Nigerian oil and gas industry local

content development: A stakeholder

analysis
De Vita, G. , Lagoke, O. and Adesola, S.
Author post-print (accepted) deposited in CURVE May 2016

Original citation & hyperlink:

De Vita, G. , Lagoke, O. and Adesola, S. (2016) Nigerian oil and gas industry local content
development: A stakeholder analysis. Public Policy and Administration, volume 31 (1): 51-
79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952076715581635

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Nigerian oil and gas industry local content development:

a stakeholder analysis

by Glauco De Vita, Oluwatosin Lagoke and Sola Adesola

Public Policy and Administration 05/2015; DOI:10.1177/0952076715581635

Abstract

This paper undertakes the first stakeholder analysis of the Nigerian oil and gas industry local

content development (LCD) policy to gain a better understanding of the extent of

stakeholders’ interactions and how such interactions align to conditions conducive to LCD.

Drawing from policy documents and semi-structured interviews, 15 stakeholder groups are

identified, and seven of them categorized as key ‘players’. A social network analysis then

reveals that: (i) a significant proportion of relationships between key players are

unidirectional; (ii) a marginal role is played by higher education institutions within the

network; (iii) it is international oil companies rather than indigenous operators that exhibit

‘global centrality’ within the industry network, with the former stakeholder group pivotally

determining industry activities. Our findings provide a valuable first step towards the

development of a polycentric framework for the appraisal of the Nigerian LCD policy.

Keywords

local content development, Nigeria, oil and gas industry, social network analysis, stakeholder

theory, stakeholder analysis

Introduction

The Nigerian local content development (LCD) policy is an initiative by the Federal

Government to help develop local capacity building in the Nigerian oil and gas industry and
to enable Nigerians to participate actively. LCD has been defined by many authors in

different ways but essentially refers to the

quantum of composite value added or created in the Nigerian economy

through the utilization of Nigerian human and material resources for the

provision of goods and services to the petroleum industry within acceptable

quality, health, safety and environmental standards in order to stimulate the

development of indigenous capabilities. (NOGIC Act, 2010: 26)

LCD in Nigeria has generated a large body of literature, with its focus ranging from

the development of theoretical frameworks (Heum, 2008; Heum et al., 2003; Ihua, 2010;

Omenikolo and Amadi, 2010) to surveys and early empirical work aimed at appraising LCD

policy objectives (Bakare, 2011; Ihua et al., 2011). However, to our knowledge, to date, no

study has conducted a rigorous analysis of the key stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas

industry who are in a position to ‘affect and be affected by’ the LCD policy, and the

relational structure that characterizes this network.

This gap is striking when considering the potential contribution of such knowledge for

a polycentric understanding of the Nigerian oil and gas industry, and for the identification of

ways in which the effectiveness of the LCD policy could be increased. Drawing from

stakeholder theory, we aim to fill this gap and thus contribute to the development of a more

comprehensive framework for the appraisal of the efficacy of the Nigerian LCD policy. As

suggested by Bryson:

Governmental and non-profit reforms across the world are also prompting the

need for more attention to stakeholder analyses […] An emphasis on markets,

participation, flexibility and deregulation all imply the need for more focused

attention on a wider array of stakeholders. (2004: 24)

 Our primary rationale for undertaking the first stakeholder analysis of the

Nigerian oil and gas industry LCD policy is to gain a better understanding of the

stakeholders involved and, in particular, the extent of the actual involvement in policy-

making and implementation of non-state actors in such process. Key questions we aim

to address through such analysis, therefore, include ‘who are the key industry players?’

and ‘how do interactions among such key players align to conditions conducive to

LCD?’ The latter question, to be investigated through an application of social network

analysis (SNA) techniques, should be particularly informative since, as elaborated later

in the paper, for LCD to come to fruition considerable coordination of and collaboration

among the multiplicity of stakeholders that characterize the relational structure of this

network is required.

A brief review of the history and objectives of Nigeria’s LCD policy

The history of the LCD policy in Nigeria is traceable to the Petroleum Act of 1969, which

stated that ‘the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands [...],

shall be vested in the State’ (Petroleum Act, 1990: 2), notwithstanding allowances for

foreign-owned companies to provide services or operate directly in the sector. The Act also

entails a directive that obliges owners of oil drilling leases to ensure that - within ten years

from the time the lease is granted - at least 75% of the workers employed in their operations

are Nigerians.

The Petroleum Act of 1969 was later amended by the Petroleum (Drilling and

Production) Amendment Regulations Act. Such legislation was followed by the Joint

Operating Agreement (JOA) and Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) Act, which became

effective from 1971 (Ameh, 2006). These legislative arrangements mandated the Nigerian
government to acquire a 33.3% participation interest in AGIP (‘Azienda Generale Italiana

Petroli’ – General Italian Oil Company). The government’s stake in AGIP rose to 60% in

1979, a transaction undertaken through the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC),

which had been established in 1972.

The Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) Act of 1972 led to the establishment of the PTI

in 1973. Although the institute was established as a prerequisite for the membership of the

Organization of Petroleum Exploring Countries (OPEC), it was also set up to train Nigerians

to meet the labor force requirement of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The objective was,

and still is:

... to deliver quality education and provide efficient technological manpower

to build a competent and committed workforce that will sustain and service

the continental oil and gas industry. (Petroleum Training Institute, 2011: 13)

In 1973, the Gulf Oil Company Fund was repealed by the promulgation of the

Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) Act No. 25, which established the PTDF

specifically to build indigenous capability as well as in-country technological development

through training of Nigerians in various industry fields.

The development of the Marginal Field Programme as contained in the Petroleum

(Amendment) Decree No. 23 of 1996 was also geared towards the development of LCD. A

‘marginal field’ is defined as any field that has reserves booked and reported annually to the

Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and which has remained unattended to for a

period of ten years (Ayodele and Frimpong, 2003).

This law was promulgated to help recover marginal fields from various international

oil companies (IOCs) and re-allocate them to indigenous firms. The conditions for this re-

allocation were such that current holders of oil prospecting licenses (OPLs) and oil mining
licenses (OMLs) were excluded from applying, owning, operating or acquiring participatory

interests in any marginal field (Emole, 1996). However, indigenous companies that desired

allocation of these oil fields were only eligible if they relinquished their OPLs and OMLs. In

view of this, IOCs were made to farm-out these oil fields only to citizens of Nigeria who

owned registered companies, with sound knowledge of the industry as well as financial and

technical capabilities. Invariably, this decree prevented IOCs already operating in Nigeria

from ‘farming-in’ because they would have had to relinquish their licenses for probably

smaller quantities of oil wells. This was to enable Nigerians to get more involved in the

industry upstream and midstream sectors, thereby increasing local content. However, aimed

at creating a ‘win-win’ situation, the guidelines stipulated that ‘the farmee’ (the person who

the marginal field is farmed out to) may form a business relationship with a foreign partner

(with the latter having a maximum of 40% equity).

