal
preoccupation. The good-enough mother only slowly
disillusions the infant with appropriate failure, keeping
the infant from ‘falling to bits’, or ‘disintegrating’. The infant’s initial sense
of omnipotence is a vital stage of his initial sense of going-on-being and
psychic growth. The good-enough mother has an intuitive knowledge of
this state and does not challenge or disrupt the infant’s omnipotence. The
mother who is not ‘good-enough’ induces traumatic and inappropriate
failures that lead to traumatic breakdowns of omnipotence and the
infantile experience of ‘falling to bits’.
A few possible situations which could constitute inappropriate failures
for the infant’s wellbeing range, for example, from the hospitalisation
or death of the mother soon after birth, to a mother who may be

incapable of primary maternal preoccupation due to psychiatric illness
or self-pathology. In such instances there may be premature failure of
the mother-infant bond with the infantile ego falling into fragmentation.
When the infantile ego is not contained by the mother the result is a
traumatic breakdown of the infant’s sense of omnipotence. The ego is
forced to react to separateness and this leaves the infant with an untenable
break in its sense of going-on-being. These breaks may manifest in the
adult as feelings of terror, of falling forever, of a never-ending black
hole. Such symbols represent the infantile experience of disintegration
and fragmentation. The most severe failure may result in psychosis.
The baby’s transitional
object acts as the first me-
Winnicott (1974) maintains that the clinical fear of breakdown is the fear
not me object. It facilitates of a breakdown that has already been experienced in infancy.
the child’s development into
an external world of reality. Transitional phenomena: transitional space and
the transitional object
The basis of our capacity to be alone—a state where we are secure in our
Transitional space. The existence and our ability to survive—is built upon early experiences of being
‘space’ available to the alone in the presence of a mother who holds the emotional life of the infant,
child who is allowed to knowing when not to impinge upon the infant (Winnicott, 1958).
experience the capacity This capacity to be alone is fundamentally important in the development
to be alone when in the of a creative capacity and the formation of symbolic thought and activity.
safety and containment
How this state is achieved is a question that concerns most object relations
of the mother, that is her
holding. In this space the theorists. They all consider the processes by which the infant moves from a
child plays with an area solipsistic internal world to a world of shared reality, from a sense of self as
of experiencing which one with the world to a sense of self as separate and distinct from others and yet
is about neither ‘me’ connected to the social and cultural domain.
nor ‘not me’. It is a kind Winnicott (1951) postulates the importance of what he terms tran-
of daydreaming where sitional space. This is the space available to the child who is allowed to
the infant can play with
experience the capacity to be alone while in the safety and containment
creating and destroying
the first ‘me-not me’ of the mother. In this space the child plays with an area of experiencing
object—the transitional which is about neither me nor not me. It is a kind of daydreaming where
object. the infant can play with creating and destroying the first me-not me
object—the transitional object (Winnicott, 1951). The transitional object
Transitional object. The is the first relationship the child has with an object that is both me and
first object that is both not me. This is often the infant’s teddy bear, or thumb, or the corner of a
‘me and not me’. This
favourite blanket. The character Linus in the Peanuts comic strip carries
transitional object is often
the infant’s teddy bear, or his blanket around with him—this is his transitional object. The good-
thumb, or the corner of a enough mother senses that this object is special to the infant and will make
favourite blanket. sure that it is always available.
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON

The infant will start to relate to an object in a particular way that
reveals two contrasting impulses—to love it and to destroy it. The object
is used both to soothe the infant, for example, to suck on when going to
sleep, as well as to be destroyed, in being pulled and dragged around. In
phantasy the infant both loves and destroys the object. The object’s sur-
vival and its non-retaliation allow the infant to play with its own loving
and destructive urges and in this way the object provides the bridge—the
transitional space—between what is phantasy and what is reality. The
object, by being both loved and destroyed, by being both me and not me
The capacity to be alone.
and importantly, by surviving the intensity of these emotions, facilitates The mother, by facilitating
the infant’s efforts to negotiate the space between inner reality and sufficient experiences of
external reality, leading to the development of symbol formation. integration and de-
The object survives attacks of love and hate. It promotes a distancing integration, gives the infant
between emotion, action, and the space for rudimentary thought and the the opportunity to acquire
a stable sense of the true
sense of me-not me. The object comes to stand for or symbolise me-not self without impingements.
me, rather than being me-not me. The object also comes to stand for the These kinds of experiences
emotions and/or the actions. In this way the first rudimentary symbol develop into the capacity
formation occurs. to be alone.
Winnicott (1951) postulates that transitional space is vital for play and
aliveness. It is the space where the child is able to play with potential. For
the child to be able to use transitional space, the child needs to have had
the experience of the safety of non-impingements. As we have seen, this
means being able to be with the mother who will ‘hold’ the infant, that
is, will allow the infant just to be, without impinging upon it. In these
periods, the infant has rhythms of de-integration (sleep or daydreaming)
and integration (wakefulness). These rhythms, which coincide with the
rhythms of the body, are the material substance of true self experiencing.
The accumulation of these bodily experiences coheres the going-on-being
of the infant’s sense of self. It is these experiences that result in our taken-
for-granted confidence in being
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS

able to survive and to be alone
without feeling that we will
disintegrate. The importance
that Winnicott accords tran-
sitional space is seen in his
postulation that transitional
space is the seat of the creativity
of a culture. In other words,
cultures that are too anxious
or threatened by disintegration
will struggle to be creative.
As adults we still need
moments when we can play in
transitional space. Most of us will
know the experience of reju-
venation that comes from having ‘time out’, when we can be alone with Winnicott speaks of art
ourselves. This may come from just being or from creative activities—a trip being an expression of
to the mountains, a walk in a garden, listening to music, painting, creating the creativity arising from
transitional space.
and suchlike.
The true self and the false self

Winnicott (1960) postulates that the true self is based in the experiencing body.
The true self is based upon what is true about sensate experiencing, that is,
the experiencing of id or instinctual needs. If we are able
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
to remain in touch at this level of integrity with the body

we are living closely to the true self. Body integrity would
mean that we are in touch with our emotional lives, with
our passions and hatred. We manage to conduct our emo-
tional lives in ways that have intrapsychic integrity as well as
being appropriate within social contexts. At the earliest stage,
a mother who accurately reflects the sensate experiences of her
infant accurately reflects the true self experience of the infant.
The way she cares for (holds) her infant brings meaning to
the child’s experience. A good-enough mother brings to the
child those meanings that accurately reflect the experiences
of the child. Thus an infant who cries because he is hot is
made cooler when the mother has related accurately to the
The false self develops in true ‘hot’ self of the child. If the infant is given the breast, instead of being
response to adaptations made cooler, the mother has imposed her own meanings on the infant’s
to environmental
demands. Hence the
experience of distress. She has impinged upon the true self of the infant. In this
puppet symbolises the impingement she has imposed a false ‘hungry’ self onto the child. When the
false self responding to mother does not respond to the true self experiencing, the child has no option
environmental stimuli. but to adapt to the false self expectations of the mother.
Throughout development, the environment will inevitably not
respond accurately to the experiences of the child. Such perfect response would
damage the child in the same way that continued perfect anticipation of the
child’s needs damages the child. In a social world it is necessary for the child
to adapt to the social demands of the environment. Thus it is both necessary
and natural that the child should develop a degree of false self functioning
to curb and channel its instinctual life. If it did not do this the child would be
impossible to live with, being demanding, selfish, and intent upon satisfying
its own needs. The false self may, at this benign level, provide adaptation to
social requirements.
Protection. Winnicott is Thus, at a healthy level, the false self can act to protect the true self by
quite idiosyncratic about enabling the individual to conform to social norms, to be able to accommodate
language usage and others and to curb instinctual impulses. At more severe levels of adaptation to
it would seem that his
environmental /social demands, the false self acts to protect the true self from
intention was to see the
false self as a protection in
the impingements of a failing environment.
all its positive and negative There will be degrees of severity in the development of the false self,
senses. Thus the word has depending upon the severity of the impingements to which the child must
a much broader meaning adapt. Winnicott postulates that there is a continuum of false self development.
than that given to the Normality is where the false self acts to allow smooth passage through the
term ‘defence’. world, as it were, by inducing appropriate and socially acceptable ways of
expressing love and hate and other forms of acceptable behaviour.
Further along the continuum the false self may protect the true self
from harm. For example, where a family may covertly forbid independence
and separation, the false self will comply and adapt to these demands,
while the independence of true self may lie dormant. An example may be
the young woman who has been an ‘A grade’ student at school, devoted and
obedient, and dependent upon her parents. Throughout her childhood

and adolescence she has adapted to the demands of the family in return for
their acceptance. Were she to rebel she would be seen as a disgrace or disap-
pointment to the family. When she arrives at university, she ‘goes wild’ and
attempts to liberate her true self by trying to be true to her own needs. An-
other example may be a prisoner of war who complies with the regime and
deprivations of the incarceration, knowing that to rebel would mean death.
At the pathological end of the continuum the false self acts as if
it were the real person. Adaptation has become complete. In such cases
Winnicott suggests that the person does not, as yet, exist. The functioning of
the individual is made up of adaptations to the demands of the environment.
The individual is purely an adaptation to whatever the demands of the
early environment have been. He is not a person in his own right. In such
cases, psychotherapy would need to provide a context for the individual’s
regression to a state of dependence. Working through this state of regressed
dependence would allow the false self to give up its protection to make way
for the developing true self.
Mother/Infant unit
FAILURE SUCCESS
Father
Development of false self Development of true self

(adaptation)
primary maternal preoccupation
impingements/appropriate failure
good-enough mothering
holding/stage of dependence
rhythms of un-integration and integration
inner reality
transitional space and objects
capacity to be alone
– personhood +
Figure 7.1 Mind map of Winnicott’s theory.
Critiques of Winnicott
A major critique of Winnicott is concerned with his writing style. While
he claims to be within the psychoanalytic paradigm, it is difficult to find
evidence, within his theory, of adherence to fundamental psychoanalyt-

ic concepts. Thus while he claims to adhere to psychoanalytic assump-
tion, his theory is formulated as a unique and original interpretation of
traditional theory.
Further, his concepts are often so beautifully written that they lack
theoretical rigour. As such they run the risk of being meaningless when placed
against other more theoretically ‘tight’ formulations. An example of this
problem is his conceptualisation of the self. While the concept of self is used
extensively in psychoanalytic theory to denote the totality of the personality
structure, Winnicott’s use implies that the self is possible only contingent upon
the quality of the mother’s care. Such a formulation has clinical usefulness
as it reflects the experience of many clients who feel that they do not exist
because of the quality of maternal abandonment that they experienced.
However, in terms of the development of psychic structure, the formulation
is meaningless. Psychic structure and the self will develop regardless of the
quality of maternal care.
Another example is Winnicott’s concept of transitional phenomena.
The concept is innovative but adds little within the context of a coherent
theory of object-relations development. The transition from merged unit to
separateness can be accounted for in more theoretically rigorous ways, as we
may see, for example, in Klein and Freud. It would appear that Winnicott’s
theoretical formulations are a challenge to traditional conceptualisations
of personality development. However, his theory is meaningful for the
experiences of clients and practitioners in psychotherapy, as he appears to
articulate the development and the experience of personhood in creative
and facilitative ways.
Winnicott has been influential in the Middle School of psychoanalytic
thought and has brought a strong relational component to understanding
the processes of development as well as the underlying processes of
therapeutic intervention that are involved in ‘cure’ or change in psychic
functioning.
His theories have also had a fundamental influence in Kohut’s formu-
lations, although Kohut does little to acknowledge this debt.
The Esther Bick method of infant observation

Esther Bick first described infant observation meets both parents before the baby is
as a method in 1964 (2002). In brief, the born. The parents have been asked if they
method may be outlined as follows: would be prepared to have an observer
each week for approximately one hour,
The student arranges to visit, on a weekly until the baby is two years of age. The
basis, a family with a newborn baby, for student presents himself as someone who
the first two years of life. Whilst many is interested in learning about how babies
students are already working with children, develop and form relationships.
or are professionals working in professional The observer is expected to spend the
settings, the student enters into this observational hour in a receptive frame of
situation as a learner. Usually the student mind, watching and listening, but does
>>
<<
not write anything down. He has to find a would be to describe the development
position from which he can be receptive, of interpersonal relationships between
which means not becoming part of, an infant and others, including the
interfering or intruding in the family group. observer. The possible meanings of
As soon as possible after the visit to the these careful observations are then
family, the observer is asked to record as discussed in the seminar group who
accurately and in as much detail as possible, meet weekly, observers taking turns
what has been observed. Observers are to present observational material.
often worried that they will not remember Gradually, observers are asked to consider
well enough to report the observations the emerging picture of an infant’s
of a full hour. This is a skill that gradually personality, what might be the subtle
develops, and observers are often surprised interaction between constitutional and
to find how much detail they are able to developmental factors, and how these
gradually remember and record. may be supported by the environment.
The observer, in this new setting, is There is therefore some interest in
in some sense in a position similar to discussing the extent to which the
that of new parents. He is entering into environment is holding of the infant’s
a situation of ‘not knowing’ and hopes experience. Because of the sharing in the
to gradually learn something about seminar group, each observer has the
babies and their relationships to their opportunity to get to know their observed
families, approaching the situation with baby very well, but also to know the four
an open mind, as free of judgements other babies being observed. This often
or preconceptions as possible. Whilst highlights the uniqueness of each baby,
often an observer is observing a first child mother and family situation.
and mother, sometimes there are other What one might learn from this situation:
children, or a father, present. These family An observer, in learning about an
members would be recorded as part of actual baby, is also learning about his
the observation. own responses to the observation. The
The written reports are then shared experience of an observation therefore
with a small group of usually five fellow offers opportunities for personal and
students in a regular seminar. The group professional growth. Theoretical
functions as a container for the experience knowledge is explored with the actual
of the observer himself, who may use experience of being with a child.
the group to consider the emotional The position of the observer demands
impact of a new baby on a family, but that he learns to contain and bear intense
also on himself. It is acknowledged that feelings without acting on these. One
observers, in experiencing so directly this is gradually asked to develop the mental
intense and emotionally charged event space to observe what is happening
in the family’s history, are also deeply within oneself, as well as to consider
effected by the experience. This can be what observed events might mean for a
a particularly painful if the observer is mother, father and baby. This stance is
exposed to experiences reminiscent of helpful in clinical practice, particularly in
his own early infantile experiences. For work with children.
this reason, people undertaking an infant Skills like observing accurately, and
observation are encouraged to be in their being able to remember and record the
own analysis or psychotherapy. finest details of a situation are also skills
The task of an observation, therefore, valuable in clinical practice.
Shayleen Peek
Specific tasks
➊ Research or think about which countries have provided great literature or art, great
philosophers, musicians, political thinkers etc. What conditions would you think contri-
buted to these developments? Do they fit with Winnicott’s theory of transitional space?
➋ Research literature on the impact institutionalisation [orphanages/chronic

hospitalisation] has on the physical and emotional development of institutionalised
infants. Link these findings to Winnicott’s understanding of the concept that there is
no such thing as an infant, only a mother and an infant.
➌ Consider the hypothetical case of a sexually abused child who is prematurely forced
into sexuality and becomes promiscuous. How would you explain the development of
the promiscuity in Winnicott’s terms? If you have done the chapter on Fairbairn, how
would his theory offer additional insight?
General tasks
➊ Consider in what ways you may be acting from a false self position. Remember that the
false self is largely an unconscious way of being in the world, but it is possible to have some
knowledge of when we act in ways that are adaptations to the necessary social demands of life
[healthy false self functioning], to those times when we make adaptations to those around us
rather than living in a more true manner with what we actually think or feel.
➋ Take a survey of people to find out how many of them had transitional objects in their
childhood. Find out what the objects were and what happened to them. See if your
findings fit Winnicott’s theory of transitional phenomena.
➌ Observe two mothers, one whose baby is only a few days old, and the other whose baby is a
few months old. Make notes about the differences between the ways they react to their infants
and look at the Ester Bick interest box on page 150 earlier for some important guidelines.
Goldman, D (ed) (1993). In one’s bones: The clinical genius of Winnicott. London: Tavistock.
(A collection of papers by Winnicott and others that highlights the range, creativity and unique contribution
of Winnicott.)
Kohon, G (ed) (1986). The British school of psycho-analysis: The independent tradition. London: Free
Association Books. (A wonderful introduction to the writings of some of the Independent tradition
theorists. You will get a good sense of the way they think about their world and their patients.)
Winnicott, D W (1958). Collected papers: Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. New York: Basic Books.
Winnicott, D W (1964). The child, the family and the outside world. London: Penguin.
Winnicott, D W (1965). Maturational processes and the facilitating environment. New York:
International Universities Press.
Winnicott, D W (1971). Playing and reality. New York: Basic Books.
(These four books provide the essential coverage of Winnicott’s concepts. They are all highly readable and most
enjoyable. Be aware that Winnicott’s idiosyncratic style is deceptively easy. When you try to capture what he has
said you will struggle!)
CHAPTER
8
Kernberg’s theory of
normal and pathological
development
Carol Long
This chapter will follow the development path of Kernberg’s

theory though the following sections:
1. Introduction: meeting Otto Kernberg

2. Overview of Kernberg’s developmental theory
3. The basic units of development
4. Processes of internalisation
5. Stages of normal development
6. Pathological development
7. Narcissism
8. Critiques of Kernberg’s theory
Introduction: meeting Otto

Kernberg
Teaching Kernberg’s theory to students is an inter-
esting experience. They can never decide whether it
is pioneering or lacking in novelty. Summing up her
question about his theory, one Masters student in clini-
cal psychology wrote ‘‘his work is very useful [but]
what original and revolutionary thoughts has he had?’’
Somewhat more politely, another student wrote:
Kernberg’s theory seems to be an accumulative

theory, almost like a recipe for a new cake with a
combination of well-known ingredients. There is
even a recipe-like feel to this theory as it provides
quite a structured step-by-step process; starting
with Freudian concepts and adding Erikson,
Otto Kernberg
Kleinian, Mahlerian and even some cognitive concepts and mixing

them together in a unique way in order to ‘bake’ a new theory.
Would it be accurate or fair to think about his theory in this way?
It is true that when formulating his theory Kernberg drew on a broad

range of psychoanalytic influences but is he like a bad cook in a take-away
joint, mixing world cuisine into local mush, or more like a master chef,
whipping up new delicacies from familiar ingredients? In a way, student
observations reveal an important characteristic of Kernberg’s work. It is
certainly true that Kernberg is one of the leading psychoanalytic thinkers of
our time and that his theory offers a complex integration of many burning
questions in psychoanalysis. For example, are our feelings encoded in us
or produced by the environment? Do people develop severe personality
disorders because of their constitutional make-up or because they were
raised in cold and deprived environments? Kernberg argues that we need
to integrate both constitution and environment into our understanding
of development. Another question would be whether classical Freudian
drive theory is correct or whether we should adhere more to object
relations theories? Again, Kernberg offers us an integration of the two.
Yet another question would be whether psychiatric diagnosis is important
or whether we should rather follow psychoanalytic understandings of the
person as opposed to a psychiatric classification of symptoms? Kernberg
gives us a perspective with which we can do both.
Otto Kernberg was born in Vienna, the home of Sigmund Freud and
birthplace of psychoanalysis, in 1928. Like Freud, he was forced to flee
Germany (Freud in 1938 as an old man; Kernberg in 1939 as a young boy)
because he was Jewish. He and his family moved to Chile where he later
became a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. In 1959 he moved to the United
States and rapidly became a leader in psychoanalytic circles. He is now strongly
associated with American psychoanalysis. Unlike many other psychoanalytic
theorists you will read about in this book, he is still alive and continues to
write and research in his field. In a way, then, Kernberg’s history is one of
combining different ingredients from different countries. Perhaps it is no
surprise that he does the same thing in his theory: combining and integrating
different influences to come up with a fresh perspective.
One of the primary ingredients Kernberg uses in formulating his
theories involves his work with personality disordered—particularly
borderline and narcissistic—patients. His theory therefore goes to the
heart of some of the more difficult aspects of humanity. Working with
these patients is extremely challenging, as Kernberg reflects in his writing.
Perhaps it would be fair to say that Kernberg does not only cook up his
theory in the same manner in which he integrates the ingredients of his
life, but also takes his theory into the darker aspects of human nature.
Kernberg has even applied his theory of malignant narcissism to Adolf
Hitler (as we shall see later), a man who had a very direct impact upon his
life. He has undertaken therapy with patients whom many psychoanalysts
have considered unanalysable. This flair for going where others have feared
to tread can also be read into his psychoanalytic theory and understood as
one of the reasons for his formidable reputation. As we explore Kernberg’s
K e r n b e r g ’s t h e o r y o f n o r m a l a n d p a t h o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t 155
theory of development in this chapter, it is useful to bear in mind that it

has grown out of an intimate understanding of patients who are difficult
to treat. Whether you consider him to be a bad cook or a master chef,
his ability to integrate different theories and to integrate his work with
difficult patients is key to what his theory offers to psychoanalysis.
Overview of Kernberg’s developmental theory

Although Kernberg borrows from a number of different theorists, the
way he absorbs them into his theory of development is unique. Kernberg
suggests that our development is influenced by two basic processes:
1. The development of the relationship between our affects, self repre- Basic units of experience.
sentations and object representations form our basic units of experi- The relationship
ence. As these grow more complex, so our developmental processes between our affects,
self representations and
become more sophisticated and our psychic structures develop.
object representations.
2. The development of the ways in which we internalise our expe-
riences, and the processes of internalisation, also become more
sophisticated as we develop.
STRUCTURE OF INTERNAL WORLD

Normal development - soild structure; Abnormal Development - structural problems
5. Consolidation of superego & ego integration

PROCESSES OF INTERNALISATION
PROCESSES OF INTERNALISATION
Ego Identity
4. Integration of self & object representations
Higher structures
3. Differentiation: self from object representations Identification
2. Primary self-object representations
Introjection
1. Undifferentiated
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT
Self Object
Affect
Representations Representations
BASIC UNITS OF EXPERIENCE
Figure 8.1 A mind map of Kernberg's theory.

We will begin this chapter by examining the basic units of experience

and the processes of internalisation. If all goes well, we can expect to
develop normally through a series of stages. Abnormal development,
however, may go through a similar series of stages but the person’s
experiences will be different. This is because that person has not achieved
functional developments in complexifying their basic units of experience
and processes of internalisation. When these are not mature, our intra-
Intrapsychic structure. psychic structure (the id, ego and superego) develops along a different line,
The id, ego and superego. and this causes problems for the individual and their relationships. For
Kernberg, all these processes happen intrapsychically—in our internal
Intrapsychically.
In our internal world. worlds and not in the external objective world. A mind map of Kernberg’s
theory of development is given on page 155.
It is useful to bear this overall picture in mind as we go through each
element in Kernberg’s theory, beginning with the basic units of development.
The basic units of development

Kernberg believes that we start life with three basic units of experience. These
units are affect states, self representations and object representations. Very
small babies experience life as a blur: they haven’t yet matured enough to
experience anything more than these three basic units. These primitive units
of affect-state, object representation and self representation form the basis of
all later development and become more complex as the baby matures.
Affects. The primary Affects are the primary units of experience. Affects can be understood as
units of experience. Our our emotional experiences of the world (both conscious and unconscious).
emotional experiences of At the very early stages of life, our affects are very strong but very basic.
the world (both conscious
Everything is coloured by two primary affects: pleasure and un-pleasure.
and unconscious).
Babies do not understand everything that is going on around them but they
Pleasure. The original know what is pleasurable and what is un-pleasurable. If they have a pain
affect which encompasses in their tummy, they don’t know what a tummy is or whether they are too
all pleasurable experiences. hungry or too full, but they certainly know that they are not happy, and
do not delay in expressing their un-pleasure as vociferously as possible. If
Un-pleasure. The original they are snuggled at mom’s breast having a good feed, they may not know
affect which encompasses
much about what is going on, but, at that moment, complete bliss is theirs;
all un-pleasurable
experiences.
this bliss encompasses their world.
As their experiences of pleasure and un-pleasure accumulate, the affects
become more complex. Consider Josephine Klein’s (1987:127) example:
Imagine a tiny baby being lifted up:

There is a great whoosh which is frightening or thrilling or both.
There is a sense of very powerful things going on.
There is either a sense of sharing in that power (being it) or a sense
of being at the mercy of it.
Now the baby has a more sophisticated sense of what is going on. It also
becomes clearer that the same experience might be experienced differently
by different babies, or by the same baby at different times. There is also a
Self representation. rudimentary sense not only of the feeling but of something happening outside
The representation of the the baby and something being experienced inside the baby. In other words,
self in the internal world. the baby has a rudimentary sense of self representation, in this case a sense of
sharing in the power or being at the mercy of it, and object representation— Object representation.
the feeling of being lifted up. Even though tiny babies don’t really know The representation of
who they are or that mother is separate from them, there exists some image others (such as the mother)
in the internal world.
in their internal worlds of self and object. These representations, over
time, start to become coloured by their affective experiences. The whoosh,
and the resultant affect, self representations and object representations
associated with it, become stored in affective memory.
The basic units of development, then, continually interact with one
another as various affect states become attached to self and object represen-
tations. The initial category of pleasure and un-pleasure begins to include
degrees of each of these emotions, and the self and object representations
become coloured as ‘bad’ or ‘good’. If the baby likes the whoosh, this may
build upon his existing self representation (‘‘Oh! I like that, it’s thrilling, I
feel grand and do wonderful things’’ (Klein, 1987:128)). If the baby doesn’t
like the whoosh, this may build upon his existing object representation
(‘Oh! That was horrid. Horrid mommy is doing horrid things to me’).
In other words, as the basic affects of pleasure and un-pleasure develop,
they begin to colour internalised self representations and object representa-
tions. Over time, these self representations and object representations cluster
around ‘good’ and ‘bad’. A young child will have a ‘bad’ mother image and
a ‘good’ mother image in their internal world, as well as ‘bad’ and ‘good’
self images. The implication of this is that affect is always embodied in a
self-object relationship. These interrelationships develop into the structures
of our mind (id, ego and superego). At first, the affects are very intense and
the self and object representations very unclear. As the child grows, the self
and object representations become more associated with affect and the child
becomes more able to distinguish between self and other. As this process
unfolds, the affects usually lose their early primitive intensity.
For Kernberg, the initial affects of pleasure and un-pleasure develop into
what he calls drive derivatives. Freud postulated two basic human drives: Drive derivatives.
The derivatives of basic
libido and aggression. Drive derivatives, in Kernberg’s theory, are the derivatives
pleasure and un-pleasure,
of basic pleasure and unpleasure, complexified through experience, that have complexified through
become libido and aggression. Affects of pleasure develop into libidinal drive experience, that
derivatives while affects of un-pleasure develop into aggression. It is important have become libido
to understand that drive derivatives are located in the internal world but come and aggression.
The impact of experience-

an example from the film Tsotsi
Tsotsi is about a man who hijacks a car, In the first scene, the baby is very
taking with him a baby in the back seat. distressed and Tsotsi does not know what
The film traces his dilemma in trying to to do. He happens upon a tin of condensed
work out what to do with this baby. There milk that he gives to the baby. Almost
are two very powerful scenes in the film immediately, as the baby sucks on the
involving the baby and condensed milk, sweet milk, the baby’s affect turns from
and these scenes offer vivid insights into absolute un-pleasure to absolute pleasure.
the workings of early affect. Bliss is clearly seen on the baby’s face. In
>>
<<
that moment, nothing else exists for the self and object representations (good
baby except for this intensely pleasurable and bad are more defined while self
experience. and object are more differentiated).
In the second scene, later in the film, Because of this, the experience would
Tsotsi opens the bag where he has put be more strongly related to the child’s
the baby to find that he has forgotten existing self and object representations.
the tin of condensed milk, which ants If, for example, bad self and object
have found. We see an image of the representations predominated in the
baby covered in condensed milk, ants child’s internal world, he might be
all over his face as they bite him to get more likely to internalise the second
to the condensed milk. The scene is so episode. If good self and object
powerful because the baby’s distress representations were stronger, he
is heartbreakingly obvious. In that might be more trusting of Tsotsi and
moment, the baby feels as though the forgiving of his bad experience. This
world is attacking him and his extreme would depend not only on his prior
un-pleasure is all-encompassing. experiences in the external world, but
Kernberg would predict that this also on his own innate combination of
small baby would not at first connect aggression and libido.
these two scenes. There would be Returning to the baby in the film,
no understanding that Tsotsi gave what impact would Tsotsi’s actions have
baby something good and then made on this baby’s future development? This
something bad happen. All the baby would depend upon how frequently
would know would be confined to the these experiences were repeated. It
moment in time where either pleasure would also depend upon how the
or un-pleasure predominated. Both baby initially experienced them and
of these experiences would be stored this more generally would be related
in affective memory and both would to the climate of the baby’s internal
colour self and object representations. world. A very aggressive baby would
From these two experiences, the baby be expected to respond to this
would not know, in reality, whether adverse circumstance with much more
Tsotsi was caring or uncaring. aggression than a less aggressive baby.
Imagine, however, if Tsotsi had The chances are, however, that no one
found a five-year-old child in the car, event would determine the baby’s later
and the same events had occurred. The development but that it would depend
five-year-old has more mature affects as on the general ambience of the baby’s
well as more defined and differentiated internal and external experiences.
into being through the interaction between the internal and external world.
Kernberg believes that we develop through an interaction of our inborn propen-
sities and our external experiences. Some people, for example, build up strong
affects of aggression largely as the result of bad experiences while others build
up strong aggression because they had a large amount of inborn aggression in
the first place. Experience, for Kernberg, is always a combination of the internal
and external world: we can only ever experience what happens to us through
our own subjective feelings. It is clear, however, that our first dyadic relationship
(mother and infant) is the most important site for the development of basic units
of development. Our early primitive affect states, and the ways in which these
colour our self and object representations, provide the basis for later experience.
Processes of internalisation
If affects colour our self and object representations, how are each of
these internalised? How do we build up or populate our internal worlds
with self and object representations? Kernberg believes that processes of Processes of
internalisation are crucial for helping us to complexify our basic units internalisation.
Crucial for helping us to
of development. It is these processes of internalisation that provide us
complexify out basic units
with the momentum for developing. Kernberg identifies three kinds of of development.
internalisation, which develop one after the other. First come introjections,
followed by identifications and finally by ego identity. We all use all Three kinds of
forms of internalisation. However, if we have developed satisfactorily, ego internalisation.
identity predominates. Introjections, identifications
and ego identity.
Introjection
Introjection is the earliest and most basic form of internalisation. It Introjection. The earliest
can first be found in the small baby who has not yet clearly differenti- and most basic form of
ated self representations from object representations and whose affects internalisation whereby
the baby takes into the
are still very intense, primitive and diffuse. The baby introjects (takes
unconscious mind object
into the unconscious mind) object representations and representations representations and
of self in relation to the object. What gets introjected depends funda- representations of self in
mentally on affective valence: on how self and object representations relation to the object.
are coloured by affect. At first the baby takes in chaotic impressions
related to his experience of the world. Remember, however, that these Affective valence.
chaotic impressions are largely divided into pleasure and un-pleasure. The extent to which an
experience is coloured
As the baby becomes more mature (and there is increasing differentia-
by positive (pleasurable),
tion of self from other), the chaos starts to take on a pattern. Introjects negative (unpleasurable)
of similar valence (that is, pleasure or un-pleasure) become clustered or neutral affects.
together. These experiences then fuse to form good internal objects
(internal objects coloured by pleasure) and bad internal objects (in-
ternal objects coloured by un-pleasure). Just as Melanie Klein’s good
and bad breasts represent images within the child’s psyche and not the
actual physical breast, so too does Kernberg believe that we take in
objects which are defined, not by their real qualities, but by the child’s
experience of good and bad.
These introjections are important for development. Firstly, they
help to organise the chaos of the baby’s experience, albeit unconsciously,
so that the baby can begin to make sense of the world and his place
within it. Secondly, the process of introjection, with its fusion of similar
introjects, clusters good together and bad together. This helps to keep
them separate from one another and thereby helps to prevent bad from
overwhelming good. Thirdly, in this process of fusion, the raw intensity
and diffuse confusion of early experience starts to become progressively
less intense and diffuse.
It would be terrible if we continued to experience our affects as acutely
as a baby does. It would also be very difficult to develop at all since we
would be paralysed by our affects. We do use introjections defensively
(particularly when splitting, as will be discussed under abnormal develop-
ment) when, for example, we feel the need to keep good safe from bad.
However, introjections also propel development forward by making the
internal world of the small baby more manageable.
Roles. The object is now Identification

seen as adopting a role in As the baby turns into a small child, his perceptive and
interaction with the self. cognitive abilities improve. This, together with the processes
that have already happened through introjection, allows the
PHOTO: MARC MAUREL
child to start to identify with others. This process begins

just before the child turns two and ushers in a new era. No
longer is the child dominated by powerful introjections.
Now the child can recognise that particular roles get taken
up in interpersonal interactions. This changes the quality
of affects, self and object representations. The object is
now seen as adopting a role in interaction with the self.
The self image is therefore seen as more separate from the
object. With this differentiation, affects are less powerful
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
but also more intricate than they were before. It is no longer

a case of really good or really bad. There is much more in-
betweenness of affect as good and bad become somewhat
more integrated. Objects become incorporated into the
internal world in relation to their roles and in concert with
the child’s identification with the object.
Consider the photograph of the little boy copying his father.
Kernberg says that identification does not simply mean imita-
tion. Modelling the self on an important object presupposes far
more complex internal processes. For example, identification
These siblings are having rather different
implies that there is an actual object relation, not just a phanta-
experiences of introjecting not only good
object relationships but also access to the sy of relationship (although of course the identification will be
good ice-cream! influenced by fantasy). Here, the son is not only mimicking his
father but expressing his relationship with his father. Through
identification, the self representation is modified as a result of

the influence of the object representation. We may hypothesise
that the boy’s internal object image of a ‘good’ father is modify-
ing his internal self image as ‘good’. The same dynamic would
apply if the internal object image were of a ‘bad’ father, which
would modify the internal self image as ‘bad’.
Identification also suggests that self and object representa-
tions are becoming integrated so that a more enduring sense of
self starts to develop. Processes of identification promote fur-
PHOTO: MARC MAUREL
ther developmental growth because they allow the child to test

out different roles for self and other. Like introjections, how-
ever, they can be used defensively, as in the case of a child who
imitates a parent instead of building up a self representation.
Ego identity
Ego identity is the highest level of internalisation because
it is the most mature and most approximates reality. It is
still strongly influenced by the child’s fantasies and internal
Two little boys obtaining pleasure from experiences but becomes more realistic as the child grows
identifying with a male figure. In the top
picture the boy enjoys modelling himself
older. Ego identity begins around the end of the third
on the man while in the bottom picture the year (Stage Four and Five in Kernberg’s classification of
son is sharing a relationship with his father. development—see Stages of normal development) but starts
only in a rudimentary form. Kernberg borrowed the term ‘stages’ from

Erik Erikson. In ego identity, there is a more defined structuring of the
internal world. It is called ego identity because the internalisation of self
and object images come to form part of the child’s developing ego. This
form of internalisation is characterised by a greater degree of maturity.
The internal object world comes to be experienced as more consistent.
Similarly, the child’s self image is more consolidated. The experience is
not so much one of being overridden by affects. Instead, the child develops
an increasing sense that he is recognised as a continuous person by others,
and that others are also consistently experienced by the child. The child
has started the process of connecting self and other, good and bad into an
integrated experience of the world. This allows for more individualisation
as well as for more flexibility in the internal world.
Processes of Internalisation: a summary

Kernberg understands processes of internalisation as the ways in which
we metabolise what we experience. Metabolisation is a process of taking Metabolisation.
in, and it matters what we take in as well as how we take it in. As Green- The process of taking in.
berg & Mitchell (1983:329) point out, this concept suggests that ‘we are It matters what we take
in as well as how we
what we eat’, or at least ‘we are what we experience’. To continue our
take it in.
food metaphor, we might say that we introject either something yummy
or something yukky, and we safely store each in separate compartments.
As we get older, we identify these introjections as, for example, meat, peas
and potatoes, because that is what we all eat together. Although some
of these foods may have been identified as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ we can
more or less tolerate them existing on the same plate. Once we reach ego
identity, we might metabolise sushi as something different. We might also
be able to metabolise brussel sprouts because we know that even though
we hate them, they won’t kill us.
Processes of internalisation are thus responsible for developmental
changes in affect-self-object units as they become more mature, and these
processes also drive the developing structures of the child’s psyche. They
drive the changes through the five developmental stages outlined by
Kernberg. Each one is characterised by a particular relationship between
affects and object relationships: they depend on the child’s inborn processes
as well as the quality of object relationships experienced by the child. Each
one continues into adult life and how they are negotiated determines the
quality of our adult relationships and our experiences of our internal, and
therefore external, world.
Stages of normal development

Our basic units of development and our processes of internalisation
become more sophisticated and change in quality as we develop. Kernberg
outlines five stages of development, each one influenced by our basic units
and processes of internalisation. Although Kernberg outlines five distinct
stages of development, you will notice as you read that they are fluidly
related to one another. A particular process may begin during one stage of
development, and this process may serve as a catalyst for entry into the next
stage of development, but may only be completed during a later stage. It is
Stage One. Affects of therefore instructive to read these stages as Kernberg’s unfolding story of
pleasure and unpleasure. development rather than as five separate boxes of experience. As you read
Not yet differentiated
this story, pay particular attention to what happens to categories of ‘self’
good versus bad or self
versus object.
and ‘object’ as well as to categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
Stage One: Normal ‘autism’ or primary undifferentiated stage

This first phase of development occurs in the first month of life.
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
The baby is so small that he has not yet had sufficient experi-
ences of pleasure and un-pleasure to build up self and object
representations. He doesn’t really know who or where he is and
what is going on. The very small baby simply experiences what
comes at him. At this point the baby is undifferentiated: the
baby has not yet separated self from object or good from bad.
If all goes well, the baby will experience sufficient pleasurable,
gratifying experiences (for example enough good feeds; enough
warmth and comfort) to begin to build up a ‘good’ self object
representation. This requires a caring relationship as well as ad-
equate attention to physical needs. Armed with the beginnings
of a good representation—having taken enough good inside—
the baby will be ready for the next stage.
Stage Two: Normal ‘symbiosis’ or stage of

the primary, undifferentiated self-object
representations
Orphans’ may have their Stage Two starts around the second month of life, with the consolidation
basic physical needs of a rewarding, pleasurable ‘good’ internal image, and continues until the
met but may well be baby is around six to eight months old. The task of this stage is to continue
deprived of the warmth
of a caring relationship.
to introject ‘good’ experiences into the internal world, thereby building up
They will thus tend not a more solid good internal object. This will become the core of the child’s
to flourish as opposed to ego. As the baby increasingly experiences the ‘good’, it becomes easier to
a child receiving primary differentiate between ‘good’ self images (the nice stuff that comes from me)
caregiver nurturance. The and ‘good’ object images (the nice stuff that comes from outside of me).
primary caregiver may not
neccessarily be the mother.
Un-pleasurable experiences, however, are also in the process of being
built up: the baby is storing more and more frustrating, painful experiences
Stage Two. Pleasure in affective memory. During this stage, these too cluster together and
becomes invested with begin to form the ‘bad’ component of the internal world. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’
libido and unpleasure with experiences are not yet linked into a continuous sense of the world because
aggression. Differentiation
they arise in different affective states. As the baby progresses through this
of ‘good’ self and object
images. Unpleasurable
stage, however, the risk of the bad infecting the good increases as the baby
experiences cluster into stores up more experiences of both. If the integration of ‘good’ experiences
‘bad’ internal images. are winning the race, the baby has a more stable sense of ‘good’ self and
object images. Bad self and object images are not yet differentiated.
However, towards the end of this stage, the baby starts to expel the bad
in order to protect the good. Good becomes invested with libido, and
Reality testing.
bad becomes invested with aggression. Introjection of good, however,
The ability to distinguish has become more sophisticated (as good self and object images start to
between internal differentiate), while the baby’s attempts not to introject the bad give the
experience and reality baby a vague idea that there is an ‘out there’. This is the very beginnings
in the external world. of reality testing, although the baby still has a long way to go.
Stage Three: Differentiation of self from object Stage Three: Self and
representations object become more
This stage begins when the baby has a differentiated sense of good self and differentiated. Good and
bad are first split then later
good object, usually around six to eight months. This is a very important
come closer together so
stage because the differentiation of bad self and bad object is about to that total self- and
begin more fully. The task of this stage is first to separate good and bad, object-representations
as well as to separate self and object. At first, the baby’s ego is very fragile are formed.
so it is easy to feel assailed by good and bad, and to feel confused about
where these experiences are coming from. As this stage progresses, the
baby’s defence mechanisms develop in order to deal with this situation. Defence mechanisms.
The primary defences used at this stage are designed to keep good and bad Unconscious, intrapsychic
separate: splitting, projection, omnipotence, denial and idealisation (these reactions aimed at
diminishing anxiety.
concepts are similar to those of Melanie Klein and Freud). Good and bad
are kept separate at all costs, so the child fluctuates between the two.
This frightening situation is greatly helped by the baby’s growing
recognition of his mother. This helps the baby to become clearer about
the distinction between self and other, which in turn results in more
sophisticated self and object representations, characterised by a broader
range of affects. As baby comes to know mother, he also comes to know
himself. As the baby’s ego becomes stronger, the need for splitting
should naturally decrease: good and bad self and object images become
more defined which means that good and bad can be allowed closer
together. The baby may still see his own hostility as coming from ‘out
there’ (how can something so bad come from inside?) but, over time,
there is increasing differentiation of self representations from object
representations as good and bad become less polarised. In this process,
the baby is more able to develop a sense of self and also more able to
understand other people. This whole process takes the baby to the age
of 18 months to three years, but should be complete before the now
growing child enters the next stage of development.
Right at the end of this stage, the difference between good and bad,
self and other, starts to make sense to the baby. Good and bad, at this point,
have become sufficiently integrated so that self representations and object
representations become more distinct. Rather than a stark separation, for
example, of good self and good other, there is the beginning of a sense that
both self and object representations are both good and bad. This paves the
way for the beginning of Stage Four.
Stage Four: Integration of self representations and

object representations and development of higher-level Stage Four. The child
intrapsychic object relations-derived structures discovers that both self-
Around the age of three, the child’s cognitive capacities have signifi- and object-representations
can contain both good
cantly matured and the child has now begun to integrate good and
and bad. Drive derivatives
bad, self and object. Stage Four of development is now ready to take are more mature and now
place. This stage of development corresponds roughly with Freud’s undergo repression.
phallic stage of development, Klein’s depressive position and Winni-
cott’s stage of concern (although Kernberg dates this stage at a later
age than do Klein and Winnicott). The primary task of this stage is to
fully integrate good and bad, self and object.
As the child begins to fully appreciate that the mother he hates is

the same mother he loves, and that the ‘bad’ self is the same person
as the ‘good’ self, the child begins to realise what he has done! All
the splitting of the previous stage was designed to keep good and bad
separate, but in the process, this meant that the ‘bad’ image could be
attacked with impunity. Realising that the ‘bad’ object is also the ‘good’
object, therefore, brings about feelings of guilt and depression, as well
as feelings of concern for the object and the self. Before this stage, the
child did not really experience guilt or depression at an unconscious
level. He may have felt ‘bad’ in everyday life but did not really feel
responsible for hurting another. The ruthlessness of very small chil-
dren is innocent. We, too, forgive them their ruthlessness because they
are too small to know differently. At this stage, however, they feel the
impact of what it means to know differently. In this process, the ideal
self and ideal object are created. Each of these holds the now lost ideal
state of the all-good self and object so that the self representations and
object representations can hold both ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
This painful experience prompts a very important shift in the use of
Splitting. The primitive defence mechanisms. The child relies less and less on splitting (keeping
defence mechanism good and bad separate) and instead deals with troubling affects and
of keeping good and conflicts through repression. The more powerful affects so characteristic
bad self and object
of earlier days become repressed into the unconscious, and this allows
representations separate
in the internal world.
the child access to less intense and more modulated affects. It also allows
for the development of more integrated self and object representations,
Repression. The defence which are both ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
mechanism of excluding These two processes, of repression and of integration, consolidate the
impulses, desires or fears structures of the psyche, thereby strengthening the ego. You will have
from the conscious mind.
noticed that we have not referred to the ‘id’ and ‘superego’ in previous
stages. For Kernberg, these categories only become meaningful because
of repression and integration in Stage Four. What happens to the id and
superego in Stage Four?
When splitting was predominant, it was not necessary to have a
corner of the internal world reserved for forbidden aggressive or libidinal
impulses. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ impulses could simply live in different places,
and whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ were forbidden or not was simply not an issue.
With the advent of repression, it becomes necessary to push these forbidden
impulses out of consciousness. Kernberg therefore believes that the id as
a structure only comes into being with the advent of repression. The id
is the place where the forbidden impulses go. This means that previous
internal object relations are not simply transformed by integration of self
and object, good and bad but, rather, that these more primitive images
and impulses become relegated to the id. Primitive internal worlds do not
disappear but go underground, out of consciousness.
Superego. The part Stage Four also signals the beginning of the superego as a dis-
of the psyche that holds tinct structure. Earlier experiences are gathered together with the
moral standards and that changes in Stage Four and with the experiences of the Oedipal
censors and restrains the
period (Have a look again at Freud’s conceptualisation of this period).
ego and id.
Kernberg believes that the superego contains three components that
begin to merge together in this stage in order to form the superego.
These are:
1. Early sadistic superego forerunners
The child has previously internalised ‘bad’ object images of a very
sadistic, hostile, dangerous and persecutory nature. These are the
forerunners of the superego and the basis upon which the superego
starts to develop. Everybody has early sadistic superego forerunners,
but these can be particularly sadistic if development is accompanied
by internal or external frustration and aggression.
2. The ego’s ideal self and ideal object representations
The second component of the superego is the ego ideal. This is the
internal image of all the wonderfully good, magical and wishful
ideal images of self and object—the fantasies of a perfect, benign
self and other. The ego started off with very good and very bad
self- and object images and was required to integrate these into
something more realistic. The superego is in for a similar fate.
In Stage Four the superego begins to integrate the early sadistic
superego forerunners (the bad) and the ego ideal (the good) into
something that is more toned down and realistic.
3. Realistic demands and prohibitions of the parental figures
With the toning down of components one and two of the developing
superego, it becomes possible to internalise (rather than introject) the
parental figures. The third level of the superego structure consists of
internalised parental demands and prohibitions. These more realistic
identifications form a bridge between the sadistic superego forerun-
ners and the ego ideal.
Once the sadistic and ego-ideal forerunners are integrated with realis-
tic internalisations of the parents, it becomes possible for the child to move
from identification to ego identity. With a superego now in place, the ego
becomes even more proficient at synthesising good and bad, self and other,
resulting in a stronger sense of ego identity. The child is now ready to
consolidate these achievements in Stage Five.
Stage Five: Consolidation of superego and ego integration Stage Five.

Once the superego has been integrated, the child moves into Stage Five of Mature self-representations
and object-representations
development, which is characterised by the ongoing, lifelong development
characterised by mature
of greater maturity and personal depth. Now that the superego has been affect and appropriate
integrated, the ego and superego are able to move closer together: our repression of aggressive
sense of ourselves and our sense of morality become more related. We also and libidinal
develop greater ego identity. Our internal world is not very far away from drive derivatives.
our external world (our perception more or less matches reality) and our
behaviour more consistently reflects this maturing internal world. As our
internal world and sense of self becomes more stable, we are increasingly
able to fall back on our internal world when there is a crisis. No matter how
bad the external world gets, we will not lose our internal grip on reality.
Four important processes happen in Stage Five.
1. We become more flexible in reshaping our internal worlds to respond

to new experiences. Rather than falling back on our internal worlds
to escape reality, we are able to shift our self representations and

object representations when they do not fit our experience.
2. Our capacity for integration of good and bad, self and other, is now ma-
ture so that we experience life in a more integrated and rounded way.
3. Depersonification allows us to develop overarching principles rather
than responding purely on a personal level. Depersonification allows
us to see both our viewpoints and those of other people, to communi-
cate our viewpoints and to listen to those of others.
4. Individualisation allows us to become increasingly selective and in-
dividual about the aspects of ourselves and others that we want to
internalise. This allows us to enter into mature, rather than indis-
criminate, relationships with ourselves and with others.
How do we define mental health and normality?

It is very tempting, when studying * Capacity to tolerate guilt and separation.
development from a psychoanalytic point Guilt, separation and loss are important
of view, to dwell on what goes wrong: aspects of human existence. The greater
to use the theory to describe the genesis our ability to tolerate these ‘depressive
of psychopathology. In the next section, position’ experiences, the greater our
we will address precisely this issue of resilience and ability to live our lives
psychopathology. It is refreshing, however, realistically. Losses are particularly difficult
to pause and consider how Kernberg for all of us, and the sad reality is that
might answer with: ‘what can go right there is no possibility of avoiding loss.
with development’. What defines mental Tolerance for these aspects of human
health and maturity? By identifying some existence allows us to overcome them
of the factors of maturity, we can examine and grow from them.
ourselves and our patients for health as
* Ability to integrate our self-concept.
well as for abnormality. Here are some of
Integration is probably the most
the factors Kernberg identifies:
important process in Kernberg’s theory.
* Depth and stability of internal object Everything needs to be integrated. This
relationships. If our internal sense of also means that the more integrated we
relationships with others is stable and are in our internal world, the more we
multifaceted, we are more likely to fulfil can engage externally with maturity.
this in our real relationships and to
* Ability to rely on our internal world. The
grow from our relationships.
more scary and unstable our internal
* Tolerance of ambivalence towards world, the less it can help us out when
loved objects. If we can tolerate feeling we are in trouble. A mature person will
both love and hate towards those we be able to fall back on the resources of his
love, we are likely to be able to form internal world when a crisis hits. Because
a more realistic sense of them and our internal world does not ever match
ourselves. We will also not be easily reality, a mature internal world will offer
devastated by feeling let down or by both a safe refuge from reality when
discovering those we love are not necessary and a bridge to reality on other
perfect, and will not be easily surprised occasions. An immature internal world
when we experience negative feelings may be just as frightening and unreliable
towards those we love. as an unstable or scary external world. >>
<<
* Correspondence of behaviour and maturity, however, is characterised by
internal world. Sometimes our a closer match between the internal
behaviour or our reading of reality does and external world, as well as between
not actually correspond to reality. We our experiences and our behaviour. We
are misinterpreting, and this usually find ourselves less frequently grossly
happens because something from our misreading a situation or behaving in
internal world has coloured our reading a way that doesn’t fit with our sense
of the external world. This happens to of self. When this does happen, more
everybody because we cannot (and mature people are also more likely to
do not necessarily want to) remove be able to recognise the mismatch and
ourselves from our fantasies. Growing to have insight as to why it happened.
Furthermore, our internal worlds grow during Stage Five. You

may have noticed that the internal world of the small baby was domi-
nated by mother and self (a dyadic relationship), and later by parents
and self (a triadic relationship). At these earlier stages of development,
the internal world can only cope with dyadic and then triadic relation-
ships. As greater maturity is reached, multiple objects can populate
the internal world, and this brings us into a closer relation to society
and culture.
Pathological development
What happens when something goes wrong in development? How is it
that we develop symptoms that negatively impact upon our lives? As we
mentioned earlier, Kernberg believes that things may go wrong because
the child has imbalances in libido and/or aggression and/or because object
relationships are faulty. In either case, this could be caused by the child’s
constitution (for example the amount of aggression or envy the baby is
born with) or because of failures in parenting. Often, it is a combination of
the two that causes problems.
Kernberg believes that developmental failure alters the development
of our psychic structures and this is what leads to psychopathology. If Psychopathology.
something goes wrong then the result is not that we become arrested (get Psychological
stuck or fixated) at a particular developmental stage but rather that the malfunctioning, indicated
by abnormal, maladaptive
developmental failure results in the development of faulty structures,
behavior or mental activity.
and we therefore continue our development along a different line to the
normal developmental path. The earlier this happens, the more severely
our faulty structures influence our lives.
Kernberg therefore believes that severe forms of psychopathology
are a result of early developmental failure and less severe forms are a
result of later developmental failure. For example, failure in Stages One
or Two of development (before the sixth to eighth month of life) results in
psychotic kinds of psychopathology. Failure in Stage Three or early in
Stage Four results in severe kinds of character pathology, while failure
later in Stage Four or Stage Five results in less severe character pathology
or, more typically, neurotic conditions. The pathways of developmental
failure are summarised in the table on the next page.
168
Developmental Status of Basic Process of Structural Developmental Failure Pathological

Stage Units Internalisation Development Outcome
1. Normal ‘Autism’ Affects of pleasure Beginnings of the No clear structures as Unable to take in enough ‘good’. Autistic psychosis.
and un-pleasure. introjection of yet: just basic units. Inability to establish a symbiotic
Not yet differentiated ‘good’ experiences. relationship with mother.
‘good’ versus ‘bad’
or self versus object.
2. Normal Pleasure becomes Increasing Nucleus of ego forms Central problem: loss of Children: symbiotic
‘Symbiosis’ invested with libido introjection of from ‘good’ self and differentiation of ego boundaries: psychosis.
and un-pleasure ‘good’. Beginnings object images. • Extreme regression to ‘good’ Adults: psychotic
with aggression. of introjection of when trauma is present. schizophrenia or
Differentiation of ‘bad’, with attempts • Excessive activation of psychotic
‘good’ self and to expel. ‘bad’ in this stage results depression.
object images. in severe anxiety.
Un-pleasurable • ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ are not
experiences cluster sufficiently differentiated
into ‘bad’ internal while differentiation of ‘good’
images. self from ‘good’ object does
not take place.
3. Differentiation of Self and object Introjection becomes Ego boundaries Weak ego boundaries because Borderline
self from object become more more sophisticated become more firmly of severe frustrations prompt personality
representations differentiated. and is accompanied established. the person to defensively retreat organisation.
‘Good’ and ‘bad’ by defences such as to primitive ‘all good’ self and
are first split then splitting and No developed object representations.
later come closer projection. Splits superego, but cruel, Splitting increases instead
together so that gradually soften as punitive, harsh object of decreasing.
total self and object stage progresses. images constitute Identity diffusion.
representations Identification begins. superego forerunners. Differentiation is so defensively
are formed. There is also the strong that person is unable
beginnings of the ego to integrate self and object,
ideal, derived from ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
good internal objects.
Developmental Status of Basic Process of Structural Developmental Failure Pathological
Stage Units Internalisation Development Outcome
4. Integration of The child discovers Identification It becomes possible to Failure is located in: • Narcissistic
self and object that both self and (particularly during think of a structural id • Abnormal condensation of id, personality
representations; object representa- the Oedipal period). and superego. ego and superego structures (abnormal
higher-level tions can contain This then matures Superego is formed (narcissistic personality). condensation of
structures. both ‘good’ and into ego identity. from sadistic and ego • Conflicts between ego and psychic
‘bad’. Drive ideal forerunners in superego. structures).
derivatives are more combination with • Failure to integrate good and • Higher level
mature and now internalisations of bad superego forerunners— character
undergo repression. realistic parental interferes with ability to disorders (for
demands and develop value systems. example,
prohibitions. Potential to develop paranoid hysterical,
The ego strengthens characteristics. obsessive
as a result. • Integration of superego compulsive or
components is dominated by depressive-
aggression, resulting in masochistic
sadistic demands for characters).
perfection. Associated with • Neuroses.
neurosis.
5. Consolidation Mature self- Ego identity is Ego and superego Failures are normal human Everyday life!
of superego representations consolidated. consolidated and exist failures and do not have
and ego and object- in closer proximity to pathological outcomes.
integration. representations one another.
characterised by
mature affect and
appropriate
repression of
aggressive and
libidinal drive
derivatives.
K e r n b e r g ’s t h e o r y o f n o r m a l a n d p a t h o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t
169
Table 8.1 A summary of the pathways of developmental failure.

Kernberg’s theory therefore offers possible reasons for a variety of

different kinds of pathological development at different levels. His partic-
ular focus on pathological development, however, concerns the character
pathologies because this is what he works with most in clinical practice.
Character pathology. Kernberg believes there are different levels of character pathology, rang-
Disturbances in character ing from the ‘lower-level’ infantile personalities through the medium-level
or personality. Described to the higher-level character pathologies. He deliberately places these in a
as personality disorder in
hierarchy because he believes they result from different stages of develop-
psychiatric terminology.
ment (the lower the level of character pathology, the earlier the structural
problems) and from varying degrees of integration of ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
We will focus particularly on borderline personality organisation and on
narcissism, the two most important categories in Kernberg’s work.
It is important to note that there are similarities, as well as differences,
between Kernberg’s classification and the classification of personality
disorders found in the DSM-IV. They are in many ways similar. For
example, some of the descriptive features of both borderline and narcissistic
personality disorder in the DSM-IV correspond to Kernberg’s descriptions.
However, Kernberg does not only describe borderline and narcissistic
symptoms. He is also interested in exploring the internal structure of such
individuals and the way in which they relate to the internal and external
world. For this reason, Kernberg’s classifications are more fluid than that
of the DSM-IV and are defined not only by descriptive behaviours but also
by the functioning of the person’s internal world.
Borderline Personality Organisation

Borderline. Character Kernberg deliberately talks about borderline personality organisation as
pathology characterised opposed to borderline personality disorder. He understands his category
by a pattern of disturbed
as one that refers to a general organisation of the personality that might
and unstable interpersonal
relationships and sense
result in a variety of symptoms. This includes borderline personality
of self. disorder but also encompasses other lower-level ‘infantile’ personalities
such as schizoid, schizotypal, paranoid and even narcissistic individuals.
Borderline personality organisation is defined by the relative immaturity
of defences, self and object representations and psychic structures. The
idea is that certain types of personality disorders are constellated around
a remarkably stable, though pathological, ego structure. In the case of
borderline conditions, this ego structure is stably and reliably weak,
particularly in the area of close personal relationships.
The best way, then, of realising that you may be dealing with a
borderline personality organisation, is through an examination of their
interpersonal relationships. Kernberg suggests particular qualities are
typical of the borderline organisation. As a therapist, one of the first clues
might be found in the process of transference. Quite quickly, the therapist
might turn from a wonderful, perfect, all-good therapist to a mean,
attacking, neglectful all-bad therapist, even though the therapist has not
really done anything differently. This will in all likelihood have happened
with other interpersonal relationships that the borderline personality has
had: one minute one can be the borderline’s best friend, the next minute
their mortal enemy, leaving the dismissed friend reeling as to what it was
that they might have done wrong. This is because borderline organisations
are clustered around processes of splitting, in which ‘bad’ and ‘good’ are
kept separate from one another.
Kernberg stresses that the person does not repress a memory of
‘goodness’ whilst in the grip of ‘badness’: the person may be very conscious
of the change and yet this makes no difference to them. When the person
is in a particular ego state, it is as if the other ego state is not part of that
same person. Kernberg gives an example of someone who might alternate
between being sexually prudish and inhibited, completely split off from
her sexuality, and then very promiscuous and uninhibited. When you
point out the discrepancy, this causes great anxiety to the borderline
personality because it is so important for the person to keep these different
ego states separate. If we recall the example of the baby from Tsotsi, it is
almost as if isolated ego states of ‘good’ condensed milk alternate with
ego states of ‘bad’ condensed milk. They cannot be linked as part of a
continuous experience and each ego state, of opposite affect to the other
one, exists in a bubble. This is because of the predominance of early
defence mechanisms such as splitting, projection, primitive idealisation,
devaluation and omnipotence.
The intensity of the person’s affects, as well as their rapidly shifting
nature, is reinforced by a lack of impulse control and poor anxiety
tolerance. For this reason, people with borderline personality organisation
are particularly prone to ‘affect storms’ in which intense emotion sweeps
them up and is often directed towards those close to them. This is related
to their pathological object relations. The link between their image of self
and others in their internal worlds and the external world is tenuous, so
that it is difficult to realistically evaluate reality or to feel realistic empathy
for self or others. In more schizoid types of borderline organisations, it
often feels like their internal world is empty of real relationships, whereas
in borderline personalities, their intrapsychic life is ‘enacted in [their]
interpersonal patterns, very often replacing self awareness with driven,
repetitive behavior patterns’ (Kernberg, 2004:18). Instead of having rich
and real interpersonal relationships, their interpersonal relationships
become the repository of their internal conflicts. This is related to another
characteristic of borderline personality organisation: identity diffusion. Identity diffusion. An
People with borderline personality organisation often have an unstable unstable and fluctuating
and fluctuating sense of who they are which is heavily influenced by sense of who one is,
heavily influenced by
their affective state. Self-destructive behaviours are common, including
one’s affective state.
self-mutilation or harming of others. In general, people with borderline
personality organisation experience severely distorted interpersonal
relationships, lack of direction and uncertainty and often pathological
and chaotic sexual lives. All in all, borderline personality organisation
causes severe difficulties in the relationships of these people, characterised
as they are by the intense and overwhelming feelings of a dangerous
internal world.
What causes borderline personality organisation? Kernberg
links its emergence to the third stage of development, where self and
object images have become differentiated but where there are initially
strong splits between ‘good’ and ‘bad’. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ have not yet
become integrated. Difficulties at this stage result in further pathological
development so that the personality starts to cohere around a relatively

weak ego under the sway of powerful affects. Ideally, in Stage Three,
splitting of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ gradually diminishes because there is
enough ‘good’ to protect from the ‘bad’. There is then a natural process
of integrating ‘good’ and ‘bad’. When the infant is unable to integrate
the two, a vicious cycle develops. For example, the ‘bad’ needs to be
projected out with increasing force, and the introjected ‘bad’ becomes
more and more frightening. In order to counteract this, we use primitive
idealisation at this stage, so that we have powerful good objects that can
protect us from the ‘bad’. This also, however, develops into a vicious
cycle in borderline personality organisation because the ‘good’ has to
become better and better and better, but never quite defends against
the bad. Added to this, Kernberg believes that there is a pathological
condensation of pre-genital and genital strivings. They are not properly
separated out and this is partly what results in the adult borderline
Borderline organisation
in the nursery: Tinker Bell
James (2007) undertakes an entertaining sometimes she is all bad. Fairies have to be
diagnosis of characters in popular children’s one thing or the other, at any one time. This
books. She assigns the diagnosis of is because they are so small and therefore
borderline personality disorder (BPD) to have room for only one feeling at a time. It is
Tinker Bell, the little fairy from Peter Pan who, common for those with BPD to feel this way
James suggests, ‘is unable to form stable as they have an unstable sense of self and can
relationships and fears Peter will abandon her interpret normal, time-limited separation from
for Wendy’ (2007:85). This is what she has to individuals they care about as rejection or a
say about Tinker Bell (2007:85-7): sign that they are in some way ‘bad’.
Tinker Bell finds it seemingly impossible
Tinker Bell lives in Neverland with Peter to control her anger. She has violent rages
Pan and the Lost Boys. She would like to be in response to things that would cause
Peter’s fairy, but this is not allowed as she only minor irritation in others. Wendy’s
is female and male humans cannot have a compassion makes Tinker Bell even more
fairy of the opposite sex. jealous and angry—perhaps because she is
Tinker Bell is in love with Peter and incapable of consistently feeling such warmth
becomes extremely jealous when he for another person.
interacts with Wendy. She finds it difficult to Suicide attempts and self-harm are common
control her emotions and is often verbally in those with BPD, as are reckless and impulsive
abusive and physically violent towards acts. When Peter’s medicine was poisoned by
Wendy. On one occasion she took this to Captain Hook, Tinker Bell drank it, knowing it
extremes when she tried to get one of the might kill her. It was only Peter’s intervention
Lost Boys to murder Wendy by shooting her that saved her. While it’s impossible to say
with an arrow. When Peter heard of this he whether Tinker Bell wanted to die, by drinking
banished Tinker Bell, but Wendy, forever the medicine she behaved in an irrational way.
thinking of the welfare of others, made sure It would initially appear her motive was to save
this was only a temporary measure. Peter; equally, it could be seen as a suicide
Sometimes Tinker Bell is all good and attempt or at least a cry for attention. >>
<<
Although this description is closer to the Her extremes of affect express themselves
DSM-IV definition of borderline personality in both her idealisation of Peter and her
disorder than to Kernberg’s description devaluation of Wendy. One might suggest
of borderline personality organisation, that Peter treads carefully, since he could
one can clearly see the features Kernberg turn into the ‘bad’ object at any moment.
describes. The predominance of splitting Her impulsive behaviour, both in matters of
processes and the intensity of affect, as well love and in matters of her own wellbeing
as the speed with which ‘good-Tinker Bell’ are clearly linked to poor anxiety tolerance
turns into ‘bad-Tinker Bell’ suggests that and impulse control. Her unstable sense
Tinker Bell has constitutional difficulties of self is matched by the stability of her
with aggression, perhaps combined with weakened ego, and she is never sure how
traumatic experiences in her early life. to get her needs met.
having such a chaotic sexual life: he is unconsciously needing both genital

gratification and pre-genital gratification, and is also unconsciously
unconvinced that such needs can be met. Furthermore, self and object
representations become caught up in the defensive processes so that
the internal world is full of ‘all-good’ or ‘all-bad’ figures. This is what
distorts the development of more realistic internal self and object
representations, because this whole process is developmentally prior to
the establishment of real feelings of depression, guilt and concern. The
world remains black and white, with few grey areas.
What goes so wrong that such a vicious cycle develops? Kernberg
believes that aggression, and its associated poor impulse control and
anxiety tolerance, are responsible. It could be that the person is born with
a lot of aggression and poor impulse and anxiety control. This is then
reinforced by an increasingly punitive internal world. Kernberg also
acknowledges that the external world can hamper the child’s abilities
to integrate ‘good’ and ‘bad’, thus leading to a borderline personality
organisation. In his later work, he places particular emphasis on the
role of trauma, including emotional, physical and sexual abuse. This is
in line with research that suggests that borderline personality disorder
is strongly associated with childhood abuse. An interaction between
the internal and external realities is needed, however, to result in this
pathological constellation. An excessive gratification or frustration
of early instinctual needs results in excessive aggression, which may
also be reinforced by temperament. The developing personality gets
caught up in a world that feels depriving and dangerous, as well as in
a sense of self that is unstable and affectively intense. This interrupts
the necessary process of ego strengthening and superego integration,
resulting in a weakened ego and in a superego which is unable to
integrate the sadistic superego forerunners and the ego ideal.
Narcissism. A
psychological condition
Narcissism characterised by excessive
Narcissistic disturbances, for Kernberg, can be traced to a slightly later self-love and self interest
stage of development (Stage Four) although, somewhat confusingly, he coupled with lack of
stresses that narcissists can sometimes also have an underlying borderline empathy for others.
personality organisation. The distinction between borderline and

narcissistic states, then, cannot always be made on the basis of stages of
development. Instead, Kernberg suggests that narcissism presents with a
different cluster of interpersonal difficulties. Some narcissists do not have
underlying borderline conditions while some do, and some narcissists are
fairly functional on the surface while others are not. What unites them
all, regardless of level of functioning, is the presence of a grandiose self.
Narcissists are convinced they are not only wonderful but also better than
anybody else. A popular magazine recently featured an article on how
women can identify narcissistic men. The article included a photograph
of a very beautiful man with immaculate hair. Think about Prince
Charming in Shrek. His hair is an extension of himself and he expects to
be admired.
Hairstyles are not, of course, the most reliable indicators of a narcissistic
personality (Hitler’s hair left much to be desired; ditto for Donald
Trump). Narcissistic personalities are not, however, characterised by an
external appearance of charm, beauty, power or wealth but by an internal
sense of grandiosity and a pathological need for admiration and acclaim.
Kernberg argues that the clinical characteristics of narcissistic personalities
have to do with pathological self-love, pathological object love and a
pathological superego.
Pathological self-love. Pathological self-love is manifested in an inflated sense of self impor-
An inflated sense of self tance and self regard, with extreme ambitiousness and exhibitionistic ten-
importance and self dencies. The self is loved only as a grandiose fantasy of the self. The other
regard, with extreme
side of this, of course, involves chronic feelings of inferiority, emptiness
ambitiousness and
exhibitionistic tendencies.
and boredom since strivings for brilliance, power, beauty or acclaim are
never fully satisfactory.
Pathological object- Pathological object-love is expressed in the way narcissists treat
love. Others can only be other people. Others can only be loved as an extension of the self, not
loved as an extension of for who they really are. Narcissists therefore seek out idealised objects
the self, not for who they
who make them look good. This is doomed to failure because nobody
really are.
can live up to these ideals. Accompanying this idealisation, therefore, is
a devaluation of others—once the idealisation is no longer tenable—as
well as an interpersonal ruthlessness and exploitiveness that makes others
feel devalued. This is because narcissists have serious deficits in their
abilities to feel concern and empathy for others or to depend upon others.
Narcissistic personalities are also often envious, wanting to spoil the good
in others because they cannot have it for themselves.
Pathological superego. Pathological narcissism is also characterised by a pathological superego.
The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ components of the superego have not been sufficiently
components of the integrated, which means that people with narcissistic personalities have
superego have not been
a very low tolerance for depression or self-criticism. Criticism by others
sufficiently integrated,
which means that
is particularly intolerable because it challenges their grandiose self. This
people with narcissistic means that it is very easy for narcissists to experience a narcissistic rage in
personalities have a which they attack others because they feel something has been taken away
very low tolerance for from themselves.
depression or How does pathological narcissism develop? Again, Kernberg believes
self-criticism. that something goes wrong in early development and this results in
pathological internal structures. In the case of pathological narcissism,
Kernberg focuses on Stage Four of development, around the ages of three

to five when ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are being integrated. There is already a clear
differentiation between self and other. For narcissists with underlying
borderline organisation, problems in Stage Three (as described earlier)
may be present. For higher-level narcissists, there is relative ego strength.
Kernberg suggests that what happens is that the narcissist puts various parts
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ self and object together in a pathological constellation.
This pathological self-structure occurs because the child has too much
aggression and envy (constitutionally formed or exacerbated by external
circumstance). Furthermore, Kernberg believes that narcissists often have
cold, hostile, rejecting parents who are inappropriately admiring of the
small child or who treat the child as narcissistic extensions of themselves.
This results in a pathological self-structure in which there is a condensation
of the real self, the ideal self and the ideal object. Ideal self. The idea of a
The real self is that feeling of the child’s specialness and this is wonderful, charming self
that compensates for
pathologically condensed with the ideal self and the ideal object, both of
the child’s feelings
which are fantasies used to survive a very different internal or external of frustration, envy
reality. The ideal self is the idea of a wonderful, charming, brilliant self and rage.
that compensates for the child’s feelings of frustration, envy and rage. The
ideal object is embodied in the idea of a wonderful, ever-giving, ever- Ideal object.
loving parent who accepts the child completely. This ideal object acts as The idea of a wonderful,
a replacement for the devalued and non-loving parental object. In other ever-giving, ever-loving
parent who accepts
words, the condensation of real self with ideal self and ideal object pushes
the child completely.
all ‘bad’ away from the self and out into the object world: the self becomes This ideal object acts
wonderful in order to protect against the ‘bad’. The internal world as a replacement for
becomes eclipsed by this grandiose self, although there are also shadowy the devalued and
and ominous self and object representations that are not grandiose and non-loving parent.
that are experienced as threatening the grandiose self. At the same time,
the superego cannot integrate both good and bad, and, as a result, there Grandiose self.
is loss of superego functioning. This is particularly marked in a group of Grandness and goodness
narcissists whom Kernberg terms malignant narcissists because they lack a is primarily located in the
self rather than in objects.
conscience and launch ruthless attacks on others. Hitler is a prime example
of a malignant narcissist. Malignant narcissists.
Kernberg notes that many narcissists are fairly highly functioning. They lack a conscience
Narcissism can be useful for political figures or captains of industry, for and launch ruthless
example. However, their effects on others can be ruthless and damaging, attacks on others.
and they often suffer because of their inability to love in a real way. Kernberg
therefore suggests that, despite difficulties in treatment, it is to the benefit
of society as well as the individual that treatment be undertaken.
Narcissism: Kernberg versus Kohut

Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut are the psychoanalytic heavyweights
of North American psychoanalysis. Each has contributed immensely to
the development of psychoanalysis in the USA. If you have already read
about Kohut you will have noticed that Kohut’s theory is very different
from that of Kernberg. Yet both of them have been leading contributors
to the understanding of narcissism in psychoanalysis. Kernberg is a rare
psychoanalyst in that he tries to include the theories of others rather than
marking himself in opposition to others, and he integrates a number of
different psychoanalytic theories. When it comes to Kohut, however,

Mirroring needs. Kernberg is no fan. In his writing, he unequivocally aims to demonstrate
‘A need to feel affirmed, that he is right and Kohut is wrong. Similarly, Kohut is adamant that
confirmed, recognised; to Kernberg is sadly mistaken. Virtually the only agreement between the
be feeling accepted and two is that narcissistic disturbances are characterised by a grandiose self.
appreciated, especially The differences between their theories have a number of implications for
when able to show oneself’ understanding development and have raised many of the central debates
(Wolf, 1988: 55).
that plague psychoanalytic theory in general. It is therefore interesting to
explore some of these differences in more detail.
Idealising needs.
‘A need to experience
Both Kernberg and Kohut have complex and well-developed under-
oneself as being part standings about how narcissists come to be so grandiose and how therapy can
of an admired and help them, but their understandings are very different. At the risk of over-
respected selfobject; simplifying, Kohut believes that narcissists have not had their basic mirroring
needing the opportunity and idealising needs met and, as a result, have not fully managed to develop
to be accepted by and from a grandiose self to a more mature way of relating. The baby or small
merge into a stable, calm,
child did not have sufficient experiences of being seen as wonderful (mir-
nonanxious, powerful,
wise, protective, selfobject
roring needs) or of believing in wonderful parents (idealising needs). This
that possesses the qualities resulted in developmental arrest, and the job of the therapist is to foster the
the subject lacks’ growth of these mirroring and idealising needs so that the patient can carry
(Wolf, 1988: 55). on maturing. This presents a quite different story to the one Kernberg tells.
We will briefly review some of the key differences between the theorists.
Narcissism in the nursery: Lord Voldemort

Lord Voldemort from the Harry Potter terrible childhood, and armed only with
series is a classic example of a malignant some natural talents (common amongst
narcissist. His strivings for power and malignant narcissists) his only way of
grandiosity have developed to the point surviving was to become increasingly
where he will do anything to achieve grandiose and self-centred. He was no
his ambitions, and he is no longer doubt born with certain propensities (he
capable of ordinary human relationships. is, after all, a Slytherin) which interacted
Interestingly, his pathological self- with his hostile and rejecting early
structure—of real self condensed with experiences, forcing him to become
ideal self and ideal object—has developed maliciously self-sufficient. Part of his
to such an extent that he has completely hatred for Harry Potter is rooted in his
ejected his less vulnerable self, Tom envy of Harry Potter’s goodness and
Riddle, from his self-structure. Nothing the parental love that Potter contains
of the little boy remains, much less the inside himself. His narcissistic rage is
little baby. Although Voldemort is the fuelled by Harry Potter’s very existence,
baddie we all love to hate, we can see while Harry Potter’s goodness is
how he developed into such an uncaring experienced as a personal affront to
and ruthless creature. Faced with a Voldemort’s internal world.
Developmental arrest versus pathological development

One of the fundamental differences between the two theorists concerns
their understanding of how narcissism develops. Kohut believes the
narcissist is arrested in development while Kernberg believes the narcissist

has developed pathologically. McWilliams (1994) gives a good example
to illustrate this difference. Normal development can be likened to the
growth of the plant. If all goes well, the plant flourishes. In a theory of
developmental arrest (like that of Kohut), the idea is that the plant stops
growing and remains small and immature. In a theory of structural
developmental failure, such as Kernberg’s, the plant carries on growing
but in an abnormal manner: it mutates into a twisted version of its normal
counterpart. Kohut would look at how high the plant has grown; Kernberg
would be more interested in its structural abnormalities.
Normal versus pathological narcissism

This leads us to another crucial difference between the two theorists.
Because Kohut believes that development has been arrested, he also
believes that narcissistic personality disorder is a developmentally
inappropriate version of earlier normal narcissism. In contrast, Kernberg
believes that the adult displays pathological narcissism: something
that has developed to look quite different from normal childhood
narcissism. Kohut therefore views the excessive self-love of narcissists as
developmentally misplaced whereas Kernberg views it as the development
of something abnormal. Kernberg offers some convincing reasons as to
why the pathological narcissism of the adult differs from the normal
narcissism of small children. He suggests that while adult narcissists
love themselves and are overly invested in their own goodness, they are
also self-destructive and demeaning and therefore they do not do a good
job of loving themselves.
In contrast, he suggests that the narcissism of small children can be
distinguished in a number of different ways:
• Small children also have grandiose fantasies and attempt to angrily

control their situation, but this has a more realistic quality.
• Like adult narcissists, small children can also overreact to
criticism, failure and blame and also want to be the centre of love
and admiration. However, for children, these qualities co-exist
with genuine love, gratitude and trust as well as the capacity to
depend upon others.
• Both small children and narcissists can be demanding, but narcissists
are excessively demanding in a way that destroys the ‘good’ that is
received. The child will want attention, for example, and then enjoy
it, while the narcissist’s demandingness cannot be so easily satisfied.
• Children tend to be warm in their expectation of being the centre of
the universe, while narcissists tend to be cold and aloof.
• Both children and narcissists have fantasies of never-ending power,
wealth or beauty but narcissists want to have it all only for them-
selves. Children are more prepared to share.
Kernberg therefore believes that the narcissism displayed by those

with narcissistic personality structure is not merely an extension of child-
hood narcissism but a distortion into something quite different.
The relationship between libido and aggression

Kohut believes that because narcissists have not sufficiently had their
mirroring and idealising needs satisfied, they have been insufficiently loved
and this is why they have difficulties in loving themselves. He therefore
places predominant emphasis on libidinal needs. Kernberg constantly
stresses that the narcissist also has difficulties with his own aggression and
envy, and that the person’s grandiosity is also an attempt to control others and
ward off attacks. Kohut therefore understands narcissistic rage to be an ex-
pression of frustrated libidinal needs while Kernberg believes it is also an
expression of pathological aggression. If we think about Prince Charming
in Shrek, or Lord Voldemort, Kohut would emphasise their need to love and
be loved while Kernberg would emphasise their difficulties in controlling
aggression. While Kernberg does recognise both libido and aggression, it
could be suggested that the two theorists struggle between ‘the Scylla of ig-
norance of the hostility of the patient’ (Kohut) and ‘the Charybdis of the
ignorance of the patient’s libidinal needs’ (Kernberg) (Consolini, 1999: 78).
The relationship between self and objects

Kohut believes that self-love (narcissism) and object-love develop along
two separate lines. It is therefore possible to have deficiencies in self-
love independent of object-love. In contrast, Kernberg believes that self
representations and object representations are always in interaction. In
practice, this brings us to another difference between the two: Kohut is
concerned about real parents and what happened in the real world, while
Kernberg believes that narcissism develops out of an interaction between
the environment and the internal world. Kohut has accused Kernberg of
paying insufficient attention to the actual deficiencies so often found in
the histories of narcissistic patients, while Kernberg has in turn accused
Kohut of focusing too much on reality without questioning the difference
between the patient’s experience and what actually happened. The two
theorists therefore differ markedly on the role of the environment and the
role of the intrapsychic structure in the development of the self.
An interesting example of how this difference manifests in their theories
concerns their understanding of idealisation. It is common for narcissistic
patients to idealise their therapists at some point during the treatment. Kohut
believes that it is the job of the therapist to accept the admiration, thereby
allowing the patient’s idealising needs to develop. The implication is that the
real parents were unable to accept this idealisation earlier in life. Kernberg
is much more cautious about this need for idealisation and suggests that
simply accepting the admiration means that the therapist colludes with
the patient and ignores the aggressive aspect inherent in this idealisation.
Because Kernberg believes that self and objects are in interaction, and that
they are internal rather than necessarily external, he is not convinced that the
idealisation is actually for the therapist. Rather, he understands narcissistic
idealisation as a projection of the grandiose, admired parts of the patient’s
self onto the therapist. The patient is not actually idealising the therapist, but
himself for having such a great therapist. Similarly, were Lord Voldemort
to seek a wife (would all the female readers please hide immediately…), he
would want a trophy wife who made him look wonderful. He may view
her as wonderful only as far as she made him look wonderful, and he would
probably control her in an aggressive manner to make sure she fulfilled
his projection of himself. Similarly, it could be suggested that Tinker Bell
does not love Peter Pan, but rather the image of herself that she imagines
reflected through her association with Peter Pan. Peter Pan is not a real
object for her but rather a part of her internal world.
Implications for therapy

These differences have profound implications for therapy. To return to the
plant metaphor, we might say that Kohut would want to water and nurture
the plant so that it could start growing again. In line with this, he believes
that it is often futile to challenge the grandiose self. Rather, change happens
through allowing mirroring and idealizing transferences to develop to the
point that the plant is big enough to gain insight. First water, then interpret.
Kernberg feels that this is unlikely to result in any real change because the
plant is not simply small but is also misshapen. Although Kernberg would
not himself prune the plant, he would point out to the plant that that funny
branch is a part of the plant and that the plant can prune itself. In other words,
Kernberg feels that the therapist should interpret and confront. Although
both theorists understand the role of empathy in therapy, Kohut sees this
as a primary mechanism of change while Kernberg sees interpretation as a
primary mechanism of change.
So which theorist is correct? Because both development and psychotherapy
are such complex and individual processes, it has thus far been impossible
to conduct a direct comparison between the two. Of course each therapist
believes that they are correct and the other incorrect. It has been suggested that
Narcissism: a product of US culture?
As we have seen, the battle between of opportunity, grandiosity, ambition,

Kernberg and Kohut raises a number of admiration and power are the cultural
issues, but centres around the question currency of the day, with their flipside of
of narcissism. It is interesting that this is boredom, emptiness and insecurity. It could
the battle that rages in the United States even be argued that US foreign policy is
of America. Would Kernberg and Kohut an exercise in narcissistic rage. Kernberg
be interested in the same questions if himself notes that the preponderance of
they lived and practised in South Africa, narcissistic personalities in his consulting
or another part of the world? It has been room may be related to US culture. This
suggested that Freud’s focus on sexuality raises interesting possibilities of applying the
was a historical by-product of his culture: theories of Kernberg and Kohut on a social
the Victorian era with its repressed sexuality level and questioning whether US society is
gave rise to a theory about repressed producing narcissism.
sexuality. Similarly, it has been suggested One could then consider what
that Kernberg and Kohut are addressing psychological propensities South African
a product of their time and place. Is US society may be producing.
culture particularly narcissistic? In the land
both could be useful: Kohut reminds us that the narcissist is little and fragile
underneath all that bravado and reminds therapists to be empathic rather than
punitive. Kernberg reminds us that personality structures are complicated
and that we should not be afraid of confronting issues that are clearly not
working for patients. He helps us to avoid colluding with narcissists, even
when they are stroking our own egos. Some therapists therefore use both
approaches at different points in the therapy (see Consolini, 1999). However, it
is clear that the two theorists are incompatible in a number of important ways,
and that it may be too simple to suggest that they could be combined.
Critiques of Kernberg’s theory

To review some of the critiques that have been levelled against Kernberg’s
Theory. A set of ideas, theory, we need to go back to the kitchen, bearing in mind of course that
based on evidence and in matters of food, everybody has different tastes. This is often the case
careful reasoning, which with psychoanalytic theory: because we are critiquing theory rather than
offers an explanation of
empirical evidence, we cannot prove that something is unequivocally
how something works or
why something happens.
right or wrong but instead have to appraise the whole creation. A mistake
that is often made when critiquing psychoanalytic theory lies in trying to
establish its truth value. The truth of a theory lies in its applicability and
usefulness rather than in its facts. We can observe that two plus two equals
four but we cannot observe that numbers stretch into infinity. The former
is an observation while the latter is a theory.
Different critiques have been levelled against Kernberg as a result of
different tastes. Self psychologists following Kohut’s theory find Kernberg
too spicy. They suggest that he has minimised the role of the environment,
placing too much emphasis on distorted object relations. They also feel he
is too adversarial, insufficiently accepting and facilitative of his patients.
They feel his emphasis on interpretation is likely to antagonise patients,
making them feel judged and unaccepted.
In contrast, drive theorists feel that Kernberg is not spicy enough.
He has clearly added traditional psychoanalytic spices to his recipe, such
as libido and aggression, as well as id, ego and superego. However, his
integration has transformed these terms well beyond how they were
originally intended. Greenberg & Mitchell (1983) feel that he has merely
preserved the vocabulary of drive theory but that his theory is too relational
to really work as a drive theory.
This relates to another critique that Kernberg has used too many
ingredients. While most critics acknowledge that Kernberg has done an
excellent job in integrating different psychoanalytic ingredients, some feel
that his integration does not completely work and suffers from too many
words and too many ingredients.
A final critique is that Kernberg has followed the recipe too closely. It has
been noted that his theory proceeds in a ‘precise step-like march’ (Segal in
Wallerstein, 1995). He categorises and classifies everything, giving us a very
organised theory which relates well to psychiatric diagnosis. This may account
for his enormous popularity not only within psychoanalysis but also amongst
other mental health workers. It has however been argued that Kernberg’s
attempts to systematise result in a theory which is too neat and delineated to
account for the messiness of human development and psychopathology.
Despite these critiques, Kernberg is widely acknowledged as having

contributed a great deal to our understanding of development and psy-
chopathology. He is popular and widely used, and it is worth considering
that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Kernberg certainly gives us
much to chew upon.
Specific tasks
➊ Think of a political or popular figure who you think may be narcissistic.
What evidence do you have to support this contention? What hypotheses
might you make regarding the ways in which this person developed?
➋ Compare the descriptions of personality disorders in the DSM-IV-TR to Kernberg’s

descriptions of borderline and narcissistic functioning. What are the similarities
and differences?
General tasks
➊ Is Kernberg a bad cook or a master chef?
➋ Would you prefer to have Kohut or Kernberg as your therapist? Explain why.
Books and articles by Kernberg:

Kernberg is a prolific writer and researcher. Many of his books consist of collections of articles previously
published in journals. The list below does not cover all these books but highlights some of which I have
found particularly helpful.
Kernberg, O (1984). Object relations theory and clinical psychoanalysis. Northvale, New Jersey
Jason Aronson Inc.
(Provides a good description of aspects of Kernberg’s theory, including his developmental theory.
There are also interesting chapters on his theory of romantic love.)
Kernberg, O (1985). Internal world and external reality. Northvale & London: Jason Aronson Inc.
(Kernberg discusses some of the key theorists to have influenced his own theory. There is also a
discussion of pathology and treatment, as well as an application to group psychology.)
Kernberg, O (1985). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. Northvale & London:
Jason Aronson Inc.
(A thorough discussion of character pathology, including development, diagnosis and treatment.)
Kernberg, O (1993). Severe Personality Disorders: Psychotherapeutic strategies. New Haven &
London: Yale University Press.
(Another good source for his theory of character pathology. Includes guidelines for interviewing
and explorations of cases of malignant narcissism.)
Kernberg, O (2004). Aggressivity, narcissism, and self-destructiveness in the psychotherapeutic
relationship. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
(A recently written explication of his theory, this book provides a general overview as well as
picking up specific issues. The style of the book seems more engaging and better to read than
some of his earlier books.)
Bacal, H A & Newman, K M (1990). Theories of object relations: Bridges to self psychology.
New York: Columbia University Press.
(Chapter 4 includes a discussion of Kernberg. Interesting to read a description of Kernberg
from the perspective of a self psychologist, ie someone who thinks Kohut is right.)
Fonagy, P & Target, M (2003). Psychoanalytic theories: Perspectives from developmental
psychopathology. London & Philadelphia: Whurr Publishers.
(Chapter 8 includes a thorough summary of Kernberg’s theory as well as incisive critiques.
The critiques include consideration of how contemporary developmental research might
support or challenge psychoanalytic theory.)
Glassman, M (1988). Kernberg and Kohut: ‘A test of competing psychoanalytic models of
narcissism’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36, 597-625.
(A novel attempt to test the theories of Kohut and Kernberg. The author suggests that, while both
theories have validity, Kohut’s theory can be seen as merely a special case of Kernberg’s more
comprehensive theory.)
Greenberg, J R & Mitchell, S A (1983). Object relations in psychoanalytic theory. Cambridge,
Mass. & London: Harvard University Press.
(Chapter 10 presents a thoughtful description and evaluation of Kernberg’s theory.
Also very good chapters on other psychoanalytic theorists.)
Klein, J (1987). Our need for others and its roots in infancy. London & New York: Routledge.
(This book really talks to the reader. Chapter 8 explores Kernberg’s basic units of development,
giving a wonderful sense of the development of affects.)
McWilliams, N (1994). Psychoanalytic diagnosis: Understanding personality structures in the
clinical process. New York: The Guidford Press.
(A general psychoanalytic book with a number of references to Kernberg, including a
comparison between Kernberg & Kohut.)
Russell, G A (1985). ‘Narcissism and the narcissistic personality disorder: A comparison of the
theories of Kernberg and Kohut’, British Journal of Medical Psychology, 58, 137-148.
(Provides a thorough comparison between the two theories. Fairly even-handed but with a slight
preference for Kohut, particularly in relation to treatment strategies.)
Saperstein, J & Gaines J (1978). ‘A commentary on the divergent views between Kernberg and
Kohut on the theory and treatment of narcissistic personality disorders’, International Review
of Psychoanalysis, 5, 413-423.
(A rather philosophical but interesting comparison between Kernberg and Kohut, suggesting that
they have fundamentally different ideas regarding the intentionality and agency of the person.)
Wallerstein, R S (1995). The talking cures: The psychoanalyses and the psychotherapies. New Haven &
London: Yale University Press.
(Chapter 20 examines narcissistic and borderline personality from the perspectives of both
Kernberg and Kohut. Raises some interesting meta-theoretical questions and comparisons
between the two theorists.)
Fun case study:

James, L (2007). Tigger on the couch: The neuroses, psychoses, disorders and maladies of our favourite
childhood characters. London: Collins.
(A fun book which diagnoses fairytale characters, many of whom seem to have character disorders…
Peter Pan, the Queen of Hearts, the Wizard of Oz and Snow White’s wicked stepmother would all
be very interesting to Otto Kernberg!)
Meyer, R G (2005). Case Studies in Abnormal Behaviour (7th Edition). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
(Chapter 11 of this book presents case studies of famous malignant narcissists: Adolf Hitler,
Joseph Stalin & Saddam Hussein).
CHAPTER
9
Heinz Kohut:
Self psychology
Sally Swartz
This chapter will explain Kohut’s theory of self psychology,

focusing on the following areas:
1. The history of self psychology in psychoanalytic theory

2. The development of the self
* Definition of self
* Selfobject experiences
* Types of selfobject need and the bipolar self
* The place of rage, guilt and shame in Kohut’s model
of personhood
3. The implications of Kohut’s model for theory
and technique
* Vicarious introspection and empathic
attunement
* Optimal frustration and optimal
responsiveness
* The identification of self-
object transferences
* Defensive and compensatory
self structures
* Varieties of self disorder
* A self psychology approach to
defence and resistance
4. Developments in self theory
5. Implications for psychoanalytic
practice in South Africa
6. A critique of Kohut’s self theory
Heinz Kohut
The history of self psychology in psychoanalytic

theory
Kohut was a complicated and controversial figure, as some reactions to
Strozier’s biography have made clear (Strozier, 2001; Maroda, 2002). His
disavowal of his Jewish identity when he moved to the US, his apparently
‘‘protean’’ sexuality, and his charismatic but also demanding relationship
with his inner circle, added to the rift with the American Psychoanalytic
Association. The way in which these events influenced his theory con-
tinues to be the subject of debate in psychoanalytic circles (Cocks, 2002;
Maroda, 2002; Stolorow, 2003).
Kohut’s three major works, The analysis of the self (1971), The rest-
oration of the self (1977) and How does analysis cure? (1984) illustrate the
progressive development of a theory of self increasingly differentiated
from the classical tradition in which he had trained. Self psychology,
founded on Kohut’s reformulation of the Freudian approach to narcissism,
and his innovations in the area of psychoanalytic technique, now forms an
influential and vigorous branch of psychoanalysis in the United States.
The point of early differentiation between classical Freudian theory
and Kohut’s theory centred on the concept of narcissism. In Freudian
Primary narcissism. theory, primary narcissism is a stage between auto-eroticism and object-
A stage between auto- love in which the developing infant experiences himself as omnipotent
eroticism and object-love, and relatively undifferentiated from the object world. (Freud, 1914).
in which the developing
Secondary narcissism is a pathological state in which there is withdrawal of
infant experiences himself
as omnipotent and libido from the outside world. Such states are characterised by an incapacity
relatively undifferentiated to form and maintain mature relationships with others, because they are
from the object world. driven by preoccupation with self (Pulver, 1986). Patients with narcissistic
disorders, which, in terms of Freudian theory, included psychosis and
severe depression as well as borderline and narcissistic personality
Secondary narcissism.
A pathological state in
disorders, were thought to be unanalysable, primarily because of their self-
which there is a with- involvement and inability to benefit from analysis of the transference.
drawal of libido from Kohut’s contribution to psychoanalytic theory began with a new
the outside world. look at narcissism, not as a primitive or pathological state, but rather as
an indispensable and life-long aspect of experience, with its own course
Kohut’s narcissism. Not of development (1966). In his early paper, ‘Forms and transformations of
a primitive or pathological
narcissism’, he laid the ground for the theory of self development that
state but an indispensable
and life-long aspect of
was to follow. He saw love of self and a capacity for pleasure in one’s own
experience, with its own achievements as a fundamental prerequisite for mature relationships, and
course of development. described narcissistic needs of the personality ‘as a healthy enjoyment of
our own activities and successes and as an adaptively useful sense of dis-
appointment tinged with anger and shame over our failures and short-
comings’ (1966: 255). Narcissistic needs for affirmation and for soothing
remain with us throughout life, although the means of fulfilling those
needs change many times in the course of development. He also described
Idealised relationships. idealisation as an aspect of narcissism, and the idealised parent as the
These become internalised carrier of the projected perfection and bliss of primary narcissistic states
by the developing self as a (1966: 250). Idealised relationships become internalised by the develop-
healthy sense of direction ing self as ‘a healthy sense of direction and beacon for our activities and
and beacon for our
pursuits’ (1966: 255). Having redefined narcissism in this way, Kohut then
activities and pursuits.
set about the task of identifying and describing the trajectory of healthy
Heinz Kohut: Self psychology 185
narcissism in normal development, and mapping its relationship to

specific needs and self states. The term ‘narcissism’ with its complex con-
nections with mainstream psychoanalytic theory was gradually replaced
with a rich and experience-near vocabulary of self, and self development.
The implications for treatment of Kohut’s new approach to narcissistic
phenomena is explored in perhaps the most famous of his clinical papers,
the autobiographical ‘The two analyses of Mr Z’ (1979). In the paper, he
describes two analyses with the same patient, each lasting approximately
four years. The first was a classical analysis in which Kohut systematically
confronted his patient, through interpretation, with the links between his
‘narcissistic demands’ on his analyst and his ‘fixation on the pre-Oedipal
mother’ (1979:5). Mr Z’s father had been absent from the childhood home
for a year and a half, until Mr Z was five years old. During this time Mr
Z had enjoyed an exclusive bond with his mother. In the first analysis,
Kohut understood his patient’s unrealistic grandiosity and demands for
attention from his analyst as a defence against Oedipal competitiveness
and castration anxiety. His patient responded to his interpretations with
rage, saying that he felt misunderstood. After a year and a half he became
calmer, and Kohut at the time believed this was the result of effective
interpretation. His patient believed otherwise, claiming that he had
finally felt understood by Kohut’s comment that ‘Of course, it hurts when
one is not given what one assumes to be one’s due’ (1979:5). When Mr Z
returned for a second analysis, Kohut took a fundamentally different
stance towards the narcissistic demands that quickly emerged. Instead
of regarding these as defence bulwarks against Oedipal anxieties, he saw
them as a valuable reconstruction of early experience, presenting itself Iatrogenic. A negative
to be accepted and understood. The iatrogenic rages precipitated by the reaction caused by
interpretations of the first analysis were replaced by an unfettered explo- the intervention of
ration of early experience, previously unavailable to analysis. the therapist.
PHOTO: MARC MAUREL
A little boy’s pleasure in his

father helps towards the
development of an idealised
relationship.
Mr Z is a complex case, and has been the subject of a great deal of critical
debate, not least because of the academic sleight of hand involved in describ-
ing Kohut’s own experience as a patient, without acknowledging it as such
(Schoenewolf, 1990; Strozier, 2001). However, despite its history, it remains a
significant contribution to Kohut’s theory. Its importance lies in its dramatic
presentation of the effects on the same patient of a reorientation to narcis-
sistic phenomena such as an unrealistic sense of entitlement, demands for
attention, grandiosity, all of which were previously regarded as impediments
to successful analysis. The acceptance of such phenomena as a window onto
early childhood development formed the nucleus of self theory.
The development of the self

Definition of self
The self, central to Kohut’s theory, cannot be objectively observed or
described. It is the experience of oneself as continuous in time, with a
history and a future (Wolf, 1988). It includes our ambitions for ourselves,
our ideals, our sense of having particular talents and skills, our explorato-
ry and creative energy, and the affects that colour them all. Thus, Kohut
describes the self ‘as a unit, cohesive in space and enduring in time, which
is a centre of initiative and a recipient of impressions’ (Kohut, 1977: 99).
An ‘embryonic or virtual self’ is the term Kohut gives to the loosely
organised experience of newly born infants. This develops into the
‘nuclear self’, as the infant’s experiences become organised through
repeated interactions with caregivers. Patterns of interaction will create a
set of expectations about the world and the self in that world. Experiences
of selfhood are never separate from relationships with others. In fact, it is
through relational experience that self is both known and sustained.
One of the most compelling concepts in self theory is the use of the
cohesion-fragmentation continuum as a description of self experience. A
cohesive self is vigorous, responsive, flexible and energetic, optimistic and
available to experience pleasure, regardless of whether it is attuned to the
outer or the inner world. It implies a capacity for self-soothing and self-
regulation in the face of unsettling experience. When fragmentation
occurs (as it does in all people from time to time) it is generally brief, and
does not affect basic self-regulatory structures. By contrast a self that is
fragile as the result of problems in early relationships with caregivers will
be prone to fragmentation. A fragmented self will have compromised
vitality, exploratory energy and flexibility. Attachments may be anxious
or clingy, or withdrawn and wary. The fragmented state is one in which
there may be a combination of the following: depression, emptiness, anxiety,
or rage, ambivalence, confusion, poor bodily coordination, misperception
of the body in time and space, disorganisation, withdrawal, memory loss,
mood swings, and diminished capacity for creative problem solving. The
individual may describe a sense of ‘falling apart’, of being disconnected,
panicky, overwhelmed, unable to concentrate, and unable to be soothed.
To be fragmentation-prone is one form of self disorder. However,
there are a number of other self experiences that are indicative of difficul-
ties in the development of self structure. For example, some people experi-

This image captures a baby
and father interacting,
adding to the child’s
capacities to know and
sustain a sense of self.
ence themselves as empty and lacking in energy, or as struggling to find

meaning in their lives. Others experience themselves as disproportionately
powerful and special, and struggle with any encounter in which they are
not centre-stage. There are also individuals who persistently engage in
self-sacrificing activity and are unable to value themselves except through
their provision for the wellbeing of those around them. Then there are a
range of problems that occur as the result of an individual’s attempts to
prevent fragmentation, or to overcome experiences of loneliness, empti-
ness or overwhelming need. These are often maladaptive self-soothing
behaviours and may include addictions, sexual perversions, avoidant
behaviour and the pursuit of dangerous activity.
Selfobject experiences
An infant’s earliest experiences of selfhood are always mediated by inter-
actions with primary caregivers. For example, early experiences of well-
being might arise from being rocked or stroked when distressed. These first
encounters of relatedness are undifferentiated and are part of a seamless
merger with the caregiver. As physical and cognitive capacity expands,
merger states give way to an increasingly differentiated sense of self-as-
agent. Admiring responsiveness from caregivers over first smiles, learning
to grasp an object, or taking first steps are the mirror in which the self as
the centre of goal-directed successful behaviour is seen. In other words,
without an admiring and containing audience, the infant has no sustained
and cohesive way of experiencing selfhood. The essential link between
self and other is captured in the term ‘selfobject’. According to Bacal &
Newman, an object is a selfobject ‘when it is experienced intrapsychically
as providing functions in a relationship that evoke, maintain, or positively
affect the sense of self’ (Bacal & Newman 1990: 229). To put it another
way, Wolf describes any experience that ‘functions to evoke the structured
self (which manifests as an experience of selfhood) or to maintain the
continuity of such selfhood’ as a selfobject experience (Wolf, 1988:.52).
Selfobject experiences do not always involve a relationship with another
person. For example, cuddly toys, dummies and soft blankets may soothe
and sustain a sense of wellbeing in an infant. However, these objects,
transitionally soothing, are secondary to a network of

PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
responsive relationships within which the self gains strength

and structure. Selfobject experiences continue to serve the
role of maintaining and affirming the self throughout life,
in developmentally appropriate ways. The form taken by
selfobject needs in adulthood, and the urgency with which
they are felt, depend on the pattern of strengths and deficits
in the early caregiving matrix. Selfobject experiences
always have a relationship to a sense of relative wellbeing
in the self, whether directly through adequate fulfilment of
selfobject needs, or indirectly, through the hope or
expectation that such needs might be fulfilled.
Infant research within the general framework of
This baby and grandmother
are attuned in a nuanced psychoanalytic theory has given empirical weight to Kohut’s insistence
dance with the baby on the relational aspect of self development (Beebe & Lachmann, 1994;
reacting with delight to Lachmann & Beebe, 1996; Tronik, 1998). The finely nuanced dance
the loving look on her between infant and caregiver forms a complex pattern of self- and mutual
grandmother’s face.
regulation, which includes moments of intense connectedness and also
periods of appropriate disengagement. Sometimes this dance is well-
attuned and substantially enhances the infant’s sense of attachment,
containment and curious joyful wellbeing. At other times, mis-
attunement will disrupt the interaction and cause distress. For example,
a caregiver might intrusively insist on face-to-face interaction at a time
when the infant needs a period of quiet disengagement. Alternatively he
may fail to respond to the infant’s appeal for social interaction (talking,
smiling, and eye contact). Prolonged mis-attunement between infant and
caregiver may lead to a wide range of interactive difficulty, including for
example anxious and clingy attempts to extort needed responses or, at the
other extreme, a helpless inertia or withdrawal.
Types of selfobject need and the bipolar self

Kohut identifies a primary set of selfobject needs in relation to the
development of a cohesive self. The infant is protected from inevitable
Primitive grandiosity. disturbances to his sense of wellbeing in two different ways. Primitive
The sense of limitless grandiosity, a sense of limitless power, attractiveness, of being in some way
power, attractiveness; of the centre of the universe, is the first of these. The second is an unelabo-
being in some way the
rated but equally powerful sense of merging with something or someone
centre of the universe.
who is perfectly knowing and soothing. Each of these self states has an
important role to play in the acquisition of self structure and is associated
with specific selfobject needs.
Primitive grandiosity can be seen in young children’s sense of
entitlement to instant attention and to gratification. It is also apparent
in children’s games when, for example, they joyously celebrate being
king of the castle or proudly display their first attempts at drawing.
Mirroring needs.
With appropriate affirmation from selfobjects, these grandiose dis-
The need to be affirmed,
recognised, accepted and plays of self are built into self structure as mature self-esteem. Kohut
appreciated, particularly (1971) referred to the need to be affirmed, recognised, accepted and
in relation to displays of appreciated, particularly in relation to displays of the self, as mirror-
the self. ing needs. While it is important to give confirmation to the growing
child’s unique specialness as she/he masters a growing set of physi-

cal, cognitive and emotional skills, there will be times when the child
experiences the limits of his capacities. As long as these disappoint-
ments are not traumatic or overwhelming, they contribute positively to
the modification of primitive grandiosity. Children whose caregivers
protect them from disappointment—and in this way over-stimulate
their primitive grandiosity—may develop difficulties in relation to
the inevitable failures and mishaps they later encounter in the outside
world. Some might protect themselves from the painful feelings this
evokes by holding onto aspects of their primitive grandiosity, expecting
constant attention and admiration, or by blaming the world for failing
to accommodate their unique needs. Others may be overwhelmed by
a sense of humiliation in response to minor criticisms or problems and
present as having low self-esteem.
Mirroring needs, and the grandiose sector of the self, are associated
with what Kohut termed the ‘pole of ambitions’ (Kohut, 1977). Failure Pole of Ambitions. When
to meet mirroring needs in infancy is related to later failure in striving our needs for mirroring
to achieve, and may take the form of either lack of ambition or over- and grandiosity are met
as children we develop
ambitiousness.
healthy desires for
Kohut terms the need to experience oneself as being part of an admired ambition.
and respected selfobject and the need for opportunities to be accepted by
and merge into a stable, calm, non-anxious, powerful, wise, protective
selfobject ‘idealising needs’ (Kohut, 1977). These needs may be fulfilled
initially by a parent, or caregiver, and later by teachers, mentors, and still
later by an abstract structure such as an ideology. When idealising needs are
met, the self develops the capacity for self-soothing, having absorbed the
qualities of the idealised self object.

When idealising needs are not met,
the self may become overburdened
and lack self-soothing structures. In
The Analysis of the Self (1971), Kohut
describes addiction as one possible
result of the traumatic failure of
an idealised selfobject during early
development. He suggests that when
the caregiver fails to provide needed
stimuli and also to form ‘a stimulus
barrier’ to mediate between infant
and environment, the resulting
damage to the self will include an
incapacity to maintain equilibrium
without recourse to a variety of
drugs, or else to addictive activity
(1971: 46). Father and son are not only
Ambitions and ideals are in tension with one another, and form the involved in a nuanced dance
but also in a mirroring
basis of what Kohut referred to as the bipolar self (Kohut, 1977). In healthy
relationship where the son
development, personal ambition and the need to achieve success in compe- experiences the love in his
tition with others will be balanced by the capacity to work co-operatively father’s face.
towards a shared vision for the greater good of all concerned. Self-sacri-
ficing individuals may, for example, persistently

PHOTO: ERIC MAUREL
put aside personal success in order to serve a

political or religious organisation. A very ambitious
individual might sacrifice the needs of the
organisation of which he is a member in order to
achieve fame, material success or personal power.
Mirroring and idealising selfobject needs are
central to the development of the self and are not
always easily separable from each other. There
is a dynamic interplay between them through-
out development and into adulthood. Moreover,
later theorists have suggested that many
different selfobject needs are encountered
in each unique interactive dyad (Ornstein &
Young boys already Ornstein, 1995). Adversarial selfobjects affirm the self through the
embarking on formulating acceptance of opposition, argument, and self-assertion without punitive
their ambitions and ideals.
retaliation. Adversarial relatioships often mark stages of separation from
the caregiving matrix. They imply the provision of a space within which
demands, assertiveness, oppositional behaviour and independence can
be negotiated without threat of the loss of the selfobject bond. Twinship
experiences are those in which the individual is given an essential sense
of kinship with like-minded others, of fitting in with the group, shar-
ing values, activities and interests (Kottler, 2007). Alterego selfobjects,
which Kohut’s original theory does not differentiate from twinships, has
been recast in the work of Doris Brothers (1998), and refer to a pairing
of apparent opposites, as for example, when an outgoing and socially
confident person has a friendship with a quiet and reflective
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
person. In these alterego relationships there is a recognition

of difference and complementarity, rather than sameness.
The place of rage, guilt and shame in Kohut’s

model of personhood
In self theory, aggression is not considered to be a basic drive-
driven state, nor is it seen as fundamental to disorders of the
self. According to Kohut, ‘destructive rage, in particular, is
always motivated by an injury to the self’ (Kohut, 1977:116).
This clearly distinguishes self theory from the work of Klein,
for example, or Kernberg, both of whom consider aggres-
sion and rage to be primary affective states, and treat them as
such in the therapeutic situation. Self psychologists focus their
attention not on the rage or destructiveness, but on the injury
to self that is presumed to lie beneath it. Rage arises from ‘the
matrix of a fragmented self or a self that is threatened with
fragmentation’ (Ornstein, 1998: 57). In Kohut’s view, a focus
Little girls dressing up either on the content of rage, or on the conflict aroused in
and playing mommy are the patient in response to his destructiveness, fundamentally obscures
displaying the influences of the narcissistic injury that threatens the cohesion of the self. Narcissistic
mirroring and idealising.
rage then, from a self psychological perspective, arises from an injury to
the self.
It is important to distinguish between a variety of angry, aggressive

or enraged states in order to arrive at an understanding of their origin
and function for the self. On the one end of the continuum, assertive-
ness may at times be coloured with aggression and is therefore some-
times an appropriate exploratory or aversive response to a demanding
or unfamiliar environment. Aggression as a line of defence may be
adaptive and successful as a means of protecting a self under threat.
An extreme of this, a brief state of rage, may prevent fragmentation,
and allow for clarity and focus in dealing with a threat. However, rage
may also be disorganising and contribute to the state of fragmentation.
There are also states of chronic rage, in which a self experienced as
continually under threat is bolstered by an inflexibly suspicious and
antagonistic orientation to any experience, no matter how benign.
Kohut was careful to differentiate disorders of the self from the
structural conflicts that form the content of a classical analysis (Kohut,
1966; 1971; 1977). He suggests that the central psychopathology in the
transference neurosis of a classical analysis ‘concerns conflicts over
(incestuous) libidinal and aggressive strivings which emanate from
a well-delimited, cohesive self and are directed toward childhood
objects which have in essence become fully differentiated from the
self’ (1971:19). Such conflicts are characterised by castration anxiety
and guilt (Kohut, 1977). By contrast, the central psychopathology in
disorders of the self lies in the ‘psyche’s inability to regulate self-esteem
and to maintain it at normal levels’ (Kohut, 1971:20). He identified a
propensity to the experience of shame as central to problems with self- Shame. Shame arises from
esteem (Kohut, 1966). a perceived deficit in the
Morrison suggests that shame is often experienced in relation to a self, not of doing wrong,
but being wrong.
perceived defect or deficit in the self; it is not the result of doing, but of
being (Morrison, 1989). When the reflection of the self from the other
is mis-attuned, non-attuned, abusive or punishing, shame inevitably
follows. Shame may be a reaction either to a failure to be given a needed
affirmation from a responsive selfobject, or to the failure to achieve an
ideal goal (Morrison, 1994). Both, Kohut argues, may lead to an affective
experience of ‘nameless mortification’, dejection, depletion of energy and
hopelessness (1977: 224).
The implications of Kohut’s model for theory and

technique
The goal of therapy in self psychology is to strengthen the self. This im-
plies decreasing the tendency to fragmentation while increasing resilience
to threat. It will involve building the person’s capacity for self-soothing
in ways which are flexible and creative. It will also involve enhancing the
person’s ability to seek out affirming selfobject experiences and to actualise
his potential.
Vicarious introspection and empathic attunement

The central component in strengthening the self is the experience of being
understood, through the empathic attunement of the therapist. Empathy
is frequently misunderstood as being synonymous with sympathy, or with
a warmly responsive and caring attitude towards the patient. For Kohut
(1982) empathy was first and foremost a means of collecting information
about the inner world of others. It is an act of imagination, an entry into
the essentially private experience of another through immersion in it.
Empathy provides the therapist with an affective grasp, a picture beyond
words, of the patient’s experience.
Kohut (1982) defined empathy as ‘vicarious introspection’ and the
terms are often used synonymously. However, Teicholz points out that
empathic responsiveness, through vicarious introspection, involves the
therapist in the activity of being in touch with his own internal world
as well as that of the patient. She suggests that it is the therapist’s ‘con-
tact with his own subjectivity’ that forms the basis for empathy with the
patient’s inner world (1999: 27). For the therapist to imagine what an
experience might be like involves not only an attuned responsiveness to
that patient’s unique history and needs, but also to a much broader field
of experiences encountered in many situations. Empathic attunement
involves the therapist in a process of using both the patient’s verbal and
non-verbal communications and her own field of experience, to adjust
and re-adjust his grasp of a many-layered and constantly shifting message.
Schwaber calls this oscillation between the subjectivities of therapist and
patient ‘our resonance of alikeness’ (1990: 239). She goes on to caution that
‘we must not confuse patient with us; we must know that his world is not
our world, her psychic reality not ours. It is our mutuality that allows us
to discover our individuality; the more we find our echoes of alikeness, the
more we enhance the possibility of locating our differences’ (1990: 239).
The resonant understanding arrived at through vicarious introspection
may then be communicated to the patient, and if it is sufficiently accurate,
it will fulfil a selfobject need. This however, is only the first step. As Basch
puts it, ‘Empathy leads to knowledge. By itself it neither prescribes nor
proscribes behavior any more than does the knowledge gained from logical
reasoning alone. What one does with the insight provided by empathic
understanding remains to be determined by the nature of the relationship
between the people involved and the purpose for which the empathic
capacity was engaged by its user in the first place’ (Basch, 1983: 123).
While the experience of being understood is in itself helpful to the patient,
this must be followed by interpretation of current circumstances and past
experience. Kohut makes this clear: ‘Analysis cures by giving expla-
nations intervention on the level of interpretation; not by understanding,
not by repeating and confirming what the patient feels and says, that’s only
the first step’ (Kohut, 1981: 532). The timing and content of interpretations
will depend upon the therapist’s understanding of the patient’s capacity to
experience them as helpful, and to absorb their implications as part of a
joint effort at strengthening the self.
For a very fragile patient at the onset of therapy, the experience of
having his inner world heard and understood may be all that is possible.
Interpretation of the origin and problems of that inner world will follow
later. Other patients may need to approach their inner world through an
intellectual appreciation of its contours: the full affective experience may
come later.
Optimal frustration and optimal responsiveness

Just as caregivers necessarily fail in their provision of an empathically
attuned environment for the infant, so therapists will, from time to time,
fail in their attempts to be empathically attuned to their patients. Frus-
tration of need is essential to growth: the infant whose every need is
anticipated and met by the caregiver will struggle to develop self-reliance.
Kohut (1984) suggested that there are two steps to the development of
the healthy self. ‘First, a basic intuneness must exist between the self and
its selfobjects. Second, selfobject failures (for example responses based
on faulty empathy) of a non-traumatic degree must occur’ (Kohut, 1984:
70). Optimal frustrations in the course of ordinary development allow the
child to disengage gradually from total reliance on the selfobject, and to
internalise the self-regulatory functions of the selfobject as part of the self
structure. This process Kohut termed ‘transmuting internalisation’ (1971:
49-50). The therapy relationship follows a parallel path through two
stages. The first is the development of a basic intuneness between thera-
pist and patient, and this mobilises archaic selfobject needs, experienced
as idealising or mirroring transferences. The therapist’s empathic failures
will momentarily fracture the gratifying sense of being understood, and
it is this that causes ‘a gradual shift from the self relying for its nutriment
on archaic modes of contact in the narcissistic sphere… to its ability to be
sustained most of the time by the empathic resonance that emanates from
the selfobjects of adult life’ (Kohut, 1984: 70).
Kohut saw the disruptions to attunement and the process of under-
standing the failure, and later restoration of the transference, as intrinsic
to cure. Healing involves not only the experience of being understood, but
also a sense of authenticity and efficacy in relation to the therapist. Resto-
ration of the empathic bond between the therapist and patient frequently
requires the therapist to take responsibility for the role he played in creat-
ing the empathic failure. It is this mutuality of exploration that strength-
ens the patient’s sense of self. The disruption-restoration cycle leads to the The disruption-
patient’s increasing ability to withstand the urgency of selfobject needs restoration cycle.
Restoring attunement
and to internalise some of the functions of the selfobject as self structure.
after an empathic failure
Although the experience of being understood often fulfils a selfobject is central to the
need, Kohut is clear that gratification of such needs is not the goal of self healing process.
analysis. Instead, the therapist identifies the selfobject need, and interprets
its relationship both to the transference and to its origins in the selfobject
relationships of early childhood.
There is general agreement that although disruptions inevitably
occur, therapeutic progress depends on the re-establishment of the tie with
the selfobject. However, the function of frustration in the analytic process
has been the subject of debate (Bacal 1985; Tolpin 1988). The debate is a
clear challenge to the notion of analytic abstinence. Bacal argues that it is the
therapist’s optimal responsiveness that effects change, and that this includes
‘a wide spectrum of verbal (interpretive and noninterpretive) and nonverbal
responses that may variously be experienced as optimal by the patient’ (1995:
357). The shift in emphasis away from the curative effect of frustration,
to the centrality of the restoration process, is described in using the term
‘optimal responsiveness’ in preference to the term ‘optimal frustrations’.
The identification of selfobject transferences

The therapeutic situation, with its consistency of frame, focus on the
inner world of the patient, and communication of empathic understand-
ing from the therapist, mobilises unmet selfobject needs and establishes
the regressive experience of selfobject transferences. Identifying the
nature and intensity of the transference at any given moment, and its
relation to patterns of selfobject relating in the past will determine the
appropriate therapeutic response. Selfobject needs are made apparent
through demands on the therapist, or through defences against those
needs. Thus, a patient may take care to make no demands whatever
on the therapist, as a defence against a frightening experience of over-
whelming dependency need.
Mirror transferences. A mirror transference, associated with the damaged ‘pole of ambi-
This involves the need tions’, can take a number of forms, but in essence consists of demands to be
to be recognised, admired
recognised, admired or praised by the therapist. The patient needs to un-
or praised by the therapist.
derstand his search for affirmation, and its origins in a pattern of selfobject
failure in childhood (Kohut, 1971). This involves a double focus: on the
one hand, the patient needs to be shown ‘how the intrusion of unmodified
childhood demands’ of the grandiose and exhibitionist variety, may ‘cause
him realistic embarrassment’ (Kohut, 1971: 231 ), and on the other, inter-
pretations of primitive grandiosity carry with them the immediate danger
of being experienced as deeply shaming. Kohut therefore suggests that the
therapist approach the material carried by the mirror transference with
‘sympathetic acceptance of the legitimate position of these (grandiose)
strivings as seen in an empathically reconstructed genetic context’ (Kohut,
1971: 231). ‘Mirroring’ is frequently misunderstood as a form of active and
sympathetic provision of affirmation (Wolf, 1988). Although any experi-
ence of being deeply understood necessarily entails provision of wanted
affirmation, it is interpretation that will provide the impetus for change.
Idealising transference. An idealising transference, associated with the damaged pole of
The need to merge with ideals, mobilises an archaic need for merger with a calm, strong and wise
a calm, wise selfobject is selfobject. Kohut (1971) stressed the importance of allowing the ideal-
reflected in an idealising
ising transference to unfold naturally without subjecting it to vigorous or
transference.
premature interpretation. He suggests that vigorous and early interpretation
of an idealising transference is frequently defensively motivated: ‘The
analytically unwarranted rejection of the patient’s idealising attitudes is
usually motivated by a defensive fending off of painful narcissistic tensions
(experienced as embarrassment, self-consciousness and shame, and
leading even to hypochondriachal preoccupations) which are generated
in the analyst when the repressed fantasies of his grandiose self become
stimulated by the patient’s idealisation (Kohut, 1971: 262). Idealisation
often forms an early part of the therapeutic picture and is the bedrock
of a working alliance. This orientation to the idealising transference is
another clear point of difference between self psychology and other object
relations approaches, which might interpret idealisation as a defence, for
Twinship transference.
The need to find shared or
example, against unconsciously experienced hostile or aggressive fantasies
similar experience between about the therapist.
self and therapist is found A twinship transference, associated with the intermediate area be-
in a twinship transference. tween ambitions and ideals of talents and skills, ‘seeks a selfobject that will
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS

make itself available for the reassuring experience of essential likeness’ A somewhat eccentric
(Kohut, 1984:192). In adversarial transferences, the patient might take likeminded couple enjoying
their ‘twinship’.
up an oppositional or argumentative stance in relation to the therapist.
Optimal responsiveness to this form of transference involves supportive and
non-relatiatory recognition of the patient’s need to maintain autonomy.
In addition to these forms of transference, Kohut also identified Adversarial transference.
merger states in which the patient does not experience himself as separate This expresses the
from the therapist, and is easily overwhelmed by experiences of the thera- need to find autonomy
pist’s separateness. At times, these merger states may be maintained by through voicing difference
or being oppositional to
the patient’s defensive inability to retain, in consciousness, any sense of the
the therapist.
therapist’s separate life.
It is misleading to think of selfobject transferences as mutually exclu-
sive. One kind of transference may predominate in a particular phase of
therapy, but there will always be a complex interplay between different
selfobject needs within and between sessions.
The case of Zareena will illustrate features of these transferences and
the interplay between them in the course of a year-long, twice-weekly
therapy. Zareena was a 32-year-old woman recently appointed to a lec-
tureship at a prestigious university. She had a brilliant student record, and
the research on which her doctoral dissertation was based had received
considerable media attention. She was delighted to be appointed, and
had looked forward to the challenges of academic teaching and research.
She was warmly received by her colleagues, and settled quickly into her
duties. However, soon after this she became depressed, anxious and filled
with self-doubt. She sought therapy partly because of the depression, and
partly because she was struggling to settle to the task of meeting a series
of publishing deadlines.
An idealising transference was quickly established in the early weeks
of the therapy. Zareena frequently commented on her therapist’s wisdom,
calm demeanour and ability to see ‘right to the depth of my soul’. She
also made many admiring comments about the therapist’s room, and the
beauty of her garden. She said she was sure her therapist never had any
difficulty with writing, because she seemed so calm and so sure of her
knowledge. By contrast, she experienced herself as panicky and ignorant,
not trusting that her research was either what it claimed to be, or a real
contribution to her field. In fact she was beginning to feel that when her
work was closely scrutinised by colleagues they would see that she had
made many mistakes and erroneous assumptions, and that she would be
discovered to be a fraud. At this stage in the therapy, a twinship transfer-
ence was also fleetingly apparent in assumptions she made about sharing
her therapist’s taste in clothes, books and movies, and reactions to political
events. This twinship served to consolidate her sense of being accepted
and her capacity to trust the therapy.
The therapy shifted dramatically after Zareena had a dream in which
she was giving a public lecture in front of many thousands of people. She
described her dream-self as articulate and powerful, commanding the
attention of the entire audience, until the microphone abruptly stopped
working and she could no longer be heard. People began to leave the
hall, angry and disappointed in her, and she woke up crying. This dream
marked the activation of her grandiose self in the therapy context, and
opened the way for the exploration of her intense need for, and fear of
admiration for her achievements. She began to recognise the extent to
which her colleagues’ high expectations of her and their frequently stated
respect for her work had simultaneously gratified and scared her. This
material coincided with the establishment of a mirror transference in which
Zareena tentatively explored her fantasy that she was somehow special
to her therapist. She felt sure that her therapist had changed her sched-
ule particularly to accommodate Zareena’s need to be seen early in the
morning. She also remarked that she was sure her therapist had never
seen anyone as difficult or as complicated as she was. Soon after this, the
experienced therapist made a comment in a session that Zareena found
distressingly mis-attuned, and she reacted angrily, accusing her therapist
of not paying sufficient attention to what she was saying. A pattern of
demands to be understood and closely attended to, quickly followed by a
sense that she was boring and not worth listening to, followed. The thera-
pist and Zareena explored this pattern as an effect of a childhood in which
her mother, as a result of the onset of a chronic illness, had abruptly with-
drawn from her when she was two years old. During the next few years,
Zareena had been constantly told to occupy herself, to be quiet, and not
to make demands. Her mother was preoccupied and frequently did not
listen to Zareena’s excited stories. She received some soothing and comfort
from the calm presence of her capable, clever but somewhat unemotional
father, and it was this selfobject relationship that had been recreated early
in the therapeutic relationship.
The therapist’s acceptance and understanding, first of Zareena’s ide-
alising needs, and later of her need for mirroring in the form of close at-
tention, followed by explanation of those needs in terms of the difficulties
she had experienced in her early relationship with her mother, began the
process of integrating her frightening exhibitionist and grandiose self, and
allowed her to begin to write regularly, and to consolidate her academic
standing. In other words, she was able to experience both her ambitions
and her creativity, and affirmation of them, without a disappointing fear

of failure.
In addition to the selfobject dimension of the transference, which repre-
sents in the therapeutic dyad a relational expression of a developmental
need, there is also a repetitive dimension, one that reproduces the patterns
of expectation and fear of failure derived from early experience (Lachmann
& Beebe, 1992; Stern, 1985 ). As Stern puts it, ‘patients actively seek to enlist
the therapist both in old pathogenic interactional scenarios and in new
therapeutically needed relational configurations’ (1994: 317). Attention
to both components of the transference, and the complex relationships
between the two, are necessary to therapeutic change. Lachmann & Beebe
suggest that selfobject experiences, that directly address the tie between
self and other, provide a context within which repetitive aspects of the
transference may be given expression. Conversely, exploration of patterns
of expectation and behaviour will precipitate particular selfobject needs
(Lachmann & Beebe, 1992).
Defensive and compensatory self structures

Kohut (1977) distinguished between defensive and compensatory struc-
tures in the psychopathology of patients with disorders of the self. Both are
related to a primary defect in the structure of the self. A structure is defensive
‘when its sole or predominant function is the covering over of the primary
defect in the self’ (Kohut, 1977: 3). He illustrates this by describing the
exhibitionistic, dramatic or grandiose presentation familiar to those working
with narcissistic patients, and points out that this empty energy shelters a
depleted, depressed self with poor self-esteem. The pseudo-vitality of these
patients is seldom ‘alloyed with mature productivity’ (1977: 6). By contrast,
he suggests that a structure is compensatory when ‘rather than merely
covering a defect in the self, it compensates for this defect’ (1977: 3). The idea
of a compensatory structure has its roots in Kohut’s view of developmental
deficits, and the dynamic nature of the bipolar self. If the self is damaged
in the area of ambitions, through faulty mirroring of primitive grandiosity
in early childhood, then there are likely to have been automatic attempts in
the course of development to address this weakness, through the idealised
selfobject tie. This would then lead to a relative strengthening of the pole
of ideals, and self-esteem in adulthood is rooted in the pursuit of idealised
goals, rather than personal ambitions. For example, patients with well-
elaborated compensatory structures that have resulted in the strengthening
of the pole of ideals might lead a life in which they selflessly work on behalf
of an organisation, and neglect their own need for recognition, in terms of
status, salary, holidays, or time for recreation. Types of self disorder.
The fragmenting self,
Varieties of self disorder the overstimulated self,
Kohut and his collaborator Ernest Wolf outlined a number of specific the overburdened self
and the understimulated
types of disorder, all of which fall broadly into the range of disturbances
self are varieties of self
in self cohesion (Kohut & Wolf, 1978): structure that arise from
different kinds of selfobject
• The fragmenting self is apparent in the most severe forms of failure during the
narcissistic pathology, and particularly in borderline states. These developmental process.
patients are prone to chronic states in which they lose a sense of

continuity in time and connectedness in space. Fragmentation
affects their ability to manage time, and also states of hunger and
tiredness, and simple routines of self-care. They react to even minor
disappointments or criticism with protective rage, dissociation or
overwhelming panic. They often have complex and rigid defences
against fragmentation, and these are not easily susceptible to
analysis. These patients have been exposed to massive mirroring
failure in infancy, and lack the capacity either to reflect on their
difficulties without destructive or self-destructive acting out, or to
soothe themselves in non-addictive ways. For example, Susan was
a patient who presented with recurrent, severe states of
fragmentation. She had suffered prolonged physical and sexual
abuse from her stepfather as a child, and instead of protecting her,
her mother had blamed her for creating unhappiness in the
household. She left home at the age of 17, and boarded with the
family of a friend. She worked in various temporary jobs for the
next five years, and presented herself for therapy at the suggestion
of a sympathetic employer, who was concerned about Susan’s
unhappiness, her use of drugs and alcohol, and her inability to
manage practical aspects of her life. The routine of work provided
the only consistent structure in her life, and helped her to get from
day to day. However, she had trouble with punctuality, and with
time management. She would arrive at work late, spend a long time
on one task, and underestimate the amount of time she needed to
complete others. She would get angry or tearful when offered
feedback or assistance. She would spend her salary impulsively,
often buying gifts for acquaintances. There would often be weeks
during which she had almost no money for food. She had lived in
a number of rented rooms, and problems with paying the rent
constantly caused tension with housemates. She was sexually
promiscuous and had sought terminations for three unwanted
pregnancies, at the insistence of the current partner. She described
‘black days’, often following an argument with someone, in which
she was unable to get out of bed. During these times she would feel
anxious, frightened, and easily overwhelmed by noise or movement.
• In the overstimulated self, there has been inappropriate early

gratification of grandiose fantasies, and these remain disavowed and
unmodified. As a result, these patients suffer from low self-esteem.
Primitive grandiosity is experienced as overwhelming, and these
patients will find admiration both disconcerting and disorganising.
For example, Joe was the only child of parents who were both in
their forties when he was born. His mother resigned from her job
to look after him and devoted her life to giving him a ‘perfect
childhood’. Both parents thought of him as gifted, and from an early
age they enrolled him in many extra-mural activities, including art,
music lessons, karate and swimming. By the time he was ten years
old, he had developed a pattern of engaging in an activity, boasting
that he was excellent at it, and then soon becoming bored and
refusing to continue to apply himself. His parents indulged this, and
did not insist that he sustain effort in any direction. Their constant
and unrealistic admiration thus became divorced both from his own
initiative, and from visible achievement. At the same time, his rather
brash style made him unpopular at school. He became overweight
and shy, and recalled his adolescence as being a time of loneliness
and depression. He responded to his parents’ attempts to encourage
him in any way as unsettling intrusions. He sought therapy during
his first year at university, at a time when he was struggling to
decide on a course of study, and was feeling lonely and depressed.
The legacy of his parents’ unmediated admiration and over-
investment in him became apparent during a brief interaction with
his therapist. During a session he told his therapist that he had just
achieved a very high mark for an examination, but was unable to
feel pleased about it. In fact, he had noticed himself becoming very
anxious about the mark, feeling he would never be able to
reproduce the mark, and that somehow a mistake had been made.
His therapist greeted the news of his exam result with a warm
smile, and then spent the session exploring Joe’s anxiety about his
achievement. The following session, Joe came in looking defeated
and withdrawn. It eventually became clear that he had responded
strongly to his therapist’s smile about his exam achievement. On the
one hand, this had led to the fantasy that he was going to have a
brilliant academic career that would make his therapist proud of
him. On the other, he became aware of a sense of resentment, both
that he had to achieve in order to be valued, and that his therapist
had not taken his anxiety and apprehension seriously.
• In another form of overstimulation, the self has been exposed to

a selfobject matrix in which an idealised other has persistently
demanded admiration. This presents a threat for the developing
need to experience the self as a centre of initiative, and in later life
may cause excessive wariness in relation to the pursuit of ideals.
Nomsa, for example, was raised by politically active parents, both
of whom were influential in local and central government.
Looking back on her childhood, she recalled the ways in which
her parents took pride in having both busy careers and a successful
and harmonious family-life. They were always available to
participate in school events, and both at different times served on
a variety of school committees. Although Nomsa felt proud of her
parents, she also felt increasingly worried about being a
disappointment to them. As a young adult she had no interest in
politics, and did not want to pursue a professional career. She
wanted to travel and have fun, an ambition she was sure they
would not like. It was this conflict that brought her into therapy.
Nomsa’s response to her therapist’s interpretations illustrates the
nature of her conflict in relation to selfobject experience. She was
profoundly sceptical of her therapist’s interpretations, commenting
that she felt alienated rather than understood by the connections

she made between past events and her current dilemma. Repeated
exploration of her affective response to the therapist’s attempts to
remain empathically attuned to her experience revealed that she
felt as if she was being asked to accommodate and comply to
knowledge that she did not share. She felt obliged to be helped
and to feel grateful for the therapist’s time. She also experienced
her therapist as needing to be right, and to be seen as wise and
omniscient. She slowly recognised that her difficulty in talking
readily about herself had contributed to misunderstandings in the
therapy. As she began to trust that her own needs would be
properly attended to by the therapist she was gradually able to
accept interpretations without feeling invaded by them.
• The overburdened self occurs when there has been a lack of

responsiveness from a calm and soothing selfobject. The self is
easily experienced as being flooded with disturbing emotional
states. As they lack the capacity for self-soothing, these patients
will often experience any form of stimulation through relationship
as intrusive and potentially damaging. Pieter was one of two
siblings. His mother became chronically ill soon after he was born,
and died when he was two years old. The children were cared for
by a series of housekeepers. His father was an anxious man who
tended to get flustered and angry quickly when the children were
distressed. As a result of this, Pieter and his sister soon learnt not
to confide in him, or to burden him with their difficulties. He
seldom made close friends at school, finding intimacy of any kind
alarming. He sought therapy as a young adult, at the suggestion of
his first girlfriend, who was concerned about how little he could
tolerate sharing feelings with her. Although attentive and warm,
he withdrew if she showed any sign of anxiety, anger or distress.
He also found it difficult to tell her anything about his own
feelings. In therapy, Pieter struggled to voice feelings, and
responded to interpretations as an overwhelming intrusion and a
burden. At the same time, the calm responsiveness of his therapist
stirred selfobject needs unmet in childhood, and a silent,
submerged idealising transference sustained the relationship
through its early difficulties. He gradually learned to talk about
his feelings, and later to experience his therapist as affectively
responsive, without withdrawing.
• In contrast, the understimulated self experiences pervasive states of

both deadness and boredom, and may seek highly stimulating, even
dangerous activities to ward off frightening emptiness. Drugs that
are stimulants serve to create an illusion of liveliness for short
periods. Fights, both physical and verbal, may serve a similar
purpose. For example, Esther and her husband Thabo came for
marital counselling at a time when they were contemplating
divorce. They described long periods of relative peace between
them, followed by bitter fights, usually precipitated by a trivial

event. The fights were dramatic and noisy and usually ended with
Esther storming out of the house, and returning some hours later.
Although both Esther and Thabo were both playing a role in the
marital difficulties, it became clear that the fights served a particular
function for Esther. In the third session of therapy, while describing
a fight that had taken place the day before, she realised that her
dominant feeling during the fight had been excitement. ‘When we
fight, I feel we are really together, and committed to each other,’ she
said. ‘It’s the only time I feel sure that Thabo is completely part of
my life.’ This clarified an important aspect of the dynamic between
them. Esther had grown up in a large family, and both her parents
had worked all day. The children were largely expected to care for
themselves, and had only received attention when they committed
some misdemeanour. As a result of this, Esther came to experience
fights in her relationship with Thabo as an important sign of
attachment and recognition. By contrast, she misinterpreted peaceful
coexistence as lack of interest.
A self psychology approach to defence and resistance

In self theory, sexual and aggressive conflicts are not primary components
of the developing psyche. They arise as phenomena secondary to problems
in the cohesive development of the self (Ornstein & Ornstein, 1995). This
is the theoretical context in which defence and resistance are understood.
Self psychological theory offers an orientation to the understand-
ing and analysis of defence which places two primary motivations at the
centre of all defensive activity. One is the protection of vulnerability in
self-structure; and the other is the preservation of a needed selfobject tie
(Brandschaft, 1985). Kohut insisted that defence was to be understood in
terms of ‘activities undertaken in the service of psychological survival, that
is, as the patient’s attempt to save at least that sector of his nuclear self,
however small and precariously established it may be, that he has been
able to construct and maintain despite serious insufficiencies in the devel-
opment-enhancing matrix of the selfobjects of childhood’ (1984:115). The
more endangered the self and the more threatened the needed selfobject
ties, ‘the more secondary and tertiary defensive systems develop, the more
narcissistic rage and eroticisation begin to take over, and the more chronic
self-preservative but pathological characterological attitudes develop and
become fixed’ (Tolpin, 1985: 87).
The orientation to the fragile self beneath defensive covering has meant
that within this theory interpretation of defence ‘is neither necessary nor
optimal’ (Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosshage, 1992:154). Instead, identifi-
cation of defence is understood as an invaluable tool, allowing the therapist
access to disavowed states. It is these inner states that are optimally the focus
of the analytic work. Interpretation of defence in the absence of an empathic
appreciation of the need or state being defended against may lead to shame,
further resistance or compliant acceptance of the therapist’s viewpoint as a
defence against anxiety-arousing awareness of a failure of attunement or
trust (Shane, 1985; Tolpin, 1985; Brandschaft, 1985).
Shane points out that ‘the traditional analyst, if any good, also waits
for something better to come along before working interpretively on a
resistance or a defence’ (1985: 81). It is standard analytic technique not
to interpret the defence prematurely without linking it to the underlying
anxiety, and the hidden impulse or need (Malan, 1979). Thus, the
insistence of self psychologists on a basic orientation to the self state, and
the selfobject need against which the defence is mobilised is not in itself
a radical departure from traditional technique. However, the empathic
stance precludes the therapist from taking up a perspective that in any way
implies knowing more about the patient’s inner reality than the patient
himself understands. Moreover, according to self theorists, traditional
defence interpretation does not necessarily facilitate increasing awareness
of previously unavailable memories, needs or beliefs; it simply teaches
the patient to recognise the processes through which these are kept from
awareness. It is through trust in the therapist’s availability to explore what
is unknown in a non-judgemental manner that allows for the emergence of
hidden layers of the self-state (Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosshage, 1992).
Moreover, Kohut (1971) regarded the self-in-treatment as fundamentally
disposed to seek and use needed selfobject experiences. These needed
selfobject experiences may be for admiration and affirmation, or for the
soothing effect of merger with an idealised selfobject; in either case their
initial appearance is likely to be coloured by an expectation that they will not
be empathically understood. For example, a patient seeking affirmation,
but fearing that she will be met with criticism, may become defensively
boastful, or self-denigrating, or she may disguise her pride in an achievement
within a narrative filled with digression. For Kohut, the primary aim of
therapy was to maintain a focus on the primary selfobject need, and not to
be distracted by the defences mobilised to protect the injured self. Thus,
‘the therapist’s major effort must be concentrated on the task of keeping
the old needs mobilised. If he succeeds in this, then they will gradually—
and spontaneously—be transformed into normal self-assertiveness and
normal devotion to ideals’ (Kohut & Wolf, 1978: 423).
In self theory resistance is understood intersubjectively, as a reaction to
an experience of the therapist as mis-attuned, or to a fearful retreat from
exposing aspects of the self in the therapeutic situation. While defence is
primarily seen as intrapsychic, resistance always implicates a particular
analytic context.
Developments in self theory

Right up until his death Kohut was constantly in the process of revising
his work. He reported to Paul Ornstein, a close colleague, that although
in pain, new theoretical ideas continued to come to him (Ornstein, 1990).
He always encouraged debate and exploration of his paradigm, and
was reputed to be a charismatic and encouraging teacher. For all these
reasons, self psychology, although fathered by Kohut, quickly grew well
beyond the limits of his own writings. Self psychology has become a
well-established school of psychoanalysis, with associated institutes and
training programmes. Within the school debate continues to flourish,
and a number of separate strands of self theory, research and clinical
practice are now discernible within the loose boundaries of the self
paradigm. Although the divisions between theoretical strands are fluid,
broadly they fall into three groups. There are those whose work has
largely confined itself to the elaboration of Kohut’s original contribu-
tions, particularly in the areas of self structure, selfobject experience,
and optimal provision. This strand of self theory is closely identified
with the work of Ernest Wolf (1988), Paul and Anna Ornstein (1995),
Morton and Estelle Shane (1988), Arnold Goldberg (1988; 1990), Paul
Tolpin (1988), and Marion Tolpin (1993). Two other strands in the
development of self theory are marked by more radical transformations
of Kohut’s work, and these shall be explored briefly below.
Recent contributions from infant research: The motivational

systems and self and mutual regulation
Kohut’s original mapping of the selfobject milieu has in the last decade
been expanded and enriched by work undertaken in the field of infant
observation and research. A comprehensive account of the child’s devel-
opmental needs, based on systematic empirical research, and compatible
with the basic structures of Kohutian theory, can be found in Lichtenberg,
Lachmann and Fosshage (1992), and Stern (1985).
Lichtenberg, Lachmann and Fosshage (1992) describe five motiva- The five motivational
tional systems within which innate potential is organised. Fulfilment of systems. These organise
innate potential is dependent upon a responsive caregiving. innate potential for
development in the areas
of physiological regulation,
1. Physiological regulation concerns the basic management of bodily attachment, exploration,
systems, such as eating and attention to hunger, sleep, elimination, and response to aversive
perception of the body in space and time. experience and the
search for sensual/sexual
2. The attachment motivational system concerns the need for secure stimulation and pleasure.
attachment to significant persons in the environment.
3. The exploratory motivational system includes the infant’s need to

explore his environment with energy and curiosity, the will to open
new areas of experience and to acquire new skills and competence.
4. The aversive motivational system is the area traditionally

referred to under the rubric of defence, and includes ways in which
potential threat is dealt with. There are two basic lines of reaction
to aversive experience: withdrawal (flight) or aggression (fight).
Some forms of aversive reaction are helpful in building a cohesive
sense of self, whereas others may inhibit change or become rigid
and self-defeating.
5. The sensual/sexual motivational system is concerned with seeking

sensual pleasure in a variety of bodily experiences, and the eventual
engagement in fulfilling sexual relationships.
All the motivational systems are attached to innate developmental

imperatives, and although they have widely differing goals, they are
dynamically related. For example, failure to provide an infant with food

when he is hungry will impact upon attachment to the caregiver, upon
the ability to explore the environment with a sense of joyful efficacy and
upon the sense of sensual enjoyment of the body. Failure to provide mir-
roring for the infant’s exploratory impulses by reacting with anxiety or
by restricting movement will impact on the aversive motivational system
by mislabelling benign situations as dangerous. It will also limit opportu-
nities for sensual pleasure.
This view of development stresses the need for mirroring of
achievements within each motivational system. The balance between
being mirrored by a selfobject and idealising a selfobject shifts with both
motivational system and developmental growth. For example, in the
regulation of physiological needs, the soothing, holding selfobject reads
the infant’s body as tired or hungry or colicky and provides the required
regulatory experience. In later years, this regulation may be mediated by
an idealising relationship with the selfobject, which provides the growing
child with models of when to eat and sleep.
In the past decade research on patterns of mutual regulation in early
infancy between infant and caregiver has made a significant contribution
to understandings of both the nature of interaction and the process of
change in the therapeutic dyad (Lyons-Ruth et al, 1998; Tronik et al,
1998; Knoblauch, Rustin, Sorter & Beebe, 1999; Beebe, Jaffe & Lachmann,
2002). This work demonstrates the intricate patterns of self and mutual
regulation set up between infant and caregiver from birth, and suggests
that these are influenced by, but also shape the neurobiology of affective
development (Schore, 1994). Infant research argues that early interaction
structures shape relational patterns in adulthood (Beebe & Lachmann,
1988). Identifying patterns of mutual regulation, laid down in infancy and
shifting in relation to moment-to-moment changes in motivation, offers
psychotherapists a way of understanding and interpreting subtle changes in
affect, patterns of compliant accommodation or persistent mis-attunement,
and a wide range of pre-symbolic non-verbal communications (Kiersky &
Beebe, 1994). Using the process of change in infant-caregiver interaction
as a model, this research suggests that transformation in psychotherapy
is produced as much by shifts in implicit, procedural knowledge, as by
explicit knowledge formulated in language, often referred to as ‘insight’.
Procedural knowing refers to ‘skills or goal-directed action sequences that
are encoded non-symbolically, become automatic with repeated practice,
and influence the organisational processes that guide behaviour’ (Beebe,
Knoblauch, Rustin & Sorter, 2003: 748).
Psychoanalytic theorists have long been aware that change in
patients’ patterns of behaviour and states of mind does not depend simply
on growing awareness of the roots of their difficulties in past trauma. The
rhythm of sessions, tone of voice, mutual regulation of body movement
and shared affect combine with verbal exchanges and conscious insight to
create a sense of reciprocity and common understanding. Infant research
in the past decade has allowed psychoanalytic theorists to make the links
between concepts such as containment, holding and empathic attunement
to the observable reality of the therapy session, in which patterns of mutu-
al regulation lead to a sense of shared experience that is separate from, but

also amplifies and influences, the verbal exchange. Similarly, it is now pos-
sible to link an understanding of some moments of disruption and repair,
or empathic failure, to fault-lines or ‘poor fit’ in the implicit organisational
processes that determine physical, non-verbal ways of being in the room.
Intersubjectivity and the analytic third

Self theory has always paid close attention to the early caregiving matrix
as being the network of relationships within which the self is able to
develop. This is apparent from the prominence given to selfobject
transferences and their management in the therapeutic process. It is
because of this orientation to reciprocal influence in development that
self psychology has offered a comfortable philosophical and theoretical
home for both infant researchers, and for those who identify themselves as
intersubjectivist in their approach (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984). Stolorow,
Atwood, Brandschaft, Stern, Orange, Buirski, Haglund, and others who
have been broadly identified as having strong links with self psychology,
see the intersubjective approach as a strand of theory clearly separable
from mainstream self psychology. However, they also acknowledge that
Kohut’s insistence on the empathic stance in therapy, and the centrality
of selfobject experience in development, laid the ground for a relational,
intersubjective approach to development (see for example Orange,
Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997; Stern, Brandchaft & Atwood, 1987; Buirski &
Haglund, 2001).
The primary focus of intersubjective psychotherapy within the self
school is on ‘the mutual interplay between the subjective worlds of patient
and analyst’ (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992: 1) rather than on the unfolding
of intrapsychic structures that are implicitly or

explicitly regarded as biological givens. The
intersubjective field is a system of mutual recip-
rocal influence (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988). This
has important implications for therapeutic tech-
nique because it opens the way to a full explo-
ration of the subjectivities of both therapist and
patient as they co-create the self-in-treatment.
There is no assumption of a fixed and unchang-
ing self, nor of an innate unfolding developmen-
tal programme. The self as experienced in the
therapy is always a fluid construction, brought
into awareness through dialogue. The intersubjective therapist in this It would an interesting
model is constantly alert to two different forms of information: exercise to consider the
impact of twins on the
postulations of the various
1. Repeated patterns of behaviour are understood as the manifestation theories covered in this book.
of unconscious organising principles or expectations of interaction
that are the result of accumulated experience of the self in relation
to others.
2. There is an emerging engagement, with a new way of relating in

the therapy.
It is assumed that the therapist’s organising principles will play themselves

out in the therapy, and it is this interplay between two subjectivities, the
analysis of fixed, old patterns, the description of the mutual influence and
the space created to experience something new, that will effect change.
The organisation of relational contexts and the insertion of the therapist
into that organisation in the flow of attunement and disruption is the
object of analysis.
The emphasis on mutual influence and reciprocity, the engagement of
two subjectivities and the awareness of the ways in which the therapist’s
organising principles affect emerging material has precipitated a welter of
debate on the intersections between intersubjectivity as an approach, and
long-established work on transference-countertransference phenomena.
There are clear overlaps between these. Moreover, there has been consider-
able debate about the extent to which therapists need to disclose information
about their influence on the therapeutic material. Some theorists advocate
a degree of self-disclosure, arguing that it contributes to the establishment
of mutual trust and awareness; others suggest that self-disclosure should
be used sparingly, and that the therapist’s awareness of her contribution to
patterns of interaction should be worked into careful interpretations of the
patient’s subjectivity only (Frank, 1997; Aron, 1996).
Intersubjective psychotherapy, with its underlying orientation to
Kohut’s psychology of the self, at times overlaps with the relational
theories of Thomas Ogden, Jessica Benjamin, Hans Loewald, Christopher
Bollas, and Stephen Mitchell and others, all of whom have made significant
contributions to understanding the nature of interaction in the therapeutic
dyad (see Mitchell & Aron, 1999). There are of course important differences
in the ways these theorists define intersubjectivity. Jessica Benjamin, for
example, gives a compelling account of the intersubjective field as a place
of collision and recognition of difference, leading to separation from the
other, which then allows the possibility of mutual recognition. She embeds
her theory in a description of the mother as ‘other’ to the child’s growing
independent awareness, and stresses the importance of confronting and
embracing otherness in achieving mutuality. Her work on the dynamics
of submission and control, power and passivity, that emerge from
understanding of the intersubjective field has influenced the ways in
which feminists theorise power in gender relationships (Benjamin, 1995,
1998; Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000). Christopher Bollas’s brand of
Intersubjectivity. In intersubjectivity stresses the importance of unconscious communication
psychotherapy, the between therapist and patient. He suggests that the therapist lose himself
engagement of two in the countertransference; he must allow himself to be receptive to ‘news’
subjectivities involves a
that ‘comes from within the self only on its own terms’ (1987: 236). This
balance between repetition
of old, traumatic patterns
unconscious rapport may lead to the therapist’s immersion in the patient’s
of behaviour and the illness, so that the therapist too becomes ‘situationally ill’; this in turn
search for new experience allows him to experience the patient’s unconscious world, and to use this
that will bring change. in formulating interpretations (Bollas, 1987: 204; Gerhardt & Sweetnam,
2001). Ogden’s intersubjectivity has some things in common with both
Benjamin and Bollas. In his view, ‘the intersubjective and the individually
subjective each create, negate, and preserve each other’ (1994:64). This
resonates strongly with Benjamin’s view of the dynamics of recognition
and destruction in the course of separation. Like Bollas, he emphasises

the unconscious communication that happens in the therapeutic dyad and
the creation of what he terms the analytic third (Ogden, 1994). This refers
The analytic third.
to the merging subjectivity that results from the complex interrelationship The merging subjectivity
of the subjectivities of analyst and patient. Recent literature has expanded that results from the
the concept to include the part played by the psychoanalytic community complex interrelationship
as a silent but powerful participant in the work of each analytic dyad. of the subjectivities of
Lewis Aron extends this yet further to include broader cultural influences analyst and patient.
on each relational matrix (Aron, 1996). Clearly, our theory shapes every The concept has been
expanded to include
aspect of our work, and enters the intersubjective field through our
the part played by the
reading, supervision, professional meetings and sense of kinship with psychoanalytic community
colleagues. This analytic third is an active partner in shaping clinical as a silent but powerful
choices, in containing our anxiety as we work, and in helping to prevent participant in the work
boundary-crossing and ethical slips. At times it is fluid and ambiguous, at of each analytic dyad.
other times rather rigid and dictatorial.
Implications for psychoanalytic practice in

