The Unbearable Weight of Empire

THE UNBEARABLE WEIGHT
THE UNBEARABLE WEIGHT OF EMPIRE

This book seeks to understand why the Ottomaan
OF EMPIRE
Empire was constantly at war, why it persistentlyy
attacked Hungary for more than a hundred yearss
and why Ottoman leadership regarded Hungaryy,
or more broadly, Central Europe as the mostt The Ottomans in Central Europe –
important of its frontlines in the early sixteenthh a Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy
century. The study’s primary aim is to offer a moree (–)
realistic picture of the role of the Hungarian//
Central European frontier in Ottoman politico--
military planning. In doing so, the book attemptss PÁL FODOR
to show how the conflict in this region affected thee
fate of the Ottoman Empire in the long run and howw
a series of erroneous decisions on the part of thee
Ottoman court led to the failure of its universalistt
imperial programme. In addition, the authorr
challenges some trends in recent historiography off
the Ottoman Empire that go too far in entanglingg
Ottoman and European history.
PÁL FODOR
THE OTTOMANS IN CENTRAL EUROPE – 

A FAILED ATTEMPT AT UNIVERSAL MONARCHY
(1390–1566)
OF EMPIRE
The Ottomans in Central Europe –
a Failed Attempt at
Universal Monarchy (1390–1566)
PÁL FODOR
Research Centre for the Humanities,

Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, 2016
© Pál Fodor, 2016
© Research Centre for the Humanities, HAS, 2016
First edition: 2015
ISBN 978-963-9627-93-2
All rights reserved. No part of this publication can be reproduced,

broadcasted, transmitted or translated in any form, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission
from the publisher
Published by the Research Centre for the Humanities

of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Responsible editor: Pál Fodor
Prepress preparation: Institute of History, RCH HAS
Research Assistance Team; Leader: Éva Kovács
Cover desigh, page layout: Imre Horváth
Maps: Béla Nagy
Printed in Hungary by Prime Rate Kft., Budapest
To Géza Dávid in cordial remembrance
of our joint efforts in studying Ottoman history
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter I
The conquest of Hungary and the road to Vienna
(1370s–1530s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Why were the Ottomans always at war? Some assumptions . . . 27
The Ottoman Empire and Hungary: The first phase . . . . . . . . . 48
The accession of Süleyman and the western turn in
Ottoman politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The conquest of Hungary and the ensuing Ottoman–Habsburg
rivalry in Central Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Chapter II
The capture of Buda and the road to Szigetvár . . . . . . 95
A decisive decade (1541–1550) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
The Transylvanian crisis of 1551–52 and the limits
of imperial politics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Epilogue: The road to Szigetvár . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
INTRODUCTION
On account of their particular situation, Hungarian Ottomanists

have always given special attention to the expansionism and
political ambitions of the Ottomans in Europe – above all in
Central Europe. Two main motives lay behind their interest.
First, they sought answers to one of the basic questions of
Hungarian national history: Was it inevitable that Hungary
should be (partially) occupied by the Ottomans and suffer
the irreversible damage of centuries of military conflict?
Second – and this is closely related to the first question – they
sought to understand why the Ottoman Empire persistently
attacked Hungary for more than a hundred years, launching its
occupation of the country in the early sixteenth century.1
Over the past thirty years, I too have examined these two
interconnected issues on several occasions. The results of my
initial efforts were published in a book in Hungarian in 1991.
The monograph comprised two major chapters: 1. Török
politikai törekvések Magyarországon, 1520–1541 (Ottoman
political aims in Hungary, 1520–1541); and 2. Magyarország
és Bécs az oszmán hódító ideológiában (The place of Hungary
1
Lajos Fekete, Budapest a törökkorban [Budapest in the Ottoman period]. (Budapest,
1944). Idem, Magyarság, törökség: két világnézet bajvívói [Hungarians and Turks:
champions of two world views]. (Budapest, 1947). Gyula Káldy-Nagy, ‘Suleimans
Angriff auf Europa’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 28:2 (1974)
163–212. Klára Hegyi, Egy világbirodalom végvidékén [On the borders of a world power].
(Magyar História) (Budapest, 1976). Ferenc Szakály, ‘Phases of Turco–Hungarian
Warfare before the Battle of Mohács’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae
33 (1979) 65–111. Idem, ‘The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defence System and Its
Collapse’, in János M. Bak – Béla K. Király (eds.), From Hunyadi To Rákóczi: War and
Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary. (Eastern European Monographs,
CIV; War and Society in Eastern Central Europe, Vol. III.) (Brooklyn, 1982), 141–
159. Klára Hegyi – Vera Zimányi, The Ottoman Empire in Europe. (Budapest, 1989).
Géza Perjés, The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526–Buda 1541.
(Boulder, CO, Highland Lakes, NJ, 1989). On the earlier Hungarian scholarship of the
subject, see Pál Fodor, ‘Ottoman Policy towards Hungary, 1520–1541’ , Acta Orientalia
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 45:2–3 (1991) 274–279.
–7–
and Vienna in the Ottoman ideology of conquest).2 The first

chapter was published in English in the same year and in
Turkish some time later,3 while the second chapter – again
as a separate article – was published in German (prior to the
publication of the book).4 To a greater or lesser extent these
publications have been integrated into Ottomanist discourses,
although they have not always received fair treatment (for
instance, some authors have cited the documents published
and analysed by me as unknown archival sources). For several
reasons, I subsequently returned to the subject-matter on
numerous occasions. In 1994, Géza Dávid and I co-authored
a study on the Ottoman–Hungarian peace talks of 1512–14,
which we published in a volume edited by us on various aspects
of Ottoman–Hungarian relations in the sixteenth century.5 In
1996, another colleague and I published Hieronymus Łaski’s
report on his negotiations in Istanbul in late 1527 and early
1528. The report is widely viewed as one of the most important
documents of Ottoman–Hungarian relations in the period.6 In
the same volume, I published a detailed analysis of the situation
2
Pál Fodor, Magyarország és a török hódítás [Hungary and the Ottoman conquest].
(Budapest, 1991); the appendix at the end of the book includes facsimiles of four
Ottoman documents with a Hungarian translation.
3
Fodor, ‘Ottoman Policy’ , re-published in Idem, In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial
Ideology, Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire. (Analecta Isisiana)
(Istanbul, 2000), 105–169. The Turkish version: ‘Macaristan’a Yönelik Osmanlı
Siyaseti, 1520–1541’ , İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi 40 (2004)
11–85.
4
Pál Fodor, ‘Ungarn und Wien in der osmanischen Eroberungsideologie (im Spiegel der
TârîÌ-i Beç þrâlı, 17. Jahrhundert)’ , Journal of Turkish Studies 13 (1989) 81–98, re-
published in Idem, In Quest of the Golden Apple, 45–69.
5
‘Hungarian–Ottoman Peace Negotiations in 1512–1514’ , in Géza Dávid – Pál Fodor
(eds.), Hungarian–Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the
Magnificent. (Budapest, 1994), 9–45.
6
Gábor Barta (ed.), Két tárgyalás Sztambulban. Hyeronimus Łaski tárgyalása a töröknél
János király nevében. Habardanecz János jelentése 1528 nyári sztambuli tárgyalásairól
[Two negotiations in Istanbul. Hyeronimus Łaski’s talks at the Porte on behalf of King
John. Report of Johannes Habardanecz about his talks in Istanbul during the summer
of 1528]. (Budapest, 1996).
–8–
INTRODUCTION
and political aspirations of the Ottoman Empire in the 1520s.7

In 2004, I examined Ottoman–Hungarian relations once again,
doing so this time from the initial period until the mid-sixteenth
century. My aim was to give a comprehensive account of the
ambitions and opportunities of both sides as well as the external
and internal dynamics of the relationship.8 Although this study
was also published in English,9 it remained just as unnoticed as
that of 1996 (owing in part to the fact that the English version
of the book was simply not distributed). The same fate awaited
another article published only in Hungarian (and so non-
existent as far as international scholarship is concerned), which
dealt with Ottoman imperial policy from the occupation of the
Hungarian capital Buda (in 1541) until the mid-1550s.10 In
contrast, a collective volume that I co-edited with Géza Dávid
on the parallel developments of border defence systems by the
Habsburgs and Ottomans in Hungary was given a favourable
reception. This latter volume was published by Brill in 2000.11
In addition, I have published several articles of varying length on
7
Pál Fodor, ‘A Bécsbe vezető út. Az oszmán nagyhatalom az 1520-as években [The
road leading to Vienna. The Ottoman great power in the 1520s]’ , in Barta (ed.), Két
tárgyalás Sztambulban, 63–96, re-published in János B. Szabó (ed.), Mohács. (Nemzet
és emlékezet) (Budapest, 2006), 387–409.
8
Pál Fodor, ‘A szimurg és a sárkány. Az Oszmán Birodalom és Magyarország (1390–
1533)’ , in István Zombori (ed.), Közép-Európa harca a török ellen a 16. század első
felében. (Budapest, 2004), 9–35.
9
Pál Fodor, ‘The Simurg and the Dragon. The Ottoman Empire and Hungary (1390–
1533)’ , in István Zombori (ed.), Fight Against the Turk in Central Europe in the First
Half of the 16th Century. (Budapest, 2004), 9–35.
10
Géza Dávid – Pál Fodor (eds.), „Az ország ügye mindenek előtt való”. A szultáni tanács
Magyarországra vonatkozó rendeletei (1544–1545, 1552) / “Affairs of State Are Supreme”.
The Orders of the Ottoman Imperial Council Pertaining to Hungary (1544–1545, 1552).
(História könyvtár. Okmánytárak, 1.) (Budapest, 2005), XXXV–LV.
11
Géza Dávid – Pál Fodor (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe.
The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest. (The Ottoman Empire and its
Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy. Ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi and Halil İnalcık. Vol.
20.) (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2000). In a sense, our later book (Géza Dávid – Pál Fodor
[eds.], Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders [Early Fifteenth – Early Seventeenth
Centuries]. [The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy. Ed.
by Suraiya Faroqhi and Halil İnalcık. Vol. 37.] [Leiden, Boston, 2007]) that deals with
–9–
the influence of world political developments on the Ottoman

advance in Hungary; these too have received scant attention,
perhaps in part because of the difficulty of accessing them.12
In this volume I publish a reworking of three earlier
studies, each of which has been thoroughly revised. The first
chapter arose from the merging and updating of two articles:
The Simurg and the Dragon… (2004) and Bécsbe vezető út…
(The Road Leading to Vienna) (1996). In many respects, the
chapter may be considered new and independent work, for
in the course of the rewriting process I sought to study and
integrate the vast amount of literature that has been released
since 1996 and to reflect on the facts that have come to light
and on the most recent conceptual issues. The second chapter
consists of a study originally published in Hungarian in 2005;
it too has been reworked and expanded to complement the first
chapter. In this way I could extend the chronological arc to the
history of Ottoman policy in Central Europe and of Ottoman–
Hungarian relations from the beginnings until the second third
of the sixteenth century.
There have been quite a few considerations behind my
decision to prepare and publish this volume.
ransom industry in the Ottoman frontier regions, with a special focus on Hungary, is a
follow up to this volume.
12
Pál Fodor, ‘Between Two Continental Wars: the Ottoman Naval Preparations in
1590–1592’ , in Ingeborg Baldauf – Suraiya Faroqhi (Hrsg., unter Mitwirkung von
Rudolf Veselý), Armağan. Festschrift für Andreas Tietze. (Praha, 1994), 89–111, re-
published in Idem, In Quest of the Golden Apple, 171–190. Idem, ‘Prelude to the Long
War (1593–1606). Some Notes on the Ottoman Foreign Policy in 1591–1593’ , in
Güler Eren et al. (eds.), The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilization. Vol. I. (Istanbul,
2000), 297–301. Idem, ‘The Impact of the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman–Persian Wars
on Ottoman Policy in Central Europe’ , in Éva M. Jeremiás (ed.), Irano–Turkic Cultural
Contacts in the 11th–17th Centuries. (Acta et Studia, I.) (Piliscsaba, [2002]2003,
41–51. Idem, ‘The Ottoman Empire, Byzantium and Western Christianity: The
Implications of the Siege of Belgrade, 1456’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae 61:1–2 (2008) 43–51.
– 10 –
INTRODUCTION
The first consideration relates to the nature and operative

mode of Ottoman politics and warfare. More than ever, I share
the view that Hungary in the fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries came to occupy a special place in Ottoman policy
and imagination. Hungary assumed the status of archenemy
of the Ottomans in much the same way that the Ottoman
Empire had become the archenemy of the Hungarians as
early as the beginning of the fifteenth century. As the only
power capable of resistance, Hungary came to symbolise the
whole of Christendom in the eyes of the Ottomans, who after
1453 viewed the country in some sense as the successor to
Byzantium.13 And so it is quite understandable that its attack
and defeat became the first and most important condition for
Ottoman world domination and the renovation of the Roman
Empire, which became, after the conquest of the Near East, the
principal aim of Ottoman power politics. By the 1520s the two
powers were no longer in the same class in terms of military
strength and material resources, and there are indications that
some Ottoman leaders and military groups thought little of
their Hungarian adversaries. Still, Ottoman forces departing
for the battle of Mohács exhibited a strong fear of Hungarian
fighting power.14 In knowledge of the military actions of the
Ottomans in Central Europe in the first half of the sixteenth
century and the underlying imperial ideology, one would have
to be blind not to see that the Ottoman leadership regarded
Hungary as one of, if not the most important of their “frontlines”.
Yet the Hungarian (or more broadly, Central European) front
and Ottoman–Hungarian and Ottoman–Habsburg rivalries
Pál Fodor, ‘Byzantine Legacies in Ottoman Identity’ , forthcoming.

13
Cf. Pietro Bragadin’s report of June 9, 1526: the sultan’s army set out for Hungary
14
on April 23, but “vanno con paura perchè ungheri son gran valent’uomini contra
turchi”. Eugenio Albèri, Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato durante il secolo
decimosesto. Serie III, volume III. (Firenze, 1855), 111. It is also true that after the fall
of Belgrade and the defeat at Mohács, the reputation of the Hungarians diminished.
– 11 –
are often presented as mere secondary factors in discussions of

Ottoman frontier zones and imperial strategy15 or – horribile
dictu – they are completely ignored. A striking example of this
is Giancarlo Casale’s book The Ottoman Age of Exploration. Not
to mention that probably there was no such age in Ottoman
history,16 how can one take seriously a work that claims to analyse
the “grand strategy” of the Ottomans in the sixteenth century
but fails even to mention the Habsburg Empire or the wars in
Hungary?17 Moreover, even works of fundamental importance
are sometimes simply ignored in scholarly literature.18 During
the past decade and a half, Gábor Ágoston, to whose excellent
works I make frequent reference below, has done much to
ensure that the Central European region receives the attention
it deserves – both inside and outside Hungary. Even so, the
challenges are still great in this area. My primary aim, therefore,
is to offer a more realistic picture of the role of the Hungarian
15
Leslie Peirce, ‘Changing Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire: The Early Centuries’ ,
Mediterranean Historical Review 19:1 (2004) 21. This does not apply to the excellent
book by Suraiya Faroqhi: The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It. (London,
New York, 2004).
16
I think this is so even if in her much more balanced new study Pinar Emiralioğlu also
argues that the Ottoman Empire “was an active participant of the Early Modern Period
and of the ‘Age of the Exploration’”; see Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in
the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. (Farnham, Burlington, 2014), 4.
17
Cf. Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration. New York, 2010. This work,
published by Oxford University Press and discussing Ottoman policy in the Indian
Ocean, is not only useless but also dangerously misleading: in many places it tricks the
less informed reader and contains a series of distortions and a myriad of unrealistic
concepts. The book should be read together with the review by Svat Soucek, ‘About
the Ottoman Age of Exploration’ , Archivum Ottomanicum 27 (2010) 313–342,
particularly 338–342.
18
To cite one example: without knowledge of Sándor Papp’s studies, it is impossible
to make an accurate appraisal of Ottoman–Hungarian–Habsburg relations in the
fifteenth–seventeenth centuries. However, authors writing on this subject have made
scant references to Papp’s studies – perhaps because he published most of them,
including his most important work, in German: Sándor Papp, Die Verleihungs-,
Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden der Osmanen für Ungarn und Siebenbürgen.
Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung. (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
Philisophisch-historische Klasse. Schriften der Balkan-Kommission, 42.) (Wien,
2003).
– 12 –
INTRODUCTION
or Central European frontline in Ottoman politico-military

planning. Thus, this book seeks to show how the conflict in this
region sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire and how a series
of erroneous decisions on the part of the Ottomans led to the
failure of their universalist imperial programme. In doing so, the
book also tries to provide clues as to how these developments
contributed to a profound internal transformation of the empire.
The second consideration is linked with the paradigmatic
change that has occurred in Ottomanist historiography over the
past twenty to twenty-five years. When I wrote my first papers
on the subject, both Western and Turkish mainstream historians
regarded the development of the Ottoman Empire as a “unique
and isolated phenomenon”, one that could not be compared
with anything else and which followed its own civilisational and
institutional logic. Indeed, in many regards, the Ottoman Empire
was considered to have been an exotic political and cultural
entity. Accordingly, historians at the time were of the view that
the relationship between (Christian) Europe and the (Muslim)
Ottoman Empire was above all one of hostility. However, in
consequence of the so-called “imperial (or post-colonial) turn”,
we have seen dramatic changes in recent historiography.19 Rather
than emphasise the “otherness” of the once isolated Ottoman
Empire, historians have tended more recently to narrate its
history as an inseparable part of early modern European
(or even Eurasian) history. The unique features and status
of the Ottoman Empire have been downplayed, while more
attention has been given to “facts” – however obscure – that
point to the empire’s entanglement and well-connectedness
and to transcultural commonalities. Nowadays many historians
Alan Mikhail – Christine M. Philliou, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the Imperial Turn’ ,
19
Comparative Studies in Society and History 54:4 (2012) 721–745. Suraiya Faroqhi,
Empires before and after Post-colonial Turn: The Ottomans’ , Osmanlı Araştırmaları
36 (2010) 57–76.
– 13 –
even argue that the Ottoman Empire was not only a passive
recipient (or “victim”) of European (more recently, Eurasian)
political, technological and cultural changes, but also an active
shaper of such changes.20 Indeed, according to a recent train of
thought (filled with Neophyte zeal), the Ottoman Empire even
“contributed to what has been categorised and defined as the
Renaissance”.21
Attached to this new view of history, which seems to be
particularly strong in the United States and among Turkish
historians with ties to the United States, we find the label
“early modern/modernity”, which provides the wider global
framework and acts like a magic wand to solve all the problems
arising from the change in paradigm. In 2004 Suraiya Faroqhi
described in his book – now regarded as a turning point in
Ottomanist historiography – how the Ottoman elite and,
by extension, the context of the empire were early modern in
the period 1540–1774.22 Ever since, her growing number of
followers have sought, in all areas, to uncover the elements – and
offer them up for a comparative history of the empires – that in
their view linked the Ottomans with others around them and
which can be utilised to prove the global embeddedness of the
Ottomans. It is not my task here to cover exhaustively this issue,
but I should note that the concept is both obscure and, as Peter
Burke has rightly concluded in a recent article, overused, for it
20
As followers of the new school have written: “…The Ottoman Empire participated
in many of the major developments which European historiography once considered
unique to Europe.” Pascal W. Firges – Tobias P. Graf, ‘Introduction’ , in Pascal W.
Firges – Tobias P. Graf – Christian Roth – Gülay Tulasoğlu, (eds.), Well-Connected
Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History. (The Ottoman Empire and its
Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy. Ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi, Halil İnalcık and
Boğaç Ergene. Vol. 57.) (Leiden, Boston, 2014), 5.
21
Claire Norton,‘Blurring the Boundaries: Intellectual and Cultural Interactions between
the Eastern and Western; Christian and Muslim Worlds’ , in Anna Contadini – Claire
Norton (eds.), The Renaissance and the Ottoman World. (Farnham, Burlington, 2013),
3–21.
22
Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World, 10–11, 25–26, 211.
– 14 –
INTRODUCTION
has been seized on everywhere as a seemingly useful means for

writing global history. To illustrate the problem, Burke uses the
metaphor of the “stuffed suitcase”: “There is a limit to the amount
of work which concepts can be made to do, the intellectual
weight they can be made to bear. At some point they crack under
the strain, or to use less metaphorical language, they come to
be used in such different, indeed contradictory senses that they
hinder analysis rather than helping it. To vary the metaphor, the
problem with the concept of modernity is that it is part of an
intellectual suitcase into which too much has been stuffed. The
lid won’t shut. We need to unpack and begin again.”23
I profoundly agree with Burke; and this is precisely the
problem when speaking about the early modernity of the
Ottoman Empire. The term is used indiscriminately, but
everyone applies it in a slightly different sense, whereby its
meaning and characteristics differ on each occasion.24 A similar
confusion affects the periodisation: most often the beginning of
the period is set in the mid-fifteenth century, but some authors
have (perhaps inadvertently) placed the beginning in the
fourteenth century while others have put it in the eighteenth
century; and as for when the period ended, there are differences
between authors of 80–100 years.25 All of this has not prevented
the Ottomanists from “revealing” in their respective areas of
expertise and with growing zeal the features of early modernity
23
Peter Burke, ‘Koraújkor? [What is early modern history?]’ , Obeliscus 1:1 (2014) 15.
24
Virgina H. Aksan – Daniel Goffman, ‘Introduction: Situating the Early Modern
Ottoman World’ , in Virginia H. Aksan – Daniel Goffman (eds.), The Early Modern
Ottomans: Remapping the Empire. (Cambridge, 2007), 1–12. Baki Tezcan, ‘The Politics
of Early Modern Ottoman Historiography’ , in Aksan – Goffman (eds.), The Early
Modern Ottomans, 167–198. Linda Darling, ‘Political Change and Political Discourse
in the Early Modern Mediterranean’ , Journal of Interdisciplinary History 38:4 (2008)
505–531. Firges – Graf, ‘Introduction’ , in Firges – Graf – Roth – Tulasoğlu (eds.),
Well-Connected Domains, 1–10. Kaya Şahin, Empire and Power in the Reign of
Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World. (Cambridge Studies in
Islamic Civilization) (New York, 2013), 6–12, 243–252.
25
See the studies referred to in the previous note.
– 15 –
they view as corresponding to European ones. In doing so – and

this is the real problem – they have gradually “Europeanised”
the Ottoman Empire. A background factor in this process has
sometimes been a sense of good will aimed at resolving today’s
political problems: the minimisation of the significance of
earlier hostilities and the questioning of the validity of the block
paradigm may offer useful historical arguments for promoting
Turkey’s current European integration and for addressing
cultural and religious tensions arising between Western
Europe’s indigenous populations and the immigrant Muslim
communities.26
I do not claim that it is illegitimate to offer comparisons of
the various empires; nor do I deny that the relationship between
the Ottomans and Europe was certainly a more complex one
than incessant warfare. Indeed, like John Elliott, I believe
the Ottomans played a decisive and constitutive role in the
formation of (early) modern Europe (I will return to this point
later on).27 Still, before our imagination runs away with us, we
need to clarify several basic issues. For instance, what exactly
did “Western” historiography mean by modernity – or more
recently, early modernity – when the concept emerged in the
1950s. Here I am not thinking primarily about the absence in
the Ottoman Empire of the various defining elements usually
listed (Renaissance art, the Reformation, book printing,
explorations, etc.). Rather, what seems to have been missing in
26
For two well-written examples of such alternate, in part politically motivated, historical
writings, see Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans, and
the Battle for Europe. (New York, 2008). Ian Almond, Two Faiths, One Banner: When
Muslims Marched with Christians across Europe’s Battlegrounds. (Cambridge, Mass.,
2009).
27
Pál Fodor, ‘Hungary between East and West: The Ottoman Turkish Legacy’ , in
Pál Fodor – Gyula Mayer – Martina Monostori – Kornél Szovák – László Takács
(Hrsg.), More modoque. Die Wurzeln der europäischen Kultur und deren Rezeption
im Orient und Okzident. Festschrift für Miklós Maróth zum siebzigsten Geburtstag.
(Budapest, 2013), 403–405.
– 16 –
INTRODUCTION
the region (the “East”) was the intellectual grounding that was
needed in order to accept (and, more importantly, shape) the
Renaissance. Although, as we know, the Arabs (Muslims) were
the main mediators of the classical Greco-Roman tradition to
medieval Europe, they did not take on or mediate the literature,
poetry and aesthetic forms of antiquity (or the languages
bearing such elements) in which the classical image of man
was made manifest. Yet the true novelty of the Renaissance and
of humanism (today known as early modernity) was the new
image of man grounded in classical antiquity: the idea that man
can use the instrumental mind to gain awareness of his abilities,
including his ability to direct his own destiny.28 Where do we
see anything like this in Ottoman culture? Another question is
the extent to which the Ottoman worldview was influenced by
the rational philosophy of the Muslim Ibn Rushd (Averroës)
whose ideas led to the birth of the European double truth
doctrine, an indispensable element of the Renaissance.29 If the
Ottomans had been so keen to participate in the shaping of
the Renaissance, then why did they ignore the Greek writings
that had fallen into their possession and why did they allow
the documents to migrate to the “Latins” where they served as
sources for the new era? The heart of the problem also becomes
evident when one looks at the outcomes of Ottoman history.30
If the Ottomans – whether in response to external influences
and through the adaptation of early modernity or as the result
of internal changes – had kept pace with the Western countries
and had developed their state and society in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries in a manner similar to the English (this
28
Rémy Brague, Europe, la voie romaine. (Paris, 1993). Bassam Tibi, Kreuzzug und
Djihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt. (München, 2001).
29
This problem is extensively discussed in the book by Tibi, ibid.
30
For this, see Mikhail – Philliou, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the Imperial Turn’ , 725–
727, and passim.
– 17 –
point is made by Baki Tezcan),31 then how would one explain

that the same reforms and methods which transformed the
English (the West) into rulers of the world made the Ottoman
Empire into a kind of colony of the West?
Leaving aside such theoretical considerations, we also see
that the “facts” summoned to prove the interconnectedness
and commonalities of the Ottomans and the world around
them, stand on a very flimsy base or are simply products of an
“imaginative mind”. I could cite many examples of far-fetched
comparisons that push the boundaries of common sense. For
instance, it is inconceivable to me how anyone can speak of state
formation in the sixteenth–seventeenth century in the case of an
empire32 that had been a strong, organised and efficient, albeit
changing, entity since the fifteenth century. And, it seems, one
is expected to do so simply because the sixteenth–seventeenth
century was the era of state formation in Europe after the demise
of the limited monarchies of the previous period. It is similarly
nonsensical, in my view, to speak of “constitutionalism” or of
“proto-democratisation” in the seventeenth century, a period of
unbridled lawlessness and arbitrary rule in Ottoman history.33
Baki Tezcan’s book is also a cautionary tale about the distortions
that may arise when superficial similarities are extrapolated into
structural correspondences. Others, too, have been inclined
to attribute the same kind of importance to an isolated event
as they do to multiple facts or long-term organisational
structures or attitudes. Briefly put, many among the new wave
of historians find it difficult to distinguish between essential
31
Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the
Early Modern World. (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) (Cambridge, 2010).
32
Cf. for example, Şahin, Empire and Power, 249–250. Another questionable conclusion
is that “The Ottoman enterprise did not generate a consolidated empire until the mid-
sixteenth century”; see Peirce, ‘Changing Perceptions’ , 7.
33
Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire. It is worth reading Rhoads Murphy’s critical
review in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 74:3 (2011) 482–484.
– 18 –
INTRODUCTION
and non-essential information. Historians with at least some

knowledge of sixteenth-century Ottoman history are equally
perplexed to read that the Ottoman ruling elite of the time “was
a class … primus inter pares” or that religious divisions were not
so important for that elite – even while every major analysis has
shown that the Ottoman ruling group in the era of Süleyman
was more of an “oligarchy” than it ever had been before or
became afterwards, with Islam constituting the most important
cohesive bond.34 And how should we respond to those who
describe the Ottoman Empire as a “multiplicity of centers”
when the centrality of the capital city Istanbul in all fields was
unmatched.35 It may be true that from the 1540s onwards
manuscript newspapers (avvisi) were produced in Istanbul,
whereby the imperial capital became – principally by way of
the renegades and dragomans – a part of the pan-European
system of communication, but it is also evident that these men
had merely a small or negligible effect on Ottoman society,
and that even though they disposed of an excellent intelligence
service, the leaders of the empire often displayed a frightening
ignorance of crucial political issues.36 At this point, it is worth
34
Şahin, Empire and Power, 250. Firges – Tobias, ‘Introduction’ , 5. In contrast, for the
oligarchic nature of the elite, Gülru Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture
in the Ottoman Empire. (London, 2005), 35–46. See further, Leslie P. Peirce, The
Imperial Harem: Woman and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire. (New York, Oxford),
1993, 65–90. Rhoads Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty. Tradition, Image and
Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400–1800. (London, New York), 2008,
99–174.
35
Firges – Tobias, ‘Introduction’ , 10. For a different view: Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire
and the World, 16–17. Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan, 31. Pinaralioğlu, Geographical
Knowledge, 7–9. Gábor Ágoston, ‘The Ottomans: From Frontier Principality to
Empire’ , in John Andreas Olsen – Colin S. Gray (eds.), The Practice of Strategy: From
Alexander the Great to the Present. (Oxford, New York, 2011), 118–119.
36
Zsuzsa Barbarics-Hermanik, ‘Medien und Protagonisten im Kulturaustausch
zwischen der Habsburgermonarchie und dem Osmanischen Reich’ , in Eckhard
Leuschner – Thomas Wünsch (Hg.), Das Bild des Feindes. Konstruktion von
Antagonismen und Kulturtransfer im Zeitalter der Türkenkriege. Ostmitteleuropa, Italien
und Osmanisches Reich. (Berlin, 2013), 257–260. In contrast, for a grand vizier’s
ignorance of Hungarian affairs, see Fodor, ‘Ungarn und Wien’ , 93: note 41, based on
– 19 –
noting that respect for the facts has also been on the decline.
Even in prestigious publications, one can read that the first siege
of Vienna took place in 1524 or that Charles V was elected
emperor in 1521.37 It is difficult to find words to describe the
complete lack of knowledge displayed on a few pages of Daniel
Goffman’s acclaimed book;38 at any rate, it clearly undermines
one’s confidence in the author’s otherwise erudite narration of
the “Greater Western World”.
Enough of the negative examples! By mentioning them, my
intent was not to deny that important new results have arisen
from the “imperial or European turn” in Ottoman historiography.
The integration of Ottoman history into European or universal
history was both desirable and long overdue. Concerning the
question of whether Ottoman history was generally well-
connected, my answer too would be affirmative. However, if
we are asking whether the Ottoman world participated fully in
the early modern development of Europe, my answer is a firm
no. In even clearer terms: the “Europeanisation” of Ottoman
politics and social history coupled with the depiction of the
empire as a kind of idealised prototype for today’s post-national
global ambitions, seems to me to be a highly dangerous route,
for under certain conditions it can even lead to the falsification
of history. As my colleague Géza Dávid and I remarked a
decade and a half ago in connection with the new concept of the
“frontier” and the North African frontier states, the apologetic
Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı Târihine Âid Belgeler – Telhîsler (1597–1607). (İstanbul,