In 2003 the National Committee on LCD was established by the Federal House of

Assembly. The Committee was charged with the responsibility of developing a Local Content

Bill. The Bill was passed by Senate in 2006, ratified by the House of Representatives in

March 2010, and finally signed into law in April 2010 and renamed as ‘Nigerian Oil and Gas

Industry Content Development Bill 2010’ with the acronym NOGIC Act (2010).

The main thrust of the NOGIC Act (2010) is value addition. Having realized that the

lifeblood of Nigeria resides in the oil and gas sector, the Nigerian government aims to utilize

in-country human and material resources to add value to the economy. Five specific

objectives are highlighted in the policy document.

The first objective (NOGIC Act, 2010, Section 3.1) stipulates that Nigerians are to be

considered ‘first’ in the award of exploration and contractual rights, though quality, cost and

timely delivery would still be considered as part of the competitive process. The second

objective (ibid, Section 51.1 & 52.1) mandates that all operators and contractors requiring
legal or financial services shall retain only the services of Nigerian firms. The third

objective (ibid, Section 28.1) extends the principle of ‘first consideration’ to training and

employment.

The NOGIC Act (2010, Sections 36-40) also states that adequate R&D should be

carried out by operators for the promotion, training, research and development in Nigeria.

This does not necessarily require operators to engage in R&D directly but expects them to

file an R&D plan detailing planned expenditure and how R&D programmes are to be carried

out by, for example, involving higher education (HE) institutions.

The final policy objective (ibid, Sections 43-46) mandates that technology should be

transferred to indigenous firms to enhance in-country technological development, drive

efficiency savings and improve competitiveness.

Stakeholder theory and analytical framework

Since publication of Freeman’s (1984) ‘Strategic management: a stakeholder approach’,

stakeholder theory has attracted considerable attention (e.g. Friedman and Miles, 2002).

Freeman (1984) proposed a managerial perspective that calls for the identification of key

stakeholders of the firm. Although the nature of what is a stakeholder is still subject to debate

(see Miles, 2012), it is generally accepted that this nomenclature should include all those who

may ‘affect or be affected by’ a corporation such as owners, customers, employees and

suppliers (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Phillips, 2003).

In the search for the identification of which stakeholders deserve attention, analyses

that drew from a variety of other perspectives (exchange transactions, power dependencies,

etc.) led to extensions of the stakeholder framework, to include also government, consumer

advocates, the media, and a variety of other interest and pressure groups (see Bailur, 2006;

Cummings and Doh, 2000; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Stakeholder theory
assesses stakeholders’ identity on the basis of the possession of one or more of three

relationship attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. According to Mitchell et al. (1997),

the greater the possession of these attributes, the more stakeholders’ claims should be taken

into account.

Perspectives on stakeholder theory have developed around three different approaches,

namely descriptive, normative and instrumental. As argued by Donaldson and Preston

(1995), the descriptive approach is merely used to explain the characteristics of stakeholders.

The instrumental approach is more empirical in nature, aiming to identify the connections

that exist among stakeholders, and how these relations align to overall goals. Finally, the

normative approach critically examines the functioning of these relationships with the aim of

providing guidelines for successful coordination and/or implementation.

Donaldson and Preston (1995) add that descriptive stakeholder analysis acts as a

necessary precursor to the normative and instrumental approaches; a proposition which

precisely characterizes the modeling stages of the analysis carried out by the present study.

Even though stakeholder theory was originally conceived with reference to the private

sector firm, it has now begun to be applied to public sector organizations as well as

government policies. The relevance of the theory to public policy is confirmed by the fact

that some (albeit still few) studies have already concerned themselves with conducting a

stakeholder analysis of government projects. For example, Bailur (2006) applied stakeholder

theory to a public sector policy program, by analyzing the Gyandoot telecenter projects in

Madhya Pradesh (India). Reed et al. (2009) applied stakeholder theory to participatory natural

resource management by performing an exemplary stakeholder analysis of the Rural

Economy and Land Use (RELU) program. Mandarano (2009) provided a novel, state-of-the-

art application of a series of social network analysis (SNA) methodologies to evaluate the
social capital resulting from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Estuary

Program, an ecosystem-based collaborative planning program.

Against this backdrop, and drawing broadly from the templates developed by previous

applications, our stakeholder analysis follows the process sketched in Figure 1.

< Figure 1 here >

Several authors (e.g., Ackerman and Eden, 2011) have suggested different methods

for identifying stakeholders, including focus groups, interviews, and secondary sources.

Given our aim, and to remain faithful to the policy documentation, secondary evidence (in the

form of documentary material) provided a valuable initial tool, though interviews via snow-

ball sampling were our main instrument to identify successive respondents from a cross-

section of stakeholder groups, as well as to collect network data to inform our analysis of

existing relationships within the oil and gas industry.

For the stakeholder identification and differentiation, we adopt the stepwise

framework suggested by Bryson (1995). Bryson’s approach enables us to identify each of the

various stakeholder groups within the industry, and draw distinctions in terms of their level of

interest and influence with respect to key LCD policy objectives.

The identified stakeholders are then mapped onto the power-interest framework of

Ackermann and Eden (2011), which allows for the categorization of relevant actors as

‘subjects’, ‘players’, ‘crowd’, and ‘leaders’ or ‘context-setters’ on the basis of two variables,

‘interest’ and ‘power’. Given the context and purpose of our study, the ‘power’ variable was

operationalized in terms of ‘degree of involvement in LCD policy implementation’ (the

closed question required interviewees to answer either ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ involvement), the

‘power of employment within the industry’ of each stakeholder group surveyed (using a

three-point scale rating such power as ‘weak’, ‘medium’ or ‘strong’), and the level

‘influence’ through a question probing ‘the extent to which a stakeholder group can exert
influence on the development of emerging indigenous entrepreneurs’ (similarly rated on a

three point scale ranging from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’). ‘Interest’ was operationalized with

specific reference to ‘the level of interest vested by each stakeholder group in the outcomes

of the LCD policy’ (again, rated as ‘weak’, ‘medium’ or ‘strong’). Key ‘players’ are those

who have a high interest and high power (Reed et al., 2009), with at least three of the four

items that make up the ‘power’ and ‘interest’ constructs rated on the upper bound of the

measurement scales. According to Ackermann and Eden (2011), it is ‘players’ in a network

that warrant the nomenclature of ‘stakeholders’. Although ‘context setters’ are highly

influential, they tend to have low interest. ‘Subjects’ are seen to have high interest but low

power. However, there are occasions whereby ‘subjects’ may form coalitions to enhance their

influence. On this account, interest and influence can and often do change over time.