South Africa
We also participate in a wider third, one that enters the dyad through our
class, our ethnicity, and our gender. Class, gender and racial dynamics in
psychotherapy are issues that confront many of us in our daily practice.
Our capacity to be helpful to patients depends upon the extent to which
we are able to be attuned to their experience. Class, gender and racial
divides, deepened by our apartheid history, makes this a challenging
but essential task. Theorising about gender and sexuality, race and class,
cultural difference and religious or spiritual values in the psychoanalytic
space is no longer seen as an ‘extra’ set of variables to be taken into account,
but as fundamental to the dialogue with the unconscious. The intersubjec-
tive and relational turn in psychoanalysis, embedded as it is in postmodern
concepts of fluid and shifting identities, and underwritten by powerful
social systems, has sharpened the focus on identity and difference and
their effects on relational transformation.
In South Africa, experiences of deeply entrenched and racialised
divisions between communities past and present continue to shape the
negotiation of power in therapeutic spaces, and affect participants’ capacity
to engage freely with the exploration of unconscious communication. To
work intersubjectively in a post-colonial setting means grappling with
difference, being Other and Othering, often a constitutive part of trauma
(Swartz, 2007a). Our racialised, gendered and class-conscious experience
shapes what we are able to hear and limits our capacity to immerse
ourselves in the experiential world of someone we perceive to be very
different from ourselves. As Stephen Cooper points out, ‘The analyst is
always listening within particular constraints, always looking, consciously
or unconsciously, for support of beliefs and convictions. The analyst is
never without memory or desire’ (1996: 257). Our capacity for empathy
therefore is determined by the extent to which we acknowledge the effects
of our own beliefs and convictions on the intersubjective field.
Secondly, with an orientation to the inner world of the patient, and
our construction of that inner world through the lens of an analytic
theory developed in contexts very different from those that shape African
realities, we run the risk of inadvertently colouring the patient’s commu-
nications with fundamental assumptions embedded in that theory. Our
challenge is to recast various branches of psychoanalytic theory in ways
that speak to local race, class and gender realities. This work has been
begun locally and internationally by theorists concerned with the white,
middle-class hetero-normativity of classical psychoanalytic approaches (see
for example Eagle & Watts, 2002; Lazarus & Kruger, 2004; Swartz, 2007b;
Straker, 2004; Suchet, 2004).
Self theory facilitates this endeavour by offering user-friendly techniques
for bridging the experiential gaps created by social divides. Empathic im-
mersion in particular involves, ‘respecting the patient’s communication as
providing the essential information needed to explore his inner life at that
moment without transposing time, place, or person in a manner guided by
theory’ (Lachmann & Lichtenberg, 1992:164). To guard against a theoretical
knowingness, there must be an explicit acknowledgement that the ‘patient’s
theory about himself or herself will usually be the final arbiter of what is valid
for him or her’ (Bacal, 1995:354).
A critique of Kohut’s self theory

There is general agreement among self theorists that Kohut’s greatest con-
tributions to psychoanalytic theory lie in two directions. Firstly there is his
delineation of a method of psychoanalytic inquiry, which entails sustained
empathic attunement to the patient’s experience. Secondly, Kohut’s bold
insistence on a developmental line for the self, in relation to a web of
selfobject experiences, gives the theory its unique character (Bacal, 1995;
Ornstein & Ornstein, 1995).
At the centre of the Kohutian explanation for pathologies of the self are
the closely connected areas of trauma on the one hand, and arrested develop-
ment on the other. Kohut’s vision is essentially an optimistic one, in which
trauma, located in problematic relationships between self and selfobjects,
leads to arrested development. In his view, what is curative in analysis is the
experience of being understood and accepted in the context of a new and
sustaining selfobject relationship with the analyst. It is this that will allow for
development of the self to begin again.
Moreover, he argues that there is a natural impetus towards seeking
self-sustaining experience. The emphasis on environmental trauma and the
primacy of relationships in understanding pathology throughout Kohut’s
writing has led to a concomitant under-emphasis on the role played by
unconscious conflict in the development of problems of living. Much of the
criticism levelled at self psychology turns on this central point. For Kohut,
rage, envy, greed and primal destructiveness follow trauma; they do not
precede it, nor do they distort its expression. Self theorists have made regular
attempts to answer the persistent suggestion from Kohut’s critics that the theory
results in a blindness to, and reluctance to work, with innate destructive-
ness. This critique often suggests that self psychology provides a corrective
emotional experience, rather than an intrepid analysis of unconscious conflict.
The most important of these answers came from Kohut himself (1981; 1984).
He stated categorically that analysis cannot cure ‘through love, through
empathy, through kindness, through compassion’ (1981: 527). Empathy

is the means through which the analyst arrives at an understanding of
the patient’s inner world; empathically-driven interpretations of the early
environment will automatically illuminate conflictual emotions and their
source in traumatic experience.
Another area of criticism concerns the relationship of Kohut’s theory
to mainstream psychoanalytic theory. Kohut was careful to outline the
implications of his theory of self development for a classical conceptu-
alisation of the Oedipus conflict, describing the Oedipal drama in terms
of faulty relational responses to emerging sexuality. He commented that
‘the Oedipal selfobjects are imperfect, just as they were before the Oedipal
period’ (1984:27). So for example, he would understand castration anxiety
as resulting from the failure of parents to respond appropriately to healthy
age-appropriate sexual development, rather than as a derivative of an
unconscious drive and the conflicts that this produces (Swartz, 2007b).
However, Kohut was less explicit about the relationship of his theory
to newer derivatives of classical psychoanalysis. There is no doubt that in
moving away from a model that gives primacy to instinctual drives, and in
placing emphasis on the relational origin of psychopathology, and its cen-
trality to cure, he had much in common with object relations theory, and
particularly with Winnicott. These commonalities were never addressed,
and therefore a potentially enriching dialogue between a variety of object
relations approaches and self psychology has yet to be developed (Bacal &
Newman, 1990).
Case study
John is a 26-year-old single man, living in evenings, he feels relatively calm. He is

a rented flat near the city centre. He is aware, however, of a constant tension in his
currently employed as a programmer in a mind, as he lines up events for each evening
large computer business. He was referred and weekend. He has managed to avoid
for therapy by his doctor after an incident being alone by having a large group of
in which he cut his hand badly by acquaintances, many of whom he met in
smashing it through a window. While he bars and nightclubs. On a typical weekend,
was being stitched, he told his doctor that he will go out each evening, often until two
he felt out of control and panicky nearly or three am. He will drink a large quantity of
all the time. He had smashed a window in alcohol and also use a variety of drugs,
his flat after hearing that an arrangement including ecstasy and cocaine. He will then
with friends to go out for the evening had spend most of the morning asleep. He will
fallen through. He described being swept surf the Internet for a couple of hours in the
into a wave of rage, during which he not afternoon, often spending time in chat
only broke the window, but also broke the rooms. He will then go to the gym, shower,
legs off a small table. Afterwards, he felt and get ready for another evening out. This
shaken and confused. lifestyle is an expensive one and financial
John says that as long as he has difficulties are adding to his anxiety.
continuous social engagements to fill his Although John is familiar with many
>>
<<
nightclubs and bars, he strongly dislikes the sister. During this time John was looked
idea of going into them alone. He feels that after by his mother’s sister. He has few
unless he arrives at a place with a group of memories of this time, but remembers
friends, he will seem to everyone like ‘a sitting at his aunt’s front door, crying, and
loser, someone who can’t make it’. This is saying, ‘I want mommy back’.
why he spends so much energy on making John’s schooling was uneventful. He
his arrangements. He wishes he had one or did well in his studies and played a lot
two close friends who he could rely on to of sport. He identifies his problems as
go out with him every evening and beginning in his second year at university,
weekend, but he says he has never had when he began to drink and smoke dagga
friendships like that. He also wishes he had regularly. Since leaving university, things
a girlfriend but as soon as an intimacy have gradually felt more and more out
develops between himself and a woman, of control. He feels that his life has lost
he feels himself withdrawing and becoming purpose and that he has no real goals. He
critical of her. He occasionally sleeps with occasionally has suicidal thoughts, but says
women, but seldom more than once. he never gets as far as making concrete
John comes from a small family that plans to kill himself.
lives in the Eastern Cape. His father is a At his first interview with a female
builder, and his mother has never worked therapist, John seems anxious and
outside the home, except for occasional distracted. He says he feels depressed about
employment in her church community, his life and wants things to change. He has
with which she is very involved. He has resolved to take control of his drinking and
one sister, two years younger than himself, drug use, and discusses his plans to apply
who is married, with two small children. for a job in a small computer firm in which
John has been the only member of the he will be expected to work long hours. He
family to have tertiary education. He feels that the challenge of the new job will
completed a BA degree, and has since help him to change.
done courses in computer technology. The therapist understands John’s attack
He describes his family as close-knit of rage and subsequent fragmentation
and private. He says his father is a tense as responsive to an injury to self, caused
and rather depressed man who worries by the failure of his friends to meet his
constantly about money and drinks needs. His inability to go out alone and
heavily on weekends. He was never his need to be seen as having friends is an
approachable or very involved with the indication of the fragility of his self-esteem.
upbringing of the children, but would She also notes the addictive quality of his
occasionally punish them severely for social activity, drinking and drug-use, all
small misdemeanours. His mother, a very attempts to self-soothe, in the absence of
religious woman, would often be out of well-established patterns of mature self-
the house in the evenings, at bible or regulation. She is aware that addictive forms
church meetings. The family seldom of self-soothing, and the sense of emptiness
entertained or saw friends, and the they defend against, are often linked to
children were discouraged from bringing early mirroring failures, and she wonders
friends home. The parents’ marriage is whether John’s mother was preoccupied
stable but unaffectionate. and even depressed when John was an
His mother was hospitalised for a infant. Certainly, depression and remoteness
severe depressive episode for three characterised his mother’s behaviour later in
months immediately after the birth of his his life. The trauma of separation from her
>>
<<
during her hospitalisation for depression, remarks about her therapy room, the
coinciding with the birth of a sibling, may building in which she works, and sometimes
have compounded an already anxious therapy itself. She anticipates that he will
attachment pattern. It also seems that his soon suggest that he terminate. With this in
father was unavailable to meet either his mind, after another cancellation, she
mirroring or his idealising needs. It seems interprets the link between his withdrawal
unlikely that either parent was able to affirm from the therapy, and his difficulty in
his achievements. maintaining intimate relationships with
There is evidence of an effective women, and suggests that both of these
compensatory self-structure, seen in John’s might be his way of protecting himself from
school, university and sporting achievements. the possibility of being hurt. She goes on to
It is possible that affirmation in these settings say that he might anticipate being hurt
met some of John’s mirroring and idealising because when he was a young child his
needs, and also that twinship selfobject ties mother was not often emotionally available
with his peers compensated for the failing to him, as a result of her church work, her
archaic selfobject matrix. The therapist feels depression, and later, her involvement with
that the compensatory self structure will his young sister.
provide a foundation for the work that needs John reacts to this interpretation with
to take place in therapy. She anticipates that hurt and anger. He says he feels that the
the therapy will need to address early therapist does not understand the
misattunements in self- and mutual urgency of his work demands, and
regulation, that John will be very sensitive to under-estimates the difficulty he has in
perceived criticism, rejection and getting away. The therapy is important to
abandonment, and that he will react to these him, and he looks forward to coming. He
with either rage or withdrawal or both. says he cannot understand why she is
In the first phase of therapy, which lasts taking his absences so personally.
for approximately four months, John At this stage the therapist realises that
establishes himself in his new job, and as he although her interpretation might have
anticipated, this substantially changes his been accurate in some ways, it also
after-hours behaviour. He has very little free constituted an empathic failure for two
time. The close relationships with new reasons. Firstly, it was not attuned to the
colleagues in a demanding and creative element of primitive grandiosity mobilised
work situation have made him feel confident by John’s new work, and his need to have
and full of energy. Although he still his work achievements, including a sense
occasionally goes to nightclubs, he is of being indispensable, admired. Secondly,
drinking far less and seldom uses drugs. He although her interpretation had linked his
expresses his gratitude to his therapist, defensive withdrawal to the underlying
telling her that therapy has changed his life. injury to self, she realised that he had felt
In the next phase of the therapy, John criticised. She thought this might well be
begins to withdraw. He often cancels linked to her own feelings of irritation,
sessions at short notice, saying that there which probably gave the tone of her
has been an emergency at work. His interpretation a critical edge. She also
therapist is aware of some annoyance in thought that he might not yet be ready to
herself about this and the rather high- consciously face the dependency needs
handed way in which he brushes aside her activated by the therapy. She noted that
attempts to explore his absences. She is also her interpretation had not taken into
aware that he is beginning to make critical account the extent to which she was still
>>
<<
an idealised selfobject for John. With these certain tasks at work. The therapist then
thoughts in mind, she commented that asks how it feels when he has to miss a
perhaps it was important to John that she therapy session. He says he sometimes feels
understands how much he is needed at relieved, because he doesn’t want to be
work when there is an urgent project going dependent on it, and knows he will have
on. He accepted this with relief and in the to stop at some point. This remark allows
interaction that followed he talked eagerly them to move into an exploration of his
about how great it feels to him to know pattern of defensive withdrawal at his
that his colleagues need him to perform own pace.
Specific tasks
➊ Self theory regards rage as the outcome of an injury to the self. In psychotherapy
therefore the focus tends to be on the injury that precipitated the rage, rather than on
the rage itself. This is in contrast to Kernberg’s approach, for example, and has major
implications for work with clients whose angry outbursts are a major part of their
presenting problem. Explore some of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach
to rage.
➋ An intersubjective approach to psychotherapy has changed the way that

psychotherapists think about their neutrality and objectivity in relation to the material
offered by their clients. It also affects the way in which psychotherapists think about the
disclosure to their clients of their own thoughts, feelings and experience. Write an essay
in which you compare and contrast the classical analyst’s neutrality with the stance of
the intersubjective analyst. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each?
General tasks
➊ Primitive grandiosity—the sense of being ‘the king of the castle’—has an important
place in the development of self-esteem in all of us. Arrange to spend some time
observing young children who are exploring the limits of their physical skills in a play
group or adventure playground. How do they express their primitive grandiosity?
How do their caregivers respond? What happens when a moment of delight in an
achievement (such as reaching the top of a jungle gym) is not met with an attuned
(mirroring) response from the caregiver?
➋ Kohut’s theory of the bipolar self suggests that ambition (a development from primitive
grandiosity) is balanced with idealism (a development from the experience of feeling
contained in a soothing (omniscient) selfobject relationship). Spend some time thinking
about the different ways in which imbalance of ambition and idealism affects behaviour.
There are many examples in public life of men and women at one extreme or another:
how does this affect those around them? How are you affected by people who are very
idealistic or very ambitious?
➌ Give some thought to how Freud’s developmental theory applies to your own life.
Do you think that it helps explain much about you? If so, what and how? If you feel
that Freud’s theories are not able to explain significant aspects of your life, reflect on
why you think this is so.
On self theory:
The following readings give a thorough introduction to basic self theory. They offer insight into the ways in which
Kohut himself wrote for a wide audience of psychoanalytic scholars, and also show how his close collaborators
understood and developed his work. For readers just beginning to engage with self theory, this is the place to start.
I suggest reading Kohut’s major works, listed in the references, after these excellent easy-to-read articles. Strozier’s
biography will give you a rich insight into Kohut’s place in the psychoanalytic world, and his struggles with intro-
ducing his theory into the conservative classical psychoanalytic world.
Bacal, H (1995). ‘The essence of Kohut’s work and the progress of Self psychology’, Psychoanalytic
Dialogues, 5, 353-366.
Kohut, H (1979). ‘The two analyses of Mr Z’, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 60, 3-27.
(This is perhaps Kohut’s most famous paper. It is also known to be autobiographical, so apart from giving
an insight into what a self approach offers, it also reveals the essence of Kohut’s capacity to reflect on his
own experience.)
Kohut, H (1981) ‘On empathy’, In P. Ornstein (ed), The Search for the Self, vol 4. (1990). Madison:
International Universities Press, 525-535.
(Kohut addressed the concept of empathy repeatedly. It is central to self technique, and is also the most
misunderstood concept in the theory, partly because it is confused with the use of the term in everyday
conversation, often as a synonym for ‘sympathy’.)
Kohut, H (1982). ‘Introspection, empathy and the semi-circle of mental health’, International
Ornstein, P & Ornstein, A (1995). ‘Some distinguishing features of Heinz Kohut’s Self psychology’,
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 5, 353-366.
Strozier, C (2001). Heinz Kohut: The Making of a Psychoanalyst. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Wolf, E (1988). Treating the Self: Elements of Clinical Self Psychology. New York: Guilford.
(This is an excellent readable introduction to self theory. Ernest Wolf worked closely with Kohut,
and gives an accessible and thorough introduction to his ideas.)
Developments in self theory and technique:

Bacal, H (1985). ‘Optimal responsiveness and the therapeutic process’, In A. Goldberg (ed),
Progress in Self Psychology, Vol 1. New York: Guilford Press, 202-227.
(The work on optimal frustration and optimal responsiveness continues to be a lively debate in
psychoanalytic circles, partly because this is an area of stark contrast to classical and object relations
technique. Bacal’s work sets out the theory and its implications.)
Morrison, A (1989). Shame: The Underside of Narcissism. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
(Shame is a central issue for those working in the area of narcissism. Morrison has worked in this area
for a long period, and has made a major contribution to understanding the origins of shame and how to
work with it in psychotherapy.)
Ornstein, A (1998). ‘The fate of narcissistic rage in psychotherapy’, Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 18, 55-70.
(Anna Ornstein is a major contributor to self theory and technique. While developing Kohut’s work, she
also remained loyal to his basic theories, and she writes with great clarity and vigour.)
Shane, M (1985). ‘Self psychology’s additions to mainstream concepts of defense and resistance’,
In A. Goldberg (ed), Progress in Self Psychology, Vol 1. New York: Guilford Press, 80-82.
(Self theory raises major theoretical issues about the place of resistance in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and
the analysis of defence. Both resistance and defence are de-emphasised as a primary focus for work, and this
contrasts with a more classical approach. This article is an excellent introduction to a knotty problem.)
On infant research and intersubjectivity:

Beebe, B, Jaffe, J & Lachmann, F (2002). Infant Research and Adult Treatment: Co-Constructing
Interactions. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.
(Beebe, Jaffe and Lachmann scaffold the connections between the area of infant research and that of adult
treatment. This is essential reading for those intrigued by the relationship between an early caregiving
environment, and later patterns of relating.)
Lichtenberg, J, Lachmann, F & Fosshage, J (1992). Self and Motivational Systems: Towards a Theory of
Psychoanalytic Technique. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
(Joe Lichtenberg is a major figure internationally in the field of self psychology. With colleagues, he has
written on technique, but also on development and its relationship to adult behaviour. This particular book
reports extensively on research findings, and so is a little dry at times, but is an excellent reference text.)
Schore, A (1994). Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional
Development. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
(Allan Schore has become a major figure in linking neuropsychology with psychoanalysis. This is an
exciting theoretical development in psychoanalytic theory, and offers fascinating new avenues for research.)
Stern, D, Atwood, G & Brandchaft, B (1994), The Intersubjective Perspective. Northvale, NJ: Aronson.
(Intersubjectivity embraces a range of theorists with quite different theoretical homes. This book offers a
starting point, and describes intersubjectivity from a perspective that has its roots in self theory.)
CHAPTER
10
Attachment theory
Lee Senior
This chapter presents a review of attachment theory, drawing

largely on the ideas of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth.
We introduce and discuss the following concepts central
to attachment theory:
1. Bowlby’s attachment theory

2. Internal working models
3. Ainsworth’s Strange Situation and the patterns
of attachment
4. Attachment patterns in adulthood
5. The relationship between attachment and
temperament, affect regulation, psychopathology
and culture
6. The impact of AIDS on childhood development in
South Africa
7. A critique of attachment theory
Introduction
Attachment theory concerns early
caregiving relationships and
the way that these relationships
support the child’s subsequent
development. The nature of the
parent-child relationship during
early childhood is believed to be
one of the central causal factors
in personality development and
interpersonal functioning, as well as
having implications for psychopathology.
Mary Ainsworth
Bowlby’s attachment theory

Attachment theory and research initially emerged from the clinical
observations of the psychoanalyst John Bowlby (1969; 1973; 1980),
Attachment. Strong emo- who identified the fundamental importance of infant-caregiver
tional bond between infant attachment for development. Early on in his career, Bowlby had looked
and caregiver. at the long-term developmental impact on children who were separated
from their parents for long periods of time as war evacuees or orphans. His
work in an institution with maladjusted children who had been separated
from their parents led him to believe that early disruptions in the infant-
caregiver relationship resulted in a range of behavioural, emotional and
mental health problems (1944). In the 1950s Bowlby and his colleague,
James Robertson, conducted a series of observations of young children
who were hospitalised, institutionalised or otherwise separated from their
parents. These children appeared to experience a recognisable pattern of
distress on being separated. This pattern revealed angry protest (relating
to anxieties about being separated), followed by despair (suggesting a
Attachment behaviours.
period of grief or mourning), and detachment when the separation was
Any behaviour designed to
get children into a close,
prolonged and the young children tried to protect themselves against
protective relationship the distress of losing a parent (Robertson & Bowlby, 1952). Bowlby
with their attachment became increasingly aware of the importance of a close and continuous
figure. relationship with a primary caregiver.
Attachment behaviour
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
Bowlby theorised that attachment serves an

evolutionary purpose, enhancing the survival of
the species. Humans, like other primates, possess
an evolutionary-adapted behavioural system,
the goal of which is maintaining proximity
to a caregiver, particularly when danger
threatens, and thereby ensuring the vulnerable
infant’s protection from predators and ultimate
psychological and physical survival. Attachment
behaviours are thought to be organised into
an attachment behavioural system. Human
infants’ attachment behaviours serve to activate
maternal behaviour and bring the caregiver into
close contact with the infant. An obvious early
example of this is an infant crying when a mother
Attachment theory leaves the room—a signal not easy to ignore and
emphasises the critical role designed to bring the mother to the child. Other examples include smiling,
of the early caregiving
relationship in the
babbling, grasping, the gesture of raising arms, clinging and following.
development of the child. While some attachment behaviours, such as smiling or vocalising, may be
characterised as signalling behaviours that alert the mother to the infant’s
interest in interaction, and thus to bring her to the infant, other behaviours,
such as crying, are aversive behaviours, and bring the mother to the infant
Attachment behavioural
to terminate them. Some behaviours, such as approaching and following,
system. An organised are active behaviours that move the infant to the mother (Cassidy, 1999).
system of attachment As the infant develops, he becomes increasingly effective in seeking and
behaviours. maintaining proximity to the preferred caregiver.
Attachment theory 217
A central aspect of Bowlby’s attachment theory is the hypothesis that

attachment behaviour is organised by means of a control system within the
central nervous system (Bowlby, 1969; 1988). Bowlby described the workings
of a thermostat as an example of a control system: when a room gets too cold,
the thermostat activates the heater; when the desired temperature is reached,
the thermostat turns the heater off. Similarly, when a separation from the
caregiver becomes too great, the attachment system is activated until sufficient
proximity has been achieved (Cassidy, 1999).
The behaviours and emotions associated with attachment are likely to be

triggered in situations of anxiety or distress:
s within the infant, such as feeling hungry or tired,
s within the environment, such as a frightening event, and
s within the attachment figure, such as a caregiver being absent,
unresponsive, rejecting or hostile.
Perceptual predispositions towards

attachment in the newborn
Although Bowlby asserted that the infant- which is just enough for the newborn to
caregiver relationship builds over time, he be able to recognise general features of
did suggest that, from the outset, there the face, and the newborn prefers looking
are powerful biological forces directing at human faces above any other stimulus.
the mother and infant towards mutual Newborn infants are able to differentiate
attachment. Research with newborns has between their own mother and another
confirmed the existence of perceptual mother on the basis of smell. In one study,
biases in the newborn that facilitate the significantly more babies spent more time
mother–infant bond. Newborns just a turning towards their own mother’s breast
few hours old are able to recognise their pad than towards a clean breast pad at five
mothers’ voices. Newborns’ heart rates days of age, and by six days of age were
and patterns of sucking behaviour have showing a differential response between
been shown to change in response to their own mother’s breast pad and another
their mothers’ voices. The basis for this mother’s breast pad. Breast-fed infants
recognition has been thought to be rapidly learn their mother’s characteristic
prenatal experience in hearing the mother’s olfactory signature while sucking at her
voice. The newborn infant has a visual breasts and can subsequently recognise
accommodation of about 25 centimetres, her by that unique scent.
While the set goal of the attachment system was initially regarded as
physical proximity, Bowlby (1973) later refined his definition of this goal
and emphasised the importance of the infant’s belief that the attachment
figure would not only be physically present, but be emotionally accessible and
responsive if needed. Quality of care and sensitivity of the caregiver to the
infant’s signals became the central issues of infancy.
Phases of the development of attachment

Attachment is a gradual developmental process that evolves from birth.
Bowlby (1969) describes four phases in the development of an infant’s
attachment.
Phase Age Behaviour
Pre-attachment 0 to 2 months Undiscriminating social responsiveness.

Crying, smiling, babbling, grasping and
reaching. Tracking, listening and responding
to adult speech.
Attachment-in-the-making 3 to 6 months Discriminating social responsiveness. Ability

to single out primary caregiver; selective
social smile.
Clear-cut attachment 7 months to 3 years Active initiative in proximity and contact.

Increasingly discriminating. Strangers treated
with increasing caution. Use of newly
developed language and locomotor skills to
seek out and maintain contact with
attachment figure.
Goal-corrected attachment 3+ years Begins to understand mother’s point of view,

feelings, plans and motives, and to make
inferences about her behaviour. Enters into a
more complex relationship or partnership
with caregiver.
Table 10.1 Bowlby’s phases of the development of attachment.
Attachment/exploration balance and the secure base

According to attachment theory, the attachment figure is seen as provid-
ing a ‘secure base’ (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978), allowing the
infant to express an innate instinct to explore in order to grow progressively
independent of the attachment figure. When danger seems unlikely, the
attachment system recedes into the background and allows for exploratory
activity. The infant who feels secure in the caregiver’s availability and
attentiveness may wander off to explore and play, returning at times to
check that the caregiver is accessible, before venturing off again. If, however,
the caregiver’s proximity is questionable, independent exploration of the
environment is dramatically reduced. The dynamic equilibrium between
the complementary, yet mutually inhibiting, attachment and exploratory
behavioural systems is thought to be crucial for development (Ainsworth,
1972). An attachment-exploration balance ensures that while the child is
protected by maintaining proximity to attachment figures, he or she is able
nonetheless to learn about the environment through exploration.
Internal working models

A basic assumption of attachment theory is that critical variations in the
quality of one’s early experiences with caregiving figures shape the for-
mation of mental representations or internal working models of close Internal working models.
relationships. Internal working models comprise: Internal mental repre-
sentations, developed in
early close relationships
s self model—containing perceptions of one’s own worth and
between the self,
lovability, and attachment figure(s)
s other model—containing expectations regarding the essential and the environment.
goodness, trustworthiness, and dependability of important others
in one’s social world.
Those who experience sensitive and emotionally
PHO TO : CHA JO HNS TON

available caregiving develop a sense of others
as dependably available and supportive, a sense of
themselves as competent and worthy of attention
and affection, and generally positive expectations of
intimate relationships. In contrast, when caregiving
is inadequate, the individual develops deficiencies
in feelings about self and others, and a negative set
of expectations regarding relationships (Zeanah,
Mammen & Lieberman, 1993).
According to Bowlby (1973; 1988) a person’s
internal working models, once formed in early Emotionally accessible
childhood, tend to persist and serve as a template for his subsequent close and responsive caregiving
relationships. They become a central aspect of personality and are so taken and sensitivity to the
for granted that they come to operate largely at an unconscious level. infant’s signals are central
ingredients in a secure
Internal working models may tend to become self-fulfilling in the sense attachment.
that new relationships may be created in the light of expectations developed
in earlier relationships. Internal working models may be resistant to change,
even in the face of contradictory evidence, thus limiting the person’s ability
to learn from interpersonal interactions.
Ainsworth’s Strange Situation and the patterns of

attachment
According to attachment theory, behavioural patterns of seeking care and
nurturance emerge as a function of the primary caregiver’s response to Secure. Easily absorbed
the child. A child learns, from an early age, which behaviours will elicit care in exploration after
from the primary caregiver, and which will not have this effect. Those that separation from caregiver,
then seeks proximity
elicit at least limited security become preferred and safe ways of interacting
when caregiver returns,
with caregivers (Slade, 1999). then continues playing.
Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall (1978) attempted to investigate
empirically whether the quality of maternal responsiveness is directly Resistant. Also referred to
related to patterns of infantile behaviour, particularly comfort-seeking and as ambivalent. Shows great
contact maintenance behaviour. Ainsworth et al (1978) conducted a labo- distress when separated
ratory procedure known as the Strange Situation. This involved eight brief from caregiver and then
angry, clinging behaviour
(three-minute) episodes that provided opportunities to observe a variety of
when caregiver returns.
the 12-24-month-old infants’ responses to the stresses of a new environment
and of separation from an attachment figure. Avoidant. Shows little
Ainsworth was able to distinguish three primary attachment anxiety after separation
classifications: secure, resistant, and avoidant. These patterns were from caregiver but snubs
linked to caregivers’ success or failure in responding to, and meeting, caregiver on their return.
the infants’ needs. Typically, secure infants readily separated from

the caregiver in the laboratory procedure and became easily absorbed
in exploration. After the separation secure infants simply sought
proximity with the caregiver on her return and then felt comforted
and returned to play. Securely attached children develop confidence
that caregivers will be available, responsive, and helpful, should they
encounter adverse or frightening situations. With this assurance,
they feel competent and bold in their explorations of the world. This
pattern is promoted by the caregiver’s ready availability, sensitivity to the
child’s needs, and loving responsiveness whenever he seeks protection or
comfort (Bowlby, 1988).
Resistant and avoidant attachment classifications may both be placed
within the broad category of anxious or insecure attachment (Ainsworth
1972; Ainsworth et al, 1978; Bowlby, 1973). Infants who have anxious
attachment relationships with their caregivers have not experienced
consistent availability of, and comfort from, their caregivers when the
Episode Events and procedures
1 The mother (or father) and infant are introduced into a sparsely furnished room containing
toys for the infant and chairs for the mother and another adult.
2 The mother is non-participative while the infant explores.
3 An unfamiliar adult enters, sits quietly, then converses with mother and eventually
engages the infant in play.
4 Mother is signalled to leave the room inconspicuously. First separation episode.
5 Mother returns and tries to engage the infant in play. First reunion episode.
6 Mother exits once more, leaving child completely alone. Second separation episode.
7 Stranger returns.
8 Mother returns. Second reunion episode.

Table 10.2 Summary of Strange Situation procedure
Source: Adapted from Ainsworth et al (1978).
environment has proved threatening (Ainsworth et al, 1978; Bowlby,
1973). These infants are anxious about the availability of their caregivers,
fearing that the caregivers will be unresponsive or ineffectively responsive
when needed. As such, they may not be able to direct attachment
behaviours at caregivers when appropriate, or may not be comforted
by caregivers who have been unreliable in the past. Anxious attachment
compromises free exploration of the world, which means that these
infants cannot achieve the same confidence in themselves and degree of
mastery of their environments as securely attached children (Weinfeld,
Sroufe, Egeland & Carlson, 1999).
Within the Strange Situation laboratory procedure, resistant (also
referred to as ambivalent) infants showed great distress at separation
and manifested angry, tense and clinging behaviour when the caregiver
returned. These infants wanted to be comforted, but resisted their
mothers’ efforts to soothe them. They remained too distressed in the

Strange Situation to be able to return to
play. The resistant infant is uncertain
whether the parent will be available or
responsive or helpful when called upon.
As a result of this uncertainty, the child
is always prone to separation anxiety
and is anxious about exploring the world
(Bowlby, 1988). This pattern tends to be
promoted by inconsistent parenting, that
is, when a parent is available and helpful
on some occasions, but not others.
Avoidant behaviour was seen in infants
who appeared less anxious during the
separation and snubbed the caregiver on
her return, avoiding eye contact or using Bowlby believed that the
toys to distract their attention away from the caregiver. These infants need to form emotional
bonds is the central human
showed no preference for the mother or caregiver over a stranger. The
motivation.
child who evidences anxious avoidant attachment has no confidence
that, when seeking care, there will be a helpful response, rather than
rejection (Bowlby, 1988). This pattern, in which conflict is more
covert, results from a caregiver who constantly rebuffs the child when
approached for comfort or protection. The most extreme cases result
from repeated rejections.
In later research, Main & Solomon (1986; 1990) described a third
insecure category, the disorganized/disoriented category. These infants
had no coherent strategy whatsoever to deal with the experience of
separation and showed disorganisation and dissociation upon reunion.
Some appeared dazed or confused and exhibited atypical behaviours
such as freezing of all movement; approaching the caregiver with
head averted; rocking on hands and knees, moving away from the
caregiver to the wall, rising to greet the caregiver, then falling prone
on the face, mixing avoidant with resistant behaviours. Some instances
of disorganised attachment are seen in infants known to have been
physically abused or grossly neglected by the parent (Crittenden,
1985), in infants of mothers who are still preoccupied with mourning
a parental figure lost during the mother’s childhood, and in infants of
mothers who themselves suffered physical or sexual abuse as children
(Main & Hesse, 1990).
Infant observation
Naturalistic infant observation as a Fleeing Nazi persecution, Esther Bick
method of observing the development of moved, via Switzerland, from her home
an infant in the natural setting of his and early work with children in Vienna, to
home with his mother, father or other settle in England as a refugee.
caregivers was pioneered by Esther Bick in She had a rich and fascinating life, and
1948 at the Tavistock Clinic in London. her early work with children as a teacher
>>
<<
and caregiver stimulated a lifelong interest the Tavistock Clinic. It was introduced at
in the state of childhood and infancy, and the Institute of Psycho analysis in London
the very subtle, primitive and intense in 1960 as part of the course for first
experiences of the infantile state of mind. year students.
Esther Bick’s early work was with children Margaret Rustin (1999) describes how
in a war-time day nursery in Salford. Between the infant observation methodology that
1942 and 1945 she worked one day a week was central to the training, led naturally to
in a child guidance clinic in Leeds. She was further innovations such as work discussion.
accepted by the Institute of Psychoanalysis This took the skills learned in observation
for training in 1947. Her supervisors were into other settings like social work,
James Strachey and Melanie Klein. Klein teaching and residential work, and
supervised her second adult and her first stimulated the interest of professionals with
child cases, and she was greatly influenced different areas of interest. Other
by Klein’s ideas. It was at this point that she professionals such as teachers, social
ended her analysis with Strachey and entered workers, child-care workers and nurses
into analysis with Klein. have subsequently undertaken
Bick was invited by John Bowlby to work observations. Interest in the observational
as a child psychotherapist at the Tavistock method spread as visiting students that
Clinic and it is as a result of her teaching had trained at the Tavistock took their skills
there that she is recognised as one of the farther afield, with the result that infant
founders of child psychotherapy. In 1948, observation became established in many
Esther Bick, together with John Bowlby, countries and cities beyond London. The
started the first training in child International Journal of Infant Observation
psychotherapy at the Tavistock. Infant and its Applications published its first issue
observation was to form a central part of in 1997 and are now holding regular
this training. international conferences that focus on
Bick considered observation a good infant observation and its teaching.
introduction for those wishing to work with In South Africa, the first non-accredited
children, allowing them to learn about the infant observation groups were started in
early emotional development of babies, as the early 1990s, with seminar groups in
well as being able to experience and learn Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban.
more about their own emotional responses These initial groups have developed into
to this intense and vulnerable time of a more formal seminars and are now offered
family’s life. Her own careful observations as part of a Tavistock-accredited diploma
of children she had worked with—starting course in communication with children,
with initially a behavioural observation under the auspices of the Institute for
which formed the basis of her doctoral Psychodynamic Child Psychotherapy. These
research—had stimulated her interest in the groups are overseen by visiting teachers
complexities of primitive mental states, an from the Tavistock, who also assess the
interest she was to deepen and explore in required written work.
her pioneering work on the function of skin (‘Surviving Space: Papers on infant
in early object relations. observation’ (2002) edited by Andrew
Following the initial introduction of Briggs offers a comprehensive introduction
infant observation as part of a non-clinical to the life and work of Esther Bick.)
year, it has been a central part of the
training course for child psychotherapists at Shayleen Peek
Attachment patterns in adulthood

There is growing evidence that these patterns of attachment, once
developed, tend to persist and are remarkably stable across the life-span
(Rothbard & Shaver, 1994). Bowlby maintained that attachment behaviours
‘characterise human beings from the cradle to the grave’ (1979: 129), and that,
‘while attachment behaviour is at its most obvious in early childhood, it can
be observed throughout the lifecycle, especially in emergencies’ (1989: 238).
Classifications established in childhood persist through the end of childhood
in the absence of substantial environmental change (Egeland, Kalkoske,
Gottesman & Erickson, 1990; Erickson, Sroufe & Egeland, 1985). Adult
attachment patterns appear to be developmental successors of childhood
attachment patterns (Rothbard & Shaver, 1994). Three major longitudinal
studies (Hamilton, 1994; Main, 1997; Waters, Treboux, Crowell, Merrick
& Albersheim, 1995) have shown a 68-75 per cent correspondence between
attachment classifications in infancy and classifications in adulthood.
Mary Main and her colleagues conducted research into adult at-
tachment, utilising a semi-structured interview known as the Adult
Attachment Interview (George, Kaplan & Main, 1985), in which adults are
asked to describe childhood attachment relationships, as well as experiences of
loss, rejection, and separation. Main discovered patterns of representation that
were analogous to infantile patterns of behaviour in the Strange Situation:
autonomous adults, like secure infants, had ready and coherent access to
a range of positive and negative feelings about their early attachment
experiences. While autonomous or secure adults’ representations of
early attachment experiences were coherent and flexible, insecure adults
described such experiences in incoherent and contradictory ways. Preoccupied
adults seemed overwhelmed and flooded by the affect associated with early
attachment experiences. Preoccupied adults, like resistant children, were
unable to contain and regulate memories and affects associated with early
attachment. Dismissing adults idealised early relationship experiences
and described painful events in a detached and often contradictory way.
Dismissing adults, like avoidant children, minimised and overregulated
affects that would disrupt their functioning (Slade, 1999). Main classified
subjects whose interviews revealed disordered thinking in the discussion
of mourning or trauma as ‘unresolved/disorganised with respect to
mourning or trauma’ (Main & Hesse, 1990).
In another major line of work examining attachment patterns in
adults, Hazan & Shaver (1987) extended the childhood paradigm of
Ainsworth et al (1978) to adult love relationships and developed a brief
self-report measure to assess adult parallels of the three childhood pat-
terns: secure, anxious-ambivalent and avoidant. Using this measure,
Hazan & Shaver (1987; 1990) asked adult respondents to characterise
themselves as secure, anxious-ambivalent or avoidant in romantic rela-
tionships, and asked them to respond to questions regarding their most
important experience of romantic love, their mental models of self and
relationships, their memories of childhood relationships with parents and
their experiences at work. Adults subscribing to the secure style agreed
that they found it relatively easy to get close to others, were comfortable
in depending on others and having others depend on them, and were not
worried about being abandoned. Individuals selecting the ambivalent style

agreed that others were reluctant to get as close to them as they would like,
were worried that their partners did not really love them or want to stay
with them, and wanted to get very close to their partners, although they
were aware that this sometimes scared people away. Adults identifying
with the avoidant style acknowledged being somewhat uncomfortable
with closeness to others, found it difficult to trust others completely or to
allow themselves to depend on them, and became nervous when love part-
ners wanted to get too close. Bartholomew & Horowitz (1991) subsequently
identified two subgroups of avoidant individuals: fearful avoidants who
avoid intimacy because of a fear of rejection, and dismissing avoidants
who take a detached stance towards close relationships.
Attachment and temperament

PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
Temperament may be defined as the inherited personality traits

present at birth (Buss & Plomin, 1984). Infants are believed to be born
with characteristic levels of sociability and emotional styles, including
levels of emotional reactivity to disturbances in the environment.
Temperament theorists agree that individual differences along
temperament dimensions carry implications for the frequency and
quality of exchanges between a child and the significant people in
the child’s environment, and that these exchanges may, in turn,
modify the characteristic expression of temperament (Vaughn &
Bost, 1999). There is some empirical support for the conclusion that
temperament and attachment are related (Vaughn & Bost, 1999).
This young couple look like
Two studies cited by Hetherington & Parke (1993) have found that
they might enjoy a secure
attachment style. infants with ‘difficult’ temperaments or less sociability have demonstrated
more distress during separations and reunitings with care-givers than
‘easy’ or more sociable babies. Irritability during infancy has been found
to increase the risk for later insecurity of attachment (Crockenberg 1981;
Sussman-Stilman, Kalkoske, Egeland & Waldman, 1996; Van den Boom
1994; Waters, Vaughn & Egeland, 1980). Infant temperament may increase
inadequate caregiving practices when caregivers themselves are stressed
(Vaughn & Bost, 1999). Mothers with irritable infants and poor social sup-
port have been found to be more likely to have anxiously attached infants
(Crockenberg, 1981). The influences of temperament and experience are
difficult to disentangle—the nature of the development process is such that
inborn differences in temperament and influences in early care interact to
create the adaptation of the infant. Caregiving may well be influenced by
the nature of the infant, and the infant’s basic nature is transformed by the
caregiving experience (Sroufe, 1996).
Attachment and affect regulation

Attachment theory has been regarded as a theory of affect regulation (Kobak,
1986; Kobak & Sceery, 1988; Sroufe & Waters, 1977). Attachment implies an
emotional bond between parent and infant. Attachment theorists regard
the attachment relationship as the context within which the human infant
learns to regulate emotion (Sroufe, 1990; 1996). As an infant is not capable
of regulating his own emotions, the assistance of a caregiver is required
in modulating fluctuating emotions. A dyadic regulatory system evolves

where the infant gives signals of changes in state that are understood and
responded to by the caregiver, thereby becoming more regulated. The infant
learns that becoming emotionally distressed in the presence of the caregiver
will not lead to disorganisation beyond his coping capabilities. In states of
uncontrollable arousal, the infant will come to seek physical closeness to the
caregiver in the hope of soothing and the recovery of homeostasis (Fonagy,
1999). Differences in the quality of care, including the responsiveness of
the caregiver, lead to differences in emotional arousal and the expression,
modulation, and flexible control of the emotions by the child (Sroufe, 1996).
According to the degree that the caregiver is responsive, the child acquires
confidence in his own ability to influence the environment as well as internal
states. Poor quality care and anxious attachment will be revealed in dysfunc-
tional emotional regulation (Sroufe, 1996).
For securely attached children, emotions are thought to operate in an
integrated and smoothly regulated fashion to serve the inner organisation
and the felt security of the child (Sroufe, 1990). The experience of security
is based not on the denial of negative affect or arousal, but on the regula-
tion of affect and the ability to tolerate negative affect temporarily in order
to achieve mastery over threatening situations (Carlson & Sroufe, 1995;
Kobak, 1985). Securely attached children readily engage situations that
have the potential for emotional arousal and they express their emotions
directly. This ability is based on their expectations that others are available
and will respond when they are emotionally aroused, that emotional arousal
is rarely disorganising, and that should emotional arousal be disorganising,
restabilisation is likely to be achieved quickly (Sroufe, 1996). Emotions,
especially negative emotions, are not experienced as threatening but are
expected to serve a communicative function (Bowlby, 1969; Sroufe, 1979).
Not only do secure children demonstrate an ability to tolerate negative
affect while maintaining constructive engagement with others but they are
also able to display positive emotions that enhance social interaction and
social competence (Sroufe, Schork, Frosso, Lawroski & La Freniere, 1984).
Children who have participated in responsive and smoothly regulated
attachment relationships are expected to carry forward a capacity for self-
regulation and a sense of the self as competent in maintaining some degree
of emotional regulation (Carlson & Sroufe, 1995).
Resistant children are believed to have experienced intermittent care-
giver responsiveness to signals of distress, contributing to a constant state
of arousal in these children (Bowlby, 1980; Sroufe, 1990). Affect is not
effectively modulated and the children remain chronically vigilant and
may heighten expressions of distress in an effort to elicit caregiver response
(Carlson & Sroufe, 1995). They come to expect that the caregiver will not be
consistently available or responsive to help manage high levels of tension
and arousal and to believe that they are unworthy and lacking in personal
resources to cope with distress (Bowlby, 1973; 1980). These children view a
range of situations as threatening and are prone to exaggerated emotional
displays (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972). They may develop low thresholds for
threat, be preoccupied with having contact with the caregiver, and show signs
of frustration regarding contact when distressed (Carlson & Sroufe, 1995).
PHO TO : CHA J O HNS TO N 226 Developmental Psychology
Children with histories of avoidant attachment are

believed to have been exposed to an overly rigid style of
emotion regulation and rejection of their attempts to gain
reassurance (Bowlby, 1980; Sroufe, 1990). Heightened
arousal is experienced as disorganising—the expression
of distress and negative emotion is not experienced as
effective in eliciting care, and as a result, these children
may fail to seek contact in response to perceived threat.
Instead they redirect distress and withhold the desire for
closeness (Carlson & Sroufe, 1995). Certain vital emotions
are experienced as unacceptable or confusing. In order
to minimise the conflict aroused by such unacceptable
feelings, the expression and, in time, the experience and
perception of cues arousing such feelings are defensively
restricted from awareness and there may come to be
a separation between aspects of thought and feeling
Research has found (Carlson & Sroufe, 1995). These children tend to have an
that siblings with secure underlying anger or negativism that they have learned not to express at
attachments have less its source and generally develop individual styles that distance feelings
antagonistic relationships and people (Sroufe, 1983). Negative affect tends not to be acknowledged,
than siblings with insecure
attachments.
particularly when it may heighten conflict and alienation (Cassidy &
Kobak, 1988; Kobak & Sceery, 1988).
Attachment and psychopathology

From an attachment perspective, variations in the response to stressful
life circumstances and the development of psychopathology are related to
early experiences of caregiving and the quality of attachment (Carlson &
Sroufe, 1995). Disturbed attachment relationships may
PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
be seen as markers of an incipient pathological process

or as a significant risk factor for later psychopathology
(Sameroff & Emde, 1989; Sroufe, 1983). Secure attachment
constitutes a protective factor in confronting stress and
affords people a measure of psychological resilience
(Morisset, Barnard, Greenberg, Booth & Spieker,
1990). People with an internalised sense of security in
attachment are more able to handle distress and to react
to everyday problems, as well as to deal with extreme
levels of physical and psychological threat, with more
contained negative emotional responses (Mikulincer,
Horesh, Eilati & Kotler, 1999). According to Mikulincer
& Florian (1998), this adaptational role may be derived
from three sources: First, secure individuals’ optimistic
Children expressing affection
attitude towards life may act as a shield in the face of
are likely to be expressing unexpected adversity. Second, secure individuals’ positive self-image may
secure attachment styles. allow them to confront life difficulties with a sense of self-efficacy. Third,
their openness to new information may allow for greater adjustment
to environmental change and the development of more realistic coping
plans. Conversely, individuals who have adopted insecure strategies may
be particularly vulnerable to stresses and adverse life events (Carlson &

Sroufe, 1995), and their insecure attachment strategies may negatively
influence the way in which they appraise, and react to, life events (West,
Livesley, Reiffer & Sheldon, 1986).
Mental health
SECURE Resilience
Attachment
Early caregiving
STRESS
Temperament
INSECURE Vulnerability
Attachment
Psychopathology
Figure 10.1 The role of attachment in the development of psychopathology. As depicted above,
temperament and early caregiving experiences interact in shaping attachment security. Attachment
patterns, in turn, may act as protective factors or risk factors, when facing adversity. Securely attached
individuals tend to have better self-esteem and to engage their worlds with confidence, are more socially
competent, independent and adaptable, and have been found to be better problem solvers. Securely
attached individuals tend to be more resilient to the effects of subsequent life stress. Insecure attachment
has negative implications for personality development and is associated with interpersonal difficulties and
social isolation, poor self-esteem and difficulty regulating emotion. Insecurely attached individuals tend to
experience and respond to life stress more negatively, and are vulnerable to developing psychopathology.
Attachment patterns may also influence an individual’s ability to

establish and utilise social networks, thereby affecting the availability
of support at times of stress (West et al,1968). Based on experiences
with caregivers who were unavailable or inconsistently responsive,
insecurely attached individuals may, unfortunately, be prone to forming
relationships that are not supportive and that may easily be disrupted. As
stress is elevated, the avoidant individual may fail to signal directly a need
for support from others and may remain isolated with his problems. The
resistant individual may become excessively caught up in negative emotion
and unable to remain engaged constructively in social relationships,
developing patterns of relating to others based on heightened displays of
emotion or extreme passivity (Carlson & Sroufe, 1995). What begins as
personal distress may be compounded by isolation, lack of support and
relationship dysfunction (Kobak & Shaver, 1987).
Insecure attachment has been linked to the development of psycho-
pathology in adulthood. Early experiences of major separation, loss of a
parent, or disruption of the parent-child relationship have consistently

been linked to greater risk for depression and anxiety in adolescents and
adults. The link between personality disorders and attachment problems
has been validated by research.
Attachment and culture

Child rearing and parental interaction vary across socio-cultural contexts.
Bowlby’s emphasis on attachment as species-specific has led to criticisms
about his assumptions regarding the universality of attachment across
cultures. Concerns have also been raised about the extent to which
attachment theory allows for the diverse ways in which specific cultures
incorporate attachment relationships into prescriptions for family life
(Bretherton, 1997).
Much of the work that has been done in reviewing attachment and culture
has focused on Ainsworth’s Strange Situation procedure and questions
about the generality of results across cultures and social contexts. While
Ainsworth found two-thirds of the North American infants in her research
to be securely attached, researchers using the Strange Situation in other
cultural groups have identified different proportions of secure, resistant and
avoidant classifications. Socialisation patterns and caregiving circumstances
have an impact on the perceived stressfulness of the Strange Situation in
different cultures (Harwood 1995). For instance, the high proportion of
avoidant attachments identified by Grossman, Grossman, Spangler, Suess
& Unzer (1985) in a sample of German infants was understood to reflect an
emphasis in German culture on fostering independence in one’s offspring. In
contrast, the high percentage of resistant classifications in a Japanese sample
may be attributable in part to aspects of Japanese society that encourage the
child’s interdependence on family members (Miyake, Chen & Campos, 1985).
Japanese babies are typically in constant physical contact with their mothers
throughout the day and sleep in the same room at night, and the separation
episodes of the Strange Situation are therefore totally alien to such infants,
and thus likely to cause considerable distress. While secure attachment
behaviour is associated with a variety of valued characteristics across many
cultures, in some circumstances, resistant or avoidant attachments may equip
children to grow up into adults who best fit the cultural norms (Harwood,
1995). What is adaptive, competent and responsive for one culture may not
apply equally to others. Additionally, cultural systems of meaning influence
the behavioural patterns that infants may show in the Strange Situation and
the processes for measuring and labelling attachment in the Strange Situation
may be qualitative judgements reflecting ethnocentric ideas (Takahashi,
1990). An infant’s responses to elements of the Strange Situation may not be
an accurate indication of the actual intensity of the emotional bond between
infant and caregiver.
Monotropism
Another question is whether attachment theory adequately accommodates
the use of multiple caregivers, a prevalent practice in some socio-cultural
contexts. Bowlby stressed the importance of a continuous relationship with
a primary caregiver for emotional health. While Bowlby stated that infants
will, from the outset, form more than one attachment, often establishing Monotropism. Theory
a small hierarchy of attachments, he asserted that infants have a strong suggesting that although
tendency to prefer a principal attachment figure for comfort and security, a infants have a small
hierarchy of attachments,
phenomenon known as monotropism. Authors such as Jackson (1993) have
they evidence a bias for
conducted research in cultures in which a multiple caregiver arrangement is attaching themselves
normative and question whether monotropy adequately describes attachment especially to one figure
development in the multiple caregiver context. Van Ijzendoorn (1993) asserts, at the top of the hierarchy
however, that even in contexts where infants have multiple caregivers and and will tend to seek
develop multiple attachments, a special infant-mother bond exists and infants out this figure during
are likely to prefer proximity to their mothers in stressful situations. a crisis period.
While the distribution and manifestation of secure and insecure
attachment may differ among various cultural groups, the link between
early care and infant security appears to hold across cultural contexts.
Posada, Gao, Fang, Posada, Tascon, Schoelmerich, Sagi, Kondon-
Ikemaura, Ylaland & Synnevaag (1995) found evidence of secure base
phenomena in all seven of the cultures they studied. Posada, Jacobs,
Carbonell, Alzate, Bustamante & Arenas (1999) reported strong correlations
between maternal sensitivity and infant secure base behaviour in two
different samples of Columbian infants. This relationship was evident in
both a middle-class and a very poor sample, suggesting that the association
between maternal sensitivity and infant security is not specific to middle-
class sectors of the population. Waters & Cummings (2000) argue that
while attachment theory does assume that sensitivity to infant signals,
co-operative interaction, availability, and responsiveness are important in
the development of attachment, attachment theory does not assume that
these are equally prevalent in every culture. They believe that attachment
theory is able to accommodate differing cultural contexts.
The impact of AIDS on childhood development in

South Africa
With a total of 4.2 million infected people, South Africa has the largest
number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world, as well as one of the
world’s fastest-growing epidemics. In South Africa, by the end of the year
2000, one woman in four between the ages of 20 and 29 was infected with
the virus (UNAIDS, 2000b). As more HIV infections develop into AIDS
cases, the epidemic, with its dire social and economic consequences, is
becoming increasingly visible. A less well-known but equally calamitous
effect of the AIDS pandemic is the effect of the disease on the emotional
wellbeing of South Africa’s children. The majority of those dying from
AIDS tend to be people in the prime of their lives who are often parents.
The disease poses a threat to the psychological development of South
African children both in terms of the impact for the millions who live
with a parent or parents with AIDS, and in terms of the huge number A well-known symbol in
who have been, and stand to be, orphaned by the disease. South Africa.
Women with AIDS are at risk of compromised mother-infant inter-
actions that may impede the establishment of secure attachment and
render these infants vulnerable to subsequent difficulties. Prolonged or
severe illness in the family of origin may contribute to attachment styles in
that this affects the quality of parenting—rendering parents unavailable,
or inconsistently available, to their children both physically and emotion-

ally (Stuart & Noyes, 1999). Prolonged illness and associated factors such
as physical debilitation, separations due to hospitalisation, and depression
may interfere with the development of an attachment bond to a parent
infected with AIDS. Healthy spouses may be equally unavailable to
children in their bid to care for the ill and in their absorption with their
own loss. Parental illness may also result in the parenting relationship
becoming inverted with children increasingly perceived by seriously ill
parents as sources of support, assuming caregiving roles.
Orphans due to AIDS – South Africa 1999–2010

2.5
1.5
Millions
0.5
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Projections (Source: Metropolitan Life Scenario 80)
Figure 10.2 Orphans due to AIDS in South Africa, 1990–2010 (UNAIDS, 1999).
Equally, children who are themselves infected with AIDS may have
attachment difficulties. Young children with specific chronic medical
conditions were shown to be less secure as infants than children in a matched
control group. Minde (1999) argues that not only will children with existing
attachment difficulties prior to contracting a serious medical condition be
further compromised in their attachment status by events associated with
illness, but also a chronic illness is likely to stress significantly the attachment
system of many well-attached children.
Insecure attachment puts these children at risk of developing behav-
ioural and social problems, poor self-esteem, and general adjustment
difficulties, particularly when there is no improvement in the subsequent
caregiving environment.
Clearly, loss of parents due to AIDS is likely further to disrupt
attachment for these children—the association between loss of a parent
during childhood and a marked degree of insecure attachment has been
well documented in the literature. From an attachment theory perspec-
tive, the long-term developmental impact of these early upsets and losses
is potentially dire, and these orphaned children may be vulnerable to

a range of behavioural, emotional, and mental health problems. Early
loss of a significant caregiver may render them more susceptible to the
effects of stress and influence the way they interpret future relationships
and experiences.
However, opportunities for change remain, particularly if these or-
phaned children are afforded stable and responsive care over an extended
period of time. A common strategy in AIDS-affected households is to send
one or more children away to extended family members to ensure that they
are fed and cared for. Such extended family structures have been able to absorb
some of the stress for increasing numbers of orphans, particularly in Africa.
However, urbanisation and migration for labour, often across borders, are
destroying those struc-
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON

tures. As the number
of orphans grows and
the number of potential
caregivers shrinks, tra-
ditional coping mech-
anisms are stretched
to breaking point (UN-
AIDS, 2000a).
The impetus for the
development of attach-
ment theory came from
Bowlby’s investigations
of the mental health of
homeless children in
post-war Europe, and
Bowlby’s work had Developmental psychologists
a significant impact on social policy regarding the placement and care that in South Africa have an
was most likely to foster healthy psychological development. Similarly, de- important role to play in
velopmental psychologists in South Africa have an important role to play in examining the psychology of
the AIDS orphan.
examining the psychology of the AIDS orphan, in informing society and
policy-makers about the developmental sequelae of this phenomenon, and
in making recommendations about how best to intervene in supporting these
children and fostering their psychological growth.
A critique of attachment theory

Bowlby’s attachment theory has emerged as a major domain of inquiry
among researchers interested in human development and has been
empirically productive, generating an enormous body of research focused
on understanding the social, emotional, and interpersonal development
of children.
Although the Strange Situation has been criticised for not reflecting
cultural variation in cross-cultural studies, it has provided researchers
with an excellent tool for measuring attachment security in infants.
There is substantial empirical evidence that supports the existence of
the core elements of attachment theory, including the secure-base phe-
nomenon and internal working models.
Attachment theory has also been valued for having the potential for
predictive power, based on findings of continuity between early quality of
attachment and later socio-emotional development (Harwood, 1995).
Bowlby took issue with the emphasis placed by psychoanalysis on the
child’s inner fantasy world, rather than on actual life events and inter-
actions. Bowlby chose to emphasise external reality and the importance
of environmental influence in psychological development. Consequently
he has been accused by the psychoanalysts of not taking sufficient account
of the child’s inner world (Holmes, 1995) or of distortions in the child’s
perceptions of the external world (Fonagy, 2000).
Bowlby was aware of the importance of societal supports for the
development of secure relationships in childhood and later life and had a
keen interest in social policy throughout his career (Bretherton, 1997). He
championed the rights to love and care of children who were innocent
victims of war and social disruption (Holmes, 1995). Many of the revolu-
tionary changes in child care of the post-war period were partly a result of
Bowlby’s efforts. These include allowing parents into hospital with their sick
children, the emphasis on foster rather than institutional care, and political
acceptance of the need for child-care benefits to be paid to mothers. Bowlby
has, however, been criticised for placing undue emphasis upon the role of
the mother, and the concept of maternal deprivation has led mothers to feel
anxious about the potentially damaging effects of even brief separations from
their children. These concerns appear to stem from a misunderstanding of
the concept of monotropism to mean that only the mother would do.
Specific tasks
➊ Skinner & Swartz (1989) conducted research in the Western Cape examining the
psychological sequelae for the preschool child of a parent’s detention as a political
prisoner. These authors found that children whose parents had been detained in the
1985-1986 State of Emergency in South Africa suffered a range of developmental and
emotional difficulties, including separation anxiety.

1.1 Read their research.
1.2 Drawing on attachment theory, account for the difficulties experienced in this
circumstance.
1.3 Discuss other phenomena prevalent in apartheid South Africa (such as
urbanisation, migrant labour, domestic workers), which are likely to have impacted
on the development of attachment among South Africans.
➋ Consider the AIDS epidemic in South Africa and the enormous number of children
orphaned by the disease. If, like Bowlby, you were called upon to comment on the
mental health implications of the problem and to make recommendations to the
government regarding a policy of intervention, what issues would you emphasise and
what recommendations would you make?
➌ Given the increasing number of women entering the workforce, a substantial number of
children are receiving non-parental care, including that offered by crèches or day care centres,
from a very early age. What are your feelings about this trend and its impact on attachment?
➍ Can you identify the common grounds, and the points of major theoretical divergence,
between attachment theory and psychoanalysis?
Bowlby J (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1): Attachment. London: Hogarth Press.
Bowlby J (1973). Attachment and loss (Vol. 2): Separation: Anxiety and anger.London: Hogarth Press.
Bowlby J (1980). Attachment and loss (Vol 3): Loss, sadness and depression. London: Hogarth Press.
(The original Bowlby trilogy presenting his theory of attachment. The first volume examines the nature
of the child’s ties to the mother, focusing on instinctive behaviour and the development of attachment
behaviour. The second volume focuses on separation and separation anxiety. The third volume looks at the
effects of a death in the family on the lives of children and adults. Bowlby’s writing is fairly accessible.)
Cassidy, J & Shaver, P R (1999). Handbook of attachment: Theory, research and clinical applications.
New York: Guilford Press.
(A comprehensive volume, with contributions from the pre-eminent authorities in the field, presenting
the current state of knowledge about attachment, and the continuing development of attachment theory
and its clinical applications. Highly recommended for those with a particular interest in broadening their
knowledge within this field.)
Holmes, J (1993). John Bowlby and attachment theory. London: Routledge.

(Jeremy Holmes has written several commentaries on Bowlby’s work. In this book, he provides some
detail on Bowlby’s life and work, examines the origins of Bowlby’s ideas, and presents the main features
of attachment theory and their relevance to contemporary psychoanalytic psychotherapy.)
(Peter Fonagy’s articles comparing attachment and psychoanalytic theory may be of interest. He has
written a chapter in Cassidy & Shaver’s Handbook of attachment, entitled ‘Psychoanalytic theory
from the viewpoint of attachment theory and research’. Alternatively, his paper entitled ‘Points of con-
vergence and divergence between psychoanalytic and attachment theories: Is psychoanalytic theory truly
different?’ may be downloaded at http://www.psycholucl.ac.uk/psychoanalysis/confpapers.html)
CHAPTER
11
Jung’s analytic theory of the
development of personality
Jacki Watts
This chapter presents an overview of Jung’s psychoanalytic

theory of self and personality. It covers the following of his
major concepts:
1. The three levels of the psyche

2. Complexes
3. Archetypes
4. The dynamics of personality
5. Individuation and the self
6. Jung’s theory of symbols
7. Types of pathology
8. Psychological types
9. Dreams from a Jungian analytic perspective
10. Critiques of Jung
Introduction
It is useful at the start to indicate that theorists who
follow Freudian assumptions, however unrecogn-
isable they might appear [for example Winnicott’s
theories], are seen to be part of the psychoanalytic
tradition. Theorists who follow Jung’s assump-
tions are seen to be part of an analytic tradition.
Jung’s theoretical break from Freud arose
from differences between the two men over the
role of spirituality in the human psychic world.
Jung was well aware of the significance of child-
hood for the formation of personality. In fact, he
maintained that Freud had clearly mapped out the
psychology and the appropriate intervention when
he theorised that the problems of the individual start with Carl Jung
problems of separating from the influence of home and parents (Jung, 1983).
J u n g ’s a n a l y t i c t h e o r y o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p e r s o n a l i t y 235
However, we shall see that the issue of spirituality presents a major differ- Individuation. The innate
ence between Freud and Jung. We shall see that a spiritual dimension is and lifelong process of
important to an overall understanding of Jung’s view of humanity and his becoming an individual,
the move towards
conceptualisations of psychic motivation and growth.
wholeness through the
Central to Jung’s theory is the concept of the individuation of the self as integration of conscious
an innate process. Jung sees all of humankind as located within a shared ex- and unconscious aspects
perience of humanness and guided by a universal collective unconscious. of the personality.
He sees the individual, within this context, as having an innate need to seek
growth. Growth occurs as a result of the workings of the self, which has access
to the wisdom of our collective unconscious. This wisdom becomes accessible
‘We become what we
to us through our dreams and the symbols of our culture.
dream ... We achieve
Individuation is a lifelong process that is never completed. We start
in reality, in substance,
life with the self as the centre. The self is paradoxically both the centre and
only the pictures of the
the goal of life. Throughout development the self unites and organises our
imagination.’
experiences towards its goal of progressive integration and wholeness. The
Lawrence Durrell
soul is an important concept in Jung’s theory, and appears to be the same
concept as the self—Jung sees the self as the closest we come to an experience
of God. This short description indicates how spirituality is central in Jung’s
thinking. We shall go on to examine these ideas and illustrate his theory
of individuation.
The three levels of the psyche

Jung (1983; 1986) was concerned almost exclusively with the psyche. Psyche. A term used by all
Psyche is a term used by all dynamic theorists. It signifies the idea that the dynamic theorists to refer
mind functions as the centre of thought, emotion and behaviour at both a to the idea that the mind
functions as the centre
conscious and unconscious level, adjusting or mediating the body’s responses
of thought, emotion
to the social and physical environment. In Jungian terms psyche is seen and behaviour at both a
as the place of conscious and unconscious processes. It is the centre of mind conscious and unconscious
and soul and is thus the centre of experience and meaning. Therefore we level, adjusting or
see that the psyche is not the mind but rather an organising function that mediating the body’s
unites all the mental functions that make us human. responses to the social and
Jung (1983; 1986) considers the psyche as operating at three levels. Freud physical environment.
had also postulated three levels of functioning. Freud’s structural model
postulated the working of the id, ego and superego. In Freud’s model, the
Religious symbols indicate
id constitutes the reservoir of the unconscious, the contents of which are the humanity’s desire to find
instinctual drives of the individual, which are never able to become conscious. divinity and spiritual
fulfilment.
Consciousness. The ego arises out of the id and acts as the mediator between the tensions
The range of experience of the id and the superego, which is the individual’s conscience. These
of which one is aware. three levels are distinct but are dynamically interrelated in the resolution
These experiences come
of drives. This means that Freud’s model is a conflict model, based on the
together to form a sense of
our continuity in time and
relationships (dynamics) between the three levels as they try to negotiate a
place. Consciousness is a process for psychic equilibrium around drive conflicts. Jung’s concept of the
reflection of the ego, structure of the psyche is quite different. His is not a conflict model, rather he
the ‘I’ of our being in sees the elements of the psyche as working together in a progressive journey
the world. of growth towards individuation.
Ego. The ego or
Consciousness
‘I’ is the centre of
consciousness, and as
Consciousness is the range of experience of which we are aware (Jung 1986).
such it constitutes the These experiences come together to form a sense of our continuity in time
contents of consciousness. and place. Consciousness is a reflection of our ego, the ‘I’ of our being in the
Consciousness is only world. The ego or I is the centre of consciousness, and as such it constitutes
aware of the experiences the contents of consciousness. Jung calls this the ego-complex. (We will
of the conscious ego. discuss his idea of complexes when we look at the relationship between the
Post-analytic thinking has
complexes, the personal unconscious and the archetypes.) In other words,
taken the concept further
and postulates, like Freud,
consciousness is only aware of the experiences of the conscious ego. Post-
that the ego is also partly analytic thinking has taken the concept further and postulates, like Freud,
unconscious. that the ego is also partly unconscious (Jung, 1983; 1986).
Ego-complex. The term by Personal unconscious

which Jung indicates that The personal unconscious is the reservoir of our own forgotten or re-
the ‘I’ is the centre
pressed experiences. This is not the same concept as Freud’s unconscious.
of consciousness.
Freud’s unconscious contains the id—phylogenetically inherited material
Personal unconscious. that can never be made conscious and material which is repressed due to
The reservoir of our own conflict. Jung sees the unconscious as ontogenetically constituted and it can,
forgotten or repressed in principle, be made conscious. Whereas Freud’s phylogenetic uncon-
experiences. Unlike scious is firmly located within humankind’s historical development, and
Freud’s ‘unconscious’,
which contains the PHOTO: JACKI WATTS
phylogenetically
constituted id, Jung’s
concept is ontogenetically
constituted and can,
in principle, be
made conscious.
Phylogenetic.
The development of
a species or group.
Ontogenetic. The devel-

opment of an individual
from an ovum to maturity.
Marriage is an initiation rite symbolising separation from parents and the start of a
new procreative unity.
within its cultural taboos, Jung’s ontogenetic focus emphasises the indi- Collective unconscious.
vidual’s development. Jung’s focus is upon the personal context for what has An inherited part of the
psyche, which is shared
become unconscious.
by all humans and which
is responsible for the
Collective unconscious patterning of behaviours
The idea of the collective unconscious (Jung, 1983) is Jung’s unique con- that occurs across cultures
tribution. By this concept he postulates an inherited part of the psyche, which and races. Jung postulates
is shared by all humans. It is a patterning of behaviours that occurs across this concept in an attempt
cultures and races. He postulates this concept in an attempt to account for to account for the striking
structural similarities in
the striking structural similarities in behaviour and experience that we see
behaviour and experience
across all cultures. Regardless of where one is in the world, there are human that we see across
interactions and behaviours that are universally common. This suggests that all cultures.
there are organising principles that account for us being human. These are
revealed in events such as the initiation rituals of birth, entry into adult-
hood, marriage and death.
By definition then, the universality of the collective unconscious is of Consciousness
limitless extent and depth and possibility. We are born deeply unconscious
and this experience provides the matrix out of which consciousness, and
thus the ego, will develop. It is also the matrix to which we return in sleep. Preconscious
Sleep is the place of dreaming. Through the dream experience we are in complexes
contact with the wisdom of the collective unconscious. Jung’s positive view
of man’s unconscious sets him apart from Freud and other psychoanalytic
Collective unconscious
theorists. He postulates that forces within the collective unconscious guide
archetypes
a journey towards individuation. (These ideas will unfold as we go along.)
Dreams, for Jung, are thus the fundamental processes through which
personal growth occurs, as it is through our dreams that we have access
Figure 11.1 The three
to the guiding forces of archetypal energies—the wisdom and history of levels of the structure
our ancestors. of the psyche.
Symbols
The circle is the most universal of all symbols. The unbroken line
represents perfection, eternity, and the never-ending cycle of
creation, death and regeneration.
The Tai-chi is a circle enclosing the yin and yang, the two
opposing but complementary forces of creation. They are often
thought of as male and female. Around the Tai-chi are the Eight
Trigrams. In Chinese divination, these are the magic symbols
used to determine the balance of cosmic forces.
The uroborus is a symbol of a dragon or a snake swallowing its
tail. It is an ancient symbol that is found as far apart in the world
as West Africa and central America. With the beginning (the
mouth) and the end (the tail) at the same point, it represents an
eternal cycle of destruction and simultaneous regeneration.
Complexes. Complexes
The personalised psychic The idea of complexes arose from Jung’s work with word association.
structures, found within He found that individuals displayed specific identifiable themes, unique
the personal unconscious,
to each individual, in their associations to stimulus words (Jung, 1986). The
which act as organising
principles. A complex
concept of the complex was Jung’s way of linking some fascinating observations.
clusters the effects of He noted that there appear to be universal themes common to all humankind,
several archetypal patterns such as loving, hating, desiring, raging, abandoning, engulfing, etc. He
with personal experience postulated that these strata of experiencing arose from a deeply unconscious
and affect (emotion). level of experience, which is the collective unconscious. Jung also noted that each
individual experienced these common themes in completely individual
ways. Therefore a system was in place that allowed these collective themes
to be expressed in an individual fashion. Thus he postulated that a personal
unconscious exists and that the individual nature of these universal themes is
expressed from this personal level of experiencing.
The personal unconscious is thus the centre from which the organisation
of the complexes occurs. The complexes co-ordinate the personal dimension
of being human with the collective dimensions of being human. Jung
postulated that personal experiences throughout life cluster around archetypal
energies. Events in childhood, and especially internal conflict, provide the
personal aspects of the way the archetypal core is organised and experienced
in adult life.
Thus we may define the complexes as the personalised psychic struc-
tures, found within the personal unconscious, which act as organising
principles. A complex clusters together the effects of several archetypal
patterns with personal experience and affect (emotion). Experience tends
to gather round the complexes and is mediated (organised and understood)
through them. Complexes are the personalised and integrated psychic
organising principles that emerge out of the relations between archetypal
potentialities and the personal experiences of the personal unconscious. As
a personalised and integrated psychic structure, a complex is an organising
function that makes sense of particular archetypal energies in the themes
of everyday life. Jung emphasises that the themes will accord with the
experiences of an individual, that is, within a particular life experience.
Thus a complex results from a blend of archetypal core experience and
human experience and it is through the complex that meaning is given to
certain archetypal energies.
This notion of the complexes links Jung with all other psychoanalytic
theorists who postulate that there are central internal organising princi-
ples that influence the way we are able to live our lives and interact with
others. For Freud, these were the influences of fixations, for Klein the
relative strengths of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, and for
Winnicott the mediation of the false self.
In line with his positive view of humankind’s potential, Jung saw
growth as occurring through the process of bringing to consciousness the
archetypal energies that organise or structure our existence. As long as the
complexes remain unconscious they will exert unconscious influences on
our lives and we will remain unaware of them. Jung maintains that an
individual’s most habitual complexes are the ‘tender spots of the psyche,
which react most quickly to an external stimulus or disturbance’ (Jung,
1990: 28). Free association or word association (his old research tool) will
thus inevitably lead one to the ‘critical secret thoughts’ of the individual.
Archetypes
Jung (1986) initially used the term ‘primordial images’. His thinking included
the idea that in the development of the human mind we still retained the
fundamental biological, prehistoric and unconscious aspects of archaic
humanity. These archaic remnants would provide our most primitive
but essential foundations of how to be human. He termed these remnants
‘projected memories’. (Jung’s concept of memories is similar to Klein’s
notion of phantasy, that is, a reservoir of innate knowledge of the object of
the instincts, such as breasts, nipples, and suchlike.) He conceptualised this
archaic foundation as providing primordial or archaic tendencies to organise
ourselves as human. These tendencies, he postulated, are observable as inherent
tendencies to form representations or images or symbols about experience
and behaviour. Importantly, it is not the representations that are inherited.
What is inherited is a tendency to organise behaviour or experience in certain
ways. Thus these tendencies influence each culture to form representations
of what is essentially our primordial or archaic inheritance. The tendency
to represent leads to images that indicate universal modes of experience and
behaviour. He was later to term these influences archetypes. Archetypes.
Jung (1990) explains that, in archaic times, man did not reflect upon his The typical patterns of
symbols; symbols were lived and were unconsciously animated by their meaning. human adaptations,
which have been passed
Think of any symbol that permeates your culture. You will find that once you
on through phylogenetic
start to investigate the mythology of the symbol, its origin proves to be rooted history. The actual form
in some action or deed. Bushman cave paintings capture this dynamic, that is, in which the archetype
deeds [hunting] originally motivated by affect (emotion). Another example is will be realised or lived
that fear of a new guest at the supper table, who might stab you for your lands is dependent upon the
or your wife and child, led to the custom of placing all weapons on the right- environmental and
hand side of the eater. In that way any attempt to use the weapons would be historical contexts of the
individual. Thus, while the
visible. It is now customary in Western culture to place the table knife on the
archetypes have unlimited
right hand side. universal potentialities,
The closer the image is to an archetypal core, the greater will be the how they come to be
emotional impact. Perhaps one of the most emotionally charged archetypal lived in an individual's life
behaviours is contained within the ceremonies of a wedding. Clear symbolic is always defined by the
acts that are linked to the fears and anxieties of a tribe are revealed in the culture and the particulars
ceremonies. For example, the couple needs to be protected in their separation of that individual's
personal life history.
from the parents, hence the giving of gifts. The vulnerability of a woman
in defending herself is symbolised in the vows exchanged in traditional
marriages where the husband is expected to look after her. The woman
must protect the working of the marriage for the peaceful continuance of the
tribe; she thus makes vows of obedience and commitment to her husband
and his will. Another rich example is death and its elaborate ceremonies that
attempt to allay our fears of dying and confirm our hope in the afterlife. Here
we see formalised partying, eating and giving of gifts either from the dead
person, as in bequests, or gifts to the dead as in the laying of flowers or fun-
eral wreaths. All these actions symbolise our hopes and fears about dying.
By 1919, Jung was using the term archetype to designate the inherited,
unknowable nucleus, ‘a system of readiness for action’ (1983). The arche-
types are the typical patterns of human adaptations that have been passed on
through phylogenetic history. The actual form in which the archetype will be
realised or lived is dependent upon the environmental and historical contexts
of the individuals. Thus, while the archetypes have unlimited universal
potentialities, how they come to be lived in an individual’s life is always
structured through the culture and the particulars of that individual’s personal
life history. The complex bridges the universal and the particular. Jung (1990)
gives the example of two men he was seeing as patients. One of them, a shy
young man, dreamed of jumping over a wide water channel. Other men in his
dream fell into the water. The other, a convalescent old man, who was proving
to be a very difficult patient, had a very similar dream of jumping over a water
channel. Jung observes that the dream of the young man encourages him in
the belief that he can do something that he consciously thinks he cannot.
The dream of the old man, on the other hand, offers a different wisdom. The
dream indicates that what he is doing is foolhardy in relation to his being an
old man and that he is not acting in ways that are appropriate. It signifies that
being a difficult patient is foolhardy.
Myth as archetypal tendency
In studying myths and folklore you will Anansi, the spider trickster who, while his
see that the same themes occur across all behaviour is not always moral, will usually
cultures. Myth is thought to capture manage to outwit his opponents
humanity’s attempts to tell the stories of (Dagomba people from West Africa); the
its development. These stories present Aboriginal myth of Malu, the red Kangaroo
evolutionary themes about how people who left caves, rocks and creeks to mark
have managed to master and engage with his journey across Australia; the Chinese
their surroundings. In this they convey Hare who mixes the elixir of life with his
the archetypal themes that have patterned mortar and pestle, and the North
humanity’s development. American tale of Coyote who stole fire
One such theme is the construction of from the gods to give it to humans.
the various myths about heroes or Shakespeare’s plays also contain the
tricksters. They are usually stories about trickster in such characters as the clown
animals that have heroic characteristics but in Twelfth Night, Trinculo the jester in
also tend to be cunning tricksters. Some The Tempest and Touchstone the clown
examples of tricksters include the tale of in As You Like It. These characters, while
the Praying Mantis who brought fire to acting as fools or jesters, articulate the
humanity (South West Africa); the tale of wisdom or moral of the play.
A very important distinction that Jung (1983) makes is that there is a sharp
distinction between the archetype and the archetypal image. The archetype, as
such, is never knowable. It is part of the collective unconscious and offers
only a tendency with regard to the organising of experience. The archetypal
image, however, is knowable. It is the means whereby the tendency is
given expression. This expression is made manifest through such media as
ceremonies, behaviours, symbols, etc. An example of such an archetypal
image is the family. The formation of the family is an archetypal tendency,

seen in all cultures, which serves to protect and unite people for the pro-
creation of the species or the tribe.
Hierarchy of archetypes
Since archetypes provide the organising tendencies for being human, we
can review the archetypal images by examining the developmental hier-
archy of archetypal influences. The infant, initially, is absorbed within the
total and unconscious self archetype, part of the collective unconscious. The
self is thus the very centre of being. Out of this centre arises the ego archetype.
The ego slowly develops out of the collective unconscious, that is, from
the totality of the self. The ego emerges as fragments from the collective
unconscious and gradually coheres with ‘good-enough’ interpersonal
experiences. Such coherence entails the integration of psychic functions,
the personalisation of archetypal images and themes, and the development
of a personal identity and boundary. The ego comes to contain what is
conscious and what is concerned with living with others in a shared world.
The ego presides over the processes of becoming conscious of thinking,
knowing, and being able to live autonomously. The ego allows desire
and ambition to be fulfilled and takes us into a world where we share the
collective ideals of our culture (Jung, 1983; 1986; 1990).
In childhood, archetypal images are related to in projected form and in a Projection. The psychical
concrete way. The child is unable to see the mother in her unique personality. process whereby qualities
To the child, the mother is the archetypal mother; she is the incarnate of all of the self are seen as
embodied in another.
that mothers ought to be. Much of the work in psychotherapy deals with the
difference between the client’s relations to images of the archetypal mother,
and their actual relations to the real mother. It is sometimes the case that
great disappointment in the mother is related to fantasies of the archetypal
mother, who is experienced as all good or all bad. Once these archetypal
influences have been worked through, the client is able to appreciate that the
mother, while fallible, was still a loving mother.
Persona
Through development, the child must learn to conform to societal Persona. This archetype
norms. The persona archetype is the social mask that develops in order to is the social mask that
enable the containment of strong, primitive emotions and impulses. develops to enable the
containment of strong,
There is a need for the persona archetype, as it allows one to adapt to the
primitive emotions
demands and cultural needs of one’s society and culture. The danger of and impulses.
the persona is that one can become too closely identified with the mask and act
as if it were the real self. In such an instance one has become inflated with Shadow. The archetype
the persona and may lose the capacity to integrate the wholeness of one’s self. that contains whatever
(Inflation will be discussed when we look at pathology.) is unacceptable to one’s
culture and also to
Shadow one’s self, such as moral
issues like greed, envy,
In our attempt to adapt to our cultural norms, we also develop the shadow
prejudice and racism.
archetype. The shadow contains whatever is unacceptable to our culture and It also contains repressed
also to our self. These unacceptable aspects often entail moral issues such as aspects of instinctual life
greed, envy, prejudice and racism. The shadow also often contains repressed such as sexuality
aspects of instinctual life that are intended for survival, such as sexuality and aggression.
and aggression. These are perhaps aspects about which we are ashamed
and which we attempt to hide, both from others and ourselves. As shadow
aspects we often project them onto others, seeing others as the embodiment
of those aspects that are too difficult for us to face in our selves. Life is full
of examples of people who project their shadow onto others. Prejudice is a
process whereby aspects repressed within one’s own sense of self are projected
onto another race or culture. You can come to know about your own shadow
by taking note of any strongly held negative belief about other people. These
negative beliefs are the basis of your own shadow, which you have projected
onto others. The therapeutic process attempts to move away from judgemen-
tal attitudes towards the shadow and to try to integrate these qualities into
the self. Integration of one’s shadow is an aspect of the individuation process.
Integration of the shadow
A dreamer dreams that she has been abandoned by their families and that they
cornered in a cul-de-sac by a group of must suffer great despair. In relation to her
street children. Her immediate thoughts are own life, she too had shown remarkable
that such children are dirty and are thieves. resilience in overcoming severe childhood
Further exploration reveals that she also trauma. She had split off and projected
sees that they show remarkable resilience onto the street children her own abandon-
in surviving their harsh lives. What finally ment and despair. These were shadow
emerges in her amplifications on the street emotions, which she had been too afraid to
children is that they have been fatally embrace in response to her own situation.
Animus and anima

Animus/anima. During childhood and adolescence, physiological and social pressures influ-
The contra-sexual ence the development of sex role and gender identities. Jung (1983) postulates
archetypes. Animus is Latin that these identities are intimately involved in archetypal male and feminine
for mind or intellect, while
images. He proposes the concept of the contra-sexual archetypes: the animus
anima is Latin for soul or
breath. In colloquial usage
and anima archetypes. Animus is Latin for mind or intellect, while anima is
(following Jung) they are Latin for soul or breath. In Jung’s adaptation, they are the masculine aspects
the masculine aspect in in women (animus) and the feminine aspects in men (anima).
women (animus) and The contra-sexual archetypes are based upon both the collective and
the feminine aspect the personal unconscious. Thus a man will carry with him images
in men (anima). of the feminine arising from the archetypal tendencies of the collective
unconscious. These could be typical images such as the ‘virgin’, the
‘whore’, the ‘Madonna’, ‘the girl child’, etc. He will also have his personal
experiences of his mother, sisters, lovers, friends and societal images of women.
The same process holds true for women. It is possible that one’s shadow
can be projected as the qualities of our contra-sexual archetype. In such
a situation you might experience your partner as containing the hated,
despised aspects of your own rejected contra-sexual archetype. An example
might be a man who fears being dependent and emotional. He projects
these aspects onto women and then fears and hates them for what he
sees as their emotionality and dependence. A passive woman might fear
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON

her dominant husband. She has projected
her own assertive, aggressive abilities. Her
shadow contains these potentially helpful
qualities but she has rejected them and
projects them onto her husband. Thus,
while he may be a dominant man, she
inflates his dominance into fearful
proportions. What is important is that
these projections comprise aspects of one’s
self. Therefore, while the projections
might find likely ‘hosts’ for themselves
(we will always find people who fit the
projection in some way), they are not the
truth about the other.
Another way in which the contra-
sexual archetype tendency might be rea- The young hero forging his
lised is through identification with the archetypal image. Identifying with way in the world. The hero
archetypal images of the masculine and the feminine might result in stereo- breaks ties with the mother
typical portrayals. An example might be an animus-possessed woman. She archetype and goes out into
the world of adventure.
has become identified with the masculine and is ‘more man than a man’. An
anima-possessed man might be a ‘screaming queen’ in gay circles.
The contra-sexual archetypes themselves often appear in projections
onto real men and women, thus potentially facilitating empathy and
understanding of the opposite sex. Integration of the animus in women
allows a capacity for logical intellectual thought and assertion balanced with
the feminine. Integration of the anima in men allows for the capacity for
feelings and emotions balanced with the masculine. Some cultural norms
make integration difficult. Some cultures or societies do not support the
emancipation of women; neither do they support the notion of men being
informed by their emotional side. The ‘metro-sexual man’ does not do well
in a beer-drinking, rugby-oriented society. In a similar way, an assertive,
ambitious, logical woman does not do well in a culture that requires her to be
The variety of archetypes
Jung identified only a small number of often the subject of stories, myths and art.
archetypes. Post-Jungian writers have Read the myths of a number of cultures
identified many more, such as the divine and you will find that they contain stories
child, the eternal youth, the Oedipal child, that have the same themes, such as
the earth mother, the hero, death, birth creation, keepers of light and darkness,
and rebirth, the wise old man or woman fertility stories, elements of nature, heroes
and the wounded healer. These archetypes and tricksters, death and rebirth. These
are universal potentialities but their realisa- myths chronicle humankind’s continual
tion occurs within a cultural context and is quest to understand the organising
further differentiated by the particulars of principles that govern the condition of
family life and experience. These images are being human or the meanings of life.
Self. The archetype of

all archetypes, the self
submissive and subservient, where her place is ‘children, kitchen, and church’.
for Jung is the centre and For growth to occur, the contra-sexual archetypes need to be balanced and
the totality, the source integrated. Where this is missing, there is neglect of the whole self.
and the goal of human
life. The self is part of the Self
collective unconcious as Jung (1990) saw the self as the archetype of all archetypes. By this he means
the goal of individuation.
that the self is the centre, source and totality [the collective unconscious] as
It is the prime agent
in the production
well as the goal of human life. Remember that he sees the self as the initial
of deep spiritual unconscious state of the infant. Consciousness emerges out of this matrix
numinous symbols. of the unconscious by means of symbols, which for Jung are the purpo-
sive, healing inventions of the self archetype. The self has a teleological
Symbols. The purposive, (purposive) healing function. Throughout life, the self is the overarching
healing inventions of the ordering tendency for all other archetypal experiences. The widening and
self archetype.
deepening of consciousness, through progressive integration of archetypal
Telelogical. Purposive,
energies, is the goal of the self. The aim of this integration is ultimately the
indicating that something progressive integration of the self.
has a final cause. Thus the self is understood to be both the source and the goal of
human life. In Jung’s terms, the self is mysterious and divine. How else
Opposites. Archetypal are we to understand this uniquely human capacity for self-realisation
themes occur as pairs and movement towards a spiritual realm? Jung (1990) sometimes sees
of opposites such as
the self as the archetype whose special function is to balance and pattern
outside-inside, self-other,
male-female. Resolution
not only other archetypes but all of a person’s life in terms of purposes
of opposites brings about not yet considered nor lived. What raises the self above the patterning
individuation. An example of other archetypes is its function as synthesiser and mediator of the
would be the integration opposites within the psyche. Jung (1990) also sees the self as the prime
of the shadow and the agent in the production of deep, awesome, numinous [spiritual] symbols.
persona, or of the animus These symbols are of a self-regulatory and healing nature. A numinous
and the anima.
experience verges on a sense of the inspirational or the divine. Such an
Numinous symbols.
experience is one that is powerful, awesome, mysterious, and not able
Symbols of a self- to be described exactly. Such an experience could be the inspirational
regulatory and healing feeling some people have when standing on top of a mountain or seeing a
nature. A numinous beautiful sunset, moments that capture a sense of completeness and unity
experience verges on the with the universe. Jung held a positive view of the potential of the self as
sense of the inspirational. an innate potential for growth and individuation as an integrated person.
Thus Jung saw individuation as an instinct that will occur with or without
the person’s assistance. According to Jung, maturity is host to the many
faces of the self which occur to consciousness.
The dynamics of personality
The role of opposites

Freud had postulated psychic motivation as dependent upon the conflicts
inherent within the drives. Kleinian and later object relations theorists
moved the conceptualisation of psychic motivation into a relational realm.
At the time that Klein (and Fairbairn) was working out her theory, Jung was
also postulating that the motivation for psychic activity was primarily relational.
The focus on relational motivations was one of the principal developments
in post-Freudian thinking. This focus moved psychic motivation from a
drive-conflict model to an emphasis on relational dynamics. Jung postulated
that relational needs express themselves through conflict and resolution of

opposite archetypal tendencies.
Psychic activity
Archetypes express built-in polarities between positive and negative
aspects of experience and emotion. Consider for example the persona
and the shadow, the animus and the anima. The impact of the archetypal
image depends to a great extent on the way in which environmental
experience blends with or mediates the archetypal imagery. In ordinary
development, such mediation will prevent too extreme a concentration at
one or other end of the polar continuum—either inflation or alienation. Inflation.
(We shall examine these conditions presently.) If real experience rein- Inflation develops when
forces either extreme, the individual is hooked onto only one end of the the environment has
reinforced one extreme of
range of archetypal possibilities. An example of this might be the belief
the archetype. This is the
that the persona is the real self. By contrast, the resolution of opposites situation in which the ego
brings about individuation. An example of such resolution would be the has become too identified
integration of the shadow and persona, or of the animus and anima. Jung with the archetypal
(1986) maintains that difficult times in one’s life are often turning points energy; the identification
when one is working out archetypal activity towards a resolution. is of such an extent that
the ego is engulfed by
the archetype.
Individuation and the self
Individuation is the process of becoming an individual, the move towards Alienation. The situation
wholeness through the integration of conscious and unconscious aspects of in which the ego becomes
the personality. Conflict is an inevitable condition of the polarities of life. detached from the life-
Individuation occurs through acceptance and integration of these polarities, giving archetypal energies
such as the shadow and the persona, and the two contra-sexual aspects. and life loses its meaning.
Individuation for Jung was not an elimination of conflict, but rather
an increased consciousness of conflict and its potential. The self becomes an
image of a more complete person, as well as being the goal of life. This is the
attaining or realising of one’s self (Jung, 1983; 1986; 1990).
In the process of individuation, the ego ideal is given up in favour of
self-acceptance. Remember that the ego is the centre of consciousness. Thus
the ego ideal is taken up with the ego archetype. It is concerned with the
outer aspirations of the ego, with collective aspirations. These could be aspects
such as ambition, achievement, family, and friends. With individuation, there
is withdrawal from these collective foci of the ego. The collective ego norms
are replaced with the self as an inner guide.
There are basically two stages of adult development—the morning and
afternoon of life. The transition from one to the other is often, but not always,
heralded by a mid-life crisis. In the morning of one’s life the focus is on the de-
velopment of the ego. The ego, the ‘I’, will establish a social identity (persona)
and forge a place in the world, independent of parents. The ego has primacy
and functions with a consciousness immersed in the collective consciousness
of social conformity. The ego is thus taken up with collective norms. The
morning of one’s life lasts until about the mid-forties or fifties (Jung, 1983).
In the afternoon of life there is a move towards the realisation of the self,
and the self becomes the new centre of psychological life. Individuation
is often associated with this latter stage of life, with realisation of the self as
its goal. Just as the depth of the collective unconscious is unfathomable and
limitless, self-realisation is never complete and thus individuation, as a fixed

or attainable state, cannot be achieved. One is always on the way towards
individuation (Jung, 1983).
The journey to the self, or individuation, will occur even if one is not
consciously concerned with fostering one’s own development. Clearly,
however, there are great ad-
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
vantages in being consciously

and actively aware of this
striving towards growth and
individuation. The process
occurs through the workings
of dreams and the integration
of the archetypes.
There have been a number
of people in our history whom
we might consider to demon-
strate having attained a high
level of individuation. Gandhi
and Mandela probably exem-
plify such people. They are
We commemorate the dead
people who have been able to
through belief in a spiritual hold true to their self in the face of enormous pressure from the outer world
afterlife. Jung postulated to conform to ego norms and aspirations.
that the quest for spirituality
was the quest of the self Stages in the individuation process
archetype.
Nearly all Jung’s work after 1916, when he first used the term individuation,
was concerned with amplifications on this central theme (1983). The process of
individuation can be represented along a chronological spectrum as follows.
First there is birth and early childhood. Initially, archetypal themes are largely
undifferentiated as pairs of opposites such as outside-inside, self-other, male-
female. The self is largely experienced in relation to the Great Mother archetype
that is projected upon the actual mother or the primary caregiver.
The role of the ego is dominant in early development and young
adulthood. This is the time, as we have seen, when the individual is concerned
with the establishment of identity and fitting in with societal norms and
ambitions. The ego is thus concerned with what is conscious and collective
in society. Throughout childhood, adolescence and young adulthood, the ego
develops, giving a sense of identity and growing autonomy to the individual.
In order to achieve this autonomy, the Great Mother archetype must be
overcome. The individual must break the tie to an archetypal mother. Thus
the hero archetype must slay the dragon that keeps the hero young and afraid,
and embark upon a journey of self-discovery.
The father archetype, as the spiritual principle, counteracts the regres-
sive longings for the Great Mother and unconsciousness. The father
opens up a world beyond the mother. Here Jung sees the significance of
the Oedipus complex. Where a child is unfortunate enough to have an
Oedipal victory, it is locked into pre-Oedipal primitiveness. The child
then cannot afford to slay the dragon and move into the world, for there
is no world beyond the mother. Negotiation of the Oedipus complex
opens up the triumph of rationality over instinct and the child’s appro-
priation of the human cultural order.
The development of the persona is the compromise that links identity
with the needs of society. Where there is too close an identification, there is
an immersion in the anonymity of collective life. True individuality and
consciousness is founded upon dialogue with the self. Severe and persistent
identification with the persona leads to crisis. Jung postulates that this
crisis will tend to happen in mid-life when the individual realises that who
they are in a world of collective consciousness is no longer fulfilling. Many
individuals attempt to solve the crisis by changing their circumstances. This,
however, does not solve the problem. It is just more of the same. Jung suggests
that the crisis is actually the call to give up this immersion in a life of social
consciousness—that is, the collective norms of the ego—and embark upon a
journey of self-discovery. This is essentially a journey of aloneness, where one
finds values and meanings that are personal and individual. The essence of
these values and meanings, Jung postulates, will be spiritual in nature. This is
based upon the notion that the self is indistinguishable from the God-image
and the goal of individuation is spiritual wholeness.
Jung’s theory of symbols

Jung (1990) viewed symbol creation as central to the understanding of
human nature. He explored the correspondences between symbols arising
from the life struggles of individuals and the symbolic images underlying
religious, mythological, and magical systems of many cultures and eras.
Jung hypothesises that psychological functioning is largely the work of
symbolic activity. Symbols of totality are symbols of the self. Characteristical-
ly, he postulates that the symbol expresses a conflict in a manner that also helps
to resolve it. Some symbols operate consciously, but others require a symbolic
attitude before they are perceived and experienced as symbols. Whether it is
conscious or unconscious, Jung conceives symbolic activity as the content of
psychological functioning. The symbolic nature of dreams thus gives us direct
access to the content of psychological functioning. The symbol, according to
Jung, is the best possible formulation of relatively unknown psychic contents
which cannot be, or are not, known to consciousness. He describes symbolic
Symbols of the self

As the self symbolises the infinitude of the archetypes, anything
postulated to be greater than oneself can become a symbol
of the self—for example Christ or Buddha. Symbols of the self
are often exemplified by the mandala, the ‘magical circle’. The
appearance of a mandala symbol in dreams is seen to express
not only potential integration but also to contribute to the self-
healing capacities of the psyche. This is an important concept.
Jung postulates that healing and individuation occur through the
workings of symbolic activity in our dreams, creativity and daily
life—whether we take note or not.
experiences as numinous, which means that they are powerful, awesome,

mysterious, and not able to be described exactly. Humanist psychologists
would call these ‘peak experiences’.
Types of pathology
There are several possibilities for pathology, each of which reflects imbalance
or lack of integration in the relationship to archetypal energy (Jung, 1983).
Inflation
Where the environment has reinforced one extreme of the archetype,
inflation develops. This means that the ego has become too identified with
the archetypal energy. The identification can be so complete that the ego
is engulfed by the archetype. Psychosis would reflect this state, in which the
ego is engulfed and fragmented, and at the mercy of archetypal powers.
In psychosis the individual is so inflated with the archetype that contact with
reality is lost. This is the condition seen in schizophrenia.
In less extreme forms of inflation, the person acts out the archetypal
energies. These energies define the person and preclude the possibility of
integrating the total person. An example that we may find in everyday life
is the woman who has no life other than in her children. She is inflated
with the mother archetype and is not connected to her larger personality or self.
Another common example is the man who is a philanderer; he is unable to
make commitments and may be inflated with the peura eterna archetype—the
youth who never grows up. Inflation with the persona would indicate that
Participation mystique.
The situation in which the
one has become identified with the persona as the whole of the personality.
ego becomes fused with
archetypal reality. The Participation mystique
ego struggles to find an Jung’s ideas offer a helpful approach to certain pathological phenomena such
adequate differentiation as cult involvement and cult leaders. He terms this pathology participation
between inner and outer mystique. Participation mystique reflects a situation where the ego becomes
reality. The conscious
fused with archetypal reality. Unlike inflation, where the ego is potentially
capacities of the ego
remain but they are fused
engulfed and disintegrated by the archetype, in participation mystique the ego
with the unconscious struggles to find an adequate differentiation between inner and outer real-
realities of the archetype. ity. The ego becomes fused with the archetype. Thus the conscious capacities
of the ego remain but they are fused with the unconscious realities of the ar-
Neurosis. The concept of chetype. An example of participation mystique is a cult leader who becomes
neurosis, for Jung, refers fused with (or participates in) a myth. The theme of the myth is usually about
to the situation in which
a saviour or a great leader. The cult leader becomes fused with this myth
the ego misguidedly
but heroically fights
and lives as if he or she were this mythical leader.
the changes that the
archetypes are trying Neurosis
to bring about within the Freud sees neurosis as the ego’s compromise between the strivings of the
total personality structure. id and the censorship of the superego. As the id presses for discharge,
Through the ego’s anxiety signals the ego into action. When such action does not resolve
resistance of
the problem, the symptom then becomes the disguised means whereby
the changes that are
indicated, the potentialities
the ego can satisfy both the id and the superego. The symptom thus
of the archetypal core are holds the meaning of the conflict.
prevented from Jung’s (1986) formulation is similar to Freud’s. Jung also saw the
being realised. symptom as holding the secret of cure in its meaning. However, Jung’s
formulation differs fundamentally over the nature of the psychic energy

pressing for expression. Whereas Freud has the dangerous id pressing
for discharge, Jung postulates archetypal energy pressing for expression.
In the Jungian sense, archetypal energy is not of itself dangerous. It is in
fact the seat of wisdom. It is our relation to this archetypal energy that is
the potential problem.
For Jung, in neurosis, the ego misguidedly but heroically fights the
changes that the archetypes are trying to bring about within the total
personality structure. Through the ego’s resistance of the changes that
are indicated, the potentialities of the archetypal core are prevented
from being realised. In Jung’s view of the innate strivings towards
individuation, the changes that the archetype indicates and strives to
bring about are steeped in wisdom, yet the ego is afraid of the power of
the self and the archetype and resists these changes.
An example of such neurosis may be obsessive behaviour that indi-
cates the struggle of the ego to keep chaos at bay. The ego cannot allow
the experience of chaos to impart its wisdom and be integrated into
the total personality. It may be that the individual’s life had contained
too much chaos either in the external or internal world. Now there is a
desperate fight against allowing the chaos its expression. Thus, instead
of integrating the potential wisdom of chaos, the individual must
defend against it by obsessively tidying and ordering life’s experiences.
Alienation
In alienation the ego becomes detached from the life-giving archetypal
energies and life loses its meaning. Jung believed that the plight of modern
society is that we have become alienated from our collective unconscious
and our spiritual domain. Suicidal people have become alienated from
archetypal energies. They no longer feel that the patterns and organising
symbols of life have any meaning. Adolescence is a time of potential
alienation where adolescents question the received wisdom of the culture
and society. Adolescence is the period of life when most suicides occur.
The integrating of despair and alienation offers a renewed vigour and
optimism about life as a young adult.
Psychological types
Jung (1983) postulates that each individual can be characterised as
either primarily outwardly or inwardly oriented. Extroversion and
introversion, respectively, are his terms for these attitudes towards
stimulation (or the world). Clearly it is rare for an individual to be
only extroverted or only introverted. However, individuals may tend
towards one or other habitual attitude.
The extroverted type

The extroverted attitude is characterised in a person by an outward flow
of libido, an interest in events, people and things. The individual has
a relationship with, and a dependence upon, these stimuli. When the
attitude is habitual, this is the extroverted type—an individual who is
motivated by outside factors and greatly influenced by the environment.
Extroverted types may then be characterised by:
• qualities of sociability and confidence,

• a tendency to be active in trying to shape the world according to
their patterns,
• superficiality,
• an inability or dislike for being alone,
• a tendency to find self-reflection morbid, hence possible lack of self-
criticism or insight,
• typically being more popular with the world than with their own
family, and
• a tendency to be conventional.
The introverted type

This attitude is characterised by libido flowing inwards to subjective factors.
The major motivation is inner necessity. When the attitude is habitual, this is
the introverted type, which is characterised by:
• independent judgement and values,

• a tendency to be at their best when alone or in small groups,
• a preference for reflection rather than activity,
• a lack of confidence in relation to others,
• sensitivity to criticism, and
• a tendency to be over-conscientious, pessimistic and critical.
Each type undervalues the other, seeing mainly weakness. The

extrovert sees the introvert as egotistical and dull. The introvert sees
the extrovert as superficial and insincere. These attitudes clearly reflect
the shadow aspects of each type. These differences may cause difficulties
in relationships and marriages, especially as there seems to be a tendency
to be attuned to the opposite type. If the relationship is to move beyond
the ‘being in love’ phase, there will be inevitable difficulties. Merely being
tolerant of one another is not the answer, according to Jung. This will
only lead to deadness and perhaps violent warfare between the couple.
Jung proposes that what is needed is far-reaching development of each
personality. This would mean the integration of the split-off and pro-
jected parts ‘held’ by the partner.
Functions of psychological types

Each psychological type uses what Jung terms the most developed function.
Jung postulates four functions that we use to orientate ourselves towards
the world and also towards our own inner reality:
• thinking: organising meaning and understanding through thought,

• feeling: understanding through assessing and judging values,
• intuition: sensing future or past possibilities and organising
information about the atmosphere that surrounds all experience, and
• sensation: perception through the senses.
Each function can be experienced in either an extroverted or an intro-

verted way. Most people use one function, while more complex individuals
use two. People who are more individuated may use three while the use of
all four functions lies in the domain of highly individuated people. These
individuals have reconciled their opposing trends.
Rational functions
The functions of thinking and feeling are rational functions that arise from
the level of consciousness.
Thinking
Where thinking is the dominant function, we may see the extroverted
thinker as characterised by:
• the drawing of conclusions based upon facts,

• the use of formulae to express views,
• a life strategy based upon principles,
• a view of the self as rational, logical and correct,
• a tendency to ignore things that do not fit,
• a fear of the irrational,
• the repression of emotions and feelings, and
• the tendency to neglect friendships, to be ‘in and out’ of relationships.
The unconscious takes revenge through a number of ways. The

repressed feelings burst through in unfortunate love affairs with unsuitable
partners. There may be moods that are denied; there may also be some-
thing noble about the individual, but they lack warmth and tolerance.
By contrast we may see the introverted thinker as characterised by:
• a tendency to value ideas over facts, the inner over the outer,
• a quality of being at odds with the world, especially since they
often pay little attention to nurturing their general relationship
to the outside world.
The inferior function for the thinking type is feeling.
Feeling
Jung has an interesting understanding of feeling. Feeling is not an
emotion; rather it is a function by which values are weighed, accepted, or
refused. (Any function can lead over to emotion, which is then a conse-
quence, but not the function.) Thus to say, ‘it feels right’ is to be using the
feeling function.
Where feeling is the dominant function, we may see that the extroverted
type is characterised by:
• a tendency to be well adjusted to the environment,

• a strong feminine principle,
• good personal relationships,
• charming, soothing qualities, a desire to help,

• (at best) being sympathetic, helpful and charming, and
• (at worst) being superficial and insincere.
By contrast, the introverted type, where feeling is the dominant function,

is characterised by:
• a tendency to appear cold and reserved,

• being constant and reliable both in relationships and in work, and
• the capacity for deep love.
The inferior function for the feeling type is thinking.
Irrational functions
The functions of sensation and intuition are the irrational functions as they
arise from the level of the unconscious.
Sensation
Where sensation is the dominant function, we may see the sensation type. These
are those individuals who experience things as they are, without imaginative
trimmings. What counts for the sensation type is the strength and pleasure of
the sensation. They can be mistaken for rational because of their calm, even
phlegmatic natures. They are frequently easy and jolly with a great capacity
for enjoyment. The danger lies in overvaluation of the senses. There is the
danger of degenerating into unscrupulous and hedonistic pleasure-seekers.
For extroverted sensation types, the object is important. For introverted
sensation types, the experience is important.
Intuition
Intuition is a perception of reality that arises from the unconscious. Extro-
verted intuition types are characterised by the attitude that all things are
possible, and by an intense dislike for what is known, familiar, safe and well
established. Extroverted intuitive types exhibit little respect for customs and
typically show ruthlessness towards the feelings of others when they feel
they are ‘onto something’. They are the classic ‘sowers of seeds’ but not the
reapers; it is others who benefit from their energy and enterprise.
Jungian analytic therapy
In Jungian therapy, which deals extensively favourable conditions they may enter into
with dreams and fantasies, a dialogue is the individuation process: a lengthy series
set up between the conscious mind and of psychological transformations
the contents of the unconscious. Patients culminating in the integration of opposite
are made aware of both the personal and tendencies and functions and the achieve-
collective (archetypal) meanings inherent ment of personal wholeness.
in their symptoms and difficulties. Under
Introverted intuition types are characterised by a concern with the collec-

tive unconscious. They see visions, and often have prophetic dreams. They
are often at risk of madness unless a way is found to relate experience to life.
Such individuals are usually quiet about their experiences. They come across
as odd but harmless, but may also be gripped by an inner vision that is power-
ful for good or evil. The experience of this type is highly contagious and may
result in religious conversions, or mob violence, or cult or sect involvement.
Dreams from a Jungian analytic perspective

For Jung (1986; 1990) the dream is the principal therapeutic method. It
is the psychic phenomenon that affords the easiest access to the contents
of the unconscious. Dreams are the language of the unconscious. Their
images express the archaic potentialities in the collective unconscious. The
self is seen as the source of dream images; it is the organising centre and has
a regulating effect on the development of the psyche. One could say that one
does not dream, but is dreamed.
The dream structure not only reveals the core of the neurosis or
conflict but also has a purposeful structure, indicating an underlying
intent or idea. The dream is seen as a natural psychic phenomenon,
which is autonomous and purposive. The purpose may be unknown to
consciousness, but is accessible to anyone who cares to engage with the
dream. Freud maintained that the dream was a disguised wish fulfilment
of instinctual desires. For Jung, the dream content articulates exactly what
the unconscious means about a situation. The dream and its images are not
seen as distortions of hidden content.
The functions of dreams

Jung (1986) postulated that we could think of dreams as having a number
of purposes:
• The dream may convey a specific diagnostic message about the

dreamer; it tells something about the dreamer’s psychic state. The
diagnosis may concern childhood issues, as well as a present-day
assessment of psychic function.
• The dream may also be prognostic, that is, it tells you something
about possible future outcomes.
• The dream can be considered as having a compensatory function.
This means that the material of the dream (wisdom from the
unconscious) is the opposite of the conscious attitude. Emotions or
attitudes that are repressed by the rational consciousness demand
expression through the dream formation. The dream then reflects
the need for expression of the potentialities of the personality. (For
example, a passive woman dreams of being full of rage and
murderous intent. The dream suggests that she is one-sided and
needs to integrate a more dominant assertive side.)
• Dreams also could have a purposive (or teleological) function. This
derives from the compensatory function. It indicates the area in
which the individual has repressed potential. The dream image is the
unconscious showing us where the conscious attitude needs to be
redressed. Here we must ask for what attitude the dream is

compensating. (For example, a man dreams of having no hands.
The dream suggests that he has lost the ability to take, give or do.
He must ‘grow hands’.) This function is concerned with prospective
possibilities that are indicated to assist in the integration of opposites.
• Dreams can also have a reductive function. In such instances the
dream ‘brings the dreamer down’, as it were, to his mortal
insignificance. An inflated individual may dream of being poor
and insignificant.
• There are anticipating dreams. These are especially significant
when embarking upon new ventures. The initial dreams in
psychotherapy give valuable information about the therapeutic
attitude and possible prognosis (outcome) of the therapy.
Dream-work, or amplification
Jung conceptualises dreams as the psychic seat of wisdom. The dream
is as much concerned with the direction in which we are going, as with
the experiences from which we have come. The implication is that the
unconscious is creative and that it contains a moral component. Dream
symbols may have rich symbolic significance but this significance,
Amplification. The process Jung cautions, is personal. Dream-work, or amplification, is required
whereby associations are to access the personal significance of a dream symbol. Amplification
made to each of the dream
is a process of associations that are made to each of the dream images
images so as to establish
the context of the dream
themselves. This process establishes, with great care, the context of the
images. Amplification dream images. Amplification broadens and enriches the dream con-
broadens and enriches tent with analogous images and personal associations of the dreamer
the dream content with and the therapist. Together they move towards establishing a correct
analogous images and interpretation which the dreamer finds convincing. Amplification is
personal associations conducted first on the personal level. Only when the personal concerns
of the dreamer and
and conflicts have been redressed, does it move to an archetypal focus.
the therapist.
A knowledge of myths and symbolism is necessary for the therapist
when working at the archetypal level of understanding.
Jung maintains that free association, as used
B C by Freud, will always reveal the complexes.
However, it will not necessarily reveal those
connected to the dream image. Therefore it
is necessary to stay close to the dream images
themselves.
A THEMES D Another source of amplification is a
series of dreams. Over a series we are able
to recognise important contents and themes.
Every interpretation is only an hypothesis, but
F E
a degree of relative certainty can be achieved
when working with a series of dreams where
Figure 11.2 Conceptualising a series of dreams the dream continues like a monologue. The
around a central point. series can be conceptualised around the theme
as a central point.
When the central point is revealed to consciousness, a new point
arises. It is therefore important to keep dream books for recording
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON

dream-work, or ampli-
fication. In this way the
continuity and meaning
of dream processes are
brought to conscious-
ness. Jung observes that
conclusions can seldom
be drawn from a single
dream. It is the series that
reveals the context and
meaning of the dream’s
guiding message.
Big dreams have a
special vividness and
often occur in colour. By middle age to old age,
They often have little relevance to events from conscious life and collective ego ideals have
may reflect ancient or bizarre images or symbols. Such a dream arises given way to a more self-
from the collective unconscious and there is little close relation to the reliant sense of self. It is the
time of the wise old man and
conscious concerns of the individual. Amplification is of little use here; woman.
it is knowledge of mythology and universal symbols and analogies that
will assist in understanding the dream.
Analysing dreams as drama

An interesting way of conceptualising and analysing dreams is to see them as
classic dramas and to understand them from the perspectives of a drama:
1) What is the time and place of the setting? What thoughts might
one have about why the dream needed to be placed in this setting?
What wisdom is there in this setting? Are things still fantastical or
‘All human beings are
are they more reality-based?
also dream beings.
2) Who are the dramatis personae? What archetypal figures occupy the Dreaming ties all
dream? What does this tell you about the psychic tensions and con- mankind together ’
flicts of the dreamer? Jack Kerouac
3) What are the characteristics of the archetypal figures? These are the
amplifications of the archetypes. Are they inflated, alienated, etc?
4) What is the ‘plot’ or the ‘problem’ of the dream? Here the unconscious
gives the archetype or complex a visible form that can be worked
upon by the dramatis personae. How does this problem relate to
the conscious problems of the dreamer? Why has the dream offered
this ‘problem’?
5) What is the quality of the ‘play’, the emotional tones, the weaving
of the plot, the intensification of the events? Is the dream filled with
affect (emotional appeal) or is it flat? Why does the ‘problem’ need
to be approached in emotional ways or non-emotional ways?
6) Is there a development of a crisis, or a transformation, or a

catastrophe? In offering a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’, the dream
then provides some insight into one or more of its compensatory,
purposive, reductive or anticipatory functions.
7) What is the solution or resolution? The conclusion points to the

needful transformation within the dreamer in terms of any of
the compensatory, purposive, reductive or anticipatory functions.
When there is no conclusion, or it is unrealistic, the indications
are that the ego is still in control and fearful. The ego blocks the
wisdom of the self, which is the offering of the dream wisdom.
A dream analysis
‘I am walking through a magical land. Everyone is ful.’ This is confirmation of the identification
smiling and happy and there are many children with the Great Mother archetype and the
running about. I feel as if they are all my children anima. ‘Suddenly I see a huge lion, it is a
and that I am the perfect mother. Everything is male lion and it wants to eat me.’ Masculine
beautiful. Suddenly I see a huge lion, it is a male power and aggression are symbolised by the
lion and it wants to eat me. I run away, but it lion. Instinctual and shadow aspects are
chases me. I realise that I have nowhere to run primitive as seen in the symbol of an animal.
and that it will catch me. I stop and turn. I feel This indicates the lack of current integration
terrified but look at the lion. Suddenly the lion of the animus, that is, the animus is still at
turns into a horse, a beautiful white horse. I get the instinctual level. Lack of integration is
on the horse and we gallop over the land. I find indicated in the desire to flee and in the fear
myself at the office having a meeting with A, a of the lion, the shadow aspect.
work colleague. He usually frightens me but we ‘I run away, but it chases me.’ This illus-
are discussing things and I am very strong.’ trates the dream’s purposive function—if
integration is run away from, it will follow
Overarching understanding: and be destructive. ‘I realise that I have
This is a compensatory and purposive nowhere to run and that it will catch me.’
dream. It gives the woman insight into her Here is realisation and acceptance of the
unbalanced identification with the feminine need for integration.
(purposive aspect) and shows her what ‘I stop and turn. I feel terrified but look at
might be possible were she to integrate the the lion.’ A moment of possible integration
masculine (compensatory aspect). is attempted, even in fear. The dream’s
‘I am walking through a magical land.’ purposive function is showing what might
This is not based in the real world; it is a be possible. ‘Suddenly the lion turns into
fantasy component. ‘Everyone is smiling a horse, a beautiful white horse.’
and happy and there are many children A transformation occurs with the facing of
running about.’ This evokes a scene of the animus. The primitive and fearsome lion
motherhood and child bearing. It suggest transforms into a horse, which is symbolic in
a great mother archetype and identifica- evolutionary terms—it has assisted human-
tion with the feminine [anima]. kind to evolve and develop in ways not
‘I feel as if they are all my children and I possible before it arrived. White indicates
am the perfect mother. Everything is beauti- purity and the possibility of transformation.
>>
<<
White is symbolic of new beginnings. things and I am very strong.’ This is the
‘I get on the the horse and we gallop compensatory function of the dream
over the land.’ Newfound possibilities of showing how, when integration of the
covering new terrain and psychic ground. animus occurs, there is the possibility of
‘I find myself at the office having a being strong and equal in relation to
meeting with A, a work colleague. He masculine energies, which are no longer
usually frightens me but we are discussing experienced as frightening.
An example of thinking around a dream
A man’s dream: He thus appears to be out of touch with

the potentials of this place.
‘I was going down into a cave or something like The plot is about finding a sick woman
a dungeon. It was very dark and cold, with a who needs care and rescuing. The sick or
strange smell. I didn’t seem to feel scared or dying woman appears to represent a sick or
anything. In the corner I saw a woman. She was dying aspect of his psyche, his animus. The
crouched down and looked very sick or was dream indicates that the animus needs rescu-
dying. I was repulsed by her and couldn’t stay ing and that to neglect this task will result in
there. I ran out of the cave.’ serious repercussions for the psyche. His initial
lack of response and his subsequent fleeing
This dream appears to indicate a indicate that the ego is afraid to engage with
descent into some place that is unfamiliar the wisdom of the shadow and animus
and uninhabited. This might indicate a archetypes. The dream indicates the degree
psychic place that is not inhabited and is to which he has split off and neglected the
neglected, has been neglected for a long animus qualities in his conscious life. His
time. Going down might indicate a descent repulsion at the sight of the woman indicates
into the unconscious. Certainly the space is the degree to which he is out of touch with
small and lacks aliveness and light. qualities of the animus, perhaps empathy,
There are only two people in the concern, vulnerability and death.
dream, the dreamer and a woman. The The dream seems to be a purposive
man, being the dreamer, is probably the dream offering the man insight into what he
persona while the woman could be both has to redress and what he is actually doing
the shadow and the anima. with his shadow and animus.
The persona is initially unafraid but is It would seem that the woman represents
then repulsed by the woman. The shadow/ the abandoned animus that he has shut
anima energies are sick or dying, indicating away in the cave. The invitation to rescue
the degree to which the man has become her is rejected and he flees, leaving her
alienated from these archetypes. He appears behind. The dream seems to indicate that
to be inflated with the persona. He is he has projected the animus qualities onto
unafraid and uncaring for the plight of the the shadow archetype and that he needs to
woman. Significantly the man is not scared care for the animus and integrate this
in a context that calls for some degree of neglected aspect into his personality.
fear or wariness.
Critiques of Jung
Clearly the same kinds of critiques that have been applied to Freud have
been levelled at Jung’s theories, though his theories have perhaps drawn
more criticism because of their esoteric or spiritual postulations. The
arguments that have been raised against Freudian conceptualisation
could be applied to Jung. Look at the critiques of Freud (Chapter 3) and
apply them to thinking about Jung’s theories.
Psyche
Consciousness Personal unconscious Collective unconscious
Complexes Archetypes
Process of individuation
Integration of opposites
Hierarchy of archetypes
Dreams
Persona
Function of dreams
Shadow
SELF
Animus/Anima
Psychological types
Etc.
Introvert Extrovert Inflation

Pathology
Functions Participation mystique
Thinking/Feeling Rational Neurosis
Sensation/Intuition Irrational Alienation
Figure 11.3 Mind map of Jung’s theory.
A number of post-Jungian theorists themselves argue that Jung’s

emphasis on the role of the self is an over-emphasis (Samuels, 1985). They
claim that Jung’s postulation of an innate growth-seeking potential does
not provide a sufficiently complex understanding of psychopathology.
Further, some theorists have rejected the notion of integration of
archetypal energies as a product of psychic wholeness. This has resulted
in the development of the Archetypal School of Analytic Psychology.
Hillman is a major theorist within this tradition. As its name suggests, the
focus is on the archetypes. This tradition rejects the notion of integration
of the archetypes as symptomatic of a healthy psyche. Rather, they claim

that we are most psychologically healthy when we are able to embrace
our multiplicities of being.
The Developmental School has evolved to address Jung’s lack of
focus on a developmental psychology. Their allegiance is with the object
relations tradition, since the idea of archetypes ties in well with Klein’s
postulation of innate knowledge of certain primitive images. Object
relations theory has come to be the informing developmental theory of
this school of thought.
Specific tasks
➊ Considering that Jung’s theory is principally about adult development, how does it
provide an understanding of the behaviours and motivations of a person such as Mugabe?
Think about the archetypal energies that might be involved and how, or if, these energies
constitute a pathology. You would need to consider the role of the complexes in trying to
locate the workings of the archetypal energies in his personal life.
➋ Consider what particular psychological function is dominant in a man such as Mugabe. Think
about how the dominant and inferior function interact to perhaps account for his behaviour.
➌ Jung suggests that archaic man did not reflect upon his symbols, but rather lived them,
and was unconsciously animated by their meaning. Investigate the origins of a symbol or
symbolic behaviour within your culture. Whatever symbol you choose, be it marriage,
the Star of David, initiation rites, this symbol is the link to archetypal organising energies.
Consider how it was originally lived and what function it serves in ordering our humanity.
➍ Consider the four major patterns of pathology and provide an example of people or events
that illustrate Jung’s understanding of each of these pathological possibilities.
General tasks
➊ Make a family tree of your family. Provide pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality. Identify what
patterns emerge. It may be that the women or the men of the family follow similar patterns or
have similar characteristics, or that particular events or characteristics are seen in the family. Trace
these patterns and identify which of the archetypal images are being activated within this family.
How do you understand this activation?
➋ Consider the stages of the individuation process. Discuss where you are in this process and
what archetypal themes may have already been integrated into your life and what still lies
ahead. Remember that individuation is a lifelong process.
➌ Describe your psychological type and which function is dominant for you. Which function
are you most challenged to develop? Explain in your answer why you think these observa-
tions apply to you.
➍ Keep a dream journal for a month. Trace the themes and symbols. You’ll probably find
that the themes make sense of things happening in your life at the moment. If there are
some strange symbols look them up in a book of symbols.
➎ Think of an example of a leader of a religious cult (ie David Koresh, the charismatic cultist
involved in the infamous Waco incident in the USA). Consider how Jung’s concept of
participation mystique may be applied in this case.
(Brooke, Samuels, and Jung’s collected works are probably for the more serious scholar of Jung, but they are
worth a try. The other books make quite accessible reading.)
Adler, G (1967). ‘Methods of treatment in analytic psychology’. In B Wolman (ed), Psychoanalytic

Technique. New York: Basic Books.
(An overview of the methods and assumptions that underlie Jungian interventions. Interesting for those
who are interested in entering a Jungian psychotherapy or in how psychotherapy works.)
Brooke, R (1990). Jung and phenomenology. London: Routledge.

(This is a scholarly read. Brooke, in elucidating the assumptions of phenomenology, argues that Jung, far
from being within a psychoanalytic paradigm, was a phenomenologist at heart. The book offers an
in-depth and extensive coverage of Jungian concepts.)
Jung, C G (1963). Memories, dreams, reflections. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(This is Jung’s autobiography. It gives an insight into Jung’s life and the particularities of his personality.
There is a fascinating introduction by Donald Winnicott, which is a gem on its own.)
Jung, C G (1972). The Collected Works of Carl G. Jung. 20 vols. (1953-75). London: Routledge.
(Routledge published the first complete English edition of Jung’s work. It is worthwhile going to the
original works to follow Jung’s own elucidation of his theory.)
Jung, C G (1983). Jung, selected writings. Introduced by Anthony Storr. London: Fontana.
(A wonderful selection of Jungian concepts that Storr brings together to elucidate the development of
Jung’s thought.)
(This slim volume covers Jung’s 1935 lectures to the Tavistock. They are published in their lecture
format and give a wonderful sense of how Jung thought and spoke about his concepts.)
Jung, C G (ed) (1990). Man and his symbols. New York: Aldus Books.
(A beautifully illustrated book with essays by Jung and others on various aspects of mythology
and symbolism.)
McGuire, W & Hull, R C G (eds) (1980). Jung speaking: Interviews and encounters. London: Picador.
(The book presents interviews with a vast number of people who knew or met Jung, covering his whole
life. A fascinating portrait of the man develops through the eyes of those who knew him.)
Samuels, A (1985). Jung and the post-Jungians. London: Routledge.