1970), 113–114.
37
Zweder von Martels, ‘Old and New Demarcation Lines between Christian Europe and
the Islamic Ottoman Empire: From Pope Pius II (1458–1464) to Pope Benedict XVI
(2005–2013)’ , in Contadini – Norton (eds.), The Renaissance and the Ottoman World,
171. Palmira Brummett, ‘Ottoman Expansion in Europe, ca. 1453–1606’ , in Suraiya
N. Faroqhi – Kate Fleet (eds.), The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol. 2: The Ottoman
Empire as a World Power, 1453–1606. (Cambridge, 2013), 51.
38
Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. (Cambridge, 2002),
99–105.
– 20 –
INTRODUCTION
idealisation “can lead … to historical constructions which have

little to do with one-time historical reality”.39 Similar caution
has been shown by Alan Mikhail and Cristine M. Philliou who,
while recognising the advances in knowledge brought about by
the “imperial turn”, have also underlined the following: “Early
modernity has become a repository and testing ground for
our post-national ambitions and desires.”40 In my view, those
Ottomanist historians who have been seduced by the concept
of early modernity should give due consideration to the author-
duo’s wise counsel on how the Ottoman Empire is best treated
as an entity in its own right and, at the same time, as a part of the
global system: “Difference – specificity not freakishness – must
come before similarity. The crucial point is that the Ottoman
Empire was not like any other empire. … This, of course, …
does not mean it is beyond comparison. Quite the contrary. …
We should … begin … to examine the positive processes going
on in the space ‘between’ – not the assumed void, but an arena
of intense contestation between a panoply of forces, actors, and
places.”41
This, indeed, is the aim of my book. The goal is to
describe – from the initial period until the last third of the
sixteenth century – the relationship that evolved between
the Ottoman Empire (with its unique structures and modes
of operation) and Hungary, a part of the respublica christiana
that came into the possession of the Habsburg dynasty.
An examination of the series of events underway in this
“intermediate space” will also enhance our understanding of
the Ottoman Empire’s fate and destiny and the various power
and human factors at play. A further aim is to demonstrate
how, among the multiple connections of the Ottoman world,
39
Dávid – Fodor (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs, 12.
40
Mikhail – Philliou, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the Imperial Turn’ , 736.
41
Mikhail – Philliou, ibid., 743.
– 21 –
warfare and diplomacy (closely connected as they are) as well

as trade retained their primacy throughout the period and how
these factors were assigned greater importance than cultural
and intellectual interaction and exchange.42 At first sight this
book may seem to be an ordinary (but hopefully not boring)
political history or event history analysis, but in reality it
intends to be more than that. It is also a structural historical
and strategic historical study, and I seek to give a picture of the
subject-matter spanning various “ages”. In doing so, I also reflect
on the issues arising in Ottoman studies out of the “empire for
ages” approach. This term was coined by Mikhail and Philliou
to relate how uniform Ottoman history was slowly fragmenting,
as an increasing number of “separate” eras were being carved out
of it (“age of the beloved”, “age of the exploration”, etc.), leading
to its being debated according to a sometimes merely perceived
or retrospectively constructed rationale. In my approach I am
careful to put proper emphasis on long-term structures spanning
“ages”, thereby underscoring the importance of continuity in
Ottoman history.
Finally, addressing several concrete issues, I must acknow
ledge that some results of the comparative (early modernist)
studies can be combined with the “traditional” or structuralist
approach. Suraiya Faroqhi drew attention to the fact that
foreign policy – the development of relations with the outside
world – has never been the exclusive prerogative of rulers or
dynasties. In this respect, the Ottoman Empire was no exception,
On military acculturation and exchange, see Gábor Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan.
42
Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire. (Cambridge, 2005).
Idem, ‘Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military
Revolution, 1450–1800’ , Journal of World History 25:1 (2014) 85–124. For an analysis
of the contacts and networks of Ottoman (both Muslim and non-Muslim) merchants
in east and west, see Suraiya N. Faroqhi, ‘Trading between East and West: The
Ottoman Empire of the Early Modern Period’ , in Firges – Graf – Roth – Tulasoğlu
(eds.), Well-Connected Domains, 15–36.
– 22 –
INTRODUCTION
and the empire’s foreign policy decisions often emerged from

struggles between various factions (and households) of the
elite.43 I agree in full with this conclusion and offer evidence in
this book that even in the centralised Ottoman state, the opinions
of the central and provincial elites had to be taken into account
before strategic decisions were made and great military ventures
embarked upon. This was true if for no other reason than that
the empire was both a land-based and maritime polity, where
tensions naturally arose between rival groups among the ruling
elite with conflicting interests. I also agree with Faroqhi that
sometimes decisions were based on expediency, perhaps after the
arguments of one or the other faction had been adopted. This
underscores the view – now widely held – that the so-called
political households played an important and growing role in the
Ottoman political system.44 At the same time, I think it is wrong
to cast doubt on the existence and significance of certain system-
based “imperatives”;45 it seems to me that such imperatives – for
instance, the long-term institutional structures and the closely
associated mentality – could not be evaded by decision-makers
and were factors exerting a strong influence on the decision-
makers themselves. In agreement with Faroqhi and despite
contrary opinions, I regard the Ottoman system – and Ottoman
foreign policy – to have been decisively influenced by such
factors as the strong legitimacy of the ruler and the dynasty, the
strong cohesion of the ruling elite and the state apparatus, their
dynastic loyalty, and their commitment to defend the interests of
43
Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World, 4–5, 27–28.
44
Faroqhi, ‘Post-colonial Turn’ , 67–72. While historians date the rise of the households
to the seventeenth century, in my view they existed some time before, but less visibly so;
cf. Pál Fodor, ‘Who Should Obtain the Castle of Pankota? Interest Groups and Self-
Promotion in the Mid-Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Political Establishment’ , Turcica
31 (1999) 67–86, re-published in Idem, In Quest of the Golden Apple, 227–241.
45
Cf. Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World, 5.
– 23 –
the state.46 All this was of enormous advantage to the Ottoman

Empire in the period under discussion when the estates and
then the foreign and religious policies of the denominations and
churches severely limited royal power in the main European
rivals. It is no accident that the enemies of the Ottomans regarded
the empire as far more efficient and purpose-driven than other
states. However, as we shall see, even this did not suffice to ensure
the accomplishment of the principal goals.
One final observation: my views published at the beginning
of my career on the subject-matter have changed in only one
essential aspect: my judgment of the imperial campaign of
1520–21. I once believed that at this time the Ottoman plans
for conquest were limited to Hungary as even that appeared as
too much of a challenge. More recently, however, the evidence
has persuaded me that world domination became a goal of
Ottoman policy immediately after Süleyman’s accession to the
throne. In my book, I present events in this light.
The unreliable nature of the renegades (Christians) who became Ottomans is

46
emphasised by Tobias P. Graf, ‘Of Half-Lives and Double-Lives: “Renegades” in the

Ottoman Empire and Their Pre-Conversion Ties’ , in Firges – Graf – Roth – Tulasoğlu
(eds.), Well-Connected Domains, 131–149. In contrast, the cohesion and loyalty of the
elite is underscored in Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World, 29–30, 43–44,
213.
– 24 –
CHAPTER I
THE CONQUEST OF HUNGARY

AND THE ROAD TO VIENNA
(1370s–1530s)
WHY WERE THE OTTOMANS ALWAYS AT WAR?
SOME ASSUMPTIONS
On behalf of János Hunyadi, governor of Hungary, his chan

cellor János Vitéz wrote the following to Pope Nicholas V
on September 17, 1448: “If my memory does not fail me, the
spiteful weapons of the Turks have been lurking around Europe
for a hundred years now. They subjugated Greece, Macedonia,
Bulgaria, and Albania in quick succession … casting them into
servitude, depriving them of their religion, forcing onto them a
foreign faith, foreign morals, foreign laws, and the language of
the infidels. They showed no mercy either to the rights of man
or to those of God. ... The devastating plague spread from there
towards all the other neighbours. Recently, it nearly penetrated
into the heart of Europe, gaining a foothold close to our country
and homeland. ... For over sixty years, we have firmly withstood
the scorching wrath of war, relying on our own resources
and with the arms of a single nation. Though exhausted by
the numerous defeats, the warfare and the mourning, we are
persevering. ... To sum everything up in a few words: we have
never suffered so much by any other foe, and apart from the
memory of freedom, we are left with nothing but our weapons
and courage, as many a time we have fallen into extreme peril…
Because there is no cruelty that we have not endured and it will
never end, whether we lose or win: the enemy will always be at
our neck, for its hatred is greater even then its strength. Even
now our enemy… wants not victory, but revenge us.” 47
Sándor V. Kovács (publ.), Magyar humanisták levelei, XV–XVI. század [Letters

47
of Hungarian humanists]. (Budapest, 1971), 120–121. Cf. Pál Fodor, ‘The View of
the Turk in Hungary: the Apocalyptic Tradition and the Red Apple in Ottoman–
Hungarian Context’ , in Les traditions apocalyptiques au tournant de la chute de
Constantinople. Actes de la Table Ronde d’Istanbul (13–14 avril 1996) édités par
Benjamin Lellouche et Stéphan Yerasimos et publiés par l’Institut Français d’Études
– 27 –
Hunyadi’s chancellor had a good knowledge of Hungarian

history. The Ottoman Turks had indeed appeared at – and
even inside – the borders of Hungary sixty years earlier,
in 1390. Together with auxiliary Serbian troops, they had
“visited” and pillaged the banate of Macsó and the counties of
Krassó and Temes in 1390, Syrmium in 1391 and the region
around Temesvár and Syrmium in 1392.48 The inhabitants of
Hungary had soon come to realise that the “newcomers”, whose
advance into the Balkans had been much talked about, would
be unusually tough and ambitious foes. Indeed, their methods
were felt to be so ruthless that in the years during the reign of
Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387–1437) they were regularly
compared with the Tatars, who were the paragons of armed
menace for Hungarians at the time.49
But who were these conquerors? The Ottoman state was
formed in the first decades of the fourteenth century in the
north-western corner of Asia Minor. The emergence of the new
power was facilitated by two circumstances: 1. a population
movement elicited by the advance of the Mongols into the
Middle East, which forced hundreds of thousands of Oghuz
(Turcoman) people to migrate to the border areas of the Seljuk
and Byzantine Empires in Asia Minor; 2. a power vacuum
that had come about by the end of the thirteenth century in
the Ilkhanid Empire and its Seljuk vassal state, as well as in the
remaining provinces of the Byzantine Empire in Asia Minor.50
Anatoliennes Georges-Dumézil d’Istanbul. (Varia Turcica, XXXIII.) (Paris, Montréal,

1999), 101–102.
48
Pál Engel, ‘A török–magyar háborúk első évei 1389–1392 [The first years of the
Ottoman–Hungarian warfare, 1389–1392]’ , Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 111:3
(1998) 565–569.
49
Fodor, ‘The View of the Turk’ , 100.
50
Halil İnalcık, ‘The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State’ , International
Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (1980) 72–75. Claude Cahen, La Turquie pré-ottoman.
(Istanbul, Paris, 1998), 275–295. Rudi Paul Lindner, Explorations in Ottoman
Prehistory. (Ann Arbor, 20104), esp. 81–101 (in his view Mongol rule was more
– 28 –
THE CONQUEST OF HUNGARY AND THE ROAD TO VIENNA
The tribe led by Osman (ca. 1288–1324) was not alone in

organising the Turcomans of Asia Minor, but within a century
he and his successors had overcome all their rivals and had made
the defeated areas their own. At the time of the onslaught on
Hungary, their troops were nearing the Euphrates in the east
and were at the Danube in the west.
There is still no consensus among historians about the causes
of this unprecedented success. One thing is unquestionable: in
several regards their behaviour differed conspicuously from that
of the other Turkish (Turcoman) rulers and families. From the
outset they avoided the division and sharing of power customary
among the Turks, and unlike their rivals they made use of the
service they rendered as mercenaries to the Byzantines not
only to acquire booty, but also to pursue a deliberate policy
of territorial expansion. Characteristically, they immediately
exploited upon the extraordinary opportunity that arose in the
1340s: when a battle for the throne broke out in the Byzantine
Empire and the strongest Turcoman beyliks were put down by
the Latins, they penetrated the vacated political and military
spaces without hesitation.51
The sense of purpose, determination and long-term
perspective of the House of Osman are striking, even though
we know that, contrary to the dynastic legends that arose in the
latter half of the fifteenth century, many of the early conquests
in the Balkans were achieved in conjunction with the allied
marcher lords (uç beyis): the Evrenos, Mihaloğlu, İshakbeyoğlu
effective than scholars previously thought). Idem, ‘Anatolia, 1300–1451’ , in Kate

Fleet (ed.), The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol. 1: Byzantium to Turkey 1071–1453.
(Cambridge, 2009), 118. Donald M. Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–
1453. (Cambridge, 19932), 41–89.
51
Cf. Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State.
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1995), 136–138. Lindner, ‘Anatolia, 1300–1451’ ,
108–109.
– 29 –
(latterly Turahanoğlu) and Malkoçoğlu families.52 And even

if it is true that the dynasty appropriated to itself the glory
of its former comrades-in-arms and deliberately obscured the
memory of their contribution to the founding of the state, we
observe no significant difference in the manner in which the
marcher lords and the dynasty pursued the policy of expansion
and consolidation (for instance, the establishment of a network
of charity kitchens and caravanserais based around dervish
monasteries, the founding of new Muslim urban centres outside
the walls of conquered cities, etc.).53
A longstanding topic of debate among historians concerns
the ultimate objective of Ottoman conquests in the fourteenth–
sixteenth centuries. Did the Ottomans even have a concrete
vision that historians, following in the footsteps of the military
strategists, might call a grand strategy? In Ottoman studies, having
been inspired by earlier studies by Edward Luttwak, Geoffrey
Parker and others (note, historians treat the conclusions of the
former with reservations), Gábor Ágoston examined whether
this model could be applied to Ottoman history. He concluded
that a “grand strategy” would mean simply “a global vision on the
geopolitics of states and their military, economic and cultural
capabilities”.54 Such a vision determined the long-term policy
of the Ottoman Empire and the mobilisation of economic
and human resources for the achievement of policy objectives.
According to Ágoston, however, it cannot be claimed that the
Ottomans possessed a uniform strategy spanning centuries
52
Heath W. Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State. (Albany, 2003). Idem, ‘Early
Ottoman Period’ , in Metin Heper – Sabri Sayarı (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of
Modern Turkey. (London, 2012), 5–14.
53
Lowry, ‘Early Ottoman Period’ , 8–10.
54
Ágoston, ‘The Ottomans: From Frontier Principality to Empire’ , 107. Idem,
‘Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in
the Context of Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry’ , in Aksan – Goffman (eds.), The Early
Modern Ottomans, 76–77.
– 30 –
and explaining all their policy measures, for such a strategy

could not have existed at the time of the early conquests given
that the state had been just one of several actors. Instead, it is
more accurate to speak of a number of strategies pursued by
various rulers but sharing long-term features.55 In Ágoston’s
view, under Sultan Süleyman (discussed in depth below), the
palpable outlines of a “grand strategy” emerged. This strategy
contained the following elements: a comprehensive ideology
concerning the empire’s universal mission; domestic and foreign
intelligence gathering for the purpose of promoting the empire’s
integration into Europe; the dissemination of the self-image
through appropriate foreign policies and propaganda; and the
utilisation of the available economic and human resources for
imperial objectives.56
In the absence of sources of similar depth to those relating to
the age of Süleyman, we cannot know what the early rulers were
thinking exactly when they decided to launch a military action
or implemented a shift in policy. Yet, as I have already indicated,
their actions and the thrust of their policies leave little doubt
as to the presence of long-term considerations at an early stage.
It seems to me that from the 1340s at the latest the Ottoman
state – a relatively well-organised entity by that time – pursued
a remarkably consistent and deliberate policy. Its immediate
goals included: 1. the elimination of the minor states in the
Balkans, 2. the ousting (or pushing back) of the Italian (Latin)
trading states, 3. the subjugation of the Turcoman Muslim states
55
For example: dynastic marriages, the integration of local elites and military organi
sations, a pragmatic and flexible approach to regional administration and taxation, and
forced resettlement. Ágoston, ‘The Ottomans: From Frontier Principality’ , 114–118.
Idem, ‘‘The Most Powerful’ Empire: Ottoman Flexibility and Military Might’ , in
Georg Zimmar – David Hicks (eds.), Empires and Superpowers: Their Rise and Fall.
(Washington, D.C., 2005), 127–171, esp. 154–157.
56
Ágoston, ‘The Ottomans: From Frontier Principality’ , 109, 123, 128. Idem,
‘Information, Ideology’ , 77–103.
– 31 –
in Anatolia, and 4. the encirclement and gradual destruction of

Byzantium and the capture of Constantinople.57 By the end
of the century, its successes had surpassed all expectations. To
mention a few of the more spectacular victories: defeating the
Serbian and Balkan coalitions at Černomen (1371) and Kosovo
(1389); conquering Asia Minor (Anatolia) as far as the Kızıl
Irmak river by 1390; reducing Byzantium, which was forced to
pay an annual tax from 1371, to the capital and its surroundings;
compelling Genoa and Venice to conclude an agreement and
pursue cooperation with the Ottomans.58
Concerning the era of Murad I (1362–1389) and Bayezid I
(1389–1402), the sources and documented events offer insights
into the long-term goals. In this regard, it is particularly
illuminating that in late 1394 Sultan Bayezid I assumed the
title sultanü’r-Rum (ruler of [Eastern] Rome/Asia Minor).
By using this title, which had earlier been employed by the
sultans of Konya, Bayezid I wanted to show to the world
that he considered himself heir to both the Seljuks and the
Eastern Roman (Byzantine) emperors. It is therefore quite
justified to assume that he wished to obtain or rebuild their
respective empires.59 The practical steps he took also confirm
that he envisioned an empire stretching from the Danube to the
57
A good summary of the events of the early Ottoman (and contemporaneous Balkan)
history: John V. A. Fine, Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the
Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest. (Ann Arbor, 1987). Ernst Werner, Die
Geburt einer Grossmacht – Die Osmanen (1300–1481). Ein Beitrag zur Genesis des
türkischen Feudalismus. (Weimar, 19854). Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–
1481. (Istanbul, 1990). Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream. The Story of the Ottoman
Empire 1300–1923. (New York, 2005), 1–80.
58
For the (far from constantly hostile) relations with the Italian city states, see Elisabeth
A. Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and
Aydin (1305–1415). (Venice, 1983), esp. 63–81 and Kate Fleet, European and Islamic
Trade in the Early Ottoman State. The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey. (Cambridge,
1999), esp. 4–12, 134–141.
59
On this question, see Paul Wittek, ‘Rum Sultanı’ , in Batı Dillerinde Osmanlı Tarihi.
(İstanbul, 1971), 90–93. Cf. Cahen, La Turquie pré-ottoman, 179–180.
– 32 –
– 33 –
Euphrates, which tallies with the main territory of the Eastern

Roman Empire.60 The plan came close to realisation in 1402,
failing only temporarily because of Timur Lenk’s offensive
from the east and his victory over Bayezid. However, within a
short time the Ottoman dynasty revived the idea of the empire
as envisaged by Bayezid I, and from the reign of Mehmed II
(1451–1481) in the latter half of the fifteenth century they
made plans for Ottoman–Islamic rule of the whole world.61
Having conquered the Near East in the early sixteenth century,
they felt more motivated than ever to “restore” Alexander the
Great’s one-time world empire.
At this point, we must address another puzzling question:
why did the Ottoman Empire pursue its conquests so
consistently? The answers usually stress three factors: the
incentive role of the holy war of Islam, the jihad (preferably gaza
in Ottoman usage), the militarist nature of the state, and the
importance of war spoils.62 Without casting doubt on these
explanations (and sometimes even corroborating them), in the
following, I identify and analyse several underlying causes of the
Ottoman Empire’s wars and conquests.
60
Halil İnalcık, ‘Bayezid I’ , in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. Vol. V. (İstanbul,
1992), 234. Cf. Speros Vryonis, Jr., ‘The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms’ ,
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 23–24 (1969–1970) 255–256.
61
Osman Turan, Türk Cihân Hâkimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi. Vol. II. (İstanbul, 1969), 60–
71.
62
Halil İnalcık, ‘The Rise of the Ottoman Empire’ , in M. A. Cook (ed. and introd.), A
History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730. Chapters from the Cambridge History of Islam
and the New Cambridge Modern History by V. J. Parry, H. İnalcık, A. N. Kurat and
J. S. Browley. (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne), 1976, 31. İnalcık, ‘The
Emergence’ , 75–77.
– 34 –
Acquisition of booty and territory
Though it has been stated that booty played only a “localized

role in Ottoman economic life”,63 domestic and foreign data
demonstrate unequivocally the importance of this factor over
a long period. Especially at the beginning, the war animated
the entire society, and it had two main purposes: acquisition
of land and securing a living, or, in the more fortunate cases,
enrichment.64
The importance of booty-making
The chapter on jihad in a mid-fourteenth century work

written in Turkish lists the main means of making a living as
follows: 1. spoils from the gaza, 2. trading, 3. tilling the land, 4.
craftsmanship.65 The list suggests an order of importance, which
cannot have been accidental in Western Anatolia at the time.
Booty (mainly slaves) was amply procured and not only during
the major imperial campaigns. In peacetime the frontier defence
units were the providers, and since one fifth of the spoils were
due to the state according to the religious law, this represented
a continuous source of income.66 Some data stemming from
various periods can serve to illustrate the importance of goods
obtained through warfare. First, according to the traditional
Ottoman view, imperial mosques could only be built from booty
acquired during a jihad (gaza malı). That is probably why so few
63
Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World, 100.
64
Heath Lowry even calls the early Ottoman state a “predatory confederacy”, cf. The
Nature, 54, 57.
65
Şinasi Tekin, ‘XIV üncü Yüzyıla Ait Bir İlm-i Hâl: Risāletü’l-İslām’ , Wiener Zeitschrift
für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 76 (1986) 286. Idem, ‘XIV Yüzyılda Yazılmış Gazilik
Tarikası ‘Gâziliğin Yolları’ Adlı Bir Eski Anadolu Türkçesi Metni ve Gazâ/Cihâd
Kavramları Hakkında’ , Journal of Turkish Studies 13 (1989) 156.
66
Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, ‘En marge d’un acte concernant le penğyek et les aqınğı’ ,
Revue des Études Islamiques 37 (1969) 21–48, esp. 35 ff.
– 35 –
sultanic mosques were built after 1566 when the sultans no

longer took part in the campaigns, whereas in earlier periods
one had been erected after the other.67 Second, Georgius de
Hungaria, who was held captive in the empire for twenty years
in the middle of the fifteenth century, wrote that “throughout
Turkey everyone shares the view that a man who manages to
take a male or female slave will never know destitution again.”68
Third, the importance of slave trade in the Crimea is a well-
known fact. As Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha noted in early
1528, the Ottoman state treasury had annual revenue of 30,000
gold coins from this trade69 and in 1578 in Caffa income from
slaves amounted to 4.5 million akçe (about 75,000 gold coins).70
Fourth, it was from gaza malı (mainly from the price of slaves)
that Grand Admiral Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha paid the bulk
of the costs of the fleet for the maritime campaign along the
67
Peirce, The Imperial Harem, 189. Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan, 59–66, 68. For the
social prestige garnered from the booty that was obtained from the infidels, see also
Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World, 100. War booty in general was a source
of imperial pride and magnificence (for this reason selected precious objects were
exhibited at celebrations in Istanbul); cf. for instance, Şahin, Empire and Power, 52.
68
Georgius de Hungaria, Incipit prohemium in tractatum de moribus, condictionibus et
nequicia Turcorum. Értekezés a törökök szokásairól, viszonyairól és gonoszságáról 1438–
1458 [Essay on the customs, conditions and wickedness of the Turks 1438–1458],
in Lajos Tardy (ed.), Rabok, követek, kalmárok az oszmán birodalomról [Slaves, envoys
and merchants on the Ottoman Empire]. Translated by Győző Kenéz. (Budapest,
1977), 69. For the original Latin text with a German translation, see Georgius de
Hungaria, Tractatus de moribus, condictionibus et nequicia Turcorum. Traktat über die
Sitten, die Lebensverhältnisse und die Arglist der Türken. Nach der Erstausgabe von
1481 herausgegeben, übersetzt und eingeleitet von Reinhard Klockow. (Schriften zur
Landeskunde Siebenbürgens, Band. 15.) (Köln, Weimar, Wien, 1993), 200–201.
69
Legatio Laszky apud Sultanum Solymannum anno 1527 functa. Actio Hieronymi Laszky
apud Turcam nomine Regis Iohannis, in Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki (ed.), Documente
privitóre la Istoria Românilor. Vol. II/1. (Bucuresci, 1891), 54.
70
Halil İnalcık, ‘Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire’ , in A. Asher – T. Halasi-
Kun – B. K. Király (eds.), The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds:
The East European Pattern. (Studies on Society in Change, 3.) (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1979),
39. Cf. Zübeyde Güneş Yağcı, ‘İstanbul Gümrük Defterine Göre Karadeniz Köle
Ticareti (1606–1607)’ , History Studies 3:2 (2011) 371–384.
– 36 –
shores of Italy and Corsica.71 Fifth, the beylerbeyi of Buda was

warned twice, in December 1589 and January 1590, to call the
former agha of janissaries of Buda to the books as he owed the
treasury 30,000 guruş (or, according to the second order, 35,000
guruş). The agha had received his office against a pledge that he
would deliver this sum from the ransoms of prisoners. 72 The
fact that an agha of janissaries of Buda undertook to pay roughly
20,000 gold coins from the slave trade in formal peacetime when
the Ottoman expansion was at a standstill sheds light on the
economic importance of looting – not so much for the quantity
of goods it brought into circulation but for its dominant role in
sustaining the military sector of society, which was often left to
its own devices when making a living.73
Acquisition of land
Though tightly connected to the previous motive, this one is worth

investigating separately. In my view, the Ottoman conquests can
be pictured as an avalanche, whereby: 1. a neighbouring country
is pillaged and looted first by the frontier defence units and then
by the imperial army whereafter the spoils are channelled to the
centre; 2. the area is then occupied, integrated into the empire
and economically restored, whereupon its resources (prebends,
71
Halil Sahillioğlu, Tokapı Sarayı Arşivi H. 951–952 Tarihli ve E–12321 Numaralı
Mühimme Defteri. (Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi Serisi, 7.) (İstanbul, 2002),
Nos. 180, 232, 285.
72
İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Mühimme defteri 66, 210/97, 504/233.
73
See the illuminating studies in a volume on the ransom industry along the Ottoman
borders: Dávid – Fodor (eds.), Ransom Slavery. In the fifteenth century, quite a few
Ottoman soldiers who were stationed in Greece made a living from incursions into
the territory of remote Hungary (ibid., XIX, 18). In a treatise presented to Murad II
in 1429 it is stated that “every year more or less fifty thousand male and female infidels
are taken from the abode of war as captives”. See Cemal Kafadar, ‘A Rome of One’s
Own: Reflections on Cultural Geography and Identity in the Lands of Rum’ , in
S. Bozdoğan – Gülru Necipoğlu (eds.), History and Ideology: Architectural Heritage of
the ‘Lands of Rum’ , in Muqarnas, Special Issue, 24 (2007) 14.
– 37 –
tax farms, etc.) are put to the service of new contingents and
new conquests, while the advanced frontier zone begins to
supply booty to the centre from new areas. Two conclusions
can be drawn from this state of affairs: 1. The first phase of the
conquest is destructive (as it had been in the Seljuks), while
the second, the phase of occupation with the Ottomans having
taken a foothold, is comparatively tolerable.74 2. It is easy to see
that in the long run the system is vulnerable: if the outsized
machinery gets bogged down and expansion stops, this can lead
to a shortage of resources as the crucial frontier zones begin to
consume rather than supply, thereby overburdening the financial
resources of the centre.
Social factors
As noted above, at first broad social strata were interested in the

offensive campaigns. The latter turned into a popular venture
involving the entire society and strongly resembling the raids
of the Hungarians in Western Europe at the time of their
settlement in the Carpathian Basin.
After a while, the “grass-roots” troops were replaced or
supplanted by the professional army. In this phase, the motor
of fighting was the army of slave origin. From the latter half of
the fourteenth century the House of Osman pursued a policy
of training prisoners-of-war and children collected under the
devşirme system (a levy of Christian boys, introduced towards
the end of the century) to produce a ruling elite of foreign origin
A meticulous study has demonstrated that 80–90% of the population of the County
74
of Valkó between the Danube–Drava and Sava rivers was lost owing to Ottoman raids:
Pál Engel, ‘A török dúlások hatása a népességre: Valkó megye példája [The impact of
Ottoman incursions on the population: the example of Valkó County]’ , Századok
134:2 (2000) 267–321, esp. 276, 280–282.
– 38 –
(kul in Turkish) that was loyal to the Ottoman House.75 A

noted intellectual of the sixteenth century, Mustafa Ali, argued
that this governing elite was a particular and defining feature
of the Ottoman Empire. He characterised the ruling class as a
separate “race” (kul cinsi) and as a great invention of the sultans
which had been developed consciously and whose members
spoke a special language. He observed that there was not one
distinguished Ottoman personality without Christian forebears.
He described this ethnic mixture as the quintessential feature
of Ottoman society; non-Muslims of the Balkans provided
physical strength and beauty, while the Muslim intellectuals
originating in the East provided the intellect, bringing Islamic
high culture with them and teaching it to the inhabitants of
“Rum”, thereby turning the populace of the Ottoman Empire
into a nation of culture.76
The decisive influence of the kuls had four important
consequences.
1. The dynasty had a support base which it could employ
to massively bring the society under state control (in a prudent
manner, the leadership chose the would-be cadres of state
administration and the army from among the poor strata and
75
İnalcık, ‘The Rise of the Ottoman Empire’ , 28. Idem, ‘Ghulam’ , in The Encyclopaedia
of Islam. New ed. Vol. II. (Leiden, 1983), 1086. İ. Metin Kunt, ‘Turks in the Ottoman
Imperial Palace’ , in Jeroen Duindam – Tülay Artan – Metin Kunt (eds.), Royal Courts
in Dynastic States and Empire. A Global Perspective. (Rulers and Elites. Comparative
Studies in Governance, 1.) (Leiden, Boston, 2011), 289–301.
76
Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian
Mustafa âli (1541–1600). (Princeton, 1986), 253–257. On the kul, see also Christine
Isom-Verhaaren,‘Shifting Identities: Foreign State Servants in France and the Ottoman
Empire’ , Journal of Early Modern History 8:1–2 (2004) 109–134. Necipoğlu, The Age
of Sinan, 36–46. Tijana Krstić, Contested Conversion to Islam. Narratives of Religious
Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. (Stanford, California, 2011). For an
original view on the “Turks” (which distinquishes between good trueborn Muslims and
wicked “renegades”), see Gábor Kármán, ‘Turks Reconsidered: Jakab Harsányi Nagy’s
Changing Image of the Ottoman’ , in Firges – Graf – Roth – Tulasoğlu (eds.), Well-
Connected Domains, 110–130.
– 39 –
these men would constitute the basis of despotism as faithful

servants of the rulers.)
2. This force did all in its power to hold the empire together
and defend the dynasty under all circumstances, as its existence
depended on the dynasty. This explains why the unity and
coherence of the empire could be restored so quickly after grave
domestic crises (for instance, in 1402, 1416, 1421–1422, 1511–
1512).77
3. The kul class concentrated its energies on conquest since
that provided a living: new prisoners-of-war and resources.
Providing for the army of the court and the state apparatus was
always costly, and the size of these groups steadily increased
in the fourteenth–sixteenth centuries. Here one should note
the frequently mentioned militarist nature of the state. In
subsequent periods, this large force, this enormous military
machinery had to be continuously engaged in external fighting
lest it should cause internal disturbances, having become aware
of its own strength.78
4. The kuls were quite tolerant towards subjugated Christians
as the majority of its members were aware of their origins and
knew and contacted their relatives (even if they had been captured
as little children).79 Therefore, their priority was not to convert
77
For the unifying, consolidating and expansion-inspiring role of the kuls, see the career
of Grand Vizier Bayezid in the early fifteenth century: Michel Balivet, Islam mystique
et révolution armée dans les Balkans ottomans. Vie du Cheikh Bedreddîn le „Hallâj des
Turcs” (1358/59–1416). (Cahiers du Bosphore, 12.) (Istanbul, 1995), 87–88. Cf.
Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks by Doukas. An annotated
translation of “Historia Turco-Byzantina” by Harry J. Magoulias. (Detroit, 1975),
128–131.
78
As happened in 1525–26, 1593 or 1683 when one (of several) reasons to launch a
campaign was to remove the soldiers from Istanbul. Cf. Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman
Empire. The Classical Age 1300–1600. (London, 1973), 49. Fodor, ‘Ottoman Policy’ ,
282–283.
79
Ibrahim Metin Kunt, ‘Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century
Ottoman Establishment’ , International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (1974)
233–239. Pál Fodor, ‘Török és oszmán: Az oszmán rabszolgaelit azonosságtudatáról
[Turk and Ottoman. The sense of identity within the Ottoman elite of slave origin]’ ,
– 40 –
the Christians, but to involve as many as possible in warfare, the