We then investigate the relational structure that exists among stakeholder groups

populating the oil and gas industry ‘network’ (linkage and structure), and the strengths of

such ties, by means of SNA. Although the origins of social network theory can be traced back

to the work of Moreno (1934), it wasn’t until 1956 that Cartwright and Harary (1956)

formalized the use of graph theory as the official tool to conduct SNA.

As noted by Serrat (2009), SNA employs a unique set of measurements by utilizing

structural information to study social networks. Social networks are ‘nodes’ of individuals,

groups, organizations, agencies, and related systems that tie in one or more sets of

interdependencies. As such, we see the applicability of SNA to our quest for a better

understanding of both the relationships among key stakeholders in the oil and gas industry,

and the extent to which the current operational connectivity of this network appears to be

conducive to the achievement of the LCD policy objectives, as self evident.

Drawing from interview data, our SNA entails the computation of several descriptive
indices of the social structure constituted by the stakeholders populating the network. This

process involves the presentation of matrix data in both ‘valued’ and ‘binary’ form from

which analyses of local and global ‘centrality’, ‘betweenness’, and overall network ‘density’

are conducted. These analyses will be complemented by sociograms, which are visual

representations of the network structure (Hatala, 2006).

Methodology

The data collected for this study were obtained from semi-structured interviews though

documentary evidence based on policy documents also complemented the analysis at the

stakeholder identification stage.

Interviews were preferred to focus groups because there are clear cut responsibilities

(as detailed in the NOGIC Act) of each stakeholder group within the oil and gas industry.

Moreover, assembling a focus group of executives alongside government officials would not

have been feasible given their busy schedules. This approach is consistent with ego network

analysis. Hatala (2006) argues that ego network analysis aims to gauge the perspective at

each end of a relationship, since it is the independent information they individually supply

that counts as data. On the other hand, complete network analysis deliberately brings

individuals that are part of a network together, to exchange their views. For this study, ego

network analysis was preferred since we wanted to let stakeholders speak freely on existing

relationships, with no external influence.

Interviews were conducted by telephone rather than face-to-face. This approach

offered several advantages, including greater personal safety/security and reduced costs of

transport. Data collection began with a pilot study (with eight respondents, drawn from across

the stakeholder groups identified for the main study) aimed at ensuring both face and content

validity of the interview questions to be posed during the interviews. The primary reason for
this exercise was to develop, through expert feedback, the most appropriate wording for the

core questions of our study, namely, those concerning the analysis of the relationship

characterizing the stakeholders populating the oil and gas industry network (for which no

blue print exists in the literature), as well as the critical constructs of ‘power’ and ‘influence’

of stakeholders in the context of the LCD policy (which also required fresh development).

The pilot exercise also proved helpful to ensure that all the questions to be posed to

respondents were clear and devoid of any leading or misleading elements which may have

caused any form of bias.

An initial schedule of two interviews with representatives of each of the 15

stakeholder groups was carried out. This initial sample was identified, in the first instance,

through contacts made at the Global Local Content Summit (London, 24-27 September 2012)

and via further enquiries made to the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board,

the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and the Department of Petroleum Resources,

whose management provided a useful set of initial contacts. From this a total of 28 semi-

structured interviews were then conducted with four respondents from each stakeholder

group subsequently categorized as a key ‘player’. As noted earlier, additional interviewees

were identified using a snow-ball technique, a process which terminated when recurrent

answers and recognizable data patterns signalled data saturation. We refrain from claiming

‘theoretical saturation’ given that, admittedly, our exercise was not intended to discover a

new theory and despite the fact that our number of interviews compares well against what is

customary in standard qualitative research of this kind, our sample cannot be deemed to be

representative of the substantial number of individuals populating each stakeholder group

identified. Nevertheless, we deem it sufficient to draw preliminary conclusions that can pave

the way for future studies on the key issues that flow from our main findings.

To preserve anonymity, we do not refer to any respondents by name nor disclose the
specific organization or government department where they work. The analysis is carried out

on a ‘stakeholder group’ basis. We have simplified our nomenclature by choosing a ‘3 letter

abbreviation’ for each stakeholder group as follows: ‘GOV’ for government; ‘IOC’ for

international operating companies; ‘INO’ for indigenous operators; ‘MSP’ for multinational

oil and gas companies; ‘ISP’ for indigenous oil and gas service providers; ‘EPC’ for

engineering, procurement and commissioning (EPC) contractors and fabricators; and ‘TUT’

for HE engineering and geo-science tutors.

The four respondents from GOV consisted of three senior managers in the LCD

division, and one LCD coordinator. These respondents were drawn from various parastatals

of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Each respondent had at least seven years of experience

in government and had been involved in ensuring due process for LCD policy

implementation.

The four respondents from the IOCs were all LCD managers. Each respondent had

over nine years of experience and had the opportunity to work for various oil and gas

divisions before managing the LCD division for at least three years. Their experiences span

from writing and evaluating LCD strategies to ensuring full compliance with the directives

contained in the NOGIC Act (2010). Their responsibilities also entailed reviewing tenders to

ensure conformity with the LCD plan regarding the procurement of materials and equipment

leasing.

The four participants from INOs were all LCD managers with at least seven years of

industry experience. Although this stakeholder group is made up of indigenous companies

which mostly benefit from OMLs farmed out by IOCs, they still partner with foreign firms

especially in the areas where they lack capability.

The respondents from the MSPs were all LCD managers with an average of seven

years of industry experience. Their main responsibilities entailed building indigenous

capacity as well as ensuring that the LCD element contained in their bids conforms to the

requirements of the NOGIC Act (2010).

The respondents from the ISPs were all senior executives with at least 11 years of

industry experience. Of particular interest is that each of the respondents also played a role as

LCD manager/advisor, given their in-depth knowledge of LCD affairs.

The respondents from the EPC stakeholder group were all LCD managers. These

participants had spent at least five years in the engineering industry before managing their

LCD division. The four engineering and geo science tutors (TUT) were all experienced

academics from reputable Nigerian universities involved in engineering and geo science

courses that have been fully accredited by the National Universities Commission (NUC). The

respondents were veterans in their fields and knowledgeable about the LCD policy. Three of

them also had oil and gas industry experience before joining academia.

In order to examine stakeholders’ relationships, we base our analysis on the responses

to one of our core interview questions which asked: ‘Can you please rate your working

relationship with each of these stakeholder groups on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is very weak

and 5 is very strong’. Based on the feedback from our pilot study, by working relationship,

the respondents were made to understand that this encompassed contract awards, corporate

social responsibility (CSR) activities, and any other meaningful interaction and/or form of

collaboration. Follow-up questions then probed on qualitative aspects of the relationships

identified, also in terms of the ‘direction’ of these linkages and relative strength so as to allow

us to determine whether the underlying exchanges or joint activities were based on ‘a two-

way relationship’ or, instead, were ‘primarily driven, initiated or managed by one stakeholder

group’.