(This book is a scholarly read but well worth the effort. Samuels takes us through the essentials of Jung’s
thought and then shows the progressive development of three post-Jungian schools of thought. These are
the Classical Jungian School, building upon Jung’s theory, the Developmental School, which has close
ties with object relations theory, and the Archetypal School, which has developed Jung’s thinking around
the functions of the archetypes.)
CHAPTER
12
Lacan’s mirror stage
Derek Hook
This chapter introduces Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage. It

locates Lacan’s theory in relation to certain basic principles of
early Freudian psychoanalysis and presents the following:
1. The source of the ego

2. Challenges facing the newborn
3. The image of the self
4. The enabling function of the image
5. Identification with the image
6. Alienation through the image
7. Critiques of Lacan
The chapter examines what for Lacan is both a key event in

childhood development and the fundamental structure of human
subjectivity. The chapter also includes a critique of his work.
Introduction
Jacques Lacan was perhaps the most controversial
‘post-Freud’ Freudian. Although a psychoanalyst
and an advocate of a return to the original works
of Freud, Lacan radically reinterpreted much of
Freudian psychoanalysis and offered a number
of complementary psychoanalytic notions that
differed from traditional understandings. In fact
it was exactly this ‘radicalism’ that ultimately re-
sulted in his ‘excommunication’ from established
psychoanalytic circles. By introducing to psycho-
analysis certain important notions pertaining to
French Structuralism and Linguistics, Lacan ar-
guably extended the parameters of psychoanalysis,
and in some ways ‘modernised’ and changed the
face of the discipline.
Jacques Lacan
Lacan rejected all popular attempts to explain Freudian ideas, and

took from these ideas a model of mental life that was full of fracture
and internal conflict (Ward, 1996). Whereas certain versions of psycho-
analysis suggested that the basic conflicts of mental life could be resolved,
Lacan felt that they were, as Ward puts it, ‘fundamentally irreparable:
discord and fracture cannot be cleared away from the psyche because
they are the psyche’ (Ward, 1996: 134). Not only did Lacan hope to deflect
attention away from watered down and overly optimistic interpretations
of Freud’s original work, he also suggested that psychoanalysis should
take an almost anthropological interest in the cultural and place less
emphasis on biological-level explanations. Similarly, he suggested that
less emphasis should be placed on the idea that the self-sufficient events
within the individual mind are the source of dreams, word associations,
Freudian slips, and so on, as these are affected primarily by cultural
rather than personal factors (Ward, 1996).
Lacan’s popularity and importance has grown in recent years. Many of
his works are notoriously difficult. However, his theorisation of the ‘mirror
stage’ has proved extremely influential and we will briefly discuss the impor-
tance of this notion to child development.
The source of the ego

Lacan saw himself as a faithful adherent to Freudian psychoanalysis;
indeed, Freud’s notions are basic and fundamental to many of the seem-
ingly complimentary ideas that Lacan would go on to develop. (Note that
this chapter will assume a basic familiarity with the Freudian terms of
ego, superego, id, auto-eroticism, sexual object, and so on.) The obvious
connection-point to Freud, with regard to Lacan’s mirror stage, is the notion
of the ego, and the idea of the ego’s development. For Lacan, the weak point
in Freud’s developmental theory was exactly this—his description of the
initial formation of the ego.
Lacan maintains that for Freud the ego was not ‘in-built’, that is, was
not present within the child from birth. Freud, in Lacan’s view, did not suf-
ficiently explain how this psychic apparatus came into existence. The superego
was well explained as the internalisation of social values and morals through
the identification with parental authority. Likewise the id, as the instinctual
set of unconscious desires and drives innate to all human organisms, seemed
adequately explained. From where, though, did the ego stem?
Ego as mental projection of the body’s surface

Freud did offer a number of possible answers. First, he noted, the ego was
largely derived from bodily sensations, and chiefly those springing from the
surface of the body (1966). In this way the ego was like a projection of the surface
of the body.
The ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those

springing from the surface of the body. It ... [is] a mental projection
of the surface of the body ... representing the [surfaces] of the mental
apparatus (Freud, 1966: 26).
L a c a n ’s m i r r o r s t a g e 263
Narcissism: the ego arising through self-love

This was not the only answer Freud gave though. According to Freud, the
newly born child is in an ‘auto-erotic’ stage where it can, initially, obtain
satisfaction from its own body without needing an external object. (A prime
example of this is in the action of thumb-sucking). The infant will obviously
need to move on from this auto-erotic state—as discussed in Chapter 3—if it
is to take on an adult sexuality, and focus its sexual instinct on an external
object (another person). The only way that the infant will succeed in this goal
is by first taking himself as his object of desire, and then transferring this self-
desire onto other objects. According to Freud (1966: 60-61):
There comes a time in the development of the individual at which he

unifies his sexual drives (which have until now been engaged in auto-
erotic activities) in order to obtain an [external] love object ... he begins
by taking his own body as his love-object, and only subsequently
proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself.
In other words, if auto-eroticism is to cease, the child needs to go through

a stage of narcissism, which will then lead to the process of making external Narcissism. Narcissism
object-choices. Presumably, the ego in this scheme, as Benvenuto & Kennedy is the (generally
(1986) put it, would be formed at this stage of narcissism, between the stages of gratuitous) love of the
auto-eroticism and object-love, while being taken as a love-object. Part of this self, as epitomised in
the myth of Narcissus.
stage of narcissism would be the gradual development of a sense of self and
In psychoanalytic terms,
a sense of separateness from the external world, both of which would stem narcissism is the state in
from processes of identification and incorporation. Freud, however, did which one’s libido is so
not fully explain exactly how this state of narcissism came about, especially strongly invested in one’s
since it did not exist from the start of life. He noted that some ‘new psychical own ego that it cannot
action’ would have to take place to constitute the ego, but did not, as Leader & properly involve itself in
Groves (1995) point out, say exactly what this action would be. object-love (love
of another).
Ego as outcome of transition from pleasure to

reality principle
Another possible ‘strand of development’ that we may provide as a way of
bolstering Freud’s account of the emergence of the ego is through the devel-
opment of the reality principle. The reality principle modifies the pleasure
principle and aims to adapt the instincts and impulses of the organism to
the state and conditions of the objective and external world. (The pleasure
principle, by contrast, always seeks first and foremost the most direct route to
the satisfaction of instinctual needs—a route which can understandably get its
subject into a considerable amount of trouble.)
In terms of this explanation, the ego—as that entity that needs to balance
the rivalling forces of id and superego—comes into being exactly because of
the need to moderate the pleasure principle, exactly as that psychical agency
which will develop and implement the reality principle. In short, it is through
learning to moderate the wishes of the pleasure principle and to obey instead
the pragmatics of the outside social world that the reality principle—and more
fundamentally, its governing agency, the ego—comes into being.
To translate this account more directly into Freud’s own terms: one por-
tion of the id undergoes a special development; a special organisation arises
which from that point on ‘acts as an intermediary between the id and the
external world ... [that special organisation is] ... the ego’ (Freud, 1966: 145).
Superego considerations
Freud also involved the superego in his explanation of the ego. Now
whereas the superego cannot be in any way responsible for the emergence
of the ego (the superego only develops after the ego), the ego does contain
certain elements within it that will make it a suitable place for the superego
to arise. These elements give us an important clue as to the development
of the ego. Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986:51-52) provide an extremely
helpful summary in this regard:
The super-ego ... compromises both a critical, self-observing and

punishing function, and also the setting up of ideal goals derived
from the ‘ego-ideal’. The notion of the ego-ideal ... brings into a
basically persecuting and aggressive super-ego (with which it is
difficult to identify) a narcissistic element, the love of one’s own
ideal. What the individual projects before him as his ideal, is the
substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was
his own ideal.
In other words, Freud has suggested that the superego contains, in the
‘ego-ideal’, a powerful element of narcissism, the love of one’s own ideal.
This powerful element of narcissism stems from the ego, a factor already
alluded to above, but now reiterated. For these reasons, it now becomes
crucial to involve an explanation of narcissism in the account of how the ego
emerges. Lacan will go on to do just this. In fact, his explanation for the emer-
gence of the ego will be able to account for both the elements of aggressivity
and narcissism, which—following Benvenuto and Kennedy’s (1986) thoughts
above—will be strongly present in the incipient superego.
Gaps in Freud’s account

All of these explanations above were important to Lacan. They were able to
tell us something about the ego, to offer important tentative contributions as
to how the ego might have developed, but were, ultimately, not able to tell
us properly how it came into existence. Although these various explanations
are mutually supportive and generally coherent, they tell us a lot more about
the ‘whys’ than about the ‘hows’ of ego development. Lacan hoped, with his
‘mirror phase’ theory of development, to provide the definitive explanation of
the formation of the ego.
Challenges facing the newborn

Before we enter into a discussion of the exact ‘mechanism’ of the mirror stage,
it is useful to familiarise ourselves with the physiological and psychological
challenges facing the newborn infant. These ‘challenges of survival’ will, un-
derstandably, need to be overcome if the infant is one day to enter the adult
world of identity, individuality, self-sufficiency and autonomy. Having a clear
sense of these challenges will give us a better sense of what it is that the mirror
stage, that is, the formation of the ego, will come to enable within the child.
‘Humans are always born prematurely’

Lacan repeatedly emphasised how helpless, dependent, and unprepared
for the world human infants are at birth. The human infant is extremely
dependent on external care, and takes a far longer time than any other
animal to reach a reasonable level of self-sufficiency. As Leader & Groves
(1995: 18) put it, ‘Humans are born prematurely. Left to themselves they
would probably die. They are always born too early. They can’t walk or talk
at birth; they have a very partial mastery of their motor functions and at the
biological level, they are hardly complete’.
This prematuration is visible in a number of ways. Infants lack basic Prematuration.
sensorimotor co-ordination, that is, they do not possess basic motor control The term Lacan uses to
of their limbs, which, within the first few months of life often move and emphasise how biologically
and psychologically
twitch uncontrollably, independent of the infant’s volition. Likewise, they
‘incomplete’ and
have not yet attained control of their bodily functions such as defecating or dependent the human
urinating and as such have no real sense of agency over their own body. infant is at birth, especially
Understandably, given that the child is relatively uncoordinated, helpless and in its lack of basic
dependent, the first months of life are full of anxiety, uneasiness and ‘discord’ sensorimotor coordination
(Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986). The importance of this early period of anxiety and control of even
and discord can barely be overestimated for Lacan. We as adults sometimes its most rudimentary
bodily functions.
revisit this period of unease in later life, experiencing it as horrific, as we will go
on to explain. The facts that the human infant’s body is so immature relative
to that of other mammals, that it takes such a long time to develop, and
that the baby ‘has a basic deficit, a lack of co-ordination and fragmentation
of functions’ (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 54), make for a daunting set of
challenges, but also for a unique psychical solution on the part of the human
infant, as we shall see.
Separation and individuation

The fragmentary, disconcerting and helpless nature of the infant’s early motor
experiences has a profound impact on his psychical development. At this point,
the infant can be described as a heterogeneous, shifting and centre-less mass of
needs and sensations (Burr, 1995). He has no proper sense of being separate from
the world or the mother, and certainly no sense of being a separate person in his
own right. As Marini (1992) puts it, the child has only a very slowly dawning
sense of distinction between the world, others and himself. All sensation and
experience have appeared, until now, as a complete whole for the infant,
who is still bound up in a symbiotic relationship with the mother, lacking a
fundamental sense of being separate from her (Burr, 1995). (It is interesting here
to speculate around the fact that babies cry not only when they have a painful or
pressing physical stimulus on the level of their own body—but also when their
more general environment is disturbed. This might be taken to indicate that a
more proper distinction between the two has yet to be drawn.)
Developing the rudimentary distinctions between self and outside world,
between self and mother, between internal and external forms of stimulus,
will clearly prove central to the infant’s psychological development, and to his
formation of an ego. Without these rudimentary psychological adaptations
the infant can be said not to possess an ’I’, a basic sense of self or a fledgling
identity. Simply put, the baby understands himself, at this point, as neither
psychologically nor physically distinct from the world around it.
Corps morcele. Literally The ‘hommelette’: the ‘little scrambled person’

‘the body in pieces’; Lacan Lacan is keen to emphasise here not only the disturbing or disconcerting
uses the term to refer to nature of this early pre-separation-individuation experience, but also the
those primal (and largely
fragmentary, shapeless, undifferentiated nature of the infant’s sense of
unconscious) images of
the fragmented body that
the world. The baby has no proper sense yet of where his body ends and
remind us of our earliest where the world begins, of himself as a unified anatomical whole. His
experiences of bodily limbs, not properly controlled by him, are not seen as necessarily his own,
discord, before we had nor are they conceived of as parts of his own bodily whole. Hence Lacan
gained a sense of our body refers to the child as the ‘hommelette’—the little scrambled person.
as a whole, singular unit.
Corps morcele: the body in pieces
Given a moment of introspection, one can see how this experience, of not
knowing where one’s body ends and another begins, of perceiving a series of
disconnected and separate limbs that may or may not be one’s own, might
be horrific or frightening, especially from the
perspective of the adult who is used to being

able to control his own limbs and to distinguish
them from others. In fact, images of the body in
pieces, what Lacan calls the corps morcele (or
fragmented body), will always be disturbing
to us as adults, because they remind us of the
specific and fundamental relation each and every
one of us has had to our own body. This primal
relation is vividly enacted, for Lacan, in the
playing of children, where the ‘pulling off
... of the head and the ripping open of the belly
are themes that occur spontaneously to their
For Lacan, the corps morcele (body in pieces) is vividly
enacted in the games of children when they pull off the imagination, and ... [that are] ... corroborated
heads and limbs of their dolls. by the experience of the doll torn to pieces’
(Lacan, 1977: 11).
These are the aggressive images and phantasies of dismemberment that
are, as Bowie (1991: 29) puts it, ‘the burden of all self-aware and membered
creatures’. They crop up constantly in dreams and in analysis, precisely when
the most archaic and fundamental fixations of the analysand are accessed.
In Lacan’s own words:
The fragmented body manifests itself regularly in dreams when

the movement of analysis encounters a certain level ... It then
appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those of organs,
represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking arms up for
intestinal persecutions (Lacan, 1977: 5).
The image of the self

Having gained something of a sense of the physiological and psychological
challenges facing the newborn infant, it is now time to look at exactly how
the infant overcomes them. The answer to these challenges—which is also
Lacan’s answer to the riddle of the formation of the ego— lies in the notion
of the image, or more specifically, in the infant’s accommodation of an image
of the self. This is the fundamental activity of the mirror stage, a key devel-
opmental event that, according to Lacan, occurs roughly between the ages
of six and eighteen months, when the infant begins to recognise its image in
the mirror.
This formative event has been well documented in various studies of
early child and primate behaviour: the baby looks into a mirror, recognises
the image—a recognition which is accompanied by great pleasure—becomes
fascinated by it, and goes on to try and control or play with it. This is the mo-
ment, as Bowie (1991) puts it, that the child suddenly seems able to formulate,
however roughly, the propositions ‘I am that’ and ‘that is me’. A variety of
important bodily and psychological changes accompany this event:
At a certain point, around six months ... the infant becomes aware,
through seeing his image in the mirror, of his own body as a total-
ity, a total form or Gestalt. The mirror image is held together, it
can come and go with a slight change in the infant’s position, and
his mastery of the image fills him with triumph and joy. The mir-
ror image anticipates the mastery of the body that the infant has
not yet objectively achieved. He falls in love with his image and, in
contrast to the auto-erotic stage, in which he has an erotic relationship
to his fragmented body, he now takes the image of his whole body as
his love-object (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 54-55).
This is a valuable and compact description of the major features of the

mirror stage, which we will break down into a series of important devel-
opmental implications. Before we turn to this, however, we should first
examine what might be meant by the image.
Various media for the image, and the image as reflection of

the self
Although Lacan uses the example of the mirror as the paradigmatic case
through which the infant comes to recognise his own image, this is not the
only medium in which the infant may perceive his own reflected image.
‘Monkey business’: Chimpanzees and the mirror stage
The ‘mirror test’ claims Evans (1996) was in the mirror and jubilantly assumes it as its
first described by the French psychologist own image, whereas the chimpanzee quickly
and friend of Lacan, Henri Wallon in 1931: realizes that the image is illusory and loses
interest in it (Evans, 1996:15).
It refers to a particular experiment that can
differentiate the human infant from his Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986) likewise
closest animal relative, the chimpanzee. make reference to the use of this ‘mirror
The six-month-old child differs from the test’ in early chimp experimentation, and
chimpanzee of the same age in that the quote at length the work of Kohler:
former becomes fascinated with its reflection Rana [a chimpanzee] ... gazed long and
>>
<<
intently into the mirror, looked up and possible behind her back, gazed with an
then down, put it to her face and licked it air of indifference at the other animal,
once, stared into it again, and suddenly then suddenly made a pounce with her
her free hand rose and grasped as free hand. However, she and the rest
though at a body behind the mirror. But soon became used to this side of the
as she grasped emptiness she dropped affair and concentrated all their interest
the mirror sideways in her astonishment. on the image; this interest did not
Then she lifted it again, stared fixedly at decrease ... but remained so strong that
the other ape, and again was misled into the playing with reflecting surfaces
grasping into empty space. She became became one of the most popular and
impatient and struck out violently at the permanent of their fashions (Kohler, cited
mirror ... She held the mirror still in one in Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986).
hand, drew back the other arm as far as
Indeed, as might well be pointed out, not all infants have access to
mirrors. Such an awareness of one’s own image—an image that is as a reflec-
tion of self—may occur in different ways. One example lies in the infant’s
awareness of how the mother’s gaze—or for that matter, the mother’s
voice—reflects its own current emotional state. In fact, intersubjective
moments more generally, where individuals gain a sense of self through
multiple kinds of interactions with others, are all an important source of
reflected ‘images’ of self. The same holds for interactions with ‘like’ indi-
viduals, such as children of the same basic age as the infant. As Bowie (1991)
notes, a roughly equivalent experience to beholding one’s mirror image is
that of seeing one’s own behaviours reflected in the imitative gestures of an
adult or another child. The important point is that the child will come to
understand himself as a coherent, unified being via these reflected images of
the self. (This also occurs through the fact that parents, adults, and siblings
treat the child as if it were a unified and coherent being. Hence he is sent
messages about his coherence and unity, both bodily and psychologically,
from the various responses of caregivers in addition to glimpses of his own
physical appearance in the form of visual reflections.)
The body becomes ‘a whole’

Lacan characterises the sight of the infant before the mirror as a ‘startling
spectacle’. Even though the infant is as yet unable to walk, and has diffi-
culty standing up, and in supporting itself, it nonetheless tries his best to
overcome these obstructions in his eagerness to gaze at his own image.
This of course can only happen when the perceptual apparatus is reason-
ably matured—although, importantly, this gazing into one’s own image
takes place before the child has attained the maturity of basic motor
and physical coordination. This means that the body now becomes ‘a
whole’—as far as the infant is concerned—and, second, it means that
a sense of the image of one’s self always precedes the actual mastery of
motor coordination.
The fact bears repeating here that the infant has, up to this point,
never seen his body as a whole—as a composite organism of different
parts. Indeed, how else is the child to ‘see’ his whole body—his face and
eyes as attached and related to his torso, legs, and arms—apart from seeing
an image of itself? This is indeed a momentous event for the child. It starts
to have some understanding of how his body fits together, how it might
control it, and where it ends and the world begins. A part of this is realising
that whereas it can control his arm, for instance, it cannot control the breast,
or other external objects. This control of the body, and his accompanying
sense of separateness from the world, is something that we as adults typically
take for granted. Hence it is certainly worthwhile considering, as we shall
do, the psychological gains that are associated with these newfound levels
of mastery.
The body as gestalt

A vital part of what happens in the mirror stage (as indicated in the sum-
mary above by Benvenuto & Kennedy) is that the child comes to see his own
body as ‘a totality, a total form, or a gestalt’. We should be careful not to skip
over this last word, because it proves to be a vital piece of the puzzle. What Gestalt. An organised
exactly is a gestalt? It is an organised pattern or, more distinctly, a visual pattern, or more
pattern which is perceived as a unified whole. We should add here that an specifically, a visual pattern
image is only a gestalt in the sense that it has an effect which none of its which is perceived as a
unified whole. An image is
component parts have in isolation; indeed, in a gestalt, the whole is greater
only a gestalt in the sense
than the sum of its parts. that it has an effect which
It is useful here to think for a moment of optical illusions. Think for example none of the component
of a series of dots that are suggestively arranged somewhat like a circle. Even parts have in isolation; in a
though this shape may not be properly formed—the circle may not be closed, gestalt, the whole is always
for example, or the arrangement of dots may be somewhat irregular—we greater than the sum of
still perceive a circle. The importance of this for Lacan’s mirror stage is that the parts.
in perceiving our own image as gestalt, there is always the possibility that
something is being added, that we are seeing something in addition to what
is actually there. There is always the possibility for trickery and illusion, for
the suggestion of a unity or closure that may not in fact exist at all. We shall
return to this point presently.
The statue that symbolises the mental

PHOTO: C HA JOHNSTON
permanence of the ’I’

The image of the infant’s body is like a mirage,
an external image that the mirror reflects back
in reversed symmetry and perspective. As
Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986: 55) put it, ‘The
infant’s movements and bodily prematurity are
reversed in the fixity of a big ‘statue’ of himself’.
Why do these authors, following Lacan, choose
the metaphor of a statue? Well, because this
image gives to the infant more than just a sense
of unity and cohesion. It also gives him a basic
and solid sense of consistency, a sense of fixity
The image gives to the infant more than just a sense of
and stature, which can join together various unity and cohesion—it also gives it a sense of fixity and
moments of experience. It is in this way that stature, a basic and solid sense of consistency, which can
the infant gains a consistent sense of self over join together various moments of experience.
time—a series of experiential moments joined together give some substance,

no matter how illusory, to the ego. In Lacan’s own words (1977: 2), ‘This
Gestalt ... in these two aspects [fixity and stature] of its appearing symbolises
the ego’s mental permanence’.
Importantly then, the image not only unifies the perceptions and experi-
ences of the body, it also unifies the psychological experiences of the infant,
and substantiates ‘the mental permanence’ of the ‘I’.
This notion of the statue as the means through which the infant projects
his own mental and bodily permanence bears a strong resemblance to one
of the explanations that Freud had offered for the development of the ego.
As Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986) note, in Freud’s later work the ego was
regarded, in part, as a ‘mental projection of the surface of the body’. This is
compatible with the notion of the mirror image as a projection of the surface
of the body.
The beginning of narcissism: the infant falls in love with his

image
Myth of Narcissus. Psychoanalysis is well renowned for its affinity for the myths of classical
Famous Classical Greek antiquity. The myths of Oedipus and Elektra were both taken up as emblems
myth of a god who falls for primal phylogenetic developmental processes, as we have seen in the
in love with his own
chapter on Freud. In the same vein, Lacan refers to the myth of Narcissus as
image (reflected in a pool
of water) with tragic
a telling analogy for what happens in the mirror stage. Like the central figure
consequences. in this myth, the human infant recognises the reflection of his own image and
falls in love with it. In contrast to the earlier auto-erotic stage, in which the
infant has an erotic relationship to his own fragmented body, he now takes the
image of his whole body as his love-object. For Lacan, it seems, this is a fairly
automatic or instinctual outcome of the child’s exposure to his own image.
The Myth of Narcissus
In Greek mythology Narcissus was the image, he was unable to pull himself
handsome son of the river god Cephissus away from it, and eventually pined away.
and the nymph Liriope. For rejecting the His body was transformed into the flower
love of Echo he was punished by of the same name, which was said to be
Aphrodite by being compelled to fall in the last flower plucked by Persephone,
love with his own reflection in a pool of the goddess of fertility, before she was
water. Hopelessly enamored with his own carried off to the underworld.
It is this activity that provides the answer to Freud’s unspecified ‘new

psychical activity’ that had to occur before (external) object-love could take
place. It is important to note, as pointed out by Evans, that this narcissism has
both an erotic and an aggressive character:
It is erotic, as the myth of Narcissus shows, since the subject is

strongly attracted to the gestalt that is his image. It is aggressive,
since the wholeness of the image contrasts with the uncoordinated
disunity of the subject’s real body, and thus seems to threaten the
subject with disintegration (Evans, 1996: 120).
For Lacan the development of a stage of narcissism is, in this way,

unavoidable. It is an absolutely fundamental aspect of human psychology
across cultures and across history. The subjectivity of every single human
being involves both elements of narcissism, including the ‘aggressivity’ that Aggressivity. Lacan’s
this narcissism entails. For Lacan, these are both fundamental constituent notion of aggressivity
elements of our ego’s emergence. We will return to this point. is best understood by
distinguishing it from
the similar concept of
The enabling function of the image aggression. Where the
Lacan almost always emphasises the degree to which the child’s recogni- latter refers explicitly to
tion of his own image fills him with triumph, jubilation and joy. It seems violent acts, ‘aggressivity’
that there may be a number of reasons for this. Since this is an experience has a more fundamental
that enables the child to unify his disturbing and fragmented sense of meaning which indicates
his body, and of himself, it is understandable why this might be such a tri- a wider range of acts
and phenomena—even
umphant event. Another reason why this is such a ‘jubilant’ moment is that
seemingly benevolent
from this point on, the child begins to achieve a far greater mastery of his ones. Thus Lacan uses
various bodily functions (such as sphincter control) and his motor functions this term to define the
(movement). (Both reasons may partly explain why the infant seems so fundamental ambivalence
inevitably to fall in love with his own image.) underpinning love and
One can start to understand that the exposure to the mirror image may hate. Since the erotic-
result in a kind of mastery for the child. If a child is able to see the reflections aggressive relationship
with the mirror image
of his physical movements, he may understand better the correspondence
is seen by him as
between his attempts to control his body and the movements his body actually underwriting the basic
makes. In this regard, the child’s sense of the correspondence between what he structure of human
is trying to make his body do, and what he sees it doing in the reflection, might be subjectivity, the term
thought to accelerate the learning process. ‘aggressivity’ embraces the
It is this enabling function of exposure to the mirror image that Lacan wide range of aggressive,
is referring to when he notes that ‘the mirror image anticipates the mastery rivalrous and hating
emotions and values that
of the body that the infant has not yet objectively achieved’ (Lacan, 1977:
are present in any instance
20). The pivotal point for Lacan is that the infant’s imaginary mastery of of identification, whether
the body always anticipates his biological mastery. In short, our percep- conscious or not.
tions of ourselves and our abilities are always based on an image before
anything else. In this way, as Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986) assert, ‘any
future relationship with reality will be marked by imaginary anticipation’.
There are a series of profound implications that stem from this position,
which we will go on to discuss. Before we do this, though, it is important
to consider how the image might be seen as enabling.
The image as ‘instinctual trigger’

The image as in some way ‘enabling’ is a theme that Lacan often returns
to, and he elaborates on it in a number of ways. For a start, he considers
the image of the self to act as a ‘releasing mechanism’ that triggers certain
instinctual responses. For example, when an animal perceives a unified
image of another member of its species, it responds in certain instinctual
ways. Lacan’s famous illustration in this regard describes the female pi-
geon that will not properly develop a gonad (that is, a specific reproductive
organ) if it does not see another member of its species. Nevertheless, as
Lacan notes, the sight of its own mirror reflection is enough to ensure this
development. Lacan argues that for humans the body image also produces
instinctual responses, especially sexual ones, such as triggering the end of
auto-eroticism and the beginning of desire for an external object.
Another powerful example of the instinctual importance of the image
is to be found in Lorenz’s famous experiment of ‘imprinting’:
Lorenz had put his Wellington boots next to duck eggs. As the
ducklings hatched out and saw the boot, they became ‘imprinted’
with its image; wherever that boot went, the little ducks would
follow. They mistook Lorenz’s boot for their mummy. When
Lorenz wore his Wellingtons he was slavishly followed by a trail
of ducklings, each of whom [was] captivated by the image of the
boot (Hill, 1997:11).
These ecological examples of the instinctual importance of exposure

to the image at early phases of development certainly strengthen Lacan’s
argument. Just as in the case of the pigeon, or as in Lorenz’s ducks,
Lacan argues, the early exposure to the image—the image of the self—
will be vital to the human child, and will trigger a series of uniquely
human psychological processes which would not otherwise be initiated.
(The vital psychical stage of narcissism, as explained above, is one
example of this triggering.)
Mimicry: learning and adaptation through the image

The image is also central to activities of mimicry, through which the
Mimicry. In the zoological young child learns by reproducing the movements and activities of others
or ethological sense this (or of his own reflected image). The role of mimicry in learning is vital to
refers to the fact that Lacan (1977), as, arguably, is its role in adaptation to a given environment.
certain beasts have the
It is exactly through reproducing kinds of actions observed in the outside
habit of assuming insignia
and colouring that match
world, and in various images (whether of themselves or of similar others),
their surroundings. that infants come to be able to control their bodies and progressively adapt
to the world around them.
Mimicry, in the zoological or the ethological sense, refers to the fact that
certain beasts have the habit of assuming the insignia and colouring of their
surroundings. The obvious explanation for this phenomenon, as Leader
& Groves (1995) point out, is that it protects the animal against predators.
This is not always the case however, because as investigators found out,
those animals that assumed an image were very often just as likely to be
eaten as those that did not (Leader & Groves, 1995).
Mimicry, then, need not be confined to an adaptive activity, it may simply
follow a natural law whereby people or animals within a certain environ-
ment come to take on certain of its qualities, becoming ‘captured in their
environment’. Indeed, whether through the active learning of mimicry, or
through less voluntary processes in which organisms become ‘captured in their
environment’, the evolutionary or instinctual process of ‘taking on an image’
seems widespread across the animal kingdom. Lacan’s implication is that
this is an enabling activity that has an important function in the psychological
development of the human infant: that of founding an ego.
Mirror anecdotes
There were pillars lined with full-length Harry (a year older). While we were
mirrors at the department store where opening presents, Ben started pointing
I used to work. Young children always at the full-length mirror which was
seemed drawn to the mirrors. I remember balancing against the mantelpiece and
one little girl who kissed her reflection excitedly identified ‘Harry, Harry’, even
and pressed her face against the glass, though Harry was at the other end of the
forcing air out of her cheeks at the same room. Ben toddled up to the mirror and
time. Others would pull faces and make started to pull at it, trying to climb
gurgling sounds, whilst playing with behind it, all this time calling Harry.
‘themselves’ in the mirrors. There were Eventually I asked Ben, curious to see
nearly always little hand marks at the whether he was identifying with the
bottom of mirrors at the end of the day mirror image, ‘Where is Ben?’ Ben then
when I went home. hid behind the couch, eventually peeking
I remember a separate occasion when I around the corner. ‘Ben’ he identified,
shared Christmas with another family, pointing to himself, joining in the game.
who had two young boys, Ben (who was
18 months old) and his brother Michele Vrdojak, University of the Witwatersrand
Identification with the image

If we bring together all of the explanatory elements discussed above—
that the gestalt image enables a bodily and psychological permanence
and unity not otherwise achieved, that it initiates the stage of narcissism,
that it enables learning and adaptation through mimicry, as well as
providing an important instinctual trigger—then we can start to
appreciate the centrality of the image in developmental psychology for
Lacan. However, there is one vital element missing in this description,
an element that will strengthen Lacan’s overall account, and amplify
its explanatory ability. That element is identification. Indeed, this is Identification. For Freud,
the key—and the central process—in infants ‘taking on an image’. identification is the process
In emphasising the importance of identification in this way, Lacan’s whereby a subject adopts
one or more attributes of
account is much like Freud’s. Indeed, identification should not be
another subject for himself.
underestimated in the psychological development of the individual. For Lacan basically agrees
psychoanalysis, as Heaton (2000) notes, identification is the operation with this definition, but
whereby the human subject is constituted. In a very fundamental way, adds to it the importance
we, as humans with identities of some psychological depth, do not exist of the image, so that
without making identifications. identification, for him, is a
With this emphasis in mind, we can understand the full force of transformative process in
which the subject ‘assumes
Lacan’s assertion that the ‘image is the first organized form in which the
an image’.
individual identifies himself so the ego takes its form from, and is formed
by, the organizing and constitutive qualities of this image’ (Benvenuto &
Kennedy, 1986: 55).
Implications of our identification with the image

There is one particular aspect of the mirror stage that Lacan never tires
of repeating, and that is that the ego is always formed on the basis of an imaginary
relationship of the subject with his or her own body. We know from the above
discussion that identification with the image is an enabling factor, which gives
the child increased control over his motor functions, among other things.
But what does it mean that the ego is formed on the basis of an imaginary
relationship with the body, and that all future engagements with reality will
be marked by imaginary anticipation?
Here it is important to reconsider certain implications of the image as
gestalt—that, for example, the gestalt lends a sense of completeness, closure, unity
and autonomy that is not necessarily there. In other words, there is always
something imaginary, something illusionary, in our identifications with our
own images, something deceptive, untruthful and fictitious. Lacan hints at
this in his descriptions of the mirror stage as a process of trickery, seduction,
captivation, slavery and bondage.
‘Captation’ by the image

One cannot escape the fact that, for Lacan, something delusory is going on
in front of the mirror. As Bowie observes: where the chimpanzee is able to
recognize that the mirror is an epistemological void, and to turn his atten-
tion elsewhere, the child has
a perverse will to remain de-

luded. The child’s attention
is seized [by the image] ... he
or she is captivated (Bowie,
1991: 23).
It is in this sense that
Lacan uses the term captation
to describe what is going on.
As Evans (1996) points out,
the French term has two
equally applicable meanings:
it expresses the fascinating
and seductive power of the
The child is thought to be seduced by, and to fall in love with, its mirror image at
image, on the one hand,
the earliest stages of development. Lacan uses the term ‘captation’ to describe this
process, implying both the sense of fascination and of capture. and the idea of ‘capture’,
the more sinister sense of an
‘imprisoning’ or ‘disabling fixation’ on the other. It is in this way that Bowie
(1991) speaks of the mirror as that which, although so seemingly consoling
and advantageous, nonetheless operates as a ruse, a trap and a decoy. The idea
is that ‘falsehood and underhandedness are somehow ingrained into the ego
during its first, formative moments’ (Bowie, 1991: 23). In other words, the
Meconnaissance. Literally ego, which may have been assumed as basically honest, is in fact integrally and
‘misknowing’. Lacan uses fundamentally dishonest.
this term to suggest what
he sees as the primary ego Meconnaissance: misknowing as the primary function of
function—the misleading
the ego
and deceiving of its
subject. For Lacan,
In this regard, Lacan’s notion of the ego has powerful resonances with
people have an almost that of the early Freud. Both observe the ego’s capacity to mislead and
infinite capacity to trick its owner. Lacan, if anything, would like to emphasise even more
deceive themselves. strongly this deceiving quality of the ego. Deception, for him, is the
primary function of the ego. Hill (1997: 18) describes this deceptive
function of the ego:
This means that whatever the circumstances, and however much

psychoanalysis a person has had, in matters of consciousness and
judgement—especially reflexive ones in which people make
judgements of themselves—the productions of the ego are suspect
... The deceptive function of the ego is something we are all stuck
with. A deceptive ego that tells lies is a necessary part of our men-
tal structure.
Implications of meconnaissance for psychology
Considering Lacan’s characterisation of the possession of a healthy tolerant ego. In

ego’s primary function as meconnaissance, addition, he considered that the individual
what are the implications for psycho- was in permanent conflict with his
therapy? Well, if one makes the surroundings, and that any notion of a
assumption that the ego is not to be unified, healthy individual who was happy
trusted, it stands to reason that Lacan was with his adjustment to his surroundings was
a meconnaissance of Freud’s basic teachings
absolutely and fundamentally opposed to (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 60).
any idea that one should help the [patient]
... to strengthen his ego, or to help him This is certainly a radical view, especially
adjust to society in any way, or that one in Lacan’s ardent opposition to any
should help him tolerate unconscious suggestion that psychotherapy should
impulses by building up his ego. He was play a role in adjusting the individual to
opposed to any notion that psychoanalysis his or her social environment. Many of
is concerned with producing healthy, well- course would suggest that it is exactly
adjusted individuals who would be able to this objective that constitutes one of the
know what reality is, and who would be in predominant functions of psychotherapy.
Lacan refers to the false judgements of the ego as meconnaissance, or

misknowing. It is on this basis that he suggests that people have an almost
infinite capacity to deceive themselves, particularly when they are mak-
ing value judgements about themselves, or when they are contemplating
their own image (Hill, 1997). It is important to emphasise how different
this understanding of the ego is to other versions of psychoanalysis or
to American ego psychology. The latter ‘philosophies’ of the ego argue
that it may be strengthened, or put more in touch with reality, by the
construction of a ‘conflict free zone’ (Hill, 1997). For Lacan this is not only
idealistic, it is also simply false. The ego lies compulsively. It attempts to
negotiate between unconscious desire and reality by covering up the ne-
cessary conflicts that life entails. Importantly then, not only does the ego
twist and distort and censor unconscious impulses, it also twists, distorts
and alters our perceptions of external reality. As Hill (1997: 19) puts it, ‘In
other words, it bullshits, like any public relations department’.
The return of the fragmented body

We know why the image is false, and hence why our egos lie to us. But
what is achieved in this way? Why is it so important that this lying
actually happens? It happens, first, as a way of covering up the real extent
to which we lack a basic completeness, unity, or autonomy of the ‘I’—of
the ego. Second, it happens to cover up the great disparity between how we
perceive and understand ourselves—via the image—and how we actually
are. And third, it happens as a way of hiding the fact that we are continu-
ally threatened by disturbing images and feelings of fragmentation,
disunity, and dislocation. These three answers stem, in fact, from a single
central cause. This is how Evans (1996: 67) represents it:
In the mirror stage the infant sees its reflection in the mirror as a
whole/synthesis ... [a perception which contrasts with] the perception
of its own body ... as divided and fragmentary. The anxiety
provoked by this feeling of fragmentation fuels the identification
with the ... image by which the ego is formed. However, the anti-
cipation of a synthetic ego is henceforth constantly threatened by
the memory of this sense of fragmentation, which manifests itself in
images of ‘castration, emasculation, mutilation, dismemberment,
dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body’
which haunt the human imagination.
The less than unified ego needs to lie to us continually if it is sufficiently

to hide the disparity between our illusions of autonomy and cohesion and what
is actually the case. It has to hide from us the fact that our apparently unified
senses of self and identity are always being threatened with collapse. Here
Evans (1996: 67) makes a further crucial point:
In a more general sense, the fragmented body refers not only to images
of the physical body but also to any sense of fragmentation and disunity
... Any such sense of disunity threatens the illusion of synthesis which
constitutes the ego.
We are not only haunted by images of physical or anatomical

dislocation and dismemberment, we are also continually threatened, on a
psychological level, with the fragmentation of our seemingly solid senses
of self and identity.
The hated image and aggressivity

This return of the fragmented body has a profound implication in terms of how
we take ourselves as our first and most primal rivals. In the discussion of infant
narcissism we mentioned that narcissism is characterised by aggressivity, which
stems from the contrast between the wholeness of the image and the uncoordi-
nated disunity of the subject’s real body. We can return to this understanding
now, and elaborate upon it, again with reference to Evans (1996: 115): ‘This con-
trast is first felt by the infant as a rivalry with its own image, because the whole-
ness of the image threatens the subject with fragmentation ... the mirror stage
thereby gives rise to an aggressive tension between the subject and the image’.
Instituting a primal rivalry with the self

Of course, the subject must identify with the image because of the image’s
enabling function. In this way the infant ends up identifying with, and
internalising, his most hated rival, the image of himself. Hence it is true to say
that the infant is his own rival, before being the rival of another. The image
of the self that the subject comes to identify with is both loved and hated;
such identification implies an ambivalent relation with the counterpart,
involving both eroticism and aggression (as discussed in connection
with narcissism). This ‘erotic aggression’ continues as the fundamental
ambivalence underlying all future forms of identification. This is a fact that
reiterates Freud’s concept of ambivalence, that is, the notion that feelings of Ambivalence.
love and hate are powerfully interlocked and interdependent. The coexistence of
The erotic/aggressive identification with the mirror image will form the contradictory impulses
or emotions towards the
basic template for all future relations of love and hate. All future objects of
same object; the term
love and hate will in some ways re-evoke these primal feelings of self-love and usually refers to the co-
self-hate. At the beginning of this chapter we discussed how Freud’s notion of existence of love and hate.
the ego precipitated the superego by suggesting that the ego contained both
self-loving qualities (the ego-ideal stemming from the individual’s narcissistic
childhood when they took themselves as their ideal) and aggressive qualities
(self-punishing tendencies). We now see how both of these loving and hating
qualities are foreshadowed by, and ‘inbuilt’ within, the ego. Lacan continues,
in later writings, to elaborate on how the hated image of the self is thus always
the source of our aggressive feelings for others.
Primal identification and rivalry: the mirror stage and our

interactions with others
The mirror stage hence signals the onset of two very basic yet also very
fundamental psychological functions within the human infant: identifi-
cation and aggressive rivalry. Both of these come to feature as powerful
components in even our most ordinary interactions with others. The
importance of the mirror stage lies not only in the fact that it conditions
the way the infant sees and understands himself, it also powerfully affects
the way he sees and understands others.
In fact, these qualities of identification and rivalry are generally far more
a part of our day-to-day engagement with others than we might at first
assume. As Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986: 58) observe, ‘The primary conflict
between identification with, and primordial rivalry with ... the image, begins
a dialectical process that links the ego to more complex social situations’.
In some ways (and this indicates how readily humans are ‘seduced’ by the
image) humans are over-identificatory beings. In fact, identification with
others seems to be a uniquely human characteristic. The implication of this
is that we humans are always gratuitously identifying, not only in the sense
of identifying personally with someone else, but also in the case of mistakenly
identifying another person with a third party. Lacan humorously refers to
this when he says that he loves his dog Justine because, unlike humans, she
would never mistake him for anyone else. (Another obvious and classical
psychoanalytic example would be the tendency to see your mother or father
in your sexual partner.) This kind of overidentification, or ‘domination by
the image’ is, of course, largely unconscious.
Transvitism. The over- Transvitism: the other as self

identificatory practice in Lacan’s attention to the importance of identificatory processes in early
which the needs, desires, childhood enabled him to explain the fascinating developmental
or emotions of the other
phenomenon of transvitism. Transvitism is that process, to quote Lacan
are taken on as one’s own.
(1977: 19), when ‘The child who strikes another says he has been struck; the
child who sees another fall, cries’. Transvitism is the over-identificatory
practice in which the needs, desires, or emotions of the other are taken
on as one’s own. In this connection it is well documented how children find
other children more interesting than adults, and how they engage more
readily with other children—particularly of the same age—than with adults.
Given that the identifications of self with the external image do not stem
exclusively from the mirror but also from children’s identifications with other
children, we can see how transvitism occurs. By over-identifying with the other
who is structurally similar to the self, and by not yet having settled exactly
where one’s body ends and another’s begins, the desire, need or emotion of
the other is taken on as that of the self. It is in this connection that Marini
(1992: 32) comments, ‘If there is a counter-part—an other who might be me—it
is only because the self is originally other’.
The deep-rootedness of rivalry and hatred: the self as other

We take on the other as self in the mirror stage, through over-identifying with
people who, quite literally, are not part of ourselves (although at some level
we act as if they are). We also do the opposite: we project self as other. Both of these
are constituents of the intensive identificatory practices that occur around
the mirror stage, and which, as much as we might deny it, continue to occur
throughout our adult lives. The important consequence of this is that origi-
nal elements of self-rivalry and self-hatred feature in all our interactions
with others. His assertion of this fact enables Lacan to provide something
of an explanation for the frequency of conflict, aggression and hatred that so
often characterises human relationships. It also suggests an explanation for the
apparently deep-rootedness of particular forms of social prejudice and in-
tolerance such as racism, sexism and bigotry. These are all forms of hatred
that are anchored in the very foundational structures of the human ego.
Make no mistake, Lacan warns: jealousy and hatred are emotions that
exist even in the youngest infant. He derives the following anecdote from St
Augustine’s Confessions: ‘1 have myself seen jealousy in an infant and know what
it means. He was not old enough to speak but whenever he saw his foster-
brother at the breast, he would grow pale with an envious stare’ (Lacan 1977:
20). Lacan presents this as an example of the infant involved in a confrontation
with his counterpart, as if in front of the mirror. He continues to emphasise
how aggressivity and narcissism are tightly bound to one another, suggesting
that, ‘They enter into action in every process of identification, whether it be
with an image or oneself, with another person, or with fragments of oneself
or another’ (Benvenuto & Kennedy 1986: 59).
Alienation through the image

We have spoken, in our discussion of the image as gestalt, of how the image
always potentially ‘adds something’, how it includes qualities (kinds of
unity, closure, autonomy, and so on) that are not necessarily there, within
the subject. In this way, claims Lacan, while there are vitally important Alienation. On a basic
achievements to be gained by the recognition of the image of self, there is also level the term refers to a
a fundamental alienation in this act, by virtue of the fact that it must always, fundamental split within
the subject, in which he
at some level, represent the inclusion of something more than is actually there.
is estranged, distanced
In other words, we might suggest that the action of identifying oneself with from his self. Alienation is
the image must always represent the internalisation of something external. the unavoidable result of
The infant’s prospective mastery, through the mirror image, of basic the process by which the
motor and physical co-ordination must always come from outside of itself; he ego is constituted through
is not yet really the master of his own movements. He can only see his form as identification with the
unified—as a more or less total image—in an external image. This external image external counterpart.
is a virtual, alienated, ideal unity that cannot actually be touched (Benvenuto
& Kennedy, 1986). Indeed, the mirror image is always a paradox; it is always
two contradicting things at once. It seemingly is the child, by virtue of the fact
that it is exactly the child’s reflection. But by being a reflection, and a reflection
only, it is also essentially not the child but something outside of him.
There is ... a fundamental ‘alienation’ in this action [of the mirror

stage]. The infant’s mastery in the mirror image, is outside of himself
... his form [resides in] ... an external image ... that cannot be touched.
Alienation is this lack of being by which his realization lies in another
actual or imaginary space (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 55).
‘I is an other’: alienation as human psychical destiny

Given that this recognition of the image of self is in some ways the found-
ing point of the ego, then it stands to reason that there is always something
fundamentally alien—something external, at the basis of the ego, at the basis of
our most fundamental understandings of ’I’. For Lacan, we only ever realise
ourselves through an external image or reflection, and accordingly there is
an ‘inbuilt’ sense of alienation that cuts across all our self-understandings, no
matter how deep or how arbitrary. This is perhaps one of the most profound
implications of his understanding of how we are ‘seduced’ by the image. This
is how we ‘take on board’ something as being real and integral to ourselves,
which in fact is quite external, quite other, and quite false. Indeed, it is at
this point of the mirror stage where Lacan (1977) ironically notes that the
instrumental intelligence of the ape very briefly surpasses that of the human
infant of the same age. Where the chimpanzee, like the human being,
appears briefly to confuse the image with reality, it eventually loses interest,
recognises the image for what it is—merely an image—and moves on. The
human being remains entranced, fascinated by the reflection, mistaking it
for himself. This is the prototype of the self-alienation to which all human
beings are damned, and which the ape manages to avoid.
Alienation is hence an inevitable consequence of the process by which
the ego is constituted by identification with the counterpart. The attempt to
gain a full or truly meaningful knowledge of oneself will always be doomed
to failure. As Bowie (1991: 25) puts it, ‘The “alienating destination” of the
“I” is such that the individual is permanently in discord with himself.’ Evans
(1996: 9) makes a valuable allusion here to illustrate the point. Quoting
Lacan, he notes, ‘the initial synthesis of the ego is essentially an alter ego’.
He extends this by referring to Rimbaud’s assertion that ‘I is an other’.
PHO TO : G I LL MO O NEY 280 Developmental Psychology
Conclusion
The mirror stage describes the formation of the ego via the process of
identification with an external image. The child identifies with an image
outside himself, which may be a real mirror image or simply the image of
another child. The apparent completeness of this image gives the child a new
mastery over his body, a new awareness of his capacities, which, through a
kind of mimicry, precipitates the child’s actual control over himself. This
identification with an external image or other party enables the child to do
things that he could not do before. Importantly, this identification with an
external image is more than a single moment in childhood: it is an organising
principle of human development generally. As Evans (1996) emphasises, it is
not simply a moment in the life of the infant, rather it represents a permanent
structure of subjectivity—a structure in which the subject is permanently
caught and captured by its own image.
For Lacan, we only ever However, this mastery of motor functions, this entry into the human
realise ourselves through an world of space and movement, comes at a price: the subject is captivated
external image or reflection, by the image and becomes fundamentally deluded by it—with significant
and accordingly there is an
‘inbuilt’ sense of alienation
consequences for the rest of life. The image as gestalt possesses an illusory
that cuts across all our self- completeness and unity that the infant does not possess in terms of his
understandings, no matter physical or psychological conceptions of self. In fact, in total contrast to
how deep or how arbitrary. this, the infant exists in a disturbing state of fragmented and disconnected
physicality, where he perceives his body as in pieces. Because the image
enables him to gain a sense of the physical integrity of his body, along with
a basic sense of ‘this is me’ apart from the outside world, it comes to love
and identify with the image. This image is also the form of the first rival,
however, because it contrasts with the uncoordinated disunity of the subject’s
real body. The image accentuates the subject’s feelings of fragmentation and
For Lacan, the mirror stage gives rise to an aggressive tension and rivalry between the subject and the
represents a permanent image. The erotic/aggressive identification with the mirror image will form
structure of subjectivity, a the basic template for all future relations of love and hate.
structure in which the
subject is permanently
Since the mirror image always comes from ‘the outside in’—and since
caught and captured by his the recognition of the image of self is in some ways the founding point of
or her own image. the ego—it stands to reason that there is always something fundamentally
P HOTO: GILL M OONEY

In terms of Lacan’s theory,
our sense of self is always
imbricated with the other,
just as the other is always
imbricated in our sense
of self.
alien, something external, at the basis of the ego, at the basis of our most
fundamental understandings of self. In this way, a sense of identity only
comes at the price of a fundamental alienation. We only come to know
ourselves, and to develop our efficacy in the world, in terms of what is not
us, in terms of something other, and apart from ourselves. Hence our sense
of self is always imbricated (enmeshed, interwoven) with the other (the
position of someone outside of us), just as the other is always imbricated
in our sense of self.
The primary function of the ego then, based as it is on imaginary
images, is deception, mis-knowing, meconnaissance. It is not to be trusted,
and treatment should not seek to strengthen or develop it, or to help the
subject know him- or herself better. These attempts to find a unified
and total person are futile, and doomed to end in failure. Mainstream
developmental psychology has still to ponder the full implications of this
intriguing theory for the psychosocial development of the child.
Critiques of Lacan
Perhaps the chief criticism of Lacan is one that applies to virtually all of his
writings, and not to the mirror stage alone. It is simply that Lacan seems
almost perverse in the obscure and abstruse style in which he expresses his
theories and ideas. He intentionally chose a writing style that was non-
linear and opaque, and which, as Bowie (1991) notes, is typically frustrating,
difficult, and ambiguous. At a literary level perhaps this might be rationalised
as a style appropriate to its subject matter—to the unconscious flow of
meaning. The problem, however, is that one is almost always at pains to
know whether one is accurately interpreting his ideas. The mirror stage has
been an extremely influential theory. It has been widely lauded and even
more widely applied in academic discourse, and has become emblematic
of post-structural, and postmodern debates about the fragmentation
and ‘multiplicity of self’. (This fact is lamented by Sey (1999), who sees
it as a misappropriation and ‘domestication’ of the theory.) Mainstream
developmental psychology has still to engage properly with the ideas, and to
assess their practical utility. Until then the popular jury is still largely ‘out’,
at least regarding the critical evaluation of this theory.
Specific tasks
➊ Be on the lookout for the theme of mirror images in popular magazines,
advertising and popular culture generally. Try and collect a series of such
examples. Carefully ‘read’ these examples according to your understanding of
the mirror stage, and explore the various implications of Lacan’s theory for each
of them.
➋ If possible, try to observe infants playing in front of mirrors. Do their actions seem
to affirm or refute the basic mirror stage theory? Motivate your answer.
➌ Is it true, in your opinion, that young children often ‘play out’ the theme of the
corps morcele? (Think about games that you yourself played as a child.)
Give examples to support your answer.
➍ How would you explain the disorder of anorexia nervosa in terms of the mirror
phase? Consider the usefulness of the theory for this disorder?
Benvenuto, B & Kennedy, R (1986). The works of Jacques Lacan: An introduction.
London: Free Association Press.
(In a field filled with deliberately obscure styles of writing, this volume presents an invaluably
accessible primer to Lacan’s basic ideas. Highly recommended.)
Bowie, M (1991). Lacan. London: Fontana.
(Almost as accessible as Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986). Bowie’s book does a similarly admirable job
of plotting out the general shape of Lacan’s overarching psychoanalytic theory.)
Evans, D (1996). An introductory dictionary of Lacanian psychoanalysis. London: Routledge.
(A clear and thorough explication of all the major terms and concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis, which
includes commentaries on how they have been developed and in some instances transformed across the
whole span of Lacan’s writings.)
Hill, P (1997). Lacan for beginners. London: Writers and Readers.
Lacan, J (1977). Ecrits. London: Norton.
(It seems unusual not to recommend the original writings of the author to students, but as mentioned
above, Lacan’s original writings can be hair-raisingly frustrating and esoteric. Ecrits contains the mirror
stage paper, and is probably the slightly easier of the two.)
Leader, D & Groves, G (1995). Lacan for beginners. Cambridge: Icon Books.
(Both of the above are colourful, user-friendly, comic-book style introductions to Lacan, which usefully
illustrate many of his core concepts.)
CHAPTER
13
Erikson’s psychosocial stages
of development
Derek Hook
This chapter presents the psychosocial theory of Erik Erikson.

We shall discuss the following:
1. Introduction: differences between Freud and Erikson

2. Basic assumptions of Erikson’s theory
* The epigenetic approach
* Developmental virtues and vices
* The idea of ongoing and cumulative development
3. The eight stages of psychosocial development:
* Basic trust versus basic mistrust
* Autonomy versus shame and doubt
* Initiative versus guilt
* Industry versus inferiority
* Identity versus role confusion
* Intimacy versus isolation
* Generativity versus stagnation
* Integrity versus despair
4. Criticisms of Erikson’s theory
Erik Erikson
Ego. The ‘executive’ or Introduction: differences between

adaptive agency of the Freud and Erikson
mind, which mediates There are a significant number of continuities between the developmental
between the demands of
theories of Sigmund Freud and Erik Erikson. In fact, in many ways
reality, the superego and
the id. The ego arises
Erikson’s first five stages are a reformulation and an expansion of Freud’s
from the need to master psychosexual stages (Maier, 1988). There are also, however, vital differences
instinctual impulses, to between the theories, and it is worthwhile, by way of introduction, to focus
operate independently briefly on some of these theoretical divergences.
of parental figures, and Freud emphasised the role of the unconscious, and hence the id, in
from the self-preservative determining behaviour. He also prioritised the sexual level of development,
imperative for the id to
and viewed the developing child within a tight focus on the child-mother-
adapt to the conditions of
objective reality.
father Oedipal triangle. Erikson, by contrast, focused on the adaptive
abilities of the ego, and prioritised the social level of development. Instead of
Crises. Key challenges an ongoing, lifelong struggle between conscious and unconscious processes,
or turning points of he considers how personal and social crises provide the necessary challenges
maturation through for healthy growth to occur within the individual. In short, although
which one can trace the Erikson, like Freud, held a psychoanalytic view, it would be true to say that
pattern of an individual’s
he converted Freud’s psychosexual account of development into a psychosocial
personality. Each step in
the cycle of life presents
theory of development.
the individual with a new A further difference between the theorists lies in the fact that Erikson
adaptive psychosocial life seems to adopt a far more optimistic view of development than Freud
task, which the individual does. One might say that whereas Freud’s theory is a ‘map of how things
needs to resolve if further can go wrong’, Erikson’s is a ‘map of how things go right’ in the life of
healthy development is the child. Erikson’s optimism is also reflected in the theoretical focus on
to occur.
development that takes place after the first six years of life. Erikson (1980)
asserts that fundamental developmental changes occur across the entire life-
span. He saw people as problem-solvers who move towards constructive and
progressive resolutions of life problems.
Basic assumptions of Erikson’s theory
The epigenetic approach

Erikson favours an epigenetic approach (‘epi’ meaning ‘upon’, ‘genetic’
Epigenetic approach meaning ‘emergence’) to the study of human development. This, in short,
to development. means that everything that grows has a ‘ground-plan’, a predetermined
The view that psychosocial
schedule, in terms of which each part of a developing organism will have
development follows
a ‘ground-plan’, a a special time of ascendancy. This time of ascendancy is a critical period in
predetermined schedule, which maturational growth must take place, failing which, detrimental
in terms of which each effects will follow. A decisive turn one way or another is unavoidable here—
part of a developing these are moments of decision between progress and regression, integration
organism will have a and retardation (Erikson, 1963). Having said this, it is important to be clear
special time of ascendancy. that the various stages do, however, all exhibit a tendency to overcome their
respective developmental challenges.
For Erikson (1963; 1980), growth occurs in a regular and sequential
fashion, moving in an orderly and cumulative manner from one devel-
opmental stage to the next, until each part of the individual has developed.
The outcome of this ‘maturational timetable’ is a wide and integrative set
of life skills and abilities that function together within the autonomous
individual. Each stage of the maturational timetable ties a key social life-
E r i k s o n ’s p s y c h o s o c i a l s t a g e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t 285
challenge (or crisis) to a crucial point of physiological development. As

Erikson puts it, each human being is at all times a biological organism, an
ego, and a member of society, and is involved as such in three processes
of development. The outcome of human development then is ‘the ego’s
successful mediation between the physical stages and social institutions’
(Erikson, 1963: 54). Hence Erikson, like Freud, powerfully links psycho-
logical development (and socialisation generally) to biological maturation.
Erikson places far more emphasis on specific social structures than does
Freud, to the point that he even implicates social institutions in the out-
come of his developmental stages.
Developmental virtues and vices

Although Erikson refers to his developmental stages as crises, these are not
crises in the fatalistic or catastrophic sense, but are rather critical times in the
developmental sense of challenges—turning points of maturation—through
which we can trace the pattern of an individual’s personality. Each step in
the cycle of life presents the individual with a new life task, a set of choices
and tests, which are prescribed by the structure of the culture and society in
which he lives (Erikson, 1963). The successful resolution of such challenges
leads to the gaining of what Erikson calls virtues, a term which should be Virtues. The psychosocial
understood not as an evaluation of the individual, but as an indication of values of hope, will,
growing ego strength. In this way growth, for Erikson, may be understood purpose, skill and fidelity
that are the outcome of
in terms of the achievement of integration—both of new psychosocial abilities
the healthy resolution
within the ego, and of the individual into the structures and values of society. of developmental crises.
The completion of each stage of life means, in Erikson’s words, that a These virtues should
‘new strength is added to a widening ensemble of life-skills’ (1969: 52). One not be understood as
should note here that the opposite of a virtue is not a vice, an ‘evil’, but is rather an evaluation of the
a developmental deficit, a disorder or dysfunction, that manifests wherever individual, but rather as
an individual has been hindered in the activation and perfection of virtues an indication of growing
ego strength.
(Erikson, 1968).
Ego strength. The term
The idea of ongoing and cumulative development used to describe the ability
Although certain crises become critical at certain points of the life-cycle (at of the ego to moderate
which point they will be more important than other related crises), and and deal with the effects
although they require the resolution of certain tasks and conflicts, these of the opposing forces of
crises are all presented throughout the life of the individual (Erikson, the id, the superego
and reality.
1963; 1980). Throughout life, for example, people will need to test and
revisit the degree to which they can trust others. In this way none of the stages
is ever fully complete, or absolutely resolved. We will continue, for instance,
both to trust and mistrust throughout our lives, and indeed knowing how
to mistrust is frequently as important as it is to trust.
Because Erikson’s is a cumulative account of development, each
developmental stage is reliant, to a degree, on the successful negotiation
of earlier stages. The resolution of earlier developmental crises and their
integration into the ego is in a sense the necessary preparation the child will
need to tackle the next developmental stage. Each resolved step is also, in
some ways, a reintegration of previous steps. Nevertheless, although Erikson
claims that the lack of resolution of an earlier stage will adversely affect how
the individual attempts to resolve later stages (because the later stages will
have a foundation which has not been completely built), he does allow for the
possibility that adjustments made at one stage can in fact be altered or even
reversed in later stages. Craig, (1996: 59) describes this as follows:
... children who are denied attention in infancy can grow to nor-
mal adulthood if they are given extra attention at later stages ...
adjustments to conflicts play an important part in the develop-
ment of personality. The resolution of these conflicts is cumulative; a
person’s manner of adjustment at each stage affects the way he or she
handles the next conflict.
Although each developmental crisis manifests around a biological

focus and has a social dimension (not to mention a powerful effect on
the eventual personality of the child), it is important to understand that
each stage crystallises around an emotional conflict. This is why Erikson
refers to each stage as an opposition. Erikson is predominantly a theorist
of affect; it is emotions in their productive and resolving capacities that
make up the building blocks of human behaviour, and ultimately, indi-
vidual personality. In what follows we will discuss Erikson’s eight stages
of psychosocial development, with a particular focus on the first five, all of
which are applicable to childhood.
Stage 5: identity versus role confusion
Stage 4: industry versus inferiority
Stage 3: initiative versus guilt
Stage 2: autonomy versus shame and doubt
Stage 1: basic trust versus basic mistrust
Figure 13.1 For Erikson each stage forms the basis for the next; the successful resolution of each stage
forms the foundation for the next stage of development (Carver and Scheier, 1988).
The eight stages of psychosocial development

Stage 1: basic trust versus basic mistrust
After a regulated life of warmth and protection in the womb, the newly
born infant arrives in the outer world as a helpless, vulnerable, and
absolutely dependent creature. Understandably, his first emotional task
is learning how to trust the primary caregiver, without whom the infant
would not survive. This trust is reliant on the baby’s developing sense of
the world as a good and safe place. He is also reliant on a sense of physical
comfort and on a minimum amount of (physiological) uncertainty and
doubt. As Maier (1988: 90) describes it:
Maintaining the bodily functions of respiration, ingestion,

digestion and motor movements are the only concerns of young
organisms ... these functions comprise their immediate purpose
for interacting with their environment. Thus, bodily experiences

provide the basis for a psychological state of trust.
It is in this way that Erikson notes that the first demonstration of social
trust in the baby is ‘the ease of his feeding, the depth of his sleep, the relax-
ation of his bowels’ (1963: 247).
The psychological impact of physical needs and effects

A basic sense of mistrust stems from unsatisfactory physical experiences,
from the sense that one’s needs are being unmet. A fundamental goal of
this stage is the attainment of a kind of equilibrium—the mutual regulation
of the baby’s increasingly receptive capacities with the maternal techniques
of provision (Erikson, 1963). It is this regulation that helps the child balance
the discomfort caused by the immaturity of the homeostasis with which he
was born (Erikson, 1963). In his increasing waking hours the child comes to
develop a greater sense of familiarity, which coincides with a feeling of inner
goodness. In this sense it is understandable that Erikson (1963: 247) calls the
infant’s first social achievement his ‘willingness to let the mother out of sight
without undue anxiety or rage’.
A rudimentary trust begins to develop here—a sense of inner certainty
as well as of outer predictability. Indeed, this basic growing bud of ego
identity depends on the recognition that there ‘is an inner population
of remembered and anticipated sensations and images which are firmly
correlated with the outer population of familiar and predictable things
and people’ (Erikson, 1963: 247). Consistency and sameness are important
values for the child, and need to be experienced both on the ‘inside’ and on
the ‘outside’ so that the child can learn to trust and rely on his providers,
and so that he can trust the self and the capacity of his own organs to cope
with urges (Erikson, 1963).
Erikson, like Freud, feels that the mouth is the primary bodily focus of
this stage of development. Accordingly, he suggests that teething is a crucial
testing phase here, where the child is set the challenge of trying to moderate
the internal stimulus of pain without giving in totally to the only action
which promises some relief—biting (Erikson, 1963: 248). Biting of the breast
of course may result in the breast being withdrawn, hence this inner sensation
may affect the child’s outer-world relations. Erikson claims that teething
may have a prototypical significance, and that masochistic tendencies later
in life may stem from just this tendency to ‘assure cruel comfort by enjoying
one’s hurt when unable to prevent a significant loss’ (1963: 248).
The possibility for psychopathology

This is the most foundational of all the stages; indeed, its resulting virtue—
hope—is the basic ingredient of all ego strength to follow. Given the founding
importance of this essential constituent of the ego, it is unsurprising that Erik-
son notes that a great variety of psychopathologies would have their origin at
the unsuccessful resolution of this early stage of development. He observes:
… we do find in potentially psychotic people that the first relation-

ships in earliest childhood seem to have been severely disturbed.
We could speak here of a psychosocial weakness which consists

of a readiness to mistrust and to lose hope in rather fundamental
ways (Erikson, 1963: 248).
In addition to masochism and depression, schizoid behaviour (that

is, social detachment and a strongly conflictual or restricted emotional
disposition) may stem from this early developmental phase. Each of
these disorders, for Erikson (1963), relates to the absence of a basic trust
in self and the world.
Identity. For Erikson the The importance of parental care

idea of identity refers to Although the various crises of trust versus mistrust ultimately need to
a sense of being at one be dealt with in the child’s newly developing ego, they are first a task
with oneself as one grows
for maternal care. Indeed the quality of the maternal relationship here
and develops; it refers
to an affinity between
is vital—it is mothers who create a sense of trust in their children by
the individual and his administering to their needs in a way that combines sensitive care of the
or her social roles and baby’s individual needs with a firm sense of personal trustworthiness
community ties. Identity (Erikson, 1963). This maternal care forms the basis in the child of a
for Erikson is only attained sense of identity which will later combine ‘a sense of being “all right”, of
through the integration being oneself, and of becoming what other people trust one will become’
of previous identifications.
(Erikson, 1963: 249). As Erikson (1963) puts it, good maternal care
results in the baby learning once and for all to trust the mother, to trust
himself, and to trust the world.
Erikson is optimistic about the
PHOTO: GILL MOONEY
abilities of infants to learn to trust,

and claims that there are very few
frustrations that the child cannot
endure if ultimately their frustration
leads to ‘greater sameness and stronger
continuity of development, toward a
final integration of the individual life
cycle with some meaningful wider
belongingness’ (Erikson, 1963: 249).
It is important to note that the care
of the child does not begin and end
with the mother. Other adults in the
household will also play some caring
For Erikson, one of the role in the development of the infant,
child’s first developmental as will the extended family into which the child is born. Moreover,
challenges is learning to society’s recognition of the family as one of its basic institutions, and the
trust the external world. relevant culture’s guarantee for the continuation of fundamental societal
The role of the parents,
as principal caregivers,
mores and values, will likewise influence the developing child (Maier,
in consoling the child 1988). What is important here is that Erikson places the infant squarely
in times of misfortune, within his sociocultural context. Therefore, although Erikson has aimed
disappointment, or to design a theory that is a generalisable and even universal account
physical pain, is of utmost of human development, he still suggests that we should, indeed must,
importance here.
‘fill in the blanks’ by looking carefully at the sociocultural and political
circumstances underpinning development.
Institutional correlatives to development

For Erikson, each successive developmental crisis corresponds to a
social institution, for the simple reason that the human life cycle and
society’s institutions have evolved together (Erikson, 1963). The social
institution corresponding to this first stage of development is religion,
an institution that powerfully demonstrates the human ability to hope
and trust (Erikson, 1963).
Stage 2: autonomy versus shame and doubt

With the development of a basic sense of trust in their caregivers, in their
environment, and in themselves, infants begin to realise that they can
determine their own behaviour, and this ability is the basis of a growing sense
of autonomy (Erikson, 1963; 1980). Infants are still very much dependent on
caregivers, however, and this continued reliance means that they experience
doubt about their capacities and about their own autonomy (Erikson, 1963).
The infant’s contrasting feelings about his self-capacity and autonomy stem
from the range of activities he is involved in at this stage. It is at this stage that
toddlers have a budding awareness of their body and how to control it. At
this stage they are involved in a very wide range of day-to-day activities like
eating, dressing, ‘toileting’, and moving about.
The importance of rudimentary mobility and muscular maturity

The toddler at this stage is mastering movement and mobility; reaching,
walking, climbing and holding are all important new exploratory
activities (Maier, 1988). Similarly, this is the stage where children become
able to regulate their own toiletry activities through increased muscular
maturity (Erikson, 1963). All of these activities can lead either to a
sense of accomplishment, self-control and self-confidence if successfully
carried out, or to a sense of self-doubt if unsuccessfully executed. Parental
supervision accompanies all of these activities, and the parent’s role is
absolutely vital in encouraging and affirming certain accomplishments,
and in correcting failures. Parental approval inevitably boosts the
child’s sense of self-esteem and competence in the case of ‘a job well
done’; failures, on the other hand, particularly in toilet training, may
be accentuated (Erikson, 1963). This is especially the case if the child
is punished or labelled as messy, sloppy or bad, and creates a situation
where the sense of shame and self-doubt may become very strong and
may have detrimental effects on the emotional development of the child
(Erikson, 1963). Given that toilet training and sphincter control are the
most important physiological challenges at this stage of development, it
is hardly surprising that the two most basic and abstract concepts that
come to prominence within the child at this stage are those of ‘holding
on’ and ‘letting go’ (Erikson, 1963). Virtues and vices can both be read
into these relations:
... to hold can become a destructive and cruel retaining or restraining,

and it can become a pattern of care: to have and hold. To let go, too
can turn into an inimical letting loose of destructiv e forces, or it can
become a relaxed ‘to let pass’ and ‘to let be’ (Erikson, 1963: 251).
A budding sense of volition and independence

It is at this stage of the infant’s life that he comes to possess, in the most powerful
way so far, the prerogative of choice—to ‘hold on’ or to ‘let go’—and this is his
route towards ‘standing on his own feet’, to deciding for himself or, on the
other hand, to clinging fearfully to the parents. A sense of autonomy then
stems not only from the child’s sense of accomplishment in toilet training,
and in a variety of exploratory activities, it also comes from the child’s sense of
independence, from his limited but growing ability to choose and act for himself.
Accordingly, the virtue of this stage is that of possessing one’s own will. The
development of such a will calls for sensitive parenting, because this is the ‘me
do’ phase where toddlers begin to try and do almost everything themselves.
This is where parents have to strike a balance between granting the child
gradual independence, letting him try certain things, while still maintaining
firm limits, and disallowing him from trying others. It is important here
that a give-and-take relationship is established between child and parent,
because it is through a balanced relationship of this sort that autonomy is
fostered and self-doubt diminished within the child.
The inadequate resolution of this stage can lead to detrimental out-
comes in the individual. If it is the case that children are denied the gradual
and well-guided experience of the autonomy of free choice, they will turn
against themselves all these urges to manipulate and discriminate (Erikson,
1963). They will overmanipulate themselves, and develop a precocious and
excessive self-consciousness, which for Erikson (1963) is the source of
senseless repetitiveness, obsessiveness, stubbornness and obsessive-compulsive
behaviour. Intolerance and irrational fear may likewise be seen as the result
of such a lack of confidence and self-assurance.
The implications of self-doubt and shame

Doubt and shame are the chief factors that threaten the development
of autonomy. Erikson characterises shame as an extreme form of self-
consciousness—as being highly visible without wanting to be visible (Erikson,
1963). This ‘being seen’ against one’s own wishes, this being caught ‘with one’s
pants down’ is like a rage that would like to ‘destroy the eyes of the world’,
or alternatively it is a ‘rage turned against the self’ (Erikson, 1963: 253). In
this connection one might consider how formative childhood experiences of
shame play a part in influencing the development of suicidal tendencies, or
antisocial personality disorders. Doubt is ‘the brother of shame’ according
to Erikson (1963). It results as a personality trait if the child is consistently
dominated by the will of others, if what they do is constantly questioned or
criticised. For Erikson (1963) this stage becomes decisive in determining the
individual’s interpersonal ratios of co-operation or wilfulness, self-expression
or self-suppression, and love or hate. As he puts it, ‘From a sense of self-
control without loss of self-esteem comes a lasting sense of good will and
pride; from a sense of loss of self control and of foreign over-control comes a
lasting property for doubt and shame’ (Erikson, 1963: 254).
The institutions of law and order

Just as the first developmental crisis was tied to a fundamental social
institution, so this stage is tied to ‘the lasting need of the individual to have
his will reaffirmed and delineated within an adult order of things which
at the same time reaffirms and delineates the will of others ... [under] the
institutional safeguard [of the] ... principle of law and order’ (Erikson, 1963:
254). Erikson also suggests that the pattern of child training established at this
stage determines the eventual form of political authority that the child will
prefer as an adult.
Stage 3: initiative versus guilt

Having gained a rudimentary sense of autonomy, children now build on
their limited explorations of the previous phase by moving on to a new set
of environmental conquests in widening social and spatial spheres (Maier,
1988). This is an optimistic period of growth for Erikson (1963), who remarks
how children seem to be in possession of surplus energy that enables them
to forget failures quickly and to approach new activities with undiminished
enthusiasm. This is the stage in which the social environment of children
challenges them to be active and directed in mastering specific tasks. The
virtue that correlates to these challenges is purpose. It is at this stage that
children are asked to assume an increasing amount of responsibility—for
themselves, for their own bodies, and even, occasionally, for their siblings.
Children’s widening exploratory potential

Having mastered the skills of reaching, grasping, climbing and holding,
children are now learning better how to walk and run, two new-found
mobilities that quickly extend the child’s exploratory abilities (Erikson, 1963).
Similarly, children have a better grasp of language and can ask enquiring
questions about what they do not understand. They are fascinated by how
the world works, and how they may be able to influence it. In many ways,
children at this stage are testing their new skills and abilities, ‘feeling out’ their
potentials. Children also have an active fantasy life at this stage; for them the
world contains both real and imaginary things and people, and they fantasise
actively about what they might become ‘when they grow up’ (Erikson,
1963). These imaginative abilities are important in stimulating learning and
creativity in the child.
Children at this stage have an enormous thirst for experience and
exploration, an enthusiasm for initiative that can easily get them into
trouble, or lead them into danger. As Maier (1988) explains, children are
reaching out with both language and locomotion at this stage, expanding
their fields of experience and of imagination, but some of these possibilities
frighten them. Certain boundaries and rules have been put in place by
caregivers, and the child has to decide whether to respect these restrictions,
or whether to explore beyond them.
Guilt and self-regulation

Guilt is the emotion that arises to limit these explorations, to stake out
reasonable from unreasonable areas of investigation. Maier (1988: 100-101)
claims that, ‘Permissiveness towards such trying out, daring, and investi-
gating is an essential feature of development—as is the establishment of certain
boundaries to circumscribe just what is permissible’. It is the child’s task
to balance these two options. Given that Erikson’s developmental stages are
largely mapped upon those of Freud, it is not surprising to discover

that the exploratory activities of this stage also revolve around the
discovery of the genitals as a zone of pleasure. Similarly, the guilt of
this stage is intricately intertwined with the content of the Oedipus
complex and, in boys, the phobias of castration anxiety.
The conflict of initiative versus guilt is to a large degree the process
by which children learn to take on a parental role over themselves
(Erikson, 1963; 1980). This is the stage where children face the
universal crisis of turning from an attachment to their parents to
the slow process of becoming a parent, of becoming one’s own parent
and supervising one’s self (Erikson, 1963). Through the processes of
the Oedipus complex, through strong identification with the same-
sex parent, and through a greater awareness and respect for parental
authority, the child now becomes able to do just that—to take on, in
part, a parental role over itself. The conscience of the superego now
comes into operation. Erikson’s suggestion here is that there is a split in
the child ‘where the infantile body and mind now become divided into
an infantile set which perpetuates the exuberance of growth potentials,
and a parental set which supports and increases self-observation, self-
guidance and self-punishment’ (Erikson, 1963: 256).
Moral development
Erikson (1963) suggests that moral development in children occurs
primarily at this stage, and contends that its source (the early super-
ego) can be cruel and over-controlling—over-constricting to the point
that children develop an over-obedience more literal than the one the
parent has wished them to develop. In fact, Erikson argues that some
of our deepest regressions and longest resentments stem from parents
who themselves did not live up to the ideals of this new conscience:
‘One of the deepest conflicts in life is the hate for a parent who served
as the model for the superego, but who ... was found trying to get away
with the very transgressions which the child can no longer tolerate in
themselves’ (Erikson, 1963: 257).
The adult problems that can stem from this phase of development
are inhibition, impotence, or denial—the kinds of paralysis that result
from an individual being too scared to ‘stick their neck out’ (Erikson,
1963). On the other hand, we may find recklessness, showing-off and
gratuitous risk-taking behaviour in those who are trying to over-
compensate for such inhibitions (Erikson, 1963).
The moral conscience (or superego) is built up not only from
parental prohibitions, but also from the child’s sociocultural heritage.
Cultural values, the tastes, class standards, characteristics, and traditions
of a society all contribute to the child’s sense of morality (Erikson, 1980).
Many of the child’s wildest fantasies are now repressed and inhibited
through this new capacity for guilt, and the predominant challenge here
is to balance a newfound sense of moral order with an ongoing thirst for
initiative. The child has to negotiate the tension between an ever-present
sense of moral surveillance and the desire to gain social experiences and
knowledge. Like Freud (1991) though, Erikson (1963) suggests that the
The effects of domestic violence on

psychosocial development in children
South Africa is a violent society charac- Guilt is a major problem for abused
terised by high levels of brutal crime children. As Angless & Shefer (1997)
and physical political conflict. An often- suggest, an alarming number of children
neglected form of South African violence is who live with the threat of domestic violence
that of domestic abuse. As Angless & Shefer feel that such violence is their fault, and
(1997) note, the home—far from being come to blame themselves for ‘causing the
a safe place for children—is often riddled problem’. This can have detrimental effects
with various forms of familial violence, on the self-esteem of such children, in the
with physical and sexual abuses, which can form of shame and feelings of ‘badness’.
understandably cause a range of emotional Social isolation is a frequent outcome
difficulties in child development. The effects for children who witness or suffer domestic
of witnessing violence committed against a abuse. Angless & Shefer (1997) quote
family member by another family member, a variety of figures suggesting that the
or of being abused oneself, vary widely for children of battered women are often
different children. alienated from their peers, and do not relate
In Erikson’s psychosocial developmental to their common interests and activities.
theory it is easy to see that a violent parent, or Similarly, children who have been abused
violence in the home more generally, would themselves often have great difficulties in
pose a threat to the child’s ability to resolve, social adjustment, in ‘fitting in’ at school
in particular, the crisis of trust versus mistrust, and in maintaining productive social
but also the crises of autonomy versus shame/ interactions more generally. Difficulties in
doubt and of initiative versus guilt. If children concentration, poor academic results, school
live largely in the shadow of fear of an phobia, fighting with peers and general
abusive parent, it will be very difficult, if not rebelliousness against adults and authority
impossible, for them to form a strong sense figures may all stem from a violent home
of trust in that parent In this connection, background (Angless & Shefer, 1997).
Angless & Shefer (1997) report that children The formation of strong role models and
exposed to domestic violence often live positive gender identifications are both also
with terrible anxiety and uncertainty, and extremely problematic for children who come
exhibit symptoms of emotional distress such from violent homes. While children do not
as restlessness, nervousness and a variety want to identify with the abuser, they equally
of related somatic complaints, in addition do not want to identify with the victim and as
to not being able to trust their basic home such they may equate maleness with violence
environment—or abusive parent(s)—such and hurting women, and femaleness with
children often experience the suspicion that being hurt by men (Angless & Shefer, 1997).
they may ultimately not be able properly to Perhaps most disturbing of all is the
trust or control themselves. Abused children contention that frequent exposure to vio-
observe parents who cannot control their lence, both as a witness and as a victim,
own anger and subsequently become appears to be a predisposing factor in
concerned that they may not be able to future violence. This is an ominous sugges-
control themselves. Guilt and anxiety, and tion, particularly considering the current
auto-phobia (fear of their own behaviour) are ‘culture of violence’ in South Africa, where
generally characteristic features of this state of a climate of brutal violence is so well
fundamental mistrust. established in the history of the country.
new superego of the child not only restricts the horizon of the permissible
but also fosters positive goals; it sets the direction in which the dreams of
childhood might be attached to the goals of an active adult life.
The child becomes ‘a unit of social interaction’

The energetic learning of this stage is matched by a new willingness to share
and cooperate, to associate with, and enter the lives of others. The child at this
stage, according to Erikson (1963), learns quickly and avidly, and is eager to
combine with other children, to profit from teachers, and to emulate ideal
prototypes. Indeed, sociability is certainly a core component of this stage—
here the child starts to become a social unit, an integrated personality, a social
being in relationship to other beings (Maier, 1988). Children begin to take
note of and understand role and sex differences among those within their
environment. They come to experience themselves as a boy or a girl—a
gender identity that is grasped and understood in a social manner through
a sense of membership with a particular social grouping.
Gender and social role development

Overt gender differences become apparent at this stage. Erikson (1963)
sees boys as indulging in intense motor activities, and as participating in
directed problem-solving practices where curiosity and urgent exploration
fuel investigations into the unknown. Boys’ activities at this age are marked
with an intrusive quality; the earlier emphasis on experiences with people
shifts increasingly to a preoccupation with the world of actions and things
(Erikson, 1963). By contrast, the activity of girls at this age is characterised by
an inceptive quality, a willingness to include others, and to be involved in the
lives of others. These are the qualities that will go on to prepare girls for their
future maternal role (Erikson, 1963). Erikson adds here that cultural values
and roles are imposed on developing children, and therefore one should
allow a certain amount of cultural latitude for the way that boys and girls will
be gendered into social roles. In whatever way such roles may be assigned
however, Erikson (1963) does emphasise that they will be well practised by
the child at this stage of development.
As children become increasingly socially competent, they also come to
be aware of differences between discrete families and social groups. They
are also involved with a variety of different social institutions: nursery
schools, kindergarten, the earliest grades of primary school, church and,
of course, their own family (Erikson, 1980). Their sense of social role and
placement becomes increasingly well defined and they gradually become
aware of the opportunities and responsibilities that they may be able to, or
have to, take on as adults (Erikson, 1980). The social institution that cor-
relates to this stage of development is economic endeavour, an institution
which takes root through the adoption of ideal role models that children
will go on to emulate as they become active participants in the economic
life of a society (Erikson, 1963).
Stage 4: industry versus inferiority

This stage corresponds to Freud’s period of latency and is, accordingly,
a relatively calm period where children need to consolidate the rapid
advancements made in the three previous stages. In many ways this is the
stage in which the child ‘fills in the gaps’ of those psychosocial skills, social
roles, and levels of physical growth already achieved. Although the child is
now rapidly approaching the age where it is able to be parent (in the most
rudimentary psychological and biological terms), it must first become a
worker—a productive member of society and a potential provider (Erik-
son, 1963). In short, the child must develop the virtue of industriousness.
A wider sphere of social interactions

According to Erikson (1963), the child has now resolved, at some uncon-
scious level, that there can be no workable future within the ‘womb of the
family’, and he must now spread its skills and initiatives across a wider
social realm. Children at this stage are developing an increasing number
of skills and abilities at both home and school. They are preoccupied by
the goal of gaining competence, proficiency and mastery in certain key
tasks assigned to them by parents and teachers (Erikson, 1963). Energies
once expended in play are now devoted to honing physical and perceptual
skills, and children are eager to apply themselves to task-oriented activi-
ties, to becoming an absorbed unit of a productive situation (Maier, 1988).
It is at this stage that the child’s peer group comes to act as an extra-
familial source of identification, and subsequently this group quickly
becomes one of the most important influences on the developing
personality of the child. The ability to communicate and productively
engage with peers becomes highly valued, as does gaining the recognition
and positive acknowledgement of the peer group. This means of social
identification is a highly competitive one, and children accordingly focus
a great deal of energy on trying to excel at whatever activity they are
involved in (Erikson, 1963). Children are almost constantly ‘sizing one
another up’, measuring their own skills and worth in comparison to a
group norm. A great deal of emphasis is placed on who is the best, the
funniest, the strongest, the fastest in the group, and in many ways the
school environment becomes a little society of its own, ‘a little culture by
itself’, as Erikson (1963) expresses it.
PHOTO: GILL MOONEY
At Erikson’s fourth stage,

industry versus inferiority,
energies once expended
in play are now devoted
to honing physical and
perceptual skills, and
children are eager to apply
themselves to task-oriented
activities, such as those
involved in education.
PHOTO: GILL MOONEY

In many ways the school
environment becomes ‘a
little culture by itself’, as
Erikson (1963) puts it.
Evaluation of self relative to group norms

The threat here lies in the danger of the child’s sense of inadequacy and inferi-
ority relative to this social group. Because comparison with peers at this stage is
so important, a negative evaluation of self (relative to one’s peers) is especially
damaging at this time. In this way, the developmental crisis of this stage occurs
precisely around the need of the child to find a strong sense of identity apart
from the nuclear family, within a receptive and affirming peer group (Erikson, 1963:
1980). Should the child fail in this quest, and in the related quest to gain the
necessary technical competencies relevant to his culture then an abiding sense
of inferiority and ineptness is what awaits him. For Erikson (1963), inferiority
complexes, feelings of unworthiness, inability and low self-esteem are rooted
in this stage of development.
Technological proficiency
This stage is characterised by training, by systematic forms of instruction

that teach children the basic fundamentals of technology, how to handle
the utensils, the tools and household appliances handled on a day-to-day
basis by ‘big people’ (Erikson, 1963). Teaching the child to read and write,
and application to practical educational tasks, become important focal
points at this stage, because these are the means through which the widest
possible range of careers is made open to the child. Indeed, success at
At the fourth stage of education is an important priority at this stage, no matter where the child
development the child’s is being raised. In this way, the exuberant imagination of children becomes
imagination is increasingly
increasingly tamed and harnessed, as Erikson (1963) puts it, to the laws of
submitted to the laws of the
‘three Rs’ (reading, writing, the ‘Three Rs’ (reading, writing, and arithmetic). The child’s sense of self
and arithmetic). This stage is enriched by the realistic development of certain competencies; he begins
is also characterised by to appreciate the pleasures of work-completion through steady attention
training, by systematic and persevering diligence (Erikson, 1963). The child is now becoming a
forms of instruction
little adult with abilities that mirror and reflect the abilities of adults. At
that teach children the
basic fundamentals of this point childhood ends and young adulthood begins. The ideal virtues
technology—how to handle that reflect this stage of development are technological skill and industri-
necessary tools and utensils. ousness, and the social institution is technology.
Stage 5: identity versus role confusion

Puberty brings about rapid bodily growth and a number of significant
anatomical changes. The mastery of the body previously accomplished
must now in a sense be ‘re-accomplished’ as the child enters adulthood.
The same holds for a variety of psychosocial skills: the adolescent must
now face up to increasingly strong sexual urges, and must relocate him- or
herself within a very different social matrix to the one inhabited as a child
(Maier, 1988). The doubts of childhood must now be re-negotiated; all the
sameness and continuity relied upon in earlier stages must now be ques-
tioned (Erikson, 1963). The entire developmental span of childhood must
now be left behind, and a whole new set of
challenges must be met if the adolescent

is successfully to become an adult (Maier,
1988). Just as the quality of basic trust was
the platform upon which the child could
forge new childhood experiences, so the
establishment of identity (and the process
of identity formation) will now prove fun-
damental if the adolescent is going to be
able to enter the adult community. For
Erikson (1963) the idea of identity refers
to a sense of being at one with oneself as
one grows and develops, and to an affin-
ity between the individual and his or her
social roles and community ties. Identity
for Erikson (1963; 1980) is only attained
through the integration of previous identifications. This integration is Answering the question
more than the sum total of all childhood identifications. It is the accrued ‘Who am I?’—securing a
solid base identity made
experience of all identifications hitherto made—all libidinal investments
up of various roles, talents,
(that is investments of the sexual instincts), taken along with the aptitudes skills and preferences—is the
developed out of endowment and the opportunities offered in social roles key challenge for individuals
(Erikson, 1963). Skills and technical competencies gathered at the previ- to face at Erikson’s fifth
ous stage are also integrated into the developing sense of identity at this stage of development.
point. A key challenge here is in the way that these abilities may be culti-
vated within the occupational prototypes of the day (Erikson, 1963).
Integrating all aspects of self

In this phase, the dominant challenge in substantiating a secure sense of identity
is to bring together the various facets of one’s ego—those identifications and
object-choice decisions, along with talents, skills, and multiple social roles. The
key tension at this stage of development lies in holding together this diffuse and
dispersed array of possible identifications, in trying to assemble and integrate
the disparate rudiments of an identity. As observed by Craig (1996), it is typical
these days for children to learn a number of roles: student, friend, sibling,
athlete, musician, boy/ girlfriend, etc. They have to sort out these various roles
in some consistent way that allows for a basic similarity of attitudes and values,
often a difficult task. It is made all the more difficult because a feeling of
wholeness and self-consistency has to be coordinated with an ever-increasing
perception of self as distinct and separate from others (Erikson, 1963).
There are many life choices to be made here that will impact on
the identity of the individual. These concern the individual’s choice of
career, the nature of personal alliances they will be prepared to enter
into with others, the degree of mutuality they will share with peers, and
their placement relative to their social roles, and with reference to the
predominant socio-political issues of the day. The formation of identity
requires a number of hallmarks of stability, and these stabilities are pro-
vided in terms of sameness and continuity—the qualities that are needed
to hold together both one’s past history and one’s possible future and
career. It is these qualities that lend a sense of confidence to the developing
identity of the adolescent (Erikson, 1963).
Role confusion. Role confusion can surface in various ways. Strong previous doubts
Inability to settle on an about sexual orientation can lead to delinquent or psychotic episodes
occupational career, (Erikson, 1963), whereas milder forms of confusion stem predominantly
a sexual object-choice or
from the inability to settle on an occupational career, and from
a fundamental social role,
leading to the inability
overidentifying practices (Erikson, 1963).
to form a secure identity.
In- and out-group identifications
Overidentification. Overidentification for Erikson (1963) refers to that overzealous adoption of
Adoption of a group a group identity that threatens to totally eclipse one’s own sense of identity.
identity that threatens to Here he means the excessive emulation of heroes or idols, involvement in
totally eclipse one’s own
particular cliques or crowds, or blind adherence to varieties of dress codes
sense of identity.
or youth conventions. Overidentification is itself part of falling in love which,
Erikson (1963) claims, is by no means simply a sexual matter at this age: ‘To
a considerable extent adolescent love is an attempt to arrive at a definition of
one’s identity by projecting one’s diffused ego image on another and by seeing
it thus reflected and gradually clarified’ (Erikson, 1963: 262).
Stability of identity is likewise secured through a consistency in the way
that others variously understand, receive and perceive one (Erikson, 1963).
For Erikson (1963), young adults at this stage are remarkably sensitive to, and
aware of the way that they appear in the eyes of others. This increased awareness
of how one is viewed by the social world can complicate the process of identity
formation, because one is involved in the attempt to define and distinguish oneself
as precisely distinct from the rest of the social world generally. The danger at this
stage is that of role confusion.
Erikson (1963) notes how youngsters at this age of development can
be remarkably cruel to those who are ‘out’—who are ‘different’ in race or
cultural background, in tastes and gifts, in dress and gesture. This stage of
development is characterised by the selection of the signs of the ‘in-group’
and the ‘out-group’. The intolerance of youths towards ‘out-groupers’ is
in large part, according to Erikson, a ‘defence against [their own] sense
of identity confusion’ (1963: 262). If children were impressionable at the
previous stages, they are in a sense more so now, because identity formation
has become such an overriding focus. Indeed, Erikson (1963) notes that
simple, cruel and totalitarian doctrines often have appeal to the youths of
countries and classes that are in the process of losing their more traditional
group identities. The mind of the adolescent is an ‘ideological mind’, ‘eager
to be affirmed and to be confirmed by social rituals, creeds, and programmes
which delineate what is evil, uncanny, and inimical, along with what is
socially valued, prized, and idealised’ (Erikson, 1963: 263). This search
for identity also means that youths often end up appointing well-meaning
people in the role of adversaries. Youths are, as Erikson puts it, ‘ever ready to
install lasting idols and ideals as guardians of a final identity’ (1963: 261).
Black adolescent identity development

in apartheid South Africa
Drawing on Erikson’s psychosocial theory, increased emotional insecurity among black
Stevens & Lockhat (1997) have attempted adolescents ... [to] difficulties related to
to explore how black South African emotional independence during and
adolescents may be attempting after adolescence’
to negotiate the developmental challenges (Stevens & Lockhat, 1997: 252).
facing them within the changing socio-
historical contexts of post-apartheid In addition, these authors question
South Africa. whether the majority of black adolescents
at this time were in a position to enjoy a
Correctly reflecting the central challenge moratorium period, especially considering
of Erikson’s fifth stage, Stevens & Lockhat that economic independence was almost
(1997) suggest that the primary task without exception unattainable, and that
here is the development of congruence entrance into a restricted job market
between the self-image and role would mean almost instant ‘material
expectations of the individual’s social enslavement’ rather than a rich array of
and emotional world. This, the authors career options.
suggest, may have been hampered in
many black adolescents in apartheid Rather than simply portraying black
South Africa because of contradictory adolescents as victims in this way, Stevens
role expectations encouraged through & Lockhat argues that involvement in
capitalist ideology on the one hand and one or another kind of political activism—
a racist ideology on the other: whether whole-hearted or merely
peripheral—enabled a powerful way of
Black adolescents have been exposed resolving this stage of development:
to the imagery, symbols and values that
encouraged individual achievement and Politicisation provided a framework in which
social mobility, but simultaneously have to generate meanings for social experience
been refused access to any significant and to challenge them, and simultaneously
material resources that allowed for this ... offered a ‘home’ to many black adolescents
these contradictions have impeded the who had originally experienced a
development of healthy self-concepts ... disintegrated family life. It ... promoted
and healthy levels of independent a common social identity through
judgment among Black South Africans identification of common oppressive
(Stevens & Lockhat, 1997: 252). experience, a common ‘enemy’, and broad,
common objectives. In addition it fostered
Moreover, the widespread destruction of various counter-ideologies, a culture of
black family relations has also contributed collectivity, democratic- participation,
to: mature and socially independent judgment
(Stevens & Lockhat, 1997: 205).
The importance of peers

Peers are important intermediaries between the developing individual
and society at this stage. In a sense, the task of establishing a firm
identity needs to happen fundamentally through such peers, and if
possible, through a co-operating partner, someone with a place, a social
career and a perception of the future (Maier 1988). According to Erikson
(1963: 262), ‘adolescents ... help one another temporarily through much
discomfort by forming cliques and by stereotyping themselves, their
ideals, and their enemies’. Peer groups, friends and close associates are
generally the best indication here of the life path that the individual will
follow. Key relationships with significant adults are also able to stabilise
the identity and social role of the adolescent.
Moratorium. A time of Moratorium

experimentation with This stage is also characterised by the transition from the general and
different ideologies
abstract morality learned by the child to the applied and pragmatic
and careers, which will
ultimately be resolved with
ethics to be adopted in the day-to-day life of the adult (Erikson, 1963).
a firm choice of identity. Similarly, it is this psychosocial stage that is most indicative of the
transition between childhood and adulthood. The mind of the adoles-
Ego diffusion. cent is essentially a mind of moratorium (a time of experimentation
Inability to settle on a with different ideologies and careers which will ultimately be resolved
stable and well-founded with a firm choice of identity). It is in this way that Maier (1988)
sense of self, which stems
suggests that society should ideally offer adolescents sufficient time,
from failure to integrate a
central identity, to bring
space and social freedom to experiment with their forming identities,
one’s moratorium to a yet not deny them its ultimate range of control and guidance. Failure to
productive close, or to integrate a central identity, to bring one’s moratorium to a productive
resolve major conflicts close, or to resolve major conflicts between roles with opposing value
between roles or with systems can lead to ego diffusion, the inability to settle on a stable and
opposing value systems. well-founded sense of self. Likewise, inability to enter or properly to
resolve a psychosocial moratorium might lead to identity foreclosure—
Foreclosure. The status
of a person who has made
the situation in which self-definition is attained without exploring
identity commitments different possible identities. Foreclosure is the status of a person who
with little evidence of has made identity commitments with little evidence of a crisis, without
a crisis, without first experimenting with other identity possibilities. An example of someone
experimenting with who is foreclosed—as provided by Carver & Scheier (1988)—is a young
other identity possibilities. man who is committed to becoming a surgeon because his father and
grandfather were surgeons.
Negative identifications
Negative identity Ego diffusion, a particularly severe form of role confusion, can lead
formation. The choosing to social alienation—to the social withdrawal and isolation of those
of an identity opposite who are unable to integrate themselves within the social structure
to the one suggested by and values of their home culture. The lack of resolution at this stage
society. A lack of identity
may be linked to the behaviours of substance abusers and antisocial
resolution is often evident
in the behaviours of
personalities such as violent criminals. For Erikson (1980) these are
substance abusers and roles of deviance and extreme non-conformity that suggest negative
antisocial personalities identity formation, or the choosing of an identity opposite to the one
such as violent criminals. suggested by society.
Stage Trust vs Mistrust Autonomy vs Shame Initiative vs Guilt Industry vs Inferiority Identity vs Role
and Doubt Confusion
Age birth to 12–18 months 12–18 months to 3 years 3 to 6 years 6 to 11 years Adolescence
Corresponding Oral stage Anal stage Phallic stage Latency Genital

Freudian stage
Virtue Hope Will Purpose Industriousness and skill Fidelity
Predominant Intake of food, eating. Development of muscular Locomotion and genital Child is typically engaged in Adolescent decides on
activity Oral sensory activities. control, particularly activity. Exploration forms of systematic occupation, significant
anal control. and play. instruction and education. other and identity.
Goal of stage Reduction of tension. Attaining a basic sense of Reaching out; meeting the Technological proficiencies; Integration of ego
Attainment of basic independence, free choice challenges of the social ability to use tools. identifications, personal
equilibrium, both of inner and free will from accompl- environment in a directed aptitudes and social
biological need and ishment of rudimentary tasks and purposeful way; being opportunities into
between inner and and exploratory activities. able to take responsibility solid identity.
outer worlds. for self.
Possible Psychosocial weaknesses. Aggression, cruelty, Rigidity, overdeveloped Inferiority complexes, Social withdrawal and
developmental Masochistic, depressive, intolerance, irrational fears, superego, inhibition, self- low self-esteem, feelings isolation, psychotic
maladaptations schizoid personality (social obsessiveness, stubbornness, consciousness, social of unworthiness episodes, delinquency,
detachment and restricted antisocial personality impotence; alternatively, and incompetence. substance abuse, antisocial
emotional disposition), disorder. recklessness, showing-off, personality disorder.
psychosis. gratuitous risk-taking.
Radius of Maternal person Paternal person Basic family Neighbourhood and school Peer groups, in- and out-
significant groups. Models of leadership
persons
Period of Infancy ‘Toddlerhood’ Early childhood Late childhood Adolescence

childhood
Corresponding Religion Law and order Economic structures Technology Ideology

social structure
E r i k s o n ’s p s y c h o s o c i a l s t a g e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t
Table 13.1 Schematic representation of Erikson’s first five stages of development.

Source: Table assembled from various sources (Maier, 1988).
301
More fully individual and more fully social

As the adolescent moves towards the resolution of this stage he or she
becomes increasingly a member of society, and yet also an autonomous
person in their own right (Erikson, 1963). In Maier’s formulation (1988),
the gradual growth and transformation of the adolescent increasingly
comes to make sense to them, just as it makes increasing sense to others.
An ever-wider social sphere of identifications now becomes important,
where the identities of individuals are jointly informed not only by peers,
friends, and family, but by their neighbourhood, school, work, and by
their ethnic, national or community ties. The integration of identity is
therefore characterised by a ‘two-way pull’—one comes increasingly
to be an individual, distinct from the social mass, yet also more fully a
member, more fully a part of one’s society (Maier, 1988). This situation
reiterates the fact that identity development is both psychological and
social (Erikson, 1980). Considering the importance of role-defined
behaviour and self-identity here, Erikson (1963) nominates fidelity as the
characteristic virtue of this stage.
The social institutions that correlate to this stage of development are
those of social value, meaning and identity, which correspond to ideology
(Erikson, 1963).
Stage 6: intimacy versus isolation

The search for the prospective significant other takes centre stage at this
developmental phase. What individuals are looking for here is more than
sexual intimacy (although this does play a strong role). Individuals are
seeking to invest in others, to forge important romantic relationships,
to find a healthy, well-balanced and developed sense of love—a fact
reflected in Erikson’s assertion that love is the key virtue at this stage
of development. As Craig (1996) observes, the central objective at this
stage is to share oneself with another, and to do so without the fear
of losing one’s own identity. The success at this stage depends largely
on the individual’s success at identity formation at the previous stage.
This is because the individual now needs to take chances with identity,
which, in the previous stage, was precisely what was most precious and
vulnerable (Erikson, 1963). Indeed this is perhaps the stage that most
crucially relies upon the successful resolution of prior crises, because if
they have not previously been resolved, they are likely to reoccur here.
The role of racism in psychosocial development
Louw, Louw, & Schoeman (1995) have minders, it has become a pressing research
called attention to the influence of the question as to what the effects of such an
black child-minder on psychosocial child arrangement would be upon white chil-
development. Given that a large number dren. Indeed, in such a historically racially
of white South African families use black divided society, it may have been proposed
‘domestic workers’ or ‘nannies’ as child- that this was a situation that lent itself to
>>
<<
a form of racial integration. In view of the positions and disparities of power in
fact that the ‘nanny’ was taking on a partly their immediate social spheres. Erikson
maternal role in caring for the children of a (1963) predicts this in his third stage,
family, one may have supposed that strong where he warns that the increasing
affectional bonds may have been exhibited social competence of the child enables
by children in ways that transcended the their awareness of a variety of social
apartheid imposition of racial boundaries. institutions, social roles, and standings
Similarly, in view of the fact that such in society. Bronfenbrenner (1979)
‘nannies’ were entrusted with the children likewise would find the results of the
of a family, and charged with their care, above study unsurprising in the sense
one might suppose that the family as a that macrosystem influences, like broad
whole (parents included) would come to socio-political values and ideologies such
form close emotional ties with her. as racism, would permeate all the way
Ultimately, however, research into the down to the more immediate levels of
influence of black child-minders (Straker, development such as the microsystem
1990; Wulfsohn, 1988) on white children sets of face-to-face ‘nanny’ and
supported neither of these suppositions. It child relationships.
was, as Louw et al (1995) note, markedly Another significant fact stemming
not the case that extended contact from the above research is that parental
between white child and black child- influence on children is not always
minder meant that such white children benign or positive. Parents cannot take
exhibited greater acceptance of other responsibility for all social values learnt,
race groups in South Africa. especially when there is no doubt that
Similarly, such consistent daily the environment into which the child is
exposure to a member of another culture developing is a social one informed by
did not significantly influence white a particular history, and populated with
children in the sense that they became certain popular (or predominant) values,
better versed in the values of a different standpoints and ideologies. Nevertheless,
culture, or less entrenched in the values of parents certainly can take responsibility
their own culture. The black child-minder for socio-political values that are the norm
was not a central figure in the life of the at home. Given the foundational nature
child, particularly not in the emotional of immediate familial relationships within
sense and, as Straker notes (cited in Louw the context of home life (in Freud, Erikson
et al, 1995), had no power, status, or and in Bronfenbrenner) it seems that
real importance in the eyes of children. racism might well ‘start in the home’ so to
In many ways the perception of the child speak, and that parental influence would
seems to have been that the child-minder have a lot to answer for in the psychosocial
had a contractual and not an emotional development of racism in the child. This is
bond to the family. This is a view certainly an area in which more research is
corroborated by many of such children’s needed, particularly in view of the fact that
actions, where they were content to a psychosocial developmental account of
‘let the nanny do it’ rather than do it racism would seem to be able to explain
themselves (as in the case of cleaning up not only the tenacity of the phenomenon,
a mess left by the child). but also its ‘deep-rootedness’—the way
It seems in this way that even fairly it seems to function at such an intuitive,
young children were responsive to socio- immediate, almost ‘naturalised’ level
political factors in their developmental within people.
environment, and aware of social role
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON 304 Developmental Psychology
The search for the prospective The importance and risks of intimacy
significant other is central to Most young adults emerge from the search for identity with a willingness
Erikson’s sixth stage.
to fuse their identities with others, with an enthusiasm for intimacy, and
with the rudimentary ethical strength that they will need in order to abide
by the emotional commitments they make to potential significant others
at this stage. The ego needs to be strong in this phase, so as to fend off the
fear of ego loss in the case of close friendships, in the case of inspiration by
teachers, in the orgasms of sexual union, and in various close affiliations
(Erikson, 1963). The consideration here is the necessity to maintain the
integrity of the ego and not allow it to be incorporated wholesale into some-
thing or someone else. Such ego losses may lead to a deep sense of isolation
and subsequent self-absorption. (It is understandable, by this rationale,
why suicide might occur with particular prevalence at this stage of life.)
Distantiation and competitiveness

Distantiation (distancing those around one) is the counterpart of intimacy. What
frequently occurs here is a willingness to destroy and isolate those forces and
people who seem to threaten the ego. Prejudices that have been learned when
young may be consolidated and strengthened at this stage. The danger here is
that often the sharp and cruel distinctions between the familiar and the foreign
that so characterise this stage are experienced with and against the very same
people with whom intimacy is being sought (Erikson, 1963). Competitive,
combative and intimate kinds of interaction are hence often part of the same
relationship at this stage. The competitive encounter and the sexual embrace do,
however, become more distinct and separate as full adulthood begins.
Orgasmic and genital sexuality

The physical focus of this phase of development is on genitality. It is here that
true, mutually interactive and heterosexual genital sexuality can begin to occur
in a way distinct from the phallic or vaginal strivings of earlier development
where the sex life was largely concerned with building identity (Erikson, 1963).
The search for and substantiation of gender is now well and truly over. The
emphasis now is towards achieving an ‘orgastic potency so free of pregenital
interferences that the genital libido ... is [exclusively] expressed in heterosexual

mutuality, with full sensitivity of both penis and vagina’ (Erikson, 1963: 265).
Erikson recalls, in paraphrase, Freud’s curt response to the question
as to what a healthy, normally functioning individual should be able to do
well. Freud’s response was ‘to love and work’. Erikson takes this formula
as a summary of the goals of this stage: the ability to formulate a mature
love that may be acted upon with a genital sexuality, and the ability to ex-
press a general work-productiveness that compromises neither this genital
focus nor this capacity for being a loving person (Erikson, 1963).
In many ways Erikson (1963: 265) presents the prospects of sexual
union as something of a curative force:
… the total fact of finding via the climactic turmoil of the

orgasm, a supreme experience of the mutual regulation of
two beings in some way takes the edge off the hostilities and
potential rages caused by the oppositeness of male and female,
of fact and fancy, of love and hate. Satisfactory sex relations
thus make sex less obsessive, overcompensation less necessary,
sadistic controls superfluous.
For Erikson (1963: 266) the ‘utopia of genitality’ should include the
following elements:
1. mutuality of orgasm,
2. with a loved partner,
3. of the other sex,
4. with whom one shares a mutual trust,
5. with whom one can work, procreate, and relax, and
6. so as to secure offspring to the successful stages of development.
Despite Erikson’s implicit suggestion that this is the normative pattern

of development, one cannot escape the heterosexual bias that seems so
dominant within his theory and that seems to marginalise any image of
healthy homosexual development and mutuality. We will return to this
point in discussing critiques of Erikson towards the end of this chapter.
Stage 7: generativity versus stagnation

Erikson begins his description of this stage by saying that:
... the fashionable insistence on dramatizing the dependence of

children on adults often blinds us to the dependence of the older
generation on the younger one. Mature man needs to be needed,
and maturity needs guidance as well as encouragement from
what has been produced and must be taken care of (Erikson,
1963: 266-7).
The idea is that adults by now have often largely resolved earlier life-stage
conflicts and are hence free to direct their attention to the assistance of oth-
ers, particularly their own children (Craig, 1996). Generativity refers chiefly
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON 306 Developmental Psychology
to the tasks of establishing and guiding the next

generation. Recognising that not all individuals
will have children, this generativity also refers
broadly to values of productivity and creativity,
although neither of these can ever be a proper
replacement for the guidance of offspring (Erik-
son, 1963). Craig (1996: 60) succinctly states that
‘parents sometimes find themselves by helping
their children’. It follows that caring is the virtue
of this middle adulthood stage of development.
Failure to provide such guidance and assis-
For Erikson, the role of tance (and through them self-enrichment) can lead to a sense of stagnation
peers, friends and colleagues and self-impoverishment (Erikson, 1963). Here Erikson locates those adults
remains an important
who seem to gain their only pleasures through self-indulgence, who are pre-
influence throughout the
stages of psychosocial occupied with themselves, and who treat themselves, basically, as their ‘only
development. child’; whose early invalidism—physical and psychological—becomes their
chief vehicle of self-concern (1963).
This stage is also characterised by a sense of community, a ‘belief in
the species’ as Erikson (1963) puts it, a willingness to direct one’s energies,
without conflict, to the solution of social issues. ‘As to the institutions which
safeguard and reinforce generativity, one can only say that all institutions
codify the ethics of generative succession’ (Erikson, 1963: 267).
Stage 8: integrity versus despair

‘Ego integrity’ is the name that Erikson gives to the ripening rewards
of having resolved all previous stages of development—‘it is the ego’s
accrued assurance of its proclivity for order and meaning’ (Erikson, 1963:
268). Attaining ‘ego integrity’ involves a love for the human ego—not of
the self— as an experience that conveys world order and spiritual sense.
It is normal here for individuals to look back over their lives and judge
them. In looking back, if one has a sense of meaning and involvement—a
sense of acceptance—then one has this sense of integrity. If not, if one’s
life seems to have been a series of misdirected energies and lost chances,
one is left with a sense of despair (Craig, 1996).
Dealing with the fear of death represents an important challenge at
this stage of development. On the one hand the individual may accept that
theirs is not the one and only ‘life within life’ so to speak; on the other hand
despair arrives, by virtue of the realisation that time is too short now to start a
new life, to try out alternative routes to integrity (Erikson, 1963). The virtue
of dignity is something of an index of ego integrity:
... the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his

own life style against all physical and economic threats ... he knows
that an individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one life
cycle with but one segment of history ... In such final consolidation,
death loses its sting (Erikson, 1963: 268).
Disgust on the part of ageing adults can often function in trying to hide
despair, even if only in the form of ‘a thousand little disgusts that cannot add
up to one big remorse’ (Erikson, 1963). In reaching this final developmental

stage, each individual must have developed to some extent all the previously
mentioned ego qualities; they must have resolved all the foregoing
developmental crises, although each cultural location requires a particular
combination of these resolved conflicts (Erikson 1963). Moreover, this final
integrity is only really achieved if the individual knows, understands and, to
some extent, participates in the various social institutions of his or her society—
the religion, the politics, the economic order, the technology, and the arts and
sciences which make up their home culture (Erikson, 1963). ‘Ego integrity
implies an emotional integration which permits participation by followership
as well as acceptance of the responsibility of leadership’ (Erikson, 1963: 269).
Black adolescent identity formation

in post-apartheid South Africa
Stevens and Lockhat (1997) assert that influence of the ‘Coca-Coca’ culture a
post-apartheid South Africa also poses situation in which ‘Western ideological
significant challenges to black adolescent symbols’ are present at ‘all levels of the
identity development. While apartheid social fabric, through language, dress
capitalism no longer exists, ‘racial codes, recreational facilities and so on’.
capitalism’, they argue, most certainly The problem here is that choosing an
does. Hence many black adolescents are identity appropriate to this socio-historical
presented with prescribed roles that period may mean adopting one that also
are consistent with a capitalist framework, marginalises and alienates the adolescent
yet which, given the historical legacy from his or her social reality. This is a
of apartheid, are still unattainable for situation where role confusion emerges,
them. Likewise, the common enemy that instead of the desired integration
provided such a crucial rallying point for of identity.
collective (oppositional) self-definition is no In fact, for Stevens & Lockhat (1997:
longer so visible, or so obvious, in the post- 253), the current South African situation is
apartheid state (Stevens & Lockhat, 1997). anything but facilitative for identity devel-
As Stevens & Lockhat express it, many opment among black adolescent youth:
black adolescents have had to change their
life scripts virtually overnight, from ‘young The cynicism related to not being able to
lions’ to ‘young entrepreneurs’. experience tangible benefits in the ‘new’
The increased prominence of Western South Africa, the double-bind as a result
ideologies and role models—through of confusing and contradictory role pre-
the expanding influence of American scriptions, the lack of structural contain-
popular culture—has led to the promotion ment and programmes to allow for the
of the values of American competitive development of healthy independence and
individualism and wealth-creation. This judgement; have all contributed to even
makes a strong contrast with the collective fewer healthy options for black South African
identity of shared political consciousness adolescents ... What we now also encounter,
that challenged and resisted a pervasive is a proliferation of gangsterism, substance
racist ideology. Stevens & Lockhat (1997: abuse, anti-social behaviour ... and an
245) refer to this as the ascendant emerging ethnic separatism ...’
>>
<<
Nevertheless, this author feels that the Rather, these kinds of influence might
creativity of much contemporary youth prove to be valuable resources from which
culture in post-apartheid South Africa vital South African youth movements and
should not be underestimated. Exposure cultures may emerge. Kwaito music seems
to the ‘Coca-Cola culture’ of ‘first-world’ a good example; to consider Kwaito merely
entertainment role models does not simply an alienating cardboard cut-out of American
lead to a kind of dead-end or derivative rap and dance music would seem to miss
culture of alienation and marginalisation. the vibrancy and originality of this new style.
In some ways this last stage of development links up with the very first
stage, of trust, particularly since trust is sometimes defined as ‘the assured
reliance on another’s integrity’. Accordingly, Erikson concludes with the
observation that ‘it seems possible to ... paraphrase the relation of adult
integrity and infantile trust by saying that healthy children will not fear
life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear death’ (1963: 269). The
virtue at this late adulthood stage of development is wisdom.
Criticisms of Erikson’s theory
More description than explanation

While Erikson’s theory is certainly a good description of psychosocial
development, it appears, unlike Freud’s theory, to lack a fundamental
explanation of why changes occur. It is, in short, better at accounting for ‘how’
than for ‘why’ in respect to developmental changes. Shaffer (1996) argues that
Erikson’s theory is often vague, and that it does not have the ability to explain
the enormous personality differences that exist among people. Moreover,
Shaffer (1996) argues that Erikson is not clear enough about how the resolution
of each stage impacts on individual personalities. In this connection, it seems
that Erikson’s failure to involve more centrally the dynamic personality
structure of Freud’s id, ego and superego has limited the degree to which his
theory is applicable in idiosyncratic, specific, individual or atypical contexts.
Idealism
Whereas Freud has been criticised for a seemingly pessimistic view of
development, it has been argued that Erikson’s theory is frequently too
optimistic and idealises descriptions of typical development (Maier, 1988).
What place is there for human tragedy in his theory? And, likewise, are there
not emotional conflicts that lead in no ‘healthy’ direction at all? It would
seem that the very essence of certain crises is that they lead to no productive
resolution, and in fact constitute a ‘waste’ of human feelings and impulses.
One needs to ask whether Erikson, in avoiding Freud’s theoretical tendency
to focus on ‘how things can go wrong’, has not perhaps given us an idealised
rather than a realistic or a pragmatic account of psychosocial development.
In a similar vein, approaches like that of Lacan (1977) would suggest that,
while Freud may appear deterministic and reductionist, Erikson, by contrast,
overvalues the adaptive and integrative functions of the ego. For Lacan (1977)
it is decidedly not the case that the ego is a basically honest mechanism that is
congruent with reality, and that places the individual in an ever more healthy
and adaptive relationship to society. For him, many of the primary functions
of the ego remain unconscious, fundamentally deceptive, and connected to
external reality in a basically illusionary manner. This view makes a stark con-
trast to Erikson’s positive understanding of ego-adaptation and development.
Allegations of sexism
Erikson, like Freud, has been criticised for treating the male as the standard
of human development, with the female featuring only as a variation, or
even deviation, of the normal path of psychosocial development. As Maier
(1988) contends, Erikson can reasonably be criticised for suggesting that
the development of ‘humankind’ is in fact the development of ‘malekind’.
Not only is it the case that Erikson’s writings reflect a male bias and
dominance, it is also the case that his clinical and historical research subjects
are all male (Maier, 1988). For this reason, Erikson’s theories may be seen
as not only a limited means of accounting for female development, but also
as a demeaning account of female development. His later stages strongly
prioritise the procreative and maternal qualities that he sees as endemic to
femininity; these qualities are indicative to Erikson of both necessary social
roles and personality development within women (Erikson, 1963). As an
extension of this view, women have, within Erikson’s theory, typically
been conceptualised as more dependent and less assertive or active than
men. This induces the suggestion that it is only through intimate relations
that women come properly to find their identity—a precondition that
does not hold for men (Maier, 1988). In this vein, and quoting Erikson to
substantiate her critique, Weisstein makes the following observation:
Erikson ... upon noting that young women often ask whether
they can ‘have a identity before they know whom they will
marry, and for whom they will make a home,’ explains ... that:
‘Much of a young woman’s identity is already defined in her
kind of attractiveness and in the selectivity of her search for the
man ... by whom she wishes to be sought...’ Mature womanly
fulfilment, for Erikson, rests on the fact that a woman’s ‘...
somatic design harbors an “inner space” destined to bear the
offspring of chosen men, and with it, a biological, psychological,
and ethical commitment to take care of human infancy’ (Weisstein,
1973: 391).
Cultural bias
If Freud can be accused of cultural bias, then so can Erikson. Erikson’s theories
may seem less biased to us purely because they are not as historically or cultur-
ally distant to us as Freud’s. However, they exhibit a number of strong late 20th
century capitalistic American values, which may limit the universality of his
theory, or its cross-cultural applicability. Certain of Erikson’s virtues, like inde-
pendence (the virtue of his third stage), initiative and industriousness sound more
like the individual qualities that are specifically desirable within a competitive
and capitalistic society than the universal virtues of healthily developing chil-
dren. In this connection, Sampson (1992) takes issue with Erikson’s approach,
which, according to him, is a model of human development that insidiously

inserts a series of dominant American cultural and ideological idealisations.
These idealisations are chiefly those of self-contained individualism, economic
profitability and self-responsibility, all of which contribute strongly to the so-
cial, political and economic order of late 20th century America.
A similar criticism here is that Erikson has, despite his protestations to the
contrary, implicitly moralised development by pinpointing a series of ‘virtues’
as developmental necessities. The obvious implication is that those who do not
develop the required (and culturally specific) virtues specified by Erikson are
‘sinful’—lacking in some basic moral fibre. This becomes a particularly impor-
tant concern if Erikson’s virtues are in fact specific to his own cultural location
but are nonetheless imposed cross-culturally.
Overly prescriptive developmental values

A danger of Erikson’s theory that he himself (1964) was well aware of, is
that it may be taken as overly prescriptive. Rather than as a theory of phases
of development, Erikson was concerned that his work might be taken as an
ineluctable piece of science, as an ascending list of developmental challenges
that would be ‘eagerly accepted by some as a potential inventory for tests of
adjustment or as a new production schedule in the manufacture of desirable
children, citizens or workers’ (Erikson, 1964: 59). This concern parallels
those of Rose (1991) and Burman (1994) who point out that theories of
developmental psychology may often function as evaluative norms against
which deviance may be identified and stigmatised. It is seemingly in this
connection that Erikson (1980) claims to have no interest in proposing a new
set of norms that would facilitate the giving of ‘good or bad grades in mental
health’ (Erikson, 1980).
Rose (1991) and Burman (1994) also express reservations about how
developmental theories such as Erikson’s may inform professional practices
such as health, law, education and welfare. They argue that these theories
are applied in an overly standardising or ‘normalising’ manner. In such an
application, not enough attention is paid to class, race and gender variables,
and the standards of white, male, heterosexual, upper class and American
development are uniformly imposed on all children. This is a process that
has the tendency to ‘pathologise’ differences across demographic categories
(Rose 1991; Burman 1994).
Specific tasks
CRITICAL THINKING TASKS
➊ Reflect briefly on how a punitive upbringing with frequent corporal punishment would
influence a child’s acquisition of basic trust.
➋ What parenting styles would ideally promote the development of autonomy in the
young child? Similarly, give some thought to the kinds of life events that would threaten
the development of basic autonomy in the child.
➌ In terms of Erikson’s theory, how would blindness or lack of mobility, as in the case
of the handicapped child, impact on child development within the first three stages?
➍ Try and ‘rewrite’ Erikson’s description of the fifth stage of development in the terms
of your own personal life experiences at this age. >>
<<
➎ Trace a series of parallels, where possible, between the first five stages of development as
conceptualised by both Freud and Erikson.
➏ This chapter provides a tabular breakdown of the first five of Erikson’s developmental
stages. Following the same format, try to generate a similar table highlighting the key
aspects of the last three developmental stages.
General tasks
➊ Research a biographical account of a famous psychopath. By systematically working
through the first five stages of Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development, compile a list
of the developmental challenges that this person appears to have been unable to meet.
➋ What are some of the developmental ‘virtues’ that this individual did not attain, and
how do you see this failure as impacting on the psychopath’s individual personality
development?
➌ What kinds of interventions or crucial differences in the psychopath’s life could have
helped to prevent his actions? What plausible life events may have aided him in
repairing early developmental deficits?
➍ Whose theory, Freud’s or Erikson’s, do you feel has the greatest explanatory power with
regard to the psychopath’s case? Explain your answer, giving concrete examples.
➎ How can the theories of Freud and Erikson, with their different focuses, be used in a
complementary way? Can you use them to build on one another, to ‘fill in each other’s
gaps’, in explaining developmental phenomena in the psychopath’s case?
Erikson’s theory has proved to be an influential and popular staple of developmental psychology, and as such
it features in virtually every developmental psychology textbook. If you are interested in Erikson’s theories
though, it is worthwhile engaging directly with Erikson’s own writings, which are generally accessible,
and contain far more textured and nuanced detail than most textbook summaries of his thinking. The two
central texts to try are:
Erikson, E H (1963). Childhood and society. New York: Norton.
Erikson, E H (1968). Identity, youth and crisis. New York: Norton.
(Both these texts provide useful perspectives and elaborations on his psychosocial stage theory.
Also interesting are the following texts, which essentially extend and apply the theory.)
Erikson, E H (1964). Insight and responsibility. New York: Norton.
Erikson, E H (1969). Gandhi’s truth. New York: Norton.
Erikson, E H (1980). Identity and the life cycle. New York: Norton.
(If you’re interested in tackling a good critical commentary on Erikson— and it is a good idea to read
someone other than Erikson on Erikson, because, regrettably, some of his understandings of race and
gender have dated badly—then try the relevant sections of:
Maier, H W (1988). Three theories of child development, 3rd ed. New York: University Press
of America.)
SECTION TWO
Cognitive development
CHAPTER
14
Introduction to cognitive
development
Kate Cockcroft
“The mind is an exquisitely organized system that accomplishes

remarkable feats no engineer can duplicate” Pinker (1997: 23).
This chapter deals with the subdiscipline of cognitive

development and focuses on certain key areas:
1. A brief history of the study of cognitive

development
2. Key cognitive developmental assumptions:
* The use of analogies
* Experimental, laboratory-based research
* Stability versus plasticity
* Development as a constructive process
3. A critique of cognitive assumptions
Introduction
Attempts to understand human cognition always result in one marvelling
at how it functions. In How the mind works, Steven Pinker (1997) notes
that man’s attempts to artificially replicate how the mind works are feeble
in comparison to the intellectual feats of which even a four-year-old
child is capable. Not all of these amazing capacities arrive fully formed
in the newborn infant however, but require decades of experience and
biological maturation. Cognitive developmental psychologists are
therefore interested in how our mental processes are related to our biology
and experiences.
Going a step back, ‘cognition’ is a collective term for the processes involved
in acquiring, organising, manipulating and using knowledge. These processes
are not directly observable. Remembering, problem solving, imagining,
creating, fantasising and using symbols, for example, are all cognitive
processes. Cognitive psychologists do not see people as passive recipients of
information but as active processors of information, constantly reorganising
Introduction to cognitive development 315
and changing the information they receive from the environment via
their senses. Cognitive development therefore refers to the ways in which
people acquire various cognitive abilities and how these abilities change
in structure and function over time. In addition, cognitive developmental
psychologists realise the significance of individual differences in cognitive
performance among people of a particular age and regard these variations
as useful, providing interesting and important information about alternate
patterns of development and alternate developmental outcomes.
By now you know that development is generally thought of as the
progressive change from simple to increasingly more complex structures
and behaviours. However, this does not mean that early forms of cognition Cognition. A collective
are less effective and incomplete in comparison to adult cognition. Piaget term for the processes
was the first cognitive developmental theorist to point out that early forms involved in acquiring,
organising, manipulating
of cognitive functioning may serve a particular function, for example
and using knowledge.
the tendencies of preschool children to overestimate their physical and
cognitive abilities may serve to bolster their self-esteem.
The purpose of this section is to introduce the substantive theorists and
issues in cognitive developmental psychology in sufficient depth that read-
ers can engage with them at a variety of levels. It is hoped that after reading
this section, you will see cognitive developmental psychology as an exciting,
stimulating and practically relevant field.
The structure of Section Two: Cognitive

Development
Studying invisible and often unconscious mental processes presents a great
challenge. Teaching them presents an even bigger one. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, theories organise and give structure to information that
may otherwise be unmanageable. They provide a framework within Cognitive developmental
which we can formulate questions and understand behaviour. Each psychologists are concerned
with both similarities and
theory tries to develop a plausible explanation as to why and how differences in cognitive
a particular behaviour occurs. Consequently, it is worth knowing abilities over time.
several theories of cognitive PHOTO: K ATE COCKCR OF T
development because one
alone is unlikely to account
for all aspects of develop-
ment. Reading through
this section, you will
soon realise that different
cognitive developmental
theorists have different ways
of understanding human
mental processing. Some
prefer a computational mo-
del (information processing
and cognitive science),
others view it as inherently
linked to our adaptation to
the environment (Piaget and
evolutionary psychologists),
while some regard it as the influence of internalised cultural and

environmental mores and values (Vygotsky). Yet others (Kohlberg)
have taken one aspect of cognitive development (moral reasoning) and
attempted to explain the development of that particular area.
Beyond these theorists, it becomes necessary to focus on different
themes within cognitive development, which accounts for the second
half of this section, in which the development of memory, language
and intelligence are discussed. Numerous theorists have made valuable
contributions to our understanding of these aspects of cognitive
development and since one alone cannot be singled out as the leading
theorist, these sections are presented by theme.
Another purpose of this section is to illustrate the pervasiveness
of cognitive developmental psychology and its impact on all areas
of human functioning. Cognitive psychologists are interested in
understanding everyday, ordinary mental processes, for example
the processes by which we calculate how much change we should
get. These processes, while routine, are far from simple. Further,
the interest in mental processes is not only in ‘normal’ processes;
cognitive psychologists are also concerned with the psychologically
‘abnormal’, for example the processes involved in types of thought
disturbances associated with schizophrenia or multiple personality
disorder. This means that there are many topics to investigate and
cognitive developmental psychologists ask a wide range of interesting
questions such as ‘How does the development of memory influence the
development of reading?’, ‘How does our moral development influence
the judgements that we make?’ and ‘Where do racial stereotypes come
from and how do we determine if they are irrational?’
The first step in comprehending how cognitive psychology came
to be the discipline that it currently is, is to understand the historical
development of cognitive psychology as a sub-discipline of Psychology.
A brief history of the study of cognitive

development
The problem of what constitutes knowledge has concerned philosophers
Introspection.
for centuries. Much of Greek philosophy is concerned with the form
The examination and
reporting of one’s
and origin of human knowledge. For example, Plato’s dialogues
mental experiences. include empirical observations about the usefulness of knowledge and
its source. Descartes influenced the study of thought by introducing the
Rationalism. idea of mental structure. As a rationalist, he believed that knowledge
A philosphical perspective was acquired through reasoning. Through the application of such an
that holds that truth can
approach, he inspired the method known as introspection, which involves
be ascertained through
rational thought an examination of one’s mind and its contents, and was a major technique
(reasoning and used in the early years of psychology’s development. Hume, on the
empirical testing). other hand, was an empiricist, who believed that knowledge is acquired
through experience. Hume’s contribution to the development of cognitive
Empiricism.
A philosophical approach
psychology was his investigation of the laws by which ideas are associated,
based on the assumption and the classification of the mind’s operations. Kant identified both mind
that all knowledge comes and experience as sources of knowledge, proposing an approach based on
from experience. both rationalism and empiricism. Stating that the mind provides structure,
while experiences provide facts to fill the structure, he distinguished three

kinds of mental structure encountered in the study of cognition, namely
schemata, dimensions and categories.
Although these three philosophers are not the only ones responsible
for the early seeds of cognitive psychology, they were among the most
influential and demonstrate the origins of psychology’s focus on conceptual
analysis and speculation.
Early cognitive psychologists were trained in the natural sciences.
For example, Wilhelm Wundt, originally a physiologist, founded the
first laboratory in Leipzig, to observe and apply empirical methods to the
systematic study of behaviour. You may have encountered descriptions
of Wundt’s ideas that the mind has elementary structures and that each
perception is a composite of these basic parts. Appropriately, this approach
came to be known as structuralism. Although structuralism is often
attributed to Wundt, it was actually his student, Titchener, who was the Structuralism.
main advocate of the approach. Wundt is also often portrayed as the one An approach that is
who pioneered the use of analytic introspection, although Descartes actually concerned with the
structure or organisation
introduced the technique. As mentioned earlier, introspection is a technique
of phenomena
that required subjects to analyse their immediate perceptions, for example under investigation.
to verbalise what flows through your mind while you are performing a
particular task. This technique became very controversial because of its
subjectivity and the difficulty of replicating introspective data.
Also with a background in natural science, William James first qualified
in medicine. He was working at the same time as Wundt, but in America,
and wrote what is considered to be the first modern psychology textbook,
which was based on the systematic study of psychological phenomena. He
attempted to apply these phenomena in everyday settings, particularly
educational environments.
Mental explanations fell out of vogue in the early part of the
20th century (at least in the United States). At that time, American
psychology was dominated by behaviourism, which held that only Behaviourism.
observable behaviours could be scientifically studied. This remained the An approach to
state of things until the 1950s, when developments in communication psychology which holds
that the only appropriate
systems and computers, together with a dissatisfaction with ‘mindless’
subject matter for
behavourism, led to what has been termed the ‘cognitive revolution’. investigation is observable,
According to Jerome Bruner (1990), one of the first leaders of the measurable behaviour.
movement and an influential commentator on Vygotsky’s work, the
focus of this revolution was on meaning.
The mind-brain debate
A popular point of debate in the Initially, this question was the domain of
philosophy of psychology concerns philosophers and theologians. The French
whether mind and brain are the same or philosopher, Rene Descartes, argued that
not. For example, do you think that your humans have ‘mental substance’ or an
sense of self is separate from your body? immaterial, non-spatial mind in addition
>>
<<
to our physical brain, which distinguishes Searle, argues that mere symbol
us from lower life forms. When manipulators (computers) cannot have
psychology was established as a semantics or meanings, and thus
discipline, questions concerning the intentionality. Searle (1980; 1992) uses
relationship between mind and brain his famous ‘Chinese Room Argument’ (of
were also asked. Descartes’ mind-brain which there are several versions) to argue
dualism was criticised, with many arguing his case. Suppose the central processing
that there is no mind over and above the unit (CPU) of a digital computer is
brain. Rather, the brain is the self programmed with the rules of Chinese
(Churchland, 1995). Churchland argues syntax. The CPU is able to string together
that all cognitive processes can be Chinese characters and output them in
explained entirely in terms of the brain. such a way that a person fluent in
For example, post-mortem examinations Chinese could read, understand and
of the brains of individuals who suffered respond to them. Even though the CPU
from Alzheimer’s Disease reveal actual gives the impression of knowing what the
plaques and tangles throughout the fine Chinese characters mean, and can
web of synaptic connections of the manipulate them according to a
neurons of the brain that embody one’s programme, it does not have
cognitive capabilities. Churchland also intentionality in the sense that it cannot
discusses how the advances in understand the world and its features. So,
neurosciences and artificial intelligence brains or computers which can only
allow for brain function to be represented manipulate symbols according to a
as the parallel distributed processing of programme, cannot have intentionality.
recurrent neural networks. Intentionality can only be had by objects
On the other hand, others argue that that have a conscious mind, such as the
computational modelling of mental Chinese speaker. Searle’s argument
processes does not demonstrate the presents a challenge to Churchland’s
uniquely human characteristic of view that the material brain is just
intentionality. The philosopher, John a neurocomputer.
Intentionality. Every
mental phenomenon has a
Evidently the cognitive revolution was a success, as cognitive psychology
content, and is directed at is today a dominant paradigm in academic psychology. Cognitive science
an object (the intentional is currently one of the fastest growing and most influential areas of study
object). Intentionality in the twenty-first century. It is an interdisciplinary approach involving
refers to the fact that every anthropology, artificial intelligence, computer science, mathematics,
belief, desire etc, has an linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, evolutionary biology and, of course,
object that it is about: the
psychology. For more detail on this approach see Chapter 21, which deals
believed, the wanted, etc.
with the contributions of cognitive science to this field.
Key cognitive developmental assumptions

As you read through this section, you will see that certain basic assumptions
keep appearing. There are four main assumptions thaaaqt underlie
cognitive developmental theorising. Once you have read through
this entire section, it would be valuable to re-read the key cognitive
developmental assumptions and consider how the various theorists utilise
them in their theorising.
The use of analogies

One way of trying to make sense of something we do not understand very
well, such as cognitive processes, is to relate or compare it to something
we do understand. This is known as argument by analogy, and it goes back
thousands of years. For example, Socrates compared long-term memory
to an aviary, with the pieces of information we possess being represented
by birds. Remembering was compared to hunting for a particular bird,
and errors in remembering were likened to catching hold of a bird that
resembled the one sought in some way. Since then, the memory system has
been compared to all sorts of things (for example, the ocean, a filing system
and a computer).
The most well known analogy in cognitive psychology is that of
comparing the brain to a computer. In this analogy, mental processes are
likened to the software, and the structure of the brain to the hardware.
Although you may not think of the mind as anything like a computer, the
reason for the analogy is that all machines are constructed of parts and each
part serves a particular function, which may be to initiate the functioning
of another part. The analogy also arises because both brains and computers
are involved in processing information. However, you may argue that
the differences between brains and computers outweigh the similarities,
because computers are serial (capable of doing one thing at a time) while
brains are parallel (capable of doing many things at once); computers are
very fast while brains are slower; computers are (generally) reliable while
brains are often unreliable, and brains have far more connections than
computers. Today there is a preference for using what is referred to as the
computational theory of mind. This theory still relies on a computer analogy
but it ensures that the commonalities are drawn between the processing of
information, between the data and relations of logic that are independent
of the physical medium (brain or computer) that carries them. Thus,
the computational theory of mind does not claim that the brain is like a
computer, but rather that brains and computers embody intelligence for
some of the same reasons. Pinker (1997: 27) illustrates this as follows:
To explain how birds fly, we invoke principles of lift and drag and
fluid mechanisms that also explain how airplanes fly. That does
not commit us to an Airplane Metaphor for birds, complete with
jet engines and complimentary beverage service.
The computational theory of mind helps us to understand the

evolution and processing of the human mind. It suggests that natural
selection equipped us with a neural computer, and that human thought
and behaviour may be the result of a very complicated program consisting
of intricate, logical and statistical operations. (See Chapter 20 for more on
evolutionary psychology.)
Experimental, laboratory based research

Cognitive psychology is based on experimental research. Experimentation
has as its basis the processes of observation (what we see happening),
inference (what we think is happening), control and comparison (how we
may test the resulting hypothesis). For example, we might observe that
it is possible to drive and talk on a cellphone provided there is no other
distraction. So, we may ask, ‘Does talking on a cellphone affect the ability
to drive?’ We can test this question by comparing two situations that are as
similar as possible. In one, the participants undertake a simulated driving
test without talking on a cellphone. The effects on their driving are noted.
In the other situation, the participants experience the same as the first
group but have to conduct a conversation on a cellphone. Any significant
difference between performance on the simulated driving test between
the two situations leads us to infer that talking on a cellphone had an effect
on driving.
Such an approach also allows the hypothesis to be tested for falsifiability.
Popper (1959) stated that if a theory is to be a good one, then it should
be possible to prove it false. While this may sound like a contradiction
in terms, consider the classic example of falsifiability, namely the white
swan hypothesis. If we think that all swans are white, we cannot prove
this hypothesis to be true. Every instance of a white swan adds to our
conviction, but without seeing every swan in existence, in the past and
future, we cannot completely prove this hypothesis to be true. But we can
prove it false if we see one black swan. In this way, we are setting up a direct
comparison between two situations (white swan-black swan; driving and
talking on a cellphone versus driving and not talking on a cellphone).
Stability versus plasticity

Once a certain level of intellectual competence is achieved, we often
wonder to what extent it will remain constant over time. For example, is
an intellectually slow six-year-old likely to develop
PHOTO: KATE COCKCROFT
into an above average high school student? The

concepts of stability and plasticity are related and are
generally discussed with reference to the pliability
of intellectual functioning. Stability is the extent to
which an individual maintains the same relative
rank order in comparison to his/her peers in some
aspect of cognition, for example spoken language
ability. Plasticity refers to the degree to which an
individual’s cognitive functioning can be altered by
experience (Bjorkland, 1995).
Until relatively recently, it was firmly believed
that individual differences in intelligence are stable
over time and not modifiable. Typically, these
views were held by people who believed that such
differences were largely inherited (nature), and
others who believed that they were determined
by early environmental experiences (nurture).
There is growing support (For more about the nature-nurture debate, see
for the plasticity of human Chapter 1.) Evidence for the latter came from studies of infants raised
cognition across the in impoverished, unstimulating settings, who showed signs of mental
lifespan, not only in early retardation from a few months of age (Skeels & Dye, 1939; Spitz, 1945).
childhood.
The belief in the long-term consequences of early experience is one
interpretation of Freudian theory, which holds that experiences during

the oral and anal stages of development have significant effects on adult
personality. There is, however, growing support for the plasticity of
Could Freud have been a cognitive psychologist?

Freud’s theory (discussed in Chapter 3) of prior experience is central to research,
is rich with implications for a variety of from attention and perception to
areas in psychology, including cognitive problem solving.
psychology. The idea that much of our Freud’s theory has also influenced the
behaviour is controlled by the techniques used in much cognitive
unconscious influence of prior experience research. For example, how do we gain
has formed the basis for much research access to unconscious influences on
in cognitive psychology. For example, behaviour if they are inaccessible to the
Freud’s ideas about repression (an active individual? Freud used dream analysis and
psychological process that drives projective techniques such as free
threatening thoughts and perceptions association to access the unconscious.
into the unconscious where they may Cognitive methods may differ, in the
influence conscious memory) formed the details, from Freud’s therapeutic
focus of the controversy over false techniques, but they share his logic of
memory syndrome (discussed in Chapter eliciting past experiences from a person
17 on Memory). Also, the idea of the indirectly, without requesting intentional
conscious versus unconscious influences memory of that experience.
human intelligence over the life-span and one of the proponents of this
view, Reuven Feuerstein (1979), has conducted numerous studies in which
the cognitive abilities of severely retarded children are modified to become
more efficient (See also interest block in Chapter 22 on Vygotsky).
Development as a constructive process

This notion that we are not passive organisms, either waiting to be moulded
by our environments or the victims of our genetic inheritance, originated
from Piaget. Instead, we act on our environments in our attempts to make
sense of the world. This is a constructive process, as we interpret events
and objects in the world in terms of what we already know. As Vygotsky
pointed out, how we think is also structured by the particular social
environment in which we live.
A critique of cognitive assumptions

It is also necessary to identify some of the limitations of this sub-discipline.
To the distress of many (for example Neisser, 1976), much cognitive
research deals with artificial, laboratory-type experimental methods and
techniques that ask simple questions and may yield overly simple answers
about the functioning of cognitive processes. Many researchers argue that
such research is artificial and lacks ecological validity (generalisability to
everyday, real-life situations). However, cognitive psychologists are being
increasingly called upon by those outside academic circles, such as within
the legal system to explore aspects such as memory for crime details, the
military to explore robotic and mind-controlled machinery, health-care
providers to explore the effects of brain trauma on cognitive functioning
and educators to explore the most effective ways for teaching and learning
to occur. Thus, there is a move to demonstrate the broader applicability of
laboratory-tested experiments.
An experimental approach to research may be further justified by the
argument that it is reasonable to adopt a reductionistic approach, where an
attempt is made to understand complex mental processes by analysing them
into their constituent parts, for example studying eye movements when read-
ing. Naturally, it would also be reasonable to assume that these researchers
would eventually put the various pieces back together again and also deal with
the larger event as a whole, for example how eye movements can be corrected
to improve the reading ability of children with dyslexia. Recent developments
(see Chapter 21 on cognitive science) seem to hold just such a promise.
So, although different aspects of cognitive development will be
discussed in the chapters that follow, the cognitive system generally
operates as a whole, and it is necessary to emphasise that each aspect
must be viewed as integrally related to the functioning of all the other
parts. While the chapters may give the impression that various aspects
of cognitive development, such as language, intelligence and memory,
can be neatly compartmentalised, in reality this is not the case. Using
a language, for example, requires that we draw on aspects of attention,
perception, memory and concept formation, to name a few of the
cognitive processes involved. Language also has emotional impact. Just
think about the emotional responses evoked by the phrases ‘I love you’
and ‘I hate you’. However, due to the complexity of the cognitive system,
it is often easier to explain cognitive development by using these artificial
distinctions. Similarly, cognitive development is one of the many parts
of human development, and should be regarded as integrated with a
person’s emotional and psychosocial functioning.
Because of the tendency to focus on discrete aspects of cognitive
functioning, cognitive developmental psychology often appears to lack
integration. This is also because there is no particular framework and no
one particular theory that we can point to as the main or archetypical theory.
There is also no distinct theme. Cognitive developmental psychology is
not so much a set of theories as an approach to human development that
focuses on mental processes and how they change over the life-span and
how these changes may affect our behaviour. A benefit of this is that we
can use a cognitive approach to understand many aspects of functioning,
such as emotion and social functioning. So, a criticism that the field is
difficult to study, is also a demonstration of its flexibility.
Another major criticism of cognitive developmental psychology is
that the notion of man as computer, the metaphor often used by cognitive
psychologists, seems offensive to many, who argue that it does not take into
account the fundamental differences between human and machine. By
way of explanation, this is a metaphor, a useful way of using something we
understand (computers) to explain something that we do not (the human
mind). However, this does have limitations if it is used in an absolute way.
Specific tasks
➊ How do cognitive theories help us to make predictions about development
and behaviour?
➋ Create your own theory of cognitive development by combining those aspects

of the theories discussed in this section that you feel are most important for
explaining cognitive development. Justify your choices.
➌ What is the value of cognitive developmental psychology to understanding

human development generally?
Bjorklund, D F (2005). Children’s Thinking. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole.
(This book is based on the premise that individual differences in cognition can be understood by
considering their developmental function. It discusses cognitive development, with a focus on the
relationship between biology and the child’s physical and social environment. It is an easy and
engaging read suitable for both undergraduate and postgraduate students.)
Blackmore, S (2005). Conversations on Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(This is a series of interesting, and often humorous, conversations between Blackmore and the world’s
leading philosophers and neuroscientists.)
Erdelyi, M (1985). Psychoanalysis: Freud’s Cognitive Psychology. New York: W H Freeman.
(This book examines the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and cognitive theory.)
Pinker, S (1997). How the mind works. London: Penguin Books.
(This book explains what the mind is, how it evolved and how it allows us to do the myriad of things
that we take for granted on a daily basis.)
CHAPTER
15
Piaget’s constructivist
theory of cognitive
development
Kate Cockcroft
This chapter presents an overview of Piaget’s constructivist

theory of cognitive development. It addresses the following
main concepts:
1. Basic concepts underlying Piaget’s theory: schemes,

operations and adaptation
2. Piaget’s stages of cognitive development
3. Object permanence
4. Imitation
5. Symbolic representation
6. Criticisms of Piaget’s theory
Introduction
Jean Piaget (1896-1980), more than any
other person, has laid the groundwork for
many of our current beliefs about cognitive
development. From a young age he was
interested in the scientific study of nature.
When, at ten years old, he found that his
questions could only be answered by access to
the university library, Piaget wrote and signed
a short paper on the sighting of an albino
sparrow, in the hope that this would
stop the university librarian from
treating him like a child and
give him access to the library.
It worked (Papert, 1996). Later, Jean Piaget
Piaget trained as a biologist and,
P i a g e t ’s c o n s t r u c t i v i s t t h e o r y o f c o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t 325
before he was 20 years old, was well known in Europe for his work in
this field. After completing a dissertation on molluscs and receiving
his doctorate at the age of 21, Piaget decided that he wanted more
formal training in psychology. He became interested in psychoanalysis
and attended Jung’s lectures in Zurich. Shortly thereafter he started
working with Theodore Simon (who developed the Simon-Binet
Intelligence Test). During this work, Piaget discovered that whether
a child was right or wrong on a particular intelligence test item was
far less interesting than the child’s reasoning in arriving at a particular
answer, especially a wrong answer. Piaget concluded from examining
children’s answers and how they reached them that children’s thinking
was qualitatively different from adults and that it had its own special
logic. Einstein called Piaget’s discovery ‘so simple that only a genius could
have thought of it’ (quoted in Papert, 1996: 59). In one of his famous
experiments, Piaget interviewed many children to reveal how they
thought. One question that he asked them was: What makes the wind?
Julia: The trees.

Piaget: How do you know?
Julia: I saw them waving their arms.
Piaget: How does that make wind?
Julia: (waving her hand in front of his face): Like this. Only they are
bigger. And there are lots of trees.
(Piaget in Papert, 1996: 60).

Piaget recognised that five-year-old Julia’s beliefs,
while not correct according to any adult criteria, are not
strictly incorrect either. Another common belief that
Piaget’s research identified among seven-year-olds was
the belief that going faster can take more time. Einstein
was particularly intrigued by this, maybe because his
own theories of relativity run contrary to common sense
(Papert, 1996).
While Piaget believed that the social context is
important for development, most of his work focused on
the role that individuals play in their own development.
He referred to the developing child as ‘a little scientist’,
making and testing hypotheses relatively independently
in order to construct an understanding of the world. He
said, ‘children have real understanding only of that which
they invent themselves, and each time we try to teach them
something too quickly, we keep them from reinventing it
themselves’ (Piaget in Papert, 1996: 56). In addition, Piaget
was concerned with explaining the universal aspects of
cognitive development rather than individual differences
between people. While the specific beliefs and ideas of
different cultures may vary, Piaget believed that the stages
of cognitive development unfold in the same sequence Piaget viewed the child as a solitary explorer,
irrespective of cultural background (Piaget, 1952). discovering the world in a relatively independent
manner.
Adaptation. Piaget’s term Piaget devoted the rest of his life to investigating how intelligence develops.
for the ability to adjust By intelligence Piaget meant more than just what is measured by intelligence
to the demands of the
tests. According to Piaget, intelligence influences all acts of thinking—
environment, a process
during which schemes
perception, language, morality, to name but a few. This is why his theory
are elaborated, changed is often called a theory of cognitive, rather than ‘intellectual’, development.
and developed. Piaget Reflecting his past training, he saw the development of intelligence as a
separated adaptation form of biological adaptation to the environment. Remaining a helpless
into two complementary baby, totally dependent on others for survival, is not adaptive. So, for example,
components called through the process of adaptation, the baby gradually learns how to grasp a
assimilation and
bottle and satisfy his hunger, thereby decreasing his dependence on others.
accommodation.
The process of adaptation will be discussed in more detail later.
Constructivism. Piaget’s theory is essentially a constructivist one which assumes the active
The notion that reality is building up of knowledge and cognitive processes from a very basic starting
a construction based on
point, and that children at different developmental levels construct different
the information from
our environment and
realities (Papalia & Olds, 1993). Piaget referred to his approach as genetic
in our heads. So, each epistemology, where the term genetic signifies growth and development,
person constructs a rather than the action of genes, and epistemology means the study of
different understanding knowledge (Piaget, 1952). Piaget developed a philosophy of epistemological
of the world. relativism in which multiple ways of knowing are acknowledged and
examined analytically and objectively.
Genetic epistemology.
The experimental study of
the development
Basic concepts underlying Piaget’s theory:
of knowledge. schemes, operations and adaptation
Piaget called mental structures schemes. Schemes, in this definition, are
Schemes. Piaget’s term ways of processing information that change as we develop. There are two
for mental structures types of scheme: sensorimotor schemes (also known as action schemes) and
that process information cognitive schemes (also referred to as concepts). During the first two years of
from the external world.
life, the infant’s knowledge of objects and events is limited to various practi-
Schemes change as
we develop.
cal sensorimotor schemes such as grasping, sucking and looking. Thus, for
a ten-month-old baby, a fluffy teddy bear is not understood as a bear but
simply as an object that feels soft and can be cuddled or chewed. According
to Piaget, the child only shows signs of cognitive schemes at about two years
of age. Then the child becomes capable of solving problems and thinking
about objects and events without having acted on them. This means that the
child is able to represent experiences mentally and use these mental symbols
to achieve certain objectives. Piaget (1962: 63) illustrates how his 16-month-
old daughter, Jacqueline, formed a mental representation of the behaviour
of a visiting child and reproduced his behaviour the following day:
Jacqueline had a visit from a little boy (13 months of age) ... who, in the
course of the afternoon, got into a terrible temper. He screamed as he
tried to get out of a playpen, and pushed it backward, stamping his feet.
Jacqueline stood, watching him in amazement, never having witnessed
Operations.
such a scene before. The next day, she herself screamed in her playpen
Piaget’s term for
reversible mental actions. and tried to move it, stamping her foot ... several times in succession.
Operations combine
to form qualitatively Schemes are ultimately organised into operations (that is, reversible
different stages of mental actions), which combine to form qualitatively different stages of
cognitive development. cognitive development (Papalia & Olds, 1993).
Adaptation: assimilation and accommodation

Piaget believed that cognition develops as a consequence of two inborn
intellectual processes, which he named organisation and adaptation. Organisation.
Organisation is the process whereby children combine existing schemes, or The process whereby
ways of understanding, into new and more complex intellectual structures children combine existing
(Shaffer, 1996). For example, the baby who has the gazing, reaching, and schemes or ways of
understanding, into
grasping reflexes will soon learn how to organise these reflexes into a more
new and more complex
complex structure called visually directed reaching, which enables the baby to intellectual structures.
reach out and grasp objects within his field of vision, and so learn more about
those objects. Piaget believed that children are constantly reorganising their
existing schemes into more complex and adaptive structures (Shaffer, 1996).
The aim of organisation is adaptation, or the ability to adjust to the
demands of the environment. Piaget separated adaptation into two
complementary components called assimilation and accommodation. To Assimilation.
explain these concepts, Piaget used a biological analogy: the ingestion and The process of
transforming new
digestion of food. In eating, physical substances such as food are broken
information so that it
down and converted by the teeth, mouth, gastric juices and other organs fits within existing ways
of the digestive system. In other words, something from the external, of thinking.
physical world is transformed and changed—it is taken in or assimilated
to become part of the existing digestive system so that it can be beneficial Accommodation.
to the person. A similar thing happens at the cognitive level—informa- Changing ways of
tion that we receive from the environment is processed and assimilated thinking to integrate
new experiences.
into our cognitive systems. Each person will take in or assimilate infor-
mation to a different degree since our cognitive systems vary in degree of
sophistication. For example, while Einstein’s general theory of relativity
may be understood at some level by all of us, only those who are more
intellectually or academically developed in the understanding of physics
will grasp its intricacies. Assimilation thus refers to transforming new
information so that it fits within existing ways of thinking (Piaget, 1952).
The converse of assimilation is accommodation. Here, the structures
themselves are changed. In terms of the biological example of the ingestion
and digestion of food, the mouth must be reshaped to take in solid food in-
stead of liquids or modified to be able to drink milk from a cup rather than a
bottle or breast. Additional structures, such as teeth, emerge and allow for the
ingestion of new types of food. Similarly, cognitive structures are altered and
reorganised as a result of our experiences. For example, although you may
not fully understand Einstein’s theory of relativity, through exposure to it you
may have changed the way you think about things. Accommodation refers
to changing ways of thinking to integrate new experiences. Therefore, we
assimilate new learning into existing mental structures and we change our
existing mental structures to accommodate new information (Piaget, 1952).
All cognition involves both assimilation and accommodation. They are
complementary aspects of the need to adapt and their aim is to bring the Equilibration.
cognitive system into equilibrium, or balance, with the environment. (Such The basic process of
human adaptation,
a balanced state of affairs is called cognitive equilibrium, and the process of
according to Piaget.
achieving it, equilibration.) Piaget saw development as the formation of ever This involves seeking a
more stable equilibria between the child’s cognitive system and the external balance between the
world. He also suggested that equilibration develops in three stages. First, environment and one’s
very young children are satisfied with their mode of thought and are there- mental structures.
fore in a state of equilibrium. Soon, they become aware of shortcomings

in their existing thinking and are dissatisfied. This constitutes a state of
disequilibrium. Finally, they adopt a more sophisticated mode of thought
that eliminates the shortcomings of the old one. That is, they reach a more
stable equilibrium. Piaget conceptualised cognitive development as a gradual
construction of self-contained operations (Piaget, 1952).
Sensorimotor stage. Piaget’s stages of cognitive development

Piaget’s first cognitive According to Piaget, there are four qualitatively different cognitive devel-
developmental stage, opmental stages. These are: sensorimotor (birth to two years); preoperations
during which the infant (two to seven years); concrete operations (seven to 11 years); and formal
processes information operations (adolescence onwards). Piaget argued that people pass through
through his or her senses
these stages at different rates, and therefore the ages attached to them are
and motor actions,
thereby learning about
not very important. However, everyone progresses through the stages in a
the world. fixed sequence. Each progressive stage reflects an increasingly more complex
way of thinking than the previous one and thus the process of thinking at
Preoperational stage.
each stage is qualitatively different from the previous one. Preoperational
Piaget’s second stage of
cognitive development, thinking is different from concrete operational thinking because the
which is initiated by former lacks the operations that are present in the latter. Similarly, concrete
symbolic representational operational thinking, although logical, is still tied to concrete objects and lacks
ability. During this stage, the abstract and hypothetical qualities of formal operational thinking (Crain,
the child’s thinking tends 1992). Piaget also believed that the accomplishments of the lower stages
to be concrete, irreversible become integrated into the subsequent new stage. For example, we still
and egocentric.
use the co-ordinations of the sensorimotor stage in activities such as playing
tennis (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). These stages of cognitive development will
Concrete operational
be discussed briefly below.
stage. Piaget’s third stage
of cognitive development.
Children are now able to The sensorimotor period (birth to two years)
perform reversible mental Piaget agreed with Darwin and Watson that the process of cognitive
actions on real, concrete development begins from the most basic reflexive actions such as sucking and
objects, but not on grasping. During this stage, basic sensory inputs and motor capabilities are
abstract objects. Thinking coordinated to form sensorimotor schemes, which are the way the infant
also becomes less intuitive
processes information from the environment during the first two years of
and egocentric and
more logical. life. From this limited set of primitive reflexes or schemes, basic programmes
of intelligent behaviour develop, called circular responses, which eventually
give rise to verbal intelligence and thought (Piaget, 1952). Piaget identified
Formal operations.
different types of circular responses or reactions, which effectively separate
Piaget’s final cognitive
developmental stage,
the sensorimotor stage into six sub-stages. These sub-stages describe the
which is characterised infant’s transition from a ‘reflexive to a reflective organism’ (Shaffer, 1996: 249).
by increased abstract
thinking and the use of Sub-stages of the sensorimotor period
metacognitive ability.
Sub-stage 1: The use of reflexes (birth-one month)
Circular responses. A
The newborn enters the world with a set of inherited response patterns
specific form of adaptation
in infancy, in which the or reflexes. Piaget used the term ‘reflex’ broadly to refer to the obvious
infant accidentally ones such as sucking and grasping, as well as to more subtle ones such as
performs some action, eye movement, orientation to sound and vocalisation. Intellectual devel-
perceives it, and then opment begins here as the infant makes contact with the world via these
repeats the action. basic reflexes. Piaget based many of his ideas about this developmental
stage on his observations of his newborn son, Laurent. He noticed that

Laurent would suck his hand or the quilt even when not hungry, and the
reflex was stimulated by almost anything that touched his lips. Piaget also
observed that Laurent’s ability to locate the nipple and feed successfully
improved gradually over the first three weeks of life, as he learnt to apply
the sucking reflex selectively to the nipple. At this stage, the infant cannot
separate his needs from action and cannot behave with intentionality.
Sub-stage 2: Primary circular responses (1-4 months)

In this sub-stage, reflexes are extended so that new patterns of behaviour are Primary circular
acquired. According to Piaget (1952), much of what the young child learns responses. Circular
begins by accident. The child accidentally performs some action, perceives it, responses involve the
likes it, and then repeats the action, assimilating it into his existing scheme. For discovery of the baby’s
own body and occur
example, the baby accidentally puts his thumb in his mouth, becomes aware
between the ages of one
that he is sucking it, finds this pleasurable and so gradually learns how to to four months.
repeat this action. This would be what Piaget called a primary circular reaction
or response. Circular responses are a specific form of adaptation in infancy.
Such responses are termed primary because they are the first motor habits
to appear and circular because the pleasure that they bring stimulates their
repetition (Shaffer, 1996). Primary circular reactions involve the discovery
of the baby’s own body (Papalia & Olds, 1993). In this sub-stage, the infant
shows the beginnings of intentionality as it is able to initiate a scheme, which
although it is made up of reflexes, is not inherited.
Sub-stage 3: Secondary circular responses (4-8 months)

From four to eight months the baby’s circular reactions become more Secondary circular
advanced and start to involve objects and people outside the baby’s body. For responses. Circular
example, the baby coos, the mother smiles, and this makes the baby feel responses which involve
goal-directed behaviour
good. He wants the mother to stay with him, so he coos again. This is a
that gets a response from
secondary circular reaction or response. Secondary circular responses involve another person or object.
goal-directed behaviours that get responses from another person or object.
They are not based on reflexes and represent the first acquired adaptations of
new behaviours.
Sub-stage 4: Coordinated secondary circular responses

(8-12 months)
From eight to 12 months the baby demonstrates coordinated secondary
circular reactions, where he coordinates two or more actions to solve new
problems. He will know, for example, to pick up a cup to look for something
underneath it, or will look at a toy and feel it simultaneously. At this stage, Tertiary circular
the baby’s behaviour starts to display intentionality, as in using a stick to pull responses. Circular
a toy closer. This demonstrates goal-directed behaviour and the beginning responses that occur
of the differentiation between means and ends (that is, cause and effect). between twelve and
eighteen months, when
the baby experiments
Sub-stage 5:Tertiary circular responses (12-18 months)
with different ways
Tertiary circular responses occur when the baby experiments with different of reproducing an
ways of reproducing an accidentally discovered response or solving a accidentally discovered
problem. He accidentally steps on a squeaky toy, for example, likes the response or of solving
squeaky noise it makes and so picks it up and squeezes it, so that it squeaks a problem.
Baby sucks thumb Baby enjoys sucking
(a) Primary circular reaction: action and response both involve infant’s own body (one to four months)
Baby coos Baby sees smiling face
(b) Secondary circular reaction: action gets a response from another person or object, leading to
baby’s repeating original action (four to eight months)
Baby steps on Baby squeezes Duck squeaks

rubber duck rubber duck
(c) Tertiary circular reaction: action gets one pleasing result, leading baby to perform similar actions
to get similar results (12 to 18 months)
Primary, secondary, and tertiary circular reactions. According to Piaget, infants learn to reproduce
pleasing events they have discovered accidentally.
(a) Primary circular reaction: A baby happens to suck a thumb, enjoys sucking, and puts the thumb
back into the mouth or keeps it there. The stimulus (thumb) elicits the sucking reflex; pleasure then
stimulates the baby to keep on sucking.
(b) Secondary circular reaction: This involves something outside the baby’s body. The baby coos; the
mother smiles; and because the baby likes to see the mother smile, the baby coos again.
(c) Tertiary circular reaction: The baby tries different ways to reproduce an accidentally discovered
response. When the baby steps on a rubber duck, the duck squeaks. The baby then tries to produce
the squeak in other ways, perhaps by squeezing it or sitting on it.
Figure 15.1 Primary, secondary and tertiary circular responses. Adapted from Papalia and Olds (1998).
again (Papalia & Olds, 1993). Here there is a clear differentiation between
means and ends. When faced with a problem, such as getting a stick
through the bars of a gate, the toddler can now make subtle adjustments
to his existing schemes to work out a solution. Together with these new
intellectual tools come increased locomotive abilities, which enable the
toddler to actively experiment with the environment. At this age, problems
are solved by means of a physical trial-and-error process. So, if the toddler
wants to know how much toilet paper is on a roll and whether it will all fit
into the toilet, he has to try this out. The toddler cannot simply examine the
two objects and discern that one will easily fit into the other. At this stage
objects are understood only by acting on them (physically manipulating
them). Mental comparisons, which involve the symbolic representation of
objects and events, are not yet possible.
Sub-stage 6: Invention of new means through mental

combinations (18-24 months)
During this last sub-stage of the sensorimotor stage, the child develops Symbolic representation.
symbolic representational ability. Symbolic representation refers to the use The use of a picture,
of a picture, word, number, gesture or some sign to represent past, present word, number, gesture or
some sign to represent
or future events, experiences and concepts. It is the ability to represent
past, present or future
something that is not physically present. The earliest forms of representation events, experiences
are actions, such as waving ‘bye-bye’, and the ultimate form of symbolic and concepts.
representation is language. Symbolic representation is also manifest in the
child’s play, as in using a broomstick to represent a horse.
Object permanence

The most important development of the sensorimotor stage,
according to Piaget (1952) is object permanence. This is the
awareness that objects continue to exist even when they are no
longer visible. Searching for hidden objects begins at about five
months. Before that, the baby does not search for a hidden object,
but seems to forget about it altogether. At a year, the child’s object
permanence is still not fully developed. If the child is used to
finding a hidden toy in place A, she will carry on looking for it in
place A, even if you show her that you are hiding it in a different
place (place B). Object permanence is generally reached around
18 months when the walking toddler is able to explore the world
more actively, for example when a ball rolls out of sight, now he The earliest forms of
can follow it and see where it has gone. However, some research suggests symbolic representation are
that object permanence may develop earlier than Piaget thought, because actions, such as waving ‘bye
he tested its existence with activities that required motor actions of which bye’.
the baby was not yet capable. For instance, the baby may remember that
the object is under the pillow but does not have the motor ability to move
the pillow. When tested with more age-appropriate procedures, infants
as young as three and a half months act as if they remember an object
Object permanence.
that they cannot see. (Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). It is suggested that The awareness that
infants may have a more sophisticated knowledge of objects based on objects continue to exist
their perceptual development, but their motor development lags behind even when they are no
this (Baillargeon, 1987). longer visible.
Imitation
Deferred imitation. Piaget believed that imitation plays an adaptive role in the child’s development.
The ability to reproduce Based on his observations of infants, Piaget believed that they are incapable
the behaviour of an of imitating novel responses until eight months of age. Deferred imitation, or
absent model.
the ability to reproduce the behaviour of an absent model, first appears around
12 to 18 months of age. (Jacqueline’s reproduction of her playmate’s temper
tantrum, mentioned earlier, is an example of deferred imitation.) It is only once
a child is capable of forming mental symbols or images of another person’s
behaviour, and of storing and retrieving these from memory, that he is capable
Preconceptual stage.
of deferred imitation (Ginsburg & Opper, 1969). Research has indicated that
The first phase of the
preoperational stage of infants and children are capable of imitation and deferred imitation much
cognitive development. earlier than Piaget proposed (Craig, 1996). Some newborns are able to imitate
It is characterised by the an adult sticking out their tongue, but then lose this ability and do not recover
increasing use of symbols, it for several months (Craig, 1996). Meltzoff (1988) found that nine-month-olds
including language and are able to imitate very simple acts such as pressing a button to activate a noise-
symbolic play. producing toy, a day after observing a model producing such behaviour.
Intuitive stage. The
second phase of the Symbolic Representation
preoperational stage of
cognitive development, Preoperations (two to seven years)
also known as the The period from two to seven years is a time of much intellectual curiosity,
transitional stage. During when children come up with all sorts of questions, such as ‘What makes
this phase the child you stop growing?’ or ‘Why do you have to have a man and a lady to have a
becomes less egocentric
baby?’ Piaget called this period the preoperationaI or prelogical stage because
and much better at
classifying objects on he believed that preschool children have not yet acquired the cognitive
the basis of perceptual operations that would enable them to think logically or to interpret reality
categories such as size, correctly. Piaget’s descriptions of preoperational thinking focus mainly on
shape and colour. the limitations of this stage (Piaget, 1952).
The preoperational stage is divided into two parts: the preconceptual
Transitional stage. stage (from two to four years) and the intuitive or transitional stage (from five
See intuitive stage.
to seven years). The preconceptual stage is characterised by the increasing
Animism. use of symbols, including language and symbolic play. For example, a child
The preoperational belief playing with a stick as if it were a gun is engaging in symbolic play. The use
that all moving objects of symbols enables the child to think about things that are not only in his
(and sometimes inanimate immediate environment. The child also has the power to name things that
objects) are alive. may not be immediately present. Children in the preconceptual stage still
have difficulty distinguishing between mental, physical and social reality.
Egocentricity. A view of
They may think, for example, that all objects that move are alive, including
the world that is centred
on one’s own perspective; cars and clouds. (This is called animism). The child may expect that the
a characteristic of inanimate world will obey his commands, a trait stemming partly from
preoperational thinking. the child’s self-centred view of the world (or egocentricity). Most of these
‘illogical’ ways (by adult standards) of thinking about the world result from
Transductive reasoning. the child’s transductive reasoning. Transductive reasoning entails reasoning
Reasoning from the from the particular to the particular. When any two events co-vary, the child
particular to the
assumes that one has caused the other. For example, when Piaget’s daughter
particular. Assuming, for
example, that when any had missed her regular afternoon nap one day, she said, ‘I haven’t had a nap,
two events occur so it isn’t afternoon’ (Shaffer, 1996: 256).
simultaneously, one has The transitional or intuitive stage begins around five years of age and the
caused the other. differences between the preconceptual and the intuitive stages are so slight,
one wonders whether the preoperational stage actually warrants division

into these two stages. The intuitive child is less egocentric and much better
at classifying objects on the basis of perceptual categories such as size, shape
and colour. Piaget called the child’s thinking at this stage intuitive because
his understanding of objects and events still centres on their single most
important characteristic, rather than on logical or rational thinking.
How preoperational thinking differs from later cognitive stages
s Preoperational thinking tends to be centred on one physical aspect of

an object or a situation. For example, when given six sticks of different
lengths, the preoperational child can usually pick out the longest and
shortest. But the child cannot line the sticks up from longest to
shortest because this requires that he or she simultaneously judges
that each stick is longer than the one before but shorter than the one
after. This is because the child can only focus on one aspect or dimension
of an object or situation at a time.
s The thinking of the preoperational child is concrete. He finds it

difficult to deal with abstract concepts, such as honesty.
Preoperational children’s reliance on the concrete world for under-
standing often results in them confusing appearance with reality,
as in thinking that non-documentary events on television are real.
s The preoperational child’s thinking tends to be irreversible. That is, Irreversibility.

events and relationships are believed to occur only in one direction. The belief that events and
The child cannot imagine how things can return to their original relationships occur only
in one direction;
state or go in two (or more) directions. According to Piaget, reversibility
a characteristic of
is the most clearly defined characteristic of intelligence. Lack of preoperational thinking.
reversibility is illustrated in this excerpt from Piaget’s child
observation diary (Piaget, 1952): Reversibility. The ability
to reverse an action by
Piaget: Do you have a sister? mentally performing the
Marie: Yes. opposite action.
Piaget: What is her name?
Marie: Stephanie.
Piaget: Does Stephanie have a sister?
Marie: No.
s Preoperational children tend to focus on present states of objects and

not on processes of change. They judge things according to their
present appearance and cannot understand how they came to be that
way. An example of this is when the child is shown two identical
balls of clay and one ball is transformed into various shapes, while the
other is untouched. When the child is asked which ball has more clay,
he or she may sometimes select the untouched ball, because it is fatter,
and other times the transformed one, because it is longer or more
spread out. The child never says that the two balls have the same
amount of clay, although he is always shown how the one is changed.
This is because the child is focusing on the current state of the object
and not on the process of transformation. The child is also focusing
on one dimension of the clay at a time such as its ‘flatness’ or ‘fatness’.
This example also shows how the preoperational child’s thinking is
concrete, based on direct experience in the ‘here and now’, and it
shows the irreversibility of the child’s thinking—he is unable to
reverse the clay ball back to its original state.
s Thinking tends to be egocentric or centred on the child’s own

perspective. For example, the child may think that other people cease
to exist when they are not in sight. Research indicates, however, that
young children may not be as egocentric as Piaget assumed and
that he may have underestimated the ability of preschool children
to understand events from another’s point of view. Flavell, Everett,
Croft & Flavell (1981) showed three-year-olds a card with a picture
of a dog on one side and a cat on the other. The card was then held
in such a way that the child could see the dog and the tester could
see the cat, and the child was asked which animal the tester could see.
The three-year-olds answered correctly each time, indicating that
they could assume the tester’s perspective. Despite this and other
findings (Ruffman, Olson, Ash & Keenan, 1993; Sodian, Taylor,
Harris & Perner, 1991) that indicate that preoperational children
are not as egocentric as Piaget believed, they tend nonetheless to
rely on their own perspectives and therefore often fail when judging
other people’s motives. They often assume, also, that if they know
something, others will too.
The development of symbolic representation:

Some practical implications
One of the main distinctions between photographs of objects as though they were
humans and other creatures is our capacity the real object, attempting to grasp them or
for symbolic representation. This enables us pick them up off the page. Some would
to transmit information from one generation even lean over and put their lips on the teat
to the next, thus ensuring cultural of a photograph of a bottle, for example.
continuity, as well as to learn without direct They only did this, though, if the depicted
experience—we all know about dinosaurs object was highly similar to the object it
although we have never encountered one. represents (its referent) as in colour
Symbolic representation is possibly one of photographs and video footage. When the
the most important aspects of human objects bore less resemblance to the real
development, due to its fundamental role in thing, as in a line drawing, the infants
nearly everything we do. One of the first would rarely explore them. By
types of symbolic objects that Westernised approximately 18 months, infants come to
infants master is pictures. DeLoache (2006) realise that the picture only represents the
found that American infants, as well as rural real thing. They interpreted the picture
infants from a village in the Ivory Coast, symbolically, as standing for, not just being
would attempt to explore colour similar to, its referent. >>
<<
But researchers have found that it takes on the further assumption that such a
several years for children to completely child will be able to think of the doll as
understand the nature of pictures. Flavell a representation of him- or herself.
(cited in DeLoache, 2006) found that, Several researchers have questioned these
until the age of four, many children think assumptions, and have shown that when
that turning a picture of a bowl of preschoolers were asked to recall a visit to
popcorn upside-down will result in the the paediatrician, either using a doll or
popcorn falling out of the bowl. In young not, the children’s reports tended to be
children, symbol confusion also occurs more accurate when they were questioned
with other objects that are representative without a doll. They were more likely to
of something else, such as a model house. falsely report genital touching when a doll
Between 18 and 30 months, children was used (DeLoache, 2006). It is
typically make errors of scale with suggested that children younger than
miniature versions of real objects, for three are not able to relate their own
example attempting to sit on a miniature body to a doll.
chair or climb into a miniature car. Such The concept of dual representation has
scale errors involve a failure of dual implications for education as well.
representation—the child cannot maintain Preschool and elementary school teachers
the distinction between the symbol and its often use blocks, beads and other objects
referent. This has some important practical to stand for numerical quantities, assuming
implications. For example, the use of dolls that these concrete objects help children
when interviewing very young children in to understand abstract mathematical
cases of suspected sexual abuse, is based principles. But if children do not
on the assumption that the child will find understand the relations between the
it easier to describe what happened using objects and what they represent, such
a doll. However, this assumption is based techniques may be counter-productive.
Advances of the preoperational stage over the

sensorimotor stage
Symbolic representation continues to develop in the preoperational child.
Once children begin to use symbols, their thought processes become in-
creasingly more complex. Pretend play, too, helps the child to understand
the feelings and viewpoints of others. This increased sensitivity to others
moves the child from egocentric thinking into more sociocentric thinking.
Sociocentric thinking takes several years to develop, but has its roots in
the symbolic representational abilities of the young child. In addition to
symbolic representation, the preoperational child has an understanding
of cause and effect relationships. Preoperational children are also able to
classify objects into categories, for example, they know that mum and dad
belong to the category of people.
Preoperational children begin to develop a rudimentary idea of numbers
and what they represent. At some point, usually by three years of age, they
understand five basic principles of numeracy:
• The one to one principle, that is, that you say only one number for each
item being counted.
• The stable order principle, that is, that you say numbers in a fixed
order.
• The order irrelevance principle, that is, you can start counting with any
item and the total number will always be the same, for example, if
counting ‘Smarties’, you can begin counting with any colour ‘Smarty’,
and you will always reach the same total number (unless you eat
some in the process, of course).
• The cardinality principle, that is, the last number name that you use is
the total number of items.
• The abstraction principle, that is, that you can count all sorts of things -
sweets, people, number of times jumping up in the air (Papalia &
Olds, 1993).
Concrete operations (seven to 11 years)

Piaget saw the ages of five to seven as marking the transition from pre-
operational to concrete operational thought. At around seven years, the child
moves into Piaget’s stage of concrete operations. He defined an operation as
a reversible mental action. In the preoperational period, the child is unable to
perform reversible mental actions, while in the concrete operations period,
he can perform reversible mental actions on real, concrete objects but not
on abstract objects. Thinking now becomes less intuitive and egocentric
and more logical, which is probably why most cultures choose this age for
starting formal education (Papalia & Olds, 1993).
Figure 15.2 While the preoperational child may understand number

concepts, the concept of conservation is not understood until the concrete
operational stage.
Advances of the concrete operational stage over the

preoperational stage
A major difference between preoperational and concrete operational
thinking is shown in the school-going child’s use of logical inference. This
is when a conclusion is reached through either seen or unseen evidence, as
exemplified in Piaget’s famous conservation of liquids experiment. In this
experiment, preoperational children judge that a tall, narrow glass holds
more water than a wide, short glass, although the liquid was poured into
both containers from the same glass. Concrete operational children know
that the differently shaped glasses contain the same amount of liquid. They
realise how the liquid can be transformed by the shape of the container and
remember how it appeared before it was poured into the glasses. These chil-
dren display reversibility, or the ability to undo mentally the pouring process
and imagine the water back in its original container, while preoperational
children will point to one or the other glass as having more water.
Children in the concrete operational stage gradually master the con-
cept of conservation in a series of stages. For instance, the conservation of Conservation.
number and weight is usually understood first (around seven or eight A cognitive capacity
years) and conservation of area last (around 11 or 12 years). Piaget called described by Piaget as
particularly important
this inconsistency in the development of a particular cognitive ability, such
during the concrete
as conservation, horizontal decalage. Children in this stage find it difficult operational period. It
to transfer what they have learnt about one type of conservation to another refers to the ability to
type, such as from number conservation to length conservation, although the judge changes in amounts
underlying principles are the same. One explanation for this is that problems (liquid, area, volume or
of conservation, while appearing to be similar, actually differ in complexity. mass) through logical
The concrete operational child is able to understand seriation problems, deduction rather than on
the basis of appearance.
that is, he can mentally classify objects by placing them in order according
to one or more dimensions. This indicates transitive inference—the ability Seriation. The ability to
to mentally compare different objects and find similarities and differences mentally classify objects
between them. If, for example, Susan is shorter than Peter, and Peter is by placing them in order
shorter than Mary, who is the shortest? It follows logically that Susan is the (in series) according to
shortest, and the concrete operational child is able to understand the transi- one or more dimensions.
tivity of these size relationships. The child is also able to focus on more than
Transitive inference.
one feature of a problem simultaneously, an ability referred to as decentration The ability to mentally
(the opposite of centration). compare different objects
Concrete operational children, unlike preoperational children, can and find similarities and
theorise about the world. They can guess about things and test out their differences between them.
guesses, estimating, for example how many breaths of air they can blow
into a balloon before it pops or how many blue ‘Smarties’ it is necessary to
eat for their entire tongue to turn blue. But this ability to theorise is limited
to concrete objects that they can see. Children only develop theories about
abstract concepts in the formal operations stage around 11 or 12 years of age.
The skills outlined above, which are characteristic of concrete opera-
tions, do not appear all at once or over a short period of time. Piaget (1952)
maintained that operational abilities develop gradually and sequentially as
the initial, basic skills are consolidated and reorganised into increasingly
more complex mental structures.
Formal operations (12 years onwards)

Cognitive development at this stage is characterised by increased abstract
thinking and the use of metacognitive skills (the ability to think about Metacognition.
one’s own mental processes). While younger children are more comfortable The ability to reflect
on one’s own
with concrete, empirical facts, adolescents are able to think abstractly about
mental processes.
possibilities, and to compare reality with things that might or might not
be. Formal operational thought involves the ability to formulate, test and
evaluate hypotheses. It involves the manipulation of known facts as well as
events contrary to fact. During this stage thinking becomes more systematic
and the adolescent is able to plan and think ahead. In a study where tenth-
graders, twelfth-graders, first-year college students and final-year college
students were all asked to imagine and describe what they thought might
happen to them in the future and to say how old they thought they would be
when these events occurred, the older subjects could look farther into the
future than the younger ones and their speculations about the future were
far more specific (Greene, 1990).
Formal operational thought is characterised as a second-order process. First-
order processes of thinking entail discovering and examining relationships
between objects. Second-order processes involve thinking about your own
thoughts, looking for connections between relationships, and moving
between reality and possibility. The three main characteristics of hypothetical-
deductive formal operational thought are:
s the ability to combine all variables and find a solution to a problem,

s the ability to speculate about the effect one variable may have on
another, and
s the ability to combine and separate variables in a logically formulaic
manner, for example if X then Y (Piaget, 1952).
In addition to the development of deductive reasoning, Piaget proposed

that formal operational children are also able to think inductively, reasoning
from specific instances to broad generalisations. Inhelder & Piaget (1958)
developed a series of tasks to assess formal operational reasoning, of which
the pendulum problem is the most well known. In this problem, the child
is given a rod from which strings of differing lengths can be suspended.
Objects of varying weights can be attached to the strings.
Figure 15.3 The pendulum problem

Source: The growth of logical thinking
from childhood to adolescence by
B. Inhelder and J. Piaget (1958)
Basic Books.
The child is shown how the pendulum operates by placing a weighted

string on the rod and swinging it. He is then asked to determine the factors
responsible for the speed with which the pendulum swings (that is, the
rate of oscillation). The child is told that, in addition to varying the length
of the string and the weight of the object attached to it, he can drop the
objects from different heights and alter the force of the push that he gives
the object when initially propelling it. The child is given an opportunity to
experiment with the pendulum before providing an answer to the question
of which factors are responsible for the pendulum’s rate of oscillations.
There are four possible factors to consider (string length, weight of object,
height of release and force of push), as well as several levels within each
factor (for example three lengths of string and four weights of objects).
The correct answer is the length of the string: short strings swing faster
than long strings, regardless of all other factors. The child is observed as
he goes about attempting to solve this problem, formulating a testable
hypothesis and then testing it. According to Inhelder & Piaget (1958), it is
not until formal operations that children can correctly test their hypotheses
and arrive at a logical conclusion.
The thinking of the formal operational child is not fully mature,
however, and Piaget noted some similarities with much younger children
in terms of egocentricity. He proposed that adolescents demonstrate a part-
icular form of centration. While adolescents are interested in their future Centration. Focusing on
in society and how they might transform the world, many of their grand only one physical aspect or
political and social ideas conflict with the beliefs or attitudes of others, dimension of an object or
situation; a characteristic
particularly authority figures. Adolescents also tend to believe that these
of preoperational thinking.
abstract ideas are unique to them.
The self-centred perspective of adolescence often results in an erron-
eous belief that other people are as concerned with their feelings as they
are, which serves to enhance the adolescent’s self-consciousness. Elkind
(1967) hypothesised that adolescents feel that they are continually on stage,
acting in front of an imaginary audience and this idea has been confirmed
in several studies (Elkind & Bowen, 1979; Gray & Hudson, 1984). Elkind
also proposed that the egocentrism of adolescence leads to what he referred
to as the ‘personal fable’, a belief in one’s uniqueness and invulnerability.
This is reflected in the often reckless behaviour of adolescents and the
belief that bad things only happen to other people (for example, ‘I won’t
get addicted to drugs’ or ‘I can run off the tracks before the train arrives’).
While this egocentricity has obvious disadvantages, it may also serve an
adaptive purpose. For example, it ensures that adolescents will experiment
with new ideas and start behaving more independently, in preparation for
separating from their parents.
Not all people are capable of thinking in formal operational terms.
Between one-third and one-half of American adults never attain this
stage of formal operations, as measured by Piagetian tasks (Kohlberg &
Gilligan, 1971). This fact has lead many psychologists to believe that it should
be considered an extension of concrete operations, rather than a separate
stage. (Piaget actually proposed this himself.) Also, once formal operations
have been attained, a person may not maintain them consistently. Many
people, when confronted with unfamiliar problems in unfamiliar situations,
will fall back on a more concrete type of reasoning (Piaget, 1952). Does
cognitive development then end with formal operations? Many theorists
have proposed development beyond this final Piagetian stage.
Risk-taking behaviour in the teenage years
* Males and females between the ages of 16 programmes for teens. Traditional
and 20 are twice as likely to be in a car intervention programmes stress the
accident than drivers aged between 20 and importance of providing information
50. Car accidents are the leading cause of about risks and allowing teens the
death among 15 to 20-year-olds in the USA, freedom to make their own decisions.
and 31 per cent of these were intoxicated at For example, it is assumed that by telling
the time. teens the risks of unprotected sex, such
* Three million adolescents contract sexually as unwanted pregnancy and HIV infection,
transmitted diseases every year. they will not engage in such behaviour.
* More than half of all new cases of HIV Reyna and Farley (2007) argue that such
infection occur in people younger than 25. programmes are flawed, not because they
* Forty per cent of adult alcoholics report that presume that teenagers will weigh risks
they started drinking between the ages of 15 against benefits and come to a rational
and 19. conclusion about their actions, but
* Ten to 14 per cent of adolescents show because the unfinished architecture of the
evidence of pathological gambling and many teen brain prevents them from thinking
report that they started gambling at 12. like adults. Recent studies have shown
(From Reyna & Farley, 2007) that teens tend to weigh the benefits
more heavily than risks when making
Part of this reckless behaviour may be the decisions. So, after carefully considering
result of brain regions associated with the pros and cons of a situation, the teen
planning, reasoning and impulse control brain tends to focus on the benefits and
only developing in early adulthood. may choose the risky situation.
This has implications for intervention
Post-formal Post-formal operations

thinking. Also called Research indicates that mature thinking may be far richer and more
dialectic or relativistic
complex than is suggested by the abstract manipulations of formal
thinking, this refers to
thinking that is flexible
operations (Labouvie-Vief, 1985; Riegel, 1984). Post-formal thinking
and adaptive, relying (sometimes called dialectic or relativistic thinking) is flexible and adaptive,
on intuition and logic. relying on intuition and logic. It is characterised by the ability to deal with
It is characterised by uncertainty, inconsistency, contradiction, and compromise. Sinott (1984)
the ability to deal with proposed the following criteria of post-formal thought:
uncertainty, inconsistency,
contradiction and
s the ability to shift between abstract reasoning and practical, real-life
compromise.
situations,
s awareness that most problems have more than one cause and more
Dialectic thinking. than one solution, and that some solutions may be more successful
See post-formal thinking. than others,
s the ability to choose the best of several possible solutions and to Relativistic thinking.
identify the criteria upon which this choice is based, and See post-formal thinking.
s recognition that a problem or solution involves inherent conflict.
Critics argue that the notion of a stage of post-formal thinking has no

research support. This means that future research needs to determine
whether post-formal thinking can be assessed by means of reliable and
objective measuring of its qualitative characteristics.
Criticisms of Piaget’s theory

Piaget’s theory is one of the most enduring in the field of cognitive devel-
opment. It has been in existence for over 67 years, and continues to influence
developmental psychologists today. However, much of the interest in his theory
now comes in the form of criticism. A few of the major criticisms of Piaget’s
theory are outlined here, as well as some responses to the criticisms.
Cognitive development as a series of stages

Piaget held that his stages of intellectual development are holistic
structures, or ‘coherent modes of thinking that are applied across a broad
range of tasks’ (Shaffer, 1996: 274). However, the term ‘stage’ generally
implies that there are abrupt changes in intellectual functioning as the
child acquires higher-level abilities and progresses through the stages.
Research indicates that transitions in intellectual ability actually occur
very gradually, and there is often a great deal of inconsistency in the child’s
performance of the tasks identified by Piaget to measure the abilities
that define a particular stage. For example, some concrete operational
children are capable of success in formal operational tasks, yet cannot
successfully complete all concrete operational tasks (Bjorklund, 2005;
Flavell, Miller & Miller, 1993).
The issue of whether cognitive development occurs in stages is still
debated and much of this debate centres on the understanding of the word
‘stage’. Some theorists agree that cognitive development is coherent and
does progress through a series of stages (Flavell et al, 1993). Many others,
however, hold that cognitive development is a complex, multifaceted
process in which children gradually acquire skills in a wide range of areas
such as visual spatial ability, mathematical reasoning, verbal reasoning,
and so on (Bjorklund, 2005). While development within each of these
areas may occur in a series of stages, one cannot assume consistency across
them. It appears that cognitive development does not occur in stages that
are as discrete or clear-cut as Piaget proposed.
Piaget himself was among those who were unsatisfied with the
ability of equilibration to explain sufficiently how transitions between
stages take place. One of his final projects was a more detailed version
of equilibration (Piaget, 1975). Most critics seem to agree that the model
is almost certainly right in general, but that it leaves many unanswered
questions about transitions between stages.
In addition, there are some problems with within-stage developmental
shifts. Only the sensorimotor stage has a delineated within-stage sequence of
six levels. On the other hand, preoperational-stage thinking has been richly
described, but not organised into a sequence of within-stage levels. The same
is true of concrete and formal operations. Thus, a sequence of within-stage
levels from entry into the stage to its full mastery of its structures is lacking
for all but the first stage.
Underestimation of children’s abilities

Piaget particularly seems to have underestimated the abilities of preoperational
children. It has also been found that children who are not initially capable of
performing certain concrete or formal operational tasks can often be trained in
these abilities. Four-year-old children, for instance, can be trained to perform
successfully in conservation tasks (Bjorklund, 2005). However, most of these
training studies are limited to artificial training situations and the extent to
which these skills can be generalised to everyday situations is as yet unknown.
Competence versus performance

Piaget assumed that if a child failed on one of his tasks, it was because the
child lacked the underlying competencies necessary to perform that task.
However, this is an invalid assumption since there are many factors other
than a lack of the underlying conceptual competencies that may undermine
performance on a cognitive task. For example, young babies appeared to lack
object permanence, because they were assessed on tasks that required them
to perform motor actions that they were not yet capable of producing. When
assessed with more age-appropriate methods, they display object permanence.
Piaget (1972) later realised that he may have been mistaken in this regard
when he discovered that adolescents are more likely to use formal operational
thinking when solving familiar problems and concrete operational thinking
when attempting to solve unfamiliar problems. To account for this, he used
the term horizontal decalage, described earlier. This explains the discrepancy
between what structures, as a whole, a given developmental stage allows and
what the child is actually capable of doing at any given moment.
Description or explanation of cognitive development?