main activity of the Ottoman state. By the fifteenth century, the
use of Christians in warfare had become unusually widespread.
With some exaggeration, it can be said that half the Balkans
had been integrated in some form and under some name (eflak,
martolos, voynuk, akıncı, derbendci, şahinci, etc.) in the Ottoman
war machinery, whereas Latin Europe had gradually abandoned
medieval military forms.80 Hence, not only the kuls, the ruling
elite, but also the subordinated Muslim and even parts of the
Christian societies became interested as beneficiaries of the
system and the wars that supported it.81 Cooperation was also
facilitated by the peculiar forms of Islam in the Balkans. The
dominance of Sunni orthodoxy was for a long time unknown
among ordinary people; what spread among them was a kind
of syncretic Euro-Balkan Islam characterised by common cultic
places, saints, churches, animal sacrifice and baptism widespread
Történelmi Szemle 37:4 (1995) 367–383. Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan, 42–43. For a
recent discussion of the subject (with debatable conclusions), see Graf, ‘Of Half-Lives
and Double-Lives’ , 131–149. – It is important to note that European travellers and
diplomats considered the kuls of slave origin more relentless enemies of the European
Christianity than the trueborn Turks.
80
Klára Hegyi, ‘Magyar és balkáni katonaparasztok a budai vilájet déli szandzsákjaiban
[Hungarian and Balkan peasant soldiers in the southern sanjaks of the vilayet of
Buda]’ , Századok 135:6 (2001) esp. 1255–1272. Pál Fodor, ‘Ottoman Warfare, 1300–
1453’ , in Fleet (ed.), The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. I, 192–226.
81
A fine example of cooperation between a kul and his Christian relatives can be found
in the following order of the imperial council sent to the district governor of Sirem
and the kadı of Varadin (Hung. Pétervárad) on June 9, 1573: “Now you, who are the
sancakbeyi of Sirem, have sent a letter to let us know that the zimmi called Istepan,
son of Petko from the village of Radiç in the judicial district of Varadin belonging
to the district of Sirem is actually the brother of Hasan Bey, the sancakbeyi of Kırk
Kilise, and besides, he is useful, making efforts to increase the wealth of the treasury,
he is a respectable zimmi worthy of protection. An application was submitted that I
should issue a noble deed to him that would exempt him similarly to the rest of the
Muslims from the legal tithes and traditional taxes, as well as the compulsory labour
to be rendered. I therefore order that Istepan, son of Petko be exempt not only from
the poll tax and the tithes, but also from labour service and war-tax... When you have
seen my noble order, forward it to his hands...” (İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi,
D.EVM 26278, 193).
– 41 –
in both religious communities, and a general reverence of sacred

fountains rooted in Seljuk times, etc.82 In addition, for economic
reasons the state sought to keep the defeated Christians in their
previous positions, for, according to an Ottoman chronicler at
the end of the sixteenth century, even the sultan realised that
“for the treasury, the infidel is the most useful”.83
Domestic stabilising function of the campaigns
With the expansion of the empire and the pushing out of the
frontiers, the assertion of the will of the central power in distant
areas encountered an ever-increasing number of obstacles. It
also required increased efforts from the sultanic army to reach
the borders and the land of the enemy. The advances, however,
afforded the ruler and the dignitaries of the country a chance
to gain insights into the situation of the area and the main
concerns of the population. Local leaders in such areas (kadıs,
beys, magistrates of towns, leaders of guilds) were expected to
seek out the sultan and give him presents, who also granted
them gifts in return. Such reciprocal and symbolic actions
also took place between the sultan and the rank and file of
the army (sometimes producing the most absurd situations),
mainly during spectacular parades staged with the participation
of the ruler. The presence of leading officials and workers
accompanying the army, as well as the temporary coincidence of
the military and civil requirements resulted in the realisation of
82
Michel Balivet, Romanie byzantine et pays de Rum turc. Histoire d’un espace d’imbrication
gréco-turque. (Istanbul, 1994).
83
Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selânikî. Hazırlayan Mehmet İpşirli. Vol. I. İstanbul,
1989, 410. Cf. Pál Fodor, ‘The Ottomans and their Christians in Hungary’ , in Eszter
Andor – István György Tóth (eds.), Frontiers of Faith. Religious Exchange and the
Constitution of Religious Identities 1400–1750. (Budapest, 2001), 137–147. Antal
Molnár, Le Saint-Siège, Raguse et les missions catholiques de la Hongrie ottomane 1572–
1647. (Biblioteca Academiae Hungariae – Roma. Studia, I.) (Rome, Budapest, 2007),
17–23.
– 42 –
long-needed public works. Several welfare institutions (charity

kitchens, caravanserais, medreses, etc.) were founded (or built
quickly), roads were cleaned and bridges repaired. The brigades
rounded up and liquidated robbers and other criminals in the
neighbourhood, thereby strengthening law and order – which
was important for both sides. Thus, the campaigns and advances
had a dual function: on the one hand, they intensified solidarity
between the commanders and the common soldiers and between
the elite and society both practically and symbolically, and on
the other, they strengthened the authority of the central power.
The latter purpose was also served by the practice of appointing
staff: it favoured those who applied for posts in the camp and
who consequently carried out the orders of the centre more
ardently – at least at the beginning.84 The assurance of domestic
peace and the demonstration of the might and potency of the
state and ruler, were particularly important functions of the
war around the turn of the seventeenth century, though earlier
instances can also be adduced.85
Psychological functions
Incessant victories over the Christians and the unstoppable

decline of adversaries became the decisive collective experience
84
The abovesaid is chiefly based on a description of the campaign of 1596 by Abdulkadir
Efendi; see Topçular Kâtibi ‘Abdülkādir (Kadrî) Efendi Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlîl). (Türk
Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, III/21.) Vol. I. Yayına hazırlayan Ziya Yılmazer. (Ankara,
2003), 98–142.
85
For instance, in 1537 (Rhoads Murphey, ‘Suleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary:
Ottoman Manifest Destiny or a Delayed Reaction to Charles V’s Universalist Vision’ ,
Journal of Early Modern History 5:3 [2001] 206–207), during Süleyman’s Iranian
wars (Christine Woodhead, ‘Perspectives on Süleyman’ , in Metin Kunt – Christine
Woodhead [eds.], Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age. The Ottoman Empire in the
Early Modern World. [London, New York, 1995], 168–169) or in 1570–71 (Vera
Zimányi, Lepanto, 1571. [Budapest, 1983], 108–113). Of course, the villages and
towns through which the armies passed were required to give as well as to receive: they
had to bear the extra burden of supplying the army (services, taxes in kind, etc.).
– 43 –
of fifteenth-century Ottoman society. The spectacular successes

inspired self-confidence and a certain sense of superiority
even in the lower social strata. The contemporary Georgius de
Hungaria, who knew the world of the Ottomans better than
anyone else and recorded his personal experiences with a rare
lack of prejudice, wrote that all this “confirms them and makes
them lastingly strong in their sect... they call themselves ‘victors’...
Besides, they take pride in abusively calling the Christians
women and themselves their masters.”86
In constrast to such Ottoman self-assurance, the Christians
in the Balkans displayed signs of emotional breakdown, re
sponding to the Ottoman advancement as could be expected
on the basis of Ibn Khaldun’s observations: the continuous
triumphs of the foe convinced many of the superiority of the
God of the Muslims.87 Michel Balivet cites the words of a Greek
priest from the Saltukname (latter half of the fifteenth century)
which convey with remarkable pungency this experience: the
Turks chased the Greeks away from their lands, so probably
they would drive them out of Paradise as well.88 As Georgius
de Hungaria noted, most captured Christians also felt that
“God had abandoned them”.89 The interpretation of wars and
conquests as collective or sacred goals (for example, as in the
86
Georgius de Hungaria, Incipit, 85 and Tractatus, 240–241.
87
Ibn Khaldûn, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History. (Bollingen Series, 48.)
Vols. I–III. Translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal. (New York, London,
1958), chapter II/22 (cf. Ibn Khaldún, Bevezetés a történelembe (Al-muqaddima) [An
introduction to history]. Translated from the Arabic original and commentaries by
Róbert Simon. [Budapest, 1995], 159): “The vanquished always want to imitate the
victor in his distinctive mark(s), his dress, his occupation, [his religion] and all his
other conditions and customs. … Therefore, the vanquished can always be observed to
assimilate themselves to the victor in the use and style of dress, mounts, and weapons,
indeed, in everything.”
88
Michel Balivet, ‘Aux origines de l’islamisation des Balkans ottomans’ , Revue de Monde
Musulman et de la Méditerranée 66:4 (1992) 13.
89
– 44 –
legend of the “golden apple”) largely contributed to reinforcing

social cohesion.90
Jihad
There are recurrent disputes in Ottoman scholarly literature

on the possible role of the doctrine of jihad in the Ottoman
expansion. To this day, many believe that it was one of the most
important motives and even ultimate cause of the creation and
ascendancy of the empire.91 While I think this is an exaggeration,
I must modify my earlier position and acknowledge that the
religious duty of jihad was an important element in Ottoman state
ideology, one that was not used exclusively for the subsequent
justification and sanctification of secular wars. I cannot expand
further here, but I would stress that the decisive circles of the
Ottoman Empire interpreted jihad for a long time similarly to
Molla Hüsrev, who summarised it in his “manual” written in the
1470s (and used in medreses and kadı courts for centuries).92 His
90
Fodor, ‘Ungarn und Wien’ , 81–98.
91
For a thorough historiographic review, see Kafadar, Between, 29–59. See further
Lowry, The Nature, esp. 1–13 (Lowry argues strongly against the jihad/gaza theory,
even its “moderate” version as formulated by Kafadar) and Lindner, Explorations in
Ottoman Prehistory, 1–14.
92
Molla Husrev, Kaynaklarıyla Büyük İslam Fıkıhı – Gurer ve Dürer Tercümesi (İslâm
Fıkhı ve Hukûku). Mütercimi: Arif Erkan. Vol. II. (Istanbul, 1979), 3–42. It is
important to note that the fourteenth-century text published by Tekin, which is written
in simple Turkish summing up the gaza for the ordinary people, perfectly harmonizes
with Molla Husrev’s (and the ulema’s) concept of jihad with the exception of a few
tenets (e.g. the question of the fifth), so it seems that there was no great difference
between the popular and orthodox concepts of the holy war. In some of his writings
Colin Imber asserted the contrary (see, for example, his ‘Ideals and Legitimation in
Early Ottoman History’ , in Kunt – Woodhead [eds.], Süleyman the Magnificent and
His Age, 138–153, esp. 141–146), but later on he subscribed to the above view. See
Colin Imber, ‘What Does a Ghazi Actually Mean?’ , in Çigdem Balım-Harding – Colin
Imber (eds.), The Balance of Truth. Essays in Honour of Prof. Geoffrey Lewis. (Istanbul,
2000), 165–178. Idem, ‘Fiqh for Beginners. An Anatolian Text on Jihād’ , in G. R.
Hawting – J. A. Mojaddedi – A. Samely (eds.), Studies in Islamic and Middle Eastern
Texts and Traditions in Memory of Norman Calder. (Oxford, 2000), 137–148.
– 45 –
conception did not differ in essentially from that of classic Sunni

orthodoxy, its main tenets being: 1. Jihad is “religious practice”
and “worship” (ibadet), and as such it is compulsory (vacib) like
the other rituals (the five fundamental obligations) constituting
Islam. In normal cases, jihad is incumbent on the society as a
whole, and where there is great danger everyone is personally
obliged to take part. Abandoning it is a sin, and so peace is an
abnormal state as it means the suspension of jihad. 2. The aim
of jihad is “exalting the word of Allah” (ila-i kelimetullah), the
strengthening of religion and the enforcement of religious law
(şeriat). Jihad is punishment for unbelieving, whereby the infidels
are servants of the Muslims and their goods are the goods of
Muslims. A religious war can also be waged against Muslims to
ward off domestic chaos or rebellion. 3. Jihad is not simply a war
or state of conflict; it is much more: an all-embracing principle
of organisation that determines taxation, land ownership and
the position of religious minorities, etc. after a conquest.93
The “gazi ideology”, regarded by some scholars as a specific
feature of the Ottoman Empire,94 did not represent a unique,
novel interpretation of jihad, even if opinions may vary on the
question of supreme authority. As Şinasi Tekin pointed out, the
offensive war launched in the name of the religious community
was called gaza (the participants were gazis) in the Ottoman
Empire, while the defensive war binding on all individually was
called jihad (the general mobilisation it implied was called nefir-i
am). This distinction, in effect for a long time, precisely tallies
with the concepts farz kifaya and farz ayn of Islamic religious
law.95 One must look elsewhere for Ottoman specificities. One
93
Cf. Colin Imber, Ebu’s-su‘ud. The Islamic Legal Tradition. (Edinburgh, 1997), 68–69.
94
This position, which is mistaken in my view, is also taken by James Turner Johnson,
The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. (Pennsylvania, 1997), 151–157.
95
Tekin, ‘Gazilik Tarikası’ , 140–143. The only deviation may be that some also call the
war against Muslims hindering the holy war farz ayn. Cf. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Osmanlı
– 46 –
peculiarity is that from the mid–sixteenth century we see a

disruption of conceptual consistency with the offensive war
also being called jihad and the required (personal, material)
contribution also being interpreted as farz ayn. This seems
to have been linked with the consolidation of orthodoxy and
the growing sunnitisation of the empire and reduction in the
fighting zeal of society.96 Another feature is that jihad, as the
collective “religious practice” of society, took shape in spectacular
communal prayers. While the warriors were brandishing their
weapons against the foe on the battlefield, the population left at
home supported the fighters and performed their duties to God
in the camis and mosques through ritual prayers of supplication
(dua, hacet namazı, tazarru) under the guidance of the religious
leaders.97 Although not everyone took part in these large collective
events with full enthusiasm, yet it is incontestable that – at
least until the end of the seventeenth century – the majority
of the Ottoman state and society regarded the war against
Christianity as a religious war, practising and experiencing it
as such ritually. As Georgius de Hungaria wrote: “They try to
defend their sect with swords and weapons ... instead of logical
arguments and reasoning. They do so because, as they claim,
Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.–17. Yüzyıllar). (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,

60.) (İstanbul, 1998), 101–102.
96
Pál Fodor, ‘A terjeszkedés ideológiái az Oszmán Birodalomban [The ideologies of
expansion in the Ottoman Empire]’ , in Idem, A szultán és az aranyalma. Tanulmányok
az oszmán-török történelemről [The sultan and the golden apple. Studies in Ottoman
history]. (Budapest, 2001), 173. Viorel Panaite argues similarly (The Ottoman Law of
War and Peace: The Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers. [East European Monographs,
DLXII.] [New York, 2000], 93–94), but he dates this change to the great wars at the
end of the seventeenth century. In my cited article I mention an example from 1571.
97
The relevant data are included in my forthcoming study: The Doctrine of Jihad in the
Fifteenth and Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Empire. Cf. Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan, 66–
67. My conclusions support, and even verify in a general sense, what Barbara Flemming
has found about the sultans’ ritual prayers (mainly on the basis of narrative sources):
‘The Sultan’s Prayer before Battle’ , in Colin Heywood – Colin Imber (eds.), Studies in
Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage. (Istanbul, 1994), 63–75.
– 47 –
they have been ordered to do so by their law.”98 It is wrong to pit

this position against the stance of some (often criticised at the
time) that regarded the holy war as an opportunity for looting.
The two complemented, rather than opposed, one another.
Indeed, pillaging was a concomitant and legitimate act of jihad,
provided that the rules of distribution were observed. When,
therefore, the rulers encouraged the population to take part in
the wars called gaza and jihad by promising prospective spoils,
they acted in a perfectly legitimate manner, in consideration of
the interests of religion, state and individual alike.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND HUNGARY:

THE FIRST PHASE
Neither the aforementioned factors, nor the fifteenth-century

Ottoman political and military realities leave any doubt that the
Porte attacked Hungary with the aim of occupying its territory.99
This is indisputable even though we have just one piece of
indirect information about the Ottoman state’s intentions in
this regard. It is a fictitious story that demands our attention
because it stems from the times prior to the Ottoman conquest,
from the turn of the sixteenth century, and contains political
plans for the future in the form of prophecies (thus presumably
it does not project events that had already taken place onto the
past with legitimising intentions, a frequent device in Turkish
sources).
The anonymous chronicle states that, in 1481, fishermen
caught in the Danube the sword that had been dropped in by
a man named Byzantin (the son of the legendary builder of

98
On the Ottoman advance, see Szakály, ‘Phases of Turco–Hungarian Warfare’ , 65–111.

99
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1481, passim.
– 48 –
Byzantium) during his flight. It had an inscription that no one

could decipher, so the Hungarian king gifted it to the envoy of
Sultan Bayezid II. A man mastering Syriac in the sultan’s court
deciphered the inscription and the identity of its owner became
known. When Sultan Bayezid learnt about it, he said: “Praised
be God, my deceased father conquered the town of Islambol
[Istanbul], and the sword of Şeddad has come to me from the
province of Ungurus. So it can be hoped that by this sword it
[Hungary] will be my property by the grace of Allah – may he
be exalted! –, or my sons will occupy the land of Ungurus.”100
The leaders of fifteenth-century Hungary were presumably
well aware of the ultimate goal of the menacing great power in
their neighbourhood, even without knowing this story, which
was perhaps just one of many. What could they do to forestall
the danger? Reviewing the possibilities of the age, one may glean
seven kinds of measure that could be applied alternately and in
different combinations.
1. Organising or supporting crusades. Such endeavours include
the battle of Nikopol (1396), the “long campaign” (1443–44),
the defence of Nándorfehérvár/Belgrade (1456), joining the
League of Cambrai (1510) and the lasting cooperation with
Venice and Poland. The final balance sheet of these endeavours
is disastrous for the Hungarians. In the early sixteenth century,
mainly after the Venetian–Ottoman and Polish–Ottoman
compromises, crusades were ruled out as a possible tool.101
2. Offensive campaigns in the Balkans. Several such actions
took place during the first half of Sigismund of Luxemburg’s
100
Friedrich Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken. Vol. I. (Breslau, 1922), 88,
Vol. II. (Leipzig, 1925), 117–118.
101
Cf. Carl Göllner, ‘Zur Problematik der Kreuzzüge und Türkenkriege im 16.
Jahrhundert’ , Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes 13 (1975) 97–115. An excellent
summary of the events in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with relation to the
“Turkish question”: Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571).
Vols. I–IV. (Philadephia, 1976–1984).
– 49 –
– 50 –
reign (1387–1437), but with the weakening of the Hungarian

state, the campaigns decreased. The last significant, but sporadic,
attempts are linked with János Hunyadi. Subsequently, there
were only small-scale and occasional (sometimes revenging)
raids.102
3. Building out buffer states (ring of vassals) beyond Hungary’s
southern and south-eastern frontiers. Such attempts were
variably successful, but by the latter half of the fifteenth century,
all the buffer states except for the north-western parts of Bosnia
had fallen under Ottoman domination or influence (Serbia:
1459, southern Bosnia: 1463–64, Wallachia and Moldavia:
middle and last third of the century).103
4. Transformation of the military organisation and the frontier
defence. Major and lasting results were achieved by organising
and continuously reforming the defences of the southern
borders, which began during Sigismund’s reign and went on
until the battle of Mohács (1526). The central elements of the
defensive system included:104
a) The nobility’s participation in fighting, extending the“noble
insurrection” beyond the borders of the coontry, organising the
“militia portalis” (1397) and employing professional mercenaries
(hussars, vojniks, frontier castle garrisons).
b) Constructing a double line of border fortresses in the
south with Nándorfehérvár/Belgrade at its centre. The project
also began under Sigismund (in1427) and culminated during the
reign of Matthias Corvinus (around 1476–79) when, including
102
So far the most systematic description of the Ottoman–Hungarian wars is Szakály,
‘Phases of Turco–Hungarian Warfare’ , 65–111.
103
Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans, 548 ff. Panaite, The Ottoman Law, 156–168.
104
Géza Pálffy, ‘The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against
the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)’ , in Dávid – 
Fodor (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs, 7–13. András Kubinyi, ‘The
Battle of Szávaszentdemeter–Nagyolaszi (1523). Ottoman Advance and Hungarian
Defence on the Eve of Mohács’ , in Dávid – Fodor (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians, and
Habsburgs, 72–88.
– 51 –
Transylvania, three centres of command were created. In 1521

attempts were made to modernise the network (replacing the
noblemen’s troops with mercenaries), but for lack of money
the previous system was restored in 1523. The network of
border fortresses and the hinterland were capable of holding
up the Ottoman attacks, but by the early sixteenth century the
situation had become critical. A broad strip of the border area
had been devastated. The much-weakened Hungarian forces
were forced back to their lines, except for in Jajce, Bosnia, which
was encircled by Ottoman fortresses. Poorly armed, they faced
the threat of an Ottoman invasion that was looming ever larger.
5. Concluding peaces or armistices. From the early fifteenth
century onwards, the Hungarian leadership regularly signed
short-term peace agreements with the Ottoman Empire,
whenever such ambitions coincided with those of the sultan’s
court. The agreement of 1483 is often regarded as the starting
point, but in fact some thirty truces there had earlier been signed
by representatives of the two sides.105 However, these were
treugas, that is, temporary cease-fires and not real agreements.
Though they forestalled imperial campaigns, they usually
offered no protection against raiders in the border zone. The
banate of Srebernik, for example, also fell during such a period in
1512. It did not help that during the reign of Matthias (1458–
1490) for political reasons Ottoman troops were permitted by
treaty to pass through Hungary and thus cause destruction in
the Austrian territories. On the eve of the battle of Mohács the
general opinion in Central Europe was that an agreement with
the Porte was the surest way to perdition.106
105
See Sándor Papp, ‘Hungary and the Ottoman Empire’ , in Zombori (ed.), Fight against
the Turk, 37–89.
106
Ferenc Szakály, A mohácsi csata [The battle of Mohács]. (Budapest, 1975), 110–111.
András Kubinyi, ‘A magyar állam belpolitikai helyzete Mohács előtt [The domestic
political situation of the Hungarian state before Mohács]’ , in Lajos Rúzsás – Ferenc
Szakály (eds.), Mohács. Tanulmányok a mohácsi csata 450. évfordulója alkalmából
– 52 –
6. Cooperation in, or unification, of Central Europe. Hungary’s

leaders were quick to realise that the country was unable to
defend itself alone. Cooperation among the states of the region
and a union of forces were mentioned as options quite early on.
The first attempt was the Hungarian–Polish personal union
(1440–44).107 King Matthias took steps to build an empire
under the House of Hunyadi, but after his death only two
of the rival dynasties remained on the scene: the Habsburgs
and the Jagiellonians. At the turn of the sixteenth century, the
Jagiellonians had the upper hand, but although they acquired
the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia in addition to that of
Poland, this entailed no palpable advantages for Hungary.108 As
mentioned earlier, the Poles gave up fighting against the Turks
after they suffered a defeat and when they became encircled by
a coalition composed of the Habsburgs, the Teutonic Knights
and Russia. Consequently, after Venice’s change of strategy,
Hungary was left alone to face the Porte.109 The outbreak of
the Italian war and the new rivalry for the supremacy in Europe
added to Hungary’s isolation.
[Mohács. Studies on the occasion of the 450th anniversary of the battle of Mohács].
(Budapest, 1986), 65.
107
Krzysztof Baczkowski, ‘Idea jagiellońska a stosunki polsko–węgerskie w XV wieku’ , in
Idem, Polska i jej sasiedzi za Jagiellonów. (Kraków, 2012), 131–144.
108
Cf. Krzysztof Baczkowski, ‘Die jagiellonische Versuch einer Großreichbildung um
1500 und die türkische Bedrohung’ , in Ferdinand Seibt – Winfried Eberhard (Hrsg.),
Europa 1500. Integrationsprozesse im Widerstreit. Staaten, Regionen, Personenverbände,
Christenheit. (Stuttgart, 1987), 433–444.
109
Marian Biskup, ‘Die polnische Diplomatie in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. und in den
Anfängen des 16. Jahrhunderts’ , Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 26 (1978)
171, 173–178. Ilona Czamańska, ‘Poland and Turkey in the First Half of the 16th
Century – Turning Points’ , in Zombori (ed.), Fight against the Turk, 91–101. Cf.
Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland–Lithuania: International
Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties
Followed by Annotated Documents. (The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage. Politics,
Society and Economy. Edited by Suraiya Faroqhi, Halil İnalcık and Boğaç Ergene. Vol.
47.) (Leiden, Boston, 2011), 21 ff.
– 53 –
7. Looking for eastern allies that might threaten the Ottomans

from behind. In Central European diplomacy, Sigismund was the
first Hungarian king to employ this device when he sent envoys
to Kara Yülük, chief of the Akkoyunlu federation. Later other
European powers followed suite, but apart from the Karaman–
Hungarian cooperation in the 1440s, these connections brought
about no relief for threatened Hungary.110
By the turn of the sixteenth century, the balance of power had
tilted massively in favour of the Ottomans. Had they launched a
frontal attack then, they would have been able to defeat medieval
Hungary in 1510 or 1514 rather than in 1526. The delay was
primarily due to the advent of Safavid Iran and to Ottoman
domestic movements that were closely linked with the Iranian
(kızılbaş) threat.111 It was vital for the Ottoman state to respond
adequately to this challenge in politics, religion and legitimacy,
as its power position in the Near East and its role within Islam
were at stake. The handling of this issue – the war against Iran
and the ensuing conflicts – gave a respite to weakened Hungary.
Although ultimately it could not evade Ottoman conquest, it
was tremendously lucky on one count. During Sultan Selim’s
(1512–1520) engagement in the Near East the dynastic
strife in Central Europe was settled conclusively in favour of
the Habsburgs.112 With marriage contracts, the dynasty laid
the foundations for its subsequent intervention in Hungary.
110
On the eastern relations of the Hungarians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
see Lajos Tardy, Beyond the Ottoman Empire. 14th–16th Century Hungarian Diplomacy
in the East. (Studia Uralo-Altaica, 13.) Translated by János Boris. (Szeged, 1978). Cf.
Barbara von Palombini, Bündniswerben Abendländischer Mächte um Persien 1453–
1600. (Freiburger Islamstudien, Bd. 1). (Wiesbaden, 1968).
111
Hanna Sohrweide, ‘Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkung auf die
Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert’ , Der Islam 41 (1965) 95–223.
112
Zsuzsanna Hermann, Az 1515. évi Habsburg–Jagelló szerződés. Adalék a Habsburgok
magyarországi uralmának előtörténetéhez [The Habsburg–Jagiellonian agreement of
1515. Addenda to the prehistory of the Habsburgs’ rule in Hungary]. (Értekezések
a történeti tudományok köréből. Új sorozat, 21.) (Budapest, 1961), esp. 47–53.
Hermann Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich und Europa an der
– 54 –
Indeed, in the early 1520s, it took control of the Croatian

frontier defence in place of the Hungarian king.113 Thus, when
the Ottomans deployed all their might against Central Europe,
they were encountered not only by Hungarians in Hungary.
Had the country failed to get this respite, it would probably
have suffered a greater territorial loss, since the Habsburgs were
far less prepared to withstand an offensive at that time than
after Mohács. In fact, the aforementioned constellation was
upheld throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the
existence of the Safavid state by itself, without close or direct
European–Persian alliances, was an enormous help to Hungary
and Austria, as the offensives in the east interrupted the advance
of the Ottomans in Central Europe at crucial moments (1533,
mid–1540s, 1603, etc.).114
But there is another side to the coin: while nascent Central
Europe may have gained a temporary breathing space, the
prospective foe gained unprecedented strength. After defeating
the Safavids, Sultan Selim subjugated Syria, Palestine and
Egypt. These new provinces broght the empire huge financial
benefits in the short run with their profuse human and material
resources and they deepened the Islamic character of the
empire, as for the first time Muslims formed a majority of the
population.115
Wende zur Neuzeit. Band IV. Gründung des habsburgischen Weltreiches. Lebensabend
und Tod 1508–1519. (Wien, 1981), 154–220.
113
Pálffy, ‘The Origins’ , 14–15.
114
Fodor, ‘The Impact’ , 41–51.
115
Heath Lowry, ‘The ‘Soup Muslims’ of the Balkans: Was There a ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’
Ottoman Empire?’ , Osmanlı Araştırmaları 36 (2010) 97–134. Idem, ‘Early Ottoman
Period’ , 12–13.
– 55 –
THE ACCESSION OF SÜLEYMAN

AND THE WESTERN TURN IN OTTOMAN
POLITICS
In the early hours of September 22, 1520, Sultan Selim died and
his throne was taken by his only son, Süleyman I. This news was
met with relief both in the Ottoman capital and provinces and in
the royal courts of Europe. Both the Ottoman subjects and their
Christian opponents looked forward to the new sultan’s rule,
but they did so for different reasons. In the Ottoman Empire,
there was rare agreement among members of the elite and the
broad masses of subjects concerning the need to terminate Selim’s
maniacal eastern policy; they could hardly wait to see the end
of the wars fought against fellow Muslims and the associated
domestic discord. For their part, the Europeans, who had greatly
feared – for no reason, as it turned out – the warlike Selim, felt
that Süleyman’s enthronement would mark the beginning of a
period of peaceful co-existence between Christendom and Islam.
This hope seemed to be well founded, having been nurtured
by Venetian diplomacy – so well versed in the affairs of the
Ottoman Empire. In October 1520, Tomaso Contarini, bailo in
Istanbul, reported to Venice (the Venetians then forwarded his
conclusion to the major European courts) that in all likelihood
the new sultan would be peaceful, as “he has just and perfect
attributes”. On hearing the news, Pope Leo X stated with relief
that in the future Christians could feel secure.116 In early 1521
the Venetians dispatched further reports of the sultan’s peaceful
nature, but within a few months it became clear that the city-
state’s diplomats had made a fatal miscalculation. In the very
Alberto Tenenti, ‘La formation de l’image de Soliman à Venise (1520–1530 env.)’ , in

116
Gilles Veinstein (publ.), Soliman le Magnifique et son temps. Süleyman the Magnificent
and His Time. Acte du Colloque de Paris. Galeries Nationales de Grand Palais. 7–10 mars
1990. (Paris, 1992), 43.
– 56 –
first year of his reign, Süleyman implemented sweeping changes

in Ottoman policy. He ended the eastern campaigns and turned
all his attention to Central Europe. In place of the standing
war that had been fought by Ottoman and Hungarian border
forces for much of the preceding fifty or sixty years, the new
sultan initiated a series of attacks by imperial troops. It seemed
as though Süleyman wished to return to the era of the great
European conquests in the fifteenth century. The initial strikes
were directed against Hungary, but by the end of the decade
the conflict had spread to the border regions of neighbouring
Austria.
There is no consensus among historians concerning Süley
man’s military efforts and his strategic ideas. Scholars once
regarded the sultan as a deliberate conqueror and aggressor,
while the Hungarians and Habsburgs were seen as the defensive
party.117 More recently, an increasing number of historians have
expressed doubts, arguing that it is difficult to perceive deliberate
planning on the part of Süleyman.118 Many have questioned
whether he really wanted to occupy Central and Western Europe
and whether he can be described as a ruler with an ardent wish
to conquer because, clearly, this is very difficult to prove. Several
scholars have probed into the issue of the “radius of action”,
meaning that allegedly Central Europe (Hungary) lay outside
the area in which the Ottomans could conduct successful wars
in view of the transport and technical conditions of the era.119
Others have tended to infer from concrete political and military
117
For instance, Nicolae Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches. Nach den Quellen
dargestellt. Zweiter Band (bis 1538). (Gotha, 1909), 350, 356. Cf. İnalcık, The Ottoman
Empire, 34–36.
118
See for example, Káldy-Nagy, ‘Suleimans Angriff auf Europa’ , 165. Jean Bérenger,
Histoire de l’Empire des Habsbourgs. (Paris, 1990), 209–219.
119
William H. McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier 1500–1800. (Chicago, London, 1964),
41–42, 50. Vernon J. Parry, ‘The Reign of Sulaimān the Magnificent’ , in Cook (ed.), A
History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730, 84–85. Perjés, The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom
of Hungary, 78–80.
– 57 –
measures and a few sources that Süleyman did not originally

seek to conquer Hungary (except for making it his vassal). In
their view, it was the Habsburgs who forced him to do so.120
According to a recent hypothesis, the incessant fight against the
“infidels” and Charles V representing the Christian world, was
merely a (self ) image created by the political propaganda of the
sultan’s court, a legitimising ideology in which the “ideal ruler”
became the “militant sultan”.121 The most extreme variant of this
conception claims that Süleyman had no elaborate strategy for
Europe; he did not want to conquer it but merely responded to
the “provocations” of Hungarians and Habsburgs.122 Meanwhile,
the sultan’s opponent, Charles V has also become a victim of
similar “deheroisation”. A recent interpreter of the emperor’s
policies declared that the fight against Ottoman expansion, the
halting of Süleyman, and the incessant fight between the two
religions was only a myth, a false picture created by propaganda,
just like in the case of the Ottoman ruler: “During the reign of
Charles V imperial propaganda created an image of the emperor
as a Christian monarch who confronted the Ottoman sultan and
stopped his advance through Europe and the Mediterranean.
The monarch himself personally contributed to this myth in
his Memorias when he affirmed that ‘the Turk who wanted to
120
Gilles Veinstein, ‘La politique hongroise de Sultan Süleymân et d’Ibrâhîm pacha
à travers deux lettres de 1534 au roi Sigismond de Pologne’’ , in Jean-Louis Bacqué-
Grammont – İlber Ortaylı – Emeri van Donzel (eds.), CIÉPO … VII. Sempozyumu
Bildirileri. Peç: 7–11 Eylül 1986. (Ankara, 1994), 333–380.
121
Cf. Imber’s and Woodhead’s cited studies (‘Perspectives on Süleyman’ , 164–190, esp.
167 ff ).
122
Murphey, ‘Suleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary’ , 199: “All his interventions
north of the Danube during the first two decades of his reign came in response to
provocations emanating from neighbouring states.” In Murphey’s view, the rule of the
Ottomans in the Balkans depended on the sultan’s protection of the local Orthodox
Christian subjects from the danger of Latin domination. Still, a frontal attack against
the Latin West would have alienated them and so the sultan could not risk this (ibid.).
One may ask: if the Orthodox subjects were happy to be protected, would they not
have been even happier to see the Latins put down conclusively? Murphey advanced
similar views in his Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700. (London, 1999), 1–11.
– 58 –
approach Vienna … returned to Constantinople with great loss