The analysis of social network data was carried out using the software package

‘UCINET 6’ (see Borgatti et al., 2013). Our findings from the SNA are presented in both
matrix and sociogram form. The matrices are developed by transforming qualitative data

(obtained from participants’ responses) into quantitative form, to enable a quick overview of

all the data across the stakeholder groups analyzed to be formed. From these matrices,

sociograms are generated.

Findings

Identification and categorization of stakeholders

Scrutiny of the NOGIC Act (2010) reveals that the policy document identifies only four main

stakeholder groups which should work together towards the achievement of the LCD policy

objectives. These are: (i) government; (ii) operators (IOCs and INOs); (iii) the legal service

sector; and (iv) the financial services sector.

The roles and responsibilities of the above mentioned stakeholders, as identified in the

NOGIC Act (2010), are highlighted in Table 1. Evidently, incestuous responsibilities and

conflicts of interest aside, the Act provides only a limited representation of those ‘actors’

likely to ‘affect and be affected by’ the LCD policy, calling for a more in-depth analysis of

those who have a stake in, and the capacity for influencing LCD in Nigeria.

< Table 1 here >

Following Bryson’s stepwise approach, as shown by the additional findings reported

in Table 1, our further analysis (based on field survey and interviews) allowed us to identify

15 stakeholders in total, including first and second tier suppliers, fabricators, HE institutions,

local resident pressure groups, etc.

< Figure 2 here >

From the analysis we conducted, the stakeholder groups that we deem fit to be

classified within the ‘players’ category are IOCs, indigenous operators, international

(multinational) oil and gas service companies (first tier suppliers), indigenous oil and gas
service companies (second tier suppliers), EPC contractors and fabricators, HE institutions

and, of course, the Federal Government. Indeed, these are the only stakeholder groups who

according to our operationalization of the ‘power/influence’ and ‘interest’ constructs, record

sufficiently high scores (see also the third, fourth, fifth and sixth columns of Table 1,

alongside our concluding remarks in the final column). Given their insufficient scores for

‘power/influence’ and/or ‘interest’, the other stakeholders, including the residents of the

Niger Delta region, fall within the ‘subjects’, ‘crowd’ and ‘context setters’ quadrants of the

Akermann and Eden’s (2011) matrix, as shown in Figure 2.

Some may view our findings as evidence confirming the typical critique of stakeholder

analysis; that it involves a lot of rigmarole that produces not too surprising and rather thin

results. Yet, we consider these findings significant in at least two important respects.

First, they complement previous analyses of the Nigerian oil and gas industry by

highlighting the importance of a multiplicity of ‘actors’, many of which, in spite of

considerable interest in both the activities of the Nigerian oil and gas industry and the LCD

policy, are found to exert limited influence, having no power roles to instigate a change in the

current state of affairs (best exemplified by the fact that a very large proportion of jobs within

the industry is still carried out by non-nationals and most of the profit generated by the

industry is repatriated abroad). This observation resonates with Phillips’ (2003) call for a

normatively legitimate redefinition of ‘stakeholders’; one that going beyond the traditionally

derivatively legitimate stakeholder status, accounts for the actors to whom an organization or

even more so, a government (as in our case), holds a moral obligation. Opening the analysis

of the sector to consideration of all the constituencies that have a stake in the industry and to

whom the government may have a moral or social responsibility towards is, in this sense, an

endeavour that promotes transparency by encouraging further scrutiny through the lens of

stakeholder groups that have had, traditionally, no voice in shaping policy. In this respect, the
findings also call for a greater empowering of Nigerian citizens, by instilling a sense of

ownership of their natural resources that would enable, in turn, a more vigorous demand for

accountability. As eloquently emphasized by one of our interviewees:

We are still deprived of a rightful share of the benefits that the natural

resources of our land should offer to us, and of the opportunity to develop a

collective, social conscience capable of fuelling public demand for the

government to be transparent and accountable on how substantial revenues

from control over such resources are distributed. (Representative of local

residents of the Niger Delta region)

Second, the findings of our stakeholder categorization analysis reveal the extent to

which industry experts and well as academics that have already devoted attention to Nigerian

LCD, have systematically neglected the importance, at the very least, of actors that aside

from the government and operators can and do play a key player role for LCD in Nigeria. On

this account, it is worth noting that the various theoretical frameworks that have emerged to

date in relevant literature to evaluate the efficacy of Nigerian LCD policy (see Bakare, 2011;

Heum et al., 2003; Ihua, 2010; etc.), though of considerable merit in many respects, appear to

have focused almost exclusive attention to - at most - two stakeholders, namely the

government and/or the operators. For example, Ihua (2010) restricted his framework to

operators alone. Heum et al. (2003) extended the model but only by considering the

additional role of the government. Bakare’s (2011) framework too concerns itself exclusively

with the role of the government and operators, with particular emphasis on indigenous

participants.

We would argue that to enhance local capacity so as to deliver proactive strategies to

sustain the Nigerian common interest requires soliciting the support and cooperation of a
much wider array of stakeholders. In short, what is required is ‘community participation’ in

LCD policy, which is currently conspicuous by its absence.

Social network analysis (SNA)

Our stakeholder analysis would be incomplete without an in-depth investigation of the

relationships between the key players in the industry, and the resulting context effects of the

linkages among them.

< Table 2 here >

Given that our data for the SNA is based upon Likert scale measurements, we begin

by presenting our results in matrix ‘valued’ form. The matrix depicted in Table 2 is bi-

directional in nature, with columns depicting each stakeholder group in the capacity of

‘receiver’ of the content of the exchange pertaining to the identified relationships with other

stakeholders, and rows listing stakeholders as ‘senders’. The numbers displayed in the cells

of Table 3 report the average rating (based on interviewees’ responses) of the strength of each

possible relationship among stakeholders in the network on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 5

(very strong), in terms of both ‘receivers’ and ‘senders’. This implies that the strength of the

relationship that stakeholder A claims to be in existence with stakeholder B does not

necessarily correspond to that perceived by stakeholder B. For example, the ‘valued’

measurement for the TUT < GOV relationship, with TUT as the ‘receiver’, scored an average

rating of ‘2’ (weak relationship), but an average rating of ‘3’ (moderate strength) when

viewed from the perspective of the government as the ‘receiver’ of the GOV < TUT

relationship. Though informative for reference purposes, evidently the ‘valued’ matrix format

is not particularly reader-friendly, and does not lend itself to easy interpretation. In order to

comment and elaborate on the significance of these results, therefore, we swiftly proceed to

dichotomize the data in order for it to take a binary, and more easily interpretable format (this
process is also necessary since for some of the structural indices utilized it is required that a

binary format is used, see Hatala, 2006).

