The Miscief Rule
The Miscief Rule
The Miscief Rule
The Mischief Rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in
order to discover Parliament’s intention.
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the
golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent.
It can be argued that this undermines Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it
takes law-making decisions away from the legislature.
Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary sources, such as committee
reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding statutes.
This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule
cannot be applied but associated problem is that the fact that this rule helps achieve is
that the use of this rule is limited due to Parliamentary intent.
This modern use of the mischief rule ought to be understood as one of the components
of what is characterized as the “modern” method of statutory construction, rather than
a stand-alone rule serving, as an alternative to the methods of construction proposed by
the plain meaning rule and the golden rule.
This is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned.
It is often referred to as the “rule in Heydon’s Case”. This very important case reported
by Lord Coke and decided by the Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid
down the following rules:
That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered
–
1) What was the common law before the passing of the Act?
2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of
the Commonwealth”.
4) The true reasons for the remedy.
And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
The rule is also known as the rule of Purposive Construction.
Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar; AIR 1955 SC 661.
The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business of
manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines.
Its registered head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar
in the district of 24 – Perganas in West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the
Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered number is S.L. 683A. Its products
have extensive sales throughout the Union of India and abroad. The goods are
dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by the appellant
company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither any agent or manager in Bihar
nor any office, godown or laboratory in that State. On the 24th October, 1951 the
Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant
company which concluded as follows:
“Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar
Sales Tax Act. Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar
Treasury at an early date under intimation to this Department”.
The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by
the appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner
mentioned in its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar. This was done by construing
article 286 whose interpretation came into question and the meaning granted to it in the
case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd; [1995] QB 88; was
overruled. It raises a question of construction of article 286 of the Constitution. It was
decided that Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases
that take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal
and void.
The Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express
terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be
declared wholly ultra vires and void. Until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the
State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-state dealers in
respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or
purchases for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in
this Court and in the court below. Bhagwati, J. had agreed to the above interpretation.
RMDC v Union of India; AIR 1957 SC
The definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Prize competition act 1955,
was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no substantive skill is
involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required were exempt
from the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Act. Hence, in the
aforementioned case, the Supreme Court has applied the Heydon’s Rule in order to
suppress the mischief was intended to be remedied, as against the literal rule which
could have covered prize competitions where no substantial degree of skill was required
for success.
MacMillan v. Dent; 1907
Glaxo Laboratories v. Presiding Officer; AIR 1984 SC
NC Singhal v. UOI; AIR 1980 SC