Piaget did not clearly explain the underlying mechanisms that enable a
child to move to progressively higher levels of intellectual functioning.
Consequently, many researchers regard his theory as a detailed description
of cognitive development as opposed to an explanation of how cognitive
development occurs (Kuhn, 1992).
Failure to consider individual differences

Piaget’s theory is notorious for being oblivious to individual differences.
However, this was his deliberate intention. One of Piaget’s central aims
was to create a theoretical framework that captured the common qualities
of cognition and its development, which would occur regardless of the
particular circumstances. Situated in a time where an IQ-dominated psy-
chometric tradition made discrimination between individuals and groups
a primary purpose, Piaget’s theory was intended to do the opposite.
Failure to include social and cultural influences on cognitive

development
Piaget did admit that cultural factors might influence the rate of cognitive
development.
Research has shown that cultural factors may also influence how chil-
dren think (Rogoff, 1990). Piaget’s theory gives insufficient attention to
the ways in which children’s social interactions with others may influence
their cognitive development. Recall the image of the little scientist ex-
ploring the world, in rela-tive isolation from everyone around her or him.
It is now common knowledge that many of the child’s competencies are
gained through his interactions with peers, siblings, parents, and other
caregivers. Piaget chose not to concentrate on socio-cultural and contextual
influences on cognitive development, which formed the focus of Vygotsky’s
theory. Thus, Vygotsky’s theory is not presented here as an alternative to
Piaget’s, but as complementary to it. Piaget’s theory provides the specifics
regarding mental development, while Vygotsky’s accounts for the role of
socio-historical and contextual factors in mental development.

Specific tasks
➊ What is the significance of symbolic representation for cognitive development?
➋ How could teenagers be taught to reason like an adult in evaluating risky situations?
➌ Do you think Piaget’s theory has universal applicability? Give reasons for your answer.
Piaget, J (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press.
(This is quite a difficult read, in parts, but is highly recommended for the serious student of Piaget’s work,
as it gives a nearly first-hand [it is translated from the original French] description of his theorising.)
Tryphon, A & Voneche, J (1996). Piaget-Vygotsky: The Social Genesis of Thought. New York:
Psychology Press.
(This book focuses on the long and heated debate between supporters of Vygotsky and Piaget and so it is
best read after you have been through the chapter on Vygotsky’s theory. The book highlights the fact that
the two theorists actually based their theorising on a common premise, namely that knowledge is
constructed within a specific context. The book also looks at how the theories complement one another
and together provide a comprehensive account of child development. It is recommended for the
postgraduate or advanced student.)
CHAPTER
16
Intellectual development
Kate Cockcroft and Nicky Israel
This chapter provides a brief overview of the different approaches

to intelligence and its development. It covers the following:
1. Issues encountered when defining intelligence:

What is intelligence?
2. The psychometric approach to intelligence
3. Critical evaluation of the psychometric approach
4. The cognitive approach to intelligence
5. Critical evaluation of the cognitive approach
6. The concept of ‘emotional intelligence’
7. Changes in intelligence: Is global intellect
rising?
8. Intelligence and ageing
9. Intelligence and creativity
Introduction
Often the terms intellectual development and cognitive development are
used interchangeably. This is because intelligence generally encompasses
all cognitive abilities (attention, perception, memory, language, concept
formation and problem solving all feed into our intellectual ability). This
chapter explores how our intellectual competence increases as we develop.
You will note, however, that a substantial portion of this chapter is devoted to
explaining the different theories of intelligence. This is necessary in order to
illustrate the extent to which the theories do or do not attempt to account for
intellectual change over time. The chapter starts with an attempt to define
what intelligence is. It then looks at the various approaches to intelligence
and its development, and finally it considers a few of the more interesting
topics that have been linked to intelligence, such as the concept of emotional
intelligence and the links between intelligence and creativity.
Issues encountered when defining intelligence:

What is intelligence?
The short answer to this question is, as Pyle (1979) puts it, ‘We don’t
know.’ Intelligence has been given many definitions by different philoso-
Intellectual development 345
phers, psychologists and researchers. Here are a few of them (from Pyle,
1979: 3):
Binet: to judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well.

Terman: the capacity to form concepts and to grasp their significance.
Wechsler: the global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to
think rationally and to deal effectively with the environment.
Piaget: adaptation to the physical and social environment.
All of the theorists mentioned above stress the ability to reason as an

important part of intelligence, but they each tend to focus on different aspects
of intelligence. For example, biologists, such as Piaget, stress the ability to
adapt to the demands of the environment, while educationalists, such as
Binet, stress the ability to learn. Debate about what exactly intelligence is
continues even today. Detterman & Sternberg (1986), in an attempt to find
a shared definition of intelligence, asked the main theorists in the field
each to provide their own definition. The responses were then analysed for
frequencies of mentioned attributes. Twenty-five attributes were mentioned
but only three of these—namely biological, cognitive/motivational and
behavioural/environmental factors—were mentioned by 25 per cent or more
of the theorists. One of the reasons why there is still no common definition of
intelligence is because different theorists make different assumptions about
the structure and stability of those attributes that they view as indications
of intelligent behaviour (Shaffer, 1996). The fact that ‘intelligence’ seems
to mean different things to different psychologists has led to a recent
suggestion that it is better understood, not as a fixed phenomenon existing
within people but as one created through social activities and represented
between people as a social construct (Mugny & Carugati, 1989).
Intelligence as a social construct

According to Mugny & Carugati (1989), our social world provides certain
‘signals’ of intellectual inferiority or superiority, which we conceptualise
as part of intelligence. These signals have been shown to include quite
superficial aspects such as personal appearance (wearing glasses or
having a high forehead), accent and self-presentation. We then attribute
‘intelligence’ differentially to people according to the extent to which they
display the accepted signals.
It is also important to keep in mind that the types of signals considered
to provide evidence of intelligence vary between different groups and
cultures, and will be highly affected by the surrounding environment.
For example, Sternberg, Nokes, Geissler, Prince, Okatcha, Bundy &
Grigorenko (2001) found that in a rural village in Kenya, knowledge of
medicinal herbs and traditional forms of healing was considered key to
adaptation and survival in that environment, and was thus considered
a very important ‘practical intelligence’. In another study by Okagaki &
Sternberg (1993), parents from different ethnic affiliations in the United
States placed differing emphases on aspects such as cognitive abilities,
practical skills, motivation and social skills in judging an ‘intelligent’
first-grade student. There are, however, also certain similarities between
cultures in defining ‘intelligent behaviour’. For example, in her study

exploring racial and cultural differences in the conceptualisation of
intelligence, Chen (1994) found that both Australian and Taiwanese
students identified three factors—non-reasoning ability, verbal reasoning
ability and rote memory—as constituting ‘intelligence’.
There are numerous studies highlighting both the similarities and
differences in conceptualising intelligence across different cultures. The
task of these scientific studies of intelligence as a social construct are to
demonstrate how such representations are related to particular social
contexts, and to then consider the effects on both intellectual
development as a process and the effect on ways of examining
this process.
Perspectives on intellectual development

There are two main perspectives on intellectual development:
the psychometric approach, begun by Sir Francis Galton,
which led to the creation and use of intelligence tests, and
approaches that focus on the cognitive processes underlying
intelligence. (Piaget’s theory, discussed in the previous chapter,
fits in with the latter approach.) Each of the approaches is briefly
discussed below.
The psychometric approach to intelligence

The psychometric approach is concerned with attempts to
measure intelligence (whatever it may be). This approach was
initiated by Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin,
Francis Galton
who, like Plato, favoured a eugenics breeding programme
for the improvement of intelligence in society. Galton is
credited with making the first scientific attempt to measure
intelligence. Between 1884 and 1890, he ran a service at the
Psychometric approach. South Kensington Museum in London, where, for a small fee, visitors could
Theories of intelligence have their intelligence checked. For example, he invented a whistle, which,
which are based on the he claimed, could tell him the highest pitch a person could perceive. Other
assumption that tests involved determining the weight of gun cartridges or how much
intelligence can be
pressure on the forehead was necessary to cause pain! When correlations
described in terms of
mental factors, and that were run to determine whether performance on Galton’s ‘intelligence tests’
tests can be developed was related to school and college marks, the findings were unsurprisingly
which measure individual negative (Robinson, 1981).
differences in these
factors. The Binet-Simon Intelligence Test
The first real breakthrough in the measurement of intelligence was the
work of Alfred Binet. He was commissioned to devise a test to predict
school performance and, especially, to distinguish children who were
genuinely mentally retarded from those who had behavioural problems
but whose mental processes were intact. Together with his colleague,
Theodore Simon, Binet developed the Binet-Simon Intelligence Test. This
test measured a range of abilities such as vocabulary, verbal comprehension,
verbal relations and repeating a sequence of numbers, and it summarised
performance as a Mental Age (MA) score (Robinson, 1981). The majority of
eight-year-olds would manage the items at the eight-year-old level, and

so could be said to have a mental age of eight. If an eight-year-old could
only manage up to the six-year-old level of the test and no further, then,
although his or her chronological age (CA) is eight, his or her mental age
is said to be six. The idea of using MA and CA to determine a person’s
intelligence quotient (IQ) was developed in 1914 by Stern, who devised
the following formula (Pyle, 1979):
Mental Age (MA)

Intelligence quotient (IQ) = X 100
Chronological Age (CA)
Army Alpha and Beta Tests

During World War I, intelligence testing acquired greater
importance as psychologists were required to develop a method
to screen potential soldiers. This led to the development of the
Army Alpha test (a verbal test for English speakers) and Beta test
(a non-verbal test, with pantomimed instructions for non-English
speakers). These tests could be administered in groups.
Alfred Binet
The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale
Shortly afterwards, a series of tests was evolved to measure various kinds Mental age. Level of
of achievements and abilities including IQ, scholastic aptitude, academic mental functioning (in
aptitude and related constructs. In 1916, Lewis Terman, of Stanford years) as determined by
the number of items
University, published a revision of the Binet-Simon Intelligence Test, which
passed on a test (usually
was similar in structure to the original test, but included more items (90 in an IQ test). Previously,
total). This test, which became known as the Stanford-Binet Intelligence mental age was used in
Scale, was so successful at predicting school performance that a revised the calculation of IQ
version is still in use today, mainly in the United States (Robinson, 1981). scores, today deviation
IQs are used.
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
David Wechsler, an American psychologist, believed that the Stanford-Binet
test was not very useful for assessing adults, and so devised the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) in the 1930s. Shortly afterwards, he also
developed the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) and the
Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI), both of
which, in revised format, are still in use today. In South Africa, the Junior
South African Individual Scales (JSAIS) were developed in 1979 to assess
scholastic and intellectual functioning in English- and Afrikaans-
speaking white children between the ages of three and
seven years. The Senior South African Individual Scales-
Revised (SSAIS-R), were first developed in 1964 to gauge
intellectual functioning in white and Indian English- or
Afrikaans-speaking children between the ages of five
and 17 years. Individual Scales have also been developed
for all of the different cultural groups in South Africa, for
example, isiZulu, Xhosa, Venda, Tswana, and Northern
and Southern Sotho. These are generally for school-age
children and adolescents up to 19 years old. The South African Lewis Terman
Wechsler Adult Individual Scale (SAWAIS) was modelled on the Wechsler-

Bellevue Adult Intelligence Scale in 1969 for English- and Afrikaans-
speaking white South Africans (Owen & Taljaard, 1989). For adult South
Africans, there are norms for the WAIS-III (Claassen, Krynauw, Paterson
& Mathe, 2001).
Spearman’s two-factor model of intelligence

Some psychometric theorists challenged the idea that what constitutes
Factor analysis.
intelligence can be captured by a single IQ score, particularly since
A statistical technique intelligence tests consisted of a range of sub-tests. These theorists proposed
used to find clusters of that these sub-tests might represent distinct mental abilities rather than a
IQ test items that are single, general ability. The performance of great numbers of individuals
highly correlated with one on intelligence tests was subject to a type of statistical analysis called factor
another but unrelated to analysis, in order to investigate whether intelligence is a single attribute or
all of the remaining items
many different attributes. Factor analysis, very simply put, is a technique
in the test. The clusters of
items are called factors, for finding clusters of test items that are highly correlated with one another
and each factor is but unrelated to all of the remaining items in the test. The clusters of items
believed to represent a are called factors, and each factor is believed to represent a distinct mental
distinct mental ability. ability (Shaffer, 1996).
general ability (g)

Group abilities
verbal, educational spatial, mechanical psychomotor

(v:ed) practical (k:m) & physical
mathematical
creative verbal numerical spatial mechanical

scientific &
technical
S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S
Special abilities
Figure 16.1 Schematic representation of Spearman’s two-factor model of intelligence.
Charles Spearman developed factor-analytic methods and used them to

investigate relations among intelligence test scores. He found that children’s
g (Spearman’s g; general scores were moderately correlated across a range of cognitive tasks, and so
mental ability). The idea
concluded that there must be a general mental ability, later designated as
that intelligence can be
expressed as a single
‘g’, which flows into performance on all of these tasks. However, Spearman
general mental ability that also noted that there were inconsistencies in intellectual performance,
flows into performance on so that a person who excelled at most cognitive tasks may perform poorly
all cognitive tasks. on a particular test, such as mathematical reasoning. He proposed a two-
factor model of intelligence, which stated that, in addition to general ability

(g), intellectual ability also consists of specific abilities, designated as ‘s’, s (Spearman’s s; specific
which are specific to performance on a particular task (Pyle, 1979). The best mental ability). The idea
evidence for the existence of g is what has been termed the positive manifold— that intellectual ability
consists of specific
the frequent finding of high correlations among scores on sets of cognitive
abilities (s), which are
tasks that have little in common with one another in terms of content or specific to performance
strategies used (Bjorklund, 1995). on a particular task.
Thurstone’s primary mental abilities

Several years later, Louis Thurstone factor-analysed the test scores of
approximately 50 intelligence tests, and found seven factors, which he called
primary mental abilities. These were spatial ability, perceptual speed (how Primary mental abilities.
quickly you can process visual information), numerical reasoning, verbal Thurstone’s seven mental
meaning (defining words), word fluency (how quickly you can recognise factors, determined by
subjecting IQ test scores
words), memory and inductive reasoning (generating a rule based on partial
to factor analyses. These
information). All the primary mental abilities were held to be quite basic, basic abilities include
with none assuming more importance than any other. spatial ability, perceptual
speed, numerical
Guilford’s structure of intellect model reasoning, verbal
J P Guilford believed that a model of intelligence based on g, or broad group meaning, word fluency,
factors, was far too simplistic, and he proposed that there were at least 180 memory and inductive
reasoning.
distinct mental abilities, if not more.
PRODUCTS
Units
Classes
Relations
Systems
Transformations
Implications
OPERATIONS
CONTENTS Evaluation
Figural Convergent production
Symbolic Divergent production
Semantic Memory
Behavioural Cognition
Figure 16.2 Guilford’s structure of intellect model.
He argued that to group them together under broad headings such as ‘visuo-
spatial ability’ did not do justice to describing the richness and complexity
of human intelligence. He based his ‘structure of intellect’ model on three

facets:
1. content (what the person must think about, for example, letter
symbols or numerical symbols),
2. operations (the kind of thinking the person needs to perform, for
example, recognising information in symbolic form and holding it
in memory), and
3. products (the kind of answer that is required, for example,
speaking a word or pressing a button).
He proposed that there are five types of content, six possible operations,
and six products, which allow for up to 180 primary mental abilities (5 X
6 X 6). There is much respect for Guilford’s attempt to broaden the view
of intelligence. His model is based on evidence from genetics, neurology, the
biological sciences, and experimental psychology.
Guilford’s next task was to construct tests to measure each of his 180
mental abilities, and to date there are tests that assess over 100 of the mental
abilities in his model. However, findings have indicated that scores on these
tasks are often correlated, suggesting that the abilities they measure are not
as independent as Guilford assumed (Brody, 1992).
Hierarchical models of intelligence

Today many psychometricians (people who attempt to measure mental
processes) use a hierarchical model of intellect. In this model, intelligence
is viewed as consisting of a general ability factor at the top of the hierarchy,
which influences performance on all cognitive tasks, as well as several
specific ability factors (similar to Thurstone’s primary mental abilities), which
influence performance in particular areas of intellectual functioning, such as a
test of numerical reasoning (Shaffer, 1996). Evidence to support this model
has been found in multidimensional scaling studies of various intelligence
tests, which have produced graphs showing a wide range of complex
reasoning tests involving abstract reasoning (g) that correlate highly with
each other in the centre, and less complex, single tasks, or specific focus
tests, lying further out towards the edges of the graphs (Carpenter, Just &
Shall, 1990).
Fluid intelligence
Fluid intelligence or Gf .
The ability to solve novel
The final psychometric approach is that of Raymond Cattell and John Horn.
and abstract problems of They proposed that Spearman’s g and Thurstone’s primary mental abilities
the sort that are not could be divided into two major dimensions, namely fluid and crystallised
taught and are relatively intelligence (Horn & Cattell, 1982). Fluid intelligence or Gf is the ‘ability to
free of cultural influences. solve novel and abstract problems of the sort that are not taught and are
relatively free of cultural influences’ (Shaffer,1996: 336), such as verbal
Crystallised intelligence
analogies. Fluid intelligence is a measure of the influence of biological
or Gc . The ability to solve
problems that depends on
factors. It is comparable to inherited ability and is believed to flow (hence
knowledge acquired as a the term ‘fluid’) into a wide variety of intellectual activities. In contrast,
result of schooling and crystallised intelligence or Gc is ‘the ability to solve problems that depends
other life experiences. on knowledge acquired as a result of schooling and other life experiences’
(Shaffer, 1996: 336), such as general knowledge questions. Research indicates

that Gf and Gc, in reality, are difficult to separate.
Factors affecting performance on IQ tests

Considerable research over the past century has identified numerous
factors that are linked to performance on psychometric tests of IQ across the
world. These include length and quality of education, home environment,
including aspects such as child-rearing practices and exposure to reading,
and biological factors such as nutrition and exposure to toxins such as
alcohol and lead in the environment (Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard Jr, Wade
Boykin, Brody, Ceci, Halpern, Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg & Urbina,
1996). Many of these factors have been shown to affect not only intellectual
The Learning Propensity Assessment Device (LPAD)
Departing radically from conventional about traditional conceptualisations of

psychometric testing, with its static, prod- intelligence, particularly since tests of
uct-oriented approach, Reuven Feuerstein learning potential do not correlate highly
formulated a dynamic assessment and with traditional measures of intelligence.
intervention model, called the Learning The response to this is that either IQ or
Propensity Assessment Device (LPAD). This learning potential is not a valid measure of
model assesses an individual’s learning intelligence. Given the controversy around
processes, obtains a measure of learning the definition of intelligence, this is not
potential, and provides the opportunity to surprising. All that can be concluded from
modify or change the deficient and the available evidence is that the two
problematic cognitive functions that are phenomena are different: IQ is not
identified. This approach to assessment, learning ability. ‘Whether either or neither
known as learning potential assessment, is “intelligence” remains to be studied and
or dynamic assessment, raises questions debated’ (Lidz,1991: 4).
development, but physical, social and broader mental development in

children as well and all appear to be closely linked to socio-economic
status and the related level of access to resources.
Culture-fair intelligence testing

Culture-fair tests are tests that are designed to be culturally unbiased. Some Culture-fair tests. Tests
would argue that no such test exists, since it may be impossible to rule out the that are designed not
role of experience in relation to socio-economic and ethnic background. Many to be culturally biased,
usually by removing the
intelligence tests are clearly culturally biased, favouring urban dwellers over
language component.
rural dwellers, people from high socio-economic backgrounds to those from
lower socio-economic backgrounds, or white people over black, coloured,
or Indian people. For example, one item on an intelligence test for children,
which has subsequently been revised, asked, ‘What would you do if you found
a three-year-old child in the street?’ The correct answer was, ‘Call the police’.
However, children who may have negative perceptions of the police are un-
likely to choose this answer. Such an item does not measure the knowledge
necessary to adapt to one’s environment. Furthermore, cultural attitudes can

affect how well a person does in a testing situation. For example, a person
from a culture that stresses sociability and co-operation may be handicapped
in taking a test alone, or a person from a culture that stresses slow, pain-
staking, and precise work, may be handicapped in a timed test (Kottak, 1994).
These factors are still seldom taken into account in testing situations.
Critical evaluation of the psychometric approach

Many difficulties have arisen out of the attempts to measure intelligence
and some of these will be discussed here.
Assessing infant intelligence

Testing infants’ (children under two years) and toddlers’ intelligence is
difficult, mainly because most tests are language-based and very young
children have limited language abilities and attention spans. Intelligence
tests for infants tend to focus on motor abilities (what the child can do and
what he is used to doing) and on developmental milestones, as in the Bayley
Scales of Infant Development (Bayley 1993). The latter test calculates a
Developmental Quotient (DQ) rather than an IQ, and compares it to the
norm group. Generally, infants’ intelligence test scores tend to be unreliable.
That is, they tend to vary markedly from one test occasion to the next.
Bias in intelligence testing: nature or nurture?

One of the most controversial findings in nature or nurture. In other words, is IQ
IQ testing over the last century has been something we are born with, or is it
that when white and non-white something that develops as a result of the
populations have been tested using environment in which we grow up? The
standard psychometric IQ tests, non-white answer, as with almost all psychological
groups have been found to score, on phenomena, is almost certainly both—
average, about one to two standard there are likely to be elements based on
deviations lower than white groups our genetic make-up and elements based
(Neisser et al, 1996). This has sparked a on our environment and upbringing that
long-standing, bitterly fierce and highly contribute towards our intellectual
politicized debate as to whether these development. The exact split between
differences reflect an actual difference in heredity and environment in determining
cognitive ability (that is, they are our IQ, however, remains an open and
genetically determined differences), or highly acrimonious debate in the field.
whether psychometric IQ tests themselves While certain theorists whole-heartedly
inherently measure IQ in a way that is maintain that genetic determinants are
biased towards white groups (that is, the most important, others propose that IQ
tests are designed in a way that does not measurement itself is biased and thus
allow people from different cultures to reflects only culture or environment, or,
perform equally). more specifically, the level of exposure the
From a developmental perspective, this person has had to those concepts
debate is extremely interesting as it measured in the test.
reflects the fundamental question of This issue raises serious questions in
>>
<<
relation to the suitability of IQ tests for 1992; Rushton & Skuy, 2000; Rushton,
measuring IQ in the same way across Skuy & Fridjhon, 2003 and Rushton, Skuy
different groups of people, particularly in & Bons, 2004. These researchers all
societies that are multicultural and concluded that despite the difference in
multilingual, such as South Africa. One of scores between the groups, the test
the highest priorities of practitioners and functioned similarly for the different
psychometrists in South Africa today is groups in terms of item structure, item
therefore to examine the suitability of difficulty and item loadings on ‘g’, and
specific available IQ tests for measuring IQ that therefore the test was not biased.
in a fair and unbiased way in the general Owen (1992), however, also argued that
South African population. there might be cultural differences in the
As an example, one IQ test that has way the items of the test were approached
received special attention in this regard is and solved. A preliminary study by Israel
the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, a (2006) suggested that this might be the
picture-based test that involves solving a case, as deep-seated differences in the
series of logic problems on paper. The test way the test was responded to, based on
is thus non-verbal, and is therefore seen as the home language spoken by the test
particularly useful in the South African respondent, were found. This would
context because it is assumed to be suggest that further research is necessary
reasonably free of linguistic and cultural to establish more clearly the degree to
biases. Despite this, the same difference in which both nature and nurture affect IQ
performance between white and non- and its measurement, particularly in
white groups has been found when relation to using IQ tests across different
administering the RPM to South African cultural contexts.
samples, as seen in research by Owen,
Infant ability as a predictor of later IQ

Infant’s IQ scores tend to be poor predictors of future functioning. It is not
until a child is about three years old that the child’s IQ score, as well as factors
such as the parents’ IQ and educational level, enable more accurate prediction
of later intellectual ability (Cockcroft, Amod & Soellaart, 2008). Of a group
of toddlers who were tested at two and a half years and again at 17 years, one
in seven showed an increase of 40 IQ points or more. Since an IQ score of
100 means an average IQ, and 140 means a gifted IQ, this is quite a marked
difference. Developmental scales have value in that they enable one to trace
a baby’s developmental progress and allow for the diagnosis of neurological
and cognitive disorders, but they are also poor predictors of the child’s later
IQ or scholastic achievement (Rose, Feldman, Wallace, & McCarton, 1989).
The main reason for this discrepancy is that tests for very young children tend
to focus on sensory and motor abilities, while tests for older children measure
verbal, mathematical and spatial reasoning (Bornstein & Sigman, 1986).
School-age IQ scores as predictors of later achievement

For school-going children, IQ test scores are quite good predictors of
school performance. Conventional intelligence tests correlate between 0.4 and
0.6 (on a 0 to 1 scale) with school marks, which, statistically speaking, is quite
a good level of correlation. However, a test that predicts performance with
a correlation of r = 0.5 only accounts for about 25 per cent of the variation in
individual performances, leaving 75 per cent unexplained. Therefore, there
is much more to school performance than IQ. The predictive validity of IQ
tests decreases when they are used to forecast performance in later life, such as
salary, job performance, or even the likelihood of obtaining a job. Generally,
the correlations are slightly over r = 0.3, which means that the tests account
for approximately ten per cent of the variation in people’s performance, while
90 per cent remains unexplained (Ceci, 1990). Further, IQ prediction is even
less effective when populations, situations or tasks change. Fiedler (cited
in Ceci, 1990) found that IQ positively predicts leadership success under con-
ditions of low stress, but in high stress situations the tests negatively predict
leadership success. Research has shown that the IQ scores of most students
improve when they are taught to think analytically, creatively and practically
(Sternberg, 1998). Despite this, the actual contents of IQ tests have changed
very little since the beginning of the 20th century. What does an IQ represent
then, if not one’s intellectual ability? Many researchers in the field believe
that an IQ score is just an estimate of a person’s performance at one particular
point in time, that is, when the test was taken (Shaffer, 1996).
Cognitive approach.
Theories of intelligence Narrow definition of intelligence
that seek to understand Psychometric definitions of intelligence have been criticised for being too
intelligence in terms of
narrow. They focus predominantly on what the test taker ‘knows’, rather
actual knowledge and
underlying reasoning
than on the process whereby this knowledge is acquired, stored and
processes. manipulated in problem solving. More recently, tests such as The Kaufman
Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC) (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983)
and the Cognitive Assessment System (CAS) (Das, Naglieri & Kirby, 1994)
have been developed as attempts to assess the processes involved in intelligent
behaviours. However, although they are tests of intellectual ability, these
tests do not fall strictly within the psychometric domain, as they are based
on theories of cognitive processing. They form part of the growing group
of tests developed as a reaction to the narrowness of the psychometric
understanding of intelligence, and fall under the cognitive approach
to intelligence.
The cognitive approach to intelligence

The cognitive approach seeks to understand intelligence in terms of
actual knowledge and underlying reasoning processes. Many
of these theorists extend the basic information-processing
assumptions described in Chapter 21, in an attempt to
formulate models of intelligence or cognition. The two main
cognitive theories of intelligence are those of Sternberg and
Gardner, which will be discussed below.
The triarchic theory of intelligence

Robert Sternberg (1985: 45) defines intelligence as ‘mental activity
Robert Sternberg directed toward the purposive adaptation to, and selection and shaping
of, real-world environments relevant to one’s life’. He claims that many
theories of intelligence are not incorrect but are incomplete, since human
intelligence encompasses a much broader variety of skills than imagined
by previous theorists. Sternberg believes that skills necessary for effective Triarchic theory.
performance in the real world are just as important as the more limited Sternberg’s theory of
skills assessed by traditional intelligence tests. He proposes a triarchic intelligence which
emphasises three inter-
theory of intelligence that, as its name implies, emphasises three
related components of
interrelated components of intelligence. Sternberg presents these as the intelligence, designated as
componential, experiential and contextual sub-theories. the componential,
experiential and
• The componential sub-theory addresses the mental processes that are contextual sub-theories.
emphasised by most theories of intelligence, namely the ability to
acquire new knowledge and to solve problems effectively, that is, it Componential sub-
looks at what happens inside a person’s head, when he or she thinks theory. That part of
intelligently. Sternberg’s triarchic
theory of intelligence that
• The experiential sub-theory deals with the ability to adjust to new
considers the various
tasks, to use new concepts, to adapt creatively in new situations and types of ‘components’ or
to use insight. mental operations that
• The contextual sub-theory considers people’s ability to select contexts individuals use in problem
in which they can excel, to capitalise on strengths and compensate for solving. This sub-theory
weaknesses, and to shape the environment to fit their strengths includes three types of
(Sternberg 1984). components: knowledge
acquisition, performance
and metacomponents.
The componential sub-theory
The componential sub-theory is the most highly elaborated of the sub-
Metacomponents. In the
theories. It considers the various types of components or mental operations componential sub-theory
that individuals use in problem solving. The component is the basic level of of Sternberg’s triarchic
analysis in Sternberg’s theory and is defined as ‘an elementary information theory of intelligence,
process that operates upon internal representations of objects and symbols’ these components are
(Sternberg, 1985: 97). Sternberg further specifies three broad kinds of involved in planning,
component, which are interrelated: monitoring and evaluating
the processing that occurs
during problem solving.
• Metacomponents play a supervisory, decision-making role in problem
solving. They are used to plan, monitor and evaluate processing dur- Performance
ing problem solving. These components are responsible for allocating components. In the
attentional resources to various aspects of task processing. componential sub-theory
• Performance components carry out problem-solving strategies of Sternberg’s triarchic
specified by the metacomponents. They can be subdivided into: theory of intelligence,
these components are
1. Encoding components, in which the sensory information
involved in executing
is defined and represented in the information-processing cognitive tasks.
system,
2. components involved in the combination of, or comparisons
Knowledge-acquisition
between sensory stimuli, and components. In the
3. response components, which provide the necessary response to componential sub-theory
the problem. of Sternberg’s triarchic
• Knowledge-acquisition components selectively encode, combine and theory of intelligence,
compare information during the course of problem solving, thereby these components are
bringing about new learning (Sternberg, 1984). involved in the acquisition
of knowledge, which
entails selective encoding,
For example, when writing an essay, metacomponents help you to selective combination
choose a topic, organise the paper, monitor the writing and evaluate the final and comparison
work. Knowledge-acquisition components enable you to carry out research of information.
for the paper. Performance components are involved in the writing of the
paper, in searching for appropriate words and phrases and retrieving them
from memory.
The experiential sub-theory

Experiential sub-theory. The experiential sub-theory was developed to explain an aspect of intel-
That part of Sternberg’s ligence that was missing from the componential sub-theory, namely the role of
triarchic theory of experience in intelligent performance. A given problem does not draw on
intelligence which deals
the intelligent use of mental components to the same degree for all people.
with the ability to adjust
to new tasks, to use new
To a Grade One child, for example, reading the word ‘dog’ may be a novel
concepts, to adapt experience requiring a great deal of effort to sound out the letters and blend
creatively in new situations them together, while a literate English-speaking adult would find the word
and to use insight. very easy to read and understand. Since a particular task may be new to
one person or may be unfamiliar within a particular culture, the degree
to which a problem requires intelligence will vary from person to person
and from culture to culture. Sternberg maintains that experience with a
particular task resides on a continuum, from totally new and unfamiliar
to completely automated. In relation to this, the experiential sub-theory
proposes that intelligence is partly a function of two abilities—the ability
to work through new tasks and situations, and the ability to automate
information processing. The two abilities interact, since the more one is
able to automate information processing, the more mental resources can be
devoted to processing new tasks (Sternberg, 1984).
According to Sternberg (1984), the most important application of
the experiential sub-theory concerns the selection of tasks for measuring
intelligence. Tasks that are either completely new or completely automated
will not reveal much about a person’s intelligence. If a task is completely
novel, the testee will not have a frame of reference for handling the
problem. If it is completely automated, a task will not reveal much about
a person’s intelligence either, because such tasks bypass problem solving.
Therefore, the best tasks to use in measuring intelligence are those that are
relatively novel or are in the process of becoming automated. Sternberg
proposes that how people respond to novelty, and the ease with which
they can automatise information processing, are important and universal
aspects of intelligence.
Contextual sub-theory. The contextual sub-theory

That part of Sternberg’s The contextual sub-theory holds that intelligence must be viewed in the con-
triarchic theory of text in which it occurs. There are three kinds of mental process that are
intelligence which
central to the contextual sub-theory:
considers the ability to
select contexts in which
the individual can excel, • adaptation,
to capitalise on strengths • selection, and
and compensate for • shaping of real-world environments.
weaknesses, and to shape
the environment to fit his These three kinds of mental process are hierarchically ordered.
or her strengths.
Adaptation is the adjustment of one’s behaviour to achieve a good fit with
one’s environment. If adaptation to the environment is not possible, then
the person will try to select a different environment in which they can
adapt successfully. Alternatively, if a new environment cannot be selected,

the person may shape the environment in order to achieve a better fit. For
example, if a spouse is unhappy in a marriage, adaptation to the current
circumstances may no longer be feasible. The spouse may then select a
different environment by getting a divorce or separation or may try to
shape the current unhappy relationship into something better by attending
marital counselling (Sternberg, 1984).
Although these three processes are universal features of intelligence, what
is required for adaptation, selection and shaping will vary among different
groups of people, so that a single set of behaviours cannot be specified as
intelligent for all individuals (Bjorklund, 1995). Therefore the contextual sub-
theory is culturally relativist: intellectual skills that are crucial for survival in
one culture may not be as important in another.
The development of intelligence

The information-processing approach has attempted to explain the
development of intelligence in terms of the development of specific
cognitive processes. These include the development of control strategies
such as monitoring, ‘chunking’ of information, and selectivity of responses
in problem solving; the increase in the amount of information that can be
processed by the individual at any one time; the ability to analyse increas-
ingly complex or ‘higher order’ relations; and the increased flexibility in
thinking (Sternberg, 1988). These processes are what Sternberg (1984)
refers to as components in his triarchic theory. It has been suggested that
general cognitive ability develops through increase in the size of a ‘central
computing space’ (Pascual-Leone, 1970). Also, as children get older, they
tend to use more complex strategies of reasoning and to construct more
complex mental models and better procedures for testing these models
(see Piaget’s theory in Chapter 15).
The greatest strength of the triarchic theory is that it brings together
diverse aspects of intelligence: the componential sub-theory considers
low-level explanations; the experiential sub-theory considers the role of
experience and the contextual sub-theory addresses higher-order views
of intelligence.
Multiple intelligences
Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (MI theory) is less mechanistic Multiple intelligences.
than the triarchic theory. Gardner (1984) challenges the assumption that Gardner’s theory of
there is a single general intelligence, or g, which is believed to be reflected intelligence, which holds
that human intelligence
by an individual’s IQ. The basic tenet of the theory of multiple intelligences
encompasses at least eight
is, as its name implies, that human intelligence encompasses at least eight different kinds of
different kinds of competencies. These include what are traditionally competencies. These
regarded as intelligence, such as linguistic, logical-mathematical and spatial include linguistic, logical-
abilities, as well as other less traditional conceptions of intelligence, such as mathematical, musical,
musical and kinaesthetic capabilities. For Gardner, each form of intelligence naturalist, spatial, bodily-
represents a modular, brain-based capacity. These intelligences do not kinaesthetic, interpersonal
and intra-personal abilities.
always reveal themselves in traditional paper-and-pencil tests.
Gardner’s theory is based on extensive research into the nature of
intelligence. In order to define the various intelligences possessed by
humans, he developed the following set of conditions and criteria that each
distinct intelligence had to meet:
• Potential isolation by brain damage. For example, there is evidence

that damage to specified areas of the brain can either compromise or
spare linguistic ability.
• The existence of prodigies (individuals with generally normal
abilities in most areas and exceptional ability in one area), savants
(individuals with low IQs who display a single and exceptional
cognitive ability) and other exceptional individuals, who allow for
the intelligence to be observed in relative isolation. Gardner believes
that such exceptions reflect modular, brain-based skills, which must
surely exist in the general population.
• An identifiable core operation or set of operations, for example,
musical intelligence consists of a person’s sensitivity to melody,
harmony, rhythm, timbre and musical structure.
• A distinctive developmental history within an individual, together
with a definable nature of expert performance. For example, one can
examine the skills of an expert athlete, as well as the steps that occur
towards attaining such expertise.
• An evolutionary history and evolutionary plausibility. For instance,
forms of spatial intelligence can be examined in mammals.
• Support from tests in experimental psychology. Researchers have
devised tasks that indicate which skills are related to one another,
and which are discrete.
• Susceptibility to encoding in a symbol system, such as language,
mathematics and maps (Gardner 1984).
In 1983, Gardner concluded that there were seven abilities that

met these conditions sufficiently well to be regarded as intelligences:
linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, spatial, bodily-kinaesthetic,
interpersonal and intra-personal abilities. The last two refer
respectively to the ability to read other people’s moods, motivations
and other mental states, and the ability to access one’s own feelings and
to draw on them to guide one’s behaviour. Interpersonal and intra-
personal intelligence may be considered as the bases for emotional
intelligence (which we will discuss presently). In 1995, Gardner
added an eighth intelligence—that of the naturalist, which
permits the recognition and categorisation of natural objects,
such as in the personalities of Charles Darwin and John James
Audubon. Gardner is currently considering a ninth intelligence,
namely existential intelligence, which involves the proclivity to
raise and ponder fundamental questions about existence and
death and which is embodied by personalities such as the religious
leader, the Dalai Lama, and the existentialist philosopher, Søren A.
Kierkegaard (Gardner, 1998).
Multiple intelligences theory makes two claims: that all humans
Howard Gardner possess these intelligences, and that each person has an individual profile
of intelligences (Gardner, 1998). Gardner argues that, since children enter
school with distinctive profiles of intelligences, these should be cultivated

through suitable activities in the curricula. He argues that the reliance on
IQ tests to classify individuals in terms of their intelligence does a great
disservice to them and to society. Since the focus of these tests is linguistic and
mathematical abilities, children gifted in other areas, such as musically or
manually, are often ‘thrown on society’s scrap heap’ (Gardner, 1984: 76).
Critical evaluation of the cognitive approach
Is the cognitive approach significantly different from the

psychometric approach?
Gardner (1984) argues that Sternberg’s account of intelligence is not very
different from the psychometric account, in that it allows for a general
intellectual factor similar to Spearman’s g. Sternberg (1984) counters that it is
too early to compare his and Gardner’s theories because there have been no
experimental tests of Gardner’s theory. Furthermore, Gardner’s theory has
been described as an extension of Guilford’s domain-specific theory of intel-
ligence, and therefore not that different itself to the psychometric approach.
Definition of intelligence
Gardner’s theory has been criticised in particular for including human
characteristics that are not typically considered to be mental operations, such
as athletic ability and bodily control. This returns us to the question asked at
the beginning of this chapter, namely, ‘What is intelligence?’
The concept of ‘emotional intelligence’

Peter Salovey and John Mayer coined the phrase ‘emotional intelligence’ Emotional intelligence.
in 1990 to describe qualities such as understanding one’s own feelings, The term used to describe
empathy for the feelings of others, and ‘the regulation of emotion in a way qualities such as
understanding one’s own
that enhances living’ (Goleman, 1996b: 4). Emotional intelligence, or EQ,
feelings, empathy for the
was popularised by Daniel Goleman in his book on the subject (Goleman, feelings of others, and the
1996b). Goleman maintains that IQ and standardised achievement tests may ability to read social cues.
be less predictive of success than a person’s emotional skill. EQ, however, is
not the opposite of IQ. Some people are lucky enough to have a lot of both,
some have little of either.
The cornerstone to EQ seems to be ‘metamood’ or a sense of awareness
of one’s own emotions. Metamood is a complex skill since many emotions
disguise others. For example, a person in mourning may know that they are
sad but they may not recognise that they are also angry with the deceased
for dying, because this seems inappropriate. Goleman (1996b) believes that
self-awareness is the most important factor in EQ, because it allows us to
exercise some self-control over our behaviour.
Anger is possibly the most difficult emotion to control, probably
because of its evolutionary role in priming people to action. The
body’s first response is a surge of energy that results from the release of
neurotransmitters called catecholamines. If a person is already aroused
or under stress, the threshold for release of these neurotransmitters is
lower, which explains why people’s tempers shorten during a difficult
day. Anxiety also serves a useful function, as long as it does not become
excessive. Worrying is a rehearsal for danger, where the mind is made to

focus on a problem in order to search effectively for solutions. Problems
occur when worrying blocks the ability to think efficiently.
People with higher EQs, as measured on Rosenthal’s Profile of
Nonverbal Sensitivity (PoNS), appear to have sufficient self-awareness
to develop mechanisms for coping effectively with these emotions. Such
people tend to be more successful in their work and relationships, while
children who score well on the PoNS are more popular and successful,
even though their IQs are often average (Goleman, 1996b).
Did you know? (Some interesting intelligence facts)
* An average IQ ranges between 90 and * Rather than being bad for children,
110, while MENSA level IQ (top 2 per some research suggests computer
cent of the population) is usually a games may actually help to develop
score of above 132. One report states their IQ by improving their critical
that Albert Einstein, famous for his thinking and memory skills.
theory of relativity, had an estimated
IQ of 160. * Contrary to popular belief, it is not
possible to make a baby cleverer by
* Children’s brains are far more efficient playing him/her classical music in
at learning than adults, and very the womb, and there is no scientific
recent research suggests that the first evidence suggesting exposure to
two years of life may be the most classical music has any long-term
critical learning period of all. effect on IQ.
Changes in intelligence: Is global intellect rising?

Research indicates that IQ scores have been rising by approximately
three points per decade and therefore by a full standard deviation (15
points) in the past 50 years (Flynn, 1998). Since this change is too rapid
to be accounted for by genetic factors, Ulric Neisser (cited in Flynn,
1998) proposes that this increase may have to do with the increasing
visual complexity of modern life. Images on television, billboards,
and computers have enriched our visual experience, making us more
capable at performing well on the visual-spatial aspects of intelligence
tests. Others suggest that improved nutrition may be responsible for
the rise in average levels of both IQ and height in developed countries
(Flynn, 1998). Although the Flynn effect is an extremely interesting
phenomenon, a recent study by Teasdale & Owen (2005) provided data
suggesting that it may, in fact, have peaked in the middle of the last
decade and that performance on IQ tests has begun to decline slightly
since the mid-1990s. They suggest that reduced numbers of students
entering higher levels of education might be responsible for this.
Intelligence and ageing

Brain imaging techniques such as PET scans and MRI indicate that
the brain shrinks somewhat in old age, but not as much as was previ-
ously thought. Furthermore, this shrinkage, in a healthy brain, does
not seem to result in a great loss of mental ability (Goleman, 1996a).
In the past it was believed that brain cells were lost every day. While
some loss does occur with healthy ageing, it is not this dramatic. The
amount of space between the ventricles and sulci of the brain does
gradually increase with age, reflecting a loss in the overall mass of
the brain. Between the ages of 20 and 70 years, the average brain loses
approximately 10 per cent of its mass. However, because there are so
many interconnections among neurons, the brain can often compen-
sate for this loss.
Analyses of the brain also reveal that older people use different
parts of the brain from those used by younger people to accomplish the
same task. People in their twenties, for example, tend to be quicker at
recognising faces and tend to use more diverse areas of their brains than
do people aged between 60 and 75. However, it was found that older
people recognise faces with the same degree of accuracy as do younger
ones, only the former group needs more time to do so (Goleman,
1996a). In the context of development, fluid intelligence is believed
to increase gradually throughout childhood and adolescence as the
nervous system matures. It levels off during young adulthood, and
gradually declines with age (usually after 60). Crystallised intelligence
is said to increase throughout the life-span, since it is the culmination
of one’s learning experiences (Schaie & Willis, 1996).
The damage of Alzheimer’s disease

Some of the data about the ageing brain comes from the Nun Study,
a longitudinal study of ageing and Alzheimer’s disease that began in
1986 and is funded by the National Institute on Aging in America.
The participants are 678 American members of the School Sisters of
Notre Dame religious order who were between 75 and 103 years old
at the commencement of the study. Each sister in the study agreed
to participate in annual assessments of her cognitive and physical
functions, to undergo a brief medical examination, have her blood
drawn, allow investigators full access to her archival and medical
records, and to donate her brain at death for neuropathologic study.
In 1990 David Snowdon, the research leader, restricted the focus of
the study to examining Alzheimer’s disease.
Alzheimer’s disease is a progressive, irreversible brain disorder,
characterised by gradual deterioration of cognitive functioning—
particularly memory, reasoning and language—and eventually,
physical functioning. Autopsies reveal that the brains of Alzheimer’s
patients are filled with deposits known as plaques, formed from pieces
of nerve cells and a protein, beta amyloid. The plaques accumulate at
sites of nerve cell connections and prevent communication between
nerve cells, and they also impair the ability of neurons to absorb glucose
from the bloodstream. It is uncertain whether the plaques actually
cause Alzheimer’s or whether they are a secondary effect caused by

other factors. Something also goes wrong with the neurotransmitter
acetylcholine in Alzheimer’s patients. (This chemical is important for
memory and for the motor control of muscles). It is possible that the
problems with acetylcholine production are due to a defective gene
(Smith, Sayre, Monnier & Perry, 1995).
The Nun Study has revealed that there is a relationship between
the occurrence of strokes and the severity of Alzheimer’s disease.
Many of the brains of deceased nuns revealed that they were living
with advanced Alzheimer’s, yet, even in their last years of life, these
nuns managed to conduct themselves with clarity and coherence. It
was found that none of these nuns had suffered from strokes, particu-
larly the small strokes that occur frequently in the elderly. Only 57
per cent of the ‘stroke-free’ nuns developed dementia (deterioration of
mental functioning), compared with 93 per cent of nuns with a history
of mini-strokes (Nash, 1997).
Figure 16.3 Left: MRI scan of a normal adult brain. Right: MRI scan of a patient with Alzheimer’s disease,
showing the deterioration of the cerebral cortex.
Source: Lahey, B. B. (2001). Psychology: An introduction. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Intelligence and creativity

Creativity is the ability to think about something in novel and unusual ways
and to come up with unique solutions to problems (Goleman, Kaufman &
Ray, 1993). Experts on creativity believe that intelligence is not the same
as creativity and research indicates that creativity is only weakly related to
IQ scores. A reason for this may be that intelligence tests tend to measure
convergent thinking, where a person is required to produce one correct
answer to a problem, while creativity entails divergent thinking, where a
person produces many answers to the same question (Guilford, 1967).
Amabile (1993) has been studying creativity in children for many years.
Her research indicates that the following circumstances are most likely to
destroy children’s natural creativity:
• Pressure. Establishing huge expectations for a child’s performance

can inhibit creativity.
• Surveillance. When adults hover over children, they make the
child feel that they are constantly being watched while they
are working and risk-taking creative urges are diminished.
• Rewards. Excessive use of rewards (toys, stars, money) can stifle
creativity by undermining any intrinsic pleasure that the
child may derive from creative activities.
• Overcontrol. This is related to surveillance and involves telling
the child exactly how to do things. This leaves the child feeling
that any originality is a mistake and exploration a waste of
time.
• Restricting choice. If an adult dictates which activities the child
should engage in, without allowing the child to choose its
interests, it is less likely to engage creatively in those activities.
Despite the links between intelligence (as measured by traditional

IQ tests) and creativity being tenuous, children can benefit from the
presence of creative people. Santrock (1999) describes how the poet
Richard Lewis visits classes in New York City. He brings with him only
a shiny marble that fills with a spectrum of colour when held up to the
light. He shows this to the class and asks students to write about what
they see. One student wrote that she sees the rainbow rising and the
sun sleeping among the stars.
Specific tasks
➊ Definitions of intelligence are difficult to obtain and rarely agreed upon. Try C R I T I C A L T H I N K I N G TA S K S
to create your own definition of intelligence. Examine your definition to try to
establish what ‘signals’ you have included and reflect on why this might be the
case. For example, if you have included academic performance in your definition,
is this because people around you consider people who do well in school to be
intelligent?
➋ There are a number of identified problems with measuring IQ psychometrically,

particularly in children. Summarise the key difficulties you might face in testing both
IQ generally and testing IQ in young children in particular.
➌ Identify the main differences and similarities between the psychometric and
cognitive approaches to intelligence.
➍ How do Sternberg’s triarchic theory of intelligence and Gardner’s theory of multiple

intelligences overlap?
➎ Critically discuss the role each psychometric and cognitive theory presented in the chapter
might play in accounting for or explaining the process of intellectual development.
>>
<<
➏ Critically analyse the similarities between aspects of Gardner’s theory of multiple
intelligences and the concept of emotional intelligence.
➐ How does creativity differ from intelligence? Think up some tasks that could be
used to assess creativity and explain whether and why these would also be suitable
for assessing intelligence as well—or not.
Anderson, M (ed). (2001). The Development of Intelligence. London: Psychology Press.
(This edited collection by contemporary theorists in the field covers a wide range of theories and research
related to the development of intelligence and is an excellent field-specific resource.)
Brody, N (1992). Intelligence. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
(A detailed account of the difficulties in defining and measuring intelligence.)
Ceci, S J (1990). On intelligence, more or less. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
(A discussion of the development of theories of intelligence and their value in modern society.)
Gardner, H (1998). ‘A multiplicity of intelligences’, Scientific American, 9 (4), 19-23.
(An easy-to-read, first-hand explanation of Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory).
Neisser, U, Boodoo, G, Bouchard Jr, T J, Wade Boykin, A, Brody, N, Ceci, S J, Halpern,
D F, Loehlin, J C, Perloff, R, Sternberg, R J & Urbina, S (1996). Intelligence: Knowns and
Unknowns. American Psychologist, 51 (2), 77-101.
(Although this article does not cover the topic of intellectual development per se, it is widely recognised
as a seminal paper in the broader area of intelligence. Compiled by a number of the current leading
researchers in the field, the paper provides a comprehensive overview of the key issues and debates
coherently and sensibly, and indirectly raises a number of topics pertinent to intellectual development.)
Sternberg, R J (ed). (2000). The Handbook of Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(This edited collection provides a comprehensive overview of current research and theory in the field of
intelligence, although it does not address developmental issues specifically.)
CHAPTER
17
Memory development
Kate Cockcroft
This chapter provides a brief overview of the major models of

memory and the development of memory. The following topics
are covered:
1. What is memory?
2. Models of memory
* Schema theory
* Semantic network models
* Connectionist models
3. The development of memory
4. The development of memory strategies
5. Metacognition
6. Memory in later life
What is memory?
When I used to grieve for my mother, and later for my aunt, I told myself
that although they were certainly as dead as they were ever going to be they Short-term
were still mine, that they inhabited my interior world, which was at least memory. That
memory system
as noisy and various as life itself. From early on I valued the gift of memory
which stores
above all others. I understood that as we grow older we carry a whole information over
nation around inside of us, with places and ways that have disappeared, very brief intervals
believing that they are ours, that we alone hold the torch for our past, of time (usually
that we are as unpenetrable as stone. Memory still seems a gift to me and seconds).
I hold tight to those few things that are forever gone and always a part of
Long-term
me ... (Hamilton, 1994:39).
memory.
Information that is
People often think of scenes from their past when thinking about stored for longer
‘memory’. However, these ‘autobiographical’ memories are not the only than a few seconds.
type of memory we possess. First, there is the well-known, distinction
Episodic memory.
between long- and short-term memory. An example would be looking
Memory for personal
up a telephone number and remembering it for just long enough to be able to experiences and
dial it (short-term memory), as opposed to recalling an event from childhood events that have
(long-term memory) (Greene & Hicks, 1984). Tulving (1972) distinguished happened in an
between two types of long-term memory, namely episodic memory, which is individual’s life.
Semantic memory. our memory for personal experiences and events that have happened in our
Memory of general life, and semantic memory, which contains our general knowledge.
knowledge or Long-term memory has also been separated into explicit and implicit
factual information.
memory, where explicit memory is your conscious memory of a specific event
Explicit memory.
or fact, usually required to fulfil some direct goal (for example answering the
Conscious memory of a question, ‘What was the name of that movie with Johnny Depp in it where
specific event or fact. he was a pirate?’ or remembering your first day at university). Implicit
memory, on the other hand, is memory without awareness, usually where
Implicit memory. a ‘part’ memory is triggered by a priming (triggering) event, but the actual
Memory without memory is not explicitly recalled. For example, the neurologist, Klaperede
awareness, usually
(Santrock, 1999), recounts the story of a patient with anterograde amnesia
where ‘part’ memory
can be triggered but the
who had to visit him on a weekly basis. Due to her amnesia, the patient was
actual memory is not unable to remember who Klaperede was. To test whether she had implicit
explicitly recalled. memories, Klaperede hid a pin in his hand and when he shook her hand,
she was pricked by the pin. The next day she had forgotten who Klaperede
was, and when she came into the room he held out his hand to shake hers
but she didn’t want to, even though she could not explain why. Implicitly,
she knew that something unpleasant would occur if she shook his hand.
Implicit and explicit memories are sometimes further divided into
Procedural memory. procedural and declarative memories. Procedural memory concerns knowing
An implicit memory that how to do something, and is thus usually an implicit memory, for example
involves knowing how to knowing how to drive a car. Declarative memories are conscious recollections
do something, for example
of specific facts or events, and are therefore usually explicit memories, in fact
knowing how to drive
a car. the terms are often used interchangeably. There is a further refinement of
declarative memory into episodic and semantic memories. Episodic memory
Declarative memory. refers to memories for specific personal experiences and events that have
Concious recollection of happened in your life (such as having breakfast this morning). These memories
specific facts or events. are usually linked to a specific time-frame and the ‘truth’, or validity, of the
memory depends on the strength of the individual’s belief in that memory.
Semantic memory contains your general knowledge about the world,
for example, that Nelson Mandela was South Africa’s first democratically
elected president. Episodic memories may lead to the formation of semantic
memories or be used to infer semantic memories.
LONG TERM MEMORY
EXPLICIT/DECLARATIVE IMPLICIT/NON-DECLARATIVE
(conscious) (not conscious)
Episodic Semantic Procedural

(personal events) (facts, knowledge) (how to carry out procedures)
Figure 17.1 Hierarchical depiction of the different types of long-term memory. Adapted from
Goldstein, EB (2008). Cognitive Psychology. Connecting Mind, research and Everyday Experience.
Instructors Resource CD. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Memory development 367
Models of memory
Most work on human memory has taken place within the information-
processing framework. Information-processing theorists define memory
as ‘the capacity for storing and retrieving information’ (Baddeley, 1982:
11). This framework conceptualises memory as a series of complex, inter-
connected processes that take in, store, and retrieve information about
the world. The process of taking in sensory information about the world
and converting it into a memory is referred to as encoding. Storage is the
way in which the information is represented in the brain and retrieval is Multistore model of
how information in memory is made available to the individual. Failure memory. An information
processing model of
to remember could be the result of a problem at any of these three stages: memory that proposes
encoding, storage, or retrieval. several different stores
The distinction between long- and short-term memory led within memory.
researchers to develop a multistore model of memory. It is called ‘multi-
store’ because it proposes
several different stores
within memory. The Sensory Short-term Long-term
Stimulus
most common version processes memory memory
input
(SM) (STM) (LTM)
is that of Atkinson &
Shiffrin (1968), a basic
information-processing
model that conceptualises
Response
the memory system in
terms of three main
processes or stores (see Figure 17.2 Atkinson and Shiffrin’s model of memory.
Figure 17.2).
First, information that is perceived by the senses is held briefly in the
sensory store (called iconic memory when referring to sensory visual mem- Sensory store. Information
ory, and echoic memory when referring to sensory auditory memory). The that is perceived by the
information here is in its raw state—the only thing that has been done to senses is held here very
briefly. (Sensory memory
it is to convert it from information in the environment, such as sounds or
is called iconic memory
light, into electrical activity in the brain. Information in this state is still when referring to sensory
relatively meaningless. Information from the eyes, for example, arrives in visual memory, and echoic
the brain in the form of ‘blobs’ and ‘edges’ of light and dark. Information memory when referring to
that is selected for further processing enters the short-term store, where it sensory auditory memory.)
is processed further. The short-term store, as its name implies, only holds
information briefly, between six and 12 seconds. However, this can be Iconic memory.
extended by using various strategies such as rehearsal, where you repeat See sensory store.
the contents of the short-term store either out aloud or mentally in your
head. (Memory strategies and their development will be discussed later Echoic memory.
See sensory store.
in this chapter.) The use of various strategies to increase memory reten-
tion results in the information being stored indefinitely in the long-term
store. Schema theory provides a useful explanation for the understanding Schema theory. Bartlett’s
of long-term memory. theory that we construct
schemata (units of
information about typical
Schema theory events), for example, we
Schema theory was developed by Frederick Bartlett (1932) who proposed have a schema for a typical
that memories are constructed, rather than being exact replicas of the movie theatre and what
information that is stored. The reconstructive nature of memory is occurs there.
evident when you think about how two people may have experienced
the same event, yet their recollections of that event can show great
Shemata. Discrete units of deviations. Memory schemata are discrete units of information that relate
information that relate to a to a typical object or event. Schemata incorporate everything we know
typical object or event. about a subject or object, for instance by now you should have a fairly
well-defined schema about lectures, and how they typically proceed.
In addition to supplying a base of knowledge, schemata also provide a
framework within which new information can be processed. Schema-
Scripts. like memories for events (called scripts) influence how we remember
General remembered events. A script for a restaurant might include information about food,
outline of a familiar
waiters or waitresses, paying the bill, and so on.
repeated event, used
to guide behaviour.
Semantic network models
Schemata are not represented as separate from one another. Rather,
Semantic network. they are depicted in memory as a massive interconnected web of
A large interconnected information, called semantic networks. Collins & Loftus (1975) were
web of schemata. interested in the links between concepts stored in memory, rather than
the actual concepts, and this led to the development of a semantic
Nodes. The concepts
(words, numbers, ideas)
network model of memory. In semantic networks, the connections
that are linked in a between the concepts (or nodes as they are referred to) in the network
semantic network. specify the relationship between them. So, for example, the link
between ‘apple’ and ‘fruit’ would be an ‘is a’ link. The links also have
varying strengths, since concepts can be strongly, weakly, or moderately
Two people can have
distinctly different related to one another (with many gradations in between). Apples, for
memories of the same example, are always fruit, so the link between apple and fruit would
event, demonstrating be very strong. The link between ‘apple’ and ‘green’ would be weaker,
the reconstructive nature since not all apples are green.
of memory.
Semantic networks illustrate the associative and
interconnected nature of memory. All concepts are
linked, and when one concept is activated (as in being

mentioned, seen, or thought about), this in turn activates
the other concepts to which it is linked in a process called
spreading activation.
While semantic networks are often located within
the traditional ‘boxes and arrows’ or modal model
understanding of memory, they are actually somewhere
between the traditional information-processing and
connectionist explanations of memory. (See Chapter
21 for a review of these approaches.) The reason why
semantic networks cannot fully be defined as part of the
connectionist approach is because connectionist models
attempt to make a neural analogy between memory
functioning and brain processes, while semantic
networks are hypothetical only. The commonality
that schema theory and semantic networks share with
the information-processing approach is that they are
functional models of memory, since they attempt to
explain what is happening in memory without saying
what is happening in the brain.
False memory syndrome
In Missouri, USA, in 1992, a church circumstances, false memories can be

counsellor ‘helped’ Beth Rutherford to instilled quite easily in some people. False
remember during therapy that her father, memories are most likely to be created,
a priest, had regularly raped her between whether in an experimental setting in
the ages of seven and 14, and that her therapy, or in everyday life, when certain
mother sometimes assisted by holding her external factors are present. The first
down. In therapy, she developed memories comprises the social demands on the
of her father twice impregnating her and individual to remember. For example, the
forcing her to abort the foetus herself, therapist may exert some pressure on a
using a coat-hanger. The father had to patient to recall instances of abuse.
resign from his post as a priest after the Second, memory construction through
allegations became public. Later medical imagining events may be explicitly
examination of Beth revealed that, at 22, encouraged when people are having
she had never been pregnant and was still trouble remembering. Finally, individuals
a virgin. The daughter sued the therapist may be encouraged not to think about
and received a $1 million settlement whether their memory constructions are
(Loftus, 1997). Rutherford’s case was one real or not (Loftus, 1997).
of many instances of false memory False memories are constructed by
reported in the USA in the 1990s. Some of combining actual memories with the
the cases were based on abuse that content of suggestions received from
occurred during the first year of life. others. During this process, the individual
Loftus (1997) maintains that it is highly may forget the source of the information.
unlikely that an adult will be able to recall However, though experimental work on
genuine episodic memories from the first the creation of false memories raises doubt
year of life because the hippocampus, which about the validity of long-buried memories,
plays a key role in the creation of memo- as in the case of repeated trauma, it does
ries, has not matured enough to form and not disprove such memories. Without
store long-lasting memories that can be corroboration, there is little that can be
retrieved in adulthood. How is it possible, done to help even the most experienced
then, for people to acquire detailed and researcher to differentiate true memories
confident false memories? Research has from ones that were planted through
demonstrated that, under the right suggestion.
Connectionist models
McClelland & Rumelhart (1985) describe a basic computational model of
conceptual memory that explains how object schemata are represented in
human memory. Their model illustrates some of the important aspects of
connectionism. Just as sensory information is converted into electrical activity
in the brain, so McClelland and Rumelhart’s model processes information
in a numerical way. The network consists of 24 units, each connected to
the others by a link, which has a strength or weight. Concepts that are
recognised by the network are converted into numbers, depending on what
the concept is. Activation is also sent to all other units in the network that
PHO TO : K ATE CO CK CRO FT 370 Developmental Psychology
are related to the concept. Just as with neurons

in the brain, the activation of the units can be
either inhibitory or excitatory, depending on
the relationship between them. For example,
the concept ‘apple’ would excite activation with
concepts such as ‘fruit’ and ‘red’, but would
probably inhibit activation with concepts such
as ‘car’ and ‘shoe’, which are unrelated to it.
McClelland & Rumelhart provided a formula
that is used by the network to calculate
activation levels between the various units.
Eventually the network will settle into a stable
Verbal methods used to state, with the activation of all the units scarcely
study memory in older changing, and it is then said to have recognised the stimulus or concept. (This
children and adults cannot is how the network learns.) The greatest criticism of these models of memory
be used with infants. presented above is that they all focus on the similarities rather than on the
differences in the human memory.
The development of memory

Habituation-
dishabituation paradigm.
Prenatal memory
A method of assessing Research suggests that memory for sound may be present even before birth.
memory in babies. Studies show that three-day-old babies can distinguish their mother’s voice
If the baby stops looking from that of another female. In one study, the baby was able to control which
at a familiar pattern voice it heard, by the rate of sucking on an artificial nipple (which did not
over a number of trials, provide any nourishment). Fast sucking made the mother’s voice play
this means that the
on a tape recorder, while slow sucking made a stranger’s voice play. Once
baby has remembered
it (become habituated
the babies learned that they could control their environment in this way, the
to it) and chooses to babies in the study sucked in such a way as to produce their mothers’ voice
look at something new most of the time. Since the babies had only spent about 12 hours since birth
and more interesting. If with their mothers—they were looked after by nurses in the hospital—it was
the baby is not shown concluded that each preferred his or her own mother’s voice because they
the familiar pattern for had grown used to it while still in the womb (Wertheimer, 1961).
a period of time, he or
she will ultimately start
looking at it again for
Memory in infants
the same length of time Most of the methods that are used to study memory in children and adults
as when he or she first require the subject to verbalise his response, and are thus inappropriate for
saw it. This means that babies and infants. In order to assess memory in infants that are under two
the baby has forgotten it years of age, a method was needed that does not depend on language ability.
(dishabituation). One that is commonly used is called the habituation-dishabituation paradigm
(Kail, 1979). Habituation means a decrease in responding to a repetitive
Habituation.
A decrease in responding
stimulus. Dishabituation means the recovery from habituation, that is, it
to a repetitive stimulus. means that responding returns to prehabituation levels. Visual recognition
is the most popular type of memory assessed using the habituation-
Dishabituation. dishabituation method.
The recovery from A typical habituation-dishabituation experiment would involve pre-
habituation when senting infants with the same pattern over a series of trials and recording the
responding to a
length of time they fixate on (look at) the pattern. Usually the infants show
stimulus returns to
prehabituated levels.
a decrease in the amount of time spent looking at the pattern as it becomes
PHO TO : K ATE CO CK CRO FT

familiar to them. This decrease is believed to reflect
habituation, that is, the infants recognise the pattern from
previous trials and choose to look at it less than before
because it is no longer novel and interesting. By varying the
amount of time between trials and observing the extent of
habituation that may occur, it is possible to estimate how
long infants can maintain their memories for the original
pattern. If a long enough delay occurs between successive
showings of the pattern, they will forget the pattern
altogether. When this happens, the infants will inspect the
pattern on subsequent presentation for approximately the
same amount of time as they did when they first saw that
pattern (Kail, 1979).
Infants may choose to look at one pattern rather
than another for several reasons that are unrelated to
memory, for instance they may find certain patterns more
interesting than others—three- to five-month-old babies
have been found to prefer bull’s-eye patterns to stripes
(Fantz, Fagan & Miranda, 1975). To control for such
preferences, the infants in the study were divided into Most people do not have
two groups. The memory test for both groups involved a bull’s-eye pattern memories for events in
paired with a picture of stripes. For one group, the bull’s-eye pattern was the their lives prior to the age
first one shown, followed by both patterns, while the other group was shown of three years.
the stripes first, followed by both patterns. If both groups looked longer at
the new pattern (stripes for the first group and bull’s-eye for the second),
there was evidence of infant memory, as they remembered the old pattern
and became habituated to it.
Memory in childhood
What is your earliest childhood memory and when did it occur? Until quite
recently, it was believed that most people are unable to recall specific events
that occurred before their third birthday. This was called infantile amnesia. Infantile amnesia.
Freud (1953: 175), who coined the term, said that the first years of life showed Freud’s term for the
‘the remarkable amnesia of childhood ... the forgetting which veils our individual’s inability to
recall specific events that
earliest youth from us and makes us strangers to it.’ He believed that the
occured before their
experiences of the first years of life are not actually forgotten, but are instead third birthday.
merely inaccessible to our conscious awareness due to repression. According
to Freud, many of our desires and fantasies are very erotic in nature at
this age and these sexual feelings conflict with the realities of everyday life.
To resolve this conflict, we repress this whole period of our lives into the
unconscious mind. However, stripped of its psychoanalytic trimmings,
Freud’s view basically maintains that infantile amnesia is due to retrieval
failure. The experiences are still represented in memory but the individual
cannot gain access to them. It is supposed that retrieval failure occurs because
the context at the time of the original learning is very different from the con-
text at the time of attempted retrieval (often decades later).
It has also been suggested that young children organise, encode and
store information in very different ways from adults. For example, adults
and older children use language to a much greater extent than do infants.
Encoding specificity For instance, if asked to recall your second birthday, you would probably
principle. The likelihood have difficulty doing so because the memories were probably not originally
of retrieving information encoded and stored verbally. In order to retrieve any information about
from long-term memory
your second birthday, you will need to reinstate some of the original
will be maximised if the
conditions at retrieval
context, to look, for example, at a photo or video of your party. This
match as closely as illustrates the encoding specificity principle (Tulving, 1972), that is, that
possible the conditions the likelihood of retrieving information from long-term memory will be
present during the maximised if the conditions at retrieval match as closely as possible the
original learning. conditions present during the original learning. Remember this when
studying for exams—make your study conditions as similar as possible to
the exam conditions.
Children as young as two years old have been shown to have memo-
ries of events that occurred months earlier. However these memories often
Implicit memories. do not last for a long time, because they are implicit memories, that is,
Memories that can memories that can produce behavioural change without intentional recall
produce behavioural or conscious awareness of the memory. Examples of this are the knowledge
change without intentional
of how to kick a ball or drive a car. It is thought that the brain structures
recall or conscious
awareness of the memory.
necessary for implicit memory develop before those necessary for explicit
Examples are how to kick a memory, that is, memories for factual knowledge such as names of people
ball or drive a car. and events. Consequently, most people are unable to retrieve explicit
memories that occurred before the age of three. The rapid development
Explicit memory. of language from three to six years enables the child to store information
Memories for factual for longer periods than previously, when information was stored mainly
knowledge such as names
in a visual format.
of people and events.
Recognition. Refers to Assessing memory in older children and adults: recognition

the ability to select from and recall
pictures, objects, words, Recognition refers to the ability to select from pictures, objects, words or
or digits that are currently digits that are currently present, those that have been seen or heard before.
present, those that have Recall refers to the ability to retrieve information about objects or events
been seen or heard before.
that are neither present nor current. It requires the generation of infor-
Recall. Refers to the ability
mation from long-term memory without the object being in view.
to retrieve information Recognition is present at birth and develops considerably in the first six
about objects or events months. The onset of recall is more difficult to specify exactly. A typical way
that are neither present of assessing memory recall in adults and older children is to present a set of
nor current. It requires the stimuli to be remembered, remove the stimuli, and then ask the subject
generation of information to recall the set (Kail, 1979). It is, obviously, impossible to give such tasks
from long-term memory
to infants. Instead, their search for objects is examined. By seven months,
without the object being
in view.
infants will look for objects that are out of sight (Ashmead & Perlmutter, 1980).
Requiring the infant briefly to wait seems to disrupt memory considerably
as he will no longer search for the object after as brief a delay as five seconds.
At eight months even, a very short delay (eight seconds) makes it impossible
for the infant to find a toy that has been placed under one of two identical
cloths. However, by 10 months, infants can wait as long as eight seconds and
still find the hidden object. By 16 to 18 months, recall is possible after delays
of 20 to 30 seconds (Diamond, 1985).
The assumption in all of the studies of infants’ recall is that their search
for the hidden object is based on their ability to recall the experience of seeing
the toy being hidden. The failure to find a hidden object does not imply
that the infant lacks the capacity to recall it. It is possible that they may
not understand what is required of them, or that the experimenter’s actions
are too complex for the infant’s motor-skill level. Nevertheless, the research
indicates that the ability to recall prior experiences seems to emerge in the
first year of life and increases gradually thereafter.
While preschool children are readily able to recognise things, their recall
is much poorer but this improves with age. In a recognition task, in which
many objects were shown only once to children between the ages of two
and five years, even the youngest could correctly recognise 81 per cent of the
objects when placed with other objects, while the older children were able to
recognise 92 per cent of the objects correctly. This shows that young children
are able to encode and retain substantial amounts of information. In recall
studies, when children between two and four were asked to name objects
the experimenter had shown them, the three-year-olds could only name 22
per cent of the objects, while the four-year-olds could name 40 per cent
(Myers & Perlmutter, 1978). This finding may reflect increasing vocabulary,
which may be a confounding factor in this study.
Experiences early in life impact on how a person develops subsequently.
But, experiences can only have impact if they are stored in memory.
Consequently, infants with better memories should be able to learn from
experience better than those with poorer memories. This line of reasoning
led to the hypothesis that measures of early memory ability should be
related to later cognitive development. In support of this hypothesis, Rose &
Wallace (1985) found that recognition ability at six months was positively and
significantly related to intelligence at two, three and six years of age.
The development of memory strategies

Memory strategies or mnemonics are purposeful and deliberate attempts Mnemonics
to enhance memory performance. As such, mnemonics are controll- or memory strategies.
able, deliberately implemented by the individual and potentially available Purposeful and deliberate
attempts to enhance
to consciousness (Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1990). They may be used to
memory performance.
acquire information, such as study skills learned at school, or to retrieve
information from long-term memory. Memory strategies can either
be executed at the time of learning (at input), or at the time of retrieval
(at output). Input strategies include rehearsal (the repetition of selected
information), organisation (grouping similar items together) and elabora-
tion (the association of two or more items by creating a representation that
connects them). Output strategies are simply retrieval strategies, which
involve accessing information and bringing it into consciousness.
Mnemonics based on visual imagery go back a long way, in fact to the
first century BC. Cicero, who wrote at that time, mentions the visual
mnemonics used by the Greek poet Simonides (about 500 BC). The story
goes that a Greek who had won a wrestling match at the Olympic Games
invited guests to a victory banquet at his house. Simonides was among the
invited guests and gave a recitation in honour of the victor. Shortly after
completing his eulogy, Simonides was called away. This was fortunate for
him because shortly afterwards the floor of the banquet hall collapsed,
killing and mutilating the guests. Many of the bodies were unrecognisable.
Simonides, however, found that he could assist with the identification of the
bodies by remembering where they had been at the time when he left.
Consequent to this, Simonides speculated that since his visual memory
appeared to be so good, why not use it to recall other material? He
then devised a system in which he visualised a room in great detail,
and then imagined various items in specific places in the room.
Whenever he needed to remember what the items were, he would
look into his room, and find them at the appropriate location. This
system became very popular with classical orators such as Cicero, and
has continued in use to the present day (Baddeley, 1982). Baddeley
(1982: 196) illustrates how it works:
Cultures differ in the extent
to which they encourage First of all, think of ten locations in your home, choosing them so
the use of particular that the sequence of moving from one to the other is an obvious
memory strategies.
one—for example, front door to entrance hall, to kitchen, to bed-
room, and so on. Check that you can imagine moving through your
ten locations in a consistent order without difficulty. Now think of
10 items and imagine them in those locations. If the first item is
a pipe, you might imagine it poking out of the letterbox of your
front door and great clouds of smoke billowing into the street. If
the second is a cabbage, you might imagine your hall obstructed by
an enormous cabbage, and so on.
Vygotsky’s use of mnemonics
Vygotsky made use of mnemonics to help Then we would ask him to reproduce the
him remember information. His daughter 17th, 43rd, 61st, 7th and so on, word, and he,
wrote this about his ability: without difficulty and without any mis-
takes, would do it. (Vygodskaia, 1995: 58).
Right there, by the stove, Lev Semenovich
would demonstrate to us his ability to The secret to Vygotsky’s amazing memory
remember large numbers of words. We was his use of visual imagery. Not only could
would, working together, compile a list of he easily create a wealth of images, he also
100 words and hand it over to Lev made use of synaesthesia or the ability for a
Semenovich. He would slowly read each stimulus in one sense (for example vision or
word, return the list, and then offer to recite hearing) to evoke an image in another, for
it in any order. To our amazement and joy, example associating high-pitched sounds
he would, without mistake, repeat all the with bright colours and low-pitched sounds
words on the list from beginning to end, with more sombre colours.
and then repeat them in the reverse order.
Different cultures evidently differ in the extent to which they encourage

particular memory strategies. Shaffer (1996) points out that strategies such
as rehearsal, organisation and elaboration are useful for school-age children
living in Western urban societies, but not for unschooled children from more
rural environments, whose important memory tasks may be recalling the
location of objects in a natural setting, such as water, animals, poisonous or
medicinal plants, or remembering instructions told to them in the form of

proverbs or stories. This is in keeping with Vygotsky’s notion that cognitive
development is always located within a particular cultural context, which
defines the problems that children are faced with as well as the strategies
(which he called tools) that they develop for solving the problems.
The development of mnemonic strategies

Age differences have been found in both the number of strategies that
children of different ages use as well as the efficiency with which they
use those strategies. One of the reasons why children under the age of six
tend to be poor at recall tasks is that they do not spontaneously organise
or rehearse information they want to remember in the same way that an
adult would. If you were given a list to remember, with items such as ‘cat’,
‘chair’, ‘aeroplane’, ‘dog’, ‘desk’, ‘car’, you might first classify the items
into groups such as ‘animals’, ‘furniture’, and ‘vehicles’, and then repeat
them to yourself before being asked to recall the list. In doing this, you are
using the memory strategies of organisation and rehearsal to assist your
recall. Preschool children tend to display a ‘passive’ or non-cumulative
rehearsal style, because they only repeat one or two words of an entire list
they are asked to recall. Children over the age of six tend to show a ‘cumu-
lative’ rehearsal style, because they rehearse as many words as possible
when given a list of words to recall (Ornstein, Baker-Ward & Naus, 1978).
However, the rehearsal capacity of 10-year-olds is only about 80 per cent
that of adults. The reason for this may be that most ten-year-olds only
speak 80 per cent as quickly as adults. It appears that the capacity of short-
term memory is linked to the speed of speech. Therefore, the faster you
can speak, the more information you can rehearse (Hulme & Tordoff,
1989). Organisational strategies develop around nine or 10 years.
Rehearsal serves to strengthen the memory trace, while organisation
helps in two ways. First, it structures what is being learned, so that recall-
ing partial information is likely to make the rest accessible, and second, it
associates newly learned information with information you already have
stored in your memory. This means that the richer your existing knowledge
base is, the easier it will be to remember new information (Baddeley,
1982). Thus children’s memories improve as their knowledge base expands.
The more you know about a topic, the easier it is to understand, integrate,
organise and remember new information concerning that topic. In addition,
to remember something well, a person needs to be motivated to learn more
about that topic. Children can show amazing memory abilities if motivated
to learn about a topic. Chi & Koeske (1983) reported on the knowledge
that a four-and-a-half-year-old boy had about 21 different dinosaurs.
Although many young children have an interest in and some knowledge
about dinosaurs, this child’s interest bordered on the unreal. To support his
consuming interest in the topic, his parents apparently read dinosaur books
to him about three hours a week for one-and-a-half years prior to his
testing. He owned nine books on dinosaurs and had many plastic models.
Contrary to what the previous passage indicates, young children do
use memory strategies, but they are not the typical ones that adults would
use. Instead they use what we would consider to be faulty strategies. For
example, an eight-year-old may write a note to remind himself to watch a

favourite television show tonight but then hide the note somewhere safe so
that it won’t get lost.
Metacognition
Metacognition. Metacognition refers to the sophisticated intellectual processes that enable
The sophisticated people to be aware of their own thinking, memory (metamemory), and
intellectual processes language (metalinguistic) abilities. Between the ages of six to 12, children
that enable people to
develop metacognitive abilities, which they use to help them with problem
be aware of and reflect
on their own thinking,
solving and decision making. A simple example of this is a study where
memory (metamemory), preoperational and concrete operational children were all given a group
and language of items to study until they felt they could remember them perfectly. After
(metalinguistic) abilities. studying the items for a while, the concrete operational children said they
were ready, and they usually were. When tested, they could remember
all of the items. The preoperational children did not perform as well,
although they also assured the researchers that they knew all the items.
Thus, their metacognitive abilities or awareness of their own cognitive
processes and ability to monitor these abilities were poorer than those of
the concrete operational children (Kail, 1979).
Memory in later life

Little research exists on memory during later life, although some evidence
does indicate that a decline occurs in the memory capabilities of 40- and
50-year-olds, often at the time when careers make bigger memory
demands (Parkin, 1999). Former US President Bill Clinton, for example,
in his defence over his affair with Monica Lewinsky, claimed that he had
forgotten the details of their various encounters, because his memory was
overloaded. Research into memory in later life has tended to focus on
retirement age (post-65 years). Findings indicate that short-term memory
remains relatively unaffected by advancing age. General knowledge about
the world and vocabulary remain intact, although there is some evidence
that older people access their memories more slowly.
PHOTO: CHA JOH NST ON
The major change in memory with age is a decline in the ability to recall
things explicitly. Therefore, memory for day-to-day events decreases consid-
erably and older people, in laboratory experiments, often perform poorly at
the recall of lists of words or pictures. However, recognition memory does
not show such dramatic declines with age. While explicit memory appears to
decline with age, implicit memory appears to remain intact in older people.
At the simplest level, our memories fail with increasing age because we
lose neurons, resulting in reduced processing capacity. In order to function
effectively, our mental processes must attend to what we are doing and
actively ignore irrelevant information (a process called inhibition). In relation
to memory, a deficit in inhibition could impair memory, leading people to
concentrate less effectively on what they are trying to remember. Ageing
selectively causes neuron depletion in the frontal lobes of the brain, which are
While some memory loss is
inevitable in old age, responsible for controlling inhibition (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Another theory
staying mentally active can of ageing and memory, the processing speed hypothesis, is that our memories
considerably lessen this become poorer because our brains just get slower at operating (Salthouse,
loss. 1997). A problem with this hypothesis is that the tasks used to support it may
only be measuring fluid intelligence (the ability to think flexibly and solve
problems) and not crystallised intelligence (knowledge of language and basic
concepts). Fluid intelligence is known to decline markedly with age, while
crystallised intelligence does not (Parkin & Java, 1999).
A severe deterioration in memory in old age is often a precursor
to senile dementia or organic brain syndrome, ultimately resulting in
intellectual handicap. The forgetfulness may seem at first quite mild—
forgetting where one has put objects, or the times or dates of appointments.
It can, however, become so severe that the afflicted individual is unable Senile dementia.
to lead a normal life. Baddeley (1982: 141) cites the case of an old lady Cognitive decline in old
suffering from senile dementia who agreed to have a nurse stay with age resulting in confusion,
her at night, then forgot all about this arrangement so that when the forgetfulness, and
nurse arrived, she was treated with suspicion, locked out, and the police personality change
telephoned. Senile dementia is progressive and typically occurs shortly (also known as organic
brain syndrome).
before death in very old people. Riegel & Riegel (1982) studied many
elderly people, testing their intellectual and physical abilities over several
years. They suggested that mental ability declined fairly gradually in old
age up to a point approximately a year before death, when deterioration
became rapid, a phenomenon referred to as terminal drop.
For those who are not afflicted with dementia, there is hope. Studies
of animals suggest that an enriched environment results in the loss of
fewer neurons as age progresses. A few studies have compared elderly
individuals living in institutionalised settings with those living more
active lives in the community. On various tests of memory, the active
community-dwelling elderly showed fewer decrements. The answer
then seems to be: keep mentally active.

Specific tasks
➊ Think of various strategies that an elderly person could use to prevent memory decline.
➋ What function does memory play in cultures with a strong oral tradition?
➌ Think back to a memory of a shared event that happened at least five years ago and
write it down. Then speak to a person who shared that event and ask them to write
down their memory of it. What does your comparison of the two recollections tell
you about the reconstructive nature of memory?
Baddeley, A (1982). Your memory: A user’s guide. London: Multimedia Publications.
(An accessible, introductory text to the structure and functioning of short- and long-term memory.)
Loftus, E (1994). The myth of repressed memory. New York: St Martin’s Press.
(A fascinating, and somewhat chilling, account of how people delude themselves into believing in
memories for events that did not exist.)
CHAPTER
18
Language development
Kate Cockcroft
This chapter introduces the main theories of language

acquisition and the process of language development. The
following aspects of language development are discussed:
1. The main theories of language acquisition

2. The process of spoken language development
3. The process of learning to read
4. Disorders of language development
5. The relationship between language and thought
The chapter also includes a brief section on the advantages

and disadvantages of bilingualism and multilingualism.
What is language?
Language involves the use of a shared set of symbols (letters, words,
gestures, icons) for communicating information. Vygotsky (1962)
described language as one of the primary mental tools that connects the
human mind to the world. Learning to use this tool requires the child to
master an extremely complex linguistic system. This task is particularly
difficult because language is arbitrary, often with no overt connection
between the symbol (the word) and the object or idea to which it refers.
So, the meanings of words, particularly abstract ones, are often difficult
for the child to discover. Having overcome this obstacle and discovered
what certain words mean, the child then has to determine the complex
ways in which particular words may be combined to form sentences.
The child does not only have to learn how to produce sentences of his
own, but also how to discover the meaning of sentences which other
people use. Despite the difficulty of these tasks, most children learn to
talk, and by five years of age, most children are able to use language with
a great deal of skill.
The main theories of language acquisition

There are several theories that attempt to explain how a child learns to
speak. Five of the major approaches to language acquisition are discussed
below. Few theorists today would support any of the extreme versions
Language development 379
of these approaches. Rather, it seems that language is learned through a

combination of the processes put forward by these approaches.
Learning theory
B F Skinner (1957) extended his model of operant conditioning in
order to explain language acquisition. Operant is the term he uses to Operant conditioning.
define behavioural responses of the subject (or child) that influence his A term used by B. F.
environment. In other words, such responses are associated more with Skinner for responses
that are reinforced by
their consequences (their effect), than with their cause or origin; they may
their consequences.
be seen as emitted rather than elicited responses. (Operant conditioning
is the process by which selected operant responses are reinforced by Operant response.
the caregivers.) Skinner claimed that children learn language through This is a kind of
imitating their caregivers, who, through reinforcement, also shape the behavioural response—
child’s initially incorrect attempts at speech so that these eventually become identified and defined by
‘adult-like’. According to Skinner, utterances that are not reinforced Skinner—which leads to
a certain consequence. In
gradually decline in frequency until they stop occurring altogether. The
other words, the emphasis,
remaining utterances are then shaped with reinforcers until they are in such behaviour, is on its
correct. For example, as children grow older, parents may use shaping and effect rather than on
insist on closer and closer approximations of the word ‘chocolate’ before its cause.
supplying the requested treat.
Skinner did not believe that animals could be taught to speak
through schedules of reinforcement, because animals use vocal expres-
sion in set ways to express emotional states such as fear or rage and
they also lack the necessary articulatory organs for producing many
of the sounds in human language (Skinner, 1957). It seems that,
according to Learning Theory, most early vocabulary is learned
through imitation, with the infant trying to copy the adult, saying
for example ‘airpha’ for aeroplane. However, this approach fails
to explain how the child comes up with novel and grammatically
incorrect sayings that he could not have imitated from anyone else,
for example ‘that man growed outwards’. Also, when the child is
very young, parents tend to reinforce all utterances, even
the grammatically incorrect ones, tending to correct
the content, rather than the grammar of what is
being said. For example, the child may say ‘That
dog eated the food’, and the parent may respond,
‘No, it’s not a dog, it’s a horse’ rather than saying,
‘We don’t say eated, we say ate’ (Craig, 1996).
Nativism
Noam Chomsky (1959) held that language is creative. B.F. Skinner
This means that a person who knows a language does not just know how
to speak or understand a limited number of spoken, written or signed
messages. Rather, a language user knows how to produce and understand
an infinite number of messages, including messages that they have never
encountered previously and could therefore not have copied from their
caregivers. The creativity in language is possible because the individual
units of a language, namely words (which are finite in number), can be
combined in an infinite number of ways.
Chomsky argued that Skinner’s view of language acquisition did not

explain how children are able to understand new utterances and why they
make so many errors as in saying ‘I goed to school’. Children can’t
imitate things they don’t hear. Therefore, Chomsky held that children
are born with certain innate linguistic skills, which he termed the
Language Acquisition Device (LAD). The LAD allows the language
user to discover the rules governing his language, starting with
simple rules and progressing to more complex ones. Chomsky held
that language is largely preprogrammed in our biological make-up,
and is acquired as a result of maturation rather than learning. He also
stressed that the rules of language could not be learned through
reinforcement, as Skinner maintained, since adult language
is often riddled with hesitations and grammatical errors,
and thus serves as a poor model for children. According
to Chomsky, language is innate because most children
seem to acquire the complex skill of language quickly and
effortlessly, and development in most children unfolds at
approximately the same pace, even though there are vast
Noam Chomsky
environmental differences (Chomsky, 1959).
Although Chomsky’s theory does not deal with the actual processes
people use to produce or understand sentences, it was the first theory to draw
psycholinguists’ attention to the syntactic rules of language. Chomsky
outlined the process whereby children learn the rules of language, not just
specific verbal responses, as Skinner’s theory proposed.
Bilingualism and multilingualism

South Africa’s population of approximately sets of vocabulary, special usage, and
40 million people speak more than 28 different pronunciation. Most bilingual and
different languages, of which 11 are multilingual three-year-old children show
officially recognised, namely Afrikaans, little confusion between the languages they
English, isiNdebele, Sepedi, Sesotho, are learning, although they do sometimes
siSwati, Xitsonga, Setswana, Tshivenda, substitute vocabulary from one language
isiXhosa, and isiZulu. IsiZulu and isiXhosa when speaking in another. This has led
are the most common home languages, linguists to theorise that the young child
spoken by 22 per cent and 17 per cent of initially uses a unitary language system,
the population respectively. Afrikaans is and only much later is able to distinguish
spoken by 15 per cent of the population two separate languages. A recent study
and English is the home language of only suggests that when children learn two
9 per cent of the population (Raidt, 1995). languages simultaneously from infancy,
More than half of the country’s population the languages share the same brain region
are bilingual or multilingual (Raidt, 1995). (Broca’s area) that is responsible for the
Much controversy surrounds the issue of execution of speech as well as for some
whether bilingualism is an advantage or grammatical aspects of language (Hirsch
disadvantage. & Kim, 1997). However, when a second
Learning two languages is a complex language is learnt later in childhood or in
task involving two systems of rules, two adulthood, this brain region is divided,
>>
<<
with a distinct area for the second multilinguals may have been depressed for
language. These findings may account for reasons other than their multilingualism,
the apparent ease with which a second such as poverty, poor education, or lack of
language is learnt in early childhood. familiarity with the culture of test taking.
Does learning two languages instead of More recent research indicates that
one during the preschool years hinder the learning more than one language in
child’s language acquisition or cognitive early childhood has cultural, linguistic
development? Early studies in the United and cognitive advantages (Diaz, 1985).
States of America and Great Britain found Young children may be at a disadvantage
that learning two or more languages at while acquiring two (or more) languages,
a young age could have a detrimental but once they have integrated the two
effect on cognitive development, languages, they often surpass their
because multilingual children scored monolingual peers linguistically and
lower on standardised English tests than cognitively (Goncz, 1988). Studies have
monolingual English-speaking children. found that bilingual children are more
However, none of these studies took into creative both linguistically and cognitively,
account differences in socio-economic or are more adept at divergent thinking, and
educational level of the children or their better at concept formation than their
parents. It is possible that the scores of monolingual peers.
Language acquisition as part of cognitive development

Piaget (1926) maintained that language couldn’t be separated from
general cognitive development, which he viewed as preparing
the way for linguistic development. According to him, during
the first 18 months of life the baby learns to interact with the
world through sensory and motor activities. Piaget held that it
is only once the sensorimotor stage nears its end, and the child
acquires the ability to represent objects and events symbolically,
that language appears. He argued that language acquisition is
the result not of conditioning (Skinner) nor of maturation
(Chomsky), but of the completion of the cognitive
processes involved in sensorimotor development, such
as object permanence and the capacity for symbolic
representation. For example, once the child has fully
acquired object permanence, he reflects those cognitive
processes in speech with words such as ‘bye-bye’ and ‘all gone’. Jean Piaget
Piaget believed that the ability to conceptualise an idea develops
before the ability to express it in words. So, the child would first understand
the concept of ‘bigger than’ and ‘smaller than’ before using those words. The
relationship between language and thought is discussed in more detail at
the end of this chapter.
Social interactionism
This approach is less clearly defined than the others we have mentioned so
far. Lev Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner are both social interactionist theorists
and stress the importance of the interpersonal context in which language
appears. According to this approach, the baby learns about language via his
exchanges with the mother or caregiver in a highly familiar context. While

the caregiver may introduce new utterances to the child, the situations in
which they are spoken are familiar. These familiar contexts provide an
opportunity for the child to learn about concepts that he will later be able
to express in language. For example, a child and caregiver may play games
together and the caregiver will comment on their actions as they play. In this
way the child learns about objects and the relations between objects and,
through the caregiver’s verbal comments, the child also learns a verbal way
of expressing these concepts. Research confirms that the responsiveness
of the environment is crucial for both intellectual and language
development (Hoff-Ginsberg & Shatz, 1982). Language is a social
act that requires practice. The more that caregivers talk with
babies, the sooner babies can pick up the rules of speech.
Connectionism
Connectionism has as its starting point the human neural system, which has
the ability to form and retain networks of interconnected neurons. Babies
are born with such a system, which continues to develop throughout life.
Lev Vygotsky
According to the connectionist view, neural systems are constructed on the
basis of what happens to the developing person’s senses. As more sensory
information becomes available, the neural system will be extended and
modified to incorporate the new sensory material. An aspect of language
that has been widely researched using connectionist models is the learning
of the English tense system. The usual explanation is that children have
to learn a rule that, in order to refer to the past, verbs must be given an
‘-ed’ suffix. They must also learn that there are many irregular exceptions
in English, for instance, ‘go’ becomes ‘went’, and ‘see’ becomes ‘saw’.
Children have to learn and store the rule and its exceptions. Children in
the early stages of learning English tend to overuse the rule and add ‘-ed’
to both regular and irregular verbs. For example they may say ‘goed’ and
‘seed’ instead of ‘went’ and ‘saw’.
flies animate hairy flat round metallic big
bat cat mat can car
b/1 c/1 m/1 t/1 a/2 e/2 i/2 n/2 t/3 n/3 r/3 s/3
Figure 18.1 An example of a three-layered connectionist network. The bottom layer contains the units that
represent particular graphemes (written units) in particular positions within a word. The middle layer
contains units that recognise complete words, and the top layer contains units that represent semantic
features concerning the meaning of the word.
Source: Cognitive Psychology: A student’s handbook by Michael W Eysenck & Mark T Keane, Lawrence
Earlbaum, 1990: 230.
Rumelhart & McClelland (1986) constructed a connectionist model

that was given information about verbs as its input and was required
to produce past-tense verbs as its output. The model produced the
same pattern of verb usage as found in the language of young children.
Importantly, the model produced this ‘human-like’ behaviour without
learning a rule. Connectionist models are based on learning connections
of various strengths between (in this case) the tenses of different words.
This may indicate that although the language of young children appears
to be rule-governed, there may be no need for the complexity of rule
knowledge at all. Connectionist models of language and language
development are currently an important area of research activity
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).
Semantics.
The process of spoken language development The meaning of words.
Language development has several aspects to it: learning to produce
words (spoken and written), learning semantics (the meaning of words)
Receptive language.
and learning the grammatical rules of a language (how words can be Our understanding of
combined into sentences to express ideas). A distinction is made between the language we hear
receptive language, which is your understanding of the language you hear or read. Receptive
or read, and expressive or productive language, which is the language language generally
you produce in writing or speech. Receptive language generally develops develops slightly before
slightly before productive language ability. So, if the parent says to the expressive language ability.
one-year-old, ‘go to your room and fetch your shoes’, the child may be
Expressive language.
able to understand this instruction and carry it out, but cannot produce The language we produce
such a sentence himself. in writing or speech.
It was previously believed that language development only started Also called productive
when the child was around two years old. In fact, the word ‘infancy’, language.
which refers to children under the age of two, derives from the Latin
infans, meaning ‘without language’. However, it is now apparent that Productive language.
language development begins from birth, or possibly even earlier. See expressive language.
The language of animals:

Do chimpanzees have a history?
Can chimpanzees have a meaningful, cross- moon’ without the use of an oral or written
generational cultural history? For Vygotsky language. (Granted, this is a very specific
the answer must be no. Why so? Because kind of history but it is precisely a history
chimpanzees have a very limited linguistic of this sort about which we are talking.)
ability. For Vygotsky, the idea that ‘the limits Try to communicate this ‘fact’ to someone
of my language are the limits of my world’ without using language, and you’ll get
holds true in a very important way. In fact, a sense of how impossible it must be to
the assertion that chimpanzees don’t have record or ‘archive’ information of this sort
a meaningful cultural history is reasonably without language. One should also bear
easy to prove. Think for a moment of how in mind here that, although chimpanzees
one would record, or commit to memory, have certain communicative abilities—they
a statement of the sort: ‘On 20 July 1969 can most certainly express basic emotions
the first chimpanzee set foot on the to one another—they cannot convey
>>
<< before, or in the sense of properly

complex propositions to one another, such grasping the rules of grammar and syntax.
as the statement given above. (Interestingly enough, human infants
How do we know this? Well, chim- tend to do both with ease.)
panzees do not have a grasp of the basic The point of all this, for Vygotsky,
rules of language, the structuring elements is that our psychological (or cognitive)
of syntax and grammar, which make tools, such as speech and the ability to use
language use meaningful. After exhaustive written language, or numbering systems,
experimentation, linguists found that greatly extend our abilities. We have far
even though chimpanzees could repeat greater mnemonic skills (strategies to
fairly elaborate hand-gestures (apparently help us to remember), both in terms of
non-verbal language), ultimately this was our individual and our shared cultural
merely the case of learned responses— lives. So it is not surprising that we cannot
associated or conditioned responses would remember much from our first few years
get them certain rewards. Despite the of life. See Chapter 17 on memory for
linguists’ rigorous efforts, chimps were more about infantile amnesia.
never able to use the language in the
sophisticated sense of formulating Derek Hook
statements that they had never heard
Before words
At birth, the most obvious vocalisations that the baby makes are crying, and
by two months, also cooing. The baby’s cooing contains the basic sounds of
all languages, not just those of the baby’s native language.
By four to five months, the infant strings several sounds

together to produce babbling. These sounds are the
building blocks for later language development. Children
born to deaf parents also babble, so that adult verbal
interaction is not necessary for this aspect of language to
develop (Lenneberg, 1967).
A few months later, the baby may string together
the same sound, as in ‘dadada’. The baby’s babbling will
also take on the inflections and speech patterns similar
to his parents’ language, and by six months, the infant is
only producing the sounds contained in the language(s)
From approximately he is exposed to. If there are no verbal interactions by
six months, the baby’s this age, for example if the child is deaf, he gradually loses the ability to
babbling has the communicate verbally.
intonation and pitch Between six months and a year, the infant’s babbling includes pauses
of adult-like speech.
and changes in pitch that often make it sound like real speech. Psycho-
linguists call this expressive jargon since its intonation resembles adult
Expressive jargon. A speech but its content is said to be meaningless.
baby’s babbling, which
includes pauses and Infant-directed speech
changes in pitch that often Social learning theorists, such as Vygotsky and Bruner, were interested in how
make it sound like real the child’s caregiver helps the child’s language development in several ways.
speech, while its content is
For example, most adults generally tend to talk to infants in a different way
meaningless.
than when they talk to other adults or to older children. This speech was
initially termed motherese, then
PHO TO : MI CHELE V RDO LJAK

parentese, as fathers also talk to
their infants in this way, and it is
now called infant-directed speech,
as most adults employ it when they
talk to infants. There are several
characteristics of infant-directed
speech: the pitch is higher, it is
slower, it contains much repetition
and it is grammatically simple.
The pitch helps to gain the infant’s
attention and enables the infant to
know that the adult is addressing
him. The slow speech and
repetitions help the infant to hear
Infant-directed speech
and learn the words. As the child’s capacity for language advances, the serves a special purpose in
parent gradually increases the complexity of verbal exchanges (Furrow, helping infants to learn
Nelson & Benedict, 1979). This is an example of scaffolding, which helps a language.
the child to move in his zone of proximal development with regard
to language learning. (See Chapter 22 on Vygotsky for a more detailed
discussion of scaffolding.) Infant-directed speech.
Social learning theorists pointed out that it is not only the caregiver’s The form of speech most
verbal utterances that contribute to the infant’s language development, adults use when talking
to young children. This is
but also the types of social exchanges engaged in with the infant. Much
characterised by a high
interest has centred on the game of ‘peek-a-boo’, and other give-and-take pitch, slow pace and
games played between infants and their caregivers. These games have frequent repetition of
some of the structural qualities of conversations, such as turn taking. words. It is also sometimes
As a note of caution, however, Vygotsky (1978) warned against over- referred to as motherese
intellectualising children’s play. He made the point that children and or parentese.
parents often play for the sake of playing and not in order to advance
intellectual or social development.
Telegraphic speech
Eventually that first wonderful word is spoken, when the child is
approximately a year old. The first words are usually concrete nouns
spoken in the presence of the objects they represent. During the next six
to eight months, children build up a vocabulary of one-word sentences Holophrases. The young
child’s first ‘sentences’,
called holophrases such as ‘up!’ and ‘more!’ They may also compound
which consist of single
(join) words such as ‘awgone’ (all gone). By the age of two years, the child words such as ‘up!’ and
is generally able to create two-word combinations such as ‘Mommy gone’, ‘more!’
which are primitive sentences and which soon expand in length. The
rules of syntax start to appear, for example English-speaking children Telegraphic speech.
always say ‘see car’ and not ‘car see’. Brown (1965) found that children at The young child’s stage
this age seize on the most important parts of speech, those that contain of language development
where simple sentences are
the most meaning, called contentives (nouns, verbs, adjectives) and tend
formed. These sentences
to omit inflections, auxiliary verbs, prepositions and articles, which he include only the most
called functors. The result is what Brown (1965) called telegraphic speech, important words, for
which omits less significant words and includes words that carry the most example ‘Mommy
meaning, for example ‘Mommy give bopple’. give bopple’.
Pivot grammar. The name Pivot grammar and case grammar

given to the use of single Braine (1963) identified what he called pivot grammar during this two-
nouns with adjectives, word stage. At the two-word stage, the child’s language consists of
adverbs, prepositions,
pivot words in combination with nouns, or nouns on their own. Since
or possessives on either
side of the noun, typically the meaning of a pivot is ‘a short staff or pin supporting something that
during the two-word stage turns’ (Hanks, 1989: 637), pivot words are usually verbs, prepositions or
of language development. possessives, which may appear on either side of a noun. So the sentence
For example, ‘big dog’, ‘see cat’ consists of the pivot ‘see’ and the noun ‘cat’. Pivot words are not
‘dog bite’. generally used on their own— they act as support or description to other
words. Because the two-word sentence can have many meanings (‘mum-
Case grammar.
my up’ may mean ‘mummy pick me up’, or ‘mummy look up there’), it
During the two-word stage
of language development, must be interpreted in context. The child may change the word order to
word order is often used indicate different things, for example ‘doggie play’ may mean ‘the dog is
to express different playing’, and ‘play doggie’ may mean, ‘I want to play with the dog’. This
relationships in speech; is called case grammar, where word order is used to express different
this is referred to as case relationships in speech.
grammar. Hence the child
may change the word
Referential and expressive speech styles
order to indicate different
things: ‘doggie play’ may Katherine Nelson (1973) found that the individual words and the category
mean ‘the dog is playing’ of early words that a child uses depend on the child’s personal speech
and ‘play doggie’ may style. She found that speech style in young children could be divided into
mean ‘I want to play with two types, namely referential and expressive. Children with a referential
the dog’. style tended to be object-oriented and predominantly to use nouns like
‘bird’ and ‘plane’ in their speech, while children with an expressive style
Referential speech style.
tended to be more oriented towards people, including themselves, and to
One of two speech styles
found in young children. It use mainly verbs and pronouns like ‘go there’ and ‘give here’ to express
is characterised by object- their feelings and needs. Expressive children also tend to create and use
oriented speech with dummy words or words with no apparent meaning (except to the child,
frequent use of nouns. of course, and possibly to a few significant adults) to stand in for words
they do not know, for example ‘there’s a flight-bit’ (aeroplane). Nelson
Expressive speech style. also found that children with a referential style tended to show faster
One of two speech styles
vocabulary development than children with an expressive speech style.
found in young children. It
is characterised by people- However, the children with an expressive style showed a faster rate of
oriented speech and syntactic development. These differences have been confirmed by several
consists mainly of verbs later studies, for example Barrett (1979).
and pronouns. Expressive
children often create their The overextension error
own words to stand in for Because the young child’s vocabulary cannot yet encompass all he wishes
words they do not know,
to describe, the child quite skilfully overextends the meaning of words
as in ‘there’s a small ‘puter’
(calculator). that he already knows, to cover things and ideas for which a new word
is lacking. For example, the child may use the term ‘dada’ to refer to
men other than his own father (this could be quite distressing to a proud
Overextension error. new father), and a general term for any kind of four-legged animal
When a young child could be ‘doggy’. The term for this adaptation is overextension error. An
incorrectly uses a word
overextension occurs when a child incorrectly uses a word to describe a
to describe a wider set of
objects or actions than it is
wider set of objects or actions than it is meant to describe. Often the child
meant to, as in using the emphasises aspects of objects that adults may ignore when, categorising
word ‘moon’ to refer to them, for example, a child may use the word ‘fly’ as an overextension to
anything that is round. refer to anything small.
The child’s words and their meanings are generally

linked to the concepts that she or he is learning about.
A child who uses the word, ‘moon’ for everything that
is round, has developed a concept of what roundness is.
Some researchers, including Piaget (1962), believe that
the concept is formed first and then the child learns
the corresponding word for it. Others believe it works
the other way around, that is, the child first learns the
name of an object and through naming the object, he
learns about the category it belongs to and forms a
concept of it. Probably the processes work both ways.
The relationship between language and thought will
be discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter.
After three years, children begin to fill in their
sentences, for example ‘Roy school’ becomes ‘Roy
goes to school’. They start using the past tense as well
as the present, they ask more questions and learn to
employ ‘why?’ effectively (and persistently). By four
years they have mastered most of the grammatical
rules of their language. South African children
typically begin learning to
The process of learning to read read in the year that they
In Western cultures, reading is highly valued. Young children in South Africa turn seven.
typically begin to learn to read in Grade One, in the year that they turn seven. Alphabetic writing
Alphabetic writing systems, such as English, Afrikaans, isiZulu, isiXhosa, systems. Are based on the
and Sesotho, are based on the association between letters or graphemes (the association between letters
smallest units of written language) and sounds or phonemes (the smallest units and sounds in languages
of spoken language). The first step in learning to read entails understanding such as English, Afrikaans,
this alphabetic principle. The alphabetic principle is based on grapheme- isiZulu, isiXhosa and
Sesotho (in fact all of South
phoneme correspondence rules that relate letters or groups of letters to
Africa’s official languages).
phonemes. For example, the word ‘ship’ has four graphemes, which relate
to the three phonemes ‘sh’, ‘i’ and ‘p’. In English, the grapheme-phoneme Phonemes. The smallest
mappings are not always straightforward or regular, since there are only units of spoken language.
26 letters and more than 40 phonemes. Certain words such as ‘choir’, for For example /sh/ /oo/ /t/
instance, cannot be pronounced correctly by using the alphabetic principle and are the three phonemes in
thus have to be learnt by using a visual strategy where the arrangement of the the word ‘shoot’.
letters and their corresponding pronunciation are stored in visual memory.
Phonics reading strategy.
The stages through which the child progresses when learning to A method of teaching
read may vary according to the language of instruction and whether children how to read by
the child is taught to read by means of a phonics or a visual strategy or a focusing on the sounds
combination of the two. Phonics is based on using spelling-to-sound rules in words.
to read a word, while visual (sometimes called whole word) strategies
entail learning direct correspondences between a letter string and its Visual or Whole word
reading strategy.
spoken representation. Several theories have been proposed to account for
A method of teaching
the development of the reading process. One of the most representative young children how to
approaches to the development of reading is Harris & Coltheart’s (1986) read by focusing on the
four phases in learning to read, which is based on ideas from Marsh, learning of entire word
Friedman, Welch & Desberg (1981), Seymour & McGregor (1984), Frith representations, rather
(1985) and Seymour & Elder (1985). than the separate sounds.
Four phases in leaming to read
The sight-vocabulary stage

Sight-vocabulary stage. The first stage of learning to read, which occurs roughly between four to
The first stage of learning six years, is called the sight-vocabulary stage. During this stage, the child
to read, which occurs is able to read aloud a small set of words. The child is able to read these
roughly between four to
words because he has memorised their appearance either through direct
six years of age. During
this stage, the child is able
teaching or through his own observations of pairings of particular words
to read aloud a small set and particular pronunciations, for example on television or on shop signs.
of words whose visual Even children as young as two years old have been found to possess sight
appearance has been vocabularies of a few hundred words. Harris & Coltheart (1986) conducted
memorised, either through some informal studies with a four-year-old girl called Alice, who was in
teaching or through the the sight-vocabulary stage of reading. Alice could read approximately 30
child’s own observations
real words, but was unable to read unfamiliar words or nonsense (made-
of pairings of particular
words and particular
up) words. One example of a word that Alice had learned to read without
pronunciations, as seen being taught was the British shop name ‘Harrods’ which she read from
for instance on television shopping bags.
or on shop signs. A common proposal has been that children in the sight-vocabulary
stage of reading recognise words in terms of their overall shape. This
makes sense, because the words are clearly not read
PHOTO: ANDEE DEVERELL
by using letter-sound rules, as children at this stage

can’t read words they have not seen before. So, per-
haps the fact that the words are made up of letters
is ignored and the words are treated as indivisible
visual wholes or as single visual patterns. In order
to test this, Alice was asked to read this item:
hArRoDs
This is a word-shape or visual pattern that

Alice had never seen before. If she were reading by
recognising words as visual wholes, she would not
have been able to read this word, as it was entirely
unfamiliar as a visual whole. She read the word
correctly. This experiment was replicated with
other words in Alice’s sight-vocabulary, with the
same results. Alice’s performance indicates that
the direct, visual procedure for reading which is
used during the sight-vocabulary stage, does not
necessarily depend on recognising words as wholes
(by their overall shape, for example), because
changing the word’s overall shape did not prevent
her from being able to read the word. Rather, the
Learning to read starts
direct procedure during the sight-vocabulary stage appears to operate
long before learning the
alphabet—exposure to by recognising words as particular sequences of letters, even though the
books and paired reading procedure does not involve translating these letters into sounds. In this
are important from an stage, words seem to be analysed into their constituent letters in order that
early age. the words be recognised, and thus it is inappropriate to refer to the stage
as involving only whole-word recognition.
The discrimination-net stage Discrimination-net

The second stage in learning to read is called the discrimination-net stage. The second stage
stage. The reason for this name is that the child now reads single words in learning to read. The
child reads single words
by discriminating or selecting from amongst the set of words that he can
by discriminating or
already read, that word which most closely matches the letter string that selecting from amongst
has been presented to read. Of course, the item that is presented to be read the set of words that he or
may be a non-word or a word outside the child’s existing vocabulary, but she can already read, the
the child does not consider these possibilities. For example, if the child word which most closely
knows that the word ‘big’ is short and begins with a /b/, he may read other matches the letter string
short words beginning with a /b/, such as ‘boy’ or ‘bag’ as ‘big’. This is that has been presented to
read. For example, if the
not really reading in the strict sense—the child is actually collecting just
child knows the word ‘dog’
enough information from the printed stimulus in order to discriminate begins with a /d/, words
between all the words in his existing reading vocabulary so as to decide (or such as ‘doll’ or ‘dad’ may
guess) which word in this vocabulary should be produced as a response. also be read as ‘dog’.
When the child has just entered the discrimination-net stage and still
has a very small reading vocabulary, the amount of information from the
printed stimulus that is used to select an item from the reading vocabu- Phonological recoding.
The third stage in learning
lary can be very small. For example, the child may simply use word
to read, where the child
length and may read ‘television’ as ‘children’, explaining that he knew the begins to learn how to
word was ‘children’ because ‘children’ is a long word. Or the child may map individual sounds
focus on certain letters and may read any letter-string containing /ll/ as onto letters and can sound
‘yellow’, because ‘yellow has two stalks’ (Harris & Coltheart, 1986). If the out unfamiliar words.
child is reading words in a text, he will also use the

surrounding context to decide what the unfamiliar
word is. Thus the main feature of the second stage
in learning to read is selection, which often occurs
on the basis of minimal cues.
As the child’s reading vocabulary expands, it
becomes more difficult to read using discrimination-
net techniques. This is because it becomes more
difficult for the reader to distinguish between words
in his reading vocabulary on the basis of certain
fragmentary features of the word. The number of
items in his reading vocabulary is getting to be rather
large. It is this difficulty that prompts the child to
move to the next stage of reading development,
namely phonological recoding.
The phonological recoding stage

Before entering this stage, the child is unable to
read aloud written non-words, such as ‘brillig’
or ‘loddernappish’, because he is not able to map
individual sounds onto individual letters. Rather, a
non-word will be read as the closest existing word
in his reading vocabulary, for example ‘pib’ may be There is some debate about
read as ‘pig’. Eventually, however, the child begins to learn how to map whether all children learn
individual sounds onto letters, that is, the child learns how to recode (or to read by progressing
translate) letters into sounds (or phonology)—hence the term phonological rigidly through the same
recoding. This is based on learning the alphabetic principle discussed sequence of stages.
earlier. The child’s responses are no longer only selected from his reading
vocabulary but may also be words that have not been learned directly or
may even be non-words, as the child is now able to sound out words. This
leads to a rapid expansion in the number of words the child is able to read
aloud correctly. This behaviour indicates a move from the discrimination-
net stage to the phonological recoding stage. In the phonological recoding
stage, the child makes use of translating letters into sounds and also learns
the visual representations of words where the spelling prevents them from
being translated directly into the correct sounds, for example with the
words ‘rough’ and ‘yacht’. Evidence shows that the tendency to translate
letters into sounds dominates at this stage (Doctor & Coltheart, 1980).
The orthographic stage

Orthographic stage. Phonological recoding may have certain advantages as it allows the reader
The final stage in reading to read completely unfamiliar new words, but it also has disadvantages.
development, where
The first of these is that English has many homophonic words, or words
skilled readers use a
direct strategy of reading
that are spelled differently yet pronounced the same, such as ‘wear’ and
words as visual wholes ‘where’. A reader who relies on sounding out words in order to read
(orthographically), rather would be unable to discriminate between homophone pairs. A second
than by using only disadvantage is that exceptions or irregular words such as ‘choir’ or ‘yacht’
phonological recoding. will not be read correctly using this approach. For these reasons, we know
that phonological recoding is used when acquiring reading skills, but is not
used by skilled readers who are able to distinguish between homophones
and to read irregular words correctly.
Progress from being an effective beginner reader to being a skilled
reader involves a progressive increase in reliance upon orthographic
or visual recoding (Doctor & Coltheart, 1980). Hence the final stage in
reading development is called the orthographic stage, where skilled
readers use a direct strategy of reading words as visual wholes, rather than
by using phonological recoding. Phonological recoding may still be used
during this stage when the reader is presented with a totally unfamiliar
word. A process of analogy may also be used to read unfamiliar words,
for instance, the non-word ‘oftight’ may be read by drawing analogies
between it and the known words ‘often’ and ‘light’.
Learning to read in South Africa
In South Africa, English has steadily year longitudinal study by Cockcroft

become the most important language for (2003) focused on whether the same
children’s literacy skills, although for the cognitive developmental factors predict
majority of South Africans, English is a English reading ability for English first-
second or third language for oral (EL1) and second-language (EL2) children.
communication. The development of In the first year of the study, there were
theories about the way children learn to 40 Grade R children, 51 Grade One
read English is dominated by studies of children and 46 Grade Two children.
English first-language populations. A five- The EL2 children all had as their mother
>>
<<
tongue either a Sotho or Nguni language, methodological problems, yet the data
which are highly transparent in indicate that a stage model based on the
comparison to English, which has a very reading development of monolingual,
opaque orthography (writing system). In English children cannot effectively account
transparent orthographies, such as Italian, for reading development in EL2 children.
Afrikaans, isiZulu, Sesotho (in fact, all of Rather, theories of reading development
the indigenous South African languages), should take the form of flexible
the spelling-sound relationship is relatively frameworks that can accommodate
consistent, so that words are generally different developmental pathways related
spelled as they sound. In an opaque to different methods of instruction.
orthography, such as English, the spelling- Beyond that, models of reading
sound correspondence is more indirect, development also need to accommodate
that is, there are many words with the influence of different oral language
grapheme-phoneme correspondences that backgrounds, as well as consider the
are irregular or not 1:1, such as ‘yacht’ relationship between the child’s two (or
and ‘steak’. Depth of orthography is not more) orthographies.
absolute, but should be understood as a The results of the study also showed
continuum, with some orthographies that knowledge of letter sounds and
at the more transparent end and others at names is one of the strongest initial
the more opaque end. With this in mind, predictors of developing word and non-
the EL1 and EL2 children in the study would word reading ability in both the EL1 and
have had different skills and expectations EL2 samples. Further, letter knowledge
regarding spoken language, which were and short-term phonological memory
likely to impact on the process of learning appear to be mediating factors in the
to read in English. The children were relationship between phonological
assessed annually on reading tests as well awareness and reading development.
as on a number of measures that are Phoneme deletion or the ability to
related to reading development, namely segment words into their constituent parts
phonological awareness or one’s sensitivity emerged as a consistent concurrent and
to the internal sound structure of words, long-term predictor of later word
letter knowledge and short-term and non-word reading and of reading
phonological memory. comprehension for both language groups.
Certain tentative conclusions were The results of this study also showed that
drawn from the study, the main one being phonological awareness is a set of skills
that the EL1 and EL2 children appeared to that develops gradually and reciprocally
progress through the same developmental with learning to read. While differences in
stages of reading and phonological performance on the phonological
awareness, but at different rates. These awareness measures emerged at preschool
differences could be attributed, at least in level between the EL1 and EL2 children,
part, to the influence of the children’s these differences, which were in favour of
different home languages. Despite these the EL1 children, disappeared with
differences, neither language group exposure to the same reading instruction.
demonstrated an advantage over the The finding that the EL1 and EL2 children
other in single word or non-word reading progress through the developmental
or reading comprehension. The linguistic phases of phonological awareness but at
diversity of South Africa’s school different rates and that these phases exert
population raises a number of a changing role in early reading
>>
<<
development suggests that task bilinguals, though it must be remem-
appropriateness at each developmental bered that the generalisability of these
level is an important issue. The results findings is restricted to children who
of this study indicate that some of the are learning to read in English, and
mechanisms at work in learning to read may differ for languages with different
are common to monolinguals and alphabetic characteristics.
There is some debate about whether learning to read occurs rigidly

in the fixed sequence proposed by Harris and Coltheart’s four phases.
Seymour & Elder (1985) found that young children may employ sight-
word and phonological recoding simultaneously when learning to read.
Disorders of language development

Not all children acquire language in the normal way. Children who
acquire language more slowly or less completely than the majority are
said to show a developmental language disorder (language disorders
which result from injury to the brain are termed acquired disorders and
will not be dealt with here). The term learning disability is often used to
refer to developmental language disorders including dyslexia (impaired
acquisition of reading), dysphasia (impaired acquisition of spoken lan-
guage), and dysgraphia (impaired acquisition of writing).
Definitions of learning disabilities generally include several assump-
tions about the learning-disabled individual. The most common
assumptions are that the individual:
s has at least average intellectual ability, that is, an IQ score of 90 or

above (this helps to distinguish between children who are learning-
disabled and those whose problems are related to low intelligence),
s has experienced adequate educational instruction,
s is not socioculturally deprived,
s possesses some form of neurological dysfunction in the sense of
atypical brain or central nervous system functioning, and
s experiences difficulty performing certain cognitive tasks.
The relationship between language and thought
Piaget
There has always been debate about which develops first—language or
thought—and about the exact nature and degree of interdependence
between them. According to Piaget, language is intimately related to the
development of symbolic representation, which provides the capacity for
mental representation, imagery, imitation and pretend play, as well as
spoken language. All new stages (language being one of them) must wait
for the appropriate mental structures to develop and mature. Thought
develops first, from sensorimotor activities, and creates the necessary
mental structures for language development. Piaget thus believed that
language is dependent on thought.
Sapir and Whorf

Linguistic determinism presents the opposite view, in which it is proposed
that language determines the nature of thought. This is often called the
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis after Benjamin Whorf (1956) and his mentor, Linguistic determinism.
Edward Sapir, who first advocated this view. Whorf speculated that a The idea that the way
particular language would dominate and shape its user’s perceptions of one thinks is dependent
on (relative to)
reality, providing a total world-view. The Garo people of Burma, for
one’s language.
example, distinguish between many different kinds of rice, which is
their staple diet and source of income, while the English language has Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis.
just one word for rice. Whorf speculated that the Garo people perceive The proposal that one’s
rice differently from English-speaking people. When the Garo thought language determines the
about rice, they would perhaps view it with greater complexity of nature of one’s thought;
thought since they had more cognitive categories for it than English- also called linguistic
determinism.
speakers. In essence, the Whorfian hypothesis proposes that language
shapes thought. Balanced bilingual.
Some evidence for linguistic determinism comes from research among A person who is
people who are balanced bilinguals or fluent in two languages. It has equally competent in
been suggested that bilinguals think about things somewhat differently two languages.
in one language as distinct from the other. For example, in forming
impressions of people, Chinese-English bilinguals have a social schema
for characterising people that go to work that is formulated in English
but not Chinese (Hoffman, Lau & Johnson, 1986).
The major problem with this view is that it sees infancy and early
childhood as subject to a process of socialisation into a closed system
of restricted thinking. It does not address the possibility of thought
existing before language, or of types of thought that may exist without
language.
How is language used to shape our thoughts?
Semantic slanting refers to deliberately without which, it would seem, your life will
choosing words to evoke specific emotional be incomplete.
responses. For example, in the language of Language not only affects our choices
the military and politicians, an invasion is a but also our sensory experiences of those
‘pre-emptive counter-attack’, bombing the choices. For example, people will choose a
enemy is providing ‘air support’, a retreat is hamburger that is 75 per cent lean over one
a ’backloading of augmentation personnel’, that is 25 per cent fat. When they actually
civilians accidentally killed or wounded taste the two burgers (which are actually
by military strikes are ‘collateral damage’, two versions of the same burger), the 75
and troops killed by their own troops are per cent lean burger is rated as tasting
‘friendly casualties’. Advertisements are better (Schwartz, 2007). This suggests that
notorious for using language in evocative advertisements and descriptions not only
ways to compel you, the consumer, to part affect our decisions but also how we
with your money and buy a new product, experience the results of those decisions.
Vygotsky
Vygotsky adopted a position somewhere between those of Whorf and
Piaget. Vygotsky proposed that thought and language are potentially
present, but separate, at birth and their subsequent development is not
parallel but undergoes many changes (Vygotsky, 1988). The earliest form
of thinking in infants is action-based and concerned with purposeful,
but basic, problem solving such as reaching for food or toys, or opening
a container. The earliest ‘speech’ consists of sounds produced by air
leaving the lungs and passing through the throat, nose and mouth.
This often serves as a form of emotional release, as with cries of
frustration, grunts of pleasure and screams of anger. This ‘speech’ also
serves a social function, since it keeps the infant in close contact with
his caregivers and attracts attention and help. When a relatively high
level of development has been reached in both pre-verbal thinking
and pre-intellectual speech, around the age of two years, the two
processes begin to combine and form a new kind of mental function,
verbal thinking (Vygotsky, 1988). The onset of verbal thinking is
marked by the child’s curiosity about words and the names of things,
and the corresponding increase in the child’s vocabulary. Language
develops first in social interactions with adults or peers, with the sole
objective of communicating. As language is mastered, it is internalised
in private speech, to support thought and inner speech dialogues. (See
Chapter 22 on Vygotsky for more about private speech.)
Vygotsky (1988) maintained that thought is largely the product of
language. He believed that we could only really understand a child’s
mental processes through the psychological tools such as language
that mediate them. This means trying to understand the cultural
meanings of words and language, the unique context in which they
are being used, and the range of previous experiences and motivations
that lie behind them.
Specific tasks
➊ Use the spellchecker on a computer word processor. How has it been organised,
and which theory(s) of language acquisition discussed in this chapter is it based on?
➋ Which of the theories of cognitive development discussed in this section would be

most useful when describing how a child learns to read? Motivate your answer by
giving examples based on the theory.
➌ Explain why phonological receding is not the final stage of reading, even in
languages that do not possess any irregular words.
➍ Vygotsky saw language as a tool that helps us to organise and refine our thoughts.
What are some of the ways in which language aids our thinking?
Bjorklund, D F (1995). Children’s thinking: Developmental function and individual differences.
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole.
(An easily accessible account of how thinking (including) language develops over childhood.
It makes mention of all of the major approaches to language acquisition.)
Harris, M & Coltheart, M (1986). Language processing in children and adults. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
(A detailed cognitive explanation of models of developing and mature language, as well as
disorders of language. Suitable for both under- and postgraduate readers.)
Saunders, G (1988). Bilingual children: From birth to teens. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
(An interesting book about how bilingual children’s language–and thinking–differs from that
of monolinguals).
CHAPTER
19
Kohlberg’s theory of moral
reasoning
James Grant
This chapter will introduce and explain Kohlberg’s theory of

moral development. The following topics are covered,
including a consideration of some critiques of the theory:
1. The cognitive developmental approach

2. Piaget’s influence
3. Kohlberg’s stages of moral development
* Level One
* Level Two
* Level Three
* Transitional Stages
4. Critiques of Kohlberg’s theory
* Methodological concerns
* Stage Six
* Gilligan’s critique of ‘justice reasoning’
* Invariance of sequence and cross-
cultural universality
* The relationship between moral
reasoning and action
* Rest’s Four Component Model
Introduction
How does one decide what one ought to do in circum-
stances of moral significance? Are there certain clear
rules that one must obey: don’t steal, cheat, and above all,
don’t kill. Is it that simple? Would you observe the principle not to
kill if you were attacked and the only way to defend yourself was
to kill? That is, would you avail yourself of the well-recognised
right to self-defence? Several states, including Botswana and Lawrence Kohlberg
K o h l b e r g ’s t h e o r y o f m o r a l r e a s o n i n g 397
the United States of America, still practise the death penalty in which they
kill people in the most premeditated fashion. But, you may argue that the
people they kill are bad. Well then, what about abortion? South African
law permits abortion (Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act), but pro-
hibits the death penalty (State v Makwanyane, 1995). Is this inconsistent?
Can we sometimes kill?
What about theft? Is that not simpler? Yet here we must ask whether
Robin Hood is immoral. In the following scenario we must contemplate
what ‘Heinz’ should do:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of can-

cer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save
her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town
had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but
the druggist was charging 10 times what the drug cost him to
make. He paid R400 for the radium and charged R4 000 for
a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz,
went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every
legal means, but he could only get together about R2 000, which
is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was
dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But
the druggist said, ‘No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to
make money from it.’ So having tried every legal means, Heinz
gets desperate and considers breaking into the man’s store to
steal the drug for his wife (Colby, Kohlberg, Speicer, Hewer,
Candee & Gibbs, 1987: 1).
Here we see the rule not to steal, manifested in the law, together with
the right of someone to his property, in conflict with the right to life of
another. What should Heinz do, should he steal the drug?
Lawrence Kohlberg found that people offered different answers to
questions such as these (which always set an individual in a dilemma of
having to choose some rule or right over another). There seemed to be
no one right answer. More particularly, there appeared no significant
relationship between an individual’s knowledge of moral rules or
declared morality in the sense of what someone says they will do in a
morally significant circumstance, and their ultimate conduct (Kohlberg,
1964; 1968; 1969). What he did find, however, was that the way people
reasoned about the problem tended to correlate with their ages and
degree of cognitive development, so individuals of similar age and cog-
nitive development generally considered moral problems in the same
manner. Thus, Kohlberg’s interest in posing dilemmas, such as that
of ‘Heinz’, was to elicit the reasons for the solutions that his subjects
proposed. His concern became the structure of cognition behind the
individual’s notions of right and wrong. Furthermore, since morality
involved cognition, it could not be explained by reference to fixed
biological dispositions, non-rational dispositions, such as conscience, or
the acquisition of and adherence to societal norms or cultural practices
or orientations (Turiel, 2006: 9).
The cognitive developmental approach

Kohlberg’s thesis is that morality may be variously conceived. He distin-
guished six different modes of apprehending the moral course of conduct
of moral reasoning. He structured these modes into a developmental-stage
theory, namely, Kohlberg’s Cognitive Developmental Theory.
Although cognitive development is considered to be a necessary
factor for the development of moral reasoning, it is regarded as being, in
itself, insufficient (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Research supports the
argument that cognitive abilities alone do not translate into moral reason-
ing capacities. Proficiency in cognitive tasks, for instance, does not translate
into proficiency in moral reasoning (Rest, 1983). Cognitive development
precedes moral development and allows for the subsequent development of
moral reasoning as a child interacts with the social environment (Bee, 1992).
It is only after the application of cognitive processes to social problems that
moral development occurs (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Cognitive and
social challenges, then, produce moral development.
Alternatives to the cognitive

developmental approach
According to behaviourism, one learns that morality is a reflexive reaction such

the habits of what is required by society as disgust and revulsion or sympathy and
by conditioning or modelling. Forbidden that morality is equivalent to perception in
conduct becomes conditioned with which moral rights and wrongs are known
emotions such as anxiety. Cognitive- instantly, and any judgement or reasoning
Social theory gauges moral development is at best a post hoc justification or
as indicated in pro-social behaviour. rationalisation for what is intuitively known
Psychodynamic theory postulates that to right or wrong (Haidt, 2001).
morality inheres in an individual’s Notably, behaviourism, psychodynamic
conscience (the superego). It develops by theory and intuitionism all take morality to
identification and internalisation of societal follow upon some form of tendency or habit
standards and expectations, first as external arising at an unconscious or preconscious
rules and later, internalised as personal level, producing non-intentional or
guides. Morality is enforced through one’s uncontrolled reactions, in which cognition,
conscience primarily by the avoidance in particular, social cognition, is excluded
of guilt—as inner directed aggression (Blasi, 1980; Turiel, 2006: 21).
(Freud, 1923; 1930). Intuitionism claims
Piaget’s influence
Kohlberg’s observations led him to elaborate upon the two-stage
cognitive model of children’s moral judgement presented by Piaget
(1932/1965) whose theories fascinated and inspired him (Crain, 1992).
Piaget had conceived his theory by observing children’s treatment of
rules when playing games such as marbles. Moral development, Piaget
theorised, took the form of a progression from heteronomous (subject to
external rules) to autonomous (internal) moral reasoning. Heteronomous

moral reasoning is the reasoning initially
adopted by children and is characterised
by strict adherence to rules and duties, and
obedience to authority. Rules are regarded
as fixed and absolute, deriving from some
supreme commandment (adults, parents
or a deity even). One cannot break or
amend these commandments, regardless
of whether they are inconvenient or even
unfair. This is the reasoning of children
younger than about 10 years old (and of
some civil servants: the rules are the rules).
This reasoning results from three factors.
The first is due to a problem of ‘realism’
(the difficulty the child experiences in
distinguishing rules from real objective
phenomena). The second is due to the
Morality is not something
egocentric nature of the young child’s cognitive structure in that he
we are born with; rather it
cannot take a different perspective. The third results from the power is something that develops.
relationship between adults and children in that children are subject to Moreover, if Kohlberg is
adult authority. The heteronomous orientation is characterised by the correct, our level of moral
child’s respect for the unquestionable authority of adults or parents. reasoning is dependent on
the level of our cognitive
The autonomous moral reasoning orientation develops out of interac-
functioning.
tion with other children and is characterised by an ability to consider rules
more critically, and selectively to apply these rules based on the goals of
mutual respect and cooperation. If the rules of one’s game of marbles Autonomous
are inconvenient or unfair they can be altered with the agreement of the moral reasoning.
participants. Kohlberg elaborated Piaget’s model into a six-stage theory. Piaget’s second stage of
moral reasoning, which
In this he proposed a heteronomous orientation (marked by the first stage)
is no longer dependent
as a child’s initial morality, and an autonomous orientation (marked by upon respect for norms as
the later stages) as the ultimate development of moral reasoning. supreme commandments.
Children’s moral
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development reasoning in this stage
According to Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987), children progress is characterised by an
sequentially from lower to higher stages out of recognition that a higher ability to consider rules
critically, and selectively
stage of moral reasoning provides a better mechanism for the resolution
to apply these rules based
of moral issues. Each new stage represents a qualitative reorganisation on the goals of mutual
of the individual’s pattern of thought, which becomes more complex, respect and co-operation.
differentiated, and adaptive. The child is not just smarter and more caring, (Autonomous means
his morality is qualitatively advanced. Progress occurs through engaging having one’s own laws,
with others in debate over moral issues, and in social experience that making it one’s own
challenges one to evaluate one’s moral reasoning. Such challenges motivate rules, making internal
independent judgements.)
one to develop new and more comprehensive moral conceptions that equip
one better to resolve moral problems. Progression requires understandings
gained at previous stages, so development proceeds in a predictable
sequence without skipping stages. Subjects are regarded, therefore, as able
only to represent the stage of moral reasoning actually attained, since a
subject is not able to internalise higher-stage thinking or produce higher-
level responses than the level of development actually achieved.
Thus, development is determined by the individual’s own concerns

with moral problems and not by biological imperatives (genetic clockwork)
or socialisation agents (such as parents or teachers) (Crain, 1992; Kohlberg,
1969). While he opposed the notion that children are taught morality,
Kohlberg did, however, consider it possible to promote moral development
by challenging people to consider the aptness and efficacy of their present
orientation (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975; Kohlberg, 1981).
Kohlberg’s six stages are structured in three levels, each of which
comprises two stages that describe the sequence of moral development
within each level. The full sequence (Kohlberg, 1969: 379-382) is presented
below, with illustrative exemplar statements in respect of the Heinz
dilemma, both in favour of (for) and opposed to (against) Heinz stealing
the drug (Bukatko & Daehler, 1995; Crain, 1992; Kohlberg, 1969; 1981;
Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987; Papalia, Olds & Feldman, 1998).
Level One
Preconventional/
pre-moral morality.
In Level One morality is referred to as preconventional or premoral
Kohlberg’s first level morality. This means that morality resides externally: norms and principles
orientation in which are imposed from ‘above’. It is dependent upon consequences, since the
morality resides externally, individual is concerned with the avoidance of punishment or the attainment
determined by norms of reward.
and principles that are
imposed from ‘above’.
Stage One
It is dependent upon
consequences since the
The first stage is the obedience and punishment orientation (or heteronomous
individual is concerned morality) in which right is determined by the avoidance of punishment.
with the avoidance
of punishment or the For: He should steal the drug. It isn’t really bad to take it. It isn’t
attainment of reward. as though he didn’t ask to pay for it first. The drug he’d take is
Heteronomous only worth R400; he’s not really taking a R4 000 drug. Or: if you
moral reasoning. let your wife die, you will get into trouble. You’ll be blamed for not
Piaget’s notion that spending the money to save her and there’ll be an investigation of
the reasoning adopted you and the druggist for your wife’s death.
by children is initially
characterised by strict
adherence to rules and
Against: He shouldn’t steal the drug; it’s a serious crime. He didn’t
duties, and by obedience get permission, he used force and broke and entered. He did a lot
to authority. Rules of damage, stealing a very expensive drug and breaking up the
are regarded as fixed store, too. Or: you shouldn’t steal the drug because you’ll be caught
and absolute, deriving and sent to jail if you do. If you do get away, your conscience would
from some supreme bother you thinking how the police would catch up with you at
commandment (adults,
any minute.
parents, or God).
(Heteronomous means
according to various Stage Two
external laws or principles, The second stage is the stage of individualism, instrumental purpose, and
that is, laws and principles exchange and is determined by how one can attain reward as opposed to
that are imposed on one avoiding punishment. The concern remains ‘pre-conventional’ in that
from outside.) moral reasoning is that of an individual rather than a member of society.
The orientation is represented well by the notion: ‘You scratch my back
and I’ll scratch yours’.
For: It’s all right to steal the drug because she needs it and he wants
her to live. It isn’t that he wants to steal, but he has to use this way
to get the drug to save her. Or: if you do happen to get caught you
could give the drug back and you wouldn’t get much of a sentence.
It wouldn’t bother you much to serve a little jail term, if you have
your wife when you get out.
Against: He shouldn’t steal it. The druggist isn’t wrong or bad; he

just wants to make a profit. That’s what you’re in business for, to
make money. Or: he may not get much of a jail term if he steals the
drug, but his wife will probably die before he gets out so it won’t
do him much good. If his wife dies, he shouldn’t blame himself, it
wasn’t his fault she has cancer.
Level Two
Level Two is referred to as the level of conventional or role conformity Conventional/role
morality in which norms have become internalised and the individual is conformity morality.
concerned with his or her reputation, and how he or she is perceived by Kohlberg’s second level
orientation in which norms
others. Moral values are determined by whether one conforms to majority
have become internalised
norms, maintains the conventional social order and fulfils the expectations and the individual is
of others. concerned with his or her
reputation—how they are
Stage Three perceived by others. Moral
The third stage is oriented by mutual interpersonal expectations, values are determined by
relationships, and interpersonal conformity (also called the good-boy/ conforming to majority
norms, maintaining
good-girl orientation). Morality is now determined by an attitude of
the conventional social
approval-seeking and is attained by fulfilling the expectations of others order and fulfilling the
close to one: being ‘good’ and ‘nice’. Concerns shift from consequences to expectations of others.
intentions in that ‘meaning well’ prevails over the possible consequences
of conduct. It is a morality of love, empathy and caring for one’s
significant others.
For: He should steal the drug. He is only doing something that is

natural for a good husband to do. You can’t blame him for doing
something out of love for his wife; you’d blame him if he didn’t
love his wife enough to save her. Or: no one will think you’re bad
if you steal the drug but your family will think you’re an inhuman
husband if you don’t. If you let your wife die, you’ll never be able
to look anybody in the face again.
Against: He shouldn’t steal. If his wife dies, he can’t be blamed.