Since selection of any single dichotomization specification of data generated from a

five-point Likert scale is always inevitably arbitrary and hardly defensible, we present data

dichotomized according to two opposite interpretative scenarios. The first leans towards a

rather rigid, strict interpretation of what constitutes a meaningful working relationship among

stakeholders, while the second takes a more flexible, lenient interpretative approach. First, we

recode values 1 to 3 as binary code ‘0’ (i.e., ‘no relationship’) and values 4 to 5 as ‘1’ (to

denote the ‘existence of a relationship’). Henceforth, we refer to this data transformation as

‘dichotomization 1’. In order to account for a more flexible interpretation of the responses,

we then repeat the process by recoding values 3 to 5 as ‘1’, and values 1 to 2 as ‘0’

(henceforth referred to as ‘dichotomization 2’).

Table 3 presents the binary data matrix from dichotomization 1. In Table 3, numbers

ordered by column record the inexistence (‘0’) or otherwise (‘1’) of a relationship from the

perspective of stakeholders as ‘receivers’, whilst numbers ordered by rows pertain to

stakeholders as ‘senders’ of the content of the relationship exchange. Consideration of these

results suggests the preponderance of the absence of meaningful working relationships

between pairs of key players making up the network. For example, TUT emerges as a rather

marginalized ‘actor’ within the industry (‘0’ relationships as a receiver and as a sender, as

indicated by the last column and the last row of Table 3, respectively). The implication of this

is that there appears to be no link between HE institutions (TUT) and any other industry

players, including the Government (GOV). Engineering, procurement and commissioning

contractors (EPC) only record one single ‘bidirectional’ working relationship in the matrix

displayed in Table 3, with ‘multinational oil and gas companies’ (MSP), though EPC also

acts as ‘sender’ in unidirectional ties with GOV, ISP, and IOC. Most interestingly for our
purposes, EPC displays no relationship whatsoever with ‘indigenous operators’ (INO). INO

themselves only appear to have established a single bidirectional working relationship, with

‘indigenous oil and gas service providers’ (ISP), and only one additional tie with government

(GOV), for which INO acts as ‘sender’ in the flow of the information exchange, further

denoting the limited collaboration and joint coordination of activities between indigenous and

foreign (multinational) members of the wider industry network.

< Table 3 and Figure 3 here >

An even clearer representation of the results obtained from ‘dichotomization 1’ data, is

provided in the sociogram represented in Figure 3. The absence of a relationship between HE

institutions (TUT) and other stakeholder groups is seen even more clearly in this sociogram

format as there is no line (tie) that connects the TUT node with any other stakeholder group.

The visual structure reveals that some sort of relationship, either unidirectional or

bidirectional, exists between some other stakeholders. However, the government only

exhibits a bidirectional relationship (recorded by arrowheads at both ends of a line) with IOC

and MSP, suggesting that there is still a significant level of foreign dominance within the

Nigerian oil and gas industry. This finding is of critical importance as it reveals that for local

content to be fully developed there is a need for additional bidirectional relationships,

particularly between the government and HE institutions, indigenous operators and service

providers, so as to promote indigenous capacity and capability development.

< Table 4 and Figure 4 here >

The binary data matrix from ‘dichotomization 2’ is presented in Table 4.

Unsurprisingly (given the benevolent specification of this particular data transformation) a

slightly improved picture emerges, as we now see, for example, the government accounting

for more relational ties. TUT now also exhibits some connections. Specifically, it has a

relationship with GOV, IOC and MSP. Yet, as shown by Table 4 and the associated
sociogram (Figure 4), the TUT ties with the IOC and MSP stakeholder groups are

unidirectional (with TUT merely acting as the ‘receiver’ in such relationships), and so is the

tie with GOV, though in this case TUT acts as the ‘sender’ of the flow of exchange.

Evidently, there is a need for these ties to become stronger, and for more relationships to be

forged by and with HE institutions.

Section 57 of the NOGIC Act (2010) formed the platform for the Nigerian Content

Consultative Forum (NCCF), which was set up primarily to enhance collaboration among

stakeholders, but the extent to which this collaboration is being facilitated requires critical

appraisal. As Omenikolo and Amadi (2010) argue, the R&D ties between Nigerian

universities and the oil and gas industry constitute an important weak link. This is an issue

that came out strongly also from our wider interview data, with one interviewee from the

TUT stakeholder group explicitly stating:

To drive LCD, the government itself should establish a strong path linking

Nigerian universities’ capacity to supply first class graduates with proper,

large-scale apprenticeships programs (to be co-sponsored by the State) in

foreign-owned as well indigenous operators in the oil and gas industry.

Instead, Nigerian universities continue to be highly underfunded, and the

scale of such programs is so small so as to make hardly any difference. (Geo-

science university tutor)

Further scrutiny of our findings of ‘dichotomization 2’ data (Table 4 and Figure 4), further

reveal that some bidirectional relationships are present between other industry ‘players’.

Unsurprisingly given its institutional role, GOV records the highest number of such

relationships (with IOC, INO, MSP, ISP and EPC), but international players (IOC) are not far

behind, recording four bidirectional relationships (with GOV, INO, MSP and ISP). Indeed,
IOC is the only stakeholder group which alongside the government has a relationship – even

if only unidirectional (as is the case with its tie as ‘sender’ to TUT) – with every other

stakeholder making up the industry network. Significantly, indigenous operators (INO)

display a modest level of connectivity, with only three ties as ‘receivers’ (with GOV, IOC,

and ISP), three four ties as ‘senders’ (with GOV, IOC, MSP, and ISP) and only three

bidirectional relationships (with GOV, IOC, and ISP). However, before reaching any

premature conclusions, it may be useful to subject our data to further scrutiny by analyzing

the local (point ‘centrality’) and global ‘centrality’ (graph centralization) measures of the

network.

It should be noted that a wide range of measures of centrality have been proposed in

the literature but for our purposes adoption of these two most popular measures should

suffice. Local centrality refers to the position of a node (stakeholder group) within the entire

network. Following Hatala (2006), we operationalize this measure by computing the number

of direct ties a particular node has with other nodes. Global centrality, on the other hand, is

concerned with how strategically a particular node is positioned within the overall network.

To operationalize this measure we refer specifically to Freeman’s (1979) notion of the

structural centre of the graph, and hence to the overall cohesion or integration of the nodes in

the whole network. This measure is an important complement of the local centrality indicator

since it attempts (by simply looking at distances between points in the graph) to identify any

unique central point in the network. Indeed, even a node that displays high local centrality

may lie physically towards one side of the connecting nodes, and its centrality, therefore,

would be a purely ‘local’ phenomenon.