... this was the beginning and from here on out his strength
would decrease.’ Perpetuating 16th-century propaganda,
current Spanish historiography continues to sustain the thesis
that the Spanish monarchy and the Ottoman Empire were in
constant confrontation during the first half of the 16th century.
Nevertheless, in the final balance of his kingdom, the triumph
of the eastern over western power on the continent and sea,
as well as the limited amount of warfaring that actually went
on between these two Mediterranean sovereigns, becomes
evident.”123
If the historian were to take all these new statements or
opinions seriously, he would clearly run into trouble. He would
have two protagonists fighting wars throughout their lives as
monarchs with claims to “universal sovereignty”, organising
armies and fleets year by year, and spending incredible amounts
of money, only because – in terms of this interpretation – they
misunderstood each other’s intentions. Or, to stay with the
Ottoman side, he would have to accept that an Ottoman ruler,
and quite an able one, too, marched from Istanbul to Buda and
Vienna several times in response to “provocations” (1526, 1529,
1541, 1543), or, as has been recently claimed, that he marched
to the Austrian border with immense efforts merely to show off
his wealth, might and regalia in military parades on the way.124
What shoud be the position of the historian who is not
willing to regard the two mightiest rulers of the age as fools? As
123
Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, ‘Charles V and the Ottoman War from the Spanish
Point of View’ , Eurasian Studies 1:2 (2002) 161.
124
Gábor Ágoston, ‘Ideologie, Propaganda und politischer Pragmatismus. Die Aus
einandersetzung der osmanischen und habsburgischen Großmächte und die mittel
europäische Konfrontation’ , in Martina Fuchs – Teréz Oborni – Gábor Újváry (Hgg.),
Kaiser Ferdinand I. Ein mitteleuropäischer Herrscher. (Münster, 2005), 207–233. Idem,
‘Information, Ideology’ , 75–103. Cf. Murphey, ‘Süleyman I and the Conquest of
Hungary’ , 214–216 and Şahin, Empire and Power, 82.
– 59 –
a scholar of Ottoman history, he will obviously adhere to the

facts and evaluate the main events, trends, internal and external
conditions of the 1520s, a decisive period in his judgment, while
seeking to draw conclusions from the findings. For a start, it is
to be noted that in the family politics of the Habsburgs, the
anti-Turkish struggle was still considered a secondary issue,
a matter of less importance than the religious struggle against
the Protestants and the power struggle with France. Any action
taken by the eastern branch – i.e. King Ferdinand I – had to
accommodate these two factors.125 This precluded any initiative
on the Ottoman front. For this reason it was the events of 1526
and of 1529 particularly that made Charles V realise he had to
pay more attention to the eastern part of their empire. Neither
before nor after Mohács was the Hungarian state in a position
to launch an offensive against the Ottomans.126 Since the
1520s was replete with Ottoman–Hungarian and Ottoman–
Habsburg frontal encounters, these must have been initiated by
Süleyman because he alone was capable of such undertakings.
But what were the goals of the Ottoman ruler?
First of all, it follows from the discussion in the first part
of the study that the empire could not afford peace on all its
frontiers in the long term – or even in the medium term because
this would have upset the interior balance. Upon his accession,
Süleyman was facing dangerous enemies on four different
fronts; offensive wars could be fought in four directions.
On the Iranian front, a source of concern was the
failure – despite his father’s victory at the battle of Chaldiran
(1514) – to destroy Shah Ismail I and his state. It was to be
125
Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918. (Berkeley, Los Angeles,
London), 1980, 34–36.
126
Yet such irrealistic plans were also forged on the eve of Mohács. For the last attempt
in 1522–23, see István Zombori, ‘The Jagiello–Habsburg Attempt at War against the
Ottomans in 1523. Based on Chancellor K. Szydłowiecki’s Diary’ , in Zombori (ed.),
Fight against the Turk, 147–153.
– 60 –
expected that Ismail, having consolidated his power, would

seize the initiative once again, drawing support from the kızılbaş
groups. The concerns strengthened when, in late 1520 and early
1521, reports of rebellions were received from the eastern half
of the empire. The second such report arrived amid preparations
for the campaign in Hungary, and it was beyond doubt that the
rebels had received support from Shah Ismail.127
Ever since his humiliation at Chaldiran, the Safavid ruler
had faced Selim’s threats in the absence of a significant military
force. His only option had been to counter his weakness
by employing clever tactics, by causing disturbances and by
strengthening political relations.128 From 1516, Ismail had made
great efforts to obtain firearms and to keep showing them off on
the Ottoman border.
In all likelihood this lessened the enthusiasm of the Ottoman
soldiers for a new Persian campaign. Clear evidence of this came
in the spring of 1518 when the forces were returning from Egypt.
Their lord, Selim, expressed a desire to attack the shah, but
coming from the fields of Marc Dabik, where two years earlier
the Mamluk sultan had been defeated, they (mostly janissaries)
127
Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, ‘Études Turco–Safavides, III. Notes et documents sur
la révolte de Şâh Velî b. Şeyh Celâl’ , Archivum Ottomanicum 7 (1982) 5–69. Idem, ‘Şah
İsmail ve Canberdi Gazali İsyanı’ , Erdem 5:13 (1989) 227–237.
128
For the following, see also Sohrweide, Der Sieg der Safaviden, 95–223. Selâhattin
Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim. (Ankara, 1969). Adel Allouche, The Origins and
Development of the Ottoman–Safavid Conflict (906–962/1500–1555). (Islamkundliche
Untersuchungen, 91.) (Berlin, 1983). Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans,
les Safavides et leurs voisins. Contribution à l’histoire des relations internationales dans
l’Orient islamique de 1514 à 1524. (Istanbul, 1987). Idem, ‘XVI. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında
Osmanlılar ve Safevîler’ , in Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu’na Armağan. (İstanbul, 1991),
205–215. Idem, ‘Études Turco–Safavides, I. Notes sur le blocus du commerce iranien
par Selîm Ier’ , Turcica 6 (1975) 68–88. Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, ‘Le règne de Selīm
Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’Empire ottoman’ , Turcica 6 (1975)
34–48. Irène Melikoff, ‘Le problème kızılbaş’ , Turcica 6 (1975) 49–67. Hans-Joachim
Kissling, ‘Šâh Ismâ’îl Ier, la nouvelle route des Indes et les Ottomans’ , Turcica 6 (1975)
89–102. Feridun Emecen, Zamanın İskenderi, Şarkın Fatihi Yavuz Sultan Selim.
(İstanbul, 2010).
– 61 –
resisted his call, and so Selim was forced to set a course for
Istanbul rather than for Iran. In part because of the exhaustive
march of 1514 and in part because of the bitter memories of
the battle of Chaldiran, the janissaries, who six years earlier had
helped bring Selim to the throne, now prevented the realisation
of his dream – a final showdown with the shah.
For his part, Ismail sought out relations with the adversaries
of the Ottoman Empire: with the Knights of Rhodes (he would
have liked to acquire from them Murad, the son of Prince Cem,
the brother of Bayezid II who had died in European exile), with
the Portuguese (he had backed a trade agreement with them),
and with the European powers (he sought to persuade them to
launch a concerted attack). He also established good relations
with countries in the Caucasus (thus improving his supply lines),
and he did not shrink back from interfering behind the lines in
Selim’s own territory. Having guessed that the sultan’s military
preparations were directed against him, in the second half of
1519, he organised an uprising among his followers in Anatolia,
particularly in the province of Rum. On the date prescribed by
Ismail (February 5, 1520), Şah Veli bin Şeyh Celal unfurled
the flag of the uprising. In the end, however, Ismail abandoned
the rebels, who after several initial victories succumbed to the
onslaught of government troops. In late 1520 and early 1521,
despite a prior pledge of support, Ismail similarly let down the
rebel Caberdi Gazali in Syria. In withdrawing his support, Ismail
acted primarily to deny Selim a pretext for attack. A secondary
objective was to rescue the much-anticipated peace agreement.
After 1514 Selim rejected all attempts by Ismail to secure a
rapprochement. He even ordered the detention and subsequent
execution of the members of three delegations sent by Ismail.
Between 1518 and 1520, he provoked Ismail with a series of
outrageous actions to provide Ottoman public opinion with
a pretext for attack. Today we know that Canberdi initially
– 62 –
contacted Ismail with the consent of the sultan and even based
on his instructions; the planned “sham rebellion” was designed to
drag the shah into yet another war. After Selim’s death, however,
the experiment failed; Canberdi realised the time had come for
him to take an independent position.
Over time Selim’s total war against Iran gave rise to increas
ing resentment within the empire. The commercial blockade
introduced by him had caused enormous losses not only for
Iran but also for the Ottoman Empire’s subjects and treasury.
A growing number of people had fallen victim to the abuse
that surrounded the controls and confiscations. They did not
like how the merchants of Tabriz, Aleppo and Egypt had been
forced to come to Constantinople. The mood of the army and its
readiness for battle were matters of concern. The long campaigns
fought in remote places, the difficult terrain, the ‘dog-fight’ (köpek
savaşı) methods employed by the Persians (i.e. the scorched earth
tactics129 and the resultant food shortages), the depletion of the
military operating areas, the bravery of the kızılbaş forces, and
the reluctance of the soldiers to fight against fellow believers – all
these factors meant that in the east the authorities could rely less
and less on the soldiers who, in the areas plagued by clashes with
kızılbaş rebels, tended to switch allegiance or run off without
explanation. In his report of March 10, 1519, Bartolomeo
Contarini, the Venetian envoy, wrote for good reason that the
Ottoman soldiers had grown weary of the struggle against the
shah and would rather have resumed the battle against the
Hungarians who were more familiar to them.130
Unsurprisingly, therefore, one of Sultan Süleyman’s first
measures was to lift the commercial blockade of Iran (true, the
export of certain metals was still subject to permits). He then
129
Rhoads Murphey, ‘Süleyman’s Eastern Policy’ , in Halil İnalcık – Cemal Kafadar (eds.),
Süleymân the Second and His Time. (İstanbul, 1993), 233.
130
Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, 172.
– 63 –
released the merchants from Iran and the Arab countries who
had been forcibly resettled in the empire and returned assets
to merchants who had been deprived of their properties. The
political change required the Ottoman leadership to settle their
relationship with Ismail at least to a minimum extent. First and
foremost, the leaders needed to ensure that the shah would remain
passive when the campaigns against Hungary were launched. This
was achieved in part by ordering the Anatolian troops to deploy
to Central Anatolia under Ferhad Pasha’s command. In addition,
at Grand Vizier Piri Pasha’s behest (who had been a principal
spokesman for reconciliation even under Selim) and without
informing the kızılbaş leadership, the Ottomans sent envoys to
Tabriz with the task of making an ambiguous compromise offer
in order to delay any attack by the shah’s forces. As it turned
out, the fear of a Safavid attack was unwarranted; the shah’s
ministers had long awaited such an offer and were delighted to
confirm the Safavid court’s willingness to compromise. In late
1521, Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha, governor-general of Diyarbekir
and Selim’s one-time confidant, died. With the passing of this
implacable enemy of the kızılbaş, one of the biggest obstacles to
reconciliation was no more. After diplomatic preparations, the
details of which remain unknown, in September 1523 the envoy
of Shah Ismail, a man named Taceddin Hasan, arrived in Istanbul
bearing generous gifts. Ismail wished to express his condolences
on Selim’s death and congratulate Süleyman on his victories
at Belgrade and at Rhodes. At the negotiations the Ottoman
leaders allegedly demanded that the shah renounces Baghdad
and several Iranian territories. It seems nothing came of this, but
when the envoy left the Ottoman capital the two empires were
once again on speaking terms after a decade of hostility. On May
23, 1524, Shah Ismail passed away and his country, which he had
protected with great skill against its powerful enemies, fell into
complete anarchy following a power struggle between the various
– 64 –
kızılbaş tribes. Until 1528, Süleyman faced no problems with his

(still weak) Iranian neighbour. Accordingly, in the 1520s, with
the full support of the empire’s various actors, he could “steer the
reins of his victorious imperial campaign against the … accursed
Hungarians”131 while putting a solution to the “eastern question”
on hold.
The other front in the east was in the Red Sea and the
Indian Ocean with the Portuguese on the other side, who had
arrived there after going round the Cape of Good Hope at the
turn of the century. Having secured a foothold on the western
shores of India, the Portuguese made incursions into the Red
Sea, threatening Mecca and – more importantly – the Muslim
trading monopoly in the Indian Ocean.132 The inherent danger
was clear, especially in view of their contacts with Shah Ismail of
Iran; the Portuguese even planned to conclude an anti-Ottoman
and anti-Mamluk alliance.133 The Mamluks, the lords of the
holy cities, the overseers and main beneficiaries of the Muslim
pilgrimages and trade between Arabia and India, were less and
less able to withstand the Portuguese pressure and from 1507
they had to resort to Ottoman material aid. In this way the latter
became involved in the anti-Portuguese struggle, and after the
defeat of the Mamluks (1517) they took charge of protecting
the holy shrines of Islam and the Muslim, mainly Egyptian,
131
Feridun Ahmed Bey, Münşeatü’s-selatin. Vol. I. (İstanbul, 1274/18582), 547. Cf. József
Thúry, Török történetírók [Turkish chroniclers]. (Török–Magyarkori Történelmi
Emlékek. Második Osztály: Írók.) Vol. I. (Budapest, 1893), 379.
132
Charles R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825. (London, 1969), 1–47.
Salih Özbaran, ‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu. Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Ticâret
Yolları Üzerinde Türk–Portekiz Rekâbet ve İlişkileri’ , Tarih Dergisi 31 (1977[1978])
71–81. Most of Özbaran’s studies cited here can be found in Idem, Yemen’den
Basra’ya: Sınırdaki Osmanlı. (İstanbul, 2004). Cf. recently Casale, The Ottoman
Age of Exploration. For more on this book, see Soucek, ‘About the Ottoman Age of
Exploration’ , particularly 338–342, and my remarks in the introduction to the present
volume.
133
Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery.
(Albany, 1994), 45.
– 65 –
trade which was of decisive importance for them. Although

some have argued that the Ottomans conquered the Mamluk
Empire with the intention of using its territory as a launching
pad for their struggle for the domination of the Indian Ocean,134
it seems they did not feel strong enough for a maritime encounter
with the Portuguese. In the summer of 1525 Selman Reis, the
commander of the Ottoman fleet at Suez proposed an offensive
(claiming that the Portuguese could be defeated) in his report
to Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, but his suggestion was turned
down.135 The central government, so far as it was able to, reinforced
the Red Sea navy, set up a command at Suez, but it did not
venture out into the high seas, and was content with defending
the “inland sea” and its southern entrance near Yemen (not
always successfully). The leaders of the empire similarly backed
out of a clash with the Portuguese in the early 1530s when the
Red Sea navy was almost completely ready for an offensive on
the Indian Ocean.136 The reluctance of the Istanbul government
can probably be ascribed to two major factors: the extraordinary
costs (e.g. the perennial problem of obtaining and delivering
the wood necessary for ship-building) and the realisation that
the Ottoman (Mediterranean) naval technology lagged behind
that of the Portuguese, which rendered the outcome of a naval
encounter so uncertain.137 Until the Ottomans acquired new
134
Brummett, Ottoman Seapower, 111–121, esp. 120. The same is suggested by Casale,
The Ottoman Age, 25–29.
135
Michel Lesure, ‘Un document ottoman de 1525 sur l’Inde portugaise et les pays de
la Mer Rouge’ , Mare Luso-Indicum 3 (1976) 137–160. Cf. Salih Özbaran, ‘A Turkish
Report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean (1525)’ , Arabian
Studies 4 (1978) 81–88.
136
Salih Özbaran, ‘The Ottomans in Confrontation with the Portuguese in the Red Sea
after the Conquest of Egypt in 1517’ , in Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations. Annual
1986. (İstanbul, 1986), 213.
137
For the differences in technology and management, see Kirti N. Chaudhuri, Trade
and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to
1750. (Cambridge, 1985), 121–159. Colin H. Imber, ‘The Navy of Süleyman the
Magnificent’ , Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980) 222–227. Salih Özbaran, ‘Ottoman
– 66 –
outlets to the Indian Ocean through their occupation of Iraq

(1533–35) and Basra (1546), they did not change their basically
defensive maritime policy.138
The third front was in the Mediterranean, stretching in a
north-south direction from the eastern shore of the Adriatic
Sea to Egypt, with a few extensions in North Africa. The
Ottomans had learnt from the example of Byzantium that an
empire with its centre in Constantinople and with various parts
separated by sea, could not cope without an effective navy. This
was particularly true given the long-distance trade conducted
through its territories. The demands of mainland conquests
(the transportation of troops and provisions), the control of
the movements of enemy ships and the defence of an extensive
coastline all required a fleet. Sultan Bayezid II (1481–1512)
had established the largest fleet of the Mediterranean by the
turn of the century, entrusting its command to pirates, who
were regarded as the best seamen of the age. Pirate competence
coupled with the economic might of the Ottomans yielded an
enormous harvest in 1499: in the battle of Lepanto the imperial
fleet defeated the earlier invincible Venetian fleet (contributing
to the transformation of the Republic’s policies).139
Naval Policy in the South’ , in Kunt – Woodhead (eds.), Süleyman the Magnificent and
His Age, 64. İdris Bostan, Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı Gemileri. (İstanbul, 2005), 103 ff.
138
On events of the later period, see Muhammad Yakub Mughul, Kanunî Devri.
(İstanbul, 1987), 137–206. Salih Özbaran, ‘The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese
in the Persian Golf 1534–1581’ , Journal of Asian History 6 (1972) 56–74. Idem,
‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu’ , 92–146. Idem, ‘Ottoman Naval Policy’ ,
55–70. Halil İnalcık, ‘The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300–1600’ , in
Halil İnalcık – Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman
Empire, 1300–1914. (Cambridge, 1994), 325–340. Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu’nun Güney Siyaseti: Habeş Eyaleti. (İstanbul, 1974), 1–42. Soucek,
‘About the Ottoman Age of Exploration’ , 325–342.
139
Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborn Empire in the Age of the
Oceanic Discoveries, 1453–1525’ , The American Historical Review 75 (1970) 1904–
1906.
– 67 –
After 1500 the Ottomans had no one to fear. They ruled the
Levant and the Black Sea, with the latter gradually becoming
an inland sea.140 For the time being, however, they used their
naval force mainly to ensure the trading routes and to defend
themselves against the Hospitallers on Rhodes and against local
pirates privateering in coastal waters.141 In the 1510s Sultan
Selim continued his father’s endeavours by reinforcing the fleet;
he relied on it heavily in his campaigns in the Near East during
which he united the western Islamic lands, elevating his dynasty
to the rank of supreme power in Islam. The appearance of the
Portuguese, as mentioned earlier, also spurred the Ottomans to
deploy their navy in the Near Eastern and Red Sea zone.
After the conquest of Egypt (1517), it became gradually
unavoidable for the Porte to deal with the west of the
Mediterranean, where a new conflict was taking shape around
1510. While the Ottomans were engaged in the Near East, the
rising Spanish monarchy shifted the Christian–Muslim front to
North Africa after their Iberian victories. Within the Spanish
leadership there were two conflincting conceptions. Cardinal
Ximénez de Cisneros (supported by Queen Isabella) envisioned
a North African, Spanish–Mauritanian empire, while King
Ferdinand judged it sufficient to construct a defensive system
restricted to the shores and directed against the Saracens, because
his priority was domination of the Western Mediterranean and
Southern Italy.142 Ferdinand’s conception gained the upper hand,
and from 1505 the so-called presidio system, a defensive line, was
gradually erected by seizing or building seaside fortifications
140
For a recent, different view on the status of the Black Sea, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk,
‘Inner Lake or Frontier? The Ottoman Black Sea in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries’ , in Faruk Bilici – Ionel Candea – Anca Popescu (eds.), Enjeux politiques,
économiques et militaires en Mer Noire (XIVe–XXIe siècles). Études à la mémoire de
Mihail Guboglu. (Braïla, 2007), 125–139.
141
Brumett, Ottoman Seapower, 107.
142
John H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1496–1716. (London, 1963), 53–54.
– 68 –
and garrisons in the Maghrib. In response to the Spanish

expansion, the North African population composed of Moorish
refugees, Christian slaves and local elements established closer
links and turned to organised piracy, which had previously been
pursued only as a secondary occupation. In the 1510s a local
war evolved from clashes between the Spaniards and the pirate
communities of Jerba, Algiers and Tunis, etc. From 1515 Oruc
and Hayreddin, the two Barbarossa brothers, took over the
command of the fighting and occupied Algiers the next year.
By the end of the 1510s the local war had almost escalated
into a global Christian–Muslim conflict. Hayreddin, who
succeeded his brother killed in 1518, realised that he was
not powerful enough to confront either the Spaniards or the
increasingly jealous Hafsid dynasty of Tunis and his other local
ennemies, so he turned to Istanbul for help, where their envoys
had been received favourably a few years earlier.143 Until recently
it was thought that in response to Hayreddin’s request for
assistance, Sultan Selim had appointed him governor of Algiers
and had then reinforced his position by sending artillery and
two thousand janissaries (who were granted the same privileges
as their fellows in Istanbul) and by giving general authorisation
for volunteers to go to the Maghrib, whereupon the pirate chief
had formally accepted Ottoman suzerainty by having Selim’s
name read in the Friday sermons and minting coins in his
name.144 However, as a recent study has pointed out, Sultan
Selim was intitially reluctant to give a helping hand because
he was preoccupied with preparations for a campaign against
Rhodes. So probably it was not until the spring of 1521 that an
emissary of Sultan Süleyman arrived in the Maghrib, bringing
143
Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-
African Frontier. (Chicago, London, 1978), 61–62.
144
Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, 65. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the
Islamic Period. (Cambridge, 1987), 150.
– 69 –
an appointment diploma and a standard for Hayreddin. Only

then was the vassalage established through the mentioning of
Süleyman’s name in a Friday sermon and its placement on the
coinage.145 These developments cleared the way for a direct
Spanish–Ottoman confrontation in the western basin of the
Mediterranean.
However, the great war was tarrying, for neither Charles
V, elected emperor in 1519, nor Sultan Süleyman resumed the
policy of confrontation in North Africa, both concentrating
instead on the European theatre.146 We do not know Süleyman’s
concrete opinion about the Mediterranean, but it would seem
he judged that the immediate interests of the empire were
not jeopardised by the Spaniards. This belief was probably
corroborated by Hayreddin Barbarossa’s successes, who, after
some transitory difficulties, scored minor and major victories
over the Spaniards in the latter half of the 1520s.147 Süleyman
had nothing to fear of the Venetians; they had been weakened
not only by Ottoman military might and the Italian wars of the
western powers (which had even made them consider soliciting
145
Nicolas Vatin, ‘Note sur l’entrée d’Alger sous la souveraineté ottoman (1519–1521)’ ,
Turcica 44 (2012–2013) 131–166, esp. 154–156. For other nuanced accounts of
Hayreddin’s early career based on an Ottoman narrative source (also used extensively
by Hess) entitled Gazavat-i Hayreddin Paşa, see Rhoads Murphey, ‘Seyyid Muradî’s
Prose Biography on Hızır Ibn Yakub, Alias Hayreddin Barbarossa. Ottoman
Folk Narrative as an Under-Exploited Source for Historical Reconstruction’ , Acta
Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 54:4 (2001) 519–532 and Nicolas
Vatin, ‘“Comment êtes-vous apparus, toi et ton frère?”: note sur les origins des frères
Barberousse’ , Studia Islamica n. s. 1 (2011) 103–131. For the editions of the work, see
Vatin, ‘“Comment êtes-vous apparus”’ , 103: note 2.
146
Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, 66–67. Emrah Safa Gürkan, ‘The Centre and the
Frontier: Ottoman Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in the Sixteenth
Century’ , Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 132. Idem, ‘Osmanlı–Habsburg
Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar’ın XVI. Yüzyıl’daki Akdeniz Siyaseti’ , in Haydar
Çoruh – M. Yaşar Ertaş – M. Ziya Köse (eds.), Osmanlı Dönemi Akdeniz Dünyası.
(İstanbul, 2011), 22–44.
147
Zoltán Korpás, ‘Spanyol védelmi rendszer Észak-Afrikában V. Károly uralkodása alatt
[The Spanish defence system in North Africa during Charles V’s reign]’ , Africana
Hungarica 1:1 (1998) 66–67.
– 70 –
Ottoman assistance), but also by concerns about commercial

competition from Ottoman (both Muslim and non-Muslim),
Ragusan and Portuguese merchants. Apparently, the Porte did
not seek a global Mediterranean clash until Charles V radically
changed his maritime policy under Spanish pressure. Istanbul
only then decided upon opening a new front and getting more
actively involved in Mediterranean warfare. This was after
Andrea Doria and the Genovese fleet had switched allegiance to
Charles (1528) and their attack in Greece in 1532 had made it
clear that despite a spectacular development the Ottoman naval
force and defence was still highly vulnerable.148
Along the fourth front, in Central Europe, where the
Ottomans were at Hungary’s southern borders, there were
several new developments, and these served as incentives for the
Istanbul government. Western politics, which in earlier periods
had been relatively unified by the idea of crusades and the
underlying papal authority, became increasingly diversified and
divided from the end of the fifteenth century. In 1494 the Italian
wars began, and for half a century after Charles V’s accession
to the throne (1519), the western world turned its attention to
the Valois–Habsburg rivalry.149 Added to this were the decline
of papal authority and the rise of Protestantism, which caused
further divisions in European societies.150 Being attentive to
148
On the campaign, see Zoltán Korpás, V. Károly és Magyarország (1526–1538)
[Charles V and Hungary 1526–1538]. (Budapest, 2008), 152–153, 159. Özlem
Kumrular, ‘Koron: Uzak Topraklarda İmkânsız Misyon’ , in Eadem, Yeni Belgeler
Işığında Osmanlı–Habsburg Düellosu. (İstanbul, 2011), 185–190. Gürkan, ‘The Centre
and the Frontier’ , 132–133.
149
Hermann Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich und Europa an der
Wende zur Neuzeit. Band II. Reichsreform und Kaiserpolitik 1493–1500. Entmachtung
des Königs im Reich und in Europa. (Wien, 1975), 9–58. Richard Mackenney, Macmillan
History of Europe. Sixteenth Century Europe. Expansion and Conflict. (Houndmills,
London, 1993), 219–242.
150
Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe, 129–172, 268–280.
– 71 –
such European events,151 the sultan’s court must have have felt
that there had never been a more favourable opportunity for
the long-anticipated breakthrough in Europe. This impression
was probably enhanced by successive attempts on the part of the
European powers to seek the sultan’s friendship; they evidently
perceived him not only as a hated religious foe but also as a
potential ally in the struggle for power in Europe.152
In addition to the external factors, there were several do
mestic political considerations supporting a European offensive.
The first and foremost reason was economic. The bulk of
the Ottoman state’s resources and revenues came from the
Balkans, and although with the conquest of the Near East the
importance of the region had somewhat declined, it remained
the primary source.153 If the Ottomans had some knowledge of
the Hungarian (Central European) lands and of their developed
state in relation to the Balkans (and they usually carried out
thorough reconnaissance before a conquest), they could easily
conclude that their acquisition would be a clear gain for the
empire (in terms of revenues, timar-estates to be distributed,
etc.).
Expansion northward and westward was especially urged
for by the troops stationed in Rumelia. There appears to have
been a “Rumelian lobby” which applied methods similar to
151
Christine Isom-Verhaaren, ‘An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the
Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to
the Power of Charles V’ , Turcica 28 (1996) 299–318 (an intelligence report around
1530). On Ottoman intelligence in general in this period, see Ágoston, ‘Information,
Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy’ , 75–92. Emrah Safa Gürkan, ‘The Efficacy
of Ottoman Counter-Intelligence in the 16th Century’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 65:1 (2012) 1–38.
152
For relevant information, see Fodor – Dávid, ‘Hungarian–Ottoman Peace Negotia
tions in 1512–1514’ , 13–14. A major ruler who was one of the first to seek an alliance
with the Ottoman Empire was Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor.
153
See the amounts in the central budget of 1523–25: Halil Sahillioğlu, ‘1524–1525
Osmanlı Bütçesi’ , İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 41 (1985) 424. In
1527–28 Egypt and Syria provided roughly a third of all revenues.
– 72 –
those of the Ottoman military elite in Bosnia and Hungary

before the so-called “Long War” (1593–1606).154 The similarity
is not accidental. In both cases decades had passed since a large
imperial offensive against neighbouring countries.155 Owing
to incessant incursions, clashes and pillaging, the border areas
had been devastated. The troops, hungering after prebends
and booty and with their numbers boosted by volunteers,
were impatient to seize new lands from where raids could be
conducted to more remote and untouched areas.156 While in
1591–93 the war-party was led by the governor of Bosnia Hasan
Pasha, around 1520 Bali bey seems to have been the spokesman
of the “Rumelian lobby”.157 As a member of the Yahyapaşaoğlu
family, he had useful connections to the upper circles and a good
knowledge of the enemy’s position. Describing Hungary as easy
prey in his report, he encouraged the sultan’s court to launch an
offensive as soon as possible.158
The government could not ignore such voices, even if it
might have wanted to turn a deaf ear. As I noted above, by the
time of the change of rulers, serious discontent had accumulated
not only among the Rumelian soldiers but also in the entire
Ottoman society about Selim’s autocratic methods and his
insistence on the eastern wars. In an effort to consolidate his
power, Süleyman – as mentioned earlier – had no choice but
154
Fodor, ‘Prelude to the Long War’ , 297–301.
155
In 1456 and 1566, respectively.
156
For the importance of the pressure by volunteers, see Caroline Finkel, The Adminis
tration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606. (Wien,
1988), 44.
157
For his life, see Dušanka Bojanić, ‘Požarevac u XVI veku i Bali-beg Jahjapašić’ , Istorijski
Časopis 32 (1985 [1986]) 49–77, esp. 50–53, 55–65.
158
M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, Kanunî Sultan Süleyman. (İstanbul, 1967), 7. Cf. Fodor,‘Ottoman
Policy’ , 292, 334–336. According to Hoca Sadeddin, the military commanders of the
Rumelian army had already proposed an invasion of Hungary immediately after the
death of King Matthias, making use of the turbulence prevailing in the country. See
Hoca Sadeddin, Tacü’t-tevarih. Vol. II. (İstanbul, 1280/1863), 69–70. Thúry, Török
történetírók, Vol. I, 174.
– 73 –
to break with his father’s heritage in both domestic and foreign

policies. His first measures to remedy the grievances of various
social groups were meant to prove that with his rise to power
the empire had returned to the path of justice and lawfulness.159
When revising foreign policy and examining the status of the
four major fronts, he could not ignore the mood of the army and
that of society as a whole. The weighing of power relations and
the resources available clearly showed the decisive superiority
of the Ottomans in Central Europe. The anticipated victories
would not only enhance the growth of the empire but also further
strengthen his domestic position. The sultan was persuaded
that the enormous Ottoman war machinery should be deployed
in the western theatre of war with a view to demonstrating to
his subjects that a new foreign policy era had began in Ottoman
history.160
THE CONQUEST OF HUNGARY

AND THE ENSUING OTTOMAN–HABSBURG
RIVALRY IN CENTRAL EUROPE
In the autumn of 1520 the decision was taken, and in the

very next year the Ottoman forces led by Sultan Süleyman
set out against Hungary. Though the original plan was to
occupy the capital city of Buda, the ruler’s inexperience and
clumsiness in military commandership “only” resulted in the
seizure of the key points of the southern Hungarian border
defence, the fortresses of Nándorfehérvár/Belgrade and Szabács/
Woodhead, ‘Perspectives’ , 164–166.