It isn’t because he’s heartless or that he doesn’t love her enough
to do everything that he legally can. The druggist is the selfish or
heartless one. Or: it isn’t just the druggist who will think you’re a
criminal, everyone else will too. After you steal it, you’ll feel bad
thinking how you’ve brought dishonour on your family and your-
self; you won’t be able to face anyone again.
Stage Four
The fourth stage’s orientation is based in the social system and conscience
(or authority and social-order-maintaining). It is directed by a sense of the
value in maintaining the conventional social system as a duty. In contrast to
Stage Three reasoning, in which the individual’s moral focus is his or her
significant others such as family and friends, at Stage Four the individual
becomes concerned with society and ‘the institution’. The orientation is
represented well by the notion that the system is supreme and that one
cannot simply do what one thinks is right if it conflicts with what the
system requires, because then there would be chaos.
For: You should steal it. If you did nothing you’d be letting your
wife die, and it’s your responsibility if she dies. You have to take
it with the idea of paying the druggist. Or: if you have any sense
of honour, you won’t let your wife die because you’re afraid to do
the only thing that will save her. You’ll always feel guilty that you
caused her death if you don’t do your duty to her.
Against: It is a natural thing for Heinz to want to save his wife

but it’s still always wrong to steal. He still knows he’s stealing and
taking a valuable drug from the man who made it. Or: you’re
desperate and you may not know you’re doing wrong when you
steal the drug. But you’ll know you did wrong after you’re punished
and sent to jail. You’ll always feel guilty for your dishonesty and
lawbreaking.
Level Three
Postconventional/ Level Three is the level of postconventional or principled morality in
principled morality. which morality becomes internal and autonomous. Norms are determined
Kohlberg’s third level
upon the basis of principles of justice, fairness and dignity, independent of
orientation in which
morality becomes internal
conventions such as national laws.
and autonomous, and
norms are determined Stage Five
on the basis of principles The fifth stage’s orientation is in social contract or utility and individual
of justice, fairness and rights. Moral norms are now defined in terms of laws or institutionalised
dignity, independent rules for their social utility. Now the concern is with a good society. This
of conventions such as
sets it apart from Stage Four reasoning in which the focus was simply on
national laws.
maintaining the system. An autocracy that functions smoothly would not
impress a Stage Five reasoner. A good society is defined as one born of
consensus (the social contract), while at the same time respecting certain
rights, such as life, as inviolable on the premise that respect for these rights
is universal. Agreement in this respect is assumed.
For: The law wasn’t set up for these circumstances. Taking the
drug in this situation isn’t really right, but to do it is justified. Or:
you’d lose other people’s respect and not gain it, if you don’t steal.
If you let your wife die, it would be from fear, not from reasoning
it out. So you’d just lose self-respect and probably the respect of
others too.
Against: You can’t completely blame someone for stealing, but even
extreme circumstances don’t really justify taking the law into your
own hands. You can’t have everyone stealing whenever they get
desperate. The end may be good, but the ends don’t justify the means.
Or: you would lose your standing and respect in the community and
violate the law. You’d lose respect for yourself if you were carried
away by emotion and forgot the long-range point of view.
Stage Six
The sixth stage is the morality of universal ethical principles in which
morality is directed by self-chosen ethical principles—not dependent upon
consensus—which are assumed to be the foundation of the law, but which
predominate where the law conflicts with these personal principles. The
existence of Stage Six as a separate stage above and beyond the scope of
Stage Five is questionable. It is treated as a hypothetical theoretical endpoint
of the sequence of development (Kohlberg, Boyd & Levine, 1990). However,
it is not provided for in the most recent edition of the instrument for the
attribution of stages to subjects (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Colby et al, 1987).
The distinction between Stages Five and Six is not all that clear as both are
concerned with what constitutes a good society and both respect individual
rights. The difference seems to be that rights, in Stage Five, are respected on
the assumption that they are dictated by consensus. In Stage Six, however,
rights are respected irrespective of consensus; they are apparently taken as
rules of natural law (Crain, 1992). All post-conventional thought is now
assessed, however, as Stage Five reasoning (Colby et al, 1987).
For: This is a situation that forces him to choose between stealing

and letting his wife die. In a situation where the choice must be
made, it is morally right to steal. He has to act in terms of the
principle of preserving and respecting life. Or: if you don’t steal
the drug and you let your wife die, you’d always condemn yourself
for it afterwards. You wouldn’t be blamed and you would have
lived up to the outside rule of the law, but you wouldn’t have lived
up to your own standards of conscience.
Against: Heinz is faced with the decision of whether to consider

the other people who need the drug just as badly as his wife. Heinz
ought to act not according to his particular feelings toward his
wife, but in considering the value of all the lives involved. Or: if
you stole the drug, you wouldn’t be blamed by other people but
you’d condemn yourself because you wouldn’t have lived up to
your own conscience and standards of honesty.
This description of the levels and stages is presented in definitive form in

Table 19.1
The stages are dependent upon the structure of an individual’s

reasoning rather than on the content of that reasoning (Kohlberg &
Kauffman, 1987). That is, the stage at which an individual’s reasoning
404
Level and stage Content of stage Social perspective of stage
What is right Reasons for doing right
Level One – Preconventional To avoid breaking rules. Backed by Avoidance of punishment, and the superior Egocentric point of view. Does not consider
punishment, obedience for its own sake and power of authorities. the interests of others or recognise that they
Stage One: avoiding physical damage to persons and differ from the subject’s; doesn’t relate two
Heteronomous Morality property. points of view. Actions are considered

physically rather than in terms of psycho-
logical interests of others. Confusion of
authority’s perspective with one’s own.
Stage Two: Following rules only when it is to someone’s To serve one’s own needs or interests in a Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware
Individualism, Instrumental immediate interest; acting to meet one’s world where you have to recognise that that everybody has his or her own interest
Purpose and Exchange own interests and needs and letting others other people have their interests too. to pursue and these conflict so that right is
do the same. Right is also what’s fair, what’s relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.
Level Two – Conventional Living up to what is expected by people close The need to be a good person in your own Perspective of the individual in relationships
to you or what people generally expect of eyes and those of others. Your caring for with other individuals. Aware of shared
Stage Three: those in your role as child, sibling, friend, etc. others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to feelings, agreements and expectations that
Mutual Interpersonal ‘Being good’ is important and means having maintain rules and authority that support take primacy over individual interests.
Expectations, Relationships good motives, showing concern about others. stereotypical good behaviour. Relating points of view through the concrete
and Interpersonal It also means keeping mutual relationships, Golden Rule, putting themselves in the other
Conformity such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude. person’s shoes. Does not yet consider
generalised system perspective.
Stage Four: Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have To keep the institution going as a whole, Differentiates societal point of view from
Social System and agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in to avoid the breakdown in the system ‘if interpersonal agreement or motives. Takes
Conscience extreme cases where they conflict with other everyone did it’. The imperative of the point of view of the system that defines
fixed social duties. Right is also contributing conscience to meet one’s defined roles and rules. Considers individual relations
to society, the group or institution. obligations (easily confused with Stage in terms of place in the system.
Three belief in rules and authority).
Level and stage Content of stage Social perspective of stage
What is right Reasons for doing right
Level Three – Being aware that people hold a variety of A sense of obligation to law because of one’s Prior-to-society perspective. Perspective of a
Postconventional or values and opinions, and that most values social contract to make and abide by laws rational individual aware of values and rights
principled and rules are relative to your group. These for the welfare of all and for the protection prior to social attachments and contracts.
relative rules should usually be upheld, of all people’s rights. A feeling of contractual Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms
Stage Five: however, in the interest of impartiality and commitment, freely entered upon, to family, of agreement, contract, objective impartiality
Social Contract or Utility because they are the social contract. Some friendship, trust and work obligations. and due process. Considers moral and legal
and Individual Rights non-relative values and rights like life and Concern that laws and duties be based on points of view; recognises that they
liberty, however, must be upheld in any rational calculation of overall utility: ‘the sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to
society and regardless of majority opinion. greatest good for the greatest number.’ integrate them.
Stage Six: Following self-chosen ethical principles. The belief as a rational person in the validity Perspective of a moral point of view from
Universal Ethical Particular laws or social agreements are of universal moral principles, and a sense of which social arrangements derive. Perspective
Principles usually valid because they rest on such personal commitment to them. is that of any rational individual recognising
principles. When laws violate these the nature of morality or the fact that
principles, one acts in accordance with the persons are ends in themselves and must
principle. Principles are universal principles be treated as such.
of justice: the equality of human rights
and respect for the dignity of human beings
as individuals.
Table 19.1 Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning

Source: Colby & Kohlberg (1987).
K o h l b e r g ’s t h e o r y o f m o r a l r e a s o n i n g
405
is determined by the relationship between her or his ideas; it is

determined by the form of thought rather than by the conclusions
reached. Any decision concerning the proper course of action may be
justified by alternative means. It may, for example, be an egocentric
justification or a justification concerned with the maintenance of
individual rights. These alternative justifications represent the
underlying form or structure of moral reasoning, which is the concern
of Kohlberg’s theory.
Kohlberg asserts that his stages are invariant in their sequence,
as presented above, in that every child goes step by step through each
stage, without regressing, and that, moreover, the invariant stage
sequence applies universally and cross-culturally, that is, to every society
(Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987).
Transitional Stages
Kohlberg was confronted with some data (Kramer, 1968) suggesting
that some adolescents had apparently regressed from Stage Four or
Five reasoning, back to Stage Two reasoning. However, Kohlberg
noted on closer analysis that these individuals were instead in a stage
of transition between Stages Four and Five—which he denoted as
stage 4½ or 4+. These individuals had become dissatisfied with Stage
Four reasoning, but had not yet fully adopted Stage Five reasoning.
The notion of blame being apportioned by society for wrongs
committed, in line with Stage Four (law and order) reasoning, had
been replaced by a sense of contempt for society, that society was
rather to blame (Kohlberg, 1984). A Stage 4½ response to the Heinz
dilemma could be that Heinz should steal the drug because to do
so would be the a humanistic or moral act in a capitalist society, or
because a society in which one must steal to save life is unjust (Colby
et al, 1987: 11). This may easily be mistaken for Stage Two reasoning,
but is better regarded as part of the process of developing Stage
Five reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; 1984; Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987).
Task: Classifying stages of moral reasoning
Classify the following statements according to the stage of moral reasoning that they
demonstrate:
1. Heinz should not steal because the owner worked hard for what he has and you
shouldn’t take advantage;
2. Heinz should steal the drug because certain rights have been agreed upon or defined
by us through social process or social contract;
3. Heinz should steal the drug because his wife might be a very important person;
4. Heinz shouldn’t steal because it’s selfish or deceitful to steal;
5. Heinz should steal the drug because of the marital responsibility he accepted.
Stage scores are shown at the end of the chapter, in the Critical Thinking Tasks section.
It is notable that the Stage model has been further complicated by

the introduction of stages of transition between all stages (Colby et
al, 1987). Also, sub-stages A and B have been introduced for Stages
Three and Four (within conventional moral reasoning) to distinguish
reasoning (as of B type) within Stages Three and Four which, while
not properly representing Stage Five (post-conventional/principled)
morality, show some semblance of it (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987: 37;
Lapsley, 2006: 49).
Critiques of Kohlberg’s theory

Criticisms have been made of Kohlberg’s theory in respect of method,
the status of Stage Six, of his claim of invariant stage sequence and cross-
cultural universality, his conception of the moral domain (as concerned
with ‘justice reasoning’) and of moral reasoning’s relationship with
moral behaviour. Each of these will be considered in turn.
Methodological concerns
Kohlberg’s method for scoring (assessing) moral reasoning, the Moral
Judgment Interview (MJI), relies upon a subject’s free responses to
questions concerning his or her moral reasoning about moral dilemmas
such as that of Heinz. The MJI has attracted criticism for its reliance
upon an interpretative scoring system, which has been said to incur
serious threats of scorer subjectivity. The elaborate scoring system is
cumbersome, and to the extent that subjects do not offer clear stage-
related responses (due to the freedom given them to answer), inferences
must be drawn from what is said in order to identify the responses
with a particular stage or stages. The present MJI (Colby & Kohlberg,
1987; Colby et al, 1987) claims ‘semi-standardisation’ while conceding
complexity and that it may appear ‘at first unwieldy’. An aspirant
interviewer is warned to set aside a minimum of a month or two of
concentrated study and practice to learn how to score an MJI. Thus,
while the threat of subjectivity may have been reduced, the MJI remains
a complex and somewhat tortuous instrument to administer and score.
One may apprehend the difficulties inherent in scoring by considering
the statements in the box above and attempting to attribute each to a
Kohlbergian stage.
In response to the criticisms levelled at Kohlberg’s MJI, Rest developed
the Defining Issues Test (DIT) as an objective and simpler measure of
moral reasoning (Rest, 1974; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999;
Thoma, 2006). Using Kohlberg’s moral stages, statements were compiled
which exemplify the characteristics of the various stages. Subjects are
scored on the importance they attach to each of these statements. The
DIT, now in its second edition (DIT2), is probably the better instrument
(The Centre for the Study of Ethical Development; (see http://www.
centerforthestudyofethicaldevelopment.net/). DIT research and the
development of moral reasoning theory in response to data collected using
the DIT now represents the new face of Kohlberg’s work—referred to
as the neo-Kohlbergian model (see Thoma (2006) for a discussion of the
theoretical developments associated with DIT research).
Stage Six
It must be regarded as a shortcoming that a developmental theory
proposes an endpoint which is empirically unattainable even if it remains a
hypothetical endpoint (Kohlberg, Boyd & Levine, 1990). If a developmental
stage theory posits an endpoint for development which no one, in practice,
can attain, then it has, in effect, no developmental endpoint (Lapsley,
2006). To posit a hypothetical endpoint signifies only what, in Kohlberg’s
view, people’s morality ought to become, as a philosophical dream; it does
not indicate, as is required of a psychological developmental theory, what
people’s morality does or can become. Does this mean that we cannot
empirically verify whether something is inherently right, irrespective of
the consensus regarding the issue in question? This would have dramatic
implications for the notion of universal human rights, which are said to
exist irrespective of the consensus regarding those rights; that for instance,
the majority is not always right. Is there hope from the cross-cultural
studies that autonomy and individual rights are observed throughout the
world, across cultures? (See discussion on cross-cultural universality later
in this chapter.) Of course there is, but only if the reasoning behind the
belief in those rights can be found to be independent of society or social
consensus. Perhaps the evidence of resistance to inequality and oppression
from minorities provides some hope (Turiel, 2003).
Gilligan’s critique of ‘justice reasoning’

Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning is concerned with justice reasoning.
An individual’s development is traced against her or his progress in
considering moral dilemmas from the perspective of what an impartial
social contract would demand, based on universal rights and equality
(Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Gilligan (1982) argues that Kohlberg
ignores the feminine moral orientation of the morality of care, a morality
of responsibility and caring based on non-violence. She proposes that this
alternative ‘morality of care’ predominates in women, whereas justice
reasoning predominates in men, and that Kohlberg’s theory is therefore
biased in terms of gender in that ‘the thinking of women is often classified
with that of children’ (Gilligan, 1982: 70).
Kohlberg can be said to have brought this controversy upon himself in
that his initial sample—which served as the basis of his theory—comprised
only boys aged between 10 and 16 years (Kohlberg, 1958).
Gilligan’s claims raise two questions:
1. Whether men and women are differently orientated: men to justice

and women to the morality of care; and
2. Whether Kohlberg’s theory is gender-biased in that it relegates
women to lower (less adequate) levels of reasoning.
In respect of whether men and women are differently orientated in

terms of moral reasoning, there seems to be little or no evidence to suggest
that different genders do actually subscribe to one orientation more than
another. Moral reasoning orientations have not been found to be gender-
specific (Walker, 2006: 98-99; Walker, de Vries & Trevethan, 1987). Men
and women seem to utilise both orientations equally. Further, Kohlberg

does regard other incidental orientations as included in his concept of
justice reasoning, such as:
1. general and normative order, or impartial following of rules and

normative roles,
2. utilitarian maximising of the welfare of each person,
3. perfectionistic seeking of harmony or integrity of the self and the
social group, and
4. fairness, balancing of perspectives, maintaining equity and social
contract
(Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987).
It appears that Gilligan’s morality of care may well be subsumed under

the justice orientation and the claim that Kohlberg’s model undervalues
a female morality of care cannot be empirically substantiated.
On the issue of whether women’s moral reasoning is devalued within
Kohlberg’s scheme, again the answer seems to be ‘no’. Gilligan’s suspicions
have not been confirmed by research, in that no discernible difference
in moral reasoning has been observed between males and females (Bee,
1992; Bourne & Felipe Russo, 1998; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau &Thoma, 1999;
Thoma, 1986; Walker, 2006: 98). For example, Thoma (1986) found that
education accounted for 52.5 per cent of the variance in moral reasoning,
whereas gender accounted for only 0.2 per cent. Thus, education explains
Gilligan (1982) criticises
250 times more variance in moral reasoning (Thoma, 2006). Walker (1984: Kohlberg for not taking into
688) found such scant evidence for the proposition of gender bias that she account the possibility
lamented that energy would be better spent wondering ‘why the myth that the ‘caring morality’
that males are more advanced than females persists in the light of so little of women may differ
fundamentally from
evidence’. The weight of evidence appears not to support the claim that
the morality of men.
Kohlberg’s scheme is biased against women (Lapsley, 1996). However, research has
However, Gilligan & Wiggins (1987) persist. They point to the dis- not substantiated
crepancy between men and women in terms of moral behaviour, that Gilligan’s claims.
PHOTOS: CH A JOHNSTON
men are responsible for the majority of violence and antisocial conduct,
that prison populations are overwhelmingly male and they ask, ‘If there
are no sex differences in empathy or moral reasoning, why are there sex
differences in moral and immoral behaviour?’ (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987:
279). Gilligan & Wiggins present a very good question, which needs to be
considered within the framework of the multiplicity of complex factors at
play in the production of conduct in a morally significant context.
Invariance of sequence and cross-cultural universality

Kohlberg’s rather grand assertions as to the universality and invariance
of the sequence of these Stages have attracted much controversy. Many
believed his assertion that the Stages associated with his justice-orientation
(an orientation concerned with impartiality, fairness and individual rights)
would be observed cross-culturally, would be proved wrong. It seemed
he was suggesting that what may be considered a western morality of
individual rights and personal autonomy was a morality observed by all,
which seemed a particularly imperialist position to take. The entire world
could not possibly be so self-centred. After all, non-western societies were
supposedly morally oriented toward the group and inter-dependence
(Turiel, 2006: 25). But concern for individual autonomy and rights is not
restricted to Western societies (Helwig, 2006). Helwig notes:
Is Kohlberg warranted in
suggesting that lower-class The developmental patterns emerging from findings of studies
rural populations are less conducted in a variety of nations and cultures show that, as
likely to develop principled children develop, they consider in increasingly complex ways an
and autonomous morality?
array of factors such as the goals and structure of different social
The findings of Tudin,
Straker, & Mendelsohn contexts (for example peer groups, family, school, government),
(1994) show that lower- the competence of different agents (for example children or adults)
class rural people may well to act on autonomy and rights, and the presence of other social
develop principled and and moral concerns, such as issues of harm or legal requirements.
autonomous morality—in
Such factors, and not general cultural orientations, were far more
response to challenging
social circumstances. informative in explaining the applications of concepts of rights
and democratic decision making
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
in the cultures examined so far

(Helwig, 2006).
People across cultures recognise

and value individual rights and
autonomy such that where inequalities
and oppression is perceived, there is
and inevitably will be, resistance and
subversion of any system that permits
this or imposes this (Turiel, 2003).
It is impressive that these asser-
tions of Kohlberg have endured
empirical scrutiny. Rest (1986b)
described the evidence against
stage skipping and regression as
spectacular, arguing that if one was
not impressed by the empirical findings on the topic, it is difficult to

know what would impress. Snarey (1985) reviewed 45 studies of moral
development throughout 27 countries and found the notion of invariant
stages well supported. He attributed the apparently rare occurrence
of stage skipping and regression to measurement error. Universality
of stages was found in respect of Stages One through Four while the
development of principled morality (Stages Five and Six) appears to be
biased in favour of complex urban societies and middle-class populations
as opposed to simple, rural, lower-class populations who are therefore less
likely to develop principled and autonomous morality. This bias is not
entirely unpredicted by Kohlberg. He believed that moral development
follows from opportunities for thinking and that such opportunities
may be lacking in lower socio-economic classes and rural communities
owing to their relative social and cognitive simplicity. Nisan & Kohlberg
(1982) explain that in isolated villages and tribal communities, Stage
Three moral reasoning (mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships
and interpersonal conformity) may be a perfectly proficient orientation
for the personal relations inherent in such societies, so that nothing
motivates further moral reasoning development.
Some evidence has appeared, though, which questions the relation-
ship implied by Kohlberg between low socio-economic class, or rural
circumstances, and delayed or under-developed moral reasoning
(Tudin, Straker & Mendolsohn, 1994). This later study demonstrates
that the cognitive and social challenges that foster moral development
might exist in lower socio-economic classes. Essentially however,
Moral reasoning and criminal conduct
Moses Sithole’s life is littered with violations express will in handing down a sentence
of the law and the rights of those who have of 2 410 years in prison with eligibility for
encountered him. His previous convictions parole arising at 1 460 years.
begin at the age of 13, for housebreaking, Grant (1997)* examined Sithole’s
for which he admits guilt. When he was 20 moral reasoning from a Kohlbergian
he was again convicted of housebreaking perspective and was surprised that Sithole,
and admits guilt again. At 22 and again the worst serial killer and rapist in South
at 25 he was convicted of fraud; he admits African history to date, demonstrated
guilt in both these instances. At 25 he was post-conventional moral reasoning
also convicted of a rape; he insists he is not and may appropriately be assigned to
guilty of this crime however (Sithole, 1996). that level. In the face of this finding, it
When he was 30, he was again appears doubtful that moral reasoning
arrested, this time on suspicion of being can be taken as a direct indicator of an
a serial rapist and killer responsible for 40 individual’s prospective conduct in a
rapes, 38 murders and 6 robberies. morally significant context.
On 4 December, 1997 he was * The assistance of Merle Friedman
convicted on all counts and the following was invaluable to this project and
day sentenced to die in prison: the Judge’s greatly appreciated
Kohlberg’s prediction that cognitive and social challenges foster moral

development remains intact, and his claim of invariant universal stage
development appears well-founded with the caveat that some societies
do not progress all the way—only as far as is necessary in their own
circumstances.
The relationship between moral reasoning and action

One should be clear at the outset that Kohlberg was far less concerned
with moral action (that is, action in a morally significant context) than
with an individual’s deliberations of what he or she ought to do in the
circumstances and, more particularly, his or her reasons for this (Westen,
1996). Further, Kohlberg’s theory is but one possible perspective (of how
individuals consider what they ought to do) of one possible component (of
what is required of individuals ultimately to do what they ought) (Rest,
1983; Westen, 1996).
Nevertheless, as we have mentioned, Kohlberg’s theory has attracted
criticism for having no direct correlate with moral behaviour. He did not
propose, however, that such a correlation would exist. His assumption in this
respect is not that moral judgement will match or be matched by behaviour:
[Kohlberg’s theory assumes] that the subject’s thinking about moral

questions and interpretations of right and wrong are important
determinants of moral conduct. This is not to say that people always
do what they think is right. The relation of moral judgment and
conduct is complex and incompletely understood. No doubt the
causality is bi-directional: Our overt behaviour can influence our
moral beliefs just as our moral beliefs can influence the course of
our behaviour. But our present point is that judgment is an integral
component of action and that moral judgment must be assessed if
moral conduct is to be understood (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987: 2).
Research has demonstrated an impressive correlation between the degree

of development of moral judgement and moral conduct when interpreted
from Kohlberg’s perspective: the higher the level of reasoning, the stronger
the link becomes between what the individual considers to be the right course
of action and his or her behaviour (Blasi, 1980; Kohlberg, 1968).
Some studies may illustrate the point well:
s Only 11 per cent of subjects who associated themselves with princi-

pled morality cheated in an experimental situation, whereas half of
those at a conventional level of morality cheated (Kohlberg, 1968).
s Whereas 75 per cent of morally principled subjects (reasoning at a
principled level) refused to administer increasing levels of electric
shocks to an experimental ‘victim’, only 13 per cent of the other
subjects, (those not reasoning at a level of principled morality)
refused to shock the ‘victim’ (Kohlberg, 1968).
s The study by Kohlberg and Candee (1984) found that of those
individuals who concluded that it was morally correct to parti-
cipate in a student protest, approximately 75 per cent of those
reasoning at Stages Four and Five participated while only about

25 per cent of those reasoning at Stage Three participated.
Blasi (1980) reviewed 75 studies concerning the relationship between

moral judgement and behaviour and found in 76 per cent of the studies
that moral judgement correlated with behaviour. He concludes that
the body of research appears to support the hypothesis of a statistical
relationship between moral reasoning and moral action in the sense of the
subject doing what she or he considers to be moral.
What might be argued is that the small positive correlation that
Kohlberg claims, and that seems empirically supported, leaves much to
be explained, so that its value may be questioned as being negligible.
But this argument overlooks the complexity of the precedents of moral
conduct in implying that one factor should offer a clear insight into the
moral nature of conduct that is expected from individuals. Kohlberg
clearly considered that a variety of other factors mediate between an
individual's moral reasoning capacities and his or her ultimate conduct.
He recognised that moral reasoning or principles in themselves do
not direct behaviour, but that principles (moral reasoning) are a basic
component for moral action:
The prediction from stages or principles to action requires that we

take account of intermediary judgments that an individual makes.
One does not act directly on principles, one acts on specific content
judgments engendered by those principles. We hypothesize that
moral principles or ‘structures of moral reasoning’ lead to two
more specific judgments, one a judgment of deontic choice, the
other a judgment of responsibility. The first is a deontic decision
function, judgment of what is right. The second is a follow-
through function, a judgment of responsibility to act on what one
has judged to be right (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984: 517).
Rest’s Four Component Model

Rest (Rest, 1983; 1986a), a student of Kohlberg’s, offers a framework
that may explain how other factors beyond moral judgements may be
responsible for a failure to act morally. The framework allows for some
insight into the complexity of factors that may produce moral behaviour,
considering that moral reasoning explains only 20 per cent of conduct
in a morally significant circumstance (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma,
1999). Rest proposes that moral behaviour depends on four components.
(Note that he does not assert that moral behaviour is produced out of
a linear process of the components, and he cautions that components
are interrelated in such a way that each component may influence the
outcome of other components.) His framework assumes that the following
components produce moral behaviour:
s Component One: Moral Sensitivity: involves the interpretation of the

situation in terms of how other people’s welfare may be affected by the
subject’s actions and what courses of action are available to the subject.
s Component Two: Moral Judgement: concerns what ought to be done

in the circumstances, identified in Component One. This is the realm
Deontic. of moral judgement in its deontic (ethically binding) sense.
Ethically or morally s Component Three: Moral Motivation: involves the selection of
binding. It describes
which value or domain or motive (such as moral or prudential or
that which is an ethical
obligation, or duty.
conventional) will inform the subject’s intentions for action. This is
the component of competing claims or domains.
s Component Four: Moral Character: concerns the execution and
implementation of what one intends to do (as conceptualised in terms
of Component Three).
Failure to behave morally may then be attributed variously to deficien-

cies in one, some, or all of the components. Where there is insensitivity
to the needs of others, or the circumstances are too ambiguous for
interpretation, the subject may fail to act morally (deficiency in Component
One). Where a subject fails to appreciate what ought morally to be done in
the circumstances, action may fail to be moral (deficiency in Component
Two). Where moral values are compromised or displaced by other values
or motives (from other domains) the subject may again fail to act morally
(deficiency in Component Three). If the subject, who has decided upon
and intends a moral action, loses sight of his or her goal, is distracted, or
just wears out, there may again be a failure to act morally (deficiency in
Component Four) (Rest, 1983). Component Two may be identified with
Kohlberg’s domain of moral reasoning, since it is the component in which
what morally ought and ought not to be done is considered (Rest, 1986a;
Thoma, 2006).
It may be possible now to consider an answer to Gilligan & Wiggins’s
question: ‘If there were no sex differences in empathy or moral reasoning,
why are there sex differences in moral and immoral behaviour?’ (Gilligan
& Wiggins, 1987: 279). The answer may be that the difference lies anywhere
in the other factors within the moral judgement component or any of the
other components required for moral conduct.
It appears that many factors collaborate to produce behaviour of moral
significance. Kohlberg’s claim is that the domain of moral reasoning is
only one such factor, though he does assert that it is an integral factor
(Blasi (1980) concurs in this assertion). Rest’s component analysis offers
some insight into how these factors may need to collaborate in order to
produce moral behaviour.
Conclusion
Kohlberg’s method is so cumbersome and prone to errors of interpretation
that James Rest’s DIT has probably superseded the MJI as the instrument
of choice for measuring moral reasoning development. Also, although
Kohlberg’s theory seems lacking in respect of its ability to explain
behaviour directly in a morally significant context, he never claimed that
it would, and his theory stands as an explanation of an integral factor
of what is required for moral conduct. Further, his claims of invariant
sequence and universality appear to have withstood empirical scrutiny
(save that in some societies, for reasons Kohlberg seems to explain,
development is restricted). Finally, Gilligan’s critiques have not found

empirical support and seem misplaced.
Kohlberg’s realisation that moral reasoning develops alongside
cognition has allowed for an appreciation that what determines what
one ought to do in a morally significant context may not simply be
concerned with the internalisation of set rules. His theory has explicated
and confirmed Piaget’s speculations that morality develops qualitatively.
Moreover, he has illuminated the fact that the appropriate moral course
has different meanings for different people and that ‘wrong’ doesn’t
have just one meaning. Ultimately it must be recognised that the
understanding of morality has clearly been advanced by his theory and
his rich research tradition.
Specific tasks
➊ What stage of moral reasoning do you adopt when resolving morally significant
problems?
➋ What does it mean to say that someone knows that what they are doing is wrong,
particularly in the case of a child?
➌ What do you think can explain the way people conduct themselves in a morally
relevant context?
Stage scores for the task on classifying stages, according

to the MJI manual (Colby et al, 1987)
Statement stages:
1) Stage Three (p 74)
2) Stage Five (p 55)
3) Stage One (p 12)
4) Stage Three (p 74)
(it is scored as an equivalent of statement 1)
5) Stage Four (p 42)
Kohlberg, L & Kauffman, K (1987). ‘Theoretical introduction to the measurement of moral
judgment’. In A Colby & L Kohlberg (eds), The measurement of moral judgment. Vol 1.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(This provides the most recent and comprehensive exposition of Kohlberg’s theory, on the authority
of Kohlberg himself.)
Rest, J R (1983). ‘Morality’. In P Mussen, J H Flavell, & E M Markman (eds), Handbook of Child
Psychology. Vol. 3. (4th ed-). New York: John Wiley.
(An accessible rendition of Kohlberg’s theory and a detailed discussion of Rest’s component analysis
of moral conduct.)
M Killen & J Smetana (eds) (2006). Handbook of Moral Development. London: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
(A compendium of current thinking on moral development by leading scholars in the field.)
CHAPTER
20
Evolutionary psychology
Michael Greyling
In this chapter we discuss the contributions of evolutionary

psychology with a focus on:
1. What is evolution?
2. Mechanisms of evolutionary change
3. What is an adaption?
4. Key principles of an evolutionary psychology approach
5. What evolutionary psychology is not
6. The development of the brain and the role of genes
7. Aspects of development within an evolutionary
psychology framework
8. Cognitive development and evolutionary psychology
This chapter also provides some critiques of evolutionary

psychology and provides a brief discussion on the possibility of
believing in both evolution and the existence of a divine Creator.
Introduction
Evolutionary psychology is an approach to understanding modern human Nature-Nurture Debate.
behaviour from the perspective of the challenges faced by our evolutionary The debate centres
ancestors. Our bodies and brains have evolved over millions of years and around the degree to
each of us shares that heritage. This chapter will explore that communality which our behaviours,
between our evolutionary pasts and what insights we may derive from it. beliefs, values, etc, are
To begin, evolutionary psychology revisits some of the ‘Nature- things we are born with
(Nature or Nativist) as
Nurture’ debate that occupies much of psychology. While the notion of our
opposed to things which
evolutionary past must give some weight to the nature (nativist) side of the develop due to influences
equation, the debates are not as simple or as crude as they are frequently from our environment
presented. Firstly, all theorists to a lesser or greater extent subscribe to (Nurture).
some form of interactionism. Simply put, learning, growth or ‘nurture’
would not exist without the DNA, genes and abilities which humans as a Interactionism. The
species share (‘nature’). By the same token DNA and genes do not operate position that argues
that all development
in a vacuum and no development of any sort can take place without an
occurs in the context of
enabling environment. In each and every developmental step there are an interaction between
either stable or important environmental influences that interact with the the environment and
developing organism and the way this happens is to a large extent reliant our inherent or genetic
on the genetic potential carried by individuals and species. potential.
Evolutionary psychology is not an attempt to quantify the degree

to which any trait is determined by the genes but rather is an attempt
to document aspects of human nature that appear to be common to all
humans and to understand why those features might be part of what it is
to be human.
Before exploring the potential links within human behaviour it is
Evolution. important to outline the notion of evolution and the principal mechanisms
The notion that species for evolutionary change.
change over time and
that the diversity of life on
earth is due to this process
What is evolution?
of gradual change.
Charles Darwin (1859) described evolution as ‘descent, with modification’
(Darwin, 1859: 411). Descent refers to the process whereby organisms
produce replicas of themselves. This happens
PHO TO: MICHAEL GREYLING
in a variety of ways, from the obvious human

example whereby children are produced
through sexual reproduction, to simple
unicellular organisms where a single cell simply
splits in two, to the strange examples of viruses,
such as influenza, where a virus invades another
cell and turns it into a factory for making copies
of the virus. The modification part of Darwin’s
definition indicates that the new copies are
not always identical to the original. This
modification can be inherent in the process,
Human breeders select such as the way you are not identical to either of
which animals to breed your parents or accidental, when something goes wrong with the copying
with in order to enhance process and results in a random mutation.
particular traits both While evolution can be thought of in terms of changes in a single
physical and mental. These
two dogs from similar blood
replicating event, the definition only attains its full force when considered
lines share not only physical over the timespan of natural history (literally billions of years.) Tiny changes
characteristics but also accumulated over many generations have resulted in the development of all
drives and working abilities. of the species present on earth today. Given enough time these changes within
a species lead to new species and ultimately the diversity of life we know today.
We can see such evolutionary change on a small scale when examining how
the shapes and characteristics of domestic dogs have changed dramatically
over a few hundred years of careful (and sometimes reckless) breeding.
Mechanisms of evolutionary change

The science of animal husbandry is well established and based on the
Natural Selection. simple principle of breeding specimens that have the desired character-
The process whereby istics and not breeding those that do not. Human breeders, through their
certain traits are more choices of breeding stock, have had a massive impact on the species of
likely to occur in domestic animals. For example, the high incidence of hip dysplasia has
subsequent generations
made it a requirement for most dogs in the ‘Working Group’ to have their
of a species due to the
fact that members of the
hips scanned before they are allowed onto breed registers.
species with this trait are Charles Darwin’s most significant contribution was to describe a
more likely to survive until mechanism in which these changes took place without the need for any
they reproduce or are conscious intervention. He called this process Natural Selection with obvious
better able to reproduce. reference and contrast to the selective breeding practices described above.
Evolutionary psychology 419
Darwin noted that not all members of a generation were able to reproduce.
Some were killed before they could reproduce while others were unable to
find a suitable mate. Secondly, Darwin noted that not all members of a species
were identical. In fact there is a large amount of variation between members
of the same species. Now imagine that some members of the species had a
trait that made it more likely for them to survive (for example colouring
which provides better camouflage from predators). Then on average more
of those with better camouflage would survive until breeding age. The next
generation then becomes more likely to have a greater proportion of those
with the better camouflage. In time we would anticipate that the whole
population would come to have that trait.
It is important to remember that natural selection operates on
variability in the population that already exists and as such does not aim for
a particular outcome. Rather, the process merely assumes that on average
those whose characteristics are most suited to the task of surviving long
enough to reproduce (or to produce the most offspring) are those most
likely to form the template for the next generation, which, in turn, will be
more suited to the task of surviving.
An imaginary example will be used to demonstrate this principle. Ima-
gine a small plant that produces berries. At some period in its evolutionary
history the plant has berries that are generally quite bitter but some of the
plants have berries sweet enough to be palatable to the local birds. The birds
fly down and carefully peck the berry until they find one that is sweet enough
to eat. The berries are then either eaten on the spot or carried away to feed
the birds’ young. Berries that are carried away and dropped somewhere else
on average have a better chance of growing as they do not have to compete
with the existing plants for nutrients. Now this scenario (not implausible,
if somewhat oversimplified) is likely to lead to two consequences if played
out over time. The sweeter berries, which the birds seek out, are more likely
to be carried away and germinate and will then become more common in
the plant population. In addition, birds more adept at spotting the subtle
variations in shape or colour that reveal the sweeter berries are more likely
to feed themselves and their young and as such the birds that have these
skills are also likely to predominate.
The important lesson from this example is that evolution via natural
selection did not set out to make sweeter berries. It merely happened
that in the context of birds eating the berries more of the sweet berry-
producing plants reproduced and therefore on average the berries got
sweeter. Students of evolution are often misled by examples such as these
to assume that evolutionary change is a steady process of improvement, for
example sweeter obviously being better. It is important that the solution
found is in some way random and dependent on the available variation.
An equally plausible set of events, given the situation above, is that some
birds have a better ability to tolerate the bitter berries and that slowly the
bird population changes to one that eats/enjoys bitter berries.
Finally it is important to remember that species do not, as a rule,
exist in nice little dyads but form part of a complex ecosystem of food,
predators, prey, environment (for example temperature, water, colours,
etc), parasites and competing species. Each component of the ecosystem
can change over time and in doing so make alternative variations within
a species more successful, thereby changing the parameters under which
natural selection operates.
What is an adaption?
The notion that random chance guided by natural selection is the basis
for all the diversity of life is surprising because there are so many aspects
of different animals that seem so well designed for their task. (This is an
overstatement as we have not discussed all the mechanisms of evolution-
ary change.)
Think, for example, about our eyes. They are extremely complex organs
that have lenses, sensors, muscles, and cavities to remove excess light— all
of which do a brilliant job to perform the function of seeing. In fact, even
this massively underestimates the complexity of our visual system. It just
seems ‘obvious’ that eyes were designed for seeing.The issue here, however,
is not how natural selection and variation have come to produce an eye.
Again it is important to emphasise that according to the theory, eyes were
not planned from the outset. Rather, eyes came to be the way they are, and
eyes are clearly suited to the task of seeing. Put differently, an animal that
can map objects such as food, obstacles, prey and predators at a distance
clearly has an advantage over one that cannot. The eyes are a very effective
solution to this task. Of course other solutions, such as the echolocation in
bats or the acute smell of dogs, are also effective.
The eyes provide us with so many advantages that it may be difficult
to identify the evolutionary story that resulted in them being as they are
today. However it may be interesting to consider a possible story behind
this one small feature. Why do we have eyebrows when the rest of our
face has no hair? A functional explanation would point to the idea that
a dark patch around the eyes reduces glare from excess light, much in
the same way as we might shield ourselves from the glare with our hand
when looking in the direction of the sun. Imagine now a proto-human
population, some of which had brows while others did not. Humans with
eyebrows would have slightly better vision in bright sunlight and perhaps
recognise food, predators or other opportunities/risks better than their
non-eyebrowed compatriots. On average more of them would survive,
ultimately leaving only eyebrowed individuals in the population. As such
the eyebrows would have been selected for through the process of natural
Adaption. A trait that selection, and we would call them an adaption. Adaptions then are features
exists in a population that at some time in our evolutionary history conferred an advantage on
due to the fact that it those members of our species—or a species from which we derived—who
supplied and evolutionary
possessed them, and as such were selected for by natural selection.
advantage and as such was
selected for by means of
natural selection. Not all features are adaptions
If natural selection were the only game in town then all features would be
adaptions. However this is not the case. Three important alternatives need
to be considered. Firstly, while some random changes affect the survival
of an animal, some of the changes are neutral. If a series of random neutral
changes occurs in a species this may ultimately result in new features
that were not selected for, but merely not selected against. As an example,
random changes might result in some purple flowers in amongst a species

that previously only had red flowers. If purple makes no difference to the
chance of survival or reproduction then the change is a new feature that
was neither selected for nor selected against.
Secondly, some features may merely have hitched a ride as a con-
sequence of another adaption. For example, adding some segments to a
millipede may make it longer and larger, which may confer some benefit
in and of itself, but it may also increase the length of the gut, add to the
surface area of the skin, and so on.
Finally, many features are present simply because natural selection
can only operate on the available variation. This has the effect that many
structures show elements of our ancestral history even if those features
could have been better designed from scratch. It is often noted that a
giraffe has the same number of neck bones as every other mammal (that
is, seven). This allows the giraffe to reach areas that other mammals of
similar build are unable to, but it also makes for a neck that does not bend
very easily. This may be advantageous in that it might require less muscle
to keep upright but it makes drinking water out of a low dam extremely
difficult. Whether or not seven bones in the current configuration is the
optimal solution (which seems implausible), the giraffe most likely has
seven bones in its neck because a viable effective version with eight or
more bones simply never occurred and, as such, natural selection has
never had the option to select for it.
Key to all of these possibilities is the possibility that a useful feature
might arise for reasons that are not directly related to natural selection. In
particular the usefulness of a feature in the present may not be the reason
that it is present in the organism. Consider that the first feathers appeared
on creatures that could not fly. The fact that feathers make brilliant wings
is not the reason they were selected for. Such features are called exaptions Exaptions. Features that
as they appear to be an adaption but in fact are not. appear to be adaption but
Exaptions are important to evolutionary psychology in that any attempt are, in fact, not.
to understand a feature of the mind as an adaption needs to consider the
possibility that its current utility has no relationship to its evolutionary
origins. This raises doubt about any evolutionary explanations that may
be proffered.
Key principles of an evolutionary psychology

approach
As noted above, the essence of an evolutionary psychology approach is
an attempt to explain aspects of our behaviour in terms of adaptions that
enabled our ancestors to survive and prosper. It is thus an overarching system
of explanation (like cognitive, behaviourist or psychoanalytic approaches)
rather than a specific theory of development. As with many such systems
not everyone working under the evolutionary psychology banner holds all
the same assumptions and there are many others who make evolutionary
arguments for their theories but who would not see themselves as
evolutionary psychologists. Nonetheless, two of the most vocal proponents
of evolutionary pscyhology, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1997), suggest
five principles that capture the essence of this system of explanation.
These are:
s Principle 1: The brain is a physical system. It functions as a computer.

Its circuits are designed to generate behaviour that is appropriate to
our environmental circumstances.
s Principle 2: Our neural circuits were designed by natural selection
to solve problems that our ancestors faced during our species’
evolutionary history.
s Principle 3: Consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg; most of what
goes on in our minds is hidden from us. As a result, our conscious
experience can mislead us into thinking that our circuitry is simpler
than it really is. Most problems that we experience as easy to solve are
very difficult to solve—in that they require very complicated neural
circuitry.
s Principle 4: Different neural circuits are specialised for solving
different adaptive problems.
s Principle 5: Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.
Cosmides & Tooby, (1997)
The first principle is similar to the guiding principle of cognitive psychology,

namely that the brain is an information processor and performs similar
tasks to those of a computer. Cosmides & Tooby (1997) argue that the brain’s
primary function is to interpret our environment and produce appropriate
behaviour. The brain does this through multiple circuits or modules
(presumably a given combination of neurons and neurotransmitters
located somewhere in the brain), many of which, according to Principle
4, have very specific functions. The notion of separate circuits performing
unique functions is referred to as modularity. The majority of these circuits,
according to Principle 3, operate below the level of awareness and enable
us to interpret a complex set of information received from our senses and,
seemingly without effort, to guide behaviour. None of the above assumptions
are unique to evolutionary psychology but they are important in justifying
the conclusions that are often drawn by evolutionary psychologists.
Principle 2 identifies these neural circuits as adaptions and as such they
were selected for in our history. The task of an evolutionary psychologist
is then to discover these adaptions by examining their function and trying
to understand how they conferred an evolutionary advantage to our
ancestors. As our brains appear to set us apart from other species similar
Environment
to us, a key assumption is that our neural circuits are largely specific to
of evolutionary our species. For the vast majority of human history, humans lived in small
adaptiveness (EEA). hunter-gatherer societies. This period of time constituted the environment
The period in our for which human brains were adapted. Our current environment (cities,
evolutionary history where technology, livestock and cultivation) has existed for too short a period
the adaptions that make for our brains to have made any significant adaptions from the hunter-
us distinctively human
gatherer period.
appeared. As such our
brains are evolved to
This is the essence of Principle 5. Evolutionary psychologists refer to
solve problems that we this period as the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA) and
encountered in believe that an understanding of our Stone Age ancestors is the key to
this environment. understanding our modern brain.
In summary, an evolutionary psychologist will look for patterns of

behaviour, in all humans, that are present because they were selected for in
our evolutionary history. The explanation for those behaviour patterns will
be found in the advantage they conferred on our hunter-gatherer ancestors.
PHO TO S : JACK I WATTS

The assumption of modularity (Principle 4) allows us to both imagine
and identify specific traits accomplished by specific circuitry that have a
specific adaptive function.
The fact that an explanation put forward by evolutionary psychology
may seem alien to our experience does not mean that the explanation
is wrong. For, as Principle 3 notes, most of the circuits operate at an
unconscious level and our conscious understanding merely operates as
the result of these myriad processes. Thus, for example, when a beautiful
member of the opposite sex walks past, we might immediately note the
beauty but not be aware of a myriad of reasons as to why our brains have
come to that decision.
What evolutionary psychology is not

While the above gives a brief outline of what evolutionary psychology
proposes it is useful to distinguish it from the essential model that it
opposes and also from a number of similar approaches with which it is
often confused and at times deliberately combined.
s The Standard Social Science Model: The extreme opposite of the

evolutionary psychology approach is the assumption that the brain is
in essence a general purpose learning device which with the correct
environment could be shaped to just about any task, that is, that the
brain is a blank slate. While no one holds strictly to this view it is
probably true that most other approaches either do not emphasise, or
ignore, the possibility that some of our traits are manifestations of our
genetic make-up.
s Genetic Determinism: If the standard social science model is one end of

an extreme spectrum of understanding, then genetic determinism sits
at the other pole. Genetic determinism assumes that every aspect of
our person is encoded in our genes and all our behaviour is inevitable.
While evolutionary psychology sees many of our abilities as inherited
this process is seen as enabling rather than restricting of freedom.
Evolutionary psychology argues that it is precisely because of our
many and varied neural circuits that we can accomplish and become
the complex individuals that we are, rather than be determined on a
set path laid down by our genes.
s Social Darwinism: This is an approach to understanding human

society that sees the differences between human groups (for example
ethnic or social groups) as having resulted from natural selection. In
Evolutionary psychology
particular this approach sees social differences in wealth and power as
looks beyond surface
being due to the favoured groups having superior genes. In contrast differences in order to find
evolutionary psychology examines and emphasises the commonality mental traits which are
of all humans and tries to understand the faculties that we all have in common to all humans.
S CANS : MI K E G REY LI NG
common. The emphasis of Principle 5 is specifically that evolution

is too slow a process for substantive differences between groups of
humans to be evident.
s Sociobiology: This approach predates evolutionary psychology and

the distance between them is very small. Much of the work done by
9 weeks sociobiologists is still considered valuable by evolutionary psychologists
who believe that they have addressed the critiques that have been
made of sociobiology. A key difference is the emphasis evolutionary
psychology places on the EEA, as discussed above. This emphasis avoids
the critique that mental characteristics that are adaptive today may not
have been adaptive in the context for which they were selected.
The development of the brain and the role of

10 weeks
genes
As mentioned earlier, evolutionary psychologists propose the existence of
neural circuits, each of which performs a function that gives humans some
cognitive skill (modularity). How are these neural circuits reliably built in
an organ as complex as the brain?
The human body starts off soon after conception as a small lump of
cells that multiply and then flatten out to form three layers. The outermost
layer, called the ectoderm, is destined to become the brain and spinal
cord. The layers twist into a tube, one end developing into the brain and
16 weeks the other into the spinal cord. The brain first forms three lumps later
destined to become the fore, mid and the hind brain. It then begins to
expand rapidly, particularly the forebrain. As the brain grows literally
billions of neurons are created. Curiously, the cells start in the centre of
the brain and grow outwards towards what will become the cortex (the
outer layer of the brain.) The neurons are guided to their destination by
chemicals in the cortex. Eventually the surface area of the cortex is so
large that it starts to fold in on itself, and it is this that gives the brain its
20 weeks
wrinkled appearance. After birth the brain continues to grow and a large
number of connections between the nerve cells form. These connections
continue to increase at an exponential rate and in an important sense
can be described as the ‘wiring’ of the brain. Some connections are close
together, forming small clusters of brain cells, while others link different
areas of the brain.
Interestingly, massively more connections are initially formed than
are ultimately needed or used. Experiences and other influences appear to
remove some of the excess connections. Although much of this ‘pruning’
of connections happens before adolescence, the twin process of synaptic
growth and degeneracy continue throughout life.
To understand the role of genes we first need a quick introduction
to the concept of a gene. In our discussion of evolution we noted that
30 weeks
organisms need a mechanism to copy themselves and in doing so pass on
Ultrasound scans show the information about themselves to the next generation. The vast majority
early prenatal development
of the infant.
of this information is coded in the genes. Many texts would say all of
this information is in the genes, but in most cases a whole cell is passed
on which includes mitochondria (with its own genetic material) and the
chemical building blocks essential for development. In truth, on its own,

the genes would achieve nothing.
The term ‘gene’ was originally conceptualised by Gregor Mendel as
representing a unit of information, passed on from one generation to the
next, which determined some aspect of the organism, for example the
colour of a flower. Francis Crick and James Watson famously discovered
how genes were encoded through the structure of the DNA molecule.
The DNA molecule is in the shape of a double helix. (Imagine a long
twisted ladder.)
DNA. Deoxyribonucleic
Each rung of the ladder contains a pair of molecules called base Acid, the molecule that
pairs. There are four different molecules (adenine, thymine, cytosine and stores your genetic
guanine) that can be described as the alphabet of the genetic code. The information.
molecules are always paired so that adenine (A) is always with thymine
(T) and cytosine (C) is always with guanine (G).
This one-to-one matching is important as it allows for the
DNA molecule to be copied. The copying is required every time
a cell divides into two to ensure that the same DNA is present in
every cell in the body. It is particularly important when passing
information on to the next generation that an accurate copy of the
DNA is passed into the sex cells, the gametes (sperm and ovum.)
The ladder splits in two through separation of the base pairs of each
rung, and then the other side of each half is filled in. The one-to-
one mapping ensures that an exact replica is made.
The brain, as with every other organ in the body, develops
according to instructions coded in our cells by means of DNA
molecules. Many authors have used analogies that suggest that
the DNA contains the blueprint of our bodies, which reliably
determines our construction. While the analogy is useful to the
extent that DNA certainly does contain information relevant to our
development and is crucially involved in determining how we will
turn out, it is a much messier and a less determined process than the
blueprint analogy suggests.
How then is DNA involved in development? Each protein
(an important building block of organisms) used by our bodies is
described by a sequence of the letters (CGAT) on the ladder. A
Figure 20.1 The double
protein can be manufactured by the copying procedure described above. helix structure of the DNA
Here, instead of a complete copy of the DNA, a section of the ladder is molecule.
copied onto another molecule called RNA. This is similar to DNA but only
has one half of the ladder. The RNA molecule then becomes the template
from which a protein is formed. Our genes, in this revised scheme, are
now those areas of the DNA molecule that describe proteins.
However, this is where it starts to get messy. There is no simple map
for a gene to correlate directly to, for example, hair or height. It turns
out that most of the information in the approximately three billion
base pairs of the human DNA molecule does not code for anything
at all. Not only that, the same set of DNA can affect many aspects of
development depending on where it is in the body and which chemicals
are around it. The proteins which a particular cell will build, and how
it will divide, depend not only on the DNA, but also on its location
in the body, the timing of the developmental process and the range of
chemicals present.
How this all works, particularly in a complex structure such as the
brain, is not well understood. What is evident is that the genes exert an
enormous amount of control over development but at the same time
rely on numerous factors external to the DNA in order to function.
These include the internal and external environment of the body as
well as a fair bit of random fluctuation. The degree to which the DNA
is responsible for the building of individual neural circuits or rather
merely providing the broad structure of the brain is at the heart of the
nature/nurture debate.
Aspects of development within an evolutionary

psychology framework
It was noted above that evolutionary psychology is an overarching frame-
work for thinking about the mind and psychology. The section below will
highlight a few areas of development discussed in other sections of the
book and apply the evolutionary lens to highlight how this perspective
might understand their development.
The development of language

Language is a crucial part of human society and the complexity and
power of language is remarkable. Human children are extraordinary
linguists, a fact that we often underestimate because it appears so simple
to us. Language (in the complex form we know it) certainly appears to
be a skill unique to humans. This is not to say that other species do not
communicate, but rather to emphasise that their communication is of a
qualitatively different form.
In the section on language development you were exposed to a num-
ber of theories of language development. While not developed under
the banner of evolutionary psychology (the term came much later)
Noam Chomsky’s notion of a language acquisition device (LAD) fits
clearly in the nativist framework of evolutionary psychology. One of the
most vocal proponents of evolutionary psychology, Steven Pinker, has
rigorously defended this approach in his book The Language Instinct.
Chomsky attacked the prevailing behaviourist theories of his day (they
largely ignored any internal processes) by arguing that an approach to
understanding language that assumes only a general learning capacity
(that is, no specific aspects of the brain dedicated to learning language)
simply could not explain the abilities of human children.
Of course no one is claiming that human newborns arrive with a
fully-fledged language module. For one thing this would not account for
why we do not all speak the same language. However proponents of the
innate (nativist) approach argue that we have modules that specify some
key principles of language which shortcut the myriad of possibilities for
language structures.
As a result much research within this framework aims to determine
what it is that young children learning a language do in order to learn the
language. This is in contrast to other approaches to language development
that may focus on what adults do to encourage language development.

Ellen Markam, for example, has suggested that children make a set
of assumptions when learning new words that assists them in ruling out
many possible meanings. These assumptions include:
s The whole object assumption: The child assumes a new word refers
to the whole object being named, not any aspect of the object. For
example, if the mother points to a dog and says, ‘dog’ the child will
assume that what is being referred to is the whole dog and not its ears
or that it is running.
s The taxonomic assumption: The child assumes that a new word for
an unknown object refers to the class of objects, not the name of
that particular object. Thus if the mother points to a dog and says,
‘Geordie’ the child will assume that this is the generis name for all
dogs, not that ‘Geordie’ is the name of just this dog. Children often
make this mistake with pets, assuming that the name for their pet is
the generic name for all such animals.
s The basic level of categorisation: Children also assume that the categor-
isation takes place at what is called the basic level of categorisation. The basic level of
Again, using the taxonomic assumption, the child will assume a new categorisation. Consider
word applied to the first dog encountered refers to the category ‘dogs’ the terms furniture, chair,
director’s chair. Chair is at
(or a least four-legged furry animals) but not a higher category such
the basic level. Furniture
as animals or pets or a lower category such as Boxers. is a higher level. Director’s
chair is a lower level
s The mutual exclusivity assumption: Once a child has a word for a categorisation. The basic
category he will assume that new words for the same category are not level is the largest level of
synonyms, but refer to aspects or features of that particular example. categorisation in which a
If the child knows the word ‘dog’ and the mother says ‘brown’ the single mental image of the
object can be formed. It
child will make the assumption that brown is a feature of the dog and
is also the largest level at
not another name for dogs. which the way we interact
physically with the object
Why and how did natural selection produce the language is the same.
facility?
The major problem with this question is that language confers so many
benefits that it is hard to single out one benefit that might have come
first. There are many theories of the evolution of language. For example,
the ecologist and science writer Jared Diamond (1991) has pointed to
the complex nature of communication in vervet monkeys as a potential
bridge between human and animal language. The monkeys appear
to have different sounds/words for different kinds of predators and
hierarchies of other monkeys. These are highly adaptive as the correct
call from a monkey will result in appropriate behaviour from the other
monkeys. Consider that the ‘leopard’ call will send all the monkeys up
into the trees, while the ‘eagle’ call has the monkeys hiding under the
nearest bush.
This is a long way from human language, but Diamond argues that
we have yet to fully understand the complexity of animal languages and
that these languages may be early steps towards the development of

human language.
The development of sexuality and sexual identity

The chapter on gender identity presents evidence that gender (‘the
conceptual understanding of the social and cultural differences between
men and women’) is unrelated to biological sex and is largely something
defined by the norms of the society in which we live. This assumption has
been key to feminist critiques of a male-dominated and controlled society
in which women were and still are often relegated to inferior roles. This is
often justified, or implicitly informed, by assumptions about the nature of
women and their characteristics relative to men.
It is precisely because of these substantive and important political con-
siderations that arguments by evolutionary psychologists about separate
adaptions for men and women are so hotly contested.
A number of researchers have examined the differences between men
and women and attempted to provide evolutionary explanations as to
why those differences may both be adaptions (that is, produced by natural
selection) and yet continue to underpin the development of sexual identity
today. Typically, researchers have attempted to demonstrate the universality
of the behaviour (that is, it is present in all cultures) and that the behaviours
would have been adaptive (that is, produced a higher number of viable
offspring) for Stone Age men and women who practised them.
The notion of evolutionary differences in men and women is a
fundamental discourse which is woven into many aspect of society and
was, for example, hilariously played out in Rob Becker’s hit Broadway
show Defending the caveman. These cultural examples of the theory may
also present a challenge to evolutionary psychologists who try to find
scientific arguments for their theories but which become, in the public
mind, oversimplified or reified. It is a small step from postulating that
women on average will be more nurturing to pronouncing that a career
woman is ‘unnatural’.
A major area of study in the field of evolutionary psychology has
been in the area of mating strategies for men and women. The research
has argued that as sexual reproduction is the most fundamental aspect
of genetic inheritance, it is highly likely that the behaviours related to
reproduction and mating have been subject to natural selection.
As noted above there are two aspects to research in this area: their
universality and their adaptive value. The list of behaviours that are
considered universal to all men and women are many but the following is
a typical list of universal behaviours as postulated by evolutionary psycho-
Parental investment. logy research. Research may have included, for example, questionnaires
The degree to which a with large samples in different cultures, demonstrating consistent aver-
given parent invests his/ age differences between men and women on these traits.
her resources into their
The evolutionary explanation for these preferences hinges on a
shared offspring. The
parent who invests more
concept which Robert Trivers (1972) called ‘parental investment’. In
is on average more likely essence, Trivers noted that the contribution of each sex to the raising of
to be choosy about the children varies from species to species. This includes the physical cost
potential mates. of producing the gametes (the sex cells, that is, sperm and eggs) as well as
the costs involved in gestation and raising of the children. He argued that
where one sex invests more than the other, there will be differences in
strategies for obtaining a mate. In particular the greater the cost to a given
sex the more careful that sex will be in choosing his or her mate.
Men Women
Men desire as many sexual partners Women seek a few partners (typically one)
as possible. who will ensure provision for themselves
and their children.
They are typically undiscriminating but Women desire men who are powerful,
their primary desire is for beautiful and wealthy and reliable.
young women.
They don’t seek long-term commitments They desire long-term commitment.

but will commit to a few women to ensure
that their children grow to maturity.
Their fundamental concern is that they Their fundamental concern is that their
don’t raise someone else’s children. mates do not divert needed resources to
the children of other women.
They are capable of violent reprisal if they They are jealous of other women who
suspect that someone else has sexual access may seek to lure their men
to their mate. (and hence resources.)
Table 20.1 List of behaviours postulated by evolutionary psychologists to be universal.
This follows logically from the simple notion that the more one invests,
the more risk is placed on the outcome and hence the more important
the choice will be. By definition the female is the sex that has the larger
gamete (the egg is larger than the sperm) thus on average the female is
more likely to carry the heavier cost and therefore be the more careful
mate. This definition obviously only applies where there are two sexes and
there is a difference in the size of the gametes. (There are species that have
many sexes and many that have asexual reproduction.)
In humans the difference between the sexes is typically large in a
number of ways. Women produce fewer eggs and have the additional
‘cost’ of menstruation. After conception a woman carries the baby to
term and needs to provide resources for herself and her child. Even after
birth a human infant is essentially helpless and needs careful support and
resources until the child can fend for himself. Added to this, the pregnant
mother is particularly vulnerable to predators.
By contrast, men continue to produce sperm for most of their lives
and do so in large quantities. Although men are typically involved in the
raising of their children and frequently bear the cost of providing food
and protecting the mother, they carry much less personal risk of failure. In
addition, if they can find other mating partners for whom they do not take
any responsibility and hence incur less personal risk, they increase their
chances of siring more children, and this has adaptive value.
In summary, evolutionary psychologists and the sociobiologists who
preceded them argue that male parental investment is much lower
than that of women. To this end, they theorise that the male strategy in
mating will be to have as many sexual partners as possible but only to
commit resources to one or a few of those partners. By contrast, because
a woman carries the foetus, she will be dependent on a male who will
provide for her and her children and will thus seek out men who are
reliable providers. They must be willing to make a commitment to her
children and have the financial, social and physical resources to do so.
Women will be cautious to ensure that their mate is committed only to
them and will thus be jealous of rivals.
Men’s choice to commit to some women will be guided by which
women are likely to produce many children and are strong and healthy
enough to raise them. Evolutionary psychologists have proposed that
the notions of beauty and youth are adaptive proxies for the underlying
need for fecundity and wellbeing. For men the worst possible outcome
would be to provide for another man’s child (a significant risk in a small
hunter-gatherer society) and they would guard jealously against this.
The above presents a grim and fundamentally transactional view of
human relations. It is important to remember the principles that were
laid out in the first section. In particular, most humans will not make
these economic calculations consciously and will emphasise concepts such
as love and attractiveness. Evolutionary psychologists would argue that
we are not aware of the unconscious calculations that underpin simple
experiences of liking and desire. The fact that we are not aware of them,
however, does not mean that these calculations are not happening at less
conscious levels.
It is also important to realise that evolution and natural selection are not
moral forces that produce desirable outcomes. It is simply that strategies
that are successful are likely to be repeated. If the above strategies were
successful for our ancestors then those are the strategies that will be passed
on to later generations. We may experience them as love, attraction, care
and passion but they mask a complex set of neural calculations that assess
the value of any potential mate.
Finally, it is important to recognise that these strategies are not
necessarily effective or desirable in modern society. As noted before,
evolutionary psychologists have distanced themselves from claims that
these patterns are how things ‘ought to be’. Nevertheless, they would
argue that we will not properly understand gendered behaviour unless
we consider the different evolutionary challenges faced by the males and
females who were our Stone Age ancestors.
Cognitive development and evolutionary

psychology
Evolutionary psychologists typically view the mind as consisting of a
number of modules, each designed through natural selection to perform
a specific function. This is particularly true of human reasoning. They

argue that the brain is not an effective general-purpose reasoning tool but
rather that it has many modules each designed to perform an adaptive task.
The brain is so effective precisely because it has so many well-designed
adaptive circuits that can be used for any given problem.
Researchers in this area have typically tried to identify each of these
modules and demonstrate that they operate independently of each other.
As an example of an independent reasoning module, Tooby & Cosmides
(1997) have spent many years researching mechanisms for social exchange.
They argue that all humans reliably develop a module to detect cheaters
in social exchange transactions. These transactions are defined as the Social exchange
exchange of benefits. Thus each party gives and receives a benefit. For transactions. Human
example, ‘I give you some of my ice-cream if you let me ride your bike’. interactions where
benefits are exchanged,
Cheaters are those who do not fulfil their side of the bargain; they receive
ie. one individual gives
the benefit but do not supply one in return. over a service or gift
The essence of their argument is based on a number of experiments and is rewarded either
using the Wason Selection Task. The task is a simple logic problem, immediately (or more
which has a clear and obvious solution based on elementary propositional significantly in the future)
logic. They found that in spite of this the average person performs very by a reward or gift of
poorly on this task even if the content is very familiar to them. Tooby similar value from the
other party.
& Cosmides (1997) noticed that if the task was framed in the form of a
social exchange, then the average person is very successful. A series of
further experiments demonstrated that the improved performance on
the task within the social exchange context operates in different cultures
at a young age and can also be distinguished from similarly phrased tasks
that are not about social exchange.
They further argue that social exchange is behaviour that is almost
unique to humans and that detecting cheaters would be a crucial ability for
anyone engaging in such transactions. Although the need for this ability
is not raised by Tooby & Cosmides, they clearly intended to distinguish
the conscious nature of social exchange in humans from the apparently
symbiotic relationships commonly found in nature.
Combining these findings, they conclude that since our performance
on logic tasks is so poor, we cannot be said to contain a general logic device
in our brains. Secondly, they argue that the enhanced performance in
social exchange indicates that humans have an innate model for cheater
detection that is an adaption relevant to our Stone Age ancestors. They
argue that no domain general (such as general reasoning or intelligence)
can explain the very specific performance in social exchange tasks.
They note that as reason is often highlighted as a defining trait of our
species then evidence that there are specific modules in reasoning ability
would lend strong support to the notion of a highly modular mind.
While the commitment to modularity is key to most self-proclaimed
evolutionary psychologists such as Tooby and Cosmides, a number of
cognitive theories of development suggest that our cognitive capacities
develop universally in a series of defined stages, Piaget being the most
obvious example. Within such theories there are assumptions that there
are also large components of our cognitive make-up that are innate
rather than learned.
Critiques of evolutionary psychology

The critiques of evolutionary psychology arise from many different
domains and the field has produced some of the more robust engagements
within the academic community. This section will highlight some of the
more prevalent critiques at a general level rather than those that apply to
specific findings.
As a starting point it is worth noting that when the debate between the
positions of evolutionary psychology and their critiques are raised it is often
presented in the most extreme terms, with two untenable and indefensible
positions contrasted with each other. Evolutionary psychologists typically
present their opposition as adherents of the Standard Social Science
Model (or blank slate) where humans are presented as empty learning
machines with no natural predispositions at all. By contrast evolutionary
psychologists are presented as genetic determinists who see no, or a very
limited, role for learning. Alternatively they are presented as ‘Ultra
Darwinists’ who have perverted the story of evolution.
Where do the real distinctions lie? Many of the debates fall between
those who see human learning as largely domain-general (that is, applying
the same principles to many different aspects of the mind) and those who
have domain-specific theories, such as evolutionary psychologists, they
see the mind as having many specialised circuits for solving particular
problems. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, both positions would
still take an interactionist perspective on the nature/nurture debate but
with different emphases and approaches.
Evolutionary psychology has a number of detractors. A number of
critics argue, from the perspective of evolution, evolutionary psycholo-
gists do not take sufficient care when constructing their theories. Not
every feature is an adaption and careful work needs to be done to locate
the proposed adaption in a context, explain the timeframe in which it
occurred, explore the historical events surrounding the adaption and
demonstrate that it is the most reasonable explanation. The complexity
of evolutionary history is such that these explanations are difficult to
find and demonstrate even for adaptions that appear on the surface
to be obvious and clear. Critics point out that for any plausible adaption,
any story can be produced to explain its existence. A number of these
critics use the phrase ‘just so stories’ to describe a plausible account that
nevertheless stands among any number of equally plausible accounts
with no real evidence to support the one or the other. The charge of
‘Ultra-Darwinism’ comes therefore from the tendency to ignore other
mechanisms of evolutionary change and to see every feature as an
adaption that must have some selective value.
Evolutionary psychologists are often criticised for supporting
conservative viewpoints about humans and in particular undermining
the gains that women have made in modern societies. The section
on gender identity suggests that not only are the claims about men
and women stereotypical, but they present a bleak picture of gender
relations. In response evolutionary psychologists would point to the
classic philosophical dictum ‘you cannot turn an is into an ought’. In
other words the claims presented cannot be interpreted as how sexual
relations are supposed to be but only what they are. Understanding

how humans choose mates says nothing about how they ought to do
so. While this is true of the theory, many people would happily justify
their behaviour in terms of what is ‘natural’, for example a philanderer
might say, ‘Well I am a man’. Furthermore, at least some commentators
have noted that innate sex differences may well support arguments that
the lack of women in certain professions is inevitable and should not be
attributed to gender-role socialisation.
Feminist critiques have pointed to the reality that evolutionary
psychology explorations of sex and gender easily slip into well versed
stereotypes and in doing so are often framed from the male perspective.
Anne Fausto Sterling (2000) notes that the tendency of male sociobiologists
to interpret the world from a male perspective has often resulted in females
being relegated to passive observers of male endeavours. She notes that the
same evidence, when interpreted by female sociobiologists, has resulted in
major discoveries of the significance of, for example, female kin groups
in baboons. She suggests that similar biases may well be operating in the
nature of the claims that evolutionary psychologists have made regarding
sex differences in mating strategies.
Given the political significance of the claims of evolutionary psychologists
we can see why there is much debate and the need for strong evidence to
support such claims.
Can one accept the theories of evolution, in particular natural

selection, without giving up one’s belief in God?
There are certainly many devout religious the existence of the Creator, rather than to
individuals from all of the world’s major provide a blow-by-blow scientific account.
belief systems who accept the evidence for Certainly all religious scholars accept that the
evolution and see no contradiction with scriptures contain some figurative language
their faith. The theory of evolution does but some are still uncomfortable with a
however challenge some long-held beliefs. broad interpretation of the word ‘days’.
These challenges need to be understood if Secondly, the notion of a Creation that
one hopes to find a middle ground. is consistent with evolution is one in which
Firstly, as natural selection relies on the Creator starts off the process, but has
extremely long time periods, the theory little involvement thereafter. That is not
comes into conflict with beliefs that the to say that no further involvement could
world was created in literally seven days be entertained, but the power of natural
or some similar time period. Many Jewish selection as a theory is precisely that it
and Christian scholars, for example, are provides an explanation for life’s diversity
comfortable with the interpretation that the without postulating constant intervention
days referred to in the book of Genesis are by a grand designer. If one’s belief system
figurative and reflect periods of time rather sees only a Creator who creates each
than exact days. They would argue that individual species immediately then one’s
the primary religious function is to indicate beliefs will contradict with the theory.
>>
<<
Again religious scholars have noted that However, there is no a priori reason to
the world (as created) shows regularity assume that the theory of evolution is, in its
and order, and as such there is support broadest sense, contradictory with a belief
for the notion of a Creator who may in God. For some religions it is probably
intervene but for the most part has created complementary. It is of course a topic that
a system that operates on its own, and this is hotly contested. A brief meander through
could be consistent with an evolutionary the World Wide Web will reveal many
perspective. sites that are extremely disparaging of the
Perhaps the final challenge, which may theory. While one should read as broadly
be ‘a bridge too far’ for many beliefs, is the as possible, one should also be cautious
notion that human evolution is no different and refer to more scholarly critiques.
from that of any other species. Evolution Although the content fluctuates, Wikipedia
does not regard humans as the pinnacle of often provides balanced coverage of these
evolution but rather as only one branch on debates. Theorists such as Richard Dawkins
a very messy tree. Again it may well be that and Stephen J Gould have written many
human evolution was as much a part of the excellent and accessible texts defending the
Creator’s plan as every other species, but theory of evolution.
this is speculation outside the theory.
Specific tasks
➊ Look over the list of gender differences in Table 20.1. Do they ring true to you?
1.1 If so, how do you respond to critiques of these differences as merely stereotypical?
Do you support the argument that science which has potentially negative social
consequences requires a higher standard of proof?
1.2 If not, is this more than a gut response? Try to construct a critique of these views
using the evidence presented by the critics.
➋ Newspapers often carry articles about scientific discoveries of gender differences,

citing evolutionary implications or genes for particular behaviours. Find one of
these articles and re-evaluate their claims in terms of the critical arguments
presented above.
➌ Observe an infant as it starts to learn new words. Can you see evidence of the
assumptions described in the language section above?
Readings about evolution, genes and brain development:
With the exception of Darwin all of the books below are written for a popular audience. In spite of its age
Darwin’s text is both engaging and relatively easy to read.
Darwin, C (1859). On the origin of the species by natural selection. Many editions—available on
Google books.
Dawkins, R (1976; 1989). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, Richard [1986] (1996). The Blind Watchmaker. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Greenfield, S (2000). Brain Story. London: BBC.
Kukonis, G and Barr, T (2008). Evolution for Dummies. Indiana: Wiley Publishing Inc. Indianapolis.
An excellent summary of the science history of DNA is available at http://www.dnaftb.org/dnaftb/
Books by evolutionary psychologists and theorists who provide evolutionary and/or human nature-
based explanations of their theories:
Buss, Cosmides and Tooby, Pinker and Wright are all strident proponents of evolutionary psychology.
Buss, M (2005). Handbook of evolutionary psychology. Hoboken New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons.
Cosmides, L & Tooby, J (1997). Evolutionary psychology: A primer. Retrieved July 27, 2008, from the
University of California, Santa Barbara, Center for Evolutionary Psychology Web site: http://
www.psych.uscb.edu/research/cep/primer.html
Malik, K (2000). Man, Beast and Zombie. What science can and cannot tell us about human nature.
London: Phoenix.
Pinker, S (1994). The Language Instinct. How the Mind Creates Language. London: Penguin.
Pinker, S (1997). How the mind works. London: Penguin.
Pinker, S (2002). The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. New York: Viking Penguin.
Wright, R (1994). The Moral Animal. Why we are the way we are. London: Abacus.
Diamond, J (1991). The rise and fall of the third chimpanzee. How our animal heritage affects the way we
live. London: Vintage.
Ridley, M (2003). Nature via Nurture: Genes experience and what makes us human. London: Harper.
Overview Texts:
Workman, L & Reader, W (2004). Evolutionary psychology: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Badcock, C (2000). Evolutionary Psychology: A critical introduction. Malden Mass: Blackwell.
Critical Responses:
Rose, H & Rose, S (2001). Alas poor Darwin: Arguments against evolutionary psychology. London: Vintage.
Dupré, J (2001). Human nature and the limits of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(This book is a fairly challenging read but well worth it.)
CHAPTER
21
Contributions of cognitive
science approaches to
cognitive developmental
psychology
Kevin G F Thomas, Susan Malcolm-Smith, Marianne Ball
and Michelle Robberts
This chapter deals with the contributions made by cognitive

science and focuses on:
1. Introduction and History

2. Cognitive science approaches to the development of autobio-
graphical memory
3. Cognitive science approaches to the development of theory
of mind
Introduction and History

Early history: psychobiological roots
Contrary to the way many histories of cognitive psychology are written,
the information-processing approach to explaining human behaviour
(and, by inference, the development of cognitive structures in children)
has strong roots in psychobiology (that is, the application of principles of
biology, such as physiological changes in response to an external stimulus,
to the study of behaviour and mental processes). Major figures who
challenged the dominant behaviourist paradigm in the early part of the last
century included Edward Tolman (1932; 1949), who suggested that true
understanding of any behaviour begins with consideration of the purpose
of that behaviour; Karl Lashley (1951), who argued that the brain was not
simply a passive organ, geared toward simply responding to externally-
generated stimuli, but was instead a dynamic mechanism, capable of
organising a vast range of complex and creative behaviours; and Donald
Contributions of cognitive science approaches to cognitive developmental psychology 437
Hebb (1949), who proposed the influential concept of cell assemblies (two Psychobiology.
or more cells that are repeatedly active at the same time and thus become Also known as
associated with one another, so that activity in one facilitates activity in biopsychology or
behavioural neuroscience,
another) as the foundation for learning in the brain. It was the work of
this discipline is one
these individuals and their students that paved the way for the cognitive branch of the study of
revolution of the later part of twentieth century. brain-behaviour relations.
More specifically, it takes
The information-processing approach as its starting point some
On the one hand, what we refer to as the ‘cognitive science approach biological process (eg,
to development’ emerged from the psychobiological roots mentioned the way in which some
particular brain regions
above. It also emerged, however, from technological developments in
work together) and
telecommunications, human-factors engineering, and, particularly, digital asks how that process
computers in the 1950s. Psychologists of the time were fascinated by the contributes to higher
possibilities of such technology, particularly with regard to the notion mental functioning
that they could design computer programs to do the kinds of the tasks (eg, how a particular
we humans do. Alan Turing’s classic paper (1950) elegantly stated the key event is remembered).
issue: Can a machine show the same kind of intelligence that a human
being does? In other words, a computer would pass the ‘Turing test’ if you Turing test.
were to exchange SMSes with it and not know that it was a computer and Alan Turing’s proposed test
not a human being. of a machine’s ability to
demonstrate intelligence.
The information-processing approach, then, is very different from
More specifically, what he
the approaches outlined in previous chapters because it is based on a called an ‘Imitation Game’.
computer analogy for the way the mind processes information received There are three players: a
from the external environment. So, information-processing theorists human being, a machine,
argue that the human mind/brain (and, to a lesser degree, those of non- and an interrogator.
human animals) is a computer-like system that uses logical rules and The interrogator must put
strategic systems to receive, manage, store and send information. a series of questions to the
other two entities in order
With regard to cognitive development in children, the analogy here
to determine which is the
is at the level of hardware and software: Information-processing theorists machine and which is
hold that we are born with identical representational and computational the person. The machine’s
systems that are genetically pre-structured; that is, we all start as entry- goal is to try to make the
level computers. Just as more powerful computers are those that have interrogator think it’s
more sophisticated microchips and dual-core processors (hardware), the person; the person’s
as well as more complex and wide-ranging programs (software), goal is to help the
interrogator correctly
similarly, older children have more sophisticated interwoven neural
identify the machine. Any
systems for sensory input and motor output (hardware), as well as machine that successfully
more complex and wide-ranging logical rules and strategic systems confuses the interrogator
(software) to support input and output. This is because, during typical is said to have passed the
development, children are exposed to stimulus-rich environments and Turing test.
people, which result in the rapid development of the brain and nervous
system. As the child becomes skilled at successfully dealing with those
environments and people, he learns new problem-solving, attentional
and memory strategies, and becomes capable of performing cognitive
tasks with greater speed and accuracy. As adults, then, we are super-
computers (Shaffer, 1996).
Information-processing theorists and researchers who are inter-
ested in cognitive development use this computer-based analogy to
design and test models of the way in which, for instance, children of
different ages encode information (that is, identify key aspects of an
object or event in order to form an internal representation

PHO TO : G I LL MO O NEY
of that object or event), and then use that information to

solve problems. In their conventional guise, such models
assume sequential stages of cognitive processing that are
usually represented in the form of a flowchart. One of the
most commonly known of these models is Atkinson and
Shiffrin’s (1968) model of how the human memory system
functions. (A more detailed discussion of this model is
included in Chapter 17 on memory development.) An
important note here, however, is that there is no single
information-processing theory of cognition; instead,
there are many models which attempt to explain different
A central tenet of the cognitive processes.
information-processing
approach is that cognitive
In summary, the main assumptions of information-processing
functioning can be likened theories of human behaviour are:
in many ways to the
processing of a computer. s People process information, that is, we interact with stimuli in our
environment to perceive, encode, represent, store and (eventually)
retrieve elements of that information. This processing of information is
what we call thinking.
s People have limited processing capacity, that is, we can deal with only a
certain amount of information at a given time.
s Information moves through the cognitive system, and the pathways
between input, storage and output can be depicted schematically as
a flowchart.
Furthermore, with regard to the application of information-processing

theories of human behaviour to child development, these are the main
assumptions:
s As children develop, increased sophistication in their cognitive skills

is brought about by increasingly efficient processing on four fronts:
encoding, strategy construction (that is, the ability to formulate a plan
to deal with the environmental contingency), automatisation (that
is, the ability to assign even complex cognitive tasks to less effortful
processing without being less successful at completing them) and
generalisation (that is, the ability to derive general concepts from
specific instances).
s Children play an active role in their own development. That is to say,
as they grow older, they interact with the environment in increasingly
independent ways, and they use previously acquired knowledge, rules
and strategies to regulate and modify responses to novel situations.
Thus, self-modification is critical to the development of ever-more
sophisticated knowledge, logical rules and problem-solving strategies.
In this way, then, digital computing and related technology had an

indirect (by way of theoretical, information-processing, models of the
mind) influence on cognitive approaches to psychology.
Short-term memory
(STM)
Temporary
Sensory registers working memory Long-term memory
(LTM)
Environmental Visual Control processes: Permanent memory
input store
Auditory Rehearsal
Coding
Decisions
Haptic Retrieval strategies
Response output
Figure 21.1 Atkinson and Shiffrin’s model of memory (1968) was one of the first to depict the flow of
information through various memory systems in the form of a flowchart.
Artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence (AI), a field closely related to information-processing
theories, developed from a more direct influence of computing technology
on the study of cognition. AI researchers program computers to simulate
human cognitive functions or processes. These computer simulations
range from the very specific (for example, producing models of circuits
related to visual pattern recognition) to the very broad (modelling global
intelligence).
A significant line in the early empirical research on information-
processing theories, then, involved attempting to produce computer
systems that would use optimal methods to solve various problems. For
instance, Newell, Shaw and Simon (1957) developed a program called the
General Problem Solver (GPS) that used a general strategy called means-
end analysis to solve a range of quite specific problems. Essentially, the
problem-solving mechanism of the GPS was to successively reduce the dif-
ference between the current state (where you are now) and the goal state
(where you wish to be). GPS, then, is an example of a computer simulation
that emphasises global processes; other simulations, such as MYCIN
(Buchanan & Shortcliffe, 1984), which was used to detect and diagnose
bacterial infections, were designed to perform the way that a human
expert in a specific domain might.
Although AI approaches have contributed not only to methodological
and empirical but also to theoretical advances in the understanding of
human cognition, they have not been immune to criticism. One of the
most serious limitations identified by critics of (especially early) AI
approaches to, and computer simulations of, human cognition is that, by
and large, computers can only process one instruction at a time. Thus, Serial processing.
Occurs when information
the early computer-based models and simulations of human cognition
is handled in linear
almost invariably relied on step-by-step, line-by-line processing of fashion; each operation on
information. This is called serial processing, and attempts to overcome the information happens
its limitations have also led to major advances in our understanding of separately and
human cognition. in sequence.
Parallel distributed processing: connectionist models

In one of a seminal series of papers by their research group, McClelland,
Rumelhart & Hinton (1986: 3) asked:
What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly

are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better
at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations,
at understanding language and retrieving contextually appro-
priate information from memory, at making plans and carrying
out contextually appropriate actions, and at a range of other
natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to
do these things more accurately and fluently through processing
experience. What is the basis for these differences?
One answer to this question is that humans, unlike most computer-

based models and simulations, are not bound by serial processing. Instead,
psychobiological theories and neuropsychological research (beginning with
the work of Hebb), as well as research into basic cognitive processes such
as language learning, suggest that the human brain is capable of handling
many operations and processing information from several sources at the
same time—in other words, taking into account what McClelland and
colleagues called multiple simultaneous constraints. These ideas led to
Parallel processing. the development of what is called parallel distributed processing (PDP) or
Occurs when multiple connectionist models of human cognition (see McClelland, McNaughton &
sources of information O’Reilly, 1995; McClelland, Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group, 1986).
are handled at once;
The connectionist approach (an interdisciplinary undertaking that
multiple operations
occur simultaneously.
draws on ideas from artificial intelligence, psycholinguistics, cognitive
psychology and neuropsychology) is based on an understanding of
the interconnections between the neurons in the brain. Each neuron is
connected to many other neurons, forming large
and complex neural networks. Neurons produce
certain electro-chemicals that may either excite or
inhibit other neurons, causing them to fire. Using
this analogy, connectionist models conceive of
information as being stored in a pattern of excited
or inhibited elements called nodes, which are
functionally similar to neurons.
Each node is connected to many other nodes.
When a person’s perceptual system is stimulated—
by hearing a particular word, for example—some
nodes related to the perception and comprehension
of that word will ‘fire’, while others that are not
related to it will be inhibited. The connections
between the ‘firing’ nodes are strengthened each
Figure 21.2 A diagrammatic representation of
McClelland & Rumelhart’s (1981) connectionist time that word is perceived. There is some debate
network model of word recognition. as to whether it is the pattern of connections that
Source: Reisberg, D (2006). Cognition: Exploring represents the knowledge (which may be concepts
the Science of the Mind (3rd ed). New York: or any other type of information) or whether
WW Norton & Co, Inc. the specific nodes represent this knowledge
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985). The development of connectionist

networks is affected by the stimulation received through the senses and
continues throughout one’s life. As more information becomes available,
the system is extended and modified to assimilate or accommodate it.
(Note that these concepts are not far removed from Hebb’s (1949) notions
of cell assemblies.)
Although information-processing and connectionist accounts of
cognitive development are similar, that is, problem-solving and knowledge
systems grow based on experience within particular environments,
models based on these theories are quite different with regard to the level
and process of information storage. Specifically, information-processing
models store information as ‘symbols’ or meaningful units in long-term
memory, whereas connectionist models store information as a pattern of
excited and inhibited nodes in an interconnected network.
Cognitive science
Contemporary research in cognitive psychology is heavily influenced by
all of the approaches mentioned above: information processing, artificial
intelligence, connectionism, psychobiology and neuropsychology. Addi-
tionally, methods and theories from outside the discipline of psychology
(for example, from linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, economics and
neuroscience) have become an integral part of investigations into the
hardware and software that make up human cognitive architecture and
processing. The term cognitive science is thus used to subsume research
that not only draws from all of the fields listed above, but that also (a) takes
as its starting point the fact that human cognitive processes are constrained
by the limits of brain architecture, and (b) is concerned with the ways in
which human thinking is influenced by emotions and motivations, and by
the affective reactions humans have to each other and to social situations.
With specific regard to cognitive development, the cognitive science
approach is a clear improvement over traditional information-processing
approaches in numerous ways. One of these is that the social and
cultural factors so emphasized in the Vygotskian approach to cognitive
development (see Chapter 22 and also Kozulin, 1990) are absent in
information-processing accounts. Cognitive science, on the other hand, is
sensitive to both anthropological and personality variables, and cognitive
scientists have, for instance, made great contributions to cross-cultural
studies of intelligence (see for example, Nisbett, 2003).
Cognitive science approaches to the development

of autobiographical memory
Cognitive science researchers interested in understanding the changes
in memory function that take place during childhood have made
numerous important discoveries over the past decade or so. For
instance, computational models of short-term and working-memory
function have provided a possible theoretical basis to account for the
well-established empirical observation that, during childhood, there are
dramatic increases (especially up to the age of eight) in the capacity to
retain information for brief periods of time (Gathercole, 1999; O’Reilly,
Braver & Cohen, 1999; Page & Norris, 1998). Importantly, these
computational models have remained consistent with what is known
about the neuroanatomy of short-term and working memory (see for
example, Smith & Jonides, 1998), and with research that has established
that the prefrontal cortex, a key region for working memory function,
only fully develops relatively late in adolescence (Diamond, 2006; Sowell,
Delis, Stiles & Jernigan, 2001).
This part of the chapter focuses on that aspect of long-term memory
Autobiographical referred to as autobiographical memory (AM). It uses cognitive science
memory. The memory an research into the development of AM as an example of how fruitful this
individual has of his own approach is in furthering the aims of cognitive developmental psychology.
history and life.
Here, we use ‘long-term memory’ to refer to memory for events that
occurred years, months, days and hours ago (as opposed to ‘short-term
memory’, which refers to the recall of material presented seconds or
minutes before).
Relation of Autobiographical Memory to Conventional

Memory Typology
Relatively recent neuropsychological studies of the neural bases of long-
term memory (see for example de Haan, Wyatt, Roth, Vargha-Khadem,
Gadian & Mishkin, 2006; Skotko, Kensinger, Locascio, Einstein, Rubin
& Tupler, 2004) tend to support the distinction between semantic and
episodic memory systems, which was originally made more than 30
years ago by Endel Tulving (1972; see also Schacter & Tulving, 1994).
Semantic memory refers to general knowledge that each of us has about
the world, and includes our knowledge of names, our understanding
of the meaning of words, and so on. This kind of memory is for facts
that (a) are not unique to us, (b) are not associated with any particular
spatiotemporal context, and (c) we don’t recall when we learned.
Episodic memory, in contrast, refers to memories for events (or episodes)
that we personally experienced and that are associated with a particular
spatiotemporal context (that is, we can remember where and when a
Episodic memory is particular event occurred).
the memory of specific
Where does autobiographical memory fit into this typology? Newcombe,
events that we personally
experienced. Lloyd & Ratliff (2007) suggest that AM is episodic memory of a self-related
kind (for example, on Saturday we
P HOTO: MEDIAC LUBSOUT HA FRICA. COM, EMILY VISSER
went to the rugby game), as opposed to

episodic memory of an impersonal kind
(for example, that word was on the list
I was told to remember). Furthermore,
they suggest that AM is distinct
from autobiographical knowledge
(for example, I know I was born in
Johannesburg, but I have no recollection
of that event). Autobiographical
memory, then, is different from the
kind of episodic memory typically
studied in the laboratory in that it is
highly self-referential, is accompanied
by the phenomenal experience of remembering a specific event, and is

often accompanied by an emotional and personal interpretation of the
event (Conway, 1996; Gathercole, 1998). Importantly, however, it is not
completely distinct from the traditional conception of episodic memory,
which means that results from conventional laboratory-based studies of
memory might still be usefully applied to developing theories about AM.
One question to address before reviewing the literature on autobio-
graphical memory development in children is this: Why is it important
to study AM? One very clear reason is stated succinctly by Newcombe et
al, (2007: 40):
Autobiographical memory is a uniquely important kind of epi-

sodic memory because of its relevance to human cognitive and
emotional life: people treasure their personal memories and work
to retain them by making scrapbooks, taking photos, [and] sharing
them at family gatherings.
A second reason is that we have no memory of early events in our lives;

even important events, such as the first birthday party, the first experience
of solid food and the first time we were presented to a gathering of our
relatives, are beyond our recall. The fact that this lack of memory is
evident even while we are acquiring fundamental language concepts and
forming familial bonds is a mystery worth investigating.
Infantile Amnesia and Childhood Amnesia: Definitions

This inability to access memories for events that happened early in one’s
life is perhaps the feature of AM that has spurred the most interest in
developmental and other psychologists. The modern wave of research
into this ‘childhood amnesia’ began with a seminal review paper by
Pillemer & White (1989), in which they established that most individuals
have no memory for events that took place before two years of age, that
the average age of the earliest retrieved memory is approximately 3.5
years, that memory for the period between two and five years is patchy,
and that for most people intact AM is only present after five years. These
findings, and other studies that replicated them (for example Rubin, 2000),
provided the groundwork for contemporary distinctions between infantile
amnesia—the early two-year period from which people can consciously
recall almost nothing—and childhood amnesia (the period between two
and five years during which there is gradual lifting of the dense amnestic
condition; Newcombe et al, 2007).
Although cognitive science has contributed to answering several
different questions about AM and infantile/childhood amnesia (why
semantic and procedural/implicit memory is intact from birth to two years
while episodic memory is absent, for example), the focus here will be on
causes of early amnesia. Our specific focus will be on causes that are rooted
in developmental changes in the neural bases of memory systems and that
eventually lead to changes at the behavioural level. (It is worth noting that
other accounts of AM development have been proposed; these include
theories that focus on social-interactional frameworks, self-awareness,
and narrative coherence. See Gathercole (1998) for a review.) Even more
Hippocampus. A brain specifically, we will focus on one crucial brain structure, the hippocampus,
region, located in the following the argument of Newcombe et al, (2007) that the maturation of
temporal lobes, that plays this neural region can be linked to the move from infantile amnesia and
a critical role in learning
into childhood amnesia, and then from childhood amnesia and into adult-
and memory.
like AM capabilities.
Neural bases for infantile amnesia and childhood amnesia

Computational, neuroimaging and lesion-based neuropsychological studies
have argued that the hippocampus is always important to episodic memory
at three stages of processing: encoding, consolidation (that is, directing
information to neocortical areas for storage) and retrieval, and that the
hippocampus is responsible for the ability to bind together inter-item
associations that form the basis for the what-where-when structure present
in AM (Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley & McAndrews, 2004; Conway, Pleydell-
Pearce & Whitecross, 2001; de Haan et al, 2006; McClelland, McNaughton
& O’Reilly, 1995; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye & D’Esposito, 2000).
With regard to the development of the hippocampus, the key question,
of course, is whether relatively late postnatal maturation in this area might
contribute to infantile and childhood amnesia. Unfortunately, there is no
direct answer to this question. It is clear that neuronal differentiation of
hippocampal cells extends into at least the third postnatal year, but that
neurogenesis (that is, formation of cells in the central nervous system) may be
reasonably complete somewhat earlier than that (Frotscher & Seress, 2007).
Some researchers, however, have described maturation-related changes
in this structure that extend over at least the first five postnatal years (for
example Gogtay, Nugent, Herman, Ordanez, Greenstein & Hayashi, 2006).
Because there is no direct answer to the question of whether relatively
late postnatal maturation in the hippocampus (and/or in other critical
neural regions, such as the prefrontal cortex) contributes to infantile and
childhood amnesia, one has to draw inferences from behavioural studies.
For instance, if a particular behavioural task is known to rely on optimal
hippocampal functioning for successful completion, then one can look at
studies detailing the developmental trajectory for successful task comple-
tion and thereby (indirectly) assess the maturation of the hippocampus.
Assessing hippocampal maturation from birth-two years:

cognitive mapping tasks
Taking the approach outlined above, then, we review data emerging from
spatial cognitive tasks to evaluate whether the lack of episodic autobio-
graphical memories from birth to two (that is, infantile amnesia) might
be attributed to hippocampal immaturity. The particular tasks we will
discuss here are related to spatial navigation and place learning (the ability
to locate a particular target in an environment by using information about
its geometric relationship to landmarks in that environment).
Researchers who study spatial memory have identified the fact that, in
their day-to-day experiences, humans use at least two kinds of navigation.
One kind involves following a familiar route, where the person performs
the task almost unconsciously (driving from work to home every day, for
example). This form of navigation is typically called route following or

landmark-guided navigation. The other kind of navigation, with which we
are primarily concerned here, is a deliberate, consciously controlled process
that may depend on knowing or inferring the global spatial relations among
various locations in an environment (when a person has to find a new place
or a new route to a destination, for example). This form of navigation is
typically called wayfinding or cognitive map-guided navigation (Maguire,
Burgess & O’Keefe, 1999; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), and its use is desirable
for flexible and successful orientation to an environment.
Studies involving rodents, and more recently humans, have shown
that wayfinding involves distinct forms of cognitive representation with
correspondingly distinct neural bases (Morris, Garrud, Rawlins & O’Keefe,
1982; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). Arising from the discovery of location-
specific firing of place cells in the rodent hippocampus (O’Keefe &
Dostrovsky, 1971), cognitive mapping theory posits that a fundamental Cognitive maps.
function of the hippocampus is the construction and maintenance of Mental representations
spatial maps of the environment (that is, the hippocampus has a special of external physical
environments.
role in wayfinding; Maguire et al, 1999; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). A recent
neuroimaging study by Kumaran & Maguire (2005) replicated earlier
findings (see for example Astur, Taylor, Mamelak, Philpott & Sutherland,
2002; Roche, Mangaoang, Commins & O’Mara, 2005; Thomas, 2003;
Worsley, Reece, Spiers, Marley, Polkey & Morris, 2001) suggesting that
the right hemisphere hippocampus has a bias towards processing spatial
relationships and has a special role in mapping large-scale space.
In their study, Kumaran & Maguire (2005) compared patterns of brain
activation while their subjects (18 healthy, right-handed individuals)
performed two tasks placing similar demands on relational processing:
navigation within either a spatial domain (their city) or a non-spatial domain
(their social network). They showed that execution of these two complex
tasks resulted in very different patterns of brain activation; specifically,
the hippocampus was only engaged by relational processing in a spatial
(city), but not in a non-spatial (social) domain. Similarly, Hartley, Maguire,
Spiers & Burgess (2003) used functional MRI and virtual-reality navigation
tasks to confirm that humans show distinct patterns of neural activation
when engaging in different forms of navigation. Specifically, their findings
supported the notion that the hippocampus is especially involved in accurate
navigation via new routes (that is, cognitive mapping).
The findings from these neuroimaging studies are consistent with
studies of (a) neurologically normal adults (see for example Maguire,
Frackowiak & Frith, 1997), (b) adults with specific brain lesions (see
for example Bohbot, Kalina, Stepankova, Spackova, Petrides & Nadel,
1998) and (c) computational models of hippocampal function (Redish,
1999). Additionally, a recent study using single-cell recording techniques
(Ekstrom, Kahuna, Caplan, Fields, Isham & Newman, 2003) also supports
the proposal that the human hippocampus is preferentially engaged
during cognitive mapping tasks.
Research on the development of place learning and cognitive mapping
ability in humans has therefore focused largely on the maturation of the
hippocampus as an explanatory mechanism for change. Studies show
that successful place learning first occurs around 21 months of age;

for instance, at that age children can successfully use environmental
landmarks to find a toy that they had watched being hidden in a sandbox,
despite having to start their search from a different place to that from
which they watched the toy being hidden (Newcombe, Huttenlocher,
Drummey & Wiley, 1998). Cognitive mapping skill continues to develop
into the school years, with children becoming more accurate in their
place learning abilities and increasingly comfortable in more complex
environments featuring multiple (relevant and irrelevant) landmarks
(Newcombe et al, 2007).
The trend in the research on cognitive mapping in human children
is consistent with literature indicating that the developmental trajectory
for success in cognitive mapping tasks in rats corresponds to early
maturation of the rodent hippocampus (Nadel & Zola-Morgan, 1984).
Taken together, this evidence suggests that the end of infancy is a defining
moment in hippocampal functioning. Before the age of 21 months,
infants are unable to successfully complete
PHOTO: ZOË MOOSMANN
tasks that require optimal hippocampal

function for solution. After 21 months,
they gradually begin to approach adult
levels of success in those tasks. Given that
the hippocampus is critically involved in
all stages of episodic memory, and in the
binding together of inter-item associations
(spatial with temporal context with event
details, for example), it might be inferred
that the neural basis of infantile amnesia
is, to a great degree, due to the lack of
hippocampal maturation between birth
and two years.
Children at around 21
months successfully Assessing hippocampal maturation from two to five years:
use place learning binding tasks
(environmental landmarks) As noted earlier, adult recall of personal events that occurred during the
to find a toy.
first two years of life is marked by a dense amnesia; this infantile amnesia is
quite likely related to incomplete development of the crucial hippocampal
region. During this period however, the dense amnesia lifts (again, quite
possibly because of hippocampal maturation), and children can clearly
recall some autobiographical events for up to several weeks and, in some
cases, years, after the occurrence of those events. Nonetheless, the number
of autobiographical events recalled, and the detail with which they are
recalled, does not reach the levels attained by older children, adolescents
and adults until approximately school-going age (Rubin, 2000). It is to this
period of childhood amnesia that we now turn, seeking explanations for
the patchy quality of AM between the ages of two and five, and for the
complete lifting of that amnesia at the age of six.
As we noted earlier, AM is characterised by the phenomenal
experience of recalling the where, what and when of highly self-
referential events. That is to say, several different kinds of information
PHO TO : ZO Ë MO O S MANN
need to be associated and linked (bound)
together to produce autobiographical
recall of an event. For instance, to recall
that ‘We went to the rugby game on Saturday’
and to produce details of that outing, one
would need to remember, among other
things, where and when the game was,
with whom one went, and what happened
at the game. In this way, then, an episode
that one recalls ‘is not a holistic entity but
[is] instead the assemblage of a net of pair-
wise associations’ (Newcombe et al, 2007: Children between two and
37). The process of binding together these pair-wise associations is thus five years can clearly recall
critical to the production of AM, and, again, the hippocampus is a neural autobiographical events (for
region critical to this process. example a birthday party),
for up to several weeks or
Although the literature on the binding function of the hippocampus even years after the event.
is less well-developed than that on the cognitive mapping function of the
structure, there is a growing body of research from neuropsychology,
behavioural neuroscience (rodent and non-human primate studies of food
caching and sequence learning), psychophysiology (single-cell recordings
during retrospective and prospective memory tasks), psychopharmacology
(drug-based interventions affecting hippocampal functioning) and
genetics (interventions targeted at suppressing specific components of the
hippocampus), suggesting that this structure is a major player in a neural
circuit underlying the ‘what-where-when’ aspects of episodic memory
(including AM; see Morris, 2007, for an extensive review).
Surprisingly, however, there has been little work on the childhood
development of binding processes. This dearth of research is particularly
puzzling given the importance of binding to episodic autobiographical
memory, and because, at the other end of the life-span, a reasonably large
number of studies suggests that age-related declines in episodic memory
are associated with binding deficits (Castel & Craik, 2003; Chee, Goh, Binding. In this context,
Venkatraman, Tan, Gutchess & Sutton, 2006). In an attempt to jumpstart refers to the way in
research on the early development of binding, Sluzenski, Newcombe which the hippocampus
& Kovacs (2006) created a task that featured pictures of animals shown might act as a device that
integrates (binds) different
against complex naturalistic backgrounds (but, importantly, not the
contextual features
environments in which the animals are usually found; for instance, an of information in our
elephant might be pictured in a hotel room). Over the course of multiple environments. Following
experiments, Sluzenski and colleagues found that four-year-olds were no this theory, separate
worse than six-year-olds or adults at recognising either the animals alone features of an object,
or the backgrounds alone, but that there were substantial differences in event, or scene might be
memory performance when binding together of animal + background processed via separate
brain pathways in the
was tested: six-year-olds were much more likely than four-year-olds to
brain, but are all bound
remember seeing the elephant in that particular hotel room; indeed, the together, eventually, by
performance of six-year-olds was more similar to that of adults than it was the hippocampus.
to that of four-year-olds.
This behavioural evidence of a developmental change in binding
ability in children from four to six years old, along with the above-cited
neurobiological and adult neuropsychological literature on binding
and hippocampal structural maturation, suggests that the neural basis

of childhood amnesia may be due to the lack of complete hippocampal
development at ages two to five years. Clearly more research is needed
to fully examine developmental aspects of binding, but, given that
an experimental paradigm for the exploration of binding ability in
preschoolers has now been established, one might expect that many more
studies in this area will be forthcoming.
Summary and conclusion

Although this part of the chapter has focused only on autobiographical
memory, and has neglected to mention the numerous other forms of
memory (for example working memory, semantic memory, non-
autobiographical episodic memory, priming, procedural memory and
non-declarative associative memory), we hope that it is clear that the
interdisciplinary cognitive science approach taken here can be applied
to investigating childhood development of all different types of memory
systems. In brief, we showed that findings from neurobiological
studies, neuroimaging studies, lesion-based neuropsychological studies,
computational models and cognitive and behavioural studies (both
animal and human), can be used to explain why adults have no memory
for even exceptionally important events that occurred before they were
two years old, and why even those adults with the most impressive
memories can struggle to relate details of personally relevant events that
occurred before school-going age.
Cognitive science approaches to the development

of theory of mind
Theory of mind. The term ‘theory of mind’ was first used by Premack & Woodruff (1978),
The ability to infer mental who speculated on the comparative cognitive abilities of chimpanzees and
states in others, such as
humans. Specifically, they asked whether chimps, like humans, have a
what they believe, desire,
intend or feel.
‘theory of mind’: an innate ability to use others’ mental states to explain
and predict behaviour. Humans think about what others may know,
believe, intend or feel, and these inferred mental states richly inform our
understanding of each other. The term ‘theory of mind’ caught on, and
generated both philosophical debate and a growing area of research.
Why ‘theory’ of mind?

Premack & Woodruff suggested the ability to reflect on mental states
was ‘theory-like’ in two ways in that: 1) mental states are unobservable
constructs that we infer, and 2) referring to these mental states allows us to
accurately explain and predict behaviour.
The philosopher Daniel Dennett was one of the first to enter the fray,
asking how we can be certain that someone (or some animal) has a theory
The false belief test. of other minds. He suggested that one sure way to know is to use a false
Requires a child to belief test. A typical example of such a test is this: a child is in a room
understand that someone with an experimenter and a confederate (let’s call her Sally). Sally puts a
will act based on what
sweet in a box, and closes it. She then leaves the room. While Sally is out,
they believe, even if that
belief is not true.
the experimenter moves the sweet and puts it in a cupboard. The child is
asked where Sally will look for the sweet when she returns.
Anyone able to represent someone else’s mental state (in this case a
belief about where the sweet is), will predict that Sally will look for the
sweet in the place she thinks it is. Predictions based on reality (that is, based
on the child’s knowledge of where the sweet actually is) will be wrong. So
being able to pass a false belief test clearly proves that the child is correctly
inferring a mental state—Sally’s false belief about where the sweet is.
The false belief test has become a standard in theory of mind (ToM)
research. Multiple studies have demonstrated that before the age of
about four years, a typically developing child will not pass this test. He or
she will make incorrect predictions based on his or her own knowledge
of reality. This developmental milestone seems to occur universally.
For example, Avis & Harris (1991) showed that Baka children living in
the rainforests of Cameroon showed the same developmental pattern
demonstrated in Western cultures: older children (around the age of five
years) were able to infer false beliefs, while three-year-olds could not.
So, even in preliterate cultures, false belief reasoning comes online at
around the age of four years. Subsequent studies have confirmed these
results, strongly suggesting that the ability to reason about other people’s
mental states may well be an innate human ability—an evolved capacity
that provides adaptive advantage.
What is this adaptive advantage? It seems clear that ToM is part of a
set of mental abilities that allow us to successfully interact with others in
our social group. Thus, research into ToM falls in the domain of social Social cognition. Refers
cognition. There is a current line of thinking that sees the evolution of to the set of abilities that
primate (and thus also human) brain size as being primarily shaped by the enable social animals to
interact successfully with
demands of living as a social being. As early as the 1970s, it was suggested
each other. It includes
that the primate social environment created the evolutionary pressures the abilities to behave
that resulted in the development of larger brains (Humphrey, 1976; Jolly, co-operatively and
1966). Living in groups clearly provides adaptive advantages in providing altruistically, as well as the
protection against predation, allowing food sharing, and so on. However, ability to detect cheating.
it brings with it the costs of competition over resources and mates. Adap-
tive social functioning requires successful social co-operation and altruistic
behaviour towards group members. It also requires the ability to detect
cheating, and the ability to predict who is likely to reciprocate rather than
default on their obligations. It is argued that social intelligence, including
ToM abilities, evolved in order to facilitate these highly complex social
cognitive skills. In other words, it is possible that the unique size and
complexity of primate brains is the direct result of us being social animals.
Theory of mind in normal development

We have seen that a critical component of ToM—the ability to represent
other people’s beliefs—develops at approximately the age of four. Since
this discovery, researchers have examined the developmental trajectory of
theory of mind, both in terms of precursors to this milestone and in terms
of the development of more complex and sophisticated abilities.
Early development: Infants attribute emotions, goals, and desires

With regard to the attribution of emotions to others, from early infancy
it seems human babies have a preference for social stimuli. Newborns,
for instance, show sensitivity to others’ emotions: they tend to cry when
others cry, and they show some ability to discriminate sad from happy
expressions (Field & Walden, 1982). By six months, infants can definitely
discriminate facial emotions (Caron, Caron & MacLean, 1988; Nelson,
1987). By age 12 months, infants will use parental emotional expressions
to guide their own behaviour in novel situations (Feinman, 1992). From
12-18 months, infants begin to use adults’ gaze direction to determine the
object of an emotional message. For example, Moses (2001) gave infants a
novel toy and, while they were engaged with this toy, had an adult make
a negative emotional noise. The infants would look up to determine what
the adult was looking at, and would later avoid only the object at which
the adult had been looking.
With regard to the attribution of goals to others, very young infants
prefer faces to objects, and they prefer to watch biological motion rather
than random movements. For example, they prefer to watch light points
that mimic a moving body rather than random movement (Bertenthal,
Proffitt & Cutting, 1984). At six months, they also begin to understand
movement by agents. In other words, infants are surprised if an object
moves of its own accord, but are not surprised if a person moves of his
own accord. This grasp of biological movement by an agent is probably
Intentional action. a necessary precursor to understanding intentional action (Frith & Frith,
Goal-directed movement 2003; Spelke, Phillips & Woodward, 1995).
by a biological agent. Between the age of five and eight months, infants seem to develop some
This type of movement
understanding that agents have goals. When watching a human hand, they
is processed in particular
ways by the brain.
expect the hand to keep reaching for the same object even when the object
is moved to a new location. They act surprised if the hand reaches in the
same direction but for a new object. They are not surprised if the hand
changes direction to reach for the original goal object. These responses are
not present if a mechanical object is doing the reaching (Woodward, 1998).
This set of observations suggests that these infants are attributing a goal to
the agent, and using this knowledge to predict the agent’s behaviour.
With regard to the attribution of desires to others, from around the age
of 12 months an understanding of intentions and desires begins to emerge.
Infants begin to understand the relationship between someone’s directed
gaze and the object of that gaze. For instance, they can use gaze direction
and a positive emotional expression to predict that the adult will reach for
that object (Phillips, Wellman & Spelke, 2002). Furthermore, they begin
to show an understanding of joint attention (looking at an object a parent
is looking at, for example). This reveals a reasonably complex cognitive
capacity to form a representation that includes an object of attention,
another person’s directed gaze, and their own gaze. This capacity begins
with gaze following: the infant follows the gaze of an adult to an object of
mutual attention. Initially, this only happens if the object is already within
the infant’s field of view. From ages 14-18 months, however, infants begin
to turn their heads in the direction of another’s gaze (Butterworth &
Jarrett, 1991; Caron et al, 1997).
How should we understand this evidence from pre-verbal infants?
It seems clear that infants have a desire-based theory of mind: they can
use emotional expressions to infer desired objects/goals (or things to
be avoided), and predict intentional actions. It may be, however, that Referential versus
these understandings are referential rather than representational (Saxe, representational
Carey & Kanwisher, 2004). A desire or a goal may be conceived of as a understanding.
Very young children
connection between a person and a real object, but toddlers may have
seem to understand the
no representational understanding of desires. This line of reasoning relationship between
would explain the long delay between the development of desire-based looking at and wanting. A
theory of mind, which begins to be evident at around 14 months, and the referential understanding
representational belief-desire theory of mind inferences that only become of wanting links the person
possible at approximately four years of age (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). and the object; it is a
An alternative line of argument, however, is that children younger concrete understanding
of actual things in the
than four are indeed capable of representational thinking. For instance,
world. A representational
Leslie (1987) argues strongly that the emergence of pretend play at around understanding is more
age 18 months is evidence of representational theory of mind ability. He abstract or symbolic, and is
uses the following example: a mother picks up a banana, and talks into decoupled from the actual
it as if it is a telephone. Her 18-month-old child will laugh, and will not concrete objects.
become confused about what bananas are and what telephones are. Leslie
calls this evidence of decoupling: the ability to represent thoughts about
objects separately from actual representations of objects. He also points
out that this type of interaction shows the child has an understanding of
the mother’s mental state (‘pretending’).
Regardless of whether or not one accepts that children younger than
four are capable of representational thinking, empirical and observational
studies make it clear that, from 14-24 months of age, normally developing
children start to engage in pretend play, to demonstrate joint attentional
capabilities, and to show dramatic increases in language learning (Duchan,
2000; Frith & Frith, 2003). From the ToM perspective, these developments
are crucial because pretend play and joint attention are viewed as
precursors of fully developed ToM capabilities (Charman et al, 2000), and
linguistic ability has been correlated with ToM test performance (Harris,
De Rosnay & Pons, 2005; Tager-Flusberg, 2007).
Early development: Toddlers talk about and understand

mental states
At around the age of two, children begin to talk spontaneously about
their own mental states, especially in terms of what they do and do
not want. They begin to talk about the causes of their own emotional
states, in particular the relationship between their frustrated desires and
experienced negative emotional states. This level of understanding has
been demonstrated in empirical studies: For instance, Wellman & Woolley
(1990) demonstrated that two-year-olds would choose a happy face for a
boy who wanted a puppy and was given a puppy, but a sad face if the boy
had wanted a bunny and was given a puppy. At this age, children are
also able to show appropriate responses to other people’s desires, even if
those desires differ from their own. For example, a child will give another
person more of the snack they prefer (broccoli), even though the child
prefers cookies (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997).
Two-year-olds mainly use mental state words like want, wish or pretend.
By three, however, terms like I think or I know begin to be used frequently
(Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983). At this age, children know the difference
between actual objects and objects of thought. For instance, if they are told
that Anne has an apple, and Jane is thinking about an apple, they know
they can only touch Anne’s apple (Wellman & Estes, 1986). Furthermore,
it seems that three-year-olds may have some understanding of false belief.
Some researchers have demonstrated that, in the false belief test, when
asked where Sally will look for her sweet, three-year-olds tend to look first
towards the place where she put it, although they incorrectly say that she will
look for it in its new location (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2002). In other words,
the idea that seeing leads to knowing is beginning to emerge in three-year-
olds, even though it is only finally fully present in four-year-olds. By age
five years, typically developing children can fully understand others’ false
beliefs, appearance-reality differences and their own previous false beliefs
(Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Naito, Komatsu & Fuke, 1994).
Theory of mind in older children and adults

ToM ability is clearly a complex set of skills that is likely to continue to
develop across the life-span. Research on this development in older children,
adolescents and adults has not yet, however, progressed beyond basics.
So, what do we know about ToM in individuals older than four years
of age? The false belief task described above can be described as requiring
First-order mental state a first-order mental inference (that is, she thinks that...). The ability to make
inferences. An inference more complex inferences seems to develop a little later. Only at around six
that someone else has years of age are children able to correctly perform second-order inferences.
a particular mental state
That is, they can grasp that a person can have beliefs about other people’s
(eg, He thinks that …).
beliefs for example, she thinks that he thinks …).
Second-order mental One of the major researchers in this field, Francesca Happé, developed a
state inferences. An set of materials, the ‘Strange Stories’, which are even more challenging than
inference that someone second-order inferences. Understanding Happé’s vignettes and responding
else has made a particular correctly to the test questions requires the ability to detect sarcasm, irony,
inference about a third white lies and double bluffs. The stories require theory of mind ability be-
person’s mental state
cause the literal utterances of the characters do not fully convey the meaning
(eg, He thinks that she
believes …).
present and readers have to correctly infer the intent of the character. British
children of around eight years of age are able to perform well on this task.
Similarly, it is only around the age of seven or eight that children
can begin to (a) differentiate lies from jokes, and (b) appreciate language
forms such as metaphor, sarcasm and irony (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006;
Sullivan, Winner & Hopfield, 1997). Again, the development of these
abilities is an important indicator of ToM capability, because intention
has to be inferred from the context: A boy saying ‘I did a good job eating
my peas’ to a mother who has seen him not eat his peas has a different
Non-literal speech. communicative intent (‘joking’) than one who says the same thing to a
Includes metaphor, irony, mother who is unaware that he hasn’t eaten his peas (‘lying’).
lies and jokes. The literal Another major researcher in this field, Simon Baron-Cohen, developed
or actual content of the the Faux Pas test, another challenging set of materials that involves the
speech does not fully
ability to correctly detect and explain errors in social interactions. To
convey what it means.
The listener must take
successfully complete this test, the individual must have the ability to
into account the speaker’s represent the mental state of the person committing the faux pas, and the
intention in order to mental state of the person affected by it. Between the ages of seven and
properly understand. 11, children show development of skill on the Faux Pas test. Interestingly,
girls begin performing at above chance levels at the age of seven, while
boys attain this level of performance at nine. Most typically, developing
children between nine and 11 years of age perform very well on this task.
Although we have no measures of individual differences in ToM abilities
in normal adults, some interesting data have emerged from Baron-Cohen
and his group, who have developed a test for use with adults: Reading the
Mind in the Eyes. Participants are shown photos of the eye area, and must
choose from a set of four adjectives the one that best describes the expression
pictured. This is the best ToM test for adults because, unlike others that have
been developed, it does not have ceiling effects. Studies on ToM in normal
ageing are also scarce. Happé, Winner & Brownell (1998) found that older
adults (mean age 73 years) performed better on a theory of mind task than
did adolescents (mean age 14) and young adults (mean age 22). Maylor et
al (2002), however, showed the opposite pattern, with theory of mind skills Children around seven or
declining across age bands: young adults performed better than 60- to 74-year- eight years can appreciate
olds, who in turn performed better than 75- to 89-year-olds. Obviously, far language forms such as
more research is needed to clarify patterns of ToM ability in adulthood. sarcasm, for example,
‘Mom, I’m really enjoying
these sandwiches’ while his
Theory of mind in autism face clearly shows he isn’t
This is the arena where most ToM research has taken place. In a seminal really enjoying them.
1985 paper, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith showed that 80 per cent of a
sample of children and adolescents with autism (and only mild degrees of Autism. A developmental
mental handicap) failed the false belief test that is passed by most typically disorder characterised by
developing four-year-olds. This poor performance was in contrast to that a triad of impairments:
deficits in language
of a group of children with Down’s Syndrome, who had moderate degrees
development, social
of mental handicap, and yet passed the false belief test with the same ease communication and
as normal children. This finding of a ToM deficit in autism has been imaginative play.
consistently replicated; alongside these replications are equally important
demonstrations that ToM is intact in other developmental disorders where
general intelligence and attention are impaired. For instance, children
with Down’s Syndrome, Williams Syndrome, and attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) do not show theory of mind impairments.
This set of findings suggests that ToM abilities are independent of general
intelligence and attention, and that ToM deficits are a specific feature of
autistic spectrum disorders (ASDs). Baron-Cohen subsequently put forward
the conceptualisation of autism as ‘mindblindness’—the inability to interact
with others as beings possessing feelings, thoughts and beliefs of their own.
The diagnosis of autism is not simple, as features of the disorder occur
along a spectrum. However, what is striking about children with any
autism spectrum disorder (including Asperger’s Syndrome) is a marked Asperger’s syndrome.
impairment in social function. These children appear to lack empathy and Part of the autism
to dislike social contact. They actively avoid making eye contact with their spectrum, but children
with this disorder usually
parents or anyone else, and often seem to dislike close physical contact.
have normal language
They are generally socially withdrawn, and do not establish emotional development.
relationships. The idea of the primary deficit in ASD being mindblindness
thus accounts very satisfactorily for these features.
In the years following the Baron-Cohen’s original study, research on
ToM in ASD individuals has enriched our understanding of both ToM
itself, and of how deficits in ToM in autism present. It seems that these
deficits are evident from the very early stages of development in ASD
children. For instance, Baron-Cohen and others have shown that children
with ASD are deficient at using direction of gaze as an indicator of desire
or intention, and are deficient in joint attention abilities. They also tend
not to engage in spontaneous pretend play, and perform at chance levels in
distinguishing real from mental objects.
So, for example, we saw that typically developing three-year-olds could
reliably say that you can only touch the apple that Anne has. In contrast,
children with ASD (even those who are older than three years) are just as
likely to say you can touch the apple that Jane is thinking about. These
children also have difficulty on tests that assess understanding of the principle
that seeing leads to knowing. Typically developing three- to four-year-olds
have no trouble knowing that, of two dolls, only the one who has looked
inside a box knows what is inside. Children with ASD (even those who are
older than three to four years old) consistently fail to make this distinction.
Furthermore, children with ASD have difficulty distinguishing
between accidents and intentional actions (that is, whether someone
meant to do something, or whether it was an accident), and they seem
unable to engage in deceit. They do not understand sarcasm, metaphor
or irony. In summary, most low-functioning autistic children (especially
young ones) show severe deficits in ToM ability that can account for the
social, communicative and imaginative deficits seen in autism.
Therefore, most children and adolescents with ASD fail false belief
tasks such as the Sally-Anne test. This implies that these individuals
might have an early delay in ToM, so that their ToM ability is equivalent
to that of a typically developing child between one and two years of age
(in other words, an individual who has not yet developed joint attentional
and imaginative play capabilities).
A significant minority of autistic individuals (between 15 per cent and
55 per cent, depending on which study one reads) do, however, pass first-
order false belief tests (Happé & Frith, 1996). These individuals are usually
older and have higher verbal mental ages (VMAs) and verbal IQs than
do autistic individuals who fail first-order false belief tasks (Ozonoff &
McEvoy, 1994). In 1995, Happé reviewed 28 studies of ToM abilities in
individuals with ASD, and concluded that a verbal mental age (VMA)
of at least 11 years was needed before someone with ASD has an 80 per
cent chance of passing a false belief test. (In typically developing children,
those with a VMA of five years perform at this level.) Thus, a relatively
high verbal ability might be necessary, but not sufficient, for children
with ASD to pass false belief tasks. One might also think about these data
this way: Autistic individuals who pass first-order false belief tests have
reached a ToM ability equivalent to that of a typically developing four-
year-old. They do, however, usually fail second-order false belief tests that
are aimed at the typically developing six- to seven-year-old child.
Baron-Cohen has demonstrated ToM deficits even in older indi-
viduals with high functioning autism or Asperger’s Syndrome. These
individuals can pass false belief tests, but the deficit becomes evident on
more complex tasks; for instance, they perform poorly on the Faux Pas
test and on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task.
This pattern of data has led researchers to suggest that individuals with
ASD have a specific developmental delay in ToM (Baron-Cohen & Swetten-
ham, 1997). The findings of a longitudinal study by Steele, Joseph & Tager-
Flusberg (2003) support this delayed development hypothesis. In that study, Delayed development.
autistic children aged four to 14 years showed significant improvement in Means an ability comes
ToM abilities over the course of one year. Of particular interest in the Steele online much later than
in typically developing
et al (2003) study is that the researchers used a developmentally sensitive
children.
battery that included tests for early-developing aspects of ToM, such as
desire-based action tasks. Indeed, they found that most of their participants’
improvement took place between early ToM and first-order ToM abilities.
The findings of other studies have provided support for a deviance, rather Deviant development.
than a delayed, account of ToM development in ASD. For instance, Peterson, Means the developmental
Wellman & Liu (2005) found that individuals with autism, aged six to 14 years, trajectory may follow
a different pattern
showed a different ToM developmental pathway to both typically developing
altogether, with abilities
children and deaf children with a ToM deficit. Specifically, although the coming online in a
participants in all three groups showed the same developmental sequence in different order to typically
the acquisition of early ToM abilities, children with ASD found the false belief developing children.
task more difficult than a hidden emotions task, while typically developing,
late-signing deaf, and native-signing deaf children found the hidden emotions
task the most difficult. So, while both autistic and late-signing deaf children
have deficits in ToM, deaf children follow the same developmental pattern as
typically developing children, whereas children with autism seem to follow a
different developmental pattern, one that may be unique to autism.
There is, therefore, empirical support for both delayed and deviant
hypotheses of ToM development in ASD. That is to say, ToM development
does happen in ASD, but it happens more slowly and might follow a differ-
ent path to that in typically developing children. Furthermore, results from
longitudinal studies by Holroyd & Baron-Cohen (1994) and Ozonoff & Mc-
Evoy (1994) point to a possible ceiling effect in ToM development in ASD.
Recently, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2005, 2008) have proposed that
autism be understood in terms of two dimensions: empathising and sys-
tematising. They regard empathy as the foundation of ToM abilities, argue
that in autism empathy is clearly deficient. Systematising is the quest for order,
an interest in rule-bound phenomena; this tendency is present in all of us to
greater or lesser degrees, but in autism, it is pathologically strong. This lack
of balance between empathising and systematising in autistic individuals
explains other features of ASD, such as rigid, repetitive behaviour, reliance on
routine, mathematical skills, fascination with mechanical objects, and etc.
Theory. ‘Theory theory’
Theories of theory of mind states that theory of mind
No consensus exists as to how ToM should be theorised. As mentioned is a metarepresentational
previously, the evidence around a universally consistent developmental ability. We theorise
trajectory strongly suggests that it is an innate capacity. Some argue that abstractly about what
ToM is in fact a ‘folk psychological’ theory—a metacognitive ability to people think or feel.
represent and reason about others in terms of their beliefs, knowledge, ‘Simulation theory’
states theory of mind is
intentions, etc. Within this school of thought are those who see it as a
grounded in mirror neuron
dedicated cognitive module; that is, an independent set of schemas and activity, for example our
processes that act exclusively on ToM information. ability to empathise with
Another line of thinking explains ToM according to a simulationist the pain of others.
account. The idea of simulation originated with the discovery of mirror

neurons in primate brains: Monkeys watching another monkey reach
for an object activate the same set of neurons that activate when they
themselves reach for that object. In humans, a similar phenomenon has been
demonstrated in relation to pain: Similar patterns of neural activation are
seen when we watch another person experience pain as when we experience
it ourselves. Simulation theorists argue that this type of simulation is the basis
of empathy, and thus of ToM abilities. By this argument, inferring someone
else’s mental state thus involves running a simulation of their situation in
your own mind, and drawing conclusions from that simulation.
Yet another perspective sees ToM as simply being an instantiation of
domain-general cognitive abilities. In other words, researchers who adopt
this theoretical perspective do not believe there is a distinct and specialised
ability to reason about other minds. They propose that the same structures
and processes that are used for complex reasoning in other spheres operate
when reasoning about mental states. They point out, for instance, that
ToM abilities develop alongside linguistic and executive abilities, and may
simply be a function of these developments. The challenge here, then, is to
demonstrate impaired ToM in the context of intact executive and language
abilities (or the opposite). Unfortunately, no such demonstrations have been
forthcoming, and so the debate in the literature continues. However, if we
take the evolutionary perspective that suggests social factors were primary
determinants of brain development, this argument can be turned on its head—
perhaps it is due to our increasing abilities to understand others’ mental states
that our communicative and general reasoning skills improved.
Regardless of these conceptual debates, the area of ToM has provided rich
material for theorising and research, and not only in the area of developmental
psychology. Theory of mind deficits are evident in a number of psychiatric
disorders (for example, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder), in degenerative
disorders (for example, frontotemporal dementia), and following certain types
of brain damage. The concepts and tests developed in the ToM literature
provide an immensely useful way of clarifying and characterising the cripp-
ling social deficits evident in a broad spectrum of disorders.
Specific tasks
CR I T I C A L T H I N KI NG TA S KS
➊ How does the information-processing approach to cognitive development reflect our

technological society? Provide examples to illustrate and explain your answer.
➋ How and why is the cognitive science approach to cognitive development superior
to information-processing approaches? Provide examples of where information-
processing approaches fall short and the cognitive science approach does not.
General tasks
➊ How do cognitive theories help us to make predictions about development and behaviour?
➋ Create your own theory of cognitive development by combining those aspects of the
theories discussed above that you feel are most important for explaining cognitive
development. Justify your choices.
These are classic textbooks in developmental and cognitive psychology. The reader interested in the historical
foundations of the field of cognitive developmental psychology could consult these books to gain a deeper
understanding, for instance, of how the work of major figures in developmental psychology (such as Vygotsky
and Piaget) has been integrated into a cognitive scientific approach.
General:
Bjorklund, D F (1995). Children’s thinking: Developmental function and individual differences.
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole.
Flavell, J H, Miller, P H & Miller, S A (1993). Cognitive development. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kozulin, A (1990). Vygotsky’s psychology: A biography of ideas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sternberg, R J (2006). Cognitive psychology, 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth.
Memory:
These works provide the reader with broad overviews of theoretical approaches to the development of
autobiographical memory in infancy and early childhood, and also review major empirical studies in the field.
Bauer, P J (2006). Remembering the times of our lives: Memory in infancy and beyond. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Nadel, L & Zola-Morgan, S (1984). ‘Infantile amnesia: A neurobiological perspective’
In M Moscovitch (ed), Infant memory, 145-172. New York: Plenum.
Pillemer, D B (1998). ‘What is remembered about early childhood events?’, Clinical Psychology
Review, 18, 895-913.
Theory of Mind:
Baron-Cohen, S (1997). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Frith, U & Frith, C (2003). ‘Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing’, Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 358, 459-473.
Saxe, R & Baron-Cohen, S (eds) (2007). Theory of mind. London: Psychology Press.
CHAPTER
22
Vygotsky’s theory of the
development of cultural
tools
Gillian Mooney
This chapter presents the central concepts of Vygotsky’s

theory of development, as follows:
1. A discussion of the concepts that underpin Vygotsky’s theory

2. An explanation of Vygotsky’s method of analysis, or episte-
mological position, namely dialectical historical materialism
3. Vygotsky’s use of Marx’s ontological framework of
technological determinism is presented in terms
of cultural tasks and cultural tools
4. The core ontological concepts, created by Vygotsky to
describe and account for development are discussed in
terms of sociohistorical development
5. The historical interpretation of Vygotsky’s work is evaluated
6. The varying interpretations of Vygotsky’s theoretical terms
Historical background
The social and historical structure in which theorists
are located is a vital component of analysing their
contributions to our understanding of human
development. Theories, or ways of understanding
human development, do not emerge in a vacuum.
Rather, theories and theorists are products and
producers of knowledge in particular social and
historical circumstances. Theorists, or indeed
any reader of psychological writing, are never
completely neutral or objective interpreters of
ideas. We are unable to be totally neutral and
Lev Vygotsky
Vy g o t s k y ’s t h e o r y o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c u l t u r a l t o o l s 459
objective because of our own social, linguistic, political and economic

standpoints. Consequently, Vygotsky’s thinking about human development
was influenced by the fact that he lived in post-revolutionary Russia in
the 1920s, and had been tasked with the indoctrination of Communism.
Vygotsky read the writings of many other authors who had approached
the investigation of human development in various ways. At this time,
developmental research, or ways of understanding human development,
included behaviourism (Kohler, Buhler, Pavlov), the Gestalt school,
Binet’s conceptualisation of intelligence, Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking
and Piaget’s work on the development of cognition. Vygotsky interpreted
and analysed the work of these theorists, among many others, in order to
construct his own ideas about human development. If you were a student
of developmental psychology in the 1930s you would only be reading the
work of a limited number of theorists. At the time, the psychoanalytic
school of thought was dominated by the work of Freud. Feminist critiques
of his theory only started to emerge as a force in knowledge production
much later in the 1960s. In terms of understanding the development of the
mind—what we call cognitive development—as a student in the 1930s, you
would mostly encounter the work of Piaget. Vygotsky’s writings would not
have been available for you to read (unless you were fluent in Russian or
had read one concise journal article published in 1929). The information-
processing model was only conceptualised once computers were created
in the 1950s and early 1960s. Your view on intelligence testing would not
be influenced by the discovery that Cyril Burt had fabricated his evidence.
The point is that we have to view theories in developmental psychology as
historical in the sense that they are written at particular points in time and
influence the thinking about developmental psychology that follows. Each
idea or concept used to understand how humans develop is a reflection
of the development of the society from which it emerges. In this sense,
theories are also social products. Vygotsky’s approach to understanding
human development is an example of this.
Vygotsky was born in 1896 in a small town, Gomel, in western Russia.
The family of eight children loved to engage in lively conversations led
by his banking executive father and his mother, who was a teacher. A
love of debating was instilled in Vygotsky, who in secondary school was
known by his friends as the ‘little professor’ because of his enthusiasm
for discussion, debate and mock trials. After he had completed secondary
school, Vygotsky wanted to attend the University of Moscow, but this
presented difficulties for a Jewish person in Russia at the time. Russian
universities had a quota system in which only 3 per cent of students were
Jewish, and usually only gained access to a university after a stringent oral
examination. Because Vygotsky was exceptionally intelligent, it seemed
certain that he would gain entrance. However, before he had completed
the examination, the state altered the entrance system to one based on a
lottery system, and Vygotsky gained entrance to the university by chance
alone. In 1917, the year of the Communist Revolution, he graduated with
a law degree, but had also completed a diverse array of courses in literature
and art. Vygotsky returned to his hometown of Gomel and, between
1917 and 1924, taught literature at a secondary school, psychology at a
local teachers’ training college, and started his doctorate on the psychology
of art (Wertsch, 1987).
In January 1924 Vygotsky, as an unknown theorist from the provinces,
delivered a lecture on the psychology of consciousness in Leningrad. The
audience was so impressed by the clarity and brilliance of his thinking that
he was recommended for a position at the Moscow Institute of Psychology.
In Moscow, Vygotsky worked at a frenetic pace, despite being very ill with
tuberculosis. He completed not only his doctorate, but also rapidly produced
research and worked in neurological clinics. He was both loved and
respected by students, who listened to his lectures through open windows
when venues were too small and who wrote poems in honour of his journeys
to either lecture or conduct research. He worked collaboratively with many
colleagues and students, many of whom actually conducted research in the
satellite states when Vygotsky was too ill to travel (Wertsch, 1987).
In 1934, the year in which his most widely-read work, Thinking and
Speech, was published, Vygotsky succumbed to tuberculosis. The Soviet
government banned his work in 1936 because of Vygotsky’s research on
intelligence testing. The ban reflects one of the many ironies of Stalinist
ideology. The Stalinist state was opposed to the use of intelligence
testing and missed the subtleties of Vygotsky’s argument against the
use of conventional intelligence tests, which he believed were static
and, thus, did not encapsulate potential for development, and were,
therefore, an unhelpful measure of an individual’s ability. Even though
the ban on Vygotsky’s work was only lifted in 1956, his many students
and colleagues kept his ideas alive. Most notable of these is A.R. Luria,
a neuropsychologist, who is well known in the West (Wertsch, 1987).
Vygotsky’s place in history, that is, post-revolutionary Russia during the
infancy of the practice of Communism, resulted in his attempt to create
a scientific approach to the investigation of the development of the mind.
His quest for psychology to be scientific was informed by his allegiance to
the Marxist method of analysis.
The relationship between ontology and

epistemology
Ontology. The substantive Understanding Vygotsky’s ideas about the development of mind is only
content of Psychology. possible if you understand his views regarding the relationship between
ontology and epistemology. Briefly, ontology is the substantive content of
Epistemology.
psychology, or what it is about, such as the concepts that are used to explain/
The methods through
which the substantive
account for certain aspects of the world. For example, Freud’s theoretical
content is created. terms, ‘id’, ‘ego’ and ‘superego’, are used to represent the ‘structure of
personality’. Epistemology concerns the methods through which the
substantive, or theoretical, content is created. Freud, for example, used
the interpretation of dreams and free association to examine the contents
of the mind. Since the birth of psychology, there has been disagreement
between theorists over what (ontology) the study of the mind should focus
on and how (epistemology) the study of the mind should occur. When
Vygotsky was writing, the central disagreements over ontology and
epistemology were represented by the Freudian interpretative method
and the behaviourist/ Pavlovian method of extrapolating theory about
humans from animal experiments. Vygotsky’s critique of each of these

approaches focused on both epistemological and ontological considerations.
Accordingly, while the behaviourist model upheld the tenets of science, it
did not adequately account for the mind as a uniquely human property
in which human thinking represented a higher form of consciousness
than animal behaviour. Thus, while the behaviourist school may utilise
a method that is scientific (epistemology), it did not provide an adequate
explanation of the complexity of human development (ontology). The
Freudian interpretative model was criticised as being unscientific and
representing a circular form of logic (epistemology) in which consciousness
was used to account for the development of consciousness (ontology).
Vygotsky was adamant that the tools of investigation (epistemology)
that we use determine the results that we receive, or what we then know
about the mind (ontology). This idea has been called Vygotsky’s ‘tool-and-
result’ framework (Newman & Holzman, 1993). The relationship between
ontology and epistemology was important in the context of Vygotsky’s
search for a ‘science of the mind’ or the development of an appropriate
method in which complex human behaviour could be investigated. The
fact that Vygotsky was developing his theory in the new Communist state
in Russia, was also pivotal to his ideas about the relationship between
ontology and epistemology. Russian theorists during Vygotsky’s time had
little choice in terms of method, as the state was attempting widespread
indoctrination of the Communist way of life. Thus, the thinking of Karl
Marx regarding the investigation of the development of societies was
central to Vygotsky’s own ideas about the development of mind.
Vygotsky’s epistemological position: dialectical

historical materialism
The method that Karl Marx used to study the development of society
is known as dialectical historical materialism, which has several features.
Any scientific investigation should analyse the concrete, tangible or real
conditions of human existence (Lloyd, 1993). Thus, the human condition
provided the scientist with an abundance of circumstances to analyse
and understand. Examples of the ‘real conditions’ of human existence
during Vygotsky’s time included the analysis of so-called ‘problematic’
children. These were children who had been placed in institutions during
the Tsarist reign or who had been abandoned or orphaned during the
civil war. Vygotsky was also interested in how the vast population of both
Russia and the satellite states could be acculturated into the Communist
system. The most notable example of this interest is revealed in the
studies conducted in collaboration with Luria in Uzbekistan in which
they attempted to determine how to best educate the peasants, who were
subsistence farmers, into collectivist farming in the Communist state
(Luria, 1976). A researcher does not merely apply Marxist or Vygotskian
principles to a new situation. Rather, the central task of researchers would
be to describe and construct the historical situation in which they exist.
Both Marx and Vygotsky understood the notion of history as ‘…the History. The continuous
living, sensuous, continuous, indivisible totality of human existence, the process of development
complex yet describable process of development under definite conditions’ under definite conditions.
(Newman & Holzman, 1993: 13). History is, thus, an ongoing part of a whole
that is a process with a beginning, a present and a future. Not carefully
scrutinising historical process would result in an incomplete understanding
of development; it would be analogous to describing the democratic state in
South Africa without any reference to apartheid, colonisation, or relations of
power between indigenous peoples. Vygotsky, who focused on the cultural
tool of language, analysed language development at the start of formation,
that is, when children learn to verbally interact with other people in their
environments. He believed that analysing adult language skills did not
tell us very much about the development of language because, in order to
understand a historical process, we need to describe it from its origin. This
is known as Vygotsky’s genetic or instrumental method.
As we live our lives from birth to death, or as development occurs, there
is a tension between the ways of thinking that we have already acquired and
the new forms of thinking emerging as social practice, in our interactions
with other individuals. Thus, historical materialism is dialectical because
it concerns the action of opposing forces or interplay between juxtaposed
concepts. These forces are dynamic in the sense that constant change or
activity characterise development. Any social circumstance, or level of
development, may be analysed by determining its constituent parts or units.
These units are then placed alongside, or in opposition to, one another. It is
these units and, more importantly, the relationships between these units that
provide an account of a complex whole. The notion of a unity of concepts or
units is central to this method of analysis.
For Marx, relations of power (between ownership of capital and
workers) and the means of production (for example, technological tools such
as machines or computers) were the two central forces in the development
of societies. Vygotsky provided many analytic units in the development of
the mind. These will be discussed in greater detail below.
Vygotsky’s ontological framework for

understanding human development
It is Vygotsky’s use of the Marxist method of analysis of problems that
allowed him to create a meta-theoretical approach to the understanding of
human development. Accordingly, Vygotsky’s contribution to psychology
is not limited to a set of abstract principles that can be applied solely to the
investigation of cognition. He believed that it was the task of any investigator
to, firstly, identify problems that emerged in particular sociohistorical
situations. Secondly, the investigator should identify all the components
or elements of the problem and understand the role, or purpose, of each
element. Thirdly, each part was placed alongside all the other components
to determine the relationships between the aspects of development in order
to provide a complete account of human development.
Consider the example of what is known in developmental psychology
as the nature and nurture debate. Many students of psychology view this
debate in absolute terms. Thus, it is either our genetic inheritance or factors
in our environments that account for development. A Vygotskian would
have a different approach to understanding the development of humans.
All factors that are part of human development would have to be identified

and described. Thus, if we are going to
fully understand human development,
we have to understand all of its parts and
understand how all these parts interact
with one another. We need to examine
the biological, emotional, social and
cognitive aspects of our developmental
paths, and demonstrate how each part is
related to all other parts. For Vygotsky
our physical development, or maturation,
was an important component of our
development. Biological development
provided a condition of development.
Vygotsky spent a great deal of his time
trying to understand how having a
physical problem, for example being blind, deaf, mute or physically disabled, An important aspect of
would affect the development of our thinking. An important aspect of his sociohistorical development
is the important role
search was related to understanding how people with physical disabilities
that families play in our
could be an integral part of society. For Vygotsky, what we call the social socialisation into society.
and the individual (cognitive) development were directly related to one
another. Our thinking on an individual level is framed or constrained by
the patterns of thought that are present in societies. We become members
of our societies as we master the ways in which communication occurs in
our society. In terms of what we call emotional development, Vygotsky
was emphatic that individuals do not acquire any new skills unless they
are interested or motivated to do so. Thus, all the parts of development,
including the biological, social, cognitive and emotional aspects, need to be
identified. The nature and purpose of each aspect must be explained, and
how each part relates to other parts described in order to present a complete
account of human development. Thus, Vygotsky presented a view of
human development that was multifaceted and which presented the many
facets of development in an integrated manner. This view provides us with
a complex understanding of how we develop as humans.
The role of tools in the production of human

consciousness
Vygotsky believed that consciousness, or mind, is a uniquely human Consciousness.
function. What makes the human mind unique, or distinct from all other A uniquely human function
characterised by the ability
forms of life on Earth, is the ability of humans to create and use tools.
to create and use tools.
While animals do have the ability to use tools, for example chimpanzees
may use rocks to break open nuts, their tool use does not demonstrate the
creativity and sophistication of human tools. It was the capacity to use
tools that caused humans to gain ascendancy above all other life forms
on Earth. Humans gained control over nature. We built structures that
protected us from the forces of nature with many different tools, those
that could cut and cohere many materials, both natural and synthetic.
We hunted and domesticated animals in order to feed ourselves, and thus
ensured our continued existence. We changed the places in which plants
naturally grew in order to grow other plants that could feed both our
domesticated animals and ourselves. In

this way, we subordinated nature to our

will. Vygotsky’s ontological argument
regarding the importance of tools was
based on Marx’s technological determinist
theory of the development of society.
It is the tools, or the things that we have
created to control our environments, that
demonstrate the creativity of humans
and serve as the frameworks and pat-
terns of our internal processing, or
cognitive functioning.
Consider how the computer, as a
tool or way of accomplishing something,
In the early 21st century, is changing the way in which human
computer technology beings think. Before computers became tools that are commonly used,
continues to shape the way authors of books, as sources of information, wrote them by hand. When
in which we think. the use of the typewriters became widespread, authors were able to ensure
that their work could be read easily, although they would have to be able
to type a complete page without error. The manuscript may have been
posted or delivered to a publisher, who printed multiple copies, which
were then distributed to booksellers. These books were then sold to the
members of society who understood the language in which the book was
written, were literate, and could afford to buy them or had access to a
library. The computer is now the central way in which ideas, or human
thinking, is captured and shared by individuals. The author of a book
will type ideas into a computer, will easily be able to edit or reorganise
the ideas in the piece of writing, and submit the work for publication
via e-mail. In addition to disseminating ideas through the publication of
books, the author is able to establish a website, a blog, or even add them
to an entry in Facebook. People who are able to understand the language
in which the ideas are written, use a computer and access the worldwide
web, are able to read and interpret these ideas. The computer is a tool
that allows for the rapid and widespread creation and dissemination of
ideas. We currently live in a world that is defined in some ways by the
computer, or the use of a particular tool. We can easily communicate our
ideas to others in distant places, we can read the ideas of people who live
in distant parts of the world and whose experiences seem very different
from our own. Currently, we have access to far more information than
humans who lived at any other time before us. The tools that we are
able to use as individuals are attached to many ideological practices or
to the relations of power in the production of knowledge. So, the type
of information that you are exposed to, and, thus, the ways in which
your thinking will develop, depends on many factors, including, but not
limited to, those that relate to the language that you speak, your ability
to use a computer and your economic resources. The languages that you
are able to use and your utilisation of technology may be considered to
be tools that structure your thinking, or cognitive functioning. Language
and technology are the tools, or the things that we use to accomplish
tasks. It is the use of tools that represent the higher forms of thinking
that characterise human development.
These tools are ‘cultural’ or ‘ideological’ in the sense that they are used by
distinct groups of people and are related to the exercise of power in society,
or between groups of people. Ideology, in this sense, is a system of ideas
and ideals forming the basis of a political or economic theory and is, more
generally, the set of beliefs or ways of doing things that are characteristic of
particular social groups. In the example of the role of the computer in shaping
our consciousness, those who are computer-literate, or who are able to use a
computer, have access to far more information and ideas than those who
are not. In this sense, computer-literate individuals, those who have appro-
priated the tool, are able to acquire more power in the societal structure.
They have jobs that are described as skilled labour. They are able to perform
a multiplicity of tasks and are thus able to work in many areas of the labour
market. They are more highly rewarded in terms of money for their work,
and, consequently, occupy a more prestigious place in the structure of society,
forming part of the middle, rather than the working class.
Human consciousness is unique: the relationship

between higher and lower mental functions
Vygotsky’s arguments for the uniqueness of human consciousness utilised
the distinction between higher mental functions and lower mental func- Lower mental functions.
tions. Lower mental functions are the most basic ways in which thinking, Vygotsky’s term for
or internal, mental processing occurs. Examples of what Vygotsky would those basic cognitive
abilities such as reactive
understand as a lower mental function from psychological literature in-
attention, associative
clude Pavlov’s dogs salivating in response to bells and Skinner’s pigeons memory and sensory
pecking disks after lights are switched on in their cages. These are basic motor thought, which are
conditioned and unconditioned responses. Examples of lower mental eventually transformed
functions in your daily lives may include feeling hungry when you see an by a person’s culture into
advertisement for food, and waking up on the weekend at the same time more sophisticated mental
that you do during the week, even though you did not set your alarm. Lower processes such as focused
attention, deliberate
mental functions are exactly what you would expect them to be: lower forms
memory and symbolic
of thought. In contrast, higher mental functions are more advanced ways thought (higher mental
of thinking or internally processing information. Higher mental functions functions).
are more advanced in nature because they included the use of tools, or
ways of thinking. Higher mental functions.
Vygotsky’s term for those
Human consciousness as the transformation of sophisticated cognitive
processes such as focused
the external into the internal attention, deliberate
Our ways of thinking are initially presented to us in an external form. We memory and symbolic
are born into a world that pre-exists us, in which there are existing ways thought, which evolve out
in which individuals interact with one another. We learn how to become of basic cognitive abilities
members of our families, communities and societies by appropriating such as reactive attention,
the methods, or ways, in which members of that society interact with associative memory and
one another. Vygotsky conceptualised the ways in which individuals in sensory motor (lower
mental functions) as a
societies interact with one another as cultural development. The most
result of exposure to
central part of ‘culture’ was the role of language, both as a mechanism one’s culture.
for interaction between individuals and as framework for the structure
and content of consciousness. Communication between individuals, or
social interaction, is ‘based on rational understanding, on the intentional

transmission of experience and thought, (which) requires some system
of means’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 48). Human consciousness, or higher mental
functions ‘… are constructed on the basis of using stimuli-means (signs)
and because of this, they have an indirect (mediated) character’ (Vygotsky,
1999: 40). We, as humans, communicate with each other in ways that are
indirect, and it is our ability to create these symbolic forms of interaction
(signs) that characterise human thinking, or higher mental functions. We
have developed sophisticated systems of symbols, such as sounds, letters,
numbers and pictures, to share our thoughts and experiences with the
people who share our world. These semiotic systems have evolved in
societies over time from grunts and gestures to the multiple ways in which
we communicate today, including visual representations, and spoken and
written language in its many forms that relate to the current technology,
for example the worldwide web (computers) or cellphones. The ability
to use a computer would also be illustrative of a higher mental function,
although it is not one that Vygotsky, in the 1920s could have imagined.
Signs. The externally Vygotsky discussed many examples of signs, including language,
present semiotic or decision-making strategies, mnemonic techniques, and material objects
symbolic systems such as pencils or paper. Signs are the semiotic, or symbolic, systems
through which
through which we engage with the world and others in it. Signs and tools
humans communicate.
are two facets of the same phenomenon. Signs are formulated as being
psychological in nature and as ‘alter(ing) the entire flow and structure of
Tools. The internalisation
of society’s semiotic
mental functions’ (Vygotsky, 1981: 137). In contrast, tools are considered
systems, or the to be technical, altering the ‘process of natural adaptation by determining
appropriation of the form of labour operations’ (Vygotsky, 1981: 137). The use of the word
sign systems. ‘sign’ appears to indicate the inward movement of objects in the social plane
(external) to the individual plane (internal), while the use of the word ‘tool’
indicates an outward movement from the individual as he or she engages
with the environment (Daniels, 2001). This exposition of Vygotsky’s
work utilises the concept of the tool, following the Russian interpretation,
because tools accord the individual an active role and demonstrate that
the individual has actually appropriated the way of thinking. Signs only
indicate ways of thinking that are externally present, or exist in the world,
CULTURAL TOOL
TASK RESPONSE TO TASK