Our analysis suggests that TUT in particular exhibits limited local centrality

compared to other stakeholder groups (especially GOV, IOC and MSP). It is also important

to highlight that although GOV’s local centrality is considerable, it is purely a ‘local’

phenomenon since the GOV node is located at the margin of the network illustrated in Figure

4 and, after TUT, it is the node displaying the lowest degree of ‘global centrality’, being

placed at the greatest distance from the other nodes (stakeholder groups) that make up the

network. According to the sociogram depicted in Figure 4 – it is IOC that stands out as the

stakeholder group exhibiting global centrality within the network given its ‘central’ position

of considerable strategic significance in the overall structure. As such, it is reasonable to

conclude that IOCs play a pivotal role as far as oil and gas activities are concerned,

irrespective of the exploration and production (E&P) arrangement (JOA and PSCs) they have

with the Nigerian government and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). It

is also striking that the government itself (the regulators) does not exhibit global centrality, as

should be expected given their institutional responsibilities in driving the LCD policy.

Instead, IOCs still appear to play such a central role. Effectively, all the main activities in the

upstream (E&P) - which determine midstream and downstream activities - are still primarily

under the steering control of IOCs.

Another way of measuring how close network members are to the ‘centre of the

action’ in the network (industry), is the determination of ‘betweenness’ of a node, simply

measured by computing the number of times a node (stakeholder group) lies between each

other pair of nodes who lack a direct connection. Scott (2000: 86) defines betweenness as ‘the

extent to which an agent can play the part of a “broker” or “gatekeeper” with a potential for

control over others’. Figure 4 indicates that, alongside GOV, IOCs play such part, acting de

facto as the intermediary between other stakeholder groups in the network (e.g. ISP < > IOC

> TUT; INO < > IOC < EPC), most significantly, between INO (indigenous operators) and

EPC (engineering, procurement and commissioning contractors and fabricators). This

measure, which corroborates the global centrality results, additionally suggests that
indigenous operators are dependent on the IOCs for carrying out industry activities, and

perhaps even for their survival.

These disconcerting findings are also backed up by Freeman’s (1979) approach to

‘betweenness’ that is built around the concept of ‘local dependency’, according to which a

node in a network is dependent upon another if the paths which connect it to other nodes pass

through it (Scott, 2000). This is shown clearly in Figure 4, where IOCs appear to be the

middle node, with several points intersecting this stakeholder group to connect to other

nodes. Our analyses of centrality and betweenness, therefore, show that IOCs play a pivotal

role in the industry and, invariably, without this stakeholder group, oil and gas activities at

midstream and downstream level could not take place.

Our analysis of the level of ‘connectivity’ within the network concludes with the

computation of the ‘network density index’ (Hatala, 2006: 56) using the formula {L / [n(n-1)

/ 2]}, where L represents the number of lines (ties) and n the number of nodes present within

the network. The value of the density ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 depicts a situation whereby

100% of network members have formed direct relationships with all other members. As noted

by Mandarano (2009), the density index can be used as an indicator of the community’s

social capital, which Mandarano defines as an important outcome of collaborative planning

and ‘a precursor to collaborative planning success’ (Mandarano, 2009: 245). For

dichotomization 1, we obtained a density of 0.43. In other words, the actual number of ties

present within the network is 43% of the potential number of possible ties. For

dichotomization 2, a density of 0.76 was obtained. From these two values, a mean density of

59.5% can be determined. We agree with Mandarano (2009) who suggests that different

network types have different densities. Hence de-contextualized comparisons can be

misleading. Being the present SNA the first carried out in the context of LCD, we are,

unfortunately, unable to benchmark our density index against that obtained in comparable
studies in a similar setting. However, in this context, a mean density just short of 60% would

seem to indicate a highly inadequate level of connectivity to generate the kind of shared

information, collaborative efforts and consensus building required for network participants to

act effectively in pursuing LCD objectives. Hence, much work still needs to be done by

stakeholders to ensure a shared and interrelated modus operandi that would aid and hence

facilitate the achievement of the LCD policy objectives.

Concluding discussion

This paper aimed at identifying the key industry ‘players’ in the Nigeria oil and gas industry,

and the existing process of interaction among them. The findings of our stakeholder analysis

unveil a wider array of actors besides those typically identified in relevant literature

(government and operators). However, in spite of considerable interest and involvement in

the activities of the Nigerian oil and gas industry, most of these additional stakeholders are

found to exert a limited influence, having no real power to instigate the much needed change.

Our investigation of the relational structure that exists among the stakeholders also

highlights that in spite of the existence of some relationships among key industry players, a

significant percentage of these relationships are unidirectional. Bidirectional relationships

found were mostly between the government on one side, and international operating

companies and multinational service providers on the other.

Another significant finding is the marginal role played by HE institutions, as

evidenced, for example, by the minimal level of local ‘centrality’ displayed by this

stakeholder group vis-à-vis others. This is particularly striking when it is acknowledged that

HE institutions are responsible for providing the knowledge base to fuel the development of

in-country capacity and competence-based capabilities.

 Significantly, our data showed that it is IOCs rather than indigenous operators that

exhibit global centrality within the network, suggesting that in spite of the ratification of the

NOGIC Act (2010), this stakeholder group still pivotally determines the activities of the

Nigerian oil and gas industry. Our analysis of ‘betweenness’ further revealed that other

stakeholders, including indigenous companies, are dependent on the IOCs for their survival in

the industry.

So, what implications and recommendations can be drawn from our findings to

increase the efficacy of the LCD policy? First and foremost, our analysis underscores that the

achievement of the LCD policy objectives is a collective responsibility, with each stakeholder

group’s contribution being singularly necessary but individually insufficient for the

operational efficiency of the network. Computation of the mean density index of the network

revealed a very modest level of connectivity, thus underscoring that considerable effort is still

required by all stakeholder groups to strengthen their ties, and forge new ones.

Notwithstanding the above, the coordination and facilitation of the collaboration

needed for LCD to come to fruition is evidently the main responsibility of the regulators, i.e.

the government. Yet the inability of the government to ensure that indigenous oil companies

alongside local oil and gas service providers exhibit global centrality in the industry network

is a major weakness, particularly when it is acknowledged that this role is currently still being

played by the very stakeholder group that is meant to benefit the least from the successful

achievement of LCD, i.e. IOCs.

Our findings contribute to a more in-depth analysis of the Nigerian oil and gas

industry and, contextually, provide a valuable first step towards a more comprehensive

framework for the appraisal of the efficacy of the Nigerian LCD policy. Indeed, consistent

with a much overdue shift towards a polycentric understanding of policy making and

assessment, our novel application of stakeholder analysis to Nigerian LCD can be seen as an
essential blueprint for any policy analysis aimed at establishing its effectiveness.