159
Kaya Şahin, relying on the preamble of the Egyptian kanunname, thinks this “western
160
turn” and the birth of a new “political theology” with claims to messianic kingship and
universal monarchy took place in 1524 (the year of the compilation of the mentioned
law-code) and its translation into practice began only in 1526; see Şahin, Empire and
Power, 56–63, 188–190.
– 74 –
Böğürdelen.161 Still, it seems likely that even at the time of

this firs campaign the objective of the sultan’s army was not
merely to occupy Hungary. Rather it appears this was the
overture to a more sweeping strategy. As Marco Minio, the
Venetian envoy who after the Ottoman victory had hurried
to Istanbul to express the Republic’s good wishes, reported
from Istanbul that the pashas had inquired about European
policies, Rome and the roads, and also told him overtly that
the sultan had committed himself to a European offensive;
the first objective of the war was Hungary whence they would
be able to attack other countries more easily.162 As Venice, in
line with expectations, had remained neutral at the time of the
Hungarian campaign, the padishah consented, on December
11, 1521, to the reaffirmation of the earlier treaty between
the two parties. During the negotiations, the pashas advised
the Venetian envoy in an amicable manner that the Signoria
should avoid violating the peace between the two states during
the upcoming wars in Hungary. It should not offer any form of
assistance to Hungary, as it might well suffer an attack on its
long and indefensible coastline. The Venetian leaders heeded
this admonition; in the 1520s they watched idly as Hungary
was attacked and defeated. Indeed, immediately before and
after the battle of Mohács, they went even further, encouraging
Ottoman expansion in Central Europe.
161
Káldy-Nagy, ‘Suleimans Angriff ’ , 165–169. Ferenc Szakály, ‘Nándorfehérvár, 1521:
The Beginning of the End of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom’ , in Dávid – Fodor
(eds.), Hungarian-Ottoman Military, 47–76. On the goals, see Fodor, ‘Ottoman Policy’ ,
290–291.
162
Albèri, Le relazioni, Vol. III/III, 75–76. The same was stated by Shah Ismail with
reference to the sultan’s letters of 1523 to him: Tardy, Beyond the Ottoman Empire, 131.
Before the start of the 1526 Mohács campaign, Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha uttered
similar words to the Venetian ambassador, making him feel that the eventual aim of the
empire was to conquer the “Roman Empire” and establish the rule of Islam. Cornell H.
Fleischer, ‘Shadows of Shadows: Prophecy in Politics in 1530s Istanbul’ , International
Journal of Turkish Studies 13:1–2 (2007) 55.
– 75 –
The events of the next twelve years proved that the Venetian
envoy was not talking out of his hat. True, the consolidation
of the new provinces in the Near East and of the Levant led to
a four-year interruption in the implementation of the plan.163
After 1525, however, nothing prevented the sultan from
resuming the undertaking.
It was in this and the previous year that he began
preparations for a further European campaign. The leadership
had previously considered the possibility of an attack on
Poland, but this idea was now rejected. Indeed, in the autumn
of 1525, a three-year truce was signed with King Sigismund’s
envoy.164 Also in 1525, the Porte abandoned its attempts to
integrate Wallachia into the empire, recognising the rule of the
tenacious Voivode Radul in return for his submission and an
increased annual tribute. After such diplomatic preparations
there was no real doubt that Hungary would be the target
of the upcoming attack; this was the logical continuation of
the line taken in 1521. Amid the preparations the envoy of
Francis I arrived in Istanbul. The King of France, who had
fallen captive to Charles V following his defeat at the battle of
Pavia in February 1525, informed the sultan of his misfortune,
requesting him to attack Hungary as a means of weakening the
Habsburgs. The envoy Joannes Frangepan allegedly warned
Ibrahim and the Ottoman authorities that unless prompt
163
On the capture of Rhodes, see Setton, The Papacy, Vol. III, 198–216. Nicolas Vatin,
L’Ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jerusalem, l’Empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre
les deux sièges de Rhodes 1480–1522. (Collection turcica, 7.) (Louvain, Paris, 1994),
339–374. On the suppression of the revolt and the settling of administrative matters in
Egypt: Seyyid Muhammed es-Seyyid Mahmud, XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyâleti. (İstanbul,
1990), 72–90. Michael Winter, Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule 1517–1598.
(New York, London, 1992), 14–17. Şahin, Empire and Power, 53–59.
164
Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman–Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century): An
Annotated Edition of ‘Ahdnames and Other Documents. (The Ottoman Empire and its
Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy. Ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi and Halil İnalcik. Vol.
18.) (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2000), 116, 222–226.
– 76 –
action was taken against Emperor Charles, he would soon

become ruler of the world.165 For Süleyman, this message,
coming from one of the most powerful rulers of the Christian
world, was evidence of the fatal divisions afflicting Europe. It
also reassured him that there was no danger of the emergence
of a hostile military alliance in Hungary. Süleyman felt that
his ideas had been vindicated, but – as the course of events
show – none of this directly influenced his decision about the
campaign.
When Hungary, left completely alone, was crushed easily in
the battle of Mohács on August 29, 1526,166 the road opened
towards the west. Yet after 1526 a degree of confusion can be
discerned at the Porte. Certain sources indicate that the sultan
and Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha had not expected Hungary
to collapse so quickly; they were not prepared to occupy the
country right away. In the meantime, local revolts broke out in
Anatolia that had to be put down. A similarly paralysing effect
stemmed from the fact that the food reserves of the empire had
been temporarily exhausted as a result of the serial campaigns
and the destruction wrought by the rebels.
Meanwhile, events in both Hungary and the West
accelerated. In Hungary, after the death of Louis II at Mohács,
there were two rival claimants to the throne: John Szapolyai,
Voivode of Transylvania, whose coronation actually took
165
On the Ottoman–French attempts at “making friends”, see Michael Hochendlinger,
‘Die französisch–osmanische ‘Freundschaft’ 1525–1792. Element antihabsburgischer
Politik, Gleichgewichtsinstrument, Prestigeunternehmung – Aufriß eines Problems’ ,
Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 102:1–2 (1994) 108–
164, esp. 115–119, 146–149. Cf. recently Christine Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the
Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century. (London, New York,
2011), 23–40.
166
János B. Szabó – Ferenc Tóth, Mohács (1526). Soliman le Magnifique prend pied en
Europe Central. (Paris, 2009). Feridun M. Emecen, ‘Mohaç 1526: Osmanlılara Orta
Avrupa’nın Kapılarını Açan Savaş’ , in Idem, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş. (İstanbul,
2010), 159–216.
– 77 –
place on November 10, 1526, and Ferdinand of Habsburg,

Archduke of Austria. The latter backed up his claim with the
force of arms, and it seemed he might well accomplish his goal.
In Italy, the anti-Habsburg League of Cognac (an alliance
between the Pope, Venice, Milan and France) were roundly
defeated by imperial troops, and Rome fell into the hands of
Charles V (1527). These developments quickly led the Porte
and Venice to form a united front. The latter was dismayed
by the double advance of the Habsburg brothers. Through
its envoys in Istanbul and Lodovico Gritti,167 who was living
in the city, from the spring of 1527 Venice kept urging the
sultan’s court to take action in Hungary. It also reminded the
ruler and his advisors of Charles’ ambitions to rule the world
and of the danger such ambitions posed to both Venice and the
Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the Signoria did not wish
to see a permanent Ottoman presence in Hungary. For this
reason, it sought a significant role for John Szapolyai. Venice’s
hope was that Szapolyai might remain on the Hungarian
throne as an Ottoman vassal. It advised the beleaguered king
to seek assistance from the sultan. It then instructed its bailo
in Istanbul (and also Gritti, it seems) to do his (their) utmost
to persuade the sultan to reach out to Szapolyai and support
his status as king.
By this time, however, the Porte, having been influenced
by the dramatic events, was thinking of much grander plans.
Süleyman and Ibrahim were both of the view that the time
had come for the dynasty to attempt to bring to fruition its
claim to “world rule”, which until then had been expressed
For more on the role of this interesting figure, see Ferenc Szakály, Lodovico Gritti in
167
Hungary 1529–1534. A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian

Rivalry. (Studia Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 197.) (Budapest,
1995). Gizella Nemeth Papo – Adriano Papo, Ludovico Gritti: Un principe-mercante
del Rinascimento tra Venezia, i turchi e la corona d’Ungheria. Mariano del Friuli, 2002.
– 78 –
only in principle. Indeed, there was no sense in delaying any

longer. Emperor Charles V, a figure largely ignored by the
Ottoman Empire prior to Mohács, had come close to realising
his hegemonic plans through his recent victories. Meanwhile
Ferdinand’s victories in Hungary called into question the very
meaning of Ottoman efforts. In view of these factors and the
military and political balance of power, the sultan appears to
have decided in the autumn of 1527 to abandon the gradualist
approach and lead his armies against Vienna. The apparent
aim was to deliver a decisive blow against Habsburg power in
Central Europe. With the defeat of Ferdinand I, Hungary could
have been integrated into the Ottoman Empire. Before it could
launch this campaign, however, the Ottoman leadership needed
to establish a whole series of financial, organisational and
diplomatic conditions. It was not until the beginning of 1529
that the task could be completed.
The priority for the sultan’s court was to form an unbreakable
bond with John Szapolyai, who was needed for three reasons:
to ensure that Hungary would remain divided until the arrival
of the sultan’s army; to provide a friendly environment in
Hungary for Ottoman forces as they advanced towards their
target; and to ensure that Hungary would provide food supplies
to the Ottoman soldiers. The last point was particularly
important given that the campaign was being fought at greater
distance from Istanbul than had been the case in any previous
undertaking. This is why Szapolyai’s response was so anxiously
awaited in Istanbul. It also explains the rather unfriendly words
spoken by the pashas on the belated arrival (in late 1527) of
Szapolyai’s envoy, Hyeronimus Łaski. The Porte initially offered
the status of tribute-paying vassal to the Hungarian king, but
when this was firmly rejected by the envoy the sultan agreed
to renounce for a time the tribute or gift symbolising political
dependence. The alliance was finally signed in February 1528; it
– 79 –
seems the agreement was of equal importance to both the Porte

and Szapolyai.168
In these months, the sultan’s court claimed repeatedly that
the aim of the attack would be to assist Hungary and achieve
Szapolyai’s reinstatement. It seems that this was believed not
only by Szapolyai but also by Venetian diplomacy and the
Polish royal court.169 In a separate message, Ibrahim informed
the latter of the intentions of the sultan’s court in this regard.
Concluding their preparatory action, the sultan and the grand
vizier undertook two further diplomatic maneouvres. The first
amounted to a gesture to Francis I: in September 1528, in an
imperial letter issued to the French consul in Alexandria they
confirmed the privileges of French and Catalan merchants
(originally obtained from the Mamluks in 1513) in the
Mediterranean.170 The second was a three-year truce signed in
October of the same year with King Sigismund, which served to
rule out the possibility of Polish assistance to the Habsburgs.171
This act completed the diplomatic isolation of Ferdinand I. The
rest would depend on weaponry.
168
See the documents and studies published in the volume Barta (ed.), Két tárgyalás
Sztambulban, particularly Fodor, ‘A Bécsbe vezető út’ , ibid., 63–96. – In 1529, the
sultan, issuing a new letter of covenant, sought to compel Szapolyai to accept the status
of tribute-paying vassal, but the Hungarian king refused to pay the tribute during his
reign. For more details, including various issues surrounding the Ottoman-Hungarian
letter of agreement, see Papp, Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vetragsurkunden,
27–51. Idem, ‘Hungary and the Ottoman Empire’ , 70–83.
169
Indicatively, when reporting in May 1529 on the sultan’s departure for battle, Pietro
Zen, bailo in Istanbul, wrote that the Turks had set out for Hungary to restore
Szapolyai’s kingship.
170
Ernest Charrière, Négotiations de la France dans le Levant… Tome I. (Paris, 1848),
121–129. Gilles Veinstein, ‘Les capitulations franco-ottomanes de 1536. Sont-elles
encore controversables?’ , in Vera Costantini – Markus Koller (eds.), Living in the
Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi. (The Ottoman
Empire and its Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy. Ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi and
Halil İnalcık. Vol. 39.) (Leiden, Boston, 2008), 81–84.
171
Fodor, ‘A Bécsbe vezető út’ , 93–94. Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman–Polish, 116–117, 227–
229.
– 80 –
The siege of Vienna ended in an enormous fiasco for the

Porte.172 The next campaign in 1532 had the same result
(although the troops did not reach Vienna, this was – in
my view – the second Vienna campaign, and not the one in
1683).173 The Ottoman expansion was halted, the strength of
the huge empire proved insufficient to defeat the Habsburgs
and their supporters and to drive them out of Central Europe.
The year 1532 was one of the most important turning points in
the history of the Ottoman Empire and in its relationship with
Europe. This was so not only because of the military failure but
also because of subsequent developments. On the other three
fronts described above the Ottomans’ position took a sudden
turn for the worse. As noted earlier, Charles V opened the
Mediterranean front – to relieve the land front and bringing
great relief to the Spaniards. This forced the Ottomans to do
likewise, whereby they had to invest immense resources in the
fleet and give their attention to both the land and maritime
fronts.174 At the same time, the war with Iran was rekindled (I
refer to the campaign of 1533–35), and in no time a far greater
Ottoman involvement was necessary in the Red Sea and the
Indian Ocean.175 There would never be another situation like
the one in the 1520s when the sultan’s court could concentrate
172
Ferdinand Stoller, ‘Soliman vor Wien’ , Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt
Wien 9–10 (1929–1930) 11–76.
173
On this, see István Bariska, ‘Az 1532. évi török hadjárat történetéhez [To the history
of the Ottoman campaign of 1532]’ , in István Lengvári – József Vonyó (eds.), Népek
együttélése Dél-Pannóniában. Tanulmányok Szita László 70. születésnapjára [Studies in
honour of László Szita on his 70th birthday]. (Pécs, 2003), 11. The “results” of the
campaign from the Ottoman angle are summarised in Şahin, Empire and Power, 85–
87.
174
On the beginnings of the reshuffling, see İdris Bostan, ‘The Establishment of the
Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid’ , in Elisabeth Zachariadou (ed.), The Kapudan
Pasha: His Office and His Domain. (Rethymnon, 2002), 241–251.
175
Allouche, The Origins, 102–103, 138–139, 150–151, as well as Özbaran’s studies
mentioned above.
– 81 –
its attention and the military strength of the state on a single

front for some years.
After this period, Süleyman’s policies became increasingly
muddled. Several times he tried to simultaneously achieve
success in different regions (as in 1537–38 and 1552), resulting
in a number of negative consequences in the long term.176
Though the Ottomans had scored an undeniable victory in the
Mediterranean, this brought little economic gain for their society.
For the sake of short-term political advantages, Süleyman also
broadened the system of capitulations, which subsequently led
to the economic penetration of the empire by the European
countries.177 A number of lesser or greater successes in the Near
East and the Indian Ocean were not enough to stave off the
subsequent trading superiority of the West (or the North).178
The Safavid dynasty put the respite to good use in Iran, and
when the Ottomans turned against the country once again,
they found they were no longer able to achieve what might have
been possible earlier: the elimination for good of an annoying
neighbour. The wars waged repeatedly until the mid-seventeenth
century were rather fruitless and incurred enormous expenses
for only transitory gains. An Italian observer wrote in 1594:
“Persia is to the sultan as is Flanders to the Spanish king or
Crete to the Venetians, as the expenses are extremely high, and
the income is insignificant. There is no gain from the acquired
lands.”179
176
See the second chapter of the volume.
177
For a recent well-balanced evaluation of the capitulary regime in the Ottoman Empire,
see Umut Özsu, ‘Ottoman Empire’ , in Bardo Fassbender – Anne Peters (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. (Oxford, 2012), 429–448.
178
Even Casale with his delusions about great Ottoman successes in the Indian Ocean
and Southeast Asia (The Ottoman Age of Exploration, 198–203) was forced to admit
this.
179
Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa. Dritter Theil.
(Gotha, 1855), 580–581: note 2. The areas won by the empire at a great price in 1590
were lost in 1619. Neither the quotation nor the expenditures known to me from the
– 82 –
On the Central European (Hungarian) front too, the

outstanding opportunities of the 1520s never returned. What
has been said of the Safavids also applied to the Habsburgs:
they were never as weak as in those years. The Ottoman attacks
had a dual impact on Europe.180 Where the percieved danger
was greatest (the German Empire, Austria, the Kingdom of
Hungary, Spain, several states of Italy, etc.) and social forces felt
under threat (including the Protestants, especially after 1529
when Luther’s position on the Turkish issue changed), people
lined up in support of the Habsburgs. And this was particularly
true at times of greatest danger. When, however, the Habsburgs
gathered strength, the centrifugal forces were reactivated. At
such times, the dynasty had to make several concessions in order
to garner support against the Porte (in this way the Ottoman
offensive promoted the survival of Protestantism).181 Whatever
the course taken by the dynastic, social and religious struggles in
the West, the Habsburgs were capable, at the crucial moments,
of mobilising sufficient forces to halt the Ottoman advance.
In any evolution of Süleyman’s European policy, the central
question is whether or not he was aware of these barriers. The
answer is that he failed to recognise them at least prior to the
late 1520s. Yet he cannot be blamed for this as the barriers were
still hardly noticeable.
At the time there was still no indication that the empire
might be stopped or that the great clash between the two
end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries seem to support the
view of Rhoads Murphey (Ottoman Warfare, XVIII) that the eastern border region,
roughly 600 miles in length, required no substantial funding from the centre because
“the costs of maintaining the Ottoman’s presence in this sphere could be offset by
relying mostly on local sources”.
180
John Elliott, ‘Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry: The European Perspective’ , in
İnalcık – Kafadar (eds.), Süleymân the Second, 153–162. Mackenney, Sixteenth Century
Europe, 252.
181
Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism 1521–
1555. (Cambridge, 1959), esp. 111–117.
– 83 –
superpowers of the period with their very different cultures and

religions would end indecisively. In the first decade of his rule,
Süleyman’s position was, in every respect, more favourable than
that of Charles V, who had acceded to the throne around the
same time. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the
world of Islam set out on the same path to integration as that
taken by Christian Europe, but it proceeded much further along
this route – at least in the western half. The basic difference
between the two processes was that whereas Europe sought
to overcome medieval discord and disintegration on the basis
of competing (“national” and imperial) strategies and having
abandoned religious unity, Islam could only envision an end to
territorial divisions once the imperial structures and religious
unity were in place. For the time being, this latter (the Ottoman)
strategy was the more effective.
When Charles V was still taking the initial steps towards
uniting his various domains and was still pondering a leading
role in Europe, the Ottoman Empire – thanks to Selim’s
conquests – had already defeated and in part absorbed those
countries (Safavid Iran and Mamluk Egypt) against which it had
earlier fought tooth and nail for leadership of the Islamic world.
Whereas the Papacy – formerly a symbol and representative
of Christian unity and defence against the Turks – was
fatally weakened by the fierce battles fought between secular
princes and by the emergence of the Reformation after 1517,
the Ottoman Empire, having obtained the Arab lands and
the Muslim holy places, acquired for itself the right to lead
the (Western) Islamic world. True, the Ottomans still had
to share power with the three other great Islamic powers (as
well as with the many Muslim princes of local importance):
the Safavids of Persia, the Mughals of India, and the Shibanids
of Central Asia. Even so, these empires were in no position to
threaten militarily or question the authority of the Ottomans,
– 84 –
who controlled the central Muslim areas as well as the lands

bordering Latin Christianity. After the occupation of Egypt,
the Ottomans won the support of the Sunni religious scholars,
a significant element in Muslim society. In this way, the
Ottoman Empire could take a stand as a united Islamic empire
on the European front, where it faced a mosaic of warring and
divided states.
While the most threatened Christian countries sought in vain
for allies in the Ottoman Empire or beyond its eastern borders,
the Ottoman state effortlessly broke up the Christian world.
Having bound Venice to itself through the Levantine trade and
some coercion, the Ottomans soon found themselves approached
by the French.182 While Europe’s major princes, with a view to
concealing their own “betrayals”, claimed to be the defenders of
Christians living in the Ottoman Empire and of the holy places
in Jerusalem while looking on passively as the Ottoman Empire
swallowed up millions of Christians, the Ottoman state accepted
Muslims and Jews hounded out of Europe by the same princes,
granting them social and economic opportunities. Whereas the
struggle of Charles V and Francis I for dominance brought blood,
sweat and bankruptcy, the Ottoman Empire, by occupying Egypt
and Syria and imposing custom dues on Levantine trade, received
an extra amount of revenue that covered the costs of expansion.
Whereas under the pressure of a never-ending conflict, the
European leaders (the French at the fore) began to establish
permanent armies,183 the Ottoman sultans had already possessed
such an army for a century and a half: the janissary corps (not to
mention the rest of the court mercenary troops), which had been
182
Veinstein, ‘Les capitulations franco-ottomanes de 1536’ , 71–88. He argues (not quite
convincingly) that there were no valid capitulations given to the French state or king
before 1569.
183
Practically, the process gained momentum only in the late seventeenth century, see
David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early
Modern Europe. (Cambridge, New York, 2012), 260–327.
– 85 –
armed with guns since the second half of the fifteenth century. By
the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman rulers, having
kept abreast of technological developments in Europe, were
equipping the army with modern artillery (including cannons and
guns).184 At that time, the Ottoman army was evidently bigger,
better organised and able to more rapidly mobilise than the forces
of any European country or military alliance. Thanks to the
forward-looking policies of Sultan Bayezid II (1481–1512), the
Ottoman Empire had transformed itself into a major maritime
power in the Mediterranean by the sixteenth century. Its fleet
was able to defeat the Venetians in open battle, and thanks to
developments implemented under Selim, Süleyman could even
compete with the Spanish fleet of King and Emperor Charles V.
No wonder perhaps that after his Mohács triumph
Süleyman entered the battle for control of the world. Wherever
he looked, he could see only advantages for such action. All
sober prognoses indicated an enormous superiority, and it
was not until after the two campaigns against Vienna that the
errors in the calculations were realised. After 1532, however,
Süleyman’s assessment of the situation and his policy display
more and more irrational signs. Apparently, he was unwilling
to take note of the changing balance of power, and while he
was forced to exert increasing efforts on all fronts, he refused
to give up the dream of subduing Vienna.185 Instead of aiming
at a decisive battle and continuing the political manoeuvring
(retaining Szapolyai’s vassal kingdom, etc.), he ought to have
seized the whole of Hungary at the turn of the 1530s, when
he had the last chance to do so. This might have delayed (if
Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan.

184
Rhoads Murphey and Kaya Şahin, too, are of the opinion that the Ottoman imperial
185
programme had come to a deadlock by the 1530s. See Rhoads Murphey, ‘Ottoman
Expansion, 1451–1556. II. Dynastic Interest and International Power Status,
1503–56’ , in Geoff Mortimer (ed.), Early Modern Military History, 1450–1815.
(Houndmills, New York, 2004), 70. Şahin, Empire and Power, 108–109.
– 86 –
not prevented) the construction of the eastern Habsburg

Empire.186 Instead, he temporarily ignored the region after
1532, leaving Ferdinand I enough time to lay the foundations
of the Habsburg military defence system and to introduce the
most up-to-date forms of warfare (e.g. the joint use of firearms
and pikes). When, hopelessly too late, Süleyman resumed the
interrupted invasion in the first half of the 1540s, the Ottoman
army and military organisation had already lost its earlier
decisive superiority.187 By 1545 Süleyman had realised that he
could not reach Western Hungary, let alone Vienna; he had to
be content with devouring John Szapolayi’s areas. Then both he
and his successors were forced to create a border defence system
and maintain it in the middle of Hungary at unprecedented
cost. The resources of the empire were squandered in a frontier
war without prospects. In the years following the Ottoman–
Habsburg peace (1547), signs of the overburdening of the
central treasury were unmistakable.188
It is beyond doubt that the acquisition of land in Central
Europe was primarily sought by the military-bureaucratic elite
(including the military establishment in Rumelia).189 Süleyman
was unable and probably unwilling to oppose this ambition
(at least in the first two or two and a half decades of his rule).
Whatever the more recent opinions about his figure, the sheer
186
Only about one third of Hungary was under Habsburg rule, but even in its divided
state it subsequently provided a third of the empire’s revenues and contributed a lot to
the defences (human resource, food, raw materials, etc.), albeit in a manner that is hard
to quantify. See Géza Pálffy, The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in
the Sixteenth Century. (East European Monographs, DCCXXXV.) Translated from
the Hungarian by Thomas J. and Helen D. DeKornfeld. (Boulder, Colorado, 2009),
89–155.
187
John F. Guilmartin, Jr., ‘Ideology and Conflict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire,
1453–1606’ , Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (1988) 735–736. Cf. also the
important observations in Géza Dávid, ‘Ottoman Armies and Warfare, 1453–1603’ ,
in Faroqhi – Fleet (eds.), The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. 2, 315–319.
188
On this, see the end of the second chapter.
189
Hess also shared this opinion: ‘The Evolution’ , 1914, 1916.
– 87 –
– 88 –
number of wars that were waged with his personal participation

proves that he gave priority to the Central European, Hungarian,
or broadly speaking, Christian front(s), as nine of the thirteen
campaigns were led in this direction (see italics).190
1. 1521 Nándorfehérvár/Belgrade
2. 1522–1523 Rhodes
3. 1526 Mohács
4. 1529 Vienna
5. 1532 Vienna (Kőszeg/Güns)
6. 1534–1535 Iraq
7. 1537 Rome (Avlonya)
8. 1538 Moldavia
9. 1541 Buda
10. 1543 Vienna (Esztergom,
Székesfehérvár, etc.)
11. 1548–1549 Iran (Tabriz)
12. 1553–1555 Iran (Nakhchivan)
13. 1566 Vienna (Szigetvár)
Nor should it be forgotten that Süleyman was guided not

only by sober foreign and domestic political calculations but
also by profound ideological considerations. There is no reason
to question that he personally conceived of the wars of the
dynasty as “religious wars” (jihad).191 Kemalpaşazade, one of the
190
Similar is the position of Cemal Kafadar, ‘The Ottomans and Europe’ , in Thomas A.
Brady, Jr. – Heiko A. Oberman – James D. Tracy (eds.), Handbook of European History
1400–1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation. Vol. 1: Structures and
Assertions. (Leiden, 1994), 609–610 (though in his view he led 10 campaigns out of
the 13 against the West – evidently he added in the siege of Rhodes).
191
See, for example, his report about the battle of Zsarnó (Havale, near Belgrade), in
which the troops stationed along the border crushed John Szapolyai’s army, written in
a highly solemn, religious tone in mid-May 1515, when he was still heir to the throne
(İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, E. 5438), or his order to his subjects in 1532
on the occasion of the “Vienna campaign” (İstanbul, Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi,
– 89 –
empire’s intellectual pillars, stated, recalling a personal meeting

with Süleyman in late 1526, that the ruler firmly believed that
“his success in this jihad [the victory at Mohács] was due to the
assistance of divine mercy and that the driving into slavery of the
army of evil gyaurs and their beys and such an unprecedented
and unrepeatable defeat on the battlefield were thanks not to
human efforts but to the power of the eternal.”192 But there was
more to it than that. From the turn of the fifteenth century, the
Ottoman sultans regarded themselves as the heirs to the ancient
conqueror Alexander the Great. Their repeated victories turned
this idea from political ideology into the personal conviction of
the rulers during Mehmed II’s reign.193 Süleyman inherited from
his great-grandfather the belief that he was destined to unite the
East and the West. It is no accident that Paolo Giovio, who was
well informed of Süleyman’s intentions, wrote the following in his
book on the Ottomans submitted to Charles V in 1532: “Believe
me, your Highness, Sultan Süleyman has nothing else on his mind
but occupying your lands, because by nature he longs for glory,
and his many victories and the size of his empire have made him
audacious and reckless. I have heard from trustworthy people that
he often claims that he is rightfully due the Roman and the entire
Western Empire, because he is the legal successor to Emperor
Constantine, who moved the empire to Constantinople.”194 On
Veliyüddin Ef. 1970, 56b–57b). See further the testimony of the chancellor Celalzade
Mustafa, a chief architect of the imperial project of Süleyman: Şahin, Empire and
Power, passim.
192
Kemal Paşa-zâde, Tevarih-i Âl-i Osman. X. Defter. (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları,
XVIII/13.) Hazırlayan Şefaettin Severcan. (Ankara, 1996), 319–320.
193
Gülru Necipoğlu, Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power. The Topkapı Palace in the
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. (Cambridge, London), 1991, 11–13.
194
Paolo Giovio, Commentario de le cose de’ Turchi. A cura di Lara Michelacci. (Bologna,
2005), 156. On the importance of sedes imperii as a legitimising principle in Ottoman–
European relations, see Peter Thorau, ‘Von Karl dem Großen zum Frieden von Zsitva
Torok [Zsitvatorok]. Zum Weltherrschaftsanspruch Sultan Mehmeds II. und dem
Wiederaufleben des Zweitkaiserproblems nach der Eroberung Konstantinopels’ ,
Historische Zeitschrift 279:2 (2004) 316–330.
– 90 –
the coins minted in the year of his accession, he named himself