Figure 22.1 From ‘The Problem of the Cultural Development of the Child’, by L S Vygotsky (1929), Journal
of Genetic Psychology, 6, p420.
and do not adequately indicate that the sign has been incorporated into
the individual’s consciousness. The central focus of Vygotsky’s theory is
how you would actually use the tool, how you appropriate the tool, how
cultural forms of thinking are created by, and are active in your thinking,
or the ways in which you engage with the world.
Tools alter the characteristics and course of mental processes. These
instruments of learning re-create and re-organise the entire structure of
our thinking and behaviour (Vygotsky, 1987). It was with the concept
of the tool functioning to re-organise our thinking that Vygotsky separated
himself from the circular forms of logic proposed by the behaviourist school
of thought. Vygotsky (1929) represented this re-organisation of thinking
and interacting in the world in the following manner (see Figure 22.1).
The dotted line between the task and the response to the task represented
the explanation provided by the behaviourists—a simple stimulus-response
bond. For Vygotsky, this dotted line represented an individual’s automatic
response, encompassing the ways of thinking that the individual had already
acquired. Vygotsky was interested in determining how the individual
learnt new ways of thinking (as depicted by the solid lines). These new
ways of thinking incorporated new cultural tools, which altered the way
in which tasks were understood and how problem-solving occurred. What
is of central importance to Vygotsky’s ideas is that the new cultural tool
fundamentally alters the process of responding to tasks. Vygotsky was
attempting to describe how the use of cultural tools becomes automatic in an
individual’s functioning, or how we automatically use the tools of thinking.
The tool used by the individual could not be separated from the response
to the task using that tool because the tool would represent a different way
of thinking. If two individuals used two different tools in order to solve the
same problem, then their responses to the same task would be qualitatively
different (Vygotsky, 1987).
Vygotsky presented evidence for his ideas through the use of analogies
and examples. While this form of evidence does not conform to acceptable
standards of research in psychology today, the example below may help you
to understand the role of tools in changing the ways in which we think:
In our experimental investigations we place a child in such a

situation that he is faced with remembering a definite number
of figures, words, or some other data. If that task is not above
the natural abilities of the child, he will master it by the natural
or primitive method. He remembers by creating associative or
conditional reflexive connections between stimuli and reactions
(the dotted line in Figure 22.1). However, we rarely obtain such a
situation in our experiments. The task set to the child is above his
natural (or previously acquired) capacities. It cannot be solved in
such a primitive and natural method. We put before the child some
object, quite irrelevant to the task set, such as paper, pins, string,
small shot etc. …The problem occurs in the process of the natural
activity of the child, but its solution requires some roundabout way
or the application of some means (the solid lines in Figure 22.1). If
the child finds such a solution, he takes recourse to signs, the tying
of knots on the string, the counting of small shots, the piercing or

paring of paper, etc. Such memorization based on the use of signs
is regarded by us as a typical instance of all cultural methods of
behaviour. The child solves an inner problem by means of exterior
objects. This is the particular peculiarity of cultural behaviour
(Vygotsky, 1929: 419).
The developmental phases in the acquisitions

of tools
Vygotsky (1929: 424) provided a ‘complete cycle of cultural development
of any one psychological function’. There were five phases in the cycle
of tool acquisition. Firstly, Vygotsky’s (1929) initial phase of development
Primitive behaviour. The is ‘primitive behaviour or natural psychology’ (Vygotsky, 1929: 424) in
non-use of cultural tools. which the child is not aware of, and does not make use of the cultural
Naïve psychology. Tool tool. Secondly, in the phase of ‘naïve psychology’ (Vygotsky, 1929: 425),
use, but no awareness of the child makes use of the tool, but is unaware of how the tool functions.
how the tool functions. Thus, ‘(t)he child grasps very quickly the method which we suggested, but
does not usually know by what means the (tool) helped him’ (to perform
the task) (Vygotsky, 1929: 425). This phase marks the start of the process
External sign of tool use. Thirdly, in the phase of external sign and external operation,
and operation. Tool use the child is able to use the tool and have an understanding of how the tool
in the external or social helps to complete the task. However, this understanding and the use of
plane only.
the tool occurs on the external or social plane only. Thus, the child ‘solves
the internal mental task on the basis of an external sign…e.g. counting on
fingers’ (Vygotsky, 1929: 426). During the fourth, or rooting phase, the
Rooting phase. The start tool is both internal and external in nature and this stage is ‘characterised
of the internalisation of by the movement of the external operation to the internal plane, by the
the tool.
transformation of the external operation into an internal operation’
(Vygotsky, 1929: 426). Vygotsky argued that adult functioning would be a
Adult functioning. more developed state because the tool would operate on an internal level
Internal operation of only (Vygotsky, 1929).
the tool.
The role of social interaction in the development
of mind
Human consciousness is characterised by higher mental functioning,
and is formed by social interaction, or social systems of activity in which
individuals participate. Several assumptions are present in this view
of consciousness. The structure and pattern of internal cognition is
determined by social activity or interaction. This implies that the social
or cultural context cannot be separated from cognitive development. This
marks a distinct move away from traditional theories of cognition which
view human thinking as a process that relates solely to the individual. For
Vygotsky, ‘(a)ll higher mental functions are the essence of internalised
relations of social order, a basis for the social structure of the individual’
(Vygotsky, 1997b: 106). It is the social world, and our interaction with
others, that provides the framework for the nature of our thinking. We
are not born into a vacuum. Rather, we are born into a world that already
has ways of thinking, ways of communicating or ways of structuring our
cognition. We have to learn or acquire these ways of communicating
and thinking in order to be a part of society. In other words, we have to

appropriate the tools that are used in our environments in order to become
a part of the social structure.
It is both organic development (physical/ biological) and the ‘mastery
of the use of tools’ (social) that determined an individual’s system
of actions or activity (Vygotsky, 1978: 21). Vygotsky’s (1987) notion
of activity is of central importance to the understanding of cultural
development. Activity may be defined as ‘ordinary day-to-day, hour-
to-hour, human (historical) activity’ (Newman & Holzman, 1993: 46).
Newman and Holzman (1993) argue that because Vygotsky was locating
himself within a Marxist framework, his notion of activity is one that
is ‘revolutionary’. The notion of revolution was not analogous to the
action of making a revolution (the overthrowing of the Tsarist regime,
for example) but ‘it is a particular action, a changing of the totality of
circumstances (historical ‘scenes’) of human existence’ (Holzman &
Newman, 1993: 46). This revolutionary activity occurred when a lower
level of development or functioning was transformed/revolutionised into
a higher form of development or psychological functioning (Vygotsky,
1987). For example, to be reading this book, you have developed through
a series of revolutions in the ways in which you think. When you were
born, the verbal interactions between other people in your environment
were meaningless sounds. Your interactions with others changed when
you developed the ability to speak. You could probably understand what
people in your environment were saying to you before you understood
that words are abstract representations of things in the real world.
You learned to interpret letters and attached meaning to their infinite
combinations. Your literacy ability exposed, and continues to expose,
you to a plethora of ideas or ways of thinking about the world.
How you think about yourself and the world is determined by
the language and culture in which you were raised. Vygotsky was
particularly interested in how adults teach children to become a member
of a particular culture, especially how caregivers teach children to use
language in order to communicate with others. What is important is that
the social or external, precedes the individual or internal, and the social
is, thus, the moving power of development. However, we are not passive
recipients of culture. To argue that we are victims of our cultures is to
violate the fundamental principle of the dialectical historical materialist
method because only one part of the larger whole of human thinking
would be taken into account. While the moving power of develop-
ment is the social world, we are accorded active roles in our own
development. Thus, ‘every new form of cultural experience is not
simply external … but the organism, assimilating external influences, Zone of Proximal
assimilates a whole series of forms of behaviour, and assimilates them Development. Vygotsky’s
depending on his degree of mental development’ (Vygotsky, 1997: 223). term for tasks too difficult
for children to master
alone, but which can
Vygotsky’s conceptualisation of development: be mastered with the
sociohistorical development guidance and assistance
Vygotsky created many theoretical terms to explain development, of adults or more skilled,
including the Zone of Proximal Development, actual level of develop- usually older, children.
ment, potential level of development, the general genetic law of

development and the dialectic between scientific and everyday concepts.
These theoretical terms may appear to be complicated, but are actually
directly related to Vygotsky’s method of analysis, that is dialectical
historical materialism. Dialectical historical materialism is, in its
essence, an analytic technique in which distinct parts of a larger whole
are identified, described and discussed in relation to one another. The
relationships between the parts that constitute the whole, or the entire
picture/process, are typically characterised by conflict or opposition.
Vygotsky’s ontological concepts are a reflection of his method of
analysis, his ‘research method/design/analysis’ and the ways in which he
investigated human development. Two concepts, historical and social,
form the parts of his concept of development (the whole). Each part,
what is internal (historical) and what is external (social) is vital to the
explanation of how humans develop, but neither of the concepts, on their
own, or in isolation, are able to fully account for human development.
The concepts of the historical and the social are separate components,
existing in opposition to one another, that become tightly intertwined as
we live in the world, as we develop. Vygotsky consistently underlined
the interconnectedness of his central concepts of development, history
and social and referred to ‘developmental history…the interconnected,
dynamic, unified whole’ (Vygotsky, 1993: 278).
Vygotsky (1997b: 99) defined development as:
… a complex dialectical process that is characterised by complex

periodicity, disproportion in the development of separate functions,
metamorphoses or qualitative transformation of certain forms
into others, a complex merging of the process of evolution and
involution, a complex crossing of external and internal factors, a
complex process of overcoming difficulties and adapting …
Central to Vygotsky’s concept of development are the concepts of

change, process, the dynamic interaction between the natural, the existing
ways of thinking or the historical, and the cultural, the social, new ways of
thinking, or the moving power of development.
Vygotsky’s concept of development includes the notion of change.
He was interested in finding out about how our ways of thinking were
arranged and reorganised as we become individuals in a society. For
example, in order to become an active member of our families, we need
to learn their language, or tool, for engaging or communicating with
others. When we are infants, we cry when we feel discomfort. When we
are toddlers, we need to change the way we communicate with others.
We learn how to express our discomfort, or any other emotion or thought,
in language, or by using the tool that others use to communicate with
one another. Development is change; there is a difference between how
we used to think and how we think now. For Vygotsky, this difference is
for the better: change is understood as improvement. It occurs when our
ways of thinking shift from a lower to a higher level, when our thinking
becomes more advanced. Thus, change is revolutionary.
Development is a process, or a series. We are not the same individual

when we are born and when we die, assuming that we live a fairly long
life. Our lives are a series of changes that we have to undergo in order
to be part of a society. We are born and function as part of the family,
with caregivers and siblings, or others who share our world. We attend
school as children and adolescents and are expected to develop our
thinking in terms of acquiring literacy and numeracy skills. As adults,
we are members of the workforce; we are expected to sustain not only
our own existence, but also that of others, our own children and families.
When we are in our old age, we may expect that our families will look
after us as we grapple with the issue of mortality. The process of human
development thus has a beginning, we are born, and an end, we die. The
time between our births and our deaths is filled with transformations in
our bodies, in our emotions, in the ways in which we interact with other
individuals and in the ways in which we think.
The aim of developmental processes is a more advanced state of
mental functioning (Vygotsky, 1978). Different ways of thinking develop
at different rates, for example you may have learned how to count to ten
before you were able to recite the letters of the alphabet. Even though
the moving power of development is the external social world, which
provides the ways of thinking in a society, individuals play active roles
in their own development. It is the complex interaction between the
cultural tools, or ways of thinking, that we have previously acquired
and new forms of knowledge that determine how we develop. Thus, we
do not merely passively internalise the environment. It is our ‘history’,
or what we already know, the ways of thinking that we have previously
acquired, that interact with new cultural tools and determine whether
or not we will acquire new knowledge or these new ways of thinking.
Thus, it is the external, social world that creates a state of conflict within
the individual, which in turn, moves development forward depending
on whether or not this conflict is resolved. This view of development is
characteristic of dialectical historical materialism because two opposing
forces, the historical and the social (that is, what you currently know and
new knowledge), interact in dynamic ways.
Consider the example of attending university for the first time.
At school, you may have been successful because you could learn the
information in a textbook and were able to recall this information in
an examination. This way of learning, that is, memorisation and recall,
would constitute your cultural tools of learning or history. However,
at university, the cultural tools that are valued include reading widely
and assimilating a vast amount of information from diverse sources in
order to construct your own opinion. Thus, how you currently learn or
your internalised history (your memorisation and recall, for example)
is in conflict with the learning required at university (synthesis and
evaluation, for example). How successful you are at resolving this conflict
and adapting to the rigors of university will determine how successful
you are at developing the new cultural tools of synthesis and evaluation,
and thus your success at university.
Vygotsky’s description of sociohistorical

development
1. The natural and cultural lines of development

Vygotsky described the relationship between the historical and the social in
many different ways. His use of the dialectical historical materialist method
can be evidenced in his division of development into two lines, namely the
Natural line of natural and cultural lines of development. The natural line of development
development. was defined as ‘the processes of genetic organic growth and the maturation
The biological or
of the child’ (Vygotsky, 1929: 415). Thus, biological characteristics could
physical growth of
the child, involving
not be ignored and Vygotsky wrote a great deal about the need to find
genetic inheritance creative ways in which children that were deaf, blind or physically disabled
and maturation. could become active and productive members of society. However,
Vygotsky focused his attention on the cultural line of development, or ‘the
Cultural line of improvement of psychological functions, the working out of new methods
development. of reasoning, the mastering of the cultural method of behaviour’ (Vygotsky,
The mastery of the
1929: 415). An example of a ‘cultural method of behaviour’ includes language
behaviour and thinking
present in society.
as the tool through which humans communicate with one another. The
natural and cultural lines of development could not, however, be viewed in
isolation. Accordingly, maturation provided a condition for the process of
the development of cultural tools, which were considered to be the moving
power of development.
2. The General Genetic Law of Cultural Development

In the theoretical concept of the General Genetic Law of Cultural
Development, the juxtaposition of the external (social) and internal (historical)
or the social plane and the individual plane create a unified system of ana-
lysis and understanding of development. Vygotsky explained the individual
and society in his General Genetic Law of Cultural Development:
Any function in the child’s cultural development appears twice,

or on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then
on the psychological plane. First it appears between people as
an interpsychological category, and then within the child as an
intrapsychological category. We may consider this position as a
law in the full sense of the word, but it goes without saying that
internalisation transforms the process itself and changes its structures
and functions. Social relations among people genetically underlie all
higher functions and their relationships (Vygotsky, 1987:163).
This is what is meant by the ‘social’ as the moving power of

development. All higher mental functions or ways of thinking are
present firstly in the social plane or in the external world (social). These
ways of thinking are present in collective activity or interaction between
people (social). Other individuals in our environments teach us the
ways of thinking of our particular cultures (social). We internalise these
ways of thinking in dynamic ways depending on our current ways of
thinking (historical). Activity in the social plane creates a state of conflict
in the individual plane (social and historical). It is this conflict, and its
resolution, that results in development (Vygotsky, 1993). Thus, conflict

has a central role to play in development. Vygotsky explained the role of
conflict between the social and the historical in the following way:
Introduced into the history of the child development at the

same time is the concept of conflict, that is, contradiction or
clash between the natural and the historical, the primitive and
the cultural, the organic and the social. … the old form is forced
out, is sometimes completely disrupted, and sometimes there
is a geological superimposition of various genetic epochs that
make the behaviour of the cultured person resemble the earth’s
crust (Vygotsky, 1997b: 221-222).
Private speech
Anyone having contact with young development of private speech, or inner

children will have noticed that they talk speech, is a process of internalising
to themselves a lot, sometimes more social interactions. This starts as an
than they talk to others. This private interpersonal process, occurring
speech is an essential part of cognitive between the child and adult, usually the
development for all children. Vygotsky caregiver, and ultimately becomes an
was the first psychologist to document intrapsychic process that occurs within
its importance and there has been much the child. Vygotsky believed that this
debate about its purpose and value. pattern—the development from
Piaget called it egocentric speech the interpersonal, or social, to the
because the child does not adjust her intrapscyhic or personal—occurs
speech to the perspective of the listener, in all aspects of the child’s
but egocentrality assumes that the cognitive development.
listener’s perspective is the same as one’s Research supports Vygotsky’s
own. Further, Piaget said this type of interpretation of the usefulness of
speech reflects social and cognitive private speech in cognitive
immaturity and has no positive role in development. Berk (1986) attempted to
normal cognitive development. discover whether all children engage in
Vygotsky, on the other hand, believed private speech, whether it really emerges
that private speech plays a special role from social communication, and
as a guide to help the child to master whether it helps to guide the child’s
her actions, and it eventually fades away actions. Through observational studies
as the child is able to do this silently of young children, he found what Piaget
(see the developmental phases in the referred to as egocentric speech (speech
acquisition of tools). Vygotsky also that is not addressed to anyone in
believed that children who engage in a particular nor adapted in any way so
large amount of private speech are more that another might understand it)
socially competent than those who do seldom occurred. Most of the private
not use it extensively. He argued that speech that children engaged in served
private speech represents an early to describe or guide the child’s
transition in becoming more socially actions—consistent with Vygotsky’s
communicative and that the assumption that self-guidance is the
>>
<<
central function of private speech. Berk behaviour. In addition, Berk found
also found that children talked to evidence that private speech develops
themselves more often when working similarly in all children, irrespective of
alone on challenging tasks and also cultural background, and that it
when their teacher was not immediately arises from social experience, as
available to help them, that is, when the Vygotsky maintained.
child needed to take charge of his own Kate Cockcroft
3.The Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD)

Vygotsky described this notion of conflict in many different ways, for
example, ‘a continuous contradiction between primitive and cultural
forms’ (Vygotsky, 1997b: 222). Vygotsky underlined the role of conflict
between the social and individual planes in his metaphor of the Zone
of Proximal Development (ZPD) (Wertsch & Stone, 1987: 164). The
ZPD constitutes the arena in which the social and individual interact
(Daniels, 1996) and was defined by Vygotsky (1978: 86) as the margin
Actual level of between an individual’s ‘actual developmental level as determined by
development. independent problem solving’ and the more advanced level of ‘potential
Independent
development as determined through problem solving under adult
problem-solving.
guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers’. In the ZPD,
Potential level what was of fundamental importance was that the child was not capable
of development. of solving the task set by the adult independently, or with his/her current
Problem-solving under level of ability. Therefore, the explicit point made by Vygotsky is that
adult guidance or tasks need to be designed so that they are above the child’s current
peer collaboration. ability, thereby creating a state of conflict (Vygotsky, 1998). This was the
initial moving force of development. However, the setting of tasks above
the child’s current ability was a necessary but insufficient, condition
of development. The problem-solving strategies or tools provided by
the more experienced other was another condition of development.
Through guided learning, Accordingly, the adult, or more capable peers, provided the strategies
the adult shifts the of tools that could be utilised to solve the new task. What was of central
child’s Zone of Proximal
Development to even
importance was that the tools were slightly above the child’s current
higher levels. level of ability (Vygotsky, 1997a). Tools that were designed either below
or too far above the child’s current ability were not
PH OT O: KATE COCKCROFT
appropriated. Whether or not the child actually

completed the new task was dependent on how
successfully the child was able to appropriate the
new tool that was necessary for the solution of said
task. The level of tool appropriation was dependent
on the child’s current mental state (Vygotsky,
1997b). Thus, Vygotsky’s central explanation of
development provides direct evidence for his use
of the dialectical historical materialist method,
since there are dialectical relationships between
tasks and tools, between the child’s current level of
ability and tool appropriation and, thus, between
the historical (internal) and the social (external).
Beyond the upper limit are those tasks that the child is as yet unable to perform, even with assistance,
since they are beyond his or her current cognitive capacity
Upper limit: the highest level of problem solving that the child is capable of,
given the assistance of an able instructor
Zone of Proximal Development
Lower limit: the level of problem solving that the child is capable of when working independently
Figure 22.2 Schematic representation of the Zone of Proximal Development.
4. Scientific and everyday concepts, and instruction and

development
Vygotsky had been tasked with the indoctrination of Communism
during the Leninism era. Consequently, the purpose of education
was not to create harmony within the individual, but to provide a
mechanism for acculturating the individual into a particular form of
thought (Vygotsky, 1993). This form of thought was the Communist
way of life and Vygotsky was emphatic about the nature of education:
‘(t)he central idea is that education is viewed as a part of social life and
as preparation for the child’s participation in this life’ (Vygotsky, 1993:
119). Because of this, Vygotsky focused on the role of instruction in
human development.
Central to his focus on instruction and development was the dialectic
between scientific and everyday concepts, a clear adoption of the Marxist
method. Vygotsky’s adoption of the Marxist method is reflected by both of his
central assumptions. Firstly, scientific concepts and everyday concepts are two
distinct constructs. Secondly, it is the interplay between these two concepts
that results in the development of a higher level of mental functioning.
Vygotsky defines scientific/non-spontaneous concepts as ‘new concepts’
that are taught to the child through direct instruction. In contrast, everyday
or spontaneous concepts are the child’s ‘own concepts, particularly those
that have developed in the child prior to conscious instruction’ (Vygotsky,
1987: 172). Accordingly, scientific concepts exist in the external plane, while
everyday concepts existed on the internal plane. The development of scien-
tific concepts has a direct influence of the development of everyday con-
cepts: ‘(e)veryday concepts are restructured under the influence of the
child’s mastery of scientific concepts’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 217). Vygotsky’s
assumptions here again illustrate his methodological focus of the juxta-
position of contrasting concepts, scientific concepts (the social) and everyday
concepts (the historical) in order to construct a unified whole (change
or development).
Discussing the development of oral and written speech, Vygotsky stated,

‘(i)nstruction depends on processes that have not yet matured, processes
that have just entered the first phase of their development’ (Vygotsky, 1987:
205). Vygotsky (1987) also concerned himself with the temporal relationship
between instruction and development, and concluded that ‘instruction
always moves ahead of development… the processes never run in parallel’
(Vygotsky, 1987: 206). That instruction occurred first was seen to be related
to the conscious and volitional nature of instruction. So, instruction is also
constrained by development: ‘(w)hat collaboration contributes to the child’s
performance is restricted to limits which are determined by the state of
his development and his intellectual potential’ (Vygotsky, 1987: 209). The
relationship between instruction and development represents the current
state in the Zone of Proximal Development.
The historical interpretation of Vygotsky’s work

When Vygotsky was alive, his work (1924-1934) was published primarily
in Russian, with an article outlining the central tenets of his theory of
cultural development in English in the Journal of Genetic Psychology in
1929 (Vygotsky 1929; 1987; 1993; 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999). His most well
known work, Thinking and Speech, was published in Russian in 1934, the
year of Vygotsky’s early death. There has been much debate concerning
the relative importance of activity (our interactions with others) and
semiotic systems (signs and tools) in Vygotskian thinking. The Soviet
theorists have generally adopted an activity-oriented approach in which
Marxist thinking is clearly apparent. Western theorists have concentrated
on the role of semiotic systems in the development of the individual.
The Western neo-Vygotskians have typically de-emphasised the
influence of Marx on Vygotsky’s concepts. This anti-Marxist argument
has been generated by discussions of the influence of Stalinism and on
the nature of political expedience in Communist state/party control over
knowledge generation. Thus, the central thrust of the Western anti-
Soviet argument has been a lack of reflection by Soviet theorists about
their subjectivity or the influence of sociohistorical ideologies. However,
if one believes that there is misdirection in the emphasis that is placed on
concepts because of political ideology, then an exposition of the critics’
sociohistorical location is required. Explanations of the relationships
between sociohistorical ideologies and ontological and epistemological
stances are largely absent in the work of Western theorists. There
are, however, some points of agreement between Soviet and Western
interpretations. For example, Bruner’s (1987) notion of scaffolding or
the support provided by the parent or teacher that allows the child to
extend skills to higher levels of competence, is mirrored in Karpov’s
(2006) ideas about the reduced involvement of the adult in mediation.
The Soviet Neo-Vygotskians

Historically, there has been debate concerning the relative roles of Luria
and Leontiev in the development and subsequent interpretation of
Vygotsky’s work. (See Vygotsky, (1997a: 371) and Wertsch, (1987:3) for a
discussion on the ‘troika’ of Vygotsky, Luria and Leontiev.) Both Leontiev
and Luria, like Vygotsky, unapologetically adhered to the agenda of

widespread indoctrination of the Communist way of life. Leontiev and
the Kharkov School developed what came to be known as ‘activity theory’
(Kozulin, 1996). Luria (1960; 1976; 1978) also examined the development
of new cultural tools. His Uzbekistan investigations demonstrated the
conflict that exists between the natural and cultural lines of development
in the appropriation of a new cultural tool. However, the prominence of
Luria’s neuropsychological ideas in Western thought led to his work on
language development being noticed by Western linguistic theorists, who
utilised the concept of the ‘sign’ (Simon & Simon, 1963; Vocate, 1987). In
contrast, the Soviet neo-Vygotskians primarily focused on the concept of
‘tools’. Consequent Soviet research based on Vygotsky’s ideas investigated
the use of external means (tools, for example) in the facilitation of
internal higher mental functions (Bogoiavlenski & Menchinskaia, 1959;
1960; Elkonin, 1963; Fleshner, 1958; Kalmykova, 1955; Kostiuk, 1956;
Krutetski, 1961; Leontiev, 1959; Milerian, 1960; Natadze, 1957; Teplov,
1946; Zankov, 1957).
Karpov (2006: 20-21) summarised Vygotsky’s concept of sociohistorical
development in the following manner:
In the course of interpersonal communication, an adult presents

to the child a new psychological tool in the form of an external
device and mediates the child’s appropriation and mastery of
this tool. As the child masters the tool, it gets internalised and
turns into an internal mediator of the child’s mental processes.
Simultaneously, the adult is less and less involved in mediating
the child’s mastery of this tool. As a result, the child transits
from the use of the external psychological tool as mediated by
the adult to the independent use of the internal psychological
tool, which indicates the completion of the development of a
new higher mental process.
Thus, Vygotsky’s pivotal notion of the ‘social’ was incorporated in the

idea of a ‘new psychological tool’, while history, or our current state of Psychological tools.
mental functioning, would determine the process of appropriation of the Vygotsky’s term for
new tool. According to the Soviet neo-Vygotskians, Vygotsky principally cognitive abilities and
strategies that enable
distinguished between tool-mediated behaviour and instincts, and
us to use our mental
biologically programmed changes (Karpov, 2006). The inclusion of physical abilities more adaptively.
functioning was important to Vygotsky because he was attempting to For example, mnemonics
provide a complete account of development (Karpov, 2006). It is, however, help us to remember
unclear in the Soviet interpretation why physiological maturation would information better.
only be an influencing factor on the child’s motives, and not also on the
child’s mental processes. The Soviet neo-Vygotskians understood mental
processes to be cognitive processes involved in memory, problem-solving
and metacognition (Karpov, 2006).
The Soviet neo-Vygotskians have emphasised that the ‘social situation
of development’ is constituted by the ‘unique relation, specific to the given
age, between the child and reality, mainly the social reality that surrounds
him’ (Vygotsky, 1998, in Karpov, 2006: 42). The ‘social reality’ that
surrounds us is described and theorised in terms of cultural tools that are

related to sociohistorical circumstances in which they occur, and are related
to relations of power between individuals. Accordingly, ‘…(i)n the case of
learning how to use tools invented by human culture, observers attending
to a demonstrator’s tool-use strategy is a must for successful learning of
the strategy. Indeed, as opposed to the physical characteristics of objects,
their social meanings are not ‘written’ (Elkonin, 1989: 48) on objects and
therefore cannot be discovered in the course of independent explorations’
(Karpov, 2006: 49). In general, the Soviet neo-Vygotskians believed that
Vygotsky proposed a holistic view of development in which both instruction
by ‘cultured adults’ (the social) and the child’s present cognitive and affective
state (the historical) interacted in order to move development forward.
The Western interpretation of Vygotsky

The historical interpretation of Vygotsky’s works in English is more
complex because, with the exception of Vygotsky (1929), interpretations,
rather than translations of Vygotsky’s writings, first appeared. In 1962,
Hanfmann and Vakar presented Vygotsky’s (1934) Thinking and Speech as
Thought and Language. An important neo-Vygotskian, Bruner, believed
that he was ‘privileged to write an Introduction to the first translation
of Vygotsky’s classic’ (Bruner, 1987:1). However, Thought and Language
(1962) is criticised as having transformed, rather than faithfully translated,
Vygotsky’s central writings (Rieber & Carton, 1987; Knox & Stevens, 1993;
Simon & Simon, 1963; Van der Veer, 1997).
Little interest in Vygotsky’s ideas was evidenced in the West until
1978 when his book, Mind in Society: the development of higher psychological
processes, was published. Bruner, Scribner, John-Steiner, Cole and Souberman
(1978, p.x) clearly stated that Mind in Society was ‘not a literal translation of
Vygotsky’, although they thought that his work could be useful in the areas
of educational (John- Steiner and Souberman), developmental (Bruner
and Scribner) and cognitive (Cole) psychology. The Western Vygotskian
interpretation had the purpose of more fully understanding the cultural
tool of language, and perhaps, the ideological agenda of denouncing activity
theory as a peculiarly Communist interpretation of Vygotsky’s work. (See
Scribner’s (1985) discussion of Vygotsky’s uses of history, for example.)
These interpretations seem more aligned with the notion of ‘perestroika’ or
‘restructuring’, Mikhail Gorbachev’s economic and political reforms in the
Soviet Union in the 1980s. Sociohistorically, Mind in Society emerged from
the bastion of capitalism, the United States, during the Cold War Era. Both
Vygotsky and the Communists clearly regard Marx’s dialectical historical
materialist theory (epistemology) of economics (ontology) as the foundation
of their ideas. Thus, questions can be raised about the willingness of Western
interpreters to engage with Vygotsky’s Marxist epistemology. However,
Mind in Society was a seminal work, which sparked subsequent translations
and exogenesis of Vygotsky’s ideas (Glick, 1997).
The linguistic theorist, Wertsch’s, reading of Mind in Society (1978) led
him to investigate the concept of activity in Soviet psychology, focusing on
Vygotsky’s instrumental or genetic method (Vygotsky, 1997b) and children’s
learning in the ZPD (1984, with Rogoff). Wertsch’s inauguration as the
official translator of Vygotsky’s ideas in the West occurred in 1985, with

Culture, communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives and The social
formation of mind: A Vygotskian approach. The first of these was reprinted
in three successive years and contributed to the dissemination of Vygotsky’s
ideas to the previously marginalized English-speaking communities. None
of the books mentioned here are literal translations of Vygotsky’s writings.
Direct Russian to English translations of a diverse array of Vygotsky’s
writing (including publications, manuscripts, notes for lectures) were only
published between 1987 and 1999 in The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky.
Described as ‘an event’ (Bruner, 1987: 2), the neo-Vygotskian community
eagerly anticipated the publication of the Collected Works and they were not
disappointed (Daniels, 2001). Thinking and speech appeared in Volume 1,
and Bruner, who was an eminent neo-Vygotskian since the publication of
Mind in society (Daniels, 2001), wrote the Prologue to Vygotsky’s work.
However, Bruner (1987), in his translation of Vygotsky’s writing,
transformed Vygotsky’s epistemological framework, that is, Marx’s dialectical
historical materialism, into six ‘critical contrasts’ in the analysis of higher
mental functions. An examination of Bruner’s (1987) critical contrasts reveals
fundamental violations of Vygotsky’s ontological concept of sociohistorical
development. While Bruner’s ‘critical contrasts’ detail social mediation by an
active agent and the internalisation of this mediation by the child, they do not
present the mutually formative interplay between what the child has already
acquired (the historical) and new forms of interacting with others (the social).
Bruner’s focus on the thinking of the individual child (the internal), illustrative
perhaps of a particularly Capitalistic way of thinking, excludes both a thor-
ough analysis of the forms of thought that are being indoctrinated (the social)
and a complete account of the relationship between the two. The scaffolding Scaffolding.
interpretation of the ZPD is ‘governed by a rule of voluntary handover and Adjusting the guidance
given during a learning
willing receipt’ (Bruner, 1987: 28), thereby placing the fundamental role of
session to fit the student’s
conflict in Vygotsky’s theory into question. Bruner (1987) does, however, current performance level.
provide a personal, or individual, history of how he came to understand
Vygotsky’s ideas, but no mention is made of his own sociohistorical location
of how this may have affected his interpretation. (Bruner details his work as
a graduate student, mentioning the years 1936 and 1954. No mention is made
of World War II and its aftermath, in which the Communists were labelled
as the enemy of the Cold War era.) In addition, these ‘critical contrasts’ are
not central to most analyses of Vygotsky’s ideas.
Central to most analyses of Vygotskian writings is the ZPD and not
the concept of sociohistorical development which has been identified as
Vygotsky’s central ontological concept. There are diverse interpretations
and operalisations of this theoretical concept. The ZPD has been used to
explain the manner in which social and participatory learning may occur
(Daniels, 1996). The ZPD is, therefore, a theoretical (as distinct from
practical) attempt to elucidate the driving force of development, which
Vygotsky believed to be the contradictions between external needs (social)
and internal possibilities (historical) (Daniels, 2001). It is apparent that
Vygotsky, the psychologist, and not the methodologist, has been the point
from which the Western neo-Vygotskians have departed. Vygotsky’s ideas
have not been utilised as a dialectical historical materialist understanding of
the formation of mind, but rather, as an argument for the inclusion of social
factors in the formation of the individual (Wertsch, 1985).
The historical schism in the development of Vygotsky’s ideas is the
result of the manner in which the ‘social’ and the ‘individual’ have been
demarcated and the way in which the relationship between the two
has been conceptualised (Daniels, 2001). There appears to be pervasive
agreement that Vygotsky rejected any rigorous separation of the social
and the individual. In this conception, the social and individual are
‘mutually formative elements in a single interacting system’ (Daniels,
2001: 72). The interacting system may, on the surface, appear to be the
application of Marxist method to the study of development. However,
the neo-Vygotskians have predominantly focused on only one half of
this mutually interacting system, namely, the individual. They do not
explain the dynamic interaction between the social and the individual in
real material circumstances and have primarily focused on ontology as
unrelated to epistemology (Newman & Holzman (1993).
Wertsch’s substitution of ‘historical’ with ‘cultural’

Wertsch (2005) viewed Vygotsky as the founding father of the sociocultural
approach because of the primary influence that sociocultural processes have
in development (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995; Wertsch & Tulviste, 1992). It is
apparent that for Vygotsky the ‘social’ and the ‘cultural’ were analogous—
‘everything cultural is social’ (Vygotsky, 1997b: 106). Thus, Wertsch is
open to the accusation that he transformed Vygotsky’s dialectical historical
materialism (epistemology) and sociohistorical development (ontology) into
the amorphous ‘cultural’ theory (Cole, 2001; 2005a; 2005b; Cole & Wertsch,
1996; Wertsch, 2005). Wertsch himself has commented, ‘the danger in using
sociocultural is that the historical dimension may get short shrift’ (Wertsch,
1991: 16). What Wertsch has faithfully taken from Vygotsky’s ideas is the
notion that investigations should focus on the start of the historical process
of development of a particular function. Hence his use of the Vygotskian
(1997b) terms, the ‘instrumental’ or ‘genetic’ method. It appears that Wertsch
only focused on half of Vygotsky’s ontological and epistemological approach.
While he investigated the start of development, how this investigation
occurs—that is, dialectical historical materialism—appears to be ignored.
Thus, the complex historical interaction of the natural and cultural lines
of development that, in themselves, constitute development has also been
overlooked. According to Wertsch (1987), the spoken word and gesturing
are the primary forms of mediation. Within his notion of intersubjectivity
between the situational definitions of the mother and child, the relationship
between the mother and child dyad is not characterised by conflict. Wertsch
also does not comprehensively explain how the task set for the child is
located above the current level of ability.
According to Wertsch (1985, 1987), three themes characterise Vygotsky’s
work. Firstly, individual functions were investigated through the utilisation
of the developmental or genetic method. An investigation of a single function
is not possible unless its place in development as a whole is understood.
Wertsch’s use of the genetic method (a term that is used by Vygotsky)
indicates his decision to ignore Marx’s dialectic historical materialism.
Wertsch (1999) argues that this genetic method dictates that higher mental
functions, therefore, should be examined in terms of processes, rather
than products. This constitutes a distinct shift away from the ‘objects and
outcomes’ of the activity approach. This is congruent with both Marx and
Vygotsky’s conceptualisations of development (albeit in a diluted form in
which revolution is not pivotal). Secondly, Wertsch (1985) believed that the
guiding assumption of the General Genetic Law of Cultural Development
is that mental processes originate from social interaction. It is at this point
that Wertsch violates the central principle of any dialectic, and indeed the
General Genetic Law of Cultural Development, which states that a higher
level of mental processing is the result of the interplay between both the social
and the individual planes. Accordingly, social interaction alone does not
cause the development of mental process (a position that Wertsch proposes).
His cause-and-effect relationship does not meet the requirements of any
juxtapositioning. The third theme that Wertsch believed characterised
Vygotsky’s work is that human action is mediated by tools/signs (Penuel
& Wertsch, 1995). Here Wertsch (1999) places emphasis on the individual
plane and his ontological framework reflects his interest in Linguistics
as the term ‘sign’ is favoured over the term ‘tool’ (Wertsch, 1991; 1993;
1998; 1999). For Wertsch, sign systems are resources in action rather than
representational systems only. Signs transform the purposes of their users
and mediate mental functions, a hierarchical relationship in which signs
themselves dominate those who use them (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995). Wertsch
(1981), with his conceptualisation of social practices in which individuals are
provided with tools and thereby master and transform activity, highlighted
Vygotsky’s idea of mutually formative elements (the individual and social
planes) in an interacting system. What Wertsch does not make clear is that
both tools and activity have no meaning unless they are defined in relation
to one another. Wertsch does not provide a clear account of how Vygotsky’s
natural line and cultural line (with tools) may be distinguished.
Wertsch’s (1987) framework is founded on two fundamental assumptions:
s He upholds an ‘irreducible’ account of agency of individuals ‘acting-

with-mediational means’ (Daniels, 2001: 79). It is Wertsch’s use of the
preposition ‘with’ that is problematic because it violates Vygotsky’s
notion that method (or tool) is both a prerequisite and a product. The
way in which the act itself is defined necessarily includes the cultural
tool. The word ‘with’ indicates an instrument used to perform
an action. However, it does not account for how an action itself is
transformed by the tool that is utilised to complete a new cultural
task. Therefore, Vygotsky’s triangular conceptualisation of task-tool-
response (see Figure 22.1) is not emphasised.
s Wertsch’s work includes the assumption of teleological action in which
‘actors achieve their goals through decisions among alternative courses
of action, choosing means that have the promise of being successful in
the given situation, and applying them in a suitable manner’ (Wertsch,
1991: 9). This is a particularly problematic assumption because the
focus of Wertsch’s research has been the development of speech in
early childhood. It is certainly questionable whether such young children
are capable of such goal-directed action. Wertsch’s epistemological

interpretation places mediated action as the appropriate focus of
empirical description and explanation (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995).
Despite the concern that Wertsch’s ideas raises, he is a post-Vygotskian

theorist who cannot be ignored because of his influence on other neo-
Vygotskian writers, including Cole (2005, 2001), Engestrom (1996—whom
Penuel and Wertsch liken to Leontiev, 1981), Kozulin (1996), Lave (1993) and
Wenger (1999). The value of Wertsch’s contribution (1991; 1993) lies in his
presentation of a rationale for investigating single elements or components
in a system in order to examine how alterations/changes in a single element,
or combination of elements, may affect the entire system (Daniels, 2001). It is
perhaps then fair to state that while Wertsch (1985) did attempt to consider
the social and individual as mutually formative, he is still shackled by his
capitalistic focus on the individual only and, therefore, does not utilise the
fundamental method of dialectical historical materialism.
The varying interpretations of Vygotsky’s

theoretical terms
Feuerstein’s construct of mediated learning experience
Feuerstein’s construct of Mediated Learning range of cognitive, creativity and self-concept

Experience (MLE) and his structured measures prior to the intervention, and they
Instrumental Enrichment (IE) programme were post-tested on the same measures after
of cognitive development have been used a one-year intervention during which IE and
successfully to improve the thinking skills of MLE skills were incorporated into the school
a range of populations, for example mentally curriculum. On the cognitive level, all three
retarded adolescents, elementary school groups showed significant improvement
children from disadvantaged backgrounds, after the intervention, with the black children
deaf students, learning-disabled students, improving the most of all groups. The
and gifted, disadvantaged students (Skuy, coloured and black children also improved
Lomofsky, Fridjohn& Green, 1993). significantly in terms of their self-concept and
In South Africa, MLE and IE have proven creative ability. Overall, the improvements for
effective in improving the self-concept and the black children were significantly greater
academic and creative skills of disadvant- than for the others, which was expected in
aged students. In the study by Mentis, Skuy, terms of their educational deprivation under
Durbach, Cockcroft, Fridjohn and Mentis apartheid.
(1995) the IE thinking skills programme An important achievement of this study
was combined with teacher training in MLE was to demonstrate the effectiveness of MLE
skills, and carried out with three different and IE for different socio-cultural, ethnic
primary school groups in the South African and language groups. This is an important
mining town of Lime Acres. The groups were achievement in view of South Africa’s
a) Afrikaans- and English-speaking white multicultural composition.
children, b) coloured children and c) black Kate Cockcroft
children. The children were pre-tested on a
Mediation
The notion of mediation is characterised by a historical schism in the
interpretation of Vygotsky’s work, namely, activity theory (Soviet) and
the sociocultural approach (Western). This historical split between
activity theory and semiotic means of mediation is a result of the different
conceptualisations of the relationship between the social and individual
planes (Daniels, 2001) or the social and the historical. These two distinct
paths of neo-Vygotskian thought are consequently characterised by both
philosophical and sociohistorical difference. What the two approaches
have in common is that neither resorts to a deterministic position. Both
positions recognise that, in terms of individual development, individuals
actively shape the cultural forces that are central in their development
(Kozulin, 1990). This may be conceptualised as a mediational model in
which the social and individual planes are mutually formative.
The Zone of Proximal Development

The ZPD has been labelled as Vygotsky’s most profound contribution
to the understanding of learning. Paradoxically, this contribution has
resulted in the neo-Vygotskian substitution of one complex concept in the
place of many, equally complex phenomena (Van der Veer, 1997). In this
chapter, the ontological concept of sociohistorical development is seen as
Vygotsky’s central concept and the ZPD is a framework of inter-related
terms that enabled him to explain his primary ontological position. There
have been numerous versions of the original conceptualisation of the
ZPD, which differ in terms of how the social world is theorised, described,
and operationalised (Karpov & Brandsford, 1995). There are, therefore,
both ontological and epistemological differences in interpretations of
the ZPD.
Firstly, the scaffolding approach highlights the distinction made bet-
ween support (mediation) provided for an individual’s initial performance
and subsequent, unaided performance (Bruner, 1987). Mediation, or the
‘social’, therefore, occurs in ‘highly framed or formulated situations’
(Bruner, 1987: 27). While it could be argued that this understanding
involves the juxtapositioning of initial performance (the historical) and
unaided performance after mediation (sociohistorical development), the
investigations are not clearly structured in this manner. Vygotsky did
not clearly detail any forms of social assistance and only wrote general
prescriptions concerning guidance and collaboration, assistance through
leading questions/ demonstrations, and provision of the initial elements of
the solutions to tasks (Moll, 1990). The scaffolding approach has a focus
on assistance, thus ‘limit(ing) the complexity of the task to a level that the
child can manage’ and providing ‘a support system that helps learners get
there’ (Bruner, 1987: 32). Therefore, while the ideas of the social and the
historical are present in Bruner’s interpretation, the notion of conflict as
the central explanatory force in development is not emphasised.
Secondly, the cultural approach (Davydov, 1982: 5, in Hedegaard,
1996: 168) defines the ZPD as the ‘distance between cultural know-
ledge provided by socio-historical context, made accessible through
instruction, and everyday experience of individuals’. Hedegaard (1985)
labelled this as the distinction between understood knowledge as

supplied by instruction (the social), and active knowledge as owned by
the individual (the historical). This framework appears to incorporate
the notion of conflict between scientific concepts developed by
instruction and the everyday knowledge of individuals. However, the
fact that everyday knowledge (internal, or the historical) was, at one
point in the individual’s development, cultural knowledge (external,
or the social), is not clearly emphasised. The point that the individual’s
sociohistorical context shapes the formation of both scientific and
everyday concepts is not fully explicated. Thus, it is questionable
whether this conceptualisation views the development of the individual
as a sociohistorical process.
Thirdly, Lave and Wenger (1991), who label themselves as having a
‘situated’ or ‘cultural’ approach, also focus on Vygotsky’s separation of
scientific and everyday concepts, in which the ‘mature’ concept arises from
the merger of the two. While this is a clear presentation of a whole, the
situated approach violates Vygotsky’s social/individual juxtapositioning.
The situated theorists propose that knowledge does not exist internally in
the individual (the historical), but relationally between people (the social).
Thus, while there is unity between the social and individual planes, there
is no real distinction between the two.
Fourthly, the collectivist/socio-cultural approach interprets the ZPD
as the gap between the student’s everyday actions (the historical) and the
historically new form of social activity (mediation) that can be collectively
generated (the social) (Wertsch, 1985; 1999). Wertsch (1995; 1999) attempts
to circumvent the difficulty of definition by stating that the central issue is
not where analysis should begin, either with cultural tools (the social) or
the individual (the historical). Rather, the focus of study should be centred
on the fundamental irreducible tension between these two analytically
distinct, but inextricably connected, facets of any mediated action. Here
Wertsch (1985) appears to be adopting the dialectical historical materialist
method; however, his constructions of ‘social’ and ‘individual’ are not
analytically distinct, as he has defined ‘individual’ merely as ‘social’ (Cole
&Wertsch, 1996).
The above interpretations of Vygotsky’s ZPD also highlight differences
in the ways in which Vygotsky’s concepts of mediated activity by tools
has been developed by the neo-Vygotskians. Vygotsky’s Soviet successor,
Leontiev, in the 1930s, is labelled as a ‘revisionist’ of Vygotsky’s ideas
(Kozulin, 1996: 99) because he emphasised ‘practical (material) actions’ as
the core of Vygotsky’s ideas. Kozulin (1996: 99), in a similarly disparaging
vein, casts Leontiev’s focus on activity as ‘a local affair of Soviet Psychology’.
Wertsch (1985), after the publication of Mind in Society (1978), provided
the ‘breakthrough’ of Vygotsky’s work into Western thought (Kozulin,
1996: 100) with his books Vygotsky and the social formation of mind (1985)
and Culture, communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives (1987).
(This notion of a breakthrough is somewhat confusing as Vygotsky’s
central ideas had been available in English since 1929, in the Journal of
Genetic Psychology.)
Activity
Culture, communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives (1987) contained
a chapter by Davydov and Radzikhovskii (1987) that outlined the activity-
oriented approach. They make their opinion about Wertsch’s interpretation
of Vygotsky’s work quite transparent in their chapter in Wertsch’s book,
by making no reference to him whatsoever in their discussion of activity-
oriented psychology. Davydov and Radzikhovskii’s (1987) activity theory
had joint activity/practice as the unit of analysis and centred on the role
of mediating artefacts in learning (Engestrom, 1996). Davydov and
Radzikhovskii (1987) detailed an instruction strategy as ascending from
the abstract to the concrete, in line with Vygotsky’s scientific concepts/
everyday concepts juxtaposition. The goal of learning at school was to place
knowledge out into the world by making it theoretically powerful and
dynamic when the student is faced with theoretical problems (Engestrom,
1996). Thus, activity theorists locate psychological development and analysis
as grounded in practical cultural activities (Daniels, 2001), seemingly in line
with Vygotsky’s emphasis. Activity theorists define an activity as students
using the tools that they are given for a specific purpose. The effect of objects
in the social plane on the motivation of subjects was viewed as central
(Leontiev, 1981). This conceptualisation was not founded on an account of
any social structures, which may act to organise and confine any act on the
social plane (Penuel & Wertsch, 1991). Davydov (1988) did attempt to address
this concern by adding rules, the community and the division of labour
(that is, lecturers’ control and students’ study) into his conceptualisation.
However, these notions were considered in a narrow way, for example rules
(classroom behavioural codes and assessment standards), and community
(classroom), and did not engage in issues concerning the impact of wider
sociohistorical factors.
PHOTO: KATE COCKCROF T
Technological tools in the

new millennium include
portable electronic games
and have changed the way
in which children play.
The Westerners, Lave (1988; 1993), Lave and Wenger (1991; 1996) and
Wenger (1999), in their communities of practice approach, or legitimate
peripheral participation model, attempted to redefine elements of the mo-
del provided by Davydov (1988). This approach conceptualises the student
as a legitimate participant (subject) and defines tools as the technologies
of transparency and simulation stories, and the tools of the established
practice. Davydov’s (1985) ‘community’ was defined as a ‘community of
practice’ within a school setting. Engestrom (1996) attempted to reconcile
the disparate positions of Davydov, Lave and Wenger. His ‘learning by
expanding’ approach was based on studies with adolescents and positioned
the school as a collective instrument (perhaps reflecting an attempt to
incorporate the ideas of Wertsch).
These three interpretations share key ideas. Firstly, their research
focus is on joint activity or practice. Secondly, the theorists clearly position
themselves as followers of the cultural-historical school of Vygotsky,
apparently because of their focus on activity. These theories of activity,
however, differ in their interpretations of previous neo-Vygotskian
work. Davydov (1988) focused on the translation and interpretation by
Leontiev (1981), while Engestrom (1996), Lave (1993) and Wenger (1999)
demonstrate the influence of the Western interpretation of Wertsch
(1985). Thirdly, all three perspectives claim to emphasise the role in
learning of mediating artefacts, which are socially created (Engestrom,
Education prepares 1996). Their triangular conceptualisation places tools at the apex, with the
individuals for participation community (which is narrowly defined) at the centre of the base. This
in social life (or society), triangular conceptualisation does not reflect the explanatory principle of
thus schools (and the dialectic between two analytically distinct constructs in the traditions
consequently, 'school
culture') are key agents
of Marx and Vygotsky. Their subject, learner and group (Davydov, 1988),
of socialisation of the student as a legitimate participant (Lave, 1993; Wenger, 1999), and a
the individual. team of students, lecturers, practitioners, local people (Engestrom, 1996),
and object, namely understanding of content and context (Davydov, 1985;

Engestrom, 1996) and the context of the practical reproduction of content
(Engestrom, 1996; Lave, 1993; Wenger, 1999) are all positioned on the
same level. All three approaches locate the outcome of learning action
(theoretical concept and its relationship with the wider world) (Davydov,
1985; Engestrom, 1996) and the mastery of the practice of dealing with
theoretical content and related issues (Engestrom, 1996; Lave, 1993;
Wenger, 1999) as positioned outside all other factors. This separation
of outcome appears to be in violation of Vygotsky’s (1987) fundamental
focus on the social and individual planes as being mutually formative
elements in an interacting system. In addition, this separation violates
the fundamental tenet of dialectical historical materialism, in which the
interplay or relationship is a pivotal aspect of the explanatory structure.
Lave (1993) and Wenger (1999) criticise Davydov (1985) for his
narrow conceptualisation of the ‘social’ and accuse him of providing no
account of learning in the wider context of the structure of the social
world. However, they merely define Davydov’s (1985) components
in an identical learning structure in a different way (semiotically)
and there seems to be little evidence to suggest that they themselves
have overcome their own criticisms of Davydov’s work. Yet, they do
highlight the important aspect of the student as a legitimate participant
and the tool of transparency in the learning context. Engestrom’s
(1996) attempts to incorporate school as a collective instrument, and
his cultural tool of criticism, present a concept that may be helpful in
higher levels of education. However, all three approaches to learning
have a focus that is too narrow. Not all aspects of the social plane and
the complex relationships between these aspects, in particular the
wider societal structure, are discussed.
The individual (internal)

The discussion of neo-Vygotskian thought to this point has focused
on the role of the social plane in the interpretation of the General
Genetic Law of Cultural Development, the ZPD, mediation and tools.
However, it is also important to understand how tool appropriation
and the individual plane (or the internal) are understood by the neo-
Vygotskians. Vygotsky (1981, in a book edited by Wertsch) asserted, ‘it
goes without saying that the internalisation transforms the process itself
and changes its structures and functions’ (1981: 163). The individual
has to attach some form of meaning to the social plane in order for
internalisation to occur, or be an active constructor of knowledge
(Karpov, 2006). Social activity or acts in the social plane (the social)
generate consciousness, but meaning is formed in the individual plane
(the historical) (Kozulin, 1996).
Vygotsky (1987) provides no evidence for the existence of internal
mental structures, but rather examines internal psychological processes
that are embedded in particular sociohistorical circumstances (Daniels,
1996). Consequently, development of the individual occurs through
reflection on, and internalisation of, external activity (Vygotsky,
1987). Vygotskian principles have been located within a constructivist
perspective. The constructivist interpretation has been dismissed as

being simplistic, reductionistic, reifying rational mastery and control,
and positioning reflection as mental processing (thereby reinforcing
a conduit thesis of learning) (Matusov, 2001). The situated antithesis
of constructivism is helpful in elucidating what Vygotsky may have
meant by internalisation. Lave (1993) and Wenger (1999) postulate that
learning has its foundational roots in the situation (or context) in which
you participate. Learning is ratiocinated as inherent in human nature,
as the ability to negotiate new meanings to create emergent structures,
which are social, experiential and transformational (Wenger, 1999).
Learning occurs as a result of engagement in the changing processes of
activity in a particular community (Lave, 1993). As a consequence, we
participate in communities with the tools that they are given, in moments
of activity. Knowledge emerges as an interaction of participation, tool
use and social activity (Wenger, 1999). The role of others, who are
already a part of this community, is to enable you to participate in a
meaningful manner in the practices of the community by arranging
authentic conditions and activities in which you may practice interaction
with other individuals, who may be more, equally, or less, part of the
community than you are (Wenger, 1999). Lave (1993) and Wenger’s
(1999) approach has its historical roots in the work of Bruner’s (1987)
scaffolding approach, so the role of conflict in development may be
obscured. The situated antithesis may also be criticised for over-stating
the fact that knowledge is context-dependent, and the investigator has
to explore the subject positions of every participant within a particular,
broadly defined community.
In order to avoid Piagetian connotations of transmission, Wertsch
(1985) prefers the term ‘appropriation’ to that of ‘internalisation’. It would
appear that Wertsch (1984) is interested in the act of setting apart (the social
and individual planes) and how we take and use objects, or tools, from the
social plane. As a result, the use of the word ‘appropriation’, rather than
‘internalisation’ may be more expedient and judicious, given the important
role that tools play in Vygotsky’s ideas. Wertsch (1984; 1991) also utilises
the notion of ‘conscious reflection’, which he relates to appropriation.
Hence, reflection does not necessarily cause appropriation or tool use.
Particular examples of appropriation are distinguished by the extent to
which conscious reflection has occurred, the forms in which conscious
reflection has occurred, and willingness, voluntary use, or motivation, to
appropriate the tool. Here Wertsch (1985; 1991) acknowledges historical
factors in our appropriation of tools, that is, what tools we currently
possesses and how we are using these tools.
Conclusion
In the introduction to this section of this book, it is mentioned that
cognitive developmental psychologists are interested in how our mental
processes are influenced by our biology and experiences. For Vygotsky,
biology is the natural line of development, maturation as the gradual
unfolding of our genetic blueprints. Our experiences are our interactions
with others in the real world, the social, the external. These experiences,
our interactions with other people in the world form the basis, or provide
the structure, of our thinking. This means that our thinking does more
than influence our experiences in the real world. Rather, our experiences
and our interactions with other people in the world form the basis or
structure of our thinking.
There are, however, points of agreement between Vygotsky’s notion
of sociohistorical development and subsequent cognitive developmental
theory. The central concepts in cognition relate directly to Vygotsky’s
ideas about human development, in particular to the development of
the human mind. These concepts reveal that cognition is a collective
term that describes a process, that developmental processes include the
notion of change, that individuals are accorded an active role, and that
the intellectual feats of humans are unique. Our thinking, or cognition,
has many parts. Cognition is one theoretical term that represents many
other concepts and theoretical terms. A central concept of cognition is
that it relates directly to the use of knowledge. The important questions
that cognitive psychologists ask include, ‘How do we learn?’, or, ‘How do
we acquire new thinking and new ways of doing things?’. Cognition is a
process, a series of functions, which become increasingly more complex
in the sequence/series. Cognition as the process of appropriating the ways
of thinking inherent in our ‘cultures’, or knowledge is congruent with
Vygotsky’s work on the development of the mind. Our thinking is an
active process. We do not passively internalise information. We are not
the victims either of culture or of the dominant ways in which a society
is structured. When we learn the ways of the thinking of our society, we
actively reconstruct our existing ways of thinking and form new ways of
thinking and interacting with others. Cognition is developmental in the
sense that describes changes in the ways in which we think. The notion
of change also makes the concept of cognition ideological in the sense that
‘advanced’ forms of thinking are regarded as demonstrating a better, or
higher, level of cognitive development. However, on what basis cognition
is considered advanced and what relationships of power are present when
some ways of thinking are subordinated to others are often not questioned
or investigated by cognitive developmental theorists.
Vygotsky’s work may certainly be characterised as ideological. His
notion of what kind of thinking is advanced is discussed in his descriptions
of higher mental functions. One of his central aims was to indoctrinate
Communism in the Stalinist Soviet state. He believed that Marx’s
Communism was the most progressive, or advanced, way of organising
human society, and thus, structuring the thinking of individuals in that
society. Our ways of thinking, our ‘intellect feats’ are unique. Vygotsky
wrote extensively about the unique nature of human consciousness.
Human consciousness is (currently) the highest form of thinking on a
planet called Earth. We have subordinated all other forms of life on Earth
to the development of our species. We believe that other ways of ‘thinking’,
by animals and machines that have ‘artificial intelligence’, are so inferior
to our own that even the people who are relatively new to our society, our
collective of people, are capable of these lower forms of thought. In this
sense, cognition is ideological. We value the ways in which humans think.
We believe that we, as humans, are superior. We occupy the dominant

subject position, and we have marginalised the ways of existence of other
forms of life on Earth, and therefore have a great amount of power in
relation to these life forms. We have subjugated nature, these other forms
of life to human will.
Vygotsky is a Marxist developmental theorist in the sense that he
used the dialectical historical materialist method to understand human
development. He was interested in understanding all the aspects or parts
of development. He discussed what we now call physical development, our
biology or genetic inheritance; personality development, or what defines
and creates us as a person or individual; emotional development, the ways
in which our emotions are created; cognitive development, or how our
minds and our thinking develop; social development, or the ways in which
we engage with other people. In other words, he attempted to define the
central parts, or units of human development, and understand how these
units all related to one another in the construction of an adequate account
of how we develop as humans. The important point is that, in this book,
we have discussed the different parts, or aspects of development. If you are
going to understand development, in the Vygotskian sense, then you need
to develop your understanding of how all these parts fit together.
Specific tasks
➊ How has being able to read and use a computer changed the ways in which you
think and understand the world?
➋ Discuss how Vygotsky’s ideas about development have resolved the tensions between
the relative roles of nature (genetic inheritance) and nurture (the environment).
➌ Select any theoretical framework in developmental psychology. How are the

theoretical concepts presented (ontology) related to the methods used to examine
these concepts (epistemology)?
Karpov, Y V (2006). The Neo-Vygotskian Approach to Child Development. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
(Karpov discusses the Soviet interpretation of Vygotsky’s ideas in the 20th century.)
Newman, F & Holzman, L (1993). Lev Vygotsky. Revolutionary scientist. London: Routledge.
(Following the eminent American neo-Vygotskian traditional of both Cole and Wertsch, Newman
and Holzman offers a new interpretation of the role of revolution in Vygotsky’s work.)
Vygotsky, L S (1987). The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Volume One. Problems of General
Psychology. New York: Plenum Press.
(This volume contains Vygotsky’s famous work ‘Thinking and Speech’.)
Vygotsky, L S (1993). The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Volume Two. The Fundamentals of
Defectology. Abnormal Psychology and Learning Disabilities. New York: Plenum Press.
(Vygotsky discussed physical and mental disabilities with a focus on participation in social life.)
Vygotsky, L S (1997a). The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Volume Three. Problems of the Theory
and History of Psychology. New York: Plenum Press.
(Vygotsky discusses important questions concerning the nature of ontology and epistemology in
psychological knowledge.)
Vygotsky, L S (1997b). The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Volume Four. The History of the
Development of Higher Mental Functions. New York: Plenum Press.
(The nature of sociohistorical development is fully explored in this volume.)
Vygotsky, L S (1998). The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Volume Five. Child Psychology. New York:
Plenum Press.
(The notion of developmental change is discussed with reference to infancy, childhood and adolescence.)
Vygotsky, L S (1999). The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky. Volume Six. Scientific Legacy. New York:
Plenum Press.
(This volume presents an explication of Vygotsky’s primary ontological concepts.)
SECTION THREE
Psychosocial and socio-political
contexts of development
CHAPTER
23
Developmental psychology:
Critiques and contextual
considerations
Norman Duncan
This chapter deals with the following:
1. The history of developmental psychology

2. Critical developmental psychology
It also provides a guide to the chapters that follow in this

section, as well as has interest boxes that discuss
developmental psychology as a means of social regulation.
The history of developmental psychology

For a significant period of its history, mainstream developmental psychology
was constructed as a disciplinary endeavour aimed simply at describing,
explicating and predicting those ongoing physical, mental, emotional and
behavioural changes to which the individual is subjected (see, for example,
Berger, 1994; Craig, 1989; Mussen, Conger & Kagan, 1974). This construction
was mirrored by the popular representation of the sub-discipline as largely
aimed at describing, explaining and predicting the ‘practicalities of child
development or, more recently, human development (with the relatively
recent recognition that development is a ‘life-span’ affair)’ (Burman 2008:
13). Generally, therefore, the agenda of development psychology has
traditionally been represented as fairly uncomplicated and transparent.
However, with the increasing salience of the work of various critical
social science scholars (including Erica Burman, Mark Poster and Nikolas
Rose) during the latter half of the 20th century and particularly after the
1980s (Cf. Foster, 2008), this seemingly straightforward and innocuous
agenda was increasingly interrogated; and increasingly developmental
psychology was found to be less transparent and unambiguous than
traditionally represented. In essence, theorists such as Rose (1990) and
Burman (1994) argue that rather than being an uncomplicated enterprise,
developmental psychology theory and research, in many respects, can in
Developmental psychology: Critiques and contextual considerations 495
fact be seen as resulting in the obfuscation of the processes governing Traditional definition
not only human development but also various extant social asymmetries. of development.
Specifically, these theorists argue that developmental psychology and Developmental psychology
is that sub-discipline of
research often aid in the concealment of social asymmetries, such as
psychology that describes,
gender, racial and age-related inequalities through its ‘naturalisation’ or explicates and predicts the
‘normalisation’ of said inequalities. ongoing physical, mental,
For much of the history of developmental psychology, a dominant emotional and behavioural
discourse in the sub-discipline has been that human development is largely development in individuals
a function of intra-individual processes and the individual’s immediate throughout the human
socialising environment. life-span.
Rose (1990: 1-2), however, correctly argues that human development
is not simply an internally propelled process of change or a process
mediated only by the individual’s immediate environment. Instead, it is
also a process that is significantly mediated by broader external public-
political and social processes and conditions. Indeed, as Rose (1990: 1)
argues, human development is an ‘intensively governed’ process that is
continuously subjected to ‘the scope and aspirations of public powers …
at the level of social and political strategies and institutions and techniques
of administration and regulation’ (Rose 1990: 1). The most obvious mani-
festation of this ‘management’ and regulation, Rose (1990: 2) posits, has
traditionally been ‘the complex apparatuses’ targeting the child, such as
the child welfare system, the schooling system, and the surveillance and
control of parents.
For example, Rose (1990) and Burman (2008) illustrate how the
schooling system was harnessed to deal with the anxieties of the domi-
nant classes concerning the growing levels of pauperism and crime in
nineteenth-century England. Specifically, they argue that compulsory
primary schooling was introduced during this period as a means of
occupying ‘disorderly’ groups, such as the pauperised working classes
and keeping them under routine surveillance (Burman, 2008). It has
to be remembered that during this period Europe was experiencing
unprecedented levels of social restiveness and turbulence. Additionally,
rapid industrialisation accompanied by increasing urbanisation led to
the development of sprawling slums, disease and crime. Within this
context, extant dominant groups viewed the working classes with
growing apprehension; hence the implementation of compulsory
primary education and concerns about ‘appropriate’ child-rearing
practices. These concerns were later incorporated into developmental
psychology in significant ways (Burman, 2008).
The role of developmental psychology in what Rose (1990) refers to
as the ‘administration and regulation’ of people and social conditions in
the interest of the powerful was also reflected in the early 20th century
when the political and social agendas of the powerful in Europe (and
later in South Africa) became increasingly preoccupied with finding
scientific justifications for oppression of other-than-European/white
groups (See Chapter 28 by Kasese-Hara). At this point, it was to
the technologies of developmental psychology, such as intelligence
tests and comparable instruments that the ruling elites turned their
attention. It has been argued that, internationally, developmental
psychology played a significant role in harnessing these technologies

in the generation of research that ultimately was used to illustrate the
intellectual ‘inferiority’ of people of colour in relation to Europeans/
whites over the years ( Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). As indicated
in Chapter 28, historically, the role of South African developmental
psychology research in structuring asymmetrical racialised social
relations (that is, racism) locally had been particularly telling.
Developmental psychology and the

regulation of the human subject
Developmental psychology is one of the Moreover, given the expertise and social
contemporary disciplines that have authority attributed to developmental
developed a whole range of conceptual psychology in contemporary society, its
systems and ‘truths’ that enable the better power to influence the regulation of the
management and ‘regulation of the human human subject is immense.
subject’ (Rose, 1990: 2).
Popular representation Poster (1988) and Rose (1990) allude to another manner in which
of developmental developmental psychology may have been complicit in social control or
psychology. regulation. During periods when various labour markets internationally
Developmental psychology
experienced a surfeit of workers (as was the case after World War II,
is concerned with the
‘practicalities of child
for example), it was developmental psychology that aided in the produc-
development or ... tion of research and literature indicating the importance of women
human development’ providing full-time home-based care to their children. Developmental
(Burman, 2008: 13). psychologists such as John Bowlby (in Rose, 1990) explicitly admonished
mothers who through routine absences deprived their children of
‘vital’ ongoing maternal care and presence. Such children, according
to Bowlby’s writings, were destined for ‘delinquency’ and a range of
adjustment problems. In this manner, developmental psychologists
reinforced a dominant discourse that had become increasingly evident
in Europe in the nineteenth century, namely a discourse that argued that
mothers were ultimately responsible for the wellbeing of the individual,
and more specifically, for social order (Refer to the discussion in the box
titled Motherhood and social regulation).
It is of course important to note here, as correctly argued by Walkerdine
(in Burman, 2008), that broader social and political motivations cannot be
said to have ‘caused in any simple sense’ the tendencies of developmental
psychology to bolster the interests of the socially and politically
dominant. Rather, it is perhaps more accurate to view these social and
political motivations, on the one hand, and the agendas of developmental
psychology on the other, as being ‘mutually implicated, making and
remaking the other possible’ (Walkerdine, in Burman, 2008: 23).
In view of the attention given to the views of critical developmental
psychologists such as Burman (2008) and Rose (1990) above, it might be
apposite to briefly consider what critical developmental psychology is.
Motherhood and social regulation
The following statement by McClintock (in measuring of babies, the regimentation of

Burman, 2008) very cogently illustrates the domestic schedules and the bureaucratic
regulatory—indeed, oppressive—potential administration of domestic education. Special
of developmental psychology in relation to opprobrium fell on ‘non-productive’ women
not only women and children but also in (prostitutes, unmarried mothers, spinsters)
relation to men: and on ‘non-productive’ men (gays, the
Fears for the military prowess of the imperial unemployed, the impoverished). In the eyes
army were exacerbated by the Anglo-Boer of policymakers and administrators, the
war, with the attendant discovery of the puny bounds of empire could be secured and
physiques, bad teeth and general ill-health of upheld only by proper domestic discipline
the working class recruits. Motherhood and decorum, sexual probity and moral
became rationalised by the weighing and sanitation (McClintock, in Burman, 2008: 18).
Critical developmental psychology
Critical psychology has a double meaning: a critique of psychology, Critical developmental

and a critical way of doing psychology (Collins, 2004: 23) psychology. An approach
or orientation to
Very simply stated, critical developmental psychology, as an expression
knowledge (re)production
of the critical social science perspective, is an approach or orientation to and practices that aims
developmental psychology knowledge (re)production and practices that to unmask the ways in
aims to reveal the ways in which power operates, so as to counter the unequal which power operates, so
relations of power that said knowledge and practices (re)produce (Hook, as to counter the unequal
2004; Neuman, 1997). According to Hook (2004), critical developmental relations of power that said
psychology can be seen as: knowledge and practices
(re)produce.
…concerned both with critiquing oppressive uses of psychology

and with enabling transformatory forms of practice that disrupt
imbalances of power and which have social equality as their goal.
Importantly, implicit in the above is a concern to deconstruct those

‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions or ‘truths’ about human nature that are
embedded in and structure developmental psychology (Hook, 2004: 16),
such as the assumption that deviations from Western developmental values
and norms are pathological (or, at least, indicative of deficiency), that social
institutions are simply unchangeable, and that the nuclear family, as a
social institution, is the only or ideal location within which optimal human
development can occur (See the discussion on Erikson below).
Furthermore, as is evident from Hook’s (2004: 11) exposé on critical
psychology in South Africa, critical developmental psychology, by
definition, would be ‘diverse and multiple … [It] cannot be localised
to one form of theory, one type of critical practice, or single context’.
Importantly, however, all these diverse forms of critical developmental
psychology have at least one thing in common and that is their
commitment to identifying and critiquing the various ways in which the

power asymmetries in society are concealed and reproduced.
In keeping with the primary concerns of critical psychology, the
chapters in this section attempt to provide a critique of the manner in which
developmental psychology has traditionally dealt with issues of gender,
‘race’, culture, development, childhood and the family. Additionally, and
also in keeping with the key premises and practice of critical developmental
psychology, this section explores some of the contexts and issues that have
traditionally not been dealt with in mainstream developmental psychology
texts. Specifically, this section deals with the following critical issues and
contextual considerations.
In response to mainstream developmental psychology’s traditional neglect
of the contexts of human development, Hook in Chapter 24 of this textbook,
provides an introduction to, and examination of Uri Bronfenbrenner’s
Erikson’s psychosocial theory of human

development and the legitimisation of Western values
and social institutions
As indicated in at least two chapters in this providing adequate chances for each
volume, Erik Erikson proposed a individual to attain these values’. Of course,
psychosocial theory of human development. we know that even in societies in which
It is frequently argued that this theory Erikson’s values might have currency, all
advances a more holistic view of human people simply do not have equal
development than its more traditional opportunities to acquire these values.
psychoanalytic predecessors, in that it Lastly, as Poster (1988: 71) correctly
ostensibly pays greater attention to the asserts, through his valorisation of the
impact of social factors on human supposed synthesis between the individual
development. However, herein also resides and social institutions, Erikson effectively
at least three key weaknesses in the theory, repositions the study of human
according to Poster (1988). development away from the ‘conflicts ...
According to Erikson one of the key discontinuities ... [and] antagonisms’ that
consequences of the individual’s successful characterise the human condition in
interaction with her or his society is the contemporary society. Indeed, unlike its
internalisation of a set of values, namely psychoanalytic predecessors, Erikson’s
hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, theory constrains us ‘only to see society as
love, care and wisdom. However, as Poster a harmonious unity ... never needing to be
(1988) observes, firstly, this postulate is challenged fundamentally or to be
based on the fallacious assumption that overturned, never really oppressive’ (Poster,
these values have the same import in all 1988: 71). Scrutiny of the conditions
contexts. Secondly, Poster (1988: 70) characterising contemporary society
notes, the manner in which this postulate indicates that it is certainly not
is articulated in Erikson’s theory, results in harmonious, nor is it free of oppression—
‘an affirmation of all social orders as quite the contrary.
ecological theory of development. In his exposition of Bronfenbrenner’s

theory, Hook argues that through the theory’s identification of the myriad
overlapping and interfacing contexts of human development, it adds
significantly to, and enriches the study and our understanding of human
development. The chapter is concluded with a useful critical assessment of
the heuristic value of the ecological theory of human development.
In Chapter 25, Stevens explores the factors associated with violent
crime and the potential impact of violent crime on the wellbeing and
development of the individual, particularly the adolescent. The chapter
provides an interesting application of Erikson’s theory, in that it employs
the theory to explore the possible effects of violent crime on the identity
development of adolescents. Of even more critical value though is the
chapter’s exploration of the circumstantial concomitants and assumed
determinants of violent crime in the South African context.
Continuing this focus on South Africa as a context for human
development, Connolly and Eagle in Chapter 26 examine the effects
of the various forms of trauma to which South African children are
routinely subjected, as well as how these effects condition the affected
children’s later development. Included in the chapter is a comprehensive
overview of pertinent local research on trauma. Through its extensive
focus on the factors mediating children’s experiences of trauma, the
chapter conveys the critical message that there can be no single, universal
response to children’s exposure to trauma.
As an ensemble, Chapters 25 and 26 provide understandings of
aspects of the South African society that are critical for understanding
development (and particularly child development) within this context.
Co-authored by Hook and Duncan, Chapter 27 undertakes a
critical examination of some of the objects of the field of developmental
psychology’s gaze and scrutiny. Engaging the works of critical scholars
such as Erica Burman, Mark Poster and Nikolas Rose, the authors assay
a critical deconstruction of the notions of childhood; adolescence as a
period of storm and stress; the family; normality; and the centrality
of mothers in optimal child development. The chapter ends with a
critique of some of the more hidden and fraught discursive practices
and messages of mainstream developmental psychology.
Chapter 28 by Kasese-Hara provides a critical analysis of the
inter-related histories of European colonialism and the emergence of
psychology. An examination of how mainstream psychology (including
developmental psychology) was influenced by the racism of the society
in which it developed and how it, in turn, furthered the racist agendas of
broader society, constitutes a crucial aspect of this chapter. Kasese-Hara
cogently argues that it is essentially as a result of mainstream psychology’s
own racism that it has for so long neglected the cultural specificities
of other-than-Western contexts in the development of its constituent
theories and practices. The chapter endeavours to address this lacuna
by providing a discussion of a perspective on human development that
originates in West Africa.
In the next chapter, Mooney and Kiguwa provide an exploration of
the development of gender identity. Using various theoretical models
Generative theory and frequently employed in psychology as exemplars, the chapter importantly
knowledge. Theory and also contains a critical examination of the ways in which gender has
knowledge capable of traditionally been defined and investigated in psychology.
generating new insights
In the final chapter of this section and volume, Macleod explores
and social transformation.
the theoretical beliefs and assumptions that have informed the research
and literature in South African developmental psychology in recent
years. Using some of the key theoretical orientations in developmental
psychology as her point of departure, she provides a thorough critical
analysis of the predominant forms of research and literature that have
emerged from the sub-discipline in South Africa. This critical inventory
provides an appropriate conclusion for this volume.
While ostensibly fairly diverse in focus, the chapters in this section
have one important feature in common, and that is their critical
engagement with the field of developmental psychology. Importantly,
this criticality is not an end in itself, but is introduced as a means of
providing pointers for the development of more generative (Cf. Gergen
& Gergen, 1994) and contextually appropriate developmental psycho-
logy theory and knowledge.
Specific tasks
➊ Describe the ways in which developmental psychology theory and research can be seen
to aid in the concealment of inequalities in society.
➋ How has South African developmental psychology in the past, according to you,
provided justification for the racialised inequalities in South African society?
➌ In your opinion, how can developmental psychology research and theory be

employed to justify ageist practices or age-related power inequalities in South
African society?
➍ Identify the ways in which any of the theories described earlier in this volume could
be seen to justify existing social inequalities.
Three key texts are recommended for readers wishing to further explore some of the issues broached in
this chapter:
Burman, E (2008). Deconstructing developmental psychology. London: Routledge.
(This book provides a very accessible overall critique of developmental psychology. Highly recommended.)
Poster, M (1988). Critical theory of the family. New York: Seabury Press.
(This book provides an incisive analysis and critique of extant theories of the family and
human development.)
Rose, N (1991). Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self. London: Routledge.
(While not focused on developmental psychology alone, this book provides a very useful critical
description of the history of the sub-discipline.)
CHAPTER
24
Bronfenbrenner’s ecological
Derek Hook
This chapter presents Bronfenbrenner’s theory of ecological devel-

opment. We will introduce and discuss the following concepts:
1. The importance of a contextual approach to development

2. The role of the individual in development
3. Multi-person systems of interaction
4. The dyad as a basic unit of analysis
5. The ecological environment: microsystem, mesosystem,
exosystem, macrosystem and chronosystem spheres
of influence
6. A new approach to environmental interventions
7. The notion of ecological transitions
The chapter also features a brief historical study of apartheid’s

effects on development, before closing with a critique of
Bronfenbrenner’s theory.
The importance of a contextual approach

to development
Urie Bronfenbrenner (1977; 1979) offers a welcome
corrective to those accounts of psychosocial development
that do not properly engage with the overarching
socio-political context in which development occurs.
Bronfenbrenner’s is an original contribution to
psychosocial developmental psychology for a number
of reasons. For a start, he accords relatively
equal importance to both the environment
of development and the developing person;
for him, development is effectively the
evolving interaction between these two
variables. This two-fold emphasis on the
interplay between individual and environment
Urie Bronfenbrenner
focuses on the mutual accommodations that occur between individual

and environment. In this way, Bronfenbrenner prioritises the reciprocity
of relationships (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Second, Bronfenbrenner sees the
laboratory and testing room of experimental psychology as limited and
insulated contexts for the study of psychosocial development (1977, 1979).
He attempts to extend the scope outwards, to the consideration of ever-
wider social spheres of influence. For Bronfenbrenner, the developing child
never exists outside of a unique sociopolitical, historical, and ideological
set of circumstances.
Furthermore, for Bronfenbrenner, psychosocial development does
not centre on the traditional psychological processes of perception,
motivation, thinking and learning perceived at the isolated level of the
individual. He focuses rather on the content of these functions, on what
is perceived, desired, feared, thought about, or acquired as knowledge,
and on ‘how the nature of this psychological material changes as a
function of a person’s exposure to an interaction with the environment’
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979: 9). In this way, Bronfenbrenner (1979) defines
Ecological development. development as individuals’ evolving conception of the ecological
Development approached environment, their relation to it, as well as their growing capacity to
from a strongly contextual discover, sustain, or alter its properties. For Bronfenbrenner there are no
basis, which prioritises
questions of psychology that are not also questions of context, and this
the influence of the
individual’s various
would be particularly true for developmental psychology.
social environments.
The role of the individual in development
However, having suggested that context is not a minor element in any
reasonable account of development (development for Bronfenbrenner is
always development-in-context), it’s important to emphasise that the in-
dividual remains always a proactive feature of the environment. The
developing person is not merely a tabula rasa on which the environment
makes its impact, but is rather a growing dynamic entity that progressively
moves into and restructures his or her social milieu (Bronfenbrenner,
1979). Individuals are in fact capable of adapting their imagination to the
constraints of objective reality, and even of refashioning their environ-
ment so that it is more compatible with their abilities, needs and desires.
In this sense, Bronfenbrenner takes a strong anti-deterministic approach
to development, and to the social factors impinging upon individual
development. In fact, he sees the growing capacity to remould reality in
accordance with human requirements and aspirations as representing the
highest level of development (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
Multi-person systems of interaction

In attempting to determine the fundamental environmental influences on
development, Bronfenbrenner (1979) claims to break from the traditions
of developmental psychology research. Rather than attempting to isolate
the influence of linear variables, Bronfenbrenner’s approach is to conceive
Systemic forms of
influence. Where any
development in system terms, where any given variable is linked to a whole
given variable is linked to a ecological chain of associated influences. In other words, Bronfenbrenner
whole ecological chain of thinks in terms of systemic forms of influence. If a mother becomes sick,
associated influences. for example, or is fired from her job, this sets up a reverberating series
B r o n f e n b r e n n e r ’s e c o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f d e v e l o p m e n t 503
of influences, which impact not only on the child’s relationship with his
mother, but on his relationship within the immediate family more generally,
on his life, on the familial resources available to him and so forth. Thus,
the healthy development of the child is intricately entwined with factors
such as role demands and stresses placed on the parents, the flexibility
of the parents’ job schedules, the adequacy of child-care arrangements,
the presence of family friends and neighbours, the quality of health and
services, neighbourhood safety and so forth (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
Bronfenbrenner’s conception of environmental influences on
development is not only systemic, it also recognises the fact that
environments are non-static forms of influence that exist in a constant
state of flux. Bronfenbrenner recognises that what can be said of a
given developmental environment today may not necessarily be true
of that environment tomorrow. It is also important to understand that
the developing individual is very possibly an agent of change within a
given environment, including larger environments. In Bronfenbrenner’s
view (1977), this fact is rarely dealt with satisfactorily in psychosocial
Multi-person systems of
developmental studies. In this way Bronfenbrenner (1979) argues that to
interaction. An awareness
understand human development adequately one needs to examine multi- of the complex and
person systems of interaction that are not limited to a single setting, and multifaceted nature of
that take into account aspects of the environment beyond the immediate patterns of interaction
situation that contains the subject. within groups of people.
Connections between different settings of development

Interconnections between various environmental settings can be as
instrumental in influencing development as discrete events that take Interconnections between
place within separate settings (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). The example that various settings can be
Bronfenbrenner gives here is that of education, suggesting that effective instrumental in influencing
development. Take for
learning requires effective parental support, supervision, and encourage-
example the case of
ment, in addition to school tuition. Such interconnections include joint effective education, which
participation, communication and the existence of information in each would seem to require more
set-ting about the other. Bronfenbrenner suggests, that the child can be than simply going to
profoundly influenced by events that take place even in settings in which they school, or a good teacher,
but also parental support,
are not present. In many ways, this seems an obvious assertion but it draws
encouragement and
attention to the fact that these forms of influence have not typically been supervision.
considered as of any great importance in
P HOTO: GILL MOONEY
the history of developmental psychology.

The example that Bronfenbrenner (1979)
draws on here involves the conditions
of parental employment, which exert a
powerful influence on the developmental
context of the child.
Despite the varying scale of these dif-
ferent settings they frequently exhibit
marked similarities within a given culture
or sub-culture (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
In fact, within a given culture, there are
generally more similarities than differences
across these various levels and fundamental
disparities often only appear in cross-cultural comparisons. This circumstance

leads Bronfenbrenner to speculate on the existence of a blueprint for the
organisation of every type of setting, a blueprint that if changed will effect
corresponding changes in other spheres of behaviour and development:
Research results suggest that a change in maternity ward practices

affecting the relation between the mother and the newborn can
produce effects still detectable five years later … a severe economic
crisis occurring in a society is seen to have positive or negative
impact on the development of the child throughout the life span,
depending on the age of the child at the time that the family
suffered financial duress (Bronfenbrenner, 1979: 4).
The dyad as a basic unit of analysis

Dyad. Dynamic structure The basic unit of analysis for Bronfenbrenner (1979) is the dyad, or
of the two-person two-person system, a fact which itself indicates his commitment to not
relationship characterised viewing the subject of development in social isolation. Dyads are dynamic
by reciprocal relations,
structures characterised by reciprocal relations, where the parties are
where both parties are
mutually able to affect the
mutually able to affect the nature of interaction, to the extent that
nature of the interaction. Bronfenbrenner argues that ‘if one member of the pair undergoes a process
of development, the other does also’ (1979: 5). Dyads extend into larger
structures: triads, tetrads, and larger interpersonal systems of interaction.
In this sense, Bronfenbrenner asserts that the presence and participation
of third parties, such as relatives, friends, neighbours or work colleagues,
can influence the child’s immediate setting:
If such third parties … play a disruptive rather than a supportive

role, the developmental process, considered as a system, breaks
down: like a three-legged stool, it is more easily upset if one leg is
broken, or shorter than the others (Bronfenbrenner, 1979: 5).
The importance of the perceived environmental context

Bronfenbrenner’s theory (1979) also has a pronounced phenomenological
quality in the sense that the environment is conceived not in a realist or
PHOTO: MICH EL E VR DOLJAK
objective sense, but as how the subject perceives and experiences it. This
subjective approach arises from Bronfenbrenner’s certainty of the:
… impossibility of understanding … behaviour solely from the

objective properties of an environment without reference to its
meaning for the people in the setting: the palpable motivational
character of environmental objects and … the importance of the
unreal, the imagined (1979: 24).
The ecological environment

Like concentric onion peels, the ecological environment is a series of
successive layers, each surrounding a smaller sphere. The example
Perhaps the most basic and
fundamental example of a Bronfenbrenner uses is a collection of Russian dolls, each (but one) inside
dyad is the mother-child the next, enclosing a succession of formally similar yet smaller containers.
bond in earliest childhood. For Bronfenbrenner, each such container can be likened to a different-
level environment, a different environmental system of development. The

smallest such environmental system is the microsystem.
n osyste m
Ch ro
cr o s y st e m
Ma
s y st e m
Exo
o s y st e
es
M
m
osyste
icr
m
M
Figure 24.1 Bronfenbrenner’s ecological theory of development.

The concentric spheres of micro-, meso-, exo-, macro- and chronosystem
make up the five environmental systems.
The microsystem
The microsystem is the immediate context that directly affects the Microsystem.
developing person (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). It is the realm of face-to-face The microsystem is the
bi-directional relationships where influences flow back and forth so that complex of face-to-face,
bi-directional relationships
a new baby will affect the lives of his parents, just as their attitudes will
between the developing
affect the baby (Papalia, Olds & Feldman, 1998). The microsystem is the person and important
complex of relations between the developing person and important figures figures such as caregivers,
such as caregivers, parents, siblings, friends, classmates and teachers. It is parents, siblings and
important to understand that this complex of relationships includes the friends. It is the smallest
connections across various people within the immediate setting, so that environmental system in
the relationship between the child’s father and the child’s grandfather will Bronfenbrenner’s theory
of development.
also ultimately exert a degree of influence on the child.
Bronfenbrenner’s microsystem is assembled from three basic factors
comprising the pattern of activities, roles and interpersonal relations
experienced by the developing person (1979). By ‘role’ he means the set of
behaviours and expectations associated with a position in society, such as
that of mother, baby, teacher, friend, and so on. He ties the microsystem
firmly to particular concrete settings, such as the home, the day-care
centre, the school playground and suchlike.
To get a sense of the next environmental system of development—
the mesosytem—we need to ‘zoom out’ a little and take a slightly broad-
er overview of the developmental context by looking at interrelations
among microsystems.
The mesosystem
Mesosystem. A system
of microsystems, formed
The mesosystem is a system of microsystems, which is formed whenever
whenever the developing the developing person moves into a new setting (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
person moves into a (Remember that a setting, for Bronfenbrenner, is a place where people
new setting. The sphere readily engage in face-to-face interaction.) The bi-directional interactions
of the mesosystem also of the microsystem are now enlarged to the extent that we are now looking
accommodates linkages at slightly higher-order environments, such as the school as a whole, the
and interconnections
home taken to the level of neighbourhood, the extended family, and social
between the different
facets of microsystems.
relationships on the level of peer groups. The sphere of the mesosytem also
accommodates linkages and interconnections between the different facets
of microsystems. This means that influences across home and school, peer
and family groups, work and recreational settings, are also considered.
A case in point here is how parents and teachers may collaborate in
educational planning for the child (Craig, 1996).
The exosystem
Exosystem. The social The exosystem refers to the social setting or organisation beyond the
setting or organisation individual’s immediate experience that nevertheless affects him or her.
beyond the individual’s Examples may range from formal settings like a parent’s workplace, the
immediate experience that
community, welfare health systems, or the activities of the local school
nevertheless affects him
or her. It is an extension
board, to less formal organisations like the parents’ network of friends or
of the mesosystem, the school class of an older sibling (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Bronfenbrenner
embracing other specific defines the exosystem as:
social structures, both
formal and informal, …an … extension of the mesosystem embracing other specific social
that impinge upon the structures, both formal and informal, that … impinge upon or
immediate settings in
encompass the immediate settings in which that person is found, and
which that person
is found.
thereby influence, delimit, or even determine what goes on there.
These structures include the major institutions of the society, both
deliberately structured and spontaneously evolving, as they operate at
a concrete level. They encompass, among other structures, the world of
work, the neighbourhood, the mass media, agencies of government, the
distribution of goods and services, communication and transportation
facilities and informal social networks (Bronfenbrenner, 1977: 515).
Macrosystem. The macrosystem

The macrosystem refers We noted earlier that there is a good deal of consistency and similarity
to the overarching
across different settings within a culture. Bronfenbrenner (1977) points to
institutional patterns
of the culture or the
this similarity as evidence of the existence of the macrosystem. He notes
sub-culture, such as that micro-, meso- and exosystems all function in similar ways and appear
the economic, social, ‘to be constructed from the same master model’ (Bronfenbrenner 1977:
educational, legal and 515). The macrosystem, as the master model, refers to the overarching
political systems, of institutional patterns of the culture or the sub-culture (such as the economic,
which macro-, meso- social, educational, legal and political systems) of which the macro-, meso-
and exosystems are the
and exosytem are the concrete manifestations (Bronfenbrenner 1977;
concrete manifestations.
The laws, values, traditions
1979). The laws, values, traditions and customs of a particular society are
and customs of a particular to be found at this level.
society are to be found at This is the level at which we might locate those very broad cultural
this level. patterns of ideology, dominant economic and political systems, general and
PHO TO : G I LL MO O NEY
popular discourses, values, laws
and customs. Bronfenbrenner
(1977; 1979) warns that macro-
systems should be conceived
and examined not only on
structural terms, but should
be seen also as carriers of
information and discourse that,
both explicitly and implicitly,
endow meaning and moti-
vation to particular agencies,
social networks, roles, activities
and their interrelationships.
In this connection, Craig
(1996) valuably notes as an The sphere of the
example that laws providing for the inclusion of handicapped children mesosystem also
in mainstream school classes are likely to affect profoundly the education accommodates linkages
and social development of both disabled and normal children who are and interconnections
between the different facets
students in these classes. Craig (1996) suggested that the success or failure of microsystems. These
of this ‘mainstreaming’ may encourage or discourage other governmental include influences across
efforts to integrate the two groups. home and school, and
across peer and family
The chronosytem groups.
Bronfenbrenner (1979) also counts the dimension of time—the
chronosystem—as a fundamental influence on the direction of psycho- Chronosystem.
social development. The implication of time applies in two ways within Bronfenbrenner’s term for
the effects of time on other
ecological theory. Time is important as it entails the patterning of
developmental systems.
environmental events and transitions over the life-span. It also refers
to the unique sociohistorical placement of the individual. An example
in the first instance here would be the effects of the divorce of parents,
which, while very severe around the first year of the event, appear,
like the effects of the death of a loved one, to decrease as time passes
(Santrock, 1999).
In the second instance of ecological application, that of sociohistorical
contextualisation, time constitutes a very broad level of ecological influence.
It includes factors as diverse as changes in family size, place of residence,
employment, dominant sociopolitical values (such as the current importance
of democracy as a political system in most ‘first world’ Western countries,
as opposed to 300 or 400 years ago), and larger scale cultural changes
such as those caused by wars or economic cycles. One important example
of a chronosystem change that particularly influences the development
of women is an increasing culture of women’s rights, which means that
women today are less likely to be discouraged from pursuing careers than
they would have been thirty years ago (Santrock, 1999).
A new approach to environmental interventions

Bronfenbrenner differs from many developmental psychologists in
the sense that the recommendations he makes for inducing productive
and beneficial changes in the developing individual are not necessarily
PHO TO : G I LL MO O NEY 508 Developmental Psychology
limited to the level of the microsystem. In fact,

Bronfenbrenner’s suggestion is that developmental
interventions should occur preferably at the level of the
macrosystem, because macrosystem changes impact on
all lower levels of development.
Bronfenbrenner (1979) is a notable example amongst
prominent developmental theorists in suggesting that
developmental intervention should take the form of
political lobbying for relevant changes in governmental
policy. This form of implanting developmental change
obviously has important bearing on the South African
context. Indeed, one only needs to consider the macro
role of apartheid in influencing all other spheres of
development contained within it, particularly in the
life of the black child. Indeed, the influence of such a
system of government did not stop at the macrosystem
and exosystem levels of racist ideology and segregation
(respectively), but spread also to mesosystem and
microsystem levels where families were broken up by
One of the most important pass-laws and migrant labour, where police violence
political (macrosystem) and intimidation reached into township homes and schools, and
challenges facing
contemporary South African
where racialised poverty and subsequent problems like malnutrition
society is racial integration and inadequate education ensured development deficits at the smallest
from an early age. levels of development.
Examples of environmental systems

in the South African context
Characteristic examples of Bronfenbrenner’s new Constitution would also belong here.

environmental systems in contemporary Unfortunately, many less positive realities
South Africa would, on the level of the would also feature at the macrosystem
chronosystem, include a history of apart- level, including the facts of ongoing racism
heid, along with the large-scale political in South Africa, the culture of violence and
changes introduced since the 1990s. crime, and the strongly racialised lines of
Examples on the level of the macrosystem poverty and affluence. Notable exosystem
might include the discourses of ‘Truth and examples might include governmental
Reconciliation’, the ‘African Renaissance’, policy and its practical implementation in
the ‘new South Africa’, and the values of the lives of South African citizens, as in the
racial equality, non-sexism and tolerance cases of affirmative action and outcomes-
towards diverse religious beliefs. based education.
The fundamental ideals of South Africa’s
The notion of ecological transitions

Considering the importance of the ecological setting of development for
Bronfenbrenner, it is not surprising that ecological transitions assume
such an important place in his theory. In many ways, it is largely through Ecological transition.
such ecological transitions that one can trace the key life events and life An ecological transition
changes of an individual. occurs whenever a person’s
position in the ecological
An ecological transition occurs whenever a person’s position in the
environment is altered as a
ecological environment is altered as a result of a change in either role result of a change in either
or setting, or in both concurrently (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). An ecologi- role or setting, or in both
cal transition can occur throughout the life-span and can occur at any of concurrently. An ecological
the four levels of the ecological environment. Examples of an ecological transition can occur
transition include the arrival of a baby sibling, the beginning of school, the throughout the life-span
establishment of a secure relationship with a significant other, graduating and can occur at any
of the levels of the
from school or an institution of higher learning, getting or losing a job,
ecological environment.
marrying, moving, or even a change in government.
Role changes are nodal points in the developmental history of the in- Ecological environment.
dividual, because they correspond to a change in self-perception and a The ecological environment
change in what behaviours are socially expected from an individual. For is a series of successive
layers, each surrounding
Bronfenbrenner (1979), role changes have an almost magical quality,
a smaller sphere of
which alters how people are treated, how they act, what they do, and even environmental influences.
what they think and feel. The social influence and presence of others are Bronfenbrenner maintains
also paramount in tracing an individual’s developmental progress. Expo- that the ecological
sure to, and active engagement with important and influential individuals context contains five such
can lead to the adoption of certain behaviours and habits on the part of the environmental systems:
individual. A child is ‘more likely to learn to talk in a setting containing the microsystem, the
mesosystem, the exosystem,
roles that obligate adults to talk to children or that encourage … other
the macrosystem and
people to do so’ (Bronfenbrenner 1979: 7). the chronosystem.
Apartheid’s effects on childhood development
Post-apartheid South Africa has found it On the level of the microsystem, one
difficult to assess the full extent of the damage needs to bear in mind that the lives and
of apartheid’s large-scale and governmentally upbringing of many black children were
institutionalised forms of racism on South fundamentally affected by the absence of
African society. In many ways, of course, the parents. Segregated living arrangements,
impact that this form of government has had, created by the old ‘homelands’ system, and
particularly on the lives of black South Africans, by the pass-law system, meant that parents
remains unquantifiable, and it is precisely this frequently had to work in places far removed
fact that has proved such a ‘sticking point’ from where they lived, which, as in the
for the reparations committee of the recent situation of migrant labour, or of a ‘domestic’
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While worker living in ‘white South Africa’,
it obviously cannot quantify the damage frequently led to the disintegration of the
of apartheid, Bronfenbrenner’s model of family. Furthermore, the division of privilege
developmental influence can be used to trace with regard to public service amenities meant
a series of possible developmental sequelae that it was far more difficult for black families
stemming from the implementation of the to access services such as public health, and
apartheid system. even when they did, the facilities typically
>>
<<
were vastly inferior to those available for time enter a township house, forcibly
white South Africans. remove any children and detain them
At perhaps an even more fundamental in prison for indefinite periods, without
level, the fact of racialised poverty—the giving any indication when they would be
effect of, amongst other things, poor released. The security forces also frequently
‘Bantu’ education and white job- added to the punishment of incarceration
reservation—meant that black families by torturing such children in a wide variety
did not have the financial means to of ways (Duncan & Rock, 1997).
afford childcare, which the majority Education was a particularly important
of white families had. Such economic developmental focus of apartheid
disempowerment made for a pervasive repression, as signalled by the Soweto
influence that affected almost all levels of uprisings in 1976. So-called ‘Bantu’
development, even down to questions education was developed to turn black
of basic nutrition and the availability of children into productive and subservient
food. As Chikane (cited in Duncan & Rock menial labourers who could work for
1997: 139) notes: whites. Security forces were also active in
breaking up social gatherings on even the
Being born into apartheid South Africa smallest scale, even when of a religious
meant, for most black children, the nature. Apartheid also worked on a
deprivation and violence associated strong ideological level, and mass-media
with living in the ghettos created for reports were dramatically slanted towards
those not classified as white ... inferior supporting the National Party government,
education ... discriminatory social whereas dissenting voices were quickly
security ... parents [exploited by] local silenced. The educational system for
enterprises [or as] ... migrant labourers whites, in the form of ‘Christian National
... communities constantly destabilized Education’, was ideologically slanted
as a result of forced removals. towards and embedded in strongly
conservative, nationalistic and racist values.
Duncan and Rock (1997) call attention Clearly then, the effects of the
to the fact that, during the apartheid apartheid system were felt in virtually every
state’s various ‘states of emergency’, the conceivable aspect of Bronfenbrenner’s
security forces were given far-ranging model of developmental influence, from
warrants and prerogatives, which meant the basic level of the health of the child,
that they were able to disregard all legisla- through to the levels of the family, the
tion promulgated to protect children. neighbourhood, the church, the school,
No one was exempt from repressive the community, basic public amenities and
measures such as the military occupation resources, recreational and health facilities,
of black residential areas, house arrest and the mass media, commerce, industry,
indiscriminate attacks on black citizens. religion and fundamental social values,
Members of the police force could at any beliefs, discourse and ideology.
A conclusion on the ecological perspective

Bronfenbrenner’s theory is intended to offer a conceptual frame-
work for analysing psychological life in terms of three predominant
factors: activity, role and relation, as they manifest across different
levels of social influence. In this way, it draws attention to the

importance of individual differences in development, and implicit-
ly supports the need for an increasing amount of cross-cultural and
localised developmental research.
Bronfenbrenner’s model provides, in total, a strong theoretical and re-
search means through which the influence of the environmental as a whole
can be factored into individual or social accounts of human development.
Furthermore, it seems that this ecological theory of development can
be used in conjunction with other explanatory accounts, typically as a
complementary level of explanation with which to supplement more
isolated individualist accounts of psychosocial development.
A critique of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological theory

Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model is a very recent one, and the field of
developmental psychology has, at the time of writing, offered few real
critiques of his approach. There are, however, two basic criticisms one might
be able to level against this theory. The first is that while Bronfenbrenner
has plotted an account that does not seem to underestimate the complexity
of development, it does appear that it may be a difficult explanatory model
to apply. There are two main reasons for this. First, Bronfenbrenner
requires an extensive scope of ecological detail with which to build up
and substantiate an adequate developmental account. The breadth of his
model would seem to suggest that almost everything within an individual’s
developmental environment could potentially play some role in their
development. While this may well be true, and while this level of detail
and complexity may be necessary for an adequate developmental account,
we need to ask at what point one has enough detail and information to
mount a tentative explanation for behaviour or personality.
Second, whereas earlier developmental accounts sought the answers
for development outcomes in immediate familial or social surroundings
(as in Freud and Erikson’s theories, respectively), Bronfenbrenner’s scope
of developmental influences seemingly knows no bounds, and this makes
his model difficulty to apply in a balanced way. It is often difficult to
collect so much information, and when one has so much information, it
becomes difficult to hierarchise according to the relative importance of
developmental influence.
Another problem stems from this contention: if Bronfenbrenner
is right that we need to conceptualise developmental influences only
in systems terms, then the smallest factor of influence needs to be
understood only as a part component of a complex multifaceted system
of influence. Because all factors of development are mutually and
systemically influential, it seems that we need to take all such factors into
account when trying to establish the significance of even the smallest
developmental variable. This fact once again makes the complexity
of Bronfenbrenner’s model practically unwieldy. The same holds
for his argument that development is always a two-way process: the
sophisticated and complex nature of his model, which prevents it from
being reductionist, also makes it very difficult and complicated to
implement practically.
Specific tasks
➊ How do you see the ecological model in terms of your own childhood? Draw a
developmental ‘map’ based on Bronfenbrenner’s diagram of the various spheres of
psychosocial influence. Identify at least six salient examples from each of the five
spheres of ecological influence that were foundational to your own development.
In doing so give special thought to who you are, to how you understand yourself,
and to your own sense of identity. Use little icons and diagrams as part of your
developmental ‘map’.
➋ Considering that Bronfenbrenner prioritises macrosystem changes as the most

effective level of implementing beneficial developmental interventions, what

particular recommendations would you make if you were in the position to make
suggestions to the South African government regarding pre-school child care,
for example.
General tasks
➊ The American sociologist Michael Kimmel recounts a revealing anecdote about one
of his first graduate classes in Women’s Studies in which he heard a dispute between
a white and a black woman. The white woman was arguing that the universal
oppression of women by men bound white and black women together in a common
plight. The black woman disagreed and asked, ‘When you wake up in the morning
and look in the mirror, what do you see?’ ‘I see a woman,’ the white woman replied.
‘That’s precisely the problem,’ said the black woman. ‘When I wake up in the
morning and look in the mirror, I see a black woman. My race is visible to me every
day because I am not privileged in this culture. Because you are privileged, your race
is invisible to you’. Kimmel was struck by this exchange because he realised that
when he looked in the mirror he saw neither his whiteness nor his masculinity. All
he saw was a simple human being (Kimmel, in Wetherell & Griffin 1991: 365).
1.1 When you look in the mirror what do you see? How do you account for
the‘invisibility’ of Kimmel’s masculinity and whiteness in the above example,
and what can this tell us about the influence of sociopolitical factors on the
development of our senses of self and identity?
1.2 At what points of the ecological model of development would you place such
forms of influence? And how do you imagine this would impact on childhood
development?
➋ Can Bronfenbrenner’s theory be linked to Erikson’s theory in any way, and if so, in
what ways would these theories usefully complement one another?
➌ How do you feel Bronfenbrenner’s theory measures up in relation to Freud and

Erikson’s theories?
3.1 Which types of explanation would suit which theory? (And which would expose
their relative limits?)
3.2 Would it be possible in any way to use all three theories in conjunction?
Bronfenbrenner, U (1977). ‘Towards an experimental ecology of human development’,
American Psychologist, 32(7), 513-531.
(The original paper that summarised Bronfenbrenner’s new metatheoretical approach to
developmental psychology.)
Bronfenbrenner, U (1979). The ecology of human development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.
(Essentially a more involved and elaborated version of the above. Important if you are looking
for a more detailed presentation of the ideas.)
CHAPTER
25
Violent crime and
human development
in South Africa
Garth Stevens
This chapter explores the relationship between violent crime

and human development in South Africa, focusing on the
following areas:
1. Definitions of crime, violence and violent crime

2. The extent and magnitude of violent crime in South Africa
3. The cascading social impact of violent crime
4. Various factors that influence human development and
violent criminal behaviours
5. Interactional factors and violent crime
6. Developmental sequelae associated with exposure to
violent crime: a focus on adolescence
Introduction
Violent crime is undoubtedly one of the major psychosocial problems
that currently preoccupies South Africans. As an entrenched mode
of interpersonal and social relating, violence has shown a remarkable
resilience and recalcitrance over the entire span of modern South African
history. Not only is this evident from the enduringly high rates of fatal
and non-fatal violence within the specific confines of South African
society today (Matzopoulos, 2004, 2005; SAPS, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008), but
the obduracy of violent patterns of social relating in the South African
context is also reflected in pre-colonial histories of indigenous conflicts
(Marks & Atmore, 1980), the pernicious impacts of colonial oppression
and dispossession (Milton, 1983; Vail, 1989), the violent perversions of
social engineering associated with apartheid segregation and repression
(Duncan & Rock, 1994), resistance politics and confrontational liberatory
struggles (SATRC, 1998), and presently in the high rates of criminalised
interpersonal violence (Suffla, van Niekerk & Duncan, 2004).
Vi o l e n t c r i m e a n d h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t i n S o u t h A f r i c a 515
In recent years however, a shift in public perceptions of violence

reflects a growing tendency away from its construction as overtly political
in character, to violence as predominantly criminal, sociological and as a
pervasive public health concern in contemporary South Africa (Butchart,
Terre Blanche, Hamber & Seedat, 2000). While this shift can certainly
be understood in the context of a focus on good governance, citizens’
rights and civil liberties within the new post-apartheid dispensation, it is
important to note that violence, crime and violent crime have all been part
and parcel of the South African landscape for its entire history (Dawes &
Donald, 1994). For many South Africans, two immediate commonsense
questions spring to mind when faced with the pervasiveness of violent
crime. Firstly, why does this occur, and secondly, what are the consequences
of this psychosocial phenomenon for us in the long-term?
When considering these questions from a developmental psychology
perspective, they can be refined and focused in the following manner.
Firstly, how do we understand the psychological drivers of violent crime, and
secondly, how do we understand the developmental consequences of violent
crime? This chapter addresses these two central questions, but in a manner
that takes cognisance of both internal psychological processes and social
contexts as determinants of violent crime, and also as determinants of
developmental responses to violent crime. Thus, it addresses both questions
through linking human developmental processes and social contexts to
violent crime at the levels of its potential antecedents and consequences.
Definitions of crime, violence and violent crime

While this chapter focuses on violent crime and its relationship to human
development, it is important to note that there is often a seamless slippage
between crime and violence in most commonsense understandings today
that conflates the two. However, the two are not always that integrally
related. While crime broadly involves the transgression of laws that are
geared towards the regulation of social interactions and behaviours, it may
or may not have violence as an integral component. Crime can broadly
be defined as the breach of the rule or law for which a punishment may
ultimately be prescribed by some governing authority to deter or to exact
some form of restitution, and its regulatory functions are premised on the
protection of rights and liberties (Snyman, 1989). While there are many who
would suggest that all crime is therefore potentially violent (see for example,
Bulhan, 1985), for our purposes a clearer distinction is perhaps required. It
is very clear that not all forms of crime involve acts of overt violence (the
transgression of parking laws, for example), but there are several instances
when crimes that involve interpersonal encounters and confrontations
(either directly or indirectly) actually do become violent in character.
When juxtaposing the following definition of violence against the
above definition of crime, it is perhaps easier to understand the intersecting
nexus points between the two. The World Health Organisation (WHO)
defines violence as:
The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual,

against oneself, another person, or against a group or community,
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury,

death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation
(Dahlberg & Krug, 2002: 5).
Here it becomes clear that many acts of violence (although not all) may
be deemed criminal, insofar as they infringe upon the rights and liberties
of others. From the above description, the intersection between violence
and crime is primarily at the point at which the violence is expressed as an
interpersonal or group relation, through which the prevailing norms of a
society are flouted and the liberties and rights of others are compromised.
In South Africa, violent crime is probably most common in forms
of interpersonal violence that involve threats, injury or death to others,
either as a primary outcome of a confrontation (in the case of homicide, for
example), or as a secondary outcome of such a confrontational encounter
(as with threat, injury or death as a consequence of a primary crime such
as hijacking). Within the criminal justice system in South Africa, violent
crimes are also often referred to as contact crimes and include categories
of acts such as murder, rape, attempted murder, assault with intent to do
grievous bodily harm, common assault, indecent assault, robbery with
aggravating circumstances and common robbery (SAPS, 2008).
The extent and magnitude of violent crime in

South Africa
At present violent crime is certainly endemic to South African society.
This is not only evident from a perusal of any mainstream newspaper but
also from the staggering statistics on this psychosocial problem. However
partial this reporting may be, it is apparent that violent crime is very
salient in the broader public consciousness, and for good reason. Whilst
homicide rates in most high-income countries average approximately
14/100 000 population, in low- to middle-income countries the mean tends
to cluster around 32/100 000 population—more than twice the rate of high-
income countries (Mercy, Butchart, Farrington & Cerdá, 2002). Notably,
the African region and the Americas are implicated most significantly in
these high rates. South Africa mirrors the overall trends visible in low- to
middle-income countries, with approximately 40 per cent of all non-natural
injury fatalities being due to homicide in the year 2004 (Matzopoulos,
2005). This astounding statistic provides some insight into the nature,
extent and magnitude of violent crime in South Africa, especially when we
consider that the sector of the population most represented as victims are
economically active adults between the ages of 15 and 44 years (Matzopoulos,
2005). In 2002, statistics obtained from the Department of Correctional
Services did not yield rates, but the actual number of incarcerated prisoners
who were serving penal sentences for murder was in the region of
19 504 (Department of Correctional Services, 2002), while the total number
of prisoners serving sentences for aggressive crimes (including murder) in
2007 was 63 677 (Department of Correctional Services, 2007b). In addition,
recent murder statistics released by the South African Police Services
(SAPS) still highlight a rate of 38.6/100 000 population in 2007/2008. While
these statistics reveal an apparent decline from 47.4/100 000 population in
Incidence of crime per 100 000 of the population Raw figures/frequencies
2002/ 2003/ 2004/ 2005/ 2006/ 2007/ Increase/ 2002/ 2003/ 2004/ 2005/ 2006/ 2007/ Increase/
Crime category
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 decrease 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 decrease
06/07 vs 06/07 vs
07/08 07/08
Contact crimes
Murder
47.4 42.7 40.3 39.5 40.5 38.6 -4.7% 21 533 19 824 18 793 18 528 19 202 18 487 -3.7%
Rape * (April - December)

85.6 84.1 88.0 88.2 82.9 75.6 -8.8% 38 896 39 007 41 006 41 343 39 304 36 19 -7.9%
Attempted murder
78.9 64.8 52.6 43.9 42.5 39.3 -7.5% 35 861 30 076 24 516 20 571 20 142 18 975 -6.7%
Assualt with the intent to

585.9 560.7 535.3 484.0 460.1 439.1 -4.6% 26 31 260 082 249 369 226 942 218 030 210 104 -3.6%
inflict grievous bodily harm
Common assault
621.6 605.7 575.0 485.3 443.2 413.9 -6.6% 282 526 280 942 267 857 227 553 210 057 198 049 -5.7%
Indecent assault* (April -

14.1 14.5 16.1 15.5 14.4 14.1 -2.1% 6 425 6 721 7 501 7 264 6 812 6 793 -0.7%
December)
Robbery with aggravating

279.2 288.1 272.2 255.3 267.1 247.3 -7.4% 126 905 133 658 126 789 110 726 126 558 118 312 -6.5%
circumstances
Common robbery
223.4 206.0 195.0 159.4 150.1 135.8 -9.5% 101 537 95 551 90 825 74 723 71 156 64 985 -8.7%
Vi o l e n t c r i m e a n d h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t i n S o u t h A f r i c a
517
Table 25.1 RSA Contact Crimes from 2002/2003 to 2007/2008.

Source: SAPS (2008).
2002/2003, they are nevertheless significant in relation to global statistics

and means (SAPS, 2008). While crime statistics are frequently cited for all
manner of political reasons in South Africa, these disconcerting statistics
clearly reveal that the population’s pervasive preoccupation with this
psychosocial problem has a significant basis in reality.
The cascading social impact of violent crime

Before examining the developmental antecedents and consequences of
violent crime it is instructive to broadly highlight the more generalised
social impacts that ripple throughout the social formation as a result of
violent crime. The most obvious of these would include the consequences to
those persons that have been left either dead, injured, disabled or bereaved.
However, alongside these are the psychological and economic impacts—that
are experienced by families and others closely associated with those that have
been directly affected by violent crime. Similar psychological impacts may
be experienced by those responsible for committing the crimes, especially
in relation to guilt, trauma and an adjustment to the loss of freedom due to
incarceration (Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Paulus, 1988). In addition, the families
and associates of those held responsible for violent crimes frequently have
to endure the social stigma and related economic losses that accompany
community vilification and incarceration of the perpetrators (Morris, 1965).
The broader social and economic burden of violent crime is more clearly
evident when reviewing economic productivity losses and health costs
associated with it in South Africa (Bowman & Stevens, 2004; Butchart,
2000; Peden & van der Spuy, 1998; Phillips, 1999), but also in the increasing
emphasis being placed on its prevention, reduction and control by the
political apparatus, criminal justice systems, public health systems, and
others in the public and civil sectors.
Homicide and violence were ranked as second only to HIV/AIDS
as a cause of premature mortality in South Africa in 2000 (Bradshaw &
Nannan, 2004). It outranked other causes of premature mortality such as
tuberculosis, respiratory illnesses, low birth weight and diarrhoeal diseases.
It is increasingly being recognised as a pressing focus of intervention for
various government departments within South Africa, with its prevention
becoming part of the stated core business of several departments such
as Safety and Security, Justice, Health and Social Development (see for
example, Department of Correctional Services, 2007a; Department of
Health, 2004; Domestic Violence Act, 1998; NCPS, 1996).
Even though the economic costs of violence in general are often
quoted to run into billions of US dollars per annum internationally (Krug,
Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi & Lozano, 2002), and exact figures for South Africa
do not exist at present, estimates place them at millions of South African
Rand each year (Bowman, Stevens, Seedat & Snyman, forthcoming;
Butchart, 2000).
Furthermore, the social effects for the public at large cannot be as easily
quantified. Violent crimes and their widespread reporting in the media affect
public opinion as to the nature of perceived threats to personal and asset
safety; encourage behaviours that promote increased social securitisation
and limit resource inputs into preventative measures; impact on investment,
foreign trade and tourism; and generally contribute to a pervasive social

culture of fear and a reduction in social capital that cannot be entirely
measured in economic terms (Emmett, 2003; Emmett & Butchart, 2000).
Clearly, how we then come to understand violent crime is as important a
broader social priority as how we can prevent and reduce it.
Various factors that influence human

development and violent criminal behaviours
Over the past several decades, a significant amount of research has been
conducted into the developmental antecedents of violent crime. While
the scope of this chapter does not allow for a comprehensive review of
this research, this section presents some of the more consistent research
areas and findings into developmental factors that may potentially drive
violent criminal behaviours. It includes a focus on psychophysiological,
psychological, relational, social psychological and interactional research
findings that may all impact on developmental processes and potentially
drive violent criminal behaviours.
Psychophysiology and violent crime

While many social science researchers in the area of violence are frequently
sceptical and even dismissive of the research on the relationship between
physiological factors and behavioural outcomes, it is nevertheless a body
of knowledge that has a lengthy tradition and is constantly developing.
Given the advances within the medical sciences as well as in auxiliary
technological developments, this form of research and the resultant
findings cannot simply be discharged without some consideration.
Genetics and evolution

Studies on the relationship between genetics and violence date back to the
early 1900s, when one of the largest systematic adoption studies in Denmark
revealed that boys who had biological parents with criminal backgrounds
had a 20 per cent likelihood of themselves having one criminal conviction,
as opposed to boys whose adoptive parents had a criminal background
(but not their biological parents) who only had a 14.7 per cent likelihood
of similar convictions (Mednick & Christiansen, 1977). More recent studies
by Brunner, Nelen, Breakefield, Ropers & van Oost (1993) have suggested
a link between a genetic variant causing Monoamine Oxidase-A deficiency
and violent behaviours in males (see Caspi, McClay, Moffitt, Mill, Martin,
Craig, Taylor & Poulton, 2002, for similar findings). Lesch & Merschdorf
(2000) have also further suggested that serotonin-pathway genes may be
tentatively implicated in antisocial, aggressive, impulsive and violent
behaviour, once again supporting the genetic hypothesis.
An associated research trajectory has focused on the evolutionary basis
for violence, especially masculine violence. Evolutionary psychology has long
held that violence is a condition that is ‘hard-wired’ into the constitution
of the human species from one generation to the next, and in particular,
that differences occur across gender. This line of argument has been
cogently developed, and suggests that violence has its origins in processes
of natural selection, and all species tend to survive because of the fittest
elements within it (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Nell, 2002; Workman & Reader,
2004). Here in particular, this school of thought has argued that increases
in risk-taking behaviours (including violence) may become more evident
in adolescence, as males in particular prepare for adulthood and greater
competition within the gene pool. More recent research has supported this
argument by highlighting gendered differences that are correlated with
differences in behaviours and disease patterns between men and women.
Sexual dimorphism. These findings imply that these differences or sexual dimorphisms may
Refers to the systematic be present at a neurological level within the structures of the brain itself
differences in physical (Dennis 2004; Goldstein, Seidman, Horton, Makris, Kennedy, Caviness,
form and structure
Faraone & Tsuang, 2001), which may have some impact on behavioural
between individuals of
different sexes within
repertoires that either inhibit or facilitate aggression.
the same species. While some evidence for a genetic hypothesis can certainly be found
in the literature, it has often been critiqued for not accounting fully for
how genetic anomalies and transmission become translated into violent
or criminal behaviours. The absence of the mechanism of translation
has therefore undermined the degree to which these studies have been
accepted within the social sciences. In addition, the degree of similarity
between the neurobiology of men and women far outweighs their sexual
dimorphism, suggesting that we are much more similar than dissimilar
across the sexes. However, most geneticists today would acknowledge
the interactional effects of genetics and environmental factors. They
would also acknowledge the argument that genetic anomalies may also be
associated with a range of additional adaptational problems that may also
predispose individuals to aggressive or violent behaviour.
Prenatal factors
A second strand of inquiry has focused on the relationship between
violence and prenatal factors that may impact on congenital physiological
differences. Kandel & Mednick (1991) showed that 80 per cent of youths
arrested for violent crimes had higher rates of delivery complications at
birth, pointing to some congenital effects. Farrington (1997) also found
that youth with a lower resting heart rate showed greater propensities
for risk-taking behaviours that may predispose them to violence and
aggression. In addition, research has also shown that prenatal exposure to
certain hormones such as androgens (due to maternal stress) can sensitise
the foetal brain and contribute to hypervigilance and aggression in later
life (Floody & Pfaff, 1974; Rutter, 1970). Testosterone increases at this stage,
as a result of rapid responses to environmental stimuli from mothers, may
also be associated with postnatal aggressiveness in infants (Lewis, 1992).
Psychological factors and violent crime

Mainstream psychology also has a lengthy tradition of attempting to
determine constitutional factors at an intrapsychic, cognitive and moral
level to account for individual differences in violent behaviour.
Temperament
As a key psychological component that is characterised by our states of
arousal and arousal responses to situational circumstances, and that is also
influenced by both prenatal and postnatal factors and exposures, tempera-

ment has been implicated in research findings on violent behaviour. Earlier
work by Eysenck (1977) and Eysenck & Gudjonsson (1989) attempted to link
constitutional factors to violent behaviours. Both studies noted a relation-
ship between the autonomic nervous system and delinquent behaviours—
specifically that more excitable and less inhibited individuals were more
prone to violence than those who displayed greater levels of reflex inhibition.
More recent studies have also supported the contention of a correlation
between temperament and violence. Henry, Avsalom, Moffitt & Silva (1996)
found a relationship between impulsivity in childhood and convictions for
violence in adolescence, while Caspi & Silva (1995) also noted that negative
emotionality such as avoidance, caution and anxiety in childhood had an
inverse relationship to violence. More recently, Follingstad, Bradley, Helff
& Laughlin (2007) have found that an angry temperament is a correlate and Secure attachment. Refers
predictor for violence in later life. to a strong and enduring
affective or emotional
bond between caregivers
Attachment and infants, resulting in
A further focus of psychological research has drawn on psychoanalytic an ability to form close
theory and attachment theory and highlighted the importance of early emotional relationships
secure attachments between infants and caregivers as an important with others in later life.
predictor of violence in later life. Recent psychoanalytic approaches to
violence (see for example, Kernberg, Selzer, Koenigsberg, Carr &

Appelbaum, 1989; Perelberg, 1999) have tended to apply an object-
relations perspective to understanding violent individuals. Glasser’s
(1985) work on defensive violence suggests that it occurs as a result
of a breach of the body boundary that represents an internal
phantasy and that becomes enacted in reality. Fonagy & Target
(1999) also utilise this argument and suggest that violent patients
may experience early object relations as malevolent and then utilise
aggression as a means of defending the fragile ego. Thereafter,
self-expression becomes easily intertwined with aggression in a
pathological manner, thereby promoting the individual’s ability to
conceive of the ‘other’ as devoid of vulnerability. However, they also
argue that in instances of meaningless or sadistic violence, similar
early object relations exist. However, in the process of attempting
to fuse with a malevolent object, individuals feel trapped and
controlled by the malevolent introject. This results in a form of
violence that is fundamentally a release and an attempt to bring the
psyche back into a state of equilibrium and homeostasis, by ridding
itself of hostile phantasies. In South Africa, Pistorius (2002) also notes Secure attachment in
that certain forms of murder are often characterised by poor ego strength infancy is an important
that results from either poor attachment to primary caregivers or overly feature of development that
may prevent violence.
enmeshed object relationships that result in a symbiotic fusion.
Intelligence
Low intelligence scores have also consistently been found to be a correlate
and predictor of violence in later life, dating back from studies in the
early 1900s to the present day (Bartollas & Dinitz, 1989; Lipsey & Derzon,
1998; West & Farrington, 1973). However, while the propensity to enact
violence was stronger in many of individuals with low intelligence scores,

Hollin (1989) suggests that intelligence is not necessarily a major factor
that always predicts extreme violence such as homicide. Rather, it may be
a reflection of poor impulse control and a limited set of psychological and
social resources that are often associated with low intelligence, which in
turn impact on the individual’s ability to manage conflictual encounters.
Moral development
Running parallel to cognitive development, and associated with it,
research on moral development in children (Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget,
1932) has also been a focus as a potential correlate of violence. However,
while most contemporary writers acknowledge that moral reasoning
is an important internal psychological process (Garbarino, 1995), it is
also relative to context and therefore not simply a direct determinant
of violence in later life. Illustrative studies within South Africa suggest
that adverse circumstantial influences on moral reasoning do not always
translate into more diffuse forms of truncated moral reasoning. Dawes
(1994b) and Straker (1992) note that exposure to political violence in
South Africa during the apartheid period did not in and of itself reduce
moral reasoning among children and result in greater proclivities towards
violence, and that in instances where such acts did occur, they were not
generalisable to contexts outside of the political terrain.
Psychopathology
With regard to psychopathology, children who have been diagnosed
with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorders or Oppositional Defiant
Disorder tend to be at greater risk for asocial behaviours and also for
developing Conduct Disorder if their initial symptoms persist into
adolescence. Both of these disorders include an increased potential for
impulsive and violent ‘acting out’. Conduct Disorders in childhood and
adolescence are also relatively good predictors for later antisocial behaviour
and possible psychopathy, especially if there are comorbid diagnoses such as
substance abuse, alongside poor social resources (Sadock & Sadock, 2007).
Cartwright (2001:14), in his review of research on psychiatric illnesses and
their relationships to rage-type homicides (see for example, Blackburn,
1993; Hollin, 1989), notes that while psychotic disorders such as Paranoid
Schizophrenia are sometimes implicated in violence, these form the
minority of instances. In addition, he notes that studies on depression and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder tend to ‘endow an individual with a greater
propensity for explosive violence’.
Personality
In terms of research into personality types and disorders Glueck & Glueck
(1968) found that delinquents were more assertive, unafraid, aggressive and
unconventional in their attitudes than non-delinquents, who were more
self-controlled, perceptive and responsive to social cues. Conger & Miller
(1966) also found that delinquents were rated, on average, more highly
as emotionally unstable, suspicious, hostile and unhappy than their non-
delinquent counterparts. Earlier studies using the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI) found that violent criminals deviated from the
general population on traits of psychopathy, schizophrenia and hypomania
(Hathaway & McKinley, 1951). Many of these studies have provided the basis
for the consistent associations of personality and certain personality disorders
(antisocial personality disorder, for example) with violent acts that include
criminal homicide (APA, 2000; Sadock & Sadock, 2007). Furthermore, while
studies on authoritarianism as a central feature of personality have freq-
uently been directed towards understanding rigid ideological belief systems
(see for example, Perrin, 2005), they have also suggested a correlation to a
propensity for violent enactments (Funke, 2005).
Relational factors and violent crime

Relational factors have also long been implicated in the perpetration of
violence, either as precipitants or as predisposing features that may encourage
violence as a normative form of social relating. Relational studies certainly
extend beyond the individual factors previously discussed, and thereby
introduce the possibilities of social learning and the acquisition of violent
behavioural repertoires within a relational dynamic. Most commonly,
research in this area has focused on the influencing nature and context of
family and peer relationships on the occurrence of violent crime.
Parental and familial factors
PHOTO: DAVID LURIE

In the area of research that focuses on the
relationship and interaction between the
individual and parental or familial factors,
McCord’s (1979) study noted the role of
violence in child-rearing practices and
found that certain antecedents such as
harsh physical punishment of children
was correlated with later convictions for
violent interpersonal enactments. This
has been supported by other studies on
the role of parental involvement and
has highlighted that poor monitoring
and supervision of children (McCord,
1996), harsh physical punishment (Eron,
Huesmann & Zelli, 1991), poor parent-
Poor levels of ‘parental’
child bonding and low levels of parental affection (McCord, 1996), involvement, monitoring
parental neglect or abuse of children (Widom, 1989), exposure to and supervision in relation
familial violence (Farrington, 1998), poor familial cohesion and support/ to children may predispose
stability (Gorman-Smith, Tolan & Zelli, 1996), single-parent family individuals to violent
behaviours in later life.
structures (Henry et al, 1996) and lower socio-economic status families
(Hawkins, Herrenkohl, Farrington, Brewer, Catalano & Harachi, 1998),
all contribute to and place children at greater risk for violent behaviours
in later life. In South Africa, males committing violence in intimate
relationships were more likely than women to have been exposed to
physical assault by a family member, had witnessed couples physically
fighting within families, and had characterised their relationships within
families as more negative (Swart, Seedat, Stevens & Ricardo, 2002).
Peer relations
PHO TO : DAV I D LU RI E
Peer relations as a potential determinant for

violent behaviours have also been extensively
studied, suggesting that associations with
delinquents or drug users increased the
risk of violent behaviours, most notably
in the form of the gang culture or sub-
culture (Blumstein, 1995; Farrington, 1998;
Hawkins et al, 1998). The increased presence
of gangs tended to increase the rate of violent
crime and homicide in particular (Howell
& Decker, 1999). Because peers provide an
important developmental point of reference,
Gang violence is often particularly within adolescence, negative
associated with the peer influences may lead to delinquent behaviours that deviate from social
breakdown of effective prescriptions, in order for adolescents to maintain a sense of psychological
community and family and social integrity (Pettit, 1997).
mechanisms to regulate
In South Africa, Pinnock (1982a; 1982b; 1997) conducted extensive
behaviour, where peers
become a more influential work on gangsterism and its relationship to violence, noting its historical
factor in the development of development and its social functions in adverse social conditions. Mingo
violent crime. (1999) also reviewed some of the available literature, and suggested
that involvement in gangs predisposes individuals not only to the per-
petration of violence but also to injurious outcomes, psychological
disruption and the potential for moral truncation and atrophy. Reddy,
Panday, Swart, Jinabhai, Amosun, James, Monyeki, Stevens, Morejele,
Kambaran, Omardien & Van den Borne (2003) also found that 14.3 per
cent of learners in South Africa had been involved in a gang structure
of some sort, and that this also coincided with significant levels of
interpersonal violence of different forms among the same cohort.
Community factors, social factors and violent crime

In various sub-disciplines such as social psychology, community
psychology, and critical psychology, violence has also been understood
and researched as a function of a range of community and social factors
or ‘enablers’. These factors essentially refer to the extent to which
community integration, or the lack thereof, results in certain prohibitions
against violence, or the extent to which violence is accepted as a normative
means of conflict resolution. Research has thus examined whether social
structures or sociocultural mechanisms either encourage or inhibit the
expression of violence. While research into these areas may appear to
be unrelated to human development, these factors directly impact on
processes related to socialisation and identity formation.
Social capital
Mercy et al (2002) note that there is good evidence that community
integration affects the extent and magnitude of violence within
communities. Citing the body of literature on the relationship between
social capital and violence, they argue that lower levels of social capital
are more frequently than not associated with higher levels of youth
violence. Here the concept of social capital is characterised by ‘features

of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve
the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action’ (Putnam, cited
in Emmett, 2003: 11).
Moser & Holland (1997) found that lower levels of social capital were
generally associated with an increased likelihood of violent behaviours.
This was supported by Lederman, Loayza & Menéndez (1999) who found
a similar relationship between social capital and crime rates across several
international contexts. Wilkinson, Kawachi & Kennedy (1998) noted that
in particular, higher homicide rates were associated with lower levels of
social capital as well. Similarly, Ahmed, Seedat, van Niekerk & Bulbulia
(2004) examined community integration in South Africa through the
associated concept of community resilience and found a relationship
between seven domains of resilience and the potential for violence
prevention. Using the concept of sense of community from within
community psychology, Levine (1986) also highlighted the importance of
fostering this psychological sense among community members to reduce
crime and violence within community contexts.
What is apparent from the above is that in the absence of more
collective and shared constructions of identities, more individualistic and
defensive forms of social relating, including the use of violence, may be
more commonplace.
Understanding Eugene de Kock: psychoanalytics, family

relations and the social context of apartheid
Eugene de Kock, also known as ‘Prime Evil’, set of circumstances within his familial
was a commanding officer in the apartheid context. Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) goes
death squads and had his application for on to articulate how this could have given
amnesty denied during the TRC hearings. rise to the psychodynamics of splitting,
identification with the aggressor, as well as
Psychologically, how do we understand a pattern of defensive violence. She argues
de Kock’s violence? that these underlying psychodynamics
Gobodo-Madikizela’s (2003) psycho- found a specific foothold in the social
history of Eugene de Kock attempts context of the apartheid security forces
to unravel how his early childhood in South Africa, where defence against
experiences shaped his psychological the external threat of blackness and
and behavioural responses within the Communism mirrored his defensive
particular social context of apartheid South aggressive impulses at a psychological
Africa. In her interviews with de Kock, level (that were rooted in hostile threats
he disclosed how his early experiences from significant others experienced within
within his family were characterised by an his early childhood years).
authoritarian father who drank too much,
a mother who appeared submissive and Are there any other potential antecedents
emotionally abused, humiliation because to de Kock’s violent behaviour that you
of his stuttering, and a generally violent could identify?
Exposure to violence
Other community-level studies have focused on the normativity of exposure
to violence and its relationship to violent enactments. In their community-
based study in Johannesburg, Swart, Seedat, Ricardo & Johnson (1999),
found that high levels of violence within romantic relationships among
the youth coincided with significant exposure to violence within the
community context. A quarter of boys and 32 per cent of girls reported
that they had been physically hurt by an adult family member.
Once again, violence as a normative method of social relating and conflict
resolution within communities may have a significant effect on legitimising
further violence. Here too, social learning theory provides a sound basis for
understanding the transmission of such behaviours after exposure to it. In re-
viewing the extant literature, Mercy et al (2002) also note the effects of exposure
to media violence on immediate aggressive behaviour, but are cautious about
making the linkages to violence in the long-term. The premise of such studies
rests on the idea that various social institutions such as the media may play a
significant role in reproducing and maintaining such normative belief systems
that are embedded within the community fabric of a social formation.
Social transitions
Within the context of socio-structural factors, countries such as South Africa
that are undergoing social transitions to post-conflict and post-authoritarian
nation state formations (Manganyi, 2004) have also been shown to have higher
rates of violence. Shaw (1998) noted that in such contexts, new social structures
require a certain amount of time to develop and to create the necessary levels
of civil obedience in the direction away from violent crime. Kim & Pridemore
(2005) and Pridemore (2006) found that negative socio-economic change in
transitional Russia was associated with higher homicide rates, and this has
been supported by other writers in contexts such as transitional Serbia as well
(Simeunović-Patić, 2003). Co-occurring with such transitions is of course the
process of globalisation, which also influences crime rates in certain regions
due to the penetrating proliferation of associated criminal activities in the
illegal arms industry, the trafficking of drugs, and the trafficking of humans
(Findlay, 1999). Under such circumstances, not only is violence normalised as
a means of social relating, but often becomes reinforced as a central element of
identity that needs to be attained and maintained.
‘Race’ and violent crime: What is the link?
Research indicates that internationally data at face value however generates

members of marginalised groups are several ideological pitfalls that range
clearly over-represented in victim and from stereotyping marginalised groups
offender profiles related to homicides as violent, engaging in racial profiling,
and other violent crimes (Matzopoulos, supporting white supremacist notions, and
2005; Pallone & Hennessy, 1999; Samp- even bolstering newer forms of scientific
son, 1985; Wolfgang, 1958). Taking this racism (Pallone & Hennessy, 1999).
>>
<<
So how does research understand the to studying ‘race’ and homicide. They
linkages between ‘race’ and violent crime? suggest that certain spatial patterns
in homicide rates in black communities in
Mainstream research has focused on particular, can be related to overcrowding,
‘race’ as a proxy measure, most notably insufficient municipal services, and
for economic, wealth, social and political the disruptions of social networks that
disparities. While the extant literature in all exacerbate violent behaviours and
this area is by no means conclusive and result in urban desertification and decay,
entirely consistent (see Ousey, 1999), which further compound the problem
disaggregation studies on ‘race’ and of violence within black communities.
violent crime (see for example Krivo & Parker & McCall (1999) noted that racial
Peterson, 2000) highlight the importance differences in crime rates could also be
of ‘race’ as a proxy for concentrated accounted for by economic deprivation
disadvantage and residential instability, and limited local opportunity structures
especially among black populations. facing blacks in particular. This is
McNulty & Holloway (2000) also noted supported by Ousey’s (1999) contention
that ‘race’ is often also reflective of that deprivation and poverty were the
proximity to public housing (which mainly most significant factors in determining
houses the poor) and that increased black violent crime rates.
proximity to this form of institutional
housing increases the crime rates for What are your ideas about the links
black populations in particular. Wallace between ‘race’ and violent crime in
(1990) and Morenoff & Sampson (1997) South Africa?
also suggest a geographical component
Economic factors
While a significant number of socio-structural studies have also shown
a correlation between economic decline, recessions, downward pressures
on real wages, a lack of economic opportunities and the increase in
crime rates, this relationship is not necessarily as definitive as believed
(Messner, 1982). Schneidman (1996) points out that in periods of
economic crisis, basic social infrastructure is often compromised,
while the WHO (1995) notes that under these conditions, poverty
often becomes concentrated in urban areas. Both of these findings can
partly account for the linkages between poverty and crime. Similarly,
Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza (1999) noted a decline in homicide
rates with an increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across
several countries. In addition, under circumstances of economic crisis,
a decline in access to low-skill, entry-level employment was also
correlated with increased propensities towards violence (Shihadeh &
Ousey, 1998), while the decline in industrialisation within certain sectors
has opened up the possibilities for greater levels of unemployment,
female-headed households and increased rates of juvenile homicide
in many urban cities in the United States of America (Ousey, 2000).
However, Gartner (1990) found that income inequality (that is, relative
poverty and deprivation) was significantly related to rates of violence
in several industrialised countries.
PHO TO : ZO Ë MO O S MAN 528 Developmental Psychology
In South Africa, Appelgryn (1987), Appelgryn &

Nieuwoudt (1988) and Bornman (1998) also found
relationships between perceived relative group depriva-
tion, perceived injustice and militant attitudes towards
outgroups who were considered more privileged. In their
focus on concentrated relative poverty, Parker & Pruitt
(2000a) and Lee (2000) have also highlighted the impor-
tance of this concentrated relativity in wealth disparities
as a significant localised variable that impacted on the
crime rates in the United States of America. Important to
note here is that poverty does not simply have a range of
deleterious effects on normal pre- and postnatal human
development and relational processes, but can also act as a
predisposing factor for violent crimes, especially in contexts
where access to wealth and resources is socially valued and
integral to the maintenance of psychological integrity and
health throughout the life-span.
Poverty and economic
decline are contextual Macro-political structural level
factors that may act as At a macro-political structural level, population confidence in the state’s
enablers of crime in societies ability to respond in a protective manner towards its citizenry. More
that value access to wealth objective indicators of this ability, have been well documented as factors
and resources.
influencing rates of violence. In their review, Mercy et al (2002: 37)
highlight the importance of adequate policing, and state that where a
populace feels unsatisfied with this policing and protective function, it
often opens up the possibility for the enactment of alternative forms of
‘extra-judicial actions involving violence’. Pampel & Gartner (1995) argued
that the presence of national institutions charged with social protection
had an inhibiting effect on homicide rates as compared to those contexts
where these institutional arrangements were absent.
Messner & Rosenfeld (1997) also found that in countries where higher
rates of social welfare spending were directed at populations, there was
also a generally lower rate of criminal violence than in contextual instances
in which fiscal demands necessitated spending in a direction away from
social safety nets. Messner (1989) further found that indicators of economic
discrimination against certain social groups were strongly related to
increases in crime rates and were even more significant than income or
poverty concentration, highlighting that more formalised socio-structural
inequalities have a significant bearing on rates of violence and homicide
in particular.
In South Africa too, institutionalised racism during the apartheid era
was also examined in relation to its impacts on levels of crime and violence.
Wilson & Ramphele (1991) highlighted how poor access to social, political
and economic resources among the black populace often promoted
an underground economy that involved illicit criminal activities that
were also often associated with increased rates of community violence.
Bulhan (1985) also highlighted how the structural features of apartheid
predisposed black communities to higher rates of mortality, in which
homicide ranked within the top five causes of death during the 1970s.
This pattern remains fairly consistent today, suggesting that the historical
effects of institutionalised racism may still be a significant factor in high
crime rates, even in contemporary South Africa (Matzopoulos, 2004).
Militarisation
A further feature of the macro-political landscape is the increasing levels
of global geopolitical militarisation that reinforces the nexus between
masculinity, violence, weaponry, war and death. Xaba (2001) examined
constructions of masculinity and notes the integral relationship between
violence and masculinity in both the period of liberatory struggle and
in post-apartheid South Africa. In particular, Xaba (2001) argues that
while violence was considered necessary and even noble in the context of
militarisation during the liberatory struggle, the shifting social conditions
have now created a sense of delegitimisation and criminalisation of this
violence. In the context of post-apartheid South Africa, there has been
an inversion of the meanings attached to violence and therefore to mas-
culinity. This has resulted, to some degree, in men who are unable to
attain the new ideal of manhood, and therefore recast their violent ‘skills
and expertise’ into a form of criminalised masculinity.
Cock (2001) also engages with the history of militarisation in South
Africa as she reflects on the relationships between masculinity, violence
and weaponry, especially firearms (see Cock & Nathan, 1989, for a more
detailed discussion of this). She notes that both the apartheid state and
the liberation movements were heavily invested in generating and main-
taining a militarised masculine construction, especially during periods
of intense armed conflict. Weapons became the symbols of defence,
resistance and freedom for many black and white South African males
in the construction of their identities. Similarly, Swart’s (2001) study on
right-wing Afrikaner masculinity notes the relationship between white
men, firearms, masculinity and violence. As with Xaba’s (2001) study,
she examines the historical construction of the white male as dominant,
defender, leader, and associated with symbols of war to mark the historical
hardships and struggles of survival. However, given the marginalisation
of this right-wing identity in contemporary South Africa, there are shifts
towards even more excessive displays of masculinity in which there is the
continued use of symbols and discourses of firearms and militarism in a
context that is yet to be fully demilitarised.
Gender
Given the disproportionate involvement of men as both victims and per-
petrators of violent crime across the globe, research on gender differences in
relation to violent crime has tended to suggest that female victimisation and
male perpetration is directly related to ideological and structural processes
that support male domination. The general findings indicate that women
are more likely to be victims of crime in circumstances where their absolute
status in a social formation is compromised or where their status relative to
men is compromised (Heise & Garcia-Moreno, 2002; Hird, 2000).
Chodorow (1978) has incorporated this broad feminist approach into
a psychoanalytic understanding of gender and violence. She suggests
that within most contemporary social formations the primary