By way of acknowledgement of limitations, some caveats should be borne in mind.

First, within the confines of a journal article we had by necessity to be selective in both the

range of analytical tools used to examine our data, and our treatment of issues. For example,

empirical tractability demanded limiting the adoption of the centrality indicator with

reference to the two most important and relevant measure of centrality in SNA (local and

global centrality). However, future studies could employ additional centrality indicators

(eigenvector centrality, beta centrality, etc.), alongside further quantitative analyses to

accompany the visual representation of the network, in order to draw a wider range of

statistical inferences. Future studies could also extend our coverage of the issues by

considering, for example, the political economy connotations of the ‘resource-curse’

dichotomy that the wealth of Nigerian oil and gas resources represent, and the way in which

such connotations interact with the well documented legacy of corruption that ‘affects and is

affected by’ the intricate power networks not only across industry sectors that are part of the

network but also within societal structures. Second, replication studies across countries,

including countries at different stages of both socio-economic development and LCD, would

offer a profitable extension, both for comparative purposes and to aid the development of the

policy application of stakeholder analysis to different contextual settings.

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 Rationale
Descriptive, instrumental and normative

(i) Identification and categorization of stakeholders

Typology (ii) Analysis of stakeholders’ relationships

(i) Documentation and interview data

Methods (ii) Analytical power-interest categorization
(iii) Social network Analysis (SNA)

Figure 1. Framework for stakeholder analysis of Nigerian LCD policy

Source: Framework adapted by the authors from the blueprints developed by Reed et al.

(2009: 1936) and Bailur (2006: 69–73).

 PLAYERS
SUBJECTS
International oil companies
(IOC); Indigenous operators
Local resident pressure
(INO); 1st tier (multinational)
groups; Financial sector; providers (MSP); 2nd tier
(indigenous) providers (ISP);
Legal sector.
Engineering, procurement
and commissioning
contractors & fabricators
(EPC); HE institutions
(TUT); Federal Government
(GOV)

CROWD LEADERS OR CONTEXT-

SETTERS
Journalists
Independent marketers;
Interest Independent refiners;
Pipeline companies; Trade
unions.

Power
Figure 2. Application of Ackermann and Eden’s (2011) power-interest framework
Figure 3. Sociogram of industry network (from dichotomization 1)
Source: Authors’ interview data.
Notes: In the absence of a relationship, no line appears (e.g. TUT-; GOV-ISP; IOC-ISP; IOC-INO;
INO-EPC; INO-MSP). If the relationship is unidirectional, the line has only one arrowhead pointing
to the ‘receiver’ in the relationship (e.g. INO > GOV; EPC > IOC; EPC > ISP). If the relationship is
bidirectional, the line has arrowheads at both ends (e.g. GOV < > MSP; EPC < >MSP; MSP < > ISP).
Figure 4. Sociogram of industry network (from dichotomization 2)
Source: Authors’ interview data.
Notes: In the absence of a relationship, no line appears (e.g., ISP-TUT; INO-EPC; TUT-EPC). If the
relationship is unidirectional, the line has only one arrowhead pointing to the ‘receiver’ in the
relationship (e.g., INO > MSP; IOC > EPC). If the relationship is bidirectional, the line has
arrowheads at both ends (e.g., ISP < > GOV; INO < > IOC; ISP < > MSP; INO < > GOV).
 Table 1. Identification of and differentiation between stakeholders
Stakeholder Responsibilities to oil & gas industry Involvement Level of Level of Level of Remarks Overall
and power power on influence interest assessment
in employment on
influencing emerging
LCD local firms
International (i) Ensuring Nigerians are given first consideration Direct Strong Strong Strong IOCs are critical to the industry because they are Player
operating for employment & training (NOGIC Act, 2010, involved in exploration and production of crude oil
companies Section 10.1.b); (ii) Developing indigenous and other major activities. They have a strong
capacity in compliance with the Act by employing influence on employment and on emerging
Nigerian nationals (ibid, Section 11.3); (iii) entrepreneurs.
Submitting a Nigerian Content Plan to the Board
setting out how they will give first consideration to
Nigerian goods & services (ibid, Section 12); (iv)
Developing indigenous firms through partnerships
and JVs (ibid, Section 13); (v) Providing the Board
with Employment & Training Plan for every
project to be undertaken and declaration of
expatriate quota (ibid, Sections 29-34); (vi)
Employment of Nigerians in junior and
intermediate cadres (ibid, Section 35); (vii)
Submission of R&D plan and R&D reports to the
Board (ibid, Sections 38 & 39).
Indigenous (i) Development of manpower and equipment to Direct Strong Medium Strong INOs are important since they are involved in Player
operators globally competitive standards through JVs with exploration and production of oil, and because of
IOCs and MSPs (NOGIC Act, 2010, Sections 13 & their recruitment potential (though they have less
15); (ii) Providing all fabrication and welding influence on the development of entrepreneurs than
activities (ibid, Section 53). IOCs).
Multinational 1st tier, multinational suppliers (MSPs) offer Direct Strong Medium Strong MSPs are a significant stakeholder since they provide Player
oil and gas procurement and other technical services to services ranging from technical procurement to
service operators. supplies. Hence, they have a direct involvement. Oil
companies & gas services are provided to the operators by the
(1st tier service companies and as such, they require more
suppliers) labor than the operators to execute contract projects.
In view of this, their level of interest is deemed high.
Indigenous 2nd tier, indigenous suppliers (ISPs) offer Direct Strong Medium Strong ISPs also bear strong relevance because they provide Player
oil and gas procurement and other technical services to similar services to 1st tier suppliers. 1st tier suppliers
service operators. also subcontract services to them. In as much as 2nd
companies tier suppliers may offer fewer services than 1st tier
(2nd tier suppliers, they are also deemed to have strong
suppliers) influence on employment.
Financial (i) Providing advice on appropriate framework and Indirect Weak Medium Medium Compared to operators and service companies, they Subjects
sector tax incentives for all oil & gas companies (NOGIC do not bear as much importance. However, the Act
Act, 2010, Section 48); (ii) Insuring all oil & gas mandates that all financial activities within the sector
and other related businesses, and handling their be carried out in-country but with the waiver window
financial services (ibid, Sections 49, 50 & 52). being given to operators and service companies (not
yet being fully complied with). The financial sector is
deemed to have indirect involvement in the industry
since it services a wide range of industries. Their
influence on employment is limited. However, more
attention is currently being paid to loan awards for
entrepreneurs within the oil industry. Because of this,
we consider their level of interest and influence on
employment as medium.
Legal sector Handling all legal services within the industry Indirect Weak Medium Medium The legal sector is yet to be strengthened after the Subjects
(NOGIC Act, 2010, Section 51). expiration of the waiver window which mandates the
domiciliation of all legal services. Although this
group is more involved than the financial sector, its
level of industry engagement is still not as strong as
that of operators. Legal firms do not have currently a
strong stake in terms of employment within the
industry. Nevertheless, their influence on the industry
as well as interest is deemed as moderate.
Engineering, (i) Fabrication of oil & gas equipment (pipelines, Direct Strong Medium Strong The NOGIC Act (2010) seeks to improve Player
procurement drill bits, etc.) in line with operators and service domestication of activities and domiciliation. Hence
and company requirements; (ii) Providing all EPCs are highly relevant for the manufacturing of oil
commissioning fabrication and welding activities. & gas equipment required by operators, service
contractors &
fabricators
providers, etc. With the ratification of the Act, new
fabrication yards have been established and old ones
revamped. Fabricators have a direct link with the
industry, a strong influence on employment, and a
strong level of interest.
Local These include: Movement for the Emancipation of Indirect Medium Weak Strong This stakeholder group has indirect involvement, in Subjects
resident the Niger Delta; Militant Ijaw Youths; and spite of their community element. However, their
pressure Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People. They power cannot be underestimated especially when they
groups claim to fight for their community and ethnic agitate for welfare support. This group can only
 rights, and to protect their environment. influence employment by exerting pressure on
operators and service companies. However, they do
not have direct influence on entrepreneurial
development. They have a strong interest since the
largest deposit of crude oil is found within their
community.
HE (i) Providing knowledge and skills; (ii) Training Indirect Strong Medium Medium Although HE institutions (TUT) may not have a Player
institutions manpower; (iii) Keeping up-to-date with industry direct involvement they are expected to play a major
developments so as to ensure the ‘currency’ of the role on employment since they should supply industry
HE curriculum. with an educated and skilled workforce and by this
they are considered to have a strong influence.
Federal (i) Monitoring, coordinating and implementing the Direct Strong Strong Strong The government (GOV) is the regulators of the oil & Player
Government Act provisions via the Nigerian Content gas industry and, as such, it is directly involved. It
Development Monitoring Board (NCDMB) and also regulates employment within the industry whilst
other parastatals (NOGIC Act, 2010, Section 4); enforcing compliance of the LCD policy.
(ii) Protection of domestic industries (ibid, Section Undoubtedly, the government has a strong interest
3.2); (iii) Setting targets for LCD and growth of because the oil & gas industry constitutes its main
R&D (ibid, Section 36); (iv) Setting up the NCCF source of revenues.
to provide a platform for industry collaboration
(ibid, Section 57); (v) Regular assessment of LCD
performance (ibid, Section 62).
Independent Purchasing and selling of refined products. Indirect Medium Medium Medium This group is solely involved in downstream activities Context
marketers hence their level of involvement is minimal. setters
Independent Purchasing and processing of crude oil. Indirect Medium Medium Medium This group is solely involved in downstream activities Context
refiners hence its level of involvement is minimal. setters
Pipeline Transporting crude oil, refined products, natural Indirect Medium Medium Medium Pipeline companies perform mainly downstream Context
companies gas and liquids. activities hence their involvement upstream is setters
minimal.
Journalists Reporting on industry activities. Indirect Weak Weak Medium The media appears to play a marginal role. Crowd
Trade Unions Protecting employees’ rights in the workplace. Direct Medium Medium Medium Although they are directly involved, Unions’ Context
jurisdiction is limited to upholding employees’ rights. setters
Source: Authors’ findings based upon scrutiny of NOGIC Act (2010) and field survey (interviews).
Table 2. Matrix of ‘valued’ data