“sovereign of power and victory on land and at sea” still continuing
in Mehmed’s footsteps. Meanwhile, from his father Selim, he took
the titles of Iranian “shah” and “protector of the two holy cities”,
complementing them with the title “sultan of the two continents
and hakan of the two seas” – a clear formulation of his claim to
dominion over the whole world.195 Though apparently he did not
use these titles on his coins, he was pleased to be addressed as
“world conqueror” (sahib-kıran, lit. “the master of the auspicious
conjunction”) and “messiah” (mahdi) of the last times, similarly to
his two predecessors.196 For a long time (at least from the reign of
Mehmed II onwards) the idea that the wars of conquest in Europe
were part of a cosmic struggle between East and West in which
the forces of the East – at the forefront the rising and westward
heading Sun, that is, the padishah – would be victorious and
would take revenge for the grievances suffered at the hands of
Christians, loomed large in the Ottoman conciousness and in
Ottoman political ideologies. It is telling that a poet named Behari,
who had fought in the battle of Mohács, used this particular
conceptual framework in the immediate aftermath of the clash
to describe the events of the campaign and that Kemalpaşazade
195
István Nyitrai, ‘The Third Period of the Ottoman–Safavid Conflict: Struggle of
Political Ideologies (1555–1578)’ , in Jeremiás (ed.), Irano–Turkic Cultural Contacts,
164–165.
196
Barbara Flemming, ‘SāÎib-þirān und Mahdī: Türkische Endzeiterwartungen im ersten
Jahrzehnt der Regierung Süleymāns’ , in György Kara (ed.), Between the Danube and
the Caucasus. A Collection of Papers Concerning Oriental Sources on the History of the
Peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe. (Budapest, 1987), 43–62 (he had the
title sahib-kıran engraved in the candle-sticks taken as booty from Buda in 1526, too;
ibid., 62). Cornell H. Fleischer, ‘The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial
Image in the Reign of Süleymân’ , in Veinstein (publ.), Soliman le Magnifique, 159–177.
For a Eurasian context of the universalist political ideas and titles of the Ottoman
ruler (including various elements of the sahib-kıran and mahdi ideologies) and for their
importance in the early modern empire building, see Şahin, Empire and Power, esp.
1–12, 53–57, 61–62, 67–68, 188–191.
– 91 –
interpreted the invasion of 1521 as revenge for the one-time

invasion of Asia Minor by German crusaders.197
This vision, together with the matchless power and military
strength he disposed of, strongly influenced the development of
his character already in his youth. From the moment he occupied
the throne he behaved quite unlike his forefathers: he was
unapproachable, wrapped in silence during public appearances
(e.g. when receiving envoys), and later introduced a sign language
in the inner section of the palace.198 During his reign he tried to
create the image of a mystical and impersonal authority elevated
above his subjects and the world. It can be presumed that for a man
who viewed himself as so exceptional, it became a personal issue to
achieve a victory over the Habsburg ruler Charles V airing similar
claims. In my view, this human vanity is reflected in the above list
of battles. In addition to the ruler’s sense of mission, this feature
largely accounts for the mistaken European policy after 1532.
After the battle of Mohács the court goldsmith Ahmed
Tekelü made a yataghan for Süleyman.199 Reliefs adorn both
sides of the blade of the splendid weapon showing a simurg (or
anka in Arabic) fighting against a dragon. István Vígh, a historian
of arms, has claimed that it is not accidental that the body of the
mythical bird is wholly gilded while only a part of the dragon is
197
Balázs Sudár, ‘A végítélet könyve. Oszmán elbeszélő forrás a mohácsi csatáról [The
Book of Doomsday. An Ottoman epic about the battle of Mohács]’ , Történelmi Szemle
52:3 (2010) 399, 403, 405, 410. Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe. (New
York, London, 1982), 165. As these pieces of evidence make clear, “a narration of the
early modern period predictated upon a [conceptual and] religious dichotomy dividing
East and West” (Norton, ‘Blurring the Boundaries’ , 4, 19) was not a pure invention of
European humanists or modern historians but was also endorsed by the contemporary
Ottoman actors.
198
Necipoğlu, Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power, 25–30.
199
Nagy Szulejmán és kora / Kanunî Sultan Süleyman ve Çağı. 1994. szeptember 7. – 1995.
január 8. /7 Eylül 1994 – 8 Ocak 1995. Budavári palota „A” épület / Buda Sarayı „A”
Binası. A kötetet összeállította és a bevezető tanulmányt írta / Albümü derleyen ve giriş
incelemesini yazan Ibolya Gerelyes. (Budapest, 1994), 79/1–3. The simurg is a huge bird
nesting on top of Mount Kaf (Elburz) whose feathers have healing power; in Islamic
mysticism it is the symbol of divinity; see F. C. de Blois, ‘Sīmurgh’ , in EI2, IX, 615a.
– 92 –
gilt, and most of its body is black. Vígh’s interpretation is that

Süleyman, the simurg, was fighting against the dragon – King
Louis of Hungary – and would overcome the forces of darkness,
Christianity, with his supernatural strength.200 The prediction
did not come true: the dragon grew new heads and the Ottoman
simurg was beating with broken wings.
István Vígh, ‘Szülejmán jatagánja és a mohácsi csata [Süleyman’s yataghan and the
200
battle of Mohács]’ , Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 117:2 (2004) 730–738.
– 93 –
CHAPTER II
THE CAPTURE OF BUDA

AND THE ROAD TO SZIGETVÁR
A DECISIVE DECADE (1541–1550)
As we have seen in the first chapter, the campaigns launched

in 1529 and in 1532 to occupy Vienna proved that the sultan
had greatly overestimated his army’s strength. Though the
Ottoman army managed to reach the Austrian frontier and
neared Vienna, it was not in a position to carry out sustained
military operations at such a distance. The events of 1532
clearly indicated that, relying on the manpower and material
resources of the German Empire, the Habsburgs were capable
of repelling a direct Ottoman threat to their core territories. The
sultan, however, was reluctant to learn the obvious lessons from
his western adventure. In the aftermath of his victories in the
1530s on the Iranian and the Mediterranean fronts (the latter
being opened against the other Habsburg, Emperor Charles V),
he returned his attention to Central Europe, seeking to take up
where he had left off in 1532.
To bring the supply bases closer to Vienna, in 1541 he
occupied Buda and established the first Ottoman province
(vilayet-i Budun) in Hungary. Initially, he also planned to annex
the whole of the territory controlled by John Szapolyai and
to capture the leaders of the pro-Turkish party, but after the
easy seizure of the Hungarian capital he modified his strategy.
He nominally granted the region beyond the River Tisza
(Hungarian: “Tiszántúl”) and Transylvania – both of which lay
outside the main direction of conquest – to John Sigismund (de
facto to his guardian, Friar George Martinuzzi, a confidant of the
late King John Szapolyai) and let the region around Temesvár be
governed by Péter Petrovics (another proxy of John Szapolyai).
These two statesmen were, however, not appointed to office as
allied Hungarian leaders but as Ottoman district governors
(sancakbeyis) of special status. Their task was to prepare for
direct Ottoman rule in these eastern territories in the event of
– 97 –
the defeat of Ferdinand I of Habsburg. Evidently, Süleyman

was not considering the establishment of an eastern Hungarian
or Transylvanian vassal state at that time, for he had resolutely
rejected a proposal of such nature made by the Transylvanian
magnate István Mayláth in late 1540.201
Believing that as legitimately elected king he was entitled
to all the accessories of the crown, Ferdinand I also held a
claim to the eastern parts of Hungary. Thus, the future of the
Tiszántúl region and Transylvania became dependent on the
outcome of an inevitable conflict between the two great powers,
the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. The upcoming clash was also
destined to determine the fate of the whole of Central Europe.
The first act in the struggle ran its course in 1542 and 1543.
First, the German imperial troops besieged Pest, but their
efforts ended in complete failure.202 Then, in the following year,
the sultan turned his army against Vienna once more. While
achieving several notable successes in the course of his campaign
(he conquered Valpó [Valpovo, Ottoman Valpova], Pécs
[Peçuy], Siklós [Şikloş], Tata, Székesfehérvár [İstolni Belgrad]
and Esztergom [Estergon], thereby greatly strengthening Buda’s
position), he failed to reach Vienna, his main target.203 This
setback, however, did not discourage him. Indeed, in 1544 he set
about preparing for an even more ambitious and daring military
enterprise. Meanwhile the local Ottoman forces kept expanding
the frontiers of the occupied territory, conquering Visegrád
(Vişegrad), Nógrád (Novigrad) and Hatvan. The orders of the
201
Fodor, ‘Ottoman Policy’ , 324–333.
202
Árpád Károlyi, A Német Birodalom nagy hadi vállalata Magyarországon 1542-ben.
[The great military campaign of the German Empire in Hungary in 1542]. (Budapest,
1880).
203
Gábor Barta, ‘Adalékok az 1543. évi török hadjárat történetéhez [A contribution to the
history of the Ottoman campaign of 1543 in Hungary]’ , Hadtörténelmi Közlemények
106:3 (1993) 3–17. Mehmet İpçioğlu, ‘Kanunî Süleyman’ın Estergon (Esztergom)
Seferi 1543: Yeni Bir Kaynak’ , Osmanlı Araştırmaları 10 (1990) 137–159.
– 98 –
THE CAPTURE OF BUDA AND THE ROAD TO SZIGETVÁR
imperial council offer us glimpses of these preparations from

December 1544 onwards.
The Christian envoys in Istanbul had been warning for some
months that the sultan was planning a great military campaign
against Vienna in the following spring.204 The rumours were
also fuelled by the fact that the sovereign moved to Edirne
during the autumn. In past decades his wintering in Edirne and
hunting in its vicinity had been associated with the planning and
organisation of military campaigns against Hungary. And that
is exactly what happened this time. Between December and the
end of April, a series of orders were issued for the mobilisation
of the required material and human resources. Instructions
were given for the inspection of the weaponry and munitions
in Ottoman Hungary, for setting up the cannons, gun carriages
and the Mediterranean and Danube flotillas, for mustering
the Wallachian oarsmen and draught horses, for gathering
provisions for the army and shipping them to storehouses in
Buda and in Belgrade, and, finally, for the mobilisation of the
armed forces of the empire, especially the timar-holding sipahis.
Originally, the cavalry troops of 116 districts were expected to
go to war, but there were uncertainties even at the outset as to
which forces were to be deployed. Then, by mid-April, it became
clear that the lengthy and costly preparations had been to no
avail: the campaign was “postponed” (tehir olundı) as stated by
an entry subsequently written on the order of April 12.205
204
Mihnea Berindei – Gilles Veinstein, L’Empire ottoman et les pays roumains 1544–1545.
Études et documents. (Documents et recherches sur le monde byzantin, néohellénique
et balkanique, 14.) (Paris, Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 17. The two authors thoroughly
discuss this matter, especially the duties of the Voivode of Wallachia, on the following
pages.
205
İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, E. 12321, 212b. This mühimme defteri has been
published by Sahillioğlu, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi H. 951–952 Tarihli. The entry above
the order referred to here, however, has been rendered incorrectly (ibid., 370). The
firmans of the collection relating to Hungary and Central Europe were also published
(both in Ottoman-Turkish original and Hungarian translation) in Dávid – Fodor,
– 99 –
The reasons for the sultan’s decision are still unclear. It

seems likely, however, that the Ottoman leadership had been
rattled by the immense costs of recent land and sea campaigns,
discords among the members of the royal family, and, as
external causes, the cooperation between Georgia and Iran and
the peace treaty concluded between the French king, Francis I,
and Emperor Charles V in September 1544. In March 1544
they started negotiations with the envoys of Ferdinand I in
Istanbul.206 A lengthy and eventful bargaining process then
began, which soon included the envoy of Charles V, who made
a truce for one and a half years with Süleyman on November
10. In the end, the negotiating parties concluded a peace
treaty for five years on June 19, 1547 in Istanbul. The sultan
insisted on the fiction of his possessing the whole of Hungary.
Even so, de facto, he acknowledged the rule of Ferdinand I in
the territories that were indeed in Habsburg hands. In the
Ottoman interpretation this is why Ferdinand paid the annual
“tribute” of 30,000 gold coins (viewed as an “honourable gift”,
or Ehrengeschenk, by the Austrians), which was part of the
treaty.207
“Affairs of State Are Supreme”; the relevant entry: ibid., 180–183: No. 123. The orders
pertaining to the Rumanian principalities have been first brought out in facsimiles and
French translations by Berindei – Veinstein, L’Empire ottoman, 145–300.
206
Pál Török, I. Ferdinánd konstantinápolyi béketárgyalásai 1527–1547 [The peace
negotiations of King Ferdinand I in Constantinople 1527–1547]. (Értekezések a
történeti tudományok köréből, XXIV/12.) (Budapest, 1930), 94. Cf. Austro–Turcica
1541–1552. Diplomatische Akten des habsburgischen Gesandtschaftsverkehrs mit der
Hohen Pforte im Zeitalter Süleymans des Prächtigen. (Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, 95.)
Bearbeitet von Srećko M. Džaja unter Mitarbeit von Günter Weiß. In Verbindung mit
Mathias Bernath herausgegeben von Karl Nehring. (München, 1995), 37–41: Nos.
7–8, 89–90: No. 31. A Chronicle of the Early Safavīs Being the AÎsanu’t-Tawārīkh of
Íasan-i-Rūmlū. Vol. II. (English Translation). Translated by C. N. Seddon. (Baroda,
1934), 138–139.
207
Ernst Dieter Petritsch, ‘Der habsburgisch–osmanische Friedensvertrag des Jahres
1547’ , Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs 38 (1985) 49–80, esp. 54,
58. Cf. Idem, ‘Tribut oder Ehrengeschenk? Ein Beitrag zu den habsburgisch–
osmanischen Beziehungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts’ , in
Elisabeth Springer – Leopold Kammerhofer et al. (eds.), Archiv und Forschung. Das
– 100 –
The compromise between the two great powers and their

sharing of territories in Hungary gradually put the eastern
parts of the country into a new orbit. As indicated in the orders
of the imperial council of this period, the two “sancaks” created
by Süleyman had been under close Ottoman supervision even
before the peace treaty of 1547. Indeed, Istanbul had given
instructions to Friar George Martinuzzi and to Petrovics in
the same manner as to the Ottoman sancakbeyis. Similarly to
the latter, the former were required to provide provision for
the Ottoman army; in addition, they were constantly under
pressure to hand over fortresses. The absence of a further
decisive campaign meant that Transylvania and Temesköz
avoided annexation. The sultan and his advisors seem to
have seen a feasible solution in the two political entities,
which were relatively independent in their internal affairs
and dependent on the Ottoman rather than the Habsburg
court.208 Petrovics turned out to be a willing and submissive
partner, as his sancak was adjacent to the Ottoman territories
and he also needed support from the Porte to counterbalance
the increasing pressure from Friar George (not to mention
the fact that Petrovics also hoped that Istanbul would assist
in protecting the interests of the young prince and Queen
Isabella).209
In contrast, the sultan’s court badly misjudged Friar George.
Since the fall of Buda, the friar had been working incessantly on
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und
Europas. (Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, 20.) (Wien, München, 1993),
49–58. Sándor Papp, ‘Kárrendezési kísérletek a hódoltságban az 1547. évi békekötés
után [Attempts at compensation in Ottoman Hungary after the peace treaty of 1547]’ ,
Keletkutatás 1996. ősz – 2002. tavasz, 153–155.
208
Berindei – Veinstein, L’Empire ottoman, 31–40.
209
Gábor Barta, Az erdélyi fejedelemség születése [The birth of the Principality of
Transylvania]. (Magyar História) (Budapest, 1979), 103–104.
– 101 –
bringing Transylvania under the sway of the Habsburg king.210

But he had to keep postponing the execution of this plan because
of unfavourable military conditions and had to regain the
goodwill of the Ottomans over and over again. In 1549, however,
the pace of events quickened. In September, representatives
of Friar George and the king renewed an agreement aimed
at uniting Transylvania and the so-called Partium (an area of
eastern Hungary situated between the Ottoman territories and
Transylvania which would be incorporated into Transylvania
in 1571) under Ferdinand’s sceptre. They also agreed on
compensation for Isabella and John Sigismund and on the
appointment of Friar George to govern Transylvania on behalf
of the king. While earlier attempts had made little impact, the
Treaty of Nyírbátor of September 8, 1549 resulted in quite
a stir in high politics. The displeased Queen Isabella and her
followers had their share in fuelling the discord, openly opposing
the Nyírbátor arrangement. In the summer of 1550, they even
made formal accusations against Friar George at the Porte.
In the meantime the sultan’s court had come to know of the
negotiations between Friar George and Ferdinand I, but for the
time being it made do with only ordering, by way of a messenger
(çavuş), the Transylvanians to depose the governor and kill him.
A civil war thus broke out in Transylvania in September, but by
the end of the year the supporters of the queen (who were also
assisted by the Voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia, the pasha
of Buda and other Ottoman contingents) had been defeated by
the troops of Friar George.
For his goals, motivations and the key events, see Gábor Barta, Vajon kié az ország?
210
[Whose is the country?]. (Labirintus) (Budapest, [1988]).
– 102 –
THE TRANSYLVANIAN CRISIS OF 1551–52

AND THE LIMITS OF IMPERIAL POLITICS
When, in the summer of 1551, Ferdinand I officially made

known to the Porte the occupation of Transylvania,211 Süleyman
had but one means to protect his “possession”: military action.
He sent off his armies and vassals to attack Transylvania from
two directions, from the Temesköz and from the east. The
smart tactics of Friar George, however, made the Ottoman
military leadership apprehensive, and on top of that the military
actions did not bring the expected result (i.e. the occupation of
Temesvár).212 The failures of the governor-general (beylerbeyi)
of Rumelia and the assassination of Friar George at the turn of
1551–52 led the sultan’s court to reconsider its strategy and to
deploy more powerful forces to resolve the situation.
The events of 1551–52 have been extensively discussed
in Hungarian and international scholarship,213 and so I shall
focus in the following on those details and relationships that
have tended to be ignored or which cannot be properly assessed
without the information furnished by the orders of the Ottoman
imperial council.
211
The date of Ferdinand’s statement is corrected and his arguments are summarised by
Sándor Papp, ‘Die diplomatischen Bemühungen der Habsburger um Siebenbürgen in
den Jahren 1551–1552’ , Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 89 (1999)
109–133, esp. 111. On Ferdinand’s administration of Transylvania, see Teréz Oborni,
Erdély pénzügyei I. Ferdinánd uralma alatt 1552–1556 [The finances of Transylvania
under the rule of Ferdinand I 1552–1556]. (Fons Könyvek, 1.) (Budapest, 2002).
212
On the Hungarian war of 1551–52, see Imre Szántó, Küzdelem a török terjeszkedés
ellen Magyarországon. Az 1551–52. évi várháborúk. [Struggle against the Ottoman
expansion in Hungary: the siege wars of 1551–52]. (Budapest, 1985).
213
Szántó, Küzdelem. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, Vol. IV, 565–586. For the
Habsburg diplomatic documents of these years, see Austro-Turcica 1541–1552.
– 103 –
The sultan’s participation in the military campaign

in Hungary
In early 1552, Süleyman was preoccupied by the situation in

the Ottoman–Iranian–Georgian borderlands where a possible
Safavid attack posed a real threat. He wrote the following in his
order to the governor-general of Erzurum on January 28: “Surely,
this summer my imperial departure shall be for that region.”214
In the following month, however, the crisis in Transylvania
arose, and the probability of sending the entire Ottoman army
against Hungary and of the sultan personally commanding the
“imperial campaign” increased. The imperial council had been
mobilising the troops from mid-January. It called the eastern
beylerbeyis, the janissaries stationed in the Rumelian districts
and the Voivode of Wallachia to arms and began an inspection
of the fortresses in the province of Buda. The governor-general
of Rumelia, at war since the preceding year, was informed about
the death of Friar George and was instructed to keep an eye on
Transylvania and to make a comprehensive survey of the roads
between the Danube and Temesvár and to assess where bridges
needed to be built (a latter order shows that such an assessment
was made for the whole of Transylvania). An extraordinary war
tax in kind (nüzül) was levied to obtain provisions from the
subjects of the empire, Wallachia and Moldavia. Further, the
two voivodeships and the districts of Semendire (Smederevo,
Szendrő), Vidin, Niğbolu (Nikopol), İzvornik (Zvornik),
Alacahisar (Kruševac) and Bosna (Bosnia) were instructed
to round up more than 100,000 sheeps. The imperial council
also arranged for the collection of victuals and ordered the
preparation of transport ships on the Danube (for which the
sancaks on the Lower Danube became primarily responsible).
İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, 40a.

214
– 104 –
The Voivode of Wallachia was prohibited twice from selling

foodstuffs to the allegedly starving Transylvanians.
Nevertheless, as time went by, more and more signs indic
ated that despite the hints and allusions, the ruler had no
intention of coming to Hungary in person. In an order of
March 6, 1552 to the governor-general of Van, which once
more ordained the mobilisation of ten vilayets, he announced
his decision on this matter: “My noble departure shall be for
that side (i.e. Asia Minor).”215 He made it even clearer on March
22, when replying to a letter from his son, Mustafa. In the letter
he informed Yahya, the tutor of the prince, as follows: “There
is no such matter that would lead me in my felicitous person
to move against the miserable heathens. Should an imperial
campaign become necessary, my victorious departure shall be
for the eastern parts of the country. … For the time being, my
noble person does not intend to launch a campaign against the
land of the Hungarian infidels.”216 Süleyman thus indicated
that he considered the situation on the eastern borders more
important or more dangerous in that given moment and that he
was planning on expelling the Habsburgs from Transylvania by
merely winning over the Transylvanians and sending a smaller
number of troops.217 He entrusted the command of military
operations in Hungary to three men: Sokollu Mehmed Pasha,
215
Teveccüh-i hümayunum ol canibleredür. İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi,
Koğuşlar 888, 104b.
216
Zat-i saadet-simatumuz (?) ile küffar-i haksar üzerine azimet iktiza eder maslahat yokdur.
Sefer-i hümayun lazım gelürse teveccüh-i feth-makrunumuz diyar-i şarkadur. … Şimdi
zat-i şerifümle küffar-i Macar caniblerine sefer niyeti yokdur. İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı
Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, 130b–131a. Dávid – Fodor, „Affairs of State”,
340–342: No. 110.
217
Though subsequently he made contradictory statements, this clearly served the
purpose of keeping his senior office-holders in both parts of the empire in uncertainty,
thus leading them to make even more thorough preparations. He motivated them
also by exaggerating or suppressing certain information. For instance, he wrote to the
beylerbeyi of Buda that he was going to send 5,000 janissaries to Hungary, albeit he
actually dispatched 2,000 men there.
– 105 –
governor-general of Rumelia, Hadım Ali Pasha, governor-

general of Buda, and second vizier Kara Ahmed Pasha. He
nominated Ahmed Pasha as commander-in-chief (serdar) of the
Hungarian campaign (we hear of this for the first time on April
2, 1552), authorizing him to act as he saw fit.
Ottoman military objectives and the expeditionary army
The contents of the orders of the imperial council show that

both in the preparatory phase and after the cancellation of the
sultan’s participation the main Ottoman military goal was the
occupation of Transylvania. Beginning in January, many letters
were sent to men of all stations in that part of the country and
to the two neighbouring voivodes. The essence of the sultan’s
argument was that the turmoil and problems in Transylvania
were due to the treason of Friar George and the fact that he was
in cahoots with the Austrians. His death, however, cleared the
slate and the sultan offered the Transylvanians an opportunity
for repentance: if they came to heel again, took up arms against
the intruders and stood in support of John Sigismund and the
queen, he would forgive them and they would find favour with
him again as his “vassals”. If they helped reinstate the earlier
situation, Transylvania would be re-established as a sancak of
the sultan and would be returned to the son of King John. Based
on the information it received, the sultan’s court sensed that the
Székelys (Siculi) and the Saxons were the principal opponents of
the Austrians seizing power, and so in letters of a friendly tone,
it made attempts to separate them from the Christian camp.
The planning of military actions began in parallel with
political preparations. In the second half of January, when the
participation of the sultan was still uncertain, the Ottoman
military leadership considered launching a major offensive
from several directions. Naturally, it intended the main strike
– 106 –
to be made against Transylvania. According to the first scenario,

the troops from the province of Karaman and the armies of
the Moldavian voivode and the Crimean khan were to attack
from the east under the command of Osman Pasha, governor-
general of Karaman. By ravaging and looting the region, they
were to discourage the Transylvanians from resisting (as is
written in many letters: “Do not leave one stone upon another
in Transylvania”). The second and bigger army – even if it was
never confirmed in writing – would evidently have been tasked
with smashing the Transylvanian defence from another side by
invading the Temesköz and then by occupying Transylvania.
At the same time, the bey of Bosna, Mehmed Pasha, for this
purpose appointed commander-in-chief (serasker), was to have
marched to Esztergom (Estergon) with soldiers from Bosnia,
Pojega (Požega), Buda and Sirem (Syrmium, Szerémség) and
with the raiding akıncıs given to him to establish a bridgehead
providing access to Habsburg Hungary. His further tasks were
not detailed, but presumably he would have been expected to
block any kind of assistance provided to Transylvania from the
territory of Habsburg Hungary. And lastly, a military formation
under the command of the district governor (sancakbeyi) of
Hersek (Herzegovina) was to have attempted a breakthrough
at Zagreb by launching an attack with the akıncı against the
Christian border defence system in Croatia.
This well-formulated plan, which incorporated diversionary
elements, was undermined by an attack launched by the heyducks
of Mihály Tóth against Szeged (Segedin) at dawn on February
21, as well as by reports concerning the movement of Christian
armies in Croatia and the threat posed to Esztergom and
Székesfehérvár (İstolni Belgrad). After the beylerbeyi of Buda
had liberated Szeged and reinforced the defence of his province,
the sultan’s court amended the military goals and organised the
available troops as follows.
– 107 –
1. The Moldavian voivode was entrusted with the task

of invading Transylvania from the east together with the
sancakbeyi of Bursa, Behram (who was commanded first
to Nikopol, then to Silistre), the Crimean khan (or the
commander delegated on his behalf ) and the sancakbeyi of
Kırk Kilise. Nevertheless, the final setup was established in a
flexible manner as reorganisations had to be made several times
due to the possibility of Polish and Cossack incursions. The
Crimean khan (whose invitation to battle was later rescinded
temporarily) did not come to Hungary, but went to carry out
a raid on Russia (his arrival in Hungary was made hopeless
by the military campaign of the Muscovites against Kazan
the same year). Thus, the Tatars played merely a psychological
role in operations: for some months, the Ottoman leadership
threatened the Transylvanians with an invasion of 30–40,000
marauding Tatars. Concurrently with the manoeuvre of the
Moldavian voivode, the combined troops of the Voivode of
Wallachia and of Sinan, district governor of Teke, had to raid
Transylvania from the south (for a short period of time it
seemed the sancakbeyi of Aydın would join them, but soon he
was commanded to return to Anatolia).
2. Having occupied Temesköz, the main army under the
command of Kara Ahmed Pasha was to launch an attack
against Transylvania. True, we only know of this latter plan
from the allusions of the commands given to the troops that
were gathering on the other side and from the repeated reports
of the projected smashing of Transylvania on two fronts. Such
instructions were presumably transmitted verbally to the com
manders-in-chief.
The corps of Kara Ahmed Pasha was composed of the
following forces.
a) Court infantry and cavalry elite troops placed directly
under him: 2,000 janissaries, armbearers (silahtars; their exact
– 108 –
number is unknown, approximately 2,000 men),218 the salaried

men of the right wing (ulufeciyan-i yemin; based on earlier
and later figures approximately 1,000 men).219 In addition,
the district governor of Silistre with the armoured Tatars of
Dobruja, the district governor of Vize with the sipahis of Mora
(Morea), a large part of the Rumelian akıncıs and conscripted
members of the Rumelian paramilitary and peasant soldier
units (müsellem, yürük, etc.) were also commanded to join
the commander-in-chief. Further, many volunteers and 4,000
cerehors (workers) accompanied them.
b) The governor-general of Rumelia with the sancaks
subordinated to him. They faced a major problem; namely they
lacked food at the meeting place in Sirem. Apparently, the food
shortage was due to the war in the preceding year. They had
no choice but to spend the winter far away from the theatre of
war around Üsküb (Skopje) and Köstendil (Kyustendil) and to
reassemble there before marching to Semendire.
3. The troops of the governor-general of Buda were to go
to Transdanubia and to Upper Hungary (Felföld, Felvidék,
today Slovakia) to tie down the Hungarian–Habsburg forces
(consequently, the plan for the bey of Bosna to cross the Danube
at Esztergom would be abandoned). The raid at Szeged resulted
in a mild panic among the Ottoman leaders. In response, the
pasha of Buda was given, in addition to the troops of his own
218
1,593 and 2,785 people in 1527 and in 1567 respectively (Gyula Káldy-Nagy, ‘The
First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 31:2 [1977] 168). In 1543 we see only 297 silahtars in
Süleyman’s army (cf. İpçioğlu, ‘Kanunî Süleyman’ın Estergon seferi’ , 140) though this
simply means that the sultan did not take along the majority of them to Hungary.
219
589 men in 1527 (Ömer Lütfi Barkan, ‘933–934 [M. 1527–1528] Malî Yılına Ait Bir
Bütçe Örneği’ , İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 15:1–4 [1953–1954]
300) and 1,337 men in 1567 (Ömer Lütfi Barkan, ‘H. 974–975 [M. 1567–1568] Malî
Yılına Âit Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi’ , İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 19:1–4
[1957–1958] 306). In 1543, 232 ulufecis of the right wing participated in the military
campaign in Hungary (İpçioğlu, ‘Kanunî Süleyman’ın’ , 140).
– 109 –
– 110 –
province, the district governors of İzvornik, Semendire, Sirem,