PHO TO S : DAV I D LU RI E
object of attachment and identification is initially the mother

for most children, but that during resolution of the Oedipus
complex young boys need to engage in an active disavowal of
the mother to avoid castration anxiety and to identify with the
father. Thus, not only is there identification with a symbolic
aggressor but also a repudiation and devaluation of the mother.
She suggests that this template becomes the basis for the
hegemonic forms of masculine identity that we see among adult
males, often resulting in emotionally disconnected men, who
have the potential to engage with women in a contemptuous
manner, and who have the propensity for violent enactments.
The development of this identity is thus dependent upon an
emotional rejection of the feminine, and later even a possible
hostile enactment of this rejection within the external world
(Chodorow, cited in Segal, 1990; Frosh, 1994; Mayseless, 1991).
This may in part account for the high rates of intimate partner
Dominant sociocultural
violence experienced internationally (Bergman 1992; Jackson,
beliefs of masculinity and Cram & Seymour, 2000; Jewkes & Abrahams, 2002; Rasool, Vermaak,
femininity have defined Pharoah, Louw & Stavrou, 2002; Reddy et al, 2003; Swart et al, 2002).
and popularised normative More recently, a growing body of research and theorising has
male behaviour of strength examined the role of constructions of masculinity in the perpetration
and aggression, and female
behaviour of submissiveness
of violent crime. Consistently, these studies have also highlighted the
and passivity. normative nature of masculine commoditisation and objectification of
women, masculine entitlement and control, the defence of masculine
honour, the widespread legitimation of masculine violence and sexist
beliefs, sexually aggressive masculine behaviour, the masculine flouting
of authority and the importance of economic success in the attainment
of masculine identities. This would suggest a broad ideological basis for
the construction of masculinities that normatively rely on violence and
aggression and a disavowal of all alternative ‘feminine weaknesses’ (see for
example, Campbell, 1992; Connell, 1995, 2000; 2002; Dobash & Dobash,
1984; 1998; Lau, 2008; Morrell, 2001; Polk, 1994; Radford & Russell, 1992;
Stevens, 2008; Vetten, 1996; Wood & Jewkes, 2001a; 2001b).
Age
Age too is not merely a demographic variable but also a social
stratification marker across which significant variations in crime rates
can be found. Unlike the previously examined variables which have all
in some manner been directly associated with other variables linked to
inequality and status, age appears to operate relatively independently
from ‘race’, class and gender. However, upon closer inspection, and
moving beyond the developmental, psychological, physiological or
evolutionary sets of processes that may be responsible for this global
trend, the implicated age groups in their late teens and early adulthood
may be more susceptible to the economic strains of an environment,
given that this not only represents the time of entry into the world
of work, but also the period of greatest anticipated economic and
social productivity. The absence of such opportunities may very well
predispose this age group between adolescence and early adulthood

to greater rates of violence, highlighting a potentially more complex
relationship between age and other variables such as ‘race’, gender and
class (Mercy et al, 2002).
Cultures and sub-cultures of violence

At the level of socio-cultural factors, the relationship between cultures and
sub-cultures of violence and higher levels of youth violent crime has also
been explored as a potential explanatory framework. In South Africa,
several writers have argued that the high levels of violence in the country
are in part due to a pervasive belief that it is a legitimate cultural form
of expression and conflict resolution, especially given the violent nature
of historical forms of oppression and liberatory struggles in this context
(Straker, 1992; Vogelman, 1990).
By far the most extensive research on cultural influences on violent
crime patterns has been conducted on the variance in homicide rates
between southern and other states in the United States of America.
In attempting to understand why rates of homicide have historically
been higher within these states, and where they could not be accounted
for by economic factors, Messner (1983) suggested that this variance
was a result of violent values permeating multiple levels of southern
society. Huff-Corzine, Corzine & Moore (1986) supported these
findings and noted a sub-culture of violence among white southerners
that was associated with high rates of white homicide. In a later
study, Huff-Corzine, Corzine & Moore (1991) point to a southern
culture that incorporates a perception of violence as an acceptable
mechanism for resolving frustrations, as well as a tendency to make
external attributions that increase the propensity for homicidal
violence. They relate this to the historical development of this region,
in which southerners have constructed themselves as victims who need
to defend themselves in a hostile environment that has always been
characterised by imposed social change, from the abolition of slavery
to the demise of legal segregation. This finding has been supported by
Parker & Pruitt (2000b) who note that white southerners tend to have
beliefs and attitudes that are consistent with the use of violence as a
means of self-defence and in defending a collective sense of honour.
Clearly, such studies highlight how various historical belief systems
within specific sociocultural contexts have contributed to sanctioning
violence as a legitimate social response in certain situations, thereby
partially accounting for higher rates of violent crime.
Interactional factors and violent crime

Interactional studies (such as those emerging out of the ecological
approaches of the public health model) have increasingly focused on the
importance of the interaction between individual factors and certain
products and environmental situations that may enhance the individual’s
predisposition to violent crime in particular. As an approach, it is premised
on a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of the determinants of
violent crime, and therefore also promotes more comprehensive and multi-
faceted strategies to prevent it. Here, the interaction of certain individual

factors, situational factors (such as temporality, victim characteristics and
location) together with the presence of specific products such as weaponry
and drugs, is also argued to increase the opportunities and likelihood of
violent encounters.
Drugs and weapons

Of all the interactional factors, the most critical probably centres around
the interactions between violent crime and product availability in the
form of drugs and weapons. Blumstein (1995) noted that the increase in
crime in certain parts of the United States of America could be directly
attributable to battles over turf in the selling of crack cocaine. Similar
findings on the relationship between drugs and violence have been noted
elsewhere in the international literature (Howell & Decker 1999; Mercy
et al, 2002). In South Africa, where blood alcohol levels were available
for homicide victims, 47.27 per cent of these victims tested positive for
alcohol, indicating again the significant relationship between alcohol
and violence (Matzopoulos, 2005). In Swart et al’s (1999) study in South
Africa, high rates of intimate partner violence also coincided with 46 per
Contemporary cent of males and 27 per cent of females using alcohol, higher rates of
interactional approaches
to understanding violent
other drug use by males, and at least 10 per cent of males reporting that
crime suggest that a range they had sold drugs as compared to 2 per cent of females. Reddy et al
of constitutional, relational (2003) found that 41 per cent of South African learners had been bullied,
and social factors intersect 30.2 per cent had been involved in physical fights, 29.3 per cent were
with certain environmental injured in these fights, 13.6 per cent had been assaulted by an intimate
enablers, which include the
availability of products such
partner, and at the same time, 49.1 per cent of these learners had used
as guns and drugs. alcohol, and significant numbers had used other drugs.
While the link between drugs and violent crime is not
PHOTOS: DAVID LURIE
a simple linear causal relationship, substance use, abuse,

dependence and sales are clearly implicated as interactional
factors that increase the likelihood of violence (Marais,
Sukhai & Donson, 2004). Howell & Decker (1999) also
argue for a significant interactional relationship between
gangs, drugs, guns and homicide rates. They suggest that
the mere presence of firearms in these contexts increases
the likelihood of homicide, and that drugs tend to increase
the presence of such firearms. While the relationship
between the availability of firearms and homicide is not
always consistent across international studies, it is certain-
ly not as insignificant as the WHO tends to report (Mercy
et al, 2002). Kellermann, Rivara, Rushforth, Banton, Reay,
Franscisco, Locci, Prodzinski, Hackman & Somes (1993),
in their study in the United States of America, note that
despite perceptions that the presence of guns in homes
confers protection, it in fact rather increases the risk for
homicide by a family member or intimate acquaintance.
Studies on youth violence in South Africa have showed
that between 16.7 per cent and 32 per cent of learners have
carried weapons (Reddy et al, 2003; Swart et al, 1999).
Developmental sequelae associated with exposure

to violent crime: a focus on adolescence
While the previous sections of this chapter have addressed the potential
antecedents of violent crime from a developmental perspective, the
chapter now focuses on the developmental sequelae or impacts of violent
crime. Not only is it critical to understand the underlying psychological
predisposers of violent crime but, as important, are the impacts that violent
crime may have on developmental processes. Rather than highlighting
the array of developmental outcomes that exposure to violent crime
could engender, this section approaches the question of impacts from
the vantage point of adolescent identity development. This is partly
due to the fact that adolescence is such a critical developmental fulcrum
that separates childhood and adulthood. Consequently, it is the point at
which early formative experiences of being in the world are integrated
into processes of identity crystallisation that influence future behavioural
repertoires as adults. Given the particular cusp location of this life stage,
it is perhaps ideally placed to understand how the effects of violent
crime within a social formation may impact on those who are emerging
from childhood and simultaneously being propelled into adulthood.
Furthermore, the international data on violent crime consistently indicates
that adolescence has the ignominious distinction of being the life stage at
which young people begin to commit violent crimes in general. The focus
on this developmental stage is therefore also an appropriate opportunity
to determine whether early exposure to violent crime always results in the
perpetration of violent crime in adulthood, or whether adolescents display
a measure of resilience in response to this psychosocial problem.
Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development

Despite the wide range of personologists who have theorised about
psychological development, there are relatively few who have focused
specifically on what may be seen as the most important social psychological
task of adolescence, namely, identity development. Erikson’s (1963) Ego
Psychology provides a psychosocial theory of human development that has
proven to be very influential in thinking about adolescence and individual
identity development in general, but is also arguably the only theory to
comprehensively address adolescence as a specific developmental phase
within a coherent and integrated life-stage framework.
His theory is based on several psychosocial stages, in which internal
psychological needs and drives are mediated by various social and
environmental influences. At each stage a new developmental crisis
or challenge emerges, with either a positive or negative resolution or
outcome. In general, positive outcomes are associated with mental health
and negative outcomes with maladjustment.
An Eriksonian perspective on identity development

In his focus on the developmental task of identity formation in adolescence
during the period between puberty and early adulthood, Erikson (1968)
suggests that adolescents engage in self-definition and discover their
sexual, gender, occupational and ideological identities. This is attained
through combining certain aspects of earlier childhood identifications

with the adoption of certain socio-historically influenced systems of values,
norms and standards. This process therefore involves a relatively unique
integration of both intrapsychic and sociohistorical aspects into the person’s
developing personality (Erikson, 1968). The key developmental task of
adolescence incorporates the conflicts related to negotiating between ego
identity versus role confusion.
Erikson furthermore notes the importance of several concepts such
as the psychosocial moratorium and identity foreclosure in the process of
identity formation. In fact, he conceptualised adolescence as a psychosocial
moratorium in which society provides a period of grace for adolescents
to experiment and pursue various identities. The premature conclusion
to this process in which self-definition is attained without exploring
Identity foreclosure. different possible identities is what he termed identity foreclosure
Refers to a premature (Erikson, 1968). Erikson has been extremely successful in analysing a
commitment to an combination of internal psychological drives and needs, as well as the
identity, social values,
demands of the external social world of the adolescent (Rosenthal, 1987),
ethical system and way
of being in the world,
and his contributions have subsequently generated further developments
without having the in this area of theorising and research (see for example Marcia, 1980).
opportunity to experiment However, while Erikson’s (1963) theory may be an elegant framework for
with a range of comprehending adolescent identity development within a social context,
identity permutations. it has a number of shortcomings. Firstly, the theory is unable to explicitly
and adequately address the impact of prolonged structural inequalities,
cultures in transition, countries at war, or societies in the midst of
humanitarian crises. Secondly, the theory does not fully comment on the
experiences of minorities and marginalised groups within social contexts.
Thirdly, Erikson does not sufficiently develop his theoretical position
around the import of sexuality and gender in identity development, and
tends to imply that men’s and women’s experiences of life crises are similar
(Stevens & Lockhat, 2003). Finally, authors such as Macleod (2002) and
Hook (2002) have highlighted the importance of questioning the biased
underlying assumptions of developmental theories such as those proposed
by Erikson, as they tend to universalise developmental processes without
sufficient sociocultural contextualisation. While being cognisant of the
criticisms of this theory, this section of the chapter also recognises that it
remains a key framework for understanding adolescent identity formation
within contemporary psychology. It therefore engages with the theory
in an internally critical manner when considering the consequences of
violent crime on the developmental tasks of adolescence.
Violent crime and identity development

By way of sketching the impact of violent crimes directly affecting children,
it is important to highlight that approximately 570 000 instances of fatal
abuse of children were recorded internationally in the year 2000. This
of course does not even factor in the many more incidents of non-fatal
violence in the form of sexual abuse, neglect, physical abuse and emotional
abuse. Furthermore, it does not include the vicarious exposure that many
children have to violence and violent crime internationally (Runyan,
Wattam, Ikeda, Hassan & Ramiro, 2002).
In South Africa, over 46 000 children were displaced due to conflict

during the period from 1991 to 1994. In addition, a conservative reflection
of over 26 000 crimes against children were reported to the South African
Police Services between 1989 and 1991 alone (Duncan & Rock, 1995;
Lockhat & van Niekerk, 2000). More recent statistics on crimes against
children reveals a staggering 63 906 incidents of crime reported to the South
African Police Services in the 2007/2008 period (SAPS, 2008). Clearly, direct
and indirect exposure to violent crime is not only a broader international
phenomenon, but is of serious concern in South Africa as well.
Crime category 2006/2007 2007/2008 Difference Increase/

decrease
Murder 1 152 1 410 258 22.4%
Attempted murder 1 309 1 488 179 13.7%
Rape (April - December) 17 224 16 068 -1 156 -6.7%
Common assault 23 526 21 736 -1 790 -7.6%
Assualt GBH 20 445 19 687 -758 -3.7%
Indecent assault (April - December) 4 581 3 517 -1 064 -23.2%
TOTAL 68 237 63 906 - -
Table 25.2 RSA Contact Crimes Against Children under 18 Years from 2006/2007 to 2007/2008.
Source: SAPS (2008).
Effects of violent crime

At the level of effects, for those who survive the immediate effects of violent
crime, their injuries often result in permanent disability. In addition,
violence is also often associated with a wide range of health and psychosocial
problems (Bergman, 1992; Farrington, 1991; UNAIDS, 1999; WHO, 1997),
such as eating and sleeping disorders, mental illness, unwanted pregnancies
and sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Research on the
impact of violence indicates that children and youth are at high risk for
developing various psychological syndromes, social dysfunctions (including
destructive, antisocial behaviour and substance abuse), poor educational
progress and health problems (Lockhat & van Niekerk, 2000). Beyond the
direct exposure to violent assaults, researchers have also noted that lesser
degrees of exposure, such as the observation of assaults and even the mere
absence of a personal sense of safety, can generate feelings of impotence and
curtail a child’s positive emotional, social and educational development, due
to constant perceptions of threat (Mingo, 2000; Wyngaard, Van Niekerk,
Bulbulia, Van der Walt, Masuku, Stevens & Seedat, 2000). Furthermore,
many children who have survived violent incidents may themselves be at
risk of becoming perpetrators of violence in later life (Ensink, Robertson,
Zissis & Leger 1997; Gartner, 1990).
When considering Erikson’s (1963) perspective on identity formation,
the primary task that the adolescent must negotiate successfully is the
development of congruence between the self-image (the evaluative
component of one’s conscious personal experiences) and role expectations

of the environment. This must include independent judgement, emo-
tional independence, assurance of economic independence, preparation
for occupational and family life, socially responsible behaviour, and
the adoption of a value and ethical system. If these tasks are central to
adolescent development, then clearly their successful negotiation may
be hampered for many South African adolescents today (Stevens &
Lockhat, 1997).
The question that then emerges is whether South African adolescents
should be characterised as ‘damaged’ and ‘lost’ on the one hand, or
‘resilient’ and ‘hardy’ on the other.
Negative developmental effects

When considering the negative developmental effects of violent crime
Psychosocial on identity formation, it is apparent that ethical systems may be com-
moratorium. Refers to promised by the adoption of violence as a means of social relating, thereby
the developmental period contradicting the prevailing social norms of society. In addition, future
in which individuals
occupational life may be negatively impacted upon by poor academic
are searching and
experimenting with
progress due to exposure to violence, and an overall sense of independence
identity possibilities, may be offset by persistent perceptions of threats to personal safety.
resulting in a temporary Increased social withdrawal, isolation and self-protective strategies may
deferment of commitment hamper social relationships further. Under these circumstances, the
to any identity forms. notion of the psychosocial moratorium becomes unattainable for many
adolescents, as they do not have the latitude to experiment with a range of
identity permutations before committing to any of them.
Identity confusion. Here, three potential outcomes immediately become possible. The
Is said to occur when first is that of identity confusion, in which the adolescent is unable
the indiviual is unable to to generate an integrated sense of self because of the contradictory
develop an integrated
expectations of society and the non-facilitative nature of the environment
sense of self.
to meet these expectations.
Identity diffusion. Refers The second potential outcome refers to what Marcia (1980)
both to an absence of characterises as identity diffusion, in which the adolescent is unable to
crisis about identity and an commit to any identity, because of the limited exposure to the array of
absence of commitment identity permutations.
to an identity, and is The third is characterised by the process of identity foreclosure, in
frequently characterised by
which the adolescent is forced to prematurely commit to an identity
a sense of directionlessness
and apathy.
constellation because of environmental constraints and pressures to
do so. Examples of this latter outcome may include increased social
Identity foreclosure. withdrawal because of threat perception, social atomisation, and a
Refers to a premature retreat into more individualistic and privatised ways of functioning
commitment to an in the world, all of which of course reduces social capital, creates the
identity, social values, spaces for less humane ways of relating to others, and ironically, may
ethical system and way
also foster the perpetration of violence within privatised contexts.
of being in the world,
without having the
Alternatively, the environmental constraints could be so significant
opportunity to experiment that the adolescent commits to a life of violent crime as a means of
with a range of negotiating and coping in a world that is fundamentally perceived as
identity permutations. hostile and alienating. In each of the three instances referred to above,
the resolution of adolescence is less than ideal and may lead to elements
of maladjustment in later life.
While some authors (Macleod, 2002) have argued that a focus on the
negative developmental effects of adverse social contexts pathologises
adolescents unnecessarily, these arguments are perhaps equally problematic
when they overstate adolescents’ abilities to manage such circumstances in
a healthy manner. In addition, they run the risk of negating the very real
material circumstances and impacts that hostile social environments have
on human developmental processes.
Resilience
Nevertheless, it is important to note that several researchers have consistently
argued that adolescents should not only be characterised as victims in such
contexts, and that we should acknowledge that they also display resilience Resilience. Refers to
and fortitude. Even though they may therefore be predisposed to a host the capacity of people to
of negative effects, this is not necessarily a logical outcome for all of them cope with stressors in
a psychologically
(Dawes, 1994a; Levett, 1988; Swartz & Levett, 1989).
healthy manner.
While the negative repercussions of these contexts for adolescent children
should not be underestimated nor negated, Dawes (1994a) notes that there
may be several mediating factors that determine the extent of children’s
subjective experiences of social stressors. Here, several authors have
suggested a number of factors that may reduce these impacts and even help
adolescent children to redefine their negative experiences more positively.
These include the degree of available social support, family integration and
stability, the availability of long-term emotional relationships with others,
the ability of adolescents to elicit support, and the meanings that adolescents
ascribe to their experiences, amongst others (Dawes, 1994a; Richter, 1994;
Straker, 1992). Under these mediating conditions many adolescents may
therefore still be able to acquire a sense of integrated identity, even under Identity integration.
the most difficult social and environmental circumstances. Refers to a presence
What needs to be recognised is that the relationship between intra- of commitment to an
identity, after the presence
psychic factors and social conditions in the formation of identity during
of a struggle for identity,
adolescence is more complex and nuanced than had been conceptualised by and implies that a person
most theorists. It is evident that exposure to violent crime may have severe has arrived at a sense of
negative consequences for identity integration and attainment. However, who he is following a
it is also clear that under certain mediating conditions, the attainment of search of what he can be.
an integrated sense of identity in adolescence remains possible for many
young people in South Africa today.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the relationship between human development
and violent crime by focusing on both the potential antecedents and
consequences of violent crime. What is apparent is that the interrelation-
ships between intrapsychic processes and sociohistorical conditions are
extremely complex and sophisticated, and that both are integral to human
development. This implies that a holistic and comprehensive approach
to understanding the psychological drivers of violent crime must be
undertaken, if we are to actively promote mental health and adjustment.
Furthermore, an equivalent level of comprehensiveness and integration is
critical if we are to develop successful intervention strategies to reduce and
control the marring psychosocial effects of violent crime.
Specific tasks
➊ Given the extent of research on the antecedents of violent crime, critically discuss the
degree of agency that we as humans have in determining such behaviours (that is, are our
behaviours shaped by our natural constitutions, our environments, or by the meanings

that we attribute to ourselves and our environments)?
➋ Rates of HIV/AIDS have reached pandemic proportions, especially in sub-Saharan

Africa. What do you believe are likely to be the impacts of this disease on the nature
of attachments between HIV-positive mothers and their infants, and do you believe that
the HIV pandemic is likely to impact on violent crime in future?
➌ Much of the research into the relationship between family functioning, family structure
and delinquency in later life appears to be premised on assumptions of the family being
nuclear in orientation. How would you apply these research findings to the South
African context, where a range of family structures and characterisations can be found?
➍ Dominant or hegemonic constructions of masculinity reinforce the normativity of male

violence and aggression. Elaborate on what you believe alternative forms of masculinity
would need to encompass to offset this normativity of violence and aggression?
➎ Based on available research on the antecedents of violent crime, what would the key elements
for a comprehensive intervention to combat violent crime entail in the South African context?
(This book represents Erikson’s seminal work on the integral relationship between socio-cultural
contexts and psychological development, across many different social formations and social groups.)
Erikson, E H (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: Norton.
(A classic collection of Erikson’s major essays on the topic of adolescent identity development and
crisis, and the role of cultural influences in shaping new forms of adolescent identity.)
Krug, E, Dahlberg, L, Mercy, J A, Zwi, A B & Lozano, R (2002). World report on violence and health
Geneva: WHO.
(The most comprehensive international report to date on the extent, nature, magnitude, determinants,
consequences and potential intervention strategies to understand and address various forms of violence.)
Marcia, J E (1980). Identity in adolescence, (In Adelson, J. (ed), Handbook of adolescent psychology.
New York: Wiley, 159-187)
(An expansion and elaboration on Erikson’s theory of adolescent identity development, with a focus on the
manner in which the degree of commitment to an identity can determine identity status.)
Stevens, G & Lockhat, R (1997). ‘“Coca-Cola kids” - Reflections on the development of black adolescent
identity in post-apartheid South Africa,’ South African Journal of Psychology, 27(4), 250-255.
(A journal article reflecting on the possible trajectories of black adolescent identity development after the
demise of apartheid in South Africa.)
Suffla, S, van Niekerk, A & Duncan, N (eds), (2004). Crime, violence and injury prevention in South
Africa: Developments and challenges. Tygerberg: MRC-UNISA.
(A collection of papers focusing on the extent, nature, magnitude, determinants, consequences and potential
intervention strategies to understand and address various forms of violence within contemporary South Africa.)
CHAPTER
26
The effects of trauma
on child development:
Children in South Africa
Patrick Connolly and Gillian Eagle
This chapter examines research in the field of traumatic

experience and its effect on child development. The impact of
trauma is discussed in terms of how various traumatic experiences
affect all children, regardless of their nationality, ethnicity or their
social and economic resources. The particular stressors faced by
children in South Africa are discussed in terms of how they
mediate these children’s experiences of trauma and the effects
such experiences may have on their further development.
The chapter focuses on the following areas:

1. The South African context of childhood development
2. Psychological trauma as understood within a diagnostic
system
* Type I and Type II traumas
* The impact of Type I trauma
* Stages of development and Type I trauma impact
* Children’s recovery from as single traumatic events
* Mediating factors and the South African context
* Long-term, repeated Type II trauma
The South African context of childhood

development
Many of the developmental theories covered in this volume attempt to
describe patterns in, as well as various influences on, child development that
are universal in nature and occur in all environments. However, at the same
time, all of the theories covered make some allowance for environmental
influences related to the social and historical context in which children
grow and develop. In this respect, South Africa is a nation in a period of
considerable social change, including a transition from a period of serious
Aftermath of apartheid. conflict and social unrest under apartheid to what it is today, just over a
The aftermath of the decade after the introduction of democracy: a country with considerable
apartheid era is a promise but facing difficult social and economic problems.
generation of children
Many of the problems experienced by contemporary South African
growing up in conditions
of extreme poverty,
children are considered to be a longer-term consequence of the apartheid
despair and regular system, a system entailing almost half a century of systematic racial inequal-
exposure to violence, ity, enforced by a repressive government. Under Apartheid black children
within a context of in particular experienced deprivation and hardships of various kinds that
embattled family life affected psychological development. The following table shows research
and disintegrating findings cited in the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into the Effects of
communities.
Political Violence on Children and illustrates the difficulties, anxieties and
signs of distress exhibited by a group of children and adolescents as a result
of apartheid-era policies and practices (Duncan & Rock, 1997b).
The effects of political violence on children

35,8% are left without any supervision after school hours.
50,8% are preoccupied by a fear of thieves.
37,1% preoccupied with the possible death of their parents.
9,0% use marijuana at least three times per week.
76,5% show at least three stress-related symptoms.
39,4% exhibit five or more depression symptoms.
59,6% exhibit two or three symptoms of PTSD.
66,9% had experienced at least one traumatic incident which they cannot forget.
Table 26.1 The effects of political violence on children.
Source: Beukes & Heyns 1994, in Duncan & Rock, 1997b.
This research, conducted over a decade ago, reflects the reality of most
black children’s lives under apartheid. State repression in the form of brutal
acts of public violence, detentions, murders, torture and intimidation
affected many children, either directly or indirectly, through their impact
on family members, friends or community. Secondly, so-called ‘political’
violence in the form of counter-violence towards state agencies, as well
as violence between resistance organisations, self-defence units (SDUs)
and vigilante organisations, as well as spontaneous acts of public violence,
were commonplace (Duncan & Rock, 1997a; Emmett, 2003).
Today, over a decade after the 1994 transition to a democratically
elected government, while violence is far less often purely politically
motivated, public acts of violence in the form of violent crime, gang
violence and vigilantism, remain a prominent part of South African life
(Emmett, 2003), affecting different communities in different ways. For
example, Lewis suggests that in some townships exposure to violence is
part of everyday life:
Violence has been a part of township life for decades. For many of
the children who grow up in townships, violence is continuous…
The effects of trauma on child development: Children in South Africa 541
to pass by the body of someone who has been shot on the street is
not unusual … death becomes normal: ‘life becomes cheap. That’s
why they kill someone for earrings’ (Lewis, 1999: 89).
According to the South African Police Service (SAPS) 18 545 murders

were reported during the 2005/2006 period, as well as 54 926 cases of rape
over the same period (SAPS, 2006). Given that many cases of violent crime
are not reported, as well as serious problems (including corruption) with
the reporting process, the real figures are most likely significantly higher.
Specific statistics for domestic abuse are hard to come by because the SAPS
records domestic assaults as ordinary assaults (Duncan & Rock, 1997b).
Also, official government statistics do not include specific statistics for child
physical or sexual abuse. These are generally recorded as common assaults,
rape and indecent assault. However, general offences against children
listed for the 2004 period were given as over 6 000. This figure is viewed
as problematic, as a single clinic serving abused children in Johannesburg
(‘The Teddy Bear Clinic’) reported serving over 6 000 cases in that year
alone (ChildrenFirst, 2004). Suicide figures are estimated at between
6 000 to 8 000 successful suicides per year in South Africa, with an estimated
20 failed attempts per successful attempt (Health24, 2008). What is clear is
that despite the demise of apartheid, exposure to relatively high levels of
violence is a pervasive background feature of South African life:
In the space of one meeting [a teachers’ meeting at a township

crèche school in Gauteng], incidents mentioned included: the
recent murder of the husband of one of the crèche teachers, the fact
that a trainer present had lost her husband in tragic circumstances
some while before, and that she had been shot and wounded herself
at some point; while another trainer voiced her concern about a
friend whose home-loving and well-adjusted son had been killed
in a senseless street fight (Miller, 1997: 257).
Many South African children are unable to escape these widespread

acts of violence and abuse and some are directly affected as victims of
violence, rape and abuse. In addition, children are frequently witnesses
to such actions affecting family members and acquaintances in their
community (Peltzer, 1999; Ward, Flisher, Zissis, Muller & Lombard, 2001).
All these instances of violence constitute potentially traumatic events for
South African children (Emmett, 2003; Lewis, 1999; Seedat, Nyamai,
Njenga, Vythilingun & Stein, 2004).
Exposure to criminal and domestic violence is probably the most Domestic violence. Rates
common trauma for children in South Africa but it should also be noted that of violence occurring in
traumatic stressors include accidents and a range of other life-threatening South African homes are
events. Some accidental risks may be more common in contexts of poverty consistently amongst the
highest in the world. By
and deprivation, such as burn-related injuries sustained by children
the time most people
brought up in homes in which flammable means of heating and lighting reach adolescence and
are used. The high incidence of contextually related traumatic stressors young adulthood, they
suggests that psychic trauma—in the form of intense emotional, social and may often consider family
behavioural responses to traumatic events—has to be considered as having violence to be normal.
a potential impact on the psychological development of large numbers of

South African children.
This chapter now turns to examining psychological trauma more
carefully before examining the effects of trauma on the psychological
development of affected children.
Psychological trauma as understood within a

diagnostic system
Trauma as a psychological construct is not simple to define (Eagle & Michelson,
1997). The latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) defines a traumatic stressor
as being an event (or events) experienced by the person that involves ‘actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self
or others’ (p. 467).
A criterion for the diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
is that the individual’s emotional response has to have involved ‘intense fear,
helplessness or horror. Note: in children, this may be expressed instead by
disorganized or agitated behaviour’ (ibid, p. 467). Lenore Terr (1983: 1544)
adds to this definition, stating that a traumatic event is often ‘surprising,
unanticipated, and piercingly intense’, and is a real rather than an imagined
experience (such as a nightmare or hallucination).
In response to traumatic events, identifiable anxiety-related symptoms (such
as those described next) often occur in adults as well as children (Yule, 2003).
These symptoms of traumatic stress fall into the following main categories:
s Re-experiencing symptoms: memories of the event consistently intrud-

ing into everyday thoughts, nightmares, even vivid ‘reliving’ episodes
called ‘flashbacks’.
s Avoidance: avoiding thinking or talking about the event, as well as
avoiding places, people or other stimuli associated with the event.
s Numbing symptoms: a restricted range of feelings, an emotional
detachment from either the event or life in general, a foreshortened or
limited sense of future.
s Hyperarousal symptoms or symptoms related to increased physiological
arousal: sleeping difficulties, irritability, hyper-alertness, concen-
tration difficulties, startle responses (APA, 2000).
Although they may manifest differently, all these sets of symptoms can
be present in both traumatised adults and children. Some may experience
relatively few of these anxiety-related ‘symptoms’ following such an
event. However, it is normal for some of these reactions to occur for up to
a month following exposure. If sufficient symptoms persist for longer than a
month, a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) can be given,
indicating that some form of assistance is required to process the event and
cope with the symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
Type I and Type II traumas

Terr (1991) makes a further distinction with regard to traumatic stressors,
suggesting that they fall into two categories, which she refers to as Type
I and Type II traumas. Type I trauma refers to a single traumatic event

that is usually unexpected, intense and does not recur regularly over time.
Adults and children who experience such an event often have some of
the symptoms described above (although these do not always lead to a
diagnosis of PTSD). Of course, a person can experience many such events
in their lifetime (as many South African children do), a situation referred
to as exposure to ‘multiple trauma’ (Lewis, 1999).
In contrast, a Type II trauma is one that involves a series of traumatic
events regularly occurring over a long period of time. Examples of such
traumatic stressors include long-term physical or sexual abuse (Terr,
1991). While adults and children experiencing such long-term repeated
traumatic stressors do exhibit many of the PTSD symptoms described Post-Traumatic Stress
above, they often also exhibit changes in their personalities and behaviour Disorder. While it is not
stemming from attempts to cope with such inescapable situations. This unusual to have serious
and even very intense
type of trauma is also referred to as continuous or complex trauma and is
responses to traumatic
generally far more likely to result in long-term difficulties that significantly events, Post Traumatic
impact on development (Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Herman, 1993; Lewis, Stress Disorder (or PTSD)
1999; Yule, 2003; Yule, Perrin & Smith, 1999). is only diagnosed when
Traumatic stressors of both types are pervasive in South African society, these responses exceed
and in many cases a child may experience both Types I and II traumas. what is considered normal,
Given the relative deprivation, neglect and poverty that many South African especially when occurring
for unusually long periods
children experience, the long-lasting effects of such traumatic events is often
of time.
much worse than it should be (Emmett, 2003; Lewis, 1999; Yule, 2003).
We will now focus on examining Type I and II traumas separately
with regard to how they impact upon children, at the same time reviewing
how long-term developmental processes may be affected.
The impact of Type I trauma
Exposure and Effect

As described above, a Type I trauma refers to a single, once-off, intensely Type I trauma.
traumatising event that produces an intense traumatic response in the This refers to a trauma
person. This is the kind of scenario that we usually think of when talking that is a once-off, singular
event (considered outside
about ‘trauma’, whereas Type II traumas are often spoken about as
of the range of everyday
‘abuse’. International work on the effect of Type I traumatic events on events), which causes
children has focused on a variety of stressors, including natural and man- sufficient feelings of terror,
made disasters (such as floods and nuclear radiation accidents), accidents, helplessness or horror,
interpersonal violence and epidemics (Benedek, 1985; Yule, 2003). so as to cause traumatic
Pynoos & Eth (1985) focused on interpersonal violence in America, and symptoms. Common
found that the most traumatic incidents for their child clients were the examples of Type I
traumas in South Africa
murder of a parent, the rape of a mother and the suicidal act of a parent.
include robbery, rape
Eagle & Michelson (1997) and Emmett (2003), focusing on violence in the and witnessing murders.
South African context, suggest that, historically, the most common types
of traumatic incidents children were likely to be exposed to were political
violence in urban and rural townships, exposure to criminal violence
(housebreaking, robbery and hijacking) and child rape. In contemporary
South Africa, the most common traumatic stressors that children are
exposed to are criminal and intra-familial violence, as well as sexual
assaults and abuse (Emmett, 2003).
PHO TO : ZO Ë MO O S MANN 544 Developmental Psychology
The field of research into children’s responses to trauma

has grown considerably from its origins in the 1940s, and there
is now a wealth of data that demonstrates that children can
have intense and serious responses to trauma, just like adults
(Yule, Perrin & Smith, 1999; Yule, 2003). Furthermore, while
not always the case, such traumatic responses to events can
potentially have serious long-term effects for the child, perhaps
even shaping their adult personalities and behaviour (Duncan &
Rock, 1997c; Maddaleno, Concha-Eastman & Marques, 2006).
As will be evident from reading other chapters, it is generally
accepted in psychology that early childhood experiences play a
significant role in determining personality development as well
as other aspects of psychological functioning such as cognitive
and moral development.
For the most part, children’s presentation of traumatic
There is research that
shows that children can
stress largely follows that of adults, in that they exhibit re-experiencing,
have intense and serious avoidance and numbing, as well as hyperarousal symptoms (Benedek,
responses to trauma. 1985; Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Yule, 2003). The only differences in child
presentations of traumatic stress conditions (included in the more recent
diagnostic criteria) are in the way that certain symptoms will manifest.
For example, rather than talking about a trauma children may show
their intrusive recollections of an event by repetitively playing out scenes
that relate to the event. A little girl who had been sexually assaulted by
a neighbour disturbed her family by asking her sister and friends to lie
down and play a game which involved taking off their panties. A little
boy who had been involved in a taxi accident insisted on giving his play
therapist medical examinations.
Children’s experience of trauma, as well as their response to it, is
shaped by their particular level or stage of development. The experience
of trauma can then, in turn, affect the subsequent development of the
child, although how it does so is often very complicated. A comprehensive
model for understanding the manner in which trauma impacts upon
development has been articulated by Robert Pynoos (1994). Pynoos
suggests that a traumatic stressor does not have a simple, linear effect
on a child’s further development, but that the stressor affects the child
at a particular point in development and sets in motion a number of
complicated reactions, having a ‘cascading’ or multiplying effect on
subsequent developmental stages and achievements (Maddaleno et al,
2006; Yule, Perrin & Smith, 1999). We will therefore move on to examine
both how the child’s developmental level affects the manifestation
of the post-traumatic responses, as well as how the child’s subsequent
development can potentially be compromised by trauma. We will look
at characteristic patterns of response at the broad stages of development
outlined in most psychological development theory.
Stages of development and Type I trauma impact

The level of development attained by a child (cognitive, emotional, social
and behavioural) has an influence on the manner in which trauma is both
perceived and expressed, as well as on subsequent development. It is worth
noting that one overarching principle that holds true at just about all ages
and stages of development is that traumatic responses during childhood
typically involve some form of regression, where previously attained
developmental achievements (such as toilet training) and independence
are lost. The child or adolescent may behave as a younger child, showing
more immature emotional regulation and social behaviour than is age
appropriate. For example, two children in their early teenage years
became fearful to sleep in their own beds after an armed robbery in their
home and insisted on sleeping in their parents’ bed as one might expect of
much younger children. As a consequence of losing developmental gains,
later development can be delayed as previous milestones and abilities have
to be reacquired (Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Maddaleno et al, 2006). What
follows is a brief overview of how trauma may be both perceived and
manifest within children at four broad stages of development: birth to
two years (infancy), three to six years (early childhood), seven to 12 years
(middle childhood) and 13 to 18 years (adolescence).
Birth to two years (infants and toddlers)

The thinking capacity of infants and toddlers is usually not sufficiently
developed for them to perceive most threat-related stimuli from the
environment as harmful (Yule, Perrin & Smith, 1999). At this stage
of development, infants are reliant upon their mothers for almost all
their biological and psychological needs and have a profound need for
the security associated with the ongoing presence and availability of the
mother or caregiver. The importance of attachment to a stable caregiver
at this stage of development has been outlined in other chapters in this
volume. Hence, for an infant, the most traumatic event is usually in Trauma-induced distress
experienced by the mother
fact separation (or threatened separation) from their mother, which is
may indirectly traumatise
experienced as fundamentally life threatening (Lewis, 1999). very young children.
Since infants are so heavily dependent on their mothers

they are usually well attuned to the mother’s emotional state.
There is evidence to suggest that very young children, while
not aware that certain stimuli are threatening, are in fact aware
of their mother’s distress in response to a traumatic event and
may in a sense be indirectly traumatised. Traumatic anxiety
and shock in the mother (and perhaps in other caregivers and
adults) are most likely to be experienced as highly anxiety
provoking by a very young child (Benedek, 1985; Freud &
Burlingham, 1943; Leibowitz et al, 1999).
However, there is evidence to suggest that children, even
at this young age, may also be directly affected by traumatic
stimuli (Yule, 2003). Their responses to these stimuli are often
‘somatic’ or bodily in nature and include: sleep problems,
feeding difficulties, restlessness, diarrhoea, and frequent
illness (Eagle & Michelson, 1997). Regressive responses at this
stage may involve the loss of achievements in speech, bladder
control and motor skills (such as sitting). There is often
increased crying, irritability and attention seeking. The child
may either become jumpy and easily startled or less responsive
to stimulation and attention (Lewis, 1999). However, should an infant’s

situation revert to an adequately nurturing and supportive environment
following a single traumatic incident, these symptoms typically disappear
(Kaminer & Eagle, in press). Thus, it is apparent that the role of the primary
caregiver(s) is crucial in mediating the responses of young children to
traumatic events and that while their lack of sophisticated thought capacity
may protect them to some extent, their physical responses may demonstrate
that they nonetheless experience a measure of anxiety, disruption and
unease following exposure to these events.
Three to six years (toddlers to preschoolers)

Children of this age are more likely than infants to recognise that a
situation is directly threatening, even if they may be confused about what
is actually taking place. However, generally they do not possess the ability
to make any real adaptive response in a traumatic situation and so often
experience themselves as completely helpless and defenceless (Lewis,
1999). Children at this stage are also often greatly influenced by the
emotional responses of their parents and caregivers to the traumatic event
(Benedek, 1985; Leibowitz et al, 1999; Pynoos & Eth, 1985). A little girl of
four years was more upset by the harsh scrubbing her mother gave her in
an extremely hot bath following an incident of sexual molestation than she
was by having an acquaintance of the family touching her inappropriately.
She could not comprehend the seriousness of the sexual abuse, which had
not been painful, but felt instead that she was being treated as naughty and
punished by her mother. In this situation the panicked mother’s response,
although understandable, created difficulties for the toddler in processing
what had happened.
Children are somewhat egocentric at this stage, and tend to believe
that bad things that happen are ‘intentional’ even if the cause of the hurt
is an inanimate object. For example, if a child were to bump her head on a
shelf, she may say that the shelf was ‘naughty’, or ‘bad’. This is in keeping
with the preoperational thinking observed and described by Piaget and
his followers. As in the example of the little girl just described, their ego-
centricity may also lead children to believe that the event is a punishment
for things that they have done (or not done), potentially increasing anxiety
levels and inhibition in the child’s subsequent behaviour (Lewis, 1999).
In a further example, another little girl who had angered her mother by
refusing to behave in the morning linked this to her mother’s accidental
death later that same day. In her drawings she depicted her mother as
angry with her in heaven and as having abandoned her deliberately as a
form of punishment. It was important for her play therapist to help her to
understand that the two events were not linked and that she was indeed
not responsible in any way for her mother’s death. This allowed her to
recall her mostly positive memories of time with her mother and to begin
to attach to her aunt who became her new loving caregiver.
Children also exhibit strong use of fantasy from about four to five
years. Fantasies are a typical response to trauma at this age and can be
used to ‘fill in the gaps’ in recollections of the trauma or may take the form
of ‘inner plans of action’ (Lifton, 1979) which tend to arise more often
after activity (on the part of the child or others) has appeared fruitless in a
traumatic situation that they have witnessed (Pynoos & Eth, 1985). These
fantasies often involve some person (either the child, or another, such as
a policeman) intervening to prevent the trauma from taking place. Such
fantasies of ‘undoing’ or altering an outcome are common at this age, and
represent an attempt to limit traumatic anxiety and feelings of impotence
(Pynoos & Eth, 1985).
Evan … was present during a robbery and saw his father being
shot. In therapy sessions afterwards, he drew the scene of the killing
but drew himself as the ‘superhero’ with a cape and a mask. In the
story, he saved his father from the ‘bandits’ (Lewis, 1999: 29).
Where a traumatic event has been experienced by the child as suf-

ficiently intense, such fantasies of undoing can come to occupy a central
place in the child’s subsequent identity formation, sometimes even in-
forming the adult occupational choices of the child, who may become a
police officer, doctor or social worker in an effort to help others who may
experience similar situations (Pynoos & Eth, 1985).
In terms of symptoms, children at this stage may experience distress-
ing intrusive memories of the trauma and may talk about it often (Lewis,
1999). However, this verbal processing and communication of traumatic
events is limited, and the child is also likely to non-verbally re-enact the
trauma in repetitive post-traumatic play as mentioned earlier. Such play
is not experienced as pleasurable, but rather demonstrates confusion and
preoccupation on the part of the child, an attempt to ‘make sense of’ the
event (Kerig, Fedorowicz, Brown & Warren, 2000).
In one such case … a four year old girl whose mother was knifed
to death carefully painted her hands red and acted out a game of
being stabbed with a paint brush (Pynoos & Eth, 1985: 29).
Similar to infants and toddlers, children of this age range may also
demonstrate jumpiness and be easily startled, or may become withdrawn
and quiet (Lewis, 1999). Terr (1985) suggests that there is not much
evidence of emotional numbing in children in this age group, but there
is often a constricted range of play and of affect. They may also have a
limited sense of future (Kerig et al, 2000; Yule, Perrin & Smith, 1999).
Lastly, there may be difficulties in concentration and memory—although
traumatised children are often very alert and attentive to signs or news of
danger. Specific phobias related to an object or situation associated to the
traumatic event occur from this developmental stage onwards and can
persist for years afterwards (Green, 1985; Pynoos & Eth, 1985; Yule, Perrin
& Smith, 1999). For example, the little boy injured in the taxi accident
became phobic about getting into any form of motorised transport.
Regression at this stage may take the form of increased ‘clingy’
behaviour (increased separation anxiety) and reverting to bed-wetting,
thumb-sucking or asking for a bottle (Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Lewis,
1999). Children may become irritable and demonstrate new fears (such as
fear of the dark or of strangers) or develop new aggressive or destructive

behaviour. There may be disturbed sleep in the form of night terrors,
nightmares and sleep-walking. In terms of symptom formation pre-
primary children appear particularly vulnerable to traumatic incidents,
even once-off events. One of the reasons for this vulnerability is that, due
to the regressive response, children may lose some of the developmental
gains they have made in terms of separation from the parent, which is
experienced as very frightening to the just developing sense of self (Eagle
& Michelson, 1997). Should these fears persist, and should the child
become stuck in a pattern of over-relying on maternal support, it may
mean that gains in independence are not recovered within age-normal
stages, with far-reaching consequences for the child’s future social
functioning amongst peers. Children who remain withdrawn and fail
to become integrated within their peer group are deprived of one of the
central means of socialisation (Bronfenbrenner, 1974).
Seven to 12 years (primary-school children)

Many of the ways in which trauma presents in preschool children also
manifest in primary-school children. Children in these middle childhood
years can be plagued by thoughts of the trauma, may often speak about
it, become more fearful and may startle more easily. They may also
withdraw socially and reduce their range of activities. Post-traumatic play
also occurs at this stage and children may include classmates and peers in
such play. Regression takes place, and may even involve behaviour such as
bed-wetting or thumb-sucking. Sleeping and eating disturbances, as well
as somatic complaints, such as headaches or stomach-aches occur at this
stage as well (Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Lewis, 1999).
The primary difference between preschoolers and primary-school
children with regard to their experience of trauma is the increased
significance of the school setting as well as their intellectual development.
Altered cognitive and emotional functioning following a traumatic event
typically affects the child’s academic capacity (Lewis, 1999). For example,
traumatised children often struggle to concentrate and complete tasks.
Impulse control may be compromised in children who have a strong
hyperarousal response to distressing events and the child’s consequent
hyper-activity may adversely affect their academic progress (Pepler, Catallo
& Moore, 2000; Rossman & Ho, 2000). Further, aggressive outbursts and
difficulties with work often lead the child to become quite disruptive at
school, even when they were previously well-adjusted (Lewis, 1999; Yule,
Perrin & Smith, 1999). Again, in the vast majority of cases, such detrimental
effects following a single traumatic event usually dissipate after some time,
but in some cases may become a ‘stuck’ point in development, potentially
causing long-term damage to learning and education.
Middle childhood is associated with growing cognitive and social
capacities, for example the acquisition of operational thinking. This has
a positive influence in the sense that children are better able to effectively
communicate about a traumatic event, as well as to describe their
associated feelings (Yule, Perrin & Smith, 1999; Lewis, 1999). However,
this development also shifts the way in which the child processes trauma.
Because these primary-school children now have a greater understanding

of the dangers inherent in the traumatic event, their fantasies become
more reality-based and more connected to the incident. They may also
experience intense fantasies of revenge and strong feelings of anger, as well
as shame and guilt about these feelings and fantasies (Kerig et al, 2000;
Pynoos & Eth, 1985).
Adolescence
Adolescents tend to have responses to traumatic events that resemble
those of adults, while also retaining many of the facets of traumatic
response demonstrated by younger children. Many adolescents have re-
experiencing and hyperarousal symptoms similar to those of adults. They
may become socially withdrawn, or alternatively, may start socialising far
more than before. Sleeping and eating patterns may be disturbed, and
they may experience difficulty concentrating and poor memory. School
functioning often deteriorates (as with primary-school children), and
irritability and aggressiveness may cause disruption at school. Skipping
classes and running away from home, if only for brief periods, is not
uncommon. Adolescents may have revenge or ‘rescue’ fantasies and may
become fearful of another traumatic event occurring (Kerig et al, 2000;
Lewis, 1999; Maddaleno et al, 2006). All of these responses, should they
persist, can potentially affect future academic and social development,
even in response to a single event.
One important element of adolescent development is the development
of independence. There is a movement to separate from parents and
towards individuation, as well as to integration with the peer group
and the development of a social identity (Erikson, 1950). On the one
hand, there is considerable self-monitoring (or self-consciousness) with
regard to how one is viewed by peers; on the other, there is a need to
reduce dependence on parents and caregivers. As such, the vulnerability
and/or emotional fragility experienced in response to a traumatic
event, together with the increased sense of emotional attachment to, or
dependence on, parents is often experienced as humiliating or shameful
by the adolescent (Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Lewis, 1999; Maddaleno et
al, 2006). Traumas at this stage can have a detrimental effect on further
identity development. Firstly, as a protective measure, adolescents may
foreclose on their identity in the sense of becoming rigid and inflexible Externalising response.
in their identity formation. Secondly, they may lose any real direction or An externalising response
to trauma is one in which
certainty in the identity directions they have explored or taken, resulting
the person ‘acts out’ or
in identity diffusion—a lack of development of any adaptive identity directs his or her distress
formation (Duncan & Rock, 1997c; Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Maddaleno in action (rather than
et al, 2006). an inner experience of
A key issue distinguishes adolescents in terms of their response to distressing thoughts or
traumatic events and also helps make sense of the responses that particular emotions) towards people
younger children or even adults have to emotionally traumatic circum- or objects in the outside
world. This may include
stances. This is the difference between externalising versus internalising
activities such as abusing
responses to trauma (Pepler, Catallo & Moore, 2000). substances, fighting,
An externalising response refers to a ‘turning outward’ of behaviour. driving recklessly or
It has also been referred to as ‘acting out’. This process can be described regular risk-taking.
as one where there is no longer any ability to ‘tolerate’ intense levels

of feelings, such as anxiety or aggression, and the feeling is directly
acted upon, without being ‘held’, thought about or reflected upon.
With adolescents and particularly boys, given their preoccupation with
generating a social niche, such an externalising response to trauma
can take the form of impulsivity, aggression with siblings and peers,
rebellious behaviour at home and school, substance abuse, precocious
sexual activity, delinquency and political activity (a response actively
encouraged during apartheid) (Duncan & Rock, 1997b; Eagle &
Michelson, 1997; Maddaleno et al, 2006; Pepler, Catallo & Moore, 2000).
Such responses are sometimes permanently detrimental to the academic
and intellectual development of the adolescent, and in some cases may
be associated with later career failure.
Internalising response. In contrast, an internalising response to trauma refers to a ‘turning
An internalising response inward’ of feeling. Here, feelings are contained entirely within the mind,
to trauma is one that is usually never acted upon, but ruminated upon, and felt within the person.
not directed in action
Examples of internalising behaviours seen in adolescents (more usually
towards the outside world
but, rather, refers to inner,
girls), particularly after trauma, are somatising (headaches, for example),
consciously experienced sleep disturbances, anxiety, fear of separation, social withdrawal and
feelings of distress, often isolation, depression, and questioning the meaning of existence (Eagle
leading to self-damaging & Michelson, 1997; Pepler, Catallo & Moore, 2000). Such responses
experiences of depression can potentially have a knock-on effect on later social and emotional
and chronic anxiety. development, may be detrimental to self-esteem, and may be associated
with diagnoses of depressive and anxiety disorders later in development
(Duncan & Rock, 1997c; Kaminer & Eagle, in press).
Having reviewed the effects of trauma at various stages of development,
as well as some of the potential fallout at subsequent developmental stages,
we now turn to critically examine the resources that may assist children
to recover from traumatic incidents and whether these are generally
available or compromised in the South African context.
Children’s recovery from single traumatic events

While many of the manifestations of post-traumatic response in children
described above can last for months or even years, and while there can
often be setbacks to recovery, in the vast majority of cases a traumatised
child’s intense emotional responses diminish with time (Matsakis, 1992).
If sufficient supportive elements are present in the child’s environment the
impact of the trauma will generally reduce over time, without any serious
compromise to the child’s further psychological development. It is perhaps
testament to human resilience that people, including young children, can
survive and overcome horrifically inhuman experiences. In fact, it is even
the case that strengths and powerful coping mechanisms can be brought
to the fore by traumatic experiences (Eagle & Michelson, 1997). However,
in South African society many of the supportive elements that have been
found to facilitate psychological recovery from traumatic experiences are
compromised for many children. Traumatic stress impact and recovery
cannot be divorced from the broader context in which development
is taking place. We now examine some specific factors that may aid or
hinder recovery.
Mediating factors and the South African context

A variety of factors affects how a child responds to a trauma and many of these
make the difference between whether there is minimal long-term adverse
effect on development or whether there are serious long-term consequences.
While a number of these factors, such as age, temperament and constitution,
are fairly universal in terms of the way they affect a child’s response to a
trauma, specific social, cultural, economic and environmental dimensions
may shape children’s responses in different contexts (Emmett, 2003;
Maddaleno et al, 2006). This section reviews three critical factors affecting a
child’s ability to cope with a trauma: constitutional or physiological factors,
intellectual factors and social support. These three influences are focused
upon not only because of their centrality in mediating post-traumatic
recovery but also because of the extent to which they reflect the impact of
wealth disparities and other social problems within the country.
Constitutional or physiological factors

Children’s ability to successfully negotiate the consequences of a traumatic
event is very much affected by their physical health and resilience, a capac-
ity determined by both genetic and environmental influences. The poorer
the health of the body, the more difficult it is for the mind to overcome
trauma without adverse consequences (Peterson, Prout & Schwarz, 1991;
Maddaleno et al, 2006) and a child’s physiological capacity is very much
influenced by their socio-economic position within society. A very high
proportion of children in South Africa grow up in impoverished circum-
stances, experiencing nutritional and other forms of deprivation either
through neglect or lack of resources. The effects of such deprivation are
evident in unacceptably high mortality rates amongst infants and pre-
adolescent children. These deaths are very often the result of preventable
and treatable diseases, as well as malnutrition (Duncan & Rock, 1997a;
Emmett, 2003).
In present-day South Africa high levels of poverty and unemployment
mean that many children continue to suffer from malnutrition. The World
Health Organisation’s last figures (recorded for 1999) placed the prevalence
of underweight children in South Africa at 12 per cent (WHO, 2008).
The effects of malnutrition on the child’s wellbeing are significant. Brain
growth and intellectual development may be compromised and children
may struggle to engage with the world, showing signs of disorientation,
lethargy, restlessness, aggression and mistrust (Duncan & Rock, 1997b).
Given that the highest levels of trauma tend to be experienced by the most
marginalised and oppressed populations, it is often difficult to separate
out the effects of trauma on a child from the general effects of deprivation
(Green, 1985).
South Africa also shows some of the highest rates of HIV infection
in the world. It is estimated that in 2005 as many as 5.5 million people in
South Africa were living with HIV/AIDS. Of these, 240 000 were children
(WHO, 2006). The physiological sequalae of HIV infection are often very
serious for children, placing them at risk for acquiring serious disease and
illness, as well as affecting cognitive and emotional development, at even
earlier stages of AIDS infection than previously believed (Levin, 2007).
PHO TO : G U Y S TU BBS 552 Developmental Psychology
As a result, a large percentage of South Africa’s

children do not have the physical resources
required to overcome the psychological
effects of trauma. Cluver & Gardner (2006), in-
vestigating trauma symptoms in 60 black Cape
Town-based HIV-positive children orphaned
by HIV/AIDS, found that 73 per cent of the
sample met their criteria for PTSD risk. They
speculate that one reason for this unusually
high level of traumatisation may have been as
a result of children witnessing their infected
parent’s horrible and stigmatised AIDS-related
Children orphaned by death. The HIV/AIDS pandemic thus deserves
HIV/AIDS may be special future attention in terms of its potentially traumatic impact on
severely traumatised. children’s lives as well as the complex effect it has on their resources for
recovery from other kinds of traumatic events (Cluver & Gardner, 2006).
Intellectual factors
A tradition of research has demonstrated a strong association between
intellectual functioning and the ability of a child to successfully overcome
trauma. The manner in which a child’s intellect mediates the effects of a
traumatic event is not entirely clear but it seems most likely that the child’s
ability to cognitively process the overwhelming stimuli related to the event
is implicated in recovery (Peterson, Prout & Schwarz, 1991; Yule, Perrin
& Smith, 1999). As indicated previously, nutrition and adequate home
stimulation are vital to intellectual development. However, educational
opportunities also play a crucial role and the past iniquities of ‘Bantu
education’ continue to hamper the provision of adequate educational
training to all South African children.
Despite the ANC government’s consistent stated commitment to
improving education, schools in poorer communities and townships
continue to offer sub-standard teaching and learning experiences. A lack
of teaching materials, overcrowding, under-qualified and underpaid
teachers, limitations linked to mediums of instruction (English is the
primary language for teaching and yet for the majority of South African
children it is not their first language), and a harsh school environment
continue to limit the effectiveness of teaching in such schools (Emmett,
2003). Further, due to general poverty in the community, many township
children are also under-stimulated outside school, often complaining
that their environments are ‘boring’ and lack recreational outlets. Such
school and community conditions may result in a relative lack of cognitive
development and poor scholastic achievement (Duncan & Rock, 1997b;
Emmett, 2003), depriving children of the intellectual capabilities that may
help them to overcome adversity such as trauma.
Social support
A considerable volume of research has confirmed that one of the strongest
protective factors against trauma impact on children is the presence of
strong social support, in the form of significant caring human relation-
ships. A strong emotional bond with a concerned caregiver is perhaps

the most significant factor in preventing or ameliorating the long-term
impact of trauma, or, in the absence of this, the presence of supportive
peers (Benedek, 1985; Bronfenbrenner, 1974; Eagle & Michelson, 1997;
Emmett, 2003; Freud & Burlingham, 1943; Lewis, 1999; Yule et al, 1999).
Many caregivers are indeed sympathetic to their children’s distress and
are able to help them to ward off the worst of trauma symptoms and long-
term effects.
However, South Africa’s socio-political constitution, both past
and present, has contributed in many instances to a lack of family and
community cohesion. Poverty and township life in general exert a constant
and damaging pressure on family relationships (Emmett, 2003) and
conditions in many households today are not very different from those
described under apartheid.
The fact that these black townships or ghettos were usually severely
overcrowded, under-serviced, dreary, poverty-stricken and crime-
ridden created unbearable tensions in family life, often leading to
high levels of anger and aggression, which in turn, frequently led
to the violent abuse of children (Duncan & Rock, 1997c: 74).

Further, many working-class South African parents are unable
to spend sufficient time with their children, an ongoing effect
of the separate-development policies pursued by the apartheid
government (Duncan & Rock, 1997c; Emmett, 2003). During the
apartheid era many parents were forced to move to urban centres
to seek work as migrant labourers, living in hostels or townships,
while children remained at home, living in severely deprived
rural communities, often with ageing grandparents without the
resources to provide adequate care (Duncan & Rock, 1997c). This
remains the situation for large numbers of South African children
(Emmett, 2003).
Bronfenbrenner (1974) describes the impact on children of
growing up with little contact with caregivers. In the case of absent
fathers, he suggests that mothers of children who grow up without
fathers, which is common in South Africa, typically tend toward
over-protectiveness and reliance on a form of discipline referred
to as ‘love-oriented’, where undesirable behaviour is punished by
a temporary withdrawal of loving behaviour. In such situations, Peer activities, such as
children may grow up demonstrating behaviour that is more submissive, Street Cricket, can help
dependent and passive than children who receive parenting from a father boost a child’s ability to
and mother figure (Bronfenbrenner, 1974). Although single mothers may face adversity.
provide very loving and stable homes, it is possible that children growing
up in such households may have less inner and external resources at their
disposal to overcome trauma.
Further, Bronfenbrenner (1974) suggests that when the role of parents
in the socialisation of children is diminished, the peer group becomes
increasingly central in guiding the further development of the child.
Thus the school environment, peer activities (such as clubs and sport) and
popular media exposure, increasingly determine the child’s resilience or

vulnerability in the face of adversity, particularly in the case of children
from poorer socio-economic backgrounds (Bronfenbrenner, 1974). Many
South African children and adolescents seek support for their traumatic
life experiences from other children, who themselves may be battling with
difficult life experiences in school environments increasingly characterised
by violence, sexual assault, substance abuse and gang-related conflict
(Emmett, 2003). Given such circumstances, it may not be surprising that
both the inherently traumatic lives experienced by South African youths,
and the dissolution of the family and social structures that are necessary
in offering support through difficult times, leave permanent scars on a
disproportionately large number of South African children in the form of
pervasive anger, anxiety, depression and behavioural problems (Duncan
& Rock, 1997b; Emmett, 2003).
In summary, what the discussion of three mediating influences on
trauma impact has suggested is that South African children may not only
be at risk for direct trauma exposure, but that in many instances social
conditions that might offer direct and indirect protection from traumatic
stress are seriously compromised. This is largely as a consequence of poverty,
inequality, deprivation and discrimination, despite ongoing attempts at
redress and social restructuring. The discussion now turns to looking in
more depth at Type II stressors, involving prolonged traumatisation and
almost invariably resulting in long-term adverse effects.
Type II trauma. Unlike the Long-term, repeated Type II trauma

Type I trauma, this refers In contrast to the Type I traumas discussed previously, Type II traumas
to traumatic stressors that refer to a series of events that occur often enough to be fairly regular (if not
are not once-off events
predictable) events in a child’s life (Terr, 1991). Such trauma is often referred
but, rather, regularly
occurring traumatic
to as child abuse and/or neglect and includes both physical and sexual
events, often occurring abuse. Girl children tend to be sexually abused much more often than boys,
in a pattern. Common although there is increasing recognition that the rates of sexual assault on
examples of Type II boys may have been significantly under-reported in the past because of the
traumas which children are intense shame associated with such abuse. Physical abuse can be experienced
exposed to, are physical by both boy and girl children and often takes the form of severe beatings.
and sexual abuse.
Although corporal punishment has been outlawed in South African society
there are still many reports of children being given severe beatings by both
teachers and older family members (Emmett, 2003). Corporal discipline
is viewed as normal in many communities and may easily slide into more
severe forms of abuse. Parent alcohol abuse is often associated with serious
child abuse and neglect. Whole texts have been devoted to these topics, so
the coverage of these issues in this chapter is rather brief, with a specific
emphasis on the developmental impact of this kind of trauma. The effects
of these Type II traumas is often more severe precisely because in many
instances it is the people who have responsibility for caring for the child who
inflict the abuse. Not only do children not receive the kind of protection from
trauma expected from a caregiver, but their sense of betrayal is profound,
since supposedly trustworthy people are harmful and clearly place their
own needs ahead of those of their children. Such abuse can have powerful
effects on development, particularly on personality development.
Consequences of long-term, repeated traumatic stressors

Type II traumas are far more likely to result in permanent detrimental
effects than Type I traumas, having both psychological and physiological
effects on development. Given that during a traumatic experience parts
of the brain become intensely over-activated under the influence of stress-
related neurochemicals and neurohormones (Mohr & Fantuzzo, 2000),
researchers are beginning to understand how changes in brain function-
ing may create circular patterns of developmental change with possibly
permanent effects.
Without prompt corrective measures designed to defuse and

discharge the tensions set up by the intense traumatic experiences,
newly activated reverberating neural circuits can fixate, become
permanent, and result in affectively charged flashbacks as well
as motor behaviour that is affectively driven (Mohr & Fantuzzo,
2000: 71).
Should such patterns of neural activation become repeated over time,

this can result in what is known as ‘sensitisation’ of the neural paths: Sensitisation of neural
this means that these patterns of hyperarousal can be generated with paths. A consequence of
less and less external pressure, leading such abused children to over- the repeated activation of
neural paths, resulting in
react emotionally and behaviourally, particularly in situations of conflict.
patterns of hyperarousal
The influence of chronic hyperarousal and emotional reactivity on later being generated by envi-
personality development eventually becomes evident in oppositional and ronmental pressure with
conflictual behaviour. Some chronically traumatised children display decreasing potency.
bullying tendencies and may engage in acts of cruelty towards other
children or animals, responding aggressively to the environment as their
behaviour of choice.
The greater and more frequent the personal impact on the child,
the greater the likelihood a traumatic state will occur, and given
enough of these states, the child responds the same way repeatedly
and thus may acquire a trait (Mohr & Fantuzzo, 2000: 75)
Other children tend to ‘internalise’ rather than ‘externalise’ their

emotional distress, carrying negative feelings for much of the time, feelings
such as intense anxiety, sadness, despair, irritation and guilt. Should this
kind of internalising response to chronic traumatisation become repetitive,
then such emotionally negative experiences of the self become evident
in conditions such as depression, low self-esteem, social withdrawal,
psychosomatic complaints (such as headaches), sleep disturbances, fear
of separation and even self-destructive and suicidal behaviour (Calam
& Franchi, 1987; Eagle & Michelson, 1997; Jouriles, Murphy & O’Leary,
1989; Mohr & Fantuzzo, 2000; Pepler et al, 2000).
It is clear that the effects of continuous trauma are qualitatively
different from those of once-off, less predictable events. With Type II
traumas what happens is that over time the child has to develop some kind
of adaptive response (or in psychodynamic terms, a defence) that serves to
limit the extent of the terror, anxiety or even rage associated with each
and every single event (Green, 1985). Perry et al (1995) suggest that child-
ren under continuous severe stress respond in one of two ways—either
with the kind of hyper-arousal response described above, or, alternatively
with what is called a ‘dissociative’ response (a common defence):
Abused children gradually increased their tolerance for painful

affects with the passage of time. The intensity of their initial fears
of annihilation, abandonment and feelings of helplessness were
eventually dampened by a gradual constriction of affect. These
children eventually described the frightening details of their
batterings in a bland and detached manner. They often smiled as they
recounted specific memories of their beatings (Green, 1985: 143).
This emotional detachment (or numbing) represents a basic defence

Dissociation. in the human organism known as dissociation. A dissociative state is one
An adaptive response to in which overwhelming, intense experiences of fear are suppressed from
trauma characterised by consciousness. Anyone who has ever been in a very frightening situation, such
feelings of numbness and
as a serious car accident or an armed robbery, will know the characteristic
a sense of ‘unreality’.
feeling of numbness and unreality that tends to occur, known colloquially
as being ‘in shock’. While this defence may be initially adaptive, giving the
body and mind time to adjust, if this defence of dissociation is employed in
a long-term, repeated manner, it eventually becomes a permanent part of
the child’s emotional experience and behaviour, resulting in ‘desensitisation’,
where quite intense stressors fail to produce significant brain and emotional
Community workers, responses as described in the quotation above (Mohr & Fantuzzo, 2000). The
amongst others, can help numbing and defensive style in a sense becomes part of the personality make-
break the cycle of abuse by
up of the person.
playing a vital preventative
and curative role. There is a physical basis to such personality development in that exposure
to ongoing extreme stress can cause permanent alterations in
PHOTO: ZOË MOOSMAN N
brain chemistry and structure that will influence the further

development and adaptation of the brain, with pervasive
effects on behaviour, emotion and cognition. Brain-
mediated psychological functions, such as empathy, attach-
ment, managing of emotional states (affect regulation) and
even humour can be compromised, which in turn may
have an effect on the child’s relationships and environment
(Mohr & Fantuzzo, 2000). The constriction of emotional
functioning, together with uncontained aggression, that
can occur in the context of prolonged exposure to an
inescapable traumatic environment is often, although not
always, associated with later diagnoses of conduct disorder
and possibly adult antisocial personality traits (Mohr &
Fantuzzo, 2000). It is thus apparent that the effects of such
abuse can become perpetuated in an ongoing cycle, with
severely abused, brutalised children, themselves in turn
engaging in abusive behaviour as adults. Preventative and
curative interventions are very important and some of the
key work engaged in by psychologists, social workers, and
health, education and community workers is in this area.
Having discussed the general effects of chronic traumatisation in

childhood we now move to examine more specifically the kinds of problems
and concerns that children face with regard to exposure to three more specific
kinds of Type II trauma; physical abuse, domestic violence and sexual abuse,
conditions not uncommon in South Africa.
Children traumatised by physical abuse

Children directly exposed to violence, particularly when such violence occurs
on a regular and long-term basis often present with injuries to the central
nervous system (CNS), particularly as a result of head injuries. A common
injury in infancy is a ‘shaking injury’ caused by being shaken violently by
a caregiver, often as a ‘punishment’ or disciplinary measure for crying too
much, which results in the development of a subdural haemotoma (bleeding
on the brain) (Calam & Franchi, 1987; Green, 1985, in Eth & Pynoos, 1985;
Hyder, 2006). Such injuries impact upon the further cognitive and intellec-
tual development of the child and can subsequently affect the adult capacities
for independence and adaptive behaviour (Maddaleno et al, 2006).
Green (1985) suggests that the psychological impact of physical abuse by
an adult caregiver is a result of two kinds of stressors, the first of which is the
immediate physical and psychological assault, and the second is the long-
term exposure to a typically harsh and punitive child-rearing climate.
In response to the first, immediate stressor, the repetitive acute
physical and psychological assaults, a child may engage in a number of
defence mechanisms. The simplest is termed ‘avoidance’ and involves
a psychological distancing from the assaultive parent. The child avoids
both physical and eye contact with his or her abusive, adult caregiver(s)
and may instead attach to unfamiliar adults. The child may also show a
behaviour known as ‘frozen watchfulness’, where he or she sits apparently
passive and immobile, but actually alert and hypervigilant, with senses
devoted to attempting to detect possible danger in the environment, thus
affecting concentration on other tasks. Abused children are often also
less exploratory in their environment than others and may habitually
approach adults only from the side or rear, or by ‘back-stepping’ (walking
backwards) (Calam & Franchi, 1987; Green, 1985). This cautious and
watchful behaviour, suggesting anticipation of danger, may be a useful
cue as to the presence of abuse. A further psychological defence, known
as ‘splitting’, helps children to preserve their intense need and attachment
for the assaultive parent, by allowing them to continue to seeing them as
‘good’ and to direct all their negative feelings of rage and disappointment
onto some other adult person, who for them becomes a very ‘bad’ adult
(Green, 1985). This kind of defence can easily persist throughout the life-
span, with the child (and later adult) always finding someone in their
environment towards whom they can feel hatred, while protecting the
good image of the aggressor parent (Kaminer & Eagle, in press). Another
kind of splitting involves the child perceiving him- or herself as all bad
and deserving of punishment by the justified ‘good’ parent, leading to
chronic problems with self-esteem and feelings of self-worth.
One of the common ways in which an infant or young child may
respond to the constant threat of attack, humiliation and abandonment,
is through what has been called ‘identification with the aggressor’

(Green, 1985). This identification with the abuser permits the child’s
fears of helplessness and annihilation to be replaced with feelings of
power and control. Aggressive and threatening behaviour becomes
the way the individual commonly relates to significant others in order
to escape anxious feelings, and to feel ‘good’ in dominating others in
relationships instead. While many individuals are able to experience
abusive childhoods without repeating their parent’s behaviour with their
own children, for some child victims, this pattern becomes the way they
will relate to their own children in time (Dutton, 2000; Green, 1985),
perpetuating a cycle of abuse, as mentioned earlier.
Where cognitive and social functioning is still being developed,
trauma(s) can cause precocious or premature development. This may be
the basis of the common observation that abused children may present
‘Pseudo-mature’ with apparently adult or ‘pseudo-mature’ behaviour. In order to survive
behaviour. the child becomes increasingly skilled at observing and manipulating
Age-inappropriate adults to protect themselves from possible attack. While such coping
behaviour employed by
strategies have potentially positive effects in terms of building resilience
children with the intention
of manipulating adults so
and independence, the child may become stuck in a pseudo-adult style,
as to protect themselves which is not conducive to age-appropriate enjoyment or flexibility
from attack. (Calam & Franchi, 1987; Eagle & Michelson, 1997). Some abused
children may become more rigid and immature in their thinking–they
have weaker cognitive accommodation skills (the ability to alter existing
thought patterns), to use Piaget’s term. This may have an adverse effect
on the child’s later cognitive development; for example, those who
have witnessed repeated domestic violence tend to adopt quite rigid
and aggressive approaches to problem solving throughout the life-span
(Rossman & Ho, 2000).
Besides the direct effects of physical abuse on the child’s further
development described here, prolonged physical abuse can also have
a more subtle indirect effect on the child’s future social and emotional
development, by affecting the child’s ‘attractiveness’. In a study requiring
primary-school teachers to rate the physical attractiveness of the children
they taught (in other words, how likeable the child’s appearance made
them), they commonly selected children with histories of physical abuse as
the least attractive, this despite a lack of awareness of the abused status of
the children. It seems that abused children may come to look less attractive
to others, affecting their popularity and integration with their peers.
Furthermore, the various health problems that occur within the neglectful
harsh environments in which physical abuse typically occurs, as well as
disfiguring injuries, may indirectly begin to limit the child’s capacity to
mobilise social support and gain acceptance (Calam & Franchi, 1987).
Domestic violence
One might imagine that children’s experience of trauma is more severe
when they are in the position of victim rather than witness. In keeping
with this idea it has been found that children who are direct victims
of violence are more likely to experience dissociative symptoms and to
demonstrate traumatic amnesia or disavowal (inability to remember or
accept that the event took place) than those whose involvement
in trauma is at the level of witnessing disturbing events (Pynoos &
Eth, 1985). However, there is strong evidence that children who
witness acts of domestic violence in many instances demonstrate
serious trauma symptoms. Witnessing violence between one’s
parents or other relatives in the home brings with it unique
stressors that can have far-reaching consequences for later
development (Maddaleno et al, 2006; Pepler, Catallo & Moore,
2000; Pynoos & Eth, 1985).
Witnessing domestic violence (in South Africa, this most
often means witnessing a mother being assaulted by a male
partner, often the child’s father) brings with it a particular
experience of passivity and helplessness in the face of the injury,
humiliation and destruction of someone one is attached to
(Leibowitz et al, 1999; Pynoos & Eth, 1985). The child’s limited
ability to prevent the violence may bring with it a distorted sense
of responsibility, as well as a strong need to try to undo the event,
for example through fantasies of ‘inner plans of action’ described
earlier (Pynoos & Eth, 1985). Another fairly common outcome A fairly common outcome of
of witnessing domestic violence during childhood is a later tendency children witnessing domestic
towards suspicion, paranoia and mistrust of people’s intentions (Lewis, violence is a tendency
1999). Occupying the vantage point of observer in witnessing domestic towards suspicion, paranoia
and mistrust later on in life.
violence also means that the child is, in a sense, free to identify with
multiple positions, those of victim, abuser, rescuer, bystander and/or
rescuer, for example. The propensity to identify with the aggressor is
even greater in such situations than it is for direct victims of familial
violence (Dutton, 2000; Pynoos & Eth, 1985). It is not uncommon for
boys to join their fathers in abusing their mothers as they move into
adolescence, for example, indicating their identification and taking on
of both dominating and gendered roles in the family. It has also been
observed that in situations of domestic abuse children may be forced to
demonstrate their loyalty to a particular parent, sometimes prematurely
and inappropriately, creating difficulties for further emotional and
relational development (Dutton, 2000). For example, a boy child who
identifies with his mother and feels hostility and contempt for his father
(which is also not uncommon) may find it difficult to make a positive
masculine identification when attempting to establish a gendered
identity in adolescence.
It is clear that in addition to the trauma of direct exposure to the
infliction of injury and the sounds, sights and sensations associated with
this, domestic abuse places children in conflicted positions with regard
to their role and responsibilities and with regard to their relationship to
both parties. Witnessing familial violence damages the child’s relation-
ship to both the aggressor and the victim. The child may lose faith in the
authority, competence and strength of the victimised parent, including
in his or her ability to protect them from harm, weakening attachment to
the ‘victim’ parent (Dutton, 2000). Exposure to the extreme hostility and
aggressive actions of the perpetrator also damages the child’s attachment
to this parent, as the latter now appears dangerous to the child (Dutton,
2000). Further, the horrifying loss of control in the aggressor may make
children afraid of their capacity to control their own impulses, which
may result in generally inhibited and depressed behaviour in the future
(Green, 1985; Lewis, 1999; Pynoos & Eth, 1985). Alternatively, the loss
of control in the aggressor may be replicated by the child in similar
failures in impulse control in the form of uncharacteristic aggression,
recklessness and self-destructiveness (Dutton, 2000; Pynoos & Eth, 1985).
It is apparent then that growing up in a household in which domestic
abuse occurs places children at risk for a number of different kinds of
psychological disturbance and outcomes.
Child sexual abuse

As noted earlier, it is likely that rates of sexual victimisation of South
African children are amongst some of the highest in the world
(ChildrenFirst, 2004). Most often victims are young women, although
many young boys are also the victims of sexual abuse. Perpetrators are
overwhelmingly older males, usually relatives, or friends of the family
(Goodwin, 1985; Leibowitz et al, 1999). Sexual abuse may refer to a
number of sexual acts including adults exposing themselves to children,
sexual touching, oral sex, vaginal and anal penetration, child prostitution
and child pornography (Lewis, 1999).
Goodwin (1985) poses a question with regard to sexual abuse: Why is
it traumatic and in what ways? She poses this question in the context of
clear evidence that children are commonly very seriously and adversely
affected by long-term sexual abuse. However, sexual abuse is complicated
in that the influences it exerts are various, and often hidden or delayed
(Goodwin, 1985). This may be due to the circumstances surrounding the
abuse as suggested below:
Thus, while there might be some overlap, an eight-year-old

girl brutally raped by a gang member is likely to experience
this violation differently from an eight-year-old girl bribed (or
threatened) into sexual activities with her older cousin over a
period of months. While the effects may be equally damaging,
the first child is more likely to present with the features associated
with post-traumatic stress. The child who has experienced sexual
abuse will be more likely to develop chronic behavioural and
psychological problems such as sexual precocity and low self
esteem (Eagle & Michelson, 1997: 228).
The fact that sexual abuse very often has long-term effects may be due
to a number of factors. First, the child is often confused and frightened
by intense physical feelings that occur together with the abuse, some of
which may be pleasurable but are felt in conjunction with very unpleasant
feelings about the incident. Further, such confused feelings towards an
adult in a caregiving role, and the movement between being a sexual
object and then child again, creates problems in attachment (Goodwin,
1985). Second, the events are often accompanied by high levels of
secrecy, guilt and shame. Perpetrators may often threaten punishment
to ensure secrecy, either threatening the child, someone they love, or

even sometimes threatening to harm themselves. This secrecy prevents
the child from accessing social support from other sources that might
mediate or help them to process the effect of the experiences (Leibowitz
et al, 1999; Yule, Perrin & Smith, 1999). Thus such children often become
isolated and withdrawn, feeling different from their peers but unable to
disclose why this might be.
As a result of all of these complicated dynamics, child victims of
sexual abuse present with a complex variety of symptoms. In the short
and medium term they may respond very similarly to child victims of
rape, with symptoms such as fear, sleeping and eating disturbances,
guilt, school difficulties and irritability. Into adulthood, there are often
long-term relational and sexual problems, such as promiscuity, or
frequent and severe orgasmic problems. Due to the long-term nature
of the stressor, all of these responses can potentially persist throughout
adulthood (Goodwin, 1985; Leibowitz et al, 1999). Such children may
also exhibit self-destructive patterns of behaviour and chronically low
self-esteem. Sexual abuse histories are over-represented in women with
mental health problems in general (Gibb, Chelminski & Zimmerman,
2007; Wilson & Strebel, 2004).
Overall then, it is apparent that Type II traumas can produce varied
patterns of response and that they often produce more long-term or
permanent changes to the individual’s functioning. From a developmental
perspective it is clear that external events that interfere with the ‘normal’
process of development can interfere with developmental tasks and
achievements and, in a sense, skew development in such a way that later
disturbance becomes almost predictable.
Conclusion
Having perhaps presented a somewhat bleak picture of the risks for
traumatisation that South Africa children face, it is important to
reiterate that there are various factors that increase resilience in the face Childhood resilience.
of trauma and serve as protective factors. These include both individual Children’s capacity
and social and community resources. For example, as discussed to recover from
environmental insults or
previously, children’s temperament and intellectual ability may assist
attacks to their wellbeing
them to better process the inevitable traumatic events that most people or development.
will experience over their life-span. Children who have been securely
attached and have caring and helpful parents or caregivers will also
experience less adverse effects in the face of traumatisation. Community
cohesion, a strong culture of human rights and access to information
and assistance are also important supports to those attempting to foster
optimal child development. Although levels of traumatisation remain
unacceptably high in a number of respects, South African policy-makers
and interventionists are also trying to tackle some of these problems
more or less successfully. While the material discussed in this chapter
demonstrates that there is a wealth of research, both international and
local, aimed at helping psychologists to understand and respond to
aspects of childhood trauma in an informed way, the need for ongoing
research, particularly local research, remains pressing.
Specific tasks
➊ Etienne Kabimba, the youngest of a migrant family of five had recently been witness to
his home being burnt to the ground and his father being hacked to death by a group of
South Africans in one of the recent incidents of xenophobic violence that have marred
the social landscape in Johannesburg. Identify both the possible short- and long-term
effects of these traumatic experiences on Etienne’s development.
➋ If you were a policy-maker in the Department of Social Development or the

Department of Health, what proposals would you make in respect of:
2.1 The prevention of childhood trauma in South Africa?
2.2 The treatment of childhood trauma in South Africa?
➌ What are three key differences between Type I and Type II trauma? Consider whether
the distinction between Type I and Type II trauma is useful.
➍ Discuss the possible differential responses (in terms of explanations and sense of
culpability) of children in the following stages of development to the trauma of witnessing
a family member being shocked while fixing some faulty wiring in the home:
4.1 Early childhood
4.2 Middle childhood
4.3 Adolescence
Duncan, N & Rock, B (1997). Children and violence: Quantifying the damage. (In B Rock (ed.)
Spirals of suffering. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 43-68.)
(This text reports on the research conducted on behalf of the Goldstone commission of enquiry into the wellbeing
of South African children, focusing on the previously neglected poor and black majority. This focus gives a useful
overview of the particular traumatic pressures facing children in South Africa and developing countries.)
Eagle, G & Michelson, C (1997). Post-traumatic stress in children: presentation and intervention
guidelines. (In B Rock (ed.) Spirals of suffering. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 227-254.)
(A useful reading for counsellors, practitioners and clinicians in terms of highlighting principles of
intervention and a model for brief term intervention, illustrated by way of case material.)
Eth, S & Pynoos, R S (eds.) (1985). Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Children. Washington: American
Psychiatric Press.
(This important text contains writings of pioneers in child trauma studies. It is essential reading.)
Pynoos, R & Eth, S (1996). Witness to violence: the Child interview. (In M Horowitz (ed.) Essential
Papers on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. New York: New York University Press, 360-373.)
(Important reading at a more advanced level for the counsellor, practician or clinician working with
traumatised children, highlighting critical information that needs to be obtained during initial assess-
ment and how this can be worked within a single session. It also offers some engaging case material.)
Terr, L (1996). Childhood traumas: An outline and overview. (In M Horowitz (ed.) Essential Papers
on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. New York: New York University Press, 61-81.)
(An overview of research and theory on childhood from one of the pioneering professionals in child trauma stud-
ies. In this paper the idea of two distinct types of trauma is introduced and is illustrated by vivid case examples.)
Yule, W & Williams, R (1990). Post-Traumatic Stress reactions in children. Journal of Traumatic
Stress, 3(2), 279-295.
CHAPTER
27
Critical issues in
Derek Hook and Norman Duncan
In this chapter we examine a series of critiques and

interrogations of the field of developmental psychology.
First we consider a brief overview of different historical
conceptualisations of childhood, and then discuss the broader
themes of critical questioning as they are presented in the
first and second editions of Erica Burman’s influential book,
Deconstructing developmental psychology (1994, 2008).
Focus areas are:
1. Adopting a critical perspective
2. Scrutinising some of developmental psychology’s
dominant assumptions
3. The powerful effects of developmental psychology
4. Five basic criticisms of developmental psychology
* Developmental psychology as a means of social
regulation and control
* The ‘normalising’ effects of developmental
psychology
* The ‘blameworthy mother’
* An isolated focus on the individual child
* Blaming the victims
We also provide a critique of developmental psychology as

a discipline.
Adopting a critical perspective

Having had the opportunity to survey some of the key theoretical perspectives
in developmental psychology, it may be opportune at this point to consider
some of the general critiques of the field that have been articulated over
the last three decades or so. One of the most articulate critical voices within
the field is that of the feminist scholar, Erica Burman, whose influential
publications, Deconstructing Developmental Psychology (1994, 2008) and
Developments: Child, Image and Nation (2008) are the sources of many of
the ideas examined in this chapter. The ideas of two other critical theorists,
namely Mark Poster and Nicholas Rose are also briefly examined.
Arguably, Poster’s seminal work, Critical Theory of the Family (1988) and
Rose’s text, Governing the Soul: the Shaping the Private Self (1991) have had
an important impact on psychology and have provided important building
blocks for the development of a more critical developmental psychology.
Some of the key ideas on human development that will be examined in
this chapter include the notions of childhood, the innocent child, the conflict-
laden adolescent, the unchanging family and the consistently benevolent family.
This examination will be followed by an exploration of the effects of various
developmental psychology assumptions and theoretical perspectives.
Scrutinising some of developmental psychology’s

dominant assumptions
‘Inventing’ the child and childhood ‘innocence’
There are few assumptions that more naturally attach to the study of
developmental psychology than that of the supposedly fundamental
qualitative differences between the child and the adult. Surprising as
it may seem, however, the category and the understanding of the child
as qualitatively different from the adult is, historically, relatively new.
According to the French historian, Philippe Ariès (1962/1999), it was
not until the 16th century that European society, for example, accorded
any special status to children. Before that, they were simply considered
smaller, less intelligent and weaker versions of adults. Indeed, it appears
that size was the most salient difference in medieval depictions of adults
and children, with the latter typically viewed, treated and even dressed in
the same way as their adult counterparts. An examination of 12th-century
European art will reveal that children during that period were invariably
portrayed as miniature adults, complete with adult-like facial features and
postures (Ariès, 1962, 1999). Similarly, when depicted naked, the bodies
of children were frequently shown to possess the musculature of adults
(Ariès, 1962, 1999).
These types of representations of the child led Ariès (1962, 1999: 31) to
assert that, at this point in history, ‘representation did not know childhood’.
Differently stated, at this point, the image of childhood as we currently know
it had, in fact, no reality. Below is a later elaboration by Ariès of this idea:
In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not
to suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised.
The idea of childhood is not to be confused with affection for
children: it corresponds to an awareness of the particular nature
of childhood ... which distinguishes the child from the adult ... In
medieval society, this awareness was lacking … Language did not
give the word ‘child’ the restricted meaning we give it today …
The infant who was too fragile as yet to take part in the life of
adults simply ‘did not count’ (Ariès, 1973: 125).
Of course, this construction of what we consider to be childhood was

not based solely on the representation of children’s appearance. Ariès
Critical issues in developmental psychology 565
(1962;1999) and Poster (1988) point out that because children were not
viewed as significantly different from adults in European society prior to
1600, they were expected, when physically able, to work long hours and
to enjoy many of the same pleasures as adults. For this reason, children
at the time were frequently included in adult conversation, jokes and
entertainment (Craig, 1996; Poster, 1988). This is in sharp contrast to
current practices in which every effort is made to ‘protect’ the child from
the ‘realities’ and ‘excesses’ of the adult world.
Importantly too, in early Europe, children were not thought to share
the strong emotional bonds with their parents that they are assumed to in
contemporary society (Poster, 1988). Furthermore, rather than possessing
more rights and privileges than adults—as it seems is overwhelmingly the
case in the modern world—children, prior to the 17th century, were in
certain respects considered significantly less important than adults. To give
an indication of this sometimes inferior status of the child, Ariès (1962,
reprinted in 1999) notes that if children died before an arbitrary age they
would be buried in graves that were not even marked by a tombstone.
By the 17th century, and more so after the 18th century, childhood had
begun to be thought of as a distinct category of humanity. Moreover (and
perhaps partly inspired by the way in which the Christ-child was frequently
depicted during this period), childhood was now increasingly considered to
be a period of innocence. From this point onwards children were less often
seen as anonymous members of a clan or community and more frequently as
an identifiable sub-group located within families. It was not until the 1800s,
however, that this attitude became popularised and that children began to
be treated as persons with a special status of their own (Poster, 1988).
Hendrik (1990) suggests that the idea of children as dependent and
of childhood as a period of innocence and helplessness emerged as a
largely ideological position. He suggests that it may be politically linked to
initiatives for channelling children into the classrooms of mass education
as a means of controlling social groups capable of political insurrection
and rebellion within a given social order. Constructions of the child as
ignorant and in need of education and socialisation furthered these
objectives by keeping children in schools. Here they could be morally
educated and kept away from social activities that could disrupt the social
order (Hendrik, 1990). The British government’s Education Act of 1870,
which made schooling compulsory for all, could be seen as an example of
this kind of political agenda.
Many of Hendrik’s (1990) views might be considered radical, and
some may be countered by the suggestion that universal education, for
example, may well be in the interests of the public good, and therefore
that current constructions are in society’s best interests. Nevertheless, he
does make some important points. For example, the following much-cited
observation regarding the age of conscription gives some force to Hendrik’s
(1990) contention that the predominant constructions of children are used
primarily to control them and regulate their behaviour. In many western
countries, young men of 16 are considered too young to vote or marry
without permission but are considered old enough to kill or be killed for
their country.
The sexuality of the child across time and geographic context

Constructions of One of the easiest ways to demonstrate how understandings of childhood
childhood.Constructions have changed over the course of history and how these differ from one
of childhood change not geographic context to another is to understand how children are viewed
only across time periods
in relation to sexuality and its related practices.
but also across geographic
contexts within the same In pre-industrial Western Europe, sex and sexuality were not kept away
time period. from children. Indeed, amongst the aristocracy childhood masturbation
and imitation of adult sex acts were, if not encouraged, viewed with amused
indulgence. Furthermore, it was also not at all unusual for an older man
to marry a girl 12 or 13 years of age, as Shakespeare did, for example. We
know of course that marriages that involve children are strongly proscribed
in most Western contexts today. However, while this is the case, as Bunting
(2005) and the International Women’s Health Coalition (2008) report,
marriages involving children as young as 13 are currently not uncommon in
places such as Bangladesh, Mali, Niger and northern Nigeria. This confirms
the observation that ‘constructions’ of childhood change not only across time
periods but even across geographic locations within the same time period.
With the establishment of the bourgeois family unit, however,
childhood sexuality became increasingly controlled, repressed and elided
(Poster, 1988).
Dominant constructions of adolescence in developmental

psychology
Extant dominant constructions of adolescence represent another range of
developmental assumptions that have also been the subject of consistent
critique in recent years. Adolescence is generally defined as the period that
commences with puberty and ends with the taking on of an adult identity.
For much of developmental psychology’s history, this sub-discipline has
traditionally reinforced the idea that adolescence is a period of emotional
and moral turbulence and angst. Indeed, G Stanley Hall, one of the
founding figures in developmental psychology described the period of
Storm-and-stress view. adolescence as a period of sturm und drang (storm and stress). However, in
An understanding of recent years various writers have questioned whether this period is in fact
adolescence that sees this always characterised by turbulence and whether it is experienced similarly
as a time of particular
across differing social contexts (Shefer, 2008).
turbulence, conflict and
mood swings.
Shefer (2008: 86) argues that adolescence is not necessarily turbulent
and that there ‘may not be one universal experience of adolescence, but
rather that this stage may take different forms across different cultures ...
and for different individuals’. Indeed, in some contexts, adolescence may
not even constitute a distinctive developmental period.
Changing families
Just as we can question our assumptions of what it means to be an adoles-
cent or an adult, we can interrogate our assumptions about the family.
Mainstream developmental psychology textbooks, especially those
published prior to the 1980s, frequently dealt with families as though they
were timeless ‘units’, similar across all contexts. Indeed, traditionally the
‘nuclear family’ has been represented as the typical and desired family type,
with all deviations from this type seen as atypical and less than ideal.
There is a huge amount of

historical variation in what
constitutes a ‘normative’
family. What, in your
opinion, is an ordinary
size family in South Africa?
What are ordinary ages
for parents, and so on?
However, as Poster (1988) observes, the typical nuclear family is The family is not
not timeless. Indeed, in his analysis of the family as one of the key timeless. The family as an
contexts of human development, he identifies at least four dominant institution is not timeless.
Through the centuries it
family types that have developed in Western Europe since the 16th
has undergone various
century, namely: the peasant family type of the 16th and 17th centuries, profound changes.
the aristocratic family type of the 16th and 17th centuries, the working-
class family type of the early industrial period and the bourgeois family
type of the mid-19th century and later. Furthermore, he points out that
each of these family types had distinct advantages and disadvantages
for human development. Very importantly too, he observes that the
dominant family form represented in 20th century and contemporary
developmental psychology texts, namely the nuclear family, is fre-
quently not as conducive to optimal human development as it is typically
held to be. As he puts it, inasmuch as the modern nuclear family is
frequently held to be the healthiest and safest place for the individual
in a hostile world, it is also responsible for ‘oppressing women, abusing
children, spreading neurosis and preventing community’ (Poster,
1988: ix). This, he argues, is largely due to the interaction between
the specific emotional structure of the modern nuclear family and the
society in which it is located. As he puts it:
Although the [nuclear] family provides many benefits, it

also sustains certain forms of oppression … The domination
of women and especially children, the limited sources of
identification for children, the limited sources of love objects
for all family members … the peculiar combination of total
parental authority and intense love for children, the absence
of community dependence and sociability—all these structural
features of the … family produce emotional effects which
undermine the mutual recognition of people in the process
of regulating their own affairs. These are contradictions in
the structure of the family, dependent on hierarchies of age
and sex, which enter into the wider social conflicts of today
(Poster, 1988: 202).
AIDS orphans and child-headed

households in South Africa
The changing shape of families and the Along with the high number of adults
changing responsibilities of children are dying from AIDS, and reduced capacity of
brought into dramatic perspective by communities to support and care for
the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. children, is a changing family structure
According to a recent report published and care-giving patterns where the burden
by AIDS Foundation South Africa (2008), of care falls on those who have the least
the burden of HIV/AIDS on South African capacity to provide parenting, support and
society is enormous: care for the affected children, ie the elderly
and the young. Hence the disturbing
South Africa has the sixth scenarios of grandparent-headed
highest prevalence of HIV in the world, households and adolescent/child/sibling-
with 18.8% of the population estimated to headed households (NMCF, 2001: 5).
be infected.
PHOTO: iAFRIKA PHOTOS
The UNAIDS 2006 Global Some of the results of this

Report estimated that crisis are that the social, men-
320 000 people died of AIDS tal, and emotional needs of
related [illnesses] during children remain unmet; like-
2005. South Africa is wise children lack a protective
regarded as having the most social environment in which
severe HIV epidemic in the to grow up. A key problem is
world (n. p.) the deprivation of parental
love, guidance, support and
One of the tragic effects protection; similarly the emo-
of AIDS is the vast number of tional trauma associated
Child activist Nkosi Johnson did
children orphaned by the much to sensitise the world to the
with parental loss is often
disease. According to the AIDS plight of child HIV/AIDS sufferers. not addressed. Growing up
Foundation South Africa He died of AIDS in 2001. in an environment where
(2008), as of the end of 2005, rules and values are not
there were 1.2 million AIDS orphans in consistently applied and in the
South Africa. absence of a positive role model, may
The Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund lead children to adopt less-than-
(NMCF) (2001: 13) suggests that the desirable values. These problems
extended family structure has traditionally are further compounded by the
operated as a primary support mechanism challenges faced by child ‘heads of
in African societies—‘a social safety net for families’ in having to cope with adult
children that has remained resilient over responsibilities (like becoming the
the years’. However, the capacity of household provider) at an age when
communities and households to cope has they are not emotionally mature.
been undermined by the growing number Food security has been identified as
of AIDS orphans. The extended family as a the foremost problem, this being
social support network is also being the first thing that AIDS-orphaned
undermined by a range of factors, such children ask for whenever they seek
as social upheavals, rapid urbanisation, help. The NMCF report quotes a
poverty and overstretched resources: UNICEF researcher who claims that >>
<<
AIDS orphans are at greater risk of * begging for food on a daily basis,
malnutrition, illness, abuse and sexual * resorting to prostitution, at ages as
exploitation than children orphaned by young as eight to 10 years (NMCF,
other causes. They grapple with the 2001: 26).
stigma and discrimination so often
associated with AIDS, which can even Stigmatisation is still a huge problem:
deprive them of basic social services
and education (NMCF, 2001: 15). The community often isolates [AIDS
orphans] and they respond by isolating
In addition to the responsibilities of having themselves from the community; parents
to take care of their siblings, the problems discourage their children from playing
faced by orphan heads of households with kids from child-headed families
include: because they are believed to also have
AIDS; the children who go to school tell
* a shortage of income to fulfil basic us that their friends don’t want to play
needs, including food and clothing, with them as they might infect them
* obstacles to their and their siblings’ (NMCF, 2001: 21).
attendance at school, including inability
to pay school fees and to purchase As one child reported:
school materials and uniforms,
stigmatisation and rejection by My teacher said I will also die of AIDS;
community members, neighbours talk bad about us - saying our
* lack of access to health care, and house is the AIDS house (NMCF, 2001: 22).
* lack of moral support (NMCF, 2001: 15).
AIDS orphans have to deal with the
Such children are highly vulnerable to phys- humiliation of begging for food from
ical and sexual abuse by neighbours and neighbours, and the frustration of being
relatives, and to poor health status due to unsuccessful. This is the report of another
the likelihood of being drawn into prostitu- respondent in the study:
tion and criminal acts as a means of
survival. Many AIDS orphans often appear I feel bad because when there is no food
helpless and unable to think of ways of my younger brothers and sisters look at
fending for themselves, tending instead to me and that worries me; at times I travel
look up to the child head to ‘make a plan’, all the way to my aunt to ask for food
especially in terms of providing food. Some and … find nothing - it frustrates me
survival strategies include: even more to think that I still have to tell
the others that I went to my aunt for
* child heads performing casual or ‘piece’ nothing (NMCF, 2001: 22).
work (washing cars, polishing shoes,
selling vegetables) in order to support Many of these children speak about
their siblings, being ridiculed by teachers and other
* running errands for sympathetic children because they do not have school
neighbours, uniforms or because their parents have
* attending church and then asking the died of AIDS. In fact, according to the
pastor for food, NMCF (2001) Report, many claim that
* in the case of teenage girls, attempting school authorities insisted on them paying
to commit themselves to early school fees, even though their situation
marriages in order to survive, and may be well known to the teachers.
The powerful effects of developmental

psychology
What we wish to emphasise in this chapter is that the concepts and theories
generated in developmental psychology have an impact on how individu-
als live their lives, are raised and treated, how they think of themselves,
how they socialise their children and how they seek to influence their
world. Furthermore, developmental psychology, like our understanding
of the child, childhood, adolescence and the family, is saturated with social
and political meanings that reflect our times and beliefs rather than being
timeless and universal.
We should constantly be aware of the manner in which developmental
psychology and its assumptions are employed as categories of knowledge
and interventions. Importantly, we should constantly be aware of whose
interests this knowledge and interventions serve.
Imposing adult categories of experience

onto how we understand children
We have emphasised how historically relative Chapter 15). For example, children tend to
our present-day notions of childhood are, be more egocentric in their thinking, and
and we have considered the effects of are less able to concentrate on more than
‘constructing’ childhood as a qualitatively one dimension of a problem at a time
different concept from adulthood. It is (Piaget, 1926). Likewise, it would seem that
important also to be aware of the opposite children have less difficulty in believing in
tendency, that of assuming too much of a simi- imaginary worlds, friends and figures, which
larity between adults and children. Whereas corroborates the popular notion that
emphasis on the difference between adults children have more active imaginations than
and children seems the far more dominant adults. Children also appear to make moral
tendency in developmental psychological decisions on a different level to that of most
thinking, it is important also not to interpret adults (see Chapter 19 on Kohlberg and
childhood on the basis of adult experience. moral reasoning).
We should be aware that the way we experi- Piaget’s belief in the qualitative
ence the world now may be radically difference between the cognitive abilities of
different from how we experienced the world adults and children should be
as toddlers. For instance, we should be aware understandable, especially since language
of the tendency to project adult categories of use is such a large part of what we typically
experience and understanding onto the consider to be cognition. Children have
phenomenological world of the child. had a far shorter exposure to spoken
Piaget (1926), for example, held firmly to language and hence are far less competent
the belief that in many ways children were language users. This fact, in Vygotsky’s
qualitatively different to adults. For him the view (1962), impacts dramatically on the
difference was principally in the realm ability of children to have, store and make
of cognition (those psychological facets of active use of memories. Similarly, the more
intelligence, memory, language use, and so competent one is in language use, the
on). In fact he provided powerful evidence more one can enquire into what one does
that children think and reason in not understand—one has a better-
qualitatively different ways from adults (see equipped ‘tool-box’ for making sense of >>
<<
the world. Of course the paradox here is world are probably very blurred
that children, for the most part, are so and incoherent).
dramatically superior to adults in the speed In this way the world of the child, like
at which they acquire a new language. its imagination and its various cognitive
The importance of emphasising these abilities, seems to be quite different from
differences is to suggest that certain very that of the adult. It is important to bear
basic concepts that seem so innate and so this in mind, not so that we can accentuate
intrinsic to us need in fact to be learnt. gratuitously the qualitative difference
These are concepts such as the notion of
PHO TO : CHA JO HNSTON

having a self, being an ‘I’ separate from the
outside world, and having a gender. Much
of what we assume to be ‘pre-packaged’
often needs painstakingly to be learnt.
We would also have to grant that on the
phenomenological level (the level of an
individual’s received sensations and
experiences) being physically smaller leads
to a very different exposure to the world. We should be aware of assuming that
children and infants perceive and understand
Not being able to walk, crawl or run would the world in the same way that adults do.
obviously limit the exploratory abilities of a
child—what they are able to do, the between children and adults, but rather so
various forms of stimuli they may be that we can guard against assuming certain
exposed to, and so on. Likewise, the social similarities in trying to understand what it
world responds very differently to you if means to be an infant, a toddler, and a
you are in the body of a child or a baby. child. In fostering critical skills in our
Moreover, the senses of a child are not approach to developmental psychology it
always the same as that of an adult. will be useful both to emphasise similarities
Sometimes they are sharper and more between adults and children (for instance,
accurate (children often have better in arguing that children are often actively
eyesight than their parents); at other times disempowered in modern society), and to
their senses are not as accurate (it takes a emphasise differences in order to avoid
newborn infant some time to adjust to projecting adult categories of experience
bifocal vision and its earliest images of the onto children.
Five basic criticisms of developmental psychology

Burman (1994) has drawn together a number of diverse critical perspectives
on developmental psychology and arranged them into five general themes.
We shall examine each of these in turn.
Developmental psychology as a means of social regulation

and control
It is easy to underestimate developmental psychology’s influence on people
and institutions. We should be under no illusion however:
Developmental psychology, more than any other variety of psychol-

ogy, has a powerful impact on our everyday lives and ways of think-
ing about ourselves. Its effects are so great that they are often almost
imperceptible, taken-for-granted features about our expectations of

ourselves, others, parents, children and families … (Burman, 1994: 2).
Developmental psychology has participated in social initiatives

that are explicitly concerned with the comparison, regulation and
control of people and societies (Burman, 1994). In fact, more generally,
developmental psychology can barely be separated from the establish-
ment of tools of mental assessment and psychometric procedures that
aim to classify abilities and develop norms by which people may be
effectively categorised and regulated. In the South African context it
has been shown that developmental psychology, especially in the area of
testing, has, historically, been of significant value to the state’s attempts
to regulate people and society. Available studies suggest that, from its
establishment in the early twentieth century, South African psychology
exhibited a near-obsession with the study and measurement of intellectual
abilities. This preoccupation was closely linked to proving the existence of
racial differences in intellectual ability and, more specifically, the putative
‘inferiority’ of people of colour in relation to whites. The foundations for
this focus, or ‘fixation’, on racial differences in intellectual ability were laid
just prior to the 1920s with the research of the South African psychologist,
Charles Templeton Loram (1917). During the late 1910s, Loram
administered a series of intelligence tests to Asian, white and African
school children in an attempt to establish the extent of racial differences in
childhood intelligence. Based on his fundamentally specious research, he
argued that African children were, as he put it, ‘much less efficient’ and
‘much slower in their thinking’ than the other children tested (in Louw &
Foster, 1991: 62). This type of research was later pursued by many South
African psychologists, and subsequently used with pernicious effect by the
former National Party government. In effect, this research provided this
government with an important means of legitimising its policies of racial
separatism and apartheid.
Also important to note, as Dubow (1995) so very cogently argues, is
that mental testing in South Africa during the early twentieth century
played an important surveillance function, aimed at identifying those
whites whose functioning and positions in society would compromise the
narrative of white superiority. Thus, much of this research was also used
to develop interventions aimed at drawing ‘deviant’ white groups (such as
poor and illiterate whites) from the margins into mainstream privileged
white society, largely so as to distance them from the ‘inferiorised’ black
‘other’ and to entrench notions of white superiority (Dubow, 1995).
Of course this is not to suggest that testing and developmental psychology,
more generally, are fundamentally and irrevocably morally dubious; it is
merely to suggest that the knowledge generated by developmental psychology
is often put to powerful use in the regulation of populations, and that its useful
prescriptions, like its errors, reverberate ‘beyond the theory ... as well as
beyond the pages of child advice magazines and toyshops’ (Burman, 1994: 6).
Thus, we should not underestimate the power or the effects of developmental
psychology. Moreover, we should maintain wherever possible a strong critical
and ethical awareness of the potential impact of its repercussions.
The power of psychology
As early as 1953 Eysenck was publishing officer status, is determined by [such

his concerns regarding how regulative the methods and theories] ... our new rulers,
industries of psychology were proving to the upper ranks of the Civil Service, are
be in modern society. Consider the views being selected by ‘new type’ selection
he presents here, and their ramifications for methods; vocational guidance and
the critique of developmental psychology: occupational selection are affecting the
everyday working lives of thousands ...
In one way or another almost everyone [These theories and methods] ... some
has come up against the mixed blessings of them carried out by Government
which applied psychology bestows on agencies ... help to lay the foundations
humanity. Decisions regarding the child’s for legislation and policy-making ... Even
future education are being made on the old age is not safe from the ... scrutiny
basis of intelligence tests applied at the or [psychologists]; the intellectual and
tender age of eleven or twelve; indeed emotional development of old people is
the whole modern system of education is being studied more and more intensely,
based on [developmental] psychological and action based on the results. This
discoveries and theories that are brief and incomplete survey shows to
relatively recent. The soldier’s allocation what extent psychology is already
to a particular arm or trade inside the taking part in transforming our lives ...
service, as well as his advancement to (Eysenck, 1953: 7-8).
Influenced by the work of Foucault, Nikolas Rose (1991) has also written
extensively about the important ways in which individual psychology
contributes to the classification and surveillance of individuals. He argues
that, in order to control and regulate potentially unruly, wayward or
unproductive social elements, ‘disciplinary societies’ (Foucault, 1977)
developed a form of monitoring, and psychology helped to provide this by
producing developmental norms.
Selecting the war: The use and misuse

of IQ tests in the military
Just as Eysenck (1953) was critical of the crucial test of practical application by the
regulative functioning of applied psychology American Army during the First World
within society, he also gave critical attention War; their triumphant success there
to the usefulness of intelligence testing: established psychology once and for all as
an indispensable adjunct to all selection
The new scientific discoveries of Binet, procedures. It may be of interest to quote
Spearman, and Stern in the field of the directive setting out the tasks which the
intelligence testing were put to the Army authorities expected the intelligence
>>
<<
test to perform. The test was to designate methods to fields where they may not be
and select men whose superior intelligence appropriate (Eysenck, 1953: 8-9).
indicated the desirability of advancement
for special assignment; to select and This quote is interesting in that it reveals
recommend for ‘developmental battalions’ the indispensable use of psychology in the
such men as were so inferior intellectually as making of armies (and, for that matter,
to be unsuited for regular military training; the making of war). It also suggests how
to enable officers to build up organizations of these tests may go wrong and may lead,
uniform mental strength, in accordance with through misapplication and misuse, to the
definitive specifications concerning mental discarding of those people who might have
requirements; to select men for various types been suitable for a given job and to the
of military duty or for special assignments; retention of those who may be unsuitable.
to eliminate men whose intelligence was so This example also suggests how such tests
inferior as to make it impossible to use them may implicitly be used to separate upper
at all ... The very success of the intelligence and lower classes across a division of labour
test in this difficult assignment became the between the more dangerous and more
reason for subsequent disappointment. menial jobs, on the one hand, and those
Thousands of enthusiasts ... eager to cash that are safer and more desirable on the
in on the new fad, invaded the field and other (it would be interesting to question
tried to apply the Army testing procedures whether these tests were not
in industrial and commercial institutions ... at some level implicitly selecting on the
Uncritical enthusiasts, fired by the conviction basis of class rather than on the basis of
of righteousness given them by some ‘pure’ intelligence).
‘system’ or other, are trying to extend these
The ‘normalising’ effects of developmental pscyhology

Developmental norm.
A standard based upon Development and its relationship to abnormality
the average abilities or
As Rose (1991) notes, a developmental norm was a standard based upon
performances of children
of a specified age. the average abilities or performances of children at a certain age. Such
See norms. norms not only presented a picture of what was normal for children
at a particular age, they also enabled the ‘normality’ of any child to be
Norms. Averages of assessed according to this standard (Rose, 1991). Children could now
growth, development, be rated and assessed through all manner of detailed developmental
work-rate or various norms that could grade their performance between the poles of ‘normal’
other abilities observed
and ‘abnormal’. It is this attention to what is the ‘normal’, and to the
across populations.
It is important to be normalisation of children, that made ‘abnormality’ possible, that is,
aware of the difference ‘abnormality’ in the sense of a coherent category or conceptualisation of
between statistical norms people (Burman, 1994).
(a mathematical average The danger of the scientific category of ‘normal’ and its correlate
drawn from a sample of ‘abnormal’ is that they become very loaded terms. Certain critics suggest
a population) and the that it is personally damaging to be labelled ‘abnormal’, and that such
evaluative implications
labelling practices lead to social stigmatisation (cf. Masson, 1992). In effect,
in talk related to norms
(implications of that this language is doing little more than replacing notions of good/bad and
which is ideal, right/shameful with the new categories of normal/abnormal. Burman
‘normal’, ‘natural’, or (1994) suggests that this practice allows for the scientific legitimating of
socially desirable). practices of social regulation.
Burman (1994) contends that what is especially problematic about Normalisation.

the normalising standards of developmental psychology is that the moral The attempt, through
evaluation underlying them is rendered visible and incontrovertible typically interventionist,
curative, rehabilitative,
through the apparent impartiality of statistical description and norms.
punitive or educational
Administration through the power of institutions can hence enforce means, to make the
statistical description as moral-political prescription: ‘abnormal’ subject
conform more closely to
Normative descriptions provided by developmental psychology slip the norms of a population
into naturalised prescriptions. Developmental psychology makes or society.
claims to be scientific. Its use of evolutionary assumptions to link
the social to the biological provides a key cultural area in which
evolutionary and biologist ideas are legitimized. Closely associated
with its technologies and its guiding preoccupations has been its use
to classify and stratify individuals, groups and populations so as to
maintain class, gender and racial oppression (Burman, 1994: 4).
The political value of ‘normality’
According to Eysenck (1953: 177), ideal, whether it be ideally high intelligence,

‘normality is a term which recurs with good looks, or uninterrupted health. But the
disturbing frequency in the writings of ideal norm may be one which is statistically
psychologists’. The reason for Eysenck’s very infrequent, or which is not found at all
concern here is that there is no single in the population examined.
accepted definition of the term. There Confusion between these two uses of the
are, however, at least two conceptions of term is ... common, particularly with respect
‘normality’ that may be implied by the term: to mental health. When the psychoanalyst
declares that no one is normal, [he or she
We may mean by normal that which has]... in mind the ideal concept of normality
characterises the conduct of the majority of (Eysenck, 1953: 178).
people; this is what we may call the statistical
definition of normality … This usage of the The socially evaluative use of the term
term is perfectly clear, straightforward and ‘normality’ is more often than not a false
intelligible. It does however present certain exploitation of a neutral, scientific and
difficulties when we consider certain traits statistical description. The evaluative function
such as intelligence, or beauty or health of the term—the way it is used to designate
… This ambiguity of the term comes out social ideals—becomes apparent in the
strongest in relation to health. The normal seeming incongruence of notions like that of
person is the one who has an average ‘abnormal beauty’ or ‘abnormal intelligence’.
number of illnesses and fractures … The Eysenck extends this argument by
person who is completely healthy and lives to specifying a third implication of normality
a ripe old age, without any kind of physical (which is of particular relevance to psycho-
disease, would be exceedingly abnormal logical descriptions): the conflation of
from this point of view ... This is not a usual ‘normal’ with the concept of the ‘natural’:
method of looking at health or beauty or
intelligence. We tend to substitute for the We [often] call normal that which we consider
statistical norm an ideal norm. We call a to be natural. Thus ... [some might] consider
person normal the more [they] approach the it ‘normal’ for the male to be dominant >>
<<
and the female to be submissive; we consider why one would want to continue using
heterosexual attraction ‘normal’, homosexual the term ‘normality’ to refer to statistical
attraction ‘abnormal’. [One might] hold averages, especially since its various
these views even though it could be shown implications of the ideal, or of the natural,
that in some communities, among the do not necessarily hold in this context.
ancient Greeks, say, homosexuality was The statistical average is not ideal, nor
statistically more frequent than hetero- need it be natural (as far as that term is
sexuality, or that among some nations, say even relevant here). Indeed, we should
the ancient Egyptians, women tended to be also be cautious of using the notion of
more aggressive and males more submissive the statistical average because to a large
(Eysenck, 1953: 178). extent it retains the evaluative implications
of ‘the normal’. Think of the value
Eysenck’s examples are revealing—not judgement implied, for example,
only of the fact that certain politically by being categorised as ‘well below
implicated values (such as chauvinism average intelligence’.
and homophobia) are often embedded Perhaps Eysenck’s most important point
in the designations of what is ‘normal’ or here is that socio-political ideals often
‘natural’—but also of how these values masquerade as ‘norms’; that when we call
change historically. Few academics today something ‘normal’ we are making a politi-
would venture such propositions as in cally loaded statement (one thoroughly
the above paragraph; yet at the time of invested with social values), rather than a
Eysenck’s writing neither seemed to be value-neutral objective statement. Eysenck
particularly controversial, so much so that (1953: 189) ends his commentary by
he thought to use them as examples of calling our attention to the fact that ‘no
how we use ‘normal’ to designate what ... universal norms of behaviour exist’. He
is in fact supposedly natural. Clearly substantiates this fact with reference to
Eysenck’s attempt here is to show us that Kinsey’s massive study of American sexual-
we frequently use the term ‘normal’ to ity. Kinsey reported such great diversity
refer to something that we consider and conflict of opinions (related to topics
to be somehow biologically or essentially such as masturbation, pre- and extramarital
innate, something natural. What his intercourse, the illicitness of certain sexual
example shows us is that what is taken acts, etc) across areas, age groups and
to be normal, just as what is taken to be communities that no overarching norms
natural, changes over time, and therefore could be found. He quotes Kinsey’s findings
supposed descriptions of normality to substantiate his conclusion:
should be seen as neither universal nor
a-historical. It is clear that assertions of The data now available show that patterns of
universal and a-historical verity are implicit sexual behaviour may be strikingly different
in aligning the supposed ‘norm’ with an for the different social levels that exist in
understanding of what is natural. the same city or town, and sometimes
The point is that not only do so- in immediately adjacent sections of the single
called norms possess an evaluative and community. The data show that divergences
denigratory function, they often take on in sexual patterns of such social groups may
the form of dominant social prejudices, be as great as those which anthropologists
which try to present themselves as natural have found between the sexual patterns of
and universally applicable. Given these different... groups in remote parts of the
problems, it is difficult to understand world (Kinsey, cited in Eysenck, 1953: 184).
The ‘colonialism’ of normalisation

The problem with norms becomes even more evident when one
considers their origins. Since most developmental psychology research
originates in the United States of America, it is not surprising that
most of these developmental psychology norms have been strongly
influenced by American values. Burman (1994) provides the example
of the cultural value placed on maturity and individual autonomy
within mainstream society in the United States (especially as compared
to developing contexts). This value, she indicates, has produced a
research bias in which variations in child-rearing practices suggest that
American children have more secure attachments than, for example,
African children. Such norms necessarily reflect poorly on children
in other countries with different social and ideological values. Two
other examples are to be found in what are considered ‘developmental
problems’ for American developmental psychology, namely ‘child-
hood obesity’ and ‘teenage pregnancy’. Burman (1994) points out that
while these phenomena have largely been constructed as significant
problems in North America, they are not necessarily construed as
significant problems in the majority world where most children are
born to mothers under 20 (and as such teenage motherhood is not
so much a problem as a natural or commonly occurring event) and
where most of the world is starving and struggling to survive (hence
invalidating the universality of the problem of ‘childhood obesity’).
Normality and power

Rose (1991) trenchantly amplifies these foregoing critiques by Burman.
He argues that our constructions of what is ‘normal’ development are
not simply a function of our cultural experiences, but also of the various
claims made by developmental psychology ‘experts’ on the basis of a
particular type of scientific ideas that have elaborated a knowledge of
normality that is largely based on studies of groups deemed to exhibit
signs of ‘pathology’:
It is around pathological children—the troublesome, the

recalcitrant, the delinquent—that conceptions of normality have
taken shape. It is not that a knowledge of the normal course of
development of the child has enabled experts to become more
skilled at identifying those unfortunate children who are in
some way abnormal. Rather, expert notions of normality are
extrapolated from our attention to those children who worry the
courts, teachers, doctors and parents (Rose, 1991: 131).
Thus, Rose (1991) not only calls into question the reliability of
norms, in that norms are largely generated around the study of the
apparently ‘abnormal’, he also argues that they are almost always
developed as part of the agenda of social control, and that they are
inseparably attached to relations of domination and the maintenance
of hegemony within societies.
Norms and clinical treatment:

The prospects of damage
Eysenck examines the dangers of using very select set of social values above and
norms in applied contexts, as in psycho- beyond all others. That is to say, he is
logy. He notes that what essentially occurs wary of how the norms adopted by the
is that select persons (typically advantaged mental health professions may champion
white males): the values only of those in dominant social
positions. Moreover, he is wary of the
… lay down the law, or try to ... help people damage that this perpetuation may cause.
from [historically disadvantaged] ... classes ... If a patient is seeking a psychotherapist’s
In clinical practice ... therapy ... and help in help because of falling short in some way
the sexual sphere are based essentially upon of a social ‘norm’—say, for example, that
concepts of marriage and sexual conduct of ‘normal sexuality’—then any treatment
which agree with the norms obtaining among schedule that, however subtly, reiterates
the [dominant or controlling classes] ... from this ‘abnormality’ will be damaging,
which the practitioner comes, but which may (Consider here that homosexuality used to
be quite inappropriate to the norms of the be considered psychopathological for this
... person to whom [help] ... is being given very reason.) Such treatment will in effect
(Eysenck, 1953: 190). reinforce and perpetuate the very social
problem (in this case homophobia) that
Although Eysenck uses the example had caused the problem in the first place.
here of sexual norms, the value of his In short, notions of ‘normality’, once
comments should not, obviously, be carried into the sphere of something like
restricted to this context alone. He is wary clinical psychology, can in fact be
here of the problem of perpetuating one actively damaging.
The ‘blameworthy mother’

The 'blameworthy' Feminist and critical perspectives on human development (see for example
mother. In contemporary Burman, 1994, 2008; Poster, 1988) suggest that, in many ways, mothers
society, mothers frequently may be replacing children as the primary focus for developmental
have to shoulder the
psychological investigation, at least in terms of the regulation of develop-
blame for all types of
problems experienced
ment. In this regard, Burman (1994: 3-4) observes:
by their children.
It is the adequacy of mothering that developmental psychology is
called upon to regulate … and the continuity with which this issue
crops up across the range of topics in developmental psychology
is a manifestation of the widespread and routine subjection of
women to the developmental psychology gaze.
Moreover, mothers frequently become the scapegoats for any

developmental problems; they are the ones seen as bearing almost full
responsibility for the healthy development of children. The notion
of the ‘bad mother’ is important here. Indeed, there is no lack of
traditional developmental theory that implies that ‘a woman’s place
One of the key criticisms

of developmental
psychology centres on
‘mother blaming’, the
tendency to hold the
mother responsible for a
wide variety of supposed
developmental deficits.
is in the home’ and that children suffer if they are not in the full-time
care of their mothers (Burman, 1994; Poster, 1988). Similarly popular
in developmental psychology literature is the notion that children who
have personal and behavioural problems in their later lives have been
inadequately mothered.
Not only does this mean that mothers (women) are held more
‘responsible’ for the healthy upbringing of children than fathers (men),
it also means that they are frequently held responsible for developmental
problems which in many instances stem from contextual problems beyond
their control, such as poverty and the resultant problems of under-nutrition.
As Singer (1992: 99) suggests, while women are frequently excluded
from full participation in the world they are inevitably held accountable
for the impingements emanating from the world beyond the family on
their children. In this regard, Richter & Griesel (1994) observe that while
mothers are frequently blamed for child malnutrition because of the early
termination of breast-feeding or because they purportedly lack a sufficiently
strong attachment relationship with their children, in reality, malnutrition
is over-determined by poverty and associated social conditions.
Blaming the working mother

For much of its history, developmental psychology research largely
conformed to dominant familial and patriarchal assumptions of the family
as a unit containing a male breadwinner and female child carer (Burman,
1994; Poster, 1988). Almost by definition then, working mothers have
historically been constructed as not being ‘good’ mothers. Developmental
psychology contains many such assumptions.
Burman (1994: 82), commenting on the work of Bowlby, states that
basically ‘any woman who asserts her right to have an existence indepen-
dent of her child is dismissed as abandoning her, with a clear dichotomy
set up between women who put childcare first and those who will not.’
The developmental psychology notion of ‘maternal deprivation’ works
in the same way. Winnicott (particularly with his concept of the ‘good-
enough mother’) and Bowlby made various bold pronouncements in
respect of women’s economic and social roles. Indeed, both imposed near-
impossible demands on women, arguing that the conscientious mother
needs to be available and attentive to her children, or risk producing
far-reaching ill-effects in her children (Burman, 1994).
Closely linked to these kinds of understanding of motherhood are
very particular definitions of femininity, definitions which characterise
motherhood as women’s ultimate fulfilment, something they should
necessarily pursue at all costs. Idealising motherhood and making the
primary caregiver gendered in this way perpetuate asymmetrical gender
relations and pathologises women who refuse or fail to conform to these
specific standards of mothering.
An isolated focus on the individual child

An exclusively Why should the individual and isolated child necessarily be the focus of
child-centred focus developmental psychology? Although this question might appear a little
is limited. Child strange, considering the extent to which we naturalise ‘the child’ as the
development is immediate and common-sense focus of developmental psychology, it
not the whole of is a question that is worth considering. As Burman (1994: 4) remarks,
developmental constructing children as the primary objects of developmental psychology
psychology leads to ‘a failure to theorise the psychological context they inhabit’. We
(Goodnow & need to ask ourselves about the consequences of considering the child as
Collins,1990: 10).
the single or predominant focus of development. Specifically, we need to
ask ourselves: what is left out of such accounts, and what are the effects of
the resultant omissions?
Furthermore, following on from Burman (1994), we need to ask:
whose and what development are we talking about here? Is it one that
reflects all cultures and social classes, or is it simply a limited vision of
development that reflects a specific culture and social classes—the culture
and social classes of those who control the production of developmental
psychology? Is the developmental psychology we learn a psychology of
both men’s and women’s experiences? What are the consequences for
developmental psychology of its inadequate focus on gender, age and
culture as structuring dimensions of development?
The child as both familial individual and as subject

Hayes (1989: 89-90) draws our attention is social meaning attached to ‘having
to the fact that the child has both an children’, and rearing children. The parent’s
individual familial role within a particular relationships to their child are not always
family, and a greater political role within individual and emotional, but are often
the structural powers of a given society: determined by social factors. For example,
child-rearing practices, the social standard
Parents respond to the child as both an of acceptable behaviour which is often class
individual and a subject. The child is a determined, the morality that is promoted in
subject for the parents in so far as there the educational (school) system and so on.
>>
<<
It is these social and ideological is not purely familial in nature, and that it
factors that intervene between parents is infiltrated and invested by politics and
and their children and which interpellate social values in all its aspects. He uses Louis
children not as individuals, but as subjects. Althusser’s concept of interpellation, which,
In the complex societies of contemporary in short, refers to how we are each socially
capitalism, parents do not experience their situated as subjects of various types of
children in an innocent and immediate power (Althusser, 1971). The example often
way, and it is argued that a factor like provided for this hegemonic mechanism of
ideology and its functioning can contribute interpellation is that of an individual walk-
significantly to explaining why the ing down a road who is hailed by a police
relationship between parents and children officer. In turning around and answering this
is often tense and contradictory. In other hail, the individual is immediately placed in
words, parents experience their children a particular position which is underwritten
for what they are, as they appear, and also with structural power and meaning; thus
as subjects that are constituted by multiple in this very act he or she becomes a subject
determinations. In this sense, ideology of power. The mechanism of interpellation
interpellates individual children as subjects shows how we are not perhaps as free as we
for parents (Hayes, 1989). typically assume; it emphasises how we are
Hayes’s (1989) point here is essentially placed in particular roles within society in
that the bond between parent and child largely unavoidable ways.
Blaming the victims

Looking at development in isolation from sociopolitical factors fre- Interpellation.
quently leads to individualistic interpretations of socially structured A term introduced by
phenomena that can then lapse into victim blaming. Take, for example, Louis Althusser (1971)
referring to the ideological
the situation where mothers are treated as responsible for the social ills
construction—through
of the world in which they are trying to rear their children (Burman, a process of ‘hailing’
1994). Consider likewise the situation where ‘underprivileged’ sectors of or ‘recruiting’—of
society are blamed for their own poverty or lack of education. Failures and the individual as a
problems in development often stem from causes greater than that of the participatory subject of
individual child, or of the individual style of mothering. Class, culture social or political power.
and other sociopolitical factors are often responsible for failures in child
development or education, and we need to ask ourselves why this field
of influence has not received more attention within the field of develop-
mental psychology (Burman, 1994).
One important focus of attention here could be parents, that is, parents
themselves, beyond simply the question of parenting styles. As Goodnow
& Collins (1990) comment, parents are interesting and important in their
own right, and their attitudes and values (political or otherwise) along
with their general habits, preferences, tendencies and lifestyles can exert
a huge influence on children, for better or worse. The poet Philip Larkin
is one of those who holds a rather negative view of the ways in which
parents are able to influence their children, and expresses this in a stanza
from his poem This be the verse:
They fuck you up, your mum and dad.

They may not mean to, but they do.
They fill you with the faults they had.

And add some extra just for you.
(Larkin, in Jones, 1988: 56).
A similarly negative view is reflected in the progressive rock group

Pink Floyd’s song, Mother.
Trying to get her baby to stop crying, a mother explains to him how
she will keep all the possible dangers that the world holds in store for him
at bay. To wit, she will ensure that he does not get dirty; she will ‘check
out’ all his future girlfriends; when he is big enough to go out at night,
she will wait up till she knows that he has returned home safely; and no
matter what, she will always find out where he has been! However, in her
attempts to keep her child safe, she will, paradoxically, according to Pink
Floyd (1979), ‘put all of her fears into’ him. Indeed, ‘Mama’s gonna make
all of [his] nightmares come true’!
There are numerous foci for developmental psychology that would
take researchers away from the isolated individual. Burman (1994: 9)
argues that the unit of development under investigation should be seen
as variable: ‘We could be concerned with the development of a process,
or a mechanism, rather than an individual’. This suggests an interesting
direction for future and possibly more multi-disciplinary approaches to
the study of human development.
Children and power in modern society
Rose (1991) shares Burman’s (1994) Like Poster (1988), Rose observes that
concern about traditional developmental the recent history of childhood has been one
psychology’s neglect to analyse the of multiple anxieties concerning children,
dynamics of power in the study of which have occasioned any number of
childhood. He argues that childhood is programmes to conserve and shape them.
the most intensely governed sector of He observes that the child, both as an idea
personal existence: and as a target, has become inextricably
connected to the aspirations of the
In different ways, at different times, and by authorities. The environment of the growing
many different routes varying from one section child is to be regulated legislatively and
of society to another, the health, welfare, financially, and educational programmes are
and rearing of children have been linked in likewise carefully monitored and developed.
thought and practice to the destiny of the
nation and the responsibilities of the state. Legislative obligations are imposed upon
The modern child has become the focus of parents, requiring them to carry out social
innumerable projects that purport to safeguard duties from the registration of their children
it from physical, sexual, or moral danger, to at birth to ensuring that they receive
ensure its ‘normal’ development, to actively adequate education up to their teens ... Child
promote certain capacities of attributes such as protection legislation has imposed powers
intelligence, educability, and emotional stability and duties upon local authorities, requiring
(Rose, 1991: 121). them to evaluate the standards of care being
>>
<<
provided to children by their parents through Childhood, in short, has become
the agencies of social work, and to intervene intensely regulated by political power.
into the family to rectify shortcomings,
PHO TO : ©JES PER S TRU DS HO LM/ i AFRI K A PHO TOS

utilizing legal means where necessary (Rose,
1991: 121).
In accordance with these concerns,

and with the correlative implementation of
institutional mechanisms within the lives
of children, the last hundred years have seen
a rise in the ‘rights’ of the child. Scathingly
critical of how this idea of the rights of the
child has been put to use, Rose (1991) notes:
The extension of social regulation to the

lives of children actually had little to do
with the regulation of their rights. Children
came to the attention of social authorities
as delinquents threatening property
and security, as future workers requiring
moralization and skills, as future soldiers
requiring a level of fitness—in other words on
account of the threat which they posed now
or in the future to the welfare of the state.
The apparent humanity, benevolence, and
enlightenment of the extension of protection
to children in their homes disguised the
The prevalence of war on the African
extension of surveillance and control continent points to the frequency of the use
over the family … The upsurges of concern of child soldiers.
over the young … were actually moral
panics: repetitive and predictable social Moreover, if we follow Rose’s (1991)
occurrences in which certain persons or arguments, both childhood itself, and the
phenomena came to symbolize a range of ideas and initiatives around the promise
social anxieties concerning threats to the of its protection have become key terms
established order and traditional values in how a given social or political order is
(Rose, 1991: 123). governed, maintained and extended.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined a variety of major criticisms of the
field of developmental psychology. It has been important to consider
some of the questions raised about the nature of childhood, adolescence,
and the family. This is because commonplace and seemingly ‘natural’
assumptions about what a child is, or should be, are powerful forms of
knowledge. These are the kinds of knowledge that affect the way we
treat and understand others, particularly children. Put differently, what
we learn in developmental psychology affects people in powerful ways,
and hence the development of children and of adults can come to be

affected by the ideas, principles, and theories that we deal with here.
With regard to the overarching critiques collected by Burman
(1994) and explored by others, it is important to emphasise that these
do not imply that we should do away with developmental psychology,
or that we should reject all developmental theory developed thus far.
Rather, we must understand that they highlight important issues of
power and equality (or inequality), which should be given prominence
in the developmental theory of the future. In assimilating important
traditions and theories of developmental theory, it is vital that we be
aware of their shortcomings, and that we involve critique as an active
part of our learning.
Specific tasks
➊ If indeed children were treated and understood differently in past European cultures,
consider what may have been the case traditionally or historically in African societies.
➋ How do you understand your own adolescence? Do you find that the storm-and-
stress view has any relevance in describing your experiences of this process?
➌ If it is true that developmental norms are developed by experimental psychologists

and are based on the study of small groups, what do you suppose might be the origin
of these studied groups, and how legitimate do you think the results would be when
applied to ‘adolescents’ in other sociocultural environments?
➍ What familial factors do you think have a strong influence on the psychological
development of children?
➎ To what extent, and in what ways, do you think children are controlled in modern
Western society? Do you feel that these kinds of control are warranted?
➏ Give some thought to the developmental theories covered in the preceding chapters.
Which theories exhibit certain of the tendencies criticised by Burman? Furthermore,
if you do have a preferred or favourite theory, give particular thought to how it
might be criticised in terms of the arguments Burman presents.
➐ Thinking beyond the realm of psychological developmental theory itself, consider

in what way certain of the tendencies mentioned by Burman are apparent in our
day-to-day assumptions about human development. Provide examples to support
your answer.
➑ How might one ‘customise’ Burman’s critiques to human development in the South
African context?
➒ Draw up a list of stereotypes around the idea of ‘mothering’. Do the same around
the idea of ‘fathering’ and then contrast and compare them. Reflect on the
gendered nature of these parenting stereotypes, as well as on the different types of
responsibilities and activities implied by each. >>
<<
➓ If it is indeed limiting to maintain a (relatively) exclusive child-focused approached to
development, what other important areas of focus could we use to widen our
understanding of human development?
11 Consider the notion of normalisation: what kind of children/ parents/ families/ homes
would have been the basis for developmental norms in apartheid-era South Africa, and
which would have been routinely ‘problematised’ (considered deviant, problematic,
‘pathological’) in terms of these norms?
This chapter has been based on four central texts:
Burman, E (1994, 2008). Deconstructing developmental psychology. London: Routledge.

(Burman’s book is the most accessible, and arguably the most important of those listed here, for an
overall critique of developmental psychology. Highly recommended.)
Eysenck, H J (1953). Uses and abuses of psychology. London: Penguin.
(Eysenck’s book was useful for its time, as the lengthy extracts above suggest. However, it has since
dated somewhat, and the author’s critical claims are in retrospect diluted by the remainder of his
work which is in certain respects notably uncritical of psychology.)
(This text provides an incisive analysis and critique of extant theories of the family. Importantly
too, it provides us with the theoretical tools to begin to make sense of the impact of families on the
psychological development of the individual.)
Rose, N (1991). Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self. London: Routledge.
(Rose’s text is a critical tour de force through the history of psychology. This text is hard to match for
pure critical incisiveness, although it is by no means focused on developmental psychology alone.)
CHAPTER
28
Race, culture and
psychological theory
Mambwe Kasese-Hara
This chapter looks at race, culture and psychology, with a focus

on the influence of historical factors, culture and ethnicity in
shaping contemporary developmental theory. A range of issues
in cognitive and social development is discussed. We start with
some of the early Euro-American debates surrounding the issue
of ‘cognition and culture’ and conclude with a proposed model
of human development in an African context:
1. Events surrounding the birth of psychology as a discipline

2. The racism of psychology
3. Psychology and culture
4. Psychology in a racialised society
5. In search of a more appropriate psychology
6. Human development: A West African conceptual framework
Introduction
Often students initially experience undergraduate psychology as though it
were an imitation of some form of natural science—as though it were a pure
science born and nurtured in a neutral environment, without the bias
of class, culture or creed. Most psychology classes introduce the discipline
with concepts and phenomena, such as Wilhelm Wundt’s reaction time,
Thorndike’s law of effect and Skinner’s operant conditioning (Gleitman, 1991);
so that from the onset we tend to assume that the discipline of psychology is a
‘science’ of human behaviour, concerned mainly with physiological processes
in interaction with environmental experiences.
Although the environment could be anything and everything that
bears relevance to the individual or group, psychological theory has tra-
ditionally been based mainly on a particular kind of environment, which
is largely European and middle class (Nsamenang, 1992; Liddel, Kvalsig,
Shabalala & Masilela, 1991). As such, when it comes to the social, cultural
and ethnic contexts in which individuals develop, traditional psychological
theory is generally found to be lacking.
Race, culture and psychological theory 587
This chapter is aimed at providing students of psychology with some

insights into race, ethnicity, and culture as central features in the evolution
of psychological theory, mainly as points of inclusion or exclusion. We shall
consider how psychological theories may reflect common belief systems
in society, and how they may help foster these, especially in relation to
culture and ethnicity.
Events surrounding the birth of psychology as

a discipline
The birth of psychology as a discipline can be traced back to late 19th-century
Europe (Cole, 1993). Although some of the concepts and phenomena in
psychology can be traced back to philosophers before this time, there was
no distinct discipline prior to the late 19th century. In historical terms, the
period preceding this was also when Europe was extending her interests in
the rest of the world through exploration, trade, the spread of religion, and
the subsequent colonisation of foreign lands. Europe saw itself as the centre
of civilisation and culture, while the rest of the world was constructed as
mysterious territory to be explored and conquered. Africa was seen as the
‘dark’ continent inhabited by ‘primitive beings’.
Thus, psychology as a discipline emerged out of an era and context
that was highly polarised along sociocultural, racial and geographical
lines. Within European society itself, a preoccupation with culture and
socio-economic status crystallised around the notion of ‘civilisation’,
which became highly debated, with the general thinking being that
these factors were linked to mental abilities, which were geneti-
cally endowed. As though it were an endorsement of such prejudice,
Darwin’s evolutionary theory that linked human evolution to that of
the ape was highly influential, and so—in addition to the hierarchical
ranking of people according to class—all living things were ranked
according to race, with humans (whites) at the top of the evolutionary
scale. Anthropologists even argued that black humankind was the
‘missing link’ between humanity (white) and ape in the ‘great chain of
being’ (Mosse, 1999).
Racist ideology, the legacy of which the social sciences and society in
general continue to battle with, was conceived and nurtured in 17th- and
18th-century Europe (Mosse, 1999). This ideology was exported to the
‘new world’ (Australia and the Americas) and Africa by the settlers and
colonial administrators, who established a social order that was made
up of ‘satellites’ of the ‘mother society’ back in Europe. Racist ideology
became consolidated, and further enhanced, by the challenges of having
to live in close proximity, and to share land and other resources, with
groups of people Europeans knew little about, except in terms of highly
distorted stereotypes. The colonial societies established by Britain,
France, Spain and Portugal developed socio-economic, cultural and
political hierarchies with white settlers at the top. This was reflected, for
instance, by the immigration policies of Australia and the United States
of America, which excluded non-Europeans from citizenship (Castles &
Vasta, 1999; Omi & Winant, 1999). Contemporary society still bears the
social and psychological burdens from these historical social processes,
so that the world our children are expected to thrive in today, whatever
their colour or ethnicity, is still a world that is polarised along socio-
economic, ethnic, and cultural lines. This presents special challenges for
developmental psychology, some of which will become more apparent
later on in this chapter.
The racism of psychology

Research shows that many of the acclaimed ‘founding fathers’ of
contemporary psychology were actually quite instrumental in the
elaboration of racist theories (Duncan, Stevens & Bowman, 2004). Herbert
Spencer, for instance, applied evolutionary theory to social problems,
which led to ‘Social Darwinism’, a racially based political theory. According
to Howitt & Owusu-Bempah (1994), this theory had a strong and long-
Eugenics. The selective lasting influence on the Nazis. Spencer also subscribed to the eugenics
breeding of human beings movement. The most extremist proponents of this movement believed in
aimed at improving a ‘selective breeding’ as a means of eliminating ‘unfit’ races (Leahey, 2004).
race. Positive eugenics,
Historically, the involvement of psychology in racism extended beyond a
mainly associated with
the British movement,
discursive and theoretical level, as seen in Nazi Germany, for example,
and led by Francis Galton, where psychologists and psychiatrists were actively involved in attempts
focused on encouraging to wipe out the so-called ‘racially inferior’ members of that society.
the reproduction of the Erik Erikson, one of the most influential developmental theorists,
middle- and upper-class. based his psychoanalytic memorandum on the identity of ‘Negro youth’
Negative eugenics, on highly flawed and fundamentally racist assumptions. Erikson’s
mainly associated with
attempts to analyse the identity formation of black American youth
the American movement,
refers to attempts to
during the desegregation era quite aptly picked up on the reality of
regulate the breeding conflicting identities in the face of racial domination and a history
of the alleged ‘unfit’ of slavery. These identity conflicts are also discussed by progressive
members of society black psychosocial theorists such as Hussein Buhlan (1980a) and
(Leahey, 2004: 303). Frantz Fanon (see Bulhan, 1980b). However, Erikson firmly located
within a mainstream perspective, portrays a picture of the subjugated
as disempowered, as victims whose identity formation could only
ever be a shadow of their slave past. There can be no denying that, in
Erikson’s analysis, the behaviour and characteristics of the black people
(the way they move, laugh, talk and sing, for example) were viewed
from a distinctly deficit point of view, with negative connotations, and
could be seen as having the effect of diminishing and stigmatising the
black personality. In the same article, Erikson refers to the ‘Negro’s
submissiveness’ and the ‘Jew’s intellectuality’. It is interesting that even
Racism. The process though both black people and Jewish people have historically suffered
whereby the systematic racism at the hands of others, albeit in different forms, and even though
domination or subjugation examples of resistance to slavery are evident in black history, Erikson
of a racialised group (or
chooses ‘submissiveness’ as the symbol of black identity. Coming from
groups) by another group
(or groups) is justified. a Jewish family background himself, it is quite telling that he would
choose ‘intellectuality’ as the symbol of Jewish identity.
According to Duncan et al (2004), academic psychology in apartheid
South Africa aided the reproduction of racism in two ways. Firstly,
through denial, or what is referred to as the racism of omission, that is,
by consistently denying the centrality of racism in South African society.
Secondly, through racism of commission, that is, the reproduction of the
racism of broader South African society by professional psychology in its

organisational structures, and by offering the ‘scientific’ rationale needed
by the apartheid state when formulating its policies (Dubow, 1995).
Psychology and the eugenics movement
Sir Francis Galton (1869), who is noted to psychologists were ardent followers of the
be the first scholar to attempt some form eugenics movement, including Herbert
of psychological testing, was also the first Spencer and Cyril Burt.
to put forward some form of geneticist Herbert Spencer was renowned for
theorisation regarding mental abilities. the publication of his Introduction to
Galton reasoned that quality breeding stock psychology (1886) in which he argued
yielded quality offspring, and consequently that ‘selective breeding’ was necessary
that brilliance and social eminence were to eliminate ‘unfit’ ‘races’ (Duncan et al,
outcomes of good breeding (that is, ‘good’ 2004). Based on Darwin’s and his own
genes). He argued further that the lower evolutionary ideas, Spencer developed a
classes, in contrast to the upper classes who political theory, namely, ‘Social Darwinism’
monopolised constitutional superiority, which argued that natural selection (that
were lacking in these qualities (Howitt is, survival of the fittest) should be allowed
& Owusu-Bempah, 1994). According to to take its course in humans, and that
Galton’s theory, there was a danger that the governments should not try to help the
good hereditary stock would be swamped poor, weak and the helpless by offering
by the bad as a result of the fecundity them resources (Leahey, 2004: 303).
of the lower classes. His solution to this Cyril Burt, another proponent of
problem was to simply give the more eugenics, was descended from Francis
suitable races—or strains of blood— Galton. Burt was a hereditarian and faithful
a better chance of prevailing over the disciple of the eugenics movement. He
less suitable races through various means, is believed to have falsified his data on
including through sterilisation of the mental inheritance in twins to prove his
lower classes. beliefs. Arthur Jensen and others used
Eugenics refers to the ‘scientific’ Burt’s research data to help argue that
movement begun by Galton’s psychology, racial differences in intelligence were
which was committed to a biosocial mainly due to genetic factors (Howitt &
programme of selective breeding. Several Owusu-Bempah, 1994).
Psychology and culture
The reductionist approach

Against this brief background on the events that surrounded the birth
of psychology as a discipline in European society, we now turn more
directly to developments in psychological theory. Early developments in
psychology were characterised by a drift towards ‘reductionism’, which
refers to the notion that all the sciences can be arranged hierarchically
from the highest to the lowest, and each science is reducible to a more
basic science, until we arrive at physics, the most basic science (Leahey,
1987). Accordingly, psychological concepts of individual behaviour

can be reduced to the concepts and laws of neurophysiology, or the
functioning of individual bodies.
Recapitulation theory. At the turn of the 20th century, Hall (1904) and other genetic
A broad-based 19th- psychologists adopted recapitulation theory in their attempt to explain
century approach to individual development over the life-span. Consequently they proposed that
biogenetic laws reproduce forms of thought and behaviour in the individual’s
in which it was suggested
that individuals’
development (ontogeny) that correspond to the various stages of cultural
development reflects the evolution (phylogeny). According to this theory, the white Western child
historical development of passes through earlier and lower stages to arrive at ‘civilisation’, while on the
their culture (Fugel, 1953). other hand the individual in non-western societies retraces only part of this
ancestral cultural history and remains arrested at one of the lower levels.
Spencer (1886), one of the key proponents of this theory, postulated the
idea of cultural stages and concluded that societies develop over history and
become increasingly complex and more highly organised, with each stage
marked by more advanced forms of thought. This reasoning supported
the commonly held belief that culture, civilisation and mental activity were
closely interlinked. Obvious differences in technological advancement
between peoples living in different parts of the world prompted some of
the debate, but in theorising about the possible sources of these differences
certain assumptions were made which shaped both theory and commonly
held beliefs. The first assumption was that it would be possible to study the
history of humanity by studying different peoples in contemporary society
who were at different levels of progress. The second was that there was no
major distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘culture’. The reasoning for this was
that as culture provided experience—and it was assumed that some cultures
provided a greater diversity of experience than others—there should be a
direct relationship between cultural development and mental development
(Cole, 1993).
Early debate about culture and cognitive development

Thus the debate about culture and cognition was born, and many theo-
rists have since argued against this reductionist perspective, including
Vygotsky, Boas, Cole and Scribner.
Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) was among the first to offer a counter-
argument to these notions of culture and cognition (that is, mental activity).
Proposing a ‘socio-historical approach’, he attempted to theorise the role of
sociocultural and historical factors in shaping the cognitive development
of individuals and the subsequent advancement of societies (Glassman,
1994). Although based on the same theoretical question of culture, class
and cognition, Vygotsky’s position was that any society that had attained
the use of language was in essence developed to the ‘civilised stage’ and,
accordingly, an adult in a non-industrialised society could not be considered
cognitively equivalent to the ‘child’ in industrialised society.
According to Franz Boas (1911), who carried out some observational
studies with non-European cultures himself, some of the misconcep-
tions about the mental abilities of people from non-European cultures
were based on deeply flawed evidence that was apparently supportive of
evolutionary schemes.
A broader view of culture and cognition

Culture is indeed a part of the environment that shapes cognition, but
arguing that culture equals cognitive development as in the Spencerian
view is rather simplistic, and contemporary theory gives a much broader
view. In more recent years greater interaction between psychology,
anthropology, and history has enhanced the scope of the study of human
development (Liddell et al, 1991). Consequently, human development
is seen as a complex process that takes place in an ecosystem, jointly
structured by the physical environment and a cultural community with
a sociopolitical history (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Serpell, 1993). This means
that the environmental forces that determine the child’s behaviour or
development are mediated by mental processes, which come about through
conscious interaction among the persons that constitute a social group; this
interaction is in turn mediated by that group’s accumulated cultural stock
and cognitive resources, their language, theories and technology (Serpell,
1993). Furthermore, in the case of non-European cultures such as African
cultures, which have been subjected to evaluation and interpretation from
a Euro-American perspective (Nsamenang, 1992), any value the culture
may potentially have is negated in the face of the Euro-American-inclined

theorist or researcher who is prevented through bias from seeing any
redeeming properties in the ‘other’s’ culture.
Take for instance the traditional African practice of carrying the baby on
the back (or indeed the front), closely secured to the mother’s body by a long
sash or blanket. This behaviour was generally frowned upon in the early
days of colonialism and seen as ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’. More recently,
however, psychological research has established some of the positive qualities
of the close physical contact that comes about as a result of this practice,
particularly with regard to infant sensory and motor development, as well as
attachment (Brazelton, Koslowski & Tronick, 1993). These findings would
not be possible if researchers had continued to maintain the early Western
misconceptions about African parenting styles.
Recent psychological
Psychology in a racialised society research has shown that
We have established how theories of human development have been this traditional method
influenced by, and have themselves influenced, notions of ethnicity and of carrying the baby has
positive qualities. This would
cultural differences. The world today is characterised by racial prejudice have been lost in earlier
and tension, whether in South Africa (which is still dealing with the research due to culture bias.
social and economic heritage of apartheid), or North America, Europe
and Australia, which claim to be egalitarian societies (Kasese-Hara, 2000).
Race and ethnicity become central issues in theorising human development
in the African context, and indeed in any context throughout the world
where different ethnic groups live together as communities. It is important
to consider when studying human development in African societies, the
experience of colonisation and other forms of socio-political oppression such
as imperialism, neo-colonialism and globalisation. All of these conditions
perpetuate the subordination of African cultural experience, as well as
socio-economic hierarchies that are based on socio-cultural experience
and ethnicity. Similarly, the historical role of psychology in colonial and
post-colonial Africa, which has been mainly to rationalise and perpetuate
racial differences, must give way to approaches and perspectives that are
less prone to bias (Nsamenang, 1992; Seedat, 1997).
Some examples of psychology that have been

used to impact negatively on Africans
Psychological theory was used to provide * On the African continent psychological

a scientific rationale for slavery early in the tests provided a basis to ensure inferior
19th century. The rationale was based on positions for blacks and Africans in
the prevailing beliefs about Africans lacking organisations and companies (Bulhan,
in intelligence (Bulhan, 1981). 1981). The notion that Africans were
only fit for lower, technical and manual
* The notions underlying racial positions, rather than higher
differences found on standardized managerial posts that involved greater
IQ tests, which persisted through the mental capacity, continued to be
early 20th century, were later reinforced through psychological tests
discredited by mainstream psychology which were invariably developed on
as racist, only to resurface again in the basis of Western cultural norms.
the 1990s. They have continued to be
backed by psychological ‘findings’ * According to Moosa, Moonsamy &
(see for example, Herrnstein & Fridjhon (1997), early psychological
Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969; Yerkers, research in South Africa tended to
1923). The findings that over time focus on blacks simply as victims of
have helped support the notion that overwhelming socio-economic and
blacks are intellectually inferior to political forces which undermined their
whites, and that the differences are psychological functioning individually
likely to be genetically determined, and collectively, thus negating the
have tended to be methodologically agency of people in responding to and
flawed and biased. For example, confronting the dilemmas they faced.
observations have been made that The past few decades have seen
the so-called scientific studies done psychological literature that supports a
with black Americans were biased in much broader view of marginalisation.
ignoring the cultural, linguistic and This view basically contends that,
socio-economic status of samples whereas marginalisation according to
from the black community. Moreover, race, language or culture may bring
many scientists, though claiming to with it disadvantage in terms of access
be impartial, intrinsically believed to resources and knowledge, it may
blacks to be intellectually inferior to equally have enhancing properties.
whites and tried to rationalise away Bilingualism, for example, which
any evidence of superior was traditionally seen as a ‘handicap’,
performance, such as performance on is now considered rather as
rote memory tasks, making rhymes, an opportunity for broader linguistic
naming words and in time orientation experience (Mohanty &
(Grubb, 1986). Perregaux, 1997).
In search of a more appropriate psychology

Authors writing from a critical perspective on psychology and race issues
identify the peculiar challenges faced by intellectuals and psychologists from
non-Western, often economically and/or culturally subjugated societies in
developing identities (Bulhan,1980; Seedat, 1997). One common point of
agreement is the disillusionment that non-Western intellectuals experience
in relation to the dominating Euro-American culture and the ensuing
process of re-assessing both one’s own culture in relation to the dominant
culture and the final radicalisation that occurs in relation to both.
There has been a realisation that indigenous peoples of the world are
not passive recipients of experience but long before colonisation were
actively creating psychosocial and other knowledge systems, which over
time led to the development of concepts, world-views and assumptions
that addressed the challenges they faced in their day-to-day lives (Mkhize,
2004). This realisation has led to a call for the indigenisation of psychology.
Seedat (1997) saw the indigenisation of psychology as part of this agenda
towards the development of a liberatory psychology.
Nsamenang’s (1992; 2000; 2006) model, discussed below, like other
similar attempts to theorise human development from an African
perspective, provides invaluable information when trying to fill in the
gaps of the missing psychologies of indigenous people.
Human Development: A West African conceptual

framework
The search for culturally informed theories of developmental psychology
reflects a growing awareness among theorists that their endeavours are
situated in a cultural matrix (Serpell, 1994). Nsamenang (1992) asserts
that, due to psychology being an ethnocentric science that has been
cultivated mainly in Western Europe and North America, theories
of psychology overwhelmingly reflect a Western sociocultural ethos,
as if the rest of the cultural world had nothing to offer the discipline.
Nsamenang (2000), believing that the rest of the scientific world deserved
to know how other cultural contexts—especially family environments—
shaped human development, laid out a conceptual framework of human
development in African societies, with a focus on West African societies.
Below is an overview of the main tenets and concepts of Nsamenang’s
model of human development.
Familial context
According to Nsamenang (2000) familial context is an important part of
the child’s social world. Because the family, the child, and the environment
constantly interact, and therefore influence each other, the family context
plays a determinant role in what is normal and what facilitates or hinders
development. Thus children’s search for meanings, competence and the
‘right way’ of the world begins in the family, long before they go to school
(Nsamenang, 2000). In the African context, parental actions and regulatory
behaviours are embedded in a familial ethos that extends beyond the
parents to include siblings, relatives and other mentors, especially peer
mentors of the extended family networks and neighbourhoods.
World-views
World-view. A shared World-views are shared frames of reference or psychological outlooks
frame of reference that by which members of a particular culture perceive or make sense of the
informs the members universe and the fate of the people in it. These are integral aspects of
of a particular culture’s
the social representations through which cultures make sense of human
perceptions of the universe
and the fate of people in it.
existence. Indigenous West African world-views are marked by a set
of social realities, cultural traditions and existential imperatives. These
world-views constitute different frames of reference from those that
inform contemporary developmental psychology.
Virtue-based versus rights-based social relationships

Social relationships and factors in cultural institutions such as the family
(broadly defined) are the primary forces in forming and shaping the norms
and values that regulate behaviour, and that set limits on the developing
person. According to Nsamenang (2000), the relationships and competencies
that sustain life and energise development in African cultures are virtue-
based rather than rights-based. The individual’s character is thus configured
not through his or her private psychological characteristics and experiences,
but through the community and through activities of a collective or social
nature. Thus, in the West African community, the worth of the individual’s
motives and actions is judged on the basis of the common good, whereas
in Western culture, the motives and actions of the individual are primary.
In the West African community, because seeing oneself as secondary
to the common good is virtuous, cognition (which is otherwise a personal
attribute) is deployed less for personal gain than to serve social purposes.
Thus the relationship between the individual and the collective is the key to
understanding African behaviours.
African participatory learning

In traditional African society, learning is linked directly to daily life as it
takes place through social acts (such as production) and social relationships
(such as in family or peer groups). Nsamenang identifies three stages of
African participatory learning: observation, imitation and creative action.
The child observes first before imitating, and is then able to exercise his or
her trade or art by taking perspective and acting creatively (Nsamenang,
2000). Children are expected to observe, with little or no instruction, to
think or build mental pictures by themselves, and to imitate or rehearse
whatever they have observed during their play activities. Participatory
learning is socially designed to fit each child’s emerging capacities and
competencies and therefore it helps the child gradually to discover his
or her talents and limitations and to improve on them.
The role of the peer group

Peer group activities in traditional African society help to bridge the gap
between play and productive work. As part of play, children create their
own playthings and make miniature replicas of common objects from
available materials. Through these activities children learn how to plan
work, organise tools and materials, measure and conceive of objects in
multiple dimensions (Nsamenang, 2000; Nsamenang & Lamb, 1993). These
constructions express remarkable creativity and when acknowledged as

‘products’, boost children’s self-esteem and nourish their mental growth.
The onus to learn rests on the child who, in the context of the peer group,
is frequently reminded of and almost immediately experiences the conse-
quences of any failure to learn.