Receivers → GOV IOC INO MSP ISP EPC TUT

Senders ↓
GOV 4 3 4 3 3 2
IOC 5 3 4 3 2 3
INO 4 3 3 4 2 1
MSP 4 5 2 4 4 3
ISP 3 3 4 4 3 2
EPC 4 4 2 4 4 2
TUT 3 1 1 2 2 1
Note: Acronyms refer to Government (GOV), International Operating Companies (IOC),
Indigenous Operators (INO), Multinational Companies (MSP), Indigenous Oil & Gas
Service Providers (ISP), Engineering, Procurement & Commissioning Contractors (EPC),
and HE Engineering & Geo-science Tutors (TUT). The numbers in Table 2 report the
average rating of the strength of each possible relationship among stakeholders in the
network on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 5 (very strong), in terms of both ‘receivers’ and
‘senders’ of the content of the exchange pertaining to the identified relationships.

Table 3. Matrix of ‘dichotomization 1’ data

Receivers → GOV IOC INO MSP ISP EPC TUT

Senders ↓
GOV 1 0 1 0 0 0
IOC 1 0 1 0 0 0
INO 1 0 0 1 0 0
MSP 1 1 0 1 1 0
ISP 0 0 1 1 0 0
EPC 1 1 0 1 1 0
TUT 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Acronyms refer to Government (GOV), International Operating Companies (IOC),
Indigenous Operators (INO), Multinational Companies (MSP), Indigenous Oil & Gas
Service Providers (ISP), Engineering, Procurement & Commissioning Contractors (EPC),
and HE Engineering & Geo-science Tutors (TUT). The numbers in Table 3 are
‘dichotomization 1’, binary data transformations. ‘0’ denotes ‘no relationship’ whilst ‘1’
denotes the ‘existence of a working relationship’. Numbers ordered by column record the
existence or otherwise of a relationship by stakeholders as ‘receivers’, whilst numbers
ordered by rows pertain to stakeholders as ‘senders’ of the content of the exchange
pertaining to the identified relationships.

37
Table 4. Matrix of ‘dichotomization 2’ data

Receivers → GOV IOC INO MSP ISP EPC TUT

Senders ↓
GOV 1 1 1 1 1 0
IOC 1 1 1 1 0 1
INO 1 1 1 1 0 0
MSP 1 1 0 1 1 1
ISP 1 1 1 1 1 0
EPC 1 1 0 1 1 0
TUT 1 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Acronyms refer to Government (GOV), International Operating Companies (IOC),
Indigenous Operators (INO), Multinational Companies (MSP), Indigenous Oil & Gas
Service Providers (ISP), Engineering, Procurement & Commissioning Contractors (EPC),
and HE Engineering & Geo-science Tutors (TUT). The numbers in Table 3 are
‘dichotomization 2’, binary data transformations. ‘0’ denotes ‘no relationship’ whilst ‘1’
denotes the ‘existence of a working relationship’. Numbers ordered by column record the
existence or otherwise of a relationship by stakeholders as ‘receivers’, whilst numbers
ordered by rows pertain to stakeholders as ‘senders’ of the content of the exchange
pertaining to the identified relationships.

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