Vidin, Alacahisar and Vulçitrin (Vučitrn) as well as the timariot
cavalry of their sancaks. In the end, the soldiery of İzvornik,
Semendire, Sirem and Alacahisar showed up (although the
troops of Vulçitrin may possibly have arrived too). While the
İzvornik troops left the pasha’s side after Veszprém (Besperim)
had been taken, the rest remained with him for the duration of
the campaign.
4. The forces that were stationed in the Bosnian–Croatian
(Slavonian) borderlands (the troops of the sancakbeyi of Bosna)
were to stay put and undertake a defensive task, while the rest (the
soldiers of Pojega, Klis and Hersek) would reinforce the armies
of the pashas of Buda and Rumelia. In view of the diversionary
manoeuvres of the soldiers of the Christian border fortresses
and the Ottoman side’s fear of the Christian hand-gunners, the
district governor of Pojega, Ulama Bey, managed not only to
get an authorisation to stay where he was, but also to secure an
order commanding the troops of the sancaks of Klis and Hersek
to the defence of the Slavonian border, as well as 160 garrison
soldiers equipped with muskets from the sancak of Hersek to
his service.220 Meanwhile, the district governors of Ankara and
Üsküb were also sent there as reinforcements, though later on
we lose sight of them, the former being most likely deployed to
the eastern part of the empire. Eventually, in the course of July,
the sultan’s court took a new stance, commanding the troops
led by Mehmed, the sancakbeyi of Bosna, and by Ulama Bey to
attack the parts of Slavonia controlled by the Hungarians.
Based on the above incomplete data, the strength of the
Ottoman military forces operating in Hungary in 1552 can be
established as follows.
For the life and career of Ulama Bey, see Géza Dávid, ‘Ulama bey, an Ottoman Office-
220
Holder with Persian Connections on the Hungarian Borders’ , in Jeremiás (ed.), Irano–
Turkic Cultural Contacts, 33–40.
– 111 –
The army of commander-in-chief Kara Ahmed Pasha

court mercenary troops
(included armourers, artillerymen), ca. 5,000
the troops commanded by the two sancakbeyis, ca. 1,000
The army of the beylerbeyi of Rumelia, ca. 10,000
The army of the beylerbeyi of Buda, ca. 10,000
Troops from Pojega, Klis, Bosna, ca. 4,000
Others (akıncıs, soldiers from the two Romanian
voivodships and from the districts of Asia Minor) 10,000
Total (including camp folk, etc.), ca. 40,000
The results of the Ottoman military campaign of 1552

in Hungary
1. In the end the greatest achievement of the main Ottoman

army in Hungary was the capture of Temesvár (Temeşvar)
and the Temesköz region together with Lippa (Lipova) and
Solymos (Solmoş), this latter having been occupied without a
siege because – according to Hungarian sources – its defender,
Bernardo de Aldana, cowardly fled.221 Though Kara Ahmed
Pasha reported just the opposite, it may well be that his aim,
as commander-in-chief, was to amplify the military merits
before the sultan. Afterwards he marched to Szolnok (Solnok)
instead of Transylvania, where he joined the army of the pasha
of Buda, easily occupied the castle, and then, with Hadım Ali
Pasha, attempted (in vain) to capture Eger (Eğri).222 As shown
221
Ferenc Szakály (publ.), Bernardo de Aldana magyarországi hadjárata [1548–1552]
[The Hungarian campaign of Bernardo de Aldana]. Translated by László Scholz.
(Budapest, 1986), 244–246. Cf. Zoltán Korpás, ‘La correspondencia de un soldado
espanol de las guerras en Hungría a mediados del siglo XVI. Comentarios al diario de
Bernardo de Aldana (1548–1552)’ , Hispania 60/3: 206 (2000) 881–910.
222
Szántó, Küzdelem, 153–255. For a historical novel narrating the siege with great
accuracy, see Géza Gárdonyi, Eğri Yıldızları (Egri csillagok). Translated from the
Hungarian by Erdal Şalikoğlu. (İstanbul, 2013).
– 112 –
by one of his reports, he took a total of 21 fortresses (among

them ten royal castles) from the Hungarians. He kept five of
these and the rest he claims to have had demolished. Because of
the high number of volunteers, he approved of several raids in
the region of Szolnok and Várad (Nagyvárad, Oradea, Varat)
where, according to his certainly exaggerated figures, his soldiers
took 30,000 captives.
In the thick of military actions, Kara Ahmed Pasha set
about organising the vilayet of Temeşvar, a task that seems – in
view of the speed of developments – to have been decided upon
some time before.223 Before anything else, the garrison troops
of the chosen centre, Temeşvar, had to be set up. First, 750 men
were redeployed to the castle from Becse (Beçey) and Becskerek
(Beçkerek). Then, Kara Ahmed Pasha requested authorisation
for the recruitment of another 1,600 garrison soldiers.224 For
the fiscal administration of the province, he appointed Mustafa,
an employee of the treasury, as finance director (defterdar) and,
with a daily wage of 40 akçes, he assigned the former judge of
Beçe, Abdulfettah, to administer legal services as kadı. Being
extremely familiar with the borderlands in Hungary, Kasim
223
Some of this information was used by Gyula Káldy-Nagy (A budai szandzsák 1559.
évi összeírása [The cadastral survey of 1559 of the sanjak of Buda]. [Pest megye
múltjából, 3.] [Budapest, 1977], 10: note 2), Pál Fodor (‘Das Wilajet von Temeschwar
zur Zeit der osmanischen Eroberung’ , Südost-Forschungen 55 [1996] 25–44) and by
Cristina Feneşan in her monograph on Ottoman culture in the province of Temeşvar
(Cultura otomană a vilayetului Timişoara. [Timişoara, 2004], esp. 25–55). On the
450th anniversary of the occupation of Temesvár by the Ottomans, the University of
Timişoara published a book that, in summing up the available information, contains
references to the establishment of the province too: Vilayetul Timişoara (450 de ani de
intemeiere a paşalâcului 1552–2002). (Timişoara, 2002).
224
The only pay register so far available for these years provides information about the
soldiers deployed here and to Lipova; see İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi,
Maliyeden Müdevver, 77. In actual fact, 787 soldiers were transferred from the two
mentioned fortresses, 496 of which were sent to Temeşvar and 291 to Lipova. On this,
see Klára Hegyi, A török hódoltság várai és várkatonasága [The Ottoman fortresses and
fortress garrisons in Hungary]. (História könyvtár. Kronológiák, adattárak, 9.) Vol.
III. (Budapest, 2007), 1351.
– 113 –
Pasha was given the post of governor-general of Temeşvar with

a revenue grant of 800,000 akçes. Prior to this, he had been
appointed to administer the double sancak of Beçe–Beçkerek,
then Lipova and from here he was reassigned to Temeşvar.225
In Kara Ahmed Pasha’s view, the vilayet of Temeşvar was a
“wedge” or “cornerstone” (köşe) which, in conjunction with Buda
and Bosnia, would help to protect Ottoman interests in Central
Europe.226
In contrast to Kara Ahmed Pasha’s obvious accomplishments,
the attack against Transylvania from the other side of the
Carpathian Mountains resulted only in a very modest success.
As mentioned above, the military forces of the Crimean khan
failed to show up, while the district governor of Kırk Kilise
received orders to defend Özü because of the unrest of the
Cossacks. Meanwhile, the Voivode of Wallachia together with
the district governor of Teke acted to sabotage the ordered
incursion from the south. In the end, military action was
limited to the Voivode of Moldavia and the sancakbeyi of Bursa
invading the Székely region and the environs of Brassó (Brașov)
through the Ojtoz (Oituz) pass. They ravaged and looted for
nearly sixteen days, but after having been severely beaten by the
two vice-voivodes of Transylvania, they rapidly withdrew to
the other side of the Carpathian Mountains. In his reports sent
to the Porte, the voivode wildly exaggerated his feats: he told
about the occupation and the torching of twenty-four fortresses
and castles, and about enormous spoils, for which the Porte
rewarded him with a robe of honour.
2. Similarly to Kara Ahmed Pasha, the governor-general of
Buda, Hadım Ali Pasha, accomplished victory after victory in
225
For information on his career, see Géza Dávid, ‘An Ottoman Military Career on
the Hungarian Borders: Kasım Voyvoda, Bey and Pasha’ , in Dávid – Fodor (eds.),
Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs, 265–297.
226
Cf. Fodor, ‘Das Wilajet von Temeschwar’ , 31.
– 114 –
Transdanubia and at the borders of Nógrád (Novigrad) until

the siege of Eger. He captured Veszprém (Besperim), Drégely
(Dregel), Ság (Şag), Gyarmat (Garmat), Szécsény (Seçen),
Hollókő (Holloka) and Buják (Buyak). His most remarkable
feat of arms was at Palást (Plášťovce) where, in an open field
battle, he utterly destroyed the royal army led by Erasmus von
Teuffel.
3. Following their initial vacillation, the Ottoman forces
made considerable progress in Slavonia. In addition to thirteen
fortresses of different sizes, the district governors of Pojega
and Bosna, Ulama Bey and Mehmed Pasha, captured Verőce
(Virovitica) and then proceeded towards Zagreb, reaching the
River Csázma (Čazma) and capturing the fortress of Csázma
(Zacaşna in Ottoman Turkish), which in subsequent years
became the centre of a new sancak.
Despite these remarkable achievements, the Ottoman
military campaign in Hungary failed to deliver the expected
results. In this regard, the following question arises: Why did
the Ottoman military command change its original strategy
and why did Kara Ahmed Pasha turn against Eger rather than
against Transylvania? Imre Szántó, monographer of the events
of that year, believed that the idea for a campaign in Transylvania
occurred to Ahmed Pasha after the early success in Temesköz.
It was then that he sought authorisation from the sultan.227
Based on Ottoman documents, the reality seems different, since
these clearly refer to an earlier plan for attacking Transylvania
from two sides. Nevertheless, a certain hesitation on the part of
the Ottoman leadership in August is evident. Referring to the
Hungarian chronicler Nicolaus Istvánffy, Szántó wrote that the
direction of the campaign was changed mainly because Hadım
Ali Pasha, the beylerbeyi of Buda, urged the occupation of those
Szántó, Küzdelem, 137.

227
– 115 –
castles that represented a threat to Buda and from which attacks

could be launched against the territories under Ottoman rule.
Szántó also adds that Kara Ahmed Pasha himself was beset
by doubts because of reports he had received which may have
exaggerated the strength of the Transylvanian defence.228
In my opinion, the explanation given by Istvánffy and
subsequently by Szántó gets to the core of the problem. The
main reason for the disputes and hostility between Ferdinand
I and the Ottomans in the preceding years lay in their differing
interpretation of the treaty concluded in 1547.229 According to the
ratification document issued by the sultan in the autumn of 1547,
Ferdinand I was liable to pay a “tribute” of 30,000 gold coins for
the Hungarian territories under his control. The king, however,
kept stressing what they had originally agreed upon, namely that
out of the 30,000 gold coins only 10,000 was an “honourable gift”
(Ehrengeschenk), while the rest (two sums of 5,000 gold coins) was
payable as redemption for the estates of two important Hungarian
aristocrats: Péter Perényi (who had been arrested by Ferdinand I
in 1542) and Bálint Török (who had been arrested and taken to
Istanbul by Sultan Süleyman in 1541) and as compensation for
other disputed lands. Around 1543, the land which the Ottomans
referred to as the “district (liva) of Péter Perényi”230 covered Eger
and the Diocese of Eger, the dependencies of which were mainly
under Ottoman rule. As the king and the Hungarian nobility
saw it, the garrison troops of Eger and Szolnok were entitled – in
compliance with the treaty – to pay regular visits to the occupied
228
Szántó. Küzdelem, 138. Cf. Miklós Istvánffy, Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája. Tállyai
Pál XVII. századi fordításában [His history of the deeds of the Hungarians rendered
into Hungarian by Pál Tállyai in the seventeenth century]. Vol. I/2, 13–24. Books.
Edited by Péter Benits. (Budapest, 2003), 204.
229
Petritsch, ‘Der habsburgisch–osmanische Friedensvertrag’. Papp, ‘Kárrendezési
kísérletek’.
230
Géza Dávid, ‘Incomes and Possessions of the Beglerbegis of Buda in the Sixteenth
Century’ , in Veinstein (publ.), Soliman le Magnifique, 395: note 3.
– 116 –
territory, collecting taxes from Ottoman subjects and managing

the diocesan estates as their own.231 (With reference to this
situation, Ferdinand I followed the same logic when asking for
Transylvania from the sultan in the summer of 1551: he would
undertake to pay the annual tribute of the province and so gain
possession over it, in a similar fashion to the situation in the
Ottoman-ruled territories.)232 The governor-general of Buda
was right, therefore, to argue that the liquidation of the two
aforementioned castles (Eger and Szolnok) was indispensable to
the consolidation of Ottoman rule in Hungary, as this would have
eliminated for good all legal and military grounds for Hungarian
action in the occupied territories.
Nevertheless, another long-term consideration lay behind
the change in strategy. In his description of the siege of Eger,
the contemporary János Zsámboki mentions a letter written
by Hadım Ali Pasha of Buda to the commander-in-chief Kara
Ahmed Pasha.233 The letter allegedly contained the following:
“…He reported that the occupation of Hungary is being greatly
hindered by Eger and Szolnok, and so he wishes to put these
castles under siege so that nothing should thwart the further
victories. He (Ali Pasha) hopes that the capture of these places
will succeed with small forces, because the royal army has
recently been routed and thus the Christians have no hope of
receiving support from anywhere else.”234 If these words were
231
Papp, ‘Kárrendezési kísérletek’ , 141–160, esp. 153–155.
232
Papp, ‘Die diplomatischen Bemühungen’ , 111–117.
233
Johannes Sambucus was his humanist (Latin) name. He was a noted Hungarian
philologist and polymath of the sixteenth century, and from 1565 onward the
court historian of Maximilian I, King of Hungary. For the king, who did not know
Hungarian, he translated into Latin prose the historical song Egervár viadaláról (On
the siege of the Castle of Eger) by Sebestyén Tinódi. Zsámboki mentions the letter
referred to here in this work.
234
Sándor Mika (ed.), Magyar történelmi olvasókönyv. II. rész. Magyarország történelme
a mohácsi vésztől a tizennyolcadik század végéig [Hungarian historical reading-book.
Second part: A history of Hungary from the battle of Mohács to the end of the
eighteenth century]. (Budapest, 1907), 33. Cf. Szántó, Küzdelem, 138.
– 117 –
true, it would mean that Hadım Ali Pasha urged a return to the
initial Hungarian policy of the Ottomans – an expansion at the
expense of Habsburg Hungary and the renewal of the offensive
against Ferdinand I. An order issued by the imperial council
appears to confirm the accuracy of this information, providing
insights into Hadım Ali Pasha’s thinking. Accordingly, it seems
that after the battle of Palást (August 9–10, 1552) the pasha
proposed that “if he received approval for placing new garrisons
in the fortresses of Şag, Garmat and Seçen in sufficient number
and the demolished parts of the forts were repaired and guarded,
then, within a short period of time, the whole of Hungary, the
mines, the major cities and castles of the mining district could
surely be occupied and thus the revenues from these areas would
cover the expenditures.”235 Hadım Ali Pasha seems to have set
his sights on conquering one of the richest regions of Hungary at
the time, Upper Hungary (Felföld, Felvidék). His starting point
was the assumption (often the subject of Ottoman fantasies)
that the budget deficit of the occupied territories could be
offset by means of revenues received from these areas.236 These
arguments were appealing to Kara Ahmed Pasha; using his
granted right of absolute authority (and presumably asking for
the approval of the sultan’s court), he abandoned the idea of
235
Şöyle ki Şag ve Garmat ve Seçen kalelerine yeniden kifayet mikdarı nefer inayet olunub
tamire muhtac olan yerleri termim olunub hıfz ve hiraset oluna, az zamanda külliyen
vilayet-i Macar ve banalar semtinde olan maadin ve muazzam varoşlar ve kaleler
zabt olunub hasılı harcına yetişmek mukarrerdür. İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi
Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, 381b–382b. Dávid – Fodor, “Affairs of State”, 596–600:
No. 320.
236
The mines of Upper Hungary had already aroused the attention of the governor-
general of Buda in 1549 when the Hungarian grandee Menyhért Balassa, besieged by
the troops of Ferdinand I, offered him the castle of Szitnya (Hrad Sitno) together with
the neighbouring mines in return for his help in protecting the rest of the fortresses
possessed by him. Still, the pasha did not dare breach the peace treaty openly; on this
incident, see Szakály (publ.), Bernardo de Aldana, 73. An Ottoman document written
around 1593 says that a Hungarian mining town would have been worth more than
the whole territory conquered from the Persians; cf. Joseph von Hammer, Geschichte
des osmanischen Reiches... Bd. IV. 1574–1623. (Pest, 1829), 643.
– 118 –
occupying Transylvania and turned against Szolnok instead. In

his decision, he may have been influenced by the absence of the
anticipated reinforcements from the east. An additional factor
was the murder of the Voivode of Moldavia, who had been
expected to mobilise his forces. The assassination of the voivode
took place with the support of Giovanni Battista Castaldo, the
commander-in-chief of the Habsburg–Hungarian forces sent
to defend the Temesköz and Transylvania. There were also
reports about the desertion of Ottoman soldiers.
Thanks to Hadım Ali Pasha, the eastern part of Hungary was
spared from Ottoman occupation. It set out on the path that would
lead to the establishment of the Principality of Transylvania in
1556 and to the acceptance of Ottoman vassal status. Although
this was much less than expected by the Ottomans in 1552, in
the end they acquiesced to this development since it was not too
far from the temporary arrangement made by the sultan’s court
after 1541 in this region. A bigger problem from the Ottomans’
perspective was the failure of the modified plan of 1552, namely
the occupation of Eger. The results are well-known: the expansion
towards Upper Hungary came to a halt; and with the exception of
a couple of years, the vilayet of Buda produced constant deficits,
while the problem of double taxation in the occupied territories
intensified, causing much damage to the conquerors.237
Consequently, the year 1552 did not bring gains to
the Ottomans commensurate to the losses suffered by the
Hungarians. The clearest proof of the Ottoman leadership
being of this opinion lies in the fact that apart from a brief entry
in one of the firmans of the imperial council confirming that
Kara Ahmed Pasha had captured Szolnok and then marched
Ferenc Szakály, Magyar adóztatás a török hódoltságban [Hungarian taxation on

237
territory under Ottoman rule]. Budapest, 1981. Klára Hegyi, ‘The Financial Position
of the Vilayets in Hungary in the 16th–17th Centuries’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 61:1–2 (2008) 77–85.
– 119 –
– 120 –
against Eger, there is not a word in the orders (even though

available until the end of the year) about the siege of the castle
and the termination of the military campaign. If there were no
other sources on these events, we would not even know of the
Ottomans having laid siege to the “Gate of Upper Hungary”.
The limits of imperial politics
Still, it would be wrong to view the failures of the Ottoman Empire

in Hungary as being rooted solely in the interim modification of
goals, in the mistakes of the local military leadership, or in a lack
of time (even though this latter factor clearly played a role in the
fiasco at Eger). The primary reason for failure lay in the absence of
clearly defined aims or strategies on the part of the leaders of the
empire. In 1552, Ottoman decision-making became particularly
difficult, as there were many other problems to solve elsewhere in
and around the empire.
1. After they regained their freedom of movement in 1550,
the French re-established cooperation with the Ottomans,
and in 1551 a war in the Mediterranean with Charles V broke
out anew. The Ottoman naval fleet occupied Tripoli in Libya,
and from the autumn of 1551, similarly to 1543–1544, the
two allies proceeded to set up a joint sea operation combined
with a land-attack by the French against Naples. Though the
Ottoman Empire threw a lot of money and other resources at
the undertaking in 1552 (120 ships set sail with 5,000 men
aboard and they were accompanied by two to three ships of
the French envoy), the fleet had to return without any tangible
results owing to organisational and provisional difficulties and
due to shortness of time.238
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip
238
II. Vol. II. Translated from the French by Siân Reynolds. (New York, Hagerstown,
San Francisco, London, 1973), 911–926, 974–992. Stéphan Yerasimos, ‘Les relations
– 121 –
2. Besides these diverse engagements and after a prolonged

period of passivity, it was at this time that the imperial court
committed itself to take up arms against the Portuguese in the
Indian Ocean with a view to obtaining a bigger slice from the
cake of long-distance trade. They ventured to push forward from
two directions: from Iraq and from the Red Sea. In December
1546, the governor-general of Baghdad occupied Basra, which
became the centre of an independent province (beylerbeyilik). In
1550, Ottoman troops invaded Lahsa on the western side of the
Persian Gulf, establishing a sancak around its port, Qatif. They
also erected a fortress packed with cannons near Bahrain. After
such arrangements, in 1552 the Porte considered that the time
had come to occupy the whole of Arab Iraq (the region between
Baghdad and Basra) and to launch an attack against Hormuz
Island, which lay under Portuguese rule at the time. The first task
was completed by the beylerbeyi of Baghdad during the spring.
Reinforced with the armies of Diyarbekir and Karaman, as well
as some troops of the Porte, he captured the wet and marshy
lands called Cezayir, situated to the northeast of Basra at the
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates. Its strongest fortress,
Medina, was made into the centre of a new beylerbeyilik, and
the governor-general of Basra was transferred to govern it in the
future. Medina’s conqueror, the beylerbeyi of Baghdad, however,
stayed there for months, because the organisation of the new
administrative-military unit was beset by many difficulties.
Meanwhile in April 1552, Piri Reis launched an Ottoman fleet
of 25 galleys and 4 galleons (kalyon) from Suez with 850 soldiers
aboard to take Hormuz away from the Portuguese. On the way,
franco–ottomanes et la prise de Tripoli en 1551’ , in Veinstein (publ.), Soliman le

Magnifique, 529–547. Gilles Veinstein, ‘Les préparatifs de la campagne navale franco-
turque de 1552 à travers les ordres du divan ottoman’ , Reveu de l’Occident Musulman et
de la Méditerranée 39 (1985) 35–67. Cf. Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel, 40–42,
114–140.
– 122 –
he raided Muscat in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula

and besieged the island in late September. Then, however, the
Ottoman ships were forced to pull back to Basra to escape
the Portuguese relief fleet, and the admiral fled back to Egypt
with three ships, for which the sultan promptly ordered his
execution. In the long term, this defeat effectively discouraged
the Ottomans from seeking control of the Indian Ocean.239
3. Further, the growing tension on the boundaries with
Iran caused the Ottoman leadership much distress during the
year. The two great powers had most recently fought a war in
1548–49, when, following the revolt and escape of a Safavid
prince, Elkas Mirza, the sultan thought that the time had come
for the final defeat of his strongest enemy in the Middle East,
the Safavid dynasty. His hopes, however, had not been borne
out by subsequent developments; indeed, he only managed, save
from a punitive expedition against Georgia, to seize the fortress
of Van, where he set up another beylerbeyilik.240 Since that time,
in line with the traditional methods, Ottoman politics had
aimed, on the one hand, at luring to the empire tribal leaders
in the frontier zone, which was inhabited by various ethnic and
religious groups (mainly Kurds), and, on the other hand, at
maintaining good relations with the minor states on the border,
including Gilan, Şirvan and Georgia.241 In the year in question,
as mentioned above, the situation at the Georgian border became
more acute. The Ottoman sources describe the reasons for this
in a contradictory manner. The statesman and chronicler Lütfi
239
Salih Özbaran, ‘XVI. Yüzyılda Basra Körfezi Sâhillerinde Osmanlılar: Basra
Beylerbeyliğinin Kuruluşu’ , Tarih Dergisi 25 (1971) 51–73. Idem, ‘Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu, 65–146, particularly 112–128. Cengiz Orhonlu,
‘Hint Kaptanlığı ve Pîrî Reis’ , Belleten 34:134 (1970) 235–254. Casale, The Ottoman
Age of Exploration, 95–98. Soucek, ‘About the Ottoman Age of Exploration’ , 329–331.
240
John R. Walsh, ‘The Revolt of Alqās Mīrzā’ , Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des
Morgenlandes 68 (1976) 61–78. Şahin, Empire and Power, 116–122.
241
About the bottom lines of the eastern policy of the empire, see Murphey, ‘Süleyman’s
Eastern Policy’ , 229–248.
– 123 –
Pasha reports that some Georgian and Safavid nobles were

about to bring the tributes due to the shah, but the beylerbeyi of
Erzurum got wind of it and robbed the money, murdered several
people and captured many Iranian nobles.242 Conversely, the
orders of the divan state that many Georgian nobles were ready
to cooperate with the Porte, subject to an assurance that they
would be allowed to keep their lands and social status. Such a
letter of agreement (ahdname) granting safety of life and property
to a Georgian monarch has survived the perils of history.243
According to the sultan’s orders, the crisis was provoked by the
“heretic” Safavids attacking the cooperating Georgians, whom
the Ottomans had to save. Whatever aroused the hostility, in
the end the shah did indeed gather an army, marched to the
vicinity of Lake Van, raided and destroyed the castle of Ahlat
in August and then pulled back to Erciş. Thereafter, he sent out
his son with many troops, who entrapped and badly defeated
the armies of the beylerbeyi of Erzurum, wounding even the
pasha himself. The Safavid incursion or revenge campaign led
the sultan’s court to accelerate preparations – commenced at the
beginning of the year – for a military campaign against Iran. In
successive fashion, the troops were mobilised and commanded
to different concourses (chiefly in the vicinity of Sivas, Ankara
and Kayseri). In late September, first the grand vizier, and then
the sultan himself, set out for the east. The launching of the
campaign, however, had to be delayed until the following year
due to heavy snow.
In my view, this brief account of events suffices to show
that the Ottoman Empire was burdened beyond its capacities
in 1552. One might even say that the Ottoman leadership had
become utterly perplexed by this point in time (a historian more
Lütfi Paşa, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman. (İstanbul, 1341/1925), 450.

242
İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, 39a, cf. 37a–38b,
243
39b–40a.
– 124 –
elegantly calls it a “crisis of orientation”),244 for which indications

can be seen since as early as the 1530s. Consonant with his
dignity, the “magnificent” sultan sought to achieve the maximum
at all times and on all fronts, but increasingly he encountered
failure. As never before, the events of the said year revealed
the weaknesses of a global policy that had proved incapable of
prioritising among the various fronts and tasks. All in all, in 1552
the Ottomans sought victory in five different arenas (Hungary,
the Mediterranean Sea, the Iranian border, Iraq and Hormuz).
The dissipation of their military and financial resources meant
their original goals could not be achieved in most cases. (And we
have not even mentioned the northern front, where the primary
threat came not so much from the Cossacks or Poles but from
the rise of a new great power, Russia. When the latter conquered
the Khanate of Kazan, the Ottoman court and its Crimean ally
could only watch as the events unfolded.)245
An even more serious problem was the weakening financial
position of the empire, a direct result of its desultory policies.
Not even such an extraordinary great power could afford to
wage so many wars with impunity. The detrimental effects of
the conquests are also clearly reflected in Ottoman documents
stemming from 1552. In connection with the organisation of the
vilayet of Temeşvar, Istanbul and Kara Ahmed Pasha squabbled
over in whose interest the expansion of the empire really lay.
According to the court, expansionism lay chiefly in the interest
of the upper echelon of the army, which quickly turned the policy
to its own benefit. “You know very well,” Ahmed Pasha was told,
244
Subhi Labib,‘The Era of Suleyman the Magnificent: Crisis of Orientation’ , International
Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979) 435–451.
245
On the expansion of the Russian Empire, see Janet Martin, Medieval Russia 980–1584.
(Cambridge, 19962), 351–357. On the beginnings of the Cossack incursions causing
many troubles later on, see Berindei – Veinstein, L’Empire ottoman, 89–119 and Gilles
Veinstein, ‘Prélude au problème cosaque à travers les registres de dommages ottomans
des années 1545–1555’ , Cahiers de Monde russe et sovietique 30:3–4 (1989) 329–362.
– 125 –
“that usually the beylerbeyis divide such newly conquered lands

at their own discretion among their favourites under the title of
sancak, ziamet, and timar or under the title of the rehabilitation
of devastated lands, in order to grant senior offices and prebends
to them. Nevertheless, they do not care about raising enough
money to cover the pay of the garrison troops or the costs of
the armament and other necessities of the castles, and so while
money is flowing to them from the inner provinces, the area does
not start to boom, and instead of profit it produces costs and
losses.”246 This last sentence amounts to clear acknowledgement
of the ending of an era when the borderlands did not only fritter
away money but also made some (mainly from spoils) and the
beginning of a new era in which further expansion would impose
increasing financial burdens on the central treasury – unless
the conquered area were as rich as the aforementioned mining
districts in Upper Hungary. The immediacy of this problem is
shown by the fact that the dispute that occurred in Temeşvar
was repeated during the establishment of the beylerbeyilik of
Cezayir–Medina in Iraq. On August 5, the divan informed
the local finance director (also holding the post of defterdar in
Basra) that the following complaints had been received by the
court: 1. lands being suitable for the has-estates of the sultan
had been assigned in part to sancakbeyis and in part to other
people for a low rent; 2. the latter ones were subsequently taken
by others as tax farms by force, causing enormous damage to
those who had invested in and re-cultivated those lands; 3. some
Ama malumundur ki bu asl yeni açılan yerleri beğlerbeğiler muradları üzere kimisine
246
sancak deyü ve kimisine tımar ve ziamet deyü ve harabesin şenletmek deyü mücerred
istedükleri kimesnelere mansıb ve dirlik sahibi olmağiçün dağıtmağı adet edüb ol diyarun
muhafazasıçün tayin olunan kulun mevacibine ve kılaun levazım ve yarağın[un] harcına
kifayet edecek kadar mal tedarik eylemeğe mukayyed olmamağla muttasıl iç ilden hazine
gidüb memleket dahi şenlenmeyüb israf ve itlafdan gayri menfaatleri yokdur. İstanbul,
Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, 347a–347b. Dávid – Fodor,
“Affairs of State”, 554–556: No. 292.
– 126 –
of the taxes levied under Arab rule were let go, thus reducing
the revenues of the treasury; 4. the holders of the highest offices
(beylerbeyis, sancakbeyis, ağas) granted military offices to their
own people and servants, but still they continued to serve them
(even children are listed on the payroll). As a consequence, the
treasury was depleted, and public services were not performed.247
Although the sultan’s court failed to abandon the wars of
conquests for reasons of power politics and under the pressure
of its own oversized army and state apparatus, there was
evidently a growing awareness of the futility and ever-decreasing
profitability of these wars. In the 1550s the empire was rapidly
drawing near to its financial limits. A money shortage occurred,
and the central administration could only manage by extending
the institution of tax farm, which, in the long run, led to the
depletion of reserves and the over-burdening of the tax-paying
population. The contemporaries as well as later observers blamed
Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha (1544–1553, 1555–1561) for
the introduction of “destructive” (but apparently unavoidable)
measures.248 In this context it is worth noting that these measures
were not unprecedented. The extensive wars of Mehmed II
(1451–1481) could only be financed by imposing heavy taxes
on the peasantry and, to a certain degree, by confiscating
hereditary and foundation estates.249 The enormous costs of the
endless wars in the first decades of Sultan Süleyman’s reign also
247
İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, 395b.
248
It is hardly accidental that during his tenure of office the institution of venality
appeared with governor’s posts. On all this, see M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, ‘Rüstem Paşa
ve Hakkındaki İthamlar’ , Tarih Dergisi 8:11–12 (1955) 11–50. Cf. Klaus Röhrborn,
Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte. (Studien zur Sprache,
Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift “Der Islam”.
Hrsg. von Bertold Spuler. Neue Folge, Band 5.) (Berlin, New York, 1973), 114–115,
119, 126 and Baki Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi (XVI–XVIII. Yüzyıl). (İstanbul,
2003), 36, 38.
249
Heath Lowry, ‘Changes in Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Peasant Taxation: The Case
Study of Radilofo’ , in Anthony Bryer – Heath Lowry (eds.), Continuity and Change
in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society. (Birmingham, Washington, D.C.), 1986,
– 127 –
required the ever fuller exploration of the empire’s resources, to

which we owe the great number of meticulously prepared defters
from this period.250 It is telling that toward the end of his career,
even Celalzade Mustafa, a confidant of Sultan Süleyman and
chief collaborator of his universalist imperial programme, came
to realise the devastating effects of the incessant warfare.251
The real solution would have been to prioritise the wars,
unavoidable for structural reasons, to a certain degree and to
ensure that military action served long-term strategic objectives
(such as tightening control of trade in the Mediterranean). The
Ottoman leadership failed, however, to do this, and by the end
of the century the traditional financial administration system of
the empire collapsed under the unbearable weight of burdens.
One of the key milestones on this road was the multi-front war
23–27, 34. Oktay Özel, ‘Limits of Almighty: Mehmed II’s ‘Land Reform’ Revisited’ ,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 42:2 (1999) 226–246.
250
They were published by the T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü
Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı from the first half of the 1990s onwards; see for
instance, 438 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri [937/1530]. Vols. I–II.
(Ankara, 1993–1994).
251
Şahin, Empire and Power, 127–128. For the beginning of the social unrest and banditry
in the 1550s that led to the so-called celali rebellions, see Gyula Káldy-Nagy, ‘Rural
and Urban Life in the Age of Sultan Suleiman’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae 32:3 (1978) 288–295. – In view of this, I disagree with Rhoads Murphey
and Suraiya Faroqhi, who seem to underestimate the impact of wars and the war-
related activities of the state on Ottoman economy and society in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries; see Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 169–192. Faroqhi, The Ottoman
Empire and the World Around It, 98–110. To expand on this question would go beyond
the scope of this study, and so I refer solely to the fact that taxes collected from the
sultanic hases in the sancak of Buda were increased by 300 per cent in the second half
of the sixteenth century; Klára Hegyi, Török berendezkedés Magyarországon [Ottoman
rule in Hungary]. (História könyvtár. Monográfiák, 7.) (Budapest, 1995), 63. It has
been also pointed out that the wars at the turn of seventeenth century led to a near-
complete destruction of the revenue sources of the province of Buda. Cf. Hegyi, ‘The
Financial Position of the Vilayets in Hungary’ , 77–85. For a new assessment of the
effects of the heavy demands of war, see Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the
Early Modern Ottoman Empire. (Cambridge, 2011).
– 128 –
of 1552, which, seen in this broader context, seems to have been

much less successful than previously thought.252
EPILOGUE: THE ROAD TO SZIGETVÁR
The problems that remained unresolved in Hungary in 1552

accompanied Süleyman until the end of his life. The Ottoman
ruler continued to seek for ways of strengthening and
consolidating his position in Hungary even after he launched
his final Iranian campaign (1553), which led to a compromise
between the two rival Middle Eastern powers (the Peace Treaty
of Amasya, 1555) and even while he dealt with the succession
struggle between his two sons and its consequences (1558–
62) and made renewed (only partially successful) attempts
to strengthen Ottoman positions in the Mediterranean Sea
and the Indian Ocean (the operation to take Bahrein in
1559; the capture of Djerba, 1560; the siege of Malta, 1565,
the occupation of Chios, 1566, etc).253 The apparent guiding
principle of Süleyman’s policy was to push the Habsburgs out
of Transylvania and to return the principality to the heir of the
House of Szapolyai, John Sigismund, which meant that the
Ottoman ruler abandoned the idea of occupying this part of
Hungary for good. To this end, Süleyman made a mixture of
diplomatic and military threats (while his troops in Hungary
252
Gábor Ágoston is of the opinion (see, for instance, ‘The Ottomans: From Frontier
Principality’ , 128) that the Ottoman leaders – in line with the empire’s “grand
strategy” – tried to avoid, as far as possible, waging war simultaneously on more than
one front. Based on the aforesaid, I think this may only apply to the period after the
mid-sixteenth century. Even so, I agree with Ágoston (ibid., 126) that the Ottomans
had reached the limits of their logistical capacities by that time – mainly because they
were unable to properly set the priorities among their military-political tasks.
253
For the major events of the period, see Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, Vol. 4, 586
ff. Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 134–151.
– 129 –
continued to harass and capture Hungarian strongholds).254