In African societies peer
group activities blur the
boundaries between play
and productive work
(Nsamenang, 2000: 5).
The social ontogenic framework

Social ontogenesis views human development as being anchored within
the ecological and social environments in which the development occurs
(Nsamenang, 2006). Drawing upon his interpretation of West African
world-views, Nsamenang (1992) proposes a social ontogenic framework, Social ontogenetic
according to which the human life-cycle is divided into three basic framework. A theoretical
dimensions of personhood, namely, spiritual selfhood, which starts at framework that views the
individual’s development
conception and ends with the naming of the child, social selfhood, which
as being anchored within
progresses from the process of naming to death, and ancestral selfhood the ecological and social
which follows biological death (Serpell, 1994). Social selfhood, which is the environments in which
experiential phase of personhood, is further sub-divided into seven socio- it occurs.
ontogenic stages or phases namely, (1) the newborn, (2) social priming, (3)
social apprenticing, (4) social entrée, (5) social internment, (6) adulthood
and (7) old age and death. These phases, along with the two metaphysical
dimensions of human selfhood (that is, spiritual selfhood and ancestral
selfhood), complete the human life-cycle (Nsamenang, 2006).
The phase of the newborn is symbolised by happiness for the safe
delivery of the child (that is, the gift), as well as a projection of the sort
of being the neonate should become through socialisation. Social priming
is a period of increased verbal and non-verbal communication between
the baby and parents (and other caregivers), through cuddles, smiling,
feeding and play. The child begins reciprocating or returning the ‘gifts’,
which is an initial step in learning the sharing and exchange norm. The
principal developmental task in the social apprentice phase, which roughly
corresponds with childhood, is the recognition and rehearsal of social roles
that pertain to the main spheres of life. Social entrée, which is the fourth
phase, corresponds with puberty and the appearance of secondary sex
characteristics. In some societies this is marked by initiation ceremonies but

is in general a period of increased social responsibility. Social internment is
a period of intense social induction (internship), marked by the socialisation
of the emerging adult. In stage six, individuals acquire the proto-adult
status when they marry, and their seniority is increased with the birth of a
child, which leads to the full adulthood status. Stage seven of social selfhood
is old age. According to Nsamenang (1992) it is at this stage that the person
becomes a grandparent, who although physically frail perhaps, is likely to
epitomise social competence. Nsamenang argues that in the West African
social ontogeny, the confidence level with which old people face death
depends upon the number of competent living biological offspring.
Conceptualisation of development
According to Nsamenang (2006), developmental stages are characterised
by distinctive developmental tasks that are defined within the framework
of cultural realities and developmental agenda. Underlying this is the
conceptualisation of development ‘as the acquisition and growth of
the physical, cognitive, social and emotional competencies required to
engage fully in family and society’ (Nsamenang, 2006: 295). Development
therefore, is seen as a transformation within the individual, which is
brought about by their participation in cultural activities. This means
that child development can be a guided process of gradual and systematic
social integration (Rogoff, 2003).
This characterisation of development as a cumulative process of inte-
gration within the community and clan differs theoretically from the
more individualistic accounts proposed by Freud, Erikson and Piaget,
and resonates much more with the cultural preoccupations expressed
by parents in many African societies (Serpell, 1994). Nsamenang’s social
ontogenic framework also bears much in common with Vygotsky’s
social cultural approach in that both models conceptualise development
as a set of processes embedded within the sociocultural relations (and
events) in the child’s immediate environment (Kasese-Hara, 2004).
Nsamenang (2006) argues that socio-ontogenesis is a universal para-
digm that makes possible the study of human development in the context
of children’s engagement of cognition as they participate in cultural
communities. As such the paradigm, according to Nsamenang, offers
an innovative impetus to conceptualise and generate developmental
knowledge, which not only empowers various cultures but also has the
potential to expand visions and data beyond restrictive Eurocentric grids.
Evaluating Nsamenang
Seedat (1997) observed that there has been a tendency for mainstream
psychology to ignore the value of scholarly ideas from critical theorists
such as Fanon and Bulhan. It is no surprise therefore that Nsamenang’s
work, perhaps the only comprehensive attempt at theorising the cycle
of human development, backed by indigenous research by various
researchers on the continent (see for example Asante, 1990; Babatunde,
1992; Jahoda, 1982; Rogoff, 2003; Serpell, 1993) has received such negligible
attention. Theoretical developments from an African perspective such as
Nsamenang’s are moving developmental psychology away from models of

human development that are based largely on a Euro-American, middle-
class history and experience, in which other cultural experiences have
only been considered as peripheral and comparative. From an African
perspective, Nsamenang’s social ontogenic framework offers unlimited
opportunities to look at the psychosocial experience of children from
various environments and backgrounds, without the assumptions or bias
that may arise from the pre-judgment of their racial, ethnic, cultural or
socio-economic experience, as seems so inherent in Euro-American models
of psychology. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the African subject is
totally free from being misunderstood or misrepresented. African societies
and culture still face many challenges of their own, such as human rights
abuses, some of which are entrenched in socio-cultural structures.
Nsamenang proposes that researchers within the African context face
the task of assigning 21st-century goals to indigenous structures, rather
than replace them, and further, that new conceptions of family and family
life need to be forged (Nsamenang, 1992). Although these propositions
were raised in relation to the dilemma posed for Africans by the politico-
economic dualism inherited from interaction with external cultures (Serpell,
1994), these propositions could be equally applicable to the problems of
African social structures that may be sources of disadvantage.
Nsamenang’s (2006) claim that this social ontogenic approach is
universal is true to some extent in that any child from any environment
or background when studied using the social selfhood part of the model is
neither advantaged nor disadvantaged. However, only the social selfhood
part of the model can truly be said to be universal, as certain societies and
cultures worldwide do not concern themselves with the metaphysical (that
is, spiritual and ancestral) aspects of human life. The question remains as to
whether or not this still remains a significant aspect of one’s development.
Conclusion
The following issues have been raised in this chapter:
s The way in which psychology has been implicated in the propagation

and elaboration of racism and racist theory.
s The predominantly Eurocentric nature of contemporary psycho-

logical theory, and the consequent imposition of models that con-
ceptualise human development from a Euro-American perspective
and which by no means represent the numerical majority of the
world’s population.
s The implication of culture in conceptual formulations about intel-

lectual development and the underlying assumption of early
psychological theory that cultural achievements in society were
linked to intelligence which in turn was genetically endowed.
s A broader socio-cultural perspective that illustrates how people develop

psychologically through interaction with their social environment.
s The understanding that culture per se is not indicative of individuals’

intellectual capacity. It is the intricacies of the individual’s experiences
and interactions within that cultural context that matter.
s Nsamenang’s attempt to theorise human development from a West

African perspective.
It is hoped that in contemplating all of the above, the reader will

begin to consider how developmental psychology may begin to deal
with these issues in order to avoid bias and the drawing of erroneous
conclusions. Such an endeavour will enhance psychology as a social
science that is concerned with peoples of various cultural, ethnic and
socio-economic backgrounds worldwide, and in sub-Saharan Africa
in particular.
Specific tasks
➊ In your own opinion, would the theories of psychological development be any
different if they had evolved from a historical or cultural context other than the
Euro-American one?
➋ Critically evaluate Nsamenang’s notion of social ontogenesis as a tool for the

indigenisation of developmental psychology in sub-Saharan Africa.
➌ Developmental psychology has evolved a great deal since the nineteenth century
when psychology was implicated in societal racism. Given that societies such as South
Africa are still battling with issues of racism, how free is contemporary psychology
from bias based on race, ethnicity or culture, and how objective can researchers and
practitioners be when dealing with individuals or groups from a different racial,
ethnic or cultural background than their own?
Bulhan, H A (1980). Dynamics of cultural in-betweenity: An empirical study. International Journal
of Psychology, 15, 105-121
(This article is recommended because it provides a unique view of the dynamic nature of identity
development among black intellectuals amidst an alien cultural domination.)
Duncan, N, Stevens, G & Bowman, B (2004). South African psychology and racism. (In D Hook,
N Mkhize, P Kiguwa, A Collins, E Burman & I Parker. Critical psychology. Lansdowne:
UCT Press, 360-388.)
(This chapter analyses ‘racism’ as a concept and gives an extensive and critical discussion of how South
African psychology has been implicated in the racism of the society.)
Howitt, D & Owusu-Bempah, J (1994). The racism of psychology. New York: Harvester Wheatshef.
(This text gives a historical journey of psychology, highlighting the racism inherent in the theorisation
and practice of psychology.)
Kasese-Hara, M (2004). Human development in underdeveloped contexts. (In D Hook, N Mkhize,

P Kiguwa, A Collins, E Burman & I Parker. Critical psychology. Lansdowne: UCT Press, 540-558.)
(This chapter highlights psychological development among so-called cultural minorities, and how
culture and race are intertwined. It attempts to shed some light on how mainstream psychology may
better understand development from a more inclusive premise.)
Mkhize, N (2004). Psychology: An African perpective. (In D Hook, N Mkhize, P Kiguwa,

A Collins, E Burman & I Parker. Critical psychology. Lansdowne: UCT Press, 24-52.)
(Mkhize explores indigenous African psychological discourses and cites some very interesting
African thinkers, philosophers and activists, for example Senghor.)
Moosa, R, Moonsamy, G & Fridjon, P (1997). Identification patterns among black students at
a predominantly white university. South African Journal of Psychology, 27(4), 256-260.
(This article has been recommended because it is an empirical report of the application of Bulhan’s
theory of ‘cultural in-betweenity’ among South African students. It further elaborates on the dynamic
role that the subjugated play in forming their own identities in reaction to cultural domination.)
Nsamenang, A B (1992). Human development in cultural context: A third world perspective.

Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
(Nsamenang’s theory is one of the very few attempts to explain human development from an
African context.)
Nsamenang, A B (2006). Human ontogenesis: An indigenous African view on development

and intelligence. International Journal of Psychology, 41(4), 293-297.
(This is a full text and a comprehensive discussion of development from an African perspective.)
Scribner, S (1985). Vygotsky’s uses of history. (In J V Wertsch (ed.), Communication and cognition:
A Vygotskian perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(An intricate discussion of the Vygotskian view of cognitive development.)
Serpell, R (1993). The significance of schooling: Life-journeys in an African society. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
(Serpell discusses the significance of schooling in African society, by critically analysing the sociocultural
environment in which African children develop, and how this may differ from the assumptions of Western
developmental psychology. The text draws on empirical research done in rural African communities.)
CHAPTER
29
Gender identity:
Contestations and questions
Gillian Mooney and Peace Kiguwa
This chapter will discuss the central debate in the production of

psychological knowledge about gender. There is disagreement
that occurs on two distinct, but related, levels, namely, how
‘gender’ should be defined (ontology) and how ‘gender’ should
be investigated (epistemology). The different approaches to
understanding gender have been structured according to these
two considerations. In this chapter we consider:
1. Introduction: The relationship between ontology

and epistemology
2. Defining gender
3. The developmental process of gender identity formation
4. Explanations of gender identity formation
Introduction: The relationship between ontology

and epistemology
Social scientific research is characterised by paradigmatic
understandings of social phenomena and how we can account for these.
This refers to what is known as the relationship between ontology
and epistemology. Ontology is the substantive content of psychology,
or what it is about. For example, in some gender studies, two binary
terms, masculine and feminine, are used to describe either male or
female behaviour. In other studies, gender is understood as being fluid
in nature. The dichotomy between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ is viewed
as problematic because there are multiple ways in which individuals
may construct their gender identities.
Epistemology concerns the ways in which—or how—knowledge
is generated. It includes our beliefs about what constitutes adequate
standards of knowledge production and the appropriate methods through
which knowledge can be produced. For example, if you believed that
gender was a binary construct and if you wanted to know what kinds
of gender characteristics a particular set of individuals, such as students,
Gender identity: Contestations and questions 601
display, you might ask them to complete a questionnaire that lists so-
called ‘masculine’ (for example aggressive) and ‘feminine’ (for example
passive) characteristics. However, if you believed that gender is fluid in
nature and multiple forms of gender identity are possible, then you may
examine a specific set of individuals who exist in a particular set of social
and historical conditions. For example, you would interview the same
group of students, asking them questions that allow you to understand
how their gender identities had evolved over the course of their lives.
Thus how we define gender (ontology) determines how we investigate
it (epistemology); in this sense, there is a reciprocal relationship between
ontology and epistemology.
Defining gender
Gender, in many ways, can be described as a practice or something that the
individual does. Gender encompasses the sociocultural and psychological Gender. Social, cultural
differences between men and women. Gender is distinct from sex, which and psychological
describes biological and anatomical differences between men and women. differences between men
and women.
When we behave in certain ways because we are ‘male’ or ‘female’, we are
engaging in social practices that inform us what our gender is. A practice
here may be referred to as a way of behaving. Practices are ideological
in the sense that some ways of being are dominant while others are
marginalised. Gendered practice is ideological when it structures our
choices around our own gendered behaviour. For example, fatherhood
has undergone many ideological changes in practice. Twenty years ago
parenting was largely the prerogative of women; women were given
maternity leave from work in order to care for their children. The work
life of fathers remained uninterrupted. Today however, the practice of
parenting has shifted to include men, who now bear more responsibility
for parenting and are awarded paternity leave from work, although this
is still less than maternity leave. Our choices of gender roles are thus
influenced by our wider social contexts.
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
Gender is a fundamental guiding principle of
society. The ways we order and organise our world
and ourselves are determined by pre-existing societal
circumstances and relations, and these constrain how
we may understand ourselves and relate to others.
These social relations are material in the sense that
they act upon individuals in society in concrete ways
and affect the kinds of freedom that we may exercise
as men and women. When we employ different mean-
ings to understand certain behaviour as ‘masculine’
or ‘feminine’, we are engaging in a gendered process
that is discursive. Discursive here refers to those social
and cultural meanings that are ascribed to both males
and females. The discursive aspect to understanding gender is useful From the minute we are
born we are assigned
in its focus on the role of ideology and power in the practice of gender.
a gender label which
Gender is a characteristic existing outside of us; it is the way that society determines how society
categorises people. We are born into a world of gendered practices understands us, and how
and we are actively acculturated into these practices. Thus in terms of we understand society.
developing our identities or personalities, our choices around gender

are limited to those that society deems appropriate. The social (external)
is thus pivotal in the creation of the individual (internal). Most gender
theorists agree that gender is a social construct, that is, an aspect of our
identity that emerges from social practice.
The role of the social structure

Social structure. The social structure is the relatively stable manner in which individuals
The relatively stable in a particular culture are organised to carry out their roles and
manner in which functions. It is this organisation that gives a society its basic character,
individuals in a particular
which distinguishes it from other societies, and which forms the lives
culture are organised
to carry out their roles
of its individual members. The contents of culture are strongly linked
and functions in their to social structure. Cultural or ideological products comprise the stand-
particular society. ards for deciding what exists and what can be, how we feel about these
circumstances and what to do about how we feel, and the standards for
determining how we should act (Goodenough, 1963, in Fishbein, 1984).
Our experience of the world, our perceptions, and our concepts give
form to what exists, and these are acquired through social interaction.
Gender lenses. What can be consists of our beliefs and propositions through which we
Mechanisms for the are able to explain our experiences. Our values determine how we feel
assimilation of what exists, about this existence (Fishbein, 1984).
which shape how we
perceive, conceive and Gender lenses
discuss our social reality in
We have to make sense of what exists, what can exist, how we feel about
terms of gender.
this, and how to deal with our feelings in respect of what exists. One of the
Biological essentialism. ways in which we assimilate what exists is through gender. The mechanism
Where biological through which this process occurs can be conceptualised as our gender
differences between lenses. It is these gender lenses that shape the way we perceive, conceive
males and females are of and discuss our social reality. These gender lenses are embedded within
central to the organisation our social institutions and, therefore, mould material practice (such as
of a society.
gender discrepancies in monetary remuneration). Thus our social reality is
Androcentrism.
constituted. Three gender lenses have been identified in society, and they are
Where the male and male considered to be our mechanisms for defining gender: biological essential-
experience is defined ism, androcentrism and gender polarisation (Bem, 1993). These three gender
as the norm or lenses operate simultaneously in society in complexly related ways.
neutral standard. The lens of biological essentialism is a secularised framework of the
teleological scheme of existence provided by religion. This secularised
Gender polarisation.
framework is constructed through a substitution of religious principles
A social organising
principle in which the
with ‘scientific’ ones. Consequently, explanations involve an evolution
perceived differences of a teleological creation. Thus gender is no longer a matter of faith but
between male and of ‘scientific proof’, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. Money (1965) postulated that
female are central. biology and culture combined to form critical periods in gender identity
development. A critical period is a brief time in life when biological changes
Critical period. A brief combine with environmental events to produce virtually irreversible
time in life when biological
gender role patterning (Crain, 1992). There are two critical periods for
changes combine with
environmental events
this development: in the first three years and during adolescence. It is
to produce virtually during these two critical periods that the individual is faced with rapid
irreversible gender physiological changes that influence gender role development, after which
role patterning. several outcomes are possible.
First, the individual may develop an adaptive concept of masculinity

or femininity, which is in accordance with the social scripts for his or Scripts. Organised sets
her biological category. Second, the individual may be confused about of knowledge that detail
the psychological characteristics of gender that are associated with the what individuals know
about common activities.
biological category. Third, the individual may settle on some mixed gender
role, for example a female role and a male body (Santrock & Yussen,
1987). However, congruence between role and body may not necessarily
be psychologically healthy, as girls increasingly assume more masculine
characteristics in order to cope in a capitalist society.
Androcentrism is embedded within our cultural discursive practices,
individual psyches, and social institutions. This lens defines the norm, or
the neutral standard, as the definition of the male and male experience.
The female and female experience are positioned as deviations from
the norm, which is sex-specific. Therefore, males are not viewed as only
superior and females as inferior, but rather, males are conceptualised as
‘human’ and females as ‘other’. This ‘othering’ process is implicated in
broader ideological functioning that works in the interests of patriarchal
power relations within society. To this end, some gender theorists have
argued that we need to investigate what functions certain gender roles and
values serve in society. The argument here emphasises societal practices as
opposed to individual differences.
The lens of gender polarisation incorporates the perceived differences Gender polarisation.
between males and females as the central organising principle for the social A social organising
life of a particular culture. Virtually every facet of human experience (for principle in which the
perceived differences
instance social roles, dress codes, expressing emotion, and sexual desire)
between male and
is affected by the differences between males and females. Psychological female are central.
theories, for the most part, conceptualise gender through the lens of gender
polarisation. Thus, mutually exclusive scripts for gender have been defined.
Traits that are thought to be typical of one sex or another are identified
as either masculine or feminine characteristics. This understanding has
two implications. First, we believe that either men or women possess a
certain characteristic. This is a descriptive notion—it helps us to describe
what men and women are. Second, we believe that either men or women
should possess this characteristic. This is a normative idea and provides the
rules for how men and women should behave. This normative function of
gender is illustrative of a broader normalising function of developmental
psychology, which reinforces specific sets of relations within society.
An understanding of the role and influence of power in how norms
become regulated and are experienced by men and women is crucial to
understanding the ideological role of gender in general.
Any discussion of the differences between males and females is
complicated by more general assumptions and speculations about cognitive
and emotional development. An example of this would be the nature and
nurture debate. This debate centres on the relative roles, inborn characteristics
and the effect of social interaction in the moulding of the gender identities
of individuals. In addition, each society or culture has its own views about
which traits belong to either males or females, which means, therefore, that
physical differences are associated with mental ones (Fuchs Epstein, 1988).
An implication of this is that the individual who deviates from prescribed
gender scripts is labelled as problematic. The effects and implications

of these mutually exclusive scripts are to both construct and to naturalise
the gender-polarising link between biological sex and the character of the
individual psyche (Bem, 1993).
The lenses of gender polarisation and androcentrism may become con-
flated, with the consequence that scripts for male and female are valorised, the
male stereotype positioned as the ‘norm’ and the female stereotype positioned
as ‘other’. Furthermore, considering that each society conceives of particular
traits as belonging to specific genders, we may see slightly different gendered
patterns across the globe. This attests to the cultural specificity of gender.
Gender stereotypes
A stereotype is a structured set of expectations and beliefs about the personal
Stereotype. Structured qualities, attributes, and characteristics of a group of individuals (Nelson,
set of expectations and Acker & Manis, 1996). In psychology, stereotypes have traditionally been
beliefs about the personal understood in neutral terms, as one type of categorisation that shares
qualities, attributes and
many of the facets of other cognitive categories (Deux, 1987). The process
characteristics of various
kinds of people.
of gender stereotyping is the portrayal of the ideal or typical characteristics
of males and females. Stereotyping, therefore, is the mechanism through
which the prescriptive process for ideas of ‘normal’ behaviour is
actualised. It is through this process that the concepts of ‘femininity’ and
‘masculinity’ become opposites (Sharpe, 1978). Stereotyping behaviour
may often be linked to broader ideological functioning that is deployed
to reinforce existing power relations between men and women. In this
sense, stereotyping is never only about cognitive processing, as is often
emphasised in traditional social psychology.
Our gender belief system may be our internal site of gender stereotypes.
This system is composed of our beliefs and opinions about males and
females, and the qualities of masculinity and femininity. This belief system
includes attitudes towards prescribed behav-
iours and roles, and attitudes towards those
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
individuals who differ from our internalised

notions (Deaux & Kite, 1987). Our belief
systems also impact on our gender attributes,
which may be divided into three classes: defining
characteristics (biological differences between
male and female); identifying characteristics
(which focus on externally visible signs), and
ascribed characteristics (the adjectives we use
to describe traits) (Aube, Norcliff, Craig &
Koestner, 1995). Stereotype threat work has
further allowed us to understand how some
social stereotypes may function in debilitating
Society has certain ways for the stereotyped individual. For example, the stereotype about
expectations of how both women not being as good at science as men may work to undermine a
girls and boys should
behave. These expectations
female student’s belief in her own ability as well as her performance in
are reflected in the toys and a science class. In this instance, if the student thinks that her lecturer holds
clothing that are purchased this gendered stereotype she may be conditioned to underperform. This is
for children. generally what is referred to as stereotype vulnerability.
No universal definitions of masculine and feminine

personalities
Mead (1950, in Sharpe, 1978) investigated the construction of gender from
the perspective of anthropology. She found that there was no universal
definition of masculine or feminine personalities. Mead argued that
the differentiation between the sexes and the surrounding values and
attitudes of this differentiation are greatly influenced by the economic
structure of a given society and by that society’s division of labour. For
example, in a society in which the economy is dependent on the constant
care of animals or the tending of crops, both genders may be taught to
be responsible, obedient and compliant. These are characteristics that are
described as feminine in industrialised societies. In contrast, in a society
in which hunting and fishing are central to the economy, both sexes may
be encouraged to be self-reliant, achievement-oriented and assertive. In
industrialised societies these characteristics form part of the masculine
gender identity (Sharpe, 1978). The society’s economic structure in this
instance is shown to be constraining in terms of how people experience
gender and gendered practices. This role and function of gender
stereotypes is elaborated later in the chapter.
Cross-culturally generalisable stereotypes

Although there is no universally adopted manner in which genders are
defined, different societies do hold similar stereotypes about gender.
Comparisons between the iconic western industrialised society, the United
States, and other industrialised countries reveal both similarities and
differences in gender stereotypes. William and Best (1982, in Deux, 1987)
reviewed the gender stereotypes of 30 countries in all seven continents.
Cross-culturally generalisable stereotypes included notions of males as
strong, active, autonomous, achievement-orientated and aggressive,
and notions of females as weak, passive, affiliation-orientated, nurturing
and deferent. Although the manner in which stereotyped traits are
labelled may differ, gender differences usually fall into this framework
of instrumental (male) versus expressive (female) traits (Aube et al, 1995).
Therefore, masculine and feminine stereotypes are typically viewed as
opposite ends of one continuum. Thus, by definition, what is masculine
is not feminine and vice versa. This idea is reinforced in the English
language through such phrases as ‘the opposite sex’.
Fuzzy sets
The perspective from which the understanding of masculinity and
femininity is constructed is important. This is because our language, by
which we delimit and define such constructs, changes according to the
usefulness of the constructs within a given society at a particular time.
Often there is no evidence of actual differences between the genders
in terms of constructs such as achievement-orientation, self-esteem,
sociability, nurturance and dominance (Deux, 1987). It is important
to acknowledge that our ideas of what is masculine and feminine are
located as ‘fuzzy sets’. This means that there are no universal definitions
of masculinity and femininity. Definitions of these constructs primarily
consist of associated characteristics that relate to them in varying degrees

of probability. It is important to acknowledge points of confusion and
lack of clarity which are inherent in concepts of gender and which evolve
within a particular sociohistorical context. Gender stereotyping may occur
in the kinds of roles we attribute to both women and men. We may tend
to explain gender roles in terms of individuals’ personality differences
(see the interest box below). Social roles in this sense may also influence
perceptions of gender.
Brown Buttons and Grey Buttons at a singles bar
The scene is a ‘singles’ bar located in a As the music comes to an end, Grey
middle-sized town. Some people are dancing Buttons says, ‘You are a very interesting
in one section of the room. Others are sitting person. I’d like us to talk some more…why
or standing around the bar drinking and don’t we sit over here?’ motioning to a
socialising. An individual with brown shirt small table in the corner.
buttons (Brown Buttons) walks purposefully ?
toward a person with grey shirt buttons They’ve been sitting for quite a while.
(Grey Buttons) and begins a conversation. Brown Buttons orders drinks again,
After a few minutes, Brown Buttons asks Grey and they continue to talk … ‘I’m really
Buttons to dance. Grey Buttons agrees, and fascinated by your life; I’d like to get to
they begin to move to the dancing area. know you better.’
? ‘That’s interesting,’ says Grey Buttons.
As they start to dance, Grey Buttons ‘I find you exciting too, but I’m not
says to Brown Buttons, ‘You are a good sure that I’m able to handle too much
dancer. I don’t come across many people familiarity now. I’m really interested in
who dance this well.’ pursuing my career…’
‘Thank you’ says Brown Buttons with ?
a slightly embarrassed smile. ‘I think you ‘I understand your position,’ says
dance well too.’ Brown Buttons, ‘but I’d really like to
‘What do you do for a living?’ asks see more of you.’
Grey Buttons. ‘I’m going to think about it,’ says
‘I’m a high school teacher’, answers Grey Buttons. ‘Why don’t we stop off at
Brown Buttons. ‘And you?’ my place? Perhaps we’d both get some
‘I’m a research technician,’ says Grey perspective over coffee and…’
Buttons, ‘but I’m thinking of getting
into computers.’ Source: Crawford & Unger, 2004: 70
The developmental process of gender identity

formation
Psychological gender is extremely difficult to alter after the child is two
to three years old (Kate, 1979). It is thought that a rudimentary gender
identity develops between the ages of 18 months and three years. Children
correctly label themselves and others as either male or female at this age
(Louw, 1991). In observations of children’s play and sex-role development
between the ages of one and three years, children displayed a great deal
of interest in gender-typed activities and play. In home observations, the

girls played with dolls, soft toys, dress-up clothes and danced more, while
boys played with blocks and transportation toys (Santrock & Yussen, 1987).
These differences between the genders are not necessarily biological in
nature, but may have occurred because parents purchased gender-specific
toys, thereby limiting the choices of both girls and boys.
During the preschool years, the child’s understanding of gender
identity may be somewhat limited because children do not necessarily
display gender constancy. Between the ages of three and seven years, the Gender constancy.
child’s understanding of gender constancy (that is, the understanding The understanding that
that gender does not change) develops further (See next section). The gender does not change.
child will increasingly enjoy spending time with peers of the same sex.
His or her knowledge of gender stereotypes increases and both personal
and social attributes of gender are further developed. Mussen, Conger,
Kagan & Haston (1990) postulate that during the preschool years the
child’s gender stereotypes are absolute prescriptions for what is considered
to be appropriate behaviour. Children may enforce these stereotypes
with more rigidity than adults. During the stage of middle childhood,
children continue to define their understandings of the social expectations
of gender, but their thoughts about gender stereotypes become less rigid
than they were in early childhood (Mussen et al, 1990). During this stage,
girls do not display an increase in feminine activities, but show a stronger
preference for masculine activities and interests.
In terms of the developmental stage of adolescence, theorists often
incorporate the notion of sexual identity into gendered identity. These two
constructs are generally seen as mutually inclusive. Thus, the adolescent
consolidates her or his commitment to a gendered identity and begins to
explore the ways in which this gendered identity will relate to the gendered
identity of another individual. Gendered identity continues to evolve
into adulthood as our roles in society change and develop: for example,
the gendered roles associated with marriage, parenting, and the work
environment. This perspective is predominantly explanatory of hetero-
sexuality and traditional psychological theories have not fully provided an
adequate account of the development of alternative sexual identities.
The gender of other individuals is an important and salient criterion
by which children formulate their responses to their environments
(Maccoby, 1988). Gender identification and stereotyping occurs through
the process of the development of the notions of gender constancy, gender
valuing and gender stereotyping, all within the contextual framework of
economic factors.
Gender constancy
When determining whether or not children uphold gender stereotypes,
we need to determine, firstly, whether or not these children have attained
an understanding of gender constancy. For a child to have developed a
sense of gender constancy, he or she has to have a biological understanding
of gender. This involves understanding that gender generally does not
change. This understanding is acquired in three stages. First, the child
will acquire a rudimentary gender identity as either a boy or a girl. Second,
the child will learn that the genitalia do not change. This occurs at about
four years. Third, the child will understand that gender remains the same
regardless of changes in clothing, appearance or activities. This occurs at
about five or six years.
In the United States, by the age of three years, children were found to
be able to classify males and females correctly, and were aware of the social
expectations surrounding each gender; for example, girls wear dresses and
boys do not (Papalia & Olds, 1993). Between the ages of four and five years,
children possess knowledge of the stereotypes for adult occupations; for
example, women are nurses and men are doctors. In this sense, culture may
be understood to function ideologically in its favouring of some gendered
practices and not others.
Gender valuing
An important part of the awareness of the social categories of gender is that
children often value the categories to which they assign themselves and
devalue those categories to which they do not belong (Powlishta, Serbin,
Doyle & White, 1994). It is often considered important that children value
their particular categories in order to formulate a gender identity (Turner
& Gervai, 1995). The notion of valuing may be more complex for girls
because the masculine identity is generally more valued in societies such
as South Africa.
Gender stereotyping
Labelling. Attaching a An important part of the acquisition of gender labelling and identity is
meaning to an object or a developing awareness of gender stereotypes. Some children who are
an individual, which helps
as young as two years old have acquired gender stereotypes around toys
individuals to order
their world.
and activities (Mayes, 1986) and adult occupations (Weintraub, Pritchard-
Clemens, Sockloff, Ethridge, Gracely & Myers, 1984). Other important
gender stereotypes include appearance (Edelbrock & Sugwara, 1978),
peers (Beneneson, Apostoleris & Parnass, 1997; Newcomb & Bagwell,
1995), and media figures (Santrock & Yussen, 1987). The examination of
the development of social skills relating to gender has found that mothers
and fathers interact differently with boys and girls (Best, House, Barnard
and Spicker 1994). Boys are generally more stereotyped and show more
negative reactions to female-preferred activities than girls do to male-
preferred activities. This is thought to occur because girls receive more
latitude in terms of constructing themselves around gender stereotypes
(Fagot, 1977). It is in this sense that some feminists have argued that the
category, ‘woman’, is not universal.
Socio-economic factors and gender

There is evidence for differences between economic groups in terms of
adherence to gender stereotypes (MacKinnon-Lewis, Volling, Lamb,
Dechman, Rabiner & Curtner, 1994). Expectations of the self and others are
developed through the experience of interactions with primary caregivers,
particularly during infancy and early childhood. It is these experiences that
predispose children to respond selectively to later experiences (Bowlby,
1980). MacKinnon-Lewis et al (1994) found that economic difficulties
form the setting in which coercive parent-child interactions occur. Part of

this coercive interaction may be strict adherence to gender stereotypes.
Differences in socialisation have been consistently found in different
income groups. Accordingly, children from higher income groups (people
who work in professional and managerial positions, and usually have some
form of tertiary education) (Giddens, 1992) are generally exposed to a greater
emphasis on individuality. They have fathers who are more involved with
them, and they experience discipline that is based on reasoning and shame
(Lewis, 1987). In contrast, children from lower income groups (people who
work in the blue-collar or manual occupations, such as skilled and unskilled
workers) are generally exposed to an emphasis on conformity to social roles,
especially gender roles (Giddens, 1992). These children generally come from
larger nuclear and extended families in which more specialised family roles
are prevalent and they experience more physical discipline (Lewis, 1987).
Barbie and beyond: An example of

gender identity research in South Africa
With the changes in the political they do ballet... and they wear skirts’
dispensation in South Africa, a new (Haiden, 1998: 56).
pattern of social thought has become
dominant. We now have a Constitution The following dialogue presents a
that guarantees equal rights to all few interesting observations in terms of
citizens. One of these rights is equality in activity and toy stereotypes:
terms of gender.
The Constitution should reflect Question: What do girls do when they play?
the attitudes of the people. We can Answer: They like to do all kinds of stuff.
assume, therefore, that because it is in They like Princess...
the Constitution South Africans believe Question: How do you play Princess?
in gender equality. If this assumption is Answer: Princess ... there’s like the queen
correct, then we should be raising our and the princess, the wicked witch and
children to believe in gender equality. stuff... The wicked witch treats Cinderella
This notion was scrutinised in relation like rubbish ... and like isn’t very, very
to a group of six-year-old girls. These girls nice. The princess, she cleans up the floor
were asked about their beliefs regarding and stuff like the ugly witch tells her to ...
gender and gender stereotypes. All the Question: What makes toys be for girls?
girls could correctly label themselves as Answer: Toys is Barbies and like talking
girls. They valued being a girl because dolls and ... clothes. Barbie clothes and
girls perform better academically (even the most important thing that I like in the
though they were all still in preschool). whole wide world is Barbie. I’ve always
They all would choose to be girls because asked my Mommy and Daddy
girls are not naughty or aggressive. for Christmas.
In terms of appearance stereotypes, most Gender stereotyping for activities is

of the girls believed that ‘[girls] ... have less strictly prescribed for girls than it
dresses on ... they have long hair... and is for boys (Fagot, 1977).
>>
<<
This was evidenced in the following play with Kens, but not Barbies (Haiden &
girl’s comments: Zietkiewicz, 1999).
Question: Can girls play with guns Thus, even though we have a
and cars? Constitution that guarantees gender
Answer: No ... I don’t play with cars. equality, are children still being raised
Because it isn’t right for [girls] to. with gender stereotypes and rules for
They have to play with Barbies and stuff. gender behaviour?
If they haven’t got anything to play with Considering the evidence presented
then they can, but it’s not right for them. here and your own childhood experiences,
Question: Can boys play with dolls? what do you think is the ideal way to raise
Answer: No ... they just can’t. They can children in terms of gender socialisation?
Explanations of gender identity formation

Many psychological explanations about the formation of gender identity
have been proposed. These include explanations concerning biological
differences, a psychoanalytic explanation from Freud, cognitive devel-
opment, social learning and environmental theory. Critiques from feminist
and critical psychological approaches have also broadened our understand-
ing and conceptualisation of gender identity development.
Biological explanations
Gender identity Gender identity formation has often been explained through the physiology
formation. Development or biology of girls and boys. According to this explanation, the child’s
of the sense of being physiological constitution as either a boy or a girl will automatically and
masculine or feminine.
naturally determine his or her masculine or feminine gender identity
(Craig, 1996). This explanation, however, does not receive much support
and evidence has been produced which indicates that physical sex has little to
do with psychological gender. Money, Erhardt & Masica (1968, in Papalia &
Olds,1993) examined subjects who were chromosomally male (that is, they had
testes and not ovaries), but looked like females, and were raised as girls. These
children were all stereotypically female and played with dolls and other girls’
toys. Money and Tucker (1975, in Sarafino & Armstrong, 1980) reported a
male who was raised as a female. During a circumcision procedure at seven
months, one identical twin’s penis was irreparably damaged. At 17 months,
doctors advised the parents to raise the child as a girl. The child’s genital
structures were modified and she or he underwent hormone treatment. The
parents changed the child’s name, clothing and hair accordingly. At three
years, the child’s gender identity was diverging from her twin brother’s.
At five years, she preferred wearing frilly dresses, and asked for a doll for
Christmas. In short, she was conforming to a feminine stereotype (Money
& Tucker, 1975, in Sarafino & Armstrong, 1980). This evidence would
suggest that the examination of gender identity formation cannot occur
without consideration of social factors. However, Money & Tucker did not
provide an account of the individual’s adolescent development. Subsequent
evidence suggests that the subject in the study in question experienced
anxiety, problems in the formation of identity, struggling with the perception
of being a man in a woman’s body. This would therefore suggest that biology
may have some role to play in gendered identity.
Freud’s psychoanalytic explanation

Freud identified two processes of identification: anaclitic and aggressive Anaclitic identification.
identification. In terms of anaclitic identification, the individual is moti- Identification that
vated to reproduce the behaviour of the parent because of the threatened occurs because of
threatened withdrawal
withdrawal of parental affection. Both girls and boys form an anaclitic
of parental affection.
bond with their mothers. This form of identification is more important
for girls because its pattern is maintained, while boys shift to identifying with Aggressive identification.
the father as a model (Parke, 1979). Aggressive identification involves Identification that
the adoption of parental behaviour through fear of punishment. This, occurs because of
according to Freud, facilitates the shift of boys towards the father as a role fear of punishment.
model and occurs at the resolution of the Oedipal complex (Parke, 1979)
(see chapter on Freud’s theory of development for more detail). It has been
argued, however, that Freud’s explanation does not adequately account for
gender identity formation in single-parent or same-sex parent households
(Mussen et al, 1990; Santrock & Yussen, 1987).
Cognitive development
Kohlberg (1966) postulated that gender identity development is a function
of cognitive developmental changes. Children achieve gender identity
(classifying themselves as girls or boys) as part of a general tendency
to think in terms of categories. Once this gender identity has been
established, the child will actively seek out behaviour, activities and values
that distinguish boys from girls and subscribe to the gender category that
he or she belongs to. This process is considered to be complete when the
child achieves gender constancy and it is accompanied by Piaget’s notion
of concrete operational thought (Grain, 1992) (see chapter on Piaget’s
theory of cognitive development for more detail).
Block (1973) expanded Kohlberg’s theory in terms of stages of gender
identity development. First, very young children will possess undifferen-
tiated gender role concepts. Second, in the preschool years, the child will
conform to conventional and rigid gender roles. Third, during early
adolescence, this rigidity will be at a maximum. Finally, during adulthood, a
stronger androgyny emerges (Mussen et al, 1990). It should be noted, however,
that not all children place a high value on the roles that have been prescribed
for their gender, and this theory also does not explain individual differences
in the nature and strength of gender typing (Mussen et al, 1990).
Gender schema theory

Schemata or schemas may also be utilised to explain gender identity Schema (pl. schemata).
formation. Schemata can be understood as the manner in which we arrange The manner in which we
our knowledge about people and things (Sabini, 1995). People are more likely arrange our knowledge and
memory about people and
to remember information that is consistent with their existing schemas than
things. (See Chapter 17:
information that is in contradiction to them. Thus, information is absorbed Memory development.)
on the basis of existing knowledge structures. The information in our memory
is often organised around our schemas (Craig, 1996). Thus, once the child has
acquired a gender role schema, he or she will interpret events in terms of this
schema. If events are in violation of this schema, the child may fail to notice
or remember them. Gender schema theory is an example of the meeting
of cognitive and social theories. This is because it assumes that in societies
that are gender polarised, this internalised lens facilitates the developmental
process of conventionally gendered perceptions. This theory, therefore, rests
on two fundamental tenets: first, that gender lenses are entrenched in societal
discourses and practice, and internalised by children; and second, that once
these lenses have been internalised, the child is predisposed to constructing
his or her identity in a manner that is congruent with this lens (Bem, 1993).
This theory does not, however, explain how the child acquires a gender role
schema and how the schema may differ from child to child.
Gender salience
Gender salience. Where Gender salience may be a further aspect of cognitive development that offers
gender is considered an an explanation for gender identity formation. Gender may be more salient
important organising or important to some children than it is to others. Some children may view
principle for the individual.
and interpret the world through gender-based lenses, while others may
interpret it through other categories (Papalia & Olds, 1993). An example
of the impact of gender salience may be as follows: A group of children are
playing with a ball in a park. Child A, for whom gender is salient, may
ask herself whether or not playing with a ball is an activity in which girls
participate, or whether other girls are playing. Child B, for whom gender is
not salient, may ask herself whether she will look foolish or clumsy if she
participates (Mussen et al, 1990). Although this theory may provide insight
into individual differences in gender identity formation, it does not explain
why for some children gender is salient, while not for others.
An important aspect to remember in the formation of gender identity is
the role of language in this process. The English language contains many
gender biases, for example, man and he have traditionally been used to refer
to all humans, both male and female. Sexist thought and gender stereotyping
may thus be the product of years of exposure to sexist language (Santrock &
Yussen, 1987). This masculinist bias is reflected in many languages.
Social learning and environmental factors

This explanation holds that gender identity development occurs as a result
of instrumental conditioning and observation. Thus, a child is reinforced
or punished for different stereotypical behaviours from early childhood.
This reinforcement or punishment may come from several sources, such as
parents, peers, teachers and the media (Louw, 1991).
The role of parents

In terms of the role of parents in the formation of gender identity, one has to
consider the gender stereotypes which the parents themselves hold, which
they will then expose their children to. Provenco & Luria (1974, in Sarafino
& Armstrong, 1980) interviewed parents of newborns on the first day of
their children’s lives. Male and female babies were matched for general
health, weight, and size, but both mothers and fathers described the sexes in
gendered terms. Girls were described as being smaller, softer and less atten-
tive, while boys were described as being stronger, firmer, better coordinated
and more alert. Thus, the expectations of the parents were based on societally-
gendered notions of the different sexes. Lamb (1981) found that, in terms of
parental roles, mothers assumed more responsibility for physical care and
nurturance, while fathers fulfilled the role of providing playful interaction,
and were more demanding and exacting in seeing that the child conformed
to societal norms. McCandless (1967) found that parents engaged in selective
reinforcement of gender-appropriate behaviour. Fathers were rougher in
play with their sons than with their daughters, and generally mothers were
gentler when playing with their sons. In terms of toys, parents bought toys
such as guns, transportation toys and footballs for boys, while girls received
toys such as tea sets, dolls and doll furniture (McCandless, 1967).
Rheingold & Cook (1975, in Sarafino & Armstrong, 1980) examined
the bedrooms of middle-class preschool children and found that the boys’
rooms were decorated with animals and the girls’ rooms were decorated
in florals and frills. In terms of household chores, girls were assigned tasks
such as washing dishes and dusting, while boys had to take out the dustbin
and wash the car (Sarafino & Armstrong, 1980). Thus, the actions and
gender stereotypes of parents themselves that are vital in the formation of
a child’s gender identity. It is through this process that gender stereotypes
are perpetuated from generation to generation.
Parents also tend to socialise boys more intensely than girls, and there is
considerable pressure on the boy to act like a ‘real boy and not like [a] girl’
(Papalia & Olds, 1993: 391). Girls are allowed more freedom in terms of
clothing, games, play and playmates. Fathers appear to be a major influence
in gender stereotyping, appearing more concerned about this than mothers.
Fathers become more easily upset when their sons engage in cross-gender play
(Biller, 1993). In terms of single-parent homes, it is usually the mother who
is the single parent. Children from these homes tend to hold less stereotyped
views because the mother is a more androgynous role model (Kate, 1979). In
these homes, boys show a more feminine patterning of behaviour, but this Children prefer playmates
does depend on the attitude of the mother (Lamb, 1981). of the same gender.
PHOTOS: CH A JOHNSTON
The role of peers

Peers may also influence gender identity formation. As early as the preschool
years, peers reward gender-appropriate activity or play. Children who engage
in cross-gender activities are generally either criticised by their peers or left
to play alone. Social labels such as ‘sissy’ and ‘tomboy’ are common terms
used to describe boys and girls who engage in cross-gender activities. These
labels are indicative of the varying values and freedom that are attached
to traditional gender roles. Accordingly, ‘sissy’ is a more pejorative term
than ‘tomboy’. Perhaps successful tomboys are the best example of ‘gender
bilinguals’ (Santrock & Yussen, 1987: 492), who are successful in both
same- and cross-gender play, and are not ostracised by their peers. These
girls are able to switch patterns of talk, naming, touch, and space as they
cross the divide between the genders. They have access to the segregated
activity of boys, depending on their verbal and athletic skills, and their
willingness to fight. They maintain access to girls’ activities by claiming
friendship with the most popular girl and guarding the play of girls from
the invasion of boys (Santrock & Yussen, 1987).
The role of the media

The media contributes to the formation of gender identity in terms of
exposing children to stereotypes. Evidence for the role of the media in
gender identity formation in South African children is sparse. However,
international evidence suggests most
PHOTO: CHA JOHNSTON
children watch an average of three to five

hours of television each day. Many pro-
grammes on television portray roles that
are distinctly either masculine or feminine
(Perloff, Brown & Miller, 1978, in Santrock
& Yussen, 1987). Occupational stereotypes
are also highly prevalent, for instance, the
male is a member of the workforce and
the female is the romantic interest of the
male and/or a housewife. In advertising,
stereotypes are even more prevalent.
Women appear in advertisements for
Gender neutrals or home appliances and beauty and cleaning products, and men appear in
‘tomboys’ are able to advertisements for cars and liquor (Santrock & Yussen, 1987). Thus, the
cross the gender
media serve as a potential source of gender-role stereotypes, which children
divide successfully.
may incorporate into their own gender identities.
All the above psychological explanations of gender development are
located within a tradition that defines gender as a binary construct that
includes a perception of the individual as located within a neutral and
apolitical developmental context. In addition, researchers are often viewed
as neutral and objective observers. This tradition has come under severe
criticism by feminist and critical-oriented theorists discussed below.
Feminist contributions
Since the emergence of the feminist movement there have been significant
contributions to writings on gender development by feminist researchers
that have critiqued traditional models of development as exclusive of
women’s subjective experiences of gender. In addition, these contributions
have also proposed alternative approaches that seek to address such
omissions. The work of Carol Gilligan (1982), for example, represents
a challenge to models of development based on male norms. Gilligan’s
work is not only significant in its critique of how universal standards
may be biased against women, but also in its challenge to psychology’s

epistemology and ontology. Some of the key contributions of feminist
critique have included a greater emphasis and focus on the issue of power
relations, the subjective experiences of individuals, a material focus of
analysis and a rejection of the notion of an autonomous human subject
that simply develops according to set stages.
Power relations
The influence of power relations that not only exist within society
as a whole but also between the researcher and the subject has gained
increasing attention in developmental psychological research. Qualitative
research methodologies (see Gergen, 1988) have in many ways promoted
this issue of how power dynamics may play out between psychologists
and their participants. These power dynamics reinforce particular
understandings and interpretations of social phenomena and people.
Furthermore, the role of power in how both women and men may
experience gender within society means that we cannot theorise aspects
of human development without taking into account how particular social
relations are produced and negotiated within different societies (Burman,
1994; Butler, 1990).
Subjective experiences
Through research approaches that emphasise the significance of people’s
subjective experiences and the meanings that they ascribe to these
experiences, a crucial shift in the traditional paradigm of the objective
researcher interested only in experimental and observable behaviour has
been common in some areas of research in developmental psychology (see
Burman, 1994). This tradition has provided significant understandings
of how women experience gender within society, allowing us to
understand the social nature of the gendered process. However, it may
also be redundant in its tendency to focus only on the description of these
experiences without substantive critical interrogation or engagement with
issues of ideology and power.
Material focus of analysis

Subject matter in much developmental psychology research has tended
to posit a view of human development that occurs in contexts devoid of
social and material inequalities. In this way, the individual subject is seen
to develop or form an identity in contexts devoid of politics or power
imbalances. Feminist critique has shown, however, that these factors
are in fact crucial to the reproduction of and resistance to gendered
development. By incorporating both a material and psychological level
of analysis into research, a more holistic understanding of the subject is
achieved (Burman, 1994; Gergen, 1988).
The autonomous subject

Fundamental to developmental psychological theorising on human
development is the idea of the autonomous subject. The individual is seen as
independent and relatively unaffected by broader sociocultural and economic
contexts in the sense that he or she may independently resist these contexts.
This notion has been severely criticised by many feminist theorists who
emphasise the importance of the shared nature of human relations, whereby
the individual only develops identity in relation to others (Shefer, 2004).
Critical psychological approaches

Critical psychological approaches are fairly recent in their contributions to
understanding the epistemology of psychological knowledge production
and its subject matter more specifically. This contribution has generally
taken the form of challenging psychology for its positivism and its dis-
regard of power differentials. Part of this critique has thus included a
challenge of the notion of the self-contained and self-defining individual.
The emphasis here is on the role of social regulation practices and how
these may actively form the subject. By so doing, a challenge to the role
of psychology itself is promoted, whereby the function of sub-disciplines
like developmental psychology are seen to be complicit in a process of
social regulation by producing norms of behaviour that work to reinforce
inequalities. Five crucial areas of critique are useful to note here:
1. How the subject is socially and historically situated;

2. The relational nature of development, that is, how we are influenced
by others in our production of self;
3. How our identities are not stable but may be characterised by conflict
and tensions;
4. The embodied nature of our identities; and
5. The role of the discursive in how we position ourselves as women and
men within socially available and acceptable practices.
Perhaps the key contribution of a critical psychological approach

to gender identity development has been its elaboration of how
developmental psychology has tended to ‘normalise’ gender difference
(Shefer, 2004). Through constructs of a rigid male and female binary,
developmental psychology has legitimised gender inequality. This has
been achieved through naturalising gender difference and rationalising
gender oppression. Behavioural therapies have historically been deployed
as intervention strategies to ‘cure’ individuals deviating from dichotomous
gender identity prescriptions. This is one example of how developmental
psychology is powerful in its normative role. However, new ways of
understanding gender development have been proposed that seek to
deconstruct or dismantle traditional gender binaries of ‘male’/‘female’ and
‘heterosexual’/‘homosexual’ for instance (see Gergen, 1988; Shefer, 2004).
Conclusion
The following table presents four different positions related to ontology
and epistemology in understanding gender and how knowledge about
gender is created. These four perspectives may share ways of defining
gender as a social construct (ontology), but have different ways of investi-
gating what the social constructs of gender actually mean (epistemology).
We, as authors, have presented a variety of ways in which gender is
currently understood in psychology. We challenge you, the reader, to

explore further these different ways of understanding by engaging with
the table below. If you were a researcher in gender studies, what kinds of
questions would you be interested in asking related to gender, and that are
in line with each of the different approaches?
Cognitive social Discursive Phenomenological Social

psychological psychoanalytic
Theory of The information- The socially- The experiencing, The conflicted

the person processing constructed, embodied individual psyche in dynamic
(ontology) individual in a situated, con- in relation with relation with the
social context. tingent identity. others. external world.
Methodology Statistical Discourse analytic Phenomenological Social psychoanalytic

and (quantitative, (qualitative, (qualitative, through or psychosocial
description through controlled through textual rich description of (qualitative, through
conditions, scien- and conversation experience). interpretation of
tific paradigm). analysis). what is said as
well as unsaid).
Methods Experimental, Conversation First-person written Case study,

social analysis, account of experi- free association,
psychometric. Foucauldian ence, interview, narrative interview,
discourse analysis. literary text. observation.
Unit and Individual External world Detailed description Internal world of

focus of cognitions in of discourse, its of social experience psyche in relational
analysis controlled social meanings and derived through settings and its
conditions. effects. the senses. effect on actions.
Table 29.1 Four approaches to researching gender identity development in psychology.

Adapted from Hollway, Lucey & Phoenix, 2007.
Specific tasks
➊ What are the three best and three worst things about being the gender you are?
Provide justification for each one.
➋ Do you think that gender roles should exist in society? Provide reasons for your answer.
➌ Examine the ways in which you think your culture impacts on your gender identity.
➍ What do you think is the relationship between gender identity and sexual identity?
➎ ‘Men are perpetrators of crime. Women are victims of crime.’
5.1 Do you agree with this statement? Give reasons for your answer.
5.2 Why do you think that this particular dichotomy exists in societies?
➏ Refer to the Box on Brown Buttons and Grey Buttons in the text. At each question
mark, select the sex of the participants. Do you find that it is easy to determine the
sex of the Grey or Brown Buttons? What criteria of gender stereotyping influence
your choice?
6.1 Do you think it is possible to engage in continuous gender inconsistent behaviour
during social interaction? Can masculinity and femininity be complementary
aspects of gender that reproduce sex?
Bem, S L (1993). The lenses of gender. New Haven: Yale University Press.
(This text is a typical example of the ontological and epistemological positions of the positivist
gender researcher located within the social-cognitive perspective. Bem is also the leading proponent
of “androgyny”.)
Burman, E (1994). Deconstructing developmental Psychology. London: Routledge.

(A critical accompaniment to developmental psychology textbooks. This text presents a critical analyses
of knowledge in the field of developmental psychology, providing an insightful critique of the role and
influence of cultural practices to the knowledge base in developmental psychology.)
Butler, J (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge.
(This text is a typical example of the ontological and epistemological positions of a post-positivist
gender researcher. Butler’s seminal text explores the idea of gender identity as performative, that is
the possibilities of forming and choosing individual identity. The text offers a critique of binary forms
of thinking, including feminism, that have promoted a notion of ‘women’ as a group with common
characteristics and agendas.)
Crawford, M & Unger, R (2004). Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (4th ed).
Boston: McGraw Hill.
(This text presents feminist analyses of gender in society from social, economic, political contexts,
illustrating the importance of gender as a system of meanings.)
Gergen, K (1988). Feminist Critique of Science and the Challenge of Social Epistemology. In M Gergen
(ed). Chapter 3. Feminist Thought and the Structure of Knowledge. New York: New York University.
(This reading presents a useful and critical exploration of feminism’s position in critical social science,
critiquing the hegemony of gendered knowledge base.)
Nicholson, L J (1990). Feminism/Postmodernism. New York: Routledge.

(This text presents a critical and insightful analysis of the thorny relationship between feminism and
postmodernism, including the epistemological difficulties that a postmodern standpoint presents for the
feminist project.)
Reinisch, J M (1987). Masculinity/Femininity: Basic perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
(Providing comprehensive summaries of the different positivist psychological explanations of gender
identity and its formation, this text is a comprehensive historical introduction to the study of gender.)
Wood, J T (1994). Gendered Lives: Communication, gender and culture. Belmont: Wordsworth.
(The social nature of gender means that the viewpoints of other disciplines may assist the reader
to understand the notion of gender. This text provides an introduction to the approaches offered
by sociology.)
For a number of articles on the history of adolescence and adolescent sexuality see the journal
The History of the Family, 8, 2003.
CHAPTER
30
Theory and South African
research and literature
Catriona Macleod
In this chapter we examine the theoretical assumptions that

drive developmental psychology research and literature in
South Africa.
The basic underlying models utilised in developmental

research may be described as (a) mechanistic, (b) organismic,
(c) contextual, and (d) social constructionist. A description of
the fundamental premises of each of these will be followed by
examples of research that utilise the particular approach.
In the discussion, some of the controversies that plague
developmental psychology research will be highlighted.
The questions that form the basis for this chapter are:
* What are the theoretical frameworks utilised by South

African researchers and authors in developmental psychology?
* How are these theories put to work to highlight issues
in people’s lives in the South African context?
* What are some of the criticisms that could be levelled at
the theories used?
These questions are important in the light of the dominance of

Euro-American research in our textbooks and many
developmental psychology courses.
Theoretical frameworks
It must be made clear from the outset, however, that this chapter is
not intended as a comprehensive review of developmental psychology
research and literature in South Africa, for two reasons. First, putting
boundaries around what counts as developmental psychology, and what
does not, proves to be difficult. For example, collecting research on
children only is not satisfactory, given the life-span developmental theories.
Focusing on work that specifically studies individual development is also
not adequate, given the emphasis on the meso-, exo- and chrono-systems
of Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) approach. Asking the questions ‘Which
studies concerning children, adolescents, adults and the aged are relevant,
and which not?’ and ‘Which studies on the family, the school, race, class,
cultural issues etc. are relevant and which not?’ becomes a tedious, and
perhaps not very useful task. Second, researchers in South Africa, contrary
to popular belief, are relatively prolific. Collating and summarising all the
Mechanistic approach.
A philosophical approach
research in developmental psychology (whatever the boundaries decided
to studying humans upon) exceeds the scope of the current chapter. In this chapter, therefore,
that maintains that all we shall take a broad view of the field in the last 15 years, discussing the
phenomena may be main theoretical trends and illustrating each with examples of research or
understood in terms of theoretical writing.
cause and effect, and that In structuring this chapter I have utilised Overton & Reese’s
basic universal laws may
(1973, cited in Widdershoven, 1997) distinction between mechanistic
be established.
and organismic models of development, as well as Lerner (1986) and
Organismic approach. A Widdershoven’s (1997) extension of this to the contextual and narrative
theoretical approach that models, respectively.
emphasises the need to In 1973, Overton & Reese (in Widdershoven, 1997) identified two
approach people as a total basic metaphors or models that underlay developmental psychology
entity with a multitude of theorising of the time. What they meant by this is that all the theories
inter-related processes.
of human development could broadly be divided into two categories
Contextual approach.
in terms of their underlying philosophical assumptions about the
An approach to the study nature of development and the nature of the developing person. They
of psychology that posits called these two categories mechanistic and organismic (more detail
that behaviour must be concerning what is meant by each of these is supplied in the relevant
studied in relation to the sections below). In response to further developments in the field,
context within which Lerner (1986) introduced a further category, the contextual model.
it occurs; interpreting
At a later stage, Widdershoven (1997) discusses a narrative approach
behaviour outside the
context is misleading.
to developmental psychology. Although Widdershoven (1997)
introduces an important new element to the broad understanding
of the basic models underlying developmental theorising, his use
Narrative approach.
Emphasises the central role of the word ‘narrative’ is less than inclusive. Narrative theory is
of language and meaning- just one approach within many broadly identified with the social
making in the formation constructionist movement in psychology. Thus, for the fourth model
and structuring of self, we shall propose a social constructionist model.
identity and the other. Work in developmental psychology has from its inception been
plagued by a number of controversies. These controversies are usually
Social constructionist
posed in the form of dualisms: nature versus nurture; continuity
approaches. Theoretical
approaches that highlight versus discontinuity; universality versus relativism; activity versus
the role of language in passivity; risk versus resilience. The questions evolving from these
constructing reality. controversies essentially are: To what extent is human development a
T h e o r y a n d S o u t h A f r i c a n d e v e l o p m e n t a l p s y c h o l o g y r e s e a rc h a n d l i t e r a t u r e 621
PHO TO : CATRI O NA MACLEO D

function of biological or hereditary forces or of
environmental and social influences? Is human
development an additive process that occurs
gradually and continuously, or are there a series
of abrupt changes in which the person is elevated
to a new and more advanced level of functioning?
To what extent do developmental sequences
apply to all ‘normal’ people in all cultures, and
to what extent do specific cultural or sub-cultural
factors affect development? Are children active
in determining the outcome of their development
or are they passive recipients of environmental
and genetic influences? Are all children that are
exposed to difficult circumstances vulnerable or
at risk for developing problems or do some cope
well without being negatively affected? These
controversies have been debated in the literature
for some time now. Often, however, a researcher
may merely assume one or the other position. In
this chapter we shall delineate how some of these
controversies have been taken up in the South
African literature.
Mechanistic approaches A life-span approach to

In mechanistic approaches human development is seen as a collection of human development means
elements, each of which can be causally explained (much like the working that research on people in
of a machine). Events are seen as causally related to prior events and, middle to late adulthood
should be included in any
under the same set of circumstances, equal causes will have equal effects. review of developmental
Humans are seen as passive in that they develop as a result of outside psychology.
influences. Development is continuous, with change happening gradually
as new elements (such as new behaviour patterns) are added or subtracted.
Behaviourism, with its emphasis on learning theory, represents the most
striking example of a mechanistic approach.
Morojele’s (1997) discussion of adolescent use and abuse of alcohol
provides an example of a mechanistic approach. She discusses Ajzen’s theory
of planned behaviour, which is based on a rational decision-making model
of behaviour referred to as the theory of reasoned action. She modifies an
illustrating diagram from Ajzen & Madden (1986, cited in Morojele, 1997),
which is reproduced below. Each box represents a discrete, identifiable
attribute or the interaction of two attributes (outcome beliefs and intention
to perform the behaviour, for example). The arrows are indicative of causal
(one-way) relationships between these discrete elements.
Similarly, Panday, Reddy, Ruiter, Bergstrom & de Vries (2007) use an
extension of the Theory of Planned Behaviour, the I-Change Model, to
investigate factors relating to smoking amongst young people of different
‘ethnic’ groups. Non-smoking was found to be related to a positive attitude
to non-smoking, social influences supportive of non-smoking, good levels
of self-efficacy, the intention not to smoke, and low levels of depressive
mood and risk behaviour.
Outcome beliefs
Attitude to the
X
behaviour
Outcome evaluation
Normative beliefs
Intention to perform
X Subjective norm The behaviour
the behaviour
Motivation to comply
Control beliefs
X Perceived
Perceived power of behavioural control
control factor
Figure 30.1 Each box in the diagram represents a discrete and identifiable attribute, or the interaction of
two attributes. The arrows indicate causal (one-way) relationships between these discrete elements.
Source: Modified from Ajzen & Madden (1986 in Morojele, 1997: 223).
The mechanistic model can lend itself to treating socio-political issues

merely as variables that should be measured in terms of their impact on
Variable. A property that the individual’s development. It is possible, within this model, for the
changes or varies over complexities of these issues to be glossed over. Race, class, gender, ethnicity
time or from particular
and so forth may become homogenised and essentialised through being
categories of people
to others.
measured as a variable.
Some South African authors using this model have, however, attempt-
Essentialist. Viewing ed to grapple with contextual and political issues. For example, Panday
phenomena (such as et al (2007: 208), in justifying their use of ethnicity as a variable, state that
culture) as having an ‘the history of Apartheid in SA (sic) means that poverty and inequality
absolute reality, continue to exhibit strong spatial and racial biases … Consequently
existence or essence.
ethnicity has become a proxy for social, economic, spatial and cultural
differences when these factors are difficult to estimate’. They found that
the strength of the ‘determinants’ of smoking differed amongst ethnic
groups. This led them to call for further research to understand the
influence of differing social, economic and cultural contexts on smoking
onset, but also to acknowledge the political difficulties potentially
associated with their research. They conceded that ‘the history of
racial segregation and discrimination in SA makes recommendations
for ethnic-specific school-based programmes undesirable’ (Panday et
al, 2007: 215). As we shall see throughout this chapter, how contextual
issues are conceptualised and theorised in developmental psychology is
something that needs to be carefully considered.
Organismic approaches
In organismic approaches the processes of human development are
viewed as an organised whole. In other words, development is seen
as a totality rather than as a collection of parts. Instead of causal

explanations, theorising centres around the final goal or the function
of development (much like the systems of a living organism). The
principles, epigenesis and equifinality apply. Epigenesis refers to Epigenesis.
the irreducibility of later forms from earlier ones. In other words, During development
new characteristics emerge at higher levels, making development new characteristics
emerge at various stages,
discontinuous in nature. Equifinality means that goals may be reached
making development
along different lines. In other words, although tendencies may be discontinuous in nature.
described, predictions may not be made (compare this to the mechanistic
model). Organismic models see the individual as active in the process Equifinality.
of development, with change occurring because of the unfolding of Goals may be reached
internal forces. Examples of theories fitting into the organismic model along different lines.
are Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of development, Piaget’s cognitive-
developmental theory, and Kohlberg’s theory of moral development.
In each it is assumed that, given reasonably optimal conditions,
human beings will progress through invariant, discontinuous stages of Invariant stages.
Developmental stages
development as directed by forces lying within them.
that follow one another;
Turning to South African research, Broom & Doctor’s (1994) analysis people progress through
of children’s reading difficulties illustrates some of central premises of the the stages in predictable
organismic approach well. They assert that ‘When children are learning to order (that is, stages are
read, competence at one developmental stage depends on transmission of not skipped).
information from a previous stage, so impaired development of a previous
stage will affect development of subsequent skills’ (Broom & Doctor, Norms. Statistically
speaking, any measure of
1994: 219). Development thus proceeds through the unfolding of series
central tendency that is
of invariant stages. Each stage requires the mastery of particular skills (be representative of a group
they emotional, cognitive or social). Failure to do so has implications for and which may be used as
development at a later stage. a basis for comparison of
This type of stage theorising has a number of implications. The first is individual cases.
that it allows for the development of tools to measure the appropriateness
of a particular individual’s development as calibrated against the norms Validation.
The process of determining
of others in the same developmental stage. For example, Herbst &
the correctness of a
Huysamen (2000) report on their development and validation of a set of proposition or conclusion.
developmental scales for what they call ‘environmentally disadvantaged’
preschool children. The purpose of the scales is to assess these children’s Culture-free test.
‘mastery of selected cognitive and motor developmental tasks’ (Herbst & A test designed to be
Huysamen, 2000: 19). free from cultural bias.
The development and use of norm-based tests has been a highly Language or other skills
specific to a particular
controversial issue in South African psychology. A full discussion is not
culture are eliminated.
possible here but, in summary, various questions have been posed. For
example, is it possible for tests to be culture-free or, alternatively, culture- Culture-fair test.
fair? Should tests that have been standardised on one population group A test designed to include
be used on other groups? Do these tests really measure what they pur- a range of elements
port to measure? Are there not too many dangers inherent in the use of so that it is fair to all
tests (the possibility of maintaining purported distinctions between races, the cultural groups
undertaking the test. In
for example)?
other words, individuals in
These debates are important because the second implication of the various cultures have
stage-like theorising, which is linked to the first, is that it allows for an equal chance of scoring
particular children to be categorised as developmentally delayed, thereby according to their ability
necessitating intervention programmes. Broom & Doctor (1994), for or disposition.
PHO TO S : CATRI O NA MACLEO D
Organismic approaches
assume that people example, recommend in cases of developmental dyslexia (as assessed by
progress through invariant the above-mentioned tests) an intervention programme aimed at the
stages of development. development of orthographic reading skills. Amod, Cockcroft & Soellaart
Environmental factors (2007: 123), in reporting on a study of the use of the Griffiths Mental
(such as school or home) Developmental Scales for infants amongst black South Africans state that,
merely enhance or impede
the progression. ‘the early identification of delay in infancy and early childhood improves
the possibility of intervention’.
One of the potential difficulties with organismic models is that,
because of the emphasis on internal factors, researchers may ignore the
political, social, gendered and cultural context within which development
is taking place. This has certainly been the case in some earlier South
African research (see for example Ackerman, 1990). However, this type
of decontextualisation is not necessarily a feature of research that utilises
organismic frames. For example, Swartz (2007: 361), using psychoanalytic
theory, argues that the Oedipal stage is pivotal in terms of children’s
awareness of ‘racial differences and their effects on class, privilege and
custom’. She emphasises the variability of developmental pathways (recall
the principle of equifinality discussed above) and ‘their construction in
powerful social, economic and political contexts’.
Organismic models that take context into account inevitably bump
up against the universalism versus relativism debate. For example,
Tudin, Straker & Mendolsohn (1994) investigate the relationship between
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development and exposure to political and social
complexity amongst a group of South African university students. They
accept Kohlberg’s assertion that there are universal principles that guide
moral reasoning and that there are basic, invariant developmental stages.
Although their research revolves around the influence of social context on
the development of this moral reasoning. Ferns & Thom (2001: 38), on the
other hand, present their findings in a study on the moral development
of white and black teenagers as ‘evidence against cultural universality in
Kohlberg’s theory’. They argue that the influence of norms and values,
parenting styles and historical and political effects mitigate against a stage-
like progression and identical endpoints of morality.
Contextual theories and research

In these approaches, human development is theorised in relation to or
transaction with the environment or context. Thus, development is seen
as a dynamic interplay between person and environment. These models
allow for ‘both/and’ rather than ‘either/or’ thinking. For example, the
individual can be seen as both active in his/her developmental processes, as
well as being influenced by the environment. How well theories manage
to explain the ‘both/and’ of various developmental controversies differs
however, as we shall see later with the individual versus society debate. In
contextual models, the embeddedness of various systems (the family, the
school, ideological frameworks, etc.) is emphasised, with change at one
level promoting change at another level.
It appears that a contextual approach is currently the most popular Positivist approach.
in developmental psychology research in South Africa. Speculations as to An approach to science
why this should be the case could include: that argues that it is not
possible to go beyond
the objective world, and
1. the unique social and political space that South Africa occupies, that only those questions
2. the self-inspection that psychology in South Africa underwent in that can be answered from
terms of its contextual relevance in the mid- to late- 1980s (see for the application of scientific
example Dawes (1986) and Gilbert (1989) amongst others), and methods are valid.
3. the development of a relatively strong (although certainly not domi-
nant) South African Critical Psychology (cf. Hook, Mkhize, Kiguwa, Contextual approaches
Collins, Burman & Parker, 2004). theorise the interaction
or transaction between
We shall now discuss approaches that fall under the broad banner of and context. Consider the
contextual models. The first is a positivist approach. In many respects similarities and differences
positivism may be classed as mechanistic as it isolates various elements and between the developmental
explores the relationship between them. However, the research I discuss contexts depicted in these
here all has one key feature, and that is a commitment to understanding photographs (commercial
farming in a former ‘white’
the influence of contextual issues on children’s responses. Other approa- area of South Africa, right,
ches discussed include a developmental-contextual approach, cultural and a rural village in a
psychology, a public health perspective and a political approach. former ‘homeland’, left). PHOTOS: CATR IONA MA CLE OD
Positivist approaches
Much research in South Africa that attempts to understand the relation
between individual children and the environment is premised on
Operationalise. positivist principles. In positivism relevant variables are identified and
To give definition to operationalised, controls are set up to obviate the influence of extraneous
variables and procedures variables, quantitative data is collected, and statistical tests of probability
utilised in research.
are run. In this way it is hoped to gain insight into the influence of the
Extraneous variables.
environment on the child. Importantly, though, the child and the social
Variables that interfere context are treated as two distinct realities, ontologically separate while
with (that is, are affecting each other (Dawes & Donald, 1994).
not central to) the One of the aims of positivism is to build up a cumulative knowledge
main relationships base that is objective and based on universal truths. A key concept here is
being studied. generalisability, which means that results in one situation will hold true
in another. Barbarin & Richter (2001) and Aase, Meyer & Sagvolden (2006)
Probability.
The calculation of
provide examples of studies that investigate generalisable developmental
the likelihood of an processes or properties.
event occurring using Barbarin & Richter (2001) test the cross-national generalisability of
proportional frequency. the relationship between community violence, poverty and psychological
difficulties in children. They find that, as in the United States, community
Ontology. Metaphysical danger in South Africa is linked to a variety of psychological problems,
inquiry concerned with
including anxiety, depression, aggression, opposition and low affability
the question of existence.
in children, but that socio-economic status is not related to behavioural
Generalisability. and emotional adjustment. Aase, Meyer & Sagvolden (2006) argue for the
The ability to judge dynamic developmental theory of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Dis-
whether something is order (ADHD), in which it is postulated that ADHD is a neurobiological
applicable to an entire disorder caused by dysfunctional dopamine systems. They support their
class or category of people, argument through the replication of findings amongst children in Norway
events or phenomena.
with children in the Limpopo province of South Africa. The key difference
Attention Deficit
between these two studies is that Barbarin & Richter (2001) analyse
Hyperactivity Disorder. generalisable relationships between social and individual characteristics
A disorder characterised (that is, a contextual approach) whereas Aase, Meyer & Sagvolden (2006)
by attentional argue for the generalisability of internal, biological characteristics.
problems, impulsivity Positivist research allows for comparative work. This is different to
and hyperactivity. the notion of generalisability discussed above. Researchers conducting
comparative research are not necessarily interested in establishing universal
laws or truths. They may rather want to provide an in-depth description
of two groups identified as different in some ways and as similar in others.
A good example of this is Liddell’s (1996) research on the interpretations
of six pictures by 80 South African and 80 British children in their second
and third year of schooling. Liddell (1996) starts her paper by exploring
how pictures may:
1. provide a bridge into literacy for children,

2. enrich the meaning of texts,
3. provide contextual information in text, and
4. assist children in retaining information.
She reviews the literature from developed countries in which it is

shown that children follow a predictable developmental sequence in
their picture interpretation skills. But then she asks the question whether
the same patterns ‘manifest themselves in children from homes where
literacy skills amongst parents are poorly developed, where picture books
do not exist, where teacher:child ratios mean that one teacher assists
40 to 50 children in the classroom, and where children at school are
exposed to—at most—four illustrated readers in a year’ (Liddell, 1996:
356). This question is important, as it provides the framework within
which the comparative research is located. Here Liddell (1996) invokes
structural-contextual issues, not to explain the differences noted, but to
frame her question. Her results show differences in the way rural South
African and rural British children interpret pictures, as well as different
patterns of change as the two groups progress in school. She discusses
this in the light of the possible different functions of literacy in the
two communities.
One of the most significant achievements of positivist research is
the development of statistical models that allow for prediction. Liddell,
Lycett & Gordon (1997) utilise such a model to predict children’s early
school achievement in rural South African schools. They found that if
children master basic elements of the curriculum and behave in ways that
allow them to survive crowded and under-resourced rural classrooms,
they will do well in Grade Two. Mathews, Aarø, Flisher, Mukoma,
Wubs & Schaalma (2008) use structural equation modelling to predict
transition to first sexual intercourse. Factors include being male, being
older, coming from a lower socio-economic status, intentions to have
sexual intercourse, poor self-efficacy in negotiating delayed sex, inti-
mate partner violence. However, the variables and models used in
making these predictions are not quick or cheap to measure, thereby
putting into question the usefulness of utilising this type of research in
widespread programmes.
One of the potential difficulties with positivist research is that
there is too little critical analysis by researchers as to how terms are
operationalised. For example, Cherian & Malehase (2000) investigate
the relationship between parental control and children’s scholastic
achievement. They state that an ‘objective estimate’ of parental control
was obtained via a questionnaire. The questionnaire items, we are
informed, measured ‘parental order and control of children, parental
supervision of daily activities of children, parental involvement in proper
control and supervision of school tasks, parental time spent on children’s
school work, and parental communication with their children’ (Cherian
& Malehase, 2000: 666). The actual items of the questionnaire are not
provided, so we are not able to judge exactly what questions elicited
responses in these various areas. Nevertheless, there is no indication that
the choice of words such as ‘proper control and supervision’, ‘parental
order’, ‘parental involvement’ is political, and implies the valuing of
particular parental activities over others. Instead, these practices take on
the aspect of naturalness—correct and good parental actions. This point
is taken up by Rose (1989), who points out that scientific and professional
descriptions of good parental practices gain their power by appearing to
be universally valid and natural.
Developmental-contextual perspectives
Developmental-contextual approaches take an overtly ‘both/and’
perspective. In other words, researchers attempt to include both individual
and social factors into their theorising, rather than one or the other. For
example, in his discussion on special educational needs, Donald (1994:
151) calls for ‘ecologically sensitive research that clarifies the interactional
relationship between various disabilities and their socially and structurally
determined contexts’.
Stead (1996) utilises a developmental-contextual model to analyse
career development in black adolescents in South Africa. This perspective
emphasises the dynamic interaction between an individual and proximal
(family and peers, for example) and distal (economic and sociocultural, for
example) contexts. He discusses career development in black adolescents in
relation to education, the family, the economy, culture (see later discussion
under cultural perspectives) and identity development. Stead (1996: 272)
states that the developmental-contextual approach ‘overcomes (a) an
inordinate focus on either the individual or the individual’s environment
and (b) an emphasis on a unidirectional relationship between the self and
context’. However, his analysis does not make it clear how this is done. Indeed,
his discussion is limited to an exploration of either the environment (the
family, or education, for example) or the individual (identity development)
without theorising exactly how one relates to the other. Merely saying that
individual development is influenced by context is insufficient. This point
is important as theorising exactly what the inter-relationship is between the
individual and society is one of the crucial aspects of a contextual approach.
It is on this level that we may start differentiating between adequate and
inadequate contextual (and other) analyses of development.
This point is clearly illustrated in two papers about related issues—
child neglect and child abuse and their respective effects in terms of
child development. In the first, Du Preez, Naudé & Pretorius (2004)
research the influence of neglect on language development. They found
that the neglected children in their sample had delays in terms of verbal
development. They postulate that this is owing to a lack of interaction
and communication between the parents or caregivers and children.
However, exactly how this external event leads to the internal one is left
untheorised. What are the cognitive, emotional, social and neurological
processes involved in moving from the one to the other?
This kind of careful theorising is evident in a paper by Panzer &
Viljoen (2004). They argue that child neglect and abuse leaves children
with an experience of ‘fright without solution’ (Panzer & Viljoen, 2004:
11). The child’s efforts to elicit help are met with abuse and, in order to
cope, disassociation of explicit from implicit processing is required. The
detail of their theorising, which draws on psychoneurology, is relatively
complex. Importantly in this context, however, they engage in careful
analysis of how an external event such as abuse may be detrimental to the
neural networks of individuals.
Another important aspect in contextual theorising is the ack-
nowledgement of historical effects. Finchilescu and Dawes’ (1998) paper
on South African teenagers’ socio-political orientations following the
rapid social change of the early to mid-1990s is an excellent example of the Cohort. A group of
importance of taking cohort effects into account. Their work was partially people that possess
common characteristics,
informed by a generational approach to the study of the influence of political
in particular being born in
context on human development. From a generational perspective, particular a particular year.
age brackets will share a political consciousness, which is shaped by exposure
to particular events occurring during the sensitive developmental period
of youth. Thus, Finchilescu & Dawes (1998) talk of the Resistance cohort,
the Negotiation cohort and the Democracy cohort, referring to people
who entered adolescence prior to 1990, during the time of the political
negotiations, and after the elections of 1994, respectively. Each of these
generational cohorts contains sub-generational units based on the racial
groups defined by apartheid. This approach clearly links contextual issues
to historical effects, effects that are obviously more clearly seen in times
of rapid change, but which should always feature in our thinking about
developmental psychology.
Cultural approaches
That there are diverse cultures in South Africa is probably a truism that few
people would dispute. This is reflected in developmental psychology research
where culture features relatively strongly. However, the way in which
culture is conceptualised and the uses to which it is put differs markedly. In Cross-cultural research.
the first place, there is cross-cultural research in which culture is viewed as An experimental method
in which different cultures
a variable that can be separated from other variables, and that can be used
are evaluated and
in explanations of observed differences or similarities. Secondly, ‘culture’ compared on different
is used as a broadly defining, static and over-arching feature of human cultural dimensions.
existence. Thirdly, there are those studies that locate themselves within
the cultural psychology tradition. Cultural psychology utilises a dynamic
conceptualisation of culture as social practices and traditions that permeate,
transform and regulate human behaviour. Cultural psychology thus studies
the meaning of the cultural worlds we inhabit, their historicity and the
interpersonal maintenance of the practices on which they are premised.
Examples of cross-cultural research are the papers by Akande (1999),
and Meyer, Eilertsen, Sundet & Sagvolden (2004). Akande (1999: 171)
conducted a ‘cross-cultural assessment of self-esteem among youth in the
twenty-first century South Africa’. He hypothesised that perceptions of
the self differs from one cultural context to another. He thus compared
the means obtained on the Self-Description-Questionnaire-1 by South Mean. A measure of
African, Australian, Kenyan, Nigerian, Nepalese and Zimbabwean chil- central tendency that
dren. Meyer et al (2004) investigated whether the Disruptive Behaviour refers to the average,
or the sum of the scores
Disorders rating scale measures the same constructs in South African as in
divided by the number
Western cultures. They administered the scale to South African children of scores.
and compared the results with those found for children in the United
States of America and Europe.
In both of these studies culture is thus seen as a variable. An instrument
to measure some characteristic or trait is administered and the results of the
various ‘cultures’ under scrutiny are compared. The difficulty, even from
a positivist perspective, is to separate out culture as a variable from other
variables such as socio-economic status, household size, location (urban or
rural, for example), and means of subsistence.
The second sense in which culture is used (that is, as a static, essentialist
feature of human existence) is evidenced in Stead (1996), who discusses
career development in black adolescents (see earlier discussion). In this
paper, Stead seems to see culture as a possession, something that defines
groups of people in definitive sense. Note the following passage:
Whites are generally considered to identify with a Western

lifestyle that emphasizes independence, individuality, self-
actualisation, and competitiveness. In this respect they tend to
differ from Blacks, who follow a traditional African lifestyle that
emphasizes cooperation; Blacks tend to be community oriented
and be dependent on the wishes of significant others when making
decisions (Stead, 1996: 272).
Thus, ‘whites’ equal ‘western’ and ‘blacks’ equal ‘traditional’, with all
the attendant characteristics. The use of the qualifying words ‘generally’
and ‘tend’ does not detract from this equation, as there is no indication
that any of these cultural characteristics is dynamic and fluid.
It is this static and essentialist view of culture that cultural psychology
has attempted to counter, while still maintaining the explanatory power
that may be gained by considering cultural issues in developmental
psychology. Gilbert, Van Vlaenderen & Nkwinti (1995: 229), for example,
locate their research within cultural psychology. They study the role
of local knowledge in the process of socialisation in rural families.
They define local knowledge as ‘the presuppositions used to interpret
immediate experience borne out of action in the local environment’. This
conceptualisation illustrates the dynamic nature of a cultural psychology
perspective, in that local knowledge is a product of day-to-day actions and
hence is constantly being constructed and re-constructed while still having
a historicity. Contrast this to the notion of ‘traditional knowledge’, which
has the connotation of stasis and preservation.
This theorising of socialisation as a dynamic process allows for a
dialectical understanding of the active versus passive debate. Utilising
a combination of the Vygotskian zone of proximal development (the space
between what children can do on their own and what they can do with the
help of a more knowledgeable member of the culture) and Geertz’s view
of culture as a set of control mechanisms used for governing behaviour,
Gilbert, Van Vlaenderen & Nkwinti (1995) indicate that socialisation is
both a conservative and a creative process. In other words, it simultaneously
structures children’s lives so that they internalise the available cultural
rules and instructions and allows the space for children to construct their
own meaning.
It is when ‘culture’ is invoked that issues of universality and relativism
tend to be raised. Some authors attempt to tread the middle ground,
indicating the relative importance of both universalism and relativism.
For example, Magwaza (1997), in her discussion of child sexual abuse,
attempts to integrate a cultural relativist perspective (that is, recognising
and theorising about cultural differences in the understanding and
practices of sexuality) while at the same time maintaining moral
universalism (i.e. there are particular benchmarks against which we can

judge particular actions such as sexual abuse as reprehensible). Richter
(2002), in her discussion of infant care, identifies ‘near universals’ in the
care and regulation of infants, as proposed by Bradley and Caldwell
(1995, cited in Richter, 2002), these being sustenance, stimulation, support,
structure and surveillance. Nevertheless, concludes Richter (2002: 129),
there is much cultural variation in these practices:
Across all cultures is a perception of infants as being vulnerable to

hazards that can endanger the infant’s life and jeopardise his or
her development. These hazards take many forms and there is no
question that they are culturally, socially and economically framed
and expressed.
This assertion is in line with Dawes & Donald’s (1994) suggestion of a

distinction between developmental processes that could be shown to have
universal relevance, and the content and norms of behaviour that may be
culturally specific.
Theorising relativism versus universalism in an integrative manner
that avoids the potential dangers of an ‘either/or’ position requires a
dynamic and historicised view of culture, and an understanding that
difference and diversity are intricately linked to socio-political power
relations. There is a very real danger that attempts at understanding
cultural variation may ‘hide an implicit evolutionism which claims
Western culture as top of a pyramid [and in which] westerners (and
Western psychologists) know, and understand the “real” phenomena’
(Swartz & Rohleder, 2008: 543).
Public health approach

Most Euro-American textbooks of developmental psychology assume a
certain basic level of health and hygiene in children. Where issues of
physical health are dealt with, concerns include such factors as exposure
to parental smoke, birth defects, cancer and heart disease (see for
example Santrock 2007). The health issues that face North American and
European children and that affect their development are very different
to those facing the majority of children in South Africa. For example, in
South Africa the under five-year-old mortality rate is 72.1 per 1000 live
births, whereas in the United States it is 7. While 10.3 per cent of South
African children under the age of 10 are underweight and 21.6 per cent
experience stunting, only 2 per cent of American children under the age
of five are underweight and 1 per cent experience stunting (Dawes, Bray
& van der Merwe, 2007; UNICEF, n.d.). HIV/AIDS obviously forms one
of the major health issues for South African children, with an estimated
5.6 per cent of children between two and 14 years old being infected
with HIV, and an estimated 1 100 000 being orphaned as a result of HIV
(Dawes, Bray & van der Merwe, 2007).
Given the above, there is a strong public health focus in many South
African writers’ work in developmental psychology. This acknow-
ledges the fact that general health issues and children’s development
are strongly interconnected. For example, Richter (2004) provides a

thorough review of the psychosocial impact of HIV/AIDS on children’s
development and adjustment.
Public health shifts the definition of health away, firstly, from
an individual focus and, secondly, from something attended to by
medical practitioners in clinics and hospitals. Instead, public health
‘targets all points where matter, energy and information are exchanged
between people and their human, social and physical environments,
for it is through this exchange that individual and group health status
is determined’ (Butchart & Kruger, 2001: 215). Duncan (1997), for
example, illustrates how the causes of malnutrition, a condition linked
to poor developmental outcomes, should be located not in individuals’
shortcomings (parental ignorance concerning nutrition, for example),
but rather in broader social processes. Combating malnutrition will,
according to Duncan (1997), require broad-ranging interventions,
including employment generation programmes and projects aimed at
making diversified nutrition and basic health facilities available to all.
Much of the public health debate is framed within the human rights
discourse. Authors draw on documents such as the United Nations
Declaration of Children’s Rights (Duncan, 1997), and the World
Health Organisation and South African government documents on
disability rights (Van Niekerk, 1997). Strong arguments are made for
the recognition of the rights and aspirations of groups marginalised by
developmental psychology and government policy decisions—such as
children with mental handicap (Parekh & Jackson, 1997). In an edited
collection, entitled ‘Monitoring child well-being’ and containing
chapters on a wide range of issues relating to children, a strong rights-
based approach is taken (Dawes, Bray & van der Merwe, 2007). The
editors explain that there are three stages of measurement required in
this approach. Firstly, the specification of rights and what the state and
others are duty-bound to deliver; secondly, provision through policy
and programmes to deliver these rights; and thirdly, the measurement
of child outcomes in relation to minimum standards, models of cause
and effect, and the opinions of children and their carers and service
providers (Bray & Dawes, 2007). Thus a rights-based approach is
intricately linked to advocacy for delivery of services and interventions,
and the evaluation of these services.
The risk versus resilience debate has, mostly, been framed within a
public health discourse. On the risk side of the debate, factors that put
children at risk for the development of particular problems are analysed.
This is frequently done with the aim of prevention (one of the fundamental
purposes of primary health care). The rationale is that if we can identify
risk factors, then we can perhaps do something to prevent them. Van der
Merwe & Dawes (2007) take this approach. They review the risk factors
for the development of violent and antisocial behaviour, as well as the
developmental pathways along which violent and antisocial behaviour
Empirical. Based on the may manifest itself. Arguing that interventions need to based on theoretical
collection, analysis and and empirical evidence, the authors review the common characteristics of
evaluation of data. effective violence-prevention and treatment interventions.
A strictly risk approach was questioned in the mid-1980s (Rutter,

1985). Since then, the idea of resilience in the face of adversity has become
popular. The key reasoning here is that some children, despite difficult
circumstances, manage to cope well and do not develop any problems. For
example, Henderson (2006: 303) argues that ‘too narrow a focus on the
vulnerabilities of AIDS orphans obscures the ways in which they share
similar circumstances with other poor children, as well as the strengths
they bring to bear on their circumstances’.
The resilience thesis has gained a fair amount of credence in South
Africa in the light of the poor socio-economic conditions and the political
violence that characterises many South African children’s young lives.
Instead of seeing children as victims of their circumstances (that is, at risk
for the development of a range of psychosocial and physical disorders),
the resilience hypothesis allows researchers to emphasise positive aspects
of children’s environments as well as the children’s agency in developing
coping mechanisms.
In a similar fashion to the risk approach, researchers have attempted to
determine the factors that lead to resilience. For example, Kritzas & Grob-
ler (2005) studied the relationship between resilience amongst teenagers
and the parenting styles they experienced. They used scales that measure
sense of coherence and coping strategies as indicators of resilience,
and found that authoritative parenting (as opposed to permissive or
authoritarian parenting) contributed the most to resilience amongst
teenagers. Focusing more specifically, Van Rensburg & Barnard (2005)
found that close family ties, an internal locus of control, a positive self-
concept, a supportive environment and positive personality characteristics
were associated with resilience to child sexual molestation.
Again the issue of interventions arises in the resilience literature.
Kritzas & Grobler (2005: 1) believe that their findings have ‘distinct
and far-reaching implications for envisaged interventions’, while Cook
& du Toit (2005) describe the Circles of Care: Community Capacity
Building project, an intervention that is aimed at supporting ‘child and
community resilience’.
The issue of resilience has, however, been critiqued by some researchers.
Duncan (1997) points out that the resilience argument has one serious
defect and that is that it could lead to complacency on the part of those
in power in ensuring conditions that promote the optimal development
of children.
Sociopolitical issues
The status of developmental psychology in Africa and South Africa has
been a disputed matter. Some time ago Liddell & Kvalsig (1990) asked
whether, firstly, developmental psychology can claim to be neutral in the
research that it conducts and, secondly, whether our research has, indeed,
no impact in the real world. They argued that reseach conducted by South
African developmental psychology has been used and, at times, abused
in the real world. Later, Nsamenang & Dawes (1998) argued that Africa
has had a number of alien influences imposed upon it, and that scholars
in developmental psychology should engage in a ‘liberatory project’ in
which they ‘enter a critical dialogue with external knowledge systems, in

constructing an understanding of child psychological development on the
continent’ (Nsamenang & Dawes, 1998: 73). More recently Nsamenang
(2006: 293) accuses theories of development and intelligence of mirroring
‘mainstream Euro-American ethnocentrism’.
In response to these concerns, a number of researchers have engaged
directly with sociopolitical issues. Stevens & Lockhat (1997) argue that a
combination of Erikson’s psychosocial theory of adolescent development
and Bulhan’s analysis of identity development within oppressed social
groups may be used to analyse the impact of both apartheid-capitalism
as well as post-apartheid politics on black adolescent identity develop-
ment. Owing to a combination of apartheid-capitalism and the domi-
nance of ‘western’ ideologies in post-apartheid South Africa, the authors
see black adolescents as having few ‘healthy options’ (1997: 253) for
identity development.
Richards, Pillay, Mazodze & Govere (2005) embarked on a similar
project, investigating the impact of colonial culture on identity formation.
They collected iographies (stories that focus directly on experiences
that impact on identity development) as data. Interestingly, they did
not initially intend to study colonialism, but found that this emphasis
emerged in the data presented by the participants. They discuss a number
of themes related to colonialism and identity formation, formulate these
in terms of Bulhan’s analysis of identity development, and conclude that
colonial culture and apartheid had a damaging effect on their participants’
identity formation.
While these sorts of papers are important, there are also potential
dangers. For example, Stevens & Lockhat’s (1997) conclusion rests on
an uncritical usage of Erikson’s theory. They indicate that Erikson’s
concept of adolescence as a psychosocial moratorium (a period in
which society allows adolescents to experiment with various identities)
does not apply to the majority of black adolescents. Furthermore, in
choosing between capitulation and assimilation into the dominant
(white) culture versus radicalisation, the authors see black adolescents
as experiencing what Erikson called identity foreclosure. Instead of
problematising the theoretical concepts of psychosocial moratorium
and identity foreclosure as linked to particular sociohistorical
circumstances, the authors accept their legitimacy and utilise them to
suggest that there are ‘potentially negative psychological consequences’
(1997: 252) and a ‘long-term impact’ (1997: 253) associated with the
lack of a psychosocial moratorium and with identity foreclosure.
The net result is the (probably unintended) pathologisation of black
adolescents. Aware of this potential, the authors spend some time
discussing the debate on risk versus resilience in South Africa, stating
that adolescents should not merely be seen as victims. However, their
own theorising allows for little more, and merely asserting resilience
does not do the trick.
Social constructionist analyses

Social constructionism is a fairly diverse field and not easily summarised
in a few short sentences. Nevertheless, there are some basic commonalities.

Burr (1995) summarises some of the basic premises as follows:
1. A critical stance is taken regarding taken-for-granted knowledge.

Social constructionists question the assumptions made in psychology
and indicate how these are frequently used to serve particular domi-
nant interests.
2. There is an emphasis on the social and historical specificity of human
characteristics and interactions. This links up with the above point
as it highlights that there is nothing fundamental or necessary in the
way that we view things, but rather that our knowledge of the world
is socially and historically constructed.
3. Knowledge is viewed as constructed in interactions between people.
Social action and knowledge are intricately linked.
4. Binary logic (male/female; active/passive; nature/nurture etc—see
the above discussion) is rejected and a focus on multiple layers of dif-
ference is employed.
Social constructionist work contributes in two ways to the
PHOTO: CATRIONA MACLEOD

critique of mainstream developmental psychology. Firstly,
basic assumptions that underlie theorising and research in
developmental psychology are questioned. Secondly, the
nature of the child, the adolescent, the mother and the family
(mostly) that is spoken of in developmental psychology is
called into question.
Examples of the first contribution are to be found Parekh
& Jackson (1997) and Shefer (1997). Parekh & Jackson
(1997: 41) argue that ‘children with mental handicap are
subjected to, constrained and marginalised by psychological
developmentalist talk’. They question the assumption that
mental handicap means the same thing for one group as
for another, as well as the prioritisation of the cognitive and
intellectual as hallmarks of childhood development. Shefer
(1997) discusses how developmental psychology’s approach
to gender ignores the social, historical and political context of
gendered identity development and presents development from
a male perspective. She uses a social constructionist perspective
to analyse how gender (as a social construction) has an impact Social constructionists
on our development from the moment we are identified as male or female. question the taken-for-
Bozalek (1997) provides an example of the second contribution. She granted assumptions of
shows how textbooks assume a particular family form (the nuclear family developmental psychology,
such as the assumption
with two, heterosexual parents) as universal, an assumption she highlights
that mothers are
as erroneous, given the lived realities of many South African children and necessarily the primary
adolescents. Furthermore, the functional systems perspective of families caregivers of infants.
that dominates the discussions in textbooks disregards power relations that
exist within families. This allows for wife and child abuse to be seen as
symptoms of family pathology rather than as part of differential power
relations based on discourses surrounding gender and child relations
within the family.
Social constructionism is not just about critique, however. An increas-

ingly popular social constructionist approach in areas such as therapy
is narrative theory. Narrative psychology emphasises the central role of
language and meaning-making in the formation and structuring of self,
identity and the other (Crossley, 2000). Laubscher & Klinger (1997) utilise a
narrative approach to explain the development of self-definition or what is
more commonly called personality. They contend that ‘all people are story-
tellers and create a particular story about themselves that defines who they
are, that captures their essential and evolving self’ (1997: 67). They explore
how the personal myth begins in infancy when infants learn about narrative
tone (the qualitative mood or feeling of stories). This tone may permeate the
entire life-cycle. Through the use of narrative tone, imagery, theme, mythic
characters and the contextual ideological setting, we create and re-create
our self-defining myth. Laubscher & Klinger (1997) claim that a narrative
approach to development simultaneously acknowledges individuality and
social factors, thereby overcoming the individual/society divide characteristic
of more traditional theories (see above discussion).
Mkhize & Frizelle (2000) utilise a narrative approach to explicate
cultural and historical issues in career development work. They argue that
every culture develops an indigenous psychology, which they define as the
shared understanding of what it means to be human. The primary vehicles
of this indigenous psychology, they argue, are narrative or cultural tales
passed on from generation to generation, through language, myths, fairy
tales, histories and stories. To develop into a competent member of a society
requires developing an appreciation for and knowledge of the multiple and
complex range of meanings developed by that society over time. This does
not imply narrative determinism, as individuals enter into dialogue with the
multiplicity of voices and perspectives available in context.
As mentioned earlier, the ‘activity versus passivity’ debate is one of
the controversies that inhabits developmental psychology. Parkes (2002),
using a social constructionist approach, attempts to overcome what she
sees as the overemphasis in psychological literature on the negative
effects on children of exposure to violence. She concludes from her
ethnographic research that ‘children draw creatively on local discourses
about punishment and authority, loyalty and friendship … they construct
rules, which are fluid, dynamic, adjustable and help them to make sense
of the social world around them’ (2002: 69). Parkes (2002) believes that this
kind of research that does not view children as passive victims of violence
but as active social agents may be useful in the kinds of interventions that
are made with respect to community violence.
Conclusion
From the above it is clear that a range of theoretical approaches and
models have informed developmental psychology research in South
Africa. Two important questions are: Why is it important to take stock of
our theoretical orientations? Why is it vital that a forum for the discussion
of theory in developmental psychology remains open when there are
clearly pressing issues facing children and adolescents (as well as parents,
adults and the elderly) in South Africa? I hope that the answers to these
questions are at least partially provided in this chapter. But to summarise,

the basic philosophical and theoretical assumptions that we make have
implications in terms of:
1. how we view the nature of the developing person;

2. what factors we consider in our research and how we conceptualise
their linkages;
3. the questions we ask in conducting our research;
4. how we undertake our research;
5. the usages we envisage for our research; and finally
6. how interventions in the lives of children, adolescents and
parents proceed.
The latter point is made very strongly in a book edited by Donald,

Dawes & Louw (2000), in which they discuss various community-based
programmes that have attempted to address adversity in children’s lives.
As noted earlier, the amount of research that is being conducted in
South Africa in the field of developmental psychology is, contrary to
our perceptions, relatively large. Many interesting articles have not been
featured in the limited space provided for this chapter. Perhaps we are not
there yet, but we imagine a time when the developmental psychology texts
to which our students are exposed can be written off the basis of research
and scholarship produced within South Africa, when the theories and
principles we package for students are ones with which South African
researchers have engaged, utilised in their research or critiqued, when
the conclusions we reach about people’s development are based on local
empirical work, and when we are more likely to draw on African theorising
(for example Nsamaneng, 2006) and to turn to the lessons learnt within
our own context (see Clacherty & Donald’s (2007) discussion of the ethical
challenges of child participation in research within southern Africa) than
from those generated in a context vastly different from our own.
Specific tasks
➊ Which of the above-mentioned models provides the most promising approach to

studying developmental psychology in South Africa? What criteria are you using in
forming an answer to the above question?
➋ Do you think that South African developmental psychologists should take an overtly
political stance in their work, or do you think that there is a place for scientific
neutrality and objectivity? Is there a middle ground? Do you think there is a way of
integrating the two stances, and if so, how?
➌ Do you think that ‘culture’ should be included in our thinking about developmental
psychology? If so, how should it be conceptualised?
➍ Imagine yourself as a researcher in developmental psychology in South Africa. What

would your research priorities be? What sort of approach would you want to take in
investigating the issue? What do you think should be done with the results of your
research (ie how should they be utilised)?
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Tracy Morison for invaluable assistance in gathering the literature for this chapter
and for organising the references.
There are four excellent South African books of relevance to developmental psychology.
The first two provide reviews of research done in a variety of areas relating to developmental psychology,
the third addresses interventions with children, and the fourth takes a public health approach to child
development. The Human Sciences Research Council has a very active Child, Youth, Family and
Social Development Unit. Many useful publications, mostly with free downloads, are available from this
unit. The approach is generally a public health one.
Dawes, A & Donald, D (eds) (1994). Childhood and adversity: psychological perspectives from South
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Donald, D, Dawes, A & Louw, J (eds) (2000). Addressing childhood adversity. Cape Town:
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Dawes, A, Bray, R & van der Merwe, A (2007). Monitoring child well-being: A South African
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Index
Entries are listed in letter-by-letter alphabetical order. Page references in italic indicate where you can find a figure, table or
photograph relating to the index entry term.
A attachment 216, 521 binding tasks 446-448

abnormality 574-578 attachment theory Binet, Alfred 346-347, 347
Abrahams, Karl 23, 24 adulthood 223-224 biological essentialism 602-603
abuse see trauma affect regulation 224-226 Bion’s theory 29, 30, 81, 113
accommodation 327-328 Ainsworth, Mary 219-221 alpha-elements 117
activity theory 477, 485-487 attachment behaviours 216-217 beta-elements 116-117
activity versus passivity debate 636 attachment/exploration Buddhism and 135
adaptation 326, 327-328 balance 218 conceptual models 126-128
adaptions 420-421 avoidant attachment containing 118, 119, 120, 122,
ADHD see Attention Deficit classification 219-221 126-128
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Bowlby, John 216-219, 231-232 critique of 133-136
adjustive technique see defences critique of 231-232 development of thinking 114-119
adolescence 533-537, 549-550, 566 culture 228-229 dream-work 126
adults 223-224, 372-373, 570-571 disorganized/disoriented ego-destructive superego 129
adult sexuality 40-42, 42 attachment classification 221 Hate 123-125
affect regulation 224-226 HIV/AIDS 229-231, 230 infant observation 121-123
Africans 592 infant observation 221-222 intuition 134
age and violent crime 530-531 internal working models 218-219 Knowledge 123-125
ageing 6, 361-362 monotropism 228-229 links 123, 126-128
aggression 80, 81, 85, 178, 190-191 newborn babies 217 Love 123-125
aggressivity 271, 276-278 phases 218, 218 mental health 131-133
AI see artificial intelligence (AI) psychopathology 226-228, 227 mentalisation 114-115
Ainsworth, Mary 215, 219-221 resistant attachment nascent capacity for
alienation 245, 249, 278-279 classification 219-221 thought 119-120
Alzheimer’s disease 361-362, 362 secure attachment non-psychotic parts of self 130-131
AM see autobiographical classification 219-221 positions 126-128
memory (AM) secure base 218 projective identification 119-121
America see United States of America Strange Situation 219-221, 220 psychological growth 131-133
amplification see dream-work temperament 224 psychotic mental
analytical psychology see Jung’s Attention Deficit Hyperactivity functioning 128-130
analytic theory Disorder (ADHD) 626 psychotic parts of self 130-131
androcentrism 602, 603 autistic spectrum disorders resistance 133
antilibidinal ego 96-97 (ASD) 453-455 reverie 117-118
apartheid 509-510, 528-529, autobiographical memory schizophrenia 129-130
539-540, 540 (AM) 441-448 thinking apparatus 128
appropriate failure 140-141 avoidant attachment thought 114-119
Archetypal School of Analytic classification 219-221 unconscious 126
Psychology 258-259 Bion, Wilfred R 25-26, 112 see also
archetypes 239-244 Bion’s theory
Ariès, Philippe 564-565 B bipolar self 188-190
Army Alpha and Beta tests 347 Barbie (toy) 609-610 black adolescent identity development
artificial intelligence (AI) 439 Baron-Cohen, Simon 452-453 299, 307-308
ASD see autistic spectrum Bartlett, Frederick 367-368 blameworthy mother 578-580
disorders (ASD) behaviourism 317, 398 Bollas, Christopher 206-207
assimilation 327-328 beta-elements 116-117 borderline personality organisation
assumptions 7-8, 14-15, 564-567 Bick, Esther 221-222 see also infants, 122, 170-173
Atkinson and Shiffrin’s model of observation of Bowlby, John 216-219, 231-232
memory 367, 367, 438, 439 bilingualism 380-381 brain development 424
Index 679
Bronfenbrenner, Urie 501 see also rationalism 316-317 constitutional factors and
ecological theory of development stability versus plasticity 320-321 trauma 551-552
Bruner, Jerome 381-382, 479 structuralism 317 constructivist theory 324-326
Buddhism 135 Wundt, Wilhelm 317 see also Piaget, Jean
cognitive mapping theory 445-446 accommodation 327-328
cognitive science adaptation 326, 327-328
C artificial intelligence (AI) 439 animism 332
captation 274 Asperger’s Syndrome 453 assimilation 327-328
castration anxiety 46, 51-52, 53 Atkinson and Shiffrin’s model centration 339
Cattell, Raymond 350-351 of memory 438, 439 circular responses 328-331, 330
child-headed households 568-569 autistic spectrum disorders concrete operational stage 328,
childhood see also (ASD) 453-455 336-337
childhood development autobiographical memory conservation 337
assumptions of 564-567 (AM) 441-448 criticisms of 341-343
constructions of 564-567 Baron-Cohen, Simon 452-453 cultural bias 343
gender identity in 609-610 binding tasks 446-448 deferred imitation 332
imposing adult categories on childhood amnesia 443-448 egocentricity 332
570-571 cognitive mapping theory 445-446 equilibration 327-328
memory development in 371-373 connectionist models 440-441, 440 formal operations stage 328,
psychoanalytic theories 29-30 definition of 441 337-340
sexuality in 566 Dennett, Daniel 448-449 imitation 332
significance of 29-30 episodic memory 442-443 intuitive stage 332-333
view of 564-566 false belief test 448-449 irreversibility 333
violent crime in 534-535, 535 Faux Pas test 452-453 metacognition 337
childhood amnesia 443-448 see also first-order mental state numeracy, principles of 335-336
infantile amnesia inferences 452 object permanence 331
childhood development General Problem Solver (GPS) 439 operations 326
apartheid’s effects on 509-510, Happé, Francesca 452 organisation 327
539-540, 540 hippocampal maturation 444-448 pendulum problem 338-339, 338
domestic violence and 541-542 infantile amnesia 443-448 post-formal operations
power and 582-583 information-processing approach stage 340-341
South African context 539-542 437-438, 439 preconceptual stage 332-333
trauma and 546-549 intentional action 450 preoperational stage 328, 332-336
childhood resilience see resilience nodes 440-441 reversibility 333
chimpanzees 267-268, 383-384 parallel distributed processing risk-taking behaviour 340
Chomsky, Noam 379-380, 380, 426 (PDP) 440-441, 440 schemes 326
circular responses 328-331, 330 psychobiology 436-437 sensorimotor stage 328-332
cognition, definition of 314-315 referential versus representational seriation 337
cognitive development 314-318 understanding 451 stages of cognitive development
analogies 319 second-order mental state 328-340, 341-342
assumptions 318-321 inferences 452 symbolic representation 331,
behaviourism 317 semantic memory 442-443 332-341
constructive process 321 serial processing 439 transductive reasoning 332-333
critique of 321-322 social cognition 449 transitive inference 337
culture and 590-591 theory of mind 448-456 contact crimes see violent crime
definition of 315 Turing test 437 containing 118, 119, 120, 122, 126-128
empiricism 316-317 cognitive-social theory 398 contextual approaches 501-502, 620,
evolutionary psychology and cohesive self 186-187 625-634
430-431 cohort, definition of 14, 629 contextual sub-theory 356-357
experimental research 319-320 collective unconscious 237, 238 continuity versus discontinuity 11-12
Freud, Sigmund and 321 complexes 238-239 conventional morality 401-402, 404
gender identity formation 611 componential sub-theory 355-356 corps morcele 266
intentionality 318 connectionism 382-383, 382 creativity and intelligence 362-363
introspection 316, 317 connectionist models 369-370, crime, definition of 515-516
James, William 317 440-441, 440 see also violent crime
language development and 381 conscience 59-60 critical developmental psychology
mind-brain debate 317-318 consciousness 54, 56, 236, 463-468 497-500, 616
moral development and 398-399 constitutional capacity critical periods 12-13, 602-603
psychoanalytic theories 33-34 see innate capacity crystallised intelligence 350-351
cultural approaches 629-631 critique of 511 DNA molecules 425-426, 425

cultural tools see tools dyad 504 environment of evolutionary
(Vygotsky’s theory) environment 504-509, 505 adaptiveness (EEA) 422-423
culture 16-17, 588-598 see also race and exosystems 506 evolutionary change 418-420
violent crime; racism individual’s role 502 exaptions 421
attachment theory and 228-229 macrosystems 506-507 gender and 428-430, 429
cognitive development and 590-591 mesosystems 506 genes and 424-426
constructivist theory and 343 microsystems 505 genetic determinism 423
intellectual development and multi-person systems of key principles 421-424
352-353 interaction 502-504 language development 426-428
moral development theory and perceived environmental Markam, Ellen 427
410-412 context 504 modularity 422-423
psychoanalytic theory and 67, 69 role changes 509 natural selection 418-420
psychosocial theory 309-310 systemic forms of influence parental investment 428-429
self psychology and 207-208 502-504 religion and 433-434
violent crime and 531 transitions 508-509 sexual identity 428-430, 429
culture-fair tests 351-352, 623 ecological transitions 508-509 Social Darwinism 423-424
economic factors and violent crime social exchange transactions 431
527-528 sociobiology 424
D EEA see environment of evolutionary standard social science model 423
Darwin, Charles 418-420 adaptiveness (EEA) violent crime and 519-520
debates within developmental ego 57, 57, 58-59, 59, 60, 236, 262-264, Wason Selection Task 431
psychology 6-14 284, 285 evolution, definition of 418
defences 33, 47, 60-62, 62, 163, 201-202 egocentric speech see private speech exosystems 506
De Kock, Eugene 525 ego-defence mechanism see defences experiential sub-theory 356
Dennett, Daniel 448-449 ego identity 160-161 experimental research 319-320
depressive position 84-85, 84 elderly people 376-377 explicit memory 366, 372
developmental psychology Elektra complex see female Oedipus externalising response 549-550
criticisms of 571-583 complex extroverted type 249-250
debates within 6-14 emotional development 33-34 Eysenck, H J 573, 575-576, 578
definition of 495, 496 emotional intelligence (EQ) 359-360
history of 494-496 empathy 142, 191-192
dialectical historical materialism empiricism 316-317 F
461-462, 470-471 endopsychic structure 89, 94-98, 96 Fairbairn’s object relations theory
Diamond, Jared 427-428 environment and ecological theory of 88-90, 104-105 see also Klein’s object
discontinuity versus continuity 11-12 development 504-509, 505 relations theory
dishabituation 370-371 environment of evolutionary case study 100-102
dissociation 61, 556 adaptiveness (EEA) 422-423 critique of 106-109
DNA molecules 425-426, 425 envy 81-82, 83, 85 endopsychic structure 89, 94-98, 96
domestic violence 293, 541-542, epigenetic approach 284-285 infant dependence 89, 90-92
558-560 see also trauma; violent crime episodic memory 365-366, 442-443 libido 90
dream-work 63-64, 126, 253-257, 254 epistemology 460-462, 600-601 mature dependence 89
drive derivatives 157-158 EQ see emotional intelligence (EQ) object seeking 89
drive theories 95 equilibration 327-328 primary identification 89, 92-94
drugs and violent crime 532 Erikson, Erik 283 see also psychopathology 98-102
dyadic relationship 74-75, 504 psychosocial theory schizoid 89-90, 94-98
ethnicity see culture theory of motivation 90-92
eugenics 588, 589 treatment implications 102-104
E everyday concepts 475-476 true object related nature of self
early childhood 17-19, 353-354, evolutionary psychology 88-89
545-548 see also childhood; childhood adaptions 420-421 Fairbairn, William Ronald Dodds 25,
development; newborn babies basic level of categorisation 427 88, 98, 99, 104, 105
eating disorders 144 brain development 424 false belief test 448-449
ecological environment 504-507, Chomsky, Noam 426 false memory syndrome 369
505, 509 cognitive development and 430-431 false self 138, 148-149
ecological theory of development critiques of 432-433 families 523, 566-567, 593
apartheid 509-510 Darwin, Charles 418-420 fathers, role of 144-145
chronosystem 507 definition of 417-418 Faux Pas test 452-453
contextual approach 501-502 Diamond, Jared 427-428 female Oedipus complex 52-53
Index 681
feminist movement 614-616 moral development theory 408-410 307-308, 533-535

Feuerstein, Reuven 351, 482 psychosocial theory 14-15, 309 identity diffusion 171, 536
fixation 43, 61 social structure 602 identity foreclosure 300, 534, 536
fluid intelligence 350-351 socio-economic factors 608-609 identity integration 537
four component model 413-414 stereotypes 604, 605, 608 imitation 332
fragmented body 276 valuing 608 impingement 140-141
fragmenting self 186-187, 198 violent crime 529-530 implicit memory 366, 372
Freud, Sigmund 23-24, 37 see also gender identity 617 income inequality and violent crime
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory Barbie 609-610 527-528
as chauvinist 55 in childhood 609-610 individual plane 487-488
cognitive development and 321 critical developmental individuation 235, 245-247, 265
as homophobe 50-51 psychology 616 infant-directed speech 384-385
Jung, Carl Gustav and 28 critical periods 602-603 infantile amnesia 371, 443-448 see also
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory 23-24, feminist movement 614-616 childhood amnesia
29, 30 see also psychoanalytic theories formation of 606-607, 610-616 infantile sexuality 40-42, 42
adult sexuality 40-42, 42 gender salience 612 infants see also early childhood
anal stage 45 gender schema theory 611-612 dependence of 89, 90-92
case study 66 media, role of 614 intelligence of 352-353
critique of 64-70 parents, role of 612-613 memory development 370-371
cultural bias 67, 69 peer groups 613-614 observation of 79, 121-123, 150-151,
defences 60-62, 62 psychoanalytic theory 611 221-222
deterministic trends 67-68, 69-70 gender polarisation 602, 603 trauma 545-546
dreams 63-64 General Genetic Law of Cultural inflation 245, 248
Erickson, Erik versus 284 Development 472-473, 481 innate capacity 80-82
gender identity 611 genes 424-426 inner speech see private speech
genital stage 48-49 genetic determinism see nativism instincts 32, 38, 56
infantile sexuality 40-42, 42 genetics and violent crime 519 instinctual trigger 271-272
latency stage 47 gestalt 269 integration 141-142
neurosis 62-63 Gilligan, Carol 408-410, 614-615 intellectual development
Oedipus complex 51-54 good-enough mothering 140, 145-146 ageing and 361-362
oral stage 43-44 see also motherhood Alzheimer’s disease 361-362, 362
pathology 62-63 grandiosity 139-140, 175, 188 Army Alpha and Beta tests 347,
phallic stage 45-46 Guilford’s structure of intellect model 573-574
psychosexual stages of 349-350, 349 Binet-Simon Intelligence Test
development 43-49 guilt 190-191, 291-292 346-347
psychosocial theory versus 284 Guntrip, Harry 102-104 Cattell, Raymond 350-351
reductionist trends 67-68, 70 changes in intelligence 360
scientific evidence and 65, 67, 68-69 cognitive approach 354-359
stages of development 31 H componential sub-theory 355-356
structural model 54, 57-60, 57, 59 habituation-dishabituation paradigm contextual sub-theory 356-357
structure of mind 54-60 370-371 creativity and 362-363
topographical model 54-56, 56 Hate (Bion’s theory) 123-125 crystallised intelligence 350-351
trieb 39 health see public health approach cultural bias 352-353
unconscious 38-40 hierarchical models of intelligence 350 culture-fair tests 351-352
fuzzy sets 605-606 hippocampus 444-448 emotional intelligence 359-360
HIV/AIDS 229-231, 230, 551-552, experiential sub-theory 356
568-569 factors affecting performance 351
G holding 119, 142 Feuerstein, Reuven 351
Galton, Francis 346, 346 hommelette 266 fluid intelligence 350-351
Gardner, Howard 357-359, 358 homophobe, Freud as 50-51 Galton, Francis 346, 346
gender see also gender identity human development, definition of 495 Gardner, Howard 357-359, 358
constancy 607-608 Goleman, Daniel 359
cultural context 17 Guilford’s structure of intellect
definition of 601-602, 605 I model 349-350, 349
evolutionary psychology and id 57-58, 57, 59, 60 hierarchical models of
428-430, 429 idealisation 61, 178-179 intelligence 350
fuzzy sets 605-606 identification 44, 61, 160, 273-274, Horn, John 350
gender lenses 602-604 277, 611 infant intelligence 352-353
labelling 608 identity development 288, 299, Learning Propensity Assessment
Device (LPAD) 351 opposites 244-245 innate capacity 80-82

mental age 347 participation mystique 248 internal world 76-78
multiple intelligences 357-359 pathology 248-249 intra-psychic world 73-74
psychometric approach 346-354 personal unconscious 236-237 object relations 74-75
school-going children 353-354 psychological types 249-253 paranoid-schizoid position 31,
Spearman’s two-factor model of shadows 242 82-83, 84
intelligence 348-349, 348 symbols 237, 239, 244, 247-248 phantasy 30, 74, 77-78
Stanford-Binet Intelligence three levels of psyche 235-237, 237 positions 82-85, 84
Scale 347 psychic structure 78-80
Sternberg, Robert 354-357, 354 psychological birth 76
Thurstone’s primary mental K selfhood 76
abilities 349 Kernberg, Otto 27, 153 theoretical focus 75-76
trauma and 552 Kernberg’s theory 107, 153-156, 155 knowledge-acquisition components
triarchic theory of intelligence affective valence 159 355-356
354-357 affects 156 Knowledge (Bion’s theory) 123-125
violent crime and 521-522 aggression 178 Kohlberg, Lawrence 396 see also moral
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale basic units of development 156-158 development theory
(WAIS) 347-348 basic units of experience 155 Kohut, Heinz 27, 175-180, 183 see also
intelligence, definition of 344-346 borderline personality self psychology
intelligence tests see intellectual organisation 170-173
development critiques of 180-181
interactional factors and violent crime defence mechanisms 163 L
531-532 drive derivatives 157-158 Lacan, Jacques 261-262, 261 see also
interactionism 417-418 ego identity 160-161 mirror stage theory
internalisation 94, 159-161 idealisation 178-179 language development
internal plane 487-488 identification 160 bilingualism 380-381
internal working models 218-219 internalisation 159-161 case grammar 386
internal world 76-78 introjection 159 chimpanzees 383-384
intersubjectivity 205-207 Kohut, Heinz and 175-180 cognitive development and 381
intrapsychic world 73-74, 156 libido 178 connectionism 382-383, 382
introjection 61, 78, 159 mental health 166-167 definition of language 378
introspection 316, 317 metabolisation 161 disorders 392
introverted type 250 narcissism 173-180 evolutionary psychology 426-428
intuitionism 398 normality 166-167 expressive jargon 384
IQ tests see intellectual development object representation 157 expressive language 383
irrational functions 252-253 pathological development 167-180, expressive speech style 386
168-169 holophrases 385
pleasure 156 infant-directed speech 384-385
J reality testing 162 Language Acquisition Device
jealousy 81-82 repression 164 (LAD) 380
Jones, Ernest 24, 26 roles 160 learning theory 379
Jung, Carl Gustav 28, 234 self representation 156-157 linguistic determinism 393
Jung’s analytic theory 30, 31, 32-33, splitting 164 multilingualism 380-381
234-235, 258 stages of normal development nativism 379-380
alienation 245, 249 161-167, 168-169 newborn babies 384
archetypes 239-244 superego 164-165 operant conditioning 379
collective unconscious 237, 238 therapy implications 179-180 overextension error 386-387
complexes 238-239 Tinker Bell 172-173 phonemes 387
consciousness 236 Tsotsi 157-158 phonics reading strategy 387
critiques of 258-259 un-pleasure 156 Piaget, Jean 381, 392
dreams 253-257, 254 Voldemort 176 pivot grammar 386
dynamics of personality 244-245 Klein, Melanie 24-25, 26, 30, 31, 73 process of 383-387
ego 236 Klein’s object relations theory 86 see reading 387-392
extroverted type 249-250 also Fairbairn’s object relations theory receptive language 383
individuation 235, 245-247 case study 81-82 referential speech style 386
inflation 245, 248 critique of 85 Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 393
introverted type 250 depressive position 84-85, 84 scaffolding 385
myths 240 envy 81-82, 83, 85 semantic slanting 393
neurosis 248-249 infant observation 79 social interactionism 381-382
Index 683
telegraphic speech 385 multistore model of memory moral development theory 396-397
theories of language acquisition 367, 367 autonomous moral reasoning 399
378-383 prenatal memory 370 behaviourism 398
thought and 392-394 procedural memory 366 cognitive developmental
visual reading strategy 387 schema theory 367-368 approach 398-399
Vygotsky, Lev 381-382, scripts 368 cognitive-social theory 398
383-384, 394 semantic memory 365-366 conventional/role conformity
Learning Propensity Assessment semantic network models 368 morality 401-402, 404
Device (LPAD) 351 senile dementia 377 criminal conduct and 411
learning theory 379 sensory store 367 critiques of 407-414
libidinal ego 96-97 short-term memory 365 cultural bias 410-412
libido 43, 90, 178 Vygotsky, Lev 374-375 Defining Issues Test (DIT) 407
life-span perspective 6-8 memory strategies 373-376 four component model 413-414
links (Bion’s theory) 123, 126-128 mentalisation 114-115 gender and 408-410
long-term memory 365-366, 366 mental mechanism see defences Gilligan, Carol 408-410
Love (Bion’s theory) 123-125 mesosystems 506 heteronomous moral reasoning 400
LPAD see Learning Propensity metacognition 337, 376 intuitionism 398
Assessment Device (LPAD) microsystems 505 Moral Judgment Interview
militarisation 529 (MJI) 407
mimicry 272 Piaget, Jean 398-399
M mind-brain debate 317-318 postconventional/principled
macro-political factors and mirroring needs 176, 188 morality 402-403, 405
violent crime 528-529 mirror stage theory 30, 261-262, preconventional/premoral morality
macrosystems 506-507 280-281 see also Lacan, Jacques 400, 404
manic defence 84, 84 aggressivity 271, 276-278 psychodynamic theory 398
Marx, Karl 461-462 alienation 278-279 reasoning and action 412-413
mechanistic approaches 620, captation 274 Rest, J R 413-414
621-622, 622 chimpanzees 267-268 stages of 399-407, 404-405
meconnaissance 274-275 corps morcele 266 transitional stages 406-407
media and gender identity 614 critiques of 281 moratorium 300
Mediated Learning Experience ego 262-264 motherese see infant-directed speech
(MLE) 482 enabling function of image 271-272 motherhood 497 see also good-enough
mediating factors affecting trauma fragmented body 276 mothering
551-554 gestalt 269 motivational systems 203-205
mediation 483 hommelette 266 multilingualism 380-381
memory development identification 273-274, 277 multi-person systems of interaction
adults 372-373 image of self 266-271 502-504
Atkinson and Shiffrin’s model of individuation 265 multiple intelligences 357-359
memory 367, 367, 438, 439 instinctual trigger 271-272 multistore model of memory 367, 367
Bartlett, Frederick 367-368 meconnaissance 274-275 mutual regulation 204-205
in childhood 371-372 mimicry 272 myths 240, 270
children, older 372-373 narcissism 263, 270-271
connectionist models 369-370 newborn babies 264-266
declarative memory 366 prematuration 265 N
definition of memory 365-366 reality principle 263-264 narcissism 173-180, 184-186, 263,
dishabituation 370-371 rivalry 277, 278 270-271
elderly people 376-377 separation 265 nascent capacity for thought 119-120
encoding specificity principle 372 statue metaphor 269-270 nativism 8, 379-380, 423
episodic memory 365-366 superego 264 natural selection 418-420
explicit memory 366, 372 transvitism 278 nature-nurture debate 8-10, 417-418
false memory syndrome 369 MI theory see multiple intelligences neglect see trauma
habituation-dishabituation MLE see Mediated Learning neonates 10 see also newborn babies
paradigm 370-371 Experience (MLE) neuroses 30, 62-63, 248-249
implicit memory 366, 372 mnemonics see memory strategies newborn babies 10, 17-19, 217,
infants 370-371 modularity 422-423 264-266, 384
long-term memory 365-366, 366 monotropism 228-229 nodes 368, 440-441
memory strategies 373-376 moral defence 98-99 non-psychotic parts of self 130-131
metacognition 376 moral development and normality 574-578
models 367-370 violent crime 522 norms, definition of 574, 623
Nsamenang, A B 593-597 postconventional/principled morality gender 14-15, 309

numeracy, principles of 335-336 402-403, 404 guilt 291-292
power and childhood development identity development 288, 300,
582-583 533-534
O preconscious 54-56, 56 moratorium 300
object-choice see sexual object preconventional/premoral morality negative identity formation 300
object relations theory see Fairbairn’s 400, 404 overidentification 298-299
object relations theory; Klein’s object prenatal memory 370 parental care 288
relations theory preschoolers see childhood psychopathology 287-288
Oedipus complex 51-54 development racism and 302-303, 588
older children see childhood primary identification 89, 92-94 role confusion 298
omnipotence 76, 140 primary maternal preoccupation shame 290
ontology 460-461, 462-463, 143-144 stages of development 286-308,
600-601, 626 primary mental abilities 349 286, 301
opposites 244-245 primary-school children violent crime 533-534
optimal frustration/responsiveness see childhood development virtues 285
193-194 private speech 473-474 psychotic mental functioning 128-131
organismic approaches 620, 622-624 projection 61, 78, 241 public health approach 631-633
orphans due to AIDS 230, 568-569 projective identification 83, 119-121
overburdened self 200 psyche 38, 78, 235-237, 237
overextension error 386-387 psychic structure 33, 78-80 R
overidentification 298-299 psychoanalysis 65 race and violent crime 526-527
overstimulated self 198-200 psychoanalytic theories 22-28, 34 racism 302-303, 588-589, 591-592
see also Freud’s psychoanalytic theory see also culture
childhood, significance of 29-30 rage 190-191
P cognitive development 33-34 rational functions 251-252
parallel distributed processing (PDP) critique of 34-35 rationalism 316-317
440-441, 440 emotional development 33-34 reading 387-392
paranoid-schizoid position 31, normal development 30-31 reality principle 58, 263-264
82-83, 84 pathological development 30-31 recall 372-373
parentese see infant-directed speech psychic structure 33 recognition 372-373
parents 288, 428-429, 523, 612-613 stages of development 31 reductionist approach 589-590
participatory learning 594 unconscious 31-33 regression 61, 545
part objects 77 psychobiology 436-437 religion and evolutionary psychology
pathological development 30-31, psychodynamic theory 398 433-434
167-180, 168-169 psychological birth 76, 139-140 repression 47, 60-61, 92, 99, 164
PDP see parallel distributed psychological growth 131-133 resilience 537, 561, 633
processing (PDP) psychology, history of 587-588 resistance 133, 201-202
peer groups 524, 594-595, 613-614 psychometric approach to intellectual resistant attachment classification
pendulum problem 338-339, 338 development 346-354 219-221
penis envy 46, 52-53 psychopathology 30, 167 Rest, J R 413-414
performance components 355-356 attachment theory 226-228, 227 reverie (Bion’s theory) 117-118
personality disorders 30, 139, 522-523 Fairbairn’s object relations theory risk-taking behaviour 340
personhood 139-140 98-102 risk versus resilience debate 632-633
perversions 42 psychosocial theory 287-288 rivalry 277, 278
phantasy 30, 74, 77-78 violent crime and 522 Rose, N 577, 582-583
physical abuse 557-558 see also trauma psychophysiology and violent crime
physiological factors affecting trauma 519-520
551-552 psychosis 28, 128 S
Piaget, Jean 324-326, 324, 381 see also psychosocial theory 7, 284-286, 498 see Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 393
constructivist theory also Erikson, Erik scaffolding 385, 479
childhood development 570 crises 284 schemata 367-368, 611-612
language development 381, 392 criticisms of 308-310 schemes 326
life-span perspective 7 cultural bias 309-310 schizoid 80, 89-90, 94-98
moral development theory 398-399 domestic violence 293 schizophrenia 129-130
pivot grammar 386 doubt 290 school-going children
pleasure principle 57-58 ego 284, 285, 300 see early childhood
positions 31, 82-85, 84, 126-128 epigenetic approach 284-285 scientific concepts 475-476
positivist approaches 625-627 Freud, Sigmund versus 284 scripts 368, 603
Index 685
secure attachment 219-221, 521 social constructionist approaches 620, toddlers see early childhood
secure base 218 634-636 ToM see theory of mind
self disorders 197-201 social control see social regulation tools (Vygotsky’s theory) 463-468, 466,
self-doubt 290 Social Darwinism 423-424 477, 481
selfhood 76 social interaction 468-469 topographical model 54-56, 56
selfobject experiences 187-190 social interactionism 381-382 transductive reasoning 332-333
self psychology 184-186 social ontogenetic framework 595-596 transitional object 146-147
see also Kohut, Heinz social regulation 496-497, 571-574 transitional phenomena 146-147
adversarial transferences 195 social structure and gender 602 transitional space 146-147
aggression 190-191 social support 552-554 transvitism 278
analytic third 207 social transitions 526 trauma
case studies 195-197, 209-212 sociobiology 424 adolescence 549-550
cohesive self 186-187 socio-economic factors and gender constitutional factors 551-552
critique of 208-209 608-609 corporal punishment 554
defence 201-202 sociohistorical development 469-476 definition of 542
development of self 186-191 sociopolitical issues 633-634 dissociation 556
developments in 202-207 South Africa domestic violence 558-560
disorders 197-201 self psychology in 207-208 early childhood 546-548
disruption-restoration cycle 193 theoretical frameworks in 619-637 externalising response 549-550
empathy 191-192 trauma in 539-542, 540 HIV/AIDS and 551-552
fragmenting self 186-187, 198 violent crime in 516-518, 517 infants 545-546
guilt 190-191 Spearman’s two-factor model of intellectual factors 552
idealising transferences 194 intelligence 348-349, 348 internalising response 550
intersubjectivity 205-207 stability versus change debate 6 malnutrition 551
mirror transferences 194 stability versus plasticity 320-321 mediating factors 551-554
motivational systems 203-205 standard social science model 423 middle childhood 548-549
mutual regulation 204-205 Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale 347 physical abuse 557-558
narcissism 184-186 statue metaphor 269-270 physiological factors 551-552
optimal frustration / responsiveness stereotypes of gender 604, 605, 608 Post-Traumatic Stress
193-194 Sternberg, Robert 354-357, 354 Disorder 543
overburdened self 200 Strange Situation 219-221, 220 preschoolers 546-548
overstimulated self 198-200 stress see trauma primary-school children 548-549
pole of ambitions 189 structural model 54, 57-60, 57, 59 ‘pseudo-mature’ behaviour 558
rage 190-191 structure of intellect model recovery from 550-554
regulation 204-205 349-350, 349 regression 545
resistance 201-202 structure of the mind 54-60 resilience 561
selfobject experiences 187-190 sublimation 47, 61 sensitisation of neural paths 555
selfobject transferences 194-197 substance abuse see drugs and sexual abuse 560-561
self structures 197 violent crime social support 552-554
shame 191 superego 57, 57, 59-60, 59, 63, South African context 539-542, 540
in South Africa 207-208 164-165, 264 symptoms of 542
twinship transferences 194-195 symbolic representation 331, 332-341 toddlers 545-548
understimulated self 200-201 symbols 237, 239, 244, 247-248 Type I trauma 542-554
vicarious introspection 191-192 symptom formation, model of 62 Type II trauma 542-543, 554-561
self representation 156-157 systemic forms of influence 502-504 triarchic theory of intelligence 354-357
semantic memory 365-366, 442-443 trieb 39
semantic network models 368 true self 138, 148-149
semantic slanting 393 T truth 123-125
separation 265 temperament 224, 520-521 Tsotsi 157-158
sexual abuse 560-561 see also trauma Terman, Lewis 346, 346 twinship transference 195
sexual aim 40-41 theoretical frameworks in South Africa two-person system see dyadic
sexual identity 428-430, 429 619-637 relationship
sexuality 39-42, 428-430, 566 theory of mind 448-456 Type I trauma 542-554
sexual object 41-42 theory of motivation 90-92 Type II trauma 554-561
shame 191, 290 Theseus 9
signs 466-467, 481 thought 114-119, 392-394
Simon, Theodore 346-347 Thurstone’s primary mental abilities U
Skinner, B F 379, 379 349 unconscious 31-33, 38-40, 54, 56, 56,
social capital and violent crime 524-525 Tinker Bell 172-173 126, 236-237
understimulated self 200-201 Vygotsky, Lev 374-375, 382, (WAIS) 347-348

unintegrated personality 141-142 458-460, 458 Wertsch, J V 478-482
United States of America 179, 531 Vygotsky’s theory 458-460, 488-490 West African conceptual framework
activity theory 477, 485-487 593-598
actual level of development 474 Whorf, Benjamin 393
V adult functioning 468 Winnicott, Donald 26-27, 138
vicarious introspection 191-192 Bruner, Jerome 479 Winnicott’s theory 30-31, 138-139, 149
victims 581-582 change 470-471 appropriate failure 140-141
violence, definition of 515-516 see also consciousness 463-468 birth 141
violent crime cultural line of development 472 body-needs 143
violent crime 514-515 see also trauma culture and 590 critiques of 149-150
adolescence 533-537 dialectical historical materialism eating disorders 144
age 530-531 461-462, 470-471 ego-needs 143
apartheid 528-529 epistemology 460-461 empathy 142
attachment and 521 everyday concepts 475-476 false self 138, 148-149
against children 534-535, 535 external sign and operation 468 fathers, role of 144-145
community factors 524-531 Feuerstein, Reuven 482 free association 139
cultures and sub-cultures of General Genetic Law of Cultural good-enough mothering 140,
violence 531 Development 472-473, 481 145-146
definition of 515-516 higher mental functions 465 grandiosity 139-140
De Kock, Eugene 525 historical interpretation 476-478 hallucinatory relationship 141
drugs 532 individual plane 487-488 holding 119, 142
economic factors 527-528 instruction 475-476 impingement 140-141
Erickson, Erik 533-534 Instrumental Enrichment (IE) 482 integration 141-142
evolution and 519-520 language development 381-382, personality disorders 139
exposure to violence 526 383-384, 394 personhood 139-140
factors influencing 519-532 lower mental functions 465 primary maternal preoccupation
familial factors 523 Mediated Learning Experience 143-144
gender 529-530 (MLE) 482 protection 148
genetics and 519 mediation 483 psychological birth 139-140
identity development 534, 536, 537 naïve psychology 468 self-pathology 139
income inequality 527-528 natural line of development 472 transitional phenomena 146-147
intelligence and 521-522 ontology 460-461, 462-463 true self 138, 148-149
interactional factors 531-532 potential level of development 474 unintegrated personality 141-142
macro-political structural level primitive behaviour 468 wish fulfilment 139-140
528-529 private speech 473-474 wish fulfilment 58, 139-140
militarisation 529 rooting phase 468 wombs, environment in 11
moral development 411, 522 scaffolding 479 working mothers 579-580
parental factors 523 scientific concepts 475-476 world-views 594
peer relations and 524 signs 466-467, 481
personality and 522-523 social interaction 468-469
prenatal factors 520 sociohistorical development Z
psychological factors 520-524 469-476 Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD)
psychopathology 522 tools 463-468, 466, 477, 481 469-470, 474, 475, 479, 483-484
psychophysiology and 519-520 Wertsch, J V 478-482
psychosocial theory 533-534 Western interpretation 478-480
race and 526-527 Zone of Proximal Development
relational factors 523-524 (ZPD) 469-470, 474, 475, 479,
resilience 537 483-484
social capital 524-525
social impact of 518-519
social transitions 526 W
in South Africa 516-518, 517 WAIS see Wechsler Adult Intelligence
statistics of 516-518, 517, 535, 541 Scale (WAIS)
temperament and 520-521 Wallon, Henri 267-268
United States of America 531 wayfinding see cognitive mapping
weapons 532 theory
virtues 285, 594 weapons and violent crime 532
Voldemort, Lord 176 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale

Developmental Psychology

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Published by Juta & Company Ltd

PO Box 14373, Lansdowne, 7779, Cape Town, South Africa

© 2013 Juta & Company Ltd

ISBN: 978 1 48510 227 4 (Print)

ISBN: 978 1 48512 512 9 (WebPDF)

Typeset in Garamond and ITC Stone Sans

1. Basic concepts and principles in developmental psychology 5

SECTION ONE: Psychoanalytic approaches to

2. A basic introduction to psychoanalytic thought 22

3. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of development and personality 37

4. Klein’s object relations theory of development and personality 73

5. Fairbairn’s contributions to object relations theory 88

7. Donald Winnicott 138

8. Kernberg’s theory of normal and pathological development 153

9. Heinz Kohut: Self psychology 183

11. Jung’s analytic theory of the development of personality 234

12. Lacan’s mirror stage 261

13. Erikson’s psychosocial stages of development 283

SECTION TWO: Cognitive development 313

15. Piaget’s constructivist theory of cognitive development 324

16. Intellectual development 344

17. Memory development 365

18. Language development 378

19. Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning 396

20. Evolutionary psychology 417

21. Contributions of cognitive science approaches to cognitive

22. Vygotsky’s theory of the development of cultural tools 458

SECTION THREE: Psychosocial and socio-political contexts

24. Bronfenbrenner’s ecological theory of development 501

25. Violent crime and human development in South Africa 514

27. Critical issues in developmental psychology 563

28. Race, culture and psychological theory 586

29. Gender identity: Contestations and questions 600

30. Theory and South African developmental psychology

All three editors are also contributors to this textbook.

Susan Malcolm-Smith is a lecturer at the Department of Psychology at the University of Cape

Pg 218: Table 10.1

Pg 362: Figure 16.3

Pg 382: Figure 18.1

Pgs 404-405: Table 19.1

Pg 440: Figure 21.2

This second edition of Developmental Psychology draws together three perspectives

This chapter presents certain fundamental concepts in the

1. Debates within developmental psychology

This chapter discusses certain important ideas and debates

Debates within developmental psychology

Stability versus change

The life-span perspective

The advantages of the life-span perspective

PHO TO S : CHA J O HNS TO N

Assumptions within developmental psychology

s Development is lifelong: development occurs across the full life-

s Development is multidimensional: biological, socio-emotional

s Development is multidirectional: some dimensions of development

s Development is fluid: depending on an individual’s life conditions,

s Development is embedded in history: historical conditions are very

s Development is multidisciplinary: sociologists, psychologists, linguists,

The riddle of the ship of Theseus

There is no doubt that the separate roles of these two factors