On March 7, 1553, Süleyman appointed John Sigismund “King
of Hungary and Transylvania”. His hope was that Hungarians
would now unite in support of the chosen ruler.255 Of course,
this is not what happened, albeit in 1556 John Sigismund
and Queen Isabella were able to return to, and take charge of,
Transylvania. In view of the unresolved territorial issues and the
presence of power ambitions on both sides, there was repeated
armed conflict between John Sigismund and the Habsburg kings
of Hungary (Ferdinand and then, from 1564, Maximilian).256
Neither the unratified Habsburg–Ottoman agreement of 1559
nor the eight-year peace treaty of 1562, which was renewed in
early 1565, could bring an end to the hostilities.257 Moreover,
the Habsburg-Hungarian border defence forces (particularly
254
For an excellent study of this period, see Markus Köhbach, Die Eroberung von
Fülek durch die Osmanen 1554. Eine historisch-quellenkritische Studie zur osmanischen
Expansion im östlichen Mitteleuropa. (Zur Kunde Südosteuropas, II/18.) (Wien, Köln,
Weimar, 1994).
255
İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşvi, Kepeci 210, 311. Cf. Fodor, ‘Das Wilajet von
Temeschwar’ , 28.
256
On the formation of statehood in Transylvania, see János B. Szabó, ‘Ceremonies
Marking the Transfer of Power in the Principality of Transylvania in East European
Context’ , Majestas 11 (2003) 111–160. Teréz Oborni, ‘Between Vienna and
Constantinople: Notes on the Legal Status of the Principality of Transylvania’ , in
Gábor Kármán – Lovro Kunčević (eds.), The European Tributary States of the Ottoman
Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. (The Ottoman Empire and its
Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy. Ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi, Halil İnalcik and
Boğaç Ergene. Vol. 53.) (Leiden, Boston, 2013), 67–89. Károly Kisteleki, ‘Az európai
szuverenitás nézőpontjai és az erdélyi állam [Aspects of European sovereignty and the
Principality of Transylvania]’ , in Veronika Dáné et al. (eds.), Bethlen Erdélye, Erdély
Bethlene. A Bethlen Gábor trónra lépésének 400. évfordulóján rendezett konferencia
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257
Ernst Dieter Petritsch, Regesten der osmanischen Dokumente im österreichischen
Staatsarchiv. Band 1. (1480–1574). (Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs.
Ergänzungsband, 10/1.) (Wien, 1991), 131–156. Köhbach, Die Eroberung von Fülek,
17–82. For the relevant documents, see also Anton C. Schaendlinger (unter Mitarbeit
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(Wien, 1983).
– 130 –
those of the castles of Eger, Szigetvár and Gyula) attacked

and plundered territories held by the Ottomans with growing
audacity.258 In 1565, John Sigismund’s situation became rather
desperate, and so Süleyman had no choice but to lead his troops
in defence of his protégé and with a view to stabilising Ottoman
dominion in Hungary.259
There was much speculation at the time and subsequently
about the factors that led the sick and aged monarch to set out
for Hungary in 1566. Historians often cite the change in the
grand vizieral office (the relatively peaceful Semiz Ali Pasha’s
post was taken up by the more bellicose Sokollu Mehmed), the
delay in the payment of the tribute by the Habsburgs, or the
influence of Nureddinzade, the favoured Halveti sheikh, who
had reminded the sultan of his duty to perform jihad.260 It is
difficult to verify and evaluate these factors, but it is quite possible
that Nureddinzade, in reminding Süleyman of his obligation,
was in fact conveying a growing sense of dissatisfaction among
258
Szakály, Magyar adóztatás, 59–98. Cf. 5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (973/1565–
1566). Vol. I: Özet ve İndeks. Vol. II: Tıpkıbasım. (Ankara, 1994) and Gisela
Procházka-Eisl – Claudia Römer, Osmanische Beamtenschreiben und Privatbriefe
der Zeit Süleymāns des Prächtigen aus dem Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv zu Wien.
(Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse.
Denkschriften, 357. Band) (Wien, 2007), documents relating to Eğri, Sigetvar and
Gula.
259
At their solemn meeting in Belgrade, however, he stated that the capture of Vienna
was his aim; see Ferenc Forgách, Emlékirat Magyarország állapotáról Ferdinánd, János,
Miksa királysága és II. János erdélyi fejedelemsége alatt [Memorandum on the state of
Hungary under the rule of Ferdinand, John, Maximilian and under the Transylvanian
principality of John II], in Humanista történetírók [Humanist historians]. (Budapest,
1977), 851–854.
260
These are well-summarised by Gilles Veinstein, ‘La campagne de Szigetvár et la
mort de Soliman le Magnifique, au-delà des mythes et légendes’ (unpublished
paper, Budapest, April 19, 2011). See also Nicolas Vatin, Ferîdûn Bey, Les plaisants
secrets de la campagne de Szigetvár. Édition, traduction et commentaire des folios 1 à
147 du Nüzhetü-l-esrâri-l-ahbâr der sefer-i Sigetvâr (ms. H 1339 de la Bibliothèque
de Musée de Topkapı Sarayı). (Neue Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
des Morgenlandes, Band 7.), Wien, 2010, 16–23, and Erika Hancz – Fatih Elçil,
‘Excavations and Field Research in Sigetvar in 2009–2011: Focusing on Ottoman-
Turkish Remains’ , International Review of Turkish Studies 2:4 (2012) 77–78.
– 131 –
the troops. Around 1558, the janissaries expressed their anger

at the sultan’s having become a sedentary ruler as follows: “The
padishah is the padishah of Islam. He does not know anything
about anyone by living within four walls. He places all his
confidence in a host of tyrants when proclaiming ‘I have viziers,
everyone has his ağa and they know whose interest is what’.
He (the sultan) is unaware of the condition of the people. …
Why is that so?”261 It seems the ruler was facing a grave crisis of
legitimacy; he needed to prove his valour and worth and restore
his shattered authority. What better could serve this purpose
than a return to the grand programme of the initial period and a
further successful campaign against the “King of Vienna”?
Accordingly, in 1566 Süleyman attempted to revive his
old self, the conquering sultan. Still, instead of a new life,
death awaited him. And rather than conquer Vienna,
he managed “only” to capture a Hungarian border fortress:
Szigetvár – regardless of the importance of the fortress for the
consolidation of Ottoman territory in Hungary. Paradoxically,
therefore, the world conqueror’s final victory and the castle of
Szigetvár, which soon became a sacral centre of the Ottoman
world,262 could even be a symbol of the failure of Ottoman
ambitions for world domination. But they could also be deemed
a symbol of a serious political legacy. With his policy in Hungary
and Transylvania, Süleyman left to his successors a programme
that they could not, or did not wish to, break with and that they
sought time and again to realise. At the focus of this programme
lay a conquest of Vienna (and the defeat of the Habsburgs).263
This was the aim of the Ottoman campaigns of 1593–94,
261
Quoted in Pál Fodor,‘Sultan, Imperial Council, Grand Vizier: Changes in the Ottoman
Ruling Elite and the Formation of the Grand Vizieral telhis’ , Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 47:1–2 (1994) 80–81.
262
On this, see Nicolas Vatin, ‘Un türbe sans maître. Note sur la fondation et la destination
du türbe de Soliman-le-Magnifique à Szigetvár’ , Turcica 37 (2005) 9–42.
263
Fodor, ‘Ungarn und Wien’.
– 132 –
1663–64, and 1683. Despite partial successes (e.g. the repeated

creation of new governorships in Hungary), the project ended
in complete failure: the loss of Hungary. Successor generations
came to view Süleyman as an ideal ruler and his reign as a golden
age. Perhaps this explains why they failed to perceive how, as
prisoners of his legacy, they were squandering the resources of
the empire for wrong ends the same way as their paragon did
during his 45 years of reign.
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INDEX
Abbreviations: B: Bulgarian; Cr: Croatian; G: German; H: Hungarian;
O: Ottoman; R: Rumanian; S: Serbian; Sl: Slovak
Abdulfettah (kadı of Beçe and Temeşvar), 113

Adriatic Sea, 67
Ágoston, Gábor, 12, 30–31
Ahlat, 124
Ahmed Pasha, Kara (second vizier, commander-in-chief ), 106, 108, 112,
114–119, 125
Ahmed Tekelü (court goldsmith), 92
Akkoyunlu federation, 54
Alacahisar (S. Kruševac), 104, 111
Albania, 27
Aldana, Bernardo de, 112
Aleppo, 63
Alexander the Great, 34, 90
Algiers, 69
Ali Pasha, Hadım (governor-general of Buda), 100, 112, 114–115,
117–119
Ali Pasha, Semiz (grand vizier), 131
Anatolia, 32, 62, 64, 77, 108; see also Asia Minor
anka, 42
Ankara, 111, 124
Arabian Peninsula, 123
Asia Minor, 28–29, 32, 92, 105, 112; see also Anatolia
Avlonya, 89
Baghdad, 64, 122

bailo, 56, 78, 80
Balivet, Michel, 44
Basra, 67, 122–123, 126
Bayezid I (Ottoman sultan, 1389–1402), 32, 34
Bayezid II (Ottoman sultan, 1481–1512), 49, 62, 67, 86
Behari (Ottoman poet), 91
Behram (sancakbeyi of Bursa), 108
Belgrade, see Nándorfehérvár
– 162 –
INDEX
Besperim, see Veszprém

Black Sea, 68
Böğürdelen, see Szabács
Bohemia, 53
booty, 29, 35–36, 38, 73, 91
Bosna, see Bosnia
Bosnia, 51–52, 73, 104, 107, 111, 114
Buda, 9, 37, 59, 74, 89, 91, 95, 97–99, 101–102, 104–107, 109, 111–112,
114–119, 128
Buják (O. Buyak), 115
Bulgaria, 27
Burke, Peter, 14–15
Buyak, see Buják
Caffa, 36
Cape of Good Hope, 65
Carpathian Basin, 38
Casale, Giancarlo, 12
Castaldo, Giovanni Battista, 119
Čazma (H. Csázma, O. Zacaşna, fortress), 115
Čazma (river), 115
Celalzade Mustafa (statesman and chronicler), 90, 128
Cem (prince, son of Mehmed II), 62
Central Anatolia, 64
Central Europe, 7, 10–13, 52–55, 57, 71–72, 74–75, 79, 81, 83, 87, 89,
97–99, 114
Černomen (O. Çirmen), 32
Cezayir (in Iraq), 122, 126
Chaldiran, 60–62
Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor, 1519–1566), 20, 58, 60, 70–71, 76,
78–79, 81, 84–86, 90, 92, 97, 100, 121
Chios, 129
Constantine (Emperor of Roman Empire, 306–337), 90
Contarini, Bartolomeo, 56, 63
Contarini, Tomaso, 56, 63
Corsica, 37
Cossack, 108, 114, 125
Crete, 82
– 163 –
Crimea, 36, 107–108, 114, 125

Crimean khan, 107–108, 114
Croatia, 55, 107, 111
Csázma, see Čazma
Danube, 29, 32, 38, 48, 58, 99, 104, 109

Dávid, Géza, 8–9, 20
Diyarbekir, 64, 122
Dobruja, 109
Doria, Andrea, 71
Dregel, see Drégely
Drégely (O. Dregel), 115
Edirne, 99
Egypt, 55, 61, 63, 65, 67–68, 72, 74, 76, 84–85, 123
Elkas Mirza, 123
Elliott, John, 16
Erciş, 124
Estergon, see Esztergom
Esztergom (O. Estergon), 89, 98, 107, 109
Euphrates, 29, 34, 122
Europe and the Ottoman threat
Habsburg–Valois rivalry, 71, 85
League of Cambrai, 49
League of Cognac, 78
papal authority, 71
Faroqhi, Suraiya, 14, 22–23, 128

Felföld, see Felvidék
Felvidék (Felföld, Upper Hungary, today’s Slovakia), 109, 118
Ferdinand I (of Habsburg, King of Hungary, 1526–1564), 60, 68, 78–80,
87, 98, 100, 102–103, 116–118, 130
Ferhad Pasha, 64
Francis I (King of France, 1515–1547), 76, 80, 85, 100
Frangepan, Joannes, 76
French–Ottoman relations, 76, 80, 85, 121
Friar George, see Martinuzzi, George
– 164 –
INDEX
Garmat, see Gyarmat

Gazali, Canberdi (governor-general of Syria), 62–63
Genoa, 32
Georgia, 100, 104, 123–124
Georgius de Hungaria, 36, 44, 47
Gilan, 123
Giovio, Paolo, 90
Goffman, Daniel, 20
Greece, 27, 37, 71
Gritti, Lodovico, 78
guild, 42
Gyarmat (O. Garmat), 115
Gyula (O. Gula), 131
Habsburg Hungary, 107, 118

Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire
Ehrengeschenk (“honourable gift”: yearly tribute), 100, 116
eight-year peace treaty of 1562, 130
Habsburg dominions as target of Ottoman expansion, 79, 81, 86, 92,
97–99, 132
Habsburg–Ottoman rivalry over Transylvania, 97–98, 102–121
Ottoman menace and Habsburg dynastic politics, 60, 76–78
the peace treaty of 1547, 87, 100–101, 116
Hadım Ali Pasha, see Ali Pasha, Hadım
Hasan Pasha (governor-general of Bosnia), 73
Hasan, Taceddin (Safavid envoy), 64
Hatvan, 98
Hayreddin, Barbarossa (pirate chief, grand admiral), 36, 69–70
Hersek (S. Hercegovina), 107, 111
Herzegovina, see Hersek
Holloka, see Hollókő
Hollókő (O. Holloka), 115
Hormuz Island, 122, 125
Hospitallers, see Knights of Rhodes
humanism, 17
Hungarian–Polish personal union, 53
Hungary and the Ottoman Empire
agreement of 1483, 52
– 165 –
defence system and politics against Ottoman expansion

Banate of Krassó, 28
Banate of Macsó, 28
Banate of Srebernik, 52
Banate of Temes, 28
border defence system, 9, 87, 107
building buffer states, 51
concluding peaces or armistices, 52
cooperation in or unification of Central Europe, 53
double line of frontier fortress, 51
frontier castle garrisons, 51, 74
heyduck, 107
hussar, 51
long campaign (1443–44), 49, 63
looking for eastern allies, 54
militia portalis, 51
offensive campaigns in the Balkans, 49
organising or supporting crusades, 49
transformation of the military organization and the frontier
defense, 51
vojnik, 51
Hungary within or beyond the Ottoman “radius of action”, 57
Hunyadi, House of, 53
Hunyadi, János (governor of Hungary), 27, 51
Matthias Corvinus I (King of Hungary, 1458–1490), 51
Ibn Khaldun, 44
Ibn Rushd (Averroës), 17
Ilkhanid Empire, 28
Indian Ocean, 65–67, 81–82, 122–123, 129
Iran, see Safavids
Iraq, 67, 89, 122, 125–126
Isabella ( Jagiellon, wife of John I Szapolyai), 101–102, 130
Isabella I (Queen of Castille, 1474–1504), 68
Islam and other religions
Christianity, 41, 47, 85, 93
Protestantism, see Reformation
Reformation, 16, 84
– 166 –
INDEX
respublica christiana, 21
Christians, 13, 24, 38–44, 56, 58, 68–69, 77, 84–85, 89, 91, 99,
106–107, 111, 117
gyaur, 90
Jews, 85
Muslims, 13, 16–17, 22, 30–31, 39, 41, 44, 46, 55–56, 65, 68–69, 71,
84–85
non-Muslims, 22, 39, 71
Islam in the Ottoman Empire
cami, 47
Euro-Balkan Islam, 41
Halveti, 131
holy shrines of Islam, 65
jihad, 34–35, 45–47, 48, 89–90, 131
dua, 47
farz ayn, 46–47
farz kifaya, 46
five fundamental obligations, 46
gaza, 34–35, 45–46, 48
gaza malı, 35–36
gazi ideology, 46
hacet namazı, 47
ibadet, 46
ila-i kelimetullah, 46
nefir-i am, 46
tazarru, 47
vacib, 46
zimmi, 41
medrese, 43, 45
mosque, 35, 47
şeriat, 46
sheikh, 131
sultanic mosque, 36
Sunni orthodoxy, 41, 46, 85
sunnitisation, 47
Ismail I (Safavid ruler, 1514–1524), 60–65, 75
Istanbul, 8, 19, 40, 49, 56, 59, 62, 64, 66, 69, 71, 75–76, 78–80, 99–101,
116, 125
– 167 –
İstolni Belgrad, see Székesfehérvár

Istvánffy, Nicolaus, 115–116
Italy, 37, 68, 78, 83
İzvornik (S. Zvornik), 104, 111
Jajce (H. Jajca, O. Yayçe), 52

Jerba, 69
John I (Szapolyai, Voivode of Transylvania, King of Hungary, 1526–1540),
77–80, 86, 97
Kara Ahmed Pasha, see Ahmed Pasha, Kara

Kara Yülük (Akkoyunlu ruler, 1402–1435), 54
Karaman, 54, 107, 122
Kayseri, 124
Kazan, 108, 125
Kemalpaşazade (chronicler), 89, 91
Kızıl Irmak, 32
Klis, 111–112
Knights of Rhodes, 62, 68–69
Konya, 32
köpek savaşı, see Safavids and the Ottomans
Kosovo, 32
Köstendil (B. Kyustendil), 109
Kőszeg (G. Güns), 89
Kruševac, see Alacahisar
kul, see Ottoman elites
Kurd, 123
Kyustendil, see Köstendil
Lahsa, 122
Łaski, Hyeronimus, 8, 79
Leo X (pope, 1513–1521), 56
Lepanto, 67
Levant, 68, 76, 85
Libya, 121
Lipova, see Lippa
Lippa (O/R. Lipova), 112
Louis II (King of Hungary, 1516–1526), 77, 93
– 168 –
INDEX
Lütfi Pasha (grand vizier, chronicler), 123

Luttwak, Edward, 30
Macedonia, 27
Maghrib, 69
magistrate, 42
Mamluk, 61, 65–66, 80, 84
Marc Dabik, 61
marcher lords (uç beyis), 29–30
Evrenos, 29
İshakbeyoğlu, 29
Malkoçoğlu, 30
Mihaloğlu, 29
Turahanoğlu, 30
Martinuzzi, George, friar (governor of Transylvania), 97, 101–104, 106
Matthias Corvinus, see Hunyadi
Maximilian I (of Habsburg, King of Hungary, 1564–1576), 130
Mayláth, István, 98
Mecca, 65
Medina, 122, 126
Mediterranean Sea, 125, 129
Mehmed II (Ottoman sultan, 1451–1481), 34, 90–91, 127
Mehmed Pasha, Bıyıklı (governor-general of Diyarbekir), 64
Mehmed Pasha, Sokollu (governor-general of Rumelia, grand vizier), 105,
131
Middle East, 28, 123, 129, see also Near East
Mikhail, Alan, 21–22
Milan, 78
Minio, Marco, 75
Mohács, 11, 51–52, 55, 60, 75, 77, 79, 86, 89–92
Moldavia, 51, 89, 104
voivode of, 102, 107–108, 114, 119
Mongol, 28
Moor, 69
Mora, 109
Morea, see Mora
Mughals, 84
Murad I (Ottoman sultan, 1362–1389), 32
– 169 –
Muscat, 123
Mustafa (finance director of Temeşvar), 113
Mustafa (prince, son of Süleyman I), 105
Mustafa Ali (Ottoman intellectual), 39
Nakhchivan, 89
Nagyvárad, see Várad
Nándorfehérvár (S. Beograd, O. Belgrad[-i Ungurus]), 49, 51, 74, 89
Near East, 11, 34, 54, 68, 72, 76, 82, see also Middle East
Nicholas V (pope, 1447–1455), 27
Niğbolu, see Nikopol
Nikopol (O. Niğbolu), 49, 104, 108
Nógrád (O. Novigrad), 98, 115
North Africa, 20, 67–70
question of suzerainty in, 69–70
Novigrad, see Nógrád
Nureddinzade (Halveti sheikh), 131
Oghuz, 28
Ojtoz (R. Ojtuz) pass, 114
Oradea, see Várad
Oruc (elder of the Barbarossa brothers), 69
Osman I (Ottoman sultan, c. 1288–1324), 29
House of, 29, 38
Osman Pasha (governor-general of Karaman), 107
Ottoman administration
ahdname, 124
akçe, 36, 113–114
appointment diploma, 70
bey, 41–42, 73, 90, 97, 101, 107, 109, 111, 115
beylerbeyi, 37, 103–105, 107, 112, 115, 122–124, 126–127
beylerbeyilik of Basra, 122
beylerbeyilik of Cezayir–Medina, 122, 126
beylerbeyilik of Van, 123
çavuş, 102
defterdar, 113, 126
devşirme, 38
divan, 124, 126, see also imperial council
– 170 –
INDEX
district of Semendire, 104, 109, 111

guruş, 37
has-estate, 126
imperial council, 99, 101, 103–104, 106, 118–119
kadı, 42, 45, 113
liva, 116
nüzül, 104
sancak, 101, 104, 106, 109, 111, 114–115, 122, 126, 128
sancakbeyi, 41, 97, 101, 107–108, 111–112, 114, 126–127
serasker, 107
serdar, 106
sipahi, 99, 109
standard as a symbol of vassalage, 70
vilayet of Temeşvar, 113, 125
vilayet-i Budun, 97
Ottoman army, 86–87, 97, 101, 104, 112
agha (ağa), 37, 127, 132
akıncı, 41, 107, 109, 112
auxiliary troops
cerehor, 109
derbendci, 41
eflak, 41
grass-roots troops, 38
müsellem, 109
martolos, 41
şahinci, 41
voynuk, 41
yürük, 109
court mercenary troops, 85, 112, 122
janissary, 37, 61–62, 69, 85, 104–105, 108, 131
kalyon, 122
marcher lords, see marcher lords
prebend, 37, 73, 126, see also timar, ziamet
silahtar, 108, see also court mercenary troops
timar, timar-estate, 72, 99, 126
ulufeciyan-i yemin, 109, see also court mercenary troops
ziamet, 126
Ottoman elites, 14, 19, 23–24, 31, 38–41, 43, 56, 87
– 171 –
households, 23
kul, 39–41, 126
kul cinsi, 39
pasha, 75, 79, 102, 109, 111–112, 118, 124
Porte, see sultan’s court
Rumelian lobby, 72–73
sultan’s court, 40, 48–49, 52–53, 58, 68, 71–73, 76–81, 83, 92,
101–103, 106–107, 111, 114, 118–119, 122, 124–127
Ottoman political and state ideology
Byzantine heritage of the Ottoman Empire
Byzantine Empire, 28–29
Byzantium, 11, 32, 49, 67
Constantinople, 32, 59, 63, 67, 90
Eastern Roman Empire, see Byzantine Empire
gaza and jihad, see Islam in the Ottoman Empire
hakan, 91
ideology of conquest, 8
ideal ruler, 58, 133
militant sultan, 58
universal sovereignty, 13, 31, 59, 74, 91, 128
mahdi, 91
padishah, 75, 91, 131
sahib-kıran, 91
sultan, 91
sultanü’r-Rum, 32
Ottomanist historiography, 7–24
empire for ages approach, 22
paradigmatic change in, 13
Özü, 114
Palást (Sl. Plašťovce), 115, 118

Palestine, 55
Parker, Geoffrey, 30
Partium, 102
Pavia, 76
Pécs (O. Peçuy), 98
Peçuy, see Pécs
Perényi, Péter, 116
– 172 –
INDEX
Persia, see Safavids

Persian Gulf, 122
Pest, 98
Petrovics, Péter, 97, 101
Philliou, Cristine M., 21–22
Piri Pasha (grand vizier), 64
Piri Reis (cartographer and admiral), 122
Plášťovice, see Palást
Poland, 49, 53, 76
Qatif, 122
sancak of, 122
Radul (Voivode of Wallachia), 76

Red Sea, 65–66, 68, 81, 122
Renaissance, 14, 16–17, 20, 89
Rhodes, 89
Rome, 32, 75, 78, 89
Rum, 32, 39, 62
Rumelia, 72–73, 87, 103–104, 106, 109, 111–112
Russia, 53, 108, 125
Rüstem Pasha (grand vizier), 127
Šabac, see Szabács

Safavids, Safavid Empire and the Ottoman Empire
commercial blockade of Iran, 63–64
confrontations and wars with Iran, 54–55, 60–65, 81–82, 89, 97, 100,
104–105, 123–125, 129
kızılbaş, 54, 61, 63–65
köpek savaşı (scorched earth tactics), 63
peace treaty of Amasya (1555), 129
Safavid dynasty, 55, 61, 64, 82–84, 104, 123–124
shah, 60–65, 91
Ság (O. Şag), 115, 118
Şag, see Ság
Şah Veli bin Şeyh Celal, 62
Saltukname, 44
saracen, 68
– 173 –
Seçen, see Szécsény

Segedin, see Szeged
Selim I (Ottoman sultan, 1512–1520), 5, 55–56, 61–64, 68–69, 73, 84,
86, 91
Selman Reis (commander of the Suez fleet), 66
Semendire (S. Smederevo, H. Szendrő), 104, 109, 111
Semiz Ali Pasha, see Ali Pasha, Semiz
Shibanids, 84
Sigismund of Luxemburg (King of Hungary, 1387–1437), 28, 49
Siklós (O. Şikloş), 98
Şikloş, see Siklós
Silistre, 108–109
simurg, 92–93
Sirem, see Syrmium
Şirvan, 123
Sivas, 124
Slavonia, 111, 115
Smederevo, see Semendire
Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, see Mehmed Pasha, Sokollu
Solmoş, see Solymos
Solnok, see Szolnok
Solymos (O. Solmoş, R. Şoimoş), 112
Spanish-Mauritanian Empire, 68
presidio system, 68
Suez, 66, 122
Süleyman I (Ottoman sultan, 1521–1566), passim
Syria, 55, 62, 85
Syrmium (H. Szerémség, S. Srem, O. Sirem), 28, 41, 107, 109, 111
Szabács (S. Šabac, O. Böğürdelen), 74–75
Szántó, Imre, 115–116
Szécsény (O. Seçen), 115
Szeged (O. Segedin), 107, 109
Székesfehérvár (O. İstolni Belgrad), 89, 98, 107
Szendrő, see Semendire
Szerémség, see Syrmium
Szigetvár, 89, 131–132
Szolnok (O. Solnok), 112–113, 116–117, 119
– 174 –
INDEX
Tabriz, 63–64, 89
Tata, 98
Tatar, 28, 108–109
Tekin, Şinasi, 46
Temesköz (region around Temesvár), 101, 103, 107–108, 112, 115, 119
Temesvár (O. Temeşvar, R. Timişoara), 97, 103–104, 112–114, 126
Temeşvar, see Temesvár
Teuffel, Erasmus von, 115
Teutonic Knights, 53
Tezcan, Baki, 18
Tigris, 122
Timur Lenk, 34
Tisza, 97
Tiszántúl, 97–98
Török, Bálint, 116
Tóth, Mihály, 107
Transdanubia, 109, 115
Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire
Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry over Transylvania, 97–98, 101–119
Ottoman plans to occupy Transylvania, 106–108
Saxons, 106
Székelys (Siculi), 106, 114
treaty of Nyírbátor (1549), 102
Transylvania as Ottoman sancak, 97, 101
Transylvania as vassal principality, 119
treuga, 52
Tripoli, 121
Tunis, 69
Turcoman, 28–29, 31
beyliks, 29
Ulama Bey, 111, 115

Upper Hungary, see Felvidék
Valpó, 98
Valpova, see Valpó
Valpovo, see Valpó
– 175 –
Van
district of, 105
fortress of, 123
Lake, 124
Várad (O. Varat, R. Oradea), 113
Varat, see Várad
Venice, 32, 49, 53, 56, 75, 78, 85
Venice and the Ottoman Empire, 49, 56, 67, 70–71, 75
Signoria, 75, 78
Verőce (Cr. Virovitica), 115
Veszprém (O. Besperim), 111, 115
Vidin, 104, 111
Vienna, 8, 10, 20, 59, 79, 81, 86–87, 89, 97–99, 131–132
Vígh, István, 92–93
Virovitica, see Verőce
Visegrád (O. Vişegrad), 98
Vişegrad, see Visegrád
Vitéz, János, 27
Vučitrin, see Vulçitrin
Vulçitrin (S. Vučitrin), 111
Wallachia, 51, 76, 99, 104

voivode of, 99, 102, 104–105, 108, 114
Western Anatolia, see Asia Minor
Western Europe, 16, 38, 57
Ximénez de Cisneros (cardinal), 68
Yahya (tutor of prince Mustafa), 105

Yahyapaşaoğlu family, 73
Yemen, 66
Zacaşna, see Čazma

Zagreb, 107, 115
Zsámboki, János, 117
Zvornik, see İzvornik
– 176 –

This book seeks to understand why the Ottomaan
OF EMPIRE
Empire was constantly at war, why it persistentlyy
attacked Hungary for more than a hundred yearss
and why Ottoman leadership regarded Hungaryy,
or more broadly, Central Europe as the mostt The Ottomans in Central Europe –
important of its frontlines in the early sixteenthh a Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy
century. The study’s primary aim is to offer a moree (–)
realistic picture of the role of the Hungarian//
Central European frontier in Ottoman politico--
military planning. In doing so, the book attemptss PÁL FODOR
to show how the conflict in this region affected thee
fate of the Ottoman Empire in the long run and howw
a series of erroneous decisions on the part of thee
Ottoman court led to the failure of its universalistt
imperial programme. In addition, the authorr
challenges some trends in recent historiography off
the Ottoman Empire that go too far in entanglingg
Ottoman and European history.
PÁL FODOR

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THE UNBEARABLE WEIGHT

THE UNBEARABLE WEIGHT OF EMPIRE

THE OTTOMANS IN CENTRAL EUROPE –

Research Centre for the Humanities,

First edition: 2015

All rights reserved. No part of this publication can be reproduced,

Published by the Research Centre for the Humanities

On account of their particular situation, Hungarian Ottomanists

and Vienna in the Ottoman ideology of conquest).2 The first

and political aspirations of the Ottoman Empire in the 1520s.7

the influence of world political developments on the Ottoman

The first consideration relates to the nature and operative

Pál Fodor, ‘Byzantine Legacies in Ottoman Identity’ , forthcoming.

are often presented as mere secondary factors in discussions of

or Central European frontline in Ottoman politico-military

has been seized on everywhere as a seemingly useful means for

they view as corresponding to European ones. In doing so – and

point is made by Baki Tezcan),31 then how would one explain

and non-essential information. Historians with at least some

Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı Târihine Âid Belgeler – Telhîsler (1597–1607). (İstanbul,

idealisation “can lead … to historical constructions which have

warfare and diplomacy (closely connected as they are) as well

and the empire’s foreign policy decisions often emerged from

the state.46 All this was of enormous advantage to the Ottoman

The unreliable nature of the renegades (Christians) who became Ottomans is

emphasised by Tobias P. Graf, ‘Of Half-Lives and Double-Lives: “Renegades” in the

THE CONQUEST OF HUNGARY

On behalf of János Hunyadi, governor of Hungary, his chan­

Sándor V. Kovács (publ.), Magyar humanisták levelei, XV–XVI. század [Letters

Hunyadi’s chancellor had a good knowledge of Hungarian

Anatoliennes Georges-Dumézil d’Istanbul. (Varia Turcica, XXXIII.) (Paris, Montréal,

The tribe led by Osman (ca. 1288–1324) was not alone in

effective than scholars previously thought). Idem, ‘Anatolia, 1300–1451’ , in Kate

(latterly Turahanoğlu) and Malkoçoğlu families.52 And even

and explaining all their policy measures, for such a strategy

in Anatolia, and 4. the encirclement and gradual destruction of

Euphrates, which tallies with the main territory of the Eastern

Acquisition of booty and territory

Though it has been stated that booty played only a “localized

The importance of booty-making

The chapter on jihad in a mid-fourteenth century work

sultanic mosques were built after 1566 when the sultans no

shores of Italy and Corsica.71 Fifth, the beylerbeyi of Buda was

Though tightly connected to the previous motive, this one is worth

As noted above, at first broad social strata were interested in the

(kul in Turkish) that was loyal to the Ottoman House.75 A

these men would constitute the basis of despotism as faithful

the Christians, but to involve as many as possible in warfare, the

in both religious communities, and a general reverence of sacred

Domestic stabilising function of the campaigns

long-needed public works. Several welfare institutions (charity

Incessant victories over the Christians and the unstoppable

of fifteenth-century Ottoman society. The spectacular successes

legend of the “golden apple”) largely contributed to reinforcing

There are recurrent disputes in Ottoman scholarly literature

conception did not differ in essentially from that of classic Sunni

peculiarity is that from the mid–sixteenth century we see a

Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.–17. Yüzyıllar). (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,

they have been ordered to do so by their law.”98 It is wrong to pit

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND HUNGARY:

THE OTTOMANS IN CENTRAL EUROPE – 

they view as corresponding to European ones. In doing so – and

Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı Târihine Âid Belgeler – Telhîsler (1597–1607). (İstanbul,

On behalf of János Hunyadi, governor of Hungary, his chan

Böğürdelen.161 Still, it seems likely that even at the time of